

**Social identity perspectives on European integration: a  
comparative study of national and European identity  
construction in Britain and Italy**

**Submitted by Marco Goffredo Cinnirella for the  
degree of PhD in Social Psychology at the London  
School of Economics and Political Science (University  
of London), June 1993.**

**This research was funded by E.S.R.C. Postgraduate Research  
Award R00429024719**

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## **ABSTRACT**

**Taking a comparative perspective, the current research examines national and European identities in Britain and Italy, using a multi-methodological approach. The aims of the research are twofold: firstly, to examine current limitations with psychological theorising on social identity, and secondly, to enhance social psychological knowledge of European integration and its effects upon national and European identities. The theoretical perspective adopted is a hybrid synthesis of social identity (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1987) and social representations (Moscovici, 1984) approaches. Evidence for a European identity amongst British respondents and interviewees proved to be minimal: few felt any sense of European pride, and most construed European integration in instrumental terms. Italian constructions of European identity were more robust than those of the British, and consisted of both instrumental and symbolic attachments to the European ideal. Some of the social psychological bases for such cross-national differences are explored, and the prospects for the development of a European identity examined. Applying social identity theory to questions of national and European identity construction, raises questions about the current applicability of the paradigm to large-scale social categories of this type. The social representational context of intergroup relations has often been ignored, and social influence processes in large-scale entities seem more complex than previously assumed. It becomes apparent that issues of key conceptual importance to the social identity and self-categorisation paradigms are in need of urgent clarification. These include: the differences between face-to-face groups and abstract social categories; the adequacy of motivational constructs within the paradigm; and the role of the wider ideological milieu in which identity construction takes place. Along with a discussion of these issues, some of the key features of social identity construction in large-scale social categories and groups are examined, and ways in which the social identity and social representations paradigms might be reconciled explored.**

**Keywords: Social identity; European integration; European identity; national identity**

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to thank the following for their valuable assistance during the data-collection phases of this research: Jonathan Chase, Tom Farsides, Adrian Furnham, Andrea Jarmy, Caroline Kelly, Janet Stockdale, Angela Stathopoulou, Bob Watson, and Dan Wright. In addition, the author is indebted to Pio-Enrico Ricci Bitti and his associates at the University of Bologna, Italy, for their considerable assistance with data-collection and translation. I am grateful to Paul Jackson and Dan Wright for invaluable advice concerning computing and statistical analysis. Throughout the course of the thesis George Gaskell justified his reputation as a fine supervisor, and the author expresses his gratitude for the enthusiasm and support continually expressed by Dr Gaskell during many meetings over the period 1990-1993. A word of thanks is also in order for the ESRC, who made the thesis possible through their funding. Finally, I wish to thank my parents, Luigi and Margaret, for their continued encouragement and support.

Marco G. Cinnirella, June 1993.

## OVERVIEW

The current discussion has two primary aims: firstly, to further social psychological understanding of social identity mechanisms - i.e. the means by which membership of social groups comes to form an important part of the self; and secondly, to explore such theoretical questions by focusing on an externally valid set of social identities currently of social significance - national and European identities in the context of European integration. To the extent that European integration and its effects upon national and European identities, raise key conceptual issues about social identity processes, it is a particularly fruitful domain for the exploration of social identity. Furthermore, since there is as yet relatively little published research examining the social psychological factors of European integration, such a focus has the additional benefit of filling this void in the literature. The research about to be described sought to fulfil these two primary aims by means of an interplay between theoretical and empirical endeavours. The discussion will therefore focus around three separate empirical studies, and use these studies to generate theoretical insights about both social identity processes, and the psychological effects of European integration on national and European identities.

### *Chapter 1 - Introduction to the social identity paradigm*

In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the topic of social identity, with particular attention being paid to the Social Identity Theory (SIT) developed by Tajfel (1974), and Turner's related Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) (Turner, 1987). Some of the conceptual weaknesses present in both theories, and which will be examined via the empirical research, are introduced, including weaknesses in the explanations of salience, social influence, and stereotyping, and problems associated with the application of the social

identity paradigm to large-scale social categories and groups, such as nations.

*Chapter 2 - A theoretical basis for exploring national and European identities*

This chapter explores the current state of social scientific knowledge pertaining to national identity and European integration. Particular emphasis is placed on how national and European identities might be influenced by the process of European integration, and how identities of this diffuse and large-scale nature raise conceptual and empirical problems for the social identity paradigm. Existing research in this area, of a largely attitudinal nature, indicates that Britain continues to be the least enthusiastic of all EC nations about European integration, and some possible bases for this phenomenon are examined.

*Chapter 3 - The design of the cross-national questionnaire*

In this chapter, the design of the first phase of the empirical research is described. This involved a cross-national questionnaire study, examining the effects of European integration upon national and European identities and their associated social representations (Moscovici, 1984). Questionnaires were administered to higher education students in both Britain and Italy, during 1991.

*Chapter 4 - The cross-national questionnaire data - 1: the British*

The British results emerging from the 1991 questionnaire study are presented and discussed in this chapter. In congruence with the existing body of attitudinal data, the British respondents manifested a British national identity significantly stronger than their sense of European identity. Further analyses indicated that British identity may conflict with a sense of European identity. Observations arising from both quantitative and

qualitative data are used to map-out some of the interrelations between national and European sentiments in Britain. In addition, a number of key issues pertaining to social identity theory are examined. These include: the measurement of social identity; the nature of stereotypes and their situational fluctuation; prototypes; and the adequacy of the social identity paradigm when applied to large-scale identities such as national and European identities.

#### *Chapter 5 - The cross-national questionnaire data - 2: the Italians*

This chapter details the 1991 questionnaire data collected in Italy, and examines some of the social psychological aspects of national and European identities as manifested by the Italians. Data indicate that the Italians construe national and European identities as highly compatible, and cross-national comparisons highlight a stronger sense of European identity amongst Italian, compared to British, respondents. Some of the probable bases for the marked differences in European identity between British and Italian respondents are examined, and interpreted in the light of previous research.

#### *Chapter 6 - An interview study of British and European identities*

In the second phase of research which is detailed here, a qualitative in-depth interview methodology was used to explore in greater detail the construction of British and European identities, and how these identities challenge current conceptualisations of social identity. Focusing solely on British respondents, some of the qualities of British national identity are examined, including British prototypes, objects of national pride and embarrassment, and situations associated with national identity. Similar issues are also addressed in relation to British constructions of European identity. The data emerging from this study indicated that, in congruence with the earlier questionnaire study, empirical evidence suggests a weak and

ambiguous British orientation to European integration, with little sense of pride in Europe or perception of dimensions other than economic. The utility of qualitative and idiographic approaches to social identity is discussed, together with a further refinement of some of the differences between large-scale social category membership and identification with smaller, more concrete entities, developed in earlier chapters.

### *Chapter 7 - The Social identity paradigm: new horizons*

This chapter looks back at the first two empirical phases of research, using them to draw some general observations about the nature of social identity processes. Some of the ways in which social identity processes operate in the context of large-scale social categories and groups are suggested, with an important theoretical emphasis being placed upon the need to incorporate the notion of social representation (Moscovici, 1984) into social identity theory. Recent developments in the social identity paradigm are discussed in relation to the current focus, and weaknesses in research on individualism-collectivism (Triandis et al., 1985;1986;1988;1990), and non-comparative social groups (Brown et al., 1992) examined.

### *Chapter 8 - Some new horizons explored*

The third and final phase of empirical research is detailed in this chapter, which focuses on the results emerging from a fixed-response questionnaire study examining some of the issues relating to social identity outlined in Chapter Seven. In particular, British constructions of national and European identities are examined in relation to: Brown's Autonomous-Relational dimension (Brown et al., 1992); Individualism-Collectivism (Triandis et al., 1990); perceptions of interdependence (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988); motivational bases; and possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986).

### ***Chapter 9 - Conclusions 1: National and European identities***

**In this first concluding chapter, the empirical and theoretical investigations in previous chapters are re-considered and drawn together to provide an overall impression of the social psychological dimensions of national and European identities in Britain and Italy. As well as charting some of the peculiar properties of these identities, general theoretical observations are made about national and international identities. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the observations made have practical implications, firstly for those who might wish to encourage a European identity, and then for those who might wish to suppress such allegiances.**

### ***Chapter 10 - Conclusions 2: Social identity theory: where next?***

**The final chapter examines the implications of the research discussed for the study of social identity, with particular reference to the Tajfel-Turner social identity paradigm. It is argued that, if the social identity paradigm is to prove robust and useful in the future, current weaknesses will have to be overcome, especially those relating to individual differences, social belief systems, and operationalisation of concepts. One possible means of strengthening the social identity paradigm is via a synthesis with some of the key ideas associated with the study of social representations (Moscovici, 1984), since social identities are almost always associated with related social representations. Such a synthesis could, in fact, prove beneficial to both traditions. Some of the directions this kind of integrative endeavour might take are examined in the final section of the chapter.**

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL IDENTITY PARADIGM

### OVERVIEW

The following four chapters describe a questionnaire-based study investigating aspects of national and European identity. The questionnaire was administered simultaneously to university students in the United Kingdom and Italy, and contained both open and closed-type questions examining features of national and European identity, stereotype processes, attitudes toward, and social representations of, European integration. The questionnaire was formulated using the broad theoretical framework provided by Social Identity Theory (SIT) as defined by Tajfel, Turner and associates (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;1986; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The text of the English language questionnaire appears in Appendix C.

### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

#### *1.1 On the choice of Research Method in the study of Social Identity*

The broad concept of social identity - that part of a person's self-concept which derives from social group membership and placement in a system of categorization - has been the subject of much empirical research within the social sciences. It is not surprising that the different theoretical orientations of researchers have given rise to the employment of a quite diverse collection of research techniques for the measurement of social identity and related constructs. One of the earliest and most influential techniques was the "Twenty Statements Test" (TST) developed by Kuhn and McPartland (1954). Using this paper and pencil projective test, respondents had to answer the question "Who am I?" twenty times.

Whilst being criticized for its crudeness, and the difficulty involved in interpreting the results obtained (see, for example, Zavalloni, 1973), many

researchers continue to sympathize with the idea, implied in the research method, that it is important to consider the complete identity repertoires of respondents, rather than attempt to focus on a single identity in isolation. Furthermore, the notion (again emerging from Kuhn and McPartland's work) that identities are hierarchically ordered, has continued to figure prominently in theories of social identity. One of the most contentious issues concerning the TST is related to its interpretation. It could be argued, for example, that the order in which identities, personal characteristics, and so forth, are mentioned in a TST, might say something about the underlying salience or importance of these elements for the self-concept. However, the issue of the salience of identities is a highly complex one, and it is rather difficult to establish whether identities elicited by such techniques are influenced by the current situation rather than some underlying dimension of importance for the self. R.H. Turner has raised rather similar doubts about the TST, suggesting that respondents might give leisure or "escape" identities, whilst ignoring other, more important aspects of the self (Turner, 1987).

However, it is worth noting that, whilst losing favour with many (but not all) social psychologists, Kuhn and McPartland's measurement technique and its later derivatives continue to enjoy popularity amongst sociologists and political scientists interested in identity. In addition, interesting new possibilities have emerged for using the TST to investigate the existence of individualistic and collectivistic belief systems, and their relationship to the self (c.f. Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). Clearly then, the TST has certainly not outlived its usefulness.

Whilst some theorists have attempted to further develop and refine the Twenty Statements Test (see, for example, Hutnik, 1985; Yardley, 1987), others have attempted to utilize different measurement procedures, or develop their own. Zavalloni (1971;1973) for example, who, like Kuhn and McPartland, was influenced by personality theory, developed a projective measurement technique which she christened Focused Introspection. However, largely due to the time-consuming and complex nature of its application, focused introspection is not commonly utilized as a measure of social identity. For similar reasons, the application of variants of

the Kelly repertory grid technique (Kelly, 1955; Bannister, 1966) seems not to hold the potential its proponents once promised (e.g. Liebkind, 1982).

Both social psychologists working within the Tajfel/Turner tradition of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;1986), and an increasing number of social scientists from other disciplines, have come to focus on the use of questionnaire methodologies in the measurement of social identity. Hooper (1976), a political scientist, proposed a questionnaire-based technique which utilized the Twenty Statements Test as a starting point, and went on to investigate, via the use of fixed-response numerical ratings, the perceived importance for respondents of their various social identities. Like Hutnik (1985), Hooper suggests the addition of a negative identification format along the lines of "Is it important for you to think of yourself as *not* ...?". It is interesting to note how this assumption that ingroups are always related to outgroups, identification with disidentification, etc., is in fact common to many theories of social identity (e.g. Apter, 1983; Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1987; Wallman, 1983). Hooper (1976) goes on to suggest that the responses elicited by this methodology can finally be subjected to factor analysis, and thus indicate the underlying structure of identity.

Whilst there is something to be said for a methodology which examines the complete identity structures of individuals, followers of Tajfel and Turner have preferred to utilize the survey approach for the isolated study of particular social identities. Although there is some disagreement as to whether social identities may be studied in isolation (see, for example, Scheibe, 1983), recent theorizing on the salience of social identities (Oakes, 1987) would suggest that, generally speaking, at any point in time one of our social identities will be the most salient. It follows from such theorising, that in situations which are thought to encourage the salience of a particular social identity, one might be able to study this identity, its related stereotypes, etc., in *relative* isolation. Assumptions of this nature will be questioned on numerous occasions throughout this and the following chapters.

This kind of focus on particular intergroup contexts is in fact indicative of a fundamental difference between the Tajfel-Turner tradition of Social Identity Theory (SIT), and the approach to identity taken by personality and role theorists

(e.g. Sarbin & Scheibe, 1983). From the beginning, Tajfel (e.g. 1974) made it clear that social identity theory was primarily intended to be a theory of intergroup behaviour - its implications for the self-concept were secondary. In contrast, role theorists like Sarbin and Scheibe (1983), are also interested in a fuller appreciation of the individual functioning of identity structures. It is only in recent years that social psychologists have come to recognize the necessity to end this false division, and work towards a multi-level analysis of identity which allows for both individual and social level variables (see, for example, Abrams, 1990;1992; Breakwell, 1986;1991; Deaux, 1992; Doise, 1988).

Some of the most productive recent work within SIT has been conducted by Rupert Brown and associates (e.g. Brown, 1978; Brown et al, 1986). Much of this work is noticeable for its application of questionnaire-based survey methodologies within ecologically valid field settings, such as bakeries, hospitals, and factories. Like Hooper (1976), the notion of *perceived importance* of the identity for the individual, figures strongly as a measure of social identity in these studies. Additionally, following on from Tajfel's theorizing (e.g. Tajfel, 1974), the *affect* linked to the particular group membership under investigation is also measured, as are perceptions of *similarity* with other group members. The kinds of fixed-response questions utilized by Brown and associates have become fairly common within the SIT/SCT tradition.

A further technique which has become increasingly popular within the SIT/SCT framework is the analysis of *stereotype ratings*. Hogg and Turner (1987) for example, had their respondents rate the in-group, out-group, and self on various stereotype dimensions. A standard measure of the strength of identity in such studies is the correlation between in-group and self-stereotype (see Huici, 1984, for a criticism of this procedure). Whilst a number of objections to a purely quantitative trait-based approach to stereotype measurement are raised in other chapters, the notion that social stereotypes should form an integral part of any study of social identity is an important one. Furthermore, Hogg and Turner's point that we must recognize the inherently situational nature of social stereotypes is addressed at some length in this and other chapters, as is the relationship between identity and self-stereotyping.

It is disturbing to note the lack of discussion within the Tajfel-Turner school of thought of the advantages and disadvantages associated with the various research techniques typically employed in the study of social identity. Hofman (1988), whilst not working within the strict confines of Social Identity Theory, has made a welcome contribution here. As he emphasizes, whilst a multitude of research techniques have been employed in the study of identity - questionnaires, semantic differential scales, graphic representations, etc. - no single method is especially suited to the task. We are in full agreement with Hofman that the best solution is to utilize a number of methodologies, and to capitalize on the benefits associated with each particular method. At the same time, one should recognize that a number of the existing methodologies carry their own "theoretical baggage" - i.e. they have been designed with a particular theory of identity or self in mind.

It is our opinion that social psychologists working within the confines of Tajfel's Social Identity Theory, or Turner's Self Categorization Theory, have yet to discover a research methodology which is particularly well-suited to the empirical investigation of social identity. This being the case, the only acceptable option would seem to be to follow Hofman's (1988) suggestions and make use of a variety of research techniques. We would add to this, the urgent need for research into the strengths and weaknesses of the ever increasing number of methodologies available. In its use of a number of different question formats, as well as both questionnaire and interview methodologies, it is hoped that the current research might, in a limited sense, contribute to our knowledge of how these research methods may be utilized for the study of social identity.

## *1.2 Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT) - central issues*

For Tajfel (1974;1981), social identity represents the individual's awareness of being a member of a social group, together with the affect associated with that knowledge. Enlightened by his earlier work on the categorization of objects (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), Tajfel went on to hypothesize that categorization into in-group and out-group(s) involves an accentuation of *differences* between groups and *similarities* within groups, and later research was to provide empirical support for

this assumption (Doise et al., 1978; Eiser & Strobe, 1972; Tajfel et al, 1964). In common with a number of conceptualizations of social identity, Tajfel postulated that the perception of ingroup membership is crucially linked to the perception of outgroups: there can be no in-groups without out-groups of which one is not a member.

We may consider a social identity to be positive or negative for an individual, depending on whether the particular group membership is associated, respectively, with positive or negative affect. The determinant of the latter is the extent to which the social identity affords the individual the opportunity of attaining positive ingroup distinctiveness. This may be achieved by making favourable comparisons between the in-group and relevant comparison groups, on appropriate dimensions of social comparison.

It is clear from Tajfel's writing (e.g. Tajfel, 1981), that his Social Identity Theory is built on the foundations of Festinger's (1954) theory of Social Comparison, extended by Tajfel from the interpersonal to the intergroup domain. For Tajfel, following Festinger's ideas, the maintenance of self-esteem became the most important motivation behind social identity processes. Only in recent years has the focus solely on self-esteem as a motive been seen as restrictive and simplistic (see, for example, Abrams, 1990; 1992).

In support of his theory of social identity, the minimal group series of experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971) seemed to indicate that the mere process of categorization into a social category was sufficient to elicit differentiation between social groups. This suggested the inadequacy of individualistic theories of group formation and conflict, such as those based on interpersonal attraction (Lott & Lott, 1965), or frustration-aggression (e.g. Berkowitz, 1962). Similarly, the influential theory of Realistic Conflict proposed by Campbell and others (e.g. Campbell, 1965) could not account for differentiation in the minimal group scenario. For Tajfel and his followers, the notion of social identity and the drive towards differentiation provided the most parsimonious explanation of minimal group phenomena.

This interpretation of the minimal group has not been without its critics, however, with a number of alternative explanations of minimal group phenomena being forwarded by, amongst others, Rabbie and associates (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schot & Visser, 1989), and, more recently, Schiffman & Wicklund (1992). Amongst the key issues in such debates are: a) the significance of the minimal group paradigm for social identity theory; b) the explanation of minimal group phenomena; and c) the ecological validity of minimal group studies. In the current discussion, the merits of social identity theory are assessed on the basis of its overall contribution to social psychology, rather than on the strengths or weaknesses of one particular series of studies.

One of the papers which indicates that social identity theory is certainly much more than just the minimal group studies, was published in 1979, when Tajfel and Turner examined some of the macro-level implications of the theory. It became clear to them that the shared conceptions of reality held by members of a group were of crucial importance to an understanding of intergroup relations. Tajfel and Turner suggested that in general, there are two kinds of *subjective belief structure* (SBS) which influence the course of intergroup relations. The *social mobility* belief system involves the assumption that group boundaries are relatively permeable, and thus that inadequate social identity can be alleviated via individual movement between groups. In contrast, the SBS of *social change* suggests that intergroup relations are characterized by stratification, and that it is impossible or at least very difficult for those dissatisfied with their social identity to move into another group.

In their model of intergroup relations, Tajfel and Turner demonstrate how the SBS accepted by group members in turn determines the nature of the strategies utilized to maintain or enhance social identity. Further refinements of the model included the notions of the perceived legitimacy and stability of the intergroup milieu, which interact with the perception of cognitive alternatives in determining intergroup strategies. It is suggested here that Tajfel and Turner's model seems to rely, implicitly, on the notion of *social representations* (Moscovici, 1961;1984;1988) - shared constructions of reality generated in the course of social interaction. The final model seems to stand up quite well to empirical validation (see, for example,

Turner & Brown, 1978) and application in ecologically valid field settings (e.g. Bourhis & Hill, 1982). It remains one of the most promising models of macro-level intergroup relations.

### 1.3 Turner's Self-Categorization Theory (SCT)

Whilst Tajfel was primarily interested in developing a model of social identity able to contribute to our knowledge of *intergroup* relations, Turner (1982;1984;1987) went on to develop a theory, the aim of which was to provide a parsimonious explanation of the whole spectrum of inter and *intra*-group processes. Turner's Self-Categorization Theory postulates that self-categorization is the mechanism by which group behaviour becomes possible. For Turner (1987), self-categorization may be seen as accomplishing two things: it causes one to perceive oneself as "identical" to other members of the category, and thus places the group "in one's head"; and it generates category congruent behaviour on dimensions which are stereotypic of the category.

Self-categorization, according to Turner, involves a qualitative change in self-perception, termed depersonalization. Turner stresses that this process does not involve a *loss* of self, but merely a change in the focus of the self-concept from that of individual to that of group member. The depersonalization process also involves self-stereotyping, whereby the individual internalizes the perceived beliefs, behaviours, etc., of the in-group, and comes to view these as his/her own. In-group members come to perceive the appropriate norms, stereotypes, etc., of their group via the process of *referent informational influence*, which involves emulating the beliefs and actions of those who are seen as *prototypical* of the in-group. It is generally assumed that the most prototypical group member will be the individual perceived to be most similar to the ingroup, and most different to the outgroup, on currently valued dimensions of social comparison (Turner, 1987). It is important to recognize how this definition of prototypicality differs significantly from its use in models of memory, such as Cantor and Mischel's (1979) prototype theory.

There remain, however, a number of difficulties associated with the notion of referent informational influence, most of which seem to stem from a focus on the laboratory as a research environment. For example, whilst it may be possible to derive, using Rosch's (1978) notion of *metacontrast ratio*, a prototypicality score for members of a group faced with a judgement task, it is difficult to see how such a procedure might be utilized outside the confines of the laboratory to study prototypes in large-scale social categories such as gender and race. A further problem involves Turner and associates' assumption of the situational specificity of prototypes, since this does not allow for the presence of group status and leadership structures which might institutionalize the role of group prototype. It seems a rather simplistic and convenient strategy to merely re-define leadership in terms of degree of prototypicality, as Turner and Oakes (1989) appear to do. The notion of prototypes being situationally derived, also does not seem to allow for the possibility that prototypes might be contained within stereotypes and broader social representations of the group, which, at least in terms of core elements, often do evince a degree of cross-situational stability. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to Hogg and Abrams' (1988) suggestion that subgroups may sometimes constitute in-group prototypes. Finally, it is suggested here that Cantor and Mischel's (1979) postulation of numerous *sub-prototypes* within a category may be of value, especially where large-scale social categories are concerned.

Whilst Turner (1987) and other proponents of the theory have tended to assume that a strong social identity will be associated with perceptions of similarity between in-group members, we should be aware of a number of phenomena which may act as caveats to this assumption. Codol (1975) for example, found evidence for a *primus inter pares* (PIP) or "superior conformity of the self" motivation which encourages group members to perceive themselves as slightly superior to the average group member. This might suggest that strong identity need not be reflected in perceptions of strong similarity with other in-group members. Furthermore, it raises the possibility that some people might feel they themselves deserve to be the prototypical in-grouper, even when the majority of other group members disagree. This highlights how both individual and group-level processes can and do operate simultaneously, and challenges Turner's (1987) suggestion that

in-group members perceive themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the category.

A number of theorists have also recognized the flexible and self-serving nature of self-stereotyping procedures (see, for example, Jaspars and Warnaen, 1982). One method of maintaining positive self-esteem, for example, is to project any negatively evaluated attributes of the in-group onto group members who are then labelled as "deviants". Marques and associates (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques et al., 1988) have demonstrated how the creation and marginalization of such "black sheep" actually serves to strengthen social identity and the cohesion of the in-group. Codol later went on to suggest that, whilst social reality testing (Festinger, 1954) might be valued for attitudes and beliefs, individuals do not strive to be similar in terms of personality dimensions, raising further doubts about the likelihood of self-stereotyping taking place on personality dimensions (Codol, 1984). All of these aspects of social identity construction tend to lend weight to Liebkind's recent suggestion that partial identification with groups tends to be the norm - placing all of one's self in a single social identity, even briefly, may be a rather unusual thing to do (Liebkind, 1992).

Tajfel (1982a) suggested that one of the major benefits of Turner's SCT is its applicability to all manner of social groups - from small decision-making bodies to large-scale social categories such as religions or nations. It is suggested here that the applicability of SCT to large-scale social categories is still a matter for empirical validation, not least because there remain a number of conceptual problems with current formulations of the theory. We would like to suggest, for example, that Rabbie and Horwitz's (1988) distinction between social groups and social categories deserves greater attention. According to Rabbie and Horwitz (1988), a social group is a social entity within which members feel a sense of interdependence, whereas a social category is essentially a categorization of people who share at least one attribute in common. Whether or not interdependence is the crucial difference between groups and categories, it is argued throughout the course of the current discussion that *some* kind of distinction between groups and categories would be useful. The work of Emler and Hopkins (1990) for example, on the manipulation and negotiation of *reputation* in social groups, would seem to imply that there may

be certain aspects of behaviour in social *groups* which might not characterize behaviour in terms of large-scale social *categories* which, of necessity, are more reified entities. The research described below, which focuses on national and European identity, may be considered, in part, as an attempt to examine the applicability of SCT to large-scale social categories.

#### 1.4 Social Stereotypes

It is suggested here that Tajfel's notion of the social stereotype (Tajfel, 1981) should be considered as an integral element of his Social Identity Theory, and one which is highly compatible with the notion of social representations. For Tajfel, social stereotypes are shared conceptualizations of social reality - in particular, they constitute representations of social groups: the behaviours, attitudes, and so on, typically associated with the group in question. At the level of the individual, social stereotypes serve the twin functions of imposing an order on an otherwise bewilderingly complex social environment, whilst at the same time acting to preserve the individual's system of values.

However, as Tajfel's use of the prefix "social" implies, the fact that stereotypes come to be *shared* necessitates a social level of analysis to complement the focus on individual functions. Thus, Tajfel went on to discuss three social functions served by social stereotypes. He noted, for example, how social stereotypes may be utilized to help understand and *explain complex events*. Additionally, social stereotypes are crucially involved in the process of identity maintenance, via their function as providers of comparison dimensions for the achievement of positive group distinctiveness - they therefore serve a *differentiation* function. Finally, Tajfel postulated that social stereotypes serve a *justificatory* function, by means of which past, present, and future treatment of outgroups is legitimized.

It is important to note how Tajfel's notion of the social stereotype is one which accords much significance to the content of shared beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that such a conceptualization of stereotypes implies the need to go beyond

the traditional trait-based analysis and measurement procedures frequently employed by social psychologists in the past (e.g. Katz & Braly, 1933), as well as the purely cognitive approaches which often dominate North American research on stereotypes (c.f. Stephan, 1985). Whilst the research described below makes use of a trait-based stereotype measure, its purpose is *not* to elicit the contents of social stereotypes, but instead to focus on some of the accentuation and comparison processes involved in stereotyping.

Recently, the notion of the differential *salience* of social identities (Oakes, 1987) has drawn attention to the fact that social stereotypes are unlikely to be completely static entities. Hogg and Turner (1987) for example, suggest that social stereotypes are likely to be rather sensitive to the particular intergroup context, and there has been recent experimental evidence to support this assertion (Spears and Manstead, 1989; Haslam et al., 1992). We would like to suggest here that, whilst social stereotypes might possess a relatively stable core structure (and this remains a matter for further investigation), only certain aspects of the social stereotype will be salient in a particular intergroup situation. Furthermore, aspects of the social stereotype may be exaggerated in order to achieve positive distinctiveness in the current situation. One would therefore expect that the most significant aspects of a social stereotype in any situation, and those most likely to become salient, will be those dimensions best able to provide positive distinctiveness. Of course, this assumes that the intergroup context is one in which the outgroup(s) is a relevant comparison group. Additionally, different groups within a society have different access to the mass media and other symbolic forms which might help them impose a particular definition of the intergroup context. This highlights the fact that social stereotypes and social identities are intimately involved in differences of power (c.f. Deschamps, 1982). We also note with interest here how the suggestion that social stereotypes are situationally variable seems to fit-in quite comfortably with the arguments of discourse analysts and proponents of a rhetorical approach, concerning the variability of accounts (c.f. Billig, 1987; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

If one accepts the notion of situational variation in social stereotypes, this carries with it the necessity to allow for the latter in one's research methodology. The research described below utilized an experimental manipulation in an attempt

to assess the nature of this situational variance in stereotype content, and its implications for the elicitation of stereotypes in questionnaires. We would like to suggest that the question of whether there is any *pattern* to the variations observed in social stereotypes should also be an important topic for future research. The social cognition literature pertaining to social schemata (c.f. Crocker et al., 1984) would certainly suggest the likelihood of relatively invariant core structures, as does Abrie's notion of the nucleus at the heart of social representations (Abrie, 1984).

### 1.5 *Salience*

Recently, there has been a long overdue re-awakening of interest in the question of the salience of social identities (Oakes, 1987). Working within Turner's (1982;1984;1987) Self-Categorization framework, Oakes (1987) proposed a modification of the model suggested by Bruner (1957) in which the salience of a particular category is determined by an interaction between cognitive structure and environmental stimuli. Specifically, Bruner suggested that salience is a function of *Accessibility x Fit*. Oakes suggests we may consider *accessibility* as the current significance of a particular social identity for an individual. Factors such as recent activation of the social identity, the positive contribution of the social identity to self-esteem, etc., are among the most significant determinants of accessibility. *Fit* represents the degree to which environmental stimuli can be categorised along dimensions in a way congruent with the particular stereotypes associated with the social identity in question. Thus, "fit" is not simply a function of the most distinctive categories in the perceptual field, but depends upon perceived differences being congruent with expectations. The salient identity in any situation is therefore considered to be that which maximizes accessibility and fit in the current situation.

Much work remains to be done in order to develop and validate Oakes' framework. At present, the salience model seems able to explain and predict categorization of out-groupers more efficiently than it can explain self-

categorization. Perhaps the notion of our social identities varying in salience is most valuable for helping us conceptualize the functioning of the repertoires of different identities each individual is likely to possess. If our social representations (Moscovici, 1984), attitudes, stereotypes, and so on, fluctuate as our social identities fluctuate in salience, it seems clear, at least to the current researcher, that further development of our knowledge of the salience mechanism should perhaps be the primary objective of social psychologists working within SIT/SCT. Predicting *when* and by what processes our social identities become salient would greatly enhance the allure of the social identity paradigm, and open the way for an integration with theories of the attitude, social representations, and discourse analysis.

It is hoped that the research described below might highlight some of the situations and outgroups linked to the salience of national and European identities. We feel at this point the need to state our hope that much more work on salience in the future will be conducted outside of the restrictive confines of the laboratory. The laboratory experiment can be an excellent research tool for the "fine-tuning" of theoretical concepts and hypotheses, but in the early stages of exploratory research, it should at least be supplemented by ecologically valid research techniques.

## CHAPTER 2

### A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR EXPLORING NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES

#### *2.1 National identity*

Whilst enjoying a brief spell of popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the topic of national identity has failed to attract the interest in Social Psychology which it has instilled in some of the other social sciences. Nevertheless, the social psychological work which has emerged in this area has often provided valuable insights and shown how nationalism can be studied at a psychological level of analysis. For example, Tajfel and associates' (e.g. Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966) early work on the development of national loyalties in children indicated that we seem to learn affective responses to our own and other nations before we have any concrete knowledge about them. Earlier, Floyd Allport (1927) had made the controversial claim that nationalism could be understood solely in terms of the early conditioning of favourable responses to national symbols - any other explanations of nationalism simply represented the "nationalist fallacy". To their credit however, Tajfel and associates preferred an altogether more social explanation, suggesting that at least our early images of nations are almost totally determined by the "propaganda environment" created by the mass media, parents, peer groups, and so on. It would appear that at an early age, we are more susceptible to the affective content of this informational data-base than any other aspects of the data.

In a later article, Tajfel (1970) noted how the issue of national and ethnic loyalties should be of central concern to social psychologists, not least because it raises questions relevant to many of the crucial debates within the field of psychology. Whilst Tajfel was never to develop his ideas about nationalism much beyond those expressed in this seminal paper, his conclusion that any study of nationalism must include an examination of nationalist ideologies and "collective representations" is well-taken, as is his plea for an inter-disciplinary approach which is not limited to the laboratory as a research environment. Following-on

from Tajfel's suggestions, the research described below included an analysis of the social representations associated with national and European identities.

In fact, Tajfel's plea for an examination of the collective representations associated with national loyalties was not altogether original, for the 1960s witnessed a growing interest in what were variously termed national "images", "stereotypes", "ideologies", and "perceptions". Scott (1965) for example, focused specifically on the psychological aspects of international images, which he suggested consist of three interacting components - cognitive, affective, and conative (behavioural). One of the more interesting (although un-tested) postulations made by Scott was that common themes running through an individual's nation-images might represent a person's "world-view" - an ideological organizing structure representing views of world politics, history, and so on. It will be interesting to note whether the current research suggests evidence for such overarching conceptions of world affairs.

A further significant point raised by Scott, albeit rather obliquely, is the link between power and the diffusion of international images. It seems that certain groups in society are likely to attempt to disseminate international and national images which serve their own ends. Thus, for example, Scott notes how it may well be in the interest of a government, when engaged in a military conflict with another nation, to disseminate international images which are relatively simplistic, and which define the conflict in terms of "us" and "them". Such conceptions of the link between power and national/international images are compatible with Tajfel's (1981) analysis of the social functions served by social stereotypes.

Kelman (1969), taking a slightly different approach to Scott, attempted to elicit the psychological mechanisms behind personal involvement in the nation. For Kelman, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling elite of a nation is crucial in maintaining national loyalties. Like Tajfel (1970), Kelman noted how the ideology of nationalism serves to justify the existence of the nation-state and prescribe the relationship of the individual to that state. Those who adopt a *sentimental orientation* to their nation tend to endorse nationalistic ideologies, and to manifest a strong degree of affective attachment to their nation and its varied symbols. For

those who do not internalize such ideologies, allegiance to the nation can be maintained via *instrumental attachment*, which focuses on role as national and citizen, rational analyses of the benefits associated with citizenship, and so forth. Interestingly, Hinkle and Brown (1990) have recently suggested the resurrection of Bales' (1950) similar notion of *task* versus *socio-emotional* orientation to the group, proposing that orientation may determine the kinds of comparison dimensions we utilize in the struggle to achieve positive distinctiveness. In a similar vein, Inglehart and Reif (1991) stress the utility of a homologous distinction between utilitarian and affective orientation, this time in terms of kinds of support for European integration.

It will be interesting to note whether there is evidence for different *orientations* to national and European identity in the current research. However, it should be noted that Kelman's notion of *orientations* is not unproblematic. At times, it can be difficult to perceive clear-cut boundaries between sentimental and instrumental orientations, and it is left rather unclear how stable one might expect such orientations to be. Bloom (1990) has made the additional point that Kelman leaves unspecified the probable motivational bases for the different kinds of orientations.

An extremely important aspect of Kelman's (1969) theorizing is the significance he assigns to the notion of nationalist *ideology*. Whilst we might prefer here to substitute the concept *social representation* (Moscovici, 1984;1988) for ideology, we retain Kelman's interest in socially constructed and shared interpretations of the nation and its relationship to individuals. In line with this approach, it may be constructive at this stage to briefly examine some of Goffman's ideas concerning the nature of identity. Studying those labelled as "mentally ill", Goffman (1959a;1968) noted how the assignment of such a label required the re-adjustment of individual's "life-stories". Specifically, he suggested that individuals create narrative-like life-stories which have past, present and future elements. Generally speaking, it is psychologically beneficial if all three temporal components are in harmony (Breakwell, 1986), and thus we quite frequently re-interpret and re-construe elements of our life-stories to achieve some kind of equilibrium. We would like to suggest the extension of this idea to social

representations of the nation and national populace. In fact, sociologists like Anthony Smith (1991;1992) have also realised how national *myths* have an important temporal dimension. The notion that changes in identity require consummate changes in social representations, including re-interpretations of the past and the possible future, will be an important consideration when we come to examine European integration.

Samuel (1989a), taking a historical perspective on patriotism and British national identity, has also recognized the significance of the temporal dimension in national culture. In common with a number of other theorists, he points to the pervasiveness of individualism as a possible threat to national and other socially-derived identities. He suggests that an important aspect of British identity today is its focus on the tradition of the past. It is noticeable, for example, how interest in national heritage seems to have increased in recent years, and how we seem to have developed a fascination with relics of the past, which has manifested itself in the current popularity of Victoriana, "classic" fashions such as Laura Ashley, the success of the heritage industry, and even in that epitome of British milieu, the garden (Samuel, 1989a).

For Samuel, this fascination with the national past, together with feelings of pride at the apparent depth and richness of national heritage and culture, may well serve to maintain British national identity in a potentially powerful, but dormant state. We should note that at the present time of writing, in the aftermath of Gulf-war nationalism, British national identity is likely to have been "resuscitated" from such a dormant state, perhaps to once again slowly fade into the background as patriotic fervour dissipates.

Ross Stagner (1967), in an interesting analysis of the psychology of nationalism, suggested that individual desires and needs are reflected in national identity. He argued, for example, that individuals tend to have a desire for autonomy, which is reflected at the level of the nation, by the doctrine of sovereignty. Similarly, Stagner contends that we have a desire for power, which is reflected in international power struggles in which we may enjoy vicariously, the power of the nation. Whilst Stagner's work may be criticized for its implicit

reliance on Psychoanalytic theory, its underlying assumption that psychological aspects of attachment to the nation are worthy of study is an important one: after all, as Stagner emphasized, "Nations begin in the minds of men" (Stagner, 1967, p.vii).

The subject of pride in one's nation, and what form the latter might take, has gained some of the attention of social scientists, and is worthy of brief discussion since it is investigated in the current research programme. Almond and Verba (1963), who collected their data in 1959, found that their British subjects deemed the political system to be their primary object of national pride. For Shils and Young (1956), the combination of constitutional monarchy and political democracy were responsible for the creation of a moral consensus within Britain, and intimately bound-up with the maintenance of national identity. More recently, Topf and associates (1989), as the table below indicates, found that the primary object of British national pride in their survey was the monarchy, closely followed by scientific achievements.

<b>% expressing national pride in:</b>	<b>%</b>
monarchy	65
scientific achievements	61
welfare state	52
Parliament	33
sporting achievements	29
artistic achievements	21
economic achievements	16

Source: Topf et al. (1989, p129)

A word of caution is in order regarding any possible comparisons between this previous research and the current questionnaire study. Whilst the earlier study of Almond and Verba utilized an open-response format like that utilized in the current study, Topf et al. had their respondents make choices from a list of pre-defined categories. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note any changes over time apparent from the results obtained by the current study.

Common to many analyses of national identity, is the assumption that national *symbols* serve important functions. Kelman (1969) for example, noted how national symbols might be used by governments in attempts to increase the salience of national identity, and thus national solidarity. Presumably, the primary

means of achieving the latter would be via the mass media, although national military service would provide an alternative. In an interesting study, Opie (1985) also discussed how national symbols and nationally-manufactured products have a long history in marketing and advertising. Furthermore, it is interesting to note how Doob, in his lengthy treatise on patriotism and nationalism, frequently stresses the significance of national symbols diffused by the mass media, especially in terms of the role such symbols serve in maintaining the *salience* of national identity (Doob, 1964; see also Bloom, 1990). An extremely important point made by Doob, and one which is echoed throughout many chapters of this discussion, refers to the fact that these national symbols can be interpreted differently by different sub-groups within society. Thus, as Doob suggested, "To comprehend patriotism and nationalism fully...it is necessary to observe in detail how the media of communication function *not in general but within important groups of a society*" (Doob, 1964, p. 44, our emphasis).

Clearly, the national *territory* is one of the most affect-laden symbols associated with national identity (Mitchell, 1981), not least because the spatial component is perhaps the most salient aspect of lay conceptions of "nation". The national flag is also a particularly potent symbol of a nation and its people (Lawson, 1963;1975) - it appeared regularly in the British tabloid press during the recent military conflict in the Gulf for example, and has a prominent presence in the North American schoolroom. Other symbols and images include the association of particular animals with nations. Chilton (1982;1988) for example, noted the implications of the "bulldog versus bear" metaphor once utilized by the British Ministry of Defence to portray the relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union.

Kelman (1969) also noted with interest the frequent emergence of the family as a metaphor for the nation - note, for example, the use of "father/mother-land", "Mothertongue", etc. This may also be a further example of how we tend to think of nations in terms of people (Scott, 1965; Stagner, 1967). Thus, for example, the prominence of national leaders in our images of our own and other nations. One significant aspect of this personalization of nations is reflected in the British fascination with the royal family, who enjoy an extraordinary level of coverage in

the British mass media. As Tom Nairn (1989) points-out, there is a surprising lack of research into the nature of this apparent "royal romance". Kavanagh (1985) has also recognized the symbolic power of the British monarchy, suggesting that "Today the monarchy is the most prominent symbol in British public life and still stimulates popular emotions".

For Nairn (1989), "Britain's royal symbolism has a specifically fetishistic character" which involves the "worship" of royalty as if it embodied the essential elements of the nation, and a taboo against criticism. The change in emphasis from king/queen to royal *family* had the benefit that it allowed royalty to symbolize the larger family represented by the national community. There are indications that, contrary to intuition, royal ideology with its current focus on ordinariness, may act to enable the royal family to serve as prototypes in the sense implied by Social Identity theory. Thus, as Nairn suggests, "They're just like us" also implies the converse: "We're just like them". Despite the unprecedented crises faced by the British monarchy in the early 1990s, national opinion polls continued to indicate overall levels of support for the institution of royalty itself. Furthermore, there are some indications from opinion data that the Queen herself has lost little of her apparent popularity, despite the well-publicised marital problems of her children.

It is interesting to note how Topf et al. (1989) found in their survey study that in Britain, the monarchy is more popular amongst women, the over-sixties rather than 18-24 year olds, and for those with "intermediate" or no qualifications, more than for graduates. Furthermore, Topf and associates found the monarchy to be more popular amongst Church of England members than people of other or no religious convictions. Finally, they noted how the monarchy is much more popular in England than in Scotland or Wales. We would suggest that these findings together lend weight to the hypothesis that social representations of the nation, and the choice of national symbols, may vary across sub-groups within British society. This also seems to support Zavalloni's (1973) contention that national identity is mediated by other identities.

More recently, Billig (1992a; 1992b) has collected data which seems to confirm the widespread popularity of the royal family amongst the British public.

Significantly, Billig also makes the point that the royal family is often construed as an essential element of British national identity, and one which engenders a considerable desire to resist change. Perhaps the most powerful evidence to support such conclusions, derives from the observation that many British subjects were able to utilize the royal family as a means of apparently attaining positive distinctiveness for Britain in comparisons made with other nations (e.g. the U.S.A.).

A study of national and international symbols and metaphors would hold much promise for an integration of social identity theory with the theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1984). For example, since the existence of "prototypical" group members seems such a crucial yet problematic aspect of social identity theory, one might endeavour to examine the national heroes and heroines created by the mass media, present in national mythology, folklore, literature, etc. The truth of the matter is that social psychologists who turned to such phenomena would find they have already been subjected to detailed study by academics in other disciplines (see, for example, Samuel, 1989b). The task of the social psychologist thus becomes one of applying the social identity paradigm as an explanatory framework, to the existing body of research on national folklore and myth. It is hoped that a number of the open-ended questions included in the current research might elicit national symbols. Additionally, the degree of attachment to the national flag and anthem is assessed, and its relationship with identity variables examined.

The reader may be wondering whether we should locate nationalism as a phenomenon, in individuals or in society. The only acceptable answer can be that we must locate it in both. We are in agreement with Scheibe's (1983) argument that, whilst the particular manifestations of nationalism are likely to be temporally and culturally relative, the psychological mechanisms behind nationalism should be fairly stable and universal. Naturally, the latter claim is a matter for empirical investigation, and this is one of the reasons behind the cross-national nature of the current research project. For Scheibe, national identity is perhaps the most crucial of all identities, since it establishes an individual's *birthrights* - the basic rights all citizens are entitled to. According to Scheibe, the birthright represents an institutionalization of a particular representation of human nature. As part of such

a perspective, we may view nationalist movements as "searches for missing birthrights" (Scheibe, 1983, p.137).

The discussion so far has avoided the rather difficult question of actually defining "national identity". Whilst there is a growing trend within sociological approaches to focus on ethnicity, national and ethnic identities are not necessarily equivalent, as Smith has recently noted (A.D. Smith, 1991). In fact, Hewstone (1986) found interesting evidence that, whilst the Italians seem to rate the concept "Italy" as inferior to that of "Britain" or "Germany" for example, they rate the concept of "Italians" as superior to "the British" or "the Germans" on a range of dimensions. There is therefore evidence that one's perceptions of the *nation* can be divergent from one's perceptions of the national *populace*. It may be useful to consider there to be two sets of *social representations* - one pertaining to the nation itself, and another set pertaining to the national population. The nature and possible interactions of these sets of social representations should perhaps be addressed by future research.

We would like to suggest a working social psychological definition of national identity as *the self-categorization of an individual as a national or citizen of a particular nation, and the internalisation by the individual of this self-categorisation AS A SOCIAL IDENTITY*. This is, by necessity, an over-simplified conception of national identity, but a useful compromise for the purposes of the current theorising. Following-on from Tajfel (1974;1981) and Turner (1982;1984;1987), it is proposed that self-categorization and, crucially, social identification, as a national, leads to the internalization of the social representations, social stereotypes, etc., associated with the national group, together with the self-stereotyping of these perceptions. There are good indications that these representations and perceptions often include notions of a national territory, a body of historic national myths and memories, and notions of a cultural and political community (A.D. Smith, 1991).

As a vehicle for furthering our current understanding of social identity processes, the study of national identity seems particularly promising. It is not at all clear-cut, for example, whether SIT/SCT can be unproblematically applied to such large-scale social categories as race, gender, and nationality, especially since

so many of the important experiments within the paradigm have tended to focus on transitory group memberships created by the experimenter (Lalonde et al, 1989). This issue is of particular significance for the SIT/SCT paradigm, since one of its most attractive aspects has been its supposed applicability to all manner of social groupings (Tajfel, 1982a).

Prior to the crystallization of Tajfel's ideas into his Social Identity Theory, Marisa Zavalloni (1973) had suggested that large-scale social categories such as gender and nationality are only experienced via the *mediation* of smaller, more concrete social groups. Her own research seemed to suggest, for example, that political affiliations seemed to mediate national identity. Interestingly, this kind of embedding of one social identity within another may also be reflected in the way regional identity may influence identity at the national level.

The consequences of this *mediation* of national identity remain to be examined by future research - there seem already to be good indications though, that being British for example, might mean something quite different to those who adhere to opposing political ideologies. Recently, Brewer and Schneider (1990), noting the difficulties facing environmentalists trying to encourage a sense of "global awareness", have suggested that large-scale social categories tend towards sub-grouping, and do not meet identity needs as satisfactorily as smaller-scale social groups. Yet whilst national identity may be mediated by our other social identities, this certainly does not mean that such an identity is impotent. Turner (1984) for example, was well aware of the intense emotions national identity can engender - these are particularly noticeable in times of war. Furthermore, Turner, like a number of other researchers, was impressed by the ability of national identity to unite a previously divided populace. For these reasons, he had no doubt that nations can and do constitute meaningful psychological groups, a conclusion which we readily endorse. The current research attempts to examine how national identity might be mediated, taking the specific examples of British and Italian identity. Clearly, the question of the applicability of the Social Identity paradigm to large-scale categories will require further detailed and varied examination.

## 2.2 Hewstone's (1986) study of attitudes to the European Community

Given that European integration has been on and off the political agenda for a number of decades now, it is somewhat surprising to note the relatively scant attention social psychologists have paid to this subject area. Since Hewstone's (1986) detailed and thoughtful consideration of attitudes towards the European Community represents one of the most significant social psychological analyses of European integration to emerge in recent years, we will examine aspects of this study in some depth. It would seem that Hewstone's primary aim was to develop a model predicting overall attitude towards the Community. However, his monograph is noteworthy for its attempts to examine a number of related issues, such as national stereotypes, social representations of the European Community, and relevant work conducted in the other social sciences. Paradoxically, this very strength of Hewstone's work - namely its apparent scope - is also in some respects its weakness, since Hewstone does not show particularly well how stereotypes, identity, social representations, and attitudes might be interlinked. As Hewstone readily admits, his study does not show where these attitudes "come from" - i.e., how they are formed, how they might change, etc. There seem good reasons to expect attitudes to be linked to social identity processes. In particular, attitudes may well be learnt and internalized via the process of *self-stereotyping* (Turner, 1987). One might go on to predict that, as our social identities fluctuate in *salience*, so to do the related attitudes. Clearly, such ideas are in need of further empirical investigation, but are at least suggestive of how identity and attitudes might be interlinked (see also Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

It is worth briefly examining at this point, the responses of the British and Italian respondents in Hewstone's study, since the current research focuses on the same populations. It is of particular interest to note that Hewstone found his Italian respondents to have a more favourable attitude towards the E.C. than the British. This result is in fact compatible with trends apparent in the European Community *Eurobaromètre* series of opinion polls. This is doubly interesting since the Italians also appeared to be the most ethnocentric in terms of stereotyping and liking ratings. However, whilst the Italians rated their own *nationality* highly, they rated the other *nations* in the study more positively than their own. As mentioned earlier,

this might suggest that, at least for the Italians, images of one's nationality and one's nation can be divergent - at least in terms of general evaluations. What is interesting to examine is whether this relatively inferior rating of the Italian nation by Italians may be linked in some way to their strong support for the European Community. Unfortunately, Hewstone's analysis does not allow us an understanding of what particular aspects of the Italian nation the Italians may be dissatisfied with.

Interestingly, Barzini (1983) had earlier suggested that the Italians were strong pro-Europeans since the European Community was seen as offering a possible alternative to unstable and often inefficient Italian governments. Hewstone (1986) also suggested that the Italians might support the E.C. strongly since they perceive it as good for Italy - there are indications, for example, that "objectively", Italy may be the only nation with net economic gains from the Community. Both Barzini and Hewstone's explanations of Italian pro-Europeanism would therefore suggest that the Italians do not perceive the E.C. as an alternative to Italy, but rather as an institution which can strengthen the Italian nation, and make up for some of its faults. This interpretation is further supported by Hewstone's finding that national image and attitude towards the E.C. were positively correlated for his Italian respondents. We hope that the measures of national and European identity in the current study might further elucidate the nature of Italian support for the European Community.

In stark contrast to the Italians, the British, according to the *Eurobaromètre* polls, are the only nation to have a large minority who believe the United Kingdom should actually leave the Community. Furthermore, in contrast to the Italians in Hewstone's study, for the British respondents, national image was *negatively* correlated with overall attitude towards the E.C. There are a number of indications that the issue of sovereignty is particularly salient to the British - in the 1979 *Eurobaromètre* for example, the British respondents were alone amongst their E.C. partners in expressing concern about the encroachment of the European Parliament upon Britain's national parliament.

Hewstone highlights at least four interlinked reasons for the relatively low levels of support for the Community in Britain. Firstly, he notes how historical factors such as the decline of the British empire may have encouraged the view that threats to Britain's sovereignty are indicative of how advancing European integration might further reduce the United Kingdom's power and prestige. One might also add that social representations linked to the time of the British Empire are likely to have considerable longevity, and to remain with us, and affect more recent representations of Britain and its current status, role in world affairs and so on. In other words, social representations associated with the time of the British empire may form the representational foundations into which modern-day views of Britain are anchored. Such a view is compatible with Crick's suggestion that Britain continues to have an exaggerated sense of power and importance as a result of the aftermath of the British empire (Crick, 1991). Hewstone also pointed to the long history of British distrust of the French - this will be significant if the British perceive France and the European Community to be closely associated with each other.

A further important point made by Hewstone is that British politicians past and present, who we may assume represent important "opinion leaders" (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944), have expressed anti-European sentiments more frequently and to a greater degree than in other European nations. There has certainly been heated political debate as to what Britain's role should be in a unified Europe. Such political debate is likely to have a significant effect upon the social representations, attitudes, and so on, expressed by the general public, since it continues to gain considerable media attention. We note with interest here, Hewstone's (1986) finding that Britain was the only nation in his study where political affiliation was significantly linked to attitude towards the E.C. Since the mass media of television and newspapers constitute the primary source of information on the E.C. and European matters for the general public, it becomes imperative to study the varying social representations being diffused in this way, and how they are internalized by individuals and groups.

We find it both disappointing and surprising that much of the work conducted in the social identity paradigm continues to ignore the mass media,

especially since Turner himself suggested that one of the likely ways new identities might be internalized is via "persuasive communications" (Turner, 1987). Hewstone made a modest start by pointing to the way the mass media in the United Kingdom seem to encourage perceptions of the E.C. and European integration in terms of "gains versus losses". He also noted how the metaphors associated with the E.C. are often predominantly negative in evaluative undertone - witness "butter mountains", "wine lakes", "cod wars", "bureaucracy", etc. It is however, rather disappointing to note how Hewstone seems to have reduced the richness of his open-ended questionnaire responses to a simple positive-negative affective dimension.

Clearly then, despite important historical and sociological factors, it is still highly valuable to investigate some of the social psychological reasons behind the apparently quite different orientations to Europe adopted by the British and the Italians. In the following chapters, some of the factors behind such differences will be explored, and it will be suggested that Hewstone and Barzini have perhaps stressed the instrumental elements of orientations towards Europe too greatly, especially when considering the Italians and their boundless enthusiasm for Europe.

### *2.3 Elements of European identity*

One useful way to examine the psychological effects of European integration is to focus on changes in *identity*. If we consider national and European identities to be social categorizations in the Turner-esque sense, we might examine how these interact. We might, for example, ask whether these categorizations/identities are *consonant, dissonant, or indifferent?* (Hofman, 1988). Guetzkow (1955) suggested that two identities can exist together harmoniously if each one furnishes compatible solutions to different needs. One conceptual problem with such issues concerns the level of analysis at which they are examined. Turner (1987), for example, defines the self-concept as "the set of *cognitive representations* of self available to a person" (Turner, 1987, p.44, our emphasis).

This would suggest that one level of analysis would be the individual-cognitive level, with the primary focus on "cognitive representations of self". We would like to suggest that schema theory (e.g. Crocker et al., 1984), and especially the notion of *schema perseverance*, might in the future provide useful pointers as to the nature of changes in self-categorization at the cognitive level. For example, if we can treat national identity *at one level of analysis* as a schema-like construct, then schema perseverance would suggest that national identity might be quite difficult to change and modify. This is clearly an important issue, especially if the development of a European identity is dependent upon changes and modifications to national identity schemata.

There are numerous problems with a purely cognitive approach to social identity, not least of which is the danger of neglecting both its shared element, and likely association with social representations. However, it is certainly not being suggested here that social identity theory be reduced to a *purely* cognitive level of analysis. At the same time, we note the frequent dissociation of social and cognitive psychology with disappointment. One of Turner's (1987) most crucial points was that the social (i.e. group membership) is represented in the cognitive. For this reason we actually see Turner's Self-Categorization Theory as a useful attempt at integrating cognitive and social levels of analysis. As Turner himself suggested, "...if the self is a cognitive system, then it is a socially mediated one, one that reflects and interacts with social relations" (Turner, 1988, p.115). The problem here is that it is somewhat debatable as to how far Turner has in fact managed to bring the social into his cognitive theorising. At present, it seems that SCT often remains overly-cognitive, although this certainly need not be the case.

Breakwell's (1986) illuminating analysis of threatened identities is also noteworthy here, since it is illustrative of how identity can be examined usefully at a variety of levels. As Doise continues to argue (Doise, 1988; Lorenzi-Cioldi & Doise, 1990), this kind of multi-level approach to social psychology is long-overdue. It remains to be seen whether future research will actually attempt an *integration* of the different levels, something which as yet remains to be achieved for the phenomenon of social identity.

At the social level of analysis, socially constructed and shared interpretations of reality, which have been referred to as *social representations* (Moscovici, 1984), are of key importance for any study of European integration. It seems, for example, intuitively reasonable to hypothesize that the representations of European integration, the E.C., etc., circulating in the mass media and within social groups will have significant effects on national and European identity structures. Furthermore, it is likely that particular groups within a nation will endorse and attempt to circulate particular representations which serve their own ends. If national identity is mediated by smaller-scale identities as Zavalloni (1973) suggested, it is likely that particular sub-groups will have their own varying social representations of the nation, its people, customs, etc. This is just one example of how social representations are likely to be inherently linked to processes of social identity.

Whilst Tajfel and Turner's seminal 1979 paper on macro-level intergroup relations tended to focus on conflict between groups, it contains a number of useful conceptual tools for the current analysis of European integration. Thus, for example, it seems likely that perceptions of the *permeability* of national group boundaries will be significant for the question of whether a European identity might ever replace a national identity. In addition, the effects of what Tajfel and Turner referred to as social mobility belief structures, upon national and other social identities, seem likely to be significant, although there is as yet little published research on this issue, which is only now beginning to attract the interest of social identity theorists (c.f. Brown et al., 1991;1992). If a European identity was perceived as an alternative, rather than a complementary identity to national allegiance, then the Tajfel-Turner framework would suggest that the conditions most likely to lead to the abandonment of national identity for a European equivalent would be:

1. When national group membership boundaries are seen as permeable - i.e. leaving the group is perceived to be a realistic option.
2. When a social mobility belief structure is accepted.
3. When the current intergroup structure is perceived to be unstable and illegitimate.
4. When a European identity is perceived as a realistic alternative to national identity.
5. When a European identity is perceived to serve social identity needs (e.g. self-esteem) more efficiently than national identity.

Clearly this is a simplistic framework, especially when applied to such a complex issue. Furthermore, the decision process behind a sub-group changing its identity may not be identical to the decision processes an individual utilizes. However, the above framework at least provides a starting-point for an analysis of the kind of factors which might influence the conscious decision to abandon national for European identity. It is of course, by no means being suggested here that the only way a European identity will be adopted is as an alternative to national identity. The point being made here is that the Tajfel-Turner macro-social framework has some useful predictions if this were the case. Furthermore, we perceive the Tajfel-Turner framework to be of value since it acknowledges the significance of social representations of the intergroup milieu.

Accepting that social representations of the nation, Europe, etc., are important determinants of any psychological aspects of European integration, it is interesting to note their apparent persistence and resistance to change (Moscovici, 1984). Even if our perceptions of Europe and our own nations are undergoing change, these changes are likely to be mediated by our previous representations. As Moscovici (1984) argues, the unfamiliar, which is disturbing and threatening, is

typically interpreted in terms of the familiar - this is the process of *anchoring*. It is interesting to note how the idea of an integrated Europe is far from a recent one, but has fluctuated in salience for thousands of years. This is an important point, and one indicative of the danger of focusing on social representations of the European Community to the exclusion of other relevant social representations. Whilst the European Community may be the major vehicle through which European integration is being achieved, social representations of Europe are likely to have been present for hundreds, if not thousands of years. Furthermore, European integration comprises a myriad of different aspects apart from the political, such as improvements in communication and transport networks (e.g. the Channel Tunnel), increased contact with other Europeans due to tourism, etc.

The application of the theory of social representations to the study of European integration might benefit the theory itself by encouraging an analysis of the processes through which social representations change. As mentioned earlier, we would like to suggest, as an extension of Goffman's (1968) analysis of changes in identity structure at the individual level, that changes in social representations are likely to involve re-interpretations of the past, present, and future, in order to make these temporal elements as congruent as possible. Changes in key social representations - such as those of the nation - are likely to have significant reverberations within a society, since social representations tend to be interconnected in a web of socially constructed meaning. Changes in especially central social representations might have consequences not unlike those proposed by Thomas Kuhn in his theory of paradigmatic change within scientific institutions (Kuhn, 1970).

Victor Turner's illuminating work on ritual (Turner, 1969) would also seem to be relevant here. Heavily influenced by van Gennep (1960), Turner noticed how changes in identity in many diverse societies seem to involve similar processes. For the individual, this often involves a period of *liminality* during which s/he leaves the social structure and enters a norm-less, role-less, state of limbo, possessing no definite sense of identity. Eventually, the individual re-emerges with a new identity - this "coming-out" process is typically marked by cathartic rituals in what have

been called "primitive" societies. What is significant for the current discussion is Turner's suggestion that whole communities may pass through states of liminality.

It is interesting to postulate as to whether European nations are currently entering such a stage in which identities are being re-moulded and perhaps new identities formulated. Turner's analysis indicates that such processes of identity change tend to follow certain patterns for both individuals and social groups. Furthermore, his work suggests that we would be foolish to disregard the ritualistic aspects of nationalism in the Western industrialized world - military parades, national anthems, flag-waving, and so on.

It certainly seems to be the case that European and national identities are in a state of flux at present, with the fate of one being tightly bound-up with that of the other. Political and economic integration in Europe has given rise to new social constructions of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), new social representations of Europe, some of which are compatible with existing notions of nationhood, others which seek to construe national and European identities as incompatible. At the same time, one should note that existing social representations of nations and Europe constitute a context and background within which new social representations may be negotiated. These new representations may therefore derive in part from a re-working of existing social beliefs.

A further interesting issue raised by the social identity paradigm refers to the question of out-groups. An assumption common to both Tajfel and Turner's accounts is that in order to identify oneself as a member of a particular group, there must be meaningful outgroups which allow for intergroup comparisons. This raises interesting questions for the emergence of a European identity (presuming one does not already exist). It is hoped that the present study might elicit some of the relevant outgroups for a European identity. An analysis of the latter should then indicate at what *level* European identity operates. For example, is Europe compared with other nations or continents? The level at which social comparisons are made should also have noticeable reverberations in the social stereotypes and representations of Europe and the European Community circulating within society. If national and European identities operate at different levels in this way, they

should not become salient at the same time (Turner, 1987). We would thus expect their salience to be linked to different situations, different outgroups, and so on.

If national and European identities operate at different levels (e.g. national versus continental) then this might be one way in which both identities may be internalized by individuals without any integrative problems. In fact, Turner's SCT and Oakes' model of salience both suggest that social identities linked to quite different and sometimes opposing social representations can be internalized by individuals without causing problems, as long as the two identities are seldom or never salient at the same time. If social representations are linked to social groups, it is therefore possible that individuals might adhere to quite different views about their own nation, European integration, etc., depending on whether their national or European identities are currently salient.

Whilst commentators have tended to express guarded optimism for the prospects of a European sense of identity, some have argued that such an identity is within reach of most Europeans. Inglehart (1967, 1970a,b, 1971, 1977) argues that, at least amongst the youth of Europe, there is already evidence for a sense of supra-national European identity. Inglehart's optimism appears to be shared by both the original architects of the Community, and the authors of recent official Community publications (see, for example, CEC, 1985), which appear to reflect the belief that a common European identity is already flourishing across Europe. To the extent that such assumptions might discourage further efforts to foster a Euro-identity, they might have the somewhat ironic effect of actually reducing the chances of such loyalties developing, if, as seems to be the case at least in Britain, they are in fact in a very embryonic and critical stage, marked by the possibility of both their development or their rejection.

#### *2.4 British perceptions of European integration: are we really Barzini's (1983) "reluctant Europeans" ?*

In fact, when one examines more closely the record of British public opinion on European integration and the EC, it becomes clear that the British have certainly

not embraced the European dream with the same fervour as some of the other nations in the EC (e.g. Italy). Commentators such as Jowell and Hoinville (1976) have noticed the particularly emotional way in which the British have often sought to defend their sovereignty from the perceived threat posed by the EC (see also Eurobaromètres 2,3,4, which show that the British tend to prefer action taken by sovereign states above collective European action). When Britain joined the EC in 1973 it did so in a half-hearted manner, still mourning the loss of empire (Lewis, 1987). Upon entry to the EC, only 37 per cent of Britons polled were favourable to efforts to unify Europe - half the level of support witnessed in France, West Germany and Italy (Inglehart & Reif, 1991). Perceptions that, following its late entrance into the EC, the UK was being asked to contribute unfair amounts to EC coffers, seemed to come to a head in 1975 when the first nation-wide referendum in the UK posed the question of whether the UK should remain in what was then usually referred to as the Common Market. Some 17 million Britons voted "Yes", compared to 8 million who voted "No", apparently indicating a willingness to give the Common Market a chance to fulfil its ambitious aims.

Politically, the issue of EC membership and European integration has sometimes followed party political lines in Britain, however support has waxed and waned such that at times, there have been few clear-cut party differentiations (c.f. Himmelweit et al., 1981; MacFarlane, 1981). This floating, changeable quality of British political reactions to Europe appears to be mirrored in many attitudinal measures of British support for the EC (Pinder, 1991). Whilst far from clear-cut, Eurobaromètre data indicate that there is a slight tendency, across the Community, for those on the left of the political spectrum to evince slightly more positive attitudes towards the EC and integration than those on the right (see, for example, Eurobaromètre #34).

Despite a perceptible long-term trend indicative of increasing British support for the EC, Eurobaromètre surveys almost always show the British as possessing a markedly lower level of attitudinal support for both the Community and integration, than most of the other EC member states (see also Hewstone, 1986). Pinder (1991) has recently suggested, for example, that Britain usually has a ten per cent mean deficit from the rest of the Community in enthusiasm and support for

the EC and integration. It should not be forgotten, however, as Hewstone (1986) stresses, that there always seems to be net support for the EC in Britain. Whether this is a trend set to continue indefinitely is something of a moot point. Hewstone, himself usually eager to stress that the British are far from anti-European, nevertheless recently concluded that "there is a lack of a reliable reservoir of support for the Community in the U.K." (Hewstone, 1991, p.82). Recent polls seem to indicate a slight wane of British support for the EC - for example, Eurobaromètre data for December 1990 (Eurobaromètre #34) indicated that only 53 per cent of Britons polled thought EC membership was a good thing, this being the lowest level of support of all EC nations. More recently still, in the wake of Danish doubts about Maastricht, an N.O.P. opinion poll conducted for the Independent on Sunday, 20<sup>th</sup> September, 1992, indicated that if the British had a referendum on the Maastricht treaty, they might reject it by a margin of at least two to one. Of those polled, 47 per cent indicated that they would reject the treaty, whilst only 24 per cent supported it. In-keeping with the general trends apparent in the Eurobaromètre, Conservative voters were more strongly opposed to the treaty than respondents of other political orientations. Despite the problems inherent in judging the import of such public opinion surveys, what is perhaps most noticeable is how the results of this survey were quite congruent with those of other surveys conducted at the time, all of which tended to indicate a rather low level of pro-Europeanism amongst the British.

One of the problems, however, for the current discussion of European identity, is how questions of *identity* tend to have been overshadowed by questions of *attitudes and opinions*, especially in the otherwise highly informative Eurobaromètre surveys (see Hewstone 1991 for an evaluation of the Eurobaromètre and its merits). When the question "Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe? Often, sometimes or never?" was posed in polls 17 and 19, large groups of respondents (especially in the UK) "never" thought of themselves as citizens of Europe. A further question of interest asked whether respondents felt the EC should go further than a single Common market. It is interesting when considering the possibility of a European identity being embraced by the British, to note how some 57 per cent of British respondents in 1988 suggested that the EC should NOT go further than a common market, with only 24 per cent being in favour of going

further. This contrasts sharply with the responses of the Italians in the 1988 poll, which indicated that some 71 per cent were in favour of going beyond a common market, with only 12 per cent being against such moves (c.f. Eurobaromètre 29). Compatible results were obtained by Furnham & Gunter (1989) in a study of British adolescents' attitudes towards the EC and integration. Here, it emerged that such adolescents were not at all keen on closer political union, instead feeling that the economic dimension of integration was the most important.

Eurobaromètre and similar attitudinal indices provide data which is broadly congruent with that emerging from Sotirakopoulou's detailed analysis of social representations of European integration (Sotirakopoulou, 1991). In general, Sotirakopoulou found little evidence to suggest even an embryonic sense of European identity in Britain. In-keeping with Hewstone's results, she discovered that her measures of nationalism were negatively correlated with views about the EC and unification. Britain was often perceived as superior to most or all other nations, with other European nations appearing to constitute outgroups for the British, in the sense that comparisons were made with such nations. Furthermore, in a valuable analysis of Times and Guardian representations of European integration, Sotirakopoulou found that these two newspapers, supposedly of rather different ideological inclinations, in fact carried rather similar, and, significantly, negative, representations of the EC and integration. Certainly, it was discovered that the public concern with issues of sovereignty was mirrored in the press - according to Sotirakopoulou, social representations in the press suggested that "National identity and sovereignty, as well as everything that the British people are proud of, are in danger from the E.C." (Sotirakopoulou, 1991, p.180).

### *2.5 A European identity for the 90s?*

It seems to be the case that the majority of commentators remain somewhat sceptical as to the likelihood of a harmonious integration of national and European identity. Barzini (1983) for example, concluded that national pride continues to remain a powerful obstacle to European integration, and even where respondents in survey studies seem to evince pro-EC attitudes, this does not necessarily signify

an accompanying sense of European *identity*. It is significant that Hewstone (1986), himself often eager to stress British *attitudinal* support for the Community, nevertheless suggests that the forging of a supra-national *identity* seems "a Herculean task" (Hewstone, 1986, p.13).

Social Psychologists interested in this area face the added problem that the expression of pro-European opinions may in some instances be due to impression management (Hewstone, 1986). However, while there may be evidence which suggests societal pressures to *express* a pro-European orientation, this does raise the question of whether the mere expression of such opinions, even in the context of impression management, might actually lead to their eventual internalization (c.f. Bem, 1972). We note with interest Turner's (1987) likening of self-categorizations to attitudes, and his suggestion that acting in terms of a particular self-categorization might lead, in time, to its internalization.

Within the International Relations and Political Science literature, there has grown the tendency to stress the importance of "identity units" (e.g. Burton, 1985) and how the interests of the latter tend to be overlooked by large-scale bodies such as nations and supra-national organizations. Many theorists remain ambivalent as to whether international communities can be made to serve the needs of such identity groups and thereby maintain a sense of equilibrium and world order. In fact some go as far as to suggest that even nation-states, in their modern multi-ethnic guise, are inherently unstable structures, which should be replaced by decentralized modes of organization.

Anthony Smith (1991;1992) suggests that national identity is unlikely to ever be fully replaced by a wider European identity. For Smith, allegiance to one's nation provides the most fundamental of all social identities. This, he argues, is largely because it offers a common bond between all members of a nation, and in addition, offers citizens a stable sense of continuity and immortality. Whilst recognizing the globalizing tendencies of world-spanning corporations and advances in communications technology, Smith suggests that the latter have the paradoxical effect of actually enhancing the salience of national identities, since they simply involve a re-working of existing national symbolic forms. For Smith,

perhaps the only way a European identity might develop is through the development of "pan-nationalism", which involves movements to create a single cultural and political community on the basis of states perceived to belong to a "family of cultures" which share certain cultural characteristics. Such a European identity would probably complement, rather than replace, national sentiments.

A.D. Smith (1992) suggests that further research examine the representations of Europe and European integration in the mass media, history textbooks, and so on, and criticizes attitude-oriented and similar research which has focused on individuals. What he fails to realize is that, whilst a study of symbolic forms is extremely valid, we also need to gain an awareness of how individuals and social groups interact with, interpret, and attempt to disseminate, symbols. Furthermore, a focus on the interactions between social groups and symbols would seem valid - as Tajfel (1984) argued, we can not gain a clear understanding of social myths without at the same time examining the intergroup milieu in which they were disseminated, and in which they are currently interpreted.

It is also important to appreciate that national identity and its related symbols, mythology, and so on, are represented in the minds of individuals as well as in the pages of newspapers and books. As Farr (1993) has suggested, in order to appreciate social representations, we must sample both culture *and* cognition. Perhaps one of the most important challenges facing Social Psychology in the future will be to develop our understanding of how individual and society interact. We would like to suggest that one of the theoretical tools which might point us in the right direction is the Social Identity paradigm.

In the next chapter the rationale for an empirical investigation of some of the issues raised earlier is presented. This research should be interpreted as an element of the wider research programme described throughout the following chapters. The aim of this programme is to provide a social psychological perspective on at least some of the issues arising from European integration. This has the additional benefit of enabling us to raise some crucial questions pertaining to the current adequacy of the social identity paradigm. The perspective associated with the empirical research shortly to be described is meant to complement that

**provided by sociologists, political scientists, and other researchers, to add a piece to the jigsaw, but not to replace or be an alternative to this existing body of research.**

# Chapter 3

## THE DESIGN OF THE CROSS-NATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE

### 3.1 METHOD

The research reported herein derived from a questionnaire-based study investigating aspects of national and European identity. The questionnaire was administered to university and polytechnic students in the United Kingdom and Italy.

### 3.2 PROCEDURE

#### 3.2.1 Respondents

Respondents were university and polytechnic students from a variety of disciplines, mainly studying at the various colleges of the University of London in the U.K., and at the University of Bologna in Italy. Due to the nature of the questionnaire, it was necessary to limit respondents to current British and Italian nationals. Owing to the limited resources available it was not possible to utilize sampling procedures, and it should be recognized that the respondents did not constitute a representative sample of students, or the general population (British and Italian nationals). Respondents were recruited on a volunteer basis, with the research described as "a questionnaire-based study of opinions about Britain/Italy and Europe". Overall there were 107 British respondents (63 female, 44 male), and 137 Italian respondents (99 female, 38 male). Demographic data for these respondents is presented in Chapters 4 & 5, respectively.

It is fully acknowledged here that the use of students may introduce a source of error when attempting to make generalisations to the population as a

whole - Sears (1986) amongst others has suggested that university students may constitute a far from representative sample. However, a case could be made for utilizing students when attempting to make generalizations about the nature of social processes which are postulated to exist across whole societies. Whilst the questionnaire discussed here explores aspects of identity and stereotypes, its focus is intended to be primarily directed at the consummate processes involved, rather than the contents of stereotypes, or the evaluative nature of attitudes in the populations concerned. This argument can also be extended to counter some of the problems associated with the possibility of volunteer bias (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1970).

Since we have identified some of the possible pitfalls involved in utilizing a student sample, it is perhaps fitting to highlight how there are also some benefits attached to the use of student respondents. The current questionnaire, for example, makes use of open-ended questions. Whilst university students are unrepresentative of the population in that they are likely to be more literate, at the same time this means that significant differences in open-ended responses between respondents should not be simply due to differences in linguistic ability. It may also be the case that university students might be more likely to actually have attitudes, opinions, etc., about European integration, and not be simply responding in a random fashion, as Converse's (1964;1970) notion of the non-attitude might suggest.

In fact, Hewstone (1986), who utilized a similar student sample in his research on closely related issues, made the more general point that the use of university students allows us to control for the effect of different levels of education, as well as providing a relatively homogeneous age distribution. He found the results of his own research to be broadly comparable with that of the European Community Eurobaromètre ongoing survey, which is based on much larger, representative samples. In the case of the current study, the use of a university student sample also allows us to make comparisons with Hewstone's (1986) data. It is, of course, recognized that comparisons with previous research must be interpreted with caution, not least because the current questionnaire differs

in a number of respects from those typically utilized in this subject area (Turner & Krauss, 1978).

### 3.2.2 Pilot work

The questionnaire utilized in the current study was the product of extensive background research into the social science literature associated with the phenomena of national and European identity, stereotypes, European integration, and the general functioning of identity processes. Whilst some specific hypotheses were under consideration (detailed in the corresponding description of the related questions), in general the questionnaire served an exploratory function, not least because many of the issues explored had not been raised by previous researchers in quite the way done here. As the biologist Szent-Gyorgyi (1971) has emphasized, such exploratory endeavours are a crucial aspect of the scientific approach. This is even more so in cases where the particular subject domain is broad and only poorly defined.

In fact, it is suggested here that the subject focused on in the current research deserves a variety of different methodological approaches in recognition of both its significance and its likely complexity. In any case, as Campbell and Stanley (1966) have emphasized, a multi-method approach has the benefit of allowing one to assess the concurrent validity of one's research findings, and to appreciate and allow for the error variance associated with the particular research techniques employed. Therefore, the aim of the current research is to elicit some of the processes associated with social identity functioning, in the hope that these processes might be isolated and studied in greater depth at a later date using different research methods.

Pilot studies were utilized to assess, amongst other things, the appropriateness of question format and wording, the adequacy of instructions, and the average completion time for the questionnaire. Both interview and self-completion methods of administration were utilized during pilot work, with interviews proving especially important in assessing question comprehension. Pilot work was conducted in both the U.K. and Italy, and the functions served by the

pilot work in terms of the cross-national aspects of the questionnaire are examined later in the discussion.

