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RESISTING REFORM: POLICE AND SOCIETY
IN OCCUPATION JAPAN
(1945-1952)

A thesis submitted for a final examination
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Economic History

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the role of the Japanese police during the American Occupation of Japan (1945-52), highlighting the problems that attended reform of this key institution. It contends that there was tension between the commitment to democratise the police on the one hand and the decision to engage in an *indirect* Occupation on the other. Emphasis on the ambivalence of US policy, mirrored by divisions within GHQ, SCAP, helps to explain the discrepancy between the professed aims of police reform and its actual results.

Parallels are drawn between the prewar/wartime police and its postwar counterpart, particularly with regard to the range of duties undertaken and the attitude of the police towards ordinary Japanese. Historical legacies stretching back to the beginning of the Meiji period and beyond are juxtaposed with the ideas of American reformers, determined to circumscribe the role of the police and to dissolve its ties with the Japanese establishment. Both aims were difficult to achieve, it is argued, amidst widespread socio-economic dislocation, typified by a thriving black market. Elucidation of the symbiotic relationship between prominent black marketeers and the police points up the latter's financial problems. It is suggested that these were compounded by decentralisation of the police system in 1948.

Drawing on the memoranda, letters and reports of reformers in Tokyo and administrators in the field, the thesis concludes that the Japanese police resisted reform, taking strength from deeply-rooted traditions and benefiting from the Occupation's decision to opt for indirect rule. The police institution was too important an agency to be overhauled in the first two years of the Occupation, and when structural reorganisation was finally pushed through in 1948 it was sabotaged by the Japanese government. In sum, this study sheds light on the limitations of the Occupation, the durability of traditional forms and institutions and the basic continuity between the prewar and postwar periods.

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JAPANESE WORDS AND NAMES

Japanese words are romanized according to the modified Hepburn system. Long vowels are indicated by circumflexes, except in the case of capitals where they have been omitted for technical reasons. Likewise, they do not appear in such well-known place names as Tokyo and Kyoto.

The usual conventions concerning Japanese names are observed throughout the thesis (ie. the family name is followed by the given name). However, the order is reversed for Japanese scholars writing in English (eg. Tetsuo Najita).

ABBREVIATIONS

ACJ	Allied Council for Japan
AFPAC	Army Forces Pacific
ATIS	Allied Translator and Interpreter Service
BCOF	British Commonwealth Occupation Force
CAS	Civil Affairs Section
CHS	Civil Historical Section
CIC	Counter Intelligence Corps
CI&E	Civil Information and Education Section
CIS	Civil Intelligence Section
C/S	Chief of Staff
CTS	Civil Transportation Section
EIA	Economic Investigation Agency
EIB	Economic Investigation Board
ESB	Economic Stabilisation Board
ESS	Economic and Scientific Section
FEC	Far East Command
FEC	Far Eastern Commission
FEQ	<u>Far Eastern Quarterly</u>
FES	<u>Far Eastern Survey</u>
G-1	Assistant C/S or General Staff Section, Personnel
G-2	Assistant C/S or General Staff Section, Intelligence
G-3	Assistant C/S or General Staff Section, Operations
G-4	Assistant C/S or General Staff Section, Supply
GHQ	General Headquarters (SCAP)
GS	Government Section
IRAA	Imperial Rule Assistance Association
MG	Military Government
MGT	Military Government Team
MIS	Military Intelligence Section
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MP	Military Police (US)
MP	Municipal Police
MPB	Metropolitan Police Board
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (Suitland)
NDL	National Diet Library (Tokyo)
NPR	National Police Reserve

NRP	National Rural Police
NRS	Natural Resources Section
NT	<u>Nippon Times</u>
PM	Provost Marshal
PRJ	<u>Political Reorientation of Japan</u>
PSC	Public Safety Commission
PSD	Public Safety Division
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SCAPIN	SCAP Instruction (ie. directive)
SHP	Special Higher Police
SFK	<u>Sangyô Fukkô Kôdan</u>
SRD	Sociological Research Division
UP	United Press

INTRODUCTION

The role of the Japanese police during the American Occupation of Japan (1945-52) is surprisingly a neglected subject amongst Western historians. This can be explained in large part by general attitudes towards both the study of the Occupation itself and the police as an institution. In the case of the former there has been too much concentration on the various factors that informed US policy-making, and too little interest in the impact of reform. A tendency to dwell on the bigger picture, to emphasize the contribution of particular individuals, has led to neglect of more mundane, but ultimately more important, issues. This thesis contends that survival rather than democracy was the principal aim of most Japanese. The key was the black market rather than a new basic law. Yet we have little sense of the former's pervasiveness and its impact on political and social relations. Study of the police, spread as they were throughout Japan, draws attention to the black market together with its principal constituency - the Japanese people. We discover what they were doing through the activities of those officials with whom they had most contact.

The police are examined in this thesis from several angles - from the very different perspectives of the Occupation, the Japanese government and the Japanese people. A comprehensive approach is necessitated by the absence of any rigorous, detailed studies of the police during the Occupation period. This deficiency is explicable in terms of a wider pattern of neglect - for a variety of reasons historians seem reluctant to focus their attention on the police, regardless of the country or period under examination. D. H. Bayley, an authority on police systems, seeks to explain "the discrepancy between the importance of the police in social life and the amount of attention given them by scholars". Disregard for policing, he argues, may derive from its association with "forces of control, of conservatism, of the status quo". More interestingly, he suggests that "police are rarely important actors in great historical events....Their activities are too routine, their presence too

pervasive, and their clientele too ordinary to be the stuff of high political drama".¹

It is precisely for these reasons that they are so important during the Occupation. "High political drama" - the machinations of a Yoshida or a Willoughby - must not be allowed to dominate the historical landscape. Just as important were the petty struggles that represented the real stuff of life for most people. By focusing on the police - the interface between government and governed - this thesis draws attention to developments at all levels of the Occupation. It supplements existing literature on the Japanese police and, indirectly, general studies of the institution itself. More importantly, however, it contributes to an understanding of the Occupation of Japan, adopting a different kind of vantage point in the hope that features hitherto obscured will stand out in sharp relief.

Studies of the Police in Japan and Elsewhere

Recent analyses of the prewar police have not generated sequels. Thanks to the efforts of Richard Mitchell ² and Elise Tipton, ³ much is now known about the imperial police and the legal framework within which they operated. The notion of a "police state" - its applicability to prewar Japan - has been examined by both authors, Tipton accepting the term only after redefinition,⁴ Mitchell opting for elaboration ("paternalistic police state").⁵ Whilst these studies concentrate on the interwar period, James Leavell and Eleanor Westney have focused on the origins of the modern police system, the former exploring the "transition from Tokugawa to Meiji"

¹ D. H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1985) pp.5-6.

² R. H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1976); Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1983); Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992).

³ E. K. Tipton, The Japanese Police State: The Tokkô in Interwar Japan (Athlone Press, London, 1991).

⁴ "Prior to the 1930s ('police state') was the translation of Polizeistaat, a neutral technical term used to designate the type of 'regulative state' that emerged on the European continent during the eighteenth century" (p.14). Thus, she uses the term to describe a tightly controlled state under an absolute monarch.

⁵ Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.xvi.

(c.1853-76),⁶ the latter assessing the relative importance of Western models and indigenous influences.⁷ Westney examines the postal system and newspapers as well as the police, investigating each institution with reference to "cross-societal emulation". Her seventy page chapter represents the only substantial analysis of the Meiji police written in English. In marked contrast to the interwar period, the years before World War One and immediately after World War Two have been largely disregarded as far as the police are concerned. The Occupation period does not even merit a chapter in a book.

English-language studies of the postwar police first appeared in the 1970s.⁸ Written by American social scientists they generally reflected admiration for Japan's success in *reducing* crime in the face of increasing urbanization.⁹ D. H. Bayley places Japan's police system within a comparative framework, analysing the cultural, social and political determinants of police work and its effectiveness. Detailed studies of the police systems of India, US and Japan,¹⁰ together with periods of research in Britain, France and Norway, culminated in a comparative work that examines "relations between police and society - the ways in which each affects the other".¹¹ Although Bayley provides a useful theoretical/conceptual framework, his analysis of the historical development of Japan's police system is sketchy. Other relevant texts by Walter Ames and Craig Parker examine police-community relations with little regard

⁶ J. B. Leavell, "The Development of the Modern Japanese Police: Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji", Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1975.

⁷ D. E. Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organisational Patterns to Meiji Japan (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987).

⁸ D. H. Bayley, Forces of Order: Police Behaviour in Japan and the United States (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976); W. L. Ames, "Police and Community in Japan", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976 (Police and Community in Japan, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1981).

⁹ E. F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1979) pp.204-22.

¹⁰ D. H. Bayley: The Police and Political Development in India (Princeton University Press, 1969); Forces of Order. D. Bayley and H. Mendelsohn, Minorities and the Police (Free Press, New York, 1969).

¹¹ D. H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing, p.3.

for historical legacies.¹² In fairness to them all, their subject is police studies rather than Japanese history. Nevertheless, their conclusions are still important for the student of Occupation Japan. As Bayley explains, "the police are not self-created; they are tied to the social units from which they derive authority". These social units survived the shocks of defeat and Occupation - the way they functioned during the Occupation would not have been very different from the way they function today.

Comparison with other countries that were occupied after the Second World War may reveal some general truths about the impact of defeat and Occupation on an indigenous police force. Were other police systems as durable as that of Japan? Are there features peculiar to police organisation that make it impervious to change? In Germany and Korea, both subject to direct rule by the Allied powers, indigenous police forces were neither supplanted nor transformed.¹³ With regard to the British zone in West Germany the Foreign Office regarded a reliable police force as an essential "instrument of Military Government". As a result, "the German police force was (only) half denazified".¹⁴ In the case of South Korea, the American chief of the Police Division saw no reason why policemen trained by the Japanese should not be retained: "We felt that if they did a good job for the Japanese, they would do a good job for us. It would be unfair to drive men trained by the Japanese out of the force".¹⁵ Given that the Occupation of Japan was "indirect" - the Japanese Government was responsible for implementing American directives - it can be supposed that the Japanese police was even less susceptible to reform than its Korean and German counterparts. All three were conforming to a general pattern identified by Bayley:

¹² W. L. Ames, Police and Community; L. C. Parker, The Japanese Police System Today: An American Perspective (Kodansha, Tokyo, 1987).

¹³ Another interesting case is that of Italy. See D. W. Ellwood, Italy 1943-1945 (Leicester University Press, 1985).

¹⁴ A. Kramer, "'Law-abiding Germans'? Social Disintegration, Crime and the Reimposition of Order in Postwar Western Germany, 1945-9", in R. J. Evans, ed., The German Underworld (Routledge, London, 1988) p.254.

¹⁵ M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.391.

Police systems exhibit an enormous inertial strength over time; their forms endure even across the divides of war, violent revolution and shattering economic and social change.¹⁶

The Japanese Police and the American Occupation

English-language studies of the Japanese police during the American Occupation are confined to a few articles in periodicals¹⁷ and one short piece in a collection of essays.¹⁸ These sketch in the outlines of the pre-surrender police, discuss the impact of the Occupation and then highlight the retreat from decentralisation. There is a sense in which the Occupation is nothing more than a temporary irritation for the Japanese police, an interlude between defeat and reconsolidation. The strict division between local and national jurisdictions, formalized in 1948, barely lasted three years. "A succession of legislative revisions beginning in 1951 and culminating in 1954,...succeeded in recentralising the police system....".¹⁹ Developments affecting the police are generally examined in the light of the Police Law of December 1947. This is in keeping with most studies of the Occupation, Japanese and American scholars preferring to examine the process of policy formation - the influences that informed it - rather than the more mundane business of administration.²⁰

¹⁶ D. H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe", in C. Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Europe (Princeton University Press, 1975) p.370.

¹⁷ R. J. D. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.18, No.2 (24/1/49) pp.17-22; H. Nakahara, "The Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol.46, No.4 (Nov.-Dec. 1955) pp.583-594; H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol.43, No.5 (Jan.-Feb. 1953) pp.655-671.

¹⁸ S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System" in R. E. Ward, ed., Five Studies in Japanese Politics (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1957) pp.1-14.

¹⁹ J. W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988) p.347.

²⁰ Nakahara, Sugai and Wildes all concentrate on the Police Law and its subsequent revision. Articles in Japanese tend to focus on divisions within GHQ concerning police reorganisation: Takemae Eiji, "Sengo Keisatsu no Seiritsu Katei", Chûô Kôron (May 1975), pp.190-202; Yoshikawa Jun, "Keisatsu Kaikaku - Minsei Kyoku (GS) Kôan Ka (PSD/CIS) no Tairitsu o Chûshin ni", Hôgaku Seminâ Zôkan, Gendai no Keisatsu (Oct. 1980); Miura Yôichi, "Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen: 1947-nen 9-gatsu 16-nichi Makkâsâ Shokan no Seiritsu Katei", Rekishigaku Kenkyû, 498 (Nov.1981), pp. 35-51.

The most recent study of the Occupation period by Richard Finn ²¹ typifies the tendency among Western historians to focus on individuals - in this case MacArthur and Yoshida - with a view to assessing their relative importance. At the same time they seem concerned to highlight and explain the changing balance of power between Washington and Tokyo and its effects on policy-making. Finn's book is atypical in the sense that it surveys the Occupation as a whole rather than examining a specific aspect,²² but its principal conclusions can be located in a well-established historiographical framework. Finn describes "waves of reform" and then moves on to the evolution of "new policies and new directions", indicating acceptance of the conventional outline of the Occupation - a progressive phase followed by a period of reassessment. The latter is described as a "second phase" or, less charitably, as a "reverse course", depending on the politics of the writer. Regardless of the designation chosen, this change of direction cannot be ignored. The police were affected by it as were other important actors in the Occupation drama (eg. the labour unions, the zaibatsu, conservative politicians).

Justin Williams dismisses the concept of a reverse course as "that idée fixe of sympathizers with radical socialism in Japan....",²³ whereas John Dower incisively defines it as "the shift of Occupation priorities from democratization of a former enemy to reconstruction of a future cold-war ally...".²⁴ Divergent views, representing "orthodox" and "revisionist" schools of interpretation, tend to

²¹ R. B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992).

²² For example, H. Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959); R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (Oxford University Press, 1959); M. S. Farley, Aspects of Japan's Labour Problems (John Day, New York, 1950); Takemae Eiji, Amerika Tainichi Rôdô Seisaku no Kenkyû (Nihon Hyôronsha, Tokyo, 1970); T. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan (1945-52) (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Cal., 1982); A. C. Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks Back (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1976).

²³ J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant's Account (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979) p.208.

²⁴ J. Dower, "Reform and Reconsolidation" in H. Wray and H. Conroy, ed., Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983) p.347.

obscure a common focal point, namely *policy* - the principal participants in its creation together with its various determinants. The orthodox line tends to concentrate on early social and political reforms, equating the passage of progressive legislation with benign motives on the part of the Americans.²⁵ Concluding his book on a positive note, Finn encapsulates the orthodox interpretation:

Whatever historians say about "feudal survivals" or "reverse course", few people would disagree that Japan today is democratic, peaceful and prosperous. This is the kind of Japan Americans wanted, and Japanese eagerly cooperated. It is not too much to say...that the peace that followed the Pacific War in 1945 resulted in victory for both the US and Japan.²⁶

Revisionists, however, reject the "American Altruism Abroad School of postwar Japanese history",²⁷ identifying US economic and strategic interests as the principal determinants of policy.²⁸ The "reverse course" and "feudal survivals" figure prominently in revisionist accounts, indicating little regard for positive appraisals of either the aims or achievements of the Occupation. In short, Occupation policies are regarded as at best ambivalent, at worst as clear indicators of US determination to use Japan for its own ends. This thesis contributes to the policy debate by examining the Occupation's original intentions with regard to the police (Chapter Two). Moreover, it draws attention to the factional struggles - within both GHQ and the Japanese government - over such questions as the comprehensiveness of the purge programme and the extent of structural decentralisation (Chapters Two and Six respectively). The

²⁵ Examples include R. E. Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan", in R. E. Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1968); G. K. Goodman, ed., The American Occupation of Japan: A Retrospective View (Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence, 1968).

²⁶ Finn, Winners, p.316.

²⁷ J. Dower, "The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan In and Out of The Pentagon Papers", in N. Chomsky and H. Zinn, eds., The Senator Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers Vol.5 (Beacon Press, Boston, Mass., 1972) p.113.

²⁸ Works that stress the international context of the Occupation and the role of U.S. economic/strategic aims include: J. Dower, "Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945-50", in E. Friedman and M. Selden, eds., America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations (Pantheon, New York, 1971) pp. 146-206; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (Harper and Row, New York, 1972); M. Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985).

decision to break up the centralised police system and the problems that attended fragmentation reveal much about the motor of reform - the Occupation headquarters - and the context of reform - the Japanese social environment. Whilst the former's structure served to complicate the process of policy-formation (and implementation), the latter proved resistant to change. Social attitudes and patterns of interaction, regarded by many reformers as "feudal", became more entrenched in the face of economic dislocation.


The Occupation Structure

Personality clashes and jurisdictional rivalries led to constant bickering among those who had an interest in police reform. Various sections, particularly Government Section (GS) and General Staff Section G-2 (Intelligence), the latter formally responsible for "public safety", regarded the police as of vital importance for the realisation of Occupation objectives. Whereas GS saw the police in negative terms - as an obstacle to democratization - G-2 stressed the importance of effective law enforcement in the face of serious social dislocation. These divergent attitudes arose from differing remits and conflicting political perspectives. Moreover, overlapping jurisdictions, particularly noticeable in the case of the police, invited inter-sectional hostility. In short, the progress of reform was impeded by the poor design of its engine - the Occupation headquarters was assembled from parts that did not fit well together.

The principal flaw was the coexistence of civilian and military organisations, GHQ SCAP²⁹ and GHQ AFPAC³⁰ (later FEC) respectively. Physically combined in Tokyo, they represented the key components of a rather awkward structure produced by surprises more than anything else - surprise at the premature end of the war and surprise at the cooperative attitude of the Japanese following surrender. The Military Government Section of GHQ, US AFPAC was "formally activated" on August 5, 1945, only to be deactivated at the

²⁹ General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. See Figure 1.


³⁰ General Headquarters, (US) Army Forces Pacific. FEC - Far East Command. See Figure 2.



GHQ, SCAP, 1 January 1946

Source: J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution Under MacArthur, p.3.


Figure 1



GHQ, AFPAC, January 1946

Source: J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution Under MacArthur, p.4.

Figure 2



Command Channels for Military Government Teams as Reorganised 1 January 1947

Source: Lt. Col. H. L. Hille, "The Eighth Army's Role in Military Government in Japan"

Military Review (February, 1948) p.13.

Figure 3

beginning of October. Its function was never clearly defined, "the main difficulty (arising) from the fact that the role of military government had been planned in terms of an invasion, or at least in terms of the assumption of direct control of the Japanese governmental machinery at all levels".³¹ The decision to use the Japanese emperor and the government he dignified resulted in "guidance" by American civilians and "supervision" by their military counterparts. Whilst the former was undertaken by GHQ, SCAP, the latter involved GHQ, AFPAC.

However, the division of responsibility was not as neat as implied. In October, 1945, the Military Government Section was replaced by ten special staff sections,³² constituent parts of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. At the same time, however, GHQ SCAP "included the general and some special staff sections of GHQ US AFPAC, which served in a dual capacity".³³ One such section was G-2, whose residual military responsibilities included intelligence and security. Its SCAP equivalent was the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), set up to "advise on policies related to civil public safety agencies...".³⁴ It seems that these overlapping jurisdictions produced some confusion, evidenced by shortlived administrative changes during the first half of 1946. On 3rd May CIS ceased to be a special staff section, its functions and responsibilities taken up by G-2. A little over four months later, on 29 August, the section was reactivated with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as its head.³⁵

These changes suggest that in the case of the Japanese police the distinction between military and non-military interests was

³¹ A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan" in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) p.335.

³² Economic and Scientific Section ; Civil Information and Education Section ; Natural Resources Section ; Public Health and Welfare Section; Government Section; Statistical and Reports Section; Civil Communications Section; Legal Section; Civil Intelligence Section; Office of General Procurement Agent (Bouterse, Taylor and Maass, p.337).

³³ SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan (Tokyo, 1950-1951) Monograph 2 (Administration of the Occupation), p.29.

³⁴ Ibid., p.35

³⁵ Ibid.

blurred. Whilst there was a commitment to democratisation of the *civil* police, there was also a sense of Japan's vulnerability following the dismantlement of her war machine, a feeling in certain circles that exceptional circumstances might justify a military-style police force. Thus, the interests of the Japanese police were protected by G-2, whose members harboured the military's dislike of instability and revolutionary upheaval. In short, they were determined to err on the side of caution. G-2/CIS tended to be staffed by soldiers, whose political views were generally conservative or reactionary. This tendency was typified by Major General Charles A. Willoughby, the head of G-2, who warmed to the likes of Mussolini and Franco. The American historian, Michael Schaller, gives us the following profile:

A German-born immigrant with pretensions of noble birth, Willoughby brought a Prussian demeanour and extremely right-wing views to his intelligence post. MacArthur hit the mark when he once called his aide "my lovable fascist". Willoughby saw Communist and Jewish conspiracies at home, abroad, and especially in SCAP's ranks.³⁶

Willoughby's principal sparring partner was Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, the head of Government Section. The latter stood in marked contrast to G-2. The product of a novel creation, GS epitomised the crusading mission of GHQ, SCAP. Unlike G-2, there were no residual military functions, and little regard for the soldier's sense of insecurity, even paranoia, vis à vis the Occupation. Charged with reforming "the internal structure of the civil government of Japan", Government Section sought to promote decentralisation of political power, to foster local responsibility.³⁷ In short, GS's reformers were determined to politicise the Japanese people, to convince them that they had rights that government could not infringe.

Members of GS embraced the opportunity to remake Japan, to teach her the lessons of American democracy. Whitney's deputy, Charles Kades, was regarded as "the epitome of the brainy, liberal

³⁶ M. Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (Oxford University Press, New York, 1989) p.121.

³⁷ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.2, p.39.

American"³⁸ committed to the democratisation of Japan. His lieutenants - Guy Swope (head of National Government Division, GS) and Cecil Tilton (chief of Local Government Division, GS) amongst others - used a political vocabulary quite different from their opponents in G-2/CIS. Whilst they warned of the dangers posed by a strong, centralised police force - namely "the ruthless liquidation of opposing elements"³⁹ - the head of G-2/CIS's Public Safety Division, Colonel H. E. Pulliam, warned against turning "the nation over to the pinks and reds".⁴⁰ Other sections had a view on the subject, the Economic and Scientific Section, for example, voicing concerns over the financial implications of drastic decentralisation.

At the risk of oversimplification, the conflicting positions of GS and G-2/CIS reflected the divergent views of civilians and soldiers, or, more interestingly, of liberals and conservatives. According to one reformer, Robert Textor,⁴¹ "the 'liberals'.... tended to be people who had matured politically during the Roosevelt period, and who endorsed the broad humanitarian and equity goals of the New Deal".⁴² Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru distinguished between "realists" and "idealists" like Kades, "enlist(ing) the support of SCAP's fanatic anti-communists against its 'New Dealers'....".⁴³ According to Textor, liberal Occupationnaires actively pursued ambitious goals, whilst their more conservative counterparts "were more inclined to regard pro-change Japanese as Communist or pro-Communist", preferring

³⁸ Finn, *Winners*, p.87.

³⁹ GS Memo dated 12/4/47; For: The Deputy Chief, GS; Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police System Submitted by the PSD; From: G. Swope [National Diet Library: fiche GS(B) 02306].

⁴⁰ CIS, G-2, PSD; Memo dated 24/3/47; Subject: Conference - Reorganisation of and Increase in Strength of the Japanese Police (NDL: fiche G-2 00247).

⁴¹ Robert Textor served in two capacities during the Occupation - first, in the 1 Corps area around Kyoto, as a Civil Information and Education Officer (1946-7), then as a member of the Wakayama Military Government Team (1947-8).

⁴² R. Textor, "Success in Japan - Despite Some Human Foibles and Cultural Problems" in W. Nimmo, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots* (MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Va., 1992) p.158. The resonance of the New Deal in Occupation Japan is examined in T. Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (Free Press, New York, 1987).

⁴³ J. W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1988) p.295.

"to build up conservative elements....(to) serve as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in Asia".⁴⁴

Willoughby's G-2 was at the forefront of the fight against Communism. His principal instrument was the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), "which spied on Americans and cultivated former members of Japan's secret police and armed forces".⁴⁵ Although the CIC were thinly spread throughout Japan, their presence caused disquiet amongst liberal-minded Americans working in the field. Thus, there were clashes over reform at all levels of the Occupation, the skirmishes in the localities sometimes proving as bitter as the battles that took place in GHQ. Rather than focusing on *either* the local *or* the national dimension of the Occupation, this thesis seeks to weld the two together, to illuminate their interrelationship.

The contours of "military government", or more accurately military/civilian supervision,⁴⁶ are less well known than those of GHQ, SCAP. Those in the field can basically be classified according to three types: counter intelligence agents; military government officials; and tactical troops. The former acted as G-2's field units, receiving instructions from and reporting directly to their seniors in intelligence. In marked contrast, military government officials were assigned to one of 35 prefectural military government teams or one of eight regional teams. Depending on their location, they took orders from one of two Corps HQ (I Corps in Kyoto or IX Corps in Sendai), which occupied a level immediately below Eighth Army Headquarters in Yokohama (See Figure 3, p.19). The latter liaised with GHQ, SCAP, passing on MGT reports to the relevant section, and then channelling instructions or advice back down to the field units. This five-layered structure ⁴⁷ was extremely cumbersome, leading to frustration amongst military government officials and an increasing willingness on their part to act unilaterally.⁴⁸ As far as the tactical troops were concerned, they were sufficiently removed

⁴⁴ R. Textor, "Success in Japan....", p.158.

⁴⁵ M. Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, p.121.

⁴⁶ The local dimension is examined in detail in Chapter 5.

⁴⁷ The five layers, in descending order, were as follows: GHQ, 8th Army HQ, Corps HQ, Region, MGT.

⁴⁸ In Textor's words, to "guide and assist" rather than "observe and report".

from the Japanese people as to make such active intervention improbable. Their role was, for the most part, a passive one - they represented the potential enforcement arm of GHQ, SCAP, to be actively employed only in the event of widespread disobedience or resistance. In August 1947, the ratio of tactical troops to CIC agents and military government officials was roughly 30:1.⁴⁹

As well as there being local and national dimensions to the American Occupation, there was also of course an international one. Such organisations as the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) or the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) qualified, albeit to a very limited extent, the notion of an exclusively American Occupation. Established outside Japan - in Washington - the FEC comprised representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines.⁵⁰ Although the commission was accorded an active policy-making role, in practice "activities were largely confined to approving policies long after their execution".⁵¹ Operating within Japan and representing the interests of the United States, China, the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union, the ACJ assumed an active advisory role, challenging Occupation policy on a number of occasions. In January 1949, for example, the Russian representative alleged that "the Japanese police force secretly (was) being expanded into a revived army".⁵²

The Occupation's international context lies outside the scope of this thesis, hardly impinging at all. What is being examined is specifically domestic in orientation - the structure of the Occupation and the degree to which it influenced the reform of the police. In this section GHQ's structural problems have been investigated, with a view to understanding its schizophrenic character. However, in order to fully understand the *impact*, rather than just the *process*, of police reform, the recipient of Occupation

⁴⁹ Analysis of Population, Military and Police Strength by Prefecture, dated 29/8/47 (NDL: G-2 02776).

⁵⁰ Burma and Pakistan became members in November 1949.

⁵¹ G. Daniels, "Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies Towards Japan, 1946-52", in The Hokkaidô Law Review, Vol.27, No.2 (Nov. 1976), p. 337.

⁵² Stars and Stripes (5/1/49).

policy must be examined - ie. the Japanese police and the social environment in which they operated.

Police and Society

From the time of its establishment in the early Meiji period, the Japanese police developed within a social structure that many in GHQ, SCAP found difficult to fathom. The principle of kanson minpi (meaning "respect for officialdom, contempt for the people") placed policemen above the people, affording the former a privileged position at the expense of the latter. This was something that American reformers sought to overturn, determined as they were to weaken the Japanese propensity for hierarchy. The intention was to loosen some of the bonds of Japanese society, to free people from some of the constraints, in the hope that they would be better able to influence the conduct of their political masters. This was difficult to achieve, however, during a time of economic privation, when people naturally fell back on social institutions that many Occupationnaires dismissed as "feudal".

One such institution was the oyabun-kobun system, variously translated as the division between parent-child or boss-henchman. The Occupation identified it as an enemy of democracy, highlighting its criminal manifestations and largely disregarding its positive aspects. Those who had been badly affected by the war sought refuge in pseudo-families, the heads of which provided them with food, clothing and shelter in return for services rendered. People needed friends in high places, and were keen to ingratiate themselves with anyone who might help them acquire scarce commodities, particularly food. The methods employed ranged from bribery to gift-giving, the distinction constantly exercising zealous reformers. "The non-reciprocal exchange of gifts" was, and remains, an essential "expression of hierarchical difference".⁵³ When the Occupation discovered "contributions" - public "donations" to the police - it confronted some of Japan's most durable cultural traits. Just as reformers were unable to instil in the Japanese mind the cherished distinction between public and private realms, so too

⁵³ J. Hendry, Understanding Japanese Society (Routledge, London, 1992) p.72.

were they incapable of taking on such sacred cows as collective responsibility and respect for officials.

This thesis aims to elucidate the mutual relationships between the police and their charges on the one hand, and the police and their political masters on the other. The feelings of ordinary Japanese towards the police were conditioned by the manner in which they had been dominated, their lives closely regulated during the 1920s and '30s and especially during the war. Fear and deference were the products of a pervasive system of thought control, characterised by excessive intrusion by the police into citizens' daily lives. The authority and raw power of the police and its identification with the conservative ruling order can best be explained by tracing its development from the early 1870s when it was established as a vital support for the new regime.

The characteristics of the prewar/wartime police are examined in Chapter One, and its development traced from the establishment of the Keishichô (Metropolitan Police Board) in the early years of the Meiji period; through the Taishô and early Shôwa periods when police functions were increasingly divided among specialist units, such as the Tokkô or Thought Police; up to 1945, by which time the degree of police regulation was unprecedented. Tokyo's police force was modelled on the Paris Prefecture of Police, and particularly important was the transmission of the notion of a "Higher Police" (ie. one engaged in political activities conducive to the maintenance of the status quo). It was one of the Occupation's primary objectives to cut the umbilical cord between the political establishment and the police in order to make the agency of law enforcement accountable to the people.

The attitude of the Japanese police towards the people, that is to say those without influence, is examined in Chapter Three - essentially from two perspectives: their political/social activities and their economic role. The former encompasses their response to demonstrations and strikes, and their behaviour towards individual detainees, suspected of having committed crimes. Constitutional guarantees were often not enough to ensure respect for civil

liberties, especially when police lock-up facilities were in a poor state of repair and food, disinfectant and medicines in short supply. As for the police's economic activities, these remained much the same as before the surrender - the enforcement of pricing and rationing regulations, which involved the monitoring of retail outlets and the control of traffic in scarce commodities. Any purchase of food, or indeed any controlled commodity, on the black market was technically illegal, although the huge number of economic offences⁵⁴ attests to the inadequacy of official rationing and distribution systems. Sudden blitzes on illegal transport of goods in short supply revealed the scale of the problem, although these intensive drives against the black market were often followed by long periods of inaction. The situation was complicated by continuing police searches of persons and their baggage, a practice that was not consistent with the Occupation's promotion of civil liberties.

Chapter Four investigates the relationship between the police and the political establishment, their connections with the conservative government and what was deemed its "shadow" counterpart, the oyabun-kobun system. The main aim of the chapter is to determine the validity of a claim made by a prominent Occupation official, Theodore Cohen, that from the beginning of the Occupation "the property of the nation as a whole was skewed in effect to restore the old regime".⁵⁵ If this indeed was the case, then the police must have consciously turned a blind eye to illegal activities aimed at safeguarding the position of the old regime. The establishment's appropriation of the "surrender dividend", by which is meant the substantial military stores "civilianised" immediately after the surrender, certainly required the cooperation of the police. It is inconceivable that they did not know about large amounts of hoarded goods in their respective localities. On both individual and corporate levels, the police depended on those with influence in the community. Given the harsh economic climate, it was not surprising that police officials were compromised by dealings on the black

⁵⁴ These were conveniently ignored by the Occupation's statisticians when determining levels of crime.

⁵⁵ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.347.

market. More seriously, however, police forces received substantial funds from prominent figures in the community. These contributions - a necessary supplement to government subsidy and local taxation - invited preferential treatment.

Financial problems were accompanied by a burdensome workload, forcing the police on occasion to delegate responsibilities to powerful black marketeers with friends in high places. The unpopularity of Osaka's police chief, Suzuki Eiji, in the upper reaches of government resulted from his determination to expose the illegal practices of powerful oyabun, a course of action that would have implicated members of the ruling party. Smear campaigns that aimed to discredit Suzuki would have succeeded had it not been for the active support of the head of the Police branch (Public Safety Division), who was determined not to lose "the only Japanese official I have met who thinks like an American".⁵⁶ Chapter Five focuses on the unlikely alliances that developed between Japanese and American personnel in the field. Accorded a very limited role and subjected to an extremely cumbersome chain of command, military government officials increasingly chose to react to developments rather than simply monitor them. As a result, they began to identify with local hierarchies, frequently eliciting the cooperation of the police.

Chapter Six explores the reasons for "immediate and final decentralisation" of the police, focusing on divisions within both GHQ and Japanese governing circles over structural reform. As the seventh and final chapter demonstrates, decentralisation compounded the problem of finance and further enfeebled police forces vis à vis gangster organisations and communist elements. It returns to themes developed in Chapters Three, Four and Five, such as the locus of power in the community and the loyalties of the police. The latter were not transferred to the people, as the Occupation intended. Drawing strength from longstanding social attitudes and the exigencies of an indirect Occupation, the Japanese police resisted reform.

⁵⁶ Letter from H. S. Eaton to Lt. Col. R. T. Battey, undated (NDL: G-2 00257).

Methodology and Sources

The thesis title - "Resisting Reform: Police and Society in Occupation Japan" - immediately identifies the principal foci of this study, namely the Occupation itself, the Japanese police and the society that defined it. The combination of these elements produced tensions and conflicts that reveal much about the process of reform, the differing perceptions of the various participants and the attitudes of those on the receiving end. In any analysis of the Occupation there is tension between the American view on the one hand and the Japanese experience on the other. This is particularly true of this study, which unravels the Occupation structure so as to clarify the process of reform, just as it probes the social environment in which the police operated in order to properly assess the impact of reform. The crucial link, of course, is *indirect* rule, a state of affairs that forced Occupation officials and Japanese policemen to work together, often for very different reasons. Thus, the police took on numerous, conflicting roles - guarantor of social stability, agent of reform and, most uncomfortably, object of reform.

Any study of the Japanese police during the Occupation challenges such dichotomies as centre-periphery and policy formation-implementation. Involved in all these arenas - as active agents or passive recipients - the police invite a comprehensive view of the Occupation, one that is not too narrowly focused. The problem with most studies of the Occupation is that they either focus on a particular area of policy or examine the whole gamut of reform through the eyes of those in GHQ. Neither approach begins to unite or merge the various Occupations that have been separated out by historians. A recent symposium on this subject concluded that there were "two distinct, yet intertwined, Occupations" - one represented by GHQ, the other by the grassroots.⁵⁷ Of course there were many more, reflecting the spectrum of political views in both the Japanese and American camps. This study of the Japanese police begins to reassemble the Occupation jigsaw. Admittedly the police are in the centre, as befitting their pivotal position, but the viewer

⁵⁷ T. W. Burkman, "Reflections on the Occupation's Grassroots and the Eight Symposia" in W. Nimmo ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots, p.188.

can also make out the faces of Japanese and Americans in a variety of roles. In short, this thesis highlights the importance of the police as the crucial link between high-level political agencies and low-level social institutions. This suggests a holistic approach, one that marries the formation of policy with the process of administration. The final product is social-political-economic history, the balance depending on the piece of jigsaw at hand.

The jigsaw, however, remains incomplete, perhaps unsurprising given the scale of the enterprise. Whereas numerous American faces can be discerned, relatively few Japanese ones appear around the jigsaw's jagged edges. The missing pieces correspond to Japanese sources. This thesis grew out of eight months' research in the National Diet Library, Tokyo. The richness of the SCAP archive, together with the limitations on the author's ability to use Japanese sources, dictated that the subject would be viewed essentially through American eyes. Although new vistas have been opened, new territories explored, the preoccupations and predilections of the Occupier are much clearer than those of the great majority of Japanese. This deficiency must be acknowledged at the outset. Although Japanese primary sources have been hardly used at all, a number of secondary sources have been consulted, particularly with regard to the history of the police and the debate concerning decentralisation in 1947/8.

As far as the police are concerned, there seems to be a pattern of neglect on the Japanese side that mirrors gaps in Western scholarship. Still, more use could have been made of Japanese newspapers, prefectural histories and personal accounts. Although they would have added another dimension, their inclusion would have substantially increased the length of the thesis, perhaps making it unwieldy (not to mention the time involved). Some details of local and national developments - as reported by Japanese newspapers - were obtained from the press summaries of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS). Translations of the communist newspaper, Akahata (Red Flag), afford an interesting contrast to the more conservative appraisal of developments, contained in such newspapers as the English-language Japan Times. The ATIS records

provide fascinating glimpses of problems and flashpoints - a policeman's disregard for a detainee's human rights, a battle between Koreans and Japanese over control of an area of market stalls, the over-zealous reaction of policemen in Osaka to a civil disturbance.

A large amount of new material was uncovered in the National Diet Library, and, to a lesser extent in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Suitland, Maryland.⁵⁸ In both cases the principal sources were the records of G-2, the section responsible for the Japanese police, GS and, to a lesser extent, ESS. Numerous letters, memoranda and reports draw attention to inter-section and intra-section relations within GHQ, SCAP, the dialogue between the centre and the periphery, and, most significantly as far as this study is concerned, the various issues and questions raised concerning the Japanese police. Without access to the letters and reports of reformers in Tokyo and administrators in the field, it would have been impossible to get a sense of the interrelationship between American officials and Japanese policemen.

In addition, two multi-volume histories of the Occupation, published by GHQ, SCAP, proved to be invaluable sources. The Summations of the Non-Military Activities in Japan, of which there are thirty-five volumes, provide month-by-month coverage of activities from September, 1945, to August, 1948. Although the series does not extend to the final years of the Occupation, there is a great deal of raw data concerning crime, the black market, the police response to such problems, and prison conditions. The summations provide a useful running commentary, a detailed account of developments as they occurred. Adopting a thematic, rather than chronological, approach, the History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan consists of fifty-five monographs. These cover the period up to 1950, and contain useful appendices of statistics and documents. As an official account, a house history, the series is not without bias. The final volume, "Police and Public Safety",

⁵⁸ The National Diet library has a huge stock of documents on fiche, classified according to section and subject. Although it is hard on the eyes, this system is much easier to use than the one in NARA, where the researcher must wade through numerous "boxes" of documents in order to find what s/he is looking for.

generally presents police reform in a favourable light, although problems attending decentralisation are acknowledged. Like the Political Reorientation of Japan, published by Government Section in 1949, the official history concentrates on American policy and initiative, paying little attention to Japanese attitudes.

This deficiency is partially corrected by the trenchant accounts of such foreign journalists as Mark Gayn,⁵⁹ William Costello⁶⁰ and Honor Tracy.⁶¹ Suspicious of the official record, these intrepid characters ventured out of Tokyo in order to assess the impact of reform, the responsiveness or otherwise of its recipients. Admittedly they are prone to cynicism or sensationalism, the usual vices of journalism. Honor Tracy makes it clear that she is "not quite sympathetic with American efforts in Japan".⁶² Similarly, it could be argued that William Costello and Mark Gayn judge the Occupation too harshly, that they set standards that were impossible to meet. Like our friend in military government, Robert Textor, they perhaps "demanded too much".⁶³ Although these sources must be used with care, they add an important dimension to this study. Gayn's hunches, for example, often turned out to be correct, leading to disclosure of "feudal survivals", resistance to reform and corruption in high places. Interestingly, and reassuringly, these journalistic accounts frequently echoed the misgivings of military government officials, voiced in their reports to higher authority. As is made clear by this thesis, the anxious whispers of those in the field must be heard above the din emanating from GHQ, SCAP.

⁵⁹ M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981).

⁶⁰ W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism in Postwar Japan (Hagaki Shoten, Tokyo, 1948).

⁶¹ H. Tracy, Kakemono: A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950).

⁶² Rinjirô Sodei, "The Occupier and the Occupied" in W. Nimmo ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots, p.3.

⁶³ Ibid., p.171.

CHAPTER ONE

FOUNDATIONS

The Japanese word for "police" - keisatsu - was coined at the beginning of the Meiji period (1868-1912). The need for "the new nomenclature"¹ and the novel institution that it described or anticipated reveals as much about the situation before the restoration as it does about the priorities of the new regime. According to J. B. Leavell, "Tokugawa Japan was an unpoliced society",² underpinned by the principle of "self-regulation". Emphasizing "organised and legitimate coercion (police)" rather than "normative and voluntary processes (traditional values)", Leavell states that "the emperor's policeman, as opposed to the neighbourhood's watchman, served as a demonstration of the imperial government's determination to rule...".³ Taking its cue from Leavell, this chapter will focus on the development of Japan's police system during the period 1874 to 1945, drawing attention to both Western models and indigenous traits. It begins with the establishment of a Continental European-style police system, and concludes with the crucial role of neighbourhood associations in wartime Japan, suggesting that a modern police force dovetailed neatly with traditional values, namely "the principle of collective responsibility".⁴

The history of the Meiji police system effectively begins with the transfer of the Police Bureau, together with its functions, from the

¹ Oura Kanetake, "The Police of Japan", in Fifty Years of New Japan, Okuma Shigenobu, ed., trans. Marcus B. Huish (Smith, Elder & Co., 2nd ed. 1910) Vol.1, p.281.

² According to R. J. Smith (see fn.4), Tokyo was policed in the 1850s and 1860s by "only 350...officers, of whom 60 were responsible for dealing solely with members of the warrior class". It was lower-grade samurai (dōshin) who investigated crimes and ordered arrests where necessary. The system of crime control in Tokugawa Japan is described in M. Hane, Premodern Japan (Westview, Boulder, Col., 1991) pp.139-142; C. Dunn, Everyday Life in Traditional Japan (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1972) pp.28-31.

³ J. B. Leavell, "The Policing of Society", in H. Conroy, S. Davis, and W. Patterson, eds., Japan in Transition (Associated University Presses, Cranbury, 1984) pp.22-45.

⁴ R. J. Smith, Japanese Society (Cambridge University Press, 1983) p.39.

Justice Ministry ⁵ to the new Home Ministry ⁶ in January 1874 .⁷ This coincided with the establishment of a metropolitan police force (Keishichô or Metropolitan Police Board), "directed and supervised by the Home Minister" through the Board's Superintendent-General.⁸ Both developments followed the submission of a report by eight young members of the Justice Ministry, who had travelled abroad in 1872/1873 and spent time in France, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Austria and Italy, studying legal systems, the courts, penal codes and the police.⁹ A Satsuma samurai, Kawaji Toshiyoshi, directed investigation of police organisations, becoming the first head of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board in 1874.¹⁰ Characterised as "the great benefactor of the imperial police" (teikoku keisatsu kensetsu no daionjin),¹¹ Kawaji was active as both a planner and an administrator, supervising the establishment and early development of the Keishichô. The latter's significance derives from the use of the capital's police system as a model for prefectural organisation.

The Japanese government accepted and adopted most of Kawaji's proposals for the establishment of a modern police system. His association of police organisation with monarchical principles caused him to be drawn to the European Continental structure, characterised by a centralised, national system.¹² The new regime had the option of either imitating the Continental system or following the English example. Whilst the former offered a high

⁵ The Police Bureau (Keihoryô) had been established in 1872.

⁶ The Naimushô was established on November 10, 1873

⁷ S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed., Five Studies in Japanese Politics (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1957) p.1. For developments between 1868 and 1874 see Leavell, "Policing of Society", pp.26-36. Sources in Japanese include: Keishichô Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Keishichô Shi, Vol.1 (Keishichô Shi Hensan linkai, Tokyo, 1959); Obinata Sumio, Tennôsei Keisatsu to Minshû (Nippon Hyôronsha, Tokyo, 1987); Oka Tadao, Meiji Jidai Keisatsu Kan no Seikatsu (Yûzankaku Shuppan, Tokyo, 1974); Saitô Teruo, ed., Keisatsuchô (Kyôikusha, Tokyo, 1974); Taikakai, ed., Naimushôshi, Vol. 2 (Chihô Zaimu Kyôkai, Tokyo, 1971); Takahashi Yûsai, Meiji Keisatsu Shi (Reibunsha, Tokyo, 1961).

⁸ K. Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Stanford University Press, Cal., 1965) p.45.

⁹ D. E. Westney, "The Emulation of Western Organisations in Meiji Japan: The Case of the Paris Prefecture of Police and the Keishichô", Journal of Japanese Studies, 8, No. 2 (Summer 1982) p.311.

¹⁰ Saitô Teruo, ed., Keisatsuchô (Kyôikusha, Tokyo, 1974) p.23.

¹¹ Hironaka Toshio, Sengo Nihon no Keisatsu (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1969) p.4.

¹² Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.2.

degree of centralisation, a multiplicity of administrative functions and an active political role, the latter combined a more restricted role with a decentralised organisation.¹³ Around forty years later Raymond Fosdick, an authority on European police systems, trenchantly distinguished between the two alternatives:

In Great Britain the police are the servants of the community....They are civil employees, whose primary duty is the preservation of public security. In the execution of this duty they have no powers not possessed by any other citizen....In sharp contrast is the Continental theory, which, *evolved from the necessities of autocratic government* (my italics), makes of the police force the strong arm of the ruling classes. The Continental policeman is the servant of the Crown or the higher authorities....He possesses powers greatly exceeding those of the citizen.¹⁴

Considering the demands on the early Meiji state, it was not surprising that its leaders favoured the Continental model. D. H. Bayley places their decision in context:

The statesmen of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 wanted to impel Japan into the the modern world by the creation of an effective national government...The political imperatives of modernization compelled the government to centralize administration, especially in education, taxation and policing.¹⁵

A police force with a broad ambit of control was highly desirable, considering that a modern administrative system was barely in the making and a blueprint for local government had yet to be drawn up. So too was the active political role accorded the police - those in control, intent on defending themselves against political rivals, coveted the weapons of surveillance and control.¹⁶ Determined to survive "a whirlpool of disturbance"¹⁷ and smarting from the insult of the unequal treaties, the Japanese government's immediate objective was to "reclaim full sovereignty over its internal

¹³ Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organisational Patterns to Meiji Japan (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987) pp.41-2. An invaluable source, I & I provides the material for much of this chapter.

¹⁴ R. B. Fosdick, European Police Systems (Century Co., New York, 1915) pp.15-16. D. H. Bayley states that it is "still properly regarded as a fundamental text".

¹⁵ D. H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1985) p.69.

¹⁶ Westney, JJS, p.313.

¹⁷ Oura Kanetake, "The Police of Japan", p.281.

affairs".¹⁸ A strong, effective police force would facilitate the maintenance of internal order and win the respect of the Western powers. Thus, domestic and international pressures combined to recommend a theory of policing that stressed social control rather than citizens' freedoms.

It was the French system, specifically the Paris police, that was singled out as the one most suitable for Japan. According to R. H. Mitchell, this was "a logical choice":

It was famous, it was highly centralized, it performed a wide range of administrative functions (including preventive policing and political surveillance), and that model was already under study for the legal system and the courts.¹⁹

Influenced by the French set-up, Kawaji had recommended that the judicial police be separated from their administrative counterparts, the latter maintaining public order under the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry, the former investigating offences on behalf of the Justice Ministry. Although the two spheres were not as discreet as Kawaji implied, his proposal reassured Justice Ministry officials, keen to retain some influence over police affairs after the necessary establishment of an Interior Ministry. Thus, even the system's complexity was utilised by Japanese planners, in this case to temper inter-departmental competition.²⁰

The ideas and patterns imported from France were complemented by indigenous influences, such as the samurai legacy. With the establishment of new forms, the ranks of the police were filled with unemployed ex-samurai. Benefits and disadvantages flowed from this pattern of recruitment: "staunchness (and) relative immunity from corruption, (indicative) of a system of morality peculiar to the former warrior class", was coupled with "an attitude of disrespect

¹⁸ P. J. Katzenstein & Y. Tsujinaka, Defending the Japanese State (Cornell East Asia Series, Ithaca, N.Y., 1991) p.35.

¹⁹ R. H. Mitchell, Janus-Faced Justice (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992) p.2.

²⁰ Leavell, "Policing of Society", p.37; Westney, JJS, pp.317-18. In practice "for most of the Meiji period the same men performed most...tasks, under the supervision of specialized administrative units in the Keishichô central headquarters" (Westney, I & I, p.57).

and superciliousness towards the people".²¹ At the same time the Keishichô identified strongly with the military, conscious of the Japanese army's organisational superiority and the need for joint action against threats to the country's security. Kawaji saw the role of the "forces" as complementary - the army and navy defending the nation against external adversaries, the police dealing with internal dissent.²² In fact, it was the army rather than the police that suppressed uprisings in the 1870s, the newly-organised urban police units unable to meet the challenge on their own.²³ Nevertheless, "in 1877, when the (Satsuma) Rebellion broke out under the leadership of....Saigô (Takamori), a police brigade....displayed no small valour in the campaign,...(winning) for the police in general a reputation which....(in 1910 was) still green in the memory of the people".²⁴

A National Police Organisation

During the early 1870s available resources for policing were concentrated on Tokyo - as the new capital and the administrative centre, it was the obvious starting point. However, the Police Bureau (Keihokyoku)²⁵ was well aware of the existence of a variety of local policing structures outside the capital. These would have to be swept aside before new police organisations modelled on the Keishichô could be established in the prefectures. When it moved to the Home Ministry in 1874 the bureau ordered prefectural governors to dismiss municipal police personnel, who were characterised as ineffective and untrustworthy.

In January 1877 the Keishichô was "made a bureau of the Home...(Ministry) under the name of the Keishikyoku", its Superintendent-General now responsible for "the police business of the whole country....".²⁶ The reorganisation reflected "internal disorder and financial pressures", but was reversed in 1881 due to positive and

²¹ Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.4.

²² Westney, I & I, p.61; See also Keishichô Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Keishichô Shi, Vol.1.

²³ R. L. Sims, A Political History of Modern Japan (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1991)p.46.

²⁴ Oura Kanetake, "The Police of Japan", p.293.

²⁵ This was called the Keihoryô until April 1876.

²⁶ Oura, "The Police of Japan", p.283.

negative developments - the decline of internal disorder and abuses of centralized police power respectively.²⁷ One of the principal reasons for structural change had been "the low standards of quality and performance among the provincial forces".²⁸ However, little had been achieved in terms of standardization by 1881, despite a positive trend signalled by the promulgation of the Administrative Police Regulations (Gyôsei Keisatsu Kisoku) in 1875.²⁹ The government's announcement in 1881 that it would establish constitutional government within ten years acted as "a spur to the consolidation of the structures of administration and control".³⁰ It was followed by the creation of a new post - keibuchô (chief inspector) - that ensured tighter control of prefectural police.³¹ "The first prefectural police official to be appointed directly by the central government", the chief inspector headed the prefectural Police Central Headquarters (Keisatsu Honbu). A key agent of standardization and centralization, he enforced national police regulations and, "in connection with political cases....took orders from the Home Ministry".³²

Ultimately the Japanese police surpassed its French progenitor in the level of centralisation achieved.³³ The Home Minister stood at the top of the command structure. His immediate subordinate was the director of the Police Bureau, "the key person in nationwide police administration...":

He could issue directives in the name of the Home Minister, formulate general policies and carry out administrative and operational control over all prefectural departments except the Keishichô. His chief means of control, however, was his authority to appoint and transfer police officials in the rank of superintendent or above.³⁴

²⁷ E. K. Tipton, The Japanese Police State (Athlone Press, London, 1990) p.40. See also Keishichô Shi, Vol.1; Taikakai, Naimushôshi, Vol.1.

²⁸ Westney, I & I, p.67

²⁹ Leavell, "Policing of Society". p.43. These were modelled on regulations drawn up by Kawaji for the Keishichô.

³⁰ Westney, I & I, p.71. The source for the remainder of this paragraph unless otherwise stated.

³¹ Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.3.

³² Ibid.

³³ Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, Defending, p.38.

³⁴ Tipton, Police State, p.39.

Bureau personnel were civilian administrators with higher civil service qualifications, rather than police officials who had worked their way up through the ranks; uniformed policemen seldom rose higher than the rank of superintendent.³⁵ In the prefectures, with the exception of Tokyo, police authority ultimately resided with the centrally-appointed governor. In practice, however, the chief of the prefectural police division exercised control over police units in cities and towns throughout the prefecture.³⁶ The fact that the Home Minister appointed prefectural police chiefs, rather than the governors under whom they ostensibly served, undermined the latter's position.³⁷ The centre also had financial muscle, providing about 35% of all prefectural policing expenses and 60% in the case of Tokyo.³⁸

By the end of the Meiji period the key functions of the Police Bureau were divided between sections concerned with police affairs, peace preservation and censorship.³⁹ This division of police activities corresponded with organisation at the prefectural level, although there were differences within these broad categories reflecting the level of urbanisation and industrialisation. Beneath the prefectural divisions were the district stations which again varied in the grouping of police functions.⁴⁰ Despite the diversity with regard to the minutiae of organisation, the core categories of police work, such as peace prevention or general affairs, characterised all levels of the system. At the same time channels of communication followed a clear command hierarchy. To take Tokyo as an example, there was a two-way flow from Keishichô HQ to the main police

³⁵ Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R. & A. Report No. 2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation"(28/9/45) p.38.

³⁶ For further details re. national police organisation: H. Nakahara, "The Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol.46, No.4 (Nov.-Dec. 1955) pp.583-4.

³⁷ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.18, No.2 (24/1/49) p.18: "Although the police director was one civil service rank below the governor, there were many instances in which, because of the personalities of the two officials, the director of police wielded greater power than the governor".

³⁸ R. & A. Report, No.2758, p.11.

³⁹ R. H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1976) diagram on p.195.

⁴⁰ PSD, Report on the Japanese National Police System (1/47), Pt.1, Section 6, p.136 (NARA, Suitland, Box 335, file 9).

stations, which in turn passed/received information to/from their respective substations and police boxes. The exchange of information between the different levels, concerning the social environment and the performance of police officials, facilitated coordination and control.⁴¹

Moreover, the pervasiveness of the police presence made monitoring of social/political activity that much easier. The dispersal of police substations and boxes throughout the country took place during Yamagata Aritomo's period of office as Home Minister (1883-90).⁴² His "term as Home Minister....marked the transition from the French to the German model of police".⁴³ Indeed, it was Wilhelm Höhn,⁴⁴ a captain of the Berlin police, who criticised the concentration of police officials in urban areas and recommended the wider distribution of permanent police posts.⁴⁵ His proposal, adopted in 1886, led to an increase in the total number of police posts from 3,068 in 1885 to 11,357 by 1890.⁴⁶

The basic unit of policing was the kôban - a small three man post, which operated as a neighbourhood institution, encouraging contact and information exchange between the police and the public. The regular three man kôban was essentially an urban policing unit; its rural equivalent was the one man residential box (chûzaisho), which served as both an office and a home.⁴⁷ In 1909, Arthur Lloyd, a lecturer at the "Imperial University", stated that Japanese policemen worked from "boxes at regular intervals along the streets,

⁴¹ Westney, I & I, pp.58-9.

⁴² According to Roger Bowen, Yamagata was "Japan's Bismarck" (Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan). For a more detailed analysis of his contribution to police development, see R. F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

⁴³ Tipton, Police State, p.41.

⁴⁴ Heinrich Friedrich Wilhelm Höhn was employed as an adviser to the Home Ministry during the period 1885 to 1891.

⁴⁵ Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo, pp.103-4; Westney, I & I, p.80; Taki Shizuo, Keisatsu Konjaku Monogatari (Shin Jinbutsu Oraisha, Tokyo, 1974) p.61.

⁴⁶ Westney, I & I, p.80.

⁴⁷ PSD, Report on the Japanese National Police System (1/47), Pt.1, Section 6, p.130 (NARA, B.335, file 9). The kôban and the chûzaisho still constitute the backbone of the Japanese police system, eliciting the praise of foreign commentators (eg. Bayley and Ames).

....maintain(ing) order and discipline". Drawing attention to the pervasiveness of the police system, its cellular structure, he remarked that nobody "could travel far in Japan, certainly not in a Japanese city, without coming across the ubiquitous policeman".⁴⁸ This impression of ubiquity was strengthened by the scope of police activity - the many instances in which police exercised control over people's lives.

Wide-Ranging Police Powers

In a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister written in 1947, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, suggested that "in the past, one of the ill-conceived aspects of the Japanese police system was the exercise by police officials of numerous administrative functions not related to the task of investigation and apprehension of criminals or the preservation of public order".⁴⁹ Convinced that there were close parallels between imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, Americans viewed the broad scope of police powers and the methods employed as the key supports of a "police state" in pre-surrender Japan. R. H. Mitchell, an authority on the prewar criminal justice system, plumps for the label "paternalistic police state", suggesting perhaps that "persuasion" rather than coercion was the preferred method of control.⁵⁰ E. K. Tipton argues that Japan can be usefully described as a "police state" if the term is associated with its European exemplars in the eighteenth/nineteenth centuries rather than the embattled regimes of the 1930s. In the former case "'police' referred to civil administration - to government regulation of any kind...".⁵¹

⁴⁸ Arthur Lloyd, Every-day Japan: Written after Twenty-five Years' Residence and Work in the Country (Cassell, London, 1909), p.161.

⁴⁹ Letter dated 16/9/47 (NDL: fiche G-2 02750)

⁵⁰ Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.xvi. He draws attention to "scholarly theory about 'soft rule', which depicts force as frequently used in the West to subjugate people, whereas in Japan obedience was secured through persuasion rather than fear". More detailed explanation of "soft rule" can be found in J. V. Koschmann, "Introduction - Soft Rule and Expressive Protest" in J. V. Koschmann, ed., Authority and the Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective (Tokyo University Press, 1978): "In Japan, a pattern of given authority, reflected in an affirmative belief system, forms the background for a system of political rule characterised by the use of ideology as an integrative mechanism in place of physical force".

⁵¹ Tipton, Police State, p.14.

According to a report compiled by the Public Safety Division of GHQ, the activities of the police prior to surrender entered into every phase of Japanese life, a claim supported by a long list of responsibilities: those relating to the prevention and investigation of crime, the enforcement of laws and the apprehension of offenders; traffic control; supervision of the licensing and operation of numerous financial and commercial institutions including banks, restaurants, doctors, barbers, masseurs and market stalls; enforcement of laws, rules and regulations concerning public health and hygiene, from venereal disease prevention to overseeing the biannual compulsory cleaning of individual houses; welfare work, including the distribution of emergency relief supplies and the attempted resolution of domestic/social difficulties; supervision of construction, repair, maintenance and fireproofing of buildings; enforcement of game laws, conservation of forests and other natural resources; intervention in the settlement of labour disputes, regulation of unions and enforcement of factory legislation; monitoring the neighbourhood environment by frequent checks on population, individuals' occupations and leisure activities, and family relations; control of scarce economic resources through the enforcement of price control and rationing laws; and supervision of fire prevention in urban areas.⁵² The list is a lengthy one, demonstrating the indispensability of the police to the administration of public affairs. Their involvement in economic and social activities was matched by an active role in politics.

The National Affairs Police (ie. political police) was renamed the Higher Police (Kôtô Keisatsu) in 1886,⁵³ its duties encompassing the various forms of political expression - organisations, meetings,

⁵² PSD, Report on the Japanese National Police System (1/47), Pt.1, Section 5, p.120 (NARA, Suitland, B.335, file 9); Braibanti, "New Police Law", p.18.

⁵³ Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.3.

newspapers⁵⁴ and other political publications.⁵⁵ Measures were taken against the Freedom and People's Rights Movement (jiyû minken undô), "a series of semi-popular campaigns, agitation and organizations which provided the main vehicle for the expression of anti-government opinions (from 1875) up to the establishment of the first diet in 1890".⁵⁶ In April 1880 the Home Ministry extended its range of control beyond the censorship of newspapers, targeting the activities of political parties and other dissident organisations. Policemen were empowered to approve or deny the organisation of political societies, to enforce the ban on membership by soldiers, women, teachers and students, to withhold permission to convene public meetings and to intervene if speakers were encouraging lawlessness. In December 1887 the government again signalled its determination to prevent the spread of dissent by issuing the Peace Preservation Ordinance, which, amongst other things, authorised the police to expel from the capital anyone engaged in subversive activities.⁵⁷ According to R. F. Hackett, "the ordinance was so unexpected and so sweeping that the momentum of the popular movement was decisively broken".⁵⁸ The Public Peace Police Law, promulgated in 1900, included measures intended to "firmly check....the expanding labour movement; Article 17, while not explicitly outlawing union organizing activities or strikes, was worded in a manner that allowed government officials to interpret such activities as illegal".⁵⁹

⁵⁴ As far as the press was concerned, laws confining political commentary to positive appraisals of government policy were enforced by the Home Ministry from 1875. The following year a separate Publications Bureau was assigned the task of overseeing the publication of books, whilst the police monitored newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets (Westney, I & I, p.98).

⁵⁵ Tipton, Police State, p.45. The title "higher police" was borrowed from France, and reflected common attitudes towards political management.

⁵⁶ J. E. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan (Longman, London, 1989) p.210.

⁵⁷ W. G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990) p.75; Sims, Political History, p.70.

⁵⁸ R. F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo, p.105. 570 people were expelled from Tokyo (p.106).

⁵⁹ Mitchell, Janus-Faced, pp.23-4. See also S. Large, Organised Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan (Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp.15-16.

Every effort was made to force political developments along a course favourable to the system's powerholders. For example, in the second national Diet election of February 1892, Home Minister Shinagawa Yajirô tried to influence the outcome of the election by encouraging police intimidation. However, "the extensive and violent use of the police to sway electors benefited the oligarchy in no way whatsoever".⁶⁰ The death of twenty-five people and the injuries sustained by four hundred others served to "deepen the hostility of Diet members to the police system", restricting the flow of funds "until well into the twentieth century".⁶¹ Thus, Itô Hirobumi was right to regard "the use of military and police force (as) counterproductive to the achievement of those national goals he and Yamagata were agreed upon". Not surprisingly, "he objected to Yamagata's endorsement of police interference at the polls".⁶²

Clearly Itô was not concerned about the "legality" of police violence. "Law was considered primarily as a framework within which the central government organised the exercise of its power, not as a restraint on that power".⁶³ Members of the oligarchy were not so confident in their positions of power that they could voluntarily subject themselves to a higher principle, namely the rule of law. R. H. Mitchell refers instead to "the concept of rule-by-law":

Under the Meiji constitutional system the concept of natural laws was pushed into a dark corner, and administrative agencies were responsible mainly to themselves, with kanson minpi⁶⁴ (putting government above people) as an all-pervasive attitude.⁶⁵

Thus, "laws....became instruments of the lawmaking power".⁶⁶ The police were happy to invoke the law, since effectively they were operating outside it. It was not there to restrain them, but rather to facilitate administration and social control.

⁶⁰ Hunter, Emergence, p.217

⁶¹ Westney, I & I, pp.96-7.

⁶² Najita Tetsuo, Japan - The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1974) p.104.

⁶³ Steiner, Local Government, p.42.

⁶⁴ This literally means "revere officials, despise the people".

⁶⁵ Mitchell, Janus-Faced, pp. 12-13.

⁶⁶ Tipton, Police State, p.56.

