

**RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT  
AND URBAN POLICY IN GREECE  
THE CASE OF GREATER THESSALONIKI**

**ATHINA YIANNAKOU**

**A Thesis  
submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
at the London School of Economics  
University of London**

**April 1993**

UMI Number: U056071

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U056071

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against  
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESSES



F

7063

x210183623

*Στους γονείς μου  
με αγάπη και ευγνωμοσύνη*

*To my parents  
with love and gratitude*



## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis surveys the interactions between residential land development and urban policy in Greece, with special reference to the case of Greater Thessaloniki providing an understanding of the contradictions in urban policy during the period 1974-89. The starting point is a speculation that institutional attempts to reform urban policy and planning throughout the period 1974-89 remained largely inactive. We hold that this inefficiency is an outcome of a compound political, economic and institutional process linked to the characteristics of residential land development. Main emphasis is paid on: the role of land policy in determining the modern forms of landownership, the impacts of a widespread small landownership upon the pattern of residential development, and, finally, the way politics and ideology are enmeshed in policies related to the residential development process.

From a theoretical standpoint it is argued that the analysis of land development phenomena and the attempts to manage them should ~~link~~ link the traditional distinctions between the analysis of land development and policy analysis. This interdisciplinary approach should also embrace an understanding of structural influences, whether economic political or institutional, with individual strategies, whether of a specific agent or the final investor in - or consumer of - land.

The research is largely based on a historical analysis of state land policy implemented throughout the years 1917 up to contemporary periods. Special emphasis is given to the role of land allocation programmes, which were implemented for the refugee rehabilitation in inter-war years and created a great legacy in land policy. A national account of this policy is provided and the formulation of the first town planning machinery is discussed. The problems and contradictions in urban policy formulation during 1974-89 are examined against the actual institutional practice. A detailed account of state land policy and its repercussions on the structure of urban landed property and the residential development process in Greater Thessaloniki is provided examining more closely the nature and the problems of urban policy and planning in Greater Thessaloniki.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Professor Derek Diamond for his constant encouragement and valuable help at every stage of this long process of writing a thesis. His generous and kind support, his enormous experience, and his discreet supervision were the main impetus for me to complete this thesis.

I would like to acknowledge the Greek State Scholarship Foundation, who granted me with a scholarship that made it possible to finance my studies at the London School of Economics. Special thanks are also due to the Central Research Fund of the University of London, the London School of Economics and the Schilitzi Foundation who granted me with financial support at specific stages of the research.

I am deeply grateful to Lefteris Tsoulouvis, for his valuable comments and practical help on parts of this work. The resourceful and continuous debate we had over the years on various aspects of Greek urban development and planning has deeply affected my work. Many of the ideas in this research were also influenced by the stimulating discussions with my sister Tasia Yiannakou-Psaltopoulou. Although coming from the different discipline of medicine, her aspects on Greek social problems have affected my way of thinking. Special thanks are also due to my friend Orly Gilat for her comments in parts of the thesis and our brainstorming correspondence on planning. Mark Goodwin and Michael Hebbert were kind to read early drafts and offer valuable comments.

During the course of the research there were many officers in various government and local government departments who helped me a lot but it is not possible to refer to them separately. However, I would like to acknowledge the prompt assistance of Spiros Tsovras, architect of the Settlement Department of Thessaloniki, who also initiated me in the complexities of the Greek Planning Law.

The writing of this thesis offered me the chance to meet Wendy Hall, who was the first to correct my English in drafts of this work. I am indebted to her for bringing me also closer to a language that is not my mother tongue. I want also to thank Andy Tsoutsouloupoulou for correcting a few parts. My friend Maria Panteki

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	iv
LIST OF TABLES, MAPS, DIAGRAMS AND FIGURES .....	vii
ABBREVIATIONS .....	xi
 CHAPTER 1	
INTRODUCTION: SETTING OUT THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....	1
1.1. The scene of the study: Setting out the research questions .....	1
1.2. Conceptual and Methodological Problems .....	5
1.3. Theoretical approaches to the study: a brief discussion.....	8
1.3.1. Residential land development and public policy: linking the traditional distinctions.....	8
1.3.2. Greek literature: Contributions and omissions.....	11
1.4. Structure of the thesis.....	14
1.5. Notes for chapter 1 .....	16
 CHAPTER 2	
STATE INTERVENTION IN LAND ALLOCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE HOUSING SECTOR: A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.....	20
2.1. The consolidation of a system of small land-holding in the inter-war years...	21
2.1.1. The land question before the Agrarian Reform.....	21
2.1.2. The Rise of Middle Classes and the 1917 Agrarian Reform.....	23
2.1.3. The Refugee Rehabilitation Programme: establishing new relations over land.....	25
2.2. The first town planning legislation .....	30
2.2.1. Attitudes on town planning before the 1923 Act.....	32
2.2.2. The 1923 Town Planning Act.....	34
2.2.3. Town Planning legislation: problems and contradictions .....	36
2.2.4. The 1929 Property Law .....	38
2.3. Post-war housing development.....	40
2.3.1. The growth and decline of the housing sector .....	41
2.3.2. The role of the housing sector and its links to the family economy.....	44
2.3.3. Forms of housing development .....	47
2.4. Concluding Remarks .....	51
2.5. Notes for chapter 2 .....	53
 CHAPTER 3	
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO LAND DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF A PLANNING REFORM. ....	58
3.1. Urban land allocation: Protective versus legitimisation policies.....	59

3.1.1. Protection of agricultural land and public landed property .....	60
3.1.2. Policies on unauthorised housebuilding .....	63
3.1.3. Inner-city development and residential policy .....	69
3.2. 1974-81: Institutional changes and their limitations.....	72
3.2.1. The Decrees on "Active Planning" and on "Master Plans" .....	73
3.2.2. 1974-79: a widely disputed institutional modernisation .....	75
3.2.3. 1979-81: The introduction and suspension of a Planning Act .....	77
3.3. 1981-1989: New reforms and old contradictions.....	80
3.3.1. The 1983 Planning Act .....	81
3.3.2. EPA: A Programme for Urban Restructuring .....	86
3.3.3. Other urban policy reforms: weaknesses in restructuring the residential sector.....	90
3.4. Concluding Remarks .....	93
3.5. Notes for chapter 3 .....	95
 <b>CHAPTER 4</b>	
<b>LAND POLICY IN GREATER THESSALONIKI :</b>	
<b>A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT .....</b>	<b>99</b>
4.1. The Urban Rehabilitation Programme in Greater Thessaloniki:	
consolidating small urban land holding .....	102
4.1.1. An account of the Urban Rehabilitation Programme.....	103
4.1.2. Basic features of the Urban Rehabilitation Programme .....	111
4.2. The Rural Rehabilitation Programme in Greater Thessaloniki:	
consolidating small land holding in the urban periphery.....	115
4.2.1. An account of the Rural Rehabilitation Programme.....	116
4.2.2. Basic features of the Rural Rehabilitation Programme.....	121
4.3. Other agents and forms of land allocation .....	126
4.3.1. Exchangeable property.....	127
4.3.2. The role of building co-operatives .....	130
4.4. Concluding Remarks .....	132
4.5. Notes for chapter 4.....	134
 <b>CHAPTER 5</b>	
<b>LAND FRAGMENTATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN</b>	
<b>GREATER THESSALONIKI: A CASE STUDY .....</b>	<b>137</b>
5.0. The character of the selected area .....	138
5.1. Conversions from rural to urban land and the legacy of the land allocation	
programmes .....	141
5.1.1. The rural allotment.....	141
5.1.2. The "settlement" and the first town plan.....	144
5.1.3. Land supply in peripheral rural land at a period of high demand .....	148
5.1.4. Contemporary land structure.....	153
5.2. Appropriations of municipal land .....	156
5.2.1. Appropriations before 1970 .....	158
5.2.2. Appropriations after 1970 .....	163
5.3. Residential development patterns and links to EPA plans .....	166
5.4. The features of the development process.....	173
5.4.1. The growth of the housing sector and the operation of the <i>antiparohi</i> market .....	174

5.4.2. Contemporary characteristics of the developing process and the organisation of the developing industry .....	180
5.5. Concluding Remarks .....	184
5.6. Notes for chapter 5 .....	185
<b>CHAPTER 6</b>	
<b>URBAN POLICY IN GREATER THESSALONIKI: PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF AN OPEN ISSUE.....</b>	<b>189</b>
6.1. Development-without-planning and the legacy of two plans.....	190
6.1.1. From an eclectic town plan to the layout-plans .....	190
6.1.2. The 1966 Master Plan: From the layout plans to strategic planning (?) .....	197
6.2. 1974-1981: A self-perpetuating discussion on a never- implemented reform .....	201
6.3. 1981-89: New Plans for old problems.....	208
6.4. Whatever happened to Strategic Planning (?).....	217
6.4.1. The 1985 Development Plan and the establishment of the Planning Organisation of Thessaloniki .....	217
6.4.2. Zone of Development Control: the deadlock of land-use planning.....	222
6.5. Concluding Remarks .....	225
6.6. Notes for chapter 6 .....	227
<b>CHAPTER 7</b>	
<b>CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .....</b>	<b>231</b>
7.1. The theoretical standpoint.....	231
7.2. A summary of the main findings.....	233
7.3. Future research questions .....	239
7.4. Future policy considerations : an epilogue .....	242
7.5. Notes for chapter 7 .....	245
APPENDIX A: DETAILS ON REFUGEE REHABILITATION .....	246
APPENDIX B : BUILDING ACTIVITY IN GREECE AND IN GREATER THESSALONIKI.....	248
APPENDIX C: THE PROGRESS OF EPA NATIONALLY AND IN GREATER THESSALONIKI .....	252
APPENDIX D: POPULATION TRENDS OF GREATER THESSALONIKI .....	261
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	263

## **LIST OF TABLES, MAPS, DIAGRAMS AND FIGURES**

### **TABLES**

- 2.1. Area expropriated for the Agrarian Reform in the period 1922-38
- 2.2. Land assigned to EAP until 1.1.1929
- 2.3. Type of land tenure disposed for the Urban Rehabilitation Programme until 3-6-1932
- 2.4. Dwelling output in the period 1954-89
- 2.5. Gross Domestic Asset Formation (by branch of industry)
- 3.1. Authorisations of illegal building
- 3.2. Unauthorised buildings
- 3.3. Area outside the authorised town plan in different regions
- 3.4. Number of applications of planning cases in suspension by 31/ 1/ 1982
- 3.5. The progress of EPA in the period 1984-86
- 3.6. Land released by EPA by 1990
- 3.7. Topographic Implementation Projects (PE), until 1990
- 3.8. First residence co-operatives
- 3.9. Second residence co-operatives
- 4.1. Composition of Thessaloniki's population before the refugee inflow
- 4.2. Distribution of families in the Rehabilitation Programmes in GT and PT
- 4.3. Land disposed under the jurisdiction of EAP, MSW and building co-operatives for URP
- 4.4. Distribution of URP per area of GT
- 4.5. Number of families settled by URP in different periods
- 4.6. The progress of URP during 1965-84
- 4.7. Distribution of plots per family in the 1965-1984 URP
- 4.8. The situation of land owned by MSW in the years 1981-84
- 4.9. Number of families per type of rehabilitation
- 4.10. Distribution of the settled families per community
- 4.11. The Rural Rehabilitation Programme and the distribution of land per "Farm"
- 4.12. A detailed account of the allocation policy in Polichni and Rodohori
- 4.13. The implementation of RRP over time
- 4.14. The average size of the allocated landed property in the different areas
- 4.15. Average size of farming land in the allocation areas

- 4.16. Number of distributed allotments per family
- 4.17. The situation of exchangeable property in Central Macedonia, 1979
- 4.18. Land allocation to refugee building co-operatives
- 5.1. Population change of Polichni and GT, 1940-1991
- 5.2. Land fragmentation at the time of allocation in Polichni
- 5.3. Distribution of holding-size and farm-size in the initial allocation
- 5.4. Structure of landed property in the "Settlement" by 1955
- 5.5. Distribution of landed property in the "Settlement"
- 5.6. Distribution of landed property in the complementary allocation in the "Settlement", 1965.
- 5.7. Transfers until the mid-1950s
- 5.8. Structure of landed property after its transfer to inheritors
- 5.9. Size of holdings before and after their transfer to inheritors
- 5.10. Size of holdings per allotment after the transfer to inheritors
- 5.11. Structure of landed property in the areas of EPA plans
- 5.12. Owners per plot in EPA1 and EPA2
- 5.13. The situation of co-ownership per analytical category of plot-size in EPA2
- 5.14. Multi-ownership in EPA1
- 5.15. Estimated investment in land in EPA1
- 5.16. Municipal land as allocated in 1953
- 5.17. Municipal land by category of its situation
- 5.18. Distribution of plot-size in the appropriated land
- 5.19. Distribution of plot-size by analytical categories
- 5.20. Changes in the appropriated land during 1970-84
- 5.21. Years of issuing the final contracts
- 5.22. Distribution of plot-size in land appropriated after 1970
- 5.23. Structure of landed property in EPA3, 1989
- 5.24. Co-ownership in EPA3
- 5.25. Number of floors, 1970
- 5.26. Illegally built-up houses as declared in 1983
- 5.27. Construction of new dwellings in Polichni and GT
- 5.28. Development in the EPA areas in 1984
- 5.29. Housing tenure in the different zones of Polichni
- 5.30. Built-up area inside and outside the plan before 1984
- 5.31. Land proposed for expropriation in EPA1
- 5.32. MLD and occupied MLD in EPA
- 5.33. Dwelling output in the period 1963-1989
- 5.34. Distribution of new buildings per number of floors

- 5.35. Multi-storey building output per developer (an estimate)
- 5.36. Housing tenure in 1979 and 1989
- 5.37. Types of firms involved in housebuilding
- 6.1. Area incorporated into the town plan before EPA
- 6.2. Number of Decrees concerning extensions of the town plan in GT
- 6.3. Average area of reference of each Decree and Plot Arrangement Act
- 6.4. Plans prepared on the basis of the 947 Planning Act
- 6.5. Densely built-up area outside the plan
- 6.6. The programme of EPA per large zones of GT
- 6.7. Area incorporated in the town plan per period
- 6.8. Area with a town plan before and after EPA per large zones of GT
- 6.9. The progress of EPA in the Wider Area of Thessaloniki in 1989
- 6.10. Land released all over the Wider Area of Thessaloniki in the period 1986-89
- A.1. Number of refugees allocated in the different regions
- A.2. Rural Settlements and houses built by EAP
- A.3. Assets spent by EAP (until 1.1.1929), in sterlings
- A.4. Houses built by EAP for the needs of urban rehabilitation (until 1/1/1929).
- A.5. Land used for the needs of Rural Rehabilitation in Macedonia
- B1. Building activity in Greece 1961-89
- B.2. Building Activity in GT, 1961-1989
- B.3. Housing tenure in six European Countries
- B.4. Housing tenure in the different areas of Greece
- B.5. Ways of acquiring the self-owned dwellings in GT (%)
- B.6. The structure construction firms in Greater Thessaloniki
- C.1. Number of buildings declared as unauthorised by the proceedings of the 1983 Planning Act
- C.2. Approved and under study GPS in 1990
- C.3. Land released by EPA by 1990 (PME in settlements > 2,000 inhabitants)
- C.4. Area released in the Programme of Resort Residence, 1990
- C.5. Topographic Implementation Projects (PE), until 1990
- C.6. Densely built-up area outside the plan before EPA per Municipality of GT
- C.7. Planned area before and after EPA in GT
- C.8. Illegal buildings inside and outside the plan as declared by the proceedings of the 1983 Planning Act
- D.1. Population in 1920 and 1928
- D.2. Population change of GT 1940-91 per Municipality / Community
- D.3. Population change 1940-91 (%)



## MAPS

- 4.1. Greater Thessaloniki (area inside the plan)
- 4.2. Refugee Settlements in the Province of Thessaloniki (RSTH area)
- 4.3. Land allocated to refugees by the Refugee Rehabilitation Programmes (including land allocated to building co-operatives)
- 4.4. A historical account of the structure of landed property in Kalamaria
- 4.5. The distribution of exchangeable landed property in Greater Thessaloniki in 1966
- 5.1. The "Farm of Polichni" and the gradual land allocations
- 5.2. The town plan of the "Settlement of Polichni"
- 5.3. Land fragmentation at the edge of the town plan
- 5.4. The distribution of scattered municipal land
- 5.5. The gradual extensions of the town plan in Polichni
- 6.1. Hebrard's Plan
- 6.2. The gradual extensions of the town plan in GT until 1980
- 6.3. The 1966 Master Plan (HMTH)
- 6.4. Proposed extension of the town plan by HMTH
- 6.5. The structure of landed property in the area between GT and Thermi
- 6.6. Extension of the town plan by EPA until 1989
- 6.7. The 1985 Regulatory Plan
- 6.8. Zone of Development Control (proposal by OTH)

## DIAGRAMS

1. Trends in new dwellings construction, 1961-89
2. Size of holdings before and after their transfer to inheritors
3. Land fragmentation in the area inside the plan, Polichni

## FIGURES

1. Family income strategy
2. A schematic picture of *antiparohi*

## **ABBREVIATIONS\***

AFS	: American Farm School
DAP	: Department of Public Exchangeable Property
DC	: Development Corporation
DEPOS	: Public Corporation of Planning and Housing
EAP	: Refugee Rehabilitation Committee
EKTE	: National Mortgage Bank of Bank
EPA	: Operation of Urban Restructuring
ESYE	: National Statistical Service of Greece
GPS	: Structure Plan
GT	: Greater Thessaloniki
HMTH	: The 1966 Master Plan of Thessaloniki
KED	: Corporation of Public and Real-Estate Property
KEPE	: Centre of Planning and Economic Research
LAR	: Land Allocation Records
LDL	: Land Development Levy
LRR	: Land Registry Records
MA	: Ministry of Agriculture
MLD	: Municipal Land with Development Potential
MSW	: Ministry of Social Welfare
OEK	: Organisation of Working-Class Housing
OTH	: Planning Organisation of Thessaloniki
PASOK	: Panhellenic Socialist Party
PE	: Topographic Implementation of a Plan
PME	: Urban Plan for Expansion
PT	: Province of Thessaloniki
RML	: Records of Municipal Land
RRP	: Rural Rehabilitation Programme
RSTH	: The 1985 Regulatory Plan of Thessaloniki
SADAS	: Association of Greek Architects
TEE	: Technical Chamber of Greece
TEE-TKM	: Technical Chamber of Greece - Division of Central Macedonia
TPR	: Transferable Plot-Ratio

---

\* Generally accepted abbreviations are used with their Greek initials

<b>URP</b>	<b>: Urban Rehabilitation Programme</b>
<b>YHOP</b>	<b>: Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and Environment</b>
<b>YPEHODE</b>	<b>: Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works</b>
<b>ZAA</b>	<b>: Zone of Urban Land Re-distribution</b>
<b>ZEK</b>	<b>: Zone of Special Incentives</b>
<b>ZEP</b>	<b>: Zone of Active Planning</b>
<b>ZKOD</b>	<b>: Zone of Building Regulations</b>
<b>ZOE</b>	<b>: Zone of Development Control</b>

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION: SETTING OUT THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

---

The present thesis examines the interactions between residential land development and urban policy in Greece, with special reference to the case of Greater Thessaloniki. On the basis of a historical analysis of land policy and its repercussions on the residential development process, we attempt here to provide an understanding of the problems and contradictions inherent in urban policy making, in the years 1974-1989. Special attention is devoted to the way land policy was implemented after 1917 in Greater Thessaloniki and enmeshed in the structure of land-ownership, the development process and the attempts to manage it.

#### **1.1. The scene of the study: Setting out the research questions**

The restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 marked a new period in government policy, which is considered to have lasted for almost 15 years, until the change of government in 1989<sup>1</sup>. During the first part of this period<sup>2</sup>, and in particular up to 1977, the term "modernisation" entered the agenda of public policy. New legislation was introduced, in an attempt to modernise public policy and, hence, reorganise state intervention in social and economic development<sup>3</sup>. Urban policy was no exception. The mounting urban problems of the time drew special attention to the agenda of public debate. Uncontrolled urban expansion, continuing land fragmentation, unauthorised building, dense inner-city development and a degrading urban environment, were among the most popular issues in this debate. The lack of a contemporary planning machinery and a statutory framework, which would allow for the implementation of new forms of urban policy, were widely considered as the main cause of these problems.

The government intention to reform urban policy was initially stated in the 1975 Constitution. It was the first time that Greek Constitution made special reference to regional and urban planning matters and to the role of the state:

*"... the country's regional restructuring as well as the development and planning of all its towns and settlements are under the responsibility and the control of the State with the purpose to secure their function and development and to ensure the best possible living conditions of their inhabitants"*<sup>4</sup>.

On the grounds of the new Constitution, and its approach to spatial and environmental issues, new legislation was introduced, aiming at creating a contemporary framework for urban policy. The first attempts seemed to be partial and cautious. However, in 1979 a new Planning Act, aiming at regulating all new residential development, was endorsed. This Act was to become one of the most disputed pieces of legislation of its time. The government presented it as the "institutional milieu" on the basis of which modern forms of urban policy would gradually allow,

*"... the revival and renewal of problem residential areas and mainly the creation of new ones in such a way that would ensure the best possible living conditions"*<sup>5</sup>.

The new Planning Act was also a chance in which the opposition set out its own approach to the problems of urban development and expansion as well as of urban planning. Summarising the available criticism, and the dominant ideologies of this period, the socialist opposition argued that the new Act:

*"... does not give any answer to the real problems, that is the social needs for residential development"*<sup>6</sup>,

meaning by the latter, the housing needs and the dense inner city development. Furthermore, the communist opposition argued that this Act would allow,

*"... large firms to control development, redevelopment and trading of whole residential areas"*<sup>7</sup>.

By the end of the 1970s, it was realised that all new legislation remained inactive, whereas the so-much debated 1979 Planning Act was even officially put in suspension soon after its endorsement. Moreover, the various arguments, which suggested that this policy change reflected and was necessitated by a restructuring of the housing production proved to be a rather theoretical construction with very little empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the 1970s ended with a consensus, leading to

a peculiar optimism on the subject: the need of a new planning machinery, and a reform in urban policy, were recognised by all agents, even where motivations might have been different. All that was needed, was an adequate institutional framework, and above all, a "political will and intention", which would promote these changes and put them into practice<sup>8</sup>.

From 1981 onwards and under the influence of such approaches and ideologies, the new socialist government passed a new legislation. "Democratisation" replaced "modernisation", the target of institutional change in the 1970s. This new target vaguely meant that policy change should aim primarily at ensuring democratic institutions, and open the way of public participation to decision-making<sup>9</sup>. The major piece of new legislation of this period was the 1983 Planning Act. Designed on the lines of the 1979 Act, this Act aimed primarily at sorting out the urgent planning needs of the already built-up areas outside the official plans. It also provided a complete planning framework for all new residential development. This framework was once more presented as the point of departure from which urban development and planning problems would be sorted out. It was argued that the new Act was a flexible piece of legislation, which:

*"... can be applied in all urgent cases, such as the planning needs of illegally built-up areas, the renewal and upgrading of residential areas and the implementation of a public housing policy"*<sup>10</sup>.

A nation-wide programme, under the impressive title "Operation of Urban Restructuring" (EPA), accompanied the endorsement of the new Planning Act. The Programme included the designation of new plans for areas built-up without a plan, as well as, the review of existing plans. It concerned 272 settlements of more than 2000 inhabitants, along with the two big urban agglomerations, Greater Athens and Thessaloniki. In a letter to planners and architects, A.Tritsis, then Minister of Spatial Planning and Environment (YHOP), stated that EPA:

*"... is not an attempt to provide simply a layout plan. Among its aims are: land policy implementation, a dynamic housing policy, protection of seashore and public land , creation of a land registry for every city, allocation of the necessary space for industrial and social activities, protection of the cities from natural disasters, and finally local government reorganisation"*<sup>11</sup>.

Practically, the programme was widely accepted by all those involved in it, namely, local councils, professionals and the inhabitants. Even the criticism from the

opposition parties was rather subdued. It was believed that the new Act together with EPA would rationalise urban expansion, and ease all tensions around it. It was also believed that the new institutional machinery could revive inner cities, and contribute to the solution of their mounting problems.

However, by the mid-1980s, when a number of changes had already been introduced to remedy the objectives of the 1983 Planning Act and EPA, it became evident that, despite the growing body of new legislation, one could hardly claim the implementation of an urban policy essentially different from which had prevailed hitherto in Greece. Whereas EPA continued after the 1984 deadline, it was gradually restricted to a statutory framework for the designation of layout plans of the already expanded areas, as well as, the official release of new land for development.

By the end of the 1980s, all other objectives, such as, the promotion of new forms of development in the urban fringe, the revival of a degrading urban environment, the implementation of a new land and housing policy, were even hardly remembered. On the contrary, although land release was apparently accelerated in the late 1980s, illegal building, unauthorised land fragmentation, and therefore "expansion-without-plan", remained a particular form of residential development. Whereas, by the end of the 1970s, it was believed that illegal building and non-planned urban expansion were, either a remnant of the past, or a result of an "urbanisation-without-plan" public policy, a decade later one was sceptical about such arguments. Afterall, EPA officially revealed that this type of urban expansion did not concern only the big urban centres, as it was widely believed in previous years. It was rather a stereotype for all new development.

Hence, the problems and contradictions in urban policy making and implementation, during the period 1974-89, raise a number of questions. Do they reflect simply an institutional weakness in consolidating and implementing public policy, or are they a more complicated phenomenon whereby institutions and policies are mediated within the land development process and its specific historical characteristics? To what extent, and in what respect, do these, primarily legislative, changes affect and are affected by the character of the development process? Which are the key components to this process, and the major changes it came through? What is the scope and content of urban policy and to what extent does it affect the forms of residential development?

Throughout this thesis we argue that a satisfactory understanding of this policy period requires an understanding of the key components of the residential development process. More specifically, this thesis brings together three key issues:

- a. The **role of land policy** in determining the modern forms of land ownership and in particular, a wide system of small land-ownership with close connections with the state.
- b. The **interrelations between small land-holding and the development process**, within a context of a growing importance of a "family-based" economy.
- c. The way **politics and ideology** are enmeshed into the development process and affect the operation of institutions.

## 1.2. Conceptual and Methodological Problems

Prior to giving a short review of the various approaches to the subject in question, a few points will be made on the basic conceptual and methodological problems of this thesis.

An analysis of the interactions between urban policy and residential land development is fundamentally an empirical issue. In other words, it can be better understood only when set in a specific time and place<sup>12</sup>. Thus, the research was not conducted in a linear way in which a theoretical hypothesis was to be tested through a research inquiry<sup>13</sup>. On the contrary, theoretical conception and empirical analysis were strongly interconnected at each step. The historical analysis adopted, contributed furthermore to the interplay between theory and practice. Thus, the initial framework of analysis constituted rather of a set of research questions than of a pre-designed explanatory scheme.

Interaction between theory and practice is conducive to another major theoretical problem, that of the use of concepts and theoretical approaches, which have been developed in different empirical realities and, which have often been used in a universal manner. This "universal" use of concepts and theories, characteristic of social research in previous periods, has been successfully put into question from various insights and disciplines. The criticism has focused on the fact that the universal use leads to generalisation, diminishes important aspects of a particular reality, and tends to be either without substance or fallacious<sup>14</sup>.



The above point does not suggest that one should "construct" new concepts or new theories for every instance<sup>15</sup>. As all research practically builds upon existing approaches and experiences, such a task would not only diminish conceptualisation to an empiricism; it would also make academic discussion almost impossible. This point intends to clarify that in the actual course of a research one is confronted with the need to put into question the relevancy of various concepts and theories concerning the subject in question.

The process of refinement of certain crucial concepts, such as that of "state", has been confronted by the sociological literature in a rather satisfactory manner<sup>16</sup>. Still, there are a number of other crucial concepts, such as "family economy", for which only limited sociological work exists. Evidently, a new conceptualisation cannot be offered in our research. In such cases, tentative definitions are to be adopted, while empirical analysis points out the need for further research.

Of particular importance to this thesis is the use of terms fundamental to the subject in question and whose content differs considerably according to the context in which they have been applied. We refer here to the content of the term "policy". As the nature of social problems differs substantially at different contexts, so does the scope and content of policies attempting to manage them. At the same time, policies evolve and change considerably over time<sup>17</sup>. In any case, strictly speaking, the term "policy" incorporates a rationality incompatible with societies like Greece. In practice there exists even a confusion between "policy" and "politics"<sup>18</sup>. This problem is undoubtedly related to the particular role of the state. Although it is intended to illuminate and explain these problems, it is necessary to clarify *a priori* that no *ad-hoc* definition of the term "policy" is to be adopted<sup>19</sup>.

Another important point is the traditional question of adopting a specific theoretical strand. The adoption of a single theoretical strand led in many cases to rigorous or one-sided explanations, and once again to the fallacy that a single theory should offer the foundations for a universal and rational explanation of social phenomena. Interaction between theory and practice not only contributes to a multi-sided approach, but also necessitates an openness to various theoretical discussions and disciplines. Very often the neglect of a number of important aspects by urban analysis was in fact a combination of either adopting a single theoretical strand or drawing experience from a single-discipline. For instance, rural land policy was left only in the analysis of agriculture, thus adopting a distinction line between rural and urban land<sup>20</sup>. Similarly, the role of the household, as the unit which finally

invests or consumes in the housing sector, has been underestimated by approaches, which argue that investment is realised by "capital".

Finally, interaction between theory and practice is also important from a more practical point of view. In most theoretical works, a dichotomy between theory and every day experience is observed. Although one cannot diminish the understanding of social processes to a description of every day micro-practices, it would be wrong for a theory not to approach these practices. In the case of residential development, many theories overlooked, in many respects, the every day experience of developers, surveyors, architects, or the households who seek to acquire a plot of land. Thus, theories have been used in a functional way, generalising human practices and underestimating the nature of social phenomena. We will come back to this point in section 1.3.

As far as the methodological problems are concerned, there are two basic issues related to each other, which needed special attention: the overall designation of the empirical research, and the problem of data availability.

Following the basic research questions the empirical study was designed to cover three levels of analysis.

a. An analytical account at the national level was considered necessary. Analysis at this level is not only important in order to examine the structural influences to the subject in question. As it will become clear in the next chapters, Greek society functions in such a way that makes the "national", whatever form it takes, to be determinant at any other level. An investigation of official and historical records, as well as, bibliographical material, was the main source of this part of the analysis.

b. The study focuses on Greater Thessaloniki so as the interrelations between land policy, the development process and the nature of urban policy be investigated in the context of a city's development. Apart from the use of historical and other official records and bibliographical material, long informal interviews, addressed to almost all land policy and planning agents, were also an important source of information for this part of the analysis. These interviews were conducted on the basis of a general questionnaire, which was formed according to the interviewed person<sup>21</sup>.

c. Finally, two small case-studies were conducted and allowed for a thorough investigation at a micro-level. The first concerns the process of land fragmentation over time and its impact on residential development in an area incorporated in the EPA programme. The second refers to the specific characteristics of the development process, and its links to land structure and policy constraints.

Data availability was one of the most critical research problems. This problem concerns the availability both of historical records, as well as, more recent statistical data. Generally speaking, information concerning land processes is not easily available<sup>22</sup>. Still, lack of information was not the only problem. Even where information was available, the filing system was so problematic that it was hardly of any use. Moreover, the reluctance of the various authorities to provide with the small data available, made the task even more complicated. In a way, information on land processes has become something like a "myth". This led us to consider the problem from another point of view. To put it more bluntly, this lack of information and the observed reluctance in providing the one available, was in its turn one of the crucial characteristics of the way land is allocated, and developed. The findings of this research highlight this argument.

### **1.3. Theoretical approaches to the study: a brief discussion**

Whereas the individual chapters incorporate a number of theoretical comments, at this stage, it is important to clarify certain points regarding theory. This section includes, a brief discussion on the basic theoretical approaches, and highlights the need for an interdisciplinary approach, which incorporates the interrelations between structure and agency. A special reference to the Greek relevant studies follows and their basic assumptions are commented upon.

#### **1.3.1. Residential land development and public policy: grasping the traditional distinctions**

The study of land development phenomena and policies intended to manage them, involves various academic disciplines as much as their practice involves various professions. Within these disciplines certain apparently contrasting approaches have been developed. Thus, a number of distinctions were created either between disciplines or within the same discipline. This problem has been very often underestimated by academic research. The very distinction between the study of

land development processes in geography and public policy analysis proves this very problem.

In the study of residential land, two major traditions lay down the analytical tools of explanation: the neo-classical and the marxist tradition, as incorporated in the theory of urban economics, and the land rent theory respectively. In the first case, analysis focuses predominantly on the micro/agency behaviour, whereas macro-trends are considered as an environment in which an agency operates. On the other side stands marxist tradition, in which macroscopic/structural aspects are the generators of agency behaviour. To be more precise, even the latter is part of a structure, i.e. a "class".

The study of residential land in urban economics is preoccupied mainly with location or spatial differentiation. Land value, i.e. price, is the key analytical tool, operating as the allocating mechanism on the basis of which locational decisions are made. The household as the basic unit of decision behaves in this case as the "economic man" of the neo-classical theory<sup>23</sup>. Upon these grounds, a rational pattern of land-use evolves, even when it is recognised that no allocation model can grasp satisfactorily the complexities of urban development.

Naturally, every other "mediation" process or mechanism, such as public policy, is external to the price mechanism, either modifying it or influencing a household's decision<sup>24</sup>. Thus, for urban economics, residential structure and land-use allocation is the product of competition between single actors, households or firms, upon land. This idealised "supply-demand" relationship has been criticised for inadequacy in explaining the actual processes of land development<sup>25</sup>. Moreover, no theorisation is provided on the relations between individual actors and the wider context in which they make their decisions.

Whereas urban economics is preoccupied with the "consumption" of space, marxist tradition stresses its interest upon the "production" of the built environment. By the end of the 1970s, a renewed interest in land rent theory laid down the marxist contribution to the study of residential development. Marxist theorists consider land rent as a mechanism by which landed property<sup>\*</sup> intervenes between producers (or capitals), or between classes in their competition over space, in other words over the location of production<sup>26</sup>. A very elaborated theory of the production of the built environment has also been provided<sup>27</sup>. Thus, locational optimality suggested by micro/agency approaches is replaced by the geography of capital accumulation.

\*The term landed property is used in this thesis for that part of property which refers only to land.

Structural relations is at the core of interest of marxist approaches. *Decision* (or behaviour) by the individual actor is replaced by *action*, class action in particular<sup>28</sup>.

Criticism of the approach highlighted the problems resulting from its one-sided focus on structure or production. Even later developments tended to underestimate the role of the individual, and the interconnections between production and consumption within the development process. Although structural influences are of utmost importance in the understanding of the residential processes, at the same time, it would be fallacious to argue that individual action, whether of a consumer or a producer, a household or a developer, is subjected to structural constraints in a linear way. Such an argument is not essentially different from the neo-classical perspective, in which price (land value) determines individual decision. On the other hand, action is eventually taken by the individual irrespective if he/she is part of a wider whole, a class or an interest group.

The major contribution of the approach is undoubtedly its analysis of the state and its role in the development process. However, in these predominantly structural trends, policies operate as elements or mechanisms of a social reproduction process<sup>29</sup>. Often this type of theorisation focuses on the constraints set by economic and political structures to group action (producers or consumers)<sup>30</sup>. Emphasis on class action tended to underestimate the role of the individual, both in investing on- and consuming the residential space. Notwithstanding the social groups or classes formed in a mode of production, decision to invest on- or buy a house, lies with the individual and it would be wrong to deny the importance of this factor<sup>31</sup>. Moreover, this action may produce differences and groupings, in other words "interest groups" differentiated by their access to land or their role in the development process not necessarily identified with pre-defined classes<sup>32</sup>.

Thus, despite their contrasting point of departure, both theories reviewed, bear in many respects, similar deficiencies regarding the understanding of the various and complex dynamics that characterise the development process and its interaction to policies attempting to manage them. Practically speaking, land and property development was for a long time peripheral to their interest, since both theories focused primarily on spatial development and structure.

On the other side of the academic research, policy analysis is preoccupied with the various politico-institutional inputs to residential development. These studies aim at understanding, either the constraints and prospects of public policy

implementation<sup>33</sup>, or the political behaviours and the role of specific agents in policy making and implementation<sup>34</sup>. Some studies offered extensive material regarding the process of implementation, and the various aspects, which affect and are affected by it. Again overemphasis to institutional considerations tended to underestimate the process by which residential development occurs.

A number of the above "distinctions" were gradually raised in more recent academic work of the 1980s. As the need for a more interdisciplinary approach is widely recognised, so does the need for an approach which will use the contribution of various theoretical strands. A renewed interest in the study of land and property development was accompanied by a growing research on the dynamics of the development process. Most of these works address the various and complex factors, whether economic or politico-institutional, which influence land and property development, paying particular attention to the role of different agents involved<sup>35</sup>.

Still, no complete explanatory framework has been provided for such an integrated approach. A first attempt made by P.Healey and S.Barrett (1990) points out that important aspects to the development process and public policy, such as the role of land ownership, the organisation of the construction industry, the nature of finance invested in the urban sector, the role of intermediaries, are only partially referred to and not investigated by the relevant literature. Following developments in sociological research and in particular the work of A.Giddens, P.Healey and S.Barrett, suggest that an interactive approach which will combine structure and agent can offer a more comprehensive understanding of how:

*"... external pressures are reflected in and affected by the way individual agents determine their strategies and conduct their relations as they deal with specific projects and issues and as they consider their future stream of activities"*<sup>36</sup>.

Although these efforts are still at the stage of academic discussion, they do offer a framework which can be relevant to the scope of this thesis.

### **1.3.2. Greek literature: Contributions and omissions**

Residential land development undoubtedly attracted special attention of Greek urban studies. The specific characteristics of urban sprawl through illegally built housing and the post-war vast growth of speculative housing were the two striking features of Greek urban development for a long time in post-war period. Thus,

urban studies were almost identified with residential development. As we shall see, urban policy and planning is, in many respects, identified with the residential sector. Despite this traditional interest to residential development, urban analysis was preoccupied more with the character of urbanisation in Greece or the role of the state in determining the forms of urban development and less with the residential development process itself. Moreover, urban analysis of the 1970s was characterised by strong ideological or normative elements. It is not within the scope of this thesis to offer an analytical review of this literature<sup>37</sup>; we merely point out the major assumptions and omissions of certain studies which offer a more comprehensive analysis to the subject in question.

A major progress in the study of urban development in Greece was the work of L. Leontidou<sup>38</sup>. Having contributed enormously to the study of urbanisation, she addresses the importance of historical analysis, thus offering a very interesting account of the urban history of Athens. The whole work draws special attention to the understanding of the locational process. It also lays down the major differences between trends of urban development in Athens and that in Latin American cities<sup>39</sup>, a tendency which had influenced previous studies. The key tool to explanation is "class analysis" as a "driving force" of urban growth and land allocation. Little attention is given to other major features, such as the structure of landownership, the actual development process, and their influence on the specific locational patterns. This problem, however, leads to two major fallacies which are incorporated in L. Leontidou's approach.

First, it is argued that, during the post-1950 period, land allocation in the urban periphery was realised eventually by a generalised land market, where land value was the basic distribution mechanism:

*" ... if housing production was pre-capitalist, land allocation was not. The dominant land allocation was that of a generalised land market and land rent was the basis of the distribution mechanism"*<sup>40</sup>.

Thus, the specific patterns by which development occurs, for instance excessive land fragmentation or "illegal" building, are discarded as mere outcomes of a process in which class allocation plays the dominant role<sup>41</sup>. Related to this argument is the second fallacy. These specific patterns are considered as modes of allocation in the urban periphery through which the need for housing is satisfied. Such an assumption does not allow for explanation of very similar processes apparent in smaller cities or resort areas, i.e. where the residential sector acquires a dominant

role in the local economy, while social structure is related in a very different way to land and housing allocation. These developments became evident mainly in the last twenty years. Similarly, little attention is paid to the role of the state. The latter is confined to a "populist land allocation" policy to which legalisation policies are attributed. Such policies fluctuate according to political circumstances.

Another elaborate work, that of D. Emmanuel, focuses on the structure of the housing production<sup>42</sup>. According to this work, post-war housing in Greece was dominated by two modes of production, the speculative building and a petty commodity mode in which he categorises "illegal building". Although the study offers a valuable insight on the macro-trends in the housing sector and its role in the country's economy, it nevertheless fails to address the importance of the various and diverse factors, which affect the residential process and hence housing production. Thus, in his own words, the wide access to land ownership; the diffused pattern of land and small capital; the middle level of the country's economic development the system of values, social institutions and legal-political structures<sup>43</sup>, are all seen as external preconditions to the organisation of the housing sector. Moreover, both studies mentioned above, fail to appreciate the great significance of the structure of land ownership and its interconnections to land policy.

A major contribution to urban studies was the work of L. Tsoulouvis<sup>44</sup>, whose analysis of the Greek social formation, and its interrelations to urban development and planning offers a systematic theoretical elaboration, as well as, more plausible assumptions. The core of his analysis is the role of the state, as the primary mechanism for value generation and income distribution. Based on his assumptions about the weakness of the Greek civil society in which "statism" dominates, he argues that urban space is the product of direct intervention by the state and the spontaneous activities of individuals (developers, landowners)<sup>45</sup>. This "direct" relations are accounted for a number of peculiar characteristics in the residential structure, such as the geography of land values<sup>46</sup>. Within this context L. Tsoulouvis considers that the functioning of planning in Greece

*"... is strongly related to the role granted to the state by social relations of production, as the primary mechanism for value generation and income distribution"<sup>47</sup>.*

Moreover, he discards arguments that consider certain crucial features of the residential development process, such as "illegal" building, as "class" phenomena. He argues that "illegal" building is rather a procedure that sets a minimum limit for



plot-ratio and urban values and points out that "illegality" is a more generalised practice and does not characterise development only in the urban fringe.

L. Tsoulouvis' work has offered a very in depth analysis of the role of the state, the nature of social relations and their interconnections with urban development and planning. It also provided more plausible explanations as to the peculiarities of urban development and structure, as well as, about the character of planning in Greece. Of course, this approach emphasises on macro/structural relations and does not incorporate an analysis of the various influences to the residential development process and their impact upon urban policy making and implementation<sup>48</sup>.

#### **1.4. Structure of the thesis**

Chapter 2 is a historical analysis of the role of state intervention in determining contemporary forms of landownership. Major emphasis is laid on the character of land policy as incorporated in the 1917 Agrarian Reform and mainly the Refugee Rehabilitation Programmes implemented both in urban and rural areas. The chapter provides a critical account of these major land and housing allocation programmes and examines their impact upon the structure of landownership and the complex and contradictory system in landed property. In this context, the formulation of the first town planning legislation and urban policy machinery in the mid-war years is examined. The chapter carries on with a discussion on post-war housing development, its role in the country's economy, and the major changes housing development came through. Special attention is given to the peculiarities of the development process and its impact to the prevailing forms of housing production.

Chapter 3 begins with an analysis of the various politico-institutional actions related to the management of residential development and examines the dominant forms of urban policy that prevailed over the years. After this discussion, it proceeds to an analysis of the different government attempts to reform urban policy during the period 1974-89. The chapter provides an analytical account of the various laws, policies and programmes, explores their characteristics as well as the major problem of non-implementation. The various politico-ideological attitudes that surrounded these attempts are also discussed. The analysis focuses especially on the character

and the process of implementation of EPA, the major urban policy programme of the 1980s.

The next three chapters turn to a more detailed analysis of the relations between land policy, the residential development process and urban policy in Greater Thessaloniki. Chapter 4, therefore, includes a step by step analysis of the refugee rehabilitation programmes implemented in Greater Thessaloniki during the mid-war years. The chapter analyses the scope and characteristics of both the Urban and the Rural Rehabilitation Programme. Here, the neglected aspects of these programmes and their impact upon the relations of landownership within a particular city are empirically examined.

Chapter 5, proceeds to a case study on the structure and situation of landed property in one of the areas where the Refugee Rehabilitation Programmes were implemented. The process of land fragmentation from mid-war period to the time of the implementation of EPA is analysed and its peculiarities are identified. Against this background, the case study also examines the major obstacles in the implementation of EPA layout plans. The analysis goes on with the findings of a second case study on the specific characteristics of the development process with special emphasis to the relations between the structure of landed property, the development process and characteristics of the developing industry.

Chapter 6 provides an overview of the problems and contradictions inherent in urban policy and planning in Greater Thessaloniki. In the first place it analyses the influence of two plans in urban policy making, the 1917 Town Plan and the 1966 Master Plan and at the same time examines the actual planning practice followed. The chapter investigates in greater detail urban policies and plans of the period 1974-89 and gives an account of the progress of EPA in Greater Thessaloniki. Special attention is paid to the constraints of strategic planning and its management at a metropolitan scale.

Finally, in chapter 7, the concluding chapter, we provide a synthesis of the various aspects inherent in the character of residential development and the problems of urban policy making and implementation. A number of suggestions are incorporated on the necessary future research, whereas the future policy prospects are briefly discussed.

## 1.5. Notes for chapter 1

1. The fall of the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) from government in 1989 has been considered as the end of the so-called "*metapolitefsi*", in other words the period after the restoration of democracy in 1974. This period has only partially been studied regarding in particular the nature and characteristics of government policy. Whereas the years after 1974 saw a rise in social research, academic interest focused primarily on the historical and structural characteristics of the Greek social and economic development and less to the specific forms this development took in more recent periods. A more comprehensive analysis of this period is provided by Karabelias, G. (1989). The special edition of *Les Temps Modernes* (1986) includes an overview on various aspects of Greek social development after 1970.
2. All period throughout 1974-89 is characterised by a continuity not only as far as macro-trends are concerned but also in respect to the specific way political power was performed. Nevertheless, the change in government in 1981 brought about important differences in various aspects of policy making. Thus, methodologically speaking, it is better to distinguish this period into two parts, 1974-81 under the administration of the New Democracy Party and 1981-89 under the administration of PASOK.
3. Under the strong influence of Karamanlis' policy, then Prime Minister, a belief in the role of state intervention characterised almost the whole New Democracy Party. This attachment to state intervention also reflected Karamanlis' policy at the beginning of the 1960s. Manesis, A. (1981) analyses the way "state intervention" is incorporated in the 1975 Constitution.
4. Constitution of Greece, 1975, article 24.
5. Statement of Katsigiannis, Chr. Majority Spokesman, *Parliamentary Proceedings*, 13-6-1979, p. 5126.
6. Natsinas, M., Spokesman from PASOK, *Parliamentary Proceedings*, op. cit., p. 5134.
7. Damanaki, M., Spokesman from the Communist Party, *Parliamentary Proceedings*, op.cit. p. 5133. PASOK also adopted a similar argument (Kedikoglou, V., *Parliamentary Proceedings*, p. 5131).
8. "Political will and intention" had not only been manifested as a key element to policy implementation by PASOK and its 1981 government. It was also a rhetoric, which dominated the various public discussions on urban policy making in the years 1981-85 and turned to be the familiar slogan used by many officials or authors with a strongly ideological approach to the problem.
9. In the 1970s, "democratisation" was used many times as opposed to "modernisation", the latter seen as an attempt to capital restructuring. Both terms were hardly clarified by those agents or parties who provoked them, a problem related to the character of politics in Greece. Alivizatos, N. (1980) attempted a theoretical elaboration of the term "democratisation". In any case, this term, in particular, quickly acquired a number of ideological elements behind which corporate or party interests were hidden.
10. Koliousis, A., Majority Spokesman, *Parliamentary Proceedings*, 31-3-1983, p.3355.
11. Message of Tritsis, A., YHOP: Circular T1 35796/3045/29-2-1982.
12. Whereas geography is the discipline which, by definition, is preoccupied with "place" (or "locale"), various theories from which geography drew its basic assumptions have

ignored this parameter to a large extent: This neglect was so wide as Massey, D. to recognise that "While this (i.e. the importance of the locale) is easy to say - or seem so now - as we forget the enthusiasm with which we denied spatiality in the 1970s ..." (1985, p.17). Time on the other hand has been usually identified with historical studies rarely incorporated into the understanding of contemporary social phenomena. New developments in social theory, and in particular the work of Giddens A., influenced geographical analysis. Thus in the 1980s "place" and "time" were brought back into the agenda of academic research (Giddens, A., 1979 & 1984; Gregory, D., 1978; Gregory, D. and Urry, J. (eds.), 1985; Massey, D., 1984; Massey, D. & Allen J. (eds), 1984 & 1988).

13. A methodological approach which characterises positivist tradition. It should be noted that although positivism has been widely criticised, social science is largely influenced by it as it offers a clear "scientific" methodology in approaching complicated phenomena. For a critique to positivist tradition see, Keat, R. & Urry, J. (1979), Keat, R. (1981). A review of non-positivist approaches is included in Silverman, D. (1985). The positivist legacy in geography has been analysed by Gregory, D. (1978). From the same discipline Sayer, A. (1984) has developed a realist approach in the analysis of social processes.
14. Sayer A. op.cit., Mouzelis, N., 1991. Tsoukalas, K. (1981, pp. 16-31) has put into question universal theories as inadequate in the understanding of what he calls "peripheral" societies. The renewal of interest in the 1980s to geographical specificity contributed furthermore to overcome such problems (see, note 12).
15. Post-modernism, for example, goes to the other end and suggests a "deconstruction" of theory. Mouzelis, N., 1990 & 1991, provides a criticism of this approach.
16. The work of Tsoukalas, K. (1981 & 1986) was a turning point in the study of the state and its role in the country's social and economic development. Based on Tsoukalas' major assumptions more recent academic research such as, the work of Petmezidou, M. (1984 & 1987), Tsoulouvis, L. (1985), Leontidou, L. (1986), Karabelias, G. (1989) have further contributed to the analysis of various aspects of the Greek society.
17. Healey, P. & Barrett, S. (1985, p.4) make a brief comment on this problem whereas Dunleavy, P. (1980) points out and criticises the descriptive way by which policy has been defined by the relevant literature.
18. It is worth noting that, despite the Greek origin of the word, there hardly exists a distinction between policy and politics in Greek language. Therefore, the paucity of policy analysis is not coincidental (see, note 1).
19. A systematic study of political theory is provided by Vlachos, G. (1977, 1978, 1981). There, we meet a distinction of political theory into two main strands: the first considers the "state" as the object of analysis, whereas the second considers the study of "power" (Vlachos, G., 1978). Naturally, it remains to be identified empirically which should be the objects of political analysis in relation to the nature of a specific policy.
20. Healey, P. & Barrett, S. (1985) point out this problem. See, also note 3 in chapter 2.
21. These interviews were not addressed only to the officials in charge of the various departments, but also to a number of employees from lower ranks of the public service who were involved in the actual management of specific issues and whose answers were less politically biased.
22. The lack of land registries is one of the main causes for this problem. Chapter 2 analyses this problem in greater detail.

23. Muth, R.F.(1969); Mills, E.S. (1972); Richardson, H.W. (1972); Evans, A. (1973), are among the typical representatives of neo-classical urban economics. More realistic attempts were developed later (Richardson H.W.; 1977, Harrison, A. 1977; Balchin, P.N. & Kieve, J.L., 1983; Evans, A., 1985).
24. The works of Harrison, A. (1977) and Hallet, G. (1979) are representative of this type of approach.
25. For a review and a critique see, Ball, M.(1979), who has even questioned whether there can exist a discipline like urban economics, and Bassett, K.& Short, J. (1980). Edwards, M. & Lowatt,D. criticised the approach as far its treatment of land values is concerned: "Thus we may find that the pattern of landownership (shapes, sizes and juxtaposition of plots) or the forms of tenure (freeholds, leases) or statutory limits on land are more important than matters of prices (Edwards, M. & Lowatt, D. 1980, p. 7).
26. Initial formulations of the role of land rent are included in Ball, M. (1977), Massey, D. & Catalano, A. (1978). For an overview and the recent developments of the theory see, Ball, M. et.al. (eds.) (1985).
27. This is the case of Harvey, D. (1982 & 1985).
28. See, for example the relevant argument provided by Leontidou, L. 1990.
29. In practice, marxist theorists were not interested to the policy factor as such but to the role of the state where a whole body of theory has been developed. To a large extent a number of studies on the nature of planning are placed in this stream (see, for example, Kirk, G., 1981; Paris, C. (ed.), 1982; Calavita, N., 1983; Cook, Ph., 1983).
30. Rydin, Y. (1984) makes this point in her criticism of radical approaches and in particular the work of Ball, M. (1983) and Short, J. (1982).
31. The various studies of home-ownership, irrespective of the approach adopted, show the importance of the individual decision (Ball, M., 1983; Saunders, P., 1984; Saunders, P. & Williams, P., 1988).
32. Although this thesis does not suggest the significance of a "housing class", for instance, we do not deny that access to land, or housing, generates interests that may differ considerably from the way classes are defined in marxist tradition. The importance of the sociology of consumption should be appreciated by residential studies in order to understand a household's action and behaviour (see, Pahl, R., 1975 & 1989; Saunders, P., 1990).
33. See, the work of Darin-Drabkin H. (1977) and Lichfield, N. & Darin- Drabkin, H. (1980) on land policy and planning. Basset, S. & Fudge, C. (eds.), (1981), includes also among the most typical studies of policy implementation. For a review of the basic theoretical assumptions incorporated in policy analysis see, Dunleavy, P. (1980a) and Rydin, Y. (1984). A more elaborate public policy implementation study in the field of urban planning with special attention to the role of institutions is the work of Healey, P. et. al. (1988).
34. Dunleavy, P. (1980b); Cawson, R. & Saunders, P. (1983); Rydin, Y. (1986), are primarily interested in the nature and the process of policy change and its interrelations with corporate, or other group, interests.
35. Healey, P. & Barrett, S. (1990) provide a brief review of this research. Among the works to be mentioned are Ball, M. (1983); Ball, M., et. al (1985); Short, J. (ed.) (1985); Healey, P. & Barrett, S. (1985); Rydin, Y., 1986.
36. Healey, P. & Barrett, S. (1990), p. 90.

37. Tsoulouvis, L. (1985) makes more analytical comments on the character of such studies.
38. Leontidou, L. 1981, 1986, 1989.
39. This comparative perspective was incorporated, for example, in the work of Wassenhoven, L. (1980). Leontidou, L. (1981) argued that there are important differences not only in respect to the specific growth trends but also to the way development occurs and hence to the peculiarities in the land allocation process. The latter refers to squatting phenomena in the urban fringe, a trend very different by its nature from Latin American cities.
40. Leontidou, L. (1981). However, it is worth mentioning that her reference is at older times when housing needs were undoubtedly acute.
41. In a later reformulation of her study she distinguishes two modes of allocation: the "dominant", i.e. through market forces, and the "dominated" in which she classifies illegal development and public housing (Leontidou, L., 1989). This distinction is also too general lacking a thorough reasoning of its importance in land and housing analysis.
42. Emmanuel, D. 1981. In later studies he offered a further elaboration of the role of the housing sector in the Greek economy (Emmanuel, D., 1987 & 1991).
43. Emmanuel, D. (1981, p. 109).
44. Tsoulouvis, L. (1985 & 1987).
45. Tsoulouvis, L. (1985, p. 109).
46. Tsoulouvis, L. (1979 & 1984) study of land values is a very interesting insight into the way the peculiarities of social structure, landed property and the development process determine the level of prices in the residential sector.
47. Tsoulouvis, L. (1987, p. 514).
48. Some other attempts that highlight the impact of small landownership on the peculiar features of post-war housing development (see, Antonopoulou, S., 1990) are confined to a macro-analysis of structural trends and do not enter into the way small landownership is enmeshed in residential development or urban policy making. On the other hand, Hastaoglou, V., et. al. (1987) attempted to explain urban policy reform in the 1980s in connection with what they call "process of urban restructuring", but their approach is very general providing rather rigid explanations based on a typical "class analysis".

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **STATE INTERVENTION IN LAND ALLOCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE HOUSING SECTOR: A NATIONAL ACCOUNT**

The purpose of this chapter is to set out a brief historical analysis at a national level of the components to residential land development. Analysis focuses on the interaction among three main aspects: the role of state land policy implemented during the inter-war period through the 1917 Agrarian Reform and the consequent Programmes of Refugee Rehabilitation; the nature of the first town planning machinery formulated in the same period; and the characteristics of housing development during the post-1950 period.

The rise of middle classes in inter-war Greece played a major role in the country's industrialisation. In this context, the Agrarian Reform and the forms of landed tenure became central issues of state policy. Section 2.1. discusses the consolidation of a system of small land-holding and examines the role and character of two major policies: the 1917 Agrarian Reform and the 1922 Refugee Settlement Programme. Our main interest is to investigate those aspects that have affected the patterns of later urban expansion and urban land tenure .

The specific forms of capitalist development in the inter-war period appear to have given the state a determinant role in land development. This period also saw the first legislation in the sphere of town planning, with the state adopting a liberal-indicative attitude to it. This legislation became the basis of statutory planning for almost sixty years. Whereas explanation of this lasting character is part of the task of this thesis as a whole, section 2.2. investigates the purpose of its formulation and its relation to the overall land policy of the inter-war period.

Post-war economic development was characterised in part by the dominance of housebuilding. Section 2.3. switches to a discussion on the growth and decline of the housing sector and its relations to post-war social structures. Upon these grounds,

this section concludes with an analysis, at a national level, of the forms of residential development in both inner urban areas and the urban fringe.

## **2.1. The consolidation of small land-holding in the inter-war years**

Relations of landownership and the theorisation of landed property have been examined in the study of agriculture as well as in those studies dealing with the analysis of the transition to capitalism. The main interest of these studies has been the subordination of landed property to industry<sup>1</sup>. However, as a new set of relations of landownership was developed under capitalism, the way they were formed, their nature and their interactions with new forms of economic development have not been studied in detail<sup>2</sup>. Of interest to this thesis is the fact that these processes have only partially, or at a descriptive level, been dealt with urban analysis *per se*<sup>3</sup>. This is especially true in the case of Greece, where urban studies laid the major emphasis on macro aspects of the country's transition to capitalist development, whilst largely omitting some of the interesting insights into the nature and structural relations of landownership provided by some sociological literature (see, section 1.3.2).

In the following pages we will sketch out the way in which small land-holding became dominant and highlight those aspects in the process of its formation that have affected later urban land allocation.

### **2.1.1. The land question before the Agrarian Reform**

The agrarian character of Greece was undoubtedly dominant until the beginning of the twentieth century. Despite the fact that after independence Greece entered a long transitional period, its transformation into a capitalist society did not take place until at least the beginning of the century<sup>4</sup>. At the economic level, there developed a dualism: on the one hand, a largely agrarian domestic economy, with peasantry being the most numerous class; on the other hand, an increasingly dominant *diaspora*, i.e. the Greeks living abroad, with its external relations to the country's social development<sup>5</sup>. A series of important changes had taken place in the nineteenth century, most of which were centred around the domination of a pre-given, as an institutional form, state machinery.



There were two dimensions in the way the state intervened over landed property: first, it determined the transition of landed property into its modern form, i.e. the commodity form; second, through land law, it shaped landed property as an object of complex public administration and hence it protected the creation and reproduction of specific forms of property rights to land<sup>6</sup>. Taking these assumptions into consideration, we will give a brief account of the land tenure system before the Agrarian Reform.

After the country's independence from the Ottoman Empire, the newly established Greek State nationalised all land that had been under Turkish ownership. National land covered almost 50% of the cultivated land<sup>7</sup>. Its cultivation and development remained a highly controversial political issue for almost a century, until the Agrarian Reform. There are two main reasons why the Greek state followed land nationalisation instead of privatisation. First, it was an attempt to avoid the creation of large land holdings. Large landownership, in the hands of Greeks, had existed since the eighteenth century, but represented only a small part of the available land<sup>8</sup>. Second, it was seen that land nationalisation would constitute an important source of public revenue, crucial to the rising power of the state.

This policy had a series of implications. It has been argued that it actually worsened the conditions of the peasants by demoting them into simple tenants, in contrast to the Ottoman-Byzantine tradition<sup>9</sup>. Land nationalisation, therefore, was an effort to ease capitalist expansion in agriculture, by inhibiting the recreation of large ownership. However, this policy actually resulted in re-creating the problem; and above all it created an obscure situation in the relations of landownership<sup>10</sup>. Land appropriation was extensive, although excessive bureaucracy and a situation of **polynomy** (i.e. whereby a multiplicity of laws are enacted for the same case) over the management of this property concealed the various forms of land appropriation<sup>11</sup>. The absence of a Cadastre - one of the major problems in contemporary land policy - stems from this period<sup>12</sup>.

This obscure situation in regard to land was partly settled in 1871 through an agrarian reform introduced by the Komondouros government, that gave both legal and economic ownership over land to peasants. It is estimated that through this reform almost all peasants in the free parts of Greece were gradually provided with land, a policy that allowed them to become landowners.

The condition of having two forms of land tenure, national and small agricultural ownership, changed after 1880, when Thessaly, and later Macedonia and Thrace, became parts of the Greek territory. Large landownership was formed in Thessaly in the years 1878-1881 as a result of a mass transfer of legal titles of ownership to the Greek financiers of the *diaspora*. Thus, this form of land tenure, far from being a pre-capitalist remnant, was a new phenomenon in the process of the integration of the Greek territory, financed from abroad and concentrated only in specific regions<sup>13</sup>. The emergence of large landownership led the Greek state, always hostile to this form of ownership, to proceed to its major Agrarian Reform.

