
LANGUAGE, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALISM: Comparing the Basque and Catalan Cases

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ABSTRACT

Through a comparison between Catalan and Basque nationalism, this thesis describes two patterns of nationalism: *inclusive* and *exclusive, cohesive* and *fragmented*. These are related to the core values of national identity chosen by nationalist elites.

However, this choice cannot be arbitrary, but is based on pre-existing cultural material. As language is the key value of most European nationalisms, the degree of language maintenance has a direct influence on the patterns of nationalist mobilization.

These two patterns are tested against the different attitudes towards immigrants: early Basque nationalism was isolationist and exclusive, early Catalan nationalism was more integrationist and inclusive. However, during Francoism, Basque nationalism changed its focus from race/religion to language and action, although nationalists never agreed on which one of these was crucial. The result was a more inclusive form of nationalism.

Finally, the thesis relates the two models to the rise and spread of political violence. It is argued that ideological infighting and fragmented constituencies are potentially more conducive to violent forms of nationalism. In turn, such ideological frictions are related to cultural discontinuities, including partial assimilation into the dominant culture.

However, for this violent potential to fully emerge, there must intervene a second variable, namely state repression. It is argued that the effects of state repression have been different in the two cases: in Catalonia, it encouraged people to mobilize around language and related cultural endeavours; in the Basque Country it provided a powerful catalyst for further violent confrontation and for the 'militarization' of nationalism.

PREFACE

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of a number of people and institutions in several countries. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Anthony D. Smith, my supervisor, for his incisive guidance, comments, suggestions and encouragement. I sincerely believe that this result could not have been achieved without his highly professional, concerned, and meticulous efforts.

I am also indebted to several organizations and founding bodies. For the research underlying chapter 5, thanks are due to the *Institut d'Història Contemporània de Catalunya*. In particular, I wish to thank Professors Josep Benet and Josep M^a Solé i Sabaté. Some of the material included are the fruit of a long interview with Josep Benet. For the research in chapter 4, thanks are due to the *Basque Studies Program*, University of Nevada, Reno, US, which allowed me an unique opportunity to investigate into primary sources such as pamphlets, interviews, and other documents by Basque leaders. My research on Catalan nationalism predates my interest in the Basque case and, in the years immediately preceding my doctorate at LSE, I was given very useful help and advice by several scholars, among whom I wish to acknowledge Professors Salvador Giner and Carlota Solé. In Italy, I also wish to thank Professor Franco Ferrarotti for encouraging me in undertaking both an interdisciplinary and a sociological route.

There is a long list of people whose experience and opinions gave me insights into some of the more subtle dimensions of the form and content of this work. Among those people, I would especially like to extend my most heartfelt thanks to my friend, Jacqueline Kaye for reading drafts of different chapters and making pertinent comments and helpful suggestions for translation purposes, and all those others who are too numerous to mention but who have helped me in the practical and linguistic aspects of my work, and to whom I am also indebted. Moreover, I am grateful to several members of the LSE Library staff, particularly to Mr. Mark Perkins of the inter-library loan service at BLPES for his most professional and competent inquiries about hard-to-find publications.

In 1991, I founded together with other research students the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism. This enterprise took several months of work which was well worth it, since the association has now grown to become a respectable international body with a worldwide membership. I also became Editor of the association's Bulletin, a publication now acknowledged by most scholars in the field.

My 'intellectual' debts are numerous. In my theoretical approach, I owe much to several books by Anthony D. Smith, articles by Jerzy J. Smolicz and Frederick Barth and numerous other publications which I have mentioned in the first chapter. For my Catalan case study, there are too many authors to be mentioned. For the Basque case, the reader will find repeated references to three authors: Javier Corcuera, Gurutz Jauregui, and Robert Clark. However, I have consulted many others excellent studies. My research diverges in significant aspects from all the quoted authors and responsibility for my views is mine alone. Jauregui's own comments for chapters 4, 6, and 9, have proved particularly helpful. In the final draft of my thesis I owe many thanks to Alison Palmer for her corrections of chapter 4, 5 and 6.

For the names in Basque, I tried to use, as much as possible the official (*batúa*) spelling, except for those few names, such as Navarre, which have an equivalent in English. In the quotations of Basque leaders and intellectuals writing before the 1980s, i.e. before *batúa* was made official, I shall instead use *their* original spelling (for example, Arana's use of Euzkadi and Euskera, rather than the standard Euskadi and Euskara).

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NOTE TO MAPS

Map 1 shows the present administrative division of the Spanish state into Autonomous Communities. Map 2 specifies which are the three historical nations which share with the Castilians the multinational character of the Spanish state. By comparing these two maps, we can see that the historical territories claimed by Basque and Catalan nationalists do not fully correspond to those of their autonomous communities. For instance, all Basque nationalists claim Navarre as an integral part of Euskadi, and most of them are also willing to include the French Basque provinces. There is less unanimity concerning possible Pan-Catalanist claims, as mainstream nationalists have refused to get involved in territorial disputes with other Autonomous Communities. As in other nationalist movements, a certain ambiguity over the precise borders of the nation appears unavoidable, even necessary.

Map 3 shows the present diffusion of the languages of the three historical nationalities. The map also shows the supplementary indication of three other regional languages which do not have official status (*aranese*, *bable*, and *fabla aragonesa*. See chapter 6).

Map 4: Catalan nationalists consider Catalonia as only one of the Catalan regions, referring occasionally to it as the *Principat*. This is divided into four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona). The other regions, as defined by the spread of Catalan, are: the Valencian Country (Alacant, Valencia, Castelló), the Balearic Islands (Mallorca, Menorca and Ibiza= Eivissa), a small fringe of southern Aragon; outside Spain, we can find Roussillon in France, the Principality of Andorra, and the town of L'Alguer in Sardinia, Italy.¹ These are called Catalan Countries (*Països Catalans*), with more than 10 million inhabitants, over 7 million of whom are Catalan-speakers.²

Map 5: Basque nationalists define Euskadi (the Basque Country) as composed of seven provinces: in Spain there are Alava (*Araba*), Vizcaya (*Bizkaia*), Guipúzcoa (*Gipuzkoa*),

¹ Catalan language has no equal status throughout its territory. In the *Principat* it enjoys a relatively high prestige, in competition with Castilian. In other Catalan-speaking territories, especially in Valencia, it is instead considered a stigmatized variety and associated with peasants and left-wing intellectuals. For several reasons, this situation is a mobile one, and Catalan is making decisive inroads into new domains and, to a lesser degree, is also spreading in the other Catalan-speaking regions. In Valencia, the second city in the Catalan Countries and a traditional rival of Barcelona, regionalist feelings are strong.

² The comparison between the 1986 Censuses for the three main regions (Catalonia, the Valencian Country and the Balearic Islands) puts the number of people able to understand Catalan at eight and an half million (8.623.202) (the Balearic Islands and Valencian Country censuses only included items on 'passive competence', i.e., the ability to understand Catalan). The distribution of Catalan "understanders" is as follows: 5.287.200 in Catalonia (*Principat*), 2.775.007 in the Valencian region, and 560.995 in the Balearic islands. No reliable data is available concerning the other Catalan-speaking areas. See *Avui*, 21 april 1988, pp. 1-3.

which form the Autonomous Community of Euskadi (established in 1980), and Navarre (*Nafarroa*), which forms a separate autonomous community (*Comunidad Foral de Navarra*); the remaining three provinces are in France: Labourd (*Lapurdi*), Soule (*Zuberoa*) and Basse Navarre (*Baxanabarra* or Low Navarre). Basque nationalists call the former area Euskadi Sur (*Hegoaldea*) and the latter Euskadi Norte (*Iparralde*). Euskadi Sur includes 85% of the Basque land mass, more than half of which lies in Navarre. There is a more 'neutral' term to define the same area, *Euskal-Herria*, which is partially devoid of nationalist connotations.³

The focus of this thesis is limited exclusively to the Spanish side of both ethno-regions. In Euskadi, we shall consider all the four provinces with particular attention to Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, while for the Catalan case we shall concentrate only on Catalonia-Principat, the historical heartland of Catalanism, omitting all other Catalan-speaking areas.


STATISTICAL DATA

With its 6,077,000 inhabitants (1988 data), corresponding to 15.9% of the Spanish population, Catalonia occupies 31,932 kmq, corresponding to 6.3% of the Spanish state surface.⁴


In Euskadi (map 5), 2.3 million people (over 90%) live on the Spanish side, 200,000 on the French side. This makes up for an aggregate area of 20,600 kmq and over 2.5 millions inhabitants. Euskadi Sur (including Navarre), which is the only focus of my thesis, occupies 17,600 kmq, about 3.5% of the Spanish territory. Its inhabitants amount to 7% of the Spanish population.

³ On the use of this term, as opposed to *Euskadi*, see chapter 3, p. 97, particularly note 151.


⁴ See Xifres de Catalunya 1988/89. Barcelona: Generalitat/ CIDC




Map 1 - Spain's Autonomous Communities



Map 2 - Spain's historical nationalities



Map 3 - Languages of Spain



Map 4 - Catalonia and the other Catalan countries



Map 5 - The Basque Country (Euskadi) and its seven provinces

Introduction

This thesis is a comparison between Catalan and Basque nationalism and tries to chart the main differences in their developments. I concentrate on specific aspects which have been neglected by previous research: in contrast with virtually all previous studies on Basque and Catalan nationalism, either comparative or non comparative, my thesis focuses on national culture and symbols, their systematization and manipulation by nationalist elites, and their relationship with political violence. The aim is to contribute to a sociological paradigm which takes into account the oppositional character of nationalism

My thesis is not about economic factors, class cleavages, or other variables. These have been adequately covered by many other researchers -albeit not in a comparative manner, and these will be referred to in the thesis. Nor am I defining culture, as I am studying the people who define it, the nationalists, and how they did that.

The reason for attributing so much importance to culture is that no country's politics exists independently from its culture. Culture is about *values* and the latter include attitudes, prescribed behaviour, expectations, as expressed in symbols and as preserved in the material heritage of the nation. The concept of value has been widely discussed in sociology. In Parsons (1975, 1991), shared values act as standard bearers and pillars of the social order.⁵ They are internalized through both primary and secondary socialization.⁶ Every society must be supported by shared values, otherwise it risks disintegration. However, both in times of rapid social transformation and ethnic conflict, values may change and are likely to clash with one another. Challenging officialdom, the values of a stateless nation compete with those of the nation-state. In time- and space-related changes, some values emerge

⁵ "Values held in common constitute the primary reference point for the analysis of a social system as an empirical system. Such a system of societal values may, of course, change over a period of time, but it is the most stable component of the social system" (Parsons 1991: 8).

⁶ In stateless nations, socialization is often carried out by non-state agents, that is, unofficial media, informal education, self-taught research, voluntary associations, etc. I will refer occasionally to this as *nationalist socialization*.

stronger than others, representing focal points for mass mobilizations.

It is also important to remember that most ethnonationalist movements in Europe are based on cultural, in particular linguistic, claims.⁷ The prominent position of language in many ethnic claims has, if anything, increased during the last twenty years.⁸ The exploration of this dimension will highlight important differences between Catalan and Basque nationalism: if we accept the assumption that the primary focus and means of legitimation of *most* contemporary European nationalisms has been -and is- language, a contradiction between this accepted precondition and the lack of a shared language has necessarily emerged within Basque nationalism. No such contrast has emerged within Catalanism.⁹

Several scholars have acknowledged *en passant* that the distinctive character of the two nationalist movements is related to cultural factors. "Catalan nationalism has always been more cohesive than that in the Basque Country, in part stemming from the strong cultural and linguistic ties..." (Hannum 1990: 267). Some went as far as asserting that violence in the Basque Country was a consequence of the lack of a vibrant and shared cultural tradition. "It was [the Catalans'] cultural self-confidence that made terrorism superfluous, a terrorism that perhaps suited the more racist nationalism of the Basques and their emphasis on physical prowess and exuberant youth. In contrast, ...the democratic opposition achieved in Catalonia a degree of unity and co-operation without parallel in Spain" (Carr and Fusi 1981: 161). However, all these authors fail to provide a deeper, more systematic analysis for their intuitive assertions. To my knowledge, no study has followed this perspective -to relate cultural variables, or the lack of them, to violence - in either sociology or other social sciences. Even in comparative studies concerning other areas of the world, such an approach has not been given the attention it deserves.

It will be useful to list here the main research in our field. Interestingly, systematic and large-scale comparisons between the two movements are few, both in Spanish and in other

⁷ Language features to different degrees in European nationalist claims, with the Scottish and North Irish cases having the least linguistic content.

⁸ Most independence movements in the former Soviet Union started from linguistic claims (Estonia, Moldova, Belarus, etc.), although this is not the case of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia before their disintegration. In Cornwall, Brittany, Wales and several other Western European stateless nations, language features as a prominent element in their nationalist programmes.

⁹ My approach considers the language as the carrier of culture, rather than conflating the two terms. This raises the question whether we can conceive a distinctive culture without a distinctive language as its vehicle for expression. Many nationalists will deny that, but there arises the *vexata quaestio* of how to define a culture. The very effort of defining a culture as opposed to another implies a process of border creation. Hence, the choice of language as the crucible of nationhood will be related to its availability as an 'ethnic marker'.

languages. In English, there are studies by Payne (1971, 1976), Mansvelt Beck (1991, 1992), Medhurst (1987), and, in French, by Loyer (1990). Miguélez (1984) has attempted a sketchy comparison in Catalan and Euskara. The only large-scale systematic comparison between Basque and Catalan nationalism has been carried out by Díez-Medrano (1989) (forthcoming). I encountered this work too recently for it to have influenced my thesis in significant ways; besides, its focus is mainly political and economic.

The mutual relationship between Basque and Catalan nationalism is analyzed by several authors, among them Nagel (1987, 1991), until 1923.¹⁰ Hernández, Mercadé and Oltra (1983) compare the ideology and platform of several regionalist and nationalist movements in Spain. Comparisons are also occasionally included in more general studies: Linz (1973, 1975) balances survey data with historical insight. Perceptive comparisons are available in Payne (1975), as well as in Elorza (1984), Corcuera (1984), and Olabarri Cortázar (1981). Other authors have contrasted specific aspects of the two economies, electoral turnouts, social systems, etc., but without focussing on nationalism: Carreras (1985), Izard (1985), González Portilla (1985), and Roiz Célix (1984). Finally, Silver's (1988) interpretive essay does not offer a systematic comparison.

More studies are available comparing each nationalism with similar movements abroad. Scottish nationalism has been compared to Catalan by Brand (1985), Ehrlich (1993) and Moreno (1988), and to Basque nationalism by Zirakzadeh (1991) and Watson (1992). Pierre Birnbaum (1988: 146-155) has attempted a comparison between Scottish, Breton and Catalan nationalism. Khatami (1990) has compared Eritrea and Euskadi; Kimmel (1989) Brittany-Euskadi-Quebec, Mayo (1974) Brittany-Euskadi-Wales, and Waldman (1989) Northern Ireland-Euskadi-Quebec. A special issue of the "Journal of Baltic Studies" was recently devoted to comparisons between the Baltics' and other national movements, among them Basques and Catalans (Johnston 1992, Kasla 1992, Laitin 1992, Shafir 1992).

Few of these studies give a prominent place to culture. But is it possible to isolate cultural factors from economic or structural ones? A solution is to compare two cases which offer similar economic, structural and social variables, whilst differing sharply in the cultural variables. This, of course, does not imply a refusal to take into account other dimensions, which will be considered throughout the thesis.

The violent character of Basque nationalism has inspired a great deal of research in the Basque Country, both scholarly and otherwise from several disciplines and viewpoints. In

¹⁰ For an up to date bibliography, see Conversi (1993).

contrast, Catalan social scientists still tend to treat nationalism as a given, as an unaccountable collective feeling, often as something not worth analysing. With a few exceptions, the Catalan contribution to the literature on nationalism is entirely limited to historians.¹¹ Perhaps it is true that, "as scholarship is reactive, the spilling of ink awaits the spilling of blood" (Horowitz 1985: 13).

Moreover, the study of Catalan nationalism has attracted left-wing historians more than nationalists *tout court*. The latter are more prolific in Euskadi. Nuñez (1992: 5, 1993) explains this contrast in terms very similar to mine: "while in [Euskadi] an extremely clear-cut division exists between nationalists and non-nationalists, and, within the intellectual circles, between [radicals] and moderates, in Catalonia the situation is much more flexible. Catalan culture and language serves as a vehicle for the integration of foreigners and non-nationalists into publishing houses and reviews concerned with the task of propagating Catalan culture".

General orientations

As I said, given the similarity of economic or structural factors in Catalonia and Euskadi, I attempt to relate the development of the two ethnic movements to the vitality of shared culture and values. Where the latter flourish, not only do they become a central part of the nationalists' claims, they also add cohesion to their struggles. That is to say, the availability of pre-existing cultural 'markers' which help to differentiate the group from its neighbours, facilitates the organisation of united political action. The common elements chosen as core values can work both as mobilizing symbols and as points of reference for a wide political platform and large constituencies. Conversely, the absence of shared cultural distinctiveness is likely to encourage political fragmentation within nationalist movements. In this case, the movement is bound to rely on an 'antagonistic identity'. An *antagonistic identity* is one constructed essentially through the opposition of the ingroup to one or more outgroups. All identities are in some way based on opposition, but an antagonistic identity focuses more on the need to define one's own group by negative comparison to others, and by exclusion. This border-definition process is carried out by a radical re-evaluation of the positive traits of the ingroup and a parallel devaluation of those of the outgroup. Borders are stressed rather than content, that is, the group's culture. Culture can also be oppositional, as when it is used in opposition to another culture, generally the dominant one. But when the ethnic culture is

¹¹ Such exceptions are worth mentioning: in sociology, Giner (1980, 1984, 1986, 1987, Giner and Moreno 1990), Hernández (1983), and Mercadé (1982). In philosophy, Bilbeny (1984, 1988). In political science, Colomer (1984). In anthropology, Pujadas (1983).

weak and ill-defined, the whole group must be opposed to the out-group, generally the dominant one. Hence, a possible common bond can be provided by violent political mobilization. Given particular historical conditions (state repression, dictatorship and censorship), violence can become a source of cohesion and the principal mean of forging a community and fostering the long-awaited 'rebirth of the nation'.

In order to understand the source and legitimacy of most nationalist movements, especially cultural ones, we must also take into account the *feeling of threat*.¹² In the age of the nation-state, minorities do not generally feel protected or safe. Their very cultural survival is at stake under the joint pressures of centralization and modernization. In order to assure their survival, they try to achieve some political control over their destiny. This is only feasible by exercising some form of jurisdiction over an established geographical territory. Modern nationalism cannot be conceived without this spatial dimension. Territory lies at the heart of all nationalist programmes, hence the importance of maps and mapping in their strategy. Ultimately, in a world of nation-states, ethnic groups can only feel fully protected if they achieve the formation of their own nation-states. However, if a group's identity is strong enough and the group feels confident about its future survival within an existing nation-state, demands for independence or separation may become politically irrelevant.¹³

Definitions, Sources and Methods

In this thesis, I shall speak of Catalan and Basque nations and nationalism. I shall also use the suffix *ethno-* (ethnonationalism, *ethnies*, ethnic groups, ethnic borders, ethnic identity, ethnic conflict, ethnicity, etc.) in reference to the broader comparative dimensions.¹⁴ The

¹² Some authors treat this fear of extinction as a non measurable variable. For instance, Horowitz (1985: 179) speaks of a fabricated 'anxiety-laden perception' which is potentially endless (175-81). But my thesis will show that this perception is rooted in historical events which have direct consequences upon cultural and political practices.

¹³ Memories of past oppression are difficult to erase. The collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia reminds us of the all-pervasive strength of such memories of collective sufferings and their potential for explosion once -and even before- free expression has been reinstated. As a consequence, the group may perceive that the overarching nation-state can again represent a threat to its future survival. Hence, apparently quiescent ethnic communities often keep a 'separatist' reservoir that can be revived in case of a crisis in the group's relation with the centre. The main variable is again the behaviour of the central government in its relationships with the periphery.

¹⁴ Far from being used in a genetic sense (as coterminous with *race*), the term 'ethnic' will generally be used to take into account the dimension of putative descent, which is indeed central to any ethnic identity and distinguishes ethnic groups from other groups sharing similar cultural elements (not sharing culture as a whole, which is often a construct of ethnic groups themselves and serves to categorize their ascription into their own category or to legitimize such ascription).

term *ethnonationalism* refers exclusively to movements acting on behalf of stateless nations.¹⁵ The more wide-ranging term *nationalism* refers instead to both state and non-state nationalisms. The distinction between the two concepts is blurred and uneven in most European languages: in fact, while ethno-nationalism is used to describe stateless nationalism, there is no specific term to define state nationalism as a distinctive phenomenon.¹⁶ Indeed, in using the term ethno-nationalism, I encountered criticism from some Catalan scholars,¹⁷ who pointed out that the only justification for using this term lies in an ill-starred confusion between state and nation. Walker Connor (1972) claims that this confusion is historically unwarranted, since nations are nothing else but 'self-aware ethnic groups': many previous ethnic groups turned into nations and eventually into states. Yet, in the mind of West European scholars and ordinary people, the term nationalism is inextricably associated with *state* nationalism, with all the negative traits normally attached to it.

In their reach for some form of self-determination, nationalists use the instrument of the '*nation*'. It is exactly the latter's situational, transitory and instrumental value which makes it so difficult to define. The nation cannot be defined, because its purpose is to define. It is a conceptual tool and a boundary perception through which an ethnic group wishing to be represented in a state attempts to establish and define its own space of action. Central to this definition is the demarcation of a territory through an ideal reference to historical past.

My research integrates documentary material (mainly, the nationalists' recorded declarations and writings), sociolinguistic surveys and other data (such as language censuses, sociolinguistic analyses and other derivative data on the relation between identity, language, nationalism, voting behaviour, etc.). I rely both on primary and secondary sources. Particularly in chapters 4, 5 and 6, I use primary data, such as political pamphlets, communiques, biographies, newspapers' and magazines' excerpts, and personal interviews.¹⁸

The thesis focuses on those individuals, the intellectuals and the intelligentsia, who set the agenda of nationalist mobilization. Many of the founding fathers of the two movements were

¹⁵ For a discussion of the concepts of ethnonationalism, ethnic nationalism and related ones, see Ma Shu Yan (1990).

¹⁶ For a discussion of the terms nation, ethnies, minority and related concepts, see Riggs (1986). Riggs (1991a, 1991b) concludes that ethnicity is the most general and scientifically undefined of these concepts.

¹⁷ In particular, Professors Salvador Cardús, Josep Llobera, and Rafalel Ribó, whom I thank for their insightful comments. Salvador Giner (1984) uses the term 'ethnic nationalism'.

¹⁸ As a general bibliography on the national question in Spain from 1939 to 1983, I have consulted Beramendi (1984), as well as the more up-to-date and comprehensive reappraisal on studies of nationalism in Spain by Nuñez (1992, 1993).

primarily cultural nationalists who felt that the national culture was being threatened by state centralization. As the state was needed to protect the culture, the cultural nationalists needed to ally with political nationalists in order to reach the state. Thus, they formulated their regenerative programmes in political terms. Finally, in Catalonia they aimed to form alliances with economically hegemonic classes in order to gather the necessary financial support. There, they had to adapt their cultural arguments to the needs of economic elites and frame their programmes in a way that did not clash too harshly with the latter's interests.

I would like to compare the role of a sociologist to that of a photographer. By changing the perspective and colour of the light filter, the same scenario may assume a different appearance, revealing new and unexpected facets. Eventually, the whole picture may change. The aim is indeed to explain the same phenomenon with a new light, rather than a new phenomenon with the same light, as overarching theoretical paradigms often do.

Plan

The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 is a critical overview of the main scholarly theories of nationalism. Those theories which are central to the argument of my thesis will be selected and their possible application tested. The rest of the thesis is a comparison divided into two parts: firstly, an historical part and, secondly, a more theoretical part in which the main hypotheses are tested.

The historical part consists of five chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 deal, respectively, with the formation of early Basque and Catalan nationalism, with the establishment of their respective programmes and definitions of national identity. Chapters 4 and 5 explore the transformations undergone by the two movements during the Francoist dictatorship and try to illustrate how the changed demographic, political and cultural conditions precipitated a radical re-formulation of the two movements. Chapter 6 focuses on the democratization process and the legitimacy crisis of the centralized state inherited from Francoism. The rapid political changes are charted taking into account the influence of peripheral nationalism in the creation of the new state and vice-versa.

I have divided the history of Catalan and Basque nationalism into two broad periods: from their foundation to the end of the Civil War (1939) and from the latter to the democratic Transition. The reason is that the Civil War (1936-39) was a clear-cut severance and a radical break from the past. In the minds of those old enough to have survived it, the war is "a rupture so complete that it divides time in two; there is 'before the war', and everything that

came afterwards" (Di Giacomo 1984: 31).¹⁹ Also, nationalism was at the root of the Civil War, which can be seen as a conflict between official Spanish nationalism and centrifugal trends.²⁰

The second part of the thesis will deal with three deeply intertwined aspects of nationalist mobilization: the choice of language as opposed to other core values (Chapter 7), the consequence of large-scale immigration (Chapter 8) and the cause and effects of political violence (Chapter 9). Chapter 7 will show how two different sociolinguistic situations influenced the nationalist leaders' attempts to forge a bounded national identity: language maintenance influenced the moderate and unified course of Catalan nationalism; language shift created a vacuum in the Basque arena, to which the leaders responded by emphasizing other elements, but never agreed on which of them to choose. The selection of different core values can result in the development of different nationalist programmes. We shall delineate two broad patterns of nationalism, *inclusive* and *exclusive*. Stress on language as the achieved epitome of a group's culture creates the preconditions for the development of an inclusive form of nationalism. Stress on race, descent and other ascriptive elements creates the preconditions for an exclusivist form of nationalism.

Chapter 8 analyzes the contribution of immigration to the nationalist movement and identifies the different ways in which nationalist proto-elites reacted to the challenge. Immigration both reinforced and modified local core values. Encouraged by the high level of language maintenance, the Catalan pattern emphasized cultural integration through language. In contrast, immigration in Euskadi increased the original fragmentation, inspiring a more radical form of nationalism whose goal was to involve the immigrants in the national struggle. Nationalist mobilization became increasingly based on action, voluntary participation, subjective involvement, and the playing down of primordial symbols. New core values were selected and stressed in the process.

Chapter 9 attempts to relate the above to violence. Two factors are highlighted to explain the drift towards violent action: firstly, *internal* cultural, ideological and political fragmentation impinged upon the radicals' resort to *external* confrontation with the state;

¹⁹ As Termes (1986: 18) puts it, the enormously negative impact of the Civil War, a war which "disintegrated nearly everybody", has been inadequately studied. In Euskadi, the change was also abrupt: "The tragedy of that war left unforgettable images and experiences in the memory of those who lived it. These were vividly described to us youths during our upbringing. After five decades... still the great divide is 'before the war' and 'after the war'" (Zulaika 1988: 16).

²⁰ This historical reality is often neglected by many, especially English, historians who prefer to emphasize the class nature of the conflict. This issue will be discussed in the chapters on Francoism.

secondly, state repression was needed for violence not only to begin, but also to spread. Having related cultural assimilation to political fragmentation, I argue that the latter two, together with state violence, are ideal preconditions for the rise of violent confrontational politics.

I conclude with a brief Epilogue, setting out the main themes which have emerged from my comparison, drawing up some general conclusions and confirming the hypothesis (of cultural nationalism, core values and state repression) expressed in the previous chapters.

Chapter 1

THEORIES of NATIONALISM

The first task of this thesis will be to explore some influential theories of nationalism, to see whether they illuminate the thesis' main hypothesis which we discussed in the introduction. Apart from the mainstream theories, others will be added in order to clarify specific aspects, as well as the overall aim of the thesis. The main interpretative currents in scholarly research on nationalism can be subsumed broadly within three groups: primordialism, instrumentalism, transactionalism.²¹ A fourth section on the role of culture and myths will be added.

PRIMORDIALISM

The most traditional approach in the study of nationalism has been defined as primordialism.²² It dates the origin of both nationalism and national identity back to remote epochs, explaining them as forms of emotional givens. All classic nationalisms proclaim the immutable nature of their *Volksgeist* and symbolic universes. Indeed, it is the very primordialist 'pedigree' of dominant nations which, with its determinist eschatology, constitutes a powerful obstacle for the transformation of "*ethnies*" into "nations". In nationalist rhetoric, existing states are often given as evidence of the primordiality of the nation they enclose.²³

²¹ Several authors however appear under more than one heading, espousing different interpretations. This is partly a consequence of the protean, ambiguous and multi-dimensional nature of nationalism. As no single over-arching theory of nationalism has emerged so far -and perhaps will never emerge-, most authors develop either a multi-layered theory or several theories at once in order to deal with separate aspects of the phenomenon. Yet, it is still fruitful to establish the following three main theoretical frameworks.

²² This term was used for the first time by Shils (1957), who identifies ethnicity with 'primordial ties'.

²³ Thus, Pierre Vilar points out that "since the Frenchman takes nations for granted as

Primordialist approaches have been at the centre of much criticism. Their appeal to emotional and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations for ethnic mobilisation has been an easy target from more positivist, calculative approaches. By accentuating the explosive and unpredictable nature of ethnic bonds, primordialists seem to discourage further enquiries into the causes of ethnic conflict. They also "tend to unite upon the explicit or implicit argument that ethnicity, properly defined, is based upon descent" (Brass 1979: 35).²⁴ The cultural non-ascriptive basis of nationalism is hence overlooked and ignored.²⁵

An extreme variety of primordialism is Pierre Van den Berghe's **sociobiological** approach, which considers ethnic and racial sentiments as an extension of kinship ties (1981: 80). The idea of ethnic ties as 'kinship' ties is also embraced by Donald Horowitz (1975, 1985), who defines ethnic groups as 'super-families'. Using the term '*ethnic affiliation*', Horowitz argues that "there is always an element of descent. Most people are born into the ethnic group in which they will die, and ethnic groups consist mostly of those who have born in them" (1985: 55). Similarly, Joshua A. Fishman notes that "ethnicity has always been experienced as a kinship phenomenon, a continuity within the self and within those who share an inter-generational link to common ancestors ... It is crucial that we recognize ethnicity as a tangible, living reality that makes every human a link in an eternal bond from generation to generation... Ethnicity is experienced as a guarantor of eternity" (1980: 84-5). The role of the nation as an 'extended family' has been promptly noticed by Churchmen and other religious leaders. We shall see that in both the Basque Country and Catalonia the Church has integrated this vision as part of its nationalist 'conversion'. Nationalism conveys the idea that the members of the nation are somehow related by birth. Myths of common ancestry are central to this perception. Sociobiological and other 'kinship' perspectives bring forth the centrality of descent in defining ethnic groups. In fact, if we wish to reject any biological definition of ethnic groups, sticking purely to a cultural definition, we shall have to include all kinds of formal or informal groupings which share some symbols, language and culture (although not necessarily myths and history, since the latter are related

natural facts verified by the existence of states, the existence of Portugal seems to him to have been tied to the geography of the peninsula from time immemorial, while the ideas of a Catalan or Basque 'nation' is all the more surprising..." (1980: 527, my italics).

²⁴ Brass concurs with Smith that "it is not *actual* descent that is considered essential to the definition of an ethnic group but a *belief* in common descent" (1979: 35, italics mine).

²⁵ For these reasons, some authors propound a complete rejection of the term primordialism from the social science vocabulary (Eller and Coughlan 1993).

to descent). Hence, some kind of 'biological' component, or at least a perception of common descent, is necessary to distinguish *ethnies* and nations from other 'cultural' groups. However, this concept, as we shall see, is diametrically opposed to the one I wish to apply to the Catalan case: ethnicity as ascription is one of two possible options, the other being ethnicity as a free choice through the voluntary adoption of the ethnic culture.

Intellectuals and intelligentsia

How is it possible to believe in this immemorial - sometimes perennial- character of the nation? An answer lies in the role played by a particular stratum, which is crucial for the success of nationalist movements: the *intelligentsia*. In the social sciences there is no agreement on its definition. Anthony D. Smith (1971, 1982, 1984) defines the intelligentsia as a group of individuals exposed to some form of superior education. It is not strictly a class, but rather a social category, since, in theory, individuals hailing from all classes can belong to it. As the intelligentsia starts to challenge officialdom by taking advantage of its strategic position, it becomes a key protagonist of emerging ethno-nationalist movements.

The intelligentsia, or the professionals, should not be confused with the narrower concept of *intellectuals*, namely the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas which the intelligentsia may then spread (Smith 1981: 109).²⁶ Indeed, the intelligentsia is that group which has the power to apply and disseminate the ideas produced by the intellectuals. There are, obviously, overlapping cases, such as individuals who, in their lifetime, have the possibility both to create and disseminate their ideas. However, they are two clearly distinct activities, or 'phases' (Gella 1977, Smith 1981: 109). Generally, the tendency to be organized in professional corps indicate membership in the intelligentsia. One of its attributes is modernity; intellectuals existed in many epochs, but only with modernization do we encounter large numbers of individuals dedicated exclusively to applying and disseminating ideas, the intelligentsia (Smith 1973: 79).

Within the intellectuals a decisive role is played by *historians*, whose mission is to provide a legitimizing historical perspective as the basis of the national project. In the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, most European historiographers and social philosophers

²⁶ Peter Alter speaks of this category as 'the awakeners': "every nation has done its utmost to praise the deeds and merits of the philologists, poets, historians and politicians who substantiated, and in most cases successfully asserted, the nation's claim to independence and self-determination... These makers and recreators of states were 'great men', individuals powerful enough to have wrought the shape of history" (Alter 1989: 80).

were national 'propagandists'. Extolling the heroic deeds of past national leaders, they provided the political aims of their own leaders with an historicist justification. Nationalist and minority historians are often set apart from mainstream historians. The term *uneven ethno-history* has been suggested by Smith (1993) for this purpose. An *ethno-history* is an imaginary reconstruction of the past. It paints an ideal tableau of what once was. The ethno-historian is thus not concerned with investigating his own claims, but with creating a fiction which is more apt to convey the message of nationalist renaissance. The ethno-historian is nothing more but the modern version of the ancient myth-maker.

Yet, there is no value-free history, as there is no value-free sociology. To paraphrase Marx's dictum, all history is the history of the dominant nations. And borrowing from psychology, we can also say that memories are also selective. Turkish history books do not mention the Armenian genocide in which millions perished, yet Turkish mainstream history is not generally classified or referred to as ethno-history. What, in principle, distinguishes professional/ academic historians from official and ethno-historians is the latter's lack of a filter of analytical critique. Ethno-history was prevalent in early Catalanism, but it was even more central to Basque nationalism, where the lack of past statehood has prompted his founder to turn obscure medieval skirmishes into the guideposts of Basque historical continuity.

In general, the crucial importance of the intellectuals will be shown in both the Catalan and Basque cases. Their role is at the core of Elie Kedourie's Euro-centric approach (1993): nationalism is diffused by a mechanism of imitation by local intellectuals and elites. It is the result of the diffusion of the modern principle of self-determination as derived by the philosophical visions of German Kantianism and Herderian Romanticism and by the political praxis of the French Revolution. Intellectuals of one country emulate intellectuals from another country and the epicentre of everything lies in the midst of Europe (France and Germany). The central role of the intellectuals and the professionals brings us to the consideration of how far they can influence, mobilize and 'instrumentalize' public opinion.

INSTRUMENTALISM

Ethnic and national mobilization may be seen as resulting from the conscious efforts of groups - and/or individuals within them - to obtain access to specific social, political and material resources. This is obviously done in the name of 'alleged' common interests. The emphasis is on the instrumental tendencies of elites or proto-elites, who choose to mobilize

their own group(s) under the banner of ethnicity or nationalism. Underlining "the strategic efficacy of ethnicity" in relation to the Welfare state (Glazer and Moynihan 1975:11), such approaches are of limited interest for this thesis. They do not recognize that mobilised groups may simply be interested in the defense and maintenance of their cultural heritage. Ethnicity is seen as a dependent variable, controlled according to its strategic utility in achieving other, material goods for the group.

The most radical instrumentalists assert that the category "nation" is totally invented and does not correspond to any objective reality. If not purely invented, nations are at least *imagined* communities (Anderson 1983), the outcome, one would say, of a collective hallucination.²⁷ In some cases, an attitude of deep diffidence towards nationalism has inspired lapidary sentences, such as the following: "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (Gellner 1964: 168). The impatience of an entire generation of scholars to demonstrate the fallacy of nationalism pushed them to over-state its arbitrary character and under-state its creative potentials. Instrumentalism postulates a sharp fracture between nationalist elites and their passive followers, who are depicted as totally controlled by ambitious political leaders. The latter are 'social engineers' (Hobsbawm 1990) deliberately stirring up the atavistic emotions of the masses (Kedourie 1993).

Within the instrumentalist field, **resource mobilization theory** sees social actions as adaptive answers to specific cost-benefit calculations. Their success is therefore determined largely by strategic factors (Jenkins 1983: 528). Broadly speaking, mobilization theorists visualize ethnic and racial groups as being involved in competition for the control of economic, political and social resources. Moreover they suggest that hostility and antagonism are a natural derivation of such competition (Levine and Campbell 1972: 29). Resource mobilization theory and its derivatives have not proved helpful to illuminate the main argument of my thesis, although they do possess relevance in the study of ethnic conflict and competition.²⁸

²⁷ See Petrosino (1994) for an application to the Italian case of the possibility 'inventing' ethnic groups.

²⁸ Another approach which we cannot consider thoroughly, because of its reductionism, is **rational choice theory** (Levi and Hechter 1985). The possibility of collective action rests on whether or not members of the ethnic group are convinced that such action would result in net individual benefit (Hechter 1986). For example, analyses of the electoral gains of regionalist parties emphasize (in a rather tautological way) the latter's ability to present themselves to the electorate as potential channel of protest and pressure, while offering to

In short, classic instrumentalist approaches try to single out the 'manufacturers' of nations amongst those classes and social groups which have given the starting signal to nationalist claims. Hobsbawm (1990) speaks of 'social engineering' and his term 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) has now become an icon in popular usage. A deconstructionist urge for identifying 'invented' traditions has reached the proportion of a virtual industry among historians and anthropologists (Urla 1993: 101) and is particularly popular in Catalonia.²⁹ Hobsbawm belongs to a Marxist tradition that has still some credence among European scholars. Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars seem to be the most self-confident in locating with mathematical certainty and surgical precision the manipulators of nations.

Economist approaches: Marxism and Internal Colonialism

Marxist "orthodox" thought can be easily singled out as the most traditional instrumentalist approach. However, its incapacity to deal with nationalism is overwhelming, and has been recognized by Marxists themselves. For this thesis, Marxism has proved uninspiring and inapplicable. Yet, influential Marxist interpretations have emerged in historical study of early Catalanism. For instance, Pierre Vilar (1977, 1980) sees the latter as a bourgeois movement which turned to regionalism as a consequence of its inability to control the state. In the most orthodox Marxist vision, nationalism is seen as a bourgeois conspiracy and reduced to pure class terms.

However, Marxist political praxis also emblazoned the right to self-determination, especially in the works of Lenin and Stalin.³⁰ Such incongruity between proletarian internationalism and the right to self-determination originated in the specific historical and geographical milieux which Marxist political strategists were compelled to face (Connor 1984a). As Joshua A. Fishman shrewdly points out, "classist Marxists joined these movements only when they triumphed and then only to capture them from within, since Marxism failed to destroy them from without" (1980: 80). But nationalist movements have

their members more attractive and wider "selective incentives" than other organizations (Rogowski 1985). The cultural aspects of the phenomenon are given little weight (when not totally overlooked), as are the more general social ones.

²⁹ See, for instance, Fradera (1992), Marfany (1987) and several contributions to the historical journal *L'Avenc*. I see their approach as useful in exploring some aspects of the phenomenon, but insufficient as overall explanation.

³⁰ For a survey of classical Marxist positions on the national question, see Connor (1984a), Nimni (1991) and Salvi (1978).

been quick to seize on this ambiguity, by either denying or exalting the right of self-determination. The use of Marxism by Basque radicals in the 1960s is the case we shall follow in more detail.³¹

Perhaps the most popular and widely quoted economist theory is -or was- Michael Hechter's (1975) 'internal colonialism'. Support for nationalist parties originates in the *cultural division of labour*, that is, the concentration of an ethnic group in a narrow range of low status occupations. Nationalist movements, such as those active in the Celtic fringe, are seen as responses to the lack of overall social mobility, which is in turn caused by cultural discrimination. Economic differences are sharpened in periods of economic crises, when a declining core cannot afford to grant the periphery its share of scarce resources. As is well-known, this interpretation failed to explain why most conflicts tend to occur in regions which are economically and technologically more advanced than their cores (Birch 1978: 330-331, Brand 1985, Smith 1981). The Basque Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland, Slovenia, Eritrea and the Baltics all contradict the theory of internal colonialism. Furthermore, many of these cases illustrate that, while the economic distance between groups diminishes, the meaning attached to ethnic diversities can become more salient (even if such diversities do not in themselves increase, or even if they are actually weakened). To meet mounting criticism and face the facts, Hechter abandoned internal colonialism and adopted other theories, in particular 'rational choice' (Hechter 1985, 1992).

Economist theories represent a conspicuous body within instrumentalism. Walker Connor rightly points out that ethnonationalism appears to operate independently from economic variables and that perceived economic discrimination can merely work as a reinforcing variable, as a "catalytic agent, exacerbator, or choice of battleground" (1984b: 356). To put economic issues at the centre of the analysis means to miss the basic point, that ethnic movements are indeed ethnic, not economic.

Modernism and modernization theory

There is an interpretation which cuts across all previous ones, with the partial exception of primordialism. Following Smith (1984, 1986: 12, 1988), I will use the term **modernism** to indicate those mainstream theories which see the nation as an entirely modern product.³²

³¹ Despite its shortcomings, Marxist sociology has inspired interesting contributions in the study of neo-nationalism; apart from Hechter, we need only to think about Nairn's (1977) work on the 'break-up of Britain' and Blaut's (1988) reconsideration of nationalism as a form of class struggle .

This vision is shared by all the approaches mentioned so far, and is particularly relevant to regional nationalism in Spain.

Some 'primordialist' authors also appropriated it, seeing nationalism as the modern equivalent of ethnocentrism: "modernization does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely modernizes it" (Geertz 1963: 154). This dictum is one of the few postulates overwhelmingly embraced by most scholars, and, hence, it represents a rare achievement in the field: primordialists see nationalism as a modern re-enactment of an ancient idea, instrumentalists see in it a thoroughly modern condition.³³ In Gellner's (1983) version, this proposition highlights how the all-pervasive changes brought about by modernization disrupt the traditional balance of society, creating new constellations of shared interests.³⁴ The set of theories which I intend to include in this section do not substantially contradict what we have said so far: albeit linked to instrumentalist conceptions, modernists do not necessarily deny the persistent and historical aspects of ethnicity.

Modernism is not to be confused with the **modernization paradigm** popularized by Karl Deutsch and other post-war political scientists.³⁵ According to Deutsch (1966), modernization is characterized by the presence of 'social mobilization', that is, the process

³² Modernism is opposed to **perennialism**, according to which the origins of the nation fade away into immemorial times, but are destined to eternal existence. As Gellner puts it, it is this doubly reassuring temporal projection which, at the same time, represents the unfathomable force of nationalism and its weakness. Perennialism is not to be confounded with primordialism. The former refers to nations and is opposed to modernism, the latter refers to ethnic groups and is opposed to instrumentalism.

³³ In our case study, we shall see how modernization destroyed old Basque loyalties grouped around Carlism, but gave birth to a much more radical form of nationalism. A second wave of massive modernization in the 1950s-1960s sparked the birth and spread of an even more radical and popular nationalist movement. Similarly in Catalonia, successive waves of modernization and industrialization changed the nature of ethnic identities and set the basis for a modern form of nationalism.

³⁴ Benedict Anderson (1983), who does not offer a unified theory, but incorporates parts of a variety of theories, can still be classified as a modernist. His "emphasis on the distinction between the educated and uneducated, and the concomitant appraisal of the educated through literacy, are a peculiar disease of modernism. This disease permeates Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* as well" (Roberts 1993: 135).

³⁵ For a critique of the modernization paradigm, see Ferrarotti (1985), Gusfield (1967), and Smith (1973). The confusion over the term has, if anything, dramatically increased in recent years. Ever since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the conventional view that modernization automatically lead to secularization has been shattered. The collapse of the Soviet Union has dealt a *coup de grace* to the 'social mobilization' paradigm of modernization still held by Deutsch's imitators.

through which the ancestral bonds with the individuals' primary institutions are eroded, and by which these individuals are freely available to new forms of socialization. In brief, modernization theorists stress that increased communications would erase ethnic cleavages and result in successful achievement of nation-building. This theory remained an unchallenged and all-pervasive paradigm in the social science for over twenty years following World War II.

Ernest Gellner (1983) does not move too far from Deutsch's tradition. Indeed, he shares with extreme modernists and modernization theorists the belief that there is a radical split between industrial and pre-industrial societies. Only some aspects of Gellner's nomothetic grand-theory are relevant to my purpose. In particular, his **theory of social cohesion** singles out the birth of nationalism in the modernization process itself which uproots traditional society, undermining its system of ascriptive relationships. Nationalism's task is to forge a new loyalty (and identification) for the nation-state, after industrialization has corroded traditional norms, values and notions which sustained 'communal life'. This emphasizes the functional character of nationalism: spatial and social mobility makes necessary the construction of a collective identity which can work as anchor and point of orientation for the uprooted individuals. The problem is that the forced homogenization imposed by the nation-state provokes the unavoidable reactions of those who have been excluded from both decision-making and emotional - cultural participation.

In a similar vein, **mass-society theory** holds that without cohesive ideological forces modern societies risk 'disintegrating' and being torn apart by internal conflicts of interest. In particular, during rapid processes of urbanization, industrialization and democratization, or after military defeat, the masses become highly manipulable as a result of the destruction of previous social bonds (Giner 1976, Kornhauser 1960). Recent world-wide events, especially the collapse of Communism, seem to confirm these perceptions. Both Gellner and Kornhauser are not too distant from Emile Durkheim's concept of 'anomie' which indicates the breakdown of norms governing social interactions.³⁶

In his own adaptation of the modernization theory, Walker Connor (1972, 1973, 1987) reverses the tables, considering how nationalism is a force directly linked to increasing contacts and communications: nationalism spreads as communications spread.³⁷ This is the

³⁶ According to Durkheim (1970: 241-76), the most likely victims of mass manipulation are uprooted and isolated individuals, whose number increases notably during such crises derived from rapid modernization

³⁷ Connor's approach has been identified as part of the **conflictual modernization theories**, as opposed to Deutsch's and others' **melting pot modernization theories**

foreseeable reaction by peoples submitted to the steam-rolling action of *nation building*. Nationalism is, hence, "an intrinsic characteristic of the modern world" (Smith 1981: 37).³⁸ Tom Nairn (1977) goes as far as seeing in modernization the cause of most international conflicts. Development produces hatred and wars. By throwing up national boundaries, commerce gives rise to 'atavistic urges'. Thus, there is a direct link between modernization, nationalism and war (Nairn, cited by Smith 1981: 39). My research will clearly show that the impact produced by industrialization and modernization was an essential, perhaps the most relevant, factor in the rise of regional nationalism in Spain.

Homeostatic and cause-effect models.

In what I wish to refer to as a **homeostatic** approach, social movements gather momentum when and where there arises the need to restore a dis-equilibrium. In this vein, ethnic insurgency is seen as a movement in defense of a group threatened with extinction by an alien state or by abrupt social change.³⁹ Patricia Mayo (1974) sees the 'loss of community' as the crucible in the explosion of ethnic conflicts. Their origin lies in the erosion of traditional communitarian structures by the bureaucratic state, with the consequent intrusion of industrial anonymity in every area of modern life. Echoes of Tönnies' distinction between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* reverberate in this approach. Gellner's theory of social cohesion, which sees industrial society as radically in opposition with agricultural society, is not distant either. But in homeostatic approaches the external variable which causes the nationalist movement to explode is the state.⁴⁰ In brief, homeostatic

(Newman 1991). The former approach could also include Smith and Nairn. Recently, Eric Hobsbawm (1994) has considered the spread of nationalism as a reaction to several aspects of modernization, particularly worldwide secularization.

³⁸ This thesis is shared by most historians (Kohn 1955: 10-15, Hobsbawm 1990, 1994, Seton-Watson 1977) and anthropologists (Gellner 1973, 1991).

³⁹ In the past, peripheral cultures could feel relatively protected or safe. Change was perceived by their members as mostly acceptable and tied to the constant flux of earthly matters. An Heraclitean conception of *panta rei* may well have been widespread in many cultures (Heraclitus formalized and transcribed a kind of thought probably present among the wise men of his time, and we have no reason to doubt that a similar vision was current in most places and times). In a perpetual process of adaptation, change was constantly supported by the protective shield of tradition as a steady point of reference, rather than being radical and abrupt.

⁴⁰ For a more recent and broader theory which sees ethnonationalist movements as a response to both state intervention and the intrusion of technological society, see Jauregui (1993).

interpretations refer to a primary and spontaneous reaction against state-sponsored bureaucratization and assimilation. However, they do not concern specifically nationalist movements, since a reaction of this kind can be produced through traditionalist, fundamentalist, New-Age, federalist, ecologist and other movements as well. Anti-state reactive movements can, for example, be pursued for religious reasons, which only afterwards may be taken up by the intelligentsia as part of their nationalist platform.⁴¹ Nationalist movements can be distinguished from other reactive movements by their assumption of typical elements of a modern western culture (secularism, appeal to citizenship and equality, a certain degree of centralization, etc.).⁴² However, in many historical cases, a homeostatic reaction has been an essential prerequisite for the successive formation of a nationalist movement. This interpretation confirms that the state is the main variable in the formation of nationalism, and that nationalism itself is a product, or a consequence, of the state. This is a theory clearly expressed by Breuilly. However, Breuilly holds that it is *failure* in state-building that gives rise to distinctive nationalist politics (1993: 367). This is a rather tautological argument expressed also by several scholars of Spanish politics (Linz 1973, 1975) and its results risk reifying the state into the ultimate arbiter of all social processes. Again, state-centered reductionism concentrates only on a single aspect of the phenomena, the state. The state is a crucial element in my explanation as well, but I consider ethnic nationalism to have been actually reinforced by state intervention, rather than being the result of "the failure to concentrate sovereignty in particular institutions" (Breuilly 1993: 367). It will become obvious in the course of this work that the catalyst was the state's failure to decentralize its institutions, not to concentrate them. An excess of over-zealous centralism engendered an homeostatic reaction which, in turn, gave rise to two powerful peripheral nationalisms.

A variety of this approach is the **cause-effect model**, which explains ethnonationalist insurgencies as a *direct* response to state repression. This model is often used to explain

⁴¹ Alliances between a secularized westernized intelligentsia and religious elements are a constant in the history of nationalism. In the case of Islam they are certainly decisive: the Algerian example is well-known, while the first phase of the Islamic revolution in Iran provides the most indubitable example.

⁴² Smith appears to be himself a modernist when he distinguishes *nations* from *ethnies* for the presence of "western features and qualities: territoriality, citizenship rights, legal codes, ... political culture ...[and] social mobility in an unified division of labour" (Smith 1986: 144). Even though the latter are mostly ideal rather than real practices, and even though their origin dates prior to the modern age, they have imbued with their conceptions the contemporary societies which have been forged on the basis of nationalism.

nationalist violence as a defensive mobilization against the state. As we shall see, a 'repression-resistance' hypothesis has been widely used in order to explain the peculiar strength and virulence of Basque nationalism in terms of a direct consequence of Francoist repression. The nationalists themselves sometime have used this explanation in order to justify their recourse to anti-state violence. The worldwide role of 'politicide', genocide and other forms of state repression in the genesis of ethnic conflicts has been well analysed by Ted Gurr and others (Gurr 1993, Gurr and Scarritt 1989, Harff and Gurr 1989).

Some authors go as far as seeing the level of ethnic mobilization as directly proportional to the degree of repression: "The greater the opposition -economic, political, social, religious, or some combination thereof- perceived by an ethnic group, the greater the degree to which its historical sense of distinctiveness will be aroused, and hence the greater its solidarity or the more intense its movement towards redress" (Scott 1990: 164). We shall see that state repression was crucial in the crystallization of both Basque and Catalan nationalism, and, if this repression was directed against particular core values (such as the Catalan language), it only served to reinforce the latter's importance.

Alternate cycles of nationalism

In the previous section, we have observed that there is an underlying distinction between an instinctive self-defense of threatened communities against the early industrial onslaught, and nationalism *per se*. The former is not sufficient in itself to inspire or create the latter. As we have seen, the first step in this direction is the existence of a proto-elite which could set the basis for a revival of ethnic culture in modern terms. The final task is to put the mobilized 'nation' on the same footing as other nations. As Gellner (1983, 1991) puts it, the modern world is a national world, where no space is granted for stateless ethnies. Thus, ethnies have to face a fatal choice, a momentous decision, and find themselves at a radical cross-road: either they passively accept their destiny of extinction, or they organize themselves on the basis of a new state model. Such organization must follow strict political lines. The latter process, aimed at state-building, is quite distinct from cultural resistance as such. Yet, cultural resistance is the first ingredient for the creation of a national culture. To clarify this point, Hutchinson (1987, 1992) elaborates a distinction between *political nationalism* and *cultural nationalism*. The latter is an important ideological force which is regularly adopted by an intelligentsia in expansion, as a political option against the state. Cultural nationalists aim at the 'moral regeneration' of the nation, and culture is to be the means.⁴³ The

politicization of culture is again linked to the traumatic impact of modernization guided by the state. Many successful nationalist movements experienced an *alternation* between these two kinds of nationalism. Hutchinson describes them as historical cycles which succeed and reinforce each other, since none of them is conceivable without the other, even though one of the two may prevail at a given historical moment. However, my research will show that the strength of *cultural* nationalism depends on the strength of the local culture, and a thriving local culture can produce a permanent movement of cultural nationalism. If, as in the Basque case, the local culture is poorly developed and urban elites are thoroughly assimilated, cultural nationalism may be particularly inactive. It will then have to yield most of the initiatives of political reawakening and 'moral regeneration' to political nationalism.⁴⁴

The crucial importance of the cultural activists is recognized by both Smith and Hroch. We have seen the central role played by the intellectuals in Smith's theory. Hroch (1985) postulates a three-stages model of national development: phase A is the period of scholarly research; poets, philologists, archeologists, historians, artists all contribute to the 'discovery', creation and formalization of the national culture. Phase B is the period of patriotic agitation. Finally, phase C corresponds to the rise of a mass national movement.⁴⁵ The difference between Hroch and Hutchinson is that the first conceives the evolution from cultural to political nationalism as a linear process, the second as recurring cycles. Hroch and Hutchinson also agree that a first generation of scholars and amateurs is needed to envision the nation, to consolidate an embryonic 'image' of the nation, and that cultural nationalism

⁴³ "For a cultural nationalist... the state is regarded with suspicion. ...The glory of a country comes not from its political power but from the culture of its people and the contribution of its thinkers and educators to humanity. The aim of cultural nationalists is rather moral regeneration... [It] remains in 'normal' circumstances a small-scale movement that promotes progress through communal self-help. ...It may, if adopted by a young intelligentsia, develop into a loose network of language societies, dramatic groups, publishing houses, lending libraries, summer schools, agricultural co-operatives and political parties. Even so, it generally remains a minority enthusiasm... In terms of its communitarian goals, cultural nationalism fails. Often unable to extend beyond the educated strata, it is forced to adopt state-oriented strategies by which to institutionalize its ideals in the social order" (Hutchinson 1987: 15-7).

⁴⁴ Even in Basque nationalism the two movements can be kept distinct. Perhaps such distinction is not so evident in its early phases and re-foundation, when the two movements were conflated in the ideology of a single leader or organisation (Arana and ETA). In periods of nationalist consolidation, such as in 1918 and in the 1980s, the difference became more salient.

⁴⁵ Recently, Hroch's model has been applied to the study of Basque and Catalan nationalism (Mees 1991, Nagel 1991).

does not vanish after it has been taken up by political activists. However, Hutchinson sees the two movements as more separable and continually reinforcing each other.

My own contribution is that, in the study of violent movements, it is necessary to distinguish a third form of nationalism, *military nationalism*. The latter develops its own autonomous dynamics and follows its own route, rather than alternating with the other two. We shall define the phenomenon in the Basque context in both chapters 4 and 9.

TRANSACTIONALISM

A third group of theories and models fall under the broad heading of 'transactionalism' or **boundary approach**. According to its main proponent, the Norwegian anthropologist Frederick Barth (1969), ethnic identity cannot merely be conceived as the survival of cultural forms derived from geographic and social isolation.⁴⁶ On the contrary, it is the outcome of intense interaction and transactions between groups.⁴⁷ However, there is an implicit contradiction between its founding aspects: ethnic groups perceive themselves as independent and autonomous, yet it is precisely their inter-dependence which is the source of their differential plans, identities and self-perception. "Groups tend to define themselves, not by reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, that is, by comparison to 'strangers'" (Armstrong 1982: 5). *Opposition* is then the crucible of ethnic and national identity. According to Lanternari (1986: 67), "there is always a contradiction in the definition of a group, because it is a group (i.e., it has a group identity) only in relation to other groups".

The central role of opposition in identity formation has been theorized in more detail by Spicer (1971: 797). He defines the *oppositional process* as "the essential factor in the formation and development of the persistent identity system" (cited by Scott 1990: 164). Likewise, Boon (1982) sees in this contrast the central feature of cultural groups. They need to produce a sense of themselves only because they encounter and interact with others. Since juxtaposition is the key to ethnic identity and groupness, cultural nuances and details are often grandly exaggerated. It is part of the process which Sigmund Freud (1991: 305) called

⁴⁶ In Barth's words, "though the naïve assumption that each tribe and people has maintained its culture through a bellicose ignorance of its neighbours is no longer entertained, *the simplistic view that geographical and social isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity persists*" (1969: 9).

⁴⁷ As we have seen, the perception that ethnic identities are reinforced through interaction and global communication is not what distinguishes Barth's theory from competing ones. Connor, Hechter, Anderson, Armstrong, and several modernists concur that ethnic boundaries are strengthened in response to intense interaction.

the 'narcissism of small differences'. The less different are the juxtaposed groups, the more will be their insistence on separateness. Mechanisms of compensation are thus central to groups as well as to individuals. Similarity will be counter-balanced by stress on alleged differentiae. "Any discourse at some levels alludes to the absences it intrinsically sets in abeyance... Every discourse, like every culture, inclines toward what is not: toward an implicit negativity" (Boon 1982: 232). Antagonism is thus the main element in the formation of social identities. We shall see that this is precisely what has occurred in the Basque case, where militancy was enhanced by repression. This view is also common to homeostatic and cause-effect models. But did the nationalist leaders deliberately know that and choose to act consequently? My thesis will show that it was more of an open and conscious choice, than a surreptitious and semi-conscious one.

As a form of oppositional social organization, ethnicity may articulate a multiplicity of forms of ecological interdependence between groups, from the exploitation of complementary niches to the maximal competition for specific resources (Barth 1969, Cohen 1985).⁴⁸ Ethnicity is defined by *boundaries*. This implies that the cultural and biological content of the group can alter, while the boundary mechanism remains unchanged. One of Barth's main contributions is thus the distinction between *ethnic borders* and *ethnic contents*. He observed that the boundaries defining a group's identity may be maintained independently from the culture they enclose. In particular, cultures may change, but the permanence of boundaries themselves is more longstanding. However, Barth's playing down of culture does miss its central importance of the construction of identities: even though identities are often constructed rather than given, they must rely on the pre-existing diffusion of shared symbols and cultural elements, as well as on memories of a shared past and myths of a common destiny (Smith 1986, 1991).

My thesis emphasizes the distinction between ethnic boundaries and their content. By emphasizing this distinction without focussing on only one of the two poles, a proper emphasis will be given to the oppositional dynamics of nationalism (and of ethnic identity in general), without omitting the basis upon which nationalism supports itself and legitimates itself. The latter's legitimacy derives largely from its capacity to absorb, and to delve into, the local culture. The relative weakness or strength of ethnic boundaries will be correlated to the relative weakness or strength of cultural contents.

The comparative analysis of Basque and Catalan nationalism will define two models of

⁴⁸ On 'niche theory' and the origins of the term 'niche', see Hannan (1979: 260-4).

nationalist mobilization, one emphasizing borders and opposition, the other emphasizing culture and compatibility. Different nationalist movements put a different emphasis on culture, as well as on opposition. Stress on opposition will be linked to the core values prevailing in the two societies: in the Catalan case, the persistence of a single core value, Catalan language, made it unnecessary to reinforce opposition and borders through frontal clashes with the state. Opposition was largely conveyed through linguistic nationalism in the form of a massive movement of cultural resistance. In the Basque case, there was no clearly defined core value or symbol of national identity to mobilize people around. Borders needed to be reinforced through opposition, and that was what the nationalist leaders chose to do. However, it is also true that the Basques shared powerful myths of national uniqueness (certainly no less powerful than the Catalan ones), although these myths clashed with a general lack of cultural markers and differentiae. The result was that 'un-hyphenated' Basques developed a much more assertive and violent form of nationalism than their 'un-assimilated' Catalan colleagues.

Border vs. content, opposition vs. compatibility, violence vs. culture

Nationalism can also be defined as a form of group categorization. As studied by social psychologists, the process of social categorization is *independent* of real and discrete differences among groups (Tajfel 1970, Billig 1976, Billig and Tajfel 1973). Nationalism assumes that the world is naturally divided into discrete entities called nations, hence, nationalism is a process of social categorization, both of the 'self' and the 'other'. From here it follows that, although cultural differences may be important in legitimizing nationalism, they are by no means necessary in creating opposition, antagonism and conflict. What is relevant is the capacity of nationalist leaders to impose upon their constituencies the idea that they belong to a united single body called the 'nation'. For many people, to be able to 'imagine' a nation means that a process of social categorization has finally succeeded. The 'art' of imagining and creating a nation is intimately bounded to the 'science' of classifications and categorizations. Imagination and invention concur in the process of founding categories named 'nations'. However, it is highly unlikely that nationalist leaders can manipulate their constituencies at their own discretion, as extreme instrumentalists uphold. In order to mobilize the 'masses', the intelligentsia, and before them the intellectuals, must touch some chord, their message must reverberate amongst the people, it must even

look familiar to them. As the world is no laboratory, some 'real' element must be present in order for social categorization to become effective. Some pre-existing ethnic markers must facilitate the ascription into a category. However, if the group to be mobilized is too fragmented and assimilated to retain some shared hyphen, social categorization can always be enforced by stimulating borders and opposition, rather than contents and uniqueness.⁴⁹ Here is where the role of violence comes in.

In the booming field of comparative studies of nationalism, few attempts have been made to analyse the relationship of violence to pre-existing cultural markers and the 'identity material' available to them. I will try to show that the presence or absence of such cultural markers can have a crucial influence on the developments of nationalism. The more the external markers are visible, the easier will it be to 'feel', perceive or imagine the nation. The problem arises when two communities share too many cultural features: then, it becomes more difficult for political elites or proto-elites to forge some form of separate communitarian identity out of this cultural mingling and overlap.⁵⁰ The boost is often provided by violent conflict. Wars, civil strife and government oppression deeply affect the collective psyche, moulding shared memories, collective identities and national myths (Smith 1981b). My interpretation goes further, in that when there is a paucity of cultural markers, only violence can make communities 'imagined' as well as real.

In order to understand this statement, we have to comprehend the essential character of nationalist movements. Their major aim is to emphasize an 'us-them' dichotomy and conceptually separate their group -which they conceive as a whole- from another group. Hence, *nationalism aims at border creation*, at least as much as it aims, internally, at border elimination. But, if the state curtails the course of the national re-awakening, nationalist leaders may calculate that it is in their -and the nation's- interest to engage in open rebellion. As my final chapter will stress, given widespread assimilation, nationalism will more likely develop violent fringes. The likelihood that such violence will then spread and be legitimated as a replacement for the illegitimacy of the state is then connected with several other factors, but I will focus on the two which I conceive to be essential: political fragmentation (in itself a

⁴⁹ "The boundaries are *relational* rather than absolute; that is, they mark the community *in relation* to other communities" (Cohen 1985: 58).

⁵⁰ If we accept Anderson's (1983) definition of the nation as an 'imagined community', its consequences also vary according to the two following patterns: it becomes easier to imagine oneself as being part of a whole when there are objective cultural markers which differentiate one's own whole from another whole. In contrast, imagination needs an extra boost when no tangible elements of differentiation are shared by the majority of the populations in the would-be nations.

consequence of cultural fragmentation, which is, in turn, related to cultural assimilation) and state repression. When these two factors appear together, the leaders will more likely resort to violence and radical forms of struggle, than in cases where cultural distinctiveness and cohesion are the norm.

I shall also argue that violence is a result of the (internal) conflict between persisting ethnic memories and lack of widespread recognizable distinctiveness. Assimilation normally results in cultural fragmentation. The would-be nation becomes divided among assimilated and non-assimilated constituencies. In both the historical chapters and the final conclusions, I will stress how cultural fragmentation engendered political fragmentation and how, in turn, the latter engendered a need for either strong leadership or strong action.

Bringing culture back in

Among most present-day ethnonationalist movements, language continues to be the basic criterion of self-definition and nationhood. As a consequence, the sociolinguistic vitality of these languages can be highly relevant in determining future political developments. Starting from this premise, I will explore the difficulties in choosing other elements as symbols and carriers of nationhood where the ethnic language is scarcely spoken.

Language is a central component in many modernist approaches we have discussed so far. The role of mass education in Gellner's theory is related to the needs of 'national' markets and industrialization. Anderson's idea of print capitalism and mass literacy postulates the development of a national language as a prerequisite for nationalism. Hroch, Kedourie and many others see the work of philologists, poets and other language 'manipulators' as crucial. Fishman (1966, 1980, 1982, 1985) offers the most convincing scholarly argument about the importance of language both in ethnic identity and nationalist programmes. He points out that for nationalism to emerge "it is first necessary for populations to become convinced that they possess in common certain unique ethno-cultural characteristics, and that these similarities... are of *importance* to them" (Fishman 1972: 5).

Other theorists are more critical of such centrality of language.⁵¹ For Smith, the importance of myths, memories and symbols is far more significant. Language is treated as

⁵¹ John Edwards is perhaps the most comprehensive critic of language-based identities. He holds that "while language is commonly held to be a highly important or, indeed, essential component of group identity, it is not necessary to retain an original variety in order to maintain the continuity of a sense of groupness" (1985: 159). However, Edwards hardly explains what then takes the place of language.

just one of the components in the wider realm of culture and symbols (1981: 45-ff). Smith holds that "in general, the linguistic criterion has been of sociological importance only in Europe and the Middle East (to some extent)" (1971: 18-9). However, this point omits to stress that these two areas are among those where nationalism triumphed and accompanied their entrance into modernity.

Chapter 7 will show how language has been a core value for the Catalan people and intelligentsia, while it has not been so for their Basque counterparts, at least until very recently. This difference will be related to the lesser diffusion of the Basque language in comparison with the liveliness of Catalan, and will be finally related to violence as a replacement for shared cultural markers in mass mobilizations.

Cultural differences, whether relevant or residual, might provide rough clues about the likelihood that individuals in the past shared a common heritage. Hence, independently from the degree of apparent cultural assimilation, they might work as heuristic devices of a common descent and are hence imbued with a rich repository of meaning.⁵² To overcome the dichotomy between perennialism and modernism, Smith (1986) develops an *ethno-symbolic* approach which underlines the continuity between premodern and modern times, without leaving out the changes brought about by modernity. The persisting feature in the formation of nations and the creation of national identities are myths, memories, values and symbols. This is a complex of elements which Smith often uses interchangeably.

In using the concept of core values, we shall understand the impact of cultural elements which carry in themselves the crucibles of a nation's identity. But in all human groups, be they nations, secret societies or sport clubs, there is a much more powerful series of elements capable of synthesising the general values which that group upholds. These are the symbols. Catalan and Basque nationalisms provide plenty of examples of this ability to use mobilizing symbols which are deemed to be central to the self-definition of the community and which convey widely shared popular values. A symbol is more than 'a thing that stands for something else', or a vehicle of meaning plus meaning. It is, in Jung's view, the best possible expression of a relatively unknown or unfathomable fact, or, better, of a fact the complexity and vastness of which could not otherwise be grasped. Symbols are especially crucial in rationalizing or making easy to comprehend irrational things, events, taboos, beliefs. They act as a bridge between the rational and the irrational. Symbols are therefore

⁵² For instance, in areas where any form of indigenous culture has long disappeared, memories of separateness are often preserved in names of places and other identity clues.

central in carrying myths.

Conclusions

All the theories so far presented have some validity for explaining different aspects of the development of nationalism, and many of them could be applied to the Basque and Catalan cases. However, some are more useful than others. Internal colonialism, Marxism and other economist theories are particularly flawed, even in their successive corrections and amendments. Gellner's approach has proved to be too abstract for an application to West European stateless nationalism. Older theories such as the modernization paradigm or structural-functionalism have been dismissed as typical ideological constructs of postwar Anglo-Saxon academia. Three broad streams of theories are useful for interpreting nationalism in the following order: transactionalism, instrumentalism and primordialism. The latter has proven to be least useful, but we have not rejected it altogether since it can still offer insights into the kinship-like vision of the nation and its feelings of common descent. Extreme instrumentalism has been discarded for its determinist reductionism (its exclusive focus on political leaders). Yet, the role of the intellectuals and the intelligentsia is crucial in the study of all nationalism. The latter's use of local culture, symbols and values, as well as their attempt to delimit the boundaries of the national community through the use of these materials is central to my research. In other words, the focus is on the construction of boundaries which separate communities, as well as on these boundaries' relationship with their content (that is, the culture which they enclose). Hence, transactionalism is the most useful of the three broad approaches. In order to avoid falling into a reductionist form of transactionalism which would focus merely on ethnic borders, we have to integrate transactionalism with symbolic (or ethno-symbolic) approaches. The latter are necessary to explain the central role of values, symbols and cultural markers in the construction of national identities.

Since the role of the state in both nationality formation and political violence has been chosen as a second independent variable -the first is cultural fragmentation/ assimilation-theories focussing on the role of the state have been also considered. Their application has been intermingled with transactionalist interpretations, since the state is perceived as the main element of opposition to the national community. We must remember that borders and opposition are at the core of transactional theories. The state works as an external referent and is in itself a symbol of the denial of ethnic identity. Hence, the result of state action is seen as

essential in reinforcing ethnic borders, while attempting to destroy ethnic contents. More generic homeostatic and cause-effect models are an intrinsic part of this focus. Finally, the conceptualization of cultural, political and military nationalism as distinctive phenomena has been useful in relation to the presence or absence of a rich regional culture, especially as expressed through language.

The rest of the thesis is divided into two parts. A first historical part (chapters 2-6) will focus on the role of the nationalist intellectuals in Euskadi and Catalonia and on the way they created a national vision through the use of ethnic material and symbols. In the second part (chapters 7-9), the focus will be on the concept of core values, the consequence of massive immigration and the role played by violence in the construction of the national community.

Chapter 2

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF CATALAN NATIONALISM TO THE CIVIL WAR

In this chapter, we shall tackle the issue of when Catalonia began to be defined as a nation in the modern sense, that is, when Catalan nationalism arose. We shall see that this development was slow and many early Catalanists were often at pains to stress their Spanishness. Initially, Catalanness began to configure itself in the form of a distinct vision of the world, set of customs and laws. This vaguely defined identity began by attributing to a different mentality the existing economic gap between Madrid and Barcelona. Hence, at the beginning, Catalan identity was not a clearly defined notion and several cultural revivalists wrote in Spanish. Only gradually, did some consensus begin to emerge around the centrality of culture and, within the latter, of language.

Catalonia had an imperial past when the Mediterranean possession of the confederal Crown of Aragon extended as far as Southern Italy and Athens. After a period of decline, its autonomy within the kingdom of Spain was brought to an end by Felipe V (1716). A Royal Decree (*Nueva Planta*) banned most Catalan institutions, laws and customs, including the language, and imposed an uniform centralized administration. Although the local institutions were slowly eroded, the country underwent economic recovery. As a consequence, the gap between the region and the rest of the peninsula increased, possibly contributing to inspire the forthcoming regionalist movement. The establishment of the steam-powered Bonaplata mill in Barcelona in 1832 is commonly taken to be the beginning of Catalan contemporary industry.⁵³ Catalonia became "the one Mediterranean exception to the tendency of early

⁵³ However, its prodromes date back to the early Eighteenth-century (calico-printing was inaugurated in 1728), and in the 1770s-80s cotton production expanded to unprecedented levels. But this industry eclipsed suddenly and totally in the first decade of the Nineteenth-century (Thomson 1992).

industrialization to be concentrated in Northern Europe" (Thomson 1992).⁵⁴

On the pretext of a dynastic dispute, the First Carlist Wars erupted in 1833. The Carlists were supporters of Don Carlos M^a Isidro, the legitimate heir to the throne.⁵⁵ However, behind this loomed more deeply rooted reasons: Catholic traditionalists, defenders of local charters, and proto-regionalists fought on the Carlist side. The latter were defeated after a bloody civil war and Isabel II (1830-1904) was elected Queen of Spain. The defeat of Carlism (1839) prompted the introduction of social and economic reforms, the disentanglement of ecclesiastical properties, the suppression of guilds (*gremis*), and freedom of commerce. These measures favoured Catalan textile industries, but the repression of Catalan institutions continued.⁵⁶

A military *pronunciamiento* (an officers revolt) overthrew Isabella II in 1868 and led to the installment of the First Spanish Republic (1873-1874), which assumed an overtly federal arrangement (Hennessy 1962). Nowhere else were Republican ideas so welcome as in Catalonia, where there were sincere expectations for a reversal of over a century of centralism. But the enthusiasm for autonomy and federalism spread too quickly, running out of control. In many cities, particularly in the South, several cantons declared independence from Madrid. In 1874, the Republic fell after another *pronunciamiento*, preparing the way for Queen Regent Maria Christina's (r. 1885-1902) ascension to the throne. In the meanwhile, the Carlists attempted another popular rebellion: a Second Carlist War (1872 - 1876) erupted more than 30 years after the first one, but was mostly confined to the Basque provinces. As we shall see in the next chapter, its end meant the demise of traditional Basque liberties.

According to some local historians, Catalanism was generated by the confluence of four distinct strains: cultural revival, traditionalist Carlism, Republican federalism, and industrial protectionism.⁵⁷ The first of these forces is of particular concern to the present thesis.

⁵⁴ Thomson maintains that state support was essential to the take-off of the cotton industry.

⁵⁵ Fernando VII (who ruled until 1833) wanted to be succeeded by his only daughter, Isabel, but succession in the Bourbon family could only pass through the male line. Don Carlos María Isidro, Fernando VII's younger brother, was supported by the Church and the traditionalists. His rival and niece Isabel was supported by the army, the liberals and foreign powers, France and Britain.

⁵⁶ In 1834, Catalan tribunals were abolished. In 1837, coinage was suppressed. In 1845, Madrid decided to abolish the *cadastre*, a financial agreement designed to compound the last remaining taxes.

⁵⁷ This is the opinion of both the nationalist historian Jesús Pabón (1952) and the federalist Rovira i Virgili (1930, 1982). However, Vicens Vives (1958) disagrees with this interpretation, reminding us that a sense of grievance and consciousness -which he calls *provincialisme* - already existed before these four factors reached their peak. See also Simon (1993).

Hence, we shall describe it in the next section.⁵⁸

The *Renaixença* (1840s-1870s)

The cultural movement of the *Renaixença* (=Renaissance) provided an ideal basis for the subsequent spread of nationalism. Its beginnings as a literary movement during the 1830s and 1840s were slow, and, at the start, it seemed nothing more than a local expression of regionalist pride. The publication in 1833 of the poem *La Pàtria* (=The Fatherland) by Bonaventura-Carles Aribau (1798-1862) is generally identified as the first literary document of the *Renaixença*. However, this is more myth than history.⁵⁹ Much more crucial to the Catalan revival was the work of the poet Joaquim Rubió i Ors (1818-1899) who, under the pseudonym of *Lo Gayter de Llobregat*, published several poems in Catalan. The verses were collected in the anthology *Poesies* (=Poems, 1841). In its preface, he mentioned for the first time the idea of recovering Catalonia's distinct stature.⁶⁰ Since his call had a vast response, it was rightly considered as the manifesto of the *Renaixença*. From that moment onward, modern Catalan literature began to develop until its outstanding epic, lyric and dramatic poets became the vanguard of Spanish culture at the turn of the century. Before Rubió, men of letters considered Catalan no more than a dialect of Occitan, and Aribáu himself called it *llemosí*.⁶¹

The *Renaixença* was not an exclusively bourgeoisie phenomenon, as some authors imply (i.e., Vilar 1977).⁶² Indeed, the Catalan bourgeoisie was enthusiastically pro-Spanish in the 1830s (Fontana 1988: 49-50). Moreover, the *Renaixença* was not simply a version of Romanticism (as with the case of Provençal *Felibridge*), since it kept on producing new

⁵⁸ On pre-modern Catalan 'national' consciousness, see Simon (1993).