Apart from the Diet, the executive and its agencies had legislative powers, namely the right to issue administrative ordinances. There was, therefore, a division between statute law and administrative law. Article nine of the 1889 Constitution declared that "the emperor will issue or have issued ordinances necessary for the execution of statutes, for the preservation of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of his subjects".⁶⁷ Thus the emperor, the Home Ministry, the Metropolitan Police Board and prefectural governors were empowered to issue numerous ordinances for police purposes, provided they did not override statutes passed by the Diet.⁶⁸ This condition did not in fact check the growth of administrative law, since the language of statutes was often vague and their scope ill-defined.⁶⁹ Although Chapter Two of the Meiji Constitution outlined popular rights vis à vis executive power, it was understood that these were in the gift of the emperor and were constitutionally subject to restrictions originating in statutes. Once a statute limiting rights came into existence it could then be implemented by ordinances which usually interpreted its provisions very freely. The Meiji rulers followed well-established Western precedents (ie. Continental European practices) in ensuring that constitutional guarantees could be modified by law.⁷⁰

In addition to administrative authority, "the police held judicial and quasi-judicial powers, based on both ordinance and law".⁷¹ Summary Trial Regulations for Police Offences (1885) empowered heads of police stations summarily to convict people for minor crimes. Such acts as loitering without a fixed residence or job, punishable with detention of up to twenty-nine days and with fines of less than twenty yen, were included in the Ordinance on Penalties for Police Offences (1908). Police station chiefs thus acted as both prosecutor and judge with regard to minor offences. The Administrative Enabling Law of 1900 was a procedural law that restricted certain

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.3.

⁶⁹ R. & A. Report No. 2758, p.13.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.14-15.

⁷¹ Katzenstein & Tsujinaka, *Defending the Japanese State*, p.43.

constitutional rights. It authorized the detention of those who needed protection or were deemed a threat to public order (the so-called "protective and preventive custodies") until sunset of the following day; the forceful entrance of a residence under certain circumstances such as suspicion of gambling activities; and the use of force to effect compliance with police orders - these powers were exercised without consultation with judicial authorities.⁷²

Although the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulated "reasonable limits" on the length of detention for someone held without charge, in practice the police were able to hold people for months or even years by simply renewing their detentions on a daily basis.⁷³ Since the courts had no jurisdiction over the police's administrative activities, people were unable to act against illegal or unconstitutional behaviour.⁷⁴ The legal system provided no protection against a police force, which was already inclined towards arrogance and disregard for the people's wishes.

The Police Ethos

In the preface to his report submitted in 1873, Kawaji Toshiyoshi stated that "the police are a daily cure and remedy to a state, as everyday hygiene is to the individual...(They) are able to protect good citizens and nurture the active force of a country".⁷⁵ The analogy between a state's police force and an individual's personal hygiene is an interesting one, pointing up the preventive aspect of police work, without which the health of the polity would deteriorate. The idea that the police should foresee problems and prevent them from occurring by strict regulation was in line with practices in Continental Europe, as was the promotion of the police as a mechanism for integration and national mobilisation. Thus, they had a dual purpose - the preservation of the nation and the protection of

⁷² Mitchell, Janus-Faced, pp.24-5; Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.3; Tipton, Police State, pp.60-61. "While fines were light and jail terms short, these regulations were used effectively against the government's political foes as well as against individuals in the various movements for social reform; and in so doing police badly abused their power to arrest" (Mitchell).

⁷³ Braibanti, "New Police Law", p.18.

⁷⁴ Ibid.; Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.4.

⁷⁵ Sugai, p.2.

the people - combining authoritarianism with paternalism, the balance between these two elements reflecting domestic and international developments.

Observance of hierarchy, a basic Confucian tenet, was fundamental to Kawaji's vision of both an effective police institution and a stable political order. In "Hand and Eye of the Police" he stressed the nurturing role of the police, describing it as "nursemaid" to the people.⁷⁶ The police acted as intermediaries, implementing the commands of government (the parents) ostensibly for the benefit of the people (the children). Kawaji's use of the family as a metaphor for the nation illustrates the ruling group's attitude towards the masses, who were considered politically immature and in need of guidance.⁷⁷ In the same way as it was acceptable for a parent or nursemaid to be strict or firm with his/her charges, so the police were permitted to use force to secure compliance with directives. Confucian terminology was used not only to characterise police-public relations but also those within the institution itself - "The officer is parent and older brother; the subordinate is child and younger brother".⁷⁸

Arthur Lloyd, our man in Japan at the turn of the century, noted the durability of "honourable traditions" in the police force. He maintained that Japanese policemen were "as a rule superior to bribery and corruption", and despite their being "no longer mostly of samurai origin,...they generally act(ed) as such".⁷⁹ These positive features can be attributed to the "pattern of professionalization", discernible from the early Meiji period. "By 1887 (police) personnel throughout the country were rigorously selected...and trained in prefectural police schools".⁸⁰ The cohesiveness of the police and their identification with the interests of government, rather than personal or community concerns, reflected a strong commitment to education and training.

⁷⁶ Hironaka Toshio, Sengo Nihon no Keisatsu (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1969) pp.3-5.

⁷⁷ Tipton, Police State, p.47.

⁷⁸ Keishichô Shi, p.56 - Quoted in Westney, I & J, p.53.

⁷⁹ Lloyd, Every-day Japan, pp. 162-3.

⁸⁰ Bayley, Patterns of Policing, p.48.

Nevertheless, central organisations, such as the national Police Officers' Academy, established in Tokyo in 1885, fared less well than the prefectural institutes. The academy was in operation for only four years due to shortage of funds, whereas the prefectural training foundations survived until the Pacific War. The second national school lasted from 1897 to 1904, its successor supported by proceeds from the Police Association (Keisatsu Kyôkai). Only in 1918 did the government provide the necessary financial backing to safeguard the future of the officers' academy. It continued to function until 1943, although there were cuts in expenditure and shrinkage of training courses to cope with financial constraints.⁸¹

Policemen were taught military expressions of organisational identity - salutes and drills - and practised martial arts. Jûdô and kendô were regarded as essential for the development of spiritual and physical discipline and strength. "Police training was exacting. The patrolman was trained to walk his beat at the speed of seventy-five steps per minute".⁸² When dealing with the public he was instructed to be polite but reserved. Matsui Shigeru, a leading police educationalist during the interwar period, insisted that policemen were both guardians of the people and representatives of the state.⁸³ That there was tension between these two positions is demonstrated by a policeman's reaction to his chief's instructions in 1920:

As a police officer of Japan, I am a central government official, and I intend to work hard to save the nation. Isn't it strange that he should tell us to work hard for the people of Nihonbashi ward? There may well be a contradiction between the interests of the people of the ward and those of the nation.⁸⁴

Efforts at professionalization, particularly after the First World War, reflected concern at the high turnover of patrolmen and

⁸¹ Westney, I & I, pp.76-80, 86-9; Tipton, Police State, p.79

⁸² Braibanti, "New Police Law", p.18.

⁸³ Matsui Shigeru, "Sengo no Keisatsu ni tsuite", Keisatsu Kyôkai Zasshi, No.242 (Aug. 1920) pp.16-34; Tipton, Police State, pp.82-4.

⁸⁴ Miyashita Hiroshi, Tokkô no Kaisô (Tabata Shoten, Tokyo, 1978) pp.28-9. Quoted in Westney, I & I, p.88.

dissatisfaction with the quality of applicants. Harsh working conditions and poor salaries ⁸⁵ were identified as the principal causes of these problems. Patrolmen earned on average ¥50/month between 1930 and 1937, spending about half of it on living expenses.⁸⁶ In 1941 the approximate level of pay for a constable in Osaka was ¥70/month, following a 20% increase in base pay granted to all police personnel to meet the rising cost of living. Although this did not include overtime pay, allowances for meals when on duty twenty-four hours a day, help with accommodation and bonuses for meritorious deeds, the police as an occupational group were not well off. Perhaps the key issue was working conditions. Police officers often worked twenty-four hour shifts or a pattern of twenty-four hours on duty, eight hours off, then eight hours on. In rural areas where there was just a single one-man police post the constable was never off duty. ⁸⁷

Pressure of work and a keen sense of superiority together ensured that the police were impatient with their charges. The rudeness with which policemen stopped passersby resulted in the nickname oi kora, an exclamation more commonly associated with parents chastising their children.⁸⁸ The arrogance of police officers derived from the ideas that underpinned the police institution, such as their characterisation as nursemaids of the people, but also from modern

⁸⁵ In 1909 Arthur Lloyd referred to police pay as "exiguous". Five years earlier Lafcadio Hearn stated that the police were "paid from £1 to £1 10s. per month, according to locality; and the average pay of school-teachers is yet lower...- many receiving less than 7s. a month". Both compared unfavourably with the monthly wage of a second lieutenant in the army, which Hearn estimated at £3 (Japan - An Attempt at Interpretation, Macmillan, New York, 1904).

⁸⁶ In 1933 a commentator on police affairs, Toyama Fukuo, stated that policemen were not that badly off, bearing in mind that many people were suffering. According to Hane, the average urban worker earned three yen a day in 1935-6, and had to spend at least 1/3 of it on food (Modern Japan, p.219). J. B. Cohen states that the average monthly factory money wage for males increased from ¥65.42 in 1936 to ¥71.02 in 1939 (Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, p.330). The Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook, 1940, contends that "with a pittance of a salary, ¥40-70 in the service of the Metropolitan Police Board, besides a petty allowance below ¥7, the lot of policemen is anything but enviable...they certainly deserve better treatment from the central and local treasuries" (p.145). If the other figures quoted are correct the upper limit of the figure suggested -¥70 - is more likely to be correct than the lower limit.

⁸⁷ R. & A. Report No.2758, p.40; Tipton, Police State, p.87.

⁸⁸ See subsection entitled oi kora keisatsu in Hironaka Toshio, Sengo, pp.2-4.

organisational mechanisms that encouraged a positive self-image and a sense of belonging to an elite.

Eleanor Westney argues that close identification with the police institution caused patrolmen to be intolerant of challenges to their authority. Referring to the Hibiya riot of 1905,⁸⁹ she states that "police overreaction and violence were widely blamed for the transformation of a peaceful protest into six days of rioting that left over two thousand citizens....injured".⁹⁰ Arthur Lloyd was in no doubt as to the cause of the disturbance:

(The) demonstration was on the occasion of the publication of the peace terms with Russia. Everybody was excited and disappointed, and the citizens of Tokyo wanted to assemble in Hibiya Park and talk the thing out. Unfortunately the authorities viewed the matter from a different standpoint, and the park gates were guarded by police, who drew their swords and wounded several persons, some of them fatally. Then the people rose up in their wrath....⁹¹

However, the police were capable of harnessing the people's energies for their own ends. In 1923, following the great Kantô earthquake, hundreds of Koreans were killed by mobs incited by talk of sinister plots. "Rumours spread that Koreans were poisoning wells. The police were later accused of encouraging hostility by urging particular attention to wells...".⁹² The authorities, always suspecting Koreans of antisocial activities, decided to whip up latent popular hostility. Following the declaration of martial law, the police took the opportunity to round up anarchists, communists and socialists. Ten labour leaders were murdered at Kameido police station and the anarchist Osugi Sakae suffered a similar fate.⁹³

⁸⁹ This began as a protest against the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, which concluded the Russo-Japanese War. Matsui Shigeru, first division chief of the MPB at the time, dismissed the claim that "the riot was caused by 'unlawful police intervention and brutality'", arguing that "fundamentally the police were made scapegoats for the popular indignation invited by government secrecy about the peace negotiations" (S. Okamoto, "The Emperor and the Crowd: The Historical Significance of the Hibiya Riot", in T. Najita & J. V. Koschmann, eds., Conflict in Modern Japanese History, Princeton University Press, N.J., 1982).

⁹⁰ Westney, I & I, p.89.

⁹¹ A. Lloyd, Every-day Japan, p.164.

⁹² E. Seidensticker, Low City, High City (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1984) p.7.

⁹³ Tipton, Police State, p.21; M. Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 1910-1923 (Manchester University Press, 1989) pp.164-200.

Police Methods

Early in 1946 a high-ranking Japanese police official explained the relationship between "brutality" and "efficiency" to an investigator of the Public Safety Division in the following terms:

Humane treatment toward suspected persons and...expensive methods of crime detection are luxuries which we (Japanese) cannot afford...The loss of his clothing to a Japanese is irreparable - the loss of his bicycle may deprive him of his livelihood. Under these circumstances, no consideration can be given to abstract justices; the policeman is interested only in recovering the suit of clothes or the bicycle. This is done by apprehending all the likely suspects, and if necessary their families, and securing a confession...by methods that perhaps are not considered humane.⁹⁴

The speaker's examples of crime - the theft of a suit or a bicycle - suggest that mistreatment of suspects and criminals served to protect the interests of ordinary, law-abiding Japanese who could not afford to lose the few possessions they had. It is implied that firm, decisive police action acted as a deterrent against the violation of an individual's right to property. In fact police brutality was mainly directed at those who undermined national unity and mobilisation - those who voiced reservations concerning the soundness of government policies or advocated a radical political agenda. Above all, the police official's statement reveals the durability of traditional practices, namely the use of torture to extract confessions from suspects. In Tokugawa Japan, torture was an acceptable method of obtaining a confession, without which there could be no punishment.⁹⁵ The introduction of French criminal procedures after the Meiji Restoration did little to discredit it as a means of solving crimes.

The principle of trial based on evidence was introduced into Japan following the adoption of French legal practices, and was accompanied by the formal abolition of torture in 1879 on the

⁹⁴ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.10 (NARA, Suitland, Box 334, file 25). The identity of the police officer is not revealed.

⁹⁵ Hane, Premodern Japan, p.141.

recommendation of the French adviser, Emile Boissonade.⁹⁶ However, the choice of an accusatorial trial system, in which the suspect is considered guilty until proved innocent, encouraged the Japanese practice of securing evidence of guilt and then sending the case to court.⁹⁷ Confessions were to be expected, given the ease with which a procurator could detain a suspect and the judge's lengthy pretrial investigation (both characteristic of Continental criminal procedure).⁹⁸

Neither the provisions of the 1889 Constitution nor the six basic legal codes imported from France and Germany supplanted traditional thought and practice. Deference towards government officials rather than assertion of rights remained the rule, a suspect's confession representing an accommodation with constituted authority. Just as the law was manipulated by the police as a flexible tool of administration, so the extraction of confessions was used to speed up the process of solving crimes and, more importantly, to justify rehabilitation. The emphasis placed on apprehension and confession was mirrored by neglect of scientific investigation and preparation of evidence.⁹⁹

In the immediate prewar period the primacy of confession as a legal device was such that in most cases its extraction was seen as sufficient justification for the means employed. These ranged from persuasion to brutality. According to an American military government officer, "the use of third degree tactics to enforce confessions was common. In one instance....(he) saw the effects of acid being poured over the eyes of prisoners, blinding them for life".¹⁰⁰ Kobayashi Takiji, who wrote a novel about police

⁹⁶ Boissonade campaigned hard for the abolition of torture following an incident on 17/4/1875. Passing the Tokyo High Court Building he heard "a half-human, half animal scream....(On investigating) he was paralysed with horror at the sight of a man seated on a rigidly corrugated board holding a big stone slab, screaming under the brutal torture". See H. Abe, "Criminal Justice in Japan: Its Historical Background and Modern Problems", American Bar Association Journal, 97 (June 1961) p.557.

⁹⁷ Tipton, Japanese Police State, p.39.

⁹⁸ Chalmers Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972) p.156.

⁹⁹ PSD, Police branch, "Japanese Police System", p.15 (Suitland, B.334, file 25).

¹⁰⁰ Braibanti, "New Police Law", p.18.

brutality,¹⁰¹ was subjected to appalling treatment following his arrest. Horrific injuries indicated that he had been tortured to death, rather than dying of heart failure as the police claimed. He had wounds consistent with beating and kicking, marks left by hot tongs on his forehead and perforations on his thigh made by a nail or drill.¹⁰² That the mistreatment of detainees was widespread is indicated by a statement made by Procurator-General Koyama Matsukichi in 1927. Directing his comments at procurators and policemen, he warned them that beating and torture were unacceptable. His reminder to senior police officers to observe "moral principles" and "protect human rights", both fundamental to the revised Criminal Code, was probably an attempt by the Judiciary to rein in police excesses.¹⁰³

R. H. Mitchell draws attention to the "psychological torture" that attended miserable conditions in gaol and the long wait for a trial. Feelings of isolation and depression were probably more conducive to meaningful conversion (tenkô) than direct action by the police.¹⁰⁴ Individuals were held for as long as two years without being charged, policemen merely issuing successive orders for detention. The police managed to evade legal constraints, such as the prohibition of detention for the purpose of criminal investigation and the time limit on protective and preventive detention. Officers observed the rules without paying attention to their spirit. For example, Special Higher Police (SHP) ¹⁰⁵ personnel went through the motions of releasing a suspect at one door, only to immediately detain him at another (hikimodoshi). Another ruse was to take the prisoner to colleagues in another station, and have them detain him immediately after his formal release (taraimawashi).¹⁰⁶ As for the

¹⁰¹ The novel, The Fifteenth of March (1928), exposed police practices in Otaru, Hokkaidô.

¹⁰² Tipton, Japanese Police State, p.26.

¹⁰³ R. H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1976) p.101.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp.101-2; R. & A. Report No.2758, p.28. The tenkôsha's perspective is examined by P. G. Steinhoff, "Tenkô and Thought Control", in G. L. Bernstein and H. Fukui, eds., Japan and the World (Macmillan, Oxford, 1988) pp.86-91.

¹⁰⁵ Examined in the next section.

¹⁰⁶ Tipton, Police State, pp.66-7; Hironaka, Sengo, pp.15-18.

extent of such abuses, even former SHP officials admit that they were prevalent.¹⁰⁷

Although most Japanese did not suffer in police cells, they all experienced intrusion, however harmless it might have seemed. The policeman on duty in the kôban had access to the local population or family register (koseki), which contained details of the life and background of every citizen in a given district.¹⁰⁸ Indirect methods of investigation, such as home visits, represented a subtle form of surveillance, one which often produced results. An informal chat with residents over a cup of tea provided an invaluable opportunity for observing and hearing about local developments.¹⁰⁹ Another pretext for invading an individual's personal space was the periodic inspection of houses for reasons of public health or morals.¹¹⁰ The SHP lacked the subtlety of the regular police - they justified forced entry of a residence during the night by citing the provision "when a police officer deems that there is danger".¹¹¹ As the elite of Japan's police organisation and the primary agents of social control, they could act with impunity. Responsible for controlling thought, the SHP's role expanded in line with increasing military adventurism in China and the drift towards war in the Pacific. During this period of crisis it was deemed essential that Japan be ideologically one, united behind a common purpose and confident of the realisation of national ambitions.

Thought Control

In 1911 the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Kô tô Keisatsu or Tokkô) was established in the Keishichô as another branch of the political police.¹¹² Its creation represented the final stage in the organisational development of that part of the police force involved in strictly political activities. Subsequent expansion reflected an increasing awareness by the authorities of the threat posed by

¹⁰⁷ Tipton, Police State, p.26.

¹⁰⁸ Braibanti, "New Police Law", p.18.

¹⁰⁹ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.121.

¹¹⁰ R. & A. Report No.2758, p.24.

¹¹¹ Tipton, Police State, p.67.

¹¹² Ibid., p.44.

radical political groups to national unity and political stability, both of which became more important as the country found itself entering a period of crisis. The decision to establish the Tokkô was made after the dramatic high treason case of 1910, involving Kôtoku Shusui, a leading anarchist. Accused of "conspiring against the throne", Kôtoku was found guilty and hanged along with eleven others. "In the years that followed his name came to symbolize the type of person who indulged in 'dangerous thoughts' to the detriment of the nation....".¹¹³

The principal duties of the SHP, or "thought police" as it later became known, were the control of social movements¹¹⁴ and the suppression of radicals/advocates of dangerous foreign ideologies.¹¹⁵ Political functions were not monopolised by the new unit, the Higher Police dealing with election control and the Book Section of the Police Bureau responsible for censorship. In 1912 Tokkô sections within the Metropolitan Police Board and its Osaka counterpart became independent of the Higher Police, initiating a process that culminated in an elite force - a "police aristocracy" - that operated separately from the regular police. "As the eyes and ears of the powerful Home Ministry, the 'thought police' kept an investigative finger on the pulse of society, sending detailed reports regularly to that Ministry".¹¹⁶

The growth in importance of the Special Higher Police from the early 1920s ran parallel with the reinvigoration of threatening alien ideologies, particularly communism in the wake of the Russian revolution. The Tokkô represented a logical development from the notion of a higher police. As the political threats to the status quo became more sophisticated, so there was a corresponding need for the police organisation to become more elaborate, dividing its

¹¹³ F. G. Notehelfer, Kôtoku Shûsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical (Cambridge University Press, 1971) p.1. Some historians argue that Kôtoku was "framed" by the the Japanese government - See G. O. Totten, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1966) p.4.

¹¹⁴ See Large, Organised Workers & Totten, Social Democratic Movement.

¹¹⁵ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.24.

¹¹⁶ R. H. Mitchell, Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1983) p.146.

various tasks among specialist units so as to function more effectively. As for the great majority of the Japanese people, their compliance became more marked as the government refined its instruments of persuasion and coercion. The authorities perpetuated Tokugawa norms, namely the lack of redress against authority and the absence of a distinction between public and private morality.¹¹⁷ The latter premise implied that an individual's thought was a matter of concern for the government, and accounts for the visibility of the thought control system.¹¹⁸

According to P. G. Steinhoff "'thought control' refers to a power relationship in which one party deliberately attempts to limit or direct the thoughts and beliefs of some other party".¹¹⁹ Censorship, propaganda and police harassment were the principal means by which the state sought to influence individuals' beliefs and discourage independent intellectual development. Formal procedures of pre-publication and post-publication censorship effectively limited the parameters of public debate, confining it to positive appraisals of the imperial political system. At the same time police intimidation forced editors and writers to "voluntarily" censor themselves.¹²⁰

As far as propaganda was concerned, the ruling elite sought to protect its position by manipulating the imperial figurehead. The emperor embodied the kokutai - "the unique essence of Japanese society".¹²¹ Literally translated as "national polity", its principal elements - "a ruling family 'unbroken for ages eternal', and an intimate connection between throne and people" ¹²² - reflected the Meiji oligarchy's "invention of tradition".¹²³ These doctrines,

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.337.

¹¹⁸ Tipton, Police State, p.137.

¹¹⁹ Steinhoff, "Tenkô and Thought Control", p.78.

¹²⁰ Mitchell, Censorship, Preface p.10.

¹²¹ R. H. Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law: Emperor, State and Law in the Thought of Hozumi Yatsuka (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970) p.65.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ E. Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914" in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.266. See also C. Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1985).

however, were challenged by foreign political theories that advocated abolition of the emperor system and the liberation of the individual. The establishment of an illegal communist party in 1922 and the assassination attempt on the Prince Regent by Nanba Daisuke in 1923 brought about an atmosphere of profound unease that paved the way for the passage of the Peace Preservation Law in 1925.¹²⁴ This coincided with the passage of the universal male suffrage bill, and represented "a counterweight with which conservative forces sought to buttress the emperor system and a capitalist economy".¹²⁵

"Since the intention of the Peace Preservation Law was to prohibit acts which stemmed directly from certain political ideas, the aim can be termed 'thought control'".¹²⁶ Criminal punishment could now be meted out to anyone involved in activities arising from an ideology that threatened the kokutai, the authorities directing their attention to ideological motive rather than actual practices.¹²⁷ Membership of a political group with radical aims, and later just a sympathetic attitude towards that group's goals, was sufficient justification for arrest and detention. Article one of the law read as follows:

Anyone who organises a group for the purpose of changing the national polity (kokutai) or of denying the private property system, or anyone who knowingly participates in said group, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding ten years. An offence not actually carried out shall also be subject to punishment.¹²⁸

The phrases "changing the national polity" and "denying the private property system" were targeted at anarchists and communists respectively. Although the legal meaning of kokutai was relatively precise - the emperor as the location of sovereignty - it conjured up in the minds of the Japanese people a much broader picture, comprising their way of life.¹²⁹ The vague, ill-defined terminology

¹²⁴ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.39.

¹²⁵ Katzenstein & Tsujinaka, Defending the Japanese State, p.37.

¹²⁶ Steinhoff, "Tenkô and Thought Control", p.80. Unravelling the notion of "thought control", she explains that "the reach of the law was limited to action proceeding from thought. The law could not exercise effective jurisdiction over what a person thought".

¹²⁷ Tipton, Police State, p.64.

¹²⁸ Quoted in Large, Organized Workers, p.67.

¹²⁹ Tipton, Japanese Police State, pp.62-4.

of the law promoted the Tokkô not only as agents of enforcement but also as decision-makers.

There was "a vast discrepancy between arrest rates and charge rates", suggesting that "the Peace Preservation Law was utilised for harassment purposes".¹³⁰ Between January 1928 and October 1941, 65,921 "leftists", the great majority communists, were arrested by the police, but only 5,559 were indicted. 6,199 suspects received "suspension of indictment", and for 2,667 charges were withheld.¹³¹ Clearly, the Peace Preservation Law was used by the police to deter people from indulging in dangerous thought. Revision of the law in 1928 in the direction of harsher provisions was followed by expansion of the thought police, with a unit now assigned to each prefecture. After 1932 the Special Higher Police became a full department with six sections, presumably so as to accommodate expansion and elaboration of Tokkô functions. In Tokyo Headquarters there were now 380 thought police, compared to only 70 in 1928. New recruits assisted in the work of intelligence-gathering, maintaining surveillance over such organisations as unions, political parties and educational institutions.¹³²

The scope and degree of police repression increased in line with developments abroad. Following the "China Incident" of July 1937, the government took further measures to ensure conformity and extract more intense expressions of loyalty from suspects. The 1941 revision of the Peace Preservation Law approved the practice of applying it to religious movements and individuals unassociated with any political organisation, by which time anarchists, communists, socialists, liberals, Christians and even some Shintôists and Buddhists had been victimised by the thought control system.¹³³ After 1937 the police became increasingly involved in the daily life of each citizen. By the early 1940s the burden of

¹³⁰ Steinhoff, "Tenkô and Thought Control", p.80.

¹³¹ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.142. Figures that also cover the period 1941-45 can be found in B-A. Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981) pp.12-13.

¹³² Mitchell, Thought Control, pp.119-120.

¹³³ Tipton, Japanese Police State, p.70; Mitchell, Thought Control, pp.137, 148.

regulation was such that they could not have coped without the active cooperation of neighbourhood groups.

Wartime and the Neighbourhood Associations

The neighbourhood associations (tonari-gumi or rinpo-han) were an integral part of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai). The latter was a loose federation of citizens' groups and former political parties which, according to Vice-Governor Soto of Tokyo, aimed to "drastically....expand the fighting strength and enhance the fierce spirit of service to the state".¹³⁴ Both institutions were formally established by the Japanese government in 1940, although as far as the neighbourhood groups were concerned it was more a case of revival for government purposes. During the Tokugawa period townships were organised into groups of from five to ten householders (gonin-gumi). Members were "held jointly responsible for the payment of taxes and criminal acts committed by any of (their number)".¹³⁵ The system of neighbourhood cooperation and solidarity had deep roots in Japanese society, and became increasingly important as the demands of war forced ordinary Japanese to endure many privations. In marked contrast, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was created by central government, its "cumbersome soggiess....(making it) almost useless to the authorities after mid-1942".¹³⁶ In January 1942 the Asahi Shinbun declared that "the IRAA has accomplished very little...since the Tōjō cabinet was established (October 1941)....Yet there are people who still advocate investing this organisation with political powers".¹³⁷ In May 1945 the paper smugly reported the IRAA's dissolution:

Ever since the IRAA was established, we urged it to adopt reasonable objectives. Unfortunately, it did not heed our advice and became a huge body with no clear functions. Under such circumstances its dissolution became inevitable.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Braibanti, "Neighbourhood Associations in Japan and their Democratic Potentialities", Far Eastern Quarterly Vol.7, No.2 (Feb. 1948), p.141. Shillony, Politics and Culture, p.3.

¹³⁵ Hane, Premodern Japan, p.148.

¹³⁶ T. R. Havens, Valley of Darkness - The Japanese People and World War Two (W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1978) p.60.

¹³⁷ Asahi, 11/1/45. Translated by Shillony, Politics and Culture, 102

¹³⁸ Asahi, 18/5/45. Translated by Shillony, Politics and Culture, p.107.

It was the local groups, operating independently of their parent federations, that mobilised communities and assisted the police in the implementation of war-related measures.¹³⁹ Performing a vital role, the neighbourhood associations continued to exist until May 1947.¹⁴⁰

There were two administrative tiers below the recognised organs of local government. At the base was the tonari-gumi, composed of about ten households within a given area.¹⁴¹ Between ten and twenty tonari-gumi in turn made up one block association, known as chōnaikai in cities and towns and burakukai in rural areas. The block association was essentially a coordinating agency, responsible for the distribution of orders and papers outlining government policies.¹⁴² "The tonari-gumi were the de facto agencies of local rule".¹⁴³ It was at this level that "the application of sanctions compelled the desired behaviour pattern".¹⁴⁴ Order number seventeen - "Essentials of Providing for Community Councils" - was issued by the Home Ministry in September 1940 to explain the purpose of neighbourhood councils and associations.¹⁴⁵ According to the first three paragraphs of the order, the aims of the structure were as follows:

- 1) To reorganise the people of towns and villages on the basis of the cooperative neighbourhood spirit and to make them perform their duties....
- 2) To make this system the foundation in building national morality and a national spirit of cooperation.
- 3) To disseminate the national policy thoroughly so that the national administration can be improved.¹⁴⁶

¹³⁹ An excellent summary of the history, organisation and significance of neighbourhood associations can be found in J. B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949) p. 374, fn. 37.

¹⁴⁰ Shillony, Politics and Culture, p.179 (fn. 4).

¹⁴¹ J. W. Masland, "Neighbourhood Associations in Japan", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.15, No. 23 (20/11/46) p.356.

¹⁴² Braibanti, "Neighbourhood Associations...", FEQ, p.143.

¹⁴³ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.163.

¹⁴⁴ Braibanti, "Neighbourhood Associations...", FEQ, p.143.

¹⁴⁵ Havens, Valley of Darkness, p.75.

¹⁴⁶ Braibanti, FEQ, p.142.

The reference to "national morality" suggested a role for the neighbourhood groups in the control of thought. Indeed, their involvement in "moral training"¹⁴⁷ was the main reason for the Occupation's disapproval of the system. A Public Safety Division report referred to "the re-establishment of the tonari-gumi (in 1940) as a communal spy system", and stated that neighbourhood groups fostered patriotism and served as effective instruments of rigid control. The neighbourhood association is described as "an auxiliary police agency which reported crime, conducted censuses, registered changes of address and performed functions concerning sanitation, traffic, public peace, morals and punishment for minor offences". In addition it liaised with the police concerning public health, and organised savings and bond subscription campaigns. According to the report the police were often working from the inside: "District commissioners became the heads of local tonari-gumi in many instances and in all of them the police participated in leadership".¹⁴⁸

American preoccupation with the active cooperation between police and neighbourhood associations and their common involvement in thought control comes across clearly in Research and Analysis Report Number 2758. It contends that "the associations are a valuable asset to police strength", their importance deriving "more from a deterrent effect than anything else. The integration of individual Japanese into communities" made it difficult for them to escape the observation of others and led to a fear of social ostracism, a major disincentive to commit crime.¹⁴⁹ The census surveys, conducted regularly by the associations and shared with the police, reminded people that "private" developments were the business of others, thus adding to the sense of personal denial and public duty.

John Masland, a member of Government Section during the first half of 1946, highlighted "the distribution of commodities and the

¹⁴⁷ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.163.

¹⁴⁸ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", pp. 8-9 (Suitland, Box 334, file 25).

¹⁴⁹ R. & A. Report No.2758, p.25.

operation of the official rationing system" as the principal functions of the tonari-gumi¹⁵⁰. Clearly, these related to an economic role rather than a political one. Paragraph four of order number seventeen (September, 1940) characterised the local groups as "a force in the management of a controlled economy and in the stabilisation of national living".¹⁵¹ As the Pacific War progressed it was this function, more than any other, that increasingly occupied police and their auxiliary agencies. After all, nothing is more basic to the execution of a war than provision of an adequate supply of food for both the military forces fighting overseas and those at home working on their behalf.

In 1938 Economic Peace Preservation became an independent section in the Police Bureau,¹⁵² its new status reflecting an increasing awareness of the need to marshal scarce economic resources. In September 1939 price controls were imposed and in April 1941 rice rationing to consumers was introduced.¹⁵³ However, it was not until October 1942 that the authorities delegated the task of distributing food and clothing rations to the tonari-gumi,¹⁵⁴ so making these local organisations the key to survival. J. B. Cohen maintains that "there is considerable evidence to indicate that the use of the neighbourhood associations for rationing resulted in widespread maldistribution of civilian supplies. Goods were...diverted into the black market".¹⁵⁵ The "corruption of the economic police" is identified on several occasions as an important contributory factor to the rapid growth of the black market.¹⁵⁶ Increasingly aware of their country's plight, police officials gave in to temptation, putting their own interests before those of the nation.

¹⁵⁰ Masland, "Neighbourhood Associations...", p.355.

¹⁵¹ Braibanti, FEQ, p.142; Havens, Valley of Darkness, p.75. For more detailed analysis of the economic role of tonari-gumi see E. Pauer, "From a 'Controlled Economy' to a 'Planned Economy': Food Distribution and Neighbourhood Associations in Japanese Cities During the Pacific War", in G. Daniels, ed., Europe Interprets Japan (Paul Norbury Publications, Tenterden, Kent, 1984) p.34.

¹⁵² Mitchell, Thought Control, p.196.

¹⁵³ Havens, Valley of Darkness, p.49. Cohen, Japan's Economy, pp. 358, 362.

¹⁵⁴ Braibanti, FEQ, p.150.

¹⁵⁵ Cohen, Japan's Economy, p.374, fn.37.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.362.

"Often as much as 30% of staple foods were diverted into black market channels",¹⁵⁷ not surprising given the rising value of scarce commodities. "A private research organisation, in a study of purchases by factory workers in Tokyo during September-October 1944, found that such consumers purchased 9% of their rice, 69% of their vegetables, 38% of their fish and 7% of their seasonings on the black market".¹⁵⁸ These figures increased dramatically once American bombing raids began in November, 1944. The police, charged with enforcing economic regulations, had to contend with large numbers of hungry city residents travelling to the nearby countryside in search of food. As a result absenteeism became a major problem in 1945. The police rebuked those guilty of neglecting their public duties but with little success.¹⁵⁹ Trains leaving the cities were crowded with Japanese on their way to nearby rural areas to buy directly from farmers. "The police were supposed to search their baggage for food, but arrangements could be made to avoid this". For example, the leader of one local branch of the fujinkai (Ladies' Aid-to-the-War-Effort Society) obtained permission from the local police for each woman to carry in a "daily...back-load of garden produce".¹⁶⁰ As early as January 1943 the economist Kawakami Hajime claimed that people were "thinking from morning to night only of food".¹⁶¹ By the spring of 1944 thousands of Tokyo residents were travelling every day to Chiba or Saitama prefectures to buy food on the black market.¹⁶²

There were around 1,300,000 neighbourhood associations throughout Japan during the war.¹⁶³ Their effectiveness as units of local government made them indispensable to the civil police force, although they were not the only auxiliary organisation. The distinction that has been drawn between economic and political functions is a convenient one, perhaps obscuring the true picture. In

¹⁵⁷ Braibanti, FEQ, p.151.

¹⁵⁸ Cohen, Japan's Economy, p.385.

¹⁵⁹ F. S. Hulse, "Some Effects of the War upon Japanese Society", Far Eastern Quarterly Vol.7, No.1 (Nov. 1947), p.30.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.28.

¹⁶¹ Quoted in Havens, Valley of Darkness, p.118.

¹⁶² Ibid., p.124.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p.77.

1939 the head of the Criminal Affairs Bureau stated that thought and economic crimes were one and the same thing,¹⁶⁴ since both threatened the kokutai by undermining national mobilisation. Such problems as hoarding of scarce commodities and illegal black market sales frustrated government efforts to distribute resources equitably throughout the nation and were potentially damaging to morale. The police focused on any activities that weakened the national will to support the war effort, and as the distinctions between different types of crime became more and more blurred, so too did the separation of military and civil police functions.

The Kenpei

The quiescence of the Japanese people is unsurprising given that they had to contend with not only the Tokkô but also the Kenpei (military police). Both agencies were determined to suppress political dissent and given wide-ranging powers to do so. Established in 1881, the Kenpei combined military, administrative and judicial powers under the jurisdiction of the army, home and justice ministers respectively.¹⁶⁵ Formally attached to the Japanese army and "commanded by a Provost Marshal-General directly responsible to the War Minister",¹⁶⁶ the Kenpei increasingly represented a roving police presence. Although the Minister of Justice had the power to act against the military police, this was rarely exercised, reflecting the strength of the military vis à vis civil agencies of government.

Following Japan's aggression in Manchuria in 1931 the definition of military security expanded.¹⁶⁷ The Kenpei was increasingly active in Japan and abroad, making every effort to stamp out disaffection with the military's policies. By the late 1930s its vigilance extended to anything which might undermine the war effort. "Since pacifism, liberalism and sympathy for the US or Britain were considered to be obstacles to victory, the military police were

¹⁶⁴ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.166.

¹⁶⁵ Westney, Imitation and Innovation, pp.72-3.

¹⁶⁶ R. Deacon, Kenpeitai - The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1990) pp.162-3.

¹⁶⁷ Hulse, "Some Effects of the War...", p.27, fn.12.

determined to suppress them".¹⁶⁸ Their functions overlapping, the Kenpei increasingly encroached on the Tokkô's jurisdiction, generating conflict between themselves and their civilian counterparts. The police institution, therefore, was not monolithic. That rivalry between civil and military police forces continued up to ministerial level is demonstrated by the "Go-Stop Incident" of 1933, when the Home Ministry clashed with the army. The origin of the dispute was a fight between a soldier and a policeman following a minor traffic violation (the soldier twice crossed the road when the "go-stop" light was red).¹⁶⁹

As the Kenpei became increasingly involved in policing functions outside the army, the size of the force grew - from a domestic strength of 2,000 men during the Meiji period ¹⁷⁰ to 7,500 during the Pacific War (there were many more overseas, mainly in Japan's colonial possessions, engaged in intelligence work). Despite its being a small force it was dreaded everywhere. According to a PSD report, "the Kenpei became interwoven in the entire pattern of Japanese life...(and) the severity of their methods made them disliked and feared by the civilian population".¹⁷¹ In 1941 the Kenpei's commander, Major-General Katô Hakujiro, felt the need to reassure the public in a radio broadcast:

In some quarters Military Policemen are feared and suspected as a kind of secret police. I positively assure you...that you need not fear them.¹⁷²

The Japanese people, however, were not convinced. F. S. Hulse, who was in Japan from October 1945 to June 1946, stated that "there was still, during the first few months after the surrender, considerable dread of the police, although....the (civil) police claimed to be the protectors of the people, especially from the Kenpei".¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Shillony, Politics and Culture, p.14.

¹⁶⁹ K. van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power (Papermac, 1990) p.51. See also D. Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (Columbia University Press, New York, 1974).

¹⁷⁰ Westney, I. & I., p.73.

¹⁷¹ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.14 (Suitland, Box 334, file 25).

¹⁷² Shillony, Politics and Culture, p.15.

¹⁷³ Hulse, "Some Effects of the War....", pp.39-40.

Although this claim may have reflected attempts by the Japanese authorities to focus all the blame on the military, it is indicative of the unpopularity of the Kenpei that ordinary police agencies should defend themselves in this way. Russell Brines, an American journalist in Japan between 1939 and 1941, intimated that military police excesses surpassed those of their civilian counterparts by alleging that "torture was routine in ordinary prisons (but) much more highly developed among the Kenpeitai".¹⁷⁴

Wartime emergency measures, such as the National Mobilisation Law, the National Defence Security Law and the Peace Preservation Law, "furnished the police with indisputable authority to act with terrorism and brutality in enforcing the policies of the militarists".¹⁷⁵ The state monopolised the instruments of violence, and the Japanese people fell into line, incapable of resisting the police and the army. Ultimately, "fear was probably an even more awesome means of standardisation than the elaborate organisational restrictions imposed on workers, neighbourhoods, and the media".¹⁷⁶

Conclusion

This chapter has set the scene for the Occupation's initial efforts at reform of the police. By highlighting the principal characteristics of the pre-surrender police force it has sketched in the context of Occupation policy, anticipating its aims and hinting at possible problems. Japanese bureaucrats must have known that American reformers would take a dim view of the centralised police system, either because they were aware of its excesses during the prewar/wartime period or because they advocated "Anglo-Saxon" theories of policing. Moreover, a commitment to sweep away the remnants of a "police state" necessitated the constriction of what was a wide ambit of control, and the re-education of police officials "prone to sermonising...(and) bullying".¹⁷⁷ Policemen could not be allowed to continue mistreating detainees, regulating economic

¹⁷⁴ R. Brines, MacArthur's Japan (J. B. Lippincott, New York, 1948) p.49.

¹⁷⁵ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.11.

¹⁷⁶ Havens, Valley of Darkness, p.69.

¹⁷⁷ Lloyd, Every-day Japan, p.163.

affairs, frustrating the expression of dissenting views and engaging in neighbourhood surveillance. In short, democratisation dictated transformation of the police system.

Although this may well have been an admirable aim, it was perhaps an unrealistic one. Japan's police force had evolved over several decades, and was deeply rooted in the Japanese social environment. The appearance of a Meiji policeman might have owed much to Western models, but his behaviour reflected the priorities of the new regime and, just as important, often the attitudes of the Tokugawa samurai. American values were up against social norms and patterns of thought that had developed over hundreds of years. Reformers tended to shelter behind dichotomies - public and private, rights and duties, the state and the individual - that were not as well defined in Japan as they were in the United States. A more immediate problem than that of historical legacies was the economic state of Japan by 1945. Reference has been made to the growth of the black market, and the breakdown of central controls. Cooperation and solidarity at the local level minimised the disruptive effects of war, demonstrating the strengths of Japanese society rather than inviting alternative solutions.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT

When the American Occupation of Japan began in September 1945, the role of the Japanese police and their effectiveness as an agency of law enforcement was determined by three factors: the attitude of the Occupation authorities towards the police and their intentions with regard to reform or abolition of the prewar system; the health of the police institution in terms of both human assets - manpower, morale, confident/effective performance of duties - and physical resources - firearms, transport facilities, communications; and the disastrous economic situation in Japan following her defeat. The decision to engage in an indirect Occupation meant that the police were indispensable to the Americans, and ensured that the institution would not be radically altered until other reforms had been successfully pushed through. In the meantime, however, reforms aimed at democratising Japanese society, namely the promotion of civil liberties and the efforts made to stimulate a rights-consciousness on the part of the Japanese people, adversely affected the position of the police by undermining the people's traditional respect for government officials. This reinforced the weakness of the police, who, as a vital support of the prewar/wartime regime, were associated with a political order that had been discredited by the convincing defeat of Japan in the Pacific war. The privations that had accompanied national mobilization for war, compounded by the trail of destruction left by American bombing raids, left a legacy of anger and resentment.

Popular activism, deliberately encouraged by the Occupiers, made such duties as economic regulation and maintenance of law and order particularly difficult for the police to perform. Despite their siding with the Japanese people, the Americans still expected the police to ensure that stable conditions conducive to a successful Occupation prevailed. Chaotic economic conditions forced the Americans to recognise the traditional police system as a necessary evil; thus it was left largely intact until 1948. The above three determinants of police activity - Occupation policy, the state of the institution itself and economic conditions - impinged upon one another.

Although they will be dealt with separately in this chapter, the aim is to demonstrate how the ambiguity and ambivalence of Occupation policy further weakened an already enfeebled force. This had serious consequences for the resolution of economic problems, particularly the expanding black market. Such was the weakness of the police that they were forced to ally with influential members of the community, whose power often derived from control of illegally-hoarded goods. Thus the pathetic state of the police force combined with the difficult economic situation to ensure the obstruction of Occupation reforms, particularly those relating to the permanent removal of the "Old Guard" from positions of influence.¹

United States Policies

Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 ² called for the removal of "all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" and the establishment of "freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for fundamental human rights".³ Such statements, made before the Pacific War had been brought to a close, promised very different policing methods from those that had characterised the prewar/wartime period. The liberation of the Japanese people dictated the destruction of what American reformers saw as a totalitarian political system, underpinned by a police force that closely controlled the lives of the people and employed methods considered unacceptable in "democratic" societies. Whilst those who had "deceived and misled the people into embarking on world conquest" would be punished, the Japanese people would be free to elect a "peacefully inclined and responsible government".⁴

However, the decision to engage in an indirect Occupation ⁵ presaged an accommodation with the Japanese establishment, which would

¹ These contentions will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

² The Potsdam Declaration was issued by the Presidents of China and the U.S. and the Prime Minister of Britain.

³ Japanese Ministry of Finance, Financial History Section, The Financial History of Japan, Volume 20 (Tokyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo, 1982) p.151.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ According to Theodore Cohen, this decision was not taken until after the Japanese emperor's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August, 1945.

undermine the realisation of objectives agreed at Potsdam. The rationale for retaining the Japanese governmental structure was explained in the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,⁶ dated 29 August 1945:

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives.⁷

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur, was empowered to intervene if the Japanese Government did not act on Occupation directives. More significantly he was to encourage "changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people ...in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies" even if violent means were used. In such a case he was permitted to intervene "only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation".⁸ At first glance this policy of detachment afforded a nightmare scenario for the Japanese police who could expect little respect from their former charges. On closer inspection, however, the people's freedom to push through some sort of revolutionary programme for change was so qualified as to make it almost meaningless. It was inconceivable that a violent transfer of power could take place without affecting the security of Occupation personnel. The first target of a hungry, angry urban population would have been stores of scarce commodities, which were guarded by both the Japanese police and Allied soldiers. Even if the new regime

⁶ The process of policy-formation is examined in detail by Theodore Cohen (Remaking Japan, pp.14-48). He argues that the US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan reflected the views of "radical economic reformers and the 'China crowd'" rather than those of the "old Japan hands" in the State Department, whose dominant role in policy formation was usurped in the summer of 1945. "The result was the rejection of moderation"(p.31) and the endorsement of fundamental economic reforms. R. A. Moore, writing in the August 1979 issue of the Journal of Asian Studies, contends that the "contradictions between SCAP's professed goals and its actions" originated in this "change in policy" in mid-1945. He identifies three phases of policy development - 1942-45, 1945-48 and 1948-1952 - maintaining that the middle one was sandwiched by Occupation policies of a "conservative orientation".

⁷ Government Section, SCAP, The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1949) Appendix A:11, p.423.

⁸ Ibid. p.424.

avoided conflict with the American authorities, it would still have to be in complete agreement with the Occupation's reform programme in order to be permitted to govern.

US policy was both ambivalent and ambiguous. At the same time as it permitted the continued operation of the traditional Japanese civil police system, it encouraged the Japanese people, through the active promotion of civil liberties, to obstruct the performance of police duties. Both Japanese government officials and the people themselves must have been confused. Imperial amnesties of October 1945 and November 1946 resulted in the release of 300,000 and 90,000 political offenders respectively.⁹ Those released from prison were allowed to organise, but when mass demonstrations took place organisers were warned not to go too far - after all the police could be reinforced by Allied soldiers if the need arose. Despite the ambiguity, the fact that an institution like the civil police survived the arrival of American forces on Japanese soil benefitted the forces of tradition over those of change. Although political reforms were pushed through, these were only piecemeal, their effectiveness always depending on the commitment of those charged with their implementation. Once the Japanese people became accustomed to seeing Occupation personnel working with government officials, particularly the police, the possibility of radical political change receded into the distance. By administering reform through the prewar governmental structure, the Americans, whether they liked it or not, were legitimizing that very structure. There was, therefore, a contradiction at the heart of the Occupation's policy "to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it".¹⁰ The distinction was not as clear cut as the Americans perceived it to be, the former in fact suggesting the latter. For Ralph Braibanti, a military government officer in Yamanashi prefecture, "it was unfortunate but inevitable that American forces in the early stages of the occupation relied on the Japanese police to an extent that increased the latter's power".¹¹ He acknowledged the difficulty of

⁹ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.18, No.2, (24/1/49) p.19.

¹⁰ Political Reorientation of Japan (PRJ), Appendix A:11, p.424.

¹¹ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", p.18.

reconciling "American slogans of democratisation with obvious support of the police system".¹²

The confusion characterising the relationship between SCAP and Japanese Government officials was complemented by an ambivalent reform programme that demanded radical change on the one hand and a stable socio-political environment on the other. It was difficult to envisage a revolution in police-community relations when the police continued to regulate the daily lives of ordinary Japanese much as they had done before and during the war. As Ralph Braibanti suggested, there was tension between the Occupation's policies of democratisation and the exigencies of an indirect Occupation. However, before democratisation came demilitarisation, the latter proving far less problematic than the transformation of Japan from a "feudal" to a "democratic" society. Japan's armed forces, together with such auxiliary organisations as the Kenpei (Military Police), were abolished, and factories engaged in production for war were shut down.

Part One of the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy - "Ultimate Objectives"- stated that "Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized" by eliminating "the authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism....from her political, economic and social life" and "institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed".¹³ In view of the fact that the police had developed along military lines from the beginning of the Meiji period and had been responsible for suppressing anti-militarist opinions, it should have been the main target after the armed forces for disarmament and demilitarisation. However, General Directive Number One from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (otherwise known as SCAPIN 1), dated 2 September 1945, excluded the Japanese police force from the disarmament provision. It was acknowledged in Occupation circles that if radical surgery was immediately performed on the police institution, the implications for the maintenance of stability would have been serious indeed. So

¹² Ibid.

¹³ PRJ, p.423.

the police were instructed to "remain at their posts" and would continue to be "responsible for the preservation of law and order".¹⁴ On 17 October 1945 General Headquarters, SCAP, directed the Japanese Government to demobilise the Kenpei with the condition that "the civil police...be instructed by proper Japanese authority to take over all remaining police duties previously performed by the military police" (SCAPIN 156).¹⁵ Bearing in mind that the Kenpei was seen as a vital support of the wartime "fascist" regime, it is strange that American policy-makers advocated the transference of any of its functions to the civil police. Perhaps the oversight was due to increasing concern with problems of socio-economic dislocation throughout Japan, which caused many in General Headquarters to demand stability as well as democracy - support for the Japanese authorities as well as encouragement of popular protest.

The latter, along with demilitarisation, was seen as an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government, properly accountable to the Japanese people. The Initial Post-Surrender Policy called for the development of "a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech and the press" on the part of the Japanese people.¹⁶ In a later section of the same document the implications for the police of the promotion of civil liberties were made clear: "Laws, decrees and regulations which establish discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion shall be abrogated....and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified".¹⁷ Abolition was the fate of the Kenpei and Tokkô, whereas the rest of the traditional police structure was to be subject to modification sometime in the future.

The Tokkô was formally abolished on 4 October 1945 when SCAPIN 93, concerned with the removal of restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties, was issued. Usually referred to as the Civil

¹⁴ SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan (Tokyo 1950-1951), Monograph 55 (Police and Public Safety) Appendix 2, p.10.

¹⁵ Ibid., Appendix 5, p.19.

¹⁶ PRJ, p.423.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.424.

Liberties Directive, it targeted those laws, ordinances and regulations which had severely limited the freedom of ordinary Japanese to question government policies before and during the war as well as those agencies charged with their enforcement. The Bureau of Police in the Ministry of Home Affairs was abolished, along with all Tokkô units and commissions concerned with "protection and surveillance" under the Ministry of Justice, on the grounds that they interfered with freedom of thought, speech, religion or assembly.¹⁸ In addition the directive called for the release of all political prisoners, the removal of central and prefectural police chiefs and an end to physical punishment and mistreatment of detainees and prisoners.¹⁹ The Occupation sought to establish a government responsible to the will of the people, and the Civil Liberties Directive was seen as a mechanism for accelerating that process. Although it undermined the police by discrediting the prewar/wartime system of control, it must be remembered that it was a legal measure that could only work in practice if it was properly enforced. As will be made clear later in this chapter, the enactment of legislation forbidding the employment of former Kenpei or Tokkô officials was not enough to ensure an end to their influence in public safety activities. As for legal statements concerning the rights of detainees and prisoners, these were not enough to ensure hygienic conditions and adequate provision of food, clothing and medicines for those awaiting trial.²⁰

The abolition and disarmament of such agencies as the Tokkô and the Kenpei were seen as essentially "negative" policies; their positive counterparts, much more difficult to achieve, were a reduction in "the pervasive powers of the police" and the injection of a "Western" (ie. American) police ethos.²¹ Although the establishment of legal limitations on police activities could be pushed through without delay, fundamental reforms could not take place against a backdrop of serious socio-economic problems. American reformers, aware of the importance of an adequate force for the maintenance of internal

¹⁸ Ibid., Appendix B: 2d, pp.463-464.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.464.

²⁰ The situation in Japanese gaols will be described in Chapter 3.

²¹ History of the Non-Military Activities, M. 55, p.5.

security, had acknowledged the importance of traditional agencies of law enforcement at the outset. In the Initial Post-Surrender Policy document it was admitted that "the judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed *as soon as practicable...*"(my italics).²² Thus "from September 1945...to December 1947 the prewar system preserved its precarious life with minor internal changes".²³ A good example of such slight adjustment was the abolition of the Police Defence Corps (Keibitai) on 16 January 1946. Set up in 1944 to help deal with problems arising from American bombing raids, its duties and powers can have been little different from those of the regular police.²⁴ SCAPIN 606 instructed the Japanese Government "to abolish and disband the Keibitai and all other organisations or mobile forces organised to augment the Japanese civil police force".²⁵ However, the intention was not "to affect the overall authorised strength of the Japanese civil police force, which was established at a total of 93,935".²⁶ That is to say the institution itself was abolished on the grounds that it was militaristic ²⁷, but its personnel were presumably transferred to the *civil* police force. Cosmetic change rather than structural transformation was the order of the day, reflecting the discrepancy between legislative reforms and de facto conditions.

On 3 May 1947 a new Constitution, written by members of Government Section, became law. As far as the powers of the police and the rights of citizens were concerned, it represented the culmination of earlier directives, particularly SCAPIN 93. Article 13 reads as follows:

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, shall be the supreme consideration in legislation and other government affairs.²⁸

²² PRJ, Appendix A:11, p.424.

²³ S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed., Five Studies in Japanese Politics (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1957) p.4.

²⁴ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.12 (Suitland, Box 334, file 25).

²⁵ History of the Non-Military Activities, M. 55, Appendix 6, p.20.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R. & A. Report No. 2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" (28/9/45) p.32.

²⁸ History of the Non-Military Activities, M. 55, Appendix 10, p. 30.

Such language exposes the document's American parentage, demonstrating the authors' faith in the universal relevance of American ideas and institutions. The Constitution's provisions reflected policy statements concerning democratic government and civil rights, enumerated in both the Potsdam Declaration and the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. "The infliction of torture.....and cruel punishments" were forbidden (Article 36),²⁹ and "confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention" was not to be admitted in evidence (Article 38).³⁰ The Constitution declared that "all public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof" (Article 15),³¹ the juxtaposition perfectly capturing the contrast between the reformers' rhetoric and the real situation in the case of the police. The contention that the police served the interests of a narrow establishment rather than the Japanese people will be pursued in later chapters. For now it is enough to acknowledge the limits of reform, and the cosmetic quality of much of the legislation. The Japanese political system appeared to have assumed democratic credentials, but in reality operated in much the same way as before.

With startling prescience, a report entitled "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation", dated 9 September 1945, drew attention to the possible consequences of the Occupation's conflict of interests. It stated that the Allied forces "will have an interest in both the maintenance of order on a level adequate for their operations and protection, and the accomplishment of such reforms as the aims of the Potsdam Declaration may require", and then remarked on the dangers of such a dual purpose:

These two interests may conflict in practice since effecting in the police force....reforms vital to the achievement of the ends of the Occupation, or the diminution of police power under disorganised conditions, may impair the maintenance of public order and open the way for the operations of subsidized gangs (sôshi) with reactionary aims.³²

²⁹ Ibid., p.34.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid. p.31

³² OSS, R & A Report No. 2758, p.45.

The authors were realistic about the likely machinations of the Japanese government, warning that it "may attempt, unless checked, to use the police system to repress popular movements in opposition to its policies, justifying its measures as necessary in the interests of orderly conditions demanded by Occupation forces".³³ There was, therefore, an appreciation of the lengths to which conservative elements would go in order to frustrate the reformers' designs. The report accepted the limitations of "mere alteration of the police system" and the utilisation of legal checks, arguing that the only real guarantor of democratic development is the "enlargement of the political power of the Japanese people".³⁴ American forces did not want to assist the police in preserving internal stability, because such action would have suggested support for the Japanese government. Fortunately the Japanese authorities would be aided "by the existence...of long-established machinery for the maintenance of public order and by the *traditional acquiescence of the Japanese people in orders issuing from what they regard as legally constituted authorities*"(my italics).³⁵ Thus the Americans simultaneously sought to exploit the Japanese people's traditional docility and to inject a spirit of popular activism. The report concludes by enumerating specific problems concerning police reform, namely the limitation of police functions, the question of legal constraints on police powers and methods, and the elimination of undesirable personnel.³⁶ The last of these had direct bearing on the strength and confidence of the police force.

The Health of the Police Institution

The purges of police personnel naturally affected those in the upper echelons of the police service more than their junior counterparts. The reasons for this were twofold: firstly, the authorities, given the indirect character of the Occupation, were not able to purge all members of the prewar/wartime police force; flowing from this was the decision to hold individuals responsible for past abuses rather

³³ *Ibid.* pp. 43-4.

³⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 52-3.

³⁵ *The Financial History of Japan*, Summary of R. & A. Report No.2758, p.276.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.277.

than the system itself - in the short term, at least, only the leadership would be targeted for removal. The only exceptions to this policy of limited purge were those policemen who had been members of units, such as the Tokkô, considered to be in direct contravention of the Civil Liberties Directive. In such cases personnel were barred from further employment in the police force regardless of their rank. Following the issuance of SCAPIN 93 in October 1945, 47 out of 51 prefectural police chiefs were purged, together with 54 superintendents, 168 inspectors, 1,000 assistant inspectors, 1,587 sergeants and 2,127 patrolmen.³⁷ The last three statistics represent members of the Tokkô.³⁸

As a result of SCAPIN 550, issued on 4 January 1946 and more commonly known as the Purge Directive, further removals were made - two more prefectural police chiefs lost their jobs, together with another 60 superintendents and another 28 inspectors.³⁹ By 1946 12% of superintendents had been purged, along with 11% of inspectors, 15.2% of assistant inspectors, 12% of sergeants and 3.2% of patrolmen. The only assistant inspectors, sergeants and patrolmen to lose their jobs were those employed by the Tokkô, evidence of the Occupiers' sympathetic attitude towards the lower ranks; they were seen as more malleable, more responsive to democratic change. The purge reduced the police force by some 5,073 men, or 5.7% of the total strength.⁴⁰ Although numerical strength is an important determinant of a police force's effectiveness, of equal if not greater significance is the quality of its leadership, often measured by such criteria as length of service or experience. The fact that it was experienced, influential officials who were removed meant that the effects of the purge were disproportionate to its size.

However, the enactment of legislation excluding influential personnel from further employment did not necessarily mean an end to their activities. SCAPIN 115, issued on 10 October 1945, tried to

³⁷ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.11.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

guard against evasion of purge directives, cautioning against reemployment of Tokkô personnel "in any other position of power or responsibility over the people".⁴¹ Like its predecessor, SCAPIN 93, the new directive "limited but did not forbid transfer" of purged officials from the Ministries of Home Affairs or Justice to other agencies of government.⁴² Following the issuance of SCAPIN 550 in early 1946, the rules became stricter, barring purgees from *all* public service. The Purge Directive stated that "Persons removed from public office will be disqualified from holding any other positions in the government service".⁴³ The Occupation authorities, aware that there were large holes in the purge's net, sought to prevent undesirable personnel from slipping through. It was reported on 2 August 1946 that 1,187 persons had been "removed from positions in other agencies to which they had been transferred".⁴⁴

It is interesting to consider what happened to the purgees, many of whom had great influence and substantial local followings. Not surprisingly, the evidence suggests that they did not disappear from the scene, but continued to operate much as before. At the end of 1945 one Tsubaki Kenkichi, a patrolman at Nerima police station, Tokyo, complained that the directive eliminating the Tokkô was not thorough enough. His interviewer characterised the problem as follows:

As in cases of other men holding positions in objectionable organisations, there are not a few instances where injustices have occurred when...men who were in their positions but a few days were dismissed, while men who held the positions for a good part of the war...were proceeding from one good position to another unaffected.⁴⁵

In the case of Nerima police station, even the new chief of thought control, in his position but a week and appointed presumably to protect his predecessor, was untouched by SCAPINs 93 and 115.⁴⁶ The admission that "apparently similar situations exist throughout

⁴¹ History of the Non Military Activities, M.55, Appendix 4, p.17.

⁴² Ibid., main text, p.10.

⁴³ PRJ, Appendix B: 5b, p.482.

⁴⁴ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.10.

⁴⁵ Memo dated 13/11/45; To: Major Davis, Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence; From: Capt. W. H. Smith; Subject: Pertinent Contributions by Patrolman Tsubaki Kenkichi [National Diet Library, fiche no. G-2 00231]

⁴⁶ Ibid.

the country"⁴⁷ confirms the suspicion that efforts to evade Occupation directives were not confined to Nerima police station. Mark Gayn, a correspondent for the Chicago Sun who worked in Japan from December 1945 to October 1946, commented on the difficulty of removing Tokkô officials from positions of influence. In his diary entry for December 22, 1945 he refers to five thought control officers in Yamagata prefecture who resigned, only to be identified a little later as high police officials.⁴⁸ In Aomori prefecture, in the extreme north of Honshû, US Command purged six high police officials. However, "it was not long before the US Military Government found three of them back at work - in other towns".⁴⁹

The problem of evasion of American directives may have been compounded by a less than unanimous endorsement of the police purge by those within GHQ. A degree of ambivalence is detectable in the Office of Strategic Services' report, entitled "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" (dated 28 September 1945): "Since members of the Special Higher Police are experienced in the detection of subversive activity, some modification short of complete elimination....might be considered".⁵⁰ It is even suggested that they might be used to help eliminate ultranationalist/militarist elements, although "the dangers of using a body devoted primarily to the elimination of left-wing/liberal elements" is recognised.⁵¹ Accurately predicting the retention of both Tokkô and Kenpei personnel, albeit against the wishes of many Occupation officials, the report calls for "especially careful screening of ex-members and the balancing of the potential danger of using trained agents against their value as policemen".⁵² In February 1949 a Civil Censorship Detachment of the Civil Intelligence Section intercepted a letter from an ex-Kenpei member, one Saitô Masa, in which the writer states that he is now working as a traffic policeman in Yokohama.⁵³ There were even occasions when former Tokkô officials

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.51.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.52.

⁵⁰ OSS, R&A Report No. 2758, p.55.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., p.61.

⁵³ CCD, CIS-MIS-GHQ-SCAP, PSD files (NDL, fiche no. G-2 03755).

were employed by the US army, the Occupiers often unaware of their inconsistency. When Mark Gayn visited Sakata, a conservative town in Yamagata prefecture, in December 1945 he found the former head of the local Tokkô unit acting as the liaison officer for contacts between local Japanese and American soldiers. To make matters worse three of his colleagues were "with the Liaison Office, assisting the American detachment".⁵⁴ Lieutenant Robert McHardy, the local garrison commander, angrily asked of Gayn's informer if that meant "that every Japanese who wants to see me has to be passed first by these characters?"⁵⁵ The answer cannot have pleased him.