### **3.2.3 Method of Administration**

The questionnaire, as mentioned earlier, consisted of both open and closed-type questions, and was specifically constructed with self-completion in mind. Whilst self-completion often presents a number of difficulties (Moser & Kalton, 1971; Hoinville et al., 1978) - especially when open-ended responses are required - many of the associated drawbacks may be overcome through the use of a "controlled administration" technique, as utilized for the purposes of the current study. Such a technique involves respondents (who in this case were volunteers) completing the questionnaire in fairly large groups in a quiet, distraction-free environment, and under the supervision of the researcher and his/her assistants. This technique at least ensures that the respondent who completes the questionnaire is the one expected by the researcher, that the respondent completes the questionnaire alone (i.e. without discussion with peers), and that it is completed in a single sitting. Additionally, preliminary pilot work indicated that the controlled administration method also seems to discourage the answering of questions out of sequence, and to reduce the willingness to read ahead of the current question. Self-completion has the added benefit of reducing the possible error variance associated with interviewer bias. This is not to say, however, that self-completion questionnaires are necessarily free from what might be labelled "reactivity bias". The U.K. and Italian data were collected simultaneously between March and April of 1991 using the controlled administration procedure outlined above.

It should be noted that, in order to facilitate controlled administration of the questionnaires within lectures, some of the questions contained in the British questionnaire were omitted from the Italian variant. This meant that the section prefixes which appear in the Italian questionnaire may be different to those pertaining to the English-language version. The sections omitted from the Italian questionnaire are indicated in the discussion below.

### **3.2.4 Cross-national aspects of the research**

The problems associated with the design of cross-national research are numerous (see, for example, Manaster & Havighurst, 1972). Where a questionnaire is to be utilized, the most intractable problem will be that of adequate translation (Peabody, 1985; Davis & Jowell, 1989). As Davis and Jowell (1989) emphasize, one can never be sure that a particular question, word, or phrase, will have an equivalent meaning when translated into another language and ultimately answered by a subject in another country.

For Brislin (1970), after a detailed investigation of translation procedures, the crucial factor appeared to be the quality of the translators, who ideally would be familiar with both the relevant languages and the nature of the material to be translated. In a later work, Brislin went on to argue that it is generally better for translators to translate *into* their preferred language (Brislin, 1976). The recommended remedy against nonequivalence in translation is back-translation by a second bilingual, with comparisons being made between the back-translated text and the original, and differences being discussed by the translators.

The Italian version of the current questionnaire was translated by a team of bi-lingual social scientists in both the U.K. and Italy. Particular attention was paid during pilot work in Italy to the comprehension of the questions, and by the end of the piloting period the researcher and translators were satisfied that the Italian and English versions of the questionnaire were as equivalent as the restrictions of the two languages would allow. Most of Brislin's recommendations were implemented where possible, for the purposes of the current research. These included the use of psychologists as translators, translating into preferred language, and the implementation of back-translation. In addition, key issues, such as the nature of national and European identities, were addressed by means of multiple measures, meaning that a weak translation of one question should not invalidate all information pertaining to the issue (c.f. Hofstede, 1980).

When cross-national differences emerge in comparative studies, considerable caution must be exercised in their interpretation, since they may simply represent

measurement error associated with translation problems, or simply differences between the languages. Furthermore, a whole myriad of cultural, demographic, and other variables may be operating on the data, adding further complexity to any possible interpretation.

Nevertheless, as long as the researcher is aware of the consummate problems inherent in cross-national research, the technique may prove extremely valuable, especially where the researcher is interested in making comparisons between nations. The latter allow some kind of assessment of the extremity and strength of attitudes, stereotypes, etc. (Davis & Jowell, 1989). Such an argument is often crudely expressed by the belief that we can gain a better understanding of our own society or culture by comparing it with others. Another useful function of cross-national research is in testing the cross-cultural validity of social psychological theories or hypotheses. As Shweder and Bourne's (1984) revealing study emphasizes, we should not take the cross-cultural validity of major psychological theories (in this case attribution theory) for granted (see also, P.B. Smith, 1991). It is hoped, therefore, that the current study will, amongst other things, provide some measure of the cross-cultural validity of social identity theory.

### **3.2.5 Questionnaire design and construction - some general points**

The reactive nature of questionnaire administration is fully acknowledged by the current researcher. Whilst scientific knowledge concerning questionnaire design and construction remains rather limited (Schuman & Kalton, 1985), the relevant literature was consulted during the design of the current questionnaire. For example, the usual practice of guaranteeing respondent anonymity was followed. It is generally recommended that the anonymity of respondents be stressed, in the hope that this might encourage more open self-reflection and reduce the possibility of social desirability bias (Manstead & Semin, 1988). For similar reasons, the questionnaire instructions stressed that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions, and that the researchers were only interested in opinions and beliefs. It is, however, interesting to note that recently, doubt has been raised as to the pervasiveness of social desirability bias in questionnaires (Schuman & Kalton,

1985) - there is evidence, for example, that we tend to think that our own attitudes are shared by others. It was also hoped that by stressing the important contribution to knowledge respondents were making, this might enhance motivation to complete the questionnaire diligently, answer the questions fully, etc.

The questionnaire made use of both open and closed-type question formats. One of the justifications for using both formats was the exploratory nature of the research - it might well be argued that such exploratory endeavours are most informative if conducted from a number of perspectives. Open-ended questions allow respondents to utilize their own language and subjective frame of reference to formulate an answer. In doing so, they may allow respondents to communicate beliefs which might not have been elicited by closed-type questions (Hoinville et al., 1978). The rich data provided by such answers can then be subjected to content analysis (see, for example, Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990), and the language utilized studied for the use of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and other linguistic devices. Disadvantages associated with open-ended questions include the low reliability and long time-period often associated with the coding of responses.

Closed-type questions suffer less from coding problems, but must be most carefully worded. Furthermore, the interpretation of answers to closed-type responses must proceed with caution, since in this kind of question the researcher, rather than the respondent, has defined the frame of reference in which the question is answered. As Schuman and Kalton (1985) argue, the tendency to forget the latter can be considered an example of the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). Since neither open nor closed questions are problem-free, it was deemed preferable to utilize both types in the spirit of the multi-method approach proposed earlier - the use of multiple indicators for a construct is often a recommended strategy for reducing unwanted response effects.

It was not feasible during the course of the current research to allow for or investigate question order effects. Where possible, question order was designed to minimize boredom (by interspersing different question formats) and the consistency bias sometimes associated with order effects. It is worth noting however, that Schuman and Kalton (1985) came to the conclusion that order effects

are not necessarily common or pervasive, and that in any case, it is rather difficult to control for them.

Pilot work indicated that the questionnaire took on average around 40 minutes to complete (30 minutes for the shorter, Italian variant). Whilst the questionnaire text may seem quite long, separate sub-sections and sectional question numbering were utilized to help reduce the apparent length of the questionnaire as recommended by Hoinville and associates (1978). Additionally, the use of back-to-back printing reduced its perceptible length.

### **3.2.6 The questionnaire: section-by-section breakdown**

There were in fact three variants of the English questionnaire, due to an experimental-type manipulation involving different combinations of stereotype questions. These variants are briefly described below and discussed more fully in the description of section C of the questionnaire.

**Variant 1: Section C.1 asks respondents to rate the British  
Section C.2 asks respondents to rate the Italians**

**Variant 2: Section C asks respondents to rate the British**

**Variant 3: Section C asks respondents to rate the Italians**

There were no other differences between the variants of the questionnaire.

#### ***Section A***

This section contains seven fixed-response questions of an identical format, designed to tap different aspects of national identity. For the purposes of the questionnaire, national identity was treated as an example of one of Turner's self-

categorizations (Turner, 1987). The questions are similar in format to those typically used in the semantic differential scale (Osgood et al., 1957) in that they combine both verbal and diagrammatic dimensions. A seven-point response scale was utilized, with responses providing quantitative measures of national identity.

Question 1, which asks respondents how much they feel British/Italian, and question 5, focusing on the perceived importance of national identity, might be linked to Oakes' (1987) notion of accessibility discussed earlier, or may equate as a more general measure of the current salience of national identity. (Oakes, 1987; Hofman, 1988). The notion of feeling a strong attachment to other group members tapped by question 2 is typical of many theories of identity and group formation (e.g. Tajfel, 1974; Lewin, 1948), and similar questions are often used in studies of social identity (e.g. Brown, 1978). Questions 3 and 7 might be interpreted as tapping the affective aspects of national identity, and as such are important for the traditional Tajfellian definition of social identity (Tajfel, 1974).

Question 4 on perceived similarity to the average British/Italian is interesting since we might predict different results depending on whether or not Codol's (1975) P.I.P. effect (discussed earlier) is operating. If this were the case, the "first among equals" motivation might lead to respondents with high levels of national identity as measured by the other questions in this section, but a low perceived similarity with the average British/Italian.

Question 6 is interesting in that it could tap a number of rather different concepts. The Tajfel and Turner approach to social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;1986) would suggest that strong national identity will be associated with the belief that one's own views about Britain/Italy are those of most British/Italian people - i.e. the group's normative beliefs. However, if Zavalloni's (1973) suggestion that we encounter national identity through the mediation of other identities is correct, then we might not expect views about Britain/Italy to be perceived as shared by all Britons/Italians, but just those who are members of the mediating identity group. Alternatively, Codol's P.I.P. effect might explain the response that one's own views about Britain/Italy are not shared by most other Britons/Italians.

### *Section B*

The questions contained in this section are complementary to those in section A, and focus on some of the qualitative aspects of national identity. Questions 1 and 2 examine what makes respondents pleased to be, or regret being British/Italian. It is hoped that answers to these questions might shed light on the social representations linked to national identity - whether, for example, respondents seem to mention people rather than other attributes of the nation itself.

Question 3, which asks for examples of typical Britons/Italians is an attempt to elicit in-group prototypes (Turner, 1987). It is of particular interest to note whether the prototypes given represent individuals or groups, and whether they include prototypical deviants or "black sheep" (c.f. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988) as suggested earlier in the discussion.

It will also be of interest to compare the affective tone of responses to all three questions with the responses to the national identity measures in section A. Should these questions produce interesting responses it might encourage social psychologists working within the social identity theory framework to appreciate the value of utilizing both open and closed-type question formats. The questions in this section could readily be adapted to another identity group besides that of nationality.

### *Section C (this section was omitted from the Italian study)*

The contents of this section, which was concerned with national and international stereotype processes, varied depending on the particular version of the questionnaire :

*Version 1:* This version contained two separate sections. The first section, C.1, presented respondents with a list of ten trait adjectives, and asked them to estimate what percentage of their own national populace possessed each trait. This question is virtually identical to that used by Hewstone (1986), with the only difference

being a slight change in the wording of the instructions, and the addition of an importance-rating task at the end. Hewstone's format was utilized in order to allow a direct comparison with his data, and therefore some indication of any possible chronological changes which might be occurring. It is, however, noted here that the interpretation of this kind of comparison must be undertaken with care.

Whilst the limitations of trait-based approaches to stereotypes have been emphasized throughout this discussion, this type of format is used here in order to study the processes behind stereotype functioning, rather than the actual contents of stereotypes themselves, which are perhaps more amenable to open-ended question formats. The instructions for section C.1 made it clear that respondents would, after rating their own nationality, be given the task of rating a foreign nationality (the Italians). It was hoped that these instructions would make the comparative nature of the task salient to respondents while they were rating their own and the foreign nationality. Section C.2 goes on to present respondents with the task of rating the foreign nationality on the same set of adjectives. It is postulated here, following the earlier discussion of stereotypes, that the stereotypes elicited in this comparative context are likely to be different to those elicited in a non-comparative context. In particular, it is predicted that respondents will accentuate those traits thought to be most important in differentiating their own nationality from the Italians (c.f. Hogg & Turner, 1987).

Whilst any foreign nationality could have been chosen for section C.2, Hewstone's (1986) results indicated that the British seem to differentiate themselves quite strongly from the Italians, at least in terms of likeability. Furthermore, research into national stereotypes also suggests that the British perceive their national character as quite different to the "Latin" temperament exemplified by the Italians (see, for example, Peabody, 1985). This being the case the Italians were used as examples of a foreign nationality in section C.2.

*Version 2:* This version only presented respondents with the task of rating their own nationality group on the ten adjectives.

**Version 3:** This version only presented respondents with the task of rating a foreign nationality group (the Italians) on the ten adjectives.

**Section D (this section was omitted from the Italian study)**

This section of the questionnaire required respondents to rate how well each of the ten trait adjectives presented in section C could be said to describe their own character. It is hoped that by this stage in the questionnaire, respondents' most salient social identities will be their national identities. This being the case, it is anticipated that self-stereotypes will be influenced by national identity. Again, it is the processes involved in this self-stereotyping procedure (Turner et al., 1987) which are our primary focus. In particular, it is interesting to examine the similarities between national and self-stereotype ratings, and the possible interactions between these ratings and the national identity measures contained in section A. The Tajfel-Turner social identity approach would predict that a strong national identity should be associated with self-stereotyping of the perceived national attributes. However, as suggested earlier, Codol's (1975) P.I.P. effect may prove a mediating influence here. Whilst this question keeps to the Hewstone-type format, it was not in fact posed by Hewstone in his own study (Hewstone, 1986).

**Section E (this section was omitted from the Italian study)**

Respondents are requested in this section to rate each of the ten trait adjectives from sections C and D on an evaluative dimension. Again, this task derives from Hewstone's (1986) earlier study and keeps closely to his original format, which in this case involves seven-point scales with anchoring labels of "extremely good" and "extremely bad". Answers to this section allow the responses to the stereotype questions in sections C and D to be scored for evaluative content, as described in Chapter four.

### *Section F*

In this section respondents are presented with the task of rating pairs of concepts in terms of similarity, on the standard seven-point rating scales used in previous sections of the questionnaire. The concepts included in the task were: *Myself; Britain; Italy; France; Germany; and The European Community*. Whilst the task might seem intuitively rather difficult and ill-defined, previous research (e.g. Liebkind, 1982) has shown that the similarity-rating approach is generally straightforward for subjects and quite promising in eliciting interesting results. In addition, pilot work for the current questionnaire failed to elicit any problems with the similarity judgement task. All possible combinations were presented, allowing for a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) of the responses. Such an analysis will prove especially useful in assessing aspects of the representations of the European community, respondent's self concepts, and so on. The inclusion of self, Britain, and Italy will allow for the study of possible associations between stereotypes and similarity measures, whilst the inclusion of France and Germany, the other two members of the "big-four" of the E.C., allows a comparison with Hewstone's (1986) stereotype measures. The inclusion of the European Community as a concept allows for the study of possible associations between the similarity judgements and European identity as measured by section H.1. of the questionnaire.

### *Section G*

The two open-ended questions in this section focused on the perceived role of one's own nation in Europe, and the role of Europe in world affairs. Both questions examine aspects of the social representations of one's own nation, Europe, and the European Community, held by respondents. They may also tap a wider ideological-type structure such as that of world-views (Scott, 1965) discussed earlier. It is also hoped that answers to these questions might elicit outgroups for national and European identity.

### *Section H.1*

The questions in this section are concerned with European identity. They are identical in every way to those in section A, apart from the substitution of the words "Europe" and "European" where applicable. The inclusion of separate measures of both national and European identities in the questionnaire allows for a number of comparisons to be made. As discussed earlier, for example, Hewstone's (1986) earlier work suggests that British and European identity may be negatively correlated, whereas there is evidence for a positive correlation between Italian and European identity. Similarly, it will be of some interest to note the relationships between the similarity judgements and identity measures, as well as the qualitative answers to section G on the role of one's own nation within Europe, and Europe's role in world affairs.

### *Section H.2*

The two open-ended questions in this section attempt to examine whether particular significant others or reference groups are perceived to share the respondents' views about their own nation and Europe. In particular, it is hoped that responses might shed light on Zavalloni's (1973) contention that other groups serve to mediate our national identity, by at least identifying the kind of groups likely to fulfil this mediating role. Similarly, responses will be of relevance to Brewer and Schneider's (1990) assertion that large-scale social categories tend towards subgrouping.

Question 3 is a variant of the routine voting intentions-type question, with the addition of instructions allowing respondents to answer with a "not vote" response. Schuman and Kalton (1985) have suggested that in general, answers to this type of question prove quite successful predictors of actual voting behaviour. Question 4, which utilizes the seven-point fixed response scale common to other questions, focuses on the perceived importance for respondents of their political beliefs. It will be of some interest to examine possible differences in national and European identity across different political groupings, as well as the relationship

between these differences and the perceived importance of political beliefs. As mentioned earlier, whilst Zavalloni (1973) suggested that political beliefs have an important relationship with national identity, Hewstone (1986) found that political beliefs were only significant for his British sample. It will therefore be interesting to note whether the current research supports the assertions of Zavalloni or Hewstone.

### *Section I*

The questions in this section concentrate on respondents' attitudes and opinions about the future of Europe and European integration. All the questions are of the fixed-response variety, and stick closely to the formats already used in previous sections of the questionnaire.

Question 1 utilizes Hewstone's (1986) exact wording and format to assess the respondent's overall attitude towards the European Community. The researcher thought it interesting to also include an identically-worded question on overall attitude towards European integration (question 4), in order to assess how closely related the responses would be to those for question 1.

Questions 2 and 3, which examine interest in European affairs and frequency with which respondents discuss European matters with other people, are perhaps especially open to social desirability bias (c.f. Hewstone, 1986). It is however, worth noting that one might at least expect respondents who express a reasonable degree of interest in European affairs to actually possess attitudes about Europe, thus perhaps negating the possibility of responses merely linked to non-attitudes (Converse, 1964;1970). Furthermore, one might reasonably expect the attitudes associated with subjects discussed frequently with others to represent salient and important attitudes for the holder (c.f. Eiser & van der Pligt, 1983).

Question 5 was intended to elicit the compatibility between respondents' views about their own nation, what it represents, what its future should be, etc., and their views about Europe. One would hope that responses to this question will

be associated with attitudes towards European integration and the European Community, as well as the general national and European identity measures.

Question 6 examines respondents' reactions to the hypothetical replacement of their own national anthem and flag with a European Community equivalent. It is hoped that the relationship between responses to this question and responses to the identity measures might shed light on the significance of symbols in the identity process, as discussed earlier.

Questions 7a and 7b are concerned with examining respondent's commitment to a European super-state. The inclusion of these questions was suggested by a number of studies which have indicated that favourable attitudes towards European integration tend to diminish when the possibility of integration is defined in concrete terms, using examples, etc. The inclusion of a separate subsection measuring how certain respondents are about how they would vote in a referendum concerning a European super-state provides a measure of whether attitudes, etc. concerning European integration are fairly crystallized, or remain in something of an early developmental stage, not unlike Victor Turner's (1969) previously discussed state of "liminality".

Question 8 examines how much respondents feel their national populace have gained from membership of the European Community. Hewstone (1986) interpreted favourable responses to this type of question as indicating utilitarian support for the European Community, and found utilitarian and affective support to be the most significant predictor variables in his model of overall attitude towards the European Community. It will thus be of some interest to note the significance of responses to question 8 in terms of their contribution to the prediction of overall attitude towards the E.C.

*Section J*

In this section, respondents are requested to provide their age, sex, country of origin, and current nationality. In addition, question 5 asks respondents to list any newspapers currently read.

*Section K*

The final section invites respondents to make any comments regarding the questionnaire, placing particular emphasis on comprehension difficulties. As suggested by Hoinville et al. (1978), respondents were informed by the instructions at the beginning of the questionnaire, that space was provided for comments and criticisms in this final section. Obviously, responses to this final section were paid especially close attention during the self-completion trials conducted as pilot work.

The results of the questionnaire study are presented separately, for the British and Italian data. This is congruent with Kuechler's (1987) recommendations, which are to focus on the data for each nation separately, and then to move on to cross-national comparisons at a later stage. Thus, in Chapter Five, the Italian data are discussed, but comparisons are frequently made with the data emerging from the British questionnaires. It is this British data which will be our focus of attention in the next chapter.

# Chapter 4

## The cross-national questionnaire data - 1: the British

### 4.1 SELECTED RESULTS & DISCUSSION

#### 4.1.1 Demographic data

Table 1 below provides details of basic demographic data pertaining to the current study.

Table 1 - Demographic data for British respondents (1991 study)

#### QUESTIONNAIRE VARIANT:

	count	%
1 (rate British only)	38	35.5
2 (rate Italians only)	29	27.1
3 (rate both)	40	37.4 (n=107)

#### SEX:

	count	%
Female	63	58.3
Male	44	40.7

#### AGE:

Mean: 22 years  
Mode: 18 years  
Range: 18-48 years

#### COUNTRY OF ORIGIN:

	count	%
Great Britain	101	94.4
Other	6	5.6

#### PREDICTED VOTE IN GENERAL ELECTION:

	Frequency	Percent
CONSERVATIVE	34	31.8
GREEN	8	7.5
LABOUR	23	21.5
SDLP/LIBERAL	18	16.8
(NOT VOTE)	15	14.0
(MISSING DATA)	9	8.4
	-----	-----
Total	107	100.0

## 4.2 FIXED RESPONSE QUESTIONS

### 4.2.1 Section's (A) and (H.1): British and European identity

Preliminary analysis of descriptive statistics indicated that all of the British identity variables have means close to the neutral scale point of 4, or towards the positive British identity end of the scale. It should be emphasised quite strongly that, due to the limited resources for data collection available, the term British identity could not be broken down into possible constituent elements, such as separate English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh, or indeed, regional, identities (see, for example, Crick, 1991; Parek, 1989). This does not mean that we assume here a homogeneous British identity, but rather that the broad focus of the current research precluded analysis of how British identity might contain sub-identities of this type.

Means for the European Identity variables also tended to converge on the neutral scale point of 4, perhaps reflecting the documented tendency of questionnaire respondents to avoid the extremes of bi-polar scales (Hoinville et al., 1978).

#### *Principal Components Analysis*

In order to examine the relationships between the British identity variables, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was conducted, with a Varimax rotation, on the section A variables. A summary of the results obtained is presented in Table 2 below.

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**Table 2 - Summary of PCA results for section A: British identity**

The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigen value of 4.228, which accounted for 60.4% of the variance; variable loadings on this component were as follows:

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Loading</i>
A1	.841
A2	.828
A3	.845
A4	.637
A5	.821
A6	.745
A7	.698 (n=107)

(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)

---

An examination of Table 2 above indicates that all British identity variables load highly and positively on the extracted component, which would therefore lend itself to the intuitive label of "British identity". This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the correlation matrix (presented in Table A, Appendix (A.1)) which indicates that all British identity variables correlate highly, in a positive direction, and significantly (2-tailed  $p < .001$  for all correlations).

We note with interest how variable A4, which referred to the perceived similarity of the respondent to the "average British person" had the lowest loading of any variable on the component. An analysis of the correlation matrix in Table A also indicates that the correlations between this variable and the other British identity variables tended to be lower than those observed for the other variables. One may recall from the previous chapter, that it was suggested that responses to this question might indicate the presence of a P.I.P or "superior conformity of the self" motivation (Codol, 1975). Thus, relatively low levels of perceived similarity to the "average British person" might not reflect low levels of British identity.

The presence of the P.I.P. effect is surely linked to the ideology of individualism (Ichheiser, 1949) which seems pervasive in Britain and other Western nations. The results obtained in the current study are inconclusive and merely suggestive of the need to allow for P.I.P. and similar effects in measures of social identity. The similarity measure did not possess the lowest component loading for the European identity analysis, for example. There are, in conclusion, at least

preliminary indications that Turner's (1987) suggestion that self-stereotyping leads to group members perceiving themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the category might be inaccurate when P.I.P. motivations are in effect.

A PCA was also conducted, with the same specifications, on the European identity variables contained in section H.1. An inspection of Table 3 highlights that, as for section A, the European identity variables may be described quite parsimoniously by a single underlying component upon which all contributing variables load highly and positively. Similarly, the correlation matrix (Table B, Appendix (A.1)) indicated that all European identity variables correlate highly, positively, and significantly with one another (2-tailed  $p < .001$  for all correlations).

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**Table 3 - PCA results for section H.1: European identity**

The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigen value of 4.593, which accounted for 65.6% of the variance; variable loadings on this component were as follows:

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Loading</i>
H1	.854
H2	.752
H3	.868
H4	.827
H5	.862
H6	.807
H7	.681 (n=107)

(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)

---

### *Reliability analysis*

Since both the British (section A) and European (section H.1) identity variables seemed to be described well by single underlying components, it was decided to calculate reliability measures to further investigate the usefulness of each component as a *scale*. As can be seen from Table 4, both the British and European identity variables seem likely to form reliable scales. A frequently used measure of the reliability of a scale is Cronbach's Alpha, which Kline (1986) has described as "the estimated correlation of the test with another test of the same length from the item universe". As indicated in Table 4, coefficient Alpha meets the usual

criterion of 0.85 specified for psychometric tests, for both the British and European identity scales.

---

**Table 4 - Reliability analyses for sections A and H.1**

		(British)	(European)
n=107	mean inter-item correlations:	section A	section H.1
		.532	.594
corrected item-total correlations:			
A1: .766	H1: .786		
A2: .741	H2: .656		
A3: .765	H3: .803		
A4: .522	H4: .748		
A5: .736	H5: .800		
A6: .641	H6: .732		
A7: .598	H7: .586		
		-internal consistency reliability-	
		Cronbach's Alpha: A=.882 H.1=.906	
		Standardized	
		Item Alpha: A=.888 H.1=.911	

---

Whilst the results presented above are promising for the construction of scales to measure British/national and European identity, there are a number of conceptual problems involved in measuring social identities, as outlined earlier in Chapter One. It was not feasible in the current study to calculate split-half reliability, nor was it feasible, or deemed theoretically valid, to ascertain test-retest reliability, since this contradicts the assumption of *salience* discussed earlier.

Researchers who utilize measures of the "strength" of social identities must recognize that the results obtained must be treated as temporally relative. However, one useful application of such strength measures is to verify whether experimental or other manipulations intended to make an identity salient have succeeded. In addition, longitudinal studies focusing on fluctuations in the salience of social identities might be extremely valuable if they help us develop a knowledge of the mechanisms and processes behind such fluctuations. Such longitudinal studies would ideally combine subject-oriented research with mass media and "cultural" analysis.

Since the theoretical basis of the current investigation was that social identity is likely to be a complex, multidimensional construct, further analyses focused both on the separate identity variables and scores on composite British or European identity scales. Clearly, this question of whether social identity can

adequately be encapsulated by a single construct is one which requires detailed investigation in the future. However, as some of the results shortly to be discussed indicated, reducing a potentially multi-dimensional construct to a single scale can mask the relationships between individual variables and other theoretical constructs (see also Garza & Herringer, 1987; Hinkle et al., 1989).

In addition, the current results raise the question of whether a single scale might be developed which could be utilized for the measurement of *any* social identity. This is an issue for further research to address, but is interlinked with a number of other themes which emerged in Chapter One. For example, for a single social identity scale to be feasible, we must assume that all social identities involve the same underlying dimensions and processes. The latter is certainly a claim made by the SIT/SCT paradigm, and one which is supported by a large body of research (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988). However, as we suggested earlier, the unproblematic application of the Social Identity paradigm to all manner of social groups should not be taken for granted. A theme which will emerge as this discussion progresses, is that Social Identity Theory may need modifying in order to adequately encompass aspects of large-scale social category membership.

Whilst there are likely to be numerous difficulties involved in developing a general social identity scale, such a scale would perhaps prove useful in wide-ranging studies where social identity is but one aspect of the research focus, and thus a short, succinct measure is required. However, we remain doubtful as to the potential use of such scales. As the current research indicates, social identities are intimately associated with social representations. This being the case, the utility of a single, quantitative measure of social identity is clearly limited.

#### *Correlations between identity and other relevant variables*

Table 5 below details the correlations between the British identity variables and four other variables which were theoretically likely to be associated with them.

**Table 5 - Correlation matrix for section A variables with DEXT, E10, F1, AND I6.**

<i>British Identity variables</i>							
	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7
DEXT	.411 p=.000	.452 p=.000	.503 p=.000	.352 p=.000	.533 p=.000	.467 p=.000	.518 p=.000
E10	.436 p=.000	.481 p=.000	.441 p=.000	.423 p=.000	.541 p=.000	.453 p=.000	.514 p=.000
F1	.635 p=.000	.580 p=.000	.668 p=.000	.632 p=.000	.628 p=.000	.541 p=.000	.508 p=.000
I6	-.428 p=.000	-.314 p=.001	-.542 p=.000	-.324 p=.001	-.554 p=.000	-.390 p=.000	-.460 p=.000

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)  
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)

DEXT="HOW WELL YOU THINK 'EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC' DESCRIBES YOU"  
E10 =EVALUATIVE RATING OF "EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC" AS A TRAIT  
F1 =SIMILARITY RATING OF "BRITAIN-MYSELF" (X/7)  
I6 =IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF BRITISH FLAG & ANTHEM

As indicated in Table 5 above, one may note that all seven of the British identity variables correlate significantly and positively with how well subjects felt the label "extremely nationalistic" described themselves. Similarly, all British identity measures correlate significantly and positively with evaluative ratings of the trait "extremely nationalistic", indicating that, as British identity increases, evaluative ratings of the trait "extremely nationalistic" become more positive. Whilst not examined in the current study, such results are suggestive of the possible links between language use and social identity, which are already well documented (see, for example, Giles & Johnson, 1981). There seem to be good indications that the linguistic labels we use in order to describe ourselves both reflect, and are influenced by, our social identities (see also Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The same pattern of significant and positive correlations was observed for the variable measuring the perceived similarity between Britain and "myself", perhaps suggesting that the conceptual "closeness" of these concepts is reflected in level of national identity.

A significant but negative association was discovered between all British identity variables and the variable examining support for the replacement of the

**British flag and anthem by European Community equivalents. This indicates that high levels of British identity are associated with increasing unwillingness to have the British flag and anthem replaced. Thus we find support for the contentions of many commentators that national symbols are intimately related to national identity (c.f. Bloom, 1990; Doob, 1964; A.D. Smith, 1991).**

**We would like to suggest that the flag and anthem of a nation are likely to be particularly potent symbols since they are intimately involved in nationalistic ritual. The national flag seems an especially central symbol, since in a single visual image it is able to encapsulate the nation and what it stands for. The anthem serves a similar function in the auditory modality. In the case of Britain, the national anthem also serves the purpose of confirming the intimate links between the British nation and royalty. Symbols such as the flag and anthem of a nation, which can apparently encapsulate the social group, are perhaps especially significant for large-scale social groups, since they provide a focus and a concrete image of what is potentially a reified and diffuse entity. It should be noted, however, that the questionnaire administration closely followed the Gulf conflict which the British mass media tended to present as a victory for British and allied forces. Thus, the current study's finding that attachment to the flag and anthem are related to national identity, might in part be a reflection of the salience of these symbols in mass media reporting of the Gulf war.**

**However, a link between national identity and symbols is in keeping with much previous research and, we would argue, unlikely to be a temporal artefact. This is not to say that the salience of national symbols will not fluctuate with differing mass media attention. We would suggest the latter is in fact quite likely.**

**Table 6 details a similar correlation matrix, this time examining associations between the European identity measures and variables likely to be correlated with them.**

**Table 6 - Correlation matrix for section H.1 variables with F4 AND F15.**

		<i>European identity variables</i>						
		H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7
F4		.161	.150	.210	.233	.104	.214	.334
		p=.098	p=.122	p=.030	p=.016	p=.286	p=.027	p=.000
F15		.404	.484	.520	.397	.494	.427	.340
		p=.000	p=.000	p=.000	p=.000	p=.000	p=.000	p=.000

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)  
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)

*F4 =SIMILARITY RATING OF "U.K.-E.C." (X/7)*

*F15=SIMILARITY RATING OF "E.C.-MYSELF" (X/7)*

One may note from Table 6 above that European identity measures H3, H4, H6, and H7 correlate significantly and positively with the perceived similarity between the United Kingdom and the European Community. However, the magnitude of the observed correlations is low, signifying that other variables are responsible for a large part of the variance. All seven European identity variables correlate significantly and positively with the perceived similarity between the E.C. and "myself", although the magnitudes of these correlations are less than those observed for the association between British identity and question F1. Nevertheless, the results for British and European identity, taken together, would seem to suggest that the cognitive "proximity" of the concepts "self" and "Britain / the E.C." are related to the strength of British/European identity.

### *British versus European identity*

In order to compare the pattern of overall responses on the British and European identity measures, a within-subjects design Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted, the results of which are summarized in Table 7 below.

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**Table 7 - MANOVA comparing British and European Identity**


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(n=107)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.504 F=14.503 D.F.=7,100 Sig. of F=&lt;.001

**Significant univariate effects:****A1 v H1 "To what extent do you feel British/European?"**

Means: British=5.075 European=4.131 F(1,106)=21.335, Sig of F=&lt;.001

**A2 v H2 "To what extent do you feel strong ties with other British people/Europeans?"**

Means: British=4.495 European=4.000 F(1,106)=6.040, Sig of F=.016

**A4 v H4 "How similar do you think you are to the average British/European person?"**

Means: British=3.673 European=4.075 F(1,106)=5.064, Sig of F=.026

**A7 v H7 "When you hear someone who is not British/European criticize the British/Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"**

Means: British=4.178 European=3.290 F(1,106)=17.930, Sig of F=&lt;.001

---

From an analysis of Table 7, one may observe that the overall multivariate effect is highly significant, indicating a significant overall difference between British and European Identities. An examination of the means indicated that in general, British identity is significantly stronger than European identity. However, the univariate results in Table 7 above should be consulted for a more detailed understanding of the differences. From the latter it emerges that British is significantly higher than European identity specifically on questions A1/H1, A2/H2, and A7/H7.

Variables A1/H1 may perhaps be regarded as a measure of the current *salience* of the identity: thus the results would suggest national identity was more salient for respondents than European identity. We would suggest that at the time of the study, this probably reflects the status of European identity as a rather obscure and as yet poorly defined "cognitive alternative" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;1986) to national identity.

Respondents who indicated feeling strong ties with other Britons/Europeans (variables A2/H2) were arguably expressing sentimental rather than instrumental attachments (Kelman, 1969). Similarly, one might suggest that this question measures Bales' (1950) notion of socio-emotional orientation to the group. The current results would seem to indicate that the respondents expressed a significantly greater level of socio-emotional attachment to the national, rather than European, membership group. In some ways this is to be expected, in as much as a socio-emotional orientation is likely to be linked to attachments to symbols, which are perhaps more salient and accessible at the national than European level. Furthermore, the responses to the open-ended questions, which are examined at length later in this discussion, seemed suggestive of an instrumental orientation to European identity, with a focus on Europe as a geographical and political, rather than cultural, entity. If, as A.D. Smith (1991;1992) suggests, the British in time come to perceive a truly "European" culture, then this might be reflected in a change from an instrumental to a socio-emotional orientation to European identity.

The observed pattern of responses to variables A7/H7 indicates that respondents felt more personally criticised when Britain, rather than Europe, was the subject of criticism. This result is in-keeping with the general superiority of British over European identity in the current data.

Interestingly, respondents also reported feeling more similar to the average European than the average British person (A4 v H4). We suggest that this is perhaps an indication of how European identity is more general and diffuse than British identity. Thus, it may well be the case that respondents felt they could maintain a sense of "individuality" while still accepting they are similar to the average European. This apparent desire for individuality was in fact expressed in a number of the responses to the open-ended questions. We would suggest, following Shweder and Bourne (1984) that this is likely to be a culturally relative phenomenon, perhaps indicative of Western industrial society, and reflective of a pervasive ideology of individualism (Ichheiser, 1949; Farr, 1990). In fact, the likely impact of individualistic beliefs on social identity construction is a subject we will return to in future chapters.

*Do British & European identities vary with political affiliation?*

A between-subjects MANOVA was conducted in order to examine whether British and European identities might fluctuate with political affiliation. The analysis focused solely on Labour and Conservative voters, thus representing both ends of the traditional left-right political dimension. Tables 8 and 9 present the significant results for British and European identity respectively.

---

**Table 8 - MANOVA examining British Identity across vote**

(n=57; Conservative=34, Labour=23)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.301 F (exact)=3.010 D.F.=7,49 Sig. of F=.010

**Significant univariate effects:**

**A1 "To what extent do you feel British?"**

Means: Con=5.765 Lab=4.478 F(1,55)=15.637, Sig of F=<.001

**A3 "To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?"**

Means: Con=5.176 Lab=4.043 F(1,55)=8.978, Sig of F= .004

**A5 "How important to you is being British?"**

Means: Con=4.500 Lab=3.348 F(1,55)=6.351, Sig of F= .015

**A6 "How much are your views about Britain shared by other British people?"**

Means: Con=4.441 Lab=3.913 F(1,55)=4.555, Sig of F= .037

**A7 "When you hear someone who is not British criticize the British, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"**

Means: Con=4.853 Lab=3.304 F(1,55)=8.736, Sig of F= .005

Con=Conservative Party Lab=Labour Party

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**Table 9 - MANOVA examining European Identity across vote**

(n=57; Conservative=34, Labour=23)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.299 F (exact)=2.897 D.F.=7,49 Sig. of F=<.025

**Significant univariate effects:**

**H1 "To what extent do you feel European?"**

Means: Con=3.647 Lab=4.652 F(1,55)=5.407, Sig of F=.024

**H2 "To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Europeans?"**

Means: Con=3.706 Lab=4.783 F(1,55)=6.295, Sig of F=.015

**H3 "To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?"**

Means: Con=4.412 Lab=5.609 F(1,55)=10.628, Sig of F=.002

**H5 "How important to you is being European?"**

Means: Con=3.441 Lab=4.609 F(1,55)=5.306, Sig of F=.025

Con=Conservative Party Lab=Labour Party

---

From an examination of Table 8 above, it is apparent that there is a significant overall multivariate difference between the level of British identity expressed by Conservative and Labour voters. The univariate analyses indicate that the significant differences occur specifically on variables A1, A3, A5, A6 and A7, all of which indicate higher levels of British identity for Conservative compared with Labour voters. This lends support to Zavalloni's (1973) finding that political affiliation tends to mediate national identity. What the current results suggest, is that level or strength of British identity varies across political affiliations. Further research should perhaps examine whether this is reflected in differences at the level of social representations, attitudes, and so on, pertaining to the nation.

An examination of Table 9, which pertains to European identity measures, indicates that we have again discovered a significant multivariate difference between Conservative and Labour voters, this time on European identity measures. One might recall from Chapter Two, that Eurobaromètre data suggests that one

might expect there to be a slight tendency for Labour voters to evince a stronger sense of European identity than Conservative voters. The univariate results support such a difference, suggesting that for European identity measures H1,H2,H3 and H5, Labour voters express a significantly stronger European identity than Conservative voters. This result is also congruent with Hewstone's (1986) discovery that political affiliation affected attitude towards the E.C. for his British respondents, as well as recent research conducted by Lyons and Sotirakopoulou (1991). Thus, there is evidence that both British and European identities may be mediated by political affiliation. This finding does require further examination, especially since the question on which it was based was not intended to be a direct measure of *political identity*, but simply a measure of *voting intentions*. However, as we shall see in later chapters, there are strong indications that political affiliations often are networked with national and European identities, at least in the case of the British.

Should further research support the current findings, it would suggest that the social identity paradigm may need modification if it is to be applied to national and European identities - and perhaps any large-scale social identity. Specific attention might, for example, be given to how this kind of association or networking of identities affects the salience mechanism, social stereotypes, and the self-stereotyping process. Furthermore, in the case of national and European identities, there is no reason why there might not be other social identities which act as mediators, such as regional or ethnic identity. Such mediating identities need not act as barriers to national identity. The Italian example indicates how regional identity and national identity can co-exist (Barzini, 1983). However, what does seem likely is that these mediating identities might determine the "flavour" of national identity, in terms of the particular national stereotypes, customs, prototypes, etc., adhered to.

It is worth stressing that we are not siding with Brewer and Schneider's (1990) argument that large-scale social groups are not able to serve social identity needs particularly well. This remains a matter for future investigation, suffice to say that the finding that other identities might mediate national identity, does not imply that national identity itself does not serve identity needs. As a number of

other authors have indicated, it is likely that there are certain times when national identity may well be an extremely potent provider of security, self-esteem, and a sense of continuity/stability over time (c.f. Stagner, 1967; A.D. Smith, 1991).

*Do British & European identities vary across sex?*

Once again a MANOVA analysis was conducted, this time investigating whether British and/or European identity vary across sex. It is virtually impossible to have strong a priori hypotheses about the role of sex on national and European identities, at least, in terms of hypotheses suggested by existing research. This is largely because there is virtually no research on this issue, and analysis of relevant Eurobaromètre data suggests no conclusive findings as yet. This being the case, the current analysis should be considered as exploratory in nature. There were found to be no significant sex differences on the British identity measures. However, a significant multivariate effect of sex upon *European* identity emerged, as detailed in Table 10.

---

**Table 10 - MANOVA examining European Identity across sex**

(n=107)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.186 F (exact)=3.236 D.F.=7,99 Sig. of F=.004

**Significant univariate effects:**

**H4 "How similar do you think you are to the average European person?"**

Means: M=3.591 F=4.413 F(1,105)=10.563, Sig of F=.002

**H5 "How important to you is being European?"**

Means: M=3.367 F=4.206 F(1,105)=5.741, Sig of F=.018

M=male F=female

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From an examination of Table 10 above one may note how European identity variables H4 and H5 elicit stronger responses from female respondents. In fact,

across all the European identity variables, sex differences, though failing to reach significance, were in-line with this result.

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**Table 11 - Breakdown of political affiliation by sex  
- Party -**

	Conservative	Labour
<b>Male</b>	17	8
<b>Female</b>	17	15

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It is interesting to note from Table 11 that, whereas there are equal numbers of male and female Conservative Party voters, there is almost a 2:1 ratio of female to male Labour Party voters. However, a further MANOVA indicated that there was no significant multivariate interaction between sex and vote in terms of the European identity measures. It is somewhat beyond the scope of the present discussion to deliberate over these observed sex differences. There is clearly a need for further investigation of the role of such demographic variables in influencing national and European identities.

### **Sections C.1 and C.2 - Stereotypes of the British and Italians**

#### *Descriptive statistics*

Table 12 shows the mean stereotype ratings for the British and Italians. Inspection of these results indicates that, on average, the trait which is perceived to be most frequent among the British is "reserved" - this was also the case for Hewstone's (1986) respondents. The trait perceived to be most frequent amongst Italians was "passionate" - a result which is also congruent with the data from Hewstone's (1986) respondents, who gave joint primacy to "passionate" and "quick-tempered". These traits also represented the modal responses to the questions asking respondents to list the most important trait in describing the British/Italians.

Since stereotypes were similar across the current and Hewstone's (1986) studies, there may be indications of a certain stability, or perhaps evidence for a core structure, as mentioned in Chapter One. Since Hewstone's study was

conducted in 1986, there are indications that stereotypes might possess both cross-situational and temporally stable dimensions. It is also worth noting that the current study used a similar subject base to that used by Hewstone - namely higher education students. This stability might conceivably be indicative of the persistence of social representations, since we regard the concepts of social stereotype and social representation to be virtually synonymous, despite Moscovici and Hewstone's (1983) suggestion that stereotypes are much more rigid, inflexible, and simplistic than social representations (an argument which we do not endorse). However, this evidence for the stability of *key elements* of social stereotypes should be interpreted in light of the evidence for variation in stereotypes across type of questionnaire presented below.

---

**Table 12 - Mean stereotype percentage ratings**

<b>Trait</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>Italians</b>
<b>INTELLIGENT</b>	48.47%	53.87%
	(50)	(44)
<b>PROGRESSIVE</b>	38.76%	46.38%
	(42)	(36)
<b>CONCEITED</b>	49.36%	55.22%
	(52)	(51)
<b>RESERVED</b>	53.82%	25.53%
	(65)	(25)
<b>DOMINEERING</b>	44.57%	50.75%
	(47)	(41)
<b>INDUSTRIOUS</b>	45.73%	47.25%
	(49)	(41)
<b>AGGRESSIVE</b>	47.77%	53.76%
	(45)	(51)
<b>PASSIONATE</b>	41.26%	72.91%
	(36)	(66)
<b>QUICK-TEMPERED</b>	44.06%	65.58%
	(37)	(66)
<b>EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC</b>	49.61%	65.88%
	(63)	(62)

MEANS IN BRACKETS DERIVE FROM HEWSTONE'S (1986) BRITISH RESPONDENTS

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One may also note how the traits "reserved" and "passionate" could be regarded as almost bipolar opposites. Since these were the traits which respondents felt were most important in describing the British and Italians respectively, it is perhaps not surprising that Hewstone's (1986) British respondents perceived themselves as most different to the Italians, when comparing themselves with their European partners.

This also justifies the choice of the Italians as a comparison group in the current study.

However, we should bear in mind that the stereotype measures included in the current study were primarily intended to enable a focus on stereotype *processes*. We remain convinced that qualitative approaches are of most value when stereotype *content* is the main focus of interest. It is interesting to consider the implications of these two most important traits for the process of differentiation. Whilst the trait "reserved" was judged by respondents as relatively neutral in evaluative terms, "passionate" had a mean evaluative rating which was positive. This being the case, it seems that comparisons on these most important dimensions were not likely to maintain the positive self-esteem of British respondents. This was reflected in the way respondents appeared to modify their stereotypes, when faced with the "rate both nationalities" variant of the questionnaire, in order to make more favourable intergroup comparisons, as described below.

#### *The effect of questionnaire variant on stereotyping*

Table 13 details the results of a series of independent groups *t*-tests calculated to examine the effect of questionnaire variant upon British stereotypes. As explained earlier, some respondents were required to rate only the British, whilst others were required to provide stereotype ratings for both the British and Italians. It was predicted that stereotypes should vary across these conditions such that those traits which are deemed important in the current situation would be accentuated, and perhaps those deemed unimportant minimized, when both groups were rated.

As the results presented in Table 13 suggest, for the stereotype traits "industrious", and "reserved", the percentage of British people deemed to possess each trait was greater when both the British and Italians were rated. One may note from the mean evaluative ratings (responses to section 'E'), that the trait "industrious" was on average rated as positive, and "reserved" as close to neutral - evaluative ratings were coded 1 (-ve) to 7 (+ve). There were found to be no significant changes in these evaluative ratings across questionnaire variant. It was

therefore the case that changes in British stereotype ratings across the questionnaire variants took the form of *accentuation* of traits. That "reserved" was accentuated is perhaps not surprising since it is the trait which was deemed most important for the British, and which discriminates most efficiently between British and Italian stereotypes. That "industrious" is deemed to describe more British in the "rate both" condition is suggestive of attempts to maintain self-esteem through positive group distinctiveness.

---

**Table 13 - Significant changes in British stereotype traits across questionnaire variant**

<b><u>INDUSTRIOUS</u></b>	Rate British only: Mean=38.816% (n=38)
	Rate both: Mean=52.838% (n=37)
	(mean evaluative rating=5.953: +ve)
	t=3.28, 2-tailed significance of t=.002
<b><u>RESERVED</u></b>	Rate British only: Mean=49.316% (n=38)
	Rate both: Mean=58.459% (n=37)
	(mean evaluative rating=3.832: neutral)
	t=2.04, 2-tailed significance of t=.045

---

Table 14 below examines changes in Italian stereotype ratings across the questionnaire variants. The results indicate that Italians are rated as less "intelligent" and "progressive" when respondents have previously rated the British on these traits. An examination of the mean evaluative ratings indicates that, on average, "intelligent" and "progressive" are rated as the two most positive traits by respondents. Thus, in contrast to changes observed in the British stereotype ratings, the changes observed for the ratings of Italians involve the *reduction* in certain traits, as opposed to accentuation. This observed reduction in Italian stereotype ratings is in-line with an interpretation in terms of attempts to obtain positive group distinctiveness on valued comparison dimensions.

---

**Table 14 - Significant changes in Italian stereotype traits across questionnaire variant**

**INTELLIGENT** Rate Italians only: Mean=61.714% (n=29)  
Rate both: Mean=48.324% (n=37)

(mean evaluative rating=6.168: +ve)

t=3.37, 2-tailed significance of t=.001

**PROGRESSIVE** Rate Italians only: Mean=52.500% (n=29)  
Rate both: Mean=42.108% (n=37)

(mean evaluative rating=5.991: +ve)

t=2.14, 2-tailed significance of t=.036

---

The results obtained would appear to have a number of consequences for past and previous research. For example, we have shown how the content of social stereotypes appears to be, at least partly, context dependent, thus supporting the findings of Hogg and Turner (1987). This suggests the futility of attempting to elicit the contents of social stereotypes, if these contents are assumed to be completely stable. Whilst the results reported earlier are perhaps suggestive of at least a potentially stable *core structure*, the stereotype dimensions which are significant for intergroup comparisons are often dependent upon the current intergroup context. This also raises the interesting question of whether situational fluctuations in group stereotypes are also reflected in self-stereotyping.

These conclusions seem to support the focus upon particular intergroup contexts, often utilized by proponents of the Social Identity paradigm (e.g. Bourhis & Hill, 1982). When we are interested in the intergroup relations between two social groups, it is reasonably straightforward to elicit the relevant stereotypes and examine the functioning of differentiation processes. It should be noted however, that intergroup relations usually take place in a complex web of *multi-group* interactions, and this common focus on two interacting groups in some senses is artificial in its tendency towards over-simplification of social identity.

*British versus Italian stereotypes*

Table 15 below summarizes the results of a series of ANOVAS examining differences between mean British and Italian stereotype ratings when the questionnaire variant required the rating of one or the other nationality, rather than ratings of both.

**Table 15 - comparison of mean stereotype ratings when questionnaire variant=rate British only and rate Italians only**

<b>Trait</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>Italians</b>	<b>prob (2-t)</b>
INTELLIGENT	46.710%	60.965%	.003
PROGRESSIVE	36.210%	51.724%	.001
CONCEITED	43.737%	50.793%	.232
RESERVED	49.316%	21.172%	.000
DOMINEERING	41.579%	51.429%	.060
INDUSTRIOUS	38.816%	51.138%	.003
AGGRESSIVE	43.763%	50.517%	.169
PASSIONATE	39.105%	75.069%	.000
QUICK-TEMPERED	42.158%	63.759%	.000
EX. NATIONAL.	48.368%	69.793%	.001

An analysis of Table 15 indicates that the Italians are rated significantly higher than the British on seven out of the ten stereotype traits. The British are only rated significantly higher than the Italians on the stereotype trait "reserved", which, one may recall from earlier in the discussion, was the most frequently given trait in the "most important in describing the British" question. It is worth noting that, in general, respondents were more willing to assign higher percentages to the Italians than the British: the mean percentage across stereotype traits for the British was 42.98, compared with 54.64 for the Italians. Hewstone (1986) also noted how his British respondents seemed more willing to stereotype foreign nationalities. Table 16 below examines differences between British and Italian stereotypes in the condition where respondents rated both nationalities.

**Table 16 - Comparison of mean stereotype ratings when questionnaire variant-rate both nationalities: significant results**

<b>Trait</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>Italians</b>	<b>prob (2-t)</b>
RESERVED	58.46%	28.30%	.000
INDUSTRIOUS	52.84%	44.14%	.029
PASSIONATE	43.49%	71.84%	.000
QUICK-TEMPERED	46.03%	67.43%	.000
EX. NATIONAL.	50.89%	63.24%	.004

It can be seen from Table 16 that the British are perceived as significantly more reserved and industrious than the Italians when respondents are asked to rate both nationalities. This seems to support the suggestion made earlier that the traits "reserved" and "industrious" were utilized by respondents in order to maintain positive group distinctiveness. Additionally, the Italians are rated as significantly more passionate, quick-tempered, and extremely nationalistic than the British in this condition. Taken as a whole, these stereotypes are somewhat reminiscent of those obtained by Peabody (1985), with the Italian stereotype being rather similar to the generic "Latin" stereotype Peabody discovered.

#### *Combining stereotypes with their evaluative ratings*

A composite score was calculated in order to combine the percentage ratings for each trait with their evaluative ratings (i.e. the responses to section 'E'). Following Hewstone (1986), for each respondent, the percentage allocated to each trait was divided by 10, multiplied by the evaluative rating (-3 to +3), and summed across the ten traits. This gives a single composite variable with a potential range of -300 to +300. The mean of this composite variable was found to be +10.339 for ratings of the British, and +10.849 for ratings of the Italians.

ANOVAS and *t*-tests were calculated in order to assess whether these two composite variables varied significantly across the different questionnaire variants, and whether the composite rating of the British was significantly different to that of the Italians. There were found to be no significant differences across the different variants of questionnaire, and the difference between the score for the British and Italians was not significant. Hewstone's (1986) British respondents had

composite scores of -17.77 for the British and -87.27 for the Italians. We would suggest that the failure of this composite score to reflect the changes in stereotypes highlighted by a focus on individual traits, is yet further evidence of the dangers associated with collapsing potentially multidimensional constructs into composite scales.

#### 4.2.3 Section D - self-stereotype ratings

Following Hogg and Turner (1987) a set of *difference scores* were calculated, which examined the differences between ratings of the British on the stereotype dimensions compared with ratings of self on these traits. The difference scores were calculated by converting British and self-stereotype scores to the same scale of 0-10, and then subtracting British scores from self scores. This results in a separate score for each respondent, on each of the ten traits. These scores have a potential range of -10 to +10, where negative values indicate greater stereotyping of the particular trait to the British rather than self, and positive values indicate greater stereotyping of the trait to the self. Table C (Appendix (A.1)) provides a trait-by-trait breakdown of these difference scores. Hogg and Turner's further suggestion of focusing upon positive, negative and neutrally-evaluated traits separately using composite scores was also followed. Four composite scores were calculated:

**MEDIFF** : which represents the overall mean of all the difference scores, regardless of the evaluative ratings of the traits.

**NEGDIFF** : which represents the mean of the difference scores for those traits the respondent rated as negative.

**NEDIFF** : which represents the mean of the difference scores for those traits the respondent rated as neutral.

**POSDIFF** : which represents the mean of the difference scores for those traits the respondent rated as positive.

It should be clear from the above that the particular stereotype traits which comprise each component will differ for each subject, as the evaluative ratings of the traits differ. The means for these scores are compared in Table 17.

---

**Table 17 - Comparison of composite difference scores**

<b>Score</b>	<b>Mean</b>
<b>MEDIFF</b>	<b>+ .588<sup>1 2</sup></b>
<b>NEGDIFF</b>	<b>- .623<sup>2</sup></b>
<b>NEDIFF</b>	<b>- .219<sup>1</sup></b>
<b>POSDIFF</b>	<b>+2.170<sup>1 2</sup></b>

Means with the same superscript are significantly different from each other at the <.001 2-tailed level, using t-tests.

---

One may note from an examination of Table 17 that respondents tended to attribute negative traits less to the self than to the nation, whereas positive traits were attributed more to the self than to the nation, thus suggesting a form of *self-serving bias*. A series of ANOVAS indicated that there were no significant differences in these composite scores when respondents rated only the British, compared with when they rated both the British and Italians.

This supports the suggestion made earlier that both individual level and social-level processes are involved in social identity. We would like to suggest that social identities linked to large-scale social groups such as national identity, may well offer more opportunity for the use of self-serving biases than smaller social groups, precisely because of their rather diffuse and reified nature. This might especially be the case when the "black-sheep" strategy of maintaining self-esteem is utilized (c.f. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988).

Self-serving biases, which have gained the attention of those working within the social cognition paradigm for some time now (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984), are likely to involve both cognitive and social level aspects. Whilst previous social cognition research has tended to focus on the cognitive aspects of self-serving

biases, it seems that such biases are also likely to involve discursive practices, and we see no reason why self-serving biases might not be utilized by sub-groups as well as individuals, in much the same manner as appears to occur with Pettigrew's "ultimate attribution error" (Pettigrew, 1979).

Unravelling the rather confusing interactions between self-serving biases and self-stereotyping is a task for the future. There are indications however, that we may have to modify our understanding of the self-stereotyping process, for it seems reasonable to hypothesize that those who only stereotype in-group traits perceived to be positive, are quite likely to have a strong sense of social identity - after all, they have manufactured an identity which is characterized solely by traits which they evaluate positively! If the standard procedure of assessing the similarity between self and in-group stereotype was utilized, it may well indicate a misleadingly low level of social identity in such instances, since the individual has distanced him or her self from aspects of the in-group stereotype they perceive as negative. This suggests that, if researchers wish to utilize self-stereotyping as a measure of the strength or level of a social identity, they must allow for self-serving tendencies biasing their results.

#### *Correlations between difference scores and national identity*

Table 18 below presents a series of Pearson Product Moment Correlations calculated to examine any possible associations between the composite difference scores and the British identity variables contained in section 'A' of the questionnaire. As mentioned earlier in the discussion, it is generally assumed that self-stereotyping may be taken as an indication of the strength of a social identity. Thus, one would expect *small* differences between self and British stereotypes to be associated with *strong* British identity, and *large* differences to be associated with *weak* British identity. One should note, however, the caveats to this assumption discussed earlier, such as self-serving biases, P.I.P. effects, and so on. The difference scores utilized for the correlations were identical to the composite scores MEDIFF, NEGDIFF, NEDIFF, and POSDIFF described earlier, except that the

scores were this time based on absolute differences, since it was the magnitude of the differences which was of primary interest to the analysis.

**Table 18 - PPM correlations between absolute difference scores and British identity variables**

	<i>British identity variables</i>						
	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7
MEDIFF	-.216 p=.031	-.144 p=.109	-.256 p=.018	-.402 p=.000	-.391 p=.000	-.327 p=.002	-.147 p=.104
NEGDIFF	-.140 p=.115	-.210 p=.035	-.218 p=.030	-.208 p=.035	-.244 p=.017	-.278 p=.008	-.018 p=.438
NEDIFF	.038 p=.378	.111 p=.182	.073 p=.277	-.158 p=.098	-.103 p=.202	-.140 p=.128	-.053 p=.335
POSDIFF	-.172 p=.071	-.096 p=.209	-.129 p=.136	-.392 p=.000	-.342 p=.001	-.209 p=.037	-.175 p=.068

(probabilities are 1-tailed - see hypothesis discussed above)

An examination of Table 18 above indicates that overall difference (MEDIFF) correlates significantly with British identity variables A1, and A3 to A6. The negative direction of the observed correlations confirms the hypothesis that, as British identity becomes stronger, so the difference between British and self stereotype becomes smaller. For traits rated as negative by respondents (NEGDIFF) there were significant correlations on variables A2 to A6, again in the expected negative direction. Traits rated as positive by respondents (POSDIFF) correlated significantly with A4 to A6, in the same negative direction. There were no significant correlations between traits which respondents rated as neutral, and the British identity measures.

Overall, therefore, the hypothesis that self-stereotyping is related to level of social identity was supported. It is worth noting, however, the generally low magnitude of observed correlations between difference scores and social identity measures. This suggests that a large amount of the variance in the identity and self-stereotyping measures is linked to other variables, once again highlighting how a single measure of social identity - in this case self-stereotyping - does not adequately capture the complex nature of identity phenomena.

#### **4.2.4 Section E - evaluations of stereotype traits**

Table D (Appendix (A.1)) presents the mean evaluative ratings of the stereotype traits. There were found to be no significant changes in these evaluations across the different types of questionnaire.


#### **4.2.5 Section F - similarity judgements**

This section of the questionnaire contained what amounted to a lower-triangular matrix of similarity judgements, with the European Community, "Myself", Britain, Germany, France, and Italy as stimulus objects. The resulting similarity judgements, which were on a seven-point scale, were used as the input to an INDSCAL individual differences Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) program. MDS is a useful tool for exploring cognitive representations in graphical format (c.f. Kruskal & Wish, 1978). Although it can be used to formulate and develop predictive theories, it is used here in perhaps its most helpful application, as an instrument for exploratory data analysis (Tukey, 1977).

For the purposes of the current analysis, the SPSS<sup>+</sup> ALSCAL procedure was utilized to obtain non-metric INDSCAL solutions in a number of dimensions, with an ordinal level of measurement specified, and the "ties=untied" option selected. The latter option was specified following Davison's (1983) recommendation that the untied or Primary approach tends to result in a better fit to the data. Non-metric MDS attempts to provide monotone rather than linear transformations from (dis)similarities to distances, and thus makes less assumptions than its metric equivalents, or indeed than factor analysis. An individual differences analysis was preferred since this allows for the fact that individuals are likely to differ in terms of the importance they attach to criteria in making judgements about objects. Furthermore, the solution obtained by an INDSCAL procedure should be relatively unambiguous, since the particular rotation obtained is (hopefully) meaningful, and should not, ideally, be subjected to rotation.

Since the three dimensional solution obtained was not significantly greater than the 2-dimensional solution in terms of fit to the data, the latter solution will be focused on in this discussion. The 2-dimensional solution obtained had an averaged stress of 0.179 and averaged R-Squared of 0.730. Using the rule-of-thumb criteria of Rabinowitz (1986) and others, these figures indicate a "fair" solution. Whilst steps were taken to eliminate some of the more common causes of weak solutions, such as degeneracy, local minima and lack of convergence (c.f. Davison, 1983; Schiffman et al., 1981), it should be noted that, ideally, an MDS solution will have at least ten stimulus objects - space and time restrictions associated with the length of the current questionnaire forced the adoption of only six stimuli. Nevertheless, although the solution obtained is far from perfect, it may serve its purpose as an exploratory tool to investigate respondents' cognitive representations. The 2-dimensional solution obtained is presented in Figure 1 below - more detailed results may be found in Table E (Appendix (A.1)).

*Figure 1: derived stimulus configuration for MDS analysis - dim 1 (horizontal) vs dim 2 (vertical)*



Dimension 1 (horizontal) in Figure 1 above appears to contrast Britain and Germany with Italy and France. The European Community and "myself" appear to be fairly neutral on this dimension. The contrast between Britain and Germany compared to Italy is quite noticeable on this dimension, perhaps supporting Hewstone's (1986) finding that the British tend to perceive Britain and the British as more similar to Germany than Italy, and corroborating the earlier suggestion that the British see themselves as more different to the Italians than to their other European neighbours.

The observed contrast of Britain and Germany with Italy and France might be open to a number of interpretations. Further research might endeavour to investigate whether this apparent difference is based on perceptions of nations, peoples, or both. We note with interest however, how, once again, the data are reminiscent of Peabody's (1985) finding that stereotypes of the French and Italians tend to be rather similar, suggesting a generic "Latin" stereotype, which might have been reflected in the form of a "Latin - non-Latin" dimension in the current MDS analysis.

Dimension 2 (vertical) appears to contrast "myself" and "Britain" against the other stimulus objects, suggesting that this might be thought of as a self/nationality vs non-self/foreign dimension. It is interesting to note here how the European Community is also distanced from Britain and "myself". If we for the moment make the assumption (supported by the observed correlation between European identity measures and variable F15) that the perceived similarity between self and the E.C. is roughly equivalent to a measure of European identity, the observed solution seems to support the earlier finding that British identity is stronger than European identity.

In addition to the two dimensions, one may note the cluster formed by France and the European Community. If this may be interpreted as suggesting respondents' cognitive "maps" closely link France with the E.C., then this might partly explain the apparently low levels of European identity found in the current study. The latter hypothesis depends on the significance of the apparent British tradition of distrust of the French highlighted by Hewstone (1986) and others. In

conclusion, we note the apparent potential of MDS as an exploratory tool for the analysis of intergroup perceptions. It should be stressed however, that the interpretation of MDS solutions utilized in the study of social identity should be informed by the results of other research techniques.

#### **4.2.6 Section I - Attitudes and opinions about the E.C. and European integration**

##### *Preliminary remarks*

Appendix (A.2) contains descriptive statistics for the attitudinal questions relating to Europe and the E.C. We may note from these, how the mean attitude towards the European Community (question I1) is 5.121 ("slightly in favour"), and how 65.4% of all responses were towards the "in favour" end of the scale. This certainly suggests a degree of support for the European Community. However, as the responses to the open-ended questions (examined later in the discussion) revealed, support for the European Community can take a number of forms, and need not be linked to a European *identity*. Furthermore, one should recall the earlier findings that British identity was significantly greater than European identity, and that the concepts "self" and "the E.C." seemed to be contrasted in the multidimensional scaling analysis. A similar point should be made about attitudes toward European integration (question I4) - again, mean responses indicated a moderately favourable attitude (mean=4.991) - but as previously suggested, this need not indicate high levels of European identity.

The frequency distribution for question I2 indicates that most respondents reported a high level of interest in European affairs. This is not surprising, given the intensity of mass media coverage of European issues, and the fact that respondents were university students. The high levels of interest reported at least allow us more confidence in examining attitudes, since we might assume that interest in an issue is likely to be reflected in the possession of relevant attitudes, thus negating problems associated with "non-attitudes" (Converse, 1964;1970).

*The underlying structure of attitudes to the E.C. and Europe*

Table 19 summarizes the results obtained from a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) conducted to examine the underlying structure of some of the attitude and opinion questions contained in section I of the questionnaire.

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**Table 19 - Principal Components Analysis of attitude questions**

**Variables entered into the analysis:**

- I1: overall attitude to the E.C.
- I2: interest in the future of Europe
- I3: how often respondents discuss European affairs
- I4: overall attitude to European integration
- I5: compatibility of views about Britain and Europe
- I6: willingness to have British flag & anthem replaced
- I7A: certainty about European super-state vote
- I8: How much Britain has gained from membership of the E.C.

PCA extracted 3 factors with Eigen values over 1.00:

Factors:		Eigen values	% variance	Cum % var
1		3.24	40.4	40.4
2		1.19	14.8	55.3
3		1.08	13.5	68.8

**Rotated factor matrix (varimax rotation specified):**

	<u>FACTOR 1</u>	<u>FACTOR 2</u>	<u>FACTOR 3</u>
I1	.852		
I2	.815		
I4	.766		
I3	.712		
I8	.688		
I5		.815	
I6	(.401)	-.650	(-.361)
I7A			.862

(loadings below 0.35 not shown; n=107)

---

An examination of Table 19 indicates that the PCA extracted three components with Eigen values of 1.00 or greater. Together, these three components accounted for 68.8% of the overall variance, which indicates a good fit to the data. From an inspection of the rotated factor matrix, one may note that attitude variables I1,I2,I3,I4 and I8 load highly and positively on the first component. Since these variables seem to combine both attitudinal orientations towards the E.C. and measures of interest/involvement, this component will be assigned the label "attitude and involvement". We also note with interest how the composition of this

component suggests that attitudes about European integration are closely associated with attitudes towards the European Community.

An examination of Table F (Appendix (A.1)) indicates that variable I2 (interest in the future of Europe) correlates most highly with variable I1, Hewstone's key question on overall attitude towards the E.C. ( $r=.610$ , sig.  $<.0000$  2-tailed). One should also note the support for Hewstone's (1986) finding that instrumental support is related to overall attitude to the E.C. - variable I8 (how much Britain has gained from E.C. membership) correlated highly with variable I1 ( $r=.584$ , sig.  $<.0000$  2-tailed).

The second component consists of variable I5 (compatibility of views), which loads highly and positively, and variable I6 (willingness to have British flag/anthem replaced) which loads highly but negatively. In some ways variable I5 may be considered to measure self-perceived cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) between views about Europe/the E.C. and Britain. When scores on this variable are high, there is little or no dissonance - i.e. the views are highly compatible.

Variable I6 was designed to assess attachment to symbols associated with Britain, and in some sense could be thought of as tapping what Kelman (1969) referred to as "sentimental" attachment to the nation. As such, one would expect respondents who express a strong desire to retain Britain's own flag and anthem to possess strong affective associations with these national symbols. We note with interest that responses to the flag/anthem question indicated that the majority of respondents (64.5%) were against replacement, and only 17.8% in favour. The second component might, therefore, usefully be interpreted in terms of "cognitive and emotional compatibility of national and European attitudes and representations". Thus, as indicated by the component loadings, when factor 2 is high, views about Britain are seen as compatible with views about Europe, and there is little resistance to replacing the British flag and anthem with European Community equivalents.

The third component extracted from the PCA consisted solely of variable I7A, which loaded highly and positively. This variable measured respondents'

certainty about how they would vote in a referendum proposing that Britain become part of a European "super-state". It is interesting to note from the correlation matrix in Table F (Appendix (A.1)), that this variable does not correlate significantly with any of the other attitudinal variables. (Responses to question I7b which required respondents to predict how they would vote in such a referendum, were not entered into the PCA since this would have resulted in a reduction in sample size).

*Predicting "attitude and involvement" (component 1)*

In order to investigate whether any of the other variables examined in the questionnaire might prove good predictors of the first component highlighted in the PCA analysis, "attitude and involvement", a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted. Component scores were calculated by simply summing responses to those variables which constituted component one: I1,I2,I3,I4 and I8 - thus component 1 constituted the dependent or *criterion* variable. The independent or *predictor* variables entered into the analysis are listed below - note that composite variables were utilized where responses to questions in a section were highly correlated, so as to minimize problems associated with multicollinearity:

**BRITISH IDENTITY:** A composite score made up of the sum of the British identity variables (Section A)

**EUROPEAN IDENTITY:** A composite score made up of the sum of the European identity variables (Section H.1)

**FACTOR 2:** "Cognitive & emotional compatibility of national and European attitudes and representations". Comprised of the sum of responses to questions I5 and I6.

**I7A:** Certainty about European super-state vote

**I7B:** Predicted vote in Euro super-state referendum: this variable was dummy-coded as "for" or "against".

**SEX:** This variable was dummy coded.

**AGE:** In years.

**F1:** Similarity rating of "Britain-Myself"

**F4:** Similarity rating of "Britain-E.C."

**F15:** similarity rating of "E.C.-Myself"

Table 20 contains a summary of the results of the multiple regression analysis. For the purposes of the analysis the "Enter+Stepwise" method of equation building was requested.

**Table 20 - Summary of multiple regression analysis:  
criterion variable=FACTOR 1**

Final Equation:-

Multiple R	.67204			
R Square	.45164			
Adjusted R Square	.43014			
Standard Error	4.68573	ANOVA F=21.002		Sig=<.0001

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	S.E. B	Beta	t	Sig. t
F15	1.095	.335	.285	3.265	.001
I7B	-2.421	.612	-.292	-3.957	<.001
EURO IDEN	.246	.061	.354	4.041	<.001
F1	-.484	.287	-.124	-1.683	.095
(constant)	16.315	2.034		8.022	<.001

Variables not in the Equation

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	t	Sig. t
FACTOR 2	.088	.098	.674	.988	.325
I7A	-9.638E-03	-.012	.688	-.123	.902
SEX	-.076	-.096	.687	-.969	.335
BRIT ID	-.014	-.011	.359	-.113	.910
F4	.066	.076	.671	.761	.448
AGE	-.019	-.026	.671	-.247	.806

From an analysis of Table 20 one may note that the enter+stepwise selection procedure constructed a "best subset" of predictor variables which consisted of:

F15	Similarity rating of "E.C. - Myself"
I7B	Predicted vote in Euro super-state referendum: this variable was dummy - coded as "for" or "against"
European identity	A composite score made up of the sum of the European identity variables (Section H.1)
F1	Similarity rating of "Britain - Myself"

Together, these predictor variables are able to account for some 43% (adjusted R Square) of variance in the criterion variable, Factor 1. Examination of the

standardized regression coefficients (Beta scores) indicates that variable I7B has a negative regression coefficient. Since this variable was binary coded such that 0=vote for a European super-state and 1=vote against, this indicates that votes for a super-state are associated with higher scores on factor 1, "attitude and involvement".

Although included in the final equation, the Beta coefficient for variable F1 is not in fact significant. However, since the beta coefficient is approaching significance, it is interesting to note how the beta weight is negative for this variable, indicating that high degrees of perceived similarity between Britain and self are associated with low levels of factor 1, i.e. negative attitudes towards Europe/low interest in European affairs. Since the perceived similarity between Britain and self was earlier found to be significantly correlated with a number of the British identity measures, this is perhaps an indication that higher levels of British identity might be associated with low levels of factor 1. This, in turn, could be interpreted as suggesting that British and European identity might be dissonant (Hofman, 1988) - i.e. that they conflict with each other. This is a theme which will also emerge in the analysis of the open-ended responses.

It is also interesting to note how the composite variable "European identity" makes a significant contribution to the overall prediction, thus supporting the suggestion made throughout the chapters of this discussion, that social identities are linked with attitudes, opinions, social representations, and so on. Since the beta coefficient is positive, this indicates that as European identity increases, so scores on Factor 1 also increase. We hope that the current results serve to emphasize to other researchers how studies of attitudes and opinions could benefit from an analysis of the social identities likely to inform them. The exact nature of this link is as yet rather unclear, especially as far as the likely order of causality is concerned. For example, the Social Identity paradigm would seem to suggest that social identification *precedes* the internalization of attitudes and social representations. However, Moscovici's (1990) definition of a social group as essentially a collection of individuals who share a social representation, seems to suggest the causal primacy of social representations. This rather tricky theoretical issue is likely to remain a matter for debate for some time to come.

It should be emphasized that multiple regression was utilized in the present context mainly as a *simplifying tool* to investigate the contribution of the predictor variables to variation in the criterion variable. It was not the purpose of the current study to develop a *causal* model of attitudes and opinions to Europe, as Hewstone (1986) attempted to do. At this early stage of investigation, we feel it would be premature to construct path analytic (c.f. Blalock, 1964) or similar models, especially since the links between social identity and attitudes, which have been shown to be significant in the current study, have received relatively little attention from other researchers.

*Predicted vote in European super-state referendum*

Table 21 details responses to question I7(b), which asked respondents to predict how they would vote if Britain was offered the chance to become part of a single European "super-state". One may note how the majority of respondents indicated they would vote *against* Britain becoming a member.

**Table 21 - predicted vote in European super-state referendum**

	<i>frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	
Vote for	34	31.5	
Not vote	26	24.1	
Vote against	47	43.5	(n=107)

This result is highly compatible with British opinion data contained in the Eurobaromètre polls.

*Classifying respondents into those who would vote "for" versus those who would vote "against" a European super-state*

In order to examine how well attitudinal and identity measures could differentiate between those respondents who said they would vote for or against a European super-state (question I7B), a statistical procedure known as Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA) was utilized (c.f. Klecka, 1980). DFA aims to weight and linearly combine a set of independent variables, so as to "discriminate" between subgroups

of a nominal-level dependent variable. For the current analysis, respondents were classified into those who would vote "for" or "against" a European super-state. The independent or *discriminating* variables entered into the analysis were the same as those used in the multiple regression described earlier, except for the addition of Factor 1 - "attitude and involvement". A stepwise method of selecting the best subset of discriminating variables was requested. Discriminant analysis is able to provide at least two particularly useful pieces of information for the current study (c.f. Himmelweit et al., 1981):

1. A measure of the overall accuracy of the classification - in this case, in terms of the proportion of respondents correctly classified as answering "for" or "against".
2. A measure of which variables were most important in discriminating between respondents who would vote "for" and "against" a European super - state.

As Himmelweit et al. (1981) emphasize, it is important to remember that a discriminant analysis is not a means of prediction, but of *discrimination* between groups. The DFA indicates the percentage of respondents correctly classified *in the current study*, using actual responses as a criterion for selecting the best subset of discriminating responses. However, if the independent variables had little relevance to the decision to vote "for" or "against" a super-state, the percentage correctly classified by the model would be low. Thus, as Himmelweit et al. suggest, we may think of discriminant analysis as providing a form of "pseudo-prediction".

Table 22 provides summary data for the results of the discriminant analysis (more detailed results may be found in Table G (Appendix (A.1))).

**Table 22 - Discriminant Analysis on groups defined by predicted vote in European super-state referendum**

**% of cases correctly classified:**

Vote "for" : 76.5%  
 Vote "against": 83.0%    **OVERALL % CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED=80.25%**

**Canonical Discriminant Functions:**

	Eigen Value	Canonical Corr	Wilk's Lambda	Chisquare	DF	Sig
<b>FUNCTION 1:</b>	.687	.638	.593	40.019	5	<.0001

An examination of Table 22 indicates that overall, 80.25% of cases were correctly classified by the Discriminant Analysis, an excellent level of accuracy. Wilk's Lambda gives some indication of the amount of variance *not* explained by the analysis - the obtained statistic of .593 is generally considered good.

Table 23 lists the "best set of discriminating variables" selected by the stepwise procedure. Since the stepwise procedure selected variables to enter into the analysis on the basis of largest "F to enter", the order in which variables are selected gives an indication of their overall importance in the analysis. One can see from Table 23 that Factor 1 - "attitude and involvement" was the single most important discriminatory variable. It is also interesting to note that both British and European identity are significant discriminatory variables in the analysis.

