

THE GREEK RIGHT:
STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY
OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY

by

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ABSTRACT

The main issues on which the present study is focused are the foundation of the New Democracy party (ND) in 1974; its political personnel, leadership, organisation, ideology, electoral strategy and overall performance from 1974 until 1990 at both the national and the local level; as well as the extent to which ND resembled and/or differed from the traditional practices of its predecessor, the National Radical Union (ERE).

The analysis and interpretation of ND not only comprises new empirical information obtained from our research in Greece, but also takes into account the specific characteristics and nature of the post-1974 socio-political system within which all the political parties have operated. Moreover, comparisons between ND and ERE go beyond the party level. In order to obtain rather more comprehensive and satisfactory explanations concerning the nature and exact political identity of ND (and, secondarily, of ERE), we expanded our analytical scope to include the broader socio-political characteristics of the two systems within which ERE and ND were created, functioned and interrelated. In other words, in our attempt to analyse ND, we used not only the explanatory variables of the party's historical background, political personnel, organisation, leadership and ideology, but also the specific features of the political systems within which ND and its predecessor ERE were set up, as well as the extent to which both parties were influenced by and themselves affected and shaped the broader socio-political environment.

Taking into consideration all of the new empirical information and comparing ND with ERE, with the other major post-1974 Greek parties (particularly the Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK), as well as with many West European conservative parties, it is argued that ND should not be seen as simply a mere continuation of ERE, nor as a completely new and modern political formation. Although throughout the period under examination ND presented elements of continuity with its predecessor, it also gave evidence of change and modernisation, and demonstrated the characteristics of both a clientelist and a mass party of the Western European kind. Notwithstanding the coexistence and specific articulation among traditional and modern elements within its ranks —at times complementary, at other times not— ND today is still going through a transitional period. Whether or not this will lead to its full transformation into a modern mass party and an integrative political force of the Right, depends on a wide range of factors (operating from both within and outside the party), and remains to be seen.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADEDY	Anotati Dioikissi Enosseon Dimossion Ypallilon (Supreme Administration of the Unions of Civil Servants)
ASEA	Anotato Symvoulío Ethnikis Amynis (Supreme Committee of National Defence)
CDS	Centro Democrático e Social (Social and Democratic Centre, Portugal)
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
DAKE	Dimokratiki Anexartiti Kinissi Ergazomenon (Democratic Independent Movement of Workers)
DAP/NDFK	Dimokratiki Ananeotiki Protoporia/ Nea Dimokratiki Foititiki Kinissi (Democratic Renewing Vanguard/ New Democratic Movement of Students)
DE	Dimokratiki Enosis (Democratic Union)
DIANA	Dimocratiki Ananeossi (Democratic Renewal)
EA	Enomeni Aristera (United Left)
EAK	Ethniko Agrotiko Komma (National Rural Party)
EAM	Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (National Liberation Front)
EAR	Elliniki Aristera (Greek Left)
EAS	Epiheirissi Astikon Syngoinonion (Corporation of Civil Transport)
EDA	Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (United Democratic Left)
EDE	Ethniki Dimokratiki Enosis (National Democratic Union)
EDIK	Enosis Dimokratikou Kendrou (Union of the Democratic Centre)
EGE	Enossi Gynaikon Elladas (Women's Union of Greece)
EK	Enosis Kendrou (Centre Union)
EK/ND	Enosis Kendrou/Neas Dynameis (Centre Union/New Forces)
EKO	Epangelmatiki Kommatiki Organossi (Occupational Party Organisation)

EKOF Ethniki Koinoniki Organossis Foititon
(National Social Organisation of Students)

ELAS Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos
(National People's Liberation Army)

ELK Enossis Laikon Kommaton
(Union of Peoples' Parties)

EON Ethniki Organossis Neon
(National Youth Organisation)

EP Ethniki Parataxis
(National Camp)

EPEK Ethniki Proodeftiki Enossis Kendrou
(National Progressive Centre Union)

ERE Ethniki Rizospastiki Enossis
(National Radical Union)

EREN Ethniki Rizospastiki Enossis Neon
(National Radical Union of Youth)

ERK Elliniko Rizospastiko Kinima
(Greek Radical Movement)

ESK Elliniko Sosialistiko Komma
(Greek Socialist Party)

GSEE Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Elladas
(General Confederation of Greek Labour)

IDEA Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon
(Sacred Bond of Greek Officers)

KKE Kommounistiko Komma Elladas
(Communist Party of Greece)

KKE (es.) Kommounistiko Komma Elladas (esoterikou)
(Communist Party of Greece (of the interior))

KODISO Komma Dimokratikou Sosialismou
(Party of Democratic Socialism)

KP Komma Proodeftikon
(Party of Progressive People)

KPEE Kendro Politikis Erewnis ke Epimorfosseos
(Centre for Political Research and Information)

KPO Kanonismos Perifereiakis Organosseos
(Peripheral Organisation Regulation)

KYP Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion
(Central Intelligence Agency)

ND Nea Dimokratia
(New Democracy)

NE Nomarchiaki Epitropi
(Departmental Committee)

NO	Nomarchiaki Organossi (Departmental Organisation)
NODE	Nomarchiaki Dioikoussa Epitropi (Departmental Administrative Committee)
NOE	Nomarchiaki Oikonomiki Epitropi (Departmental Financial Committee)
NOMEKE	Nomarchiaki Ektelestiki Epitropi (Departmental Executive Committee)
NOPS	Nomarchiako Peitharhiko Symvoulío (Departmental Disciplinary Council)
ONNED	Organossi Neon Neas Dimokratias (New Democracy Youth Organisation)
PADE	Proodeftiki Agrotiki Dimokratiki Enosis (Progressive Rural Democratic Union)
PAME	Pandimokratiko Agrotiko Metopo Ellados (Pandemocratic Rural Front of Greece)
PASEGES	Panellinia Synomospondia Enosseon Georgikon Synetairismon (Panhellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives)
PASOK	Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement)
POLAN	Politiki Anoixi (Political Spring)
RPF	Rassemblement du Peuple Francais (Rally of the French People)
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic, France)
SEN	Soma Elpidoforon Neon (Hopeful Youth Corps)
SEV	Syndesmos Ellinikon Viomihanion (Association of Greek Industries)
SYN	Synaspismos tis Aristeras ke tis Proodou (Coalition of the Left and Progress)
TE	Topiki Epitropi (Local Committee)
TEA	Tagmata Ethnikis Amynis (National Defence Battallions)
TO	Topiki Organossi (Local Organisation)
UCD	Unión del Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre Union, Spain)
UDR	Union des Démocrates pour la République (Union of the Democrats for the Republic, France)

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The complete absence of a detailed and comprehensive analysis concerning the reconstitution of the right-wing political forces in Greece since the restoration of democracy in 1974, and the formation and overall performance of the conservative New Democracy (ND) party set up at that time, was the major motivation for the present study. Such an analysis has been overdue for some time, given the fact that it was the ND party, under the leadership of its founder C. Karamanlis, that polled an unprecedented 54.37 per cent of the popular vote in 1974, and took the lead in not only representing the conservative political forces, but also in carrying out the difficult task of changing to and consolidating what must be acknowledged as the most open, competitive, and fully democratic regime the country has ever experienced.

Although several articles have been published concerning ND's characteristic features and political identity, they were not the result of scientifically impartial enquires. On the contrary, they were blatantly biased either for or against ND, and openly served party-political propaganda purposes. Most of them dealt almost exclusively with the question of whether ND was indeed a totally new political formation, as claimed by the party itself, or a simple regrouping of the same political forces that had been represented by the National Radical Union (ERE) during most of the pre-coup period, as asserted by its political opponents.⁽¹⁾

The inter-party controversy has not added much to the identification, analysis, and explanation of ND's characteristics since,

depending on the personal political stance of each "analyst" vis-à-vis the party and its founder, the respective views ranged from complete accordance with ND claims —that the party was not only a totally new political formation, entirely dissociated from past political practices, but also a national party, which was alone in serving solely the true interests of the people and so stood quite outside the "misleading, arbitrary and absurd Right-Centre-Left classification"— to intense polemics, asserting that it was nothing but the old ERE under a new name. In the end, it was the latter view that came to predominate, partly because ND, having failed to elaborate a concrete and coherent ideology of its own, lost power to the opposition, which then stepped up its attack on ND as a mere continuation of ERE and denigrated it for not only its own past record but just as much for that of the ERE. As a result, issues concerning particular party characteristics, especially the systematic establishment and the functioning of ND's organisation and the belated elaboration of its ideological principles, were almost totally ignored.⁽²⁾

All in all, then, in the post-1974 political discourse, ND received no more attention than the above ill-documented, narrow and simplistic polemic, confined to the issue of whether the party had or had not departed from past practices, and whether or not it had dissociated itself from its predecessor's politics. If it is also taken into account that in the early years after 1974 it was anti-dictatorship, anti-Right and radical liberal and leftist attitudes and ideas that emerged and became dominant, it will be more readily understood that ND as "the bearer of reactionary and authoritarian right-wing political tradition" was condemned and dismissed altogether.⁽³⁾

Instead, the bulk of political analysis and examination during the early post-1974 years centred on the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and its leader Andreas Papandreu. Its radical and coherent

ideology, its effectively militant mass organisation, its introduction of an unprecedented number of newcomers to politics and its outstanding electoral performance, as well as the charismatic personality of its leader have resulted in numerous studies of PASOK itself, its relation to pre-coup political parties, the extent to which is a departure from past political practices and, since 1981 when it came to power, in how far it has managed to enforce its projected policies and what kind of overall governmental record it can show.⁽⁴⁾ In the meantime, although ND had already begun its belated and slow process towards the elaboration of a centre-Right (and later neo-conservative) ideology and the creation and development of a grass-roots organisation, very little if any attention was paid to the party, which continued to be considered a continuation of ERE and as such was heavily stigmatised by the latter's pre-coup authoritarian and repressive legacy.

All in all, apart from harangues excessively for or against ND, little more was written about the party characteristics in Greek, and almost nothing in English; moreover, there is a complete lack of empirical data on the party's history, political personnel, grass-roots organisation and electoral strategy. The present study aims to fill this gap, by presenting, analysing and evaluating empirical information about ND at both national and the local level. Our analysis of the party will be carried out in a historical and theoretical context that will allow an impartial, factually-based and cogent explanation of the nature of the party, its precise political identity, and its relationship not only to ERE but also to PASOK as the other major post-1974 party, as well as other West European conservative parties. In other words, it seeks to show that, first, the creation and nature of ND in 1974 cannot be simplistically considered as either a rejuvenation of ERE, or as some spectacular new political start. A systematic and detailed examination of ND's historical background will give us a better understanding of the

specific characteristics of the post-1949 dominant political system and allow comparisons with ERE to see in how far ND continued and/or diverted from the political practices of its predecessor. It will also show that, although within the open and democratic political system after 1974 ND constituted a reformed and more moderate representative of the conservative political forces, its full transformation into a modern party of the Western European kind remained incomplete, given that it has failed to articulate a coherent and distinctive ideological identity, and did not create an effective mass organisation that could free the party from having to rely on its traditional personalistic and clientelist practices.

The research for this work was conducted in two separate phases. It began at party headquarters in Athens in October 1987, and until September 1988 consisted mainly of a study of the party's publications since the year of its foundation, and of various other documents on ND's ideological principles and grass-roots organisation. (With few exceptions, most of the documents I asked for were given to me). As there were no data concerning ND's predecessor (ERE), prominent ND members were interviewed who had been elected as ERE members in the pre-coup period, and who continued their political careers in the ND ranks for some time after 1974. ND deputies who first came to politics in 1974 were also interviewed, as well as leading members of ONNED, ND's youth organisation.⁽⁵⁾

The second phase started in September 1988 and lasted until July 1989. It took place in the Department of Larissa, in the region of Thessaly in central Greece. The aim of the research was to study the ND organisation and the rank and file at the local level; the Department of Larissa was chosen because, with its social and political statistics (the composition of its population, labour distribution, election results) largely reflecting the national ones, we expected to acquire a

more comprehensive and objective impression concerning ND's specific features. The fieldwork research consisted of interviews with local MPs, higher party members, and various prominent ND sympathisers and supporters, as well as of interviews based on a pre-structured questionnaire to be answered by ordinary party members.⁽⁶⁾

A 5 per cent simple random sample from the party membership in the city of Larissa was selected, plus all of the party members in the small village of Kalohori. Although it had initially been agreed to conduct these interviews face-to-face, in the end this proved impossible; in Larissa and Kalohori it was ND's local-committee presidents who themselves distributed the questionnaires to the party members, and not all of them were returned afterwards. In the meantime, I managed to interview 18 party members personally (out of the 63 originally selected from the local committee of the city centre); as election day (18 June 1989) was coming closer, the local party headquarters did not allow me to complete my research, on the grounds that party members should be left to carry out party-political propaganda work, and to do their utmost to help ND resume office.

Despite these difficulties, the total number of those who answered the questionnaires (158 party members) is quite significant and provided considerable and interesting data concerning the party base. Nevertheless, this information should be evaluated with due caution and reservation —first, because the study remained incomplete and, second, because the representativeness of our sample is uncertain. For all that, the answers given by the rank and file on a broad range of party issues, coupled with information obtained through both formal interviews and informal discussions with local MPs, higher party members as well as ex-party members and prominent ND supporters not directly involved in politics at the time, significantly complemented our knowledge of the

party, and in the end provided a much more comprehensive picture of its nature and particular characteristics.⁽⁷⁾

The present study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents a detailed account of the historical context within which ND's predecessor, ERE, was created and also its general performance. Moreover, the specific features of what came to be called "repressive parliamentarism" are analysed —not only in order to understand the historic roots of ND, but also to obtain a more complete picture of both the social and political reality at the time, and to determine the interrelation and specific linkages between the dominant socio-political system and the political parties in general.

Chapter 2 deals exclusively with the creation of ND in 1974 right after the collapse of the military dictatorship, and the establishment of the post-junta open democratic regime. More specifically, the analysis focuses on the special circumstances prevailing at the time ND was founded, as well as on the transitional process that ultimately led to the consolidation of democracy in the country as a whole, a process that —at least in the beginning— was carried out and supervised by ND, and particularly by its founder and first leader, C. Karamanlis.

ND's particular characteristics concerning political personnel, organisation and ideology are analysed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The analysis covers a sixteen-year period (1974-1990), and all changes in the party leadership and ideology, as well as the major developments concerning ND's organisational expansion and its overall performance, are taken into account.

Chapter 6 deals with ND in action. It includes a local case-study of ND in the Department of Larissa, which provides new empirical information concerning the party's characteristics, functioning and politics at the local level; moreover, the analysis includes an examination of ND's behaviour and performance shortly before and during

the June 1989 elections, which brought PASOK's fall from power and ND's return to office after eight years in opposition. Chapters 3 to 6 inclusive use information obtained from our research in Greece, together with data drawn from the Greek and foreign press.

Chapter 7 presents our concluding remarks. A systematic comparison between ERE and ND is followed by another comparison of the specific characteristics of the two dominant socio-political systems (that of between 1949 and 1967 and the post-1974 one respectively). The results of these two analyses are the basis for our final assessment of ND's specific nature and exact political identity.

CHAPTER ONE: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE GREEK RIGHT

FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE 1967 DICTATORSHIP

1. Introduction

A. After the end of the civil war (which was fought, intermittently from 1944 until 1949), Greece entered a period of rapid economic development and relative political stability, which ended with the Colonels' coup on 21 April 1967. In this chapter we shall try to give an overall account of the major social, political and economic features of that period; this will facilitate a better understanding of the post-dictatorial formation (1974 onwards) of the new democratic regime. First, however, it will be useful, to take a brief look at certain characteristics that had developed in Greece's politics and economy since the country acquired its independence (1832), in order to have a fuller picture of the socio-economic and political background.

After the War of Independence, Greece emerged as a "...predominantly agrarian society with very low social overhead capital and a non-existent industry" (in English originally).⁽¹⁾ At the risk of overgeneralisation, one may argue that this pre-capitalist state of affairs lasted for about fifty years (1830-1880). Thereafter, the country's economy entered a transitional period leading to its large-scale industrialisation, which finally began in 1922 when, after the Asia Minor debacle, more than one million Greek refugees swarmed into a country with a five-million population. On the one hand, this massive influx of people created severe disruptions, with fundamental

consequences for the Greek social structure.⁽²⁾ But, on the other, it acted as an "imported proletariat"⁽³⁾ that accelerated the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation already shaped in the 1880-1922 transition period.⁽⁴⁾ It should seem, then, that from 1922 onwards the country entered a new phase of development in which the capitalist mode of production can be said to have become dominant. What is inarguable is that the Greek capitalist model did not develop according to the West European one but followed a route of its own, often characterised as "uneven development" and comprising features of pre-capitalist underdevelopment. We shall return to the examination of these features, and to the reasons for their emergence, later in this chapter.

All capitalist institutions being lacking in the young Greek state, political, and more generally state institutions were imported, themselves the products of Western capitalist development. As might have been expected, they could not be adapted and function properly within a socio-economic environment that had neither the capacity nor the capability to assimilate and integrate them. While in the West European states industrialisation had preceded the adaptation of democratic parliamentary political institutions, in the Greek case the opposite was true: imported political institutions presaged the development of capitalism proper.⁽⁵⁾ Consequently, one can identify from the very beginning a mal-integration or, as another scholar has put it, a "tense and sterile symbiosis"⁽⁶⁾ between state and society. Autonomous voluntary associations were almost totally absent, and the civil society was extremely weak and heavily dependent upon an expansionist, paternalistic, and omnipotent state.⁽⁷⁾ It hardly managed to curb or propose limits to the latter's ever expanding activity; instead, the shoe was on the other foot. Consequently, political struggle centred on the issue of controlling the state apparatus which, little by little, acquired disproportionately big dimensions. So it was the state that took

the lead in carrying out the task of the country's industrialisation, instead of playing the moderating arbiter's role as had been the case in the West European democracies.⁽⁸⁾ This circumstance was of great importance for the country's overall process of capitalist development, a process which deviated from the Western pattern and comprised—and still does—features of underdevelopment.⁽⁹⁾

Greek political life meanwhile was dominated for almost a century (1832-1922) by the so-called Megali Idea, the Dream of a Greater Hellas.⁽¹⁰⁾ Although the country, after the end of the War of Independence, was economically ruined, physically desolate, and highly dependent on the foreign Great Powers, the main everyday issue was the re-establishment of the fifteenth-century Helleno-Byzantine empire. Greek irredentism was omnipresent, as if it were the country's one and only problem.

One can barely speak about political parties at that time. The country's political destiny was in the hands of the so-called tzakia, a handful of notable families that had played a dominant role during the War of Independence and continued to do so afterwards, until the reforms instituted by E. Venizelos in 1910.⁽¹¹⁾ Political parties, at the time, were "simple coteries of personalities, heading extensive clientelistic networks".⁽¹²⁾ As one historian remarked, "...political parties were personal; political struggle revolved around persons and not ideas; nuclei of organisation were formed around persons and not around parties".⁽¹³⁾ This political struggle, moreover, did not concern issues emerging out of class differences, but centred on quarrels over the distribution of spoils.⁽¹⁴⁾ Add to this picture the growing royal and army interference in politics (the King was the nominal head of state⁽¹⁵⁾ and the nucleus for the tzakia establishment),⁽¹⁶⁾ as well as the foreign interference in the country's internal affairs (which until 1947 was predominantly British, thereafter American), and it becomes

obvious what a multitude of structural discrepancies and drawbacks heavily influenced the country's socio-economic and political processes and are highly answerable for the course that was finally adopted. The so-called "uneven development" is to a great extent an outcome of these discrepancies.

The year 1910 was a turning point in Greek history, both because it signalled the rise of the middle classes,^{'17'} and with regard to the political process. The latter showed the beginning of some kind of rationalisation, due to the reforms of E. Venizelos.^{'18'} At the same time, patronage politics and clientelistic networks did not disappear although, as new classes entered the political arena, the tzakia families began to weaken with the general broadening of political participation and integration.^{'19'}

It is at this time, namely in December 1911, when some prominent political personalities^{'20'} met at Gastouni in the Peloponnese, and under the leadership of D. Gounaris formed themselves into a political team rather than a party. This political team, together with some of the representatives of the old regime,^{'21'} acted as the main opposition to Venizelos. Later, in February 1915, when Venizelos' government had resigned,^{'22'} and the King appointed D. Gounaris to the premiership, the latter became the rallying point for a good number of MPs and politicians.^{'23'} The result was the formation, under the leadership of Gounaris and the "Gastouni meeting" politicians, of the Party of Nationally-Minded People, which in October 1920 changed its name to People's Party.

Generally speaking, the "Right"^{'24'} during this period (1910-1922) has been presented as a gathering of hide-bound and reactionary oligarchic forces, refusing renewal and reform, opposing even changes that would favour the preservation of the *status quo*.^{'25'} Indeed,

"...opposition to Venizelos' political message, actions, and even his personality as such, was the primary founding element of the conservative camp, in combination perhaps with a vague ideology of preserving the socio-political *status quo*. Very soon, though, Venizelos' political opponents sought for a common identity under the banner of the crown, which hereafter operated as the unifying force of their camp, their essential camp-leader, and their alternative to the Venizelist legend".⁽²⁶⁾

This transitional period came to an end in 1922 with the Asia Minor debacle, which discredited the institution of the monarchy, shattered the Megali Idea, and introduced a new major dividing line within political life; namely that of the constitutional question.⁽²⁷⁾ The nation split into two. The supporters of Venizelos and the republican ideal rallied to Venizelos' Liberal Party, and those who were anti-Venizelists and supporters of the monarchy, chose the People's Party of D. Gounaris. The issue tormented and harmed the country until the imposition of the Metaxas dictatorship in August 1936, and served again to distract the people's attention from aggravating social issues and differences; it discouraged horizontal organisation and preserved patronage politics; and it ultimately divided the nation so deeply that, even after the end of the civil war, the wounds still festered. The constitutional issue was the country's first serious split. Its main outcome was the creation and polarisation of two major groupings/camps within Greek society: on one side were the Liberals, who opted for modernisation, reform, disentanglement from the past, and for parliamentary democracy without a king but with a president as the figure-head of state; and on the other was the People's Party, which opted for the establishment of the monarchy and the preservation of the *status quo*.⁽²⁸⁾ In the end, a quasi-totalitarian⁽²⁹⁾ form of the latter prevailed (i.e. the Metaxas dictatorship), and set the foundations for what later, after the end of the civil war in 1949, came to dominate Greek society continuously until 1967: the use of a mixture of

exclusionist/incorporative modes of political control,⁽³⁰⁾ exercised by a quasi-authoritarian, albeit parliamentary, right-wing political regime.

B. To explain how and why the Metaxas dictatorship came to be established falls outside the scope of this study.⁽³¹⁾ We shall restrict ourselves to a brief examination of the developments in the political process from after the dissolution of democracy in 1936 until the end of the civil war in late 1949.

When General Metaxas imposed his dictatorship, he suspended political freedoms and put the country under military rule. Political organisations were dissolved and the political world, largely stayed aloof, disliking perhaps what was happening, but not resisting it dynamically.⁽³²⁾ Metaxas then colonised the state bureaucracy with his own followers, purged the army of its Liberal elements and set up corporate bodies (like for example EON, the National Youth Organization), that were imbued with nationalistic ideologies, being organised like their nazi and fascist counterparts in Germany and Italy. As A. Papandreou observed,

"...lacking a massive social base of any kind, Metaxas was left with only one alternative: heavy reliance on the repressive aspects of fascism. In this he proved a master, and he left a permanent imprint on the public life of Greece. Metaxas was the first to introduce the concept of a modern totalitarian state, complete with official guidance of the press, censorship of artistic creation and a compulsory National Youth Organisation of para-military character".⁽³³⁾

His regime's quasi-totalitarian profile is more fully mapped if one adds the systematic persecution of his opponents, especially leftists, through appropriate legislation and the numerically unprecedented deportation of his political opponents to concentration camps.⁽³⁴⁾ The dictator's death coincided with the outbreak of World War II, and his

regime did not immediately collapse. On the contrary, many of his ministers and colleagues were collaborating with the Germans who had occupied the country. The bulk of the Greek population, meanwhile, was on the side of EAM (National Liberation Front), a communist-led organisation, that managed to take the lead in the struggle against the country's invaders.

With the end of World War II, EAM was the only real power in the country, the National Government and the King having been in exile in the Middle East. Due to various reasons and circumstances, which again cannot be analysed here,⁽³⁵⁾ EAM did not seize power but opted for collaboration with the National Government under certain conditions to be agreed upon.⁽³⁶⁾ Instead, the country was rent by civil war, which ended in 1949 in favour of the right-wing (and liberal) forces, after considerable economic and military aid from the Americans, who had meanwhile undertaken the duty of protecting Greece (soon after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947). It should be stressed here, however, that the civil war put an indelible stamp on the division and polarisation of Greek society; officially it ended in 1949, but in fact it did not do so until 1974,⁽³⁷⁾ and in some respects its impact can still be felt in Greek society today.

2. The Post-War Situation

2.1 The regime level

2.1.1 The economy

As it was mentioned already, the Right emerged victorious from the civil war. This was followed by a new national split, that was to remain a feature of right-wing government throughout its political domination,

and even until the restoration of democracy in 1974: this was the separation of Greeks into "nationally minded" or ethnikofrones on the one hand, and on the other into "non-ethnikofrones", who would either be actual communists or at least fellow-travellers. Anti-communism, in other words, became the banner of the Right and, in combination with other characteristic features of the post civil war Greek social formation,⁽³⁸⁾ the dominant ideological system.⁽³⁹⁾ The Right, as mentioned above, was already closely associated with the monarchy, and hereafter was to establish a firm and close relationship with "Atlanticism", i.e. with the USA and the NATO alliance.⁽⁴⁰⁾

The analysis of this period will begin with an outline of the Greek economy. World War II and the civil war had devastated the country,⁽⁴¹⁾ and especially the civil war brought the economic situation to a new low. It was only in the mid-1950s that Greek capitalism managed to get back to its pre-war levels of output, and thereafter the economy began to grow at a fast rate (6 per cent per year on average).⁽⁴²⁾ If the apparent political stability of the post-war years and until 1965 is also taken into account, it seems logical to assume that the Greek economy would, at some point, have managed to overcome its pre-war features of underdevelopment and entered into the stage of full capitalist development, of capitalism proper.

Nevertheless, this proved not to be the case. First of all, the Greek bourgeoisie was then, and is still, of a predominantly commercial character;⁽⁴³⁾ one could plausibly argue that, even with all other factors necessary for rapid industrialisation present, this merchant class would hardly transform itself into an industrial elite. Second—and this complements the previous argument—regardless of various state initiatives, Greek capital refused to direct itself into those key manufacturing sectors (metallurgy and chemicals, in other words sectors which constitute a sort of industrial substructure),⁽⁴⁴⁾ where growth

has great transformative power and important multiplying effects on the rest of the economy.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Third, as K. Vergopoulos noted,⁽⁴⁶⁾ after World War II the state became responsible for the creation of another, peripheral bourgeoisie, one that would ensure the country's insertion into the international economy without any obstructions. As Spyros Markesinis, the "economic brain" of right-wing economic policy in general and of the 1953 stabilisation of the drachma, has said in one of his speeches, "...because it finds itself between two social extremes, the middle class always acts as a guardian of the regime. It always constitutes a precious element of stability and balance upholding the bourgeois regime".⁽⁴⁷⁾ Needless to say that the vanguard of this newly formed bourgeoisie consisted of a motley assortment of people with dubious ethical backgrounds, and its very creation was, to a large extent, due to economic collaboration with the Germans during the four years of the country's occupation. (For example, during these four years 6,500 private enterprises were created).⁽⁴⁸⁾

After 1944, and especially after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947, American intervention in Greece took over from the British in encouraging the formation of the new bourgeoisie and, whether deliberately or not, tried to consolidate national, social, and economic integration through reinforcement of the relative strength of the state apparatus.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The state, for its part, did not try to suppress these new middle classes or civil society generally, but was mainly interested in profiting from their enrichment, asserting itself, and being acknowledged as the ruling power of the system in its entirety.⁽⁵⁰⁾ (It is not surprising that many Greek Marxist economists speak of state-monopoly capitalism in post-war Greece, or of a state-bourgeois class.) In consequence, capitalist development in Greece did not take the form encountered in the West European societies. Given also the commercial orientation of the Greek bourgeoisie, the simple-

commodity production sector was not restricted or modernised but continued to coexist side by side with the industrial capitalist sector, so giving to the latter an enclave form. In addition, then, to the inequalities between labour and capital that could normally be expected, came vast inequalities between the technologically advanced and the backward sectors of the economy. Suffice it to mention here that, at that time, one thousand families (0.5 per cent of the population) earned more than half of all private income.⁽⁵¹⁾

It was only in 1950 that the Greek economy attained its 1938 production levels again. Two years later, Marshal Papagos inaugurated a period that was marked, first, by the political domination of the Right and, therefore, by relative political stability⁽⁵²⁾ lasting until 1963; and, second, by the achievement of a spectacular economic growth. During these twelve years —and especially during the eight years of his successor's premiership, from 1955 to 1963— the situation in Greece changed dramatically.