⁵⁹ Apparently, Aribau himself was not interested in political Catalanism and was surprised by the success of his composition, which he wrote as a homage for his employer's birthday. Both he and his boss were Catalan expatriates working in a Madrid's bank (Miquel i Vergés 1944).

⁶⁰ As a starting point for the association between political and cultural nationalism, Rubió announced Catalan literary independence, asserting that Spain is no longer 'our Fatherland'.

⁶¹ The word was originally designed to describe the *llengua d'oc* (Occitan, including Provençal), since the most famous troubadors came from Limoges, north of Toulouse (Sanchis Guarner 1972: 23-4). Provençal literature exerted a strong influence on all nearby Romance literatures, but particularly on the Catalan one and Catalan poetry was often written in Provençal. However, Provençal was never used in prose. All kinds of treaties, laws, novels, holy books, etc., were already written in Catalan by the XIII century. The term *llemosí* was indeed used to differentiate from the latter the poetic works written by Catalan authors using the language of the troubadors (Sanchis Guarner 1972: 23).

⁶² Its initial impetus was elitist. The first representatives of the *Renaixença* considered poetry just as an intellectual exercise, and did not feel particularly compelled to reach the wider public (Sanchis i Guarner 1972: 177).

forms of literature once the latter faded away (Balcells 1983: 41-2). The *Jocs Florals* (Floral Games), ancient poetry contests and history pageants from the XIV century, were revived in 1859 under the initiative of a group of poets, historians and literati (Joan Cortada, Victor Balaguer, Joaquim Rubió i Ors, Manuel Milà i Fontanals, Antoni de Bofarull) with the aim of re-establishing the prestige of Catalan.⁶³ They succeeded in getting the sponsorship of Barcelona's *Ajuntament* (municipality), in whose building the first *Jocs Florals* were celebrated, providing a unique stimulus for the great poets of the *Renaixença*.⁶⁴

In contrast with the lethargy of other Spanish regions, a musical, artistic, literary and political wave of creativity swept every sector of society. The *Renaixença* touched all fields of humanities: poetry, theatre, architecture, painting, sculpture, philosophy, and spread all over the Catalan-speaking regions, from the Balearic Islands to the French Roussillon, from Valencia to the Sardinian port of Alguer.⁶⁵ Theatre blossomed, although at the beginning only in Castilian. In the realm of philosophy, Ramon Martí d' Eixalà (1808-1857) and Francesc-Xavier Llorens i Barba (1820-1872) introduced German idealism and the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Batista i Roca 1959). Relying heavily on Herder, Llorens affirmed that every people has a national spirit (*Volksgeist*), which is reflected in all its cultural manifestations, including philosophy (Llobera 1983).⁶⁶ Llorens was an influential thinker also in the rest of Spain: amongst his disciples were Torras i Bages, Prat de la Riba and Menéndez y Pelayo (Bilbeny 1988: 60), the two former of whom we shall consider later.

The *Renaixença* was initially centered in Barcelona, but slowly spread to other towns and villages. According to Fradera (1990, 1992), the middle to upper echelons of rural society were keen to participate in the revival inasmuch as it suited their own ends. The rural intelligentsia reviled urbanization, sensing the threat it posed to their traditional lifestyles and customs. Nationalism provided an ideal vehicle with which to voice these apprehensions. As bourgeois nationalism was gaining ground in Barcelona, it tried to forge an alliance with the people living in its agricultural hinterland, the *mntanyesos*. The latter warmly embraced the

⁶³ The original *Jocs Florals* were a literary competition held in Provençal at Toulouse from 1324 onwards. The Catalan attendance at those functions was so great that the *Consistori de la Gaia Ciència* (=Poetry Committee) was transferred to Barcelona in 1393.

⁶⁴ These kinds of poetic context can be found among most European stateless nations, where they often acquire a political meaning. The most familiar ones for the British readers may be the Welsh *eisteddfodau* (see Morgan, in Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

⁶⁵ On the manifestations of the *Renaixença* in Valencia, Roussillon and the Balearic Islands, see Jorba et al. (1992).

⁶⁶ A very cautious scholar, Llorens always spoke in the name of a Spanish nation. Nevertheless, he was puzzled about the wide divergences between Barcelona and Madrid in the realm of philosophy, economy and culture (Fradera 1992).

programme of the *Renaixença* proposed by the urban bourgeoisie. Yet, they were determined to resist capitalist and urban encroachment. The *muntanya* (hill-side, countryside) was seen both as a base from which insurrection against the state could be mounted, as during the Carlist wars, and as the last bastion of rural values which were being inevitably crushed by urbanization. On the one hand, the *Renaixença* offered these rural diehards a means of redemption by which they could boost their self-esteem, here and now. On the other hand, it embodied for the urban dwellers a nostalgic desire to recapture a pre-modern past. Though the two groups came from opposing standpoints, they nevertheless joined together in the creative celebration of the beauty of nationhood. The greatest Catalan poet of the time, the priest Jacint Verdaguer (1845-1902), spent much of his life in the countryside. Lamenting the loss of Catalan traditions and mores, he became "the person who best condensed these values...by accomplishing a complete synthesis between popular and high culture" (Fradera 1991: 63). But the driving force behind the movement remained firmly city-rooted: the Liberal politician, historiographer and journalist Victor Balaguer (1824-1901) was the first to popularize Catalan historical dramas and poetry. He began to write in Spanish, but from 1868 onward shifted to Catalan. A super-active man, skillful politician and 'commercial' writer, he can well be defined as a 'modernizer'. Imbued with Romantic and historicist spirit, Balaguer made full use of the new print techniques, such as the popular *feuilleton* (in periodic installments), and took full advantage of the opening markets of his time (Fradera 1992).⁶⁷

A respectable interpretation identifies the *Renaixença* as a response to the disruption and violence brought about by modernization. This led to the disillusionment of a previously Liberal intelligentsia who turned to the past "as an escape route to avoid confronting the problems of modernity" (Fradera 1992). One of the key schemes of the movement was the historicist reconstruction of an idealized, especially Medieval, past.⁶⁸ Of all the arts, poetry acted as the core of the *Renaixença*, yet poetry was itself historicist and past-oriented. The success of the *Renaixença* and the rich output which Catalan literature has produced ever since, constituted a solid base upon which political nationalism could draw its stable

⁶⁷ This seems to confirm Anderson's vision of the *print revolution* as a driving force behind nationalism. The novel and the newspaper provided "the technical means for 'representing' the kind of imagined community that is the nation" (1983: 30).

⁶⁸ This was accompanied by a drive to reach those areas of Catalonia where modernity had not yet claimed its toll. In this research resided the link between historiography and other intellectual endeavours: the past had to be rediscovered in the present. The result was a selective exaltation of those elements of popular culture which more suited the aspirations of the dominant urban classes (Fradera 1992).

legitimacy. Once established as a political movement, Catalanism had to rely on a pre-existing definition of Catalan identity. By then, this work had already been completed by the cultural revivalists which preceded the political nationalists.

On a parallel, and sometimes independent, track, a form of political nationalism emerged. Some scholars consider *Cataluña y los catalanes*, written in 1860 by Joan Cortada (1805-1868), the main promoter of the Floral Games, as the earliest statement of political nationalism. However, the scattered sentences contained therein were still too ambiguous and did not present an outright political programme.⁶⁹ Still others see in Joan Illas i Vidal's (1819-1876) *Cataluña en España* (1855) a prelude to political Catalanism, but the book did not envisage any separate political development for Catalonia.⁷⁰ The publication in 1887 of *El Regionalismo*, a collection of articles by the influential journalist Joan Mañé i Flaquer (1823-1901), put forward a tenuous plan for regional autonomy. Flaquer's quasi-traditionalist leanings were based on a defence of local customs and laws, linking them with the interests of Catalan upper classes (Mañé 1900). However, the paternity of political Catalanism must certainly be ascribed to Valentí Almirall, whose work we shall analyse in the next section.

Almirall and the Federalist tradition

The first explicit nationalist programme was formulated by Valentí Almirall (1841-1904) in his *Lo Catalanisme* published in 1886, which outlined the transition from regionalism to nationalism in a federalist framework. In contrast with the historicist and culturalist generation of the *Renaixença*, Almirall can be defined as a 'modernizer'. One of his aims was to reconcile the traditionalist and the progressive strands within Catalanism, adding to them the ingredient of the defence of Catalan economic interests. Since the 1830s, Catalan industrialists had been unsuccessfully pressing for protective measures to shield their industries against foreign competition. As a failed hegemonic class, they represented a precious ally to the regionalist cause. Soon, some of them rallied in support of Catalanism providing conspicuous financial backing for both political and cultural initiatives. Prominent

⁶⁹ Far from presenting a nationalist programme, the book simply defined Catalonia as a homeland. Cortada recalled Catalonia's historical glories in order to demonstrate that the Catalans "are different from other Spaniards". He stressed that Spain's historical, cultural, and economic cleavages made centralist attempts far more difficult than in other European cases. However, he demanded that Catalan interests be accommodated within the Spanish state.

⁷⁰ As the Castilian title indicates, there was no concept of 'separating' Catalonia from Spain. In his timid outline of the Catalan question, Illas i Vidal protested the abuse of Catalan interests by the Spanish state, proposing a greater measure of self-government and a change of economic policy on a reformist line. The protectionist Illas i Vidal was a politician, lawyer and economist, who actively participated in the Jocs Florals.

Catalan industrialists acted often as patrons, financing art production, literary festivals, theatres and opera. However, this class remained unconditionally pro-Spanish at heart (Fontana 1988).

Almirall singled out the outstanding aspects of the Catalan character and mentality, and language began to move to the centre of the stage, although as one among other means of defining national identity. As we previously mentioned, political regionalism was the fruit of the fusion of four currents: the cultural revivalists, the progressive federalists, the anti-Bourbon traditionalists and the representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie. The first alliance between Romantic literati, conservative lawyers and protectionist industrialists was created under the aegis of Almirall. Which factors triggered this successful union? The lack of political power for industrialists, the absence of protective measures for the Spanish economy, and the threats to abolish the Catalan civil code, were probably the most immediate catalysts lying behind the formation of this first alliance. But underlying the whole process was the memory of the lost freedom of Catalonia and the desire to strengthen a renewed ethnic identity under the guidance of the cultural revival.

One of Almirall's most important achievements was the drafting of the *Memorial de Greuges* (=grievances) presented in 1885 to King Alfonso XII (Nadal et al. 1986). This "Memorial in the defence of the moral and material interests of Catalonia" was signed by a committee of businessmen, industrialists, intellectuals, professionals, artists, workers' delegates and men of letters (such as Verdaguer and Guimerà). The Memorial was quickly forgotten after the King's death in that same year 1885. Yet, it was a milestone in the evolution of Catalan consciousness. Its two immediate achievements were the creation of a broad front representing most social sectors and interests, and an unprecedented attempt to enter the 'citadel of power' through a direct dialogue with Madrid (Peers 1937: 130).

We have seen how, at the beginning, Catalanism was made up of a few poets, lawyers, local historians, and other intellectuals. We have also seen how their alliance with politicians came about. The trend towards the politicization of cultural Catalanism increased in the forthcoming years. Greatly concerned with linguistic normalization, Almirall set up the first daily newspaper in Catalan, *Diari Català* (f. 1879). As organizer of the the First Catalanist Congress (1880), Almirall attempted to coalesce around his federalist principles a group of poets and historians (Figueres 1985). They were members of *La Jove Catalunya* (Young Catalonia), founded in 1870 by a group of literati.⁷¹ But this group of cultural revivalists

⁷¹ As indicated by the name, they were inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini and the Romantic

was not particularly concerned with political activities, despite their name being reminiscent of Mazzinian principles. They were active in the organisation of the *Jocs Florals*, but their conservatism barred them from espousing the progressive federalist principles which Almirall inherited from his Republican upbringing. Thus, Almirall's first attempt to bring together political and cultural nationalists failed as a result of ideological cleavages. Yet, two main agreements emerged from the Congress: the drafting of a document in defence of the Catalan law and the foundation of a political organisation, the *Centre Català* (1882). At a Second Catalanist Congress (1883) convened by the *Centre Català*, political affiliation within Spanish parties by Catalans was condemned for the first time. Motions in favour of the Catalan law, the co-official status of Catalan (alongside Castilian), economic protectionism, and a central government for Catalonia were also passed. With these initiatives, political Catalanism was finally merged with cultural Catalanism.

Almirall was heir to the Republican tradition of Pi i Margall, who in his *Les Nacionalidades* (=The Nationalities, 1877) summed up his vision of a federal Spain based on both pragmatic and historical arguments. He foresaw greater possibilities of carrying out a separate programme for Catalonia in which federalism would be anchored to local traditions, rather than relying on 'abstract' rational and internationalist principles (Llorens i Vila 1993). This led him to break with Pi and the Spanish federalist party and found the *Centre Català*. In turn, Almirall's idealism soon clashed with the bourgeois interests and political conservatism prevailing in his group. A particular source of friction was his opposition to the Barcelona Universal Exhibition in 1888, which had the backing of virtually the entire Catalan establishment. This stance cost him the defection from the *Centre Català* of its most right-wing members, which formed a separate *Lliga de Catalunya* in 1887.

From the *Lliga de Catalunya* to 1898

Since the Restoration of the Monarchy (1874), Spain had been dominated by two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, who alternated in power through a complex rotation system based on political corruption. Key regional issues were fought in this all-Spanish framework. Only from the early 1890s a new political option started to gain ground in Catalonia - and afterwards in Vizcaya. The decision adopted by the Second Catalanist Congress to condemn political affiliation within Spanish parties was crucial to this

awakening of European stateless nations, in particular by Italian, German and Irish nationalisms.

development. A new possibility of political allegiance outside the two main Alfonsist parties (and outside Carlism) began to emerge only with Catalan regionalism. In its early stages, the regionalist movement did not aim at separation from Spain. On the contrary, it wished to influence Madrid's political choices by intervening in central Spanish affairs. The Catalan bourgeoisie's efforts to secure a hegemonic position within the Spanish state, were thwarted by the latter's incapacity for self-modernization due to the predominance in its ranks of a centralist landowning oligarchy permeated with Jacobin ideals. The rightist split from the Centre Català which led to the formation of the Lliga de Catalunya, was once again guided by literary men, although they clearly represented vested interests: the Lliga was founded by the playwright Angel Guimerà (1845-1924) and the lawyer Joan Permanyer (1848-1919). At the beginning, it appeared as a revival of conservative and 'floralesque' regionalism. Soon they were joined by the young students of the *Centre Escolar Catalanista*, founded about one year before, among whom was Enric Prat de la Riba. Under the leadership of the Modernist architect Lluís Domènech i Montaner (1850-1923), the Lliga become the protagonist of the regional scene. Domènech i Montaner was one of the chief planners and builders of the Barcelona Universal Exposition of 1888, which had been opposed by Almirall. As with other nationalist movements, Catalanism was made up of planners and artists. The planners (intelligentsia) needed an infrastructure (the state) in order to achieve their aims. The artists provided both the emotional inspiration and the framework of ideas for the nationalist goal.

The first salient act engineered by the Lliga was a successful campaign for the defence of the Catalan Civil Code, which in 1889 Madrid attempted to stamp out in order to unify legal procedures. In the meanwhile, Almirall's Centre Català became isolated from mainstream politics and, finally, was dissolved (1890 ca.). The fissiparous trends and recurrent schisms besetting incipient Catalanism gave rise to a general awareness of the need to create a more broadly encompassing body. Hence, the *Unió Catalanista* was founded in 1891 as the first coalition to reunite the whole gamut of groups with the aim of propagating regionalist and federalist ideals (Llorens i Vila 1993, Riquer 1977: 48). Their delegates assembled in 1892 at Manresa, a town north of Barcelona, drawing up a seminal document known as the *Bases de Manresa*. Its programme -much more radical than the Memorial de Greuges- included among other points: political autonomy, the replacement of the artificially imposed provinces with more 'natural' *comarques* and *municipis* (town councils), the reservation of public appointments for Catalonians (by virtue of either birth or 'naturalization'), and Catalan as the only official language (Termes and Colomines 1992). The powers attributed to Catalonia

should encompass taxation, coinage, legislative and executive authority, civil, penal and mercantile legislation, specific Catalan units for the army, a regional police force, and control of education by the *municipi* or the *comarca*.⁷² These proposals, albeit ambitious, represented the first basic agreement on political terms among Catalanist forces and a stable basis upon which slow progress in the attainment of regional consensus was later made possible in a more uniform way. However, the Bases of Manresa had a limited popular impact and, hence, achieved their unitary aims only at an elite level.

In 1897 an international dimension was added to the conflict when the Unió Catalanista sent to King George I of the Hellenes a message of sympathy for the Cretans in their struggle against Turkish rule. But Madrid could not tolerate an external involvement of Catalanism and its response was brutal: a wave of repression struck Catalonia, with closure of newspapers, proscription of meetings, a thorough search of houses, closing down of clubs and societies, arrest of leaders (Riquer 1979: 22). The occupation of Catalonia was not lifted until 1901, when free elections were allowed and for the first time the Catalanists gained the poll (Riquer 1979: 46). In a typical pattern, repressive measures only reinforced the popularity of the persecuted leaders.

Barcelona *fin de siècle*: a flourishing cultural life.

In the 1870s, Catalan literature entered a stage of maturity. Its foremost representatives were the dramatist Àngel Guimerà, the poet Mossen Jacint Verdaguer, and the Realist prose writer Narcís Oller (1846-1930), the founder of the modern Catalan novel.⁷³ The period from about 1882 to 1906 is known in Catalonia as *Modernisme*.⁷⁴ It began with the lyrics of Joan Maragall (1860-1911) and his articles in the journal *L'Avenç* (=Progress).⁷⁵ The latter journal (1881-4 and 1889-93) contributed to the translation and dissemination of European artists and thinkers, but its role in the development of Catalan nationalism is particularly tied to a campaign for the creation of a unified Catalan orthography, which, as we

⁷² *Comarca* (pl. *comarques*) is a traditional unit that stands between the municipality and the province.

⁷³ Verdaguer's main success was the great epic poem, *L'Atlantida* (1876), but the spirit of the epoch was more fully reflected in his other poem *Canigó* (1886).

⁷⁴ The movement received different names in different countries: *Art Nouveau*, *Liberty*, *Modern Style*, *Jugendstil*, *Sezessionstil*, etc. Its origins lie in the English *Aesthetic Movement* of the 1870s, generally accepted as a prelude to the Parisian *Art Nouveau*. Catalan architects were at the forefront of the movement already in the 1880s, culminating in the 1900 Paris Expo. As an outstanding symbol of the movement, the café-cabaret *Els Quatre Gats*, a work of Puig i Cadafalch immortalized in a Picasso's painting, became a centre for *tertulies* (informal and friendly talks) for artists and intellectuals at the turn of the century.

⁷⁵ Not to be confused with the present-day historical monthly *L'Avenç*, founded in 1977.

shall see, only succeeded some decades later, thanks to the work of the linguist Pompeu Fabra. The term *modernisme* was probably coined in 1884 in an article published in *L'Avenç*, where it was used as a synonym of 'modern' and of the will to receive 'cosmopolitan' influences. Modernism was a reaction against the conservative Romanticism of the *Renaixença*, and a scramble for all things new and 'modern'.⁷⁶ Modernist intellectuals were "Almirall's heirs insofar as they attempted to justify Catalanism not in nostalgic or historicist terms..., but as a vehicle of progress and a way to see this progress as a regenerating factor for the Catalan collectivity" (Termes and Colomines 1992: 79).

Through Modernism, a new brand of intellectuals entered into Catalanist politics. They had previously remained aloof because they did not share the conservative tone of the *Renaixença*. Modernism succeeded in incorporating into Catalanism variegated groups such as Esperantists, naturists, occultists, Theosophists, rural teachers, employees, theatre-goers, members of moral centres and parish churches, small traders and shopkeepers (Castellanos 1986: 30).⁷⁷ Of all the arts, Modernism excelled in architecture.⁷⁸ The years between 1880 and 1906 were a period of great urban renewal. A *Modernista* desire for novelty, universality, and openness towards Europe was widespread among other artists, in particular writers (Cacho Viu 1984: ix). Such xenophile desire was not always contradictory to political Catalanism, and was indeed an antidote to Spanishness.

In the field of music, the Republican Antoni Clavé (1824-1874) laid the foundations of the choral Masses and Orfeons choirs, devoted to the diffusion of both classical and Catalan traditional music amongst the working class.⁷⁹ Felip Pedrell (1841-1922) undertook the

⁷⁶ As a paradox common to many nationalist movements, Modernism, which aimed at the creation of a national art, brought about a cosmopolitan art which was the polar opposite of its original aims (Castellanos 1986).

⁷⁷ A measure of Modernism's popularity is given by its survival in a plethora of local domains well after its intellectual demise: small town opinion leaders and local writers assumed the messianic overtones of Modernism and, "thanks to it, they found a new place and a sense of life in the world" (Castellanos 1986: 32-2). On modernism's relationship with messianism and myths, see McCarthy (1975).

⁷⁸ In 1878, Domènech i Montaner published "In Search of a National Architecture" (*En busca d'una arquitectura nacional*), inaugurating a movement which later produced the great masterpieces of Antoni Gaudí (1852-1926), Josep Puig i Cadafalch (1867-1957) and others. In architecture, the group is also known as the *nova escola catalana* (new Catalan school) (Rohrer 1984). Although, ideologically, Gaudí was a Catholic integralist, that is, an anti-modernist, esthetically he was the main representative of Modernist architecture (Mackay 1985).

⁷⁹ The effort was systematized by Lluís Millet (1867-1941): in 1891 Millet created the *Orfeó Català* mixed choirs, which would provide an ideal milieu for Catalanist assertion throughout the years (Vinyes 1990, Renart 1992). Joan Maragall composed *El cant de la senyera* (Song of the Catalan flag) as the Orfeo's hymn, with music of Lluís Millet. The choir's popularity persists till the present-day (Poblet 1973). In chapter 5, we shall mention the role of choral and other amateurish societies in promoting Catalan resistance under Francoism.

systematization of musicological studies, propounding the reform of religious music and the creation of a national opera. The theatre and concert hall *Liceu* (Lyceum), founded in 1837, became the paradigmatic cultural institution of the Catalan elites (McDonogh 1986: 188-ff.).⁸⁰ Vicens Vives described its creation in the following terms: "The Catalan bourgeoisie of the industrial revolution needed an institution which could serve as a weapon to propagate its hegemony. Deprived of a Court and without rooted social traditions, the bourgeoisie intuitively forged the organ which expressed its arrogance, focussing on the only root of spirituality still existing after the crisis of values of the turn of the century: the love for philharmonic art" (1958: 136).

Cultural life flourished at all levels of society, and cultural associations blossomed in every environment. Among the most important were the athenaei or academies (*ateneus*). The original athenaeum was a "scientific and literary association dedicated to elevate the intellectual level of its associates through discussions, conferences, courses and lectures" (Alegret 1977: 318).⁸¹ Not all of them were popularly oriented, but the majority of their customers were artisans and day labourers (*jornaleros*). They were sustained mostly by their members' fees, although some of them received substantial contributions from generous patrons and philanthropists. Some were educational, others were devoted to music, especially choirs, still others to tourist excursions (Solà 1978: 39-44). Between 1860 and 1910 the "people's academies" (*ateneus populars*) aimed at diffusing literacy and modern knowledge among the workers (Pi i Sunyer 1971, Solà 1978: 39-ff.). At the beginning of the century, Anarchist and Marxist groups too, organized their own centres, under the "cover" of cultural activities (Solà 1978: 39-44). This widespread *associacionisme* was often strictly linked to Catalanism (Llorens i Vila 1992). The link between excursions and politics dates back to the last century. For instance, Jaume Masso' Torrents (1863-1943) was at the same time a co-founder of *L'Avenç* in 1881 and a co-founder of the *Centre Excursionista de Catalunya* (=Catalan Touring Club) in 1891, which aimed to encourage Catalan national consciousness.⁸² Jacint Verdaguer's poetry too was inspired by his solitary walks in the

⁸⁰ "After using an expropriated convent for its first performances, the group made plans for a permanent building on the Ramblas. The building was begun in 1844 and finished in 1847. This triennium also witnessed such economic milestones as the foundation of the Bank of Barcelona (1844), the Barcelona Saving and Loan (1844), and the giant textile firm La España Industrial (1845)" (McDonogh 1986: 189).

⁸¹ They were first born in France (*Athénée de Paris*, 1785, *Athénée des Arts*, 1792) and in England (*The Athenaeum*, 1824) as part of the Enlightenment's program to diffuse universally the fruits of reason and science. In 1820 the *Ateneo Científico y Literario* was founded in Madrid (Solà 1978: 40).

⁸² See his *Croquis Pirenencs* (=Pyrenean Sketches), Barcelona: L'Avenç, 1896.

wilderness of the Pyrenees from 1875 to 1878.⁸³

Catalan nationalism has been an underlying force beneath much of the contemporary avant-garde movement (Kaplan 1992). During the 1910s, Pablo Picasso's (1881-1973) *cubist* period was influenced by international anarchism as it blended with Catalan nationalism and the symbolist movement in Barcelona. But around this date modernism was already being replaced by a new artistic and intellectual trend, which will be dealt with after the next three chapters.

The crisis of 1898 and the rise of conservative nationalism

In 1898, Spain lost Cuba, the last of its overseas colonies in the Americas. Its loss represented the final expiry of the empire and, hence, the symbolic demise of a powerful and respected Spain. The interests of Catalonia were particularly at stake, since 60 per cent of its export went to the island. On this occasion, the Catalans became the most staunch defenders of the empire.⁸⁴ However, "for most people in Spain the key issues were neither social nor economic, but the patriotic and emotional appeal of sustaining the Spanish flag" (Payne 1973: 2: 510). Nearly a quarter of a million troops were sent to Cuba to face one of the first modern guerrilla warfares. The Spanish army inflicted enormous suffering on local people, who also had to confront the atrocities of both the guerrillas and the local *españolistas*. An uncompromising line prevailed on the mainland, together with tough support for unbridled repression. But soon after the United States was dragged into the conflict, Spain had to surrender and lost not only Cuba but also the Philippines, Puerto Rico and the Lesser Pacific islands. That was the end of the Spanish empire, which was left with a few African possessions.

This defeat represented one of the major traumas in modern Spanish history, the psychological impact of which indelibly marked its intelligentsia. The loss of empire provided the name for a whole generation of intellectuals, the *Generation of 98*, who joined in a wide intellectual and political current named *Regeneracionismo* (Regenerationism), that is, calling for the 'regeneration' of Spain. The Catalan response to this generalized Spanish malaise was couched in regionalist terms: Catalanism was part of the Regenerationist

⁸³ This inspiration is manifested in Verdaguer's *Canigó* (from the name of a peak in the Pyrenees), dedicated to the Catalans of France. Recounting a medieval legend set in the Roussillon, the novel recalled the historical links that spanned the frontier and called for a unified Catalonia.

⁸⁴ The *Lliga de Catalunya* was especially worried about the prospects that autonomy would allow the opening-up of 'their' Cuban market to American products. When Spain surrendered Cuba, there was an explosion of protest in Catalonia.

movement, but, in Catalan eyes, the Cuban defeat appeared as the foreseeable outcome of years of faulty centralism by a putrescent corrupt administration.

For a short while it seemed that Catalan aspirations could find a sympathetic echo among a few progressive Spanish politicians. In particular, General Camilo García de Polavieja (1838-1914) proposed the unification of the four Catalan provinces under a single administration, autonomy for the university, the compounding of taxation, a municipal reorganization and respect for the Catalan civil law. Hence, many Catalanists joined the Polaviejista party. This led to a split in the *Unió Catalanista*: in opposition to the Polaviejistas, a group led by Enric Prat de la Riba founded the *Centre Nacional Català* in 1899, which performed badly at the polls. However, in 1901 Prat's group allied again with the Polaviejistas, obtaining a sweeping triumph in the general elections. Immediately after this largely unexpected outcome, they declared their permanent union under the name of *Lliga Regionalista*. This was the first fully-fledged Catalanist political party and it was destined to dominate Catalanist politics until the Republic of 1931. The moderate Lliga, hostile to political radicalism in any form, was dominated by industrialist leaders, notably the self-made millionaire Francesc Cambó (1876-1947). In the municipal elections, Cambó was elected and entered Barcelona city politics.

The Church was soon dragged into the movement for the rediscovery of the Catalan personality. After the disappearance of *L'Avenç* (1893) and the eclipse of Modernism, conservative Catalanism re-emerged, finding its foremost representative in Josep Torras i Bages (1846-1916), who later became Bishop of Vic. Torras i Bages published in 1892 one of the key texts of Catalanism, *La tradició catalana*. The work, inspired by the Catholic apologist and neo-Thomist Jaume Balmes (1810-1848), stressed the Christian origins of Catalonia in the Middle Ages, so that the Catalan 'spirit' and Catholicism were seen as inseparable dimensions. However, religion never played a central role in Catalan nationalism. We have to bear in mind that the first stirrings of Catalanism were uttered in the secular idiom of Almirall. Furthermore, Almirall's progressive attitude was at the root of the right-wing split which brought about the foundation of the *Lliga de Catalunya*, but, despite its conservatism, the latter could not drop altogether its secular ideological baggage. Likewise, its successor party, the *Lliga Regionalista* "had no specific religious character or platform, and did not need one" (Lannon 1987: 140). It never presented itself as a Catholic party, nor was the defence of religion an essential aspect of its programme. Although much of the

electorate was conservative and religious, religion was considered as an established fact unnecessary to stress (Molas 1972: 1: 163). Catholicism remained in the background, more as the creed of individual Catalanist leaders. In sharp contrast with Basque nationalism, religion could not be used in Catalonia as an oppositional factor *vis-à-vis* Castile. Bages' work represented a belated attempt by the Church to 'Christianize' a movement which was born under the mark of secularism. Until then, the Church had been an ally of Carlism, but as soon as it was evident that ever larger numbers of Carlists were turning to Catalanism, the Church had to change tactics. The immersion in a secular environment gave Catalan Catholicism a particular flavour. A characteristic of Catalonia became "the active presence ...of an enlightened and tolerant Catholicism. Its Catalanist orientation forced it to compromise itself in a public project of national revival, which is certainly Christian at its root, but without a confessional or exclusivist character" (Cacho Viu, cited by Massot 1986: 182). In chapter 7, we shall explain why language, rather than religion, became the hallmark of Catalan nationalism.

From Solidaritat Catalana to Lerroux's populism: the failure of popular regionalism

The Lliga proved victorious once again in the 1905 municipal elections. The "Victory Banquet" organized by the party provided the occasion for a caricature published in the satirical Catalan magazine *Cu-Cut!* The anti-militarist tradition of Catalan nationalism was only rivalled by the Anarchists' one. This innocuous illustration was sufficient to exacerbate the easily aroused sensibility of the Army. Hundreds of officers and cadets assaulted and seized both *Cu-Cut!* and the Lliga's organ, *La Veu de Catalunya*. But the authorities, rather than punishing the authors of the misdeed, pitilessly attacked the victims: the editor of the *Veu* was jailed and the publication of *Cu-cut* was suspended. Madrid's government was beset by one crisis after another and three ministries fell in a few days over this insignificant cartoon. In 1906, the Prime Minister Segismundo Moret (1838-1913) introduced in the *Cortes* (=Congress) a "Law of Jurisdictions", by virtue of which offences against the Army and national symbols (such as the flag, the name, or the anthem) were punishable by civil tribunals.⁸⁵ With the closing down of the newspapers infringing the law, the legislative measure provoked an uproar in all avenues of Catalan society. Progressives and conservatives, Left and Right, immigrants and natives, regionalists and former centralists came together in protest. Nearly all Catalan parties joined in a coalition named *Solidaritat*

⁸⁵ This law, which was aimed principally at Catalonia, was upheld until the Second Republic.

Catalana.⁸⁶ More than 200,000 demonstrators assembled in Barcelona in May, probably the greatest mass political event seen in the city up until that time. At a similar meeting in October, protesters stood in a defiant silence waving thousands of handkerchiefs.

At the 1907 elections Solidaritat's victory was sweeping: it gained 41 out of the 44 deputies to be returned to the *Cortes* for the constituency of Catalonia (in Barcelona it won all of them). Solidaritat Catalana represents a nearly mythical event for Catalan historiography. It is often depicted as the culminating moment when all sectors of Catalan society were united as a single entity of soul and action and the 'imagined community' became embodied in a tangible reality. Joan Maragall described the movement as "the living affirmation of the existence of Catalonia as a self-conscious collectivity".⁸⁷ Solidaritat's success was ephemeral and could not withstand the rapid changes of mood in the anarchoid Barcelona of the first decade of the century. When Solidaritat was defeated at Barcelona's parliamentary by-elections of 1908, the Republicans abandoned the coalition. This created a favourable environment for the affirmation of their pro-centralist rivals, Lerroux's Radicals, who won the March 1909 municipal elections. The demagogue Alejandro Lerroux (1864-1949) is one of the most emblematic figures of modern Catalan history. His blend of anti-Clerical Republicanism and 'proletarian' anti-Catalanism, coloured with populist vehemence, won him the quick support of large chunks of the Catalan under-classes (Alvarez Junco 1990, Culla 1987). Lerroux's rhetoric struck a sensitive chord among immigrants, who found it difficult to identify with the host society at a time when an intolerant bourgeoisie scorned any concessions to the working class. The movement, known in Catalan historiography as *lerrouxisme*, sounded an alarm bell for Catalan elites, making them realize that the bourgeois character of much Catalanism had produced a fracture within society and was incapable of integrating the newcomers. The experience was instrumental in bringing about the subsequent formation of a Catalan Republican left. This, in turn, created increasing political fragmentation. However, more than before, cultural nationalism functioned as an unitary reference for all Catalanists, beyond party partisanship.

Since Catalonia was the first region of Spain to undergo extensive industrialization, it was also the first one to experience the explosion of social conflicts and the advent of working class politics. As military conscription extended its grip in response to a Moorish revolt in

⁸⁶ Only the Radical Republicans headed by Alejandro Lerroux did not participate in the platform.

⁸⁷ In his *Obres Completes* (Maragall 1960), cited by Peers (1937: 150).

Morocco, the Anarchists and the Syndicalists declared a general strike in 1909.⁸⁸ Martial law was imposed, but a revolt of huge proportion suddenly broke out, with bombs, widespread murders, barricades, blowing up of bridges, desecration of tombs, random killing of clergy, burning of churches and monasteries.⁸⁹ This event became historically known as the *Semana Tragica* (Tragic Week): five days of shootings, looting and savage destruction which have left an ineffaceable mark in the memory of many Catalans. It also acted as a perpetual warning of the dangerous threat posed to social stability by radical extremism. Once the Army, the Civil Guard and the police reestablished control over the city, the head of the Spanish Conservative government, Antonio Maura (1853-1925), could not avoid addressing the Catalan question. He drew up a plan which included the creation of *Mancomunitades*, administrative bodies closer to the historical reality of each region to be given superior powers to the provinces they encompassed.⁹⁰ Maura's plan provided the first practical opportunity to bring about a minimal degree of self-government after so many years of failed aspirations. Such an opportunity had to be used to the maximum, since it would not easily return. The man who charged himself with this historical mission was Enric Prat de la Riba.

Catalanism' mature age, Prat and the Mancomunitat (1914-1917)

The final transposition from regionalism into a fully-fledged nationalism was the work of Enric Prat de la Riba (1870-1917). Already in his 'Catechism' of 1894, we find a clear separation between the two concepts of state and nation: Catalonia is the fatherland of the Catalans, while Spain is merely a state (Prat 1894). Prat formulated this vision in much deeper terms in a seminal collection of lectures and articles published in 1906 as *La nacionalitat catalana* (Prat 1978). This remains the key text for the study of Catalan nationalism up to the present day. However, the moderate strand remained: whilst Almirall talked about federation rather than independence, likewise Prat avoided any reference to separatism. Yet, Prat de la Riba adopted a more radical stance *vis-à-vis* Madrid, while

⁸⁸ In a country still deeply traumatized by the Cuban tragedy, anti-militarism was widespread among all social classes. Hundreds of impaired and disabled war veterans still begging in the streets of Barcelona bore visible witness to past horrors and inspired average people with a visceral hatred for all wars (Josep Benet, personal suggestion).

⁸⁹ These attacks on religious centres, peoples and symbols were part of a pattern which was often repeated until the end of the Civil War (Estivill and Barbat 1980, Alvarez Junco 1990).

⁹⁰ It was the first time that a prominent Spanish statesman seemed to meet Catalan aspirations, although most Catalanists considered his proposals too weak. This precipitated a split within the Solidaritat alliance between Cambó's Lliga supporting the plan and the Left opposing it.

defending conservative interests on the social level. We shall discuss in chapter 7 the details of his organicist political vision.⁹¹ In 1907 he was elected President of the Barcelona's *Diputació* (= Provincial Government). Prat's years were marked by intense activities in all realms of culture, politics and society. In 1906 the *Estudis Universitaris Catalans* was founded in order to provide University-level classes of Catalan history, law, language and literature. The greatest leap forward was achieved with the creation of the *Institut d' Estudis Catalans* (IEC) by the *Diputació* of Barcelona in 1907. The Institute's task was the thorough investigation of all of the elements of Catalan culture. For this purpose it was divided into three main sections: Philology, Archeology-History and Science. In its Philological section, the linguist Pompeu Fabra (1868-1948) elaborated a wide programme of linguistic reforms which culminated in the creation of a unified standard language: the "Orthographic Norms" (*Normes Ortogràfiques*) were published in 1913, followed by a "Catalan Grammar" in 1918 and by a "General Dictionary of the Catalan Language" in 1932, all of them the work of Pompeu Fabra. This work contributed to turning Catalan into the vivid expression of an increasingly rich and articulate contemporary culture. The importance of this for my thesis will be underlined in chapter 7. The lively and affluent character of Catalan civil society allowed for the spread of a Catalan high culture through a plethora of intermediate bodies. The National Library (*Biblioteca Nacional de Catalunya*), with its network of smaller popular libraries, has been a centre of Catalan culture ever since the 1910s.⁹²

In 1911, the idea of uniting the four provinces of Catalonia under a single administrative umbrella began to take shape, and accordingly Prat presented his proposal to José Canalejas (1854-1912), then Prime Minister of Spain. He agreed to it along with the leaders of most of the other parties. But, just before the Bill could be ratified, Canalejas was assassinated in Madrid by an Anarchist. The project was then placed on file for nearly two years, when a massive demonstration in the streets of Barcelona succeeded in focussing the Government's attention.⁹³ Under the pressure of the Catalan MPs, the Government passed a decree carrying into law the first article of the proposed Bill. It was the most crucial one,

⁹¹ Organicism was not just a Catalanist option. The entire 'Regenerationist' movement conceived Spain as an organic whole, as a human 'body' gifted with its own personality and spirit. Jaume Brossa (1875-1919) and Joan Cortada applied this principle to Catalonia, asserting that Spain hampered a full development of the Catalan character (cited in Castellanos 1986: 25).

⁹² Even today the seat of the IEC lies in the same building of the Biblioteca, a magnificent fifteenth century palace whose interior is decorated with Catalan majolicas and ancient furniture.

⁹³ The demonstration was attended by representatives from 990 municipal councils (out of 1,072 in all Catalonia)

empowering the *Diputacions* (= Provincial Governments) to group together in *Mancomunitats* for administrative purposes. The *Mancomunitat de Catalunya* was officially set up in 1914, in the same building as Barcelona's provincial government. It worked as the administrative liaison and coordinating body of the four *Diputacions* of Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona (Camps i Arboix 1963). The *Mancomunitat* soon became intensely active in all fields, since Prat had already paved its way by the time he was elected President of the *Diputació* in 1907. Many institutions were created or expanded under the aegis of the *Mancomunitat*. Its infrastructure was used effectively "to improve education, roads and local services and to foster regional culture, giving Catalonia by far the most intense cultural life of any region in Spain" (Payne 1973: 2: 606).⁹⁴ Particularly innovative were the changes in the field of education. The *Association for the Protection of Catalan Teaching* was charged with the supervision of private schools where Catalan was the medium of instruction and was entrusted with the publication of the relevant text-books. Prat, this "eminently creative genius, who lived apart from the noisier exponents of his creed" (Peers 1937: 164) died suddenly in 1917 at the height of his activities and with "his serene and imperturbable optimism" (164). His successor at the head of the *Mancomunitat* was the architect and art historian Josep Puig i Cadafalch.

The world's upheavals of 1917 and the post-World War I settlement had their impact on Catalan politics. In 1917, there was a sharp increase in terrorist attacks, strikes, boycotts, lock-outs and various forms of violence. The regime's persistent centralism spurred the nationalists to radicalize their ideology. As soon as it was clear that the Monarchy would never accept any change in the status quo governing its relation with the periphery, Catalanism turned more and more towards Republicanism. At the same time, it became more radical and nationalist in its manifestations: incidents such as assaults on the Spanish flag started to become commonplace and Catalan began to be used illegally in the University. As a response to Madrid's intransigence, Francesc Macià (1859-1933) founded in 1922 *Estat Català*, a party which advocated straightforward separatism. Macià, a former colonel in the Spanish army, lived through a personal evolution from federalist principles to 'independentism' (Jardí 1977). He left the army in 1906 in order to join *Solidaritat Catalana*. He was a man of action, not a thinker, and wrote no major book on Catalanism. As we shall

⁹⁴ Among other achievements, we can quote the Social Museum, the School of Dramatic Arts, the School of Fine Arts, the Agricultural School, the Industrial University, the Work School, the School of Local Administration, the Professional Orientation School, numerous technical schools, archeological excavations, restoration of ancient buildings and programmes of urban renewal.

see, in his later years Macià became a living symbol of Catalanist struggle.

In that same 1922, the less conservative elements of the Lliga abandoned the party forming *Acció Catalana*, which attracted the support of the Left.⁹⁵ The party won the elections of 1923. One of its most ambitious achievements was the creation of a Triple Alliance (1923) with the other two historical nationalities of Spain: the Basques and the Galicians. But all these developments were brought to an end by the dictatorship. Before describing the latter's impact and evolution, the next section shall analyse the development of a national culture under the Mancomunitat and its link with political action.

Culture and politics: the *Noucentista* experience

Most artists and intellectuals found in the Mancomunitat an ideal source of support, which was translated in the emergence of the Noucentista movement. *Noucentisme* (= 'Nine-hundred-ism', referring to the new century) was "an ideological movement which..... typified the hegemonic aspirations of the most active sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie... Through the creation of its own iconography and a complex corpus of linguistic signs, it formulated... patterns of social behaviour which could facilitate reformist action" (Murgades 1986: 105). The entire ideological debate was addressed to a reform of Catalan society, an objective effectively achieved under the Mancomunitat. Noucentista intellectuals made extensive use of the administration's powers, aiming at transforming society through an efficient apparatus of self-government. They started to operate in 1906, when the Lliga entered the government of Barcelona's province.⁹⁶

More than ever before, the project of cultural Catalanism was the common unifying platform for a galaxy of interests, ideologies, parties, voluntary associations, art schools, and professionals. The heart of the project was in fact centred around language and its orthographic unification. The creation of the IEC in 1907 was a turning point, since many outstanding intellectuals were co-opted into the running of the Institute. This was also the Catalan bourgeoisie's answer to the sclerotic state university: the Institute's sections were devised to reflect university faculties. The subsequent step was the creation of the *Biblioteca*

⁹⁵ Its leaders were the Republican journalist and historian Antoni Rovira i Virgili (1882-1949), the Noucentista poet Jaume Bofill i Mates (1878-1933) and the Medievalist historiographer Lluís Nicolau d'Olwer (1888-1961).

⁹⁶ The fact that the Mancomunitat also attracted Modernist exponents, although they rejected Prat's conservatism, is a clear sign of the increased perception of the centrality of politics in the realm of culture. Moderate Republicans, such as the engineer and economist Carles Pi-Sunyer (1888-1971), were drawn in the development projects of the Mancomunitat.

de Catalunya in 1914 to stimulate scientific research, together with a network of popular libraries (*Biblioteques populars*). The 'national' library was to be the centre of cultural production, while the smaller town and *barri* libraries were to be centres for cultural dissemination (Murgades 1986). All these activities stemmed from the regional bourgeoisie's desire to produce its own cadres and expertise. Professional qualification was an indispensable need for a class aiming at reform and political rule. This ambition required both technical expertise and ideological orientation. The latter was an antidote against extemporary political radicalism, be that in the shape of national separatism or working-class agitation. With the Mancomunitat, political power transformed the Noucentista ideology into an operational praxis. In its turn, this ideology contributed to the legitimacy of the process of social reforms engendered by the regionalists.

There are some parallels between Modernisme and Noucentisme: both encapsulated a drive for social reform, both were Catalanist, admired Europe and disliked traditionalism. But, whereas the Modernist intellectuals moved in a power vacuum relying on militant action, the Noucentistes acted within the institutions. This distinction is also reflected in two conceptions of language reform: the Modernists tried to engage in language reform at the level of informal discussions, in particular from the editorial columns of *L'Avenç*. Reacting against the purist pundits of the *Renaixença* and their archaizing proposals, they pursued a language suitable to all cultural and scientific purposes, not just for the glory of the *belles lletres* (Castellanos 1986, Murgades 1986). Pompeu Fabra himself, who was originally a chemist, participated in the Modernists' debates. However, their impact was limited and their decisions were unlikely to be respected, since they lacked the authority to agree on them and the means to spread them. What they needed was some kind of central authority. In the anarchic ambiance of Modernism, no single authority was acknowledged.⁹⁷

The scenario changed radically with Noucentisme. Fabra was called upon by Prat to work in the IEC and enthusiastically accepted the invitation, knowing that, through the power which Prat represented, it was possible to establish a first base of consensus for the standardization of Catalan. Indeed, one year after the *Normes* were published under the auspices of the IEC, the Mancomunitat took upon itself their diffusion through its large school and publishing network. Only then, the petty disagreements over 'correct' orthographic forms ceased to vitiate the scientific debate. While the Modernists' linguistic

⁹⁷ The Modernist longing for novelty welcomed everybody who had something new to say. Different trends and attitudes co-existed, and there was a constant curiosity for everything new. On the contrary, Noucentisme selected only those trends which were consistent with the Catalan bourgeoisie's interest for reform

disquisitions were bedeviled by ideological radicalism, the Noucentistes found a balance between opposing trends under the umbrella of political power. In the name of political realism, it was necessary to reach a consensus. Thus, everybody was compelled to give up some of her/his most cherished options.

Among other things, Noucentisme glorified city life. The urban space was the locus of rational planning and social reform where man could operate and shape its environment. Under the Mancomunitat, the main network of roads was established to link the city with the countryside, together with other infrastructures. The emphasis was always uni-directional: it was the city which lavished all these benefits on the countryside. And the epitome of the city was Barcelona, traditionally identified as the *cap i casal* (head and home) of Catalonia.⁹⁸ The triumph of bourgeois ideals conveyed a message of repression of instincts and affections. Passion and *rauxa* (impetuosity) were to be eliminated in favour of reason and containment. Everything was subordinated to obtaining posterior gains. This is the opposite attitude of Modernism. In literature, the trend was reflected in an effort to eradicate all kinds of irrational effusions and exaggerated sensuality (Izard 1986, Castellanos 1986). Neo-classicism came again to the fore as a weapon against Romanticism. This reflected a rational faith in culture as a tool for influencing social development. "Culture was no longer seen as a gratuitous activity -art for art's sake- nor as a fruit of desperation -rebellious art. Culture had to become an efficient collaborator of social reform engineered from above" (Murgades 1986: 109).⁹⁹

However, in the end, this positivist zeal marked the failure of bourgeois nationalism, fomenting a split between the upper classes imbued with such a puritan ideology and the rest of society. Yet, nobody can deny its lasting effects in the establishment of a Catalan high culture. But the latter risked remaining a ghetto phenomenon, if it failed to become the patrimony of the wider community. Immigration from other regions only increased this risk. The first social chasm was brought to light by the Lerrouxist revolt. Lacking any coercive means, the Catalan bourgeoisie proved to be incapable of tackling increasing social chaos.

⁹⁸ The concept of *Catalunya-ciutat* (Catalonia-city) was later coined by Gabriel Alomar to express the unity between the intellectuals of the *comarques* and Barcelona. Urban-oriented ideologies still today permeates the attitude of some Catalan intelligentsia. In such a vision, the countryside is merely seen as an appendix of the capital city. On the other side, the concept acknowledges the radical historical importance of urban centres for any programme aimed at promoting social and administrative reform.

⁹⁹ This confirms that nationalism is a movement aimed at controlling social change, rather than bringing it about (that is, being favourable to, or against it). Its aim is to control particularly one type of social change, the one which questions the very basis of one own's [ethnic] identity.

The lack of a state was at the root of this failure. The regional elites needed a stable power structure to sustain their reform plan. *Noucentisme* ended symbolically in 1925 when Primo de Rivera abolished the Mancomunitat. So far, we have seen the thriving vitality of a stateless culture. In the next section, we shall describe the state's attempt to crush that culture and its overall lack of success.

The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930)

General Miguel Primo de Rivera (1870-1930) declared the dictatorship on 13 September 1923. At the beginning, most Catalanists hoped that the dictatorship would bring back some stability in a region plagued by social conflicts. But in only a few days a Royal Decree banished the Catalan flag and language and had all offences against the unity of the country put under the jurisdiction of military courts. Catalanist organizations were dissolved, meetings were prohibited or surveyed by Madrid's agents, political leaders were arrested on trivial pretexts. A Royal Order imposed the national syllabus on all Spanish schools, with a ban on teaching any subject not included therein. When Primo de Rivera realized that Catalanist leaders could never accept his policies, he first deposed the President of the Mancomunitat and then suppressed it altogether in 1925.

Despite all these prohibitions, Catalan culture persisted in a semi-clandestine environment (Roig i Rosich 1992). The Bernat Metge Foundation (f. 1923) for the study of Greek and Latin classics encouraged scientific investigations and the translation of the Ancient classics, under the sponsorship of Cambó. It also opened a translation school, organizing lectures both in Spain and abroad. The Catalan Biblical Foundation (f. 1922) was devoted to editing and publishing Biblical texts, again with the sponsorship of Cambó.¹⁰⁰ The Church's Catalanist attitude was reinforced under the dictatorship, as it resented the latter's attempts to suppress the use of Catalan in the liturgy. From his exile in Paris, Francesc Macià organized a military expedition to 'liberate' Catalonia. However, before they could even put foot in Spain, his quixotic army was rounded up in Prats-de-Molló near the border. This semi-glorious defeat, without even a dead or wounded person, created a mythical aura around the figure of Macià and his heroic dedication to the Catalan cause. More than sixty years old, he became the admired Great Old Man, the Grand-pa (*l' Avi*) of Catalonia (Jardí 1977).

Lacking popular support and increasingly out of touch with the population, the Dictatorship

¹⁰⁰ From 1928 to 1948, it published the Catalan version of the Bible in 15 volumes, directly translated from ancient Hebrew and Greek. A new version in a single volume was edited in 1978.

slowly burnt itself out, until it came to a sudden end in January 1930. The late phase of the Dictatorship demonstrated in embryonic form what would be the result of anti-Catalan policies under Franco. At first, the ban on the Catalan language only disturbed some intellectuals and politicians, when their lectures and speeches were interrupted by the police and government's agents. However, more wide-ranging actions such as the removal of street name-plates, prohibition on displaying or using Catalan sign-boards in shops, in public Masses, and for teaching the Catechism, created resentment among wide sectors of the population. At the same time, wherever its use was not restricted, language was used with increasing frequency (Roig Rosich 1992). Thus, with the return of democracy, the language was already experiencing a come back and the new freedoms found a fertile ground for its further diffusion. With the Dictatorship's demise, hundreds of *ateneus* blossomed throughout Catalonia, especially in Barcelona. Many of them were devoted to the diffusion of pedagogical ideas. Others were naturist, vegetarian, Esperantist, sporting, recreational, antiquarian, political, trade unionist, religious, artistic, theatrical, scientific, poetical, movie-going, historiographic, outing groups,¹⁰¹

The Second Republic (1931-1939)

As soon as the injunctions against the use of Catalan were lifted, a new dynamism was released. The intelligentsias of Madrid and Barcelona experienced a rare moment of reciprocal entente. The President of the Spanish Academy, Ramón Menéndez Pidal (1869-1968), visited Barcelona and commended the benefits of bilingualism. In turn, Catalan intellectuals were grateful to their Madrid fellows for having raised their voices against their persecution under the dictatorship. The use of the Catalan flag, anthem and emblems were once again restored. In a convention held in San Sebastian (Euskadi) different Republican parties signed the Pact of San Sebastian (1930) to bring down the monarchy. The Pact resulted in the creation of a 'Republican Revolutionary Committee', which in 1931 was to become the provisional government of the Republic. Three Catalan parties sent their delegates: Estat Català, Acció Catalana and the newly formed *Acció Catalana Republicana*. They subscribed to full-blown cooperation with their counterparts from other regions in exchange for the

¹⁰¹ They were a sign of the times: in those days, before the advent of mass-media, to hold *tertulies* (conversations, informal and friendly talks) with friends, to 'go to the café' and discuss social events, was a daily habit and an imperative social need (Corredor, cited by Solà 1978: 43). Social networks were much more close-knit and, through them, the diffusion of ideas was part of every individual's social life. The contrast with today's inward-looking individualism is, indeed, stark and dramatic.

recognition of Catalan distinctiveness. Their final agreement incorporated the principle of self-determination for Catalonia. A major outcome was the foundation in March 1931 of *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC, Catalan Republican Left), a coalition of several minor groups centered around the charismatic figure of Francesc Macià. They included the signatories of the Pact of San Sebastian. The coalition swept to victory at the municipal polls of April 1931, less than one month after its creation. The Lliga, which had collaborated with the Dictatorship, was utterly defeated. Cambó's staunch anti-Republicanism was the other main cause of the final demise of his party.

The Statute of Autonomy (*Estatut*) was approved in a plebiscite by 600,000 out of 800,000 voters in that same year (1931). In the ensuing elections for the new Catalan Parliament, ERC gained votes from both the middle and popular classes. The *Generalitat* (the autonomous Catalan Government) was re-established in 1932 and Macià was elected its President until his death the following year. He was succeeded by Lluís Companys (1882-1940). Many reforms were inaugurated during the Republic. In several areas, Catalonia became a theatre for the most radical innovations in Europe. The Catalan school system became one of the most progressive in the world.¹⁰² During the first two years (*Bienni Reformista*), the Republican-Socialist government embarked on a policy of moderate reforms. But their 'slow' pace roused discontent among the impatient under-classes. Badly worked lands were handed over to day-labourers, but the speed of the reform process did not satisfy the latter and only irritated the landowners. In the cities, labour unrest was aggravated by the economic crisis. The situation prompted the Central Government to dissolve the Corts and call for new elections. The Right, grouped under a united cartel, the CEDA (*Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*, Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights), achieved a broad victory against the divided parties of the Left, while the Anarcho-syndicalists campaigned for abstention.

The victory of the Right was less sweeping in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain. In the ensuing *Bienni Negro* (Black biennium, November 1933 - February 1936), the Left continued to rule in the Generalitat and most Catalan municipalities. But an increasingly

¹⁰² Candel (1972: 91-8 and 273-81) recalls his own experience as a child of Southern immigrants: "It was a European education. Sunny, ventilated classrooms, courtyards with plants and flowers, boys and girls together, no parrotlike memorization. We learned while we played. We sang, we studied dance. The students weren't lined up in rows. Instead of desks, we had large tables, as at a get-together, with vases of flowers. The school had all the most modern facilities: a library, first aid station, showers, an anatomy model, a skeleton, an air pump, a microscope, maps, large illustrative sheets... In the summer, they took us away for a month to camps" (Candel, cited in Rosenthal 1991: 119, as note 14 of ch. 1).

right-wing Madrid Government paralyzed most reforms. A Bill in favour of small tenant farmers (*rabassaires*) was approved by the Catalan Parliament in April 1934. Through their powerful lobbies, the landowners stirred up anti-Catalan sentiments in Madrid against a Catalonia dominated by the Left. Madrid established that the Autonomous Government did not have authority to rule in social agrarian matters. This allegation *de facto* minimized Catalan autonomy. This and other actions carried out by Madrid provided the main rationale for the revolt of the Generalitat, when Lluís Companys proclaimed the 'Catalan Republic'. The Republic lasted only a few hours and ended in disaster, with the leaders of the 'coup' and more than 3,400 Catalan politicians arrested. Censorship and a state of emergency ensued for months, and the *Estatut* was suspended. Since Companys was also jailed, the Generalitat was stripped of all authority.

In the February 1936 elections, the Left presented itself in an united Popular Front (Cat. *Front Popular*), resulting in a historical victory. Released from prison, Companys and the other Catalan leaders were returned to the Generalitat. However, the Anarchists came soon to dominate the scene. Under the Government of the Popular Front (February-July 1936), a new set of revolutionary reforms were carried out in a highly radicalized atmosphere. Anarchists, Syndicalists and Marxists participated in the Government of the *Generalitat*. But the latter proved unable to stem the tide of popular revolt and the pressure for further revolutionary change.

Many reasons have been given to explain why Anarchism took root with such extraordinary power in Catalonia. Certainly, the Restoration governments (1874-1931) had hindered normal development of working class organizations. However, for a scholar of nationalism, aware of the latter's overarching pervasiveness, the most convincing hypothesis relates to the region's history. Anarchism found an ideal arena for expansion in Catalonia insofar as it advocated "a drastic decentralization of Spain...It is presumably to this fact that Joan Maragall referred when he said 'Within every Catalan there is an Anarchist'...The Anarchist finds no more support in Catalonia than elsewhere, but having once obtained a foothold he is able, by exploiting the Catalan character, or by other means, to strengthen it...Anarchism...was greatly helped by the cantonal risings, the vogue of federalist ideas, and the unrest which followed the deposition of Isabel II" (Peers 1937: 156-7). Its neuralgic centre slowly moved from Southern Spain, particularly Andalusia, to Barcelona, in part following waves of immigration. However, there is another explanation of the widespread political radicalism in Barcelona. A frustrated bourgeoisie, incapable of asserting its control

over the state's means of coercion and labour regulation, developed an intransigent attitude towards workers' organisations. The bourgeoisie could always blame social unrest on Madrid's anti-Catalan policies. At the same time, in Madrid we find a state dominated by economic elites whose interests contrasted with those of the Catalan industrialists. The former were not interested in settling labour disputes in Barcelona until the moment in which matters got seriously out of hand, threatening the very integrity of the state. Only at these moments did the central elites intervene, with brutal means, against both workers' and regionalist associations. Repression was obviously even more brutal against those sectors who espoused both regionalism and socialism. For them they coined the word *rojoseparatistas*, which became popular under Francoism. The ultimate target was the regionalist movement and, with this aim, Madrid elites skillfully exploited labour unrest to stamp their control on Catalonia, letting class disputes rage until the moment when repression was strongly requested by regional elites. In this way, Madrid condemned Catalan industrialists to depend on state intervention, rather than give them any direct power. Thus, a lack of state intervention was counter-balanced by ruthless state repression. The state became a vicious machine increasingly delegitimized in the periphery, and, at the end, could only rely on brutal force to impose its will.

On the 18th of July of 1936, the Spanish garrison in Morocco, under the command of Francisco Franco (1892-1975), revolted against the dual threat of 'socialism' and 'separatism'. The Civil War had begun. The militant workers decreed a general strike, preparing for an armed insurrection. In Catalonia, the initiative passed to the leadership of the Anarchist mainstream CNT-FAI (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo- Federación Anarquica Iberica*). The CNT entered the Generalitat, which acted more and more as the Government of an autonomous state. In October the Generalitat launched a massive campaign of collectivization. In November, Hitler and Mussolini recognized Franco's government. As we shall see in the following chapters, the Civil War brought about extensive destruction, hundreds of thousands of wounded and dead, and unprecedented population displacement. It lasted for more than three years. In January 1939, after the 'conquest' of Barcelona, the Generalitat was dissolved and the Catalanist leaders were either executed or escaped into exile. As the Civil War ended in April, the Francoist era began.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have seen how Catalan nationalism emerged initially as a moderate

regionalist movement imbued with progressive Republican ideas at a time of relative economic prosperity. Its first inspiration came from a cultural revival known as the *Renaixença*, which met the interest of an emerging industrial bourgeoisie. The latter tried to use political regionalism as a lever in its difficult dialogue with Madrid, especially for its protectionist campaign. Yet, cultural Catalanism was from its inception also a popular phenomenon. At the turn of the century, the political movement was dominated by the bourgeoisie, but it slowly came to represent middle bourgeois interests, and finally 'descended' into the popular classes.¹⁰³

The bulk of nationalist thought was conceived between the publication of Almirall's *Lo Catalanisme* (1886) and Prat de la Riba's *La nacionalitat catalana* (1906) (Llobera 1983: 343). Since then, there has remained a stable body of doctrine which was kept broadly unchanged until recent decades. As we shall see in ch. 5, Catalonia was conceived as a nation in virtue of its linguistic distinctiveness, and hence the relationship between language and nation was always central to all nationalist discourse. When Catalan language was attacked by the dictatorship, its political importance increased. Thus, cultural nationalism provided the shared horizon for a movement which was politically fragmented. Political pluralism persisted, and even increased, under the hegemony of the Lliga (Brunn 1992). Indeed, the Lliga could exert only limited influence over a host of small and short-lived Republican parties (Casassas 1989). They finally united under Macià's populist leadership (Sallés 1987). However, the splits were purely political and concerned attempts to dissociate themselves from the bourgeoisie character of the Lliga and to approach the working class. Hence, the fragmentation was purely political and did not reflect opposite visions of Catalan identity. It did not reflect debates, ambiguity or confusion over Catalan identity, nor they did result from tensions between radical separatists and moderate regionalists, although groups such as Estat Català were born on a separatist platform. The aim was to fill the gap between upper and lower classes and between natives and immigrants.

¹⁰³ Refuting the classic interpretation of Catalanism as evolving from regionalism to nationalism, Termes (1986) identifies an opposite direction, with four distinct phases. At first, there was the doctrinaire nationalism of 'organic intellectuals' such as the Federalist physician and writer Josep Narcís Roca i Farreras (1830-1891) and the cultural revivalist Sebastià Farnés (1854-1934) (1986: 17). The latter clearly formulated Catalan identity on the basis of linguistic distinctiveness (Bilbeny 1988: 64). In the aftermath of the 1898 defeat, a bourgeois regionalism emerged. From the end of World War I until the Second Republic, a new popular nationalism developed in working class milieux. Finally, after 1931, Left-wing nationalism moved towards demands for self-determination. This right was invoked by all Marxist parties without exception, from the Trotskysts to the Stalinists, from the 'Bolsheviks' to the 'social-democrats'. All of them favoured the creation of a Catalan state (Termes 1986: 18).

In the next chapter, we shall focus on the rise of Basque nationalism and consider some of the differences and similarities with Catalanism. In chapter 5, we shall analyze the new form of Catalanism which emerged during Francoism without excessively departing from its previous tradition. This will be contrasted to the Basque case (chapter 4), where a major break occurred in the methods (strategy and tactics) adopted by the new Basque nationalist movement.

Chapter 3

BASQUE NATIONALISM: FROM ITS BEGINNING TO THE CIVIL WAR

The Basques have for a long time been identified as a separate people by foreign travellers, classical writers and local scholars. Pre-historic evidences of what were probably the ancestors of today's Basques are plentiful in several caves and archeological sites found in the region (Collins 1986: 16-30). Roman historians and Greek geographers, such as Strabo, recorded their existence as early as AD 7, with the name of 'Vasconians'.¹⁰⁴ The Romans never succeeded in subduing them or absorbing their culture, nor did the Visigoths, the Muslims, the Franks, and the Normans.

Basque speakers, who called themselves *Euskaldunak*, had long used the term *Euskal Herria* to define their area. Navarre was the region of the Iberian peninsula last to come under direct control from Castile, when the Duke of Alba conquered Pamplona and Fernando de Aragón established the 'union' of the two Kingdoms under his crown (1512).¹⁰⁵ The first book written in Basque of which we have knowledge appeared in 1545 by the hand of the poet Bernard Dechepare (Villasante 1979: 49-ff., Sarasola 1982: 35-9).¹⁰⁶ A sense of separate cultural -and political- identity had existed in the area for many centuries. The Jesuit Father Manuel de Larramendi (1690-1766), often quoted as a pioneer of Basque 'irredentism', conceived the Basque provinces as a unit which Castile and France had no

¹⁰⁴ Ουασκωνουζ for Strabo, *Vascones* for later Latin authors (Collins 1986: 31-7).

¹⁰⁵ However, Navarre's constitutional liberties were granted until the end of the first Carlist War (1841).

¹⁰⁶ A New Testament in Basque was published shortly afterwards (1571), followed by other books and translations aimed at converting the Basques to Protestantism (Sarasola 1982: 40-2).

right to rule (Ortzi 1975: 57-8). The French-Basque chronicler and local historian Augustin Chaho (1811-1858) saw all Basque history as a history of national defence from outside encroachment.¹⁰⁷ From his pen comes the first mention of Euskal Herria as an oppressed 'nationality'. Chaho was also among the first scholars to interpret the Carlist War as a national struggle for the freedom of the four provinces (Corcuera 1979: 54, Juaristi 1987: 76-106). Such interpretation became a common refrain in a tradition of local historiography which saw Carlism primarily as a catchword for proto-nationalism. It was also part of a popular primordialist interpretation which sees nationalism as a pre-modern force springing up from the soil and soul of the people. Nationalism, then, followed as a natural conclusion from the foralist and Carlist reading of history, readily encountering a broad resonance (Corcuera 1979: 211).

The structural pre-conditions

In order to highlight the difference between the Basque and the Catalan case, it is important to overview the circumstances in which modernization occurred. Contrary to other Spanish regions (we remember that Catalan autonomy was abolished in 1716), the Basque provinces had long kept intact their local laws and customary privileges. They were among the last regions of Spain to maintain their *fueros* (local statutes and charters), under which each province kept a long -but rarely unchallenged- separate record of administration. Although some of them date back to the seventh century, most of the *fueros* were codified in the 17th and 18th centuries as agreements between the Spanish Crown and Basque regional powers. Jealously guarded, they exempted the local population from both military service and taxation, while allowing the right of the provincial assemblies to veto royal edicts, though this rarely occurred. According to the centralists, the *fueros* were a special concession offered by the Spanish Crown, which always had the power to rescind them. Although the *fueros* were slowly eroded, before their abolition the Seigniorship (*señorío*) of Vizcaya was working as a state within the Spanish state, and was even expanding its powers (Agirreazkuenaga 1987).¹⁰⁸ The foral institutions survived several attempts at centralization. However, the

¹⁰⁷ Among other things, Chaho formulated the myth of Aitor, legendary father of the Basques, although it was first conceived by Navarro Villoslada, a *riojano* (from the region of La Rioja) (Juaristi 1987).

ideology which sustained their preservation was not nationalism, but foralism. I shall use the term *foralism* (Sp. *fueros*) to indicate the ideological and political apology of the *fueros*.¹⁰⁹ Local historians played a key role in defending Basque institutions, since their studies on the antiquity, nobility, utility and democratic character of traditional Basque rights served to legitimise (or counter-legitimise) their continued existence. In the plethora of foralist claims and centralist counter-claims, historical research was crucial since each side had to obtain new pieces of evidence from past history.¹¹⁰

The persistence of the *fueros* and the centralist attempts to abolish them explains why the Carlists, who theoretically were a Spanish-wide movement, had their stronghold in the Basque regions. At their height, the *carlistadas* (Carlist Wars) were nearly exclusively fought in Basque territory. Here, a high level of mass mobilization was drawn in the defence of the ancient regime, whilst, in the rest of the peninsula, Carlism was embraced by more limited sectors of the population, linked to the small nobility (Corcuera 1979: 31). Giner (1984) has observed that Carlism was dominant in the rural hinterlands of those regions that actually spearheaded the process of modernization and industrialization. An overall abolition of the *fueros* in Vizcaya would have penalized the Liberals more than the Carlists, since the former constituted the richest strata of the country (Corcuera 1979: 84). The *fueros* were finally abolished in 1876, after two long and violent civil wars.

While their abolition was reluctantly accepted in Alava and Guipuzcoa, resistance was much more tenacious in Vizcaya. Here, led by the liberal foralist Fidel de Sagarmínaga (d. 1894), an "intransigent" line prevailed of refusal to collaborate in the levying of Spanish taxes.¹¹¹ But the *diputación*, the representative assembly of the province, was soon throttled by the central government which replaced it with a more "compromising" assembly.

¹⁰⁸ The Seignior (or Lordom) was a seignioral form of government, that is, ruled by a *Señor* or Lord. On economic growth and social change in Euskadi between 1100 and 1850, see also Fernández de Pinedo (1974). On trade and mercantile bourgeoisie in Eighteenth century Bilbao, see Basurto Larrañaga (1983).

¹⁰⁹ There is a parallel for this defence of local rights and privileges in Justus Moser's arguments in mid-Eighteenth century Germany (Barnard 1985, Smith ps).

¹¹⁰ Probably, the most salient product of this historicist tradition was E. J. de Labayru's *Historia General del Señorío de Vizcaya*, the first volume of which appeared in 1895. The foralist tradition received a new lease of life in the aftermath of the definitive Carlist defeat and, also as a reaction to this, most literature appeared after 1878.

¹¹¹ As a liberal anti-Jacobin, Sagarmínaga conceived the state "not as a national unity, but as [an institution] which integrated the different nationalities in a superior unity" (Zabala 1980: 49).

However, the latter maintained a foralist stand in order to placate the vociferous "intransigents". Indeed, the renewed diputación wrung many concessions from Madrid parading the threat of a possible exacerbation of Basque bitterness as a leverage against the crown (Corcuera 1979: 91-92). The Diputación soon came under the control of the oligarchic bourgeoisie who struck numerous deals with Madrid. In 1878, the first *concierto económico* was signed, allowing the Basque diputaciones to collect taxes and remit their receipts to Madrid. However, the only beneficiary of this arrangement were the big industrialists who paid a very low share of the tax burden. The rural areas and small towns were penalized, as local merchants, professional sectors, and the peasants, suffered most of the hardships brought about by new industries and taxes. As a reaction against the abolition of the fueros, Basques lent their support to any movement which opposed centralism, and that explains the particular popularity of Carlism in Euskadi.

Following the abolition of the fueros, industrialization rapidly developed in the country. Modernization abruptly swept in, bringing the sudden destruction of ancient lifestyles in its wake. A relatively isolated and balanced society collided with new untamed forces. Its response to the unstoppable tide of events was a neo-traditionalist retreat, first in the form of continuing Carlist support, then through foralism and, finally, as an isolationist form of nationalism.¹¹²

The abolition of the fueros,¹¹³ both symbols and instruments of economic autonomy, marked a watershed in relations between the Basques and Madrid. It was the key condition, although not the only one, for the subsequent appearance of Basque nationalism. The brutal shock of industrialization transformed the pre-existing ethnocentric awareness of a common identity into a political ideology (Fusi 1984). Since at least the 1880s, the Vizcayan landscape had become dotted with blast furnaces, large shipyards, steel mills, and open-air mines. Modernization was not merely an economic matter, but it infiltrated every level of society. Not even the most intimate relations were spared by it, with families broken apart and

¹¹² As in other fields, nationalism took up its isolationist postures from a pre-existing underlying trend. Thus, before nationalism, Sagarmínaga reflected a widely-shared desire of non-interference into Spanish affairs: "Contrary to the Catalans, the Basques must not at all interfere in the problems of the rest of the state" (Sagarmínaga, cited by Corcuera 1979: 123). Since the Basques were heavily represented in Madrid's economic and political elites, such messages were probably addressed to the *españolista* Basques.

¹¹³ In particular, the removal of the custom posts from the river Ebro to the actual Spanish border.

'foreign' habits gaining ground in most walks of life. Industrialization was accompanied by proletarianization and by the displacement of the Basque youth from the countryside to the city. And there was more: since the demand for cheap labour required by the bourgeoisie's intense programme of industrialization exceeded the local supply, immigrants flooded the country. This added another dimension to the conflict, as the displaced local youth had to compete on many levels with new arrivals originating from extremely different backgrounds. Most immigrants came from Castile, the land of the oppressors, and, thus, were readily identified as oppressor's stooges. Although the newly urbanized Basque youth was fast forgetting Euskara and shared a common language with the immigrants, their backgrounds remained very different. Modernization, therefore, can be seen as a fatal wound for which Basque nationalism claimed to be the cure. Basque nationalism appeared as a providential alternative to this chaotic human scenario. As in Catalonia and in the modern world generally, the age of transition to industrialism was also bound to be an age of nationalism (Gellner 1983: 40). Basque nationalism was "born of the intersecting of traditionalism and modernization, and of the need to adjust to and achieve the latter while preserving as much as possible of the former" (Payne 1975: 64).

Industrialization

Early Basque industrialism was dominated by a cohesive upper bourgeoisie, fairly small in size, which was able to set for itself considerable economic benefits from Madrid, in particular protection for its heavy industry.¹¹⁴ Hence, this autochthonous 'semi-oligarchy' was absorbed into mainstream Spanish economy and politics and rejected nationalism.

However, as the cycle of industrialization deepened, a local upper-middle class grew and began looking for a political ideology. Like most of the population, this emerging class was pressing for the re-establishment of the *fueros*, while, at the same time, it could hardly be attracted by the traditionalist leanings of Carlism, then the most ardent defender of the *fueros* (at least rhetorically). Both the Liberals and the Conservatives were associated with centralism, although in Vizcaya they often defended the *fueros*.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the

¹¹⁴ The first Chamber of Commerce in Spain was founded in 1881 in Bilbao. In the immediate aftermath of its foundation, "it began a vigorous campaign for state encouragement to Spanish shipbuilding" (Harrison 1977: 373).

¹¹⁵ Basque liberals were not necessarily centralist. Many supported the idea of creating a

interests of the two main branches of the Basque industry, the steel magnates who controlled Spain's high finance, and the shipbuilders, came into conflict. The latter soon passed to the nationalist cause, joining the low and middle bourgeoisie, which were not linked to other centres of capital accumulation outside the Basque provinces and, thus, tended to be more naturally attracted to nationalism (Perez-Agote 1984). Once the Bourbon monarchy passed the post-1876 reforms permitting foreign investment and the export of natural resources, British capital for mines and furnaces poured into Vizcaya and British orders for iron ore boomed (Zirakzadeh 1985: 254). The yearly amount of iron ore exported from Vizcaya increased from 55,000 tons in 1866 to 4,272,000 tons in 1890. By 1900, 252 mines operated in the province which produced 13.2 % of the world's iron ore (Ortzi 1978: 112). The *Liga de Productores Vizcaínos* (LPV, Vizcayan League of Producers) was founded in 1894 as a go-getting and aggressive corporate association of protectionist Basque steelmakers.¹¹⁶ The economic development led by the LPV conditioned for nearly a century an industrialization based on heavy industries and a monoculture of iron.

Economic expansion attracted a legion of wage labourers into the region. In chapter 8, we shall deal with the dramatic demographic effect produced by this influx and we shall also briefly describe the pitiful conditions in which the immigrants lived. The situation was an ideal hunting-ground for socialists, anarchists, nationalists, and other kinds of populists. However, the uprootedness of the immigrants proved a more fertile ground for the spread of socialism and related class-oriented doctrines, than for either anarchism or nationalism. As we shall see, the main reason for this lack of appeal by early nationalists was their open rejection of the immigrants.

In 1890 more than 20,000 steel workers, railways workers and miners from the west bank of Bilbao's river Nervión (known as the 'Left Bank', where most industries were and are still concentrated) organized a general strike, demanding reform of working conditions, wage rises and shorter workdays. A landmark, this was the first general strike by industrial workers in Spanish history. The immigrants were thus attracted to the Socialist cause, away

United Provinces of the Pyrenees on the federal models of the United States of America and the Netherlands (Agirreazkuenaga 1991).

¹¹⁶ The LPV was a tributary of the steel-making process invented by Henry Bessemer during England's second industrial revolution (Harrison 1977). The Bessemer blast-furnaces allowed an inexpensive production of metal derivatives from low phosphorous iron ore which was plentiful in Vizcaya and scarce in Britain.

from nationalism. In 1890, year of the general strike, Socialist candidates were elected to public office for the first time in Spain, winning seats in Bilbao's city council.¹¹⁷ However, the post-1876 atmosphere was ripe for a nationalist counter-attack and there were also weak signals of a Basque cultural revival.

***Euskaros* and *Euskalerriacos*: an aborted Basque renaissance**

Although not comparable in quality and size to the Catalan *Renaixença*, a small cultural revival took place in the Basque Country before the emergence of nationalism. The *renacimiento euskerista* was centred in Navarre and, to a lesser extent, Vizcaya. The *Asociación Euskara* was founded in Pamplona (the capital of Navarre) in 1878 by Juan Iturralde y Suit (1840-1909), with the aim of studying and propagating Basque language, literature, history, and legislation (Elorza 1978a, López Anton 1990). Limiting its membership to top Navarrese intellectuals, its support never spread to the wider population (Corcuera 1979: 134). The defence of the *fueros* was the association's mainstay. Persons from different creeds and parties joined its eminently cultural activities. Most *Euskaros*, as the members of the association were called, were moderate Liberals, and a few were Carlists (Corcuera 1979: 131, Elorza 1978a, Martínez-Peñuela 1989). As professional classes, they formed the bulk of the Navarrese intelligentsia. Son of a leading banker, Iturralde studied art in Paris, where Romantic ideas exerted a profound impact on him. Back in Pamplona, he mixed artistic with political activity as a municipal councillor.