**Table 23 - Best set of discriminating variables elicited by stepwise Discriminant Analysis**

Step entered	Variable	Wilk's Lambda	Sig.
1	FACTOR 1	.68270	<.0001
2	BRITISH ID	.62383	<.0001
3	AGE (YEARS)	.61164	<.0001
4	EUROPEAN ID	.60178	<.0001
5	F4	.59267	<.0001

**Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients:**

FACTOR 1	.829
BRITISH ID	-.469
AGE (YEARS)	-.305
EUROPEAN ID	.264
F4	-.212

**Canonical Discriminant Functions evaluated at Group Means:**  
 vote for: .963    vote against: -.696

In order to ascertain the nature of the relationship between predicted vote in the referendum and these five discriminating variables, we should firstly consult the canonical discriminant functions evaluated at the group means (Table 23), which indicate that the mean score on the discriminant function for the "vote for" group is .963, whilst the mean for the "vote against" group is -.696. This means that votes for a European super-state are associated with higher scores on the discriminant function than votes against. If we turn to the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients, we are now in a position to suggest that scores on Factor 1 are higher for those who anticipate voting *for* a European super-state. An examination of the *F*-test shown in Table G of Appendix (A) confirms this interpretation, indicating that, on average, respondents who predict voting *for* a European super-state have significantly higher scores on Factor 1 ( $F=36.72$ ,  $d.f.=1,79$ ,  $sig. <.0000$ ).

Scores on the British identity composite variable are significantly lower for respondents who anticipate voting *for* a European super-state ( $F=7.632$ ,  $d.f.=1,79$ ,  $sig. .0071$ ). This is not surprising, given the apparent concern the British have about sovereignty and the maintenance of a separate national identity (Hewstone, 1986). The observed negative correlation between British identity and support for British membership of a European "super-state" suggests that respondents perceived such membership as a potential threat to national identity. This seems also to support the earlier suggestion that British and European identities might be dissonant - i.e. the salience or presence of one inhibits that of the other. This would seem compatible with much of the mass media treatment of European issues in Britain, in as much as the concern for sovereignty has tended to be reflected in the construing of British and European identities as "either/or" phenomena (see also Sotirakopoulou, 1991). In addition, the observed results seem congruent with Hewstone's (1986) finding that the positivity of British "image" is negatively correlated with level of support for the European Community.

In contrast, and as one would expect from the above discussion, scores on European identity are significantly higher for those who anticipate voting for a super-state, compared with those who would vote against ( $F=9.552$ ,  $d.f.=1,79$ ,  $sig. .0028$ ). There is thus evidence to suggest that European identity is linked to both

attitudes and predicted voting intentions concerning European integration and the European Community.

The direction of the Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients for age and variable F4 (similarity of Britain and E.C.) suggests that higher scores on both variables are associated with voting against a super-state. However, the group means are not significantly different, and thus it would seem that the nature of the relationship between predicted vote and these variables is less than clear-cut, and therefore deserving of further investigation in the future.

### 4.3 Open-ended questions

The open-ended responses contained in the current questionnaire were analyzed by means of traditional Functionalist content analysis (c.f. Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990). Holsti (1969) has identified a wide variety of definitions of the term "content analysis" - Berelson (1952) refers to the method as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication", while Kaplan (1943) prefers a somewhat more ambiguous definition - "the statistical semantics of political discourse". In a synthesis of these and other definitions, Holsti (1969) describes content analysis as "any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages".

Whilst the sympathies of the current author lie with those who appreciate the need to integrate both quantitative *and* qualitative approaches within content analyses, there are a number of reasons why the scope for a thorough qualitative analysis of the current data is limited. Primary amongst these is the fact that, as one would expect from questionnaire responses, there was a tendency to answer in a quasi short-hand which is not particularly similar to the much richer data obtained from group discussions or open-ended interviews. The latter also allow for the probing of answers, a clarifying of ambiguities, and the general negotiation of a true inter-view between interviewer and interviewee (Farr, 1982).

The general content analysis procedure utilized involved the following stages, which were repeated for each question:

**Stage 1: Careful and repeated reading of responses to the question, making notes on recurring patterns, word usage, and so forth.**

**Stage 2: Identification of categories of response, guided by research questions. At this stage there are likely to be too many categories.**

**Stage 3: Refinement of category coding frame into a smaller, more manageable number of categories by collapsing those which are semantically similar.**

**Stage 4: Counting every occurrence of each category, and assessment of adequacy of coding frame.**

For the purposes of the current study, the *recording unit* - the specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category - was every occurrence of a category within a sentence or part of a sentence, in essence, therefore, the focus was on *propositions*. For the purposes of coding propositions, the whole of the response to the current question constituted the *context unit* which defined the widest area of text which could be searched for clarification of meaning. Every occurrence of a category was counted, and the resulting frequencies by category breakdown the major focus of final analysis. The reliability and validity of the coding frame was assessed by having multiple coders discuss sample responses and formulate a mutually agreed-upon frame. In addition, the usual practice of having multiple coders code the same responses and then compare results was used at the initial phase, before the final coding frame was formulated. It should be stressed, however, that, once the final coding frame was agreed upon, the coding was undertaken solely by the current author.

Whilst this simple focusing on *frequencies* has been criticized (see, for example, McQuail, 1987) - rightly so in our opinion - alternative or supplementary approaches, which, for example, might also look at the *intensity* of responses, are rather difficult to operationalize in the context of text obtained from questionnaire responses. Furthermore, content analysis is here used primarily as a tool for summarizing text -in other words, as a means of focusing on Holsti's (1969) "What is said", rather than his "How it is said" category.

#### 4.3.1 Question B.1: things which make people pleased to be British

Table 24 shows the categories respondents most frequently used to describe the things which made them feel pleased to be British.

**Table 24 - Things which make people feel pleased to be British-most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	RICH TRADITION & HERITAGE	49
2	DEMOCRACY	34
3	BEAUTY OF COUNTRYSIDE	31
4	GENEROSITY OF PEOPLE & NATION AS A WHOLE	22
5	ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS	22
6	ROYAL FAMILY	16
7	IMPORTANT ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS	16
8	WELFARE STATE	15
9	SPORTING ACHIEVEMENTS	13
10	SENSE OF HUMOUR	11
11	GENERAL STANDARD OF LIVING	11

An analysis of Table 24 above indicates that the category most frequently utilized by respondents refers to pride in the rich tradition and cultural heritage they believed being British endows upon citizens. This is in keeping with the previous finding that symbolic aspects of national identity are important, and lends weight to the suggestion that national identity is especially likely to be reflected in a socio-emotional attachment to the nation - at least in the British case. Additionally, this supports A.D. Smith's (1991) contention that national heritage and culture has a competitive/comparative aspect - after all, one would expect pride to be derived partly from comparison processes. Finally, one may note how this finding is supportive of Samuel's (1989) contention that British national identity is currently

linked to a fascination with the past, which is manifested in an interest in national heritage and culture.

The salience of pride in the British democratic system and its related values is congruent with the earlier findings of Almond and Verba (1963). However, whilst a number of the categories which Topf et al. (1989) more recently found to be important are also present in the results from the current study, it is noticeable how the frequencies of occurrence for these categories are quite different across the two studies. This is open to conflicting interpretations. For example, the study by Topf et al. utilized a general population sample, whereas the current study focused on the arguably un-representative subject group of university students. However, leaving this difference aside for the moment, the differences observed between the results of Topf et al. and the current study might alternatively be taken as an indication of how the salience of national symbols fluctuates. This interpretation is in fact congruent with some of the other observations made below. One should also add that some of the response categories which emerged in the present study did not appear in Topf et al.'s study simply because they used pre-defined categories, rather than open-ended responses.

One should be aware that the occurrence of category 4 seems to have been affected by temporal aspects, in that many respondents made particular reference to "Kurd Aid" and other fund-raising events which had occurred in close temporal proximity to the questionnaire administration. We would argue that this is suggestive of how national symbols - in this case the objects of national pride - are subject to fluctuations in salience. There are good intuitive reasons for hypothesizing that the mass media play an important part in determining the objects of national pride. Even though these objects may differ across sub-groups, as Topf et al.'s (1989) findings might suggest, the mass media are at least likely to provide part of the data base of national symbols and objects of pride from which sub-groups and individuals sample.

An analysis of Table 24 also indicates that both people and nation-oriented responses are reflected in the list of most frequent categories. Thus, for example, respondents who reported feeling proud of the welfare state (the National Health

Service and state benefit systems) tended to be focusing on aspects of the state/nation, whereas respondents who were proud of the British sense of humour seemed to be focusing on aspects of the national character, rather than the state. Furthermore, the intermingling of aspects of the nation and the national peoples would seem to suggest that social representations of these phenomena are connected.

It was interesting to note how occurrences of category 7 - Britain's important role in world affairs - were often past-oriented in their regret of the decline of the British Empire and their remembrance of a time when Britain was the world's most powerful nation. One might recall that Hewstone (1986) has suggested that memories of the British Empire and the former power of Britain may well act to inhibit the development of pro-European attitudes. We would extend this argument to include the hypothesis that such social representations may also serve to inhibit the development of a European identity. However, as results soon to be discussed indicated, this apparent concern with power and dominance might also, paradoxically, be linked with a *pro-European* stance.

#### 4.3.2 Question B.2: things which make people regret being British

Table 25 below shows the categories respondents most frequently used to describe the things which made them regret being British.

**Table 25 - Things which make people regret being British - most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	FOOTBALL HOOLIGANS	35
2	SENSE OF SUPERIORITY	24
3	LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT	21
4	RACISM	20
5	"COLD" CHARACTER	20
6	THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT/ITS POLICIES	19
7	XENOPHOBIA	18
8	VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY/HIGH CRIME RATE	17
9	BEHAVIOUR OF BRITISH ON HOLIDAY ABROAD	16
10	UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH	15
11	LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT	12

An examination of Table 25 above indicates that football hooligans are most frequently cited as an example of what makes respondents regret being British. One might hypothesize that this result may well be temporally relative, especially since the Heysel tragedy seemed to heighten the salience of football hooliganism as a subject for mass media attention. It is interesting to note how football hooligans represent a particular, numerically insignificant, *sub-group* within British society, perhaps suggesting that respondents are utilizing them as "black sheep" (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Furthermore, we noted with interest how respondents stressed the minority status of this sub-group, and were disturbed that such an "unrepresentative" sub-group were creating a "false" impression of the British abroad. Much the same was evident in responses which focused on category 9 - the British abroad. In-line with the self-serving nature of the black-sheep strategy, we also noted with interest the frequent tendency for respondents to list sub-groups or behaviour which they themselves felt exempt from (e.g. football hooligans, racism).

#### 4.3.3 Question B.3: groups or individuals perceived to be "typically British"

Table 26 details the categories respondents most frequently utilized to describe individuals or groups perceived to be "typically British". One should note that, since one question of particular theoretical interest was whether respondents mentioned individuals or groups, the category coding frame was specifically set up to allow for this question to be examined. This being the case, some of the categories - such as "the queen", as opposed to "the royal family" - represent instances where the focus was either on an individual, or the group to which that individual belongs. Since this semantic difference is of interest to the current investigation, we are justified in treating such categories as mutually exclusive on semantic grounds.

**Table 26 - Individuals & groups perceived as typically British-most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	THE QUEEN	22
2	MARGARET THATCHER	19
3	THE ROYAL FAMILY	18
4	OTHER INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF ROYAL FAMILY	15
5	FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS	13
6	JOHN MAJOR (PRIME MINISTER)	13
7	THE ARMED FORCES	13
8	THE "MIDDLE CLASS"	10
9	BUSINESSMEN	8
10	CHARITY WORKERS	7
11	BRITISH TOURISTS ABROAD	7

An examination of Table 26 indicates that the Queen was the most frequently utilized response category. It is noticeable how mentions of the Queen, the royal family, and other specific royals together figured very prominently in the overall set of responses. This lends empirical weight to the suggestions of Nairn (1989) and other researchers, regarding the symbolic significance of the British royal family. One may also note how the two most frequently used categories - the Queen and Margaret Thatcher - represent individuals rather than groups. It is also interesting how football supporters appear as a response category, football hooligans having previously emerged as being the thing which most frequently made respondents regret being British.

One may note how a number of the categories refer to individuals or groups who have been, and continue to be, the subject of mass media attention. Whilst mentions of the Queen and the royal family would appear to refer to things which are fairly stable and unchangeable over time, some of the other responses seem intuitively more likely to be reflections of recent events. Thus, for example, there was a tendency for mentions of the armed forces to also refer to the recent Gulf war. Similarly, the recent aid initiatives discussed earlier were often mentioned when charity workers were given as a response.

These observations are significant for the social identity paradigm, since they have implications for the notion of prototypes and their operation in large-scale social groups. Recent work within Turner's self-categorization paradigm

(Turner, 1987) has focused on how in-group prototypes tend to represent the individual most different to the outgroup and most similar to the ingroup on currently valued comparison dimensions. This framework seems particularly simplistic when applied to the current context of national identity. There are potentially a myriad of possible national prototypes available, some of whom -the Queen for example - are rather likely to be situationally stable. Exactly what informs the decision process in the choice of national prototypes is unclear, although we already have evidence that political affiliation is a potential *mediator* of national identity.

The question of who represents the prototypical British person is an important one, since self-categorization theory makes the assumption that the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of the prototype are internalized by group members. We should add the important point that in-group members internalize the behaviour and beliefs which they *perceive* to be associated with the prototype. This leaves room for different sub-groups, and different individuals, to differ in what they perceive as the prototypical behaviours and beliefs of the in-group. Furthermore, it seems likely that sub-groups and individuals might actively attempt to persuade other in-group members that their interpretation of social reality is "correct".

Intuitively, one might guess from an examination of Table 26 above that the responses seem to refer to individuals and groups perceived in both positive (e.g. charity workers) and negative ways (e.g. football supporters). It was in fact the case that responses to this question were of the nature that affective judgements were also given of the particular individuals or groups mentioned. This being the case, it was possible to provide a further breakdown into those perceived as positive (henceforth called "prototypical") and those perceived as negative (henceforth called "black sheep"), as shown in Tables 27 and 28:

**Table 27 - Individuals & groups perceived as typically British:  
"prototypes"**

category	description	frequency
1	THE QUEEN	14
3	THE ROYAL FAMILY	13
4	OTHER INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF ROYAL FAMILY	13
7	ARMED FORCES	10
2	MARGARET THATCHER	7
6	JOHN MAJOR (PRIME MINISTER)	7
10	CHARITY WORKERS	7

(Frequencies indicated represent the number of occurrences of the category which were characterized by a positive evaluative tone)

From an examination of Table 27 one may note that the Queen was the most frequently mentioned "Prototype" of the British, once again highlighting the prominence of royalty as a whole. That the royals are given by respondents as examples of people who are "typically British", supports Nairn's (1989) suggestion that the current emphasis on the "normality" of the royal family does indeed seem to have permeated into public perceptions. In the listing of the most frequent prototypes, the ratio of individuals to groups is roughly equivalent (4:3). This would suggest, as hypothesized earlier in the Introduction, that sub-groups as well as individuals might act as prototypes. We would also like to suggest the possibility that, especially for large-scale social categories, individuals and sub-groups might perceive a number of in-group prototypes, and that these may be perceived to embody different aspects of the group.

Inspection of Table 28 indicates that football supporters are the most frequent "black sheep" or negatively-evaluated example given by respondents. Since Margaret Thatcher appears prominently as both a prototype and black sheep, we may deduce that affective evaluations of her are relatively polarized. This is also a good indication of the point made earlier, that different sub-groups may select different in-group prototypes.

**Table 28 - Individuals & groups perceived as typically British:  
"black sheep"**

category	description	frequency
5	FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS	11
2	MARGARET THATCHER	10
11	BRITISH TOURISTS ABROAD	7
20	"LAGER LOUITS"	6

(Frequencies indicated represent the number of occurrences of the category which were characterized by a negative evaluative tone)

#### 4.3.4 Question G.1: Britain's most important role within Europe

Table 29 details the most frequent categories respondents utilized in answering question 1 of section G. One may note from an examination of Table 29 that the most frequently mentioned role for Britain was economic - many of the respondents who utilized this category expressed the hope that London might become the financial capital of Europe/the E.C., or suggested that it already holds this position.

**Table 29 - Britain's most important role within Europe:  
most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	ECONOMIC	24
2	ACTIVE E.C. MEMBER	19
3	MODERATING/STABILIZING INFLUENCE	16
4	ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	14
5	CONTRIBUTE BRITISH "CUSTOMS"/TRADITIONS	10
6	MAINTAIN SEPARATE NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN EUROPE	10
7	CONTRIBUTE BRITISH SKILLS & KNOWLEDGE	7
8	TO BE IN CONTROL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	6
9	TO SLOW THE PACE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	6
10	TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN NATIONS	6

There are at least two important points suggested by this result. Firstly, the salience of Britain's economic role in Europe appears in-keeping with much of the mass media treatment of European affairs, and Hewstone's (1986) observation that the British mass media have portrayed the debate about Europe in terms of "gains versus losses". The second point to make is that the frequent mentions of Britain being, or becoming, the Financial capital of Europe, also seem to indicate the desire for Britain to play a leading, and perhaps dominant role in European affairs.

One should note that, whilst many respondents wished Britain to be an active E.C. member (category 2), in a number of cases this was so as to prevent European integration going further than these respondents wished it to proceed. Respondents who utilized this category of response were also typical of the majority of respondents, in that they focused on the role they would like Britain to have in Europe, rather than the role they perceived Britain currently has. This apparent desire to control the course of European integration may reflect a deeper need for individuals to feel in control of their own destiny. Proponents of identity-oriented research within the field of International Relations for example, have come to recognize how individuals and groups like to feel in control of identity maintenance and changes in identity (see, for example, A.D. Smith, 1986).

In terms of the possibility of a European identity becoming more significant than it currently appears to be, one may note the evidence of a number of Social Psychological studies which seem to indicate that loyalty to a group, and desire to sustain group membership in the face of adversity, appear to be enhanced when individuals feel they made the initial decision to join the group (Taylor et al., 1983; Turner et al, 1984). The most parsimonious explanation for this phenomenon seems to be in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). This would seem to imply that, if individuals, or indeed, the British nation as a whole, came to feel that membership of the European Community, and involvement in the on-going process of European integration, were the results of conscious decisions to be a member and to be involved, then loyalty to the European ideal - and, perhaps, to a European identity - might have a much firmer foundation than they appear to have at present. This, we would suggest, is why it is crucial for the possible

development of a European identity, that nations and their peoples feel actively involved in the process of European integration.

Response category 3 - moderating/stabilizing influence - reflected responses which suggested Britain's role is to maintain peace and stability in Europe, and to avoid political extremism. It appears that the prevalence of this response category may also reflect the desire to feel in control of European affairs, and to steer a course for European integration which is in Britain's interest.

#### 4.3.5 Question G.2: Europe's most important role in world affairs

Table 30 below details the most frequent categories respondents utilized in answering question 2 of section G.

**Table 30 - Europe's most important role in world affairs:  
most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	PROMOTE/MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE	37
2	ECONOMIC	29
3	AS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL POWER	23
4	TO PROVIDE AID & DEVELOP THIRD WORLD	17
5	AS A THIRD SUPERPOWER	14
6	TO MAINTAIN BALANCE/STABILITY IN INTERN. RELS.	14
7	TO PROVIDE AID TO ANY NATIONS WHO REQUIRE IT	12
8	TO BECOME A UNITED COMMUNITY	6
9	TO SET AN EXAMPLE OF NATIONS CO-OPERATING	6
10	TO BE INDEPENDENT FROM U.S. INFLUENCE	5
11	TO FORM AGREEMENTS WITH MAJOR WORLD POWERS	5

From an examination of Table 30 one may note that the most frequently cited role for Europe was to maintain world peace. There are indications that a number of respondents felt Europe as a whole potentially offers more power and influence in the world arena than individual nations can offer. This seems to be congruent with

the view, expressed by a number of respondents, that Europe could become a new superpower. One should note that almost all of the respondents who suggested the latter, emphasized the benefits that would ensue from such a development. Whilst a number of respondents made the superpower analogy, they tended to be rather vague as to the exact nature of a European superpower - i.e. whether it would be economic, military, political, or all of these. Similarly, respondents tended not to address the issue of whether a European super-power would comprise separate states or a single "super-state".

There are indications from the responses to the current question, that one possible way in which a European identity might develop, is if it promises the power and influence consummate with being a third "superpower". This seems to support Stagner's (1967) suggestion that the desire for power is a motive behind identity processes. Paradoxically, the very social representations of the British Empire which might serve to inhibit a European identity (i.e. those suggesting the power of the British empire) might, therefore, also encourage the development of a European identity, if the latter was perceived to *augment* the current power and prestige of Britain, and thus re-instate Britain as the world's most powerful nation. This milieu would suggest a European identity which would *complement* rather than replace British identity.

We would also suggest that the desire for Europe to become a third superpower is also indicative of the desire for control. This interpretation appears to be supported by the frequent suggestion made by respondents that a European superpower could act as a stabilizing factor in world affairs, providing an element of balance between East and West. We would, of course, expect that such representations of the future of Europe are likely to be undergoing revision in light of the recent changes in the Soviet Union. Further research might endeavour to investigate the consequences for the survival of national identity, associated with social representations of Europe which focus on the prospect of a European superpower.

It is also interesting to note the significance of economic and political role, and the absence of any cultural role for Europe. This seems to support the earlier

suggestion that, at present, European identity is likely to be "instrumental" rather than "sentimental", or to utilize Bales' (1950) dichotomy, to be characterized by a "task-oriented" rather than a "socio-emotional" orientation. In fact, whilst A.D. Smith (1991) suggests that the most likely prospect for the development of a European identity is in terms of the perception of a common European culture, we would suggest that the apparent prevalence and strength of the British attachment to *national* culture will make such a process especially difficult.

Finally, one should note that, as mentioned earlier, the frequency with which category 4 - to aid and develop the third world - was utilized may have been associated with the mass media attention devoted to fund-raising events and campaigns, which closely preceded the collection of the questionnaire data. It is, however, interesting to note how recent events appear to enter into respondents' social representations of the role of Europe, suggesting that, whilst such social representations are likely to be fairly resistant to change, they also require the flexibility to encompass recent events of significance.

In terms of possible outgroups for a European identity, it is instructive to consider the appearance of "a third superpower" as a possible role for Europe in world affairs. Most of the respondents who utilized the latter category made a specific comparison with the U.S.A. - other apparent outgroups included the U.S.S.R., China, Asia, and Japan. That the U.S.A. was the most frequently mentioned out-group for Europe seems to lend weight to the apparent allure for respondents of the prospect of a European superpower.

**4.3.6 Section H.2 : *Individuals, groups or political parties with  
Question 1 which respondents share broadly similar views  
about Britain***

The individuals, groups, or political parties respondents most frequently reported sharing similar views about Britain with are reported in Table 31.

**Table 31 - Individuals/groups/political parties with which views are shared about Britain**

category	description	frequency
1	CONSERVATIVE PARTY	29
2	SDLP/LIBERAL PARTY	26
3	LABOUR PARTY	23
4	GREEN PARTY	20
5	"LEFT WING" GROUPS	10
6	ECOLOGICAL PRESSURE GROUPS	9
7	"NOBODY"/"NONE"	7
8	FRIENDS	3
9	"DON'T KNOW"	3

An analysis of Table 31 indicates that, in general, political parties are cited most frequently as examples of individuals or groups with which respondents share similar views about Britain. It was usually the case that respondents who listed a political party would list the one which they indicated they would vote for in a hypothetical general election. However, there was a tendency for those who listed the Labour or Liberal parties to also list other parties/groups, and to suggest that they agreed with some of the policies of each of the listed groups. One may also note how groups predominate over individuals in the list of most frequently occurring categories.

**4.3.7 Section H.2 : Individuals, groups or political parties with  
Question 2 which respondents share broadly similar views  
about Europe**

Table 32 details the individuals, groups, or political parties respondents most frequently reported sharing similar views about Europe with.

**Table 32 - Individuals/groups/political parties with which views are shared about Europe**

category	description	frequency
1	CONSERVATIVE PARTY	20
2	SDLP/LIBERAL PARTY	16
3	LABOUR PARTY	16
4	"NOBODY"/"NONE"	9
5	"DON'T KNOW"	6
6	"LEFT-WING" GROUPS	6
7	FRIENDS	4

As was the case for sharing views about *Britain*, one may note from Table 32, that respondents most frequently report sharing similar views about Europe with political parties. There was also the same tendency for respondents who reported sharing similar views with the Liberal or Labour Parties to say that they agreed with certain policies from a number of parties. Once again, we may note the predominance of groups over individuals. Furthermore, we note with interest the occurrence of "nobody/none" as a response to both questions 1 and 2. It was somewhat unclear as to whether these respondents actually thought their views were totally unique, or whether they were simply unaware of others who might share similar views. We interpret the occurrence of this response category as suggestive of the ideology of individualism prevalent in Britain (c.f. Farr, 1990).

Overall, responses to questions 1 and 2 above, provide support for Zavalloni's (1973) finding that political affiliations act to mediate national identity, in as much as they suggest that political affiliation and national identity are often interconnected. Furthermore, the responses to question 2 suggest that political affiliation also mediates European identity. That support for the notion of national and European identities being mediated was discovered from both quantitative and qualitative analyses we find particularly compelling. We would suggest that such results reflect the current prevalence of a number of competing social representations of Europe and the European Community.

Which of these social representations becomes dominant is likely to play a large part in the development of European integration and its effects upon our national identity. It is our contention that the Social Identity paradigm will provide

a useful conceptual framework for charting this power struggle between alternative "constructions of reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), since the latter is intimately associated with the relations between social groups. It should also be emphasized that, whilst the current data are supportive of Zavalloni's argument, what they can not do is prove her contention that it is political affiliations which mediate national identity, rather than the opposite case of national identity acting as a mediator. It should be remembered however, that part of the justification for politics mediating national identity, is that politics, political parties and so on, are rather more concrete entities than nations, the implication being that being a diffuse and abstract entity, a nation is only experienced via the mediation of more concrete categories (c.f. Zavalloni, 1973).

#### **4.4 CONCLUSIONS**

##### ***4.4.1 The measurement of social identity***

The results from the current study have indicated that a general "social identity scale" might be feasible in the future. However, whilst possible uses for such a scale are suggested, it is noted that social identity is a multidimensional construct deserving of research which takes a number of perspectives, and makes use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Furthermore, the research has indicated that we may have to modify our understanding of the self-stereotyping process if we wish to utilize self-stereotyping as a measure of the strength of social identity. Finally, we noted how multidimensional scaling procedures can prove useful tools for exploratory analysis of social identity issues.

##### ***4.4.2 Social stereotypes***

It was shown how variations in the format of survey questions can elicit differences in social stereotypes. In particular, we may note how eliciting social

stereotypes in essentially comparative contexts seems to lead to elements of such stereotypes being modified in order to achieve positive in-group distinctiveness. Some of the implications for the elicitation of social stereotypes were addressed. In addition, it was noted how there is some evidence suggestive of stable core elements within social stereotypes, since the stereotypes of the British and Italians elicited in the current study bore similarities to those obtained by Hewstone (1986). The multidimensional scaling analysis also indicated the possibility of a general "Latin" stereotype, as suggested by Peabody (1985).

#### *4.4.3 The self-stereotyping process*

The self-stereotyping measures included in the current study seemed to indicate that self-serving biases tend to mediate the self-stereotyping process, such that there is a tendency to self-stereotype more readily those traits the individual perceives in a positive evaluative light. Further evidence for self-serving biases mediating social identity processes, was furnished by responses to the open-ended questions. In conclusion, it was noted how the results tended to confirm the assumption made by the Social Identity paradigm that degree of self-stereotyping may be used as a measure of level or strength of social identity. However, it was suggested that future measures of self-stereotyping should allow for self-serving biases, P.I.P. effects, and other individualistic strategies, which might bias the results obtained.

#### *4.4.4 Prototypes*

Responses to open-ended questions suggested that large-scale social groups, such as national identity group, are likely to be characterized by the existence of *multiple in-group prototypes*. The choice amongst competing prototypes will be influenced by self-serving biases, the mediating sub-groups to which the individual belongs, and the differential media attention paid to them. Furthermore, evidence was found for the existence of both prototypical individuals and prototypical *sub-groups*. It was also found that some of the prototypes elicited appeared to possess

cross-situational and temporal stability. Finally, evidence was found for the perception of in-group "black sheep" - sub-groups which are perceived to embody negatively-evaluated aspects of the in-group, and through marginalizing processes enable the maintenance of positive self-esteem (c.f. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988).

Current theorizing within the Self-categorization paradigm, it is suggested, has failed to consider such aspects of prototypes, largely due to a restrictive emphasis on laboratory experimentation, and somewhat crude operationalisations of the social influence process, raising serious questions about ecological validity.

#### *4.4.5 Social Identity Theory and large-scale social categories*

Results obtained during the course of the current study suggested that the Social Identity paradigm might require further development in order to adequately encompass aspects of social identity processes linked to large-scale social groups. For example, the current study found evidence that national identity seems to be *mediated* by smaller-scale identities - in particular, by political identity. Whether this is indicative of Zavalloni's (1973) suggestion that most or all large-scale social groups are mediated will be a matter for future research to address. Whilst finding evidence for the mediation of large-scale social groups, the results obtained in the current study were *not* interpreted as supporting Brewer and Schneider's (1990) contention that large-scale social groups can not serve identity needs as well as smaller groups. In fact, the evidence for strong "sentimental" attachments to the British nation, and indications that national and European identity satisfy control and power motivations, would suggest that national and other large-scale social identities can and do satisfy identity needs.

It was also suggested that symbols of the in-group might take on added potency for large-scale social groups, since the latter tend to be diffuse and reified entities. Furthermore, it was argued that this diffuse quality, and the sheer size of social groups like national identity, may afford greater opportunity for the use of self-serving and other biases which aim to avoid the self-stereotyping of negatively-evaluated properties of the in-group. Finally, the evidence of multiple prototypes,

sub-groups acting as prototypes, and so on, discussed earlier, may also be suggestive of social identity phenomena which particularly characterize large-scale social groups, rather than the small groups often focused on in laboratory research.

#### **4.4.6 National identity**

Evidence arising from the current research indicated that British national identity is characterized by a strong attachment to national culture and symbols - in essence, what Kelman (1969) described as a "sentimental" attachment to the nation. It was suggested that Kelman's instrumental-sentimental dichotomy is theoretically similar to Bales' (1950) notion of socio-emotional versus task orientation to the group. Perhaps the most salient symbol linked to British national identity proved to be the royal family, a result which was in keeping with previous theorizing (Nairn, 1989) and empirical research (Topf et al, 1989). Furthermore, open-ended responses which focused on the economic and political role of Britain also served to indicate the presence of instrumental orientations to the nation (Kelman, 1969), suggesting that British national identity at the present time is characterized both by sentimental *and* instrumental attachments to the nation. There was also evidence to support Stagner's (1967) contention that national identity serves the individual needs for power and autonomy.

As mentioned earlier, political affiliations were found to mediate level of British identity, such that Conservative voters possessed significantly higher levels of national identity than Labour voters. Furthermore, it was suggested that mediating identities are likely to influence choice of national symbols, prototypes, and social stereotypes, such that the phenomenological meaning of national identity will differ across varying sub-groups within the nation.

#### 4.4.7 *European identity*

Overall "strength" of British identity was found to be significantly higher than the strength of European identity. In particular, it was found that the salience of British identity was greater than that of European identity. Combined with the results from the open-ended questions, it seemed that European identity represents a poorly defined and as yet rather vague "cognitive alternative" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979/1986) to national identity. This interpretation was lent weight by the general distancing of the European Community from the concept of "self" in the multidimensional scaling analysis.

There were also indications that, whilst British national identity involves a strong attachment to national symbols and culture, European identity appears much more instrumental in character, being linked more to the instrumental dimensions of economics and politics. Just as British identity was found to be mediated by political affiliation, so it was found that Labour voters expressed significantly higher levels of European identity than Conservative voters. There were also indications that females expressed a higher level of European identity than males. Finally, it was proposed that previous research (e.g. Turner et al., 1984) suggests that a European identity is likely to be adhered to with more perseverance if its internalization is seen as an act of will, rather than as a result of external imposition.

#### 4.4.8 *The European Community and European integration*

There were indications from both the closed and open-ended responses that British and European identities are perceived as *dissonant* or conflictual. It was suggested that this might reflect the treatment of European issues in the British mass media, and the resistance to change of existing social representations of the nation. This result was in-keeping with Hewstone's (1986) discovery that positivity of British national "image" was *negatively* associated with attitudes towards the European Community in his survey study.

Evidence was also found which suggested that social identities are related to attitudes and social representations. In particular, it was discovered that European identity proved to be an important predictor of attitudes to the European Community and European integration. There was also evidence to suggest that British identity may act to inhibit pro-European attitudes and voting intentions. It was also discovered that apparently pro-European Community responses could be indicative of a desire to slow the pace of European integration, and enable Britain to play a leading role in European affairs, thereby ensuring the protection of British interests, and the maintenance of a separate British identity.

Finally, responses to open-ended questions indicated that some respondents considered European integration to hold the prospect of the development of a European super-state comparable to the United States. This was interpreted as supporting Stagner's (1967) contention that identity processes are linked to the need for power and control. It was suggested that one way in which a European identity might augment or even replace British national identity, is if it is perceived to offer greater prestige and power. At present, with the apparent intensity of British attachment to *national* culture and symbols, it was thought unlikely that a European identity would develop along cultural lines, as suggested by A.D. Smith (1991).

An interesting perspective for future research in this area to take is to focus on the struggle between different social groups within nations and within Europe, which are attempting to disseminate and propagate their own, often incompatible, social representations of Europe, European nations, the European Community, and the directions European integration might take. The social psychological manifestations of the on-going process of European integration seem especially appropriate for this kind of analysis, which might attempt an integration of the social identity and social representations paradigms. Such a study, which would probably take the proportions of a research programme, would necessitate the adoption of a variety of research techniques, and could only benefit from a collaboration with scholars from the other social sciences.

Even though the current study was quite broad in its scope, there were inevitably aspects of national and European identities which could not be addressed. Thus, for example, future research should also examine variables such as race, gender, regional identity, religion, country of origin, language etc. Furthermore, the single European Market and whole "1992" package would also seem a potentially instructive focus for future analyses. In conclusion, we perceive the process of European integration to offer an ideal "field-setting" for the study of social identity and social representations, and thereby serve to complement the current focus on the experimental laboratory, evident in much work within the self-categorization paradigm.

In the next chapter, the observations arising from the current British data are compared with those suggested by data collected in Italy, where it soon becomes apparent that, as expected, British and Italian orientations to integration are indeed quite different.

# Chapter 5

## The cross-national questionnaire data - 2: the Italians

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

#### 5.1.1 *Italian national identity*

It is important to concede from the beginning that Social Psychology can contribute only a *perspective* on national identity, one which *complements* observations arising from the other social sciences, such as Sociology and International Relations. At the same time it is worth noting that certain schools of thought within European social psychology have of late come to advocate an approach to our discipline which goes some way towards reconciling socio-historical and social psychological perspectives (see, for example, Himmelweit et al., 1981; Moscovici, 1984). It is in the spirit of this arguably more "social" social psychology that we now turn to a brief discussion of some of the socio-historical factors relevant to our current interest in Italian national identity.

In historical terms, the Italian nation is relatively young, deriving from the formation of the republic in 1860, which brought together what had previously been a collection of relatively independent regions and city-states (c.f. Mack Smith, 1969; 1985). In the centuries prior to unification, a good number of future Italian citizens lived under what was often perceived as harsh and unjust foreign rule. This led many to develop a deep-seated distrust of authority and government, which may well have its psychological reverberations today. Luigi Barzini (1983)

has aptly described the problems facing the would-be architects of the Italian nation at the time of unification:

The nongeographical divisions among the people were deep and irreconcilable. They lived next door to each other, called themselves Italians, but were almost as different as inhabitants of foreign countries. Most of them seemed to be inhabiting their own personal imaginary Italies and to be trying to promote or perpetuate their existences. (Barzini, 1983, p.181)

Whilst the culture of the Italian people has a veritable and ancient basis, the modern Italian state has at times looked fragile. Commentators such as Barzini (op. cit.) and Haycraft (1987) suggest that the embarrassment of fascism and the Second World War, coupled with relatively poor economic performance, led to something of a crisis in what had always been a brittle Italian identity. The threat to national identity was compounded by political crises, terrorism, organized crime, and widespread corruption. The dream of many Italians - a capable and just government (*il buongoverno*) - continued to elude them (see, for example, LaPalombara, 1987). Today, many Italians have come to accept, albeit with a sense of disappointment, that political confusion, corruption, and the Mafia, have become fairly permanent aspects of life in Italy. Yet by the beginning of 1993, amidst a tide of particularly significant scandals, it seems that many Italians are coming to feel they have had enough, and perhaps the largest attempt at finally coming to grips with corruption is beginning to take shape, as politicians and other notable public figures past and present, struggle to repair their badly damaged reputations.

However, it has been argued by some (e.g. Ward, 1990), that Italian national identity enjoyed something of a revival during the 1980s, which has continued to some extent, to the present day. The 1980s, argues Ward, witnessed a dramatic reversal in Italy's fortunes: economically, Italy appeared to be progressing at a healthy pace; highly salient political and media figures such as Pertini and Baudo engendered pride in the Italian people; and the soccer world cup victory of 1982 was cherished by a nation of avid sports fans.

The role of the mass media here should not be underestimated (a common mistake in psychological discussions of national identity). For Ward, "it was

television that was to complete Garibaldi and Cavour's work in unifying the peninsula, in giving Italy a linguistic and cultural identity previously missing." (Ward, 1990, p.129). For all modern nations, television serves a unifying role, with nationwide news broadcasts being especially crucial in establishing notions of the "national interest". The mass media also provide citizens with a rich resource of norms, stereotypes and prototypes from which to construct their national identity.

However proud the Italians may be about their cultural heritage, economic prosperity and sporting achievements, it is indisputable that the majority remain deeply frustrated with the political system and state services (e.g. postal and telephone agencies). During the period 1978-1987, Eurobarometre surveys indicate that on average, 75% of Italians were "not at all satisfied with the way democracy works" in Italy. Interestingly, this dissatisfaction with politics does not appear to have reduced the public's *interest* in political matters - turn-out at national elections averages an extremely high 90% (Ginsborg, 1990). It is worth noting that, despite the perceptions of many foreign observers, Italy is in fact quite stable politically: whilst there are frequent government reshuffles, the actual number of general elections since the Second World War is no greater than in the U.K., and the Christian Democrats (D.C.) have managed to hold political superiority since 1945.

Since the regions and city-states of the past were such important aspects of pre-unification life, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that regionalism is still a significant aspect of life in Italy today. Whilst the state apparatus, economy, transport system, youth culture, and other elements of Italian life are relatively nationwide, a number of regional factors remain significant (see, for example, Capozza, Bonaldo & Di Maggio, 1982; Procacci, 1988). Thus, for example, regional media - both newspapers and television stations - remain extremely popular. Local governments often have significant levels of autonomy from the state. Italians trace their regional and local heritage with fervour and pride. Culturally, all of the regions have their own cuisine, sense of humour, accent, and dialects. Many Italians continue to diffuse and accept regional stereotypes - of the Bolognese, the Milanese, the Romani, etc. Despite the teaching of standard Italian in all schools now, it appears that around 71% of Italians can still speak some form of regional dialect (Lepschy, 1990), and some of these remain completely incomprehensible to

Italian speakers from outside the local area. Such regional practices appear to have evinced an impressive longevity, yet at the same time, one should remember that they do, after all, outdate the Italian nation by a good few centuries.

### 5.1.2 *Italy and Europe*

The Italians have almost always been amongst the most enthusiastic proponents of European integration, and Italy can rightly be considered as one of the architects of the European Community. Today, Eurobaromètre opinion poll data from the E.C. member states regularly shows the Italians as expressing the highest levels of support for the Community and further integration (see also Hewstone, 1986). For example, data from Eurobaromètre #34 (December 1990) indicates that the Italians were the most keen amongst EC members for efforts being made to unify Europe, with some 87 per cent being in favour. Commentators have observed how this stance is noticeable in parliament, the press, and public opinion (Ward, 1990). In contrast to the heated political debate and media criticism witnessed in Britain, the major Italian political parties, together with the prominent newspapers, appear to have lost any reservations they might have had decades ago, and are relatively homogeneous in their support for integration.

It is hoped that the current study might provide some social psychological pointers as to *why* the Italians appear to be so unreservedly pro-European (in contrast to the British). Both Barzini (1983) and Ward (1990) suggest that Italians hope the E.C. perhaps offers them an escape from inept government and at last the promise of *il buongoverno*. We will see shortly that this does indeed seem to be the case for some Italians, but is not the whole story. Similarly, whilst many Italians undoubtedly link Italy's economic development with E.C. membership, this alone does not seem to account for the degree of pro-Europeanism evinced by the Italians - Eurobaromètre polls for example, indicate that the Italians do not necessarily feel Italy has gained a great deal *yet* from E.C. membership.

### **5.1.3 A NOTE ABOUT THE ITALIAN TRANSLATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Although the Italian translation of the questionnaire is as identical as possible to the English translation, there was one interesting (though minor) change in wording which had to be adopted. It soon emerged that Italians typically tend not to talk of "Britain/the British" or "the United Kingdom", but instead talk of the "English" and "England". It was beyond the scope of the current study to examine the possible psychological consequences of this interesting linguistic phenomenon, but it should be noted that throughout the questionnaire, the Italian noun *Inghilterra* (England) was used to refer to Britain. The text of the Italian questionnaire is presented in Appendix D. Please note that since a number of sections included in the English questionnaire were removed from the Italian version, the section headings and question numbers may be different between the two versions - for clarification, please consult the questionnaire texts reproduced in the appendices.

## 5.2 RESULTS & DISCUSSION

### 5.2.1 Demographic data

A basic demographic profile of the Italian respondents is presented in Table 33 below.

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**Table 33 - Demographic data for Italian study**

SEX:	count	%	AGE:
Female	99	72.3	Mean: 21 years
Male	38	27.7	Mode: 19 years
			Range: 18-44 years
	-----		
Total	137		

#### COUNTRY OF ORIGIN:

	count	%
Italy	135	98.5
Other	2	1.5

#### PREDICTED VOTE IN GENERAL ELECTION (MOST POPULAR RESPONSES):

	Frequency	Percent
PDS	15	10.9
LISTE VERDE	13	9.5
RIFONDAZIONE COMUNISTA	10	7.3
OTHER	28	20.4
(NOT VOTE)	44	32.1
(MISSING DATA)	27	19.8
	-----	
Total	137	100

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## 5.3 FIXED RESPONSE QUESTIONS

### 5.3.1 Sections (A) and (E.1): Italian and European identity

Much like the British data, it was noticeable from an exploratory data analysis, that the majority of the Italian identity variables have means close to the neutral scale midpoint of 4. Similarly, the means of the European identity measures also tend to converge on the scale midpoint or towards the positive end of the scale.

#### *Principal Components Analysis*

A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation was conducted in order to investigate the relationship between the Italian identity variables. Table 34 below contains a summary of the results obtained from the PCA.

---

**Table 34 - PCA results for Italian identity variables**

The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigen value of 3.531, which accounted for 50.4% of the variance; variable loadings on this component were as follows:

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Loading</i>
A1	.839
A2	.736
A3	.763
A4	.683
A5	.778
A6	.432
A7	.667 (n=130)

(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)

---

In keeping with the British data, one may note that the Italian identity variables load highly and positively on the single extracted component, which can therefore be labelled "Italian identity". From an examination of the correlation matrix (Appendix B.1, Table A), one may note that all of the identity variables correlate significantly with each other, except for variables A6 and A7. Since question A6 refers to respondents sharing views about Italy, it is perhaps not surprising that responses to this question, which may well be open to individualistic and P.I.P.

biases, are less highly correlated with the other identity variables. Question A7 refers to Italians feeling personally criticized when Italy is criticized. As the analysis of the open-ended responses will demonstrate, it appears that some, though not the majority of, Italians endeavour to distance themselves from the frequent criticisms levelled at Italian politics, corruption, and organized crime. As we discovered in the analysis of self-stereotyping amongst the British respondents, it seems quite common for individuals to distance themselves from aspects of a social identification they feel unhappy about, or outsiders criticize. This does not necessarily imply a lower level of identification compared to those who are willing to incorporate negatively evaluated aspects of the ingroup into their own self-stereotypes.

Table 35 contains a summary of the Principal Components analysis of the European identity variables.

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**Table 35 - PCA results for European identity variables (Italian data)**

The PCA extracted 1 component/factor with an Eigen value of 3.630, which accounted for 51.9% of the variance; variable loadings on this component were as follows:

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Loading</i>
E.1 1	.743
E.1 2	.647
E.1 3	.814
E.1 4	.659
E.1 5	.791
E.1 6	.626
E.1 7	.739 (n=129)

(since only 1 component was extracted, rotation was not possible)

---

In a similar manner to the Italian identity variables, the European measures all load highly and positively on a single component - European identity. An examination of the correlation matrix (Appendix B.1, Table B) indicates that all European identity variables correlate positively and significantly. This result is in keeping with that obtained from the British data.

*Reliability analysis*

It can be seen from Table 36 that both the Italian and European identity variables are able to form fairly adequate composite scales.

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**Table 36 - Reliability analyses for sections A and E.1**

	(Italian ID)	(Euro ID)
mean inter-item correlations:	section A	section E.1
	.408	.434
corrected item-total correlations:		
A1: .737	E1: .629	
A2: .610	E2: .526	
A3: .637	E3: .710	
A4: .556	E4: .533	
A5: .662	E5: .679	
A6: .318	E6: .501	
A7: .531	E7: .622	
		-internal consistency reliability-
		CRONBACH'S ALPHA: A=.829 E.1=.843
		Standardized
		Item Alpha: A=.828 E=.843

Note: Section A=Italian identity; section E=Euro identity

---

Cronbach's Alpha for both scales is close to the ideal 0.85 or over recommended for psychometric scales (c.f. Kline, 1985). The points made earlier concerning the pros and cons of a general social identity scale are equally relevant here: to briefly summarize what was argued previously, we would suggest that social identity is potentially a multidimensional construct, and should be treated accordingly. This is not to say that single social identity scales can not be valuable, but only that they should be utilized with the admission that they may well be simplifications of complex psychological constructs.

*Correlations between identity and other relevant variables*

Table 37 below contains the Pearson Product Moment correlations between the Italian identity variables and two other variables likely to be associated with them.

**Table 37 - Correlation matrix for Italian identity variables with C3, AND F6.**

	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7
C3	.694 p=.001	.399 p=.001	.579 p=.001	.591 p=.001	.546 p=.001	.326 p=.001	.417 p=.001
F6	-.432 p=.001	-.178 NS	-.165 NS	-.119 NS	-.335 p=.001	-.216 NS	-.201 NS

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)  
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)

C3 =SIMILARITY RATING OF "ITALY - MYSELF" (X/7)  
F6 =IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF ITALIAN FLAG & ANTHEM

From an examination of Table 37 above, one may note that all of the Italian identity variables correlate positively and significantly with responses to question C3, which measures perceived similarity between Italy and self. This result, which is in keeping with that obtained from the British data, adds further weight to the earlier observation that measures of the "cognitive closeness" of concepts might be related to social identification and self-categorisation. In particular, the observed correlations seem in part to validate the use of multidimensional scaling techniques in multi-methodological investigations of social identity processes.

It is interesting to note the differences between the British and Italian data concerning the associations between national identity variables and willingness to have the national flag and anthem replaced by European Community equivalents (variable F6). Whereas for the British, all national identity variables were significantly (and negatively) correlated with the willingness to see the flag and anthem replaced, for the Italians, only variables A1 and A5 correlate significantly with variable F6. Variables A1 and A5 both seem to tap elements of the current *salience* of national identity - thus, since the observed correlation is negative, when the salience of Italian identity increases, then one would expect opposition to the replacement of the flag and anthem to also increase.

As we will shortly discover, since the Italians appear to be significantly more favourable towards European integration than the British, it is not altogether

surprising that Italian national identity appears less resistant to changing the national flag and anthem *for an E.C. equivalent*, than British identity.

Table 38 below details the correlations between the European identity variables (section E.1) and some other variables likely to be associated with European identity.

**Table 38 - Correlation matrix for European identity variables with C5, AND C15.**

	E.1 1	E.1 2	E.1 3	E.1 4	E.1 5	E.1 6	E.1 7
C5	-.062 NS	.067 NS	-.018 NS	.059 NS	.046 NS	-.081 NS	.080 NS
C15	.457 p=.001	.428 p=.001	.429 p=.001	.342 p=.001	.393 p=.001	.300 p=.001	.324 p=.001

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)  
(all probabilities are 2-tailed)

C5 = SIMILARITY RATING OF "ITALY - E.C." (X/7)  
C15 = SIMILARITY RATING OF "E.C. - MYSELF" (X/7)

Once again, from an examination of Table 38 one may note an interesting difference between the British and Italian data. For the British respondents, four of the British identity variables were significantly (and positively) associated with the perceived similarity between Britain and the E.C. However, one may note from Table 38 that for the Italians, *none* of the Italian identity variables correlate significantly with perceptions of the similarity between Italy and the E.C. This initially puzzling finding is rendered much more comprehensible when considered together with the fact that many Italian respondents, regardless of their orientation towards European integration, perceived Italy as quite different to the other E.C. nations, in that they felt Italy was much more prone to corruption, inefficient bureaucracy and political instability. These observations derive from open-ended responses, highlighting once again how open-ended questions are often crucial when one wishes to examine the deeper implications of quantitative measures.

One way in which the British and Italian data are similar, is in the observed correlations between the European identity variables and the variable measuring

the perceived similarity between "self" and the E.C. From an examination of Table 38, one may note that all European identity variables are significantly and positively correlated with variable C15, such that as European identity increases, so the concepts "self" and the E.C. are rated as more similar. It is worth making the point that, given the magnitude of the observed correlations, one should not rely on this type of similarity rating for one's *only* measure of a social identification - for this purpose, a scale based on the seven identity measures themselves would be much more suitable.

### *Italian versus European identity*

A within-subjects MANOVA was conducted in order to compare the overall pattern of responses on the Italian and European identity variables, and a summary of the MANOVA analysis is contained in Table 39 below.

---

**Table 39 - MANOVA comparing Italian and European identity**

(n=130)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.310 F= 7.893 D.F.=7,123 Sig. of F=<.001

**Significant univariate effects:**

**"To what extent do you feel pleased to be Italian/European?"**

Means: Italian=4.238 European=4.962 F(1,129)=17.191 Sig=<.001

**"How important to you is being Italian/European?"**

Means: Italian=3.969 European=4.546 F(1,129)=9.628, Sig=.002

---

The MANOVA analysis detailed in Table 39 indicates that overall, there is a significant multivariate difference between Italian and European identities ( $F=7.89$ , d.f. 7,123,  $p<.001$ ). Examination of the univariate statistics also presented in Table 39, indicates that there are two cases where Italian and European identities are significantly different.

Variables A3/E.1 3 refer to the extent respondents felt pleased to be Italian or European, and one may note from the univariate *F* statistics that the Italian respondents reported feeling significantly more pleased to be European than Italian. This is therefore an instance where at least *an element* of European identity appears to be stronger than national identity. As the discussion of the open-ended responses will make clear, this result is not surprising, given that the Italian respondents often felt much more positive about Europe and the E.C. than they did about their own nation. However, it is extremely important to note that one of the reasons the Italians were so positive about Europe was precisely because they hoped further integration might ease some of Italy's problems regarding politics, bureaucracy, and so on. Thus, one should note that whilst European was stronger than Italian identity on this measure, the means for *both* identities were above 4, and therefore towards the positive evaluative end of the scale.

Variables A5 and E.1 5 refer to how important respondents feel being Italian or European is to them. One can see from Table 39 that the mean importance of being European was significantly higher than the mean importance of being Italian. This dimension appears to primarily tap the *salience* of Italian and European identities - it thus appears that, to some extent, for the Italian respondents, European identity was more salient than Italian identity. Given that European integration, the E.C. and related issues were receiving extremely high levels of mass media coverage (almost all of which was pro-European) in Italy at the time of data-collection, this result is readily understandable, and in keeping with the generally pro-European orientation of the majority of the Italian respondents.

Taken as a whole, these results deviate in an interesting manner from those pertaining to the British respondents. It is worth recalling that three measures indicated a significantly higher level of *British*, as opposed to *European* identity. For the Italians, at least in terms of quantitative measures of identity, it seems reasonable to conclude that European identity is at least as strong as, and in some cases stronger than, Italian identity. Since Eurobaromètre opinion polls consistently suggest the strength of Italian support for European integration, these results are to be expected, although it should be noted that the Eurobaromètre focuses on *opinions and attitudes*, not on *identities*. Thus, it is interesting to find that the pro-

European *opinions* espoused by the Italians also seem to be complemented by quite a healthy European *identity*.

### 5.3.2 Cross-national comparisons of identities:-

#### *Italian & British identity: a comparison*

A between-subjects MANOVA was conducted in order to investigate any significant differences between Italian and British *national identity*. It should be noted that here we are focusing on *quantitative* aspects of national identity - we will address the question of *qualitative* differences between the samples in our discussion of the open-ended responses. Since an analysis of the means indicated they appeared to be very similar, it was not surprising to discover that the MANOVA procedure indicated the absence of any multivariate difference between the Italian and British quantitative identity measures. This result will prove of relevance when we later come to examine the nature of Italian opinions about Europe and the apparent strength of European identity amongst the Italians. At this point in the discussion, it is sufficient to note that there are no statistically significant differences in national identity between the British and Italian samples. This means that differences in the overall strength or level of *national* identity can not be forwarded as explanations for any differences in *European* identity between the two samples.

#### *Comparing European identity in Italy and Britain*

Table 40 below contains a summary of the output obtained from a between-subjects MANOVA conducted to examine any quantitative differences in European identity between the British and Italian respondents.

---

**Table 40: MANOVA comparing European identity in Britain & Italy**

(n=237 : Italian=130, British=107)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.120 F= 4.465 D.F.=7,229 Sig. of F=<.001

**Significant univariate effects:**

"To what extent do you feel European?"

British: mean=4.131 Italian: mean=4.769 Sig= .002

"How important to you is being European?"

British: mean=3.860 Italian: mean=4.546 Sig=.003

"When you hear someone who is not European criticize the Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"

British: mean=3.290 Italian: mean=4.162 Sig=<.001

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)

---

The results presented in Table 40 above confirm what an eyeballing of the means suggested, since it was noticeable that on all measures bar one (where they are equal), the Italian respondents reported higher levels of European identity than the British respondents. The MANOVA highlighted a significant overall multivariate difference between the two samples, and in particular, univariate differences on three identity dimensions.

The question which focused on how much respondents felt European, can be thought of as tapping elements of the salience of European identity - in particular, the current relevance or "fit" of European identity for the respondent (c.f. Oakes, 1987). Similarly, the question which refers to how important respondents feel being European is, can also be thought of as tapping the salience of European identity, perhaps also including elements of the accessibility of the identity - i.e. how readily it is activated. There are thus indications from the MANOVA analysis, that the salience of European identity is significantly greater for Italian respondents.

The other dimension of European identity on which there appears to be a significant difference between the samples, concerns how much respondents feel personally criticized when the Europeans as a whole are criticized. Once again, one finds that the Italians lead the British on this dimension of Euro-identity. One should be somewhat cautious in interpreting this finding, in as much as the existence of self-serving and similar individualistic biases might enable people to distance themselves from criticisms directed at groups to which they belong, and still maintain a strong and positive social identity. Nevertheless, the observed difference between the British and Italian respondents does appear to suggest that the Italians find it harder to distance themselves from criticisms of Europe than the British. It would be in keeping with the results obtained from the other analyses conducted, to interpret this difference as indicative of a greater commitment to European identity amongst the Italians. It should be noted, however, that this finding could also reflect a wider difference in styles of identity maintenance and use of self-serving biases between the British and Italian groups. Any such differences, although potentially interesting, are somewhat beyond the scope of the current study.

Taken as a whole therefore, there are good reasons to believe that the Italian respondents possessed a European identity which was significantly stronger than that manifested by the British. In conclusion, the observed differences in European identity between the British and Italians seem to suggest that the apparent differences in attitudes and opinions about European integration highlighted by the Eurobaromètre are also reflected in differences at the level of social identity construction.

*Do Italian & European identities vary with political affiliation?*

Returning to our focus on the Italian data, we now turn to an examination of whether Italian national identity and European identity fluctuate across different political affiliations. Since there are a large number of political parties in Italy, it was necessary to collapse categories into three meaningful political sub-divisions:

- i) COMMUNIST (including PCI and Rifon. Com. parties)
- ii) GREEN (Liste Verde party)
- iii) SOCIALIST/SOCIAL DEMOCRAT (PSI & PSDI parties)

It is interesting to note how some 32.1% of respondents indicated that they would not vote if there were a general election in the near future. Analysis of the open-ended responses suggests that this may well reflect a general dissatisfaction with the process of politics in Italy, and a feeling of confusion as to what the numerous parties actually stand for - both ideologically, and, more concretely, in terms of the policies advocated (c.f. Barzini, 1983; Haycraft, 1987). We would suggest that the general confusion and apathy associated with views about politics may also be reflected in the relatively high proportion of missing answers to the political vote question (19.8% of responses) - it is interesting to note that Hewstone (1986) also had a high non-response rate for this question (41.1%).

The between-subjects MANOVA analyses indicated that both Italian and European identities do *not* vary significantly across political affiliation - at least, in terms of quantitative "strength" of identities. In fact, given the relatively homogeneous treatment of European issues in the Italian mass media, one might also go on to hypothesize that there is likely to be little difference at the level of the social representations being diffused by the political parties, about Europe. This is especially likely, given that European integration has not been a subject for political conflict in Italy since the late 1960s/early 1970s.

These results are somewhat different to those obtained by Hewstone (1986), who found that those respondents in his sample who voted Christian Democrat were more pro-Community than those who would vote Communist. However, it is important to remember that Hewstone's focus was specifically on *attitudes* towards the European Community - our current focus is on national and European *identities*. Similarly, it is interesting to recall how both British and European identity varied significantly across political affiliation for the British respondents. The results which emerged from the MANOVAs were in keeping with the open-ended responses - especially the frequent comments from respondents which expressed their surprise that questions pertaining to political affiliation were included in a

questionnaire on opinions about Italy and Europe. We will return to the issue of politics and whether political parties in Italy are associated with particular orientations to Europe and Italy, when we come to examine the open-ended responses.

*Do Italian & European identities vary across sex?*

In order to investigate whether quantitative elements of Italian and European identities might vary across sex, two between-subjects MANOVAs were conducted. In keeping with the British data, there were found to be no significant differences in Italian national identity between the sexes.

Table 41 below summarizes the results obtained from the MANOVA analysis of European identity across sex.

---

**Table 41 - MANOVA on European Identity across sex (Italian data)**

(n=130)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.173 F (approx)=3.653 D.F.=7,122 Sig. of F=.001

**Significant univariate effects:**

**"How important to you is being European?"**

Means: Male=4.029 Female=4.737 Sig=.038

**"When you hear someone who is not European criticize the Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"**

Means: Male=3.629 Female=4.358 Sig=.032

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)

---

If one examines Table 41, again, in a similar way to the British data, one may observe that quantitative levels of European identity also vary significantly across sex for the Italian sample. In particular, the univariate F-tests indicate significant differences on a salience-related question, and a question pertaining to whether

Italians feel personally criticized when Europeans are criticized. On both these questions, female respondents appear to report significantly higher levels of European identity than male respondents.

At present there is a dearth of research on the question of gender differences in national and/or European identity. Data from the Eurobaromètre opinion polls is somewhat ambiguous on this issue, showing no clear gender differences. There is some evidence from these polls to indicate that, in Italy and the United Kingdom, females report being more "indifferent" about the European Parliament than males (Niedermayer, 1991), but the implications of this finding for European identity are far from clear. It has also been suggested that housewives may be less favourable towards the E.C. since they feel the brunt of E.C. economic policy, however such claims remain as yet little more than un-tested hypotheses. Since the majority of the female respondents in the current study were students between the ages of 18 and 24, it seems unlikely that many of them could have been categorised as "housewives". Other researchers have suggested that males are often more interested in political affairs than females (see, for example, Sears, 1969). What the current results appear to indicate is that these differences in interest (if they exist) do not necessarily affect European *identity*. The precise nature and origin of these sex differences, especially since they occurred in both the British and Italian data, and in the same direction (females had a higher Euro-identity), certainly warrants further research in the future.


### 5.3.3 Section F - similarity judgements

As for the British data, the similarity ratings, which included the E.C., "Myself", Britain, Germany, France, and Italy as stimulus objects, were subjected to a Multidimensional Scaling analysis (MDS). The SPSS\* ALSCAL command was utilized to conduct a non-metric individual-differences analysis, with an ordinal level of measurement specified, and the "ties=untied" option requested (see earlier discussion of MDS in Chapter four for further details).

Whilst a three dimensional solution was obtained, this proved not to be significantly greater, in terms of fit to the data, than a two dimensional solution,

and we will therefore focus our discussion on the latter. The 2-dimensional solution had an averaged stress over matrices of 0.187 (Kruskall's Stress formula 1) and R-Squared averaged over matrices of 0.715. These levels of fit to the data are on the low to fair side according to the guidelines given by Rabinowitz (1986). However, since our ultimate aim is to use MDS as an exploratory tool, it seems justifiable to pursue our analysis, if we accept some of the limitations outlined in our earlier discussion of MDS. Figure 2 below, shows in a graphical format the 2-dimensional solution obtained from the MDS - since an individual differences methodology was utilized we did not employ a rotation, as the initial rotation obtained from this method should prove meaningful (see Appendix B.1, Table C for a more detailed breakdown of the MDS analysis).

*Figure 2: derived stimulus configuration for INDSCAL analysis - dim 1 (horizontal) vs dim 2 (vertical): Italian data*



If we focus our attention on dimension 1 (horizontal) in Figure 2, it becomes apparent that Britain and Germany are contrasted on this dimension with Italy, France, and to a lesser extent "Myself" and the E.C. In this respect, the MDS solution obtained is strikingly similar to that deriving from the British data. It seems quite likely that this dimension especially reflects perceptions of national character and temperament, rather than a focus on aspects of the nations themselves, such as economic prosperity or political system. Given the cross-national similarity on this dimension, there seems good reason to argue for some sort of Latin stereotype. Evidence for the latter has emerged from work conducted by Peabody on perceptions of national characteristics (Peabody, 1985) as well as research examining perceptions of trust within Europe (Inglehart, 1991).

It is an interesting question as to whether such patterns of perceptions are conceptualised as shared stereotypes/social representations or merely co-existing stereotypes which have common elements. This may well be an important issue, although it seems likely that both conceptualisations are correct to some extent. Given the increasing homogenisation of Western European culture and development of mass communications technology, there may be a strong argument for at least some internationally shared social representations, and thus social stereotypes. Nevertheless, to the extent that the social stereotypes of nationalities develop in particular socio-historic environments, and given that they might also be linked to other social representations which are peculiarly national, then one must be wary in accepting the assumption that common patterns in social representations can be taken to signify a single shared representation.

Dimension 2 (vertical) is an interesting reflection of many of the issues which will soon be discussed in relation to the open-ended responses. One may note that this dimension seems to contrast Britain from the E.C., with the other stimulus objects being relatively neutral. Whilst Britain is obviously a member of the E.C., a number of commentators have suggested that the Italians, often passionately enthusiastic about European integration, have found Britain's cautious stance both frustrating and, at times, infuriating. It seems that such perceptions may be shared by Italian politicians and the Italian public (c.f. Ward, 1990).

It is interesting to note how Italy is not as close to the E.C. as France, Germany, or "Myself" on the vertical dimension. This might at first seem somewhat puzzling, given that we have already presented evidence that the Italian respondents possessed a strong European identity. However, we have also emphasized that responses to the open-ended questions indicated that many respondents felt that Italy was not a "model" E.C. member state, and could not be until it dealt with its problems concerning political instability, corruption, and organised crime. This seems the most likely reason why Italy is not perceived as extremely similar to the E.C. and what it represents. Once again, there is also an interestingly congruent element between the British and Italian analyses, in that both represent France and the E.C. as quite close in conceptual space, perhaps again suggesting grounds for some sort of shared social representation (although the reasons for perceiving these stimulus objects as quite similar could, of course, be quite different, as could the evaluative connotations of such an observation). Finally, and in keeping with the apparent differences in level of European identity between the two samples, it is noticeable how the concept of "Myself" is not prominently distanced in conceptual space from the E.C. by the Italians, whereas the E.C. and "Myself" are noticeably distant in the British analysis.

#### **5.3.4 Italian attitudes & opinions about the EC and European integration**

##### *Preliminary remarks*

Given that the Italians appear to possess a relatively strong European identity (especially compared to the British), it is important to examine whether this is reflected at the level of attitudes and opinions. There are already strong reasons to expect pro-European opinions, given the consistent support evinced by Italians in the Eurobaromètre opinion surveys.

Appendix B.2 contains descriptive statistics for the Italian responses to the attitude and opinion questions contained in the questionnaire. It is apparent from Appendix B.2 that the mean attitude towards the European Community is 5.434

("slightly in favour") - towards the positive end of the scale, although perhaps not as positive as one might have expected from the Eurobarometre findings. Nevertheless, some 72.2% of all respondents were in favour of the European Community. Similarly, mean attitudes towards European integration were positive (5.500), with 79.6% of respondents expressing favourable attitudes towards integration. These favourable attitudes towards the E.C. and European integration were also complemented by a relatively high level of professed interest in the future of Europe - 80.30% of respondents were interested to some extent in the future of Europe. As for the British data, it is hoped that, given this level of interest in European affairs, we are justified in examining questions concerning European identity and opinions, on the assumption that interest generates a need for social representations and attitudes.

*The structure of Italian attitudes to the E.C. and Europe*

A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with a Varimax rotation requested was conducted in order to examine the structure of responses to some of the attitudinal questions contained in the questionnaire, and the results arising from this analysis are summarised in Table 42.

An examination of Table 42 indicates that the PC analysis extracted two components with Eigen values greater than or equal to 1.00. The two components together account for some 49.0% of the variance. This is a less satisfactory level of variance explained than for the British data, and it is readily accepted that there remains some 51% of variance in the data not explained by the components, and as such, one must accept that the components offer only a partial account of Italian respondents' attitudes towards Europe.

If one inspects the rotated factor matrix contained in Table 42, one may note that attitudinal variables F1, F2, F4, F5 and F8 load highly and positively on the first component. This component appears to be somewhat conceptually similar to the first component from the analysis of the British data, combining elements of attitudinal support for European integration and interest in European matters.

However, unlike the British, the Italian analysis indicates that how often respondents discuss European affairs is *not* part of this component, whilst the compatibility of views about Italy and Europe *is* included this time in the component.

Once again, it is noticeable how the composition of this component suggests that attitudes and opinions about the European Community are associated with attitudes about European integration in general. An inspection of the correlation matrix (Appendix B.1, Table D) indicates that these variables (F1 and F4) correlate positively and significantly ( $r=.683$ , 2-tailed significance  $<.001$ ). However, this correlation, high though it may be, still leaves some 53.3% of the variance unexplained. The moral of this seems to be that, whilst attitudes towards the European Community and European integration are related, they are still different hypothetical constructs since they pertain to different attitudinal objects, and should be treated as such.

It is interesting to note from the correlation matrix (Appendix B.1, Table D) that, although Hewstone's important concept of instrumental support (variable F8) is significantly correlated with overall attitude to the E.C., the absolute magnitude of the correlation is quite low (0.271). In fact, the correlations between all the attitudinal variables and variable F8, although significant, appear to be of low or moderate magnitude, and are noticeably lower than for the British respondents. There are thus indications that instrumental assessments of how much Italy has gained from E.C. membership are not as crucial to Italian attitudes about Europe as similar perceptions might be for the British. We will return to the question of instrumental dimensions of Italian identity and opinions concerning Europe shortly, when we examine the open-ended responses.

---

**Table 42 - PC analysis of attitude questions: Italian data**
**Variables entered into the analysis:**

**F1:** overall attitude to the E.C.  
**F2:** interest in the future of Europe  
**F3:** how often respondents discuss European affairs  
**F4:** overall attitude to European integration  
**F5:** compatibility of views about Italy and Europe  
**F6:** willingness to have Italian flag & anthem replaced  
**F7A:** certainty about European super-state vote  
**F8:** how much Italy has gained from membership of the E.C.

**PCA extracted 2 components with Eigen values over 1.00:**

Components:		Eigen values	% variance	Cum % var
1		2.80	35.0	35.0
2		1.12	14.0	49.0

**Rotated factor matrix (varimax rotation specified):**

	<u>FACTOR 1</u>	<u>FACTOR 2</u>
F1	.842	
F2	.674	
F4	.837	
F5	.421	
F8	.688	
F3		.568
F6		.588
F7a		.806

(loadings below 0.35 not shown; n=135)

---

The second component consists of a variable examining how often respondents discuss European affairs (F3), a question measuring Italian's willingness to have their flag and anthem replaced by E.C. equivalents (F6), and a question pertaining to how certain respondents are about how they would vote in a European super-state referendum (F7a). All of these variables load highly on this component, which appears to encompass willingness to change potentially potent national symbols, active participation in discussion about European issues, and certainty about how one would vote in a super-state referendum. It is interesting to note how, even though the Italians appear to have manufactured quite a strong and positive European identity, and are quite pro-E.C., still only some 29.9% of respondents were willing to have the Italian flag and anthem replaced by E.C. equivalents.

Whilst this figure is certainly higher than its equivalent for the British data (17.8%), it nevertheless underlines the significant resistance to change associated with national symbols.

In conclusion, this second component appears conceptually meaningful and phenomenologically sound. Since there are good reasons to suggest that the majority of social representations of European issues circulating in Italy at the time of the data collection were pro-European in outlook, it is understandable that participation in discussion about Europe, and thus contact with these social representations, will be associated with a pro-European sentiment (willingness to have the national flag and anthem replaced by E.C. equivalents). Similarly, one might reasonably expect participation in relevant discussion to help crystallise views on the European issue, and thus be associated with increased certainty about how one might vote in a European super-state referendum.

*Predicting the first component (attitudinal support & interest)*

The first component highlighted in the PC analysis may be thought of in terms of general attitudinal support for the E.C. and interest in European issues. Since this component contains the primary attitudinal measures of support for the E.C. and the process of integration, it was deemed interesting to pursue a multiple linear regression analysis, in order to examine which variables in the questionnaire as a whole might prove to be significant predictors of this component. The first component, consisting of variables F1, F2, F4, F5 and F8, thus constituted the *criterion variable*, and was constructed by simply summing the responses to its constituent variables. The independent or *predictor variables* entered into the regression analysis are listed below. In order to minimize multicollinearity, composite variables were used where responses to questions were significantly correlated with each other.

**ITALIAN IDENTITY:** composite variable deriving from sum of  
7 Italian identity measures (section A).

**EUROPEAN IDENTITY:** composite variable deriving from sum of  
7 European identity measures (section E.1).

**FACTOR 2:** composite variable deriving from sum of variables  
F3, F6, F7a.

**VOTE:** variable F7b (predicted vote in super-state referendum),  
dummy-coded as for or against a European super-state.

**SEX:** variable G2, binary-coded.

**AGE:** variable G1, in years.

**C3:** similarity rating of Italy and self (x/7).

**C5:** similarity rating of Italy and the E.C. (x/7).

**C15:** similarity rating of "Myself" and the E.C. (x/7).

A summary of the multiple regression analysis, which was conducted with an enter+stepwise method of equation-building requested, is provided in Table 43 below.

If one examines Table 43, it can be ascertained that the best subset of predictor variables to emerge from the analysis consisted of predicted vote in a European super-state referendum, component/factor 2, and the European identity composite variable. These variables together are able to account for some 31.4% of the variance in factor 1, which once again, is a lower level of explanatory power than that obtained in the equivalent analysis of the British data.

An examination of the standardised regression coefficients (Beta scores) indicates that the super-state vote variable has a negative regression weight. This observation is in-keeping with the notion that increasing willingness to vote for a super-state is associated with increasing levels of pro-European attitudes and interest in Europe (i.e. factor 1), since this variable was dummy-coded such that 0=vote for and 1=vote against a super-state. This variable was also a significant predictor of the primary attitudinal factor in the British data.

**Table 43 - Summary of Italian multiple regression analysis:  
criterion variable=FACTOR 1**

**Final Equation:-**

Multiple R	.58202			
R Square	.33870			
Adjusted R Square	.31395			
Standard Error	3.59890	ANOVA F=13.661		Sig=<.0001

**Variables in the Equation**

Variable	B	S.E. B	Beta	t	Sig. t
VOTE	-2.473	.864	-.278	-2.864	.005
FACTOR2	.220	.103	.212	2.146	.035
EURO IDEN	.178	.054	.316	3.295	.001
(constant)	18.533	2.052		9.030	(<.001)

**Variables not in the Equation**

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	t	Sig. t
ITALID	.010	.012	.785	.105	.917
SEX	-.048	-.056	.828	-.496	.621
AGE	.059	.069	.800	.619	.538
C3	.047	.056	.815	.499	.619
C5	-.055	-.064	.813	-.573	.568
C15	.076	.075	.612	.669	.506

It is encouraging to once again observe how European identity has proved to be a significant predictor of attitudes and opinions about Europe. Since the Beta coefficient is positive, increasing levels of European identity are therefore associated with increasingly pro-European opinions, as measured by factor 1. With converging evidence from both the British and Italian samples, there are now strong indications that questions of social identity are relevant to studies of attitudes and opinions. It is hoped that many studies in the future will make explicit this conceptual linkage, which has so often remained implicit and unexplored in any systematic fashion.

Whilst factor 2 appears to be a significant predictor of factor 1, this does not necessarily imply that the original use of an orthogonal factor rotation was unsuited to the data. When we conducted an oblimin rotation, one which allows for the factors themselves to be correlated, the actual clustering of variables which emerged, was functionally identical to that which was produced by the orthogonal varimax rotation procedure. What the observed role of factor 2 does suggest, is that

this factor, which encompasses certainty about vote, participation in discussion about Europe, and willingness to have an E.C. flag and anthem replace their national equivalents, is significantly associated with the major attitudinal variables (factor 1), whilst not being identical to these variables.

In contrast to the equivalent British analysis, there were no indications that elements of Italian national identity might stand in the way of pro-European attitudes and opinions. This is perhaps the first, but by no means the only, indication that the British and Italian respondents construed the relationship or *networking* between national and European identities quite differently. Whilst we are not in a position to say that Italian identity encourages European sentiments, similarly, Italian identity does not appear to dampen enthusiasm for Europe. For the British, a number of findings emerging from both the questionnaire and interview studies (to be discussed in Chapter six), serve to indicate that many British respondents construed their national and European identities as conflictual.

### 5.3.5 Cross-national comparisons of attitudes:-

#### *Comparing Italian and British attitudes towards Europe*

A series of independent-sample *t*-tests were conducted to examine the possibility of any significant differences on the attitudinal variables between the Italian and British respondents. It is worth reminding oneself at this point that the interpretation of cross-national data - especially differences which emerge between national samples - must proceed with caution, given the large number of intervening variables which might be in effect. However, when such differences appear to be in-keeping with data collected using a variety of methods (e.g. questionnaires and interviews), as seems to be the case in the present study, one can at least be a little more confident that observed differences are of theoretical and empirical significance.

Table 44 below details those *t*-tests which highlighted a significant difference between the British and Italian samples.

---

**Table 44 - Comparison of British and Italian attitudes to Europe**


---

British data: n=107    Italian data: n=136

"Overall, what is your attitude towards European integration?"

Means: British=4.99    Italian=5.50    t=2.51    Sig=.013

"In general, would you be in favour of, or against the replacement of the British / Italian flag and national anthem by a European Community equivalent?"

Means: British=2.78    Italian=3.43    t=2.67    Sig=.008

(Significance levels are 2-tailed)

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It emerges from an inspection of Table 44 that there are two attitudinal variables on which the British and Italian responses differ significantly. One may first of all note that the mean for the Italian respondents on the overall attitude towards European integration variable is significantly higher than the mean response of British respondents. This result is to be expected, given the differences which usually emerge in the E.C.'s own Eurobaromètre surveys. However, it is important to note that the differences in European identity between the two samples which were discussed earlier are also reflected at an attitudinal level, as one would expect, if indeed social identities are related to social representations and their related attitudes.

There appear to be at least two, probably equally valid, ways to explain the observed difference in willingness to have one's national flag and anthem replaced by E.C. equivalents. One can see from Table 44, that once again, the Italians appear more pro-European than the British, although it is important to remember, as we noted earlier, that the majority of respondents in both countries, were opposed to the loss of these potentially potent national symbols.

One possible explanation for this cross-national difference is in terms of national identities - perhaps the British have a stronger national identity than the Italians, and this might explain why they cling-on to national symbols with a greater tenacity? Persuasive as this argument might at first appear, we have already noted from a MANOVA analysis, that there was no significant difference between

the two samples in terms of quantitative level of *national* identity. A more promising explanation might focus on *qualitative* differences in national identity: is it the case that the flag and anthem, and perhaps other symbolic aspects of the nation, are more important to the British than the Italians ?

It became apparent from the open-ended responses that the Italians may indeed lack a *civic identity* (i.e. an identity associated with the state and what it represents). The Italians clearly show signs of sentimental attachments to national symbols and culture, but the national flag and anthem, being also symbols of an Italian state many citizens feel dissatisfied with, might understandably not be as powerful as other, more culture-rich symbols, such as architecture and art. Italian orientations towards European integration and the E.C. are probably also relevant here - the Italians are fervent supporters of further integration, and it seems only natural that they would oppose an E.C. flag and anthem replacing the Italian equivalent to a lesser extent than the British, who in many ways remain the "reluctant Europeans" (Barzini, 1983).