### 2.1.2. The Rise of Middle Classes and the 1917 Agrarian Reform

From the above account, it becomes evident that nationalised land was rather a transitional form of tenure. There is no evidence that the Greek state proceeded with land nationalisation in an attempt to manage this factor of production by itself. Rather it aimed at allocating it through future agrarian reforms. The upheaval, brought about by the formation of large landownership, and the long-lasting transitional process, allowed the co-existence of three forms of land tenure - small, large and nationalised - until the beginning of the 1920s.

The rise to government of Venizelos and his liberal party after the 1909 coup opened the way for the rise of the middle classes and their control over most of the state machinery<sup>14</sup>. The integration of a national State and the limitation of economic activity within the national territory, which resulted from, on one hand, the fall of the *diaspora*'s economic role and, on the other, the refugee inflow, led to a more indigenous development. Against a background of economic crisis, a considerable expansion of the domestic market took place, accompanied by a reorientation of economic policy towards industrialisation<sup>15</sup>. The entry of new social groups into the political scene and the fall of local oligarchies, that dominated political life up to that period, led to further centralisation, as social priorities and material resources shifted from local to national level<sup>16</sup>. Political processes were also gradually transformed with the emergence of political parties organised on a "class basis" and a decline of the significance of political clientelism. However, political processes still accounted for

*"... the creation and the distribution of income, making the State the institution par excellence used by social processes for this purpose"*<sup>17</sup>.

Within this context, one of the major policies in contemporary Greek history was introduced: the 1917 Agrarian Reform. The 1917 Agrarian Reform is considered as the most extensive of the similar reforms introduced during the same period in other Balkan and East European countries. Almost 50% of all cultivated land was allocated to peasant families. Land expropriation for the purpose of the Reform included all large landed property (table 2.1). Through this reform the pre-existing system of small land-holding and family farming was widened as it was seen as the mode most adaptable to the development of industrial capitalism<sup>18</sup>.

**Table 2.1.** Area expropriated for the Agrarian Reform in the period 1922-38

<i>Region</i>	<i>Area (in Ha) of big landed property (cultivated and non -cultivated)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Total area of cultivated land in each region</i>	<i>%</i>
Peloponnesus	3,800	0.46	529,000	19.10
Aegean Islands	6,800	0.82	102,000	3.68
Stereia Hellas & Evoia	90,000	10.86	524,000	18.92
Thessaly	273,000	32.93	400,000	14.44
Macedonia & Thrace	255,000	30.76	876,000	31.62
Epirus	200,000	24.12	145,000	5.23
Crete	484	0.06	194,000	7.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>829,084</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2,770,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: Tsoukalas, K., 1975, p.82.

About 1,700,000 hectares of farmed land was distributed to native and refugee peasant families. After the Asia Minor disaster, and the refugee inflow, the need for land to be allocated to landless families increased drastically. For this reason the relevant legislation became so exceptionally radical that it affected not only the large landed property but also that of a medium-size. By removing all constitutional obstacles, mainly as far as expropriation and compensation problems were concerned, the implementation of the Agrarian Reform aimed

*"... only at finding, as rapidly as possible, the means of livelihood for the peasant refugees and the numerous indigenous families ..."*<sup>19</sup>.

Only about 3% of the agricultural land all over the Greek territory was left under the control of large landowners, most of which was distributed in a later reform, in 1952. After 1930 landed property hardly exceeded 1,200 acres per estate.

### 2.1.3. The Refugee Rehabilitation Programme: establishing new relations over land

The Agrarian Reform was in fact implemented after 1922, the year of the Asia Minor disaster and the inflow of about 1,300,000 refugees. The national population increased by almost 25%. This drastic increase constituted a major force in accelerating industrial development since, for some time, labour had been almost unrestricted. However, due to the peculiarities of capitalist development, the newly developed industry did not absorb much of the available labour. Smaller industry, self-employment and artisan jobs, were also expanded in the big urban areas<sup>20</sup>. A significant number of refugees, 47% of the total, were settled in rural areas.

An international Committee, the Refugee Rehabilitation Committee (EAP), was set up to carry out the rehabilitation of the refugees in the years 1923-1929. EAP's prime objective was the allocation of land to refugee families. Rehabilitation policy was divided into two major parts: the rural and the urban, by which refugee population was settled in rural and urban areas respectively. In the years 1924-29 a total area of 839,044 hectares was assigned to EAP for the needs of the rehabilitation programme (table 2.2). A large part of this property, approximately 60%, was the so-called **exchangeable property**, the part of public property that originated from the abandoned holdings of the transferred persons and passed to the ownership of the Greek state<sup>21</sup>.

**Table 2.2.** Land assigned to EAP until 1.1.1929

<i>Type of property</i>	<i>Area (in Ha.)</i>	<i>%</i>
Bulgarian exchangeable property	94,020.7	11.21
Turkish exchangeable property	498,109.5	59.37
Turkish non-exchangeable property	19,959.8	2.38
Expropriations	58,845.2	7.01
Compulsory acquisitions	36,736.3	4.37
Public property	53,639.3	6.39
Property of foreign	29,595.3	3.53
Miscellaneous	48,138.3	5.74
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>839,044</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: Kararas, N., 1973, p.37.

Up to 1930, the year EAP was dissolved, 1,221,849 people were rehabilitated by both parts of the refugee rehabilitation programme.

**Rural rehabilitation** concerned 145,758 families (578,824 people), the majority of which, a 89,52%, were settled in Macedonia and Thrace (table A.1, Appendix A). The task of rural rehabilitation was undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA). All refugee families rehabilitated with this programme were provided with agricultural land for cultivation. Land allocation to peasant families was based to the so-called "viable allotment", as prescribed by the Agrarian Reform. A "viable allotment" could consist of more than one piece of land, a feature that led to further land fragmentation as well as lower productivity of the agricultural land. The average size of an allotment varied. Pentzopoulos, N. provides figures, which range from 3.7 acres per allotment in Thrace, to 120 acres in Thessaly<sup>22</sup>. According to the Survey Department of the County of Thessaloniki, the average size of the allotments was much lower and ranged between 6.2 to 8.6 acres per family.

The actual operation of land allocation took place at different stages in two respects: First, in most cases an individual allocation was only temporarily arranged so that the boundaries of the allocated parcels were only loosely defined. In these cases the final allocation, which also settled the ownership title, took place only after 1930 and in many cases, as indeed in certain areas of Greater Thessaloniki, it took place during the post-war period, irrespective of the changing character of these areas (see, chapter 4). Second, the first, so-called "basic allocation" (temporal or final), did not cover all the allotment a family was entitled to, as this was subject to land availability in the area of a family's location. A complicated land legislation was gradually formed around land allocation to refugees<sup>23</sup>. Among other things, it allowed the extension of the right to an allotment to the inheritors of the family concerned. Both these cases were covered by the "complementary allotments", which once again were subject to land availability. Complementary allocations either to initial beneficiaries or to their inheritors or to new landless families were made in the post-war period and still constitute a major part of the MA's allocation programmes. Through this process land was further fragmented to such an extent that in the case of the county of Thessaloniki a parcel hardly exceeds 1.2 to 3.7 acres nowadays<sup>24</sup>.

The repercussions of agricultural rehabilitation upon the rural hinterland, in particular in Macedonia and Thrace, the two regions that absorbed the majority of peasant refugees, were immense<sup>25</sup>. A large number of new settlements were

established, 1947 in Macedonia and 574 in Thrace (see, table A.2, Appendix A), which transformed the settlement system in these regions. A rapid expansion of the farming area accompanied by a massive increase of the available labour force accelerated the modernisation of cereals cultivation, whilst tobacco farming became one of the leading branches of the local economy in Northern Greece. Above all, rural rehabilitation was an upheaval as far as the relations over landed property were concerned.

**Urban Rehabilitation**, on the other hand, was not the first priority of the government and EAP, yet not of less importance either. Apart from the fact that the rehabilitation of rural population was also seen as an essential part of the Agrarian Reform, whose implementation was a major target in this period, it was felt that the rehabilitation of urban population was a very complicated task. This does not imply that urban rehabilitation should be underestimated. Indeed, its scope and implications become more evident when one considers the fact that this policy was concentrated mainly in the two major urban centres. Through this programme 160,856 families (643,025 persons)<sup>were</sup> settled in 93 different urban communities (table A.1, Appendix A). Sixty per cent of this population was settled in communities of Greater Athens and Thessaloniki. For the purpose of urban rehabilitation, approximately 3,525 hectares of land were acquired in various ways and placed at the disposal of EAP (table 2.3). More than 50% of this land was expropriated, an action that changed drastically the structure of landed property in the big urban centres.

**Table 2.3.** Type of land tenure disposed for the Urban Rehabilitation Programme until 3-6-1932

<i>Type of property</i>	<i>area (in Ha.)</i>	<i>%</i>
Expropriations	1979.36	56.14
Exchangeable property	149.80	4.25
Public property	668.72	18.97
Municipal property	593.00	16.82
Purchase of private property	126.59	3.59
Donations by private owners	8.24	0.23
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3525.71</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: Agelis, I., 1973, p. 33.

Urban rehabilitation cost the Committee about one-fifth of the sum spent on the agricultural rehabilitation programme (table A.3, Appendix A) of which 90% was used for building purposes, the public housing programme, in Athens and Piraeus<sup>26</sup>.

There are a number of problems to be considered in the examination of this programme. We shall focus on two main aspects: a) the process of its implementation from the period of its launching up to more recent years; and b) its repercussions on the urban structure of the two major urban centres along with the employment linkages this policy attempted to create.

As happened with the rural rehabilitation, the urban programme was also completed at different stages. Although the major part of the programme took place in the pre-war period (see table A.4, Appendix A), it is difficult to estimate either the total number of families that were settled or the number of houses constructed in each period. Chapter 4 provides these estimates in the case of Greater Thessaloniki using the best available sources. During 1923-1941, the programme was undertaken by EAP and later by the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW). Both these agents concentrated on the construction and provision of houses. Before 1930, it is estimated that about 52,000 houses were constructed by both EAP and the government. After MSW had taken over, and although housing provision remained the principal form of rehabilitation, other forms were also applied, namely: a) a "self-housing" system, whereby the refugee families were provided by a plot of land accompanied by a loan for the construction of their own house, and b) provision of 5,900 plots to 350 building co-operatives, again accompanied by financial assistance for the construction of houses.

After 1952, there still remained 35,248 families (22% of the initial number) entitled to rehabilitation<sup>27</sup>. In the period 1950-1965, rehabilitation was implemented either through the system of "self-housing", as described above, or by a public housing programme, which included the construction of multi-storey buildings that housed "shed dwellers" in Athens and Thessaloniki. After 1965, at a time when about 15,000 families were still entitled to rehabilitation, "self-housing" was the only form for it. Only a small programme of public housing was implemented, and this concerned the clearance of certain slum areas.

The programme of urban settlement had important repercussions on the structure of many Greek cities, and in particular, Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki. Indeed, it was through this programme that suburbanisation occurred on an

extensive scale in contrast to previous times. At the same time, the establishment of a number of suburban communities in the outskirts of Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki, where low-income families were located determined to a large extent the social character of suburbanisation trends. The new areas of urban expansion in Greater Athens became areas of working-class location, where in most cases,

*" ... industry came to be established near dense working-class concentrations"*<sup>28</sup>.

Employment linkages was perhaps the most complicated problem EAP and the government were facing with this huge urban rehabilitation and public housing programme. In view of the weakness of the newly developed industry to absorb this labour force, linkages between place of work and home were defined more loosely:

*"The town refugee must above all be located where he can carry on his trade, or some trade, without which any house provided to him, beside being useless to him, might even injure his interest by diverting him to a spot where he could obtain no work"*<sup>29</sup>.

In fact the new urban suburbs had a mixed occupational composition, a characteristic of Greek urban development even in more contemporary periods.

The refugee rehabilitation programmes had an unprecedented massive scale, which by virtue make them very significant in any study of the relations between land policy and urban development. However, it is not simply their scale that is of prime interest to this thesis; it is mainly their implications upon the structure of landed property both in the urban and rural sector. Summing up the basic characteristics of land policy in the inter-war period we should point out the following:

i. The 1917 Agrarian Reform, and its implementation through the Refugee Rehabilitation Programme, established the small land holding system as the predominant - if not the only - system of land tenure on a very extensive scale. This system underlined the nature of land market at the period of conversion from rural to urban land. At the same time, through this land structure, the small land holding became an essential part of the survival and further development of a family economy that characterised post-war social relations.

ii. The urban housing programme was the only extensive programme of public housing ever to be implemented in Greece. Partly due to the emergency situation, however, this programme was implemented with extreme improvisation that led to



the creation of large slum areas. More important, though, was its emphasis on land allocation and home-ownership. A careful study of the programme and its actual implementation over the years show that the core of its interest was once again in the principle "one-family, one-piece-of-land". One of the most important aspects of this policy was its effects upon the development of speculative apartment building in the suburbs, initially established by EAP and the government in the period under consideration<sup>30</sup>.

iii. Refugee Rehabilitation, in both rural as well as urban areas, alongside with the Agrarian Reform, turned to be a long-standing policy whose dynamics created an extremely complicated pattern of legal and economic rights over land. The confusion over the situation concerning public land, the long-standing disputes over the exchangeable property, the lack of land registry are only some aspects of the new set of relations over land whose implications upon residential development and urban policy have to be studied carefully over time. A policy that was particularly radical at the time of its introduction, turned to become one of the great barriers in more recent attempts to reform the system of residential development.

iv. Finally, through this programme a complicated land policy was formed, characterised by its strong legalistic nature and a situation of *polynomy*. Through this policy small landownership became heavily dependent upon the state.

## 2.2. The first town planning legislation

This section will deal with an analysis of the town planning legislation, introduced in the years 1923-1932. It will outline the nature and main characteristics of the 1923 Town Planning Act and some Decrees complementary to this Act, and, finally, the 1929 Property Law. Special attention will also be given to the debate on the formulation of this planning framework, in order to provide a better understanding of the dominant currents underlying a legislation that remained in force for more than 60 years. Unfortunately, the relevant material available is rather limited<sup>31</sup>. For this reason, the following analysis relies principally upon certain Parliamentary Debates on related issues.

Considering law as an intermediary between the state and civil society<sup>32</sup>, planning legislation should be examined on the basis of its interactions with wider social processes. In this respect an *ad-hoc* theory of planning as a decision-making process

will not be applied here<sup>33</sup>. Such a theory would tend to imply that town planning is an activity with universal characteristics based on the "regularities" of an urban system. The main interest of this research does not lie on the study of a "decision-making" process, isolated from the nature of land development processes. At the same time, it would be common sense to argue that planning has never been the only - or main - form of state intervention in urban development. This means that even without a systematic activity we cannot attribute urban development to an uncritically assumed "market mechanism". The development of town planning legislation of the 1920s will be examined as part of the socio-political changes that took place in the same period of time, of which the three following aspects have been the most influential:

i). In this period a new stage of urbanisation had started, caused by the inflow of a large number of urban refugees. The growth rates of the capital were relatively high in the pre-1920 period, mainly on account of state expansion, the development of the tertiary sector, and the agrarian migration from areas where small land-holding was dominant<sup>34</sup>. Nevertheless, however impressive these rates might have been, the population of the capital never exceeded 8% of the country's population. On the contrary, in 1920-1928 the population of the capital increased by 77% reaching 13% of the total population. At the same period the population of Thessaloniki increased by 38%. Therefore, pressures for urban expansion were much higher and of a different nature than have been in previous years.

ii). This new stage of urbanisation was characterised not only by high rates of growth. The development of the industrial sector and the emergence of a working class affected considerably the social structure of the cities. As homeownership was the undisputed form of tenure in the provision of housing, the demand for cheap land in the urban periphery increased sharply<sup>35</sup>. This demand had been already facilitated through the land programmes implemented in the same period. Extensive urban sprawl put the urban containment issue for the first time on the government's agenda.

iii). Finally, the modernisation of public administration was one of the major objectives of the liberal government administration. As state intervention expanded towards new economic sectors, a series of institutional reforms were necessary to consolidate the establishment of constitutional liberalism. These reforms, however, were determined by internal contradictions between the social structure and the political institutions<sup>36</sup>. Central administration was further bureaucratised and the

executive power was strengthened to such an extent that the great politician Alexandros Svolos claimed in 1933:

*"Our contemporary democracy is political but it has not yet become social"*<sup>37</sup>.

Aspects of these contradictions can be easily distinguished in the town planning legislation of the time.

### **2.2.1. Attitudes on town planning before the 1923 Act**

Town Plans were elaborated as early as 1827, the year of the country's independence. However, most of these plans were only partly implemented<sup>38</sup>. Whereas conflict over land development had already become apparent from the time when Athens was declared as the country's capital, contemporary debate around various socio-economic aspects of town planning appeared much later. An interesting relevant document is the 1919 debate in the Parliament concerning the redevelopment of Thessaloniki's city centre after its destruction in the 1917 fire. This document is among the very few ones available on the subject. For this reason it will be examined more closely, as it is characteristic of the different contemporary approaches to town planning practice. Of great interest is the fact that many of the arguments provided then in support of, or against, Thessaloniki's Town Plan, remained on the agenda of town planning until very recently (see, chapter 3).

Thessaloniki's Town Plan, known by the name of its leading architect, E.Hebrard', concerned its central area that had been destroyed by the 1917 fire. The government expropriated those areas that were designed for transport and other public facilities and reallocated the building area on the basis of a layout of the streets that only partly followed Hebrard's Plan. A compulsory co-operative of the initial owners was set up and this, together with other restrictions concerning land sales, enabled them to compete in the newly created land market of the city centre (section 6.1 deals in greater detail with Hebrard's Plan).

There were three main issues that occupied this debate: land subdivision and its allocation to the initial or new owners; the role of the state in managing socially created externalities; and the general question of planned versus unplanned urban development.

The plan anticipated a minimum plot-size ranging from 200 to 1,500 square metres, and the ratio between the buildings and street areas raised strong criticism from the anti-Venizelist party. They advocated that further land subdivision was the only possible way to keep land values low and to enable previous owners to buy land in the areas affected by the plan. According to them, the main purpose of the plan should have been to economise as much building area as possible:

*"We must examine whether the plan was prepared with excessive luxury disproportionate to the city's economic base"*<sup>39</sup>.

In contrast to this view, Alexandros Papanastasiou, Minister of Transport at the time<sup>40</sup>, who was later responsible for the preparation of the 1923 Town Planning Act, took the opportunity to develop his social democratic views concerning the role of the state in respect of socially created surplus value. As early as 1919, Papanastasiou declared that not only land use, but also

*"... private ownership should be restricted because one or the other use of a plot affects the whole city"*<sup>41</sup>.

In the same speech Papanastasiou, A. went on to analyse the role of public revenue in the urban context:

*"... the meaning of public revenue in the cities is very broad, all the more since it was observed that urban growth results in a continuous increase of land values. The latter is in fact unjustified, because the owner of an urban site does not contribute anything. And what is the result? The States today tend to take over all or part of the value of these plots for the sake of social interest"*<sup>42</sup>.

The Venizelos administration, however, was much more moderate, committed basically to a centralised liberal democracy. Venizelos, E. himself opposed this argument by reassuring the Parliament that the government did not intend to nationalise land values in any way. The actual interest of the government centred on a type of planning, through which land would be allocated so as to be more efficient in view of the future growth trends, without interfering in the overall pattern of private landownership:

*"Before the fire there was [in the city centre] the owner of a small shop; today we will create space for a big store (...) Those owners who cannot afford to buy land in the centre can move out of that. This is the basis of our plan"*<sup>43</sup>.

Thus, the attitude adopted at the time considered planning as a necessary mechanism to increase land use efficiency in such areas, as the city centre, where competition was high.

All these issues were of course raised in the context of a city centre redevelopment. Therefore, they do not necessarily reflect the overall attitudes to urban development and planning. Yet, they are characteristic of the rising domination of the middle classes and their political commitment to reform state intervention in accordance with capitalist development. The point is that these views remained to a large extent as political arguments, similar to those encountered in later periods and which will be discussed in the next chapter. The answer to this problem lies mostly in the way urban land development and policy continued to be conditioned by the relations between the state and the socio-economic interests over land.

### **2.2.2. The 1923 Town Planning Act**

The 1923 Town Planning Act and the relevant legislation introduced in the same period constituted the basis of statutory planning until 1983 whereas it is practically still in action in many ways. According to this Act, every town and city in the country should be developed and regulated on the basis of a town plan approved by the central administration. Municipal authorities, national agencies, housing co-operatives, private developers and central administration could propose a town plan either for the whole city or for separate areas. With the exception of the plans prepared by the central administration, all proposals had to be approved by the municipal council. Approval by the municipal council was nonetheless in the nature of advice to the Minister in charge of town planning who was responsible for the final authorisation of the town plan.

Town plans essentially concerned the layout of the streets, other public sites, sites of private building and the general building regulations of each district of the city. Building regulations were also subject to the General Building Code as well as various presidential decrees.

The same Act described in detail a number of legal requirements necessary for the expropriation and compensation procedures, plot reallocations and the procedures for acquiring a building permit. Municipal authorities were mostly responsible for acquiring land for public use and compensating the affected owners. The same authorities were also in charge of carrying out all the relevant technical and

infrastructure works during the preparation and the implementation of the town plan. Planning authorities, that were under the control of the Ministry in charge of town planning, were entirely responsible for issuing building permits. It was clearly stated that,

*"... the design, implementation and the use of every building or any sort of building work inside or outside a town plan is under state control..."*<sup>44</sup>.

The 1923 Town Planning Act suggested that in the preparation of town plans account should be taken of the "maximum possible urban expansion trends". On the basis of this anticipation a town plan should define the boundaries of those parts that would be immediately implemented. Having confronted the expansion problem in this way, restrictions concerning development outside the boundaries of a town plan were prescribed in a later Decree, that of 23-10-1928. Development beyond the authorised area of a town plan was normally allowed only for building of special use, namely: industrial plants, hospital and other health centres, hotels of more than 50 rooms, educational buildings, stores etc. Housing building was allowed only on the basis of similarly inflexible regulations, namely when the site for development was at least 4,000 square metres and floor space did not exceed one tenth of the total area of the site.

In 1926 the first legislation concerning illegal building was endorsed by the 20-3-1926 Decree. According to this, "illegal building" was defined as that which either did not follow the plan's requirements or was constructed without a planning permit. Apart from the Planning Department, the Police was also responsible for examining whether a building in construction followed planning and building regulations. If it did not fulfil the plan's requirements law provided the relevant procedures for its demolition. Otherwise, when construction had been started, the case was examined by the Planning Department.

In 1929 the first General Building Code was also approved and with it the general directions of statutory town planning of the 1920s were completed. This Code, together with all the others introduced in later years, described in an extremely detailed and elaborate manner a series of building regulations such as plot-ratio, height of buildings, distance from streets, etc. These regulations varied on the basis of the size of a plot, its location and the development system proposed by the town plan. Of great interest is that these Codes treated building all over the national territory in an extremely homogeneous and unified way<sup>45</sup>.

### **2.2.3. Town Planning legislation: problems and contradictions**

So far, we have attempted to present the main issues with which town planning legislation was preoccupied. The following paragraphs include a criticism in respect of the core objectives and the overall nature of this legislation.

Planners in Greece have very often argued that, this legislation and, in particular, the 1923 Act, was a comprehensive and progressive piece of law at the time of its enactment<sup>46</sup>. According to these views, the later deficiencies in planning were either due to the fact that this legislation was only partly implemented or because it was inevitably outdated in the context of post-war urban development whereas no essential reform was introduced<sup>47</sup>. Obviously, these general assumptions are not enough to give a comprehensive historical account of the relations between planning legislation and the land development process. Also, since it remained fully in force until 1983, and partly up to now, a reconsideration of its basic character is necessary.

The 1923 Act and the Decrees relevant to it, intended, in fact, to cover all building and planning activities. To what extent, and in what respect, they did so remains to be viewed empirically and in relation to the process of urban land development. Nevertheless, such an intention is characteristic of the fact that urban planning was considered as an overall physical regulation of spatial activities through the implementation of a town plan. At the same time, it reflects the way modernisation was attempted.

While the 1923 Act indicated in detail all legal requirements for the bulk of public and private activities over land, apparently it paid less attention to the expected conflict over urban land development and its use. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to assess what was the dominant attitude with regard to the use of land and its development and how planning institutions intended to intervene in it. So, for instance, compulsory expropriations are considered necessary for the implementation of a town plan. Yet, the 1920s legislation dealt only implicitly with the general principles that should rule expropriation and compensation issues. Municipal authorities or planning agencies had to estimate compensation returns on the basis of a vaguely implied "market value". This, as much as it reflects the predominant ideas about private property, also indicates that the core interest of

planning was to safeguard the specific relations between state and private owners or developers through a sophisticated description of procedural issues.

The main concern of this legislation, when examined as a whole, was the quantitative development of land. There are two core concepts in the 1923 Act: The **"boundaries"** of a town plan (i.e. the area in which urban development is permitted), and the **"building use"**, in contrast to land use. The Act was entirely concerned with the development inside the authorised area of the town plan. This development was basically considered as one tracing the building blocks for private and public use, and determining the general standards of development. The introduction of the General Building Code and its close connections to planning legislation was another factor that led planning and its agencies to being exclusively concerned with the plot-ratio.

Land-use, on the other hand, was essentially defined as a distinction between private and public areas. Although concern for the need of public space - one of the most acute problems in Greek town planning nowadays - was explicit in the 1923 Act, there is little doubt that high demand for land and housing, and a market oriented attitude to land expropriation, have prevented this concern from being put into force. Above all, the development process was determined in such a way (see, section 2.3), that the **"boundaries"** of any town-plan together with plot-ratio became the most controversial issues of the Greek post-war planning practice.

Another important element was the approach to central-local relations inherent in the town planning legislation. The 1923 Act was perhaps alone in anticipating a more active role for local government, compared to the legislation introduced in the post-war period; nonetheless, it did not dispute the principles of the 1912 Local Government Act, according to which local authorities were entirely subject to the control of the central administration<sup>48</sup>. In this respect, local government had no authority either to approve a town-plan or even any minor revision thereof. The permanent fiscal crisis of local government, on the other hand, did not allow it to carry out infrastructure and expropriation works. This was one of the main reasons of the limited provision of space for public use:

*"The perennial financial crisis of all municipalities which are usually at the verge of bankruptcy, means that implementation of plans proceeds without the provision of much of the service infrastructure contained in the urban plan, above all the public open spaces"*<sup>49</sup>.



#### 2.2.4. The 1929 Property Law

The 1929 Property Law (374/4-1-1929 Act) cannot be classified as part of the town planning legislation but the overall urban policy of the period. It is a piece of legislation whose repercussions upon residential land development were of utmost importance. Following the French model of Property Law, this Act removed all barriers preventing the easy transfer of freehold land, and established it as the only system of tenure. This facilitated the multi-storey building development on the basis of a freehold land system. The latter had been in force in parts of the Greek territory, namely Crete, Samos and Eptanesa, since the nineteenth century. It was also implemented in the redevelopment of Thessaloniki's centre after the fire as well as in the case of refugee rehabilitation. By the 1929 Property Law the freehold system became the only system of land holding for all national territory.

The freehold system had been advocated by the anti-Venizelist party since the 1919 debate on Thessaloniki's Town Plan. At that time the Venizelos government had dismissed its general use, on the grounds that such a system should be applicable only in cases of large size land properties. Strong pressures for land supply and the further expansion of home-ownership as the dominant tenure of urban housing, led the Venizelos administration to remove all barriers to the freehold ownership of land. This Act, put fully in action in 1933, provided the legal background for the expansion of the *antiparohi* system that dominated housing development in the inner urban areas (see, section 2.3).

The government declared that the main objectives of this Law were to: increase housing supply, and hence cope with the unemployment problem, a policy that was repeatedly followed during the post-war years; facilitate land allocation in complicated cases, such as land distribution between members of a family, i.e. co-ownership, a problem that became quite acute in the case of land distributed by the state; and, finally, open the way towards the abolition of rent control that was argued to have been as one of the causes of housing shortage since the beginning of the century<sup>50</sup>. There is no doubt that expansion of the freehold system went hand in hand with land policies of the same period, through which land supply was gradually transformed to an unrestrainedly supplied good.

Moreover, two other interesting views were put forward in support of the new Property Law. On the one hand, it was considered that a law which facilitated free

transfer of single dwellings, and therefore multi-storey development, would counteract the excessive urban sprawl that was the main trend of urban growth in this period:

*"The big cities have already expanded dangerously. This Act will facilitate city growth by increasing the density of inner areas, and hence municipal authorities and central administration will be able to cope more easily with infrastructure works.."*<sup>51</sup>.

Nonetheless urban expansion at this period was not actually so great as to be considered excessive. Moreover, apart from Greater Athens, other urban centres, even Greater Thessaloniki, did not expand on a large scale in the post-war period. This hostility towards urban expansion was also characteristic of later urban policy.

On the other hand, it became evident that this Act aimed at facilitating the owner-occupied sector, which presupposes

*"... free, rapid and unquestionable transfer of small land plots and single dwellings..."*<sup>52</sup>.

Whereas small landownership in the urban periphery led to the domination of the owner occupied sector in the form of small, self-built houses, the new Law would enable this sector to expand in inner areas in the form of apartment buildings, and thus make it less necessary for middle-income groups to move to the outskirts, where land was cheaper:

*"... through this institution ... it will be possible, with rather small assets, to build multi-storey houses inside the city. Hence, the small owner, the relatively well-off refugee, the civil servant, the intellectual, will be able to acquire a self-owned dwelling ... with relatively small expenditure (...) therefore, the present tenant ... will not have to move to the outskirts of the city in order to seek for housing"*<sup>53</sup>.

As we shall see in the following discussion never such a parliamentary manifestation proved to be so true as the above one.

Having established the major historical influences on land allocation and development, we can now move on to examine their actual effects upon post-war housing development and provision.

### 2.3. Post-war housing development

The housing shortage in Greece, already severe in the pre-war period, was considerably aggravated when 30% of the existing stock was destroyed in the Second World War, and further destruction followed in the 1946-49 Civil War. An increase of population by 10% in the decade 1951-1961 and the high rates of internal migration also contributed to this severe shortage<sup>54</sup>. The post-war housing boom, common to all European countries, started in Greece at the beginning of the 1950s. From this time onwards the construction of new housing increased steadily until 1974, the year of a short run but sharp decrease in housing construction. Housing became the dominant sector in the process of gross fixed capital formation. Before 1960, investment in dwellings represented 33.8% of the total gross fixed capital investment. During the whole period 1958-1980 gross investment in dwellings averaged 30% of total gross fixed capital formation, while the corresponding figure for manufacturing industry was 14,2%.

This rapid increase in house building during 1950-80, and the apparent domination of this sector in post-war investment trends became two of the major objectives of economic analysis and policy debate in Greece. Assuming that house building belongs mainly to the consumer sector, these trends were considered among the most serious problems in the country's economic development<sup>55</sup>. On these grounds housing investment has often been seen as a barrier to industrial development.

This emphasis on the "over-investment"<sup>56</sup> trends in house building has led to an analytical deadlock with clear implications for the evaluation and formation of housing policy<sup>57</sup>. Although some economists have argued that it is the structural weakness of industrial development that have led to the flow of capital into housing investment, they have tended to neglect the role of housing production *per se*<sup>58</sup>. A trend that became more evident in the 1980s, when investment in housing had fallen considerably, but its role remained of great importance in the economic strategy of an individual family. Furthermore, this approach shows similar weakness to the urban analysis, that is, an underestimation of the residential development process as a whole. In this sense it has tended to neglect the combined action, of historically specific forms of housing production, ownership of land and the plurality of forms of state intervention in land allocation and the provision of housing.


After a brief account of the national trends in housing activity and its relationships to some of the basic characteristics of post-war social development, this section will proceed with an analysis at an overall level of the basic forms of housing provision and the characteristics of the residential development process which they entail.

### 2.3.1. The growth and decline of the housing sector

The post-war housing boom was dominated by the private sector. Public sector building, although significant in the immediate post-war period, almost disappeared after 1960. In 1948-1950 the public share in housing investment was 35%, in 1951-58 it was 8-15% and after 1958 fell to 3-5%. In terms of production, during 1954-1958 public housing amounted to 32.5% of the total number of new dwellings, in 1959-62 6.6% and after 1962 the figure fell below 2%<sup>59</sup>. The special nature of public housing has made private building to become almost the only sector in housing production during the entire post-1960 period.

Since there is a lack of complete data on public housing and also on private non-authorised activity, the following examination concerns only the trends in the private authorised sector. Diagram 1 shows the construction of new dwellings per year for the whole period 1961-89 and table 2.4 describes the average construction of new dwellings per each five-years period.

**Diagram 1. Trends in new dwellings construction, 1961-89**



**Table 2.4.** Dwelling output in the period 1954-89

<i>Year</i>	<i>Yearly average number of new dwellings</i>	<i>Average rate of growth (%)</i>
1954-59	31,788	
1960-64	49,854	56.8
1965-69	97,640	95.8
1970-74	137,580	40.9
1975-79	131,741	-4.2
1980-84	106,627	-19.1
1985-89	106,183	-0.42

source: ESYE, Statistical Yearbooks 1954-89.

Four basic periods in the trends of new house buildings can be noted. During the first period, from the beginning of the 1950s up to 1963, although dwelling production increased at high rates (in 1954-57 investment in housing reached the record figure of 40% of the total Gross Fixed Asset Formation) it was not high enough to cover the existing shortage. In 1961, the shortage was estimated from 350,000 to 580,000 dwellings<sup>60</sup>.

In the next period, 1963-73, the yearly construction increased more rapidly, with the exception of two short declines in 1967 and 1970. The problem of shortage was in fact resolved during this period accompanied by a gradual improvement in housing standards. In 1971, the average number of persons per dwelling fell from 4.07 to 3.31 and the average number of persons per room dropped to 1.14. Nevertheless, the housing problem still remained serious, in particular for low-income groups. An important proportion, 11.3%, of the population was living in dwellings of more than two persons per room, and 64.5% had neither bathroom or indoors lavatory.

In the period 1974-79, under the influence of the 1974 economic crisis, housing construction initially suffered its first serious post-war decline. Although housing construction increased in the following years, the 1974 crisis was considered by the construction industry as a set-back with serious repercussions for the future of the housing sector. These claims were proved to be unfounded: the construction of new dwellings increased at higher rates in the following years, and reached, in 1979, the highest ever figure of 189,195 new dwellings. In fact, during 1977-79, the average construction of new dwellings per year reached a record point of an average 162,215 new dwellings per year. In the years 1976-80, despite the fall in 1980, the average

annual construction exceeded the target of 130,000 dwellings set by the 1976-80 National Development Plan by 23%<sup>61</sup>. Indeed, the 1970s ended with an "over-investment" in the housing sector<sup>62</sup>.

After the 1979 peak, a phase of decline began in 1980, with more long term characteristics than the 1974 decline. In the period 1980-89, house-building fell to a level of 106,000 dwellings per year, with the lowest production, 72,851 new dwellings, in 1984. Although this figure is a little higher than the corresponding one of the late 1960s, it was the first time that a declining trend in housebuilding had showed more long-term characteristics. The slow increase of the output after 1985 did not lead to previous standards of production.

A number of reasons have been set forth to explain these trends, ranging from the sharp increase in construction costs, the high levels of interest rates, and rent control, to the post-1980 economic recession. The slowing down of urbanisation trends was also considered of utmost importance<sup>63</sup>. Of course, the decline of housebuilding should be evaluated in relation to the fact that the five-years period 1975-79 saw an over-production of housing, which led to the creation of surplus stock. A more systematic account of the repercussions of all the above factors upon housing activity should be provided. Construction costs, for example, had increased since 1974, but housing construction flourished in later years. Research on the characteristics of this crisis that would lead to more realistic explanations is also inadequate.

The effects of the housing crisis in the 1980s varied in relation to housing tenure, geographical areas or type of housing provision. The major change was undoubtedly a reduction of the housing surplus. After the mid-1980s, the latter led to an apparently severe shortage in the rental sector. The supply of privately rented housing, the only alternative form of housing besides owner occupation, was restricted for the first time since the beginning of the 1960s. A change that was an upheaval for the structure of the housing market, which, during 1975-85 had been formed in such a way that covered demand in both the owner-occupied and the rental sector<sup>64</sup>.

A more comprehensive explanation of these changes lies in the understanding of the nature of the residential development process and its relation to socio-economic structures.

### 2.3.2. The role of the housing sector and its links to the family economy

The following section examines, from a macroscopic point of view, the domination of the housing sector in post-war economic development. In addition, we sketch out the links between the housing sector and the family economy, more specifically, the economic strategy of an individual family.

Throughout the entire period 1958-1980, the distribution of investment in different sectors remained relatively unchanged (table 2.5). Investment in housing represented a little less than a third of the total investment in Gross Domestic Asset Formation. This characteristic was attributed partly to the flow of internal investment sources and banking finance from manufacturing into housing and the real estate market. More important was the fact that this flow did not take the form of investment in industrial enterprises but was directed to the consumer sector, where the purchase of new houses and real estate property was particularly high<sup>65</sup>. Furthermore, capital was attracted into housing, despite the fact that returns of investment in this sector were lower than those in manufacture<sup>66</sup>.

**Table 2.5. Gross Domestic Asset Formation**  
(by branch of industry)

<i>Sector</i>	<i>1958-74</i>	<i>1975-80</i>	<i>1981-88</i>
Dwellings	30.0	30.2	24.6
Infrastructure (Energy, Transport, Communications)	28.5	28.0	29.1
Manufacture	13.7	15.2	16.1
Agriculture	11.6	8.6	7.1
Other	16.2	18	23.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*source: ESYE, Yearly Statistical Books.*

Thus, the housing sector had a leading role in the country's economy throughout all post-war period until 1980. This leading role should be attributed partly to the weaknesses of other sectors, in particular, the manufacturing sector and its structural problems. It is worth mentioning that until 1963-64, the Greek economy was dominated by a large number of small firms concentrated in a few consumer oriented branches of industry, and organised on the basis of traditional forms of

production. After 1963-64, there was a relative change in this structure. Until 1973, and as multinational capital penetrated industry, investment was characterised by a shift towards capital and intermediate industrial manufactures. Nevertheless, the domestic capital remained relatively static. This became more evident after the beginning of the 1970s.

This leading position of the housing sector changed in the 1980s when, for the first time in the post-war period, dwellings had the second place in Gross Domestic Asset Formation, after infrastructure. However, this change cannot be attributed to any wider economic restructuring. The 1980s saw a gradual shift of economy to more traditional production, in terms of industrial plants or in terms of the method of production. This shift was so crucial that, in a time of crisis, Greek economy was dominated by

*"... an industry fragmented into a large number of small firms, with very small productivity, without any autonomous technological base, with few organic linkages to each other and whose viability was dependent upon state protection and the continuous transfer of ... resources in the form of subsidies"*<sup>67</sup>.

Thus, the above mentioned changes should rather be attributed to a decline of investment in housing *per se*. Our fieldwork from Thessaloniki (section 5.4) suggests that a number of changes in the development process, especially those related to the structure of the speculative market and land availability for speculative housing, were of particular importance.

Despite these macroscopic trends, we hold that the propensity in investing in housing has not changed considerably. As the rental housing proved to be an expensive investment with rather low returns<sup>68</sup>, there was a change of investment propensity to small housing for second residence, either in resort areas or in small towns and villages, where access to ownership of rural parcels is high. This is due to inheritance reasons as well as the close links of the urban households with their home in the countryside. Unfortunately there exists no separate data for this category of housing. Furthermore a large part of second-residence housing belongs to the unauthorised sector, which is not registered (see, section 2.3.3). Once again, the level of investment affected rather the privately rented part of the speculative sector than the entire housing market.



Therefore, the role of the housing sector remained particularly important in the organisation of a family-based economy. Petty property-ownership plays a founding part in the way the **economic strategy of a family** is realised. This form of family economy, revived during the post-1975 period, is characterised by a flexible and multiple interchange of economic activities and has been based upon

*"... securing employment in the public sector of at least one member of the family, a temporary (but intensive) employment in agricultural production and a temporary employment in formal or hidden services often connected to formal public services"*<sup>69</sup>.

Hence, the Greek household is not an economic unit in itself. The actual unit of consumption and investment is the family. A Greek household handles its income problems and prospects with a **"family income strategy"**, making the family to function


*"... as an enterprise that maximises its income inputs"*<sup>70</sup>.

Within this strategy the public sector, in particular, and the service sector, in general, have a special gravity: the first is a source of "steady income"; the second provides the possibility for "informal income" and a future exit from the salaried situation. To the informal sources of income one should include income deriving from the housing sector, both the urban rental and the tourist sector. It has been estimated that informal income from dwellings reaches 90% of the formally declared income from the same sector<sup>71</sup>.

Land- and home-ownership, as determined by the historical conditions described in section 2.1, became in their turn not simply an element of "security" as is often argued, but also a crucial input in the organisation of family economy. This commodity enters the speculative sector, with the owner as a basic partner, and produces new income and family property. The fluidity of rural landed property, which can be easily transformed into urban or other, such as tourist, landed property plays an essential part<sup>72</sup>. Rural property in many cases operates either as a complementary income from agriculture or as a residential income from its conversion to residential property<sup>73</sup>.

In figure 1, we sketch out this family income strategy and its connections to real estate property and housing.

Figure 1. Family income strategy



More empirical research is, of course, necessary in order to identify the nature of this socio-economic structure, so dominant in Greek everyday life. This type of social organisation, with the family economy playing a crucial role, is reflected in a **fluidity** of social relations, whether economic or ideological<sup>74</sup>. A number of issues are raised in the examination of the residential development process and the form of state involvement, that can be better understood against this background.

### 2.3.3. Forms of housing development

In the previous discussion, we examined the growth of the housing sector, its dominance in the urban economy and its linkages to certain structural characteristics, especially the nature of the family-economy. Within a context of a rapidly growing housing sector and a land supply dominated by small ownership, certain forms of housing provision and residential development were created, the

dynamics of which will be examined here. It is in the framework of these forms of housing provision and residential development that urban policy operates. In the following section we shall examine at a national level the basic forms of housing provision and their interrelations with the structure of landownership and the developing industry.

Having already commented on the specific nature of state housing, we will focus here on the private sector and the two main systems of housing provision that dominated urban housing: a) the system of *antiparohi*, and b) the **small housebuilding** in the periphery of urban areas.

Through the system of *antiparohi*, a land owner provides land for the developer and gets in return a percentage of the developed property. The term "rate of *antiparohi*" stands for the proportion of developed property that goes to the land owner (figure 2). The partnership between a land owner and a developer is not considered officially as entrepreneurial activity and therefore is not taxed as such<sup>75</sup>.

**Figure 2.** A schematic picture of *antiparohi*

marketed
property
by the
developer
rate
of
<i>antiparohi</i>

Thus, the essential element of this system is that no financial investment by the developer is involved in the development process for the purchase of land. For *antiparohi* to operate efficiently and on a profitable base there are three important prerequisites:

- a. an extensive system of small land holding in which land supply is almost unrestricted (i.e. non-monopolistic);
- b. a unified system of free-hold land ownership, through which control over land is transferred from the initial owner to all new owners of the developed property;
- c. high plot-ratios that give a profitable investment for both the landowner and the developer.

The first two conditions had gradually been determined by the inter-war land allocation policy. *Antiparohi*, however, operated at an extensive scale throughout the post-war period, when demand was very high, and became the dominant system of development in the inner areas where plot-ratio was formed at high levels.

*Antiparohi* constituted the basis for the growth of speculative apartment building and operated in close relation to the small, personally based, housebuilding industry. As soon as the plot-ratio was high enough for the developer to get a profitable yield, he would start construction with very little capital and was able to finance it from the sales that were completed during the process of construction. When *antiparohi* entered the housing market of a certain area, due to its structure in small plots, land was immediately released for development and to such an extent that land availability never became a barrier to the development process.

On the other hand granted that housebuilding industry remained small and traditionally organised, *antiparohi* became the only viable system for speculative development. It is not surprising that when housing production fell drastically in 1974, and in 1980-84, no reorganisation of this sector took place, as this did not seem to be necessary for *antiparohi* to operate efficiently.

Another important element in this pattern of development is that it is not only related to small landownership in the whole real-estate market, but that it also leads to further fragmentation of this ownership. Naturally, this system aims principally at the owner-occupied sector, which, despite its gradual decline remained particularly high (see, tables B3 & B4, Appendix B). The owner-occupied sector in the urban areas declined from 67% in 1957-58 to 60% in 1981. However, there are signs for an increase of this sector in the following years (see, section 5.4). *Antiparohi* became gradually more and more dependent upon home-ownership. The dramatic crisis of the privately rented sector after 1980 and the overall housing decline is related to these characteristics of *antiparohi*. At the same time, the patterns of ownership created by this system, constituted a barrier both to urban renewal and conservation in the inner areas.

**Small housebuilding**, on the other hand, was the main system of development in the periphery of big urban centres. This type of building has been classified as "**unauthorised**" or "**illegal**" building, a term which focuses mainly on the fact that the bulk of this development took place outside an approved town-plan and without

conforming to the requirements of the planning legislation. The obscurity of this term is evident, as, due to its emphasis on the non-authorised aspect, it neglects the specific nature of development in the urban fringe<sup>76</sup>. Nevertheless, as it will be seen in chapter 4, this "institutional" aspect is important at a certain stage of the development process and it represents a specific relation between planning legislation, the structure and the legal situation of landed property and development. The terms "unauthorised" or "illegal" will be used here, on the grounds that they sum up the institutional situation of development patterns in the urban fringe<sup>77</sup>.

The national statistics of "non-authorised" activity available do not cover the whole period under examination. "Non-authorised" activity fell from around 35% of the total private activity to 13% during 1955-59 and it increased to 20% until the mid-1960s. Sixty five percent of this activity was concentrated in Athens. After 1965, there were signs for a gradually decrease of this activity to an average of 10%<sup>78</sup>. However, later periods, in particular after the mid-1970s, saw a rise in non-authorised activity, and a considerable change of its geographical distribution. Non-authorised activity was increased sharply in the second-residence housing sector in resort areas. Many of these areas are near the two big urban centres thus operating as new locations as well as types of suburbanisation. By the end of the 1980s it was estimated that one in five buildings in Greece were built initially as unauthorised<sup>79</sup>.

The lack of data on the non-authorised house building does not allow for an overall estimation of the relative share of small house building in the total housing sector. In any case, it is of particular importance to understand the development process incorporated in this form of house building. Despite its relative decline in the two urban centres, it was, and, to a certain extent, it still remains, one of the dominant systems of housing provision in the urban fringe, the main force of urban expansion and conversion of land use, and above all the centre of controversy in the formulation of urban policy.

As with the case of *antiparohi*, the essential element of this form of housing provision was land structure and, more specifically, the structure of agricultural land and the process of subdivision in the urban periphery. Land subdivision had already started before the last war and ran contrary to the respective planning legislation due to its inflexibility concerning urban expansion. Post-war migration trends intensified this process, through which the already small and non-profitable agricultural plot was subdivided into small plots which entered the urban land

market. Of interest to this thesis are the mechanisms through which land subdivision was promoted. It has often been argued that speculators entered the land market in the urban fringe as early as the beginning of the 1940s. However, evidence from Greater Thessaloniki suggests that this was only partially true (see, chapter 5). The main promoters of land subdivision were the owners of the agricultural land themselves, while state land allocation played a very important role in this process.

In this respect we could assume that land supply in the urban periphery was also non-monopolistic. This facilitated access to land for the new migrant, for whom the purchase of a land plot was the first stage of his movement to an urban centre. Another characteristic of the development in the urban fringe was its linkages to the system of *antiparohi*, an aspect which has been neglected by the relative literature. These linkages were reflected upon the pressures for the expansion of the town plan.

## 2.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter is an account of the national level of three major issues related to the residential development process and urban policy.

First, it analysed how contemporary forms of landownership were established. The role of the state was highlighted in particular in its consideration to public and private land. It was argued that the territorial and social transitions led the Greek State to administer large parts of land but always with the intention to privatise this land. This policy was integrated by the 1917 Agrarian Reform which became the basis of land policy throughout the 20th century. The inflow of the refugees after the Asia Minor disaster put this policy into practice and led to a widening of access to land for both the urban and rural areas.

It was argued that the principal purpose of the Rehabilitation Programme in the urban areas was the "one-family, one plot" objective. As for the rural areas the needs for as much land as possible led to an excessive fragmentation in agricultural land.

This chapter continued with an analysis of planning policy in the 1920s. It was revealed that during this period a number of very forward aspects were at the political agenda related to the use of urban space and its allocation. The 1923 Planning Act, however, had to compromise different views and aimed principally at

a statutory framework for setting the physical boundaries for development. The same period saw the authorisation of a Property Law which was to facilitate multi-storey development that characterised residential development in later periods. A hostility towards urban expansion seems to stem from this period.

Finally, this chapter examined the trends in housing development, throughout the period 1950-1989. The rise and decline of the housing sector was examined and a tentative explanation for the changes occurred was attempted. We argued that the effects of the changing trends were different in the two sectors of the housing market: the owner occupied and the privately rented sector. Furthermore a scheme was provided on the close links between the housing sector and the family income strategy, a crucial feature in Greek social organisation. Finally, this chapter outlined the characteristics of two dominant systems of housing provision, the *antiparohi* market and the small house building in the form of unauthorised building.

## 2. 5. Notes for chapter 2

1. The forms of this "subordination" are dependent upon the nature of the transition in each country. Dobb, M. et al. 1982, reflect the controversy and the debate around this issue.
2. Massey, D & Catalano, A. 1978, have provided an interesting analysis of these relations in the case of Great Britain. Property relations have attracted the interest of urban history and sociology (see, for example, Elliot, B. & McCrone, D., 1982).
3. We are referring here to the debate around urban rent and its influence from theories of land rent traditionally applied in agriculture. Ball, M. et al. (eds.), 1985, have summarised these problems and made an attempt to develop an understanding of the role of landed property in the non-agricultural context. Barrett, S. & Healey, P. (eds.), 1985, provided a comprehensive account of land policy as a unitary field of study, which highlights the interrelations between urban and rural land.
4. There was a long-standing debate in Greece about the time and the forms of the transition to capitalism. Moskof, K. 1972; Tsoukalas, K. 1975; Svoronos, N. 1976; Dertilis, G. 1977; Mouzelis, N. 1978 & 1986; Vergopoulos, K. 1975; and others, offer different aspects of this issue.
5. Most of the writers referred in note 4 have highlighted the role of *diaspora* and its "comprador" character in relation to the relative underdevelopment of the indigenous bourgeoisie. More specifically see, Moskof, K. 1972; Tsoukalas, K. 1975 pp.. 269-371; Dertilis, G. 1977, pp. 13-39.
6. McMahon, M., 1985, provides an interesting analysis of the role of property rights on town planning for the case of Great Britain.
7. The area of "national lands" is dubious. The estimates vary between one third and three fourths of the total cultivated land (Stefanidis, D., 1953).
8. The transitions in the situation of ownership in the 17th and 18th century are analysed in Kremmydas, V., 1976, p.p. 47-61.
9. Vergopoulos, K. (1975 & 1978), makes this point in his analysis of the agrarian question in Greece.
10. Different aspects of this obscurity are described by Tsoukalas, K. 1975, pp. 71-84 and Vergopoulos, K. 1975, pp. 104-115. Tsoukalas, K. highlights the confusion in the management and the administration of this property, whereas Vergopoulos stresses the problems which rose between peasants and the state as nationalisation resulted to a separation economic and legal control over land.
11. A point made by Psarros, P.K. 1958, in Tsoukalas, 1975, p. 75.
12. The appeals for the creation of a National Cadastre are very old. See, for instance the analysis of Photopoulos, G. (1939 & 1953). For a review of the problem see, Rokos, D. 1981.
13. Tsoukalas, K. 1975, p.79.
14. Dertilis, G. 1977, provides an analysis of the character of the 1909 coup and its repercussions in later social development.
15. Although many writers consider industrial development of the 1922-36 period as the basic indication for the country's transition to capitalism, one should not overestimate



these trends. The most important aspect of this period was the expansion of the labour force and an increased investment in infrastructure by the state. However, these trends were not enough to change drastically the socio-economic structures. For a review and a thorough discussion on the subject see, Tsoulouvis, L., 1985, p.p. 55-66.

16. Mouzelis, N. (1983 & 1984), considers this period as one in which a transformation to what he call "post-oligarchic" politics took place. According to this view, the rising middle classes, proceeded in the implementation of a series of reform after they managed to consolidate their position against the old oligarchies.
17. Tsoulouvis, L. p. 64.
18. This is the main argument of Vergopoulos, K. (1975 & 1978).
19. Stefanidis, D., 1953, p.97.
20. Leontidou, L. 1981, pp. 138-39, suggests that the government and EAP did, in fact, favoured the development of these jobs, often classified as a way to deal with abundant labour. Further discussion on the subject is provided by Leontidou, L. 1989.
21. In 1955 this property comprised 92,711 estates, 18,320 of which were urban estates (Pentzopoulos, N. 1962, p.334). This property is only partially registered (see, also section 3.1.1).
22. Pentzopoulos, op. cit. p.145.
23. A classification of the relevant legislation is included in Giannakouros, P.E. 1985.
24. Seitaniadis, A. 1982. He also argues that the implementation of these complementary allocations was in contradiction to the reallocation programme which the Minister of Agriculture launched after 1950.
25. Ancel, J. 1930, p.p. 105-210, offers a detailed account of the refugee rehabilitation in Macedonia. For a brief review, see Negreponti-Delivani, M. 1973.
26. Pentzopoulos, op.cit. p.157.
27. Fifty six percent of these families were shed dwellers or former shed dwellers and the rest were living in rented accommodation, (Pentzopoulos, op.cit. p.337).
28. Leontidou, L. 1981, p.137.
29. League of Nations, Official Journals, 8th year, no 8, July 1927, p.247 in Pentzopoulos, op.cit. p.155.
30. Gizeli, V.D. 1984, based on Castell's approach to social housing, analyses the urban refugee settlement programme simply on the basis of collective consumption and does not take into consideration the new land and housing structures created by this programme as well as its consequences in later housing development.
31. It should be remembered here that most of this legislation, including the 1923 Act, are government Decrees not debated in the Parliament. In addition in 1923, when the Town Planning Act was endorsed, the Parliament had dissolved following the 1922 Asia Minor Disaster. The Act was later approved by the Parliament, but the records of parliamentary debate in this period are kept only in outline form.
32. Urry, J. 1981, p.115-16.
33. We are referring here to views of planning as a rational-solving problem that were developed in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (Davidoff, P. & Reiner, T.A. 1962; McLoughlin, J.B. 1969; Chadwick, G.F. 1971; Faludi, A. (ed.) 1973; Hall, P.

- 1975; and others). For a<sup>7</sup> overview of various approaches to planning theory and its critique see, Healey, P. et. al. (eds.), 1982.
34. Tsoukalas, K. 1975, p.p. 164-266; Leontidou, L. 1981, p.p. 66-109.
  35. Dimitrakopoulos, A., (1937 p. 1077) points out that the poor household searched for cheap but self-owned home.
  36. Alivizatos, N. 1983, pp 33-36, has analysed the crisis of the political institutions that led to the fall of constitutional liberalism. Aspects of these problems are also highlighted by Svoronos, N. (1976 & 1985).
  37. Svolos, N. 1923, Constitutional Reform, Athens, Themis, p. xx, in Alivizatos, N. 1983, p.36.
  38. The best known case is the master plan of Athens created by Kleanthis and Shaubert and modified by Klentze in 1834. This plan aroused strong opposition from the local landowners and for this reason it was implemented only in a rather small area. A review of pre-1923 town planning is provided by Wassenhoven, L. 1984, Filippidis, D. 1984, Gerolympos, A. & Papamichos, N. 1985.
  39. *Gazette of Parliamentary Debates*, 16-12-1919, p.149.
  40. From 1914 the Ministry of Transport was in charge of Town Planning. Later, this responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Public Works; in 1945 to the Ministry of Reconstruction; in 1953 to the Ministry of Social Welfare and later in this year to the Ministry of Public Works; in 1979 to the newly created Ministry of Physical Planning, Housing and Environment. In 1985, the latter emerged with the Ministry of Public Works under the name, Ministry of Physical Planning, Environment and Public Works.
  41. *Gazette of Parliamentary Debates*, op. cit., p.154.
  42. op. cit.
  43. op. cit. p.151.
  44. 1923 Town Planning Act, article 52.
  45. The title "General Code of the State" (the underlying is ours) is worth noting. In this respect the long-standing claims of the Architectural Associations, that the Building Code determined architectural design in an *ad-hoc* manner and was the cause of the architectural poverty in the country, are not exaggerated. Only much later when buildings of architectural value were demolished one after the other, some regulations concerning architectural preservation were introduced. It was through these regulations that local peculiarities in building development were partly considered. The implementation of these regulations is, however questionable.
  46. See, for example Wassenhoven, L. 1984, p.16.
  47. Martinos, H., 1979, emphasises the partial implementation of the 1923 Act without giving an explanation of this issue; KEPE, 1976c, highlights the outdating of this legislation.
  48. On the powers and the problems of Local Government in Greece see, KEPE, 1976a and Yiannakou, A. 1981.
  49. Wassenhoven, L. 1984, p.17.
  50. *Gazette of Parliamentary Debates*, 18-1-1928.
  51. op.cit. p. 814.

52. Ball, M., 1983, p.29.
53. See, note 51.
54. In 1947, the number of persons per room was 2.5 and only by the beginning of the 1960s did this figure fall to the 1940 rate of 1.88 persons per room (Ellis, H., 1965, pp. 209-10).
55. "The fact that they [dwellings] absorb 31% of the total fixed capital formation involves serious risks for a developing economy", Negreponi-Delivani, M., 1981, pp. 255-56. Particularly critical to these trends is the analysis by Ellis, H. 1962, pp. 205-34, who not only argues that housing building is a "non-productive" investment, but also challenges the prevailing policy attitude that construction activity is conducive to employment.
56. Criticism of the "over-investment" thesis has been provided by Emmanuel, D. 1979. He argues that given the rise in income levels and its positive relation to housing demand, housing investment trends were not abnormal. He also criticises the prevailing approach to the "productivity" of the housing sector. For a further discussion on this issue see in a European context see, Folin, M. 1985.
57. Naturally such an approach lays emphasis solely on the relation between housing development and policies on inflation and employment, but it does not offer a comprehensive account of housing policy.
58. See, Papantoniou, Y. 1979; Yiannitsis, T. 1983.
59. Emmanuel, D., 1979, p.88, and Gratsias, N., 1979, p.83. An analysis of the role of the housing sector is provided by Kotzamanis, V. & Maloutas, T., 1985, and Yiannakou, A. 1988.
60. Ellis, H. 1965, pp. 211-14 & 220-22; Gratsias, N. 1979, p.85. These estimates were made on the basis of two persons room.
61. KEPE, 1976b.
62. Emmanuel, D., 1990 considers the second half of the 1970s a period of excessive building by any standards.
63. For a macroscopic analysis see Emmanuel, D. (1987 & 1990) and Kotzamanis, V. 1987.
64. An upheaval so typically expressed in the numerous "first-page" newspaper reports about the crisis of the rental market. This issue created a number of "myths" around the situation of the housing market, such as the level of house prices, rents and so on. Emmanuel, D., 1991 argues that the housing market in Greece suffers from the operation of a systematic "para-information".
65. Papantoniou, Y. 1979, p. 61.
66. Negreponi-Delivani, M., 1981, p.532.
67. Yiannitsis, T., 1983, p.360. On these grounds he argues that the nature of economic crisis in Greece is "micro-economic". Later developments made this argument to be proved absolutely right.
68. Stergiou, D. (1990) points out that returns from rents were reduced from 12% in the beginning of the 1970s to 3% by the end of the 1980s.
69. Tsoukalas, K. 1986, p.23. He provided this analysis about the role of the family economy and its influence in the social structure of Greece.
70. Simitis, K., p.13.

71. Pavlopoulos, G.P., 1987, p. 175. He argues that the housing sector has the first position in informal economy.
72. This point is also made by Karabelias, G. , 1989, p. 79. The role of petty property in Greece has been analysed by Moshonas, A., 1986.
73. It is worth mentioning that a large part of owners of small agricultural parcels (about 49% in 1977) is working in non-agricultural sectors, Karabelias, G., op.cit.
74. Tsoukalas, K. 1986 and Karabelias, G. 1989 provide an analysis of social relations and their "fluid" nature. The sharp difference with typical class structure is therefore evident.
75. This point was made by Sophoulis, K. (1980) only to cause a number of reactions from the construction circles (see the answers by Kouloumbis, E, 1980 and Pampoukis, G., 1980).
76. Emmanuel, D. 1981.
77. There is also another important sub-sector of small housebuilding in the urban fringe that is not illegal. It concerns middle-class houses, built outside a town plan and which fulfil the legal requirements. This sector increased considerably in the 1980s as new patterns of suburbanisation trends towards the wider areas of the large urban centres. However, this category is not examined here.
78. Leontidou, L., 1981 provides estimates which cover the period 1955-69.
79. This estimate was made by Pirounakis, G., 1992.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF A PLANNING REFORM**

---

The previous discussion aimed at setting out in an historical analysis a number of structural influences upon urban land development. In this discussion we highlighted the role of the policies and programmes for land allocation in the 1920s, and we argued that it was mainly through them that the specific patterns of state intervention in the private land market were determined. We also pointed out that this intervention was centred on three issues: The interaction between state and small landowners, the obscure situation of land ownership and the complicated, and very often contradictory, land law. Against this background, the town planning machinery, formulated in the 1920s and remaining in force for almost all the period under study, was concerned primarily with indicating the physical boundaries of urban development rather than laying down a specific framework of state intervention in urban land allocation.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: On the one hand to examine in detail the way post-war Greek governments have addressed themselves to major issues in urban land development, and on the other hand, to analyse the various attempts made during the period 1974-89 to institutionalise a more contemporary system of urban planning. An understanding of the political and institutional responses to land development processes cannot be acquired solely from their interaction with the existing patterns of this development. A number of other aspects have to be taken also into consideration. In the Greek case, the most prominent one is the contradiction that arises from the way institutions and ideologies have been formed in an environment predominated by political processes. It is against this background that the importance of certain inputs, such as the politics involved in policy-making, will be examined.