However, the key figure in the movement was Arturo Campión (1854-1937), son of a French official who first came to Spain with the Napoleonic armies and returned there as a shopkeeper once the war was over. In a pattern common to many early nationalists, the abolition of the *fueros* radicalized Arturo's political position. He became a vocal journalist and writer in defence of Basque culture, whilst undertaking political activities at Pamplona's municipal council and as a deputy in the Spanish Cortes. The *Asociación Euskara* became marginally involved in politics, but its main activities consisted in organizing poetry contests (such as the Floral Games), prizes for historical research, classes of language and music, lectures, etc. Ibon Sarasola (1982: 135) dates the Basque literary renaissance back to 1879,

¹¹⁷ Another general strike occurred in 1903, and again met with fierce repression, as happened in 1890

the year of the first Floral Games in the Spanish Basque Country.¹¹⁸ The *itz-jostaldiak*, literary contexts, were added later, organized by the municipality of San Sebastian. In contrast to the Catalan *Jocs Florals*, the Basque ones were not properly a literary manifestation, but a folkloric event where literary competitions were mingled with popular sport games, folk songs, and oral poetry (Sarasola 1982: 136).¹¹⁹

In those years, another society emerged in Bilbao, but its orientation was more political, working as a vehicle for the aspirations of Bilbao's emerging middle and upper classes. A radical advocate of foralism, the *Euskalerrria* (f. 1876) society was more worried about the expediency of its business than about local history and religion (Larronde 1977: 261-280). Bilbao's shipping magnate Ramon de la Sota and other representatives of the non-oligarchic "intransigent" bourgeoisie, such as Sagarrímagá, were its main figures (Elorza 1978a). As liberal intelligentsia, this group of modernizers was able to produce a political praxis and, later, express it in a political organization. That is why, as we shall see, the majority of the society's members joined Arana's nationalist party in 1898-99, bringing a key liberal contribution to the latter (Zabala 1980). This event is probably the real moment of nationalism's birth as a political option, the moment when "the messianic 'assimilationists' try to realize their former vision by adopting the ethnicity solution of the defensive reforming 'revivalists'" (Smith 1971: 255, cited in Payne 1975). According to Zirakzadeh (1991), the entry of the *Euskalerrriacos* into Arana's organisation, where they soon acquired key positions, totally changed its course, transforming it from a neo-traditionalist group to a fully fledged, albeit more moderate, nationalist party. However, their entrance made the party much more internally fragmented than it was at its birth. A clash between moderate and intransigent elements accompanied its history through and through. But why was this foralist intelligentsia attracted to nationalism?

The Sota sector felt itself to be increasingly displaced from the centres of political power

¹¹⁸ See Arana (1982: 1987-93 and 2155-61). Basque Floral Games were already celebrated in the Northern (French) side's town of Urruña (Labort) over twenty years before, in 1853.

¹¹⁹ Sarasola (1982: 136) notes that the prize awarded to the best poetry was five fold inferior to the prize awarded to the winning *pelota* game or to the best cow milk. The participants were often from lower classes (with the exception of a few physicians), most of whom being artisans, peasants and local priests. The poetry of the games derived directly from the tradition of the *bertsolariak* (troubadors), with their improvised texts, key actors of popular culture (Aulestia 1994).

controlled by the mining and siderurgy-related upper bourgeoisie (the LPV). The latter used electoral corruption ('*caciquismo*') in order to monopolize the control of political representation in local governments. The excluded 'modernizers' were then searching for a political space which could reflect their orientation and interests. Since they did not feel to be sufficiently represented by mainstream political parties, they found in nationalism a suitable political vehicle. Arana offered them two irreplaceable advantages: a ready-made ideology and a popular following.

Similarities between Navarre's Euskaros and Vizcaya's Euskalerriacos were limited to foralist ideology and a few cultural activities. Vizcaya was facing rapid modernization, while Navarre's social structure remained statically rural. The movement assumed clear political overtones among the Euskalerriacos, whilst it remained confined to the realm of culture among the Euskaros. The former became nationalists and even separatists. The latter did not move further than regionalism and were often monarchists (Corcuera 1979: 135-6). They were more traditionalist, wholly Catholics, intensely anti-Liberal, and foralist to the backbone. This reliance upon tradition was reflected in their ideological continuity and scant theoretical output. In contrast, their Vizcayan counterpart had to extrapolate its own balanced vision out of disparate social groups' interests, a search which finally led to nationalism. The culturalist Euskaros, disconnected from the process of modernization, dissolved as an organization, while the Euskalerriacos, former assimilationist intellectuals, decided to join arms with the nationalists. However, the works of Campión and his friends still remain an important point of reference for Basque scholars and have left their indelible mark on Navarrese historiography and ethnology.

Arana's legacy

Few nationalisms in the modern world can be said to have been permeated and shaped by a single person. Basque nationalism is one such exception. Most of its symbols and values have been the work of one man, Sabino Arana (1865-1903). He single-handedly formulated its first political programme, coined its name, defined its geographical extension, founded its first political organization, wrote its national anthem, and designed its flag. Moreover, the anniversary of Arana's 'nationalist revelation' is celebrated every year as the Basque national

holiday (*Aberri Eguna*). Let us now examine all these 'inventions' one by one.

The first political programme of modern Basque nationalism was contained in Arana's *Bizkaya por su independencia* (1892). In this and other early writings, he spoke of *Bizkaya* (Cast. Vizcaya) rather than the whole Basque Country. Vizcaya was the cradle of Basque industrialization and the laboratory of all social changes that came with it. It was also the province which most resisted the surrender of its *fueros*.¹²⁰ The neologism *Euzkadi*, invented by Arana, was later universally accepted as the national name for the Basque Country in its recently standardized (*batua*) version, *Euskadi*. Arana synthesized the geographical extension of Euskadi in the motto *Zazbiak-bat* (= Seven in one)¹²¹ and in the formula $4 + 3 = 1$ (Four plus three equals one). The number seven in one alluded to the four provinces in the Spanish side (*Euskadi Sur*) and to the three departments in the French side (*Euskadi Nord*).¹²² In the aspirations of all nationalists, the seven areas will one day be united in a free Euskadi. The first nationalist organization, named later PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco* = Basque Nationalist Party) was founded by Arana in Bilbao, the capital of Vizcaya. Although informally created in 1895, a political 'bureau' was founded only two years later (San Sebastian 1984: 29, Corcuera 1979: 413, Elorza 1978a).¹²³ Arana composed the anthem of the PNV, *Gora ta Euzkadi*, in 1895 when he was in prison. After nearly a hundred years, in 1980, it was adopted as official anthem by the Autonomous Community of Euskadi and is today's Basque national hymn. Sabino designed the Basque flag, calling it *ikurriña*. Its red and green colours were adopted by the PNV in 1933 and it became the official flag of Euskadi in 1936 (Corcuera 1979: 226). Finally, the Basque national holiday, *Aberri Eguna* (Day of the Fatherland), celebrates Arana's political conversion which

¹²⁰ Although Arana always perceived the Basques as a single people, he followed the foralist tradition of non-interference in matters of other provinces, since interference was 'contrary to the spirit of the *fueros*'. Hence, he framed his programme for Vizcaya, convinced that the other provinces would spontaneously follow, and, at the same time, intensified his visits and contacts with them. Arana's programme was based on a great degree of decentralization which allowed each province to separately follow its path, in accordance with the foralist tradition.

¹²¹ This motto was first used by the Navarrese Euskaros (Corcuera 1979: 132) to replace the older *laurak-bat* (= four in one), limited to the four provinces on the Spanish side (Elorza 1978a: 23).

¹²² The presence of an international border running through the Basque nation has hindered Basque collective identity by creating two very different relationships with their respective central governments (Lancaster 1987). The border dissecting the Basque Country was established by the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1660).

¹²³ In 1895, Arana founded in Bilbao the *Bizkai Buru Batzar* or Regional Council of Vizcaya (Elorza 1978a: 149).

occurred on Resurrection Sunday, 1882.¹²⁴ Thus, Easter has special meanings in Euskadi and its colourful celebrations assume a unique flavour. The fact that nationalist festivals parallel the Christian calendar seems to give substance to the interpretation of the Basques as a 'chosen people'. The description of Arana as a martyr, or even a suffering Christ, helped in this direction.

For all the above reasons, the personal biography of Arana is very important in order to understand the origin of Basque nationalism. Alas, its importance is greater than that of any life history of the main Catalan leaders and thinkers.¹²⁵ Differently from Prat de la Riba, Arana is to be valued more as an organizer and inventor of nationalist symbols, than for his intellectual contributions (Ortzi 1975: 134).

Sabino Arana was born in 1865 in Abando, a borough (or parish, *anteiglesia*) swallowed up by greater Bilbao during his lifetime.¹²⁶ His father, Santiago Arana, was a small shipbuilder and a man fervently dedicated to the Carlist cause. At the time of the Carlist uprising in 1872, he wholeheartedly joined the insurgents' side, hiding a leading Carlist general in his shipyard at Ripa. He travelled to England in order to purchase arms for the rebels, investing more than 50,000 *duros* from his own pocket (Basaldua 1977: 34-5). But the Carlists were defeated and, at the end of the hostilities, he had to flee becoming a refugee in France (Bayonne). The triumph of the Liberals represented for the Arana family the defeat of all they and the Carlists stood for. Vizcaya had lost its ancestral institutions, Basque traditional values were sinking, swept away by economic greed, Catholic religion was threatened by liberalism (Corcuera 1979: 185). But the defeat also badly damaged the

¹²⁴ The first *Aberri Eguna* was celebrated in Bilbao fifty years on, in 1932, under the suggestion of Sabino's brother, Luis, at that time President of the 'Euzkadi-Buru- Batzar' (Garcia Venero 1968: 516-8, Granja 1986: 236-8). The itinerant character of the celebration was designed to rekindle pan-Basque ties. Thus, in 1933 the festival was celebrated in San Sebastián, in 1934 in Vitoria, in 1935 in Pamplona, and so on (in 1936 it could no longer be publicly celebrated).

¹²⁵ Most biographies of Arana tend to be hagiographic and eulogistic (see, for instance, Basaldua 1977). Larronde's (1977) in-depth study of Arana's works is more detached and objective. A great deal of original biographic information is available in Corcuera (1979: 184-241). In English, see Payne (1975: 61-86). Ortzi (1975: 137) suggests the need for a comparative biography of Arana and Prat de la Riba, with their two sharply different personalities and ideologies.

¹²⁶ Urban expansion, the absorption of the native *anteiglesias* and the destruction of the rural *baserriak* (farmhouses) surrounding Bilbao, were a powerful reminder of the perverse effects of industrialisation all through Arana's life. "In Bilbao...live a handful of bad Vizcayans who govern the town by whim and keep a continuous fight against the peasant, the *baserriar*, the native of the *anteiglesia*..." (Arana 1982: 1281). "The harm that Bilbao, dreadful foe of the Fatherland, has caused is incalculable" (Arana 1982: 1285).

financial well-being of the Aranas: all the money generously donated for the Carlist cause was lost. Furthermore, the wood-hull shipbuilding industry was rapidly eclipsed by the iron-made one with its more modern technology.¹²⁷ When Santiago Arana returned from his French exile, he was a depressed man. "The Carlist collapse dealt him a psychological and emotional blow from which he never recovered" (Payne 1975: 65). Faced with the triumph over him of a cruel world which he could not comprehend, he died in 1883, bequeathing to his offspring a legacy of unfulfilled justice.

The young Sabino and his brother Luis were themselves raised as Carlists. Sabino later recognized that he was a Carlist *per accidens*, "insofar as the triumph of Don Carlos of Bourbon seemed the only way to re-establish the fueros" (Corcuera 1979: 89). The best account of Arana's education in the Jesuit college of Orduña is contained in Corcuera (1979: 185-8). His schoolmates came from *acomodadas* (well-off) rural or small town families, and many were born in the overseas colonies of the Spanish empire. However, no name in the list of Arana's school-fellows was linked to big industry (1979: 186). The school environment and the teaching methods -with their strong emphasis on Catholic missionary vocation- had an important effect on his upbringing. At the close of his student years, he had deepened the devout religiosity which imbue all his writings. Arana was also "obsessed at an early age by the desire to know the history and institutions of his country" (Corcuera 1979: 189).¹²⁸

Sabino 'converted' from Carlism to nationalism after an animated discussion with his brother Luis. According to nationalist mythology, this marked the birth of Basque

¹²⁷ The economic trajectory of the Arana family responded to a common pattern of industrial elites marginalized by economic development. The industrial boom after 1876 "tended to foster the growth of a financial and manufacturing elite which rapidly accumulated a large share of the region's industrial wealth. As a consequence, a number of the members of the bourgeois sector... fell into some degree of decline. Smaller firms were absorbed or driven out of business by the large industrial combines. ...The decline of this sector of Basque leadership was reflected in the shift of their sons from industry into the professions....They were lawyers and doctors, journalists and teachers, artists, composers, and writers, the providers of services, such as transportation, communication, design and planning. They were the 'second' generation of the industrial boom" (Clark 1979: 38) and, thus, became the main supporters of the emerging ethnonationalist movement. Sabino Arana, son of an industrialist, studied law in Barcelona, while his brother Luis was trained as an architect.

¹²⁸ In *Bizkaya por su independencia*, after a *dedicatoria* (preface) in Euskera, Arana presented his own interpretation of four historical battles which he converted into the emblems of Vizcayan independence: Arrigorriaga, Gordexola, Otxandiano and Mungia. As defined in chapter 1, Arana was a classical *ethno-historian* (Smith 1993).

nationalism. It is said that the nationalist idea first appeared in Luis' mind on a trip to Galicia, shortly after his father's death.¹²⁹ It is not certain in what circumstances and after what readings Luis came to this conclusion. Basaldua (1977: 44) recalls that the conversion occurred roughly at the same time that many small nationalities were awakening in other parts of Europe.¹³⁰ On his return, Luis had a long and agitated discussion with Sabino, from which the latter came out thoroughly convinced that Carlism was now a lost cause, useless to the advancement of Basque rights. Years later, he recalled that "understanding that my brother knew history better than me and that he was unable to deceive me, I entered in a phase of doubt, and promised myself to study with a serene spirit the history of Vizcaya while adhering firmly to the truth" (cited by Basaldua 1977: 46).

In 1882, Arana moved to Barcelona to study law, remaining there until 1888. This was a period in which Catalonia was experiencing a widespread cultural, economic and political revival. Although Catalanism had little influence on him, he was directly exposed to it. In particular, the renaissance of the Catalan language must have impressed him deeply, since he hoped to launch a similar revival for Euskara. But this proved to be a hard if not impossible task during his short lifetime. The Basque language was half-forgotten and derided by the natives as anti-modern.

From 1885 he dedicated himself to the study of Basque, publishing in Barcelona the first part of a *Gramática elemental del Euzkera bizkaitno* (1888). As he came back to Bilbao, he entered a competition for a chair of Basque language at the Secondary Institute of the province.¹³¹ Among other candidates, stood the philologist and writer Miguel de Unamuno (1865-1936). However, neither of the two was awarded the place and the competition was won by a priest, Resurrección Maria de Azkue (1864-1951), who later became a prominent

¹²⁹ Payne (1975: 65) refers to Luis' train trip to Galicia. The slogan *Vivan los fueros* (Long live the fueros) was carved on his suit lapel and a travel companion remarked with indignation: "How could you ask for a privilege which other Spaniards have no right to?". This statement plunged Luis into a deep reflection and made him realize that the Basques were not Spaniards. We can better understand this episode if we consider that the opposite slogan was normally dubbed on the walls of most other Spanish towns in the aftermath of the Carlist War: *Abajo los fueros* (Down with the fueros, Hormaza, cited by Corcuera 1979: 82). The Basque provinces were the only region of Spain where the fueros were still preserved, while the aggressive campaign to abolish them was increasingly perceived as an assault by many Basques. Corcuera mentions the wave of hatred against the Basque Country and the persecutions against the defenders of the fueros.

¹³⁰ However, in his first pamphlets and articles, Sabino Arana (1980: 10) seems to ignore all of them and only mentions the former Spanish colonies of the Americas and the Pacific.

¹³¹ On the establishment and closure of this chair (*catedra de vascuence*), see Corcuera (1979: 150-1). See also Arana (1982ca: 1: 621).

philologist (Basaldua 1977: 54). It is possible to speculate how this event influenced the life courses of two prominent Vizcayans, Unamuno and Arana. After they failed as professional philologists, they both had to dedicate themselves to other endeavours. And, somehow, they both moved away from language. However, the former turned to cosmopolitan values, rejecting Basque culture through and through, whilst the latter turned to defining a new nationalist ideology, in which language rarely became the central element. Arana continued his linguistic studies more as a hobby -never completing his grammar book- as he became involved in politics.¹³²

After the publication of his booklet, *Bizkaya por su independencia* (1892), Arana attracted limited attention in some professional sectors of Bilbao. A few days later about twenty admirers and friends decided to invite him and his brother for a luncheon in Larazábal, near Bilbao. On this occasion, Sabino announced to the incredulous acquaintances his political creed for Vizcayan independence. To him, Vizcaya was now dying, but dead would have been preferable. Instead, it was humiliated, trampled, mocked by that weak and miserable nation, Spain. Complete separation from Spain was the only hope, the only way to escape such misery. Despite the bystanders' cool and even hostile reception, a few years later most of them passed into the rank and file of Arana's party. Hence, the Larazábal luncheon is conceived by some scholars as the informal act of birth of the subsequent nationalist organization (Elorza 1978a: 148). The average age of the audience was under 32. Most of them were from Vizcaya and from a relatively high social status, representing those urban and liberal strata which emerged with industrialization (Corcuera 1979: 208).¹³³ Among them was Ramon de la Sota, a founding member of Euskalerria. The participation of liberal professions in the embryo of what will be the PNV is easily explained in terms of the political-economic losses suffered by these sectors since 1876.

In 1893 Arana founded the bi-weekly *Bizkaitarra* (the Vizcayan), where he was almost the only contributor, writing articles on grammar, history, morality, and local politics. Its tenth

¹³² Professional failure often plays a prominent role in the careers of nationalist leaders. In situations of 'blocked mobility', the evolutionary vision of ethnic historicism has a special appeal for the proto-national intelligentsia (Hutchinson 1987, Smith 1981: 124-8). Although Basques were over-represented in the higher echelons of the Spanish administration and industry (Heiberg 1975: 181), more important was "the belief that one's community [is] being disadvantaged, together with a genuine shortage of opportunities" (Hutchinson 1987: 267).

¹³³ Corcuera (1979: 208) counts two engineers, three tradesmen, one businessman, and other liberal professions.

issue (1894) published a plan for the organization of an *Euskeldun Batzokis* (E.B., or *Centro Vasco*, Basque Centre), a recreative society and informal club for nationalists which was to be the germ of 'Bizkaianism' (Elorza 1978a: 148-9). With 150 founding members, the first *batzoki* named a junta (committee), presided over by Arana.¹³⁴ One year later, in 1894, the centre assumed the form of a political 'bureau' as *Bizkai Buru Batzar* in order to contest its first municipal and provincial elections (Basaldua 1977: 91). The bureau was closed down in 1895 by the Spanish authorities, which also suspended the publication of *Bizkaitarra* and Arana was sentenced to four and a half months in prison.

As we shall see through his quotations, the theoretical production of Sabino Arana is often of a low quality, yet he can be defined an intellectual, since his main activity was the production of ideas.¹³⁵ Furthermore, as a politician and organizer of the nationalist movement, he was also part of the intelligentsia. A lot of Arana's symbolic importance lies in his dedicated personality sincerely vowed to extreme self-sacrifice. In Larazábal, he impressed everybody by his oath of being ready to achieve the freedom of Vizcaya "with all my weak forces, sweeping all the obstacles on my way and disposing myself, if necessary, to the sacrifice of all my affects, from the family to friendship right up to social formalities, economic well-being and my very life" (cited in Ortzi 1975: 141). Arana was a traditional man living in a non-traditional world. He embodied a neo-traditionalist route to nationalism. In many respects, he was a man of the past, but this past was forever lost in the anomic metropolis. Yet, he was also a child of his times. Let's now see how this contradiction worked at the ideological level.

Arana the racist

In the forthcoming chapters, we shall have the opportunity to analyze in more depth the attitude of Arana and other nationalists in respect to the immigrant workers who were then settling in Vizcaya. One of the consequences of rapid industrialization was the arrival in Vizcaya of unprecedented numbers of immigrants from non-Basque regions of Spain. Many

¹³⁴ In a few years similar *centros* sprang up throughout Euskadi and even among the Basque diaspora in the Americas and the Philippines (Clark 1979: 43).

¹³⁵ His main activity was indeed journalism, as writer and editor of his own journals. "The fact that he was wealthy enough not to have to worry about employment allowed him to devote his time and energy" to the nationalist cause (Da Silva 1975: 243).

of them came from Castile, the land of the oppressor. The traumatic impact caused by immigration is one of the factors which explains Arana's abandonment of cultural nationalism in many of his political statements. Rather than trying to revive or encourage the spread of Euskara, Arana and his followers chose to use it as an ethnic boundary.¹³⁶ His aim became not so much to preserve the language as to preserve a sense of 'unique' Basque racial purity, dividing the autochthonous population from the newcomers, who he called '*maketos*'.

Traditionally, before the spread of nationalism, there had been some sort of pride on the part of many Basques about the un-intelligibility of their language. The contention that no foreigner has ever been able to master their tongue worked as a strong psychological barrier against amalgamation and 'evil infiltrations'. An ancient legend tells that, once upon a time, the devil visited the Basque country to learn the idiom and make disciples. He tried for weeks, but was defeated and returned to Hell after having learned no more of the language than *bai* (yes) and *ez* (no) (Clark 1979: 148, Dickson 1968: 50). Thus, the legend tells us not only that Euskara was God-given and crucial to the definition of Basque identity, but that popular ethnicity considered language already as an 'ethnic barrier' against foreign infiltrations. Hence, Arana's refusal to allow the immigrants to learn the language was not his own invention, but hailed in origin from centuries-old attitudes.

It is not certain how far Arana can be blamed for being a racist, as many of his opponents do. Indeed, he never espoused a biological theory of racial superiority, neither did he advocate an universal hierarchy of races. Most likely, he used race as a defensive barrier to prevent the corruption of Basque values and culture from external encroachment. It is then clear that his main aim was to preserve the local culture and way of life by adopting an extremely defensive approach (Payne 1975: 74, Corcuera 1979). For instance, Arana's condemnation of interracial marriage corresponded to the firm belief that any such kind of marriage would have inevitably resulted in a loss for Basque language and values and in a further expansion of Spanish influence in the family unit. When he was elected to the Bilbao city council, he proposed that the city's prisons be separated in order to prevent Basque juvenile delinquents from learning blasphemous sayings and immoral habits from their Spaniard inmates. Arana required that all members of his nationalist organization be Catholic,

¹³⁶ Language was seen as a border-guard and a wall protecting the besieged nationalist citadel. On the *muralla* (wall) conception of language, see Sarasola (1982).

and have at least four Basque surnames, or one grandparent who was a native Basque, in order to prove their Basque ascendancy.¹³⁷ At the root of this isolationist posture lied a pervasive insecurity and pessimism about the possibility of assimilating foreigners. This attitude was inextricably tied to the scarce diffusion of the language, the difficulty faced by prospective learners, and the un-availability of other national symbols. In the absence of language, race proved to be a much more pervasive and ready-made criterion.

Why did Arana appear so intolerant? Was racial exclusivity a necessary step in the foundation of Basque nationalism? For all nationalist movements, a first and primary task is to instill in the people that they wish to mobilize a newly found sense of self-confidence. In order for this to occur, a subjugated nation must unequivocally rid itself of the sense of inferiority and shame to which it has been subjected over the centuries. The reverse of this negative self-image is often materialized as a radical upgrading of all positive traits of the would-be-nation. Hence, it can take the form of an openly declared sense of superiority *vis-à-vis* the outgroup.

Arana the believer

Basque civil society was far less secularized than its Catalan counterpart.¹³⁸ I am not just talking about the countryside, which was a well-known bastion of Carlism and Integrism, but also about the urban middle classes and considerable sections of the native working class.¹³⁹ Their ideological conservatism was an obstacle for the diffusion of new radical ideologies such as nationalism. Arana, who understood this predicament, as well as upholding the same theistic values, had to stress some aspects of his doctrine more than others. His religious education gave him the ability to understand and sympathize with the reverent Christian feeling of his compatriots. The religious basis of Arana's programme are resumed in the motto JEL (*Jaungoikua eta Lagizarra*, God and the Old Law).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ On the highly selective criteria for admission in the *batzokis*, their rigid internal discipline and ideological intransigence, see Elorza (1978a: 148-9) and Azcona (1984: 134-7).

¹³⁸ Luis Mitxelena dates this common endowment back to the Council of Trento (1545-), "the effect of which came lastingly to inform nearly all aspects of local life. ...Its consequence was the now familiar identification between Basqueness and Catholicism" (Mitxelena 1960: 59).

¹³⁹ On the contribution of the clergy and religious orders to Basque language and culture, see Villasante (1979: 401-7).

¹⁴⁰ This was taken from the Carlist-foralist slogan *Jaungoikua eta Foruak* (God and Fueros), already 'revived' by the 'Euskaros' (Corcuera 1979: 35, 48-51 and 133). See also

Arana derived from Catholicism a whole set of ideas which remain the bastion of the PNV's doctrine until the present-day. Firstly, he advocated non violent methods to achieve his political goals. It is important to observe that this vision was later discarded by post-1959 radical nationalists as a burden, together with most Aranist precepts. Secondly, he espoused the core of social Catholicism's concern for the poor and the needy. Arana deeply resented the materialistic and rapacious attitude of Bilbao's upper classes: "All of us know that today the poor are inhumanely exploited and treated like beasts by industrialists and businessmen, mine owners and the property owners".¹⁴¹ As a solution to these injustices, Arana posited an utopian classless society which he identified as his traditional Catholic homeland before the imposition of liberalism and the *maketos'* invasion. Accordingly, before the latter's arrival upset labour relations, the employers and the employees lived in a state of near harmony where all classes helped each other. The employers did not hold their workers in contempt, and the workers did not disobey or clash with their employers. The nationalist union founded after his death later reflected this paternalistic attitude and concern for social justice (see afterward).

Arana's pious vision is stressed as he compared the Vizcayan programme with the Catalan one: "Do Catalan nationalists, either moderates or radicals, have in their programmes a solution to social problems, which are so important in their land? We do not think so, because they have not adhered to a religious theme, and there is no solution without Christ. Have the Basque nationalists fastened onto a religious theme? Yes, and this is clearly demonstrated in their motto 'For God and the Old Law'. Their goal is not political but social: to Christianize the people, the poor as well as the rich. Politics is only to be the means".¹⁴² He also wrote: "My patriotism is rooted... in my love for God, and its aim is to connect God to my blood relatives, to my great family, the Basque country".¹⁴³ And: "Ideologically speaking, before the Fatherland there is God; but in practical and temporal life here in Vizcaya, in order to love God it is necessary to be a patriot, and in order to be a patriot it is necessary to love God; this is what the Fatherland is all about".¹⁴⁴ To him, political

Corcuera (1979: 314-27). According to Clark, this was one of the first "verbal political symbols Basques had ever used in their native tongue" (1979: 42).

¹⁴¹ Arana, cited in Larronde (1977: 253) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 127).

¹⁴² Arana, cited in Larronde (1977: 258) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 127-8).

¹⁴³ Arana, cited in Larronde (1977: 95) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 125).

centralization also meant a conspiracy to deprive the Church of its hold on society and dilute Catholic values of piety and justice in the name of materialism and avarice. Hence, Spain was dominated by sinister anti-clerical forces epitomized by the Liberals and their corrupt electoral system. His own was a crusade against the irreligiosity and "immorality" of Spanish reformers who were leading devout souls astray. Indeed, his whole campaign was to provide a new morality and set of values for the emerging Basque society at the very moment when there was an absence of, and a need for, them. The disentailment of Church lands and free-market economic liberalization were seen as part of the same plot aimed at upsetting the values of Christian justice, foral autonomy, and Basque culture. He also proposed to establish an extremely decentralized autonomous confederacy of Catholic municipalities and provinces under the authority of the Church, each entity with wide powers and even the right to secede.

The motto of the *Bizkai Buru Batzar* was "For God and Custom". A logo with the acronym GETEJ (= *Gu Euzkadirentzat ta Euzkadi Jaungoikoarentzat*, "We for Euskadi, and Euskadi for God") also frequently appeared in their own documents and signboards. "I proclaim Catholicism for my country because its traditions and its political and civil character are essentially Catholic...If my people resist it, I would reject my race. Without God, we want nothing" (Arana, quoted in Basaldua 1977: 69). Soon, a large part of the Basque clergy was attracted to Arana's nationalism, mainly in rural areas. The PNV became "one of the earliest Christian democratic parties in Europe" (Clark 1979: 44).¹⁴⁵ As for other nationalist conceptions, for Arana the nation was an extended 'family', and this family was closely linked to God.¹⁴⁶ The nation, for Arana, was to be rejected, if it failed to obey God. Only if it continued to obey God, was it acceptable. This is typical for a belief in 'ethnic election': the Basques are chosen so long as they love God (Smith, personal suggestion).

Finally, we have to consider that, according to the pre-nationalist Basque tradition,

¹⁴⁴ Arana (1982: 615), cited by Jáuregui (1981: 19) and Zirakzadeh (1991: 125-6)

¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, Arana "portrayed an almost sublime faith in the workings of the democratic process... If Basque could only learn their history, their culture and their language, and if they had the freedom to vote for candidates who pledged to protect those things, then Basque nationalism would triumph at the ballot box" (Clark 1979: 46-7).

¹⁴⁶ Arana himself declared that "the patriarchal family, that is, the *patria* is the union of individuals of an historic race for whom time has formed customs and language and on whose behalf history has created a patrimony of liberties which all generations (of that race) have the perfect right to enjoy" (1982: 1762, also cited in Heiberg 1989: 52).

language itself was associated with the Creator. Theological interpretations of the origins of Euskera defined it as the common language of mankind before the Tower of Babel. At the turn of the Nineteenth century, the Abbé Dominique Lahetjuzan considered it as the first human tongue, spoken in the Garden of Eden (Gallop 1970: 2-5, Tovar 1957, 1980). Another Abbé, Diharce de Bidasouet, even claimed that Euskara was the language spoken by God (Gallop 1970: 2-5).

Arana the philologist

One of Arana's legacies had been to distort and complicate Euskara while attempting to purify it from 'Hispanicisms'. Basque was forced to absorb neologisms since it lacked the vocabulary to convey new inventions and concepts. Thus, Arana dedicated many years of his life attempting to cleanse its lexicon from Spanish 'borrowings' and interferences. He pursued this goal with a zealous fervour which led him to 'invent' a purified idiom virtually alien from the language spoken by the common people. However, many terms he invented have been successfully adopted by other nationalists and, subsequently, by most average Basque speakers.¹⁴⁷ He also established an alphabet with a different order, in which, for instance, the letter *c* is absent and the letter *m* comes last.¹⁴⁸

However, all these efforts have been devalued "by the secondary character which Sabino conferred on language as a defining element of the nation, always second to race" (Corcuera 1979: 395). In order to grasp a further reason for Arana's choice in favour of race, we must remember that Euskara was barely spoken in the urban centres. This is especially true in Arana's home city, Bilbao, where he conducted most of his political activity and created the first nuclei of Basque nationalism. The same Arana clearly perceived this decline, when he stated in a disenchanted but sorrowful mood: "Euskara is fading away. We must acknowledge this fact as an undeniable reality of which everybody is aware" (quoted by

¹⁴⁷ Among his successful creations, a few have even entered into contemporary Spanish usage, although with reference to Basque politics. Apart from *Euzkadi* and *ikurriña*, we can count *abértzale* (patriot, derived from *abérri* = fatherland) and *azkatasun* (independence or freedom, normally associated with the acronym ETA). I am using here Arana's spelling, not the current *batua*. See Arana (1982 ca: 2: 975-ff.). He also coined many Christian names, such as *Koldobika* for his brother Luis, included in his *Ixendegi* (list of names/calendar) to be used as a baptismal registry. Individual names are today a central feature of Basque identity and it is not uncommon among immigrant families to baptize their children with Basque names.

¹⁴⁸ Hence, the title of Father de Ibero's catechism, *Ami vasco*, stands for an 'A to Z' of Basqueness (Ibero 1906). This also explains why the present-day Basque education system is divided into three types of school, which are identified as A, B, and D.

Corcuera 1979: 395). Arana did not conceive a direct link between language and vision of the world (here including way of thinking, culture, and general values). To him, learning the language did not necessarily mean changing a state of mind or acquiring a new value orientation. Hence, the language revival was fraught with dangers, because any immigrant who learned Euskara threatened the Basque natives with moral contamination.

At the same time, Arana could not avoid the traditional importance of language as a signifier of Basqueness. For centuries the Basques had been singled out by both external observers and local intellectuals in virtue of their unique tongue. Hence, language worked as a readily available and unmistakable sign of distinctiveness for the local people. Its importance can be gauged by considering the self-definition of many Basques who still today name themselves *Euskaldúnak* (sing. *Euskaldún*), meaning a person who has (-*du-n*) the Basque language (*Euskal*-).¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the word *Euskal-Herria* (or *Euskalerría*) has been traditionally used by the Basques to define their country.¹⁵⁰ It refers -at least in its original sense - to the whole of the people who speak Euskara and means the "Country of Euskara" (*Euskal*= Basque language, -*Herri* = Country or People).¹⁵¹ Both the terms *Euskaldún* and *Euskal-Herria* have been used for centuries, long before the advent of nationalism, in order to define the collectivity of the Basques through the most visible element of their differentiation, language. The term *Euskal-Herria* appears with different spellings in early Basque literature, hence, according to Estornes Lasa (1965) it was already widespread in popular use by the Sixteenth century.¹⁵² We can define this as a case of pre-modern linguistic ethnicity (Smith, ps). Arana's doctrine was directly connected to this pre-existing ethnic base. As nationalists *ante litteram*, the Basques defined themselves through language: according to Campión, an Euskara-speaking Basque would introduce him/herself as "*euskalduna naiz*" (= I am a Basque speaker), rather than mentioning his/her province (cited in Estornes Lasa 1965: 3:

¹⁴⁹ This term is often Hispanised as *Euskaldunes*. Its antiquity is attested by the fact that both Strabo and the Latin authors probably coined the name 'Vasconians' as a rough translation from the local word *Euskaldúnak* (Collins 1986: 32).

¹⁵⁰ The term *Euskal-Herria* does not have political connotations and is universally accepted by all social, cultural and political sectors of Basque society, as well as in the rest of Spain. The more politically salient term *Euskadi* is less deep-seated (Jauregui, personal suggestion).

¹⁵¹ *Herri* means, at the same time, 'town', 'country', and 'people'.

¹⁵² Its first recorded written usage dates back to 1571, in Leizarraga's preface to the New Testament in Basque. It subsequently appeared in 1643 in Axular's *Gvêro* and, then, in several other works (Estornes Lasa 1965: 3: 25-6). The sheer number of local variants of the term testify to the adaptation of the word in the several dialects (Estornes Lasa 1965: 3: 27).

27).

The name invented by Arana, *Euzkadi* (*Euskadi* in contemporary *batua*),¹⁵³ has gained widespread acceptance with the diffusion of nationalism and today is used by non-Basque speakers, both in the Basque Country and, to a certain degree, in the rest of Spain. At the same time, *Euskal-Herria* is still preferred by many *Euskaldunak*.¹⁵⁴ However, it is important to stress that the winning term, *Euzkadi*, can be translated as 'the place of the Basque race': attaching the prefix *-di* (locality) to the word *Euzko-* (= 'the Basque race', according to Arana), the new toponym was purposely designed to eliminate the cultural component and emphasize community of race.

In recent years, language has gained a prominent position in the definition of who is Basque. A measure of the increasingly inclusive character of today's Basque identity is given by the emergence of a new term, *Euskaldunberri* (*Euskaldún*= Basque-speaker, *-berri*= new). This term began to be used in the mid 1960s, referring to those adults both natives and immigrants who were voluntarily learning *Euskara*, in order to distinguish them from the native *Euskaldun-zaharra* (*zaharra* = old).¹⁵⁵ Rejecting the old dichotomy between *euskaldunak* (Basque-speakers) and *erdaldunak* (speakers of any other language)¹⁵⁶, contemporary nationalists have chosen to stress the importance of the "new Basque speakers", both immigrants and natives, in order to emphasize their shared participation in the making of *Euskal-Herria*.

With the advent in Nineteenth-century of comparative linguistics and the study of Indo-European languages, the radical distinctiveness of the Basques from other European peoples was clearly demonstrated by scientific investigation.¹⁵⁷ However, in Europe during the last century, race soon became associated with language, rather than being opposed to it. That is, biology became tied to other human sciences, and, thus, the opposition between nature and culture was downplayed, when not nullified. In a time of global changes and widespread

¹⁵³ In their effort to dissociate themselves from Arana's racialism, present-day language-planners have changed the spelling of many of his words, replacing, for instance, the *-z* with an *-s*.

¹⁵⁴ The political implications of the nationalist name, *Euzkadi*, led to its ban under Francoism, while the authorities tolerated the use of the ancient *Euskal-Herria*.

¹⁵⁵ This was also a result of the success of the *ikastolak*, a semi-clandestine network of schools where *Euskara* was -and still is- the only medium of instruction (see chapter 4).

¹⁵⁶ *Erdera* (*Erdara* in *batua*) = any language other than Basque.

¹⁵⁷ On the studies on Basque by von Humboldt and Bonaparte, see Villasante (1979).

socio-geographical mobility, the desire to re-build ethnic borders was pushed towards the extreme of confusing inherited characteristics with acquirable elements, in a desperate attempt to limit that very mobility. The Basque intelligentsia was also affected by this European-wide shift of perspective. An additional reason was the fact that many international studies of the time often quoted the Basques as a distinct race.¹⁵⁸ Not only did nationalism and modernization appear on the scene together, but racialism soon joined them.

The first nationalist victories.

The first limited electoral victory was achieved by the nationalists in the 1898 provincial elections, when Arana himself was elected to the provincial assembly of Vizcaya. In the 1899 municipal elections, the nationalists won five seats on the city council of Bilbao and three other seats in nearby towns. In part, this success was a consequence of the support received by the '*Sotistats*', followers of the shipping magnate Ramón de la Sota. He was then the only leading industrialist who openly supported nationalism and his choice determined the subsequent evolution of the movement. Ideological radicalism periodically erupted from the grass-roots, producing minor splits. While the heirs of Arana remained in control of the party's ideology, the pragmatists (Sota and other former Euskalerriacos) firmly controlled its political praxis. A characteristic of the PNV was thus the continuous tension between these two trends. Yet, this tension offered its advantages to the pragmatists, since radicalism was an irreplaceable tool of popular mobilization.

In Arana's later life the PNV moved pragmatically from separatism to more moderate postures. However, in the 1901 provincial elections the nationalists failed to gain a single seat. Arana was jailed for the second time in 1902, when his telegram to President Theodore Roosevelt was intercepted. Here, he congratulated the US for having freed Cuba from slavery, and praised America's federal system. What can be called Arana's second 'conversion' from radical separatism to a more compromising and regionalist line was probably inspired by the triumph of the moderate Lliga Catalana (1901).¹⁵⁹ It may also not

¹⁵⁸ On the important contribution by foreign scholars and *vascofilos* (pro-Basques) to the study of the Basques and their culture in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth century, see Azcona (1984: 50-ff) and Villasante (1979: 407-16).

¹⁵⁹ According to de la Granja (1986: 18), Catalanism began to influence Basque nationalism from 1901 onwards. However, Arana did not refer to Catalonia or to Galicia as nations, since he considered them to be part of Spain (Corcuera 1979: 188-9). Only the Basques were allowed

have been a heart-felt decision, but the result of Arana's desperation in experiencing continuous harassment by the central authorities, although he was not ill-treated during his prison-terms. Many present-day radical nationalists hold that Arana's moderate ('*españolista*') evolution was merely a tactical device in order to gain wider popular support and the backing of the ruling classes in a period of great crisis for the PNV, while Arana never gave up his radical convictions. In his prison meditations, Arana apparently pondered about the need for a change, as all political activities of the nationalists were hampered. His message "could not spread with the required speed at a time of great travail for the Basque nation" (Basaldua 1975: 74-5). "When he emerged from jail, the bureau office had been closed, the party was out of money, and his supporters could not have numbered more than several hundred" (Clark 1979: 43-4). Arana's health, which had always been precarious, soon deteriorated with Addison's disease, which probably attacked his weak body as a consequence of the stress. He had to resign as president of the PNV (his place being taken by Angel de Zabala). Sabino Arana died on 25 November 1903 at the age of 38. He was long remembered among the Basques as a personality of irreprehensible rectitude, courage and self-sacrifice. His behaviour remained the model for all his followers.

That year, the PNV won two seats in the Vizcayan provincial assembly. It is somewhat ironical that the greatest victories of the nationalists came about only after Arana's death. A possible explanation of these late victories is that the party had become less intransigent and more pragmatic, as a result of Arana's 'second conversion', and, thus, could attract a wider range of supporters. Soon the party became the second political force in Vizcaya, after the Conservatives.

In 1906, the mayor of Bilbao was a nationalist. In 1907, the nationalists were relegated to third place. That year, the abortive Maura plan for the 'mancomunidades' (see chapter 2) failed to reach agreement over the degree of autonomy to be granted to the Basque provinces. In 1910, the bureau adopted a new more Catholic-oriented title, *Comunión Nacionalista Vasca* (CNV, Basque Nationalist Communion), and a less loosely organized structure. A new nationalist and Catholic union was set up in 1911, the *Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos* (SOV, Solidarity of Basque Workers). Informally linked to CNV, it became strong among

the 'privilege' of separate nationhood.

railroad workers and, generally, among ethnic Basques.¹⁶⁰

Spain's neutrality during the First World War provided an exceptional stimulus for the expansion of Basque industry, boosting arms manufacturing, shipping and mining. The ensuing wave of economic prosperity brought the first major electoral triumph for the nationalists in 1914 which lasted until 1918. However, most of the nationalists' impact was limited to the province of Vizcaya, where they gained an absolute majority of the seats in the diputación, but achieved only marginal results in Guipuzcoa and Navarre.¹⁶¹ The nationalists sent a delegation to Versailles in the hope of receiving aid from the Big Four, but to no avail. Urbanisation and industrialization continually increased the importance of professionals, tradesmen, bureaucrats, administrators, and other sectors who were providing most of the PNV's cadres. However, post-war depression and the example of the Bolshevik revolution also led to an increase in labour strife, nourishing an unprecedented fear of Communism. The national question was relegated to the background, as the local ruling classes relied on the central government to quell working class unrest. This situation was reflected in the electoral decline of the nationalists. The CNV returned three delegates to the Cortes in the 1919 parliamentary elections, and in 1920 it only gained one deputy. The crisis fed internal dissent, leading to a split and readjustment of the party. The re-emerging party was now called PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco* = Basque Nationalist Party) and became the hegemonic force in Basque politics.

The first Congress of Basque Studies (1918) and the nationalists' internal tensions

In 1918, at the height of industrial growth and social change, a group of Basque scholars, professionals, politicians, and businessmen gathered in the town of Oñate (Guipuzcoa) in order to form a Basque Studies Society, *Eusko Ikaskuntza* or *Sociedad de Estudios Vascos* (Urla 1987: 27-60, 1988: 382). They believed that economic growth and social change could no longer be left to the hazards of improvisation. After the 1914 industrial boom, more poor

¹⁶⁰ In 1933, it assumed the present-day name of *Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos* - *Eusko Langille Alkartasuna* (STV-ELA).

¹⁶¹ This was obviously due to the differential impact of industrialisation on the other Basque provinces. Alava and Navarre remained fundamentally rural. For economic development in Guipuzcoa between 1876 and 1915, see Castells (1987).

landless labourers were pouring into the industrialized areas. Social problems accumulated on a gigantic scale while the state stayed aloof: urban congestion, homelessness, pollution, and illness were affecting industrial cities like Bilbao and Renteria. The participants at the first Congress of Basque Studies denounced the lack of planning and pleaded for a guiding role not only in economic development but also in the management of social change. They believed that science and knowledge were powerful tools in achieving such aims. In this respect, the founders of Eusko Ikaskuntza were children of the Enlightenment and shared a positivist faith in the possibility of influencing - and even directing- socio-political change (Urla 1987).

The scientific study of the past was an important step in this direction. History had to be rescued from the fetters of nationalist distortion. Language too needed to be re-founded and salvaged from purist amateurism. "Authority over language reform had to be wrested away from zealous nationalists and handed over to language experts who would guide it according to the rigors of modern linguistic methods" (Urla 1988: 383).¹⁶² A foremost proponent of this approach was the philologist Julio Urquijo (1871-1950).¹⁶³ His attacks were directed against the Aranists' obsession with a purified language, with its "extravagant etymologies" based on "the most grotesque hypotheses" (Urquijo, cited by Urla 1988: 383). The founding members and organisers of the Basque Studies Society were acting independently from political nationalism. Many non-nationalist intellectuals were interested in the revitalization of Basque culture without aiming at an independent state. The Congress represented a clear instance of cultural nationalism as a movement autonomous from its political counterpart. Yet, it was hardly thinkable that such a Congress could have taken place without the previous nationalist victories. Behind the curtains, the feelings aroused by political nationalism gave the necessary impetus for many such initiatives to occur.

A Basque Language Academy (*Euskaltzaindia* or *Academia de la Lengua Vasca*) was also created in 1918 in Oñate,¹⁶⁴ aiming at working not only on the *corpus* (structure) of Euskara but also on its *status*. That is, the goal was not only to create a proper grammar, syntax, lexicon, but also to enhance its social status, in terms of prestige, literacy, publishing, and

¹⁶² On the extravagant and amateurish character of the first *euskerálogos*, see Corcuera (1979: 398), Sarasola (1982: 81-3), Villasante (1979: 326).

¹⁶³ On Urquijo, see Villasante (1979: 370-ff).

¹⁶⁴ On the Academy, see Euskaltzaindia (1976) and Villasante (1979: 394-8).

use in academic milieux.¹⁶⁵ "From this new perspective, the fate of Basque was seen to depend primarily on the nature of its social distribution - who speaks Basque" (Urla 1988: 383). This was a first departure from Arana's restricted conception of language as an 'ethnic barrier'. Urla observes that the concern for language planning "arose in conjunction with a host of new social concerns - public health, improving the race (*sic*), better schools, safety in the workplace, social insurance, and urban planning - problems that were emerging in the context of deep social and economic transformation.... For this, members of the society availed themselves of the latest advances in social scientific research..." (Urla 1988: 383). This emphasis reflects a radical shift of perspective from Arana's defensive nationalism to a newly dynamic conception. Now, Basque society "did not so much have to be *sheltered* from contact as it had to be properly *managed*" (Urla 1988: 384).

In the meanwhile, major contrasts plagued the political field. Following Arana's tough line on independence and inspired by the Irish *Sinn Féin* (Conversi 1993), the radicals separated in 1921 from the CNV in order to re-found the party under the historical heading of PNV. Their mouthpiece was the journal *Aberri* (= Fatherland), founded by Luis Arana, and its main contributor was Eli Gallastegi (1892-1974), who adopted the nickname of *Gudari* (= warrior) (Elorza 1977, Gallastegi 1993). In 1921, the Spanish police opened fire on a peaceful workers' march, indiscriminately killing several attendants. Most of the media applauded the police's action, and even mainstream nationalists refused to condemn it. Against them, Gallastegi wrote a piece on *Aberri* calling for solidarity with the workers: "There had fallen idealistic men; some men who had struggled and suffered constantly. They are the Communists, as earlier there had fallen members of SOV...The bullets that have entered their chests seemingly have been lodged in our own hearts. We feel the tragedy as if they were our own, because we too, like them, are young, are idealistic, suffer, and are of modest condition".¹⁶⁶ This piece exemplified a whole trend of Basque nationalism which was opposed to the Euskalerríacos' bourgeois control over the CNV. Inspired by Arana's original concern for the welfare of the working class, this trend increasingly developed into a more articulated anti-capitalist ideology and remained crucial when, finally, Basque nationalism turned towards Marxism in the 1960s.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ We introduce here Heinz Kloss' distinction between *corpus planning* and *status planning* (Kloss 1967).

¹⁶⁶ Eli Gallastegi, *Fiesta de sangre*, reprinted in Ortzi (1975: 169). See also Espinosa (1993: 108-ff.).

It is important to stress the fact that this and other splits occurred under the banner of a comeback to Arana's original principles: Arana left a legacy of contradictions and ambivalences that sowed the seeds of future nationalist fragmentation. Each of the opposing forces within the nationalist field claimed to be the true heir of Arana's ideal, be that in its moderate or in its radical form, in its anti-capitalist overtones or in its rapprochement with the industrialists, in its emphasis on language or in its stress on religion, and so on.

Under Primo de Rivera

The precepts elaborated by Arana dominated the PNV right up to the Civil War. From Arana's death until 1931, there is no relevant ideological evolution within Basque nationalism. According to Garcia Venero (1968: 315), the few ideological cleavages which emerged answered solely to tactical considerations.¹⁶⁸ At the local level, the PNV was generous in its alliances with other parties and independent candidates. Most coalition partners were moderate or right-wing businessmen, theocrats and conservatives. The PNV always remained hostile to the Socialists, due to the latter's centralizing trends, professed atheism, and control of the immigrants' vote through class politics.

Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923-1930) forced both the PNV and the CNV into clandestine activity. The nationalist journal *Aberri* (Fatherland) and other independent publications were suppressed. Gallastegui fled to Ireland. Under such conditions, the nationalist torch was carried by a few groups around the PNV, the most important of which were the *mendigoitzales* or mountaineering groups, which Gallastegui himself helped to establish, inspired by the organisative structure of the Sinn Fein (Ortzi 1975: 176-7). "High atop some remote mountain, the Basque alpinists could meet safely, far from Spanish police scrutiny, and discuss politics freely" (Clark 1979: 51).¹⁶⁹

As in the case of most dictatorships worldwide, the stronger the repression, the more the

¹⁶⁷ Many of ETA's founders were inspired by the works of Gallastegui, which they discussed in informal meetings.

¹⁶⁸ For instance, the splits between the confessional and the secular, or between the democrats and the liberals inside the party. Even the contrast between the CNV and the re-founded PNV was based, not on an alternative to Arana's principles, but on a different emphasis on independence or autonomy.

¹⁶⁹ In the next chapter we will observe how important were these -and kindred- societies as forms of resistance to Francoism, especially in Catalonia. In Euskadi they soon assumed a paramilitary form and in the 1960s they became a fertile ground for ETA recruiting.

nationalist feelings received a boost. At the fall of Primo de Rivera (1930), both Catalan and Basque nationalism emerged with renewed vigour, reinforced by years of secrecy. Furthermore, the clandestine condition emphasized the importance of culture, since informal cultural and folkloric groupings were the only outlet available to express national sentiments, all political activities being banned. The non-violent precepts of Sabino Arana held the field, as he had counselled not to meet repression with open resistance, confidently assuming that democracy would prevail. He himself suggested that in times of trouble the Basques could retreat to the safe haven of their mountainous terrain and to the "mental sanctuary of their ancient culture" (Clark 1979: 50).¹⁷⁰

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the fall of Primo de Rivera prompted the principal antimonarchical parties to meet in San Sebastian where they set the base for a forthcoming Provisional Government. Although the nationalists did not directly participate in the pact, Basque and Catalan Republicans wrung a promise of regional autonomy from other Republican groups (Granja 1986: 19-23).

In the meanwhile the nationalists healed their wounds, agreeing to reunite their two wings (Aberri and CNV) under the banner of PNV (Granja 1986: 30-35). The dictatorship had helped to unite the different souls of Basque nationalism and mobilize even wider sectors (Estornes Zubizarreta 1990). The uppermost echelons of Basque nationalism held an assembly in Vergara (1930), where a new generation of political leaders emerged unsullied by former political rivalries (Granja 1986: 48-ff).¹⁷¹ What united them was a comeback to pure Aranist principles, only toning down separatism. Under the revived motto JEL, race and religion were firmly confirmed as the bastions of Basquehood. Hence, two weeks later a fringe group of disaffected leftists broke away to form the secular Republican *Acción Nacionalista Vasca* (ANV, or *Euzko Abertzale Ekintza*).¹⁷² The latter's anti-clerical stand condemned it to play a marginal role in regional politics, yet its ideological impact would become relevant for later generations (Granja 1986: 601-13).¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ "Basques must not engage in open rebellion, but simply continue the slow, steady pressure of cultural resistance, wearing away the chains of tyranny" (Arana, cited by Clark 1979: 47).

¹⁷¹ These included José Antonio Aguirre, the party's President and future *lehendakari* (President of the Basque Government in exile), the barrister Manuel Irujo, and the lawyer José María Leizaola.

¹⁷² According to De la Granja, ANV was more properly a nationalist party, in opposition to the PNV, which subordinated its nationalism to the religious question (Granja 1986: 606).

Basque nationalism under the Republic

In the municipal elections of April 1931 the PNV ran a slate with the Carlists. In the June parliamentary elections, this coalition won 15 of the 24 seats reserved to the four provinces at the *Cortes Constituyentes* (parliamentary assembly) (Granja 1986: 180-229, Payne 1975: 122). But the anti-clerical legislation passed by the Cortes provoked acrimonious debate among the nationalists and led to an irreparable split with the Carlists. In reaction to state-sanctioned secularism, the latter developed increasingly integralist trends which finally led them to ally with the far right. In the 1933 parliamentary elections, the PNV -running solo- became the largest party in the region, gaining 12 of the 24 Cortes seats (Granja 1986: 397-437). This was the "greatest ballot-box triumph" in the PNV's history (Payne 1975: 134). Even more astonishing, a proposed autonomy statute was supported in a plebiscite by 84% of the voters throughout the three provinces, with a turnout of 87% of eligible voters (Granja 1986: 394-6).¹⁷⁴ The latter was "the highest for any context in Spanish history" (Payne 1975: 133-4). However, the disengagement of the Carlist Party from the alliance made possible a victory of the right wing coalition CEDA in Madrid (see chapter 2).

Since the anti-nationalist Right came to power, the PNV switched from anti-Republican rhetoric to bolster the Left. This shift proved counter-productive in electoral terms as the party lost votes in 1936, going from 12 to 7 seats in the Cortes (Granja 1986: 554). This again testifies to the all-pervasive strength of religion in Euskadi and suggests that any 'nod and a wink' towards the Left would have a price to be paid. The PNV articulated Basque hostility towards Republican secularism, as its support was based on the Catholic vote. Yet, the PNV was also a Republican party, whilst its Catholic commitment pitted it firmly against other forces of the Left, especially Marxist ones. The torch of radicalism was carried by Luis de Arana's new journal, *Jagi-Jagi* (= Arise). Most of its articles were a restatement of

¹⁷³ For instance, ANV attacked the racist trends prevailing in PNV's rank and file. For the first time, a nationalist party declared that the immigrants could be accepted as Basques, although it also expressed resentment at their moral habits (Granja 1986: 601-613). ANV rejected Arana's foralist idea of a loose Confederation of provinces and opted for a centralized Basque state. However, it drew its support from the same urban liberal middle classes which backed the PNV (Ortzi 1975: 176-7). The creation of ANV was inspired by the federalist thought of Antoni Rovira i Virgili and by the foundation of *Acció Catalana*, a splinter group from the Lliga (Granja 1986: 18).

¹⁷⁴ Dominated by the Carlists, Navarre defected, rejecting the autonomy draft (Blinkhorn 1974, Granja 1986: 289-95).

Sabino's sayings, mottos and principles. The journal implemented its radical stance devoting more attention to working class' aspirations. Many young writers argued in the journal's columns that proletarian struggle and national emancipation should go hand in hand. Back from his Irish exile, Gallastegui resumed his contributions (Elorza 1977). *Jagi-Jagi's* constant critique of capitalism was to be intended as an attack against capital's concentration into a few hands; in principle, it was not a struggle against private ownership of the means of production (Zirakzadeh 1991).

In the 1930s, with Jesuit support, the PNV became almost a confessional party at a time when secularism held sway in the rest of the state. This prompted accusations by sectors of the Left that a concordat between Euskadi and the Vatican was imminent and Indalecio Prieto, the Socialist leader, denounced the plan to establish a 'Vatican Gibraltar' (Hills 1970: 151). Yet, the Basque clergy committed itself to the Republican cause. This infuriated Franco's authorities, who, before the end of the Civil War, ordered the execution of 16 priests and monks. A similar kind of indiscriminate repression led many Basque priests and monks to join the ranks of ETA in the 1960s. It was not a complete accident that the Basque Country received a statute of autonomy from the Republic in December 1936, only months before the outbreak of the Civil War. This occurred after three different statutes had been proposed between 1930 and 1936 and all but the last one failed to be approved (Castells 1976). The main reason for this failure was anti-Republican opposition from Alava and Navarre (Aguirre 1991).

As soon as the autonomous government was installed, local administration was fully reorganized making the region "the most orderly, least revolutionary part of Republican Spain during the next nine months. Revolutionary excesses and atrocities... were brought under control [and Vizcaya]... enjoyed greater political harmony than any other part of the Republican zone. Under the nationalist hegemony, direct conflict was largely averted, and relations with the Communists and other leftist groups were generally amicable" (Cortada 1982: 78).

During the Civil War, the Basques supplied the Republicans with some of their most effective troops. In 1937, German planes of the Condor Legion -sent to bolster the Francoist insurgents- bombed the town of Guernica on a market day, partially razing it to the ground

sectors this crisis differed from the one experienced in other countries, and its effect in Euskadi took a particularly heavy toll: large industries were the main pillar of the Basque economy. As branch plants of multinational corporations dominated, Euskadi was severely struck by the international crisis and many factories had to close down (Zirakzadeh 1989: 321). When the international economy slumped in the 1970s, Euskadi was badly hit because of the relevance of its export sector and the specialization in metallurgy and capital goods. Small and big industries alike found themselves without customers. Hence, "oscillation with international demand..... lead to wave of popular support for nationalist parties that aim to protect the semi-peripheral areas from external economic pressures" (Zirakzadeh 1989: 323).

Yet, wide ranging economic change had already occurred in the 1880s, but did not prompt a violent reaction. Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa were the poorest Spanish provinces in 1877. In a few years, they became the richest, creating both social discontent and demographic displacement. The virulent anti-Spanish tones of Arana concealed the rage of many Basques, yet such rage was, for the moment, simply channelled through a non-violent nationalist movement. Still in 1973, Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa held the first and third place respectively amongst all Spanish provinces in term of per capita income.⁵¹³ Moreover, the economic crisis occurred approximately ten years after ETA had adopted armed struggle. Undoubtedly, violence rose to a new peak in the wake of the economic doldrums, when unemployment, recession and their corollary reinforced social tensions. For instance, between 1975 and 1981 the adult labour force shrank by 11% and Euskadi's gross product had a negative growth rate for three successive years (Zirakzadeh 1989: 327). ETA took advantage of these negative circumstances. But a convincing reason for the increase of violence could hardly be given on the basis of the economic situation alone. Undoubtedly, the electoral programme of Herri Batasuna (the political wing of ETA) included powerful appeals to the economically dispossessed "through the use of pictorial representations of shovels, anvils and pitchforks", constantly alluding "to its candidates' firsthand experiences with unemployment layoffs and insecure jobs" (Zirakzadeh 1989: 328). Theories of 'relative deprivation' can be partly useful to explain this outcome. But, again, it seems better to consider the economic situation as a powerful reinforcing factor rather than as a determinant of the choice of violence.

⁵¹³ See García Crespo et al. (1981) and Payne (1975: 229-33).

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⁵¹³ See García Crespo et al. (1981) and Payne (1975: 229-33).

and slaughtering hundreds of people. The event, immortalized by Picasso, shocked international public opinion. It was history's first aerial bombardment on a civilian population. Pressured by a world-wide outcry, the Francoists denied any responsibility.

Autonomy lasted just nine months, as Bilbao was captured by the Spanish 'nationalist' troops in June 1937. The short-lived statute was immediately abrogated, and all political parties suppressed.

Conclusion

This chapter has served to illustrate the congenital fragmentation of Basque nationalism, its origin as a response to modernization, and the importance assumed in Basque society by religion, race and other elements prior to the Civil War. It also showed the central role of Sabino de Arana in the birth of nationalism and his agglutinating force. Initially, Arana's nationalism was a nostalgic re-assertion of ancient values. As a person, he reflected in himself the dramatic tensions of his time. Since change was radical, the reaction of many Basques was a desperate rejection of all things modern and a plunge into cherished memories, creating a ditch between the present and the past. What distinguishes Arana from the main Catalan nationalists is his single-handed arbitrariness. He is the inventor of virtually all the key symbols of modern Basque nationalism. No Catalan nationalist can be credited for having similarly invented the main 'esthetic' symbols of Catalanism.¹⁷⁵ Catalanist ideology evolved slowly and steadily from Almirall to Prat, and thereafter. On the contrary, Arana formulated Basque symbolism *ex-nihilo*, drawing uniquely from a pre-existing foralist and Carlist tradition.

This and the previous chapters have shown that ethnic nationalism is the result of both modernization and state-enforced assimilation. Very few scholars of nationalism still defend the assumption that modernization -with its concomitant processes - can erode ethnic identity. However, we have also seen that full-blown nationalism was related to cultural displacement and assimilation, rather than simple modernization. In this sense, nationalism was a radical response to the attack on ethnic values, culture, and identity carried out by the state. Although in times of democracy nationalism often rests on the cultural heritage of the nation - and it is

¹⁷⁵ Many such symbols, such as the Catalan flag or anthem, pre-existed nationalism, although it is only with the latter that they received their modern political meaning.

especially strong where the ethnic language is maintained (Clark 1981, 1984) -, the crucial role is played by hitherto assimilated elites (the intellectuals), and, later, by disaffected modernizers (the intelligentsia). Basque language was lost far and wide to these regional elites as they were fully assimilated into the dominant Castilian culture. This is especially true for Arana and his acolytes, as well as for all those who retained a sense of Basque identity without retaining tangible aspects of Basque culture. In the process, they had virtually to re-create it from scratch. In the case of Catalonia, the nationalist elites were at least bilingual. Though they fully mastered Castilian, most of them knew how to express themselves properly in Catalan. Hence, cultural nationalism could thrive in Catalonia, whereas it could hardly take-off in Euskadi.

One of the contrasts between the two lies in their different assimilative power, and in the way the latter is perceived by the respective intellectuals and intelligentsia. The racial choice of Arana was due especially to a 'pessimistic' (but also traditionalist) disbelief in the capacity to conceive Basque culture in assimilative terms. Many ethnonationalist elites in Western Europe learned the ethnic tongue only after their nationalist 'conversion'. Most of them were -and are- raised in either dominant monolingual environments or imperfectly bilingual ones. Only later did they engage in the recovery of the ethnic culture.

Furthermore, we have to remember that both early Catalan and Basque nationalists encountered apathy in rural areas where the language was still widely spoken. In these areas, which normally bolstered the Carlists, the defence of the ethnic tongue was not an object of mobilizations. In times of rapid urbanization, it was seen rather as an annoying obstacle to geographical and social mobility. Like most modern nationalisms, Basque nationalism was born as a typically urban phenomenon. Industrialism, urbanization, increased state control, the abolition of local rights and laws, and, in particular, immigration from Castile, produced an explosive situation that was later to find its political expression through nationalism. Modernization was a "challenge to Basque identity and as such it needed to be tackled, and only nationalism could provide the tool for such a task" (Payne 1975). Paradoxically, its full success came about nearly a century later, in the 1980s. Today, both Basque and Catalan nationalism can be counted amongst the most popular recent examples of nation-making in Western Europe. The next two chapters will chart this evolution.

Chapter 4

EUSKADI: DICTATORSHIP, RESISTANCE and RESURRECTION

In this chapter, I shall focus my analysis on the 1950s and 1960s. This was the period when a new nationalist movement slowly emerged which departed sharply from Aranist neo-traditionalism. The period of greatest interest begins in 1952, the date of the formation of the first radical student grouping, and lasts up to about 1970, when all significant ideological debate ceased. Yet, it is after 1970 that the message began to spread among the general population. Before coming to the 1950s, I shall address the historical and structural factors which brought about this radical change. The chapter's data is drawn from both secondary and primary sources (the writings of the nationalist leaders, newspaper excerpts and magazine quotations).

The darkest years

Beltza (1977) divides the period which followed the imposition of Francoist centralization into four phases:

1. 1939-45 (Exile and Clandestine Activity), when the nationalist government in exile was in a precarious position due to the possibility of an Axis victory and to the Nazi occupation of Northern France.
2. 1945-47 (The Golden Years), when the Basque Republicans tried to channel Allied action against fascism in the aftermath of World War II.
3. 1948-52 (The Fall), with the onset of the Cold War and the tacit rehabilitation of Franco as a potential bulwark against Soviet influence.
4. 1953-60 (The New Nationalism), parallel to the radicalization of the youth, with the slow fossilization of the PNV after the opening of Franco's Spain to the West.

From 1939 to 1945, the Basque Country was subjected to a regime of state terror with no parallel in Basque history. Once they had occupied the Basque provinces, Franco's troops initiated a vindictive campaign of repression against any sign of Basque identity. Even the most innocuous aspects of popular culture, such as dance and music, were subjected to constant suspicion, inquiry, and proscription.¹⁷⁶ A sketchy picture of this repression, which paralleled the Catalan one, is included in a message to UNESCO written in 1952 by José Antonio Aguirre (1904-1960). The then president of the Basque Government-in-exile denounced the following misdeeds: "Closure of the Basque University...Occupation by armed force of the libraries of social and cultural associations...Mass burning of books in Euskera...Elimination of all use of Euskera in schools, on radio broadcasts, in all public gatherings and in all publication. Suppression of Basque cultural societies...of all magazines, periodicals and reviews in Euskera. Prohibition to use Euskera...in the celebration of the Mass and in other religious ceremonies. Decree requiring the translation into Spanish of all Basque names in civil registries and other official documents..., official directive mandating the removal from tombstone and funeral markers of all inscriptions in Euskera..." (Aguirre, in Beltza 1977: 134-6 and Clark 1979: 137).¹⁷⁷

The ensuing atrocities were so disturbing that the Carlist supporters of Franco could no longer tolerate them and intervened to stem the actions of the vigilante squads (Clark 1979: 82). In the very first years after the Civil War, innumerable people were imprisoned or executed on the pretext of promoting 'separatism'. The number of exiles ranged from 100,000 to 150,000, more than 20,000 of whom were children (Legarreta 1984). A Basque diaspora spread throughout France, Latin America, and other Western countries. At the same time, the oligarchic bourgeoisie sided with Franco, thereby stamping a sinister class mark on state repression (Espinosa 1989, Zirakzadeh 1991).

From 1945 to 1947, in the aftermath of the World War, the Basque Republicans tried to drag the Allies into opposition against the dictatorship. The above message by Aguirre, written when Spain was knocking on UNESCO's door, is a good example of the international pressures which the Basque government-in-exile tried to exert. Overall, their impact was limited. In 1945, a Basque Consultative Council (*Consejo Consultativo Vasco*) was set up in exile as an alliance of the most important Basque parties and labour unions, both leftists and nationalists. The Council was charged with coordinating the action of a

¹⁷⁶ On Basque dance as a symbol of national identity, see Lamarca (1976).

¹⁷⁷ On the repression of Euskara, see Nuñez (1977), Urrutia (1977) and Euskaltzaindia (1977).

Resistance Committee (*Junta de Resistencia*) inside Spanish territory. The Resistance Committee announced a strike on 1 May 1947. As 75 percent of the workers in Vizcaya answered the call, the government reacted with a state of siege and the successful mobilization slowly died out. This experience taught the activists that an alliance between the nationalists and the Left was capable of mobilizing large sectors of the working class, though it failed to ignite other classes and spread to other regions. Nationalism had demonstrated its ability to unite broad sectors of society, transcending class divisions and withstanding harsh repression. Moreover, during the workers' mobilization, a younger generation started to assume leadership roles in the movement (Clark 1979: 104-6).

The Basque youth had previously attempted an ephemeral political experience. A Society of Basque Students (*Euzko Ikasle Alkartasuna*, EIA) was set up in the 1940s as an apolitical association with its main seat in Leiden, The Netherlands. In 1947 they started to hold political meetings in the French Basque Country, but soon their activity began to spill over across the Spanish border, where they distributed clandestine leaflets and journals. The organization was easily uncovered by the Spanish police and in 1951 all its leaders were either arrested or forced to go into exile, leaving EIA completely dismantled. The rapidity with which the police dealt this fatal blow taught them a bitter lesson as they vowed never to again act except in complete secrecy.¹⁷⁸ It was the year 1951. In this year a general strike in Bilbao signalled the end of the Resistance Committee. The strike was successful, but, as a consequence, "the repression imposed from Madrid was so intense that the network of clandestine cells within Spain was left in ruins" (Clark 1984: 23). At the same time, the Western powers withdrew their support of the Basque government in exile, dominated by the PNV. Thus, the Basque Country, and especially the nationalists, faced a desperate isolation and most of them plunged into a sense of hopelessness.

From 1947 onward, with the onset of the Cold War, the Francoists succeeded in slowly coming in from the cold. Clark (1979: 93-102) offers a good description of the precedents and the subsequent steps which led to the overture of the US towards Franco's regime, lured by the possibility of opening a military base in the peninsula.¹⁷⁹ Spain became successively a member of the World Health Organization (1951), UNESCO (1952), and UNO (1955). In 1953, Spain signed a bilateral treaty with the United States and a Concordat with the Vatican. Thus, the Basques were amongst the several illustrious victims of the Cold War. The failure

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Txillardegui (quoted in Ibarzábal 1978: 362). See also Ibarzabal, Eugenio (1978) *Así nació ETA*, "Muga", nº 1, 1979, pp. 77-89.

¹⁷⁹ On Basque refugees, especially children, see Legarreta (1984, 1985).

of Western democracies, especially Great Britain and the US, to isolate and exert pressures on the regime "led the Basques to conclude that they could not depend on outside assistance" (Clark 1979: 80).¹⁸⁰ This is one of the crucial features which helps to explain the birth of ETA less than ten years later.

From Ekin to ETA (1952-1959)

The PNV, who had played a key role under the Republic, seemed now incapable of responding to the new challenges and became increasingly de-legitimised. Its forced idleness and prudent attitude contrasted with growing nationalist unrest among the youth.¹⁸¹ In the 1950s, the Basque economy was still at a standstill. But towards the end of the decade, it started to undergo a phase of expansion. As a result, many Basques, including traditional PNV supporters, began to prosper and benefit from the regime's policies. Fearful of government repression, most PNV members appeared to be less interested than ever in Basque nationalism, except in promoting marginal cultural events and folkloric activities. However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the PNV's passivity. In 1956 a World Basque Congress was held in Paris to celebrate the twentieth Anniversary of the Basque government.¹⁸² Financed by exiled Basque businessmen, 363 persons from all political leanings were invited to participate (except the Communists, who were excluded in a further attempt to please the Americans). It has been remarked that "never before had there been such a gathering of the Basque intellectuals and political elite" (Clark, in Aguirre 1991: 13). But all this activity was carried out abroad and the Basques within the country descended into a state of utter despair.

This situation inevitably created a generational crisis. Tired of the general impasse but also frustrated by the "obsolete" PNV's ideology, a group of university students in Bilbao started to hold weekly meetings to study and discuss Basque history and culture. In the beginning, in 1952, there were only six or seven of them, all in their early twenties.¹⁸³ This clandestine activity "uncovered for them an unknown world which [state] terrorism under Franco had

¹⁸⁰ Before this, the US government refused admission to refugees from the Spanish Civil War (Legarreta 1985: 194-6, Clark 1979: 91). Hence most of them chose to live in Venezuela, Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina.

¹⁸¹ The *lehendakari* Jose' Antonio Aguirre recognized that, at a time of general disillusion, "one of the most consoling phenomena in the last 16 years... has been the enthusiastic adhesion of the Basque youth to the ideals of freedom for their people" (cited by Jauregui 1981: 75).

¹⁸² Its four sections were: Politics, Culture, Socio-Economic Aspects, and Basque Diaspora.

¹⁸³ Different sources give different names and estimates for Ekin's early members. Some authors (themselves early members) mention a handful participants in Ekin's seminars (i.e., *Kemen*, 1964, in *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p. 434), other claim they were a dozen.

relegated to the category of a non-existent reality. Thus, in their readings they discovered Basque nationalism and anti-Francoist resistance. Their formative period was relatively long and intense..." (Jauregui 1986: 571).¹⁸⁴ An irregular bulletin, *Ekin* (= To do), which gave its name to the group, was their underground organ.¹⁸⁵ At the beginning the PNV was kept in the dark about their existence. For four years they secretly and ardently worked as self-taught persons, confining themselves to purely intellectual tasks.¹⁸⁶ But their activities were eventually 'discovered' by the PNV, an inevitable outcome, since all of them were raised in nationalist families. The reception was cool, circumspect and ridden with mutual incomprehensions.¹⁸⁷

Another group also maintained a modest amount of political activity. This was EGI (*Euzko Gastedi del Interior*), the youth cell of the PNV. Ekin members worked hard to keep in touch and join forces with the latter. They succeeded for a while (1956-59), when Ekin and EGI united under the PNV's patronage. Since the intellectual level of the Ekin components was far higher than that of EGI's, the PNV assigned to the former the task of educating the latter. At the same time, the fusion with EGI presented the previously isolated intellectuals of Ekin with a unique opportunity to spread their political credo to wider numbers of young activists. EGI membership consisted of local militants, most of whom lived in small towns and villages within the Basque cultural heartland. At that time, the EGI activists were just beginning to operate more or less in broad day light since repressive measures had been partially lifted. As EGI's activities were purely nostalgic, 'folkloric' and had scarcely any intellectual impact, they could be tolerated by the regime.¹⁸⁸ But this mixture of inoffensive

¹⁸⁴ At the beginning, they read exclusively nationalist textbooks, [such as Arana, Eleizalde and Aranzadi,] all of which were outlawed and very difficult to obtain. "What united them was a lively awareness of national oppression, a great interest for the Basque language - the majority of them ignored it and would learn it [later]...- and an ethnic vision of Euskadi" (Ortzi 1977: 279).

¹⁸⁵ For the first meetings only seven copies, plus the original, were printed [in offset] for exclusive internal consumption (*Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p. 434), but in a few years the demand grew rapidly.

¹⁸⁶ Despite the name (*Ekin* means to do), their actions did not contemplate any direct intervention in political life. They even reproached the PNV youth sections for being too active and 'inconsiderate' (Ibarzabal, Eugenio, *Así nació ETA...*, op. cit.).

¹⁸⁷ From this moment onwards the scholar is faced with twin materials and diametrically opposed versions of the events, one by the moderates (PNV), the other by the radicals (Ekin). It is a hard task to draw an objective balance between the two.

¹⁸⁸ See *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p. 76 (*Notas a los 'Cuadernos de Ekin'*). The older generation subsequently reversed the accusation, blaming the Ekin group for being 'culturalists'. Thus, the PNV leader Jesús Solaun recalled that "our problem with them [was] to demand that they did something more than the promotion of Euskara and the study of history... By that time, Ekin was nothing more than a group dedicated to intellectual labour; they did not admit anybody, neither agreed to do illegal works, since they did not want to arouse police suspicions". See Solaun, J. (1980) *Memorias de antifascismo, "Muga"*, 3, pp. 35-46. While

'openness' and 'folklorism' appeared to be a serious problem to Ekin members who were much more ambitious. Furthermore, the only partially clandestine character of the organization posed a threat to their personal safety and their freedom of speech.¹⁸⁹

Reciprocal accusations between the PNV and Ekin-EGI of being American agents became increasingly frequent after what was perceived as the great American betrayal.¹⁹⁰ In the past, Aguirre had been a firm friend of the US and an admirer of American society to the point that he believed that his party was liable to receive the same kind of American protection enjoyed by other European Christian Democratic parties (Aguirre 1991).¹⁹¹ During the 1940s, the PNV's *Servicios*, an intelligence organization set up during the war to provide the Allies with data, still used to pass secret information on the internal situation of Spain to the American services. Since the pro-American stance of the PNV remained unchanged over the years (Sullivan 1988: 31), many nationalists had serious reasons to worry that the information which the *Servicios* was passing to the Americans was in turn given to Franco.

Furthermore, the excessively zealous control exercised by the PNV over the youth soon became a hindrance to Ekin's own evolution. The spontaneous character of Ekin and its enthusiastic attitude made it hard to control, thereby arousing the mistrust of the nationalist old guard. When in 1959 Ekin definitively broke off its alliance with the PNV, it took with it most of the EGI youth.

The disappointing encounter with the *peneuvistas* (PNV cadres) contrasted with the idealization of nationalism during Ekin's formative years. The conservative control of the old generation "collided head-on with the mentality of the members of Ekin, who had been accustomed... to reasoning in a search for an answer to all questions" (Jauregui 1986: 572,

Ekin accused the PNV of 'folklorism', the PNV accused Ekin of 'intellectualism', not really a compliment in the reactionary atmosphere of those years (Moran 1982: 268).