Whilst we expected to find a significant difference in overall attitude towards the E.C. between the two samples, this was not in fact the case. However, the mean for the Italian sample was somewhat higher than that observed for the British, and the difference between the two means approached the .05 level of significance (1-tailed significance = .053). In conclusion, it seems that the Italians are not simply more pro-E.C. than the British, but they are also more enthusiastic about European integration in general. These differences have emerged from a variety of analyses of both identity-related and attitudinal variables.

#### *Predicted vote in European super-state referendum*

Question F7(b) of the Italian questionnaire asked respondents to indicate how they would vote in a hypothetical referendum addressing the question of whether Italy should become a part of a European super-state. Table 45 below provides descriptive statistics for this variable.

**Table 45 - vote in super-state referendum: Italian data**

	<i>frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>(British data: %)</i>
<b>Vote for</b>	57	43.2	(31.5)
<b>Not vote</b>	37	28.0	(24.1)
<b>Vote against</b>	38	28.8	(43.5)

(n=132)

One may note from an examination of Table 45 that some 43.2% of Italian respondents would vote for Italian participation in a super-state, and 28.8% against. These figures stand in marked contrast to those pertaining to the British data - for the British, a greater proportion of respondents would vote against a super-state than for one.

*Classifying respondents into those who would vote "for" versus those who would vote "against" a European super-state*

As for the British data, a Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA), with stepwise elimination requested, was conducted in order to investigate which variables might be able to discriminate between those respondents who would vote for and those who would vote against, a European super-state. The discriminating/independent variables entered into the analysis were the same as for the multiple regression analysis discussed earlier, except for the addition of component/factor 1 from the PC analysis.

Table 46 below contains a summary of the DFA output obtained, with more detailed results being presented in Table E of Appendix B.1.

**Table 46 - Discriminant Analysis on groups defined by predicted vote in European super-state referendum: Italian data**

**% of cases correctly classified:**

Vote "for" : 79.6%

Vote "against": 61.1%      **OVERALL % CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED=72.22%**

**Canonical Discriminant Functions:**

	Eigen Value	Canonical Corr	Wilk's Lambda	Chisquare	DF	Sig
<b>FUNCTION 1:</b>	.462	.562	.684	30.198	5	<.0001

The overall accuracy of the DFA is reflected in the figure of 72.22% of cases correctly classified. Once again, it appears that the Italian attitudinal data are somewhat more complex than the British: the level of variance not explained by the analysis is higher for the Italian data (Wilk's Lambda for Italian data=.684, for the British data=.593).

The best set of discriminating variables designated by the stepwise procedure, is presented in Table 47. It is interesting to note that for both the British and Italian samples, the major attitudinal factor proved to be the single most significant discriminating variable. From an examination of the standardised canonical discriminant function coefficients given in Table 47, it becomes apparent that scores on factor 1 appear to be higher for those who anticipate voting for a super-state. This is confirmed by the results obtained from an ANOVA, which indicates that, on average, respondents who predict voting for a super-state have significantly higher scores on factor 1 than those who predict voting against a super-state ( $F=17.35$ ,  $sig.=.0001$ ).

Scores on variable C5, the perceived similarity of Italy and the E.C., are also a significant discriminating variable, with those respondents who predict voting for a super-state perceiving, on average, a significantly higher degree of similarity between Italy and the E.C. than those who predict voting against ( $F=6.733$ ,  $sig.=.0113$ ). Once again, this result is congruent with the DFA conducted on the British data, although there remained a degree of ambiguity about the

discriminatory role of this variable in the case of the British (see earlier discussion of British data in Chapter four).

**Table 47 - Best set of discriminating variables elicited by stepwise Discriminant Analysis: Italian data**

Step entered	Variable	Wilk's Lambda	Sig.
1	FACTOR 1	.82513	.0001
2	C5	.76542	<.0001
3	SEX	.73023	<.0001
4	FACTOR 2	.70011	<.0001
5	AGE (YEARS)	.68443	<.0001

**Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients:**

FACTOR 1	.635
C5	.475
SEX	-.398
FACTOR 2	.438
AGE (YEARS)	-.281

**Canonical Discriminant Functions evaluated at Group Means:**  
 vote for: .527      vote against: -.856

The second attitudinal factor, as one may note from Tables 46 and 47, also proved to be a significant discriminatory variable, with those respondents who predicted voting for a super-state manifesting significantly higher levels of this factor than those who predicted voting against ( $F=9.509$ ,  $\text{sig}=.0028$ ).

Whilst both sex and age were selected as significant discriminatory variables by the stepwise procedure, the precise nature of their discriminatory ability in the analysis is not clear, since the univariate  $F$ -tests failed to highlight significant differences between those who vote for and those who would vote against a super-state on these variables. This suggests their contribution to the analysis requires further research in the future.

In conclusion, it appears that for the Italian data, the attitudinal variables are the most useful in discriminating between those who predict voting for and against a European super-state. This result contrasts in an interesting manner with that obtained from the British data, in that for the British, both national and European identity composite scores were significant discriminatory variables. There

were indications from the British data that a European super-state posed a threat to British national identity. This certainly was *not* the case for the Italians. From these cross-national differences, there are already signs that national and European identities in Italy and Britain may be constructed quite differently. We have seen from the DFA, for example, that Italian and European identity composite scores were not significant discriminatory variables. It seems that European identity for the Italians encompasses something more than a simple focus on the E.C. and political integration in Europe - this will become increasingly apparent as the interpretation of the open-ended responses unfolds.

Finally, it is significant that there are some noticeable differences in the DFA analyses across the British and Italian samples. Whatever the problems associated with interpreting this kind of cross-national difference, it does seem that we are justified in suggesting that they raise the question of whether the social psychological manifestations of European integration require a nation-specific approach. We do not mean to dismiss the possibility of interesting cross-national *similarities* in identity construction, but rather to suggest that even when *apparent* similarities occur, the *underlying reasons* behind observed similarities in attitudes, social representations, and identities, may well be culture-specific. This highlights once again, how quantitative and qualitative approaches are both crucial elements of any worthwhile study of European integration: where one source indicates interesting cross-national similarities and differences, the other will often provide significant clues as to the underlying factors behind such phenomena, or at least point the researcher in a promising theoretical direction.

#### 5.4 Open-ended questions

In keeping with the analysis of the British data, the Italian open-ended responses were analyzed using a variant of the traditional Functionalist content analysis advocated by Holsti (1969), and described in detail earlier, in chapter four.

#### 5.4.1 Things which make people pleased to be Italian (Question B.1)

The categories most frequently utilized by Italian respondents to describe the things which made them feel pleased to be Italian are detailed in Table 48. It is interesting to note how for both the British and the Italian respondents, the object of national pride most frequently mentioned was national culture and heritage. Both the British and Italian respondents appeared to believe that they had been blessed with a culture more ancient and veritable than most, or in some cases all, other nations. As one respondent remarked, "I think of Italy as the centre of Europe and the world, from the historical-cultural point of view. We are the oldest civilization in the world." This highlights once again the value of A.D. Smith's observation that there is a competitive element to culture, with a particularly high value being placed on the *depth* of a culture (A.D. Smith, 1991).

**Table 48 - Things which make people feel pleased to be Italian: most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	RICH CULTURE & TRADITION	60
2	ARTISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS	45
3	OUTGOING NATURE OF ITALIAN PEOPLE	35
4	BEAUTY OF COUNTRYSIDE	34
5	HELPFULNESS OF ITALIAN PEOPLE	30
6	ITALIAN CUISINE	28
7	ANCIENT HISTORY	22
8	DEMOCRACY	19
9	CLIMATE	14
10	ADAPTABILITY/RESOURCEFULNESS OF ITALIANS	13

In many ways this valuing of one's own culture, usually above that of other nations, is a form of ethnocentrism associated with the more symbolic aspects of national identity. This is readily apparent from the response of one Italian subject: "There are no words to describe the feeling when I walk the soil of Italy, where culture has existed for thousands of years. I feel joined with the entire human race through the past." There is a further significant observation to be made here, for while the ethnocentric orientation to Italian culture adopted by this respondent is clear, there are also indications that in some way the respondent's awareness of his cultural heritage also endows him with a sense of *human identity*. There is

something paradoxical operating here, in that this respondent's very ethnocentrism itself also allows him to feel ties with the rest of humanity, even if these ties are based on ethnocentric perceptions that Italian/Roman culture has greatly influenced the world's peoples. As yet there appears to be little or no existing research on this human level of social identity, even though it is frequently mentioned in Turner's theory as a *possible* level of identity (see, for example, Turner, 1987).

It is also quite likely that another factor behind this valuing of national culture is the comfort associated with the familiar. The process of socialisation attempts to instill a society's norms and culture in the child from an early age, and it seems only natural that one might come to value the culture one has been immersed in since childhood. This is obviously something of a simplification, in that citizens who have lived in foreign countries, been raised in multi-national families, etc., may well have different orientations to the national culture. Here, for example, it is interesting to note how there are already indications that the learning of a second language may be intertwined with matters of national culture (c.f. Ball, Giles & Hewstone, 1984). There is good evidence to suggest that the familiar - in this case one's national culture - is often highly resistant to change, at both the level of social representations and social identities, and at the more individual-cognitive level of schemata.

The frequent mentions of Italian culture, art and cuisine, together suggested that the symbolic dimensions of Italian identity were almost certainly the most significant for the Italian respondents. Whereas for the British, these symbolic orientations to the nation were complemented by instrumental ties to the nation, and pride in national institutions, this dimension of national identity proved much more problematic for the Italians.

If one attempts to break national identity down into possible constituent elements, one important component might usefully be termed *civic identity*, that is, identification with the nation-state and what it represents - the political system, state institutions and services, international role, and so forth. Whilst certain ceremonies, such as military parades, may act to associate potent symbols such as the flag and anthem with civic identity, it may well be that civic identity usually

depends more on the endorsement of social representations which foster the acceptance of the nation state and what it represents. Thus, civic identity is not directly associated with national *culture*, nor is it particularly associated with what is perceived to be the national *character* (if one is indeed perceived). Evidence emerged in Hewstone's (1986) analysis of attitudes towards the E.C. which is suggestive of the need to distinguish between civic and other possible elements of national identity - he found that the Italians may have quite different and incongruent attitudes about the Italian *nation* and the Italian *people*.

There were numerous indications throughout the open-ended responses to suggest that the majority of Italian respondents did not possess a healthy sense of civic identity. The Italians were, however, often proud of their rich cultural heritage, and also of what they perceived to be valuable dimensions of the national character - helpfulness, an outgoing and friendly nature, and the ability to adapt to change. These results are highly congruent with those obtained by Almond and Verba, who came to the conclusion that:

Italians in the overwhelming majority take no pride in their political system, nor even in their economy or society...to the extent that they have national pride at all, it is in their history, the physical beauty of their country, or in the fact of being Italian. (Almond & Verba, 1963, pp.102-103).

It is an interesting example of the operation of self-serving biases, to note how the respondents were quite willing to suggest, without prompting, that certain positively evaluated traits might be regarded as national characteristics, yet, as we will discover, when specifically questioned about national prototypes and characteristics, they were also keen to stress their own individuality and the *heterogeneity* of the Italian people. This pattern of responses was demonstrated by one respondent in particular, who suggested that "It pleases me to be Italian, especially since the Italian people are warm and passionate - these are characteristics which I possess" yet went on to argue, in their response to a later question, that "You cannot talk of an Italian national character - Italians are too diverse".

Whilst many respondents were pleased to live in a democratic nation, this was perhaps the only thing which made them feel pleased about the Italian *state*. Whereas the British respondents were proud of the welfare state, Britain's role in world affairs, and so forth, the Italians often felt that the Italian state did not serve their best interests - as one respondent remarked, "I feel the state should represent the nation, but at present it does not." In some respects, there appears to be a lack of legitimacy operating here, although this interacts in a complex manner with a certain degree of apathy and resignation which was apparent from the open-ended responses as a whole - a number of respondents had resigned themselves to the fact that inefficient government was simply a part of life in Italy, something one could do little about.

In many of the open-ended responses to this question, one could observe a phenomenon which also emerged in the interviews with British respondents. This was the tendency of respondents to feel they *should* find something to be proud of about their nationality, since they had little or no *choice* about the categorisation - for example, one Italian respondent explained that "Since I am bound to Italy - I was born here and live here - I can not ignore the fact that I have ties with this country - I have to be satisfied with being Italian." In fact, only six respondents indicated that *nothing* made them feel pleased to be Italian.

In many ways national identity is an excellent example of what sociologists have called an *ascribed* identification or group membership. Tajfel and Jahoda's work on the development of national loyalties in young children (Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966) demonstrated how children seem to learn that they should value their own nation above others before they are given (or could indeed understand) any concrete reasons for doing so. One methodological implication of such observations is that a developmental approach should provide an important perspective on certain key social identities (c.f. Duveen & Lloyd, 1986). At a theoretical level, these observations are congruent with Tajfel and Turner's (1979/1986) suggestion that social identifications which appear to allow little scope for exit may well encourage enhanced attempts to manufacture positive distinctiveness - at least, when that identity is perceived to be under threat. One further point, which we will make throughout the following chapters, is that there are some aspects of social

identifications which are peculiar to the particular identification under investigation: while S.I.T. and S.C.T. are attractive for their apparent generalisability, it is always valuable to ask "is there anything about this particular social identification which is unique ?". If we ask this question about national identity, the answer must be a resounding "yes".

#### 5.4.2 Things which make people regret being Italian (Question B.2)

Table 49 contains the categories Italian respondents most frequently referred to in their responses to the question asking about things which made them regret being Italian. Once again, it was noticeable how a number of respondents voiced the opinion that it was somewhat pointless to regret being Italian, since one had little choice in the matter.

*Table 49 - Things which make people regret being Italian - most frequent categories*

category	description	frequency
1	POLITICAL SYSTEM	57
2	ORGANISED CRIME (MAFIA, CAMORRA, ETC.)	43
3	INEFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC SERVICES	21
4	BUREAUCRACY	19
5	CRIME IN GENERAL	18
6	NORTH-SOUTH INEQUALITIES	18
7	RACISM	14
8	EDUCATION SYSTEM	13
9	APATHY	12
10	CORRUPTION	12
11	CURRENT GOVERNMENT	11
12	LACK OF CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT	9

The differences between the responses of the British and Italian respondents on this question are rather interesting. As one would expect, given the observations of previous commentators such as Barzini (1983) and Haycraft (1987), the Italian respondents are clearly dissatisfied with their political inefficiency, bureaucracy, public services, and organised crime. As we suggested earlier, these grievances may well constitute a significant barrier to the development of a healthy civic identity. For the British, while there was the inevitable opposition to the current government (i.e. inevitable in any democracy), there were no reasons to suspect a lack of civic

identity - in fact, many British respondents were proud of their political system and state institutions, suggesting a strong civic identity. If anything, the British were more displeased about what they perceived to be negative aspects of the national character, such as a cold and emotionless demeanour. The Italians, perhaps partly in order to compensate for a weak civic identity, seemed to stress the positive aspects of their perceived national character, and tended not to mention aspects of national character in response to the current question on things which made them regret being Italian.

For the British respondents, football hooligans and British tourists abroad, appeared to represent salient in-group *black sheep* (c.f. Marques et al., 1988) - sub-groups of the British who are the subject of much criticism, whilst at the same time, efforts are made to marginalise them and thus minimalise the threat to the social group as a whole. The Italians did not appear to use this strategy, even though in the Mafia and similar organisations, they certainly had apt candidates for the black sheep process. In fact, the Italian respondents who, not surprisingly, felt organised crime did make them regret being Italian, also tended to feel that in some respects the Mafia and similar organisations were perhaps the most visible symptom of an affliction affecting many aspects of Italian life - i.e. corruption.

One can not emphasize enough the serious consequences for Italian national identity of the Mafia, Camorra and N'Drangheta, Italy's most notorious criminal organisations. Recent mass demonstrations against the Mafia serve to indicate the fear and desperation engendered by the apparent impotence of the state and law enforcement agencies in their attempts to combat organised crime. A crucial cornerstone of national identity is the perception that the state will protect the citizen - security is one of the most basic, and perhaps the most urgent of all human needs (Maslow, 1965;1968). There are growing indications that Italians feel the state is failing to protect the citizenry in this respect, and the consequences for civic identity are likely to be dire: as Ginsborg (1990) noted, corruption acts as a barrier between the state and its citizens. One aspect of national identity which appears to be relevant here, is the likelihood that threats which are relatively specific to a particular *dimension* of national identity, might provoke processes which seek to compensate via the other dimensions of national identity. In fact, it

is often suggested by students of the self that individuals may respond to threats in one area of self-definition by affirming alternative aspects of self (see, for example, Steele, 1988). There are indications from the current study for example, that the Italians may stress Italian *culture* and national *character*, partly in order to compensate for a relatively negative sense of *civic* identity.

Finally, it is constructive to briefly consider how a number of both British and Italian respondents remarked that their nation's respective environmental policies were not sufficiently "green" for their own tastes. This appears to be an example of how the particular orientation to political and related issues adopted by individuals might act to mediate or colour their national identity. If these respondents actively identified themselves as "environmentalists", we would have an example of one social identity interacting with another. In fact, in keeping with our recent argument for different *dimensions* of national identity, it may well be that the interactions between national and other social identities are often specific to particular dimensions of those identities. For example, in this case, the perception that one's nation was not giving enough attention to environmental issues might have consequences for the *civic* and *national character* dimensions, but would presumably be unlikely to have repercussions for the *cultural* dimension.

#### 5.4.3 Groups or individuals perceived to be "typically Italian" (Question B.3)

Table 50 contains the groups or individuals most frequently given by Italian subjects in response to the question concerning "typical Italians". It should firstly be noted that, like the British respondents, the Italians were quite reluctant to accept that individuals or groups symbolised the essential characteristics of being Italian. This serves to demonstrate once again the complexities involved when one attempts to apply Turner's notions of prototypicality and self-stereotyping (Turner, 1987) to the case of national identity - and perhaps most large-scale social categories. As was the case for the British respondents, there was little agreement on choice of prototypical individuals or groups, with quite a diverse list of examples being drawn upon. Yet despite this confusion over prototypicality, it

should be stressed that most respondents *were* happy to accept the label "Italian", seemed to have self-categorised themselves as Italians, and to have derived a social identity from this self-categorisation.

**Table 50 - Individuals & groups perceived as typically Italian:  
most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	POLITICIANS	23
2	COSSIGA (PRESIDENT)	19
3	GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES	19
4	NEAPOLITANS	18
5	FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS	18
6	ANDREOTTI (A POLITICIAN)	17
7	CRAXI (PRIME MINISTER)	17
8	THE "MIDDLE CLASS"	16
9	SORDI (A COMEDIAN)	15
10	THE MAFIA	14
11	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS	13
12	THE ITALIAN FAMILY	12
13	THE MILANESE	12

Interestingly, and of much importance for our current discussion, the vast majority of prototypes were public figures or nationally salient groups (e.g. political parties), rather than idiosyncratic individuals or groups. This signifies that the mass media may play a critical role in providing a data-base of prototypes from which to draw upon.

Politicians, political parties, and political personalities all figured prominently in the Italian responses to this question. Interestingly, the political personalities tended to be mentioned in a positive context, whilst the generic category "politicians" was almost invariably associated with negative evaluations. The politicians mentioned - Cossiga (The President), Andreotti (a skilled Christian Democrat), and Craxi (the Prime Minister)- all have quite impressive political credentials, although in some cases these have been tainted, perhaps inevitably, by investigations for corruption. While the Italians appear to appreciate individual political skills, especially when these may bring a semblance of order and stability to Italian politics, at the same time they express highly derogatory opinions of politicians in general - as one respondent commented, "The politicians are doing their best to disrupt, and to bring the country to ruin". Another respondent also

served to exemplify how these negative opinions of politicians also reflect a general feeling that Italian society to some extent is itself corrupt: "The politicians - they are totally inefficient, confused and corrupted, as you could only find in Italy." In many ways, it appears that the politicians, together with government officials and bureaucrats, serve as visible and salient targets for the dissatisfaction many Italians seem to have with their civic identity.

It was interesting to note how a number of Italian respondents made reference to *situations* in their responses. For example, one respondent felt that "people eating and talking in a pizza parlour" was "typically Italian". Such examples seem to suggest that key situations might be associated with the salience of social identities. In fact, this kind of response also suggests that situations and events might be associated with prototypicality. There may be interesting avenues for integrating social and cognitive perspectives here, since in some respects these responses seem to draw upon what have been called *scripts* (Schank & Abelson, 1977) or *event schemata* (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Whilst one might expect there to be a certain amount of overlap in terms of key situations for different nationalities (e.g. ceremonies and military parades), the kinds of situations mentioned by Italian respondents (e.g. the pizza parlour, coffee bars) tended to be relatively specific to Italy. In fact, this issue of situations associated with social identities is one we will return to in later chapters.

When we analysed the responses of the British subjects to this question, it seemed appropriate to divide these into those which made reference to positive prototypes, and those which made reference to negative prototypes ("black sheep"). In the case of the Italians, this becomes less straightforward, since affective orientations towards the prototypes given were relatively heterogeneous. Perhaps the prototype which engendered the most enthusiasm when given, and was never the subject of criticism, was Alberto Sordi, a seasoned and well-loved comedian, who, in the words of one respondent, "is a perfect model of an Italian -he represents extremely well a large majority of the Italians and the Italian character". It is fascinating how comedians were mentioned quite frequently in connection with national character, by both the Italian and the British respondents. In almost all cases, comedians were seen to typify positive aspects of the national character -

it seems that both the British and Italians like to think they have a good sense of humour.

Unlike the British, the Italian respondents tended not to utilise the black sheep strategy to marginalise and distance themselves from elements of the Italian people they disliked. Thus, as we have already noted, many respondents, whilst being highly critical of the Mafia, also felt that to some extent organised crime was simply a reflection of Italian society in general. It is rather difficult, and somewhat beyond the scope of our present discussion, to elucidate in much further detail the nature of social representations of the Mafia in Italy. One of the most interesting issues for national identity is whether dissatisfaction with organised crime is directed at the Italian state, or the Italian people. Preliminary indications from the current study would suggest that dissatisfaction has been directed at *both* these dimensions of Italian identity.

In conclusion, one may note that whilst many Italian respondents felt uneasy at the prospect of listing typical Italians, they felt much more at ease when discussing *regional types*. A glance at Table 50 indicates that the Milanese and the Neapolitans were mentioned as typical Italians - in this case, these regional types were thought to encompass certain *aspects* or *dimensions* of the Italian character, but by no means were they perceived to encapsulate *everything* Italian. Whilst regional stereotypes were perhaps explicitly drawn-upon by some 30% of Italian respondents, the implication to be drawn here is that regionalism is still likely to be a significant dimension of Italian national identity. The history of the Italian nation is almost certainly relevant here, with indications that at least some Italians still feel more at ease with a regional, as opposed to an Italian, identity.

#### 5.4.4 Italy's most important role within Europe (Question D.1)

Table 51 below details the major themes utilised by the Italian respondents when they came to discuss what they perceived to be Italy's most important role within Europe.

**Table 51 - Italy's most important role within Europe:  
most frequent categories**

category	description	frequency
1	CONTRIBUTE CULTURALLY	35
2	MODERATING/STABILIZING INFLUENCE	18
3	TO AID THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	17
4	ECONOMIC (GENERAL)	17
5	ACTIVE & SUPPORTIVE E.C. MEMBER	16
6	TOURISM (ITALY AS A TOURIST ATTRACTION)	14
7	MINIMAL	12
8	IMPROVE ITALY THROUGH E.C.	11
9	EXPORT ITALIAN CUISINE	10
10	SET EXAMPLE OF CO-OPERATION	9

In-keeping with the evidence discussed earlier for a particularly strong Italian *cultural identity*, it is apparent from an examination of Table 51 that many Italian respondents felt that elements of Italian culture represented Italy's most important contribution to Europe. Furthermore, a number of respondents also suggested that cultural exchanges were desirable - this may well be a reflection of the confidence and pride Italians have in their own culture, which they perhaps consequently feel can not be threatened by other cultures.

However ethnocentric the Italians might be about their own culture, what this does also indicate is that there is a potential for Italians to develop a sentimental orientation to Europe, even if this is based upon the assumption that Italian culture, with its ancient origins, is inevitably an important aspect of European culture itself. This immediately highlights a significant difference between British and Italian orientations to Europe - whilst there are indications that the Italians do perceive a European culture, one which, in fact, they feel inexorably bound-up in, the British felt there was little or no evidence for common strands in European culture. In fact, the overwhelming impression from the British questionnaire data, was that the British respondents felt isolated culturally from the European mainland. As we shall see in the next chapter, British *interviewees* also expressed highly similar opinions about European culture.

The generally pro-European stance taken by most of the Italian respondents is reflected in the appearance of response categories 3 and 5 in Table 51, which

focus on pushing the process of European integration further, and supporting the E.C. in its related endeavours. It is significant that only 2 out of 137 Italian respondents expressed the opinion that *nothing* could be achieved by European integration, and that Italy should take no part in the process.

The indications of a sentimental-cultural orientation to Europe are further supplemented with evidence for instrumental orientations. In particular, one may note that a number of Italian respondents, and this time in-keeping with the British, felt that the economic dimensions of European integration were important. Unlike the British, the Italians felt that Italy *could* have much to gain from E.C. membership economically - it is important to note the future orientation here, which is congruent with Eurobaromètre data indicating that at the moment, the Italians tend not to feel they have gained more than any other member state.

One of the most important divergences between the British and Italian respondents, concerns the issue of *perceived control and interdependence*. In general, many British respondents appeared to be concerned that further European integration would mean a loss of national sovereignty, and thus construed European integration as something of a *threat* to national identity. In contrast, perhaps the majority of Italians felt that acceding *more* power and control to European power structures could only benefit Italy, since national institutions functioned so poorly. Thus, while many British respondents feared further interdependence between Britain and the E.C., the Italians tended to actively desire such interdependence. It is interesting to postulate what effect the failure of the E.C. to meet Italian expectations might have on European identity in Italy. However much such a failure might disappoint Italians and perhaps harm the instrumental dimension of support for integration, European identity would still possess a significant sentimental-cultural element for the Italians.

As was the case with the British respondents, a number of Italians indicated that Italy should play a stabilising influence in Europe. However, whilst it appeared that, in the case of the British, this desire was tied to a wider ambition to gain *control* over European integration, this was not manifested by the Italian

respondents, who tended to want increasing powers to be given to European political bodies (see also Eurobaromètre #28, & #29).

#### 5.4.5 Europe's most important role in world affairs (Question D.2)

The themes most frequently used by the Italian respondents to describe what they perceived as the most important role for Europe in world affairs, are detailed in Table 52 below.

**Table 52 - Europe's most important role in world affairs:  
most frequent categories (Italian data)**

category	description	frequency
1	TO MAINTAIN BALANCE/STABILITY IN INTERN. RELS.	33
2	ECONOMIC	28
3	AS A THIRD SUPERPOWER	21
4	TO PROVIDE AID TO ANY NATIONS WHO REQUIRE IT	20
5	AS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL POWER	18
6	AS AN IMPORTANT ARTISTIC/CULTURAL CENTRE	17
7	PROMOTE/MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE	14
8	TO SET AN EXAMPLE OF NATIONS CO-OPERATING	12
9	TO UNITE EAST AND WEST	10
10	CREATE GREATER UNITY BETWEEN STATES	10

A cursory glance at Table 52 appears to indicate that the Italian and British respondents have quite similar desires for Europe and European integration. Respondents from both nations for example, hoped that Europe might act to maintain world peace and stability in international relations, perhaps taking the role of a mediator, not unlike the United Nations. If respondents do indeed perceive their ultimate security as linked in some way to Europe as a whole, or to the European Community, this would certainly raise the possibility of a European identity, since security is such an important motivating force behind the identification process. However, the issue is far from straightforward - whilst many respondents hoped Europe might promote world peace, at the same time very few respondents (in either sample) suggested they desired a European defence force or even a European defence policy.

As was the case for the British data, there are numerous indications from the responses to this question that Europe affords multiple avenues for the development of *instrumental ties*. Once again, it is noticeable how an economic role for Europe was the second most popular response category. Interestingly, it appeared to be the case that those who perceived a strong economic role for Europe had particular competitors in mind. Both the U.S.A. and Japan were frequently mentioned in this context - as one respondent suggested, "It is very important that we are all united against the economic might of Japan and the United States."

To an extent therefore, both Japan and the United States might be considered potential outgroups for a European identity -or at least, for the instrumental-economic dimensions of such an identity. We have already discussed earlier the complex nature of British perceptions of the U.S.A., and it is intriguing to note how there is a similar ambivalence in Italian perceptions. It seems, for example, that while the United States might be perceived as an economic outgroup, at the same time many Italians recognise that their security ultimately depends upon the umbrella provided by American military firepower - afterall, like Britain, Italy has numerous American military bases, airfields, etc.

Further evidence for instrumental orientations to Europe can be obtained by noting how a number of Italians, like the British, hoped that Europe might become a powerful force in international relations - perhaps even an alternative superpower. Once again, and especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is perhaps the most obvious choice for a comparison/out-group. As was suggested earlier, such themes appear to reflect a desire for power and control which is often linked to social identity processes. There are reasons to believe that, given their recent history, the Italians perhaps more than the British, feel they can have a greater say in world politics through the European Community. Intertwined with the desire to become an alternative superpower is the wish to become relatively autonomous. A significant minority of both British and Italian respondents felt that Europe as a whole should become autonomous from the United States.

Perhaps the major divergence between the British and Italian respondents pertains to the symbolic-cultural elements of European identity. British respondents gave little indication that cultural elements of European identity were important to them - on the whole, the British stressed the *differences* between European cultures. As one can note from Table 52, a number of Italians appear to perceive Europe as a potential cultural centre. In fact, we have already noted how the Italians tend to perceive their own culture as intertwined with, as one respondent put it, Europe's "vast historical and cultural heritage". In general, the Italians appeared much more willing to talk of Italy as a part of Europe than the British respondents were to discuss Britain as a part of Europe.

Whilst no formal and exhaustive technique of measuring affect in the open-ended responses was utilised, it was, nevertheless, noticeable that in general, the majority of responses in both the Italian and British samples, reflected little, or at most moderate, indications of affect associated with European identity. This in fact is congruent with the results obtained from a comparison of British and Italian responses on the *quantitative* measures of European identity - here, it was found that the Italians perceive European identity as more salient, and perhaps perceive themselves as more interdependent with Europe, than the British, but they did not display significantly different levels of affect in relation to European identity. If anything, perhaps the most significant affective difference in European identities between the British and Italians pertains to perceptions of the *future*. The Italians seem much more hopeful that European integration can achieve valued objectives - both instrumental and sentimental-cultural. This is why on attitude-like measures the Italians do indeed express more positive affect about Europe than the British, but on identity measures the difference is largely in terms of salience. At the level of social identities, the affective differences between the British and Italians may be in terms of possible social identities, or what Markus & Nurius have called *possible selves* (Markus & Nurius, 1986).

Finally, it is worthwhile noting that the Italian respondents often felt ill-equipped to answer questions concerning European integration. There are indications that in both Britain and Italy, the subject of European integration, and especially the European Community, is perceived as an *expert domain*. In the next

chapter, we will discover that such feelings of inadequate knowledge of the relevant issues, were also voiced by British respondents in the interview study. One implication to be drawn from this is that any would-be architect of European integration would do well to de-mystify the European issue, and encourage debate and discussion among the populace as whole.

**5.4.6 *Individuals, groups or political parties with which respondents share broadly similar views about Italy (Question E.2 1)***

The Italian political system is a totally obscure universe in which a young person, in the attempt to understand it and make the right choice, becomes totally disorientated. (Italian respondent)

This comment encapsulates rather well the feelings of the Italian respondents when they attempted, usually with considerable difficulty, to answer the questions about political parties and their views about Italy. This makes the most popular response displayed in Table 53 below - that the respondent shares his/her views about Italy with "no one" - immediately more understandable. Where the "no one" response for the British appeared to be associated with individualistic orientations, for the Italians it largely reflected this sense of political confusion. In addition, one should recall that some 32.1% of respondents indicated that they would not vote in a general election. A similar explanation seems appropriate for the popularity of the "Don't know" response.

**Table 53 - *Individuals/groups/political parties with which views are shared about Italy***

category	description	frequency
1	NO ONE	39
2	PCI (COMMUNIST)	23
3	GREEN PARTY	18
4	DON'T KNOW	18
5	PDS (DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST)	17
6	PSI (SOCIALIST)	14
7	DC (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT)	14
8	REPUBLICAN PARTY	10
9	RADICAL PARTY	9
10	LIBERAL PARTY	9

The proliferation of different parties in Italy, coupled with the general level of political confusion, was clearly reflected in most responses to this question. Whilst political parties were mentioned, most respondents heavily qualified their answers by stating that they were not at all clear what the parties stood for, and that in all likelihood they probably shared their views with more than one party. In-keeping with the results obtained from the quantitative analysis, one may conclude that generally, domestic politics is not as significant an aspect of national identity for the Italians as it appears to be for the British. This suggests that the various social representations of Italy and the Italians circulating within Italian society are not always clearly identified with political parties. In this respect the results observed here are congruent with those deriving from the quantitative measures, which indicated that overall strength of national identity did not fluctuate significantly across predicted vote. Nevertheless, it is perhaps significant that like the British, when Italian respondents did mention groups or individuals they felt they shared similar views with about their nation, these were political parties. One may conclude from this that citizens are perhaps most *aware* of social representations of the nation which are associated with political parties. This does not however, mean that there might not also be important sources of social representations concerning the nation which are simply less salient to the citizenry - thus, the socialisation process, education, and so on, might be much less obvious, but no less significant, sources of such representations.

#### *5.4.7 Individuals, groups or political parties with which respondents share broadly similar views about Europe (Question E.2 2)*

The confusion over politics reflected in many of the responses to the previous question, is also relevant when we come to examine the individuals or groups Italian respondents felt they shared their views about *Europe* with (Table 54).

**Table 54 - Individuals/groups/political parties with which views are shared about Europe (Italian respondents)**

category	description	frequency
1	NO ONE	32
2	DON'T KNOW	29
3	GREEN PARTY	17
4	PDS (DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST)	14
5	PSI (SOCIALIST)	14
6	DC (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT)	13
7	PCI (COMMUNIST)	10
8	RADICAL PARTY	10
9	REPUBLICAN PARTY	9
10	LIBERAL PARTY	8

Once again, an examination of Table 54 suggests the confusion of Italian respondents, this time over what the various political parties are recommending for Europe. This result is also in-keeping with the quantitative analyses discussed earlier, which indicated that strength of European identity was not significantly different across predicted vote. One further dimension involved here is the perception of European integration and the E.C. as an *expert domain* - this was observed to influence some of the "no one" and "don't know" responses. In fact, respondents in both the United Kingdom and Italy tended to report feeling much more uncertain about the policies of the political parties concerning Europe, than they were about their domestic policies. Yet once again, it is noticeable, even allowing for the considerable confusion surrounding politics in Italy, that political parties appeared to be the most salient source of social representations of Europe for respondents.

### 5.5 CONCLUSIONS

One of the most important theoretical conclusions to emerge from the current research concerns the necessity for any social psychological analysis of *European* identity and indeed, European integration in general, to at the same time focus on issues of *national* identity. This is because in many ways, one of the most useful questions for a social researcher in this field to ask is: how do citizens in nation *x*

construe the relationship between national and European identity? At the same time, the posing of this question also addresses, inevitably, the issue of how *social representations* (Moscovici, 1984) of the nation and Europe interact. Since social identities are likely to be associated with social representations, attitudes, opinions, schemata, and ultimately, actions, it seems clear that an approach to European issues focusing on social identities is an essential element of *any* would-be social psychology of European integration.

As one would expect from the European Community's own Eurobaromètre opinion polls, we have discovered that the Italians do indeed seem to have adopted a different orientation to the E.C. and European integration than the British. Given the existing evidence from Eurobaromètre polls, the observed differences in attitudes, with the Italians appearing more pro-European than the British on two important questions, were to be expected. However, the Eurobaromètre is frustrating in its inattention to questions of *identity*, and it is here that the current study appears to fill something of a theoretical and empirical gap.

When empirical evidence from both quantitative and qualitative measures emerges as congruent, this is often a promising indication of an interesting phenomenon. In the current study, it soon became apparent that this kind of evidence existed, and that it signified how the British and Italians tended to construe the relationship between national and European identities quite differently - in fact, in an almost antithetical manner.

British respondents tended to feel their national identity to be threatened by the loss of sovereignty and ultimate control over national matters they perceived to be associated with European integration. In contrast, the Italians, particularly in terms of the salience and perceived importance of European issues, were considerably more positive about European integration. In a similar way to many British respondents, a number of Italians obviously had developed strong instrumental attachments to the European ideal, hoping that further integration might improve the Italian economy, and bring the semblance of order and efficiency to the nightmare of Italian politics and bureaucracy. However, unlike the British, the Italians often supplemented this instrumental attachment to Europe

with the expression of an awareness and pride in European culture, and thus a symbolic attachment to Europe. In answer to our "key question" posed earlier, one might therefore conclude that the Italians appear to have construed national and European identities as *mutually beneficial*, whereas the British have often perceived the two as *incompatible*.

Social Psychology can provide only some of the answers to why citizens of Britain and Italy may be interpreting the process of European integration differently. Historical factors, some of which we have addressed in our analysis, are clearly an important piece in the jigsaw. There were numerous indications that in some sense, many British respondents felt that Britain, especially when one considers her colonial history, was still one of the most important powers in the world, and as such should not relinquish her powers to a European governing body. In contrast, the Italians may well have realised that they stood a much better chance of enhancing their influence on the international scene via the European Community. Geographically, Britain's isolation from the European mainland was reflected by a reluctance to think of Britain as part of Europe. The Italians, on the other hand, dwelling on their indisputable cultural heritage, felt if anything, an integral part of Europe.

To further develop this last point, it should be stressed that the observed differences in level of European identity between the Italian and British respondents are not likely to be explained by an assertion that the Italians feel they have more to gain from European integration. Certainly, many Italians did feel that Italy could only benefit from further integration, but this was only part of the story - after all, a good few British respondents could perceive economic and other instrumental benefits from E.C. membership. The crucial point is that the Italians already feel an integral part of Europe - this is not something which public information campaigns must attempt to instill - it is already observable. Even though the Italians are, perhaps inevitably, ethnocentric in their appraisal of their cultural heritage, at the same time they perceive this, and indeed, their ultimate destinies, as inextricably bound-up with Europe.

In some respects what we are suggesting is that a European identity comes easier to the Italians than the British, albeit for a variety of often complex reasons. Furthermore, it is not merely the *potential* for European identity which is greater amongst the Italians, but the reality at *present* is such that Italians have embraced European identity with open arms - or at least can perceive themselves as doing so in the future. The British, whilst not turning away from a European identity, are cautiously and pessimistically assessing the future from a safe distance, anxious not to allow their national identity to be devoured by what could turn out to be a European monster. Since what is especially crucial is the perception of the *future* of Europe, of one's *possible* national and European identities, this whole process is linked to social representations of the European economic, political and social landscapes of the future, social representations which are disseminated largely via mass communication. The fate of national and European identities may thus lie ultimately, in the hands of the media.

In the next chapter, a purely qualitative perspective is adopted in order to examine in greater detail, aspects of British national and European identities. As this analysis unfolds, the utility of qualitative approaches to social identity will become even more apparent, as the ability for qualitative and quantitative data to complement one another is explored in some depth.

# Chapter 6

## An interview study of British and European identities

Still today, when one asks a Briton, any Briton, pointblank, "Are you European ?" the answer is always, "European ? Did you say European ? Er, err" - a long thoughtful pause in which all other continents are mentally evoked and regretfully discarded - "Yes, of course, I'm European." This admission is pronounced without pride and with resignation. (Barzini, 1983, pps. 64-65).

### 6.1 Introduction

It has been argued throughout the previous chapters that a social psychological level of analysis can constitute a valuable addition to current theorising on the subject of European and national identities. However, if the full potential of such a contribution is to be realised, a narrow focus on only one research methodology must be discouraged, and instead full use should be made of varied techniques and perspectives. This kind of multi-method approach, apart from providing the obvious and valuable benefit of reducing the effects of error variance in any single method, also offers considerable advantages in its ability to provide different and usually equally illuminating perspectives on the area of study (c.f. Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Sotirakopoulou & Breakwell, 1992). The questionnaire research described in earlier chapters endeavoured to combine elements of quantitative and qualitative perspectives through the use of both open and closed question formats. This chapter describes qualitatively-oriented research designed with the aim of exploring in a little more depth, some of the issues raised by the questionnaire study. For such purposes, and in order to provide different perspectives from those afforded by the questionnaire, an in-depth interview methodology was utilized.

## 6.2 Interview procedure

A number of interesting issues emerged from the British questionnaire research, and it was thought that a further examination of these could prove beneficial for at least three reasons. Firstly, there seems to be a strong argument that converging evidence arising from a variety of research techniques is especially compelling. Secondly, an interview methodology affords a much more dynamic environment for: a) the elicitation and examination of social representations (Moscovici, 1984), linguistic repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1988), and rhetorical discourse (Billig, 1985); and b) the investigation of how the latter interact with processes of personal and social identity (Tajfel, 1974). Thirdly, it is argued that interviews are especially useful tools for examining the interactions between intraindividual, interpersonal, and intergroup levels of psychological functioning (Doise, 1978;1988). Whilst the benefits of interview methodologies have sometimes been fully exploited by social identity researchers (e.g. Bourhis & Hill, 1982), such theorists have, of late, appeared more attracted towards the use of quantitative questionnaire and experimental procedures. In contrast to such recent trends, the approach to the study of identity adopted by Breakwell and her research associates (Breakwell, 1986; 1991) is much closer to that of the current discussion, in its adoption of a multi-method and multi-level approach to research.

Amongst the themes which emerged from the analysis of British questionnaire responses, the following were selected for further examination via in-depth interview procedures:

i) The nature of European identity (E.I.):

*Interaction of beliefs about the E.C. and E.I.*

Do respondents have any fears about European integration ?  
 Are any major problems in the process of integration predicted by respondents ?  
 What do respondents believe should be the goals of European integration ?

(continued)

*Possible bases of, and barriers towards, E.I.*

Do respondents feel that European nations are interdependent ?  
 Is Europe perceived as unique in any way ?  
 Do respondents believe a European culture exists ?  
 Is there anything which makes respondents feel proud or, alternatively, regret, being European ?

ii) The nature of British identity (B.I.):

Are particular situations crucial for B.I. ?  
 How do respondents define "patriotism" and do they label themselves as patriotic ?

iii) How do European and British identities interact ?

iv) The nature of large-scale social category membership:

How do group prototypes operate at this level ?

v) General issues pertaining to social identity processes:

Which other motivations besides self - esteem maintenance are important influences upon social identity ?  
 How do such motivational factors influence social identity mechanisms ?  
 How might an idiographic approach enhance our understanding of social identity processes ?  
 How useful is the concept of "types" of attachment to a social group ?

The issues described briefly above were examined via a series of open-ended questions posed within the context of a semi-structured interview. Interviews were conducted on an individual basis by a single interviewer, with volunteer respondents being recruited from various departments of the University of London, during the period of December 1991 to February 1992. Respondents were thus university students, and the discussion of the validity of such a subject group in Chapter Three remains equally applicable to the current interview study. The most important point to make is that, whilst students can not be regarded as representative of the British populace as a whole, for the purposes of an examination of social identity *processes*, it seems reasonable to suggest that students in this context are just as worthy subjects as any other group. Furthermore, given the utilization of students in the questionnaire study, it seemed appropriate to persist with the same subject group when exploring related issues in the interview study.

Thus twenty-five in-depth interviews were conducted, following an interview schedule deriving from the issues outlined above, and reproduced in Appendix E. The 25 respondents (13 female, 12 male) had a mean age of 23 years, and as with the questionnaire study, all were required to hold British passports. In terms of political affiliations, which were elicited via questioning on voting intentions, 14 respondents predicted voting Labour, 8 Conservative, 2 Liberal Democrat, and 1 respondent was undecided. Interviews tended to take around fifty minutes to conduct, and were tape-recorded for the purpose of later transcription. This resulted in some 189 pages of interview transcript to analyse.

It should be acknowledged at the outset that the responses of 25 respondents can not validly be utilized to make *some* kinds of generalization. In particular, it would seem unwise to make assertions about the *contents* of beliefs, attitudes, and opinions held by the British population as a whole, on the basis of such data. However, once again a case can be made which justifies generalising from this kind of study about the *processes* under investigation. Of course, any such generalisations should be subjected to repeated critical scrutiny and thus possible refutation. Furthermore, it is in no way being suggested that identity-related and other social psychological processes are necessarily static or universal - either temporally or culturally.

There can be few hard and fast rules about the analysis of qualitative material. Since responses to some of the questions lent themselves to *meaningful* representation by means of quantitative categories, in these instances frequency-by-category breakdowns of particular themes are presented. In such cases the traditional Functionalist-oriented content analysis procedure outlined in Chapter Four was followed. One of the most important aspects of the latter approach is that responses are summarized in terms of major *themes* which should remain mutually exclusive, so that a frequency count can give an indication of those most commonly utilized (c.f. Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990). It is important to note that the frequencies presented in the current chapter are based on *the number of respondents referring to a theme*, not on the number of references to the theme itself. Furthermore, in general, those themes mentioned by less than five interviewees are not discussed

at length, although some idiosyncratic belief structures are examined when theoretical points about the structure of beliefs and identities are being discussed.

Whilst quantitative content analysis procedures can yield interesting and readily appraised results, in-depth interviews also provide a rich source of data for a more qualitatively oriented approach (see, for example, Farr, 1982). This being the case, the following discussion also takes into account some of the particular uses of discourse and rhetoric made by respondents, and makes reference to the social representations (Moscovici, 1984) apparently referred to by respondents. This has tended to be a somewhat unusual perspective to take, at least within the traditional Tajfel-Turner tradition of social identity research, although in many ways it seems a natural extension of many of Tajfel's ideas pertaining to national identity (Tajfel, 1970) and social stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981).

### 6.3 Results and Discussion

#### 6.3.1 General observations concerning European integration and identity

##### *European integration as an "expert domain"*

There were numerous indications throughout the course of the interview research, that the subject of European integration was one which respondents felt somewhat uncomfortable discussing. The primary reason for this slight anxiety turned out to be the feeling, expressed by many respondents, that the issue of integration is in some ways an *expert domain* - that is, a domain which requires the possession of specialist or expert knowledge if it is to be adequately comprehended, or in this case, discussed. This is not a trivial observation, since the belief that a particular issue is an expert domain has significant consequences for peoples' opinions and beliefs, as Hilgartner, Bell, and O'Connor (1983) have demonstrated for the domain of nuclear power. One of the significant implications of labelling a domain as the province of "experts", is the implication that the "general public" are not in a

position to fully comprehend such matters, whereas experts are, a belief very clearly expressed by one interview respondent: "The European issue is a very complex one. I'm not an economist, and it really takes an economist to answer questions on it". In fact, the perception of European issues as an "expert domain" is compatible with data arising from the E.C.'s own studies, which, for example, indicate that young people in the E.C. see European institutions as distant and unknown entities (CEC, 1988).

It is also usually the case in domains perceived as expert that, not only is there perceived to be a monopoly of knowledge, but also one of *control*. Once again, there was ample evidence from responses to indicate that this dimension was also present - as one interviewee remarked, "integration seems to be the domain of the politicians". It is, of course, worth noting that there is a strong "objective" sense in which control of European integration is held by a small group of people - Members of Parliament, European bureaucrats, etc. There are thus at least two ways in which respondents might have felt - and seemed to report feeling - isolated from the process of European integration: firstly, through the lack of "expert" knowledge of the issues involved; and secondly, through an essentially realistic recognition that they had little or no control over the course of events.

If a large number of British citizens perceive European integration to be associated with a loss of control over the nation and other affairs, then it seems likely that integration will be opposed, since loss of control is generally perceived in a negative evaluative manner. Markus and Nurius (1987) have also made the relevant point that possible selves - perceptions of what the self has been and might become - associated with lack of control are likely to be evaluated negatively. Breakwell (1992) has also recently made the interesting suggestion that feelings of low self-efficacy may be associated with political cynicism and withdrawal from political participation. If the sense of little control over European affairs which seems common amongst the British is, in turn, related to feelings of low self-efficacy in this domain, then it goes some way to explaining the general apathy with which many British respondents regarded the European integration issue.

There is something of a paradox to be found in public opinion about European integration, in as much as the belief in integration being an expert domain seems to conflict with the implicit demands of the opinion pollsters that the public *should* have beliefs about such issues. Yet it was certainly *not* the case that this professed belief in the issue being an expert domain prevented respondents from expressing any opinions on the subject. On the contrary, some respondents appeared to have quite complicated systems of beliefs and justifications for this domain. What the expert domain attribution does provide, is an excellent justification for expressing ambivalence in one's views, and at the same time allowing one's beliefs on the issue to contain an in-built safety mechanism: if one later appears wrong, the retort that "the experts know best" or "I was not in full possession of the facts" can always be called upon to save face. In this respect, the belief that European integration is an expert domain may have consequences for what Billig has recently referred to as the *implicit* properties of attitudes (Billig, 1992a).

It is interesting to note that Hewstone (1986) found that his British university student subjects actually did seem to have a low level of knowledge about the European Community, perhaps suggesting that *claims* of little knowledge might be reflections of reality. If, as seems to be the case, British university students profess to having little knowledge of the details surrounding European integration, and this actually reflects their state of knowledge, it seems rather unlikely that the general public as a whole will feel in any better a position to appraise the situation.

As already suggested, some of Michael Billig's suggestions for a *rhetorical* approach to Social Psychology provide useful tools for conceptualizing some of the issues raised by the interview responses. European integration, it is suggested here, is an issue as rich in contradictions and paradoxes as almost any other one might care to investigate, and this was readily apparent from interview responses to questions relating to the topic. Respondents themselves were often well aware of apparent paradoxes caused by contradictory processes, such as the centralization of power versus the devolution of power to regions, or the attempts to forge a wider

European identity at the same time as national and regional identities are gaining in strength.

With respondents often being aware of many of the apparent paradoxes concerning the issue of integration, it was not surprising to find that the beliefs expressed by respondents tended to be multi-dimensional and often ambivalent. Whilst van der Pligt and Eiser's (1984) suggestion that different opinions might be linked to differences in the perceived *salience of issues*, seems an attractive one, and is indeed useful in certain instances, it proves of less obvious value when one attempts to make sense of the kind of multidimensional and often ambivalent beliefs which emerged in the current study. An excellent example of this point is how the issue of economics was viewed by the majority of respondents to be the most important dimension of European integration - respondents who were equally likely to make such a belief the justification for supporting *or* rejecting further European integration. This was by no means the only example of situations where respondents were in agreement as to the most important issue (i.e. the salience of the issue), but adopted different perspectives on the issue itself.

The ambivalence of expressed opinions about European matters was nicely demonstrated by the fact that all respondents found *something* good to say about integration, even when the general tone of their responses was strongly anti-European. This finding, which is not unusual, could, of course, merely be an artifact of the interview method itself, or the particular questions utilized. It is certainly likely that the interview situation encourages a degree of rationality and a more even-handed approach to controversial issues than might usually be taken (c.f. Hoinville et al., 1978). However, this ambivalence, as we have already suggested, is quite likely to be linked to the notion of this issue being perceived in some respects as an expert domain. This would suggest an artifactual explanation of response ambiguity might in this case be unwarranted. It should be noted that one of the advantages of in-depth interviews, as demonstrated here, is that such ambiguity is allowed full expression - something which quantitative attitude scales might otherwise stifle, especially where attitudes are assessed by only one or two questions.

### *Britain is "different"*

One of the most prominent themes to emerge from the responses was evident throughout many of the interviews, and clearly affected a variety of beliefs and opinions concerning European integration. The basic claim of this theme or argument, was that Britain is *different* - different to the other nations of Europe, and in some cases different to every other nation in the world. In the sense that this belief was expressed by the majority of interviewees, there are grounds for suspecting it might be linked to a shared social representation - such a theme has certainly pervaded the British mass media periodically (Hewstone, 1986). Furthermore, Lyons and Sotirakopoulou (1991) have recently found that similar beliefs were expressed by their random sample of British 16-19 year olds. For a variety of reasons, most interviewees in the current study also felt that these apparent differences between Britain and Europe were significant. Some used the perception of such differences to argue against European integration, other interviewees, who were pro-European, utilized the theme to help explain what they perceived as the general lack of enthusiasm for integration expressed by the British. This is an indication of an important point which will be made a number of times throughout this and other chapters: namely, that *the same* social representation can be interpreted and utilized by different individuals and social groups in different, and even diametrically opposed, ways (c.f. Breakwell, 1991).

In keeping with this theme of Britain being significantly different to other European nations, it was interesting to note how in many instances such a theme was reflected in linguistic usage. As Zavalloni (1973) once suggested, the use of pronouns such as "us/we" and "they/them" can be highly significant, sometimes carrying the connotation "in-group" and "out-group" respectively. It was certainly interesting to note how the selective use of "us" and "them" did indeed often seem to follow the nature of the interviewees' professed identities. It was generally the case that "we" were the British, whilst "they" were the Europeans. Furthermore, it was interesting to note how many respondents referred to "Europe" as if Britain was not included in the concept. This is similar to the fairly common linguistic practice in Britain of referring to Europe as "the continent" in a way which again excludes Britain itself from the concept.

There is of course an "objective" sense in which Britain, being an island, is not part of the same land mass as the rest of Europe, and a number of respondents made reference to just this point, some feeling that this geographical separation was itself a contributing factor to Britain's differences, others merely finding it a useful visual metaphor. Barzini has also hinted at the possible psychological significance of Britain's geographical position: "In a way, Britain sees itself as the sceptered isle, cut from the Continent by divine will. If God had wanted to tie it to the rest of Europe, He would evidently not have dug the Channel." (Barzini, 1983, p.59). It will be interesting to note whether the Channel tunnel link between Britain and France might have social psychological reverberations, through its possible effects upon geographically-oriented social representations of Britain and Europe.

Other justifications for the assertion that Britain and the British are significantly different from other European nations and peoples centred around *language and culture*. Some respondents felt that Britain's history is very different to that of other nations, while others made reference to the British empire and Britain's former prominence in world affairs. All of these issues were also raised by respondents in the questionnaire study.

It is of course not surprising, especially from a Social Identity perspective, that British interviewees seemed to feel that their own nation is somewhat unique and different to others. After all, it is the perception of differences, and the ability to evaluate such differences in a positive light, which underpins social identity processes in Tajfel's model (Tajfel, 1974). What is surprising is the ease with which respondents talk of Europe as if Britain is not included in their conception of that continent. This is not to say that respondents deny they are European, although as we will soon discover, many deny feeling any sense of European *identity*. Thus, while we would not wish to make the kind of strong claims associated with proponents of linguistic determinism (e.g. Sapir, 1949) it is significant in itself that common linguistic usage in Britain often seems to discourage self-categorization as European, even if this is little more than a *reflection* of the psychological unwillingness of the British to think of themselves as Europeans.

Whilst the perception of differences between Britain and other nations is perhaps a crucial foundation for national identity, it is significant for the prospects of a future *European* identity, that *Europe and other European nations* are often the objects of comparison for the British (see also Lyons & Sotirakopoulou, 1991; Sotirakopoulou, 1991). It certainly seems likely, as A.D. Smith (1991;1992) and other commentators have suggested, that if a European identity is to be forged, international comparison processes will have to be turned outside of Europe, and non-European comparisons encouraged, thus promoting the perception and salience of *similarities* between the European nations.

*Britain and the U.S.A.: a special relationship?*

At least in the case of Britain, one such non-European outgroup already exists, in the guise of the United States. Billig (1992a; 1992b) has recently noted the paradoxical nature of British perceptions of the United States, which seem to combine an element of envy with a strong desire to stress the differences between the two nations. Furthermore, despite the frequent attempts to distance Britain from the United States on a variety of dimension, there are many dimensions on which the British could construct an identity with their North American cousins. These include a common language, culture, and many common traditions (c.f. Lewis, 1987).

Yet the United States appeared to be an extremely salient comparison or *out-group* for the respondents taking part in the current study. Furthermore, the reader might recall that a number of respondents in the questionnaire study reported in Chapter Four, suggested that one of the benefits of European integration might be the creation of an alternative super-power, able to equal the political and economic power of the United States and the Soviet Union (data were collected prior to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.).

The issue of the relationship between the United States and Britain has fluctuated in salience quite considerably over the last two decades - at least in terms of its appearance in political debate and coverage in the mass media. It is interesting to note how what is often termed "our special relationship with the

United States" by politicians, can have quite contradictory elements. Thus, while lip-service is often paid to the notion that the ultimate security of the United Kingdom is crucially dependent upon the United States' "nuclear umbrella", at the same time, there has been a strong desire to maintain an independent British nuclear deterrent, and considerable debate in the early 1980s as to who actually controlled American nuclear missiles deployed in the U.K.

This issue of *control* is surely linked to the ultimate desire for sovereignty and autonomy often lying behind national identity construction (Stagner, 1967). Billig, in attempting to explain this British desire to be different to the United States, suggests that Sigmund Freud's notion of the narcissism of close differences might be relevant (Billig, 1992a). The basic premise of Freud's idea is that when social groups are quite similar, they will be motivated to emphasize and develop differences. Social psychology can add a certain amount of empirical evidence to this claim, in as much as research seems to indicate that intergroup co-operation can cause problems, when group members begin to perceive the blurring of intergroup distinctions, and come to fear a subsequent loss of the original identity (c.f. Turner, 1981). This fear of losing one's identity certainly seemed real enough to Billig's respondents, who felt that the British royal family was perhaps the most significant differentiating factor between Britain and the U.S.A.

Whilst Billig was interested primarily in the interrelations between the desire to be different to the United States, and representations of the British royal family, it is suggested here that this desire for difference and autonomy has implications for the development of a European identity amongst the British. In particular, it would seem that the seeds of a European identity - at least for the British - are present in Europe's potential for increasing the perceived differences between Britain and the U.S.A. This theme will be explored shortly in relation to a number of issues pertaining to the form a European identity might take for the British.

### 6.3.2 European identity and beliefs about European integration

#### *Fears about European integration*

Respondents' fears about European integration were examined by questions specifically directed at this issue, although interviewees would often reveal such fears in their responses to other questions. The primary aim in examining such fears is to establish the most salient psychological barriers to European identity. One should, however, be somewhat cautious in as much as the relationship between opinions about the *European Community* and feelings of *European identity* is not necessarily a straightforward one. Some respondents were able to express quite negative *opinions* of the E.C. yet *identify* quite strongly with other Europeans. This is indicative of how European identity can transcend the political domain - especially when culture is focused upon. Nevertheless, this divorcing of European integration and identity from its political context within the European Community was the *exception*, and most British respondents - in both the questionnaire and interview studies - equated the issue of European integration with the European Community. Such an equation, despite various E.C. cultural initiatives, in some ways affords political and economic dimensions a greater level of salience than cultural aspects. This was reflected in the way that British respondents seldom mentioned cultural aspects of integration before being prompted to do so.

There are fairly good reasons to expect that the perception of any kind of large-scale social change is likely to meet psychological resistance. One of the few motivational assumptions of Moscovici's theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1984) is that the unfamiliar induces fear, while the familiar is comforting in its predictability. This is the motivation behind the *anchoring* of representations into existing knowledge structures. Marris (1974) has gone as far as to liken significant change in one's environment to bereavement, suggesting that both involve feelings of loss of self, and thus identity. It is precisely because the structures of meaning which we adhere to become part of our self-concept, that we tend to cling-on to them with such determination. Doob has also gone on to suggest that resistance to change might become focused on a particular outgroup:

"How convenient, how meaningful it is to ascribe the pain of change not to abstract forces but to some identifiable, distinctive outgroups" (Doob, 1964, p.253).

Cognitively oriented social psychologists have detailed many cognitive mechanisms which seem to encourage resistance to change, perhaps the most relevant here being the notion of *schema perseverance* (c.f. Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). All of these suggest that European integration, in as much as it holds the potential for significant social change, might be subject to certain psychological mechanisms geared to minimizing or resisting such change. We are not, incidentally, suggesting that such mechanisms are only located at a cognitive, and thus individual level. On the contrary, social representations seem to have in-built mechanisms for self-perpetuation which exist outside of individuals, whilst at the same time the members of social groups might *collectively* resist change.

Table 55 below indicates the five most frequent fear-inducing themes to emerge from the interviews (frequencies show the *number of respondents* referring to each theme).

**Table 55 - Things which worry respondents about European-integration**

<i>Theme</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
Centralisation of power & loss of sovereignty	11
Loss of British identity	7
Rise of extreme nationalism	3
Britain net contributor to E.C.	3
"Eurocentrism" / "fortress Europe"	3
(nothing)	2

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

The most common theme which emerged was mentioned by 11 interviewees, and referred to fears concerning the centralisation of European power and consequent loss of national sovereignty. This theme also emerged in open-ended responses to the 1991 questionnaire, and as suggested earlier, pervaded the British mass media and political debate in Britain for some time. Many respondents were aware of the contradictions between moves towards the centralization of European power, and

at the same time the rise in regionalism and assertion of separate national identities, with Eastern Europe providing a particularly salient example. That sovereignty has once again emerged as a barrier to European identity for the British is highly congruent with the observations arising from other empirical research (see, for example, Sotirakopoulou, 1991). In fact, Fitzgerald (1991) has suggested that a challenge to British sovereignty seems almost to deny history itself, with sovereignty having extremely deep roots in Britain's past.

It should also be emphasized that, while respondents feared centralization of power, they remained largely ignorant as to the actual and proposed power structures of the E.C., and thus somewhat ambivalent on this issue. Furthermore, a number of the respondents who suggested they were concerned at the possibility of centralisation, remained enthusiastic about European integration in general. In fact, only 2 of the 25 interviewees reported that *nothing* worried them about European integration, suggesting that even those sympathetic to integration have doubts and fears about *certain aspects* of the process.

What this apparent concern with issues of centralisation and loss of sovereignty does seem to demonstrate, is the significance of control motivations (see also Stagner, 1967). It was suggested in earlier chapters that there is often a motivation to feel in control of one's life - as well as a desire to control the lives of others - and that this control motivation should not be overlooked in discussions of social identity. Of course, what we are in fact talking about, are *perceptions* of control, for just how much control individual citizens have over political decision-making is questionable. This, in some respects, is where Kelman's (1969) stress on *perceived legitimacy* is especially helpful, since many British citizens presumably accept as legitimate the government's right to make decisions on their behalf. What is interesting in this respect is that this legitimacy is often not extended by the British public to *European* governing bodies - at least for certain issues. Thus, one interviewee who was generally in favour of European integration, felt that whilst some decisions could be made at a European level, certain key issues, such as taxation policy, should be left to national decision-making bodies. Responses of this nature are highly congruent with trends apparent in the Eurobaromètre opinion

surveys, which indicate that the British typically lack enthusiasm for anything more than *economic* integration.

In some ways the fear of centralisation theme seems interrelated with the concern over the loss of British identity, voiced by 7 of the interviewees. This echoes the finding arising from the 1991 questionnaire research, that some respondents perceive British and European identities as incompatible, with some feeling that European identity poses a significant *threat* to British identity. Such respondents would appear to perceive British and European loyalties as linked to alternative, rather than complementary, identities.

Some commentators (e.g. Smith, 1991;1992) have suggested that a European identity might be forged if it is perceived as similar to adding another layer to national loyalties, a *higher level* of identity which does not compete with national identity. In the latter case, the question of compatibility between the two identities does not arise, as both operate at essentially separate levels of inclusiveness. In principle, this seems a plausible means of holding both a national and European identity, and does not seem very different to the way people are able to apparently feel loyalties to both their region and their nation. However, if the results of the questionnaire and interviews described here are anything to go by, a significant number of British citizens seem to perceive the two identities as incompatible, thus presenting a fairly insurmountable psychological barrier against their harmonious integration. As one concerned respondent put it, for many Britons, the prospect of European integration "just seems so terribly anonymous, and as if we're going to have to abandon some of the things which are most British".

The theme of loss of sovereignty is also a powerful illustration of how social representations and social identities are intimately related. The belief that European integration poses a threat to British sovereignty seems a fairly widespread belief in Britain, at least to the extent that it might justifiably be labelled a social representation. Furthermore, this social representation appears to have often been deliberately diffused by certain social groups - e.g. the Bruges group. The acceptance or internalization of such a representation carries with it potential consequences for one's social identities. In particular, this social representation

contains the basis for perceiving British and European identities as incompatible - one might therefore say that it *affords* or *suggests* how individuals should organize their identity structures, albeit implicitly. It seems a fairly natural progression from Tajfel's (1980) earlier assertion that societal myths and beliefs (i.e. social representations) provide individuals with their repertoire of possible social identities, to go on to suggest that social representations might also suggest or prescribe the *preferred interrelationships* between them.

*Predicted obstacles to the progress of European integration*

Table 56 below details the most common themes which emerged when respondents discussed any problems they predicted might interfere with the progress of European integration.

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**Table 56 - Predicted problems for European integration**

<i>Problem</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
British reluctance	15
Diversity of different member states	2
Resistance to centralisation of power	2

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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It was interesting to note how *all* respondents felt European integration would face *some* problems, although most predicted that none would be serious enough to halt or reverse the process. It is striking that so many interviewees predicted that Britain in particular, would be the major cause of problems for the progress of European integration. Often this prediction was tied to the theme of Britain being different to the other European nations, discussed earlier. Additionally, a number of respondents felt that the present British government had been cautious about integration.

*Desired goals for European integration*

The most frequently mentioned goals which respondents felt European integration should be aiming to achieve, are presented in Table 57 below.

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**Table 57 - Desired goals for European integration**

<i>Goal</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
Economic	9
Peace	9
Provide aid for poor nations	5
Promote understanding between people	2
Facilitate greater freedom of movement	2

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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In both the questionnaire and interview responses, the economic dimension was very prominent in colouring the issues respondents thought about when they considered the subject of European integration. Specifically, most respondents mentioning economic goals thought that integration should aim for the economic prosperity and equality of E.C. member states. In fact, these aims tended to be shared by pro and anti-Europeans alike, indicating that the economic dimension is perhaps less likely than others to be the focus of differences of opinion. Furthermore, those who felt economic considerations should be important, also felt that integration generally had a good chance of realising economic goals.

Such feelings of optimism did not characterize the responses of those who felt the achievement of peace should be an important goal of integration. On the contrary, most respondents mentioning such a goal were extremely doubtful about the likelihood of its realisation - as one interviewee candidly remarked, "I think world peace should be an ultimate goal, but I don't think it's got a snowball's chance in hell of being achieved". It is interesting how even though such respondents felt that one of the goals they valued was not likely to be achieved, this did not seem to dampen their enthusiasm for integration, when such enthusiasm was present.

It is interesting to note how, in a way which seems congruent with the responses to the 1991 questionnaire, most of the goals given by respondents are quite indicative of an *instrumental orientation* to European integration and identity - i.e. an orientation which focuses more on gains versus losses type analyses than emotional and symbolic identification (Kelman, 1969). This kind of orientation appeared to be demonstrated quite well by an interviewee who was rather ambivalent about European integration, feeling especially concerned that Britain's economic input to the E.C. was greater than the benefits it received in return. Hewstone's (1986) earlier study of attitudes towards the European Community also indicated the significance of this kind of instrumental orientation.

As one might expect, those respondents who gave the overall impression of being pro-integration, tended to be more optimistic that the goals they mentioned might one day be realized. Those respondents who mentioned a likely time-frame for their goals to be achieved, tended to allow between ten and twenty years for this. There was only a single interviewee who felt so negative about European integration that they believed it should have no goals - in fact, that the process should be halted. This is perhaps significant, in as much as it indicates that, whilst there exists opposition to *certain aspects* of the integration process, this opposition tends not to be so intense that the project of European integration *as a whole* is rejected.

### 6.3.3 Elements of European identity

#### *Perceptions of interdependence*

The idea that perceptions of interdependence between individuals constitute an important element of group loyalty is an old one (c.f. Lewin, 1948; Sherif, 1966). Lewin in particular, stressed the potency of *interdependence of fate* in forging allegiance to a social group. For Lewin, perceptions of *task interdependence* were perhaps even more crucial influences on the development of group processes. Social psychologists working in the Lewinian tradition were able to find ample

empirical evidence to suggest that these two forms of interdependence had important effects upon group processes, and that perceptions of interdependence were at least *sufficient* for group formation, even if Tajfel and associates' minimal group studies (Tajfel et al., 1971) seemed to suggest that interdependence was not a *necessary* precondition for group behaviour.

Recently however, the minimal group paradigm has been the subject of serious criticism, most of which has not focused upon the reliability of the research findings, but rather their interpretation. Of most relevance to the current discussion is a series of papers by Rabbie, Horwitz, and associates, which posits that perceptions of interdependence are both necessary and sufficient elements of group behaviour and self-categorization as a group member (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schott, & Visser, 1989). Furthermore, Rabbie and Horwitz (1988) propose a distinction between *social groups*, which constitute "a 'dynamic whole' or social system, characterized by the perceived interdependence among its members", and *social categories*, which represent "a collection of individuals who stress at least one attribute in common". Whilst this conceptual distinction is in many ways congruent with suggestions raised in this and other chapters of the current discussion, we are not fully convinced that Rabbie and Horwitz's distinction is adequate. As we will discover shortly, it appears that perceptions of Europe include elements which the latter authors would associate with both *social groups* and *social categories*, begging the question: is European identity associated then, with perceptions of Europe as a category, or as a group?

Table 58 below presents the most commonly given dimensions of interdependence between European nations, as perceived by the interview respondents.

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**Table 58 - Perceived dimensions of European interdependence**

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
Economic	13
Cultural	3
Geographic	2

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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In keeping with the dominance of the economic dimension in other responses, once again one may note how this dimension, an essentially *instrumental* one, dominated interviewees' perceptions of interdependence between European nations. In fact, it is noticeable how only 3 out of 25 interviewees made reference to a dimension of interdependence which might be considered reflective of a symbolic or *sentimental* attachment to Europe (cultural). Given the involvement of various European nations, including Britain, in a number of military alliances, the most prominent of which must be N.A.T.O., it also seems somewhat surprising that no respondents reported feeling that the nations of Europe are interdependent in terms of *security*. As we will discover when we come to examine British identity, it may well be the case that national security is a domain in which the desire for perceived control is especially strong. This, incidentally, might also be a key factor behind the paradoxically ambivalent attitude of the British towards the United States.

There were important indications from the overall structure of the interviews, that perceptions of economic interdependence are *not* sufficient for feelings of European identity. Thus, a number of respondents perceived economic interdependence between European nations with *regret*, and there seemed to be at least two psychological underpinnings to such perceptions:

- i) Some respondents felt that Britain in particular, is a net contributor to the European Community, largely due to the poorer economic nations in Europe. As one interviewee stated: "You can't help feeling that some of the poorer nations in the E.E.C. are a drain upon the better-off ones such as Britain".
- ii) An alternative theme was associated with respondents' feelings that economic interdependence in some way constrained and reduced the ultimate control separate nations have over their own economies. Thus, one respondent remarked: "Unfortunately, we are now *locked* into a situation where some countries are dependent on others" (our emphasis).

In some respects the example response given in i) above, appears to exemplify a perception of *negative interdependence*, in that the implication is that this interviewee regrets the fact that poorer European nations are benefitting from EC membership, at the expense of Britain and other wealthy nations. It is rather unlikely that individuals who perceive this kind of *inequity*, and are concerned about it, will easily develop a sense of European identity based upon interdependence.

Case ii) returns us to a point made several times throughout this discussion, that there appears to be a significant desire for *control*, which can exert a powerful influence upon social identity processes. In this case respondents seemed to lament the fact that economic interdependence between European nations reduces control at the national level. As always, the metaphors and linguistic devices chosen by respondents provide further possible hints as to their perceptions: the metaphor of Britain being "locked" into economic dependence seems to imply quite well the unpleasant feelings of restraint perceived loss of control can engender.

The significance of the two cases detailed above is that both appear to demonstrate instances where perceived interdependence has actually acted to *inhibit* group or identity formation (both respondents reported feeling no sense of European identity). Perhaps the crucial point to make here, is that everything hinges on the *interpretation* of interdependence - by individuals, but also by social groups and other purveyors of social representations. The paradoxical nature of British-U.S. relations recently discussed should be enough to demonstrate how such interpretations of interdependence can be the cause for considerable political and public debate. Here, once again, we may see how interdependence *can* encourage feelings of common identity, but it can also cause *resentment*, especially where it is perceived to be associated with loss of control.

From the preceding discussion, it will be obvious that perceptions of interdependence between European nations are clearly not *sufficient* for the development of a European identity - in fact, it seems to be the case that in certain instances, such perceptions might *inhibit* the development of such an identity. It

was also interesting to note how all of the interviewees felt the nations of Europe were interdependent in some way, once again suggesting that perceptions of interdependence are not always sufficient to engender social identity, since by no means all of the interviewees felt that being European was an important aspect of their identities. The conclusions concerning interdependence to be drawn from an interview study of this nature must of course be regarded as tentative, but at the same time, the value of observing social identity processes and identity construction outside of the sometimes artificial constraints of the experimental laboratory, should not be underestimated.

### *Is Europe perceived as unique ?*

If a European identity is to develop, or if it already exists, there are several strong reasons to suspect that its existence will depend on the perception of Europe being distinct or unique in some way, in comparison to other categories, at least if Tajfel's social identity theory is correct. Here an interesting question arises: distinct or unique compared to what, or to whom ? This question was addressed in the previous chapter during the examination of likely *outgroups* for a European identity. It emerged from the questionnaire responses that the most common focus of comparisons, at least for British respondents, was between Europe and the United States, although this kind of direct comparison between Europe/the Europeans and another category was not common. In fact, this relative absence of comparisons between Europe and other categories may itself be indicative of the relatively low levels of European identity which were found among the questionnaire respondents.

This is a complex and emotive issue, not least because many commentators interpret Social Identity Theory as implying that outgroups are very likely to be denigrated. Robinson (1991) for example, has recently wondered whether a European identity will require the selection and denigration of a non-European outgroup. In terms of Tajfel's formulation of the theory (e.g. Tajfel, 1981), it is important to remember that outgroups fluctuate in *salience*, and that perceptions of in-group superiority and out-group inferiority are only predicted for *salient and*

*relevant outgroups*. In addition, and crucially, ecologically valid empirical fieldwork has demonstrated that even where members of two social groups make regular intergroup comparisons, hostility and prejudice need not develop, especially where each group does not challenge, but actually *endorses*, the claims of the other group for positive distinctiveness (see for example, van Knippenberg and Oers, 1984; Oaker & Brown, 1986). The moral to be drawn from such cases, is that whilst ingroup bias tends to be the norm (excepting out-group preference effects in underprivileged groups), ingroup-outgroup relations *can* remain amiable and generally hospitable. Thus, the selection of an outgroup, by default, does not signify that hostility and severe prejudice will be directed towards that group.

In fact, the outgroup issue, and in particular, the question of whether the perception of an outgroup is a necessary precondition for group formation, is perhaps one of the most crucial issues facing current social identity theorists. Tajfel, like many other prominent group psychology theorists, tended to take for granted the assumption that ingroups go hand-in-hand with outgroups: "No group lives alone - all groups in society live in the midst of other groups. In other words, 'the positive aspects of social identity' and the reinterpretation of attributes and engagement in social action only acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparisons with, other groups." (Tajfel, 1981, p.256). Yet over the last two years or so, a number of commentators have raised the possibility of social identities and social group memberships which do not depend upon explicit comparisons with outgroups. Rupert Brown and associates for example, have recently suggested that social identity construction can derive from comparisons with norms, rather than explicit outgroups (Brown et al., 1991;1992).

Whilst Brown and his associates strive to avoid taking the position that *non-comparative social identities* can exist, others have been willing to argue just this point. Hinkle and associates, for example, suggest that future research should take into account the possibility of non-comparative group ideologies (Hinkle et al., 1989). Such a focus on the shared social representations held by group members, as well as the general ideological milieu in which social groups operate, would represent a much-needed change in perspective for social identity theory. What all of these debates suggest, is that there are some doubts being raised as to whether

comparisons with out-groups are necessary for the formation of social identities. This being the case, and at least until more research is conducted in this area, we are not in a position to say whether the formation of a European identity does or does not require the perception of relevant outgroups. Nevertheless, this does not reduce the significance attached to investigating whether any outgroups for a European identity exist, and if so, on which dimensions comparisons are being made.

In the current interview study, respondents were directly questioned as to whether they perceived there to be anything unique about Europe, and the dimensions mentioned most frequently by respondents are presented in Table 59.