The restricted character of statutory planning does not necessarily imply that non-market decisions were of marginal importance in the development process. This chapter, therefore will start, in section 3.1, with an analysis of the nature of policy responses to two major aspects of post-war residential development: (i) The process of conversion of agricultural land to urban land and the official release of this land for urban use, and (ii) the dense, high-rise, development in inner urban areas.

By the beginning of the 1970s, it was widely advocated that a reform of planning machinery was necessary to cope with the then high rates of urbanisation and the widespread land fragmentation in the urban periphery. After the restoration of the democratic regime in 1974, a wider institutional modernisation was attempted by the New Democracy Party in power, in an effort to consolidate parliamentary democracy. In the context of this, rather, cautious modernisation, and at a time when urban problems were mounting, new legislation was passed and a number of policies were launched, most of which either remained inactive or were suspended. The character of this policy reform will be discussed in section 3.2.

The accession of the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) to government in 1981 brought onto the agenda the wider issue of the institutional reform and the economic restructuring of the country. According to PASOK's initial manifestations, decentralisation and regional development were to become cornerstones of this reconstruction. In the field of land development a new Planning Act came into force and an apparently ambitious programme of urban restructuring was launched to deal with the accumulated problems in the urban periphery. Section 3.3. will examine all the relevant reforms introduced by PASOK's administration. Our main interest is to analyse the set-backs to this policy and the reasons why they were only partly successful.

### **3.1. Urban land allocation: Protective versus legitimisation policies**

The main policy issues to be reviewed in this section concern: a) protection of two special categories of land, agricultural land and public landed property; b) control of unauthorised house building; c) urban expansion outside the town plan, and d) development control within the town plan area. Our main task will be to assess how far these non-market forces affected the way in which the residential process was generated. Following that, our intention is to investigate to what extent such policies became an obstacle to urban policy reform.

### 3.1.1. Protection of agricultural land and the public landed property

As the Agrarian Reform and the Refugee Rehabilitation Programme were implemented in a piecemeal way and over a long period of time, an enormously complicated and contradictory land legislation was enacted. One could argue that a **dualism** had prevailed in land law, since the introduction of the Agrarian Reform. On the one hand, one category of legislation aimed at assuring that land, which was allocated to landless families, was used for the purpose for which it was given, so as to protect the agricultural use of this land. On the other hand, given the high demand for land, not only in urban areas but also in the resort areas, and the restrictions on urban expansion set by the 1920s town planning legislation, another strand of legislation was gradually built-up over the years. This legislation was of either national or local validity and aimed at legitimising - in some cases even reinforcing - processes of land fragmentation and land-use conversion.

We will discuss this issue in reference to the protection of agricultural land and the situation of the public landed property.

The main mechanism that facilitated access to peripheral land was the **fragmentation of agricultural parcels**. According to the 1923 Planning Act, fragmentation of agricultural parcels was not allowed and hence the transfer of these subdivided properties to new owners was considered invalid. This regulation was suspended in 1944, an action that coincided with the first post-war migration movement<sup>1</sup>. Later in the same decade, another regulation was introduced attempting to control land fragmentation. According to this, transfer of "non-complete" plots, that is plots whose size was less than the minimum required for official planning permission, was considered invalid<sup>2</sup>. This regulation did not affect in the least the process of rural land fragmentation in the outskirts of the urban areas<sup>3</sup>. Purchases of such subdivided parcels were, in fact, made with private contracts. Vast areas of rural land were converted into urban plots and changed ownership, both in the outskirts of urban areas and later in resort areas, by means of these private agreements<sup>4</sup>. In 1968, with a typical populist policy, the then junta government made provisions for the transfer even of "non-complete" plots<sup>5</sup>.

Only in 1977, was a new Land Act (651/1977) introduced, which attempted to settle all relevant problems and subsequently put an end to both the fragmentation of agricultural land and the creation of "non-complete" plots inside or outside the area of town plan. The 651/1977 Act was one of the most complete and elaborate Land

Acts but was only partially and incidentally implemented. Land fragmentation was hardly conditioned by institutional motives (see, chapter 5).

Apart from the problem of land fragmentation, in large areas of rural land, property rights were not clarified. This was due to the fact that agricultural land was, to a large extent, only temporarily and partially allocated. By law, this land could not be subject to purchase, a situation that increased the obscurities in property rights. Moreover, it intensified the role of the private contracts, given the MA's rigidity to cope with the process of conversion on land administered by it. At the same time, as the complementary allocations were still in force after 1960 (see, section 2.2.), land for agricultural use was in many cases allocated even in areas where there were heavy pressures for housing development. Suspension of land allocation in these areas was subject to the Expropriation Committees, which were in charge of land allocation to landless peasants<sup>6</sup>. As our fieldwork suggests, such decisions were to a large extent taken randomly, and only after when fragmentation was already a reality (see, chapter 4).

Although the dominant mechanism of urban land allocation was the fragmentation of agricultural allotments, one should not underestimate the role of **appropriation of public land**. It has been argued that appropriation of public land was a somewhat marginal phenomenon in the process of urban expansion<sup>7</sup>. This is to a large extent true when referring to the way urban migrants acquired land in the outskirts of the cities. But there exists a whole category of appropriations of either rural or urban land that simply derives from the lack of distinction between private and public land formed in large areas in the course of the implementation of the land allocation programmes. This category has been largely ignored in urban studies. Unfortunately, there exists only limited data on the extent of these appropriations, let alone on their share in urban land allocation. This is due solely to the absence of land registration in general, and, in particular, registration of public land. The research in Greater Thessaloniki suggests that this matter should be considered more thoroughly (see, section 5.2).

Public land in Greece is divided into two major categories: one which can be exchanged (sold) and another, which is for public use and cannot be exchanged<sup>8</sup>. The legal status of all real estate property is not clear, while its administration was, in many cases, problematic. We will stop briefly to policies related to the situation the first category, as it reveals the gravity of the ownership obscurity and hence an



absence of distinction between private and public land which leads to the appropriation phenomena.

Whereas the Greek state became the owner of large areas of land at various points in time, it did not intend, to administer, at any instance, this land on its own. This attitude was not simply a result of the needs in land for refugee rehabilitation. It was also part of the general attitudes to commercialisation of agriculture, and it constituted a major attempt to transform landed property into a more fluid form of capital. Exchangeable property is the most characteristic type of property of a "transitional" nature, i.e. private property passed under public administration with the purpose either of rehabilitation or liquidation (see, section 2.1).

Until 1949, the National Bank of Greece was in charge of this property (the part left after the rehabilitation). Its main policy was to liquidate as much land as possible. Nevertheless, by 1955, almost half of this property had not been disposed of<sup>9</sup>. Problems of bad administration by the National Bank<sup>10</sup> and its anxiety to increase its share of profit from sales, led the Greek State to establish a Department of Exchangeable Property (DAP) within the Ministry of Finance, with local branches that took over the administration and the liquidation of this property.

In the meantime, the exchangeable property that was not disposed of, was either let at very low rents<sup>11</sup>, or gradually appropriated by its users. As the sales continued over a long period of time, and given these appropriation phenomena, a number of Acts and Decrees were passed in order to facilitate the acceleration of the liquidation. According to this legislation, exchangeable property, either in urban or rural areas, could be allocated to its occupants at lower than the current prices<sup>12</sup>. This legislation, however, proved to be insufficient to cope with the continuing appropriations. As the registration of large parts of exchangeable property was incidental<sup>13</sup>, a number of controversies over property rights were raised between the local DAPs and the occupants of public estates. In most cases, as, for instance, in counties of Northern Greece, the only machinery for resolving these controversies was a Cadastre originated in the Ottoman period. Appropriated exchangeable property was gradually allocated either at a very low price, when the occupant was entitled to land allocation on the basis of refugee rehabilitation policy, or at current prices to other occupants<sup>14</sup>.

Similar appropriation phenomena appeared in all categories of public land, even in the ones characterised as Public Forests. By 1990, it was estimated that 52,3% of the known estates (i.e. the ones registered) administered by the Ministry of Finance were occupied and only 47,7 % were free<sup>15</sup>. More specifically 64% of the rural estates and 47% of the urban estates were occupied<sup>16</sup>. For a large part of this property, its occupants have the right to acquire it on the grounds of special legal provisions, although according to general legislation no direct sale (i.e. without auction) is allowed for public property.

All the above problems were largely attributed to the fact that public land was administered by various Ministries and Boards. In 1979, in order to resolve the major problem of registration of public land as well as its administration the then New Democracy government established the Corporation of Public and Real Estate Property (KED). The main purpose of the Corporation was to undertake the registration of public real estate property, to co-ordinate its administration<sup>17</sup>, and finally to promote its development either by transferring it to other public authorities (such as local government) or by selling it. These latter resources would be channelled for housing and planning purposes. During the period 1979-1989 KED's activity was, however, limited to the registration of public land in specific areas<sup>18</sup>. As we shall see in section 3.3, in 1985 there was an effort to reactivate KED with rather little results.

### **3.1.2. Policies on unauthorised housebuilding**

Having set out the institutional framework related to the process of land fragmentation as well as public land appropriation, we can now turn our attention to those policies concerning unauthorised building, which dominated housing allocation in the areas in expansion.

As with the legislation on land fragmentation, the basic policies and legislation dealing with unauthorised house building were of a dualist character: one part of legislation aimed at controlling unauthorised building with strictly negative measures; another part provided the legal background for the authorisation of these buildings and hence the existing patterns of urban expansion. A synopsis of the main Acts that allowed exemption from demolition and hence authorisation of illegal building is presented in table 3.1 and analysed in the following paragraphs.

**Table 3.1. Authorisations of illegal building**

<i>Legal Acts</i>	<i>Content</i>
Royal Decree 14-3-1939	exemption from demolition of buildings of main residence
Act 410/1968	exemption from demolition of buildings inside the town plan constructed before 16-5-1968
General Building Code of 1973	exemption from demolition of buildings incorporated into the town plan between 1968 and 1973
Land Act 651/1977	authorisation of buildings inside the town plan constructed before 1973
Act 720/1977	authorisation of all buildings constructed before the publication of the 651/1977 Act
Planning Act 1337/1983	authorisation of all buildings constructed before 31-1-1983

The stringent regulations concerning unauthorised building, which were prescribed by the 1926 Decree (see, section 2.2), were suspended for the first time in 1939, when all unauthorised building of main residence was exempted from the demolition regulations. This measure introduced by Metaxas dictatorship, was later to become the basis for urban expansion policy and, frequently to be used for political purposes. New regulations against unauthorised activity were included in the 1955 General Building Code which, of course, could not affect the rate of land and housing allocation in the urban periphery.

During the following years, and while "official" expansion of town plans was taking place in a piecemeal way and always following the actual expansion (in other words small areas in the urban periphery were given retrospective planning permission), the situation of unauthorised building remained the same. In 1968, the first extensive post-war authorisation was approved by the publication of the 410/1968 Act. This Act permitted the exemption from regulations regarding demolition of all unauthorised buildings or extensions inside the approved town plans that were constructed before 16.05.1968. Although this authorisation covered a big number of buildings, it obviously avoided to deal with those buildings outside the approved town plan, the main form of low-income housing allocation.

The 1973 General Building Code set out new regulations for the control of unauthorised building, suggesting once more a number of negative measures. At the same time it extended the right of authorisation given by the 410/1968 Act for buildings in areas that were incorporated into the town plan after 1968, or were about to be incorporated. These latter authorisations were suspended in 1974, in the case of buildings built in "non-complete" plots formed from fragmentation of agricultural sites, which constituted the bulk of unauthorised buildings<sup>19</sup>.

The intensive political atmosphere of the pre-1974 period, led to an underestimation of a number of social issues by both public policy as well as social agents. As social conflict focused on the major issue of democracy, questions of land development and the resultant problems became marginal in the political debate. After 1974, two issues seemed to have brought about a renewal of interest in residential development: At the institutional level, the problem of what has often been called "modernisation" and "democratisation" of the state machinery (see, section 1.1); and at the economic level, the recognition of a number of structural problems and a reconsideration of the role of the housing sector. Indeed the post-1974 period was one in which the role of the housing sector was questioned by many theorists of the field (see, section 2.3).

In the meantime, during the years 1975-79, a further increase in housing activity took place, while unauthorised building and land fragmentation gradually penetrated the housing market in both smaller urban centres and resort areas. Taking the distribution of buildings declared as unauthorised by their owners within the procedures of the 1983 authorisation as a representative sample, about 43% of unauthorised activity was concentrated in countries apart from the county of Athens and Thessaloniki (see table 3.2.). Three counties with high levels of tourist activity, Heraclio, Evoia, and Halkidiki, contained about 12-13% of unauthorised activity, while their share in the country's population was, according to the 1981 Census, 5.3%<sup>20</sup>.

A number of problems were accumulated in areas developed as a result of unauthorised activity, such as lack of services and infrastructure in the urban periphery, increasing land speculation, and deterioration of the physical environment in resort areas. However, the main controversy raised in the process of unauthorised activity was the rising pressure for such developed areas to enter the high-rise speculative housing market. To what extent previous and later authorisations made this possible is of course a matter of empirical investigation,

since the implications of such a policy depended upon the characteristics of the housing market in each locality.

**Table 3.2. Unauthorised buildings**  
(number of applications made by the proceedings of the 1983 Planning Act)

<i>County</i>	<i>No. of unauthorised buildings</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Population share in 1981</i>
Attica	81,780	46.18	34.59
Thessaloniki	19,313	10.91	8.95
Evoia	7,282	4.11	1.93
Halkidiki	7,002	3.95	0.83
Heracio	7,968	4.50	2.50
Rest of counties	53,749	30.35	51.20
<b>TOTAL GREECE</b>	<b>177,094</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: TEE - *Enimerotiko Deltio*, 10-10-1983.

Against this background, and at a time when attempts were being made to introduce a new framework of urban planning (see sections 3.2 and 3.3), a new set of regulations, endorsed by the 651/1977 Land Act, aimed at restricting unauthorised building by purely negative measures. The same Act made it possible to legalise unauthorised building situated inside the approved town plan and constructed before the publication of the 1973 General Building Code (the authorisation of these buildings had been cancelled in 1974).

In 1977 and just before the general elections of the same year, one of the most controversial pieces of legislation related to land development was endorsed, the 720/1977 Act. According to this Act, all unauthorised buildings inside or outside the area of town plans, constructed before the publication of the 651/1977 Land Act, were exempted from the demolition regulation. In order to resolve the problem of illegal transfer of subdivided agricultural sites, as anticipated by the 651/1977 Act, the new Act allowed the approval of private sale contracts for all land sales that took place before the publication of the 651/1977 Act. Finally, for authorisation to be approved, the owners of unauthorised buildings had to pay a special tax that varied according to the size of the building and its location. Higher rates were set for buildings inside the town plans and those in resort areas.

The 720/1977 Act was indeed the most extensive measure for legitimisation of unauthorised activity during the post-war period. Nevertheless, there was an unwillingness on the part of the owners to apply for authorisation. The total number of applications for authorisation were 99,038 buildings, a figure that represented less than 50% of the unauthorised buildings<sup>21</sup>. This unwillingness can be attributed partly to the introduction of a special tax, but mainly to the rising political speculation for future authorisations.

This policy passed by the New Democracy government raised strong criticisms on behalf of the then opposition parties and the professional associations who argued that such a policy,

*"... uses the poor settlers as an "excuse" to legalise speculative illegal building"*<sup>22</sup>.

Criticisms were also centred upon the lack of a wider policy of urban expansion and provision of urban services<sup>23</sup>. Although these criticisms pointed out correctly the contradictions in government land-use and housing policies, they failed to recognise the specific characteristics of residential development and the part played by the social relations prevailing in it. Thus, they reflected the same contradictions as government policies themselves. So, whereas it was argued that post-war right wing governments were responsible for the burst of unauthorised building activity, they failed to provide a comprehensive framework of alternative policies. Such political stalemates regarding aspects of social and economic development in Greece had strongly characterised political controversy in the post-1974 period.

The second most extensive authorisation was passed in 1983 by the Socialist administration. The new Planning Act in 1983, allowed the authorisation of all buildings constructed before 31.01.1983. For those buildings constructed between December 1981 and January 1983, permission for authorisation could be given only if they were used for main residence. This legalisation was, for the first time, placed in the context of a reform of the urban expansion legislation and was accompanied by the launching of EPA (see section 3.3).

Although permission for authorisation was given to all types of buildings, with the exception of those built in 1982, an effort was made to separate speculative illegal building from that intended to house its owners, through the adoption of a new set of taxes for the approval of the authorisation. These taxes were classified with more analytical criteria than previously, namely according to the size and the use of the

building, its location, its type of construction, taking, finally, into account whether its owner possessed other real-estate property. So, for a simply constructed house building used as main or even holiday residence by its owner, this tax was lower than the official planning permission could have cost. The most heavily taxed categories consisted of buildings for tourist and industrial use.

The total number of applications for authorisations were 177,094 (table 3.2 & table C.1, Appendix C). So, a total of 276,132 buildings were exempted for demolition with the two authorisations in 1977 and 1983<sup>24</sup>. On the contrary, during the period 1974-82, only about 1,200 buildings were demolished as a result of that part of legislation that attempted to control this type of house building<sup>25</sup>. Illegal building apparently continued after 1983 although its geographical distribution might have been different, with the highest levels in coastal areas of Attica, Thessaloniki, Heraclio and Halkidiki. However, no plausible estimates exist either for the total volume of this activity or its distribution in different areas<sup>26</sup>.

As it has become obvious from the foregoing analysis, the conversion of rural to urban land and its development preceded the official release of this land for urban development. This situation resulted in the creation of the "**areas of unauthorised building**", namely, large built-up areas outside the authorised town plan, which became the most prominent issue in Greek land-use planning during the entire post-war period.

The rigidity of the concept of town plan, the bureaucratisation of the proceedings for its expansion, the absolute dependence of decision making upon central administration, were some of the important factors conducive to the creation of these areas. In addition to this, one should bear in mind that a considerable number of settlements, small ones in particular, completely lacked a town plan due to the inability of the local government to finance its implementation, and to the fact that it had only a small share of public land<sup>27</sup>.

During the post-war period, a number of partial expansions of authorised town plans were approved, through which already built-up areas were incorporated into these plans. Apart from setting the standards of building in these areas, these official expansions rarely included provision of urban infrastructure and services. During the years 1974-1982, 927 acres of land in Attiki, 865 acres in Greater Thessaloniki, and 4,176 acres in other town and settlements, were incorporated into the town plan area. However, by 1982, and just before the launching of EPA, it was

estimated that almost 30% of built-up areas in 30 towns and cities were outside the periphery of the authorised plan. Table 3.3 shows an estimation of these areas.

**Table 3.3.** Area outside the authorised town plan in different regions (in Ha)

<i>Location</i>	<i>Official area of the town plan</i>	<i>Built-up area outside the plan</i>	<i>Total built- up area</i>	<i>% built-up area outside the plan</i>
Attica	31,000	14,680	45,680	32.1
Gr. Thessaloniki	3,690	606*	4,296	14.1%
28 small urban centres	6,822	2,955	9,777	30.2

source: elaboration of data from Tritsis, A., 1982, p.p. 14-17.

\* The precise area is presented in tables 6.5. & 6.6. Here, we kept this figure for comparative reasons

The 947/1979 and later the 1337/1983 Planning Act as specified with EPA, intended to solve this problem of the areas outside the town plans. Their content will be discussed in detail in sections 3.2 and 3.3, as part of the attempts to reform the framework of urban planning.

### 3.1.3. Inner-city development and residential policy

Besides peripheral fragmentation, unauthorised building, and the areas outside the town plans, the fourth most important aspect in both residential development and planning practice was that of plot-ratio. High plot-ratios were at the core of planning conflict in inner city development, as it was mainly through them that revenue from urban land development could be realised.

Pressures for high plot-ratios was one of the main reasons for their adoption in the areas of authorised town plans. In turn, as state policy favoured high plot-ratios, further pressure was exerted for the expansion of such ratios in the outskirts of urban areas. We have already argued that as early as 1929, the time of the adoption of the Property Law, dense and high-rise development was clearly favoured (see, section 2.2). On the other hand, increases in plot-ratio were repeatedly used for political and vote-catching purposes. So, an increase of plot-ratio in one area immediately created a great deal of pressure for similar increase in other areas. Such requests were not only enmeshed in the relations between local MPs and their electorate; it also became one of the central features in local government politics<sup>28</sup>. As local councils did not possess any power over these



matters, they themselves became a pressure group. Thus, plot-ratio, and the incorporation of unauthorised built-up areas in the town plans, were used by central government for political purposes, becoming and at the same time, central issue in a long-standing controversy between central administration and local councils.

A number of revisions of the maximum permitted plot-ratio often followed the approval of a town plan and the building standards in it. Given the small size of plots available for development, increases in plot-ratio usually meant an increase of the maximum number of storeys. In 1968, in particular, the 395/1968 Decree allowed a general increase of plot-ratios, and more specifically the height of buildings, by 40%, 30%, 25% and, 20% for areas of 2,3,4,5 -storey buildings respectively. This regulation was applied all over the country, with the exception of areas of archaeological and historical value as well as suburbs where special standards were set for landscape protection. In 1977, there was an unexpected attempt to abolish this provision by introducing a special tax for those new buildings which used the additional plot-ratio anticipated by the 395/1968 Decree. This regulation gave rise to strong criticisms by professional associations, who argued that this measure affected mainly low-income groups more likely to be housed in lower storey buildings<sup>29</sup>. Upon these grounds it was finally withdrawn before its introduction into Parliament.

Thus, very rarely and only in specific cases, were plot-ratios reduced. A high plot-ratio was securing the access of a plot to speculative building. Therefore, compulsory land acquisition for public purposes was made impossible, not only because of the actual price of land, but also because of the strong resistance by the affected owners to a compulsory expropriation. In 1978, in order to cope with this problem the New Democracy government introduced the 880/1978 Act on "Transferable Plot-Ratio" (TPR), which allowed for the transfer of "**plot-ratio rights**", i.e. development rights, from a property to be compulsory expropriated to specially designed areas, the Zones of TPR. In these areas an increase of plot-ratio was permitted when a TPR was to be transferred.

The introduction of TPR was considered as a radical planning instrument in order to cope with the lack of open spaces as well as to protect listed building of historical centres<sup>30</sup>. Within a decade of its enactment TPR operated more as an instrument to increase low development capacity of specific plots rather than as the envisaged radical planning instrument (see, the relevant analysis in section 5.4).

Having examined the institutional responses to the main trends and patterns of residential development, we will now summarise how planning practice actually operated throughout the whole period from 1923, the time of the enactment of the Town Planning Act, until the early 1980s:

- (i) In the context of the political framework which has been examined above, the preparation, implementation and expansion of town plans was concentrated primarily on the so-called "Plot Arrangement" proceedings. These proceedings, undertaken basically by surveyors, had to clarify the boundaries of the plots on which development could take place.
- (ii) Town plans, despite their static definition, were gradually expanded into already built-up areas, in which land allocation remained subdivided and developed, as it was before its incorporation into a town plan.
- (iii) Development and building standards set by town plans and various General Building Codes were subsequently revised to such an extent that buildings in the same block would have been built according to different standards.
- (iv) Development control, exclusively concerned with authorised building activity, was to a large extent absorbed in longstanding procedures for the interpretation of the above contradictory legislation and the bureaucratic proceedings anticipated for the authorisation of illegal building.

Furthermore, as virtually every decision concerning town planning was the responsibility of central administration, over the years there was a constant accumulation of unsolved cases. By 1982, 2582 cases involving 702 Municipalities and Communities were expecting to be solved by the Committee of Public Works. Table 3.4 shows a distribution of these cases according to the type of issue involved.

A final point should be made in regard to the elaboration of Master Plans. Parallel to all proceedings described above, a number of Master Plans were prepared, revised and modified over the years for almost all big urban centres, but they were never implemented<sup>31</sup>. This weakness had often been attributed to the lack of adequate framework that would allow their official approval and their implementation. Although it is true that such a framework did not exist until the beginning of the 1970s, this issue cannot be explained properly, unless it is placed in the wider context of the character of land use planning in Greece. To what extent,

however, institutional changes were most effective than their predecessors remains to be discussed in the following two sections.

**Table 3.4.** Number of applications of planning cases in suspension by 31/ 1/ 1982

<i>Category of demand</i>	<i>no. of applications</i>
Plans of Residential Areas	406
Expansions of town plans	155
Renewals, Revisions of town plans	1,230
Building standards	178
Deviations	49
Protections of traditional settlements and buildings	32
Plans for open and public space	121
Miscellaneous	411
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,582</b>

source: see, table 3.3.

### **3.2. 1974-81: Institutional changes and their limitations**

The social consequences of post-war land development, and the weakness of the existing institutions to deal with them, provided plenty of empirical material for critiques of "unplanned" development. Many vital social functions were and still are not provided. The drop of housing activity in 1974, despite its quick recovery in the following years, also led to a wider debate of the apparent dependence of the Greek economy on the housing sector. Above all, reconsideration of the existing urban planning policies was related to the need of wider institutional reforms following the fall of dictatorship. The restoration of the democratic regime was not simply a change in the form of government; it opened the way for a wider restructuring of the country's political and social institutions. It was in this context that broad political support was gained for the modernisation of the state, and for a system of planning as a means of income redistribution.

However, the institutional reforms brought about by the New Democracy Party, in office throughout the period 1974-1981, were of a rather restricted and

contradictory character. Modernisation of a number of institutions was attempted as not only the general political atmosphere called for it but also the preparation of the country's entrance into EEC. These reforms proved to be inadequate to revise existing structures, and in particular, the historical dominance of the state in regulating social processes. At that time, i.e. the 1970s, it was felt that this failure was partly due to the fact that these reforms were initiated by a Party with strong connections to traditional politics and the pre-1967 regime. This issue was seen to impede a wider political consensus for such reforms, an aspect that was of particular importance in the post-1974 policy making. At the same time, one of the underlying objectives of this institutional modernisation was to secure centralised power and to keep the state machinery under the control of the party in government<sup>32</sup>. So, while part of the modernisation policy remained at the level of political rhetoric, wider issues of social and economic policy continued to be partly dominated by political processes, as the analysis in section 3.1 has indicated.

Bearing these contradictions in mind, the main task of the present section is to analyse the character of urban policy formation during the years 1974-81, and to examine to what extent and in what respect the new institutional reforms were adequate to replace the existing system of residential land allocation and development. Before proceeding to the post-1974 period, two earlier pieces of legislation, the 1003/1971 Decree on "Active Planning" and the 1262 Decree on "Master Plans", will be considered because they were practically incorporated in later statutory planning.

### **3.2.1. The pioneer Decrees on "Active Planning" and "Master Plans"**

The 1003/1971 Decree on "Active Planning" was the first legislation - since the 1923 Town Planning Act - to be concerned with the wider statutory framework of land-use planning. Without actually replacing the previous system, it set out an institutional basis for zone planning, a system similar to the French "Urbanisme Operationel"<sup>33</sup>.

On the basis of the new Decree, zone planning could be implemented either for new development or for renewal projects. Zone planning should start by a designation of the area for development or renewal as a "Zone of Active Planning" (ZEP). All land and real estate property in a ZEP was subject to expropriation, which could be extended even in areas outside a ZEP. Expropriations could take place either by compensation of the affected owners, or by exchange with property and development rights outside ZEP. This system of exchange in expropriation

proceedings was for the first time anticipated in Greek land law at this scale and created the grounds to remove the general obstacles concerning the "immovable" of property rights.

The designation of an area for development or renewal on the basis of the 1003/1971 Decree could be requested either by the Minister of Public Works, then in charge of urban planning matters, or could result from a proposal by another public authority, such as local councils, public corporations, and banking organisations. These latter proposals, as all other proceedings concerning the development of a ZEP, were subject to Ministerial approval. Implementation of the development programme could be undertaken either by private corporations or by partnerships of public and private bodies. Special incentives were anticipated in order to attract housing sales in a ZEP, either by directing housing loans to this zone, or through a number of tax allowances.

In the following years, and in particular after 1974, this legislation confronted strong criticism. The main argument put forward was that it aimed to allow monopoly capital to penetrate the real estate sector, and thus damage the small-scale housing industry. However, even if this was the intention of this legislation, eventually such penetration did not occur. Indeed, during the decade 1971-81, only five plans were prepared on the basis of the 1003/1971 Decree. Development in two ZEP areas (in the cities of Xanthi and Komotini) was undertaken by the National Real Estate Bank, the first bank to enter the housing sector. Of these plans only two reached the stage of development in 1981<sup>34</sup>.

A year later, another piece of legislation was introduced, the 1262/1972 Decree on "Master Plans" (in fact called Regulatory Plans), with the intention to complete the lack of a statutory framework for the preparation, approval and implementation of Master Plans, a problem that was often seen as one of the reasons why previously prepared Master Plans were not implemented.

The 1262/1972 Decree defined in a hierarchical way the content of regional, master and local plans and introduced for the first time the term "land-use" as a legal concept. Its specific interest was to define the procedures for the preparation and approval of a Master Plan. The latter should include a list of the development objectives, a number of maps describing land use allocation, density objectives, infrastructure networks and the various stages of the plan's implementation, and

finally, a detailed programme of the necessary public works. Elaboration of a Master Plan could be undertaken either by a public body, or by private consultants.

Master Plans, however, were not considered compulsory. During the following years, there was a revival of policy interest on Master Plans but none of the then prepared or revised plans reached the stage of approval. As we shall see below, only in 1985 were the first two Master (Regulatory) Plans passed in the Parliament, the Regulatory Plans of Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki.

### **3.2.2. 1974-79: a widely disputed institutional modernisation**

A first attempt to reconsider policy attitudes in spatial development and the role of state intervention was incorporated in the 1975 Constitution. Following, in essence, a conservative model of liberal democracy, the new Constitution laid down that the state should be concerned with regional and urban development and planning, city expansion and the protection of physical environment. Within this context, the absolute rights to private landed property, a dominant attitude in Greek land law, was modified by a general recognition that it should not be indisputable

*"... when social priorities are concerned" (article 17).*

A year later, on account of these constitutional principles, the 360/1976 Act on "Regional Plans and Environment" was passed, as the main statutory framework for regional development, seen as complementary to the 1972 legislation on Master Plans. The 360/1976 Act adopted a clearer hierarchical and physical approach to planning, and suggested that, based on national planning, regional plans should define: the distribution of population and economic activities in a region; a general land-use allocation; the basic transport services and infrastructure networks; special areas of environmental protection; and finally, a programme describing the various stages of the plan's implementation as well as its finance.

The Ministry of Co-ordination was in charge of regional policy. However, the main objectives of regional and environmental policy as well as the approval of regional plans would be the responsibility of a National Committee of Spatial Planning and Environment, created by the same Act, and consisting of the Ministers in charge of various Ministries involved in regional development and environmental protection.

The new Act represented to a certain extent those aspects of the New Democracy Government that favoured an increase of state intervention in economic development as well as a rationalisation of decision-making. Later on, an attempt

was made to implement this policy by launching a growth pole programme in 1979. The main purpose of this programme was the deconcentration of Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki through the development of six other small urban centres, called Centres of Intensive Development, or Rival Cities<sup>35</sup>. At the same time the Regulatory Plans of Greater Athens and Thessaloniki were revised. The whole programme was laid aside at the stage of its public debate, and in view of a fresh interest in residential land development caused by the passing of a new Act (see, section 3.2.3.). This programme was finally suspended by the PASOK's government.

Both the 360/1976 Act and the Programme of Rival Cities were criticised by the opposition and the professional associations as aiming simply at aligning the country's policies with that of the EEC, lacking clearly defined purposes, and ignoring the need for decentralisation and other administrative reforms<sup>36</sup>. These partly justified criticisms, failed to recognise the contradictions among various government policies and the weakness in establishing new forms of state intervention in economic development.

In 1976, the Public Corporation of Planning and Housing (DEPOS) was established in order to undertake public housing provision for low and middle income groups<sup>37</sup>. Its establishment aimed at satisfying the need for a public development corporation, which could compete in the private housing market. At the same time, it was seen as an important agent to promote zone planning as anticipated by the 1971 Decree on "Active Planning". DEPOS could either undertake a development programme by itself, or be in charge of co-ordinating such programmes undertaken by other public or partnership bodies.

As mentioned above (section 2.3) public housing had remained at the low level of about 2% since the beginning of the 1960s. On the other hand, the existing agencies of public housing, mainly the Organisation of Working Class Housing and the Refugee Housing Department of the Ministry of Social Welfare, were proved to be inadequate and covered only special groups. DEPOS, therefore, was seen as an overall planning and housing agency, which would facilitate an increase in public housing provision, widen its social basis and carry out government housing policies. Nevertheless, the founder Act did not contain any specific directions or criteria for the allocation of housing provision or subsidies by DEPOS, and only vaguely outlined government housing policy.

Despite the strong criticisms that DEPOS, together with the 1971 Decree on "Active Planning", were attempts to facilitate capital concentration in housing provision, the former's establishment did not affect in any way the structure of housing provision or the system of housing production<sup>38</sup>. DEPOS remained almost inactive, as public finance of the housing sector was primarily directed to the mortgage market and planning policy was virtually concerned only with the problem of unauthorised built-up areas. The activity of DEPOS was principally directed towards housing research and the elaboration of certain renewal projects that were only partly implemented. Two later planning Acts, the 947/1979 Act on Residential areas and the 1337/1983 Act on Expansion of Town Plans, included a number of measures in order to strengthen the role of DEPOS in residential land development (see, 3.2.3 and 3.3.1). However, as the first Act was virtually suspended and the second dealt in practice mainly with the unauthorised built-up areas, the role and the actual activity of DEPOS did not change considerably<sup>39</sup>.

### **3.2.3. 1979-81: The introduction and suspension of a Planning Act**

It has become evident from the above analysis that, during 1974-79, urban policy did not manage to go beyond defining general guidelines and legal proceedings in order to cover the statutory vacuum in the preparation and implementation of the various plans. All these could not constitute by themselves a framework for state intervention in residential land allocation, as often argued. The two cautious attempts to restructure urban land allocation and housing provision through the implementation of the 1971 Decree on "Active Planning" and the establishment of DEPOS remained simply "good intentions" without a practical effect .

Perhaps the first real attempt to change the system of urban land allocation and expansion came with the introduction of one of the most controversial pieces of legislation during the administration of the New Democracy Party, the 947/1979 Planning Act. Based upon French and German models, this Act intended to replace the 1923 Town Planning Act as far as future development, expansion and major renewal programmes were concerned. The same Act also replaced the 1971 Decree on "Active Planning".

The 1979 Planning Act prescribed that future development and expansion should be based on planned urban units, called "residential areas". Planning in these units should take place in two stages: a general land-use plan, similar to the French *Directeurs d'Amenagement et d'Urbanisme*, which defines land-use structure in the residential area and the basic system of its development; and a detailed



development plan, similar to the French *Plan d'Occupation du Sol*, which defines all development proceedings for the different parts of the "residential area".

Three alternative development systems were introduced. First, the system of "Zone of Active Planning" (ZEP), similar to the one suggested by the 1971 Decree. Development of a ZEP should be undertaken by a Development Corporation (DC), either private or partnership with the public sector. All public land, as well as, those private properties expropriated for the needs of the development plan had to be transferred to this DC. No special preference was anticipated for public or partnership corporations in undertaking the development of a ZEP. The government estimated that for the next 10 years about 10% of residential land development would be realised through the ZEP system<sup>40</sup>.

The second system was the "Zone of Urban Land Redistribution" (ZAA) on the patterns of the French *Remembrement Urbaine*. According to this system, land properties in a ZAA could be redistributed on the basis of a new plan in such a way that obstacles set by small-size and "non-complete" plots to development would be avoided<sup>41</sup>. Development of a ZAA could be undertaken either by the public sector, through DEPOS and other agencies, or by a housing co-operative of the property owners in the area, which would be compulsory established for the <sup>promotion</sup> of this development. It is worth noting that the government did not provide any estimate on its expectations for the operability of this system as it did for ZEP.

The third system was the "Zone of Building Regulations" (ZKOD). This was, in fact, the existing system of planning as defined by the 1923 Town Planning Act, which would continue to dominate development for the next decade. Special interest was given, though, to the problem of small-size and, in particular, "non-complete" plots. The 1979 Planning Act allowed such plots to be allocated to the adjacent ones, be exchanged, or, finally, be expropriated.

In addition to the three systems of development, another important innovation of the 1979 Planning Act was the introduction of a Land Development Levy (LDL). All property owners in an area under expansion or renewal had to contribute compulsory a percentage of their land and a special tax for development purposes. Thus LDL was set at 30% of the site under development and 10% of its current value for properties in ZEP and ZAA areas, while the figures for ZKOD areas were 40% and 15% respectively. This levy was seen as the main policy for acquiring and increasing the stock of public land necessary for planning purposes. The fact that no

distinction was made according to the size of the property meant that the development levy could operate at the expense of small landed property which had the largest share of land. This situation was aggravated by the fact that higher LDLs were set in ZKOD areas which would, apparently, cover future urban expansion in already built-up areas outside the existing town plans.

The introduction of the 1979 Planning Act provoked a strongly voiced and controversial debate which, perhaps for the first time in the 1970s, took place outside parliamentary and professional circles (see, also section 1.1). The criticism, strongly politicised, was centred on the lack of a national planning policy, the centralised decision making, the lack of special incentives for public and mixed corporations, and finally the development levy. The Act was rejected by the opposition and the Technical Chamber. On the contrary, it was partly accepted by the Architectural Association (SADAS), on the grounds that it opened a way to control land fragmentation and the resultant land speculation in the urban periphery, while, it facilitated local participation in planning proceedings, despite the centralised character of the anticipated administrative procedures<sup>42</sup>. However, the strongest reactions came from the developers' lobby and also from residents of built-up areas outside the town plans, who attacked principally the proposed LDL.

Added to these reactions were those inside the government itself: the new Planning Act was seen as a policy too unpopular to be enacted a little before the 1981 elections. Besides, the conservative parties in Greece were traditionally in favour of small ownership (see, section 2.2). It was these reactions that led to the replacement of the Minister of Spatial Planning Housing and Environment (YHOP), responsible for the introduction of the 1979 Planning Act by a more conservative and traditional politician.

On the grounds of the new Act a few development plans of resort areas were prepared, none of which reached the stage of approval. Thus, while this legislation was still debated, a month before the 1981 elections the newly appointed Minister of YHOP introduced a new measure in order to accelerate the incorporation of densely built-up areas into authorised town plans<sup>43</sup>. This measure, unanimously accepted by the Parliament, partially suspended the enactment of the 1979 Planning Act as far as dense built-up areas of main residence were concerned. Approval for their incorporation into the town plan could proceed without the prerequisites of the above Act, i.e. the development plans and the development levies.

The newly elected PASOK government suspended completely the 1979 Planning Act and the 1981 provision for the acceleration of the incorporation of built-up areas into the town plans, in view of a reconsideration of urban policy and the introduction of another planning Bill. These policies will be discussed in the following section.

### **3.3. 1981-1989: new reforms and old contradictions**

The change of government in 1981 did not indicate only the firm establishment of a parliamentary democracy that would in itself change the character of political and social debate. The coming to power of PASOK with an initially radical programme reflected broad political support for several more far-reaching reforms<sup>44</sup>.

Unfortunately there exist only a few studies on the character of PASOK's social policy, and the way it was enmeshed in broader socio-economic relations<sup>45</sup>, as most studies have focused primarily on the general character of PASOK itself and its subsequent style of administration<sup>46</sup>. Although answers to issues involved in a social policy are predominantly empirical, some initial observations are necessary in order to understand the problems and contradictions in the formation of a new set of urban policies during the 1981-85 period. There are three issues to which special attention should be drawn in the analysis of PASOK's reforms :

First, PASOK's initial emphasis, was on the legislative level, a policy which does not lead by itself to any social or economic restructuring. "Institutional reform" quickly acquired a wider consent, which was the principal reason why, during the first period of PASOK's administration, such reforms were carried out more smoothly than in previous years. New legislation was introduced in almost all areas of social policy, including health, education, civil rights, labour relations etc. In addition to replacing existing old institutions, an effort was made to establish a kind of a welfare state. The creation of the latter was soon inhibited, by the unchanged structures of state power and by PASOK's objective of securing its power by the pursuit of clientelist politics. This led to the subsequent modification of this policy and its limited implementation.

Secondly, at the economic level, PASOK's initial interest to strengthen the role of development planning was actually restricted to a revival of previously applied

industrial incentive policies, a reinforcement of general demand through a rise in income levels, and the use of state employment as a regulatory factor in dealing with unemployment. As this, often empiricist, economic policy failed to cope with the structural deficiencies of the economy, there was, in 1985, a change to more strict economic policy, the very much debated "austerity programme" initiated by Simitis, K., then Minister of National Economy. This economic programme seems to have led to the first more serious clash between PASOK's government and various corporate agents. However, the programme lasted only for two years and was to be suspended in the preparation of the coming elections in 1989. It was a time when "populism", through a reinforcement of statist attitudes and policies predominated social life in Greece<sup>47</sup>.

The third issue to be noted arises from the fact that, organisationally speaking, these reforms were attempted basically within the existing centralised structures of state power. The long-promised devolution of power to local authorities was very cautiously approached. In most cases this was done mainly with the establishment of a number of quasi-governmental bodies under the strict control of central administration, through which corporatist as well as inner party pressures were attempted to be incorporated. Forms of participation that were introduced in different areas of policy-making were heavily influenced by party politics, and functioned mainly as forms of policy legitimacy. Changes in state administration were once again enmeshed in clientelist politics, so that a struggle for access to the state machinery dominated once again the implementation of a number of social policies<sup>48</sup>. By 1989, in a political atmosphere predominated with scandals, it was more than ever clear that statism and clientelism was not the tradition of a specific strand in Greek politics, the right-wing parties, but a deeply rooted feature of the Greek society.

Whereas empirical investigation of these assumptions at the level of urban policy will be made in chapter 6, the present chapter will be devoted to a general outline of the characteristics of this policy. We will start by a detailed examination of the 1337/1983 Planning Act and we will proceed to the analysis of its implementation through the Programme of Urban Restructuring. We will also attempt to classify and analyse a number of relevant policies concerning land and housing allocation.

### **3.3.1. The 1983 Planning Act**

The 1337/1983 Planning Act concerned the development and expansion of residential areas with particular emphasis to built-up areas outside the authorised

town plans. This new Act was initially introduced as a transitional piece of legislation in order to deal with problems that had already accumulated in the urban periphery, and was later to be replaced by an overall statutory framework, which would deal comprehensively with urban policy and planning. Nevertheless, the 1983 Planning Act has been in action for a decade, so far. This issue not only indicates that the problem of the expansion of the town plan, that is, of the official release for development, was the central feature of urban policy; it also reveals the slow pace of institutional change in a society dominated by statist structures.

The measures included in the 1983 Planning Act in respect of unauthorised building were analysed in section 3.1.3. Here, we shall examine its content in respect of urban expansion and future development.

The first point to be made is that the 1983 Act follows lines more or less similar to the 1979 Planning Act. So, any future expansion of a town plan should be based on an Urban Plan for Expansion (PME). This plan should be elaborated on the grounds of the development and land-use allocation set by a Structure Plan (GPS) of the town or the settlement concerned. Planning of an area should be completed with a project that concerned the Topographic Implementation of a Plan (PE), which would also sort out all deviations between planning proposals and property rights. The two development systems, namely the Zone of Active Planning (ZEP) and the Zone of Urban Land Redistribution (ZAA), were also included in the 1983 Planning Act. In addition to the above, it adopted the 1979 Act's policy for the acquisition of public land for planning purposes. Thus, it also introduced a land development levy, which took the form of a percentage of the developed site and a tax based on its value.

However, there are a number of important differences between the two Acts, stemming from the different policy objectives, the circumstances in which the two Acts were introduced, as well as, the fact that the 1983 Act was primarily concerned with resolving the problem of densely built-up areas of first residence and their incorporation into city development, rather than seeking to establish new forms of urban land development. Nevertheless, it also anticipated the expansion of urban areas towards less- or non- developed areas that

*"... were connected to the existing built-up areas (...) and were necessary to cover urban expansion trends predicted by the five years national development plan"<sup>49</sup>.*

Upon these grounds, one can distinguish three main purposes in the new Act: an emphasis on the distribution of the "cost" of the incorporation into the town plan and, in particular, as far the acquisition of public land was concerned; an effort to expand the role of the public sector in urban land development; and finally the promotion of participatory procedures in urban planning.

In respect of the first purpose, the 1983 Planning Act suggested a different distribution of the LDL that varied according to the size of the landed property. Thus, compulsory contribution of land for planning purposes varied from 10% for plots of less than 250 square metres, to 40-60% for plots more than 1,000 square metres. Moreover, these LDLs were to be lower and set at the standards of the 1923 Planning Act, a measure that was already included in the 1981 provision to accelerate the incorporation of these areas into the town plans. In this respect acquisition of public land was mainly dependent upon the release of new land.

Following this emphasis on the distribution of the cost of land-use planning, a specific plot-ratio was set at a maximum of 0.8 for all peripheral land released for urban development. In the case of public housing programmes and other programmes of social housing, and in case of development in areas designated as Zones of TPR, a higher plot-ratio, called "social plot-ratio", could be set, at maximum standard of 2.4. The imposition of a unified maximum plot-ratio was seen as the main means to control land speculation in the urban periphery. In view of the small size of landed property in these areas, a ratio of 0.8 was seen to lead, generally speaking, to building only for owner occupation of the land holders<sup>50</sup>.

The second purpose of the new legislation was to increase the role of the public sector in land development. This interest was expressed mainly in the composition of the Development Corporations. The 1983 Planning Act anticipated that the public sector should control more than 50% of the holdings in a corporation, which was to undertake the development of a ZEP. It was also anticipated that the public sector would play an increasing role in the provision of housing in certain areas incorporated into the town plan. Although the 1983 Planning Act was mainly concerned with urban expansion, a number of measures in respect to housing provision were also included. The most important one was the creation of newly defined areas, the Zones of Special Assistance and the Zones of Special Incentives, in which housing loans and other subsidies should be given special priority. Development schemes of these zones were to be carried out by public, municipal or

development corporations. At the same time government was to provide special financial support to the corporation in charge of these programmes.

Along with an increase in the role of the public sector, a policy to strengthen the role of local government in planning procedures was also incorporated in the new legislation. This policy was expressed on two levels: a) its participation in a number of advisory procedures, at different stages of planning; b) financial assistance of local authorities to carry out the implementation of the plans as well as to take part in Development Corporations. Central administration was obliged to provide the local authorities with at least 30% of the total expenditure needed for infrastructure works in the expansion areas. But the dominant role of the central government in all decision-making concerning development and expansion remained unchanged. Later in this chapter we will come back to some of the decentralisation policies in the period 1981-85.

A final point, was the apparent interest of the new legislation in participatory procedures. Public participation were pursued at two levels:

(i) The level of decision making, through a reform or establishment of a number of corporate committees. In 1982, a new Committee of Spatial Planning, Housing and Environment was established along with the corresponding inter-county and county committees. They consisted of a number of civil servants, a representative of the Technical Chamber, and, in the case of the inter-county and county committees, a representative of the local authorities concerned. In the context of EPA, a number of similar corporate sub-committees were set up, in which representatives of other collective bodies were also included. All these committees acted in an advisory capacity to the county council and YHOP. This type of participation involved a number of problems, of which the most important ones were, the dominance of the civil servants and the paternalist attitudes of the professional associations, and in particular the Technical Chamber.

(ii) The neighbourhood level with the participation of the residents. The 1983 Planning Act established the Neighbourhood Committees, which were elected bodies with an advisory role to the local authorities on a number of local urban issues. The introduction of this institution was presented as the cornerstone for an urban movement, considered to be crucial in the process of an alternative urban policy. The main feature of this kind of participation was its close relation with

ideological approaches to urban development that prevailed in particular during the period 1982-85:

*"... if there is not a well formed and dynamic neighbourhood movement for the renewal of the neighbourhood as a social and political entity, Greek cities could not be rescued, whatever programmes we might have"*<sup>51</sup>.

Eventually these committees played a marginal role. The main issue discussed was the area for expansion and the size of plot-ratios. Indeed, the latter reflects the character of local politics in Greece and its similarities to national politics<sup>52</sup>. Furthermore, neighbourhood committees functioned only at the first stages of EPA whereas at later stages these proceedings were reduced to a minimum required from statutory prerequisites, such as the anticipated public appeals for the approval of a plan, not at all different from the ones included in the 1923 Planning Act.

Similar ideological elements, often based on false assumptions in respect of urban development in Greece<sup>53</sup>, have prevailed in the drawing of the 1983 Planning Act. Thus, it attempted to cope with urban expansion only on the basis of a hierarchical planning, without dealing with the actual patterns of land development and housing provision. Its emphasis on certain distributional aspects of the release of land for urban development, therefore, does not imply that the specific relations between small landownership, housing industry, and the state were necessarily affected. To give an example, there are clear indications that further land fragmentation took place after the introduction of the new legislation, as a means to avoid high rates of development levies. The extent of these phenomena and moreover their social implications can be assessed only empirically.

As it was mentioned at the beginning of this section, the 1983 Planning Act was endorsed as a transitional piece of legislation expected to remain in force for only two years. Nevertheless, a decade later it is still in force<sup>54</sup>. For this reason, we should highlight its weak regulations in respect of future urban expansion. The main relevant regulation included in the new legislation was the "Zone of Urban Control" (ZOE), a kind of green belt that should be designated around the authorised town plan. Within a ZOE land fragmentation was to be under control. ZOEs were authorised in very few areas of special uses. Section 6.4.2 provides a discussion on this problem with regard to the ZOE of Greater Thessaloniki.



A number of the issues discussed so far will be further clarified in the following analysis of the Programme of Urban Restructuring.

### **3.3.2. EPA: a Programme for Urban Restructuring**

The Operation of Urban Restructuring 1982-84 (EPA) launched at the same time as the introduction of the 1983 Planning Act aimed at a comprehensive preparation, on a national scale, of the necessary plans for the incorporation of all built-up areas into the town plan, as anticipated by the 1983 Act. Administratively speaking, EPA initially concerned the plans of 116 municipalities and communities of Greater Athens, 25 of Greater Thessaloniki and 291 in the rest of Greece. On the whole, 376 separate projects were handed over to private consultants, 180 of which were land surveys and 196 involved the preparation of plans (PMEs).

EPA aimed at expanding the authorised urban area to an aggregate of about 25,000 - 30,000 hectares. Apart from the already densely built-up areas, it also anticipated the release of new land for development that would cover the needs of the next five years. In addition to these areas, it aimed at clarifying planning permission problems and development of the land owned by 170 building co-operatives. The total programme was initially estimated to cost 1.5 billion drachmas and to employ, in the years 1982-84, more than 3,000 architects, planners and surveyors.

The first issue to be considered in respect of EPA is its **national scale**. In the early 1980s, it had become apparent that the problems of peripheral land fragmentation and unauthorised house building were not only related to the development of the two urban agglomerations, Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki, but also characterised residential development in small towns and resort areas. However, handling them on a unified national basis was bound to ignore a number of important differences in development trends in different parts of the country. It was argued by the government that such a national operation was necessary because of the severity of the problem and the previous delays in resolving it. Applying the same policy both in a resort area with increasing pressures for land development and in a declining industrial suburb in an urban agglomeration, for instance, was obviously bound to restrict the programme to a mere drawing up of layout plans. Individual policies to deal with development problems in different areas were either left to be drawn up by the private consultants or to the five-years County Development Plans, which were only indicative plans<sup>55</sup>.

The second problem EPA faced in the course of its preparation was the absence of land registry; although apparently a practical problem, the situation of landed property made it liable to reduce the efficiency of the programme. In the context of EPA, extensive land surveys were conducted, for the first time, in expanding areas. However, the obscurities in property rights and the diffusion between private and public ownership in large areas of land, created a major obstacle for the implementation of the PMEs<sup>56</sup>.

But it was to the ideological character of EPA that a number of its problems can be attributed. When launched, EPA was presented as a kind of a national emergency programme<sup>57</sup>, in the words of the then Minister of YHOP the main target was,

*"... to identify the real city with the institutionalised one"* <sup>58</sup>.

This sort of ideological elements and their influence on a wide consent to the programme reflected the nature of policies and their emphasis to institutional reform, during the first period of PASOK's administration<sup>59</sup>.

By the end of 1984, and following the change of the Minister of YHOP, the government decided to modify the whole programme on the basis of a more "realistic policy"<sup>60</sup>. By 1984, the analysis stage alone of the plans was finished, whereas only 30% of the projects were at the design stage. In the context of the new "realistic policy", the preparation of most GPS was postponed for later in order to accelerate the designation of PMEs for areas densely built-up outside the plan. At the same time, EPA was gradually transformed to a more long-term programme of both the incorporation of densely built-up areas into the town plans and the release of new land for development. Approvals of EPA plans started in 1985. Table 3.5 shows the progress of the programme in the years 1984-86, which was in fact the first period of its implementation.

**Table 3.5.** The progress of EPA in the period 1984-86

<i>Year</i>	<i>No. of GPS (approvals)</i>	<i>PME (approvals) area in Ha.</i>	<i>Expenditure (in million drchs.)</i>
1984	-	-	818
1985	26	2,071.1	1,519
1986 (targets)	300	11,000	1,816

source : TEE - Enimerotiko Deltio 3.02.1986.

Apart from urban centres, rural areas also faced similar problems with the official land release. In 1984, within the context of EPA, YHOP introduced the "Programme of Open Towns". The main purpose of this programme was to encourage development and a reorganisation of small scattered settlements, of which there were, in 1981, 12,315 villages with a population of fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. The two objectives of the new programme were: a) a revision of the existing building standards to allow the release of more land for housing development and, b) the creation of 546 units of small settlements, called "open towns", for which special standards of services were to be set up. By 1985, however, the entire programme was restricted to its first objective, in an effort to encourage the then declining housing industry. The settlements were classified according to their location and their degree of development. At a first stage, a "development-boundary" was set and approved by the *nomarch*, i.e. the head of the county council. Within this boundary plot-ratio was defined in standards higher than the ones standing for areas outside-the-plan. At a second stage a plan could be designed within the above pre-set "development-boundary"<sup>61</sup>.

Another sub-programme was the Programme of Resort Residence, whose apparent objective was to restrict land fragmentation, land speculation, illegal development and environmental deterioration of the resort areas. The programme aimed primarily to provide with a plan all areas illegally built-up in the various coastal zones of the country. All major resort areas were included in the programme. The latter was fully under the responsibility of the Central Ministry, as it was considered that it affected very sensitive areas as far as development trends and environmental protection was concerned. However, many local councils in resort areas avoided to follow the complicated proceedings of this sub-programme. In these areas land was released through the very simple procedure of setting a "development-boundary", approved by the *nomarch*, usually in favour of such a policy. In large areas of Halkidiki, which performed among the highest pressures for tourist development, land was released through such semi-formal procedures, i.e. without a proper plan.

In order to complete our general outline of this new urban policy framework, a final point should be made concerning the new Regulatory Plans of Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki. The two Regulatory Plans, whose preparation was undertaken by YHOP itself, were in fact revisions of previously prepared plans. They constituted of a general framework of development objectives with particular emphasis on the deconcentration of the two urban centres. Being versions of previous plans, they tended not to take into consideration changes in urban

development trends which had occurred during the last decade, and so they represent a minimal physical approach to planning. Two new features of these plans were, however, significant: First, they were the first Regulatory Plans to eventually have been officially approved by the Parliament during the post-war period. Second, the actual establishment of two Planning Boards for Greater Athens and for Greater Thessaloniki respectively. These Boards were to be responsible for planning matters in the areas concerned. Chapter 6 (section 6.4) examines in greater detail the nature of the 1985 Regulatory Plan of Greater Thessaloniki and the respective Planning Board established for its implementation.

Ten years after its launchment, EPA and all the other sub-programmes of urban expansion were gradually fixed as statutory procedures for land release, rather than a much-envisaged programme for urban restructuring. By 1990, only 70% of the GPS (table C.2, Appendix C) and 51% of the PME for settlements of more than 2,000 inhabitants were approved (tables 3 and C.3, Appendix C).

Above all, the plans concerned were to a large extent confined to the designation of layout plans that allowed this land release. Thus, the major outcome of EPA was precisely the large area of land released for development. By 1990, 20,166 hectares of land were released for development and another 19,349 were under study in settlements of first residence with more than 2,000 inhabitants. Thus, in aggregate, 39,514 hectares were released, 25% more than initially planned (table 3.6 and tables C.3 & C.4, Appendix C). Another 12,537 hectares were released in resort areas. To the above figures one should add the area released in 9,981 settlements under 2,000 inhabitants, for which no area statistics are available<sup>62</sup>.

**Table 3.6.** Land released by EPA by 1990 ( in Ha)

<i>Programme</i>	<i>Approved PME</i>	<i>Under study</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% approved</i>
PME of first residence (settlements > 2,000 inhabitants)	20,166	19,349	39,515	51.03
Resort Residence	3,252	9,285	12,537	25.93
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23,418</b>	<b>28,634</b>	<b>52,052</b>	<b>44.99</b>

source: YPEHODE, Department of Urban Planning, from KEPE, 1991, p.p. 34-35.

In 1988 the extremely complicated PE projects, i.e. the topographic implementation of a PME, started that would sort out differences between planning arrangements and property rights and through which the LDLs would be practically acquired. By

1990, only for a 10% of the land released by EPA was a PE project prepared or under study (table 3.7).

**Table 3.7.** Topographic Implementation Projects (PE), until 1990 (in Ha.)

	<i>Approved PE</i>	<i>Under study PE</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% area of PE / area of PME</i>
<b>TOTAL GREECE</b>	2,009	20,037	22,046	9.96

source: see, table 3.6.

### **3.3.3. Other urban policy reforms: weaknesses in restructuring the residential sector**

PASOK's planning policy as launched in the period 1982-85, appeared to be far reaching and ambitious, despite its later setbacks. This, however, was not the case with other policies that were related to the new planning framework. In three major sectors closely related to land use planning, i.e. land and housing policy and decentralisation of decision making, only a few modest measures were carried out. This was indicative of the government's failure to intervene effectively in residential land development. In the following paragraphs we will consider the main features of these policies.

Contrary to the prevailing rhetoric<sup>63</sup>, perhaps the only change that took place in the years 1981-89 concerning land policy, was an attempt to track down the scattered public land. KED's committee launched in 1983 a programme to survey the situation of public land and to release it for development purposes. The public land survey programme remains still very restricted and is carried out on a random basis, while KED itself did not manage to co-ordinate the various public boards involved which occupy public land<sup>64</sup>.

These problems increased the advocating for the establishment of a land registry system to monitor changes in ownership, use, size, and other issues relevant to land registry. Nevertheless, despite PASOK's pre-electoral promises, a Cadastre was never created. Officially the creation of a Cadastre is supported by both large parties. However, its creation is suspended for a century: a Cadastre has been practically identified with the "political cost" so much avoided by Greek government.<sup>5</sup> Other costs, stemming from the enormous loss of public revenue are hardly accounted.

In addition to the land survey programme, KED decided in 1984 to promote the provision of public land to Development Corporations, local authorities and agricultural or industrial co-operatives when this land was to be used for planning or public housing programmes. Again such transfer was rather limited.

In respect of housing policy, PASOK followed more or less similar to previous policies: an encouragement of housing loans only when macro-economic aspects allowed for it<sup>65</sup>. Two other attempts are worth mentioning:

The first concerned some changes in the 1929 Property Law which was hoped to promote inner city housing activity. According to the 1929 Property Law (see section 3.2) redevelopment of a site required the unanimous approval of all its owners. Given the multi-ownership in inner city properties, all developed through the antiparohi market, this regulation was considered to be a major obstacle, in particular for housing redevelopment in central areas. This was due to the resistance of owners of business premises in blocks of flats in these areas.

On the other hand, given the changes in the spatial allocation of housing activity, there was a growing pressure by the owners of flats and the developers for new middle class housing in the central areas, since the demand for such housing was still high. Thus, in 1985, a new regulation was introduced according to which redevelopment could proceed, when owners of the 65% of the site requested it. This measure, could be potentially inhibited by the fact that the market of the renovated flats has started to play a growing role in central city housing, as some evidence from Greater Thessaloniki indicates.

The second policy concerned a promotion of building co-operatives in housing provision. Building co-operatives in previous years were formed mainly by middle income, usually professional, groups for acquiring land in second residence areas. A small number of co-operatives was also formed by special groups, such as refugees, entitled to land allocation in first residence areas. By the endorsement of a new legislative framework, there was an attempt to increase their role in housing provision by means of a number of incentives. This policy followed the tendency for such co-operatives to be created and likely to promote middle income housing in suburban or resort areas. In 1983, there were 170 co-operatives all over the country, whose legal status and applications for planning permission were in suspension. In 1985, 37 co-operatives with a total of 13,392 members were approved on the basis of the new legislation, 11 of which were co-operatives in first residence areas

(tables, 3.8 & 3.9). About 4,600 hectares of land owned by these co-operatives entered the proceedings for planning permission, 300 of which related to main residence in urban suburbs.

**Table 3.8. First residence co-operatives**

	<i>Attica</i>	<i>County of Thessaloniki</i>	<i>Other Counties</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
No. of co-operatives	3	2	6	11
No. of members	1,095	333	878	2306
Land (Ha)	151.30	34.40	81.30	267.00

source: *TEE-Enimerotiko Deltio*, 25-5-1985.