¹⁸⁹ In the 1950s, the regime felt secure enough to relax repression and its grip on Basque activities. Nevertheless, secrecy was still a must for any committed *abertzale*. Ekin worked in the most secretive conditions and its members were bonded by an oath of total silence over their activities (Ibarzábal 1979: 78). Some of their early documents concluded with the following sentence: *irakurri ta gero erre egizu* (= read it and then burn it). Euskara was rightly deemed to be an extremely difficult tongue to learn by the 'oppressors'. Its use in ETA's internal communications has prompted the Spanish police to set special courses of Euskara for their forces quartered in the region. Its significance as a 'secret' language and as one of the key means of entering the inner sanctuary of Basque activism is debatable. The mastering of Euskara also has an initiatory component which allows the neophyte to penetrate the holiest of holies of the organization. However, learning the language is not mandatory and many members can barely understand it.

¹⁹⁰ When the level of tension further arose, some PNV leaders used to blame the Ekin group of being Communists. Similar accusations and other epithets were part of a demonization propaganda espoused by the old leaders, at a time when Ekin was still far away from any Marxist leanings.

¹⁹¹ On Aguirre's pro-Americanism, see Ortzi (1975: 259-71) and Aguirre (1991).

1981: 81). Perez-Agote (1984) describes this as a generation break in the face of the alleged inactivity of their predecessors.¹⁹² The PNV had a very bad press in most radical propaganda, but kept its support among the *baserritarrak* (farmers). Hence, the accusation that it was a bourgeois party is only a partial truth. The lack of open channels of communication and the secretive environment of those years were an ideal recipe for misunderstandings.

The PNV was then behaving as little more than a neo-traditionalist group, since it saw 'Basque festivals and cultural events as, in themselves, directly political activities'. Its ideas of culture and nation had to be articulated in a fairly static, conservative and folkloric way so as not to arouse the suspicions of the regime. In contrast, Ekin members were not only committed revivalists, anxious that Basque culture be saved and preserved, but were also eager to promote it to the rank of expressive means of a modern community. This goal could only be achieved by political means and, since during the dictatorship this was not an option, it had to be worked out along clandestine lines. That is, since political constrictions hampered any possibility of cultural self-expression, the 'culturalists' had both to devise strategies of cultural maintenance and to wage a secret struggle to change the order of things.

The 'emerging' generation was young enough to be impatient with the inertia of their fathers, but old enough to remember the atrocities committed by Madrid after the fall of the Republic. They could neither forgive nor forget these atrocities, nor the impending menace of destruction of the Basque heritage. At the same time, they could not wait for formal niceties nor permit the bureaucratic fetters placed by the PNV on any spontaneous initiatives. They therefore decided to take the serious personal risk of organizing active resistance against the regime. Probably, much of the PNV members' aloofness and distrust for the Ekin group stemmed from their concern about the danger of such a choice, since it acted as a magnet for much of their children. With the experience of the Civil War and its endless atrocities still fresh in their memory, the old generation was terrified by the prospects that their children and country might undergo a similar fate. The leaders of Ekin reacted to this invitation to prudence by radicalizing their posture with a juvenile defiance which bordered on a belief in immortality.¹⁹³

¹⁹² One of ETA's ideologues synthesized the problem as follows: "They [the old nationalists] had obtained something. We cannot deny that they won an autonomous government during the Republic. Even if not much, this was something, hence they vigorously defended it to their teeth in front of the new generation who was beginning to call them to account for their inaction. But they did not realize that the Autonomy Statute was part of a body called the Second Spanish Republic and that, with the latter's death, the Statute was buried along with it. Thus, they were wishing to keep alive the member of a putrescent body" (Krutwig 1963: 11).

The main leader and intellectual figure of the group was Txillardegui (José Luis Alvarez Emparanza). Txillardegui, then a 23-year-old engineering student and a member of the Basque Language Academy, wrote several prize-winning novels in Euskara and rarely used Castilian in any of his writings. Other founding members were Julen K. Madariaga, José Mari Benito del Valle, José Manuel Aguirre, and Jon Nicolas, who later were among ETA's founders and leaders.¹⁹⁴ People like Txillardegui felt that the very existence of the Basques was under threat.

Ekin expanded through personal contacts with friends and trustworthy acquaintances, especially in the rural heartland where the preservation of Basque culture was regarded as a guarantee of loyalty and anti-regime feelings. Since the beginning, the group had considered the possibility of armed actions as both the means to defeat Francoism and to revitalize a nation on the verge of losing its cultural identity. This second aspect, the idea of violence as a redeeming and regenerating force, was to take root slowly, almost imperceptibly and steadily. Its most ardent proponent was Madariaga, who defined Basque resistance as a form of anti-colonial struggle. The use of violence had been sporadically advocated as early as the 1940s (Garmendia and Elordi 1982: 174-ff.). However, the leadership of Ekin was more prone to follow Arana's mandate of passive resistance at a time in which the echoes of Gandhism still rebounded.¹⁹⁵

The single greatest intellectual influence on the formation of the Ekin group, particularly on Txillardegui, came from French *existentialism*.¹⁹⁶ The later support of Jean Paul Sartre for the Basque cause, with his sincere sympathy for ETA's 'liberation struggle', is highly significant on this respect.¹⁹⁷ The first 'philosophical' seminar at the University of Deusto

¹⁹³ Personal observation by William Douglass.

¹⁹⁴ Ibarzábal, Eugenio (1978) *Así nació ETA*, "Muga", nº 1, 1979, page 78, mentions also G Ansola, M Barandiaran, A Irigoyen, R Albisu, I Larramendi and I Gainzarain as first members of Ekin. According to Ibarzábal, the latter exercised the main influence. However, this list is not fully reliable, and we have to compare it with other ones. The most reliable data is probably the testimony of the protagonists included in *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, which gives us the following list: Benito del Valle, Txillardegui, Agirre, Madariaga, Larramendi, Albisu, and others who is "better not to mention" (in *Kemen*, p. 434). Garcia de Cortazar and Montero (1983: 1: 259) mention Aguirre, Del Valle, Gainzarain, Madariaga and Txillardegui.

¹⁹⁵ Only a few years later, ETA reversed these assumptions holding that "non violent methods do not seem to yield results except under relatively honest regimes. Gandhi achieved [Indian] independence from the British socialists, not from a Franco or a Stalin" (*Zutik - Tercera Serie/n.s.*, nº 6, 1963, p. 9. Reprinted in *Documentos Y*, vol. 2, p. 283).

¹⁹⁶ See Txillardegui's interviews in *Garaia*, op. cit., in Ibarzabal (1978: 363), and his two novels (*Leturiaren Egunkari Ezkutua* and *Peru Leartzako*). In particular, see the paper by Marc Lagasse on *Le 'Separatisme Basque' est-il un existentialisme?* (Lagasse 1951) and the frequent mentions of Albert Camus in several issues of *Zutik*.

¹⁹⁷ Sartre's ideas and the first ETA shared a lot more in common than has usually been

were characterized by an extremely eclectic approach drawing from an array of sources: first Unamuno (as a Basque), then Maritain, Duverger, Nicolas Berdiaeff, Don Luigi Sturzo, Monseñor Ancel, and Saint Paul.¹⁹⁸ The goal of all these discussions was not to proselytize but to reflect on the present situation of Euskadi and find some solution to its problems.¹⁹⁹ At the World Basque Congress of 1956 in Paris, Aguirre and Del Valle presented a paper on the Basque youth.²⁰⁰

The disenchantment with the PNV was the immediate cause of the breakthrough event in modern Basque history, the foundation of ETA (*Euzkadi 'ta Askatasuna*, Basque Land and Freedom) in 1959.²⁰¹ With the birth of ETA, the PNV ceased to be the only legitimate representative of Basque nationalism, and a whole new chapter of Basque history opened up. The American 'betrayal' of the Basques is one of the key ingredients needed to understand why the organization subsequently took a Leftist and even Trotskyist turn, the other two key elements being immigration (with its class nature) and ideological diffusion (with the leftist vogue spreading over Europe in the 1960s).

The origins of ETA: its first steps and ideology (1959-68)

ETA was founded on July 31, 1959 by the same group of Ekin youth who broke away from the PNV after uniting with EGI.²⁰² In the first months, their activity was limited to continuing the labour of study and reflection which they had already done as Ekin. The organization was divided into six branches.²⁰³ Membership fell into two categories: the militants, who swore an oath of silence, and the sympathizers, who did not.²⁰⁴ A few wall-daubings and the hanging of *ikurriñas* (Basque flags) was the entirety of their external

admitted. See the notes of the subsequent paragraph on the Burgos Trial.

¹⁹⁸ As mentioned by Jon Nicolas: "El grupo Ekin y los primeros pasos", *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, pp. 25-8.

¹⁹⁹ Jon Nicolas: *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ The paper, signed by 'Ekin', dealt with economic welfare of the youth, focussing on the ideological influence of communism. See 'Grupo Ekin', *Situación social de la juventud vasca*. In Euskal Batzar Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 2º aniversario. Vitoria: Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jauriaritza, 1987, pp. 264-5.

²⁰¹ Garmendia (1979) quotes four reasons for the birth and expansion of ETA: 1. The persistence of Basque nationalism; 2. A crisis in Basque traditional values resulting from economic changes in the 1950s; 3. The failure of the PNV's policies, especially its pro-Americanism; and 4. The attraction of other liberation movements (Cuba, Algeria and Israel).

²⁰² Most of EGI's youth followed the new organization. In Gipuzkoa six-eighths, in Vizcaya six-ninths, and in Navarra and Alava all, of the EGI' sections joined the successors of Ekin.

²⁰³ The six branches were: Secretariat (which edited internal bulletins and other publications), Groups (which organized study classes), Euskara (dedicated to the study and diffusion of the language), Legal Action (entrusted with the promotion of semi-legal actions), Propaganda (devoted to printing and distributing all publications) and Military.

²⁰⁴ See *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p. 22.

activity (Garmendia 1979: 21).²⁰⁵ Originally, ETA was essentially a cultural movement, concerned with the fate of Euskera and local culture.²⁰⁶ For years it remained a marginal group, which appealed to a few hundred young activists and sympathizers who were disillusioned by the lack of impetus and political activity of the PNV.

The industrial development of the 1960s brought about an impoverishment and radicalization of the small bourgeoisie and the proletarianization of rural people (Garmendia 1979). Many ETA members came from such backgrounds. The conflict was exacerbated by immigration.

Immediately upon its formation, ETA chose an intransigent line rekindling old Aranist idiosyncrasies, that is, the rejection of all things Spanish through the re-appropriation of Arana's myths (Basque primitive independence, egalitarianism, social justice, the idea of the Basques as a noble, democratic and freedom-loving people). However, it also rejected the centrality of race and religion, which were the two basic tenets of Arana's ideology. The shift from race to language as a preferred vessel of Basque identity implied a new anxiety to halt the fading of Basque cultural distinctiveness: as declared by ETA, "once language is lost" race could not sustain Basque identity.²⁰⁷ Thus, the people were 'chosen' by their history, mores and language, not by their religion or descent.

The first acts of political violence occurred in 1961, when a few explosions shattered government's buildings in different cities, but responsibility for them was not claimed. On July 18, ETA placed an explosive pack on a rail-track attempting to derail a number of trains carrying Francoist veterans from the Civil War. The plot was easily discovered since the explosion was far too weak to derail the train but nevertheless it was clearly heard.²⁰⁸ A wave of arrests occurred amongst Basque activists and their sympathizers: 110 ETA members were imprisoned, many of them tortured, and another 100 or more were forced into

²⁰⁵ On the ban on the *ikurriña* and on those patriots who risked their life hanging one of them, see Bereciartúa (1977). On Basque nationalist graffiti, see Chaffee (1988).

²⁰⁶ According to Pérez-Agote, it is impossible to understand the birth of ETA without considering its initial evaluation of language (1984: 91).

²⁰⁷ From *Cuadernos de ETA*, cited in Garmendia (1979: 22). As observed by Garmendia (1979: 23), ETA seemed occasionally to revert to racial essentialism, especially in its panegyrics for persecuted militants. The noble racial features of an imprisoned or murdered activist were idealized and his/her martyrdom presented as an edifying prototype worthy of imitation. But this esthetic of 'race' was not associated with racism, which was firmly rejected by ETA as Arana's most pernicious legacy. The esthetic of masculine beauty and physical strength is still visible in traditional sport competitions.

²⁰⁸ "Characteristically for that time, the attempt was made with such precautions that it failed to derail even a single car, and there was not so much as one injury" (Clark 1984: 35). See also Hollyman (1976).

exile (Ibarz 1981: 95). These numbers testify to the impressive growth of the organization. In 1953, Ekin was made up of five militants in Bilbao, and as many in Donostia. By 1960, more than 300 militants had passed through its *cursillos de formación* (training courses).²⁰⁹ Despite this blow, ETA continued its underground activity, inaugurating a long period of reflection. Although deeply imbued with Aranism,²¹⁰ ETA's intellectuals were quite knowledgeable about European progressive thought, Third World struggles, and Marxist analysis. In the early 1960s, ETA's leaders started to bring to light the results of years of study and discussion. The first issue of the journal "*Zutik*" ('standing up!')²¹¹ and the circular "*Cuadernos de ETA*" (also called "*Cuadernos de Formación*", =Training Notes) began to appear respectively in 1961 and 1962.²¹²

ETA's First Assembly was held in exile in 1962. On that occasion, the leadership promulgated a 'Declaration of Principles' which synthesized the previous activities and outlined the organization's trends.²¹³ ETA was defined as a 'revolutionary Basque movement for national liberation' (Garmendia 1979: 19-21), yet it advanced no clear political programme, nor new theory. However, the organization was henceforth structured into cells of *liberados*, full-time activists who were to be totally dedicated to ETA's mission and to live in secrecy. A radical change occurred with the infusion of Marxist ideology and, especially, with the opening up to Third World perspectives. The first full ideological formulation and political programme to be adopted by ETA appeared in the book *Vasconia* (1963) by Federico Krutwig, the son of a German industrialist living in Bilbao, who adopted the pseudonym F. Sarrailh de Ihartza. Krutwig, described as a 'solitary franc-tireur' (Ortzi 1977:

²⁰⁹ Interview to Txillardegi, reported in *Garaia*, vol. I, nº 1, 1976, pp. 24-25.

²¹⁰ Jauregui (1981) defines ETA's foundation as a revival of Aranism.

²¹¹ The early 1960s were still a period of reflection and debate. *Zutik* warmly solicited its readers to submit any kind of criticism on its contents. It also made calls for papers, projects, ideas, various information, data, etc. (*Documentos Y*, vol. 2, p. 317). All ETA's historical debates were published in *Zutik*. "Most of ETA's political history is inseparable from the efforts to publish in *Zutik*...It is possible to say that for many years ETA existed in the measure in which *Zutik* was published. And the internal conflicts and schisms focussed around the control of *Zutik*" (*Documentos Y*, vol. 2, p. 380). Thus, control of the magazine came to be highly prized in the infighting that ensued over the years. When splinter groups split off from the parent organization they usually established a counterpart journal to maintain the flow of words and ideas (Clark 1984: 29).

²¹² Every issue of the *Cuadernos de ETA* was dedicated to a single theme. As in Ekin's days, each leading member of the organization was charged with investigating a specific topic and preparing an ensuing *cuaderno* (notebook). Each issue had an essential bibliography, on the basis of which it is possible to establish the international ideological influences exerted on the militants (Conversi 1993).

²¹³ As a consequence of repression, only four members of ETA remained in Spain after the First Assembly. This precariousness did not deter ETA from launching a series of frenetic activities, such as the adhesion to workers' struggle, the enrollment of women, the extension of activities in Navarre, printing, producing propaganda, etc. (See *Documentos Y*, vol. 2, page 5).

280), was an ex-secretary of the Basque Language Academy and never had been a member of ETA.²¹⁴ Notwithstanding its numerous distortions and exaggerations, *Vasconia* remains the key text of contemporary Basque nationalism. It is probably the only work which has been welcomed as *vox populi* by ETA. Txillardegui defined it as "the most important book on Euskadi published in this century". Why did this provocative book attain such an unparalleled success? The answer probably lies in its straightforward language, in the way in which otherwise controversial statements are put forward as indisputable truths. Its dry prose does not admit doubts, nevertheless the book's many contradictions and ambiguities seem to satisfy most of ETA's currents: the Aranists, the European federalists, the proponents of armed struggle, the believers, the secularists, the Marxists and the 'culturalists' (Jauregui 1981: 223-4). Interpreting the new spirit of defiance to dictatorship, *Vasconia* offered to the new generations both a youthful sense of immortality and a mission.²¹⁵ It provided a series of cleverly presented dogmas which served to solidify the otherwise fragmented movement.

A double shift: from religion to secularism, from Americanism to Marxism

Krutwig's programme included an updated recovery of many elements of Aranism, but, as we mentioned before, the latter was cleansed of its racial and religious overtones. Race was replaced by the concept of *ethnos*, as manifested through language and culture. The missionary fervour implied in Arana's Christian vision was replaced by the idea of politics as a vocation. *Vasconia* was also a ferocious attack on the Church as an agent of de-nationalization and an enemy of the people (Krutwig 1963: 75-ff.).²¹⁶ Ancient Basque paganism was 'recovered' as an alternative to the current Church's impotence. Later conversion to Christianity was put forward as a further proof of Basque immemorial independence. Although the Christian ethic was still part of ETA's vision, this did not imply the primacy of the Church over the state, the latter ideal having been abandoned even by the

²¹⁴ At the first World Basque Congress in Paris (1956), Krutwig presented a hasty report on Basque language and territory, which many attendants saw as the rantings of a lunatic, but which nevertheless stimulated a vivid debate. He argued that 'violence' was necessary to create a Basque nation: "The Americans would have not backed Franco if a group of organized violence was opposing him... If the Basques will keep on acting as a docile people, the world will never take them seriously". Also, language was "more important than the Rh factor in blood groups". At first, Krutwig stressed a federalist (or cantonalist) union of Basque territories. See Federico Krutwig, *El echo vasco, el euskera, y el territorio de Euskadi*. In *Euskal Batzar Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 2º aniversario*. Vitoria: Gobierno Vasco/ Eusko Jaurlaritza, 1987, pp. 130-1.

²¹⁵ Personal communication by Joseba Zulaika.

²¹⁶ An enormous distrust towards the Church radically opposed Ekin to the old nationalists. Ekin was defined as an 'aconfessional patriotic movement' (Ortzi 1977: 279).

post-war PNV. In particular, since the Church was associated with the regime through the doctrine of *nacionalcatolicismo*, only the most universal principles of Catholicism were retained. This did not clash with the subsequent Marxist evolution of ETA, rather it reinforced the militants' commitment in their drive for social justice. Indeed, priests, monks and former seminarians continued to flow into ETA well after its Marxist - Trotskyist 'conversion'.²¹⁷

A constant feature of Basque life since the end of the Civil War has been the astonishment and complaint that the Church, by siding with Franco, 'betrayed' the Basque cause. After the phase of Falangist 'terror', many firm believers tacitly questioned the behaviour of the Church, asking repeatedly "why this silence by the [Catholic] hierarchy?" (Sierra Bustamante 1941: 204-11). The memory of anti-clerical atrocities was not a sufficient excuse for justifying repression on such a scale.²¹⁸ The Church was under fire from most of the clandestine opposition, but Basque priests and seminarians were particularly sensitive to such recurrent accusations (Iztueta 1981). In 1960, three years before the publication of *Vasconia* and less than one year after ETA's creation, the lower clergy came out into the open for the first time: 339 priests of the dioceses of Gasteiz, Donostia and Bilbao signed a joint petition to their respective Bishops in which they denounced the political and cultural oppression of Euskadi. With unprecedented courage, the manifesto defined the official policy to be "reactionary and anti-human to the point of genocide".²¹⁹ The importance of the Basque language as an instrument of evangelization was particularly stressed. With this action, the

²¹⁷ Many people raised in Catholic seminars entered ETA's ranks between 1967 and 1972. This period has been ironically described by the playwright Father Pierre Larzabal as the 'clerical phase' of ETA (cited in the EGIPV, entry "ETA", vol. 12, p. 126). Again, Krutwig compares the guerrilla fighter to a crusader, for "the spirit which pervades him must spring up over all sides as the faith of the Middle-Age's knight. Revolutionary war is thus an ideological combat similar to the medieval one. To a certain extent, it is a religious war. And, as in the latter, the revolutionary must promise to redeem the humble" (Krutwig 1963: 330).

²¹⁸ Even President Aguirre, leader of the PNV, normally described as a Christian Democratic party (Brezzi 1979), emphatically recalled that the atrocities committed by Franco's troops were far more devastating. "Both the 'Red hordes' and the 'White hordes' were guilty of burning, pillaging and murder. But when all the truth is known the world will be even more horrified by the bloody accomplishment of the White hordes than it was over the tales of the 'Red atrocities'. I can state categorically that the victims executed by Franco's regime are far more numerous than the victims made to suffer at the hands of certain hangers-on of the Republic" (Aguirre 1991: 307-8).

²¹⁹ *Escrito presentado a los excmos. obispos de Vitoria, San Sebastian, Bilbao y Pamplona, con las firmas de 339 sacerdotes de dichas diocesis, el día 30 de Mayo de 1960.* Reprinted in *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, 128-133. Most of the signing priests were PNV members who took a considerable risk in raising their voices after decades of silence. Once the first 339 priests signed the document, many more added their signatures. An overall climate of skepticism and rebellion began to creep amongst the lower clergy pitting it against the upper hierarchy. This is a frequent occurrence in nationalist movements (Smith, personal observation).

Basque priests put seriously their personal safety at risk, but the Church in other parts of Spain (and the Vatican) did not display a sufficient sense of solidarity with the protesters. This stiff attitude of the Church was indeed another factor in encouraging many believers to join ETA or support its activists.

Another mainstay of *Vasconia* is the stress on action. According to Jauregui (1981: 152), Krutwig's ideas were directly derived from Ernest Renan's (1823-1892) voluntaristic view of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite'. We shall see that the concept of voluntary participation is central to the evolution of all present-day Basque nationalism. However, *Vasconia*'s most relevant contribution was strategic with its choice of guerrilla war as the only means to liberate Euskadi. In this choice, Krutwig was directly inspired by the Algerian and Cuban experiences. A further impulse in this direction was received with Franz Fanon's (1925-1961) works. Fanon rationalized anticolonial violence as a liberating and purifying principle, essential to the psychological well-being of the 'oppressed'. This 'third-worldist' approach was opposed to the pre-existing pro-European and federalist trends and this underlying opposition continued right up to the 1990s (Conversi 1993b).

A further step forward in the definition of ETA's programme, came in 1963 with José Luis Zalbide's booklet, *Insurrección en Euskadi*,²²⁰ which synthesized those parts of Krutwig's programme dealing with armed struggle. Aimed at being a guerrilla manual, it can be regarded as the cornerstone of ETA's military branch's strategy. The influence of Mao-Tse-Tung and Ho-Chi-Minh is evident in many parts of the pamphlet.²²¹ The theses of Krutwig and Zalbide were approved in ETA's Second Assembly (1963), in which Euskadi was divided into six operative zones (*herrialdes*) with the aim of carrying out the revolutionary war. Thus, local theorists began to conceive armed struggle as their primary concern, with violence as the only means of rescuing Euskadi from its secular torpor.²²² In 1963, ETA participated for the first time in the organization of working class strikes. Although they kept

²²⁰ Published anonymously as a special issue of *Cuaderno de ETA*, nº 20 (1964), Bayonne: Goitziri. Reproduced in *Documentos Y*, vol. 3, pp. 20-71. The bibliography includes the main works of Che Guevara, Mao-Tse-Tung, Krutwig, and, especially, *La Guerre Revolutionnaire* by Claude Delmas, entire sections of which are reproduced. It may also be possible that *Insurrección en Euskadi* was written by Madariaga, the first ETA's proponent of armed struggle.

²²¹ Especially appreciated in radical milieux was the famous Maoist aphorism of the guerrilla fighter who moves among his people as a 'fish in the water', a natural element which he needs in order to survive (Krutwig 1963: 330). One of ETA's features was indeed its symbiosis with the human environment of the Basque hinterland.

²²² Still in 1962, there was no agreement on the use of violence within ETA. For instance, *Zutik* nº 19 reported that "between Gandhi's non-violence and a civil war there are intermediate methods of struggle ...which we want to put in practice" (*Zutik*, nº 19 reported in *Documentos Y*, vol. 2, 229).

a low profile and a secondary organizational role, they had to bear the brunt of the repression because, although the state could allow the airing of economic grievances, it could never tolerate ones that were couched in ethnic terms.

The Third Assembly (1964) wholeheartedly adopted Krutwig's approach defining ETA as an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist organization working for the liberation of Euskadi and for the emancipation of the working class. Zalbide wrote his *Carta a los intelectuales* (Letter to the intellectuals) which postulated the basic principles to be adopted by ETA.²²³ At the same time, the founding fathers of Ekin/ETA were expelled from France and confined to exile further afield in Belgium. Henceforth, the physical distance considerably hampered the flow of communication between the old and experienced leadership and the 'base' which began to act singled-handedly. ETA then came under the control of young radicals who advocated revolutionary war.

During the Fourth Assembly (1965), the first one which took place *en el interior* (within Spain), the programmatic link between social and national struggle was firmly adopted. Class struggle and national liberation became the two faces of the same coin. Zalbide's *Insurrección en Euskadi* provided the guidelines of this turn of events and was approved by ETA as an article of faith. Its central tenet was Krutwig's theory of the "cycle of action/repression/action", which held that, "where popular protest against injustices met with oppression, the revolutionary forces should act to punish the oppressor. The occupying forces would then retaliate with indiscriminate violence, since they would not know who the revolutionaries were, causing the population to respond with increased protest and support for the resistance in an upward spiral of resistance to the dictatorship" (Sullivan 1988: 42-43). This theory was to provide the overall framework of ETA's strategy throughout its long evolution since the publication of *Vasconia*. ETA started to assume a paramilitary form. The first direct armed attack was a robbery of a bank courier in 1965.

The main ideological rift of this period was the struggle between Trotskyists and Third-Worldists (*tercermundistas*), the latter of whom followed Krutwig's call for a Third-World-style mass insurgency. This tension was at its peak when ETA convened its watershed Fifth Assembly (1966-67), which was spread over a long period of time.²²⁴ Its first half (1966)

²²³ Reprinted in Garmendia (1979: 287-303).

²²⁴ Garmendia (1979) confers a key importance to this period, when, after Zalbide's fall and the exile of many leaders, ETA was left under the control of the Political Bureau (*oficina política*) led by Paco Iturrioz. The theory of 'action/repression/action' was dismissed and a new cleavage arose between patriotic workers and alleged 'bourgeoise' nationalists. ETA began to actively support the Cc. Oo. (*Comisión Obreras*, the pro-Communist labour union) and to participate in unions' struggles.

consecrated a 'holy alliance' between the *tercermundistas* and the 'culturalist' faction (the one immediately descending from Ekin). This alliance occurred at the expense of the Maoists who formed a separate *ETA-Berri* (= New ETA). It was the first split within ETA, but more were to follow. In the Second and crucial half of the Fifth Assembly (1967), the new concept of *Pueblo Trabajador Vasco* (Basque Working People) was elaborated to reinforce the notion that class struggle and nationalism were in pursuit of the same common interests. ETA was divided into four fronts: *Cultural, Economic, Political, and Military*. In the years to come, the great debate would be confined to the latter two, of which the Military Front eventually emerged victorious. The 'culturalists' and other original Ekin members formed a separate group, called *Branka* (1967), based on the name of their journal.²²⁵ Each of these splits was preceded by intense ideological debate, mostly in a violent atmosphere of confrontation polarized by secrecy and the fear of police intrusions. The political environment of those years could not allow the luxury of pluralism. Furthermore, ETA's logic demanded that one simple and unchallenged ideological choice be made in order to attract more conscripts from all classes. What occurred instead was a process of political fragmentation from which new leaders emerged or splinter groups were formed in an unceasing process of self-definition. Since the times of Ekin, discussions were marked by "a permanent oscillation between humble claims of the mere right to doubt to the fanatical rejection of those who dared to question what just happened to become an unquestionable truth" (*Documentos Y*: 1: 10). It is important to consider that most people in Euskadi were unaware of these internal conflicts and saw ETA as a homogeneous body. Holding a belief in ETA's ideological continuity, its external supporters and sympathizers understood these conflicts as nothing but detail.

The beginning of armed struggle

In the meantime the spiral of violence slowly escalated with the first armed bank robberies. Following one of these, on 7 June 1968 a car transporting two *etarras* (ETA members) was stopped at a road block. A gunfight erupted, a member of the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) was killed, the first victim of ETA, but the car managed to escape.²²⁶ However, at a second road block one of the two *etarras*, Txabi Etxebarrieta, was hauled from the car and shot in

²²⁵ This tradition of naming a group after the journal or bulletin which was their mouthpiece (*Ekin, Branka, Saioak*, etc.), testifies to the spontaneity of the process and the lack of formalities in their creation and, generally, in the overall Basque political evolution during these years.

²²⁶ 7 de junio de 1968: *ETA aprieta el gatillo por primera vez*, "La Vanguardia", 5 junio 1988, pp. 6-7 (Report published on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the beginning of armed struggle).

cold blood. This was the 'casus belli' which the theorists of armed struggle were waiting for. Popular indignation for the killing of Etxebarrieta broke out in mass demonstrations in every major city, town and village of Euskadi. Priests held masses in his memory for weeks, Etxebarrieta was now a hero and "ETA's ranks swelled with new arrivals" (Clark 1984: 49).

Although the use of violence had been theorized at least since the late 1950s, the first premeditated political murder was carried out only in 1968. When the police commissioner, Meliton Manzananas, a notorious torturer, was about to enter his house at 3.15 pm on 2 August, he was shot dead with several bullets by a single assailant in front of his wife.²²⁷ The government response was swift and ruthless. During a 'state of emergency', scores of suspected ETA sympathizers were rounded up, illegally detained, beaten and intimidated. In the meantime, people filled the street in mass demonstrations. The first phase of the "cycle of action/repression/action" had begun, but its heavy toll on the organization forced its leaders to rethink its applicability. In 1968 Zalbide wrote from jail a new booklet, *Iraultza or Hacia una estrategia revolucionaria vasca* (Towards a Basque Revolutionary Strategy), which replaced his anti-colonialist thesis with a broader anti-imperialist perspective (Jauregui 1981: 417).²²⁸

In 1969, the structure of ETA was severely disrupted by a further wave of arrests. Most of the leaders were forced into exile, where they rejoined the other main factions. The Sixth Assembly held in 1970 represented ETA's last serious theoretical debate, but ideological confusion reached its peak. A host of groups emerged from it more separate than ever. The *Red Cells* (*Cellulas Rojas*), focussing on the magazine *Saioak* (=Essays) and led by José Ezkubi, championed the extension of the struggle to the rest of Spain through contacts with working class organizations. The *Milis*, originating from the Military Front and led by Jon Etxabe, refused any contacts with Spanish organizations maintaining an anti-Marxist line and a radical intransigence in their quest for national sovereignty. Other factions followed their paths.²²⁹ However, all of them remained somewhat aloof from the heat of the debate in their French or Belgian exile. With nearly all the experienced leadership either arrested or in exile,

²²⁷ Manzananas was one of the most hated figures in Euskadi. An article signed by Madariaga claimed that persons like Manzananas "will pay dearly for their crimes" (*Zutik*, 1962, reprinted in *Documentos Y*, vol. 3, p. 301). These accusations were reiterated in other ETA publications (such as *Zutik* nº 2, December 1961, in *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p. 406).

²²⁸ After being criticized by Krutwig and Beltza, Zalbide reformulated his thesis in *Fines y medios en la lucha de liberación nacional* (1970), which was subsequently adopted by the new post-1971 ETA.

²²⁹ The *tercermundistas* tried to strike the balance between the goal of independence and a residual commitment to Marxism-Leninism. The culturalists of *Branka* tried insistently to form a broad coalition, which was referred to as 'national front'. Other leaders of the *Ekin* days and early ETA, such as Madariaga and Beltza, maintained good relations with Branka.

ETA's Executive Committee was now in the hands of an inexperienced youth who tried to patch up the pieces by attempting to placate each of the exiled factions. However, the participants of the Sixth Assembly were not representative of this ideological variety: the assembly became at first dominated by the Red Cells to the exclusion of the other factions. They expelled the Milis, but were in turn expelled by the Executive Committee, whilst other members bitterly resigned. Finally, the Milis and the old leaders (Krutwig, Beltza, Madariaga, Txillardegui, etc.) ruled from exile that all the participants to the Sixth Assembly be expelled from ETA. That meant that they re-founded the organization and for a while there were two ETAs.

In 1970, 16 *etarras* charged with the murder of Manzananas were brought before a military tribunal in Burgos. The famous Burgos Trial was an historical watershed for the whole Basque movement as well as for Spanish opposition (Halimi 1971, Sullivan 1988: 92-112). For weeks, international media focussed on the Basques' struggle. All over Europe mass demonstrations and solidarity committees sprang up in support of the condemned. Renowned leftist intellectuals and *maitres-à-penser* joined the chorus.²³⁰ European ambassadors were recalled for consultation and the Vatican pleaded for clemency. Popular demonstrations were held in many parts of Spain, while in Euskadi priests celebrated masses, general strikes paralyzed most activities, and universities were closed. In Madrid, dissident lawyers occupied the Palace of Justice, and massive demonstrations were held in other cities. Its legitimacy crumbling under the pressure of a powerful public opinion, the Spanish regime was now agonizing.²³¹ As a consequence, ETA rose as a symbol "above public censure. Open criticism of ETA was judged as open support for the regime" (Heiberg 1989: 107).

The trial came at a time of maximum internal strife for ETA, with factions at odds with each other and many disillusioned militants leaving the organization. The day before the trial started, the Milis kidnapped the West German consul in San Sebastian. Apparently, their double agenda was to put pressure on the regime and regain control over ETA. In the

²³⁰ See Jean-Paul Sartre's introduction to Halimi (1971). Sartre saw Euskadi as a colony exploited by a fascist state allied with American imperialism. In general, he showed considerable understanding for the problems of European national minorities. Sartre accused the European Left of uncritically assuming the French bourgeoisie's cultural Jacobinism (Ortzi 1977: 380-1). "I wish to oppose the abstract universality of bourgeois humanism to the singular universality of the Basques... A heroic people, led by a revolutionary party, has shown us another [face of] socialism, tangible and decentralizing: this is the universality of the Basques, which ETA justly opposes to the abstract centralism of the oppressors" (Sartre 1972: XXIX-XXX, in Halimi 1971). Obviously, Sartre was referring to the ETA of the Burgos Trial, which surged as an international champion of resistance against oppression.

²³¹ The regime was now being abandoned even by the Church as, since 1969, the Opus Dei technocrats left the government coalition (Hermet 1986: 455-ff.).

limelight of the Burgos trial, the Milis were provided with direct access to the international media through their spokesman Telesforo Monzón (1904-1987).²³² The kidnappers asked for a more lenient treatment for the Burgos sixteen and for the commutation of death sentences. Following secret negotiations, the consul was released unharmed and subsequently Franco commuted all the death sentences.

ETA's internecine conflicts continued in the following months (early 1971) as the old guard renamed itself *ETA-V*, from the Fifth-Assembly, while the followers of the Sixth Assembly came to be known as *ETA-VI*. The latter had almost dropped their nationalist emphasis, embracing Trotskyism and class struggle.²³³ Euskadi was then still conceived as an internal colony, but especially as an urban developed society in which the working class movement was to play a decisive role in the building of Basque socialism. Yet, at least in Bilbao, the workers were largely immigrants, therefore the emphasis had to be on class conflict, not on ethnic conflict. Clearly, the presence of immigrant workers played a key role in repeatedly shifting ETA's ideology to the far left. The need to mobilize immigrants resulted in an increasing radicalization of the process. Indeed, ETA's radicals quickly found out at the expense of the moderates that the immigrants were more likely to be involved whenever actions prevailed over theory and over 'abstract' debates on Basque identity.

In order to understand this mechanism, we have first to presuppose that newcomers are willing to integrate into the host society. Even when they chose not to do so or to give up their efforts at integration, they normally encourage their children to become full members of the host society and share its culture. However, this step is particularly difficult to accomplish in a society which is unable to offer shared and accessible core values. Until recently, race and religion worked as conscious obstacles to integration, while language was not widely available and extremely difficult to master.²³⁴ At the same time, in a polarized society mass mobilizations began to attract the immigrants' offspring. Their participation in

²³² Monzón, an independent-minded old man attracted by the enthusiasm and good-will of the new generation, left the PNV in 1977 in order to join the Left *abertzale* movement. See Idoia Estornes Zubizarreta, entry 'Monzón', in the EGIPV, vol. 29, pp. 254-8.

²³³ The only earlier abandonment of nationalism dates back to the already mentioned founding of *ETA-Berri* in 1966 by the followers of the Maoist leader Paco Iturriz. In 1970, *ETA-Berri* changed its name into *Movimiento Comunista de España* (MCE, Communist Movement of Spain) in order not to be identified with ETA and avoid police persecution.

²³⁴ Although immigrants and natives nominally share the same religion, the reality is more complex. Religious practice per Sunday varies from 80% in Euskadi to 15% in Andalusia and Extremadura (Duocastella 1965, quoted by Martin 1978: 254-5). Castile, where most of the immigrants came from, occupies a middle ground. Martin observes that "Catholic weekly practice is at its optimum where it is expression of a repressed nationalism" (1978: 152); in Eire, Poland, Euskadi and Brittany. On the regional distribution of religious practice in Spain see Duocastella (1965).

these public events encouraged the latter to share the natives' common myths and symbols. They certainly were not concerned with 'purity of blood': what was at stake was their social peace and very existence, since any mobilization carried with it the risk of being killed by the 'occupation forces'. Simultaneously, Left-wing nationalism carried a progressive message to the immigrants, while ETA's daring violence exercised an irresistible charm in many juvenile sectors. The more ETA's *ekintzak* (armed actions) involved a direct confrontation with the state, the more ETA's star would rise among non-native proletarians. Thus, violence became a vehicle of integration into the nationalist struggle.

The move away from ethnicity to class produced continuous splits within the *abertzale* movement.²³⁵ The young members who drifted towards workers' mobilization and had finally dropped the nationalist cause, became unavoidably alienated from the ethnic Basque base, which still formed the backbone and leading force of the movement. The class orientation of the now Trotskyist ETA-VI, its inactivity, and its miscalculation of the possibility of mobilizing Basque workers on class lines, together with the arrest and imprisonment of their leaders, spelled its decline and subsequent end. ETA-V, a wider interclass alliance of various nationalist forces, took the lead of the movement. ETA-VI then vanished, disappearing into the cauldron of extra-parliamentary Spanish left-wing organizations,²³⁶ while others of its components joined mainstream left parties and still others were drawn back to their radical nationalist roots. As Clark puts it, "ETA served as the point of departure for a number of splinter groups that would occupy positions of radical intransigence throughout the Spanish and Basque political spectrum" (1984: 44).

But other forces were also at work, trying to smooth over nationalist discord. In 1971, there was much talk of a proposed *frente nacional* (= 'national front') reuniting all Basque forces from both Left and Right. The main promoters of this idea were the 'culturalists' of the Branka group. Again, cultural nationalists played a key role in reinvigorating political nationalism by attempting to build up an inter-class alliance of all nationalist forces. The project was eventually to fail, because of the predominance of Marxists inside ETA who refused to make common cause with 'bourgeois' nationalists.

²³⁵ As a protest against the Marxist-Leninist turn of ETA in the mid-1960s the old leadership (Txillardegi, Del Valle, Imaz) left the organization: "ETA is no longer a means to achieve our goals and it has been converted into a Marxist-Leninist party... Since we do not accept any of the basic tenets of this political philosophy and praxis, we have decided to abandon ETA" (*Por que dejamos E.T.A.*, by J.L. Alvarez Emparanza, J.M. Benito del Valle, X. Imaz, 14 April 1967, pamphlet reprinted in Caracas [1967?] by Eusko Gastegi).

²³⁶ In 1973, ETA-VI was definitively absorbed into the Trotskyist LCR (*Lega Comunista Revolucionaria*), the Spanish section of one of the rival Fourth Internationals.

The early 1970s saw an unprecedented outburst of cultural activities. The spearhead of the cultural revival was the movement of the *ikastolas* (*ikastolak* in Basque), or schools in Euskera. Its antecedents established during the Second Republic, the *ikastolas* were forced underground and nearly ceased their activity under Francoism (Arpal et al. 1982, Tejerina 1992: 129-37). The first timid re-openings by the regime in the 1960s were quickly seized upon by the movement, which started anew, first in private homes, then in kindergartens, and in the following decade spread to every city and village of the Euskaldún area.²³⁷ The *ikastolas* were entirely financed by parents' contributions and were submitted to all sorts of legal hindrances by the Francoist authorities. The fundraising was carried out village by village and represented a high moment of collective mobilization. The revival was supported by many non-nationalists as well, in particular by the Left, since at that time the struggle on behalf of the Basque nation was considered parallel with the one for democracy. In 1960, the first three *ikastolas* were opened in Gipuzkoa (Lasa 1968). Their number increased at a spectacular rate, going from 520 pupils in 1966-65 (Nuñez 1977) to 40,000 pupils - distributed in 185 schools- in 1977 (Euskaltzaindia 1977, 1979). A literary revival also started in this period, culminating with the mythical novel *Obabakoak* by Bernardo Atxaga.²³⁸

From Marxism back to nationalism

ETA's Workers Front, known as *obreristas* (= 'workerists'), was soon accused of *españolismo* (=Hispanicism, pro-centralist attitudes) since it promoted collaboration with Spanish parties on the ground that the proletariats of Euskadi and other regions shared a common struggle against bourgeois capitalism. The accusation of being *españolista* was particularly onerous for people who had to live in absolute secrecy and for whom the slightest leak of information could have had dramatic consequences, including the arrest and torture of hundreds.

²³⁷ Benito del Valle's declaration that the first *ikastolas* were created by Ekin (*Punto y Hora*, nº 134, p. 44-5, 1979) is firmly rebutted by Ibáñez (Muga, nº 2, 1979, p. 4. See also Muga, nº 3, 1980, pp. 10-13). However, Txillardegi also mentions Ekin's failed attempt to promote *ikastolas* from 1954 to 1959 (*Garaia*, vol. I, nº 1, 2-9 September 1976, p. 25.). The *cursillos de formación* organized by Ekin gave primary importance to the teaching of Euskara, which was one of the main subjects and often also a medium of instruction. After the 'joint venture' with EGI, these initiatives spread to many villages and attracted more and more pupils.

²³⁸ For an anthology of recent Basque fiction, see Lasagabaster (1990). See also Coco (1992). However, only Atxaga's novel stands out as a great literary achievement and has been translated into English (Atxaga 1992). For a review of the novel and its implication, see Cameron (1992).

Once its rival ETA-VI disappeared, ETA-V joined an important fraction of the PNV's youth branch (EGI) merging - for the second time - under the single initials of ETA (as formally agreed in 1972). The infusion of 500 youths from EGI reinvigorated ETA and renewed its informal contacts with conservative nationalists. They adopted wholeheartedly the ideological principles of the Fifth Assembly (second half), thereby fusing class and national struggle. This new turn was translated into a stepping up of violent actions. In 1972, armed assaults reached an unprecedented peak. The turning point was the kidnapping of the industrialist Lorenzo Zabala as part of a labour dispute in early 1972. This was the first action directed against an ethnic Basque who, furthermore, spoke Euskara. As the workers of his factory had gone out on strike on a wage-raising ticket, the company responded by firing all the striking workers. This action provided an unique opportunity to assure the working class that they could count on ETA for the defence of their interests, drawing them into the struggle for the liberation of Euskadi. The fact that Zabala was an *euskaldún* (Euskara-speaking Basque) only added strength to ETA's claim of acting on behalf of the workers and beyond strictly ethnic interests. The four conditions set out by the kidnappers were all met with minor modifications by the employers: the rehiring of the sacked workers, the payment of wages lost in the striking days, an increase in salary, and the official recognition of the workers' committee charged with negotiating a wage settlement. Zabala was released unharmed after only one week of being held incommunicado.

The success of the operation proved to the regime that ETA was still alive and had regained considerable strength after the dark days of the Burgos trial. This action initiated an unprecedented wave of guerrilla attacks, unleashing renewed repression upon the whole Basque Country. A new generation of leaders emerged, among them 'Txomin' and 'Argala'. Four ETA members were killed on separate occasions. The new brand of Marxism and nationalism (this time, without rejecting the latter) attracted the important moral support of the Burgos prisoners, whose statements appeared in "Zutik" (Ortzi 1975: 390-91).²³⁹ As a consequence, ETA reached a period of unequalled expansion. The fusion between Marxism and nationalism proved to be highly attractive in a country which, as we shall see, has traditionally stressed egalitarian values and a thirst for social justice.

The most notorious act of ETA has been the killing of Admiral Carrero Blanco, the expected successor of Franco, in December 1973. This act created a spate of international concern and admiration for ETA, as well as a diplomatic focus on the Basque question, a

²³⁹ See "Zutik", nº 63, 1972, reprinted in *Documentos* Y, vol. 12, pp. 347-ff.

general sympathy for the Basques and even a few art works, such as the book and movie *Operation Ogro*.²⁴⁰ But ETA's fronts started to argue among themselves, acting autonomously and competing in their actions, as did different sub-factions within them.²⁴¹

In 1974, a bloody terrorist attack at the Café Rolando in Madrid left nine people killed and scores injured. ETA accused the security forces of being responsible for deliberately not evacuating the place after ETA's bomb alert. However, the repercussions of the attack brought about an acrid confrontation and a new split between *ETA-m* (ETA-Militar) and *ETA-pm* (ETA-Politico-Militar). The latter convened its own 'second half of the Sixth Assembly' in 1975 and decided to expand armed struggle. After the imposition of a state of emergency in Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa, two *etarras*, Txiki and Otaegi, were executed. This gave the signal for a new series of mass protests, which in turn prompted further states of emergency. But the regime could no longer stem the tide of popular discontent. Hence, its *raison d'être*, the drive to keep the country tightly united, risked becoming its greatest failure (Preston 1993). In late 1975, Franco was on his death bed and the whole region was in turmoil. Crucial changes were bound to happen.

Concluding remarks

In the late 1950s, under the full impact of Francoism, the Basque Country began to undergo a rapid process of radical socio-economic change.²⁴² Clashing with the dictatorship's stalemate, the new socio-economic changes inspired a rethinking among

²⁴⁰ The book was written by Eva Forest (1974) under the pseudonym of Julen Aguirre. See also the critique of the movie by the Italian writer Alberto Moravia, *La Memoria e i suoi figli*, in "L'Espresso", 21-10-1979. Its director, Gillo Pontecorvo, became famous in the 1960s for his *La battaglia di Algeri* (Battle of Algiers) on the Algerian revolution. *Operation Ogro* was much more coldly received than its predecessor, not just in the Basque Country. This was possibly due to the director's rejection of armed struggle, an allegedly "moralistic" choice influenced by the impact of contemporary dramatic events in Italy, namely the array of murders, kidnappings and other terrorist attacks carried out by the Red Brigades. This overlap and confusion was one of the reasons why Basque nationalists were so disappointed by the movie's overt message that ETA should drop armed struggle, although the movie recognized its legitimacy as a tool against Francoism. In some way, the 'outrageous' confusion of ETA's struggle with an international terrorist band with the sole common denominator of Marxism contributed to distance some sectors of ETA from Marxism. Pontecorvo's mistake was to have misunderstood the 'Fanonian' connection between Euskadi and Algeria.

²⁴¹ In 1974, both the Labour/Workers and the Cultural fronts split off to form autonomous parties, respectively called LAIA and EHAS. See the section on Herri Batasuna in the next chapter.

²⁴² The Basque economy had been heavily penalized during early Francoism. It began to recover from about 1959 and in the 1960s reached boom proportions. As Madrid created bureaucratic difficulties for the local economy, some businessmen suspected that Madrid was trying to undermine it. Nationalism has thus been interpreted as a means of greater control of regional economic destiny (Zirakzadeh 1985, 1991).

underground opposition circles and set the bases for impressive future political upheavals.

ETA's main ideological text was written by non-member Federico Krutwig, who never participated in organized politics. This puts him in a different historical role from Sabino de Arana. Nevertheless, Arana and Krutwig shared several similarities: they were both marginal intellectuals. Arana was castigated by his contemporary intellectual colleagues as a quaint reactionary.²⁴³ Krutwig was considered a lunatic. Both were viscerally anti-bourgeois and saw urban capitalist society as a major cause of Basque decadence. Both were Castilian-speakers and learned Euskara at a later age, as a central part of their nationalist socialization. In their choices, both Arana and Krutwig were inspired by, and synthesized, pre-existing trends. Arana drew upon the Carlist tradition which he inherited from his family's background. To a certain extent, he was also influenced by liberal foralism (Sarramaga, Iturralde, etc.) and by the strong bonds persisting between city and countryside. Krutwig drew instead on the intellectual debate initiated by Ekin, which was later put into practice by ETA. However, they sharply differed in their choice of core values for Basque national identity. Krutwig was vehemently anti-clerical since he saw the Church as an instrument of oppression against the Basque people. He also proclaimed himself to be anti-racist and did not believe in the purity of blood and other dogmas. Therefore, he blamed his predecessor Arana as being 'more racist than Hitler'.²⁴⁴ He was so anti-clerical that he defined the Catholic Church as an "army used to enslave the Basque spirit, the army of the most odious of the oppressors" (1963: 67). Yet, there is a common thread between Arana and Krutwig. It is, paradoxically, a desperate search for cultural regeneration in a world that has only contempt for tradition. In this search, they both turned to language. Yet, at a certain stage, they both laid aside language and replaced it with something else, more attuned to the times and circumstances. Arana chose race and religion. Krutwig redefined Basque identity in terms of language and *ethnos*, but in practice placed it second after voluntary participation and activism, as epitomized in 'revolutionary violence'. Race and religion were no longer feasible instruments of mobilization.

A key feature in Basque politics and within ETA has been the continuous clash between cultural and political nationalism. Furthermore, after ETA had definitely chosen the path of armed struggle, a more dramatic conflict emerged between these two kinds of nationalism and a purely military one. With the increase of killings by the police and the *Guardia Civil*, and with the indiscriminate repression of the Basque people and culture, ETA fighters were

²⁴³ See the statements of Unamuno and Maetzu in chapters 9.

²⁴⁴ From an interview in *Cambio* 16, 23-1-1984 (quoted in Gilmour 1985).

raised to the figures of martyrs and heroes. In this connection, it is important to remember that all the founders of Ekin and ETA were primarily cultural nationalists. Their central concern resided in the fate of Euskera. In the late 1960s ETA-V, and then ETA-VI, drifted towards a purely political brand of nationalism, focussing on class struggle. That occurred approximately when their leaders opted for mobilizing the immigrant working class.

This chapter has also illustrated the fissiparous trends within ETA and how these were overcome through the use of violence, generating a vicious circle of internal fragmentation and external confrontation. The trigger for the cycle of armed struggle has been the violent, often indiscriminate, oppression under the dictatorship. This chapter has also shown that ideological tensions were related to cultural fragmentation, in the form of immigration, rural/urban divide, class cleavages, Castilianization, etc. The dynamics of fragmentation and state repression will be analysed in the final chapter. In the next chapter, we shall examine how the interaction of different internal variables with the same external variable, state repression, generated a different pattern of national mobilization in Catalonia.

Chapter 5

CATALONIA UNDER FRANCO

Francoism adopted the most radical politics of assimilation against non-Castilian cultures in modern Spanish history.²⁴⁵ The dictatorship's early stage was known as the Falangist period due to the predominance in the government's ranks of members of the *Falange Española*. It lasted approximately from 1939 to 1945. Most authors divide Francoism into two broad periods: from the civil war to the advent of the 'technocratic era' (1939-1959), and from the latter to the dictator's death (1959-1975). 1959 is therefore a watershed year, although other authors have pointed to different periods and focuses.²⁴⁶

In this chapter, an historical overview of the Francoist oppression and resurgence of Catalanism will serve the purpose of underlining its strong cultural character and the reasons it developed as a broad non-violent, inter-class and inter-party alliance. In contrast to the Basque case, we shall see that the all-encompassing cultural nature of Catalanism worked as a stimulus for bridging ancient ideological rivalries, creating the basis for a non-violent democratic movement which swelled local politics with the collapse of the dictatorship.

The drive to cultural homogeneity (1939-1942)

Before his assassination, the Finance Minister José Calvo Sotelo (1893-1936) loudly proclaimed: "I'd rather prefer a Red Spain than a broken Spain" (cited in Garcia Venero 1968: 561). This sentence synthesized the driving force of the Falangist and Francoist campaigns, namely an obsession with 'national unity'. So great was this obsession that political hatred was directed against the 'separatists' even more than against the Left. Eventually, the two categories were bundled up into a unique concept and propaganda tool as

²⁴⁵ Prior to 1939 the Spanish state failed to articulate any serious process of nation-building (Arbos and Puigsec 1980, Giner 1986: 447).

²⁴⁶ As an example, Vilar (1967) focuses on 1956 as a watershed. 1956 is also the year in which Spanish Television started broadcasting from Madrid, but its programmes could be picked up in Catalonia only in February 1959 (Culla 1989: 349).

rojo separatistas (red-separatists).

The propagandists of the Falange attacked the 'separatists' for "ignoring the unitarian reality of Spain". Yet in practice, such unity, far from being 'natural', was based on the imposition of a single language, Castilian (Spanish), backed up by police repression and a centralized education system. The Jacobin idea of a common language, culture, race, history and territory as necessary prerequisites for state-building was deeply entrenched in the Falangist ideology which accompanied early Francoism. The Fascist and Nazi models of a strong unitarian self-sufficient state were also imported and adapted to the Spanish reality.²⁴⁷ Hence, everybody had the duty of "fluently speaking the tongue of Spanish unity, the ecumenical language of our *hispanidad*".²⁴⁸ Spanish was the language of the empire (*idioma del imperio*) and, for this reason, "it *must* be spoken all over the state territory".²⁴⁹

Many of these ideas were inspired by the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955).²⁵⁰ Although Ortega was at pains to stress that he was not a nationalist, he repeatedly emphasized that Spanish unity could only be preserved at the cost of accepting the dominance of the Spanish state and imposing its cultural symbols - first of all the Castilian language. Hence his anti-regionalism provided a necessary tool of legitimation for the far right's ideology.²⁵¹ He cried out for a policy of *nacionalización* (roughly translatable as 'nationalization') aimed at forging a "vertebrate, upright Spain" (cited in Dobson 1989: 87).²⁵² Ortega therefore "found himself painted into a corner, defending precisely the type of Spanish nationalism he always hoped to avoid....Only the shell of the idea - the Nation - was left, and others were to make unscrupulous use of it" (Dobson 1989: 94). That was what eventually happened, and Ortega's ideology was quickly picked up and upheld by the

²⁴⁷ For a comparison of the Fascist, Nazi, Francoist, and Vichy's models of cultural assimilation, see Ille (1990).

²⁴⁸ Quoted in Eduardo Alvarez Puga, *Diccionario de la Falange*. Barcelona: Dopesa, 1937, p. 12-3.

²⁴⁹ Id., page 36 (my emphasis). The quoted text also refers to the new directive of placing noticeboards in different Catalan public places intimating "*Habla el idioma del Imperio*" (Speak the language of the Empire), that is, Spanish.

²⁵⁰ Ortega's *España invertebrada*, a sort of Bible for many Spanish fascists, is openly quoted in the *Diccionario de la Falange*, op. cit., p. 52.

²⁵¹ In this, one can trace a parallel between him and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. On the affinities and friendship between the two, see Regalado García (1990).

²⁵² Ortega also confused his adversaries by waving the standard of 'decentralization', which he claimed to regard as a generator of widespread public responsibility and thus of commitment to the 'nation'. In rhetorical contradiction with these statements, he also claimed that "internal demands for autonomy had to be seen in the same light as the loss of Spain's colonies - as a symptom of the collapse of the nation" (cited in Dobson 1989: 94). He was therefore a sworn enemy of all regionalist and 'separatist' movements and for this reason his quotations became an ideal tool to be manipulated by the far right.

Spanish ultra-rightists of the Falange.²⁵³

Backed by the intellectual authority of opinion-makers like Ortega, the Falangists proceeded in their campaign of annihilation of all vestiges of regional distinctiveness. This far-reaching persecution assumed Orwellian overtones and "jail sentences were imposed for even casual conversations carried on in the [regional] language on public streets" (Clark 1979: 81). With a hint of irony, Oriol Pi-Sunyer states that "a totalitarian system attempted to control the totality of civil culture; it was not simply the Statute of Autonomy that was abrogated but any entity that might seem to pose a challenge to the state, whether a boy scout troop or a choral society" (1980: 108-9). However, the intellectual influence of the Falangists was minimal: in Catalonia, a land with a highly developed associative and intellectual tradition, the Falange had a very low prestige. Not even the bourgeoisie, who called for his help against the 'reds', wished to deal with it.²⁵⁴

As soon as Barcelona fell to the Francoist troops, Catalonia was submitted to a special regime of occupation for six months (Benet 1973: 221-77). In a frenzied 'hunt for the separatist', all Catalan references were erased from public access (Jones 1981), and hundreds of thousands of books in Catalan were consigned to the pulping plants or burned in public places.²⁵⁵ Patriotic statues and monuments were smashed to the ground (Benet 1973: 369-71). All bills, posters, placards, notices, signposts and labels in Catalan were removed. People who opposed these measures were heavily fined or jailed (Benet 1973: 269-73, 295-309, 371-5 and 380-2). In the workplace, Catalan was banned even as a spoken language: a civil servant caught in the act of speaking Catalan risked immediate dismissal (Benet 1973: 309-14). Municipal and state teachers suspected of Catalanist sympathies were forcibly removed from their jobs, or transferred to other regions, while others more loyal to the regime were 'imported' from the rest of Spain (Benet 1973: 328-9).²⁵⁶ In the University of Barcelona, all subjects dealing with Catalan culture were abolished, and the purge of the University staff reached levels unparalleled in other Spanish regions (Benet 1973: 355-6).²⁵⁷

²⁵³ On the ideology of the Francoist regime, see Arbos and Pulgsec (1980).

²⁵⁴ Josep Benet (personal suggestion).

²⁵⁵ The 'Library of Catalonia' became the 'Central Library', and 'Catalonia Square' (*Plaça de Catalunya*) was renamed for a few weeks 'Spanish Army Square' (*Plaza del Ejercito Español*) (Fabres et al. 1978: 76, Riquer 1989: 101).

²⁵⁶ In only five months (between April and August 1939), seven hundreds teachers from Castile and Extremadura were despatched to Catalonia to replace the deported Catalan ones. Given their total ignorance of the local language, culture and history, they were supposed to work as an instrument of de-Catalanization. All the formidable pedagogical advances registered by the Catalan schools were halted.

²⁵⁷ More than half of the teaching staff (135 professors) were expelled from the

The *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* was closed down and replaced with an *Instituto Español de Estudios Mediterraneos* which existed in name only (Benet 1973: 360-7).²⁵⁸ All symbols of Catalan identity, such as the flag, anthem, etc., were strictly forbidden (Benet 1973: 387). Contemplating this labour of destruction, the Francoist journalist Manuel Aznar could triumphantly boast: "The theory of small nationalities is dead. The German, Italian and Spanish empires are the vital forces of the new Europe" (Benet 1973: 403-4).²⁵⁹

There were attempts to proscribe the *sardana* (the national dance) and Catalan songs.²⁶⁰ 'Gothic' liturgical vestments were defined as 'separatist' and priests were advised to utter even their Latin homilies with a 'Spanish' pronunciation (Benet 1973: 435-6). The regime tried to build up far-fetched analogies between anti-semitism and anti-catalanism in order to earn Hitler's favours.²⁶¹ Censorship led to the destruction of private correspondence written in regional 'dialects' (Benet 1973: 314).²⁶² Punishment for the offenders went from simple fines to dismissal from the workplace, exile and prison. In the first years of dictatorship, many people were accused of 'separatism' only for 'daring' to speak in Catalan.²⁶³ Denunciation and spying became a common practice (Riquer 1989: 82).

The scope of all these measures was not simply to suffocate Catalanism, but to eradicate Catalan culture and any sign of a separate Catalan identity at its very roots. Their result was devastating: "Barcelona, the city of revolutionary anarchists and experimental artists, of

University.

²⁵⁸ According to Manent (1976), these figures were high if compared with the total figure of the exile from Spain, 450,000.

²⁵⁹ This penchant against small minorities was typical of Francoism, and was inherited from the ideological armour of the Fascists and the Nazis. Note its similarity with Frederick Engel's attack on 'peoples without history' and its influence on Marxist ideology.

²⁶⁰ In one edict, the *sardana* was accused as a 'differentiating agent' (Benet 1973: 386). However, according to Brandes (1990: 34-5), the dance was prohibited only in some locales in and around Barcelona, not in the countryside. "No doubt because the dictatorship considered the *sardana* to be relatively innocuous, the dance was allowed to flourish as a form of what we might call a 'peaceful protest' against the regime's more effective and oppressive campaign to eliminate the public use of the Catalan language" (Brandes 1990: 35).

²⁶¹ The Falangist identification of the Catalans as Jews resulted in the coining of the neologism *Judeo-catalanes* (Benet 1973: 128-37). Both the Nazi and Fascist governments agreed with a policy avowed to the destruction of regional 'particularisms', avoiding at all costs the 'creation of a Catalan state' (Benet 1973: 218). On the deportation of Catalan Republican refugees in France to Nazi concentration camps, see Roig (1992). Of the 6,000 Republicans who died in Mauthausen, about one third were Catalans or Valencians. However, Franco slowly tried to dissociate himself from the Axis, especially after Japan entered the war. Thus, anti-Nazi refugees and several thousand Sephardic Jews from the occupied Balkans were given sanctuary in Spain or transit visas. Finally, many Jews were granted full Spanish citizenship (Avni 1982).

²⁶² Until 1941 all private correspondence was scrutinized by the censors, but mail censorship lasted up to 1948 (Riquer 1989: 102, Gallofré i Virgili 1991, Gubern 1981).

²⁶³ On the regime's equation between Catalan language and separatism, see Benet (1973: 89-1).

thronging boulevards and excited discourse, had become another gray provincial Spanish town. Its political and cultural leaders were gone -some dead, some in exile. A defeated silence fell over the entire nation, a silence that for years would remain virtually unbroken. When it was broken - furtively and sporadically- it would be by the sound of bitter weepings" (Rosenthal 1991: 45).

More than 500,000 people fled into exile in 1939, 200,000 of whom came from Catalan-speaking areas (Pi-Sunyer 1980: 109, Sauret 1979). The latter were thus deprived of part of their intelligentsia. In only six days from May 1 to May 6, 1939, 266 people were executed after being judged by summary war councils (Benet 1973: 241-2, Solé i Sabaté 1986).²⁶⁴ The president of the Generalitat Lluís Companys was shot by firing squads in October 1940 after being seized by the Nazis who handed him over to the Falangists (Benet 1990). Between 1946 and 1953, most literary output was produced in exile.²⁶⁵ The *Jocs Florals* were alternatively celebrated in America or Europe (Benet 1973: 386-7). The Catalan intelligentsia who remained in the country was thus forced underground and had to reunite in small family-based circles of friends.²⁶⁶ Like in Euskadi, the family emerged as the extreme bulwark and retreat against Castilianization, as an inviolable space where discussions on Catalonia's destiny could be carried out in Catalan.²⁶⁷

The Franco's regime tolerated regional culture only in the form of folklore. But, while the attempts to crush Euskara were openly aimed at its eradication, the attempts at eliminating Catalan included a supplementary strategy of 'dialectization': that is, the authorities tried to promote the view that Catalan was a mere dialect, a sub-variety of Spanish; they also tried to break up its linguistic unity by supporting non-standard varieties whenever they could.²⁶⁸

After the war, Catalonia was a broken society and a widespread apathy penetrated all walks

²⁶⁴ Solé i Sabaté (1986) puts the exact number of executed to 3,350, part of a carefully planned campaign. As often happens (it was a current practice in Guatemala, Iraq and other totalitarian countries in the early 1990s), repression reached its most gruesome levels in the countryside, away from influential opinion and mass media's attention.

²⁶⁵ According to Manent (1976), 450 books and 180 periodicals in Catalan were published in exile between 1939 and 1976, the majority of them in Mexico and France.

²⁶⁶ Hence, a characteristic of postwar Catalonia was the absence of intellectual cadres in the country. The few who remained, such as Ignasi Augustí and the group *Destino*, were forced to abandon the Catalan language (Josep Benet personal suggestion).

²⁶⁷ On the role of the family as the main instrument of nationalist socialization, see Hernández (1983), Barrera (1985), Johnston (1991), Rossinyol (1974: 409).

²⁶⁸ The term "dialectization", introduced in sociolinguistics by Heinz Kloss (1986), is meant to underline a conscious or semi-conscious effort pursued by the state in order to undermine the unity of a language, both promoting its internal fragmentation and refusing to recognize it as a single unitary language. On Catalan, see Benet (1973: 72-3), and for a comparison with the Occitan case see Lafont (1977).

of life, preventing any possibility of political mobilization (Riquer 1990). The poet Salvador Espriu (1913-1985) reflected this tragedy in his lines. Speaking for many of his generation, Espriu expressed a "tactical withdrawal from a fraudulent public life into a few trusted realities.... In the background, of course, is the civil war itself, at once a collective and deeply personal tragedy: 1,200,000 dead and 500,000 exiled. The sense of drifting in a sea of specters -the ghosts of dead friends, enemies, acquaintances and relatives, all speaking a language itself mortally threatened" (Rosenthal 1991: 46-9)

A slow recovery (1942-1959)

After the Allied victory against Fascism, Catalan expectations were raised (Rossinyol 1974: 405). Indeed, the outcome of the war contributed to Madrid's decision to bestow some symbolic cultural concessions to the opposition: a few printed classical works, theatrical performances in Catalan, and concerts of the *Orfeón Catalán* choirs were finally permitted.²⁶⁹ The regime needed to break its international isolation through a facade of feeble liberalization, the minimum necessary to show the world an appearance of ongoing change. Hence, from 1946, Catalan culture began to reawaken in semi-clandestinity (Galien 1987).

As soon as the yoke of repression was slightly loosened, Catalanism gave signs of renewed vitality. Every niche of freedom was exploited by the cultural activists. In spite of endless difficulties, the language began to experience a moderate revival. Since 1942, clandestine classes of Catalan history, language and literature had been set up at the *Estudis Universitaris Catalans* for small numbers of attendants. From 1944, the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* resumed its activities, albeit only in a token way, lacking resources and continuously harassed by the regime. New literary prizes were established. Before 1939, the organization and financing of such events would have been the responsibility of the Generalitat, but now every initiative had to stem from private enterprise (Samsó 1990).²⁷⁰ Exiled intellectuals, such as the poets Carles Riba (1893-1959) and Pere Quart (1899-1986) returned home beginning to contact the new generations.

The *Selecta* publishing house was founded in 1946, through the efforts and dynamism of the entrepreneur Josep M^a Cruzet (Riquer 1989: 240). The first non-religious book, the complete works of Jacint Verdaguer, was allowed in 1946, but not in standard Catalan in keeping with the regime's policy of 'dialectization'. The printing of books in Catalan

²⁶⁹ On the modern Catalan tradition of choirs and their political content, see Artís i Benach (1980).

²⁷⁰ For the academic and literary prizes under the Generalitat, see Benet (1973: 54-7).

experienced a slow but steady increase: the output passed from 12 books in 1946, to 60 in 1948 and 96 in 1954. In 1960, they were more than 200. Catalan was first used in public for some papers presented at the "Seventh International Conference of Romance Linguistics", celebrated in 1953 at the University of Barcelona. The strictly philological character and international appeal of the conference could pass the scrutiny of the regime's censors.

Unofficial historiography thrived under the stimulating leadership of Jaume Vicens Vives (1910-1960).²⁷¹ Throughout modern Catalan history, local historians played the role of reawakeners of the national spirit. Many works by Vives' predecessors were largely apologetic eulogies, where rhetoric and mythical constructs took precedence over detailed scientific analysis. This myth-making function is crucial to any nationalist movement and characterizes Catalan historiography from its inception to the present-day. Vives broke radically with this tradition, nevertheless many of his works were permeated by a Catalanist spirit. In his classical *Notícia de Catalunya*, published in 1954, Vives asserted: "[We must] make an effort to improve the knowledge of ourselves before we begin precise plans. ... We have to define ourselves. If we want to construct an acceptable edifice, we must know who we were and who we are" (Vives 1984: 9).²⁷² The book provided some answers to these questions: the new Catalan identity was to be open, malleable, seaborne, reflective, etc.

In 1955, Selecta published Josep Ferrater i Mora's (1912-1990) *Les formes de vida catalana*,²⁷³ another key text which defined the essence of a renewed Catalan identity and influenced political Catalanism in the years to come. It was not a typical nationalist text, indeed its tones were overtly anti-separatist (Ferrater i Mora 1980: 149). Yet, as an eloquent interpretation of a pre-existing Catalan character, Ferrater also formulated a new collective self-perception: the Catalans were 'reinvented' for the benefit of a more pluralistic vision of Catalanity.

The various cultural initiatives analysed in this section contributed to the emergence of a

²⁷¹ Jaume Vicens Vives was the man who first sought to explain Catalan historical identity in concrete economic, demographic, social and psychological terms. Often referred to as Spain's first modern historian, he championed the methodological inventions of the French *Annales* school (Braudel, Le Goff, Leroy Ladurie, etc.). Yet, he envisaged the historian as social activist and catalyst for the recovery of Catalonia, striving to rebuild her culture, her institutions and her national spirit. However, this aim was to be achieved through impartial and factual analysis, rather than via old-fashioned panegyrics and eulogized writings.

²⁷² Therefore, he developed the discipline of economic history, adopting statistical and demographic analysis. He also created a network of international scholarly exchange, providing instruments like a bibliographical index and an historical journal (Enders 1984).

²⁷³ The book was first published in 1944 in Santiago del Chile in a limited edition. It was then known by only a few people, among them Vicens Vives, who openly quoted it as one of his main sources of inspiration in *Notícia de Catalunya* (1984: 190-ff). To have a clear idea of the new Catalan identity, the two books should be read in tandem.

slight optimism among some intellectuals, who perceived Catalan culture to be no longer on the verge of extinction as it was a few years before. However, prevented from spreading their message to the masses, they had virtually no social impact. In the 1950s, there was a moment of real danger that Catalan would become a family language, extinct in the public sphere. Until 1945-6, many people believed in a great mutation at the end of World War II and clandestine press thrived in the expectation of major upheavals. When it was clear that the Western world was not interested in a prompt reestablishment of democracy in Spain, the hopes of the Catalan intelligentsia waned: in 1946, the clandestine press disappeared because of disillusion and the fact that the Communists were forced out of the opposition as a consequence of the Cold War.²⁷⁴ At this point, the danger of a violent turn for Catalan nationalism was vividly present. But the most impatient activists and the youth could find in cultural nationalism a channel for expressing their anxieties. We shall analyse this in brief.

Economic 'miracle', immigration, and language revival

In 1959 Franco reshuffled his cabinet at the expense of both Falangists and Carlists, allowing the Catholic technocrats of the *Opus Dei* to enter key positions. The latter's Stabilisation Plan favoured a market economy "where prices would control the allocation of resources, and the integration of that market into the capitalist economy of the West. ...[The Plan] would cure the economy of its inherited impurities... [and] rapid growth would take care of all problems" (Carr 1980:156-7). This implied that Spain had to open-up to the world, allowing a gleam of hope for democratic reforms. These expectations were disappointed, as economic performance became the only criticism that the regime could tolerate. Indeed, the development plan became the traditional target of Left-wing criticism, since "the 'technocrats' faith in private enterprise...reinforced the hold of a narrow financial oligarchy ensconded in the 'big seven' private banks [as] only the private banks could finance industrial growth" (Carr 1980: 157).

From 1963, the *milagro economico* (economic miracle) had begun and Spanish growth rate "outpaced all capitalist economies other than the Japanese" (Carr 1980: 157). Foreign loans, especially from the US poured into the country, feeding a burgeoning economy. Mass tourism to what was then one of the cheapest places in Europe led to the irreparable destruction and over-building of large stretches of the Mediterranean coast.²⁷⁵ Finally, the

²⁷⁴ Josep Benet (personal suggestion). Benet also stresses the Castilianization of the youth (since 1955-56) who did not live through the Civil War: at all levels of instruction, only Castilian was allowed.

remittances from migrants in the richest European countries also contributed to alleviate the economy of the poorest areas of Spain. The stress on aggregate growth led to the concentration of industries in a few regions, especially Euskadi and Catalonia, although the regime tried to favour Madrid as a financial and industrial centre whenever it could. This did not help redress the imbalance between rich and poor provinces. As a consequence, the three regions began to experience the largest influx of immigrants in their modern history. As we shall see, the latter phenomenon caused severe social strains and was a crucial factor in the process of re-defining Catalan and Basque identity which finally led to the creation of new forms of nationalist opposition.

The region's upper classes were generally satisfied with the regime's performance, at least on the surface. However, dissatisfaction boiled deep within some sectors and the comparison with other European countries was inevitable.²⁷⁶ Much of the blame was directed at the Spanish state because of its decisionist role in the economy. According to a member of the emerging regionalist bourgeoisie, Raimon Trias Fargas (1972, 1974), the surplus extracted by the state removed the surplus necessary for profit and reinvestment in Catalonia. Only 52% of that taken by the state was returned to the region, while the percentage of all state funds granted to Catalonia had decreased to 11% in 1970. Furthermore, through government control of banking, 45% of savings were regulated by Madrid for development programmes of the INI (National Institute of Industry), and were not available for reinvestment in Catalonia (Trias Fargas 1972: 82-3). "The increasingly closer integration of Catalonia into a market economy of continental dimensions... worked to alter the economic balance: from a developed zone within the Spanish economy, Catalonia [was] being transformed into an appendage of a much more powerful system" (Pi-Sunyer 1979: 60). The alternative solution proposed by the regionalist bourgeoisie and rejected by Madrid was that these savings must be held in Catalonia in order to promote development by increasing investment and improving local productivity (Trias Fargas 1974). Encouraged by the economic boom, these upper classes followed the Christian Democratic orientation of its European counterparts. Most of them advocated, both at a rational and emotional level, the revival of Catalan culture in all its aspects, centering particularly on language. As we shall see, a few regionalist

²⁷⁵ The number of tourists attracted to 'the playground of Europe' rose from six million in 1960 to forty million in 1980. The Costa Brava and, even more, the Costa del Sol near València, were spoiled to the point of resembling Rumania's cementation projects under Ceausescu.

²⁷⁶ The Catalan bourgeoisie perceived itself to be in a state of 'relative deprivation' in relation to its European partners.

industrialists and small entrepreneurs were a crucial source of funding for several cultural enterprises.

In 1959, Luis de Galinsoga, the pro-Francoist director of the most popular Barcelona newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, launched a tirade against the use of Catalan while he was attending a Mass in Barcelona. He then rabidly shouted his famous 'aphorism': "*Todos los catalanes son una mierda*" (All the Catalans are shit). Taking advantage of the fuss created by such a desecration, several grass-root groups organized a boycott of the newspaper, which resulted in a sharp drop in subscriptions and advertisers.²⁷⁷ Under direct orders from Franco, Galinsoga was sacked. This was a triumph for the opposition and demonstrated that "Catalonia [was] alive, conscious, reasserting herself, and once more will be thriving".²⁷⁸

On the occasion of Franco's visit to Barcelona, some slight liberal reforms were approved such as the compilation of Catalan civil law. However, repression reared up again during some trivial occurrences. At a concert in Barcelona's *Palau de la Musica* the audience struck up Maragall's *Cant de la Senyera* (Chant to the Catalan Flag) in the presence of some Francoist ministers. Twenty people were arrested and the nationalist leader Jordi Pujol, who the police identified as the main organizer, was sentenced to a seven years prison term.²⁷⁹

From 1959, *Serra d'Or*, a first large circulation magazine entirely written in Catalan prospered under the auspices of the Montserrat Abbey. With 12,000 subscriptions in 1964, it represented a significant achievement given the times and the religious character of the publication.²⁸⁰ Children books and magazines, such as *Cavall Fort* (founded in 1961), became important elements in the Catalan pedagogic panorama (Rossinyol 1974: 446). Finally, with a circulation of 100,000 copies, *Tele-Estel* (founded in 1966) became one of the four best-selling magazines in Spain.

A key event was the foundation in 1961 of *Ómnium Cultural*, a patronage society

²⁷⁷ Most of these organization were Catholic-based. The main organizer of the boycott was Jordi Pujol's CC, which also underwent the harshest measures of repression in the aftermath of the event.

²⁷⁸ Statement from the main promoters of the campaign, chiefly the Catholic-based *Acadèmia de la Llengua*, quoted by Culla (1989: 302).

²⁷⁹ On this episode and its consequences, see Crexell (1982). Despite police beatings, Pujol denied to have taken part in the events at the Palau, although he 'confessed' to be the foremost responsible for the *Vanguardia* boycott. Nevertheless, the CC group led by him was the chief organizer of the Palau's act of civil disobedience. Pujol spent two and a half years in prison. After his release he showed less inclination to engage in direct political confrontations, turning to economic and cultural revival.