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**Table 59 - Perceived dimensions of European uniqueness**

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
Diversity of culture	11
Level of industrial development	6
Geographical location	4
(None)	4

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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One may note from Table 59 that the most frequently mentioned dimension of European uniqueness was the diversity of European culture (referred to by 11 interviewees). In keeping with the apparent desire for the British to differentiate themselves from the United States, it was interesting to note how this apparent diversity of European culture was contrasted by a number of respondents with what they perceived to be the shallowness and *lack of diversity* of North American culture. There is something paradoxical about the fact that perceived *diversity* is here being used to differentiate between two categories: European and non-European. The apparent paradox lies in the way diversity seems to be being used to characterize a categorization ("Europe") - categorization does tend, after all, to derive from perceptions of *commonalities* and *homogeneity*. Of course, it is fairly well-established that there often exists the tendency to perceive the ingroup as relatively heterogeneous when compared to outgroups, and this might especially be the case in contexts where a pervasive ideology of individualism is present, as may be the case in Britain. However, the use of the perceived diversity of European

cultures in this case seemed *not* to be related to the presence of a European identity. In fact, as will be discussed shortly, the salience of *differences* between European cultures may be one of the major factors *inhibiting* the development of a European identity - at least in Britain.

In fact, interviewees had considerable difficulty in thinking about the possible dimensions on which Europe may be considered to be unique, suggesting that the respondents had not given this issue much previous thought. In support of this interpretation, one may note how 4 respondents could think of nothing better to say than that Europe is unique only in terms of its geographical location, while 4 other respondents could not think of *any* way in which Europe could be said to be unique. In conclusion, it should however, be noted that there are indications that the United States can at times, serve the purpose of an *outgroup* for comparisons between Europe and other categories.

#### *A common European culture ?*

In previous chapters, the reader was introduced to the sociologist Anthony Smith's suggestion that one possibility for the development of a European identity, lies in the potentiality that Europeans might come to perceive a common cultural background - a family of European cultures, sharing certain key common elements (Smith, 1991;1992). Doubts were raised as to the likelihood of such perceptions developing amongst the British public, especially if the results of the 1991 questionnaire were taken into account. Such doubts are also shared by some of the other theorists working in this area. Bloom, for example, argues that European integration can only succeed if it is based upon a clear set of European symbols. Unfortunately, according to Bloom, these European symbols are yet to emerge (Bloom, 1990). Since the question of whether respondents do perceive a common European culture was not directly put to the 1991 questionnaire respondents, it was included as an open-ended question in the interview study currently being discussed.

Once again, it may be significant to note how respondents found it quite difficult to answer this question - this was apparent from both non-verbal and

verbal indicators. What exactly was meant by "culture" was deliberately left open to the interpretation of respondents, who tended to focus on general behavioural patterns, customs, traditions, art, language, and so on, apparently using much the same definition as a sociologist or anthropologist might.

Out of the 25 interviewed, 15 expressed the belief that there is no such thing as a common European culture. The response of one particular interviewee is particularly instructive, since it also serves to demonstrate how an ideology of individualism - and perhaps more precisely, the acceptance of such an ideology - is likely to affect the development of European and other identities :

No, I don't think there's anything like a common European culture. I think if anyone was to say yes to that, they'd be basically fooling themselves because...I mean...well, I think everybody would certainly say that they are totally individual compared to everybody else. I mean Italians would never say, "oh we're very similar to the French" - I'm sure they'd be up in arms. It all comes down to individualities - that, you know, we ARE different. (interview respondent)

It should be stressed that we are not suggesting that acceptance of this kind of individualistic philosophy necessarily prevents individuals having powerful social identities as part of their self-concepts. What, yet again, is crucial, is the interface between the individual (or social group) and the ideology - i.e. how the ideology is interpreted and put to *use*. For the interviewee whose response is reproduced above, it was precisely this philosophy of individualism which comprised an important element of his general anti-European perspective. Yet for other respondents, individualism, though broadly accepted, was not seen to pose any problems for a European identity.

Smith's (1991;1992) notion of a European "family of cultures" is a flexible one, in as much as it allows for the possibility that, whilst Europeans might wish to continue to perceive their cultures as separate, *in addition*, they might come to perceive certain essential similarities as well. However, Smith seems to fall into the trap of intellectualization, when he suggests that the basis for perceptions of this family of cultures might stem from an awareness of the religious history of Europe, common philosophical roots, the enlightenment, and so on. From the current

author's experience, and from the questionnaire and interview data reported herein, there appears to be little or no evidence that the British public are aware of such common roots - this is perhaps not surprising, given that the public as a whole tend not to be well versed in religious history, or the history of philosophical thought. In a way, what Smith is suggesting is that citizens of European states might turn towards the past with a new common perspective, and thus re-interpret European history. It is the contention of the current author that this kind of re-interpretation of culture and history is unlikely, especially for the British, since, as was demonstrated by the questionnaire responses, symbolic and cultural attachments to the nation can be the most potent elements of national identity. Even when the citizens of a nation lose part or even all of their national territory, they seem to cling-on to their *culture* with dogged determination.

Whilst there may be significant factors acting to inhibit the perception of a European culture, it is also important to note that 7 out of the 25 interviewees (28%) *did* express a belief in a common European culture. Almost all of these respondents however, strove to suggest that the common elements, which they found extremely difficult to define, were rather superficial, and they usually went on to suggest that the *differences* between the European cultures are more significant than the similarities. It has already been suggested earlier in this discussion, that British respondents have a tendency to define European culture(s) in terms of comparisons with North American culture, and this trend was readily apparent in responses to the current question. Many of those respondents who argued for a common European culture, found it easiest to suggest that the common element was in some way this difference between European and American culture:

I think the peoples of Europe are much more culturally linked than possibly, than we think they are. Some people think we've got more in common with Americans, but I think we've got more in common with Europeans. I think culturally, we're closer to Europeans - German people, or Italians, than we are to Americans (interview respondent)

It is rather interesting to note how this apparent concern to differentiate European and American cultures, is actually reflected in both academic and political circles, in terms of attempts to preserve a European *cultural space* from what is often

perceived as American or Anglo-Saxon "cultural imperialism" (c.f. Schlesinger, 1991).

It was also noticeable how, in general, whether respondents perceived the existence of a common European culture or not, was not related to their overall stance on the European integration issue, or to whether they expressed beliefs congruent with the existence of a European identity. This observation is in keeping with the argument made throughout this and other chapters, that British orientations to European identity are fairly instrumental in nature.

Given the fact that University students as a subject group are relatively well-travelled compared to the general population as a whole, and when one also takes into account the additional factor that the University of London tends to provide a relatively cosmopolitan and multi-national milieu, it is perhaps rather surprising that the majority of respondents were unable to perceive a common European culture. This is less surprising however, when one takes into account the fact that contact with other nationalities might act to increase the salience of one's own nationality, and thus encourage citizens to take more note of *differences* between cultures. A.D. Smith (1991) has suggested a similar process in relation to the possibility that communications technology is increasingly bringing foreign cultures into our homes, via satellite television and other developments. For Smith, such developments are only likely to enhance the perceived *barriers* between national cultures, especially if nationals come to perceive their own culture as *under threat*. This last point is of relevance to the European Commission, who appear to have taken-on the task of creating and disseminating a European culture. European Commission literature already talks of a European culture as if its existence can be taken for granted, and as if the perception of this common culture is the major factor behind feelings of European identity, which again, are assumed to already exist:

**A community of culture in Europe is already an undeniable fact. Beneath the surface diversity of languages, tastes and artistic styles, there is a likeness, a kinship, a European dimension or identity based on a common cultural heritage. (*The European Community and Culture*, CEC, 1985, p.3).**

It would seem that the European Commission is unaware of some of the contradictory themes and paradoxes which are involved in attempting to encourage the perception of a European culture. One should, for example, consider how a number of respondents actually valued what they perceived as the *diversity* of European cultures. In some ways, this has similarities with what Billig (1985) has referred to as the conflict between *categorization* and *particularization*. Individuals who hold this kind of opinion are rather likely to resist claims that a homogeneous common European culture exists.

### *Objects of European Pride*

If some of the interview respondents had truly internalized European identity as a self-categorization (Turner, 1987), one would expect this self-categorization or social identity to have an element of *affect* associated with it, at least, if the basic tenets of Tajfel's theory are accepted (e.g. Tajfel, 1974). A social identity is said to be *positive* for an individual, when it allows the attainment of positive distinctiveness (Tajfel, op. cit.). Ascertaining the affective nature of a social identity can be somewhat tricky, and the task can be complicated somewhat by at least two factors:

- i) We know that a number of individual (e.g. schema perseverance - c.f. Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984) and group-level (e.g. the ultimate attribution error - c.f. Pettigrew, 1979) processes allow the manufacturing of a positive identity in many situations which might seem "objectively" likely to cause feelings of negative identity (see also R.J. Brown, 1988).
- ii) There is evidence that group failures may have the paradoxical effect of enhancing positive social identity (c.f. Turner et al., 1984).

What the kind of factors highlighted above suggest, is that the affect associated with any particular social identity is determined by a complex and as yet poorly understood interaction between "objective" circumstances (e.g. economic wealth),

perceptions of these circumstances (by both individuals and groups), and a number of psychological mechanisms often leading to self or group-serving biases. Furthermore, the question of whether all social identities are associated with affect, *all of the time*, may not be as straightforward as many social identity theorists have assumed. The possibility of social identities not associated with affect will be examined at length later in this discussion.

Given the biasing mechanisms briefly outlined above, and accepting for the moment Tajfel's assertion that we will strive for *positive* social identities - i.e. for ones which we come to associate with positive affect - it is relevant to ask whether there are any aspects of Europe which British respondents associate with positive affect. This issue was directly addressed by asking interviewees whether there was anything about Europe which made them feel *proud to be European*, and the most popular response categories are detailed in Table 60 below:

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**Table 60 - Objects of European pride**

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
(None)	16
Depth of European history	4
Culture	4

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

---

In some respects, the results presented in Table 60 are striking, for it was apparent that the majority of interviewees (16/25) were not able to specify *anything* about Europe which made them feel proud to be European - even those who, in general, were quite enthusiastic about European integration and the European Community. In fact, taking into consideration both the 1991 questionnaire and interview data, we might be as bold as to say that in general, it seems to be the case for the British, that the possession of a European identity *does* seem to be associated with positive opinions about integration and the E.C., but that the reverse is not the case - the holding of positive opinions about integration and the Community is not necessarily enough to foster a European identity.

Many respondents reported feeling that "European" was altogether too anonymous a label, and one they were not happy about applying to their own self-concepts. It appears that such respondents simply did not identify themselves as European, and thus found the task of listing things which made them feel proud to be European, an irrelevant one. Others accepted the label "European", but attached little or no significance to it, and thus were unable to list objects of European pride - "No, it's just a fact - it's not something that I think about" - remarked one interviewee. The question of whether such comments suggest a self-categorization which apparently has no affect linked to it, is an interesting one, and one which will be addressed at a later stage in the discussion.

Those interviewees who *were* able to list things which made them feel proud to be European, did so only after considerable mental deliberation - these were clearly things which did not come easily to mind. There seemed little or no affect shown when these objects of pride were listed, and the general impression gleaned by the interviewer was one congruent with the notion of instrumental, rather than sentimental, attachments to Europe. In keeping with the observation made earlier, it was the case that those interviewees able to list objects of European pride, were all also in favour of European integration and the E.C. In conclusion, as a crude measure of the level of European identity expressed by the interviewees, it is instructive to recall the data obtained from the 1991 questionnaire study: while some 64% of interviewees were unable to list any objects of *European* pride, only 3% of questionnaire respondents had similar difficulties when asked to list objects of British *national* pride. For anyone interested in comparing the relative magnitude, or perhaps level of positive affect, associated with British and European identities, in this case the data certainly strongly favour British over European, identity.

#### *Things which made respondents embarrassed about being European*

We have already discussed some of the likely barriers to the development of a European identity amongst the British, and since interviewees were questioned concerning possible objects of *European pride*, it seemed desirable to also question

them about aspects of Europe which *embarrassed* them, or made them *regret* being European. The most frequent themes to emerge in the responses to this question are presented in Table 61 below:

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**Table 61 - Objects of European embarrassment**

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
(None)	11
Exploitation of Third world	7
Imperialist past	4

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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Given the knowledge that the most frequent response here was actually to say that *nothing* caused the respondent embarrassment about being European, one might speculate that this is promising for the likely development of a European identity. It is certainly true that none of the interviewees seemed to possess a *negative* European identity, and that, in general, none expressed a desire to actively *dis-identify* themselves with Europe. Given the general pattern of responses, we would argue that the lack of embarrassment reported, is most likely to be another reflection of the simple fact that many respondents simply did not possess a European identity, even when they generally accepted the label "European".

It is perhaps fitting to conclude this section of the discussion on an optimistic note for those who might hope to instill a European identity. Optimism is perhaps warranted, to the extent that those interviewees who *were* able to give examples of things which made them regret being European, tended to dwell on *past-oriented* themes. Thus for example, it was the case that those who gave the exploitation of the Third World as a response, tended to concentrate on *past* exploitation. This may therefore suggest that there is perhaps little about modern-day Europe which is seen as worthy of regret, although one must always bear in mind other psychological factors likely to discourage a European identity, and it is these that we now examine.

#### 6.3.4 A European identity for the British ?

##### *Resistance to change*

It should be relatively clear from the preceding discussion, that a number of psychological and social-psychological factors are likely to stand in the way of the development of a European identity amongst the British. Amongst the most significant of these processes are those associated with the tendency to resist change. As we have already suggested, such processes derive from mechanisms operating at both the intra-individual level (e.g. schema perseverance), as well as the social level (e.g. the anchoring of social representations). In fact, as with most social psychological processes of significance, those associated with the resistance and acceptance of change can be said to operate at multiple levels (c.f. Doise, 1986), and one of the real challenges is to take into account all of these levels, as well as the interactions between processes at different levels. Whilst Moscovici's theory certainly suggests social representations are imbued with a degree of longevity and resistance to change, it must also be acknowledged that change obviously *does* occur. Moscovici, for example, has been especially interested in minority influence (e.g. Moscovici, 1985), and it does seem that minorities can persuade individuals and social groups to change existing social representations, or to abandon them and adopt new ones.

Alternatively, Marris (1974) has made the interesting suggestion that changes in widely-held social beliefs and ideologies might occur along similar lines to the model proposed by Kuhn (1970) for explaining paradigm shifts in science. In particular, Marris suggests that such changes in shared beliefs are especially likely when alternative belief systems are perceived to offer a more parsimonious interpretation of social reality. We would suggest that although somewhat vague, Marris' suggestion is one worthy of further investigation. In the context of the current discussion, if Marris is correct, then one might tentatively predict that one way in which social representations linked with the resistance of European identity might come to change, is if alternative social representations are seen to be more informative. Such alternative social representations - ones which propose a

European identity, a stronger, more united European Community, etc. - certainly do exist, in as much as they are being proposed and disseminated by individuals and social groups. This rather nicely illustrates how processes of social representation and social identity are almost always interrelated - in this case, the question of whether a European identity will be adopted is also one of whether particular social representations will be abandoned or changed, and new ones adopted. In relation to this issue, a further important point must be made. Whilst the term "European identity" is used here largely for the sake of convenience, it might be more appropriate to think of European identities, since this is a more realistic reflection of the fact that there are many possible manifestations a European identity might take.

#### *Temporal aspects of European identity*

It is relevant at this point in the discussion to raise some of the issues concerned with temporal matters, and their relation to the development of a European identity. An interesting aspect of many of the more anti-European responses in the interview study, was that although these tended to be associated with little or no sign of a European identity, at the same time respondents often felt that they *might* develop such an identity within the next ten or twenty years. As an example, it is instructive to briefly consider the response of one interviewee, when asked whether anything made her feel proud to be European:

I'm British, I've been brought-up to be British, so I can't really sort of answer that question. I've just been brought-up British like we all have. But if you ask me, you know, in ten years time if I'm proud to be European, I might say yes.

One may note from the above response that this interviewee can not think of anything which makes her feel proud to be European, suggesting a lack of European identity. Furthermore, in keeping with themes already reviewed, one may imply from the response that in some way her awareness of being British (i.e. her British identity) is acting to inhibit a European identity. Yet at the same time, she suggests that in ten years time she *may* feel proud to be European - in a way suggesting that she perceives a *possible European identity*.

The question of what effect such perceptions have on identity structures, is an interesting issue for future research to explore. One interesting question which arises, concerns the possibility of *anticipatory identification* and its likely effects - here, a return to some of the early work on *reference groups* might be warranted (see, for example, Kelvin, 1970). Furthermore, one should not rule-out the possibility that such anticipatory identifications might become the focus of a *self-fulfilling prophecy* (Merton, 1957). Finally, it is interesting to note how it was earlier suggested that British identity might be linked to a *past-oriented* temporal outlook, whereas here we are seeing evidence suggesting that European identity might currently have a significant *future* orientation. These interesting differences in temporal perspective, and their possible consequences for social identification are explored in some detail in later chapters.

The important point to make for the purposes of the present discussion, is that, despite significant processes which often favour the resistance of change, there are at least two factors which might act to enable or at least ease change, and thus facilitate the adoption of a European identity. These factors are: i) the possibility that the adoption of a European identity comes to be associated with a more parsimonious interpretation of social reality; and ii) the possibility that European identity is eventually adopted via processes of anticipatory identification. Such processes are almost certainly associated with the perception of positive possible European selves - a subject which will be explored at greater length in the next two chapters.

### *European identity and perceptions of control*

Almost all respondents felt that European integration would continue, and that there was little they could realistically do to prevent or facilitate the process. Thus, one should note that these fairly common perceptions of a *possible European identity* were accompanied by perceptions of *lack of control* over the course of events. In general, allowing for the odd exception (see for example, Breakwell, 1986), it is reasonable to assume that perceived lack of control is often an aversive and uncomfortable psychological state - for both individuals and social groups. It

has already been suggested that perceptions of lack of control in the context of the European issue, may also be linked to the interpretation of European matters as an "expert domain". In an earlier chapter we made the suggestion, on the basis of empirical evidence (e.g. Turner et al., 1984), that encouraging feelings of self-control in relation to European affairs might help facilitate a positive European identity. Given the apparent salience for respondents of their lack of control over such issues, we would re-iterate this point even more forcefully.

Since the possibility of a national referendum on the European question was raised in the British parliament during 1991, it seems fitting to briefly explore some of the possible psychological effects such an event might have. Here, we are primarily interested in the psychological effects upon European identity and related opinions, and will defer the analysis of other factors to political scientists, sociologists, and other academics. The work of Turner and associates (1984) seems to indicate that when individuals feel more in control of their decision to take-on a particular social identity, they tend to cling-on to that identity to a greater degree, as well as apparently having a greater tendency to maintain positive evaluations of the identity. If a referendum on the European issue allows British citizens a greater sense of *control* over the European issue, it might therefore act to facilitate or strengthen European identity, if the results obtained by Turner et al. (1984) are robust.

There are, of course, likely to be many additional factors which might interact with perceptions of control. One of the most significant might be the level of generality within which the referendum issue is phrased - presumably, the more specific the particular European issue focused on, the less likely the referendum is to have significant effects on overall European identity. Another point worth making about the possible effects of such a referendum, is that we might also predict a possible polarization of views on the issue, since dissonance reduction (c.f. Festinger, 1957) might encourage justifications of voting behaviour, and re-interpretations of opinions. Finally, it should, of course, be borne in mind that any such referendum would take place amidst a mass media barrage of alternative social representations, which would become even more intense if the referendum became the subject of political conflict (which it almost certainly would).

Another possible barrier to European identity, and one which also appears to be closely linked to control motivations, is the apparent fear many Britons have concerning *loss of sovereignty*. The language utilised by many interviewees certainly suggests the intensity such concerns may engender, with feelings that the E.C. is "interfering in a huge number of areas of British life", and that it might come in the future to "*dictate* terms over here" (our emphasis). Significantly, these fears exist within the milieu of an apparently widely-held social representation, the primary focus of which is the preservation of autonomous states, regions, etc. - in a way, a celebration of heterogeneity, and a rejection of attempts to manufacture homogeneity. Whether this social representation is allied to wider *collective* representations or *ideologies* of individualism, is an interesting question, but one beyond the present scope of this research. As we have already noted, somewhat paradoxically, acceptance of such beliefs and representations need not stand in the way of a positive orientation to European integration. What we are suggesting here is only that they contain the *seeds* of a potential resistance to integration and thus, European identity.

The perception of European integration as a *threat* to British identity - which in some ways is what is represented by the loss of sovereignty theme - is an example of how the *networking*, or interrelationship between British and European identities can be organized in a conflictual or *inhibitory* manner (see also Chapters 2, 4 & 5). Such an organization of identity structures - either at the individual or group level - can be amongst the most serious barriers to the development of a positively valued European identity, especially in cases where national identity is associated with a high degree of positive affect. One particularly harmful (to European identity) way of organizing identity structure, is to posit that European identity stifles and ultimately destroys British identity:

We are very British in our ways, in our history, and our traditions, and to think of abandoning that to become just a European citizen, it just seems so terribly anonymous, and as if we're gonna have to abandon the things which are most British. (interview respondent)

Here, as is often the case, the respondent's choice of words seems to convey vividly their overall orientation: one can almost feel the emotion the interviewee associates

with the loss of British identity, and the sense of emptiness resulting from being reduced to "just a European citizen".

*European identity: identity without affect ?*

One of the interesting things to note about the responses of interviewees in the current study, was that many, if not most, talked about European integration with little or no emotion. As one interviewee commented, "Well, obviously I AM European, but it's not important to me - I just am, just by the fact that I live in Europe". Given that the interviewees were all university students, it was also surprising to note how all claimed that they had spent little time thinking about European issues in the past, and tended not to discuss such matters with their friends and colleagues. Both these observations would suggest that the interviewees possessed little, or no European identity, at least as far as affect and interest may serve as indicators. These observations are congruent with trends apparent in the European Community's *Eurobaromètre* surveys, which also show that the British tend not to think of themselves as citizens of Europe (for example, 74% of Britons polled in 1982 and 1983 *never* thought of themselves as citizens of Europe).

However, it is significant to note that almost all of the interviewees also accepted the label "European". A question arises here which is of much significance for the Tajfel-Turner Social Identity paradigm: is this an example of a social identity or self-categorization with no associated affect ? For Tajfel, such a possibility tends not to arise, since his definition of a social identity specifically posits the existence of associated affect (e.g. Tajfel, 1981). Turner (1984; 1987) is somewhat vague on the whole issue of affect and its role in social identity, however it does not seem an unfair interpretation of Turner's theory to argue that it also implies self-categorizations always have a level of affect associated with them.

To return to the question raised earlier, we must ask ourselves exactly what the assertion "I am European, but it is not important to me" actually implies. It is tentatively being suggested here, that this may be an example of self-categorization

without affect - even if this seems little more than the acceptance of a linguistic label to describe the self, this in itself is by no means an insignificant psychological phenomenon. This is the kind of observation which is facilitated somewhat by the interview methodology. In contrast, responses driven by this kind of orientation, would probably result in scores on a quantitative questionnaire-based measure of social identity which would often simply be interpreted as signifying the *absence* of social identity or self-categorization.

One must, of course, be careful not to interpret social identity theory too literally, and not to stifle the flexibility constructs such as variability in *salience* allow. It certainly seems reasonable to postulate, as Oakes (1987) has in fact done, that one determinant of the salience of a self-categorization will be the level of affect associated with it, as well as the nature of the affect (i.e. positive or negative). Since we have a tendency to try and make social identities which are positive salient as much of the time as possible, it perhaps says something about the potency of European identity for the British, that British citizens are apparently happy for this identity to be hardly salient at all, or even non-existent. In fact, the real significance of European identity and its related social representations, might lie in the threat it apparently poses to many Britons' sense of national identity.

There are interesting parallels between the argument put forward here about an affect-less identity, and the observation, which has been made frequently throughout this discussion, that European identity, if it exists at all, seems to be characterized by an instrumental or utilitarian orientation. Here, we might recall the dominance of economic dimensions of European integration in the responses of both interview and questionnaire respondents. It is interesting to note how Tajfel (1970) suggested that Kelman's (1969) distinction between instrumental and sentimental attachments might be likened to a distinction between non-identity and identity, respectively. This interpretation is not endorsed here, since it seems that there certainly *are* occasions when instrumental orientations can be associated with social identity. One should note, however, as indeed Tajfel (*op. cit.*) did, that at times the distinction between the two kinds of orientation seems to blur somewhat.

Whether or not one accepts Tajfel's assertion regarding sentimental and instrumental attachments, it is quite probable that sentimental attachments - i.e. those associated with positive affect, symbols of the ingroup, etc., are likely to be more powerful, as well as being more resistant to change (it is easier for economic performance to deteriorate than national culture, heritage and folklore). It is thus reasonable to assume that a European identity which is able to engender such a sentimental attachment, is likely to be more powerful and secure than one reliant on instrumental ties. As we have already suggested, the results obtained from both the questionnaire and interview studies suggest a distinct lack of any kind of sentimental attachment to Europe. Clearly, much work needs to be done, if the European Commission's apparent wish for a common European culture is to be realised (at least in terms of British perceptions). One of the primary tasks here, will be finding a way in which such a European identity can exist in a Europe "utterly congested with historical memories in which nationhood plays a central role" (Schlesinger, 1991).

### *Glimpses of European identity*

Whilst the discussion might appear to have so far implied that the prospects for a European identity in Britain are bleak at best, there are brief glimmers of hope, times when the potential barriers of national pride, sovereignty, and so forth, are momentarily lowered to reveal glimpses of a possible European future. There are examples of British citizens, some of whom were interviewed in the current study, who *are* able to integrate British and European identities in such a way that the two are *complementary*. The most common way in which this is achieved is in terms of the perception that Britain can benefit from membership of the European Community - perhaps, even that Britain *needs* the benefits of Community membership. Even here, therefore, it is noticeable how pro-Europeanism and European identity can have a nationalistic undertone, can be driven by motivations essentially linked to the maintenance of *national* identity. Here, with this most common kind of apparent co-existence of British and European identities, we also see the instrumental nature of European identity, in its frequent reduction to an economic purpose.

This kind of orientation is encapsulated well in one response originating from the current interview study:

I think Europe, and being a part of Europe will give Britain many advantages that it doesn't have at the moment. What I personally want is what's best for Britain. It's just that I feel that what's best for Britain is a European outlook - being part of a greater whole which has better economic growth rates and a better standard of living - I mean Britain will gain from that.

Clearly, the interrelationship individuals choose to create between their national and European identities is of crucial significance. Some research, such as that of IMADI (1984) and CRAM (1985), suggests that perhaps the only way a European identity can be meaningful is for it to be tied to national identity in this way, and to be perceived as extending the power of one's own nation. However, it should be noted that individuals do not have complete artistic license to manage their identities as they see fit. They are surrounded by a mass of conflicting and competing social representations, some of which are likely to be forwarded by social groups to which they belong, or to which they aspire to belong, and others which will be associated with outgroups. Yet other social representations, of potentially equal relevance, might be associated with influential individuals who we might wish to call opinion leaders (after Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). Such representations are worthy of the label *social* if a number of individuals are aware of their essential elements, although they might more appropriately be considered as *potential* social representations, in as much as the latter are truly manifested only when they become the symbolic property of social groups.

Social representations thus provide the raw materials with which individuals and social groups, like artists contemplating a new canvas, may engage in the brushwork of identity construction. In this case, one might argue that social representations contain both *implicit* and *explicit* suggestions as to how British and European identities interrelate. It is interesting to note that, whilst individuals and social groups may have some variability in how they choose to manage their various identities, social representations have an in-built mechanism for longevity, and tend to change rather slowly. Thus, there is a sense in which the brushwork of identity construction, once completed, can be viewed from various angles and perspectives, and thus afford an element of variety, but at the same time, all these

perspectives are *variations on a theme*, a theme which may well be quite resistant to change.

### 6.3.5 Elements of British Identity

#### *Interviewees' definitions of "patriotism"*

It is alarming to note that one has to go back to 1964, and Doob's detailed discussion, in order to find one of the few detailed social psychological analyses of patriotism. For Doob, this important psychological phenomenon could be defined as:

the more or less conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his society. (Doob, 1964, p.6)

One may note how an important dimension of this definition of patriotism, is the awareness that what is essentially the security and wellbeing of individuals and social groups, is intimately linked to the nation and all it stands for. This theme of security as a motivation behind national identity was explored in the previous chapters, and remains a useful conceptual tool when one comes to assess the interview responses.

However, just as Tajfel (1981) suggested researchers should take note of how group members themselves define the group, so it is also useful to note in the context of the current study, how interviewees seem to define and understand patriotism, and what it means to be patriotic. This being the case, interviewees were directly asked for their own definition of "patriotic", with the emphasis being placed on how interviewees actually used the label themselves.

One of the interesting theoretical observations to emerge from the responses to this question, concerns the apparent validity of Potter and Litton's (Potter & Litton, 1985; Litton & Potter, 1985) suggested distinction between the *awareness of*,

or reference to, a social representation, and actual use or *acceptance* of it (we are not, however, proposing that linguistic repertoires replace social representations as the focus of enquiry). The utility of this distinction is made clearly evident by one example interview response:

Often the term "patriotic" is used to describe people who are in some way prejudiced. It's got quite a derogatory tone. But that doesn't necessarily mean that's the only way you can talk about patriotism. You could say - and this is how I like to think about it - that anyone who accepts day-to-day democracy is a patriot. (interview respondent)

This kind of response, where various alternative definitions or representations of patriotism were discussed, tended to be typical. This indicates some of the dangers that can be associated with functionalist content analyses (c.f. Weber, 1990), since the latter can often be insensitive to this kind of qualitative difference between reference to, and actual acceptance of, a social representation.

For the purposes of the current discussion, we will focus our attention on those representations of patriotism *accepted* and *utilized* by the interviewees, the most frequent of which are listed in Table 62 below.

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**Table 62 - Interviewees' definitions of "patriotic"**

<i>Definition</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
Stand up for what's best for one's country	9
Be willing to fight for own country	8
Support British teams in sporting events	4
Have pride in national culture	4
Accept democracy	3

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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It was noticeable when discussing patriotism with interviewees, that most seemed to feel as if they *ought* to be patriotic, and thus strove for a definition of patriotic which they felt happy applying to themselves. This was the case even on occasions when the interviewee had been quite negative about Britain and being British. The strategy adopted by one male respondent may serve as an example: when asked for his definition, he made reference to a number of fairly derogatory interpretations of patriotism, before elaborating his own, rather unusual definition, which focused

on "having a balanced view of one's country - being able to see the good AND the bad". This interviewee would not accept the label of patriotic "in the traditional sense", but was happy to be called patriotic *in terms of his own definition*. One might thus go as far as to say that the interview responses were suggestive of a *social norm* prescribing patriotism. This social norm, if it indeed exists in a widespread form, may conflict with another societal norm which Billig (1991) has recently found evidence for - a norm which precludes prejudice. Thus, many respondents struggled to define patriotism in a way which excluded the possibility of implicitly condoning prejudice. Hence the most frequent definitions of patriotism to be *accepted* by interviewees were *not* those which suggested patriotism involves an element of prejudice.

There is, of course, quite a real sense in which feeling patriotic might be considered to be psychologically functional for both individuals and groups (Doob, 1964). As A.D. Smith (1991) has suggested, national identity (which is presumably linked to patriotism), is potentially the most powerful of all social identities, since it allows feelings of common bonds, in principle, between *all* members of a nation. Both Smith and Doob also suggest that national identity and patriotism afford citizens a significant feeling of temporal stability, a context for constructing harmonious interpretations of the past, present, and future. Doob (op. cit.) also makes the important point that the nation has more control over the activities of individuals and social groups than any other group identification. This being the case, to dis-identify with such a powerful influence upon one's life could be psychologically dysfunctional, at least in the sense that it might reduce perceptions of control.

An analysis of Table 62 indicates that the most frequently accepted definition of patriotism was supporting what is perceived as best for one's own country. In general, most respondents who utilized and accepted this definition, felt that it involved the awareness that the goals of the nation should be perceived as synonymous with one's own personal goals. It is somewhat comforting that this lay-definition of patriotism shares important elements with that of Doob (1964) and other social scientists. The security theme mentioned earlier also seemed to emerge in the second most popular definition of patriotism: to be willing to fight for one's

nation. There are few other social identifications which can demand this level of loyalty - even if it may be only be professed loyalty. It is therefore all the more surprising that studies of national identity remain largely the province of researchers from disciplines other than Social Psychology.

*The construction of British identity: an example*

At this point in the discussion, it seems useful to provide an example of how British identity can be constructed and "customised" by an individual. This kind of idiographic focus can provide useful pointers as to the mechanisms of identity construction, and is readily facilitated by in-depth interview methodologies (see also Deaux, 1992; Rosenberg, 1988). We will examine some of the elements which can be associated with what Doob (1964) might call *strong patriotism*, by focusing on the responses of a particular male interviewee. As a starting point, it is instructive to begin with this interviewee's response to the question "Is being British important to you?" :

I like being British. I like a lot of what we stand for throughout quite a lot of history. I'm a bit upset about some of the bad things which Britain has done, but almost every country's done bad things in the past. As far as I can see, I look at every other country and I don't like certain aspects of the country, and things they stand for. Take France at the moment, where Fascism and the extreme Right is very, very strong. I don't like that at all. I mean France to me is always...I don't know, I just can't get on with the French at all. I've met French people, talked with them, had a drink with them at the pub, but I just can't get on with them. (interview respondent).

Firstly, this interviewee's professed pride in being British is quite a strong indication that his British identity is important to him, especially when coupled with the dimension of Britain's historical stance, which seems quite a sentimental orientation. In keeping with most attempts at identity maintenance, this interviewee is able to take the quite sophisticated stance that the object of his loyalties - Britain - has been associated with undesirable undertakings in the past, but this admonition is rationalized, and its potential for negative identity quashed, by the accompanying assertion that "almost every country's done bad things in the past".

In support of authors such as Doob and Tajfel, both of whom forward the case for outgroups being essential elements of group identification, the focus of the interviewee now shifts, without prompting, to a comparison between Britain and a relevant outgroup. The logic behind his construction of British identity, which is beginning to emerge from the responses, suggests that most nations commit regrettable acts, but that Britain commits less than most (or less than all). France is obviously a highly salient outgroup for this interviewee, and is easily brought into the response, as an example of one of those countries whose properties he does not like. One may note how the interviewee's quite negative opinion of the French is typical of the traditional out-group derogation one would expect from the predictions of social identity theory. There are also indications of the out-group homogeneity effect - the interviewee seems happy to talk about "the French" in a collective, all-encompassing manner.

That France has here been selected as an outgroup for Britain is perhaps not surprising, given the apparent depth and history of British distrust of the French (see, for example, Hewstone, 1986). As it turns out, in a later response, this interviewee would expand his explanation for disliking France and the French, and perhaps significantly, was particularly defensive about the British royal family in this respect, suggesting that while the French might feel superior for overthrowing their monarchy, in fact, underlying their attitude, was envy of the British monarchy. Billig (1992a) has in fact discovered that this theme - essentially believing that other nations are envious of the British royal family - is an exceptionally common one amongst the British public. We may begin to perceive at this point, how this interviewee's network of beliefs relating to British identity has been constructed. It is, for example, apparent that his choice of outgroup seems in some way to be linked to, amongst other things, his fondness for the British royal family, and his wish to defend this institution from criticism.

A theme which has already been touched upon to some extent, refers to the tendency of many British respondents to perceive Britain as significantly different to other nations - including other European nations. For the current interviewee, this theme was intertwined with his belief that foreigners - in particular Europeans and Americans - tend not to understand the British very well. In fact, the

interviewee seemed to feel that Europeans and Americans - both of whom we have already noted are frequently construed as outgroups for Britain - not only misperceive British attributes, but do so in an essentially negative way. It should be clear that the latter kind of belief, essentially one which posits that outgroups mis-perceive the ingroup, might prove an excellent means of countering any foreign criticism of the British. This apparent concern with the image other groups have of one's own group is an interesting social psychological phenomenon, and one which will shortly be discussed at more length. Significantly for the current discussion, this belief that other nations fail to understand the British, also seems to have affected the interviewee's orientation towards European integration. The short excerpt below demonstrates how these themes appear to be interconnected:

The British character as perceived abroad is one of pompous arrogance. That actually represents about three per cent of the nation, but it's how Europeans and Americans like to see us. When I say European, you can see again, how far away we are from integrating into Europe, because I don't feel myself part of Europe - I feel like I'm sitting on an island a long way away from them.

As a further clue to this person's orientation towards European integration, one may note how, when questioned, he suggested that the French constituted a good example of "typical Europeans".

However, what this kind of idiographic approach also illustrates, is the danger associated with disregarding the freedom of the individual to construe his or her multiple identities in an essentially idiosyncratic manner. Whilst it is perhaps acceptable for Social Psychology to focus on instances where a collection of individuals seem to construe their identities in a similar fashion, there also seems a quite strong argument that there must come a time when the latter kind of work must be supplemented by ground-breaking research which attempts a multi-level approach (c.f. Doise, 1986). Such a multi-level approach to the present issue might therefore examine how individuals, given the limitations and recommendations of social groups and social representations, manage their identity repertoires, and crucially, how these multiple levels of identity construction interact.

Hopefully, one example from the present interviewee's responses can serve to illustrate how individual and social processes appear to interact. What is being suggested here is similar to Breakwell's recent proposal that individuals "customize" the social representations they choose to accept (Breakwell, 1991). Here, we are arguing that individuals, and perhaps sub-groups as well, also customize their chosen social identities, as, in fact, R.H. Turner has already hypothesised (c.f. R.H. Turner, 1987). One way in which they may do this, is by placing special emphasis on attempting to achieve positive distinctiveness for their social identities, *on dimensions which are especially relevant and important to them*. There is, of course, a rather tricky issue of the direction of influence here, and we fully agree that an individual's beliefs are likely to derive from his social group memberships, societal representations, and so on. However, it does seem to be the case that *some* beliefs are not directly related to social groups or cultural inheritance, and are relatively idiosyncratic in nature.

In the case of the interviewee currently the focus of attention, it emerged that he was particularly fascinated by military history and strategy. Careful questioning elicited that this interest appeared not to be directly related to any social group memberships. What is of significance here, is that this apparently idiosyncratic interest seemed to influence the dimensions of British identity which the interviewee found most important. Thus, it emerged that Britain's role in the Second World War was especially important for him, serving to demonstrate how "It's more likely that if there was a conflict, we'd choose a side that is a genuine side". Whilst many British citizens seem to feel pride when they recall the Falklands war of 1982, this interviewee gave the initially surprising opinion that the Falklands conflict was in fact rather embarrassing. However, given the nature of the interviewee's almost obsessive interest in military matters, this response was utterly understandable, especially when he went on to suggest that the reason the Falklands was an embarrassing episode, was because it highlighted significant deficiencies in British military hardware, and thus enabled the Soviets to find amusement in British military incompetence (again we see the theme of concern about the perception of the ingroup by outgroups).

The purpose of this kind of example, is to illustrate how taking an idiographic approach can provide valuable insights into how individuals customize their social identities. In some cases, the nature of the interaction between idiosyncratic beliefs and social identities is such that it seems to defy the predictions of traditional social identity theory. For example, we have seen that the interviewee described above seems to find the French a quite salient outgroup, stating quite clearly that "I just can't get on with the French". Social identity theorists of the Tajfel-Turner school might therefore have some difficulty in explaining how the same interviewee could later come to say that he could feel pride in being European, to the extent that he could feel proud of Napoleon - which is what he did in fact come to suggest. How might we explain this claim, which apparently demonstrates a case where an individual is able to feel proud of an outgroup member? In fact, when one takes into account the interviewee's justification, which centred on the claim that Napoleon was "a brilliant military tactician", it is readily apparent that such a statement *is* congruent with the individual's idiosyncratic belief structures, even if it is not in this case what we would expect from the predictions of Social Identity Theory.

In conclusion, we should also pre-empt one possible criticism likely to be raised by researchers working within Turner's self-categorization paradigm, which is that this kind of result is perfectly understandable: it can be explained in terms of the interviewee moving from the British to the European level of identity - at this level, France is patently *not* a likely outgroup. The latter kind of explanation in this case seems inappropriate, given the fact that the interviewee explicitly reported feeling little sense of being "European", and thus seemed *not* to accept a European identity.

#### *Motivational aspects of national identity*

It was perhaps Doob who, somewhat indirectly, first became aware that one way in which individuals might customize their social identities, is through the way they link them to their valued goals and motivations. For example, he suggested that "If economic pursuits are more important to a person than political ones, the

corresponding components of his patriotism will be more economic than political." (Doob, 1964, p.105). It is naturally of considerable interest, from a social psychological perspective, to ascertain whether groups of individuals organize their social identities in similar ways, including whether they arrange their identity structures such that particular social identities serve similar motivations for group members.

In Chapter Four, it was suggested that British identity is at least linked to power, security, control, and self-esteem motivations. In as much as it is reasonable to suppose that survival of the organism is perhaps the most powerful of all motivations when salient, it may well be the case that security motivations are in some ways the most significant motivational forces behind national identity. In the nuclear age, there is now a very real sense in which the physical safety of all citizens is tied directly to the security of their own nation - perhaps more so now than at any other time in history. This may serve as yet another indication of how national identity - in this case, in particular, concern over the safety of one's nation - can be perceived as functional for individuals and social groups. Put simply, national identity may have survival value: looking after the nation is, in some sense, looking after oneself.

There are also a number of reasons to suspect that *power* motivations are often associated with British, and perhaps, most national identities. From both the interview and questionnaire data, it emerged that this could be a powerful motivating force, in some cases dominating respondents' decisions about which social identities should be adopted. In fact, the distinction between power and control motivations can at times prove almost impossible, since power also tends to imply an element of control. Hewstone (1986) pondered as to whether social representations of the British empire might still pervade British identity, and if the latter were the case, one might well expect the dimension of power over other nations and world affairs to be a possible motivational remnant from the past (see also Crick, 1991). There certainly were indications in questionnaire and interview responses that the former status of Britain as perhaps the most powerful nation in the world, is mourned by many British citizens. Some clearly feel that European integration should be encouraged, precisely because it offers the chance of Britain

gaining a semblance of some of its former influence in world affairs: as interview respondent explained, "European integration is generally a good thing in the sense that it means we, the British, will have a greater influence on the outside world."

In relation to the Oakes (1987) salience framework, which has, on the whole, been uncritically adopted by self-categorization theorists, this would seem to demonstrate how individuals, when they come to manage their identity repertoires, can and do take into account more than one social identity at a time. It is an interesting question whether individuals can take a step back from their social identities, and experiment with different organizations and networks of social identities. The kind of awareness of one's multiple identity structures which would be required here, seems incompatible with self categorisation theory's assumption that we tend to focus on a single social identity at any one time. Yet the work of Goffman (1959a;1959b;1968) seems to suggest that individuals frequently *do* take note of, and actively attempt to structure, their networks of social identities.

Whilst being beyond the scope of the present research, it seems that further investigation of the relationship between motivational forces and social identity mechanisms is desperately required, if we are to further our understanding of the intricacies of identity construction. If individuals, or even members of social groups, seem to have relatively stable hierarchies of motivations, this might provide significant clues as to the likely salience of social identities which are often or always associated with these motivations. There is, of course, also the possibility that the links between social identities and motivations depend crucially on elements of the *situation*. Even if this was the case, an examination of situational processes might still enhance our understanding, and perhaps enable a crude typology of situations, or breakdown of relevant situational factors. It should be obvious that what is being proposed here does not simply pertain to national or European identities, but, potentially, to all social identities. A degree of optimism is perhaps warranted, to the extent that some theorists are slowly beginning to appreciate the motivational poverty of social identity theory (Abrams, 1990;1992). In Chapters Seven and Eight, we will return to this issue of motivation and its role in social identity construction.

A further way in which a multi-level approach to social identity might be developed, is to examine how elements of *personality* interact with social identity maintenance. Breakwell (1991) has recently suggested that a focus on personality traits might benefit the theory of social representations, noting that such traits as "shyness" and "inquisitiveness" might have significant influence on the way individuals interact with social representations. It seems obvious to the current author that these and other traits might also have important effects on the way individuals construct social identities. Stryker (1987), for example, made the useful suggestion that personality characteristics probably influence the salience of identities. Interestingly, Tajfel himself suggested that certain individuals might find it comforting to organize their social identity repertoire in a simple, clear-cut fashion, where in and out-groups are easily differentiated (Tajfel, 1981, p. 246).

Whilst such theoretical endeavours must perhaps be wary of falling into the same pitfalls as those exemplified by the work of the Authoritarian Personality researchers (Adorno et al., 1950), the potential of multi-level approaches seems promising. Hofman's (1988) tentative model of identity may serve as a useful pointer as to how future research might proceed. One of the most important points made by Hofman, is that individual-personality processes and social identity processes interact via a two-way process: they are inextricably interconnected. What is perhaps most appealing about Hofman's developing ideas about social identity, is that they are driven by the observation over many years of the very real social conflict between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. Clearly, the further elaboration of these kind of social identity processes has relevance far beyond that of armchair theorising.

#### *Situations associated with British identity*

It is highly unlikely that any single social identity will be salient for an individual all of the time. Clearly, since we can expect social identities to affect both cognition and behaviour, it is important to be able to determine *when* particular social identities become salient. As we have already noted, Oakes (1987) has developed a simple model aimed at predicting salience, and this model has already been

discussed at some length. Yet while there is always value in searching for universal models, at the same time it should be noted that in-depth knowledge of *specific social identities* is also desirable. This is especially the case for national identity, which has the potential for being the single most powerful and influential social identity a citizen might come to possess (A.D. Smith, 1991; Turner, 1984). One way in which our knowledge of *when* and *how* national identity becomes important, is to examine *situations*. Waddell and Cairns (1986) made an interesting foray into the significance of situations for social identification, when they endeavoured to investigate the relationship between particular situations and British and Irish identities in Northern Ireland. It seems unfortunate that their interesting methodological approach has not been further developed.

When considering any large-scale social identity, be it national, racial, gender-based, or any other, a focus on situations associated with their salience might be especially helpful, given that these identities can be rather difficult to get a theoretical grasp of. We might predict that perhaps most social identities probably have *critical situations* - that is, situations in which the particular identity is especially likely to become salient (see also R.H. Turner, 1987). Whilst individuals, sub-groups, *and* outgroups might potentially have some influence over these critical situations, at times external, relatively "objective" factors will determine, or at least influence, which situations are critical for a group. Thus, for the members of a professional football team, the nature of the sport dictates that matches are likely to be critical situations, highly likely to make team identity salient.

A sub-type of the critical situation might be labelled the *critical event*. Whereas critical situations can often be milieux or environments, critical events are particular *incidents* which have specific locations in time, and which hold special significance for the social group. Once again, we may note how some of these might be actively created by group members, whilst others might be the result of external forces. To take the previous example of the football team a stage further, one may note how a specific match - say, for example, one which will decide whether the team is relegated to a lower division or not - can be thought of as an example of such a critical event - in this case, one which is largely determined by the "objective" forces of the league table and relegation procedures.

Prior to examining the situations associated with British identity that interviewees spontaneously mentioned, it would be prudent to briefly discuss whether the existing literature might suggest any predictions. The socio-historical approach to national identity taken by A.D. Smith (1991) and others would suggest that symbolic aspects are perhaps the most significant elements of national identity. This being the case, one might predict that "most of the occasions when people become conscious of citizenship as such remain associated with symbols and semi-ritual practices (for instance elections), most of which are historically novel and largely invented: flags, images, ceremonies and music." (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, pps. 11-12). We have already seen in Chapter Four, that there is good reason to believe that many British citizens have this kind of sentimental orientation to Britain, which is reliant on symbolic events to bolster and support it.

Since Hobsbawm and Ranger (op. cit.) suggest that elections may be regarded as "semi-ritual practices" associated with the heightened awareness of citizenship, it is interesting to make some tentative social psychological observations regarding elections, especially since Britain is in the midst of general election "fever" at the present time of writing (April 1992). Whilst Hobsbawm and Ranger talk of citizenship, we would go further, and suggest that general elections might also be critical events for national *identity*. It is noticeable, for example, how talk of "the national interest", "what Britain needs", "our vision of Britain's future" and similar statements in which the nation is the focus, is often prevalent in the election rhetoric of politicians.

In some respects, general elections represent a bitter struggle between competing social representations. At one, fairly general level, these social representations are of the nation itself, and encompass past, present, and future temporal elements. In terms of the past and present, the differing political parties forward their own social representations which have often been deliberately manufactured to favour their own political perspective. Amongst other things, this illustrates in a stark fashion just how re-constructive a process history can be. Similarly, in some respects, the party manifestos, in their outlining of proposed policies, can be seen to rely on social representations of the future, and to offer voters "alternative futures" for the nation. Whilst we are by no means forwarding

a superior alternative to the myriad of other possible variables affecting voting behaviour, it is nevertheless likely that at least *some* voters, in voting for a particular party, are also accepting the social representations of the nation proposed by that party. In this respect at least, general elections could have profound effects on the shape of British identity.

A final observation worth making about general elections, is that they raise the issue of whether politics and national identity are always intertwined. Patently, and here commentators such as Doob (1964) and A.D. Smith (1991) seem to be in agreement, the level and nature of national identity amongst the population can be unrelated to the particular government in power at any particular time. Nevertheless, we discussed in Chapter Four how the strength of British identity was found to be significantly associated with predicted vote in the questionnaire study. It would seem therefore, that the degree of interrelatedness between politics and national identity fluctuates.

We have just argued that these two domains - politics and national identity - are often highly interconnected during general elections, but when might they be especially likely to remain separate? At least in Britain, from the recent experiences of war in the Falklands and the Persian Gulf, one might note how an implicit norm could be seen to operate, a norm which essentially prescribed co-operation between all major political parties, in order to suggest that the nation has a single will. In some respects this is a bizarre phenomenon, in as much as it implies that for the duration of war, the political parties share a common social representation of i) the war itself; ii) the enemy/outgroup; and iii) in some respects one's own nation/the ingroup. Once the war has concluded, the political parties may, it would seem, resurrect their previous social representations, or forge new, revised ones, either of which are likely, once again, to become the subject or the cause of political conflict and debate. Just how specific to Britain this kind of phenomenon may be is uncertain - there appeared to be more initial objection to involvement in the Gulf in the United States, although once again, as soon as American military action was initiated, the voices of the political critics seemed to fall silent.

Having just raised the theme of war, we must now consider briefly its significance for national identity. Almost every social scientist who has come to examine national identity and patriotism, has come to the conclusion that war is more likely to have significant effects upon these constructs than any other phenomenon. Social psychologists who have focused their attention on group psychology for example, have noted how the presence of intergroup conflict enhances intergroup perceptual biases and leads to enhanced perceptions of in-group homogeneity (c.f. R.J. Brown, 1988). There is certainly no intergroup conflict which can match international war for ferocity and potential destructiveness, and it should be no surprise therefore, if war is mentioned by respondents, when they are questioned about situations associated with patriotism. In fact, when interviewees from the present study were asked about what kind of situations are likely to encourage patriotism, 18 out of 25 mentioned war, representing easily the most popular response.

In order to investigate in detail the kinds of situations interview respondents specifically associated with British identity, they were asked to describe: i) any situations or events they could remember which had made them feel *proud/pleased* to be British; and then ii) any situations or events which had made them feel *embarrassed* about, or *regret*, being British. Early pilot work had indicated that a less directed approach to this issue tended to provide interviewees with considerable difficulties. In any case, a focus on situations specifically associated with positive or negative consequences for national identity, is clearly more interesting than an examination of situations devoid of such affective implications.

The most frequently mentioned situations associated with national pride are shown in Table 63. Whilst there were a number of idiosyncratic responses to this question, an examination of the most popular responses immediately indicates how all of these represent situations which are inherently *conflictual* in nature, apparently supporting the predictions of much of the social psychology of group conflict. It is interesting to note how four interviewees reported that they became proud of their British identity when foreigners criticized Britain. This is not surprising, given our tendency to defend the social identities we value. It does,

however, indicate how we seem to care about the opinions of others - even out-group members. This may well be an example of Festinger's (1954) postulated desire for "social reality testing", where we feel our own opinions and those of our ingroup are validated, the more people that seem to share them. Yet as we will soon discover when we come to examine situations associated with national *embarrassment*, there are some situations in which we are likely to be much more concerned about the opinions of others than we might usually be. To pre-empt our argument somewhat, it is instructive to note how the four interviewees who mentioned that criticism from foreigners made them proud to be British, all referred to specific *face-to-face* encounters they had actually experienced. The significance of this, and its relation to perceptions of control, will soon be examined.

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**Table 63 - Situations associated with national PRIDE**

<i>Situation/event</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
Falklands War	7
(None)	6
Criticism from foreigners	4
International sporting events	4
Gulf War	3

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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It is interesting at this point, to take as an example, the response of a male interviewee, who felt that the Falklands war made him feel proud to be British. This interviewee remembered feeling pride at the time of the conflict, and was also able to feel pride when looking back and recalling the event. In this respect, we might say that the Falklands war is a *critical event* for this interviewee's national identity. Upon further questioning, it became clear that the interviewee felt proud of the Falklands war, amongst other reasons, because "we won" - this in itself is no surprise, but we should perhaps recall the interviewee discussed earlier, who was actually *embarrassed* about the Falklands conflict, even though he was proud to be British, signifying that simply winning a war is not necessarily enough to make it a critical event for everyone. This indicates that individuals and sub-groups have much potential latitude over critical situations and events. It may well be the case

that this kind of flexibility associated with national identity is also likely to characterize other large-scale social identities, since the capacity to maintain homogeneous in-group norms and social representations is much more difficult here than in smaller, face-to-face groups.

To return to the current example of a male interviewee proud of the Falklands war, it is also instructive to note how the desire for *distinctiveness*, such a central dimension of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974,) can be seen here to intertwine with the desire for control, and the recurrent theme of the United States and its relation to Britain. Thus, we find that this interviewee, although finding the Falklands conflict a matter of national pride, failed to mention the more recent British involvement in the Gulf war. When directly questioned about the Gulf, he suggested that a significant barrier to his feeling pride in the Gulf war, was the fact that "when you look at it, the British role wasn't really emphasized, it was all American." This also raises the significant point that individuals and sub-groups make their choices regarding critical situations, often from a pool of *media representations* of those situations and events.

In keeping with the tendency to mention situations associated with fairly clear conflicts, one may note how four interviewees suggested that international sporting events had made them feel proud to be British. Since sporting events were also associated with national pride by many of the questionnaire respondents, it seems safe to assume that this thematic connection is not unique to the interview respondents. What is interesting to note here, is that *none* of the interviewees mentioning sport actually reported attending international sporting events on a regular basis - in fact, only one interviewee had *ever* attended such an event (a soccer international). One wonders just how significant therefore, the particular perspectives adopted by the media in their sports coverage might be - presumably sports coverage, like most other international phenomena, can be presented in an ethnocentric fashion. Televised international sporting events may therefore be another semi-ritual practice, often associated with national identity.

A final point worth making here, is how almost all respondents, when questioned, were actually thinking about *English* teams, and this was in fact

reflective of a general tendency throughout the interviews, for respondents to equate England with Britain, and to disregard the other regions of the British Isles (all respondents were English). As Kearney (1991) has noted, a persistent Anglocentric bias appears to exist in the British Isles. For Kearney, Britain might be considered to be "four nations plus one", with the primary self-description for members of the British Isles being English, Irish, Scottish, or Welsh, and much confusion existing as to what exactly being "British" means. Crick (1991) suggests that most Scots, for example, think of themselves as both Scottish *and* British, as if the two represent separate social identities. In contrast, he suggests that the English have no sense of this duality: for them, "to be British is simply to be English" (Crick, 1991: p.97). Whilst further investigation of this issue falls beyond the scope of the current discussion, it should be appreciated that when we talk of "British identity", we must accept that this is not an unproblematic and clear-cut categorization.

Table 64 below details the most frequent responses given by interviewees when they discussed situations or events which had made them feel embarrassed about, or regret, being British.

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**Table 64 - Situations associated with national EMBARRASSMENT**

<i>Situation/event</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
British behaviour abroad	8
Football hooliganism	5
Racism	4
Falklands war	3
(None)	2

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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That the most frequently mentioned situation was associated with the behaviour of the British abroad is perhaps not surprising, given that questionnaire respondents also indicated concern with this phenomenon. Once again, it is interesting how all of the interviewees giving this kind of response reported having personal experience of this phenomenon - i.e. being embarrassed by the behaviour of other British citizens when on holiday in a foreign country. This may serve,

amongst other things, to demonstrate how visiting a foreign country can often be a critical event for one's national identity, not only making one more aware of other nations and nationalities, but also making one's own national identity highly salient. Clearly, the actual effects of foreign visits upon social identities, social stereotypes and so forth, are rather complex, and have been dealt with to some extent by the literature pertaining to the "contact hypothesis" (c.f. Hewstone & Brown, 1986).

As far as level of affect could be judged from the interview responses, it certainly seemed that those respondents mentioning the behaviour of the British abroad associated such encounters with quite high levels of embarrassment, and furthermore, that these instances were quite easy to bring to mind. One of the reasons why this experience can prove so embarrassing is likely to be the *lack of control* experienced. In particular, the degree of control individuals have over how they are categorized by others is severely limited in this foreign context where nationality is highly salient. While in Britain, individuals might be able to distance themselves from hooligans, perhaps by marginalizing them as "black sheep" (see chapters One and Four), or alternatively, simply by focusing on another identity besides British. In a foreign country where the individual, at least in the eyes of the locals, appears to have more in common with the hooligans than the natives, the options for negotiating a satisfactory social identity can be severely restricted. This seems to be an example of an instance where intergroup conflict might be especially likely to lead to attempts by ingroupers to enhance ingroup *heterogeneity*.

Those respondents who reported finding football hooliganism embarrassing (as many of the questionnaire respondents had also done), in contrast, did not report having direct face-to-face experience with the phenomenon. This might well explain how such respondents appeared to find football hooliganism less embarrassing than those who had *directly experienced* poor behaviour by British citizens abroad. Nevertheless, both are instances where the root of the embarrassment appears to be concern with the images non-ingroup members have of the British. In particular, respondents in both the questionnaire and interview

studies expressed the concern that foreign nationals might form what would essentially be an "incorrect" image of the British.

It was interesting, and somewhat surprising, to find that interviewees, in general, found it much easier to recall situations associated with embarrassment than those associated with pride. This tended to be the case even for those interviewees who seemed to possess a strong, and positive, British identity. Thus, it appeared that ability to recall situations associated with positive or negative affect for British identity, was not related to the individual's actual level of British identity, at least in any straightforward manner.

There are a number of possible explanations for this finding, and we readily admit that in discussing these we are entering into what is essentially a post-hoc attempt at explanation, although in any case, it was not our intention in the interview study, nor is it very practical using qualitative research techniques, to test hypotheses in a rigorous and unequivocal manner.

A social cognition approach to this problem might focus on *schema research* (c.f. Crocker, Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). However, it soon emerges that the predictions of schema theory are rather problematic, and at times even contradictory, especially when one attempts to ascertain the predictions regarding the processing of schema-congruent and schema-incongruent information. The *schema perseverance* effect (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984) would seem to imply that schema-incongruent information will either not be paid attention to, or otherwise over time, will be re-interpreted so as to be congruent with the schema. Thus, in terms of social identities, we might expect that information which is incongruent with a person's social identity and its associated stereotypes would lose its salience over time, or even be distorted to conform to the social identity. However, some schema theorists, such as Hastie (1980), have suggested that schema-incongruent information receives *special attention*. It is unfortunate that the implications of such assertions for *retrieval* seem not to have been developed. Despite these ambiguities, the general prediction from schema research would tend to be that schema-incongruent information is likely to be filtered-out or modified so as to become congruent with schema contents, even though some theorists posit the

possibility that single events might lead to the "conversion" of schemas (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984).

As we have already suggested, the way in which reporting of events connected with pride or embarrassment seemed unrelated to general level of social identity, also suggests that the schema-based explanation is somewhat problematic, especially if we regard social identities as having schematic elements. One further significant point to note, is how those situations associated with embarrassment tended to be ones in which respondents had been directly involved (e.g. being embarrassed by British citizens abroad; racism). In contrast, the situations associated with pride tended not to be directly experienced - thus, none of the respondents had actually *fought* in the Falklands war, and only one had ever witnessed in person (as opposed to via the media) an international sporting event. It may, therefore, be the case, that events associated with actual participation are more readily recalled.

One of the most appealing possible explanations of these findings is that facilitated by McGuire's suggestion that opinions and beliefs which are seldom queried or challenged often have poorly-developed justifications (McGuire, 1964). Clearly, most of the time, British national identity is not challenged - especially while citizens remain in Britain. This might also be related to the fact that much of the time, national identity remains relatively dormant and low in salience. The argument being tentatively suggested here, is that if McGuire is correct, then instances which are associated with pride in being British might not be easily accessible, since such pride is seldom questioned. It is acknowledged that this goes somewhat beyond McGuire's initial focus on the complexity of justifications, although it seems reasonable to suppose justifications might be connected to memories of specific events.

Whatever the reason for the apparent disjuncture between recall of situations and the actual strength and nature of social identity, the important point to note is that the apparent recall or accessibility of in-group relevant events seems not to be related to social identity in a straightforward manner, indicating that future research into this area might be warranted. One interesting perspective such

research might take, is to examine how social identities might be related to what Martin Conway refers to as *autobiographical memories* (Conway, 1990). Given that researchers in the latter field are already interested in the relationship between the self and memory mechanisms, the addition of social identity to the equation seems a quite natural progression.

### 6.3.6 British and European prototypes

An important yet problematic aspect of self categorization theory (Turner, 1987) is the notion of the *prototypical group member*, a member of the group who is perceived by ingroupers as most different to the outgroup, and most similar to the ingroup, on a currently valued comparison dimension. It is postulated that other group members attempt to emulate the beliefs and behaviours of the prototype, and this means that the prototypical group member has significant social influence within the group. Yet, as we have already noted in Chapter One, the nature of prototypicality within Turner's theory is full of ambiguities. It is not clear, for example, whether the prototype must be perceived to be a group member, or simply a particular position on an issue. In addition, the definition of prototypicality adopted is purely situational in nature, apparently denying the possibility that group prototypes might actually have cross-situational stability, perhaps through the establishment of a power or status structure within the group.

A further problem lies in the fact that the relationship of the concept "prototype" in Self-categorization Theory (SCT) to the same concept in other, more cognitive theories (e.g. Cantor & Mischel, 1979) is far from clear. While Turner's definition seems to make no claims about memory structure, other theorists have specifically examined prototypes from a memory perspective, and social identity theorists such as Hogg and Abrams (1988) do the theory no favours by assuming unproblematically that the various definitions are compatible. If prototypes are stored in memory, then they would presumably be quite different to the purely situational prototypes which Turner posits.

Recently, there has been an interest in whether social categorization relies on *exemplars* or *prototypes*. E.R. Smith and Zarate (1990) suggest that exemplars may be thought of as akin to salient and accessible example members of a category, whereas prototypes are often thought of as abstract structures meant to encompass the features most commonly associated with a category. There appears to be some ambiguity as to whether prototypes are also thought to be embodied by particular category members, or whether they are abstractions which are not embodied by any single instance of the category. Clearly, whether social categorization processes depend on exemplars or prototypes is of much significance, since this might affect exactly *how* we categorize, and also the attributes we associate with a particular category.

The nature of British and European prototypes was explored in the interview study by asking respondents whether they thought any individuals or groups could be described as typical Britons or Europeans. In the case of Europeans, we are interested in both who the prototypes chosen are, and in the mechanisms associated with the selection process. Since the question of who is thought of as typically British has already been addressed in the 1991 questionnaire study, we are more interested here in focusing in some depth, at exactly how group members themselves think about prototypicality. Thus, the question asking for typical Britons was followed by further questions pertaining to: i) whether interviewees felt other British citizens were likely to share their opinions about the prototype; ii) whether interviewees felt their chosen prototype(s) exemplified behaviours or opinions which others could emulate; and iii) whether the interviewees felt that they themselves had been influenced by the prototype.

We have chosen to discuss both British and European prototypes in the same section of the discussion since most of the theoretical points emerging are interlinked and pertain to prototypes and exemplars in general. The first thing to note from Table 65, which details the most frequent responses to the European question, is that the majority of interviewees (16/25) felt that no individual or group could be said to be "typically European".

It quickly became apparent from both the European and British prototype questions, that the interviewees felt the need to suggest that they did not adhere to stereotypes, and that they believed one could not generalize about individuals - as one interviewee struggled to respond, he commented: "I'm doing my best to try NOT to think about the media stereotypes". This was the most common justification for not giving any European prototypes, and may well be associated with the general desire not to be perceived as prejudiced, which Billig (1991) has also recently encountered. Furthermore, it may well be the case that these kinds of desires are associated with the ideology of individualism which seems to pervade much of Western society (c.f. Farr, 1990; Triandis et al., 1988). One promising avenue for the further rapprochement of social representations and social identity approaches, might be to examine how these social representations of individualism, prejudice, and so forth, actually interact with social identity construction. This is a subject we will return to in later chapters.

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**Table 65: Individuals or groups perceived as "Typical Europeans"**

<i>Individual/group</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
(None)	16
The French	3
The Germans	3
Helmut Kohl	2
The Swiss	1

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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It was interesting to see once again, in the response of one female interviewee, how the U.S. theme discussed earlier could also colour her choice of European prototype, and thus demonstrate how social representations and social identity processes can mutually interact. Furthermore, one may note how the desire to be different to the Americans can influence *both British and European identities*. This interviewee thought the Swiss could be labelled as typical Europeans "because in a way they're everything which the Americans aren't, which again sounds terribly stereotypical, but they're much more cultured, much more sort of clean-living, and don't sort of, put money before everything else."

One final point to note about the responses to the European question, is that, with a single exception, all of the respondents who *were* able to give an exemplar or prototype, gave broad national categories such as the French or the Germans. In this respect, we might therefore say that these respondents provided prototypes, rather than exemplars. Here, it might be useful to make a distinction between *concrete prototypes*, which are particular category members thought to be typical in some way (as seems to be the case here) and *abstract prototypes*, which represent abstractions of typical attributes. Due to the wording of the prototype questions (see Appendix E), it should be noted that interviewees were likely to provide concrete prototypes or exemplars, but somewhat unlikely to provide abstract prototypes. This emphasis was deliberate, and chosen so as to maximize the relevance of the results obtained for Turner's theorizing, which also seems to focus on concrete prototypes.

It perhaps says something about the comparative levels of British and European identities, that interviewees felt happier talking of "typical Britons" than they did about "typical Europeans". This seems fairly congruent with the general observation that European identity was relatively low when compared to British identity, and often simply non-existent. What is not indicated in Table 66 below, and should be made clear, is that many respondents gave both individuals and groups as examples, which was in contrast to the responses referring to typical Europeans, but in keeping with the questionnaire responses discussed in Chapter Four. Whilst a few respondents in both the questionnaire and interview studies made reference to personal acquaintances, the majority of those who mentioned individuals, focused on well-known public personages (e.g. John Major). Similarly, those respondents who talked about particular groups being typical, tended to refer to groups which are well-known (e.g. the royal family), or categories which are not idiosyncratic (e.g. "businessmen").

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**Table 66: Individuals or groups perceived as "Typical Britons"**


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<i>Individual/group</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
Royal family	7
(None)	5
John Major	2

*Frequencies refer to number of interviewees referring to theme*

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Given that there can be considerable variation in those examples chosen as "typical" of the British people, it should be obvious that there are a myriad of variations of "British identity", since one might justifiably presume that choice of prototype or exemplar will have consequences for perceptions of in-group norms and stereotypes. As Schlesinger has noted, "national cultures are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions takes place" (Schlesinger, 1991, p. 174). In as much as other social identities might affect the nature of one's national identity, one might say that national identity is *mediated* by other identities. This was argued in earlier chapters, where it was suggested that political identity might mediate British identity. One further possible mediator of national identity which emerged from the interviews was *class*. Some respondents felt that, while no single individual or group could be thought of as typically British, one could think of examples in terms of class - i.e. the typical British working class person, middle class person, etc.

In general, when interviewees were willing to give examples of typical Britons, they felt that this was possible only to the extent that examples of *particular British traits* could be given, and that no single individual or group could encapsulate all aspects of being British - as one interviewee explained: "I think there are lots of different people that represent aspects of Britain, but I don't know that there's one person that typically represents the whole lot...I think everybody has examples...I don't think one type of person contains the whole". Most of the time, it was apparent that interviewees who were able to give examples, selected prototypes which were congruent with their affective orientation towards British identity. Thus, one interviewee who seemed to possess a strongly

negative British identity, and felt that racism is rife in Britain, selected the National Front as typically British. It may well be the case therefore, that our selection of ingroup prototypes and exemplars might fluctuate depending on the affective nature of our social identities.

Where interviewees gave prototypes and exemplars which they perceived positively, then they also tended to feel that other British citizens probably would share their opinions, and that it would be beneficial for others to emulate the examples they had given - at least in terms of the particular dimension(s) of Britishness they were thought to embody. In contrast, it was very rare for interviewees to suggest that they themselves had actively tried to emulate the examples they gave. This does raise an interesting issue in relation to Turner's prototypicality process - namely, should we expect group members to be aware that they emulate the prototype (presuming that they do)? Unfortunately, at present we are not in a position to answer this question, although we may note that the current interview study seems to indicate that prototypes and exemplars can be given which individuals may *deny* emulating. It seems clear that there is much work that remains to be done, if the nature of prototype and exemplar processing is to be satisfactorily examined within the Social Identity/Self-categorization framework.

## 6.4 Conclusions

### *6.4.1 European integration*

Considerable psychological and social psychological barriers exist which currently seem to militate against the development of any strong sense of European identity amongst the British public. Amongst the most potent of these are the depth of British motivations to retain sovereignty and autonomy, and the frequency with which European identity is perceived to threaten British identity. Nevertheless, at least some British citizens clearly do embrace European identity as a valuable partner to national loyalties. Yet even here, such European attachments are usually perceived as subservient to the needs of Britain. If a truly robust European identity is to develop, then it may well be the case that sentimental attachments must be encouraged - i.e. those which focus on symbols, culture, heritage, and so forth. If the research described herein is any indication, there is much work remaining to be done before such a goal is realised. The few glimpses of hope for a European identity which did emerge, suggested that a European identity might prove more attractive for the British if it is perceived to allow a greater distinction between Britain and the United States, or if it is perceived to enhance the economic status or political power of Britain on the world stage. At the present moment in time, Luigi Barzini's (1983) observation of a British attachment to Europe almost totally devoid of affect, seems just as applicable now as when it was originally made.

### *6.4.2 National and other large-scale social identities*

From our brief theoretical excursion into British and European identity, it has hopefully become apparent that a conceptual orientation which focuses on both social representations and social identities offers much potential. This is especially so when combined with the kind of multi-level approach to social psychology suggested here, an approach which recognizes that individuals are able to customize both their social identities and their social representations, and that the construction of social identities is a process which involves social groups, sub-

groups, and the individual members of such collectives. In the pursuit of multi-level analyses, the kind of in-depth qualitative methodology adopted here can prove a useful addition to the more usual quantitative methods adopted by Social Identity theorists.

A number of questions have been raised in the current chapter, most of which are not just relevant to national or European identities, but also to the general process of social identity construction itself. Among the most significant tasks facing Social Identity theorists is that of developing a more sophisticated model able to encompass the motivational and affective aspects of social identities. At the same time, it should be realised that, just as individuals and sub-groups might modify social identities in certain ways, so particular social identities must be given a degree of *individual attention* by social researchers, in recognition that all social identities are not completely alike. One distinction which is worth making is between face-to-face groups and more abstract large-scale social categories like race, gender, and of course, nationality. It was also suggested that one way to examine particular social identities, is to focus on critical situations and events, since this might enable a greater understanding of when the identity under examination might become salient. Finally, the nature of group prototypes, potentially a critical element of Turner's theorizing (1987), is badly in need of further investigation and clarification.

Some of the issues outlined above, as well as other problem areas and new lines of inquiry, are beginning to take Social Identity theory closer towards Tajfel's original goal of a theory able to provide a useful analysis of societal problems. The more immediate task facing researchers is to achieve such a goal by a road that takes full advantage of the opportunities which Social Identity Theory can provide for integrating cognitive, personality, social, and societal levels of analysis, into a promising new social psychological framework. In the next chapter, we examine some of the theoretical avenues which might eventually lead to this kind of new approach to social identity.

# Chapter 7

## The Social identity paradigm: new horizons

### 7.1 Some basic characteristics of large-scale social collectives

There is an interesting paradox concerning Tajfel's social identity theory (SIT). Much of the early empirical foundation for the theory was derived from minimal group studies, often focusing on transitory groups constructed by the experimenter, and studied in the controlled setting of the experimental laboratory (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971). The paradox arises from the fact that, despite this early empirical focus on "nonsense groups" (Fraser & Foster, 1984; see also Lalonde, Moghaddam, & Taylor, 1987), Tajfel maintained a burning desire to elucidate the social psychological mechanisms which linked individuals to important "real-life" groups. Crucially, for the current discussion, these groups were usually large-scale - based on gender, nationality, race, and so on (c.f. Tajfel, 1981).

Despite possible objections to conceptualising a race or a nation as a social group, proponents of the social identity approach have been particularly keen to argue the applicability of their theory to such entities (Tajfel, 1970; Turner & Giles, 1981; Turner, 1984). In the current chapter, the assumption that social identity or self-categorisation approaches can be unproblematically applied, without modification, to large-scale social categories (LSCs) is challenged.

Perhaps one of the reasons why the specific characteristics of large-scale social categories (LSCs) have not been addressed by social identity theorists, is that there have been no attempts to examine in a systematic fashion the differences between various *types* of social group. This is not particularly surprising, given that the positivistic approach to science encourages a search for theories with

widespread generalisability. The idea that social identity approaches might have to take account of different kinds of social group is not especially appealing to theorists striving towards a general social psychology of group processes.

It would be prudent at this stage of the discussion to examine some of the typical properties which serve to demarcate large-scale from other social categories. Primary amongst these properties is *size*. Here, the crucial point is not simply the number of category members, but the fact that the category is such that members will probably not be aware of all other members, nor will they have contact with all category associates. In this sense, such categories may be thought of as truly *imagined communities* (Anderson, 1991). Furthermore, the likelihood of all category members coming together in a single group experience is remote, or sometimes impossible. This means that empirical research on LSCs will almost always involve a focus on a sub-group of the category, a sample of category members, but rarely the whole category.

Large social categories also tend to evince a marked ambiguity and *diffuseness of norms and stereotypes*. If one takes as an example, gender categories, it should be clear that there are a variety of possible gender role-models, stereotypes, and norms, and category members thus have a certain degree of choice amongst these competing beliefs. The nature of social belief systems in LSCs will be explored in more detail shortly - the important point here is that large-scale categories often have a wider variety of possible beliefs associated with them, when compared to less diffuse categories and groups.

In a similar way, LSCs also tend to have a *diffuse and ambiguous structure*, such that power and status hierarchies within the category are not easily discerned or, indeed, implemented. Even though intergroup conflict and increases in the salience of such categories might be expected to encourage homogeneity of norms, LSCs still manifest in such situations a greater diversity of norms and beliefs than smaller or more structured groups. Such differences may have led theorists to refer to large-scale entities like nations as social *categories*, rather than social *groups*. The danger here is that social categories and social groups become posited as *completely* different social entities, subject to quite separate social psychological processes. It

is our contention that social identity theory merely requires further extension in order to encompass large-scale social categories, *not* that a completely separate theory is required to deal with LSCs. This is not to say that a distinction between categories and groups is not at times useful - it will be argued during the course of this discussion that such a distinction may in fact prove crucial. It is interesting to note how as long ago as 1948, theorists were contemplating the need to distinguish between categories and groups (e.g. Lewin, 1948).

One worthwhile use for such a distinction in the current context is afforded by the different levels of diffuseness associated with large-scale social entities. For example, some large-scale social collectives are relatively well-structured, with codified and readily identifiable norms and stereotypes, and clear power structures. A political party seems a fairly good example of this kind of large-scale social collective, which might usefully be called a large-scale social *group* (LSG), to reflect the relatively unambiguous and identifiable group structure present -i.e., it has more of the properties traditionally associated with a social group, compared to other, more diffuse, large-scale collectives. Social categories such as nationality and race, which manifest a more diffuse nature, might usefully be referred to as large-scale social *categories* (LSCs).

It should be noted that this distinction between large-scale categories and groups is somewhat different to that proposed by Rabbie and Horwitz (1988), since the current distinction makes no assumptions about the presence, or lack of, perceived interdependence. Unlike Rabbie and associates, we see no reason why allegiance to large-scale categories can not be associated with perceived interdependence, at least *at certain times* - citizens, for example, may often feel interdependent during times of war (the reaction of the British public to the Blitz during World War Two is an excellent example). Whatever the role of interdependence, it does not seem a profitable dimension on which to differentiate social groups and categories.

One paradoxical aspect of large-scale social categories and groups is that in different circumstances, such categories might afford *either* a large-scale or a more concrete group identification. For example, a group of British tourists in a foreign

country might invoke the categorisation "British" as a large-scale category, and perhaps come to construe social encounters in terms of this activated social categorisation. However, the opportunity is also available for the construction of a small-group social identity, still based on common Britishness, but focused specifically on the current group of tourists. This underlines the inherent flexibility of social identity construction, serving to demonstrate how individuals have a certain degree of latitude as to how they put a potential categorisation to use.