The reconstruction effort started in 1953 when the prominent member of Papagos' Greek Rally party, S. Markesinis, devaluated the country's currency by 50 per cent and thus became the architect of monetary stabilisation. From that time onwards, and particularly after 1955, the annual rate of growth was 5.9 per cent (as compared to an average of 4.6 per cent in the EEC countries), while the gross national product kept increasing by 6.4 per cent per year.⁽⁵³⁾ The average national per-capita income was U.S. dollars 305 in 1955, and by 1963 it had risen to \$565,⁽⁵⁴⁾ so leading to a substantial improvement in the population's living standard. This spectacular economic growth was due to a broad investment programme that was realized, mainly, during the C. Karamanlis premiership (1955-1963); these years are often called as the "golden eight year period".⁽⁵⁵⁾

Nevertheless, this economic growth did not manage to boost industrialisation proper. As A. Nikolaidis, the ex-representative of Greece in the OECD, has argued:

"...industrialisation met with infinite reactions, due to the consequences which it would probably cause to the export commerce of the interested countries, and also due to the economic autarchy which would be created in a few years for Greece. So, commercial, economic and political interests dictated to these countries [i.e., the countries which were offering economic aid] an unpretended enmity towards the plans for Greece's industrialisation".⁽⁵⁶⁾

Furthermore, the private sector was hesitant to invest in industry,⁽⁵⁷⁾ and when the state finally took on this task, mainly through public revenue, it did so unsystematically and without any long-term perspective. So for instance agriculture, which was undoubtedly modernised,⁽⁵⁸⁾ remained the biggest productive sector of the economy until 1960, when, and only then did industrial output for the first time exceed that of agriculture.⁽⁵⁹⁾

The above is reflected in and corroborates the situation with respect to the country's workforce. Greece at that time experienced a disproportionate increase of the urban population due to better working opportunities in the tertiary sector (or in small family units in artisanal enterprises coexisting side by side with the few big enterprises) and, secondly, considerable emigration abroad.

As P. Bakoyiannis has pointed out,⁽⁶⁰⁾ the foundation and the expansion of many British cities was basically due to industrial development and the proletarianisation of the rural population, which was channelled, as an industrial labour force, to the trade union-free cities. In contrast, the Greek cities (and mainly Athens) initially grew bigger due to the expansion of the service sector, namely that of the administration. Indeed, in 1961 the Greater Athens area absorbed more than half of the industrial work force, consumed 80 per cent of the

import trade, paid 75 per cent of direct and 65 per cent of indirect taxes, the average personal income of its population was 40 per cent higher than national average (which means that, despite economic growth and the increase in national per capita income, the latter was unequally distributed), and it housed the bulk of employees engaged in the various public services⁽⁶¹⁾ —yet it was not an industrial city. Less than a third of its registered active population was employed in industry. Of this one third, half were employed in small artisanal units of less than ten workers, which were usually simple family businesses. Over two thirds of the registered active population were absorbed by the overinflated tertiary sector, most usually through vertical clientelistic networks.⁽⁶²⁾ It has been estimated that during the 1951-1961 period, 600,000 people migrated internally, and that in the 1956-1961 period, 220,000 people swarmed into Athens;⁽⁶³⁾ 55 per cent of the latter were absorbed by the tertiary sector of the economy.

As mentioned already, the agricultural sector was the biggest productive sector until 1960. Despite —or indeed exactly because of — its limited modernisation,⁽⁶⁴⁾ it was still plagued by low productivity, underemployment, low wages, small land-ownership, single-crop cultivation, lack of fertilizers, and exploitation of the cultivators by the wholesalers, who usually offered very low prices for the produce.⁽⁶⁵⁾ The government took certain steps to combat these problems (investments in agriculture accounted for more than half of public spending), but again haphazardly and without a long-term perspective. To quote M. Serafetinidis:⁽⁶⁶⁾

"...on the one hand the presence of small holdings meant the fragmentation of the land and a lack of mechanisation which rendered the peasants' ownership of land a source of economic hardship and insecurity rather than of prosperity and growth. On the other hand, the commercialisation of agricultural production made the peasant dependent on and exploited by merchant and finance capital and gave him little opportunity to compete in the market and exploit

its impersonal dynamics in its favour" (in English originally).

The result was a massive exodus to the cities, to begin with, and the creation of unemployment that rapidly gained momentum, especially after 1955. At that time, when Europe was prospering and short of an adequate labour force, the developed countries looked for labour power in the countries of the South. Within ten years, 7 per cent of the Greek population had emigrated, the vast majority of the migrants being young people.⁽⁶⁷⁾ This means that the most troublesome of the masses of unemployed in the cities were gone, sending back generous remittances that covered the trade-deficit of the economy. Moreover, the workers in the small enterprises were more easily controlled. In the long run, these developments spelled danger to the socio-economic edifice, but in the meantime the social base of the Right was reinforced.⁽⁶⁸⁾

The Right's claim that it had achieved a Greek "economic miracle" is partly justified. When eventually it lost the 1963 elections, the average national per-capita income exceeded \$550. Although not rich, Greece was no longer a poor country. But this does not mean that it had entered the phase of economic development. Aside from the fact that the Right had created a more unequal and unfair society, its economic policy was inadequate for also purely economic reasons: it did not succeed in creating the full-employment opportunities that would have permitted the Greeks to remain in their own country. P. Bakoyiannis writes:

"... industrialisation is realized to the extent that the financial capital obtains prerogatives from the state to the detriment of internal and external antagonists. The phase of 'productive antagonistic capitalism' in Greece has been skipped".⁽⁶⁹⁾

In general, during this period (1952-1963) the foundations were laid for the creation of an economic infrastructure in the sectors of transportation, electricity, telecommunications, agriculture, and

finance/merchant capital. State investments in these sectors aimed at creating conditions that would attract private initiative into the directly productive sectors, but failed in their objective. The Greek economy did not change its traditional character. Until as late as the late fifties, the Greek economy managed to rebuild the damage of the 1940-1950 decade and to reproduce, on a quantitatively broader basis, the structures and relations of production that had characterised the economy before the war. No substantial qualitative transformation took place in its productive structure.⁽⁷⁰⁾

To conclude then, the main feature of the country's economy in the first decade after the civil war was still its salient underdevelopment: an overinflated, rapidly expanding tertiary sector; a badly organised and inefficient agricultural sector employing more than one-half of the labour force; and a weak, stagnating manufacturing sector.⁽⁷¹⁾ As a result, although the Greek economy could no longer be characterised as underdeveloped, the claim that its course (and present state) of development took an "uneven" form, or that both development and underdevelopment characteristics coexist side by side⁽⁷²⁾ —this is, we think, fully justified.

2.1.2 The polity

It should have become clear from the preceding analysis that (a) the task of the country's industrialisation was mainly undertaken by the state itself, and (b), that this, coming after the devastating effects of World War II and the civil war, led to the formation from above of a corresponding social class.⁽⁷³⁾ In effect, Greek capitalism had acquired its distinctive form, the features of which we have delineated above.

With respect to the political sphere now after 1949, it should be remembered that (i) it was the Right⁽⁷⁴⁾ that had emerged victorious from the civil war, and (ii) it was the state on which (and not within

which) the political struggle centred.⁽⁷⁵⁾ We intend to show in this part of the chapter how, from the early 1950s onwards, the Right established a "guided" or limited democracy, based on a fanatically anti-communist and repressive state. As will be seen, this kind of regime was to last until 1967, with only a short interval of Liberal government under the Centre Union from 1963 to 1965.

The foundations of the regime that was to rule Greece after the war were set soon after the withdrawal of the occupation forces.⁽⁷⁶⁾ This was done first, by means of the national elections of 31 March 1946, when most of the republican forces and the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) abstained, and the monarchist right-wing forces won an overwhelming majority (65 per cent of the vote and 67 per cent of the seats in parliament); and secondly, by means of the plebiscite (on 1 September 1946) on the constitutional issue (i.e. monarchy versus republic), when the "...combined effects of terror and extensive falsification gave the Monarchy an overwhelming 68 per cent as opposed to 32 per cent for the Republic".⁽⁷⁷⁾ As Mavrogordatos argues, the election and the plebiscite provided

"...the much needed and long delayed cloak of 'popular' legitimation to the regime established by the British authorities after liberation and, above all, to the monarchy, which the British regarded as the regime's keystone... Monarchical restoration also provided an avenue of national rehabilitation to the motley group of common criminals, Metaxas' henchmen and occupation collaborators who were quick to offer their services, and became the foremost agents of 'White Terror' in the King's name" (in English originally).⁽⁷⁸⁾

These two events —the election and the plebiscite— played an important role in what followed, namely the so-called "third round" of the civil war.

12 March 1947 saw the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine,⁽⁷⁹⁾ by which America took on the task of protecting Greece,⁽⁸⁰⁾ a task which

was previously exercised by the British.⁽⁸¹⁾ The Americans were to play a prominent role in helping the right-wing forces to win the civil war, in trying to support and establish Liberal governments immediately afterwards (that is, in the national elections of 5 March 1950, and of 9 September 1951) and, when the latter attempt failed, in giving their full support to the right-wing forces which, under different names and leaders, were to remain in government for eleven consecutive years (from 16 November 1952, until 3 November 1963).⁽⁸²⁾

The post-war basis of ideological struggle of the political forces was, as already mentioned, nationalism versus communism. Anti-communism, which in the inter-war years started slowly to fill the ideological vacuum left by the collapse of irredentism and the Greater Hellas dream, now became the official state ideology. The right-wing forces, which had enjoyed a firm control over the state apparatus and the army ever since the Metaxas dictatorship, oppressed and persecuted the left-wing adherents, through both legal and illegal means. The remainder of this chapter will show that through the extensive use of authoritarian methods, the Right managed to exclude its opponents —i.e. mainly the communists but also the "fellow-traveller" Liberals— from any kind of participation and contest in the socio-political arena.

First of all, the regime's "enemies" were faced with a deeply reactionary and authoritarian legislation, which consisted of the perpetuation of the civil-war emergency measures on the one hand and, on the other, of specifically anti-communist laws, some of them dating as far back as 1936, i.e. to Metaxas' legislation (for example his Espionage Law 375/1936, according to which being a communist was more or less equivalent to being a spy); or even to 1929, Law 4229 of 25 July 1929, enacted by Venizelos, the so-called Idionymo law, which

"...introduced the criminalisation of communist ideology..., it prohibited not only certain deeds but also and particularly those ideas considered dangerous to the

rulers... Named idionymo because it introduced a new crime, the 'thought crime', Law 4229 legalized state anti-communist terrorism from that time onwards and became the legal cornerstone of Greek official anti-communism until 1974" (in English originally).⁽⁸³⁾

Nevertheless, the most important civil-war legal measure was Emergency Law 509/1947, which outlawed the Communist Party and introduced punishments much more severe than any provided for in the Idionymo law, including the death penalty. This law remained in use until 1974.

The two most significant new concepts, however, of the post-war period were, to use N. Alivizatos' terminology, (a) penalisation for intentions primarily, and for concrete acts secondarily, and (b), collective responsibility for all relatives whether by blood or marriage, and the close friends of the accused.⁽⁸⁴⁾ It was at that time that the certificates of "civic-mindedness" (Diamandouros) —or of "social opinion" (Alivizatos), or "national probity" or "loyalty" (Tsoukalas), or "civic reliability" (Roufos), or "social belief" (Wittner)— were first institutionalised. They were issued by the police, based on the citizen's personal file, and were indispensable for getting a driving license for instance, or a loan, a passport, for registering in the university or, particularly, for employment in the civil service.⁽⁸⁵⁾ In this way the rulers ensured that undesirable elements, such as communists and fellow-travellers, were safely kept out, and that they were excluded from any form of participation.

Long after August 1949 then, when the civil war had ended, the civil-war emergency measures survived and were perpetuated, not by an open dictatorship, but by a crowned parliamentary democracy as the facade for an authoritarian, anti-communist and repressive state. Although martial law ended on 11 February 1950, the civil war was legally prolonged until 1962. This was achieved through a shrewd juridical construction based on the "theory of the permanent civil war".

On 27 April 1952, shortly after the enactment of the 1952 constitution, parliament passed a constitutional resolution that made it legally possible for the civil-war emergency measures to remain in force, even if they should contradict the constitution, as long as they could be abolished at some later date by an ordinary law. Besides, all courts until 1962 accepted that the civil war, or rather the "rebellion" as they called it (the "bandid war") was not ended "...since termination had not been formally proclaimed by an official act".⁽⁸⁶⁾ In this way, post-civil war Greece experienced "constitutional dualism", i.e. the coexistence of the 1952 constitution with the valid emergency measures as a "para-constitution."⁽⁸⁷⁾ As A. Manassis has put it:

"...the existence of this 'parallel constitution' considerably limited the civil liberties which were, typically, guaranteed by the 1952 Constitution and consequently, legality could only function with the proviso of loyalty (to the regime)".⁽⁸⁸⁾

The right-wing forces, in order to control the state as well as to remain in power, also used the electoral process itself as a means to manipulate the people's vote. First of all, they transformed the electoral law⁽⁸⁹⁾ into a highly efficient weapon for winning at the polls: considerable gerrymandering and continual changes in the electoral law just before each election helped them to return to office quite easily. Secondly, when the above means were not enough, they did not hesitate to resort to electoral fraud, by either intimidating the people, mainly in the rural areas (this happened during almost all the post-war elections), or by rigging the count. One example of manipulating the electoral law concerns the national election of 19 February 1956, when the ERE of Karamanlis, with 47.88 per cent of the vote took 165 seats (in the 300-seat parliament), whereas the Democratic Union of the Liberal forces, with 48.15 per cent of the vote took only 132 seats.⁽⁹⁰⁾ As regards electoral fraud, on the other hand, this

reached its peak in the elections of 29 October 1961, when it was only through the extreme use of violence and fraud that the ERE managed to remain in power.⁽⁹¹⁾

Dominating parliament, the Right also exercised its power through the monarchy and the army. At the end of World War II, Winston Churchill and the Foreign Office believed that Britain's supremacy in Greece could best be secured by working through the Greek monarchy, an institution to which they also felt a strong sentimental attachment.⁽⁹²⁾ After 1947 the Americans followed the same line:

"American policy rested on the assumption that the king was the ultimate guarantor of political stability, military preparedness and loyalty to the Western Alliance" (in English originally).⁽⁹³⁾

And as another author argues,

"...when Papagos died in office in 1955, Ambassador Peurifoy did not wait for the General's party to place a successor but went directly to the King and arranged for him to ask young C. Karamanlis to form a government".⁽⁹⁴⁾

This was the same king who, in 1963, forced Karamanlis to resign, and it was King Paul's son Constantine (and successor after his father's death in 1964) who contributed seriously to the July 1965 political crisis by virtually ousting Premier G. Papandreou from power.

It is true that the willingness of the crown —as that of the army, which will be examined below— to interfere in politics was often encouraged by politicians who hoped to gain royal favour.⁽⁹⁵⁾ To quote R. Macrides,

"From the time of Greek Independence, that had been the role of the Greek elites. They pursued and sought intervention; they relied on it, and gradually came to consider the promised protection as fact. A whole nexus of mentalities and expectations developed, resulting in something resembling institutional bonds with the foreign powers. Within this process, the attention of these elites revolved around their relationship with their protector. Through the crown, or more often through the embassies of the foreign powers that were playing the leading role at the time, they put forward their requests and accepted the

guide lines that outlined and limited their actions. The most serious decisions taken were the result of interaction between a foreign power and the Greek government. The government's stance fluctuated, according to circumstances, between full submission and servility and sorrowful disobedience".⁽⁹⁶⁾

It should, of course, be remembered that the throne's influence and position within the power structure —parliament/army/throne— was not always the same. During the inter-war period it had followed a gradual decline because, although no modern mass-parties emerged under Venizelos' premiership, national party organisations were considerably developed and strengthened, so giving the political leaders more control over their members and more bargaining power vis-à-vis the king. As party discipline increased, the king's ability to manipulate politicians and elections waned. It had not been entirely eclipsed even by 1965-1967, but it was certainly less easy to effect: "...whereas King George in 1868 had easily been able to dismiss Prime Minister Koumoundouros, King Constantine in 1915 found it considerably more difficult to rid himself of Venizelos,"⁽⁹⁷⁾ and when the last king attempted a similar thing in 1965, he triggered a series of reactions that ended with the seven-year military dictatorship and his final dethronement in 1974 (by popular referendum).

It remains a fact, that the impartiality of the crown has almost never been a characteristic feature in Greek constitutional history,⁽⁹⁸⁾ and that after the end of the civil war, the king became the symbol of anti-communism as well as the nominal head of state and the protector of constitutional stability. As King Constantine (1964-1967) said,

"Communism is a miasma, generated outside Greece and directed from abroad. Its ethic is lying and treachery. It corrupts and turns into an unforgivable enemy of the fatherland, everyone who comes into contact with it" (in English originally).⁽⁹⁹⁾

It does not seem unfair to conclude that during the period under examination the monarchy, directly or indirectly, was playing into the hands of the Right, complementing the latter's task of suppression and exclusion of its political opponents.

The army was another institution which, due to manipulation by the Right, was made to serve the same functions, and it took one step further by imposing a seven-year military dictatorship (1967-1974) when matters reached a deadlock.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ During the inter-war years the armed forces had served a different purpose. Their interventions concerned the constitutional issue, which itself was an intra-bourgeois conflict.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ In the post-war period, when the dominant issue became the "containment of the masses" —due to capitalist accumulation and the gradual entrance of the masses into politics— the role of the military changed accordingly. It gradually, acquired the dominant position within the post-war power structure (monarchy/army/parliament), assuming the mantle of guardian of the *status quo*.⁽¹⁰²⁾

One important development concerning the Greek military should also be mentioned: from 1945 onwards, and under the then Liberal Sophoulis government, the control of the army was the privilege and responsibility of a Supreme Committee of National Defence (ASEA), consisted of the ministers of war (army, navy and air force respectively), the army chiefs of staff, and the commander of the British Mission. After January 1949, when General Papagos was appointed Marshal, he also took absolute control over army affairs.⁽¹⁰³⁾ The final outcome of this change was the creation of a kind of institutionalised autonomy for the army. It was to bear fruit in 1967 when, despite the agreement between the Conservatives of P. Kanellopoulos and the Liberals of G. Papandreou to lead the country to elections,⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ the army took the decisive step alone, and imposed military dictatorship. Nevertheless, this post-war relative autonomy of the army proved no hindrance at all, when the right-wing

forces wished to mobilise army corps at their discretion during national elections in order to intimidate and counterbalance the Left and Liberal vote in the rural areas.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

For a full understanding of the Greek army and the role it played, one must not ignore the importance of the unofficial and secret army organisations, that existed within it since 1941, when Nazi Germany invaded Greece. Here we shall discuss only IDEA,⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ which played a prominent role during the early post-civil war years and, after a period of acquiescence during right-wing rule, emerged again to play its decisive part in the turbulent post-1961 period and until the establishment of the junta's dictatorship.

IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers) was a group of right-wing officers who had played a prominent role alongside the British during the Battle of Athens in December 1944, and prevented the Greek army being purged of all those who had collaborated with the nazis during the occupation —a condition that was part of the Varkiza Agreement signed between the national government and EAM.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Instead, IDEA managed, on the one hand, to purge the army of all Liberal, "unhealthy" elements, and on the other, to have its members appointed to military key positions. Its first appearance and intervention in the political arena took place on 29 May 1950, when it attempted a *coup d' état* in order to appoint Marshal Papagos to the premiership. They would have succeeded, had the latter not disapproved and told the officers to return to their barracks.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ During the post-war, right-wing political domination IDEA did not reappear, until an alarming event reactivated it again and thereafter kept it in full swing. This event was the electoral success of EDA⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ in the 11 May 1958 national elections, when it became the official opposition party, polling almost 25 per cent of the vote.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ The result of the IDEA officers' reactivation became evident in the subsequent elections (1961), when they elaborated and set in motion the

so-called Pericles contingency plan (which was devised, in collaboration with NATO, for the purpose of neutralising the communists in case of war),⁽¹¹¹⁾ and succeeded through rigged elections in keeping the ERE in power.

This secret army organisation (and others like it), is only one aspect of a whole para-state nexus that had been elaborated and established by the Right to help it keep the Liberal and particularly the left-wing populace excluded from any kind of political participation. According to Wittner, "...a secret network of military, police, and intelligence personnel exercised extraordinary power in every area of the nation's life".⁽¹¹²⁾ Indeed, the local gendarmerie corps and the National Defence Battallions (TEA)⁽¹¹³⁾ carried out their task of oppressing the leftists and the liberals by adopting various methods of discrimination and persecution.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Finally, it should just be mentioned here (we shall return to the subject in more detail below), that there was also a host of extreme right-wing organisations, operating between 1957 and 1967. These complemented the activities of the TEA battallions, particularly in the universities and at demonstrations taking place in the big cities of Athens and Salonica. The most notorious among them was the National Social Organisation of Students (EKOF).⁽¹¹⁵⁾ The activities of these para-state organisations reached their peak in May 1963, when members of their underworld in Salonica murdered the left-wing, but not communist EDA's MP Gregoris Lambrakis after he had given a speech there.

The beginning of this chapter mentioned the dominance of the Greek state over civil society, and it was argued that the reason for this lay in the fact that state-institutions, elaborated for the West European socio-economic context, had been imposed on Greece where the socio-economic conditions were totally different. It was also shown how the Right took control of the state and its institutions after the civil

war, and how it used the state apparatus to exclude all of leftist and liberal elements —or, in other words, all dissidents— from the political arena. This resulted in what came to be called "power dualism", in which the government was, at times a major, at other times a minor partner.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ In practice, the country was governed by a "parallel power", which consisted mainly of high-ranking army officers, the throne, powerful economic groups, and the "allied faction".⁽¹¹⁷⁾ If they did not create it, the right-wing forces at least tolerated and took extensive advantage of this power structure, and it is here that their main responsibility lies.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ The present analysis would remain incomplete, however, without a closer look at the post-war conservative parties' political personnel, organisation, and ideology —elements that also played their part concerning both the exclusion of the Left and the "containment of the masses" in a vertical, clientelistic and oppressive manner.

2.2 The party level

2.2.1 Reconstitution of the conservative camp: the Greek Rally party

As already discussed, it was in 1920 when, under the leadership of D. Gounaris,⁽¹¹⁹⁾ the People's Party was created. A party of personalities and local barons rather than an organised mass-party, it was characterised by being staunchly anti-Venizelist/republican and pro-monarchy. After 1941, however, anti-Venizelism as an ideology was finished. The old schism of 1915 had to make way for a new one: that of the nationally-minded (Venizelist as well as anti-Venizelist), the victors in the civil war against the communists.

In the first post-war national elections (31 March 1946), the People's Party under the leadership of C. Tsaldaris participated in a

right-wing coalition which polled 55.12 per cent of the vote, and occupied 213 seats (of the 354-seat parliament); the People's Party alone elected 163 MPs. But due to the extraordinary circumstances prevailing then (the left-wing and most of the republican parties abstained, and in the following month the so-called third round of the civil war began), and also due to blunt American intervention,⁽¹²⁰⁾ Liberal leader Sophoulis was appointed to the premiership, undertaking at the same time the task to win the war against the EAM forces. In the subsequent elections (5 March 1950), the People's Party polled a poor 18.8 per cent. It is interesting in this context to note that the "communist threat" had already been averted and the "allied faction", for reasons of its own, favoured the so-called "liberal experiment of 1950-1952",⁽¹²¹⁾ —a policy it followed also between 1946 and 1950 by supporting the Liberal Sophoulis rather than the winner of the elections, C. Tsaldaris. The initial attempt at reconstituting the conservative forces to reappear dynamically on the political scene was taken by Marshal Papagos.

Alexander Papagos was Armed Forces' Chief of Staff during the war in Albania (1941-1942), Commander in Chief during the civil war, and finally became Marshal in 1950. In May 1951, he resigned from all his military appointments, and two months later announced that he intended to contest the forthcoming elections with a new national party, the Greek Rally.⁽¹²²⁾ Most of the deputies and politicians of the already disintegrated People's Party joined the Greek Rally, together with some prominent members from the Liberal camp (e.g., P. Kanellopoulos) and some equally prominent members of the Metaxas dictatorship (for example, C. Maniatakis, Minister of Public Security under Metaxas).⁽¹²³⁾ Table I.1 below shows the composition of the Greek Rally's parliamentary group as it emerged from the 1951 national elections:

Table I.1: Greek Rally Parliamentary Group: 9 September 1951 National Election

<u>MPs'previous party affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>		<u>%</u>
People's Party	35		30.70
Political Independent Camp	10		
National Reconstitution Front	12		
National Camp of Working People	1		
		<u>Right-wing parties: 37</u>	<u>32.46</u>
National Rural Party of -X- New Party	1 9		
National Party of Greece	4		
Liberal Party	1		
		<u>Centre parties: 16</u>	<u>14.03</u>
George Papandreou Party	15		
Independent	3		02.63
Newcomers	23		20.18
Total	114		100.00

[Sources: 31 March 1956, 5 March 1950 and 9 September 1951 Parliamentary Election Results, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, pp. 365-88, 717-62 and 511-38 respectively (my computations).]

Table I.1 makes it quite clear that the Greek Rally represented a unification of the conservative forces of that time, whose centre of gravity had been the People's Party. Indeed, 35 out of the 114 Greek Rally deputies were MPs or politicians of the People's Party, 37 belonged to various other right-wing parties and 16 came from the Liberal camp. Also included were 23 newly elected MPs, who had not participated in politics previously.

The Greek Rally was not an organised mass-party. Under the strong and authoritarian personality of its leader there was only a parliamentary group, often called the lochos (an infantry company) because of the strict army-like discipline imposed on it.⁽¹²⁴⁾ There was certainly no liberalisation of the party structure, and the leader's powers went unchecked. Patron-client relationships persisted, and the party's ideology was simplistically anti-communist; furthermore, paternalism and statism were the regular remedies for most social

problems. The mixture was satisfactory and, pepped up with a dose of the correct tactics, in the next national elections (16 November 1952) the Greek Rally polled a spectacular 49.22 per cent of the vote and occupied 247 seats in the 300-seat national assembly; it remained in office until the death of its leader in late 1955.

During this period, the Greek Rally succeeded in establishing a new political reality, the so-called police-democracy regime, and a stability which lasted for eleven consecutive years. It laid the foundations for economic growth, opting for an investment policy with full support to the big finance and merchant capital. On the debit side, it failed to heal the wounds of the civil war,⁽¹²⁵⁾ and furthermore it adopted a rigidly anti-communist ideology. It also did not abolish the emergency measures that had been enforced during the civil war, and thousands of people continued still to be kept in isolated concentration camps.⁽¹²⁶⁾ Finally, it reinforced the armed forces, the security battallions, the local gendarmerie and the other para-state organisations, so contributing to the reinforcement and entrenchment of the power dualism. It established the so-called State of the Right,⁽¹²⁷⁾ which suppressed its political opponents, mainly all those whose ideology was "left" of its own, and excluded them from any political participation whatsoever.