**Table 3.9. Second residence co-operatives**

	<i>Attiki</i>	<i>Evoia / Corinthia</i>	<i>Halkidiki</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unclassified</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
No. of co-operatives	8	6	3	6	3	26
No. of members	3,933	1,592	733	1,574	3,254	11,086
Land (Ha)	543.50	276.40	3,220.00	229.30	24.3	4,293.50

source: see, table 3.8.

The last issue to be discussed concerns the decentralisation of decision making. It has already been mentioned that decentralisation was rather restricted and carried out in the context of the existing statist structures. This has been clearly evidenced in the various Local Government Acts of the period 1982-89, which dealt with modifications of previous legislation<sup>66</sup>. On the other hand, the long-promised reorganisation of local government through the creation of a new system of government at the local, county or metropolitan and, regional level, has been suspended in view of the government's priority to secure its political power at the local level.

As an outcome of this cautious decentralisation policy, emphasis was given mainly at the county level, which remained of a quasi-governmental character. The new institution introduced at this level was the establishment, in 1982, of the County Councils, a kind of corporate bodies, in which representatives from local councils, professional, agricultural and employer associations, and trade unions participated. Only two members of the County Council were elected by residents of the county.

Head of the County Council remained the *nomarch*<sup>67</sup>, who is appointed by the government, and is in charge of carrying out government policies at the county level. Apart from a number of responsibilities of advisory capacity, these Councils were mainly empowered to elaborate and approve the Programme of Public Investments. The *nomarch* was also gradually empowered to approve new town plans of small settlements as well as modifications of town plans of larger settlements<sup>68</sup>.

In respect with local government, perhaps the main change in the period 1981-89, was an improvement of the institutional framework which allowed local government to increase its activity on local matters. Such activity was, however restricted by the long-standing crisis of local government finance, and its lack of appropriate machinery to deal with local initiatives. However, no planning power was handed to local government. Nevertheless, our research from Greater Thessaloniki suggests that the political involvement of local government in planning decisions was of particular significance.

### 3.4. Concluding Remarks

The previous discussion aimed at analysing the main characteristics of what we called institutional response to residential land development. We divided our analysis into two main trends in post-war urban policy: On the one hand, we considered the actual policy practice in a number of crucial issues of land policy and planning. On the other hand, we examined the reforms introduced in the period 1974-89 that aimed at reconstructing the statutory basis of urban policy.

In the examination of the actual policy practice we considered four major policy fields: protection of two sensitive categories of land, agricultural land and public landed property; authorisation of illegal building; expansion of a town plan into already built-up areas; and the inner-city development control. Our analysis pointed out that a number of strict regulations, which indeed ignored largely the actual development trends, were followed by a package of measures that reinforced these trends in an uncritical manner. The contradictions in land law, the continuation of land allocation in areas where there were already strong pressures for housing development, the eventual authorisation of land fragmentation and the direct liquidation of appropriated public land to its occupants, are all issues that reflect an important institutional dimension of a process that widens access to urban land.



Policies of unauthorised building, on the other hand, were not merely a state action for securing social reproduction but also a component to a wide access to housing market. Thus, the two major policies for authorisation, in 1977 and 1983, were endorsed at a time when land fragmentation and unauthorised building entered the speculative housing market. Our analysis has shown that within this context town planning was an *ex poste* practice to secure the development capacity of a landed property.

The examination of urban policy reform that followed stopped to all major institutions related to residential land development. The analysis proved that urban policy reform did not lack the necessary institutional change. Urban policy by both the New Democracy and the PASOK governments were centred on an institutional reform of the existing planning system, though leaving aside important aspects of land and housing policy. During the period 1974-81 although changes were cautious they were of innovative character, giving emphasis to promoting development, such as the case of DEPOS and the 1979 planning Act.

In this process the issue of political consent played an important role during the 1974-84 period and was perhaps the main reason of the initial success, at the institutional level, of PASOK's reforms, despite the fact that the latter followed similar lines to certain policies introduced by the New Democracy government. PASOK's prime interest was to sort out the non-authorised development and to secure a better distributed cost of planning. Nevertheless, the various policies introduced created a new machinery for planning, which was well received. EPA was the programme that would secure the implementation of such an apparently ambitious policy. The first period was spent in understanding the new procedures in an atmosphere of euphoria. After 1985-86, EPA was modified to a statutory basis for one main thing that emerged as the focus of interest by all agents, public or private owners: land release for development. All new planning instruments that were to change the development process were only suggestions of the newly designated plans.

Although an aggregate account of the historical trends in residential land allocation and the policy responses to them is necessary for an understanding of these processes, it is not enough in order to clarify more concretely the way a number of different inputs are involved in residential land development in specific places and at different points in time. This will be our task in the next three chapters that focus on Greater Thessaloniki.

### 3.5. Notes for chapter 3

1. Act 1852/1944, article 3. Sales of agricultural allotments in the urban periphery started in the same period.
2. Act 690/8.05.1948, article 2. It is worth noting, however, that special provisions were always set by the plans or their modifications, which eventually allowed the granting of planning permission for the majority of these "non-complete" plots.
3. Maistros, P. 1980.
4. One of the groups whose involvement in housing activity should be noted is the legal profession. In Greater Thessaloniki, almost half of the legal profession's activity is related to land and housing market. The relations between this profession and the state have been studied by Tsoukalas, K. 1981, pp. 153-162.
5. Decree 625/14.11.1968, article 3.
6. The Expropriation Committees are based on a county level and they are constituted by officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, one judge and one agricultor.
7. Leontidou, L. 1981.
8. For a classification of public land see, Nedas, A. 1984.
9. See, note 21, chapter 2.
10. There were a number of allegations that the National Bank had proceeded to sales of public land that was not object of exchange, such as forests (information given by DAP, County of Thessaloniki). Unfortunately, there exists very limited information on the way the National Bank had administered exchangeable property.
11. During 1946-55 the revenue collected from rents of this property was as low as 4,5 drachmas per estate, yearly (Pentzopoulos, N. 1960, pp. 346-347).
12. For the relevant legislation see, 547/1970 Decree, and 357/1976 Act.
13. Registration of large areas of exchangeable property was based mainly on allegations of owners of adjacent sites, Nedas, A. 1984, and information from DAP, County of Thessaloniki.
14. These "current prices" were set by the local land tax offices. The way these prices were set demands further investigation. This problem has been sorted out after the introduction of a system of "objective land values" for most urban areas.
15. By 1990, the registered property of the Ministry of Finance comprised of 86,000 estates (in Nea 5-3-1991). The unknown property appears to be very extensive " ... the registration of every 100 parcels of land reveals 15-20 public estates" (Statement of Nikolaou, P., former president of KED, in Nea 4-3-1991).
16. Lamprou, D. & Fragioudakis, L., 1990.
17. This situation of multi-administration of public land has created a number of controversies between the various public bodies over the ownership of public land. The most important one was between central administration and municipal authorities, an issue that intensified the problem of lack of municipal land.
18. A brief description of KED's activity during 1980-90 is presented in the interview of Abakoumbkin, A., President of KED, in *Oikonomikos Tahydromos*, 19-4-1990.

19. Decree 349/1974. This Decree was the first measure taken by the New Democracy government in order to control land subdivision.
20. The counties of Evoia and Halkidiki are also areas for second residence for Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki respectively.
21. This estimate is based on the number of the buildings declared as unauthorised by their owners in 1983.
22. Statement by the Technical Chamber, in *Vema*, 24.09.1977. Nevertheless, the Technical Chamber did not make clear its stand-point on the matter of authorisations.
23. The new Act did not included any anticipation on the situation of areas outside the town plans apart from the authorisation of their buildings.
24. It worth noting that the procedures for authorisations have not yet been completed so as the buildings concerned to acquire the necessary planning permission. Naturally this delay causes additional institutional problems.
25. This figure was given in a statement by the Minister of Public Order, in *Avgi*, 30.01.1983.
26. The estimates given vary between 100.000 and 150.000 buildings (*Nea* 7-5-1991).
27. Despite the large holdings in land by the Greek state there has been a tradition not to transfer its ownership and administration to local authorities (see also, note 17).
28. These issues were, however, hidden in the process of local politics due to their apparent preoccupation with controversy between local municipalities and central government on the question of decentralisation.
29. Such an argument was provided by the Technical Chamber, in *Vema* 25.09.1977.
30. See, the analysis provided by Christophilopoulos, D. (1991) for the significance of TPR in planning.
31. For an overall account of these plans see, Voivonda, A., et al. (eds.), 1977 and Philippidis, D., 1990, p.p. 58-110.
32. Characteristic example of this tendency was the centralised principles of the new Constitution (Alivizatos, N. 1980; Manesis, A. 1980; Pavlopoulos, P.V. 1980).
33. The analogues with the French planning system are provided by Christophilopoulos, D. (1983).
34. The two schemes were the housing estates of Xanthi and Komotini undertaken by Ethnoktematiki and Ethniki-Ktematiki, both corporations of the National Real Estate Bank. They concerned building of 1,500 and 1,250 dwellings in the outskirts of the two cities respectively. For more details and a critique of the schemes see, Philippidis, D. (guest ed.), 1985.
35. For an analysis and critique of the KEPA programme see, Leontidou-Gerardi, K. 1979, and Wassenhoven, L. 1979.
36. Such criticisms were reported in *Thessaloniki*, 20.05.1976 and *Kathemerini*, 21.05.1976.
37. 460/1976 Act.
38. For a critique of the relevant debate see, Emmanuel, D. et al, 1976.
39. A further analysis on the activity of DEPOS is included in Yiannakou, A. 1988.
40. *Gazette of Parliamentary Debates* 13.06.1979, p. 5127.

41. This system was applied for redistribution of rural land and it was only partly successful due to the continuation of allocation policies (see, also note 24, chapter 2).
42. Nevertheless SADAS officially rejected the Act following the same policy with the Technical Chamber(SADAS, 1980).
43. 1221/1981 Act, article, 10. It is worth noting that the hastiness of the government to accelerate all relevant proceedings before the general elections is also indicated by the fact that this measure was introduced in the context of an Act that was dealing with the location of parking sites.
44. Although its programme was considerably modified from the beginning of its administration (Alivizatos, N. 1983).
45. For an analysis of the nature of social policy and its relation to statism see, Petmezidou, M. (1991). Alivizatos, N. 1983, provides an account of the character of PASOK's policies during its first two years of administration.
46. See, for example, Lyrintzis, C., 1984.
47. Simitis, N. (ed.), 1990 includes a discussion on "populism".
48. One should bear into consideration that, during this period, a number of social groups that were outside the state machinery acquired access to it. But, the latter did not mean that this access was acquired through other than a kind of clientelistic procedures. Petmezidou, M. (1991) argues that such phenomena as the growing political weight of middle classes made more difficult to achieve any consensus about social policy aims.
49. 1337/1983 Planning Act, article 1. This was the main point of disagreement between YHOP and the planners who argued that the new Act should deal only with the existing built-up areas while future expansion should be considered in a wider urban policy framework (see, attitudes of SADAS, in *SADAS Bulletin* July-September 1982, pp. 30-37).
50. Both the New Democracy Party and the Communist Party were opposed to this low plot-ratio. The New Democracy Party argued that such a measure will minimise land value in the urban periphery, while the Communist Party argued that such a ratio is not enough for building in small plots (*Gazette of Parliamentary Debates*, 3.02.1983, p. 3527).
51. Statement by the Minister of YHOP, *Gazette of Parliamentary Debates*, 7.02.1983, p. 3665.
52. Yiannakou, A., 1981 & 1989.
53. One the basic assumptions on the character of spatial development in Greece often adopted by Tritsis, A., then Minister of YHOP was the concept of "urban statism" (Tritsis, A. 1977 & 1982). This implies that the rates of development outside Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki were low and dependent upon these two big urban centres. Such assumptions are hardly valid and, in particular, for the 1974-84 decade. For a critique of these assumptions see, Hatzimichalis, K. 1983.
54. The current New Democracy government has not yet shown any interest in replacing the 1983 Planning Act. However, certain very important changes were introduced in order to facilitate private planning (Act 1892/90, articles 29).
55. During the year of the launchment of EPA, the 5-years National Development Plan and its respective County Plans were also prepared. These plans are in fact indicative and in practice restricted to a list of public works.

56. In these procedures one should highlight the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture, one of the most important agents of land allocation in the urban periphery, was not involved in EPA.
57. An attitude that was intensified by the way the press covered the whole programme.
58. Tritsis, A. 1982.
59. In contrast to previous periods, despite a number of controversies raised between YHOP and the professionals on the finance of the programme, its objectives were initially widely accepted as a reflection of the wider consent to PASOK's policies in its first period of administration. One should take into consideration another important factor related to high rates of professional unemployment. By 1982, 15-20% of the architects and 10-15% of the surveyors were unemployed or under-employed (TEE-TKM, 1982). Following the decline in house building activity at that time, there was a growing pressure for the absorption of these unemployed and under-employed groups into the public sector. A programme like EPA was seen as a means to alleviate temporarily these problems. However, it did offer, in fact, only part-time employment to the majority of the 3,000 professionals involved. The latter soon led consultant firms to loose interest in EPA, which added to the enormous weakness of the administrative machinery involved in the programme, resulted in a number of delays and contradictions in the proceedings of the whole programme.
60. Statement by Kouloumbis, E. then Minister of YHOP, in *Express*, 23.09.1984. It is worth noting that in 1986 YHOP was merged with the Ministry of Public Works and created a single Ministry of Spatial Planning, Environment and Public Works (YPEHODE). This marked a new switch of policy interest from planning to individual large schemes and public works, a tradition characteristic of the 1960s and early 1970s.
61. For a critique of the Open Towns programme see, Kremos, P. 1983 and Portaliou, E. 1984.
62. It was estimated that the land released by EPA can cover the housing needs of 2 million new inhabitants (Gartzos, K., 1990). Yet, the 1990s started with a new round of discussion about new release of land for development.
63. Almost all official documents related to planning and residential development of the period under examination made special reference to the need for a restructuring of land policy.
64. See, note 18.
65. Emmanuel, D. (1990) analyses in detail housing policy in the 1980s.
66. For a critique in respect to planning practices see, Yiannakou, A.1989.
67. This institution was introduced in the 1912 Local Government Act.
68. A provision that was violated in 1990 by a decision to transfer the modification of the plans around the so-called Basic Road Net-work to the Minister of YPEHODE (Act 1892/1990, article 99).

## CHAPTER 4

### LAND POLICY IN GREATER THESSALONIKI: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

---

An analysis of the historical trends in residential development and their implications for policy is an empirical issue that can be understood only when set in a specific time or place. Viewing it in a national context, that is over the way social relations have been historically formed in a country, makes one aspect of the empirical approach to our research questions. Thus, part of the research was devoted to specifying, at a national level, the structural trends of land policy, residential development and the corresponding political and institutional influences upon them.

However, at many occasions in the foregoing discussion it was argued that no definite conclusion could be drawn as to the way state, small landownership residential development and urban policy are interrelated unless further spatial disaggregation is made. There are two reasons which necessitate spatial analysis, both at a national and sub-national level: First, the simple fact that land development processes, not only in their physical but also in their socio-economic form, are intrinsically spatial ones. This issue is as old as the study of land. Secondly, because spatial analysis in itself provides the only adequate domain in which interaction between structure and agent can be brought together (see, chapter 1). Nevertheless, one should be aware of the fact that generalisations cannot derive from a single analysis of land processes in a specific place. Also this was not the purpose of this research. Apart from the acquisition of an understanding of such processes in the place under consideration itself, spatial analysis is important for comparative study in so far as it stresses the empirical - historical character of social phenomena.

In this respect the selection of Greater Thessaloniki (GT, map 4.1) was not made on the basis of statistical representiveness nor at random, but on the basis of three important reasons: The first is related to one of the main questions of this research,



**Map 4.1.** Greater Thessaloniki (area inside-the plan)

that is the decisive role of state in land allocation. GT is a place where all major inter-war programmes and policies of land and housing allocation were implemented. The second reason concerns the decision to examine the nature of urban policy in a locality where decision making, almost at any level, takes place outside its boundaries. The third reason concerns our interest in, as well as, our familiarity with this particular city. The rapid growth of Greater Athens and, in general, its role in the country's economic and social development influenced to a large extent urban research in Greece traditionally preoccupied with urban processes in Greater Athens<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, in a context where problems of paucity of research, and above all where data availability, were crucial at every stage of the research, familiarity with the area was extremely important as one way to deal with them.

The research in GT focused on three issues: (i) An analysis of the programmes of land and housing allocation implemented in the context of the Refugee Rehabilitation Programme and the Agrarian Reform which is presented in this chapter. (ii) A detailed analysis of the process of land fragmentation in the urban periphery and its connections to inter-war land policy as well as an examination of the interrelations of small landownership with the *antiparohi* sector included in chapter 5. (iii) A review of urban planning implemented in GT, with particular emphasis on the period 1975-89 which is included in chapter 6.

The present chapter will deal with the first issue of the empirical study, that of the land and housing allocation programmes implemented in GT before 1940. The purpose of this analysis is to define the significance of these programmes, their influence on the structure of landownership and the nature of land policy incorporated in them. This research was conducted on the basis of the available records and by means of long informal interviews with officials in all local departments involved in the implementation of these programmes.

Section 4.1. examines the programme of Urban Refugee Rehabilitation and its impact upon urban development of GT after 1922. Special attention is paid on the course of its implementation and the resultant characteristics of a peculiar urban land and housing policy.

Section 4.2. examines the Rural Refugee Rehabilitation in eight areas of Thessaloniki's periphery that were incorporated in the urban area of Thessaloniki



after 1950. The creation of an extremely fragmented system of small rural land holding in the peripheral areas under conversion is thoroughly discussed.

Finally, section 4.3. deals briefly with other sources of state land allocation, so as to provide a comprehensive consideration of state land policy and its impacts upon contemporary urban land allocation. The section examines in particular the policy of the liquidation of exchangeable property and that of land provision for building co-operatives.

#### **4.1. The Urban Rehabilitation Programme in Greater Thessaloniki: consolidating small urban land holding**

The exchange of Greek and Muslim populations after the Asia Minor Disaster marked the beginning of a new stage in the urban history of Thessaloniki<sup>2</sup>. As the majority of the city's Muslim population left the country and approximately 100.000 Greek refugees came into Thessaloniki, the 1920s constituted a period during which urban development of Thessaloniki in its contemporary form started. The main feature of this new stage was the complete incorporation of the city into the country's national economy and its transformation into an urban centre of secondary importance in the national settlement system. At the same time its transformation from a three- to two and finally to one- community city started to take place (table 4.1)<sup>3</sup>.

**Table 4.1.** Composition of Thessaloniki's population before the refugee inflow

<i>Year</i>	<i>Greek</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
1916	68,205	41.16	61,400	37.05	30,000	18.10	6,100	3.67	160,000

source: data from Loukatos, S.D. (1986)

It is difficult to estimate the exact number of refugees who inhabited GT. This is because the data available include only the population that was rehabilitated through the housing programmes and not that one eventually settled in GT<sup>4</sup>. Hence, it is difficult to estimate the number of families entitled to rehabilitation. One should also take into consideration that due to the delays in the rehabilitation Programme, a number of refugee families migrated abroad before their final rehabilitation in the country<sup>5</sup>. Therefore, the figures given below refer to the population settled through the programmes of housing and land allocation.

In terms of the number of the settled families, the Urban Rehabilitation Programme (URP) covered 63.89% and 91.21% of the total number of families settled in the Province of Thessaloniki (PT) and in GT respectively (table 4.2). The families that were settled through URP in the suburbs of Thessaloniki were 19,168 and represent about 12% of the total urban refugee families settled in various urban areas of the country.

**Table 4.2.** Distribution of families in the Rehabilitation Programmes in GT and PT

<i>Type of rehabilitation</i>	<i>Families</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Population*</i>
TOTAL Rehabilitation in GT	21,170	(69.20)	84,660
Rural Rehabilitation	2,002	6.64	7,988
Urban Rehabilitation	19,168	63.56	76,672
Rural Rehabilitation in rest PT	8,988	29.80	34,934
TOTAL Rehabilitation in PT	30,158	100.00	119,594


source: estimates based on data from unpublished records of MSW and MA.

\* estimates made on 3.99 persons per family.

As a result of this programme, the population of the urban area of Thessaloniki increased by 37.50% during the period 1922-28. Moreover, a number of new settlements emerged around Thessaloniki, a number of which became the geographical locus of the city's urban expansion. Map 4.2 describes all the refugee settlements within the area of reference of the 1985 Regulatory Plan of GT (RSTH area)<sup>6</sup>.

#### 4.1.1. An account of the URP in Greater Thessaloniki

The programme of urban rehabilitation started in Thessaloniki in 1925 with a major expropriation of land that was to open the way for the city's first stage of suburbanisation. On the whole, 445 hectares of land, representing 12% of the total land made available for the needs of the URP nationally, was transferred to public ownership for the implementation of the urban rehabilitation policy in GT. The largest part of this land, 395 hectares, came under the jurisdiction of the Refugee Rehabilitation Committee (EAP) and, after its dissolution in 1930, under the administration of the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW, table 4.3). In addition to this, about 50 hectares of land were transferred to 11 building co-operatives, that



Map 4.2. Refugee Settlements in the Province of Thessaloniki (RSTH area)

were to undertake rehabilitation independently under the supervision of the MSW (see, section 4.4).


**Table 4.3.** Land disposed under the jurisdiction of EAP, MSW and building co-operatives for URP (in m<sup>2</sup>)

<i>Municipality or suburb</i>	<i>EAP/MSW</i>	<i>co-operatives</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Thessaloniki	1,566,103	257,787	1,823,890
Toumpa	(1,370,453)	(22,000)	(1,392,453)
Harilaou	(1,370,453)	(35,095)	(103,856)
Xerokrene/Kalitheia	(126,889)	(6,692)	(133,581)
40 Ekklesies		(194,000)	(194,000)
Kalamaria	1,975,071	181,600	2,156,671
Agios Pavlos	117,678		117,678
Triandria	44,625		44,625
Neapoli	23,848	65,000	88,848
Ampelokipoi	57,636		57,636
Kordelio	38,078		38,078
Efkarpia	124,857		124,857
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,947,896</b>	<b>504,387</b>	<b>4,452,283</b>

source: elaboration of data from unpublished records of MSW,  
Housing Division, Department of Thessaloniki.

In addition, the programme included land allocation in Stavroupoli, Menemeni and Evosmos. However, for these areas it is difficult to give the precise figures because they were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture (MA). The largest part of land in these areas was used for rural rehabilitation. (see, section 4.3).

The largest part of the expropriated land and consequently the largest part of the URP was concentrated in the east and south areas of GT (table 4.4 and map 4.3). Presumably, the existing suburbanisation trends together with land availability determined the geographical distribution of the programme. Thessaloniki had already expanded towards its eastern part since 1880<sup>7</sup>. The URP transformed drastically the social basis of suburbanisation. A number of neighbourhoods of low-income refugees surrounded the middle-class suburbs of the eastern part. The programme was rather limited in western areas, which were still rural and so they constituted the basis for the implementation of the agricultural programme and later the main location of industrial plants and working class housing. During the



**Map 4.3.** Land allocated to refugees by the Refugee Rehabilitation Programmes (including land allocated to building co-operatives)

period 1917-27, the urban area of Thessaloniki increased by 600 hectares, 74,17% of which were involved in the URP.

**Table 4.4.** Distribution of URP and per area of GT

<i>zone</i>	<i>area (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>	<i>%</i>
East and South suburbs	3,652,979	82.05
North Suburbs	356,303	8.00
Inner West	280,065	6.29
Outer West	162,935	3.66
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>4,452,283</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Very little information exists about the precise source of land made available for the needs of URP<sup>8</sup>. However, from information given by MSW, Department of Thessaloniki, we could assume that the largest part of this land was obtained through expropriation of private property, particularly that owned by the inhabitants of Pylaia. The rest was made available from exchangeable property, expropriation of church estates, and from land already owned by MA. The way in which compensation of the expropriated property was handled was characteristic of the powerful role of the state over land allocation.

According to legislation enacted specifically to deal with such expropriations, compensation should be made within five years of the expropriation of a property. Given the financial difficulties resulting from the situation of emergency of the rehabilitation policy<sup>9</sup>, very few compensatory sums were paid within this time limit and consequent they were never given. This situation constituted one of the major sources of controversy between MSW and private owners of that time. According to information given by MSW/Department of Thessaloniki, during the post-war period, the Expropriation Office was exclusively pre-occupied with ensuing relevant appeals. Nevertheless, there was no case in which private owners won these appeals, unless final expropriation of their property had taken place after 1957<sup>10</sup>.

The actual Rehabilitation Programme started in Thessaloniki in 1928 by the EAP housing programme. Throughout the period 1922-84, 19,168 families were settled in the urban periphery by the only extensive programme of public housing ever to be implemented. One of the main characteristics of the URP was its gradual implementation over a long period of time, despite the fact that its objectives concerned the specific needs for refugee rehabilitation in the 1920s. Therefore, for analytical purposes, attention will be called to three periods of its implementation,

1928-50, 1950-65 and 1965-84. Table 4.5 gives the number of families and the type of rehabilitation in each of these periods. Map 4.4. gives a historical account of the structure of landed property in Kalamaria, one of the areas with the largest concentration of URP and the highest growth rates in GT during 1981-91 (table D.2. Appendix D).


**Table 4.5.** Number of families settled by URP in different periods

<i>Year</i>	<i>no of families</i>	<i>%</i>
1928-50	12,973	67.68
houses by EAP	2,138	(11.15)
houses by MSW	7,058	(36.82)
"shelf-housing"	3,777	(19.70)
Shed-settlers	3,096	16.15
1950-65	1,771	9.24
1965-84	1,328	6.93
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>19,168</b>	<b>100.00</b>

*source: see, table 4.3.*

The initial emphasis of the programme was on housing provision, whereby 9,196 houses were built by both EAP and later MSW and allocated, together with the titles of ownership of the plots, to an equal number of families. The emphasis on home and land ownership is evident in the programme. The latter becomes more clear with the later gradual shift towards land allocation and a promotion of self-housing. After MSW had resumed responsibility for the programme, it was split into two parts. Apart from the continuation of the housing programme as set by EAP, 3,777 families - 29% of the total settled in the first period - were provided with urban plots and with loans in order to have their own houses built. Loans given for rehabilitation purposes, both in this and in later periods, were at a very low rate of interest and should be repaid within a span of twenty-five years. In many cases, loan repayment was suspended, not only under growing pressure by the refugees, but also as a form of political concession<sup>11</sup>. Evidently, the latter reflects the long-standing weakness of the Greek financial sector.

During the first period, 3,096 families were temporarily settled in sheds. This became one of the most acute social problems during the pre-war period. The situation was resolved in the years 1950-65, partly through a public housing programme and partly through land allocation to shed-dwellers. In 1961, two housing estates were constructed, Phoinikas and Agios Ioannis, in order to house



**Map. 4.4.** A historical account of the structure of landed property in Kalamaria



families living in sheds (map 4.3). The Phoinikas and Agios Ioannis estates were the last public housing programmes for refugee rehabilitation. Along with the Axios development, which concerned working-class housing, they were, the only public housing programmes to be implemented throughout 1950-1982 in GT<sup>12</sup>. In comparison to the pre-war housing programme, the Phoinikas and Agios Ioannis ones focused exclusively on housing provision. Apart from housing shed-dwellers, during the period 1950-65, 1771 additional families were provided with urban plots for self-housing system.

After 1965, and at a time when investment in public housing had dropped to a minimum of 2%, URP was exclusively directed towards plot allocation and self-housing. During 1965-84, 1328 families were provided with 781 plots (table 4.6).

**Table 4.6.** The progress of URP during 1965-84

<i>Municipalities</i>	<i>No of allocated plots</i>	<i>No of families</i>	<i>families / plot</i>
Thessaloniki	303	497	1.9
Kalamaria	257	442	1.7
Agios Pavlos	7	12	1.7
Triandria	79	140	1.8
Neapoli	5	6	1.2
Elefterio-Kordelio	55	104	1.9
Stavroupoli	75	127	1.7
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>781</b>	<b>1328</b>	<b>1.7</b>

source: see, table 4.3.

Approximately 25-30 hectares of land were allocated during this final period. Despite the fact that house prices and demand for housing were rapidly increasing in the areas where MSW had been allocating land since the early 60s, it was only after 1973, and at a time when housing market in the south-eastern areas was flourishing, that MSW took into consideration the development value of the allocated properties. This was expressed by partially abolishing the "one-plot-per-family" policy and considering the development ratio as a criterion for setting the size of the allocated land. In this respect only families with six members or more were provided with one plot of an average size of 120-150 m<sup>2</sup>. Smaller families were given land that should have to be shared with other families (table 4.6). In this case the average size of the plot varied from 150 to 250 m<sup>2</sup>. This decision provoked

strong opposition from the families entitled to land allocation, a reaction that indicates the importance of small land holding in family economy.

**Table 4.6.** Distribution of plots per family in the 1965-1984 URP

<i>no. of plots</i>	<i>families/ plot</i>	<i>no. of families</i>
313	1	313
420	2	840
19	3	57
27	4	108
2	5	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>781</b>	<b>1,328</b>

source: see, table 4.3.

In addition to the above alterations, there was an attempt to rationalise the system of housing subsidies for refugee rehabilitation. During the post-war period the National Real Estate Bank, which controls the bulk of mortgage market in Greece, assumed responsibility for housing loans given for the URP purposes. After 1973, loans were officially given only for self-construction, in which case they covered about one third of the construction costs. However, taking into consideration the high demand for land in the south-eastern areas, in which 550 of the total 781 plots were allocated, most of these properties immediately entered the *antiparohi* market.

#### 4.1.2. Basic features of the Urban Rehabilitation Programme

On the basis of the above account concerning the general character of URP, this section will provide an evaluation of its basic features, which had a great impact on the residential development process.

The first issue to be discussed is that URP, as indeed all land allocation programmes which originated in the 1920s, finally constituted a long-standing policy, which encompassed the interdependency between state and small land ownership. It is in this context that both the delays in carrying out URP and its legalistic nature should be placed. One could argue that the slow rates of the programme can be attributed to the large scale of the task of rehabilitation and the financial difficulties in meeting with it. If this is partly true for the pre-war period, the fact that about 32% of URP was carried out throughout the entire post-war

period should be considered as indicative, not only of the state bureaucracy and its resultant inefficiency, but also of the specific way the state intervened in residential land allocation.

The bureaucratic nature of URP and its impact upon the relations between state and households can also be seen in other aspects of the programme. It has already been mentioned that there is no precise estimate of the number of households entitled to rehabilitation. Up to an extent, this was due to the vague nature of the legislation regulating URP. One characteristic case concerned the question of whether or not rehabilitation rights could be transferred to inheritors of principal beneficiaries, when the latter had not been rehabilitated through URP during their lifetime. These families pressed the government for the transfer of rehabilitation rights to inheritors of principal beneficiaries. Thus, almost fifty years since the launch of the programme and as late as 1978, the government decided to extend these rights to inheritors, provided that applications were made before 1972. As a result, there was an additional increase of applications for rehabilitation and more pressure was exercised by these families for the above decision to include also applications made after 1972. By 1984, the year when government instructed the local departments of MSW to give an end to the programme, in GT there were as many as 8,000 applications. Nevertheless, the local department of MSW estimated that only about 200 of them were legally entitled to rehabilitation.

Another important aspect of the programme's implementation concerns the appropriation phenomena. In a situation where small landownership was crucial to urban housing allocation, the very slow pace of implementation resulted in a gradual appropriation of part of MSW's property. In most cases, however, such land was appropriated by families entitled to rehabilitation. Unfortunately, due to the filing system of the local MSW department, it has been extremely difficult to acquire an estimate of the extent of these phenomena and subsequently their role in urban land allocation. Table 4.8 provides a partial indication on the basis of data concerning the situation of land owned by MSW during the years 1981-84. However, it should be pointed out that these data refer only to 1% of the total land administered by MSW throughout the period 1925-84.

It appears that the total figure of appropriations was around 25% of the total land owned by MSW out of which 18% was appropriated by a number of families. Certainly it would be wrong to make generalisations based on these figures<sup>13</sup>. Nonetheless, the local department of MSW estimated that approximately 10-15%

of MSW's land had been appropriated, in particular, during the post-war period. Afterall, appropriation constituted a principal preoccupation of URP during that time. Following the overall policy towards similar cases, appropriated land could be sold to its occupants at current prices in cases where appropriation had occurred after 1951 and at a token price in cases prior to 1951. According to information given by the local MSW, those properties appropriated after 1951 were usually bought by the occupant in co-operation with a developer, since most of these properties immediately entered the *antiparohi* market. The implications of these phenomena for the way land market operated is evident.

**Table 4.8.** The situation of land owned by MSW in the years 1981-84

<i>Situation of land</i>		<i>No. of plots</i>	<i>Area in m<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>%</i>
<b>ALLOCATIONS</b>		43	10,904.16	27.94
allocated	for public use	20	5876.92	
	to households	23	5,027.24	
<b>APPROPRIATIONS</b>		44	9,810.97	25.13
appropriated	by public bodies	2	2,852.00	
	by households	42	6,958.97	
<b>DISPUTED LAND</b>		11	3,210.84	8.23
disputed	by public bodies	2	925.00	
	by households	9	2,285.84	
<b>NON-DISPOSED OF LAND</b>		56	15,107.20	38.70
non-disposed of	claimed by public bodies	11	3,481.47	
	non-claimed	45	12,625.73	
<b>TOTAL LAND 1981-84</b>		154	39,033.17	100.00

source: see, table 4.3.

These issues led of course to the predominance of the legalistic nature of the programme. During the post-1950 period, in particular, when almost 25% of MSW's land was still not disposed of, most of MSW's activity in respect of the programme was devoted to a kind of legalistic settlement of the allocation policy. In fact, the major part of URP during this period was carried out after continuous appeals on behalf of the beneficiaries and in many cases through court action. The latter appears to be paradoxical, if one considers that the overall MSW's policy was to allocate all of its land to families.

Only after 1975 were there signs of a change of this policy of allocating land to families. Because of the large deficits of public land and the pressure exercised by the local authorities, it was decided that part of MSW's already small stocks of land would be allocated to other public bodies, especially school authorities<sup>14</sup>. However, between 1981-84, a mere 5,877 m<sup>2</sup> (i.e. 15% of the remaining MSW land, table 4.8), was allocated to other public bodies! Even these minor allocations met with obstacles and strong resistance on the part of MSW<sup>15</sup>. Local and school authorities persistently claimed all the rest of MSW's land, which by 1984 was just 28,129 m<sup>2</sup> together with the appropriated and the disputed sites. In the same year, however, MSW even delayed the reallocation of a mere 2,481 m<sup>2</sup> for which official proceedings for transfer to local authorities had started long before (table 4.8).

All the above issues reflect the overall state policy towards small land ownership and hence the latter's interrelations with urban land allocation. This does not diminish the significance of the public housing programme, particularly if one considers the fact that no other housing programme ever reached even part of URP's proportions either locally or nationally. However, evaluating its significance sixty years after its launch, one is bound to examine it in the light of URP's enormous impact upon later trends in residential development, in which firm establishment of small land ownership in the urban area was to become one of the most important factors for housing land allocation and the high share of the owner-occupied sector in it.

The above argument suggests that URP was to become an extension of the particular land policy manifested in the Agrarian Reform and consolidated in the 1920s by the then Liberal Party (see, section 2.1). This is evidenced by the major objective of the programme, that of land allocation to beneficiaries. The "one-family-per-plot" principle, which secured high rates of homeownership for low-income groups in urban areas in the 1920s, was also one of the main factors for an easy transfer of this landed property into the *antiparohi* market through which owner-occupation dominated housing allocation in the post-war period. The change of objectives from public housing provision to provision of small landed property further extended this access to future highly priced land. Altogether 6,800 families, 36% of the total, were settled through the programme of landed property provision (table 4.9).

**Table 4.9.** Number of families per type of rehabilitation

<i>type of rehabilitation</i>	<i>no of families</i>	<i>%</i>
public housing	9,196	47.98
self-housing	6,876	35.87
shed-settlers	3,096	16.15
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>19,168</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Taking into consideration land availability, extreme land fragmentation was necessary in order to achieve high rates of small ownership. The average size of the allocated plots varied from 80-200 m<sup>2</sup> and was slightly increased to 150-250 m<sup>2</sup> in the 1965-84 co-ownership programme. An examination of the plot size in the area remaining under the ownership of MSW, for example, shows that 29% of them does not even fulfil the requirements of the local plans and therefore cannot be officially developed. For the case of the allocated plots, this problem has contributed to a large number of diversions from the standards set by local plans and above all strong pressures on behalf of the owners for the revision of these standards. From these problems one can easily explain how plot-ratio has become one of the central issues in planning practice as shown in section 3.1.

By 1984, almost the entire land - 99.29% - owned and administered by MSW throughout 1925-84 in GT, was allocated<sup>16</sup>. That year the government decided to instruct the local department of MSW to bring an end to the rehabilitation issue. However, the discussion above indicates that the statement made by the head of MSW's housing department in GT, in an interview with her, according to which "... there will never be such an end for in one way or another there will always be a problem related to refugee rehabilitation", may be justified<sup>17</sup>.

#### **4.2. The Rural Rehabilitation Programme in Greater Thessaloniki: consolidating small land holding in the urban periphery**

The programme of urban refugee rehabilitation determined the character of urban expansion in the inter-war period and was to play an important role in the development of the *antiparohi* market in the inner urban areas in the post-war period. However, it was the Rural Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), which established the patterns of post-war urban expansion and the peculiarities of land market in the outer urban periphery of GT. It is rather surprising that the role of

RRP has been so underestimated by urban research in GT, an issue that will become more evident in our analysis of urban policy (see, chapter 6).

Although RRP in GT was concerned mainly with the rehabilitation of the rural refugee population, it should be mentioned that it was, in fact, part of the general policy of the agrarian reform launched in 1917<sup>18</sup>. For this reason it also dealt with land allocation to the indigenous population. However, the figures given below are not broken down into these two categories of beneficiaries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the bulk of RRP, both in GT and in the Province of Thessaloniki, was concerned with the rural refugee population and hence the establishment of a number of new rural communities. Since the actual programme of land allocation started in GT in 1930, almost at the time of the dissolution of EAP, it was undertaken entirely by MA, which, as it will be argued in this section, was to become the major agent of land allocation in areas subjected to conversion processes.

#### 4.2.1. An account of the Rural Rehabilitation Programme

RRP in GT was part of the wide land allocation programme implemented in Macedonia, which absorbed 77.07% of the rural refugee population (table A.1, Appendix A). It should be noted that, as part of the Agrarian Reform in Macedonia and Thrace, 471 big estates, 255,328 hectares, were expropriated and allocated to 40,808 landless families up to 1928,<sup>19</sup> while by the beginning of the 1950s all the remaining large property was expropriated<sup>20</sup>.

For the needs of RRP land was acquired in three ways: **a) From exchangeable property.** Properties of the exchanged Muslim population, covered almost 60% of the land for the needs of the rural refugee rehabilitation nationally. **b) From the expropriation of big landed property.** This property dominated land distribution in Northern Greece before the Agrarian Reform. In Macedonia, as indeed was the case in other regions of the country, big landed property, the so-called *tsiflikia*, was created in the late eighteenth century and reached its peak just before the liberation of Macedonia. In 1913, there were 818 *tsiflikia*, which covered about 41% of the total land and up to 52% of the cultivated land of Macedonia<sup>21</sup>. In part of the western periphery of Thessaloniki as well as Panorama there were *tsiflikia* land which had belonged to the Muslim population. In Polichni and in Evosmos, especially, there were also large properties belonging to local Jewish families (see, section 5.0) **c) From the expropriation of some of the big church estates, the**

**so-called *vakoufia*.** These estates were also created in the late eighteenth century and were closely connected with the then formed big landed property. The expropriation of *vakoufia* was more limited than that of the large landed property. In the Province of Thessaloniki the church still owns certain large estates, the most prominent one being the Patriarchate Estate in the south-east of GT (see, also section 6.2).

Seven of the areas in which RRP was implemented in the county of Thessaloniki, namely, Polichni, Menemeni, Evosmos, Kordelio, Efkarpiia, Rodohori (Sykies) and Panorama, called "Farms", were incorporated in the boundaries of GT after 1950 and they will be the object of our study in the following pages.

Through RRP 1,712 families were provided with farming land in these seven areas<sup>22</sup>. They represent 6.15% and 8.79% of the total families settled in the Province of Thessaloniki and in GT through the 1920s Rehabilitation Programmes. At the same time, an equal number of rural settlements were established. Table 4.10 shows the distribution of the families in the new settlements and map 4.3. describes the different "Farms", i.e. areas where agricultural land was allocated to refugee families under the administration of the MA.

**Table 4.10.** Distribution of the settled families per community

<i>Settlements</i>	<i>Initial allocations</i>	<i>Complementary allocations +</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Polichni	183	87	270
Menemeni	149	-	149
Evosmos	341	-	341
Kordelio*	64	-	64
Efkarpiia	158	72	230
Rodohori	75	286 **	496
Panorama	193	104	297
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>1,163</b>	<b>549</b>	<b>1,712</b>

source: Elaboration of data from Land Allocation Records (unpublished records), Ministry of Agriculture, Survey Department, County of Thessaloniki.

\* Data from Maravelakis, M. & Vakalopoulos, A. (1955).

\*\* Families provided with urban plots.

+ Not including the families allocated with land after appropriation.



On the whole 1,163 families, an estimated 4,640 inhabitants, were initially settled in the periphery of Thessaloniki. To these families 200 hectares of land were distributed within the "Settlements", the newly created rural communities, for their housing needs (map 4.3). Up to 2,800 hectares of farming land were distributed to 1,712 families throughout the period 1930-70, representing approximately 34% of the total land and 83% of the cultivated land in these areas. Table 4.11 gives an account of the allocated land in six out of the seven areas under study. Allocations in Kordelio (nowadays named Eleftherio-Kordelio) are not included due to the lack of data (estimate to reach about 200 hectares).

It should also be noted that for the post-war allocations table 4.11 does not refer to the actual structure of land-use since the then developed industrial and residential uses are not included. The same holds for the account of private land, which is exact only in reference to the structure of ownership at the time before the conversion of these areas into urban ones. The following data is based on land registration as kept in the records of MA, and it is indicative of the way this agent formed its policy in reference to these areas. This issue will be also discussed the next chapter.

The implementation of RRP involved different stages in two respects. First, the stage of initial allocations which involved two procedures. During the first procedure, the average size of the "basic" allotment, the area of allocated land each family was entitled to was set (see, section 3.1). Due to the emergency situation of the refugee problem, land was allocated only temporarily, in which case a family did not always get all the land it was entitled to. These deviations were finalised later. In four of the areas under study, Polichni, Evosmos, Efkarpiia and Panorama, final allocations of this first stage took place in the years 1930-33. In two areas, Menemeni and Rodohori, they took place between 1959 and 1964. Due to the fact that land in these areas was already converted to residential or industrial uses, it was decided to reduce the size of the "basic" allotments, taking into account their increase in value.

In the case of Kordelio, final allocations never took place practically, while land in this area had been already subdivided in small plots and sold to immigrants. This has created one of the most characteristic cases of obscurity in the situation of land ownership in GT. Only in 1984 did MA put forward the proceedings to legitimising the present land allocation of Kordelio, because this was the only way to proceed with the preparation of the local plans within EPA.

**Table 4.11.** The Rural Rehabilitation Programme and the distribution of land per "Farm" (area in stremmas\*)

	Year of allocation	CULTIVATED LAND		non cultivated land	are of settle-ment	TOTAL
FARM		allocated to farmers	private properties			
POLICHNI						
first allocation	1933	3,556.463	1,677.608	3,644.105	869.737	
second	1961	163.070	-	3,481.820	-	
third	1957-68	358.439	1,048.093	2,074.516	-	
Total area		4,077.959	2,725.701	2,074.516	869.737	9,747.913
%		41.83	27.96	21.28	8.92	100.00
MENEMENI						
total area	1959-62	2,679.641	301.958	1,663.494	176.275	4,821.368
%		55.60	6.25	34.50	3.65	100.00
EVOSMOS						
total area	1930	8,961.090	962.783	843.955	332.125	10,829.953
%		80.25	8.89	7.79	3.07	100.00
EFKARPIA						
first allocation	1931	4,367.468	883.250	8,439.353	155.250	
second	1957	222.346	-	8,217.007	-	
third	1967-68					
total area		4,726.675	883.250	8080.146	155.250	13,845.321
%		34.14	6.38	58.36	1.12	100.00
RODOHORI						
first allocation	1962-64	1,008.965	44.897	3,258.040	-	
second	1969-70	105.106	-	3,152.934	-	
third	1972	25.409	-	3,127.525	-	
total area		1,139.48	44.897	3,127.525	-	4,311.902
%		26.43	1.04	72.53	-	100.00
PANORAMA						
first allocation	1931	3,790.345	289.375	28,557.156	418.562	
second	1966	121.152	-	28,436.004		
third	1967	967.000	-	27,469.004		
total area		4,878.497	289.375	27,469.004	418.562	33,055.438
%		14.76	0.87	83.10	1.27	100.00
TOTAL GT						
		26,193.342	5207.964	43258640	1,951.949	76,611.895
%		(83.41	16.59)			
%		34.19	6.80	56.46	2.55	100.00

source: see, table 4.10

\* 1 stremma=0.1 hectare

A second stage involved the complementary allocations. New land, an overall 210 hectares, was allocated in four areas, Polichni, Efkarpia, Rodohori, and Panorama. Apart from settling new landless peasants, the purpose of these allocations was to resolve the situation of appropriated land as well as to complete certain land allocations, which old beneficiaries were entitled to from previous stages. In the

case of appropriated land, this was finally allocated to its occupants at one third of its price, in case they were entitled to land allocation<sup>23</sup>. In the case of Menemeni and Rodohori where final settlement of the initial allocations took place in the beginning of the 1960s, appropriations were also settled during this stage (table 4.12). As far as old beneficiaries were concerned, this was settled through complementary allocations, due to the fact that during the final stage of the initial allocations certain families were not provided once again with all the land they were entitled to. This was an extremely complicated procedure related to the Greek family law. In brief, given the fact that rural owner-occupation is family-based, and that part of the allocated land was already transferred to inheritors, a new computation of the land left to be provided for had to take place. In this case, not only the land that a new beneficiary had inherited from his/her parents had to be deducted, but also that from his/her in-laws, in case the latter had been distributed by MA. Table 4.12 shows the way these issues were settled in the complementary allocations of Polichni and in the total allocations of Rodohori. In the case of Rodohori in particular, due to the delays in finalising the situation of ownership of the allocated land, 43.92 hectares, 43.52% of the total allocated land, was in fact distributed as urban plots.

**Table 4.12.** A detailed account of the allocation policy in Polichni and Rodohori

Year of allo- cation	DISTRIBUTED TO				Appropriated and distributed				TOTAL	
	new		old		"farming" land		developed land			
	beneficiaries		beneficiaries							
	no.	area	no of	area	no of	area	no of	area	no of	area
	of		fami-		fami-		fami-		fami-	
	fami-		lies		lies		lies		lies	
	lies									
<b>COMPLEMENTARY ALLOCATIONS OF POLICHNI</b>										
1957-68	86	358,314			1	0.125	67	6.546	154	364,985
1961			114	167,142					114	167,142
TOTAL	86	358,314	114	167,142	1	0.125	67	6.546	268	432,127
<b>ALLOCATIONS OF RODOHORI</b>										
1962-64	56	569,758			19	429,108	3	10.099	75	1008,965
1969-70	2				232	54.739	150		384	105,106
1972	22	10,786			30	12.421	8	2202	60	25,409
TOTAL	80	580,544			281	67.160			519	1139,48

source: see, table 4.10.

As it will be argued below, the impact of the above procedures, both on the issue of land fragmentation as well as the dependence of the rural and the consequent urban land owner-occupation upon the state, was of great importance.

#### **4.2.2. Basic features of the Rural Rehabilitation Programme**

The first issue that should be taken into account in the analysis of RRP is the course of its implementation over different periods of time. As it has been discussed in chapter 3, the Agrarian Reform, on the basis of which RRP was planned, constituted one of the cornerstones of social and economic development in Greece. In this respect it is easy to understand why RRP was not simply a programme applied at a certain period of time, but rather a long-standing policy of land allocation. Nevertheless, the application of this policy at different points in time had different effects upon the localities in which it was implemented, and in relation to land processes in these areas. Thus, land allocation policy to landless peasants was implemented even after the government attempts for reallocating the already fragmented rural landed properties. It was also an active policy in areas undergoing a conversion process as well as in resort areas in which land prices increased rapidly after the mid-1960s. However, its specific effects have to be analysed in relation to the characteristics of development in these different localities.

In practice 92% of the RRP's land had been allocated in the periphery of Thessaloniki until the early 1930s, at a time when the dominant character of these areas was still rural. However, this fact is not enough to dismiss its impact on future processes of conversion in these areas, especially if one considers the structure of landed property after the allocation. On the other hand, relatively speaking, only 8% of the total allocated land was distributed in "complementary" allocations during the years 1957-72. Nevertheless it is a figure which in itself might have been very important in an urban land market where ownership of very small plots has predominated. In terms of the final allocation of land in GT, only 77.90% was settled in the inter-war period, while a total of 578.80 hectares - 7.55% of the total area under study - was settled after 1957 (table 4.13).

**Table 4.13.** The implementation of RRP over time

		area in stremmas	%	% of the total
<i>initial allocation</i>				
final stage	1930-33	20,405.353	77.90	
	1957-64	3,688.606	14.08	91.99%
complementary	1957-61	743.855	2.84	
allocations	1966-72	1,355.528	5.18	8.01%
TOTAL		766,111.895	100	100

There are two central issues to which special attention should be given in the analysis of the RRP's objectives: (i) The question of rural land allocation and its impact upon urban land market and (ii), the relation between the state and landowners, as they are reflected in the way the programme was put into practice.

The overall average size of landed property distributed to landless peasants was 17,931 m<sup>2</sup> (table 4.14)<sup>24</sup>. In this figure the part of land in Rodohori was deducted, since this was distributed in the form of urban plots. A better understanding of the evolution of the rural landed property can be also reached from an examination of its average size in different periods. As table 4.14 shows, the size of allocated property in inter-war period varied from 19,434 m<sup>2</sup> in Polichni to 27,649 m<sup>2</sup> in Efkarpia. A comparison with national data of the time shows that this average size belonged to the lowest scale of the biggest category of rural landed property. In 1929, 58.60% of landed property was 1-10 hectares while 37.50% was 0-1 hectares<sup>25</sup>.

In the case of post-war allocations there are two figures to be considered. First, as far as Rodohori and Menemeni are concerned the average size of landed property was 10,174 and 17,984 m<sup>2</sup> respectively. This was due to a decision taken by the Expropriation Committee of MA in 1955, to reduce the "basic" allotments in these areas, since the final rehabilitation of the allocated land had taken place at a time when these areas were transformed into urban ones. Secondly, as far as complementary allocations are concerned, the average size of the allocated property varied from 3,509 m<sup>2</sup> to 10,744 m<sup>2</sup>, because of the time of the allocation but also because part of these properties had already been appropriated by peasant families.

**Table 4.14.** The average size of the allocated landed property in the different areas

"FARM"	No. of benef- iciaries	size of allocated land (stremmas)				allocated land/family (m <sup>2</sup> )
		0-10	10-20	20-30	30-	
POLICHNI	270	115	41	111	3	15,103*
first allocation	183	28	41	111	3	19,434
complementary allocations	87	87				5,121*
MENEMENI	149	16	131	2	-	17,984
EVOSMOS	341	22	42	206	71	25,487
EFKARPIA	230	68	8	154		20,550
first allocation	158	1	3	154		27,642
second allocation	33	28	5			6,737
third allocation	39	39				3,509
PANORAMA	297	147	40	105	5	16,426
first allocation	193	43	40	105	5	19,639
second allocation	14	14				8,653
third allocation	90	90				10,744
RODOHORI **	56	32	24			10,174
TOTAL GT	1,429	486	286	578	79	17,931

source: see, table 4.10

total distributed area : 25,623.62 stremmas

\* In Polichni additional land was distributed to old beneficiaries during the complementary allocations. Here, we counted only the land allocated to new beneficiaries.

\*\* In this table we do not include part of the allocations in Rodohori because they were allocated as urban sites and this would falsify the average size of farming land.

The problem of land fragmentation and its possible impact on land supply becomes more acute when the average size of farming land is taken into consideration. Overall, the average size of farming land in the periphery of Thessaloniki was a mere 6,245 m<sup>2</sup> (table 4.15). This figure is practically unrealistic, and the different periods of allocation should be introduced in this analysis. In the inter-war period this average was 4,939, 4,974, 7,543, and 8,381 m<sup>2</sup> for Polichni, Panorama, Efkarpia and Evosmos respectively. During the same period only 6.3% of the farming land nationally had an average size up to 1 hectare, the largest proportion, 65.3%, being concentrated in the category of 1-10 hectares<sup>26</sup>. In later periods the average size of farming land varied around the same figures as in earlier periods, with the exception of the 1961 complementary allocation in Polichni, and the 1967-68

complementary allocation in Efkarpia where it was as low as 1,254 and 2,912 m<sup>2</sup> respectively. Overall, the average number of rural sites per family was 2.87 (table 4.16).

**Table 4.15.** Average size of farming land in the allocation areas

	no. of allot- ments	size of allotments (in stremmas)							average size (in m <sup>2</sup> )
		0-2	2-4	4-6	6-10	10-15	15-20	20-	
<b>POLICHNI</b>	937	172	239	326	190	8	2	-	4,352
first allocation	720	60	193	269	188	8	2	-	4,939
second allocation	130	111	13	1				-	1,254
third allocation	87	1	28	56	2			-	4,120
<b>MENEMENI</b>	353	155	34	19	59	81	5		7,591
<del>ΕΥΘΥΧΟΣ</del>	<del>1,034</del>	<del>58</del>	<del>154</del>	<del>209</del>	<del>286</del>	<del>240</del>	<del>84</del>	<del>12</del>	<del>8,384</del>
<b>ΕΦΚΑΡΠΙΑ</b>	680	84	150	162	126	125	31	2	6,951
first allocation	579	58	96	153	115	124	31	2	7,543
second allocation	54	14	23	6	10	1			4,117
third allocation	47	12	31	3	1				2,912
<b>RODOHORI</b>	127	40	40	20	19	8			4,486
<b>PANORAMA</b>	970	72	414	278	188	13	5		5,029
first allocation	762	60	222	274	188	13	5		4,974
second allocation	28	12	13	3					4,327
third allocation	180		179	1					5,372
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	4,104	581	1031	1014	862	475	127	14	6,243 *

source : see, table 4.10.

\* total allocated area: 25,623.620 stemmas

As the continuity of owner-occupation is affected by inheritance patterns and results to further land fragmentation, 20-30 years after the implementation of the bulk of RRP in GT, a major part of the allocated land was transferred to its inheritors resulting to further land fragmentation. Chapter 5 will deal more analytically with the structure of ownership during the conversion period.

**Table 4.16.** Number of distributed allotments per family

<i>Municipality</i>	<i>no. of allotments per family</i>
<b>POLICHNI</b>	<b>3.47</b>
first allocation	3.93
complementary allocations	2.49
<b>MENEMENI</b>	<b>2.36</b>
<b>EVOSMOS</b>	<b>3.04</b>
<b>EFKARPIA</b>	<b>2.96</b>
first allocation	3.66
second allocation	1.64
third allocation	1.21
<b>RODOHORI</b>	<b>2.27</b>
<b>PANORAMA</b>	<b>3.26</b>
first allocation	3.95
second allocation	2.00
third allocation	2.00
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>2.87</b>

Apart from the effects of RRP on the structure of land in the periphery of Thessaloniki, a second important aspect of the programme concerns the way relations between the state and the small land-owners were incorporated in the implementation of the programme. In other words, a number of characteristics of RRP, such as its gradual implementation, its bureaucratic nature or its lack of locational criteria, were related and in turn resulted in a considerable dependence of small landownership upon the state. Of interest to this work is that, although this dependence was initially created in the rural sector (see chapter 3), due to the repercussions of the programme upon residential development, it was gradually transferred into the urban sector. Thus, complementary allocations, for instance, mattered more at a period when land prices were rapidly increasing and, as a consequence, there was a great deal of pressure on MA to proceed with these allocations. On the other hand, the basic principle of the agrarian reform that encompassed the allocation of as much land as possible to landless peasants could not easily be removed by the post-war programmes of land reallocation and co-operative forms of farming. In the case of land with a potential of conversion, such as, for example in the one under examination, this could cause problems in the



small-scale, and in particular, family character of certain urban sectors, such as the residential one.

As a result of the above trends, residential development and land-use planning became to some extent dependent upon the extreme bureaucratic nature of RRP. Despite the fact that most transactions in land in these peripheral areas were illegal, both the entry of this land into the *antiparohi* market and land-use planning in these areas became dependent upon the state decision to clarify the situation of ownership in these areas. In addition, in large areas of land, most characteristically in Kordelio, an obscure situation of land ownership had been already created in the course of RRP's implementation. It is in this context that appropriation phenomena developed, while most of the activity of the Survey Department of MA throughout the post-war period was devoted to legal settlement of those issues. Thus, it is not surprising that land registration in these areas has been extremely vague and simply refers to the allocated land<sup>27</sup>. Practically speaking, in the records of MA all areas studied in this section, all of which performed high growth rates since the beginning of the 1950s, remain rural and were treated as such until almost the beginning of the 1970s.

Even though complementary allocations continued until 1972, they had been officially put to a hold by the early 1960s. This action was taken by the Expropriation Committee of MA in Thessaloniki and was based on a decision taken by the High Court according to which allocation of land was suspended in the area of Thessaloniki. Allocation programmes continued, however in the Province of Thessaloniki and in certain areas until 1981. According to information given by the president of the Expropriation Committee, in 1984 a public body applied to MA in order to be provided with land of about 20 hectares and within a distance of 20 kilometres no such site could be found<sup>28</sup>.

### **4.3. Other agents and forms of land allocation**

As we have seen in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Ministry of Agriculture established themselves as the two major agents of land allocation - and indirectly land-use planning - in GT through the programmes of urban and rural refugee rehabilitation. However, state involvement in land allocation also operated through other public and non-public authorities as a result


of the formation of special categories of land, which also played an important role in land market processes in GT.

Two categories of land must be mentioned in this section, the remaining exchangeable property, left under state control, and land distributed to building co-operatives. Unfortunately, there exists only very limited information about the size, the administration and the transactions, which took place in these categories of land. This very fact reflects the way land was administered as well as the established attitude in favour of privatisation of large parts of public land. Nevertheless, because of lack of data any estimation of the overall significance these categories of land had for the structure of land market in GT is very difficult to be provided.

#### **4.3.1. Exchangeable property**

Although a major part of exchangeable property was transferred into the ownership of the Ministry of Agriculture for the needs of RRP, large stocks of this category of real-estate property were administered rather independently from the programme by the National Bank of Greece, and after 1949 by the separate departments of Public Exchangeable Property (DAP) of the Ministry of Finance. As already discussed in section 3.1, the basic target of both agents in charge of exchangeable property was its liquidation. Map 4.5. roughly indicates sites of exchangeable property in GT in 1966, a large part of which was sold to private owners or occupants. Over the years, this liquidation took place in two ways: through sale to the occupants - tenants or through auction. Large sales to tenants of exchangeable property took place during the pre-war period, when the National Bank of Greece was in charge of this property. Auctions started in GT by the end of the 1950s and were suspended only in 1979 in view of the change of policy over public land.

During the post-war years, however, most exchangeable land was sold to its occupants, as it was gradually appropriated by them. Until 1970, no special limits were set in respect of these sales, either in terms of the size of the landed property and the economic status of its occupants, or its location. Only in 1970 there were certain restrictions made in GT - the main urban area in Greece with high concentration of exchangeable property. Only landed property up to 500 m<sup>2</sup> could be sold to its occupants in case the latter had been using it for over 25 years and had not acquired any other provision through the rehabilitation programmes.



**Map 4.5.** The distribution of exchangeable landed property in Greater Thessaloniki in 1966  
(source: Triantafyllidis, I., 1966-68, vol. 9)

Bigger properties could be sold only in cases where they were appropriated by more than one family<sup>29</sup>. According to information given by the local DAP, most the estates of exchangeable property in GT belonged to categories that could be sold directly to their occupants. Appropriated land of the above categories was sold at 50% of its current price with a 25-years repayment arrangement and with an interest rate as low as 4%.

By 1970, there was an attempt to promote transference of exchangeable property to other public authorities for public use. For certain uses though, such as schools and transport, exchangeable land was sold to respective authorities at 50% of its current price. This revenue, as indeed all revenue from sales of exchangeable property, went to the Fund for Refugee Rehabilitation, and constituted one of the most typical instances of re-circulation of public money. One could argue that this reflected the preference of the Greek State for the real estate sector as a basis of its allowance policy.

Registration of exchangeable property in GT was incidental. Hence, one of the major issues the local DAP had to deal with was the disputes with private owners over the ownership situation in various exchangeable properties. The only source for the settlement of these disputes was an old land registry of the pre-1913 period kept by the then Turkish administration<sup>30</sup>. Similar disputes were gradually developed between DAP and other public authorities. The most characteristic case is that of Rodohori, where land was administered by three authorities, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture and DAP. Even in 1984, the year when EPA was in action, there were areas in Rodohori where land was disputed by all these authorities.

By 1979, DAP estimated that in the county of Thessaloniki exchangeable property amounted to 3,788 estates or 8,710 hectares (table 4.17). In the same year the Public Real-Estate Agency (KED), which was established at that time, officially undertook the administration of exchangeable property. Due to the weakness of the new authority, DAP remained in charge of this property for all the following years.