There are a small number of social categories which researchers, across a variety of social sciences, have often suggested are potentially more significant than most other possible social identities. Stryker (1987) for example, suggests that social categories such as age, gender, and ethnicity, might usefully be termed "master statuses", since they tend to have a pervasive influence on the definition of other identities. One of the beliefs which such theorists appear to share, is the notion that these master statuses, or what we might call *core social categories*, are almost always large-scale and relatively diffuse.

One reason why certain large-scale categories might come to play particularly critical roles in social identity construction, is because allegiance to such social entities is often fostered, sometimes unintentionally, during education and socialisation (Turner & Giles, 1981). Whilst perhaps downplaying the role of the individual a little too strongly, Marie Jahoda has, nevertheless, made the important point, that a myriad of *pre-existing* social categorisations clamour for the attention and allegiance of social actors: "Society is more than in-group experiences. We are born into social life as it has been formed and institutionalized by our ancestors and not into a world to be of our own making" (Jahoda, 1986, p.254). The role of perceived interdependence in the initial stages of identification with such master statuses may well be minimal, and is certainly not a requirement for identification, given the almost unconscious acceptance of some social identities which are instilled during socialisation.

National identity is perhaps the most relevant example here - as Bloom has suggested, it is very difficult to avoid nationality and its concomitant identity: "to

be without nationality is to be perceived as almost without identity" (Bloom, 1990, p.74). Numerous studies indicate that children begin to develop an allegiance to symbols of their own nation at quite an early age (Boulding, 1975; Doob, 1964; Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966), and crucially, before they even have much of an idea about what a nation actually is. The kind of "primordial tie" (Inglehart, 1991; Smith, 1992) which nationality represents is often referred to by sociologists as an *ascribed* social identity. This can be a misleading term, in as much as it tends to downplay the agency of the person: however much society expects citizens to internalise a national or other core identity, and without disputing the negotiative nature of social identity construction, whether an identity is accepted as part of the self concept is, ultimately, the choice of the individual. This conceptual orientation towards groups is rather similar to what Tajfel termed the *dynamic* conception of groups, which involves the idea that "groups (and intergroup relations) come to life when their *potential* designations as such have acquired a psychological and behavioural reality" (Tajfel, 1982b, p.485, emphasis in original).

An intriguing aspect of core identities is how they can often appear relatively latent, below everyday consciousness thresholds, indicative of what Ralph Turner (1987) has called a "subterranean level of self-conception". This has led some empirically-minded identity theorists to dismiss large-scale social categories as insignificant, on the grounds that most measures of social identity often show them to be weak in salience and self-reported importance (see, for example, Abrams, 1992; Wong-Rieger & Taylor, 1981). It could well be argued that one of the most pervasive influences of large-scale social collectives is via systems of shared beliefs - stereotypes, norms, etc. Precisely because large-scale social categories are often diffuse and not obviously associated with *identifiable* social representations, they have a power to gradually instill social constructions of reality over time in an almost unconscious manner (see also Breakwell, 1986). It could also be argued that core social identifications fostered during childhood might be associated with systems of social representations which are particularly resistant to change, and thus form the familiar into which new representations are often anchored (c.f. Moscovici, 1984).

It would be unwise to assume that, since social identities associated with large-scale social categories and groups often seem relatively low in salience, they are not important influences upon actions and beliefs. Whilst "Who are you" measures (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) and similar techniques for examining the identity hierarchies of individuals, might suggest the low accessibility and fit (Oakes, 1987) of large-scale categories and groups (see, for example, Zavalloni, 1973), social categories such as nationality and race often have significant potency (Hofman, 1988). In essence, the crux of our argument is that social identities associated with large-scale social categories and groups can often remain *dormant*, but retain a powerful potential to influence action and social perception - even when the identity remains relatively low in salience.

A useful means of examining the potency of large-scale categories and groups is to focus on situations and events which are often triggers for activating related social identities. In earlier chapters, it emerged that international conflict - especially military or sporting - is especially likely to make national identity salient. Boulding (1975) has also suggested that national identity often relies on shared events and experiences, some of which may have occurred many years in the past, but are kept salient by means of ritual or historical record. In *critical situations*, the emotive power of attachments to large-scale categories and groups is often much easier to observe, and the connections between particular social representations and these entities become clearer than before, as conformity pressures partly lose their latent aspects and become more urgent. One particular manifestation of critical situations associated with diffuse social categories is the *ritual event* - occasions loaded with symbolic significance which help maintain dormant but potentially powerful social identities. Those ritualised events associated with national identity are often marked by national holidays, flag-waving processions, and so forth, which in their potential for invoking emotion and solidarity share something in common with what McGuire (1986) has called *archetypal events* (see also Bloom, 1990).

## 7.2 Systems of shared beliefs

### 7.2.1 *Referent informational influence*

Many aspects of Turner's model of social influence are appealing to the positivistically oriented experimentalists within the discipline of Social Psychology. There is always something alluring about a theory which appears to take a complex social phenomenon and reduce it to basic, mechanistic laws which offer the prospect of prediction. Turner's theory of referent informational influence (RII) (Turner, 1987; 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1986) posits that social influence processes can be understood as attempts to construct and interpret metacontrast ratios (Rosch, 1978), to identify and then internalise prototypical in-group positions. Such processes have been explored in detail using group decision-making and similar experimental paradigms, which allow the quantification of the social influence process via fixed-response questionnaire measures. It is often assumed that individuals are able to unproblematically engage in quite complex mental calculations of metacontrast ratios, and perhaps even more dubiously, that issues of metacontrast are relatively unambiguous. It may well be that the experimental conditions created by the researchers make the perception of metacontrast relatively straightforward, but this certainly does not mean that metacontrast is unambiguous outside the laboratory. Often social influence is concerned with attitudes or wider social representations which are not conveniently summarised for group members by means of quantitative response scales.

The tragedy here is that Turner's model of social influence contains some important theoretical insights which are in danger of being stifled by crude experimental operationalisations and an unimaginative focus on laboratory experimentation as the major research methodology for their exploration. There appears to have been little attempt to complement quantitative measures of social influence with more sensitive qualitative techniques such as interviews, which might prove especially valuable in exploring the phenomenological experience of the influence process. It also seems likely that the utilisation of real-life social categories and groups which existed prior to the laboratory experiment would soon highlight the shortcomings of the RII model, especially where such groups are characterised by status and power structures.

One of the more valuable insights of the RII model refers to the notion that category and group members attempt to identify *prototypical group members* to emulate (Turner, 1987). This is an interesting aspect of the theory to examine in detail, especially since it exemplifies how the referent informational influence process appears particularly problematic when applied to large-scale social categories and groups. There is much empirical evidence to support the pervasiveness of prototyping and allied cognitive strategies which are inherently associated with the categorisation process (c.f. Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Rosch, 1978). The trap Turner and some of his associates appear to have fallen into, despite claims to the contrary (see, for example, Turner & Oakes, 1986), is that of assuming such insights from cognitive psychology can be applied *with little or no modification* to the social psychological phenomena of group processes.

The perception of a single prototypical stance on an issue is rather unlikely in large-scale, diffuse social categories. Here, what may well be crucial are the perspectives pedalled by important *sub-groups* within the category, or by other categories which are *networked* with the present one. Significantly, the various perspectives associated with sub-groups within the category could quite easily be contradictory. It is doubly perplexing that Turner and Giles (1981) made just this point, yet Turner appeared to disregard the possibility of conflicting prototypes in his later theorising. Furthermore, it will often be the case that large-scale categories and groups do not possess the means to directly enforce normative beliefs and behaviours. Pressure for in-groupers to adopt the group's beliefs is more likely to emerge from sub-groups, or from other social groups networked with the category in question. An example of the latter process is when national identity, together with its preferred norms and stereotypes, is fostered in the context of the family (see, for example, Bloom, 1990; Kelman, 1969). In fact, it is interesting to note how family symbolism is very frequently associated with nationality - witness the use of "motherland", "fatherland", "mothertongue", and so on (c.f. Kelman, 1969). This raises the interesting possibility of the norms of one social group prescribing which other social groups should be identified with, as well as "customising" to an extent, the nature of such identities. The important point here is that large-scale social categories are especially likely to give rise to multiple prototypes, as was discovered when prototypes of the British were explored in earlier chapters.

It seems likely that certain key social categories, such as political party affiliation, nationality, and race, may well have implications for the other social identities adopted by individuals. For example, adoption of a particular political stance and internalisation of its related ideology might entail the acceptance of social representations of other social categories and groups. This is the phenomenon we have referred to as *mediation*, a process which essentially involves the social representations of one social category or group having consequence for other social groupings. Our use of the term mediation is somewhat different to Zavalloni's (Zavalloni, 1971;1973), in that we make no assumptions about mediating categories or groups necessarily being smaller than the mediated social entity. This is not to say that the core of Zavalloni's argument is incorrect - it often does seem to be the case that large-scale social categories are experienced within sub-groups of the wider category.

It thus becomes imperative to take into account the networking or interconnections between various social categories and groups if one is to gain an insight into social influence processes. Recent theorising on the salience of social identities (c.f. Oakes, 1987), has led to the implicit assumption that, most of the time, in any given situation a single social identity - that which is highest in salience - will have the most consequence for individuals. This has had the unfortunate consequence of leading most social identity and self-categorisation research to ignore the interactions between *multiple* group memberships which might well be simultaneously salient, albeit to different degrees.

The nature of the differentiation and integration individuals create amongst their various social identities is what Hofman called *multiplexity* (Hofman, 1988). Such concerns tend to necessitate the assumption that multiple group identities interact - a problematic notion for our methodologies, but a realistic reflection of the complexity of social identity construction (c.f. Breakwell, 1991; Deaux, 1992; Nesdale, 1989). In fact, as Scheibe (1983) argued, the significance of any single social identity for an individual depends largely on the *other* social identities contained in that person's identity repertoire. McCall (1987) has gone as far as to suggest that the management of one's set of identities is one of the most significant problems facing individuals today. One way in which networking appears to

manifest itself is in terms of *sub-typing* of social identities, such that two (or more) potentially separate categories are intertwined by individuals, who may thus think of themselves as, for example, "female Asians" rather than "female" and "Asian" (Nesdale, 1989). In as much as many of our most significant social identities might be intertwined in complex networks, the assumption that one can study a single social identity in isolation seems increasingly dubious. The current research has sought to demonstrate, for example, how national and European identities have become intertwined through the process of European integration, and to this extent, a focus on either identity in isolation would be somewhat naïve.

It must be stressed that investigations of mediation, networking, and similar phenomena should make use of multi-level perspectives (Lorenzi-Cioldi & Doise, 1990; Himmelweit, 1990). Networks of social identities and social representations might be constructed at the individual, group, and societal levels, and the interaction between these levels is likely to be complex. It seems likely that networking will often take place in terms of particular dimensions of social identities, such that certain aspects of our group memberships are perceived to be relevant to particular domains of other group memberships.

Turning the attention of social identity perspectives towards multiple social identities in interaction will be a problematic and difficult task, almost certainly requiring more sophisticated and varied research methods than are currently employed by the majority of researchers in this area. Two of the more interesting issues to focus on are: (a) how stable the interconnections forged between different social identifications are; and (b) exactly how idiosyncratic networks created by *individuals*, interact with networks deriving from the *group* and *societal* levels. To the extent that the networking of identities forms a possible topic of conversation, and might be implicitly carried in mass media social representations, it should be clear that the creation of social identity networks is likely to be a negotiative process.

### 7.2.2 Reference groups

One avenue for social influence which is rather problematic for the self-categorisation approach, was perhaps first highlighted by theorists working within the *reference group* tradition (Hyman, 1942; Hyman & Singer, 1968), and refers to the phenomenon of *non-membership reference groups*. These are social groups in which one is not a member, yet one looks towards for certain norms and beliefs. Internalisation of the perspectives associated with such non-membership groups can often be explained in terms of *anticipatory identification* (see, for example, Merton & Rossi, 1968), and this does not trouble the social identity paradigm, especially when Tajfel and Turner's notion of social mobility belief structures is invoked (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In fact, there seem to be interesting possibilities to develop the apparent similarities between the concepts of anticipatory identification and *possible selves* (Markus & Nurius, 1984;1986;1987). It seems highly likely, for example, that anticipatory identification will be associated with the perception of positive future possible selves.

However, it has been suggested that non-membership groups might also have social influence power over individuals, even when such individuals do not aspire to be members of the group (Shibutani, 1955). For Shibutani, one important definition of reference groups is as *perspectives*, which involves reference groups becoming "any collectivity, real or imagined, envied or despised, whose perspective is assumed by the actor." (Shibutani, 1955). This further highlights the limitations of the RII research, which has focused exclusively on how *in-groups* exert social influence upon group members.

In a rather oblique way this also raises the question of what exactly is meant by "identification"? Hyman and Singer (1968b) suggest that individuals may identify with a group in which they are not a member (see also Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988), and intuitively, it is not difficult to think of instances where one has empathised with a group, perhaps cared about what happened to a group, yet did not in any sense feel a part of the group in question. This kind of *empathic social identification* seems quite likely to lead to the target group having a degree of social influence over the empathising individual. This is despite the fact that the

individual in question may not feel a part of the target group, leading to a rather wider notion of social identification than that allowed by either Tajfel or Turner, both of whom focus specifically on *membership groups*. The implications to be drawn from these insights from reference group theory can largely be summarised by the observation that social categories and groups other than those the individual has internalised as his or her own, can and often do exert social influence forces upon individuals. Theorists interested in the effects of social categories and groups upon individuals' beliefs and behaviours must in the future take further account of the influence of such non-membership reference groups.

### 7.2.3 *The role of social representations*

Social influence processes involve acts of communication. In selecting various perspectives to internalise, individuals and social groups communicate important information to others, *and to themselves*. One interesting avenue for the further development of social influence theories has recently been highlighted by Abrams (1992), who suggests that conformity may be linked to the *self-presentational demands* made by groups. Sociologically oriented social psychologists have frequently stressed the importance of self-presentation as an act of communication, and how presentations are intimately associated with the construction of social identity (Emler & Hopkins, 1990; Goffman, 1959b; Sarbin & Scheibe, 1983).

One interesting way to conceptualise the self-presentational process is to think of individuals as attempting to diffuse particular social representations of themselves and the social groups to which they belong, amongst various audiences. This negotiated aspect of social identification (Abrams, 1992; Emler & Hopkins, 1990) is noticeably omitted from Turner's model of social influence. It seems likely that the self-presentational aspects of social identity construction may be somewhat different in small-scale, as opposed to more diffuse social categories and groups. In a small face-to-face social group in which all or most group members know one another, the audience for self-presentation and the manipulation of in-group reputations is almost always the in-group itself. In more diffuse social categories and groups, the context for self-presentation will often be within particular *sub-groups* of the wider category. In-groupers might court the approval of certain sub-

groups but not be concerned with their reputation in other sub-groups of the category.

The significance of sub-groups within large-scale categories and groups is also of relevance to the debate surrounding the importance of perceived interdependence (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). In large-scale social collectives, perceived interdependence might pervade important sub-groups, but there are good reasons to suspect that interdependence *between* subgroups will not be particularly important, at least, until the whole category is threatened, and moves towards homogeneity are made. In fact, to the extent that certain sub-groups are particularly selected for in-group derogation as "black sheep" (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988), then one would expect other sub-groups to actively desire the *absence* of interdependence between their own and the black-sheep sub-group(s).

Abrams (1992) has recently argued that Turner's theory of social influence leaves unanswered the question of exactly *how* group members come to perceive the criterial attributes, norms, etc., of the in-group. The concept which is so conspicuously omitted from almost ninety per cent of the social identity/self-categorisation work, and which could prove so useful for answering just this kind of question, is that of social representation (Moscovici, 1984). Group members learn of the supposed actions and beliefs of various groups through contact with, and crucially, negotiation of, social representations. The discernment of in-group norms and beliefs becomes much more problematic than Turner assumed, when seen in the light of a complex array of intertwined and often conflicting social representations.

Social representations can be contained in culture as well as cognition (Farr, *in press*; Moscovici, 1984), and this means that other in-group members are by no means the only source of in-group norms and beliefs. We might expect this to especially be the case with large-scale social categories and groups. To the extent that such entities are likely to be *visible* to many other social groups, one might expect large-scale social groupings to engender a wider variety of social representations than smaller, more obscure groups. Large-scale social categories are

likely to catch the attention of the mass media, whether intentionally or not, and this means that any serious attempt to explore social influence processes in large-scale categories and groups must take account of the role of the mass media as purveyors of social representations.

The mass media are likely to be especially important influences on large-scale social groups and categories (see, for example, Bloom, 1990), not least because mass communication technology can often be the only means to reach large proportions of the target audience. When diffuse categories and groups appear in danger of fragmenting into a myriad of different sub-groups, when the category itself appears close to disintegration, the mass media can foster re-homogenisation by reaching through to category members with messages of the need for in-group solidarity, providing unambiguous norms, stereotypes, and so forth, and, of course, providing an outgroup to focus hatred or competition upon, something almost guaranteed to bring the in-group together.

When individuals come to manage their repertoires of large-scale social identifications, they do so within a context of widely diffused and often conflicting mass media representations. It should therefore be clear that what Tajfel and Turner (1979) referred to as *cognitive alternatives*, essentially perceptions of alternate constructions of identity, are by no means personal constructs, but are instead a complex amalgamation of the individual's idiosyncratic perceptions of categories and groups, the shared perceptions fostered by the in-group, and those possibilities highlighted by the mass media. In one important sense, cognitive alternatives might usefully be likened to what Markus and Nurius (1984;1986;1987) have called *possible selves* - perceptions of what the self was in the past, and what it might be in the future. The crucial point to remember is that such possible selves are not only created by individuals, but come to be shared between group-members, and form the subject of mass media representations. What is being suggested here is an extension of the possible selves concept to encompass both individual and group-located possible selves. Changes in the construction of large-scale social identifications usually therefore entail changes in social representations. This becomes readily apparent, for example, when one comes to investigate the effects of European integration upon national and European identity structures -

here, issues of social identity and social representation become inescapably intertwined.

Since large-scale social category memberships may often lie dormant within the identity structures of individuals, the mass media also serve the purpose of raising the salience of such categories when needed. It is usually the case that when large-scale social categories such as nationality and race undergo critical periods, the mass media will carry social representations of the categories in question. An excellent example is provided by war, which almost always comes to be a critical event for national identity, and is typically associated with patriotic and propagandist mass media coverage (c.f. Foulkes, 1983; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Robinson, 1991). Mass media representations of social categories and groups might, amongst other things, suggest, usually implicitly, acceptable stereotypes and prototypes of both the ingroup and important outgroups; propose ways of networking various categories and groups; and have substantial influence upon the general levels of salience and affect associated with category membership.

Whilst some social identity theorists appear to pay lip-service to the notion that the mass media contain important social representations of categories and groups (see, for example, Hogg & Abrams, 1988), there appears to be little or no attempt to systematically explore the relationship between social identity construction and such representations. The role of the mass media in influencing group processes is likely to be highly complex, and researchers must be careful not to take social representations contained in the mass media at face value (Sotirakopoulou, 1991). It is not enough to conduct a sensitive content analysis of the mass media, and then assume that important themes and issues are unambiguously filtered down to readers and viewers. Much research has indicated the highly problematic and complex nature of mass media effects (Roberts & Bachen, 1981; Roberts & Maccoby, 1985), and the whole area remains replete with conflicting theoretical perspectives and ambiguous research findings.

There is a clear need for detailed examination of the mechanisms by which the mass media come to influence social identity construction. At the same time,

the reverse process - how social groups and categories come to influence mass media content - should also be addressed. It is interesting to note that such an endeavour should also prove of interest to theorists working within the social representations tradition, for whom the question of *how* social groups and individuals interact with media representations could well be crucial.

It is important to note that individuals and social categories/groups do not stand in identical positions to social representations. The question of what determines the orientation taken towards a social representation is a crucial one. Category and group membership are important factors here, and it is useful to examine how social representations are appropriated and customised by categories and groups, as well as how factors such as personal identity structures, personality traits, and motives serve to influence the interplay between identity and social representations (Breakwell, 1991). There also appear to be interesting possibilities for interlinking social representations and social identity approaches via a focus on *salience*. Both perspectives would benefit from further investigation of the mechanisms which serve to influence the salience of social representations and social identities. It might even be the case that when social identities become salient, they in turn activate their associated social representations. Some of the empirical research conducted in the reference group tradition appears to support just such a hypothesis - thus, for example, Charters and Newcomb (1958) demonstrated that when Catholic identity was made salient to subjects, their reactions to statements were substantially different to when such an identity was not made salient. The reverse process might also occur - that is, the activation of social representations might in turn make related social identifications salient. One matter which does require further clarification here concerns whether *all* social representations are associated with specific groups or categories. Whilst Moscovici (1988) and his followers often make such a claim, it seems that some representations, in as much as they are diffused throughout a society, might not fall neatly along intergroup boundaries.

#### 7.2.4 *Social stereotypes*

It has become fashionable over the last ten years or so to stress how attitudes, beliefs, images, and similar concepts often appear to be situationally located, to

vary across locations and time. One of the most persistent challenges to the traditional notion that attitudes and beliefs are carried around "in the head", that they are somehow represented in cognitive structures, has emerged from the discourse analysis perspective. Here, evidence is presented which appears to demonstrate how beliefs are constructed and expressed within discourse (c.f. Potter & Wetherell 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Rather than being seen as problematic, variability in accounts forms a major research focus, and is interpreted as important evidence for the primacy of discourse over cognitive explanations of beliefs.

One of the tragedies for social identity theory is that, in rejecting discourse analysis and its implicit behaviourism (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988), the significance of language and discourse for the construction of social identities is in danger of being overlooked (see, for example, Liebkind, 1992). In the interview study discussed earlier, a sensitivity to the use of "us", "them" and similar elements of language loaded with symbolic import proved most worthwhile. The important point to bear in mind is that, whilst categories *are* often carried in discourse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), discourse is only one, albeit rather important, element of social identity construction. Furthermore, researchers who retain an interest in social cognition would do well to note, before dismissing discourse approaches, that by no means all discourse analysts share Potter and Wetherell's enthusiasm for doing away with cognition (see, for example, van Dijk, 1988).

Social identity research which examines the content of social stereotypes would greatly benefit from the inclusion of a focus on discourse and linguistic elements, which can reveal much about the implicit metaphors and evaluations contained within stereotypes (see, for example, Chilton, 1988). In addition, a focus on the rhetorical aspects of social identity construction might also prove useful, especially since the negotiation of identities can easily be construed as a process of argumentation (c.f. Billig, 1987; Breakwell, 1991; Ullah, 1990).

It is somewhat ironic, given that some social identity theorists have firmly rejected the discourse approach (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988), to witness the recent emergence within the self-categorisation paradigm of a series of studies apparently designed to provide evidence for the situationally variable nature of stereotypes

(Haslam et al., 1992; Spears and Manstead, 1989). According to Haslam and associates, the self-categorisation perspective challenges "the long-held view of stereotypes as fixed, rigid and resistant to change." (p.3). Such a perspective would clearly be equally appropriate for followers of Potter and Wetherell's discourse analysis.

Contextual effects are not particularly difficult to demonstrate in the study of stereotypes, and it may well be useful to examine how stereotypes can often come to be *subtyped*, and thus associated with particular contexts and sub-groups (c.f. Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1991). The study of subtyping also offers interesting possibilities for examining the similarities between stereotypes and social schemas (c.f. Crocker, Fiske & Taylor, 1984). To this extent, social stereotypes often do appear to be contextual. It may well be the case that stereotypes of large-scale social entities such as nationalities are especially likely to be broken-down into more easily managed beliefs about particular sub-groups, situations, and so forth, at least when the categorisation in question forms an in-group. There is a good deal of evidence that subtyping is not so common when formulating stereotypes of foreign nationalities (Peabody, 1985).

As far as subtyping might be termed a context-effect, then stereotypes can certainly be said to have contextual elements. Unlike Haslam and associates (1992), Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn did not claim that stereotypes are completely context-dependent, free to take whatever shape the current situation demands. To be fair to Haslam and his colleagues, the precise definition of context is left rather vague at best. It certainly would be reasonable to argue that the elements of a stereotype *currently salient* are largely context dependent, and here self-categorisation theory and its notions of salience (c.f. Oakes, 1987) and metacontrast (c.f. Turner, 1987) appear to provide an interesting framework for predicting such fluctuations in stereotype content. However, this need not mean that the complete stereotype structure is context-dependent and situationally variable.

Where Tajfel's notion of the social stereotype deviates from Turner's, is in Tajfel's focus on how social stereotypes are akin to theories which serve the purpose of rendering social reality more predictable, and indeed, more favourable,

to the ingroup (c.f. Tajfel, 1981). Such a definition is quite compatible with the notion of social stereotypes as social representations (see also Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Whereas the periphery of social representations might change with little resistance, the core elements of a social representation can often be resilient to change (Abric, 1984; Sotirakopoulou, 1991). It also seems likely that the process of anchoring (Moscovici, 1984) serves to enhance the longevity of social representations, being rather similar to Marris' notion of the "conservative impulse" (Marris, 1974). This is congruent with our earlier argument that social stereotypes appear to evince a core structure which is resistant to change (see also R. Brown, 1988; Tajfel, 1978). Evidence has already been discussed which seems to suggest, for example, a marked stability in certain core elements of national stereotypes (see, for example, Peabody, 1985). It seems that two particularly promising means to tap these core structures may well prove to be longitudinal time-series analyses, and meta-analyses of different studies which examined the same stereotypes.

One of the reasons why social stereotypes can be resistant to change is that once internalised and associated with identity structures, they become a part of the self. While we clearly require an element of flexibility in our self-conceptions, at the same time stability and predictability are comforting and reassuring. In addition, the summarising and simplifying functions of social stereotypes would not be very adequately fulfilled if individuals and groups had to change their stereotypes on a frequent basis. Augoustinos and Innes (1990) have made the additional point that, whilst social representations will often be dynamic and changing, once enshrined in material entities (e.g. books), they become fossilised and much more static.

The benefit of conceptualising social stereotypes as a particular type of social representation, is that this raises the question of stereotypes in culture as well as cognition. Change in the content, evaluation, and structure of stereotypes takes place within the wider context of social stereotypes contained in the mass media, instilled through education, socialisation, and so forth. In large-scale social categories and groups the mass media may well be the primary source of social stereotypes - of both the in and out-group(s). Furthermore, to the extent that social stereotypes might come to be shared across a number of social groups, we might

expect such stereotypes to be particularly resistant to major change, since this might require change to take place simultaneously across different social groups and categories.

In as much as both social identities and representations might be intertwined in complex networks (Breakwell, 1991), it is not inconceivable that social stereotypes, especially when conceived as social representations, often exist in associative networks. As yet there appears to be little research which has examined the possible interrelationships between different social stereotypes. There are interesting possibilities for example, to further investigate the presence of a diffuse Latin stereotype which lies behind more specific stereotypes of the French, Greeks, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese (c.f. Peabody, 1985; Inglehart, 1991). It also seems valuable for future research to investigate how, like any other social representation, a social stereotype is likely to be anchored into a familiar, already established, representation (Moscovici, 1984; Sotirakopoulou, 1991).

To some extent, the different positions adopted by the current work and that of Turner and associates, can be interpreted as resulting from a difference in emphasis. Haslam, Turner, and colleagues have been keen to stress the importance, or indeed the primacy, of context effects over stability. We have endeavoured to demonstrate the other side of the coin - the pervasive nature of at least the core elements of social stereotypes. The position adopted here is more flexible than the self-categorisation position, in that we accept the importance of both contextual *and* stability effects. Future research might usefully examine both flexibility and rigidity in social stereotypes, and take account of the wider context of social stereotypes present in culture.

### 7.3 The wider ideological milieu of identity construction

#### *7.3.1 Subjective Belief Structures revisited*

In their seminal model of macro-level group processes, Tajfel and Turner (1979;1986) introduce the reader to the notion of the subjective belief structure (SBS), essentially an ideological system of beliefs rather similar to Moscovici's

notion of a social representation (Moscovici, 1984). Tajfel and Turner focus specifically on two possible systems of belief, which are termed social mobility and social change. The social mobility SBS, which suggests that group boundaries are permeable and thus, that individual movement between groups is possible, has often been construed by theorists as an essentially *individualistic* ideology (see, for example, Brown et al., 1992). In contrast, the social change SBS carries with it the notion that group boundaries are reasonably permanent and that group action is more viable than individual activity, thus lending itself to an interpretation as a *collectivist* ideology.

While the posited existence of either of these ideologies is often a parsimonious means of explaining the different strategies pursued in the maintenance of social identities, it could be argued that the social mobility and social change ideologies can not be as conveniently mapped onto the individualist-collectivist dimension as some theorists have suggested. It should be remembered, for example, that even when a social mobility belief system allows individuals to move between social groups, the focus of identity construction is still the manipulation of social group memberships. Such concerns could hardly be termed individualistic. Despite being somewhat less elegant than a neat individualism-collectivism dichotomy, it seems more realistic to posit the existence of both types of ideology, regardless of the dominant SBS.

### 7.3.2 *Individualism-Collectivism*

Even though Tajfel and Turner's subjective belief structures might not lie at opposite poles of an individualism-collectivism dimension, this certainly does not mean that wider ideological beliefs about individuals and societies should escape the scrutiny of social identity theorists. It should be fairly obvious by this stage of the discussion, that an investigation of the wider ideological milieu in which social identity construction takes place, is perfectly in keeping with late-Tajfellian theorising (see, for example, Tajfel, 1984). In addition, P.B. Smith (1991) has suggested that the social psychological consequences of individualism and collectivism should be investigated, arguing that this might go some way to explaining why some theories seem not to hold up well when applied outside their culture of origin.

Given that the majority of social identity theorists have granted social representations scant attention, it is certainly not surprising to note the lack of apparent interest in wider ideological beliefs, shown within the paradigm. However, recently there has been a growing interest in the possible influence of individualistic and collectivistic ideologies on social identity construction. These recent developments have centred around the research of Rupert Brown, Steve Hinkle, and associates (c.f. Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Brown et al., 1991; Brown et al., 1992). These researchers are particularly concerned with establishing the validity of social identity theory across different contexts and cultures, with particular reference to the individualism-collectivism dimension.

It is the contention of Brown and associates (1991;1992), that the predictions of social identity theory, and in particular, those concerning in-group bias, might be most readily observed in milieux in which collectivist beliefs predominate. At present, the measurement tools utilised by Brown and his colleagues derive from the work of Triandis and associates (e.g. Triandis et al., 1988). For Triandis, individualism and collectivism are potentially represented at three levels. At the individual level, the dimension is represented by the personality traits allocentrism and idiocentrism. Triandis and colleagues go further, however, and postulate that the dimension is also represented at both the group and cultural/societal levels. It is particularly relevant to our current interest in large-scale social groups and categories, that Triandis and his associates have suggested that in individualistic cultures, there tends to be emotional detachment from most large ingroups (Triandis, McCusker and Hui, 1990). Given the ability of national identity, racial and other similarly large-scale categories, to mobilise large sections of the populace at certain times, we would argue that Triandis and associates continue to make sweeping generalisations about the consequences of individualism and collectivism when what is clearly required is empirical validation of such claims.

There also exists something of a mismatch between Triandis and associates' theorising, and their actual empirical research. This stems from the fact that, to a large extent, the research has focused exclusively on individual-centred operationalisations, looking at individual attitudes, values, and so on, with little direct attempt to examine the shared nature of beliefs, and how ideological systems

might diffuse via the mass media. Individualism and collectivism are reduced to clusters of factors originating from individual responses to survey-type questions. The problem here is not that survey methods *per se* are inappropriate tools to examine the issue at hand, but rather that they provide one particular perspective, a perspective which should be part of a broader multi-methodological approach (c.f. Campbell, 1986). It is particularly important that such multi-methodological approaches endeavour to investigate the interactions between the individual, group, and societal levels, and resist the temptation to conduct studies looking at each level separately, with no attempt at synthesis.

One related problem with much of the social psychological work on individualism-collectivism (Ind-Col) is the lack of definitional clarity. The term ideology is used with little regard for its inherent ambiguity (c.f. Scarborough, 1990), or attempt to delineate how the concept relates to similar notions, such as social representations. For example, the work of Ichheiser (1949) on individualism, as well as the recent call by Augoustinos (1990) for the study of the implications of the ideology of individualism, are all of potential relevance for the work of Triandis and associates. In a similar fashion, the concept of culture is utilised without any exposition of what culture represents, or its likely mode(s) of transmission. Since Triandis and his colleagues also fail to make clear their own interpretation of personality traits, one is left wondering exactly what the numerous survey studies actually demonstrate - personality traits, ideologies, cultural values, or all of these? It is impossible to say without some adequate attempt at defining and differentiating key concepts.

Despite these, albeit serious, methodological and theoretical shortcomings in much of the Ind-Coll literature, it is still important to attempt to map-out and explore the way in which beliefs about the individual and his or her relationship to society, manifest themselves. One of the admirable properties of the work of Triandis and associates is its cross-cultural nature. The fact that respondents from cultures which were assumed to differ on the Ind-Coll dimension typically endorsed different values in surveys should not be lightly dismissed. It does seem to be the case that North American respondents, for example, highlight values often assumed to be associated with individualistic orientations. These include the

dominance of personal over collective goals, distance from ingroups, self-reliance, and membership of a variety of social groups. In contrast, respondents in China endorsed values typically labelled as collectivist - subordination to the wider collective, interdependence between individuals and groups, and strong allegiance to a few highly valued social groups (Triandis et al., 1986; 1988; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990; see also Chang, 1982; Hsu, 1971). It is important to note that Triandis and his co-workers accept that the actual manifestations of individualism or collectivism could well be culturally relative, although there are reasons to expect certain similarities, given the interaction of various cultures. There also exists a growing body of evidence which suggests a frequent association between the economic prosperity of a nation and the incidence of individualistic beliefs, such that high economic development tends to be associated with high levels of individualism (c.f. Hofstede, 1980; Triandis et al., 1988). This is congruent with existing theorising in a variety of the social sciences, which has suggested that democracy and capitalism may be associated with individualism (see, for example, Bêteille, 1977). Yet even here, the danger of such generalisations soon emerges when one takes account of research which seems to indicate that the Japanese, whose economy is extremely powerful and well-developed, often appear to adopt a collectivist orientation to self (c.f. Triandis et al., 1986;1988; see also Cousins, 1989).

Whether or not Triandis and associates have demonstrated cross-cultural differences in what could be termed individualist-collectivist *ideologies, cultural value systems or personality dimensions*, there is strong evidence that different individuals, groups, and cultures may orient themselves differently to the various social groups present in their environment. This being the case, it is crucial for any theory of group processes to investigate the possible consequences of such differences. Now, more than ever, there is a need for the cross-cultural validation of social identity and self-categorisation theories.

However problematic Triandis and associates' operationalisations of cultural values might be, it remains crucial to explore the implications individualistic and collectivistic belief systems hold for social identity construction. If individualistic cultures involve the kind of orientations to social groups Triandis and associates

have postulated, then one would expect relatively lower levels of social identity in comparison to more collectivist cultures. It also seems likely that the kind of self-serving biases discussed in earlier chapters, would occur with more frequency in individualistic cultures, especially when distance from the ingroup is a feature of social identity construction. It seems likely that individualists and individualistic cultures are unlikely to fully reflect Turner's notion of group members perceiving themselves as interchangeable exemplars (Turner, 1987). In fact, individualistic values, as defined by Triandis and associates, seem rather problematic for the whole referent informational influence model, with the notion of self-stereotyping appearing particularly problematic.

Furthermore, if individualistic cultures encourage a variety of different group allegiances, then it would seem that the art of managing multiple group memberships, of skilfully organising one's social identity networks, would be of paramount importance (see, for example, McCall, 1987). In fact, this picture of Western man moving quickly between different social identities, never placing too much emphasis on any single role, is in some ways reminiscent of Goffman's dramaturgical model of self-presentation (Goffman, 1959b). It also shares much with Lifton's notion of the *protean* individual, whose hunger for new and varied experiences allows him or her to change colour in chameleon-like fashion (Lifton, 1970; see also Zurcher, 1977).

In contrast, the social identity and self-categorisation paradigms appear to hold much potential for illuminating social identity construction when collectivist values predominate. Here, we would expect relatively high levels of commitment to social identities, and social groups to have a much greater chance of instilling relatively homogeneous norms and beliefs. If the social identity paradigm proved problematic in this context, then its validity would be seriously called into question, and rightly so.

If everything were as clear-cut as Triandis and associates would like us to believe, the task of the cross-cultural psychologist would perhaps seem less daunting than it often appears. However, cultures and nations tend not to fall conveniently at one end of a dichotomous individualism-collectivism dimension.

The key problem here concerns the stability of such beliefs and personal orientations. Given that most social scientists would probably accept that Western Europe is relatively individualistic in many ways, it seems problematic for Triandis' framework to note how intergroup conflict has been, and continues to be, of great significance in this area of the world. It is worth remembering that social identity theory has proven highly useful in elucidating the nature of a wide variety of intergroup phenomena, *usually in so-called individualistic societies* (see, for example, Bourhis & Hill, 1982; Brown 1978; Cairns & Mercer, 1984; Giles & Johnson, 1981).

Cultural beliefs, especially those which are enshrined in literature, art, and the mass media, are quite likely to evince a certain degree of temporal stability. However, the belief systems of social groups - essentially social representations - are less static, as are the idiosyncratic sets of beliefs and values associated with individuals. To this extent, it seems rather likely that individualistic and collectivistic orientations will be subject to fluctuation, even within cultures which tend to promote one more than the other. It thus becomes crucial to attempt to determine the factors which are likely to influence the emergence and fluctuation of these orientations - here, there is clearly much work which remains to be done.

Students of group processes already know, for example, that threats to groups can encourage moves towards in-group homogenisation, and thus perhaps be associated with collectivist orientations. At the level of individual orientations, it seems perfectly reasonable for a person to have an individualistic orientation to some groups - for example colleagues in a competitive work environment - while at the same time having a collective orientation to other groups, such as his or her extended family. Even here, these orientations might not be stable, but perhaps keyed to particular situations or events. To pursue the previous examples, certain situations might at times *reverse* the usual orientation. Thus, a competitive, relatively individualistic work environment might become a more collectivist one, marked by friendship and good-will, during the office Christmas party. Similarly, the good of the family as a whole, and its associated collectivist orientation might be threatened when relatives fall-out over the contents of a will, perhaps taking-on a more individualistic orientation to the family in such circumstances. This also,

therefore, serves to emphasize the utility of examining situations and how they serve to elicit individualistic or collectivistic orientations, in a manner not unlike Mischel's notion of studying person X situation interactions (e.g. Mischel, 1977; see also R.H. Turner, 1987).

### 7.3.3 *The autonomous-relational dimension*

A crucial element of Brown and associates' (1991;1992) argument, is the postulation of an autonomous-relational dimension which co-exists, and is supposedly orthogonal to, the individualism-collectivism dimension. Autonomous orientations to ingroups involve comparisons with norms, but not with specific outgroups. It is interesting how social identity theory has, to some extent, ignored apparently autonomous groups, and focused instead on groups involved in frequent intergroup relations, usually of a conflictual nature. Recently, theorists not directly associated with the Tajfel-Turner school of thought have also started to raise questions about non-comparative groups (see, for example, Deaux, 1992). Relational orientations, in contrast, are associated with frequent comparisons between one's own group and important outgroups - to some extent, the meaning of relational groups has little sense without the existence of outgroups. Once again, while this orientation is assumed to exist at various levels, empirical studies have so far, focused exclusively on the orientations of individual group-members to their ingroup.

Of crucial importance for the social identity paradigm, is Brown and associate's assertion that social identity theory functions most adequately as an explanatory framework, when dealing with individuals and/or groups with collectivist-relational orientations. In contrast, it is suggested that social identity theory is, at least in its current state, an inadequate framework for exploring social identity construction where individualistic-autonomous orientations predominate. In fact, given social identity theory's reliance on the notion of intergroup comparisons, it seems that the SIT/SCT paradigms are quite unsuited to explaining group processes in *any* groups associated with autonomous orientations, regardless of whether these orientations are accompanied by individualistic or collectivistic belief systems (Brown et al., 1992).

However, it is worth noting that many of the problems raised in regard to the individualism-collectivism dimension are also applicable to the notion of autonomous and relational orientations. For example, it is far from clear whether these orientations are stable or contextual in nature, how orientations at the group and individual levels might interact, and whether these orientations mean the same thing across different cultures, or even across different groups within the same culture. Again one is left wondering exactly what the phenomena under investigation represent. Socially shared belief systems? Individually-held value systems and cognitive structures? Perhaps both? Brown and associates, like Triandis and his co-workers, rather conveniently dodge the issue of how one can study so-called ideological structures, without having attempted to define what "ideology" actually means. The most the reader is told, is that the autonomous-relational dimension is manifested in a "kind of ideology or orientation" (Brown et al, 1992, p.330), as if this statement requires no further illumination.

It has been argued throughout this discussion that social identity construction might operate somewhat differently in large-scale, diffuse social categories and groups, in comparison to smaller or more structured groups. In a similar vein Brown and associates conclude their discussion by suggesting that social identity and group processes might operate differently across groups and individuals which differ on the individualism-collectivism and autonomous-relational dimensions. In this sense the conclusions to be drawn from both discussions are congruent - we require a social psychology of group processes which can take account of both different types of group, and individual differences in orientations to these groups.

It could well be argued that one of the most serious problems with the social identity paradigm - its typical focus on self-esteem as the only motivating force behind social identity - can help explain the inadequacies of the paradigm when applied to what Brown and associates have defined as collective-autonomous groups. Such groups are likely to be marked by high levels of personal involvement and commitment to the group, but few or no explicit intergroup comparisons. Clearly, in such groups, which for example, might include therapy groups or small groups of close friends, the search for positive distinctiveness

seems unlikely to be the most important motivating force behind social identity construction. This, incidentally, does not necessarily mean that self-esteem maintenance is insignificant in such groups, but merely that it is likely to find fulfilment in ways which are different to the search for positive distinctiveness. It seems reasonable for example, that a group of close friends might praise one another, communicate the fact that they like the other members of the group, and in this way enhance or maintain one another's self-esteem, without making any comparisons between the ingroup and outgroups. Furthermore, it is likely that a whole host of other motivating forces are of potential relevance for social identity construction, and it is to a discussion of some of these, that we now turn.

#### **7.4 Whatever happened to the individual in social identity theory?**

When Henri Tajfel developed and later expanded his ambitious social identity theory, he repeatedly argued that his primary aim was to develop a theory of intergroup relations. Consequently, while the theory made some assumptions about the nature of the self, it was not, argued Tajfel, and need not be, a complete theory of self in any sense. Furthermore, to the extent that Tajfel was essentially interested in times when individuals all acted in a similar fashion, the possibility of interesting individual differences in identity construction was not explored. John Turner's self-categorisation theory developed the intra-group implications of the social identity paradigm, and in doing so, made some clarifications of the nature of self implied by the perspective (Deaux, 1992). However, both Tajfel's social identity theory and Turner's self-categorisation theory chose to ignore any detailed questions about the nature of self, and, more generally, issues associated with individual differences (Schiffman & Wicklund, 1992).

##### ***7.4.1 Motivation - is self-esteem maintenance enough?***

Recently, it has been suggested, or sometimes implied, that the social identity paradigm can not be conveniently divorced from issues of the self and individual differences (see for example, Abrams, 1992; Breakwell, 1986, 1991; Deaux, 1992). One such issue pertains to the adequacy of motivational constructs contained within the social identity paradigm. As previously suggested, it is in some ways

quite bizarre that self-esteem maintenance *via positive distinctiveness* has often been the *only* motivation directly addressed by social identity theorists.

This is bizarre in as much as theorists not directly associated with the theory have often postulated a variety of other probable motivations associated with social identity (see, for example, Deaux, 1992; Doob, 1964; Stagner, 1967). Deaux has made the interesting suggestion that attachment to ascribed social identities is more related to "fundamental questions of meaning and self-knowledge" than self-esteem motivations (Deaux, 1992, p.26). In a similar vein, Mitchell (1981) has proposed that being a member of a large-scale social group such as a nation provides the individual with a sense of psychological comfort and security. Azar (1986), writing specifically about national and similar-scale identities, postulated that needs for security, distinctiveness, social recognition of identity, and participation in the maintenance of security and identity, are all important motivating forces. Abrams, himself generally sympathetic to the social identity paradigm, has proposed that consistency, control, material wealth, meaning, power, self-efficacy, and self-knowledge all be added to the list of potential motivating factors behind social identity construction (Abrams, 1990; 1992). In the current study, evidence has been presented which seems to demonstrate how motivations of power and control appear to play an important part in the construction of national and European identities.

Examining which motivations individuals choose to associate with particular social identifications could tell us much about the general management of social identity networks, as well as go some way to explaining individual differences in identity construction. It will also be important to investigate how stable the links between particular motivations and social identities are. Furthermore, the issue of motivation can also be examined at a more collective level of analysis, perhaps by exploring whether social representations prescribe particular associations, and whether different in-group members tend to associate the ingroup with the satisfaction of the same motives.

Brown and associates (1992) have recently made the interesting suggestion that the ideological dimensions of Individualism-Collectivism and Autonomous-

Relational beliefs might affect the associations made between group memberships and particular motives, suggesting that individualistic groups might engender instrumental identities focused on the fulfilment of personal goals. In earlier chapters, it was suggested that the distinction between instrumental and sentimental attachments to a social entity (Kelman, 1969) is often a useful simplifying tool when examining different orientations to national and European identities. Recently, Inglehart and Reif (1991) suggested a useful distinction between two quite similar constructs - those of utilitarian and affective support. Utilitarian support tends to be focused on particular, often well-defined, issues, and particularly on the fulfilment of desires relating to these issues. In contrast, affective support is relatively diffuse in nature. Future research might well examine whether such a distinction, based on levels of diffuseness, might be usefully applied to the instrumental-sentimental dimension suggested by Kelman, and indeed, to motives in general. It seems highly probable that these kinds of orientations or types of association will often be associated with quite different motivations, and given Brown and associates' recent reference to instrumental motives, it might be profitable in the future to further explore the interactions between the ideological dimensions identified by the latter authors, and the instrumental-sentimental dimension. The empirical investigation of such hypotheses seems to offer the social identity paradigm a theoretical lifeline, in as much as it points the way towards an adequate treatment of motivation within the framework.

It has already been suggested in an earlier chapter, that a knowledge of the motives typically associated with a social identity, might prove highly useful when attempting to predict when such identities might become salient. In many ways what is being suggested is the adoption of a more phenomenological approach to identity construction, with the particular nuances individuals give to their social identities falling under the social psychologist's scrutiny. Just such an approach was utilised by Breakwell in her study of threatened identities (Breakwell, 1986) - what is now required is an analogous approach to social identities in general - whether threatened or secure. This is congruent with Rosenberg's call for the study of individual identity structures (Rosenberg, 1988). It is interesting to note that the addition of an idiographic level of analysis might also enable the further

investigation of the role of differentiation, if Hinkle and associates are correct in their assertion that the relationship between identity and differentiation may covary both with individual differences in style of identity construction, and with group ideology (Hinkle, et al., 1989). For some theorists, it is indeed quite surprising that motivational constructs have often been neglected within the social identity paradigm: Taylor and associates (1989), for example, argue that it is only when one knows the motives underlying a social comparison, that one can begin to predict the choice of comparison likely. The same authors go on to make the useful suggestion that different outgroups may be linked to different motivations.

Another useful approach to the study of motivation and its effects upon social identity construction has been forwarded by Hazel Markus and associates (Markus & Nurius, 1984;1986;1987), in the shape of their theory of *possible selves*. The latter essentially represent individual's beliefs about what they were in the past, what they are at present, and what they might become in the future. The crucial link to motivation is afforded by the contention that individuals attempt to achieve positively valued possible selves, whilst hopefully avoiding other, negatively evaluated possible selves. In as much as possible selves encompass the past, present, and future, they involve the kind of manipulations of a temporal sense of self discussed with some elegance by Goffman (1959a;1959b;1968), and are related to the continuity motive suggested by Breakwell (1986). One particularly crucial element of the possible selves approach, is the notion that motives and goals may not be particularly specific or well-defined - the underlying motivating force behind identity construction is simply the achievement or avoidance of possible selves.

The problem of levels of analysis unfortunately rears its ugly head once more however, when one attempts to discern in detail the implications of the possible selves approach. Potentially, the notion of possible selves is an excellent example of how it is often difficult to distinguish personal and social identity: "[possible selves] are deft blendings of the representations of one's roles and social categorizations...with views of one's particular features, attributes or habits" (Markus & Nurius, 1987, p. 158; see also Deaux, 1992). When individuals construct their own idiosyncratic possible selves, they are essentially engaged in the process

of what Breakwell (1991) has termed the *customisation* of social identities, and indeed, social representations. Differences in the possible selves constructed by individuals may also be associated with what Hinkle and associates (1989) have referred to as *style* of identity construction.

However, whilst Markus and Nurius (1986) acknowledge, as, in fact, Bruner had much earlier (Bruner, 1962), that the mass media may well provide individuals with pools of possible selves from which to choose, they retain a focus on the individual level of analysis. Once again, one is left wondering exactly how individuals select from possible selves present in the mass media, especially when one considers the theoretical minefield which characterises the field of mass media effects (c.f. Roberts and Maccoby, 1985). Furthermore, the question of whether in-groupers might come to share possible selves, perhaps due to their enshrinement within group belief systems, is not addressed, or even acknowledged. Such shared possible selves might be similar to the notion of perceptions of cognitive alternatives to the intergroup situation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979/1986) which may come to be shared between in-groupers.

Despite such apparent limitations with the possible selves approach, the basic notion of possible selves continues to offer much potential for integrating the study of individual differences, in both personality and motivation, into the social identity paradigm. At the same time, in as much as possible selves appear to be in both culture (e.g. the media) and cognition (e.g. self-schemas - c.f. Markus & Nurius, 1987), their study offers interesting possibilities for collaboration between researchers working within the fields of social identity, social cognition, and social representations.

### 7.5 New methodological horizons

It should be apparent from the previous discussion that the social identity paradigm may well need considerable development if it is to offer an adequate framework for the study of group processes. Yet this need for further development is, paradoxically, a result not of the paradigm's limitations, but rather of its promise, of what might be achieved. If the promise of social identity theory is to be realised, then new methodological approaches will have to be developed which

can adequately encompass the multi-level analyses so badly needed (Doise, 1986). In previous chapters the utility of interweaving idiographic levels of analysis with a wider analysis of social identity construction has been demonstrated. This is congruent with the increasingly common calls for the study of individual differences in identity construction (c.f. Abrams, 1992; Breakwell, 1991). It has also been repeatedly emphasised how quantitative and qualitative techniques should be given equal import by researchers - the time has come within the social identity paradigm for qualitative research to rise above its often diminutive status as merely a component of pilot work.

The study of the kinds of large-scale and diffuse social identities exemplified by national and European attachments, also requires a somewhat novel approach to studying social identity construction. Such an approach must attempt to take account of the relatively dormant nature of many large-scale social identifications, and the significance of symbols and critical situations in maintaining their salience. Furthermore, research methods must be able to encompass the study of both social identity and social representations, since the two are often highly related.

There seems little doubt that multi-methodological programmes offer the most promise. However, this is by no means a problem-free panacea - if anything, the skilful use of multi-method probes is fraught with more danger than the simplistic reliance on single methodologies. There is an urgent need for the careful scrutiny of available research methods, and the elucidation of their strengths and weaknesses, *with particular reference to the study of social identities and social representations*. Clearly, the ideal solution is to capitalise on the strengths of various methods, whilst attempting to minimise the effects of any associated weaknesses. Furthermore, researchers must have clear ideas as to whether they expect the different methods utilised to yield broadly similar or disparate results, and the reasons for such expectations. This might help alleviate the problems otherwise associated with conflicting results emerging from different methods in a multi-method investigation.

It is encouraging to note the exploratory multi-methodical research already under way in the field of social representations (see, for example, Sotirakopoulou, 1991; Sotirakopoulou and Breakwell, 1992). In many ways the further development of the social identity paradigm hinges on the willingness of its adherents to adopt a broader methodological and theoretical perspective, to take a step back and perceive the possible theoretical connections between the paradigm and work in social cognition, personality theory, and the social representations paradigm. Current world events, including the prolonged civil war in what was Yugoslavia, the protracted struggle between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, and innumerable other conflicts, all serve to demonstrate that now, more than ever, social psychology needs an adequate theory of social identity and its role in group processes.

In the next chapter, some of the areas of the social identity paradigm which have been identified as requiring further development, will be examined in an exploratory empirical analysis.

## Chapter 8

### SOME NEW HORIZONS EXPLORED

In the current chapter, some of the new horizons for the social identity paradigm introduced in previous chapters, are placed under the scrutiny of empirical analysis. Given the embryonic state of these recent developments, the empirical research shortly to be discussed should be interpreted as largely exploratory in nature: it is certainly premature to expect "critical experiments" of a decisive nature.

Since qualitative data have already figured prominently in the preceding discussion, and given the sacrifice of breadth for depth usually inherent in qualitative work, it was decided to utilise a fixed-response questionnaire methodology for the final piece of empirical work to be discussed. A questionnaire was constructed and piloted, with the aim of exploring a number of the issues raised in recent chapters, pertaining to the current adequacy of the social identity paradigm, especially when applied to national, European, and other identities of a similarly diffuse and large-scale nature. In order to be able to investigate a variety of issues, and to access the largest number of respondents feasible, it was decided to construct a questionnaire based on fixed-response type measures, and ultimately leading to data of a predominantly quantitative nature. This is by no means meant to signify the superiority of quantitative measures, but rather their utility when a large number of issues are to be addressed, with a relatively large number of respondents.

#### 8.1 Major issues addressed by the questionnaire

(Note: The full text of the questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix F)

##### *The strength of British and European identities (Questions A1-A7; D1-D7)*

Since the fixed-response measures of British and European identity employed in the earlier questionnaire proved to be relatively successful, they were also included

in the current study. This allowed a direct comparison between the strength, affect, and salience of British and European identities. Furthermore, this facilitated the examination of the relationship between these social identities and other important variables in the analysis. Given the results obtained from the earlier empirical research, it was expected that respondents would manifest a British identity significantly stronger than their European identity, especially on salience and socio-emotional dimensions.

*Interdependence (questions A8-A9; D8-D9)*

Since Rabbie and Horwitz, in their important recent critique of social identity theory, posit the importance of perceived interdependence as the driving force behind group processes, it was deemed useful to include a measure of this construct in the current questionnaire (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schott, & Visser, 1989). It was argued in an earlier chapter, that what is perhaps critical is the *interpretation* individuals, or indeed, groups, give to perceived interdependence. A number of interview respondents, for example, certainly did perceive an element of interdependence between European nations, but, rather than leading to a sense of common European identity, if anything this appeared to act as a barrier to such sentiments. This was largely because the interviewees regretted such interdependence, appearing to associate it with a loss of autonomy. It seems rather likely that Rabbie and associates were aware of the importance of the interpretation of interdependence, but nevertheless, their writing fails to express this point explicitly.

In light of the ambiguous nature of perceived interdependence, it was decided to include two questions, one of which referred to whether respondents perceived any interdependence, and the other examining whether they felt interdependence was desirable or not. Each set of two questions was presented firstly, in relation to interdependence between British people, and then later in relation to interdependence between the nations and peoples of Europe.

*Possible selves (questions A10-A12; D10-D13)*

One of the more subtle factors able to differentiate between those who are broadly pro-European and those who feel wary of European integration, is the nature of the temporal perspective adopted. In many cases, and in responses from both the questionnaire and interview data, it was apparent that those opposed to integration tended to dwell to some extent on Britain's past, a past they felt was under threat from European integration. This contrasts in an interesting manner with the perspective often adopted by supporters of integration, who tended to focus on the future, on what *might* be achieved, given time and effort. Differences in temporal perspective of this nature were also highly apparent between the relatively un-enthusiastic British and the much more hopeful Italian respondents, in the earlier questionnaire study.

Since the notion of possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1984;1986;1987) strives to encompass temporal and motivational elements of identity, it was deemed interesting to include a related measure in the current questionnaire. A series of fixed-response measures focused on whether respondents felt being British would gain or decrease in importance by the year 2000, and what respondents actually wanted to happen to the importance of being British. Similar measures later focused on European possible selves.

*The Individualism-Collectivism (Ind-Coll) and Autonomous-Relational dimensions (questionnaire section B)*

In the previous chapter, the importance of the ideological milieu in which identity construction takes place, was emphasized. Considering that Tajfel repeatedly emphasized the importance of societal beliefs and ideologies (see, for example, Tajfel, 1984), it is surprising that social identity theorists are only just beginning to acknowledge and attempt to investigate the role of widespread beliefs pertaining to the relationship between the individual and society. It follows, from the earlier discussion of Brown and associates' work (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Brown et al., 1991; Brown et al., 1992), that one should expect social identity to be strongest in a collectivist milieu, and social identity theory most useful in such a context.

Predicting social identity construction in individualistic milieux appears much more problematic.

According to Brown and associates, the relational-autonomous dimension, representing the degree to which groups make explicit intergroup comparisons, exists as an orthogonal ideological dimension to Ind-Coll. Taking both dimensions into consideration, social identity theory clearly has much to say about groups in collectivist-relational milieux, but little about groups in individualistic-autonomous milieux.

The current questionnaire incorporates a number of quantitative measures of both these ideological dimensions. It was originally intended to utilise a sample of questions from the Ind-Coll scales developed by Hui, Triandis and associates (c.f. Triandis et al., 1985;1986;1988; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990), however, pilot work indicated that such a sample from the lengthy Ind-Coll scale was not adequate in terms of Cronbach's alpha (standardised item alpha=0.465, compared to recommended 0.85), and thus did not form a usable scale. This being the case, a generic Ind-Coll measure was dropped in favour of a group-specific scale based on three separate measures, repeated once for British, and once for European group identities. In many ways, this group-specific measure is somewhat more relevant to our current interest in social identity processes, and takes Brown and associates' theorising a step further, since while postulating the existence of such group-specific orientations, the latter theorists have focused on generic Ind-Coll measures in their own empirical research.

In order to examine the importance of the autonomous-relational dimension, a single question was included, focusing on whether respondents made comparisons when thinking about being British, and then when thinking about being European. It should be stressed that such operationalisations, are at essentially an individual level of analysis. This is probably the most appropriate level of analysis for the questionnaire methodology utilised, but one should remember that group and societal levels of analysis are also worthy of investigation. It seems, for example, that a variety of theorists agree that Britain and other Western industrialised nations are pervaded by a strongly individualistic

ideology at the societal level (see, for example, Geertz, 1979; Kitzinger, 1992; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990). Triandis, McCusker and Hui (1990) have suggested that individualism is high in Britain, a claim which is congruent with Hofstede's empirical findings (Hofstede, 1980). Despite the limitations of an individual level analysis, this does at least allow relatively direct comparisons to be made with existing research.

*Goals for European integration (questionnaire section C)*

In order to gain a further understanding of British orientations to European integration, a section of the current questionnaire required respondents to rate ten possible goals for integration, in terms of importance. The ten goals represented the most frequent goals mentioned by questionnaire and interview respondents in the previous studies. It is important to note that some of these goals appear to be amenable to differentiation in terms of the instrumental-sentimental dimension frequently referred to throughout the current discussion (see also Kelman, 1969).

When responses to a question contained in the previous questionnaire concerning the role of Europe were examined, it became apparent that perhaps the most popular role for Europe was that of peace-maker. However, the overall impression gleaned from questionnaire and interview data was that British respondents tended to adopt an instrumental orientation to Europe and the EC, such that economic and political issues (e.g. free trade) were given considerably more salience than symbolic issues such as those pertaining to forging a European identity. These results were highly congruent with those obtained by Hewstone (1986), and, more recently, Furnham and Gunter (1989). Thus, we would expect to find instrumental dimensions of integration, such as economics, to be rated as more important than sentimental dimensions like promoting a sense of common European culture.

*Motives (questionnaire section E)*

In this section of the questionnaire, which consists of a series of fixed-response measures, respondents were required to indicate the degree to which they agreed

or disagreed with a statement suggesting that a particular motive was an important aspect of either their British or European identity. Given the currently impoverished treatment of motivation within the social identity paradigm (Abrams, 1992), this section of the questionnaire aimed to expand the usual focus on self-esteem maintenance, by also including measures of other probable motivating forces behind national and European identities.

It emerged from the cross-national questionnaire and interview data, that autonomy, control and power, all appear to be important motivating forces behind national identity. This being the case, it was expected that these motives would be quite prominent in responses to the current questionnaire. Furthermore, to the extent that respondents had often manifested a desire for Europe to exercise control over other nations and continents, then it was also expected that control and power motivations would be prominent motives in the section of the current questionnaire pertaining to motivating forces behind European identity.

In addition to measures of self-esteem, power, and control, this section also included measures of autonomy, stability/predictability, distinctiveness, and self-presentation. While there are, in principle, a multitude of possible motivating forces behind social identity construction (c.f. Abrams, 1992), previous research, and the results of the cross-national study, indicated that these motives were most frequently associated with national and/or European identities.

It should be stressed that, to some extent, what are being scrutinized here might better be thought of as goals, rather than motives. This distinction makes sense to the extent that some motives may well be at least partly unconscious much of the time. The measures included in the current questionnaire seem to tap goals consciously associated with national or European identities. Since it seems quite feasible that different social identities might be associated with different goals, it was decided to use questions which made specific reference to either being British or European.

The questions utilised to investigate motives are listed below, with the motive they were intended to tap stated in brackets. The validity of these questions

was examined using both lay-person (n=20) and psychologist (n=5) judges, who were given the task of stating which underlying motive they thought was represented by each question. Judges were questioned using an informal interview methodology which facilitated the probing of ambiguities. Questions which elicited poor inter-judge agreement were dropped from the final questionnaire, such that the latter only contained questions which 90% or more of judges agreed upon as to the motive represented.

**MOTIVE QUESTIONS (all were of the agree/disagree type, using a 7-point bipolar scale):-**

**It is important to me that being British makes me feel proud (SELF-ESTEEM)**

**Britain should maintain its autonomy from other nations (AUTONOMY)**

**What being British stands for should remain stable and predictable over time (STABILITY)**

**Britain should exercise as much influence as possible over world affairs (CONTROL OVER OTHERS)**

**Britain should strive to be one of the world's most powerful nations (POWER)**

**Britain and the British should be thought of as distinct and different to other nations and nationalities (DISTINCTIVENESS)**

**I like other people to think I'm proud to be British (SELF-PRESENTATION)**

*Demographics (questionnaire section F)*

This section of the questionnaire requested respondents to supply information concerning age, sex, political orientation, vote in the last general election, perceived social class, and estimated exposure to the mass media.

## **8.2 Respondents**

In order to allow comparisons to be drawn with the previous cross-national questionnaire and interview data, it was decided to utilise a similar subject group for respondents. Thus, volunteer respondents were recruited in a variety of Universities across Britain, with the requirement that all respondents be current British citizens.

## **8.3 Pilot work**

The questionnaire was piloted using an interview-administration technique. Piloting, as usual, proved essential in highlighting ambiguities in question format or wording, and was conducted over a 5-week period, using 25 volunteer respondents.

## **8.4 Questionnaire administration**

The questionnaire was administered to some 121 volunteer respondents over a period between October 1992 and January 1993. Respondents were required to complete the questionnaire in the presence of a researcher, and, of course, alone. The questionnaire was of the self-completion variety, and given its totally fixed-response nature, was straightforward to complete, with respondents on average taking 20 minutes to answer all questions.

# **8.5 SELECTED RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

## **8.5.1 Demographic profile of respondents**

Table 67 below contains a basic demographic profile of the questionnaire respondents.

**Table 67 - Demographic profile of respondents**

(n=121)

SEX:			AGE:	
	count	%		
Female	74	61.2	Mean:	20 years
Male	42	34.7	Mode:	18 years
(missing)	5	4.1	Range:	18-41 years

**VOTE IN LAST GENERAL ELECTION (1992):**

	Frequency	Percent
CONSERVATIVE	18	14.9
LABOUR	9	7.4
LIBERAL	12	9.9
OTHER	5	4.1
(NOT VOTE)	70	57.9
(MISSING)	7	5.8

**SELF-ASSESSED SOCIAL CLASS BACKGROUND:**

	Frequency	Percent
"Working"	30	26.1
"Middle"	70	60.9
"Upper"	2	1.7
"Don't know"	13	11.3
(missing)	6	

**8.5.2 Comparing British national identity with European identity**

As expected from the previous questionnaire data, the seven fixed-response measures of British identity formed an excellent scale (standardised item alpha=.864). It was noticeable from an exploratory data analysis (c.f. Tukey, 1977), that for almost all British identity variables, the distribution of responses was negatively skewed, indicating a generally medium-high level of national identity.

In a similar manner, European identity measures were also seen to manifest an excellent standardised item alpha of .873, once again suggesting a good European identity scale. It was interesting to note how, in marked contrast to the British identity measures, responses to the European identity questions were predominantly positively skewed, suggesting a generally weak level of European

identity. These observations were confirmed by a within-subjects MANOVA, the results of which indicated that on *all* identity variables, respondents reported significantly higher levels of British, as opposed to European, identity (Table 68).

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**Table 68: MANOVA comparing British & European identity**

(n=115)

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.534 F= 17.650 D.F.=7,108 Sig. of F=<.001

**Significant univariate effects:**

**"To what extent do you feel British/European?"**

British: mean=4.852 European: mean=3.183 Sig= <.001

**"To what extent do you feel strong ties with other British/European people?"**

British: mean=4.357 European: mean=3.165 Sig= <.001

**"To what extent do you feel pleased to be British/European?"**

British: mean=4.478 European: mean=3.748 Sig= .002

**"How similar do you think you are to the average British/European person?"**

British: mean=4.157 European: mean=3.400 Sig= <.001

**"How important to you is being British/European?"**

British: mean=3.887 European: mean=3.130 Sig=.002

**"How much are your views about Britain/Europe shared by other British/European people?"**

British: mean=4.087 European: mean=3.574 Sig=.001

**"When you hear someone who is not British/European criticize the British/Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"**

British: mean=4.096 European: mean=2.817 Sig=<.001

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)  
(Response scale: 1 (low identity) - 7 (high identity))

---

Since British national identity has proven to be significantly stronger than European identity across two separate questionnaire studies, and given the highly congruent qualitative observations arising from the interview data, it seems that there is good evidence that British national identity is stronger, more salient, and more positive, than its European counterpart. When considered in the context of previous research (e.g. Hewstone, 1986; Furnham & Gunter, 1989; Sotirakopoulou, 1991), and the extensive Eurobaromètre surveys, there seems little reason to suggest that the current results will not be broadly applicable to the British as a whole. A strong British national identity, and a weak, poorly defined European equivalent, seems compatible with the existing body of largely attitudinal data.

### 8.5.3 Interdependence

It is interesting to note that, despite the highly significant differences in the strength of British and European identities, there was no significant difference in perceived interdependence. This finding appears to be congruent with the argument forwarded earlier in the discussion, where it was suggested that it is not so much the perception of interdependence per se which is critical, but rather, its interpretation - i.e., whether interdependence is considered a good or a bad thing. This being the case, when one considers the previous data concerning British orientations to Europe, one would expect interdependence between the British to be more highly valued than interdependence between Europeans. This expectation was in fact confirmed, with the current data indicating that respondents rated interdependence between the British as significantly more desirable than interdependence amongst the Europeans (British mean=4.55, European mean=4.23, 2-tailed t-test,  $p=.041$ ).

Disentangling the relationship between interdependence and social identity was not the purpose of the current research, and will probably prove quite a demanding task for future research. Both existence and evaluation measures of interdependence correlated significantly, and in a positive direction, with composite British and European identity scores (Table 69). Whilst indicating a clear association between interdependence and identity, this says nothing about causal relationships, or the temporal order in which these phenomena might occur. Furthermore, the observed correlations were not overly high, suggesting that there is more to social

identification than perceived interdependence. In fact, to the extent that much depends on one's definition of social identity, then whether interdependence is a crucial factor in group formation is a matter which perhaps will not be decided purely through empirical endeavours. This is especially the case when, as Rabbie and Horwitz (op. cit.) do, researchers, in a rather tautological fashion, define group formation largely in terms of perceived interdependence. It should also be noted that there appear no particularly strong reasons to suspect that perceptions of the existence of, and general reactions towards, interdependence will remain stable over time. If interdependence is the crucial element behind group formation, then surely much more research is required into its determinants, and the mechanisms behind its possible fluctuation.

---

**Table 69 - Correlations between interdependence and social identity**

**BRITISH INTERDEPENDENCE:**

Existence measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Identity  
 $r = .354, n = 117, p < .001$  (2-tailed)

Evaluation measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Identity  
 $r = .420, n = 117, p < .001$  (2-tailed)

**EUROPEAN INTERDEPENDENCE:**

Existence measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Identity  
 $r = .396, n = 117, p < .001$  (2-tailed)

Evaluation measure: Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Identity  
 $r = .480, n = 117, p < .001$  (2-tailed)

---

It is relatively common for theorists writing about the Individualism-Collectivism dimension, to postulate that perceived interdependence is typically associated with a collectivist orientation (e.g. Triandis et al., 1986). This being the case, and since such an assertion seems to make good intuitive sense, it was expected that interdependence would be perceived more favourably when respondents adopted a collectivist orientation to the group in question (either Britain or Europe). A Pearson Product Moment Correlation was calculated to examine the relationship between interdependence evaluations and a composite group-specific Ind-Coll

score. This indicated, as expected, a significant and positive correlation between the evaluation of interdependence, and group-specific Ind-Coll (see table 70). If perceived interdependence is primarily associated with collectivist milieux and groups, then it would seem that individualistic groups are both problematic for social identity theory and Rabbie and Horwitz's argument concerning the importance of perceived interdependence.

---

**Table 70 - Correlations between evaluation of interdependence and Ind-Coll measures**

**EVALUATION OF BRITISH INTERDEPENDENCE:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Ind-Coll score:  
 $r=.271$ ,  $n=118$ ,  $p=.004$  (2-tailed)

**EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN INTERDEPENDENCE:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Ind-Coll score:  
 $r=.376$ ,  $n=118$ ,  $p<.001$  (2-tailed)

Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that evaluation of interdependence is increasingly positive as collectivism increases.

---

#### 8.5.4 Possible selves

In order to examine the relationship between possible selves and European identity, the sample was split into two groups, based on whether respondents felt that being European will become more ( $n=66$ ) or less ( $n=23$ ) important by the year 2000. A between-subjects MANOVA was then conducted, with the European identity measures as dependent variables (table 71). Despite unequal cell-sizes, homogeneity of variance assumptions were met, and the MANOVA indicated a significant multivariate difference between groups. Inspection of the univariate statistics indicated that, on all European identity measures, those respondents who felt being European would become more important, reported significantly higher levels of European identity than respondents who felt being European would become less important. This provides at least suggestive evidence of an association between European identity and possible selves. In particular, it seems that a more positive orientation towards a European future is often associated with at least an embryonic sense of European identity. Such results complement the observations

arising from the interview study, where the importance of temporal perspective was emphasized.

---

**Table 71: MANOVA comparing European identity across possible selves**

(n=89)

Overall multivariate effect (Pillai's Test):

Value=.211 F= 3.099 D.F.=7,81 Sig. of F=.006

Significant univariate effects:

"To what extent do you feel European?"

Being European more import.: mean=3.507; less imp.: mean=2.182 Sig=.001

"To what extent do you feel strong ties with other European people?"

Being European more import.: mean=3.463; less imp: mean=1.909 Sig=<.001

"To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?"

Being European more import.: mean=4.134; less imp: mean=2.545 Sig=<.001

"How similar do you think you are to the average European person?"

Being European more import.: mean=3.672; less imp: mean=2.455 Sig=.001

"How important to you is being European?"

Being European more import.: mean=3.493; less imp: mean=2.045 Sig=.001

"How much are your views about Europe shared by other European people?"

Being European more import.: mean=3.701; less imp: mean=3.045 Sig=.043

"When you hear someone who is not European criticize the Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"

Being European more import.: mean=3.090 less imp: mean=1.909 Sig=.006

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)  
(Response scale: 1 (low identity) - 7 (high identity))

---

### 8.5.5 The Autonomous-Relational dimension

An examination of descriptive statistics indicated that the majority of respondents answered the current question in a manner suggestive of a largely relational orientation to Britain, although the mean score on the autonomous-relational dimension was 4.237, close to the neutral scale-point. What was clear, however, was that respondents manifested a stronger relational orientation to Britain, than they did to Europe. In comparison to the orientation to Britain, orientation to Europe was significantly less relational, and more autonomous (2-tailed  $t=5.08$ ,  $p<.001$ ; see Table 72).

---

**Table 72 - The Autonomous-Relational dimension: comparing orientation to Britain with orientation to Europe**

**Orientation to Britain:**

Mean score on Autonomous-Relational scale: 4.237  
 Median: 5  
 Mode: 5

30.5% of responses fell in autonomous range of scale (1-3)  
 17.7% of responses fell in neutral range of scale (4)  
 52.5% of responses fell in relational range of scale (5-7)

**Orientation to Europe:**

Mean score on Autonomous-Relational scale: 3.347  
 Median: 4  
 Mode: 4

45.8% of responses fell in autonomous range of scale (1-3)  
 27.1% of responses fell in neutral range of scale (4)  
 27.1% of responses fell in relational range of scale (5-7)

t-test comparing mean score on Autonomous - Relational scale:-

t=5.08 2-tailed p= <.001 n=117

---

Intuitively, it seems likely that national identity, which may often be associated with critical situations and events of a conflictual nature, might well encourage a relational orientation. To the extent that the previous empirical research discussed earlier suggested the difficulty British respondents found when attempting to think about Europe, it is perhaps not surprising to find a more autonomous orientation

to European identity. In order to investigate whether a relational orientation is associated with a stronger sense of social identity, Pearson Product Moment correlations were calculated between the group-specific autonomous-relational questions and composite identity scores (Table 73).

---

**Table 73 - Correlations between group-specific Autonomous-Relational measures and composite British and European identity scores**

**BRITISH AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British identity score:  
 $r = .267$ ,  $n = 116$ ,  $p = .004$  (2-tailed)

**EUROPEAN AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European identity score:  
 $r = .426$ ,  $n = 117$ ,  $p < .001$  (2-tailed)

Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that relational orientation increases as identity increases.

---

It can be seen from Table 73 above, that both British and European autonomous-relational measures correlate significantly and positively with their respective composite identity measures. This is what one might expect if Tajfel's basic social identity theory is to be upheld. What it clearly suggests is that both British and European identities are quantitatively "stronger" when coupled with a tendency to make intergroup comparisons. It is important to note that, if Brown and associates (1992) are correct, such identities need not be comparative - the important point is that they appear to be stronger when associated with a relational orientation. In terms of a possible European identity, these findings are congruent with Robinson's suggestion that it might be easiest to achieve a strong European identity by enhancing distinctiveness and superiority over other continental groupings (Robinson, 1991). Given the evidence from the previous questionnaire and interview data, as well as the arguments forwarded by Bloom (1990), it would seem that the United States of America and Japan are two relatively popular outgroups upon which this kind of relational orientation to Europe might be constructed. In as much as social identities closely associated with frequent comparisons might in time lead to intergroup conflict, perhaps proponents of European integration might do well to examine some of the ways in which an autonomous, or non-comparative sense of European identity might be fostered.

According to Brown and associates (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Brown et al., 1991; Brown et al., 1992), the autonomous-relational dimension is orthogonal to the Ind-Coll dimension. In their own research, for example, the latter authors found no significant correlations between measures of these dimensions. Since Triandis has argued that the two dimensions *are* likely to be correlated, it was thought useful to briefly explore in the current research, whether there was any evidence of an association between these two dimensions.

Prior to evaluating the results emerging from the current data, one should consider that the measures of both dimensions used in the current study are not identical to those used by Brown and associates or those advocated by Triandis, although they were largely based on these previous measures. Perhaps the most important difference is that measures of Ind-Coll in the current research were *group-specific*. Despite these differences, it is interesting how, contrary to Brown and associates' findings, it was discovered that in the current study, the autonomous-relational dimension was correlated with the Ind-Coll dimension (see Table 74).

---

**Table 74 - Correlations between group-specific Individualism - Collectivism and Autonomous-Relational measures**

**BRITISH AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Ind-Coll score:  
 $r = .222$ ,  $n = 118$ ,  $p = .016$  (2-tailed)

**EUROPEAN AUTONOMOUS-RELATIONAL SCORE:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Ind-Coll score:  
 $r = .440$ ,  $n = 118$ ,  $p < .001$  (2-tailed)

Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that relational orientation increases as collectivism increases.