2.2.2 The National Radical Union (ERE)

On 4 October 1955, Marshal Papagos died from a serious illness, after appointing one of his vice-presidents, namely S. Stephanopoulos (the other was P. Kanellopoulos) to succeed him. Nevertheless, the very next day the King called 48 year-old lawyer C. Karamanlis, then Minister of Public Works, to the premiership, and also gave him the right to dissolve parliament and arrange for new national elections. On 6 October, two days after Papagos' death, the new government was formed,

and that same day the Greek Rally's parliamentary group decided to give it its support. Finally, on 12 October, this newly formed government was approved by a parliamentary majority, receiving 200 votes (197 out of the then 205 Greek Rally deputies, plus 3 Independents; 77 deputies voted against it, 2 abstained and 19 were absent). Once again the Greek king, by appointing the premier also imposed a new leader on the conservative camp. The parliamentary majority approved of the King's intervention and the conservative camp's deputies acknowledged his right to appoint their leader.⁽¹²⁸⁾

Although Karamanlis had gained the parliamentary majority, he did not remain in office until new elections were due. Instead, he opted for going to the polls immediately, in order to confirm the governmental change, to legitimise his leadership, and to reinforce his own position vis-à-vis his colleagues and, particularly, his political opponents.⁽¹²⁹⁾ Early in December 1955 he put before parliament a new electoral law favouring the conservative camp,⁽¹³⁰⁾ and on 4 January 1956 he announced the founding of a new party, which he named National Radical Union (ERE). M. Evert⁽¹³¹⁾ says that Karamanlis chose to call it National to denote the new movement's broad orientation (stemming from its faith in the basic values of the Greek people's identity);⁽¹³²⁾ Radical, to express its progressive outlook; and Union to denote its founder's intention to attract sound elements from all the political world, no matter to which camp they may have belonged in the past. Most of the Greek Rally's MPs (160) joined the new party. A few days later, came a few more Greek Rally deputies, some Independents, one Liberal and one MP from the Party of Progressive People, as well as three ex-ministers who had been prominent members of the Venizelist-Liberal camp (E. Averoff, G. Kassimatis, and C. Tsatsos). The party backbone was, however, almost identical with that of the People's Party and the Greek Rally. As J. Loulis noted:

"ERE indicated its willingness to discard the Venizelist/anti-Venizelist feuds of the past, and also projected a more technocratic and youthful image than Papagos' party. But overall there were few differences between the outlooks of the two parties" (in English originally).⁽¹³³⁾

The National Radical Union (ERE) was, then, the third attempt at reconstituting a contemporary conservative camp (the other two having been the People's Party and the Greek Rally). Perhaps the new element that ERE brought with it, aside from the relative youth and energy of the Prime Minister and its leader, was its determination to accelerate the development of the Greek economy and, to some extent, to modernise the state apparatus. Its economic outlook corresponded with the trends and interests of the most dynamic and developing economic elements, who now began to play a major role in the country's industrialisation. Meanwhile, and throughout Karamanlis' eight-year term in office, the para-state organisations of every kind operated in full force. The reason for this was, as we shall see, that the conservative camp no longer enjoyed the confidence of the people's majority but, for reasons of Greece's links with Western Europe, the ERE needed to preserve a parliamentary front. In effect, the para-state acted independently but side by side with the government.⁽¹³⁴⁾

We shall now turn our attention to a closer examination of the ERE's political personnel, structure, and organisation, its ideology and programme, its strategies and tactics, and finally look at the party's electoral performance.⁽¹³⁵⁾

2.2.2.(a) The party's political personnel

We have already seen that the newly-formed party absorbed the bulk of the Greek Rally deputies together with a few prominent representatives of the Venizelist-Liberal camp. We shall now turn our attention to the composition of both the party's election candidates and

its subsequent parliamentary group with reference to the election of 19 February 1956.

The ERE contested the 1956 election with 299 candidates for the 300-seat parliament. Table I.2 below analyses the composition of the group of the party's candidates.

Table I.2: ERE Candidates for the 19 February 1956 Election

<u>Candidates' previous party affil.</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Greek Rally</u>	189	63.21
People's Party	22	
National Reconstitution Front	2	
New Party	1	
	<u>Right-wing parties: 31</u>	<u>10.37</u>
National Camp of Working People	1	
Political Independent Camp	2	
National Party of Greece	3	
National Progressive Centre Union	13	
George Papandreou Party	1	
Liberal Party	10	
	<u>Centre parties: 24</u>	<u>08.03</u>
Independent	8	02.68
Newcomers	47	15.71
Total	299	100.00

[Sources: 31 March 1946, 5 March 1950, 9 September 1951, 16 November 1952 and 19 February 1956 Parliamentary Election Results, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, pp. 365-88, 717-62, 511-38, 325-41 and 251-62 respectively (my computations).]

As is clearly seen from Table I.2, the great bulk (63.21 per cent) of the ERE's candidates came from the Greek Rally, while 10.37 per cent belonged to other small right-wing parties; these two groups together constituted 73.58 per cent of the candidates. Another 24 candidates came from the Liberal camp, some of them prominent members of it, as already mentioned above. Finally, 2.68 per cent of the candidates had not previously belonged to any party but had stood as independents, and 15.71 per cent were newcomers to politics altogether.

In the 1956 election the ERE polled 47.38 per cent and elected 165 deputies. Table I.3 shows the analytical make-up of ERE's parliamentary group.

Table I.3: ERE MPs after the 19 February 1956 National Election

<u>MPs' previous party affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>		<u>%</u>
<u>Greek Rally</u>	117		70.11
People's Party	13		
New Party	1	<u>Right-wing parties: 16</u>	09.70
Political Independent Camp	1		
<u>National Reconstitution Front</u>	1		
National Progressive Centre Union	8		
Liberal Party	5	<u>Centre parties: 14</u>	08.48
<u>George Papandreou Party</u>	1		
<u>Independent</u>	3		02.63
<u>Newcomers</u>	15		09.09
<u>Total</u>	165		100.00

[Sources: 31 March 1946, 5 March 1950, 9 September 1951, 16 November 1952 and 19 February 1956 Parliamentary Election Results, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, pp. 365-88, 717-62, 511-38, 325-41 and 251-62 respectively (my computations).]

It is clear that the percentage of elected ERE MPs who were previously affiliated to the Greek Rally party amounts to 70.11 per cent. (To put it differently, out of the 189 Greek Rally-affiliated candidates, 117 or 62 per cent managed to get elected.) Another 9.7 per cent of ERE's deputies came from smaller right-wing parties and, together with the former, amount to almost 80 per cent of the ERE parliamentary group. Fourteen deputies have a Centre origin (8.48 per cent), whereas only 3 independents and 15 newcomers managed to get elected.

Tables I.2 and I.3 leave no doubt that there was a close relationship between the Greek Rally and the National Radical Union, with regard to their political personnel. If one also bears in mind the data from Table I.1 above, it is fair to conclude that, in terms of the

conservative camp's political personnel, there was considerable continuity from the People's Party to the Greek Rally, and from the latter to the National Radical Union. The relationship between the Greek Rally and the ERE is so close that it might be argued that Karamanlis did not create a new party at all, but simply renamed Papagos' Greek Rally the National Radical Union.⁽¹³⁶⁾

Before proceeding to an analysis of ERE characteristics, it must be pointed out that two peculiar features render this somewhat difficult. The first is that the party's statutes remained at all times (1956-1967) a dead letter. Although the ERE had a fully developed administrative structure, it seems that during this period the party was ruled without any delegation of power solely by its leader, C. Karamanlis. The second feature is that since the ERE activities intermeshed with governmental activities generally, they can hardly be said to be fundamentally different.⁽¹³⁷⁾

2.2.2.(b) Structure and administration

(i) Central party administration

According to the ERE statutes, the party had nine central administrative organs. The General Assembly, held every two years, was considered the highest and most important party organ: it was designated to create, approve, and modify the party statutes, and to decide the party's ideology and political activities. It was made up of the party leader, the members of the General Council (see below), the party MPs, the non-elected candidates of the previous national election, the various managers of the General Secretariat (see below), the members of the Studies Committees (see below) and of the Supreme Disciplinary Council (see below), regional party representatives and representatives of the party's youth organisation. The number of the last two groups was restricted and set by the General Council. The General Assembly, rather

than being a representative organ, had therefore a clearly oligarchic character. In effect, no question was ever raised by any of the Assembly's representatives, because this organ was never convoked during the entire 1955-1967 period.

Second came the party leader, responsible for the ideological and political programme, and the party's authentic representative. He led the parliamentary group and directed, inspected, and controlled all other party organs. Not surprisingly, the party statutes said nothing about how the Leader was to be elected. As we have seen, Karamanlis was first selected⁽¹³⁸⁾ by the king; when he resigned and left the country in 1963, nominating P. Kanellopoulos to succeed him, the parliamentary group of the ERE confirmed that choice. This means that in both cases the leader of the party was appointed from above, and the parliamentary group simply confirmed the decisions that had been taken elsewhere. Furthermore, the party statutes shed very little light on where the party leader's powers begin and end, or how responsibility was to be shared out between him and the General Assembly and the parliamentary group (the other party organs coming under the leader's direct supervision). In practice, the General Assembly was never convoked, and the leader imposed himself on the parliamentary group.

Other ERE central administrative organs were (i) the General Council (headed by the leader, it comprised ten members elected by the Assembly, and determined the party's political line within the limits set by the Assembly's directives); (ii) the Executive Committee (headed by the leader and consisting of the party's Secretary-General and three members of the General Council, it was responsible for ERE administration and organisation and directed electoral campaigns); (iii) the Studies Committees (appointed by the Executive Committee and meant to assist the various ministers); (iv) the Economic Committee (of five to seven members, appointed by the Executive Committee and responsible for the

party's budget); and (v) the Supreme Disciplinary Council (nine members elected by the General Assembly and responsible for disciplinary matters). All of these five organs also remained a dead letter; they were never even set up.

Of the two remaining central administrative organs, one was the General Secretariat. It assisted the Executive Committee in matters of party administration and implemented its orders. It was also responsible for party organisation and propaganda, and preparation of electoral campaigns. The General Secretariat, under a Secretary-General elected by the General Council, was subdivided into departments of organisation, the political bureau, studies, and youth. The party officials in charge of each department were elected by the Executive Committee. Since it is very difficult to differentiate between party and governmental activities, it becomes almost impossible to appraise the General Secretariat's record. It seems not unreasonable to assume, however, that, aside from the periods before elections, most of the General Secretariat's duties were carried out by the civil service.⁽¹³⁹⁾

Finally, the ninth central administrative organ was the parliamentary group, comprising the party's deputies who were either elected under the party's banner or, after defecting their own party, they joined it in parliament. It was headed by the party leader and it did meet as stipulated in the statutes (once a month).⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

A special characteristic of the ERE was the authoritarian omnipotence of Karamanlis over his deputies. In contrast to what had been happening in the inter-war period, when it was the parliamentary nuclei of notables that founded or split most of the political parties, the ERE's parliamentary group's meetings—which became more and more infrequent—were merely required to confirm decisions already taken by the party-leader, not to elaborate party policies. This authoritarian behaviour was the cause of considerable conflict during the first years

of the party's life, before Karamanlis had managed to impose his authority. MPs left the party because they disagreed over matters of foreign policy, or concerning the electoral law, etc. One of the most prominent ERE members (and later of New Democracy as well), said among other things when he resigned from the party and from his government post, that the Council of Ministers was not allowed to operate; Karamanlis simply dictated his decisions.⁽¹⁴¹⁾

All in all, of the nine central administrative organs only three actually functioned: the party leader, the parliamentary group, and the General Secretariat (the latter was an executive organ, the other two were decision-making centres). The leader was in effect the one and only source of power, depriving the parliamentary group of any kind of autonomous activity; and a large part of the General Secretariat's duties were undertaken and carried out by the civil service. In conclusion, we see that the official administrative party structure was just a facade, concealing the absolute domination over the party by one single man.

(ii) Organisational structure

The party statutes stipulated that "political centres" should be set up in all electoral districts, that is, in almost every prefecture of the country. These political centres, in turn, were supposed to gradually establish provincial, communal, local or neighbourhood committees. The political centres and the committees came under the control of the party's central administration, which issued them with formal directives for their operation; they were permitted to organise their own administration on the pattern at the centre. That was the plan. In reality, only in a few large urban centres was there any effort to set up such political centres and committees. In the rest of the country, the party organisation remained in the hands of the ERE

deputies. It is hardly surprising, then, that the traditional patron-client relations kept prevailing over the new organisation's regulations. In most cases, people voted for or joined the ERE only because of personal ties and favours.⁽¹⁴²⁾

The party statutes also provided for a women's club (which, needless to say, came to naught) and for a youth organisation (EREN). In practice, youth-organisation departments were established in Athens and Salonica only. Their most important activities occurred during election campaigns, at demonstrations, and within the university. It should be mentioned here that from late 1959 onwards there was also another youth organisation, the National Social Organisation of Students (EKOF) which, without being an official organ of the ERE party, was clearly inspired by it. Many leading members of EKOF were also members of EREN's top organs. EKOF was fanatically anti-communist, and its main activities consisted of terrorist attacks against students and their councils, and close collaboration with other para-state organisations. Suffice it to say that members of EKOF in Salonica took part in the murder of the EDA deputy G. Lambrakis in May 1963.⁽¹⁴³⁾

Another youth organisation, set up in 1957, was the Hopeful Youth Corps (SEN), organised on fascist lines. It nevertheless had the moral support of the ERE, and there are indications that it also received financial contributions from that party.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Moreover, a host of para-state organisations were supported in different ways by ERE ministers and members, and were in close collaboration with the local security-police departments.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

As with the central administration of the ERE, so with the organisational structure: most of the organs stipulated by the party statutes never operated. After all, as the party statutes mentioned, all power lay in the leader's hands "until the party's organisation is completed". Continuing this "temporary" state of affairs for more than

eight years helped to reinforce the leader's power-position, since he was virtually the party's only administrative and decision-making organ.

As Karamanlis himself said,

"It is only when we cease to govern that we'll manage to organise the party. As long as we're in office, the centre of gravity lies in government, not in party organisation".⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

As we shall see below, however, the party was not organised during the 1964-1967 period when it found itself in opposition. The difference then was that the new leader, P. Kanellopoulos, by no means enjoyed the power position and omnipotence of Karamanlis.

Nevertheless, all rhetoric aside, it is of course unrealistic to propose that one person alone, whatever his qualities, was responsible for all of the planning and decision-making during the ERE's eight years in government. According to Meynaud, it seems that suggestions for action came from elements outside the party and the government, and they mainly concerned the ordinary, day-to-day running of the country. This emphasis on every-day needs and problems is a typical result of the absence of long-term programming, within either the party or the government. As regards the decision-making, one can (again according to Meynaud) discern three different categories: (i) a more or less official "think-tank" (specialists); (ii) a small number of politicians deeply loyal to the leader; and (iii) a few prominent ERE deputies who exerted some influence over smaller sections of the parliamentary group. Depending on the situation, Karamanlis would ask these people for their opinion either as a group or personally, before making his final decision.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Generally speaking, as J. Loulis has said:

"The party's structure remained authoritarian and archaic... Within ERE, not surprisingly, a 'personality cult' was bred which of course encouraged the leadership's paternalism both within the party and towards society. Furthermore, this 'cult' substituted for a sophisticated

ideology and became an obstacle in any attempt to search for new ideas" (in English originally).⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

2.2.2.(c) The party leader

Prior to Marshal Papagos' death, when Karamanlis was asked by the king to form a government, he had been Minister of Public Works (Meynaud says that even within the Greek Rally he was considered a second-class technocrat), and his sudden accession to the premiership caused a great deal of debate and dispute. It is generally agreed that this preferment was due to royal as well as U.S. favour.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ To this must be added that Karamanlis undoubtedly had considerable charisma.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ In C. Mitsotakis' opinion,

"...he was chosen mainly by the Americans and, secondarily, by the Palace. It is true that Queen Frederika supported him... I believe the Americans wanted him, but during this period, objectively speaking, Karamanlis was distinguished... Certainly he was favoured, but he also had the skills, without which he would not have been..."⁽¹⁵¹⁾

Whatever the real reasons, the fact remains that Karamanlis set out to legitimise his leadership by using every means at his disposal through control of the state-propaganda. During his period in office the state-run radio, the governmental or friendly press, the state services in Greece and abroad made a considerable effort to create for both international and Greek internal consumption the picture of a young, dynamic, and creative leader, a faithful defender of "Western values", a self-made man of the people.⁽¹⁵²⁾

Moreover, Karamanlis did his best to present himself as the only true guarantor of the well-established and highly desirable values of the bourgeois middle classes, values such as the country's protection from communist infiltration and its revolutionary repercussions; preservation of the allies' friendship and particularly of U.S. support which, by protecting the nation against foreign intrusion, was

considered to uphold the *status quo*; securing the trust of foreign bankers, industrial groups, tourists, etc. since it is they who are expected to bring the much-needed capital to keep the people going and to enrich favoured social groups. Over and above this, Karamanlis appropriated for himself the governmental mechanisms to an unprecedented extent. Let us not forget that a premier's (any premier's) domination over the governmental mechanisms is the stronger, the less adequate the structure of his party (i.e., trustworthy institutionalised organisational procedures) or the less it is willing to set limits to the leader's power. The Greek higher bureaucracy, for its part, was quite unable to resist the politicians, being greatly enfeebled and much dependent on clientelistic protection. Enjoying absolute control over both the governmental mechanisms and clientelistic protection —or, to put it differently, over the distribution of spoils— Karamanlis managed to subordinate his deputies. The latter, trying to secure for themselves and their constituencies some part of these advantages, preferred to accept their leader's policies quietly instead of struggling against him. With few exceptions only, the bulk of them opted for obedience.

On 11 June 1963, Karamanlis resigned, especially over a disagreement with the king about the expediency of a royal state visit to London. This was not the real reason, however. The resignation was basically due to dramatic changes since 1961 within both the political and social sphere. We shall discuss the political aspects here, and consider the social developments at the end of this chapter.

First of all, on the 29 October 1961 national election, the ERE received 50.80 per cent of the vote as opposed to 33.65 per cent of the Centre Union. These elections came to be known as the elections of "violence and fraud".⁽¹⁵³⁾ The leader of the Centre Union, George Papandreou, then proclaimed his famous anendotos (relentless struggle) against Karamanlis' ERE, a struggle that aimed at new, fair elections.

The Centre Union leader even went to the palace and asked the king to oust Karamanlis and arrange for new elections.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ The political climate was deteriorating rapidly, to the point when, in May 1963, EDA deputy G. Lambrakis was murdered in Salonica by para-state elements.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ Shortly afterwards Karamanlis announced that, in order to govern the country properly, he needed some amendments to the constitution. He submitted his proposals to parliament⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ (where the ERE had 176 MPs out of 300), but met with strong opposition from both the Centre Union and the EDA, accusing him of authoritarian tendencies, as well as from the palace (which resented his projected curbing of royal interventions in politics). As he himself later put it,

"...if I had stayed, we would have ended up with a new national schism, or maybe a civil war... Apart from that, I would have been worn out with the turmoil of that period's passions and I would not have been in a position to return as the paraklitos [Greek for saviour, Messiah] at the critical time of 1974..."⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

In view of the situation, he finally opted for withdrawal altogether from the political scene.

In wider terms, Karamanlis' departure was brought about by the same forces as had arranged for his accession. The throne's favour was withdrawn when the king saw his powers threatened, and the army followed suit.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ The ERE leader returned to contest the 1963 elections, and when ERE lost, he definitely withdrew from both the political arena and the country. As he later acknowledged,

"...playing the opposition role does not go with my character, both because I am a man of action, and because acting in opposition is no good unless it is accompanied by a good dose of demagogy".⁽¹⁵⁹⁾

When the ERE leader left the country, he sent a letter to his parliamentary group, in which he indicated P. Kanellopoulos as his successor for the party leadership. Now Kanellopoulos, contrary to

Karamanlis, was not at all an authoritarian personality; he was better known as an intellectual than a politician, and so posed no threat to the other leading members of ERE. He was an old hand at the political game, however, an ex-Prime Minister (in 1945), sober and moderate, and indeed was the best solution to lead the party and keep its deputies and members united. The parliamentary group approved and confirmed Karamanlis' selection. Kanellopoulos task was somewhat different from that of Karamanlis, however. He did not enjoy his predecessor's power over the ERE deputies, and had to take the opinions and tendencies prevailing within the party into serious consideration, before making a public statement. He was frequently charged with being too lenient vis-à-vis George Papandreou, and was obliged at times to take, a tough and inflexible public stance, in order to secure his own position within the party. ('160')

To conclude this section, it may be useful to note the tendencies and personalities within the ERE's parliamentary group, which comprised elements from various origins. First, there were the MPs who came from old political families; some of them had also served in the parliaments of the inter-war period, others were younger descendants of such families. Secondly, there were the deputies who had come from the Liberal camp, and had either joined the Greek Rally first or had come straight to the ERE. Thirdly, there were some extremists of the ultra-Right, who had been members of Metaxas governments or, worse, collaborated with the German occupation forces. ('161') Fourthly, there were some who would later collaborate with the colonels' junta. Most of the deputies were not particularly concerned with the constitutional question, but not all of them were fervent royalists. Finally, as was true also for the Centre Union, some ERE MPs had considerable political power and enjoyed great influence within their constituencies, and others who were more notable for their wealth. ('162')

2.2.3 Ideology and programme

During all the time the ERE party held government office, from its foundation in 1956 until 1963, no party publication was ever issued concerning its ideological stance. Since party and government activities were not differentiated, the only indication of the former's ideology is the party's political programme —and, of course, its activities.

In the sphere of foreign relations, the most serious question the government had to deal with was the Cyprus issue, which concluded (for the time being) with the Convention of Zurich and London.⁽¹⁶³⁾ Concerning relations with the countries of the Eastern bloc, the ERE expressed its wish to enter into mutual arrangements, but at the same time it accused these countries of lack of understanding vis-à-vis Greece (Greece at the time was formally at war with Albania). The party also announced that it would seek to improve Greece's relations with Yugoslavia and Turkey, but did not make any substantial progress in this. In overall terms, the cornerstone of ERE foreign policy was loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance (NATO), and more specifically to its American allies.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

An important event for Europe took place in Rome in March 1957, with the founding of the European Economic Community. From 1959 onwards, the ultimate target of Karamanlis' policies for the country was its eventual EEC membership. After long drawn-out negotiations, the Association Agreement was signed on 9 July 1961 (to come into force on 1 November 1962). Greece in fact was the first country to ask for membership of the EEC in its original form. However, full membership status was delayed for ten years, while the Greek economy attempted to reach a level acceptable by EEC standards. In the end it was mainly for political reasons, due to the fall of the military dictatorship that Greece became a full EEC member on 1 January 1981.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

With respect to the military, ERE policy was to subsidise only its most indispensable needs. To help the government meet its commitments to the armed forces, the ERE sought the continuation of foreign economic aid and proposed that the NATO countries should set up an institution for financial assistance from its richer to its poorer members.

The ERE's greatest efforts were deployed in the economic sector. As Karamanlis put it:

"Like all peoples the Greeks have their own defects: envy, slyness, inclination to intrigue. Regrettable and unpleasant in everyday life, these defects become disastrous in politics and destroy exactly those characteristics that need promotion: intelligent conduct, a sense of honour, courage. The soil in which those defects inevitably grow and prosper is poverty. In consequence it was necessary, before doing anything else, to improve our peoples' standard of living. This may sound an oversimplification, but it is only common sense. To increase the national income would not only mean securing the peoples' relief and our national independence, which is incompatible with the beggar's cup; it would also contribute decisively to curbing our character faults and developing our virtues. That is why I so passionately devoted myself to my country's economic development".⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

The basic objectives of the ERE government were, (a) the fastest possible increase of the national and per capita income, (b) securing employment for the greatest possible number of people, (c) fast improvement of the living and educational standards of the Greeks, and (d) reducing as far as possible Greece's dependence on foreign aid. The government also tried to promote accelerated development of those regions of the country which lagged greatly behind the urban centres in terms of the standard of living.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ In the end, the party felt entitled to claim that during its period in office it had succeeded in leading the country from underdevelopment to development. More specifically, the average per-capita income had gone up from U.S. dollars 305 in 1955 to \$565 in 1963 —a 85.2 per cent increase, or 8 per cent per year. At fixed prices, the gross national product had increased

by 64 per cent, added value in industry by 80.7 per cent, and gross investments of fixed capital by 125.8 per cent. Revenue from migrants' remittances and tourism had grown 194.8 per cent; private bank deposits by 858.9 per cent; and the economy's overall financing by 290.3 per cent. Last but not least, the price-index throughout the 1955-1963 period went up by only 16.9 per cent, or 2 per cent annually. The result of this very substantial progress was the spectacular improvement of the Greek people's standard of living. (168)

The ERE's leadership declared itself committed to a free-market economy, insisting on the advantages of private initiative and free competition. For all that, in reality it was the state that provided the bulk of all the basic financing needed for the country's development, and the free entrepreneurs who made all the profit. In other words, private individuals enriched themselves on the proceeds from the public sector's subsidies. This being so, the Minister of Co-ordination and prominent ERE member, P. Papaligouras, addressed to Greek merchants and industrialists the following appeal:

"Gentlemen, this country needs industrialists, merchants, artisans, professionals, farmers and workers who must have initiative and be aware of their rights and obligations. I must tell you that, as the Prime Minister has said in parliament, the country's leading businesses have unfortunately not always come up to the country's expectations and, regrettably, did none of the things they might have done on their own before our association with the EEC. This is why they must now be persuaded to do their duties, and if they cannot be persuaded, they must be compelled. The government, through its prime minister, has presented these facts in parliament and stressed that the country's leading businesses must try to attract foreign capital, which then will either co-operate with the indigenous capital, i.e. with the Greek enterprises (and this is what we prefer), or it will act autonomously, by setting up Greek-staffed production units". (169)

And a few days later he added:

"I wonder, Gentlemen, whether you above all —you, who must be the bearers of private initiative— whether you realize that some of the recent suggestions [made by the Greek Merchant and Industrialist Chamber concerning export trade policy matters] are virtually equivalent to

'publicisation' of the export commerce. Because, you see, if the state is expected to subsidise export trade, and if various measures on subsidies are to be introduced, how is it possible for anyone to believe that the conditions are right for Greece to be able to enter the EEC? You however, are responsible businessmen and nobody can relieve you of your responsibility in this respect --except for a socialist regime, and I assume you do not want that. Yet it is impossible, Gentlemen, for somebody to enjoy the advantages of a capitalist as well as a socialist regime".⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

To sum up: the ERE's ideology was as sketchy and unclear as that of its main rival, the Centre Union, the main difference being their stance towards communism: for the ERE anti-communism reigned supreme. As D. Katsoudas comments,

"...Karamanlis himself was ultimately responsible for this; for he never attempted any serious formulation of ideology, rather he was content with his own powerful and modern technocratic image".⁽¹⁷¹⁾

And finally, as we have seen, the ERE ideology was characterised by paternalism and statism, since, while

"...the state attempts to replace private initiative..., ignoring and even passionately opposing it. The Prime Minister..., whilst declaring his faith in private enterprise..., also states: 'Greece, as becomes clear on the basis of the below mentioned nationalisations..., tends socially and gradually towards a social economic democracy and has adopted planning as a means to this end...'.⁽¹⁷²⁾

2.2.4 Strategy and tactics

(a). In government

Having been in office since its very beginning, the ERE used every means at its disposal to preserve the advantages of power. It used the methods previously developed by other governments, but with unprecedented ruthlessness and manifesting an almost insatiable greed.⁽¹⁷³⁾ As already mentioned, the ERE identified itself with the state, and this logically resulted in the total submission of the state

machinery to the party. The ERE managed to clear the state apparatus not only of all elements connected with the Left, but also from all and everyone not totally on its side. This was equally true for the armed forces, the state police and the constabulary, as for public enterprises such as banks, the railways, and the electric power and telecommunications corporations. These machinations brought in various advantages. First, they allowed a selective distribution of spoils, i.e. what is called "clientelistic protection".⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ State money was abundantly given to the party's clientele, and so helped the ERE to secure, and to some extent increase, its social base. It was also used to subsidise and subvert a section of the press, which, then, was fully submissive to the party's —and government's— orders and wishes.

A second advantage accrued to the financing of the party's activities. The ERE's lack of an efficient grass-roots organisation meant that it could not be financed from party-members' contributions only. With the duties of the non-existing party organs in fact carried out by various government services, the party indirectly saved considerable money, while directly financing its propaganda and national election campaigns with state funds. The ERE also received contributions from members of the higher social strata (rich shipowners, merchants, manufacturers, etc.) since, its total control over all state decision-making made it possible to do important favours to its benefactors.

Finally, there was an indirect advantage in the ability to deploy certain state organs and services against the opposition. So the Security Corps, under the pretext of combatting the communist evil, had practically become transformed into a quasi-praetorian guard of the party. In other words, simple executive organs could be given unlimited power and finally turned into stern repressive mechanisms. The para-state organisations must, again, be left out of the consideration here. A good example of state oppression were the activities of the National

Defence Battallions (TEA) in the rural areas, where it terrorised the populace (particularly during election campaigns); and the Central Intelligence Agency (KYP), which helped the police to identify and deal appropriately with leftists and fellow-travellers.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾

(b). In opposition

The ERE moved to the opposition benches from 3 November 1963, after loosing the election, until the political crisis of 15 July 1965. Although Karamanlis had withdrawn from politics and gone abroad, the party remained united under P. Kanellopoulos' leadership and fiercely opposed the Centre Union governments concerning both its economic, social, and foreign policies.

The opposition accused the George Papandreu governments of endangering the country's currency stability because, in order to popularise its image and win votes, it was granting subsidies to education, the farmers, wage labour and the low income social classes generally. It also charged the Centre Union with being too lenient vis-à-vis the Left, and permitting communist infiltration of the armed forces. At the same time the ERE accused the Prime Minister's son, Andreas Papandreu, of trying to set up a personal faction of his own within the army, and of encouraging the creation of a "para-army" organisation. This allegation caused a great furore at the time, but finally proved mere calumny.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

In terms of its opposition to the Centre Union's handling of foreign affairs, the ERE argued that George Papandreu had weakened the country's bonds with its allies with his policy on the Cypriot issue. The ERE persisted at every possible opportunity in demonstrating its relentless anti-communism, and managed to discern the "communist threat" almost everywhere. Finally, on 15 July 1965, the ERE helped the King to get rid of George Papandreu (a reversal of the circumstances two years

earlier) by approving the latter's offer of resignation (see section 3.1) and supporting the "apostates' government" in parliament.