**Table 4.17.** The situation of the exchangeable property in Central Macedonia, 1979

<i>County</i>	<i>Urban estates</i>		<i>Rural estates</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Area</i>
Thessaloniki	2,592	3,849,000	1,196	83,254,162	3,788	87,103,162
Kilkis	268	271,712	87	868,402	355	1,140,114
Halkidiki	88	65,035	569	7,487,274	357	9,552,309
Edessa	152	128,447	2,480	15,823,502	2632	15,951,949
Veroia	40	16,973	86	3,066,399	126	3,083,372
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,140</b>	<b>4,331,167</b>	<b>4,418</b>	<b>110,499,739</b>	<b>7,558</b>	<b>114,830,906</b>

source : records of DAP, county of Thessaloniki.

#### 4.3.2. The role of Building Co-operatives

The role of building co-operatives in residential land allocation has been to a great extent ignored in Greek urban studies. In chapter 3, it was mentioned that the building co-operatives were particularly active in second residence markets. However, where urban land and housing allocation is concerned, they seem to have been of less importance, at least at a national level. This is true with regard to building co-operatives in the private market. However, there is a special category of building co-operatives with close connections to public rehabilitation programmes, whose role should be examined in more detail.

According to the Greek legislation, building co-operatives were divided into two basic categories: Co-operatives of the private sector and co-operatives of persons entitled to public housing. Until 1983, the Ministry of Social Welfare was in charge of both these categories of co-operatives. With the introduction of a new Act on building co-operatives (see, chapter 3), the first category passed into the jurisdiction of YHOP. In the second category, there were two main types: Co-operatives of refugees entitled to rehabilitation as prescribed by the regulations of URP and co-operatives of special groups entitled to a peculiar rehabilitation as prescribed by the 751/1955 Act.

As table 4.2 shows, about 50 hectares of land, 11.4% of the total MSW land, was initially given to refugee building co-operatives to house their own members. On the whole, 15 refugee building co-operatives were established in the inter-war period. Table 4.18 indicates the area of land made available to seven of them, while for the rest no relevant data are available.

**Table 4.18.** Land allocation be refugee building co-operative

<i>Refugee building co-operatives</i>	<i>Municipality</i>	<i>Year of land allocation</i>	<i>area of land (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>
Kato Toumpa	Thessaloniki	1928	22,000
Troados	Thessaloniki	1927-29	19,122
Sidiridromikon	Thessaloniki	1926	15,973
40 Ekklesies	Thessaloniki	1927	194,000
Pamfyliou	Thessaloniki	1926	6,692
Byzantio	Kalamaria	1928	181,600
Neapoli	Neapoli	1928	65,000
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>504,387</b>

source: see, table 4.3.

From the above data, and considering the fact that the main refugee building co-operatives were approximately 15, we could assume that on the whole they were provided with 100 hectares of land. A number of restrictions were made, according to which this land had to be used only for housing the members and not for profit making. Taking into account the housing problem of these members, almost all the above building co-operatives were exclusively involved in rehabilitating their own members.

However, the situation was very different with the second type of co-operatives entitled to public housing. These co-operatives were established on the grounds of one of the most scandalous pieces of legislation, the 751/1955 Act. On account of this legislation, certain special groups, such as army officers, war victims, victims of natural disasters and certain refugee groups, were provided with land for self-housing as long as they formed a building co-operative. As this Act was one of the most characteristic by-products of the political situation that prevailed after the Civil War, the criteria for land allocation were purely political.

In GT six such co-operatives were set up by the end of the 1950s. There are no analytical data on the precise area of the allocated land, let alone the actual activities of these co-operatives<sup>31</sup>. Three of them, which were the most important ones, appear to have acquired about 300 hectares of land in Panorama. It is worth mentioning that one of the allocation programmes concerning 99,6 hectares had not still been settled in 1989. Taking into consideration the character of the land and housing market in Panorama, an area which has always had the highest concentration of upper-income housing since 1960<sup>32</sup>, one could easily understand

why the bulk of this land entered the speculative sector almost immediately after its allocation.

Officially MSW, in charge of these co-operatives, allowed transfer of the allocated land only five years after its allocation to a member of a building co-operative, provided that, in the meantime, this land would be used for self-housing. Nevertheless, in most cases this prerequisite was actually violated and land was sold immediately after its allocation to the beneficiaries. According to information given by the local department of MSW, the Minister of MSW directly intervened in all these sales by facilitating the legal restrictions acting independently from the local department.

#### 4.4. Concluding Remarks

From the previous analysis two fundamental aspects were established, namely: (i) the extent and objectives of the programmes along with their consequences in the structure of landownership, and (ii) the features of land policy that emerged from these programmes and their implications for post-war land-use planning.

The analysis of the programmes revealed that their major objective was the establishment of small landownership as the dominant - if not the only - system of land tenure. Albeit a public housing programme, URP was in principle extremely influential as far as the structure of landownership in the inner urban periphery was concerned. The latter facilitated the expansion of the *antiparohi* housing market, intrinsically connected with extreme land fragmentation, to these areas. RRP, on the other hand, established similar patterns in the outer rural zone with the very small size of farms. A central feature of this policy was the continuous transfer of stocks of public land to the small family economy either in the rural or the urban sector. Subsequently, the continuation of the programmes throughout the post-war periods and the way exchangeable property was administered, resulted in enormous deficits in public land stocks and operated as a major obstacle for effective land-use planning.

It would be wrong to confine the significance of these programmes only to the level of their consequences for the city's land structure at a certain point in time. The fact that their implementation continued throughout most of the period under examination suggests that, above all, they constituted the cornerstone of actual land

policy in GT and the main domain through which the interdependencies between the state and the residential sector were built-up. It is surprising when one hears arguments that no land policy exists in Greece, ignoring the very fact that a 25% of the total area of GT, was transferred from big or medium landownership to national and finally to small ownership through an extensive programme of land reform. In a situation where the state has been historically the dominant factor in allocating land resources, a number of characteristics of the programmes were formed in the course of their implementation, such as appropriation phenomena, obscurities in the situation of ownership, the bureaucratic nature of implementation, and which constituted key features in residential land development and allocation.

As we saw in the previous sections, land policy was carried out through three major agents, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Departments of Exchangeable Property. The Ministry in charge of land-use planning was hardly involved in all in these policies, while the above three agents were practically ignored in the various programmes for land-use planning.



## 4.5. Notes for chapter 4

1. These trends have changed in the 1980s with a number interesting works. Among them, the most important ones were the works of Dimitriadis, V. (1983) in the field of urban history, Tsoulouvis, L. (1985) in the field of urban development and planning, and Gerolympos, A., (1985) in the field of urban planning and design.
2. The transition of the city gradually started after 1912, the year of its liberation. Loukatos, S.D. (1986) offers an analysis of the demographic changes in the 1910s. This was a period of profound changes for all urban centres of Northern Greece and were completed with the inflow of refugees. For an analysis of these changes and their impact on urban structure and urban hierarchy all over Northern Greece see, Gerolympos, A. et.al. (1988).
3. The Jewish community dominated the city's development from the 16th century until the inflow of the refugees. During this period the share of its population varied between 30 and 50% of the total population (Moskof, K. 1978, p. 136). After the refugee inflow the share of the Jewish community was reduced to 16% (Nar, A., 1986, p. 317) and after the Holocaust the community was further reduced approximately to 10,000 persons. The Muslim community amounted 45,000 persons, 25% of the total population at the beginning of the century (Moskof, K., op.cit., p.147). The community was gradually reduced since the 1910s. In 1926, after the exchange of population, the Muslim population left in the Province of Thessaloniki was 1,550 persons (Ancel, J., 1930, p.116).
4. Ancel, J. (op.cit., p. 201) refers that the number of urban refugees (i.e. those inhabited in Thessaloniki) was 99,937 persons in 1927. Pentzopoulos, N. 1962, gives the figure of 162,000 refugees but presumably he refers the total population settled in the county of Thessaloniki. Maravelakis, M. & Vakalopoulos, A. (1955) refer only to the rural population and notably the first refugees that were settled until 1926.
5. Pentzopoulos, N. 1962.
6. An account on these refugee settlements in the Province of Thessaloniki is given by Maravelakis, M. & Vakalopoulos, A., op.cit. For a brief review see, Gousidis, D. 1973.
7. Dimitriadis, V., 1983, pp. 217-247, provides an account on suburbanisation trends before 1912. Two main suburbs had been developed in the outskirts of Thessaloniki. The largest one was the Hamidyie suburb in the eastern part where all high income families of Thessaloniki built their mansion houses (see, also Kolonas, V., 1992). The second suburb, Kayir, was in the west side of the city and grew because of a sprawl of population outside its west walls.
8. Studies that are referring on the topography of the city, such as Moskof, K. op. cit., and Dimitriadis, V., op. cit., do not include any information about the structure of landed property outside the built-up area. Unavoidably, any speculation on that will be very tentative.
9. It should be reminded that due to the refugee problem in 1929 the Greek government declared that the Greek economy was in a stage of bankruptcy.
10. Such expropriations were mainly for land allocation to building co-operatives (see, section 5.3)

11. Suspensions for loan repayments in various cases were quite often until the beginning of the 1970s. This problem is also met in the repayments of housing loans given by the Organisation of Working Class Housing (OEK).
12. An account of public housing programmes in GT in the 1980s is included in Yiannakou, A. (1988).
13. However, the situation of the public land in general (see, section 3.1) makes us to assume that appropriations of MSW land were not a marginal phenomenon.
14. The lack of land for schools in Greater Thessaloniki has been one of the most acute problems during the last twenty years.
15. This is partly due to the bureaucratic structure of the local MSW as well as the nature of MSW itself. Although this Ministry handled the largest public housing programme, the activity of its housing departments is of a highly bureaucratic nature. On the other hand, it is worth noting that transfers of property rights from one public authority to another are made always with large difficulties due to the resistance of the initial owners. This is one of the most endemic problems in the administration of public property.
16. MSW owns also a large parcel in Panorama of approximately 1,000 stremmas. In 1989 MSW attempted to promote a housing programme in co-operation with DEPOS in part of this parcel. The Planning Organisation of Thessaloniki also proposed for this parcel to be exchanged with private properties situated in the inner urban area and which were proposed to be compulsory expropriated by EPA plans. None of these two proposals were put into practice.
17. We note that MSW is still in charge of "popular housing", a category of public housing that concerns very low-income groups not covered by OEK (Yiannakou, A., op. cit.).
18. A point clarified by Vergopoulos, K., 1975, p.176.
19. This figure is given by Vergopoulos, K., op.cit., p. 178.
20. Seitanidis, A., 1984.
21. Vergopoulos, K. 1975, p. 136.
22. On the grounds of data given by Maravelakis, M. & Vakalopoulos, A., 962 families (3,694 inhabitants) were settled in the areas under study. However, it should be noted that they refer only to the initial settlers and not to the total number of refugees eventually allocated with land in these areas. In the allocations of Kordelio we refer only to the initial settlers because a final allocation never took place and so the precise number of the families settled there is not known.
23. This was made according to the provisions of the 1832/1951 Act which integrated the Agrarian Reform.
24. The small size of the allotments and its efficiency was one issue that caused a number of claims on behalf of rural refugees from the beginning of the rural refugee rehabilitation (Pelagidis, S., 1988, p.75).
25. Vergopoulos, K., op.cit., p. 212.
26. op.cit.
27. At this point it should be noted that property rights are much more clear in the areas where MA allocated land than any other area. The last well documented land registration in Thessaloniki was conducted in 1890 as a modernisation policy by the then administrator of the city. A brief account of the cartographic and the land registry

situation is presented in Association of Rural and Surveying Engineers of Northern Greece, 1985.

28. This application was made by the Organisation of Management of Public Materials. The adventures in finding a proper site for a new hospital, the Regional Hospital of West Thessaloniki sketch out in the most dramatic way this lack in large parcels of public land. Thus, the only significant parcels left in Greater Thessaloniki are the army sites, which are now claimed by all local authorities.
29. Act 547/1970.
30. See, note 27.
31. Unfortunately, the local MSW refused to impart all the relevant statistics for these co-operatives.
32. Triantafyllidis, I., 1966-68, vol. 8, and Tsoulouvis, L. et. al, 1981.

## CHAPTER 5

### **LAND FRAGMENTATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN GREATER THESSALONIKI: A CASE STUDY**

---

From the preceding discussion it became evident that the inter-war land policy was crucial in consolidating a wide system of small landownership, within both the urban core and the rural periphery of Thessaloniki. This chapter investigates the practical impacts of post-war residential development upon the structure of landed property. Investigation focuses on two related aspects: a) the process of land fragmentation in the urban periphery, from the stage of its allocation as a rural allotment to that of its development, and b) the links between an extremely fragmented landed property, the residential development process, and the attempts to manage it.

The analysis on the process of land fragmentation is based on a case study undertaken in Polichni, one of Greater Thessaloniki's north-west suburbs, where land was allocated to refugees through RRP. This case study provides a thorough examination on the specific patterns of rural land fragmentation, its impact on the structure of land supply in the urban periphery, and the resultant characteristics of urban landed property. A special examination is provided on the problem of land appropriation and its links to state land policy. In view of these findings, the patterns of post-war residential development in the area are analysed and an attempt is made to re-assess some of the crucial problems EPA was confronted with. Finally, this chapter interrelates the structure of urban landed property and the peculiar features of the development industry and the *antiparohi* system. The chapter is accordingly divided into the following sections:

Section 5.0 includes a brief presentation of the character of the selected area, and the sources used by the case study.

Section 5.1, analyses the legacy of the land allocation programmes and the process of land fragmentation in the urban fringe during the period 1950 -1989. This section

surveys how control over land was subsumed by the rural refugee, its impact to the structure of land supply and the way a wide-spread small landownership in the urban periphery was consolidated.

Section 5.2 investigates the diffusion between private and public land and the case of public land appropriations. The structure of appropriated land is thoroughly examined, while we reconsider the character of these appropriations and their connection to central and local political behaviours.

After investigating the characteristics of the structure of urban land and the way a wide access to landownership was realised, section 5.3 examines the process of residential development in the urban periphery and the links between the "inside-" and "outside-the-plan" development. Within this context, we discuss the problems and constraints in the implementation of EPA plans, which resulted from the situation of landed property and the peculiar characteristics of the residential development process.

Finally, section 5.4. switches to an analysis of the links between land fragmentation and the operation of the development process in the *antiparohi* market. Through this investigation an attempt is being made to assess the relations between the structure of landed property, land availability and the development industry.

## **5.0. The character of the selected area**

Before analysing the specific findings of the case study, a few remarks are required to be made on the character of the selected area, as well as, about the sources used for this research.

Polichni is part of the north-west outer zone of GT, which expands alongside the industrial developments of Lagada axis, and nearby the industrial developments of west GT (map 4.1). This zone grew rapidly in the post war-period and particularly during 1951-71, the period of the rapid growth of the whole GT (table D2, Appendix D). Before the refugee incoming, the area where Polichni lies today was known with the Turkish name of Kara-ishin forming a rural area of the Municipality of Thessaloniki<sup>1</sup>. During that period, landed property in the area constituted of three types: exchangeable property, public land and private property<sup>2</sup>. Private property covered an important part of the later "Settlement of Polichni". All this

property was owned by the Jewish family Modiano, one of the biggest landowners in Thessaloniki during the pre-1922 period<sup>3</sup>, and, presumably, it was expropriated for the needs of RRP. The first settlers of Kara-ishin are referred to have been fire victims, who were temporarily settled there after the 1917 fire<sup>4</sup>.

Refugee settlement in the area took place in the years 1920-26, when 140 families from Caucasus were settled there by the Agricultural Rehabilitation Office of Thessaloniki<sup>5</sup>. On the whole, approximately 350 families were finally settled in Polichni through RRP at various stages. The refugees were initially housed in tends and sheds, and later in, very small self-built brick houses<sup>6</sup>. Thus, the so-called "Settlement of Polichni" was created, in which refugee families were provided with a plot of land. The "Settlement" was later to become the core of a rapidly grown suburb of the urban agglomeration of Thessaloniki. Land of the surrounded area was allocated by the MA, thus creating the "Farm of Polichni". The "Farm of Polichni" covers practically two Municipalities as they are distinguished nowadays, Polichni and part of Stavroupoli. It should be noted that our analysis of contemporary land structure refers only to Polichni. A large part of landed property, presumably all non-cultivated land in the area, was allocated to the Community of Polichni<sup>7</sup>.

The suburb grew rapidly in the post-war period, as it happened with all north and north-west zone of GT<sup>8</sup>. In contrast to other north and north-western areas, in which industrial developments were diffused inside the residential area, the largest part of Polichni grew to a more typical residential area<sup>9</sup>. During 1951-71, the period of the rapid growth of all GT, Polichni had one of the highest growth rates. It's growth continued in higher rates than the average GT, even after 1971 (table 5.1). During the decade 1981-91 when the bulk of GT's growth was absorbed in eastern areas, Polichni grew by almost 20%<sup>10</sup>, a phenomenon apparently related to land availability and the growth of a dynamic housing sector in the area.

**Table 5.1. Population change of Polichni and GT, 1940-1991**

<i>Population</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1951</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1991</i>
Polichni	708	2,105	6,590	19,382	22,597	26,850
GT	278,399	302,635	380,648	557,360	706,180	735,550
<i>% change</i>	<i>1940-51</i>	<i>1951-61</i>	<i>1961-71</i>	<i>1971-81</i>	<i>1981-91</i>	<i>1951-91</i>
Polichni	197.32	213.06	194.11	16.59	18.82	1175.53
GT	8.71	25.78	46.42	26.70	4.16	143.05

source: 1. ESYE, Census 1940-81; 2. ESYE, Census 1991, temporary results.

Finally, Polichni is known as one of the areas in which extensive appropriations of municipal land occurred over the years<sup>11</sup>. For a long period of time, urban studies considered this area as one in which low-income "home-less" households were seeking for a "plot" in order to house their family. Recent trends in its development make it a dynamic residential area of GT, place of residence of petty bourgeois groups and working classes of relatively middle income<sup>12</sup>.

Thus, Polichni combined a number of important elements for the scope of the study and offered a chance to review some of the views widely accepted in the past on the residential development process.

The records available on the situation of land are very few and do not offer a complete and step by step view of the alterations that occurred over time. Two major sources available were used by this study: a). The Land Allocation Records (LAR) of the MA, which refer to the various periods of land allocation. These records concern all the area covered by the "Farm" and the "Settlement" of Polichni (map 5.1). They are only nominal and include data, such as parcel size, allotment size and type of allocated land per beneficiary. b). The Land Registry Records of EPA (EPA-LRR1), which concern the area incorporated into the town plan through the EPA programme (map 5.5)<sup>13</sup>. These Records were initially undertaken in 1984, for the purpose of the designation of the layout plan. They are categorised by building square and include data per separate plot such as, plot-size, number of owners, number of buildings, number of floors and type of construction. During 1988-91, at the stage of the topographic implementation of the plan, EPA-LRR1 were corrected, complemented and reviewed as far as the situation of landownership is concerned. These new records (EPA-LRR2) constitute a kind of an urban cadastre and they are the most complete Land Registry Records available. Unfortunately, they were only partly at our disposal, since by June 1992 they had not yet been officially approved and therefore they were not for public use<sup>14</sup>.

In addition, two other minor sources of information were used. First, the Records of Municipal Land (RML1 and RML2), which are nominally based and include data on the size of appropriated land per plot in all area of Polichni. The part of these records, which refers to the appropriated land after 1970 (RML2), is incomplete and not very reliable. Second, interviews with officials from the Municipality of Polichni and certain old inhabitants, aiming at completing some of the gaps, as well as, understanding certain crucial aspects of the process of land fragmentation.

## 5.1. Conversions from rural to urban land and the legacy of the land allocation programmes


Effective control over the use and the development of landed property is closely related to the rights subsumed by ownership of land<sup>15</sup>. Land fragmentation affects not only productivity or the development capacity of a specific parcel, but also the control over this land. At this point it should be clarified that, in this study, the use of the term "fragmentation" concerns two aspects: First, ~~the scattering of land-holding~~, <sup>very small average</sup> in other words the size of landed property owned by a person or a family, and secondly, **the scattering of a field or a plot**, in other words the parcel-size, by which fragmentation is usually examined<sup>16</sup>. As far as agricultural land is concerned, the size of a parcel affects productivity and hence its potential to enter the urban property or residential market. On the other hand, in the case of urban land, plot-size affects its propensity to various forms of development<sup>17</sup>.

One of the key conclusions of chapter 4, was that land fragmentation in the urban periphery was not a phenomenon related only to urban conversion, but it preceded this process during the implementation of the rural land allocation programmes. Therefore it is important to understand how this fragmented rural land, affected the structure of land supply in the urban periphery, and hence the contemporary structure of urban landed property.

### 5.1.1. The rural allotment

According to the initial allocation of agricultural land in 1931-33, a total of 189 families acquired land for cultivation in the "Farm of Polichni" (map 5.1). This allocation created an average size of land-holding of 19.410 m<sup>2</sup> and an average farm-size of only 4,939 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.2), obviously very small and unproductive, for the cultivation of cereals, which dominated in the area. Compared to the minimum plot-size for which development was allowed outside the town plan by the 1926 Law (see, section 2.2), that is 4,000 m<sup>2</sup>, the average farm-size was a little more than one "outside-the-plan" plot. Presumably, by this stage, a family controlled in average only four such fields, i.e. with a total development capacity of 800 m<sup>2</sup>. The latter is, of course, simply a speculation, since during the whole pre-war period there was no pressure for development.





Map 5.1. The "Farm of Polichni" and the gradual land allocations

It is interesting to note that, although Polichni was part of the rural inland of Thessaloniki, no population change was observed in the pre-1940 period. In 1940 the population of Polichni was 708 persons, which represents more or less the initial number of refugees settled there until 1926, and documents that the area remained purely rural for the entire pre-war period. These trends were characteristic of all western rural inland of Thessaloniki. The city's big expansion at that period was to a large extent a result of a rehabilitation programme, the URP.

**Table 5.2.** Land fragmentation at the time of allocation in Polichni

<i>time of allocation</i>	<i>number of allotments per family</i>	<i>average size of the allotment</i>	<i>area per family</i>
<i>initial allocation</i>			
1931	3.93	4,939	19,410
<i>complementary allocations</i>			
1957	2.49	1,254	3,122
1961	2.49	4,120	10,259
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3.47</b>	<b>4,352</b>	<b>15,101</b>

source : tables 4.11 and 4.12.

The problem of rural land fragmentation appears to be more intense if the distribution of holding- and parcel size will be considered (table 5.3). Only 2.7% of the families owned land of more than 30 stremmas. As the size of the allotment was defined by the size of the refugee family, these large parcels were owned by the multi-member families and therefore had a higher potential for future fragmentation. On the contrary, approximately 14.59% of the families owned land of a size of 4-6 stremmas, a little larger than the size of an "outside-the-plan" plot. One third of these families were the so-call "urban-farmers", a peculiar category of beneficiaries for whom farming was a secondary occupation.

**Table 5.3.** Distribution of holding-size and farm-size in the initial allocation

<i>size (in stremmas)</i>	<i>0-2</i>	<i>2-4</i>	<i>4-6</i>	<i>6-10</i>	<i>10-15</i>	<i>15-20</i>	<i>20-25</i>	<i>25-30</i>	<i>&gt;30</i>	<i>total</i>
holdings	0	0	27	1	4	33	75	40	5	185
%	0.00	0.00	14.59	0.54	2.16	17.84	40.54	21.62	2.70	100.00
parcels	60	193	269	188	8	2	0	0	0	720
%	8.33	26.81	37.36	26.11	1.11	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00

source: elaboration of data from LAR.

As far as the parcel-size is concerned, 35.14% of the farms had less than 4,000 m<sup>2</sup> and only 1.39% were more than 10,000 m<sup>2</sup>. This excessive parcel fragmentation was

due to the fact that land was divided in four different types according to its quality, and therefore an allotment constituted of more than one types of land. Thus the initial rural land allocation set the conditions upon which the structure of land supply in the urban periphery was formed: a fragmented land, with no visible development potential and under the control of a relatively large group of poor farmers.

Polichni started growing rapidly since the 1940s (table 5.1). However, it was after 1951, especially after the mid-1950s, when Polichni entered the period of its rapid incorporation in the urban agglomeration of Thessaloniki. This growth took place in two areas of apparently distinctive characteristics, in terms of the structure of land as well as the potential for development set by the existing planning regulations: the old "Settlement of Polichni", and its peripheral rural land.

### **5.1.2. The "Settlement" and the first town plan**

Beside the agricultural land, the refugees were provided with a plot in the "Settlement", where they had built their small brick houses. The "Settlement" became later the core of the urban area of Polichni. This allocation is less known, despite the fact that it is one of the most important policies of the MA. As in the case of farmland, these plots were provided just after the refugee rehabilitation, but they were finally allocated in 1955. It was at this stage when the first town plan of Polichni was designated, on the basis of which this final allocation took place (map 5.2). Thus, the MA was to become the first "planner" of a rapidly growing area of GT. During 1951-61, the average population change of Polichni was 21.31% per year. It is worth noting that this plan was not among the most typical ones designated by the MA and very well known for their "Hippodamian" simplicity. It seems that the designers had in mind that they were dealing with an urban area. The "Settlement" area remained the only part of Polichni with a town plan, i.e. with land officially released for development, for almost 15 years, until 1970.

In the "Settlement" approximately 115 stremmas of land, one third of the total area, were allocated to 239 refugee families (tables 5.4 & 5.5). The number of the families given a plot in the "Settlement" was higher than that of the rural allocation programme, because certain families were settled there as urban refugees. Due to this allocation, the average holding formed in the central area of Polichni was 461.92 m<sup>2</sup>, with the highest concentration in the 251-500 m<sup>2</sup> category. As the RRP had not anticipated the future urban growth of these areas, the above holding-size was higher than the one provided to urban refugees.



**Table 5.4.** Structure of landed property in the "Settlement" by 1955

<i>Categories</i>	<i>area (in stremmas)</i>	<i>area</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>Plots to beneficiaries</i>		110,399	31.34
<i>non-disposed in 1955</i>		79,944	22.70
occupied	4,305		[1.22]
disposed in 1965	54,337		[15.43]
non-disposed (field)	21,302		[6.05]
<i>Public areas</i>		14,647	4.16
Squares	5,040		[1.43]
Church	2,949		[0.84]
School	6,658		[1.89]
<i>Roads</i>	84,367	84,367	23.95
<i>Land in the periphery</i>		11,235	3.19
disposed	2,050		[0.58]
municipal	9,185		[2.61]
<i>Other plots</i>		51,658	14.67
occupied by non-beneficiaries	2,232		[0.63]
Building Society of Civil Servants	34,374		[9.76]
other (private) holdings	15,052		[4.40]
<b>TOTAL AREA</b>		<b>352,250</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: LAR (settlement allocation).

**Table 5.5.** Distribution of landed property in the "Settlement"

	<i>0-150 m<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>151-250</i>	<i>251-500</i>	<i>&gt;501</i>	<i>total</i>
<i>holding</i>					
allocated area	0	0	79,535	30,864	110,399
no of holdings	0	0	182	57	239
%	0	0	76.15	23.85	100.00
average size	0	0	437.01	541.47	461.92
<i>plot</i>					
area	581	10,578	82,556	20,923	114,638
no of plots	4	50	199	39	292
%	1.37	17.12	68.15	13.36	100.00
average size	145.25	211.56	414.85	536.49	392.60

source: elaboration of data from LAR (settlement allocation).

Part of these holdings, approximately 19%, were not allocated in unitary parcels and hence the average plot-size formed in central Polichni was 392.60 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.5). However, this should be considered a relatively large size in comparison to the ones prevailing in urban land. Above all, this was a size that had a potential to enter the *antiparohi* market, provided that a relatively high plot-ratio would allow it.

Land allocation in the "Settlement" did not cease with the final allocation of plots to refugees. It was a period when land policy had been gradually degenerated into a populist policy, favouring a number of groups with access to political power. Approximately ten years after the final allocation, in 1965, a complementary allocation took place by which 54 stremmas of non-disposed land, approximately 15% of the total "Settlement" area (table 5.6), was allocated to 118 "landless peasant" families. By the 1960s the term "landless peasant" families had turned to become an umbrella term to cover almost all groups for which a favourable land allocation policy was taken. What is most striking is the structure of this part of landed property, evidently among the most favourable one prevailing in Polichni. The average holding size was 835.96 m<sup>2</sup> and about 85% of the holdings were more than 750 m<sup>2</sup>. In fact these families were provided with two plots of an average size of 460.48 m<sup>2</sup> each. Unfortunately, there is very little information on the possible criteria of this policy, a fact that is indicative of its character.

**Table 5.6.** Distribution of landed property in the area of complementary allocation in the "Settlement", 1965

	0-250 m <sup>2</sup>	251-500	501-750	751-1.000	>1000	total
<i>holding</i>						
allocated area	203	3,534	4,336	37,961	8,303	54,337
%	0.37%	6.50%	7.98%	69.86%	15.28%	100.00%
no. of holdings	1	8	7	41	8	65
%	1.54%	12.31%	10.77%	63.08%	12.31%	100.00%
average size	203.00	441.75	619.43	925.88	1037.88	835.95
<i>plot</i>						
allocated area	405	41,220	13,117			54,337
%	0.75%	75.86%	24.14%			100.00%
no. of plots	2	92	25			118
%	1.69%	77.97%	21.19%			100.00%
average size	202.50	448.04	524.68			460.48

source: see, table 5.5.

The low plot-ratio and the financial situation of the families who owned this land, in particular the refugee families, were the two main reasons why prices in this central area were kept rather low until 1968, when plot-ratio was increased. Presumably, land sales in the central part of Polichni were relatively high in the years 1955-68. It is not accidental that a large number of houses inside the area of the town plan were built illegally (see, section 5.3). It was considered that such a construction would compensate for the cost of land.

### 5.1.3. Land supply in peripheral rural land at a period of high demand

Whatever was the situation of land supply in the "Settlement", it was not enough to cover demand in land. Neither the land available was enough, nor could its prices meet the very low payment capacity of the migrant. The period 1955-75 was one in which the housing needs of low-income migrants were identified with the search for a plot of land and thereafter an illegally built house. In this way, a peculiar land market in rural land was gradually developed, which characterised urban expansion in Greater Thessaloniki for almost all post-war period until at least the mid-1970s. The question which arises is to what extent the structure of land supply allowed or eased the growth of such a market?

Let us see the precise situation of landed property at the beginning of a period of high demand in small plots. If control over land was diffused already by the pre-war period, this diffusion was more intense 20-30 years later, due to the fact that land was further fragmented because of inheritance patterns. One of the main characteristics of the owner occupier sector in agricultural land is its tendency to fragmentation. As landownership and the use of land is vested to a family,

*"... the continuity of owner occupation is affected by inheritance patterns whereby partible inheritance may lead to farm fragmentation, a problem that occurs less often under tenancy system"*<sup>18</sup>.

As a result of inheritance patterns\*, the already small agricultural property entered the residential market in a further fragmented situation. In some cases transfer of land to inheritors formed a holding size almost equal to that of an urban plot. In the case study we investigated the structure of rural landed property during the mid-1950s. The source of information available was the "Change Tables" of LAR. It is interesting to note that, until the end of the 1950s, the MA played a role of land registry and kept changes occurring in the situation of the landed property under its jurisdiction, including the transfers to inheritors. It thus follows that by the mid 1950s, approximately 20% of the allocated land was transferred to its inheritors (table 5.7)<sup>19</sup>. Evidently, this process continued in the following years and in higher rates.

**Table 5.7. Transfers until the mid-1950s**

Year	initial holdings	transfers to inheritors	%
1955-60	183	36	19.67%

source : elaboration of data from LAR (Change Records)

\* equally among all siblings unless otherwise provided for.

An analysis of the figures provided by the "Change Tables" shows that the size of land holdings after their transfer to inheritors was less than one third of the initial holdings, with an average size of 7,065 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.8) as the number of owners in the transferred land had been increased by three times. This situation weakened both the control over this land and the power of the owners to speculate on land market in the area.

**Table 5.8.** Structure of landed property after its transfer to inheritors

<i>total area (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>	<i>initial owners</i>	<i>final owners</i>	<i>size of land holding I</i>	<i>size of land holding II</i>
748,857	36	106	20,802	7,065

source: see, table 5.7.

On the whole, more than 95% of the new holdings were less than 10,000 m<sup>2</sup> and approximately 15% were less than 4,000 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.9). Diagram 2 sketches out the changes in the size of the transferred holdings between 1931 and 1955.


**Table 5.9.** Size of holdings before and after their transfer to inheritors  
(in stremmas)

<i>Period</i>	<i>0-2</i>	<i>2-4</i>	<i>4-6</i>	<i>6-8</i>	<i>8-10</i>	<i>10-15</i>	<i>15-20</i>	<i>&gt;20</i>	<i>total holdings</i>
1931-33 (before transfer)	0	0	1	0	0	1	10	24	36
%	0.00	0.00	2.78	0.00	0.00	2.78	27.78	66.67	100.00
1955-60 (after transfer)	1	15	31	34	20	1	3	1	106
%	0.94	14.15	29.25	32.08	18.87	0.94	2.83	0.94	100.00

source: see, table 5.7.

Control was not weakened only by the small size of holdings, but also by the consolidation of a situation of co-ownership in the already small parcels. Co-ownership initially created in this way in rural land, was transferred in the converted land and became a widespread phenomenon in urban land. Co-ownership played an important role in the way control was subsumed by the farmers over the use or the type of development of their land. Although no rule can be provided as to which were the repercussions of co-ownership in land market, there is no doubt that its impact was very important.



**Diagram 2.** Size of holdings before and after their transfer to inheritors

Taking into account the small parcel-size, control over the separate allotments was much less. The size of holdings per allotment ranged from as less as 432 m<sup>2</sup> to maximum of 4,221 m<sup>2</sup>, with an average of 1676 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.10).

**Table 5.10** Size of holdings per allotment after the transfer to inheritors (in stremmas)

	0-2	2-4	4-6	6-10	10-15	total
area	16,509	131,015	319,772	256,740	24,821	748,857
number of parcels	13	38	64	35	2	152
average	1,270	3,448	4,996	7,335	12,411	4,927
holding per parcel	432	1,173	1,699	2,495	4,221	1,676

source : see, table 5.7.

Apart from the above processes, the decade 1951-61 was also the time when new land was allocated to refugees through the complementary allocations (map 5.1), whose content is described in chapter 4. In 1957 and 1961 the MA allocated land to another 162 families on the whole. Moreover, another 28 families from old beneficiaries acquired additional land and increased their holdings. The average size of these new holdings was 3,122 and 10,259 m<sup>2</sup> respectively, whereas the average plot size varied from 1,254 to 4,120 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.2). With these complementary allocations private land in the area was increased. Thus, during the decade 1951-61, and particularly during its second half, three major processes were occurring at the same time: an increase in private land, a further increase of the landowning group and a growing demand for cheap land.

If the above discussion makes evident that a rather weak control over all peripheral land was gradually consolidated, a question arises as to whether land speculators entered the land market in areas with such a structure. The assumption that land speculation had prevailed in all peripheral land at the period of the first urban growth had been commonplace in Greek urban analysis. Of more importance is the fact that local urban policy, in particular the limited land releases for development, was reasoned for a long period of time upon such grounds. In a way it was assumed that the less area would be released, the less would a policy measure become subject to speculation. We assert that these assumptions were rather ideologically biased, than based upon concrete facts.

At this point it is important to clarify the meaning of the term "speculation". If by this term one means that land is sold in higher prices than the ones before its change of use, then "land speculation" is identified with the conversion process. Here, however, we refer to those intermediary mechanisms, such as the developers or other agents involved in real estate market, which play a determinant role in the land market in the urban periphery. Neither the structure of land, nor the structure of the developing sector, allowed for such mechanisms to be developed in the urban periphery. This tradition has not changed drastically after 1975. The scattering of landownership, as well as the special relations an owner has with his/her land operate as important obstacles for the development of such mechanisms in the land market. Land speculation in more contemporary periods is initiated by the initial owners themselves, rather than by any other intermediaries.

Apart from the above statistics, interviews with old inhabitants led to the conclusion that no speculator entered the land market in the study-area, evidently a phenomenon that occurred in all peripheral land in GT<sup>20</sup>. Land was sold by the farmers themselves who, apart from their weak control over it, had hardly a landlord or speculator behaviour. **This behavioural factor was perhaps more crucial than the structure of landed property itself.** The absence of a study on the trends in land values does not allow for any concrete statement to be made. In any case, land prices were kept low, at least until the mid-1960s. It is estimated that allotment prices varied from 50 to 150 drachmas per square metre. Apparently, no special gains were made from these sales, whereas none of these farmers entered the real estate sector. It was basically a situation of quickly-making-money for a short period of time. According to an interviewee:

*"There was a kind of an epidemic. Whatever the price of land, they were selling it as long as it would give them a little more than they were getting from cultivating cereals".*

Transactions were taking place with "private agreements", the very famous *prosymfona*. It may sound stunning but according to Greek Law, the largest part of west and north-west Thessaloniki, an area almost identified with the city's post-war development, was an "allotment" area, for which no fragmentation was allowed, as a protection policy for rural land. Thus, perhaps the only intermediary in this fragmentation process were the notaries, who promoted and gave a "legalistic" substance to these arrangements with private agreements. All these transactions were later legalised with various Acts, in particular with the 666/1976 Act (see, section 2.1). In most cases, the purchaser of this land acquired official ownership 15-20 years after he/she bought it. It follows that private contracts created more problems to the situation of ownership rights over land. Thus in many cases before the latter was completely clarified at the stage of its rural use it was transferred to different owners. Apart of creating a number of scandalous sales what is important is that it created a *de-facto* situation on which decision was called to be taken. Even by the time of the elaboration of EPA plans, approximately 15-20% (an estimation given by local officials) of these transactions had nor yet been legalised, and so their owners did not held an official ownership title.

As farmers were lacking a "landlord mentality", they saw that excessive land fragmentation was the only way for more gains to be made. Besides, a very small plot corresponded to the purchase capacity of the new inhabitant. Rural land was also sold in an amazingly sequential way. As long as one plot in an allotment was sold, the sale of the others followed very quickly. On the contrary, demand was rather moderate if not non-existent in allotments a little further away. The lack of a town plan in the area was the main factor that led the households to buy land with the nearest possible proximity to areas inside the plan. For this reason an important part of the allocated land of Polichni remained and still remains of rural use (map 5.1). Finally, as land was bought primarily for building a house for its purchaser and not for speculative purposes, it is interesting to note that no special change in ownership occurred in those parts which had not yet entered this land market. For all these reasons, one can hardly suggest that extensive conversions took place. From 1963 to 1980, it is estimated that the residential area of Polichni was increased by three times, an increase which by no means can be considered large, if one takes into account the initial small residential area.

#### 5.1.4. Contemporary land structure

Following the previous analysis, one could assume that although official land release was limited and piecemeal, land supply in the urban periphery functioned during the period of high urbanisation of GT, almost in an unrestricted way. The above findings suggest that land availability, in the form it took in the land market in urban periphery, was not a constraint upon residential development and urban expansion. Through this kind of fragmentation, the average plot-size was fixed to a figure less than 250 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.11). Thus, contemporary land distribution in the densely built-up areas shows very high concentration in very small plots. More than 80% of the plots in the densely built-up areas (EPA1) incorporated in 1986 into the town plan are up to 150 m<sup>2</sup>. The situation did not change drastically even in the part (EPA2), where there is a higher concentration of industrial uses, a fact that indicates that land fragmentation is not a process confined to residential development.

**Table 5.11.** Structure of landed property in the areas of EPA plans

	0-250 m <sup>2</sup>	251-500	501-1.000	1.001- 2.000	>2.000	total
<b>EPA1</b>						
<i>dense</i>						
no. of plots	1532	214	62	15	10	1833
%	83.58	11.67	3.38	0.82	0.55	100.00
area	230,200	71,900	42,600	19,900	31,600	396,200
%	58.10	18.15	10.75	5.02	7.98	100.00
average	150.26	335.98	687.10	1326.67	3160.00	216.15
<i>non-dense</i>						
no. of plots	81	50	41	130		302
%	26.82	16.56	13.58	43.05		100.00
area	11,250	18,380	30,240	244,100		303,970
%	3.70	6.05	9.95	80.30		100.00
average	138.89	367.60	737.56	1877.69		1006.52
<b>total EPA1</b>						
no. of plots	1613	264	103	155		2,135
%	75.55	12.37	4.82	7.26		100.00
area	241,450	90,280	72,840	295,600		700,170
%	34.48	12.89	10.40	42.21		100.00
average	149.69	341.97	707.18	1907.10		327.94
<b>total EPA2</b>						
no. of plots	1,549	215	71	41	94	1,970
%	78.63	10.91	3.60	2.08	4.78	100.00

source: elaboration of data from EPA-LRR2.

An important percentage of these plots are co-owned (table 5.12). In the areas developed without a plan there appears an average of 1,24 owners per plot. Co-ownership is higher for the non-densely built-up areas where the larger plots are concentrated. The figure 1,89 owners per plot in the non-dense areas of EPA1 appears to be much lower than the expected real figure, since the largest number of holdings in these areas belong to inheritors of old beneficiaries. This deviation is due to the fact that either many properties remain unsorted as far as their transfer to inheritors is concerned, or their ownership situation is not rightly registered. It is worth noting that an analysis of the co-ownership situation per analytical category of plot-size showed that co-ownership is not confined to larger parcels (table 5.13). In EPA2 about one fourth of the plots of the categories 150-250 m<sup>2</sup> and 251-500 m<sup>2</sup> appear to be co-owned.

**Table 5.12.** Owners per plot in EPA1 and EPA2

	<i>no. of plots</i>	<i>no. of owners</i>	<i>owners/plot</i>
<b>EPA 1</b>			
dense	1,833	2,268	1,24
non-dense	160	302	1,89
<b>EPA2</b>	1970	2346	1,19
<b>TOTAL</b>	3,963	4,916	1,24

source: see, table 5.11.

**Table 5.13.** The situation of co-ownership per analytical category of plot-size in EPA2

	<i>0-80 m<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>81- 150</i>	<i>151- 250</i>	<i>251- 500</i>	<i>750- 1,000</i>	<i>1,000- 2,000</i>	<i>2,000- 10,000</i>	<i>&gt;10,000</i>	<i>total</i>
total no. of plots	151	707	691	215	71	41	47	47	1,970
%	7.66	35.89	35.08	10.91	3.60	2.08	2.39	2.39	100.00
co-owned plots	8	104	153	55	14	10	16	16	376
% of the co-owned	2.13	27.66	40.69	14.63	3.72	2.66	4.26	4.26	100.00
% of the category	5.30	14.71	22.14	25.58	19.72	24.39	34.04	34.04	19.09
% of the total no. of plots	0.41	5.28	7.77	2.79	0.71	0.51	0.81	0.81	19.09

source: see, table 5.11.

Peripheral land, fragmented as above, was not only made available for a wide access to land and, hence, home ownership but also to petty investments in land. In the study of multi-ownership in EPA1 there appears a small number of multi-owners

which reaches the figure of 7%. The majority of these multi-owners are inheritors of old beneficiaries as their property was scattered in 3-4 parcels.

**Table 5.14. Multi-ownership in EPA1**

<i>no. of holdings per owner</i>	2	3	<i>total</i>	<i>total holdings</i>	<i>% multi- owners</i>
no. of holdings	120	51	171	2,570	6.65%
%	70.18%	29.82%	100.00%		

source: see, table 5.11.

Beside this fact, there seems to be a high rate of investment in land in these areas. In order to estimate this trend we made a hypothesis that all home-owners in the area own a plot of land and all multi-owners are inhabitants in the same area. In this case, approximately 45% of the holdings are investments from non-inhabitants in this same part of Polichni (table 5.15).

**Table 5.15. Estimated investment in land in EPA1**

<i>population 1984 (estimate)</i>	<i>no. of house- holds</i>	<i>rate of home- owners</i>	<i>holdings of inhabitants</i>	<i>multi- holders</i>	<i>total holdings of inhabitants</i>	<i>total holdings</i>	<i>investments from non inhabitants</i>
a	b=a/3.5	c	d=b*c	e=0.7*d	f=d+e	g	h=g-f
5,732	1,638	0.8	1310	114	1425	2,570	1145
%					55.44	100.00	44,56

A gradual change appeared in the patterns of land fragmentation in the 1970s, and in particular after 1975. A number of reasons can be accounted for this change such as: the policy attempts, although unfortunate at the beginning, to incorporate the built-up areas into the plan; the various legal pressures from legislation which handled land fragmentation; the changes in household preferences; the growth of the *antiparohi* sector in the areas inside the plan and hence a turn to housing market; the higher purchase capacity in an context of a growing importance of a family economy; above all, a gradual change in the way the remaining rural land was managed by its owners, the inheritors of the old refugees.

Somehow, by the mid-1970s these processes had reached a limit. As a new land market was opening in the Wider Area of Thessaloniki preferences for land were turned to these markets. Land transactions changed drastically. Not only had the latter fell but also land was sold in much larger pieces. During the 1980s only few transactions took place in the remaining rural land and they concern pieces of land

of more than 1 stremma. An examination of the structure of ownership in the "non-densely" built-up areas incorporated in the EPA plan shows that by the end of the 1970s the largest part of this land remained under the ownership of the inheritors of the initial owners, the old refugees. Map 5.3. indicates the situation of landed property at the boundaries of the town plan and shows that peripheral land remains still under the ownership of the inheritors of initial owners.

## 5.2. Appropriations of municipal land

Excessive land fragmentation was not the only mode of a wide access to land. As we saw in chapter 4, the various land allocation programmes, were administered in such a way that led to a diffusion between private and public land. As a result public land was gradually appropriated and thereafter transferred to private ownership. Polichni was one of the areas in which appropriations of public land took place to such an extent that made "appropriation" to become a mode of access to land.

In 1953 the MA transferred almost all the remaining land of the "Farm of Polichni" under the jurisdiction of the local Community<sup>21</sup>. By this decision, the Community of Polichni was to become one of the largest owners of public land in GT and in urban areas in general. Apparently all non-cultivated land, a total of 2,972 stremmas (almost 1/3 of the total area of Polichni) was transferred to the Community of Polichni (table 5.16).

**Table 5.16.** Municipal land as allocated in 1953

<i>type</i>	<i>area (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>
Mountainous	
pasture land	864,088
Fallow land	1,452,777
Yards	198,250
Trenches	5,438
Gorges	451,917
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,972,470</b>

source: Records of Municipal Property,  
Municipality of Polichni

Of course a large area of municipal land is part of the reforested zone of north GT and another large part was expropriated over the years for industrial uses. Our analysis refers to those parts which had a potential either for public uses or for development and whose area is estimated around 680-700 stremmas (table 5.17).



Map 5.3. Land fragmentation at the edge of the town plan



**Table 5.17.** Municipal land by category of its situation

<i>situation of municipal land</i>	<i>area</i>
	<i>(in stremmas)</i>
allocated appropriations	111
non-allocated scattered land	10
appropriated land after 1970	160
free land (outside the reforested area)	405
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>686</b>

source: estimates based on the Records of Municipal Land

In terms of its structure, we can divide three types of municipal land with a potential for public use or development: Large parcels outside the allocated area, small fragments of non-cultivated land scattered inside the allocated area and the gorges and trenches, expanding inside the whole "Farm". Map 5.4 indicates the distribution of scattered municipal land. Following this distinction the phenomenon of land appropriation took three forms: extensive appropriations of the large municipal parcels at the edge of the built-up area; appropriations of the scattered parcels inside the allocated area; and, finally, gradual appropriations of small pieces of land, by extending the plot boundaries to the various fragments of public land. This form was extensive around gorges and trenches, which after the suburb's growth had turned to derelict land.

### 5.2.1. Appropriations before 1970

Appropriations started immediately after the post-war period, but the rates of appropriations increased dramatically during the decade 1961-71. It was a period when this phenomenon was hardly a public issue incorporated into the whole "allocation - fragmentation" process. Within this context, an *ad-hoc* decision was taken by the then junta government whereby most of this occupied land was allocated to its occupants. Such direct transfers of municipal land was not allowed by the legislation. Thus, this was legally treated as allocation of rural land to landless peasants. By this decision, a practice, often followed in the cases of land occupation in rural areas, was introduced into the urban real estate sector. From an institutional point of view, the decision was based on the 1832/52 Act, a piece of legislation which arranges issues on rural land. Although this policy was introduced by junta, in many occasions it was followed by later governments in order to sort out similar cases<sup>22</sup>.

By the above decision, 111 stremmas of land were allocated to its occupants, a total of 391 families. Part of this land, about 10 stremmas, was scattered non-cultivated land (map 5.4). The rest belonged to a large parcel (characterised with the number 995) of municipal land outside the boundaries of the allocated area (map 5.1). An analysis of the structure of this land shows that the distribution of plot size seems to be more favourable than the one in the total area of private land market (table 5.18). Approximately 50% of this land belongs to the category of 250-500 m<sup>2</sup>, a plot size which could attract a developer even with an apparently low ratio of 1.6-1.8. The rather favourable distribution is also documented if plot-size is desegregated in more analytical categories (table 5.19). Only 2.56% of the plots belonged to the very small category of 0-80 m<sup>2</sup>, while this category reached 8% in areas formed in the private market (table 5.13). This fact questions the popular attitude that land appropriations of this period resulted from the desperate housing needs of homeless households.

**Table 5.18.** Distribution of plot-size in the appropriated land


<i>size (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>	<i>0-250</i>	<i>251-500</i>	<i>501-1000</i>	<i>total</i>
<i>parcel 995</i>				
no. of plots	127	186	22	335
%	37.91	55.52	6.57	100.00
area	23,066	64,492	13,178	100,736
average size	181.62	346.73	599.00	300.70
<i>scattered</i>	<i>municipal</i>	<i>land</i>		
no of plots	44	12	0	56
%	78.57	21.436	0.00	100.00
area	6,401	3,910	0	10,311
average size	145.48	325.83	0	184.13
total	<i>land</i>			
<i>municipal</i>				
no of plots	171	198	22	391
%	43.73	50.64	5.63	100.00
area	29,467	68,402	13,178	111,047
average size	172.32	345.46	599.00	284.01

source: elaboration of data from RML1.

**Table 5.19.** Distribution of plot-size by analytical categories

<i>size (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>	<i>0-80</i>	<i>81-150</i>	<i>151-250</i>	<i>251-500</i>	<i>501-750</i>	<i>751-1000</i>	<i>total</i>
no. of plots	10	52	109	198	20	2	391
%	2.56%	13.30%	27.88%	50.64%	5.12%	0.51%	100.00%

source: see, table 5.18.



Map 5.4. The distribution of scattered municipal land

It is interesting to note that the plot-size tends to be higher in parcel 995 than the scattered municipal land. About 55.5% of the plots in parcel 995 have an average size of 347 m<sup>2</sup> and another 6.6% have an average size of 599 m<sup>2</sup>. Translated into development capacity with a minimum plot-ratio of 0.8, developed property in these plots could be 278 and 479 m<sup>2</sup> per plot respectively.

The decision to allocate appropriated land had an *ad-hoc* character and aimed simply at arranging the ownership situation of this part of public land. As no criteria for the allocation of this land had been anticipated, a number of problems were created<sup>23</sup> :

Ownership titles were not issued at the same time as the decision to allocate appropriated land but only after the occupant had applied for it. It was at that time when the Survey Department of the MA measured the allocated land. Initial allocation was based on the size of land as stated by the occupant. In this technical procedure there was no anticipation for cases in which plot-size was proved to be larger than it was initially stated, that is in cases where further appropriation had apparently taken place.

In the case-study we proceeded to a comparison between the initially stated plot-size (IS) and that, by which the ownership title was finally issued (FS). This comparison indicated the following: The final area of the total occupied land was a little less than that at the stage of initial allocation (8,309 m<sup>2</sup> less). This was due to the fact that most households tended to state larger sizes than the actual ones, in the hope of getting a title for a larger plot. However, 30% of the occupants were proved to occupy larger plots than the ones initially stated (table 5.20). In this percentage we did not include those cases in which the difference  $SD = FS - IS$  was up to 15 m<sup>2</sup>, so as to exclude the cases where there was a measurement error. This analysis showed that further appropriations took place during the time which elapsed between the initial and final allocation, i.e. from 1970 up to 1984, when final allocations were almost completed.

The problem seems to be of minor importance, when compared with the total appropriated land. However, it is of major importance from the point of the development capacity of a household's landed property. With a hypothesis of a plot-ratio of 1.6. (the one set for the central area of Polichni) these differences would give an average development potential of 112 m<sup>2</sup>, in other words the size of a flat (table 5.20). With a plot-ratio of 0.8, the one set in the new town plan, where

most of these plots are, the average development potential of these differences are 56 m<sup>2</sup>. Taking into account the peculiarities of the development process, one can understand how important such a difference is for petty-housing production.

**Table 5.20.** Changes in the appropriated land during 1970-84

$(SD)=(FS)-(IS)$ in m <sup>2</sup>	16-50	51-100	>101	total
no. of cases	66	28	24	118
% of the total allocated plots (391)	16.88%	7.16%	6.14%	30.18%
initial area	18,579	7,882	7,582	34,043
final area	20,689	9,869	11,794	42,352
$(AD)=(FA) - (IA)$	2,110	1,987	4,212	8,309
average SD	32	71	176	70
development potential of SD				
hypothesis a: plot-ratio 1.6	51.2	113.6	281.6	112
hypothesis b: plot-ratio 0.8	25.6	56.8	140.8	56

It was mentioned above that an occupant had to pay a small price in order to acquire this land. Repayment of this peculiar "purchase", took place at the time of the final issue of the ownership title. These titles were issued much later than the initial allocation (table 5.21). Approximately 95% of ownership titles were issued after 1977. Evidently, this delay was a conscious decision by the households: they bought their land in 1984 at one tenth of the price of land in 1968! Apparently, this procedure was accelerated after 1977, when the discussions about the incorporation of these areas into the town plan had already started<sup>24</sup>. Most of these plots were incorporated into the new plan designated by the EPA programme. Thus, of more importance is the fact that for cases proposed by the plan to be expropriated for public uses, the Municipality will have to compensate them in current prices.

**Table 5.21.** Years of issuing the final contracts

1973-76	1977-81	1981-84	total
21	299	71	391
5.37%	76.47%	18.16%	100.00%

source: see, table 5.18.

It is worth mentioning that the allocation decision ignored the fact that the appropriated land was municipal. It was a time when local institutions were almost non-existent. Land policy was an issue that was under central administration in

every respect. Public land, irrespective of its owner, was treated as a fluid asset and no particular obstacle was set for its liquidation. Appropriated land was arranged in an unified manner for all the national territory since the prime aim was to

*"... legalise and existing situation even if this was created in an illegal manner"*<sup>25</sup>.

Even then, a number of cases were left unsorted, due to a number of bureaucratic procedures. Approximately 30 plots appropriated at that period were not provided with ownership titles.

### 5.2.2. Appropriations after 1970

All the above points indicate that one should be cautious to assumptions that these appropriations were forced only by the need of the low-income migrant to house his/her family. Of course this is true in many cases. However, examining these processes over time one can see that a special "market" was formed with the appropriations of municipal land. This trend was elucidated with the continuation of appropriations throughout all the period after 1968 in almost the same rates as previously. A new category of appropriated municipal land was gradually formed and hence a new pressure group emerged with particular interests in this land at a period of a considerable increase in land prices.

This new category is registered in two different records. The first one (RML2a) was created by the Office of Municipal Land of Polichni. It includes data based only upon estimations by the Office of Municipal Land (Municipality of Polichni) and not on a relevant survey. The second record (RML2b) contains data stated by the occupants themselves<sup>26</sup>. Both records are incomplete and there are serious differences between them<sup>27</sup>. In addition, none of them includes the appropriations after 1984. From these records it follows that another 80-90 stremmas of municipal land were appropriated after 1970. From a combination of these records and a survey undertaken in 1985 it further appears that the appropriated land reaches 160,000 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.18).

Despite the deviations between the two records certain important observations can be made: First, compared with earlier appropriations there is a higher concentration of large plots, i.e. plots of more than 500 m<sup>2</sup> (table 5.22). In most of these plots, 2-3-floor houses of very good construction were built. Secondly, there is a high concentration of very small plots, i.e. plots of less than 80 m<sup>2</sup>. These are case in which a shed was built, as an act to occupy this land, but no-one lives there.

**Table 5.22.** Distribution of plot-size in land appropriated after 1970

<i>size (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>	<i>0-80</i>	<i>81-150</i>	<i>151-250</i>	<i>251-500</i>	<i>501-750</i>	<i>&gt;751</i>	<i>total</i>
<b>RML2a</b>							
no. of plots	84	72	74	87	32	11	360
%	23.33%	20.00%	20.56%	24.17%	8.89%	3.06%	100.00%
area	3,729	8,628	14,576	28,896	19,077	15,619	90,525
average	44.39	119.83	196.97	332.14	596.16	1419.91	251.46
<b>RML2b</b>							
no. of plots	13	40	64	66	13	20	216
%	6.02%	18.52%	29.63%	30.56%	6.02%	9.26%	100.00%
area	714	4,967	12,857	23,781	7,483	33,180	82,982
average	54.92	124.18	200.89	360.32	575.62	1659.00	384.18

source: elaboration of data from RML2

The rates of appropriations, in particular after 1975, fluctuated according to various circumstances, related either to local politics or to planning policy, particularly regarding the case of the official release of land for development. Lack of a yearly based register on land appropriations does not allow for more concrete conclusions to be drawn on the subject. Nevertheless some points can be made. If in earlier cases it was the central administration that incorporated allocation policy into its political game this time local politics were also added. As local government is enmeshed in similar political and statist structures and behaviours<sup>28</sup>, land appropriations became gradually a central issue in vote-catching, as well as local policy.

The 666/1976 Land Act had forbidden sales of municipal land without auction. As a result, local government could not manage the problem of appropriations in its own. In 1980, a special Act was enforced that enabled for this problem to be sorted out by allocating the appropriated land to its occupants. Only this time it was left to the local council to make use of this possibility and proceed to the allocation of this land. The enmeshment of the problem into an open-ended local political antagonism did not allow for its arrangement. It is believed that the change of the mayor in the 1982 local elections was to a large extent due to this problem.

The contradictions in local government policy on the subject are obvious. Despite the apparent disagreement of the local council with the practice of appropriation, gradual provision of infrastructure to the area of appropriated land is one of its main activities (in the name of the social needs of the households concerned). At

the same time a populist ideology developed around the problem of illegal building is used by interested parties for further appropriation of public land.

Land appropriations created a more favourable situation in the structure of land than the private market. In our study we analysed separately the land structure in Meteora (EPA3), an area which was formed to a large extent through appropriations either allocated in 1968 or later ones (table 5.23). More than half of the plots in EPA3 belong to the category of 250-500. It is evident that the ownership situation is much clearer in EPA3. In the densely built-up part co-ownership is restricted to the figure 1,03 owners per plot (table 5.24).

**Table 5.23.** Structure of landed property in EPA3, 1989

<i>size (in m<sup>2</sup>)</i>	<i>0-250</i>	<i>251-500</i>	<i>501- 1.000</i>	<i>1.001- 2.000</i>	<i>&gt;2.000</i>	<i>total</i>
<i>dense</i>						
no. of plots	111	178	41	3		333
%	33.33	53.45	12.31	0.90		100.00
area	19,750	61,450	25,650	4,140		110,990
%	17.81	55.41	23.13	3.73		100.00
average size	177.94	345.22	625.60	1,380.00		333.31
<i>non-dense</i>						
no. of plots	11	11	7	3	5	37
%	29.73	29.73	18.92	8.11	13.51	100.00
area	1,330	4,000	5,000	3,900	34,000	48,230
%	2.76	8.29	10.37	8.09	70.50	100.00
average	120.91	363.64	714.28	1,300	6,800	1303.51
<i>total EPA3</i>						
no. of plots	122	189	48	6	5	370
%	32.97	51.08	12.97	1.62	1.35	100.00
area	21080	65450	30650	8040	34000	159220
%	13.24	41.11	19.25	5.05	21.35	100.00
average	172.79	346.30	638.54	1,340	6,800	430.32

source: elaboration of EPA-LRR2

**Table 5.24.** Co-ownership in EPA3

	<i>no. of plots</i>	<i>no. of owners</i>	<i>owners/ plot</i>
dense	335	345	1,03
non-dense	37	49	1,32

source: see, table 5.23.




### 5.3. Residential development patterns and links to EPA plans

After establishing the way in which a wide access to land was realised in the urban fringe, this part deals with an analysis of the residential development process. Against this context this part attempts to identify the major obstacles in the implementation of EPA plans, which resulted from the structure of landed property.

Within a situation of an extremely fragmented land, the individual plot, in terms of its size, its ownership situation and above all its final development capacity (i.e. the planning regulations), acquired a central role in the development process. Diagram 3 provides an overall outlook of the structure of contemporary landed property in the various parts of the area inside the plan.

**Diagram 3.** Land fragmentation in the area inside the plan, Polichni



As it was mentioned above (section 5.1), it was by 1955 when the first plan was designated. Its designation was more connected to the settlement policy of the MA rather than to a policy of urban development in the urban fringe. Residential development took place both inside and outside the plan. For a long time no special distinction characterised development in these two zones. Private construction of small housing dominated in both zones for almost all period until 1968 when plot-

ratio in the former "Settlement" changed. In 1970, 70% of the total building stock in Polichni were of 1 floor (table 5.25).

**Table 5.25.** Number of floors, 1970

	<i>basement</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>&gt;3</i>	<i>total</i>
no. of buildings	30	3408	1295	121	4,854
%	0,62	70,21	26,68	2,49	100,00

source: ESYE, 1970 Census.