---

An inspection of Table 74 above, indicates that both British and European Autonomous-Relational scores correlate significantly, and in a positive direction,

with a composite variable comprising their respective group-specific Ind-Coll measures simply summed together. With the current scoring system, the observed association indicates that, as orientation to Britain or Europe becomes more or less relational, so it becomes more or less collectivist, and vice versa. The direction of this association is in fact contradictory to what Triandis (1992) has recently suggested. However, Triandis appears to base much of his theorising on observations of collectivistic societies which are also relatively primitive in terms of economic and technological development. This being the case, he has suggested that collectivism in such cultures appears to be associated with relatively autonomous orientations. However, this neglects the fact that there also appear to exist relatively collectivistic cultures which are also highly industrialised and economically developed. There seems to be no reason why, within such cultures (e.g. Japan), collectivism might not co-exist, or even be positively correlated with, a relational orientation. It may, in fact, turn out to be the case that the relationship between these two dimensions, or indeed, the question of whether any relationship exists, might vary across different nations and cultures, or perhaps even within the confines of a single nation or culture. Clearly, the issue of whether these two dimensions are orthogonal or not is one which is best suited to a rigorous multi-methodological and multi-level approach, ideally involving cross-cultural research. What remains clear, is that the resolution of this issue is of much potential significance for the social identity paradigm, given that the social identity perspective appears much more suited to collectivist-relational groups than individualistic-autonomous ones.

#### **8.5.6 The Individualism-Collectivism dimension**

In order to investigate whether respondents adopted different orientations on the Ind-Coll dimension, depending on whether they were thinking about Britain, or Europe, a repeated measures t-test was conducted, examining differences in the mean scores of respondents on composite group-specific Ind-Coll measures (created by summing responses over the three Ind-Coll measures). An examination of Table 75 below indicates that the mean orientations of respondents to Britain and Europe were significantly different ( $t=2.24$ , 2-tailed  $p=.027$ ). In particular, it emerged that

respondents adopted a significantly more collectivistic orientation to Britain, than they did to Europe.

---

**Table 75 - The Individualism-Collectivism dimension: comparing orientation to Britain with orientation to Europe**

**Orientation to Britain:**

Mean score on composite Ind-Coll measure : 14.195  
 Median: 14  
 Mode: 14  
 Standard Deviation: 3.467

(Potential range=3 (individualistic) - 21 (collectivist) )

**Orientation to Europe:**

Mean score on composite Ind-Coll measure : 13.237  
 Median: 14  
 Mode: 14  
 Standard Deviation: 4.185

(Potential range=3 (individualistic) - 21 (collectivist) )

t-test comparing mean score on composite Individualism-Collectivism measure:-

t=2.24 2-tailed p=.027 n=118

---

To the extent that collectivistic orientations might possibly be linked with a more sentimental/symbolic type of identification, then the results obtained appear quite congruent with the data obtained earlier, which showed that the British seem to have a much stronger sense of symbolic identity when thinking about Britain, than when thinking about Europe. However, it should be noted that, overall, respondents tended to fall rather close to the mid-point of the composite scale, suggesting that a clear-cut differentiation between perceptions of Britain and Europe may not be present on the Ind-Coll dimension.

---

**Table 76 - The Individualism-Collectivism dimension: comparing Ind-Coll score across composite identity score**

**British identity:**

Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents BELOW median identity score: 13.093  
(n=54)

Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents ABOVE median identity score: 15.421  
(n=57)

t-test on means:  $t=3.75$ , 2-tailed  $p<.001$ )

**European identity:**

Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents BELOW median identity score: 11.037  
(n=54)

Mean Ind-Coll score for respondents ABOVE median identity score: 15.172  
(n=58)

t-test on means:  $t=5.88$ , 2-tailed  $p<.001$ )

---

Since it is generally assumed that social identities will be stronger when associated with collectivistic, as opposed to individualistic, ideologies (Brown et al., 1992), it was decided to examine whether such an association was apparent in the current data. Taking first British, and then European, composite identity measures, the sample was split into two groups, based upon those who had responded either above or below the median score. Two between-groups t-tests were then conducted to examine whether there were any significant differences on the composite Ind-Coll measures between the groups. As indicated in Table 76, it emerged that, for both British and European identity measures, respondents who had scores above the median manifested a significantly stronger level of collectivism than those respondents whose identity scores were below the median. This seems to support the notion that collectivism is associated with a stronger level of social identification than individualism. This association is also supported by the finding that both British and European composite identity scores correlate positively and significantly with composite Ind-Coll measures (Table 77).

---

**Table 77 - Correlations between group-specific Individualism - Collectivism and composite identity measures**

**BRITISH IDENTITY:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite British Ind-Coll score:  
 $r=.385$ ,  $n=116$ ,  $p<.001$  (2-tailed)

**EUROPEAN IDENTITY:**

Pearson P.M. correlation with composite European Ind-Coll score:  
 $r=.550$ ,  $n=117$ ,  $p<.001$  (2-tailed)

Note: positive correlations indicate a relationship such that identity increases as collectivism increases.

---

Since the Ind-Coll measures included in the current study focused at individual-level orientations, this appears to demonstrate the utility of examining such individual differences in identity construction, even if British society as a whole is largely individualistic in nature (and this assumption itself is not necessarily unproblematic). It should, however, be noted that the precise nature of the relationship between Ind-Coll and identification is a matter for future research to chart. At present, there appears to be evidence that collectivist ideologies and belief systems encourage a stronger sense of social identification. However, it is not inconceivable that the adoption of a salient, and positively valued social identification might not in turn encourage the internalisation of a collectivist orientation. It may well be that causality is bi-directional in such cases, such that establishing the prior existence of strong social identity or collectivist beliefs may be rather difficult.

### 8.5.7 Goals for European integration

Table 78 below, lists the ten goals for European integration included in the current questionnaire, in ascending order of mean importance rating.

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**Table 78 - Mean importance ratings of goals for European integration**


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-----GOAL-----	--MEAN IMPORTANCE--
(C2) Promoting world peace	8.76
(C4) Helping third world nations	7.94
(C1) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Europe	7.23
(C6) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain	7.05
(C7) Guaranteeing the security of Europe	6.75
(C8) Preventing the loss of separate national identities	6.23
(C3) Reducing trade barriers in Europe	5.90
(C10) Encouraging awareness of common cultural ties within Europe	5.55
(C5) Encouraging a sense of common European identity	4.31
(C9) Creating a new, alternative superpower	3.37

(Response scale: 1 (not at all important) - 10 (extremely important))

ANOVA (repeated measures):  $n=119$   $F=37.011$ , d.f. 9,110,  $p < .001$

"Protected" *t*-tests comparing mean ratings - Significance of differences (2-tailed):

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9
C2	<.001								
C3	<.001	<.001							
C4	.011	<.001	<.001						
C5	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001					
C6	NS	<.001	<.001	.015	<.001				
C7	.039	<.001	.004	<.001	<.001	NS			
C8	.003	<.001	NS	<.001	<.001	.003	NS		
C9	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001	.004	<.001	<.001	<.001	
C10	.002	<.001	NS	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001	NS	<.001

---

From an examination of Table 78, it becomes apparent that promoting world peace was rated as significantly more important than any other goal included in the question. This result is compatible with that obtained from analysis of the first questionnaire data, which indicated that the most popular role for Europe was that of peace-maker. It should be noted that the use of multiple *t*-tests in the current analysis is valid as long as the overall *F* for the analysis is significant. When this is the case, the *t*'s are said to be "protected" against the problem of capitalising on chance. As Rosenthal and Rosnow state, "For most practical purposes, the use of these protected *t*'s is at least an adequate solution and, quite possibly, an optimal one" (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, pps. 328-329).

It is also particularly noticeable that goals associated with symbolic dimensions, and the promotion of a European identity, are rated as less important than most of the other goals. In fact, "Encouraging a sense of common European identity" is rated as significantly less important than all other goals, apart from "Creating a new, alternative superpower". As expected, therefore, the respondents demonstrated little will to forge a sense of common European identity, instead focusing on geo-political and economic dimensions of integration.

In order to examine whether there might be any underlying dimensions in the importance ratings, a Principle Components analysis (PCA) was conducted. Table 79 contains a summary of the results obtained from the PCA, along with a matrix indicating the component loadings after an orthogonal, Varimax rotation was performed on the data. The PCA extracted three components/factors with Eigen values over 1.0, which together were able to account for 60.5% of variance in the importance ratings. From an examination of the rotated factor matrix, it is apparent that the first component appears a relatively complex one, encompassing three economic goals, as well as a security and autonomy-associated goal. In the light of the previous questionnaire and interview data, it could be argued that such goals may well be construed by respondents in a manner such that they in fact are subservient to British interests. Given the superiority British identity enjoyed over its European counterpart on all identity measures, it seems reasonable to suggest that this component may well be reflective of a desire to further British interests using the EC and integration as a vehicle for doing so.

The second factor to emerge from the PCA is somewhat more straightforward, involving the importance of encouraging a sense of European identity, and the perception of common cultural ties in Europe. Together, these goals represent an "encouraging European identity" component. It is important to note how this identity dimension exists as a separate component, serving to demonstrate how British respondents construed the majority of goals for European integration in a manner which divorced them from the notion of forging a sense of European identity. This serves to reinforce the impression gleaned from the interview and open-ended data, that Europe, and a sense of European identity, are rather nebulous concepts for many British respondents. In addition, it hints at the

lack of European symbols available to aid the construction of a Euro-identity (Bloom, 1990). Given that Eurobaromètre and other research (e.g. Furnham & Gunter, 1979) indicates the dominance of economics in British perceptions of integration, that the economic dimension appears to be dissociated from the identity dimension in the current data, once more emphasizes the lack of European identity amongst the British.

---

**Table 79 - Principal Components Analysis of goals for integration**

*Variables entered into the analysis:*

- (C1) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Europe
- (C2) Promoting world peace
- (C3) Reducing trade barriers in Europe
- (C4) Helping third world nations
- (C5) Encouraging a sense of common European identity
- (C6) Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain
- (C7) Guaranteeing the security of Europe
- (C8) Preventing the loss of separate national identities
- (C9) Creating a new, alternative superpower
- (C10) Encouraging awareness of common cultural ties within Europe

*PCA extracted 3 components with Eigen values over 1.00:*

Components:	1	Eigen values	% variance	Cum % var
	1	2.85	28.5	28.5
	2	1.78	17.8	46.3
	3	1.41	14.2	60.5

*Rotated factor matrix (varimax rotation specified):*

	<u>FACTOR 1</u>	<u>FACTOR 2</u>	<u>FACTOR 3</u>
C1	.679		
C3	.419		
C6	.830		
C7	.578		
C8	.651		
C5		.825	
C10		.836	
C2			.765
C4			.772
C9			-.604

(loadings below 0.35 not shown; n=119)

---

In many ways the third factor emerging from the varimax rotation may be thought of as an "altruism" dimension, encompassing the goals of helping the third world, promoting peace, and NOT creating a new superpower. In a similar manner to the two European-identity goals which constitute the second factor, the goals making

up factor 3 would probably not be conducive to construal in a manner which made them subservient to British national interests.

Given that social identities are likely to be associated with social representations, attitudes, and opinions, it was deemed interesting to conduct a further analysis of these goals, this time examining whether level of European identity affected the importance attributed to the goals. Since European identity forms a good scale (standardised item  $\alpha=.873$ ), a composite European identity score was calculated simply by summing together responses to the seven separate Euro-identity measures. The sample was then split into two groups, on the basis of whether respondents scored above the median Euro-identity score ( $n=54$ ), or below the median ( $n=57$ ). This median split allowed the calculation of a between-subjects MANOVA with the importance ratings of the goals for integration entered as dependent measures, and the European identity group (above or below the median), as a between-subjects factor.

It can be seen from Table 80, that there is evidence for an overall multivariate difference in the importance assigned to the goals for European integration, between respondents who are above and those who scored below, the median Euro-identity score (Multivariate  $F=3.892$ ,  $d.f.=10,100$ ,  $p<.001$ ). An examination of the significant univariate differences indicates that, in the case of four goals, those respondents who scored above the median Euro-identity score, rated these goals as significantly more important than those who scored below the median Euro-identity score. Given that two of these goals seem to pertain to a sense of European identity (C5 and C10), it is not surprising that those expressing a greater sense of Euro-identity also rate such goals as of greater importance than those expressing a lower Euro-identity. One can also note that those above the Euro-identity median rate reducing trade barriers, and helping the third world, as significantly more important than respondents expressing a Euro-identity below the median. Finally, it is interesting how respondents below the Euro identity median rated ensuring the economic prosperity of *Britain* as more important than respondents with a Euro-identity above the median. This result seems congruent with Hewstone's (1986) finding that the British often feel they contribute much more to EC funds than the economic benefits of Community membership warrant,

thus suggesting that a focus on the economic side of integration might inhibit the development of a Euro-identity amongst the British. Taken as a whole, such observations support the notion that social identities are likely to be associated with social representations. In this case, it seems that differences in the level of European identity expressed by respondents are also reflected in differences in the importance assigned to various goals for European integration. It seems highly likely that these differences in valued goals are likely to be a reflection of wider differences at the level of social representations.

---

*Table 80: MANOVA comparing goals for integration across Euro-identity*

*Overall multivariate effect (Pillai's Test):*

Value=.280 F= 3.892 D.F.=10,100 Sig. of F=<.001 (n=111)

*Significant univariate effects:*

REDUCING TRADE BARRIERS IN EUROPE (C3)

Above Euro-id median: mean=6.404; Below median: mean=5.333 Sig= .026

HELPING THIRD WORLD NATIONS (C4)

Above Euro-id median: mean=8.281; Below median: mean=7.444 Sig= .045

ENCOURAGING A SENSE OF COMMON EUROPEAN IDENTITY (C5)

Above Euro-id median: mean=5.368; Below median: mean=3.241 Sig=<.001

ENSURING THE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF BRITAIN (C6)

Above Euro-id median: mean=6.702; Below median: mean=7.852 Sig= .020

ENCOURAGING AWARENESS OF COMMON CULTURAL TIES WITHIN EUROPE (C10)

Above Euro-id median: mean=6.123; Below median: mean=5.019 Sig= .030

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)  
 (Response scale: 1 (not at all important) - 10 (extremely important))

---

### 8.5.8 Motives behind British identity

It can be seen from Table 81, that control over others, autonomy, and distinctiveness were perhaps the most strongly endorsed motivations associated with British identity. Taking into account the suggestion, made throughout the previous chapters, that autonomy and control often constitute important motivations behind British national identity, this should come as no surprise.

**Table 81 - Mean endorsement of British identity motives**

-----MOTIVE-----	-----ABBREVIATION-----	-----MEAN RESPONSE-----
Control over others	CON	4.252
Autonomy	AUT	4.241
Distinctiveness	DIS	4.198
Power	POW	3.826
Stability	STA	3.776
Self-esteem	S-E	3.713
Self-Presentation	S-P	3.661

(RESPONSE SCALE: 1 (DISAGREE WITH MOTIVE) - 7 (AGREE WITH MOTIVE))

ANOVA (repeated measures):  $n=112$   $F=4.162$ , d.f. 6,106,  $p = .001$

"Protected" t-tests comparing mean ratings - Significance of differences (2-tailed):

	S-E	AUT	STA	CON	POW	DIS
AUT	.007					
STA	NS	.006				
CON	.003	NS	.016			
POW	NS	.042	NS	.008		
DIS	.002	NS	.011	NS	.028	
S-P	NS	.002	NS	.003	NS	.004

What is particularly interesting, is that the self-esteem measure was endorsed significantly less than the top three motives. Whilst the importance of distinctiveness as a motive is certainly supportive of social identity theory, the relatively low level of support for the self-esteem motive is also rather problematic for Tajfel's variant of the social identity paradigm. There certainly does seem to

be evidence that respondents at least acknowledge the importance of other motives besides simply self-esteem. That distinctiveness appeared to be one of the more prominent motivations behind British identity is also congruent with the suggestion made earlier that, since national identity is often associated with conflictual situations such as war, it may well often be associated with relational or comparative orientations (c.f. Brown et al., 1992). Furthermore, it seems likely that the specific motivations individuals associate with different identities might fluctuate across situations and time. In the context of British perceptions of European integration, it may well be that distinctiveness is valued, regardless of whether such distinctiveness is perceived as positive, negative, or relatively neutral in terms of inter-group comparisons. It also seems highly likely, given the saliency of the national sovereignty issue for the British, that the motives for autonomy and control might be especially linked to British identity when this identity is considered in the context of European integration. One interesting avenue for further research on motivation and identity to explore, is to attempt to map out and perhaps predict what kinds of situations and identities are associated with various motivations, and whether fluctuations in these associations are at all systematic.

#### **8.5.9 Motives behind European identity**

It can be seen from Table 82, that the pattern of motives typically endorsed by respondents when they thought about European identity, is rather similar to that associated with British identity. In particular, one may note the primacy of control over others as a motivation, which was in fact, endorsed significantly more than all other motives in the analysis. Once again, it is also important to observe how self-esteem appears to be amongst the least important motivators included, being endorsed significantly less than control, power, autonomy, distinctiveness, and stability.

Table 82 - Mean endorsement of European identity motives

-----MOTIVE-----	-----ABBREVIATION-----	-----MEAN RESPONSE-----
Control over others	CON	4.283
Power	POW	3.973
Autonomy	AUT	3.774
Distinctiveness	DIS	3.614
Stability	STA	3.605
Self-esteem	S-E	3.211
Self-Presentation	S-P	3.070

(RESPONSE SCALE: 1 (DISAGREE WITH MOTIVE) - 7 (AGREE WITH MOTIVE))

ANOVA (repeated measures):  $n=112$   $F=7.963$ , d.f. 6,106,  $p < .001$

"Protected" t-tests comparing mean ratings - Significance of differences (2-tailed):

	S-E	AUT	STA	CON	POW	DIS
AUT	.003					
STA	.029	NS				
CON	<.001	.012	<.001			
POW	.001	NS	.017	.045		
DIS	.050	NS	NS	<.001	.032	
S-P	NS	<.001	.003	<.001	<.001	.002

It is also interesting to note how self-presentation appears to be the least popular motive amongst those included in the analysis, for both British and European identity. Taking into account the fact that large-scale categories such as those associated with being British or European, are often relatively dormant and low in salience, it is not particularly surprising if they exert self-presentational demands relatively infrequently. What is likely, however, is that during what we have termed *critical situations*, there will be some pressure towards self-presentation as a loyal in-group member. The patriotic fervour often associated with war, for example, carries with it a powerful set of norms discouraging criticism of the nation and actions taken on its behalf. As a final note, it should also be considered that many personality theorists, and especially those of a psychodynamic orientation, would argue that important aspects of motivation may well be relatively unconscious, such

that their existence can only be indirectly assessed via projective techniques. Whatever the merits and pitfalls of such approaches, it does seem likely that some motives may not be tapped by self-report measures of the type utilised in the present questionnaire. In many ways therefore, the aspect of motivation addressed herein is probably best described as part of the self-concept, i.e. that part of the self readily accessible to the respondents.

In order to compare the level of endorsement of motives associated with Britain, with those associated with Europe, a within-subjects MANOVA was conducted, the results of which are summarised in Table 83.

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**Table 83: MANOVA comparing British and European identity motives**

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillai's Test):**

Value=.206 F= 3.829 D.F.=7,103 Sig. of F=.001 (n=110)

**Significant univariate effects:**

**SELF-ESTEEM**

British mean=3.691; European mean=3.236 Sig= .028

**AUTONOMY**

British mean=4.200; European mean=3.755 Sig= .032

**DISTINCTIVENESS**

British mean=4.200; European mean=3.618 Sig= .001

**SELF-PRESENTATION**

British mean=3.655 European mean=3.145 Sig= .015

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)  
(Response scale: 1 (low endorsement of motive) - 7 (high endorsement))

---

Since British identity proved to be significantly stronger than its European parallel, it was not surprising to discover that, overall, respondents endorsed British identity motives more than European motives (Multivariate  $F=3.829$ ,  $p=.001$ ). Analysis of the univariate tests indicated that, in particular, motives associated with self-esteem, autonomy, distinctiveness, and self-presentation were all endorsed to significantly

higher levels for British, compared with European, identity. This provides suggestive evidence that differences in the strength of social identities may also be associated with differences in the degree to which motivations are associated with those identities.

#### 8.5.10 Correlations between identity and motives

In order to assess the associations between motives and quantitative measures of identity, composite British and European identity scores were created by simply summing together each of their seven separate constituent variables. Responses to the motives questions were then correlated with their respective identity score. Table 84 below details the correlations between British identity and responses to the British identity-motives questions. Whilst all motives correlate positively and significantly with the overall identity measure, it is noticeable that self-esteem and self-presentation seem to manifest correlation coefficients markedly greater than those associated with the other motives.

**Table 84: Pearson Product Moment correlations between British identity and British identity motives**

**KEY:**

-----MOTIVE-----ABBREVIATION-----

Control over others	CON
Power	POW
Autonomy	AUT
Distinctiveness	DIS
Stability	STA
Self-esteem	S-E
Self-Presentation	S-P

**Correlation coefficients:**

	CON	POW	AUT	DIS	STA	S-E	S-P
BRITISH ID	.408	.438	.455	.537	.534	.736	.675
	<i>p</i> <.001						

(probabilities are 1-tailed, expected direction being +ve)

Table 85 below, contains the correlation coefficients for the associations between the European identity motives and overall European identity score.

**Table 85: Pearson Product Moment correlations between European identity and European identity motives**

**KEY:**

-----MOTIVE-----ABBREVIATION-----

Control over others	CON
Power	POW
Autonomy	AUT
Distinctiveness	DIS
Stability	STA
Self-esteem	S-E
Self-Presentation	S-P

**Correlation coefficients:**

	CON	POW	AUT	DIS	STA	S-E	S-P
EUROPEAN ID	.356	.206	.109	.180	.186	.512	.548
	<i>p</i> <.001	<i>p</i> =.015	NS	<i>p</i> =.029	<i>p</i> =.025	<i>p</i> <.001	<i>p</i> <.001

(probabilities are 1-tailed, expected direction being +ve)

Once again, it is noticeable that self-esteem and self-presentation seem to correlate more strongly with overall identity than the other motives. All motives correlated significantly and, as expected, positively, with European identity, apart from autonomy, which did not correlate significantly with overall identity score (1-tailed  $p=.127$ ). When considering the results of both the British and European analyses, it is clear that there is a considerable divergence between the motives respondents actually endorsed, and those which correlate most highly with overall identity measures. Whilst self-esteem was endorsed to a significantly lower level than a number of other motives by respondents, the preceding analyses demonstrate that, paradoxically, self-esteem correlates most highly with both British and European identity.

One problem in interpreting such correlations is that the measures of social identity employed were specifically derived from the Tajfel-Turner model of social identity, and as such, can not be assumed to reflect all aspects of British and

European identity. Furthermore, just because self-esteem seems highly correlated with these *quantitative* measures of British and European identity, this need not mean that self-esteem is as important an aspect of some of the more *qualitative* dimensions. From pilot studies conducted across all three phases of the current research, it became evident that some aspects of identification at the national and European level are rather difficult for respondents to conceptualise clearly and discuss in questionnaires and interviews. As we have already suggested in previous chapters, social identities associated with large-scale categories can often lie dormant, with individuals perhaps not being fully aware of the relationship between their sense of self-esteem and self-presentational strategies, and the identity in question. This supports the notion, raised earlier, that some aspects of motivation may be partly inaccessible to individuals. Furthermore, the current results serve to emphasize the need for further research into the most profitable ways the associations between motives and social identities might be investigated.

Despite the relatively low correlations between most of the motivations and the overall identity measures, it should be stressed that almost all motives correlated significantly and positively with the identity measure. This means that, whilst self-esteem and self-presentation were dominant, the other motives are still associated in some way with British and European identities, and should not be dismissed. Even if self-esteem maintenance does underlie much of social identity construction, this does not detract from the fact that other motives can be linked with identities, perhaps serving at a basic level, the self-esteem motive, which might therefore lie behind other, more specific motives. Given the actual motives respondents consciously endorsed in the current study, it can be concluded that there is at least enough evidence to warrant a broadening of the motivation issue in social identity so that the drive for positive distinctiveness is not assumed to hold a monopoly in terms of motivational effects upon social identity.

#### 8.5.11 Political Orientation

Since some 59.7 per cent of respondents indicated that they did not vote in the last British general election, it was decided to focus on responses to a question concerning self-perceived left-right wing orientation. However crude such a dimension might appear, pilot interviews indicated that it made sense to

respondents, who had relatively little difficulty in placing themselves on the dimension. In order to facilitate comparisons, the sample was split into those whose responses broadly came under the label "left-wing" (scores 1-3, n=43), and those who might be labelled "right wing" (scores 5-7, n=36).

From the previous questionnaire research, and given trends apparent in the Eurobaromètre surveys, it was expected that both British and European identities would vary according to the political sympathies of respondents. In particular, it was predicted that British identity would prove significantly stronger for Conservative voters. In contrast, it was expected, given the results of the previous questionnaire and Eurobaromètre data (e.g. Eurobaromètre #34), that European identity would prove stronger for Labour voters.

As indicated in Table 86 below, a between-subjects MANOVA analysis comparing British identity amongst left versus right-wingers, indicated an overall tendency for right-wingers to manifest a significantly stronger sense of British identity (multivariate  $F=3.55$ ,  $p=.003$ ). Univariate measures indicated that this difference occurred on five out of the 7 quantitative identity measures.

Since British identity has proven stronger for respondents tending towards the right of the political spectrum in two separate studies now, it seems that this association may be relatively stable at present. However, against expectations, a further MANOVA analysis indicated that there were no significant differences in overall level of EUROPEAN identity, between left and right-wingers (n=80; multivariate  $F=1.542$ , d.f.=7,72,  $p=.166$ , no univariates approaching significance). It seems to be the case that this merely serves to demonstrate how issues associated with the EC and European integration fluctuate in terms of their associations with particular political ideologies and parties. Whilst in Europe, there is an overall trend for left-wing parties and their supporters to be more pro-European than their right-wing counterparts, in Britain it is often much more difficult to perceive clear-cut party differences. The key in many ways often appears to be the desire to simply take the opposite stance to that adopted by one's opponents. As a further example of this fluctuating relationship between politics and European issues in Britain, it is worth recalling Himmelweit and associates' finding that during the

late 1970s, orientation to Europe *was* associated with clear-cut party differences in the U.K., and a good predictor of voting intentions (c.f. Himmelweit et al., 1981). In conclusion, the networking between British identity and political orientation seems more stable than that between European identity and politics, at least in Britain.

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**Table 86: MANOVA comparing British identity across political orientation**

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillais Test):**

Value=.259 F= 3.550 D.F.=7,71 Sig. of F= .003 (n=79)

**Significant univariate effects:**

**"To what extent do you feel British?"**

Left-wing: mean=4.558 Right-wing: mean=5.472 Sig= .005

**"To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?"**

Left-wing: mean=4.209 Right-wing: mean=5.417 Sig=.001

**"How important to you is being British"**

Left-wing: mean=3.395 Right-wing: mean=4.778 Sig=.002

**"How much are your views about Britain shared by other British people?"**

Left-wing: mean=3.977 Right-wing: mean=4.583 Sig=.030

**"When you hear someone who is not British criticize the British, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?"**

Left-wing: mean=3.698 Right-wing: mean=4.861 Sig=.004

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)  
(Response scale: 1 (low identity) - 7 (high identity))

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However, orientations to Britain and Europe have their qualitative as well as quantitative aspects, and this being the case, a MANOVA was conducted to investigate whether left and right-wingers differed in the importance they attached to the goals for European integration included in the questionnaire (Table 87).

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**Table 87: MANOVA comparing importance of goals for integration across political orientation**

**Overall multivariate effect (Pillai's Test):**

Value=.268 F= 2.565 D.F.=10,70 Sig. of F=.011 (n=81)

**Significant univariate effects:**

Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain

Left-wing mean=6.773; Right-wing mean=8.000 Sig= .033

Preventing the loss of separate national identities

Left-wing mean=5.432; Right-wing mean=8.081 Sig=<.001

(Significance levels derive from F-tests, and are 2-tailed)  
(Response scale: 1 (not at all important) - 10 (extremely important))

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It can be seen from an examination of Table 87, that there is evidence for a multivariate difference in importance ratings (Multivariate  $F=2.565$ ,  $p=.011$ ). Significant univariate differences occur on two questions, with right-wingers in both cases rating the goal as more important than left-wingers. The first goal pertains to the economic prosperity of Britain, with the second suggesting that the preservation of separate national identities is important. Given the fact that right-wingers appear to manifest a stronger level of British identity, it is not surprising that they should stress these two dimensions, both of which have dominated the mass media coverage of European issues (c.f. Sotirakopoulou, 1991), as well as being prominent themes in responses to the previous questionnaire and interview studies. What is perhaps most pertinent about these two goals, is that they both tend to have the interests of Britain at their heart, as indeed, many right-wing respondents appear to have. In as much as goals endorsed are reflective of the acceptance of social representations of European integration, then the results obtained may be taken as an indication that right and left-wingers may adopt somewhat different social representations of European issues. It may also be the case that whilst general level of identity and attitudinal support for the EC and European integration might fluctuate considerably, the endorsement of social representations might be expected to be more stable, given their tendency towards self-perpetuation.

## **8.6 CONCLUSIONS**

### ***8.6.1 British and European identities***

Across three separate studies, evidence has now accumulated suggesting that British identity is significantly stronger, more salient, and more positively evaluated, than European identity, on quantitative and qualitative measures of social identity. Data from the current questionnaire indicated the supremacy of British over European identity, on all social identity measures. In fact, taken as a whole, the data suggest that as yet, British respondents feel little sense of European identity - a conclusion which is highly congruent with the findings of past research, which has indicated a distinct British dislike of the prospect of European integration going any further than its economic dimensions (CEC, 1988; Furnham & Gunter, 1989; Sotirakopoulou, 1991). Clearly, caution is required in making generalisations from the current research, which has used student respondents, to the British population as a whole. However, given the congruence of the results reported herein and those obtained by other researchers, as well as the Eurobaromètre surveys, there is good reason to expect similarly low levels of Euro-identity amongst the British population as a whole.

### ***8.6.2 Interdependence***

Despite there being highly significant differences in the strength, salience, and evaluation of British and European identities, perceptions of the existence or lack of, interdependence in Britain and Europe were not significantly different. In support of our previous argument that what is critical is the evaluation of interdependence, rather than its existence per se, it was found that respondents rated interdependence amongst the British as significantly more desirable than interdependence between the nations and peoples of Europe. Whilst the association of common fate with perceptions of interdependence (c.f. Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988) certainly does encourage group formation and self-categorisation, interdependence can also be associated with perceptions of control. This is precisely how interdependence can actually act as a barrier to European identity, since some

British respondents felt that interdependence - even if economically beneficial - somehow meant a loss of control and autonomy for Britain.

Evidence in the current questionnaire study suggested that evaluations of interdependence are correlated with the Ind-Coll dimension, such that interdependence is evaluated more positively as orientation becomes more collective. In as much as perceived interdependence is supposedly associated with collectivist orientations and cultures (Triandis et al., 1986, 1988), then future research might profitably seek to investigate whether Rabbie and Horwitz's arguments are limited to collectivist milieux, or individuals who have internalised collectivist beliefs (what Triandis and associates refer to as the allocentric personality).

### 8.6.3 *Possible selves*

The issue of European integration is clearly one which encourages, perhaps demands, that citizens take a look at their national identities, and their corresponding perceptions of the past, present, and future possibilities for such identities (Schlesinger, 1991). Despite being an era in which many social identities may be undergoing change and re-formulation, individuals usually attempt to manufacture some sense of stability and continuity for their self-concepts (Marris, 1974; Goffman, 1959a, 1959b; Breakwell, 1986). In the current study there was suggestive evidence that respondents often attempted to bring their sense of self in line with their predictions of the future. Thus, analyses indicated that those respondents who felt being European would become more important, had significantly higher levels of European identity than those who felt being European would become less important. This result is congruent with the phenomenon of "anticipatory identification" apparent in interview responses and discussed at length in earlier chapters. Despite the alternative possibility of social identification actually leading to a positive sense of a future possible self, at this stage the anticipatory identification hypothesis appears most congruent with the data.

#### 8.6.4 *The Autonomous-Relational dimension (c.f. Brown et al., 1992)*

Analysis of the questionnaire data indicated that respondents reported making more frequent intergroup comparisons when thinking about Britain than when thinking about Europe. This suggests that orientations to Britain are perhaps more relational in nature than orientations to Europe. In-keeping with what one would expect from the hypotheses of Brown and associates (1992), and, indeed, from social identity theory in general, strength of relational orientation proved to be significantly and positively correlated with strength of identity, for both British and European identity. It seems to be the case that those respondents who adopted a European identity also engaged in intergroup comparisons. Further research might endeavour to discover whether it is in fact the case that manifestations of European identity in Britain tend to be associated with relational orientations. In the light of the qualitative data already collected, it might be argued that engaging in comparisons is perhaps one of the most practical means of conceptualising Europe and a possible European identity. It was certainly the case that comparing Europeans with North Americans, for example, seemed to help interviewees perceive being European in a manner which made phenomenological sense.

Contrary to the findings of Brown and associates (1992), evidence emerged in the current study for a positive correlation between relational and collectivist orientations. Despite differences in terms of operationalisation of these concepts, this does, nevertheless raise the question of whether one can assume a priori, that a relationship will not exist between two systems of beliefs, or indeed, whether there is sufficient evidence to predict the direction of any association, as Triandis has done (Triandis et al., 1986; 1988; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990). It seems more realistic to adopt an exploratory perspective at this early stage of research, and endeavour to determine under what circumstances an association might be found, how stable it might be, and so forth.

### 8.6.5 Individualism-Collectivism

The work of both Triandis and Brown predicts that social identities will be adhered to with more vigour when they are constructed within collectivist milieux, or by individuals adopting a collectivist orientation. In the current questionnaire study, data supported such a hypothesis, indicating that both British and European identities were significantly stronger for those respondents who endorsed a collectivist orientation. In keeping with the discovery that British was significantly stronger than European identity, it was also discovered that respondents tended to adopt a more collectivistic orientation to Britain than they did towards Europe. There remain some rather awkward, and perhaps even potentially insoluble issues here concerning order of causality: for example, what comes first, social identification or collectivist orientation? Despite such troublesome issues, it remains imperative to further investigate the significance of such belief systems for social identity construction.

### 8.6.6 Goals for European integration

In a manner highly congruent with the data emerging from the previous questionnaire and interview studies, it emerged that respondents tended to focus on economic and geo-political goals. In contrast, goals associated with symbolic/sentimental attachments to Europe, and the forging of a European identity, tended to be amongst the least important to respondents. This serves to indicate that it is not just level of enthusiasm which is different for the British, compared to, for example, the Italians, but also the nature of hopes and fears about integration - i.e. social representations of Europe and the EC, of what might be achieved, and crucially, of what *should* be achieved. As one might expect if social identities are related to social representations, a MANOVA also indicated that respondents who had a European identity score above the median differed significantly in their ratings of the importance of various goals for integration, when compared to respondents who had Euro-identity scores below the median.

### *8.6.7 Motives behind British and European identities*

In the previous questionnaire and interview studies, evidence emerged suggestive of the need to add autonomy, control, and power, to the list of potential motivating forces acting upon social identity construction. In the current questionnaire, respondents endorsed statements associated with these motivations to a greater extent than statements associated with the self-esteem motive which has been the solitary focus of the Tajfel-Turner school. This was the case for motives behind both British and European identities. A MANOVA analysis comparing motives associated with British and European identities indicated that on four of the motives, respondents endorsed statements to a greater extent when thinking about Britain, than when thinking about Europe. This also provided evidence suggestive of the possibility that weaker social identities might engage the individual's motivations to a lesser extent than stronger identities, as Oakes (1987) and others have hypothesised. Despite these results, it was also found that self-esteem and self-presentation correlated particularly highly with composite identity measures, raising the possibility of an element of incongruence between self-report measures and underlying motivational associations between identity and motives. Such observations underscore the urgent need for a more detailed examination of the methodologies most suited to investigating the important links between motivation and social identity.

Despite the possibility of unconscious motivating forces, the current results nevertheless support Abrams' recent call for a much more detailed analysis of motivation and its role in social identity (Abrams, 1992; see also Deaux, 1992). It may well be the case that the motivations associated with social identities are also partly linked to particular situations. Given the frequent association of the sovereignty issue with British perceptions of European integration, it was not surprising to note how autonomy and distinctiveness appeared to be important motives behind British identity in the current study. Since the link between motives and identity may be the key to improved predictive power in our theories of social identity, there is much to recommend the further development of research in this area (see also Markus & Nurius, 1986; 1987).

### ***8.6.8 The role of politics in British and European identity construction***

Once again, evidence emerged from the current questionnaire data that respondents who labelled themselves as "right-wing" had significantly higher levels of British identity than those who labelled themselves "left-wing". Taking into consideration similar trends apparent across Europe in the Eurobaromètre data, as well as data from the previous questionnaire and interview studies, there seems good reason to suggest that this networking between political affiliation and sense of national identity is likely to be relatively stable.

In contrast, while left-wingers were expected to manifest a significantly stronger sense of European identity than right-wingers, there were found to be no significant differences on this dimension. This is interpreted as further evidence of how European issues have been used as something of a political football in Britain, with different parties appearing to adopt different stances in order to simply appear different to their opponents. However, it is interesting to note that right-wingers in the current study rated goals associated with maintaining the economic prosperity of Britain, and protecting national identities, as more important than left-wingers. It seems that such differences in the goals associated with European integration may be reflective of more general differences at the level of social representations of integration. The possibility exists that despite the unstable nature of the networking between political and European identities, differences in terms of the social representations adhered to, may be somewhat more stable.

The data emerging from the current questionnaire appear to confirm the utility of studying European integration, as a vehicle for the further development of the social identity paradigm. Many of the issues concerning motivation, the role of social representations and wider belief systems, as well as possible selves, have the added benefit of further developing our rather scant knowledge of the social psychological implications of European integration. Some of the more profitable ways this promising focus of research might be continued are addressed in the next two, and final, chapters.

# Chapter 9

## Conclusions 1: National and European identities

### 9.1 On the nature of national identity

Data collected over the three phases of the current research has proved useful in illuminating some of the facets of national, and particularly, British, identity. Of course, in many ways the notion of a "British" identity is a simplification, since many British citizens feel more comfortable exerting their English, Irish, Scottish, or Welsh identities (c.f. Crick, 1991; Parek, 1989). Nevertheless, to the extent that there are elements of British life which tend to impose a "British" identity, then it is valid to analyse the constituent elements of such an identity, whilst accepting that it might be accompanied by a more specific regional type of identity. A similar argument can be made concerning Italian identity.

National identity, despite gaining relatively little attention from social psychologists, is potentially the most powerful social identity an individual might come to adopt (Scheibe, 1983; Tajfel, 1970; Turner, 1984). This being the case, it is rather unfortunate that when social identity theory is applied in unmodified form to the study of national identity, it often appears rather inadequate. In this sense the study of national identity is particularly useful - it may essentially act as a devil's advocate for social identity theory, highlighting areas where the paradigm is particularly weak, and at the same time, allowing theorists to experiment with possible solutions which might extend SIT in useful directions.

One of the reasons for the potency (Hofman, 1988) of national identity, is because national sentiments are often instilled from an early age, during education and socialisation (c.f. Doob, 1964; Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966). This may well be a time in which social identities and representations are particularly malleable. National

identity is uniquely placed to offer *all* citizens of a nation a common sense of identity and comradeship, and to link such an identity to a national past rich in historical and cultural significance (A.D. Smith, 1991). Furthermore, national governing bodies have the potential to exert a powerful influence upon the citizens of a nation, and are perhaps in a better position than most other groups to influence the dissemination of social representations (Doob, 1964).

Like many large-scale social identities, national identity may often lie dormant, relatively low in salience, but, crucially, maintaining an inherent ability to exert a powerful influence upon citizens *when aroused* (see also Samuel, 1989a). In the interview study, it emerged that national sporting events, and, of course, wars, are highly likely to make British, and, most likely the majority of national identities, salient. One additional property of national identities, is a tendency for their intertwining with other social identities in individuals' identity repertoires, such that the social representations associated with national identity may well be largely determined by some of the *other* social identities adopted by citizens. The primary candidate here is often *political* identity. In both the 1991 and 1993 questionnaire studies, it emerged that political affiliations affected the quantitative dimensions of British identity, such that Conservative voters expressed a stronger and more positive sense of British identity, than Labour voters. It seems likely that such interconnections between social identities will also be manifested at the more qualitative level of social representations, and, furthermore, that a number of other social identities might well also interact with national identity - racial, regional, and religious identities, for example, are all possible mediators of national identity. It was interesting to note how the Italians, for example, often seemed to mediate their national identity with regional identities, but that, in contrast to the British, political identity did *not* seem to mediate Italian national identity, at least in quantitative terms. One of the most important conclusions to be drawn here is that national identity, being large-scale and diffuse in nature, allows a variety of conceptualisations, such that "being British" might well mean something quite different to different citizens in Britain. The key point, is that much depends on the social representations of Britain which are endorsed, this choice being made from quite a variety of sometimes diametrically opposed representations. One of the ways in which individuals are helped in making their selection from these

available social representations, is via the recommendations of other social identities which might be networked with national identity.

National identity, being a rather complex construct, might usefully be broken down into some of its more crucial elements. These include, amongst other things:

- i) *Geographical representations* of the nation, its landscape, climate, etc.
- ii) Representations of national *culture* and *heritage*.
- iii) Awareness of the nation as a *historical entity*.
- iv) *Civic identity* - that part of national identity specifically associated with the state and national institutions.
- v) *Linguistic identity* - especially in nations with one or more unique languages.
- vi) Representations of the national populace - of special significance are perceptions of *national characteristics*.

Since national and other similarly complex social identities appear to possess multiple dimensions of this nature, it is certainly over-simplistic, and rather difficult to justify, the operationalisation of the national identity dynamic in over-simplistic ways which may do injustice to the complexity of the concept. Reducing the cultural and historical elements of national identity to quantitative variables, for example, seems absurd, and this being the case, such complex phenomena demand a variety of research methodologies and perspectives, if their many facets are to be fully appreciated. Furthermore, it seems likely that *all* elements of these identities need not be in harmony. Where one element of the identity might be associated with embarrassment or regret, this might be compensated for by another dimension of the identity. An excellent example of this appears to be the tendency of Italian respondents in the current research to express considerable distaste at the inefficiency of Italian bureaucracy, corruption, and so forth, but to compensate for this, and still be able to manufacture a positive national identity, by stressing the value of Italian culture, and perceived aspects of the Italian national character.

There is a sense in which individuals might come to *customise* their social identities, much in the same way that Breakwell (1991) has suggested they customise social representations. For example, this might be manifested in the *orientation* or *type of attachment* individuals adopt towards the identity. Kelman (1969), for example, himself specifically interested in national identity, proposed that some individuals develop *sentimental* attachments to the nation, which are based on emotional ties to national culture and symbols. National identity based upon sentimental attachments is likely to be particularly robust and affect-laden, and is usually accompanied by the internalisation of a nationalistic ideology. Those individuals who reject such ideologies might still develop an attachment to the nation, but one which is based on *instrumental* dimensions, such as gains versus losses type analyses of the benefits associated with citizenship, satisfaction with political organisations and public services, etc. While the distinction between sentimental and instrumental attachments may sometimes appear blurred, Kelman has nonetheless provided a useful conceptual tool for examining the different manifestations of national identity, and, it is suggested here, such a distinction can also be usefully applied to the subject of *European* identity. Despite the limitations of such potentially simplistic heuristic devices, it is, nevertheless, interesting to note how the sentimental-instrumental distinction is highly congruent with similar notions suggested by Hewstone (1986), Inglehart & Reif (1991), and others. In as much as different orientations might in turn be reflected in differences at the level of motivations associated with identities, then such constructs might aid the further investigation of the motivational bases of social identification. There would be much utility in future research which attempted to investigate the situations, social representations, and so forth, which influence the orientation adopted towards a social identity.

In the current study, open-ended questionnaire and interview responses suggested a multi-dimensional British identity, encompassing instrumental orientations based largely upon satisfaction with democratic and other state institutions, but also strong sentimental orientations to Britain, deriving from a powerful attachment to national culture and heritage. The royal family proved to be an especially salient symbol of Britain (c.f. Billig, 1992; Nairn, 1989; Samuel, 1989a; 1989b), although it is worth noting that aspects of British prototypes and

general objects of national pride also evinced a degree of situational fluctuation, such that events occurring in close temporal proximity to the data collection were often mentioned by respondents. This being the case, given the recent problems experienced by the British monarchy, it may well be that their role as symbols of Britain is threatened. For the Italians, the kind of "gains versus losses" type analyses associated with instrumental attachments to the nation were much more difficult to maintain, meaning that Italian national identity was largely symbolic in nature. This is a qualitative difference in identity construction - at the more quantitative level of strength, salience, and affect, associated with national identity, Italian identity proved no different to its British counterpart.

One further aspect of national identity in Britain and Italy is particularly significant for the social identity paradigm. In the course of the current study, it became apparent from qualitative responses that motivations for control and power were important aspects of national identity, in both Britain and Italy. These suspicions were further confirmed when a quantitative analysis of the 1993 questionnaire data suggested that motivations for control and power were more closely associated with British identity than the motive for self-esteem. Such observations serve to confirm the theorising of Doob (1964) and Stagner (1967), and raise doubts as to the adequacy of Tajfel and Turner's (1979/1986) Social Identity Theory, which focuses exclusively on self-esteem maintenance as the sole motivating force behind social identity construction.

## 9.2 The social psychological manifestations of European integration

### *9.2.1 Attitudes are not enough*

The vast majority of scholarly work which has examined the psychological import of European integration has adopted an attitudinal approach (see, for example, the Eurobaromètre surveys; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, 1971, 1977; Inglehart & Reif, 1991). Whilst attitudes are potentially important aspects of beliefs and actions, an equally relevant issue is where these attitudes come from. In their seminal discussion of the relationship between attitudes and social representations, Jaspars

and Fraser (1984) suggest that we might usefully conceive of attitudes as shared between the members of social groups, and as serving to differentiate between groups in society. The conception of the attitude they develop also rests heavily on the assumption that shared attitudes in turn presuppose shared representations. Since social representations might, in turn, be associated with social identities, then it should be clear that attitudes are also likely to be linked to social identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In fact, it is interesting to note that functional theories of the attitude (e.g. Katz, 1960; Abelson & Prentice, 1989) have often included the notion that attitudes serve an identity function. Furthermore, the association between group membership and attitudes was explored quite thoroughly by theorists working within the *reference group* tradition (see, for example, Charters & Newcomb, 1958). There would, therefore, seem much utility in adopting an approach to attitudes in the future, which also takes into account their basis in social identities and representations.

The current research may be interpreted as attempting to redress this overly attitudinal bias in work on European integration. One of the primary aims of the current research has been to chart the effects of integration on national identity in Britain and Italy, and to examine the evidence for a European identity. It has become clear over the course of the research that this is a critical period for national and European identities in Europe, with the fate of one being intertwined with that of the other. Moves towards further European integration demand that citizens re-think the meaning and nature of nationhood. At the same time, one should note that existing social representations of nations and Europe constitute a context and background within which new social representations may be negotiated. These new representations may therefore derive in part from a re-working of existing social beliefs, with new and potentially challenging social representations being *anchored* into more comfortable, existing systems of beliefs (Moscovici, 1984). The major vehicle for the dissemination of these social representations is the mass media - especially newspapers and television (Schlesinger, 1991). When citizens come to construe their national, European, and other social identities, they do so only after taking stock of the pertinent social representations available to them.

It is, therefore, almost impossible to ask questions about national and European identities without also raising the issue of relevant social representations on which such identities are based. Since representations of European nations, and even of European integration, have been circulating in society for a good few centuries now, the study of European integration is certainly not just the study of *new* social representations - it is the study of how new representations are networked and anchored into existing ones, and, furthermore, how such networks of representations lay the foundations for the construction and re-formulation of social identities.

### *9.2.2 European integration as an "expert domain"*

Despite expressing a certain amount of interest in European integration, the general public in most European nations possess a disturbingly low level of knowledge about European matters and the E.C. (Hewstone, 1986). In the current research it became apparent that both the British and Italian respondents felt confused about integration, as if the whole issue demanded much more knowledge than they had in their possession. This perception of European integration as an "expert domain" was compounded by a feeling of distance and lack of control - citizens did not feel they had the opportunity to influence the progress of integration. To an extent, therefore, citizens perceive themselves as isolated from the whole European process - in this light, it is perhaps not surprising that many citizens remain rather ignorant of European politics. The danger of perceiving European issues in this light is that it may act as a barrier to the development of a European identity - as Breakwell (1992) has recently suggested, perceptions of low self-efficacy tend to promote withdrawal from political activity.

### *9.2.3 European integration and the British*

Almost all of the existing empirical research on European integration suggests that the British are, at best, rather sceptical about the European project (see, for example, Eurobaromètre opinion polls; Furnham & Gunter, 1989; Hewstone, 1986; Sotirakopoulou, 1991). While the British remain generally in favour of E.C. membership, Eurobaromètre opinion polls usually show them both to be the least

enthusiastic supporters of the EC, and to be particularly unhappy at the prospect of integration proceeding beyond its economic dimensions.

British national identity proved to be significantly stronger than European identity across two separate questionnaire studies conducted as part of the current research. These differences emerged on fixed-response measures of social identity which have enjoyed widespread use amongst followers of the Tajfel-Turner tradition (c.f. Tajfel, 1974; J. C. Turner, 1987). Evidence that the European identities manifested by British respondents were relatively weak when compared to their national identities, was also forthcoming from the interview study. Here, it was apparent that British respondents found it quite difficult to think of *anything* which made them feel proud to be European, but had far fewer problems when discussing objects of *national* pride. In fact, not only did the British respondents express significantly lower levels of European than national identity, but they often construed these two social identities as *mutually incompatible*, or what Hofman (op. cit.) might have called *dissonant*.

Given the congruence of qualitative and quantitative data across all three phases of the current research, it seems that there is good evidence that British national identity is stronger, more salient, and more positive, than its European counterpart. When considered in the context of previous research (e.g. Hewstone, 1986; Furnham & Gunter, 1989; Sotirakopoulou, 1991), and the extensive Eurobaromètre surveys, there seems little reason to suggest that the current results will be limited to the student subject groups on which they were based. A strong British national identity, and a weak, poorly defined European equivalent, seems compatible with the existing body of, albeit largely attitudinal, data.

The current analysis of European integration was not meant to be exhaustive. Thus, whilst suggesting some of the reasons for this lack of European sentiment in Britain, it should be noted that there may well be other important bases for such feelings which are not addressed herein. One of the primary barriers to European identity in Britain appears to be the frequent construal of British and European identities as *incompatible*. Many British respondents perceived integration as a threat to British sovereignty, and associated further European

integration with losing control over national matters, something which is likely to be aversive, especially if national identity is associated with a desire for control. Thus, British and European identities were networked as incompatible, or what Hofman termed *dissonant* (Hofman, 1988). These observations, which largely derive from analysis of qualitative data, are highly congruent with Hewstone's quantitative analysis of attitudes to the E.C. (Hewstone, 1986). Here, it was found, for example, that attitude towards Britain was *negatively* correlated with attitude towards the E.C.

This fear of losing national sovereignty, which has also been manifested in the British mass media (c.f. Sotirakopoulou, 1991), is linked to social representations of Britain's imperial past. In some ways, therefore, to accept a loss of sovereignty demands that British citizens abandon or reject social representations which stress Britain's past glory, which dwell on a time when, ironically, Britain's sphere of influence was *expanding* rather than shrinking (see also, Crick, 1991; Hewstone, 1986). That social representations of the imperial past appear to enjoy a marked longevity is not surprising, given that national identity often involves a glorification of the national past (Samuel, 1989a; A.D. Smith, 1991).

A further element behind the lukewarm orientation of the British to Europe, is their tendency to construe European issues in purely instrumental terms. Thus, British respondents focused on the economic aspects of integration, feeling that the most important role for Britain to play in Europe is an economic one, and limiting their perceptions of integration to the E.C. In general, British respondents showed a marked unwillingness to perceive some of the wider possibilities for European integration which exist, beyond those associated directly with the European Community. Thus, for example, British respondents felt that the differences between European cultures were more important than any superficial similarities, and found it immensely challenging to think of any symbolic or cultural basis for European integration. This being the case, it was not surprising to find a distinct lack of symbolic attachments to European identity, with integration typically being discussed with little or no emotion.

Rather than perceiving similarities between Britain and other European nations, the British respondents found these other European nations to be useful outgroups to compare Britain with, stressing that Britain was essentially different to all other European nations. This result, which is highly congruent with that obtained by Lyons and Sotirakopoulou (1991), was based on representations of Britain which suggested that culturally, geographically, historically, and linguistically, Britain is different to other nations, and that these differences should not be ignored.

Given that the underlying base of social representations required for the formation of a large-scale social identification, is perhaps in a rather embryonic state as far as European identity is concerned, it is not altogether surprising that current manifestations of such an identity in Britain remain rudimentary and fragile, with a tendency towards instrumental, rather than sentimental, orientations. However, it is significant that the existing social representations of European integration circulating in Britain appear to be predominately negative, especially in terms of the prospects for integration going beyond the economic dimension (c.f. Hewstone, 1986; Sotirakopoulou, 1991). The British mass media in particular, have frequently used negative metaphors when discussing European matters, sought to fuel the deep-seated British distrust of the French, and voiced considerable concern over the threat integration poses to sovereignty and national identity (c.f. Hewstone, 1986; Robinson, 1991; Sotirakopoulou, 1991).

It should be stressed that some British respondents certainly did appear willing to adopt a pro-European stance and perhaps to augment this with some form of European identity. Usually, such positive European sentiments were accompanied by a temporal outlook focusing on the future, rather than the past-oriented orientation adopted by many anti-European respondents. In fact, an analysis of the 1993 questionnaire data, indicated that respondents who felt being European would become more important by the year 2000, expressed significantly higher levels of European identity than those who felt it would become less important. This suggests that a more positive orientation towards a European future is often associated with at least an embryonic sense of European identity. It also raises the question of whether the notion of possible selves might be useful in our

analysis of European integration, and this is a subject we will return to later in the current discussion.

However, it tended to be the case that, where the semblance of a European identity did appear to exist, usually in a fragile embryonic form, this was an identity relatively devoid of affective associations, one lacking in any perception of a European culture and repertoire of accessible European symbols. Often, European sentiments were construed as subservient to British identity, such that European integration was supported only to the extent that it could be perceived to be in Britain's interest.

One further element of British orientations to European integration, concerns the frequent interconnections forged between political affiliations and European sentiments. These interactions between political and European identities in Britain are often rather more complex than seems to be the case in other European nations, such as Italy. Whilst in Europe, there is an overall trend for left-wing parties and their supporters to be more pro-European than their right-wing counterparts (c.f. recent Eurobaromètre surveys), in Britain it is often much more difficult to perceive clear-cut party differences. This fluctuating relationship between political and European identities was apparent in the current research. In the first phase questionnaire, Conservative respondents expressed a significantly weaker, and more negative European identity than Labour voters. However, in the third phase questionnaire, there were found to be no significant differences on European identity measures between left-wing and right-wing respondents, in-keeping with the unstable relationship between politics and European issues in Britain. However, it is interesting to note that there was suggestive evidence that the social representations of integration endorsed by respondents might be associated with political affiliation. Thus, in the third phase questionnaire study, it became apparent that right-wing respondents were more concerned with matters of sovereignty and protecting Britain's economic interests, than left-wing respondents. Given the fact that right-wingers often appear to manifest a stronger level of British identity (see chapters 4 & 8), it is not surprising that they should stress these two dimensions, both of which have dominated the mass media coverage of European issues (c.f. Sotirakopoulou, 1991).

#### 9.2.4 *European integration and the Italians*

Eurobaromètre opinion polls almost always indicate that the Italians are perhaps the most enthusiastic of E.C. citizens when it comes to supporting the E.C. and the general notion of European integration. In contrast to the British, the Italian respondents in the current research manifested a European identity which, overall, was significantly stronger than their Italian national identity. In particular, it appeared that the Italian respondents expressed higher levels of European than national identity specifically on salience and affective dimensions. As one might expect, the Italians expressed a significantly stronger European identity than the British respondents, with a particularly noticeable tendency for European identity to be more salient for Italian respondents. Thus, the current research serves to demonstrate how the attitudinal differences highlighted by previous research also seem to be manifested at the level of social identities.

This difference in level of European identity between the British and Italian respondents can not be explained simply in terms of quantitative differences in *national* identities, since there was no evidence for the latter. However, there were important *qualitative* differences in social identity construction. Of particular significance was Italian respondents' tendency to construe national and European identities as *mutually compatible*, and even mutually reinforcing. This finding was compatible with Hewstone's observation that Italians' attitudes towards Italy proved to be *positively* correlated with their attitudes towards the E.C. (Hewstone, 1986). In the E.C. and European integration, many Italian respondents perceived an opportunity to counter the corruption and inefficiency which has become the trademark of Italian national politics and public services. While the British find integration a threat to national sovereignty, in many ways the Italian respondents desired the E.C. to have *more* control over national matters, in a manner highly congruent with attitudinal data emerging from the Eurobaromètre polls. Certainly, therefore, *one* aspect of Italian pro-Europeanism appeared to be an attempt to compensate for a relatively weak and threatened Italian *civic* identity (see also Barzini, 1983).

Another qualitative difference between Italian and British orientations to Europe, was the Italian respondents' tendency to adopt a European identity characterised by both instrumental and sentimental dimensions. Italian respondents certainly were aware of the economic benefits of integration, however they also felt the cultural dimensions were valuable. Whilst Italian respondents were often ethnocentric in evaluating Italian culture, at the same time they were able to readily perceive links between their own and other European cultures. Many Italian respondents perceived the fate of Italy to be ultimately bound up with that of Europe. Thus, whereas the British tended to perceive a largely economic and political role for Europe in the future, the Italians also perceived the possibility of Europe being a cultural centre. The important point here is that Italian perceptions of their cultural ties with Europe offer the possibility of sentimental-symbolic orientations to a European identity. Furthermore, the Italian perception of cultural ties in Europe signifies how Italian constructions of European identity are not simply confined to the EC and the perceived benefits of Community membership. This may well demonstrate the need for future research to appreciate that the social psychological manifestations of European integration need not be restricted to a focus on the EC, but may incorporate wider perceptions of European culture, history, and so forth.

The Italian construction of national and European identities as mutually compatible is crucially dependent upon the existence of social representations in Italy which are favourable towards European integration and the E.C. Unlike Britain, in Italy the subject of European integration has caused considerably less political debate, and it was therefore not altogether surprising to find in the current research that European identity in Italy did not vary with political affiliation. In addition, the mass media in Italy have tended to adopt a rather positive orientation towards European integration and the EC. There has certainly been much less concern about the EC encroaching upon national sovereignty than that voiced in Britain. This favourable mass media attitude appears to be mirrored in that of the Italian people, at least, as far as opinion poll data are concerned.

One of the more subtle factors able to differentiate between those who are broadly pro-European and those who feel wary of European integration, is the

nature of the temporal perspective adopted. Those few Britons who *were* eager to embrace a European identity tended to adopt a *future-oriented* perspective, dwelling on what *might* be achieved. In a similar manner, the Italian respondents were much more concerned with the future, typically feeling that European integration was an endeavour with great potential. Such opinions are congruent with Eurobaromètre data which indicate that the Italians do not necessarily feel they have gained a great deal *yet* from EC membership - the crucial point is that they feel they may do so *in the future*. In essence, therefore, there are indications that a European identity is more likely when a positive and future-oriented temporal perspective towards Europe is adopted.

It is hoped that the current research demonstrates the utility of an approach to European integration which examines both social identities and social representations. Given the fact that evidence arising from the current research suggests that European identity may be a significant predictor of attitudes towards Europe and the E.C., it seems that future research in this area might profitably examine in greater detail the associations between attitudes, identities, and representations. It is becoming increasingly difficult to justify research which assumes such constructs exist in relative isolation - clearly then, the study of European integration, in a sense itself demands an integration of social psychological perspectives and theories. Furthermore, to the extent that theorists in other social sciences are also studying European integration, and often using psychological constructs to do so, it seems there exists an excellent opportunity for inter-disciplinary collaboration.

#### *9.2.5 Strengthening and weakening European identity: some suggestions*

The integrative approach which begins to emerge from the perspective forwarded in the current discussion has certain implications for the future of European integration. If integration is to be readily embraced then it requires both favourable social representations and, to an extent, the acceptance of some form of European identity. Both of these pre-requisites are in many ways already in existence in Italy. Thus, below, we limit the discussion to Britain. It is possible, given the observations of the current and previous research, to sketch out in a general way

some of the factors which might facilitate a more favourable climate towards integration and the EC in Britain. These might include:

- A) Encouraging perceptions of an *outgroup* with which to compare Europe with. There is certainly nothing quite like an outgroup, in terms of power to encourage in-group homogeneity and solidarity. From the current research, it emerged that the U.S.A. and Japan are already used by some British and Italian respondents as out-groups for Europe (see also Billig, 1992a, 1992b, regarding the USA as an outgroup). However, given that recent research in the social identity paradigm has pointed towards the possibility of groups which make few intergroup comparisons (Brown et al., 1992), one should perhaps ask the question: should a comparative European identity be encouraged when it might lead to potentially conflictual intergroup relations?
  
- B) Make European identity and orientations towards integration more *multidimensional* in Britain. If the Italian example is informative, then it might be wise to encourage a greater awareness of the *cultural* possibilities inherent in European integration, and to stress that these do not in any way threaten national culture, but rather complement it. Such a development largely depends on changes in the identity orientation adopted by British citizens, which in turn relies on social representations of integration being broadened to include cultural dimensions. The key point here is that European integration *can* be perceived as more than just the EC and economic integration, and if perceptions are broadened, then they might be more resilient when EC membership sometimes appears detrimental to Britain in economic terms.
  
- C) *Networking* national and European identities so that they are perceived as *mutually compatible*, rather than conflictual. One way in which this might be achieved is by turning temporal perspective from Britain's past, to its possible future. The encouragement of

*positive possible European selves* might in turn come to be associated with a degree of *anticipatory identification* (c.f. Chapter 6) with Europe. Alternatively, national and European identities might be construed as *unrelated*. Italy, the U.S.A., and other nations, serve to demonstrate the viability of both regional and national identities which can co-exist in a relatively harmonious manner. There is no reason to suppose that a homologous construction of national and European identities might not also be possible. If European identity is posited as a truly *continental-level identity*, then it could co-exist with national identities. The crucial point here is to remove the destructive perception of European integration and Euro-identity as a *threat* to national identity in Britain.

- D) Give citizens a *greater sense of participation* in European integration, whilst at the same time *de-mystifying* European issues so that citizens feel such issues should concern them.
- E) *Balancing mass media representations of integration and the EC.* As the primary source of social representations concerning European issues, the mass media must be encouraged to adopt a more balanced approach to such matters, and to avoid where possible the kind of trivialisation so tempting to the tabloids. It is only by means of a change in the social representations circulating in society, that the changes in social identity construction recommended in points A-C above might be possible. As Breakwell (1986) noted, it is difficult to maintain a social representation when representations at the societal level are against you. At present, it seems that societal representations of integration in Britain militate against the development of a European identity.
- F) *A European socialisation and education.* Attitudes and general emotional orientations to nations are forged rather early in childhood, before children are even able to fully comprehend what

nations and continents actually are (Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966). Furthermore, education often instils a particularly nationalistic perspective on world history, such that the similarities, cultural and historical ties between European nations, tend not to be presented (see also Robinson, 1991). It seems, therefore, that a European identity would be most robust if also instilled during this critical period, when socialisation in the family and via education has such power to instil favoured social representations and identities. There are already encouraging indications from the Eurobaromètre opinion polls that, across Europe, the young are perhaps the most enthusiastic about integration. This suggests, perhaps, that social representations and social identities might be more malleable at an early age. It is also compatible with the notion that future-oriented possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1987) might be especially important for younger people.

These suggestions are tentative in nature, and by no means meant to exhaust the list of possible strategies by which a European identity might be instilled. In as much as social psychologists often have little power to influence the mass media, educational practices, and so on, then the realisation of these strategies might be over-optimistic. We do not feel the need to detail possible strategies which might be employed by those who would wish to *prevent* or *stifle* a sense of European identity - such people, it would appear, are realising their aims quite successfully in Britain at present, without any need for advice from social psychologists. It is worth noting, however, that the antithesis of many of the strategies outlined in points A-F could also be employed by those who wished to *prevent* the emergence of a European identity and pro-European orientation. For example, such individuals might choose to downplay the possibility of any European outgroup(s); attempt to maintain a unidimensional and instrumental orientation to Europe; suggest that national and European identities are incompatible; continue to distance European issues from the general public; diffuse negative social representations of integration via the mass media; and ensure a strongly nationalist and anti-European environment in early socialisation and education.

# Chapter 10

## Conclusions 2: Social identity theory: where next?

### 10.1 *Charting the fluctuating boundaries of social identity theory*

Tajfel's original Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974) has stimulated a very wide variety of research, and undoubtedly contributed to our knowledge of intergroup relations (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Doise, 1988). Part of the attractiveness of Tajfel's theory was its simplicity: much of intergroup behaviour, it was argued, could be explained in terms of categorisation processes and the search for positive distinctiveness. Tajfel assumed that questions concerning individual differences and the nature of the self could be conveniently ignored, especially given his focus on *intergroup* processes and times when collections of individuals acted in relative unison (c.f. Tajfel, 1981).

Despite some innovative and successful implementations of social identity theory (c.f. the edited volumes, Tajfel 1978, 1982), there remained something of a cleavage between Tajfel's theorising and the operationalisation of social identity by many of his followers (see also Doise, 1988). This is particularly noticeable when one considers Tajfel's later writings, when he came to stress on numerous occasions the importance of social representations and widespread beliefs for social identity construction (c.f. Tajfel, 1984). Coupled with an important paper on social stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981), this later stage of Tajfellian thinking was clearly quite far removed from the early experiments on categorisation which had proved the catalyst for social identity theory (c.f. Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Tajfel et al., 1971). It is ironic that, just as Tajfel was stressing the significance of these social factors, many of his followers were exploring social identity using experimental operationalisations of highly dubious external validity, having latched onto the minimal group paradigm and the cognitive notion of categorisation, but ignored the later Tajfellian ideas (c.f. Fraser & Foster, 1984; Lalonde, Moghaddam, & Taylor, 1987).

When John Turner collaborated with Tajfel to create a model of macro-level group processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979/1986), the outcome was an innovative attempt to introduce notions of the underlying social beliefs concerning groups in a society, into a social psychological analysis of intergroup relations. As such, the model has much to say about the bases of prejudice and relative deprivation. Despite a slight "looseness" of definition (c.f. Abrams, 1992), the macro-level model developed by Tajfel and Turner remains one of the most valuable theoretical insights to emerge from Tajfel's social identity theory, and it is unfortunate that in many ways the model has not been explored to the extent that it deserves. One of the reasons for this relative neglect of the Tajfel-Turner model is perhaps the dominance of cognitive perspectives on group processes, which has arisen in recent years, especially in North America (see, for example, Stephan, 1985).

If Tajfel seemed to move away from cognitive approaches to social identity as his thinking developed, John Turner seemed to do the opposite. By the time Turner's ideas about social identity had fully matured, they had become "a cognitive redefinition of the social group" (Turner, 1982). When the collection of papers constituting *Rediscovering the Social Group* were published in 1987 (Turner et al., 1987), the social identity theory originally developed by Tajfel was modified and extended in order to encompass the complete range of both *inter* and *intra*-group phenomena. In this sense, this marked a transition, when the Tajfel-Turner approach to social identity ceased being a theory, and became a paradigm, a particular way of looking at group processes and a whole range of other issues, in much the same way that the psychoanalytic perspective has been applied to a wide variety of topics.

This audacious attempt by Turner and his followers to extend the boundaries of social identity theory rests on the key assumption that self-categorisation underlies *all* group processes. Whilst Tajfel was always willing to recognise the validity of other concepts besides social identity, which might also illuminate intergroup relations, Turner is much more eager to stress the primacy of self-categorisation: while variables such as perceptions of common fate, interdependence, and so forth, might be relevant, they only operate *after* self-categorisation has taken place, or so Turner would have us believe.

However, whilst simple, elegant theories are the dream of many a social scientist, the array of different phenomena encompassed by the umbrella term "group processes" makes it rather unlikely that a single theory can do justice to all phenomena concerned. Some of the current flaws in self-categorisation theory (SCT) are problems which have been carried-over from Tajfel's theory, and remain unresolved. Other weaknesses arise from Turner and associates' extension of the boundaries of the social identity paradigm. It is imperative that these problems are dealt with if the social identity paradigm is to develop in a useful manner in the future.

## 10.2 Current weaknesses in the social identity paradigm

### 10.2.1 *Individual differences and the nature of "self" are ignored*

As mentioned earlier, Tajfel assumed that matters of individual differences and the self-concept could be ignored in social identity theory. It would appear that this assumption has been carried-over into Turner's SCT (c.f. Abrams, 1992; Schiffman & Wicklund, 1992), although the latter theory does have more to say about the nature of self (Deaux, 1992). Recently, it has been suggested, or sometimes implied, that the social identity paradigm can not be conveniently divorced from such issues any longer (see for example, Abrams, 1992; Breakwell, 1986, 1991; Deaux, 1992). The adequacy of *motivational constructs* contained within the social identity paradigm is one case in point. It is noticeable that self-esteem maintenance *via positive distinctiveness* has often been the *only* motivation directly addressed by social identity theorists. Even if self-esteem does lie at the heart of many group processes, it is not necessarily the case that positive distinctiveness is the most likely way self-esteem will be maintained.

Tajfel's primary interest was in developing a theory which enhanced our knowledge of the dynamics underlying intergroup conflict (Tajfel, 1981). In the sense that his social identity theory was based on the notion of categorisation and comparison processes, it is not altogether surprising that positive distinctiveness was posited as the means by which self-esteem maintenance was undertaken. Turner's SCT is much less specific about the motivations underlying social

identification or self-categorisation, appearing to endorse Tajfel's additional focus on simplification as a motivation behind categorisation, but leaving the question of positive distinctiveness and self-esteem rather open. Where Tajfel's SIT is flawed in its exclusive reliance on positive distinctiveness, Turner's theory is just as problematic in the sense that it says virtually *nothing* about motivation. This is rather surprising, given Turner's desire for SCT to become a general theory of group processes. A cursory glance at any detailed textbook on group dynamics would soon indicate the plethora of motives which have been forwarded as the basis for group behaviour (see, for example, Forsyth, 1990). In distancing SCT from individualistic theories of group behaviour, such as Lott & Lott's (1965) attraction theories, it would seem that Turner has also chosen to ignore the huge body of existing research on group dynamics, which certainly has much more to say about individual differences and motivations than the social identity paradigm.

Theorists not directly associated with the social identity paradigm have often had illuminating insights into the role of motivation in social identity, which Turner and associates would do well to examine. Deaux, for example, has made the interesting suggestion that attachment to ascribed social identities is more related to "fundamental questions of meaning and self-knowledge" than self-esteem motivations (Deaux, 1992, p.26). In a similar vein, Mitchell (1981) has proposed that being a member of a large-scale social group such as a nation provides the individual with a sense of psychological comfort and security. Abrams, one of social identity theory's champions (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988), has proposed that consistency, control, material wealth, meaning, power, self-efficacy, and self-knowledge all be added to the list of motivating factors associated with social identity (Abrams, 1990; 1992).

Despite the utility of Tajfel's focus on intergroup conflict, groups do not *always* engage in conflict, and it is just as important to explain everyday social identity construction in relatively pacific groups (see also Breakwell, 1991). Caddick (1982) has made the excellent point, for example, that, if social identity theorists paid more attention to co-existence between groups, the paradigm might have much more to say about the *resolution* of intergroup conflict. In addition, recent theorising in the social identity paradigm suggests the possibility of groups which

do not rely on frequent intergroup comparisons, groups which seem much more involved in *intra*, rather than *inter*-group dynamics (c.f. Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Brown et al., 1992). In such *autonomous groups* (Brown et al., op. cit.), positive distinctiveness often seems to take second place to motivations such as psychological security, stability, and so forth. If the social identity paradigm is truly the complete theory of group processes John Turner (1987) claims it is, then the motivations behind autonomous groups must be examined, and urgently.

Over the three empirical phases of the current study, evidence emerged which seemed to demonstrate how motivations of power and control appear to play an important part in the construction of both national and European identities, especially in Britain. British respondents demonstrated in open-ended responses a marked concern for matters of sovereignty, and a desire to exert control over world affairs, both of which seem suggestive of the importance of control and power motivations in the current context.

In the third phase of research, British respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they either agreed or disagreed with a variety of motives which might potentially be associated with British and European identities. It was found that control, autonomy, and distinctiveness were the most strongly endorsed motivations associated with British identity, with the self-esteem measure being endorsed significantly less than the top three motives. In a similar manner, control was endorsed significantly more as a motive behind European identity, than all other motives included in the analysis. However, it was also found that endorsements of the self-esteem motive correlated highly with overall measures of British and European identity. Taken as a whole, these results do not suggest that self-esteem is not an important motivating force behind national and European identities. What they do suggest, is that self-esteem is unlikely to be the **ONLY** motivation behind social identity construction, and also that positive distinctiveness is only one of many possible means for the achievement of positive self-esteem. Given the relative success of Tajfel's SIT in the field of intergroup conflict, it may be that positive distinctiveness is often the primary motive behind social identity in such contexts. The addition of alternative motivations seems particularly useful, and necessary, when theorists attempt to apply the social identity approach to non-

comparative groups and situations. It may even be the case that the motives associated with a particular social identity, and the means by which such motives might be satisfied, could fluctuate across different situations. For example, given the salience for the British of the sovereignty issue in relation to European integration, it may be that control and autonomy motivations are highly likely to be salient when British identity is made salient *in the context of European integration*.

One of the more problematic issues here concerns the nature of motives: in particular, are the motives gleaned from self-report measures valid? Some personality theorists, and especially those adopting a psychodynamic perspective, might suggest the significance of *unconscious* motivations which might only be accessed by projective techniques. In the current research, there was found to be something of a discrepancy, for example, between self-report measures of motives and the actual correlations of motives with social identity scores. This is clearly one of the many potential areas of social identity construction which touches other areas of psychology. In this case, it is important that social identity theorists do not waste time engaging in debates which have already been aired in the fields of personality and motivational psychology. In order to make the study of social identity processes manageable, researchers must ensure their focus is specifically based on an analysis of motivations *in relation to group processes*. One of the more promising avenues for further research may be a development of the notion of *possible selves*, which constitute individuals' notions about their self in the past, present and future (Markus & Nurius, 1984;1986;1987). The simple but elegant idea that individuals are motivated to achieve valued possible selves and to avoid feared ones, may be one promising means of making the link between social identity and motivation more concrete. There also seem interesting possibilities to integrate work on possible selves with the quite compatible work emerging from symbolic interactionist perspectives on *self-narratives* (see, for example, Mancuso & Sarbin, 1983). It seems likely, however, that the possible selves concept will need to be expanded in order to allow for the possibility of shared possible selves which might develop within a group. Such possible selves might thus come to be contained within social representations which might exist in both culture and cognition.

One of the ways an individual might come to "customise" his or her social identities, in the same way that Breakwell (1991) has suggested they might customise social representations, is by creating networks of associations between different identities. For example, an individual might come to perceive links between their political affiliations and their sense of national identity. These associations between multiple social identities raise questions about how such associations might be organised, whether organisational structure might be relatively stable, and so forth. It is unfortunate that much social identity research continues to endorse, usually implicitly, the assumption that, in any given situation a single social identity will have the most consequence for individuals, usually because it is highest in *salience*. Assumptions of this nature have resulted in the neglect of issues pertaining to the nature of interactions between *multiple* group memberships (c.f. Allen, Wilder & Atkinson, 1983; Breakwell, 1991; Deaux, 1992; Nesdale, 1989). If social identities are networked together, then this also has consequences for social representations, in as much as it raises the possibility of social representations associated with two or more social identities intermingling. Furthermore, to the extent that social identity networks might come to be shared between group members, and even enshrined in social representations, then it should be clear that networking does not just take place at an individual level, but at *multiple levels*.

The current research sought to demonstrate how national and European identities have become intertwined or *networked* through the process of European integration, and to this extent, how a focus on either identity in isolation would be somewhat naïve. To the extent that social representations contained in the mass media have sought to present European integration as a threat to British national identity, then it seems that, at the societal level, there is pressure to network British and European identities as incompatible and dissonant (Hofman, 1988). Whilst individuals have the ultimate choice in how they organise their multiple social identities, in as much as social identity maintenance is a negotiative process, then they will be constrained by the networks recommended by society and the groups to which they belong.

The further development of our knowledge of individual differences and their effects upon social identity might also enhance our understanding of the processes through which social identities change. Clearly, change in identities takes place at multiple levels, and might involve the group as a whole, or particular individuals. Changes might involve the modification of group boundaries, the adoption of different strategies of identity maintenance, etc., with many such changes relying on consummate changes in the social representations associated with the group. Whilst the Tajfel-Turner model of macro-group relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979/1986) provides a useful framework for exploring changes in social identity, there remain some crucial questions associated with change at the individual level. For example, when an individual abandons a social identity, what happens to the social representations associated with that identity? Are these also abandoned by the individual, or have such representations become internalised to such an extent that they are no longer strictly associated with the group in question? Can once abandoned social identities re-emerge when situations encourage their salience? Questions such as these must be addressed if our knowledge of social identity construction is to be complete (see also Breakwell, 1986; Deaux, 1992).