Such revelations cast doubt on the official purge statistics (quoted on page 9), since it is clear that formal removal of certain policemen did not always amount to their exclusion from public office. The extent of the problem of evasion is impossible to quantify accurately, but what is clear is that many former Tokkô and Kenpei members continued to be employed in a public safety capacity. Nevertheless, the purge of police personnel must have disrupted the process of leadership by at least removing those at the very top (the prefectural police chiefs) and forcing others to change their jobs, to spend time and effort avoiding detection by the Occupation authorities. That the purge of higher officials undermined the effectiveness of the police is indisputable, but perhaps more significant were the large number of voluntary departures from the force, both cause and symptom of declining morale and a lack of confidence vis à vis American reforms.

In 1945, according to statistics compiled by the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry and published by the Public Safety Division, G-2, 7,891 policemen voluntarily gave up police work, 3,769 left the force due to illness or injury and 1,649 died.⁵⁶ The relative importance of these various determinants can best be illustrated by means of a piechart (figure 4). Far more policemen left the force of their own accord than were compelled to do so by order of the

⁵⁴ M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.68-9.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.69.

⁵⁶ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, Appendix 1B, p.2.

Police Losses by Reason during 1945




Figure 4

Police Losses by Reason during 1946




Figure 5

Source: History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monograph 55 (Police and Public Safety), Appendix 1B, p.2.

Occupation authorities. With regard to the higher ranks the opposite was true, the purges accounting for the loss of 5,073 capable and experienced police officers, other causes for only 1,583.⁵⁷ In 1946 voluntary departures increased, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the total (see figure 5). Losses in police personnel in that year totalled 22,494, of which 11,206, nearly 50%, were motivated by a belief on the part of the individuals concerned that they could improve their lives by giving up police work.⁵⁸

The Public Safety Division, which was responsible for the Japanese police, attributed the high level of disenchantment to "economic difficulties and probable loss of face suffered as a result of the defeat and purges".⁵⁹ Those that remained in the force, "instructed to tolerate many things that previously had been anathema",⁶⁰ were confused, unsure of themselves. The reformers' promotion of civil liberties, which dictated the release of imprisoned communists and left-wing activists, together with what one American official referred to as "scathing criticism and denunciation of the whole police system in the newly-liberated press",⁶¹ forced policemen to exercise great care in their dealings with the Japanese public. One report on the results of the police purge stated that "the (Japanese) people, in some cases, have evidenced a too complete disregard for police authority", suggesting that "the pendulum has swung as far as is healthy in the opposite direction".⁶² Thus, restraint on the part of the police mirrored an increasing public willingness to voice grievances and ignore the rebukes of policemen. According to an American radio programme, presumably broadcast to Allied personnel, "many Japanese drivers and pedestrians violate the traffic regulations and ignore (the policeman's) whistle and

⁵⁷ Memo dated July 1947; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Thru: CIS; From H. E. Pulliam, head of PSD; Subject: Police Purge (NDL, fiche no. G-2 02775)

⁵⁸ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, Appendix 1B, p.2.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.7.

⁶⁰ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science (Jan.-Feb.1953), p.659.

⁶¹ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.18, No.2 (24/1/1949) p.19.

⁶² Document undated and incomplete (NDL, fiche no. G-2 02767)

signals".⁶³ The solution to the problem, to have American military police in attendance, was obvious, given the supremacy of Uncle Sam's blue-eyed warriors - "Before the great big American soldier, the little...Japanese policeman is overawed,...conscious of the physical and mental superiority of his co-worker".⁶⁴ Although there is evidence of public disobedience in Tokyo and other large cities, it is unlikely, given the existence of a residue of fear and the tradition of respect for government officials, that it was a pervasive phenomenon.

Low morale amongst policemen can be explained in part by this negative attitude towards them on the part of vocal sections of the Japanese public, most notably political activists and the media. At the same time many American reformers were suspicious of the police, closely observing their every move so as to prevent retrograde steps. However, the main determinant of low morale was economic. Just as it was the economic problems of the cities that made policing them so difficult, so too it was poor working conditions (pay, hours, quality of life) that affected morale amongst policemen most seriously. In January 1947 it was reported that resignations in recent months reflected an "inability to subsist on the meagre pay they receive", a state of affairs that damaged both the morale and prestige of the police force.⁶⁵ Policemen were just as vulnerable vis à vis serious shortages of food and clothing as other Japanese, their wages no less susceptible to the ravages of inflation. Tsubaki Kenkichi, our friend at Nerima police station, complained that the gulf that existed between ordinary policemen and the higher echelons in terms of pay and status, the inability of the former to join the latter, led to frustration and resentment. He argued that the average policeman, unable to improve his lot, turned to corruption, augmenting his small income by numerous "subsidiary sources". This was made possible, according to Tsubaki, by "the

⁶³ "Larry: Tokyo calling: Gangbuster's ready with Commissioner Valentine" - Both the title and format of the document suggest a radio broadcast. Valentine, of the New York Police, was responsible for recommending changes re. the urban police system in Japan (NDL, fiche no. G-2 02756).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ SCAP, Summations of Non-Military Activities in Japan, No.16 (Jan. 47), p.46.

deeply-rooted fear the average Japanese family has of policemen".⁶⁶ The link between corruption and low wages was not accepted by his interviewer, who claimed that "merely raising (policemen's) pay will not cut down greed, nor remove the corrupt sources of his extra income, nor prevent his taking advantage of his position to obtain goods, services and money from certain people in his allotted area".⁶⁷

In 1946 the Metropolitan Police Planning Group, composed of American experts in law enforcement, gave more credence to Tsubaki's claims by calling for increased wages, shorter working hours, more appropriate uniforms and equipment, holidays, health benefits, pensions and rewards for meritorious service.⁶⁸ These measures were designed to improve the psychological and physical condition of policemen, essential if they were to be confident and proud of their role in society. In August 1946 the working hours of the Tokyo police were shortened, the average working day consisting of 8/9 hours rather than the former average of 12/ 13 hours. Such changes may have reduced the pressure on Tokyo policemen, but did little to improve their living conditions, thus proving an ineffective antidote against corruption. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) described the state of the police in September 1946 as follows: "The Japanese civilian police...are a willing group but *they turn out for me as tramps* "(my italics).⁶⁹ Their poverty combined with their unpopularity to make the police service a last resort as far as the search for employment was concerned. In the radio broadcast referred to earlier it was claimed that the better quality men refrained from joining, "because their family and friends would be humiliated by an appointment to the police force". Recruits would be of a higher quality only when the status of the police improved, together with their economic position.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Pertinent Contributions by Patrolman Tsubaki Kenkichi (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00231).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Summations*, No.9 (June 46), p.50.

⁶⁹ GHQ, U.S. Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC); Check Sheet, dated 14/9/46; To: Pulliam, PSD; Subject: Standards of Civilian Police (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00228)

⁷⁰ OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.62.

According to official statistics the numerical strength of the police remained fairly constant, despite the loss of large numbers of personnel through either forced removal or voluntary abandonment of the job. Apparently the actual strength of the Japanese police increased from 87,663 in 1944 to 96,810 in 1945, fell to 90,550 in 1946 and then rose again to 94,029 in 1947.⁷¹ At the same time we are asked to believe that during the course of 1945 and 1946 just over 40,000 policemen left the service.⁷² Such a serious discrepancy can be explained, at least in part, by the circumstances of defeat and surrender, which must have impeded accurate statistical survey. Even within GHQ, there seems to have been confusion as to the number of policemen throughout Japan. One source states that it was "the return to service of repatriated former policemen" that caused numerical strength to increase at the end of 1945 (from 93,913 to 96,810);⁷³ and yet a report by the Police Branch of the Public Safety Division warned that any country that loses one fifth of its police strength in one year (1945)...is in serious condition!"⁷⁴ The June 1946 issue of The Summations of Non-Military Activities in Japan stated that there were 88,000 police, compared with an authorized complement of 93,935.⁷⁵ Just two months later Colonel Pulliam, head of the Public Safety Division, claimed that numerical strength was only about 66,000.⁷⁶ Admittedly the tenor of his comments on law and order was alarmist, his aim to persuade others that "some teeth must be placed in the law enforcement and judicial arms of the Japanese Government".⁷⁷ The suspicion that he was deliberately underestimating the number of policemen seems to be justified, given his claim that in January 1947, less than six months later, there were 90,550 police.⁷⁸ This array of conflicting data suggests

⁷¹ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, Appendix 1A, p.1.

⁷² Ibid., Appendix 1B, p.2.

⁷³ Ibid., main text, p.8.

⁷⁴ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.20 (Suitland, B.334, file 25).

⁷⁵ Summations, No.9 (June 46), p.50.

⁷⁶ Report dated 15/8/46; Thru: CIS, G-2; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00228)

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Memo dated July 1947; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Thru: CIS; Subject: Police Purge (NDL, fiche no. G-2 02775)

that there was a substantial degree of turnover within the police force, that losses were quickly cancelled out by hasty recruiting of new personnel.

In view of the difficult conditions throughout Japan following her defeat and the large number of demobilised soldiers (about 5 million by the end of 1946), it was to be expected that the Occupation's attempts to discourage the employment of former military personnel would be largely unsuccessful. Yoshida Kohei, of Fukushima Prefecture, addressing his comments to MacArthur himself, complained that many former soldiers had joined the police,⁷⁹ and Tsubaki Kenkichi, of Nerima police station, stated that "members of the army and navy are being inducted into the force and given preference".⁸⁰ At the end of 1945 the Civil Intelligence Section referred to reports from the field, which indicated that former officers and non-commissioned officers of the army and navy were being employed by the police and fire organisations.⁸¹ In November of that year it was reported that "thousands of demobilised Kenpei and regular army and navy personnel are being recruited into the civil police".⁸² Therefore, the evidence suggests that numerical strength remained constant due to the employment of demobilised soldiers, which went some way to neutralise police losses. The new recruits, whether or not they were ex-soldiers, inspired little confidence in allied personnel. The Commander-in-Chief of the BCOF suggested in the autumn of 1946 that the civil police be "selected personnel rather than 'pickups' who cannot get a job elsewhere".⁸³ The picture cannot have been a tidy one, and it is reasonable to assume the existence of a "floating population" of policemen, that is to say a large number that floated in and out of employment. According to several American officials the police generally were

⁷⁹ SCAP, Military Intelligence Section, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section - digest of undated letter (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00226)

⁸⁰ Pertinent Contributions by Patrolman Tsubaki Kenkichi (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00231).

⁸¹ Memo for record, dated 12/45; Problem: Barring Certain Personnel from Employment in the Police, Prison or Fire Control Organisations of Japan (NDL, G-2 00235)

⁸² Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence; Memo for record, dated 10/11/45; Subject: Need for Public Safety Directive (NDL, G-2 00237).

⁸³ Check Sheet, dated 14/9/46; To: Pulliam, PSD; Subject: Standards of Civilian Police (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00228)

inexperienced, further implying that a large number were hastily recruited during the first two years of the Occupation. Indeed, Colonel Pulliam, writing in August 1946, claimed that 75% of the force had less than one year's experience.⁸⁴ H. E. Wildes, former head of the Political and Social Affairs Division, drew attention to the loss of experienced personnel, but disagreed with Pulliam as to the extent of the problem: "Of the 84,141 policemen on Pearl Harbour day (7 December 1941) only 40,993 were active by the end of 1946".⁸⁵

Pulliam saw the lack of experienced personnel as a serious handicap, citing it as one of the main determinants of police ineffectiveness. In his report on law and order (15 August 1946) he stated that there was a serious law-enforcement problem, arising from the police's inability to deal with the troublesome activities of the so-called "sangokujin" (literally "people from three countries" - Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans). The police were hesitant to exercise their very limited jurisdiction over the minority groups. They were afraid to take too drastic action against these new "allies" of their conquerors.⁸⁶ According to Pulliam, things had got out of hand, the Chinese and Koreans conducting open gang warfare among themselves and against the police. He demanded that the Occupation authorities support "constituted civil authority", suggesting the use of troops as well as military police.⁸⁷ The Japanese police were unable to cope with the increasing lawlessness that accompanied social and economic dislocation. They were dependent on the reinforcement of American personnel, calling on their services 784 times during the first two years of Occupation.⁸⁸ Likewise, one military government officer wrote in 1949 that "the declining prestige of the police had to be constantly bolstered by the Americans...".⁸⁹ The relationship was one of mutual benefit, the Japanese police often being used to guard the barracks, residences

⁸⁴ Report dated 15/8/46; Thru: CIS, G-2; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00228)

⁸⁵ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science Vol.43, No.5 (Jan-Feb 1953), p.659.

⁸⁶ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", FES, p.19.

⁸⁷ The report on law and order (15/8/46) represents the beginning of a policy of open support for the police by PSD, G-2 (NDL, G-2 00228).

⁸⁸ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.60.

⁸⁹ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", FES, p.18.

and warehouses of Occupation troops along with goods earmarked for reparation (1,200 policemen were used in this way in November 1946).⁹⁰ In August 1946 Pulliam objected to the fact that 5,632 of the 66,000 policemen in Japan were working for the Occupation forces, arguing that this was straining the resources of an already enfeebled force.⁹¹ By 1947 the poor quality of Japanese policemen, their lack of experience and declining morale, was a cause for increasing concern to the Public Safety Division and other agencies within GHQ, SCAP.

Therefore, the decision by Government Section to insist on the purge of the Dai Nippon Butokukai (Great Japan Military Virtue Society), membership of which was automatic for police officials prior to the surrender,⁹² caused consternation within those sections responsible for ensuring the maintenance of law and order, most notably G-2. The inevitable clash between Government Section and G-2 represented a dress rehearsal for the collision that would take place over the reform of the police system in late 1947. In both cases the views of the two sections were diametrically opposed. Pulliam's reaction to the extension of the police purge to include the Butokukai testified to his belief that there could be no further punitive measures against the police without serious repercussions for the maintenance of social stability. In a memorandum to Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Pulliam claimed that the "Butokukai purge, now being sponsored and urged upon the purge board of the Japanese Government by the Government Section, will remove about 1,004 additional police officers, all in the grade of inspector or higher....10.3% of the remaining experienced administrators".⁹³ He insisted that the damage inflicted on the police force through purge, allowing for the results of the Butokukai sweep, would amount to a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police officers (all men of the rank of prefectural chief, two thirds

⁹⁰ An anonymous document (NDL, G-2 02863).

⁹¹ Report on law and order, dated 15/8/46; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, G-2 00228)

⁹² History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.12.

⁹³ Memo dated July 1947; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Thru: CIS; Subject: Police Purge (NDL, fiche no. G-2 02775)

of superintendents and one third of inspectors).⁹⁴ What really alarmed the head of PSD was the socio-economic backdrop to this loss of experienced police personnel. He referred to the large number of repatriated ex-soldiers, "disillusioned and jobless, who may become easy prey to subversive ideas", and the problem of lawless Koreans.⁹⁵

In August 1947 Willoughby took up the baton, arguing that the activities of the Butokukai were roughly equivalent to those of the US National Rifle Association (just as the Japanese police officials concerned were *ex officio* members of the Butokukai, so too the members of state forces in the U.S. were *ex officio* game, forest and fire wardens).⁹⁶ He insisted that "continual purging of experienced police officials...will continue to be reflected in decreasing police efficiency and domestic tranquility", suggesting that "the low effectiveness of the forces of law and order, on the basis of numerical ratios, training and decreasing efficiency, could not prevail against organised blocks".⁹⁷ Both Pulliam and Willoughby pointed out that any reduction in the efficiency of the police affected the Occupation, exerting extra pressure on shrinking Allied manpower. Both insisted that a balance be struck between police efficiency and blanket purges. The reservations of PSD were shared by the Tokyo Provost Marshal and the Commanding General, Eighth Army. The latter voiced concern over the ability of the higher police officials to cope with "the growing lawlessness of gangster elements", and asserted that the Butokukai purge should not be applied to the police.⁹⁸

Government Section was uncooperative, adamant that members of a society that promoted martial arts were sure to have militaristic

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Memo for the Chief of Staff, dated 29/8/47; Subject: Police Purge - Dai Nihon Butokukai (NDL, G-2 02776).

⁹⁷ Ibid. According to Willoughby, the average ratio of Japanese police to population was 1:807, which compared unfavourably to the U.S. ratio of 1:598 backed up by a regular army and national guard. However, the ratio of Japanese police and Allied soldiers combined to population was 1:433. This was not very high in view of the problems affecting Japan. Source: Statistics attached to Memo for Chief of Staff (NDL, G-2 02775).

⁹⁸ Memo for record, dated 25/7/47, written by Colonel Pulliam.

leanings. Such undesirable personnel were to be rooted out and removed from the police service. Willoughby, in comments addressed to the Supreme Commander, referred to "unavailing contact...with Government Section", fostered in order to postpone or minimise the purge's effects on the Japanese police.⁹⁹ The reformers under Whitney were committed to far-reaching changes in Japanese society, and paid little attention to the prevailing socio-economic conditions throughout Japan, whereas Willoughby and Pulliam were preoccupied with the dangers of political/social instability. The relative merits of the two positions will be discussed in a later chapter. ¹⁰⁰ For now it is enough to acknowledge their divergent views on such fundamental political issues as the role of the police vis à vis the state. In the case of the Butokukai purge, the realism of G-2, supported by the views of those working in the field, won the day. For example, the unwillingness of the commander of Yamagata Military Government Team to permit further loss of policemen in his locale was exploited by PSD, used as ammunition against the idealists in Government Section. Lieutenant Colonel William Nunn requested that four police officials subject to purge be retained on the grounds that "simultaneous release of these peace officers would seriously hamper the enforcement of law and order within this prefecture".¹⁰¹ G-2 informed Government Section of Nunn's predicament, suggesting that reconsideration be given to the application of the purge directive to police officials.¹⁰² In the end only 222 police officers were removed and barred from public service as a result of the Butokukai purge.¹⁰³ By the end of 1947 the loss of experienced police personnel had been stemmed, but serious problems remained, not least of which was the poor state of equipment vital for effective law enforcement. There was a shortage of firearms and motor vehicles, and communications facilities were in a dreadful state of repair.

⁹⁹ Memo for the Chief of Staff, dated 29/8/47; Subject: Police Purge; From: Willoughby (NDL, G-2 02776).

¹⁰⁰ Chapter 6 examines the clash between G-2 and GS re. the decentralisation of the police.

¹⁰¹ HQ, Yamagata MGT, Letter to C-in-C, GHQ, SCAP, dated 4/10/47. Passed through Command channels [NDL, GS(B) 02307].

¹⁰² Check Sheet, dated 17/10/47; From G-2; To: GS; Subject: Japanese Police Losses [GS(B) 02307]

¹⁰³ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.12.

H. E. Wildes characterised the police for the greater part of the Occupation as "tragically defenceless".¹⁰⁴ Although there was disagreement as to the extent of the problem - that is to say, how many policemen had to share each firearm - nobody disputed the fact that supplies were insufficient to ensure effective policing. The 15 December 1945 issue of the Mainichi Shinbun (a Japanese daily newspaper) declared that Tokyo residents were concerned about a local crime wave and were of the opinion that "the poor handling of arrests is due to the insufficient armament of the police".¹⁰⁵ The article suggested that in view of the police's vulnerability vis à vis riots "permission will shortly be granted (to the Metropolitan Police Board)....to use tear bombs and revolvers....with a few restrictions".¹⁰⁶ As late as December 1948, H. S. Eaton, chief police administrator, stated in a press conference that "the police are getting along with about one pistol for every five men",¹⁰⁷ although the shortage of firearms seems to have been less acute in rural areas. According to the official history of the Occupation, six municipal policemen shared one pistol, whereas it was one between three for their colleagues in the countryside.¹⁰⁸ In November 1945 the Sixth and Eighth Armies had requested clarification of policy with regard to armament of the prefectural police forces, stating that one pistol for every three policemen was considered adequate by police experts.¹⁰⁹ "Studies in mid-1947 showed that casualties among police in the line of duty had increased 227% over the rate just before the surrender", and the number killed by guns or other weapons, compared with prewar years, had risen by more than six times.¹¹⁰ This suggests that criminal elements were in possession

¹⁰⁴ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", p.660.

¹⁰⁵ GHQ, SCAP Press Translation; Title: "Use of Tear Gas by the Police" (NDL, G-2 00235).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Extract from Press Conference of 12/5/48 (NDL, G-2 00250).

¹⁰⁸ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.61.

¹⁰⁹ Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence; Memo for record, dated 10/11/45; Subject: Need for Public Safety Directive (NDL, G-2 00237).

¹¹⁰ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.60.

of firearms, which, it may be assumed, were originally the property of the armed forces or even the police.¹¹¹

In his first general directive the Supreme Commander, as was stated in section one of this chapter, directed the Japanese civil police to continue their work of law enforcement, exempting them from the order to disarm all "Japanese armed forces". However, in the confusion attending surrender, the police turned in their weapons in the mistaken belief that this was what was expected of them.¹¹² Four months later, in January 1946, GHQ informed the Japanese Government that "the police are authorized to carry pistols in the performance of their duties...so long as the total number...available does not exceed the (authorized) strength of the Japanese civil police force (93,935)".¹¹³ Unfortunately, "it was hard to find the necessary weapons", and "only sufficient pistols were recovered to give one out of five Japanese police a gun".¹¹⁴ Many of those that were voluntarily given up by the police in September/October 1945 had apparently disappeared by January 1946. This suggests that they were appropriated by government officials, who presumably saw them as valuable assets, either as a means for personal protection or as a source of future profit.

The low ratio of firearms to policemen had not been rectified by 1948, and the problem was compounded by the variety and poor quality of the weapons available. A survey in December 1948 identified 165 different models, a diverse collection that was not matched by the necessary assortment of ammunition.¹¹⁵ Even after May 1948, when the Occupation authorities released to the police the remaining stock of captured and surrendered ammunition, the police had only 1,820,177 rounds. Supplies were carefully regulated - only three rounds/ recruit were provided for basic training and

¹¹¹ All kinds of products were concealed from the Occupation authorities and sold on the black market (see Chapter 4).

¹¹² PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.17 (Suitland, B.334, file 25).

¹¹³ Memo for Imperial Japanese Government, dated 16/1/46; Thru: Central Liaison Office; Subject: Armament of Police Forces in Japan (NDL, G-2 00250).

¹¹⁴ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.17.

¹¹⁵ History of the Non-Military Activities, p.61.

two more allocated for in-service training.¹¹⁶ By the end of 1948 most policemen were armed with batons, which replaced the traditional short swords and symbolised the changing role of the police in Japanese society. However, these wooden sticks provided little protection against gunfire, and did not prevent blatant violation of laws and regulations. In August 1949 the loan of American revolvers¹¹⁷ redressed the balance between the police and criminal elements, and demonstrated the Occupation's commitment to a strong and effective police force. Although Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese Prime Minister, believed that the police should be equipped with machine guns,¹¹⁸ the Americans considered such provision to be excessive. In May 1948 Eaton had suggested that machine guns were not suitable for close-quarters shooting and would result in injury to innocent people or damage to houses.¹¹⁹ The possession of firearms facilitated confident and efficient performance of police duties, and certainly left the individual policeman feeling less vulnerable and more self-assured. However, in terms of a collective response to crime or unrest, the existence of adequate transport and communications facilities was equally important.

In August 1946 Pulliam warned that "the police have very little motor transport and no means of rapid communication with which to cope with the gangster tactics of minority groups".¹²⁰ The following month a survey of the rural police in Saitama prefecture revealed that "motorized equipment was either obsolete or in very poor mechanical condition...", and emphasized the need for "more vehicles for transport of prisoners and answering emergency calls".¹²¹ As for Saitama's communication system, it was old and in need of repair or replacement; numerous telephones were found to be out of order, and the correction of faults took days or weeks. The over-exploitation of machinery during the war years, the failure to maintain properly limited stocks and the devastation left by numerous bombing raids

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.17.

¹¹⁸ Press Conference of 12/5/48 (NDL, G-2 00250).

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Report on law and order, dated 15/8/46; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, G-2 00228).

¹²¹ Memo, dated 5/9/46; To: Chief, PSD; From: Major W. C. Bower (NDL, G-2 00231).

combined to frustrate effective policing during the Occupation period. These problems adversely affected all sections of Japanese society. In his diary entry for 24 December 1945, Mark Gayn claimed that "millions of Japanese were on the road" and the country was "gasping for transportation".¹²² Likewise, police communications, consisting of both wire and radio-telegraph networks, ran parallel with the lines of the Ministry of Communications throughout most of the country;¹²³ in urban areas wartime bomb damage was extensive, while the problem in rural areas was poor maintenance.¹²⁴ It was not until the late 1940s that these problems even began to be rectified. In January 1948 a development plan called for the immediate establishment of wire circuits between the new National Rural Police (NRP) Headquarters and its six regional branches.¹²⁵ The NRP was the rural component of the new police structure, set up following the enactment of the Police Law in December 1947.¹²⁶ It coexisted with municipal police (MP) forces, established in towns and cities with populations of more than 5,000.

Delay over the repair or replacement of equipment did not reflect a lack of commitment, but was rather the product of a set of priorities that put the personal needs of policemen before those of the force. In 1949 Osaka introduced a patrol system that combined policemen working on foot with a few radio-equipped patrol cars. Since there were not enough cars with radios, the authorities were keen to purchase more, but of far greater consequence was the shortage of shoes and low boots, the necessary vehicles for foot patrols.¹²⁷ The fact that such necessities were in short supply more than three years after Japan's defeat attests to the persistence of serious economic problems. These preoccupied the police in their capacity as agents of economic regulation, but also, by affecting their own living conditions, influenced the way they behaved towards different sections of the community. The last part of this chapter sketches the broad outlines of the economic situation in

¹²² M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.59.

¹²³ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.64.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.65

¹²⁶ The Police Law went into effect on March 8, 1948.

¹²⁷ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.71.

Japan following her surrender. It is intended to serve as a preface to Chapters Three, Four and Five.

Economic Conditions

The OSS report, entitled "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation", predicted in September 1945 that prevailing economic, social and physical conditions would increase the difficulties of the Japanese police in maintaining order, warning that "shortages of consumers' goods and available shelter may be expected to aggravate such problems as black markets, theft and riots".¹²⁸ Mark Gayn, arriving in Japan on the 5 December 1945, described the desperate plight of the defeated Japanese:

The closer we came to Yokohama, the plainer became the gravity of Japan's hurt. Before us, as far as we could see, lay miles of rubble. The people looked ragged and distraught. They dug into the rubble to clear space for new shacks.¹²⁹

The problem of inadequate shelter was accompanied by other more pressing shortfalls, namely insufficient supplies of food and clothing. Poverty and scarcity characterised Japan in 1945. The policies of her government in the early months of the Occupation only made matters worse.

When the Emperor broadcast his surrender speech on 15 August 1945, Japan's economy, which had been totally geared to war, was close to collapse. The developments in the weeks immediately following that broadcast ensured that the Americans' political objectives would be seriously undermined by the state of the economy. The increase in note issue in the last year of the war and much heavier government spending combined to create an inflationary pressure that was released by the decline of authority that accompanied defeat. The problem was compounded by hasty withdrawals of deposits and uncontrolled government expenditure. In the first half of August the Japanese Government paid out ¥9.9 million earmarked as extraordinary military budget funds, much of this made up of discharge allowances and pensions paid years in

¹²⁸ OSS, R&A Report No. 2758 (28/9/45) p.44.

¹²⁹ M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.1.

advance. In September another ¥24 billion was spent in this way.¹³⁰ By the time the Occupation became aware of what was going on and tried to stop it, prices had increased three times.¹³¹ There was a growing shortage of essential consumer supplies, the product of the promotion of wartime production at the expense of everything else, and there had been a marked drop in coal output from seriously undermaintained mines. Add to these problems the lack of essential raw materials from abroad and it becomes clear why the Occupation authorities did not stick by their original position of non-responsibility for the economy. The situation was too serious to be left to a Japanese government with limited resources and questionable commitment.

Part Four of the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan insisted that the government of Japan was to be held responsible for the state of the economy, justifying this position as follows: "...the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering, (and) the plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behaviour, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage".¹³² The Japanese authorities were charged with developing and enforcing programmes that would prevent acute economic distress and ensure "just and impartial distribution of available supplies".¹³³ It was the Japanese police who were the principal agents of economic regulation, particularly the collection and distribution of essential commodities. Their wartime activities in the economic sphere were not altered by defeat and Occupation. The black economy continued to hamper equitable distribution of necessities, and increasingly preoccupied the police. J. B. Cohen explains the black market's development in terms of a vicious circle: "As less food appeared in legitimate channels, greater demand was created on the black market, this in turn reducing the quantity of food going into legitimate channels".¹³⁴ The illegal transport of foodstuffs by individuals on passenger trains, reflecting the inadequacy of official

¹³⁰ J. B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949) p.418.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Political Reorientation of Japan, Appendix A:11, p.425.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ J. B. Cohen, Japan's Economy, p.385.

rations,¹³⁵ was too pervasive to be effectively controlled. "The solution of...war-born and surrender-swollen problems was not helped by (the) original policy of non-responsibility in the economic sphere",¹³⁶ and ultimately demanded the active involvement of the Americans.

The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan instructed MacArthur to ensure that "all practicable economic and police measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilisation of essential Japanese resources in order that imports into Japan may be strictly limited".¹³⁷ Necessary measures included production and price controls, rationing and restriction of black markets. Therefore, from the outset MacArthur was authorized to compel the government of Japan to exploit its limited resources to the full. Military government officials were to monitor the situation, and actively to intervene only when circumstances demanded. Increasingly, as the Occupation progressed, Allied personnel were required to work with the police to enforce collection of rice. Deployment of Occupation forces reflected the weakness of the Japanese police, the persistence of economic problems, and, more importantly, the convergence of interests between the Japanese authorities and their American masters.

Conclusion

The consequences of Japan's defeat and Occupation, as far as the police were concerned, were both negative and positive. Close association with the discredited wartime regime, together with American policies that sought to promote civil liberties, damaged the status and prestige of the police institution. The removal of high-ranking police officials through purge was accompanied by the voluntary departure of thousands of policemen of all ranks, both

¹³⁵ According to J. B. Cohen, the caloric intake during 1945 averaged 1,680 calories/ person/ day compared to a minimum requirement of 2,163 (p.386). In May 1946 caloric consumption in Tokyo was 1,352/ capita/ day while in rural prefectures it was 2,022. By August 1947 it had risen to 1,704 in Tokyo and was 2,041 in rural areas (p.477).

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.418.

¹³⁷ Political Reorientation of Japan, Appendix A:13, p.436.

cause and symptom of declining morale. Confident, effective performance of police duties was undermined by a feeling of vulnerability. Policemen harboured personal doubts as to their role in society, and were often ill-equipped to deal with armed criminals. The police force was enfeebled by defeat and Occupation, but remained an essential agency of law enforcement.

Indeed, the abolition of Japan's armed forces increased the importance of the civil police. In the context of an indirect Occupation they represented the only stabilising force available to the Japanese government. The decision to govern through the Japanese authorities afforded the police an ambivalent status. The Americans considered them to be a necessary evil, prone to undemocratic activities and yet vital auxiliaries, without which reforms could not be implemented. Persistent economic problems further strengthened the police; they continued to dominate the daily lives of ordinary Japanese through their enforcement of regulations concerned with pricing and rationing. In the final analysis, ambivalent Occupation policies combined with volatile socio-economic conditions both to impair the effectiveness of the police and to emphasize their importance.

CHAPTER THREE

GUARDIANS OF THE PEOPLE

Kawaji Toshiyoshi, the architect of Japan's modern police system, characterised the police as "nursemaids" of the people.¹ The degree to which they supervised and regulated the lives of ordinary Japanese was seen as excessive by American reformers, accustomed to a more circumscribed form of policing. In March 1946 Lewis Valentine, former commissioner of the New York city police, and Oscar Olander, commissioner of Michigan state police, arrived in Japan. Invited by the Occupation authorities to assess the current situation and recommend changes, they were to oversee the compilation of reports on Japan's metropolitan police organisation and her rural forces respectively. Both missions called for "deconcentration" and decentralisation, that is to say the removal of extraneous police functions and the devolution of police power.² The Valentine Report instructed the Occupation to "strip the existing police of every duty not acceptable by American standards to the field of police work",³ and Olander recommended that such functions be transferred as soon as other government agencies could absorb them.⁴

The Occupation's inability to find effective substitutes for police regulation constantly undermined efforts to restrict police activities. As will become clear, the Japanese police continued to dominate the lives of ordinary people, paying little heed to the Occupation's occasional demands for their withdrawal from such areas as economic regulation. The proposed reduction of their powers and responsibilities was dictated by the active promotion of civil liberties and human rights. In short, it was seen as an essential precondition for transforming the role of the police in Japanese society and thereby improving police-community relations.

¹ Discussed in Chapter 1.

² History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monograph 55 (Police and Public Safety), p.18. The debate surrounding the speed and extent of decentralisation is examined in Chapter 6.

³ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report, p.1.

⁴ Ibid., Documentary Appendices 3, Introduction to the Olander Report (24/6/46), p.3.

Unfortunately serious socio-economic dislocation throughout Japan impeded the shrinkage of police activities and negated constitutional guarantees of civil rights. Threats posed by both political agitation and economic instability forced the Americans to say one thing and do another. Their ambivalence encouraged the police to trust to their own instincts: they continued to regulate economic affairs, sometimes a little too enthusiastically, and were jealous of their jurisdiction; they were careless as to the rights of detainees; surveillance of the population remained a priority, ostensibly as a crime prevention measure; and, although confused as to the correct course of action vis à vis demonstrations and strikes, they preferred an active response to a passive one.

The numerous regulations and controls that sustained the war effort were perceived by the Occupation as an obstacle to the liberation of the Japanese people. This much is clear from observations made in the report on the Japanese police system, compiled by the Office of Strategic Services in September 1945:

The Japanese police perform many functions discharged by separate government bureaus in other countries. Police functions in Japan range from the enforcement of economic regulations to arbitrary control of dissident political elements by means of censorship, suppression of labour unions, and arrest and detention for political opposition. The police by their performance of such political activities have constituted an obstacle to the fulfilment of democratic tendencies in Japan.⁵

Almost immediately, in October 1945, "the overwhelming power of police agencies over the daily lives of the people was broken by the changes effected as a consequence of the Civil Liberties Directive".⁶ Unfortunately this was true only on paper, the scope of police activities remaining much the same as before in practice. Efforts to free the press from police control met with success, permitting ordinary Japanese at least to read about the civil liberties granted them by the benevolent Occupation. However, for the most part the people concerned themselves with more pressing issues such as the search for food and other necessities. The problems they encountered in this regard were compounded by the interference of

⁵ Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R. & A. Report No. 2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" (28/9/45) p.5

⁶ History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, M.55, pp.12-13.

police, who remained the principal agents of economic regulation, continuing to work within a framework of price and rationing laws. For example, a list of economic control laws and ordinances, compiled in 1949, reveals that the Foodstuffs Control Law that was issued during the war, in February 1942, was still in operation.⁷

Economic Regulation

By the end of 1945 the Japanese Government had formulated a plan for the reorganisation of the police system, recommending amongst other things a reduction in economic duties.⁸ When the Economic Police Section of the Metropolitan Police Board was abolished the following month⁹ it seemed that the government's desire to strip the police of economic functions was a genuine one. However, this was no more than a symbolic gesture, designed to placate the Occupation authorities. Changes affecting the administrative divisions of the police system did little to undermine policing practices that had developed before and during the war. As late as November 1949 Makoto Matsukata, a Government Section research analyst, was recommending that "the Public Safety Division initiate action to remove the police from investigation of economic crimes and enforcement of economic regulations".¹⁰ Arguing that "great ill-feeling is created with the people when police powers are applied to economic controls",¹¹ he reminded the deputy chief of MacArthur's call for the abolition of the economic police in a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister in September 1947.¹² Matsukata asserted that "the police (were) more than ever involved in economic regulation".¹³ An expanding black market that constantly frustrated attempts to fully exploit limited supplies of staple foods, clothing and raw materials connected war with Occupation; it acted as a

⁷ NDL, GS(B) 02270 - undated (1949 or 1950).

⁸ Summations, No.2 (Nov. 45), p.36.

⁹ Ibid., No.3 (Dec. 45), p.30.

¹⁰ Memo dated 3/11/49; To: Deputy chief, GS; Subject: Enforcement of Economic Controls [NDL, GS(B) 02270]

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² MacArthur's letter to Katayama concerning the Reorganisation of the Japanese Police System, dated 16/9/1947 (NDL, G-2 02750).

¹³ Memo dated 3/11/49; Subject: Enforcement of Economic Controls [NDL, GS(B) 02270].

bridge across which the Japanese police successfully crossed, bringing with them their overarching authority in economic affairs. In short, where there was a black market there was also an economic police, despite Occupation efforts to the contrary.¹⁴ American attempts to deal with illegitimate channels of commerce were at best half-hearted, subordinated to the desire to push through radical political change. The maximisation of Japan's scarce resources by means of a properly regulated economy, despite its being the essential precondition for *effective* political change, was to remain the responsibility of the Japanese government.¹⁵

The Office of Strategic Services' report on the Japanese police system explained that economic sections of prefectural police divisions "handle applications for rations, distribute emergency rations and enforce wage, price, rationing and other economic regulations".¹⁶ The nature of such duties, it was claimed, was not political.¹⁷ This surprising conclusion surely derived from the authors' realisation that, given that "there (were) no other agencies immediately or economically available, abrupt transfer of functions from police control might lead to confusion".¹⁸ Thus, the Occupation authorities justified their sponsorship of the police as economic regulators by characterising such activity as a temporary expedient that was in any case innocuous.¹⁹ It was noted that the police were not effective enforcers of economic controls, their poor performance reflecting an excessive workload and the unworkability of the measures themselves.²⁰ Their economic activities, it was argued, should be circumscribed, and the burden of such regulation somehow shared.²¹ Rather than abolishing the economic police, it

¹⁴ According to Matsukata, the Economic Stabilisation Board was created principally to replace the civil police as the agency of economic control.

¹⁵ The Japanese establishment was too involved in the "free market"/black market to discharge this responsibility with any conviction (See Chapter 4).

¹⁶ R&A Report No. 2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" (28/9/45) p.57.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Given the importance of the black market in Occupation Japan, such a contention was clearly false (See Chapter 4).

²⁰ OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.57.

²¹ *Ibid.* With regard to the regulation of market stalls and other commercial outlets the burden was shared by powerful individuals whose influence often derived from criminal

made more sense to confine their role to the apprehension of those infringing economic regulations "unless...enforcement of (such) controls was found to be extremely corrupt".²² The latter proviso was well made, given their reputation during the war. J. B. Cohen, assessing the effectiveness of the Anti-Profiteering Ordinance in 1937, remarked that "the economic police (Keizai Keisatsu) of the Home Ministry were responsible for its enforcement and as a result it was enforced only against those who did not have the means to buy exemption from the police".²³ Those that compiled the OSS report seem to have largely disregarded the economic police's poor track record, preferring to recommend that "interference with regular procedures...(be) kept to a minimum".²⁴

The police continued to employ spasmodic, inadequate control measures that were supposed to combat organised black market operations. Raids on trains, inspections of warehouses and check points on major roads revealed the quantity of illicit traffic, but did little to stem it. For example, in August 1946 Miyagi prefectural police raided an express train bound for Tokyo, apprehending two hundred passengers in possession of "excessive amounts of food". Most were identified as black market operators from Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, returning from Aomori prefecture, northern Honshû, where they had illegally purchased their cargo. ²⁵ During the first two weeks of November, 1946, incoming passengers at leading railway stations in Tokyo were "inspected", resulting in the arrest of more than seven hundred people for "carrying unauthorised amounts of goods".²⁶ On the 21st January, 1947, the police set up checkpoints on all major roads into the capital, and stopped more than two hundred trucks, confiscating large quantities of nails, wire, coal, tar, charcoal, clothing, vegetables and fish. ²⁷ The following month seven checkpoints on the Kawagoe highway

activities (See chapter 4).

²² OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.58.

²³ J. B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949) p.357.

²⁴ OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.58.

²⁵ Summations, No.11 (Aug. 46), p.34.

²⁶ Ibid., No.14 (Nov. 46), p.77.

²⁷ Ibid., No.16 (Jan. 47), p.40.

(Saitama prefecture) netted food and raw materials destined for contraband channels - within four hours on one day 200 trucks were stopped and large quantities of assorted goods seized, including more than 12,000 pounds of dried fish, 3,000 bundles of firewood, 300 bales of charcoal and about 8,000 pounds of vegetables.²⁸ In April, 1947, a system of changing checkpoints was established in the metropolitan area of Tokyo to frustrate attempts to bypass the roads where barriers were usually set up.²⁹ The extent of the problem was such that the actions of the police were generally reactive rather than proactive.

Policing the railways was particularly difficult, criminal elements proving more than a match for the agents of law enforcement. Trains were regularly used by black market brokers, generally able to act with impunity whether they were operating individually or in gangs. Towards the end of 1946, the Ministry of Transport, "in an attempt to curtail thefts and other law violations....proposed to increase the number of railway police by granting police powers to a total of 8,915 railroad employees".³⁰ Acknowledging the civil police's need for reinforcements, the Public Safety Division approved of the Ministry's plans "with the understanding that no additional personnel will be employed, that employees will not carry firearms or any weapons except sticks, canes or batons and that police powers will be restricted to enforcement on railway property only...".³¹ The recommended increase in personnel does not seem to have been put into effect. According to the 2nd March 1949 issue of the Nippon Times, "The Ministry of Transport (was still) planning to increase the number of railway public safety officers from the present 2,000 to 6,000...in view of the increasing number of....crimes on trains".³² Whatever action was taken in late 1946 apparently

²⁸ CIS Periodical Summary No.12, Excerpt No.19, dated 15/2/47: Police Campaign against Black Market - Highway Checkpoints Established, Markets Raided (NDL, G-2 02777).

²⁹ Summations, No.19 (April 47), p.56.

³⁰ CIS Periodical Summary No.1, Excerpt No.2, dated 1/9/46: Railway Police (G-2 02777).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Article entitled "Ministry to Increase Railway Police Force - Action Decided to Stop Theft of Cargoes from Trains" [GS(B) 02282].

failed to stem the traffic in "yami"³³ products and its attendant problems. In February 1947 it was reported that violence on the railways necessitated a robust response from the police:

The prevalence of various kinds of lawlessness on Japanese trains, resulting in nationwide complaints by victimised passengers, finally moved the Home Ministry to inaugurate a system whereby armed policemen are assigned to certain trains, to check on violations ranging from illegal occupancy of seats to blackmarketeering, pickpocketing and even organised gang robbery.³⁴

On local or commuters' trains there was "open black market trading",³⁵ a practice that aggravated the crowded, uncomfortable conditions endured by Japanese travelling to work or to the countryside in search of food. Racketeers carrying bundles of black market goods "monopolise(d) far more than their rightful share of space, to say nothing of their violations of economic laws".³⁶ In the space of three days a special patrol rounded up 1,424 offenders in the Tokyo area alone, most of whom, however, were not "professional racketeers". The distinction between "the small fry", those infringing economic regulations in order to feed or clothe their family, and "the big fish", the large-scale brokers, is an important one, and will be examined later in this section. For the moment it is enough to acknowledge that the latter, operating in organised groups, were the intended quarry of armed police, dispatched from Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Kyoto, Kôbe, Yamaguchi and Fukuoka.³⁷

The press's response to the assignment of armed police to passenger trains was a mixed one. It was suggested by one editor that their presence smacked too much of the old days when the revolvers of the Kenpeitai "spelled awe that would have silenced a crying baby".³⁸ Most, however, interpreted it as a much needed and timely attempt to solve a problem that was beyond the capability of unarmed

³³ An abbreviation of yami ichiba, the Japanese phrase for "black market".

³⁴ CIS Periodical Summary No.12, Excerpt No.18, dated 15/2/47: Armed Police on Trains - Measures Taken to Combat Black Market (G-2 02777).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Yomiuri Shinbun, 24/1/47, Ibid.

railway officials. In any case it seems to have been effective. In Nagano prefecture armed police handled a total of 1,060 offences during the first three weeks of February, of which 600 related to the black market and 130 to disturbances of the peace (the rest were classified as minor offences).³⁹ Commodities confiscated by the police teams included 190 bags of rice (10,133 kg), 26 bags of soy beans (1,577 kg), 45 bags of red beans (2,793 kg), 459 items of clothing and 1,800 kan of apples (15,750 kg).⁴⁰ It may be assumed that the quantities involved represent the tip of the iceberg, the scale of the black market being far beyond the expectations of the Occupation. The torrent of "yami" products was continuous, police raids amounting to nothing more than the temporary closure of sluice-gates. Despite the efforts of both the Occupation and the Japanese Government, the flow was not effectively stemmed. As late as March, 1950, it was reported that "rice carriers", evading numerous train and station checks, were still entering Kanagawa prefecture with their cargoes intact.⁴¹ That much was clear from the results of police clamp downs. For example, between 15 January and 2 February, 1950, 17,257 kg of staple foods were impounded in train checks.⁴²

It was above all the scale of the black market that defeated the Japanese police. The level of illegal commercial activity can be measured according to either the quantity of "yami" goods detected or the number of people caught infringing economic regulations. Whilst the former is examined in the next chapter, the latter is relevant to any discussion of the extent to which the police interfered with the efforts of ordinary Japanese to eke out an existence for themselves. The number of violations of economic laws remained extremely high throughout the Occupation period, suggesting that many Japanese were consuming black market produce in order to supplement inadequate official rations. Those

³⁹ Letter from HQ, CIC Area No.20, dated 22/2/47; Thru: 2nd CIC Region (9 Corps); To: 441st CIC Detachment, GHQ; Subject: Armed Police on Railways - Summary of Information (G-2 00239).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Report on Conference held at Economic Investigation Agency, Kanagawa prefecture (hand-written); dated 16/3/50; author unknown (NARA, Suitland, Civil Affairs Section Box No.2733, File 2, entitled Economic Investigation Activities 1949-51).

⁴² Ibid.

who controlled the supply - they are identified in Chapter 4 - accumulated riches, whilst the majority struggled to make ends meet by whatever means possible. In 1949, when the United Press enquired as to the incidence of crime in Japan, the Public Safety Division considered it advisable to conceal the high number of infringements of economic regulations. Colonel Pulliam was adamant that only those statistics enumerating transgressions of the criminal code should be released for public scrutiny:

The other offences, mainly violations of economic regulations, are now running at 100,000 per month. A similar situation in Germany was publicised in the American press and (resulted in) unfavourable press comment...The U.S. generally feels that it is a minor problem here. We should encourage that feeling.⁴³

A little deceit was necessary to protect the Occupation's image from the many detractors at home, who increasingly charged SCAP with mismanagement of the economy. Governments, aware of the overriding importance of public *perceptions*, naturally incline towards the selective use of statistics. The Public Safety Division's attempts at statistical massage were more easily achieved after January 1947, when non-criminal offences, largely connected with black marketing, were extracted from the total number of reported violations.⁴⁴ A clearer picture of the incidence of crime emerged, the non-criminal element accounting for nearly 30% of all reported offences.⁴⁵ This gives some indication of the prominence of the black market, although, given that the police were often either despised or feared, the number of *reported* offences is a statistic that should be cited with caution. Likewise, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the number of arrests, this more than any other statistic reflecting the level of police vigilance. Fluctuations recorded by government officials were more often than not caused by enforcement drives, when the police neglected other duties in order to check the rising number of illegal transactions. Generally, it can be assumed that the level of black market activity, although subject to seasonal variation, remained fairly constant.

⁴³ Inter-Office Memo, dated 18/5/49; From: PSD; To: G-2; Subject: UP Inquiry (G-2 00255).

⁴⁴ History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, M.55, p.75.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Figure 6 illustrates that the number of infringements of economic regulations ranged from around 80,000 to more than 120,000 per month during 1947. This was the level specified by Pulliam in 1949, suggesting that for the duration of the Occupation, certainly from 1947, there were more than a million *recorded* economic offences a year. The majority of these concerned staple and supplementary foods - 77.32% in 1946 and 82.81% in 1947 (See figures 7 and 8). This was not surprising given that price and rationing controls were primarily concerned with ensuring fair and equitable distribution of necessities. During the war the Japanese government considered effective economic regulation to be a vital precondition for national mobilisation. The Occupation, however, demanded that food supplies be properly shared in the interests of democratisation. Serious shortages would induce apathy or radicalism, both of which were discouraged by American reformers.


The high number of economic offences concerned with illegal possession of food produced a fairly tolerant attitude on the part of the Japanese police. Acknowledging the inadequacy of official rations, their attempts at economic regulation were often mere gestures, intended to reassure the Occupation authorities that something was being done to check illegal trading in scarce commodities. Early on it was made clear that those caught "food-hunting" (*kaidashi*) would be treated leniently - "the economic police will consider the circumstances of the offender".⁴⁶ Sometimes, "a woman would seek to disguise her black market rice by strapping it and cosseting and posseting it and making soothing noises to it, quite as if it were a baby".⁴⁷ In the unhappy event that rice was trickling from the bundle on her back, the policeman, often reluctant to take action, would allude to the leak. Thus, there was a story of a policeman who told a woman that her "baby", which he knew to be a sack of rice, was wetting its pants.⁴⁸ The Home Ministry, anxious to

⁴⁶ Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated (Folder title - Police General and Prefectural, Book 1, 11/45 - 11/46) [NDL, G-2 00226].

⁴⁷ E. Seidensticker, *Tokyo Rising - The City Since the Great Earthquake* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1990), p.153.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

**Violations of Price and Rationing Regulations:
January 1947 - December 1947**



Source: Summations: 1/47, 2/47, 3/47- No.19, p.229 ; 4/47 - No.21, p.204; 5/47, 6/47 - No.22, p.227 (total for May calculated from Jan.-June figure); 7/47, 8/47 - No.24, p.222 (figure for Tokushima prefecture missing from Aug. total); 9/47, 10/47 - No.26, p.224; 11/47 - No.27, p.266; 12/47 - No.28, p.267.

Figure 6

Breakdown of Price and Rationing Violations:
January - June 1946




Figure 7 (Source: Summations, No.22, p.227)



Breakdown of Price and Rationing Violations:
January - June 1947




Figure 8 (Source: Summations, No.22, p.227)

please its new masters, assured them that such leniency was not applicable in the case of theft or improper disposition of *imported foodstuffs*, offences countered by "strict control".⁴⁹ Whatever might be said about the manner in which the economy was policed - incompetently, leniently or strictly - there is no doubt that it was the *consumers* of black market produce, rather than the key *suppliers*, who were oppressed by the many and diverse economic regulations.⁵⁰

The police considered many of the laws and regulations to be "inappropriate", their complexity undermining effective control, not least by the public confusion they engendered.⁵¹ According to a report written at the end of 1949, it was often the case that those reprimanded or charged by the police for infringing economic regulations reacted angrily or incredulously, apparently unaware that they were breaking the law.⁵² The report maintained that it was the responsibility of the Economic Investigation Board (EIB), established in August 1948, to provide the cure for both innocence and ignorance through education.⁵³ Characterised by the police as a mechanism for the adjustment or modification of economic controls, the EIB was encouraged to conduct research with a view to "economic rehabilitation", and not to concern itself with "exposing economic violations".⁵⁴ The latter was to remain the responsibility of the police, however difficult it proved to be. By the end of 1949, when Occupation policy was stressing the need for economic recovery, the Japanese police had to contend with government agencies that increasingly threatened their overarching authority in the economic sphere. Although critical of the numerous economic controls, the police were nevertheless jealous of their jurisdiction and unwilling to relinquish it. Thus, we find them continually at

⁴⁹ Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated (NDL, G-2 00226).

⁵⁰ By *consumers* I mean those who scraped a living from black market goods as well as those who purchased them for their own use. The *key suppliers* were those with the facilities to hoard large quantities of goods.

⁵¹ Report accompanying memo for Deputy Chief, Government Section, from Matsukata, dated 3/11/49 (re. Enforcement of Economic Controls). Author unknown, but the tone of the document suggests a member of the Japanese police [GS(B) 02270].

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

loggerheads with the Economic Stabilisation Board (ESB) and its various offshoots, the ensuing conflict impairing rather than enhancing the quality of economic regulation. This state of affairs must have perplexed many Occupation officials, convinced that the police no longer meddled in economic affairs.

In July 1947 it was reported that "economic inspectors" were being appointed in large numbers by the Home, Transport and Finance ministries ⁵⁵ to assist rather than supersede the police. Whilst the Ministry of Transport had the largest number (8,000), the Home Ministry was planning to increase its complement of around 2,000 by more than three times, thus overtaking both the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Finance with 3,500 inspectors.⁵⁶ With powers ranging "from those of the judicial police to those of mere inspectors with no police authority",⁵⁷ these officials seem to have complicated the task of economic regulation. The question of the role of the ESB enforcement bureau and its government inspectors was one that the Economic and Scientific Section was reluctant to tackle. It was recommended that Government Section, "with its obvious concern over the police tradition", assume the burden.⁵⁸ The Occupation faced a dilemma in 1947. Whilst recognising the strain on the police afforded by severe economic shortages and extensive government controls, it was hesitant to approve large increases in manpower "because of the police tradition of the Japanese state".⁵⁹ The solution was to approve the appointment of officials, who were not classified as policemen but exercised policing powers. Although the extra economic regulators were characterised as allies of the police, the relationship between the two was more often one of rivalry than cooperative endeavour.

The main source of friction was ill-defined areas of responsibility, which caused both duplication of effort and an uncoordinated

⁵⁵ Memo dated 21/7/47; To: Chief, Government Section; From: E. M. Hadley, Governmental Powers Division; Subject: Economic Inspectors [GS(B) 02306].

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

response to economic crime. In November 1949 Makoto Matsukata described communication between the police and the Economic Investigation Board, established to spearhead more efficient economic control, as both poor and confused.⁶⁰ He recommended that the police's role be restricted to the investigation and apprehension of those contravening the criminal code (this would "include all the notorious violators of economic controls").⁶¹ A spokesman for the police argued that "the EIB should concern itself with research and education...(and) determine whether the present economic control laws and regulations coincide with real conditions...".⁶² Meanwhile the police would continue to dominate the realm of action (ie. enforcement).⁶³ The EIB and police, the spokesman maintained, should make every effort to promote economic reconstruction by liaising with each other, at the same time occupying distinct spheres of operation.⁶⁴

Both agencies resorted to unseemly practices to guard against the other's encroachment. On the 22nd May, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun accused the EIB of "overstepping its authority".⁶⁵ The charge originated with a special enquiry into the EIB by the Lower House Judiciary Committee. Officials ordered before the committee included the ESB chief, who was cautioned against exceeding the board's remit, namely the prevention of economic offences.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the committee investigated the "prevailing rumour that personal grudges enter(ed) into some of the exposures by field officials".⁶⁷ It was established that the EIB was selective in its exposures of hoarded goods:

The Tokyo District Prosecutor's Office found that the Tokyo Economic Investigation Agency exposed hoarded steel at the Metropolitan Transportation Bureau in retaliation for the latter's refusal to give free

⁶⁰ Memo dated 3/11/49; Subject: Enforcement of Economic Controls [NDL, GS(B) 02270].

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Report accompanying memo for Deputy Chief, Government Section, from Matsukata, dated 3/11/49; Subject: Enforcement of Economic Controls [NDL, GS(B) 02770].

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ ATIS translation, dated 26/5/49 [GS(B) 02281].

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

streetcar passes to economic investigators.⁶⁸

The Japanese police, however, were by no means blameless. In 1950 the case of Furuya Tatsuo, an official of Saitama Economic Investigation Agency (EIA),⁶⁹ demonstrated that truculence on the part of the police often reflected involvement in black market operations. In February, 1949, Furuya instructed his assistant to investigate Chiyodaya company,⁷⁰ the legally designated agent of the Sangyô Fukkô Kôdan (SFK).⁷¹ Rumours that a large quantity of SFK materials were being sold on the black market proved to be well-founded, the investigation revealing a discrepancy between the amount of goods available and the quantity accumulated following exposure of illegal hoards.

It was not until September, 1949, that EIA investigations began in earnest. Although all illegal and hoarded goods uncovered by the police should have been turned over to Chiyodaya company as the agent of the SFK, it was found that one Hosaka, chief of the economic section of the Omiya Metropolitan Police, had withheld about 400 items and had taken them to the police station. During the period March to May, 1949, Hosaka had ordered Chiyodaya company to deliver goods into his care. Furuya warned the police that this was an illegal act, but took no immediate action "for the sake of good relations between government agencies".⁷² Nevertheless, Chiyodaya company was ordered to compile a report, a task made impossible by the subsequent confiscation of all the company's books and records by Omiya police. Unable to secure the latter's cooperation, Saitama EIA managed with Occupation backing to acquire data from SFK's

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Described in the Economic Stabilisation Board Establishment Law (No.164) as an "external organ" [History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monograph 34 (Price and Distribution Stabilisation: Non-Food Programme), Appendix 5].

⁷⁰ Report on Furuya Case, dated 31/1/50 - Information Obtained from Saitama EIA (NARA, Suitland, Civil Affairs Section Box No. 2733, File 2, entitled Economic Investigation Activities, 1949-51). All information re. Furuya case comes from this source unless otherwise stated.

⁷¹ Sangyô Fukkô Kôdan - Industrial Reconstruction Corporation. The kôdan, or public corporations, replaced the old wartime industry control associations.

⁷² Although this was the reason given, EIA's policy of restraint more probably derived from uneasiness over their authority in police affairs.

books and records that revealed the amount of goods illegally disposed of by Chiyodaya company.⁷³

Meanwhile, Omiya police were secretly investigating EIA personnel, anxious to undermine their integrity by exposing shady deals. Hosaka, insisting that the EIA had no authority over the police, did not shrink from unilateral action. On 20 January, 1950, following Furuya's arrest by Omiya police on suspicion of receiving bribes, all documents and data relating to the Chiyodaya company case were impounded by Hosaka. Four days later the charge that Saitama EIA was disseminating false information and using Kantô Civil Affairs Region (ie. military government) as a shield was carried in a local newspaper. Presumably this was the justification for refusing to allow EIA access to Chiyodaya company's books from the 31st January, 1950.

Furuya may have been guilty of improper practices, but the scandal he was trying to expose was of another order and magnitude. He accused the Procurator's Office, the Saitama branch of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, SFK headquarters in Tokyo and its local branch of illegally receiving hoarded goods.⁷⁴ An American official, who had had frequent contact with Furuya over a ten month period, described him as "a man of courage and integrity, who through faithful devotion to duty and diligent efforts has performed his work in an outstanding manner without fear or favour".⁷⁵ He maintained that Furuya's arrest was not surprising, given that his investigations in the summer and autumn of 1949 were leading to the exposure of illegal dealings by officials in the prefectural government (he had already implicated the governor of Saitama prefecture, Nishimura, in a hoarded goods scandal).⁷⁶ The Furuya case is an extreme example of the tensions that arose from jurisdictional rivalries, but its real significance derives from the issue of corruption in high places. Clearly it was the influence that

⁷³ Information Received from Furuya, dated 31/1/50 (Suitland, CAS Box No.2733, File 2).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Letter from R. A. Hashitani, Distribution and Enforcement Division, Kantô Civil Affairs Region, dated 3/3/50; To whom it may concern (CAS Box No.2733, File 2).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

accompanied dominance in the field of economic regulation that produced aggressive rivalry between the various government agencies. Whilst a regime of economic controls greatly inconvenienced and harassed ordinary Japanese, it greatly benefitted those charged with its enforcement. The situation was well summarised in the February 1949 edition of Shinsô magazine:

MPB...officials in charge of economic controls over staple foods, perishables and other foods often conduct unannounced searches for illegal goods at such centres as Shinbashi, Ginza, Ueno and Shinjuku; but the tendency is to overlook black marketeers who are rampant in their own offices.⁷⁷

The difference in treatment accorded the "respectable" law-breakers and the petty traders, who were constantly infringing economic regulations, was a cause for increasing concern among Occupation officials. It was bad enough that the police were still active agents of economic control. What made matters worse was the manner in which they policed the economy, their behaviour towards ordinary Japanese, which showed little regard for civil liberties and human rights. American reformers, whose policy documents had linked democratisation of the police with "deconcentration" of their functions, witnessed the two issues becoming entwined in practice. It became clear that policemen, whilst enforcing economic regulations, were flouting constitutional guarantees of freedom and privacy.

In 1949 the legality of spot checks of individuals' personal effects by the police was frequently discussed in both the Japanese media and Occupation circles. In January of that year Mr. Rauwald of the Civil Transportation Section/policy branch informed Legal Section that so-called "railroad police" had been spot checking freight and baggage.⁷⁸ Responding to his doubts as to the legitimacy of such actions, Meyers (Legal Section) stated that railway police "were limited in their activities as judicial police to maintaining order

⁷⁷ ATIS Translation, dated 5/2/49; article entitled "Metropolitan Police Exposed" [GS(B) 02283].

⁷⁸ Legal Section, 27/1/49; Memo for the record; From: H. Meyers (Legislative and Justice Division); Subject: Judicial Police - Ability of Railroad Employees with Judicial Police Powers to Search Baggage and Freight [GS(B) 02271].

among passengers and preventing mishaps to baggage and freight".⁷⁹ The issue raised a difficult policy problem - it was essential to stem the traffic in black market produce, but "the Constitution appear(ed) clearly to deny any search of baggage on the basis of a spot check which is unconnected with reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed".⁸⁰

Japanese people subjected to police searches understood their purpose, but objected to the manner in which they were conducted. It was this more than anything else that provoked criticism in the national press. In April and May, 1949, the mainstream newspapers alerted the Occupation authorities to the resentment felt by ordinary Japanese on being forced to alight from trains for police checks. On 28 April, the Asahi Shinbun reported that members of the Upper House Judiciary Committee had gone to Kôriyama in Fukushima prefecture the previous day to investigate allegations of "rough handling of railway passengers by policemen...".⁸¹ They witnessed a raid at Shirakawa station, and were left in no doubt as to the attitude of those undergoing "inspection". Itsuki Takeo, a committee member, had this to say:

Police circles contend that passengers get off the train to cooperate with the police, but in our opinion few of them cooperated with the police of their own free will. It is hoped that the police will change or entirely abolish this control method, from the standpoint of respecting the people's human rights....⁸²

One traveller, interviewed by the Yomiuri Shinbun, stated that any cooperation on the part of passengers could be explained by the fact that they were often "half-asleep when rounded up by the police".⁸³ In response to his demand that inspections be conducted in the train, he had been told that searches were done on the orders of the Occupation.⁸⁴ The police, he maintained, fully exploited the docility

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ ATIS Translation, dated 3/5/49: Rough Police Handling on Trains Probed - Full trans. of Kôriyama dispatch, Asahi Shinbun [GS(B) 02281].

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ ATIS Translation, dated 6/5/49: The Compulsory Examination of Passengers - Summary of sub-editorial, 30/4/49 issue [GS(B) 02281].

⁸⁴ Ibid.

of Japanese vis à vis Occupation directives.⁸⁵ Presumably the interviewee was not alone in finding it "unpleasant to be awakened on the night train and forced to get off to undergo police inspection".⁸⁶

Nobody seems to have paid much attention to statements made by the offices of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor in early April, 1949, informing passengers that the police had no authority to coerce them into obeying orders, that they could refuse to submit to inspections if they so desired.⁸⁷ The Public Prosecutor's Office ruled that it was illegal to stop trains to search passengers, and restricted legitimate police activity to questioning travellers as to the contents of hand luggage.⁸⁸ By 30 April, however, pressure exerted by media coverage was forcing the various police forces ⁸⁹ to moderate their behaviour. On 30 April National Rural Police Headquarters, Miyagi prefecture, issued a notification to all police stations throughout its jurisdiction, "prohibiting the forcible removal of passengers from trains while carrying out searches for illegally-transported staple foodstuffs".⁹⁰ Any disruption of the train service due to police interference was now deemed unacceptable.⁹¹

However, respect for citizens' rights was bound to be obscured by the increasing emphasis on economic recovery. If the Occupation had to temporarily suspend constitutional guarantees of freedom from police intrusion, then that was a price worth paying to facilitate economic rehabilitation. Comments made by the Director-General of the National Rural Police, Saitô Noboru, in May 1949 demonstrated the shallowness of the police's commitment to restraint in the field

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ ATIS Translation, dated 14/4/49: General Passengers can Refuse Baggage Inspection - Summary, Jiji Shinpô (9/4/49) [GS(B) 02281].