²⁸⁰ In the words of the literary critics Josep M^a Castellet and Joaquim Molas, *Serra d'Or* soon became "the most free and best informed magazine in the entire peninsula" (quoted by Culla 1989: 311).

dedicated to promote Catalan culture in all walks of life (Rossinyol 1974: 449-51). With the help of funding from a few industrialists and entrepreneurs, it subsidized in particular Catalan language classes. Closed down by the regime in 1963, it was allowed to resume its activities only in 1967. Subsequently, the group established scholarships and prizes, such as the *Premi de les Lletres Catalanes* (Prize for the Catalan Literature) awarded yearly from 1969.²⁸¹

The media world was shaken by the impact of the *Nova Cançó* (New Song) movement. In 1961, a group of singers and songwriters known as *Els Setze Jutges* (literally, the Sixteen Judges) burst onto the scene, while the record company EDIGSA was established to promote Catalan songs. Songwriters performed freely in universities, parishes, boy-scout camps and artistic centres of cities and countryside (Culla 1989: 306-7). The song movement was one of the most effective vehicles for the propagation of national consciousness amongst the masses. The success of singers such as Raimon from Valencia and Maria del Mar Bonet from the Balearic Islands rekindled national consciousness in all Catalan-speaking areas. Raimon's version of Salvador Espriu's poetry *Assaig de càntic en el temple* ('Trial Hymn in the Temple') became nearly an opposition's anthem. Espriu's poem was "an attack on the postwar prostration of Catalonia, in which there was almost no immediate resistance to the Franco regime" (Rosenthal 1991: 51). Catalonia was conceived as a dormant nation waiting for her bards to be re-awakened:

Oh, how tired I am of my
craven old brutish land,
and how I'd like to get away from it
to the north,
where they say people are clean
and noble, learned, rich, free,
wide-awake and happy
Then, in the congregation, the brothers would say
disapprovingly: 'Like a bird who leaves his nest
is that man who forsakes his place',
while I, now far away, would laugh
at the law and ancient wisdom
of this, my arid village.
But I must never follow my dream
and I'll stay here till I die.
For I'm craven and brutish too.
And what's more I love, with a
desperate grief, this my poor,
dirty, sad, unlucky homeland

(Translated by David H. Rosenthal 1991: 50) ²⁸²

According to Rosenthal, the phrase 'Like the bird... thus the man' "echoes both style and the imagery of parts of the Old Testament. It is also the poem's first patriotic expression, and

²⁸¹ In 1976, *Omnium Cultural* numbered 22,000 members. On the crucial activity of this association, see *Omnium Cultural, 1961-1986*. Barcelona: Omnium Cultural, 1986.

²⁸² Also quoted in Hooper (1986: 234).

suggests a parallel between Catalans and Jews, two peoples often persecuted for being more industrious and progressive than their neighbours. Another parallel is a common sense of deep and sometimes fatal attachment to a national identity" (Rosenthal 191: 51).²⁸³ In Espriu's most famous book, *La pell de brau*, Spain is referred to by its Hebrew name 'Sepharad', while other Hebrew words punctuate the text. As the appellative 'Sepharad' suggests, Spain could be emulated and desired only in its pre-1492 form.

On 11 September 1964, the first public *Diada* (Catalan national holiday) was celebrated by 3,000 citizens.²⁸⁴ This was the first postwar Catalanist street demonstration. Seven people were arrested and heavy fines were inflicted upon participants. On the institutional side, things were moving fast as well. The struggle for the language could not be carried on without re-founding the education system. A petition for the introduction of Catalan at all levels of education and the media gathered momentum in 1963. The pedagogic centre Rosa Sensat, created in 1965, established the first summer schools to train teachers of Catalan. Classical and contemporary works were translated from foreign languages into Catalan, contributing to opening-up the regional culture to universal currents.²⁸⁵ A press law (*ley de prensa*) suppressed preventive censorship in 1966, but this served only to further restrict public debate and critical analyses of political reality. Indeed, penalties were increased for those publications that 'threatened' Spanish unity, instigating a new style of self-censorship. Important publications were not spared by this onslaught: the magazine *Destino* was closed down for two months, its director sacked and subjected to heavy fines for its anti-conformism. Such 'exemplary' punishments, together with another state of emergency in 1969, were designated to intimidate journalists and media professionals.

Yet, the half-muted revival continued unabated. An ambitious campaign to celebrate Pompeu Fabra's birth centenary was articulated in 1968 through hundreds of public events under the title *La llengua d'un poble* (A people's language). All the political forces of the opposition were involved in the celebration. The first tome of a 15-volume 'Great Catalan Encyclopedia' appeared in 1969. The basis and action programme for a future government of Catalonia were now in place. It was evident that only political autonomy could allow an

²⁸³ In the Basque case parallels with Judaism were less usual. On the contrary, Arana took as a matter of pride the weak Muslim and Jewish influence in the Basque Provinces.

²⁸⁴ They assembled in the place where the statue of Rafael Casanova (1660-1743), a Catalan hero of the Barcelona's siege (1714) and the last of its *consellers en cap*, had formerly stood. As a symbol of the defence of Catalan Constitutions, the monument receives a yearly homage on the occasion of the *diada* (11 September).

²⁸⁵ Censorship had begun to soften its grip in 1958, allowing the translations of foreign works into Catalan (Gubern 1981).

effective cultural normalization and democratization. Thanks to the strength of their culture, Catalanist militants acquired a new confidence in their fate as a nation. Although most political expression were ostracized, the Catalans could always find comfort in the study and contemplation of their heritage, in the certainty that it would survive and thrive again. This is in sharp contrast to the Basque Country where no such hopes could be cultivated by a disillusioned nationalist intelligentsia, who had been historically betrayed by its Castilianized elites.

How can this cultural revival be explained? Catalan culture was already firmly established before the Civil War. Repression from above and immigration from below threatened its vitality, but could hardly erase the awareness of a strong cultural potential. Postwar Catalonia was like a fertile field which had been covered with gravel, flattering all forms of life on the surface; grass started soon to grow up again through every available niche until nature reconquered what was once its own.

Moreover, Catalan language assumed an unequivocal political meaning. This was a telescoped repetition of what happened under Primo de Rivera. In a spiral process, the state wanted to erase Catalan culture because it attributed to it a political meaning, but culture itself increased its political meaning as a consequence of state repression: the flame of cultural nationalism was still burning under the ashes of the Civil War. This contrasts to the experience of Euskadi, where cultural nationalism was weak from the start and its place was taken by military nationalism. Hence, in the latter case, the process from cultural to political nationalism (Hroch 1985, Hutchinson 1987) was replaced by a process from military to political nationalism, since military action provided the cohesive force which a declining Basque culture could not provide.

Also, thanks to the cohesive force of the cultural claim, Catalan opposition became united in a loose front encompassing not only nationalists, but also Communists, Socialists, Catholics, and even some Anarchists. In the same period, Basque nationalism remained ideologically -albeit not politically- fragmented for want of a common platform, as it had from its inception. All Catalan political parties, voluntary associations and labour unions joined in their demands for linguistic rights. "It was in the obstinate adherence to language that the Catalans manifested the most decisive proof of their vitality and will" (Rossinyol 1974: 409).²⁸⁶ Political autonomy -rather than independence- was the limited goal needed for

²⁸⁶ One of CC's founders, Miquel Coll i Alentorn described the importance of the cultural revival in the following terms: "Cultural questions were our concern since the beginning, as we saw that the people were condemned to ignore their own culture" (interview by Colomer i Mascarell 1977: 51).

such linguistic rights to become a meaningful reality. This assertive stance was derived from the inner conviction that Catalonia possessed a distinctive high culture with a unique literary and artistic heritage.²⁸⁷ By contrast, Basque culture was derided by people like Maetzu and Unamuno (see chapter 9). Such scornful attitudes have few parallels amongst Catalan intellectuals. Euskara was scarcely spoken and country-rooted, but, at the same time, it represented an unique expression of ethnic distinctiveness. All Basque nationalists at some stage conceived Euskara as the quintessence of Basque identity. But its promotion was denigrated by mainstream intellectuals as a throwback to a degraded and past-oriented culture. Furthermore, the fact that Euskara was scarcely spoken, especially in the cities, meant that it could not properly work as a tool of mass mobilization as in the Catalan case. Dream and reality clashed for many nationalists, chiefly the cultural nationalists. Arana dreamed that through his single efforts and with the help of a few trusted friends Euskara could be revitalized. However, he himself had to abandon this ideal during his lifetime, as soon as he realized that Basque nationalism could not be constructed on the basis of language alone. He therefore chose race and religion, sowing the seeds of fragmentation and ambiguity in the nationalist message. The compensation of this fragmented character was an intransigent and radical emphasis on separation from Spain.

Before passing into the specific developments of the national struggle in Catalonia, we should reiterate the main argument of this chapter, relating it to the overall thesis. The strong cultural emphasis in Catalonia created the condition for a peaceful nationalist revival in which most opposition forces were accepted independently from their ideology. This evolution has been made possible by a pre-existing lively regional culture, especially in terms of language and literature. The contrast with the Basque case has shown the importance of the existence of a lively cultural basis which is able to resist the impact of the state's assimilation policies. The lack of shared elements of cultural distinctiveness has been an important factor in determining the adoption of a violent strategy by the Basque nationalist leaders.

Paradoxes of a secular society: The Church as refuge of the nation.

After the horrors of the Civil War, when hundreds of priests, monks and nuns were

²⁸⁷ Already in 1965, Pierre Vilar asserted that "the stage of deep decadence is left behind and Catalonia lives now an indisputable moment of ascension" (Vilar, quoted in Rossinyol 1974: 414). This optimist *zeitgeist* was reflected in a positivist will to "reinforce and improve Catalonia in all domains, to prepare her to better face the new stages of her existence by placing her in the context of Western society and the Europe of natural communities" (Rossinyol 1974: 414-5).

massacred by the Republican forces, it is no wonder that most churchmen and women received the Francoist troops with open arms, as liberators.²⁸⁸ Indeed, we have mentioned that anti-clerical pogroms were a feature of Catalan 'progressive' politics since at least the turn of the century. Through the doctrine of *nacionalcatolicismo*, the regime presented itself as saviour of the faith -and the country- and therein stood one of the pillars of its legitimacy. As the Vatican accepted the new Church hierarchy proposed by the regime, the Church became an instrument of assimilation.²⁸⁹ For eight years, its higher echelons attempted unsuccessfully to de-Catalanize the regional clergy and all religious practices. Anti-Catalanist bishops were appointed in Tarragona, Lleida, Barcelona and Tortosa. As we have seen, Francoism attempted to influence Mass celebrations to the extent of changing liturgical paraphernalia and ceremonies. For many years, Mass in Spanish became the rule. The ecclesiastic hierarchy, particularly the above mentioned bishops, were "conscious instruments of Castilianisation, acting, more than as pastors, as servile functionaries of a regime which they identified with ideologically" (Culla 1989: 309-10).²⁹⁰ However, the local clergy soon started to resent these attempts, offering the first possibilities of public gatherings where Catalan could be used.²⁹¹ Eventually, the regional priesthood became the main actors in the national revival of the early 1960s.

This leading role of the Church needs explanation. As we said, Catalan society is strongly secular. In 1963, only 15% of the population of Barcelona considered themselves to be Catholics, against 82% who claimed to be indifferent.²⁹² Paralleling the decrease in religious practice, the Church strove to recapture its role as a spiritual guiding light of social values. Young vicars of urban origin who did not live through the Civil War were beginning to enter into the parishes (Gil-Delgado 1975, Hermet 1986). They were alert, active and intellectually aware. Ten years before the Vatican Concilium II, some of them were already attracted by the example of the French worker-priests, who "merged a Christian concern for the poor with progressive issues and leftist politics" (Johnston 1991: 71).

The Benedictine Abbey of Montserrat became the centre and symbol of this resistance, and

²⁸⁸ Riquer (1989: 22) calculates between 8,500 and 9,000 victims of Republican repression. Nearly a quarter of them, that is, 2,500 men and women, were clergy-people. For a collection of testimonies of the massacres, see Massot (1987).

²⁸⁹ On the shifting Vatican policies towards Catalonia and its clergy, see Carreras de Nadal and Manent (1971).

²⁹⁰ The only exceptions were the Bishop of Vic and, from 1963, the Bishop of Girona.

²⁹¹ On the role of the Church during the Civil War and its immediate aftermath, see Massot (1978).

²⁹² Diocesan sources, quoted by Culla (1989: 308-9).

people travelled there from all over Catalonia to hear a Mass in Catalan. The catalyst event was provided by a celebration for the enthronement of the Virgin of Montserrat on 27 April 1947. Three years before, the Abbey launched an appeal to raise money for the construction of a throne for the icon of the Virgin. As popular contributions reached an extraordinary level with kilos of gold and silver donated, a few people organized a feast for the event by a series of parish meetings. Some of them, such as the historian Josep Benet, were not monks, but Left-wing secular nationalists. The success was exorbitant: about a hundred thousand people converged to Montserrat with every available means, by foot, mule or car, from all venues of Catalonia. For some of them the pilgrimage lasted two or three days. "That night, very few people slept because there were not enough cells for the pilgrims" (Fabres et al. 1978: 126-9). In this first mass event of Catalanist affirmation Catalan words were for the first time publicly spoken and a huge *senyera* (Catalan flag) was hung from the peak of a mountain. The Civil Guard was unable to remove it for many hours. Aware that all this fervour was likely to be used by the Catalanist opposition, the *gobernador civil* (civil governor) nevertheless had to concede that "it would have been a political mistake to refuse permission for speaking Catalan in Montserrat" (cited by Fabres et al. 1978: 129).

This unique event proved two things: the persisting strength of Catalanist sentiment among the faithful (and beyond), and the ideal position of the Church to act as ark and sanctuary of Catalan culture. But the regime unleashed a strong repression on both organizers and participants so that nothing vaguely similar could be enacted again for many years. Henceforth, religious opposition to the regime's appropriation and misuse of *nationalcatolicismo* remained muted. But, given the regime's bias in favour of Catholicism, Churches and monasteries all over Catalonia were turned into safe-heavens and harbours of refuge for Catalanist militancy. They were the only environment where Catalanists felt protected from police irruptions and censorship.

Things started to change again in the 1960s. The example of the 339 Basque priests who in 1960 denounced the Church's support for the regime risking Franco's wrath (see previous chapter) had a strong impact on the Catalan clergy. But the great stimulus for the clergy came after the election of Pope John XXIII (1958), when he unexpectedly convened a second Vatican Council (1962-1965). His encyclica *Pacem in terris* (1963), the "encyclica of freedom", condemned cultural and political repression against national minorities stirring up enthusiasm amongst the open-minded clergy. Non-believers too followed with unusual attention the developments of the Council.²⁹³ As an unseen religious awareness permeated

²⁹³ The encyclica was directed to "all the men of good will", independently of their religion

the country in the early sixties (Culla 1989: 309), Church and civil society became singularly rejoined: Catholic-inspired political activities sprang up all over the country and secular families sent their children to Catholic-run or Catholic-inspired schools and leisure centres. The revival covered several fields and the *Publicacions Abadia de Montserrat* engaged in the publication of books and magazines that no private publishing house would dare to print. In the field of social work, there were about 20 associations of the lay apostolate which catered to local needs throughout Catalonia (Pi Sunyer 1971: 132).²⁹⁴

Under the aegis of the abbot Aureli Escarré (1908-1968), the abbey of Montserrat became the core of Catalanism.²⁹⁵ In 1963, Escarré released a famous interview for the French newspaper "*Le Monde*" in which he spelled out the toughest condemnation of the regime ever uttered from the *interior*. His declarations caused an international uproar and achieved unprecedented publicity for the Catalan cause. The accusation against the Spanish regime was of abjuring the fundamental Christian principles behind its façade of defender of Christianity.²⁹⁶ This was a burning indictment of the regime, since its legitimacy rested on Catholic backing. However, any direct attack on rebellious clergymen would have spelled a disaster. Repression was a harder task in post-Concilium times when the opposition could quote Vatican guidelines in support of its actions (Pi Sunyer 1971: 132). Yet, two years later Escarré was forced into exile, where he remained until his death, and the Vatican dispossessed him of his title of abbot. Escarré's combative stance turned him into a hero for most Catalans. A massive crowd attended his funeral in 1968 (Minobis 1988).

In 1966, the local Church joined the student movement and 130 priests demonstrated in front of Barcelona's Police Headquarters (*Jefatura*) against the ill-treatment of a student. When the procession was attacked, astonished by-standers could see the priests in gowns

or belief. "Universal peace -the Pope said- is a good which interests all mankind without exceptions". See John XXIII, *Enciclica Pacem in Terris*, presented, resumed and annotated by Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, Madrid: Espasa, 1963. According to Ruiz-Giménez, the unprecedented relativist and tolerant character is evident: it does not present "the minimal condemnation against any system as erroneous, nor the minimal concession to polemics. The only attitude which is openly condemned is racial prejudice".

²⁹⁴ The great popularity enjoyed by the Church in the 1960s, which included a boom of religious books, made many people conjecture about an 'irreversible hegemony of the Catholic field' (Lorés 1980: 23).

²⁹⁵ At least until 1947, Escarré was not an opposition sympathizer. His turnabout resulted probably from the impact of the Montserrat gathering in 1947, which he himself helped to organize (Minobis 1988).

²⁹⁶ He claimed with words of fire: "The real subversion existing in Spain is that of the government.... What we have behind us is not twenty-five years of peace, but only twenty-five years of victories. The conquerors, including the Church, which was obliged to fight on their side, have done nothing to close the gap between victors and vanquished..." (cited in Read 1978: 203).

being chased in the streets with batons and beaten by police contingents (Crexell 1992). The Christian Catalanist youth had its spearhead in the CC (*Crist-Catalunya*, later *Comunitat Catalana*) under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, the future president of the re-established Generalitat (Marcet 1987). CC was founded in 1954 as a highly informal group of friends imbued by social Catholic doctrine, mostly expressed in a paper called *Ponència* by their main ideologue Raimon Galf (b. 1917). The later was a compendium of contemporary philosophy from a neo-traditionalist standpoint and was adopted as CC's ideological stand for five years (Lorés 1980: 10-21, Marcet 1987: 3-7, Muñoz 1979, 1990: 94-108).

The shift from religion to secularism was compounded by a new interest in Marxism among former seminarians and lay intellectuals. The re-approchement was mutual and paralleled by the abandonment of traditional anti-clericalism on the part of the Communists. Religious organizations then ceased to be the vectors of the movement, as the torch passed on to the Left, notably the underground Communist Party.²⁹⁷

Paradoxes of internationalism: the Communists as makers of the nation

After Pujol's imprisonment, a small number of his followers started to focus on class struggle, developing their own brand of revolutionary socialism and finally abjuring Catholic confessionalism (Culla 1989: 304, Muñoz 1990: 166-ff). This evolution paralleled and was contemporary to ETA's massive shift towards Marxism, although revolutionary socialism remained an epiphenomenon in more moderate Catalonia. From 1964, the Communist Party (PSUC, *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya*) achieved primacy in the Catalan opposition. Nearly all active political opposition situated itself to the Left, while the Catholic nationalists led by Pujol limited their activity to cultural and economic enterprises devoid of political content. From 1958, a grass-roots movement for the propagation of national awareness and culture appeared under the motto *Fer poble, Fer Catalunya* (to make a people, to make Catalonia). This represented a break with pre-war Republican Catalanism, which Pujol and other nationalists held co-responsible for the Civil War (Culla 1989: 300). The movement's Catholic inspiration was reflected in a concern for people's welfare, although it remained

²⁹⁷ According to Lorés, the change was sudden and irreversible: in a secular society like Catalonia, "the coherence of Catholicism was maintained thanks to those 'values of rationing' typical of a postwar economy, [which proved] unable to withstand the impact of the 'values of consumerism' that displaced them in the 1960s... [This] was paralleled by a generational crisis of Marxist dogmas, of the unidimensional meaning of militancy,...and by the appearance of all sorts of cultural 'heterodoxies', accompanied by an expansion of knowledge which invalidated many of the acritical Catholic and Marxist approaches" (Lorés 1980: 30). On the eclipse of CC, see also Fabre and Huertas (1981).

aloof from working-class organizations and interests. Its initial character was non-partisan. Convinced that the regime was destined to remain in power, Pujol preferred to dedicate his efforts to *Fer País* (Make/Build the country), that is, to build up a private cultural and economic infrastructure as a bulwark against de-nationalization. In this way, it was possible to stimulate national socialization with the spread of Catalanist values and symbols (Culla 1989: 304). That meant partially renouncing clandestine action and taking the maximum possible advantages from the occasional snippets of freedom bestowed by the regime. The politics of *Fer País* was conceived by Pujol as the 'central ground' (*terreny*) for action, and his group only timidly supported overt political activities (Culla 1989: 368, Lorés 1980: 21-8, Marcet 1987: 7-10).

In contrast, the PSUC was highly organised into political fronts which covered a huge variety of fields and emerging struggles, such as the neighborhood associations and the feminist movement. Its magazine *Nous Horizons*, entirely written in Catalan, became an arena for political debate in which leading nationalist intellectuals took part. The PSUC exercised a prominent influence on the unofficial labour union Workers' Commissions (*Comisiones Obreras*) and the student movement. Most importantly, the PSUC was able to make its activities appear legal, whilst assuming an open attitude to the other opposition forces (Culla 1989: 368). The PSUC itself obviously remained illegal, until 1977. The evolution of the Communists towards nationalism was slow but steady. During its first Congress held in Paris in 1956, leading militants focused much of the attention on the 'national question' (Ribó 1977). Meanwhile, atheism was slowly dropped from the official Communist ideology. What was the reason for this slow opening to Christian ideals and even theology? The new theology emerging from the Vatican Council, with its semi-official dialogue between Catholicism and Marxism, reinforced the commitment of those 'progressive' elements within the Church which focussed their attention on social issues. Peoples of leftist leanings, such as the historian Josep Benet, played an important role in building bridges between the two fields (Lorés 1980: 23, Samsó 1991). It is interesting to note that Benet was a cultural -as well as a political- nationalist, and that many of his works dealt with the repression of Catalan culture.²⁹⁸

On 11 September 1967, the now Communist-led *Comisiones Obreras* for the first time officially participated in the *Diada*. This was an important step towards the inclusion of the Left and the labour unions in the broader Catalanist movement. For the first time, many

²⁹⁸ On clandestine postwar Catalan culture, see Samsó (1992) and Galien (1987).

immigrants attended. A new alliance between working-class organizations, the local Church and the nationalist intelligentsia was being forged. Two main issues brought together the Church and the Communists: the social question (particularly, immigrants' integration) and the national question (particularly, language rights). The 'bridge' crossing the ideological gap was provided by the defence of Catalan culture, identity and interests.

The students between nationalism and radical fragmentation

From the 1950s, Catholic students became increasingly attentive to social problems, especially those concerning the immigrants. The Universities were another sector where the regime decided not to intervene too heavily. One main reason was that most students came from the upper and upper-middle class families who supported the regime. Students were granted limited freedom to have their university organizations, but they increasingly resisted compulsory membership in the government-sponsored syndicates.²⁹⁹ At the same time, universities reeled under the heady impact of foreign ideas and became obvious candidates for oppositional practices. This situation of contact with the outside world also gave them some leverage and the opportunity to publicize the regime's excesses. The University became a place of relative freedom, a laboratory of ideas, and a centre of recruitment for the opposition, while the regime considered university life to be a barometer of public order (Culla 1989: 371).

In March 1966, 500 student delegates, professors and intellectuals met to set up a new syndicate, the *Sindicat Democràtic d'Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona* (SDEUB, Democratic Student Union of the University of Barcelona). This event became known as the *Caputxinada*, after the name of the Capuchin convent in Sarrià (suburb of Barcelona) where it took place. Again, the Church worked as an active supporter of the opposition and the assembly's location was an important factor in the police's initial attitude to desist from a frontal attack. Nevertheless, the police burst into the friary after a two-day siege. The news spread rapidly in the region, engendering a solidarity movement which had dramatically positive consequences for the consolidation of the opposition. It led to the creation of a coordinating body, the *Taula Rodona* (Round Table), under the initiative of the PSUC. For the first time in the postwar period, a vast array of opposition groups joined forces in a loose front: Communists, Socialists, Nationalists, Christian-Democrats and various independent figures.

²⁹⁹ On the student movement, see Colomer (1978).

The SDEUB acquired nearly unanimous support from students, 20 % of whom were actively involved in its events. During the academic year 1966-67, it developed intense political and cultural activity in the shadow of Catalanism, the high point of which was a massive recital by Raimon. The regime responded by expelling over a hundred students and professors, and suspending for one year the registration of all the students of the University of Barcelona.

Repression suffocated much of the student movement, but in May 1968 the echoes of the European student revolts brought to the universities a previously unknown *gauchisme* ('leftism') resulting in the proliferation of several far left groups. These *grupuscoles* (small insignificant groups) tried to "compensate for their lack of support with extremism and violence" (Culla 1989: 372) which provided the regime with a caveat for escalating its repression. In turn, the subsequent state of emergency drove the groups further towards ideological radicalism and their *grupusculització* in a plethora of violently militant teams. Before the spectre of endless fragmentation the struggle for Catalan identity offered a solid standpoint to many disaffected leftists, who, in turn, radicalized their posture, for instance, in claims for self-determination.

The vitality of Catalanist social networks:

boy-scouts, hiking groups, football supporters, neighborhood associations

We have mentioned the importance of the family in rearing and consolidating feelings of Catalanism and national identity. A major consequence of censorship was that every expression of national identity had to be acted out in limited circles of trusted friends and relatives. The result was the enlargement and reinforcement of solidarity and interaction within small groups. This led to the emergence of a Catalan middle-class network consisting of individuals from all ideologies and political leanings who knew each other well. This formed a "relatively homogeneous elite [who] inhabited a circumscribed physical and social space. Under such a situation, a village-like situation [arose]... that mitigated against anonymity and made it possible for almost everyone to know everyone else" (Pi i Sunyer 1971: 129). This seems to confirm visions of the nation as an extended family. As in Euskadi, fear of repression led to the gradual formation of "loosely structured, often *ad hoc*, networks and cliques" (Pi i Sunyer 1971: 129). At this stage, it was impossible for the authorities to regulate and check the activity of a myriad of *penyas* (get-together meetings held weekly at restaurants, bars and other public locales).³⁰⁰

The range and scope of quasi-formal associations which could bypass the regime's regulation increased. Under the disguise of hobbies, professionalism or leisure, clusters of families socialized their children into the same groups. Associations of *sardanistes* (sardana dancers), folk-singers, hikers, excursionists, as well as choirs, alumni associations, hobby congregations, private clubs, football supporters, boy and girl-scout gatherings, all served to encourage Catalanist socialization.³⁰¹

The scout movement (*escoltisme*) became one of the most fertile grounds for the cultivation of Catalan culture and nationalism (Balcells and Samper 1993, Johnston 1985, Serra i Garcia 1968). Many future politicians and pedagogues were formed in its ranks. The scouts enjoyed special protection from the clergy, particularly in the abbey of Montserrat. The movement expanded and in 1970 it numbered over 10,000 affiliated members. Parish centres organised all sort of social activities.

Excursion groups, tied to a late-Eighteenth century tradition of 'rediscovering' the countryside, also flourished (Torres 1979, Johnston 1985). The intimate bond between the territory and its inhabitants is a crucial component of all nationalisms. Since nationalism is *per se* a territorial ideology, the cult of the territory assumed a central role in the ideology of groups like the *Centre Excursionista Català* (Nogué i Font 1991). Excursions were conceived as a means to communicate with nature -scientific excursions- and to identify with the national community -revival of folklore.

Voluntary associations have been a constant undercurrent in postwar Catalonia. In periods of harsh repressions, they have provided a safety valve for cultural expressions which could not otherwise be voiced. Under Primo de Rivera, excursion groups and all other kinds of grass-roots associations served the crucial purpose of cultural resistance in both Catalonia and Euskadi (Roig Rosich 1992).

During late Francoism, several groups began to spread in the cities which also involved immigrants. In both Euskadi and Catalonia, the most important ones were probably the neighborhood associations (*associacions de veïns*), which addressed the lack of welfare provision and urban planning typical of Francoist development schemes. Hence, urban social movements in Barcelona were a response to the dearth of state intervention, as the inefficiency of the Spanish state gave rise to urban dissatisfaction (Garcia 1991). Their

³⁰⁰ The *penya*, with its "fairly flexible membership... provides an excellent forum of discussion. Since everyone knows everyone else... the atmosphere is relaxed and talk is spirited" (Pi i Sunyer 1971: 130).

³⁰¹ According to Johnston (1983: 130), social networks "play an important role in the growth of [a] movement prior to mass mobilization".

success when moving from an underground basis to a programme of open participation was due to their mutual contacts within the framework of Catalan nationalism.

Since the nationalists did not have a state at their disposition, Catalan civil society had to rely on the spontaneous initiative of thousands of citizens. Grass-root Catalanist organizations had to work in extremely adverse conditions, as their formal recognition was made impossible by the dictatorship. But Catalan civil society blossomed at every level, with a creative strength unseen elsewhere, which was drawn from a pre-existing individualistic tradition of organizational autonomy (Giner 1980, Estivil and Giner 1985). Hundreds of informal cultural bodies and recreational entities, many of them clandestine, arose in all corners of the country in order to reorganize national cultural life. They did not represent a wholly new phenomenon, as we have seen in the preceeding chapter about Barcelona's rich and intense cultural life at the turn of the century. In the 1940s and up to the 1960s, they assumed an informal and underground character. Most of their activities functioned to maintain Catalan culture (Johnston 1991).

Many of these organizations acted as a strong integrative force for the immigrants, spreading among them the gospel of nationalism. This socio-cultural participation, heightened by the thrill of fighting against a waning dictatorship, was an important factor in forging an elusive 'alliance' among immigrants and natives. The targets of Francoist repression continued to be both Catalan nationalists and working class organizations. However, it was the former who displayed the most effective symbols of political mobilization and inter-ideological alliances. Irrespective of their class, regional origin or political belief, most sectors of Catalan society united under the common goal of struggling against Francoism.

Before going on to the phase of the regime's eclipse, we should briefly reiterate some crucial points. The scope of this chapter has been to demonstrate how the slow recovery of the Catalan culture determined the quality of the opposition's struggle. We have seen a deeply changed picture from the gloomy prospects of cultural genocide following the Civil War to the unexpected revival of the Catalan culture in all fields following the first gleams of freedom. This brought about a diffused sense of optimism, showing the unique value of cultural resistance -and cultural nationalism- in shaping a country's identity without needing to resort to violent strategies. In the concluding remarks, this will be linked to the general argument of the thesis on the importance of core values and how they relate to the violent or

non-violent choices of the nationalist intelligentsia.

The unitarian front and the regime's agony (1970-75)

In July 1970, the Crown Prince Juan Carlos was officially designated to succeed Franco, strengthening the impression of the regime's imperturbable continuity. But the echoes of the Burgos Trial in December 1971 reverberated in Catalonia, engendering a wave of protest and casting a dark shadow on the regime's authority.

The mobilisation for language rights continued with the campaign *Català a l'escola* (For a school in Catalan) in 1970. November 1971 saw one of the key events of modern Catalan history, the creation of an unprecedentedly broad coalition of opposition forces which was named *Assemblea de Catalunya* (Assembly of Catalonia). The initiative and the main organisational tasks stemmed from the Communists, but the Assembly included socialists, social-democrats, Catholics, nationalists, left nationalists, liberals, etc. Under the banner *Libertat, Amnistia, Estatut d'Autonomia*, three main points were highlighted: amnesty for political prisoners, guaranteed liberty of expression and association, and the reestablishment of the 1932 Statute of Autonomy (Colomer 1976, Batista and Playà Maset 1991).

In a backlash, neo-fascist groups stepped up their activities in the early 1970s with a series of bomb attacks against book-shops, publishers, journals, cinema, and other centres of Catalan culture. Biblio-phobic violence worked as a "complement to legal repression" (Balcells 1980: 362). At the same time as the killing of Admiral Carrero Blanco by ETA clarified the crisis which the regime faced, Catalanist opposition turned increasingly to politics. From 1974, moderate members of the regime such as Fraga Iribarne, sought to introduce reforms. In 1974, Radio Barcelona broadcasted its first programme in Catalan, and a concert by the songwriter Lluís Llach in the Palau de la Música attracted an enthusiastic audience. Cultural nationalists then began openly to turn to political nationalism. In January 1975, Jordi Pujol called on the middle classes to take political action as the next phase, following the linguistic and cultural revival.

Conclusions

We have seen that the 'new' postwar Catalanism developed out of a series of historical events:

1. The defeat in the Civil War (1939);
2. The strong cultural and political repression (1939-42);

3. The corresponding underground cultural resistance, followed by a slow linguistic revival (1942-59);
4. The economic boom (1959-72);
5. An unprecedentedly massive immigration (1959-72);
6. A slow de-legitimation of the regime (1971-75).

The main forces promoting Catalanism, especially in its cultural forms, were the Church and the Left (first of all, the Communists). Most social classes, with the notable exception of the upper bourgeoisie, joined in. Furthermore, the very economic success of Catalonia helped to reinforce group identity (Pi-Sunyer 1985: 262). Contrary to theories of economic deprivation, internal colonialism and the like, it was not a clear sense of economic grievance from a poorer region which engendered nationalism. True, economic complaints were often voiced, but they were summed up in demands for less state control and more freedom of enterprise.

What, then, was the rationale of the opposition? Summarising, it can be said that nationalist mobilisation was deemed necessary in order to redress the following injustices:

1. Cultural repression;
2. Lack of political freedom;
3. Economic 'exploitation' (the middle classes and chunks of the bourgeoisie resented Madrid's centralized development plan).

In this chapter, we have also seen that the Catalanism emerging from the ashes of the dictatorship was a partially new phenomenon. Franco's ruthless repression and sweeping social change together instigated a re-definition of Catalan identity. As the traditional elements of nationhood came under heavy attack, the intelligentsia attempted a counter-mobilization, first by addressing the contentious issue of whether 'Catalonia' still existed. This process of introspection began in the 1940s, and culminated in the publication of a few books on the 'Catalan character' (Ferrater i Mora 1980, Vicens Vives 1984).³⁰² The fierceness with which the dictatorship tried to suppress Catalan culture is seen by many observers to be the main cause of the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism.³⁰³ The latter was thus essentially a reaction to the attacks against Catalan culture. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it must be recognized that since at least the 1940s Catalanism was centered, perhaps more than ever

³⁰² The phenomenon was echoed by the intelligentsia of two other Catalan-speaking areas, Valencia (Fuster 1977) and the Balearic Islands (Melià 1967).

³⁰³ "The intent to suppress the key features of a national community can produce a reaction opposed to the desired one.... It is external oppression and not a pretended national essence which legitimizes nationalism" (Giner 1986: 447).

before, on the issue of language and its recovery. The new Catalanism of the 1970s therefore had its roots in this dramatic violation of human and linguistic rights, around the defence of which all democratic forces converged. This concern for language stemmed from a long standing tradition, which we shall analyse in chapter 7.

There was a vast section of people -especially religious people- who accepted the dictatorship as the lesser of two evils, the other being left-wing repression. Franco presented himself as the saviour of the country's stability against revolutionary anarchy and fissiparous separatism (Preston 1993). Once this aim was achieved and no sign of overt opposition was visible for years, some sectors became increasingly impatient with Franco. Among the first to change their attitude were the local clergy, as they slowly welded alliances with the Catalanist opposition and, at a later stage, even with the Left.

The first nucleus of this covert opposition was formed in Montserrat and the symbol of this turnabout was Escarré's shift to the democratic opposition. Previously a staunch supporter of Franco, the abbot became slowly convinced that the regime had overdone its job and lost its *raison d'être*. The need to defend Catalan culture and to allow democratic reform played a key role in this re-awakening. However, after bitter years of frontal repression, the dictatorship had to come to terms with the fact that Catalan culture could not be erased by decree. Defying formidable odds, the regional culture showed unexpected signs of strength beginning to revive as soon as the bans were slowly slackened. Most sections of Catalan society coalesced in the defence of the threatened culture, but the simple realisation that it was still healthy gave the whole movement a non-confrontational and optimist character. Freedom was to be gained by everyday struggle, rather than by eschatological solutions. All chinks in the armour of the regime had to be exploited. In contrast to the Basque case, dialogue and moderation became Catalanist key words. The nationalist poet Salvador Espriu sang in his *La Pell de Brau* (The Bull's Hide):

"Always remember this, Sepharad
keep the bridges of dialogue safe
and seek to understand and love
your children's diverse motives and tongues
... That Sepharad may live forever
in order and in peace, in work,
in difficult and deserved
liberty". 304

Esriu echoed a committed sense of empathy and solidarity not only with the other forces

³⁰⁴ Translated by David Rosenthal (1991). As previously mentioned, Sepharad was the name Espriu gave to this ideal Spain where all cultures and religions could live harmoniously side by side. The reference to Spain prior to 1492, to the Inquisition and to Liberal Jacobinism is obvious.

of the democratic opposition but also with other oppressed peoples, and *La pell de brau* "did play an important role in opening new 'bridges of dialogue' among the nations of Spain, with their 'diverse motives and tongues'" (Rosenthal 1991: 54).

During late Francoism, far reaching social changes, such as immigration and a booming economy, shifted the focus onto new issues. In response, new political movements (Marxism, 'independentism', etc.) addressed these new challenges by trying to adapt to, and re-define, national reality. This process of re-definition was important in the intellectual arena, with the emergence of a new historiographic tradition and its related methodologies. This reflects a contrast between the two stages of defeat and renewal: early forms of opposition were virtually eradicated after the fall of Barcelona and barely survived until 1952 in the form of intermittent and weak guerrilla actions.³⁰⁵ But a new moderate opposition grew out of the social upheavals released by the *milagro economico*.³⁰⁶

In contrast to the Basque case, accounts of repression and resistance to the regime are often pervaded by a sense of irony.³⁰⁷ This can only be afforded in an atmosphere of ultimate self-confidence when the bases of collective 'integrity' are not under radical threat. The philosopher Ferrater i Mora (1980: 89-ff) conceived *ironia* (irony) to be one of the four defining elements of the Catalan personality, along with *continuitat* (continuity),³⁰⁸ *mesura* (measure), and *seny* (wisdom, good sense, judgement).³⁰⁹ In the Basque case, it is extremely unusual to find the same sense of irony, living evidence of an underlying strong cultural identity. The Francoist attempts to eradicate Catalan culture had a grotesque character which was not lost on the opposition. Although its impact on Catalan culture was disastrous, the democratic forces recognized a sense of inner moral superiority in the face of centralism. Thus, many accounts of repression by Catalanist intellectuals, historians and social scientists, are pervaded by a subtle irony tempered by the bitterness of experience.

The Catalanist programme was carried out in the name of 'prudence and clarity'. This is the opposite of the programme that emerged from Ekin's days of reflections, which ended in

³⁰⁵ On Spanish guerrilla bands until 1960, see Pons Prades (1977).

³⁰⁶ On the Spanish opposition to the dictatorship, see the collection of articles in Tusell et al. (1990).

³⁰⁷ See, for instance, Fabres et al. (1978).

³⁰⁸ *Continuitat* refers not simply to tradition and history, but to everyday persistence. The value *treball* (work) inspires every Catalan "to finish always what s/he has begun and to give the final touch to all enterprises" (Ferrater i Mora 1980: 42-3).

³⁰⁹ As the English journalist John Hooper has stressed, "there is no exact translation of *seny*. Perhaps the nearest equivalent is the northern English term '*nous*' - good old common sense. Respect for *seny* makes the Catalans realistic, earnest tolerant and at times bit censorious. Yet it sits uneasily with their frequently tumultuous history" (Hooper 1986: 234).

radicalism and confusion (rather than prudence and clarity), with no hegemonical project on which all sectors of the Basque movement could agree and which resulted in dividing the radical youth from the moderate *peneuvistas*.

From the sixties onwards, the regime's previous "policy of frontal assault was softened to one of slow suffocation" (Rosenthal 1991: 7). The main restrictions remained in force, while a steady flow of immigrants began to enter the region. This massive influx radically altered Catalonia's demographic balance (as it did in the Basque Country), producing drastic cultural and social changes. At this point, the new nationalism hitherto confined to intellectual elites started to spill over into the general population, and the increasingly de-legitimized dictatorship could not hold back its diffusion. The main concern for progressive intellectuals was the reestablishment of democracy and autonomy. But at a popular level the upsurge of nationalism also betrayed an apprehension towards large scale immigration with its concomitant identity problems.

Catalanism first re-emerged in purely cultural manifestations, and then slowly took a political form once the prohibition was relaxed. That was, step by step, the same process used at the time of Primo de Rivera, and, before that, during the *Renaixença*, reflecting a general pattern of evolution of stateless nationalisms (Hroch 1985, Hutchinson 1987). The fact that this itinerary could not be thoroughly followed in Euskadi because of the weakness of the local culture, and, hence, of cultural nationalism, has been mentioned in the previous chapter and will be fully analysed in the final chapter.

Chapter 6

The TRANSITION to DEMOCRACY. From CLANDESTINE ACTION to the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1975-1986)

This brief chapter will serve to analyse the emergence of Basque and Catalan nationalism as mass movements once the fall of the dictatorship reinstated free expression.

Franco's death and the beginning of the 'Transition'

On 20 November 1975, Francisco Franco died. Two days later, Juan Carlos de Borbón was crowned King of Spain. The process of democratization which immediately ensued came to be known as the 'Transition' (*Transición*).

On 25 November, only three days after taking possession of the throne, the King proclaimed a first general amnesty, and about 15,000 political prisoners and exiles won back their freedom.³¹⁰ The issue of a total amnesty was the crucial factor in the relations between the Basques and Madrid throughout the 'Transition' period.

The inability of the Franco regime to stay abreast of the radical changes brought about by large scale industrialization spelled its decline. At its end, not only was Francoism doomed but the very idea of the Spanish state was no longer legitimate in Euskadi.³¹¹ This remained the case at least until the late 1980s, well after the Transition had run its course.³¹² Nationalist unrest spread all over Euskadi, with demands for a general amnesty and popular demonstrations, while ETA's violence reached its peak. "The Basque region during these

³¹⁰ The *abertzale* magazine *Hitz* published a list of 749 Basque nationalist prisoners soon after Franco's death. (749 *Gudari gizon eta ematze espetxeetan*, *Hitz*, nº 5, January 1976, pp. 6-13). The pardon had affected fewer than 10 per cent of them (Preston 1986: 82). However, the demands of amnesty concerned a much larger number of exiles.

³¹¹ On the problems of the state's legitimacy in Euskadi, see Perez Agote (1982).

³¹² *Arzallus dice que el Estado español no está legitimado en el País Vasco*, "El Periódico", 12 October 1987.

days was like a pressure cooker about to explode. Sentiments for change had been so sharply suppressed during the dictatorship of Franco that there had been little opportunity for the expression of dissent. With the dictator gone, Basques now sought to release the pressures built up over the preceding forty years" (Clark 1984: 90).

The period spanning the first general elections of 1977 to the approval of the Constitution in 1978 was one of crucial decision-making. As with the passing of most dictatorial regimes, the success of minority nationalism in Spain was tightly bound up with the democratization process. The prospects of democracy meant the first real possibility for decades for submerged nationalist feelings to freely find their voice (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986).

In 1976, the King appointed the first cabinet under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez. The unitary character and superior organisation of the democratic opposition on the periphery, particularly in Catalonia, compelled the Spanish political forces to confront the Catalan and Basque question (Balcells 1992: 203). The initiative passed from the Assembly of Catalonia to the political parties, most of which were legalized under Suárez's government. After being passed by the Parliament, the democratic transition was formally accepted by popular referendum. The Law of Political Reform was approved by 69% of the Catalan electorate. As a consequence, the main Catalan political parties decided to abandon their vision of 'democratic break' or 'rupture strategy' (*estrategia de ruptura*) and endorsed a smoother process, omitting the question of the legitimacy of the monarchy and dropping any demand to 'purge' the state apparatus from former Francoist cadres (Balcells 1992: 204). In contrast, all Basque nationalist parties maintained a more intransigent line.

The initial procrastination of Madrid to fully accept democratic reform was cut short by huge mass mobilisations in most Spanish cities. Catalonia was by far the most mobilised region of Spain in terms of popular demonstrations and civic initiatives. On the *Diada* of 11 September 1977, more than a million people attended the great demonstration in Barcelona called by all the opposition to demand 'freedom, amnesty and statute of autonomy'. Hailed as the biggest demonstration in postwar Europe, it gave an unmistakable signal to Madrid that the time for dismantling the centralist state had come. All the democratic forces contributed to its organisation, but the Left, rather than the nationalists *per se*, was its main instigator. The impact was immediate: on 29 September, a decree established a provisional *Generalitat* and in October Josep Tarradellas, the president of the Catalan government in exile, was recalled home, becoming its first President.

In Euskadi, popular mobilisations were continuously disrupted by violence. In March

1976, nearly 80% of the work force in Vitoria demonstrated to demand pay increases. After several days of barricades and police charges, in which popular marches swelled with new participants, the death toll stood at five (Clark 1979: 269-71, Preston 1986: 82-3). Strikes, protests and street violence erupted in most Spanish cities in support of the Basque workers. As with most of the mobilisations following the Burgos Trial, such manifestations of solidarity proved that the Spanish opposition as a whole was more interested in real democracy, than in the Right's abstract claim that the unity of the Fatherland was in jeopardy.

In Euskadi, the first general elections in 1977 saw the PNV establishing itself as the main Basque party, but it came a close second after the PSOE, Spanish Socialists (Llera Ramo 1985). In Catalonia, a huge victory was won by the Left, with the regional Socialists (PSC-PSOE) and the Communists (PSUC) heading respectively for first and second place.

Spain's path to devolution: from the Constitution to the *Comunidades*

Autonomas

The new Constitution was approved in 1978. Various articles concerned the so-called 'autonomous communities'. Conferring official legitimacy to the regionalization process, article 3 runs *verbatim*:

"Castilian is the official language of the State. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities according to their own Statutes. The richness of the distinct linguistic modalities of Spain represents a patrimony which will be the object of special respect and protection".

But any possible 'over-interpretation' of these rights was corrected by article nº 2: "The Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible fatherland (*patria*) of all the Spaniards. It acknowledges and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which form it and the solidarity among them".³¹³ An important corrective to the latter sentence may be provided by article 145: "No federation between Autonomous Communities will be permitted under any circumstances".³¹⁴ The patent aim of this article was to curb possible unifying trends among the regions. Pan-Catalanism spoke in the name of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, while in Euskadi the question of an 'irredenta' Navarre began to fuel nationalist fire.³¹⁵

³¹³ "La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre ellas" (art. 2 del Título Preliminar de la Constitución Española).

³¹⁴ *Constitución española / Reglamento del Senado* (1982). Madrid: Publicaciones del Senado.

³¹⁵ On the definition of Navarre as a "Basque Ulster", see Blinkhorn (1974). However, in

However, the most important point of the 1978 Constitution was its acknowledgment of the existence of other 'nationalities' (*nacionalidades*) within the one and indivisible Spanish 'nation' (*nación*). The four historical nationalities, which were not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, are Castile, Catalonia, Euzkadi and Galicia (Gispert and Prats 1978). But the obvious trick was to extend decentralization to most other regions, thereby 'relativising' the potential impact of Basque and Catalan autonomy. There are now 17 'autonomous communities' (*Comunidades Autonomas*, or *Cc.Aa.*) on the official map, some of which have been entirely invented.³¹⁶

The Constitution can hardly be understood without taking into account the decisive role played by Catalan and Basque nationalism in the debates preceding its approval. Once approved by the Parliament, the Constitution was submitted to popular referendum and was accepted all over Spain, with the exception of Euskadi. All Basque nationalist forces, including the PNV (which had abstained in the parliamentary vote), opposed it.³¹⁷ The reasons for boycotting the Constitution were numerous and all related to the ambiguities about Basque rights provided therein. In the ensuing referendum, the abstention rate reached 56% in Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia. Such a figure shows the extent to which the Spanish state had little legitimacy in Euskadi, a state of affairs which provided fertile ground for the continuation and spread of violence.

The next important step was to transform the Constitution's regionalist ideal into practice by creating the instruments of regional self-determination. With its robust tradition, Catalonia was obviously an ideal candidate to be granted such honour first. The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (*Estatut*) was approved in 1979 after a popular referendum: 61% of the eligible voters cast ballots and 88% of those supported the *Estatut*. Catalonia achieved an

contrast to Ulster, religious cleavages are absent and the main conflict is between pro-Madrid 'regionalists', who want a limited degree of autonomy within Spain, and the nationalists, who defend Navarre's autonomy within a unified Euskadi. Navarre itself is divided between an *Euskaldún* north which is sympathetic to radical Basque nationalism, and a Castilianized south which supports autonomy within Spain. The capital Pamplona (*Iruñea*) is broadly situated at the intersection between these two areas.

³¹⁶ For instance, autonomy statutes were granted to *Cantabria*, an area whose ancient name was *La Montaña*, and *La Rioja*, both regions culturally and historically part of Castile. *Madrid* has been detached from its historical hinterland, Castile, and established as a separate *Comunidad Autónoma*, a sort of 'federal district' on the pattern of Canberra, Washington, or Mexico City. Recently, local historians have been mobilized in order to confer on these administrative units a new regional dignity.

Not everybody is satisfied with the present status and some regions claim a separate autonomy based on alleged historical roots. Thus, some organisations in *Leon* wish their region to 'secede' from the Autonomous Community of Castile.

³¹⁷ On the Basque nationalists' attitude towards the Constitution and the Statute, see Hills (1980) and Tamayo (1988).

autonomous government (the *Generalitat*), and its own Parliament. The Statute's charter declared Catalan the 'proper language' (*llengua propia*) of Catalonia, although it had to share the status of 'official language' (*llengua oficial*) with Castilian (Moll 1983).

The Basque Autonomy Statute was approved in the same period as the Catalan one and both were inspired by the experience of the Generalitat under the Republic.³¹⁸ Again, a popular referendum ratified its approval in 1979, with 61% voting and 89% supporting the statute. Jesús Maria De Leizaola (1896-1980), the successor of Aguirre as president of the Basque parliament in exile, returned from France ending the 43-years-old 'government in exile'. In April 1980, Carlos Garaikoetxea, at that time leader of the PNV, became the first post-war *lendakari* (head of the Basque government, or *lehendakari*).

The ghost of Spanish nationalism

However, for some people the process of devolution went too far. Provoked by the rapid spread of democratization and regional autonomy, as well by ETA's assassinations, the most reactionary elements in the military were anxious to put a halt to the process. On 23 February 1981, a plenary session of the Spanish Parliament was interrupted by a group of Civil Guards led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who seized the assembly and held the MPs prisoners for more than one day. A providential intervention by the king apparently prevented the attempted coup, nicknamed the *Tejerazo*, from becoming an open military revolt.³¹⁹

The shock of this adventure had long-lasting and damaging implications for the young democracy and halted further democratic progress, especially in matters of regional devolution. In a move conceived to pacify the 'bunker'³²⁰ and remove rumours of a more

³¹⁸ According to Clark (1979: 349), "the Catalan example proved to be the only one of negotiation over the transfer of powers. Since the Catalan regime was the first to be developed, its powers were subject to more bargaining. Subsequent regional entities, such as the Basque General Council, would have to follow the pattern established by the Catalan Generalitat".

³¹⁹ The king has played a key role in transforming the regime while preventing a coup d'état by the army. His firm behaviour in the face of the abortive coup by Tejero in 1981 caused the military revolt to subside, and the Transition to continue its course. The former leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, has often remarked that without the king Spain would be at civil war (cited in Alba 1983). The King has probably been the most popular political figure in Spain during the whole period of transition. A survey carried out by DATA in 1977 indicated that 59% of the Spaniards chose monarchy, 19% were indifferent, while no more than 18% preferred the republic (cited by Linz 1979). The reason for this preference does not simply relate to the beloved personality of the King, but it is also historical. Since Spain's two previous republican experiences were fraught with conflicts and civil wars, Republicanism does not have a positive profile in Spanish politics. The monarchy is seen as a supra-national symbol of unity and stability.

³²⁰ The term 'bunker' was often used in Spain "to cover the extreme right committed to fighting democracy from the rubble of Francoism" (Preston 1986: 232).

serious coup, Madrid tried to pass a basic law (LOAPA, *Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico*). The law was officially designed to 'harmonize' the devolution process, but its surreptitious aim was to curtail the powers of the two main autonomous communities, Catalonia and Euskadi, by standardizing the political power and representation of each community. Its attempted introduction in 1982 stirred vigorous popular protest from most of the opposition.³²¹ The impending threat of another *golpe* (coup d'état) was one of the main 'justifications' for the promotion of the LOAPA. Finally, in August 1983, the law was considered *ultra vires* by the Constitutional Court and thus was dropped after its enormous unpopularity became clear.³²²

Another event put the Transition process in Catalonia under considerable strain. Barely a month after the *Tejerazo*, a manifesto signed by a few sociologists (the complete list of names was never revealed) appeared, claiming that Castilian-speakers were subject to discrimination, and making an implicit call to oppose Catalanisation with political means. The reaction was immediate, but contrary to the one sought by its authors. Within five days, a counter-call 'in defence of the Catalan language, culture and nation' (*Crida a la solidaritat en defensa de la llengua, la cultura i la nació catalanes*) was published with the support of over 1,300 institutions and voluntary associations. Its organizers set in motion a vast mobilisation campaign, culminating on 24 June 1981 in a festival *cum* demonstration which filled up the *Camp Nou*, the largest football stadium in Europe. In 14 March 1982, the *Crida* with other groups organised a huge anti-LOAPA demonstration.

In a pattern recurring throughout Catalan history, what started as a reaction against an attack on Catalan culture, turned into an increasingly political movement. But, since this attack occurred within the framework of autonomy agreed by the nationalists with Madrid, the declared objective now became separation from the rest of Spain. The *Crida's* leaders capitalized on the threat to the core values of the nation, claiming that only with independence would Catalonia be liberated from the *españolista* threat. In order to counteract the radical independentist movement, which was popular amongst the youth, Madrid had to move rapidly and grant concessions to Catalonia. In the end, only the success of the Generalitat's politics of linguistic normalisation could curtail those who proclaimed that only independence

³²¹ *El PNV se sentirá desligado del estatuto si se 'nivelan' las autonomías, afirma Sodupe*, "El País", 1 November 1984. Apart from all Basque and the Catalan nationalists, the anti-LOAPA front also included the Communists (PCE) and the Andalusian regionalists (PSA). The law had been agreed on by the PSOE and UCD.

³²² For a legislative assessment of the LOAPA and the entire decentralisation process in comparative perspective, see Hannum (1990: 263-79).

would grant cultural freedom to Catalonia.³²³

In the 1982 general elections, the PSOE won an absolute majority in the Madrid's *Cortes*. For the first time, Spain was ruled by a Socialist government, which has lasted till the present day (1994).

The end of the PNV's monopoly over Basque nationalism

Since 1970, all relevant ideological activity within ETA has ceased. Yet, with the decline of Francoism, the ideological debate which originated in the 1960s spread amongst the wider population. From the first elections held in 1977, the nationalist parties experienced continuous growth until they achieved an absolute majority of the vote (over 70%).³²⁴ The spread of nationalism has enveloped all areas of society. It is difficult to relate this explosion to political violence. Certainly, many nationalists from all over the political spectrum believed that ETA still played a useful function to put pressure on Madrid. Moreover, active logistical support for ETA has been discovered in many respectable sectors, such as law firms, unemployed welfare societies, religious orders, etc.³²⁵ The PNV was the first party to benefit from democratization, as it emerged reinvigorated from the political process which promoted autonomy. However, democracy and autonomy triggered the people's will to express their grudges and claims through other forces. In a pluralist system, the PNV could no longer claim to be the only representative of Basque nationalism.

The situation was complicated by the persistence of political violence, which put the whole nationalist movement under considerable pressure. A large sector of nationalist opinion was still operating underground and they looked to the 'heroic' gestures of the ETA activists rather than the moderate *peneuvistas*. Hence the challenge to both democracy and nationalism became -and remains to this day - the question of how to integrate this widespread support for the radical cause into the democratic game. This process has resulted in the formation of three new nationalist parties: in order of creation, EE, HB and EA.

Once Euskadi was granted an autonomy Statute, ETA-pm, then the main branch of ETA, decided altogether to drop the armed struggle, while ETA-m continued its attacks. Together with a relevant sector of the local Communist Party, many ex-militants of ETA-pm formed in

³²³ For a comprehensive, albeit partisan, history of the Crida, see Monné and Selga (1991). For a more critical viewpoint, see Candel (1985: 197-248, especially p. 239) and Laitin (1989).

³²⁴ GURRUTXAGA, Iñigo (1986a) *Avance constante de los partidos nacionalistas*, "El País", 2 December 1986, p. 16. See also Clark (1987).

³²⁵ *La policía cita a HB, comités de parados y a los abogados de San Sebastián dentro del "complejo ETA"*, "El País", 13 September 1987.

1976 the electoral alliance EE (*Euskadiko Ezkerra*). At the time of its foundation, EE adopted a Marxist and pro-independence line, but eventually moved on to an overall acceptance of the regional autonomy framework. The renunciation of violence was a slow process and had to pass through a period in which armed actions were used to supplement legal action whenever the results of the latter were insufficient. As Preston (1986: 125) points out, "the abandonment of violence was to cause internal division, schisms and a nostalgic longing for armed action". This testifies to the thesis that violence served a functional unifying imperative and, whenever violence was abandoned, fissiparous trends emerged within the 'pacified' organisation.

At the same time, the continued use of violence was advocated by important sectors of Basque public opinion who uncompromisingly vowed to achieve independence. Since the Spanish state was still perceived as the main enemy, the whole democratization process was only seen as a façade disguising a perennial Spanish attempt to eliminate Basque identity. This was the "sectarian view that the elections were a stunt 'to legitimise fascism' [and that]... Spanish tyranny was now masked by the trapping of a fraudulent democracy" (Preston 1986: 126). Notwithstanding the autonomy concessions, the radical leftists declared that the Basques were "persecuted more than before".³²⁶ Indeed, the 'occupation forces' were still massively present in the region as a reminder of Madrid's past attempts to crush Basque aspirations. Hence, important sectors saw the severing of all ties from Spain as the only viable solution. In order to achieve this goal, ETA's actions were considered not only justified but necessary.

Herri Batasuna: the universe of anti-state protest

Eventually, those important sectors which supported radical separatism and gave moral endorsement to the use of violence had to be democratically represented. In November 1977, the veteran *abertzale* leader Telesforo Monzón (1904-1987) called a meeting of these forces in Alsasua, Navarre, in which they agreed to form an electoral coalition named *Mesa de Alsasua*. In April 1978, the Mesa de Alsasua adopted the name of *Herri Batasuna* (HB, Popular Unity). The plethora of groups which formed the HB coalition had a vested interest in the continuation of ETA.³²⁷ Some of them had been accused of being directly dependent

³²⁶ In 1983, the exiled leader F. Letamendia (Ortzi) declared that the Basques in general, not only the nationalist Left, were more persecuted than years before. "*Lo vasco, en general, y no sólo la izquierda abertzale, está ahora más perseguido que hace algunos años*", "Egin", 16 July 1983.

³²⁷ Probably, if one of these parties decided to go it alone it would fail to gain any relevant

on ETA.³²⁸

Like ETA, HB never had a proper leader or central figure-head,³²⁹ and it has been characterized by an unparalleled flexibility in the renewal of its cadres.³³⁰ An interesting feature has always been its ideological heterogeneity. Marxists, environmentalists, gay activists, neo-traditionalists, anti-nuclearists, cultural revivalists, punks, pacifists, feminists, unemployed, priests, small-town businessmen, students, peasants and every other imaginable sector from both urban and rural milieux are all well represented in what is probably one of the most unorthodox, unconventional and *sui generis* parties in Europe. What united all these groups was the rejection of both the Spanish Constitution and the Autonomy Statute, and the aspiration to independence. What kept their disparate interests in a single front was the confrontational character of the struggle, the blanket division of the world into oppressor(s) and oppressed. Violence and counter-violence turned into the *leit-motifs* and the glue of this multitude of social actors. Since independence was the key goal, all ideological differences were momentarily put aside. Thus, the main inspirer of the Mesa de Alsasua, Telesforo Monzón, was a traditionalist *jelkide* (= follower of God and the Old Laws) from the conservative wing of the PNV. But he declared himself ready to make alliances with anybody who was prepared to fight for national sovereignty.

HB and its predecessors seemed to have the capacity to absorb and make their own any conflict emerging in Basque society. That is, all contemporary cleavages and social movements have been skilfully appropriated by radical nationalism finding a 'natural' means of expression in its milieux. A good example is the anti-nuclear movement before the formation of HB.³³¹ In July 1977, an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people demonstrated in Bilbao against the nuclear power plant of Lemoniz. Most of the mobilizing efforts was carried out by the *abertzale* Left. "Hailed as the biggest anti-nuclear demonstration ever" (Rüdig 1990: 138), the event triggered other political activities which culminated in ETA's attempt to blow up part of the installations. Also in this case, we can acknowledge the radical

support. At most it could achieve the control of some minor municipality.

³²⁸ Javier Solana dice que los partidos integrados en HB dependen de ETA, "El País", 24 December 1987, p. 15.

³²⁹ Rather, its leadership was beset by endemic discontinuity and power shifts. See Clark (1984: 204-18) on the internal organisation and hierarchical structure of ETA in 1981. However, such kinds of hierarchy were continuously changing.

³³⁰ Herri Batasuna renovará a primeros de año a todos los componentes de su mesa nacional, "El País", 24 December 1987, p. 15.

³³¹ On the anti-nuclear struggles in Euskadi, see the pamphlet by Altabizkar (1974). A good synthesis is available in the international manual by Rüdig (1990: 137-9 and 212-3).

nationalists' ability to capitalize key social issues, and their awareness of both popular feelings and burning contemporary problems. Although Lemoniz was "primarily used as a political resource to further the appeal of Basque nationalism", ... "it is one of the few European nuclear stations which have been abandoned at a well-advanced stage of construction" (Rüdig 1990: 138-9).

By the 1980s, HB became the first party in Gipuzkoa, the second in Bizkaia and the fourth in Alava and Navarre. HB was voted for by the youth of other regions as well, including Madrid.³³² There, it has attracted the anti-state feelings of a few relevant sectors, especially students, fringe intellectuals and the unemployed. In these cases, the vote for HB was not so much a vote in favour of Basque separatism as a vote against the 'system'. In Catalonia, HB became in 1987 the most popular of the lists not represented in the Parliament (and the seventh among all parties, with over 40,000 votes), providing a vehicle for expressing the separatist feelings of the Catalan radical youth.³³³ Herri Batasuna was finally legalized in June 1986,³³⁴ although many Socialist leaders opposed the move on the ground that it could stimulate HB's electoral growth to the prejudice of the PSOE.³³⁵

The challenge posed by the increasing popularity of the *abertzale* movement created strong tensions within the moderate nationalist field. In October 1986, a new party, EA (*Eusko Alkartasuna*, Basque Solidarity), arose as a splinter group from the PNV. The split precipitated early elections for the Basque Parliament, since the PNV lost its ruling majority. In the ensuing elections (30 November 1986), EA won 14 seats in the 81-member Basque parliament, exactly the same number as the PNV, a remarkable achievement for a brand-new party.³³⁶ The success was ultimately due to the charismatic personality of its leader, Carlos Garaikoetxea, the former *lehendakari*.³³⁷ A major reason for EA's breakaway move was the PNV's governing alliance with the PSOE, which was considered not to be nationalist enough, threatening to erode the centrist position in favour of HB and the radical Left.

³³² See *Anuario de Euskal-Herria*, 1987. Bilbao: Editorial de Amigos del Libro Vasco, pp. 163-4.

³³³ *La presencia de Herri Batasuna en Barcelona ha sido mayor que la del resto de grupos minoritarios*, "El País", 10 June 1987. *HB es la séptima lista más votada en Cataluña para el Parlamento Europeo*, "El País", 13 June 1987.

³³⁴ *El Supremo ordena la legalización de Herri Batasuna*, pp. 1, 12, 15 and 16, "El País", 3 June 1986.

³³⁵ *Benegas relaciona el ascenso de HB con su "legitimación" por los tribunales*, "El País", 25 June 1986.

³³⁶ In those same elections, the PSOE became the first party with 19 seats, HB increased its representation to 14 seats, and EE received 11 seats. Overall, parties advocating more autonomy or straightaway independence gathered more than 70% of the vote.

³³⁷ Garaikoetxea had been the *lehendakari* from 1980 to 1984, when he was forced to resign.

Another important reason which strained Garaikoetxea's relations with the PNV was the issue of centralization.³³⁸ Garaikoetxea aimed at concentrating powers in Vitoria (= Gasteiz, the capital of the Autonomous Community) in order to avoid further administrative fragmentation.³³⁹ His modernizing approach was opposed by the PNV's old guard, who advocated an articulation of provincial interests, especially in Alava.³⁴⁰ The PNV's position was a tribute to the Aranist idea of a 'confederacy of free territories' honoured by a centuries-old tradition of provincial autonomies. As a non-violent party occupying the middle ground between the PNV and EE, Euzko Alkartasuna soon gained the support of hundreds of mayors and local councilors.

Basque and Catalan social networks

The youth has been the main protagonist of Basque radical nationalism.³⁴¹ Their nationalist socialization was accompanied by the creation of a counter-culture different from that of the forefathers, yet assertively Basque. A main vehicle for the explosion of nationalist slogans were rock concerts. The new cultural universe thereby expressed shared many elements of contemporary international mass culture. Yet, it retained a strong militant flavour, expressed in the singing of lyrics in Euskara.³⁴² City and countryside met on such occasions. Although youth nationalist culture was made up of this unique blend of local, urban and cosmopolitan elements, the core of radical nationalism was firmly entrenched in the countryside.³⁴³ Its population formed the bulk of the support for the *abertzale* parties.³⁴⁴ Another channel for the diffusion of nationalism has been sport, both traditional and modern, which we shall deal

³³⁸ *El PNV lleva ante los tribunales del partido a Carlos Garaikoetxea*, "El País", 21 de julio de 1986, pp. 1 and 14.

³³⁹ UNZUETA, Patxo (1986) *Identidad nacional y territorios históricos*, "El País", 25 November 1986, p. 17

³⁴⁰ The Ekin generation consistently criticized the PNV's old guard for the loosely decentralized structure of the party. They accused it of being *cantonalista* and tied to parochial interests, thereby hampering any possibility of a coordinated policy across provincial interests (See *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, pp. 13, 19, etc.).

³⁴¹ CASTELLANO, Rafael (1986) *La extrema juventud radical*, "El País", 1 December 1986, p. 19. PÉREZ-AGOTE, Alfonso (1986) *Euskadi, la nueva generación*, "El País", 2 December 1986, p. 11.

³⁴² *Al trepidante ritmo de Euskadi. Folkis, punkis, jivi*, "Punto y Hora", nº 442, special issue, August 1986. *Rock' vasco deseo de cambio*, "El País Domingo- Historia del Rock", p. 563. See also BLASCO, ROGELIO (1987) *Nuevo rock vasco: un fenómeno sociológico*, *Cuadernos de Alzate*, 6, pp. 12-30. On the movement of the *nueva canción vasca*, parallel to the Catalan *nova canço*, see also Muga, 59, vol. VIII, 1986, pp. 4-23.

³⁴³ The Town Hall councils have been the principal political scene of HB's political activity, especially in the small villages of Gipuzkoa.

³⁴⁴ *El voto más radical se asienta en zonas rurales*, "El País", 12 February 1984. See also Clark (1981, 1984: 185-203, 1987).

with in a separate appendix.

The anti-nuclear struggle was carried out mainly by neighborhood organizations, fishing collectivities, etc. Professional middle classes (doctors, architects, academics, cultural and leisure organizations) took up the issue (Rüdig 1990: 138).

In the Basque Country, the crucial issue around which the whole Transition process revolved was the call for a total amnesty (*Amnistiak Osuna*) and all nationalist parties have included this demand in their programmes.³⁴⁵ Amnesty demonstrations sprang up in every corner of Spain, but in Euskadi they assumed a special overtone. "Frequent demonstrations were backed by labour disputes, sit-ins, hunger strikes and mass resignations by municipal officials" (Preston 1986: 82). From 1976, the spearhead of this kind of mobilisation was the *Gestoras Pro-Amnistía* (Pro-Amnesty Committees).³⁴⁶ These were classical awareness-raising groups, as well as associations for the moral and material support of the prisoners and their families. Each of the four provinces had its own committee, while their representatives toured Western European capitals to publicize the Basque prisoners' plight. Their stalls selling badges, stick-on labels, T-shirts, publications, and pamphlets, could be seen at any major Basque *fiesta* or street market. They participated in rallies and demonstrations, held press conferences, and raised money for the families of the prisoners. They also provided medical aid for those lucky ones who were released from jail. Finally, they had contacts with international human-rights groups, such as Amnesty International, which monitored any possible human-right abuse by police forces during the Transition. The fruit of years of popular mobilisations in favour of amnesty was Herri Batasuna. The coalition derived much of its strength from the periodic, cyclical, quasi-ritual character of such mobilisations: as ETA would continue its armed attacks, "there would always be, no matter how many amnesties were granted, a fresh supply of ETA prisoners as a focus to rally the HB rank and file through amnesty mobilisations" (Preston 1986: 152).

Catalan social networks functioned in a different way, since there was not the catalyst of political violence. With the establishment of democracy, many formerly private and semi-clandestine initiatives passed into public hands. The nationalist movement was itself formalized and articulated in different political parties.³⁴⁷ But, as political struggle became

³⁴⁵ Carlos Garaikoetxea propone una amnistía sin restricciones en el País Vasco, "El País", 23 September 1987.

³⁴⁶ On the Pro-Amnesty Associations and the struggle for unconditional amnesty during the first years of democracy, see Clark (1979: 277-300) and Ortzi (1991: vol. 4: ch. 1: paragraphs 1-9; ch. 2: paragraph 84; vol. 2: ch. 6: paragraph 77).

³⁴⁷ Since 1909, state-wide parties have not stood a chance of success in Catalonia if they have not been "Catalanized" through either semantic arrangements or the establishment of

institutionalized, the civil society, which was previously its only support, began to lose its former central role. The neighbourhood associations which were the backbone of the urban social movement in the mid-1970s were on the wane and nearly disappeared (Garcia 1991). After achieving a massive peak during the mobilisations of 1977 and 1978, labour union membership drastically declined (Balfour 1989). Furthermore, Catalonia was not able to produce a nationalist union, perhaps an indication of the gulf existing between immigrants and native Catalans. In contrast, the Basque nationalist union STV-ELA became the biggest in Euskadi.³⁴⁸

Both in Euskadi and Catalonia, popular *fiestas* (*festas* in Catalan) represent a culminating moment for the expression of national identity. Local events, celebrations, folkloric, religious and even pre-Christian festivals acted as catalyst of nationalist expression.³⁴⁹ We shall mention their integrative role in the chapter on immigration. The basic unit of any mobilization, and indeed of all social life in Euskadi, is the *cuadrilla*, the informal group of friends who meet regularly.³⁵⁰

Nationalist mobilization was conducted against the backdrop of a general secularization of society. In Catalonia, we have seen the sudden decline of religion as a mobilising factor in the late 1960s. A recent survey has shown that about 75% of the Basques are believers, although only one third of them are practicing Catholics.³⁵¹ The present-day *abertzale* movement is basically secular, yet, as we said, it has attracted membership from committed priests and former seminarists.

regional sections. Left parties are among the strongest advocates of Catalanism: many members of the Communist Party endorse Catalonia's right to self-determination and even independence, while the Catalan Socialists propound a broad federalism for the existing Autonomous Communities.

³⁴⁸ In the elections for workers' delegates held in enterprises in 1986, the ELA/STV took first place in the Basque Autonomous Community, with 34.9 % of the delegates, entitling it to "most representative" status at regional level (see *Trade Unions of the World 1989-1990*, 1991. Harlow: Longman, 2nd edition, p. 349).

³⁴⁹ For an excellent study of the relationship between these *festas* and Catalan identity, see Barrera (1985). One of the most important is the *Patum* celebrated every Corpus Domini in the town of Berga. For the renewed importance and shifting meaning of the *Patum*, see Barrera (1985: 99-102 and 245-51) and Noyes (1992).

³⁵⁰ On the *cuadrilla* and other kinds of social networks, see Della Porta and Mattina (1985). Another Basque tradition is the *txikiteo*, which consists in a *cuadrilla* ritually going on a fixed itinerary from one bar to another drinking and eating small quantities of food (Ramírez Goicoechea 1991: 289-97).

³⁵¹ *El 75 % dels bascos són creients, però només un de cada tres habitants d' Euskadi és practicant*, "Diari de Barcelona", 19 February 1988. See also Perez Agote (1990).

New developments in language planning.

As an outcome of the new process of devolution, striking progress has been made in the field of linguistic rights: the use of the three main non-state languages, Galician, Basque and Catalan,³⁵² is now constitutionally recognized. To these, there are pressures to add two other languages: the *bable* or Asturian (spoken in the region of Asturias) and the *fabla aragonesa* or Aragonese (spoken in a small mountain area of North-East Aragon). Furthermore, in the Pyrenean valley of Aran within Catalonia, the Catalan government has granted official recognition to Aranese, a Gascon variety of Occitan (see map 3).³⁵³

As expected, Catalonia played the leading role in the linguistic 'reformation' of the Spanish state. Privileged with a prolific tradition of sociolinguistic studies, Catalans had both the theories and the data to set in motion a policy of language planning.³⁵⁴ In chapter 8, we shall mention some of the data which was indispensable to this task. The birth of an autochthonous sociolinguistic school dating back to the late 1960s was a response to the unparalleled Catalan situation. Given such uniqueness, which demanded original case-studies, it was difficult to find international examples to emulate.³⁵⁵ Once the Generalitat was established, the basis was there for a rapid change in linguistic policies. In all realms of culture, the powers of the 1979 *Estatut* far exceeded the ones provided by the 1932 statute (Balcells 1992).³⁵⁶

The Generalitat is composed of several Departments. Within the Department of Culture, a key role is played by the *Direcció General de Política Lingüística* (DGPL), an institution explicitly charged with coordinating the process of language planning. In 1982-83, this agency set in motion a campaign aimed at increasing public awareness of language issues. The campaign was carried on with the help of various tools: gadgets, billboards, advertisement spots, cartoons' strips, radio and television skits, adhesive badges and stick-

³⁵² Catalan also includes its "Valencian" regional variety. See Ninyoles (1969, 1977) and Sanchis Guarner (1972).

³⁵³ For some rich data on the present status and diffusion of Aranese, see Climent (1986).

³⁵⁴ For a synthesis of Catalan sociolinguistics, see Vallverdú (1980). For its theoretical contributions, see also Conversi (1985, 1988b, 1992).

³⁵⁵ Both Catalan sociolinguists and nationalists see the experience of Quebec as the most worthy of emulation, and academic contacts between the two countries are now firmly established. See, for instance, Manuel Parés and Gaëtan Tremblay (eds.) *Catalunya. Quebec. Dues nacions, dos models culturals*. Ponències del Primer Simposi, Barcelona, May 1985. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1988; *ibid.* (eds.) *Catalunya. Quebec. Autonomia i mundialització*. Ponències del Segon Simposi, Montreal, March 1987. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1990.

³⁵⁶ In all respects related to culture and language, the powers given to the Generalitat in 1979 considerably exceeded those enjoyed under the Republic. In particular, the Catalans were given an unprecedented freedom in the control of mass-media and education (Balcells 1992).

on labels, balloons, music, free classes for adults, short movies, sponsored debates, lectures, and so on. One of its objectives was to encourage speakers to use their own languages whilst at the same time being able to understand the contrasting language of their interlocutor(s) without expecting the latter to be reciprocally accommodating (Boix 1993). Borrowing from the Catalan sociolinguistic school, the DGPL described this 'ideal' practice as *passive bilingualism*, whereas each of two -or more- speakers would use their language expecting their interlocutors to do likewise (Vallverdú 1980). Without expecting the interlocutor(s) to be accommodating, bilingualism was thus meant to be encouraged.

The campaign was a prelude to a new law passed in 1983 by the Catalan Parliament with the unanimous approval of all political forces. The *Llei de Normalització Lingüística* (Law of Linguistic Normalization) set the juridical basis for language use in all public domains (Generalitat 1983). In particular, it established Catalan as the language of instruction.³⁵⁷ So, step by step, the official use of Catalan was extended, it recovered the space and the status it formerly enjoyed under the pre-war Republican government, and in many cases even improved upon it. Similar Laws of Linguistic Normalization were approved in Galicia, Euskadi and Navarre. The Basque and, to a certain extent, the Navarrese governments have attempted to make good use of the Catalan experiment, although from a much more difficult point of departure. A promotional campaign was put into action, and a Law of Linguistic Normalisation for Euskera was approved by the Basque Parliament in 1984 (Villa 1986).

In short, by the 1980s the use of regional languages in Spain was finally secured through the Constitution, national decrees, statutes of autonomy and laws of linguistic normalisation.³⁵⁸

Concluding remarks

The overall aim of this chapter has been to show the portentous expansion of nationalist mobilisation as soon as democracy was installed. In this way, we have also brought together our two case studies allowing for a first occasional comparison. In Euskadi, the diffusion of nationalism was characterized by increasing fragmentation, not only amongst parties but also within them. In Catalonia, the nationalist message also spread and became more diversified, whilst maintaining a broad consensus around a few central themes.