2.2.5 Electoral performance

During the eleven years of its life the ERE participated in five national elections. A particularity of that period is that ERE never completed its statutory four years in office but, due to various reasons which shall be elucidated below, it opted for elections long before the end of its term in office.^{'177'} As we have seen, the first national election came soon after Marshal Papagos' death, when Karamanlis had created the ERE and wished to legitimise the governmental change and secure his leadership within the party. Two months before the elections, the parliament voted in a new electoral law, described as "a majority system with limited minority representation"; it was an electoral law that greatly favoured the ERE.^{'178'} Furthermore, the allotment of parliamentary seats to each electoral district was arranged according to the (ERE more favourable) 1940 population census, although the census of 1951 had in the meantime become available.^{'179'} Since the election was to take place under an ERE government, this also included four ministers who were not "political personalities" (i.e. the Ministers of the Interior, Defence, Justice, and Northern Greece). The parties of the opposition, on the other hand, including EDA, decided to contest the election in a very broad coalition (the Democratic Union DE), mainly because they saw the new electoral law as a serious threat to their survival. However, the leaders of the Liberal parties let it be known without a doubt that their co-operation with EDA was only for electoral purposes and that any such governmental coalition was unthinkable.

In its election campaign, the ERE presented itself as a new party, completely dissociated from either of the inter-war political camps

(Venizelists and anti-Venizelists). It described the Greek Rally as a transitional movement, and claimed that the ERE would

"...create a new political and moral climate, the climate of true democracy, within which the nation, disciplined and optimistic, will assume the tough struggle for the conquest of a new way of life..., it will realize, in other words, the change, that has so long been the general and intense request of our people".⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

Nevertheless, immediately after the formation of the Democratic Union, Karamanlis began to reiterate the time-worn slogans and said in a pre-electoral speech: "Communism is numerically harmless. It does become dangerous though, when there are parties with limited national consciousness, eager to co-operate with it"; and two days before the elections he warned: "Every vote that is not given to us, is effectively given to Communism".⁽¹⁸¹⁾ The results of the ERE's first national election (19 February 1956) are presented in Table I.4.

Table I.4: 19 February 1956 Parliamentary Election

<u>Parties/Coalitions</u>	<u>number of votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>seats in parliament</u>	<u>%</u>
ERE	1,594,112	47.38	165	55.00
Democratic Union	1,620,007	48.15	132	44.00
Party of Prog. People	74,545	02.22	--	---
Independent	31,022	.92	3	01.00
Social People's Party	29,375	.88	--	---
Other	15,139	.45	--	---

[Sources: Register of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 1977, p. 93.]

It is immediately obvious that, as an effect of the new electoral law, the ERE managed to gain the absolute majority in parliament, although it had received fewer votes than the Democratic Union. (The ERE obtained 55 per cent of the seats, having received 47.38 per cent of the vote; whereas the Democratic Union, with 48.15 per cent of the vote, had

only 44 per cent of the seats.) If, moreover, we leave out of account the army and civil service vote, the ERE is seen to have enjoyed even less popular support.⁽¹⁸²⁾ Table I.4a shows a comparison between civilian electoral stations and those of the army and civil service employees, for Athens, Piraeus, and the country as a whole.

Table I.4a: Comparison Between Civilian and Army/Civil Service Votes

19 February 1956 Election

	<u>Name of Party</u>	<u>Civilian Vote Number of Votes</u>	<u>Army/Civil Service Vote Number of Votes</u>
<u>Athens</u>	ERE	153,300	4,126
	DE	193,983	1,359
<u>Piraeus</u>	ERE	64,768	2,113
	DE	106,528	691
<u>All Greece</u>	ERE	1,467,436	126,676
	DE	1,588,859	31,148

[Sources: For Athens and Piraeus see Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. III, p. 78; for the country as a whole see Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., p. 471.]

As a final point it should be mentioned that the ERE vote was not equally distributed over the various electoral districts. In the rural areas the ERE obtained an absolute majority, polling 52.8 per cent, whereas in the urban centres it received only 42 per cent; virtually nowhere, however, did the ERE vote fall below 30 per cent.⁽¹⁸³⁾

Two years later, ERE lost its absolute majority in parliament because fifteen of its deputies left the party due to their disagreement with yet another new electoral law. Karamanlis resigned, and a caretaker government took over the task of organising fresh elections. Finally, the latest electoral law, described as ensuring "reinforced proportional representation", was voted for in parliament by both the ERE and the Liberal Party of George Papandreou. The latter hoped it would work in favour of his party and, particularly, to the detriment of the United

Democratic Left, EDA, which was to contest the elections by itself. The 1940 population census was again used to allot parliamentary seats, and the election took place on 11 May 1958. The results are presented in Table I.5.

Table I.5: 11 May 1958 Parliamentary Election

<u>Parties/Coalitions</u>	<u>number of votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>seats in parliament</u>	<u>%</u>
ERE	1,583,885	41.16	171	57.00
EDA	939,902	24.42	79	26.33
Liberal Party	795,445	20.67	36	12.00
PADE ^(a)	408,787	10.62	10	03.33
ELK ^(b)	113,358	02.94	4	01.33
Other	7,562	.19	--	---

Notes: (a) Progressive Rural Democratic Union, coalition of small Centre and Centre-Right parties.

(b) Union of Peoples' Parties, coalition of right-wing parties.

[Sources: Register of Senators (1921-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 1977, p. 94.]

Although the ERE had lost some of its support, it still received the largest number of votes, i.e. 41.16 per cent and the electoral law gave it 57 per cent of the seats in parliament. The Liberal political forces, having contested the elections separately under the Liberal Party and the Progressive Rural Democratic Union, polled 20.67 per cent and 10.62 per cent respectively. The main surprise of this election concerned the United Democratic Left (EDA), which polled an unprecedented 24.42 per cent and so moved to the official opposition benches in parliament.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾

This spectacular success of EDA alarmed and re-activated the State of the Right. From 1958 onwards, institutionalised state repression was further bolstered by several anti-communist centres, mobilisation of the para-state organisations, and the general constitution of reactionary forces. It is these forces that were to bring about the electoral coup

of 1961, and would later staff the colonels' military dictatorship. In the Centre, meanwhile, serious efforts were made to bring the various parties together, so as to establish a strong and creditable opponent to the ERE, capable of succeeding the latter in government or, at the very least, take the bulk of the opposition votes away from EDA.

These efforts bore fruit in 1961, assisted by American intervention.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ A few months prior to the formation of the Centre Union (EK), the parties of the Centre agreed with ERE on a further new electoral law (a modification of the previous "reinforced proportional representation"), and voted for it in parliament. New elections were proclaimed after the Centre Union was finally set up on 19 September 1961. The very next day Karamanlis resigned and a caretaker government was sworn into office to organise and supervise the elections.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ The 1940 census was again the basis for allotting parliamentary seats in 13 of the electoral districts; for the remaining 42, the 1951 census was used. The Centre Union (EK) contested the elections in coalition with Markesinis' Party of Progressive People (KP), and EDA formed a coalition—the Pan-Democratic Rural Front of Greece (PAME)—with the National Rural Party (EAK).

During the pre-electoral period the state apparatus, in close collaboration with the para-state organisations, set in motion the so-called Pericles contingency plan, which aimed at the minimisation of EDA's strength by exerting systematic violence and fraudulent alterations of the election results. It seems that the Centre Union leadership knew of this plan, but remained opportunistically silent, hoping that it would bring EDA votes to the Centre Union;⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ in fact, they mostly went to the ERE. The 1961 election results are shown in Table I.6.

Table I.6: 29 October 1961 Parliamentary Election

<u>Party/Coalition</u>	<u>number of votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>seats in parliament</u>	<u>%</u>
ERE	2,347,824	50.80	176	58.67
EK/KP	1,555,442	33.65	100	33.33
EDA/EAK	675,867	14.62	24	08.00
Others	43,399	.93	--	---

[Sources: Register of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 1977, p. 96.]

As this shows, enforcement of the Pericles contingency plan proved partly successful: EDA's electoral strength fell by 40 per cent, i.e. from 24.42 per cent in 1958 to 14.62 per cent three years later. However, the plan did not work so well for the two major parties: the Centre Union, together with Markesinis' party, remained relatively stable, and polled 33.65 per cent (as compared to 31.29 per cent in 1958), whereas the ERE's strength —after five years in office— grew by almost 23 per cent and reached a spectacular 50.80 per cent (as compared to 41.16 per cent in the party's second, 1958 national election).

Two weeks after the election, Centre Union leader George Papandreou proclaimed his "relentless struggle" against the, as he declared, illegal ERE government, and did not hesitate to call for royal intervention by asking the king to dismiss Karamanlis and to arrange for new elections forthwith.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ Prominent members of the Centre Union visited almost every part of the country, denouncing the electoral violence and fraud that had taken place, and demanding new and fair elections. As popular unrest grew, so did the activities of the para-state organisations. As already mentioned, the terrorisation culminated in May 1963, when EDA deputy G. Lambrakis was murdered in Salonica after a speaking engagement. Public disagreement between Karamanlis and the King followed⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ and led to the Premier's resignation. The king then appointed P. Pipinellis, a non-parliamentary member of the ERE, to the

premiership, and his new government voted in a new electoral law (again a modification of "reinforced proportional representation"). Neither the ERE nor the Centre Union deputies demonstrated against the king's intervention, the latter being content that their major goal—Karamanlis' dismissal—had finally been realized. New elections were announced for 3 November 1963. This time the 1961 population census was used to distribute the parliamentary seats among the electoral districts. Table I.7 presents the electoral results.

Table I.7: 3 November 1963 Parliamentary Election

Party/Coalition	number of votes	%	seats in parliament	%
ERE	1,837,377	39.37	132	44.00
EK	1,962,079	42.04	138	46.00
EDA	669,267	14.34	28	09.33
KP	173,981	03.73	2	.67
Others	24,760	.52	--	---

[Sources: Register of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 1977, p. 97.]

As we can see, the Centre Union's claim that it would have been the winner of the previous election had it not been for the electoral fraud and violence is not fully justified. The ERE managed to retain a substantial part of the popular vote and to elect 132 deputies, only six less than its chief rival. Nevertheless, the essential message of these electoral results was that the ERE, although in government for eight consecutive years, was not invincible. The political climate was beginning to favour the Centre Union, and its leader decided to make the most of this shift. He refused to form a government with the support of EDA deputies, and opted for immediate resignation and fresh elections.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ Once again a caretaker government took over and the elections, held under the same conditions as the previous ones, took

place on 16 February 1964. In the meantime, Karamanlis had appointed his close collaborator P. Kanellopoulos to the party-leadership and left the country. Table I.8 shows the February 1964 results (with ERE contesting the election in coalition with Markesinis' Party of Progressive People).

Table I.8: 16 February 1964 Parliamentary Election

<u>Party/Coalition</u>	<u>number of votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>seats in parliament</u>	<u>%</u>
ERE/KP	1,621,546	35.26	107	35.67
EK	2,424,477	52.72	171	57.00
EDA	542,865	11.80	22	07.33
Others	9,951	.22	--	---

[Sources: Register of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens 1977, p. 98.]

It is obvious that the Centre Union profited fully from favourable political climate and polled a spectacular 52.72 per cent, so increasing its electoral strength since two elections ago by 25 per cent, and obtaining an absolute majority in parliament. The ERE's popular support fell further, and the party polled its lowest vote since its foundation, electing 107 MPs (or actually 99, the other eight being members of Markesinis' party). The vote for EDA dropped accordingly, though not as badly; ⁽¹⁹¹⁾ The party received 11.80 per cent of the vote (a decrease of 17.7 per cent), and managed to elect 22 deputies.

The triumphant assumption of power by the Centre Union and its leader, George Papandreou, was not destined to last long. For various reasons, which we shall deal with in the last part of this chapter, the Prime Minister was forced to resign after only fifteen months in office. The political crisis of July 1965 set the country on a road of no-return, which ended abruptly almost two years later with the imposition of the colonels' military dictatorship.

2.2.6 An overall critique of the National Radical Union (ERE)

First of all there can be no doubt that, for all the ERE's pretensions as a new party completely dissociated from the past, it certainly was not. In fact, as shown above, it had gathered up and expressed all those that were previously under the banner of the Greek Rally. Along the way, some prominent figures from the old Venizelist camp also joined its ranks, just as they had done in the case of its predecessor. There can be little doubt, then, that the formation of the ERE aimed particularly at reconstituting the right-wing political forces under the leadership of its founder, C. Karamanlis.

Concerning its organisational structure, the ERE was certainly no mass-party. Although it did publish a charter, which provided for several party-organs (e.g., a General Assembly, a Secretariat, regional party organisations, etc.), they remained pious theory only. In consequence of this, the local party notables were unchallenged; patron-client relations continued to prevail, particularly in the rural areas, and it was through these relations that the local party-barons secured the popular vote both for themselves and for the party. On the other hand, all power rested in the hands of the ERE leader who, given both the Right's support and his charismatic personality, proved an omnipotent father-figure and the only insurance of party-unity. In 1958, when fifteen of his MPs left the party, he did not hesitate to step down and call for new elections, although he might well have remained in office, seeing that two other deputies were to join ERE (one from the Liberal, and one from the People's Party) and two of those who had left finally returned.⁽¹⁹²⁾ When he resigned and even left the country, the ERE remained united mainly because he had appointed his successor, and also because there always was the possibility he might change his mind and come back to resume the ERE leadership.⁽¹⁹³⁾

The ERE, like its predecessor, suffered from lack of a consistent ideology. The party's appeal centred on its leader's personality and, according to J. Loulis,

"Lacking a coherent philosophical outlook ERE was bound either to be evasive (We are neither right nor left nor centre), or to revert to the use of empty slogans (we are a 'radical' and 'progressive' party" (in English originally)).⁽¹⁹⁴⁾

Still, the ERE's outstanding feature and the characteristic that differentiated it above all else from the Centre Union, was its fierce and passionate anti-communism. On the basis of this ethic the ERE established a police-democracy regime; it kept enforcing the civil-war emergency measures, it kept dividing the Greeks into ethnikofrones (nationally-minded) and non-ethnikofrones, and finally it repressed and excluded the latter —sometimes liberals as well as leftists— from any form of political participation.

In the economic sphere, the ERE exhibited statist and paternalistic tendencies. It attempted, mainly by using public-revenue funds, to reform and modernise the Greek economy and, to a considerable extent, it did succeed. By the end of 1963 Greece was no longer a poor country. Furthermore, the foundations were laid for further economic development. Nevertheless, the economic growth and the concomitant wealth were not equally distributed. Moreover, the ERE did not base its economic policies on long-term plans and perspectives; it more or less responded *ad hoc* to everyday needs. The Greek economy, therefore, never really took off to enter a phase of independent development, nor was it ever transformed into a properly industrial one.

The ERE took part in all five parliamentary elections following its foundation in 1956. Table I.9 below presents the party's electoral results.

Table I.9: The National Radical Union's (ERE) Electoral Performance

Election (year)	number of votes	number of seats	% of votes	% of seats
1956	1.594.112	165	47.38	55.00
1958	1.583.885	171	41.16	57.00
1961	2.347.541	176	50.80	58.67
1963	1.837.377	132	39.37	44.00
1964	1.621.546	107	35.26	35.67

With the exception of 1964 (when the party entered the contest in coalition with Markesinis' party), the ERE contested the elections alone. Due to the prevailing electoral law (usually tailored-made to its needs), the party always elected more MPs than corresponded to the percentage of the vote in its favour. ERE's electoral strength fluctuated from its lowest at 35.26 per cent in 1964, to 50.80 per cent in 1961 (although this figure is debateable due to the violence and fraud which marked this election). Nevertheless, since the ERE vote never fell below 30 per cent in any of the electoral districts,⁽¹⁹⁵⁾ it follows that the party had the support of a strong social base. This mass support for the ERE (and the Greek Rally before it) was derived particularly from the rural population, the majority of which voted for the ERE during the whole period under examination. By contrast, the urban population for the most part voted for the left-wing and liberal parties and, after 1961, for the Centre Union.

Concerning finally the degree of the party's institutionalisation, K. Janda's mathematical formula applied to the ERE shows that the party's degree of stability or institutionalisation amounted to 0.12 --which means that it was one of the most stable and institutionalised.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ If the Greek Rally is included in the calculation (i.e., if the ERE is considered as a continuation of the

Greek Rally in all respects), then the above degree of stability becomes 0.13 and indicates again high institutionalisation.

Generally speaking, the most striking feature that emerges from an examination of the party is the ERE's remarkable unity and continuity, from its foundation until the imposition of the military dictatorship. The case of EDA was similar, whereas the Centre Union was created only in 1961, having been devided from 1946 until then. The ERE (like its direct predecessors) was also a royalist party, in the sense that it loyally supported the institution of the monarchy. (By contrast the Centre Union, while including some staunch royalists, clashed with the throne in 1965). Aside from anti-communism therefore, royalism was the second characteristic that differentiated the ERE from the Centre Union.

A last but not less important remark should be made at this point, concerning another feature that characterised not only the ERE and the Centre Union, but also the whole period under consideration here, that is post-war party politics in Greece. As it will be shown in the following chapters, when post-junta politics in general and the New Democracy party in particular will be discussed, many of the above-mentioned features disappeared altogether, others came for the first time to the foreground, while there were quite a few which continued to exist, albeit in a more subtle manner and to a lesser extent than in the past; the most important, we think, among the latter was the so-called phenomenon of paleokommatismós which, more or less, means traditional party politics.

More specifically, there is a number of political characteristics and practices that should all be taken into account and categorized under the above label. Most of these we have already come across and discussed so far, so suffice it to recall them in brief here: patron-client relations and personal contacts between voters and politicians instead of bureaucratic mass structures; the predominance of the local

deputies and politicians over their parties and their relative independence vis-à-vis the latter and the leadership —came to be known as deputationocracy (vouleftokratia)— and which, in turn, accounted for the deputies' easy change of political affiliation at no risk of losing their parliamentary seat; the inheritance and/or bequeathing of one's personal clientele and parliamentary seat from father to son; and last but not least, the exchange of people's vote for some personal favour either for themselves or for their relatives and friends, the so-called rousfeti, which was due to but at the same time intensified clientelism. Overall, then, paleokommatismós comprised but also became synonymous with deputationocracy, clientelism, rousfeti, personalistic and hereditary politics, and as it will be demonstrated in the following chapters, these features and practices survived the break-up with the military regime and the restoration of democracy in 1974; the newly created New Democracy party comprised a good many politicians who never ceased to exercise such practices, so it did not manage to rid itself completely from these features; in consequence, paleokommatismós constituted the major obstacle to any attempts made towards articulation of bureaucratic and mass organisational structures, and the transformation of ND into a really modern party, similar to its West European counterparts.

3. Developments in the 1960s

3.1 The rise and fall of the Centre Union

As we have already seen, the 1950-1960 decade was characterised by the country's effort to heal the wounds of the civil war and to enter a phase of economic development. This process gained momentum particularly from the mid-1950s onwards, when Karamanlis' ERE provided, if by questionable means, the much-needed political and governmental stability

and laid the foundations, first, for the start of the country's development, and secondly, for the more radical changes that took place in the course of the next decade. We shall not repeat the details of the ERE record in the economic sphere. Suffice it to mention that Greece in the early 1960s was no longer a poor country, its mean annual growth rate being 5.9 per cent, the gross national product increases amounting to 6.4 per cent per year and an average national per-capita income by 1963 of U.S.\$ 565 (compared to \$305 in 1955). Chiefly through public investment in almost all economic sectors, the population's standard of living was considerably higher than before.

Nevertheless, there was much dissatisfaction. The unbalanced prosperity was conspicuously evident in the cities, with lavish displays of imported goods that the majority could not afford.⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ There was urban unemployment, and some branches of industry paid very low wages. In the countryside, despite improvements in production and income, the latter still lagged behind average incomes in the cities and the gap continued to widen.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ This was one of the factors, that speeded up migration from the countryside to the towns which, in its turn, created problems of depression in areas that were becoming severely depopulated, and housing and employment difficulties in the cities.⁽¹⁹⁹⁾

Furthermore, given that the ERE had no economic policy with long-term future perspectives, the sectors of trade and the construction/building industry were both more attractive and more profitable, and created a better sense of safety. So a huge number of people set up small artisanal businesses, retail shops, and personal services of all kinds (mainly to make up for the overinflated and inefficient civil service), so creating a big middle class of a parasitic, para-economic character. It was not until the early 1960s that rapid economic progress allowed for a new stratum of technicians, higher employees, free

entrepreneurs, administrative officials and intellectuals. Their appearance as a new social force coincided with the popular movement which brought the Centre Union to power in 1963.⁽²⁰⁰⁾

These modern businessmen, scientists, and students were not satisfied with the reforms and modernisations that the ERE governments had unquestionably realized in the spheres of industry, telecommunications, and the technical substructure. They also demanded changes in the political institutions, the abolition of the one-party state, the king remaining within his constitutional obligations, the abolition of the civil-war legacy (i.e. of the emergency measures, laws, of deportations, discrimination against and exclusion of leftists and liberals), more modern education, etc. It was the reforms made by the ERE already but mostly those that still remained unrealized, as well as the country's economic process, which led to the condemnation of conservatism and of the one-party state that had been established after the civil war.⁽²⁰¹⁾

The existing popular unrest was aggravated by the violence and fraud exercised during the 1961 election. The dissatisfied population, together with the new social strata, were given perfect political expression by the Centre Union of George Papandreou, and mobilised by his proclamation of "relentless struggle" to remove the ERE from power. Karamanlis' disagreement and clash with the king, and G. Lambrakis' murder in Salonica only inflamed the political climate further and contributed to the final ouster of the ERE in the 1963 election. The Centre Union elected 138 MPs in the 300-seat parliament but it refused to remain in office, although EDA (with 28 MPs) offered it an almost unconditional parliamentary support; so it opted for a fresh election which was held three months later, in February 1964, when the Centre Union polled a spectacular 52.72 per cent, gained an absolute majority in parliament and took office.

The Centre Union had no intention of overthrowing the *status quo* in order to install a socialist or communist regime. It only attempted, —and abortively at that, since it had little control over the state machinery and similar institutions (and when it tried to put the latter under control it was removed from office)— to "humanise" capitalism as it existed in Greece, that is, to distribute the national income more equally, and so to reduce unacceptable injustices. It must not be overlooked that, as long as the Centre Union was in office, it really tried, and to a limited degree managed, to create a "wind of freedom and liberalism". Although the Communist Party remained outlawed (and the civil-war emergency legislation was not fully abolished), its followers and supporters were no longer persecuted, most concentration-camp detainees and political prisoners were sent home, important reforms in education were initiated, and the certificates of "civic-mindedness", although not completely abolished, were no longer required for certain jobs or official businesses. As one author put it, "For the first time in twenty-eight years, all Greeks could again breathe and speak freely".⁽²⁰²⁾

In the economic sector, the Centre Union followed a keynesian policy. As its leader said in parliament:

"The state's investment policy will be limited to substructure enterprises, and to those economic sectors where private interest cannot respond, or where exploitation may acquire a monopoly character".⁽²⁰³⁾

In general, the Centre Union pursued a programme for modernising and Europeanising the country. It tried to bring about economic development by adopting methods different from those already used, i.e. by educational and administrative reforms, and by putting more emphasis on the human factor. At the same time, it set about to virtually democratise the whole political system, so that the country would sooner

or later attain West European standards. But even these rather timid attempts at reform met with determined reactions from the established interests of the monarchy and the army especially, but also from the para-state and the foreign-allies faction. As was to be expected, Kanellopoulos' ERE opposed and fiercely attacked the Centre Union policies. The latter's reforms, however feeble, were declared to be a serious threat to the power-position of the above-mentioned established interests. In the words of a prominent member of the ERE:

"The roles are reversed. While until now it was the communists who did not dare to appear and express themselves, today it is the nationally-minded people who are obliged to hide their beliefs. George Papandreou does not, of course belong, to the ultra-Left. Nevertheless, he has delivered such a strong blow against anti-communism, that we are justified in considering him a Kremlin agent in Greece".⁽²⁰⁴⁾

After the Centre Union's first few months in office, the popular jubilation died down to let the problems and demands be felt that had actually brought the party to power. The limited reforms George Papandreou began to put through parliament were much needed, but not enough; the people were expecting faster and more radical change. The Centre Union leader prepared to meet this demand by first reinforcing and securing his own and his party's power-position vis-à-vis the king and the army: in other words, he tried to curb their proclivity to intervene in politics. Matters came to a head in the summer of 1965, when he asked his Minister of Defence to resign so he could appoint another.⁽²⁰⁵⁾ The minister refused, and so did the King when the Premier approached him for help. In July George Papandreou, having failed to dissuade the King, publicly denounced the latter's stance and submitted his resignation;⁽²⁰⁶⁾ the wishes of the throne had, (as in 1956 and 1963) proved once more stronger and more decisive than those of

parliament and the leader and representative of 52 per cent of the Greek people.

3.2 The "apostates" governments and the imposition of the colonels'

military dictatorship

After G. Papandreou's resignation, the King called on prominent members of the Centre Union party to form a government. When the third attempt was presented to the parliament for a majority vote it was accepted; the ERE MPs and 45 Centre Union defectors gave a vote of confidence to S. Stephanopoulos and his government on 24 September 1965.⁽²⁰⁷⁾ Had the Centre Union been organised properly, and had it not been a simple parliamentary group of political personalities with little cohesion among them, the consecutive attempts at splitting and splintering it would most probably not have taken place.⁽²⁰⁸⁾ As it was, a considerable number of its MPs defected (the so-called apostates or renegades) and managed to sustain a narrow parliamentary majority with the help of the ERE. What is remarkable is that from July until December 1965, as many as 48 deputies abandoned the Centre Union party. According to most accounts, they were influenced by bribes and the offer of government appointments. Suffice it to quote P. Kanellopoulos, the then leader of the ERE:

"But how did the government secure 152 votes? ...this happened by buying off consciences, by governmental appointments of people who would have never become ministers under other conditions, and even by other unacceptable means, as I was later informed. If I had known that such means had been used, which I prefer not to name, I would have left parliament... Rotten consciences cannot support regimes, they cannot save nations, they cannot reform states...".⁽²⁰⁹⁾

However, this solution too did not last long. Popular unrest reached unprecedented heights, and George Papandreou proclaimed his second "relentless struggle", this one directed not so much against the ERE but

against the king himself. Finally the leaders of the two major parties (Kanellopoulos and Papandreou) agreed to overthrow Stephanopoulos' government and contest new elections. These were to be held on 28 May 1967, organised and supervised by an ERE caretaker government under Kanellopoulos. They never took place. A group of medium-rank army officers —most of them members of the IDEA organisation— intervened and, on 21 April 1967 established a military dictatorship that was to last for seven years until July 1974.

There is still much dispute over the real reasons which ultimately led to the imposition of the military coup. We shall not deal in depth with this matter, which falls beyond the scope of the present study.⁽²¹⁰⁾ Briefly, it can be argued that the Centre Union's radicalisation and mobilisation required social and political change. This was demanded by the Greek masses who had never had a say in the prevailing exclusionist political system and who, under the increasing inequalities due to capital accumulation since the early 1950s, made worse by the specific characteristics of the Greek model of uneven development, had become activated and mobilised. A tentative entrance of these masses into the political arena would, most probably, have rocked the very foundations of the regime, especially of the monarchy and the military. It is not surprising, therefore, that the army (with American help)⁽²¹¹⁾ anticipated matters and took the decisive step to preserve its own independent and dominant position within the power structure⁽²¹²⁾ by imposing a dictatorial regime.

4. Conclusion

The above analysis has tried to show that, after the civil war, the victorious Right⁽²¹³⁾ (with the help of the Americans) established a quasi-parliamentary regime, a regime of "guided democracy" that outlawed the Communist Party and, through a variety of legal and illegal mechanisms, systematically persecuted the defeated Left. To reinforce its dominant position within the state, it carried out an extensive purge—beginning with the army and thereafter not excluding any part of the state apparatus—of all "subversive" (communist, and sometimes also liberal) elements. After the post-war relative decline in the strength of the throne as part of the monarchy/army/parliament power-structure, the military which had acquired a considerable degree of autonomy after General Papagos became Marshal, occupied the dominant position, being responsible for the smooth functioning of repressive parliamentarism.

In the post-war relationship between the state and society in terms of right-wing parties, the latter were paternalistic as far as their structure and functioning was concerned.⁽²¹⁴⁾ Their main characteristics were (a) dependence on a strong leader, a father-figure who directed the "destinies of the conservative movement" in more or less authoritarian manner; (b) limited toleration of dissidents and very little patience for constructive debate; and (c) expansion of the state and its sphere of interference within civil society. Furthermore, the inter-war personalisation of ideology ("Venizelists versus anti-Venizelists") was never replaced by a more constructive stance except in negative terms: namely, anti-communism (which, of course, proved the easy solution). But such an ideology did not encourage elaboration and development of a strong party structure, because the anti-communist crusade was not carried out by a political party organisation but by the state apparatus.