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Following the implementation of the Police Law in 1948, Japan's national police system was decentralised.

⁹⁰ ATIS Translation, dated 5/5/49: Removal of Passengers in Police Train Checkups Banned - Full trans. from Yomiuri Shinbun, 3/5/49 (Sendai dispatch) [GS(B) 02281].

⁹¹ Ibid.

of economic regulation. Although he stated that passengers would no longer be forced to alight from trains, he added that "violations of regulations concerning transport of staple foodstuffs were so numerous that the police had to resort to this practice" regardless of the inconvenience caused.⁹² Saitô's assurance that the police would not re-employ such methods providing that there was no increase in the number of economic violations⁹³ suggested that things would in fact continue much as before.

The Treatment of Detainees

The harassment experienced by Japanese citizens, forced to submit to such control measures as "spot checks", was a minor inconvenience when compared to the rough treatment of those held in police custody. Although there were cases of policemen resorting to violence against prisoners, the more common charge was neglect of prisoners rather than active abuse. Prevailing economic conditions and the inability of Occupation personnel to constantly monitor developments throughout Japan made a mockery of directives that supposedly ushered in a new era of tolerance and freedom. For example, the Civil Liberties Directive, issued in October 1945, prohibited "the physical punishment and mistreatment of all persons detained...under any and all Japanese enactments, laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations", and added that "all such persons will receive at all times adequate sustenance".⁹⁴ However, Occupation personnel who visited police stations and lock-up facilities during 1946 found that detainees were enduring appalling privations, and that police chiefs were still arrogating too much power to themselves, particularly with regard to the release of prisoners. What was particularly disturbing was that many of those detained had committed only minor offences, usually relating to the possession of black market food.

In August, 1946, two PSD police administrators, Gabrielson and

⁹² ATIS Translation, dated 10/5/49, Item 19: Police Halt Detrainment of Passengers for Food Check - Mainichi Shinbun 10/5/49 [GS(B) 02281].

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Political Reorientation of Japan, Appendix B: 2d, p.464.

Whitlock, inspected six police stations in Osaka. They found "sanitary conditions (to be) in a deplorable state", and contended that the overall situation had deteriorated rather than improved since their previous visit. Whitlock listed a number of problems that justified regular monitoring of police facilities in the area. They were as follows: there was evidence of brutal treatment of prisoners; cells were overcrowded; children were confined with adults; there was insufficient light and ventilation, and "obnoxious smells" in all the cells; prisoners with communicable diseases, usually scabies, were not kept separate from others; detainees were not permitted to take physical exercise; there was a lack of medical care; and, lastly, a large percentage of detainees, guilty of minor offences such as theft, were confined for more than thirty days pending trial. Such prisoners were effectively on remand. Once they were moved to detention centres or prisons following trial, they ceased to be the responsibility of the police. Overcrowding in police cells reflected the high number of offences and the inadequate supply of prison facilities, but more significant was the inability of Japanese courts to dispose of cases quickly and efficiently. The latter was particularly marked "in July and August when top officials stop(ped) working at noon daily". Whitlock complained of a lack of initiative on the part of police station chiefs and the absence of a proper framework of supervision and inspection by Occupation personnel. He called for a clean-up campaign to include all police stations and recommended frequent spot checks by military government officers and tactical commanders.⁹⁵

In Fukuoka, Kyûshû, Whitlock catalogued similar problems to the ones he had found in Osaka. Police lock-ups were extremely crowded - there were 174 detainees crammed into 15 cells, each measuring 8' by 9' by 9'.⁹⁶ Six inmates had been held for more than 60 days, including one, Uehara Tadao, who had been languishing in gaol for 130 days.⁹⁷ The length of detention in gaols was a recurrent theme in memoranda addressed to Pulliam. In October, 1946, Whitlock

⁹⁵ Memo dated 27/8/46; To: Chief, PSD; From: M. W. Whitlock; Subject: Report of Inspection of Police Facilities in Osaka Prefecture, 19-20 Aug. 46 (G-2 00228).

⁹⁶ Memo dated 27/8/46; To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection of Fukuoka Police Station, 11 Aug. 46 (G-2 00228).

⁹⁷ Ibid.

reported that visits to police installations in Osaka, Kôbe, Fukuoka, Kumamoto and Oita prefectures revealed that economic offences accounted for the majority of detainees.⁹⁸ He maintained that minor first offences were poorly handled, many such cases provoking a ten to twenty day detention period when "it (was) obvious that they could be cleared in five days maximum".⁹⁹ What made matters worse was that first offenders were accommodated with hardened criminals,¹⁰⁰ a situation that assisted the development of criminal associations. Gabrielson warned that "juveniles (were) held for many days with adults (under investigation) for felonies", and recommended separation despite the lack of facilities.¹⁰¹ He too maintained that detention periods were too long, usually from thirty to sixty days and sometimes up to 120 days, the delays reflecting lethargic investigations.¹⁰²

Following visits to prefectural police headquarters in Fukuoka, Kagoshima, Oita, Osaka and Kyoto, Gabrielson blamed "inspectors lax in their duties" for filthy conditions in stations and gaols.¹⁰³ The latter "(hadn't) been cleaned in months and the stench coming from cells was unbearable".¹⁰⁴ Police chiefs denied wilful neglect, complaining that it was impossible to obtain disinfectant.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, they claimed that the poor health of detainees reflected serious shortages of food and medicine, and could not be attributed to their own indifference. Nevertheless, Whitlock noted that none of those questioned in Fukuoka police station could remember a doctor visiting the gaol, despite the fact that several prisoners were clearly in need of medical attention.¹⁰⁶ Police station chiefs generally seem to have cared little for the spirit of Occupation

⁹⁸ Civil Intelligence Section, 29/10/46; Subject: Report of Inspection, 16 Oct. - 28 Oct.; To: Chief, PSD; From: M. W. Whitlock (G-2 00227).

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Memo dated 28/8/46; To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection Trip, 4 Aug. - 9 Aug., 46 (G-2 00228).

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Memo dated 27/8/46; To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection of Fukuoka Police Station, 11 Aug. 46 (G-2 00228).

directives, which circumscribed their powers whilst promoting the rights of detainees. For example, in October 1946 the chief of Kuki police station, Saitama prefecture, was questioned as to his authority to continue holding one Sakimei Hideo, who had been taken into police custody on the 24th August, 1946.¹⁰⁷ His response demonstrates that the police had learnt to live with new legal constraints:

...theoretically the man is released each morning...legally the police are not authorised to detain an individual past sunrise...entry of release and rearrest is made in the records each day.¹⁰⁸

It transpired that Kuki police had completed their investigations as far as possible, but were waiting for information requested from other police stations. Thus, the procurator had not been notified as to Sakimei's arrest, detention or the charges against him, and no report had been forwarded to prefectural headquarters.¹⁰⁹ The chief of Kuki police station also considered it within his power to release suspects, whether or not there was sufficient evidence against them. Resistance to such unilateral action was only possible with cases of major importance, when notification of arrest preceded completion of investigation.¹¹⁰

The Valentine Report stated in 1946 that "the existing and legalised system of detention by the police is medieval in character, (and) at variance with democratic principles of due process of law...". It highlighted the two themes of this section - the mistreatment of detainees and the absence of effective legal safeguards. The authors' description is indeed a stark one:

(The system) places in common cells the criminal with juvenile delinquents, as well as orphans, the homeless, the lost, those mentally ill or those physically incapacitated who are held in protective custody. Persons detained are not entitled to bail, may be held for long periods of time without notification of the charges against them, and have no right of communication with friends or counsel by telephone or mail. Medical attention is not available for the sick and injured and inadequate

¹⁰⁷ Memo dated 4/10/46; To: Chief, PSD; From: J. F. Nealon; Subject: Police Authority to Detain or Release (G-2 00238).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

ventilation and sanitation, plus overcrowding in detention cells, breeds epidemics.¹¹¹

Above all the Occupation authorities were concerned with the police's attitude to detainees, their disregard for basic human rights. However, the temporary imprisonment of suspects in police gaols was considered a legitimate practice, providing it was properly regulated. Such recognition was not extended, as has been stated, to the police's economic role. Likewise, "census" activities were deemed unacceptable by American reformers, concerned as they were with restricting the scope of police control and promoting civil liberties.

Neighbourhood Surveillance

The Valentine Report called for many functions to be removed from police control, one of which was "the responsibility for taking and keeping the census, and the collection of information on living conditions".¹¹² Those activities that involved questioning people or their neighbours/acquaintances about private matters were subsumed under the heading "census", a term that usually denotes the collection of routine information (eg. address, occupation etc.) for both operational and statistical purposes. American reformers were disturbed by the kind of information sought by Japanese policemen, often of little *direct* relevance to crime prevention, and the manner in which it was collected. It was felt that policemen were too inquisitive, that they were constantly intruding into people's "private" lives. As one Japanese official put it, there were two issues involved, one a justification of the police's role as public monitors - the need to protect life and property and prevent crime - the other a rejection of census activities - the existence of fundamental human rights, which were not to be violated by the police.¹¹³ With regard to the latter, the Occupation elevated the

¹¹¹ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report, p.5.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Report on Actual State of Census Taking; To: Harrison, Police Administrator; From: National Rural Police; undated - given the dates on accompanying documents it can be assumed that it was written in 1950 (NARA, Suitland, Box No.334, File 35).

notion of a "peaceful private life",¹¹⁴ a sanctuary that should be protected from public interference. It was not surprising that attempts to separate "private" and "public" spheres of activity, a distinction of vital importance in the United States, met with frustration in Japan, where the two are not seen as mutually exclusive.

In October, 1949, Makoto Matsukata reported that enquiries were being made of Government Section that suggested that the police were constantly checking on those in their respective jurisdictions, questioning individuals themselves, or their neighbours, about their personal affairs and social activities.¹¹⁵ Such practices were "considered by progressive citizens to be outside the jurisdiction of police affairs". It transpired that families were still required "to carry out the regular spring and fall housecleaning", and that policemen were still enforcing measures concerned with fire prevention. This was in spite of the fact that the police had been formally deprived of such duties. Whilst they were legally entitled to question families and individuals "to further criminal investigation", the usual excuse for asking about personal/household affairs was its supposed contribution to "crime prevention". Census activities, representing a proactive rather than a reactive approach to crime, were justified by the assumption that "the majority of citizens are potential criminals".

Matsukata obtained translations of both Yamaguchi prefecture's regulations with regard to crime prevention¹¹⁶ and those of Tokyo metropolitan police concerning routine investigations within police boxes and stations.¹¹⁷ In the former, it was stated that the purpose of census taking was "to build up a picture of local inhabitants" in order to facilitate "the smooth execution of police duties". Policemen, it was stressed, should update their records at least once every four months, the frequency of review procedures

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Report entitled Police Surveillance of the Population; dated 11/10/49 [GS(B) 02270]. This is the source for the remainder of the paragraph unless otherwise stated.

¹¹⁶ Based on those of National Rural Police central HQ.

¹¹⁷ Report entitled Police Surveillance of the Population, dated 11/10/49 - the main source for the remainder of the paragraph.

increasing or decreasing according to the wishes of the chief of the police station. Regulations enumerating the duties of the Crime Prevention Section listed items of a personal nature to be investigated during census (Section 3, article 99) and cautioned that certain matters "shall be examined secretly" (article 100). The latter were as follows: character and conduct in the past and present; living standard; commitment to occupation; criminal involvement; acquaintances; tidiness of accommodation. Whilst preliminary studies of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police regulations suggested little correspondence with those of Yamaguchi prefecture, closer inspection revealed a great deal of common ground - "the handbook containing these regulations ha(d) an appendix which outline(d) the old census procedures". Tokyo's police manual is a fitting metaphor for the Occupation as a whole - it seemed (from reading the title page and opening chapters) that advances had been made, but more penetrating study (of the footnotes and appendices) revealed retrogressive steps.

Our determined investigator, Matsukata, persisted until his suspicions were confirmed. He visited several police stations in the Tokyo area with a police inspector, and examined several census books, all of which contained only routine information (name, date of birth, occupation and income).¹¹⁸ In each police box there were two or more officials "engaged in compiling an accurate census".¹¹⁹ Above all, it was the information sanctioned by the above articles, 99 and 100, that preoccupied Matsukata, anxious to demonstrate intrusive behaviour on the part of the police. He visited a police box in a residential area and interviewed a policeman, asking him questions about the people in his area. It transpired that policemen, perhaps deliberately, did not write everything down:

Although no record of pertinent points was kept in his notebook, he had all the necessary information at his disposal concerning the personal affairs of individuals and families...He felt it was his responsibility to know about everything that went on in his area even if he did not transmit this information to higher HQ.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

The action taken to restrict surveillance activities showed little regard for Matsukata's perseverance. In March, 1950, a PSD police investigator stated that meetings had been held with Superintendent Nakano, Chief of the Control and Traffic Section (National Rural Police headquarters) "with a view to making the 'police census' a voluntary procedure".¹²¹ Surprisingly, the Police branch had accepted assurances that "comprehensive survey of police jurisdictions (was) necessary, given an inadequate house numbering system and a lack of proper communications throughout the country".¹²² In August of the same year a public relations programme, utilising newspapers and radio broadcasts, informed the Japanese people that they did not have to cooperate with policemen engaged in census-taking.¹²³ The system, however, was not rendered harmless by reassuring comments in the press. Everybody knew that answering the police's questions would be far less problematic than incurring their disapproval by refusing to cooperate. "Voluntary census" was a face-saving formula, considered inadequate by those responsible for it. This much is clear from the qualification that accompanied it - "when a simplified numbering system is inaugurated (it hasn't happened yet) it will be unnecessary for police to maintain voluntary census".¹²⁴

Japanese police continued to monitor developments not only in the home but also in the workplace. Again the Occupation authorities were concerned at the police's failure to confine their activities to legitimate police functions, despite directives to that effect issued early in the Occupation. In 1950 the Economic and Scientific Section stated that "police officials (were) making surveys of employment conditions and issuing public reports as to the employment situation".¹²⁵ An inspection by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, reported in Nihon Keizai on 18th May, 1950, was cited as the most

¹²¹ PSD, Police branch; Memo for the record, dated 27/3/50; To: H. S. Eaton; From: P. E. Harrison; Subject: Police Census (NARA, Suitland, Box No.334, File 35).

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ PSD, Police branch; Memo dated 5/8/50; To: Chief Police Administrator; From: P. E. Harrison; Subject: Newspaper Comments re. Voluntary Census (Box No.334, File 35).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Check sheet, undated (1950); From: ESS; To: G-2; Subject: Police Survey of Employment Conditions (G-2 00703).

recent example.¹²⁶ "Such activity appear(ed) to be a carry-over from....wartime....when police were in charge of public employment offices....".¹²⁷ Given the traditional ties between employers and policemen, it was clearly detrimental to the interests of the workforce to allow resumption of any practices relating to employment conditions. Thus, ESS requested G-2 to direct the various police forces to discontinue such surveys.¹²⁸

Although the Occupation had set up alternative agencies to administer public employment programmes and to gather and analyse data on employment conditions,¹²⁹ these did not eclipse the police. It was the Occupation's ambivalence more than anything else that permitted the police to retain powers that had formally been transferred to others. For example, the OSS report on the Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation stated that, although it was "logical" to confer responsibility for safety laws on Welfare Ministry personnel, it was beneficial to all concerned when there was a government official, combining awareness of factory conditions with permanent proximity to the establishment concerned (ie. the local policeman).¹³⁰ Such inconsistency paled into insignificance beside the ambivalence exhibited when many Japanese citizens took to the streets to agitate for larger rations and higher wages.

Strikes and Demonstrations

The Occupation authorities acknowledged that the Japanese police had a duty to preserve the peace.¹³¹ There was never any question that this was a legitimate and necessary police activity. Rather like

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid. These were the Employment Security Bureau of the Labour Ministry, the prefectural Employment Security sections and local Public Employment Security Offices.

¹³⁰ R&A Report No.2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" (28/9/45), p.58.

¹³¹ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Special Report, Metropolitan Police Planning Group, dated 17/5/46, p.3.

in the case of detainees, it was the behaviour of the police, their motivation, that preoccupied the reformers in GHQ. Restraint and neutrality were to be the new watchwords, ensuring that the police served the people rather than their traditional overlords. Occupation officials realised that only by carefully circumscribing the role of the police vis à vis industrial disputes and demonstrations would it be possible to strike a balance between the maintenance of law and order and respect for civil liberties. For example, there was a need for rules and regulations that would facilitate control of "parades (and) street meetings without infringing the constitutional right of free speech".¹³²

Traditionally biased towards the interests of employers, the police were forbidden to intervene in conflicts between management and labour, except in cases where violence was being used by either side. Although it was generally accepted that this ban was being upheld, poor liaison between reformers in SCAP and military figures working in the field, together with differing attitudes and perceptions, meant that there was always a discrepancy between GHQ's claims and the testimony of the Japanese people. Early on in the Occupation, the police response to street meetings or industrial action was closely monitored by an Occupation determined to allow the seeds of democracy to germinate. However, the rapid expansion of labour unions and the increasing influence of the communist party, both made possible by widespread popular resentment, produced an explosion of conflict on the streets and in the workplace that alarmed the Occupation. The Japanese people, like the police before them, were then ordered to exercise self-restraint.

In November 1945, following the promulgation of the Civil Liberties Directive, the Japanese Government was directed to train the police "to keep order by wisdom and example rather than by force and intimidation...".¹³³ Around the same time, the Crime Prevention Section of the Public Safety Bureau warned that the food crisis would be accompanied by an escalation of mass movements.¹³⁴

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Summations, No.2 (Nov. 45), p.36.

¹³⁴ Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated (Folder title - Police General and Prefectural, Book 1, 11/45 - 11/46) [NDL, G-2

Although the police intended to avoid "oppressive action" against demonstrators, their tolerance was contingent on "orderly performance".¹³⁵ It was admitted that policemen were "never completely successful unless supported by the public, (but they were) determined to apply strict control in any case".¹³⁶

On January 10, 1946, C. V. Cadwell, representing the Office of the Provost Marshal, stated that "no orderly meetings or parades....will be broken up by force".¹³⁷ He stressed the need for patience and tolerance when dealing with unauthorised demonstrations.¹³⁸ However, his intended audience, the American military police (MP), saw demonstrators as an unruly mob, as a portent of instability and chaos, rather than a symptom of democratisation. On December 8, 1945, military police had broken up a protest rally in Matsuyama, in southern Kyûshû, and then had denied entering the fray. "A crowd of 1000 Japanese (had) gathered in front of the City Hall to protest inequities in the distribution of food and clothing" - they had no quarrel with the Occupation authorities, some of whom happened to be living in the building.¹³⁹ On 7 April, 1946, unsuccessful attempts to control a large crowd ¹⁴⁰ outside the premier's residence in Tokyo culminated in "skirmishes...all over the yard".¹⁴¹ The Japanese police retreated, waved their pistols menacingly at the demonstrators, and then waited for reinforcements before resuming the offensive - "one of the policemen opened fire, and others followed".¹⁴² However, it was left to the American military police to disperse the crowd. "They were armed with nightsticks, and they beat the demonstrators on the backs and buttocks".¹⁴³ The Japanese police must have relished such actions on the part of the American military, a

00226].

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Memo to: Provost Marshals of Tokyo, Yokohama; Subject: Unauthorised Mass Meetings or Parades [GS(B) 00244].

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ M. Gayn, *Japan Diary* (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.17.

¹⁴⁰ According to *Summation* No. 7 (April 46), p.51, the 30,000 demonstrators involved were "members of leftist political groups".

¹⁴¹ M. Gayn, *Japan Diary*, p.165.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p.166.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.167.

welcome contrast to the unsympathetic attitude of those formulating policy in GHQ.

May day rallies, attended by 300,000 in Tokyo alone, marked the beginning of a month when "popular mass demonstrations increased in size and frequency".¹⁴⁴ On May 1, 1946, demonstrators, congregating outside the Imperial Palace, the premier's residence, the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police Board and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, "demanded increased food rations, exposure of hoarded food....and the creation of a united workers' front to assume the reins of government".¹⁴⁵ On May 16 "thousands of railroad workers...forced their way into the compound of the premier's residence, but were driven out by Japanese policemen, aided by our MPs".¹⁴⁶ Following the failure of extra-parliamentary action, a delegation was dispatched to the Diet to demand "better wages, better rations, and a better government".¹⁴⁷ As many as 250,000 people participated in mass meetings and demonstrations on May 19th, culminating in a "sit-down strike" outside Yoshida's residence.¹⁴⁸ This explosion of popular agitation seems to have confirmed suspicions in GHQ that "labour in general, and especially the Communists, (were) getting out of hand".¹⁴⁹ The following day, General MacArthur found it necessary "to caution the Japanese people that the growing tendency toward mass violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organised leadership, present a grave menace to the future development of Japan".¹⁵⁰ He continued as follows:

While every possible rational freedom of democratic method has been permitted and will be permitted....the physical violence which undisciplined elements are now beginning to practise will not be permitted to continue. They constitute a menace not only to orderly government but to the basic purposes and security of the Occupation itself. If minor elements....are unable to exercise such self-restraint....as

¹⁴⁴ Summations, No.8 (May 46), p.37.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.222.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p.230.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.223.

¹⁵⁰ GHQ, United States Armed Forces, Pacific; Public Relations Office; For Immediate Release, dated 20/5/46: General MacArthur today issued the following statement which warns against demonstrations and disorders by mass mobs (NDL, G-2 00244).

the....conditions require, I shall be forced to take the necessary steps to remedy such a deplorable situation.¹⁵¹

What the Supreme Commander failed to realise was that Japan's "orderly government" was making no effort to ensure equitable distribution of food, thus provoking "minor elements" (demonstrators with legitimate complaints) to resort to violent extra-parliamentary methods of protest. Of course the communists were involved, and were just as capable of deceit as the Japanese government, but what mattered most was that the Occupation had not heeded the predominantly economic grievances of ordinary Japanese (eg. the charge that government officials and private citizens were involved in concealing hoarded food).¹⁵² As for the basic purposes of the Occupation, these were constantly undermined by the very regime it was endorsing.

The conservative governments, headed by Shidehara and Yoshida, sought to protect the interests of big business, conceding as little ground as possible to unionised labour. Demoralised and uncertain about the future, business circles opted for defensive measures, concerned with self-preservation rather than Japan's economic rehabilitation. "Big business began a general retrenchment as a hedge against the troubled days ahead", closing production facilities and hoarding stocks of essential commodities.¹⁵³ Labour responded by "seizing" their workplaces, by securing "production control" (seisan kanri). "In sum the sit-down by the zaibatsu had created conditions which required worker occupation and operation of factories if their twin demands for jobs and production were to be met".¹⁵⁴ Although their commitment to production suited the Occupation, their attitude to property rights caused concern. The Ministry of Home Affairs, acknowledging that there was "confusion" amongst American officials as to the legality of "production control", instructed the police to conduct "thorough, secret

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Summations, No.5 (Feb. 46), p.43.

¹⁵³ J. B. Moore, "Production Control: Workers' Control in Early Postwar Japan", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars Vol.17, No.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1985) p.5. See also J. B. Moore, Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945-1947 (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1983).

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p.6.

investigations to detect crimes, (but to be) very careful not to be misunderstood and accused of interfering in labour disputes".¹⁵⁵ The offices of the Yomiuri Shinbun, the third largest newspaper in Japan, witnessed the first "production control" strike on 27 October, 1945.¹⁵⁶ The dispute was a complex one - what began as a battle between management and labour over editorial control became a vicious intra-union conflict, which culminated in the rejection of the communists. Their fate was sealed by a conversation between Brigadier General Frayne Baker, the GHQ Public Relations Officer, and Baba Tsunego, the paper's publisher. The former, acting on information he had received indirectly from Yoshida, encouraged the latter to take action against disobedient editors under Communist Party control.¹⁵⁷ Thus began a train of events that led to a police raid on the Yomiuri building on 21st June, 1946. Theodore Cohen, the chief of the Labour Division, witnessed the arrest of 56 employees by 150 policemen. He was clearly appalled by what he saw:

While we were doing our best to remove police from labour affairs....only a block away truckloads of police were arresting dozens of workers in a labour dispute with no pretence of having to restore law and order....The number of arrests was the largest ever at one time in a labour dispute in Japan's history....To arrest fifty-six persons in order to catch four, or even six, certainly smelled strongly of intimidation....The new democratic police were outdoing the old.¹⁵⁸

Only four communists, charged with trespass, were detained for more than a few hours.¹⁵⁹ When Mr. Cohen later secured their temporary release so that they could attend a meeting, he found that they had been subjected to "unnecessarily harsh police treatment - they had been held incommunicado for a week, one had a bad chest bruise, and now they had showed up manacled like a chain gang".¹⁶⁰

On October 16th, 1946, George Atcheson, who represented the US in

¹⁵⁵ Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated (Folder title - Police General and Prefectural, Book 1, 11/45 - 11/46) [NDL, G-2 00226].

¹⁵⁶ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan (The Free Press, New York, 1987), p.241.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 247-9.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp.249-50.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p.249.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.255.

the Allied Council for Japan, declared that the aims of the Japanese "have become virtually identical with Allied aims".¹⁶¹ The joint action taken by Japanese police and American MPs against striking radio workers on 5th October certainly suggested a convergence of views with regard to union demands.¹⁶² When "a procession of sympathetic unions marched by the Yomiuri building", they were treated to another display of US-Japanese cooperation:

...a hundred Japanese policemen and a unit of American MPs had gone into action. The procession was orderly. Then suddenly armed men were upon it, pushing the demonstrators, seizing the posters, breaking up the parade.¹⁶³

Restraint was now expected of the demonstrators rather than the police, who revelled in the support of Occupation units. Growing in confidence, the Japanese police actively suppressed protest rallies, disregarding SCAP directives and constitutional provisions concerned with civil liberties. Above all, it was the tacit support of Occupation sections concerned with intelligence and security that encouraged the police to trust to their instincts as far as civil unrest was concerned. The strong community of interest between Japanese and American law enforcement agencies encouraged close liaison between the two. Alliances forged at the local level throughout Japan had little regard for the reforming ambitions of those in Tokyo, preferring to concentrate on maintaining law and order in their respective localities. Social and political stability were seen as the necessary preconditions for economic recovery, which increasingly eclipsed democratisation as the guiding principle of Occupation policy after 1947.

The conviction that the role of the police as guarantors of law and order should be strictly circumscribed gave way to a feeling that widespread demonstrations and strikes, and the perceived threat of a communist revolution, demanded a strong, confident police force, willing to act on its own initiative. Thus, efforts were made to ensure that the police restricted the activities of demonstrators and strikers, and to make clear to the Japanese people that they did so

¹⁶¹ W. MacMahon Ball, Japan, Enemy or Ally?, (Cassell, Melbourne, 1948), p.49.

¹⁶² M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.332.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p.333.

with American backing. Distracted by the Communist Party's involvement in rallies and parades, the Occupation disregarded the demonstrators' complaints and grievances. If those in GHQ had investigated the allegations made against the Japanese Government, they would have found many of them to be well-founded (eg. the charge that scarce commodities were being hoarded by the ruling class). Although the actions of Yoshida's administration were compounding the grave economic situation and thus fomenting political unrest, it received the support of the Occupation - the inevitable consequence of governing through Japanese agencies. Whilst the political role of the police was permitted to expand, breaking out of the confines imposed at the beginning of the Occupation, the shrinkage of their economic and social role was prevented by a pervasive black market and marked increases in the incidence of crime. MacArthur's claim that the Japanese police were undergoing a metamorphosis - from masters to servants of the people - was clearly not shared by those whose newly-won civil liberties were disregarded by officials supposedly accountable to them. As will be made clear in the next chapter, the traditional ties that bound the police to the Japanese establishment remained intact, strengthened rather than weakened by the experience of Occupation.

CHAPTER FOUR

SERVING THE OLD GUARD

In 1946 a survey of police organisation and operation in Japanese cities contended that "the police system (at the time of Occupation)...enhanced the political welfare of personnel in control of the government".¹ This state of affairs was seen as unacceptable by those Americans charged with reforming Japan. They were determined, at least at the outset of Occupation, to create a police *service* that was properly accountable to the public. In order to effect such a change it was necessary to first dissolve the traditional ties that existed between the police and the Japanese establishment. Given the circumstances of the Japanese police system's creation, its close association with the ruling class and the post-surrender weakness of policemen, both in terms of physical health and social standing, it is not surprising that the Occupation's attempt to turn policemen away from their traditional overlords met with stiff resistance and ultimately failure. The root of the problem was the enduring connection between the police and the rulers of Japan, a relationship of mutual convenience that became even stronger during a period of economic scarcity and Occupation by a foreign power.

According to George De Vos and Keiichi Mizushima, "the overt exercise of power is often, though covertly, related to officially illegal groups".² This was certainly the case in Occupation Japan. Socio-economic dislocation stimulated the growth of criminal organisations that provided a shelter for those incapable of surviving alone, a substitute, albeit a poor one, for family support. Perceived more as relief organisations than criminal groupings, they were able to reach an accommodation with both the police and conservative politicians. The Japanese term used by the Americans to describe this network of "gangs" was oyabun-kobun system, a

¹ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report (17/5/46) p.1.

² G. De Vos and K. Mizushima, "Organisation and Social Function of Japanese Gangs: Historical Development and Modern Parallels", in R. P. Dore, ed., Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1967) p.290.

label that captured their pseudo-familial character.³ Oyabun exercised considerable power due to their control of black market commodities and their ability to service the needs of the Occupiers (principally with regard to building contracts). The triangular relationship that existed between the police, conservative politicians and criminal oyabun will be examined in this chapter, along with the consequences of their mutual dependence. By 1947 many Americans in Japan had begun to grasp the immensity of the task they had set themselves. The misgivings of those in the Public Safety division essentially derived from four interrelated problems that suggested a close relationship between the police and the establishment, one that was at the expense of the Japanese people. These were as follows: the mystery of the Japanese military supplies; the oyabun-kobun system; informal financing of the police through "contributions"; and the tale of Suzuki Eiji, Osaka police chief, whose campaigns against the black market were a little too effective.

The Disappearance of Surplus Military Supplies

During the course of 1947 a scandal broke that implicated the government and bureaucracy of Japan. It concerned the disappearance of vast quantities of food, clothing and industrial material, accumulated by the Japanese armed forces for the final defence of the home islands. In direct contravention of U.S. orders following acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese government had encouraged the wholesale plunder of these stocks, ensuring that they became the property of those sections of Japanese society that had traditionally constituted "the ruling class" or "establishment". Admittedly, such terminology is imprecise, disregarding the disruptive effects of war and defeat, the blurring of boundaries between socio-economic groups. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that although social distinctions were undermined by defeat, it was the military services that absorbed the shock, their demise ensuring that other dominant interests in Japan would survive the twin threats of defeat and occupation.

³ Joy Hendry translates oyabun/kobun as parent-part/child-part.

The "ruling class", or "old guard", was composed of diverse elements, most benefitting from prevailing conditions, but doing so in a covert manner, lying low, at least during the first two years of Occupation, in the face of hostile American directives. These labels encompass the various components of what the Occupiers referred to as "feudal Japan" - that is to say military leaders, conservative politicians, those active in the extension of zaibatsu interests, neighbourhood bosses and gangsters - in short, those who had most to gain from obstruction or dilution of policies promoting democratisation. Both the weight of tradition and the exigencies of post-surrender Japan ensured that the interests of the Japanese police would continue to be tied to those of the old guard. The significance of the military supplies derived from their use as a powerful economic weapon. Those that controlled them, gradually releasing them into black market channels, continued to dominate their respective communities, generously rewarding those in positions of power, particularly policemen, who chose not to expose their providers' illegal activities. Thus, there is much to recommend Theodore Cohen's contention that from the beginning "the property of the nation as a whole was skewed, in effect, to restore the old regime".⁴

It is possible that the scandal would not have come to light had it not been for the ceaseless efforts of one Sekô Kôichi, a Liberal party politician representing the second electoral district of Wakayama prefecture. He was determined, in the melodramatic words of one American journalist, "to plead boldly the rights of oppressed wage-earners and taxpayers,.....to reveal how the cards were being stacked against the people".⁵ Appointed Parliamentary Vice Minister of Home Affairs in 1946, he used what had previously been an inert position to actively pursue those engaged in the concealment and sale of hoarded military supplies. From February to April 1947 he was vice

⁴ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (Free Press, New York, 1987) p.347. Theodore Cohen, assigned as an adviser to Government Section, quickly rose to Chief of the Labour Division. After about a year and a half he was transferred to the Economic and Scientific Section, where he advised General Marquat.

⁵ William Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism in Postwar Japan (Itagaki Shoten, Tokyo, 1948) p.149.

chairman of the Hoarded Goods Committee, set up at his own insistence, which, although lacking authority, was used to endorse his seizure of illegal stocks. In May 1947 Sekô claimed that army stocks to the value of at least 100 billion yen were being hoarded secretly at a time when they were desperately needed for economic reconstruction.⁶

Following accusations made against several members of the new Katayama cabinet, an investigation committee, the first of its kind, was established to uncover hoarded goods and to expose politicians involved in black market activities. Headed by the socialist Katô Kanjû, it was the product of a growing realisation that large quantities of essential materials were being concealed throughout Japan. Widespread investigations by members of the committee and officials of the Economic Stabilisation Board indicated that the hoarded goods represented a major source of black market supplies, and, more interestingly, that profits from illegal transactions were being used to finance "political manipulations".⁷ The report of the Special Committee for Investigation of Concealed and Hoarded Goods, or Katô committee, stated that probes into the location of hidden goods "encountered formidable opposition in various quarters" and were obstructed by "government officials and persons in various classes of society".⁸ Such accusations against the executive endorsed the promotion of Katô's committee by Colonel Kades of Government section, who saw it as an instrument for increasing the Diet's power vis à vis other institutions of government.⁹ In its report the committee referred to Sekô's reservations concerning the commitment of many local officials to the exposure of concealed materials; his comments regarding the police are particularly interesting:

I made certain that no exposure could take place without the cooperation and certification of the local police...However I was not successful in

⁶ Source for information concerning Sekô's claims and investigation of hoarded goods: T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, pp. 338-9.

⁷ Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan, No.27 (Dec. 1947), p. 23.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.339.

obtaining the cooperation of local police....Instead, I encountered active resistance and non-cooperation.¹⁰

The circumstances surrounding the dispersion of military supplies suggest that from the beginning the police knew who the beneficiaries were and where they were hiding their newly-acquired assets. They may even have assisted in further dispersion so as to avoid detection. Cooperation between the police and local elites following Japan's surrender was not surprising given a widespread feeling of dread, or at least unease, at the thought of Occupation by a foreign power.

On August 14 1945, following Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the cabinet of Admiral Suzuki Kantarô decided to distribute quickly all war goods possessed by the army and navy. According to the Katô committee report on hoarded goods, the cabinet "wilfully misinterpreted....Allied instructions...(and) deliberately chose to understand that only arms and ammunition should be handed over to the Allies and that all other war goods could be disposed of freely".¹¹ On 15 August the Japanese Army issued Secret Instruction No. 363, which implemented the cabinet's decision. Paragraph 1 read as follows:

As a principle, war goods, materials and facilities for producing war goods should not be disposed of free of charge, but in the case of deliveries to local governments etc., these goods can be delivered free of charge. In other cases where goods are sold it is not necessary that payment be made at once.¹²

Given the confusion and chaos that accompanied Japan's acceptance of defeat, it is safe to assume that if payment was not made on receipt of the goods, then their receivers acquired them virtually free of charge. According to the Finance Ministry's ledgers, the sum of money collected by the Japanese Government represented only 0.1% of the stock's value.¹³

¹⁰ Summations, No. 27 (Dec. 1947), p.28.

¹¹ Ibid., p.25.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.153.

Katô Kanjû intimated that the dispersal of military supplies among government organs, public organisations, private factories and private individuals represented an attempt to "curry favour" with the Japanese public, "an effort to bridge the gap...between the people on the one hand and the military forces on the other".¹⁴ On the face of it, the Japanese people were afforded an opportunity to recover their own property; in fact, only those with access to transport and storage facilities could fully exploit the situation. An American journalist, William Costello, whose reliability as a source is confirmed by his unpopularity in Occupation circles, described the "legalised private plunder" in the following terms:

As soon as order No.363 was circulated....trucks, wagons, railroad cars, carts, bicycles and porters swarmed into the arsenals; documents were forged, altered or destroyed. Thousands of tons of finished products, food, textiles, raw materials and machinery were hauled away".¹⁵

According to Theodore Cohen, the army had reserve stocks of uniforms, provisions and equipment sufficient for a defence force of four million men¹⁶ - an indicator of the immensity of the military stores. For fourteen days (15-28 August) the distribution process continued, ensuring that public property was scattered throughout Japan. Although the original order (No. 363) was rescinded at the insistence of the Allies, no real effort was made to reclaim goods that had been removed from government warehouses. Reflecting on these events, the Katô Committee claimed in its report, issued in December 1947, that "the goods thus diverted from their proper channels and the individuals thus enriched have remained throughout the Occupation a cancer threatening the economy of this country".¹⁷ What made matters worse was that those charged with cutting out the cancer permitted it to grow. The committee suspected an accommodation between the hoarders and local governments - "frequently local authorities appear to have connived in legalising the transfer of property to private individuals".¹⁸ Those determined to uncover hoarded goods had to contend with "bureaucratic

¹⁴ Summations, No. 27 (Dec. 1947), p.25.

¹⁵ W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.153.

¹⁶ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.339.

¹⁷ Summations, No. 27 (Dec. 1947), p28.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.30.

sabotage, divided authority, and police collusion with hoarders".¹⁹ Nevertheless, large quantities of food, clothing, fuel, metals and metal products were recovered by the police, presumably at the Occupation's insistence. Colonel Hayes (Government Section) estimated that about 50% of the military stockpiles "civilianised" during the second half of August 1945 disappeared without documentation or records.²⁰ Thus, it can be asserted with confidence that what was retrieved by the authorities represented the tip of the iceberg.

The Japanese police were charged with detecting hoarded commodities and, failing this, preventing their transport and sale on the black market. Surprise raids on storage areas and mobile checkpoints on both roads and railways were the principal means by which the police suppressed illegal commercial transactions. However, their attitude towards prominent black marketeers, as will be made clear later in this chapter, seems to have been a sympathetic one.²¹ Ian Nish, posted to Japan as an interpreter-translator for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, was based in rural Shikoku. He worked with the Japanese police in anti-black market operations, searching warehouses and other centres of hoarding, and implies that the police were less than committed in these activities - "scarcity breeds corruption....and farmers, nôgyô kumiai (agricultural cooperative) leaders and police were under severe temptation".²² When the police took their economic duties seriously, usually at the insistence of the Occupation authorities, the results could be staggering. Figure 9 illustrates monthly levels of detection of illegally-transported staple foods over an eighteen month period. Rather than providing an indicator of black market activity, it is a measure of economic policing. The huge quantity confiscated in December 1947 was "due to increased police vigilance rather than more numerous violations".²³ This is a glimpse,

¹⁹ W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.160.


²⁰ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.341.

²¹ See the next section on the links between the police and criminal oyabun.

²² I. Nish, "Britain and the Occupation of Japan - Some Personal Recollections", Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies Vol.4, Pt.1 (1979) p.157.

²³ Summations, No. 28 (Jan. 1948), p.267.

**Illegally-Transported Staple Foods Confiscated at Railway
Freight Stations and Railway/ Highway Checkpoints**



Source: Summations, No.s 18 (p.209), 19 (p.229), 20 (p.193), 21 (p.204), 22 (p.227), 23 (p.252), 24 (p.222), 25 (p.231), 26 (p.224), 27 (p.266), 28 (p.267), 29 (p.223), 30 (p.239), 31 (p.244), 32 (p.315), 33 (p.252), 34 (p.258).

Figure 9

perhaps, of the real level of black market activity as well as a demonstration of one of the few instances of police effectiveness.

It was easier to detect the movement of black market materials than it was to locate the whereabouts of hoarded supplies, assuming of course that local police were not in league with the hoarders. The Katô Committee concluded that "local government and police officials have both actively and passively interfered with investigations of hoarded and concealed goods and in some cases have conspired with holders of concealed goods to legalise fraudulent transactions".²⁴ Obstruction of the committee's work seems to have been pervasive, "opposition to a fearless and honest exposure of postwar frauds (extending) to all levels of society and government".²⁵ Thus, the mission of both Sekô and Katô was constantly undermined by the fact that too many people, many of them holding positions of power and responsibility, were caught up in the web spun by those who had acquired a substantial quantity of surplus military supplies. Katô went so far as to say that "it isobvious that the rights and interests of the Japanese public...can be protected only by the active intervention and assistance of the Allied Occupation authorities".²⁶ In fact, however, the Americans compounded the problem by instructing the Japanese Home Ministry in October 1945 to distribute the so-called "special goods", those materials initially appropriated by the Occupation force. They were to be used to ameliorate living conditions and revive the economy.²⁷ Given that politicians and bureaucrats had already encouraged the concealment of large amounts of essential commodities, it was not surprising that former Finance Minister Ishibashi complained in 1947 that he could account for only 2 to 3 % of the releases:

Only about 20 million yen or 30 million yen worth of material seemed to have passed through the hands of the Home Ministry and nobody knows where a 100,000 million yen worth (of stocks) has gone to.²⁸

²⁴ *Ibid.*, No.27 (Dec. 1947), p.32.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.25.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ SCAPIN 53, 24/9/1945; Subject: Materials, Supplies and Equipment Received and to be Received from the Japanese Armed Forces.

²⁸ Katô Committee report, Part 3 - Summation No.27, p.31.

Metals and primary metal products were distributed by the Arms Disposal Committee, set up by the Home Ministry and representatives of five zaibatsu concerns (Furukawa Electric, Kôbe Steel, Nippon Steel Tube, Fuso Metals and Nippon Iron and Steel).²⁹ The Katô Committee concluded that the "special goods" had been "improperly distributed" and "no accounting has ever been rendered".³⁰

Costello sensed a "colossal conspiracy", the ramifications of which are impossible to estimate, given that the hidden materials that came to light represented a tiny percentage of what either lay in cold storage or was slowly dribbling into black market channels. Nevertheless, the quantity and nature of hoarded goods recovered by the police give some indication of the contents of the military stores, which were now sustaining the black economy. From February 1946 the Summations quantified and catalogued concealed commodities detected by the police. Generally goods were classified according to whether they constituted foodstuffs, fuel, textile goods or miscellaneous items. The table on page 146 enumerates the amount and nature of durable goods (ie. the last category) recovered during the period February to June 1946.

Japan's physical reconstruction, in terms of both residential and office accommodation, required the maximum use of such items as iron and steel, cement and nails. There is no indication of how much timber, an important building material in Japan, was recovered during this period.³¹ Companies and individuals went to extraordinary lengths to conceal what they had received from the military. A million dollars' worth of machine tools and rubber was stowed at the bottom of Lake Inawashiro, Fukushima prefecture.³² In

²⁹ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.341 (and footnote 39, p.514); W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.154.

³⁰ Katô Committee Report, Part 4 (Conclusions and Recommendations) - Summation No.27(Dec. 47), p.32.

³¹ The original source for the table's contents was the Ministry of Home Affairs; a more accessible one, used in this instance, is Summation No.11 (August 1946) p.200. Reference is made to "lumber" (ie. partly prepared timber) in Summation No.31 (April 1948), when it is disclosed that timber to the value of 1,190,800 yen was uncovered in February 1948 (p.56).

³² Nippon Times, June 23, 1948, p.3.

Okayama City the Nakajima Propeller Company built workshops on top of a store of 80 tons of aluminium, tin, copper wire and sheeting, and scrap iron.³³ One of the Katô Committee's successes was a surprise raid on the Ishihara Gôkin factory, where thirty-two tons of buried silver wire was discovered. Investigation revealed that it had been sold for 890,000 yen, was valued at 80 million yen in September 1947 and would have fetched 800 million yen on the black market.³⁴

Miscellaneous Goods Recovered, February - June 1946

Goods	Unit	Quantity
Electric lamps	piece	346477
Rubber shoes	pair	7402
Nails	cask	61792
Iron plate coated with zinc	sheet	33634
Cement	sack	85938
Pig iron	metric tonne	3729
Steel	metric tonne	60996
Motors	piece average 5 hp	4535
Electric transformers	piece average 5 hp	735
Lathes	piece average 5 hp	146
Electric cord	250 metre rolls	12666
Other machines	piece	19279
Tools	piece	506769

Source: Summations, No.11 , p.200.

Examination of the second category (fuels) over a ten month period (September 1946 - June 1947) reveals the illegal disposition of large amounts of petroleum products, the *sine qua non* for a functioning transport system. One of the weaknesses of the Japanese police, as was stated in Chapter 2, was the poor maintenance of their inadequate stock of motor vehicles. In Figure

³³ Ibid., June 8, 1948, p.3.

³⁴ W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.160.

10 oil-related products, as catalogued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, include crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, automobile benzine, light oil, heavy oil and machine oil.

**Hoarded Oil-Related Products Recovered,
September 1946 - June 1947**




Figure 10

Source: *Summations*, No.s 13 (p.194), 14 (p.236), 15 (p.197), 16 (p.204), 17 (p.221), 18 (p.211), 19 (p.230), 20 (p.195), 21 (p.205), 22 (p.227).

According to Mark Gayn, it was established that the Japanese Army Command in Kyûshû had given its surplus fuel supplies to "big firms, contractors, officers and just friends....when somebody, quite by accident, stumbled on a buried fuel dump".³⁵ Surprise discoveries seem to have been common. A Korean pedlar cannot have improved his prospects when he discovered a hundred tons of raw rubber in a ravine, hidden, the villagers said, on orders from the commander of the local naval base.³⁶ Presumably they felt that the rubber represented a potential source of profit for the whole community.

Local elites were united in their determination to conceal the community's "assets" from the Occupation's intrusive gaze. On

³⁵ M. Gayn, *Japan Diary* (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.124.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

January 2, 1946, Mark Gayn was involved in a raid on a school in Otsuki, a small town in northern Honshû. "Regressive" literature and hoarded supplies were the quarry. Although the hunters acknowledged that surprise was their key weapon, they were actually *invited* to visit the town's two schools by the principals themselves, the police chief and the deputy mayor. The raid was not a complete failure, uncovering some banned books on "ethics" and a small collection of aeroplane instruments. Gayn attached some significance to the find, suggesting to his companion, Lieutenant Hartley, that "if we could find this stuff in a town that was obviously prepared for us, think of the stuff we could find in an unprepared town".³⁷ He had been encouraged to participate in a school raid by the revelations of one Sergeant Finley, whose enthusiasm for surprise searches began when he discovered and destroyed a full-size glider. Deciding to follow up his successful raid, he returned the following day, only to find the teachers digging a big pit, "and right next to it, waiting to be buried, three brand new airplane engines, airplane tools, instruments and a lot of other junk".³⁸

Given the physical condition of large numbers of ordinary Japanese, the burial of machine parts paled into insignificance beside the concealment of food. In January 1946 it was reported that black market operations were widespread, fuelled mainly by foodstuffs and commodities formerly held by the Japanese armed services. According to various prefectural reports, illicit trading in many places was subject to only occasional preventive action by the police.³⁹ The following month the Home Ministry declared that police raids had led to the disclosure of about 60,000 koku⁴⁰ of hoarded rice, wheat and other cereals (enough to provide a daily ration for 28,210,000 people).⁴¹ During the period February to June, 1946, 29,250 tonnes of hoarded staple foodstuffs (rice, wheat, barley and other crops)⁴² were confiscated and diverted to deficit areas. This,

³⁷ Ibid., p.89.

³⁸ Ibid., p.84.

³⁹ Summations, No.4, p.34.

⁴⁰ 1 koku = 0.18 cubic mt./ 180.39 lt./ 5.12 US bushels.

⁴¹ Summations, No.5, p.43.

⁴² Summations, No.11 (Aug. 1946), p.200.

we may be sure, represented a small percentage of the total amount of hidden food stocks. Food was imported from the US to supplement supposedly inadequate domestic supplies.⁴³ *Visible* stocks were certainly insufficient, but the scale of the black market in food suggests that the shortfall could have been made up - at least in part - by vigorous economic policing. The same could be said about textiles, supplies of which far exceeded official estimates. On April 28, 1946, Gayn reported that the first installment of a shipment of cotton had been authorized for export by the US and was on its way to Japan. A total of 890,000 bales were to be donated to Japan "under the magic 'prevention of disease and civil unrest' formula".⁴⁴ At the same time two members of the international Textile Mission informed Gayn that "the canny Japanese had concealed in their warehouses a billion yards of textiles or their equivalent".⁴⁵ In Niigata prefecture alone investigations had uncovered 100,000,000 pounds of hoarded cotton.⁴⁶ During the period February to August, 1946, 30,869,189 yards of textiles were recovered by the police.⁴⁷

An indirect Occupation dictated a degree of trust that was misplaced in the case of the Japanese government. Those in positions of power who benefitted from the surplus military supplies were the very same people who never ceased to warn MacArthur's team of the grave consequences of widespread hunger and social deprivation. Demanding food and textiles to save Japan from disaster, they delegated *their* governmental responsibilities to the Occupation authorities; it was the latter who laboured to ensure an adequate supply of necessities.⁴⁸ The American reformers, initially unaware of the hoards and then unwilling to admit to the deception, sponsored the corrupt conservative regime. Traditional

⁴³ To maintain the staple food ration in June, 1946, 47,867 long tons (1 long ton =1,016.05 kg) of imported foodstuffs were distributed in the Tokyo-Yokohama area and Hokkaidô, Aomori and Yamanashi prefectures (*Summations*, No.9, p.217). Release of imported foods in 20 prefectures during July: 157,435 tonnes of cereals + 17,273 tonnes of canned foods, equivalent to about 25% of total monthly staple food ration requirements for Japan (*Summations*, No.10, p.183).

⁴⁴ *Japan Diary*, pp.192-193.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.193.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Summations*, No.s 11 (p.200) & 12 (p.183).

⁴⁸ M. Gayn, *Japan Diary*, p.465.

economic and political organisations thrived on the surplus military supplies, whilst the privations of the great majority of Japanese were prolonged. The significance of Japan's war stockpiles was assessed by the magazine World Report (later US News and World Report):

The zaibatsu companies, Japan's family monopolies, obtained the largest share of the spoils....If the Japanese Government had obtained full payment for its stockpiles, it would have had enough to cover all budget deficits and Occupation costs since the surrender. As it is, deficit spending and sales of stockpile goods at black market prices have resulted in soaring inflation.⁴⁹

Theodore Cohen claimed that "large segments of the propertied classes, on the verge of being suffocated economically by the defeat, were resuscitated by the distribution of the military stores".⁵⁰ According to the above article in World Report, politicians as well as businessmen were implicated in the scandal - "There is evidence that Japan's ultraconservatives have filled the campaign chest of their Liberal party with some of the fraudulent gains". Writing in 1948, Harry Emerson Wildes, formerly of Government Section, cited examples of collaboration between conservative politicians and black marketeers. He referred to the exposure of a prominent politician by the Asahi Shinbun (26 October 1947):

Hara Susumu, Liberal party executive, told a party caucus in January, 1948, that he had himself received 2,000,000 yen and that the party had been promised a further 10,000,000 yen from Ogawa Heinosuke, president of the International Industrial Economy Company (Kokusai Sangyō Keizai), as part of the proceeds of the sale of army shoes and uniforms illegally disposed of by crooked politicians.⁵¹

Thus, campaign funds often derived from profits made on the black market. Not surprisingly, party records did not disclose the gifts of black marketeers. It was not just the politicians who received money from criminal elements. The police, along with other

⁴⁹ World Report (6/1/1948) - Quoted in R.Textor, Failure in Japan (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1972) pp. 48-49.

⁵⁰ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.346.

⁵¹ H. E. Wildes, "Underground Politics in Postwar Japan", American Political Science Review, 42 (Dec. 1948), p.1153.

governmental agencies, gratefully accepted dirty money, despite the debts they accrued by doing so.⁵²

This section has examined the distribution of the large military stockpiles with only passing reference to the Japanese police. Although responsible for the recovery of illegally-hoarded stocks, the police often were more concerned with prolonging their concealment. Robert Textor, who spent twenty-six months in Japan as a civilian employee of the Occupation, stated that "the police...were living and frequently fattening on the black market".⁵³ By 1947, when investigations began in earnest, many ordinary Japanese had benefitted from the surplus military supplies, either through their sale or consumption. Their disappearance remained a mystery, because "too many people, their relatives, or their friends were involved in some little piece of the action".⁵⁴ Sekô and Katô failed fully to expose the scandal, because the agents of government, particularly the police, were implicated. Economic policing necessarily targeted those whose involvement with the black economy was small-scale; that is to say, ordinary Japanese, who purchased and consumed "yami" materials. Prominent black marketeers, however, were immune from prosecution, because the police were in their debt. The military supplies facilitated the survival and dominance of sections of society that were committed to the old order. As will be made clear in the next two sections, the police, weak and disorientated, looked to these groups for moral and financial support. An accommodation was reached between the old guard and the Japanese police, which constantly frustrated the Occupation's attempts to turn the latter into public servants.

The Oyabun-Kobun System

In 1947 Colonel Kades, deputy head of Government Section, referred to "a massive underground network extending from the smallest rural village to the highest echelons of the national government".⁵⁵

⁵² Examined in Section Three of this chapter.

⁵³ R. Textor, Failure, p.102.

⁵⁴ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.350.

⁵⁵ Quoted in D. E. Kaplan and A. Dubro, Yakuza - The Explosive Account of Japan's Criminal Underworld (Macdonald, London, 1987) p.43.

He cautioned against complaisance, claiming that "this clannish and clandestine combination of bosses, hoodlums, and racketeers is the greatest threat to American democratic aims in Japan".⁵⁶ This shadow government was labelled the oyabun-kobun system by American reformers, more a term of convenience than an accurate characterisation of the situation. The phrase was poorly understood, there being little appreciation of its pervasiveness, and its positive as well as negative connotations. William Costello was endorsing the official line on the oyabun-kobun system when he portrayed it as "a sinister criminal brotherhood",⁵⁷ neglecting to analyse its importance as a peculiarly Japanese pattern of social organisation. Most Americans used the term to denote bossism or gangsterism and were keen to eradicate the system, whereas the Japanese police seemed reluctant to break up social organisations that served the community, albeit through criminal activities. This seeming divergence of interests derived from differing cultural perspectives, the police's weakness vis à vis prevailing socio-economic conditions and the Occupation's failure to appreciate the overwhelming importance of the black market as a lever for political control.

Within the Civil Information and Education Section, GHQ, the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division (SRD) was set up to assist in formulating policies compatible with Japan's traditions. The guiding principle of the Occupation was limited reform rather than sweeping change. Reformers, for the most part, were committed to the modification of existing social and political organisations, although sometimes "adherence to older forms was sensible".⁵⁸ The SRD's research on the oyabun-kobun system recognised "the desirability of reform..., especially in the more exploitative developments (but) acknowledged certain vital functions in an industrialised, overpopulated nation with inadequate programmes of social security".⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Quoted in J. W. Bennett and I. Ishino, Paternalism in the Japanese Economy: Anthropological Studies of Oyabun-Kobun Patterns (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1963) p.283, fn.2.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.26

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Herbert Passin was the first of the SRD staff to try and spread awareness of oyabun-kobun ties. On the 12 September, 1947, at a conference convened to discuss the issue, he tried to explain the pervasiveness, complexity and ramifications of the system to representatives of the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), the Government Section (GS), the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) and the Legal Section (LS). He stated that oyabun-kobun was "a type of relationship that can be applied to a variety of situations",⁶⁰ there being a broad spectrum of organisations engaged in legitimate as well as illegal activities. Occupational diversity was matched by differing levels of organisation, urban groupings proving highly specialised and organised.⁶¹ Although he characterised rural oyabun as more benevolent than their urban counterparts, Passin contended that "gangster outfits...often take better care of their people, promoting a different sort of loyalty".⁶² It was the threat posed to Occupation reforms by "criminal oyabun" that interested the representatives of the various sections. They can have found little consolation in Passin's assurances:

The oyabun-kobun system is not just a system of corrupt, illegal activities...Its essential characteristic lies in the hierarchical relationship between a set of individuals...People normally expect to enter that relationship, because in almost every village for hundreds of years you have had persons of influence assuming this position of control, of authority, of protection....over people of lesser influence and lesser position.⁶³

From 1947, when the Americans first became aware of a web of criminal gangs, they were confused as to the nature of the problem and the best method of suppression. The difficulties experienced by those who sought to eradicate what they saw as a criminal conspiracy derived from the blurred boundary between legitimate commercial concerns and those engaged in illicit activities (very often the former was used as a cover for the latter).

⁶⁰ Minutes of a conference organised by Government Section, 12/9/47, p.5 (NDL, fiche no. G-2 04562).

⁶¹ Ibid., p.2.

⁶² Ibid., p.4.

⁶³ Ibid., p.2.

Problems of enforcement flowed from problems of definition. Whilst most Americans translated oyabun-kobun as "boss-henchman", Herbert Passin and others in the SRD cautioned against oversimplification. Writing twenty years later, he stated that oyabun could be translated in English as lord, master, boss, leader, employer, landowner, protector, and patron; kobun could mean underling, subordinate, henchman, vassal, dependent, protégé, worker, employee, tenant, servant, and client.⁶⁴ This variety of meanings suggests a diversity of attitudes towards oyabun. Whilst a Japanese policeman might have regarded such a figure as a philanthropist, an American reformer more probably would have characterised him as a Japanese Al Capone. In short, one man's gangster was another man's altruist. The Occupation's association of oyabun with the American "godfather" seems to have stuck. Since the Second World War, according to Passin, the term has taken on unpleasant connotations.⁶⁵

In May, 1947, Harry Shupak, a police investigator for the Public Safety Division, produced a report on the "Oyabun System",⁶⁶ in which he identified three types of oyabun organisation: the kashimoto (or bakuto) groups, involved in syndicated gambling; the tekiya or street-stall associations; and the gurentai gangs, composed of thieves and racketeers. The latter were by far the largest and strongest organisations, usually well-armed⁶⁷ and prepared to employ violent, threatening methods where necessary. They financed themselves by exacting tribute from bars, cabarets, dance halls, restaurants and coffee shops in their respective districts, local jurisdictions that they guarded with vigilance. Shupak had had personal experience of the violence that attended gurentai rivalries. In August 1946 he compiled a report concerning gang warfare between the Matsuda gumi, based in the Shinbashi area, a Formosan organisation operating around Shibuya station and

⁶⁴ "Japanese Society", International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 8 (The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, New York, 1968) p.243.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9/5/47; To: Administrator W. G. Fritz. Shupak's sources of information: Japanese merchants; Otsuka Tadaishi - Inspector, MPB (NDL: G-2 04565).

⁶⁷ Shupak suggested that they had access to secret arms caches, abandoned by the military at the end of the Pacific War.

a group of Japanese stall vendors centred on Shinjuku station.⁶⁸ The gangs were fighting for control of market stalls, set up on territory adjacent to busy stations,⁶⁹ where black market commodities could be received and sold. Matsuda Giichi's organisation, like other prominent gangs, could be classified as both gurentai and tekiya, depending on which sphere of operations was being investigated.

Shupak stated that the influence of the gurentai was far greater than the other two systems, both in terms of financial resources and public acquiescence. Anyone wishing to open a business was forced to give a large sum of money to his local oyabun to avoid damage to his property or injury to his person, and thereafter was expected to submit weekly or monthly payments. While one theatre was rumoured to be paying 100,000 yen every month for "protection", the average monthly disbursement from bars was 5,000 to 10,000 yen.⁷⁰ Kobun frequently visited the establishments, collecting payment and usually drinking or eating free of charge. It was estimated that there were about 200 gurentai bosses in Tokyo alone, some of whom had as many as 1,000 kobun.⁷¹ What is most interesting about this type of criminal organisation is its development in the aftermath of war. This suggests that it was a product of the socio-economic dislocation that accompanied defeat, a source of gainful employment for many demobilised soldiers. George De Vos and Keiichi Mizushima, writing in 1967, characterised the gurentai as institutions "without any sense of continuity with the past".⁷² As "modern" forms, their activities and ethos deviated from those of traditional oyabun-kobun organisations.

⁶⁸ "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9/5/47 (NDL, G-2 04565); Summations, No.10 (July 1946) p.39.

⁶⁹ Shinbashi, Shibuya and Shinjuku were/ are mainline stations in Tokyo

⁷⁰ Information concerning tribute and intimidatory tactics comes from Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9/5/47 (NDL, 04565).

⁷¹ Shupak's estimates contained in "Investigation of Oyabun System". Given that he estimates a total of around 10,000 gurentai kobun in Tokyo, a following of less than fifty was probably typical.

⁷² G. De Vos and K. Mizushima, "Organisation and Social Function of Japanese Gangs: Historical Development and Modern Parallels", in R. P. Dore, ed., Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1967) p.301.

In marked contrast, the kashimoto had a long history stretching back to the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). As well as demanding and enforcing payment of fees from gambling houses, kashimoto groups often operated such establishments themselves, together with restaurants and bars. Police administrator William Fritz, who developed some of the themes introduced by Shupak, maintained that in certain districts of metropolitan Tokyo there were higher oyabun, to whom two or three lesser oyabun owed allegiance; they in turn commanded the loyalty of around five kobun.⁷³ Fritz estimated that there were fifty-seven gambling oyabun in metropolitan Tokyo, much the same as before the war, although there were considerably more kobun (around 3,000), the increase "due mainly to the economic situation...and the lack of employment".⁷⁴ Shupak's claim that kashimoto practices incited little violence was contradicted by his colleague, who stated that eighteen out of twenty-one such oyabun in Osaka had previous convictions for murder, assault or intimidation connected with gambling. Further indicating that the three types of "organisation" identified by the Occupation authorities were in fact more useful as a classification of "activities", Fritz stated that "since the cessation of hostilities, many gambling oyabun have extended their field of practice into other fields of illegal operation, such as practised by the gurentai and tekiya organisations".⁷⁵

All three elements of the "oyabun system" were seen as violent and undemocratic by American reformers, although the tekiya fitted less well than the other two into the gangster mould formulated by the Occupation. Composed of merchants'/tradesmen's associations and cooperative unions, their economic significance was not fully realised until 1947, when the Americans acted quickly to dissolve organisations that they had sponsored during the first year of Occupation. The prime example was the Street Stall Tradesmen's Union (Roten Dôgyô Kumiai), which was controlled by Ozu Kinosuke, a

⁷³ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendix 15, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" (15/9/47) pp. 1-2.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.2.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

notorious criminal. In September, 1946, H. S. Eaton,⁷⁶ confusing the Tradesmen's Union with a cooperative movement, permitted the Metropolitan Police Board to renew its right to monopolize the administration of "tekiya" (literally canvas-and-bamboo street stalls).⁷⁷ Shupak had recommended that Ozu's organisation be abolished, but his advice was not heeded, perhaps due to practical considerations (there was no institutional replacement for the Tradesmen's Association).

In his report of May, 1947, Shupak stated that "the system had been in operation for many years but did not reach its present strength or influence until after the war".⁷⁸ The growth of tekiya organisations reflected the proliferation of market stalls in cities almost levelled by American bombs. These *ad hoc* retail outlets represented conduits for black market commodities, catering to the needs of ordinary Japanese and providing jobs for the unemployed. Men like Ozu and Matsuda seized the opportunities afforded by Japan's defeat and the devastation of her cities, illegally appropriating property for open-air markets. Management of the many fixed and mobile stalls that sprang up all over Tokyo and other Japanese cities was a lucrative business, financially and politically. The Japanese police delegated administrative authority to the stall-keeper oyabun, thus surrounding tekiya organisations with an aura of legitimacy. As early as March, 1943, the Tokyo Assembly had acknowledged their status not only as tax agents but also as price and distribution regulators with the power to punish disobedience.⁷⁹ This was followed up by an ordinance, issued by the Economic Section of the Metropolitan Police Board (MPB) to district police chiefs in January 1945, compelling all independent stall vendors' unions or associations to join a central organisation covering the whole of metropolitan Tokyo.⁸⁰ Unfortunately for those concerned, the central organisation happened to be the Roten Dôgyô Kumiai. Thus it was no coincidence that Ozu's organisation dovetailed neatly with

⁷⁶ Head of Police branch, Public Safety Division.