As we have repeatedly stressed, the main aim of this thesis is to show the importance of

³⁵⁷ For a brief discussion on this law, see Mar-Molinero (1989: 314)

³⁵⁸ For a chronology of educational legislation in Catalonia, see Petherbridge-Hernández (1990: table 1)

cultural models and symbols, especially language, in the delineation of patterns of nationalist mobilisation. Notwithstanding the extensive changes experienced by the two nationalisms, the key characteristics of both have been maintained throughout dictatorship and democracy. Catalan nationalism remained moderate and broadly united around a cultural platform. Basque nationalism kept its radical separatist posture and its internal fragmentation. If anything, Basque nationalism increased its radicalism, thanks to state repression.

This chapter also confirms the second main thread of my thesis, that is, the relationship of cultural and political fragmentation to political violence. In Euskadi, the scattered nationalist scenario was continuously compounded by mass mobilisations resulting from the alleged 'crimes of the occupation army'. Funeral processions of murdered *etarras* or other Basque militants turned into epic events of national self-assertion (Aretxaga 1988). The massive and threatening presence of the police and other mechanisms of state control exacerbated the conflict and ignited popular discontent. The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque mobilisations, a partial fulfillment of the "action/repression/action theory" envisaged by ETA's first theorists, has in some way handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict. Since repression was needed to hold such an eclectic movement together, ETA was also needed as a continuous trigger of both 'state violence' and 'nationalist counter-violence' - and as a glue for the nationalist movement.

A key feature of ETA was its all-pervasiveness. The military organisation responsible for terrorist attacks was just the tip of the iceberg of what has been named the 'ETA complex'.³⁵⁹ A whole oppositional ideology with its own language and separate institutions emerged from the conflict. Lawyers were particularly prominent in the struggle, but other professions abounded.³⁶⁰ Slogans, graffiti, posters, *murales*, placards, banners and all kind of visual propaganda inundated the Basque public space (Chaffee 1988). With democracy, this heterogeneous yet tightly bound world burst into the open as a major actor in local politics, finding its electoral expression in HB. This organisation is notoriously accused of being ETA's political wing, but its huge strength in terms of votes and popular support reveals much about the illegitimacy of the Spanish state in Euskadi.

In the twilight of dictatorship, the struggle for democratic rights went hand in hand with the fight for cultural freedoms and political autonomy. These were all viewed in the

³⁵⁹ *La policía cita a HB, comités de parados y a los abogados de San Sebastián dentro del "complejo ETA"*, "El País", 13 September 1987

³⁶⁰ On the recent 'discovery' of young lawyers as a major secret force behind ETA, see *Tape traps Eta Lawyers*, "The Independent", 6 February 1993. On the social class and occupation of ETA's members, see Clark (1984: 144-7).

framework of a single inseparable concern to attain the political goals of civic liberties. Soon after Franco's death, the unitary movement reached its maximum momentum in 1977. Massive street demonstrations, particularly the million-strong *Diada* in Barcelona and the continuous clashes with the police, such as in Vitoria in 1976, put an inescapable pressure on the central government's resistance to change. Nevertheless, the unity of democratic opposition started to break down in 1978.

According to a 1982 survey, 38% of the Basque population considered ETA activists to be idealists and patriots, and only 31% believed that they were criminals or insane. However, the same survey indicate that only 8% of the Basques claimed to support ETA, while 77% said that they were opposed to its activities (Linz 1985: 614, in Olabarri 1985). This blend of justification and accusation may either derive from a persisting fear to express one own's view or from the fact that some people really believed in the genuine commitment of ETA's activists. However, successive surveys indicate a slow decline in ETA's popularity, especially after 1987, a period which I am not covering in this thesis.³⁶¹

Another opinion survey undertaken in 1982 indicates that only 13% of the population in Euskadi felt primarily Spanish, 24% felt a dual Basque-Spanish identity and 60% considered themselves only Basques. By contrast, 30 % of the Catalans felt primarily Spanish, 40% assumed a dual Catalan-Spanish identity and only 26% considered themselves Catalans (Linz 1985: 527-673, supra note 782).³⁶² Thus, Basque identity seemed to be more accentuated than the Catalan one. Considering that immigration figures were roughly the same in Euskadi and Catalonia, such percentages would seem to contradict my basic argument that Catalan culture and nationalism are more integrative than the Basque. But we are considering here the much more elusive issue of identity and feelings of belonging. It is undeniable that under Francoism and in its aftermath, the Basques have developed a more inclusive and open identity.³⁶³ We have analysed in depth this development throughout chapter 4, and will repeat its main points in chs. 7 and 8. However, this new identity has been formulated at the cost of a more moderate brand of nationalism. It was the overall confrontation with the Spanish state and 'its 'occupation armies' that moulded an overarching identity in which blood-type and surnames no longer mattered. It was the continuous emergency character of

³⁶¹ ETA's popularity certainly declined after 1987 as a result of indiscriminate killings and purely terrorist acts which sharply diverged from its original tactics.

³⁶² The difference is even sharper as regards working class perceptions: only 14% of the 'Catalan' working class considered itself Catalan, compared with 40% of working class Basques.

³⁶³ See Jauregui (1981), Gurrutxaga (1990), Perez-Agote (1986), Tejerina (1992).

the situation, in itself a consequence of the fact that nationalist leaders saw the Basque nation as verging on extinction, which created a strong and all-pervasive aura of solidarity between all sections of the population. At the end, in particular during the Transition phase, when the illegitimacy of the state reached its zenith, all kinds of social issues, from class struggle to women lib and the environment, were subsumed under the umbrella of radical nationalism. Disguised by a circumstantial unity, Basque culture remained fragmented and only started to recover ground again in the mid-1980s.³⁶⁴

A key feature in recent Basque politics has been the formation of new nationalist parties challenging the PNV's supremacy. Such a development has contributed to the articulation of the nationalist message along different political lines and competing ideologies. In the Basque Country, ETA has been the backdrop of such changes. Given its popularity and its symbolic value, ETA became an inescapable point of reference for a galaxy of groups, interests, unions, and individuals, who were looking for representation in the new democratic political arena, but at the same time rejecting the dominant value system.

Nationalist pressures have resulted in momentous institutional changes. Spain was transformed from the most centralised Western European state to one of the most decentralized. Though often hampered, the Basque and Catalan Autonomous Governments succeeded in being granted considerable powers in many sectors. Now, Catalonia has its own parliament, school system, television channels, social welfare, etc. Likewise, the government of Euskadi, with its seat in Vitoria/ Gasteiz (in the province of Alava/ Araba), enjoys similar prerogatives, albeit separately from Navarre; since the early 1980s, the Basque Autonomous Community has its own police force, the *Ertzaintza*, as the Catalans have their *Mossos d'Esquadra*.³⁶⁵ Gasteiz's government has even moved swiftly into areas previously not covered by governmental action. For instance, it has offered the best official support in Spain for the development of new technologies.³⁶⁶ Its efficiency, like those of its Catalan counterparts, has been widely acclaimed in the Spanish press.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ We should remind ourselves here that the unified standard *batúa* was only proposed in 1964, accepted by the Basque Language Academy in 1968 (Sarasola 1976: 23) and adopted as Euskadi's co-official language after 1980 (Villa 1986). Ever since, albeit not without resistance, this unifying norm has spread through the media, the schools and other means, contributing to create a new shared identity based on language, rather than on any of the previous shifting and divisive values.

³⁶⁵ *La Ertzaintza quiere ocupar su sitio*, "El País", 24 November 1986.

³⁶⁶ *El parálisis de las subvenciones públicas*, "El País", 27 November 1986, p. 19.

³⁶⁷ *Eficacia autonómica*, "El País", 18 December 1989.

Chapter 7

LANGUAGE and OTHER VALUES

The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I will underline the persisting importance of language in Catalan nationalism, contrasting it with the discontinuous attention which it has received in the Basque context. Secondly, I will explore how the stress on a particular core value has influenced the development of two very different nationalist ideologies. The choice of a particular symbol of national identity, such as language or race, can have consequences for subsequent political developments, as reflected in each movement's ideological formulations. In its turn, this choice is based on the availability of pre-existing human resources or cultural 'material'. In broader terms, historical and anthropological conditions can indirectly, but consistently, influence patterns of local mobilization.

Drawing from my two case studies, I will try to demonstrate three related hypothesis:

- 1) Where an ethnic language is scarcely spoken, its absence makes difficult the choice of another element of national identification.
- 2) In my specific case study, I will demonstrate that language was a core value for the Catalans, while it was not so for the Basques, at least until very recently. This difference was related to the dissimilar diffusion of the two languages.
- 3) In the Basque case, the absence of a clearly identifiable core element created ambiguity in the nationalists' political programmes.

I will speculate on how this difference affected the development of the two nationalisms, relating this difference to the inclusive or exclusive nature of the two nationalisms. My contrast will show how minority linguistic nationalism, which is the major variant of cultural nationalism, can be *inclusive* and other kinds of nationalism (for instance, racially or religiously oriented) can be *exclusive*.

Among many elements that a nationalist movement can choose, the Catalan movement was greatly facilitated by the availability of a lively, rich and widespread language. Even today the

contrast between the two regions remains stark: whereas over 90% of the population in Catalonia proper (*Principat*) understand Catalan and more than 60% can either speak or read it (CIDC 1987), in the Basque Autonomous Community only around 20% of the population knows Euskara, with a maximum of 35-40% in Gipuzkoa and a minimum of 4-5% in Araba (Letamendia 1987: 23).³⁶⁸ The seven main dialects correspond broadly to the seven Basque provinces. A standard form of Euskara (*batua*) is only recently attempting to bridge this segmented plurality. By contrast, the Catalan language was fully standardized at the beginning of our century by Pompeu Fabra, and is now universally accepted by all Catalans.³⁶⁹ Catalan represents a paradox in the contemporary European scene. It may in fact be the only 'minority' language³⁷⁰ which is rapidly expanding the number of its speakers. In chapter 8 we shall see that this increase is backed by abundant and reliable data.³⁷¹

In order to understand this phenomenon we must take into account a peculiarity which casts Catalonia sharply apart from other 'minorities', especially from the Basques. In its syntax, lexicon, phonetics and even orthography, Catalan is very similar to Castilian. In contrast, Euskara is completely unrelated to any other known language,³⁷² being the only remnant of a pre-Indo-European aboriginal stratum. Catalan is a neo-Latin (Romance) language, thereby belonging to the same family of Spanish, Italian and French.³⁷³ This structural similarity and proximity to Castilian can explain why immigrants can learn it with relatively little effort and without great investment of time. In turn, this can also explain why it was easier for nationalist elites to formulate an 'inclusive' nationalist programme, given their faith in the possibility of cultural integration.

³⁶⁸ In the three provinces of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi, the number of Basque speakers has recently increased from 21.5% in 1981 to 24.5% in 1986 (Tejerina 1992: 165).

³⁶⁹ The exception being some "regionalist" groups in Valencia and centralist forces, which have attempted to break up the unity of Catalan by fostering regional varieties.

³⁷⁰ The term "minority" is unsuitable to fully describe the situation of Catalan, because it is not a minority language in its own territory but only in respect to the overall Spanish state. Neither are the Catalans conceivable as a minority in a "social" sense, i.e. as a disadvantaged sector of the population.

³⁷¹ In Galicia, Spain's third historical nationality, Galician is spoken by over 80% of the population. However, the nationalist movement has been traditionally weak. Comparing the three regions, it seems that, contrary to most assumptions, the popularity of nationalism is inversely proportional to the diffusion of the local language. Euskara is by far the least diffused of the three languages, both in gross numbers and in proportion to the territory claimed by the nationalists.

³⁷² The most known, yet unproven, hypothesis claims that Euskara is related to Georgian. Other philologists and linguists have speculated about its relationship with Peul, Berber, etc. See King (1994).

³⁷³ A superficial observer may think that it derives from an intermingling of Spanish and French (and even Italian). Its detractors emphasize its patois-like character and its 'hybrid' features from a border area.

However, it is necessary first to introduce the concept of core value as an essential heuristic tool for my analysis.

Core values and key symbols.

A recurring phenomenon amongst successful nationalist movements is their use of particular mobilizing symbols, which are deemed to be central for the self-definition of their community, and which convey widely shared popular values. Since the last century, European nationalist movements have been particularly concerned with language. Among present-day ethnonationalists, language continues to be the basic criterion of self-definition and nationhood. Few works have attempted to explain the reasons for this emphasis. Gellner's (1983) focus on industrialization and its need for social mobility seems to refer exclusively to the rise of the nation-state and may be less relevant for more recent ethnonationalist movements, which he explains in term of uneven development. One might argue that, since the model cherished by many ethnonationalists is the state itself (i.e., they wish to achieve their own separate statehood), they also try to emulate the state's stress on an unified culture, by contrasting their language to the dominant one. Hence, there is a correlation between state intervention in the cultural-linguistic domain (=homogenization) and the counter-tendency among ethnonationalist movements to emphasize their differentiae. West European stateless languages have dramatically receded in the last two centuries. One of the causes of this shift, but by no means the only one, has been official monolingualism enforced by the state (Fishman 1968, 1972, 1980, 1982, 1985, Haugen 1966). Therefore, language has acquired a previously unknown political dimension and its centrality has increased in most nationalist claims. Language shift and language politicization have developed in tandem. However, imitation per se - imitation of state policies - cannot account for the stress on language. Theories of ideological diffusionism (Kedourie 1993) offer, thus, a limited explanation to the spread of the special bond between language and nationalism.

Endogenous (structural or economic) factors also play a role. A different viewpoint advances that "an emphasis on language is usually an emphasis on something else,- on dignity and economic power. Socioeconomic fights can be carried out under a linguistic guise; language as culture lends the necessary symbolism" (Khleif 1979: 61). However, to claim that language is merely a disguise for civil rights or welfare claims would be missing the point. Language is indeed both a means and an end. It has both an instrumental and a symbolic value, and, as Khleif himself recognizes, it is one of the many available boundary

mechanisms. We have already stressed the importance of symbols and the fact that language itself is the most elaborated symbolic system available to man. The more so if the symbol in question has the power to subsume in itself the entire identity of the group.

Every ethnic group confers particular importance on a specific element of its own culture. This stress, as well as the element in itself, is subjected to change especially in contexts of inter-cultural contacts and inter-group communication. According to Jerzy J. Smolicz (1979, 1981, 1984, 1988), there are elements which more than any other appear apt to epitomize the intimate essence of a culture: they therefore become its *core values*. Smolicz defines them as "pivots around which the whole social and identificational system of the group is organized", insofar as they form "the heartland of a group's culture and act as identifying values that are symbolic of the group and its membership... Removal of such pivots, through enforced 'modernization' or dominant assimilation, would result in the entire edifice crumbling to pieces" (Smolicz 1988: 394). Different words have been used by other scholars in order to define the same concept. Thus, Ortner (1973) has used the definition of *key symbols* to describe those "key elements which, in an ill-defined way, are crucial to [the group's] distinctive organization" (1973: 132). At the same time, "all nationalist movements select from the range of symbols available to them one, or perhaps two, that represents them and their goals" (Di Giacomo 1984: 21-22).

There are many ways of identifying which are the core values of a particular population or national group. Ortner (1973:133) quotes five of them:

- 1) The natives tell us that x is culturally important
- 2) The natives seem positively or negatively aroused about x, rather than indifferent
- 3) x comes up in many different contexts (behavioural or systemic).....
- 4) There is a greater cultural elaboration surrounding x
- 5) There are greater cultural restrictions surrounding x, either in sheer number of rules or severity of sanctions regarding its misuse.

All these points can be found in Catalan society in relation to language. For a sociological study, I assume, all these points have to be demonstrated adequately, through the use of quantitative or qualitative data. In this chapter, I will present some quotations by the main Basque and Catalan leaders. This will be sufficient to understand with clarity the different role played by language in the two national movements. The period covered will be from the first openly nationalist formulations (1886 for Catalonia and around 1882 for the Basque Country) until the present-day

In his comparative studies on immigrant ethnic groups in Australia, Smolicz has observed how each group tends to emphasize a peculiar aspect of its own cultural tradition which is held to be of paramount importance. Such an element can vary from community to community. In some of them it is the *religion* which is manifested as a differentiating factor (Smolicz cites the Irish, Arab, Malay and Polish examples)³⁷⁴, in other groups this role is assumed by the *family* (Italians and, I should add, secular Jews), in yet others it is the *race* (Chinese)³⁷⁵. The most universal core value in the contemporary world, however, is *language*. It is of basic importance among all literate groups, where it is occasionally superseded by other elements according to a particular historical or political situation and to their relation with dominant or other groups. The significance of language is also heightened among those groups whose sacred texts are written in their language. But in these cases, religion often assumes priority, exactly because it is a religion written and codified in sacred texts.³⁷⁶

This perspective also underlines the situational and historically-determined character of each core value. Periods of oppression or foreign domination are often those in which these values are consolidated. If a particular aspect of one's own culture, especially when it is already perceived as important, is subjected to proscription or forced marginalization, then the affections and the attentions of the community coagulate with particular energy around it.³⁷⁷ An example of this shifting stress on different cultural elements is given by the Polish case: in Poland, the core value has been language essentially until the Second World War. Then it became religion, for the very reason that it was this aspect of Polish identity which had been put under particular restrictions (Smolicz 1981). Likewise, a thorough study of legislative measures against Catalan shows that they have often strengthened the linguistic consciousness amongst regional elites, even though many of them adopted Castilian (Ferrer i Girones 1985).

The next section will illustrate that the Catalan language is a classical example of a core value, and that its political importance has been strengthened as a consequence of repression.

³⁷⁴ Hutchinson, also, illuminates the Irish as an example. He argues that a "plausible reason for the decline of the [Irish] language is that, as a symbol of nationality, most Irish men and women regarded it as definitely secondary to religion" (1987: 308).

³⁷⁵ In view of its importance, *territory* could also be considered a core value among the Aborigines and other Native groups. A territorial dimension is present in all kinds of nationalism.

³⁷⁶ See the parallel importance of religion and language in such groups as, for instance, the Arabs, the Georgians or the Armenians.

³⁷⁷ We have already highlighted this phenomenon in chapter 1 (Scott 1990).

The cultural roots of nationalism.

In chapters 2 and 3 we have demonstrated that both nationalist movements, particularly the Catalan one, were preceded by cultural revivals. These revivals were often apolitical and their protagonists conceived regional regeneration in the framework of a Spanish nation. The result was a partly unintentional regional nationalism. A similar process was repeated during the two dictatorships (Primo de Rivera and Franco), when, due to the banning of political parties, people turned to culture as a safe haven for nationhood. But in this case the focus on culture was not unintentional and culture quickly became politicized as the highest expression of nationality. Cultural resistance gave way to political resistance as soon as the regime weakened its grip. This phenomenon is not confined to our study: "the struggle for nationhood in the modern world has been *preceded* everywhere by emerging cultural nationalist movements... These movements have formed *recurrently* in post-eighteenth century societies as historic cultural revivals, in order to propound the idea of the nation as a moral community, and have inspired rising social groups to collective political action" (Hutchinson 1987: 2). Indeed, once the political movements were established, they had to rely on a pre-existing definition of what the essence of the nation should be. This work should have already been completed by the cultural revivalists which, as in most ethnonationalist movements, preceded the political nationalists.³⁷⁸ However, my stress is on the type and impact of the cultural revival, since the evolution of political nationalism also depended, in turn, on which aspects of the national culture had been selected as central values.

In Catalonia the *Renaixença* provided an essential basis for the subsequent spread of nationalism. Its success and the rich output which the Catalan literature has produced ever since (Terry 1977), constitute a solid base upon which political nationalism could draw its legitimacy. In the Basque case we have seen the much more modest precedent of the *Associación Euskara* (1877-1883), founded in Pamplona by Navarrese intellectuals in order to preserve the language.³⁷⁹ The association's estimated membership of 300 to 400, with a minimal popular influence, seems insignificant in comparison to the great manifestations of

³⁷⁸ Whereas this has been particularly the case for Catalanism, it has only been partially so for Basque nationalism. For this reason, its founder, Sabino Arana, will also have the task of being a myth-maker and a value-orientator for his nation.

³⁷⁹ See Chapter 3, section '*Euskaros* and *Euskalerriacos*: an aborted Basque renaissance'. On the *Euskaros*, see Elorza (1978: 11-ff.). On the *Euskalerriacos*, see Larronde (1977: 261-ff.)

the Catalan *Renaixença*. However, the Associació Euskara assembled people of high standing: researchers, professors, liberals, priests. These were the same categories of people who later became prominent in the Basque nationalist movement (Letamendia 1987: 58). But the revivalists were not successful in spreading their message of cultural regeneration to the masses. The other group, *Euskalerria* (1876-1899), was not precisely a cultural movement. The relatively small success of the Basque revival, in comparison to the Catalan *Renaixença*, can be ascribed to multiple factors, but certainly the most important is the scarce diffusion of Euskara, coupled with a low language loyalty on the part of the upper classes, and with diffuse diglossic habits among the overall population.³⁸⁰ Sarasola (1976: 179-83) considers that the overall number of books published in the Basque language during the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th centuries is slightly over 600. In comparison, the number of publications in Catalan for the same period rises to several thousands.

The concept of *diglossia* is useful when comparing the Basque and the Catalan case. In a classical article, Ferguson (1959) describes 'diglossia' as the uneven coexistence of two languages, or varieties of language, within a single community. The high variety (H) is used in public and formal domains, it has a written and standardized form, and is normally associated with a high status. The low variety (L) is spoken in informal situations, for instance, within the family, among friends, etc., and it has normally a low degree of prestige. Basque is a standard case of diglossia.³⁸¹ In contrast, Catalan has been associated with a high (H) position since at least last century, because of the language loyalty of most upper classes, at least in heartland Catalonia (the Principat).³⁸² It has therefore to share its 'relative prestige' with Castilian.³⁸³ Diglossia *tout court* has never really prevailed in Catalonia; daily interactions respond instead to *diglossic patterns*,³⁸⁴ partly as a consequence of the past proscriptions by the central governments. Catalan sociolinguists use the term *linguistic conflict*, rather than diglossia (Aracil 1982, Vallverdú 1972, 1980). A linguistic conflict is conceived as an unstable situation in which two languages compete for hegemony and its

³⁸⁰ The concept of '*language loyalty*' was coined by Weinreich (1953) and, since then, it has been extensively used in sociolinguistics (Fishman 1966).

³⁸¹ With the Autonomy Statute (1979) and with its final codification in a standardized variety (*batua*), Basque language has moved -slowly- towards an higher (H) position. Yet, it still faces great difficulties to spread among most sectors of society.

³⁸² Language loyalty was not a constant and universal feature amongst Barcelona's upper classes. See McDonogh (1987 and 1986: 108-122) for the adoption of Castilian among the upper bourgeoisie, particularly in periods of centralization.

³⁸³ On the concept of '*relative prestige*' applied to the Catalan case, see Woolard (1982, 1983).

³⁸⁴ A lengthy and critical presentation of the concept of diglossia is available in Vallverdú (1973, 1980), who prefers the term '*diglossic patterns*' for the Catalan case.

final result is either the disappearance of the weaker language (and the triumph of the stronger one) or its full normalization (Conversi 1985, Kremnitz 1993). *Linguistic normalization* is therefore defined as the effort to extend the use of a language to all the formal and informal domains which had hitherto pertained exclusively to the dominant language.

Catalonia: language as a unitary bond

As we have seen throughout our historical chapters, Catalan nationalists consistently focussed on the issue of linguistic rights. For them, as well as for lay people, language represented a classical core value. It was -and is- both a symbol and an essential instrument for the diffusion and the expressiveness of their own culture. This may be clearly observed by a rapid glance through the principal texts of the main Catalanist intellectuals and politicians. They persistently saw language as the vessel of national identity (Marí 1987). Such emphasis appeared less pronounced at the end of the last century than it does today, as reflected by Almirall's following statement :

"in reality, language is not the most important element of the personality of a people, because what doubtlessly has more importance is the community of moral and material interests.....However, while not being the most important, it is the most visible..... A distinct language supposes a distinct character. The form of expressing ideas corresponds to the way of conceiving them" (Almirall 1979: 77).

For Almirall, language was merely the main visible manifestation of a people's personality. What seemed to matter more to him was the mentality and 'spirit' of Catalonia. Yet, language is deeply associated with his idea of a Catalan character,³⁸⁵ and he subsequently adds in Romantic overtones:

"The use of our language is the *more eloquent* manifestation of our personality. Until the Catalan language will exist, every attempt at [cultural] unification will be a true act of tyranny, whichever the domain in which it will be exercised" (1979: 78, my italics) .

The Bishop of Vic, Josep Torras i Bages, tried to promote religion as an alternative value. Nevertheless, he also recognized that:

"Language is the people,... the thought of a nation, it is what characterizes and portrays it.... Among all the social bonds, apart from religion, language is the most deeply unifying" (Torras i Bages 1981: 42).

Torras i Bages continually stressed the Christian origin of Catalonia in the Middle Ages, so that the Catalan 'spirit' and Catholicism were seen as inseparable dimensions of a single world-vision. He is often quoted as saying: "Catalonia will be Christian, or will not be" (Benet 1968). However, his attempt has remained relatively unsuccessful in a secular society like the Catalan one. Unlike the Basque Country, religion in Catalonia did not play a central role. On the other side, the secular Catalanist leader Enric Prat de la Riba asserted that:

³⁸⁵ Almirall never used the concept of *Volksgeist*, which was later adopted and elaborated by Prat de la Riba.

"Language is the most perfect manifestation of the national spirit and the most powerful tool for nationalization and, therefore, for the survival of a nationality" (Prat 1978: 84).

Prat's vision tended to identify Spain's nationalities with the distribution of its linguistic territories. Therefore he proposed to rebuild the Spanish state on the 'natural base' of four federated regions: Galicia, Euskadi, Catalonia and Castile (this last including Andalusia and all other Castilian-speaking regions).³⁸⁶ This also implied the reunion of all Catalan-speaking territories under the project of a Greater Catalonia, which would have included the *Principat*, the Valencian region and the Balearic Islands. Prat (1978) expressed this project in his theory, but in practice he was a moderate politician, inclined to compromise and prone to bilateral negotiations with the central government. Beyond his wider ambitions, he was able to stand firm on a few points: decentralization and, above all, a full development of the Catalan language and culture. During his presidency of the *Mancomunitat*, the efforts for the recovery of the language were increased and systematized. Among the new institutions, we mentioned the *Institut d' Estudis Catalans* and the work of Pompeu Fabra. From Prat onwards, language assumed an increasing central importance, as expressed over and over again by other nationalist leaders:

"Our language, the expression of our people, which can never be given up... is the spiritual foundation of our existence".³⁸⁷

"The Catalan problem has as its only foundation the existence of a sense of Catalan distinctiveness (*fet diferencial*), of an irrefutable and indestructible Catalan personality. Within this distinctiveness, the least questionable [element] is language and the adhesion of Catalan people to their mother tongue" (Cambo' 1930: 26-26).

"Of all the elements which constitute a nationality, language is the deepest, the strongest and the most decisive. That value, at once corporeal and spiritual, which Joan Maragall found in the word, turns language into the symbol and the lively expression of the personality of a people" (Rovira i Virgili 1982: 208).

"Language is the strongest marker of a nationality. The linguistic map of Europe is, ...with a few exceptions, the map of its nationalities. Linguistic unity is the synthesis of all other unities: it presupposes in the peoples a long cohabitation, a shared culture, a common history, and a centuries-old brotherhood. Thus, it becomes an indestructible spiritual bond" (Rovira i Virgili 1982: 97).

"The Catalan personality can only be fully expressed through the intermediary of its language. When the latter recedes, the former fades, weakens and becomes corrupted,the Catalan ceases to be a Catalan..... [and], in ceasing to be a Catalan,... he/she ceases simply to be" (Ferrater i Mora 1980: 140).

Economists, such as Carles Pi-Sunyer (1929), also expressed the idea that language, development, identity and prosperity were deeply inter-linked.³⁸⁸ This tie between language and identity has been continually stressed until the present-day. In recent years, its

³⁸⁶ See Map 2 in the Introduction.

³⁸⁷ Catalanian Cultural Committee, *Appeals on Behalf of Catalonia*. Geneve: Catalanian Cultural Committee, 1924, p. 13, cited by Fishman (1972: 46).

³⁸⁸ Pi-Sunyer (1929) saw the nation as a linguistic and cultural entity. As a nationalist, he claimed that nations aspire to have their own state, but more recently expressed his deep rejection of aggressive expansionist nationalism, such as in pre-war Germany. He contrasted the latter with the liberal and open character of Catalanism (Pi-Sunyer 1975).

importance has greatly increased. To mention a recent case, on the 1st of March 1989, Jordi Pujol met with Felipe Gonzalez, the socialist head of the Spanish Government. Here is an extract of the former's speech:

"The language issue will indicate whether the relations with the central government are progressing or not..... *If some issue is absolutely crucial to Catalonia, it is its language and culture*, because they are the core elements of our identity as a people. Catalonia will not deem its historical grievance resolved until the cultural issue is settled.....*Catalonia did not want autonomy for political or administrative reasons, but for reasons of identity*". ³⁸⁹

The same Pujol re-stated the crucial importance of language when, on a visit to the Emperor of Japan (23 May 1990) praised the figure of King Juan Carlos for being the "first chief of state who spoke Catalan in many centuries".³⁹⁰

According to the writer and historian Joan Fuster, language is "not only the result of a previous unity [of all the Catalan people], but also the main thrust for the future and the basis of new bonds of solidarity" (Fuster 1977 : 134).

The central importance of language in present-day Catalonia means also that cultural and political nationalism often coincide. In Catalonia, social actors concerned with language and politics do not necessarily play different parts, because language is an overriding concern which sometimes supersedes even economic interests.³⁹¹ But whether or not they play different roles, the drama is certainly played by the same actors.

Euskadi: out of assimilation, fragmentation

In chapter 3, we have studied Arana's struggle to define the key elements of Basqueness and its ambivalent attitude towards language. In his early formulations, language was not a core value and it was replaced by race and religion. The Basques therefore found themselves in a much more difficult position in their attempts to select an element which would carry the symbolic weight of national identity.

There was a further obstacle in the use of language as an unifying national symbol. It was in fact used by Arana and his followers as an *ethnic border*.³⁹² That is to say, its function was to divide the autochthonous population from the newcomers. This is in sharp contrast with the Catalan case, where language has been conceived as a tool of integration. So, Arana

³⁸⁹ Declaration of Jordi Pujol, in *El País*, 2 March 1989, p. 14

³⁹⁰ *El País*, 24 May 1990.

³⁹¹ To confirm this, it is enough to consider the yearly expenditure which the Catalan government specifically allocates to language planning and to the improvement of the knowledge of Catalan in the school curricula. Also, the initial monetary input directed towards the creation of an autonomous TV channel, was very high.

³⁹² The concept of language as an 'ethnic boundary' has been applied to Welsh by Khleif (1979), although with a more general meaning.

simply saw language as a means of keeping the Basque people away from mixing with the 'foreigners':

"The Vizcayans [=Basques] are as much bound to speak their national language, as not to speak it to the *maketos* or Spaniards. It is not to speak this or the other language, but rather the difference between languages which is the great means of preserving ourselves from the contagion of Spaniards and avoiding the mixing of the two races. *If our invaders were to learn Euskera, we would have to abandon it*, carefully archiving its grammar and dictionary, and dedicate ourselves to speaking Russian, Norwegian or any other language, as long as we are subject to their domination. For the Catalans it would be a great glory if the Spanish government appointed Catalan as the official language of all Spain; on the contrary, if it were to do the same with Euskera, it would be for us the final blow of unavoidable death dealt from the most refined diplomacy" (Arana 1982: 404)

Yet, this attitude of Arana is paradoxical in so far as we know that one of his main concerns was recovering his country's ancestral tongue. Even more so, Arana's strategy was also to utilize the language (or at least in part) as an instrument of political mobilization, albeit only among the *Euskaldun* population. However, this strategy could not be pursued in the cities, especially in Bilbao, where Arana operated and his PNV was founded in 1895, had its first meetings and achieved its first electoral successes in 1907.³⁹³ Here, Euskara was scarcely spoken.

This seems to be a basic contradiction: at least in its beginning, Basque nationalism was more powerful among those sectors of the population who did not speak Euskara ³⁹⁴. The nationalist periodicals and magazines of the turn of the century (even the official organ of the PNV), were written 80% in Spanish, "an essential condition, if this kind of press were to attract readers" (Letamendia 1987: 25). One reason is that probably the nationalist ideology had more appeal to those urban groups which felt a greater sense of dispossession and loss of their culture: this constituted a grievance which ought to be redressed through political action, although they themselves were incapable to extend, let alone maintain, their own use of Euskera.

These ambivalent attitudes of most early Basque nationalists can therefore be blamed on the

³⁹³ However, it is also true that for the last ten years the centre of gravity of Basque nationalism has shifted eastward from Bizkaia to Gipuzkoa and today the highest proportions of nationalist voting can be found in the countryside and small towns (Clark 1987: 437). Other anthropological studies deny the rural character of Basque nationalism. In the French Basque Country, the youth's renewed interest for nationalism was not shared by most elders (Ott 1981: 28) and nationalism is much weaker than in the Spanish side. Among some plausible reasons, one is at once economic and tied to state-building: "the people realize that they owe much of their recent economic prosperity to the French social security system and the various government subsidies, which now provide them with more than half their annual cash income" (Ott 1981: 28).

³⁹⁴ For a different thesis, albeit one which refers to the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Clark (1979: ch. 6, 1980: 81-83, 1981, 1987: 439). According to Shabad and Gunther, today it is in Euskadi "that the use of the regional language is more strongly associated with attachment to the ethnic group", confirming a shifting trend in Basque identity and in the identification of core values (1982: 450-ff.).

scarce diffusion of Euskara: political activists revered it as a national symbol, but they overlooked it as a modern means for communication. In this, they were simply perpetuating the diglossia which they inherited. The same Arana did not know Euskara, nor did his parents speak it at home (Garcia Venero 1968: 239, Ortzi 1975: 124). But he learned the language of his own will: the time and effort invested in it are a measure of his commitment.³⁹⁵

In his consideration of language as an element of national awakening, how far was Arana influenced by his five-years stay in Barcelona ? He lived there at a time in which nationalism and language revival were simultaneously on the rise . All Arana's biographers have pondered about the influence of his stay in Barcelona on his formulations, but they could hardly prove that Arana was inspired by Catalanism. On the contrary, "if there were some influences, they were only negative" (Larronde 1977). His writings on the 'Catalanist errors' are full of pejorative comparisons between 'Vizcaya' and Catalonia. For instance, the latter is considered as a Spanish region which aspires to mere autonomy, while Euskadi never considered herself as part of Spain and strove for independence. The same Arana expresses this difference:

"Catalonia suffers from the ingratitude of her own mother Spain, Vizcaya has been taken over by an alien nation, which is the common Fatherland of Catalans, Balearics, Galicians, Valencians, etc. We can already see how unreasonable is an alliance between the Catalans and the Vizcayans....." (Arana 1982: 406).

Arana was indeed very explicit about the difference between his programme and the successful Catalan one:

"Catalan politics, for instance, consists in attracting other Spaniards to it, whereas the Vizcayan [=Basque] programme, v.gr., rejects all Spaniards as foreigners. In Catalonia every element coming from the rest of Spain is Catalanized, and it pleases them that urban immigrants from Aragon and Castile speak Catalan in Barcelona. Here we suffer greatly when we see the name 'Pérez' at the bottom of a poem in Euskera, when we hear our language spoken by a *rojano* teamster or a Santander salesman, or by a Gypsy, or when we find a *maketo* [=Spanish immigrant] name among a list of seamen shipwrecked in Vizcaya. The Catalans want all Spaniards [immigrants] living in their region to speak Catalan, for us it would be ruin if the *maketos* resident in our territory spoke Euskera. Why? Because the purity of race is, like language, one of the bases of the Vizcayan banner (=lema). *So long as there is a good grammar and a good dictionary, language can be restored even though no one speaks it. Race, once lost, cannot be resuscitated*" (Arana 1982: 404).

We will later see the reasons for this preference of race over language. Here language is considered purely as a symbol. It does not make a big difference if nobody speaks it. I had to add between inverted commas the word 'immigrants' because Arana seldom tended to use it. This might be meaningful as he perhaps did not want to emphasize their migratory nature, as

³⁹⁵ Arana himself learned Euskara from scratch, during a long convalescence, using as his only source a French-Basque dictionary written by Willem Jan van Eys (1825-1914) (Basaldúa 1977: 47). He learned it well enough to use it for many of his political writings (all collected in the three-volumes Arana 1982 ca.). Many of his first works were etymologies and his main commitment was to write a Basque grammar (1977: 53). On van Eys, see Villasante (1979: 279-80).

much as their foreignness and Spanishness. The purpose might well have been to underline their extraneousness as a people and as an alien body which Basque society could not absorb.

The strategy of Arana has been to adopt a double and contradictory attitude facing the autochthons and the immigrants. The following passage shows the ambiguity of Arana's project *vis-à-vis* the language:

'To an *euskeriano*' (=native speaker of Euskara).

In the streets of the towns of Vizcaya I have seen many children speaking *erdera*³⁹⁶. Are there any Vizcayan fathers in these towns? Yes: But it is not enough to be a son of Vizcaya. It is necessary to be a patriot.....

You tell me that you don't love *Euskera*, because it does not have any utility. I perfectly understand this; it is better then loving it [just] because it is beautiful. But, is not *Euskera* the language of your race and of your blood? It is not the language of your Fatherland?

If a people loses its tongue, it is because it has become the slave of another people. Do you want to be the child of an enslaved people?

Don't you have a Fatherland? If you have it, why don't you love your language?

...If you don't love the language of your Fatherland, you can't love your Fatherland either. If you do not love your Fatherland, you cannot love your forebear. Do you want your children and progeny to despise you? (Arana 1982: 1306-1307)

To an *euskerdñfilo* (=non native speaker or learner of Euskara).

To know *Euskera* means nothing, if one is not a patriot. Patriotism is everything, even if one does not know *Euskera*.

Euskera cannot save the Fatherland; only patriotism can save it.

Propagate patriotism and, along with it, the language will also be propagated. If you propagate *Euskera* as a language without Fatherland, the enemies of the Fatherland could be understood and could understand with it.

Many are the euskerianos who do not know Euskera. This is bad. Many are the maketos who know it. This is even worse.

Great damage can be done to the Fatherland by one hundred *maketos* who do not know *Euskera*. Even worse is the damage that can be done by only one *maketo* who knows it.

If *Euskera* dies, it is because there are no patriots....

.....In the heart of the Fatherland, every *euskeriano* who does not know *Euskera* is a thorn; every *euskeriano* who knows it and is not a patriot is two thorns; every Spaniard who speaks *Euskera* is three thorns.³⁹⁷

The above passage clearly indicates a double strategy of using *Euskera* as a purely patriotic symbol (1 thorn) subordinated to wider nationalist goals (2 thorns), whilst refusing to spread it as a modern communicative means or to assimilate the immigrants (3 thorns).

As expressed by another influential figure of Basque nationalism, Father Evangelista de Ibero, nationalist leaders had at their disposal different elements around which a national sense of awareness could be formed: the origin, character, language, customs, laws, 'glories' (historical past), "tendencies, aspirations and destinies". But language was awarded a secondary role:

"of all those properties, which one constitutes essentially a nationality? *In the first place, the blood, race or origin; in the second place, the language.* The other qualities are nothing but the consequences of the first two, *most specifically of the first one*" (Ibero 1957: 17).³⁹⁸

³⁹⁶ *Erdera* = Foreign language (specifically, Spanish). *Erdaldun* = Foreign-speakers (specifically, Spanish-speaking).

³⁹⁷ *La Patria. A un euskerdñfilo. 'Baserritarra'*, nº 8, 20 june 1897. Reprinted in Arana (1980 ca.: 1307-8).

Like other early nationalists, De Ibero stressed race and religion as the key element(s) of national identity.³⁹⁹ However, de Ibero, who wrote three years after Arana's death, also declared that "physical difference will never be as important, as intimate, as scientific, as that of language and moral character" (Ibero 1957: 18, cited by Payne 1975: 88).⁴⁰⁰

Race and the concept of collective nobility.

The stress was thus firmly placed on race as a substantial characteristic of the *ser vasco* (being Basque). The motives of this stress can be found in the peculiar anthropological situation of the region, to which the nationalists tried to adapt. In the Basque Country, Euskara had become a minority language, spoken by a minority within the minority. Its destiny of extinction was sensed by many early nationalists and pre-nationalists.⁴⁰¹ The appeal was therefore directed to race. This was a more obscure and less tangible element, although in the Basque case it was more powerful and charged with mobilizing effects. But why race, and not any other element or value? Was there not a more accessible symbol of identity in sight? One possible answer lies in the semantic transformation of the ancient concept of 'collective nobility' (*hidalguia colectiva*). This was the "moral core of the Basque sense of ethnic uniqueness", a fact that "seems to have few parallels elsewhere in Europe", in so far as "any Basque able to prove birth of Basque parents... was automatically recognized as noble by virtue of purity of blood" (Greenwood 1977: 86).

The historical origins of *hidalguia colectiva* can be traced back to at least 1053, when for the first time, the inhabitants of a local valley were granted the permission to bring arms and raise their own popular militia.⁴⁰² But the great bulk of these concessions date from the late 14th century. They coincided with the first major thrusts towards Spanish centralization and were conferred in order to protect the northern borders from French incursions.⁴⁰³ This was

³⁹⁸ Also quoted by Krutwig (1963: 547) and Linz (1973: 37).

³⁹⁹ On Father de Ibero and his Catechism, with its characteristic technique of question and answer, see Martínez-Peñuela (1989: 38-48). Religion came even before nationality: "Between seeing Euzkadi in full exercise of its rights, but separated from Christ, and seeing her as in 1901 [i.e., as an integral part of Spain], but faithful to Christ, the PNV would opt for the second" (de Ibero, cited by García Venero 1968: 325 and Clark 1979: 44).

⁴⁰⁰ For De Ibero, race was then defined by language (quoted by Clark 1979: 45-6). Since race was defined by language, language was in turn conceived as an impenetrable barrier of protection around Basque culture and values.

⁴⁰¹ For instance, Arturo Campión wrote that "Euskara is *retiring to the mountains in order to die closer to Heaven*" ('El Baskuenze', 1901, cited by Heiberg 1989: 48, my italics).

⁴⁰² See also Caro Baroja (1971-72: 73) and Aranzadi (1981: 395-431).

⁴⁰³ "In return for the grants, the people swore to personally defend their area without recompense. By doing so, they served as the border garrisons of the Spanish state. When attacks were particularly severe, their resistance gave the time needed to bring the state's

so because the new centralization trends had caused "an immediate problem of vulnerability to border attacks and increased the French motivation to step up their incursions. Unable to afford massive border defences, the Catholic kings and their successors were able to use grants of collective nobility to insure themselves a degree of border control. The Basque sense of ethnic uniqueness and their acceptance of the idea that they were Spanish were at that time easily compatible" (Greenwood 1977: 92). 'Reverse' theories of modernization (Connor) claim that ethnic conflicts and wars are a by-product of modernization (see ch. 1).⁴⁰⁴ In the previously discussed concept of *homeostasis*, to every action that threatens the stability of the social system corresponds a reaction devised to reestablish its integrity. When economic development irreversibly alters traditional lifestyles, nationalism supposes an attempt to reconcile the new state of things with the ancient system of social relations. That is why nationalism unmistakably arises in the cities, as cities epitomize modern disruption. Eventually, it can spread from the cities to the countryside (as occurred in the Basque Country and Catalonia), but not the other way around.

In Euskadi, an 'homeostatic' reaction against increased state control, urbanization, industrialism, immigration, and the abolition of the *fueros*, produced an explosive situation. These tensions were to find their political expression through nationalism only many decades later. Many historians stress the abolition of the *fueros* as a main cause of the subsequent rise of Basque nationalism (Payne 1975, Corcuera 1977). This abolition created the first blow to traditional Basque identity and can also explain the difference in core values with respect to Catalonia. Whilst the Basques retained their traditional privileges until the last century, Catalonia did not keep its own institutions, yet, its distinctive sense of identity was affirmed from time to time, following a pattern of continuity. Early Basque nationalists found a stable basis upon which they could build a cohesive sense of distinctiveness in the persistent sense of a collective nobility. In this sense we can find the origin of the strong concern by Arana for racial integrity and purity of blood. Arana was the man who transformed the ancient concept of 'collective nobility' into the more modern one of 'race'.

A few supposedly objective non-historical factors came also in the rescue of racial boundaries: scientific investigations proved the existence among the Basque population of an high percentage of blood group O and of a rarer presence of blood groups B and AB (Goti

army into position" (Greenwood 1977: 91-92)

⁴⁰⁴ See Corcuera (1986), Jaureguiberry (1983), Clark (1979) and most sociological studies on Basque nationalism, which follow a similar position by historians (see subsequent note).

Iturriago 1962). Less grounded claims included arguments on a different cranial formation and distinct hair and eye colouring.⁴⁰⁵ Therefore, the concept of collective nobility emerges from an interrelation of historical, anthropological and biological factors. Another feature of this concept lies in the egalitarian ethos in which it is deeply entrenched. As all Basques were nobles, "thus, a butcher, shoemaker, charcoal burner, scribe or soldier -rich or poor- was a noble" (Greenwood 1977: 87). This myth of Basque egalitarianism is central to the understanding of the strong recent impact of leftist parties and ideologies despite the religious and tradition-bound orientation of most Basque rural society. Modern Basque egalitarianism has its roots in the concept of shared nobility, which advocates no in-group differences of status.⁴⁰⁶ Otazu (1973) contends that Basque egalitarianism was little more than a myth. However, an anthropological research on Basque shepherds in the French province of Soule has shown how egalitarian values are deeply rooted in traditional ideals of co-operation and reciprocity. They are the essential basis of the three main local institutions: the household, the 'first neighbours' and the pastoral institution of the *olha*, or *cayolar* (Ott 1981: VIII).⁴⁰⁷

It may be argued that the Spanish concept of 'cleanliness of blood' (*limpieza de sangre*) filled a similar place to Basque 'collective nobility'.⁴⁰⁸ However, a comparison reveals two different world views: 1) *Limpieza de sangre* "had to be demonstrated by a meticulous process of genealogical investigation" (Greenwood 1977: 87, Amiel 1983), while Basque collective nobility was *ipso facto* conferred by the mere fact of being of Basque ancestry. 2) Spanish *limpieza de sangre* was also very difficult to prove, because Spain as a socio-cultural entity had been created through the Reconquest. Such historical process was carried out, not only by mass expulsion of the Moors and Jews, but also by a fanatical campaign of forced conversion and assimilation. Therefore Spaniards cannot trace back their ancestry to a

⁴⁰⁵ Collins dismisses these claims as neither objective nor scientific (1986: 5) and holds that "they are dictated by the predetermined requirements of a nationalist ideology, rather than by a process of rational deduction" (Collins 1986: 7). According to the same author, language is "the sole satisfactory tool with which it is possible to approach the question of Basque identity and origins" (1986: 8).

⁴⁰⁶ Greenwood (1977: 87) uses the argument of a shared nobility to explain why its vestiges "presently manifest themselves in the egalitarian and democratic tone of Basque society". A good account of this egalitarian ethos can be found in Heiberg (1985: 288-ff, and 1989: 32-33).

⁴⁰⁷ The *olha* is "a pastoral syndicate which consists of a group of shepherds, their communal herding hut, corral, and the mountain pastures on which their flocks graze during the months of summer transhumance" (1981: 4). Egalitarianism is furthermore emphasized by the importance accorded to two ordering principles: *aldikatzia*, or "serial replacement, taking turns, or alternation" (814) and *üngürü*, literally, rotation.

⁴⁰⁸ While preferring the concept of *pureza de la raza* (purity of race), Arana occasionally also used *limpieza de sangre* and other 'Spanish' terminology, such as *hidalguía originaria*, *nobleza originaria* (Arana 1982: 545-ff.)

purely Christian past, untouched by the exposure to Islam, or by Berber, Jewish or Arab blood. In contrast, the Moors never entered the Basque Country which, along with Asturias, remained the last outpost of Christian Spain.

The stress on race therefore had a specific meaning for the Basques, probably with no parallels in other parts of the industrialized world. But this very stress has proven to be untenable in present-day Euskadi after massive immigration at the end of the last century and, in much greater proportions, since the late 1950s. It was not a coincidence that ETA was created then. By the end of the immigration period, in the late 1970s, ETA reached the peak of its violent campaign.⁴⁰⁹ The sheer numbers of immigrants caused great distress among the native population and ETA was to capitalize on these tensions. Immigration as an indirect variable in the popularity of ETA is stressed in ETA's *Libro Blanco*: "Massive immigration is creating new lifestyles, customs [which are] incompatible with our way of being and which will end up by submerging the Basque people if we do not react..... The threat of extinction is so great that we Basques only have one path: to unite, forgetting all differences among us".⁴¹⁰ Such a concern for immigration occurred despite the fact that most of ETA's founders and organic intellectuals (Txillardegui, Benito del Valle, Krutwig, etc.) were themselves coming from immigrant families (Jauregui 1981: 135). This also explains why, in contrast with Aranism, the immigration issue was not tinged by racist overtones.

However, ETA has continuously tried to escape the bequest of Aranist ideology. Struggling to define itself in progressive terms, its ideologues have repeatedly accused Arana and his PNV's followers of being racists.⁴¹¹ This often led to the brink of alienating its rural *Euskaldun* base, which had hitherto accepted the Aranist tenets of Basque exclusiveness. The racially-oriented theses of Sabino Arana are today rejected by all Basque nationalist parties. However, as they characterize the first formulations of Basque nationalism, Arana's writings have indirectly conditioned the subsequent choices of the nationalist movement.

Another element of unfathomable primordiality is the Basque tongue, conceived as a still-living proof of the survival of the most ancient people of Europe. In fact, Euskara's origins still remain an enigma. Likewise, the origins of the Basque people are wrapped in mystery. It was especially because of its value as prehistoric testimony, that many early Basque

⁴⁰⁹ The largest number of political killings in ETA's history was carried out between 1978 and 1980 (Clark 1980: 125).

⁴¹⁰ Reprinted in 'Documentos Y', *El Libro Blanco*. Donostia: Hordago, 1981

⁴¹¹ For instance, Krutwig has declared that "Arana was more racist than Hitler" (interview in *Cambio* 16, 23-1-1984, quoted in Gillmor 1985). While Krutwig accepted the bulk of Arana's ideas, he could not subscribe his views on religion and race.

nationalists attached importance to language (King 1994). Thus the situation was made more complicated by the mythic value attributed to Euskara, "which is the complete identification most Basques make between Euskera and their own cultural identity. Many Basques equate its potential loss with the total demise of Basque identity...In connection with their linguistic insularity, Basque identity is founded on an acute awareness of their enigmatic past. Their being a 'mystery people' is also what seems to be of most interest about Basques to outsiders. No founding myth or political revolution substitutes for such an archaic definition of their group origin. Identity runs in an unbroken line from the ancestors..." (Zulaika 1988: 7).

The re-emergence of language

Language has discontinuously emerged as a central issue for Basque leaders, especially amongst the radicals. For instance, Txillardegui considered Euskera as "the key to the survival of the Basques as a distinct people and he felt astonished that people could consider themselves nationalists while failing to speak, study and propagate it".⁴¹² Txillardegui confesses that his *abertzale* sentiment was "intimately bound up to the discovering of Euskera" at the end of the 1940s.⁴¹³ His autobiographic sketch on the foundation of *Ekin* explains to what extent the development of a new Basque nationalism was related to the will to preserve Basque culture, especially the language:

"We started to reunite in Bilbao. We learned Euskera, we read the existentialists ...and we began to study the *foral* legislation, each one choosing the branch of his or her major interest..... We were young, we loved reading and felt the need to rationalize the Basque problem. We rejected that excess of sentimentalism, affective motivations and good will which, from our viewpoint, was the 'official' nationalism and which was translated into an attitude so incomprehensible for us as the one denouncing the oppression of Euskera, without doing anything to learn it" (364). For "we were the *ethnic patriots* and the others [the PNV] were the *political patriots*. I believe this definition fully hits the mark and propounds something that in the future will become evident" (cited by Ibarzábal 1978: 369).

We have repeatedly mentioned that, in its origins, ETA was mainly a cultural nationalist movement and that Txillardegui's cultural activism was at the root of one of ETA's main splits, which gave life to *Branka*. ETA's two 'organic intellectuals', Beltza and Krutwig, argued that "as forms of thought depended on language use, Basque socialism must be led by people who spoke Euskera, while nationalists must strive to restore it as the language of the whole Euskadi".⁴¹⁴ In another essay, they held that only those who spoke Euskera were

⁴¹² See Txillardegui's interview in Ibarzábal (1978) as quoted by Sullivan (1988: 29).

⁴¹³ See his interview in Ibarzábal (1978: 361). For a critique of Txillardegui's position, see Ereno (1979).

⁴¹⁴ *Estrategia y Táctica*, in 'Documentos Y', vol. 12, p. 298, quoted in Sullivan (1988: 130).

fully Basque and other Basques had a special duty to learn it.⁴¹⁵ *Vasconia* stressed language as the Basque Country's basic value: "Euskera is the quintessence of Euzkadi. While Euskera will live, Euzkadi will live" (quoted by Gurrutxaga 1985: 244). In his definition of a nationality, Krutwig considered five basic and 'objective' factors, in order of importance: language; mentality and culture; religion; race; and, finally, the economic, social and material factors. He held that language was the most important of all, and, as regard to the second ones (mentality and culture), "are both sustained by language: as soon as language disappears, the other two factors also fade away" (Krutwig 1963: 29).

Conclusion

In the writings of most Catalan intellectuals we find a persistent and strong concern for the fate of language. This continual effort gave Catalan nationalism its peculiar strength and stability. It acted as a firm standpoint for its negotiations with Madrid, which in its turn, during the democratic phases of Spanish history, has seen it as a stable point of reference for improvements in its relations with the periphery. By contrast, Basque nationalism, lacking a similar stable basis (and consequently, similarly persistent politics), has, at least in the past, been more outwardly unclear in its relations with the central government and more inwardly ambiguous in its self-definition in terms of identifying the highest and most important values to be maintained and promoted. As we have seen, this does not mean that language was unimportant for Basque nationalism. Indeed, it has been a central concern for all its main theorists and intellectual figures. Yet, the scarce diffusion of Euskara and its dialectical fragmentation led most Basque politicians (especially within the main nationalist party, the PNV), to play it down in favour of other more traditionally-oriented factors, such as religion and race.⁴¹⁶ This indeterminacy, ambivalence and indefiniteness helped to shape the development of Basque nationalism.

In Catalonia the emphasis on language provided a powerful instrument both for the consolidation of the nationalist ideology and for a slow integration of the immigrants. In this different emphasis lies the characterization of the *exclusive* identity promoted by early Basque nationalism, versus the *inclusive* identity adopted by Catalanism since its beginning

⁴¹⁵ *Principios de nacionalismo revolucionario*, in 'Documentos Y', vol. 12, pp. 20-21, quoted by Sullivan (1988: 130).

⁴¹⁶ Basque is divided into at least seven dialects, corresponding more or less to the seven Basque provinces and each having its own spelling.

⁴¹⁷. We have already tackled this dichotomy in the chapter on immigration. Catalanism resembles what Hans Kohn (1968) defines as 'open nationalism', directed to absorb and welcome new elements, exogenous stimuli and contributions to its culture. These are endogenously translated in order to merge them into an unique, but articulated, national culture, conceived as in perpetual evolution.⁴¹⁸ Conversely, Arana's programme reflects the model of a 'closed nationalism' outlined by Kohn (1968),⁴¹⁹ tending to avoid any overlap between the two groups. It is always possible to learn a new language. It is not possible to change one's forefathers.

Notwithstanding their initial differences, today both movements stress the centrality of language for the definition of their national identity. This viewpoint is shared in Catalonia by all political parties (except by a large part of the extreme right) and in Euskadi by most of them. However, it is still hard to maintain that language has become a core value for Basque society, though now even ordinary people start to attach to it considerable importance.⁴²⁰ This affective dimension often cannot be translated into an active use of Euskara, due to the intrinsic difficulties of mastering the language, in contrast to the relative ease for a Castilian-speaker to learn Catalan, a closely related tongue.

In this chapter, I showed how language played a central role in the formation and programmes of the two nationalist movements. The absence or presence of a powerful

⁴¹⁷ On the shifting patterns of the Catalan identity, see Di Giacomo (1984), Woolard (1986) and Llobera (1991).

⁴¹⁸ According to Salvador Giner, *open societies* "hinge upon the overt recognition of individual responsibility, privacy and citizenship as collective values for the conduct of human affairs. No known collectivity embodies perfectly the virtues of such a society...[but] Catalonia must surely be counted among those countries which have managed with relative success to approximate to the distant ideal" (Giner 1980: 14).

⁴¹⁹ If we wish to avoid Kohn's dichotomy, we can question the self-description of Arana's movement as 'nationalist' and, rather, view it as a neo-traditionalist reaction by a threatened ethnocentrism. For instance, Arana takes much from pre-nationalist thought without greatly modifying it: his praise for the excellence of the Basque race and culture was also typical of the XVI century Basque apologists (Corcuera 1979: 16). His confessional emphasis on 'God and the Old Laws' (PNV's official motto) is also a neo-traditionalist feature, rather than a nationalist one. If nationalism can be described also as a traditional society's response to the menaces of modernity, its response is normally syncretic, rather than 'homeostatic'. That is, it must adapt and re-create endogenously the new elements brought by modernization. This is hardly the case of Arana: Arana's mixture of confessionalism, racism and legal traditionalism greatly limited the spread of his message, at least if we compare it with the enormous popularity enjoyed by Catalanism. Sharing with Catalonia a similar economic structure and patterns of social disruption (rapid urbanization, immigration, class tensions, etc.), Arana's simplistic and oppositional ideology could not be accepted by local upper classes, whilst its racist overtones alienated it from the immigrant working class.

⁴²⁰ For a thesis which stresses the centrality of language in present-day Basque nationalist programmes, see Urla (1987, 1988). See also Tejerina (1992).

element of distinctiveness such as language can affect the growth of two otherwise very similar social movements. I have also explained why language has been replaced by race in Euskadi and, finally, why this substitution became impracticable with the mass arrival of immigrants. In chapter 8, on immigration, we shall see that the latter is not a new phenomenon: much of Arana's most visceral writings were inspired by it. The Aranist concept of 'race' developed with, and against, massive immigration.

Through a comparative analysis of Basque and Catalan nationalism, the chapter has shown that regional culture, especially language maintenance, has a direct effect on the development of nationalist movements. The method was a comparison of the ideas of the leading nationalist leaders and intellectuals of Basque and Catalan nationalism. Through their writings and speeches, the latter's choices are shown to be related to existing cultural conditions in their respective regions. Two patterns emerged from the analysis, which can be applied to other nationalist movements as well: the Catalan model, based on language, and with a thriving cultural nationalism; and the Basque model, not based on a single value and more confused over its definition of the nation's identity. These two patterns resulted in two opposite reactions towards massive immigration: the Catalan developed an inclusive framework in which the immigrant could be considered a Catalan after having acquired the culture of the host society; in contrast, Basque nationalism was more isolationist and exclusivist from its inception until the early postwar era. The relationship between cultural ambiguity and political violence among the Basques is the subject of the final chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 8

NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION in CATALONIA and the BASQUE COUNTRY

The aim of this chapter is firstly to describe the quantity and significance of the immigration phenomenon in Catalonia and Euskadi, and, secondly, to analyze its impact upon both nationalisms. Since the sheer number of immigrants was enormous, the consequence on both Catalan and Basque identity was inescapable. Nationalist leaders were correspondingly compelled to re-elaborate regional identities and relate them to the new trend. Both the Basque Country and Catalonia have been the targets of massive immigration and both have recently been granted Autonomy Statutes which recognize Catalan and Euskara (Basque) as regional languages co-official with Castilian. But since well before these radical changes, immigrants arriving in the two regions faced very different patterns and possibilities of integration. This is also tied to the relative facility of learning Catalan, as compared with the difficulty of learning Euskara for an average immigrant arriving from the rest of Spain. Catalan historical records, moreover, have demonstrated long-term and durable integration trends. On the other hand, integration has been strewn with difficulties in the Basque Country. However, this chapter will not focus on the sociolinguistic problems of learning the two languages, but rather on the effect of large-scale immigration on nationalism and the different responses which it inspired in the local leadership.

As we said in the thesis' introduction, the wide range of academic literature existing on Basque nationalism, even in English, has not been matched by similar studies for Catalan nationalism, apart from historical ones. In contrast, the latter region has produced a considerable amount of literature on immigrants, whereas the output of works on immigration is extremely poor in Euskadi. This difference is self-revealing: in itself, it may

be a further proof that in contemporary Catalan social science the main trend has been an optimistic assessment of the newcomers' issue, whereas in Basque scholarship -as in politics- the main issue has been Euskadi's confrontation with the Spanish state, relegating immigration to a sub-category of that issue. This is a difference that we also encounter in political action. If in Catalonia the main concern has been its self-definition and socio-cultural composition, in Euskadi the problem was 'Spain'. Whereas Arana and the first *peneuvistas* were aiming to separate Euskadi from the rest of Spain, early Catalanist leaders were instead aiming to exert some kind of control over the Spanish state, presenting themselves as an alternative model to Castilian hegemony. Finally, we have also to consider the small degree of development of social sciences in Spain under the dictatorship. Once democracy emerged, the two regions had different sets of priorities which resulted in distinct theoretical schools and specializations.

What follows is a brief historical and quantitative sketch of immigration and of the ensuing conflict it generated in the two regions.

CATALONIA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Catalonia terra de pas

Catalonia's special position along the Mediterranean coast and between Castile and France has made it a traditional receiving ground for multiple cultural influences and movements of people. The population in the coastal area open to commerce through the port of Barcelona increased at a much faster rate than most of the interior, since birth rate and immigration were higher on the coast. Massive immigration also occurred in Valencia (Vilar 1977: 2: 42-94; 1977: 3: map 56). In Catalonia, most immigrants came from neighbouring and culturally alike regions, often from nearby Occitania, and hence had no particular difficulties in assimilating.⁴²¹ This can help explain why the assimilative traditions of Catalonia are often treated as a primordial given. The past success in integrating Southern French elements provided a stimulus for future optimism.

After a sharp decline in the fifteenth century, the population of Catalonia underwent a spectacular demographic recovery between 1550 and 1620. Part of this increase was due to mass immigration from France. By the end of the sixteenth century, some 20% of the male population was made up of French (=Occitan) immigrants (Elliot 1963: 26). Until the XIX

⁴²¹ Here, Occitan (Provençal) was spoken, the nearest language to Catalan in lexicon, grammar, syntax, morphology, and phonetics. Relationships between Catalans and Provençals were mutual and intense. As for cultural matters, many Catalans travelled to Provence in order to attend the original Floral Games.

century, most immigrants came from the North, especially from this area. Important migratory movements occurred during the Eighteenth Century, when Barcelona recovered part of its economic splendour (see Nadal and Giralt 1960).

As we have highlighted in the introduction, the population of Catalonia-Principat today approaches six million. Before 1700, Catalonia hardly reached half a million inhabitants. Hence, it has increased more than tenfold in two hundreds years. Only in the Eighteenth century do we find a sharp demographic increase. The population doubled from 407,000 in 1718 to 814,000 in 1787. This was a time of economic development, following the setting up of textile manufacturing, the expansion of commerce and a good period for agricultural output. In the Nineteenth century the population continued to expand. Steady industrial growth allowed the formation of manufacturing cities and the enlargement of Barcelona. In 1887 the population of the Principat reached 1,843,000. The demographic distribution also changed: most of the population moved to the coast or not far from it, gradually leaving the agricultural hinterland depopulated. By 1900, the birth rate began to decrease, a decline which lasted to the present day. The difference in birth rates between Catalonia and the rest of Spain drastically increased, but the population continued to grow due to immigration. The overall demographic balance with the rest of the peninsula correspondingly shifted: Catalonians, who represented 10.6% of the Spanish population in 1900, became 15.77% in 1975 (Termes 1984: 132).

Several authors (Ferrater i Mora, Maluquer, C. Pi-Sunyer, Vives, etc.) have described Catalonia's historical capacities of assimilation: its position along the Mediterranean coast, between two large countries, France and Spain (both champions of an intolerant and chauvinist vision of ethnic relations), the constant flux of different peoples, the cosmopolitan nature of Barcelona, of its port and its commercial activities, Catalonia as a *terra de pas* (literally = country of passage).⁴²² The historian Vicens i Vives uses the concept of *passadís* (=passageway, corridor, passage):

"The peoples who inhabit these passageways are subjected to considerable human pressures, some peaceful, other bellicose and warlike. The play of both trends continually aroused by the ebb and flow of historical events, engenders a permanent vital tension and develops particular qualities... A passageway people finds always itself in dangerous historical situations, so that powerful currents of resistance rise up in the spirit of the people, creating and recreating it over the centuries" (1984: 20).

This vision may be related to other social theories which ascribe an integrative and accommodating capacity to seaborne societies. In particular, Lenski's (1984) definition of a

⁴²² This concept has been elaborated, among others, by the philosopher Ferrater i Mora (1980).

maritime society seems to fit the Catalan case.⁴²³ One of the characteristics of maritime societies is their greater openness in comparison with other societies, such as agrarian societies. Their reliance on free movement of goods and labour endow them with peculiar integrative traits towards out-groups.

In 1887, immigrants represented only 1.25% of the Catalan population. This number slowly increased: 3.33% in 1897, 4.22% in 1900, 5.44% in 1910. The percentage became salient for the first time in 1920, when it reached 14.03% (Termes 1984: 129), as a consequence of the industrial boom prompted by Spain's neutrality in World War I. This rhythm was kept constant until 1930. Rural immigrants from Barcelona's hinterland were now competing with immigrants from outside Catalonia. However, individuals from Catalan speaking areas still represented the majority: they came firstly from Valencia, then from Menorca, Majorca, and some from Southern Aragon.⁴²⁴ Only in 1930, when the non natives became 19.61% of Catalonia's population, did the numbers of Castilian-speaking immigrants (318.956) approach those of Catalan-speaking ones (329.708), at least in the province of Barcelona (Termes 1984: 131).

During Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, many immigrants were attracted by the salt potassium mines and, especially, the works for the 1929 Universal Exposition. This first generation of newcomers were collectively known as *murcianos*, the ones from Murcia. The economic stalemate of the 1930s produced a decrease in the immigration rate. Finally, the civil war and its aftermath caused an income of several thousands fleeing hunger from Andalusia as well as a huge political exodus from Catalonia. Afterward, immigration halted for a while. Only in the 1950s was the trend reversed. Between 1951 and 1970, 1.16 million immigrants arrived in Catalonia from other parts of Spain, mainly from Andalusia (Rebagliato 1978: 256). In 1970, 37.69% of the Catalan population was born outside the region (Termes 1984: 132), and finally in 1975 the immigrants reached 39% of Barcelona's population (Rebagliato 1978: 260). Not even in countries such as the USA and Argentina at

⁴²³ According to Lenski, *maritime societies* are distinguished from agrarian societies by the following key features: their chief source of economic surplus derived from commerce, rather than agriculture; merchants were much more favourably situated; their governments were typically republican and plutocratic, rather than monarchical; militarily, they relied on naval force, more than other forces. Lenski's classical examples are the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians, the Venetians and the mid-15th century Dutch. However, he also consider cases of *hybrid societies*, part maritime and part agrarian, mentioning the Athenians from the sixth century B.C. until the Roman conquest and England from the 16th to the early 19th century (Lenski 1984: 191-2). Perhaps, Catalan society may be included in this latter group, since its government was officially monarchical and its economy was based on agriculture as well.

⁴²⁴ These contacts did not result in major linguistic changes, since "the slight dialect differences did not weight on the process and were soon erased" (Badia 1964: 107).

the peak moment of their maximal receptiveness did immigrants exceeded 30% (Marsal, cited by Termes 1984: 132). However, the phenomenon was unevenly spread, as most immigrant families clustered in the newly built *barris* of Barcelona's outskirts. Their highest concentration was to be found in the suburban townships of Cornellà (78.4 %) and Santa Coloma (78.7 %) (Strubell 1981: 76). Also crucial was the immigrants' higher birth-rate as compared to the natives'. By 1965, immigration accounted for 65% of the total growth of Catalonia, while natural growth represented only 35% (Sàez 1980: 26). That is, if taken together, the immigrants and their children far outnumbered the natives.

All nationalisms attach an enormous importance to population figures. The more numerous the population, the more strength the nation has. Demography is therefore a power game. And a declining population is a bad omen for every sincere nationalist.⁴²⁵ That is why most cases of demographic decline in human groups are bound to generate a counter-trend in the search for a political solution through either self-determination or a campaign to expel immigrants (and, failing this, outright racism). Most nationalist movements in world history exploded at times of massive population upheavals, huge transmigrations or, simply, changes in the demographic balances. For instance, the rise of Serbian nationalism, which has led to the present-day war in the Balkans, was notoriously brought about by a dramatic shift in the demographic balance of the Kosovo province. This region, which is considered by Serbs as the cradle of their nation, has seen an unprecedented increase in its Albanian component, so that at the moment of writing Albanians make up over 90% of its population and the remaining Serbs behave like a 'besieged' minority (Magas 1993).

A decrease in birthrate has also fostered radical visions of Quebecois nationalism.⁴²⁶ Both Quebecois and Catalan demographers have traditionally lamented population decline, but the hope of integrating the immigrants could cajole their separatist components into a more

⁴²⁵ In considering several nationalist movements world-wide, it is nearly impossible to find a single one of them which encourages birth control. This does not mean that this pattern cannot change in the future

⁴²⁶ Suffering from net emigration, Quebec's share of Canada's population has declined from 29% in 1966 to about 25.5% in 1989. However, the biggest problem in the policy of immigrants' attraction is to incentivate their further staying, as many of them prefer to leave for other Canadian provinces after a while. Quebec's immigration officials award more points for good French proficiency (15) than for English (3). Therefore, Quebec has become the main focus of immigration from some French-speaking countries, notably Haiti (even though Haitian Creole is sharply different from standard French) and Lebanon. Robert Bourassa's government wanted to "raise the province's annual intake of immigrants from 17% to 25% of an expanding Canadian total", more or less 50,000 to 60,000 per year (*The Economist*, June 10, 1989). However, the fact that many immigrants insist on learning English, rather than French, inspire many Quebecois to believe that only independence *tout court* will make it clear to any potential newcomers of the French identity of their nation.

moderate stance. Accordingly, the unity of the Canadian and Spanish states can only be saved by policies which ensure the integration of the non-native population into the regional cultures. Finally, there is a pro-immigrant argument in that the only remarkable population increase in this century in Catalonia was produced through immigration. Since immigration stopped in the 1970s, bringing about a zero-rate growth, it is possible that nationalist leaders will be prone to encourage further immigration, once the instruments of Catalanisation will be fully available and the immigrants' will to integrate out of discussion.

The failure of racism in Catalonia

Given Catalonia's traditional capacity to absorb immigrants, Catalans leaders were never particularly interested in drawing up insurmountable barriers between natives and newcomers. Immigrants were not resented as a major threat to Catalan identity, the main menace coming obviously from Madrid. Madrid posed a far greater danger to the survival of the Catalan nation, and its policies were a major source of de-Catalanisation. Moreover, thanks to the strength of linguistic identity, racist definitions of the nation never gained currency. There have been attempts in this direction, but what strikes is their overall lack of success. We shall now examine some of these racist definitions, contrasting them with more integrative ones which won the day.

At the turn of the century, the positivist writer Pompeu Gener (1848-1920) tried to define Catalan identity on the basis of race and descent. The Nordic Gothic character of Catalonia was opposed to the Arab and Berber nature of Castile. Relying on Nietzsche's vitalism, Gener avowed for the creation of a *super-nationalism*. Since 'science' provided an irrefutable instrument of legitimation, it is not surprising that most European nationalist movements in the last throes of the century developed overt racist rationalizations. Race was considered to be the most reliable and incontestable way of supporting group differentiation. 'Science' provided a kind of esoteric doctrine through which a self-appointed secular clergy tried to impose their vision grounded on pretentiously immovable dogmas. The steadfastness of these dogmas was based precisely on the difficulty of demonstrating them. I hope to have shown in the previous chapter that the choice of race was directly related to the absence of other elements of ethnic differentiation. The more the differences between groups are difficult to demonstrate, the more race comes to the fore. In Catalonia, linguistic consciousness provided an impediment against race-centred ideas. In the end, the racist ideas of Gener and other marginal pundits never acquired legitimacy in Catalonia.

For a while *L'Avenç*, the eclectic Modernist mouthpiece, gave hospitality to the racist ideas of Gener with the aim of differentiating Catalonia from the rest of Spain.⁴²⁷ For the Modernists, this was simply a byproduct of their scramble for all things modern, scientific and European. Their use and abuse of 'scientific' terminology was a means of distancing themselves from the Romantics and the *Renaixença*. The stress on race was intended to provide a provisional foundation for an allegedly more 'modern' form of nationalism, against previous nostalgic attitudes. But Gener's and others' attempts were quickly forgotten. When several decades later a massive influx of immigrants created the conditions for a racist backlash, few remembered his name.

A new stream of racial thought appeared in the 1930s.⁴²⁸ In his quasi-apocalyptic portrait of Catalonia's 'decadence', the demographer Josep Vandellós (1899-1950) backed up his anti-Malthusian defence of human natality with a wealth of statistical data.⁴²⁹ Catalonia was threatened with extinction by the falling of birth-rate. As a remedy to what he described as racial decadence and generational egotism, he proposed the spread of nationalism. In this, Vandellós was influenced by Italian Fascism and German pessimism.⁴³⁰ Although more influential than Gener, his preoccupations about Catalan 'decadence' as a result of immigration and miscegenation were not seriously taken up by nationalist politicians.

Another author expressing concern for immigration was Manuel Rossell i Vilar, who linked culture with race. He was preoccupied about immigrants' 'ghettos' and the paucity of mixed marriages, but was also concerned about possible threats to 'mental purity' resulting from massive inputs of 'foreign blood'. Thus, although inbreeding (*mestissatge*) was a desirable perspective, it would have brought about long-term 'mental perturbations' (Hall 1983: 77). His writings were even less popular than the ones of Gener and Vandellós.

Much more important than them all was what I define as the *integrationist* trend. This was exemplified by several authors and scattered in most nationalist literature.⁴³¹ However, its

⁴²⁷ Gener played a more influential role in the radical magazine *Juventut* (Youth, 1900-1906) of the *Unió Catalanista*.

⁴²⁸ As predecessors, Termes (1984: 138-ff) mentions several anti-Malthusian hygienists preoccupied with the lowering birth-rate at the turn of the century. Later, the physician Puig i Sais spoke of the fatal dangers of de-Catalanization and the need to increase the number of Catalans of pure stock.

⁴²⁹ Although Vandellós avoided the concept of 'race', he often spoke of 'racial qualities' (Hall 1983: 77).

⁴³⁰ Vandellós studied with the fascist statistician Corrado Gini and was also influenced by the German philosopher Oswald Spengler (Bilbeny 1988: 156).

⁴³¹ Some authors stressed the economic advantages derived from immigration (Muntaner, Nadal, cited by Culla 1989: 339).

importance fully emerged only in the 1960s as a consequence of massive immigration and the competing danger of an anti-immigrant backlash. At this stage, it was absolutely imperative to rediscover, and appeal to, supposedly 'primordial' integrative trends innate in Catalan society. The previously mentioned works of Vicens Vives, Ferrater i Mora and others served this purpose. But active integration could be more easily achieved in the wake of a common opposition to the dictatorship. As in Euskadi, the oppositional character of the nationalist movement helped to mobilise immigrants and natives against a common enemy. In this task, the whole opposition remained united. Memories of the Tragic Week and the potential for communal strife in Catalan society haunted both left and nationalist politicians. The two main representatives of this integrative current are the journalist Francis Candel (b. 1925) and the nationalist leader Jordi Pujol (b. 1930).