Under this banner of anti-communism the Right took a series of authoritarian measures which were directed against both leftists and liberals. As we have seen, it began by employing anti-communist legislation (some dating back to 1929) and by means of a constitutional resolution prolonged the civil-war emergency measures indefinitely. Under the bogey of an imminent communist threat, it persecuted its rivals, arrested many of them and sent them to prisons and concentration camps after summary court-martial procedures; despite the 1952 constitution, a para-constitutional reality coexisted with, if it did not prevail over, the lawful one.

The Right also used the state apparatus to exert pressure on its rivals by colonising its bureaucracy (always beset by favouritism and corruption) with its own supporters, conscripted by vertical, clientelistic methods. Gradually, it acquired a firm control over the state machinery and its institutions, and complemented the exclusion of "dissidents" by indiscriminately granting the famous certificates of civic-mindedness to its supporters (leaving the rest of the people in despair when trying to get a loan, a permit for opening a private business, a driving licence or, more importantly, employment in the state bureaucracy).

When the authoritarian, anti-communist legislation and the state institutions were inadequate to the task of repression and political exclusion, it was performed by the para-state organisations which the Right, allowed to illegally develop and operate if it did not create them. These para-state organisations comprised the secret groups that appeared within the military, as well as the criminal elements that did the actual intimidating of the populace, particularly in distant rural areas. Such groups were, for example, the National Defence Battalions (TEA), or the "spontaneous" anti-leftist counter-demonstration groups which, in the case of Lambrakis' murder, proved somewhat over-zealous.

For a firm continuation of the political exclusion of the Left, the Right had to remain in power. This was an objective to be achieved by any means whatsoever. The most prominent among them were electoral gerrymandering, forgery of the electoral lists, manipulation of the electoral law according to the conditions prevailing during each election, mobilisation of army corps for purposes both of intimidation and counter-balancing the liberal and leftist vote, and, finally, rigging of the election results when all other means had proved insufficient.

In accomplishing its task, the Right was at all times supervised if not instructed by both the military, that was the guarantor of repressive parliamentarism, and by the palace, which mainly acted as the symbol of strict and absolute anti-communism. Finally, without overestimating its influence, one should also give due consideration to the foreign interventions (first British and then American), that supported the right-wing forces and offered them considerable economic aid and political advice. Repressive anti-communism, restricted and exclusionist parliamentarism, combined with state and para-state violence against the non-ethnikofrones (and in parallel lavish support for ethnikofrones) constituted the right-wing authoritarian and exclusionist modes of political control. They also accounted for the right-wing political dominance that lasted formally until 1964, when the Centre Union first took office, but essentially until 1967.

Furthermore, as regards the period under consideration, the Greek Rally and the ERE, both lacking an efficient horizontal grass-roots organisation (the same holds true for their rivals, EDA excepted), had to rely completely on clientelistic methods for securing the popular vote. Thus the people were brought into the political arena in a dependent, incorporative manner. As was the case during the inter-war period, clientelism continued to be a salient characteristic of the

Greek society and parties, only now was much more centralised. The original nineteenth century loose clientelism of the local barons became even more centralised under Venizelos in the interwar period, and more so still under the ERE of Karamanlis. However, the ERE party was characterised more by its authoritarianism than its clientelism, by its anti-communism than its paternalism, and by exclusion rather than incorporation. In the same way, the post-war political regime was more monolithic than democratic, and more repressive than parliamentary.

During the seven-year military dictatorship, the parliamentary institutions were abolished altogether and after eight months, following the counter-coup of King Constantine, the same happened to the institution of the monarchy. (In formal terms the monarchy was abolished much later, when dictator George Papadopoulos declared Greece a Republic after a public referendum in 1973.) This left the army as the sole remaining sovereign body.

Anti-communism was also the junta regime's prominent ideology. Communist ideas and dogmas had no place in the "Greece of the Christian Greeks". A new and important difference was that the regime would not tolerate neutrality. As R. Roufos observed,

"...it was possible, and even proper, for civil servants to keep out of politics, as long as governments represented a mere party; today, when the government represents the 'totality of the nation' it is unacceptable to remain aloof. Government employees, great and small, are forced to compromise more with the regime" (in English originally).⁽²¹⁵⁾

We see that with regard to the modes of political control, a qualitative change took place between the pre-coup period and the junta: in the earlier instance there was a "limited and restricted" democratic regime where the parliamentary institutions —the weakest partner in the post-war triarchy— served as a facade behind which right-wing authoritarian and exclusionist modes of political control could operate freely; in the latter case, democratic institutions were abolished

altogether, and the regime became fully authoritarian. Its tolerance vis-à-vis dissidents was as good as zero and the persecution of its rivals was intended to end in either complete subjugation, or liquidation.

The party of ERE, although it comprised in its ranks some officials who later joined and served the dictatorial regime, never supported the dictatorship. The same is true for the Greek people, whose resistance was rather passive. The first serious revolt against it came from the students, who in February 1973 occupied the School of Law in Athens and later, in November, the Polytechnic School: the perfectly non-violent occupation ended in a massacre when a tank demolished the School's gate to the Polytechnic compound and police and members of the army attacked the students. In the wake of these events dictator Papadopoulos was overthrown by the then secret-army-police chief, Brigadier Ioannidis, who took over and eight months later attempted to impose a coup in Cyprus. The attempt ended in fiasco, the Turkish troops invaded and occupied almost half of the island, and Greece was in great danger of war with Turkey. Then high-ranking army officers intervened, and transferred their powers to politicians (prominent among them C. Karamanlis who was called back from abroad), ironically for the same reasons they had imposed the military coup seven years earlier: namely, in order to preserve the power-position of the army intact.⁽²¹⁶⁾

After seven years of dictatorship, democratic institutions were once again re-established in the country. The fact that the junta was not overthrown (e.g., by a popular revolt), but actually transferred its powers to the politicians, left its imprint on the post-dictatorial regime. The re-emergence of the right-wing forces under C. Karamanlis, with regard to the different social, political, and economic conditions prevailing at that time, as well as the changing post-1974 character of the modes of political control, constitute the main issues that will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND PARLIAMENTARISM:

RECONSTITUTION OF THE CONSERVATIVE CAMP AND

THE CREATION OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY

1. Introduction

Having stayed more than seven years in power, the dictatorial regime collapsed after having staged an abortive coup in Cyprus. This deplorable piece of statecraft furnished Turkey with an excuse to seize much of the island, and confronted the military junta with a painful dilemma: they either had to risk a full-scale war against Turkey, which they were doomed to lose (it became clear later that the Greek armed forces had never been in such miserable and sorrowful disarray),⁽¹⁾ or they had to accept a humiliating retreat from Cyprus. Since it seemed that both courses would end in deadlock, they realized they would have to capitulate before the facts and hand over power to the politicians. The same military leaders who had supinely acquiesced in the establishment of the junta and then collaborated with it, returned the government to politicians during a military crisis created by the junta regime.⁽²⁾

On 23 July, the figurehead of the state, President of the Republic Lieutenant-General Phaedon Ghizikis, sanctioned the politicians to discuss the transfer of power.⁽³⁾ In view of the fact that the country was finding itself in serious trouble, he urged them to form a national-unity government, and he actually insisted on them remaining in the room until such a government was formed and sworn in. Several hours

later, and after having denounced the army chiefs' blunt refusal to hand over to civilian control also the ministries of Defence, Interior, and Security,⁽⁴⁾ the politicians agreed to form a government under the joint leadership of P. Kanellopoulos and G. Mavros, the representatives of the two major pre-1967 political parties —the ERE (National Radical Union), and the EK (Centre Union) respectively. The meeting adjourned to allow these two men to negotiate the formation of a broad coalition government.

However, one of the civilian participants, prominent ERE member, staunch Karamanlis lieutenant and former Foreign Minister E. Averoff-Tositsas, who enjoyed the military's confidence, returned to the conference room where President Ghizikis was still talking with the army chiefs and eventually managed to persuade him to arrange for C. Karamanlis' return to head the national-unity government.⁽⁵⁾ Early next morning, on the 24th of July, Karamanlis arrived at Athens Airport on a plane that had been placed at his disposal by French President Giscard d'Estaing. Thousands of people were there to greet him, and it took him almost an hour to reach the President's office where the military and the civilian leaders were waiting.

As mentioned in ch. 1, Karamanlis had withdrawn from the political arena as early as 1963 and ever since had resided self-exiled in Paris.⁽⁶⁾ In the eyes of the vast majority of the Greek people he had nothing or almost nothing to do with the facts and circumstances that, after the July 1965 political crisis had led to the demise and dissolution of democracy and the imposition of the military regime. Well-distanced and relatively unsullied as he was, he was the most qualified of the available politicians to answer the unanimous demand for democratic institutions and a disentanglement from the past. Moreover, Karamanlis had been the leader of the anti-communist Right

and, with his strong and charismatic personality had dominated Greek politics until the early 1960s. For all these reasons, he

"...appeared to possess the ideal credentials for being entrusted with the delicate role of transition manager, and for overseeing the whole process of democratic restoration. Acceptable to the military on account of his past anti-communist track record, he could also command the support and confidence of the non-royalist right" (in English originally).⁽⁷⁾

Generally speaking, Karamanlis after his return was given *carte blanche* to cope with the very serious situation the junta had left behind. Faced with an imminent war against Turkey on the one hand and, on the other, with the unanimous popular will for democratisation, dejuntaisation of the state and the armed forces, and severe punishment of the chief junta officers, he embarked upon a thorough, slow and well-balanced procedure aimed, first of all, at securing and consolidating democracy. His second step was to reconstitute the conservative camp by creating the New Democracy party, and to lead the country to the most genuinely free and fair parliamentary elections known in Greek history. The present chapter, will first analyse the steps that were taken for the restoration of democracy, and attempt an outline of the overall features of the new regime. It will then proceed to a detailed examination of the rejuvenation of the conservative camp, and of both the creation and performance of the New Democracy party.

2. The Restoration of Democracy

2.1 The transition period: Formation of a national-unity government and first steps towards democratisation

Early in the morning of 24 July 1974, the first group of the national-unity government was sworn in. Under the pressure of both the

military chiefs and the gathered politicians, C. Karamanlis first and alone at 04:00 a.m., had already taken his oath of office as Prime Minister, with G. Mavros as Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister. A second group being sworn in the next day completed the government which, the premier apart, comprised eighteen ministers and fifteen deputy ministers. Of these thirty-three civilians, twelve were ex-ERE members, seven came from the pre-coup Centre Union party, another twelve were politically neutral technocrats, and five were newcomers to politics altogether. Fourteen had already served as ministers in the past, with the remaining nineteen entrusted with ministerial office for the first time.⁽⁸⁾ It should be pointed out that the newly-sworn cabinet consisted of prominent political figures associated with the post-war Right and the Centre-Right years; no Centre-left, let alone Left representatives were included. The participation of some prominent figures of the liberal Centre, well-known for their staunch anti-dictatorial stance (some of them had been jailed and brutally tortured by the junta's security corps) did, however, make an appreciable difference to pre-coup political reality. As one scholar put it, this fact

"...was the first oblique --and at the time unseen-- indication of Karamanlis' design to break with the recalcitrant anti-communist right, and to strive for a different balance in the new political system, in which the centre of gravity would be located more towards the centre than the right" (in English originally).⁽⁹⁾

Operating within a political vacuum, Karamanlis and his government were faced with a host of mounting problems, concerning both the international and the national arena. On the one hand, they had to handle the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations in general, as well as to restore the country's credibility within the various international organisations and terminate its isolation. On the other, they were trying to embark on a democratic process, to satisfy the popular demands

for speedy and ruthless punishment of all and everyone who collaborated with the junta, and to deal with the still untamed military which, although it had transferred political power, still kept its men in key-posts and had no intention to let them be harmed. As regards foreign policy, the government did well, if only because war with Turkey was finally averted⁽¹⁰⁾ and procedures leading to Greece's EEC membership (which had been suspended due to the dictatorship) and acceptance re-activated. It was on the domestic front, however, where Karamanlis had to fight hardest to impose his authority and restore democracy.

Immediately after the national-unity government had taken office, it issued a series of decrees aimed at liquidating the disastrous policies of the dictatorship. All political prisoners were released and the concentration camp on the island of Yiaros was closed down. All political offences, except for the crimes of the dictatorship, were amnestied. Freedom of the mass media was restored, and the procedures were set in motion to restore citizenship to persons who had been disfranchised by the dictatorship. All higher civil servants, ministries' secretary-generals, university professors, and prefecture governors appointed by the junta were dismissed; conversely, all those dismissed or otherwise discriminated against by the junta because of their political beliefs and attitudes were reinstated.⁽¹¹⁾ In addition, on 1 August 1974, the 1952 constitution was temporarily reinstated, except for the clauses referring to the nature of the political regime itself; Karamanlis promised a national referendum in due course for the people to decide whether or not Greece should be a crowned democracy.⁽¹²⁾ Furthermore, all political parties willing to conform to the democratic process were recognised, including the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which had been outlawed since 1947.⁽¹³⁾

According to C. Woodhouse,⁽¹⁴⁾ Karamanlis' three main objectives were: to lead the country into the European family, to set the

foundations of a sound democratic regime, and to prove to the Greeks that they could, after all, stand on their own feet. It was mainly the first of these objectives that the legalisation on the KKE was intended to serve; by this measure Karamanlis brought the national schism to an end, even if he did not at the same time realize national reconciliation. This, along with some other remnants of pre-coup anti-communist and reactionary legislation, was left to the socialists, almost ten years later.⁽¹⁵⁾

The most serious and sensitive issue the Karamanlis government had to cope with, however, concerned the armed forces. The whole democratisation process was in jeopardy until the military was tamed, stripped of all its recalcitrant juntists, and put under civilian command. This was not at all easy. Since the junta had not been overthrown but had merely transferred power, it still loomed heavily as a potential arbiter of the national-unity government's actions.⁽¹⁶⁾ The latter had no control whatsoever over the armed forces, and another coup was seen as possibly imminent — a fear that, as we shall see later in this chapter, was fully justified.

Well aware of the unstable situation, Karamanlis took pains to reassure the military. First of all, he chose not to close down the armed-forces radio and television station, a lasting reminder of the institutional autonomy the military had acquired during and after the civil war. Neither did his government launch an outright purge of the military officers, but to start with replaced only the highest echelon of its leadership. He met with the latter's discontent when he tried to reinstate some eighty navy officers who had been dismissed by the dictatorship, and he finally shored up his government's shaky position somewhat when he demanded that the military leadership should immediately remove its tank-units from Athens to the northeastern borders with Turkey.⁽¹⁷⁾ A few days after this order had been

successfully executed, Karamanlis struck the military another serious blow by retiring both the Army and the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff, and replacing them with two more trustworthy officers.⁽¹⁸⁾

All during this time Karamanlis was under considerable pressure from other radical political groups to purge the armed forces of junta supporters (apohountopiisis) and to put the leaders of the military regime on trial. As already mentioned only the topmost military leadership was replaced, and it should be added that the five top junta officers, including dictator George Papadopoulos, were left at liberty until their arrest and deportation to the island of Kea on 23 October 1974. The so-called "invisible" dictator Brigadier Ioannides could not be found at that time; he was finally arrested and imprisoned on 14 January of next year. The reason for this meagre as well as belated action was, according to Karamanlis, that

"...the question of apohountopiisis in the armed forces and other areas of public life would have to await a government legitimised through elections" (in English originally).⁽¹⁹⁾

In view of this policy line, no immediate legal action was taken against the juntists by the state. The only criminal prosecution proceedings that were initiated prior to the 1974 election against protagonists of the colonels' regime were the result of a private suit, and did not involve the government. This was in September 1974, when a private lawyer sued members of the original junta for conspiring against and forcefully overthrowing the constitutional order by a military coup against the country's lawful government. The case was not tried until almost nine months later. In the meantime, Karamanlis and his newly created New Democracy party had won an unprecedented victory as well as an overwhelming majority of both the vote and the seats in parliament.

Nevertheless, even after this electoral triumph, Karamanlis did not feel strong enough to dispose of the juntists;

"it was only after a foiled military coup in February 1975 that he was given the long-awaited opportunity to move decisively against adherents and sympathisers of the previous regime, and to eliminate a source of major potential resistance to further change without risking serious erosion of his political support" (in English originally).⁽²⁰⁾

The trials, which sought to apportion responsibility for the 1967 coup, for the February 1975 foiled coup, and for the actions of the major figures in the suppression of the Polytechnic uprising as well as the torture of political prisoners during the seven-year regime, were held through July and August 1975. The sentences ranged from the death penalty for the three leaders of the previous regime, to life imprisonment for the major figures, and lesser prison terms for others. The previously slow pace of dealing with the aftermath of the dictatorship, now gave way to a policy of swift, decisive, but also contained and circumscribed retribution. In less than six months after the foiled February coup, all cases relevant to the previous regime were tried and closed for good. Those who had served as members of the various civilian puppet-governments of the junta were not tried for complicity, although some of them did appear as defendants in trials alleging corruption. The same held true for those responsible for the Cyprus debacle; on the grounds that a public trial might harm the country's long-term foreign policy interests, the case was never brought before the courts. Moreover, Premier Karamanlis, without even taking time to consult his cabinet, immediately decided to commute the junta leaders' death sentences to life imprisonment.⁽²¹⁾ In consequence of all of the above there was considerable discontent with the way the government was handling the situation. For all that, given that the

dictatorship was not actually overthrown but had bequeathed its power to the civilians, Karamanlis

"...had gone a fair distance in meeting the widespread desire for a public national purge and for the punishment of the worst criminals of the dictatorship" (in English originally).⁽²²⁾

2.2 The Period of consolidation: Parliamentary elections, the referendum on the monarchy, and the formation of the June 1975 constitution

Despite —and perhaps because of— the complexity of the situation that confronted him, in the pressing need to diffuse a highly threatening confrontation with Turkey, and to subordinate an army that had for seven years exercised a tight grip on power, Karamanlis was concerned with legitimising his power. Capitalising on his immense prestige as the man who stood between democracy and the tanks,⁽²³⁾ he arranged for general elections to be held within four months of his return to the country.

Karamanlis had made excellent use of the *carte blanche* he had been given to handle the situation in post-dictatorial Greece. Indeed, the remarkably smooth and successful transition would have been unthinkable without his charismatic authority and consummate statesmanship. Nevertheless, every step and measure towards democratisation, and whatever progress might be realized would be indefinitely at stake until his government, as well as the new regime, was legitimised and institutionalised through national elections. Therefore, as early as 18 September 1974, the national-unity government unanimously voted in a new electoral law (for reinforced proportional representation), and on 2 October it decided, again unanimously, that the first post-dictatorship parliamentary elections would be held on 17 November 1974. It was also agreed that within 45 days of the elections a referendum would follow concerning the question of the monarchy. The above decisions taken, the

national-unity government resigned, and a caretaker government, again under Karamanlis' premiership, was sworn in to monitor the electoral procedures.

In late September 1974, Karamanlis announced that he would participate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections as the leader of a newly created party, namely New Democracy (see below in this chapter), which was a somewhat more liberal version of his pre-coup National Radical Union (ERE). The Centre Union of George Papandreou (who had died in 1968, during the dictatorship), was now led by the national-unity government's vice-president G. Mavros, and contested the elections in co-operation with some prominent liberal anti-junta figures under the name of Centre Union/New Forces (EK/ND). More to the left of the political spectrum stood the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), a personal and, in terms of political personnel, organisation and ideology, completely new formation of G. Papandreou's son Andreas. Finally, on the Left there was a coalition of three parties, namely those of the pre-coup EDA, the now legalised Communist Party of Greece (KKE), and the small Communist Party of the Interior (KKE esoterikou), which had splintered off the latter after an intra-party dispute in 1968. The ultra-Right was represented by the National Democratic Union (EDE), which was led by a renowned junist and harbored all the recalcitrant elements that longed for the *status quo ante*. Altogether then, four major political bodies or party-coalitions contested the elections and, except for the ultra-Right EDE, all managed to gain parliamentary representation.

In terms of personal contests the November 1974 electoral campaign was virtually silent. It primarily focused on the desirability of giving a personal mandate to Karamanlis, as the one person that could be relied on to stand between the preservation of the country's newly won freedom and the return of the military. The New Democracy party made

much capital of this, and projected its leader as the only person capable of ensuring the survival of democracy in Greece. Furthermore, the bloodless and calm transition from dictatorship to democracy never ceased to be exalted; what had been successfully done between the collapse of the junta and the proclamation of elections was nothing short of a "political miracle". As Karamanlis said in the last national-unity government's cabinet meeting on 2 October 1974:

"During these seventy days a 'political miracle' has happened in Greece —so at least the foreigners claim, who have an experience of international life. Indeed, we gave all Greeks their freedom; we fully dismantled the mechanisms of tyranny; we averted an economic breakdown; we restored Greece's authority and prestige as regards its foreign relations; and finally, we are painlessly leading the country towards free elections".⁽²⁴⁾

The 17 November 1974 parliamentary elections took place in an unprecedentedly orderly manner, and were the freest and fairest elections ever held in Greece. Their outcome was an overwhelming vote of confidence in Karamanlis personally, since he had been projected as the sole guarantor of the newly founded democracy. In fact, the election was more like a referendum on the very existence, viability, and institutionalisation of the democratic regime as such. Karamanlis had managed to take a full advantage of the *carte blanche* handed to him and he did not try to pretend otherwise. It is interesting to note that he himself looks upon his role in returning to Greece in 1974 as that of a saviour. As he said in an election-speech to the people of Athens,

"You called me here on July 24 to save the country when it was in danger. But if you are not going to give me the big majority that I need in order to fulfill my mission, then why did you bring me here in the first place?".⁽²⁵⁾

The election results proved a landslide for Karamanlis and New Democracy. Polling almost 55 per cent of the vote, his party secured 220

of the 300 seats in parliament. Table II.1 below presents the electoral results.

Table II.1: 17 November 1974 Parliamentary Election

Registered voters: 6,241,066

Votes Cast : 4,963,558

Abstention rate: 20.47%

<u>Party/Coalition</u>	<u>number of votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>seats in parliament</u>	<u>%</u>
New Democracy	2,669,133	54.37	220	73.33
EK/ND	1,002,559	20.42	60	20.00
PASOK	666,413	13.58	12	04.00
United Left	464,787	09.47	8	02.66
<u>EDE</u>	<u>52,768</u>	<u>01.08</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>---</u>

[Sources: 17 November 1974 Parliamentary Elections Results, Ministry of the Interior, General Direction of Administration, Direction of Elections, Section of Elections, Athens 1976, Tables III and IV, pp. 12-5.]

At first glance, it seems that there has been a considerable shift of the electorate to the Right, although the opposite might have been expected.⁽²⁶⁾ While the overall age-distribution of the electorate was about the same, a smaller percentage remembered the anti-communism campaign and the years after the civil war. Moreover, internal migration figures for the previous ten years showed that as many as a million people had swarmed from the countryside into urban centres. Last but not least, it must be remembered that these were fair and free elections, with no pressure exerted whatsoever, no intimidation from the police, no rigging of the election results.⁽²⁷⁾ If there was no shift to the Left, neither was there really a shift to the Right.

In our opinion the election results reflect the fact that the Greek people, who had not revolted against but only passively resisted the dictatorship, would not have wanted a dynamic clash; the vast majority

were very much in favour of a "change without risk" —and that exactly is what Karamanlis sensed and offered. To quote H. Psomiades,

"...the Greek people had obviously decided that moderation, stability and orderly process, instead of rapid change and the possible polarization of society, were particularly desirable in the difficult period of transition from dictatorship to democracy. Domestic and external threats did not permit political experimentation" (in English originally).⁽²⁸⁾

The plebiscite on the issue of the monarchy was scheduled for 8 December 1974, and the parties started their campaigns on it immediately after the elections. Ex-King Constantine was not permitted to return to the country to defend his interests in person, but he was given time on both radio and television to present his arguments; equal time was duly allotted to the adversaries of the monarchy. All parties of the opposition, except the ultra-Right EDE, stood manifestly against the monarchy, while Karamanlis' New Democracy kept a neutral stance.⁽²⁹⁾ The referendum, like the elections, took place in an impeccably orderly manner; the results are presented in Table II.2.

Table II.2: Results of the 8 December 1974 Referendum on the Monarchy

Registered voters: 6,244,539

Votes Cast : 4,719,787

Abstention rate : 24.40%

<u>Vote</u>	<u>number of votes</u>	<u>%</u>
For the Monarchy	1,445,875	30.80
Against the Monarchy	3,245,111	69.20

[Sources: Macridis R. C., "Elections and Political Modernization in Greece", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 15.]

The overwhelming majority of almost 70 per cent for an uncrowned democracy could be taken to settle the constitutional issue once and for

all. It was the sixth such referendum held in the country (the others had taken place in 1920, 1924, 1935, 1946 and 1973),⁽³⁰⁾ but it was the most fairly conducted, and the only one in which the military was not directly involved. Within ten days after the plebiscite, the first temporary President of the Republic (a New Democracy MP, and the personal choice of Karamanlis) was elected by a majority of the New Democracy party.

It should be noted here that Karamanlis' handling of the issue, —that is, the adoption of a neutral stance as far as he himself and his party were concerned— was designed to ensure the permanent institutionalisation of the electorate's decision, whatever that might be. In the future, nobody would be able to bring up the constitutional issue again on the grounds that the 1974 referendum on it had been set up with a party-political bias, just like the earlier referendums. Moreover, this time the issue of the monarchy was resolved directly by the people themselves, and not by some ephemeral parliamentary majority vote. Aside from closing the issue once and for all, Karamanlis' decision for his party to remain neutral in the matter, although it comprised many pro-royalists in its ranks (as we shall try to document in the next chapter), also, of course, helped to prevent a possible split within New Democracy.

Having laid the foundations of a parliamentary republic, and with the constitutional question resolved in favour of a democracy headed by a president rather than a king, Karamanlis now moved decisively towards the third step of the regime's consolidation: that of a new constitution. This was a concern he had had in mind ever since 1962 and one which, among other things, had led to his clash with the Crown. As he himself formulated in many speeches:

"It is today, more than ever, a matter of national necessity, —and I do want to emphasise that— for the country to obtain a Greek constitution. This means a

constitution which, without copying foreign patterns, will correspond to our country's special features, a constitution that will be truly democratic, and which at the same time will allow the government to act swiftly and effectively. In other words, Greece needs a constitution proper to a parliamentary democracy, and one which will reinforce the Executive without at the same time limiting the latter's responsibility vis-à-vis the parliament".⁽³¹⁾

The enhancement of executive power was believed by Karamanlis to be absolutely essential to prevent the kind of breakdown in parliamentary government that had occurred in the 1960s and ushered in the colonels' coup.

The elaboration of and voting for the new constitution was the work exclusively of the New Democracy party. With its spectacular parliamentary majority, the ruling party allowed the opposition no quarter, and this, caused the first serious squabbles inside parliament. Furthermore, the broad powers vested by the proposed constitution in the president (including the right to dissolve parliament if he felt it no longer reflected the true mood of the people) constituted a major area of dispute and brought the accusation that the prime minister was trying to tailor the constitution for himself. Karamanlis replied that he considered such powers congruent with "Greek reality" —an elliptical reference to past troubles⁽³²⁾— and conducive to ensuring the stability and smooth operation of the new political system.⁽³³⁾ Finally, and notwithstanding the opposition's objections, the new constitution was voted in by ND's parliamentary majority on 7 June 1975.

The election of the President of the Republic was immediately scheduled for 19 June 1975. The parties represented in parliament did not manage to reach unanimous agreement concerning the candidate for the office. Finally, one day before the presidential election, Karamanlis announced his personal choice to his parliamentary group, namely that

the party should vote for its MP Constantine Tsatsos; next day the ND's parliamentary majority duly elected the latter to the presidency.

We have already seen how, after the fall of the dictatorship and in a relatively short period of time, the country entered a new period of democratic government. What remained to be seen was, of course, the smooth and unimpeded functioning of the regime's institutions. Continuity and change, within the limits and by the rules of the constitution and democracy, would constitute the basic factors determining the sanity and welfare of the regime. In overall terms, only time could be the ultimate judge of the consolidation of democracy in Greece.