⁷⁷ H. E. Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo (Macmillan, New York, 1954), p.176.

⁷⁸ Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9/5/47 (NDL, 04565).

⁷⁹ H. E. Wildes, Typhoon, p.176.

⁸⁰ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9, Appendix 15: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" (15/9/47) p.6.

the local police system, "the area covered by (each) branch office usually conform(ing) to the area covered by each police station".⁸¹

The ordinance of January 1945 reflected the police's determination to centralise control over all stall keepers, which, it was hoped, would be accompanied by more effective regulation of price levels and suppression of black market activities. Furthermore, the Tradesmen's Union was expected to put an end to "sectional strife and friction between different oyabun and unions".⁸² To begin with, therefore, it was seen as the MPB's puppet, a convenient organisation through which it could police the community more effectively. However, in the context of defeat and Occupation, the roles were reversed, the new puppeteer rising to a position of such prominence that even the Americans found it difficult to topple him. Ozu's immense power and wealth derived from the efficiency of his organisation, combining a central headquarters with numerous local branches, and its lucrative regulation of open-air markets. All stall keepers in Tokyo were subject to a membership fee (30 yen); a daily rental charge, the level of which depended on location; monthly payments to both the central association (5 yen) and the branch office (2 yen); and a daily charge for paper together with one for the cleaning of stalls (1.5 yen and 50 yen respectively).⁸³ Central headquarters was responsible for dividing all moneys collected among the different oyabun, who in turn used these funds to reward their underlings.⁸⁴ There seems to have been some confusion in Occupation circles as to the number of oyabun and kobun in Tokyo. Shupak estimated that there were around 300 tekiya oyabun with a following of around 1,200 kobun.⁸⁵ The latter statistic was

⁸¹ Ibid., p.4.

⁸² Ibid., p.6.

⁸³ Ibid., p.4; the sums of money involved are described as "average". The daily rental charge is not mentioned by Fritz, despite its being referred to in Shupak's report of 9/5/47. Galloping inflation makes it difficult to assess the actual value of these sums of money. By way of comparison, in July 1947 the Japanese government fixed the basic monthly pay of government employees at ¥1,800 (J. B. Cohen, Japan's Economy, p.456). In terms of essential expenditure, The Oriental Economist estimated monthly food and drink expenses per capita of factory workers in Tokyo to be around ¥1,500 in September 1947.

⁸⁴ Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9/5/47; To: Administrator W. G. Fritz (G-2 04565).

⁸⁵ Ibid.

qualified by the suggestion that for many a more accurate label would be "apprentice", such status presumably reflecting the inability of young men and "street urchins" to understand the demands as well as benefits of traditional oyabun-kobun ties. The situation was, indeed, a fluid one, Fritz claiming four months later that there were 200 oyabun, 7,000 kobun and 22,557 followers in the Tokyo area.⁸⁶ The last statistic must have included all those engaged in ancillary services, such as cleaning, for the tekiya organisations. The discrepancy between these two sets of estimates, separated by just a few months, could be explained by rapid increases in numerical strength, but more likely reasons are differing sample areas (Fritz refers to the Tokyo *area* rather than the city itself) and conflicting methods of classification (whether or not Fritz included Shupak's "apprentices" in his figure for kobun or "followers" is unclear). What comes across clearly is the Occupation's confusion as to both the nature and scale of the problem, although all agreed that it represented some sort of threat to Japan's nascent democracy.

In September, 1947, there were, according to Fritz, approximately 45,000 street stalls registered with the Tradesmen's Union in Tokyo. Of these 88% were under the control of oyabun, the remaining 12% paying no "tribute" but still liable for the usual fees and taxes.⁸⁷ Nobody could set up a street stall without the permission of Ozu's organisation. All prospective vendors had to apply for membership of the Union at central headquarters and then fill in two license forms, which were then sent to the local police station for approval. The relevant documentation was available only at the Union's branch offices.⁸⁸ From the beginning those who operated street stalls were made aware who was in charge. The assumption of local government functions extended to the collection of taxes. Every day the street stalls paid 2-3 yen in government taxation,⁸⁹ moneys which were not immediately forwarded to the Japanese Government; instead an annual lump sum was paid. The system encouraged corruption, "no

⁸⁶ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9, Appendix 15: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" (15/9/47), p.3.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.4.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

government employee or official assist(ing) in (tax) collection". More seriously, "the tekiya organisation account(ed) to no one for its funds except to its own heads.....no audit of this organisation's books (was) made by either the municipal, prefectural or national government".⁹⁰

It was bad enough that the Tradesmen's Union was abusing its privileged position, employing administrative methods out of keeping with the Occupation's policies. The reformers sought to create a cooperative, within which members would be free to pursue economic goals with a minimum of constraints. In marked contrast, Ozu's organisation was characterised by what the Americans regarded as "feudal" social relations - it was oppressive, a rigid hierarchy, at the bottom of which were the very people who were now entrusted with the nation's democratic dawn. What was even more galling than this frustrated ideal was the Union's sponsorship of the black economy, which was simultaneously swindling the Japanese people and undermining the Occupation's reforms. The supply and prices of commodities were controlled largely by tekiya organisations,⁹¹ headed by individuals whose prominence reflected black market connections. William Costello referred to "oyabun gangsters" as beneficiaries of hoarded military supplies.⁹² All oyabun organisations promoted black market activities, if not directly then indirectly - by "exacting exorbitant tribute/rent they were contributing to inflation and thus to the black market".⁹³

Shupak concluded that the oyabun system "controlled large commercial areas through threat and corruption, (that it was) in direct defiance of law and order and should not be tolerated in a country dedicated to democracy".⁹⁴ Ten days after he submitted his report, he stressed the pervasiveness of the tekiya: "One can begin

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.6.

⁹¹ Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9/5/47; To: Administrator W. G. Fritz (G-2 04565).

⁹² W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.153.

⁹³ Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9/5/47; To: Administrator W. G. Fritz (G-2 04565). Inflation/a reduction in the value of the yen encouraged hoarding and illegal disposition of scarce commodities.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

to grasp the strength and influence exercised by these illegal organisations in the everyday lives of the people, and on the nation as a whole".⁹⁵ Although most investigations concentrated on Tokyo, where the problem was most acute,⁹⁶ Shupak was right to see it as a nationwide phenomenon. In both Osaka and Kôbe it was reported that merchants associations, headed by oyabun, were profitably regulating commerce, their actions condoned, even encouraged, by the police.

In the case of Kôbe, the police professed ignorance of the exorbitant payments made by small shopkeepers to the associations. These included an entrance fee of 1,000 yen, monthly renewal of membership costing from 80 to 120 yen and an annual tax rate of 1,000 to 2,000 yen. To make matters worse, it was found that both the cleaning association and the merchants' organisation were collecting tax revenue for the city government *from the same stall keepers*. It was interesting that even in Kyoto, unscarred by bombing raids and largely devoid of market stalls, it was admitted by the police that shop owners were obliged (ie. forced) to become members of merchants' associations under the control of tekiya oyabun. For the privilege of conducting business they paid a 500 yen membership fee, 50 to 200 yen in dues, 5 yen a week in taxes and 10 yen a month for a health inspection service. In addition, merchants were required to submit 5% of daily takings to the association, ostensibly as a price control measure! The associations assumed responsibilities normally within the jurisdiction of the city's Health and Welfare Department, the latter presumably failing to respond adequately to popular needs.⁹⁷ Weak government stimulated the development of oyabun organisations, a process overlooked by the

⁹⁵ Shupak, "Further Investigation of Tekiya", dated 19/5/47 (NDL, fiche no. G-2 04564).

⁹⁶ Problem of oyabun, gangster organisation in Tokyo 3 times as serious as that of Osaka, Kyoto, Kôbe combined - Comments by H. Shupak on Osaka police chief's report (NDL: G-2 04564).

⁹⁷ Information concerning tekiya organisations in Osaka, Kôbe and Kyoto comes from W. Fritz's report, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" (15/9/47), pp.8-9. Higher membership fees etc. in the above three cities, compared with Tokyo, presumably reflected differences in retail outlets' size/financial value (ie. shops/stores rather than market stalls).

police and promoted, albeit unconsciously, by the Occupation authorities.

From the beginning of the Occupation, the Americans relied on individuals who could summon the necessary resources, in terms of both manpower and materials, to reconstruct and repair Japan's shattered urban environment. Such men were rewarded with lucrative cost-plus contracts, ensuring the growth of institutions that the Americans came to regard as illegitimate. The problem derived from the disguises assumed by oyabun-kobun groupings, usually that of a construction company or a labour contractor. This type of business was a convenient "front" because of its territorial character - "the building business in Japanese cities has traditionally been divided into territories controlled by particular companies, which coincided with the similar territorial nature of the gangs".⁹⁸ Fritz was not alone in realising that oyabun were operating "under the guise of legitimate public works contractors".⁹⁹ H. E. Wildes maintained that construction companies (gumi/kumi) constituted a powerful pressure group, "(their) chiefs (called oyabun) control(ling) elaborate outfits of tools, materials, minor artisans, day labourers, and ready capital, capable of being directed toward any one of a number of different types of work".¹⁰⁰

At the conference convened by Government Section in September, 1947, Mr. Collett, representing the Economic and Scientific Section, stated that the organisation regulating construction/casual labour (the contractors' association) was the same as its prewar/wartime counterpart. It was exempt from any restrictions on its activities, despite its being composed of gumi involved in "widespread black market operations". Belonging to an association was the essential precondition for employment in the construction industry, their expansion during the Occupation reflecting a hostile socio-economic environment. Unemployed Japanese were "sucked into the gumi", the influx changing loyalty patterns and distorting traditional

⁹⁸ Bennett and Ishino, Paternalism in the Japanese Economy, fn.2, p.283.

⁹⁹ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9, Appendix 15: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" (15/9/47), p.2.

¹⁰⁰ "Underground Politics in Postwar Japan", American Political Science Review, 42 (Dec. 1948) p.1155.

relationships. A prominent oyabun in one of the larger prefectures stated that half of his kobun were not regular, loyal workers. Black market rice was used as an economic weapon, prompting unemployed Japanese to equate membership with survival. The Japanese Government strengthened the hand of the oyabun by paying for extra rations bought on the black market.¹⁰¹ The realisation that gumi had a complete monopoly on construction shocked the reformers in SCAP. They could hardly believe that "virtually all the construction work done by (Occupation order), or for its interests, was handled through....oyabun organisations that held their workmen in semi-feudal bondage".¹⁰²

The idealism of the reformers can be contrasted with the pragmatism of most Occupation personnel. The reaction of one Colonel Fregosi represented the view of all those who saw themselves more as soldiers than administrators:

Where a conflict exists between executing procurement or cleaning out the system, the former must triumph, because the Occupation force intends...to get what it wants....There is no sense in trying to combat some of the problems that come up on the grounds of ethics....if it is going to stop procurement.¹⁰³

Clearly Fregosi had a job to do, and considered it unfortunate, but nevertheless irrelevant, that those Japanese who furnished him with his needs did so through criminal activities. In short the supplies themselves interested him more than the suppliers. A good example of such a supplier was Andô Akira, "one of Tokyo's great labour bosses",¹⁰⁴ who was frequently employed by the Americans as a contractor. Mark Gayn took an interest in Andô, claiming that he controlled 10,000 workers¹⁰⁵ and was probably "a receiver for the colossal hoards of war supplies...".¹⁰⁶ According to Captain N., who had been investigating Andô for three months and was quite happy to

¹⁰¹ Conference in Government Section, 12/9/47, pp. 9-10 (NDL, fiche no. G-2 04562).

¹⁰² H. E. Wildes, Typhoon, p.177.

¹⁰³ Conference in Government Section, 12/9/47, p.11 (NDL, fiche no. G-2 04562).

¹⁰⁴ Mark Gayn, Japan Diary, p.178.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.246.

supply Gayn with information, this particular "gangster" had excellent contacts:

...he is on intimate terms with Prince Takamatsu, the emperor's brother (and) is also friendly with cabinet ministers, with black market "kings" in half a dozen cities...¹⁰⁷

The owner of six contracting firms and President of the Tokyo Private Automobile Association with 8,000 members,¹⁰⁸ Andô was an extremely powerful man on whom many Occupation personnel came to rely.

Close working relationships with alleged criminals, on the part of both the Japanese police and the Occupation authorities, suggested that any attempt to bring them to justice would be half-hearted. The programme of action agreed on at the inter-sectional conference was confused to say the least. Mr. Rose (ESS) maintained that an attack on the oyabun-kobun system would have serious implications with regard to economic recovery. Mr. Meyers sensibly asked for clarification: "What do we mean by the oyabun system, and what part do we intend to attack?"¹⁰⁹ Generally, tacit consent rather than active resistance was the favoured course of action, each speaker keen to distance himself and his section from a seemingly insoluble problem. In May 1947 Shupak had written a note to Eaton concerning moves by ESS to counter oyabun influence - "Fritz (PSD's representative was) not to commit himself to any position which would amount to an assumption of responsibility by this section (Civil Intelligence Section)".¹¹⁰ It is safe to assume that as more facts came to light, so the desire to ignore "the shadow government"¹¹¹ became stronger. Meyers, who chaired the conference, proposed that it be suggested to the Japanese Government

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.245-6.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.245. According to Captain N., you couldn't own a car in Tokyo without paying a tribute to Andô.

¹⁰⁹ Conference in Government Section, 12/9/47, p.16 (NDL, G-2 04562).

¹¹⁰ NDL, G-2 04563.

¹¹¹ This characterisation was coined by Mr. Ries (ESS), Conference in GS (12/9/47), p.6 (NDL, G-2 04562).

that "a law be passed forbidding any private/quasi-government... agency...to collect any taxes or fees whatsoever".¹¹² The notion that it was enough to "suggest" to the Japanese Government what should be done testified to Government Section's poverty of ideas. Meyers made sure that everyone knew who was expected to solve the problem. Emphasizing the role of the police, he declared that "this is the Public Safety Division's jurisdiction and we don't want to interfere".¹¹³

Attempting to simplify their task, the PSD decided to target the notorious gang leaders, to break up the system from the top. In a memo to the director of the Bureau of Police, dated 20 November, 1947, H. E. Pulliam stated that "instructions should be issued to prefectural chiefs of police to stamp out all traces of oyabun-kobun and other gangster systems".¹¹⁴ From May of that year efforts were concentrated on two of the best known oyabun in Tokyo, Ozu Kinosuke and Sekine Ken. The former was arrested on 26 June, 1947, on the authority of the chief of Yodobashi police station, who was forced to take action against Ozu by Shupak.¹¹⁵ The police chief had told the investigator that his men were afraid to raid, and even the procurator admitted to a fear of taking proceedings against Ozu.¹¹⁶

The trial began on 15 July and lasted until 25 August, when "the alleged king of the Tokyo black market underworld"¹¹⁷ was imprisoned, only to be released on 12 September due to ill health. He was returned to prison on the 18 September, presumably at the Occupation's prompting.¹¹⁸ In a memo, dated 25 November, 1947, Shupak stated that "another charge of intimidation had been presented to the Procurator's Office for action and two other charges of illegal possession of weapons and black market dealings

¹¹² Conference in GS, 12/9/47, p.23.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.24.

¹¹⁴ NDL, G-2 00252.

¹¹⁵ Memo dated 25/11/47; From: Investigator H. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233)

¹¹⁶ Conference in GS, 12/9/47, p.13. Shupak had to accompany the nervous police chief on the raid (NDL, G-2 04562).

¹¹⁷ Summations, No.21 (June, 1947), p.48.

¹¹⁸ Memo dated 25/11/47; From: Investigator H. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233).

(were) being worked on with little hope of success".¹¹⁹ The Metropolitan Police Board (MPB) had informed him that the Procurator's Office would decide when to call the final trial, and until then the police would try to obtain more evidence against Ozu. Despite their leader's incarceration, Ozu's kobun still dominated the Shinjuku area, continuing to collect fees and taxes.¹²⁰ Tanemura of the MPB's Second Criminal Section "stated that this problem was deplorable, but the police could do nothing more - it was up to the ward office and other government agencies".¹²¹ Desperate to salvage something for his efforts, Shupak recommended that "the Procurator's Office be instructed to bring the trial to a speedy conclusion, regardless of the amount of charges available against Ozu".¹²² It was not until June, 1948, that Ozu received a credible gaol sentence (eight years).¹²³

In the case of Sekine, the Occupation authorities were more wary of Japanese judicial agencies. On September 30, 1947, the Provost Marshal's Office, GHQ, issued a warrant for his arrest.¹²⁴ The same day "Sekine Ken, head of a gang claiming the membership of 20,000 gamblers, thugs and construction workers, surrendered to the police....ending a three month search throughout ten provinces".¹²⁵ On 28 November he was convicted by Provost Court and sentenced to five years imprisonment.¹²⁶ So reluctant were the police to curb gangster activities and so lenient the courts that the Occupation authorities were forced to employ their own prosecutors to ensure that justice was done. However, as has been suggested with regard to Ozu, it soon became clear that toppling the heads of oyabun groupings did little to undermine the organisations themselves. On 23 February, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun reported that gangster groups still existed, despite the campaign in 1947 that aimed to eradicate

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.142.

¹²⁴ Memo dated 25/11/47; From: Investigator H. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233).

¹²⁵ Summations, No.25 (Oct.1947), p.36.

¹²⁶ Memo dated 25/11/47; From: Investigator H. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233).

them.¹²⁷ It claimed that Sekine's organisation still wielded power throughout the Kantô district, the imprisonment of its boss and leading members making little difference. "Local gangs were ostensibly reorganised into commercial cooperatives, such as building contractor groups, but the bosses and henchmen in these gangs are as closely united as before"¹²⁸ - the article surely brought tears to Shupak's eyes.

The reluctance of the Japanese police to actively participate in the Occupation's drive against criminal oyabun organisations contributed to the campaign's failure. However, there were more compelling reasons for the gangs' survival in the face of the Public Safety Division's offensive. Their ascendancy was assured by socio-economic conditions and political pressures, both beyond the control of the police. Bennett and Ishino maintained that "the efflorescence of oyabun-kobun-like groups during this...period (was) an excellent example of the way the system arises to meet needs for organisation in Japanese society".¹²⁹ Japan's decisive defeat produced an economic-social-political vacuum that was filled, at least in part, by such organisations as the Street Stall Tradesmen's Union. The increasing influence of men like Ozu reflected the declining authority of the Japanese Government and its agencies, a process speeded up by the Occupation's reforms, particularly its purges. Recognising the usefulness of the Tradesmen's Union as an instrument of control, the police chose to entrust it with administrative authority. They considered improper practices to be of little consequence, compared with the chaos that would ensue in the absence of a central coordinating agency. Besides, oyabun sheltered demobilised soldiers and repatriates, often helping them to set up and operate street stalls.¹³⁰ Costello remarked that Ozu's "drives on behalf of repatriates and ex-soldiers gave him an air of

¹²⁷ ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Service) translation, 1/3/49 - Item 4: "Local Police Powerless Against Gangs" (NDL, GS[B] 02282).

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Paternalism in the Japanese Economy, fn.2, p.283.

¹³⁰ Investigation of Oyabun in Gifu ken, 2/7/47; To: Eaton; From: Lt. McCarthy. Reported that 2,500 repatriates with no regular employment were given priority right to operate a stand; for 8 yen/month electric lights installed and construction needs taken care of (NDL, G-2 04564).

philanthropy".¹³¹ Lawyers defending Ozu at his trial characterised him as a man who had risen "in order to lead the people out of confusion.....the police had asked him to control the (Shinjuku) district after the war because they were powerless to do so themselves".¹³²

The continued acquiescence of the police was secured by the benefits that they themselves acquired from the system. They received monetary gifts or goods from oyabun,¹³³ sometimes employing the same techniques as their benefactors to extract funds from retailers. In an interview with Ortman (ESS), E. M. Arenschiold, a police investigator, received information concerning a policeman who had told the proprietor of a new restaurant that he could not open his establishment for business. The decision was reversed when "friendly gestures" were made towards members of the policeman's family (6,000 yen).¹³⁴ Thus, there was a give-and-take relationship between the police and oyabun.¹³⁵ Shupak maintained that the former had never been able to cope with the latter; they had "taken the lesser of two evils and cooperated".¹³⁶ This much was clear from their muted reaction to the many complaints made against tekiya organisations.¹³⁷ The Tokyo Shinbun endorsed Shupak's views, declaring that "policemen seem to approve the special relationship between gang bosses and their henchmen, (an attitude that) results in the special handling of gang violence cases by the police".¹³⁸

Many in Occupation circles felt that the reasons behind the police's leniency were more sinister. At the inter-sectional conference Matsukata, a representative of the Government Section, stated that the police and other governmental agencies were not independent

¹³¹ W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.125.

¹³² Ibid., pp.139-140.

¹³³ Conference in GS (12/9/47) p.13.

¹³⁴ Dated 20/5/47 (NDL: G-2 04563).

¹³⁵ Lt. Col. Petty, Tokyo-Kanagawa MGT, on Oyabun activities (NDL: G-2 04562).

¹³⁶ Conference in GS (12/9/47) p.13 (NDL, G-2 04562).

¹³⁷ Memo dated 29/5/47; From: H. Shupak; Subject: Conference re. Anti-trust Organisations (NDL: G-2 04563).

¹³⁸ ATIS translation, 1/3/49, Item 4: "Local Police Powerless Against Gangs" - Tokyo Shinbun, 23/2/49 (NDL, GS[B] 02282).

organisations, there being "a much bigger network that works behind the police and the political scene".¹³⁹ Shupak too sensed a conspiracy, asserting that "the oyabun have influence far above and beyond the police - with the governors and other institutions (from whom the police take orders)".¹⁴⁰ There was plenty of evidence available to support such contentions. Ozu Kinosuke was "a candidate for the Diet on a Liberal Party ticket, and was defeated only by a very small margin".¹⁴¹ Rumours that he contributed large sums of money to the party that adopted him and bought votes during his campaign were surely well-founded.¹⁴² In Kôbe, it was reported that Ihara, advisor to the street stall association and Liberal Party candidate, was elected to the Assembly.¹⁴³ In his report of September, 1947, Fritz described a web of alliances between oyabun and political parties in Osaka, one of which favoured a prospective prefectural governor.¹⁴⁴ Hitomatsu, Welfare Minister and member of the Liberal Party, was found to have ties with a large gurentai association (Naniwa Shôkai) in Osaka.¹⁴⁵ In Gifu prefecture Hori Yoshisuke, a member of both the prefectural assembly and the city council, "controlled" the Road Stall Keepers' Association.¹⁴⁶ Presumably his unofficial capacity was more profitable than his official one.

Conservative politicians and criminal oyabun were both profiting from prevailing socio-economic conditions and the exigencies of an indirect Occupation. Collett (ESS) claimed that whenever there was an effective campaign against black market operations in the construction industry, reactions were immediate and came from peculiar sources - from political interests seemingly unconnected with construction.¹⁴⁷ Oyabun funds were funnelled into the political

¹³⁹ Conference in GS (12/9/47) p.14.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.13.

¹⁴¹ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9, Appendix 15: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" (15/9/47), p.8.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.10.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

¹⁴⁵ Comments by Harry Shupak (NDL, G-2 04564).

¹⁴⁶ Investigation of Oyabun in Gifu ken, 2/7/47; To: Eaton; From: Lt. McCarthy (G-2 04564)

¹⁴⁷ Conference in GS, 12/9/47, p.14 (G-2 04562).

parties, which were always willing to assist the political passage of anyone endowed with wealth or influence. As for the Japanese police, the political parties and criminal oyabun could offer them far more than the Occupation or the Japanese people. Consistently the latter lost out, whilst conservative elements consolidated their hold on Japan's economic and political institutions. The Legal Section's representative at the inter-sectional conference, Mr. Carrington, clearly understood the nature of the problem. He declared that "an attack (on the oyabun-kobun system) cannot succeed without the Japanese Government's active involvement".¹⁴⁸ It was inconceivable, given the wealth, influence and political connections of such men as Ozu, that the Japanese Government would pay any more than lip service to the Occupation's demands. Profits made on the black market lubricated the machine of government. One component in particular - the police - increasingly disregarded the sources of its income.

"Voluntary" Contributions

In late 1946 the Occupation authorities happened upon a system of local government finance, which seemed to represent both a source of corruption and a threat to personal liberty. The Japanese public, either voluntarily or under duress, was contributing to the costs of local administration, particularly those of education and policing, other than by taxation. Officials charged with investigating this "feature of fiscal improvisation"¹⁴⁹ found that methods and practices were diverse, although there was a universal tendency to conceal the pattern of expenditure. Reports from Occupation personnel increasingly focused on two issues: the contributors' motives - did they have any choice in the matter, and if so, what were they hoping to buy with their money?; secondly, the true beneficiaries of the system - the community as a whole or those with illicit sources of income to protect? The bureaucratic fog encountered by those seeking answers to these questions arose from

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p.20.

¹⁴⁹ History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monograph 55 (Police and Public Safety) p.102.

the absence of both a legal framework and a system of accountability for contributions at national level.

In September, 1946, a unit of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) drew attention to the Kyoto Prefecture Public Peace Society, discovered by accident during an investigation of Usui Yoshio, Director of the Daiwa Industrial Company.¹⁵⁰ The aim of the society, which included all police officials in the prefecture and boasted a total membership of about 2,500, was "to improve the financial status of policemen...".¹⁵¹ Hinomoto Kiyoshi, chief of the Nishi Maizuru police station, had appointed one of his subordinates to collect contributions on behalf of the society, the first campaign benefitting from the support of ten large firms and netting a total of 21,000 yen. Donations were later distributed to all police stations in Kyoto prefecture, each individual policeman receiving about 200 yen. At the time of the CIC detachment's investigations, another drive to raise funds had attracted 17,400 yen, all of which had been donated by businesses such as the Daiwa Industrial Company. Further financial backing to the tune of 28,000 yen was provided by the Police Welfare Association, headed by Hinomoto - another police supporters' organisation uncovered by counter-intelligence agents in the Kyoto area. This time the intention was to provide funds for the repair of police buildings and vehicles.¹⁵² The investigators' concern derived from the Occupation's ignorance of these support networks - there was as yet no mention of improper practices.

An article in Akahata, the Communist Party's newspaper, concerning amongst other things the acceptance of bribes by the police, caused Pulliam to take action against the collection of contributions. A memo was sent to the Director General of the Home Ministry's Bureau of Public Safety, in which Pulliam quoted the following accusation levelled against the police :

¹⁵⁰ CIC Area No.10, report dated 25/9/46; Subject: Establishment of Kyoto Prefectural Public Peace Society (G-2 00239).

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid. All information concerning these support associations and the sums collected comes from the CIC unit's report.

Recently a certain Yasunaga, and other officers of Toyonashi Stall Keepers' Association in Shizuoka ken, invited the chief of police and subordinates to a feast and presented them with more than 40,000 yen, forcibly collected from stall-keepers by bosses. The Government and the prefectural chief of police are aware of the incident but have made no attempts to investigate.¹⁵³

The chief of the Public Safety Division followed up the quotation with the statement that there was "constant criticism of police forces arising from the collection of contributions", necessitating immediate action by the Japanese Government. These financial exactions, according to Akahata, were obtained by tekiya bosses. Apparently stall keepers were being forced to help fund governmental agencies that accorded them little respect, preferring to protect those who oppressed them. Private financial backing of this sort testified to the symbiotic relationship between the police and organisations engaged in illegal activities. The police were financed by the very interests that the Occupation was directing them to eradicate.

In December, 1946, presumably by way of response to Pulliam's reprimand, the Home Minister requested the formation of a committee to study the phenomenon of "police contributions". Early the following year, various police forces were investigated - in Tokyo, and in Shizuoka, Kanagawa, Yamanashi, Chiba, Saitama and Gunma prefectures.¹⁵⁴ Meanwhile the situation in and around Kyoto continued to be monitored by military government officials. Major H. B. Taylor contrasted prewar contributions, "accepted" from persons residing within the locale, with their postwar counterparts, "apparently solicited from large, well-to-do organisations".¹⁵⁵ The police now sought support from wealthy associations rather than the general public, the new pattern of fundraising reflecting the concentration of power, financial and political, in the hands of a few. Taylor recommended that "no action be taken toward the

¹⁵³ Memo dated 21/11/46; Subject: "Police still Adhere to Undemocratic Methods". 13/11/46 issue of Akahata contained these accusations (NDL, G-2 00237).

¹⁵⁴ 4/3/47 - Subject: Police Contribution Report; To Lt. Col. J. A. Benton, Executive Officer, PSD; From: Byron Engle, Acting Chief Police Administrator (NDL, G-2 00239/00240)

¹⁵⁵ HQ I Corps (Kyoto, Honshu); Report dated 10/2/47; Subject: Police Societies; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 00239)

dissolution of such organisations until the underlying causes (of their pervasiveness) are removed".¹⁵⁶ His balanced assessment of the problem exemplified the common sense and pragmatism of many of those working in the field:¹⁵⁷

While such a situation might result in favouritism and partiality on the part of the police towards contributors, to outlaw such organisations with prominent political figures as officers might open the entire situation to even greater graft and corruption.¹⁵⁸

That there was already "graft and corruption" clearly was indisputable, as far as Taylor was concerned. The recipient of his correspondence informed GHQ that police stations in Kyoto prefecture had collected more than 5,600,000 yen in two campaigns during 1946.¹⁵⁹ In addition, it was noted that the titular head of the Kyoto Prefectural Public Peace Society, so active in the fundraising effort, was the prefectural governor.¹⁶⁰ Prominent political figures apparently approved of the work of these extra-governmental organisations, presumably because they had reached an accommodation with those in control. 8th Army HQ recommended that police societies, if permitted to exist, be strictly regulated and controlled by the Japanese Government.¹⁶¹ This was a more tolerant response to the problem than that of GHQ, which nine days earlier had informed the Commanding General, 8th Army, that "the practice of receiving contributions in any form by the police is undesirable and will be discontinued".¹⁶² This decisive statement of intent was qualified immediately by the proposal "to direct the Japanese Government to deal with the problem".¹⁶³ Such delegation of

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ In many ways they represented an unused asset, more often than not their opinions being ignored.

¹⁵⁸ HQ I Corps (Kyoto, Honshu); Report dated 10/2/47; Subject: Police Societies; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 00239)

¹⁵⁹ HQ 8th Army, 19/2/47; To: SCAP; From: R. Schafer, Asst. Adjutant General; Subject: Kyoto Prefectural Public Peace Society (NDL, G-2 00239).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² GHQ, SCAP, 10/2/47; From: R. M. Levy, Adjutant General. It was recommended that the operating costs of the police be paid from a system of legal taxation (NDL, G-2 00238).

¹⁶³ Ibid.

responsibility reflected the ambivalent attitude of many American officials regarding private financial provision.

Often it was more important to make the right noises than to take the appropriate action. Many appraisals of the Occupation were based on the views of leading officials and the legislative programmes they had spawned.¹⁶⁴ Frequently the reformers' aims and ambitions were emphasized to such an extent that the actual impact of a given reform was seldom properly investigated. In the case of contributions it was enough to order, as Pulliam himself did in May of 1947, that all those "affecting police, fire and prison activities be discontinued immediately".¹⁶⁵ The recommendations that followed this statement somewhat softened its impact. PSD was to direct "the Home and Justice Ministers to *issue the necessary instructions*".¹⁶⁶ Pulliam gave no hints as to what these were, because, not surprisingly, the problem itself interested him more than its solution. Finally he called on both the Japanese Government and responsible sections of SCAP "to revise the entire tax structure and budget system" in order to ensure that the costs of local and national government were legally and democratically financed.¹⁶⁷ There would have been no mention of the need for such wide-ranging reform if it had fallen within the jurisdiction of the PSD. Pulliam must have known that none of the sections had sufficient resources to overhaul the entire fiscal structure in the context of an ongoing Occupation. However, he could not condone a system that he had characterised as unjust and "inimical to the interests of a free people and a democratic government".¹⁶⁸

In a lengthy memorandum on police contributions, Pulliam disclosed that there was no system of accountability for contributed funds, and no legal sanction for their solicitation or regulation by local

¹⁶⁴ eg. Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan ; J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur: a Participant's Account (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979).

¹⁶⁵ Memo dated 6/5/47; Thru: Deputy-chief, CIS/G-2; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; From: H. E. Pulliam, head of PSD; Subject: Police Contributions (NDL, G-2 00238).

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

administrations.¹⁶⁹ The police supporters' organisations decided on the amounts to be collected from each person, sometimes forcing prospective contributors to submit the allotted sum. According to Pulliam, there was sufficient evidence to indicate that "practically all solicited contributions were obtained under some form of duress". They were exacted from those who could not afford them, but also from those who definitely could - "Businessmen engaged in black market activities were afraid to refuse exorbitant demands". Still, it seems more likely that prominent black marketeers were voluntary donors, considering freedom from police interference to be a luxury worth paying for. Presumably, the chiefs of police in Shizuoka prefecture were not the only ones to be lavishly entertained by their benefactors, there being no better indicator of social standing than ready access to supplies of good food. High-ranking police officials retained control of the money they received, accounting to no one for the manner in which it was spent. For example, "Asakusa district chief of police retained about 17,000 yen to be disbursed at his own discretion". In Hyôgo prefecture, "the chief of police of Okashi had at his disposal 187,413 yen in a bank, with the power to withdraw any amount at any time". Whilst examination of records indicated amounts withdrawn, there was no account of what the money had purchased. In Saitama prefecture Malburg and Fujii, PSD police investigators, were told that revenue from contributions was put to good use - the purchase and repair of equipment, rewards, public information posters, and assistance to ill/injured police officers.¹⁷⁰ However, Malburg, noting that "no impartial group accounts for the money or expenditures", recommended that "all statements made to the investigators should be verified".¹⁷¹

Pulliam argued that the implications of private financial support for such agencies as the police dictated that the system be abolished. His colleagues, however, considered the elimination of supplementary funds to be more dangerous than a qualified

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. Pulliam's memo of 6/5/47 is the source for the remainder of this paragraph (except where stated otherwise).

¹⁷⁰ Report (undated); To: W. C. Gabrielson, administrator; Subject: Collection of Funds, Saitama ken police (NDL, G-2 00240).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

acceptance of contributions as a valid method of fundraising. Major Taylor's position was the one that most officials advocated. The deputy chief of the Civil Intelligence Section, R. S. Bratton, maintained that police societies should not be dissolved until their *raison d'être* was properly appreciated.¹⁷² Believing that "the police force may not be capable of supporting itself without additional funds",¹⁷³ Bratton advised against hasty eradication of fundraising organisations.

The Occupation authorities resolved the problem of contributions by belittling it. They were willing to accept the reassuring statements of the Home Ministry's investigatory committee set up in December, 1946. Arguing that contributions were necessary to ensure an effective police force, in terms of both equipment and morale, the committee convinced the officials concerned that their inaction was justified. Its report admitted that "all expenses for police work should be paid from official funds", but reliance on contributions derived from "the poor state of local financial provision".¹⁷⁴ Extra funds helped pay for improved equipment, ensuring an effective response to criminal activities.¹⁷⁵ Without public donations, the committee argued, policemen would be so preoccupied with the daily struggle for survival amid "skyrocketing" prices that they would be unable to do their job properly: "the authorities concerned are trying to improve living conditions...so that all police personnel work at their best without worries".¹⁷⁶ Reminding those in GHQ that "the duty of maintaining social order rests solely on the shoulders of policemen", the committee declared that "the people desire to have a strong and fair police....(and) are *ready to give financial aid*".¹⁷⁷ It followed that the collection of contributions from the people was "very natural", but, in case the Occupation authorities were still

¹⁷² Memo dated 17/5/47; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Subject: Contribution Solicitation by Japanese Police Societies (NDL, G-2 00238).

¹⁷³ 20/3/47 - Letter to Assistant Chief of Staff; Subject: Contribution Solicitation by Japanese Police Societies (NDL: G-2 00239).

¹⁷⁴ Memo dated 4/3/47; To: Lt. Col. J. A. Benton, Executive Officer PSD; From: Byron Engle, Acting Chief Police Administrator; Subject: Police Contribution Report (NDL, G-2 00240).

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

concerned, the committee assured them that it was "a temporary phenomenon".¹⁷⁸ It was true that the total value of contributed funds was much higher than before, but this was because of "the decreasing value of money, the reconstruction of police equipment and the necessity for supporting policemen who are suffering from the high prices of commodities".¹⁷⁹ The committee concluded its report with proposals that sought to eliminate compulsion, namely the removal of contributions from police control and the prohibition of their active participation in soliciting such funds.¹⁸⁰

The Japanese Government's recommendations were taken seriously, and it was generally accepted that new regulations were sufficient to prevent abuses of the system. Byron Engle, acting chief police administrator, declared that the committee had gone "a long way in making an undesirable practice, which they feel must continue at this time, as unobjectionable as possible".¹⁸¹ Thus, he recommended that "*tacit* approval be given to (the Japanese Government's) programme".¹⁸² Nobody wanted to endorse openly the committee's recommendations, because they suspected that they were designed merely to reassure those in Occupation circles. Engle was aware of the risks he was taking by praising the report. He stated that the solicitation of contributions in any form was undesirable, especially in the case of police work, when it was "certain to bring accusations of, if not actual, favouritism in law enforcement".¹⁸³ The problem of bias, which dented the police's image in the community and impaired their effectiveness, was even more acute where black market activities flourished.¹⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Byron continued, the contributions system had deep historical roots, and was of vital importance in the context of the early Occupation:

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ Memo dated 4/3/47; To: Lt. Col. J. A. Benton, Executive Officer PSD; From: Byron Engle, Acting Chief Police Administrator; Subject: Police Contribution Report (NDL, G-2 00239).

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

To prohibit it at this time of extreme fluctuation of the yen would seriously handicap the police, especially in many phases of reconstruction of partially-destroyed stations, construction of new detention cells and many other necessary projects....¹⁸⁵

The Occupation authorities classified the moneys received by local police forces according to the proposed object of expenditure, usually "police buildings" or "welfare facilities". Figure 11 illustrates the sums collected and spent from January to December 1946 by the prefectural police departments, police stations and the Metropolitan Police Board. It is interesting that substantial amounts remained unspent at the end of the year, suggesting that not all moneys were immediately absorbed by construction and welfare schemes. It is safe to assume that chiefs of police controlled these funds, probably using them as personal expense accounts. Afterall, it was necessary to ply both Occupation personnel and influential Japanese with food and drink to ensure continued cooperation.

**Breakdown of Police Contributions:
January - December 1946**




Figure 11

Source: Table of Police Contributions, January-December 1946
(NDL, G-2 00240)

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

As has been stated, PSD officials accepted the Japanese Government's assurances that properly regulated contributions were harmless. Concentrating on the system's threat to personal liberty, they insisted that no police supporters' association "be composed of any but volunteer members".¹⁸⁶ The likelihood of bribery and corruption ceased to preoccupy those in GHQ, although this was not true of many ordinary Japanese. Commenting on the situation in the Kyoto area in December, 1948, Frank Kowalski, a military government official, stated that "many (people) see little necessity for...(police supporters') associations and are inclined to take the view that they contribute only to banding together of police and bosses...".¹⁸⁷ He enclosed the articles of organisation of Nakatachiuri Public Peace Association and those of the Kyoto City Federation, which conjured up images of atrocious crimes and rampant black market operations in order to encourage public support for the police. Both Eaton and Pulliam, whose misgivings seem to have disappeared by this time, maintained that "properly operated voluntary associations" would guard against collusion between police and bosses.¹⁸⁸ All those concerned now acknowledged that the police would be further enfeebled by the abolition of contributions, and that such action would compound, rather than solve, the problem of bribery.

Ultimately, the Occupation authorities were forced to condone the solicitation of contributions, knowing full well that their approval contradicted reforms concerned with civil liberties and democratic, responsible local government. With regard to the latter, it was surely clear, given the importance of "obligation" in Japanese society, that an organisation that voluntarily donated large sums of money to the police would be accorded preferential treatment. For example, the gift of a new official residence worth 1,650,000 yen -

¹⁸⁶ Memo to Pulliam, dated 22/12/48; From: Eaton; Subject: Nakatachiuri Public Peace Association and Kyoto City federation of Public Peace Associations (NDL, G-2 00250).

¹⁸⁷ Kyoto MGT, 8/12/48; Subject: Public Peace Associations; Thru: Commanding Officer, Kinki MG region; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 00250).

¹⁸⁸ Memo to Pulliam, dated 22/12/48; From: Eaton; Subject: Nakatachiuri Public Peace Association and Kyoto City federation of Public Peace Associations (NDL, G-2 00250).

the police chief in Sakamoto, Kumamoto prefecture, was the lucky beneficiary - must have immunized the donors (they were gangsters) against prosecution.¹⁸⁹ In 1949 a scandal in Honjô, sixty miles north of Tokyo, demonstrated that contributions were still being exacted from ordinary Japanese by unscrupulous organisations. Three million yen had been rapidly collected by the Police Supporters' Society, the head of which had a record of five convictions for gambling and had served a six month prison term.¹⁹⁰

When American officials first became aware of contributions, they called for their replacement by a system of public taxation, properly regulated by government officials. Realising that this was impossible due to the scale of the operation, the Public Safety Division neutralised the issue by suggesting that private fundraising activities be reformed. Providing that participation was voluntary, the collection of contributions would be permitted to continue. Finding no solution to the problem and not willing to take on the burden of financial support, the Occupation decided to monitor the system to ensure that nobody was being compelled to submit sums of money they could not afford. Knowing the answers to the two questions posed at the beginning of this section - that most people were forced to contribute and that donations often bought immunity from prosecution - PSD decided to defer action against such practices until the time was ripe.¹⁹¹ It never was, mainly because the problem of contributions, like that of the oyabun-kobun system, had deep roots in Japanese society and was impossible to tackle in the context of an ongoing Occupation. Regular shifts of focus frequently left reform programmes inadequately implemented. Pulliam and his colleagues fell into line behind the Japanese Government, because they lacked the necessary resources, human and financial, to take an independent stand.

¹⁸⁹ Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, p.188.

¹⁹⁰ SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monograph 55 (Police and Public Safety) p.103. It was estimated that around 5,000 families had each "contributed" about ¥600.

¹⁹¹ Memo to Pulliam, dated 22/12/48; From: Eaton; Subject: Nakatachiuri Public Peace Association and Kyoto City federation of Public Peace Associations (NDL, G-2 00250).

The Tale of Suzuki Eiji, Osaka Police Chief

This is the story of an atypical police chief, who threw in his lot with the Occupation authorities and incurred the wrath of the Japanese establishment as a result. The lengths to which black marketeers and Liberal Party politicians went in their attempts to unseat him testify to their common interests. Describing the powerful opposition that mounted against Suzuki, this short section goes some way to explain the police's reluctance to cooperate with the Americans. Most police chiefs considered Japanese politicians and prominent oyabun to be surer guarantors of their survival than the Occupation authorities. Osaka's chief of police clearly thought otherwise. As a result Eaton held him in high regard: "Suzuki of Osaka is the only Japanese official I have met who thinks like an American....he has been outspoken about many Japanese customs and tricks".¹⁹²

The story begins in April, 1947, with the transmission of a statement by Suzuki to Major Burnett, the 25th Infantry Division's Provost Marshal, in which he outlined a plot to secure his transfer from Osaka prefecture.¹⁹³ Two parallel conspiracies, both motivated by the need to maintain the status quo, were endeavouring to topple him from his position of power. Following his transfer from Hiroshima prefecture to Osaka in July, 1946, Suzuki had concentrated on improving the system of economic regulation. The following month, with the approval of the Provost Marshal and Osaka military government team, he ordered the removal of all shacks and stalls constructed on illegally-occupied land. When a nationwide campaign was launched against black marketeers in the first week of February, 1947, Suzuki participated with such enthusiasm that those under threat decided to strengthen their position. There was an election due for the prefectural governorship, and candidates of a conservative persuasion were approached and warned that Suzuki's harsh policies were playing into the hands of the socialists. His

¹⁹² Letter to Lt. Col. R. T. Battey; From: H. S. Eaton; Subject: Autonomous Entity Financial Autonomy (NDL, G-2 00257).

¹⁹³ Office of Provost Marshal, HQ 25th Infantry Division, 26/4/47; Subject: Transmittal of Statement by Osaka Prefectural Police Chief; To: Commanding General, GHQ, FEC (NDL, G-2 00232). This is the source for all information concerning the plot to secure Suzuki's transfer in 1947.

determination to eliminate illegitimate channels of commerce was effectively stemming the illegal transport of rice, thus causing black market prices to reach exorbitant levels.

Black marketeers approached Akama Bunzô, then running for the governorship of Osaka on a Liberal Party ticket, and requested the urgent removal of Suzuki, without whom the anti-black market campaign would lose its impetus. The governor at the time, one Tanaka Kôtarô, was forced to withdraw from the election due to his falling under the provisions of the purge directive. Determined to retain some of his former power, Tanaka surreptitiously took command of Akama's campaign. The former's influence with Uehara Etsujirô, the Minister for Home Affairs, caused those most threatened by Suzuki's drive against the black market to seek his support. Tanaka was informed that the police chief's actions were playing into the hands of the Socialist Party. It was in the interest of both parties - conservative politicians and black marketeers alike - to get rid of Suzuki. They were united in their opposition to the Socialist Party's programme of strict economic regulation. The police chief was requested to tone down his policies, so as to prevent socialist successes in the coming election, but was uncooperative. He explained to Tanaka that he was above party rivalries and had no intention of diluting his campaign against the black market. The incumbent governor, certain that Suzuki's removal would guard against the defeat of Liberal candidates, successfully sought cabinet approval for a plan to appoint him Director of the Commerce and Industry Bureau (Northeastern district). Tanaka informed Akama by letter, stating that an official announcement would be made around 15 April (1947).

Meanwhile, other prominent figures were pressing for Suzuki's removal. Go Hyakufuku, a Formosan black marketeer who the Osaka authorities were trying to expose, allied himself with a well-known political boss in Tokyo. Despite his being held under house arrest as a war crimes suspect, Kuhara Fusanosuke proved an extremely

effective manipulator on Go's behalf.¹⁹⁴ He convinced the Minister for Home Affairs that Suzuki's drive against the black market in Osaka was setting dangerous precedents that would damage the Liberal Party's political prospects. The Socialist Party aimed to establish a regime of central economic control, the initial stages of which were the eradication of the black market and the promotion of properly regulated channels of commerce. Such developments were anathema to the business and financial interests represented by the Liberal Party. Kuhara on several occasions dispatched one Tanaka Tatsuo, prospective governor of Yamaguchi prefecture, to discuss the situation with the Minister for Home Affairs, his deputy, and the head of the Police Affairs Bureau (Tanaka Naraichi). The latter encouraged Suzuki to bring his campaign to a swift conclusion, warning him of the opposition in government circles incited by his actions. It was made clear that "his investigations did not please the Minister for Home Affairs". A spokesman for Tanaka Tatsuo and Kuhara was then sent to Osaka to explain that "Go was no rogue and was a very useful man for Sino-Japanese amity". Suzuki was handed Tanaka Naraichi's name card, and was strongly urged to discontinue his investigation.

In his statement Suzuki accused those who campaigned on Go's behalf of accepting bribes, describing the political machinations surrounding his projected transfer as a "black market dealing in personnel affairs". His drives against illegal commercial operations in Osaka caused ripples that spread to Tokyo, to the very core of the Japanese Government. The opposition aroused by Suzuki's commitment to fair and equitable distribution of scarce commodities illustrates the establishment's fear of the financial and political repercussions of direct control of the economy from the centre. As far as the Liberals were concerned, Go was an entrepreneur rather than a criminal, a businessman whose political views fortunately coincided with their own. They provided him with the kind of economic environment in which he could prosper, and he was generous with the money he made. The respect accorded Suzuki

¹⁹⁴ Kuhara had an impressive track record in business and politics. He founded Nissan at the beginning of the Taishō period, became Minister of Communications in 1928 and financially supported the young officers in the February 26th Incident, 1936.

by American forces in Osaka ensured that he remained at his post throughout 1947, although his opponents continued to plot his downfall.

In May, 1948, more than one year after the initial attempt to secure his removal, Suzuki Eiji was accused of "administer(ing) his office in a dictatorial, illegal manner and of misappropriating police welfare funds".¹⁹⁵ The anonymous letter containing the charges was addressed to General MacArthur, and claimed that the police chief was "winning....the favour of higher officials of local military government, military police and Civil Intelligence Section through women and liquor".¹⁹⁶ Apparently funds earmarked for welfare expenses were being used to entertain high officials of the Occupation (around 80,000-150,000 yen/month).¹⁹⁷ The letter's authors referred to Suzuki's "political inclinations", stating that he claimed to be a Socialist Party member, that he used his position to oppress the Democratic Liberal Party and that he played a major part in the impeachment of the former prefectural governor, Tanaka Kôtarô, and was now in conflict with his successor, Akama Bunzô.¹⁹⁸ Such comments betrayed the identity of Suzuki's accusers. Pulliam, with some justification, believed the letter to be "the handiwork of Tanaka Manitsu¹⁹⁹, Tanaka Kôtarô, Kuhara Fusanosuke and Go Hyakufuku - all malcontents, principally of the Liberal Party, who had failed in the April 1947 election".²⁰⁰ He maintained that the letter was "part of the Liberal Party's political propaganda line, in consonance with other political party manoeuvres,....to stage a comeback in the Osaka area".²⁰¹ Investigations revealed that the accusations against Suzuki were not only groundless but also

¹⁹⁵ Comments on Anonymous Letter re. Osaka Police System, 27/5/48; To: Lt. Col. Battey; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 00246).

¹⁹⁶ Military Intelligence Section, ATIS: Full Translation of Letter Alleging Corruption of Osaka Police System led by Suzuki Eiji (NDL, G-2 00246).

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ A Liberal Party member, and former Minister of State in the Yoshida cabinet, he was involved in the 4/1947 plot to unseat Suzuki.

²⁰⁰ Comments on Anonymous Letter re. Osaka Police System, 27/5/48; To: Lt. Col. Battey; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 00246).

²⁰¹ Ibid.

malicious, motivated purely by political expediency.²⁰² The conspirators once again failed to discredit Osaka's police chief, the principal reason being his positive attitude towards Occupation personnel. All spoke "very highly of Suzuki's integrity and efficiency as a law enforcement executive and....stressed his complete cooperation with...forces in the Osaka area".²⁰³ This, more than anything else, protected him from the barrage of accusations.

The tale of Suzuki Eiji is a fitting postscript to this chapter. Throughout the main contention has been that the Japanese police served the old guard - those associated with the financial/political/economic organisations of prewar/wartime Japan. They colluded with hoarders of military supplies, black marketeers and criminal oyabun, motivated by a sense of their traditional role in Japanese society and, more importantly, by their own economic privations; the latter reinforced the former. Although the evidence for all this is largely circumstantial, it is clear that the loyalties of the police did not lie with the Japanese people as the Occupation authorities intended. As has been suggested, the establishment was seen as the best guarantor of the police's future. Suzuki Eiji is the exception that proves the rule. The pressures that built up against him could only have been withstood by someone who combined the courage of his convictions with excellent connections in Occupation circles. Suzuki seems to have been the only police chief who could boast such attributes.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Suzuki resigned as Osaka police chief in October, 1951, following the failure of a defamation suit. His parting comment - "I have been very stubborn" - was as memorable as his period of office.

CHAPTER FIVE

ALLIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

This chapter draws on a limited number of secondary sources, principally accounts by journalists and military government officials. Japan Diary by Mark Gayn, a correspondent for the Chicago Sun, figures prominently, together with Kakemono by Honor Tracy, employed by the Manchester Guardian, and Robert Textor's critique entitled Failure in Japan. The latter focuses on the Occupation's limitations, its failings, whereas the works of Ralph Braibanti, another military government official, tend to adopt a more balanced perspective. Gayn and Textor had high expectations of the Occupation, judging it according to the realisation of radical reforms described in the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. Both were aware of developments in the field, and were principally concerned with the implementation of reform. Textor recently admitted that he expected too much of the Occupation,¹ a charge that could equally be levelled at Gayn. Japan Diary has been described as the "Japanese leftist intellectual's bible on the Occupation",² and certainly some of its claims are either exaggerated or premature; Kazuo Kawai remarked that it is "perhaps the most interesting but also the most unreliable...of the journalistic works".³ As for Honor Tracy, she regarded the Occupation as a misguided venture from the start, and was only too happy to confirm her suspicions by travelling around the country. Nevertheless, Tracy, Textor, Gayn and Braibanti all had a sense of the Occupation in the round. For this reason, their works are valuable to the historian. Besides, sources that elucidate the Occupation's local dimension are scarce. Obviously military government officials could not bare their souls in reports to higher authority.

As early as December, 1945, Mark Gayn voiced the anxieties of those charged with monitoring the implementation of SCAP directives. He

¹ R. Textor, "Success in Japan - Despite Some Human Foibles and Cultural Problems", in W. Nimmo, ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots (MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Va., 1992) p.171.

² T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.64.

³ K. Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (The University of Chicago Press, 1960) p.250.

used a nautical analogy to illustrate their predicament vis à vis an indirect Occupation: Whilst GHQ charted the broad course that Japan was expected to follow, the Japanese themselves continued to operate the ship, military government personnel acting merely as "observers".⁴ During a brief visit to Sendai, where he was a guest of General Soule, chief of military government for the area, Gayn complained that "the American observers can only report that the ship is being operated by what is largely the old gang, and (although) there appear to be major deviations from the course....the observers can do nothing on their own".⁵ This chapter develops Gayn's argument, drawing attention to the frustrations of "military government"⁶ and the unlikely alliances that they produced. The Japanese police and Allied officials in the localities apparently needed each other, the one reinforcing the other's position. The former - at least its upper echelons - will be treated throughout this chapter as a constituent part of a ruling elite ("the old gang") as well as an agency of law enforcement; that is to say, the role and conduct of Allied administrators in the field will be examined in the light of their relations with Japanese officials in general, and the police in particular. Such journalists as Mark Gayn and Honor Tracy⁷ introduce us to some very colourful military personnel, whose self-proclaimed commitment to "democracy" was frequently undermined by their consumption of large amounts of black market produce. Ralph Braibanti⁸ and Robert Textor⁹, both of whom served as military government officers, provide more general critiques of the Occupation's local dimension. Many of the problems of military government derived from both its structure and context - these factors must be addressed at the outset. Only then can the

⁴ M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.53

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Major Shaw, assistant chief of military government in the Osaka area, told Gayn that Military Government was "a misnomer....We couldn't govern even if we wanted to" (diary entry for 21/2/1946, p.117).

⁷ Tracy spent eight months in Japan (1946/47).

⁸ R. J. D. Braibanti spent sixteen months as a military government officer in Yamanashi prefecture and three months as coordinator for military government teams in the Kantô region.

⁹ R. B. Textor - a civilian employee fluent in Japanese - was Assistant Civil Information and Education Officer for I Corps, based at Kyoto, for seventeen months. He then became Civil Information and Education Officer for Military Government in Wakayama Prefecture, a position he held for a further nine months.

frustrations and foibles of military government personnel be fully appreciated.

The Structure of Military Government

Writing in 1949, Ralph Braibanti noted that "the administrative process of military government at the local level" had been largely disregarded in monographs or articles on the Occupation.¹⁰ The historiography of the Occupation has continued to reflect this tendency, and Braibanti's explanation for this could equally be applied today:

That the function of local military government units as the field service of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) has been overlooked is to be explained principally by the dramatic character and impressive scope of the functions of MacArthur's headquarters and *the resulting eclipse of local activities necessarily of a more prosaic nature* (my italics).¹¹

The fact that there were nearly two thousand military government personnel throughout Japan, all of whom were in daily contact with Japanese officials, suggests "the inadequacy of a critique of the Occupation based solely on the functions of SCAP".¹² After all, those working in the field were in a privileged position, although they themselves didn't see it that way - unlike their superiors in Tokyo, engaged in formulating social and political reforms, military government personnel were able to monitor the *impact* of the legislation emanating from the centre. Honor Tracy found the ambience in Tokyo not only very different from that in the localities, but also far less revealing:

It was not....in the mahogany foxholes of GHQ that I became aware of....undercurrents...of perplexity. That came later, when I went into the provinces and talked to some of the military government teams...In Tokyo the official note was one of a happy, almost a sublime confidence....¹³

¹⁰ R. J. Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government in Japan at the Prefectural Level", American Political Science Review Vol. 43, No.2 (April 1949), p.258.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ H. Tracy, Kakemono - A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950) p.17.

Given that those charged with supervising the implementation of reforms were so thinly spread throughout Japan, the confidence of those in their "mahogany foxholes" was perhaps surprising. In August, 1947, G-2 enumerated actual and potential agents of law enforcement (the Japanese police and American personnel respectively) in each prefecture, with a view to discouraging a comprehensive police purge. According to this survey there were only 1,885 military government personnel, 692 members of Counter Intelligence Corps, 3,492 American Military Police¹⁴ and 72,056 tactical troops.¹⁵ The latter had almost no official contact with the Japanese and represented a weapon of last resort. Considered the "strong arm of the military government",¹⁶ they were to be used only if the Supreme Commander assumed direct control - this "reserve power....exist(ed), together with the combat troops, as a potential sanction in the event of non-compliance by the Japanese".¹⁷ In December, 1945, there were 430,287 American soldiers and civilians in Japan, a figure considerably higher than that of 1947.¹⁸ Due to "the hearty Japanese cooperation with the Sixth and Eighth Armies" and the tense political situation in Korea,¹⁹ military government units had been either sent home or assigned to southern Korea, "where there was a very real military government job to do".²⁰ The Eighth Army assumed all Occupation duties in January 1946, following the withdrawal of the Sixth Army.²¹

¹⁴ Their headwear - "inverted white pots" (Tracy) - caused many to refer to them as "snowdrops".

¹⁵ Analysis of population, military and police strength by prefecture (NDL, G-2 02775/6)

¹⁶ R. J. Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government...", p.273 (fn. 3a). Involved in occasional patrol duty when called upon by Military Government.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.262.

¹⁸ Takemae Eiji, *GHQ* (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1983) p.44.

¹⁹ A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor, and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., *American Experiences in Military Government in World War Two* (Rinehart, New York, 1948) p.321.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.336 (Summary of a speech by Lieutenant General R. K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff).

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.341.

The Eighth Army was "supposed to ensure that MacArthur's orders (were) actually followed by the Japanese".²² Until the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, Eighth Army HQ coordinated corps, divisions, regiments and battalions throughout Japan, their principal responsibility being the maintenance of order. Military government teams, one of which was located in the capital of each of Japan's forty-six prefectures, were also under the Eighth Army until 1st January, 1950.²³ They communicated with military personnel at regional level - there were eight "regions", each responsible for several prefectures. Tactical (order-maintaining) generals at corps level issued orders to and received correspondence from regional HQ.²⁴ The commander of the Eighth Army stood at the apex of this cumbersome military structure.

As has already been intimated, it was some time before the administrative structures of military government settled down. Until July, 1946, they "inadequately met the needs of the actual situation".²⁵ In February, 1946, Major Shaw complained to Mark Gayn that a team of "twelve officers, twenty-six enlisted men, and four typewriters....(was) supposed to have direct authority over two prefectures, and supervision over nine others".²⁶ The reorganisation that took place in July/August 1946 was based on "an accommodation of administrative forms to the disparate needs of the (various prefectures)".²⁷ Taking into account such factors as size, location, population, level of industrialisation and concentration of combat troops, the Occupation classified prefectures according to three categories: "minor", "intermediate" or "major".²⁸ Osaka was placed in a special category, and the metropolitan area of Tokyo and Yokohama was designated the Tokyo-

²² R. Textor, Failure in Japan: With Keystones for a Positive Policy (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1972) Appendix 1, p.233.

²³ Ibid. On 1 January, 1950, a Civil Affairs Section was set up in GHQ, along with eight regional Civil Affairs offices to monitor local developments (these replaced the prefectural military government teams).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.259.

²⁶ Gayn, Japan Diary, p.117.

²⁷ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.259.

²⁸ Ibid., p.260.

Kanagawa Military Government District.²⁹ The number of officers and enlisted men assigned to each prefecture depended on its classification.³⁰ Eight regional headquarters were also set up in August 1946 - these "had no jurisdiction over the Japanese,...function(ing merely) as administrative control echelons over groups of teams".³¹

In December, 1946, the overall structure was slightly modified - three prefectures were reclassified, and the balance between officers and enlisted men was altered for all five categories. At the same time the standard regional unit was abandoned, and "a greater variety of structural possibilities introduced".³² At the end of 1946, 422 officers and 1,466 enlisted staff (total of 1,888) were assigned to military government. Whereas a minor team, say in Tottori, consisted of five officers and 26 enlisted men, the Tokyo-Kanagawa military government district boasted a staff of 65 officers and 150 subordinates.³³ Thus, some efforts were made to match the team with the prefecture concerned, although, as Braibanti maintains, there was perhaps still too much standardisation. He argues that the problem derived from the teams' military origins - "...in the military organisation structure and adherence to structure assume virtue and sanctity of unreasonable proportions".³⁴

Robert Textor argued that the American military was not equal to the task of democratising Japan, and referred disparagingly to "the dead hand of Army bureaucracy".³⁵ One of his "six suggested keystones for a positive Japan policy" was "civilianization":

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.260-1.

³⁰ A "minor" military government team was composed of 6 officers and 25 enlisted men; an "intermediate" one included 40 people (8 + 32); and a "major" team was made up of 10 officers and 37 subordinates. Officers were assigned to one of the following areas: natural resources, commerce and industry; education; procurement; public health; adjutant. Specialisation within these categories could occur only where there were sufficient officers (eg. Osaka-fu military government team assigned one of its sixteen officers specifically to money and banking) .

³¹ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.261. They were permitted a staff of 11 officers and 30 enlisted men.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 261-2.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p.262.

³⁵ Textor, *Failure in Japan*, p.193.

We must establish civilian supremacy in the Occupation at the earliest opportunity. The Army must be removed from all nonmilitary functions, and given the job of simply protecting and servicing a civilian Occupation.³⁶

Civilians worked both in the field as military government officials and in the special staff sections that made up GHQ, SCAP. Most positions in the various types of field organisation were open to civilians, and, according to Braibanti, by the end of 1947 many were filled by men and women unconnected with the military.³⁷ By 1949, however, only GHQ, SCAP could boast "functional specialists with a high degree of expertise....Although originally the local teams were staffed with trained specialists, these have long since departed and have been replaced by combat officers".³⁸ Right from the beginning of the Occupation civilian experts had to contend with both the overt and covert agencies of the military. Textor reserved special disdain for the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), which were spread very thinly throughout Japan (if we accept the G-2 survey referred to earlier, the average number of CIC personnel per prefecture was around 15). It was their close links with unsavoury individuals that particularly disturbed Textor, although he acknowledged "contact with the underworld (was) an integral part of the intelligence function".³⁹ Despite a very different job description, military government officials were also drawn to prominent Japanese racketeers. Such unholy alliances were perhaps unsurprising, given the frustrations associated with the process of military government.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-9

³⁷ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.261. At the beginning of July, 1947, the Eighth Army specifically allotted civil service personnel to the military government teams. The total number of personnel engaged in military government officially increased from 1,888 to 2,439 - 398 officers, 1,436 enlisted men and 605 civilians, the latter occupying positions from welfare officer to clerk-typist.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.264.

³⁹ Textor, *Failure in Japan*, p.123.