Candel (1964), himself an immigrant, published a defence of the immigrants' contribution to Catalan society which became a regional best-seller. Significantly, the book was titled *Els altres Catalans* (The other Catalans). However, he did not present an overall solution to the problem of cultural integration, especially in the linguistic aspect. His main merit was to have personified the immigrants' love for the host land and its people. Candel was criticised by Cruells (1965), who called his own book *Els no Catalans i nosaltres* (The non-Catalans and ourselves): according to Cruells, the majority of the immigrants were not ready to accept Catalan culture (1965: 17) and even showed connivance at the regime's suspicious 'linguistic universalism' (1965: 24). At this stage, the idea of a single Catalan community is destined to remain simply "a fiction (*enthelequia*)... if it does not bring what is essential to Catalanity, which is its language" (1965: 12).⁴³²

The most relevant thinker in this period was Jordi Pujol, whose ideas we already expanded on in other chapters. His programme consisted in addressing the immigrants' issue through linguistic incorporation, seeing acquisition of Catalan as a step 'naturally' ensuing from acceptance in the host country: "Our central problem is immigration and, hence, integration. The basic objective is to build up a community valid for all Catalans. And I care to add that by Catalan I mean everybody who lives and works in Catalonia, and who makes Catalonia his/her own home and country, which he/she incorporates and identifies with" (Pujol 1966). Hence, the stress was put on residence in an attempt to build a non-ethnic sense of citizenship (Woolard 1986, 1989). However, within what looks like an unmistakably civic concept of the nation, language (especially language use in the family) remained the real crucible and

⁴³² Cruells (1965) attacked Candel's work emphasizing the distance between what, he claimed, were two opposite communities: Catalans and non-Catalans.

badge of successful incorporation: "Language is the decisive factor in integration. It is the most definitive. A man who speaks Catalan and who speaks Catalan to his children, is already a Catalan at heart (*de soca i arrel*)" (Pujol 1966: 82-3). Pujol first expressed his vision in the late 1950s in some clandestine pamphlets. Obviously, such literature could not have a large circulation, but was very influential among important circles of intellectuals who can be defined as Catalonia's 'militant minorities' (Terms 1984: 154).⁴³³

BASQUE COUNTRY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Immigration, centralism and modernity

In contrast with Catalonia, the Basque Country did not possess a vibrant tradition of acceptance of newcomers. The concept of universal or collective nobility (*hidalguia colectiva*) discussed in the previous chapter served a clear isolationist purpose. "All those who wish to be considered as inhabitants (*vecinos*) had to, if they were not from the country, prove their nobility. This required a long and costly legal procedure. The applicant had to finance the trip of two persons -a bailiff and an inhabitant of the place - to his birthplace, where he had to prove... his nobility and purity of blood with witnesses or a baptism certificate" (Fernandez de Pinedo 1974: 51). Already in the XV century, people who came from outside Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa had limited civic rights and duties. With Bizkaia's *Fuero Nuevo*, the permission of the *anteiglesias*,⁴³⁴ villages and towns was needed in order to acquire stable residence. This implied an investigation into the moral conduct of the applicant, to be carried out in the place where he /she last resided.⁴³⁵ In 1585, the Junta Provincial of Gipuzkoa forbade the residence to all those who could not prove their collective nobility (Vazquez de Prada 1978: III: 170-2).

The abolition of the *fueros* found the local population unprepared for the vast upheavals to come, and unable to counteract them. The rapid industrialization of the Bilbao area after 1876 meant that many people from both the surrounding countryside and other regions of Spain flocked into the city, while the locals could not have a say in these developments. Bilbao more than doubled its population from 35,505 inhabitants in 1877 to 83,306 in 1900.

⁴³³ Also influential was the Left nationalist activist Antoni Pérez, inspired by social Catholicism (Muñoz 1990: 166-ff).

⁴³⁴ The *anteiglesias* (literally, before the Church) were administrative units roughly corresponding to municipal districts based on the parishes.

⁴³⁵ This attitude had been kept in the XVII century, when Bilbao's class structure started to change and expand. The members of the city's Junta periodically affirmed that its inhabitants were of noble lineage and thus they had to admit foreigners only after accurate research on their genealogies (Dominguez Ortiz 1976: 171).

By 1900 about 80% of the city's population was made up of immigrants, and only 23.4% were born in Bilbao (this figure also includes children of immigrants). Nearly half of the immigrants were non-Basques (Corcuera 1979: 73-5).

The amount of social disruption brought about by these dramatic changes in the human, cultural, social and ecological spheres was an essential catalyst for the birth of Basque nationalism. The massive arrival of dispossessed people who appeared impossible to integrate was at the root of a widespread anti-Spanish resentment which is fully reflected in Arana's words:

If a *foral* and *euskalduna* (Basque-speaking) Vizcaya were morally possible, though of *maketo* race, its realization would be the most hateful event in the world, the most creeping and abject (*rastrera*) aberration for a people, the most iniquitous and wicked political development and the most amazing falsity in history (Arana u.d.: 1: 197)

Maketismo or *españolismo* [creeps] in every sphere of Vizcayan society: within the cultural and religious authorities, in the press, in recreational and political groups, in professional and religious organizations... (189)

Our race has become despicably dominated by that of its most hard-fought enemy' (326) .⁴³⁶

Indignation and bitterness for the destruction of Basque traditional society are the main touchstones of Arana's thought. A self-righteous outrage for the decline of Basque civilization, its laws, language and values was at its basis. This wrath was reflected in Arana's manichean typologies of the incompatible human characters of Basques and Spaniards. Spaniards epitomized all negative attitudes and behaviour, all that Basques abhorred: they were painted as lazy, violent, prone to drunkenness,... By contrast, Basques excelled in all those fields where the Spaniards failed.

However, if by racism we mean a hierarchical evaluation of human groups on an universal scale, Arana can only partially be referred to as a racist, because the target of his contempt were exclusively the Spaniards.⁴³⁷ His 'racism' was a situational one, driven by hatred for Spanish political oppression and mentality.⁴³⁸ We must not forget that in Arana's time, at the turn of the XIX century, the concept of race was a fashionable one. This concept served to legitimise Basque aspirations to achieve an equal status to that of other modern nations. In

⁴³⁶ Arana also referred to the preferential allocation of administrative posts to the Spanish immigrants as *maketismo* (326).

⁴³⁷ Indeed, Arana was also able to express some solidarity for other peoples fighting against Spain or similar Western foes, like the American Indians (1980: 189-90) or the Berbers of Morocco (189-90 and 193-4), who were at that time waging their struggle against the Spanish army. In regard to the latter, Arana ironically asked: "What kind of culture can the Spaniards bring to El Riff ?" (189), implying that Berber civilization was superior to the Spanish one.

⁴³⁸ On the different meanings which the concept of race assumes relative to prevailing historical conditions and discourses, see Goldberg (1992).

this sense, it was an even stronger reminder and seal of distinction than language. Racial exclusiveness pre-existed Arana and was a common sentiment among Bilbao's residents in the third quarter of the century. The Castilianized and pro-centralist upper echelons were equally -if not more- racist than the Basque-speaking proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. Later on, both nationalists and anti-nationalists resented the *maketos* as invaders. However, only among the nationalists did they become openly identified with the state, since most of them came from Castile, the land of the oppressors.

We do not have any reliable proof that Arana knew directly the works on racial superiority which were very popular in Europe at the end of the century, especially in France, which he visited for brief periods. In his self-taught and disordered syncretism, Arana rarely, if ever, mentioned his sources. Certainly, Arana had a lively intellectual curiosity for everything that could reinforce his nationalist creed. Allied with the *fin de siècle* mood of Spanish decadence, European racial theories may have had a strong impact amongst some Regenerationist intellectuals. Physical anthropologists, both foreign and local, were asserting their theories of Basque racial uniqueness.⁴³⁹ Aranism helped only indirectly to popularize these concepts, which became more well-known after Arana's death. The consciousness of racial superiority "persisted at the ideological level long after openly racist aspects disappeared from the nationalist programmes" (Corcuera 1979: 386). As we saw, this legacy created internal conflicts and bitter fragmentation during the 1960s, when most nationalists began to consider how to involve the immigrants in their struggle.

In the previous chapter, we said that all nationalist movements search for common and shared values through which to mobilise the masses. This search is directed in order to re-create the 'essence' of national culture through an effort of syncretism. Core values are nothing else but symbolic precipitates of ethnic cohesion and synthesis of a rapidly changing culture. Arana's choice of race was the consequence of the lack of other differentiating elements. He found that race had a stronger mobilising potential precisely because it defined the 'communitarian essence' of the nation, whereas no other element could operate likewise.

Our contrast between Catalan openness and Basque exclusiveness refers to the initial period

⁴³⁹ For instance, Telesforo de Aranzadi published at the turn of the century his anthropometric works on cephalic indexes, eye colour and other physiognomic peculiarities. The former topic was also studied by the phrenologist Federico Oloriz. When race was associated to superiority, we can find easily the features of a 'chosen people'. Thus, Engracio de Aranzadi declared in 1904 that "we Basques constitute the aristocracy of the world, the noblesse of the earth" (cited in Corcuera 1979: 386). In this sense, race was not necessarily racist, but resembled more a spirit of caste. Furthermore, these declarations did not form a cohesive doctrine of racial superiority.

of the two nationalist movements. The substance of the original formulations remained basically untouched until the Civil War, as alternative visions could not find the conditions to emerge. In the postwar, Basque attitudes changed dramatically: the reaction to the second massive wave of immigration in the 1960s was to look for, and create, alternative values in order to include the immigrants into the nationalist struggle, rather than rejecting them. But we shall first examine which were the conditions of, and the reaction to, the first great immigration.

The end of Basque traditional society: forerunners of a violent upheaval

At the beginning, industrialization was limited to Vizcaya and concentrated in the mining area around Bilbao. Given the impact of subsequent urbanization and immigration, it was also here that nationalism was born and slowly spread.⁴⁴⁰ We have to remember that, initially, Arana spoke just of a "Vizcayan nation" and only later did he extend his nationalist programme to the other Basque provinces, inventing the term Euskadi. This happened as soon as the effects of industrialization sprawled into neighbouring Gipuzkoa. Immigrants in the Bilbao area were then living in pitiful conditions. A vivid picture of the appalling conditions in the mining industry was sketched by the Communist leader Dolores Ibaurri, *La Pasionaria*:

"The miners worked from dawn to dusk with no set hours. They left home before it was light and did not return until well after nightfall. The bunkhouses that the mining companies offered as shelter to those who came from other regions resembled the lairs of wild beasts rather than human dwellings.

At night...the interior of the [miner's] bunkerhouses looked like a scene from Dante. The air was filled with the smoke of harsh tobacco...and illuminated by a flickering light. The blurred figures of half-naked men could be seen moving among the cots or seated in their bedrolls in a foul atmosphere compounded of sweat, fermented food, and the odours of the latrine, which was located in a small compartment...The men slept on sacks stuffed with cornshucks placed on top of narrow wooden benches...

If one of the men contracted smallpox or typhus... he was removed from his cot and taken to a hut where the sick were housed. If he died, his bunk was sprinkled with lime water, and his cot was immediately occupied by someone else. The temporary labourers, most of whom were of peasant origin, were...carriers of fatal illnesses and epidemics which spread without control from Vizcaya to Castile and from Castile to Vizcaya. ..." (Ibaurri 1976: 17-8).

A first natural reaction to the arrival of the immigrants was self-induced isolation. The natives

⁴⁴⁰ Until the late 1950s, Gipuzkoa had relatively little non-Basque immigration. Its industrialization was a subsidiary spill-over from Vizcaya, following an eastward trend from the towns at the border between the two provinces towards the French frontier, where it halted. Industrialization in Gipuzkoa consisted mostly of small industrial enterprises. In this environment, cooperativism flourished, as exemplified by Mondragon. The process was slow and, until the 1950s, it was not as traumatic as in 1880s' Vizcaya. The other two Spanish Basque provinces, Alava and Navarre, remained largely agricultural and untouched by industrialization for a much longer time. The agricultural character of these provinces has retarded the growth of nationalism.

reacted in the typical way of threatened minorities, reinforcing traditional barriers. Efforts in this direction are normally bound to fail if the minority in question does not have the (economic) means to implement its wish of seclusion. In the Basque case, isolationist attempts were encouraged by the natives' economic well-being in comparison to the immigrants. They could afford to display some kind of 'superiority' in regard to the latter, whilst they could hardly do so in respect of the central government.

Again, the population nearly doubled from 1900 to 1930 (Fusi 1984: 15). In the 1930s, religion became increasingly more important than race. The clergy participated massively in the nationalist movement, possibly as a response to the secular threat emanating from the Second Republic. In the Basque Country, religion became an indispensable tool of social cohesion at a time of erstwhile social instability in the rest of Spain. At the popular level, this new religious awareness was expressed by visionary events, religious apparitions and performances of miracles (Christian 1987). But the cataclysm of the Civil War irreparably broke this traditional balance. The Catholic field was split along ideological and geographical lines; Navarre and part of Alava sided with the Francoists against nationalism. In the dark night of oblivion which followed, an underground movement slowly emerged challenging what had been an hitherto static nationalist ideology. We shall now see how this ideology focused first on language, and subsequently on voluntary action, as an unitary platform and source of cohesion.

In the 1960s, the Basque economy underwent a massive process of expansion. Immigration had been constant since the 1890s, but the record figures of the 1960s led to inevitable strains on Basque culture and society. The fracture between immigrants and natives was in part healed through attempts to create a new sense of Basque identity carried out by some educators and nationalists. This effort to achieve 'national' unity is epitomized by the role of the *andereños* (Basque teachers) as agents of the Basque cultural revival. They insisted on creating common schools where immigrant children could learn Basque side by side with native ones. But their first attempts failed on several occasions, not because of opposition from the immigrants, but, on the contrary, because many villagers were firmly opposed to their children being sent into mixed classes. Only a nationalist explanation - namely the sincere desire and right of the immigrants to become Basques - succeeded in convincing the reluctant parents about the viability of such schools, chasing away centuries-old prejudices. The root of the problem was the different view the teachers and the rest of the inhabitants had of Basque culture. The *andereños* had a highly positive view of it, the

villagers traditionally did not. In true Aranist spirit, their main concern was to be kept safe from 'negative foreign' influences, more than maintaining Basque culture. In the early phase of the cultural revival, positive national self-appraisal was still skin-deep.

The perception of their culture as a badge of inferiority is common to many minorities. In particular, social mobility in industrialized societies demands the mastery of a standard language as a vehicle of a homogeneous high culture (Gellner 1983). Hence, the retention of un-standardized varieties is seen as an hindrance to social mobility, as well as an emblem of cultural backwardness. This did not necessarily mean that the Basques themselves despised their culture. Quite the contrary, they often loved it, but, having continually to confront the impact of the dominant one, they did not have the means - political power - nor the knowledge - political skills - to promote Basque culture at a higher level. Centuries of diglossic inertia prevented them from even considering the possibility of transforming Euskara into a vehicle of high culture.

Eventually, the old ideology of racial superiority - which *de facto* downgraded Basque culture - waned with the spread of a neo-nationalist ideology which, in contrast, tried to promote Basque cultural manifestations. In 1971, a special issue of *Alderdi*, the underground newsletter of the PNV, was entitled "43 words for you, immigrant in Euskadi".⁴⁴¹ Its leading article called those who "came from other lands... to assume fully the duties which the impending crucial situation demands from us all". The call opened with a "welcome to our land... this is your land, you are Basque... we [the natives] are not better or worse than any others". A vigorous rebuke of the centralizing dictatorship concealed a plea for the respect of all non-Spanish cultures. The immigrants were asked first to respect Basque culture and then to join the struggle for freedom. Immigrants were finally given the possibility of becoming Basques. The only condition was to accept the Basques and their desire for independence and democracy. Hence, the stress was primarily on participation in the struggle for freedom and collective rights. *Faute de mieux*, it is a call to respect at least Basque culture and the Basques' efforts to preserve it. Hence, the next section will analyze the emergence of this voluntary conception of the nation.

BASQUE COUNTRY: CONTEMPORARY PERIOD

Voluntary action and political struggle as avenues of national integration

We have mentioned that religion assumed a primary oppositional character under the

⁴⁴¹ *Alderdi*, n° 270, December 1971.

Second Republic. Things changed again in the 1960s: through the contribution of Ekin and then of Krutwig's *Vasconia*, language became the new crucible of conceiving Basqueness. The main novelty was precisely that the previous ascriptive requirements for membership in the Basque nation were replaced by a kind of voluntary association centered on personal involvement in the political struggle. Albeit remaining in the background as a symbol of Basque identity, language was continuously overshadowed by political action. An increasing number of immigrants were enrolled in the armed struggle, and Clark (1984: 147-9, 1986a, 1986b) gives interesting figures about non-native membership inside ETA.⁴⁴² Many activists were sons of immigrants, sons of mixed parents or even immigrants themselves, and many of ETA's martyrs as well. Such was Juan Paredes Manot, who cried "Long live free Euskadi" in front of the firing squad, seconds before being executed. Even the most traditionalist Aranists were deeply impressed by this act of ultimate generosity and their beliefs in Basque purity were deeply shattered. *Action* became far more important than race and, generally, it was also more important than language as a marker of Basqueness. One of the main reasons for this choice was precisely that immigrants, as well as assimilated Basques, could not be mobilised through the old primordial tools of race, religion, and language revivalism.

This new way of conceiving Basque membership through active participation draws from a pre-existing autochthonous value, *ekintza* (action).⁴⁴³ Its inner meaning is a "commitment as far as possible to implement in secular life what the religious belief dictated to be true" (Zulaika 1988: 39). In other words, the Basque defines herself/himself as a person by 'doing' (Del Valle 1989: 127). The nationalists felt that a Basque is one who, "loving his nation, fights for its liberation"... Hence, "a true Basque can only be a Basque nationalist" (Heiberg 1979: 187). This conception was also present in Arana's stress on patriotism as a moral obligation. Also, a true Basque is one who actively (and politically) defends the symbols of Basque cohesion and differentiation (Heiberg 1979: 195). Activism is especially a duty for the youth and every youth has a particular responsibility to be an *ekintzaile*

⁴⁴² According to the surnames of ETA members, 40.1% of them came from mixed ancestry, that is, either the mother or the father had a non-Basque surname. Furthermore, 16.6% came from purely non-Basque ancestry, that is, both surnames were Spanish. In the whole, 56.7% of the *etarras* were not of purely Basque origin (Clark 1984: 147). The Basques follow the Iberian tradition of using both maternal and paternal surnames.

⁴⁴³ Zulaika (1988: 36-56) links the revival of this concept to the influence in Euskadi of the pro-regime ecclesiastical movement, *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action). According to the group's representatives, the notion of *militancy* had to be the central vocation of any Christian (ibid: 40).

(activist). The concept contains in it a sense of mission and a striving to 'convert' other people to act likewise (Zulaika 1989: 39). The new post-1960s Basque nationalism extended this sense of mission to the immigrants, where it achieved a new class-oriented meaning. The choice of Marxism as a central ideological tenet was directly linked to this drive at immigrants' mobilisation. The root of the concept of *ekintza* is contained in the name of the organization and journal *Ekin*, the predecessor of ETA. *Ekin* means 'to do' and its young founders conceived it as in opposition to the static, out-dated and passive attitude of the old *peneuvista* generation.

The relationship between this concept of self-fulfilling action and violence is clear. *Ekintza* is enhanced whenever the activity involves some kind of risk. Thus, "the requirement of underground secrecy for the more political type of *ekintza* was a proof of its importance. The high risk involved in following the dictates of one's conscience exposed the intrinsically evil nature of the existing political establishment and gave a moral, almost sacred imperative to the *ekintza*" (Zulaika 1988: 44). All participants in the struggle were not simply Basque citizens, but also Basque nationalists and part of the corresponding 'moral community', irrespective of where they were born. The 'targets' of these mobilisation tactics were both Spanish-speaking Basques and the immigrant population. Hence, the peculiar conditions of secrecy under the dictatorship, transformed each *ekintza* into a daring act and favoured the metamorphosis from simple action and militancy into violence. The choice of a voluntarist definition of the nation brought about the subsequent fall into a mounting spiral of violent actions and reactions.

Conflicting parameters of Basque identity: some data

There are different means of measuring political integration and participation. If we take into account voting patterns, the high percentage of votes for the pro-independence coalition *Herri Batasuna* in areas where immigrants are a majority can testify to the immigrants' involvement in nationalist politics.⁴⁴⁴ In Renteria, an industrial town of Gipuzkoa, only 19% of the population was native-born, yet the overall nationalist vote was 48.65% in 1979 (Llera Ramo 1985: 405, SIADECO 1981) and achieved 62.7% in the 1987 municipal elections (Anuario El País 1988, Silver 1988: 124).⁴⁴⁵ The greatest gain was recorded by radical

⁴⁴⁴ *Euskadi, 'otro' país. Los partidos nacionalistas entran en la disputa del voto inmigrante, "El País", 19 de junio de 1986.*

⁴⁴⁵ The total vote for the nationalist parties (62.77%) was distributed as follows: HB 28.13%, EA 15.92 %, EE 13.05 % and PNV 5.67 %. The PSOE remained the first party with 31.93 %. The positive result for the Left parties indicates that the choice of class-related politics by Basque radical nationalism started to yield results and vindicate their initial choices.

parties: HB (from 19.97 % in 1979 to 28.11 % in 1987 and 24% in the 1989 legislative elections) and EE (from 12.62 % to 13.1%).⁴⁴⁶ Before the Civil War, when immigrants were a small minority in Renteria, the overall nationalist vote was a mere 36.1%. Moreover, this was exclusively directed at the conservative PNV. In 1979, the PNV's percentage declined to 16.9%, while the radical parties achieved top positions. The conclusion put forward by Silver (1988) is that when immigrants vote for nationalist parties, they tend to vote for radical nationalists.

Such changes occurred on the background of a dramatic demographic shift. The population of Renteria increased from 3,062 inhabitants in 1877 to 45,789 in 1981. That is, it multiplied over fourteen fold in little more than a hundred years (Goicoechea 1991: 20). Immigration also caused a change in the age structure and there is a higher percentage of youth than in other cities (21). This is a further variable that may be taken into account in order to explain radical nationalism's strength. Indeed, the peculiar appeal which nationalism exerts over the youth has been highlighted by research in many other nationalist movements.⁴⁴⁷ Most immigrants were non-Basque: in 1975, 40.1% of the inhabitants of Renteria were born outside Euskadi (Goicoechea 1991: 21-2). Of course, this percentage did not include their Basque-born offspring, who were considered as natives, so that, if taken together, the immigrants and their children formed the overwhelming majority of the population. The average of immigrants in the *comarca* (36.3 %) was much greater than in Gipuzkoa as a whole (27.77 %) or Euskadi as a whole (30 %, including Navarre). As in most other Basque towns, the support for HB in Renteria has increased at every election. After a brief decrease to 16.59 (general election of 1982), HB support increased to 24.65 (municipal election of 1983), 25.71 (legislative election of 1986), 25.44 (regional election of 1986), and 28.13 (municipal election of 1988). HB has to compete with the PSOE (Socialists), the only relevant Spanish-based party, for the immigrants' vote.⁴⁴⁸ Since Renteria has been a special target for repression by the *Guardia Civil*, the city is a good ground for testing a correlation between nationalism, immigration, lack of common culture and state violence.

⁴⁴⁶ See *Anuario Estadístico Vasco 1985*. Bilbao: Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jaurlaritz, 1986; and *Anuario Estadístico Vasco 1988*. Bilbao: Gobierno Vasco/Eusko Jaurlaritz, 1989. For the data up to 1980, see SIADECO (1981) *Análisis Descriptivo de la Comarca Rentería Pasajes*. Donostia: Caja Laboral Popular, pp. 132-151. For a detailed analysis of the 1977 and 1977 elections in the four Basque provinces, see Llera Ramo (1985).

⁴⁴⁷ See, for instance, Alter (1989: 72). Referring to the period of the rise of nationalist movements, B. Anderson states that "both in Europe and the colonies 'young' and 'youth' signified dynamism, progress, self-sacrificing idealism and revolutionary will" (1983: 109).

⁴⁴⁸ Given its steady but slow growth, HB also appeared to be the most stable party in the region (Goicoechea 1988: 407).

This propensity towards immigrant radicalization is confirmed by other more general data. Everybody living in the Basque Country can identify him or herself as either Basque or Spaniard. Thus, many immigrants identify themselves as Basques. In Linz's (1986: 40) sample, 8.4% of immigrants identify themselves as 'more Basque than Spaniard'. Among them, 36% want independence for Euskadi, compared with 24% among those natives [that is, with both Basque parents] who identify themselves as 'more Basque than Spaniard' (not all natives identified themselves as such).⁴⁴⁹ Assuming that desire for independence is a reliable indicator of nationalism, we can see that nationalism is stronger among those immigrants who feel Basque, even stronger than among the natives in general (whether they feel Basques or Spaniards). When the immigrants 'feel' Basque, they are less prone to compromise over independence and other issues. The oppositional mechanism of nationalist mobilisation has resulted in the direct incorporation of many immigrants into the 'moral community'. The crucible for nationalist militancy is hence a shared Basque identity, rather than origin or race. Furthermore, paradoxically, the percentage of people opposed to independence is higher among 'pure Basques' than among all the other groups of immigrant or mixed origin.⁴⁵⁰ Linz concludes that "when immigrants are forced to choose between a primordial and a territorial definition, they naturally incline towards the latter"....That is why "the most extreme nationalism in the Basque Country seems to be associated with a *territorial*, rather than a *primordial*, conception of the nation" (Linz 1985: 206).⁴⁵¹ This seems to contrast with Clark's finding on the positive correlation between language maintenance and nationalist voting, but Clark refers mainly to the native population, rather

⁴⁴⁹ Obviously, these percentages are subject to widely divergent interpretations, since they touch a politically sensitive area (the desire for Basque independence). The percentages of those desiring independence vary greatly according to the source: for instance, a survey promoted in 1983 by the PNV's magazine, *Euzkadi*, claimed that 74% of the interviewed Basques were in favour of independence, "if this was peacefully achieved". Only 21 % opted against it. As to their perception of identity, 54 % assumed that the Basques are a people apart, whilst 32% claimed that the Basques do not differ from other Spaniards. Thus, the percentage of respondents aspiring to independence was much higher than that of those perceiving the Basques (and thus themselves) as a different people. The paradoxical conclusion is that nationalism -the drive to achieve a form of separate statehood - was more widespread than a sense of separate identity -a belief in sharing a different culture and origins. This bears a relation to the lack of core values as discussed in the previous chapter(s). See *Euzkadi*, nº 94 (15 julio 1983), pp. 10-15. The sociological reliability of this survey, made out from a sample of only 89 interviews, is quite doubtful.

⁴⁵⁰ Rejection is obviously strongest of all among those who feel themselves to be purely Spaniards: 75% of these firmly reject independence, a far higher percentage than any of the other groups.

⁴⁵¹ Among the 'primordial' traits, Linz includes language, which can obviously be acquired. This is perhaps on the ground that the sociolinguistic nature of Euskera (its scarce diffusion, low prestige and difficult learning) makes it more 'primordial' than Catalan.

than to the immigrants (Clark 1984, 1987).

Also, among those who favour a centralized Spanish state, the definition of who is Basque tends to focus on birth and descent: this stress on putative origin or race is adopted by 80.3% of the pro-centralists. That is, the *españolistas* are unable to conceive an integrative dimension in Basqueness. In parallel, people who define Basqueness on the basis of race or descent are 'only' 45.5% of those favouring independence (1985: 215). Thus, a racially exclusive conception of the nation is more widespread among the centralists than among the nationalists.

CATALONIA: CONTEMPORARY PERIOD

Mass migration and the limits of cultural integration

The regime's propaganda deliberately falsified the causes of migratory movements: they were explained away in terms of the "attraction exerted on the simple peasant mentality by the city, with its theatres, avenues and elegant women" (Hall 1983: 74-5). Minimizing the seriousness of the social problems caused by its policies, the regime's cop-out was to say that "these are problems common to all developed countries" (cited by Hall 1983: 75). As we have seen, the most crucial period of massive immigration occurred at a time when Catalan was still rigorously forbidden in all public spheres and its use was liable to prosecution. The immigrants did not stand a chance to learn it formally. At the same time, Catalan remained *de facto* the habitual language among Catalans 'by birth'. Francoist prohibition therefore rendered impossible the immigrants' cultural integration at the very moment in which a massive effort in this direction was most needed. On the other hand, many scholars were optimistic about the immigrants' gradual assimilation into Catalan culture. For instance, Maluquer (1963: 62-ff.) found that in the Pyrenean industrial town of Campdevàrol all the immigrants' offspring spoke Catalan and behaved as Catalans. He explained this success as a result of the children's parents' desire for social mobility and the prestige they associated with the natives as a reference group: "Their situation of socio-professional inferiority explains the efforts of the immigrants to be similar to the autochthons". While the natives labelled the immigrants as *xarnegos* (literally, half-breed, half-caste, or hybrid), the most relevant finding was that "such form of verbal discrimination was employed against the newcomers, not only by the Catalans, but also by older immigrants, who tried thus to elevate themselves by stressing a social distance" (63). This, Maluquer concluded, was a clear proof of successful integration into Catalan culture and society, extrapolating optimistic conclusions

for the Catalanization of future generations: "Despite the fact that the teaching was carried out only in Spanish, the school children spoke Catalan among themselves and called *xarnegos* those who did not master the language yet. ...This [attitude] encourages assimilation" (63). By defining anyone who did not speak Catalan as *xarnego*, hence member of an outgroup, the children also testified to the central importance of language in the definition of their identity. These attitudes highlighted prevailing integrative trends, since the immigrants were no longer considered *xarnegos* as soon as their language proficiency was clearly established.

We have seen that these assimilatory trends have ancient roots and remount to Catalonia's centenary concept of *terra de pas*. In the recent past, this process has led to optimistic attitudes on the Catalan side. Thus, in 1965 the linguist Antoni M. Badia i Margarit claimed: "the possibility that the immigrants would escape assimilation is simply nil" (cited by Vallverdú 1980).⁴⁵² Again, still in 1978, the anthropologist Claudi Esteva i Fabregat assumed that the autochthonous culture was still dominant and a new 'ethnic group' was emerging in the form of 'hybridization' (*mestissatge*): "in Barcelona, the Castilian-speaking population (that is to say, the monolingual one, my addition) is losing about 17% of its components by the second generation" (Esteva 1978).

Catalan culture started to show signs of renewed vitality once the trauma of dictatorship was overcome. However, things did not go as well as many expected. Pi i Sunyer (1971: 119) warned that "the argument that this minority within a minority can, given the right conditions, be assimilated with few problems smacks of wishful thinking and is not borne out by similar historical cases". According to Hall (1983: 74), since reliable data on immigration was still scarcely available in the 1970s, the gravity of the situation was hidden to many Catalans. An article published in 1979 in the journal *Els Marges* (Argente et al. 1979) expressed a strong preoccupation that, without drastic measures on its behalf, the language was condemned to extinction in the space of a few generations.⁴⁵³ The article struck a chord, achieving a certain resonance also beyond academia. It indicated that the main threat to the fate of the language was the unprecedentedly large number of immigrants who barely had any occasion to interact in Catalan. The number of monolingual Castilian-speakers was the highest ever recorded in Catalan history. In such circumstances, actual daily use of

⁴⁵² He also asserted that, "by the mere act of living in Catalonia, the immigrants have placed themselves along/ on the road which sooner or later will lead to their Catalanisation" (Badia i Margarit 1964: 109).

⁴⁵³ Similarly, Woolard argues that "politically motivated claims that there is only one community in Catalonia do not reflect current reality and the divisive potential of ethnic identity... has not yet been overcome" (1986a: 57).

Catalan was unlikely, even for people who did master the language.

However, assimilation was not the issue. On the contrary, the issue was the diffusion of bilingualism, which does not imply the loss of the immigrants' culture.⁴⁵⁴ Indeed, the very term *Castilian-speakers* normally refers to the monolingual population (i.e., unable to speak Catalan), whilst *Catalan-speakers* are always bilingual (and normally use Catalan).⁴⁵⁵ I use the concept of two groups, Catalan- and Castilian-speakers, only for heuristic purposes. This will prevent us from reifying the two communities in sharp terms, since there are both Catalanized immigrants (or immigrants who are undergoing a process of Catalanization), and Castilianized natives (even though they are a minority and mainly among higher echelons). Linguistic competences form a continuum shading from pure monolingualism to 'perfect' bilingualism, or the preferred use of Catalan as daily language.

To a lesser extent, the same notion of a continuum can be applied to the Basque case, where most of the literature emphasizes a chasm between autochthonous inhabitants and immigrants. In Euskadi we also find a continuum of identities and behavioural patterns, rather than a sharp opposition between two groups, although cultural integration is less likely. Several studies tend to reify the immigrants as a tightly bound and easily identifiable community, over-emphasizing the fracture between them and the host society. This may occur both in nationalist and more balanced analysis.⁴⁵⁶

Moreover, as the big wave of immigration ended in the late 1970s, the very term *immigrant* can no longer imply territorial displacement from one region to another.⁴⁵⁷ The largest part of those who migrated in the last twenty years are well-established and intend to remain in the 'host' country. This is especially true for the second generations who have virtually no desire to return to their parents' land (Solé 1981: 18-24 and 344-53). Certainly, many immigrants mythologise their land of origin surrounding it with a halo of nostalgia. But the myth falls apart as soon as they have a chance to return to their *pueblos*. Here, often

⁴⁵⁴ We can find a plethora of nationalist literature on bilingualism, its limits and dangers. The argument against bilingualism (and in favour of Catalan monolingualism) is backed by extensive sociolinguistic studies (see, for instance, Aracil 1982, Sabater 1984: 37-8).

⁴⁵⁵ In a classic case of language loyalty, Catalans tend to use their code daily in most in-group interactions. Language erosion only occurs among very limited sectors of the native population. In fact, most children with two Catalan parents have daily occasion to use Catalan within the family (Strubell 1981: 151-ff). However, the natives' competence in Catalan is often far superior to their competence in Castilian.

⁴⁵⁶ Some studies of Basque society (Escudero 1978, Heiberg 1989) speak plainly of 'two communities'. For the case of Catalonia, see, for example, Pi i Sunyer (1983) and Di Giacomo (1985).

⁴⁵⁷ Pascual and Cardelús (1987: 332) note that the fact of being born outside Catalonia does not justify the definition of a person as an 'immigrant', since he or she could have been residing in Catalonia for at least 20 years.

unrecognized as members of their own kin by the local population, they are called, ironically, *los catalanes* (the Catalans) (Solé 1986, 1987). After such disappointing experiences, they frequently feel the impossibility of being re-integrated in their former 'homeland'. The ensuing identity conflict sometimes results in a desire to acquire a stronger Catalan identity. As older immigrants find it difficult to make this step, they are nonetheless anxious that their offspring be fully integrated into Catalan society and culture. This desire is shown by several surveys mentioned in the next section, which show a clear wish for future generations to have full access to Catalan.

The spread of Catalan

We have seen in the previous chapter, that the percentage of those who are able to understand Catalan has grown spectacularly from 79.8% in 1981 to 90.3% in 1986; that is to say, in only five years it has increased by over 10% (data from the municipal census of April 1986). In the Basque Country the increase has been only 3% in the same period, nevertheless it is an increase.⁴⁵⁸ Different explanations are available to explain the diffusion of Catalan among immigrants. For instance, 'relative deprivation theory' suggests that since the autochthonous group is economically better placed, it constitutes a "reference group" for many immigrants, representing a pattern of behaviour which many migrants aspire to emulate. The language of the reference group is part of the apprehended items that people wishing to become its members may try to adopt. In sociolinguistics, the phenomenon is known as *linguistic prestige* (Weinreich 1956) or *status* (Ryan 1979). Thus, language "is generally inseparable from the prestige of those who speak it" (Woolard 1989: 93). Many authors tend to see class and ethnicity in Catalonia as overlapping, in that Catalans are concentrated in the middle- or upper-classes, while immigrants allegedly represent the working class (Woolard 1989, Di Giacomo 1985).⁴⁵⁹ Indeed, most immigrants initially fell into semiskilled and unskilled labour pools (Pinilla de las Heras 1973: 105). However, this is only a rough generalization and we cannot speak of class as coterminous with ethnicity, particularly in more recent years. In fact, some Catalans are likely to be found at the bottom of the social ladder too. On the other side, there are immigrants who have succeeded in

⁴⁵⁸ However, actual linguistic uses are much more resilient to change. Furthermore, they are difficult to assess statistically: census' forms only contained items on language proficiency, not language use.

⁴⁵⁹ Di Giacomo argues that "the confluence of social class and ethnicity is painfully obvious" (1986: 73).

reaching the highest ranks of class stratification, thanks to a relatively diffuse social mobility.⁴⁶⁰

Numerous sociolinguistic studies have confirmed the immigrants' highly positive attitudes towards Catalan language and culture.⁴⁶¹ A large part of the data refers to the respondents' opinions about the introduction of Catalan in the school curricula. The proliferation of such surveys is in itself a signal that the Catalanists were very concerned about the possible impact of forthcoming linguistic normalization on immigrants' attitudes. The investigations preceded or followed swiftly the recent changes in the local education system. A survey by Badia i Margarit (1969) was the first one to unveil a heartfelt desire to learn Catalan among the general population. The first serious quantitative work made by FOESSA (1970) came to more reliable conclusions: in a sample of housewives, 97% of the interviewees favoured the introduction of Catalan into the school system (33% of the respondent women were immigrants themselves, while 50% had at least one parent born outside Catalonia). Other surveys were specifically concerned with the attitudes of the overall immigrant population. In the prevalently rural *comarca* of Osona, 94% of the respondents, all born outside Catalonia and in Castilian-speaking areas, expressed the wish that their offspring learn Catalan (Reixach 1975). In the satellite city of Cornellà de Llobregat, which had -and has- the highest percentage of monolingual Castilian speakers in all Catalonia (CIDC 1987), 97% of the parents were favorable to increasing the teaching of Catalan (cited by Torres 1980). According to another study, 90% of an interviewed sample of both native Catalans and immigrants expressed a preference that the teaching of Catalan be extended to the overall territory, while about 80% held as necessary the introduction of Catalan as a compulsory subject in all school curricula (Bibiloni and Junyent, cited by Torres 1980). Paradoxically, the zone which showed the strongest support for the teaching of (and in) Catalan were the suburbs of Barcelona, that is to say, the place of maximum immigration and of minimum knowledge of the language (Torres 1980: 53). This evidence has been backed by more recent data on the pressing request for 'immersion schools' in the metropolitan periphery on the part of immigrant fathers on behalf of their children (Conversi 1987).⁴⁶² The fact that almost all the immigrants expressed a desire to learn Catalan is a measure of its perceived utility. In

⁴⁶⁰ On social mobility among the immigrants in the 1960s and the first 1970s, see the classical sociological investigation by Pinilla de las Heras (1973). See also Miguélez (1987), Miguélez and Solé (1987) and Pascual and Cardelús (1990).

⁴⁶¹ For an exhaustive review of these studies, see Torres (1980, 1988).

⁴⁶² For an overview of changes in the Catalan education system in the early 1980s, see Conversi (1987 b). For the implementation of 'immersion' classes adapted to Catalonia on the Canadian model, see Arenas (1986).

fact, this desire seems to be stronger in those areas which are less knowledgeable of Catalan and, therefore, have a greater need to acquire basic rudiments of the language. However, this pragmatic demand does not guarantee an increasing use of Catalan, nor does it necessarily reflect a positive attitude towards the language.

Some authors indicate a further factor of integration in the solidarity between the immigrant workers and, generally, the Catalans experienced during Francoism, a solidarity found in the wake of the common experience of oppression by the centralist state.⁴⁶³ With its double crusade against 'separatists' and 'reds' alike, Falangist rhetoric reinforced such situational alliance. After years of unceasing propaganda against the *rojo separatistas*, even ordinary people came to perceive some sort of identity among the two dimensions. The experience of the Spanish Republic was still fresh in popular memory, when the Catalan nationalists and the Left were allied against the centralist right. However, probably the most important factor of integration was that the working class leaders were themselves raised in Catalanist milieux, or directly involved in Catalanist politics. Due to the common struggle for democracy and against a common foe, a solidarity bond was created amongst leftist and nationalist leaders. This brings to the fore once more the role of the political intelligentsia as the moulder of a new social identity. Sometime, nationalist, communist or socialist leaders were members of the same families.

In this section we have demonstrated that the immigrants perceived a strong need to be integrated and that learning Catalan facilitated this process. In the next section, we shall explore the dynamics of Catalan identity.

Catalan identity: a dynamic process.

The concept of identity is among the most elusive and difficult to define both in general terms and in terms of any specific identity associated with a given ethnic group. In the theoretical chapter, we stressed Barth's (1969) view that the creation of a group's identity derives from the group's interactive activity with other groups. Barth also noticed that the intensity with which group members stress their ethnicity increases when there is intense spatial-geographical contact between groups. The most isolated ethnic groups are probably the least self-defined in ethnic terms. Thus, it is more likely that the Catalans and the Basques who underwent massive immigration and overall acculturation, would become more

⁴⁶³ This may seem part of nationalist or leftist mythology, but similar examples are given by numerous authors. On immigrant-Catalan solidarity during later Francoism, see Candel (1964, 1985).

consciously 'national' than their Galician counterparts, inasmuch as the Galicians did not experience anything like the same amount of cultural interference. Immigration is particularly important in this respect, because, thanks to the massive arrival of people belonging to a different culture, the average person becomes conscious of cultural differences on a daily basis. As the immigrants' all-pervasive presence can no longer be ignored, cultural conflict becomes part of every person's everyday life. In particular, wherever immigration occurs on a great scale, it is inevitably perceived as a form of aggression. Traditional ethnic borders are attacked daily and plunged into deep crisis. These borders might either be utterly reinforced by this crisis, as in the early Basque case, or prone to be more pliable, adapting to new trends, as in the Catalan case. The natives adopt different strategies in order to defend their identity. In both cases, national identity is a concentric process, but the hierarchy of values is clearer in Catalonia.

The Catalan leaders' attempt to define a specific sense of Catalan identity have tended to underline territoriality and residentiality ("A Catalan is whoever lives and works in Catalonia").⁴⁶⁴ On a second and more inward level, there is the linguistic aspect ("A Catalan is he/she who speaks Catalan"), which is not automatic, but can be acquired. With the stress on either residentiality or language, ascriptive and hereditary criteria of national membership have been cast aside ("A Catalan person is a child or descendant of Catalans"). Hence, present-day definitions of who is a Catalan include individuals coming from other regions, provided they remain resident in the Catalan Countries. Furthermore, this is also part of the immigrants' self-conception, insofar as 'second-generation immigrants' (that is, the immigrants' children who were born in Catalonia) usually define themselves as Catalans, independently of their knowledge or use of the Catalan language (Solé 1981, 1982). On the part of the nationalist leaders, this integrative definition is certainly linked to political -not merely electoral- goals of nation-building. However the factor 'residence' is often played down in everyday life, until it becomes almost epiphenomenal. In the previous chapter, we have seen how language gradually emerged as the core value of the Catalan nation. In this chapter we have also seen that many immigrants themselves see in it a crucible of Catalanness. The fact that language tends to be accepted as such by many immigrants as well is a measure of its integrative strength.

⁴⁶⁴ For instance, the historical works of the fathers of Catalanism: Antoni Rovira i Virgili, Francesc Pi i Margall, Enric Prat de la Riba, Vincent Almirall, etc. Among the works which are specifically dedicated to immigration, those of the now president of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol (1966), lay the foundation for a non ascriptive definition of Catalan identity.

Hence, we are faced with a series of concentric circles and progressively integrating concepts, as with an onion's layers. First, there stands a civic territorial definition of nationhood based on the *jus soli*. This definition is prevailing at least in political rhetoric. Then, there comes a deserved and acquirable membership in the nation through voluntary efforts, symbolized by the mastering of the language. The idea of 'nation of will' has to be actively demonstrated through a 'will of the nation', a longing to be part of the nation. Here, we can find some parallel in the French concept of citizenship: "*Etre Français, cela se mérite*" cried the French assimilationists. "To be a Catalan cannot be bought or sold, it can only be gained. And [the immigrants] will not be Catalans until they speak like us, until they make our needs [and feelings] their own..., until they feel hurt in seeing all things Catalan despised" (Cruells 1965: 32). Finally, perhaps limited to rural strongholds, stands a declining stress on origin and descent, usually to be proved by a person's double Catalan surname. This definition is occasionally used amongst the assimilated Catalan diaspora as a tool to rediscover a Catalanity which has been lost in its cultural aspects. However, its application has never implied an extreme stress on race, as in the Basque case.

The three above mentioned concepts of Catalan identity are often situational. A proof that language is considered more important than residence at a more intimate and popular level is well addressed by Woolard (1986: 58). She mentions that "many leaders object vigorously to any reference to 'two communities' within Catalonia, but their broad-based definition of Catalans is rarely if ever employed by individuals to talk about themselves. Even those who are in sympathy with the Catalan leaders' political goals find it difficult to avoid the basic Catalan-immigrant dichotomy that the political definition attempts to abolish. In any extended or serious discussion, the dichotomy inevitably surfaces" (Woolard 1986: 58). The basis of this dichotomy is language, and the migrant can become fully Catalan only by mastering the language and acquiring the corresponding mentality and world-vision associated with it.

Language is hence the hallmark of integration, but not its only avenue. Immigrants often find an easier way into Catalan identity by participating in folksy events of popular culture, such as popular dances, *colles de castellers* (human towers), Orfeon choirs, trekking excursions, etc. In the crucial years of resistance and transition, these activities provided a relatively painless means of integration, where not much personal reputation or sacrifice was at stake. "They were readily available and, unlike language, risked little loss of face" (Johnston 1991: 120). A particular symbolic element of integration has been provided by the Catalan national dance, the *sardana*. This dance was created during the *Renaixença* by the

Andalusian immigrant Pep Ventura (1817-1875) on the basis of a folk tradition which dates back at least to the 16th century. It was 'launched' in 1859 at the Liceu theatre and, since then, it acquired increasing popularity (Rebull 1976, Barrera 1985: 300-8, Brandes 1990). A typically invented tradition, the sardana can be seen as a symbol of the inclusive nature of Catalan culture: "By stressing the inclusion of everyone who learns the rules, the dance is a microcosmic reflection of the general Catalan belief in ethnicity as an achieved status. However, the sardana also excludes those who neither know nor follow the detailed rules of the dance" (Brandes 1990).

Children's entertainments and shows were also aimed at the immigrants' offspring. As an example, in several Barcelona's suburbs the *Roda d'Espectacles Infants* (Children Shows Group) organised shows based on the study of Catalan traditions and the revival of lost celebrations. The *Roda* was founded in 1977 by the initiative of neighbourhood associations and recreation groups, at a time when it was still imperative to revive customs and traditions which had been suffocated by years of clandestine existence.⁴⁶⁵

Comparative trends

Several factors can be singled out as determining the more or less successful extent of the immigrants' cultural integration in Catalonia and Euskadi:

1. The region of origin is an important factor in the capacity or will to acquire the regional culture. According to a survey conducted in the Catalan town of Mataró, the most adaptable of the immigrants came from Andalusia and Catalonia's nearby regions; the more refractory came from the Castilian centre (Duocastella, cited by Maluquer 1963: 59).⁴⁶⁶ In Euskadi, Castilian immigrants outnumber those from all other regions and are known to be more resistant to assimilation (Blanco 1990).
2. The structural quality of the two languages is even more crucial. The facility of learning Catalan cannot be matched by the difficulty of learning Basque, which is completely unrelated to Castilian.
3. The prestige associated with language is also determinant. Catalan enjoys a high prestige, not only in cultural terms, but also because it is associated with a dynamic entrepreneurial part of society. No such prestige has hitherto been accorded to Basque.
4. Its worth in the labour market may make the language a valuable means of economic

⁴⁶⁵ Lluïsa Celades: *la integració dels fills dels immigrants mitjançant la cultura*, *Avui*, 4 June 1986.

⁴⁶⁶ The survey simply asked the interviewees if they understood Catalan.

integration. What we defined as 'instrumental' motivations for language learning are nearly all-pervasive in an environment where Catalan is used in virtually every sector of the economy. In contrast, notable attempts to introduce Euskara in the public administration have not been matched by equally successful efforts to introduce it into the private sector. As a consequence, in the Basque Country economic integration can bypass cultural integration.

5. The reception of the local population to the immigrants' efforts to assimilate is also crucial. In contrast with Catalonia, the initial Basque isolationist attitudes implied that the locals were not particularly interested in promoting the knowledge of their language. This may have influenced the respective success of the two countries' integrative efforts.

6. The nationalist leaders' different interpretations of national identity may finally have influenced both the attitudes of the natives towards the immigrants and the immigrants' confidence of being accepted into the host society, so that their efforts of assimilation will be rewarded. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, we are faced with two original concepts of nationhood and potential citizenship. Perhaps this distinction runs parallel to the one between the German and French concepts of citizenship, the former based on the *ius sanguinis*, the latter on the *ius soli* (Brubaker 1992).

Probably other factors can be added to the above. For instance, before venturing into learning a new language, an immigrant may ponder what its intrinsic worth is, what has this language to offer *per se*. Again, Catalan was greatly advantaged by its rich and ancient literature.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have seen that immigration not only plays a central role in the formation and evolution of nationalism, but also that immigrants can be active participants in the nationalist movement. This will most likely occur if the latter promote a new inclusive vision of national identity, which is non-ascriptive and not based on putative descent. But in order to do so, the nationalist movement has to concentrate on inclusive myths, symbols and core values which are not always available. Yet, the construction of an oppositional ideology can achieve the same effects, bypassing the cultural dimension. The Basque case has shown that some immigrants are likely to participate in nationalist politics in the presence of high polarization between the nationalist movement and the state, when the latter lacks widely accepted legitimacy. As we stressed throughout this thesis, Catalan identity was originally conceived as integrative, while Basque identity had an exclusivist bent. In Catalonia, only

marginal intellectuals (never the intelligentsia) adopted racist or segregationist approaches. Such trends, whenever they emerged, were quickly superseded by the nationalist leaders' integrative stance. Barcelona has been a point of destination for immigrants for over a century (Jofre 1978). However, the steadiest migratory wave in modern Catalan history occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s, coinciding with the final phase of Franco's dictatorship. In a few years, nearly a million immigrants, most of them from Andalusia, settled in the new insalubrious peripheries of Barcelona's "industrial belt" and in other cities, such as Tarragona.⁴⁶⁷

Contrary to Catalonia, the Basque provinces had never experienced massive population income prior to the industrial revolution. Hence, the Basques had correspondingly little preparation and faith in integration. We have mentioned the special *fueros* which did not allow non-Basques to reside in the country. According to Arana, the immigrants were *maketos* from despised *Maketania* (=Spain, or the rest of Iberia), that is, fifth columns of the hated Spanish foe. For many Catalanists, the immigrants were instead uneducated people who needed human care and full integration into the more European and modern Catalan 'civilization'. Catalonia turned this sense of confidence into a pillar upon which its successful drive to turn the immigrants into 'new Catalans' rested. Arana himself recognized this when he opposed his solipsist philosophy to the Catalan aims (see chapter 7).

From Arana's virulent statements, one is tempted to infer that ethnic conflict between immigrants and natives would be much more acute in the Basque case. But it is not exactly so. On the contrary, Catalonia has a tormented history of strife between natives and immigrants. This tension reached its peak in 1909 with the anti-Catalan populist revolt of Alejandro Lerroux. It is important to consider that such anti-Catalan feelings barely depended on the language gap. Periods of great expansion of the Catalan language at the official level were not characterized by particular inter-ethnic strife. The main cause of these strifes consisted in the identification of Catalanism as a pure bourgeoisie product. An often inflexible Catalan bourgeoisie was unable to meet the workers' demands. In contrast, Arana's anti-capitalist emphasis and his stress on social Christianity made him less a target of class hatred than people like Cambó or even Prat. In a period of rabid social conflicts all over Europe, the

⁴⁶⁷ *Desarrollismo* (= fast and savage industrial and urban development) is the nick-name for the last economic phase of Francoism, when the regime devoted itself to unbridled technocratic development as a panacea for the centuries-old economic gap between the peninsula's North and the South. The government tried to find a "remedy" for this economic imbalance by encouraging 'internal' migration.

fact that Arana appeared as a racist mattered less than his visceral anti-capitalist sermons. Moreover, Lerroux's mobs saw the Catalanists as representatives of a surreptitious hidden power, the power of economy and industry, which had few equivalents in Basque nationalism. In the latter case, the bourgeois sector of Sota was always contrasted by more radical separatists, who were prone to join common cause with the working class.⁴⁶⁸

Only after World War II was race banished altogether from the nationalist vocabulary. In the aftermath of the Nazi concentration camps, appeals to race became universally discredited and Basque nationalists had to face a most serious challenge in the search for a new core value to adopt in its place. Both countries experienced suburban segregation from the late 1950s. Both nationalist movements, as they developed in the 1960s, resisted these trends. However, although the aim became the same (the immigrants' incorporation), the tactics were different. Catalan nationalism tried to *attract* the newcomers through the mobilisation of cultural symbols, presenting the language as the final prize of a successful incorporation. Postwar Basque nationalism tried instead to *penetrate* immigrants milieux by voicing their class concern through direct mobilisation of workers and the creation of a new solidarity. The national struggle with its final achievement of independence for Euskadi, rather than culture, was presented as the final prize of a successful incorporation.

In Catalonia, attempts at stigmatising and segregating the immigrants have been pushed aside by several factors: Firstly, the natives' traditional predisposition to redefine their "ethnic borders" in flexible terms helped to limit ideological segregationism. This implies a remarkable capacity to absorb external cultural elements. Secondly, as working class' leaders and nationalists formed a common front of resistance against Francoism, Catalanism was assumed by relevant fringes of the immigrant proletariat. Thirdly, Catalonia's economic vitality made its original inhabitants into a reference group for the newcomers. Fourthly, the Generalitat more recently took over the main instruments of secondary socialization, particularly education.⁴⁶⁹ Since Catalonia has been granted autonomy, Catalan has knocked down most of the remaining resistance to be accepted as a vehicle of high culture.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁸ See, for instance, Gallastegi's (1993) identification with the exploited workers in chapter 3.

⁴⁶⁹ The role of television has been of even greater importance in fostering the spread of Catalan as a language of 'high' culture. Since football is the most popular sport among immigrants and natives alike, the broadcast in Catalan of national and international matches and other sport events has been central for its diffusion.

⁴⁷⁰ Should this integrative trend still persist, Catalonia could constitute a model for those who fear migratory waves from the Third World as a threat to European cultural "integrity". A slow process of natural integration has occurred in Catalonia in the time-span of a few generations, without any of the official means which a bureaucratic state apparatus normally has at its disposal: without schools, without mass-media, and even without the official

Apart from some general similarities, the two regions face different immigration patterns. They have different timing and forms of adaptation for the immigrants. Furthermore, we have seen that their nationalist movements have tackled the issue of immigration in opposite ways.

Chapter 9

THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE

In the previous two chapters, we have shown how two national patterns of nationalist mobilisation developed through the focus on different core symbols and values and how far the latter achieved an integrating effect. Our main hypothesis was that the stress on different values influenced the formation of different patterns of mobilisation, integration, and identity, and that nationalist elites are limited in their choice by existing cultural conditions. Our historical overview showed that in the 1960s-80s Basque nationalism's preference for violence contrasted with Catalanism's traditional pacifism, although Catalan society was itself ridden by violent conflict. In this final chapter, we are going to advance a second set of hypotheses: that cultural assimilation and fragmentation created the condition for the emergence of a violent form of nationalism. However, this violent potential needed a further condition, in order to materialize, namely, state repression. The focus of this chapter will be essentially the Basque Country. I am arguing that the two most relevant factors for explaining Basque violence are respectively anthropological and political: a lack of shared core values, and the repressive action on the part of the state's military forces. These two factors are connected with all other sub-factors.

But, before considering our main argument, we have to dispel some myths about the violent character of Basque society. Hence, we shall investigate whether violence was something peculiar to Basque nationalism in comparison with Catalanism.

Violence: not endemic to Basque society

It is sometimes claimed that Basque society is inherently violent, but this can be shown to be false. In this respect, the comparison with Catalonia does not hold. There have been times when Catalonia was one of the most violent societies on the continent. In the fifteenth

century, Catalan society was permanently wracked by civil war. In 1511, the Italian political writer Francesco Guicciardini (1993: 19-22) described Catalonia as a land infested with bandits and ruled by the anarchy of violence. In 1603, a viceroy report claimed that "the majority of the population live in a state of fretfulness, belonging to bands and factions, which give rise to infinite excesses" (quoted by Reglá 1956: 124). In the 1830s, "Barcelona led all other European cities in urban rioting and intermittent wholesale insurrections against central authority" (Payne 1975: 50). Frederic Engels described it as "the city whose history records more struggles on the barricades than that of any other city in the world" (cited by Payne 1975: 50). Anarchist murders, urban rioting and burning of monasteries became commonplace in the 1910s. Barcelona has been described as "the most violent city of Europe during the early part of this century" (Hooper 1986: 234). Again, during the 1920s, Barcelona "ranked first among Spanish cities in terms of absolute numbers of labour-related shootings, and second after Bilbao in terms of labour-related shootings as percentage of the total population" (Meaker 1974: 429-30). Finally, in the 1930s extremist factions began an escalation which led to the Spanish Civil War.⁴⁷¹ Pre-Civil War Euskadi was in contrast characterized by other kinds of phenomena, not specifically politically-oriented.⁴⁷² This is in sharp contrast with the present-day, when Catalonia's relative civil peace strikes the observer, as much as does Basque radicalism.

What I argue in this section does not invalidate the basic argument of my thesis. Although before the Civil War Catalan urban society was more violent and fragmented than Basque society, this was basically true of Left-wing organisations, rather than the nationalists, who stuck to a clear definition of Catalan identity since at least Prat's compilation (1906).⁴⁷³ Certainly, the PNV remained for long the only significant force in Basque nationalism, in contrast with Catalonia's plural scenario. But Catalanism carried more weight in Republican Madrid, and was more coordinated in terms of its goals, identity and organizations. Rather, the fact that the cluster of Left-wing political ideologies stemming from Anarchism to Socialism and Republicanism were themselves divided and heteronomous may be a good

⁴⁷¹ This heritage of violence has inspired some Catalan authors to identify an underlying vein of Catalan character: the term *rauxa*, or passionate extremism, has been used, among others, by Vicens Vives (1984: 190-ff) to describe this intermittent feature of Catalan personality. Vives opposed the *rauxa* to the *seny* (common sense, wisdom, consideration).

⁴⁷² For instance, Christians (1987) describes the amazing upsurge of phenomena of Holy visions, religious trances and other mystic happenings in the early 1930s. Approximately in the same period, the first half of the 20th century, this phenomenon characterized a much broader area, stretching from Southern France (Lourdes) to Portugal (Fatima).

⁴⁷³ The Catalanist ERC was a coalition of several groups which nevertheless shared a common vision of Catalan identity.

indication of how ideological (and cultural) fragmentation is conducive to violence in non-nationalist conflicts as well.

Also important is which [and how] memories of the Civil War were selected, rather than the immediate impact of the Civil War *per se*. But why did the memories of the Civil War have such an unparalleled impact on Basque nationalists? Was not the Civil War equally associated with national oppression in Catalonia? Unlike in Catalonia, the Civil War in the Basque Country was experienced as a nationalist war. The nationalists had their own army, the *gudariak* (=Basque soldiers), who fought for the Republic and whose memories created a nationalist myth of armed resistance. In Catalonia, the war was experienced as a fissiparous and self-destructive conflict between opposite extremisms. Today, the Civil War is not celebrated by Catalan nationalists as part of their heritage.⁴⁷⁴

The first ETA activists considered themselves *gudariak*. For the Basque youth, the myth of the *gudari* remained alive, spread by a popular literature on war events. This is not the case for Catalonia, where the nationalist troops were just a few. One reason for this lack of prominence of Catalan nationalism during the Civil War was that, in contrast with the PNV, the main Catalan nationalist party, ERC (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*), was a recently established coalition without a tested structure, historical experience or definite cadres. Born as a federation of about a hundred nationalist centres, ERC represented an electoral venture more than a fully-fledged party such as the PNV, which was born over 50 years before. Moreover, a vast sector of the moderate right was marginalized by the war and was unable to take sides with either the Francoists or the Republicans.

Religious persecution was a key factor in this complex development. We have mentioned the 'tradition' of church-burning and priest-bashing which developed in Catalonia. This did not occur in Euskadi, where religious persecution was limited to a few episodes at the beginning of the war. Once the PNV imposed itself as the key resistance force, such cases ceased to enbitter the pro-clericalists, at least in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. In contrast, anti-clerical persecution in Catalonia was so ruthless that many Catalanists had to move to the Francoist field *fate de mieux*.

But was repression in the Basque Country different, or more ferocious, than in Catalonia? There is no clear-cut answer. Firstly, while in Catalonia cultural repression helped to accentuate an awareness of the importance of language, in the Basque case the attacks were not so clearly targeted. Secondly, after 1959, Francoist repression became more widespread

⁴⁷⁴ I am grateful to Josep Benet for pointing out the very different impact that the Civil War had on Catalan and Basque nationalisms.

in Euskadi, so that on some occasions the target seemed to be the entire Basque population. This stemmed from the same factor central to my thesis, namely the two regions' different degrees of cultural fragmentation and assimilation into the Spanish state: language became the main target of repression in Catalonia precisely because it was the symbol of Catalan unity. Since no such clear element was identifiable in the Basque resistance, repression was blind and unable to distinguish nuances. According to Sullivan (1988: 34), "there was never any serious attempt to prohibit the use of spoken Basque"⁴⁷⁵ and all aspects of Basque identity were instead suppressed. Certainly, Euskera was particularly under attack, at least up to 1968.⁴⁷⁶ However, repression in Euskadi had a physical side that Catalonia only experienced in the early phalangist phase, characterized by arbitrary imprisonment, police attacks on unarmed citizens, torture, etc.⁴⁷⁷ Since the 1950s, repression in the Basque Country "achieved a much higher intensity than in the rest of the state. This is demonstrated by the fact that, out of a total of *eleven* states of emergency decreed by Franco between 1956 and 1975, *ten* of them affected Vizcaya, Gipuzkoa, or both of them at the same time" (Jauregui 1981: 208, my italics). It may still be argued that most of these states of emergency concerned strikes and other forms of workers' mobilization, yet this polarized environment was ideal for ETA to prosper. "The most distinctive feature [in Euskadi]... was the intense physical repression of all resistance..., particularly since 1960" (Jauregui 1981: 205).

This role played by the state had an immediate impact on the ways of political mobilization. The states of emergency reinforced the feeling of besieged identity hovering over Basque society and were reflected in ETA's priorities. One of its leaders admitted that "ETA has never been defined by an ideology (in the strict sense), but by its spirit of struggle".⁴⁷⁸ As continuous schisms created more fragmentation, they were followed by new upsurges of activities directed to shift the conflict away from within the organization, and against the common enemy. From a certain point onwards, action totally replaced ideology. The ideological and cultural vacuum was filled by direct action, the latter being the only means by which the movement could be given a direction, a sense of change and purpose. Only in this

⁴⁷⁵ However, Sullivan's extreme interpretation is rejected by many Basques who blame on the Francoist regime a big share of responsibility for the decline of Euskara.

⁴⁷⁶ For instance, the use of Basque names at baptisms or on gravestones remained forbidden until 1976 (Sullivan 1988: 34) together with a persisting general ban on all forms of written Euskera.

⁴⁷⁷ On this, see the various reports published by Amnesty International, especially from 1968 to 1975.

⁴⁷⁸ Juan José Echave, in *Garaia*, nº 28, 1979, p. 29.

way, could ETA demonstrate that they were still alive and reacting to their predicament. The choice of action was in-built into the very foundation of ETA: "When a situation appears desperate, with no exit, action always precedes hope", their leaders declared in the 1950s (*Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p. 10).

In Catalonia, cultural activities offered a way out. "They presented an escape valve, as well as more opportunities for action. Cultural activism gave young people wishing to act something worth struggling for. In Catalonia, the defence of language could be carried out by everybody, independently of their political orientation. There was unanimity around the need to defend Catalan" (Benet, personal interview). For instance, the official magazine of the Communist Party, *Treball* (f. 1936, n.s. 1942), was published in Catalan, although most working-class immigrants spoke Castilian only. Nothing on a similar scale could be achieved in Euskadi.

The separatist dimension

It is often observed that the violent character assumed in the 1960s by Basque nationalism was related to its original separatist aim. However, the latter was also a compensative device for the lack of shared cultural values, and, in particular, for the Basques' severely restrained relationship with Madrid. In other words, separatism served to stress Basque determination *vis-à-vis* a state dominated by liberal centralism and unable to take into account peripheral aspirations. It also served to enhance the us-them divide as a counter-strategy for the absence of clearly defined cultural borders. With his moralistic, purist and anti-immigrant crusade, Arana aimed at rejecting Spain and all Spanish elements, before establishing a serious programme of nation-building. His invention of nationalist symbols was aimed at cementing a new oppositional loyalty, but his own definition of Basqueness was contradictory. His deep-seated hatred against Spain featured often more prominently than his love for the Basques. Hence, his confusion over a definition of Basqueness: he was good at rejecting, not constructing. Although he created the key symbols of Basque modern identity (flag, name, hymn, etc.), he was much more ambivalent in respect to Basque identity. Arana's oppositional dichotomies served to push Spain farther apart from Euskadi. That was part of a border-making enterprise in which differences were exasperated, as ethnic identities seemed to melt and overlap in his native Bilbao. Therefore, any contact with Spain was to be abolished and anybody indulging in that would be branded as *españolista*. Arana's main qualm was that Bizkaia (and Euskadi) could be downgraded to the lower status of a

Spanish region or province. Arana stressed continuously that Euskadi was a nation, not a region. Hence, his vitriolic attacks against Catalanism: Euskadi was not to follow the Catalan path to an integrationist regionalism at any cost. The idea that Basque autonomy could be better protected by controlling the reins of Madrid's government was a Carlist one, and the Carlist wars had resulted in a devastating defeat for the Basques. The latter "decimated the countryside, encumbered the population with huge debts in the form of war retributions, and left a standing army of occupation" (Douglass and Silva 1971: 155-6). The defeat led to a climate of intimidation against the native culture, best expressed in the attacks of Unamuno and other pro-centralist intellectuals.

Stress on separation from Spain was also reinforced by powerful myths of origin persisting despite assimilation. The all-pervasive apathy characterizing Basque society from 1939 to 1959, contrasts with the nationalist upheaval of the 1960s. This contrast testifies to the continuing resilience of memories and shared identities, when the nationalist movement appeared dormant. Since no political options could be freely expressed, memories of past suffering remained deeply entrenched, perhaps were even reinforced. When no uncensored history book is allowed to circulate, history is more likely to become myth or counter-myth. Hence, nationalism assumes an even stronger oppositional potential.

State repression: the legacy of the past

In this section, we shall analyse two sub-factors of state repression, which were conducive to the violent turn of Basque nationalism: lack of pre-existing autonomous institutions and memories of the Civil War. The former is a direct consequence of state centralization. Local autonomies were 'given up' only after prolonged military struggle and defeat (the Carlist wars). **Absence of pre-existing autonomous institutions** is often taken by analysts as encouraging violence, rather than more accommodating attitudes. According to Kellas (1991: 112), "violence erupts in areas where participative institutions are weakest; more sophisticated areas with an history of self-rule as the Baltic republics tend towards constitutional action...". Although this observation seems to be correct in the short term, it fails to account for long-lasting periods of interrupted self-rule. In other words, cases of late centralization and consequent disruption of local self-rule, as with the Basque *fueros*, do not correspond to cases in which a new form of self-rule was established, as in Twentieth century Catalonia. For instance, immediately before Francoism, the Catalans enjoyed a great degree of autonomy under the Second Republic. In contrast, the Basques were initiated to the

experience of regional self-rule only under the dramatic circumstances of the Civil War; their autonomy statute was recognized by the Spanish Republicans too late to be put into practice. The Catalans also ran a semi-autonomous Mancomunitat from 1914 to 1925, at a time when Basque nationalism was still unable to build up alternative institutions.

However, if we go further back, we have to consider the persistence of Basque *fueros* right up into the early 1870s, while Catalan privileges were eroded more than hundred years before, in 1716. Hence, in 1914 (Mancomunitat) and again in 1931 (Generalitat), the Catalans started to rebuild their regional institutions virtually from scratch after two centuries of oblivion. In the same period, the more recently abolished Basques' traditional autonomies could not be revived. Such precedents exerted their impact in the aftermath of Francoism: once a new decentralized constitution was approved in 1978, the Catalans were better equipped for self-government and ready to re-build their institutions. Hence, absence of pre-existing autonomous institutions can arguably be related to the need to resort to violence, insofar as the latter worked as a supplement to the former, and insofar as fragmented elites, unable to reach agreement over self-rule, could not control radical elements. But this absence was due to the state's opposition to nationalist demands, even during the short-lived period of democracy under the Republic.⁴⁷⁹ It was part of the more general factor of state repression. If they had not been hampered by centralist repression, local institutions might well have flourished. Indeed, we can identify centralization and the abolition of the *fueros*, not merely as a process of state intervention, but as overt acts of state repression. Local rights were not abolished with the consent of the people, rather their abolition was imposed upon them. The only sector of the population openly welcoming the elimination of the *fueros* was a small-sized bourgeois oligarchy of miners and iron industrialists.

Basque postwar resistance was characterized by a special discourse on the glorious memories of the Civil War and the horrors which accompanied it. We mentioned at the outset that the Civil War provided a moral and emotional watershed in Basque political culture. The triumph of the winners was total, the humiliation of the losers became immeasurable. Under a ruthless militarization of society, the war initiated a process of oppositional culture which had to last till the present day. In the wake of the Civil War, the Basques experienced destruction of their cities, enforced cultural assimilation and physical obliteration. A law-decree of 23 June 1937 declared Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa as 'traitor

⁴⁷⁹ This point is in contradiction to another factor, late state-building, as indicated by Linz (1973, 1975, see the section on separatism).

provinces'. "Since 1936, all mentions of the Basque people were thoroughly omitted in the constitutive administration of the Spanish state" (Jauregui 1981: 206).⁴⁸⁰ The remembrances of the Civil War, with their heroes and villains, were transmitted to the young generation couched in mythical terms. Hence, the legacy of totalitarian violence was felt all through the following decades. Much of these feelings are symbolized in Picasso's *Guernica*. What did the bombing of Guernica represent? In the words of Robert Clark, it "is without doubt the most powerful and driving symbol in the entire Basque political culture. For an American, it would be Pearl Harbor, the Alamo, and Bunker Hill all combined in a single, searing metaphor" (in Aguirre 1991: 70-1).⁴⁸¹ The legacy of the Civil War remained vivid in the new generation of Basque nationalists. Most of the references in the bibliography of Zalvide's *Insurrección en Euskadi* are war studies or memoirs of the Resistance against the Nazis, especially in France. Similarly, in the short bibliography supplied by ETA's *Libro Blanco*, references include works by the French partisans fighting the Nazi occupation.⁴⁸² The comparison between the Basques under Franco and other European peoples under Nazi occupation was frequent, because of the level of violence experienced both during and after the Civil War. It is important to remember that it was Nazi planes of the Condor Legion which bombed Guernica on a market day.⁴⁸³ These were constant topics among Basque radicals and emerged with new virulence after the Americans opened up to Franco. The

⁴⁸⁰ The official negation of any Basque entity touched "all aspects of the state's functional division", so that Euskadi did not have its own district, neither in the military sphere (*Capitanía General*), nor in the judicial (*Audiencia Territorial*), in the religious (archdiocese), in the educational (university district), etc. (Jauregui 1981: 206).

⁴⁸¹ On the destruction of Guernica, see Southworth (1977).

⁴⁸² Charles Tillon, *Les FTP: Témoignage pour servir à l'histoire de la Résistance*. Paris: Julliard, 1962. M. Granet & H. Michel, *Combat: Histoire d'un mouvement de résistance de juillet 1940 à juillet 1943*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957. Jean Marie Domenach, *La Propagande Politique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. Maurice Mégrét, *L'Action Psychologique*. Paris: Fayard, 1959. Also considered valuable was General T. Bor-Komorowski, *Histoire d'une armée secrète* (Paris: Les Iles d'Or /Plon, 1952), on the Polish resistance movement against Nazi occupation (1939-1944). Three 'reactionary' manuals were included, in order to study the strategy and tactics of the enemy: Dominique Ponchardier (*Les Pavés de l'Enfer*), Colonel Roger Trinquier (*La Guerre Moderne*) and Curzio Malaparte (*Technique du coup d'Etat*). The latter was read in its French edition (*Technique du Coup d'Etat*, Paris: Grasset, 1948). Trinquier was translated in English as *Modern Warfare. A French View of Counterinsurgency*. London: Pall Mall, 1964 [French original, Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961]. Central to ETA, was Trinquier's view that the allegiance of the civilian population becomes one of the most vital objectives of the whole struggle and how to ensure such allegiance. Finally, Claude Delmas, *La guerre révolutionnaire*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959, a guerrilla classic which was to be the most relevant for ETA activists who quoted it repeatedly. Focusing on Algeria, Tunisia and Vietnam, as well as Communist insurgents in Greece and Iran, Delmas theorized a tactical distinction between civilian terrorism and rural terrorism and formulated the transformation from the 'citizen-soldier' to the 'militant-soldier'.

⁴⁸³ Yet, although the bombing of Guernica was the first and most famous one, Catalonia was subjected to more aerial bombardments than the rest of Spain.

response of the young nationalists to this disenchantment with the West was a slow drift towards the adoption of Third World anticolonialist and anti-imperialist models (Conversi 1993). But this drift can hardly be explained without the intervention of the crucial variable, state repression.

State repression: the impact on the present.

After the devastation, postwar Basques were ready for a true 'ethnogenesis', for a re-definition of their identity *vis-à-vis* the state.⁴⁸⁴ Many authors agree that Basque nationalism under Franco was reborn in a thoroughly new shape (Gurrutxaga 1990). Going further, it is legitimate to claim that, not only a new Basque nationalism, but a new Basque identity as well was forged in the process. This identity was based on the self-perception of the Basques as a heroic people fighting bravely for their survival against a powerful tyranny supported by the West. In turn, ETA's violence has been identified by several scholars as an offspring of the Franco era (Jauregui 1981: 208, 1986, Clark 1979, 1984, Douglass 1988, Douglass and Zulaika 1990, Gurrutxaga 1985, 1990, Silver 1988). It is a description which we basically subscribe to. We shall also consider ETA as the tip of the iceberg of a much wider popular resentment against Francoism. This cause-effect interpretation is central to nearly all studies on political violence in Euskadi. Accordingly, 'terrorism' is a result of the ruthless use of the Guardia Civil, police, and other repressive forces, to deal with nationalist dissent.

ETA's spiral 'theory of action/repression/action' tallied with reality: "In the measure in which the nationalist forces in general, and ETA in particular, advanced in their struggle, the para-military occupation of Euskadi returned with extraordinary intensity" (Jauregui 1981: 205). Yet, each dismantling of an ETA cell through the use of torture was a Pyrrhic victory for the regime: it brought about a massive amount of confessions, but it inspired an indelible hatred for the 'occupation forces'. This condition was clear in ETA since the beginning:

"Repression and torture, when they uncover the horrors of individual sadism and collective cynicism, become the best recipe for the youth's rebellion. Then, no reasons or arguments are left. If morality only condemns the violence exercised by one side, justifying the other side's actions by reasons of order and authority, it loses its character of moderating social value and displays the reality of its ideological content at the service of specific interests".⁴⁸⁵

There was another proof of the conscious and direct bond existing between state repression and nationalist violence. ETA's maximalist programme aimed at the liberation of all seven Basque provinces, including the three on the French side. Nevertheless, "in all ETA's

⁴⁸⁴ As the anthropologist Richard Wilson puts the case, "ethnocidal state policies imply ethnogenesis, and the two must be studied together if we are to grasp the full meaning of war" (Wilson 1991: 57).

⁴⁸⁵ Reprinted in *Documentos* Y: vol. 1: p. 371.

writings there is not a single reference to the need to use violent methods against France" (Jauregui 1981: 213). This is surprising, particularly if we think that ETA's main model of urban guerrilla came from Algeria's relentless struggle against the French. The obvious reason for this omission is that France provided a shelter for Basque refugees and a base where they could reassemble in the hope of launching new attacks.⁴⁸⁶ There was also an understanding and mutual respect between Basque leaders and many Left-wing French intellectuals (in particular, Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists). However, another reason was more important: France was not an authoritarian state, at least not in its 'metropolitan territory', and not as much as Spain. Hence, it was an unsuitable target for ETA's theory of action/repression/action. *Only the Spanish state could be the chosen foe*, because of its predictable response in terms of mindless repression. As Jauregui puts it,

"it was precisely Francoism, with its repressive violence, which provoked ETA into the choice of violent methods of struggle; the lack of freedom, the impossibility to put into practice a legal political activity,... [all this] prompted ETA to adopt, nearly instinctively, a method of action with no relationship with traditional Basque nationalism, and which, furthermore, did not find precursors in any other European patriotic movement in those years" (Jauregui 1981: 213).

One of the characteristics of nationalism can be described as 'blame-shifting'. Each side of the conflict blames the other for the exclusive responsibility of all current and past misdeeds. Francoist propaganda consistently described Basque nationalism as an evil force. Thus, in all ETA publications, the blame for violence was diametrically reversed: state violence was continually described as the 'original', 'real' form of violence, the one which justified all ETA's actions. The Francoist regime was not just bad, but it was evil *per se*. In this context, any accusation of violence against Basque patriots was self-defeating. This view is clearly formulated in the first issue of *Zutik*:

"Several young Basques just happen to be condemned to large periods of detention. They are accused of having used violence to express their opposition to the regime. The accusers are Francoists. That is, the same people who 25 years ago rose in arms against a constitutionally legitimate Republic,... the ones who launched against Euskadi an army of *Requetés* (Carlist militia, my note), Falangists, Moors, Italians and Germans..., the ones who set Guernica and Durango ablaze with barbarous bombardments, the ones who murdered thousands of Basques.....These friends of violence unleashed a war which caused more than a million dead and are kept in power only by the use of force.....The violent are condemning violence. ...They destroyed, trampled on and burned the flags of Euskadi. They persecuted our language and culture...But violence generates violence. The Basque youth do not want to live as slaves. They are the *gudaris* of the new resistance. They have the right of the oppressed on their side".⁴⁸⁷

This vision spread to all corners of Basque society by the late 1960s. A local magazine in the town of Itziar, Gipuzkoa, claimed in 1968 that: "...there is already an ever-present institutional violence; any response to it, even pacifism, is violence. Violence therefore is the basic agent of social change; and whoever refuses to participate in it lacks personal

⁴⁸⁶ On Basque nationalism in France, see Jacob (1994).