Today, in 1993, we can say that, ever since 1974 Greece has been enjoying a democratic regime such as never before functioned in so free and orderly a manner. Political and civil rights are absolutely guaranteed and protected; the army has gradually passed into civilian control; freedom of the press, of opinion, of the trade unions is duly respected; elections are fair, and all parties are free to exist in the open, to canvass support and to fight for power; and, most importantly, after seven years in office, New Democracy duly stepped down when PASOK won the 1981 elections. It was the first time in the country's history that political power was handed from a conservative government to a socialist-marxist party (as PASOK described itself), and this gave the final stamp to the legitimation and consolidation of Greece's post-dictatorship regime. (34)

3. The Reconstitution of the Conservative Camp: The Creation of the New Democracy Party

As stated above, the ERE party had not been dissolved during the seven-year military dictatorship. All during that period it simply remained quiescent, and on 24 July 1974, the eve of colonels' abdication, it formally still existed, under the leadership of P. Kanellopoulos. When Karamanlis first returned to the country, he was so totally taken up by his work for the transition to and consolidation of democracy, he was hardly concerned with his old party. All of a sudden on 28 September, and without reference to Kanellopoulos,⁽³⁵⁾ Karamanlis set up a new, catch-all political party, which he aptly named *Nea Dimokratia* (ND). In his proclamation on the foundation of the New Democracy political front, Karamanlis presented its political identity and gave an outline of the ideological parameters of what, as he insisted, was not a mere party but "a broad and vital political front".⁽³⁶⁾

After a brief introduction exalting the virtues of democracy, he goes on to argue that democracy has not functioned smoothly in Greece "...due to the fact that the preconditions for its existence were missing or could not be created".⁽³⁷⁾ Claiming that "What has happened in Greece with the help of the people over the past two months truly borders on a political miracle",⁽³⁸⁾ for it had been achieved painlessly without the bloodshed and internecine strife that might have been expected, he asserts that the resolution of the problem of Greek democracy in a secure and permanent fashion, as well as its protection from both communism and fascism, through the creation of powerful political formations, constituted a strong national objective, in view of which he considered it his duty to create "a broad and vital political front".⁽³⁹⁾

The *Nea Dimokratia* front was to be composed of not only experienced and sound, but also progressive and radical political forces. ND identified the nation with the people, the motherland with its inhabitants, the state with its citizens, national independence with popular sovereignty, progress with the common good, political freedom with the rule of law and social justice. It was dedicated to serving the "true" interests of the nation, which could not be categorised in terms of "...the misleading labels of Right, Centre and Left".⁽⁴⁰⁾ While its objective was rapid economic development, ND did not consider its commitment to economic freedom to be incompatible with an expanded state sector. Moreover, "...individual initiative cannot be justified without the parallel participation of the broader popular classes in the distribution of the national product".⁽⁴¹⁾ ND would invest heavily in education, training and scientific research, and seek to assure the independence of Greece through the modernisation of her armed forces. In order to safeguard popular sovereignty, it would aim "...at the harmonisation of the governmental system with the conditions of Greek reality".⁽⁴²⁾

What is most striking in this proclamation at first glance is the fact that ND is nowhere called a political party. On the contrary, six times it is called "a political front", once "a movement", once a "concept" and once "a system". Adhering to this line, Karamanlis continued to refer to his party as either "a political force" or "a national front".⁽⁴³⁾ Since, therefore, New Democracy was never called a party in the first place, nobody took the trouble to clarify whether its platform was conservative, liberal, Right or Centre. Karamanlis himself called it an uncommitted, national front beyond "the misleading labels of Right, Centre or Left", which would face the country's problems by using as its only criterion the nation's and the people's interests.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Furthermore, special emphasis was given to the fact that ND was a new political formation and not the old ERE under another name.⁽⁴⁵⁾ As it became clear later, when the party put up its electoral lists for the forthcoming election of November 1974, the core of ND in terms of political personnel came distinctly from the old ERE. Moreover, prominent Karamanlis lieutenants, like P. Kanellopoulos, openly resented this "change of name" as they saw it,⁽⁴⁶⁾ and so contributed to the further obscuring of the party's real identity. Overall, though, one should bear in mind that at the time, the important question for everybody was the safeguarding of the newly restored democracy and, in this sense, ND "...was, at least in its inception, a replica of the Union for the New Republic founded by Charles de Gaulle when he returned to French politics in 1958".⁽⁴⁷⁾

We shall concern ourselves in much detail with ND's particular characteristics in the following three chapters. Suffice it to mention at this point that, after his return, Karamanlis managed to reconstitute the conservative camp by gathering most of his colleagues and lieutenants of the pre-coup ERE, together with a considerable number of new political forces of the Right as well as of the Centre. Unlike the PASOK movement of Andreas Papandreou, ND did not include in its ranks individual political figures or forces that had openly resisted the military dictatorship, whereas such elements constituted the core of PASOK alongside some prominent politicians of the pre-coup Centre Union.⁽⁴⁸⁾

As we shall try to document in the following chapters, the New Democracy party was from its very inception a personal creation of C. Karamanlis, and so mirrored to a considerable extent the characteristics of its leader —at least until 1980, when the latter was elected President of the Republic. Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to conclude that for the above reasons, ND was nothing more than the pre-

coup ERE under a new name,⁽⁴⁹⁾ if only because Karamanlis himself by 1974 was a very different man from his 1955-1963 self. As one of his biographers writes:⁽⁵⁰⁾

"While in exile, he had softened and he had conceived a new vision for Greece's position within the world. He admitted that he had become more tolerant, mainly though because circumstances had changed in the meantime".

Indeed, circumstances had changed dramatically. For one thing, King and Court had ceased to exist, and no longer constituted a separate and unchecked decision-centre; the armed forces had been purged to a considerable extent of their most recalcitrant elements and were confined to barracks; communism was no longer viewed as a threat to the nation but only to democracy, and the Communist Party could now peacefully exist and act within the limits of a democratic regime; and it was precisely this democratic regime which, above anything else, had to be protected, and all the psychoses and schisms that in the past had ultimately undermined democracy must never be allowed to happen again. A renewal and modernisation of the country's political life was, therefore, imperative, and a reappearance of the old ERE would by no means have been able to serve this end. The new ND appealed to the forces that had traditionally supported the Right, but they saw it to be, just like its founder, a renewed, reformist Right. Finally, even if ND was simply ERE under a new name—which it was not, as we shall try to show below—the fact that its founder opted for that name and not for a renaissance of ERE, by itself contributed to a further stabilisation and institutionalisation of the new regime, and must be listed among all the other facts and deeds which aimed at and finally led to the consolidation of democracy in Greece.

4. Conclusion

After seven years of dictatorial rule, the military regime collapsed and transferred its power to the politicians, mainly due to the Cyprus debacle. Karamanlis, having lived for eleven consecutive years in self-imposed exile in Paris, returned to the country and undertook the two-fold task of, on the one hand, to restore democracy and found the new regime on a more stable, sound, and permanent base and, on the other, to reconstitute the conservative camp by creating a new political formation which would have no relation with the pre-coup political parties and so play a different role within the new regime, congruent with the popular aspirations and needs prevailing at the time.

In trying to cope successfully with his first objective, he embarked upon a cautious and moderate process. Having managed to avert a disastrous war against Turkey, he moved with slow deliberation towards dejuntaisation in both the military and the civilian sectors. Between the Scylla of the recalcitrant juntists and their sympathisers who hoped to survive intact within the new regime, and the Charybdis of the radical groups who cried for merciless and outright punishment, if not revenge, of all and everyone who had collaborated with the dictatorship, he opted for a middle course.

In order to invest the regime with legitimacy and to consolidate democracy, he decided to hold national elections within four months after his return. For that purpose and without consultation with any of his lieutenants he founded a new political party which he named *Nea Dimokratia* (New Democracy), and ran for office. Since the return of the country to democratic rule had been identified with Karamanlis, —given that the Greek people had only passively resisted the dictatorship, not overthrown it in favour of something different— the elections virtually turned into a referendum for the latter; his newly formed New Democracy party won a landslide victory, and an absolute majority of almost 55 per

cent of the vote. The electorate had clearly opted for the safeguarding of democracy rather than for political experimentation in any form.

Within twenty days after his electoral triumph, he organised the referendum on the monarchy question in a peaceful and orderly manner. He himself kept a neutral stance and instructed his party to do the same. In this way he both depoliticised the matter and managed to hold his newly-created party together. After the people had overwhelmingly voted for a republic, he formed a new constitution which, after a partial reform made by the socialists in 1986, has remained in effect until today. Finally, in late August 1975, and after the junta's court trials were finally concluded, he was able to devote himself to solving the country's other problems.

Karamanlis ignored his old party, the ERE, altogether, both because the latter had been worn out in the political turbulence of the years 1964-67, and because his aims and visions for post-dictatorial Greece had now changed. In the open and fully competitive political system inaugurated in 1974 there was no place for remnants of the past. So he created New Democracy, recruiting his political personnel not only from among the old, pro-royalist ERE cadres, but also among forces of the Centre and the Centre-Right, as well as bringing in many newcomers.

New Democracy remained in office until 1981, when it lost the elections and became the official opposition party for eight consecutive years; in 1990, after three electoral fights, it managed to return to power. The nature of the party and its position in the Greek party system are among the basic questions to be explored below, as well as its evolution and performance, both while in government and in opposition, until it resumed office in 1990. In the following chapter we shall examine the party's political personnel; in chapter 4, we shall turn our attention to its organisation and leadership; and in chapter 5 we shall focus our analysis on the party's ideology, strategy, and tactics.

CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL PERSONNEL

1. Introduction

We shall now embark upon a detailed examination of the New Democracy party that will, among other things, compare it with both the pre-1967 ERE as well as the other post-1974 political parties. To begin with, the analysis will focus on the party's political personnel rather than on its ideology or organisation since, as already mentioned, it was Karamanlis himself who made the decision to ignore his old party and opt for creating an entirely new one, as he claimed New Democracy to be. Indeed, in these turbulent years of metapolitefsi (transition from dictatorship to democracy) there was very little room for any real organisation or new ideology to develop —the communist parties aside, and to a lesser extent also PASOK, which two may be considered the only organised political formations at the time.

First of all, we shall try to see whether there was a renewal of political personnel or, in other words, whether New Democracy really did constitute a new political formation or was simply a revamping of the National Radical Union, and if so, to what extent. Secondly, we shall examine the New Democracy personnel in terms of political and occupational background, in order to identify what social forces the party represented. Thirdly, we shall present the attitudes of the party's leading members, and how they themselves regarded the party they belonged to. To give the approach a wider perspective we shall briefly present the other parties' characteristics with regard to the above

issues, so rounding off the analysis of New Democracy in relation to the post-dictatorial Greek party system.

The investigation as outlined above is based mainly on ND's parliamentary group, because only in this way is it possible to make valid comparisons with ERE. (As mentioned in ch. 1, ERE never set up organs such as a central or departmental committees, although its statutes definitely provided for such administrative bodies). However, ND's central and departmental committees have also been examined, especially in comparison with PASOK's respective organs, in order to indicate the party's position in the newly emerged Greek party system generally. Finally, we shall briefly present, among other features, the attitudes as well as the political and occupational background of rank-and-file party members in the Department of Larissa. (This issue is treated at greater length in ch. 6.)

The New Democracy party having been created on 4 October 1974, the analysis spans a period of more than fifteen years. During this time the party was in government for seven years, occupied the main opposition benches for another eight, and since April 1990 has been in office again. While covering the entire period, we shall not omit to take into account the various changes that have occurred in the course of it, as well as their impact and influence on the party's political identity.

2. The Parliamentary Group

2.1 Political background

The seven-year military interlude had dissolved democratic institutions altogether and brought the country's political life to an abrupt end. Even so, for the November 1974 election the contesting parties did not emerge out of a political vacuum, but had been

reconstituted from both pre-coup social elements as well as new forces, which had either actively resisted the colonels (as was especially the case of future PASOK members) or become politicised during the dictatorship. When C. Karamanlis created New Democracy he insisted from the very beginning that it was a new party, completely dissociated from ERE and its past practices, and that it was to play a distinctively different role within the newly formed political setting of the country.

New Democracy contested this first national election with 300 candidates for the 300-seat parliament. Table III.1 below presents the political background of the party's candidates.

Table III.1: ND Candidates' Political Background
for the 17 Nov. 1974 Election

<u>Pre-coup political affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
ERE	100	33.33
Right-wing parties	2	.67
Centre parties	12	04.00
Independent	3	01.00
<u>Newcomers</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>61.00</u>
Total	300	100.00

[Sources: 17 November 1974 Election Results, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, Athens 1976, pp. 17-41 and 633-40; also Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 2nd Edition, 1976, (my computations).]

As the above table shows quite strikingly, 183 out of the 300 candidates of the party, that is 61 per cent, were standing for elections for the first time. Another 100, or one-third of the party's candidates, were veterans of pre-coup ERE elections, and 17 had previously been members of other parties.⁽¹⁾ Consequently, it does seem that the data presented above corroborate the claim that New Democracy, in terms of its political personnel, had little relation to ERE, since far more than half of its candidates were new to politics. Nevertheless,

this is not altogether true. Suffice it to mention here that 38 out of those 183 newcomers were close relatives of more or less renowned pre-coup politicians (most of them affiliated with ERE), who had inherited their predecessors' electoral clientele,⁽²⁾ and most of them managed to get elected (as we shall see below, when examining the composition of the party's parliamentary group). To obtain a more complete picture of the New Democracy candidates, we should recall how the ERE had been created in its day and the political affiliation of its candidates. Table III.2 below, where data concerning ERE and ND are compiled respectively from Table I.2 in ch. 1 and from Table III.1 above, shows the differences quite clearly.

Table III.2: ERE-1956 and ND-1974 Candidates' Political Background

<u>National Radical Union-1956</u>			<u>New Democracy-1974</u>		
<u>Cand. pol. affil.</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Cand. pol. affil.</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Greek Rally	189	63.21	ERE	100	33.33
Other	63	21.08	Other	17	05.67
Newcomers	47	15.71	Newcomers	183	61.00
Total	299	100.00	Total	300	100.00

As we can see, whereas ERE depended heavily upon its predecessor's politicians, such candidates constituted only one-third of New Democracy's list. On the other hand, only 15.71 per cent of ERE's politicians were completely new to politics, while for New Democracy they amounted to a spectacular 61 per cent.

The composition of New Democracy's parliamentary group shows a similar picture, as given in Table III.3. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the party won an unprecedented majority in the November 1974 election and 220 of its candidates were elected.⁽³⁾ The data presented in Table III.3 indicate that the conservative party underwent considerable renewal. Although the newcomers are underrepresented in

Table III.3: ND MPs' Political Background after
the 17 Nov. 1974 Election

<u>MPs' previous party affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
ERE	84	38.89
Other ^(a)	12	05.55
<u>Newcomers</u>	120	55.56
<u>Total</u>	216	100.00
<u>Pre-coup politicians</u>	96	44.44

Note (a): Eight had been affiliated with the pre-coup Centre Union, two had run independently in the 1964 election, and one each came from the Party of Progressive People and from EPEK (National Progressive Centre Union, 1952).

[Sources: 17 Nov. 1974 Election Results, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, Athens 1976, pp. 17-41, 605-30 and 633-40; also Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 2nd Edition, 1976, (my computations).]

parliament —compared to their percentage on the list of candidates— they still make up 55.56 per cent, that is, more than half of the party's parliamentary group. Just as for the candidates (see footnote 2), this is again only partly true. The vast majority of those who contested the elections as the heirs of an electoral clientele managed to get elected, whereas a relatively smaller percentage of those who were newcomers altogether succeeded in securing a seat in parliament.⁽⁴⁾ On the other hand, while MPs who had in the past been affiliated with ERE were slightly overrepresented, overall and for the first time in the camp's history, they constituted a minority.⁽⁵⁾ Furthermore, there is a relatively high representation (44.44 per cent) of politicians whose careers had started before the military dictatorship.

Nevertheless, there can be no denying that a considerable renewal of the party's political personnel did take place.⁽⁶⁾ It is interesting to see the extent of this renewal in relation to the other major parties that contested the 1974 elections. Table III.4 shows how many times New Democracy, EK/ND and PASOK MPs were elected to parliament; the sample is

Table III.4: Renewal in New Democracy and EK/ND in 1974
and PASOK in 1977

<u>Times elected</u>	<u>New Democracy</u>		<u>EK/ND</u>		<u>PASOK 1977</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
First	137	63.43	35	57.38	75	79.79
Second-fourth	37	17.13	16	26.23	18	19.15
Fifth-eleventh	42	19.44	10	16.39	1	01.06
Total	216	100.00	61	100.00	94	100.00

[Sources: For ND and EK/ND, Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 2nd Edition, 1976; for PASOK, Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1978 (my computations).]

taken from the parliamentary personnel of 1974 for ND and EK/ND, and that of 1977 for PASOK, since the 15 deputies of the latter that were elected in 1974 are too few for reliable conclusions. ND's percentage of deputies elected for the first time is the highest ever achieved by a party of the Right, and the highest of any of the major 1974 parties.

Although over half of all three parties' parliamentary personnel was being renewed, PASOK's percentage (in 1977) is the highest with 79.79, compared to 63.43 and 57.38 for ND and EK/ND respectively. On the other hand, almost one-fifth of ND MPs had been elected over five times, which means they started their political career before 1960 (some of them had been elected MPs for as many as eleven times—that is, they continued in parliament without a break from 1935 onwards), whereas a considerable part of EK/ND parliamentary group came straight from the Centre Union of the early 1960s.⁽⁷⁾

Before we proceed to examine the ND parliamentary group as it has appeared in all elections after 1974, we present a final comparison in terms of age, which illustrates from a different perspective the renewal achieved in the party's parliamentary personnel in 1974. Table III.5

below shows the ND MPs' age composition, compared to that of their colleagues in EK/ND and PASOK.

Table III.5: Age Composition of the ND, EK/ND and PASOK Parliamentary Groups

Age	<u>New Democracy</u>		<u>EK/ND</u>		<u>PASOK 1977</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Under 35	19	08.80	4	06.56	9	09.89
35-44	51	23.61	12	19.67	37	40.66
45-54	57	26.39	12	19.67	26	28.57
55-64	59	27.31	20	32.79	14	15.38
65-over	30	13.89	13	21.31	5	05.50
Total	216	100.00	61	100.00	91	100.00
Average age	51.00		53.50		46.23	

Note: There are no data for 3 of the PASOK MPs in 1977.

[Sources: For ND and EK/ND, Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 2nd Edition, 1976; for PASOK, Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1978 (my computations).]

Although the largest ND group is of MPs aged between 55 and 64, half of the party's MPs are between 35 and 54. Overall, MPs under 55 years predominate within the ND parliamentary group, making up almost 59 per cent of the total.⁽⁸⁾ Conversely, more than 54 per cent of EK/ND MPs are aged over 55, more than one-fifth of whom would already have gone into retirement had they been employed in any other public sector. Not surprisingly then, the EK/ND MPs' age average is the highest, namely 53.5 years, compared to 46 years for PASOK (in 1977) and 51 years for New Democracy.

Overall, the above analysis shows that, in terms of the political background of its parliamentary personnel, New Democracy managed to a considerable extent to differentiate itself from its predecessor, and to

present a new and rejuvenated image. Its links with ERE were still discernible, but do not justify the charge that ND was merely ERE under another name; the party's 1974 electoral lists —contrary to past usage— comprised a good number of newcomers, many of whom were elected. Last but not least (compared to EK/ND, its main rival at the time), ND bore much less resemblance to ERE than did EK/ND to the pre-coup Centre Union.^{'9)}

It could be said that Karamanlis, just as he had restored democracy in post-junta Greece —that is, painstakingly, cautiously, and step by step— adopted a similar procedure with regard to New Democracy's renewal and its dissociation from past political personalities and practices. The somewhat timid progress towards this end, already discernible when the party was created, gained momentum and, by and by achieved dominance, resulting in a very different constitution and ultimate outlook of the conservative party. In what follows we shall try to substantiate this statement by showing the characteristics of the ND parliamentary group as they appeared after every election from 1974 until today.^{'10)} Table III.6 below shows the ND deputies' previous political affiliation after all the intervening elections.

Table III.6: ND MPs' Political Affiliation after all National Elections since 1974

MPs	1977		1981		1985		1989A		1989B		1990	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
ND	136	79.53	81	70.44	103	81.75	102	70.34	137	92.57	135	88.82
New	24	14.04	16	13.91	12	09.52	41	28.28	10	06.76	16	10.52
Other	11	06.43	18	15.65	11	08.73	2	01.38	1	.67	1	.66
Total	171	100.00	115	100.00	126	100.00	145	100.00	148	100.00	152	100.00
Pre-coup	57	33.33	32	27.82	21	16.67	14	09.66	14	09.46	10	06.58

[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1985 elections, Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1978, 1982 and 1986 respectively; for the 1989A and 1989B elections, Gnoriste tous Voulefes ke Evrovoulefes, Athens: Eleftherotypia Publications, 1989; and for the 1990 elections, see the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 20 April 1990, (all computations are mine).]

As it is clearly shown in the above Table, the parliamentary group's overwhelming majority, varying between 70 and 92 per cent, has always consisted of politicians with previous party association; even so, there has been a considerable percentage of newcomers each time, ranging from 6.76 to 28.28 per cent.⁽¹¹⁾ Politicians who joined ND from other parties were always in a minority, and fade out altogether after the June 1989 election;⁽¹²⁾ the same trend applies to pre-coup representation generally, represented by the percentage of politicians whose careers began before 1967. As seen already (Table III.3 above), this group constituted 44.44 per cent of ND deputies in 1974, but thereafter kept decreasing, to fall to a mere 6.58 per cent in 1990. Similar picture emerges from an examination of how often deputies were elected. Table III.7 shows how many times New Democracy MPs have been elected to parliament, and covers all the elections from 1977 until 1990.

Table III.7: Renewal/Consolidation within ND from 1977 until 1990

Times	1977		1981		1985		1989A		1989B		1990	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
1st	33	19.30	29	25.22	20	15.87	68	46.90	18	12.16	16	10.59
2nd	81	47.37	24	20.87	32	25.40	14	09.66	56	37.84	30	19.87
3rd	8	04.68	30	26.08	30	23.81	18	12.41	18	12.16	43	28.48
4th	8	04.68	7	06.09	23	18.25	16	11.03	17	11.49	12	07.75
5th	7	04.09	3	02.61	6	04.76	16	11.03	14	09.46	16	10.59
6th	2	01.17	4	03.48	4	03.18	3	02.07	13	08.78	13	08.61
7th	7	04.09	2	01.74	2	01.59	3	02.07	3	02.03	12	07.15
8th/ more	25	14.62	16	13.91	9	07.14	7	04.83	9	06.08	9	05.96
Total	171	100.00	115	100.00	126	100.00	145	100.00	148	100.00	151	100.00

Note: the 1990 election gave ND 151 deputies of its own. A 152nd was elected with Democratic Renewal (DIANA), a New Democracy splinter group created in 1985; he joined ND after the election.

[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1985 elections, Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1978, 1982 and 1986 respectively; for the 1989A and 1989B elections, Gnoriste tous Voulefes ke Evrovoulefes, Athens: Eleftherotypia Publications, 1989; and for the 1990 elections, see the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 20 April 1990, (all computations are mine).]

The comments already made on the data in Table III.6, are further elucidated by the more detailed picture presented in Table III.7 above. The high percentages of both newcomers and pre-coup political figures in the party's 1974 composition (see Table III.3) have diminished, and the gap between older and newer deputies—in terms of how often they have been elected—is fading out. Whereas the party's parliamentary group had a constant influx of newcomers after each election, at the same time its older deputies who, as we have already seen, constituted the core of the party when it was first created,⁽¹³⁾ are gradually abandoning politics. This means that a new core has been forming, including many deputies who began their political careers in or shortly after 1974 and have been re-elected since. Consequently then, with the exception of the June 1989 election when the newly elected deputies constituted a spectacular 47 per cent of the party's parliamentary group (see footnote 11 to this chapter), there is a tendency within New Democracy towards a more balanced representation between newer and older deputies—in other words, between rejuvenation and consolidation.

When New Democracy took office in 1974, the average age of 51 years in its parliamentary group was, as we have seen already, the lowest compared to that of EK/ND and PASOK. Table III.8 below presents the age composition of the party's parliamentary personnel after all elections.

The most obvious change between 1974 and 1977 (see Table III.5 above) is the shift of the centre of gravity from the 55-64 to the 45-54 year age group, which has remained predominant ever since. On the other hand, while the youngest group has remained relatively stable, the oldest has decreased continuously: from 15.89 per cent in 1977, it now accounts for only 5.37 per cent. Conversely, the group of those aged between 35 and 44 became the second largest in 1990, and accounts for about a third of the total. Speaking generally, and despite minor variations, the average age of ND MPs has been decreasing and reached its all-time low in 1990.⁽¹⁴⁾

Table III.8: Age Composition of the ND Parliamentary Group after all Elections

Age	1977		1981		1985		1989A		1989B		1990	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Under 35	10	05.88	7	06.09	3	02.38	7	04.83	9	06.08	7	04.70
35-44	44	25.88	27	23.48	26	20.64	31	21.38	37	25.00	45	30.20
45-54	51	30.00	41	35.65	47	37.30	61	42.07	57	38.51	56	37.58
55-64	38	22.35	22	19.13	33	26.19	36	24.83	36	24.33	33	22.15
Over 65	27	15.89	18	15.65	17	13.49	10	06.89	9	06.08	8	05.37
Total	170	100.00	115	100.00	126	100.00	145	100.00	148	100.00	149	100.00
Average	51.38		50.97		52.40		50.52		49.47		48.76	

Note: No data are available for one MP in 1977, and for three in 1990.

[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1985 elections, Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1978, 1982 and 1986 respectively; for the 1989A and 1989B elections, Gnoriste tous Vouleftes ke Evrovouleftes, Athens: Eleftherotypia Publications, 1989; and for the 1990 elections, see the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 20 April 1990, (all computations are mine).]

A few words should be also said about the party's Euro-MPs.⁽¹⁵⁾ In 1981, 1984 and June 1989, the party elected eight, nine, and ten Euro-MPs respectively, polling 31.53, 38.05 and 40.45 per cent of the vote (for a total of 24 Greek deputies). Table III.9 below shows the political background of these MPs as well as their average age. As we can see, in 1981 three of the deputies had belonged to ERE in the past and there was only one newcomer, so that the average age was unexpectedly high (61.4 years) when compared to the 50.97 years of the 1981 parliamentary group. Conversely in 1984, when newcomers made up the majority, the average age fell to 50.44 years. In June 1989, no elected Euro-MP had previous affiliations with ERE, and seven of the total ten ND deputies had risen from the party ranks —as was also the case with respect to the party's June 1989 parliamentary group (see Table III.6

Table III.9: ND Euro-MPs' Political Background after all Euro-Elections

Pol. Affil.	1981		1984		1989A	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
ERE	3	37.50	1	11.11	--	---
ND	4	50.00	1	11.11	7	70.00
Newcomers	1	12.50	6	66.67	2	20.00
Other (a)	--	---	1	11.11	1	10.00
Total	8	100.00	9	100.00	10	100.00
Average Age	61.40		50.44		55.20	

Note (a): In 1984, one ND Euro-MP came from EK/ND, and one in 1989 from KODISO (Party of Democratic Socialism, a splinter of EDIK).

[Sources: For 1981 and 1984, see Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1982 and 1986 respectively; for 1989, see Gnoriste tous Vouleftes ke Evrovouleftes, Athens: Eleftherotypia Publications, 1989 (all computations are mine).]

above). We suggest that the data concerning the New Democracy Euro-MPs' political background does not only not contradict, but rather supports the picture that was obtained from examining the party's parliamentary group.⁽¹⁶⁾

Before proceeding to the examination of the occupational background of the ND party's personnel, additional points to be examined concerning their political antecedents are (i) how ND handled the pro-royalists within its ranks, (ii) the party's relations towards the reactionary, authoritative ultra-Right; and (iii) ND's shift further towards the Centre when (in 1977 and in 1981) it had absorbed political forces previously part of EK/ND and EDIK.

We noted earlier that when the referendum for the monarchy issue was held in December 1974, Karamanlis had instructed his party to remain neutral. He also warned his associates that any of them expressing his opinion in public would automatically be expelled from the party. All other parties, except for the ultra-Right EDE, publicly took an anti-

royalist stance and urged their supporters to vote against a crowned democracy. The ND party officials and deputies respected their leader's decision, although many of them later admitted that their choice had lain with, and they had therefore voted for, the King.⁽¹⁷⁾ It becomes evident then that New Democracy, especially at the time it was first created, comprised several staunch royalists within its ranks,⁽¹⁸⁾ who nevertheless became fewer and fewer as time went by. Since, however, they never formed a separate faction within the party, there are no data concerning their exact number. Due to the impeccable manner in which the referendum was conducted, the monarchy issue has ceased to be of popular concern ever since, and is merely given an occasional airing by PASOK and the Left for purely demagogic-oppositional purposes. In reality it has ceased to be of any interest whatsoever.

At the time of the referendum, however, in December 1974, the question could still cause some turbulence within the party, and finally one ND deputy resigned. He and some other dissatisfied politicians—some of whom had been collaborating with the dictatorship—formed an ultra-Right royalist party called National Front (Ethniki Parataxis), which managed to poll almost 7 per cent in the 1977 election, securing five seats in parliament. After Karamanlis' accession to the Presidency of the Republic in May 1980, and as the prospects of PASOK's victory increased on the eve of the forthcoming 1981 election, George Rallis as the then premier and leader of the New Democracy party was ready to accept the ultra-rightists back into the ND ranks;⁽¹⁹⁾ at the same time he was trying to attract political forces of the Centre, hoping in this way to prevent PASOK from winning the election. Although New Democracy fought the election reinforced on both its right and left, the victory went overwhelmingly to PASOK. Table III.10 below presents the results of the 1974, 1977 and 1981 elections.