The 1955 town plan set a ratio equal to 1.00, apparently low for the *antiparohi* market to operate profitably. Low plot-ratio, however, was not the only factor that conditioned the construction of small housing. More important was the fact that housing demand in the form of flats was rather low until the beginning of the 1970s. For a long time housing demand in GT went in alignment with housing supply as this was conditioned by the geographical patterns of the *antiparohi* market. It is not accidental that a large number of houses were built without planning permission. It was considered that such a construction would compensate for the cost of land. Among the 2,300 illegally built-up buildings registered by the 1983 Planning Act procedures, 34% were situated inside the plan (table 5.26)<sup>29</sup>. During the 1960s, the apparently large urban properties of the central area had to house the needs of three or four related families, inheritors of the old beneficiaries.

**Table 5.26.** Illegally built-up houses as declared in 1983

<i>illegally built houses</i>	<i>inside the plan</i>	<i>outside the plan</i>	<i>total</i>
number	783	1,517	2,300
%	34.04	69.96	100.00

source: records of the Planning Department of Thessaloniki.

The first increase in plot-ratio in 1968 and the incorporation of new areas into the plan with a higher plot-ratio in 1970 (map 5.5) brought about gradual changes in the forms of residential development. With the 465/1968 Law, plot-ratio was increased by 1 floor, a measure that functioned as an impetus for the development of the *antiparohi* market. These changes did not affect immediately the structure of the housing production. Until the end of the 1970s, the *antiparohi* sector remained underdeveloped. It was a period when the rate of *antiparohi* rarely exceeded 30%. Even if plot-ratio in combination with plot-size permitted for larger buildings to be

built, a higher demand was necessary. It is interesting to note that by 1979, when the new plot-ratio was set, the average number of floors in the former "Settlement", that is the central area, was 1.7 (table 5.27)<sup>30</sup>.

The development situation changed after 1979, whereby plot-ratio was consolidated into 1.6 up to 1.8, and land availability in the inner areas had been drastically dropped. For the period 1980-84 the share of Polichni in the total building activity of GT was increased, a trend that had started since the mid-1970s (table 5.3.3).

**Table 5.27.** Construction of new dwellings in Polichni and GT

<i>Year</i>	<i>Polichni</i>	<i>GT</i>	<i>%</i>
1970-74	430	56,979	0.75%
1975-78	968	46,163	2.10%
1981-84	550	18,612	2.96%

source: elaboration of data from Tsoulouvis, L., 1986.

Of course the housing crisis of the first half of the 1980s seemed to have affected the study area in higher rates<sup>31</sup>. The ambiguity with planning policy naturally affected more the housing activity in an area with intense planning problems. It should be noted that initially EPA included also a review of the existing plan, a proposal that was later suspended. The introduction of more flexible building regulations by the 1985 General Building Code, allowed for the development of high-rise building and hence for a more dynamic development. The rate of *antiparohi* increased to 42-45%, as demand for land for *antiparohi* was also increased<sup>32</sup>. Post-1985 period was the one in which the old areas of small housing had changed drastically. It was during this period that the favourable characteristics of land structure in the central areas (in connection with a situation of multi-ownership) gave the possibility for the old inhabitants to become an important group of land-owners in the area.

Residential development in the part outside the plan (before EPA) followed similar trends to those inside the plan before 1980. Small housing built-up upon the extremely fragmented land was dominant. However, housing activity was not restricted to cover simply the needs of a household, the byer of the small plot. The development of a building with more than one dwellings was very common. In the context of a family economy, "housing needs" of a family was expanding to the development of a second or a third flat for their children or even for rent. These trends were more evident after 1970. By 1984, the time of the elaboration of EPA plans, approximately 15% of the buildings outside the plan were of more than 3

floors (table 5.28). It should be mentioned that in the 1970 Census only 2,49% of the buildings all over Polichni belonged to this category.

**Table 5.28.** Development in the EPA areas in 1984

<i>floors</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3 or more</i>	<i>total no. of buildings</i>	<i>total no. of plots</i>	<i>developed plots</i>	<i>average no. of floors</i>	<i>average no. of floors inside the plan</i>
no. of buildings	1,308	914	369	2,591	3,953	65.55%	1.6	1.7
%	50.48	35.28	14.24	100.00				

source: elaboration of data from EPA-LRR1.

Given the fact that the owner-occupied sector was very large all over peripheral areas of GT, reaching the corresponding figures of semi-urban areas, it is interesting that, the privately rented sector in areas "outside-the-plan" was relatively high. In 1988, <sup>the</sup> privately rented sector ranged in similar rates than that in the inside-the-plan areas (table 5.29).

**Table 5.29.** Housing tenure in the different zones of Polichni

<i>tenure</i>	<i>inside- plan</i>	<i>the- plan</i>	<i>outside- before</i>	<i>the-plan 1986</i>	<i>areas of occupied</i>	<i>formerly municipal land</i>
	<i>no.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>no.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>no.</i>	<i>%</i>
owner-occupied	2217	75.82	2320	80.67	786	88.61
rented	690	23.60	541	18.81	96	10.82
other	17	0.58	15	0.52	5	0.56
total	2924	100.00	2876	100.00	887	100.00

source: elaboration of unpublished data from a Household Survey, Municipality of Polichni, 1988.

Thus, if during the 1950s and 1960s it was the need for housing that characterised development "outside-the-plan", in the next decade and afterwards this form operated in such a way as to set in an ad-hoc manner the minimum standards (plot-ratio) for development<sup>33</sup>.

Residential development based on the individual plot and devoid of the necessary planning framework created two major problems, which EPA plans were called to sort out: land availability for public uses, and its related problem of who pays the planning cost.

As it happened with all urban areas, official land release for development was piecemeal and apparently irrational (map 5.5). For the whole period 1955-82 only 126 Ha, i.e. 53% of the total densely built-up area had a layout plan (table 5.30). Land and housing market operated in a way that made not necessary for such an official release. As long as land prices were kept low, the very fragmented allotments covered the demand in land and hence small housing in the form of a family house of 2-3 flats. On the other hand, the *antiparohi* market had not reached yet the western urban periphery.


**Table 5.30.** Built-up area inside and outside the plan before 1984

<i>built-up area (in Ha)</i>	<i>inside the plan</i>	<i>outside the plan (dense)</i>	<i>total built-up area (dense)</i>	<i>inside the plan before EPA</i>	<i>EPA area</i>	<i>total</i>
area	126	112	238	126	143	269
%	52.9	47.1	100,0	46.8	53.2	100.0

source: GPS of Polichni

The EPA plan was designated mainly to sort out the problems of non-authorised development outside the plan. Practically speaking, the first goal of EPA was to legitimise these trends and create the legal situation by which infrastructure would be officially provided. It was by the time of EPA implementation when the complexities and peculiarities of the situation of landed property and their repercussions upon urban policy became evident. One of the major problems the new plan was confronted with was land availability to cover the needs of public uses. If the owners of rural land anticipated for a minimum road network to facilitate their properties, other open space, or space for public use, was almost non-existent.

The new town plan in the area was designed to incorporate all densely and a small part of non-densely built-up areas. The latter was included so as to cover the needs in open space and space for public use. According to the 1983 Planning Act, land development levy (LDL) was distributed in such a way so as to protect small properties. Furthermore, a policy was adopted by EPA, according to which built-up properties were not characterised for public use in order to avoid the creation of a "social problem"<sup>34</sup>. In the last instance, non-authorised development secured that a specific property did not run the risk for expropriation. Public uses were at large located by the plan in non-developed plots. Approximately 16% of the land in non-densely built-up areas of EPA1 was proposed for expropriation compared with a 12% in the non-densely built-up part (table 5.31).



Map 5.5. The gradual extensions of the town plan in Polichni

**Table 5.31.** Land proposed for expropriation in EPA1

<i>area (in stremmas)</i>	<i>totally expropriated properties</i>	<i>total EPA1(roads are not included)</i>	<i>%</i>
dense	47.8	397	12.04
non-dense	43.4	274	15.84
total	91.2	671	13.59

source: EPA-LRR2

In the initial elaboration of the plan it appeared that expropriation could be covered with land acquired from LDL. The deviations between the real situation of landed property and the one described by the 1984 Land Registry resulted to a fallacious estimation of the final deficit in public land banking<sup>35</sup>. Multi-ownership in the large parcels, registered after the approval of the plan, led to a reduction of the expected LDL. In the course of the elaboration of PE it was gradually realised that a large deficit in public land had been created. In a review of the plan, an important part of open space, in particular parking space, was abolished. In 1991, when the PEs had finished, the total deficit was estimated to reach 250 stremmas.

Taking into account the financial capacity of the local government, as well as its policy and practice in these cases, one can easily predict that this deficit will hardly be covered. This problem will inevitably result to a further decrease of open and public space. The hostile attitude towards larger land release that characterised the first stage of EPA, during which Polichni's areas were designated, intensified furthermore the problem of public land deficit.

Despite the apparent planning gain for the released large parcels, the imposition of an LDL raised reactions on behalf of their owners. As the majority of the owners in the non-densely built-up part, where land tax was higher, were inheritors of old refugees, it was claimed that <sup>they</sup> were paying the cost of illegal development. Although this was only partly true, the fact is that, in practice, the planning cost was paid by the non-developed properties. By a decision in 1986, the government reduced LDL for properties acquired from the refugee rehabilitation programme and having a size less than 2,000 m<sup>2</sup> <sup>36</sup>. Refugee rehabilitation policy remained in action for almost 70 years after its launchment, since land policy had been proved to operate mainly as a tool in the clientelistic relations between state and citizens.

The implementation of EPA also brought back into policy agenda the problem of land appropriations, and the obscurities in the situation of public landed property. In an area where local government was one of the largest owners of landed property

in GT, there appeared a deficit in public land of 250 stremmas. In EPA1 only 3,78% of the area was municipal land with a potential for development (MLD), in other words land which could be exchanged with expropriated private property (table 5.32). From this land, a percentage of 65% was already occupied. The problem was enormous in EPA3 the largest part of which is municipal land. There, MLD reaches 52%, of which 77% is occupied. The Municipality of Polichni cannot arrange expropriated properties and exchange them with municipal land (as anticipated by the relevant procedures) as long as this land is occupied. The inequities created by this problem are the usual effects of a populist policy.

**Table 5.32.** MLD and occupied MLD in EPA (in stremmas)

	<i>MLD</i>	<i>occupied MLD</i>	<i>occupied MLD/MLD</i>	<i>total area</i>	<i>MLD/total</i>	<i>occupied MLD/total</i>
<i>EPA1</i>	25,35	16,48	65%	671	3,78%	2,46%
<i>EPA3</i>	40,2	31	77,11%	77	52,21%	40,26%

source: see, table 5.32.

#### 5.4. The features of the development process

Given that the structure of land ownership determined a peculiar land market, the question that arises is how did the developing industry, the other side of the vested interests in land, intervene in or mediate these trends? In this part we switch to an analysis of the development process, as this is realised in the *antiparohi* sector. This section investigates the peculiar characteristics of this process and its interconnections with small land-ownership and the structure of the developing industry. It should be noted that the term "*antiparohi* sector" is preferred here to others, such as "speculative" housebuilding, since it is precisely this system of development which incorporates all the peculiarities to be examined below.

Besides making use of various statistics, this part is based on a small-scale research, carried out in 1985 and reviewed in 1989, on the operation of 12 developing firms of GT. This research did not aim to any quantitative approach to the problem. Such a task would be extremely complicated due to the nature of the developing industry and the lack of general statistics. A long informal questionnaire was posed to these firms, whose scope was to investigate the main characteristics of the development process in relation to the structure of the developing industry, the structure of landed property and the planning regulations. Special attention was called so that



the sample to represent as far as possible the various kinds of developers operating in the housing market.

#### 5.4.1. The growth of the housing sector and the operation of the *antiparohi* market

Before investigating the characteristics of the development process, it is necessary to examine briefly the trends in housebuilding, considering that some of the peculiarities of the development process are closely related to the volume of the housebuilding activity.

Private building activity in Thessaloniki had a steady growth throughout the whole post-war period up to 1980<sup>37</sup>. During the period 1963-80<sup>38</sup>, the average number of dwellings varied from 10,039 to 11,518 dwellings per year with the highest production in the period 1971-75 (tables 5.33 and B2, Appendix B)<sup>39</sup>. Until 1980, housebuilding activity decreased only temporarily, due to macro-economic factors or other conjunctures, rather than to more local reasons such as, land availability, the actual level of demand and the interest of the households to invest in housing, or the production capacity of the housing industry<sup>40</sup>. Thus, the sharp decline in 1974 did not influence housing production in a long-run basis, whereas the effect of the 1978 earthquake was also short-run (table B2, Appendix B).

**Table 5.33.** Dwelling output in the period 1963-1989

Year	total no. of dwellings buildings*	no. of dwellings	average buildings per year	average dwellings per year	% change
1963-65	3,462	30,118	1,154	10,039	
1966-70	5,721	50,211	1,144	10,042	- 0.03
1971-75	7,267	57,591	1,453	11,518	14.70
1976-80	7,311	50,078	1,462	10,016	-13.04
1981-85	5,019	24,207	1,004	4,841	-51.67
1986-89	6,455	32,227	1,291	6,445	33.13

source: elaboration of data from 1. ESYE, Statistical Yearbooks 1963-87,  
2. Monthly Statistical Bulletins 1988-90.

\* buildings may contain 1 or more dwellings and other uses.

Along with these trends, the *antiparohi* sector, i.e. speculative housing, grew rapidly. There exist no statistics to estimate precisely the volume of this sector (statistics do not include any division between buildings for self-housing and speculative building). A plausible hypothesis, however, can be provided from an examination according to the building height, assuming that buildings of at least 4

floors or more were built by the *antiparohi* system. Thus, the share of multi-storey buildings in the total activity increased from 32,38%, during the period 1961-65, to 60,68% during 1976-80 (table 5.34).

**Table 5.34.** Distribution of new buildings per number of floors

year	1-floor	2	3	4 or more	total
1961-65	2,254	706	411	1,644	5,015
%	44,95	14,08	8,20	32,78	100.00
1966-70	1,040	553	999	1,877	4,469
%	23,27	12,37	22,35	42,00	100.00
1971-75	1,224	850	788	4,405	7,267
%	16,84	11,70	10,84	60,62	100.00
1976-80	738	922	1,215	4,436	7,311
%	10,09	12,61	16,62	60,68	100.00
1981-85	592	982	634	1,655	3,863
%	15,32	25,42	16,41	42,84	100.00
1986-89	686	1,197	721	2,250	4,854
%	14,13	24,66	14,85	46,35	100.00

source: see, table 5.33.

From 1980 onwards trends in housebuilding changed drastically. For the first time in the post-war period, dwelling output dropped more than 50% to an average of 4,811 dwellings per year. The increase by 33%, which followed in the years 1986-89, did not lead to former high standards of dwelling production<sup>41</sup>. Along with these changes, the production of multi-storey building declined too. Their share in the total new building production dropped from 60,68%, in 1976-80, to 42,84%, in the next five years. On the contrary, buildings of 1- and 2-storeys, the typical type of building for self-housing, increased their share considerably. It is worth noting that from 1976-80 to 1986-89 there was a net increase of 2-storey buildings by 30% .

The significant decline in the rates of the population growth is undoubtedly an important reason for these changes (tables D2 & D3, Appendix D). However, the peculiarities of the housing production in connection to land availability should also be granted as crucial components to this process. The following paragraphs explore these issues in greater detail.

*Antiparohi*, as a mode of housing production, started in GT as early as the 1920s and had a boom in the years that followed the reconstruction of the city after the fire (see, also section 6.1). It was a time when speculative building, in the form of multi-storey housebuildings with commercial uses at the ground-floor, dominated development in the city-centre. The close connections between *antiparohi* and

construction in the city-centre, also characterised speculative building in the first post-war period and well until the second half of the 1950s<sup>42</sup>. The big construction in the centre of the city was hardly diffused in the neighbouring areas, even where planning regulations allowed for it. Land availability in the central area was enough to cover the level of demand as well as the level of production by the developing industry. It is estimated that, by the mid-1950s, only about 20-25 developing firms were operating in GT. These trends led to a strict geographical pattern of *antiparohi*, which nowadays may sound outrageous: development occurred plot-by-plot, rather than by specific areas, as long as the developer avoided to open new markets<sup>43</sup>. This pattern, although different in scale, was preserved to a large extent until the end of the 1970s, when land supply in the form of small landed property appeared to be non-restricted<sup>44</sup>.

Fixed by the late-1950s, high demand in housing, did not lead only to an increase in housing production; it also led to a drastic increase of the number of developers, i.e. the number of agents who controlled residential development. It was a period in which land operated as a fluid capital. Given the high demand in housing, construction was almost self-financed: the developer needed capital just enough to finance the cost of getting planning permission, or a small additional one for the construction of the building foundations. Sales started, and even completed, at the stage of planning permission. In fact, in such a situation the developer played primarily a role of a "mediator" for the development of a property, rather than an investor. In most cases, all stages of construction were undertaken by sub-contractors<sup>45</sup>.

Land availability in the form of very small properties allowed for the development process to be conditioned only by the demand side. The loose control of land by the numerous small-owners had the following effect: as soon as the development capacity at a specific area fulfilled the minimum requirements for development, then all land in that area entered gradually the *antiparohi* market. As it was pointed out by an interviewer,

*"... the 1960s was the period in which one transaction for "antiparohi" followed the other and the developer had hardly to look for a plot to develop: it would be the one next to his last construction".*

Practically speaking, during this period it was only the developers who controlled land market. High plot-ratios were giving an *ad-hoc* high price in land, which made *a-priori* profitable for the single land-owner to release his land for development.

After all this was the only way to utilise his property and create a small residential capital for his/her family. That is why the developer had hardly to initiate a new land market. Although plot-ratio might have been high in other areas as well, a developer would not take the risk to build in that area, unless demand would cover the cost of construction long before its completion.

Self-finance of the construction was facilitated by two other factors: the low quality of the construction and a loose planning control. Vast areas of Thessaloniki acquired such a low-quality housing that the houses of the 1960s were identified with low-quality housing. Moreover, during this period some of the most striking features in this type of investment were gradually fixed: excessive land utilisation, exhaustion of the development capacity; and deviation from the requirements of the planning permission, became a norm in the development process.

The above features made it possible for the sector to be an "easy" and "safe" investment. It is almost impossible to estimate the precise number of people involved in *antiparohi*. A figure given by old developers estimates that the number of developers who operated in GT between the 1960s and the mid-1970s reached approximately 1,800 - 2,000. Various professionals and tradesmen such as, lawyers, shopkeepers etc., who dealt with "clients" and hence possible plot-owners, were widely involved in this kind of land development.

After the mid-1970s the first changes became apparent. The two most important were the gradual elimination of a large number of developers after the 1974 crisis and the changes in the household preferences<sup>46</sup>.

Perhaps the most remarkable effect of the two crises (1974 and 1978), was the fact that a large number of "developers", in the form of "plot-development-mediators", were eliminated from the housing sector. These short-run crises, instead of being the end of *"antiparohi"*, as it had been anticipated<sup>47</sup>, widened further its operation as long as high demand was to be met by a smaller number of developers. By the mid-1980s the number of developers was estimated to be around 400, 300 of which could be considered as pure developing firms. The rest were firms involved primarily in other construction or technical projects. To the above number, one should also add a considerable number of firms which were occasionally involved in developing, covering, however, an important part of land development.

In any case, despite the fall of housing production in the 1980s, the building output per firm increased in relation to that in the 1960s. The position of the developing firms was improved drastically after the mid-1970s. Taking into account that, throughout 1961-75, the yearly building output was 1,200, it follows that, in average, one developer constructed only one multi-storey building per 38 months. In other words, developing was an activity of easy-making-money for a short period of time. In the 1980s housing production represented approximately a yearly cycle of 1.5 multi-storey buildings per developer (table 5.35). It is a very small cycle, representative of the very small size of the developing firms, but much more improved compared with previous trends.

**Table 5.35.** Multi-storey building output per developer (an estimate)

	yearly average of multi-storey buildings	no. of developers (estimate)	average output per developer
1961-75	566	1,800-2000	1 building per 38-42 months
1981-89	434	300-400	1.5-1.1 buildings per year

Thus, the changes that took place after the mid-1970s, did not affect the peculiarities of development process per se, but rather fixed the contemporary features of *antiparohi*. The rise in house preferences induced important changes in the housing market. It should be noted that this was the period in which an important movement took place from central to eastern areas. This movement was accompanied by a significant improvement in housing standards. Of course, these higher standards in eastern areas affected housing production all over GT. By the late 1970s, a dwelling was very rarely sold before the completion of its bearing frame<sup>48</sup>. This meant that the developer needed at least 25% of the total capital in order to start a construction, a percentage that was further increased in the following years. Nevertheless, even in times of crisis the "good" firms brought sales to an end before construction was completed.

What happened with land availability? Apart from the supply of a large number of small plots, land availability was also conditioned by planning regulations and in particular the plot-ratio. The high demand of the 1960s had been preceded by an increase in plot-ratio first in 1958, and later in 1960. Such an *ad-hoc* increase in land availability occurred a few years later, on the provisions of the 1968 Law (see, section 3.1), by which plot-ratio was increased by one floor for all areas with an approved town plan. This decision led to a boom of the *antiparohi* sector, in

particular in the eastern parts of the city<sup>49</sup>. The gradual release of land, although small in area, also eased *antiparohi* (see, section 76.1). Multi-storey construction did not necessitate for large areas to be released for speculative building.

During the period 1981-84 land release was stagnated in view of the preparation of EPA plans. On the other hand, the 1979 Plot-Ratio Decree had fixed plot-ratio to existing standards. We hold that the fall in housing activity during this period was strongly related to this stalemate in the release of new land for development. The observed increase after 1985 was related to a peculiar increase of the development capacity of non-developed plots in eastern areas. This increase was achieved by transferring property rights from other properties through the system of "Transferable Plot-Ratio" (TPR, see section 2.3). This measure, although anticipated since 1979, became applicable only after 1985 and was expanded later on<sup>50</sup>. With a TPR, a plot-ratio could be increased from 1.8, for instance, to 2.1, a very crucial increase that could make a small plot to enter the *antiparohi* and increase considerably the developing gains. The gradual scarcity in land made the developers to be in search for better connections with the real-estate sector, as well as the planning officers. This was exactly the case with the availability of TPR which necessitated for such connections. It is worth mentioning that the new land released by EPA facilitated *antiparohi* in certain areas only, where plot size was large enough to cover the disadvantages of the low plot-ratio, set at a maximum of 0.8 (see, section 3.4). The precise effects of EPA on speculative housing cannot be evaluated yet.

The above changes affected the two housing sectors, the owner-occupied and the rented sector in a very different manner. We presume that the major impact of the fall in housebuilding activity was a reduction in the housing stock for the rented sector. The owner occupied sector was not particularly affected. Home-ownership (being always high in relation to other European cities) was gradually reduced in the 1970s. On the contrary, the 1980s saw a considerable rise of home-ownership. In the decade 1979-89, owner-occupation in GT increased from 62% to 70% (table 5.36). It is interesting to note that from the total number of home-owners about 11-13% were plot owners who gave their plot for *antiparohi* development. Moreover, the family economy in connection to social institutions, such as a dowry, inheritance etc., still has a major share in the way a home is bought: approximately 20% of the households acquired their home through inheritance or a dowry provision (see, table B5, Appendix B).

**Table 5.36.** Housing tenure in 1979 and 1989

<i>TENURE (%)</i>	<i>1979*</i>	<i>1989**</i>
owner-occupied	61.6	70.3
rented	37.1	29.7
other	1.3	-

*sources:* \* Tsoulouvis (with Yiannakou et. al , 1984),

\*\*Velentzas, K. et.al. 1991.

#### **5.4.2. Contemporary characteristics of the developing process and the organisation of the developing industry**

After the preceding analysis we will sketch out the fundamental features of the development process.

##### **(i) Non-investment in land and the peculiar "urban land price"**

*Antiparohi* allows for a small capital to enter investment in housing easily, because of its major advantage, whereby no capital is needed for the purchase of land for development<sup>51</sup>. The rate of *antiparohi* stands, of course, for a land price. This rate was increased drastically since the mid-1970s. For buildings without commercial uses, it increased from an average 33% in the late-1970s, to 45-50% in the late 1980s. All firms questioned considered the *antiparohi* rates, very high, since they approached almost half the value of the developed property. Practically speaking, in the late 1980s the rate of *antiparohi* reduced the development output for sale at best to 50-55% of the development capacity of a plot.

However, in this joint venture between a developer and a plot-owner, there is no external factor that influences land price, such as taxation of the *antiparohi* transaction etc. (see, section 2.3). Therefore, the major "obstacle" and, at the same time, "advantage" for the developer, is the development contract between him and the plot-owner. This contract, which describes the precise share a plot-owner gets from the developed property, allows for part of the developer's benefit to be extracted. It is widely beleived that the rate of *antiparohi* per se determines the developer's actual benefit. This is only partly true in the case of a typical dwelling development. The importance of the contract lies in one main issue: which part of the building the two partners are to keep for themselves. If the developer manages to obtain the most advantageous flats, then it is considered a beneficial agreement, not only because of the higher value of these flats, but also because this property

can be sold much easier during the stage of construction. It is in this agreement where the developer tries to diminish the cost of land.

## **(ii) Land development policy by the individual firm**

All developers usually claim that the rates of *antiparohi* are extravagant; however, they hardly turn to purchase land for development. If the structure of landownership is a serious constraint in employing such a policy, the structure of the developing industry makes it non-feasible. None of the firms questioned had any specific policy for land banking. That is why large developments in GT are very few. Land purchase, usually in the form of small plots, was a circumstantial investment for the firms questioned. Thus, the firms well connected with land development usually try to acquire favourable plots that can allow more conformable arrangements both with the land-owners and the house-buyers. Land banking is a more usual practice for larger companies for their land development activity in resort areas.

It should be stressed that for all companies questioned, and, in particular the very small ones, the real benefit was extracted from self-owned land. Almost all technical firms questioned entered the housing development sector, or managed to expand successfully their development activity, by developing self-owned plots, where the net gain was increased by the rate of *antiparohi*. Ownership of a plot is also conducive for various firms to enter circumstantially residential land development. For architects or engineers, for instance, it is a very usual practice to develop their own, or their relatives' plots, no matter whether they manage to keep their development activity later on or not.

The obscurities in the legal situation of land, so common in the structure of landed property in GT, also play an important role in the development process. For a plot to enter the *antiparohi* market one of the most crucial elements is its legal situation both in terms of ownership and in terms of planning requirements. The less the plots left for development the biggest becomes the gravity of the so-called "problem-plots". Although further research is necessary in order to elucidate who benefits from such a situation, one could assume that "problem-plots" offer a potential to undervalue land. In the late 1980s, "problem-plots" became a special category of land market for which transactions and deals are kept in a complete dark.



Irrespectively of the rate of *antiparohi*, lesser the plots available for development, harder becomes the negotiation between the plot-owner and the developer, which was very much the case in land development by the late 1980s. The availability of a surplus development capacity, such as the TPR, is an advantage of the developer, as long as it is fully controlled by him through his deals with owners of a TPR<sup>52</sup>. The availability of a TPR eases the release of a plot to the *antiparohi* sector. Many of the problematic small plots, formed by of the Urban Rehabilitation Programme in the eastern areas, managed to enter effectively the *antiparohi* market mainly because these areas were designated as zones for which a TPR could increase their development capacity. It is worth noting that all firms questioned considered that after the mid-1980s, the availability of TPR, reduced land scarcity; hence their operation became more and more dependent upon this availability.

### **(iii) Building regulations and "surplus" development**

It becomes obvious that for *antiparohi* to operate effectively it is necessary to have building regulations such as to permit the benefit for both the landowner and the developer. The high benefits, which are often connected with *antiparohi*, cannot be extracted only from the deal between the developer and the plot-owner. A kind of a "surplus development", which is usually non-authorised, was formed over the years in order to extract further benefit. Considered among the most important and controversial issues in housing development and planning control, this problem is as old as the practice of *antiparohi* in residential land development. This surplus development cannot be defined simply as an "anarchy" in building; it ought to be considered a very important element in the realisation of surplus value. Of course this is, once again, an aspect of informal economy and its enmeshment in the housing sector (see, section 2.3). Certain forms of non-authorised development turned to become a "norm". To give a example: All semi-open spaces, allowed by the 1985 General Building Code, are now transformed to proper room-space, after a building gets final planning permission. Thus, semi-open spaces are priced differently from other open spaces such as the balconies.

### **(iv) *Antiparohi* and the structure of housing demand**

Let us switch attention to some other external influences on the developing process. Although these influences are more or less common in all European countries, they are differantiated by *antiparohi*. *Antiparohi* means not merely that enough dwellings should be available for the developer, but also a housing demand

sufficient enough to allow their sale before the completion of construction. As most constructions start with little capital, in theory they run the risk of remaining uncompleted. All firms questioned considered an investment in which flats were sold after the completion of the construction a problematic one. That is why a drop in demand leads to a reduction of the number of developers, and hence to a reduction of housing supply. Even in periods of the so-called "housing crisis", such phenomena as unsold flats hardly occur. Afterall, *antiparohi* is almost identified with the owner-occupier sector. The low capital capacity does not permit a developer to keep property for the rental market. For this reason house-prices never fell throughout all post-1950 period.

#### (v) *Antiparohi* and the features of the developing industry

The above mentioned peculiarities allow for very small firms to operate in residential land development. It is interesting that all over the years no particular change occurred in the organisation of the firms involved in development. As a matter of fact, if we take into account the ICAP registration, the number of construction firms involved in developing, such as building contractors and general engineers, has not changed, whereas their share in the total number of construction firms was reduced from 40.74% in 1977 to 26.83% in 1989 (table B.6, Appendix B). One of the most fundamental characteristics of these developing firms is their flexibility, and in many cases, their loose relations with residential development. Approximately 1/3 of the firms are considered not purely developing firms. Table 5.37 provides a classification by main activity of the various kinds of firms involved in residential land development. Although no estimate can be provided of the share of building output between these firms, it becomes evident that for a variety of investors housing development is a "circumstantial" investment for an easy-made high profit.

**Table 5.37.** Types of firms involved in housebuilding

<i>TYPE OF FIRMS</i>	<i>MAIN ACTIVITY</i>	<i>SECONDARY ACTIVITY</i>
building contractor I (large firm)	tourist development	<b>residential development</b>
building contractor II (large firm)	public works	<b>residential development</b>
the developer	<b>residential development</b>	-
technical firm	architectural & technical projects (mainly of the public sector)	<b>residential development</b>
the free-lance professional	architectural & technical projects (mainly of the private sector)	<b>residential development</b>
others investors: the occasional developer	their main activity	<b>residential development</b>

The development process does not necessitate for an enlargement or a reorganisation of the developing industry. In turn, this industry is organised in such a way as to become the "other side of the coin" of the development process.

## 5.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter had two objectives: on the one hand, to explore the process of land fragmentation in the urban fringe and hence elucidate the way wide access to land was realised, and on the other hand, to investigate how the development process operates in a situation of a widespread land-ownership.

We argued that excessive land fragmentation was of utmost importance in consolidating wide access to land. Hence, this access was not the result of a simple supply-and-demand relation, a "free-market", where price regulates accessibility to land. On the contrary, the way control was subsumed over land in connection to state protectionism of excessive land fragmentation was of prime importance in releasing this land easily for urban development. Within this situation a "free-for-all" land market was created. This chapter also revealed how these trends were further facilitated by a peculiar "land market", that of the appropriated land. This "land market" developed strong connections with central and local government populism.

We also explored how the development process operated throughout the post-war years. We pointed out that the fall of housebuilding activity in the 1980s, instead of transforming the peculiar system of development, fixed its characteristics. The structure of land supply, in relation to planning regulations should be accounted for this feature. Small land holding helped the wide creation and to a certain extent the survival of a small personally-based housing industry. The existence of a thus organised industry could not reverse the fragmentation trends through individual (i.e. of a specific firm) land policies, such as land banking.

## 5.6. Notes for chapter 5

1. The name of this area was changed to Polichni in 1927 (Houliarakis, M. 1975, vol. B, p.288).
2. It has been very difficult to find more information on the precise situation of landownership in Polichni during the pre-1922 period, as the relevant historical records are not available to the public.
3. The two Jewish families of Modiano and Alatini are referred as the two biggest landowners in Thessaloniki during the pre-1922 period (Dimitriadis, V., 1983, Hekimoglou, E., 1991, p.31). Both writers mention only the urban real-estate property providing general information only on rural property. Apparently the Modiano property in Polichni was expropriated for the needs of the rehabilitation programme. We note that according to information provided by the Municipality of Polichni, inheritors of the family, who nowadays live in France, still have claims on parts of their old property in Polichni.
4. Report of Pallis, A.A., in Papastathis, H.K. (1978). Pallis, A.A. refers that approximately 7,000 persons were temporarily settled with the help of the English military authorities, at that time camping in four places outside Thessaloniki. Karaisin was one of these places.
5. See, Maravelakis, M. & Vakalopoulos, A. (1955, p.38). They mention only the first 140 families from Caucasus, the first settlers of Polichni.
6. Many of them were semi-detached houses with common roof! Only very few of these houses are nowadays preserved.
7. The Community of Polichni was established in 1935 (Houliarakis, M., 1975, vol. B, p.388). Until then it was part of the Municipality of Thessaloniki and for a short time, in 1934-35, part of the newly established Community of Stavroupoli. Polichni was upgraded to a Municipality in 1972.
8. For an analysis of post-war urban development trends in GT see, Tsoulouvis, L. (with Yiannakou, A. et.al), 1981; Andrikopoulou-Kafkala, E. et al. 1981; Tsoulouvis, L., 1985.
9. Polichni was usually regarded as an area where mixed uses prevail. This is true only for a very small part of the municipality, that one near Lagada axis. Thus in terms of its land use structure, Polichni is very similar to other northern suburbs, and in particular to Sykies.
10. The official results on 1991 Census have not been yet published.
11. In a way Polichni's land development has been connected with all populist attitudes about land appropriations, which predominated public debate in the mid-1970s.
12. There is no recent investigation on the social structure of the area. General statistics are provided by Kafkoulas, E. (1985) and Municipality of Polichni (1988).
13. Aggregate data are not included in any of these two records. Some of them, such as the average parcel size by the 1984 LRR, were kindly provided by Tsoulouvis, L., senior planner of the PME of Polichni and Stavroupoli.

14. By June 1992 both projects were at the appeal stage. For this reason they were not yet officially available for the use of the public. However, the major problem was that these projects do not contain aggregate data. The ones which are included in this study were kindly provided by the consultants of the two projects, Karamoshos, P. and Roditakis, N. respectively.
15. Bryant, R.W.G. (1972 p.6) rightly points out that " ... the matter of effective control of the use of land is closely related to the rights subsumed by the ownership of land".
16. In the Dictionary of Human Geography by Johnston, R.J. et. al (1981, p.113) fragmentation is defined as " ... the scattering of the field of a farm so that the holding is not composed by a single unit of land".
17. The inefficiency of land fragmentation has been analysed only in the context of agricultural land (see, for example, Vergopoulos, K. 1975 and Chilsom M., 1979), but remains still an underestimated aspect in urban analysis.
18. Johnston R.J. et. al. (1981, p.179).
19. The records which include these changes omit the year of their last review. The time which is given here, that is mid-1950s, is an estimation of the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture.
20. Among the very few exceptions is Helioupolis, a part of the Municipality of Stavroupoli which was bought by a speculator, and sold divided into small plots.
21. The two areas of the complementary allocations were later excepted from the municipal land.
22. The 1080/80 Land Act includes such provisions for various cases of public land appropriations.
23. The 1832/52 Act states that land can be allocated as long as it was cultivated or "developed" by a building of an important value.
24. There are a few cases which are not settled yet and which are not included here.
25. High Court Decision, no. 941/1968. This decision was caused by an appeal to of the Community of Sykies in 1968. The answer of the High Court was quite clear-cut, that it was "... of no interest if land cultivation or building occurred before or after the transfer of a parcel to the municipality as its aim is to legalise an existent situation ...".
26. <sup>This was done as an attempt of the Municipality of Polichmi to collect a special "appropriation fee".</sup> It is worth mentioning that this fee is rarely collected.
27. It should be reminded that appropriated land is registered only after a relevant charge is brought by a citizen.
28. Yiannakou, A., 1981 & 1989.
29. Registration was based on declarations by the households. It should be noted that this number refers to all the areas inside-the-plan before 1983 and not only the "Settlement" area. In any case, the total number of illegally built-up houses was much higher since their registration is based on declarations made by the households themselves.
30. Tsoulouvis, L. ( with Yiannakou, A. et.al.), 1981, table 3.16, p.120.
31. Tsoulouvis, L., 1986.
32. During the same period, the rate of *antiparohi* in the eastern and southern parts of GT was 45-50%.

33. Tsoulouvis L., 1985.
34. This policy was followed for all built-up blocks, even in the case in the case of resort areas.
35. This problem was widely acknowledged for all EPA areas; however, the bureaucratic nature of EPA and the complications in property rights did not allow for its solution.
36. Law 1647, 12/19-9-1986, article 12.
37. An overall study of the trends in building construction in GT is provided by Tsoulouvis, L. (1981b & 1986).
38. ESYE provides statistics on dwelling output in GT only since 1963.
39. These are figures are much higher from those estimated by the 1966 Master Plan (HMTH, Triantafyllidis, I., 1966-68, vol. 66, p.194). Thus, it was estimated that the following yearly production would cover future demand:

<i>Period</i>	<i>HMTH estimates</i>	<i>actual production</i>	<i>surplus production</i>
1966-70	8,650	10,042	1,392
1971-75	7,960	11,518	3,558
1976-89	6,520	7,608	1,088

40. Velentzas, K. et al. (1990) argue that in general building activity in GT does not appear to have any local peculiarities and is influenced only by factors that operate nationally.
41. According to temporal statistics, building activity increased up to 1990 and dropped again in the following two years.
42. Here we do not use the term "shopping buildings", since the bulk of buildings even in the centre were housing with shops in the ground floor.
43. It is referred that, in the mid-1950s, the *antiparohi* rate at the edge of N. Svolos Street near the centre was approximately 35%, whereas from the other end of the same street (N. Svolos and Ethnikis Amyntis) was as less as 20% .
44. Thus, Thessaloniki grew in very high densities with relatively limited expansion, see Tsoulouvis L. (with Yiannakou, A. et al., 1981, chapter 3).
45. Given the big labour supply, we assume that the cost of subcontracting could be kept quite low in relation to more recent trends.
46. There exists no research on the changes in household preferences. Some indications are given by Tsoulouvis L. (with Yiannakou, et.al., op.cit. chapter 4).
47. Arguments on the subject developed locally were very similar to the ones provided nationally (see, section 2.3 and Aspects of the Association of Civil Engineers, *TEE-TKM, Techniki Enimerosi*, 1981, p. 10).
48. A statistical survey conducted in 1989, provides that 42% of the households with self-owned flats bought them at the construction stage and 38% after its completion (Velentzas, K. et al., op.cit.)
49. Tsoulouvis L., 1981b.

50. Although we made a great effort to acquire more information on the application of this measure in GT, there was a great unwillingness on behalf of the planning department to provide such data. So we are confined only to information given by the interviewed firms.
51. Office development also takes place with the *antiparohi* system. However, there are certain important differences in the way *antiparohi* operates within this sector.
52. A TPR is approved by the Minister of YPEHODE. All firms who used TPR had very good connections with the officers of YPEHODE in charge of these procedures and were very definite that TPR is handled within very close circles of YPEHODE's bureaucracy.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **URBAN POLICY IN GREATER THESSALONIKI: PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF AN OPEN ISSUE**

---

The previous two chapters investigated the interactions between land policy and the development process in the context of residential development in Greater Thessaloniki. Emphasis was laid on two major issues: i) the role of the state in consolidating a widespread system of small land-holding and the specific forms of land allocation, and ii) the way individual strategies affected the formation of specific interests in land, and hence the characteristics of the residential development.

This last chapter inquires into the nature and the problems of urban policy implemented in GT. Analysis focuses especially on the character and effectiveness of urban planning after 1974. The politico-institutional attempts to manage the residential process as well as the various policy perspectives and ideologies incorporated in such a process are examined so as to understand the problems, the constraints and the setbacks in urban policy making.

Section 6.1 provides a brief historical analysis of urban planning in GT before 1974, investigating, in particular, the legacy of two major plans, Hebrard's Town Plan of 1917, and the 1966 Master Plan. The peculiarities of these plans, their influence on the city's development, as well as later policy-making, are all examined against the actual planning practice and its traditional emphasis on minor arrangements.

Section 6.2 proceeds to an examination of the various policy attempts put forward in the years 1974-81, which preceded the implementation of EPA. At a period of an apparent policy change, we analyse the unsuccessful attempts to sort out the problem of unauthorised expansion and to provide a comprehensive planning machinery. Special reference is made to the consequent attempts to revise and enact the 1966 Master Plan.



Section 6.3 provides an analytical and critical account of the way EPA was implemented in Thessaloniki. Special attention is given on the specific process in the preparation, elaboration and implementation of EPA plans, and on the major changes EPA came through during the period 1982-89.

Finally, section 6.4 examines how strategic planning and the overall urban policy were implemented in G.T. during the 1980s. It analyses the character of the 1985 Regulatory Plan and the role of the Planning Organisation, which was set up for its implementation. Additionally, the proposed Zone of Development Control is examined and evaluated against the actual development policy. The ideological aspects encompassing strategic planning are also highlighted.

## **6.1. Development-without-planning and the legacy of two plans**

This section is a brief overview of town planning in the period before 1974, when a "non-planning" practice was consolidated. It analyses the characteristics and the influence of two major plans, which, in one way or another, preoccupied urban policy and planning for a very long time: the 1917 Town Plan and the 1966 Master Plan. Analysis proceeds with a critical account of the actual planning practice and its loose interactions with these two plans.

### **6.1.1. From an eclectic town-plan to the layout-plans**

Contemporary physical structure and development of Thessaloniki were initially based on Hebrard's Plan, designed after the 1917 fire, which destroyed the entire city centre of Thessaloniki, an area of approximately 120 hectares<sup>1</sup>. Immediately after this fire, the government formed an International Committee of experts to elaborate a new "contemporary" plan<sup>2</sup>. The Committee was put under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport A. Papanastasiou, who showed special interest in Thessaloniki's redevelopment. The plan, was the first ever designed for Thessaloniki, a city with a medieval urban structure. Although prepared principally for the reconstruction of the central area, it was a comprehensive proposal on the whole structure and land-use allocation of Thessaloniki (map 6.1). Prepared in 1919, it was officially approved in 1921. It is not within the scope of our inquiry to give an analytical account of the plan, as this has been covered by other researchers,



Map 6.1. Hebrard's Plan

(special reference was also made in section 2.2 concerning the relevant parliamentary debate), but to assess the possible impacts of the plan upon later urban policy<sup>3</sup>.

Hebrard's Plan was prepared at a transitional period for the future development of Thessaloniki, that is, just after the incorporation of Thessaloniki into the national territory, and before the exchange of population and the inflow of the refugees: two major events which had crucial effects upon the city's contemporary social and geographical structure<sup>4</sup>. It is also worth noting that the plan was elaborated at a period when town planning was under two main currents: the English "garden-city" tradition and the European architectural tradition and its connection to eclecticism. There are two apparent objectives that characterised Hebrard's Plan<sup>5</sup>:

First, it aimed to secure the city's physical development for a long time. The plan covered all urban area of Thessaloniki, including its immediate periphery. A "master plan" was proposed, with a simple, but clearly defined zoning, a rather rational proposal for a cosmopolitan city such as Thessaloniki. Future extensions were proposed so as to cover a population target of 350,000. Thessaloniki did reach this size forty years later (tables D1 and D.2, Appendix D). The total area of the plan, together with its future extensions, was 2,400 Ha, a proposal that refers to a rather dense and highly contained city. Taking into account the structure of landed property and the peculiarities of the land market, dense and highly contained development was eventually the model of urban development in GT. Following the English "garden-city" current, it proposed large areas of open spaces, connected to each other inside the built-up area, and a green belt surrounded the entire city. Certain areas were designed as small garden-cities, following though the relevant tradition only so far as their physical structure was concerned<sup>6</sup>.

Secondly, the plan provided a detailed scheme for the redevelopment of the city centre and an elaborate policy for its implementation. Hebrard's Plan was among the very few ones in contemporary history that considered the problem of small landed property and its effects upon city-centre development. This issue had acquired special attention, not only by the planning team, but also by the government itself and its official urban land policy (see also, section 2.2)<sup>7</sup>. An innovative instrument, a system of property reallocation, was proposed to cope with the implementation of the plan<sup>8</sup>. All area for reconstruction was compulsory expropriated. The old landowners were provided with land-bonds, and the newly allocated properties were put into auction. The old owners entered this land market

in "equal terms" with other bidders and were preferred only when they offered the same price with another bidder. Evidently, the reallocation policy was not implemented without problems. The Jewish of Thessaloniki were at large the owners of the small landed properties in the centre. Apparently they reacted strongly against this policy<sup>9</sup>. As a result, plot-size was reduced and the number of plots was increased from 1,300 to 2,600, so as facilitate their purchase by the old owners.

The system of property reallocation suggested that property was not an "immovable" capital, a trend so peculiar to Greek town planning later on. Property reallocation, widely implemented in agricultural land during the post-war period, was revived as a planning instrument in the 1979, and later, in the 1983 Planning Acts (see, sections 3.3 and 3.4) but was never implemented. Being one of the innovations of the plan, this system created a peculiar land market that dominated during the following decade. Thus, redevelopment was accompanied by a dramatic shift in ownership of an entire city centre. Apparently, such a policy eased access to land for small investors, as long as repayment could take place in instalments. An interesting feature, often underestimated by the relevant literature, is that many properties had not been repaid and, eventually, the debts were suspended during the second world war<sup>10</sup>. It is worth mentioning that auction sales became common practice in the centre later on, when the National Bank liquidated exchangeable property (see, section 4.3).

Whereas land sales were completed by 1924, redevelopment, as proposed by the plan, was never completed. Moreover, the plan as a statutory framework, was approved solely for the central section of the city. After the introduction of the 1923 Planning Act, Hebrard's Plan became the basis for approval of the various *rymotomika*, the layout plans which constituted the statutory framework for the expansion of the city. The whole area of Hebrard's Plan was approved by 1929. By that time the "urban core" of Thessaloniki took its contemporary form. Thus, the practice of "partial approval" of a plan was established as early as the consolidation of town planning legislation itself, and gradually evolved to a usual practice in planning policy.

Redevelopment in the centre took its own course through the *antiparohi* system that was gradually dominating the housing market. The free-hold system had been introduced as another instrument for the implementation of the redevelopment project, whereas its application on a national scale was approved later by the 1929

Property Law (see, section 2.2). Urban expansion, on the other hand, was realised largely by an *ad-hoc* event, the inflow of urban refugees. This event forced the preparation of a number of sketchy layout plans, with the primary purpose to define the physical boundaries of a rehabilitation programme<sup>11</sup>. The Ministry of Social Welfare became a "planning agent" for these newly created communities, and hence the chief planning agent for the city's expansion.


Until 1940 the largest part of contemporary planned area, before EPA, was approved. More than one fourth of the total planned area, before 1980, was approved in the decade 1931-40, with these sketchy layout plans of the then established new communities (table 6.1, map 6.2). Despite the increase of the population by 59.64% during 1928-40, density had fallen, as the city was expanding by the highest yearly rates than in any other preceeding period<sup>12</sup>. Most of these plans were prepared after the actual rehabilitation, thus resulting to a number of inconsistencies, which had to be arranged in later periods by numerous revisions<sup>13</sup>. These simple layout plans and their consequent revisions, often attributed to the special conditions of the mid-war urban expansion trends, turned out to be the planning system *par excellence*.

**Table 6.1.** Area incorporated into the town plan before EPA

	1921-30	1931-40	1941-60	1961-71	1971-81	total
area (in Ha)	620.16	1024.32	964.98	742.06	620.94	3,972.46
%	15.61	25.79	24.29	18.68	15.63	100.00
Yearly average	62.02	102.43	48.25	74.21	62.09	66.21

source: data from Tsoulouvis L., 1981, vol. 3, p. 202.

The so-called *rymotomika*, usually prepared and approved after the actual expansion had started, together with the numerous revisions and "plot arrangements", that sorted out inconsistencies between the plan and the situation of landed property in individual plots, dominated not only physical development, but also the production of the built environment itself. From 1921, when the first town-plan was approved, up to 1979, the year of the approval of the last layout plan before EPA, approximately 93 different Decrees were enacted related to consequent extensions of the plan (table 6.2). This practically means that in average a small extension of the plan was enacted per year.



Map 6.2. The gradual extensions of the town plan in GT until 1980

**Table 6.2.** Number of Decrees concerning extensions of the town plan in GT

	1921-30	1931-40	1941-50	1951-60	1961-1970	1971-79	total
Decrees	23	17	2	19	24	8	93
%	24.73%	18.28%	2.15%	20.43%	25.81%	8.60%	100.00%

source: elaboration of information from: 1. County of Thessaloniki (Planning Department), (1973) 2. G.D.Kostopoulos (1980).

Hence, a situation was formed in which not only planning was restricted to an approval procedure of simple layout plans; geographically speaking, the above mentioned town-plans referred to very small areas, which did not allowed for any comprehensive land-use planning related to future development, expansion or containment of the city. If we take under consideration all revisions and small changes that followed, it becomes clear how a situation of *polynomy*, so common in land policy and planning, was established forming a kind of "micro-planning". According to the relevant statistics of the Planning Department of Thessaloniki, up to 1989, the planned area of GT was under 1,650 different Decrees<sup>14</sup>. To this one should add that 5,500 Plot Arrangement Acts were on the whole enacted until 1989. Statutory planning eventually refers to a very small area (table 6.3), identified with the widespread interests in land as formed historically though the specific patterns of the development process.

**Table 6.3.** Average area of reference of each Decree and Plot Arrangement Act

<i>area per Decree of town-plan expansion (in Ha)</i>	<i>area per Decree (expansion and revision)</i>	<i>area per "Plot Arrangement Act"</i>
42.7	2.4	0.72

note: the counting was done on the basis of the area inside the plan before EPA (3972.46 Ha).

Finally, the former rural periphery of GT acquired its first planned settlements designed by the Ministry of Agriculture, on the basis of simple "Hippodamian" systems. Four areas of the later Greater Thessaloniki, Polichni, Menemeni, Efkarpia, and Panorama were provided with the so-called "Settlement Plans". These plans were prepared in the post-war period, when all areas mentioned above performed very high growth rates. It is worth noting that Panorama, which was already a location of high quality housing since the 1960s and hence high land prices, acquired a "settlement plan" as late as in 1968.

### 6.1.2. The 1966 Master Plan : from the layout plans to strategic planning (?)


During the mid-1960s, a period of the highest growth rates, urban policy constituted of a number of fragmentary actions related to the problems of the Rehabilitation Programmes, and a planning machinery that was restricted to the above mentioned gradual extensions of the boundary of the approved town plans. At this time the first Master Plan, and one of strategic character, was elaborated. If Hebrard's Plan, was motivated by a fire that destroyed the city centre and marked by the personality of A. Papanastasiou, the 1966 Master Plan was rather an outcome of a rational decision, connected to a national settlement policy.

This period was not characterised by any turmoil or major social transition; it was a "steady" period, marked by the highest ever growth rates, when regional planning was well into the agenda of public policy for the first time. Policy making was characterised by two contradictory trends. On the one hand, a situation of "non-planning" had been deeply rooted as far as the actual residential development was concerned, and was accompanied by a populist land policy roughly distinguishing the rural from the urban milieu. On the other hand, an attempt was made to form a national and regional planning policy. Within this context, a number of Master Plans were elaborated for all big cities of the country<sup>15</sup>. All these plans were influenced by two currents: the old "blue-print" tradition and the rising rational planning. The Ministry of Public Works was at this time officially the major planning agent. Among these plans was the 1966 Master Plan<sup>of</sup> Thessaloniki (HMTH, map 6.3).

The restricted character of the layout plans, the piecemeal treatment of urban sprawl and the need for a strategic plan were pointed out as early as 1960, an observation to be repeated so often in much later years:

*"Up to now the few tasks are restricted to the designation of simple layout plans and so every time we are obliged to expand the plan, most of the times in a coincidental manner [...] Moreover there exists certain proposals for a number of issues, such as studies for popular housing, transport and leisure. [However] these partial proposals should be integrated to a Strategic Plan".<sup>16</sup>*





Map 6.3. The 1966 Master Plan (HMTH)


The elaboration of HMTH was assigned by the Ministry of Public Works to a study group under the supervision of Prof. I. Triantafyllidis. Following to a large extent the rational tradition, it was a very large work divided into four sections. Three of them were submitted in 1968, while the fourth, which was to include the designation of residential units, was never completed.

The new plan ascertained that Thessaloniki had been transformed from a centre of an international magnitude to a significant, but local, industrial centre. There has been no later plan or any relevant report that gave such an emphasis to the role of the city in an international hierarchy. HMTH was characterised by an optimism that was evidenced in its fifty-years time-span as well as the fact that it envisaged Greater Thessaloniki to be expanded to a very large area (map 6.4). For the year 2016, it set as a population target 1,400,000 inhabitants and proposed that GT should be expanded to a total area of 35,000 hectares. Within this context it also provided very elaborate, for their time, estimations concerning demand in land for all categories of land-use.

Major emphasis was laid on the distribution of the residential space. A rational population distribution in units of low densities was proposed structured upon the principles of modern urban design: a form of development that was quite the opposite from the one that actually characterised GT. Moreover, HMTH's proposals on large residential expansion for middle class housing towards the north-west and west zones were far different from what eventually took place. All west zone outside the boundaries of GT turned into a location of industrial plants, whereas the outer west zone remained to a large extent rural.

HMTH devoted little attention to the necessary planning instruments. However, it is worth mentioning that one of its less known proposals anticipated the establishment of an "Organisation", which would undertake the plan's implementation, an issue that was to dominate planning debate by the end of the 1970s and onwards:

*"An "Organisation of Implementation" should be granted with the following responsibilities: collection, management and exploitation of the anticipated resources so as to make sure that the plan will be implemented without problems ..."*



Map 6.4. Proposed extension of the town plan by HMTH

Contrary to the institutional status of the Planning Organisation established in 1985 (see, section 6.4), HMTH suggested that this Organisation should be undertaken by local government under the responsibility of the *nomarch*. The proposed body was seen as a kind of a development corporation, granted with the authority to manage resources, a proposal apparently much more effective than the one approved in 1985.

HMTH was never officially enacted, an issue that remained wide-open in the planning debate for the next 20 years. At that time, planning legislation did not include the necessary provisions for the enactment of such plans. Thus, HMTH remained an extended and elaborate "planning study". Nevertheless, it was influential, though in a rather selective manner, in both local policy making and the debate around major planning issues<sup>17</sup>. Its influence concerned mostly certain locational decisions. The location of certain industrial plants and the central Meat-Market were reasoned on the basis of the proposals of HMTH. The designation of the inner and outer ring road was also proposed by this plan, whose construction actually started much later, in the end of the 1970s. On the contrary, HMTH was rather ignored as far as its proposals on residential development were concerned. The large expansion of the city accompanied by a proposal for sharp decline of the plot-ratios; the emphasis in residential development in the west outer periphery (as well as the south-east one); its proposals on resort housing around the central core; all these proposals were left aside in every debate related to the approval and implementation of HMTH !

## **6.2. The period 1974-1981 : A self-perpetuating discussion on a never-implemented reform**

HMTH was elaborated in 1966-68, but it was after 1974 that the problem of its implementation preoccupied policy making. This section examines the attempts for urban policy reform in the period 1974-81, so as to assess the characteristics of a policy period that preceded the implementation of EPA.

During the post-1974 period, issues of an institutional reform did affect widely the entire policy debate. This debate was quite vivid in GT as well. Apart from the general policy problems, the fact that legislation did not provide for any local authority the responsibility to deal with planning matters was then considered among the prominent local urban policy issues. The first apparent attempt for a

devolution of decision making had been the establishment, in 1972, of a Settlement Department, which practically assumed very limited powers: its role was restricted to recommendations on issues concerning changes of the layout plans and other relevant matters. This lack of local planning institutions became evident when major planning initiatives, such as the review of HMTH, and the incorporation of non-authorised built-up areas into the plan, were undertaken by central government or other centrally controlled local agents, such as the *nomarch*.

After 1974, the first issue to be put into urban policy agenda in GT was the approval and enactment of HMTH. In 1975 an initiative was undertaken by the then *nomarch*, to proceed with this approval. An initial report was prepared, which eventually described a large list of public works of a huge budget<sup>18</sup>. The plan's proposals on the role of the city as a port of an "international magnitude" had been then widely performed. However, the final report (prepared by the Ministry of Public Works and presented publicly in the end of 1977) was much more moderate in all respects. As this last report was prepared by central administration, it caused strong reactions among local officials and agents. As a response to these reactions, the Ministry of Northern Greece formed a Co-ordinating Committee in the same year, which was assigned to proceed to a review of HMTH based upon the Report of the Ministry of Public Works.

The new report sketched out in a few pages certain guidelines for development. The intention of this task was quite clear: a plan should be approved as a general framework that would allow for major location decisions to be taken<sup>19</sup>. Its proposals were largely based upon the assumptions of HMTH, which by this time were evidently outdated. Regardless of this problem, this report became the basis for all later discussions on locational issues, and it was above all the background for the 1985 Regulatory Plan.

As far as the major issue of urban expansion was concerned, the report made only general points and was confined to suggesting that, although in terms of the population increase, no expansion is necessary,

*"still the proposed expansions [by HMTH] in new residential areas should remain so and other developments there should not be permitted"*<sup>20</sup>.

Although it anticipated (of course with no specific elaboration) that urban expansion will lead to a restriction of illegal building, and a fall in population

density as well as land prices, the report did not proceed to any specific proposal about these expansions. Also it made hardly any reference to the problem of non-authorised development, which had been addressed by almost all authorities as the most serious problem at this period. It was reckoned that the problem of urban expansion through non-authorised development would be easily resolved as long as an overall Regulatory Plan was enacted. The same criticism holds for the issue of high plot-ratios. Instead of making a positive statement on this issue the report criticised HMTH's relevant proposals as utopian. It should be noted that at this time net population density had reached 1,000 persons/hectare in certain inner city areas<sup>21</sup>.

Apparently, the only practical outcome of this report was the creation of a Settlement Section under the responsibility of the Ministry of Northern Greece in 1978. Although the report suggested the establishment of a "decentralised agency" with planning powers, the new Section established had no particular planning power and was confined to an advisory role to the Minister of Northern Greece. It is worth mentioning that the Ministry of Northern Greece itself (now called Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace) had, and still has, hardly any power, either on planning or on any other local matter. This problem has caused a long-standing dispute between central administration and various local agents.

In 1978, only a year after the completion of the Report of the Co-ordinating Committee, the review of HMTH and its approval was once again brought back in a different manner. It was the time when the Ministry of Public Works performed its ambitious National Settlement Programme known as "rival cities" (section 3.3). Within this context the issue of the Regulatory Plans for Athens and Thessaloniki acquired special interest. In an effort to avoid local pressure, the Ministry of Public Works assigned to four different agents - three public (the Municipality of Thessaloniki, the Technical Chamber-Division of Central Macedonia and the Town Planning Department of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), and one private planning firm - to prepare their proposals for a Regulatory Plan, once again based on HMTH.

This new initiative was regarded with suspicion by the three local public agents, as well as other local authorities, most of which were under the control of the left opposition. It was a time when an ideology had prevailed considering that all similar tasks aimed at acquiring public consent to a restructuring policy and "by definition" were not in the interest of the people. Party politics were the principal factor for

this opposition to the new initiative. It was on this occasion that the proposals on behalf of the local authorities were centred upon one issue, which became central in urban policy until the mid 1980s: no plan could be put forward, unless a "planning agent" managed by the local authorities would be established:

*".... the deadlock that was created in the past with all the efforts for the preparation by the central administration of rigid plans without an active participation of local agents especially local government, which by principle is responsible for local matters, proved that the establishment of a decentralised local agency is of first priority ....."<sup>22</sup>*

Thus, the organisational and management aspect became for the first time the core issue in the planning debate. After a year and a half, in 1981, the Ministry presented its proposals under a draft-plan called "Thessaloniki 2000: a Framework of Regulations"<sup>23</sup>. As it had been expected, the plan was rejected by almost all local authorities<sup>24</sup>, in view of the coming 1981 elections.

Besides the review of HMTH, another important task in this period was related to the problem of non-authorised development outside the plan. In 1976 a decision was taken by the then *nomarch* to proceed with the incorporation of all built-up areas outside the plan within a comprehensive project. Despite its scale, the proposed project was not associated with the procedures related to the review of HMTH<sup>25</sup>. A special committee was set up, under the supervision of the *nomarch*, assigned to promote the incorporation into the town plan of all built-up areas of the west zone outside the plan. The Settlement Department undertook the elaboration of all necessary layout plans.

To a large extent, the whole project concerned approximately the same area with that covered later by EPA (the emergency part of the programme), as well as all the area of Evosmos. The preparation of the layout plans lasted until 1979, only to be suspended in view of the enactment of the 1979 Planning Act<sup>26</sup>. The task for a comprehensive solution was embedded in very slow bureaucratic procedures, and was either forgotten, or left into the hands of the local inexperienced councils<sup>27</sup>. The only exception was the Evosmos plan which was completed and enacted in 1979.