The Process of Military Government

"Ill-conceived channels of command"⁴⁰ and a very limited role were the principal causes of frustration. The latter derived from "the genius of (military government's) organisation", namely the "principle of using the Japanese government to take corrective action in (any) instance of non-compliance".⁴¹ By adopting this principle of action the US was able to distance itself from the administrative process - the Japanese Government was to be held responsible for any problems that might arise, whereas the Occupation was to take the credit for any successes. Whilst this policy of aloofness might have benefited those formulating policy, it constantly undermined the efforts of those working in the field. They were to act as supervisors or observers, their role strictly limited to "surveillance and reporting of non-compliant behaviour".⁴² Military government responsibilities were specified in the Eighth Army Annex No. 8 (Military Government) to Administrative Order No.19 - the Occupation forces were "to act solely as an agency for *observing, investigating, and reporting* compliance with the instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Imperial Japanese Government".⁴³

Mark Gayn dined with a group of military government officials in Sendai, and came away with the impression that they had their hands tied:

The Japanese, they said, were sabotaging every directive whenever they had the opportunity, and the local American commanders, operating under rigid orders from above, could do nothing but file reports that produced no action.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.267.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.265.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor, and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) pp. 343-4.

⁴⁴ Gayn, Japan Diary, p.51

It was not surprising that soldiers, used to an active rather than a passive role, increasingly resented "the mandarins of GHQ".⁴⁵ Their activities were so constrained, according to Gayn, that "a commander....(could) not...,on his own authority, close up a brothel that (was) infecting his men. All he (could) do (was) either put the establishment off limits to his men or request the Japanese police to close it".⁴⁶ Military government's dependence on the Japanese police will be examined in a later section - for the moment it is enough to register the conditions that caused American administrators to turn to Japanese officials for help. Insecurity reflected weakness, both in terms of numerical strength and their strictly supervisory role. In December, 1945, Mark Gayn, during a visit to Akita, noted the anger felt by the local military government detachment at their not having the "right to give orders to Japanese officials, except on the matter of Japanese demobilisation":

"How can you get these people to do what you want them to do without authority?" asked one of the men. "I've observed no improvement here. The old gang continues to run things. And the Military Government, instead of being what its name implies it is, and enforcing General MacArthur's directives, can only chew its nails".⁴⁷

In fact, teams did not sit back and chew their nails - they opted for an active role, and made every effort to circumvent Eighth Army regulations. Braibanti claimed that one of military government's major functions was "the rendering of informal, non-mandatory advice and assistance to Japanese prefectural governments".⁴⁸ This was done, however, in contravention of official policy directives. Paragraph 3 of Eighth Army Operational Directive 29/2, dated 17th August 1946, expressly prohibited "local" directives, except in emergencies:

The necessity for subordinate occupation force commanders....issuing administrative instructions to implement further the operational directives of this headquarters or SCAP directives will be infrequent and confined to emergencies.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ H. Tracy, Kakemono - A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950) p.82.

⁴⁶ Gayn, Japan Diary, p.52.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.79.

⁴⁸ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.268.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Even in an emergency, such orders were undermined by the provision that "no administrative instructions....issued by occupation force commanders...will provide any penalty for violation thereof".⁵⁰ GHQ went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the above regulations were observed. The Japanese administration was invited to inform SCAP whenever military government exceeded its authority. What was technically an enemy government was encouraged by the Occupation HQ to disobey American officials in the localities:

In some instances, especially in matters of procurement of Japanese supplies and services, SCAP...directed the Japanese prefectural governments to disobey local orders issued by prefectural military government officials, since such orders were illegal.⁵¹

As a result of such "curious reversal(s) of reasonable behaviour"⁵² Japanese officials in the localities were able to play off one Occupation agency against another, to exploit the gulf between GHQ and its field units. The breadth of this gulf corresponded to the height of the command structure. Its numerous layers impeded effective communication between the centre and periphery.

The five layers of administration - GHQ, Eighth Army, Corps,⁵³ military government region, and prefectural teams - "reveal(ed) a standard army pattern of line command which is characterised by vertical organisation".⁵⁴ The top and bottom strata liaised with Japanese bureaucrats in the national ministries and prefectural administrations. As far as the three intermediate levels were concerned, they were detached from the governmental process. They were merely staging posts through which a "SCAPIN"⁵⁵ passed on its way to the military government team. On receipt of a SCAPIN, the Eighth Army drew up an "operational directive", which defined the

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ I Corps in Kyoto was responsible for 20 prefectures in southern Japan (Kinki, Tôkai-Hokuriku and Kyûshû regions), IX Corps for the 15 prefectures which constitute the Tôhoku, Hokkaidô and Kantô regions. The Eighth Army was directly responsible for the remainder (Shikoku and Chûgoku regions and the Tokyo/ Yokohama area).

⁵⁴ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.264.

⁵⁵ SCAP instruction.

role of local military government units - it might, for example, order teams to undertake inspections and submit their findings.⁵⁶ As it passed through Corps and regional HQ the directive underwent minimal change, suggesting that these strata were superfluous. Indeed, Braibanti argued that these two administrative layers served no useful purpose "except to delay and confuse".⁵⁷ Directives from above and reports from below took several months to pass through the various levels, the delay often discounting their contents.

Poor channels of communication infuriated Akita military government team - they regarded wistfully the unobstructed conduits through which Japanese instructions passed:

The Japanese get the texts of the American directives through their official channels much quicker than we do. Sometimes, requests to American officers to check up on compliance with directives arrive before the directives themselves reach the outposts.⁵⁸

Military government officials, isolated and insecure, were no match for local Japanese administrations. Lieutenant Hartley, who "looked after" Mark Gayn in Komoro (Akita prefecture), was "perplexed by the problems of political directives (and) a coldly hostile Japanese town...".⁵⁹ On New Year's Day, 1946, Hartley was informed that "the Japanese town hall...had run up the 'meatball' (Japanese flag) in violation of all known orders" - the local Japanese police chief insisted that the action had been sanctioned by General MacArthur. Hartley didn't know what to think - he "had had trouble before with directives which reached the Japanese long before they got to him, and he suspected that this had happened again".⁶⁰ Major Shaw in Osaka experienced similar frustrations:

⁵⁶ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.264.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.265. R. Textor recently drew attention to military government's "inefficient structure", arguing that three levels of administration "would not only have done the job faster, but saved manpower for other purposes" (W. Nimmo, ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots, pp.155-156).

⁵⁸ Gayn, Japan Diary, p.79. Mark Orr, an official of the Civil Information and Education Section in GHQ, recently confirmed that there was "a great deal of unease at the local level where the Japanese side seemed to know much more than the American side did". (W. Nimmo, ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots, p.96).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.80.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.83.

Headquarters dreams up directives. These go to the Military Government in Yokohama. Weeks later, the directives filter down to us. Meanwhile, the Jap government rushes its orders down its own channels. What happens is this. The Japs...take some action...We say, 'You can't do this.' They say blandly, 'Excuse please, but we can. There is a directive out to that effect.' We start checking frantically with Yokohama, and the next thing that happens is that we are embarrassed no end.⁶¹

Unable to rely on the Eighth Army for the transmission of directives, the military government teams turned to the English-language Nippon Times, which fortunately published most of the SCAPINs.⁶² One officer told Gayn that his team subscribed to the Nippon Times "to learn what our policy for Japan is".⁶³

The fate of military government reports was similar to that of SCAP directives - they got lost or unnecessarily delayed in one of the military strata. Sometimes they were simply ignored. Lieutenant Colonel Munske, chief of military government in the Kansai area, submitted a report to Eighth Army, Yokohama, cataloguing "Japanese evasions", particularly those relating to the purge of the Tokkô. Munske was an object-lesson in low expectations:

Under the cute setup we have here, all I can do is report. The report is buried in the files in Yokohama, together with other reports on the same thing happening all over Japan. Indirectly, we are told there are "higher considerations" which make it necessary "for the time being" to ignore this violation of directives by the government.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, Japanese officials exploited the weaknesses of the Occupation's administrative structure. Prefectural governors fully appreciated the difficulties of military government - they realised that "methods for reporting (were) such that failure to comply on their part (would) seldom result in any reprimand, and when it (did), the time lapse (would) have been so great that the particular condition complained of (might) well have changed".⁶⁵

⁶¹ Ibid., p.117.

⁶² Bouterse, Taylor and Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan", p.344.

⁶³ Gayn, Japan Diary, p.79.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.123.

⁶⁵ Bouterse, Taylor and Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan", p.349.

In short, the process of military supervision was "rendered impractical by a sluggishness, a certain unresponsiveness, in the corrective process prescribed".⁶⁶ Braibanti cautioned that this sluggishness provoked independent action on the part of military government officials - determined to impress the Japanese with "the promptness of American action,...(they were) impelled to act in a personal capacity".⁶⁷ This "unauthorised assumption of discretionary power"⁶⁸ undermined the Occupation's basic philosophy, namely indirect rule, and widened the gulf between GHQ and its field units. Disillusioned with GHQ, military government officials increasingly relied on anyone who commanded respect in the locale and so could assist them in the resolution of problems. Perhaps more importantly, such individuals were able to relieve the boredom endured by many Americans (a subject examined in the final section of this chapter).

Mutual Dependence

Chapter Two (The Consequences of Defeat) touched on relations between the Occupation authorities and the Japanese police, paying particular attention to the latter's need for reinforcement. In numerous cities and towns Japanese officials and politicians sought the support of American agencies, fully aware that the people "imputed an almost unlimited range of authority to the military government units".⁶⁹ However, the relationship between Americans and Japanese was not always a one-sided one. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that military government teams and CIC detachments worked hard to foster good relations with local elites, which usually included a police chief. When Lieutenant Hartley, our friend in Komoro, threw a party on New Year's Eve, he invited those who carried weight in the community - for example, "the present chief of police, and his predecessor, who was dismissed for being a

⁶⁶ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.267.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp.265-6.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.265.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.270.

Thought Control man, and who apparently still runs this town".⁷⁰ According to Mark Gayn, Hartley accepted help regardless of who offered it - "...in Komoro he (could) find it only among the Japanese villains, and his uneasiness mount(ed) because he (was) aware of their villainy".⁷¹

Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachments seem to have valued both the expertise of Tokkô officials and the connections of prominent racketeers. As has already been stated, Robert Textor was particularly concerned about alliances between intelligence agents and those who had supposedly been removed from positions of influence. He argued that CIC detachments frustrated the efforts of "democratically inclined proreform people",⁷² and corroborated his charge with two examples:

First. The chief of CIC in 1946 in a prefecture adjoining my place of work, told me that his most valuable "man", whom he entrusted with his most important assignments, was a former high official in the Japanese Secret Police...A member of this CIC detachment remarked with surprised admiration how this former secret police official knew about everything that was going on in the prefecture as soon as it happened.⁷³

Textor's second example demonstrated the CIC's dominant position in the localities:

Second. In another prefecture, where I spent some time, a local Japanese was believed by Military Government...to be the biggest racketeer in the prefecture....One way he sought to protect his position was to ingratiate himself with the local CIC detachment. Not only did CIC headquarter and billet themselves in a mansion owned by and procured from this man, but they actively used his services as a key informant...⁷⁴

In short, Textor believed that CIC units depended on Japanese who were intent on obstructing the implementation of reforms.

On the whole military government teams and CIC detachments were less concerned with reform than with the maintenance of a stable

⁷⁰ Gayn, Japan Diary, pp.80-81.

⁷¹ Ibid., p.80.

⁷² Textor, Failure in Japan (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1972) p.121.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.122.

political environment. Major J. C. Milligan, responsible for public safety and rationing in the Osaka area, admitted that he was "no reformer"- his job was "to maintain public safety", and, as far as he was concerned, a policeman's politics or background mattered far less than his ability to do "a competent job".⁷⁵ In marked contrast, Robert Textor, committed to democratisation, condemned "truculent police measures on behalf of the Old Guard...".⁷⁶ Whether supportive or suspicious of the Japanese police, most American officials recognised the need for close liaison. In September, 1946, Major M. W. Whitlock, a PSD inspector, reported that the Nara military government team and Kumano Takaji, the prefectural Police Director, worked very cooperatively - daily liaison proved an effective means of resolving police problems.⁷⁷

CIC detachments, however, had to exercise more care in their dealings with the Japanese police. Towards the end of 1948 Colonel Duff (G-2) felt obliged to assure Pulliam, the head of the Public Safety Division, that "contact established and maintained by CIC with Japanese police at various levels (was) naturally and necessarily limited to securing information by appropriate methods and to the lending of moral support".⁷⁸ Duff carefully defined the role of CIC, making it clear that there would be no intrusion into PSD territory:

CIC must remain in the capacity of observers and reporters in the near background and must not involve itself in police operational support, training...Those are functions which are the assigned responsibility of other SCAP elements. As has been done in the past, CIC can report...(on) the pulse of overall law enforcement...in certain localities.⁷⁹

Following a disturbance involving repatriates at Maizuru⁸⁰ in November, 1948, General Willoughby, the head of G-2, called for

⁷⁵ Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981), p.117.

⁷⁶ Textor, Failure in Japan, p.22.

⁷⁷ Memo dated 20/9/46; To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection of Japanese Police Installations in Osaka, Kyoto, Nara and Mie prefectures (NDL, G-2 00228).

⁷⁸ To: Colonel Pulliam; Thru: CIS; undated (NDL, G-2 00252).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ A port on the Japan Sea.

"intimate liaison with Japanese police chiefs".⁸¹ Colonel Bratton confidently informed him that "all CIC areas (had) regular contact with (the Japanese) police, (and) CIC personnel...were personally acquainted with the....police chief in their respective areas".⁸² He went on to insist that CIC was "making every effort to cement relations with the Japanese police throughout the nation", and was "receiving ever-increasing cooperation", particularly with regard to repatriates.⁸³ According to Bratton, Pulliam recommended that a cooperative relationship between CIC and the Japanese police should be founded on "friendly liaison" rather than the more formal association that Willoughby desired. The head of G-2 responded brusquely to Bratton's comments:

When you speak of efforts to "cement relations", I want some positive action - place the Chief of Police on our payroll and initiate a more generous gift policy plus entertainment....Initiate informal steps with Yoshida government to develop orders for cooperation with local CIC units....⁸⁴

The reference to entertainment was ironic, given that the provision of food and leisure activities was the principal means by which local ruling elites endeared themselves to the military government teams (this subject is examined in the next section).

Willoughby appears to have been successful in formalizing relations between the Japanese police and CIC detachments. In February, 1949, the head of CIC in Mie prefecture proposed a "police liaison party", during which qualified personnel could deal with a number of questions that the local police had submitted.⁸⁵ He remarked that "close liaison...(had) already produced tangible results, (and) that clarification of the attached questions (would) tend towards better understanding between the Japanese police and the Occupation

⁸¹ Memo dated 25/11/48; To: Colonel Bratton; Subject: Repatriates Incident at Maizuru (Communist indoctrination of repatriates from Soviet areas) NDL, G-2 00251.

⁸² Memo dated 30/11/48 (G-2 00251).

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Memo to: Colonel Bratton; dated 1/12/48 (NDL, G-2 00251).

⁸⁵ Memo dated 17/2/1949; Subject: Questions addressed to Mie CIC area by National Rural Police and Municipal Police of Mie prefecture; Thru: Commanding Officer, 3rd CIC District; To: Commanding Officer, 441st CIC detachment (NDL, G-2 00257).

forces as a whole".⁸⁶ His superior, Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Dickey, maintained that the questions "should be handled by a representative of PSD (as they fell) outside the CIC mission".⁸⁷ Dickey felt that the queries indicated a "confused state of mind within Mie police" - ie. they implied that Mie CIC condoned a return to pre-war/wartime police practices. The topics that the police wished to discuss were as follows:

....In case of riots what repressive measures do American police take? Mie Military Government issued a directive dated 7/8/1948...that exempts reporting a gathering of less than 500 people. Now on account of extreme leftists would it not be better to include gatherings of less than 500 people?

....Could not a SCAP directive give power to police to stand guard at any kind of meeting, public or private? At present plain clothes policemen attend labour union sponsored meetings.

....Heretofore CIC and Military Government have been instructing us by phone in matters of making investigations. Hereafter...we would like to have such instructions in writing so that we could show them to the persons who are to be investigated.⁸⁸

These questions indicated a good rapport between Mie police and the local CIC detachment, which, given the topics involved, was potentially embarrassing. The last paragraph suggests that the police could not function adequately without the assistance of CIC personnel - a disturbing revelation in the context of an "indirect" Occupation.

There were, however, occasions when the reverse was true - when American officials could not perform their duties without the help of the Japanese police. Ralph Braibanti maintained that "the policy of utilizing existing agencies of Japanese government, the need for suitable housing for American troops, and the requirement of maintaining law and order made reliance on the police essential in the first few months of the Occupation".⁸⁹ The Japanese police efficiently drafted "labourers in great numbers to enlarge and improve cantonment areas". They "prepared rosters of workers",

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ 1st Indorsement, HQ, 3rd CIC District (G-2 00257).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol.18, No.2 (24/1/49) p.19.

visiting their homes early in the morning to ensure compliance.⁹⁰ Such labour duties were unpopular, undermining social hierarchies and disrupting agricultural activities. Cooperation between the two parties was mutually beneficial, the Occupation seeing fit to constantly bolster the police's "declining prestige....to secure sufficient labour for their needs".⁹¹

According to Arthur Bouterse, Philip Taylor and Arthur Maass, military government's reliance on the Japanese police "for the maintenance of order and the execution of...directives" constantly undermined the drive for democratisation.⁹² They maintained that the average Japanese lived "in just as great a fear of the police as he did before the Occupation. He (knew) that the police (were) supported by the Occupation troops".⁹³ In return for such support, the Japanese police made every effort to assist American personnel in the performance of their duties. For example, there was the case of the military government port officer for Kanagawa prefecture, who had to clear a beach of small craft to facilitate the discharge of cargo:

Inspection of the area revealed that many of the fishing boats were not in use and that most of the markings did not yield the necessary information to the American Nisei interpreter. The military government officer...ordered the first policeman he saw...to have all the boats and barges out by noon the next day....At the designated time the Japanese boats were out and the Port Command commenced operations.⁹⁴

American officials - from the lowly military government officer to the army commander - depended on the Japanese police for the resolution of problems. Friendly relations between the two parties sometimes reflected this working partnership, but perhaps more important were the banquets and parties at which local dignitaries, such as the police chief, wined and dined their conquerors.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.18.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor, and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) p.351.

⁹³ Ibid., p.352.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp.352-353.

A Weakness for Entertainment

The "leisure industry" was a growth area during the Occupation. The various constituent parts of what has been called the Japanese establishment each had a stake in the industry's various offshoots. When General Soule put a "dance hall" in Sendai "off limits" to prevent further cases of VD in his unit, he was visited by "a whole procession of Japanese - the owner, the mayor of Sendai, the police chief", all of whom "plead(ed) the owner's case".⁹⁵ Attending to Americans' needs was not only financially lucrative - it also served to cement relations between local rulers and their overseers. At a time when the US was supplying Japan with foodstuffs to make up serious shortfalls, local dignitaries frequently entertained Americans, always managing to satisfy the appetites of their burly guests.

Ralph Braibanti noted that Japanese "political parties were quick to discern the American weakness for entertainment, parties and celebrations...".⁹⁶ Lieutenant Hartley, Komoro's crusader against corruption, usually lost the scent when faced with a bowl of *sukiyaki*. Banquets at Otsuki (Yamanashi prefecture) and Mitsumine (Nagano prefecture) made up for "school raids" that had been frustrated by Japanese ingenuity - Komoro's police chief had managed to alert his counterpart in Otsuki, who in turn took steps to ensure that Mitsumine was "prepared" to receive the Americans.⁹⁷ Hartley, resigned to his fate, decided to get drunk:

He traded cups with the town officials, in a gesture of courtesy, and offered toasts himself. There was an atmosphere of deeprooted good will and understanding....He expressed pleasure over his visit and the indications of a good job of democratizing being done by the mayor.⁹⁸

Hartley was not alone in his frustrations, nor in the way he chose to deal with them. Honor Tracy introduces us to an equally colourful character - Captain Mooney, the Food Officer in Kyôto prefecture, who found it disconcerting that record catches of mackerel were not

⁹⁵ Gayn, Japan Diary, p.52.

⁹⁶ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.270.

⁹⁷ Gayn, Japan Diary, pp.85-91.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.90.

reaching the shops. Determined to solve the mystery of the disappearing fish, Mooney set off for Maizuru, accompanied by Tracy, an official from the Ministry of Food, and a senior man from the Kyoto fish market. The latter's get-up - suit, silk shirt and "stout moccasins" - suggested that Mooney's statement that he was "on the level" was perhaps mistaken.⁹⁹ Representatives from the collection and forwarding points, the railway, the allocation point, and the fish market in Kyôto were summoned and verbally assaulted by the Captain, who alleged that the missing fish, rather than going "into legal channels", was being diverted into the black market, where a lot of people were "getting a rake-off".¹⁰⁰

One of the Japanese assured Mooney that "he did not hear anything of black market,...that people were very honest and (the) police very busy".¹⁰¹ Following "a series of threats" Mooney adopted a conciliatory approach, distributing cigarettes and suggesting "a trip by launch to the fishing-grounds".¹⁰² This turned out to be "a delightful experience". They "witnessed a massive catch by three Japanese trawlers", and joined the fishermen for a feast of mackerel, washed down by bottle after bottle of beer supplied by the man from the fish market, who Tracy unkindly nicknamed "the Shark". The size of the catch reminded the Captain of his mission, but only momentarily, and he quickly returned to the business in hand - eating and the dinner arrangements for the evening. "On reaching land," the group retired "to recover from one banquet and to prepare (themselves) for the next". The Shark, at the Captain's prompting, had invited them all to dinner. They were treated to a "deluge of fish..., crab and prawn tenpura....(and) a vast sukiyaki...". The Food Officer was a victim of his own endeavours:

The Captain had been left with a seemingly insatiable appetite by his efforts to track down the missing fish, of which he now swallowed a handsome portion as fast as if it were forty-eight hours since he had tasted food.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Tracy, Kakemono - A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950) p.96.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp.98-9.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.99.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.100.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.104.

Hartley and Mooney, and presumably other military government officials, seemed reluctant to attribute their hosts' hospitality to black market connections. Perhaps they were simply pragmatists, aware of their difficult position and determined to salvage as much as they could from it. It was not surprising that they were drawn to Japanese who could supply them with what they needed. For example, Asano Ryôzô, the "cement king" of Japan and a "spectacular party-giver for Allied personnel" was clearly a man to cultivate.¹⁰⁴ Andô Akira, who we met in Chapter Four, never tired of entertaining Americans at the Wakatombo Club - he had between two and three hundred friends in Headquarters alone, all of whom worked hard and "need(ed) relaxation".¹⁰⁵ Mark Gayn claimed that Andô's antics were part of a "Japanese campaign to corrupt the Army of the US. The weapons (were) wine, women and hospitality, and the objective (was) to subvert the starch and purpose of the Occupation".¹⁰⁶

Perhaps, Robert Textor should have the last word. His "case study in khaki" typified the Army's weakness for entertainment. Despite the shortage of both arable land and building materials, and the initial objections of a Wakayama military government commander, a racing track was built "as a source of tax revenue".¹⁰⁷ Textor regretted the misappropriation of labour and materials, and despaired of the attitude of some military government personnel:

In building the track, enough labour and materials were used to construct easily three schoolhouses....On the grand opening day of the track, in a special place in the stands RESERVED FOR THE OCCUPATION FORCES, were to be seen several Military Government personnel, eagerly placing their bets.¹⁰⁸

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the Occupation's local dimension, focusing on the experiences, frustrations and failings of those working in the field. Both the structure and process of military

¹⁰⁴ Gayn, Japan Diary, p.243

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp.249-50.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.125.

¹⁰⁷ Textor, Failure in Japan, p.189.

¹⁰⁸ Textor, Failure in Japan, p.190.

government have been examined in detail in order to elucidate the alliances formed between military government teams or CIC detachments and the various groups that made up local elites. The Japanese police was one of those groups, and their close ties with American units have been described and explained. So too have links between CIC detachments and unsavoury Japanese with backgrounds in thought control or black market activities. The intention has been to concentrate on the activities of American observers, and it is no coincidence that they have figured more prominently than any other group. Their memoranda and reports are constantly referred to throughout the thesis, and thus it is essential that their preoccupations and predilections are fully appreciated.

The secondary aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the Japanese police were "allies of military government". The Occupation's representatives in the localities required an effective police force - they didn't want to call on the services of tactical troops - whilst the Japanese police depended on the moral and physical support of their American overseers. Whereas common interests facilitated joint endeavours, food and drink brought cosy relationships. Susceptibility to Japanese hospitality was an important influence on local developments. The degree to which military government officials compromised themselves by consuming large quantities of "yami" produce clearly had implications for the effective performance of their duties. Ultimately, they were in a no-win situation - either they tolerated the deceit of local police chiefs and prominent racketeers and enjoyed the hospitality that accompanied it, or they adopted an independent stance, and risked isolation, even extinction.

CHAPTER SIX

"IMMEDIATE AND FINAL DECENTRALISATION"

The decision to decentralise the Japanese police system, taken in 1947 and carried out in March 1948, was described by Alfred Oppler, head of the Courts and Law Division, as "ideologically sound, but...somewhat unrealistic".¹ Ideological struggles within both GHQ and the Japanese cabinet formed the backdrop to the reorganisation of the police, the differences between Government Section (GS) and the Public Safety Division (PSD) of G-2/CIS proving particularly difficult to reconcile. The clash of interests that delayed and finally produced a flawed programme of reform will be examined in this chapter, whilst the second part of Oppler's statement will be assessed in Chapter 7. The white heat of the debate concerning the new police structure demonstrates the pivotal role of the Japanese police throughout the Occupation - pivotal in both a positive and negative sense. Those concerned with national security cherished the police, whilst those intent on liberating the Japanese people saw them as obstacles in their path. PSD, preoccupied with the threat of lawlessness, was committed to a national police system, but GS would settle for nothing less than complete, unqualified decentralisation. MacArthur's determination to push through legislation concerning police reorganisation by the end of 1947 forced both sides to retreat from their entrenched positions. The concessions made can best be evaluated by examining the original plans sponsored by the two parties, and the principles that underpinned them. Only then can a judgment be made as to whose interests were best served by the final settlement, which sought to reconcile national security with local autonomy, efficient law enforcement with public accountability.

Preliminaries

During the first six months of the Occupation "feeble attempts were made to modify the police system".² In November, 1945, the

¹ A. Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks Back (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1976) p.171.

² R. J. D. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.18, No.2 (24/1/49) p.19.

Japanese Government³ called, amongst other things, for the police uniform to be redesigned "on less militaristic lines".⁴ Writing in the spring of 1946, Arthur Bouterse, Philip Taylor and Arthur Maass returned to the issue of uniform, highlighting its inclusion in a "Home Ministry...plan for democratising its police force".⁵ The plan was "wholly inadequate" and testified to the cosmetic changes favoured by Japanese bureaucrats:

As described in the Japanese newspapers, one of the major provisions of the plan called for revising the uniform of the police to provide sleeve stripes rather than the existing shoulder boards.⁶

In January, 1946, MacArthur, clearly unimpressed by Japanese proposals, "requested by name eminent police experts....to come to Japan to....make recommendations concerning reorganisation of the Japanese police system".⁷ PSD instructed Lewis Valentine, former commissioner of the New York city police, and Oscar Olander, commissioner of the Michigan state police, to examine policing needs in metropolitan and rural areas respectively. Their terms of reference were clearly stated at the outset.

On the 12th of March, 1946, PSD informed Valentine that he was to submit "plans for the organisation (to include numbers of personnel and equipment) and other recommendations for police forces in the metropolitan areas of Japan", defined as cities and towns with a population greater than 50,000.⁸ Olander was asked to make "recommendations on a national rural police force in.... rural areas", defined as "towns and villages (with a population) of less than

³ Led by Shidehara Kijūrō (9/10/45-22/5/46).

⁴ Summation of Non-Military Activity in Japan, No.2 (Nov. 45), p. 36.

⁵ "American Military Government Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) p.353.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Check sheet, dated 5/9/47; From: G-2; To: GS; Subject: Reply to Gen Whitney's Note, 4/9/47, Re. PSD's Activities Concerning Japanese Police Force [NDL, GS(B) 02272]

⁸ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Special Report: Metropolitan Police Planning Group (17/5/46), Introduction, p.1.

50,000..."⁹ Although Pulliam assured Olander, as he had Valentine, that his team was free to make *general* recommendations ¹⁰ (ie. to comment on the nationwide disposition of Japanese police forces), in practice the two groups were reluctant to challenge PSD's urban-rural dichotomy. This was hardly surprising given that the composition of the two groups reflected this dichotomy, and besides the neat division of responsibilities made their tasks more manageable.

It is important to establish that the framework within which the police experts worked was conceived by PSD. This was in accordance with the division of responsibilities within GHQ - "under the provisions of General Order No.13, SCAP, 1945, CIS/G-2 (was) specifically charged with the responsibility for submitting recommendations to the Supreme Commander on the police forces of Japan..."¹¹ The Public Safety Division's plan for police reorganisation, as will be made clear, incorporated many of the changes recommended by Valentine and Olander. This was to be expected, given that Pulliam had framed the issues. Nevertheless, PSD argued throughout 1946 that its plan reflected the opinions of American experts in law enforcement. Government Section contended that the dialogue between PSD and the "specialists" had been too cosy - the latter had not been given *carte blanche* as far as reform was concerned, presumably because PSD was determined to control the process. According to Cecil Tilton, chief of the Local Government Division (GS) , Valentine and Olander "operated under specific confining directives; neither were required to investigate such problems as what is the best overall police system for Japan..." Their recommendations were tainted by the original terms of reference:

⁹ *Ibid.*, Documentary Appendices 3, Directive to: Mr. Oscar Olander; re. National Rural Police Force; dated 9/3/46.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Check sheet, dated 5/9/47; From: G-2; To: GS; Subject: Reply to Gen Whitney's Note, 4/9/47, Re. PSD's Activities Concerning Japanese Police Force [NDL, GS(B) 02272].

The two reports have been prepared in accordance with directives which laid down in advance a preconceived method of decentralising; quite naturally then their authors did not advance *obiter dicta*.¹²

Tilton declared that the Valentine Report did "not even attempt to determine whether 50,000 (was) an appropriate minimum figure for the establishment of an independent force".¹³ Its recommendations were "based on the *apparent need* in Japan for a reorganised police department in metropolitan cities of over 50,000 population having autonomous municipal governments".¹⁴ The Special Metropolitan Police Group, as Valentine's team came to be known, was committed to devolution of police power within the parameters set by PSD:

The needs and requirements of police protection in the various metropolitan cities are distinctly local, they vary with both the size and location of the municipality, and should accordingly be under the jurisdiction of local autonomous municipal governments.¹⁵

These metropolitan governments were "to establish police commissions to administer their police departments".¹⁶ The elected head of a municipal administration would be authorised "to appoint or dismiss the police commissioner or executive head of the police department".¹⁷ The commissioner in turn was empowered to appoint and dismiss deputies, who were to assist him in the performance of administrative and executive duties. In short, the report recommended "decentralisation through commissioner and deputies (with a view to) more effective executive and administrative control without loss of accountability to the people through their elected officials".¹⁸

¹² Memo for the Chief, Government Section, dated 25/4/47; From: Cecil Tilton; Subject: A Plan for the Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 02306]. By *obiter dictum/a* (*obiter* by the way + *dictum* a thing said) Tilton means that the specialists did not feel their way towards a new police structure but rather headed for a destination set by PSD.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP", Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report, p.6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Valentine and his staff concerned themselves with many aspects of the metropolitan police system, and did not, as I have implied, confine their attention to the issues of local autonomy and popular control. Indeed, four of the six recommendations contained in the Summation of the Valentine Report addressed other concerns, namely the removal of "extraneous duties",¹⁹ the importance of active supervision by police administrators in PSD, the need for a gradualist approach to reform, and the usefulness of the New York City police department as a model for Japanese cities.²⁰ With regard to the latter, the "adaptation of an American police system to Japan" had a dual purpose - to "raise the morale and efficiency of the new police force (and to) secure the respect of the general public...".²¹ Bouterse, Taylor and Maass contended that "Mr. Valentine's recommendations were primarily concerned with methods for improving the *efficiency* of the Japanese police - cars, radios, roving policemen, and so on".²² They took issue with the report, and challenged the assumptions that lay behind it:

....it is not primarily in efficiency that the Japanese police are lacking; it is rather in any understanding of civil liberties....If the Japanese police system is in need of an expert to improve it, that expert should be a civil liberties lawyer, not a police administrator.²³

Tilton argued that the Special Metropolitan Police Group was wrong to assume that American practices and procedures were applicable to Japanese conditions.²⁴ He found very little of merit in either of the reports requested by PSD, but on balance seems to have preferred Olander's offering. The National Rural Police Planning Group assumed that "national legislation (would) create a rural police force authorised to be operated at either national or prefectural level...".²⁵ The latter proposal - prefectural police forces

¹⁹ These are examined in Chapter 3.

²⁰ Summation of the Valentine Report, pp.6-7.

²¹ Ibid., p.1

²² "American Military Government Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in Military Government in World War Two, p.353.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Memo for the Chief, Government Section, dated 25/4/47; From: Cecil Tilton; Subject: A Plan for the Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

²⁵ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP", Text 2, Documentary Appendices 3, The Olander Report (24/6/46) p.4 (Summation).

- was welcomed by GS officials, who were determined to prevent the establishment of a national police system. Olander and his staff, however, favoured the national option:

Since the expressed desire of the Supreme Commander is decentralisation of government as far as is compatible with efficiency, this group considers that a national system of rural police, complemented by separate municipal police organisations, would be an ideal solution.²⁶

Acknowledging the serious condition of the Japanese economy and the paucity of police equipment in good repair, the team advised against rapid change:

....there is the problem of how much change can immediately be made in the policing system of Japan that can be accepted by the people and not interfere with public safety - the function of good, efficient law enforcement.²⁷

The advocacy of "gradual" reform was not the only recommendation that the two reports had in common. The dominant role of PSD officials - before, during and after decentralisation - was endorsed by both groups, as was the need to define what were proper police duties. As far as priorities were concerned, both reports emphasized the need for efficient policing - the commissioner of the Michigan state police fully appreciated the various problems that contributed to poor performance:

The individual policeman had "lost face"....and his morale had dropped, his uniform was in general disrepair, his equipment....was lacking...., and he felt insecure because of contemplated or anticipated changes in the system. All of these factors....resulted in a marked loss of efficiency....²⁸

Perhaps it was not surprising that American police officials empathized with their Japanese counterparts, perceiving low morale as a more pressing problem than disregard for civil liberties. Olander and his staff viewed administrative reform as the key to improving law enforcement on the ground. Once the necessary mechanisms were in place, providing incentives, training and clear

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.2 (Memo to Chief, PSD; Subject: Recommendations for a Japanese Rural Police System).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.3 (Introduction).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.4 (Summation).

chains of command, the Japanese police force could begin to meet the expectations of the Occupation authorities. The team recommended that "organisational control of the rural police force...be echeloned laterally and vertically for decentralisation and efficiency of operation". A national director, subject to removal only by Supreme Court action, was to be appointed by the Prime Minister to supervise a centralised national headquarters. "The chain of command and functional operation (would descend) from the national HQ through six established districts (regions) to troop headquarters". Lateral operational control was to be exercised through three divisions, concerned with budgets, recruitment and training, and criminal investigation. The group insisted that "uniform crime reporting" was essential, and demanded "a wage scale sufficiently high to attract the type of personnel best suited to proper police functioning".²⁹

Olander and his staff were adamant that there were certain agencies that could be managed effectively only from the centre. They insisted that there would always be a need for a central police HQ, even if a prefectural rural police system was established:

Should the operation of a national police force....be abolished it is considered essential that the national government establish and operate (1) a national police academy (2) a scientific crime detection laboratory (3) a national bureau of identification (4) a national police communication system.³⁰

Assuming that a national system was preferred, the rural police were to have powers "effective anywhere in Japan without restraint, and upon request should receive the cooperation and aid of all other law enforcement bodies".³¹ The implication was that the metropolitan police forces should defer to their "national" counterparts. This was in tune with preconceptions harboured by officials in the Public Safety Division. The "cosy dialogue" between PSD and the "specialists" was mutually gratifying. Those charged with reforming the police received the recommendations that they had invited, whilst their benefactors left Japan confident that their

²⁹ The source for this paragraph is The Olander Report, pp.4-7 (Summation).

³⁰ Ibid., p.6.

³¹ Ibid., p.4.

advice would be acted on. Ultimately, Valentine and Olander had simply fleshed out the skeleton of reform contained in their original terms of reference. Thus, it was not surprising that PSD publicly approved the two reports, which so conveniently endorsed its own unstated views.

The PSD/Yoshida Government Plan

While "the two special commissions (headed by Valentine and Olander) were at work, the staff of PSD was busy with its own surveys and investigations...".³² Mr. Henry Eaton, former deputy chief of the Los Angeles police force and PSD's chief police administrator, compiled a report on the Japanese metropolitan police system. It was seen by his colleagues as "an adaptation of Mr. Valentine's ideas to Japanese capabilities, concepts and potentialities based on further research and study".³³ Eaton reiterated the need for gradual decentralisation, stipulating the conditions that would have to be met if the process was to proceed beyond the six largest cities:

The proposed reorganisation plan provides that transfer of the administration of policing functions....to the local level will not take place until municipal governments and the necessary agencies thereof, together with the means of obtaining municipal revenue for the support of a police department, have been established and are functioning.³⁴

Given the parlous financial state of the national government, it was safe to assume that municipalities with populations of little more than 50,000 would not be able to afford their own police departments for some years to come. Eaton, therefore, seemed to be counselling indefinite delay, a course of action (or rather inaction) that GS was to find intolerable.

³² PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.19 (NARA, Suitland, Box 334, File 25).

³³ Public Safety Division Plan for Japanese Police Reorganisation, undated [NDL, GS(B) 02306]

³⁴ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), FEC and SCAP", Text 2, Documentary Appendices 2, Summation of Metropolitan Police Report, p.3.

PSD's National Police Planning Group Report³⁵ further ruffled the feathers of Government Section officials. Its authors³⁶ painted a bleak picture of privation and lawlessness, conditions that necessitated the establishment of an efficient national police force:

Japan is a war-torn nation suffering from scarcity, crime is increasing, industrial strikes abound, radical elements seek to exploit human misery...The nation has no army, navy or militia for defence against...domestic disorder or anarchy...A national police system furnishes a maximum of police service at a minimum cost and is not as susceptible to political pressures and the ravages of local politicians as are numerous independent local departments.³⁷

Such expressions of support for a national police system at the expense of local autonomy foreshadowed the rift that would develop between GS and PSD following the publication of the Yoshida Government's police reorganisation plan.³⁸ As will become clear, the essential bone of contention was the "pitch" of decentralisation - the number of towns and cities affected and the time-scale adopted.

In July, 1946, the chief of the Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry announced "tentative reform measures for the police system".³⁹ In line with plans taking shape under the direction or guidance of PSD, the police chief stressed the need for more efficient operation, proposing higher wages and modernisation of equipment to this end.⁴⁰ The Japanese Government believed that "the most important point in the reorganisation of the police system (was) its democratisation", but only because it saw this as the key to "strengthening its efficiency".⁴¹ It was clear to those who cherished the Japanese police that there could be no "modernisation" until the force had undergone a programme of "democratisation". The

³⁵ The team received its instructions on 1/10/46

³⁶ Engle, Kimberling and Fritz, all of whom worked under Eaton.

³⁷ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9, Text 2, Documentary Appendices 4, Summation of the National Police Planning Group Report, p.1.

³⁸ Yoshida Shigeru was PM from 22/5/46 to 24/5/47, when he was replaced by Katayama Tetsu. Following the fall of Ashida Hitoshi in October 1948, Yoshida returned to power and remained the PM of Japan until 1954.

³⁹ Summations, No.10 (July 46), p.40.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Principles for the Reorganisation and Increase in the Strength of the Japanese Police Force and Temporary Measures Thereof (Yoshida Government Plan); dated 28/2/47 (NDL, G-2 02747).

meaning of that slogan as applied to the police, rather than the need for reform, was what divided the parties concerned.

At the end of November, 1946, a CIS periodical summary reported the establishment of a Police System Reform Investigation Committee, set up by the Home Ministry "to explore possibilities for reform and revision of existing police organisational policies to conform with those provisions of the new constitution which concern the police".⁴² Promulgated on 3rd November, 1946,⁴³ the new basic law had immediate implications for the reform of the police system. For example, Article 94 stated that "local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact their own regulations within law".⁴⁴ The Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) apparently appreciated the impact of this provision on policing in Japan. On the 6th November ESS requested information concerning "the plans of the Japanese Government in regard to the degree of control and authority the national government will have over the local police and/or the assignment of 'national' functions to central enforcement officials".⁴⁵ The lax enforcement of economic control regulations was producing anxiety on the part of ESS officials:

Under local autonomy articles of the new constitution, authority over police forces will presumably pass from the Home Ministry to popularly elected local officials. Such a result will adversely affect enforcement of national economic control legislation, since police forces divorced from national control will be more concerned with furtherance of local rather than national interests. The present trend towards the disregard of national allocation plans will be intensified.⁴⁶

PSD's response was non-committal - the Japanese police system would be decentralised "but not to the extent of being inimical to the Occupation mission".⁴⁷

⁴² Periodical Summary No.7, dated 30/11/46, p.63, para.3.

⁴³ Effective from 3rd May, 1947.

⁴⁴ Chapter 8, Local Self-Government.

⁴⁵ Check Sheet, addressed to G-2, attn. PSD; Subject: Japanese Police System (G-2 00232)

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

The Public Safety Division's confidence and steady nerves, in marked contrast to the nervousness of ESS, derived from its close liaison with the government of Yoshida Shigeru. General Willoughby, head of G-2 and Pulliam's superior, characterised Yoshida's cabinet as "friendly".⁴⁸ The close resemblance that the government's plan for police reorganisation bore to the various complementary reports written or guided by PSD during 1946 certainly suggests a cosy working relationship between the two parties. According to Harry Emerson Wildes "General Willoughby and Colonel Pulliam forwarded the (various) plan(s) to the Japanese Government and induced the Cabinet, February 22, 1947, to (incorporate them in)...a Japanese proposal for police reform".⁴⁹ G-2/CIS was making every effort to direct the course of police reorganisation, influencing first the proposals of Valentine and Olander and then practically dictating a plan to Yoshida's government.

Striking similarities between a "memorandum for record" written by Pulliam on 21 February, 1947, and the Yoshida government plan vindicate Wildes' contention that the Public Safety Division was prompting the Prime Minister. The subject of the memo was "Reorganisation Plan and Increase in Strength of the Japanese Civil Police Force",⁵⁰ whilst the government's plan was headed "Principles for the Reorganisation and Increase in the Strength of the Japanese Police Force and Temporary Measures Thereof".⁵¹ Both documents cautioned against the enfeeblement of the Japanese Government's only instrument of control. Pulliam warned that "the only arm of authority available...for law enforcement and supporting the national will is the Japanese civil police" - the Cabinet clung to "the only stabilizing influence available to the Japanese Government for the enforcement of law and order". Accordingly, Yoshida and his colleagues insisted that "the control of the police force should remain as at present". They were committed "in principle" to the devolution of control, but this was to be preceded by the

⁴⁸ G-2, Inter-Office Memorandum, dated 24/8/47; Subject: Police Reform Papers (G-2 02767).

⁴⁹ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol.43, No.5 (Jan.-Feb. 1953), pp.660-61.

⁵⁰ Memorandum for record, dated 21/2/47 [GS(B) 02306].

⁵¹ Yoshida Government Plan, dated 28/2/47 (NDL, G-2 02747).

establishment of "a national police force...for the purpose of executing and taking charge of matters that may concern the national interest..., and of maintaining contact with and regulation of the police activities of the local public bodies...". Thus, units of the national force were to be empowered to "regulate" their supposedly autonomous, metropolitan counterparts.

Pulliam advocated a force of "30,000 uniformed police (under) a Department of Public Safety in the Japanese government", the final residue of a process of gradual shrinkage of the national police. The slack would be taken up by local police forces "in cities and towns with populations capable of supporting the(m)". Pulliam stated that it was "necessary to increase the overall strength of the Japanese police (from around 94,000) to 125,000", suggesting that local, metropolitan police forces would eventually absorb 95,000 police officials.⁵² The Japanese Government requested that "the overall police strength be increased to 125,000 total", reiterating that "the national police shall have a strength of 30,000 uniformed police officials under a central headquarters". This was to supported by eight regional headquarters - Pulliam called for "six or more regional sub-divisions for reasons of efficient administration, operation and control". Perhaps the most interesting parallel between the two documents concerned the "transition...from national to local government control".⁵³ The government warned that "the enforcement from May 3rd (1947) of the New Constitution" would result in "drastic changes in the local administrative system" and the consequent loss of much of the central government's authority. Such circumstances, the Cabinet argued, demanded prudence and restraint:

The Japanese Government as well as the whole nation desires that the transition period be carried out peacefully with tranquillity and stability. Until the foundation of the local administrative bodies is established and their employees....have passed through the most critical period, it is required that the most stabilized condition of the nation should prevail.

⁵² 30,000 national police (+ 95,000 municipal police) = total numerical strength of 125,000

⁵³ Pulliam's memorandum for record, dated 21/2/47 [GS(B) 02306].

That the Japanese police were the essential guarantors of stability was a view already endorsed by Pulliam - they would ensure that changes would take place in an atmosphere of "tranquillity and stability". The chief of PSD was convinced that a national police system was indispensable "during this critical period", when "a democratic form of local self-government" was establishing itself:

Since it is not...desirable to use Occupation troops...there is no other reasonable or logical alternative except to provide the Japanese government with a law enforcement agency on a national level capable of maintaining law and order until such time as the officials of local self-governing bodies have demonstrated proficiency.

Disturbed by "prevailing economic and social conditions...and...the continual upward trend in crime rate", Pulliam surely endorsed Yoshida's view that "hasty reorganisation of the...(police) system (might) not only bring about confusion and inefficiency of administration, but (also) would affect the functioning of other administrative agencies, creating public unrest and confusion in law and order".⁵⁴

Thus, the message of both documents as far as police reform was concerned was "wait and see". The questions that needed answering related to the quality of local government officials and the ability of municipalities to finance their own police departments. Pulliam insisted that the issues he raised reflected "the considered judgement and recommendations of outstanding specialists"⁵⁵ (ie. Valentine and Olander). PSD's proposed plan combined decentralisation at some time in the future with immediate preparation (recruitment and training) of a national rural police. Likewise, the Japanese Government saw the latter as a priority:

Commence the establishment of the national police force immediately in order to be prepared for the national needs when complete decentralisation of the present system occurs.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ All the quotations contained in this paragraph, and the one immediately preceding it, come from the two documents under examination.

⁵⁵ Memorandum for Record, dated 21/2/47 [GS(B) 02306].

⁵⁶ Principles for...(Yoshida Government Plan), 28/2/47 (NDL, G-2 02747).

Yoshida and his colleagues, as has been intimated, approved of the Public Safety Division's programme of reform. However, there was divergence on "administrative matters":⁵⁷

(The Japanese Government) recommended retention of the existing administrative organisation with prefectural governors exercising executive authority under the supervision and control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which would retain powers to appoint and dismiss officials.⁵⁸

This was not a tactful suggestion - the Home Ministry had been identified as the chief support of Japan's wartime regime, and many in GHQ, particularly in GS, were looking forward to its abolition. Nevertheless, the Cabinet was unabashed, expressing its intention to introduce the plan "in the present session of the Diet which (was) expected to be closed within a short period of time because of the impending general election".⁵⁹

The Japanese Government's proposals, however, "ran counter to Government Section's cherished ideal of a completely decentralised administration".⁶⁰ On 24th March, 1947, the Public Safety Division convened a meeting to discuss "the reorganisation and increase in strength of the Japanese police".⁶¹ Colonel Pulliam gave an introductory talk outlining the purpose of the meeting, which was presumably to sell the PSD's plan to GS, represented by Cecil Tilton. The latter expressed reservations with regard to "a dual police capacity"⁶² and the institution of "regions",⁶³ seeing both as threats to the independence of elected prefectural governors. Tilton assured the others that "the tax program" would provide municipalities "with far more funds than they had ever had before"⁶⁴ - postponing

⁵⁷ History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, M.55, p.21.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Memo, dated 28/2/47 (accompanied the Yoshida Government Plan); To: GHQ SCAP; From: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo (the intermediary organisation between GHQ and the Japanese Government); Subject: Reorganisation and Increase in Strength of Japanese police force.

⁶⁰ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, p.661.

⁶¹ Conference stenographic notes, dated 24/3/47 (NDL, G-2 00247),

⁶² Ibid., p.2.

⁶³ Ibid., p.7.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.4.

decentralisation on the basis of inadequate local budgets was therefore unnecessary. Pulliam warned against hasty decentralisation, a course of action that would "turn the nation over to the pinks and reds". The PSD chief had serious reservations with regard to GS's elevation of the prefectural governor:

....if legal democracy unlimited is provided, the governor could take over completely. We could have secession. The governor could use his police power without restraint and prevent an ounce of rice, foodstuffs or other commodities from entering or leaving his prefecture.⁶⁵

Mr. Unkeless of ESS insisted that "no immediate decentralisation should be considered" until the economy was stable. Tilton's was the only dissenting voice - the other officials present endorsed PSD's plan, some arguing that it unnecessarily *weakened* the police! Colonel Purdy (Eighth Army) found it difficult to understand GS's opposition "to any national force which can be moved from one place to another".⁶⁶ Purdy insisted that a national police force with mobile units was the key to controlling "situations which may arise unexpectedly".⁶⁷

Tilton's comments during the meeting were surprisingly restrained,⁶⁸ suggesting that GS did not yet know enough about PSD's plan to mount a full-scale offensive against it. By the 12th April, however, the section was rehearsing arguments to be used against the Yoshida Government/PSD plan, and anticipating the opposition's line of defence:

It is likely that very few, if any, members of the Government Section could qualify as police experts and it is likely that such an allegation will be made against any criticisms which are made by this section....⁶⁹

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.4

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* PSD proposed a national force that was anchored in the rural areas. Purdy seems to have preferred a central police force - located in Tokyo - that could immediately be sent to any trouble spot.

⁶⁸ Surprising given Tilton's commitment to local autonomy and in the light of the fierce disagreements that raged during the summer of 1947.

⁶⁹ Memo for the Deputy Chief, Government Section, dated 12/4/47; From Guy Swope; Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

Directing his comments to Charles Kades, Guy Swope, head of the National Government Division, drew attention to "the record of dictatorships, more especially those of recent years, (and their) use of centralised police forces in the ruthless liquidation of opposing elements". Thus, it followed that "the very first requisite in the reorganisation of the Japanese police system (should) be decentralisation". Unfortunately, this was not appreciated by PSD:

The subject plan pays lip service to decentralisation at some vague future date but accepts with very little change in substance the over-centralised police system as it has been developed during the years of growing dictatorship.

Swope argued that Pulliam's justification for delay - the administrative immaturity of prefectural and local officials - was self-generating:

This plan, which would practically throw a national espionage system over the prefectural and municipal governments, could...prevent those governments from ever reaching the point where they would be considered qualified to take over the police system in their communities.

Reversion to "the use of powerful regional officials" was also a cause for concern. Swope contended that regional directors would bypass prefectural governors, preferring to discuss police matters with prefectural superintendents - he alleged that efforts were being made "to isolate the governor with respect to police matters". At the end of the memo Kades expressed his approval of Swope's arguments by writing "I agree" and then signing his initials.⁷⁰

Cecil Tilton, who had been in a minority of one at the conference in March, developed some of Swope's points in a comprehensive critique of the proposed new police structure, conveyed to General Whitney on 25th April, 1947.⁷¹ His thirteen page report clearly reveals that GS was now in receipt of PSD's detailed proposals, and was determined to obstruct their passage into law. According to Tilton, the Public Safety Division had circulated its plan to all

⁷⁰ The source for all the above quotations is Swope's memo for the Deputy Chief, dated 12/4/47.

⁷¹ Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, dated 25/4/47; Subject: A Plan for the Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

interested staff sections, hoping to attract their support prior to formal submission. Pulliam and his colleagues asserted that their "primary objective was the maintenance of internal stability in Japan conducive to a tranquil Occupation and the development of strong and democratically healthy autonomous municipal governments".⁷² They proposed a reform process comprising two stages - a preparatory phase followed by "gradual decentralisation of the present national system". Although recruitment, education and training were areas targeted for reform during Phase One, the police structure, subject to only minor modification, was to remain much as before - "a national police system headed by a Director General, with six or more regional districts, 46 prefectural divisions and approximately 1,164 district stations". Structural reform would take place during Phase Two, and would culminate in a dual police system - "...over 100 police departments controlled and operated by the local municipalities with populations (of over 50,000) capable of supporting the(m, and) a national rural police, or Department of Public Safety, ...serv(ing) all areas of the country falling outside the boundaries of municipalities operating independent.....police departments".⁷³

The Public Safety Division listed the various factors that had "determined the general character of the overall recommendations". Most of these have already been mentioned, particularly such concerns as "the stability of the existing economic and social situation" and "the need for an agency capable of maintaining internal stability during the transition period from centralised government to local autonomy". Interestingly, three of these "determining factors" amount to implicit criticisms of US policy. The increase in crime is attributed, amongst other things, to "a more liberal interpretation of individual rights"; it is suggested that the US learn from its mistakes in the Philippines, where decentralisation of law enforcement gave way to "a strong national military police force"; finally, the authors lament "the worldwide misconception of what the Japanese police actually represent

⁷² Public Safety Division Plan for Japanese Police Decentralisation - undated [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

⁷³ The above quotations can be found in Public Safety Division Plan for Japanese Police Decentralisation.

(*brought about by our own thoughtless indictments*)⁷⁴ and the consequent critical attitude of the world in whatever reforms are introduced in Japan".⁷⁵

Guy Swope considered this to be a startling admission - one that implied that the US had "wrongfully attacked the iniquities of the Japanese police system".⁷⁶ If that was the case - he certainly didn't think so - then perhaps the Occupation authorities "should be honest enough to apologise".⁷⁷ The head of the Local Government Division, Tilton, preferred argument to sarcasm, declaring that there was "no misconception whatsoever as to the domineering and at times brutal conduct of the Japanese civil police as it ha(d) functioned as....part of an extraordinary police state".⁷⁸ Scrutinising the various "determining factors" posited by PSD, Tilton dismissed the "incongruous comparison with the Philippine Commonwealth", and sought to turn the argument around - in fact, "it (was) their (the Filipinos') unlikeness which point(ed) towards the non-necessity of a national system in Japan". Moreover, he did not share PSD's misgivings with regard to the vulnerability of local police forces - "adequate provision (could) easily be made for lawful assistance to be rendered by one or more prefectures to a disturbed neighbour" in the event of a crisis. The "inferred financial one" was the only argument that Tilton was willing to acknowledge, if only temporarily - "the reconstructed financial system and tax program...will allow local budgets to meet their management requirements adequately".

It was not surprising that the chief of the Local Government Division was active in the initial skirmishes between the two sections. Adamant that "the growth of democracy" was impossible

⁷⁴ My italics.

⁷⁵ The "principal determining factors" are listed in Public Safety Division Plan for Japanese Police Decentralisation [GS(B) 02306].

⁷⁶ Memo for the Deputy Chief, Government Section, dated 12/4/47; From Guy Swope; Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Memo for the Chief, Government Section, dated 25/4/47; Subject: A Plan for the Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 02306]. This is the source for the remainder of this section.

under a highly centralised police system, his language was both alarmist and uncompromising:

....this quasi national system preserves an evil nexus with the past autocratic central domination....(its) adoption....would bring upon SCAP the unwarranted criticism of the entire world.

Acknowledging the need for constructive criticism, Government Section was determined to develop a realistic alternative to PSD's plan. Tilton recommended "the passage of a well-defined national law which provide(d) for a decentralised civil police structure for Japan at prefectural and municipal levels...". Only during "times of national crisis..." could the government exercise control over these police forces. Thus, GS proposed to break with tradition, to rid Japan of a centralised police system, and to entrust the job of law enforcement to the prefectures and cities. The Department of Public Safety would represent the only surviving trace of a national police system - considering that it would merely supervise such agencies as the police academy, the scientific crime detection laboratory, and the bureau of identification, this cannot have been of much consolation to the Japanese Government. In short, GS envisaged a police structure composed of four elements - prefectural and municipal police forces on the one hand, and a Department of Public Safety and "special government police" (ie. railway guards, customs officials etc.) on the other.

Tilton's memorandum of 25th April foreshadowed the conflict between GS and G-2 that would erupt during the summer. Both parties were determined to fight it out, seeing the fate of the Japanese police system as intrinsically bound up with that of the Occupation itself. The fierce debate that followed Government Section's refusal to approve PSD's plan pointed up differences that went beyond the reform of the police - they could not agree on the aims of the Occupation, its achievements up to that point and the role of the US following withdrawal from Japan. Conflicting analyses of the relationship between power and human rights revealed ideological, philosophical differences. Both sides sought to demonstrate the strength of their arguments by employing historical precedent to good effect. Even "the Patrician thinkers of society in

the city states of ancient Greece"⁷⁹ were considered useful allies in the battle that ensued.

A Clash of Principles

Considering that the responsibility for police reform had been vested in the Civil Intelligence Section early on in the Occupation,⁸⁰ it was perhaps surprising that Government Section tried to promote a plan of its own. There were several reasons for doing so - the principal justification was spelled out in February, 1947, when GS requested a copy of PSD's plan for police reorganisation, insisting that it was "difficult to introduce bills - basic codes of law - into the Diet until the problem of organisation of the police force ha(d) been solved".⁸¹ Pulliam's response was less than accommodating:

I do not accept that essentially jurisprudential legislation of basic bills on codes of law, court structure, civil codes and codes of civil and criminal procedure are wholly dependent on national police structure.⁸²

He refused to accept that Government Section's responsibility for constitutional/legal reform necessitated consultation with G-2 on a related matter, namely the structure and organisation of the Japanese police. Thus, the matter remained unresolved when the new constitution and Local Autonomy Law took effect on 3rd May, 1947. These affirmed GS's determination to close the gap between government and the people and to redress the balance between the two. As far as Whitney's section was concerned the Occupation should err on the side of the Japanese people. Willoughby, Pulliam and others in G-2, however, preferred to err on the side of the State.

⁷⁹ CIS comments on Government Section's non-concurrence to Police Reorganisation Plan, undated, paragraph 3.b. (NDL, G-2 02748)

⁸⁰ Military Intelligence Section, General Staff - Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, undated: "General Order No.13, SCAP, 1945...direct(ed) that CIS/G-2 make recommendations relative to measures which will provide a civil police system in Japan adequate for the accomplishment of the objectives of the Occupation forces". (NDL, G-2 02770)

⁸¹ Check Sheet, dated 10/2/47; From: GS; To: PSD, attn. Colonel Pulliam; Subject: Reorganisation of Japanese Police System (G-2 00240).

⁸² Check Sheet, dated 4/3/47; From: G-2; To: GS. It began frostily with the officious statement that GS's "communication should have been addressed to G-2 under the explicit terms of paragraph 1, Government Order 22, SCAP, 3/5/46...." (G-2 00240)

A reflection of their differing remits, this was the basic point of divergence, and a useful starting point for an examination of the gulf that separated them concerning the decentralisation of the Japanese police system.

On the 17th July, 1947, Government Section informed G-2 that it did "not concur in...the Police Reorganisation Plan...".⁸³ The plight of the Japanese people dictated that PSD's gradualist, piecemeal approach to the devolution of police power be summarily rejected:

Decentralisation, immediate and final, is required in order...to free the Japanese people from continued and minute regimentation by the central government, in particular from fear of an agency whose entire history has been characterised by cruelty and coercion, intimidation and retaliation against those who failed to conform to the orders of that government.⁸⁴

CIS/G-2 sprang to the defence of the Japanese police, contending that the force of 1947 was very different from its wartime counterpart. Above all, Pulliam and his colleagues urged that a distinction be drawn between the police as an institution on the one hand, and the police as the key support of a defunct wartime regime on the other:

Internal police power implements are indispensable aids to sound government. This line of reasoning⁸⁵ would advocate the destruction of the Roman Catholic Church because of the Spanish Inquisition.⁸⁶

The Civil Intelligence Section maintained that the Japanese police were the scapegoats for the military's excesses during the 1930s and early 1940s. Certainly, Government Section seemed to concentrate the blame for Japan's aggression on the police:

...perhaps more than any other single agency the state police contributed to the development of that docility and passiveness of the Japanese people

⁸³ Check Sheet, dated 17/7/47; Subject: Police Reorganisation Plan [NDL, GS(B) 02306]

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 2.d.

⁸⁵ Refers to GS Check Sheet, paragraph 2.d. (the previous quotation).

⁸⁶ CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence to Police Reorganisation Plan, para. 2.d. (NDL, G-2 02748).

which made possible the promotion of aggressive warfare at the behest of a handful of leaders in the Central Government.⁸⁷

Those responsible for public safety countered that "the police did not make possible an aggressive war".⁸⁸ The Japanese Government saw the police as an instrument of national mobilisation. CIS argued that it was no different from other governments in this respect - the police could "assist total war in any country under any system".⁸⁹ It was important to differentiate between the political system taking shape and the wartime regime that preceded it. Rather than "remind(ing) people of either militarism or of retaliatory measures of any kind whatsoever....the existence of police under a democratic government" served to deter those contemplating crime or insurrection.⁹⁰

GS disagreed, warning that "fear of the national police" would inhibit "the flowering of local government and...that quickening of the mind and independence of spirit which alone (could) guarantee the continued development of democracy in Japan".⁹¹ R. W. Reid, special assistant to Kades, claimed that a central police force was incompatible with viable local self-government - "local chief executives (would) soon find themselves bereft of the very powers necessary to assert and maintain their new position in the governmental structure of Japan".⁹² Reid warned that anything short of immediate and final decentralisation of the police system would place "unnecessary stresses and strains upon the new structure of government, which was conceived on the principle of decentralisation and (would) thus be torn between conflicting Occupation ideologies".⁹³ The pragmatists in CIS countered that men like Reid did not live in the real world:

⁸⁷ GS Memorandum for Record, dated 17/7/47; From: R. W. E. Reid, Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief; Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police Force; Paragraph 7.b. Memo accompanied GS Check Sheet stating non-concurrence [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

⁸⁸ CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.i (NDL, G-2 02748).

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Reid's memo, dated 17/7/47, para. 7.b [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

⁹² Ibid., para. 7.d.

⁹³ Ibid.

In a country where controlled economy will be necessary for years to come, it is ridiculous to even consider that local officials can be entrusted with the problems involved, nor could they be expected to work them out on a scale calculated to benefit the nation....⁹⁴

The Economic and Scientific Section had expressed similar misgivings regarding decentralisation at the end of 1946.⁹⁵ A balance had to be struck between liberating the Japanese people from government controls on the one hand, and ensuring equal/ fair distribution of scarce commodities on the other. The latter task demanded central direction, a policy option that GS was loath to support.

There seems to have been a psychological fault line running through GHQ, a fissure that caused Occupation officials to consider themselves either pragmatists/soldiers or idealists/civilians. These are crude categories that tend to simplify and distort complex, multifaceted struggles. Still, the fact that the conflict over police reform was seen by contemporaries in such simplistic terms is interesting in itself, suggesting that participants liked to identify with one or the other grouping. Commenting on GS's opposition to its police plan, the Civil Intelligence Section described the impressive phalanx defending its position:

Perhaps the desire for the destruction of central government agencies should be re-examined with infinite care when practical common sense civilian experts, and military men whose shrewd calculations won the greatest struggle in history, recommend the proposed police reorganisation plan....⁹⁶

According to CIS, Reid called for "military considerations...to be utterly disregarded".⁹⁷ GS was staffed by "inexperienced planners"⁹⁸ with totally unrealistic expectations, "idealists" who wished "to throw the burden of national government in addition to local government on local autonomous bodies before they (were) thoroughly organised".⁹⁹ CIS scathingly dismissed Reid's statement

⁹⁴ CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.k (NDL, G-2 02748).