⁴⁸⁷ "Zutik" n° 0, 1961, reprinted in *Documentos* Y: vol. 1: p. 371.

commitment" (cited in Zulaika 1988: 55). In the Basque underground literature and media, one can find endless examples like this. Hence, state violence worked directly as legitimization of nationalist counter-violence.

A consequence of state repression was **the clandestine character of political opposition**. This can account for both the choice and persistence of violence. On the one hand, illegality was attractive and prohibition exciting, especially for the youth. Never mind the consequences, ETA's challenge to authority exercised an irresistible invitation for some individuals. On the other hand, the regime was itself victim of the illusion that the use of force could restore order. Francoist prohibitions created a secretive climate conducive to violence: violence became a way of expressing one own's identity and of asserting the popular will to survive repression (Perez-Agote, 1984, 1987, 1993). In the fullest sense, violence replaced language, and became itself a language.

The popular resonance of violent actions was crucial during the stalemate of Francoism and violence became one of the most powerful political statements and a metaphor of the state's illegitimacy. Officially, Basque nationalism had ceased to exist. For the radical opposition the only means to prove the contrary was through continuous armed attacks. Against a backdrop of censorship and against a regime which pretended to have overcome 'separatism' forever, ETA's actions disproved all such pre-conceptions, demonstrating the world opinion that Basque nationalism was still alive. ETA broke the 'curtain of silence' imposed by the dictatorship. In turn, ETA's actions were translated into an immediate loss of legitimacy for the regime, which had always justified its existence as the supreme guardian of Spanish unity. Hence, Basque violence must also be understood as a method of communicating a people's existence, where no other means were available. ETA's violence in the 1960s became an unparalleled avenue of self-expression.

The ideological consequences of fragmentation: ETA's internecine conflict

In chapter 5, we have seen that ETA has undergone intense internal debate and splintering throughout its history, especially in the mid-1960s. But every time an ideological impasse emerged, the most violent factions took the lead and showed the way with their concrete actions. "The victory of the partisans of armed struggle was a constant feature during each crisis of the movement" (Jauregui 1981: 310). Which are the roots of this fragmentation?

The confusion in the nationalist goals and formulations dates back to Arana. In turn, these were related to Euskadi's pre-existing cultural peculiarities analysed in chapters 3 and 7.

Cultural fragmentation and assimilation were exasperated by mass immigration (chapter 8). When ETA attempted to involve the immigrant labourers in the nationalist struggle, it had to acknowledge this fragmentation in order to overcome it. ETA started to expand through participation in working class disputes. But this was no easy choice. The debate over immigration, and, hence, the continuous tension between class struggle and nationalism were centre-pieces in ETA's evolution. The only way for this impasse not to degenerate into a virtual break-up of the organization, was to 'externalize' the tension by fighting back against the regime. Once started, violence assumed a ritualized pace, a self-fulfilling dynamic of its own. Violence becomes a form of action

not governed entirely (or even predominantly) by instrumental means-ends considerations. ETA's *ekintzak*...are condensed events, as well as public performances, in which chance plays a key role. Action for action's sake becomes quintessential to small militant groups and acquire a momentous efficacy that far surpasses its own instrumentality. As if by magic, each action, in its renewed challenge to authority, signals a new beginning which promises to trigger a revolutionary process aimed at transforming everything (Douglass and Zulaika 1990: 255).

This interpretation can explain why violence becomes an end in itself.⁴⁸⁸ In turn, many Basques deemed ETA necessary to protect them from state encroachment.

As we have seen, most of the relevant ideological production of ETA dates back to its very first years. The reader will recall that since at least 1970, ETA has abandoned any intellectual pretension, giving absolute priority to political praxis over theoretical debate.⁴⁸⁹ It is therefore not surprising that the ideological output has since then been virtually nil. "To all intents and purposes since 1970 ETA has been ideologically dead..... all theoretical and doctrinal activity was paralysed. All discussions after 1970 have centred only around problems of strategy and political tactics; even so they have been of greater intensity than previous debates" (Jauregui 1986: 398).⁴⁹⁰

Indeed, in the 1970s violence began to plague the organization from within. State repression contributed not only to increase ETA's violence, but also to increase its fragmentation in a spiral process: as a consequence of police swoops and the arrest of

⁴⁸⁸ Lacking a historical perspective, Zulaika's interpretation is perhaps not suited to explain the origins of ETA's violence, that is, why ETA's leaders chose at a certain stage to adopt armed struggle.

⁴⁸⁹ "ETA did never halt to analyse its previous evolution. It always moved forward, even during the most tormented ideological crises", guided by a "sufficiently blind confidence in the nationalist principles" (Jauregui 1981: 310).

⁴⁹⁰ As ETA was more interested in practical action than in abstract theory or doctrine, its 'ideologues' never tried to justify their project of aiming at Basque independence. Despite some intermittent debate over what are the central values of the Basque nation, there have been few attempts to theorize its aspiration to statehood in more precise terms than Arana's already vague ones. ETA was "not preoccupied with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the right to self-determination but with the need to set in motion the appropriate machinery in order to give credibility to this demand at the earlier opportunity" (Jauregui 1986: 399).

leaders, ETA's leadership was continuously changing. However, it was precisely from 1970 onward that, in the wake of the Burgos Trial, massive demonstrations started to erupt in the streets, breaking forever the curtain of silence of the dictatorship. In this process, the [national] symbols came into the open: "nationalism became public, together with the symbols of difference;... a consciousness which was previously confined to intimacy was more and more openly expressed" (Perez-Agote 1984: 116). ETA was the leit-motif on the background of all these changes.

The initial anti-bourgeois character of Basque nationalism has already been commented upon, both in the previous section and in the historical chapter about the birth of Basque nationalism. This factor is of little value in explaining the choice of violence, though it is useful in explaining both the stress on separation (lack of interest in maintaining economic ties with the centre) and on left-wing politics. Payne (1973: 80-3) labels Basque nationalism as an "anti-bourgeois" movement supported by pre-capitalist classes, including peasants and small town businessmen with their rural values (Payne, cited by Zirakzadeh 1985). Linz (1975, 1980) identifies its main trend as "an opposition to cosmopolitan corrupting influences". However, Zirakzadeh (1985, 1991) corrects this viewpoint by showing how, at least in some phases, business classes were also interested in the nationalist movement. In chapter 3, we have seen how anti-bourgeois ideologies latent in Basque nationalism periodically emerged when the movement radicalized its separatist demands, like in the case of Gallastegui. Hence, separatist overtones increased everytime anti-oligarchic radicals and pro-bourgeoisie moderates came at loggerheads within the PNV.

Fears of cultural annihilation.

Fear of cultural annihilation represent a crucial link between our two main variables. It was brought about by the eclipse of the traditional symbols of ethnic distinctiveness and reinforced by the state's repression of these very symbols and elements. After a centuries-long decline, Euskara seemed on the verge of receiving its final *coup-de-grace* with industrialization. The lack of alternative core values made this sentiment particularly acute amongst nationalist intellectuals, who perceived the whole nation as being on the brink of extinction. This predicament was felt at the end of the last century as much as in the 1950s, yet Arana's followers never turned to violence. In the 1960s, the full impact of state repression politicized the pre-existing cleavages.

The fear of assimilation was exasperated by the snobbish attitude of Basque mainstream intellectuals. Ramiro de Maetzu, the right-wing Catholic antagonist of Arana, cynically sneered at the 'regionalists' 'attempts to revive Euskara: "In this enterprise, the intellectual efforts of the Basque race have been squandered for half a century. And what has been achieved?: a handful of philologists have learned Euskara, many thousands of Basques have forgotten it. Just ten years ago it was still spoken by the children of San Sebastian, Guernica, Deusto,...".⁴⁹¹ Unamuno reinforced this with an inflammatory speech against the use of Euskara which provoked utter radicalization in the debate. He urged the Basques to drop their language, defining it as a grave obstacle to the spread of European culture (Ugalde 1979: 11). Arana's cohort had to drain the cup of misery to the dregs.⁴⁹² Their language loyalties under attack, Basque nationalists emerged from Unamuno's harangue more determined than ever to pursue their separatist programmes. Since Unamuno was a respected intellectual in Spanish mainstream circles (and eventually abroad), his words had a particularly strong effect on nationalist feelings (Urla 1993: 106).

However, such wounded sensitivities were initially experienced by a mere minority. Only with the Francoist onslaught did this perception spread to the masses. As we said, Ekin's founders were six or seven students-intellectuals. Witnessing the alarming decline of Euskara, with an overwhelming sense of cultural loss and under the threat of police persecution, the young students of Deusto University instinctively opted for an intransigent form of nationalism. Every member and supporter of ETA, especially its founders, sensed living under a final threat. For those who doubted, the menace materialized in increasing acts of police repression, which went hand in hand with the decline of traditional elements of Basque distinctiveness. State repression only enhanced this all-pervasive apprehension of being a people on the brink of extinction, adding to it an immediate fear of physical annihilation. "Guerrilla mysticism found its justification in the sense of desperation latent in ETA since its origins. On several occasions, ETA alluded to the idea that Euskadi was on the verge of disappearing, of being erased from the map of peoples, because its language and culture were slowly dying out and its customs were being replaced by alien ones. Hence, the peremptory and urgent need to put an end to this progressive disappearance" (Jauregui 1981: 233).

⁴⁹¹ In *El Imparcial*, 14-9-1901. Reprinted in Maetzu (1981).

⁴⁹² In his journal *Euzkadi*, Arana, who claimed to be well acquainted with Unamuno, assured that the latter did not feel the way he spoke: Unamuno simply wanted to hurt the Basques in their more sensitive affects, and his only aim was a purely personal yearning for attention. Arana also suspected that Unamuno wanted to wheedle Madrid's politicians in order to prop up his career (cited by Villasante 1979: 292).

As for the life of individual *etarras*, it simply reflected the broader agony of the nation. Thus, *ekintza* actions were not politics, but acts of survival: "ETA guys are like... cornered animals holding to their instinct of survival".⁴⁹³ The driving force behind the disinterested putting at risk one's own life was something above personal circumstances. It related to a deadly challenge against one own's kin, extended family, or nation. The latter challenge manifested itself as a blow to one's very existence and sense of being.

Proof of the personal commitment required of any sympathizers wishing to join ETA was given by the severity of its rules. Glancing through the 'security norms' which made up the *Libro Blanco* and other official ETA's publications, we can see that the organization was extremely demanding. It required that each member "radically alter his/ her own habits, lifestyles, friends, environment", etc., up to the point that his/her new way of life would 'become natural'.⁴⁹⁴ The tragedy was that all the 'security norms' were rendered useless by the use of torture: ETA itself recognized that "during the interrogations, torture destroys all the patterns of behaviour and self-defence which the security norms pretended to create in the activist".⁴⁹⁵ Yet, the fight went on, and there was always plenty of enthusiastic youth ready to immolate themselves for the cause.

Needing to attract more members, Ekin's founders had to expand in areas which were partially alien to their enterprise: cultural fragmentation and the urban/rural divide impinged on their original eclecticism. They were soon presented with a dilemma and had only two possible alternatives: either minimize (even drop) the ethnic content of their struggle, in order to recruit assimilated Basques and even non-Basques, or limit their recruitment strictly to those areas which maintained a strong Basque identity (and where Euskara was still spoken). The first option would have meant a betrayal of ETA's original principles; the second one would have confined their action to a precious few, without the chance of much expansion. The stress on ethnicity would have hampered ETA in an increasingly urbanized society undergoing galloping cultural assimilation.

The conflict between these options stands at the core of most of ETA's internal diatribes and schisms, whatever ideological disguise they assumed. However, the choice between these two strategies was rarely spelt out. It was rather silently subsumed under the priority of fighting back the hovering external threat. Hence, political fragmentation was determined by

⁴⁹³ A woman 'closely involved with ETA' and 'extremely knowledgeable about most of its leaders', quoted in Zulaika (1982 [thesis] : 460, 1988: 313).

⁴⁹⁴ See *Libro Blanco*, p. 3, reprinted in *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p. 151.

⁴⁹⁵ *Documentos Y*, vol. 2, p. 369.

cultural fragmentation and the loss of Basque culture. The two concepts of national liberation were related to two concepts of Basque identity. Indeed, these identities changed whether the stress was put on language or other elements, but, within ETA, many activists never abandoned the cultural definition of Basqueness. As demonstrated in the study of other nationalist movements, a cultural definition of the nation serves as a reservoir of political legitimacy (Hutchinson 1987).

That political fragmentation was determined by cultural fragmentation is not an easy thing to demonstrate, since both the nationalist struggle and the ideology supporting it served the purpose of binding internal fissions and, hence, of hiding any potential internal cleavages and lack of cohesion. The very emphasis on names indicating unity, as with the coalition *Herri Batasuna* (Popular Unity), was meant to deny this creeping fragmentation. The unity of the Basques was stressed in all major street demonstrations and other political manifestations, yet such unity could only be brought about by popular indignation against the state.⁴⁹⁶ By definition, nationalism purports to be the ideology of a bound, compact, unitarian and clearly defined body. The nation is conceived in quasi-organic terms and no major internal divisions are acknowledged. Hence, the strictly cultural- linguistic definition of the nation may clash with other definitions: civic, as based on territory; ethnic, as based on putative origin; racial, as based on biological determinants; etc. Since all of these elements were eroded, confused or not fully representative, the nationalist community felt under threat whichever of them was chosen. Certainly, the lack of a shared culture was constantly felt as a grave handicap by most nationalists leaders.

However, preoccupation over the Basques' survival overwhelmed preoccupation over details. "What mattered to ETA was that the nation found itself in a lethal situation and that, in order to save her, it was urgent to adopt a series of drastic measures. As a consequence,...it considered the *will* of the Basque people to recover their national identity as the only valid element to save the nation" (Jauregui 1981: 151). Hence, the adoption, after 1963, of Ernest Renan's concept of the *nation de volonté*. But in the Basque case, the idea of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite' was to be implemented through the call to arms.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁶ Without ETA's actions and the state's predictable reactions, Herri Batasuna would probably cease to be, since what binds together this plethora of small Left-wing groups is the climate of radicalization induced by ETA.

⁴⁹⁷ This also dismisses a widespread acquisition in the literature of nationalism, namely, that Herderian principles are more rigid and less adaptable than the Renanian vision of the nation as a social contract. Voluntarist and contractualist visions of the nation can easily be used by radical separatists stressing opposition, rather than compatibility. Catalan nationalism was at the same time organicist and integrationist, whilst Basque nationalism was voluntarist

Nationalism: cultural, political *and* military

As stressed in the theoretical chapter, my analysis follows the distinction between cultural and political nationalism highlighted by some recent works (Hutchinson 1987, 1992). In this thesis, I consider that a further form of nationalism should be kept distinct from the two previous ones: *military nationalism*. The latter became crucial when the radicals' armed branch started to act autonomously from political nationalists and, finally, became a self-propelling force. At the same time, cultural nationalists loomed in the background, exerting a wider legitimizing influence over the general process of mass mobilisation.

One of the reasons for the resignation of Txillardegui and others from ETA in 1967 was that the organization was no longer interested in promoting Euskara, and that all the articles in *Zutik* were now in Spanish. The split, which resulted in the foundation of the group *Branka*, occurred at a time of intense internal crisis. In their communiqué, the culturalists declared that "ETA is no longer the adequate means to achieve certain aims and has been converted exclusively into a Marxist-Leninist party".⁴⁹⁸ The new attitude of ETA was in sharp contrast with the principles adopted by its First Assembly in 1962, which stated that ETA's first task was to strengthen Euskara. Now, little remained of such aim. "The defence of Euskara became a matter of fighting for equality of treatment with Spanish... As ETA seriously tried to recruit immigrants, it was faced with its own [Aranist] heritage" (Sullivan 1988: 48).⁴⁹⁹

What united opposite trends within ETA were occasional alliances of one or more trends against the other(s). Thus, for instance, what united culturalists and thirdworldists was not a common understanding on Basque identity, or on how to liberate Euskadi, but a joint effort to defeat the 'workerists' (*obreristas*), which were perceived as traitors of the Basque cause (Jauregui 1981: 307). However, after the expulsion of the workerists (see chapter 4), the thirdworldists hegemonized the organisation, pushing Txillardegui and his followers to resign from ETA. In turn, the thirdworldists' emphasis on urban -and rural- guerrilla warfare is also

and separatist. The influence of Herder and other German philosophers mingled in Catalonia to produce a moderate and integrationist scenario. The influence of Renan and other French *maitres-à-penser* mingled in Euskadi to produce a much more radical separatism. Again, these two different patterns can be traced back to pre-existing cultural factors, in particular the diffusion of regional languages.

⁴⁹⁸ J. L. Alvarez Emparanza (Txillardegui), J. M. Benito del Valle and Xabier Imaz, *Por que dejamos E.T.A.*, 1 page communiqué, 14 April 1967 [reprinted in Caracas: E.G.]

⁴⁹⁹ The subordination of cultural to political goals is reflected in an eschatological vision of independence as a panacea for all problems of cultural identity, in particular the recovery of the language: "There is only one path to save Euskara: political independence for Euzkadi." ("*Zutik*", 3d series, 15: 3, cited by Gurruchaga 1985: 245).

related to ideological and cultural fragmentation.⁵⁰⁰ The thirdworldist field was itself divided between the proposers of urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Franz Fanon, possibly the most influential foreign theorist among the radicals, theorized about urban guerrilla warfare and the mobilisation of the *lumpenproletariat*. Thus, Fanon's Algerian model contrasted with the Maoist, Vietnamese and, to a certain extent, Cuban models of peasant war led by (urban) intellectuals.⁵⁰¹ These two concepts reflected two opposite visions of nationalist mobilisation, which in turn were related to two opposite visions of Basque identity. The supporters of urban guerrilla warfare tended to focus on assimilated Basques and immigrant workers. The supporters of rural guerrilla warfare tended instead to focus on the *Euskaldún* heartland. Again, the conflict was resolved through action, or, better, a competition to act in the most prompt and effective way.⁵⁰² But the fracture between the two trends was never really formalized within ETA, although it was at the root of several splits.⁵⁰³ The two currents were later included in the vague definition of *pueblo trabajador vasco* (Basque working people). The fragmentation remained latent, but, on several occasions, the unity of the organization was saved at the cost of increasing its external aggression.⁵⁰⁴ Cultural nationalists in Euskadi were constantly under pressure from more radical elements, impatient to act. They had to adopt radical attitudes in order to maintain their credibility. The radicals kept on pressing them, questioning them roughly in the following way: "certainly, Euskara is a valuable tool, it is the proof of our ancestral uniqueness, but how can we manage to build a cohesive Basque nation if the language is spoken just by a minority ?".⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰⁰ This was recognised by Txillardegui, who declared later: "We were in favour of a much more political, and much less military, form of struggle. ...Urban guerrilla, and guerrilla in general, ...is not apt to a heavily industrialized country... It is feasible in Vietnam, not here" (Kaufmann, cited in Jauregui 1981: 308).

⁵⁰¹ I thank Sebastian Balfour for these suggestions.

⁵⁰² Obviously, this did not result in anarchy and chaos, since a prize in authority and respect was granted to those who most put their own life at stake.

⁵⁰³ Indeed, a clue to ETA's internal fragmentation is given by the fact that "each single ideological line... [within] ETA assumed those aspect of [*Vasconia*] which most suited its political and ideological positions" (Jauregui 1981: 225). This explains why Krutwig's book scored such a success and, despite its ambiguities, worked as an unitarian framework for the radical movement.

⁵⁰⁴ In order to establish their hegemony, the thirdworldists were required to appropriate some of the tenets of both political and cultural nationalists. This resulted in a 'superficial' adoption, respectively, of Marxism-Leninism and the cultural struggle. However, both programmes were *de facto* rendered void: Marxism was subordinated to anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle, while Euskara was no longer used in official publication.

⁵⁰⁵ Zulaika explores the unsuccessful attempts by a local leader near to ETA-VI and the 'workerists' to convince his younger disciples about the primacy of class struggle over national liberation. He could not convince them, as "they were definitely not interested in political groupings and polemics... [which] seemed to them just boring rhetorical subtleties" (1988: 61).

Since their identity was splintered, nationalists also felt more threatened. Thus, whether language, race or religion were taken as central elements of Basqueness, their upholders always felt that the Basque nation they identified with was under threat. At the same time, these opposing trends created confusion over the core values to be adopted, and engendered the conditions for ideological fragmentation. In the Basque case, the failure to define steadily and persistently one core value resulted in the impossibility of developing a popular form of cultural nationalism. The weakness of cultural nationalism led to the prevalence of other kinds of political activism in which an ambivalent attitude over the definition of cultural values concealed a deep conflict over forms of political mobilization. I now wish to explore a couple of other reinforcing factors.

Other reinforcing factors

Another situational factor which influenced the radical choice of both violence and Marxism was the **American about-face** (see chapter 5). This had long-lasting consequences on the morale of the Basques. Hopes for Allied -especially American- military intervention to topple Franco were dashed in 1945. Since the PNV's reliance on an American 'salvation' plan justified much of the party's stalemate, the new generation was particularly anxious to get rid of the American model.⁵⁰⁶ They were politically socialized during the period of decolonization and thus were unavoidably inspired by the newly independent Third World 'nations'. It is possible to gather which were ETA's principal ideological influences by looking at the short bibliography supplied in its *Libro Blanco* (White Book): only one Basque source is mentioned,⁵⁰⁷ the other references being works from the protagonists of successful liberation movements or analysis of their struggles, normally in their Spanish or French editions.⁵⁰⁸ As I have shown elsewhere (Conversi 1993), the most influential external model came from the Algerian revolution. The main theorist of the Algerian model of decolonization was Franz Fanon (1925-1961), who was also an advocate of revolutionary

Local groups still led by Marxist ex-seminarians "offered a platform to raise political consciousness. The beneficiary was ETA", which swelled with new members (Zulaika 198: 61).

⁵⁰⁶ The rejection of the American model and the subsequent drift towards Marxism, did not imply an immediate renunciation of the principle of democracy. ETA's leaders vowed to fight against all forms of dictatorship and never formally rejected democracy. Yet, they believed it impossible to achieve it without the use of violence.

⁵⁰⁷ It is *Ereintza: Siembra de Nacionalismo Vasco, 1894-1912*, an essentialist manual of separatism by Engracio de Arranzadi (San Sebastian: Editorial Añamendi, 1980; [first edition 1935]).

⁵⁰⁸ French was the foreign language most currently spoken by the Basques in Spain, for obvious reasons, given the continuous cross-borders contacts with their northern brethren and the placement in France of the largest slice of the Basque diaspora.

violence. The experience of Algeria seemed to promise that only violence could pay off and lead the insurgents to victory. This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also determined by the internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. As predicted by Fanon, state violence was an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general 'national awareness' among the wider population, instigating them to fight back. In synthesis, the adoption of thirdworldist models could not be realized without state repression. State repression was the central part of the Fanonian 'theory of action/repression/action' as 'imported' by ETA.

The underlying religious character of Basque nationalism has been indicated as a possible inspiration for Basque violence, as manifested through abnegation and self-sacrifice. Our exposure to media coverage of ethnic conflicts leads us to think that religious animosities are often exacerbated when they go hand in hand with nationalist claims.⁵⁰⁹ However, four observations must be made in order to put the link between nationalism and religion in the right perspective. Firstly, although until very recently the Basques considered themselves to be more religious than other Spaniards, they nevertheless share the same religion. Secondly, the strong Catholic attachment of the Basques long antedated the rise of nationalism. Thirdly, violence began to spread at the same time in which religion was becoming irrelevant, as part and parcel of a Western-wide process of secularisation. Many recent surveys indicate that the process of secularization in Euskadi is comparable to that of most Western industrialized societies.⁵¹⁰ Fourthly and finally, the religious emphasis of early Basque national ideology and the link between religion and nationalism were a consequence of the previous point, namely, the lack of alternative cultural elements shared by the majority of the population. The dismissal of religion was also a tool of further distancing ETA from the PNV and its Catholic ideology. In May 1962, the participants to the First Assembly published the organization's first formal statements of principles which called for the creation of a federated Europe based on ethno-nationalities not guided by *religion*. They also rejected the idea of *racial* superiority and opposed all forms of dictatorships.

Is there a continuity between the original religious foundations of Basque nationalism and the new Basque political culture? We already pointed out the initial religious emphasis prompted by Arana, but, as we said, Basque nationalism did not purvey a violent face until the 1960s. Some authors have indeed demonstrated the deep religious vocation which

⁵⁰⁹ The description of political violence as emanating from the religious background of their protagonists has been applied to other terrorist groups, such as the Italian Red Brigades (Acquaviva 1979).

⁵¹⁰ See for instance, FOESSA (1975) and Perez-Agote (1990).

animated many activists in the 1960s. In his study on the 'sacramental character' of Basque political violence, Zulaika (1988) observes the important influence exerted on ETA's militants by Catholic social doctrines, especially the ones emanating in those years from *Acción Católica*. Many *etarras* have lived through a phase of religious vocation followed by a disillusion with religion and the idea that their vocation cannot be carried out within the tracks of traditional Christianity. Basque nationalism has been defined as a millennialist movement (Aranzadi 1981). Many nationalists passed from religion to secularism, this passage being rather a leap forward when they tried to adapt Marxism to such a purpose. Most of them came from *Acción Católica* and its working-class branches, J.O.C. (*Juventudes Obreras Católicas*) and H.O.A.C. (*Hermanidad Obrera de Acción Católica*), and their 'apostolic' origin remained "passionately [entrenched] with their personal frustrations".⁵¹¹ Students from different seminaries and novitiates (Franciscans, Benedictines, Jesuits, Carmelites, etc.) jointly participated in the framework of local publishing in Euskara (Pérez-Agote 1986: 431). In most cases, protection by the Church was what made viable such enterprises. In the crucial phase of the early 1970s, when Marxist ideology permeated most local nationalist organisations, the Church eventually withdrew its support causing many local groups to collapse. Their disaffected membership was faced with two options: either join one of a host of nationalist left-wing organisations or join ETA.⁵¹² How could this Catholic heritage have influenced the new generation of activists? Was there a link between their self-abnegation and the principles of Christianity? We have already analysed the importance of religion in both early and late Basque nationalism. However, it is difficult to infer a direct causal link. Zulaika (1988: 55) contends that radical nationalism was linked to Christian models of sacrifice and martyrdom. We have discussed above how violence itself can be seen as a ritual, albeit secular, act, the finality of which goes beyond the mere physical damage caused (Douglass and Zulaika 1990).

In popular wisdom, economic factors are often indicated as causes of nationalist mobilisation, and even of nationalist violence. From the mid-1970s, the Basque Country underwent a process of major recession and rises in the level of unemployment. This factor can be considered as a lateral explanation and precipitant of nationalist violence, rather than its cause. But the economic crisis was a general world trend commonly experienced in most of the industrialized capitalist world. Yet, only in some areas it was accompanied by nationalist mobilizations, and even in fewer cases by nationalist violence. However, in some

⁵¹¹ *Documentos Y*: vol. 1: 371. See also Ortzi (1975: 276-7).

⁵¹² See Zulaika (1988) for the example of the main radical group in Itziar.

sectors this crisis differed from the one experienced in other countries, and its effect in Euskadi took a particularly heavy toll: large industries were the main pillar of the Basque economy. As branch plants of multinational corporations dominated, Euskadi was severely struck by the international crisis and many factories had to close down (Zirakzadeh 1989: 321). When the international economy slumped in the 1970s, Euskadi was badly hit because of the relevance of its export sector and the specialization in metallurgy and capital goods. Small and big industries alike found themselves without customers. Hence, "oscillation with international demand..... lead to wave of popular support for nationalist parties that aim to protect the semi-peripheral areas from external economic pressures" (Zirakzadeh 1989: 323).

Yet, wide ranging economic change had already occurred in the 1880s, but did not prompt a violent reaction. Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa were the poorest Spanish provinces in 1877. In a few years, they became the richest, creating both social discontent and demographic displacement. The virulent anti-Spanish tones of Arana concealed the rage of many Basques, yet such rage was, for the moment, simply channelled through a non-violent nationalist movement. Still in 1973, Vizcaya and Gipuzkoa held the first and third place respectively amongst all Spanish provinces in term of per capita income.⁵¹³ Moreover, the economic crisis occurred approximately ten years after ETA had adopted armed struggle. Undoubtedly, violence rose to a new peak in the wake of the economic doldrums, when unemployment, recession and their corollary reinforced social tensions. For instance, between 1975 and 1981 the adult labour force shrank by 11% and Euskadi's gross product had a negative growth rate for three successive years (Zirakzadeh 1989: 327). ETA took advantage of these negative circumstances. But a convincing reason for the increase of violence could hardly be given on the basis of the economic situation alone. Undoubtedly, the electoral programme of Herri Batasuna (the political wing of ETA) included powerful appeals to the economically dispossessed "through the use of pictorial representations of shovels, anvils and pitchforks", constantly alluding "to its candidates' firsthand experiences with unemployment layoffs and insecure jobs" (Zirakzadeh 1989: 328). Theories of 'relative deprivation' can be partly useful to explain this outcome. But, again, it seems better to consider the economic situation as a powerful reinforcing factor rather than as a determinant of the choice of violence.

⁵¹³ See García Crespo et al. (1981) and Payne (1975: 229-33).

Declining state legitimacy and persisting legitimacy of ETA during the Transition

State measures to defeat 'terrorism' have often prompted the fear of a much more indiscriminate kind of violence falling upon the Basques.⁵¹⁴ This perception of the state as a terrorist machinery persisted after the demise of the dictatorship, defying the dialogue with the nationalists initiated by the King, the UCD, and other reformers. *Abertzale* parties alleged that repression continued unabated after Franco's death. For instance, several 'anti-terrorist laws', some of which were condemned as unconstitutional, resulted in arbitrary arrests and detentions (Clark 1991).⁵¹⁵ Widespread opposition to the law has been expressed by popular demonstrations in several Spanish regions.⁵¹⁶ Furthermore, the murder of Basque political exiles in France by the GAL (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación*), a self-styled 'anti-terrorist' commando,⁵¹⁷ provoked angry popular demonstrations,⁵¹⁸ unfolded a political scandal,⁵¹⁹ and prompted accusations of central government's complicity.⁵²⁰

Let us now see how this situation of violent conflict was reflected in the social texture. Since the 1970s, political violence seems to have become an intrinsic feature of Basque society.⁵²¹ This has brought about the division of society in at least two opposite fields. With some exaggeration, Heiberg highlights the polarized atmosphere which pervaded most areas of public life: "Political parties, artistic production, amnesty organizations, historical research, economic enterprises, schools, newspapers, public projects, popular festivals, publishing houses, etc. were forced into the mutually exclusive categories of *abertzale* / *españolista*, nationalist/ non-nationalist, Basque/ anti-Basque" (1989: 110). However, Heiberg's dichotomy cannot be extended to more recent developments: following the approval of the autonomy statute, internal tensions started to plague the nationalist camp

⁵¹⁴ If we were to apply Weber's definition of the state as that agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence, we would be inclined to conclude not only that Spain is not a nation, but to many Basques it has not been even a state -at least in the 1970s.

⁵¹⁵ *Part de la llei antiterrorista, considerada inconstitucional*, "Avui", 18 December 1987.

⁵¹⁶ *Cinco mil personas pidieron en Barcelona la dimisión del ministro del Interior*, "Egin", 16 July 1983

⁵¹⁷ This paramilitary organization murdered several ETA militants living in exile in France, and is said to be composed of security personnel (Korn 1989, Miralles and Arques 1990).

⁵¹⁸ *Violentas manifestaciones en el País Vasco tras el doble asesinato de militantes de ETA por los GAL*, "La Vanguardia", 10 February 1984.

⁵¹⁹ *On the bloody trail of ETAgate*, "Media-Guardian", 27 November 1989. A particularly detailed study is Miralles and Arques (1991).

⁵²⁰ Chaffee (1988: 565) mentions graffiti which appeared in Basque cities and read GAL=PSOE, accusing the government that without the PSOE's approval the GAL commando could not operate.

⁵²¹ *Erradicar la violencia en Euskadi*, "El País", 15 November 1987.

along the radical-moderate line.⁵²² Non-political gatherings too have often degenerated into collective eruptions of youth violence.⁵²³ The climate of antagonism has prompted a lack of communication between different segments of the society.⁵²⁴ Although the Autonomy Statute helped to restrain support for ETA, the provisions therein contained fell short of the requirements of most Basque nationalists. In particular, the statute could hardly mend the political hiatus that, at that time, separated the Basques from Madrid.

The environment was so polarized that the Civil Guards and policemen lived isolated from the rest of society.⁵²⁵ Nobody dared to speak to them and, as soon as somebody was seen doing so, he/she was immediately suspected of being a police informer. One of the first duties for all committed *abertzale* was to shun any *chivatos* (suspected police informers, who sometime included people who had any sort of contact with the 'occupation forces'). The *chivatos* were rejected and ostracized as moral outcasts from the community. After decades of behaving as ruthless boss of the region, the 'occupation forces' experienced a dramatic anti-climax from the 1970s onwards: the Civil Guards' and policemen's extremely hard situation was reflected in a sharp rise in suicide rates amongst their numbers.⁵²⁶ This backlash was an unavoidable side-effect of the Spanish state's profound transformation.

Such a boundless resentment against the forces of 'public order' testifies to the direct link between state repression and counter-repression. The security apparatus was considered a legitimate target of political violence because they were popularly seen as the origin and prime actors of political violence. Hence, policemen became symbolic targets and ETA's activists could rarely step up their campaign of terror against more important targets, such as industrialists, MPs, etc., because in this case the popularity of their actions risked ebbing or dwindling. There were no other social figures in Euskadi who could command similarly negative feelings.

⁵²² *Violent incidents entre des séparatistes et le président du gouvernement basque*, "Le Monde", 16 August 1983; Jesús Ceberio, *Cisma en la tribu de Aitor*, "El País-Domingo", 23 November 1986, pp. 1-3.

⁵²³ *45 heridos en choques entre jóvenes violentos y policías en Vitoria*, "El País", 9 August 1987, pp. 1 and 11.

⁵²⁴ UNZUETA, Patxo (1986) *Euskadi invertibrada*, "El País", 25 November 1986, p. 16

⁵²⁵ On the Guardia Civil as a powerful instrument of centralization, see Lopez Garrido (1982).

⁵²⁶ *El SUP previene sobre nuevos suicidios de policías en el País Vasco*, "El País", 19 July 1987.

The dynamics of political violence

In order to explore the double causes of the choice of violence and of its permanence, we need different interpretations. As it has been pointed out, "various theories may have differential utility at different phases of terrorist movement. In the early stages, theories that explore the political roots of collective violence may have relatively greater utility. Later, theories that emphasize the tendency for violence to become an end in itself may be more useful" (Thompson 1989: 694-5). In the 1970s, a familiar pattern in ETA's evolution began to acquire a quicker tempo: as the more experienced and mature leaders of ETA were killed or forced into exile, younger and more radical leaders quickly replaced them, in a process that continues up to the present day. The Military Front, composed predominantly of very young people, became more and more uncontrollable, while its autonomous initiatives provoked further conflict. It clearly appears, especially during the "transition" phase, that violence has become a self-generating mechanism, a vicious circle very difficult to stop.⁵²⁷

Every exile, imprisonment or killing of ETA leaders created a vacuum which was soon filled by younger and more radical elements. For instance, in 1986, 'Txomin', at the time ETA's number one, was forced into exile. This action reached a new climax in the process of distancing the older leadership (the so-called *históricos*) from the emerging militant base.⁵²⁸ New radical elements were swiftly incorporated into ETA's Executive Committee to replace the *históricos*. The new guerrillas, who were more ruthless and determined, could move much more freely and safely across the border to France, while the known *históricos* could hardly deceive the French information services. In this way, the latter become increasingly displaced by the former inside ETA. In ETA, "it was not possible to be a militant while being abroad".⁵²⁹ By being abroad, the older leaders lost many of their contacts with the closely-knit social networks of Basque resistance and the information and protection they provided. New ambitious young militants were eager to replace them in a process which was regulated by unrelenting internal competition.

Paradoxically, while the police exulted over the elimination of ETA's leaders, moderate nationalists expressed serious concerns about further uncontrollable violence.⁵³⁰ In fact,

⁵²⁷ Parallels with other guerrilla movements easily spring to mind: the IRA in Northern Ireland and the Khalistan movement in India's Punjab were - and are - plagued by a similar internal logic. In both cases, violence served to complement internal fragmentation.

⁵²⁸ *Los 'históricos' de ETA dan paso a los jóvenes*, "El País-Domingo", 13 July 1986.

⁵²⁹ Txillardegui, in *Garaia*, op. cit....

⁵³⁰ *Medios nacionalistas consideran "un serio error" el alejamiento de 'Txomin'*, "El País", 12 July 1986.

ETA's history has shown that the young *arrivées* are unmistakably more radical, more uncompromising and less prone to negotiate. Thus, Txomin's expulsion hampered the progress of peace talks, since he was one of the leaders most favourable to negotiation.⁵³¹ The elimination of the old guard in 1986 and the following year can also explain why some of the most bloody terrorist acts occurred in 1987.⁵³²

In the last phase of the Francoist dictatorship, popular mobilizations were dependent on ETA's actions. As we have seen, each *ekintza* (ETA's action) had a deep impact among the youth, especially in the slumbering villages of the countryside. ETA has also been a means through which the Basque-Madrid conflict, and the oppositional identity related to it, have been kept alive. And as the new Basque identity was (since the 1960s) founded on conflict and opposition, the prospects of any peaceful de-assimilation from Spain was closely linked to the possibility of creating a positive self-identity no longer based on the negation of the enemy.

The trend towards 'de-ethnicization' prevailed at the time of the Marxist 'conversion' in the early 1960s with its class politics and its lack of interest in Basque culture. Although the Military Front operated within the superficial legitimacy of Basque culture, it also used violence as a mobilizing avenue by continuously redefining the Basque-Spanish conflict in irreconcilable terms. Thus, these military activists have tacitly pursued the option of reinforcing *ethnic borders* without reinforcing *ethnic contents*. The task of reinforcing ethnic contents was left to the cultural nationalists, who, although eclipsed by the military branch in the media, grew along with them. With its Maoist-derived emphasis on the countryside as the spearhead of revolutionary change, Krutwig's Third-Worldist option was an attempt to reconcile cultural, political and military nationalism, to merge ethnic borders and ethnic contents. Yet, although this direction apparently gave place of pride to culture, culture was unavoidably subordinated to armed action in ETA's practice and military nationalism became a separate force. In the aims of the nationalists, violence proved to be an effective substitute for culture insofar as it contributed to delineate the 'boundaries' of the Basque community by sharply demarcating outsiders from insiders.

We are now left to ponder whether this is the most useful way to understand what happened. Couldn't violence be an outcome of uncertainty over cultural values, rather than lack of cultural contents? The answer is that the two are deeply inter-related and we have

⁵³¹ Los '*históricos*'..., "El País-Domingo", 13 July 1986.

⁵³² ETA cometió en 1987, en Barcelona y Zaragoza, los atentados más sangrientos, "El País", 29 January 1988, 15. Algo cambiará tras Hipercor, "El País", 28 June 1987.

repeatedly came across this mutual relationship: firstly, Arana the philologist gave way to Arana the racist; secondly, the urban/ rural and Castilian/Euskaldun divide was at the core of ETA's lacerating dilemmas. These dilemmas were normally resolved by privileging action over introspection. Since at least the Fifth Assembly, "action" became the core value promoted by ETA. The concept of *ekintza*, generally used to indicate an armed attack by ETA, also conveyed a whole model of participating into the national struggle. Likewise, the concept of *abertzale* became an inclusive one by virtue of ETA's expanding struggle: "Abertzale is a status not defined by birth but by performance: an abertzale is one who participates in the political struggle... You are not born abertzale. You make yourself one" (Mac Clancy 1988). Modern *batúa* condenses these trends in the verb *abertzaletu* (=to become a patriot) and the substantive *aberriordeko* (= adopted homeland). Basques, in ETA's eyes, were distinguished from non-Basques mainly on the basis of their involvement in the struggle for Basque liberation. Lacking a discrete and visible element such as language, the requirements of Basque identity have shifted to a simpler voluntarist dimension. The more a person is involved in the struggle, the more he/ she is accepted as a member of the national community. Hence, the most radical option was likely to be considered also the most 'Basque' and thus the most morally acceptable. As a consequence, the social environment was far more polarized in Euskadi than in Catalonia, with each nationalist stressing his/her nationalist credentials in order to be accepted by the 'moral community'.⁵³³ But does this mean that activists will not accept a Basque who is passive as a member of the Basque nation? No, one thing does not imply the other. There is always a hope that passive ones, either Basques or non-Basques, will re-awaken from their lethargy and rejoin the nation by means of struggle. Hence, such a Renanian idea of the 'nation of will' is an open concept, which stands at the antipodes of Arana's closed vision. In chapter 8, we have shown that the crucible for second-generation immigrants' integration is their political involvement. They can prove their involvement by participating in more and more demanding tasks, in a concentric circle of loyalties and identities, layer upon layer into the heart of the 'moral' community. Only then, they might feel the urge of learning Euskara.

The border-making functions of violence have not always been self-conscious among activists. Obviously, militants could see that violence exerted a powerful emotional impact and attracted more people into political action. But they seldom, if ever, conceived violence

⁵³³ The concept of the nation as a 'moral community' is due to Symmons-Symonolewicz (1970: 50-ff).

as a mere replacement for something else missing. Hence, no political writing of ETA theorizes about violence as a substitute for culture. Because of the nationalist tendency to see the nation as an organic whole and to deny all internal cleavages, we have to infer ourselves these internal gaps.⁵³⁴

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have postulated several points. Firstly, we asserted that Basque violence is the product of the interaction between state repression and the nationalists' own internal tensions. These internal tensions were reflected in opposite ideologies and political trends co-existing inside ETA. Secondly, we have observed that such ideological and political fragmentation was related to cultural fragmentation. The different factions pursued different vision of Basque identity, aimed at different strata of the population (immigrant /native, rural/urban, etc.), stressed different aspects of Basqueness, and adopted different strategies and tactics in order to achieve their goals. Thirdly, we have shown that cultural fragmentation was in part the result of cultural assimilation. The latter originated from several factors which were discussed throughout the thesis: urbanization, elites' Castilianization, industrialization, centralization, and, finally, mass immigration. At this point, we must reiterate our picture of Euskadi's cultural space as plural and fragmented. In contrast with Catalonia, there is a lack of clear-cut and undisputed shared values. In chapter 7, we related the latter particularly to the degree of language maintenance, once established the centrality of language in most European nationalist movements. At no time have we argued that, because of fragmentation, Basque identity is weaker. Quite the contrary, its strongly oppositional and antagonistic character guarantees a continuous rehearsal of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite'.

Finally, this chapter has stressed how central the role of state repression was in cementing a common identity out of previous anthropological chaos. If we are to apply a purely functionalist approach, political violence responded both to an *internal logic* (the need to foster unity in the organisation) and an *external logic* (the need to respond to the challenge of the state). At any moment of stormy ideological debate within ETA, the initiative was seized by some violent factions. In this way, direct action, rather than ideology and culture,

⁵³⁴ In a rare display of the border-making mechanisms of violence, the playwright Alfonso Sastre, a former Communist and sympathizer of radical nationalism, declared: "Violence is one way of building a nation". He meant that oppositional violence is a mobilizing force which can create a sense of solidarity and a border where previously few or none were evident. This does not mean that the 'nation' is defined by violence; the latter is solely a means to its creation. "La violència és una forma de construir una nació", *El Món*, nº 204, 21 March 1986, pp. 20-21.

showed the way to be followed in order to achieve mass mobilization with its concomitant effect of galvanizing public support. While the theorists debated over the importance of this or that element of Basque culture, or about this or that ideological line or strategy to be adopted, the hard-liners overcame all of them. With their attacks, they demonstrated the simple reality that only direct action could achieve popular support and even extend mobilization to non-ethnic Basques. The 'ideologues' thus had to face the music and bow to the argument that only a violent uprising could revitalize Basque nationhood, while disquisitions about the details of Basque identity retained a divisive effect. At least from 1973 onwards (year of the killing of Carrero Blanco), ETA operated under the slogan "Actions Unite, Words Divide". ETA's activity has thus taken an anti-intellectual turn, the antithesis of Ekin's original philosophy.

A common feature of insurgent nationalist guerrillas in many countries is their relation with, and even dependence on, state repression.⁵³⁵ All over the world, a plethora of nationalities and former tribes are drawn into violent confrontation with the state as a result of decades of coercion by central authorities which are felt to be largely illegitimate.⁵³⁶ The more recent the memories of suffering and horrors are, the more acute the conflict seems to be. Of all Krutwig's ideas, his principle of 'retaliation', as expressed in the theory of action/repression/ action, was the only one which in practice remained constant in ETA throughout its long history of mutations and splits (Jauregui 1981: 220). *Lacking the cultural link or other clearly defined rallying points, the guerrilla could only rely on action.* We have also indicated who were the foreign ideologues exerting the most profound influence on both ETA's strategies and new ways of conceiving the nation: Renan and Fanon. The fact that both were French-speaking and French-educated was not a coincidence.⁵³⁷ As many Basque nationalists were well-versed in French, most foreign ideologies were imported into Euskadi via France and in French. French intellectuals, especially in the 1960s, exerted an unparalleled impact on the Basque radical intelligentsia.⁵³⁸

Recent studies have begun to stress the cultural components and ethnic origins of

⁵³⁵ Wilson's study of the impact of state repression on Guatemala's Indian communities is illuminating: "Acting on Mao-Tse-Tung's famous dictum that guerrillas depended on the population like fish on the sea, the army set about draining the sea. In the end, Q'eqchi villagers suffered far higher loss of life than the armed combatants. Repression itself was the most significant factor of all that led to Q'eqchi's joining the guerrilla" (1991: 40).

⁵³⁶ In many Third World countries, this has been one of the legacies of decolonization, whereas local elites have proved unable to impose their rule and values unless by force.

⁵³⁷ We cannot define Fanon as a Frenchman at heart, but technically he was, as French was his education.

⁵³⁸ We mentioned the impact of the existentialists, especially Sartre.

ethnonationalist movements (Hroch 1985, Smith 1986, 1991). However, movements which began as forms of cultural activism altered their strategies and objectives in the course of their struggle. Thus, at different stages, ETA relegated the cultural struggle to second rank, in order to deploy its full resources for a frontal clash with the state. How was this possible? This chapter has postulated two modes (normally opposed) of political mobilisation: culture or violence. Where differential cultural elements were available as *ethnic boundaries*, the ethno-nationalist movement tended naturally to use them. In this way, the movement could also present itself as their saviour, while promoting a new militant vision of national culture. Operating through semi-legal institutions, Catalan leaders could more easily advance their claims under an unified platform and find internal cohesion around the centrality of one (or more) values. In contrast, when they cannot take advantage of pre-existing ethnic borders, nationalist leaders are compelled to choose other types of mobilization. Cultural assimilation also highlights and uncovers a vital threat against a group's basic identity. Through the conceptualization of this existential crisis, nationalist leaders can formulate a strategy of direct defence against central power. In one breath, the state is blamed for military repression and for destroying the national culture. Hence, cultural, political and military nationalists, all have a grudge and a reason to welcome violence.

The transition to democracy reinforced the pre-existing trend at a time when the old order was collapsing and the new one still undefined. However, as both radical and moderate nationalists attempted to build up a consensus on the idea of the nation, a cultural revival became possible. Autonomy concessions seriously undermined ETA, offering a chance to try out the new constitutional arrangements. Through the reinstatement of fundamental freedoms (and that does not necessarily mean independence), the Basque community had its first chance to face a serene future and experience a positive sense of self-realization. But the process was continuously hampered by persisting state repression and indecision over Basque identity. Since Basque identity was not so strongly defined by discrete cultural elements (such as language), the nationalists needed a constant process of mobilization in order to raise collective awareness. This may be one of the reasons why it is so hard to bid farewell to political violence.

My thesis rests on the case of the Basque Country, but it is possible to find similar examples in other countries (Conversi 1994). Some of these may appear to be less convincing, yet under more careful scrutiny they do not contradict my thesis. If, for instance, we look at the Welsh case, we can see a cultural situation highly similar to Euskadi: around

20% speak the national language, there is a rural/ urban divide, etc. Why, then, did this case not produce violence? According to my thesis, the answer lies in the absence of the second factor, state repression. This has never hit the Welsh national movement indiscriminately. Hence, it is also much more difficult for the nationalists to blame the loss of Welsh culture on the repressive action of the state.

In this chapter, I followed Smith's (1984, 1986) theory that memories and myths are what found collective identities. National identities are based on shared memories and myths and, by definition, violence weighs heavily on collective memory. Myths of ethnic foundation are based on discourses and records of recent or past collective sufferings. Images of resistance are constantly re-evoked and cast against opposed images of oppression, where the people is the hero and the state the villain. My contribution to Smith's theory adds four further points: a) ethnic memories can survive over the centuries in spite of linguistic assimilation; b) assimilation, without erasing collective memories, make ethnic borders and national identities more vague, fragmented and less easy to mobilise; c) this assimilation *cum* fragmentation carries in itself the seeds of a possible violent evolution, once a nationalist movement is superimposed on this context; and d) a second variable, state repression, is necessary for this violent potential to fully emerge. When state repression *interacts with* a lack of shared culture and values, the potential for violence is likely to materialize.

Epilogue

Throughout my thesis I have stressed the importance of culture, particularly language, in the project of identity construction of ethno-nationalist elites. I have shown that, to a different degree, modernity has eroded the traditional markers of ethnicity through the subsequent processes of state centralization, assimilation of local elites, and, finally, mass immigration. All these processes have deeply altered the anthropological structure of the two regions, but have not impaired their basic identity and sense of separateness. On the contrary, they have reinforced the determination of the local leaders and their followers to pursue an autonomous status for their nation, even political independence. In this epilogue we shall formulate some conclusions on the oppositional character of nationalism, through a comparison of the two movements.

First of all, let us remind ourselves of the main similarities and contrasts between the two movements. They shared the following similarities:

1. they operated within the same state structure, Spain
2. they arose broadly at the same time, end of the Nineteenth century
3. they are among the most popular nationalist movements in Western Europe
4. their regions have been at the vanguard of the Spanish economy
5. they received vast amounts of immigrants and had, thus, to face the challenge of integrating them

However, the dissimilarities were greater, and some were related to class structure:

1. The Basque bourgeoisie was pro-centralist. The Catalan bourgeoisie wanted to control the central state, but failing this, turned to regionalism.⁵³⁹
2. The Basque bourgeoisie was small in numbers (the six to ten families who controlled the local economy can be defined as a *semi-oligarchy*), but big in capital concentration. The Catalan bourgeoisie was more diversified, there were several family-run enterprises scattered

⁵³⁹ Economic elites diverged in their attitude towards the state: the Basque semi-oligarchy was staunchly liberal, free-marketeer and centralist, while Catalan industrialists were protectionists and lobbied for increasing tariffs to shelter their production.

across a wider geography, but none so rich and financially powerful as the big Basque firms.

3. The timing of industrialization was also different, or at least its impact radically differed: Basque industrialization was massive and abrupt, after the abolition of the *fueros* in 1876.⁵⁴⁰ Catalan industrialization was a lengthier process.⁵⁴¹ Hence, Basque society had less time to adapt to such radical changes.

4. Some of the economic factors are obviously related to cultural ones. Basque industries were concentrated in a particular area of Bilbao, the left bank of the river Nervion. But Bilbao was never the 'moral' capital of Euskadi. It had to compete for this place at least with San Sebastian and Pamplona. Indeed, the choice of Vitoria/Gasteiz as the capital of today's Autonomous Community responds to the need to choose a neutral centre, alien to the traditional cultural, geographic and economic divergence. In contrast, Barcelona was the centre for both the regional culture and the industrial revolution. Yet, the latter was not really concentrated in a single area, and several towns in Barcelona's province were the seat of the most important textile factories.⁵⁴²

5. Politically, Catalan autonomies were crushed in 1716, whereas centralism reached Euskadi more than a hundred years after, in 1876.

6. According to local historians, the Basques had an 'egalitarian ethos', whereas the Catalans had an entrepreneurial and familial bourgeois ethos.

7. Religiously, we have seen that Basque society was more traditional, Catholic and conservative than Catalan society. It was also less modernized when nationalism emerged, and more alienated from the central government.

The dissimilarities in national identity patterns have been illustrated particularly in chapter 7 to 9. There are several explanations for these differences:

1. A 'popular' explanation focuses on their different 'national character'. Obviously, such a concept is more apt to reinforce stereotypes than to analyse.

2. The economic explanation privileges uneven development between core and periphery as a catch-all factor. This is difficult to relate to the two regions, since they were both advanced sectors of the Spanish economy.⁵⁴³ Furthermore, their economy was, and is, not internally

⁵⁴⁰ The only exceptions were the coastal areas of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, which became "centers of commerce, trade and manufacturing as early as the sixteenth century" (Huxley, cited by Clark 1979: 8). The shipbuilding industry also developed on a quasi-industrial basis, but no large-scale industrialization began prior to 1876. Economic fragmentation was also typical of the Basque provinces. See Gonzalez Portilla (1989).

⁵⁴¹ Catalan industrialization was also more autochthonous, that is, less influenced by foreign capital.

⁵⁴² In particular, Mataró, Sabatell and Terrassa.

homogeneous.

3. The class explanation focuses on the different role assumed by the local hegemonic classes (see above).

4. The historical explanation considers that the Basques never achieved statehood, if we except the *fueros* granted by the monarchy until 1876.⁵⁴⁴

5. The political explanation focuses on the role of state repression. It is useful in accounting for the intensity of Basque radicalism, but only after ETA was born.

6. The anthropological/ cultural explanation focuses on the role of the local culture. The latter supplied the raw material to the first nationalist formulations.

As we have said, my account privileges the last two factors. Let us now reiterate the main contrast between the two movements, taking into consideration the different relationship with the Spanish state they championed. First, Basque nationalism was intransigent and separatist from its very inception. In contrast, the initial Catalan appeal was mildly regionalist and pro-Spanish, rather than fully nationalist. Second, Basque separatism has developed from the 1960s a notoriously violent component. Catalan nationalism is more accommodative and broadly non-violent. For many onlookers, the former personifies blind irrationality, as the latter exemplifies bourgeois rationalist calculations. Catalan nationalism was, thus, a form of Spanish Regenerationism which aimed at regenerating the entire Spanish state. By contrast, Arana's drive to independence implied a break of major proportions with the Spanish state. It aimed at withdrawing from the state and drastically re-drawing its borders. This emphasis was rarely found in Catalonia, a country which could always boast obvious linguistic markers in order to advance its national 'credentials', both *inwardly* (dissemination among the people of the idea of belonging to the same Catalan nation) and *outwardly* (cultural legitimization of Catalan ethnic claims *vis-à-vis* Castile).

Intransigence and maximalism remained a central tenet of Basque nationalism throughout the years. But the Basque separatist option did not translate itself into an immediate recourse to violence. In fact, Arana and his followers were convinced apostles of non-violence. Until the Civil War, no violent form of nationalism had gained any popularity. Other crucial conditions had to intervene in order to foster violence.

⁵⁴³ However, the impressive decline of mining, siderurgy and other big industries in the 1970s affected the Basque economy to a much greater extent than Catalonia (Zirakzadeh 1989, 1991).

⁵⁴⁴ This point is disputed by Agirreazkenagua (1987) who describes Vizcaya before 1876 as a quasi-independent state.

Fragmented constituencies and authoritarian leadership

We have seen that the Basque Nationalist Party remained the sole representative of Basque nationalism, dominating nationalist politics for most of this century until the 1970s. In contrast, early Catalanism was not represented by a single party (all the main historical Catalanist parties emerged from coalitions of previously established groups), but its lack of political unanimity was compensated by its common aim and breadth of appeal.⁵⁴⁵ We have also seen how the situation was partially reversed in the 1980s, when nationalism was represented by a single main party in Catalonia (CiU), but by several parties in Euskadi (PNV, EE, EA, HB).

In the first two historical chapters, we have analyzed how Basque nationalism was centered around a single leader, Sabino Arana, whilst Catalan nationalism had been articulated through the voice of several intellectuals and political figures. But appearances should not deceive us. Paradoxically, Basque nationalism emerged from a fragmented political environment, whilst Catalonia was moving around a platform of consensus, which was basically provided by the undisputed need to regenerate Catalan culture as a minimum demand. Preceded by the *Renaixença*, Catalan nationalism could always refer back to the revival of powerful cultural symbols, epitomized by a literary renaissance. Basque nationalism was much more subject to bitter internal rifts, rivalries and ideological confrontation than Catalan nationalism at any given time. Only the charismatic-authoritarian personality of Sabino Arana could hold together under a single banner an archipelago of often solipsist and quaint local figures. Indeed, without Arana and his intransigent programme, Basque nationalism could hardly ever have arisen in its present form. Probably, no PNV could have emerged and no unitarian nationalist programme would have been able to gain popularity. Once Arana died, he left a legacy of firm principles, a line of assertiveness, a radical credo, a political bible made up of a few simple slogans, which was to be followed by several generations without significant ideological alterations until the 1950s. Attempts by bourgeois elements to infiltrate the party and to mollify its line had only temporary success. A hard-core of unswerving *sabinianos* always emerged to claim for themselves the reins of the party.

Yet, Arana's legacy was in itself confused and its commitment to language maintenance should not be taken at face value. An interesting episode shows clearly the incapacity of Arana to conceive a language with any integrating power, even among the Basques. At the

⁵⁴⁵ Catalanist parties won elections and swept the polls much earlier than their Basque counterparts.

beginning of the century, a significant effort was made to reunite in Fuenterrabia the most relevant Basque linguists and philologists from both sides of the Pyrenees for a congress on orthographic unification. Most illustrious scholars "trembled at the news that Arana was going to participate with 320 of his followers, most of them incompetent people, blind and unconditional henchmen of their master. The congress... was a complete fiasco because of the intransigence of the Aranists.... The colleagues from the French Basque Country withdrew in disgust, and the orthographic disagreement between them and us persists until the present-day" (Villasante 1979: 294-5).⁵⁴⁶ For Arana, language had to remain exclusively an ethnic barrier, and all efforts to dampen its purism met with his total opposition. Hence, Arana's credo was coherent only in its *opposition* to Spain, but not as Basque identity was concerned.

This oppositional character is present in all nationalisms and, indeed, in all forms of group identity. However, opposition can be articulated either through the self-appraisal of one own's identity, or through a negative and constant comparison with an external enemy. The contrast between these two models has emerged clearly in the thesis: Catalan mobilization has been centered on the positive assertion of the group's culture. Conversely, since Arana, Basque politics has been based on negation and confrontation. This is related to the two nationalist patterns, Basque *exclusivism* and Catalan *integrationism*. The latter proposition does not imply that oppositional movements are always exclusivist. Authoritarian leadership persisted after Arana's death and was revived during Francoism. As no personality like Arana could emerge in a captive society deprived of any freedom of expression, a strong authoritarian leadership could only arise in the underground, through a faceless organisation. That was one of the main roles filled by ETA.

In such a society, where no other communication was possible, the "logic of action/repression/ action" was indeed a form of communication. In Catalonia, an underground, but rich, cultural life could convey veiled messages of self-determination and hopes for future resurgence. In Euskadi, no high culture meant no hope, while the nationalist intelligentsia had to invent new ways of counter-mobilisation. The de-Basquisation of Basque elites was one of the prime causes for this confusion.

In short, we have seen that Basque nationalism progressed from political unity to

⁵⁴⁶ Ever since Arana, the struggle to revive Euskara always remained an argument of passionate debate amongst nationalists. In their heart and mind, Euskera remained the vessel of Basque uniqueness, yet, although hailed as a symbol of nationhood, its promotion was rarely put into practice.

fragmentation, while in Catalan nationalism the direction was opposite, from political fragmentation to unity. The influence of core values was crucial to this evolution. In order to clarify this point, we shall stress again the role of cultural nationalism in its dialectics with political nationalism. There was a difference in the way in which cultural nationalists interacted with the state. In Catalonia, they used cultural arguments as a disguise for political mobilisation, not only as an end in itself. In this way, Catalanists carved up a non-political space for themselves and were for a while, from the 1950s, able to elude total censorship. As cultural arguments were weaker in Euskadi, culture could not unite the democratic opposition, but Basque nationalists were more intransigent in their demands. Since the state was also more intransigent in dealing with Basque opposition, the latter had to act in complete secrecy. Following Franz Fanon and other radical political theorists, Basque nationalists set out to morally regenerate their nation through violence. Moral regeneration is a task normally accomplished by cultural nationalists (Hutchinson 1987), but the lack of a robust cultural nationalism and shared cultural elements implied that this regeneration had to be carried out with other means.⁵⁴⁷ The opposite process occurred in Catalonia, where the slow release of censorship allowed a timid but steady revival of the national culture, which served as a focus for the opposition.

Immigration

The relationship between cultural nationalism and political nationalism had also to withstand the test of mass immigration. In chapter 8, I have shown how immigration influenced the evolution of Catalan and Basque nationalism. By refuting Heiberg's (1989: 196) thesis that "nationalism has created two antagonistic political communities", I showed that postwar Basque nationalism has helped instead to compound and smooth pre-existing ethnic divisions, but at the cost of magnifying the overall opposition between Basques - *both* immigrants and natives - and Madrid.⁵⁴⁸

The perception of immigrants as bearer of the oppressor's culture characterized late 19th

⁵⁴⁷ Parallels with Irish history can be drawn, although the degree of Basque 'success' is relative. As in the Irish case, through opposition and repression "a self-actualizing myth developed in the course of a successful war of liberation against alien rule. This serves two purposes. It identifies the nation in the popular mind with specific nationalist ideals and leaders and provides an enemy who acts as a negative reference point. It also furnishes a set of common experiences -of triumph and of suffering - that, when invoked by cultural nationalists, may release collective energies after independence in support of the nation-building programme" (Hutchinson 1987: 306).

⁵⁴⁸ I do not pretend to deny that a fracture still exists between natives and immigrants, yet this fracture does not depend on nationalism.

century Basque nationalism (Arana 1982: 197-199). Sabino de Arana was particularly concerned with the fate of the language, but, contrary to what happened in Catalonia, Arana felt it impossible to assimilate the immigrants. To many Basques the language appeared to be irreparably lost, so the emphasis was increasingly put on more ambiguous concepts as defining traits of the Basque nation. Arana's ideology focussed on a nostalgic mythification of the past and on Basque racial purity. The goal was therefore not the assimilation of newcomers, but, quite the contrary, a nostalgic striving for an uncontaminated sense of Basqueness. This self-enclosure was bound to fail, because the increasing wealth of the region continued to attract immigrants. These could not be culturally integrated for several reasons: because of the central regime's oppression of Basque culture, because of the hostile attitudes of some of the natives, and because a difficult language such as Euskara could not be properly learned without its own school system.⁵⁴⁹ The failure to transform Basque culture into an high culture must again account for its failure to attract immigrants.

In contrast, rejection of immigrants has not traditionally featured as a prominent Catalanist concern. An anti-immigrant reaction did not materialise after the war thanks to both the Left and the social-Catholic nationalist leadership. Knowledge of Catalan was an important feature of civil participation, representing a powerful stimulus to adaptation for many immigrants (the more so from the second generation onwards). Given the similarity between Catalan and Castilian, Catalan identity was based on highly permeable borders and non-Catalans could easily become Catalans by adopting bilingualism. And, since the stress on language was clear, such borders were also more clearly identifiable and, thus, easier to cross. Immigrants were encouraged both in their integration into, and identification with, Catalonia, by the obvious stress on language as a carrier of national identity. With the twilight of Francoism and during the democratic transition, Catalan has assumed a key role on the political scene. Most political, intellectual, artistic, and religious forces fully committed themselves to the recovery of the language. Their purpose was to elevate it into a communicative instrument fully appropriate to the needs of a dynamic and modern society.⁵⁵⁰

The belief in the capacity of Catalan culture to absorb newcomers was one of the main reasons an anti-immigrant reaction did not surface in spite of the immigrant' numbers. Cultural vitality is at the basis of what can be broadly defined as Catalan optimism, as

⁵⁴⁹ In Euskadi, the language gap between immigrants and natives is even wider than in most industrialized countries.

⁵⁵⁰ The centrality of language also explains the existence of a prolific school of sociolinguistic studies. See Vallverdú (1980) for an exhaustive overview of Catalan sociolinguistics up to the year 1979.

opposed to Basque pessimist attitudes. As many immigrants coming from the underdeveloped Andalusian countryside perceived Catalan culture to be superior to their own, they were both encouraged and willing to integrate, despite the fact that another high culture, Castilian, had the one and only support from the state.

Language maintenance

Over the last century, the Basque language has been stressed over and over again as the most important distinctive element of Basqueness by politicians and scholars, both foreign and local. The founders of Basque nationalism were also cultural nationalists and saw Euskara as the quintessence of Basque identity. However, their dream of reviving it clashed with the reality of a declining tongue. This sociolinguistic situation influenced Basque politics in at least five ways:

1. It radicalized potential cultural nationalists as they faced the possible disappearance of Euskara. Their compensatory reaction was to forge an uncompromising movement stressing separation from Spain. Arana was first a Carlist, then became a nationalist. After understanding that a language revival on the Catalan pattern was not viable, he focussed on race and religion and beat a retreat into separatism.

2. Cultural assimilation prompted a contrast among nationalists over which element(s) of Basqueness should be fostered. These tensions were recurrent in ETA's internal quarrels. Although strictly political discussions were to the fore, cultural debates always loomed in the background.

3. This lack of definition of the central elements of Basqueness created a vacuum in political programmes. Once political violence was triggered under Francoism, this vacuum was easily filled by military actions.

4. It added a powerful element of accusation against the centralist regime, identified as bearing the main responsibility for cultural assimilation and loss. Accusations of cultural genocide served to justify internally armed struggle as a defence from, and response against, the state.

5. It fomented a sense of despair since many Basques perceived themselves as belonging to a people on the verge of extinction. Only drastic counter-measures, such as a mass insurrection, could save the Basques from their doomsday and their state of abeyance.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁵¹ Jauregui (1981) uses the powerful expression *sentimento agonico* (that is, a feeling of anguish and despair, of impending collective threat, of living on the threshold of oblivion).

All the above conditions remained confined to a coterie of committed militants until a decisive external factor contributed to spread it to the masses. State repression at a time of regime decline and change was the main trigger of popular support for armed reaction against the dictatorship. Although cultural nationalists such as Txillardegí did not overtly embrace violent strategies, they were nevertheless radical die-hards not prone to compromise. In the 1960s, Txillardegí's attempt to build an unitarian nationalist front through cultural nationalism provided the bond for a plethora of mutually arguing factions. Nevertheless, cultural nationalists could not put a halt - perhaps, they also did not want to- to the increasing spiral of political violence.

It is worth recalling the contrasting status of Catalan. The dictatorship sheltered a highly abnormal situation: Catalan was alive and widely spoken in many walks of life, but its public use was strictly forbidden, forcibly confined to domestic life, far from police inspection. Subsequently, the vitality of civil society has turned Catalan into one of the most creative non-official languages in Europe. Today it is used in all domains, it is a scientific language with a continuously expanding output of neologisms, it has a rich literature, it is the main language of theatre, arts, universities and television, and it is making great inroads in the movies, as well as in the daily and weekly press. All this progress was unthinkable only ten years ago, when the country came out of an uncertain transition from autocratic rule to Western-style democracy (1975-1982).

How can we explain the different impact of cultural nationalism? An answer lies in the different role played by the two nationalist intelligentsias. Nationalist leaders normally pursue the following three tasks:

1. to mobilize their constituencies through common symbols and values
2. to allocate a 'division of labour' within the movement and, in this way, control radical deviations and inter-generational tensions.
3. to convey the message that, if the nation is fatally threatened, they are able defend it through their programme of moral regeneration.

These three points have had opposite effects on our two case-studies:

1. The Catalan intelligentsia could mobilize vast numbers through the use of specific symbols and values (namely, language), and in their defence. The Basque intelligentsia could not achieve the same result.
2. At a time when political nationalism was still quiescent, the Catalan youth was drawn into the struggle for cultural regeneration. Lacking a similar tradition of cultural nationalism

and without a corresponding 'division of labour', the disoriented Basque youth was more prone to engage in other forms of struggle.

3. The Catalanist leaders could reassure their constituencies that the nation could be saved through their own programme of cultural regeneration. In contrast, the Basque youth was disenchanted with the incapacity of the old leadership to put forward a programme of national regeneration and decided to act on their own.

These three factors prompted Basque radicals to drift towards political violence, a drift which was continuously reinforced by state repression. Cultural nationalism functions not simply as a binding force, but particularly as a way to channel the energies of enthusiastic young nationalists who are eager to act with all available means. It follows that, without a thriving cultural nationalism, the chances are greater for such nationalist youth to engage in political violence.

Nationalism as border-making

The state is the most powerful institution in the modern world. Given that nationalism is also an ideology aimed at the control of the state by the nation, it should not be surprising that nationalism is also the most powerful contemporary ideology. Nevertheless, scholarship has reacted tardily to such evidence and the study of nationalism has belatedly emerged as an academic discipline in its own right. Hence, theories of nationalism are deficient in various respects and omit essential aspects of the phenomenon. For instance, few of the mainstream theories of nationalism starts from the crucial consideration that nationalism is a form of border creation and/or maintenance.⁵⁵² Borders are needed to ensure a distinction between two or more differentiable groups, or the spaces they inhabit, which could otherwise be confused and intermingle with each other. Borders are a natural mechanism of both individual and group defence and are an universal phenomenon occurring amongst all living beings.

However, the process is enormously facilitated when such borders include some clear differential markers or signposts.⁵⁵³ In the process of universal homogenization which has characterized modernity, many ethnies have lost their distinctive customs, laws, mores, traditions, etc. Nevertheless, this process of erosion of traditional societies has left almost unscathed historical memories and even myths of original independence which are at the heart of national identities (Smith 1986, 1991). Hence, the potential for nationalist mobilization

⁵⁵² On this, see Breuilly (1993).

⁵⁵³ The concept of 'cultural markers' has also been used by Gellner (1973).

and conflict has remained intact despite cultural assimilation. The nationalist leaders' job is to reawaken such 'slumbering' human material, giving voice and putting order to a set of often confused popular perceptions and myths. This job will be facilitated enormously if the leaders can focus the loyalty of their people around some shared symbols of identity or core values, and if they can express this in a distinct language.

The thesis has looked at how this process of national reawakening has worked in two opposed cases, that is, cultural persistence (Catalonia) and cultural assimilation (Euskadi). Firstly, the thesis showed that cultural preconditions and the anthropological landscape have had a determining impact on the evolution of the two nationalist movements. Secondly, it appeared that cultural fragmentation brings with it fragmented conceptions of national identity. Hence, cultural fragmentation paves the way to political fragmentation. Thirdly, it analysed the role of state repression in reinforcing previously weak or confused ethnic boundaries. Fourthly, it theorized the influence of cultural vitality and state action on the violent or non-violent character of nationalist mobilization.

An underlying rationale of the thesis was to uncover the fallacy of those who still believe that the advent of a global culture could inspire peace and prosperity through a lessening of conflict. This is far from the truth and a rapid glance at the map of world conflicts (Gurr 1993, Gurr and Scarritt 1989, Harff and Gurr 1989) will enable us to see that all of them have emerged in situations of close cultural contact and, for most of them, such contact has resulted in assimilation of the weaker by the dominant culture. Thus, in endless cases, violent conflicts have been revived by weak identities, and weak identities have been rejuvenated through violent conflicts. However, the use of violence results in a further contradiction: it brings about more disruption of the local culture, mass mobilization and homogenization (the two concepts must be treated in tandem), and massive human losses. Nevertheless, it also reinforces boundary perceptions, disrupting multicultural coexistence and reviving centuries-old antagonisms, which once triggered have a power of their own. As shown in countless cases, among which the Yugoslav conflict stands out, once a conflict is initiated, people are helplessly drawn into it on each side. The more violent the conflict, the more likely that 'unhyphenated' individuals with no predetermined allegiances are compelled to take sides.

Through a reappraisal of the role played by cultural factors, my thesis has related them to the process of boundary making and boundary maintenance. The vitality of these cultural factors is thus related to the vitality of cultural nationalism, which, in turn, is linked to the

elites' different formulations of national identity. A final finding has been that violence is used to reinforce ethnic boundaries when the latter are particularly weak or under threat.

GLOSSARY of TERMS

BASQUE TERMS

aberrietsai= enemy of the fatherland

aberrigabe= person with no country

aberrigabetasun= state of being without a country

aberritasun=patriotism

aberriordeko= adopted homeland

aberrikeria= national chauvinism

Aberri Eguna= Day of the Fatherland (coinciding with Easter Sunday)

abertzale= patriot (p. *abertzaleak*; Sp. *abertzales*)

abertzalekeria= chauvinism

abertzaletasun= patriotism

abertzaletu =to become a patriot

alderdi= political party

aldikatzia= *aldikatz*= act of alternating, substituting

batzar= meeting, reunion, session

batzoki= meeting place (referred to the PNV centres)

baserri= farmhouse, homestead (pl. *baserriak*)

baserritar= farmer, country dweller, peasant (pl. *baserritarrak*)

batasuna= unity, union, unification

batúa= standard unified Basque (from *bat*= one, *batu*= to unify)

bertsolari= troubadour

Donostia = San Sebastián

ekinkide= militant

ekinkideria= militant group

ekintasun=persistence, perseverance

ekintza= action, activity, undertaking; ETA's action, normally a killing.

ekintzaile= activist

erdara / *erdera*= foreign language (normally, Spanish or French)

erdaldun/ erdeldun = Spanish-speaker, popularly used as 'foreigner'

Ertzainza= Basque police

Euskadi/Euzkadi= Basque Country (as a political entity)

Euskal Herri/ Euskalerrria/ etc.= Basque Country (historical name)

euskaldun= Basque-speaker, Basque population (=autochthonous; originally, Basque

speaking)

euskaldundu= to become Basque and to learn Basque

euskaldunberri= new Basque speaker (not necessarily an immigrant)

euskaldun-zaharra = old Basque speaker (*zaharra* = old)

euskaltegi= Basque school or language centre

Euskaltzaindia= Basque Language Academy

euskaltzale/ euskozale= Bascophile

euskaltzaletasun/ euskozaletasun= love of all things Basque

euskara/ euskera= Basque language

Euskaros= members of the Asociación Euskara

Euskalerriacos= members of the Asociación Euskalerria

Eusko Jauriaritza= Basque-government

etarra= ETA member

fueroak/ fueros= local charters and laws

Gasteiz= Vitoria (capital of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi)

gudari= warrior, soldier, fighter (part. Basque soldier) (pl. *gudariak*)

Hegoaldea= South; Southern Euskadi (the four Spanish provinces)

herri= country, nation; people, population; town, village

Iparralde= North; Northern Euskadi (the three French provinces)

ikaratzaille= terrorist

ikastola= Basque school

ikur= symbol, sign

ikurrin/ ikurriña= Basque flag

itzjostaldiak or *itzjostaketak*= literary competitions

kulturgintza/ euskalgintza= promotion of [Basque] culture, cultural activity

lehendakari= president (of the Basque government)

maketo= pejorative for non-Basque immigrant (used by Sabino Arana, no longer used)

mendigoizale= mountaineer, mountain climber, alpinist

CATALAN TERMS

barri= quarter, borough

Jocs Florals= Floral Games (poetry contexts)

Modernisme= Modernism, local variant of Art Nouveau, Liberty, etc.

murciano= From Murcia, extended to most immigrants in the 1930s

rauxa= impetuosity, propensity for violence,

sardana= Catalan national dance

Els Segadors = Catalan national hymn
seny= common sense,
senyera= Catalan flag
tertúlias= informal group of friends who regularly meet to discuss
xarnego= pejorative for immigrant (lit., half-bred)

SPANISH TERMS

aldeano= rustic
andereños= Basque teachers, especially in the ikastolas
anteiglesia= old Basque administrative division (broadly, parish)
barrio= quarter, borough
bunker= the extreme right (esp. the military during the Transition)
caciquismo= mainly referred to electoral corruption during the Restoration
conciertos económicos= special tax privileges granted to the Basques
desarrollismo= ideology of development as panacea for all social diseases
diputación= provincial assembly/ government
españolista= pejorative for Hispanicist (sometime used as 'traitor')
fuerismo= foralism, defence of the fueros (esp. in local historiography)
gobernador civil= civil governor, appointed by Madrid
hidalguía colectiva= collective nobility
interior= inside Spain (as opposed to exile)
limpieza de sangre= cleanliness of blood
milagro económico= economic boom
nacionalcatolicismo= official Francoist doctrine merging Spanish nationalism with the defence of Catholicism
obrerista= dedicated to the working-class struggle
peneuvista= member of the PNV
rojo separatistas= epithet which the Falangists used to address their common enemy, 'reds' and 'separatists' (both terms to be intended in a very broad sense)
tercermundismo= Third-Worldism

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