There is no rational explanation as to why only the plan of Evosmos reached the stage of approval. Presumably, the pressure on behalf of the then mayor played an important part. The 1970s was the time when the problem of non-authorised

development outside the plan acquired a number of ideological elements. This type of development was considered as an outcome of a "non-planning" policy, followed by the right wing government. To a large extent such views were adopted by local government. In view of its very weak powers, local government gave special priority to the problem of non-authorised development. A type of local populist policy had been gradually formed: as all local councils in the peripheral areas were under the control of the left, the "incorporation-into-the town plan" had been identified with an anti-government policy.

The enactment of the 1979 Planning Act, strongly criticised in GT as much as in Athens, brought about an optimism to local planning authorities: a new planning machinery was available that would change fundamentally the "non-planning" tradition. As the new Act provided the possibility for new development, this time the local planning authorities showed special interest mainly in the southern non-developed areas. Three plans were promoted on the basis of the new Planning Act: two small projects in the Municipality of Kalamaria, and a large one concerning the development of all southern part outside GT up to Thermi. Apparently, the Minister himself showed special interest in all three cases<sup>28</sup>.

The first two projects concerned principally the preparation of two layout plans, the Kifisia and the OASTH plans (table 6.4). Pressure for the preparation of these two plans began much earlier. The Kifisia plan covered 216.8 stremmas and concerned an area where demand in land for the antiparohi sector was quickly rising. The plan had been promoted since 1976 by the Municipality of Kalamaria. The OASTH plan concerned an area 986 stremmas owned by a building co-operative of the partners and workers of the Thessaloniki Urban Transport Organisation. The idea for a plan in this area had been promoted by this co-operative since 1972. Both plans were completed by 1981, but their approval was postponed due to the suspension of the 1979 Planning Act. They were both included later in EPA.

**Table 6.4.** Plans prepared on the basis of the 1979 Planning Act

<i>Plans</i>	<i>area(in stremmas)</i>
Kifisia	216.8
OASTH	986.0
Total area	1,202.8

source: Records of the Settlement Department of Thessaloniki.




The third project was much more ambitious. Since the mid-1970s, interest in the southern part outside GT was becoming more and more vivid. At this point let us have a brief look on the vested interests in this area:

Two large land owners, among the largest ones in the Wider Area of Thessaloniki, showed special interest in the development of this zone: the American Farm School (AFS) and the Patriarchate, whose property was 1,556 and 200 stremmas respectively. The first parcel had been offered by the Greek State to the AFS in 1918 in order to establish a farm school. The second parcel was part of the *vakoufia* land owned by the church which had been at large expropriated for the needs of the RRP. Various public authorities also owned significant parcels, such as the National Real Estate Bank of Greece (EKTE), the Organisation of Working Class Housing etc. (map 6.5).

Pressures for commercial development, in combination with the rising links between Thessaloniki and the resort areas of Halkidiki, made the zone one of utmost importance. In 1975 AFS conducted a planning project for the development of all its property<sup>29</sup>. The plan suggested the development of a total area of 477,8 through a housing project, whereas the rest of the AFS property was left for educational and leisure needs. EKTE was also planning a residential complex to house approximately 1,500 persons at its parcel of 112 stremmas<sup>30</sup>. The Organisation of Working Class intended to construct a working-class housing project<sup>31</sup>. Finally, the Patriarchate showed strong interest in developing its property, although it did not state its intention in any specific plan. Local planning authorities were very reluctant in promoting all these projects or proposals, pleading for the lack of an approved Regulatory Plan. Within a context of a slow bureaucratic type of administration it is very difficult to assess the reasons for this reluctance.

On the basis of the 947/79 Planning Act, which offered a number of new planning instruments, the Settlement Department suggested that all the above proposals be examined in the context of the newly proposed project for the development of the entire southern zone. However, only one survey of the property situation in the area concerned had been completed. As the new Planning Act was very soon suspended, so did this plan. Moreover, the development of this specific zone was left aside by EPA, despite the actual development trends and the strong interest on behalf of a number of large owners in the area.



Map 6.5. The structure of landed property in the area between GT and Thermi

A renewed interest for development was shown in the late 1980s. Ekte abolished the idea of a residential complex and applied for planning permission of a hotel and a conference centre. AFS applied in 1990 for a large commercial unit without abolishing completely the idea for a residential development. Both cases reached only the stage of approval by local planning authorities. In 1991 the idea of a large project for all western area was again revived and a new study was under preparation, without yet being completed. We will come back to the problem of development in the urban periphery later in this chapter (see, section 6.4).

### **6.3. The period 1981-89: New Plans for old problems**

The foregoing analysis stressed two major aspects of policy making: first, that strategic planning was gradually transformed to an ideological veneer enmeshed in a slow and fragmentary policy of land release of already developed areas; and secondly, that release of new land for development, was subject to bureaucratic and political priorities. These factors proved to inhibit development at a large scale, in the last instance, despite the official interest on such development shown by the then government and the large land-owners or developers. In the following part, we will examine planning policy during the period 1981-89. This section analyses the process of the implementation of EPA, the first comprehensive planning programme implemented in the post-war period. Hereafter we will avoid a distinction between "good" and "bad" planning, although this qualitative aspect has been a vital problem in the way EPA plans were elaborated<sup>32</sup>. Our scope is to provide an understanding of the nature of EPA and its outcome in terms of the planning practice followed.

By the end of 1983, the Planning Department of Thessaloniki estimated that 3,053 stremmas of land, approximately 7% of the totally built-up area of GT, were densely built-up outside the town plan (table 6.5). We note that these estimates include neither built-up areas, which were not characterised as particularly dense, nor areas outside the plan of non-authorised scattered industrial or commercial uses. The problem was particularly acute in the west and north west zone of GT, whereby about one third of the totally built-up area was outside the town plan (tables 6.5 and C6, Appendix C).

**Table 6.5. Densely built-up area outside the plan**

<i>area (in Ha)</i>	<i>inside the plan</i>	<i>outside the plan (densely built)</i>	<i>total</i>	<i>% outside the plan (densely built)</i>
total GT	3,987.3	305.3	4,292.6	7.11%
west & north- west zone	644.7	289.9	934,6	31.02%

source: elaboration of data from the records of the Planning Department,  
County of Thessaloniki.

As we saw in chapter 3, the 1983 Planning Act anticipated a sequence of plans: the GPS, the structure plans, which would lay the planning policies for each municipality; the PMEs, the plans that would specify GPS and provide the final layout plan; and the PEs, the topographic implementation of a PME. The PME were divided into two parts, the plans that concerned the incorporation of built-up, or new land into the town plan, and the review of the existing plans. A Regulatory Plan should also be prepared in order to lay the planning strategy for all GT.

Due to the fact that EPA was launched before the approval of a Regulatory Plan for all the metropolitan area, the Settlement Department prepared a Report, in 1983, under the title "Reconstruction of Thessaloniki", which outlined the main planning objectives for GT. The Report intended to be a strategic framework for the preparation of all the GPS. It is a document characteristic of the nature of planning policy in GT in the 1980s: a collection of goals, objectives and instruments, without any particular hierarchy or estimation for the feasibility of the proposed actions. This Report became the basis for the 1985 Regulatory Plan (see, section 6.4).

During this period the necessity for a comprehensive land policy, as the principal instrument that would secure plan implementation, was widely recognised. The Report included a package of very ambitious land policy objectives. Objectives such as, creation of a public land bank and a comprehensive land registry, were accompanied by a number of ideological goals such as, the "de-commodification" of land. It is worth noting that it is the only Report that mentions the problem of continuous land allocation to various beneficiaries. However, it was confined to suggesting simply

*"... a restriction of the land allocations which take place in a  
coincidental and fragmented manner"*<sup>63</sup>.

Similarly generous is the Report on housing policy, where the ideological character of its approach is much more evident. Special emphasis is given to renewal policy. Almost all inner areas were proposed to be renewed, thus initiating a series of proposals on renewal actions that can be divided into two kinds: those concerned historical sites of the central area (which in the 1990s occupied the interest of planning authorities<sup>34</sup>), and those concerned illegally built-up or other areas with acute housing problems.

Despite the variety of the proposals on land policy and renewal actions, the Report was very ambiguous in regard to all crucial issues of GT's development and urban structure, such as urban expansion, land release, high inner city densities and so on. Implicitly, the Report was opposed to large town-plan expansion in the areas of unauthorised development, an attitude probably seen as a policy to inhibit urban sprawl and land fragmentation. This attitude affected to a large extent the limited land release during the first stages of EPA. All plans prepared in the first stage of EPA's implementation, that is until 1986, were confined to the densely built-up areas including only a very limited non-dense area. As for the problem of high densities and the high plot-ratios, the Report did not proceed to any specific proposal simply suggesting that these problems should be further examined.

According to the new planning Act, no PME could be approved unless a GPS was prepared, since the latter was to define the needs in land for public space, the various community facilities and the necessary area of new expansion. In 1984, the year in which EPA had to be completed according to the initial plan, no GPS had been yet elaborated, let alone approved. This delay led the Ministry of Spatial Planning to proceed with the so-called "Emergency Programme", which concerned the preparation of PMEs of all densely built-up areas. These PMEs could be approved even before the approval of the GPS. In GT, the Emergency Programme included a total area of 213 Ha, which represents approximately 15% of the total area of EPA (table 6.6).

**Table 6.6.** The programme of EPA per large zones of GT (in Ha)

<i>zone</i>	<i>emergency programme</i>	<i>total EPA</i>	<i>%</i>
west	204.95	1032.7	70.01
east	8.3	442.3	29.99
total GT	213.25	1,475	100.00

source: see, table 6.4.

As the Emergency Programme was delayed, it was decided that the designation of non-densely built-up areas, i.e. the release of new land for development, should also be promoted. Eventually, all PME's in GT were elaborated before the completion of the GPS. From 1984, when EPA practically started, up to 1989, when almost all PME's were approved, a total area of 1,475 Ha had been officially released for development (map 6.6). This figure represents 27% of the total planned built-up area in GT (table 6.7). It becomes evident that a major outcome of EPA was the fact that, within five years, more land was released than in any other post-war period. This process resembles the massive preparation of layout plans during the inter-war years, when the 1923 Planning Act was gradually implemented. Compared with past periods, EPA was undoubtedly more effective as far the preparation of plans and hence land release for development was concerned. Another important effect of EPA was that it sorted out the planning imbalances, in particular as far as the area with a plan in the different zones was concerned. About 70% of the newly incorporated area was in the west and north-west zone (table 6.8).

**Table 6.7.** Area incorporated in the town plan per period (in Ha)


Year	-1940	1940-60	1960-80	EPA	total
area	1644.48	964.98	1363	1475	5447.46
%	30.19	17.71	25.02	27.08	100.00

source: tables 6.1 & 6.5

**Table 6.8.** Area with a town plan before and after EPA per large zones of GT (in Ha)

zone	area before EPA	EPA	total	% before EPA	% after EPA
west & north-west	1,468.9	1,032.7	2,501.6	36.84	45.80
%	58.72%	41.28%	100.00		
east and south-east	2,518.4	442.3	2,960.7	63.16	54.20
%	85.06%	14.94%	100.00%		
total	3,987.3	1,475.0	5,462.3	100.00	100.00

source: see, table 6.5.



**Map 6.6.** Extension of the town plan by EPA until 1989

In any case, until 1986, a first stage of EPA, during which the plans of most built-up areas were elaborated, land release was rather restricted to the west areas of working-class housing with the more intense problems of non-authorised development. The largest release of non-built-up area, 216,6 stremmas (21% of the totally released area in the west and north-west zone and 29% of the non-dense area of the same zone) took place after 1986 in Retziki, a suburb outside Sykies in the northern part of the city, with a rising land market and high pressures for development of middle-class housing. The Retziki plan started in 1986, after the period of the so-called Emergency Programme (table C7 Appendix C).

After 1988, the first PEs were assigned for elaboration. It was at this stage when the obscurities in property rights and the problem of *polynomy* in land situation transformed EPA to an unfinished <sup>project</sup>. By 1989 only a small PE project had been completed, that of Menemeni, only to be suspended a little later because of its legal problems<sup>35</sup>. The restricted land release, in relation to the obscurities in the situation of landed property, led to large deficits in public land expected to be acquired from the anticipated LDL (see, the relevant discussion in section 5.3). Thus, the PEs, instead of being confined to the topographic implementation of a PME, were also transformed to new urban plans that revised a number of the proposals of the PMEs. Most of these revisions reduced the anticipated public space in order to cover the expected deficits in public land. It is worth mentioning that the delay in the preparation and approval of the PEs had led the Ministry since 1986 to allow development in the areas concerned, even for sites partly affected by the plan and, therefore, needed to be arranged. The planning practice in Greece does not allow for any optimism that the affected part of these sites will be finally allocated for public use.

Let us now switch to an examination of the GPS. Their preparation was undertaken by the Settlement Department of Thessaloniki. All GPS in GT appeared to be very ambitious plans, lacking the necessary hierarchy and a feasibility approach to the proposed actions. The various renewal and new development schemes of the above mentioned 1983 Report were included into the GPS, without any further elaboration. A number of special Zones, as suggested by the 1983 Planning Act, such as ZEP and Zones of Special Incentives (section 3.4) were also proposed as the main planning instruments of the implementation of a GPS.

One ZEP attracted special attention on behalf of the local planning authorities: the ZEP of Polichni, a planning project through which the large parcel of municipal



land (section 5.2) would be developed in order to re-house inhabitants from a renewal project in the zone of the old castles. The idea of this ZEP originated by the end of the 1970s was seen also as a measure to inhibit the continuous appropriation of municipal land. In 1985 DEPOS prepared a number of plans for the area, the local councils concerned (i.e. of Polichni and Thessaloniki) and the authorities held a number of consequent meetings to decide how to proceed with the implementation of the project, but eventually the issue remained unsolved for all the following years. As for the proposed by the GPS ZEK and other planning zones one hardly remembers today what they were about, although all GPS are officially enacted.

As GPS were prepared after the elaboration of the PMEs, a planning paradox was caused: the GPS practically described land-use distribution as suggested by the old and the new urban plans. Land-use distribution was designated in an extreme detail, not compatible with this level of planning. Furthermore, in the part of the old plans, which were about to be reviewed, GPS repeated the existing land-use allocation with very minor changes. Thus, any amendment of these plans may presuppose a revision of the GPS concerned! Taking into account planning practice, and its enmeshment in legalistic-bureaucratic procedures, such a policy leads to a transformation of the GPS into another legalistic step for every minor change of a layout plan. By the end of the 1980s, procedures for revising various GPS had already started, with regard to minor locational proposals only. The scarcity of public land accompanied by the financial inability of the local government to proceed with the necessary expropriations led the latter to request the revision of the GPS, in order to reduce the anticipated land in community facilities and open space. Local government ended up to consider that a review of the GPS was the main solution to the problem of lack of public space<sup>36</sup>.

All GPS were completed and approved between 1987-89, with the exception of the GPS of the central municipality, the Municipality of Thessaloniki. The study of this latter GPS, completed by 1988, was sent to various public agents for their comments. Almost all agents concerned, agreed with the general guidelines of the plan. Very little was debated on the nature itself and the problem of non-implementation of these plans. However, the GPS of Thessaloniki has not been yet approved. Such an approval would call for specific answers on certain fundamental planning issues, such as the lack of public space in the central area, the high plot-ratios, and so on.

Due to this delay in the preparation and approval of the GPS of Thessaloniki, an *ad-hoc* decision was taken in 1987, according to which planning permission was denied in 100 plots, which would be compulsory expropriated later after the approval of the relevant plans. Although this decision was not made officially public, it provoked strong reactions from a number of interested parties resulting to a bargain between the Planning Department and the parties concerned. As a result, the number of plots proposed to be denied planning permission was reduced to 50. Evidently, the pressures and the bargain around this issue continued and the proposal was eventually abandoned. This is a typical example of the nature of planning policy in Greece and the way institutions are transcended. Both the *ad-hoc* selection of these plots, surpassing the necessary statutory procedures, and the delay in approving the GPS are two sides of the same coin: too much ideology- in-planning about nothing.

Apart from the extension of the town plan, EPA included the revision of all the old plans. Most "revision plans" did not proceed beyond the first stage of the analysis. The suspension of the revision plans was officially attributed to the needs for completing the PME's for unauthorised built-up areas. Only two "revision plans", were completed: the Evosmos one, which intended to amend the applicability problems of the 1979 layout plan, and the Retziki one, a necessary step for the development of an area with mixed rural-urban character until recently.

Two other sub-programmes of EPA are worth to be mentioned: the programme concerned settlements surrounding GT and that of the resort areas. We examine these programme briefly in the following paragraphs.

EPA was very effective as far as land release in the settlements outside GT (i.e. the rest of the Wider Area of Thessaloniki) was concerned<sup>37</sup>. The preparation of most of the PME's for settlements outside GT coincided with an important administrative change. As the "emergent cases" were gradually sorted out and central administration (i.e. the Ministry of Spatial Planning) was entering the preparation of PEs, projects of very high cost, the preparation of the PME's in smaller communities was left under the jurisdiction of local government<sup>38</sup>.

Contrary to the officially hostile attitude of the local planning authorities to land releases, all local councils, irrespective their politics, strongly supported extended land releases. It was at this point where the lack of strategic planning for the Wider Area of Thessaloniki became evident. Such a planning could ensure an overall land

development policy from particular local vested interests. There is no case in which the Organisation of Thessaloniki, in charge for the implementation of the 1985 Regulatory Plan, gave its opinion or was involved in these procedures of land release in the Wider Area of Thessaloniki. Thus, the proposed land release at these suburban areas was left to a bargain between the local councils, in charge for the preparation of the plans, and the Planning Department in charge of its approval. Until 1989, a total of 1,413 stremmas of land were released, which represents almost half of the total land release in the Wider Area of Thessaloniki (tables 6.9 & 6.10). Another 5,500 stremmas were released in resort areas, a large area of which was already densely built-up. It is worth noting that these resort areas are gradually transformed to first-residence areas.

**Table 6.9.** The progress of EPA in the Wider Area of Thessaloniki in 1989

	<i>approved in 1989</i>	<i>under study</i>	<i>total</i>	<i>%</i>
PME (first residence)	8,934	5,200	14,134	100.00
first stage	4,384	0	4,384	31.02
second stage	4,550	5,200	9,750	68.98
Resort Residence	5,500		5,500	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,934</b>	<b>5,200</b>	<b>19,634</b>	

source: see, table 6.5.

**Table 6.10.** Land released all over the Wider Area of Thessaloniki in the period 1986-89

	<i>GT</i>	<i>Rest Wider Area</i>	<i>Total Wider Area</i>
area (in Ha)	1,475.0	1,963.4	3,438.4
%	42.9	57.1	100.00

source: see, table 6.5.

note: the projects in study are also included

This change in land release will undoubtedly have important effects upon the patterns of residential development in GT and lead to an extensive suburbanisation, a process so far realised in a scattered manner and in strong connection with the built-up area.


## **6.4. Whatever happened to Strategic Planning ?**

Within a national context EPA dealt largely with the preparation of plans for areas outside the city plan, thus functioning as an implementation programme of the 1983 Planning Act. Within EPA, however, the issue of the two Regulatory Plans of Greater Athens and Thessaloniki was promoted as part of the strategic planning of this new period of urban policy. This section examines first the character of the 1985 Regulatory Plan, paying special emphasis on the role of the agent established for its implementation, the Planning Organisation of Thessaloniki. Secondly, it analyses the proposed system of development control and the attempts to plan a Zone for Development Control.

### **6.4.1. The 1985 Regulatory Plan and the establishment of the Planning Organisation of Thessaloniki**

In 1985 the first Regulatory Plan of Thessaloniki (RSTH, map 6.7) was approved by the 1561/1985 Act, which specifies the fundamental guidelines for planning and development of Thessaloniki including a Programme of Environmental Protection. RSTH referred to the Wider Area of Thessaloniki, which covers almost half of the County of Thessaloniki. On the basis of the Report "Restructuring of Thessaloniki" mentioned above, the new plan involved three dimensions: urban planning at a metropolitan level, environmental protection and co-ordination of the various plans and schemes implemented in the Wider Area of Thessaloniki by various agents.

Before its endorsement, in 1984, a procedure of public approval was launched, in a rather celebrated fashion<sup>39</sup>, in which eventually only few local authorities took part<sup>40</sup>. A close examination of the various attitudes put forward by these authorities, shows that the new plan was widely accepted with no particular reactions or comments. The reservations were very few regarding certain sectional issues only<sup>41</sup>. Apparently, the proposed RSTH was presented as a transitional plan with a five-years time span. Hence, it followed the tradition of the 1983 Planning Act: within a short time another more comprehensive plan was to be prepared as a specification of a National Spatial Plan. In this way, it was accepted as a necessary initial step to strategic planning for the Wider Area of Thessaloniki:



Map 6.7. The 1985 Regulatory Plan

*".... it should be noted that the whole plan is of transitional character and will be in force until the preparation of a complete RSTH within the context of a National Spatial Planning. Hence, the various regulations proposed should not be bound to lead to an undesirable situation"*<sup>42</sup>.

The procedure of public participation that was followed incorporated one of the main ideological elements prevailing in urban policy at this period: Planning was considered as a "norm", and hence anything called "plan" should be accepted as long as at that period "political will" allowed for its enactment:

*"Thessaloniki can be reconstructed because there are such prospects, as well as, the necessary political will expressed by the Prime Minister in order to cope radically with the problems and their causes"*<sup>43</sup>.

RSTH was initially approved by the Prefecture Council in 1985, when the 2300 years since the city's establishment were celebrated and at a time when EPA was in its peak. After a long period of a self-perpetuating debate that lasted for almost 10 years, a RSTH was enacted by the 1561/85 Act. The whole debate at the local level, as well as in the Parliament, did not focus so much on the RSTH itself, as on the proposed Planning Organisation, which was to assume its implementation. After a long-standing discussion concerning the establishment of a local Planning Agency and almost twenty years after a relevant proposal was made by HMTH (see, 6.1.2), the 1561/1985 Act enacted the establishment of a Planning Organisation (OTH) which was proposed to be:

*" ....[an] autonomous, financially and administratively, planning agent that would co-ordinate and specify the implementation [of the plan] with procedures that would be institutionally consolidated, organisationally flexible and non-bureaucratic"*<sup>44</sup>.

The establishment of OTH was considered as the cornerstone of PASOK's local urban policy, whereas it was well received by those local agents, such as local government and the Technical Chamber, which were controlled by PASOK and the Left. OTH was presented as the agent that would promote urban development and which would further

*"... convey popular representation with central and governmental mechanisms within a process of promoting a county or metropolitan tier of local government"*<sup>45</sup>.

With a rather mild criticism in the relevant Parliamentary Debate, the New Democracy Party argued that OTH runs the risk of becoming a bureaucratic board that would intervene in the work of other public authorities, therefore increasing the problems of *polynomy*<sup>46</sup>. The Communist Party, on the other hand, criticised the government for its delay to establish a county tier local government under which the new board was proposed to be set.

Despite the initial claims, according to which the board would be administered by local agents, OTH was formed to a typical quasi-governmental body and the law made clear that government would keep full control of it: four out of its seven members were appointed by the Minister of YHOP (later YPEHODE) and only three were representatives from local authorities<sup>47</sup>. Taking into consideration that local politics in Greece are strongly influenced from national party politics<sup>48</sup>, even these three representatives were to a large extent influenced by the party in government. It was a period when a very strict control of central government upon local authorities was gradually formed through these various centrally controlled agencies, contrary to the initial manifestations of the government. A new form of statism could be seen in this

*"... ad hoc establishment of centrally controlled bodies, organisations and services in order to cope with special problems without paying any attention if these were of a national, regional or local scale"*<sup>49</sup>.

This argument does not imply that these bodies, including OTH, were particularly powerful. Devolution of power from the central Ministries to other bodies had always been a very slow and contradictory process even when power would be transferred to quasi-governmental bodies. The same trends reflect on the role of OTH examined both institutionally and by its practice. A careful analysis of the 1561/85 Act shows that OTH was solely in charge of the implementation of RSTH and has no power in reviewing or conducting a new plan. This is an issue undermined by all local authorities who supported its establishment. A careful reading of the relevant documents shows that most authorities considered that OTH was both in charge of implementation and reviewing RSTH or promoting a new Plan<sup>50</sup>. Eventually, by 1990 this issue was completely clarified by a Ministerial Decision: a special Division was set up in the Ministry of Spatial Planning, which would be in charge for strategic planning in the big urban centres and their periodic review<sup>51</sup>.

A large advisory board, the RSTH Council, was also set up as a body that would monitor and give its consultation on the process of the implementation of RSTH. Almost all major local authorities, governmental, quasi-governmental, local councils and other non-governmental agents, were proposed to take part in this council. The establishment of this body was proclaimed as an institution by which local participation was put into practice. According to a later Act, the 1622/1986 Act on Regional Councils, it was anticipated that this Council would be replaced by the proposed elected Prefecture Council, i.e. the proposed second-tier local government, without changing the composition of OTH's Executive Committee<sup>52</sup>. But this provision was never put into practice since the proposal for a second tier local government remained inactive.

Apparently OTH could exert great powers over almost every matter related to planning, large-scale schemes and environmental protection. However, the new board was gradually transformed, to a local planning bureau. Its planning activity turned to be restricted to certain consultations on major controversial locational issues<sup>53</sup>. In this context, an important problem rose: how to specify the priorities in the implementation of RSTH. A controversy between implementing urban planning objectives (considered not easy to be implemented) and certain transport and environmental protection schemes was incorporated in the actual practice of OTH during the first years of its operation. As the rising transport and environmental problems were entering the politics (and the public works) agenda in a quick pace so did the direction of OTH. Even there, its practical impact was very limited. As for the RSTH Council, throughout the period 1986-89 it held altogether only four meetings<sup>54</sup>.

Above all, by 1990 the role of OTH was practically diminished to another agency of "micro-planning". With a change in law, OTH was to be the body in charge for all revisions and amendments of layout plans, which concerned sites next to the so-called "Basic Road Network". Since then all planning activity of OTH has been centred around these issues. As far as its official responsibilities are concerned, they were practically spread among various other local bodies, according to the political importance of the matter concerned. This was the case with environmental protection which was spread under the responsibility of various departments, namely the Planning Department, the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace and the Prefecture of Thessaloniki. Thus, OTH, instead of changing the nature of local strategic planning eventually became another agent in the long-standing history of "micro-planning".



#### **6.4.2. Zone of Development Control: the deadlock of land-use planning**

Among the basic objectives of RSTH was the control and prevention of urban sprawl. Although vaguely conveyed, RSTH apparently objected to further extension of the plan and suggested that this should be confined only to the already built-up areas outside the plan<sup>55</sup>. RSTH adopted an attitude that urban sprawl should be controlled through a reinforcement of urban development at certain small communities, called local centres, around GT<sup>56</sup>. According to the 1983 Planning Act development in the urban periphery should be controlled by the designation of a Zone of Development Control (ZOE) that would define land-use allocation and impose restrictions on land fragmentation.

In 1985, the boundaries of a ZOE for the Wider Area of Thessaloniki were defined within which no fragmentation was allowed for parcels under 10 stremmas. Land-use distribution, the designation of specially protected areas, and the imposition of special building regulations were left to be prepared at a later stage. The elaboration of a first ZOE plan started almost at the same time with that of the GPS. A confusion on the content of a ZOE plan<sup>57</sup>, accompanied by political ambiguity on what should be done for the immediate urban periphery, characterised this first attempt to elaborate a ZOE plan. Most of the area outside GT already performed high development activity through semi-legal forms of the old statutory planning<sup>58</sup>. During 1985-90 two consequent ZOE plans were elaborated, which were concerned only with the immediate urban periphery and not the entire Wider Area of Thessaloniki.


The first ZOE plan, elaborated by the Settlement Department, included rather strict regulations, paying special attention to the protection of farming and reforested land. Future needs in land either for residential, office and other commercial space were hardly assessed, apart from the proposed extension of the plan by EPA and the anticipated locations for industrial plants. This proposal was confined in defining land-use distribution and did not proceed to setting other building regulations than those provided by existing legislation concerning development outside the plan<sup>59</sup>. This proposal did not proceed to the stage of approval. Still, it was used for some time by the Settlement Department as a framework for granting planning permission, in particular for industrial development (i.e. outside the specially designed Industrial Zone). This practice, however, was occasional and therefore created a situation of institutional confusion.

In 1989, OTH resumed its responsibilities on the subject and prepared a second plan called "ZOE: Transitional provisions" (map 6.8). The new ZOE was hardly a plan for development control: it was rather a detailed land-use plan for the development of GT's immediate periphery. The proposal followed to a large extent the existing trends in a typical blue-print manner. However, being a ZOE plan, no provision was included on the necessary infrastructure, community facilities, and, above all, the necessary betterment levy. Such provisions and planning instruments could be provided only through a proper urban plan.

The newly proposed plan was bitterly criticised by the Settlement Department, which at the same time reacted on the decision of OTH to resume the responsibility on designating a ZOE plan. It was there when the extent of OTH's responsibilities on planning was questioned for the first time<sup>60</sup>. Obviously, underneath this argument a dispute was concealed as to which agent would control the granting of planning permissions in such a sensitive zone.

At this point a clarification is necessary. EPA placed principal emphasis on the needs in residential space. The planning problem of other uses remained wide open. Thus, development outside the plan, where pressures for industrial and large commercial complexes were strong, due to sufficient land supply, was left under the jurisdiction of the 1923 Planning Act and the Decrees that specified it. This framework, although implicitly strict as far as the necessary site area and the building regulations were concerned, provided the possibility of granting planning permission through the so-called "stretching of law". In this case, a special committee grants specific regulations as exceptions from the ones anticipated by law. Thus, given the structure of land, planning permissions for all large developments outside the plan were held through this stretching of law. The 1923 Planning Act also provided the potential for planning authorities to impose a levy to the developed property, a provision which was never implemented<sup>61</sup>.

The 1983 Planning Act, presumably changed this situation and proposed that any new development outside the plan requires the designation of a ZOE, at a first stage, and then the preparation of a so-called "local layout plan"<sup>62</sup>. However, as the approval of a ZOE was delayed large developments in the urban periphery were approved by activating the old statutory framework. Through this framework all known large developments, such as the various department stores, the bus-station,



Map 6.8. Zone of Development Control (proposal by OTH)

the Meat-Market and other manufacturing and shopping buildings were granted planning permission.

Consequently, the problem of future development of non-residential land-use practically remained wide-open. The second ZOE plan apparently pointed out this problem but offered a paradoxical solution by designating areas where development could be allowed. However, this designation was made through an instrument that was for **development control**. Two kinds of problems arose from this institutional paradox: a) ZOE could be transformed to an urban plan, without anticipating the provisions required by such a plan; b) a dual situation could be founded whereby an entire area would be under ZOE's regulations, not yet enacted, and also under the old statutory framework, the only one officially enacted. This situation would eventually lead to different treatment in granting planning permission to various schemes. These problems were revealed in the practice followed:

In 1989, the second ZOE plan was approved by the RSTH Council and sent for public inquiry<sup>63</sup>. After approval of the new ZOE plan by the RSTH Council in 1989, the Planning Department used it shortly as a framework to grant planning permission for every development scheme outside the plan, despite the fact that it had not been enacted (since this procedure needed a Ministerial Decision). This measure was quickly withdrawn. The ZOE proposals were followed only in the case of industrial developments, since by law planning authorities should give their consultation on the location of these plants.

Finally, in 1990, after the change of government with the rise of the New Democracy Party to it, a proceeding was followed to enact part of the proposed ZOE and in particular: zones proposed for absolute protection (forests and reforested zones); zones designated for the location of industrial plants; and the so-called zones of special regulations, presumably meaning zones where industrial development had caused particular pollution and needed cleansing actions. This last effort remains still at a stage of preparation.

## 6. 5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter explored the problems and constraints of urban planning in GT, with particular emphasis on the period 1974-89. At the beginning we assessed the nature of two plans, different in their scope and objectives, but influential in local planning

debate and policy making: the 1917 Hebrard's Plan and the 1966 Master Plan. It was argued that although the 1917 Plan may have had a great impact upon property reallocation in the city centre, it affected only partially the overall structure of the city as it was enacted only as far as its layout plan was concerned. The needs in urban space for the rehabilitation programme led to massive approvals of layout plans during the period 1928-1940. Through these procedures, a practice of "micro-planning" was consolidated, by which land release was limited and piecemeal. The 1966 Master Plan came to create a framework for strategic planning for all the metropolitan area and suggested a large city expansion, aiming at increasing the role of Thessaloniki in the international and national urban hierarchy. The plan ended up to become a never-approved "request" of the local agents.

The efforts to approve HMTH, after 1974, eventually ended up to a task of the planning authorities to classify certain general goals and objectives. Similarly, the attempts to sort-out comprehensively the planning problems of non-authorised areas were embedded to slow, bureaucratic proceedings and hence left aside. Furthermore, large development schemes and proposals were never considered within an overall development and planning policy. The 1979 Planning Act provided for this opportunity but was soon suspended, whereas EPA never entered this issue.

Non-authorised building outside the plan was to be sorted out by EPA, a nation-wide programme. In addition, EPA became the statutory machinery according to which large areas of land acquired a plan in the suburban areas, a policy that in future may have important repercussions on the city's geographical structure. All other planning instruments were never implemented. The GPS, the structure plans that were to incorporate the changing planning practice, turned to another legal document for minor amendments and plan revisions. Finally, the establishment and operation of a new planning agent, OTH, proved that the lack of planning in Greece is an endemic feature, rather than an institutional incidence. The analysis revealed that major planning issues, such as development in the sensitive zones outside the plan are left to interdepartmental bargains with the use of the old statutory framework. Consequently, the 1923 Planning Act was never practically replaced.

## 6.6. Notes for chapter 6

1. An illustration of the problems caused by the fire is given in the Report of A.A. Pallis, in Papastathis, H.K. (1978).
2. The following experts took part in this Committee: E. Hebrard, French architect-planner, Th. Mawson, English town planner and landscape architect, Z. Pleyber, civil engineer and lieutenant of the French Army, A. Zahos, Greek architect, A. Ginis, Greek harbour-engineer, K. Kitsikis, Greek architect, K. Aggelakis, Mayor of Thessaloniki (Papayiannopoulos, A., 1982).
3. Since the mid-1980s this plan has attracted special interest of urban design studies, thus being thoroughly analysed as far as its proposals on urban structure is concerned. The most important work on it is by Gerolympos, A. (1985 & 1987).
4. Hastaoglou, V. & Gerolympos, A. (1986) refer to these changes, but they approach the problem mostly from an architectural-morphological point of view. For other historical references see, History Centre of Thessaloniki (1986).
5. The objectives were not clearly defined (Gerolympos, A. 1985, p.158). There exist only some general texts which analyse the "art and science of town planning", the newly established discipline (Mawson, Th. 1918). The influence of the British town-planner, Th. Mawson, representing the newly rising discipline, was evident (Gerolympos, A. 1985 p.p. 225-231).
6. There is however a false interpretation of the character of these "garden cities" by certain writers such as Kalogirou, N. (1986). They concerned one small neighbourhood outside the central area and a resort area in the mountain Hortiatiss, designed in 1936 (Playber, J., 1936). Both had very little relation with the ideas concerning the social and geographical structure of garden cities as envisaged by Ebenezer Howard.
7. Apostolopoulos, N. (1938), points out that the situation of landed property (its size as well as its irregular shape) was of equal importance to that of the finance of the reconstruction projects.
8. The system was later used for the redevelopment of other city centres (most of which were destroyed in the war) such as, the central areas of Edessa, Serres, Doxato and Heraclia (Apostolopoulos, N., 1938, and Grammatikopoulos, V., 1948 describe the relevant project of the city of Edessa).
9. For a description of the distribution of the different communities before 1912 in the city, see, Dimitriadis, V., 1983. Hekimoglou, E. (1987, pp. 137-138) argues that this decision was the beginning of the geographical deconstruction of the Jewish community and played an important role in its decline. For more discussion see, Nar, A. (1986) and Gerolympos, A. (1985, p.184).
10. Gerolympos, A. (1985, p.331-337) mentions this fact without assessing its importance in the way access to land was eventually realised in this central area.
11. Kalogirou, N., op.cit., makes a few references to these plans.
12. Triantafyllidis, I. (vol., 8 p. 3-5) estimates that the density had fallen from 178 persons/Ha in 1917 to 139 persons/Ha in 1940.
13. The inability of local government to cope with compensation and proceed to the necessary expropriations that needed either compensation or plot reallocation is one

of the main causes for these plan-revisions. The latter usually proposed a restriction of the designed public space releasing it for development.

14. For an account of the corresponding situation in other towns see, *TEE: Enimerotiko Deltio* 7/9/1990, p.15.
15. For an account of these plans see, Voivonda, A., et al. (eds.), 1977.
16. Triantafillidis, I. (1960, vol. A, p.11).
17. Tsoulouvis, L. (1981).
18. Report of K. Pylarinos (in Tsoulouvis, L. op.cit.).
19. This point is made by Tsoulouvis, L. op.cit. He also highlights the fact that this report was the beginning of an ideologically based discussion around the major planning issues.
20. Report of the Co-ordinating Committee (1977, p.33).
21. Net population density all over GT was estimated at 372,49 persons/Ha, Tsoulouvis, L. (with Yiannakou, A. et al), 1981, p. 137-159.
22. Declaration of the meeting of Local Authorities for the Regulatory Plan of Thessaloniki (*TEE-TKM, Techniki Enimerosi*, May-June 1981, p.14).
23. The draft-plan was based on the project prepared by a private company (see, Environmental Design Company, 1979).
24. See, the relevant reactions in *Techniki Enimerosi*, May-June 1981, p.p. 5-14.
25. No record is kept on this decision. The relevant information was provided by the personnel of the Settlement Department.
26. Characteristic of the way the whole project was treated is the fact that it was almost impossible to find any records with the specific plans or the procedures followed.
27. At this point it is important to note that most local councils were just institutionally changed from the status of a community to that of a municipality.
28. At that time, N. Zartinidis, a local politician, was Minister of Public Works.
29. Conducted by one of the traditionally planning offices of Athens, the Environmental Design Company (which undertook later the review of HMTH), the plan also incorporated a number of strategic proposals for the city as a whole in a form of a review of the old HMTH (American Farm School, 1975).
30. American Farm School, op.cit. p.67.
31. Yiannakou, A., 1988.
32. Alexander, E.R. & Faludi, A. (1989) rightly point out that there should be such a distinction when dealing with planning theory and practice.
33. YHOP (1983, p. 24). Presumably it is referring to the problem of the allocations of land by DAP to its occupants. Later a procedure was followed to control the way in which land was allocated.
34. The project "Renewal of the Historical Centre of Thessaloniki", a pilot project financed by EEC (approved in 1991), as well as, other proposed schemes for the occasion of the 1997 Cultural Capital, are in fact based on this and later similar reports.

35. By 1992, almost half of the PEs in GT were completed but no project had been officially approved.
36. By 1990 at least three Municipalities proposed such revisions, the Municipalities of Kalamaria, Polichni and Sykies.
37. Here we examine the settlements of more than 2,000 inhabitants together with those of less than 2,000 inhabitants which were categorised in different sub-programmes.
38. At this point it is worth noting that many officials consider that EPA ended when the Ministry stopped to be in charge of the finance of the relevant projects. Thus, the term EPA is used by them only for the plans prepared in the first stage of EPA.
39. RSTH was first publicly presented in the presence of the then Prime-Minister during the opening of the 1984 International Fair of Thessaloniki and after this occasion the procedure of public approval followed.
40. To some extent this was due partly to a strike by the architects and engineers of the public sector.
41. Among them were the views of the Industrial Chamber, which pointed out its anxiety to a possible restriction of industrial space: "... *proposals that would contribute to its dwindling* [i.e. of industrial space] *are not accepted* [...]. *Our common pursuit is that RSTH should be improved as far as its proposals on industry are concerned*" (extract from the relevant letter, Records of the Prefecture of Thessaloniki).
42. Aspects put forward by the TEE-Division of Central Macedonia (Document Ref. 2986/7-11-84).
43. Act 1561/1985, Introductory Report.
44. op.cit.
45. Document written by the County Committee of PASOK, 9-10-1985.
46. Act 1561/85, Introductory Report.
47. Namely, representatives from the County Council, the Municipality of Thessaloniki and the Local Union of Municipalities and Communities.
48. This is a policy often promoted by the opposition parties. Friedland, R., et.al. rightly point out: "Oppositional political parties frequently develop national political strategies around initial urban political mobilisation and electoral victories" (1977, p.451).
49. Petmezidou, M. & Tsoulouvis, L., 1990, p.289.
50. See, the relevant debate in the Public Inquiry Records on RSTH, County of Thessaloniki.
51. Ministerial Decision, ref. no. 39961/1036/16-5-1990.
52. 1622/86 Act, article 22 (paragraph 2).
53. We refer to the two cases that occupied most of the attention of OTH during the period 1988-89, the location of a Chemical Industry and the issue of the re-opening of the JET-OIL installations, which had closed after a big fire.
54. From 1989 and up to the end of 1992 the RSTH Council never held any meeting.
55. Act 1561/1985, article 3 (paragraphs 3 & 4d).
56. The ambiguities of the plan are quite clearly displayed in the ambivalent language that is used.



57. This was a general problem in urban policy and has been pointed out by the KEPE Working Group (KEPE, 1989, p. 89).
58. Such developments were already in action since the early 1970s (see, American Farm School, 1975).
59. Namely, the Presidential Decree 24-5-1985 that provides the regulations for building outside the plan.
60. Public Inquiry Records, Archives of OTH.
61. Articles 7, for residential development, and 9 for other developments.
62. It was clearly stated that "ZOE sets out land-use or other regulations and restrictions .... and in particular the minimum site-area under which no fragmentation is allowed", Act 1337/1983, article 29, paragraph a.
63. It is interesting to note that this was in fact a second round of public inquiry. The first one was held in 1987 and concerned the proposal of the Settlement Department.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

The starting point of this thesis was a speculation that throughout the period 1974-89 many important institutional attempts to reform urban policy and planning apparently ended up with little success. The principal question that thus arose was: does this inefficiency display merely an institutional weakness in implementing public policy, so common in societies like Greece, or is it an outcome of a more compound political, economic and institutional process enmeshed into the characteristics of residential land development? Our inquiry focused on three related aspects: **a.** the role of land policy in determining the modern forms of landownership and property relations; **b.** the impacts of small landownership on the peculiarities of the residential development process; **c.** the role of politics and ideology upon land development processes and the attempts to manage them.

#### **7.1. The theoretical standpoint**

In the Introduction we argued that a historical analysis can offer a better understanding of the various and diverse aspects of land development phenomena - intrinsically empirical ones - and their policy considerations (section 1.2). Indeed, the time of departure of this thesis was 1917, when a major land policy, the Agrarian Reform, was introduced. The research highlighted the period 1917-28, where two particularly crucial occurrences emerged: first, the Refugee Rehabilitation Programmes, that were to transform the structure of landed property both in urban and rural areas; secondly, the formulation of a planning machinery that was to last for a very long time. A historical approach was also adopted in the examination of the residential development process, nationally and locally, in order to apprehend the links of the housing sector to small landownership within a context of what we called "family income strategy".

We pointed out that the complexities and the peculiarities of land development head for the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach. Of high priority for urban studies is a better interconnection between the useful theoretical assumptions of land development studies and the valuable insights of policy analysis. So, we combined policy with processes of residential land development, in each step of the analysis. We tried to treat the policy factor as a substantial component to residential development and not as an element that generates the residential process by itself nor as a contingency external to this process. We proposed that these two apparently contrasting approaches in the literature did not provide an adequate framework for understanding the nature of policies related to residential land development.

Further, we argued that any analysis on residential land development, and the attempts to manage it, presupposes an **interactive** explanatory framework (proposed by Healey, P. and Barrett, S., 1990), which combines structural influences, whether economic or socio-political, with agency, which can be an organisation or an individual, i.e. the final investor in - or consumer of - residential space (section 1.3.1). In this respect, the role of the state was highlighted in connection both with its influence on social practices and behaviours and with its specific relations with agents of residential development, especially the small landowners. However, the "state" was not considered only as an abstract structure. Within this structure the actual practice of a number of "agencies", such as the different Ministries or Organisations that were involved in land allocation and planning, gave a distinct nature to specific policies. Thus, for instance, the planning practice exerted by the Ministry of Agriculture and assumed within its allocation policy, was different from the one exerted by "regular" planning agents, such as the Ministry of Public Works and later the Ministry of Spatial Planning.

We also stressed the role of certain groups of action, such as small landowners or developers avoiding, however, to classify these groups in a rigid manner. Afterall, any plausible classification would require a research of a different type. Our point of view was that the specific interests of these groups in land and its development capacity should not be underestimated in our understanding of eventual behaviours and practices. On the other hand, such behaviours may be not the driving force but are certainly crucial constituents in the actual residential process. For any planning policy to be efficient, this final outcome-behaviour must be reckoned and evaluated.

In addition, the role of the "individual" was highlighted within a family-based economy, the main unit of consumption of - and investment in - land. A family's income strategy, sketched in section 2.3, is far away from rigid class-approaches, even when these approaches widen their definition of traditional classes. The small allotment holder, for instance, had a specific interest in the development of this property, which could easily enter the residential sector for various reasons (section 5.1). This agent also performs a specific behaviour as an owner of an asset valued in one or another way. Thus, we attempted to highlight this aspect stemming from individual behaviour. Of course, our approach has largely a tentative character, since there is a need for more sociological, in particular, research to be done in this field.

## 7.2. A summary of the main findings

Let us summarise more concretely the main findings in each chapter.

At the beginning, we analysed the role of state intervention in land allocation, as this was incorporated in the 1917 Agrarian Reform and the Refugee Rehabilitation Programmes implemented after 1922 (chapter 2). Our analysis established two fundamental aspects, namely: the extent and objectives of the programmes, along with their repercussions in the structure of landownership; and the features of land policy that emerged from these programmes and their consequent implications for post-war urban planning. This inquiry revealed that the neglect of the role of land policy by Greek urban studies led to a number of omissions in understanding the contemporary features of urban development and policy.

More specifically, the underestimation of the **nature of property rights in the rural space** and their implications upon residential development led to rigid assumptions as far as development in the urban fringe as well as in tourist and second-residence areas is concerned (see, comments in section 1.3.2). Urban studies also overlooked other aspects of property relations. The most prominent one is the **obscure situation between private and public land**, which historically resulted to a gradual transference of public land to private ownership. As we saw this was a very important aspect in the consolidation of a wide access to land both nationally (sections 2.1 and 3.1) and locally (chapter 4 and section 5.3).

Our examination of the nature of the first town planning (section 2.3) showed that, at a time when the middle classes entered the political arena, the prevailing political attitudes to urban development concerned a major question, i.e. "who" should control urban space. This question was never put more clearly in any other period than in two parliamentary debates of this time: first, in 1919, on the occasion of the redevelopment of Thessaloniki's city-centre, and, secondly, in the formulation of the 1929 Property Law. The liberal governments of the period, however, adopted a middle line: town planning would be an indicative tool to the physical side of urban development. Small and medium landownership was not to be neglected by this machinery, whereas rather little attention was paid to public land or to future needs in land for collective consumption uses. The formulation of this indicative planning framework was accompanied by a Property Law that was to set the legal background for the consolidation of free land holding, and the multi-storey inner-city development.

A macroscopic account of the role of the housing sector during the post-1950 period showed that the housing sector performed an exceptionally steady growth throughout 1950-80. Investment in housing has traditionally had a leading position making the residential sector dominant in the country's economy. This trend changed for the first time in the 1980s. We suggested that part of the explanation for these changes may lie in the characteristics of the development process and its linkages to the structure of land. Further, we questioned whether these changes imply an overall change of propensity in investment in housing. Our examination pointed out that the close links of the residential sector to a family-based economy make the former to hold a substantial position, at least from a micro-economic point of view. Owner-occupation in land and housing is both an investment strategy and a source of income (formal and informal) for a peculiar "enterprise", the family. The specific features of the development process through *antiparohi* and small housing in the urban periphery (with unauthorised building holding the chief position) were seen as substantial elements in the reproduction and expansion of this peculiar "enterprise". The resultant forms of housing provision were largely interrelated to the structure of land and hence the nature of interest in land and its development capacity.

A national account of what urban policy consists of was considered necessary (chapter 3). At first, we analysed the actual policy practice as this was consolidated over the years. We pointed out a **dualism**: On the one hand, policies related to land development and planning were in essence of a negative character emphasising the

"development control" side. On the other hand, beyond this framework a variety of legal provisions of highly "protective" character was accumulated over the years with a main purpose to legitimise existing trends. This state protectionism concerned especially the property rights of occupants of public land and the conversion of agricultural land to residential use.

Thus, in an entire legislative package of national and local validity we meet a number of allowances such as: direct liquidation of public land to its occupants; authorisation of fragmentation of agricultural land; authorisation of illegal building and official release for development of already built-up residential land; and continuous "plot arrangements", so that the rights of small properties to be affected by planning regulation as less as possible. As a result, a situation of *polynomy* has been created leading to a complete lack of institutional rules in planning, a problem as old as state land policy (see section 2.1.1). Within this context the so-called legitimisation policy eventually became a given fact; political considerations merely affect the timing of the enactment of these legitimisation policies.

Upon these grounds, we examined thoroughly the urban policy reforms introduced during the period 1974-89. We split this period into two sub-periods, 1974-81 under the administration of the New Democracy Party, and 1981-89, under the administration of PASOK. A continuity in policy contradictions and setbacks, irrespective of the two apparently different administrations thus emerged.

Urban policy and planning, initiated by the 1974-81 New Democracy governments, were restricted to a number of legislative changes and a general political rhetoric that hardly affected the residential development process. Above all, they proved to be inadequate to form new patterns of state intervention in land allocation despite the fact that this seems to have been the underlying intention of these legislative reforms. This period also saw another important trend emerging as particularly influential in policy making: policy reforms were widely disputed by the then "dominant" public opinion (the professionals or other national and local authorities and the opposition parties) as aiming to secure the interests of large capital into the residential sector. A generation of professionals was educated with such invalid assumptions.

The 1979 Planning Act, the most important piece of legislation on urban planning since the 1923 Town Planning Act, was in practice withdrawn in an effort to minimise its political implications. The Act threatened to affect large social groups

with strong interests in small land holding. Therefore, the "unknown" impact of a comprehensive planning framework was quickly replaced by the "well-trying" regulatory practice.

PASOK's government initiated not only a new Planning Act but also a nation-wide programme for urban restructuring. At that time, **a widespread consensus was the much-promising ground for policy implementation.** The 1983 Planning Act was principally a statutory framework to sort out problems of non-authorised development in the outskirts of the urban centres, as well as in resort areas. Similar were the initial objectives of EPA, the programme that was apparently launched in order to sort out these problems. However, the programme that was to cope with emergent problems gradually incorporated an entire land-use planning framework. This framework was never practically implemented.

During the first half of the 1980s, an institutional reform was considered something of a "*panacea*" to problems of policy formation and implementation. Ironically enough, the more EPA extended to cover all planning needs and their statutory base, the less effective was in planning implementation. By the end of the 1980s, EPA was transformed to a statutory procedure for land release for development. Land release, a so much debated issue, ended up to a perpetual uncritical practice of the Greek planning.

There followed an account of land policy, residential land development and urban planning in Greater Thessaloniki so as to elucidate a number of aspects within the context of a city's development. We analysed in detail the features of land policy implemented in Greater Thessaloniki during the inter-war years (chapter 4). Our investigation highlighted an issue, which was totally overlooked by urban analysis and policy-makers in Greece: the largest part of contemporary landed property of the second largest urban centre in Greece had been formed a little before its rapid growth from property administered by the state itself. Map 4.3 provides a clear picture of this very fact.

The Programme of Urban Refugee Rehabilitation consolidated a situation of an extremely fragmented urban land, which was later to become the basis for the expansion of the *antiparohi* sector in all urban area (inside-the-plan) of Greater Thessaloniki. The study of the Rural Rehabilitation Programme in the immediate rural periphery (which became the place for location of the immigrants after 1950) showed that state protectionism was so significant that all this zone was officially

treated merely as a rural area, during all the time of its conversion to an urban area and even after that. It was also revealed that to a large extent, the nature of this policy and the process of its implementation were crucial elements, which affected **the interdependence between the state and the newly created interest groups in land**. In this new set of relations two aspects were of great importance: a) the incorporation of small landownership into a complex and contradictory land law and its parallel dependence upon an equally complex system of allowances in which political factors played a crucial role; b) the interdependence between land policy, whatever the forms this might have taken in later years, and private land market.

A further speculation focused upon two interrelated aspects: the patterns of land fragmentation and their impact upon the structure of land supply in the urban periphery; and the nature of the development process within a context of an extremely fragmented landed property (chapter 5). In a case study we investigated in detail the structure of landed property in the urban periphery and its changes throughout the period 1930-89. Our analysis substantiated one of the main arguments set from the introduction of our thesis: urban sprawl was not a purely market-related process, with the state merely supporting illegal building as a mean to cover the housing needs of the immigrants, as often argued (section 1.3.2); **the structure of landed property, and the way control over land was subsumed, played a crucial part in transforming land to an unrestrictedly supplied good**. Changes did occur in this pattern, approximately after 1970, but with very slow rates and in such a way that wide access to peripheral urban land to become a persistent feature of land market until more recent years.

The same case study gave plenty of empirical material on what we called "lack of distinction between public and private land" (section 2.1.1). Land appropriation was not a phenomenon of a specific period related to the housing needs of the urban migrants but rather one related to the structure of public landed property and furthermore to state land policy. Our investigation showed how easily public land was transferred to private ownership not only as a rural policy but also as a residential policy. Public policy underestimated the need for public land and hence the need for space of public and community facilities, an attitude that was applied even in the case of appropriated public land, which officially was eventually transferred to private ownership.

Next, we investigated the other side of the development process, the structure of housing supply and the role of the developing industry (section 5.4). We tried to



establish how the development process is affected by the specific patterns of land supply. An analysis of the operation of *antiparohi*, the only system of speculative housing, showed the linkages between the structure of the developing industry and the structure of land. It seems that, for the small plot to be developed, a small and flexibly organised developing industry was needed - not necessarily dependent upon the construction sector. This finding answered certain issues that drew our attention in chapter 2 (section 2.3.1), such as why the crisis in the housing sector has not lead to a reorganisation of the construction sector.

Finally, we evidenced the weaknesses in policy implementation, as well as the politico-ideological character of many policies in the examination of urban planning in GT (chapter 6). Our brief historical analysis showed that many of the problems discussed in the period 1974-89 were not new but had been foreseen long time ago. However, it also made clear that non-implementation, or to be precise partial implementation of plans, is a problem as old as the plans themselves. Even in the case of Hebrard's Plan and its redevelopment project the major issue that arose was its proposals on the forms and the structure of landed property. The actual planning practice that was consolidated over the years is diminished to a kind of a micro-planning in which the single plot is the unit of statutory interest.

Post-war planning policy and debate was largely stuck around the issue of "enactment" of a Regulatory Plan. Our analysis of the period 1975-81 showed that the attempts to form a strategic planning and to sort out some of the major urban problems of the city were embedded into slow bureaucratic procedures, adorned with strong ideological elements. There, the need for a metropolitan management of urban problems arose as a central issue of local planning. At the same time issues of prime concern, such as the sprawl or containment of the city were left aside from the apparent controversy between various local agents.

The enactment of the 1985 RSTH, and especially the establishment of a Planning Organisation for its implementation, summarised in the best possible way how the need for strategic planning was entangled with statism and its peculiar forms. In this state of affairs *ad-hoc* created bodies are accounted to the actions of central administration and its political priorities (as rightly argued by Petmezidou, M. & Tsoulouvis, L., 1990). At the same time, such quasi-governmental structures have created the base for the development of sectoral or the emergence of existing local vested interests. The analysis of ZOE showed that, in the case of larger schemes, planning eventually becomes a bargaining-procedure between certain interest

groups and the local bureaucracies. Many of the "planning debates" stem from interdepartmental disputes that have as a point of departure these bargaining procedures. Within this context, EPA operated to a large extent as a programme for sorting out planning imbalances in particular with the west zone, and as a base for land release in surrounding communities that will facilitate the lack in land with an official development capacity.

As a final conclusion, we assert that the reform attempted in 1974-89 was a politico-institutional proposal which did not affect existing interests in land, its use or development. On the contrary, part of this reform was mediated in such a way that allowed for the expansion of the residential land and a wide access of individuals - in the form of developers and buyers - to the residential sector. Interests in land were facilitated by state political practices incorporated in a peculiar land policy whose point of departure lies in older periods and circumstances that had very little to do with contemporary forms of urban development. Further, crucial inputs to residential development, such as the high plot-ratios, largely a result of public policy were left unaffected both by the official policy and its critics<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand the traditional slow rates of land release for development were replaced by a tendency for a perpetual release without any mechanism for the evaluation and control of its implementation.

### 7.3. Future research questions

The 1980s saw a remarkable progress in the study of land development and policy. The most notable advance was an inclination of the relevant analysis to encompass the significant contributions and insights of different theories and disciplines. As a result, many gaps in our understanding of complex phenomena, such as those related to land development, are being gradually filled. However, there is still plenty of work to be done in order to widen this understanding and link the traditional distinctions between theory and practice, a problem of prime concern for planning.

A number of omissions related to the general theory and Greek urban analysis has already been pointed out (section 1.3). Along with the need of more empirical studies, which give us the opportunity to identify the specific features of a process, there is a need for comparative analysis in order to explore the differences and similarities of apparently common processes. A broader comparative approach will

not only "fill in" many gaps in the actual knowledge of specific trends but also will provide a coherent base for generalisation and abstraction<sup>2</sup>. Thus, we need to look to groups of cities or places. Empirical research should go beyond the general statistics and explore thoroughly a number of neglected aspects in comparative analysis such as, changes in the structure of property relations and their impact upon urban development and structure of specific places.

Beyond this general point, three interrelated topics are singled out as particularly important for the study of land development and urban policy: **land policy, the analysis of the development process and policy implementation.**

**1. Land policy.** As a unique field of study, land policy can offer an understanding of various and diverse aspects of state involvement in land, its use and development, and the way this involvement is incorporated into individual strategies. The study of land policy must combine two issues: the specific land policy instruments, which incorporate the role of state intervention in land development, with land-use planning as a public policy that moderates the development process. The continuity of urban and rural land, and the forms it takes, must be especially appreciated in the identification of contemporary features of urban and regional development. These features should be linked to the structure of landed property, its specific forms and its legal status. The study of land development phenomena should delve deeply into the questions of "who owns" and "who manages" landed capital and assess their consequences upon actual outcomes, such as land values.

On the other hand, research on land-use planning as a statutory mechanism, a policy that promotes development or, finally, an instrument that moderates land development effects, must be associated with issues of land supply, structure of ownership, changes in the property market, and, above all, the ultimate behaviour of the individual consumer or investor. The impacts of land policy upon other sectors, such as office and industrial development, should also be given a special attention. In the Greek case, in particular, this is an entirely unexplored research area. Our fieldwork in Thessaloniki implied that there is plenty of material for such a research in the non-residential sector. Furthermore, we need to connect more closely the findings of land development studies with those of sociological research. A "bottom-up" approach is necessary, especially in the Greek case, so as to assess how processes related to land development, such as access to land and housing, affect and differentiate social structures.

**2. Analysis of the development process.** Although planning is about development (either its promotion or its control), very little was related to the understanding of the development process itself. This speculation holds in particular for the Greek case. On the other hand, the study of this process has suffered either from an excessive abstraction that inevitably leads to non-plausible generalisations or from an empiricism of rather little use and general validity. The forces at work must be identified at specific local or sectoral instances with the purpose of enriching the analytical tools available. These tools should refer to the structural level, as well as to the various circumstances in which the development process operates.

Thus, we need more plausible answers to questions such as, what does this process consists of, at various instances in time; how real-estate property is converted to capital and, in turn, to real-estate property; what does investment in land and built-up property consist of; to what extent and in what respect can we separate investment from consumption in the development process; how is the developing industry organised and what are the components to its restructuring; and finally, which is the position of the individual household, in this process. A profound consideration of political and institutional aspects and their impact upon the development process will further contribute in understanding this complex phenomenon. The impacts of contemporary land structure upon inner-city redevelopment is a major research and policy question, especially, in the development of the Greek cities. We must inquire how this redevelopment will occur given that control over very small pieces of land is subsumed by a very large number of parties and notably with different interests (such as the owners of commercial property and the homeowners). The question "what comes after *antiparohi* for the redevelopment of degrading areas in the inner-cities" is a major challenge for Greek urban analysis and policy.

**3. Policy implementation.** The studies of policy implementation are largely case-specific. This issue is partly due to the nature of implementation, in other words, the fact that implementation refers to the final outcome of a policy, a plan or a decision. Implementation was, and still is, one of the major questions in planning. Irrespective of the content of planning or the "explanations" provided for its understanding as a social practice, planning is very much about implementing a group of actions in order to achieve a number of objectives. Planning is an activity encompassed by various authorities to achieve their goals, irrespective of the fact that these goals may incorporate political and ideological aspects.

Therefore, the question, what does plan implementation consists of and how is it achieved, remains wide-open. Its answer should be attempted in association with the actual processes a plan is dealing with. Here, research should be wide-open into exploring non-planning influences, such as the role of politics and ideology. Greek analysis needs to investigate further the aspects of politics and ideology, not only in respect of the role of the state but also to the role of specific corporate groups as well as local government. Local politics and corporate politics are two very little investigated areas as far as their influence in land development and hence policy implementation is concerned.

#### **7.4. Future policy considerations: an epilogue**

In a way, our research has implied that future prospects in the field of land development and planning do not look so bright. Nevertheless, if the peculiarities of the residential development process, along with a politico-institutional weakness in implementing public policy, have inhibited a wider planning reform, this does not imply that the need for such a reform should be ultimately rejected. Planning is an activity that can secure collective interests upon urban development. It is precisely these collective interests that have emerged as central problems in the development of the Greek cities and regions.