⁹⁵ See footnote 46.

⁹⁶ CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.e (NDL, G-2 02748).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 3.d.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 3.a.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3.a (7).

of the aims and accomplishments of the Occupation, and ridiculed GS's efforts to achieve the impossible. The removal of "all obstacles to....democratic tendencies"¹⁰⁰ was not as straightforward as implied - US experience in the Philippines suggested that attempts at fundamental social change, particularly with regard to the family system, were futile.¹⁰¹ As for "inculcation of respect for fundamental human rights",¹⁰² this task was not to be underestimated:

It means that the entire Oriental cultural stream is to be bent back upon itself. 400 years of occupation of Gaul by the Romans and 946 years of Norman influence have not sufficed in either instance to change the deep immutable stream of culture to any degree which can be said to be more than superficial.¹⁰³

Moreover, the process of "modif(ying)...the feudal and authoritarian tendencies of the central government"¹⁰⁴ was a protracted one that could "not be hurried by senseless destruction of exist(ing) agencies".¹⁰⁵ GS was accused of destroying "old patterns of conduct and power...with no particular design for new patterns which are, however, encouraged".¹⁰⁶ Above all, CIS charged that "idealists (were) striving to pin the responsibility for the failure of their ineffectual attempts at reform in law and government on an irrelevant...issue".¹⁰⁷ Such damning criticisms testified to the resentment unleashed by GS's rejection of PSD's police plan. The negative tone of CIS's comments would not have pleased MacArthur, a leader with a weakness for self-congratulation. The Supreme Commander would have approved of Reid's sense of mission and his penchant for melodrama:

...the long term objectives of the Occupation...must be lifted above the residue of ruined hopes and cities, stripped of ties which would chain them to considerations of a purely ephemeral or military nature, and

¹⁰⁰ Reid's memo, dated 17/7/47, para. 1 [NDL, GS(B) 02306].

¹⁰¹ CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.a (3).

¹⁰² Reid's memo, dated 17/7/47, para. 1.

¹⁰³ CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.a (2).

¹⁰⁴ Reid's memo, dated 17/7/47, para. 1.

¹⁰⁵ CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.a (6).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., para. 3.c.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., para. 3.a.(8)

visualised as components of a final structure which must and will stand the test of history.¹⁰⁸

Kades' special assistant contended that the test of history was to be negotiated by Japan alone - the end of the Occupation would signal the birth of a democratic, sovereign nation. "Immediate and drastic reform" of the police system was necessary in order "to satisfy world public opinion",¹⁰⁹ concerned with the past and the future. It was not just a question of preventing "outrageous violations of personal liberties, individual dignity and fundamental human rights".¹¹⁰ Equally important was a commitment on the part of the United States not to meddle in Japan's internal affairs following withdrawal. Reid linked immediate decentralisation with a post-Occupation policy that the world could respect: "If the police force of Japan (remained) centralised....critics would imply (that) the central police force was tolerated as the principal instrument of post-Occupation control of Japan".¹¹¹ Willoughby, Pulliam and others in CIS/G-2 reminded colleagues in GS of "the prodigious efforts the United States (was) making to stop the world march of communism".¹¹² It was essential that the withdrawal of American forces was followed by an alliance of some sort - "the United States (could not), less than any other nation on earth, wash its hands of what happen(ed) in Japan after the Occupation".¹¹³ As for the charge that "a central police force (was) encouraged as a major instrument of American post-Occupation control of Japan", CIS was reluctant to even address such a "stock communistic criticism".¹¹⁴

The exchange of insults that accompanied the debate over police reform revealed fundamental differences between GS and G-2. The two sections defended philosophical/ideological positions that were diametrically opposed. Whilst Kades' special assistant regarded "power" and "the rights of man" as irreconcilable, contending that

¹⁰⁸ Reid's memo, dated 17/7/47, para. 4.

¹⁰⁹ GS Check Sheet, dated 17/7/47 (non-concurrence), para. 2.c [GS(B) 02306].

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Reid's memo, dated 17/7/47, para. 2.e.

¹¹² CIS comments, para. 3.l.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., para. 2.g.

"coordination (was) preferable to centralisation",¹¹⁵ CIS adopted an altogether more pragmatic approach to politics and government:

Men do not cooperate readily, they bring matters to an issue at which point superior authority steps in to remove the impasse. This superior authority or power is indestructible, it must be wielded and always is.¹¹⁶

Given that the two parties could not even agree on a common theoretical position, it was not surprising that the process of mutual accommodation was so fraught with difficulties.

At the end of his memorandum of the 17th July, Reid stated that "decentralisation of the police force must come without delay....,it must be full and final...and that continued failure to act on this matter (was) a reproach to claims of the democratisation of Japan....".¹¹⁷ CIS countered that GS did not appreciate "the practical problems facing both the Occupation authorities and the Japanese Government".¹¹⁸ The section responsible for reforming the Japanese police refused to gamble "with the hopes, money and reputation of the United States Government which (had) invested....heavily in the future of Japan as a democracy".¹¹⁹ At the beginning of August, 1947, Pulliam penned a spirited defence of the PSD plan - he declared that "as Hammurabi, Genghis Khan, Cesar Borgia and Charles V had each relied upon a centralised police, Japan should do likewise".¹²⁰ The chief of the Public Safety Division recommended "that the democratic state government of Japan be provided with an adequate internal security power implement".¹²¹ Drawing a parallel between the Covenant of the League of Nations and Government Section's proposals, Pulliam encapsulated the collision over police reform - "mawkish sentimentality over the individual rights of man"

¹¹⁵ Reid's memo, para. 2.

¹¹⁶ CIS comments, para. 3.b.

¹¹⁷ Reid's memo, para. 8.

¹¹⁸ CIS comments, para. 3.p.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3.q.

¹²⁰ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, p.661.

¹²¹ Memo dated 5/8/47; Subject: Democratic Stable Government and Internal Security Power Implements [GS(B) 02298]

could not coexist with "practical considerations in a world of eternal conflict".¹²²

Advising the Katayama Government

In July, 1947, Government Section rejected not only the police reorganisation plan presented by PSD, but also "the proposed directive to the Japanese Government" that accompanied it.¹²³ The latter implied that the new government of Katayama Tetsu, who had succeeded Yoshida as Prime Minister in May 1947, was incapable or unwilling to formulate its own police plan. GS insisted that this was not the case - Katayama's government had "evidenced every desire to approach such problems with courage and full honesty of purpose...".¹²⁴ In fact, Whitney's section was so sure that they could trust the new administration with police reorganisation that they had told it to start afresh:

This section has informed the present Government in unmistakable terms that in connection with such plans of internal organisation it is not bound by any plans formed by its predecessor and is entirely free to approach these problems, as yet unsolved, from the new, broader and more enlightened concept to which the present government shows every evidence of adhering.¹²⁵

Just as PSD had helped Yoshida's government draw up a police plan, so GS expected to influence Katayama's draft. Thus, the real meaning of "more enlightened" was more amenable to the wishes of Whitney, Kades *et al.* "The....leader of the Social Democrats, a pious Christian, a shrewd labour lawyer and a devout feminist",¹²⁶ Katayama was the ideal Prime Minister as far as Government Section was concerned. Immediately after the elections he had assured his supporters that together they would "struggle against the conservative reactionary camp and carry out a revolution through the Diet".¹²⁷ Such declarations encouraged ambitious reformers to seize the initiative.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ GS Check Sheet, dated 17/7/47 (non-concurrence), para.1 [GS(B) 02306].

¹²⁴ Ibid., para.3.

¹²⁵ Ibid., para.4.

¹²⁶ M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.488.

¹²⁷ Quoted in A. Cole, G. Totten, and C. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1966)p.15.

Kades decided to hijack the issue of police reorganisation, to secretly liaise with cooperative Cabinet members and to surprise PSD with a Japanese government plan more in tune with GS's proposals. Naturally, the pretence of non-intervention was to be upheld - an open dialogue was out of the question, given that PSD's directive had been rejected on the grounds that the Japanese Government should be allowed to draft its own plan.

The Judicial Administration and Police System Reform Committee, established in the Japanese Cabinet on the 15th July, 1947, was set up by Government Section directive.¹²⁸ It was the first of several manoeuvres on the part of Kades, determined to overturn the plan for police reorganisation under consideration. The committee consisted of five Cabinet members appointed by Katayama: Suzuki Yoshio, the Justice Minister, who acted as chairman; Nishio Suehiro, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; Hitotsumatsu Sadakichi, Welfare Minister; Saitô Takao, Minister of State; and Kimura Kozaemon, Home Minister.¹²⁹ As was later made clear by PSD, Government Section authorized this committee to assume sole responsibility for police reform:

GS memorandum, marked "confidential", for the Director General of the Cabinet Secretariat, in effect took from the Home Minister all matters pertaining to police reorganisation and placed that authority in a Cabinet Committee appointed by the Prime Minister.¹³⁰

Clearly, Kades had not set up a committee to then leave it to its own devices - it was seen as the vehicle for Government Section's more enlightened proposals and Suzuki, the chairman, was to be the chauffeur. On the 19th July Whitney's deputy "practically dictated a fairly detailed police plan to Suzuki",¹³¹ which was not discussed by the cabinet committee. Its members later assured Pulliam that "there were no committee meetings on police reorganisation...from

¹²⁸ Miura Yôichi, "Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen: 1947-nen 9-gatsu 16-nichi Makkâsâ Shokan no Seiritsu Katei", *Rekishigaku Kenkyû*, 498 (Nov. 1981) p.37.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Memo for record, dated 4/9/47; Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan for Police Reorganisation; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 02767).

¹³¹ Memo to Commander-in-Chief, dated 6/9/47; Subject: Unilateral Government Section Action re. Police Plan (NDL, G-2 02767).

10 July 1947 to 8 August 1947".¹³² Thus, when PSD received the Suzuki plan from Government Section on the 8th August, 1947, it was clear that its supposed author had been "playing a lone hand".¹³³

Nevertheless, the Justice Minister had submitted a "committee plan" to Government Section on 29th July.¹³⁴ Whether or not he consulted with his colleagues is less important than his/their recommendations, which corresponded closely with those of GS - immediate devolution of police power to the six largest cities and prefectures, combined with drastic reduction of the national police force. These proposals undermined the Public Safety Division's call for gradual decentralisation and the maintenance of a national police force. According to its chief, "PSD had no knowledge of the existence of any police plan (other than its own) prior to receipt of (the Suzuki) paper",¹³⁵ suggesting that Kades had been successful in his efforts to surprise the authors of the original police plan. However, Pulliam's account of what happened indicates that his division was not caught completely unawares:

About 26 July 1947, PSD was informed that a paper of instructions from Mr. Kades, concerning police reorganisation was somewhere in the Japanese Government....By devious methods a Japanese translation of the paper was obtained.¹³⁶

It appears that the Public Safety Division was very busy during the last week of July. While "specific persons in PSD and the Bureau of Police were...(trying)to locate and obtain a copy (of Kades' instructions)",¹³⁷ other officials were inviting the Cabinet committee, of which Suzuki was a member, to dinner at the Imperial Hotel on the night of the 26th July. Unfortunately, only three attended, "together with appropriate Bureau of Police officials".¹³⁸ It was clear that PSD was trying to regain the initiative with regard

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Miura Yôichi, "Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen", p.37.

¹³⁵ Memo for record, dated 4/9/47; Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan for Police Reorganisation; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 02767).

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

to police reform, even though it was only faintly aware at this time that it was losing it:

After dinner, with appropriate charts, the group was appraised of PSD police reorganisation plans and the course of action that should be taken by the committee in the preparation of a Japanese Government plan. The committee was informed at this time who was responsible for police reorganisation. Daily contact was maintained with committee members as to progress. At this time Mr. Suzuki was strongly suspected of being a pro-GS man.¹³⁹

When the GS/Suzuki plan popped up, apparently supported by MacArthur,¹⁴⁰ it seemed that Kades had achieved his objective - the defeat of the PSD police reorganisation plan. However, Pulliam moved quickly to isolate Suzuki and so to discredit his/ GS's proposals. The other four members of the committee were "emphatic in their denial of any knowledge of the plan and appeared surprised that such had happened without the(ir) being informed by Suzuki".¹⁴¹ This was not surprising, given that Kades had told the Justice Minister "to let no one see the paper (of instructions)".¹⁴²

According to Ashida Hitoshi, the Foreign Minister, "Suzuki's action was censured in Cabinet meeting on 9th August, 1947".¹⁴³ It is interesting that Ashida, rather than the Prime Minister, telephoned Pulliam to inform him of the Cabinet's action. Perhaps PSD was cultivating the more conservative members of Katayama's coalition government - Ashida was president of the Democratic Party, and more likely to cooperate with G-2 than his socialist colleagues. Three of the five cabinet committee members represented the Democratic Party - Suzuki and Nishio belonged to Katayama's party.¹⁴⁴ On 16th August "the entire committee was called to PSD for conference and orientation on PSD police plan and again informed

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Memo to Commander-in-Chief, dated 6/9/47; Subject: Unilateral Government Section Action re. Police Plan (NDL, G-2 02767). Paragraph 2 noted "prompt approval (of Suzuki plan) by direction of C.-in-C. PSD not notified".

¹⁴¹ Pulliam's memo for record, dated 4/9/47; Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan (NDL, G-2 02767).

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Miura Yôichi, "Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen", p.37.

as to who in SCAP had priority in police matters".¹⁴⁵ Pulliam and his colleagues were now working hard to repair the damage done to their reputation by the Kades/Suzuki initiative: "The committee was....informed that all PSD facilities were available to them...(and) effort was made to discreetly and effectively sell the PSD plan to the committee".¹⁴⁶ It was clear from the proceedings that at least one committee member preferred to deal with the Public Safety Division rather than Government Section:

Hitotsumatsu....posed the question - "The Japanese Government is in a very difficult position with respect to SCAP. There is a SCAP section that says they are concerned with reorganisation of the police forces. We have heard here today that no other section in SCAP has the right to do so. We would like to deal with your section, PSD, alone on police matters. Is it possible for you to have an understanding in SCAP...?"¹⁴⁷

The question was welcomed, perhaps even invited, by the American officials present. Their response was forthright and supported by documentary evidence: "That question has already been answered. Here are the written instructions, Staff Memo No. 21, 16 August 1947. These instructions have not been changed or altered."¹⁴⁸

On the 18th of August Whitney telephoned Pulliam, and informed him that "General MacArthur...(was) very anxious to let the Japanese Government develop their own police plan".¹⁴⁹ Clearly the head of GS was trying to consolidate gains made by Kades - he wanted the Cabinet to endorse the Suzuki plan, and knew that this was unlikely to happen if PSD vigorously promoted its own proposals. Pulliam's response was polite but firm:

If that is what General MacArthur wants OK, but until I receive instructions from the proper source to the contrary, I consider

¹⁴⁵ Pulliam's memo for record, dated 4/9/47; Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. "The committee was subsequently furnished a copy of Staff Memo No.63, 19 Aug. 47". These memoranda made it clear that the Japanese Government should liaise with CIS/G-2 re. policy matters affecting the Japanese police.

¹⁴⁹ Memo for record, dated 18/8/47; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; From: H. E. Pulliam; Subject: Report of Telephone Call from General Whitney, GS (NDL, G-2 02751)

reorganisation of the Japanese police the primary interest of CIS/G-2 and will continue to act accordingly....Thank you for calling.¹⁵⁰

Willoughby expressed outrage at Government Section's manoeuvres and what he regarded as the sluggish reaction of PSD officials. He claimed that "GS had moved into... a hiatus,...a gap"¹⁵¹ that should never have been allowed to develop. The Public Safety Division should have moved quicker - "...the (police) plan...could have been written six months ago, and...its adoption by the former (friendly) Government was more assured than with this new inexperienced Government, completely under the thumb of...Government Section".¹⁵² Willoughby ordered that "an attempt be made discreetly to sell (the PSD) plan...for adoption by the Japanese committee...none of them (had) the grasp of detail of the PSD...".¹⁵³ The head of G-2 accused his colleagues of "dawdl(ing) along the way until GS stepped in, and through a clever blend of 'judicial and police requirement' forced a hand".¹⁵⁴

PSD's loss of momentum regarding police reform may have derived from increasing awareness of serious flaws in their plan. It had not been approved by the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) in July, 1947,¹⁵⁵ despite the fact that both parties harboured similar reservations with regard to rapid decentralisation. ESS made three recommendations, the first of which concerned the absence of a timetable for devolution of police power - CIS acted on this advice: "Initiation of decentralisation prior to 1st July, 1948, and immediate decentralisation in Chiba prefecture on an experimental basis (were) added to the initial plan...".¹⁵⁶ ESS also recommended that the "national police organisation (be placed) under more direct

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Inter-Office Memorandum, dated 24/8/47; From: General Willoughby; To: Col. Bratton - Action, Col. Duff - Follow up, and Col. Myers - Info.; Subject: Police Reform Papers (NDL, G-2 02767)

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ CIS comments on ESS's non-concurrence with Police Reorganisation Plan (NDL, G-2 02749). ESS and GS were the only two sections that did not concur with the PSD plan.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

and responsive control".¹⁵⁷ Willoughby directed his subordinates in G-2/CIS to take their cue from the Economic and Scientific Section:

ESS comments....point....to a basic defect, namely that you still have a national central police with a director practically autonomous except through the Prime Minister.¹⁵⁸

Another serious blunder was to place the Director General under the Home Ministry - "...it should have been known...that the Home Ministry was practically abolished".¹⁵⁹ Finally, Willoughby reminded his colleagues that the police "plan must come from the Japanese Government if you wish to win. It will be defeated if it comes from you".¹⁶⁰ In other words, victory could best be secured by forcing the Cabinet to submit the PSD plan as its own.

On the 3rd of September, 1947, "the basic reform plan of the Japanese Government"¹⁶¹, prefaced by a short letter from Katayama, was presented to the Supreme Commander. At the outset of the document it was made clear that "the Government...(had) strived for the formulation of a reform plan of its own from an independent standpoint..."¹⁶² - a difficult task indeed considering the behaviour of both Government Section and PSD. The Cabinet proposed "to pursue a policy allowing the co-existence of both the national and local public entity police".¹⁶³ This was presented as a moderate course of action, an attempt to steer clear of "two fundamentally conflicting proposals" which had surfaced in committee meetings:

....the Government proposed to take the middle course between...two extreme plans. One of the two aims primarily at the perfection of local self-government and the fundamental remedy of the misuse of the police by the state power in the past. It is a progressive plan....The other purports to conserve the national police to a large extent and to place the

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Inter-Office Memorandum, dated 25/8/47; Subject: Police Reorganisation Plan; From: C.A.W; To: Col. Bratton - Action, Col. Duff - Follow-up, Col. Myers - Info. (NDL, G-2 02750)

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

metropolitan police under the national police...This may be called a conservative plan.¹⁶⁴

PSD later described the "progressive plan" as "the GS proposal with little if any modification".¹⁶⁵ It recommended that "all uniformed police...be transferred to the six large municipalities¹⁶⁶ and prefectures, leaving to the central government only certain synthetic and technical functions".¹⁶⁷ Pulliam argued that these proposals denied police to all "local autonomous bodies except the six special cities", and, more dramatically, "emasculate(d) the central police power and pave(d) the way for revolution".¹⁶⁸ The conservative plan, preferred by PSD's chief, was attributed to Hitotsumatsu. "It provide(d) the status quo less decentralisation to 13 cities (with populations) of more than 200,000", and would have been, according to Pulliam, the Cabinet's first choice "if they (had been) completely free to decide".¹⁶⁹

As it was, the Katayama Government had to choose between GS's policy of immediate and final decentralisation on the one hand and PSD's hybrid police system on the other. Not surprisingly the latter option was preferred - no self-respecting central government would voluntarily donate its police forces to prefectural governors, accepting only emergency powers in return. Thus, the Cabinet endorsed PSD's recommendations - the urban-rural dichotomy, the need for a gradualist approach and the institution of regions. In short, the Japanese Government took their cue from Pulliam rather than Kades, adopting a prudent, cautious strategy:

The national police shall gradually be decreased to the total of 30,000...while the local (city) police shall gradually be expanded to include cities of more than 50,000 population...We hope that

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Memorandum for the Record, dated 7/9/47; From: Pulliam; Subject: Analysis of the...Japanese Government's Police Reorganisation Proposal to the Supreme Commander (NDL, G-2 02750).

¹⁶⁶ Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, Kôbe

¹⁶⁷ Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).

¹⁶⁸ Memorandum for the Record, dated 7/9/47; From: Pulliam; Subject: Analysis of the...Japanese Government's Police Reorganisation Proposal to the Supreme Commander.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

consideration be given to increase the total number of police to 125,000.¹⁷⁰

The Cabinet's principal concerns reflected those of PSD, and to a lesser extent ESS. "The present financial status of local public entities",¹⁷¹ the absence of armed forces and the unpropitious socio-economic climate all necessitated a step by step approach.

It seemed that Pulliam's efforts following the sudden appearance of the Suzuki plan had paid off. The Japanese Government had submitted a plan to MacArthur that closely corresponded with PSD's proposals. Whitney was furious - his determined attempts to consolidate gains made by Kades had failed. On 4th September, 1947, he wrote to Willoughby, complaining of Pulliam's conduct:

I was amazed to learn yesterday that subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Commander that the Japanese Government was to be left free to formulate its own plan for the reorganisation of the police force....Colonel Pulliam called in various State Ministers and continued to exert great pressure to enforce his views on the Government.¹⁷²

The head of G-2 defended Pulliam - he was "merely performing his duties within the scope of the mission assigned by SCAP. It (was) clearly within his field of activity to confer, assist and advise the Japanese Government agencies and/or committees responsible for matters affecting the Japanese police".¹⁷³ In a hand-written note,¹⁷⁴ Willoughby tried to reassure Whitney, with a view perhaps to ending the damaging feud between GS and G-2 over police reorganisation:

My Dear Courtney,
...I really believe that you are unduly alarmed. The interests of the Govt. Section are not prejudiced. You have not been in the police business before. We have for two (2) years....

¹⁷⁰ Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Letter dated 4/9/47 [NDL, GS(B) 02272].

¹⁷³ Check Sheet, dated 5/9/47; From: G-2; To: GS; Subject: Reply to General Whitney's Note, 4/9/47, re. PSD's activities concerning Japanese Police Force [NDL, GS(B) 02272]

¹⁷⁴ Accompanied above Check Sheet.

At the end of the note Willoughby stated that "the legislation is written: You will assist....", suggesting that he expected PSD's proposals to be carried out. Such expectations, however, were premature - PSD had won this particular battle, but the war was not yet over. Katayama had "submit(ted) the Government reform plan informally and directly to the Supreme Commander with a view to seeking first of all his high opinions...".¹⁷⁵ It was well known that MacArthur shared many of Government Section's concerns, and was committed to "the basic concept of a strictly civilian police organisation".¹⁷⁶ He insisted that GS and PSD work together to prepare the "comments and instructions" that Katayama had requested in his letter.

Just before the final act of the police drama began, Sone, Deputy Director General of the Cabinet Secretariat, called on Kades to discuss the Japanese Government's plan. He stated that "feelings in the Cabinet on this issue cut so deeply that it was impossible to put the question....on the agenda".¹⁷⁷ Whilst elderly members of the Cabinet (70-75 years old) wanted to rely for advice on the police bureaucracy in the Home Ministry", their younger colleagues (55-69), wary of bureaucratic domination, "wanted to formulate their own proposals....". Sone also informed Kades that "the Cabinet committee, headed by...Suzuki, had been under 'terrific pressure' by the Public Safety Division to submit its plan as the Japanese Government plan". Police reorganisation was proving to be a very divisive issue. It was important, Sone argued, that officials did not lose sight of the real enemy - a centralised police system: "It would be the fight of Katayama's life to break centralised police control....anything that could be done to demonstrate to the government that (he) had the full backing of the Supreme Commander would help immeasurably". Apparently, only MacArthur could untie the knot of police reform.

¹⁷⁵ Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).

¹⁷⁶ GS, Memo for Record, dated 12/9/47; Notes on GS-PSD Conference Beginning at 10.00, 12/9/47 [GS(B) 02303]

¹⁷⁷ Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, dated 9/9/47; Subject: Conversation Concerning Police Reorganisation Plan [GS(B) 02305] - the source for the remainder of the paragraph.

Reconciliation

On 12th September, 1947, a round of conferences began that aimed to thrash out the problem of police reorganisation. At 10 am high-ranking officials from GS - Whitney, Kades, Tilton and Rizzo - and Pulliam and Smith of PSD sat down together to try and resolve their differences. The conference opened with a statement by the head of Government Section to the effect that MacArthur was aware of both parties' views concerning police reform, and was impatient for a settlement of this divisive issue. The Supreme Commander had asked Whitney to "coordinate with Colonel Pulliam and reconcile existing differences or report to him those differences that could not be reconciled",¹⁷⁸ suggesting that he was willing to act as arbitrator. Increasingly MacArthur's views determined the course of events. Whitney reported that "the General" disagreed with the proposal for a national police":

It resembles a gendarmerie (and) would be challenged as a nucleus for a standing army. Neither the PSD proposal nor the Government Section's offer¹⁷⁹ showed a disposition of this force which would accord with the basic concept of a civilian police organisation.

MacArthur had rejected PSD's gradualist approach, warning that "decentralisation, if not actually accomplished under the Occupation, would not be accomplished at all; therefore, it should proceed at once". He dismissed Pulliam's claim that such a course of action would expose the government to lawless elements - in the event of an emergency, the Prime Minister would be empowered "to take over command of the police force or part thereof under safeguards and conditions specified by the Diet". Moreover, the Supreme Commander had criticised GS's suggestion that "decentralisation of police forces to local bodies be made subject to a choice by such bodies" - it was "considered objectionable because it would delay decentralisation indefinitely". A strong commitment to civilian control of local police forces lay at the heart of MacArthur's protests.

¹⁷⁸ GS, Memo for Record, dated 12/9/47; Notes on GS-PSD Conference Beginning at 10.00, 12/9/47 [GS(B) 02303] - the source for the remainder of this paragraph.

¹⁷⁹ GS proposed "a national force of no more than 10,000 to carry out such duties as guarding important national installations, property and persons, and furnish assistance to prefectural and local forces when required" [GS(B) 02303]. This force was to be concentrated in the capital, whereas PSD's national police was to be dispersed.

Pulliam expressed surprise at Whitney's disclosures. The Commander-in-Chief had only recently approved the principle of a national police force. Whitney explained that "the realisation that proper disposition for the use of such a force was not provided" had led the Supreme Commander to reconsider his position.¹⁸⁰ Pulliam and Smith must have been disturbed by this revelation - sensing their uneasiness, GS suddenly suggested a compromise, "a basis for reconciliation...":¹⁸¹

....if the police were decentralised immediately in *all cities and towns* the Government Section would agree to the maintenance of a nationally controlled police force of approximately 30,000 to enforce law and order in the rural areas including villages.¹⁸²

PSD expressed doubts as to the viability of such a plan, particularly with regard to "the financial ability of the smaller cities and towns to support independent police forces...". Still, Pulliam was prepared to consider such drastic decentralisation, providing that local police departments coexisted with a national force. The latter, it was agreed, should be administered by a commission,¹⁸³ composed of five civilians, appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of the Diet. "The actual direction of the rural police would be entrusted to a chief of police who would be under the authority of the commission". It was proposed that "there be no channels of command between the national rural police and the various city and town police forces...(just) a relationship of mutual assistance, liaison and coordination".

Pulliam requested 48 hours to consider Government Section's offer. Another conference was held on the 15th September, attended by all those present on the 12th, except for Whitney and Tilton. The

¹⁸⁰ Notes on GS-PSD Conference, 12/9/47 [GS(B) 02303] - the principal source for the remainder of this paragraph.

¹⁸¹ GS, Memo for Record, dated 13/9/47; Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police System; From: Rizzo [NDL, GS(B) 02303].

¹⁸² This would mean that "90-95,000 city and town police would operate in approximately 209 cities (with populations greater than 30,000) and 1,800 towns of 5,000 population or more, while about 30,000 rural police would cover approximately 11,000 villages" and the remaining rural areas.

¹⁸³ The commission would also oversee a national police academy, a crime detection bureau, a central bureau of identification etc.

representatives of PSD stated that they had conferred with their experts, and decided to reject the "tentative plan evolved at the inter-section conference...".¹⁸⁴ The principal reason given was that communities of around 5,000 inhabitants did not have the necessary resources to support autonomous police forces. Pulliam then tried to back-pedal - he announced that "the Public Safety Division was ready to support the principle of decentralisation as applied to the 121 cities of over 50,000 population and (was) willing...to apply the principle to smaller localities *gradually*...". Kades and Rizzo, however, reminded the chief of PSD of the *quid pro quo* of a national police force:

...the Government Section's willingness to support the existence of a national rural police force to maintain law and order in the country and villages was predicated on the immediate application of decentralisation to all cities and towns, since this would consolidate the principle of local autonomy in enough localities to ensure freedom of local government from domination by Tokyo.

They warned Pulliam that "in the absence of agreement on this point...Government Section might well return to its original position, sponsoring immediate decentralisation to the prefectural governments and metropolitan areas, with authority vested in the prefectural governments to decentralise further". Their message was clear - PSD could only lose by rejecting the compromise put forward on 12th September. Pulliam suspected that MacArthur, given his reservations regarding a national police force, was more likely to support GS's position than the original police reorganisation plan. The conference ended with an attempt by Pulliam and Smith to regain the initiative - concerned about "the chances of political influence over the police", they proposed that "the chief of police in each locality having an independent police force be put under a civilian commission with a fixed tenure of office rather than directly under the chief executive". The head of PSD now realised that immediate decentralisation was going to take place whether he liked or not, and moved to prevent abuses of the system. Kades and Rizzo accepted PSD's proposal, "subject to the approval of the chief".

¹⁸⁴ GS, Memo for Record, dated 16/9/47; Subject: Reorganisation Plan for the Japanese Police System [GS(B) 02303] - the source for the rest of this paragraph.

The conference held on 15th September proved that Government Section was making the running with regard to police reform. "On the evening of 16th September MacArthur was shown the proposed reply to the Prime Minister's letter" - *proposed by Government Section* - and informed that the head of G-2 had not yet seen it.¹⁸⁵ The Supreme Commander "stated that unless Willoughby had fundamental objections to any part of the letter it would be approved". MacArthur's endorsement of Government Section's draft spelled the end of the long battle over police reorganisation. Both sides were exhausted, and the terms of the truce did not represent a decisive victory for either party. On balance, however, GS emerged the less battered of the two combatants. This much is clear from the last scene of the final act, when, on the morning of the 17th September, Rizzo delivered a copy of the proposed letter to Pulliam and Smith - the latter expressed surprise, or more accurately dismay, at the sudden appearance of "civilian police commissions...at prefectural level",¹⁸⁶ designed to prevent central control of the national police system. Still, Willoughby had no choice but to agree to the establishment of prefectural public safety commissions - in return "separate city police would be included under the Prime Minister's emergency powers as desired by PSD". Following Willoughby's approval of the proposed letter, it was delivered to Katayama at 11.05 am on the 17th September.

Signed by MacArthur, the letter stated that "the potentiality of a police state inherent in centralized control must scrupulously be avoided".¹⁸⁷ This could best be achieved by the establishment of local police departments and civilian commissions. Both had been part of the equation of police reorganisation from the very beginning - Valentine had recommended that "municipal police departments be established in cities over 50,000 population, responsible through a....commission to the elected head of the municipality".¹⁸⁸ However,

¹⁸⁵ GS, Memo for Record, dated 18/9/47; Subject: Reorganisation of Japanese Police System; From: Frank Rizzo [GS(B) 02303] - the source for the remainder of this paragraph.

¹⁸⁶ They were to be appointed by the governors subject to the consent of the prefectural assemblies.

¹⁸⁷ Letter dated 16/9/47 (NDL, G-2 02750)

¹⁸⁸ The Intelligence Series, Volume 9, Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Brief of the Valentine Report.

a protracted dispute over the speed or pitch of decentralisation had obscured the issue of popular control of policing. It had reappeared when Pulliam and Smith, smarting from MacArthur's advocacy of immediate decentralisation to all cities and towns, had proposed civilian commissions for each locality possessing its own police department. MacArthur's letter to Katayama explained the local dimension of the new police system:

Each city and town should be responsible for the preservation of law and order within its boundaries through its own local police system independent of the central government and headed by a police chief to be appointed and removable by a commission composed of three civilian members appointed by the mayor of the city or town with the consent of the local assembly...

As for the national dimension, the Supreme Commander was "in full accord with the proposition that the realities of the situation require the maintenance of a national rural police unit to maintain law and order in the rural areas and available to the National Government to meet emergency conditions....".¹⁸⁹ Moreover, the "suggested increase in the overall authorized police strength to 125,000 men, to provide for such a national rural police (met) with (his) full approval".¹⁹⁰ PSD had consistently argued that prevailing socio-economic conditions necessitated a national police force. Preoccupied with the threat of lawlessness, Pulliam had given little thought to the issue of civilian control, so much so that ESS had felt the need to recommend "more direct and responsive control" of the national police organisation.¹⁹¹ The late appearance of prefectural public safety commissions, on the initiative of Whitney or MacArthur, reflected their common determination "to prevent the resurgence in disguised form of a centrally controlled national police network...":¹⁹²

At the prefectural level there should...be a...commission...which will exercise *operational control* over the national rural police operating within the boundaries of that prefecture, reserving to the national

¹⁸⁹ MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 16/9/47 (G-2 02750).

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ CIS comments on ESS's non-concurrence with Police Reorganisation Plan (NDL, G-2 02749).

¹⁹² MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 16/9/47.

government *administrative authority* ¹⁹³ over such national rural police wherever stationed.¹⁹⁴

The national, prefectural and municipal public safety commissions "were to be non-partisan and politically neutral bodies, quite separate from the heads of the executive branch of the central and local governments".¹⁹⁵ Just as public safety commissions were to be insulated from political pressure, so too "the prefectural governor (was) to be protected against arbitrary police interference by the national government":

...in the event of a national emergency..., upon the recommendation of the National Public Safety Commission, the Prime Minister might assume operational control over prefectural units of the national rural police force, subject to ratification by the Diet within twenty days.¹⁹⁶

Thus, the national police force, which both PSD and the Cabinet cherished, was to be available to the government only in emergencies. For the rest of the time, the national public safety commission was to administer prefectural rural police forces. As for relations between municipal and rural forces, "no channel of command (was to) exist between the national rural police unit and the local police forces...". Again, strict separation of the two police systems was deemed necessary to prevent the re-emergence of a police state.

¹⁹³ Braibanti distinguished between the two types of control as follows: "*Operational control* is defined as the enforcement of law including the direction of police forces in preservation of law and order, planning and execution of law enforcement procedures before and during situations prejudicial to law and order, and the use of police power in areas of responsibility as provided for by law. The Police Law defines *administrative control* as management of all police affairs not included in operational control, including such matters as pay, promotion, supply, training, personnel management and like activities".

¹⁹⁴ MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 16/9/47 (G-2 02750). Braibanti drew attention to the fact that the prefectural commission "could not appoint its own public safety director. Prefectural directors (were) appointed by the regional directors (of which there were six), who in turn (were) appointed by the Director General in Tokyo. Hence it would be difficult for a prefectural commission to exercise effective control over a police chief whom it (was) powerless to remove".

¹⁹⁵ S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed., Five Studies in Japanese Politics (University of Michigan Press, 1957) p.6.

¹⁹⁶ MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 16/9/47 (G-2 02750).

Ultimately, the new police structure, outlined in MacArthur's letter, represented an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests and ideas within GHQ and to comply with the demands of the Supreme Commander. The latter shared with GS a determination to eradicate every trace of a centralized police system that had "degrade(d) the dignity of the individual".¹⁹⁷ Just as PSD's obsession with the threat of lawlessness caused it to disregard the issue of popular control of police forces, so GS's preoccupation with decentralisation meant that it ignored the socio-economic context of police reorganisation. The final product of months of bickering was a dual police system that aimed to satisfy all the parties concerned - it tried to combine conflicting models of police organisation, to reconcile conflicting ideologies. Towns and cities were invited to exercise control over their own police forces, whether they wanted to or not, and the Japanese Government was presented with rural police forces which it was permitted to use only in emergencies. Alfred Oppler, usually so enthusiastic about the Occupation's achievements, damned the new police structure with faint praise - "ideologically sound, but....somewhat unrealistic" - the next chapter will demonstrate just how "unrealistic" it proved to be.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

TOWARDS RECENTRALISATION

Those who advocated decentralisation of the Japanese police in 1947 would have done well to consult a document written at the very beginning of the Occupation. OSS Research and Analysis Report Number 2758, entitled "The Japanese Police System Under Allied Occupation", warned of the dangers of a fragmented police structure. Decentralisation might "create jurisdictional barriers or conflicts", and by removing national control bring about "a decline in personnel and other standards".¹ The report also predicted "hardship for poorer areas unable to afford a police (force) adequate to their needs", and expressed concern about "the subjection of the police system to the influence of local politics".² The difficulties experienced by the various police units brought into existence by the Police Law, and the abuses associated with the new system, bore out many of the authors' predictions, particularly with regard to the financial burden of local police systems.

As was made clear in the previous chapter, Pulliam and his colleagues in G-2 had been wary of drastic decentralisation for the very reasons specified in the OSS report. Their failure to resist demands made by Government Section meant that Japan had to cope with sudden atomization of the police system rather than gradual decentralisation. In short, the Police Law that was implemented in March, 1948, did not take account of pertinent points made in Research and Analysis Report Number 2758 - the consequences were such that within eighteen months members of the Public Safety Division were working "quietly" with officials of the Japanese Government with a view to revising the Police Law.³ Structural problems - incoherence and poor articulation - necessitated revision, as did inadequate facilities, the inability of communities to pay for their own police forces, and the latter's apparent vulnerability to lawless elements. Corrupt practices and partial law enforcement seem to have been even more widespread after

¹ R. & A. Report, p. 65.

² Ibid.

³ Memo dated 15/8/49; From: PSD; To: G-2 (NDL, G-2 00262).

decentralisation than before. Certainly, the police were brought closer to the people, but not in the sense that Government Section had intended - they accepted eagerly offers of assistance from influential, wealthy citizens, whose involvement in the black market was conveniently ignored. Identifying more with the interests of their respective communities than with abstract notions of justice, many policemen deferred to the judgement of local leaders, often working at cross purposes with forces in adjacent areas.

Organisation and Facilities

"The development of a spirit of cooperation between Japanese police agencies..." was one of many challenges confronting the Public Safety Division when the "new law concerning civil police became effective on the 7th March, 1948".⁴ About two weeks later Colonel Pulliam, daunted by the tasks ahead, stated that police reorganisation invited problems "far more numerous and complex than any facing the division before the 7th March".⁵ PSD would have to monitor police units constituting both the municipal police (MP) and the national rural police (NRP):

Control of this system no longer stems from the top but from 1,652 different sources (1,605 local forces, 46 prefectural organisations and the national government). Surveillance of compliance with SCAP directives can be accomplished in the future only through frequent trips into the field.⁶

Pulliam insisted that PSD required more personnel to cope with the tasks ahead. A model municipal code was being developed, along with plans for the education and guidance of more than 5,000 public safety commissioners and the training of administrators for MP and NRP forces. Six regional training schools were to be established, general facilities improved, and guidelines laid down for the recruitment and training of around 30,000 new policemen. It was not surprising that Pulliam was alarmed by the workload so recently

⁴ Memo dated 24/3/48; Subject: Status of Japanese Police Reorganisation; From: Col. Pulliam; To: Willoughby (NDL, G-2 00241).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. The source for the following paragraph.

foisted on his division - his subordinates were actively involved in activities ranging from the preparation of standard report forms to the establishment of criminal laboratories and identification bureaux.

Unfortunately, the rapid execution of many of the above tasks was obstructed by serious socio-economic problems. Pulliam intimated that difficult working conditions and inadequate resources - buildings, transport, firearms etc. - necessitated a cooperative attitude towards one another on the part of the various police units:

With the Japanese economy in its present state and with the supply and resupply of equipment and facilities almost non-existent, various police agencies, no longer centralised, must be educated to cooperate in the use of all existing facilities...⁷

However, the Police Law had set out to create *local* forces, independent of each other, protective of their respective jurisdictions and by extension possessive of their limited resources. Given that the main objective of the new legislation was the establishment of police forces that served their communities, it was not surprising that they were unwilling to share facilities. In his letter to the Japanese Prime Minister, dated 16th September, 1947, MacArthur had informed Katayama that "no channel of command should exist between the national rural police unit and the local police forces, but technical channels of communication should, of course, be permitted...to facilitate a relationship of mutual assistance, liaison and coordination".⁸ Conditions on the ground, however, made such protestations seem ridiculous.

In June, 1948, G-2 recommended that ESS approve "allocation of (necessary amounts) of cement and glass to be used in the construction of about 1,500 municipal police stations".⁹ The new buildings would facilitate the "*physical* decentralisation of the Japanese police system, as prescribed in the police legislation...".¹⁰

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ NDL, G-2 02750

⁹ Memo dated ??/6/48; Subject: Cement and Glass Allocations for Police Stations; From: G-2; To: ESS (G-2 00245).

¹⁰ Ibid.

Thus, although decentralisation had taken place on paper, the view from the ground was hardly encouraging - CIS reported that "a great majority...of the 1,130 police stations in Japan...are as a temporary measure occupied jointly by the NRP as district HQ and MP as municipal HQ".¹¹ This could not be allowed to continue:

...joint occupancy results in overcrowding, a lack of clear-cut command functions, confusion of duties and responsibilities, and a deterrent to the establishment of autonomy on the part of municipal departments.¹²

The break with the past was not as final as MacArthur had wished - clearly, "the evils of the past centralised system (could) not be dissipated when MP officials, designated by the Police Law to function autonomously, maintain(ed) their offices and perform(ed) their duties in the same room (as) administrators of the NRP under (whom they had) so recently operated".¹³ One observer, recalling the chaos that ensued as a result of the establishment of a dual police system, described how a line painted down the middle of the police station doorway indicated left for the NRP, right for the MP (or vice versa).¹⁴ Not only did the two police forces often use the same buildings, they also looked very similar - distinguishable, at least to begin with, only by their armbands.¹⁵ The public was baffled - lines painted down the middle of doorways and armbands proved an inadequate introduction to the complexities of the new system.¹⁶

Policemen fortunate enough not to be sharing office space were often tripping over each other - "about eight hundred small municipalities utilise(d) police boxes as substitutes for municipal HQ..., consequently operating in such close confines as to make it impossible to efficiently police their communities".¹⁷ CIS stated

¹¹ Inter-office memo, dated 8/6/48; Subject: Cement and Glass Allocations for Police Stations; From: CIS; To: G-2 (G-2 00245).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Disclosed by Professor I. H. Nish during an informal chat with the author.

¹⁵ Nippon Times, 7th March 1948 [GS(B) 02283] - "Armbands will distinguish the local and the rural police for the time being..."

¹⁶ As late as July 1949, an opinion survey in Tokyo, organised by the Yomiuri Shinbun, revealed that more than 50% of those questioned (51.4%) still did not understand the dual police system [ATIS trans., 25/7/49 - GS(B) 02280].

¹⁷ Inter-office memo, dated 8/6/48; From: CIS; To: G-2; Subject: Cement and Glass (G-2 00245).

that the Police Law stipulated that "state-owned property surplus to the needs of the NRP be transferred to the MP concerned".¹⁸ Unfortunately, however, G-2 insisted that "the majority of Japan's present 1,130 police stations (were) required as HQ facilities for the NRP".¹⁹ So, where were the MP units to conduct their business?

Although "the Japanese Government allocated ¥1,500 million in the 1948 national budget for construction of approximately 1,500 municipal police stations",²⁰ the actual sums handed over did not meet the needs of the situation. Many local police forces compromised themselves by accepting funds from wealthy individuals, whose prosperity derived from black market dealings. For example, in May, 1949, Nishi Kantarô, a well-known authority on the Japanese police system, reported in Shakai that the Tokyo metropolitan government had insufficient funds for the construction of new buildings in 1948 - "the budgetary appropriation was only 20% of the required sum".²¹ Those engaged in criminal activities - "some black market profiteers and the postwar nouveaux riches with shady backgrounds" - provided large sums of money for the construction of "dormitories and stations". Indebted to such people, the police were reluctant to prosecute them for their offences.²²

Inadequate or insufficient accommodation was just one of many problems compounded by decentralisation and devolution of police power. A unitary police system permitted the operation of economies of scale in terms of buildings and administrative personnel. Admittedly, equipment such as motor vehicles and firearms was very thinly spread, but central coordination facilitated its full utilisation. As was stated by representatives of PSD in September, 1947, "...decentralisation of police forces to all cities and towns....require(d) physical facilities (for communication, transportation etc.) which simply did not exist in Japan".²³ Another

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Memo dated ?/6/48; Subject: Cement and Glass (G-2 00245).

²⁰ Inter-office memo, dated 8/6/48 (G-2 00245).

²¹ Article entitled "Democratisation of the Metropolitan Police" by Nishi Kantarô.

²² Ibid.

²³ GS Memo for Record, dated 16/9/47; Subject: Reorganisation Plan for the Japanese Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02303].

point made was that "coordination among the many units would become impractical and the police system would be badly articulated".²⁴ Thus, resistance to decentralisation reflected misgivings with regard to facilities and coordination, both areas that proved to be problematic.

In July, 1949, the Yomiuri Shinbun published the results of an opinion survey in Tokyo, reporting amongst other things that 66.9% of the sample favoured increasing police arms and equipment.²⁵ Questions from the United Press (UP), addressed to GHQ's Public Information Office (PIO) on 16th December 1948, suggested that influential figures in the US were in agreement. UP wanted to know why SCAP did not permit the NRP to utilise all the "normal arms possessed by the police of any democratic country...".²⁶ Willoughby and Pulliam surely knew what had prompted the UP's interest. On 15th December Eichelberger, former commander of the Eighth Army in Japan, had publicly "urged the 'imperative importance' of establishing a well-armed....defence corps for policing purposes".²⁷ As it was, "the police force of 125,000 had only about 18,000 pistols".²⁸

Eichelberger was drawing attention to a problem that most of Japan already acknowledged. On the 7th and 8th September, 1948, the Nippon Times had assessed the performance of the NRP and MP respectively during the first six months of their existence. Although both were deemed to have been satisfactory, it was made clear that they were "seriously handicapped by the shortage of arms".²⁹ In June, 1948, the head of Gifu military government team had recommended that Gifu NRP "be issued more pistols as a crime prevention measure", warning that supplies were "critically

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ ATIS trans. (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20/7/49), dated 25/7/49 [GS(B) 02280].

²⁶ Check sheet, dated ?/12/48; Subject: Questions from UP; From: G-2; To: PIO (G-2 00252).

²⁷ Nippon Times, 16/12/48 [GS(B) 02283].

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ NT, 8/9/48 [GS(B) 02283].

short".³⁰ GHQ was unable to remedy the situation, declaring that there was "no source of supply" and that military government teams might "assist in this matter by making all confiscated pistols available for police use".³¹ By August, 1949, however, such half measures had given way to determined efforts on the part of PSD to arm the police. On the 19th August G-4 stated that "the initial issue of 14,000 cal .38 S&W revolvers provided for in the originally approved schedule of distribution had been accomplished".³² The aim was to supply all policemen with firearms by the end of the year.³³

Efficient policing depended on mobility and a reliable system of communications as well as pistols.³⁴ On the 10th July, 1949, the Nippon Times contended that the police desperately needed "more transportation facilities and a better system of being kept informed of impending trouble...".³⁵ The previous March, a Nagoya paper had claimed that "police were handicapped in the performance of their duties....(by) a dearth of communication and transportation facilities, such as automobiles".³⁶ Likewise, a journal in Fukuoka "deemed it urgent to reinforce police equipment...".³⁷ Whilst nobody denied that there was a shortage of cars, radios etc., many journalists focused on the issue of manpower, calling for a larger police force or more efficient utilisation of its urban and rural components. The latter could best be achieved by a closer working relationship between the various police departments.

Unfortunately, the Police Law discouraged partnerships not only among local police units but also between municipal police and their rural counterparts. The various police units were to confine

³⁰ Letter from Frank C. Seitz, head of Gifu MGT, dated 19/6/48; Subject: Strength of Gifu Prefecture NRP; Thru: Commanding Officer, Tôkai-Hokuriku MG Region; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (G-2 00243).

³¹ 4th Indorsement, dated 23/7/48; From: GHQ, SCAP; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (G-2 00243).

³² Memo dated 19/8/49; Subject: Distribution of Revolvers to Japanese Police (NDL, G-2 04221)

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Chapter 2 examines transport, communications and firearms in greater detail.

³⁵ Article entitled "For Better Teamwork" [GS(B) 02280].

³⁶ ATIS trans., dated 29/3/49; Prefectural Press Analysis: Police System [GS(B) 02282].

³⁷ Ibid.

themselves to their own jurisdictions, contacting other forces only when criminals sought refuge across the "border" and requesting assistance only in the event of an emergency. Sometimes as few as five or six officials policed a small community,³⁸ an ideal situation from the point of view of reformers, whose chief preoccupation was devolution of police power. However, many of those working in the field were horrified by the patchwork of conflicting jurisdictions, knowing full well that it would hamper law enforcement. On March 8th, 1949, an article in the Nippon Times gently pointed out the "circumstances militating against...(the police system's) satisfactory operation":

One of them is attributable to the geographic conditions peculiar to our country....urban and rural areas are contiguous to each other with hardly any discernible boundary between them. As a result it often happens that a small area falls under the jurisdiction of different police units.

Here is an example. Between Tokyo Metropolis and Musashino City in the Musashi plain one notices no distinct demarcation, whether one travels in a tram-car or in an automobile. Rows of houses interspersed with groves stretch out from the outskirts of the metropolis into the sylvan city as if the two were an extension of each other. This small area between the metropolis and the rural city falls under the jurisdiction of three different police units - the Metropolitan Police Board, the Musashino MP and the NRP for the Musashino sector....

With three police jurisdictional zones dovetailed like a jigsaw puzzle in a small area, as in this case, satisfactory police work is impossible without the utmost coordination among the constabulary units concerned.³⁹

The precondition for satisfactory police work was not fulfilled. Numerous reports complained of a reluctance to cooperate on the part of MP forces. The Nippon Times stated that "the new police system...practically preclude(d) aid in the way of reinforcement among the municipal police of different localities even in an emergency".⁴⁰ It substantiated its claim by drawing attention to a strike in April 1948, when around 1,000 operatives of the Japan Typewriter Company surrounded its factory in Chôfu (on the outskirts of Tokyo). "The Chôfu...MP with its strength of less than 50

³⁸ ATIS trans. (Asahi, 11/2/49), dated 11/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

³⁹ "Police System Weathers First Year of Operation - Actual Enforcement Reveals Unforeseen Conditions Hampering Proper Functioning" [GS(B) 02282]. The second problem identified by the article - a financial one - will be examined in the next section.

⁴⁰ Ibid. The source for the remainder of this paragraph.

was unequal to the occasion". Although the Metropolitan Police Board could easily have assisted its helpless neighbour, "reinforcements were unobtainable due to the jurisdictional demarcation". The situation was only brought under control when the NRP arrived with about 1,000 armed policemen, a force that had taken several days to "muster".

According to an ATIS press summary, dated 29th March, 1949, numerous journals in various parts of the country claimed that there was a "lack of cooperation between municipal police units", although it was generally accepted that "local units cooperated with the NRP".⁴¹ A sub-editorial in the 16th March issue of Mainichi disagreed, stating that even "liaison between the State and autonomous police forces seem(ed) to be unsatisfactory...".⁴² In February the Asahi had reported that "many criminals and local bosses" were taking advantage of "insufficient cooperation between the national and local police units". Disturbed by "many deplorable cases....(reflecting) defects in the police system", the paper drew attention to poor "communications and liaison facilities (and) the inconvenience encountered in criminal cases...., arising from the division of jurisdiction between the national and local police units....".⁴³

The dual police system complicated the suppression of illegal activities, particularly the transport of black market produce. In April, 1949, an article in the Yomiuri Shinbun explained why the NRP had "decided to place roving plain-clothes men on trains...":

This decision resulted from difficulties encountered in the investigation of crimes committed aboard trains due to the different "spheres of influence" involved...- the changes in police jurisdiction along the runs, and the control of almost all the principal stations by the autonomous police. Henceforth, the sphere of control will be put on the basis of regional HQ and the autonomous police will cooperate with the rural police.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Prefectural Press Analysis: Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02280].

⁴² ATIS trans., dated 16/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

⁴³ ATIS trans. (Asahi, 11/3/49), dated 11/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

⁴⁴ ATIS trans. (YS, 23/4/49), dated 29/4/49 [GS(B) 02281].

On this occasion the NRP was merely seeking the cooperation of MP forces. However, the situation in some communities necessitated much closer relations. In May, 1948, Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Lucas, head of Shiga military government team, informed his superiors that the town of Maibara (Sakata district) was policed by national rural policemen as well as its own municipal force.⁴⁵ A community with a resident population of around 7,500, Maibara was also a "railway centre" - it had "yards for the Tōkaidō line, was the starting point of the Hokuriku line, and the terminal point of the Omi electric line". Between January and March, 1948, an average of around 5,500 passengers had passed through the railway yards every day. "This amount of traffic....put a burden on the police force entirely out of proportion to the population of the town". To make matters worse police strength had fallen from 51 to 39 with the passage and implementation of the Police Law. The situation, Lucas explained, had produced an unequal partnership between Maibara MP and Shiga NRP:

At the present time Sakata district NRP are assisting the MP in their duties at the railyards. This is not in accord with the Police Law, but must be done if stations are to be properly policed. Shiga NRP have recommended that Maibara MP be discontinued and the NRP take responsibility for this town. Do not concur in this recommendation since many towns of this size would prefer not to have their own police force and abolition of one MP would set a dangerous precedent.⁴⁶

Around the same time, Frank Seitz, the head of Gifu military government team (MGT), was reporting an imbalance of a different sort: visits to police stations throughout the prefecture in April and May, 1948, had revealed that NRP units were understaffed, "while nearly every autonomous (police) chief felt that he had sufficient strength to perform his mission".⁴⁷ The relative strength of the system's urban/local and rural/national components was perhaps less significant than the difficulties associated with redistribution of personnel, transfers of police officers from the NRP to the MP or

⁴⁵ Letter dated 29/5/48; Thru: Commanding General, I Corps; To: SCAP, Attn. PSD (G-2 00243). This is the source for the remainder of the paragraph.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Letter dated 19/6/48; Thru: Commanding Officer, Tōkai-Hokuriku MG Region; To: Commanding General, 8th Army; Subject: Strength of Gifu Prefecture NRP (G-2 00243).

vice versa. Given that the Occupation authorities would not countenance structural change, the inflexibility of the new system - the absence of mechanisms for slight adjustment - seems to have been its chief defect.

Although Frank Seitz "recommended that the NRP strength in Gifu prefecture be increased", warning of "a tendency for criminals to transfer operations to rural areas",⁴⁸ his superiors in GHQ refused "to entertain any suggestions for revision of the...(Police Law) in so far as the NRP (we)re concerned".⁴⁹ Military government teams were to "assist in alleviating....police personnel shortages by encouraging local police administrators to...use the personnel available...more efficiently...".⁵⁰ Seitz surely viewed such instructions as half measures, unlikely to stem the rise of crime. Likewise, the situation in Maibara, Shiga prefecture, did not admit of any easy solution. Although Colonel Lucas disapproved of any moves to abolish Maibara MP, his immediate superiors favoured "amending the Police Law to permit municipalities with 5,000 to 10,000 population the option of voting whether to maintain their own police force or to join the NRP".⁵¹ This recommendation was not even considered by Lieutenant Colonel Schafer at Eighth Army HQ - he endorsed Lucas' rejection of NRP control "inasmuch as assumption of police functions in the town by NRP, without request from the municipal authorities, would constitute a violation of the Police Law".⁵²

Schafer maintained that "one of the chief causes of the difficulties enumerated in the....letter and the 1st Indorsement appear(ed) to be the prevalent practice of requiring a municipality requesting police support to pay the salaries of the police forces loaned".⁵³ Lucas had

⁴⁸ "...because of the thinner police coverage there."

⁴⁹ 4th Ind., dated 23/7/48; From: PSD; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 00243).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ 1st Ind., dated 9/6/48; From: W. V. Hickey, Asst. Adj. General, HQ, I Corps; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (G-2 00243)

⁵² 2nd Ind., dated 22/7/48; To: SCAP; From: Asst. Adj. General, HQ 8th Army (G-2 00243).

⁵³ *Ibid.* 1st Ind., dated 9/6/48, stated that Maibara was not the only town with "insufficient police forces...Another example...(was) a resort town with slightly more than 5,000 population trying...to maintain its own police department. On holidays and at weekends the population (might) double or treble, and police protection (was) spread

explained that Maibara was a poor town - "no industries other than railways and (only) a small amount of farming" - and thus unable to pay for extra policemen. He had recommended that "provisions be made to furnish additional police (for) Maibara MP and (that) support for these police...(should) come from central government".⁵⁴ Lucas and Schafer diverted attention away from the new structure's shortcomings, directing it instead at the Japanese Government. GS followed suit, a spokesman declaring that "the practice of requiring municipalities to meet the expense of supporting local police before adequate provisions for local financing ha(d) been made....(was) in contravention of the express directive of the Supreme Commander".⁵⁵ Thus, the inadequacy of local police forces was blamed on the central government, which many alleged was deliberately sabotaging the new police structure by starving it of funds. The inability of communities to finance their own police departments undermined the new system from the moment of its creation, and lay at the heart of the debate concerning revision. The nature of the problem and its ramifications increasingly preoccupied those concerned with law enforcement, convincing most of them by the summer of 1949 that the Police Law would have to be amended.

Shouldering the Financial Burden

According to the official history of the Occupation, "the inability of municipalities, especially smaller ones, to finance separate police forces....constituted the single greatest deterrent to the success of reform".⁵⁶ To begin with, as has been made clear, the central government was expected to subsidize the local police forces ("until such time as local financing (was) possible"). Those concerned with police reorganisation knew that support from the national treasury could only be a short-term expedient. Clearly, police forces dependant on the financial backing of the government could never be

very thin...If a call to adjacent units for support (was) made, the receiving unit (had to) pay the salaries of forces loaned."

⁵⁴ Letter dated 29/5/48 (G-2 00243).

⁵⁵ Memo dated 24/7/48; From: Major J. P. Napier; To: G-2; Thru: ESS; Subject: Municipal Police Financing (G-2 00243). MacArthur's letter to PM Katayama (16/9/47) was quoted to substantiate GS's claim: "...The national government should allocate the necessary funds until such time as local financing is possible."

⁵⁶ History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, M.55, p.101.

truly independent. Besides, Yoshida and his cabinet ⁵⁷ could hardly be expected to provide finances for a police system over which they had virtually no control. Thus, GHQ painted itself into a corner - it knew that small communities could not afford their own police forces, but at the same time it could not expect or allow the central government to finance the "autonomous" police forces indefinitely.

Therefore, when the Japanese Government declared local public entities to be "self-supporting" on the 1st July, 1948,⁵⁸ few in Occupation circles can have been confident of the outcome. Indeed, those who examined the local finance legislation were appalled by its provisions. Eaton, the head of the Police branch (PSD), informed a colleague that his "thoughts concerning the subject of 'autonomous entity financial autonomy' were unprintable". He contended that the "Japanese Government, apparently with the approval of ESS, had set up a method of obtaining finances for autonomous entities that would have been something to pity the ignorance of, if it had been done through ignorance". Police operations were to be financed with revenue from theatre admission and liquor taxes, "when a great number of towns (did) not have theatres or liquor sales". Understandably, Eaton was "convinced that it was done with ulterior motives on the part of the Japanese government".⁵⁹ Osaka's police chief, Suzuki Eiji, told him that the financial arrangements represented an attempt "to destroy the autonomous police":

Governors were jealous of the power they lost through autonomy in policing, and pressured the national government to "starve" the autonomous police out of existence. Through the type of tax rebate subsequently set up, this "starving" is definitely taking place.⁶⁰

Pulliam agreed, reiterating in January, 1949, that although "the Japanese Government (had) provided in part for local financing through allocation of percentages of theatre admission tax and of

⁵⁷ Yoshida Shigeru formed his second government in October 1948. His predecessor was Ashida Hitoshi who was PM from 10/3/1948.

⁵⁸ Check Sheet, dated 17/1/49; From: G-2; To: GS; Thru: ESS; Subject: Funds for MP (G-2 00257).

⁵⁹ Letter from H.S.E. to Lt. Col. Battey, 12(?) / 1948 (G-2 00257). Eaton charged the Japanese government with "using very poor judgement" - a typical small town had no theatre, and its inhabitants made their own "home-brew" (G-2 00252).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

liquor tax....many towns (had) no theatre or liquor sales". Echoing Eaton and Suzuki, he blamed factions within the government for what had happened.⁶¹ Pulliam explained that G-2/PSD was anxious to ensure "the allocation of proper funds for support of local public safety agencies", but was not really authorised to intervene - "...the problem extend(ed) into the entire structure of local government taxation, and as such (was) of primary interest to ESS, Finance Division".⁶² Realising that financial hardship would invite corruption scandals, PSD's chief was determined to distance himself from MP budgets.

Perhaps Pulliam had taken his cue from Eaton, who warned that "small towns had their backs to the wall, that they had insufficient tax income to pay their police, and that the programme had greatly encouraged the promotion of 'collections'".⁶³ There was plenty of evidence to suggest that autonomous police forces would bankrupt the communities they served unless municipal authorities could find lucrative alternative sources of income. When liquor sales and theatre admissions were low or non-existent, communities could either rely on the designated sources of income and go bankrupt or raise money through private subsidies that often derived from illicit activities. Not surprisingly, most chose the latter course of action, preferring survival to insolvency.

In December 1948 the head of Nagano MGT, Major Stratton, drew attention to the financial problems of "all 36 public entities in Nagano ken...(with) municipal police", and anticipated their recourse to "extra-legal means of obtaining financial support".⁶⁴ Following representations by its ruling elite, Stratton singled out the village of Agata in the district of Chiisagata:

The village chief and several members of the village assembly...visited this HQ in connection with the financial condition of their village resulting from the necessity of financing the municipal police system. They reported that the village will have a ¥500,000 deficit by the end of

⁶¹ Memo for Record, 1/49 (G-2 00257).

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Letter from Eaton to Battey (G-2 00257).

⁶⁴ Letter dated 14/12/48; To: Commanding Officer, Kantô MG Region; Subject: Funds for Municipal Police (G-2 00257)

the current financial year (31 March, 1949) unless funds are forthcoming from either the prefectural government or the national government as subsidies for the police department. Because of their limited power of taxation, there is no hope of alleviating the situation. It was also reported that the village will need ¥1,200,000 for the next fiscal year to support their police.⁶⁵

Nagano MGT HQ believed that unless immediate action was taken by the national government to subsidize MP forces throughout the prefecture "until such time as local autonomy in financial matters (had) been established,⁶⁶ many cities, towns and villages (would) become bankrupt and (would) lose all faith in the desirability of local police".⁶⁷ Stratton's major concern was that such communities would solicit contributions from persons who had "received services from the police".⁶⁸

Comments made by his superiors demonstrate that the problem was not confined to Nagano prefecture. Following receipt of Stratton's "basic communication", Lieutenant Colonel Loren L. Gmeier, commanding officer of Kantô military government region, informed HQ, IX Corps, that "the situation as reported (was) typical of that existing throughout this MG region".⁶⁹ Major R. M. Breeze of HQ, IX Corps, then passed the report on to the commanding general, 8th Army, concurring with Stratton's opinion and providing further evidence to support it:

A recent conference of prefectural public safety commission members of Tôhoku region resulted in an agreement of participating members to urge local public bodies to request additional aid from central government to maintain police in small communities...⁷⁰

HQ Eighth Army noted "the generally unsatisfactory condition regarding financing of local police systems" and recommended to GHQ that "this matter be referred to the appropriate agency of the Japanese Government with a view to study and suitable remedial

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Article 8, Supplementary Provisions, Police Law.