Table III.10: 17 Nov. 1974, 20 Nov. 1977 and 18 Oct. 1981
Electoral Results

Party/Coalition	17 Nov. 1974		20 Nov. 1977		18 Oct. 1981	
	%	seats	%	seats	%	seats
New Democracy	54.37	216	41.84	171	35.87	115
EK/ND (a)	20.42	61	11.95	15	01.10	---
PASOK	13.58	15	25.34	94	48.07	172
Left (b)	09.47	8	12.08	13	12.27	13
Ultra Right (c)	01.08	---	06.82	5	01.68	---
Other	01.08	---	01.97	2	01.01	---
Total	100.00	300	100.00	300	100.00	300

Notes: (a) EK/ND was dissolved before the 1977 election; in 1977 it had become EDIK, and for 1981 the figures refer to the sum total of EDIK and its splinter party KODISO.

(b) In 1974 this means the United Left party; in 1977 it is the sum total of the Communist Party (KKE) of Greece and the Alliance of Progressive Forces; and in 1981 the figures are for both the KKE and the KKE of the Interior, a splinter group of the former.

(c) In 1974 this was represented by the EDE; in 1977 by the National Front; and in 1981 by the Party of Progressive People.

[Sources: for 1974, see 17 November 1974 Election Results, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, Athens 1976, pp. 14-5 and 577-604; for 1977 see 20 November 1977 Election Results, vol. 1, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, Athens 1979, pp. 16-7 and 19-55; and for 1981 see 18 October 1981 Election Results, vol. 1, Ministry of the Interior, Dept of Elections, Athens 1984, pp. 14-5 and 17-40.]

We can see that taking back the ultra-rightists did not really help ND. On the contrary, it brought accusations and resentment from within the party, because it was believed to have kept away centrist and moderate voters. Like the royalists, the ultra-Right never had an organised faction within New Democracy, and whatever minor role they may have been playing was further reduced after 1986, when the party —theoretically, at least— moved closer to the Centre and liberalism. Still, isolated political figures remain in the ND ranks who, given the chance, do not

hesitate to voice provocative reminders of old schisms and the civil war.⁽²⁰⁾

Aside from the ultra-Right, New Democracy also tried to attract political forces from the Centre. When Karamanlis originally created ND, he tried to give to his party a more centrist and liberal outlook, and continued to do so as long as he was its leader. A good chance presented itself after the 1977 election, when the Centre did very poorly, and resulted in the first influx of centrist politicians into ND.⁽²¹⁾ After EDIK's electoral disaster in 1981, when it polled a mere 0.64 per cent of the vote, the absorption of centrist politicians was completed, to the benefit of both major parties, New Democracy and PASOK. The latter thus acquired a more moderate outlook, which played a crucial role in its battle for office in 1981. New Democracy for its part was helped by the centrist influx to disassociate itself from the ultra-Right, to adopt and present a more liberal and modern identity and, finally —also for a number of other reasons, to be examined in the following chapters— to return to power after eight years in opposition.

2.2 Occupational background

As we have already mentioned in the first chapter of this study, all Greek political parties except the communists lacked both horizontal and vertical organisational structures. In fact, they never developed such administrative organs, since the local political barons kept controlling and incorporating the voters within the political arena through vertical, dependent and personalistic mechanisms. Although there are no concrete data available,⁽²²⁾ politicians were usually lawyers and doctors who, due to their profession, could easily create and maintain a personal clientele. In consequence, the majority of Greek politicians have always been members of the liberal professions rather than salaried

employees. This distinctive feature of Greek politics seems highly recalcitrant to change.

As is shown in Table III.11 below, lawyers, doctors and engineers constituted the largest categories within ND's parliamentary personnel, making up 73 per cent in 1974. There was also quite a considerable representation of businessmen, university professors, retired military officers and economists; shipowners and industrialists were also represented, albeit more sparsely. Moreover, there was a striking resemblance between the ND and EK/ND MPs' occupational backgrounds, especially as regards the legal and medical representation.

Although similar trends can be identified within PASOK, its occupational composition has always differed considerably from that of the two other parties. PASOK comprises a significant percentage of middle and lower employees, categories that are markedly underrepresented in the parliamentary groups of both New Democracy and EK/ND. So, whereas PASOK MPs include a considerable number with a petty-bourgeois or lower-class occupational background, those of ND are much more likely to be of bourgeois extraction. This is borne out by the numerical relation between the salaried and liberal professions in the two parliamentary groups: MPs from salaried categories constitute 23.41 per cent in PASOK, but only 13 per cent in ND. Conversely, the liberal professions are represented by 75.53 and 85.65 per cent respectively—more heavily accented for ND and so giving a more lopsided picture.

According to these figures, then, the social and occupational composition of the ND MPs was not really so very different from what it had been for its predecessor in the pre-coup years, notwithstanding the spectacular rejuvenation due to the massive influx of newcomers within the party's ranks. As Table III.11 below shows, the predominant trends within ERE ranks (especially in respect of the legal and medical professions) reappeared in New Democracy in 1974, and were also more or

Table III.11: ND-1974, EK/ND-1974, and PASOK-1977 MPs'
Occupational Background

Profession	ERE 1964 ^(a)		New Democracy		EK/ND		PASOK 1977	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Lawyers	30	61.23	115	53.24	32	52.46	44	46.81
Doctors	8	16.33	29	13.42	8	13.11	11	11.71
Engineers	2	04.08	14	06.48	3	04.92	7	07.44
Ship'g/Industry	--	---	2	.93	1	01.64	--	---
Businessmen	1	02.04	10	04.63	1	01.64	1	01.06
Merchants	--	---	1	.46	1	01.64	--	---
Landowners	1	02.04	2	.93	--	---	1	01.06
Farmers	--	---	1	.46	--	---	3	03.19
High Rank Emp.	1	02.04	3	01.39	--	---	5	05.32
Middle/ Lower Emp.	--	---	3	01.39	2	03.28	6	06.38
Workers	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---
Univ. Prof.	--	---	9	04.17	3	04.92	2	02.13
Teachers	2	04.08	4	01.85	1	01.64	4	04.26
Journalists	--	---	2	.93	2	03.28	1	01.06
Artists	1	02.04	2	.93	--	---	1	01.06
Economists	1	02.04	8	03.70	4	06.56	2	02.13
Military	1	02.04	7	03.24	3	04.92	4	04.26
Miscellaneous	--	---	1	.93	--	---	1	01.06
No data	1	02.04	3	01.39	--	---	1	01.06
Total	49	100.00	216	100.00	61	100.00	94	100.00
SALARIED PROF.	4	08.16	28	12.96	11	18.03	22	23.41
LIBERAL PROF.	44	89.80	185	85.65	48	78.69	71	75.53
NO DATA	1	02.04	3	01.39	2	03.28	1	01.06

Note (a): See footnote 22.

[Sources: For ND and EK/ND (and also for the ERE-64 sample, see footnote 22), *Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon*, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 2nd Edition, 1976; for PASOK, *Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon*, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1978 (my computations)].

less identifiable in the other major parties. However, even if lawyers and doctors constituted the vast majority of the party's parliamentary group in 1974, New Democracy managed at the time to project "...a more broadminded, technocratic, and centrist outlook than its predecessors".⁽²³⁾ This, as we have already mentioned, was due mainly to those new politicians who joined and staffed the party, 58.8 per cent of whom had absolved postgraduate studies abroad (compared to 31.5 per cent for ERE and the Greek Rally).⁽²⁴⁾

In the years thereafter, lawyers and doctors did not become fewer although this might have been expected. The communist parties apart, these two professions continued to amount to more than half of both PASOK's and ND's parliamentary groups. In the former, they were always fewer and by 1990 they amounted to 53 per cent; in the latter they dropped from its 66.66 per cent or two-thirds of ND's MPs in 1974 to just below 60 per cent in 1981 and ever since, as given in Table III.12 below. Almost everything said about the ND MPs' occupational background in 1974 has continued to apply. In addition, engineers rose to constitute the third-largest group. Whereas middle and lower-rank employees were very poorly represented, and farmers and workers missing altogether from 1981 onwards, these categories fared better in PASOK. Shipowners and/or industrialists, together with businessmen and merchants, are more numerous in ND's ranks, and amounted to 7 per cent in 1990. (PASOK had and has none of the former and only a very few of the latter). A new profession, the economists, appeared as early as 1974, and since 1985 have been neck-and-neck as the third-largest group in ND, alongside the engineers.⁽²⁵⁾ All in all, the liberal professions are in the majority, both in ND and PASOK. Although one cannot yet speak of a definite trend, it looks as if New Democracy is moving to a somewhat more balanced representation of the salaried professions in its parliamentary group; the latter amounted to over 18 per cent in 1990,

Table III.12: New Democracy MPs' Occupational Background after all E

Profession	ND-1977		ND-1981		PASOK-1981	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Lawyers	94	54.97	56	48.69	84	48.84
Doctors	18	10.53	13	11.30	20	11.63
Engineers	12	07.02	10	08.70	15	08.72
Ship'g/Industry	3	01.76	2	01.74	--	---
Business	6	03.51	2	01.74	1	.58
Merchants	--	---	1	.87	1	.58
Landowners	1	.58	--	---	--	---
Farmers	--	---	--	---	4	02.33
High Rank Emp.	5	02.93	2	01.74	4	02.33
Middle/Low Rank	4	02.34	2	01.74	14	08.14
Workers	--	---	--	---	1	.58
Univ. Prof.	4	02.34	4	03.48	5	02.91
Teachers	2	01.17	2	01.74	9	05.23
Journalists	1	.58	2	01.74	1	.58
Artists	2	01.17	2	01.74	2	01.16
Economists	8	04.68	11	09.56	2	01.16
Military	9	05.26	6	05.22	7	04.07
Miscellaneous	1	.58	--	---	2	01.16
No data	1	.58	--	---	--	---
Total	171	100.00	115	100.00	172	100.00
SALARIED PROF.	25	14.62	17	14.78	32	18.60
LIBERAL PROF.	145	84.80	98	85.22	140	81.40
NO DATA	1	.58	--	---	--	---

[Sources: For the 1977, 1981 and 1985 elections, *Oi 300 tis Voulis ton E* respectively; for the 1989A and 1989B elections, *Gnoriste tous Vouleftes k* the 1990 elections, see the weekly newspaper *To Pondiki*, 20 April 1990, (

1 Elections (and PASOK's MPs in 1981 and 1990)

ND-1985		ND-1989A		ND-1989B		ND-1990		PASOK-1990	
no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
65	51.59	66	45.52	70	47.30	59	38.82	52	41.53
12	09.52	26	17.93	25	16.90	32	21.05	14	11.29
13	10.32	9	06.20	10	06.76	11	07.23	15	12.10
1	.79	1	.69	4	02.70	2	01.32	--	---
2	01.59	4	02.76	6	04.05	9	05.92	--	---
1	.79	--	---	--	---	1	.66	2	01.61
--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---
--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---	2	01.61
2	01.59	7	04.83	2	01.35	1	.66	1	.81
1	.79	2	01.38	1	.68	2	01.32	10	08.06
--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---	1	.81
3	02.38	3	02.07	4	02.70	4	02.63	4	03.23
2	01.59	2	01.38	2	01.35	6	03.95	6	04.84
1	.79	4	02.76	2	01.35	3	01.97	2	01.61
2	01.59	3	02.07	4	02.70	1	.66	2	01.61
12	09.52	9	06.20	10	06.76	11	07.23	7	05.65
9	07.15	7	04.83	6	04.05	5	03.29	3	02.42
--	---	2	01.38	2	01.35	3	01.97	2	01.61
--	---	--	---	--	---	2	01.32	1	.81
126	100.00	145	100.00	148	100.00	152	100.00	124	100.00
19	15.08	25	17.24	19	12.84	28	18.42	24	19.35
107	84.92	120	82.76	129	87.16	122	80.26	99	79.84
--	---	--	---	--	---	2	01.32	1	.81

on Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1978, 1982 and 1986
 s ke Evrovouleftes, Athens: Eleftherotypia Publications, 1989; and for
 , (all computations are mine).]

compared to a mere 13 per cent in 1974. In general though, ND MPs keep projecting a more upper-class, bourgeois occupational background, whereas their PASOK colleagues seem on the average to have lower-class, petit-bourgeois social origins.

With respect to the party's Euro-MPs the situation is different, as the data in Table III.13 below demonstrate. In 1981, out of the eight party deputies, six were lawyers and only two had done post-graduate studies abroad. In 1984, together with lawyers, doctors and economists, there were also two higher-ranking employees and one journalist, and the post-graduates' percentage rose to above 55. In June 1989, finally, lawyers became again the largest group (but not dominant as they had been in 1981), and 60 per cent of the total had done post-graduate work.⁽²⁶⁾ As regards both the Euro-MPs' political and occupational background there is a noteworthy difference between the 1981 group and those of 1984 and 1989. In the first election it would appear that the

Table III.13: ND Euro-MPs' Occupational Background
after all Euro-Elections

Profession	1981		1984		1989	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Lawyers	6	75.00	2	22.22	3	30.00
Doctors	1	12.50	2	22.22	1	10.00
Univ. Prof.	--	---	--	---	1	10.00
High Rank Emp.	--	---	2	22.22	1	10.00
Journalists	--	---	1	11.11	2	20.00
Economists	1	12.50	2	22.22	2	20.00
Total	8	100.00	9	99.99	10	100.00
Post-graduates	2	25.00	5	55.55	6	60.00

[Sources: For 1981 and 1984, see Oi 300 tis Voulis ton Ellinon, Athens: Kathimerini Publications, 1982 and 1986 respectively; for 1989, see Gnoriste tous Vouleftes ke Evrovouleftes, Athens: Eleftherotypia Publications, 1989 (all computations are mine).]

party neglected to give much thought to this issue, sending to the European Parliament rather old and inadequately educated deputies compared to those of PASOK, probably because it was channelling all its efforts into winning the national election —which it finally lost. The most striking aspect of the Euro-MPs' occupational background, is that not one of them was or is a merchant or businessman. Since, as already mentioned, compiling the Euro-lists has been the exclusive prerogative of the ND party leadership, it remains to be seen whether the absence of certain professional categories is due to chance, or whether there are special reasons for this which it has not yet been possible to identify.⁽²⁷⁾

3. Central and Departmental Committees

As we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, it took the New Democracy party considerable time to lay its organisational foundations. In late 1975 Karamanlis appointed —including himself— 21 of his closest colleagues as members of the then-called administrative committee.⁽²⁸⁾ Four years later, when the first party congress was held, the first elected administrative committee was formed, but never functioned as it was supposed to, that is as the highest party organ; it was convoked only to approve decisions already taken by the party leader and his closest colleagues.

The party cannot be said to have really developed its organisational structures until E. Averoff became its leader in December 1981, and especially following ND's second congress in February 1986. The central committee then elected included 50 non-parliamentarians (the rest were MPs elected by ND's parliamentary group itself). Table III.14 shows the 1986 central-committee members' political background.

Table III.14: ND Central-Committee Members' Political Background in 1986

Previous Pol. Affil.	Parl. members		Non-parl. members		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
ERE-1964	5	18.52	6	12.00	11	14.29
EK-1964	3	11.11	--	---	3	03.90
ND	18	66.67	44	88.00	62	80.52
EDIK-1977	1	03.70	--	---	1	01.29
Total	27	100.00	50	100.00	77	100.00

[Sources: see New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, Thessaloniki: 14-16 February 1986, ND publication (in Greek), pp. 213-21 (my computations).]

Contrary to the case of PASOK,⁽²⁹⁾ the 1986 composition of ND's central committee shows a striking resemblance to that of the party's 1985 parliamentary group. Indeed, if we take another look at the data presented earlier in Table III.6, we see that the percentage of politicians who were already actively affiliated with ND is almost identical in the 1985 parliamentary group and the 1986 central committee. On the other hand, pre-coup politicians account for over 18 per cent of the central committee, compared to 16.67 per cent in the parliamentary group; a little over 5 per cent of the central committee consist of political figures of the Centre, compared to almost 8 per cent of the parliamentary group (see footnote 12 above). In terms of their previous political affiliation, therefore, the central-committee members are not noticeably different from the party deputies at that time. Although there are no available data, it seems that the trend we identified in ND's parliamentary group can be discerned here as well: namely, that from the appointed central committee of 1975 the party moved towards renewal to further distance itself from its pre-coup ancestor, and became staffed mostly by politicians who had entered politics after 1974. This point can be further elucidated by a look at

the central committee's composition in late 1991;³⁰ the data are given in Table III.15 below.

Table III.15: ND Central-Committee Members' Political Background in 1991

Pol. Affil.	Parliamentarians		Non-parliamentarians		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
ERE	3	10.71	3	06.12	6	07.79
EK	1	03.58	--	---	1	01.30
ND	21	75.00	46	93.88	67	87.01
EDIK-77	3	10.71	--	---	3	03.90
Total	28	100.00	49	100.00	77	100.00

[Sources: see *New Democracy*, Athens: December 1991, Special Edition of the daily newspaper *Apogevmatini* (in Greek); all computations are mine).]

Here again, the resemblance with the ND MPs' political background in 1990 is very obvious (compare Table III.6 above). The percentage of central-committee members previously affiliated with ND amounts to a little over 87 per cent, compared to 88.82 per cent of its MPs in 1990. On the other hand, pre-coup politicians constitute 6.58 per cent of the 1990 parliamentary group, as against 9.09 per cent on the central committee in 1991. It is also noteworthy that there are no political figures of the Centre among either the 1986 or 1991 central-committee non-parliamentarians. Overall then, more than 90 per cent of the central-committee members entered politics after 1974 when they joined the party, having had no relations whatsoever with anti-junta organisations (as was the case with PASOK) or other political forces. In terms of the political affiliation prior to their election to the central committee, the members were no different from the party MPs. In fact, they portray much the same characteristics, thus reinforcing our earlier argument (put forward while examining the ND MPs' political background) that New Democracy was a personal creation of its leader

who, while including pre-coup ERE politicians, also brought in a good many newcomers who from the very beginning gave the party a different outlook from its predecessor and in time became the dominant element within it.

The picture as outlined above continues to hold true also in regard to the central-committee members' occupational background. What again first strikes one is the predominance of the liberal professions. According to Table III.16 below, the legal profession predominated on both PASOK's and ND's central committee, but was considerably higher on the latter. Doctors and engineers were also well represented on ND's central committee, and all the liberal professions together accounted for over 72 per cent (compared to just under 54 per cent in the case of PASOK). Although both parties had a considerable representation of high-ranking employees, the salaried jobs were better represented on PASOK's central committee. Furthermore, ND's central committee included five businessmen and one industrialist, professions of which PASOK's had none. Conversely, farmers, professors, teachers, students and artists were absent from the ND 1979 central committee. Therefore, as was the case with the party MPs' occupational background, it seems that New Democracy failed to attract members engaged in professions relatively new to Greek politics at the time. The party's central committee included a large number of members with a bourgeois social background, as opposed to the petty-bourgeois or lower-class occupational background of its PASOK counterpart.

At the second party congress in February 1986, a new central committee was elected. Its composition differed considerably from that of the first one in 1979, in the sense that there was now a more balanced representation of professions that before had been absent altogether. Even so, the percentage of the salaried categories dropped dramatically —from 23.45 in 1979 to 16.88 in 1986— mainly due to the

Table III.16: Occupational Background of ND and PASOK
Central Committees

Profession	PASOK 1977		ND 1979		ND 1986		ND-91A ^(a)		ND-91B ^(b)	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Lawyers	16	20.00	30	37.04	32	41.56	22	28.57	7	10.00
Doctors	6	07.50	14	17.28	11	14.28	11	14.28	7	10.00
Engineers	8	10.00	6	07.41	6	07.79	9	11.69	2	02.86
Ship'g/Industry	--	---	1	01.23	--	---	1	01.30	--	---
Business	--	---	5	06.17	7	09.09	8	10.39	13	18.57
Merchants	3	03.75	3	03.71	--	---	1	01.30	5	07.14
Farmers	4	05.00	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---
High Rank Emp.	15	18.75	15	18.52	1	01.30	2	02.60	11	15.71
Middle/Low Emp.	3	03.75	1	01.23	2	02.60	2	02.60	10	14.29
Workers	4	05.00	1	01.23	--	---	--	---	--	---
Univ. Prof.	2	02.50	--	---	3	03.89	2	02.60	1	01.43
Teachers	1	01.25	--	---	1	01.30	1	01.30	6	08.57
Students	8	10.00	--	---	--	---	3	03.89	--	---
Journalists	--	---	--	---	2	02.60	2	02.60	--	---
Artists	3	03.75	--	---	2	02.60	--	---	--	---
Economists	--	---	--	---	2	02.60	4	05.19	--	---
Military	2	02.50	2	02.47	2	02.60	--	---	--	---
Miscellaneous	5	06.25	3	03.71	1	01.30	1	01.30	--	---
No data	--	---	--	---	5	06.49	8	10.39	8	11.43
Total	80	100.00	81	100.00	77	100.00	77	100.00	70	100.00
SALARIED PROF.	27	33.75	19	23.45	13	16.88	10	12.99	28	40.00
LIBERAL PROF.	43	53.75	59	72.84	56	72.73	55	71.43	34	48.57
NO DATA	10	12.50	3	03.71	8	10.39	12	15.58	8	11.43

Notes (a) and (b): See footnotes 31a and 31b.

[Sources: For the PASOK 1977 and ND 1979 central committees, see Lyrantzis C., Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, op. cit., p. 273. For the ND 1986 central committee, see New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, op. cit. For the ND-91A central committee, and for the 70 elected presidents of the party's departmental committees, see New Democracy, Athens: Special Edition of the daily newspaper Apogevmatini, December 1991, (in Greek); all computations are mine].

decrease in higher-ranking employees on the central committee. The legal and medical professions once more constituted more than half of the total and by and large, the central committee's composition resembled that of the 1985 parliamentary group (see Table III.11 above). Since the spate of consecutive national elections during 1989 and 1990, and given that no party congress has been held since 1986,³² the composition of the central committee has slightly changed, as shown in Table III.16 above. The legal and medical professions have ceased to constitute the absolute majority; their loss has been the gain chiefly of businessmen, merchants and industrialists, who together make up the third-largest group and account for 13 per cent. Lawyers and doctors still make up the first- and second-largest groups respectively. The ratio between salaried and liberal categories has remained stable, the latter always being the dominant group within the party's central committee.

A completely different picture emerges from the comparison of the occupational composition of the 70 elected presidents of ND's departmental committees throughout the country. It is businessmen who now constitute the largest group, with 18.57 per cent (together with merchants, they account for almost 26 per cent). Salaried employees of higher and middle or lower rank are the next-largest group, with little difference between them: they have 15.71 and 14.29 per cent respectively. Of course, lawyers and doctors are again represented, but to a much lesser extent (10 per cent each), and there are also quite a few teachers (8.57 per cent). Not surprisingly then, the ratio between liberal and salaried professions has changed markedly: the former still make up the largest group, but now account for less than half of the total (48.57 per cent); the latter are not so very far behind, amounting for the first time to as much as 40 per cent.

The picture as presented above is corroborated by a random sample of the occupations of 158 rank-and-file party members in the Department of

Larissa⁽³³⁾ in 1989. The traditional professions of medicine and law are hardly represented (as will be discussed in more detail in ch. 6), and the largest occupational group, that of members running their own shops and businesses, accounts for less than one-third of the total, as shown in Table III.17 below. Party members employed in the public sector of the economy amount to 21.52 per cent, and another 24.68 per cent are salaried in the private sector. These last two groups together, or in other words party members in salaried jobs, make up 46.20 per cent of the rank-and-file; another large group —14.56 per cent, and all women— is engaged in housekeeping.

Table III.17: Occupational Background of 158 Party Members in Larissa in 1989

Occupation	number	%
Private Sector/Own Business	48	30.38
Private Sector/Salaried	39	24.68
Public Sector Employment	34	21.52
Housekeeping/unemployed	(23/14) 37	(14.56/08.86) 23.42
Total	158	100.00

It can be seen, therefore, that both the occupational and social composition of the parliamentary and the central-committee groups of the party are quite similar. The liberal professions predominate overall, with lawyers and doctors still forming the largest groups in both bodies (as they had in the pre-coup parties), but slowly retreating before a trend towards more balanced representation of other and newer professions without a traditional foothold in Greek politics. Where the party's grass-roots organisation is concerned, the picture is very different. Salaried jobs are by far better represented, and it is people engaged in business, large or small, who constitute the largest category. This would suggest that there is a certain imbalance between

the grass-roots and the top organisational bodies of the party, seeing that the latter, although they were elected by the former, have such different social and occupational backgrounds. We think that this is, in fact, one of the distinctive features of the New Democracy party, and we shall focus the analysis on it in depth when examining the organisation of the party in the next chapter.⁽³⁴⁾

One more point must be made concerning women's participation in the party's parliamentary group as well as in the organisation. Table III.18 below shows unequivocally that in Greece politics remains the almost exclusive domain of men, just as politicians belong overwhelmingly to the legal, medical and other liberal professions. This scarcity of women in parliament is not limited to ND, as the relevant figures for PASOK, given in parentheses, clearly attest.

Table III.18: ND Women in Parliament (PASOK data in parentheses)

	1974	1977	1981	1985	1989A	1989B	1990
Men	212 (14)	168 (88)	112 (165)	122 (154)	138 (121)	138 (121)	144 (119)
Women	4 (1)	3 (5)	3 (7)	4 (7)	7 (4)	10 (7)	7 (5)
Total	216 (15)	171 (93)	115 (172)	126 (161)	145 (125)	148 (128)	151 (124)

In both parties the presence of women is merely symbolic. In New Democracy they accounted for 1.75 per cent in 1977 (their lowest point), but even at their most numerous, in November 1989 (1989B in the Table), they did not exceed 6.76 per cent. The average for women in ND's parliamentary group is 3.66 per cent (and 4.81 per cent for PASOK).

Women's representation in the European Parliament is similar. As Table III.19 below shows (PASOK data again in parentheses), there were no women at all among the 1981 New Democracy Euro-MPs, and only one each in 1984 and in 1989. Women have done rather better on the party's central committee, where from 8.64 per cent in 1979, they rose to a significant 13 per cent in late 1991. Moreover, 48 of the 158 rank-and-

Table III.19: Women in the EP, Central and Departmental Committees

	<u>European Parliament</u>			<u>Central Committee</u>			<u>Dep. Com.</u>
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1989A</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1991A</u>	<u>1991B</u>
Men	8 (8)	8 (9)	9 (9)	74 (75)	69	67	68
Women	-- (2)	1 (1)	1 (-)	7 (5)	8	10	2
Total	8 (10)	9 (10)	10 (9)	81 (80)	77	77	70

file members of the grass-roots organisation in the Department of Larissa, or 30.38 per cent, are women. Although this is a relatively high female representation, it still lags far behind the ratio of women to men in Greek society generally, which is slightly over 50 per cent. Conversely, of the 70 elected presidents of the party's departmental committees (1991B in the Table), only two are women (2.86%).

The second New Democracy party congress in 1986, however, decided to set up a separate women's organisation to attract more women into its ranks. It also tried to involve women in party activities, and did indeed manage to get more women MPs elected in 1989 and 1990. Nevertheless, their involvement and representation remains relatively low, and ND's women's organisation has functioned only in pre-election periods, mainly by distributing party-propaganda leaflets and helping (with much enthusiasm and even fanaticism, as we shall see in detail in the next chapter) to organise party demonstrations, lectures, speeches, etc.

Before closing this section, we should say a few words concerning the party's social base, so that we acquire a more complete picture of ND voters' social, economic and occupational background.⁽³⁵⁾ Tables III.20 and 21 below present a picture of the distribution of the ND vote over urban, semi-urban and rural areas, and the party voters' socio-economic background respectively.⁽³⁶⁾

In the 1974 election, ND polled 54.83 per cent in the big cities, 52.15 per cent in semi-urban centres and 56.62 per cent in rural areas, thus following its predecessors' record in this respect (for the social base of ERE see section 2.2.5 in ch. 1). As shown in Table III.20, ND continued to poll slightly better in semi-urban and rural areas in all following elections —the 1977 one apart, mainly due to the spectacular

Table III.20: Urban, Semi-urban and Rural Vote for ND in the 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989A and 1989B National Election
(PASOK data in parentheses)

Area	1977	1981	1985	1989A	1989B
Urban	43.36 (25.25)	30.9 (48.2)	38.7 (44.9)	42.7 (36.4)	44.24 (39.19)
Semi-urban	41.18 (26.27)	39.3 (46.7)	43.3 (44.9)	46.3 (39.5)	48.21 (40.39)
Rural	41.15 (24.59)	39.6 (48.4)	42.2 (47.0)	45.3 (41.7)	47.54 (42.24)

performance of the ultra-right which fought that election independently and absorbed the bulk of its vote in these areas. Nevertheless, the party enjoys a considerable part of the urban vote as well, ranging from 30.9 per cent in 1981 to 44.24 per cent in November 1989. The same can be said also for PASOK especially after the June 1989 election, while as regards its record until then, it seems that its vote was slightly more equally distributed in all the three areas.