#### 10.2.2 *Social representations and widespread beliefs are often ignored or reduced to quantitative variables*

Whilst many current social identity theorists pay lip-service to the notion that social identities and social representations are intimately related (see, for example, Hogg & Abrams, 1988), there is a conspicuous absence of social representations from much of the empirical and detailed theoretical work within the social identity paradigm. One of the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm towards social representations is undoubtedly the imprecise nature of the concept. Yet the key notion of beliefs which are socially constructed and come to be shared between group members, is one which most social psychologists would have difficulty disagreeing with. The crucial point is that there are many alternative perspectives one might adopt in order to investigate social beliefs. In many ways the social representations approach offers a *perspective*, rather than a well-defined theory.

Apart from the notions of *anchoring* and *objectification* (Moscovici, 1984), social representations theory has tended to promote a wide variety of empirical studies, but rather fewer theoretical studies of the *process* of social representation.

One of the most important points to emerge from the social representations approach is the fact that representations come to constitute ways of seeing the social world (Moscovici, 1984), such that they lie behind more concrete and finite beliefs like attitudes (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984), and attributions (Ichheiser, 1949; Farr & Moscovici, 1984). Furthermore, to the extent that social representations might become enshrined in the mass media and cultural artifacts, then they can be said to exist in both culture and cognition (Farr, in press). Perhaps one of the major reasons why the social representations approach does seem different to many similar perspectives, is the stress given to the *content* of social beliefs, with Moscovici forwarding a strong argument that content and process can not be divorced (c.f. Moscovici, 1984; 1988). Whilst social cognition and other approaches have tended to dwell on the processes influencing content, the social representations approach is often used to investigate the opposite mechanism - how the content of social beliefs influences social perception and behaviour (see also Moscovici, 1988).

One way in which the social representations approach has often seemed incompatible with the social identity paradigm is in terms of the methodologies typically employed. Despite some interesting uses of quantitative measures of social representations (see, for example, Sotirakopoulou, 1991), it is usually the case that the focus on the contents of social beliefs best suits a qualitative research methodology. This stands in marked contrast to the predominantly quantitative and experimental approaches to social identity often employed by Turner and his followers. Since Tajfel's original social identity theory and his later theorising contained an implicit, and sometimes explicit (see, for example, Tajfel & Forgas, 1981), acceptance of the role of social representations, it is not surprising to note that there is much more qualitative work on social identity which derives from Tajfel, rather than Turner's, theorising (see, for example, Bourhis & Hill, 1982; Giles & Johnson, 1981). However, whereas in studies of social identity, qualitative data

are usually relegated to preliminary pilot studies, in the social representations paradigm, they are more often given pride of place.

An excellent example of an area which would benefit from a synthesis of social identity and social representations perspectives, is the study of *stereotypes*. Despite Moscovici and Hewstone's argument that stereotypes are simpler and more rigid than social representations (c.f. Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983), we would argue that much hinges on how one cares to define stereotypes. Tajfel's notion of the *social stereotype* (Tajfel, 1981) as akin to a theory about groups and intergroup relations in a society, seems very similar to the notion of a social representation. When stereotypes do appear rather more limited than social representations, is when they are reduced to overly-simplistic quantitative measures of the personality traits associated with various social groups (see for example, Katz & Braly, 1933). Whilst Tajfel stressed the complex nature of social stereotypes, Turner, especially in developing his theory of social influence, has encouraged the kind of operationalisation of stereotypes which reduces the richness of language and visual imagery to a quantitative concept of stereotype which is as far removed from Tajfel and Moscovici's concepts as it could conceivably be.

This cleavage between Turner's definition of stereotypes and that forwarded by Tajfel, is particularly noticeable in the recent wave of studies which have sought to demonstrate the situational nature of stereotypes (see, for example, Haslam et al., 1992). Whilst *some* elements of stereotypes may well fluctuate with situational demands, like social representations, stereotypes also seem to evince relatively stable core structures which often prove quite resistant to change, and can even come to be shared across a variety of different social groups, as appears to often be the case with stereotypes of national characteristics (c.f. Peabody, 1985; Chapter Four of the current study). Furthermore, stereotypes can also become enshrined in mass media social representations, and as such, these representations create a context within which individuals and social groups must manoeuvre when constructing their own interpretations of the associated stereotypes. Tajfel's notion of the social stereotype, especially when seen in the context of his accompanying ideas regarding social representations and myths informing social identity

construction (Tajfel, 1980), seems perfectly compatible with the notion of stereotypes evincing a resilient core structure, and, furthermore, being contained in both culture and cognition. In contrast, the recent theorising and operationalisations of Turner and associates seem quite incompatible with the notion of stereotypes as a form of social representation.

In fact, whilst Tajfel's late theorising stressed both the individual and, crucially, group-related functions of stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981), Turner and associates' theorising and operationalisations of the stereotype concept seem to focus on how *individuals* make stereotypic judgements. It is indisputable that individuals make stereotypic judgements which often serve their valued group memberships. However, the operationalisations of stereotypes used by Turner and associates fail to take account of how stereotypes can be communicated between group members, and thus come to be shared social constructions, in essence, social representations. Whilst referent informational influence and self-stereotyping provide pointers as to how individuals perceive the stereotypes pertinent to their group, the SCT model seems an impoverished treatment of the shared, consensual nature of stereotypes, how they are communicated, contained in language and imagery, and might come to be carried in the mass media. To this extent, Turner's SCT provides only half an analysis of stereotypes, focusing on individual stereotypic perception, but leaving the nature of social stereotypes rather under-explored.

Another form of social representation or widespread belief which has been neglected until recently, pertains to the existence of individualistic and collectivistic beliefs in society (c.f. Brown et al., 1991;1992). As discussed at some length in the previous chapter, conceptual thinking on these issues is somewhat imprecise and muddled, with some of the thorniest issues being the operationalisation of concepts, and the level(s) at which such constructs operate. It certainly seems indisputable however, that beliefs about the nature of groups, and the individual's role in society, are likely to have a considerable influence upon group processes and, therefore, social identity construction. In the current study, it was discovered, for example, that overall level of social identity seems to be positively correlated with the adoption of a collectivistic orientation, at least as far as national and

European identities for the British are concerned. Furthermore, the possibility that the individualism-collectivism and autonomous-relational dimensions might be correlated should be examined in greater detail since, despite Brown and associates' findings indicating no association, in the current research, data suggested a positive correlation between collectivism and relational orientations.

Brown and associates (*op. cit.*) may well be correct in suggesting that individualistic orientations to groups raise some serious problems for both SIT and SCT, and it remains to be seen whether the social identity paradigm will be able to survive the threat to its ecological validity posed by individualistic orientations to groups. There are, however, two highly valuable consequences of this line of enquiry for the social identity paradigm. Firstly, such issues demand that social belief systems are given much more emphasis than has previously been the case. Secondly, given the apparent existence of interesting cross-cultural differences in individualism-collectivism (*c.f.* Triandis et al., 1985;1986;1988; Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990), this line of enquiry also encourages further investigation of the cross-cultural validity of the social identity paradigm, something which can only benefit both the paradigm and the study of group processes in general (*c.f.* P.B. Smith, 1991).

### *10.2.3 All social groups and categories are treated equally*

Part of the attraction of both SIT and SCT was that both theories seemed applicable to all manner of social groupings (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1984). The social identity paradigm has given rise to a large body of empirical research which has focused on an extremely wide variety of different groups. Unfortunately, despite the undoubted attraction of a general theory of group processes, one should not ignore the fact that certain groups do often appear to be quite different to one another, both in terms of their essential characteristics, and, crucially, in terms of the social psychological processes which they encourage. In the current discussion, our focus has been on large-scale social categories such as national and European groups, and their associated social identities. It has been our argument that social identity processes in such large-scale entities may operate somewhat differently to the ways traditionally forwarded by the social identity paradigm.

One useful conceptual distinction is worth making here, between large-scale *categories* (LSCs) and large-scale *groups* (LSGs). Large-scale categories such as nationality, are usually associated with diffuse and varying norms and social representations, and often appear to lack a clear-cut group structure. In contrast, large-scale groups, such as political parties or pressure groups, may have more clearly perceptible and homogeneous group beliefs, and a more rigid and noticeable group structure. What both LSCs and LSGs share in common is a *scale* which means that group processes often occur within *sub-groups* of the wider grouping, with it sometimes being impossible for group members to have knowledge of, or interact with, all other group members. This means that social influence processes are much more complex in such groups, where John Turner's *prototypical positions* are potentially constructed in much more complex ways than his operationalisations would suggest (see, for example, Turner, 1987;1991; Turner & Oakes, 1986;1989).

In large-scale social entities, in-groupers might conform to the norms of particular sub-groups, but not be overly concerned with those forwarded by other sub-groups of the wider category. In a similar manner, self-presentation and audience effects may be specifically associated with particular sub-groups. It is when examining large-scale social categories and groups that the significance of *networking* also becomes even more evident. Here, since the sub-groups within which the wider grouping is experienced, can themselves come to constitute the source of social identifications, then LSCs and LSGs can often be said to be networked with, or *mediated* by, other social identities. Abstract social categories associated with rather fuzzy and indistinct social representations, may well make more sense when perceived through the perceptual filter of another, more concrete social identity, and its associated social representations. For example, it seems to be the case that political affiliations are often associated with social representations which encourage the perception of the nation in a particular manner. In this sense, national and political identities can be said to be networked, with the perception of national identity being mediated by the social representations associated with political identity.

Since perceiving the beliefs and norms of large-scale categories and groups is potentially problematic, the mass media play a crucial role, since it may be only via newspapers, television, and film, that large numbers of category members can be reached. The media also serve to increase the *salience* of LSCs at certain times. It seems to be the case that identities based on potentially diffuse social category memberships often lie dormant and below everyday consciousness thresholds (R.H. Turner, 1987). This, however, should not disguise the inherent *potency* (Hofman, 1988) such identifications have *when aroused*, and it is the media who often play a large part in encouraging their re-emergence. Future research might endeavour to investigate what we might call *critical situations* - these are events, situations, perhaps just locations, which are especially likely to make particular social identities salient. It is already fairly obvious that war, for example, almost always represents a critical situation for national identity. The charting of such critical situations might enable a better understanding of when large-scale social categories and groups may come to influence behaviour and social perception. In part, such recommendations are reminiscent of Walter Mischel's call for a social psychology of situations (Mischel, 1977; see also R.H. Turner, 1987).

Since the mass media play such a crucial role in defining representations and manipulating the salience of large-scale categories and groups, there is an urgent need for further analysis of the mechanisms by which the media achieve such effects. It can not be assumed that mass media effects are easily predicted and studied (c.f. Roberts & Bachen, 1981; Roberts & Maccoby, 1985; Sotirakopoulou, 1991), and there remains much work to be done if media effects are to be usefully examined in the context of group processes and social representations. Clearly, further social psychological investigation of this field would benefit both the social representations and social identity paradigms.

One of the more significant conclusions to be drawn from this examination of large-scale social categories and groups, is essentially that there may be a need to distinguish between different *types* of social group. Whilst SIT and SCT have assumed the widespread applicability of the social identity paradigm to all groups, this should be an empirical issue, a hypothesis to be tested, rather than a taken-for-granted assumption. Despite the undoubted success of many empirical studies in

the social identity literature, there have been no attempts to explore in a systematic manner the possible differences between types of group. In the current discussion we have attempted to delineate some of the typical properties of large-scale social categories and groups which seem particularly problematic for the social identity paradigm, at least in its current manifestation. There may well be other types of group which also pose problems for the paradigm (dyads, for example), and this being the case, there would seem much utility in future research which sought to classify, in a systematic manner, some of the different categories of groups, and their typical properties.

#### *10.2.4 Social identity processes have been explored using operationalisations of questionable validity*

The self-categorisation approach to social influence (Turner, 1987; 1991) provides an excellent example of how key concerns in the field of group processes have been examined within SCT using experimental operationalisations which should be a cause for concern. Turner's referent informational influence model of social influence (Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989) is largely based upon laboratory experiments where the process of social influence is reduced to brief, decision-making encounters, during which group norms and beliefs are conveniently reduced to positions on fixed-response scales, with potentially disastrous consequences for external validity. Unfortunately, outside the environment of the psychological laboratory, conflicting norms, stereotypes, and social representations clamour for the attention of in-groupers, who are typically not armed with a battery of questionnaires for their fellow in-groupers to complete and thus aid them in discerning the group's beliefs. The referent informational influence model leaves the possibility of group beliefs becoming enshrined in relatively stable social representations unexplored. Furthermore, the treatment of group leadership and status structures, which might conceivably have cross-situational stability and, crucially, interact with social influence forces, is woefully inadequate. Leadership, for example, seems to involve much more than simply being perceived as prototypical of the category, despite what Turner and his associates would have us believe (see, for example, Turner & Oakes, 1989).

Relying as it does on the notion of in-groupers attempting to perceive and internalise prototypical group positions, the referent information influence model is seriously compromised by its failure to adequately define the nature of prototypes and how they come to be perceived. For example, the particular definition of prototype adopted by Turner and associates is not adequately differentiated from the myriad of existing definitions in cognitive psychology (see, for example, Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Rosch, 1978). One is left wondering whether group prototypes are abstractions, notions of "ideal" group members, or perhaps related to the notion of currently salient *exemplars* of the category (c.f. Smith & Zarate, 1990). During the course of the current research, it emerged that perception of in-group prototypes pertaining to the British may be rather difficult, lending further weight to the argument that social influence is more complex in large-scale social entities. Here, the existence of multiple prototypes, and prototypes which evince a greater degree of situational stability than Turner seems to allow, both suggest weaknesses in Turner's model of social influence. Furthermore, Turner and associates, perhaps due to a reliance on decision-making methodologies, have tended to ignore situations in which groups might come to exert a degree of indirect influence on individuals when they are actually alone, perhaps via group-related communications, or even just by individuals *thinking about* the group's beliefs and norms.

If Turner's SCT is to offer a complete theory of social influence, then it should perhaps have more to say about those occasions when non-membership groups exert influence over individuals. Whilst there have been quite successful attempts to explain minority influence using social identity processes (see, for example, Mugny & Papastamou, 1982), Turner's model still appears problematic when one considers the possibility that social groups which are not minorities, might still influence individuals. Such possibilities were highlighted by Shibutani and others working within the *reference group* tradition of research (c.f. Shibutani, 1955). It is possible, for example, that a group in which one is not a member, a group which one has no desire to become a member of, might still exert a degree of social influence over oneself. This might be achieved by the group in question forwarding social representations which we accept, since we respect the opinion of the group in question, or perhaps because we are coerced into accepting the social

representations of this group. The latter phenomena might be related to differences in intergroup power structures, and is compatible with Deschamps' interesting analysis of power and its possible consequences for social identities (Deschamps, 1982).

### 10.3 Towards a new social identity perspective: methodological and theoretical suggestions

The tendency towards questionable operationalisations of concepts in Turner's SCT outlined above, is perhaps a consequence of a rather narrow-minded approach to methodology. A great number of different methodologies have been utilised by social scientists in order to examine social identity construction, and it is unlikely that any single methodology offers a satisfactory tool for the study of such a complex construct (Hofman, 1988).

Across the three phases of the current research, a variety of different methodologies and operationalisations have been employed in order to investigate questions of social identity and social representation. The cross-national questionnaire study indicated that graphical methods of summarising and displaying data can be highly useful, with multidimensional scaling proving to be a useful tool for the investigation of social identity. The traditional quantitative measures of social identity used so frequently by followers of Tajfel and Turner, also proved to be useful, highlighting interesting differences between national and European identities, and facilitating the kind of straightforward comparative analyses which quantitative data seem well suited to. However, one of the most noticeable methodological observations to emerge from the current research, was how quantitative and qualitative data complement one another, providing different but equally valid perspectives on issues, as well as highlighting dimensions of social identity construction which the other measures may have missed. During the course of the current research, open-ended questioning, in both interviews and self-completion questionnaires, proved to be particularly useful, especially when the focus of interest was on how social identities might be associated with social representations. This is primarily because social representations lose some of their vitality and dynamism when they are reduced to quantitative measures.

Furthermore, interviews proved particularly suited to exploring the finer ways in which individuals manage their identity repertoires and come to "customise" both their social identities, and their social representations.

The theoretical perspective which emerges from the current discussion is one which suggests the need to amalgamate the study of social identity and social representation. This hybrid perspective has numerous implications for methodology, some of which have already been examined. One of the notions to emerge from the current research, for example, is the need to appreciate that social identities and representations are likely to be intertwined in *networks* of varying complexity. To the extent that both individuals and social groups might come to create and manipulate such networks, they may be said to exist at multiple levels - i.e. at the individual and group levels. Some of the most crucial questions concerning networks of identities have been puzzling social scientists for many decades now. These include how individuals might cope with potentially incompatible social identities, whether individuals manage their multiple identities in an organised manner, and how the overall identity repertoire possessed by individuals might affect particular social identities.

One reason why social identities might come to be tied together, is because they might be associated with the same, or highly compatible, social representations. It is just as crucial to trace the interrelationships between different social representations, as it is to do likewise for social identities (Breakwell, 1991). Unfortunately, it can be extremely difficult to perceive where one social representation starts and another ends, but this does not mean that networking can be discarded, simply because it is difficult to trace.

The addition of networking to the study of social identities does not necessarily mean that it is no longer feasible to study a single social identity in depth. What networking does suggest, however, is that the relationships between different social identities should be given more attention. Where the social identity in question proves to be especially associated with one or two other social identities, then it might then prove beneficial to broaden the investigation and examine all of the concerned identities, giving special emphasis to their interaction.

An excellent example of the utility of such an approach is provided by the current research, which seems to suggest that national and European identities can usefully be examined in terms of two identities in interaction. It may well be that qualitative, graphical methods might prove especially useful in studies of networking, since they have proved to be quite effective in studies of belief structures and causal reasoning (see, for example, Antaki 1988), all of which topics share with networking, a need to examine the relationship between concepts.

The further development of the role of the individual in social identity construction, also necessitates something of a change in the typical methodological practices employed by researchers working in the Tajfel-Turner tradition. Whilst the social identity processes which characterise groups as a whole, and instances where all group members act alike, are clearly consequential and worthy of study, it is also valid to investigate individual differences in identity construction (Abrams, 1992). In the current research, for example, it emerged that self-serving biases seem to influence the self-stereotyping process such that a positive sense of self is often achieved by selectively self-stereotyping only those group traits which are perceived in a positive evaluative light. This means that in-depth empirical investigation of individual social identity construction is necessary if we are to gain a greater insight into how individuals come to customise their social identities, perhaps by means of associating them with particular motivations, and by organising their repertoire in relatively idiosyncratic ways. It seems likely that interviews will prove the most useful means of accessing such aspects of identity construction, although the most appropriate interview methodology is a matter for further debate.

Identification with large-scale social entities like nations also presents some unique methodological problems for social psychologists. A methodology is required which is able to take into account, amongst other things:

- i) How identification with certain large-scale entities is encouraged during early socialisation, before the cognitive faculties of the child are fully developed (c.f. Tajfel & Jahoda, 1966). This suggests the

utility of a developmental approach to such identities, and a synthesis of work on socialisation and social identity.

- ii) How large-scale category and group memberships often come to exert an influence over the other social identities in individuals' repertoires, especially in terms of recommended social representations. Large-scale social entities may well play crucial roles in the social identity networks individuals and groups create.
- iii) The often dormant nature of social identification with large-scale entities, and the association of their salience with *critical situations*. The research of Waddell and Cairns (1986) is worthy of note here, for its innovative use of methodology to explore the situational aspects of social identity in Northern Ireland. Clearly, social identities which often lie dormant and low in salience raise interesting methodological questions. It may be useful to examine both their usual dormant state, and times when such identities are "awakened", and how their characteristics might vary across such conditions.
- iv) The common mediation of large-scale social entities by interaction with sub-groups of the wider category or group. Crucial issues here concern which sub-groups mediate the larger entity, whether the sub-group itself constitutes a separate social identity, and how the sub-group in question might colour the qualitative nature of identification with the wider entity, perhaps via particular interpretations of social representations.

The above are only *some* of the ways identification with large-scale entities calls for a different methodological and theoretical approach to that employed when investigating smaller, more concrete social groups (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion).

A hybrid synthesis of social identity and social representational approaches has much to offer both theoretical traditions. Unlike Moscovici, we remain

unconvinced, however, that *all* social representations come to be associated with particular social groups. It seems to be the case, for example, that some social representations are so widely shared that they exist at a societal level, somewhat transcending group boundaries. Other representations, in the sense that they lie dormant, encapsulated in print, film, or other mediums, but not shared between people *at the moment*, are clearly not the property of social groups, although they have the *potential* to become so. To this extent, it might make sense to make a distinction between *dormant* and *active* social representations, with the latter actively engaging individuals and social groups, and the former being in a frozen state which holds the inherent potential of diffusion in the social world.

The notion that social representations constitute a background for social identity construction is a crucial aspect of our current argument. Social representations circulating in society serve not only to suggest what are the key categories and groups in society, but also to carry notions of what being a member of such entities entails, of what a "group" actually is. When a social identity is adopted, it is accompanied by a set of social representations serving to define the group's normative and stereotypical beliefs, its favoured means of identity maintenance, and often its preferred outgroups. Given the notion of networking outlined earlier, it may also be the case that these social representations suggest which *other* social groups individuals should or should not identify with, as well as suggesting particular ways to perceive the other groups and categories available to the individual.

At least some groups in society seem to exist precisely because their members share a social representation or set of representations (Breakwell, 1991). This kind of observation has led some researchers to suggest that there is a danger of circularity when social groups are equated with social representations (see, for example, Potter & Litton, 1985). It is our contention that *self-categorisation* as a member of a category or group does not require the sharing of a social representation between category or group members. However, a *shared social identification* by default seems to imply a shared conception of the group in question, even if there are idiosyncratic differences in the perception of the group, its norms, etc. Circularity is avoided since we do not agree with the notion that *all*

social representations are always associated with specific groups. For example, some social representations might be shared between groups, perhaps being the product of more than one group, such that it makes little sense talking of such social representations as being influenced by intergroup boundaries. Furthermore, it is important to note how the *same* social representation might give rise to or support quite different social identities (Lloyd & Duveen, 1988)

A crucial aspect of any social identification therefore, concerns the social representations associated with the category or group in question. The researcher needs to ascertain both the processes by which such representations serve to influence social identification, and, crucially, the content of such representations. Despite being relatively clear in Tajfel's late writings (see, for example, Tajfel, 1984), such concerns seem quite far removed from at least the majority of Turner's theorising. Methodologically, therefore, it is crucial to realise that the social representations associated with categories and groups constitute a key element of social identification. There have already been some interesting attempts to examine the association between groups and social representations (see, for example, Carugati, 1990), and such studies must be encouraged. One key question which must be tackled before empirical work in this area can really flourish, concerns level of analysis and the related issue of operationalisation of concepts. At what level do social representations operate? This is an issue which is in dire need of further investigation, with some theorists apparently favouring the notion that social representations are not carried around "in the head", but are only manifested in social interaction. This kind of definition is similar to Harré's notion that individuals carry only a part of the representation around with them, with the complete representation only being manifested in social contexts (c.f. Harré, 1984/1985), and also seems compatible with discourse-oriented perspectives (see, for example, Potter & Wetherell, 1987). An alternative notion, and the one suggested here, is that while the social representation itself might only exist in a collective sense, individuals create their own interpretations of social representations and these *are* cognitively represented. This means that, at a methodological level, it is valid, and perhaps necessary, to explore both these idiosyncratic interpretations of representations, and the wider, shared representations. It is highly likely that

different methodologies will be required to adequately encompass these different aspects of social representations.

However, such debates seem to pertain largely to what we have termed *active* social representations. The mass media are a rich source of *dormant* social representations which are often directly relevant to social categories and groups in society. This being the case, it is just as crucial to examine how such dormant representations are able to become active ones, and how they come to affect social identity construction. As we have repeatedly emphasised throughout the current discussion, knowledge of the mechanisms whereby mass media communications come to influence individuals and groups remains somewhat primitive and less than clear-cut. In as much as mass media representations have the potential to influence social identification, it should be clear that their study should be undertaken by social identity theorists, and not left to sociologists and other social scientists.

The current emphasis has stressed how social representations seem to influence social identities, and this has served the purpose of highlighting the utility of including empirical examinations of social representations in studies of social identity. However, there are also mechanisms by which social identity construction may come to influence social representations. For example, the social identities adopted by an individual are likely to have consequences for the degree to which various sources of social representations are given credibility. It is unlikely, for example, that social representations clearly associated with outgroups will be given much credence. It seems, then, that social identities might have an effect upon the *legitimacy* of social representations, especially when such representations are associated with in or out-groups. Social representations might also be adapted in order to better serve social identity needs (see also Breakwell, 1991). One example of this, especially where Tajfel's need for positive distinctiveness is prominent, might be when a social representation is modified in order to allow a greater distinction between this and another representation which is associated with an outgroup. In this way, two groups in conflict might in time come to endorse completely opposite social representations, as a direct result of the desire to maintain positive distinctiveness. Alternatively, when there is a desire for

greater intergroup harmony, the *similarities* between the social representations of different groups might be emphasised. It is important to stress that social representations of a variety of issues might be subject to such manipulations, which are by no means limited to manipulations of stereotypes of the in and out-group.

Since active social representations are so often associated with social categories and groups, then the study of social influence processes within and between groups should also have relevance for social representations. Moscovici, for example, remains rather vague as to the precise mechanisms whereby social representations are created and diffused. Despite the notion of "myth makers" (Moscovici, 1984) such as Freud and Marx, who have come to stimulate the diffusion of social representations, it seems unlikely that all social representations are diffused by such brilliant minds. There may be an opportunity in the future to integrate theories of leadership in groups with those of the genesis and diffusion of social representations. In as much as Turner's recent definitions of leadership stress power to define prototypicality (c.f. Turner & Oakes, 1989), then his definition of leadership is quite compatible with the notion of leaders being myth-makers - i.e. those who have the power to define and diffuse social representations. This definition of leadership also bears similarity to Tajfel's equation of power with the ability to originate and diffuse "social myths" (Tajfel, 1984). Unfortunately, however appealing such a definition of leadership seems, both the social identity and social representations approaches provide few pointers as to how individuals *attain* the position of leader. There is an interesting divergence here, since, in the social representations approach, agency is given to the leader him or her self, in that it is in their hands to create the social representation. In contrast, Turner's SCT suggests that perception of the group prototype, and thus, the leader, is almost out of the leader's hands initially, in that it is up to the group as a whole to perceive the prototype. Both perspectives on leadership seem to require further development, especially in terms of their ability to accommodate the fact that leadership may be enshrined in complex group power and status structures. Furthermore, it seems likely that studies of the diffusion of group beliefs and norms, the effects of different communication patterns within the group, and so forth, are all of potential relevance for the diffusion of social representations, and the perception of prototypicality.

One further area of research which is of potential consequence for both paradigms, is that of salience. Despite a useful framework for assessing the salience of social identities being suggested by Oakes (1987), there remain many ambiguities in this area, which is so crucial to the predictive power of the social identity paradigm (see also Deaux, 1992). In terms of the interrelationship between social identities and representations, some interesting questions emerge around the theme of salience. For example, when a social identity becomes salient, do its associated social representations also come to be salient? The opposite process might also be possible, with the activation of social representations associated with groups in turn leading to the activation of the social identity associated with the group. It is interesting to note how the further investigation of the salience issue might in some sense require a re-appraisal of the reference group studies which, although conducted before the emergence of either social identity or social representations theory, sought to investigate in detail the associations between groups and social beliefs (see, for example, Charters & Newcomb, 1958).

#### 10.4 One way forward: social identity as a perspective

If the social identity paradigm is to overcome its current methodological and theoretical weaknesses, a change in direction is called for. Perhaps one of the barriers which must be overcome if change is to be achieved, is the desire to promote social identity and/or social categorisation theories as complete explanations of group phenomena. To an extent, theorists working in both the social identity and social representations traditions have been guilty of theoretical myopia, which has been manifested in a persistent refusal to perceive the many strands which offer an integration between the two perspectives. Despite notable exceptions (see, for example, Breakwell, 1986;1991), there is an ironic sense in which theorists in both camps have come to adopt their own theoretical identities which they are determined to keep distinct. This is damaging, in that it fragments social psychology, when in fact, it could be drawn together and become open to the kind of integration suggested in the current discussion. This integration is not simply a theoretical, but also a methodological one, requiring the adoption of multi-methodological approaches, and a greater understanding of how methods serve to complement one another. European integration is an excellent topic for

experimentation with such integrative endeavours, in that its very complexity seems to rapidly highlight the poverty of any single theoretical or methodological approach.

What is being suggested in terms of the social identity paradigm, is a change in the kind of questions often asked, especially in the SCT tradition. Rather than asking, "How can social identity or self-categorisation explain phenomenon  $x$  ?", it may make more sense in the future to ask "What can a social identity perspective add to our knowledge of phenomenon  $x$  ?" This opens up the opportunity for further collaboration and integration of social identity and other approaches. A further, and no less important change of emphasis should centre on an investigation of relatively non-comparative or autonomous groups, which continue to raise serious doubts about the adequacy of the social identity paradigm as a general theory of group processes.

Whatever the ambiguities, flaws, and drawbacks, of the European ideal, it has as its basis the notion that certain goals can best be achieved by people working together, rather than at odds. Such a concern is equally applicable to social psychology: it seems crucial to our knowledge of group processes that different theories, perspectives, methodologies, and levels of analysis, are brought together, at least at regular intervals. If integration proves impossible, then at least the attempt at integration should facilitate a greater understanding of the relationship between different perspectives, and of the most promising directions for future research. European integration might just prove to be the catalyst for exciting new developments in social psychology, developments which will no doubt raise as much debate as European integration has done.

## APPENDIX A - 1991 questionnaire: British data

### Appendix A.1 - Inferential statistics

**Table A: correlation matrix for Section A (British identity) vars.**

	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6
A2	.671					
A3	.680	.620				
A4	.461	.512	.447			
A5	.603	.576	.725	.389		
A6	.530	.585	.555	.442	.562	
A7	.573	.500	.503	.313	.552	.377

(all have 2-tailed  $p < .001$ )

**Table B: correlation matrix for Section H (Euro. identity) vars.**

	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	H6
H2	.708					
H3	.736	.621				
H4	.631	.569	.657			
H5	.672	.536	.778	.634		
H6	.584	.470	.605	.691	.651	
H7	.473	.358	.470	.483	.583	.572

(all have 2-tailed  $p < .001$ )

**Table C: breakdown of mean stereotyping difference scores**

Trait	Mean Difference
Intelligent	+2.554
Progressive	+3.133
Conceited	-1.120
Reserved	- .107
Domineering	- .067
Industrious	+1.333
Aggressive	-1.067
Passionate	+2.360
Quick-tempered	+ .507
Ext. Nationalistic	-1.613

-ve difference indicates > stereotyping to British than self  
+ve difference indicates > stereotyping to self than British

**Table D: mean evaluations of stereotype traits**


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Trait	Mean Evaluation: 1(-ve) to 7(+ve)
Intelligent	6.168
Progressive	5.991
Conceited	2.402
Reserved	3.832
Domineering	3.604
Industrious	5.953
Aggressive	2.813
Passionate	5.439
Quick-tempered	2.224
Ext. Nationalistic	3.168

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**Table E - MDS analysis of similarity ratings: detailed results****Stimulus coordinates for 2-dimensional solution:**

BRITAIN	DIM 1= 1.1578	DIM 2= 1.0424
ITALY	DIM 1= -1.5174	DIM 2= -0.4269
FRANCE	DIM 1= -0.4701	DIM 2= -0.9691
GERMANY	DIM 1= 1.3579	DIM 2= -0.4913
EC	DIM 1= 0.0122	DIM 2= -0.8412
MYSELF	DIM 1= -0.5403	DIM 2= 1.6861

**Iteration history (Young's S-Stress Formula 1 used):**

ITERATION	S-STRESS	IMPROVEMENT
0	0.31289	
1	0.30453	
2	0.29232	
3	0.28740	0.01221
4	0.28382	0.00492
5	0.28094	0.00358
6	0.27858	0.00287
7	0.27666	0.00236
8	0.27521	0.00192
9	0.27417	0.00145
10	0.27338	0.00104
		0.00079

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 Table F - correlation matrix for attitudinal variables

	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I6	I7A
I2	<b>.610</b>						
I3	<b>.491</b>	<b>.573</b>					
I4	<b>.605</b>	<b>.529</b>	<b>.438</b>				
I5	<b>.275</b>	<b>.270</b>	.067	.133			
I6	<b>.259</b>	.146	.174	<b>.359</b>	-.129		
I7A	-.030	-.055	.072	-.099	-.054	-.115	
I8	<b>.584</b>	<b>.472</b>	<b>.257</b>	<b>.389</b>	<b>.294</b>	<b>.339</b>	-.051

Correlations in bold type are significant at .0001 to 0.010 level (2-tailed)

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**Table G - Discriminant Function Analysis on groups defined by predicted vote in European super-state referendum**

Prior Probabilities: Group 1 (vote for) = .41975 (n=34)  
 Group 2 (vote against) = .58025 (n=47)

Variables in the analysis after final step

Variable	Tolerance	F to remove	Wilk's L.	DF Coeffs.*
BRITISH ID	.835	6.079	.641	-.469
EUROPEAN ID	.659	1.435	.604	.264
FACTOR 1	.741	19.635	.748	.829
AGE	.875	2.572	.613	-.305
F4	.829	1.153	.602	-.212

\* =Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients

Variables not in the analysis after final step

Variable	Tolerance	F to enter	Wilk's Lambda
SEX	.926	.162	.591
FACTOR 2	.653	.131	.592
I7A	.951	.238	.591
F1	.371	.391	.590
F15	.648	.397E-02	.593

Group means:

	BRITISH ID	EURO ID	SEX	FACTOR1
for 1	26.91176	31.29412	.44118	28.23529
against 2	31.93617	25.27660	.57447	21.00000
Total	29.82716	27.80247	.51852	24.03704
	FACTOR2	I7A	AGE	F15
for 1	7.14706	4.94118	22.02941	4.67647
against 2	5.74468	5.10638	22.48936	3.65957
Total	6.33333	5.03704	22.29630	4.08642
	F4	F1		
for 1	3.38235	3.44118		
against 2	3.59574	4.14894		
Total	3.50617	3.85185		

Significant univariate F-ratios (with 1 and 79 degs. freedom):

Variable	F	Significance
BRITID	7.632	.0071
EUROID	9.552	.0028
FACTOR1	36.720	.0000
FACTOR2	8.581	.0044
F15	7.326	.0083
F1	4.190	.0440

**A.2 : Descriptive statistics for attitudinal variables**

**I1 OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EC**

*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
strongly against	1	2	1.9	1.9
moderately against	2	4	3.7	5.6
slightly against	3	10	9.3	15.0
neutral/undecided	4	21	19.4	34.6
slightly in favour	5	15	13.9	48.6
moderately in favour	6	36	33.3	82.2
strongly in favour	7	19	17.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mean	5.121	Mode	6.000	Std Dev	1.503
Variance	2.259	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000
Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0		

**I2 INTEREST IN FUTURE OF EUROPE**

*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
not at all interested	1	1	.9	.9
	2	3	2.8	3.7
	3	5	4.6	8.4
	4	8	7.4	15.9
	5	22	20.4	36.4
	6	34	31.5	68.2
extremely interested	7	34	31.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mean	5.664	Mode	6.000	Std Dev	1.352
Variance	1.829	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000
Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0		

I3 HOW OFTEN RESPONDENTS DISCUSS EUROPEAN AFFAIRS*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
hardly ever	1	23	21.3	21.5
	2	18	16.7	38.3
	3	12	11.1	49.5
	4	14	13.0	62.6
	5	22	20.4	83.2
very often	6	10	9.3	92.5
	7	8	7.4	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mean	3.523	Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.944
Variance	3.780	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0
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I4 OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
strongly against	1	2	1.9	1.9
moderately against	2	12	11.1	13.1
slightly against	3	9	8.3	21.5
neutral / undecided	4	16	14.8	36.4
slightly in favour	5	16	14.8	51.4
moderately in favour	6	27	25.0	76.6
strongly in favour	7	25	23.1	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mean	4.991	Mode	6.000	Std Dev	1.735
Variance	3.009	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0
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**I5 COMPATIBILITY OF VIEWS RE. OWN NATION & EUROPE***Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
totally opposed	1	9	8.3	8.4
	2	15	13.9	22.4
	3	25	23.1	45.8
	4	23	21.3	67.3
	5	22	20.4	87.9
totally compatible	6	11	10.2	98.1
	7	2	1.9	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mean	3.701	Mode	3.000	Std Dev	1.506
Variance	2.268	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0
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**I6 IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF FLAG & ANTHEM***Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
strongly against	1	37	34.3	34.6
	2	19	17.6	52.3
	3	14	13.0	65.4
	4	18	16.7	82.2
	5	11	10.2	92.5
strongly in favour	6	2	1.9	94.4
	7	6	5.6	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mean	2.785	Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.786
Variance	3.189	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0
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I7A EURO SUPER-STATE REFERENDUM:CERTAINTY RE. VOTE*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
extremely uncertain	1	11	10.2	10.3
	2	15	13.9	24.3
	3	10	9.3	33.6
	4	13	12.0	45.8
	5	8	7.4	53.3
extremely certain	6	17	15.7	69.2
	7	33	30.6	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mean	4.636	Mode	7.000	Std Dev	2.169
Variance	4.706	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0
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I7B EUROPEAN SUPER-STATE VOTE*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
Vote for	1	34	31.8	31.8
Not vote	2	26	24.3	56.1
Vote against	3	47	43.9	100.0
	TOTAL	107	100.0	100.0

Mode	3.000
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Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0
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**I8** HOW MUCH BRITAIN HAS GAINED FROM E.C. MEMBERSHIP

*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
nothing at all	1	3	2.8	2.8
	2	12	11.2	14.0
	3	14	13.1	27.1
	4	16	15.0	42.1
	5	33	30.8	72.9
a great deal	6	21	19.6	92.5
	7	8	7.5	100.0
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Mean	4.486	Mode	5.000	Std Dev	1.544
Variance	2.384	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	107	Missing Cases	0
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## APPENDIX B - 1991 Questionnaire: Italian data

### B.1 - Inferential statistics

Table A: correlation matrix for Italian identity vars. (sec A)

	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6
A1						
A2	.521					
A3	.567	.518				
A4	.553	.386	.428			
A5	.637	.500	.527	.330		
A6	.324	.178*	.245*	.290	.301	
A7	.441	.500	.398	.407	.463	.106 <sup>ns</sup>

(all have 2-tailed p. <.001 except \* = .05 or less, <sup>ns</sup>=not sig)

Table B: correlation matrix for Euro-identity vars (section E.1)

	E.1 1	E.1 2	E.1 3	E.1 4	E.1 5	E.1 6
E.1 1						
E.1 2	.497					
E.1 3	.544	.435				
E.1 4	.405	.379	.487			
E.1 5	.441	.424	.644	.398		
E.1 6	.323	.203*	.444	.340	.450	
E.1 7	.503	.361	.471	.357	.553	.450

(all have 2-tailed p. <.001 except \* = .05 or less)

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**Table C - MDS analysis of similarity ratings: detailed results**
**Stimulus coordinates for 2-dimensional solution:**

BRITAIN	DIM 1=	-1.3245	DIM 2=	1.3768
ITALY	DIM 1=	0.9897	DIM 2=	0.2667
FRANCE	DIM 1=	1.1112	DIM 2=	-0.5548
GERMANY	DIM 1=	-1.4872	DIM 2=	-0.5967
EC	DIM 1=	0.3254	DIM 2=	-0.8355
MYSELF	DIM 1=	0.6422	DIM 2=	-0.1237

**Iteration history (Young's S-Stress Formula 1 used):**

ITERATION	S-STRESS	IMPROVEMENT
0	0.31636	
1	0.31169	
2	0.29710	
		0.01459
3	0.29267	
		0.00443
4	0.29049	
		0.00217
5	0.28906	
		0.00143
6	0.28802	
		0.00105
7	0.28721	
		0.00081

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 Table D - correlation matrix for attitudinal vars. (Ital. data)

	<i>F1</i>	<i>F2</i>	<i>F3</i>	<i>F4</i>	<i>F5</i>	<i>F6</i>	<i>F7A</i>
<i>F1</i>							
<i>F2</i>	<b>.383</b>						
<i>F3</i>	<b>.187</b>	<b>.334</b>					
<i>F4</i>	<b>.683</b>	<b>.488</b>	<b>.206</b>				
<i>F5</i>	<b>.301</b>	<b>.210</b>	.103	<b>.274</b>			
<i>F6</i>	<b>.278</b>	<b>.229</b>	<b>.241</b>	<b>.271</b>	<b>.184</b>		
<i>F7A</i>	.025	.097	<b>.170</b>	.130	.169	<b>.207</b>	
<i>F8</i>	<b>.271</b>	<b>.349</b>	<b>.200</b>	<b>.277</b>	<b>.216</b>	.159	.095

Correlations in bold type are significant at .0001 to 0.050 level (2-tailed)

---

**Table E - Discriminant Function Analysis on groups defined by predicted vote in European super-state referendum (Ital.data)**

Prior Probabilities: Group 1 (vote for) = .61905 (n=52)  
 Group 2 (vote against) = .38095 (n=32)

----- Variables in the analysis after final step -----

Variable	Tolerance	F to remove	Wilk's L.	DF Coeffs.*
FACTOR 1	.900	10.111	.825	.635
C5	.957	5.720	.765	.475
SEX	.983	4.034	.730	-.398
FACTOR 2	.862	4.306	.700	.438
AGE (YEARS)	.899	1.793	.684	-.281

\* =Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients

----- Variables not in the analysis after final step -----

Variable	Tolerance	F to enter	Wilk's Lambda
ITALIAN ID	.896	.826	.680
EURO ID	.764	.311	.681
C15	.889	.45831E-01	.684
C3	.883	.175	.682

Group means:

	ITALIAN ID	EURO ID	SEX	FACTOR1
for 1	30.36538	33.40385	.63462	27.40385
against 2	31.50000	29.84375	.81250	23.68750
Total	30.79762	32.04762	.70238	25.98810
	FACTOR2	AGE	C15	C5
for 1	13.23077	21.23077	4.69231	4.01923
against 2	10.46875	22.09375	4.09375	3.25000
Total	12.17857	21.55952	4.46429	3.72619
	C3			
for 1	4.78846			
against 2	4.71875			
Total	4.76190			

Significant univariate F-ratios (with 1 and 82 degs. freedom):

Variable	F	Significance
EURO ID	4.4040	.0389
FACTOR 1	17.3501	.0001
FACTOR 2	7.3263	.0083
C5	6.7222	.0113

**B.2 : - Descriptive statistics for attitudinal variables****F1 OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EC****Frequency distribution**

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
strongly against	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
moderately against	2	6	4.4	4.4	5.9
slightly against	3	5	3.6	3.7	9.6
neutral / undecided	4	24	17.5	17.6	27.2
slightly in favour	5	14	10.2	10.3	37.5
moderately in favour	6	51	37.2	37.5	75.0
strongly in favour	7	34	24.8	25.0	100.0
(missing)	9	1	.7	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		137	100.0	100.0	

Mean	5.434	Mode	6.000	Std Dev	1.469
Variance	2.159	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	136	Missing Cases	1
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**F2 INTEREST IN FUTURE OF EUROPE****Frequency distribution**

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Cum Percent
not at all interested	1	2	1.5	1.5
	3	8	5.8	7.3
	4	17	12.4	19.7
	5	21	15.3	35.0
	6	47	34.3	69.3
extremely interested	7	42	30.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----
TOTAL		137	100.0	100.0

Mean	5.657	Mode	6.000	Std Dev	1.320
Variance	1.742	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	137	Missing Cases	0
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**F3** HOW OFTEN RESPONDENTS DISCUSS EUROPEAN AFFAIRS*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
hardly ever	1	22	16.1	16.2	16.2
	2	33	24.1	24.3	40.4
	3	17	12.4	12.5	52.9
	4	24	17.5	17.6	70.6
	5	11	8.0	8.1	78.7
	6	20	14.6	14.7	93.4
very often	7	9	6.6	6.6	100.0
(missing)	9	1	.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	137	100.0	100.0	

Mean	3.478	Mode	2.000	Std Dev	1.889
Variance	3.570	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	136	Missing Cases	1
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**F4** OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
strongly against	1	1	.7	.7	.7
moderately against	2	5	3.6	3.7	4.4
slightly against	3	6	4.4	4.4	8.8
neutral / undecided	4	15	10.9	11.0	19.9
slightly in favour	5	24	17.5	17.6	37.5
moderately in favour	6	56	40.9	41.2	78.7
strongly in favour	7	29	21.2	21.3	100.0
(missing)	9	1	.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	137	100.0	100.0	

Mean	5.500	Mode	6.000	Std Dev	1.328
Variance	1.763	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	136	Missing Cases	1
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F5 COMPATIBILITY OF VIEWS REGARDING OWN NATION & EUROPE*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
totally opposed	1	6	4.4	4.4	4.4
	2	11	8.0	8.1	12.5
	3	36	26.3	26.5	39.0
	4	40	29.2	29.4	68.4
	5	25	18.2	18.4	86.8
	6	15	10.9	11.0	97.8
totally compatible	7	3	2.2	2.2	100.0
(missing)	9	1	.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	137	100.0	100.0	

Mean	3.912	Mode	4.000	Std Dev	1.347
Variance	1.814	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	136	Missing Cases	1
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F6 IN FAVOUR/AGAINST REPLACEMENT OF FLAG & ANTHEM*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
strongly against	1	30	21.9	22.1	22.1
	2	25	18.2	18.4	40.4
	3	18	13.1	13.2	53.7
	4	22	16.1	16.2	69.9
	5	17	12.4	12.5	82.4
	6	8	5.8	5.9	88.2
strongly in favour	7	16	11.7	11.8	100.0
(missing)	9	1	.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	137	100.0	100.0	

Mean	3.434	Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.995
Variance	3.981	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	7.000

Valid Cases	136	Missing Cases	1
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F7A EURO SUPER-STATE REFERENDUM:CERTAINTY REGARDING VOTE*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
extremely uncertain	1	18	13.1	13.2	13.2
	2	18	13.1	13.2	26.5
	3	16	11.7	11.8	38.2
	4	18	13.1	13.2	51.5
	5	20	14.6	14.7	66.2
extremely certain	6	16	11.7	11.8	77.9
	7	30	21.9	22.1	100.0
(missing)	9	1	.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	137	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.265 Mode 7.000 Std Dev 2.098  
 Variance 4.403 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 7.000

Valid Cases 136 Missing Cases 1

F7B EUROPEAN SUPER-STATE VOTE*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
vote for	1	57	41.6	43.2	43.2
not vote	2	37	27.0	28.0	71.2
vote against	3	38	27.7	28.8	100.0
(missing)	9	5	3.6	MISSING	
	TOTAL	137	100.0	100.0	

Mode 1.000

Valid Cases 132 Missing Cases 5

**F8                    HOW MUCH THE ITALIANS HAVE GAINED FROM EC MEMBERSHIP**

*Frequency distribution*

	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
nothing at all	1	3	2.2	2.2	2.2
	2	13	9.5	9.7	11.9
	3	7	5.1	5.2	17.2
	4	30	21.9	22.4	39.6
	5	42	30.7	31.3	70.9
	6	34	24.8	25.4	96.3
a great deal	7	5	3.6	3.7	100.0
(missing)	9	3	2.2	MISSING	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

<b>Mean</b>	<b>4.619</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>5.000</b>	<b>Std Dev</b>	<b>1.392</b>
<b>Variance</b>	<b>1.937</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>7.000</b>

<b>Valid Cases</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>Missing Cases</b>	<b>3</b>
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## APPENDIX C

### The English-language questionnaire ("rate both" variant)

**Questionnaire on your views about Britain and Europe**

The questions in this booklet form part of a study looking at the opinions people have about the United Kingdom and Europe. Please attempt to answer all the questions in the order in which they appear in the booklet, and as fully as you can. It will also help in our enquiry if you could write clearly, and avoid using pencil. Please note that there are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions - we are only interested in your opinions. In addition, your answers will be treated as strictly confidential, and remain anonymous - you will not be asked to give your name at any time.

Please attempt to answer all the questions, and as fully as possible. Some sections of the questionnaire have their own specific instructions - please follow these carefully. Should you have any difficulty answering any of the questions, or find some questions ambiguous, please use the "comments" section at the end of the questionnaire to inform us of this. We hope you find the questionnaire interesting and straightforward, and thank you for your help. In answering this questionnaire, you are helping us to develop a greater understanding of this important subject area.





3. Describe 3 or more individuals, or groups of individuals, who you think reflect especially well the British national character. Briefly describe who each example is, and in what way each of your examples is typically British.

*please write clearly*

## SECTION C.1

In this section, we are interested in your views about different nationalities. As examples, we have selected the British and the Italians, and will be asking you to describe both nationalities. Firstly, you will be asked about the British. Below, you are presented with a list of ten words. For each word, make your best guess as to what percentage of the British people YOU THINK possess the particular characteristic, and write a number between 0 and 100 in the box marked "%" by each word. You do not have to include the % sign after your numbers. We realise that it may sometimes be difficult to arrive at an exact number - in cases of doubt please enter your best guess. Please write the numbers clearly.

	%
intelligent	____
progressive	____
conceited	____
reserved	____
domineering	____
industrious	____
aggressive	____
passionate	____
quick-tempered	____
extremely nationalistic	____

Now, please look at the ten characteristics above, and write below which you think are the three most important in describing the British.

most important	_____
2nd most important	_____
3rd most important	_____

## SECTION C.2

In this section, you will be presented with the same list of ten words. This time, we would like you to describe the Italians. Below, you are presented with a list of ten words. For each word, make your best guess as to what percentage of the Italian people you think possess the particular characteristic, and write a number between 0 and 100 in the box marked "%" by each word. You do not have to include the % sign after your numbers. We realise that it may sometimes be difficult to arrive at an exact number - in cases of doubt please enter your best guess. Please write the numbers clearly.

	%
intelligent	____
progressive	____
conceited	____
reserved	____
domineering	____
industrious	____
aggressive	____
passionate	____
quick-tempered	____
extremely nationalistic	____

Now, please look at the ten characteristics above, and write below which you think are the three most important in describing the Italians.

most important	_____
2nd most important	_____
3rd most important	_____

## SECTION D

In this section, we are interested in your views about yourself. You will be presented with the same list of ten words. This time, decide how well you think each word describes your own character, and write a number between 0 and 10 in the box marked "myself" by each word. The higher the number you assign to each word, the better you think that word describes you.

For example, if you assign "intelligent" a value of 10, this indicates that you feel the word intelligent describes you very well. Similarly, if you assign the word "industrious" a value of 0, this indicates that you do not think the word describes you at all.

Please write the numbers clearly.

	<i>myself</i>
intelligent	____
progressive	____
conceited	____
reserved	____
domineering	____
industrious	____
aggressive	____
passionate	____
quick-tempered	____
extremely nationalistic	____

Now, please look at the ten characteristics above, and write below which you think are the three most important in describing your own character.

most important \_\_\_\_\_  
 2nd most important \_\_\_\_\_  
 3rd most important \_\_\_\_\_

## SECTION E

In this section, you will be asked to rate each of the ten characteristics below, indicating how good or bad you think it is to possess each one. You should answer by placing a X in one of seven boxes. The nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.

Place your X in ONE of the boxes for each question

- INTELLIGENT  
 extremely good |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| extremely bad
- PROGRESSIVE  
 extremely good |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| extremely bad
- CONCEITED  
 extremely good |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| |\_\_\_\_| extremely bad

4. RESERVED  
extremely good | | | | | | | | | | extremely bad
5. DOMINEERING  
extremely good | | | | | | | | | | extremely bad
6. INDUSTRIOUS  
extremely good | | | | | | | | | | extremely bad
7. AGGRESSIVE  
extremely good | | | | | | | | | | extremely bad
8. PASSIONATE  
extremely good | | | | | | | | | | extremely bad
9. QUICK-TEMPERED  
extremely good | | | | | | | | | | extremely bad
10. EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC  
extremely good | | | | | | | | | | extremely bad

## SECTION F

In this section you will be presented with pairs of concepts. Rate each pair in terms of SIMILARITY, using whichever criteria you find meaningful. You should answer by placing a X in one of seven boxes. The nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.

Place your X in ONE of the boxes for each question

1. BRITAIN - MYSELF  
extremely similar | | | | | | | | | | extremely dissimilar
2. BRITAIN - ITALY  
extremely similar | | | | | | | | | | extremely dissimilar
3. ITALY - MYSELF  
extremely similar | | | | | | | | | | extremely dissimilar
4. BRITAIN - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)  
extremely similar | | | | | | | | | | extremely dissimilar
5. ITALY - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)  
extremely similar | | | | | | | | | | extremely dissimilar
6. BRITAIN - FRANCE  
extremely similar | | | | | | | | | | extremely dissimilar
7. ITALY - FRANCE  
extremely similar | | | | | | | | | | extremely dissimilar

## 8. BRITAIN - GERMANY

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar

## 9. ITALY - GERMANY

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar

## 10. FRANCE - MYSELF

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar

## 11. GERMANY - MYSELF

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar

## 12. FRANCE - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar

## 13. GERMANY - THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.)

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar

## 14. FRANCE - GERMANY

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar

## 15. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.E.C.) - MYSELF

extremely similar |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| extremely dissimilar



## SECTION H.1

The questions in this section are concerned with how you feel about being European, and require you to answer by placing a X in ONE of seven boxes. The nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.

1. To what extent do you feel European?  
 extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not at all  
 European European
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other European people?  
 extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| no ties  
 strong ties at all
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?  
 extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not at all  
 pleased pleased
4. How similar do you think you are to the average European person?  
 extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not at all  
 similar similar
5. How important to you is being European?  
 extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not at all  
 important important
6. How much are your views about Europe shared by other European people?  
 shared by |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not shared  
 all by any
7. When you hear someone who is not European criticize Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?  
 extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not at all  
 criticized criticized

SECTION H.2 - in this section we are interested in your views about Britain and Europe, and in your political beliefs.

*please write clearly and answer as fully as possible*

1. With which individuals, groups or political parties do you share broadly similar views about Britain?
2. With which individuals, groups or political parties do you share broadly similar views about Europe?

3. If there were a parliamentary election over the next few days, how would you vote? Write clearly below the name of the party you would vote for, or "not vote" if you would not vote in the election.
- 

4. How important to you are your political beliefs? Place a X in ONE of the boxes below - the closer you place the cross to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.

Place a X in ONE of the boxes below:-

extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not at all  
important important

SECTION I

The questions in this section are concerned with your opinions about Europe. Some of the questions require you to answer by placing a X in ONE of seven boxes - the nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end. Other questions ask you to choose from a number of labelled answers, by placing a X in ONE of the boxes.

1. Overall, what is your attitude towards the EEC (European Community)?

Place a X in ONE of the boxes below:-

|\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_|  
strongly moderately slightly neutral or slightly moderately strongly  
against against against undecided in favour in favour in favour

2. How interested are you in the future of Europe?

Place a X in ONE of the boxes below:-

extremely |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| not at all  
interested interested

3. How often do you discuss European affairs with other people?

Place a X in ONE of the boxes below:-

very |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| hardly  
often ever

4. Overall, what is your attitude towards European integration?  
Place a X in the box which best reflects your own opinion.

|\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_|  
strongly moderately slightly neutral or slightly moderately strongly  
against against against undecided in favour in favour in favour

5. When you think about Britain, and everything Britain stands for, and you compare this with your view of Europe, and everything Europe stands for, are these views compatible with each other, or opposed?

totally |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| |\_\_\_| totally  
compatible opposed

6. In general, would you be in favour of, or against the replacement of the British flag and national anthem by a European Community equivalent?

Place a X in ONE of the boxes below:-

strongly        strongly  
in favour in favour against against

- 7a. If there were a referendum over the next few days on whether Britain should become part of a European super-state with centralised government, bank, armed forces, and so on, how certain are you about how you would vote?

extremely        extremely  
certain certain uncertain uncertain

- 7b. At the moment, how do you think you would vote in such a referendum?

vote for membership not vote vote against membership

8. How much do you think the British have gained from membership of the European Community (E.E.C.)?

A great        Nothing  
deal at all at all

#### SECTION J

In this section of the questionnaire, you are asked for some personal information. Please remember that your answers will remain confidential and anonymous. Please write clearly.

1. How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_ years
2. What sex are you? (put a X in one box)  male  female
3. In which country were you born? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What nationality are you? \_\_\_\_\_
5. Please list below any newspapers that you read regularly:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**SECTION K - COMMENTS**

Before completing this section, we would be grateful if you would look back through the questionnaire and make sure that you have not missed-out any of the previous questions. In this final section we invite you to make any comments regarding the questionnaire. We are particularly interested in whether you found any of the questions difficult to answer or ambiguous in any way. If you have any comments about particular questions, please also make a note of the section they appear in, and the question number. Thank you again for your help.

**APPENDIX D**  
**THE ITALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE**

## QUESTIONARIO RIGUARDANTE I SUOI PUNTI DI VISTA SULL'ITALIA E L'EUROPA

Le domande poste in questo libretto fanno parte di uno studio su cio' che le persone pensano circa l'Italia e l'Europa. La preghiamo di rispondere alle domande nel modo piu' esteso possibile, rispettando l'ordine in cui sono state poste. La preghiamo di scrivere chiaramente evitando di scrivere a matita: cio' ci sara' di grande aiuto nelle nostre ricerche. Le facciamo, inoltre, presente che per ogni domanda del questionario non ci sono ne' risposte giuste ne' sbagliate: noi siamo solo interessati alle sue opinioni. Le sue risposte saranno considerate strettamente confidenziali e rimarranno pertanto anonime. Il suo nome non verra', d'altra parte, ne' richiesto ne' menzionato.

La preghiamo ancora di rispondere a tutte le domande come meglio puo' e per esteso. Alcune sezioni di questo questionario hanno specifiche istruzioni: la invitiamo a seguirle scrupolosamente. Se poi lei decidesse di portare via il questionario per compilarlo a casa, le saremmo grati se volesse completarlo senza alcun aiuto e in una sola volta. Se trovasse poi alcune domande difficili e/o ambigue, le saremmo grati se volesse fare le sue osservazioni in merito nell'apposita sezione "Commenti" posta alla fine del questionario. Ci auguriamo che il questionario sia ben formulato e di suo interesse e la ringraziamo per la sua collaborazione. Nel rispondere a codesto questionario ci aiuterà a definire meglio l'area dell'argomento trattato che riveste una grande importanza per tutti noi.

UNA VOLTA COMPLETATO IL QUESTIONARIO, SI PREGA DI CONSEGNAILO PRESSO.....

.....

## SEZIONE A

Le sezioni "A" e "B" si riferiscono ai suoi punti di vista circa l'essere italiano. Le domande in questa sezione richiedono che lei risponda inserendo una X in una delle sette caselle. Più' la sua X e' posta vicino ad una estremita' della scala piu' lei e' in accordo con l'affermazione corrispondente.

1. Fino a che punto si sente italiano?

estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non del tutto  
italiano italiano

2. Fino a che punto si sente fortemente legato con altri italiani?

da fortissimi |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| da nessun  
legami legame

3. Fino a che punto si sente soddisfatto d'essere italiano?

estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non del tutto  
soddisfatto soddisfatto

4. Quanto pensi di essere simile all'Italiano medio?

estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non affatto  
simile simile

5. Quanta importanza ha per Lei l'essere italiano?

estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non del tutto  
importante importante

6. Come sono condivise le sue opinioni dagli altri italiani riguardo l'Italia?

condivise |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| condivise  
da tutti da nessuno

7. Quando sente una persona che non e' italiana criticare gli italiani, fino a che punto si sente personalmente criticato?

fortemente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non del tutto  
criticato criticato

SEZIONE B

*Si prega di scrivere con chiarezza, nel modo piu' esteso possibile*

1. Quali cose riguardo l'Italia e gli italiani la rendono soddisfatta d'essere italiano?

2. Quali cose riguardo l'Italia e gli italiani la fanno rimpiangere d'essere italiano?

3. Descriva 3 o piu' individui, oppure gruppi di individui i quali secondo Lei rispecchino particolarmente il carattere nazionale italiano. Descriva brevemente ciascun esempio, e in quale modo ciascuno dei suoi esempi sono tipicamente italiani.

*Si prega di scrivere con chiarezza*

## SEZIONE C

In questa sezione le presentiamo una coppia di concetti. Valuti ogni coppia in termini di SOMIGLIANZA, giudicando quanto ritiene simili o dissimili i due concetti della coppia. Le chiediamo di rispondere inserendo una X in una delle sette caselle. Più' la sua X e' posta vicino ad una estremita' della scala, più' lei e' in accordo con l'affermazione corrispondente.

Inserisca una X in UNA delle caselle per ogni domanda

1. INGHILTERRA - ME STESSO/A  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
2. ITALIA - INGHILTERRA  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
3. ITALIA - ME STESSO/A  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
4. INGHILTERRA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
5. ITALIA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
6. INGHILTERRA - FRANCIA  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
7. ITALIA - FRANCIA  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
8. INGHILTERRA - GERMANIA  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
9. ITALIA - GERMANIA  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
10. FRANCIA - ME STESSO/A  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
11. GERMANIA - ME STESSO/A  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
12. FRANCIA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------
13. GERMANIA - LA COMUNITA' EUROPEA (E.E.C.)  

estremamente simile	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	__	estremamente dissimile
---------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	------------------------



2. Quale pensa sia il ruolo piu' importante dell'Europa negli affari del mondo? Spieghi brevemente la sua risposta.

SEZIONE E.1

Le domande in questa sezione richiedono le sue opinioni riguardo l'essere Europeo. Le chiediamo di rispondere inserendo una X in UNA delle sette caselle. Piu' la sua X e' posta vicino ad una estremita' della scala, piu' lei e' in accordo con l'affermazione corrispondente.

1. Fino a che punto si sente Europeo?  
 estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non del tutto  
 Europeo Europeo
2. Fino a che punto si sente fortemente legato con altri Europei?  
 da fortissimi |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| da nessun  
 legami legame
3. Fino a che punto si sente soddisfatto d'essere Europeo?  
 estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non del tutto  
 soddisfatto soddisfatto
4. Quanto pensi di essere simile all'Europeo medio?  
 estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non affatto  
 simile simile
5. Quanta importanza ha per Lei l'essere Europeo?  
 estremamente |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| non del tutto  
 importante importante



## SEZIONE F

Le domande in questa sezione riguardano i suoi punti di vista sull'Europa. Alcune domande richiedono come risposta una X in UNA delle sette caselle. Più la sua X è posta vicino ad una estremità della scala, più lei è in accordo con l'affermazione corrispondente. Altre domande invece, richiedono che lei scelga una delle risposte, ponendo una X in UNA delle caselle.

1. In generale, quale sarebbe la sua posizione verso l'E.E.C. (La Comunità Europea)?

*Inserisca una X in UNA delle caselle di cui sotto:-*

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
fortemente contrario	moderatamente contrario	leggermente contrario	neutrale o indeciso

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
leggermente favorevole	moderatamente favorevole	fortemente favorevole

2. Quanto è interessato nel futuro dell'Europa?

*Inserisca una X in UNA delle caselle di cui sotto:-*

estremamente interessato	<input type="checkbox"/>	non del tutto interessato						
-----------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	------------------------------

3. Quante volte discute questioni di carattere Europeo con altri?

*Inserisca una X in UNA delle caselle di cui sotto:-*

sovente	<input type="checkbox"/>	quasi mai						
---------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	-----------

4. In generale, come vede la sua posizione verso un'integrazione Europea? Inserisca una X in UNA delle caselle che riflette meglio la sua opinione.

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
fortemente contrario	moderatamente contrario	leggermente contrario	neutrale o indeciso

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
leggermente favorevole	moderatamente favorevole	fortemente favorevole

5. Quando lei mette a confronto ciò che pensa dell'Italia insieme a tutto quanto quest'ultima rappresenta, con il suo punto di vista sull'Europa e su quello che quest'ultima rappresenta, trova questi punti di vista compatibili l'uno all'altro od opposti?

interamente compatibili	<input type="checkbox"/>	totalmente opposti						
----------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------------

6. In generale, sarebbe contrario o a favore alla sostituzione sia dell'inno che della bandiera Italiana con equivalente inno e bandiera della Comunità Europea?

*Inserisca una X in UNA delle caselle di cui sotto:-*

fortemente favorevole	<input type="checkbox"/>	fortemente contrario						
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	-------------------------

7a. Nel caso ci fosse un referendum tra pochi giorni per determinare se l'Italia dovesse far parte o meno di uno stato super Europeo con governo centralizzato, banche, forze armate, ecc., sarebbe certo su come votare?

certissimo |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| incertissimo

7b. Al momento attuale, come voterebbe in un simile referendum?

|\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_|  
favorevole astenuto contrario

8. Quanto ritiene che gli Italiani abbiano tratto benefici nel diventare Membri della Comunita' Europea (E.E.C.)?

moltissimo |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| per nulla

SEZIONE G - In questa sezione del questionario si richiedono informazioni personali. Tenga presente che le sue risposte saranno strettamente confidenziali ed anonime. Si prega di scrivere chiaramente.

1. Quanti anni ha? \_\_\_\_\_ anni      2. Quale sesso? :\_\_ :M      :\_\_ :F
3. In quale nazione e' nato/a ? \_\_\_\_\_
4. Di che nazionalita' e'y lei ? \_\_\_\_\_

**SEZIONE H - COMMENTI**

Prima di completare questa sezione le saremmo grati se volesse dare uno sguardo alle domande precedenti, in modo da assicurarsi che non ne ha tralasciato alcuna. In questa sezione finale, la invitiamo a fare dei commenti riguardo il questionario. Saremmo particolarmente interessati nel sapere se ha trovato difficili o ambigue alcune domande. Nel caso dovesse fare commenti particolari su alcune domande la preghiamo anche di segnare la sezione e il numero delle domande in questione.

**UNA VOLTA COMPLETATO IL QUESTIONARIO, SI PREGA DI CONSEGNARLO PRESSO:**

## APPENDIX E

### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. CAN YOU DESCRIBE YOUR OWN POSITION ON THE CURRENT DEBATE REGARDING BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ?
  
2. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE USE OF THE TERM "FEDERALIST" IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT ?
  
3. WOULD YOU CALL YOURSELF A FEDERALIST ?
  
4. WHEN YOU WEIGH-UP THE PROS & CONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WHICH ISSUES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING YOUR OWN FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT ?
  
5. DO YOU THINK EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WILL PROCEED WITH RELATIVELY FEW PROBLEMS, OR DO YOU SEE SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE FUTURE ?
 

(PROBE) what makes you say that ?  
what kinds of problems ?
  
6. IS THERE ANYTHING ABOUT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WHICH WORRIES YOU ?
 

(PROBE) why does that worry you ?
  
7. SOME PEOPLE HAVE ARGUED THAT BEING PRO-EUROPEAN IS SOMEHOW INCOMPATIBLE WITH BEING PATRIOTIC AND LOYAL TO BRITAIN. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THIS ?
 

(PROMPT) for example, there has been talk of "losing" our national identity, and a great deal of debate over the issue of national sovereignty.

(PROMPT) do you think becoming pro-European somehow requires a reduction in patriotic feelings about Britain ?
  
8. DO YOU THINK VERY MUCH ABOUT HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION MIGHT AFFECT YOU PERSONALLY ?
 

(PROBE) How do you think it might ?

(PROBE) How do you feel about this ?

9. DO YOU THINK THE NATIONS AND PEOPLES OF EUROPE ARE INTERDEPENDENT IN ANY IMPORTANT WAYS ?

10. IS BEING EUROPEAN IMPORTANT TO YOU ?

11. WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE THE MAJOR GOALS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ?

(PROBE) How likely is it that these goals will be realised ?

12. WOULD YOU SAY THERE'S ANYTHING WHICH MAKES YOU FEEL PROUD TO BE EUROPEAN ?

13. WOULD YOU SAY THERE'S ANYTHING WHICH MAKES YOU EMBARRASSED ABOUT BEING EUROPEAN ?

14. DO YOU THINK THERE IS SUCH A THING AS A COMMON EUROPEAN CULTURE ?

15. CAN YOU THINK OF AN INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS, WHO YOU THINK OF AS TYPICALLY EUROPEAN ?

(PROBE) why do you say that ?

16. DO YOU THINK THERE IS ANYTHING UNIQUE ABOUT EUROPE AND THE EUROPEANS ?

*[NOW I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT BEING BRITISH]*

17. IS BEING BRITISH IMPORTANT TO YOU ?

18. WHAT DO YOU THINK A PERSON NEEDS TO BE OR DO, TO DESERVE THE LABEL "PATRIOTIC" ?

19. IS IT IMPORTANT TO YOU WHETHER ANOTHER BRITISH PERSON IS PATRIOTIC OR NOT ?

20. DO YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS PATRIOTIC ?

21. DO YOU THINK THERE ARE PARTICULAR SITUATIONS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE FEELINGS OF PATRIOTISM IN BRITISH PEOPLE ?

(PROBE) Why do you think this happens ?

22. CAN YOU RECALL ANY SITUATION OR EVENT IN THE PAST WHICH LEFT YOU FEELING ESPECIALLY PLEASED OR PROUD TO BE BRITISH ?

23. CAN YOU RECALL ANY SITUATION OR EVENT IN THE PAST WHICH LEFT YOU FEELING REGRETFUL ABOUT BEING BRITISH ?

24. CAN YOU THINK OF AN INDIVIDUAL, OR GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS, WHO SEEM TO REFLECT ESPECIALLY WELL THE BRITISH NATIONAL CHARACTER?

(PROBE) in what way do you see \_\_\_ as typically British ?

would you say \_\_\_ sets a good example for other Britains to try and emulate ?

would you say that you have been influenced in any way by \_\_\_\_\_ ?

do you think most other Britains would agree that \_\_\_ is typically British ?

*[I'D LIKE TO CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW BY ASKING YOU YOUR AGE, AND YOUR POLITICAL PREFERENCE. I'D LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT YOUR ANSWERS WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS. THE REASON THAT I NEED TO KNOW THIS INFORMATION IS SO THAT I CAN GAIN SOME IDEA OF HOW REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL POPULATION THE PEOPLE I AM INTERVIEWING ARE. OF COURSE, IF YOU OBJECT, YOU NEED NOT ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS.]*

25. WHAT IS YOUR AGE IN YEARS ?

26. IF THERE WERE A GENERAL ELECTION OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WHICH POLITICAL PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR ?

*[THANKYOU]*

## **APPENDIX F**

**The 1993 questionnaire text**

## OPINIONS ABOUT BRITAIN & EUROPE QUESTIONNAIRE

This booklet contains a series of questions concerning your opinions about Britain and Europe, as well as some broader questions looking at your general attitude towards modern life. Please attempt to answer all the questions in the order in which they appear in the booklet, and to USE INK rather than pencil. Please also note that there are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions - we are only interested in your own opinions. IN ADDITION, YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE TREATED AS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, AND REMAIN ANONYMOUS - YOU WILL NOT BE ASKED TO GIVE YOUR NAME AT ANY TIME.

If you find any questions ambiguous or difficult to answer, or if you have any general comments about this questionnaire, we have provided a section at the end of the booklet in which we would welcome your feedback.

We hope you find the questionnaire interesting and straightforward, and thank you for your help. In answering this questionnaire, you are helping us to develop a greater understanding of this important subject area.

SECTION A

The questions in this section are concerned with how you feel about being British. You should answer by placing a X in ONE of seven boxes. The nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.

1. To what extent do you feel British?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 British British
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other British people?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| no ties  
 strong ties at all
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 pleased pleased
4. How similar do you think you are to the average British person?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 similar similar
5. How important to you is being British?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 important important
6. How much are your views about Britain shared by other British people?  
 shared by |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not shared  
 all by any
7. When you hear someone who is not British criticize the British, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 criticized criticized
8. The people of Britain depend on each other in important ways  
 agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
9. Do you think British people relying on one another is generally a good or a bad thing?  
 a good thing |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| a bad thing
10. Do you think that by the year 2000, being British will be more OR less important to you than it is now?  
 more |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| less  
 important important
11. Would you LIKE being British to be more OR less important to you by the year 2000, than it is now?  
 more |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| less  
 important important



SECTION C

In this section of the questionnaire, we are interested in your opinions about European integration.

Below is a list of ten possible goals for European integration. In the box beside each goal, please write clearly a number between 1 and 10 to represent how important you think each goal is. A score of 1 would indicate that you do not think the goal is important at all, whereas a score of 10 would indicate that you feel the goal is extremely important.

(use numbers between 1 & 10; 1=not at all important, 10=extremely important)

PLEASE WRITE CLEARLY

	IMPORTANCE
1. Ensuring the economic prosperity of Europe	__
2. Promoting world peace	__
3. Reducing trade barriers in Europe	__
4. Helping third world nations	__
5. Encouraging a sense of common European identity	__
6. Ensuring the economic prosperity of Britain	__
7. Guaranteeing the security of Europe	__
8. Preventing the loss of separate national identities	__
9. Creating a new, alternative superpower	__
10. Encouraging awareness of common cultural ties within Europe	__

SECTION D

This section of the questionnaire is concerned with how you feel about being European, and requires you to answer by placing a X in ONE of seven boxes. The nearer you place your X to one end of the scale, the more you agree with the label at that end.

- To what extent do you feel European?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 European European
- To what extent do you feel strong ties with other European people?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| no ties  
 strong ties at all
- To what extent do you feel pleased to be European?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 pleased pleased
- How similar do you think you are to the average European person?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 similar similar

5. How important to you is being European?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 important important
6. How much are your views about Europe shared by other European people?  
 shared by |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not shared  
 all by any
7. When you hear someone who is not European criticize Europeans, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?  
 extremely |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| not at all  
 criticized criticized
8. The nations and peoples of Europe depend on each other in important ways  
 agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
9. Do you think European nations and peoples relying on each other is generally a good or a bad thing?  
 a good thing |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| a bad thing
10. Do you think that by the year 2000, being European will be more OR less important to you than it is now?  
 more |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| less  
 important important
11. Would you LIKE being European to be more OR less important to you by the year 2000, than it is now?  
 more |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| less  
 important important
12. In general, do you think most Europeans will feel being European is more OR less important to them by the year 2000 than it is now?  
 more |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| less  
 important important
13. Do you think most BRITONS will feel being European is more OR less important to them by the year 2000 than it is now?  
 more |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| less  
 important important

#### SECTION E

This part of the questionnaire is concerned with what you think should be the most important goals of Britain and Europe. Each of the questions presented below consists of a statement about Britain or Europe. You should indicate whether you agree or disagree with the goal represented by the statement, by placing a cross in ONE of the seven boxes after each question.

1. It is important to me that being British makes me feel proud  
 agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree

2. Britain should maintain its autonomy from other nations  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
3. What being British stands for should remain stable and predictable over time  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
4. Britain should exercise as much influence as possible over world affairs  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
5. Britain should strive to be one of the world's most powerful nations  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
6. Britain and the British should be thought of as distinct and different to other nations and nationalities  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
7. I like other people to think I'm proud to be British  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
8. It is important to me that being European makes me feel proud  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
9. Europe should maintain its autonomy from other continents and non-European nations  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
10. What being European stands for should remain stable and predictable over time  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
11. Europe should exercise as much influence as possible over world affairs  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
12. Europe should strive to be one of the world's most powerful continents  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
13. Europe and the Europeans should be thought of as distinct and different to other continents, non-European nations and nationalities  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree
14. I like other people to think I'm proud to be European  
agree |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| disagree

**SECTION F** - In this section, you are asked some questions about yourself.  
Please remember that your answers will remain anonymous.

1. What is your age in years ? \_\_\_\_\_ years

2. What is your sex ? Female \_\_\_\_\_ Male \_\_\_\_\_

3. In general, how would you describe your political preferences?

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY

left-wing |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| |\_\_| right-wing

4. How did you vote at the last British general election?

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY

Conservative |\_\_| Labour |\_\_| Liberal/SDLP |\_\_|

Other |\_\_| I did not vote |\_\_|

5. In general, how often do you deliberately watch the news on TV?

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY

__	__	__	__	__
every day	a few times a week	a few times a month	a few times a year	never

6. In general, how often do you read a newspaper?

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY

__	__	__	__	__
every day	a few times a week	a few times a month	a few times a year	never

7. In general, how do you think of your social class background?

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY

__	__	__	__
working class	middle class	upper class	don't know

SECTION G - YOUR COMMENTS

BEFORE COMPLETING THIS SECTION, WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LOOK BACK THROUGH THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE NOT MISSED-OUT ANY OF THE PREVIOUS QUESTIONS.

In this final section we invite you to make any comments regarding the questionnaire. We are particularly interested in whether you found any of the questions difficult to answer or ambiguous in any way. IF YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ABOUT PARTICULAR QUESTIONS, PLEASE ALSO MAKE A NOTE OF THE SECTION THEY APPEAR IN, AND THE QUESTION NUMBER. Thank you again for your help.

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