⁶⁷ Letter dated 14/12/48 (G-2 00257).

⁶⁸ Ibid. "Contributions" are examined in Chapter 4.

⁶⁹ 1st Ind., dated 29/12/48 (G-2 00257).

⁷⁰ 2nd Ind., dated 6/1/49 (G-2 00257).

action".⁷¹ The officer concerned, Major N. Hiney, didn't even hint at the kind of measures that would remedy the situation, probably because he had no ideas on that score. As has been noted, G-2 passed the buck to ESS,⁷² the section responsible for approving inadequate financial arrangements in the first place.⁷³

Just two months after the introduction of "self-supporting" local administrations, the Nippon Times had reported that "the MP (were) anxious for State financial aid in view of the present state of local finances".⁷⁴ The following month a representative of the Tōkai-Hokuriku assembly stated that cities, towns and villages required to fund their own police departments found "the burden of expenses impossible...".⁷⁵ Chairmen of the seven prefecural assemblies that constituted the Tōkai-Hokuriku forum - Aichi, Shizuoka, Mie, Gifu, Fukui, Ishikawa and Toyama - called for MP forces to be limited to cities with populations of more than 30,000.⁷⁶ G-2's response was hardly sympathetic, but held out the hope that revision of the Police Law might be considered in the not too distant future:

....Time and experience in local government does not indicate the advisability of entertaining suggestions for revision of the Police Law *at this time*....During the latter part of November PSD police specialists will explain in detail to those concerned the inherent value of existing laws and the reasons why suggested changes should not be made *at this time* (my italics).⁷⁷

At least one of the chairmen was not convinced by the arguments and explanations provided by PSD's experts. In December, 1948, Omi Tameji, chairman of Aichi prefecture's assembly, complained of "inadequate sources of revenue", insisting that "small communities could not afford the autonomy they had been given".⁷⁸ Displeased

⁷¹ 3rd. Ind., dated 12/1/49; To: SCAP.

⁷² See fn. 63.

⁷³ According to Eaton's letter to Battey (G-2 00257).

⁷⁴ 8/9/48 issue, entitled "Police Knit More Closely To People By New System" [NDL, GS(B) 02283].

⁷⁵ Letter dated 6/10/48; From: Representative of Tōkai-Hokuriku Assembly Conference; Thru: Toyama Liaison Office; Subject: Recommendations on renovation of police setup (NDL, G-2 00252).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ G-2 Inter-Office Memo, undated (G-2 00252)

⁷⁸ Correspondence between Omi and PSD investigator (G-2 00252)

with PSD's attitude, he added that "the conference of the seven chairmen of their respective prefectural assemblies was held at the insistence of a majority of mayors and headmen of cities and towns of less than 30,000 population". All concerned were wrestling with the problem of finance:

The object of the said meeting was to find ways and means to secure sufficient revenue for the affected small municipalities. Supported by statements of many mayors and head-men, this group of seven assemblymen concluded that even with the assistance of contributions and revenue obtained through tax channels, the majority if not all would soon be bankrupt.⁷⁹

Omi was told that PSD had "no control over budgetary matters, and thus could take no action pertaining to finances". He was advised to report his findings and conclusions to GS and ESS - the agencies that G-2 held responsible for drastic decentralisation and inadequate financial provision respectively. Moreover, the chairmen, mayors and headmen "should explain their needs to Diet representatives and press them for an early corrective measure".⁸⁰ PSD had warned of the problems that would accompany the kind of reorganisation favoured by GS, and was presumably content to look on as its predictions came true. Sooner or later, the Occupation would have to sponsor a police system more in tune with G-2's way of thinking.

Meanwhile the financial health of many small communities continued to deteriorate. In March, 1949, the Mainichi reported that "Kanagawa towns (were) unable to meet police expenses".⁸¹ Members of the prefectural assembly were reluctant to impose "greater burdens on local taxpayers....to meet the expenses of operating local autonomous police forces", and so were "increasingly inclined to turn over police functions to the national rural police". With the exception of two cities, municipalities throughout the prefecture were unable to shoulder the burden of their own police departments. The paper substantiated its claim by disclosing budget deficits in a number of towns:

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ ATIS trans. (M, 29/3/49), dated 4/4/49 [NDL, GS(B) 02281] - the source for the remainder of this paragraph.

Hatano-machi police expenses are expected to amount to ¥4.5 m. This means that there will be a deficit of more than ¥1m. even if town taxes are collected in full. Moreover, admission taxes collected from country theatres, which are expected to cover police expenses, do not even cover half of these expenses as a rule. Machida-machi is also in similar difficulty. In the case of Minamiashigara-machi and Yamakita-machi which do not have theatres their distress is keener still. Autonomous police bodies in mountainous districts appear doomed to disappear.⁸²

Even in a city of the size of Fujisawa, theatre admission taxes provided only about a quarter (¥6,760,000) of the necessary expenditure (¥23,250,000). The article concluded by declaring that the maintenance of MP forces would destabilise prefectural government.⁸³

The following month the Asahi Shinbun focused attention once more on Kanagawa communities, claiming that they were "overburdened" by police expenses".⁸⁴ In some cases budgets were "so big that they (could) not (even) be covered....by the aggregate of residence taxes...". Determined to express their dissatisfaction with the new police system, a number of headmen and public safety commissioners had decided to meet at Hatano-machi "to vote on the abolition of....autonomous police forces".

Although a new police structure was out of the question so soon after the introduction of MP and NRP forces, it was becoming increasingly clear that the "serious financial difficulties of the self-governing communities" threatened to destroy the local autonomous police system.⁸⁵ Survival depended on either higher or additional taxes or cuts in expenditure. The latter course of action was contemplated by those responsible for governing the city of Okayama. In May 1949 it was reported by a local paper that a reduction in police personnel was under consideration:

As police expenses cannot be covered by the admission tax alone, the municipal authorities are considering a reduction in personnel, although

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ ATIS trans. (AS, 19/4/49), dated 23/4/49 [GS(B) 02281] - the source for the remainder of this paragraph.

⁸⁵ ATIS trans. (Sanyō Shinbun, 1/5/49), dated 14/5/49 [GS(B) 02281].

they are not at all certain that a smaller force can give the city adequate protection.⁸⁶

Given that Okayama - with a floating population of 200,000 - was "known as the nation's number one criminal hotbed", it was not surprising that they were carefully considering their options. The police reinforced their apprehensions by arguing that they needed more manpower, not less.⁸⁷

Even when communities managed to raise enough money to support adequate police forces, "financial stringency prevent(ed) costly criminal investigations".⁸⁸ A small force, numbering seven to ten policemen, could hardly afford to allow one or two of its members to undertake long-distance travel for investigative purposes. Moreover, a shortage of funds made it more difficult for the police to combat black market activities, particularly when the interests of the local populace were involved:

The police of a fishing town in Shizuoka prefecture once rounded up...black market traffickers smuggling fish out of that town. The smugglers being guests of local inns, a strong protest came from the inn-keepers' association, (some) of whose leaders were on the local Public Safety (Police) Commission. The police relented under the pressure.⁸⁹

It is perhaps surprising that this situation arose at all, given the prevalence of alliances between local police forces and successful entrepreneurs (ie. black marketeers). There was a symbiotic relationship - in return for financial support, the police permitted their benefactors to engage in illegal, albeit prosperous, activities. In March, 1949, the Jiji Shinpô reported that financial difficulties had "given rise to conspiracy between local bosses and police officials since the police must depend on local citizens for funds".⁹⁰ Three months later, a journalist writing in Seikai Jeep claimed that "the current critical state of local finance....(made) the police extremely susceptible to the influence of local bosses", particularly

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Nippon Times, 8/3/49, article entitled "Police System Weathers First Year of Operation" [NDL, GS(B) 02282] - the source for the rest of this paragraph.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ ATIS trans. (JS, 6/3/49), dated 11/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

in cities and towns with less than 20,000 residents.⁹¹ Money was channelled through "such groups as the Police Supporters' Association or the Crime Prevention Society, and as a result the influence of wealthy bosses (was brought to bear on) the police forces".⁹² The Occupation authorities knew about such organisations - indeed, they had already considered blocking these conduits for private subsidies or "contributions".

As we have seen, it had been decided to defer action against such informal financial provision until circumstances permitted.⁹³ They never did - circumstances following decentralisation of the police system were even more unfavourable than before. Traditional sources of financial support - informal and unregulated - increasingly made up the shortfall arising from inadequate revenue-raising measures. In January 1949, a magazine article, entitled "Facts Concerning the Metropolitan Police Board (MPB)", intimated that there was a history of close relations between policemen and bosses:

The bosses and gangsters have always presented large sums of money to the police as a means of preventing any unpleasant collisions, and there has always been respect for the law of inviolability between them.⁹⁴

The creation of local police forces altered the relationship between the police and criminal elements, elevating its economic dimension at the expense of political/spiritual affinities. Realising that a huge organisation like the MPB could not function satisfactorily on its small budget, rich bosses moved to capitalise on the situation, entertaining their friends in the force and providing funds for salaries and new buildings.⁹⁵ "Many police station chiefs (were) said to be openly connected with local bosses", and involved in "countless shady deals". Some of them had even built "palatial houses with 'contributions' from contractors, and (were) living in luxury".⁹⁶ Nevertheless, Nishi Kantarô, the previously mentioned authority on

⁹¹ ATIS trans. (monthly magazine, 6/49), dated 9/6/49 [GS(B) 02281].

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ See the relevant section in Chapter 4.

⁹⁴ ATIS trans. (*Van*, 1/49), dated 15/1/49 [NDL, GS(B) 02283].

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ ATIS trans. (*Shin Tokyo*, 7/3/49), dated 18/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

the Japanese police system, was more inclined to emphasize the MPB's positive advances since the implementation of the Police Law. Confidently claiming that "gangsters and local bosses (had) mostly disappeared", he then thought it necessary to qualify this statement:

....but behind the Police Supporters' Association there are still some bosses in action, taking advantage of the lack of funds in the Police Board.⁹⁷

The Board's financial problems seem to have come to a head in March, 1949, when the Yomiuri Shinbun reported that "many police stations under the jurisdiction of the (MPB had) failed to pay telephone, light and water bills".⁹⁸ In some instances, failure to settle up had led to suspension of services:

Extreme cases are Totsuka and Waseda police stations, whose public telephone service was temporarily cut off....Still more embarrassing is the fact that payment is a very difficult task for the poverty-stricken Metropolitan Police Board - the nation's biggest autonomous police force.⁹⁹

According to the article, "the people's failure to pay the metropolitan residence tax" accounted for at least some of the arrears. Public unwillingness to contribute to administrative costs presumably brought the police and their private sponsors closer together.

There was unanimity amongst Japanese newspapers, regardless of the districts they were covering, that "so long as the police depend(ed) on contributions for their salaries they would inevitably be linked with local bosses".¹⁰⁰ In April, 1948, William Fritz - one of PSD's police administrators - examined the case of Shibata Jôji, mayor of Onuki (Ibaraki prefecture). Although local police chiefs described him as "the biggest gangster in the Kantô area", they hastily added that "the subject (was) very 'gentle' now", his

⁹⁷ Article entitled "Democratisation of the Metropolitan Police", Shakai, 5/49.

⁹⁸ ATIS trans. (YS, 25/3/49), dated 31/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ ATIS trans., dated 29/3/49; Prefectural Press Analysis: Police System [GS(B) 02282].

generosity much appreciated by "policemen and the people".¹⁰¹ Physical evidence indicated that the police thought highly of Shibata, despite his criminal record - Fritz wanted to know why "the former prefectural chief of police..., the local police chief and prominent officials of towns and villages (had) so eagerly sponsored the erection of a monument to the subject". According to the MPB, Shibata could be "put away (only) if investigated by an outside agency" - local police forces (NRP and MP) were "believed to be under (his) influence....". Given that he led "an extravagant life", spending a great deal on entertainment,¹⁰² it was probably correct to assume that local officials would be unwilling to testify against him.

Unscrupulous, wealthy individuals - Shibata is a good example - dominated communities by accommodating the interests of potentially obstructive agencies, particularly the police force and the public safety commission (PSC). According to an ATIS prefectural press summary, dated 29 March 1949, "the 'attitude' of (PSC) members and police towards money and influence was....one of the (chief grounds for public concern)....over the present police system".¹⁰³ An editorial in a Nagoya newspaper had "demanded that....Public Safety Committee members as well as policemen be incorruptible".¹⁰⁴ Assessing the new police system's track record after one year, the Nippon Times drew attention to the problems attending the PSCs:

It is bruited on all sides that they are doing little or naught...With men of questionable character on the commissions, there is the danger of the local police being made a tool of local bosses....Utmost circumspection and sound judgment are called for in the selection of (candidates)....¹⁰⁵

Just a few days later, on 11th March, the Yomiuri stated that MP forces were at the mercy of public safety commissions, "which have

¹⁰¹ Letter dated 29/4/48; Subject: Shibata Jôji, Mayor, Onuki-machi, Ibaraki ken; To: Chief, PSD (NDL, G-2 02860) - the source for the rest of the paragraph.

¹⁰² "His monthly cost of living (including social expenses) amounts to ¥1m".

¹⁰³ NDL, GS(B) 02282.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ NT, 8/3/49 [NDL, GS(B) 02282].

absolute influence in local districts".¹⁰⁶ It was, therefore, a matter of some concern that "the quality of....committeemen (was) generally inferior" - indeed, "in some extreme cases, such unsuitable persons as gangsters (had) been appointed...".¹⁰⁷ On the basis of such accounts,¹⁰⁸ H. E. Wildes later declared that "it was common knowledge that many local (PSCs) were packed with gangsters".¹⁰⁹ This was in marked contrast to H. S. Eaton's premature endorsement of the new commissions on 13 May, 1948:

The fear that under the new system gangsters and "bosses" would be placed on PSC.s, and thereby obtain control of the police for their own selfish purposes, has not materialised. Today's public safety commissioners are....strong-minded, public-spirited, intensely interested people.¹¹⁰

The following February the Mainichi conducted a nationwide public opinion poll on the dual police system.¹¹¹ Japanese residents were asked, amongst other things, if they had confidence in their local public safety committees. Nearly 50% of those living in MP districts didn't know (49.6%), whilst 15.6% answered in the negative - Eaton's views were shared by less than 1/3 of those questioned.¹¹²

Interestingly, pollsters asked a question that concerned the relationship between "bosses" and policemen - "Have you heard or seen bosses in your district exerting influence upon the police by taking advantage of police aid societies (or) crime prevention associations...?" Nearly 1/4 of those residing in MP districts (22.9%) answered in the affirmative, suggesting that little effort was made to conceal such practices as bribery and corruption. Just a month

¹⁰⁶ ATIS trans., dated 11/3/49 [NDL, GS(B) 02282].

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. "...of the 136 PSC men who have so far resigned, 12 were connected with economic offences and 12 with violent crimes".

¹⁰⁸ Others include Asahi Shinbun, 9/9/48, Tokyo Shinbun, 7/3/49.

¹⁰⁹ "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol.43, No.5 (Jan.-Feb. 1953) p.664.

¹¹⁰ Press conference (G-2 00259).

¹¹¹ Using the "regional random sampling method", the Mainichi Shinbun Public Opinion Survey Department selected districts/samples of residents in 100 cities and 191 towns and villages. 3,165 residents filled in questionnaires. Answers received to the seven questions asked in the survey were classified according to whether the pollee lived in an MP district or in a NRP district.

¹¹² ATIS trans. (M, 7/3/49), dated 11/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

earlier, in January 1949, a magazine article had drawn attention to "the inseparable bonds between the policeman and the boss":

The police are easy to bribe - that is, the results of a bribe are instantaneous. This is why there is always a close relationship between the black marketeer and the policeman. The results of this connection can be seen in the poor results of....black market raids, since police secrets are confided in the course of giving and receiving "presents".¹¹³

The following April, representatives of local organisations in Hachiôji, a Tokyo suburb, complained that "since the local police was reorganised into an autonomous police force, no major violators of economic laws (had) been arrested...". They also pointed out that "black market goods (were) being sold openly".¹¹⁴ The validity of these criticisms was recognised by the head of Hachiôji MP and the chairman of the local PSC, both of whom "promised to strive to make the police a respected and trusted group". The decline of police discipline was noted by a representative of the city's Ex-Convicts Relief Committee.¹¹⁵

Naturally, policemen were reluctant to bite the hand that was literally feeding them. Collectively and individually, they depended on black marketeers to fund their policing activities and to help them keep body and soul together at home. Some commentators were sympathetic, declaring that "crimes by the police (were) a phenomenon born of difficult living conditions".¹¹⁶ Nishi Kantarô, writing in Shakai in May 1949, argued that it was unreasonable to "expect policemen to be above the general level of society - being human, they (were) also exposed to temptations".¹¹⁷ Up to a point, therefore, close relations between the police and wealthy, unsavoury characters were explained away - mutual accommodation was inevitable given the financial problems faced by local police forces. However, the combination of a weak police force and a criminal organisation acting with impunity was potentially explosive. In some communities the MP force was so compromised

¹¹³ ATIS trans. (Van, 1/49), dated 15/1/49 [GS(B) 02283].

¹¹⁴ ATIS trans. (Asahi Shinbun, 20/4/49), dated 27/4/49 [GS(B) 02281].

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ ATIS trans. (Van, 1/49), dated 15/1/49.

¹¹⁷ Article entitled "Democratisation of the Metropolitan Police".

and so weakened by its relationship with a particular gangster that the latter actually took control of the community, usually with disastrous results.

Vulnerability to Lawless Elements

The weakness of the municipal police in the face of criminal elements and, more importantly, organised communist protest convinced the Occupation authorities that revision of the Police Law was not only necessary but urgent. They came to this conclusion following a number of incidents - notably in Honjô (Saitama), Chôshi (Chiba) and Taira (Fukushima) - scandals that were exposed, or at least thoroughly investigated, by the Japanese press. Indeed, exposés in the Nippon Times frequently caused General Willoughby to berate his subordinates - the head of G-2 (Intelligence) did "not like to get (his) news from... newspapers".¹¹⁸ Leading titles were provoked into unmasking prominent criminals by attacks on journalists. "A press campaign against the activities of gangster bosses" was initiated in August 1948, when the Asahi Shinbun reported on developments in Honjô, and continued into 1949 with the Yomiuri's "crusade against bosses and gangs in Chôshi city".¹¹⁹

The Honjô story broke during the summer of 1948, when "a cub reporter for the Asahi" was "publicly and physically assaulted" by a pillar of the community whose public persona did not fit well with his criminal background. Oishi Kasuichirô was a member of the municipal assembly, the Ex-convict Relief Committee and the Prefectural Judicial Protection Committee as well as the founder and chief director of the Police and Citizens' Society - all this despite a string of convictions. His unfortunate victim had been investigating reports of black market activities, which military government authorities had called to the attention of the local police. Although the police investigation had yielded nothing in the way of results, the reporter had managed to uncover "part of a story which involved prominent citizens, including the moving spirit of

¹¹⁸ Memo dated 7/9/48; To: Col. Bratton - Info (G-2 00253).

¹¹⁹ HQ, Civil Censorship Detachment - Press, Pictorial, Broadcast Division; Summary of Information, dated 5/3/49; Subject: Yomiuri Shinbun Fights Boss Rule in Chôshi City (NDL, CIS 02702).

the 'voluntary' collection campaign". The publication of expressions of disapproval in local editions of the Asahi provoked the assault, which in turn justified coverage in the paper's national edition. The latter carried reports daily on developments in this "town of gangsters", focusing on "measures taken by procuratorial authorities as well as the general public to rid (the) town of its firmly entrenched bosses".¹²⁰

Willoughby was not aware of what was going on in Honjô until he "picked up....a public newspaper article...on 30 August, five days after the (Nippon Times) reported on (the) incident".¹²¹ In a caustic memo to Colonel Bratton, he ordered an investigation into the "efficiency of the local CIC unit".¹²² He was assured that "local CIC....was not aware of the situation until an anonymous letter was received by Saitama MGT during the second week of August 1948". As for the head of PSD, he had been examining the allegations contained in the letter when the story broke:

Colonel Pulliam (CIS/PSD) was cognisant and has been investigating conditions with a view (to) prosecuting all persons guilty of illegal or unlawful acts, whether they be the mayor, members of the Public Safety Commission, police officials or....oyabun.¹²³

Honjô had its own inadequate police force - it was a "town of gangsters" resting on foundations of collusion and corruption. These two truths fused into a public perception that associated vulnerability with local police forces and effectiveness with greater centralisation. Although there was a willingness on the part of the Occupation to learn from what had happened at Honjô, the sections concerned could hardly be expected to blame the very police system they had devised. National agencies were similarly ambivalent - a Diet committee, whilst critical of MP forces,

¹²⁰ The information in this paragraph comes from three sources: History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, M.55, pp.103-4. Memo dated 4/9/48; From: Col. Bratton; To Gen. Willoughby (NDL, G-2 00253). HQ, Civil Censorship Detachment - Press, Pictorial, Broadcast Division; Summary of Information, dated 5/3/49.

¹²¹ Memo dated 7/9/48 (G-2 00253).

¹²² Memo dated 30/8/48; Subject: Honjô Scandal (G-2 00253).

¹²³ Memo dated 4/9/48; From: Col. Bratton; To: Gen. Willoughby (G-2 00253).

produced inconclusive findings with regard to "contributions".¹²⁴ Still, the publicity surrounding the affair led to the resignations of the mayor of Honjô and members of the local public safety commission, together with the transfer of the NRP district police chief. Interestingly, the Police and Citizens' Society was not disbanded,¹²⁵ suggesting that its importance as a conduit for funding was fully appreciated by the Occupation authorities. Any attempt to block that channel might have had serious implications for autonomous police forces - the alternative was to permit the flow of money, and to engage in an exercise of damage limitation. Providing gangsters did not run riot, the system's fundamental anomaly - its reliance on bribes - could be concealed.

However, the press was determined to expose malpractices, particularly when journalists were the victims, and so continued to produce illuminating coverage of local policing. For example, in September 1948 several metropolitan newspapers reported that a Yomiuri reporter had been attacked in the HQ of the MPB by a "gangster who was known to have frequented the building".¹²⁶ Major Imboden (Civil Information and Education Section) considered the incident serious enough to warrant a declaration that "assaults upon newspaper reporters were infringements upon the basic freedom of the press".¹²⁷ According to Shinsô, a monthly magazine, unsavoury characters were drawn to the premises of the MPB - black marketeers were "rampant" in its offices, supplying policemen with food and clothing. "Real love for the police", it contended, was "expressed by the bosses, as typified by the Honjô case".¹²⁸ Reference was made to crime prevention societies, and "dinner parties...presumably paid for by....black marketeers".¹²⁹

¹²⁴ History of the Non-Military Activities, M.55, p.104.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 104-105.

¹²⁶ HQ, Civil Censorship Detachment - Press, Pictorial, Broadcast Division; Summary of Information, dated 5/3/49; Subject: Yomiuri Shinbun Fights Boss Rule in Chôshi City (NDL, CIS 02702).

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ ATIS trans. (Shinsô, 2/49), dated 5/2/49; Article entitled "Metropolitan Police Exposed" [NDL, GS(B) 02283].

¹²⁹ Ibid.

"Even where the police were honest the tiny forces were....often.... at the mercy of...gangs".¹³⁰ This view - expressed by H. E. Wildes - was substantiated by events in Kônosu and Omiya (Saitama). On 23 February, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun reported the comments of a police chief - Iwasaki of the NRP - together with the context of his remarks:

To illustrate the helplessness of the police, take as an example Kônosu machi with a population of 14,000. Only five or six national rural and autonomous policemen during the day and one or two at night can be mobilised in case of emergency. Chief Iwasaki of the (NRP) in this district stated that if more than 10 armed gangsters attack the town, the police force would be powerless. As a result the police are hesitant about arresting gangs.¹³¹

During "the prosecution of the Omiya and Kônosu cases involving assault and battery of minor gangsters by their bosses", it became clear that the local police were impotent in the face of gang violence. Gambling was identified as the root of the problem, its luxuriant growth in the provinces reflecting effective police measures in the metropolis.¹³²

In January, 1949, the Yomiuri drew attention to the problems of Chôshi, a fishing town of 72,000 situated on the Pacific coast east of Tokyo.¹³³ It was reported that "nine tough gangs....(had) control over the labour unions and the press in the city", that "gambling and stabbing (were) everyday affairs", and that "the police (was) not much concerned with these happenings".¹³⁴ All the necessary ingredients were present for a good story - blatant disregard for the rights of journalists, a feeble police force incapable of maintaining even a semblance of law and order, and an archetypal villain at the centre of the fray. Takahashi Toramatsu - nicknamed Takatora - was described as the "Al Capone of Chôshi" by Mr. Beech of the Chicago

¹³⁰ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", p.663.

¹³¹ ATIS trans., dated 1/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ HQ, Civil Censorship Detachment, Summary of Information, dated 5/3/49 (NDL, CIS 02702).

¹³⁴ Civil Censorship Detachment - Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division, Press Section; Memo for record, dated 17/2/49; Subject: Yomiuri's Crusade Against Gangs and Bosses in Chôshi (CIS 02702).

Daily News, who met and interviewed the "notorious gambler-boss" in March, 1949. His conclusions were as follows:

(Takatora) is the most powerful boss in the city of Chôshi, (controlling the people) by use of terror...He is always protected by a tricky lawyer named Shiina Takashi whenever he gets in trouble with the law....A most courageous man is needed to ostracize....(him). There is a man named Koshikawa Yoshimaro, the editor of a local newspaper, who....once fought against him. There is still a large scar on his face...inflicted by one of (Takatora's) gang....¹³⁵

Takatora had skilfully expanded his power base. He had capitalised on divisions in the fishermen's union, organised by communists in May 1946, by encouraging a breakaway of disillusioned members. He then "formed a new union around the bolting members, appointed himself adviser and selected members of his gang as leaders". In December, 1948, his union took over the job of "maintaining order" in the city's fish markets, a task usually reserved for the police. Those assigned to this duty "looted the catches of fishing vessels from other prefectures", demonstrating scant regard for the rule of law. Likewise, threats and intimidation were the principal supports of Takatora's gambling empire:

'Customers' were threatened if they tried to stop gambling, and eight of the ten richest fishermen have gone bankrupt from gambling losses. Cases of intimidation of the townspeople as well as acts of violence....are numerous.¹³⁶

At the beginning of its "crusade", the Yomiuri Shinbun stated that "the relationship between the bosses and the police (in Chôshi) was inseparable".¹³⁷ As a result, external agencies - the Attorney General's Office and the Chiba Procuratorial Office - began to investigate "boss activities in Chôshi". Public pressure for something to be done escalated when a woman was "punished" for telling a reporter about threats she had received - her forehead was pierced with a pair of fire-tongs. "Mina-san's wounds" became the focus of "growing anti-terrorist public opinion".¹³⁸ On 20 March, the

¹³⁵ Memo for Record, dated 8/3/49; Subject: Follow-up on Yomiuri's Crusade Against Gangs and Bosses in Chôshi (CIS 02702).

¹³⁶ HQ, Civil Censorship Detachment, Summary of Information, dated 5/3/49 (NDL, CIS 02702).

¹³⁷ YS, 31/1/49 (NDL, G-2 00261).

¹³⁸ Summary of Information, dated 5/3/49 (CIS 02702).

Yomiuri reported that the "Chôshi PSC and autonomous police gave no positive aid to the arrest of Takatora", because "all the expenses of the autonomous police were paid by Takatora and other influential persons of the city".¹³⁹ Eight days later, "Takatora...., who had been under investigation of Chiba District Procurator's Office, (was) prosecuted on the charge of attempted murder, injury, violence and extortion....".¹⁴⁰ Fujii Shôjô, a PSD police investigator, later reported that Chiba's procurator favoured a sentence of at least five years imprisonment for Chôshi's notorious boss, and was optimistic about the city's future prospects now that it was "mostly cleared of gangsters and bosses". Interestingly, Fujii intimated that the Yomiuri's "account of Chôshi's condition was exaggerated....,that the (municipal) police...(were) not 'friendly' with bosses and gamblers as alleged".¹⁴¹

Although the Occupation authorities might have felt able to question the significance of such cases, the same could not be said for acts of sedition instigated by the Communist Party. When "an unruly communist-led mob occupied Taira police station" for about eight hours on June 30, 1949,¹⁴² the press, the Occupation authorities and the Japanese government reacted with alarm. The incident demonstrated not only that municipal police forces were extremely vulnerable in the face of organised protest, but also - more importantly - that communist elements were capable of humiliating NRP and MP units. Taira's force of thirty policemen had been quickly overwhelmed by a force of several hundred, most of whom were miners. The mob had then released two communists, stolen the one and only firearm and draped the police station in red flags. When the Fukushima MGT heard what had happened it immediately ordered Fukushima, Sendai and other cities to send armed NRP units to Taira. However, the National Railway Workers' Union (NRWU) was determined to obstruct the dispatch of reinforcements, particularly

¹³⁹ YS, 20/3/49; article entitled "Outrageous Chôshi PSC Retarded Arrest of Takatora" (G-2 00261).

¹⁴⁰ YS, 29/3/49 (G-2 00261).

¹⁴¹ Memo dated 31/8/49; Subject: Newspaper Campaign Against Gangsterism in Chôshi, Chiba Prefecture; To: Administrator, Group V (G-2 00260).

¹⁴² NT, 3/7/49 (G-2 04221).

from Sendai where the police must have been screaming with frustration:

About two hundred armed cadets of the (NRP) Academy (tried)...to board a special train for Taira. However, the NRWU first stoned the train, then pulled the engineer down from his locomotive and locked the car doors from the inside to prevent rescuers from gaining access. When the police were fully transferred to trucks,...workers used the railroad's communications system to order the gates closed all along the way to Taira, (thus) blocking road traffic.¹⁴³

The city of Kôriyama sent two thirds of its police force to Taira, only to find itself suffering a similar fate. Communist demonstrators stormed the police station and occupied it "apparently under a prearranged schedule".¹⁴⁴

Most commentators believed that the chain of events corresponded to "a well-coordinated and prearranged plot,... (aimed at) test(ing) the strength of the police in (the) area". This suspicion was "heightened by the fact that the direct cause of the...rioting was insignificant enough".¹⁴⁵ The riot in Taira was apparently sparked off by a police order to remove a bulletin board used by the local communist party committee. The circumstances surrounding this order are less important than the real reason for the conflict that erupted during the afternoon of June 30:

The true cause was the dismissal...of 143 out of 500 members of the Yagô Coal Mine Workers' Union in Taira, including its chairman and vice-chairman, both of whom belonged to the communist party. These fired men were looking for a vent for their anger in a city already sullen and frustrated by economic conditions...¹⁴⁶

According to Chalmers Johnson, the Taira incident was "the closest thing to actual insurrection that occurred in Japan in 1949".¹⁴⁷ It demonstrated that the dual police system was incapable of coping with organised subversive elements, so much so that "citizens in the

¹⁴³ Chalmers Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972) p.103 - the source for the preceding paragraph.

¹⁴⁴ NT, 3/7/49 (G-2 04221).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Johnson, Conspiracy, p.101.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

Taira area organised a body of 1,300 vigilantes".¹⁴⁸ The Nippon Times reported that the public was running out of patience:

The question which the public is naturally asking is whether or not the present police forces, national and local, are able to maintain law and order and to provide the people with the necessary protection against mob action. This problem...is even more pressing and pertinent than before because the highly publicised "summer labour offensive" is expected to begin in earnest with the execution of the Government's personnel slash programme.¹⁴⁹

The programme of economic stabilisation, submitted by the Dodge mission in April 1949,¹⁵⁰ provoked social unrest, sabotage and subversion. Drastic cuts in personnel, or the threat of them, were actively resisted by communists and their supporters, whose "amateur revolution-making" strengthened the government's case for revision of the Police Law. One of many squalls during the "Dodge storm", the Taira incident demonstrated that economic retrenchment and the attendant social problems necessitated an effective police force.

Trusting in the National Rural Police

On 15 July, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun declared that "the Japanese police....should not be left divided....(but rather) reorganised as the national rural police system alone".¹⁵¹ Around the same time a public opinion survey in Tokyo, conducted by the Yomiuri Shinbun, showed that there was substantial support for the adoption of a single police system (53.9%). This was not surprising given that three months earlier - before the Taira incident - the Mainichi's "nationwide public opinion poll on the new police" had revealed that 41.9% of those questioned favoured "unification", whilst 37.2% didn't know what kind of system they wanted.¹⁵² Although these statistics

¹⁴⁸ S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed., Five Studies in Japanese Politics (University of Michigan Press, 1957) p.7.

¹⁴⁹ NT, 3/7/49 (G-2 04221).

¹⁵⁰ Joseph Dodge, the president of a Detroit bank, headed the mission. Regarding Japan's problems, he did not mince his words: "Japan's economy is walking on stilts, one leg of which is built on external aid from the US and the other on internal subsidies" (NT, 8/3/49).

¹⁵¹ ATIS trans. (TS, 15/7/49), dated 21/7/49 [NDL, GS(B) 02280].

¹⁵² ATIS trans., dated 11/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

may be of questionable value, they do at least indicate that there was little public support for a fragmented police structure. The Occupation authorities held the press at least partially responsible for this rebuff. Its "ignorance of the underlying principles of decentralisation in a democratic society played into the hands of those interested political circles which supported centralisation of police authority on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness without, however, mentioning the inherent evils of the system".¹⁵³ More significant, however, was a gut feeling on the part of the general public that drastic decentralisation was misguided. Local police forces were seen as a burden, a liability rather than a benefit. Generally, they were cursed as much by ordinary Japanese citizens as they were by the national government.¹⁵⁴

In June 1949 the Prime Minister hosted a two-day meeting, the purpose of which was "to study the reform of the police system,... and the maintenance of peace and order against the labour offensive".¹⁵⁵ Attended by the nation's police chiefs, it was "the second conference of its kind", attesting to the increasing momentum of reform. Formal discussions concerning revision of the Police Law seem to have begun as early as March 1949, following reports that "the United States authorities had directed re-examination of local decentralisation of Japan's police system".¹⁵⁶ The basis for these reports was a "statement made by US Secretary of the Army Royall that Japan should be allowed to have sufficient police force for peace preservation and the suggestion forwarded by Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger that a police force of 150,000 should be created in Japan for purposes of internal peace and order".¹⁵⁷ The Japanese government was determined to forge ahead with its plans in the light of these statements.

¹⁵³ Report entitled "Evolution of a Democratic Police System", compiled in 1951 by GS [NDL, GS(B) 01832].

¹⁵⁴ An ATIS trans. (summary), dated 23/7/49, declared that "there is undoubtedly no one in Japan who approves the present Japanese police system" [GS(B) 02280].

¹⁵⁵ ATIS trans. (Hôchi Shinbun, 16/6/49), dated 16/6/49 [GS(B) 02280].

¹⁵⁶ ATIS trans. (Mainichi, 7/3/49), dated 11/3/49 [GS(B) 02282].

¹⁵⁷ NT, 6/3/49, Editorial Survey [GS(B) 02282].

The very same day that the nation's police chiefs met to discuss these plans at the Premier's official residence - 16 June 1949 - it was reported in the Tokyo Shinbun that "the (NRP's) Administrative Management Board (had)....submitted to State Minister Higai¹⁵⁸ a report on the revision of the police system which was based on the actual conditions of the local police".¹⁵⁹ Expressing an expectation that a revision bill would be submitted "in the coming Diet session", the article outlined its likely provisions: An increase in police manpower; the "limitation of ...autonomous bodies to cities only, leaving the establishment of such police forces for towns and villages to their own discretion"; and the consequent "expansion of the activities and functions of the NRP vis à vis the local autonomous police".¹⁶⁰

It seems that the Japanese government was increasingly taking its cue from prominent figures in Washington rather than their counterparts in Tokyo. Fully appreciating the importance of tensions between the US and the USSR, Yoshida and his cabinet acted on signs - the Dodge mission was the most visible - of a more prominent role for the US administration at the expense of GHQ. General Willoughby's reaction to an editorial in the Nippon Times in August 1949 demonstrates that he was completely out of touch with developments on the police front, that certain members of the Japanese government were quite willing to discuss the prospect of reform with little regard for the wishes of G-2. He asked Pulliam if he had "been advised that plans (for the reform of the police system had) been drafted by the Democratic Liberals".¹⁶¹ The head of PSD stated that the "editorial appear(ed) to be part of a planned press campaign prompted by Higai,....spokesman for the interests apparently desirous of a return of the former police state".¹⁶² Pulliam described Higai as a "general nuisance", who was "closely associated with....recent press-aided differences between the Prime

¹⁵⁸ Cabinet member in charge of police affairs.

¹⁵⁹ ATIS trans. dated 16/6/49 [NDL, GS(B) 02280].

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Inter-office memo, dated 12/8/49; From: Willoughby; To: Pulliam; Subject: Reform of the Police System (NDL, G-2 00262). In January 1949 the Democratic Liberal Party, led by Yoshida, had won an absolute majority in the lower house.

¹⁶² Memo dated 15/8/49; From: PSD; To: G-2 (G-2 00262).

Minister (on the one hand and) the National Public Safety Commission (on the other)....".¹⁶³ He assured Willoughby that PSD was manoeuvring behind the scenes to ensure that the outcome of the revision process, which was accepted as necessary, was in line with Occupation policy:

Upon application and reasonable test of the Police Law, PSD....recognised the mandatory need of a revision...This has been quietly worked on by PSD...with officials of the Japanese government. The revision, representing months of education and labour, has been handled quietly on a....schedule for submission to the next session of the Diet....'officials in the know' have quietly injected many of the desired revisions into discussions with their friends of the press. That (these)...have proved beneficial and have countered Higai's proposals is evidenced by the objections raised in the Nippon Times editorial to the more radical and nationalistic version desired by Higai.¹⁶⁴

No sooner had Willoughby received Pulliam's memo than he was inviting everyone's attention to another article in the Nippon Times, this time concerning a conference of prefectural governors.¹⁶⁵ The latter had adopted a resolution that called for "autonomous local police....(to) be limited to municipal zones (with) populations of over 30,000 and all the police in centres below this figure (to) be incorporated into the National Rural Police".¹⁶⁶ Pulliam was impatient of the arguments expressed at the conference:

Governors, mayors and autonomous assemblies have failed, in most instances, to adequately tax themselves to support local government....They revel in talking about their problems, and in order to point the finger of responsibility away from themselves they close such discussions by blaming the national government. They still prefer the politically controlled system of contribution to taxation.¹⁶⁷

MacArthur was equally impatient of Yoshida's complaints. In a letter dated August 6, 1949, the Japanese Prime Minister informed the Supreme Commander that "the ineptitude of (the) police,....demonstrated during these past eventful months, is a source of grave concern to my government, with which, after all,

¹⁶³ In July 1949 Yoshida told the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) to replace NRP chief Saitô Noboru on the grounds that he was not up to the job. Realising that the PM wanted more control over policing, the NPSC rejected his demand.

¹⁶⁴ Memo dated 15/8/49 (G-2 00262).

¹⁶⁵ Inter-office memo, dated 15/8/49; To: Pulliam (G-2 00262).

¹⁶⁶ NT, 14/8/49 (G-2 00262).

¹⁶⁷ Memo dated 19/8/49; To: Willoughby (G-2 00262).

rests the ultimate responsibility for public security".¹⁶⁸ Yoshida's principal complaints were as follows:

....the country's police power has been split up into numerous units, large and small, each of which is independent, isolated and often helpless. Moreover the entire system is detached from the government.

He requested MacArthur's assistance in "bring(ing) the police into closer liaison with government,...coordinat(ing) the various branches and units, and...plac(ing) them under unified control and direction....for swift vigorous and effective action". The Supreme Commander's reply,¹⁶⁹ based on a report prepared by PSD, claimed that "the potential effectiveness of the Japanese police ha(d) been increased" by such measures as the loan of firearms and the provision of motor vehicles. MacArthur dismissed Yoshida's claim that "the failure of coordination between the national and local police units....(was) due to the manner of their organisation or definition of their powers as provided by the law...". The problem could best be resolved, he argued, by "the proper education of the personalities involved", a process that was already underway. In other words, MacArthur stressed the importance of working within the existing system rather than overturning it. Presumably, he was suspicious of Yoshida's motives, and so was determined to resist the pressure for recentralisation of the police.

By early 1950, however, MacArthur was considering "an expansion of police forces available to protect Japan....(from) subversive activities on a major scale prior to termination of the Occupation".¹⁷⁰ The outbreak of the Korean War in June convinced the Supreme Commander that Japan's national security must be the priority. The hasty establishment of the National Police Reserve, a military force under the operational control of the national government, seemed to foreshadow revision of the Police Law at the same time that it made it less necessary. MacArthur's replacement by Ridgway in April 1951, and the latter's statement on 3 May authorizing the Japanese government to review existing legislation,

¹⁶⁸ NDL, GS(B) 02270.

¹⁶⁹ Letter dated 8/8/49 [GS(B) 02270].

¹⁷⁰ Report entitled "Evolution of a Democratic Police System" [NDL, GS(B) 01832].

spelt the end of MP forces. On 24 May 1951 the House of Representatives passed the government's police revision bill, which went into effect on 12 June.¹⁷¹ The revised law permitted "towns and villages, but not cities, to relinquish (their local police forces) and (place) them under the jurisdiction of the NRP".¹⁷² By October 1951 "a total of 1,028 towns out of 1,314 had held plebiscites, all but four asking the NRP to assume control".¹⁷³ Local police forces, so cherished by the reformers within GHQ, were close to extinction. In an editorial on 4 October, the Asahi captured the essential dilemma facing the Occupation - it warned against "the evils accompanying concentration of (police) power", but recognised the need to "increase efficiency (to) maintain public order".¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", p.667.

¹⁷⁴ Report entitled "Evolution of a Democratic Police System", p.34 [NDL, GS(B) 01832].

CONCLUSION

For reasons touched on in the introduction, Japanese and Western historians of the Occupation have been reluctant to examine the reform of the Japanese police during the American Occupation of Japan (1945-52). There is never more than passing reference to the police, despite their being one of the principal targets of the radical reform agenda articulated in the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy. Given the Occupation's commitment to free the Japanese people from "restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech",¹ it is extraordinary that nobody has assessed the degree to which the wartime regime's principal instrument of oppression was reformed during the Occupation. Every other area of Occupation reform has been examined in monographs by either Japanese or Western scholars, usually both. Even the Japanese film industry during the Occupation has attracted more attention than the police.² This thesis begins to close this gap in Occupation historiography. It has examined the professed aims of police reform, and demonstrated that the Occupation's achievements fell far short of these markers. The reasons for this, it argues, relate to the mechanics of the Occupation itself and, more significantly, the resilience of Japan's social forms and conventions. These are subjects that have been treated briefly, if at all, in previous accounts. In short, this study breaks new ground, shedding light on vital areas of the Occupation that have until now hardly figured in histories of this period.

It quickly became clear that this project necessitated a new kind of approach to the Occupation, the essential reason being that the police occupied a unique position, unlike that of any other Japanese institution. Obviously, it was not the only governmental agency that was allowed to continue, largely unaffected - in the short term at least - by the American presence. The bureaucracy, for example, "survived the Occupation - minus a Home Ministry here, and a few

¹ SCAPIN 93 (Civil Liberties Directive), dated 4/10/45.

² Whereas there is at least one monograph on this subject - eg. K. Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: The Japanese Cinema Under the American Occupation, 1945-52 - there are no more than a few articles on the Japanese police during this period.

prewar personnel there - relatively unscathed....".³ However, the police's omnipresence, its indispensability to the Occupation, made it unique. It faced several ways at once, looking to its traditional masters, both within the government and outside, for support and direction, at the same time as it received instructions, sometimes assistance, from American officials. The latter expected Japanese policemen to keep order, but also to respect the people's newly-won civil liberties. There was tension between these two positions, the Occupation ultimately according social stability a higher priority than emancipation.

The shift from reform enthusiasm to pragmatism - usually referred to as the "reverse course" - clearly affected the police, although the time frame was rather different from that of other institutions. Indeed, structural reorganisation was implemented at a time when earlier liberalizing measures - concerning labour, for example - were being reversed. The delay reflected the special position of the police. It was too important an agency to be immediately and drastically overhauled. However, at the same time, its wartime record dictated that it be "democratised" as soon as practicable. The moment came in late 1947, when members of Government Section, convinced that the police held the key to lasting democratisation in Japan, pushed through a policy of drastic decentralisation that was hopelessly ill-adapted to prevailing conditions. Ultimately, the problems and reversals that attended police reform reflected the contradictions inherent in an indirect Occupation, together with the persistence of traditional *modi operandi*. Clearly, these conclusions are intertwined. Each must be explored and related to the notion of a "reverse course", before a proper assessment can be made of the implications of these findings for broader studies of the Occupation and postwar Japan.

³ C. Gluck, "Entangling Illusions - Japanese and American Views of the Occupation" in W. I. Cohen, ed., New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations (Columbia University Press, New York, 1983) pp.188-9.

A Two-Faced Occupation

One of the great paradoxes of the Occupation was the attempt to bring about social and political transformation through the agency of the Japanese government.⁴ The decision to adopt a policy of remote control was a highly significant one, the origins of which remain obscure. According to Justin Williams, a member of Government Section, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru met MacArthur on 3 September, 1945, at Yokohama, and persuaded him to abandon plans for the establishment of military government.⁵ However, Theodore Cohen maintains that MacArthur was observing "the formula worked out hurriedly after the Potsdam Declaration that the Occupation was simply to use the Japanese Government...".⁶ This is the more credible of the two accounts, and is backed up by a statement in the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy, which justifies indirect Occupation as a way of saving scarce resources.⁷ MacArthur would have received this statement of policy by the end of August - it was sent by radio on the 29th - and so would have been predisposed to give up plans for direct military government before he met Shigemitsu. Perhaps the official history should have the last word. It suggests that the decision to work through the Japanese government was only tentatively made in Washington, and that policy-makers were careful to give the Supreme Commander some room for manoeuvre:⁸

Peaceful occupation of Japanese territory and satisfactory compliance with instructions issued to enforce the terms of surrender *confirmed the feasibility of exercising control through the existing machine of the Japanese government* (my italics). This policy for the exercise of control and the Supreme Commander's decision to issue all orders to the

⁴ Theodore Cohen maintains that "the great project was replete with paradox". He highlights the paradox of democratization "by means of that least democratic of institutions, the Army...." (*Remaking Japan*, p.6).

⁵ J. Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur* (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979), p.5.

⁶ *Remaking Japan*, p.44.

⁷ See Chapter 2, p.2.

⁸ This much is clear from the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy, which recommended that "the Supreme Commander....exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies...to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives" (my italics).

government at the SCAP level made conventional staff organisation plans for military government unsuitable.⁹

"Impressed by General Marshall with the urgent manpower shortage in the US Army",¹⁰ and unwilling to divide Japan up into Occupation zones on the German model, MacArthur certainly saw the benefits of indirect rule. Thus, this vital resolution - "to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it"¹¹ - was influenced above all by the desire to limit deployment of American military personnel and to save resources. Its implications for the radical reform programme outlined in the Initial Post-Surrender Policy were a secondary consideration.

In short, the principle of a unitary Occupation was emphasized at the expense of a direct one. Determined to prevent its leading role being usurped by other Allied nations, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States trusted in the Japanese government, naively believing that traditional agencies could be used as tools of reform. The subtle distinction drawn between using and supporting these governmental agencies did not work in practice. This much is clear from the case of the police, whose indispensability protected them from meaningful or lasting reform. With the abolition of Japan's armed forces, the police became the sole guarantor of domestic stability, a role particularly difficult to perform in the face of serious socio-economic dislocation. For these reasons, the Occupation's attempts at reform of the police - whether it was purging police personnel or circumscribing their activities - usually ended in failure or at best only partial success. Clearly, it is difficult to reform a police force when it is working at full stretch.

The charge that the Occupation was two-faced rests on a number of findings. Firstly, there was the discrepancy between radical policies and limited follow-through - the difference between dynamic policy formation and sluggish, even passive, implementation. Related to

⁹ History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monograph 2 (Administration of the Occupation) pp.28-9.

¹⁰ T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.60.

¹¹ US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, Political Reorientation of Japan, Sept. 1945 - Sept. 1948, p.347.

this was the dual structure of the Occupation, the essential dualities being GHQ-Japanese government and, equally important, GHQ-military government. Secondly, there was the coexistence in the same organisation of liberals, intent on promoting a New Deal for Japan, and conservatives, who winced at any reference to radical change. These dualities direct our attention to the Occupation's loose connections, its anomalies and contradictions. The Occupation was two-faced in the sense of promising so much, and delivering so little.¹² At the risk of being cynical, it could even be portrayed as a giant confidence trick - on an institutional rather than a personal level. Whilst the Occupation espoused noble causes, its mechanics or *modus operandi* often frustrated meaningful reform. The case of the Japanese police demonstrates the validity of this claim with more force than that of any other governmental agency.

The professed aim of US policy was the establishment of a "democratic" police system - that is to say, one that was accountable and responsive to the Japanese public, serving the nation in the widest possible sense. Traditionally, the activities of the police had reflected the narrow, sectional interests of ruling politicians and bureaucrats, a situation anathema to American reformers. MacArthur encapsulated the latter's views when he declared that "police power in the preservation of law and order in a democratic society does not attain its maximum strength through oppressive controls imposed...from above, but rather does it find infinitely greater strength in the relationship of a servant of, and answerable directly to, the people".¹³ Decentralisation was considered the key to democratisation, but long before structural reorganisation was attempted reformers were trying to circumscribe the role of the police - to rid the people of those "oppressive controls". However, chaotic conditions dictated rigorous control and regulation, activities that could only be undertaken by the Japanese police. The Occupation faced a dilemma of its own making - how to stem the growth of the black market *and* eliminate such "superfluous" police functions as economic regulation. Without

¹² In a variant of this, William Macmahon Ball, the British Commonwealth's outspoken representative in the Allied Council for Japan, declared that "it's not that they do so little, but that they claim so much".

¹³ MacArthur's letter to Katayama, dated 16/9/47 (NDL, G-2 02750).

the will or the manpower to tackle the black economy, the Occupation had no choice but to support the police in this regard. Such was the logic of indirect Occupation.

Committed reformers in Government Section insisted on drastic decentralisation of the police system in 1948, because they were only too aware of the dangers of indirect Occupation. Fully cognisant of support for the police in conservative circles, they feared that the traditional police system would emerge from the Occupation unscathed unless radical, structural reform was implemented quickly and decisively. Government Section won the battle but lost the war. It was easy for the Japanese government to sabotage the new police system by failing to provide resources in the first instance and then to insist that feeble, uncoordinated police forces unnecessarily exposed Japan to the threat of communist insurrection. Largely unaware of the subterfuge and susceptible to anti-communist propaganda, the relevant sections in GHQ permitted or rather encouraged some backpedalling.

Ultimately, G-2 won the tug of war between liberals and conservatives over the police. Its victory, secured with the help of the Japanese government, was inevitable in the context of an indirect Occupation. Volatile social conditions that delayed police reform in the first place eventually scuppered decentralisation. Latterly, of course, it was the vivid spectre of communism rather than a more general threat of lawlessness that exercised American policy-makers. Commenting on the new police system, George Kennan, the architect of "containment", contended that "it was difficult to imagine a setup more favourable and inviting from the standpoint of the prospects for a communist takeover".¹⁴ Thus began the shift *in policy* from grudging support to confident endorsement of the Japanese police. In the field, of course, pragmatism rather than reforming zeal had always prevailed. Military government officials depended on the police for the resolution of problems, and were not inclined to counsel radical reform. The likes of Lieutenant Hartley and Captain Mooney were more concerned with the

¹⁴ G. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, Mass., 1967) p.390. Kennan briefly visited Japan in February/March 1948.

appearance of stability than anything else. Isolated and confined, they became enmeshed in a social system that was impervious to "indirect" Occupation.

A Durable Social System

The enthusiasm and dedication of reformers in GHQ was not enough to ensure social transformation in Japan. More than anything else, they had to contend with the weight of tradition, a burden hardly lightened by indirect rule. The resilience and durability of social forms and patterns of interaction have been illuminated by this study of the conduct, behaviour and loyalties of the Japanese police during the Occupation. From the beginning of the Meiji period the police had acted on behalf of the government rather than serving the interests of the people. The latter were expected to respect the police, whose brusque manner and arrogant demeanour suggested contempt for their charges. Despite American efforts to close the gap between the police and the people, the traditions of the Meiji police prevailed over American prescriptions. Intent on forging an effective instrument of social control, the Meiji oligarchy had chosen to establish a centrally-controlled, administrative police, such as existed in Continental France. Ironically, this model was more applicable to an *indirect* Occupation amidst chaotic economic conditions than the Anglo-American model favoured by the reformers: hence, the delay in structural reorganisation.

The harsh economic climate caused the police and others besides to fall back on traditional support networks. These served to reinforce the very ties between the police and the establishment that the Occupation sought to dissolve. Throughout the Occupation the police were controlled by an alliance of politicians, bureaucrats and criminal elements. The latter constituted a "shadow government", a network of extra-legal or illegal organisations that became known in American circles as the oyabun-kobun system. In fact, the term described a pseudo-familial relationship that pervaded Japanese society and was as likely to exist in legitimate as criminal organisations. Justin Williams, a member of Government Section, sketches in the background to the controversy:

Kades....charged that there were mobs, gangs, and racketeers seeking to pressure and intimidate public officials. The root of the evil was thought to be the oyabun-kobun system. Deeply rooted in Japan's past, the system, in occupation parlance, suggested a boss-henchman relationship. Makoto Matsukata, Government Section research analyst...., informed Kades...that an attempt to outlaw personal relationships between oyabun and kobun would be almost impossible.¹⁵

Of course Matsukata was right and Kades' crusade soon ran out of steam. It was impossible, and perhaps misguided, to attempt to undermine "habits ingrained for hundreds of years".¹⁶

The natural inclination for the police to look to their traditional masters was reinforced by the latter's ties to prominent black marketeers. This thesis has demonstrated the importance of the black market as a lever for political control, as a support for the old regime. Those who appropriated the military's huge stockpiles of food, clothing and other necessities controlled the police on both an individual and a corporate level. In a country where the boundary between gift-giving and bribery remains blurred, it was not surprising that public officials should succumb to temptation in hard times. The Public Safety Division was more concerned about private subsidies or "contributions" to police forces, which surely derived from the principle of collective security. H. E. Wildes noted that "contributions" had a long history, and were potentially disruptive of impartial law enforcement:

For many years various unofficial groups had voluntarily contributed for police expenses. Sometimes these "police supporters" or "crime prevention clubs" were innocent; more often their support covered bribery or protection of illicit interests.¹⁷

The problem was compounded by the fragmentation of the police system in 1948. Many small communities with little more than 5,000 inhabitants were forced to fund their own police forces with revenue from theatre admissions and liquor sales. The funds raised from such sources were in most cases inadequate, forcing policemen to depend more than ever on large donations from individuals and

¹⁵ J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution, p.46.

¹⁶ W. Macmahon Ball, Japan....Enemy or Ally? (Cassell, Melbourne, 1948) p.97.

¹⁷ H. E. Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo (Macmillan, New York, 1954) p.187.

organisations with often questionable reputations. When PSD had begun to investigate the system of contributions, they had expressed concern not only about generous donors being above the law, but also about the manner in which money was exacted from ordinary Japanese.

The latter were supposed to be the beneficiaries of police reform. However, due to the weight of tradition and the economic lifeline thrown the old regime in the form of the military's stockpiles, the police did not transfer their loyalties to the people as the Occupation intended. Despite MacArthur's concern with "the dignity of the individual",¹⁸ the conduct of the police showed little regard for civil liberties. They continued to serve the interests of a narrow establishment, harassing the consumers rather than the hoarders of "yami" goods. The debate in 1949 over the legality of spot checks of individuals' personal effects by the police, together with evidence of continued neighbourhood surveillance, demonstrate that traditional policing methods could not be eradicated by SCAP directives. The latter were no match for traditions stretching back more than 75 years.

Resisting Reform

This thesis contends that the Japanese police resisted reform, taking strength from deeply-rooted traditions and benefitting from the Occupation's decision to *use, and support*, them. Longstanding social attitudes induced the police to disregard the Occupation's exhortations concerning respect for civil liberties and restriction of their activities. They got away with it, principally because US policy was ambivalent, even contradictory, in the context of an indirect Occupation. Police reform was always a "sensitive issue",¹⁹ and was delayed as long as possible. If G-2 had had its way, the gradualist approach to reform would have protected the police from disruptive change until the end of the Occupation. Of course, GS won

¹⁸ Letter to Katayama, dated 16/9/49 (NDL, G-2 02750).

¹⁹ R. B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992) p.39.

the day, pushing through a radical programme that represented the New Dealers' last gasp before the "reverse course" set in.

The backpedalling on police reorganisation that occurred in the years that followed demonstrated the impracticality of the new police system, and, more importantly, the lack of political will for it to succeed. The Japanese government resisted GS's plan for decentralisation of its police force, and, when it was imposed, sabotaged it. The strong ties between the government and the police were reinforced by an indirect Occupation that had eradicated Japan's military forces. Understandably, each worked hard to serve the interests of the other. Of course the "reverse course" of police reform was not long in coming. George Kennan's anxieties were articulated in "the central cold war statement of NSC 13/2".²⁰ It "suggested that SCAP strengthen the Japanese police establishment by reinforcing and re-equipping the present forces and expanding the national police organisation".²¹

Ultimately, this thesis points up the limitations of the Occupation, the durability of traditional forms and institutions and the basic continuity between the prewar and postwar periods. It suggests that the aims of US policy "could not be achieved through the instrumentality of Japan's old guard".²² The emphasis on continuity rather than change, on parallels between prewar and postwar Japan rather than disjuncture, is a pronounced historiographical trend, evident in the works of Chalmers Johnson and John Dower. Whilst the former has focused on the economic bureaucracy,²³ the latter has drawn attention to rearmament and "conservative hegemony".²⁴

If such a key institution as the Japanese police was not remade, despite the efforts of dedicated reformers, then surely we should be

²⁰ C. Gluck, "Entangling Illusions....", p.204.

²¹ J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution, p.210.

²² T. A. Bisson, Prospects for Democracy in Japan (Macmillan, New York, 1949) p.130.

²³ C. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-75 (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1986).

²⁴ J. W. Dower, "Reform and Reconsolidation" in H. Wray and H. Conroy, eds., Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983) p.345.

wary of accounts that suggest that the Occupation ushered in democratic revolution. The Japanese police must be set within the context of "the survival of individuals and organisations, institutional structures and patterns of authority, which had not been associated with genuinely democratic practices in the prewar period".²⁵ This thesis demonstrates that the Occupation was incapable of eradicating the traditional police system - it had neither the will nor resources to attempt such an ambitious reform. The end result is described by Walter Ames, "commended for the 'nuanced' nature of his work...":²⁶

...the present police establishment in Japan is an imperfectly blended amalgam of the authoritarian, powerful and highly centralised prewar police system and the 'democratic' and decentralised postwar system. The prewar system was based on a....model of a national police force on a level above the people, and the postwar system was patterned after an American or British model of small-scale police forces on the same level with the people. The former is closer to the honne (reality) of the police system, and the latter is ultimately a mere tatemae (facade).²⁷

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Frank Leishmann, "Under Western Eyes: Perspectives on Policing and Society in Japan", Policing and Society, Vol.4 (1994) p.36.

²⁷ W. L. Ames, Police and Community in Japan (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1981) p.215.

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1. SCAP Records on Microfiche

Records are classified according to administrative section and subject area, a system that enables the researcher to quickly identify documents relating, for example, to Government Section's attitude to political movements (classification number 333). Numerous booklets exist for each section, containing summary statements of documents within each classification, together with the microfiche numbers. Also the type of record is specified - for example, the letter (a) encompasses memoranda, directives and instructions to the Japanese Government, (e) memoranda within SCAP, (p) statistics and (s) newspaper clippings. Thus, it is possible to locate statistics on "economic crime" (classification 423) or memoranda concerning intelligence activities (037) by simply consulting the relevant booklets of ESS and G-2/CIS respectively. The comprehensiveness of the system - the range of classified topics - facilitates rapid disclosure of documents that might otherwise take weeks to find. Although the circuitous route can sometimes lead to surprising discoveries, the direct approach permitted by the library's meticulous categorisation is ultimately more rewarding. The fiche numbers listed below include all reports, letters, memoranda, CIS periodical summaries and ATIS translations cited in the text. Detailed references are given for each in the respective footnotes.

G-2 (Intelligence)

G-2	00226 - 00266
	00652 - 00709
	00719 - 00722, 00755 - 00757
	01173 - 01175, 01185 - 01187
	01294 - 01308
	01324 - 01326

G - 2 02021 - 02026, 02028, 02059, 02061
 02276
 02690 - 02696
 02746 - 02803

 02844, 02849 - 02850, 02860 - 02863,
 02867 - 02868, 02890

 03095 - 03098
 03122 - 03123, 03125 - 03126, 03153 - 03155,
 03163 - 03164
 03306 - 03309
 03419 - 03420, 03440 - 03446, 03468 - 03470
 03478 - 03480
 03509 - 03510, 03513 - 03536
 03747 - 03755, 03760
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 03906, 03915, 03919 - 03922

 04115 - 04117, 004156, 04169, 04187 - 04188
 04191 - 04193
 04204 - 04206, 04221, 04259 - 04261
 04431 - 04433, 04438 - 04439, 04441 - 04447
 04450 - 04451, 04492 - 04512
 04517 - 04419, 04562 - 04565, 04585 - 04586
 04596 - 04598
 04647, 04676, 04699 - 04701
 04833 - 04835, 04845 - 04846

 08234

Civil Intelligence Section

CIS 02171 - 02173
 02702 - 02705

Government Section

GS (A) 02515 - 02518

GS (B) 00831 - 00832
 00999 - 01003

 02028 - 02029
 02269 - 02274, 02279 - 02283, 02290 - 02291
 02298 - 02307
 02702
 02885 - 02892

Civil Affairs Section

CAS (A) 04137 - 04138

 05784 - 05785
 05800 - 05801

 10639 - 10640
 10704 - 10708

CAS (C) 04137 - 04138

 05784 - 05785
 05800 - 05801

Legal Section

LS 20940 - 20943
 24358 - 24362

Civil Historical Section

CHS (D) 00757, 00759 - 00760, 00764 - 00765

2. Documentary Collections and Reports

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Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis branch,
R. & A. Report No. 2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied
Occupation" (28/9/45) pp.1-66
Prefaced by a summary, pp. 1-9

National Records Centre, Suitland, Maryland

112 substantial boxes of documents await the researcher keen to examine the records of the Public Safety Division, G-2/CIS. S/he can identify those relating to the activities of the Police branch (boxes 328 - 338) or the Prison branch (339 - 350), but beyond that has no alternative but to wade through the piles of material contained in each box. It is a laborious process requiring patience and stamina, the only consolation being the absence of microfiche. The existence of separate folders or files of documents in each box only *slightly* simplifies the task at hand. Nevertheless, boxes containing the records of G-2/CIS were trawled, together with representative samples from other sections. The following proved particularly useful:

G-2/CIS, Public Safety Division

Police branch - Boxes: 328 (file 34)
 329 (files 7, 9, 13, 14
 330
 331 (files 8, 9, 10)
 333 (file 17)
 334 (files 25, 29, 35)
 335 (files 9, 10)
 336 (file 27)

Civil Affairs Section

Kantô Civil Affairs Region

Economic Investigation Activities, 1949-51:
 Box 2733 (file 2)

Kinki Civil Affairs Region

Economics subject file, 1945-50:
 Boxes 2896 - 2899

Economic and Scientific Section

Price and Distribution Division

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8397 (files 36, 37)

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2. Administration of the Occupation
6. Local Government Reform
7. The Purge
14. Legal and Judicial Reform
34. Price and Distribution Stabilisation: Non-Food Programme
35. Price and Distribution Stabilisation: Food Programme
55. Police and Public Safety

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