Urban and environmental problems may have not affected directly a strategy of an individual household, such as that concerned with its housing needs, but have definitely affected the way our cities operate as economic and social entities. Hence, the planning problems have serious consequences on the capacity of our cities for future forms of development. The more urban problems persist and accumulate, the more planning, both at a strategic and at a local level - where actual development occurs - seems to be the only alternative policy in reversing these trends.

Furthermore, there are a number of problems related to the distributional effects of the residential development process. At present, the way the development process operates may appear convenient for covering the housing needs for a wide number of groups with close connections with the state and to traditional social structures, but still it leaves aside a number of groups with no such links. These groups can hardly find any alternative way to cover their needs even when their economic status is not problematic in absolute terms. Therefore, housing policy never ceased

to be important. The forms of such a policy can be investigated and discussed in the light of national and international experience.

At this point a brief assessment on current trends in urban policy is necessary. Perhaps EPA's major contribution was to bring the planning agenda in all "round tables" of local and national policy making. This trend has changed since the second-half of the 1980s and things are not that optimistic. Planning is once again identified with listings of large and small schemes, a policy that has dominated even the relevant public debate. EEC regional policy, which could play a supportive role, is used by local, regional and national authorities mainly as a framework of public-spending programmes of schemes with very little connection with each other. Political priorities remain still the prime allocation mechanism.

As far as residential land development is concerned, the current New Democracy government introduced a few, but important, changes. The first is a provision for what was called "private planning". According to this provision any area of more than 100 stremmas can be granted planning permission for its development, after an application of a developer of private or public interest. Permission is issued by a relevant ministerial decision<sup>3</sup>. This measure simply repeats, in a more distinct statutory base, a provision anticipated by the 1923 Planning Act and never practically abolished (section 6.1). Our opinion is that a discussion on private versus public planning is a problem of less significant than the need for planning. Besides, regulations and instruments are provided by public policy irrespective of who undertakes a development initiative<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, we believe that such a provision simply eases the procedures for land release; nevertheless there is little provided for the re-organisation of the development process. We need schemes and innovative actions that will reverse the forces at work and prove that revenue can be made in different ways than merely an uncritical land release, which may cause more problems.

A second policy worth mentioning was an attempt to liquidate public land through a scheme of land bonds<sup>5</sup>. This policy summarises in the best possible way how residential land development and planning come second to fiscal policies. Land bonds could be an alternative way of public housing policy, if properly implemented. However, this policy, so far only marginally successful, was introduced as a means to increase public revenue. An examination of previous policies on liquidation and furthermore protection of public land shows that public land - that one left - should be very careful managed and used primarily for

planning purpose. The long history of land policy in Greece does not seem to have offered yet the necessary lessons to contemporary policy making.

## 7.5. Notes for chapter 7

1. In 1990, in the last session of the Parliament before the 1990 election, K. Liaskas, then Minister of YPEHODE and President of the Technical Chamber, introduced a Bill for the reduction of plot-ratio. This was undoubtedly a sensational movement, knowing beforehand that this proposal would never be discussed.
2. Useful comments on comparative urban analysis are made by Pickvance, C.G. (1986).
3. Act 1880/90, article 29. Of course this provision presupposes that such a permission is granted when the proposed development is not against the relevant plans. In many small areas, in particular, such plans as ZOE or a GPS simply have not been prepared or approved. Implicitly, this measure abolishes a provision of the 1983 Planning Act according to which for any development to proceed, a ZOE should be designated.
4. The British experience of the 1980s shows that even within a policy of support for the market, many types of planning can be in action (Brindley, T. et.al, 1989).
5. So far land bonds were issued for two public estates in Attica. For a critique of the system of land bonds see, Lamprou, D. & Fragioudakis, L., 1990.



## APPENDIX A : DETAILS ON REFUGEE REHABILITATION

**Table A.1.** Number of refugees allocated in the different regions

<i>Region</i>	<i>Rural Rehabilitation</i>		<i>Urban Rehabilitation</i>		<i>Total Rehabilitation</i>	
	<i>no. of refugees</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>no. of refugees</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>no. of refugees</i>	<i>%</i>
Macedonia	446,094	77.07	192,159	29.88	638,253	52.24
Thrace	72,060	12.45	35,547	5.53	107,607	8.81
Epirus	4,460	0.77	3,719	0.58	8,179	0.67
Crete	18,938	3.27	14,962	2.33	33,900	2.77
Aegean Islands	3,696	0.64	52,917	8.23	56,613	4.63
Old Greece	33,576	5.80	343,721	53.45	377,297	30.88
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>578,824</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>643,025</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1,221,849</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: Agelis I., 1973, p. 31.

**Table A.2.** Rural Settlements and houses built by EAP

<i>Region</i>	<i>no. of settlements</i>	<i>houses built by EAP</i>	<i>houses left by Turks and Bulgarians</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>State houses</i>	<i>total</i>
Macedonia	1,047	32,598	37,923		3095	73,616
Thrace	574	12,641	21,012		1261	34,914
Epirus	24	968	76			1,044
Thessaly	37	1,309	563			1,872
Rest old Greece	43	5,147		12		5,159
Crete	213	1,781	3,114			4,895
Aegean Islands	16	820	820			1,640
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,954</b>	<b>55,264</b>	<b>63,508</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4356</b>	<b>123,140</b>

source: Kararas, N., 1973, p.38

**Table A.3.** Assets spent by EAP (until 1.1.1929), in sterlings

<i>Category od expenditure</i>	<i>sterlings</i>	<i>%</i>
Rural rehabilitation	10,388,988	77.53
Urban rehabilitation	2,422,962	18.08
General expenditure of the central administration	271,368	2.03
Expenditure in installations	25,439	0.19
Compensation of peasants	10,225	0.08
miscellaneous	281,018	2.10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,400,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: Kararas, N., 1973, p. 38.

**Table A.4.** Houses built by EAP for the needs of urban rehabilitation (until 1.1.1929)

<i>city or region</i>	<i>no. of houses</i>	<i>%</i>
Athens	12,230	51.80
Thessaloniki	1,054	4.46
Stereia Hellas	240	1.02
Peloponessos	1,023	4.33
Islands	886	3.75
Thessaly	1,655	7.01
Macedonia	1,442	6.11
Thrace	5,081	21.52
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23,611</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: Kararas, N., 1973, p. 39

**Table A.5.** Land used for the needs of Rural Rehabilitation in Macedonia

<i>Category</i>	<i>Area in Ha</i>	<i>%</i>
exchangeable property	438,810	77.95
expropriated private property	47,853	8.50
Public property	45,799	8.14
Church property (of the Athos Monasteries)	13,785	2.45
Municipal property or other	16,674	2.96
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>562,921</b>	<b>100.00</b>
cultivated land	367,696	65.32

source: Ancel, J., 1930, p. 118.

## APPENDIX B: BUILDING ACTIVITY IN GREECE AND IN GREATER THESSALONIKI

---

**Table B1.** Building activity in Greece 1961-89

Year	no. of <i>buildings</i>	volume	no. of <i>dwellings</i>
1961	26,012	13,339	45,243
1962	28,951	15,479	46,951
1963	30,642	17,416	52,360
1964	33,049	21,721	66,236
1965	37,414	24,738	79,385
1966	39,311	27,618	83,944
1967	56,646	26,603	81,939
1968	72,997	35,852	112,392
1969	70,207	43,318	130,538
1970	59,391	40,253	114,700
1971	64,033	45,098	124,924
1972	82,279	64,448	178,558
1973	93,483	72,129	188,105
1974	49,975	36,546	81,616
1975	58,269	46,134	82,301
1976	52,510	52,626	89,759
1977	56,732	65,333	110,469
1978	60,977	75,894	186,981
1979	65,498	78,744	189,195
1980	58,563	57,582	136,044
1981	56,327	48,825	108,174
1982	56,564	42,510	102,123
1983	62,024	50,225	113,944
1984	39,121	33,981	72,851
1985	45,369	41,247	88,477
1986	47,804	49,325	109,643
1987	45,242	47,450	108,432
1988	47,680	51,041	107,034
1989	53,418	56,971	117,329

source: 1. ESYE, Statistical Yearbooks 1961-87  
2. ESYE, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 1988-90

**Table B.2. Building Activity in GT, 1961-1989**

<i>Year</i>	<i>no. of buildings</i>	<i>volume</i>	<i>no. of floors</i>	<i>no. of dwellings</i>	<i>floors/ building</i>
1961	633	1,261			
1962	920	1,891			
1963	893	1,947		6,679	
1964	1,247	3,078		10,910	
1965	1,322	3,429	4,357	12,529	3.30
1966	1,412	3,920	4,352	11,475	3.08
1967	841	2,204	2,719	7,310	3.23
1968	1,095	2,997	3,920	10,594	3.58
1969	1,121	3,284	4,304	10,040	3.84
1970	1,252	3,545	4,804	10,792	3.84
1971	1,297	3,807	5,111	11,134	3.94
1972	1,579	4,939	6,546	14,150	4.15
1973	1,970	6,325	8,125	16,058	4.12
1974	855	2,374	2,689	4,845	3.15
1975	1,566	4,407	5,905	11,404	3.77
1976	1,305	4,194	5,340	10,354	4.09
1977	2,297	6,869	9,215	17,455	4.01
1978	987	3,067	3,851	6,950	3.90
1979	1,138	2,926	4,065	6,696	3.57
1980	1,584	3,494	5,234	8,623	3.30
1981	1,072	2,413	3,294	5,259	3.07
1982	900	1,745	2,671	4,202	2.97
1983	981	2,095	3,030	4,863	3.09
1984	910	1,864	2,836	4,288	3.12
1985	1,156	2,420	3,498	5,595	3.03
1986	1,672	3,585	5,419	8,551	3.24
1987	1,718	3,985	5,907	8,929	3.44
1988	1,464	3,126	5,067	7,372	3.46
1989	1,601	3,294	5,167	7,375	3.23

source: see, table B.1.

**Table B.3.** Housing tenure in six European Countries

<i>Type of tenure</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Ireland</i>	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Spain</i>
Households owning accommodation	42.2	64.7	76.1	55.0	72.0	70.2
Households renting accommodation	57.3	32.1	22.1	44.0	25.3	23
Households occupying accommodation free of charge	0.5	3.0	1.8	1.0	2.7	6.8

source: EUROSTAT, Family Budgets, Comparative Tables: Netherlands-Belgium-Ireland-Denmark-Greece-Spain, 1986, p.110.

**Table B.4.** Housing tenure in the different areas of Greece

<i>Housing tenure</i>	<i>Urban areas</i> ( > 10,000 inhabitants)	<i>Semi-urban areas</i> (2,000-10,000 inhabitants)	<i>Rural areas</i> ( < 2,000 inhabitants)	<i>Total</i>
Households owning accommodation	60.4	83.2	93.2	72.0
Households renting accommodation	36.7	14.3	4.3	25.3
Households occupying accommodation free of charge	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.8

source: see table B3, p. 137.

**Table B. 5.** Ways of acquiring the self-owned dwellings in GT (%)

<i>Year</i>	<i>purchase or self built (own savings and own savings with a loan)</i>	<i>inheritance or dowry</i>	<i>antiparohi of self-owned plot</i>	<i>public housing</i>	<i>total</i>
1979*	65.6	17.6	10.9	4.8	100.0
1989**	66.7	13.4	19.9	-	100.0

source: \* Tsoulouvis, L. (with Yiannakou, A. et.al.) 1981, p. 258

\*\* Velentzas, K. et. al., 1991

**Table B. 6.** The structure construction firms in Greater Thessaloniki

<i>Year</i>	<i>building contractors ( including hotel contractors)</i>	<i>building contractors &amp; general engineers</i>	<i>general engineers</i>	<i>total firms involved in developing</i>	<i>total construction firms</i>	<i>% developing firms of the total construction firms</i>
1977	7	1	3	11	27	40.74%
1984	6		4	10	29	34.48%
1989	4	2	5	11	41	26.83%

source: elaboration of data from ICAP 1977, 1984, 1989.

## APPENDIX C: THE PROGRESS OF EPA NATIONALLY AND IN GREATER THESSALONIKI

**Table C.1.** Number of buildings declared as unauthorised by the proceedings of the 1983 Planning Act

<i>County</i>	<i>Applications</i>	<i>County</i>	<i>Applications</i>
Dep. of Athens	3,531	Kilkis	545
Dep of East Attica	45,206	Kozani	1,197
Dep. of West Attica	16,990	Corinthus	3,149
Dep. of Piraeus	16,053	Cyklades	1,930
<b>TOTAL ATTICA</b>	<b>81,780</b>	Lakonia	613
Etoloakarnania	410	Larisa	5,315
Argolida	1,327	Lasethio	841
Arkadia	385	Lesbos	293
Arta	659	Lefkada	343
Achaia	3,650	Magnesia	3,433
Voiotia	2,458	Messinia	1,939
Grevena	71	Xanthi	588
Drama	273	Pella	1,142
Dodekanesos	915	Pieria	2,162
Evros	1,084	Preveza	314
Evoia	7,282	Rethymno	515
Evritania	133	Rodopi	815
Zakinthos	399	Samos	460
Helia	965	Serres	798
Emathia	1,178	Trikala	2,931
Heraklio	7,968	Pthiotida	1,593
Thesprotia	123	Phlorina	303
Thessaloniki	19,313	Phokida	522
Ioannina	1,351	Halkidiki	7,002
Kavala	1,744	Hania	3,021
Karditsa	648	Hios	263
Kastoria	515		
Corfu	1,574		
Keffalonia	232	<b>TOTAL GREECE</b>	<b>177,094</b>

source: *TEE-Enimerotiko Deltio*, 10-10-1983

**Table C.2.** Approved and under study GPS in 1990

<i>Regions and Counties</i>	<i>No. of Approved GPS</i>	<i>No. of GPS under study</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% of approved GPS</i>
<b>East Macedonia &amp; Thrace</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>62.1</b>
Evros	8	1	9	
Rodopi	3	2	5	
Xanthi	1	-	1	
Drama	2	6	8	
Kavala	4	2	6	
<b>Central Macedonia</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>76.1</b>
Serres	2	9	11	
Thessaloniki	33	4	37	
Halkidiki	7	5	12	
Kilkis	5	-	5	
Pella	7	1	8	
Imathia	8	1	9	
Pieria	5	1	6	
<b>West Macedonia</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>84.6</b>
Florina	2	-	2	
Kozani	5	2	7	
Kastoria	2	-	2	
Grevena	2	-	2	
<b>Epirus</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>53.3</b>
Ioannina	4	1	5	
Arta	2	-	2	
Thesprotia	1	4	5	
Preveza	1	2	3	
<b>Thessaly</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>69.4</b>
Larissa	8	7	15	
Magnesia	9	1	10	
Trikala	4	2	6	
Karditsa	4	1	5	
<b>Ionian Islands</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Corfu	2	-	2	
Lefkas	2	-	2	
Kefallenia	8	-	8	
Zakynthos	1	-	1	
<b>West Greece</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>70.7</b>
Etoloakarnania	9	11	20	
Ahaia	7	-	7	
Helia	13	1	14	
<b>Stereia Hellas</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>84.6</b>
Fthiotida	17	1	18	
Evrítania	1	-	1	
Fokida	3	2	5	
Viotia	9	5	14	
Evoia	14	-	14	



**Table C.2.** Approved and under study GPS in 1990 (cont.)

<i>Regions and Counties</i>	<i>No. of Approved GPS</i>	<i>No. of GPS under study</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% of approved GPS</i>
Attica	58	39	97	59.8
Peloponnesos	25	15	40	62.5
Corinthus	5	6	11	
Argolida	5	1	6	
Arkadia	7	2	9	
Messinia	2	6	8	
Lakonia	6	-	6	
Northern Aegean	14	2	16	87.5
Lesbos	7	2	9	
Chios	3	-	3	
Samos	4	-	4	
Southern Aegean	17	5	22	77.3
Cyklades	9	-	9	
Dodekanesos	8	5	13	
Crete	15	11	26	57.7
Chania	4	3	7	
Rethymno	1	1	2	
Heraclio	5	6	11	
Lasithi	5	1	6	
<b>TOTAL GREECE</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>70.5</b>

source: YPEHODE, Department of Urban Planning, from KEPE, 1991, p.p. 32-33.

**Table C.3.** Land released by EPA by 1990 (PME in settlements > 2,000 inhabitants, area in stremmas)

<i>Regions and Counties</i>	<i>Approved PME</i>	<i>Under study PME</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>East Macedonia &amp; Thrace</b>	16,465	3,385	19,850	5.02
Evros	7,200	140	7,340	1.86
Rodopi	860		860	0.22
Xanthi	280	120	400	0.10
Drama	860	1,585	2,445	0.62
Kavala	7,265	1,540	8,805	2.23
<b>Central Macedonia</b>	46,466	9,190	55,656	14.08
Serres		5,638	5,638	1.43
Thessaloniki	21,916	2,067	23,983	6.07
Halkidiki	1,290	995	2,285	0.58
Kilkis	4,690		4,690	1.19
Pella	3,440	140	3,580	0.91
Imathia	3,930		3,930	0.99
Pieria	11,200	350	11,550	2.92
<b>West Macedonia</b>	8,290	9,400	17,690	4.48
Florina	1,150	620	1,770	0.45
Kozani	4,535	2,950	7,485	1.89
Kastoria	2,605		2,605	0.66
Grevena		5,830	5,830	1.48
<b>Epirus</b>	9,870	6,075	15,945	4.04
Ioannina	8,450		8,450	2.14
Arta	370	920	1,290	0.33
Thesprotia		3,055	3,055	0.77
Preveza	1,050	2,100	3,150	0.80
<b>Thessaly</b>	23,070	9,895	32,965	8.34
Larissa	8,080	1,965	10,045	2.54
Magnesia	5,680	3,815	9,495	2.40
Trikala	6,110	3,215	9,325	2.36
Karditsa	3,200	900	4,100	1.04
				0.00
<b>Ionian Islands</b>	3,770	1,995	5,765	1.46
Corfu	965	910	1,875	0.47
Lefkas	1,500		1,500	0.38
Kefallenia	445	665	1,110	0.28
Zakynthos	860	420	1,280	0.32
<b>West Greece</b>	9,390	21,620	31,010	7.85
Etoloakarnania	1,600	2,905	4,505	1.14
Ahaia	6,020	8,680	14,700	3.72
Helia	1,770	10,035	11,805	2.99
<b>Stereia Hellas</b>	18,540	18,350	36,890	9.34
Fthiotida	6,380	4,515	10,895	2.76
Evritania	400		400	0.10
Fokida	800	770	1,570	0.40
Viotia		2,410	2,410	0.61
Evoia	10,960	10,655	21,615	5.47

**Table C.3.** Land released by EPA by 1990 (PME in settlements > 2,000 inhabitants, area in stremmas) (cont.)

<i>Regions and Counties</i>	<i>Approved</i>	<i>Under study</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>%</i>
	<i>PME</i>	<i>PME</i>		
Attica	34,782	42,541	77,323	19.57
Peloponnesos	13,760	18,480	32,240	8.16
Corinthus	1,630	5,915	7,545	1.91
Argolida	2,970	1,750	4,720	1.19
Arkadia		5,860	5,860	1.48
Messinia	4,480	3,415	7,895	2.00
Lakonia	4,680	1,540	6,220	1.57
Northern Aegean	1,265	19,875	21,140	5.35
Lesbos	1,265	8,190	9,455	2.39
Chios		8,915	8,915	2.26
Samos		2,770	2,770	0.70
Southern Aegean	3,310	12,155	15,465	3.91
Cyklades	1,570	5,810	7,380	1.87
Dodekanesos	1,740	6,345	8,085	2.05
Crete	12,680	20,525	33,205	8.40
Chania	3,040	6,375	9,415	2.38
Rethymno	1,160	1,645	2,805	0.71
Heraclio	6,300	11,030	17,330	4.39
Lasithi	2,180	1,475	3,655	0.92
<b>TOTAL GREECE</b>	<b>201,658</b>	<b>193,486</b>	<b>395,144</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: see, table C.3, p.p. 34-35

**Table C.4.** Area released in the Programme of Resort Residence, 1990, in stremmas

<i>County</i>	<i>Approved</i>	<i>Under Study</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>%</i>
Thessaloniki*		15,000	15,000	11.96
Halkidiki		19,200	19,200	15.31
Pieria*		8,500	8,500	6.78
Larisa		6,800	6,800	5.42
Corfu		1,200	1,200	0.96
Lefkas		850	850	0.68
Helia		1,100	1,100	0.88
Evoia		9,600	9,600	7.66
Attica	32,521	27,100	59,621	47.56
Korinthia		3,500	3,500	2.79
<b>TOTAL GREECE</b>	<b>32,521</b>	<b>92,850</b>	<b>125,371</b>	<b>100.00</b>

source: see, table C.3, p.p. 36-37

\* For the Counties of Thessaloniki and Pieria the data were taken from the Archives of the Region of Central Macedonia

Note: By the same year there were another 20 plans for which no estimate in area were provided.

**Table C.5.** Topographic Implementation Projects (PE), until 1990 (in stremmas)

<i>Regions and Counties</i>	<i>Approved PE</i>	<i>Under study PE</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% area of PE / area of PME</i>
<b>East Macedonia &amp; Thrace</b>	<b>1,043</b>	<b>13,327</b>	<b>14,370</b>	<b>6.33</b>
Evros		4,580	4,580	0.00
Rodopi	510	310	820	59.30
Xanthi		100	100	0.00
Dramma		1,635	1,635	0.00
Kavala	533	6,702	7,235	7.34
<b>Central Macedonia</b>	<b>3,112</b>	<b>42,711</b>	<b>45,823</b>	<b>6.70</b>
Serres		600	600	0.00
Thessaloniki	105	21,195	21,300	0.48
Halkidiki		1,763	1,763	0.00
Kilkis		4,550	4,550	0.00
Pella		3,260	3,260	0.00
Imathia	1,612	1,940	3,552	41.02
Pieria	1,395	9,403	10,798	12.46
<b>West Macedonia</b>	<b>860</b>	<b>8,276</b>	<b>9,136</b>	<b>10.37</b>
Florina	500	575	1,075	43.48
Kozani	360	5,036	5,396	7.94
Kastoria		2,665	2,665	0.00
Grevena		0	0	0.00
<b>Epirus</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>6,866</b>	<b>7,196</b>	<b>3.34</b>
Ioannina		5,999	5,999	0.00
Arta		120	120	0.00
Thesprotia		0	0	0.00
Preveza	330	747	1,077	31.43
<b>Thessaly</b>	<b>2460</b>	<b>16,614</b>	<b>19,074</b>	<b>10.66</b>
Larissa		8,176	8,176	0.00
Magnesia	700	3,438	4,138	12.32
Trikala	320	3,550	3,870	5.24
Karditsa	1440	1,450	2,890	45.00
<b>Ionian Islands</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>6,090</b>	<b>6,535</b>	<b>11.80</b>
Corfu		900	900	0.00
Lefkas		3,000	3,000	0.00
Kefallenia	445		445	100.00
Zakynthos		2,190	2,190	0.00
<b>West Greece</b>	<b>1962</b>	<b>8,690</b>	<b>10,652</b>	<b>20.89</b>
Etoloakarnania		1,600	1,600	0.00
Ahaia	1962	3,610	5,572	32.59
Helia		3,480	3,480	0.00
<b>Stereia Hellas</b>	<b>368</b>	<b>12,993</b>	<b>13,361</b>	<b>1.98</b>
Fthiotida	368	4,968	5,336	5.77
Evritania		370	370	0.00
Fokida		600	600	0.00
Viotia		1,015	1,015	0.00
Evoia		6,040	6,040	0.00

**Table C.5.** Topographic Implementation Projects (PE), until 1990 (in stremmas)  
(cont.)

<i>Regions and Counties</i>	<i>Approved PE</i>	<i>Under study PE</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% area of PE / area of PME</i>
Attica	8756	49,472	58,228	25.17
Peloponnesos	300	16,195	16,495	2.18
Corinthus		2,200	2,200	0.00
Argolida	300	2,110	2,410	10.10
Arkadia		625	625	
Messinia		7,000	7,000	0.00
Lakonia		4,260	4,260	0.00
Northern Aegean				0.00
Lesbos				0.00
Chios				0.00
Samos				0.00
Southern Aegean		1,740	1,740	0.00
Cyklades				0.00
Dodekanesos		1,740	1,740	0.00
Crete	450	17,400	17,850	3.55
Chania		4,030	4,030	0.00
Rethymno		2,240	2,240	0.00
Heraclio	450	5,650	6,100	7.14
Lasithi		5,480	5,480	0.00
<b>TOTAL GREECE</b>	<b>20086</b>	<b>200,374</b>	<b>220,460</b>	<b>9.96</b>

source: KEPE, 1991, p. 38-39.

**Table C.6.** Densely built-up area outside the plan before EPA per Municipality of GT (in stremmas)

<i>Municipality / Community</i>	<i>Planned area before EPA</i>	<i>densely built- up outside the plan</i>	<i>total built-up area</i>	<i>% densely built- up outside the plan</i>
Thessaloniki	14,548	110	14,658	0.75%
Agios Pavlos	254	7	261	2.50%
Ampelokepoi	1,620	0	1,620	0.00%
Eleftherio-Kordelio	880	459	1,339	34.27%
Efkarpia	265	68	333	20.38%
Evosmos	4,360	0	4,360	0.00%
Kalamaria	4,950	0	4,950	0.00%
Menemeni	630	408	1,038	39.33%
Neapoli	1,150	0	1,150	0.00%
Panorama	3,850	0	3,850	0.00%
Polichni	1,428	1,119	2,547	43.92%
Pylaia	1,491	181	1,672	10.80%
Stavroupoli	1,753	665	2,418	27.50%
Sykies	2,349	37	2,386	1.53%
Triandria	345	0	345	0.00%
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>39,873</b>	<b>3,053</b>	<b>42,926</b>	<b>7.11%</b>

source: elaboration of data from unpublished Records of the Planning Department of Theesaloniki

**Table C.7.** Planned area before and after EPA in GT (in stremmas)

<i>Municipality / Community</i>	<i>Planned area before EPA</i>	<i>EPA Urban Plans</i>	<i>Total Planned Area</i>	<i>% planned area before EPA</i>	<i>% EPA Urban Plans</i>
Thessaloniki	14,548	1,203	15,751	92.36%	7.64%
Agios Pavlos	254	15	269	94.42%	5.58%
Ampelokepoi	1,620	0	1,620	100.00%	0.00%
Eleftherio-Kordelio	880	867	1,747	50.37%	49.63%
Efkarpia	265	1,200	1,465	18.09%	81.91%
Evosmos	4,360	1,810	6,170	70.66%	29.34%
Kalamaria	4,950	1,350	6,300	78.57%	21.43%
Menemeni	630	529	1,159	54.36%	45.64%
Neapoli	1,150	0	1,150	100.00%	0.00%
Panorama	3,850	195	4,045	95.18%	4.82%
Polichni	1,428	2,110	3,538	40.36%	59.64%
Pylaia	1,491	1,594	3,085	48.33%	51.67%
Stavroupoli	1,753	1,512	3,265	53.69%	46.31%
Sykies	2,349	2,284	4,633	50.70%	49.30%
Triandria	345	81	426	80.99%	19.01%
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>39,873</b>	<b>14,750</b>	<b>54,623</b>	<b>73.00%</b>	<b>27.00%</b>

source: see table, C.4.

**Table C.8.** Illegal buildings inside and outside the plan as declared by the proceedings of the 1983 Planning Act

<i>Municipality / Community</i>	<i>buildings inside the plan</i>	<i>buildings outside the plan</i>	<i>total</i>	<i>% inside the plan</i>	<i>% outside the plan</i>
Thessaloniki	1,002	325	1,327	75.51%	24.49%
Agios Pavlos	43	20	63	68.25%	31.75%
Ampelokepoi	108		108	100.00%	0.00%
Eleftherio-Kordelio	278	450	728	38.19%	61.81%
Efkarpia	33	229	262	12.60%	87.40%
Evosmos	1,576	197	1,773	88.89%	11.11%
Kalamaria	208	116	324	64.20%	35.80%
Menemeni	37	522	559	6.62%	93.38%
Neapoli	141		141	100.00%	0.00%
Panorama	221	26	247	89.47%	10.53%
Polichni	783	1,517	2,300	34.04%	65.96%
Pylaia	55	242	297	18.52%	81.48%
Stavroupoli	561	1,277	1,838	30.52%	69.48%
Sykies	379	207	586	64.68%	35.32%
Triandria	63	77	140	45.00%	55.00%
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>5,488</b>	<b>5,205</b>	<b>10,693</b>	<b>51.32%</b>	<b>48.68%</b>

source: see, table C.4.

## APPENDIX D: POPULATION TRENDS OF GREATER THESSALONIKI, 1920-1991

**Table D.1. Population in 1920 and 1928**

<i>Municipality / Community</i>	<i>1920</i>	<i>1928</i>
Thessaloniki	174,390	241,344
Agios Pavlos		957
Ampelokipoi		4,369
Neapoli		9,750
Menemeni		1,196
Kordelio		3,092
Efkarpia		591
Risio (part of Kalamaria)		3,400
Pylaia	3,637	3,258
Stavroupoli		2,255
Sykies		3,830
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>178,027</b>	<b>275,970</b>

source: ESYE, Population Censuses, 1940-91

**Table D.2. Population change of GT 1940-91 per Municipality / Community**

<i>Municipality / Community</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1951</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1991</i>
Thessaloniki	226,147	217,049	250,920	345,799	406,413	368,332
Agios Pavlos	3,993	4,707	5,650	6,370	7,169	7,180
Ampelokipoi	8,876	10,806	15,619	24,892	40,033	39,041
Eleftherio- Kordelio		1,093	4,430	9,159	12,595	16,196
Evosmos	3,029	2,913	7,713	22,390	26,528	28,530
Kalamaria		20,260	25,165	36,978	51,676	79,668
Menemeni	2,571	3,615	5,570	8,352	12,141	12,741
Neapoli	13,025	14,825	17,586	21,903	31,464	29,702
Polichni	708	2,105	6,590	19,382	22,597	27,468
Pylaia	3,972	4,640	5,971	7,793	12,015	19,596
Stavroupoli	4,046	5,273	11,695	21,595	32,225	37,348
Sykies	7,595	10,388	17,089	24,473	33,789	35,540
Triandria	2,850	3,210	4,446	4,569	10,637	11,478
Efkarpia	798	920	1,162	2,124	2,705	3,472
Panorama	789	831	1,042	1,581	4,193	10,487
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>276,812</b>	<b>300,884</b>	<b>378,444</b>	<b>553,655</b>	<b>699,282</b>	<b>726,779</b>

source: ESYE, Population Censuses, 1940-91



**Table D.3. Population change 1940-91 (%)**

<i>Municipality /</i>	<i>1940-51</i>	<i>1951-61</i>	<i>1961-71</i>	<i>1971-81</i>	<i>1981-91</i>
<i>Community</i>					
Thessaloniki	-4.02	15.61	37.81	17.53	-9.37
Agios Pavlos	17.88	20.03	12.74	12.54	0.15
Ampelokipoi	21.74	44.54	59.37	60.83	-2.48
Eleftherio- Kordelio		305.31	106.75	37.52	28.59
Evosmos	-3.83	164.78	190.29	18.48	7.55
Kalamaria		24.21	46.94	39.75	54.17
Menemeni	40.61	54.08	49.95	45.37	4.94
Neapoli	13.82	18.62	24.55	43.65	-5.60
Polichni	197.32	213.06	194.11	16.59	21.56
Pylaia	16.82	28.69	30.51	54.18	63.10
Stavroupoli	30.33	121.79	84.65	49.22	15.90
Sykies	36.77	64.51	43.21	38.07	5.18
Triandria	12.63	38.50	2.77	132.81	7.91
Efkarpia	15.29	26.30	82.79	27.35	28.35
Panorama	5.32	25.39	51.73	165.21	150.11
<b>TOTAL GT</b>	<b>8.70</b>	<b>25.78</b>	<b>46.30</b>	<b>26.30</b>	<b>3.93</b>

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

- Agelis, I., (1973), "Refugee rehabilitation in Greece in 1922", *Oikonomikos Taxydromos*, 26-4-1973, p.p. 29-35, (in Greek).
- Alexander, E.R. & Faludi, A., (1989), "Planning and plan implementation: notes on evaluation criteria", *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, Vol.16, p.p. 127-140.
- Alivizatos, N., (1980), "Democratisation today: contemporary aspects to an old demand", *Synchrone Themata*, No. 8, p.p. 71-80, (in Greek).
- Alivizatos, N., (1983), "State power and political institutions", *Synchrone Themata*, No.16, p.p. 17-39, (in Greek).
- American Farm School, (1975), *Land Development Programme*, Thessaloniki.
- Ancel, J., (1930), *La Macedoine son Evolution Contemporaine*, Librairie Delagrave, Paris.
- Andrikopoulou-Kafkala, E., Kafkalas, G., Lagopoulos, A.F., (1979), *Thessaloniki, Paratiritis*, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Antonopoulou, S., (1991), *The Post-War Transition of the Greek Economy and the Housing Phenomenon 1950-80*, Papazisis, Athens, (in Greek).
- Apostolopoulos, N., (1938), "How the Ministry of Transport dealt with the problem of landed property in the redevelopment of the burnt part of Edessa", *Technika Chronika*, No.17, p.p. 73-81, (in Greek).
- Association of Rural and Surveying Engineers of Northern Greece, (1985), *Thessaloniki in Maps*, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Balchin, P.N. & Kieve J.L., (1983), *Urban Land Economics*, Macmillan Press, London.
- Ball, M., (1977), "Differential rent and the role of landed property", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 1, No. 3, p.p. 380-403.
- (1979), "A critique of Urban Economics", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 3, No. 3, p.p. 309-330.
- (1983), *Housing Policy and Economic Power*, Methuen, London.
- Ball, M., Bentivegna, V., Edwards, M., Folin, M. (eds.), (1985), *Land Rent, Housing and Urban Planning*, Croom Helm, London.
- Barrett, S. & Fudge, C. (eds.), (1981), *Policy and Action*, Methuen, London.

- Barrett, S. & Healey, P., (eds), (1985), *Land Policy: Problems and Alternatives*, Gower, Aldershot.
- Basset, K. & Short, J., (1980), *Housing and Residential Structure*, Routledge & Keagan Paul, London.
- Berhofer, F. & Elliot, B., (1981), "Petty Property: the survival of a moral economy", in Berhofer, F. & Elliot, B., (eds.), *The Petite Bourgeoisie: Comparative Studies of an uneasy stratum*, Macmillan Press, London, p.p. 182-200.
- Brindley, T. & Rydin, Y.J., Stoker, G., (1989), *Remaking Planning*, Unwin Hyman, London.
- Bryant, C.R., (1986), "Agriculture and urban development", in Pacione, M. (ed.), *Progress in Agricultural Geography*, Croom Helm, London.
- Calavita, N., (1983), "Urban planning, the state and political regimes: the Italian case", *Society and Space*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p.p. 377-395.
- Cawson, A. & Saunders, P., (1983), "Corporatism, competitive politics and class struggle", in King, R., (ed.), *Capital and Politics*, Routledge & Keagan Paul, London, p.p. 1-27.
- Chadwick, G.F., (1971), *A System's View of Planning*, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
- Chisholm, M., (1979), *Rural Settlement and Land-Use: An Essay in Location* (3d edition), Hutchinson, London.
- Christophilopoulos, D., (1983), *The Town Plan after the New Planning Act 1337/1983*, Sakoulas, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1991), "Transfer of plot-ratio: the great harassment of an institution", *TEE-Enimerotiko Deltio*, 18-5-1991, p.p. 52-58, (in Greek).
- Cooke, Ph., (1983), *Theories of Planning and Spatial Development*, Hutchinson, London.
- Darin-Drabkin, H., (1977), *Land Policy and Urban Growth*, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
- Davidoff, P. & Reiner, T.A., (1962), "A choice theory of planning", *Journal of American Studies*, Vol.28, p.p. 103-115.
- Dertilis, G., (1977), *Social Transformation and Military Intervention 1880-1909* (2nd edition), Exantas, Athens, (in Greek).
- Dimitrakopoulos, A., (1937), "The crisis of building activity in Athens", *Technika Chronika*, Vol.12, (in Greek), p.p. 1076-1082.
- Dimitriadis, V., (1983), *A Topography of Thessaloniki under Turks (1430-1912)*, Eteria Makedonikon Spoudon, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Dobb, M., et.al., (1982), *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*, Themelio, Athens, (in Greek).
- Dunleavy, P., (1980a), *Urban Political Analysis*, Macmillan Press, London.

- (1980b), "The political implications of sectoral cleavages and the growth of state employment I & II", *Political Studies*, Vol.27, p.p. 364-383 & 527-549.
- Edwards, M. & Lovatt, D., (1980), *Understanding Land Values: a Review* (Research Report), Social Science Research Council, London.
- Elliot, B. & McCrone, D., (1982), *The City*, Macmillan Press, London.
- Ellis, H., (1965), *Industrial Capital in the Development of the Greek Economy*, KEPE, Athens, (in Greek).
- Emmanuel, D., (1979), "Housing investment in a context of an even social and economic development", in TEE, *Construction in Greece* (Conference Proceedings, vol.2), TEE, Athens, p.p. 84-99, (in Greek).
- (1981), *The Growth of Speculative Building in Greece*, Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- (1987), *Building Activity in Greece: Determinants and a Model of Predictions*, Greek Industrial Development Bank, Athens (mimeo), (in Greek).
- (1990), "Trends in housing markets and finance and subsidy systems in the 1980s: the case of Greece", *Urban Studies*, Vol.27, No. 6, p.p. 931-949.
- (1991), "The charm of land", *Vema*, 5-5-1991, (in Greek).
- Emmanuel, D., Romanos, A., Sieti-Diveri, T., (1976), "The housing problem and KEPOS", *Avgi*, 30-3 & 31-3 1976, (in Greek).
- Environmental Design Company, (1979), *Thessaloniki 2000: Proposals for the Regulation of the Wider Urban Area*, Athens, (in Greek).
- Evans, A.W., (1973), *The Economics of Residential Location*, Macmillan Press, London.
- (1985), *Urban Economics: An Introduction*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Faludi, A. (ed.), (1973), *A Reader in Planning Theory*, Pergamon Press, London.
- Folin, M., (1985), "Housing development processes in Europe, some hypotheses for comparative analysis", in Ball, M., et. al. (eds.), *Land Rent, Housing and Urban Planning*, Croom Helm, London, p.p. 46-70.
- Friedland, R., FoxPiven, F., Alford, R.R., (1977), "Political conflict, urban structure and fiscal crisis", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 1, No. 3, p.p. 447-471.
- Gartzos, K., (1990), "Trends in land policy and illegal building", *TEE-Enimerotiko Deltio*, 18-6-1990, p.p. 66-69, (in Greek).
- Gerolympos, A., (1985), *Planning and Reconstruction of Thessaloniki after the Fire of 1917*, Ph.D. Thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- (1986), "The reconstruction of Thessaloniki after 1917: specificities and implications of a planning instrument", in History Centre of Thessaloniki,

- Thessaloniki after 1912*, Municipality of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, p.p. 497-517, (in Greek).
- Gerolympos, A. & Papamichos N., (1986), "Space regulation 1914-1920", in University of Crete, *Conference Proceedings: Eleftherios Venizelos and Modernisation*, University of Crete, Heraclio, (in Greek).
- Gerolympos, A., Kalogirou, N., Hatzimichalis, C., (1988), *Northern Greek Settlements before and after the Liberation: Transitions of the Urban and Regional Space* (Research Report vols. 1 & 2), Ministry of Industry, Research and Technology, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Giannakouros, P.E., (1985), *Agricultural Legislation (including Provisions of Refugee Legislation)*, Athens, (in Greek).
- Giddens, A., (1979), *Central Problems in Social Theory*, Macmillan Press, London.
- (1984), *The Constitution of Society*, Polity, London.
- Gizeli, V., (1984), *Social Transformation and the origins of Public Housing in Greece (1920-1930)*, Epikerotita, Athens, (in Greek).
- Gousidis, D., (1973), "Urban structure of Thessaloniki", *Oikonomikos Tahydromos* 26-4-1973, p.p. 90-91, (in Greek).
- Grammatikopoulos, V., (1948), "Comprehensive plot reallocation", *Technika Chronika*, Vol.28, (in Greek).
- Gratsias, N., (1979), "Building construction and construction firms in Greece, implication form the country's entrance in the EEC", in *Technika Chronika*, Greek Construction and the Greek Engineers (Conference Proceedings), vol. 9-12, p.p. 83-95.
- Gregory, D., (1978), *Ideology, Science and Human Geography*, Hutchinson, London.
- Gregory, D. & Urry, J. (eds.), (1985), *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, Macmillan Press, London.
- Hall, P., (1975), *Urban and Regional Planning*, Penguin, London.
- Hallet, G., (1979), *Urban Land Economics: Principles and Policy*, Macmillan Press, London.
- (ed.), (1988), *Land and Housing Policy in Europe and the USA*, Routledge, London.
- Harrison, A., (1977), *The Economics of Land-Use Planning*, Croom Helm, London.
- Harvey, D., (1982), *The Limits to Capital*, Basil Blackwel, Oxford.
- (1985), *The Urbanisation of Capital*, Basil Blackwel, Oxford.
- Hastaoglou, V. & Gerolympos, A., (1986), "Thessaloniki 1900-1940: from the contradictions of cosmopolitanism to the homogeneity of a neohellenic city", in

- History Centre of Thessaloniki, *Thessaloniki after 1912*, Municipality of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, p.p. 449-473.
- Hastaoglou, V., Hatzimichalis, C., Kalogirou, N., Papamichos, N., (1987), "Urbanisation crisis and urban policy in Greece", *Antipode*, Vol.19, No. 2, p.p. 154-177.
- Hatzimichalis, C., (1983), "Nine comments on the operation of YHOP", *Avgi* 30-1-1983, (in Greek).
- Healey, P. & Barrett, S., (1985), "Land policy: towards a research agenda", in Barret, S. & Healy, P., (eds), *Land Policy: Problems and Alternatives*, Gower, Aldershot, p.p. 1-20.
- (1990), "Structure and Agency", *Urban Studies*, Vol.27, No. 1, p.p. 89-104.
- Healey, P., McDougall, G. and Thomas, M.J. (eds.), (1982), *Planning Theory: Prospects for the 1980s*, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
- Healey, P., McNamara, P., Elson, M., Doak, A., (1988), *Land Use Planning and the Mediation of Urban Change*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Hekimiglou, E., (1987), *Banks and Thessaloniki 1900-1936*, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- (1991), *The Modiano Family*, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- History Centre of Thessaloniki (ed.), (1986), *Thessaloniki after 1912*, Municipality of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Houliarakis, M., (1975), *Geographical, Administrative and Population Change in Greece*, National Centre of Social Research, Athens, (in Greek).
- Johnston, R.J., Gregory, D., Haggett, P., Smith, D., Stoddart, D.R., (1981), *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, Basil Blackwell, London.
- Kafkoula, K., (1985), *An Anatomy of Urban Structure in Peripheral Residential Areas of Thessaloniki* (Research Report), YHOP and Urban and Regional Planning Department, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Kalogirou, N., (1986), "Suburban development in Thessaloniki - the new features of urban space", in History Centre of Thessaloniki, *Thessaloniki after 1912*, Municipality of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, p.p. 475-494, (in Greek).
- Karabelias, G., (1989), *State and Society in Metapolitefsi (1974-1988)*, Exantas, Athens, (in Greek).
- Kararas, N., (1973), "The work of the Refugee Rehabilitation Committee", *Oikonomikos Tahydromos*, 26-4-1973, p.p. 37-39, (in Greek).
- Keat, R., (1981), *The Politics of Social Theory*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Keat, R. & Urry, J., (1975), *Social Theory as Science*, Routledge & Keagan Paul, London.

- KEPE, (1976a), *Five-Years National Development Plan: Local Government* (vol. 3), KEPE, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1976b), *Five-Years National Development Plan: Dwellings* (vol. 7), KEPE, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1976c), *Five-Years National Development Plan: Town Planning* (vol.8), KEPE, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1989), *Reports for the Programme 1988-92: Town Planning*, KEPE, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1991), *A Framework Study for the Border Regions in Greece* (European Community Programme INTERREG, vol.2), KEPE, Athens, (in Greek).
- Kirk, G., (1980), *Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society*, Croom Helm, London.
- Kolonas, V., (1992), *The Expansion of Thessaloniki outside the City Walls. An Econography of the Hamidie Suburb (1885-1912)*, Ph.D Thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Kostopoulos, G.D., (1980), *Decrees on Building Regulations*, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Kotzamanis, V., (1987), "Population, households, dwellings and building activity", *Technika Chronika*, Vol. 7, No. 2, p.p. 204-232, (in Greek).
- Kotzamanis, V. & Maloutas, T., (1987), "State intervention in the working-class and popular housing", *The Greek Review of Social Research*, Vol.56, (in Greek).
- Kouloumpis, E., (1980), "The guilty are others but antiparohi", *TEE: Enimerotiko Deltio*, p.p. 10-15, (in Greek).
- Kremmydas, V., (1976), *An Introduction to the History of Modern Greek Society (1700-1821)*, Exantas, Athens, (in Greek).
- Kremos, P., (1983), "Do "Open Towns" close?", *Fortnight Politis*, 16-5-1983, (in Greek), p. 14.
- Lamprou, D. & Fragioudakis, L., (1990), "Land bonds: a dubious institution", *TEE: Enimerotiko Deltio*, 26-6-1990, p.p. 62-65, (in Greek).
- Leontidou, L., (1981), *Working Class and Land Allocation: The Urban History of Athens 1880-1980*, Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- (1986), "Seeking for the lost labour: The sociology of the cities in post-war Greece", *The Greek Review of Social Research*, Vol.60, p.p. 77-109, (in Greek).
- (1989), *Cities of Silence: Working -Class Allocation in Athens and Piraeus 1909-1940*, ETVA: Cultural and Technological Institute, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1990), "Interdisciplinary and fragmented approaches in contemporary human geography", in Metsovio Polytechnic School, *Interdisciplinary Approaches to*

- Development* (Conference Proceedings), Papazisis, Athens, p.p. 81-92, (in Greek).
- Leontidou-Gerardi, K., (1979), "Structural problems of the urban settlement system", *Synchrone Themata*, No. 6, p.p. 17-32, (in Greek).
- Les Temps Modernes, (1986), Greece in Evolution, Exantas, Athens, (in Greek).
- Lichfield, N. & Darin-Drabkin, H., (1980), *Land Policy in Planning*, Allen and Unwin, London.
- Loukatos, S.D., (1986), "Statistical elements of the city and prefecture of Salonika during the decade of 1910", in History Centre of Thessaloniki, *Thessaloniki after 1912*, Municipality of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, p.p. 101-129, (in Greek).
- Lyrantzis, C., (1984), *Between Socialism and Populism: the Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement*, Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- Maistros, P., (1980), "Illegal buildings legalised for fifty years", *Vema*, 9-3-1980, (in Greek).
- Manesis, A., (1980), "The crisis of institutions in liberal democracy and the Constitution", *Synchrone Themata*, No. 8, p.p. 20-35, (In Greek).
- Maravelakis, M. & Vakalopoulos, A., (1955), *Refugee Settlements in the Area of Thessaloniki*, Eteria Makedonikon Spoudon, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Martinos, H., (1979), "The weaknesses of the statutory framework for urban and regional planning", *Economy and Society*, No. 4, p.p. 20-27, (in Greek).
- Massey, D., (1984), *Spatial Divisions of Labour*, Macmillan Education, London.
- (1985), "New directions in space", in Gregory, D. & Urry, J. (eds.), *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, Macmillan Press, London.
- Massey, D. & Allen, J. (eds), (1984), *Geography matters!*, Open University, London.
- (eds.), (1988), *Uneven Redevelopment: Cities and Regions in Transition (Restructuring Britain)*, Hodder and Stoughton/The Open University (associated Reader), London.
- Massey, D. & Catalano, A., (1978), *Capital and Land*, Edward Arnold, London.
- Mawson, Th., (1918), "The new Salonika", *Balkan News*, 29/30/31/-1-1918.
- McLoughlin, J.B., (1969), *Urban and Regional Planning: A System's Approach*, Faber and Faber, London.
- McMahon, M., (1985), "The law of land: Property rights and town planning in modern Britain", in Ball, M., et al. (eds.), *Land Rent, Housing and Urban Planning*, Croom Helm, London, p.p. 87-106.
- Mills, E.S., (1972), *Urban Economics*, Scott, Foresman, Glenview Illinois.



- Ministry of Coordination, Division of National Accounts, (1956), *Trends in Housing Activity in the years 1946-54*, Ministry of Coordination, Athens, (in Greek).
- Moshonas, A., (1986), *Traditional Petty-bourgeois Groups*, Insitute of Mediterenean Studies, Athens, (in Greek).
- Moskof, K., (1972), *National and Social Consciousness in Greece 1830-1909*, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- (1978), *Thessaloniki: the History of a Comprador City*, Stohastis, Athens, (in Greek).
- Mouzelis, N., (1978), *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, Macmillan Press, London, (in Greek).
- "On the eclipse of old politics: a comparison between Balkan and Latin American Countries", *Anti*, No.228, p.p. 30-35, (in Greek).
- (1986), *Politics in the Semi-periphery*, Macmillan Press, London.
- (1990), *Post-Marxist Alternatives*, Macmillan Press, London.
- (1991), "Modern and post-modern in social thought", *Vema*, 3,11,24/11/1991, (in Greek).
- Municipality of Polichni, (1988), *A Survey of Social Structure of Polichni*, (mimeo), Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Muth, R.F., (1969), *Cities and Housing*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
- Nar, A., (1986), "An unpublished report of 1912 on the structure of the Israeli community of Thessaloniki", in History Centre of Thessaloniki, *Thessaloniki after 1912* (Conference Proceedings), Municipality of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, p.p. 303-323, (in Greek).
- Nedas, A., (1984), "Public real estate property", *Unpublished Paper*, presented in the County Council of Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Negreponti-Delivani, M., (1973), "Economic development of Nortern Greece and the refugees", *Oiknomikos Tahydromos*, 26-4-1973, p.p. 75-78, (in Greek).
- (1981), *Analysis of the Greek Economy* (2nd edition), Papazisis, Athens, (in Greek).
- Pahl, R., (1975), *Whose City*, London, Harmondsworth.
- (1989), "Is the emperor naked? Some questions on the adequacy of sociological theory in urban and regional research", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol.13, No. 4, p.p. 709-720.
- Pampoukis, G., (1980), "Another aspect of the system of antiparohi", *TEE, Enimeritiko Deltio*, 31-3-1980, p.p. 22-26, (in Greek).
- Papantoniou, G., (1979), *Income Distribution and Capital Accumulation*, Papazisis, Athens, (in Greek).

- Papastathis, H.K., (1978), "A report on the fire of Thessaloniki in 1917", *Makedonika*, Vol.18, p.p. 143-171, (in Greek).
- Papayiannopoulos, A., (1982), *History of Thessaloniki*, Rekkos, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Paris, C. (ed.), (1982), *Critical Essays in Planning Theory*, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
- Pavlopoulos, P.G., (1987), *Informal Economy in Greece*, Institute of Economic and Industrial Research: Special Studies 17, Athens, (in Greek).
- Pavlopoulos, P.V., (1980), "The principle of legitimacy and the 1975 Constitution", *Synchrone Themata*, No. 8, (in Greek) p.p. 36-45.
- Pelagidis, S., (1988), "Problems of the refugees of Northern Greece in the Greek Parliament, 1924-28", *Makedonika*, Vol.26, p.p. 63-97, (in Greek).
- Pentzopoulos, D.T., (1959), *The 1922-23 Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece*, Ph.d. Thesis, Princeton University.
- Petmezidou, M., (1984), *Social Reproduction and Cultural Transmission within the Families: The Case of Middle-Class of Salonika*, Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford University.
- (1987), *Social Classes and Mechanisms of Social Reproduction*, Exantas, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1991), "Statism, social policy and the middle-classes in Greece", *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.p. 31-48.
- Petmezidou, M. & Tsoulouvis, L., (1990), "Aspects of state planning in Greece: historical continuation and the impact of crisis", in Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation, *The Functions of the State in a Period of Crisis*, Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation, Athens, p.p. 288-301, (in Greek).
- Phillipidis, D., (1984), *Contemporary Greek Architecture*, Melissa, Athens, (in Greek).
- (guest ed.), (1985), "Two housing schemes in Thrace", *Architecture in Greece*, Vol.19, p.p. 174-203, (in Greek).
- (1990), *About the Greek City*, Themelio, Athens, (in Greek).
- Photopoulos, G., (1939), "National economy and the Cadastre of Greece", *Technika Chronika*, Vol.18, No. 4, p.p. 323-332, (in Greek).
- (1953), "National economy and the Cadastre of Greece", *Technika Chronika*, Vol.30, p.p. 343-344, (in Greek).
- Pickvance, C.G., (1986), "Comparative Urban analysis and assumptions about causality", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p.p. 162-184.
- Pirounakis, N.G., (1992), "One in five dwellings is illegal", *Oikonomikos Tahydromos*, Vol.27, No. 8, p.p. 24-26, (in Greek).

- Playber, J., (1934), *Le probleme de l'Habitation a Salonique et a la Campagne*, Salonique.
- Portaliou, E., (1984), "'Open Towns' full of problems", *Forthnight Politis*, 6,-4-1984 (in Greek), p.p. 28-29.
- Richardson, H.W., (1972), *Urban Economics*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- (1977), *The New Urban Economics*, Pion, London.
- Rokos, D., (1981), *Cadastre and Land Consolidation: Land Policy*, N.Mavromatis, Athens, (in Greek).
- Rydin, Y.J., (1984), *Housebuilders and Planners: A Study of the Housing Land System in a Period of Policy Change (1979-83)*, Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- (1986), *Housing Land Policy*, Gower, Aldershot.
- SADAS, (1980), "A debate on the 1979 Planning Act", *Bulletin of the Architectural Association*, p.p. 36-76, (in Greek).
- Saunders, P., (1984), "Beyond Housing Classes", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 8, p.p. 202-227.
- (1990), *A Nation of Home-Owners*, Unwin Hyman, London.
- Saunders, P. & Williams, P., (1988), "The Constitution of home: towards a reaserch agenda", *Housing Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p.p. 81-93.
- Sayer, A., (1984), *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach*, Hutchinson, London.
- Seitanidis, A., (1982), "The Ministry of Agriculture and land policy, land redistribution", *paper presented in the Conference on Land Policy*, Panhellenic Association of Rural and Surveing Eng, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1985), "Landed property in the areas of land redistribution of Central and West Macedonia", in School of Rural and Surveying Engineers, *Integrated Land Information: a Foundation for Development* (Conference Proceedings), Thessaloniki, p.p. 67-90, (in Greek).
- Short, J., (1982), *Housing in Britain*, London, Methuen.
- Short, J.R., Fleming, S., Witt, S., (1986), *House building, Planning and Community Action*, Routledge & Keagan Paul, London.
- Silverman, D., (1985), *Quantitative Methodology and Sociology*, Gower, Aldershot.
- Simitis, K., (1989), "Introduction", in Simitis, K. (ed.), *Populism and Policy*, Gnosi, Athens, p.p. 9-18, (in Greek).
- (ed.), (1989), *Populism and Policy*, Gnosi, Athens, (in Greek).
- Sophoulis, K., (1980), "The building system of antiparohi as a huge mechanism for tax evasion", *Oikonomikos Tahydromos*, 31-1-1980, p.p. 9-11, (in Greek).

- Stefanidis, D., (1953), *Lessons in Agricultural Policy*, Athens, (in Greek).
- Stergiou, D., (1990), "Housing policy into a deadlock", *Nea*, 22-8-1990, (in Greek).
- Svoronos, N., (1976), *A review of Greek History* (2nd edition), Themelio, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1985), *Select Passages of Contemporary Greek History and Historiography*, Themelio, Athens, (in Greek).
- TEE-TKM, (1982), *The employment Situation of the Engineers in Thessaloniki* (Research Report), TEE-TKM, Thessaloniki (mimeo).
- Triantafillidis, I., (1960), *Contribution to the Study of a Housing Programme and a Master Plan for Greater Thessaloniki*, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- (1966-68), *Master Plan of Thessaloniki* (vols 1-69), Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Tritsis, A., (1977), "How the entire country was deconstructed", *Vema*, Vol.28, No. 1, (in Greek).
- (1982), *A Report to a Meeting with Local Government*, YHOP (mimeo), Athens, (in Greek).
- Tsoukalas, K., (1975), *Dependence and Reproduction: The Role of Educational Mechanisms in Greece (1830-1922)*, Themelio, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1981), *Social Development and the State*, Themelio, Athens, (in Greek).
- (1984) "The structure of employment and the petty-bourgeois miracle", *Anti*, no. 260, p.p. 21-23.
- (1986), *State, Society and Employment in Post-War Greece*, Themelio, Athens, (in Greek).
- Tsoulouvis, L., (1979), *Land Values, Social Stratification, State-policy and Land-Use Structure in Thessaloniki 1966*, Town Planning Chair, Aristotle University (mimeo), Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- (1981a), "Beyond the inability of implementing a development plan", *Architecture Today*, Vol.15, p.p. 79-89, (in Greek).
- (1981b), *Demand in Land and Housing in a Big Urban Centre*, DEPOS, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- (1984), "Land values and expansion of the town plan to areas of unauthorized buildings", in School of Rural and Surveying Engineers, *Integrated Land Information Systems: A Foundation for Development* (Conference Proceedings), Thessaloniki, p.p. 311-335, (in Greek).
- (1985), *Perceptions of Urban Development and Planning Policies in Thessaloniki (Greece)*, Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics.
- (1986), *Feasibility Study for a Housing Programme and Residential Development in Polichni*, DEPOS, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).

- (1987), "Aspects of statism and planning in Greece", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol.11, p.p. 500-521.
- Tsoulouvis, L. (with Yiannakou, A., Zografos, V., Thermos, K., Xepapadaki, I.), (1981), *A study on Housing Development of Thessaloniki*, Technical Chamber of Greece, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Urry, J., (1981), *The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies*, Macmillan Press, London.
- Velentzas, K., Kalogirou N., Karagianni, S., Katsikas, I., Papamichos, N., Hatziprokopiou, N., Hlomodis, K., (1991), *The Housing Market in Greater Thessaloniki, Organisation of Thessaloniki* (Research Report), Planning Organisation of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, (in Greek).
- Vergopoulos, K., (1975), *The Agrarian Question in Greece* (3rd edition), Exantas, (in Greek).
- (1978), "Capitalism and Peasant Productivity", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, p.p. 446-465.
- Vlachos, G., (1977), *Political Analysis* (vol. a), Athens.
- (1978), *Political Analysis* (vol. b), Athens.
- (1981), *Political Analysis* (vol. c), Athens.
- Voivonda, A., Kyzilou, V., Kloutsinioti, R., Kontaratos, S. and Pyrgiotis, Y., (1977), "City and regional planning in Greece", *Architecture in Greece*, Vol.11, p.p. 127-213, (in Greek).
- Wassenhoven, L., (1979), "Growth poles and the policy of "rival cities"", *Economy and Society*, No. 4, p.p. 32-39, (in Greek).
- (1980), *The Settlement System and Socio-Economic Formation: the Case of Greece*, Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- (1984), "Greece", in Wynn, M. (ed.), *Planning and Urban Growth in Southern Europe*, Mansell, London, p.p. 5-36.
- Yiannakou, A., (1981), *The Role of Local Government in Greece*, M.Sc. Thesis, London School of Economics.
- (1988), "Construction activity of the public sector", in TEE-TKM, Working Group, *The role of the public sector in housing provision*, TEE-TKM (mimeo), Thessaloniki, p.p. 26-39, (in Greek).
- (1989), "Local government in Greece: problems and prospects", in Papadopoulou-Symeonidou, P. (ed.), *Local Government in Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Paratiritis, Thessaloniki, p.p. 105-118, (in Greek).
- Yiannitsis, T., (1983), *Greek Industry, Development and Crisis*, Gutenberg, Athens, (in Greek).

## OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

### PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

#### *Gazette of Parliamentary Debates:*

- 1919 Debate on the Reconstruction of Thessaloniki after the fire"
- 1929 Act on "Ownership rights per floor"

#### Parliamentary Proceedings :

- 947/1979 Act on "Residential Areas"
- 1337/1983 Act on "Expansion of urban plans, residential development and other regulations"
- 1561/1985 on the "Regulatory Plan of Thessaloniki": Introductory Report

### ESYE

- Population Censuses 1920, 1928, 1940, 1951,1961,1971,1981
- Population Census 1991 (temporary results)
- Statistical Yearbooks 1961-1987
- Monthly Statistical Bulletin 1988-1990

### OTHER STATISTICAL DOCUMENTS

- EUROSTAAT, (1986), Family Budgets, Comparative Tables, Netherlands - Belgium - Ireland - Denmark - Greece - Spain.
- ICAP, Yearly Registration of Companies, 1977, 1984, 1989.

### OTHER DOCUMENTS

- County of Thessaloniki - Planning Department, (1973), *Thessaloniki: Codification of Town Planning Decrees*, Thessaloniki.
- "Report of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Ministry of Northern Greece for the Regulatory Plan", *TEE-TKM, Techniki Enimerosi*, 1-12-1077.
- YHOP, (1983), *Reconstruction of Thessaloniki*, Settlement Department, Thessaloniki.
- YHOP, (1986-88) *General Urban Plans (GPS)* of all Municipalities and Communities of Greater Thessaloniki.

### ACTS

- All the Acts used are referred separately in the text.