As regards the party voters' socio-economic background, Table III.21 below gives a very illuminating picture. It is obvious that at all times ND appeals much more to the upper and upper-middle social classes, and it receives a considerable —but still lesser than PASOK's— support from the middle and lower-middle social groups (C₁ and C₂ in the Table). This trend is further strengthened shortly before the 1985 election, when the A/B group tends intensely to vote for ND, the D/E one for PASOK, whereas both parties appeal almost equally to the social groups in between. It should also be added that during all elections after

Table III.21: ND Voters' Socio-economic Origins in the 1977, 1981 and 1985 National and the 1984 Euro-Election (PASOK data in parentheses)

Social group ^a	1977		1981		1984		1985 ^b	
A/B	46.9	(24.8)	25	(37)	43.7	(27.8)	65.3	(19.9)
C ₁	46.3	(26.9)	24	(39)	27.9	(38.9)	39.8	(38.5)
C ₂	46.5	(25.8)	28	(39.5)	37.9	(38.5)	39.9	(37.3)
D/E	36.8	(31.9)	18	(39)	31.3	(39.3)	32.1	(42.7)

Note (a): A/B refer to the upper and upper-middle classes, C₁ to the middle classes, C₂ to the skilled workers and D/E to semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

(b): The data for 1985 are based on an opinion poll conducted by KPEE shortly before the election.

1974, younger and more educated voters tend to vote for PASOK, while ND's appeal is stronger to older and less educated generations; and last that both parties are voted almost equally by both men and women (the latter being only slightly more numerous in both cases).

By and large, then, we may conclude that ND's claim that it is a popular, catch-all party, that does not identify with neither represents the interests of some particular social class (for these points see ch. 5 below where the party's ideology is discussed) is, to an extent, legitimate; thus, allegations of the opposition, namely that ND mainly represents and identifies with the interests of the higher bourgeois classes and the big industrial and merchant capital, cannot be taken for granted. It should be remembered, however, that the party performs better in the rural and the semi-urban areas as it has traditionally done, and that it appeals far more to the upper social strata than it does to the lowest ones.⁽³⁷⁾ This last characteristic, i.e. ND's poor performance among the working classes, although at all times dismissed by the party leadership, is being acknowledged by a considerable part of ND's rank and file who, thus, themselves accept that their party does not represent working-class interests (see ch. 6 below).

4. Political Personnel and Internal Divisions

4.1 Absence of distinctive political currents

When New Democracy announced itself as a completely new political formation, disassociated from past political figures and practices, its proclamation on the party's foundation in 1974 declared, albeit rather vaguely, that it would be composed of not only experienced and sound, but also progressive and radical political forces. None of these political forces was mentioned by name, nor has the party ever claimed to be the continuation of any particular political current.⁽³⁸⁾ Instead, its chief claim was that New Democracy was no mere party, but a broad and vital political front.

The data presented above on the political background of ND's early parliamentary group and central committees suggest that the core of the party's politicians came from the pre-coup ERE. They did not predominate, however, since a good many newcomers succeeding in getting elected and so were able to give the party a more youthful, modern, and technocratic image. ND deputies previously affiliated to the pre-coup Centre Union were few in number. We have also seen that, as time went by, MPs who had started out with ERE or other pre-coup political formations kept becoming fewer and fewer, and the 1974 and other, later newcomers came to predominate within the party.

First and foremost though, what represented and assured both continuation and renewal in New Democracy was the paternalistic, all-powerful, and charismatic personality of Karamanlis' himself, at least for as long as he led the party. Continuously elected to parliament since 1935, having been prime minister for eight consecutive years (1955-1963) as the founder and leader of ERE, and then in self-imposed exile in Paris for another eleven years, he returned in 1974 to govern for the next six years. Not only his supporters but even his political

opponents considered him to be the most experienced, and perhaps the only politician capable of undertaking the difficult task of steering Greece through the transition from dictatorship to truly democratic rule. Whereas his 1955 ERE had simply been a reconstitution of Marshal Papagos' Greek Rally, when he founded New Democracy in 1974 he relied on not only some of his closest ERE-colleagues, but also brought into the party new politicians, who did not embody any particular political current but endowed ND with an up-to-date, modern and Europe-directed outlook, so further distancing it from the conservative camp's pre-coup image. It is only reasonable to conclude that the party did indeed combine both continuation and renewal in its ranks.

Furthermore, one cannot speak of the existence of political currents inside ND, apart from that constituted by ex-ERE politicians.⁽³⁹⁾ In any case, the ERE element was never strong let alone dominant, both because Karamanlis himself did not want ND to be the heir of ERE—he fiercely denounced such allegations—and because that group's potential influence was diluted by the relatively high percentage of newcomers. The absence of political currents within the party is corroborated by the answers given by rank-and-file party members in the Department of Larissa in 1989. The relevant data are assembled in Table III.22 below.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Table III.22: Influence/Strength of Political Currents within ND (1989)

<u>Political Ideology</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal	122	77.22
National Radical Union	24	15.19
Greek Rally	11	06.96
Venizelism	10	06.33
Centre Union (pre-1967)	10	06.33
Popular Party	7	04.43
Anti-dictatorship resistance	1	.63
<u>Other</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>06.32</u>
Total	195	(% out of 158) 123.41

We can see that the overwhelming majority (77.22 per cent) of the party members considered Karamanlis' personal appeal the main force holding New Democracy together in 1974. A little over 15 per cent of them thought that ND was also influenced by ERE; very few saw any ideological evidence of Marshal Papagos' Greek Rally, and even fewer of Venizelism and the Centre Union. One member only answered that anti-junta resistance forces had played their part in the creation of the party.

Table III.23 below further supports our argument. Party-members were asked whether they considered ND the heir and descendant of ERE, or whether they thought of it as a new political force.⁽⁴¹⁾ Almost 83 per cent of them answered that they viewed ND as something new in Greek politics (as against the earlier 77 per cent who thought Karamanlis' charisma decisive for ND's appeal), whereas only 22 members (just under 14 per cent) believed it to be a continuation of the pre-coup ERE, compared to a little over the 15 per cent of Table III.22 who had a thought that ERE had exerted some influence on New Democracy. Considering the picture as it emerges from these Tables, and taking into account the earlier data on the political background of the party's parliamentary and non-parliamentary personnel as well as ND's rank-and-file perceptions and attitudes towards it, one may conclude that, aside from a minor influence exerted by ERE, no external political current or force has played any significant role in ND's creation and

Table III.23: ND's Rank-and-File Members' Perception of their Party (1989)

	number	%
New Democracy is the heir and descendant of ERE	22	13.92
New Democracy is a new political force	131	82.91
Other	5	03.17
Total	158	100.00

functioning. From its earliest beginnings the party was a political institution inspired and created solely by Karamanlis⁽⁴²⁾ as a new political force in Greek politics.⁽⁴³⁾

4.2 Clientelism

As mentioned already, during the early post-war years and under the ERE government, patronage networks and patron-client relationships continued to play a dominant role. Party notables were left unchallenged, and it was through personal relations that the local party barons secured the popular vote both for themselves and for the party. In ERE particularly, (but also in the Centre Union, the other major party at that time), intra-party organisation was non-existent; in consequence, party candidates and deputies owed their political careers to the party leader's favour as well as to their established electoral clientele.

This situation cannot be said to have changed in the immediate aftermath of the junta, since New Democracy could neither rely on nor in the time develop some kind of separate party organisation. It is not unfair, then, to argue that in the early years after 1974 ND MPs managed to get elected either by creating and/or preserving a personal electoral clientele, or by enjoying the support and help of the party leader.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Circumstances began to change when the party endeavoured to develop its grass-roots organisation, and the latter started to have a say in the parliamentary candidates' nomination, although the final decision is still made by the party leadership.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that in the June 1989 election,⁽⁴⁶⁾ out of the 68 ND newcomers, four were central-committee members and another two had stood as candidates, two had been presidents of the party's youth organisation (ONNED) in the past, six were presidents of various departmental committees, two had been general directors of the party, one was

responsible for ND's relations with the mass media, and one belonged to a special professional party organisation (EKO) —altogether eighteen deputies, or 12.41 per cent of ND's parliamentary group, can be said to have emerged and secured their seats via the party organisation.

Especially as regards central-committee members, it can be argued that their rise within ND's hierarchy was certainly not a product of clientelism. We have seen that even the appointed central-committee members in 1975 owed their posts entirely to Karamanlis' discretion; it was the personal support of the party leader that brought them on to that first central committee. Later, after the first and particularly the second party congress, it was their established role and presence in the party organisation, but also to a considerable extent their loyal attachment to the leader (or some particular leading member) that helped them greatly to acquire a place at the central committee.⁽⁴⁷⁾ It is noteworthy that among the 1991 central-committee non-parliamentary members, only three (who had been former ERE deputies) can be considered as owing their accession to personal political clienteles.

It would be misleading, though, to conclude that clientelistic practices and patron-client relations have disappeared altogether. Not surprisingly it is at the parliamentary level —traditionally the domain of clientelistic relations— where these practices can still be discerned today. A considerable number of ND deputies,⁽⁴⁸⁾ especially while the party is in government, make requests to ministers or endeavour themselves to satisfy their voters' demands. These usually revolve around getting a job in the civil service (this is the most common request), sorting out or bypassing bureaucratic red tape, favourable positioning of a civil employee or a military officer, etc.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The conclusion cannot be avoided that even today, albeit to a lesser extent, the country's political system bears the imprint of the mentality and practices of the 1950s and '60s, and that the so-called

rousfeti system continues to function as the determining factor in the careers of many prospective politicians.⁽⁵⁰⁾

A final point should be made here, before we proceed to examine the existence of tendencies and factions within the party. The situation was very different between ND and PASOK, which by and large did not include MPs or central-committee members from established political families in its ranks.⁽⁵¹⁾ In New Democracy there were also prominent political personalities —especially among those who had been affiliated with the pre-coup ERE, or who had inherited their family's political clientele— who enjoyed a relative independence vis-à-vis the party and the leader, and used their own personal mechanisms to ensure their election. It should be recalled that, for example, the 1981 ND's parliamentary group included two former prime ministers (P. Kanellopoulos and G. Rallis), and many ex-ministers (E. Averoff, A. Karamanlis the brother of Constantine, E. Kefaloyiannis, C. Mitsotakis, J. Boutos, G. Stamatis, and A. Taliadouros, to mention but a few), most of them elected to parliament continuously since 1946. They were heading extensive political clienteles, and A. Karamanlis, Mitsotakis, and Boutos are still MPs,⁽⁵²⁾ while the rest have bequeathed both their clientele and their parliamentary seat to close relatives.⁽⁵³⁾ To sum up, some of the ND MPs continue a kind of political tradition, which means that, unlike their PASOK colleagues, they enjoy a relative independence and autonomy towards their party and the leader —precisely because they come from established and well-known political families, have held important governmental posts in the past, and have created and maintained a political clientele by distributing spoils and favours to their voters, thus safeguarding their position and holding or transferring the parliamentary seat as a personal electoral fief. Although these party notables by no means enjoy the autonomy of the so-called tzakia families of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Greek political

oligarchy, their relative independence vis-à-vis the party and the leader is still discernible, and more so since Karamanlis' accession to the Presidency of the Republic in 1980, as we shall try to show in the next section.

4.3 Factions and tendencies within New Democracy

We have already seen that what accounted most for New Democracy's creation and influenced the image projected by the party was the personality of its founder; no other political currents or major grouping of political forces, played a recognisable role, with the exception of ex-ERE politicians. Nevertheless, such tendencies did exist from the moment the party was created and, at times, there were factions as well.^{'54'} But as long as the party remained in office, factions and tendencies were kept behind the scenes, overshadowed by both the day-to-day business of governing and the very presence of Karamanlis who, over and above his position as unquestionably the dominant party-political figure, had become vested with immense authority as the man unanimously considered as having almost singlehandedly restored democracy in Greece. But when he withdrew from the party leadership to stand for election as President of the Republic, and more so, when ND had lost the 1981 election and PASOK took office, internal party divisions could no longer be shut away. This section will be concerned, first, with the three main factions that arose inside at one time or another and, second, with the main intra-party tendencies, which can be considered to have remained more or less the same since the foundation of New Democracy.

It was as early as June 1976 when an autonomous political group within the then fledgling party organisation appeared in public, under the name of the Volvi Movement.^{'55'} This movement demanded greater democracy inside the party, more democratic organisation and re-orientation of the party's political targets. According to a leading member of this group,

"...the Volvi Movement meant to operate like an intra-party opposition and, to a certain extent, an opposition to Karamanlis himself. The movement aimed at the party's organisation on a democratic basis, at the dismissal of the old political tzakia families, and the adoption, institutionalisation of and full respect for intra-party democratic procedures —in other words at the party's Europeanisation and modernisation, disentanglement from the personality of its leader (present and future), and finally at its transformation from a personalistic party to a party based on set principles".⁽⁵⁶⁾

The Volvi Movement was manned by young reformist and relatively unknown party-members;⁽⁵⁷⁾ no MPs of ND or upper-cadre party officials ever joined it, and maybe this explains why the party leadership did nothing about it, at least in the beginning. But when, three years later, the movement held its first congress in Larissa,⁽⁵⁸⁾ Karamanlis reacted sharply and expelled all party members who had actively participated. The blow was strong and effective: most of the Volvi sympathisers abandoned the movement to return to the party ranks, so that the faction finally disintegrated. Nevertheless, its demands for intra-party organisation and adoption of/respect for democratic procedures remained fully alive, especially among the party's grass-roots, thus functioning as a tendency towards democratisation and modernisation. Moreover, as a tendency the Volvi Movement contributed to the realization of the first party congress four months later, and to the further development of ND's democratic organisation.

It was after ND had lost the 1981 election, that MPs were forming major groupings around leading party figures who were competing for the leadership. Although these groupings were less factions than tendencies,⁽⁵⁹⁾ it is apposite to examine at this point the specific case of C. Stephanopoulos' party of Democratic Renewal (DIANA).⁽⁶⁰⁾ Stephanopoulos did not hesitate to resign from the party in 1985, when its leadership refused internal discussions of why ND had lost the elections for the second time;⁽⁶¹⁾ a few days later, he founded

Democratic Renewal, which was immediately joined by another nine ND MPs.⁽⁶²⁾

DIANA's main criticism of ND was, firstly, that ND's 41 per cent of the vote in the 1985 election by no means constituted a political victory for the party; and, secondly, that the ND-leadership claim was false that the 1985 election had been marred by fraud and violence.⁽⁶³⁾

DIANA suggested that the conservative camp should acquire and develop a more modern and innovative outlook; that it should acknowledge its past mistakes and make a fresh start, basing itself on renewal and meritocracy or, in other words, on new persons, new methods, and new ideas.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Furthermore, DIANA accused ND of abandoning the working people, giving the impression that it mainly represents upper-class bourgeois social strata; of distancing itself from the basic ideological principles and social issues as recognised by the Chalkidiki Congress, and of having become transformed into a personalistic party. Finally, it declared that there was as yet no room for a conservative party in Greek politics, since there was too much still to be done, modified, and improved, and that DIANA itself was anything but a conservative party.⁽⁶⁵⁾

Before its emergence as a party, DIANA had never operated as a faction within ND ranks (and neither had the National Front founded in 1977). Although Stephanopoulos did exert some influence on several members of the party's parliamentary group,⁽⁶⁶⁾ this was more due to the fact that as a prominent political figure of the party he might rise to the leadership one day when past loyalties would be rewarded, than to any political-ideological considerations whatsoever.⁽⁶⁷⁾ This, we think, is the reason why those politicians who formed DIANA had not operated as a faction within ND: lacking political and ideological coherence, they kept a low profile as long as they remained in ND, waiting for their leader to make a move. When he did, they speculated that alliance with

Stephanopoulos and DIANA, would be advantageous for their personal political interests; the selfsame considerations prompted some of them later to leave DIANA and rejoin ND.

By and large then, DIANA was nothing more than a personal clique and something of a political risk for its leader when he openly disagreed with the ND leadership and its policies. Having left ND, Stephanopoulos' future political existence was at stake, but he did succeed to the extent that DIANA has secured one parliamentary seat in every election it has contested.⁽⁶⁸⁾ If we take into account that there has never been a similar case in PASOK, the other major party,⁽⁶⁹⁾ we may fairly conclude that prominent political figures in ND enjoy a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the party leader, and that to some extent it is still clientelism and patronage networks, rather than party organisation and ideology, that make a politician and secure a seat in parliament.

As we shall see in more detail in ch. 5 below where the party's ideology is examined, in February 1985 New Democracy veered away from its traditionally accepted ideological principles towards more individualistic and neo-liberal/neo-conservative ideas (much like those of Mrs Thatcher and the post-1979 British Conservative party), by launching a clear-cut and coherent declaration, named "A New Proposal for Freedom".⁽⁷⁰⁾ Prior to this, a tendency within the party ranks was propagating similar neo-liberal ideas, which were focused mainly on state non-interference in the sector of the economy. It took though this tendency several years to become a proper faction, and from February 1992 onwards it was the first *de facto* recognised faction within ND, under the name of the Liberal Forum (Philelefthero Forum).⁽⁷¹⁾

Unlike the Volvi Movement and DIANA, both of which functioned ultimately as a kind of internal opposition to the party leader (Karamanlis and Mitsotakis respectively), the Liberal Forum was founded

on wider ideological and policy issues, and it was by no means another attack base against the leadership. As its founder and faction leader A. Andrianopoulos has stated,

"The Liberal Forum consists of a group of scientists, trade unionists and cadres from the business and youth sector in general, and intends to prompt the government to consistently enforce the liberal policies it was elected for in the first place. In this sense I believe that the Liberal Forum expresses a political tendency, already established within the ND ranks ... a tendency that has been identified and recognised in parliament by the prime minister himself...".⁽⁷²⁾

And as another member has put it,

"We not only belong to New Democracy but, through the Liberal Forum, we struggle for the preservation of its liberal ideas that have lately been fading in our camp".⁽⁷³⁾

Despite the *de facto* recognition of the Liberal Forum faction, it is not yet possible to present a complete picture of it, since there is no information concerning several relevant issues —such as the exact number of MPs affiliated with it, its internal organisation and how it tries to further its policies. Nonetheless, it can be said that at least ten ND MPs belong to or at least sympathise with the Liberal Forum;⁽⁷⁴⁾ that they seek mainly to enforce and accelerate privatisation of the public sector of the economy and liberalisation of the market from state intervention; and that they do not hesitate to question the government in parliament when they consider the latter to be launching policies adverse to the above-mentioned issues. Overall then, and after the early disintegration of the Volvi Movement and the defection of Stephanopoulos and the DIANA politicians, the Liberal Forum constitutes the only organised group within New Democracy. Tendencies, however, have existed in the party ever since its foundation, and it is this point on which we shall focus our attention in what follows.

New Democracy as a party has never officially accepted the existence of dissenting tendencies in its ranks. ND's leading members on the other hand, have frequently acknowledged one or the other such, and have even taken sides. As one leading ND member has put it,

"...in every democratically organised political party there can and must exist various different tendencies, although they should never aim at splintering the party. There were tendencies within ND even when Karamanlis was the party leader and prime minister."⁽⁷⁵⁾

From its foundation in 1974 until today, New Democracy has comprised four distinct major tendencies which, although not clearly constellated from the outset, can now be identified. They came into being mainly due to different perspectives on ideological principles which, however, frequently served only as the pretext for temporary tactical alliances among leading party members to safeguard or enhance their power position within the party, or for purely personal attachments of ordinary party members to prominent ND figures.

It must always be remembered that it was Karamanlis' personality that had played the dominant role in ND's creation, early development, and adoption of an ideological identity no matter how vague. Except for some minor influence exerted by the old ERE politicians—who, however, constituted the party's backbone in the early years of its existence—there were no other political currents whatsoever. So it is not surprising that it was precisely Karamanlis' charismatic personality that became the focus of the first and, at the time the strongest tendency within New Democracy. A good many leading as well as rank-and-file party members declared themselves to be "Karamanliists":

"I consider myself a steadfastly Karamanliist, because I believe he is one of the most prestigious personalities of the century in Europe and the greatest in our country, and because I absolutely agree with his political philosophy... It is unthinkable for there to be anti-Karamanliists in ND. But if there are, they are fools...".⁽⁷⁶⁾

This uniform stamp of "Karamanliism" identified all those politicians and party members who felt a strong loyalty to their leader's personality, but it also bore a distinct ideological imprint of its own. As the first party congress in Chalkidiki (1979) declared,

"New Democracy believes in free democratic economy... but economic freedom cannot be unlimited. It must combine personal with social interest. And it is exactly this equilibrium that ND's economic philosophy is striving for".⁽⁷⁷⁾

Overall, then, the "Karamanliist" tendency includes all those who believe that New Democracy's ideology is one of so-called radical liberalism or, to use an ND deputy's terminology, "...it is social liberalism, within which the element of social justice prevails".⁽⁷⁸⁾

The second tendency, fairly clear even when the party was first created, was that of the ultra-Right. It included all those who favoured the return of the King, those who had in various ways collaborated with the dictatorship, and fanatical anti-communists longing for the return of the pre-coup, paternalistic, exclusionist and authoritative conservative rule. This tendency grew into the splinter party of the National Front and, as mentioned already fought the 1977 election separately and secured five seats in parliament. In 1981, in view of PASOK's electoral victory, most of its politicians returned to ND and, together with some of the latter's hardliners, constituted an ultra-Right tendency inside the party. Although not numerous, this remains until today. Especially among ND candidates in the June and November 1989 parliamentary elections, one could find politicians who promised to work for the jailed junta leaders' release, others who had held governmental and higher civil posts during the dictatorship, ex-National Front candidates, and members of royalist organisations.⁽⁷⁹⁾ Although they troubled and annoyed the party organisation and the moderate party members, these ultra-Right politicians were not deleted from the

electoral lists, and some of them even succeeded in getting elected. Today, this tendency is the weakest within the party ranks, but it does still exist and occasionally attempts to make its presence felt.⁽⁸⁰⁾

The two tendencies above —of Karamanliism and the ultra-Right— predominated within ND for almost ten years until C. Mitsotakis became the fourth party leader in 1984. Under his direction, New Democracy moved closer to neo-conservatism and adopted neo-liberal ideas, thus shifting its ideological balance from social justice to personal economic freedom. It distanced itself from state interventionism in the economy, denouncing the state as inept in the role of entrepreneur, and exalted the virtues of private initiative. During the election of 1985, the party acquired the epithet of "liberal"⁽⁸¹⁾ and the new ideological principles, which to some extent amended the ones adopted in 1979, were sanctioned by the second party congress in Salonica in 1986. Today, a social-liberal tendency may be said to predominate in ND, since even a good many "Karamanliists" now acknowledge, whether openly or not, that the state should not intervene in the economy to the extent it has done in the past; nevertheless, its role and intervention is still considered essential and it is not dismissed altogether.

A side effect of the liberals' rise to predominance within ND has been the encouragement of a fourth tendency, which had stirred in the party ranks ever since 1976.⁽⁸²⁾ This is the so-called neo-liberal tendency that advocates complete disentanglement of the state from the economy, roughly projecting Mrs Thatcher's policies in Great Britain as its model. This tendency has recently become transformed into a faction, the already mentioned Liberal Forum headed by A. Andrianopoulos. The neo-liberal politicians in the Liberal Forum constitute a small minority in the party. They do not exert significant influence on shaping ND's governmental policies; on the contrary, they concentrate on safeguarding their position so as to avoid being criticised for ideological

defection, for scaring the electorate by advocating ultra-liberal ideas, and for covertly harboring an inclination to splinter ND.⁽⁸³⁾

It must not be thought that the tendencies presented above constitute solid blocks in the party ranks. Even when they identify themselves with some particular tendency, ND politicians do not feel tied to it, neither do they always behave politically as the tendency they identify with would imply. A striking example illustrating this point is the party elections for the leader. As we shall see in the following chapters, while examining ND's organisation, leadership, and ideology, except for the first leadership contest between Rallis and Averoff, the other two (between Averoff, Stephanopoulos and Boutos, and between Mitsotakis and Stephanopoulos) were not at all fought over ideological issues as might be expected. So the reasons that decided the ND deputies to vote for the one or the other candidate had more to do with tactical alliances for safeguarding and strengthening their own personal power position within the party, than with their ideological following of a particular candidate.

Nevertheless, there are within ND ideological differences among its leading members as well as among the rank-and-file, and have played their part in the creation of tendencies. Particularly since Karamanlis' accession to the Presidency, however, it has rather been personal antagonisms that, disguised as ideological differences, have led to the creation of various groups. The competition between these groups, and between leading members for greater influence over the party and for winning substantial support (either in preparation for future leadership contests, or for imposing their personal interests and policies) has often cut across purely ideological divisions and differences. Also, as personal antagonisms and tactical alliances changed with time, ideological divisions and identifications changed likewise.⁽⁸⁴⁾

5. Conclusion

Ever since the early days of New Democracy, its leader has insisted that it was a completely new political formation and a new force in Greek politics, denying the loud claims of his opponents —and even of some of his supporters— that New Democracy was simply the old ERE under a new name. Our examination of ND's political personnel has shown, we believe, that the party was not a mere revamping of the pre-coup National Radical Union. It has carried a quite distinct imprint of its own, comprising within its ranks elements of both continuation and renewal, so presenting a very different outlook from both EK/ND and PASOK, of whom the former continued the political tradition of its predecessor, and the latter instituted a dramatic renewal of personnel at both the parliamentary and the organisational level.

Our analysis of ND's candidates for and deputies after the 1974 election has shown, however, that Karamanlis' urgent efforts to present New Democracy as pure and unadulterated were questionable: one third of its candidates, and even more of its elected MPs had been affiliated with ERE. They owed their inclusion on the party lists to Karamanlis himself, and in fact constituted the party's backbone during its early days. Although in time their representation in ND's parliamentary group kept shrinking (to a mere 6.58 per cent by 1990), it was mainly their early presence and contribution to ND's formation that expressed the element of party-political continuation.

Former ERE politicians did not, however, constitute the majority in the ND parliamentary group at any time. On the contrary, what is immediately striking is the unprecedentedly large number of newcomers among the party's MPs: more than 63 per cent entered parliament for the first time in 1974, and over 55 per cent had never before been active in politics. It is exactly this massive influx of new politicians which

endowed the party with a more modern, technocratic, and up-to-date image, and also set the course for ND's future process towards ideological renewal and liberalism. Neither the Greek Rally party when it succeeded the People's Party in 1951, nor ERE itself in 1955 had ever looked like this when they were formed; they simply served as their respective leaders' vehicles for reconstituting the conservative political forces under a new name. By contrast, and for the first time in the conservative camp's history, New Democracy projected a very different attitude—in other words, it was the inclusion of those newcomers within the party ranks that ultimately made the difference.

New Democracy, at least during the early years after its formation, portrayed some of the distinctive features of its predecessor, namely lack of intra-party organisation and ideological vagueness. Admittedly, in the aftermath of the dictatorship collapsing and in view of the country's mounting problems, there was insufficient time for either setting up a well-structured party organisation, or for the elaboration of concrete ideological principles. Nevertheless, New Democracy proved a very slow developer in this respect. The first administrative committee, appointed by Karamanlis, served only as an organisational pretext, and one cannot speak of organisation proper even when the party's first administrative committee was elected at ND's first congress in 1979. For all that, the 1979 Congress may be considered to have laid the foundation for the party's future organisational development, which finally made real headway after New Democracy had moved to the opposition benches in 1981. Until then the administrative committee, as well as all other higher party officials, owed their position in the party organs to their leader's discretion (and to a certain extent to clientelism), rather than to their own skills and performance inside the organisation. On the other hand, even the 1986 and the 1991 central-committee members' political background presents much the same

characteristics as those of the party MPs' political affiliation prior to 1985 and 1990: there was minimal representation of party members affiliated with the pre-coup ERE, the origins of the overwhelming majority lying within the party's own ranks. Despite these similarities, though, and following the first party congress, ND's grass-roots organisation developed to such an extent that today's picture of ND's higher party members can be said to be the reverse: they now owe their position on the higher party organs to their personal efforts, skills and performance within the organisation, rather than to their dependence on the party leader or on clientelistic networks, although clientelistic practices have not entirely disappeared.

One of New Democracy's most salient characteristics ever since its formation has been and still is that the overwhelming majority of both its MPs and its higher party members are lawyers and doctors. The legal and medical professions have at all times constituted more than 50 per cent of both the party's parliamentary group —as they have in PASOK, if to a lesser extent— and of its central committee (except for that of 1991 when these two professions amounted to 43 per cent). It in fact appears that the party has difficulties in attracting certain professional groups relatively new to Greek politics, especially among the salaried jobs (i.e. teachers, higher, middle and lower-rank civil-service employees, but also workers, trade unionists, etc.), all these being better represented in PASOK. Overall, the ND ranks comprising also industrialists, shipowners, and other businessmen, both its MPs and central-committee members have been projecting an upper-class, bourgeois social background, as opposed to the petit-bourgeois, middle-class social origins of PASOK.

With respect to New Democracy then, politics has remained the traditional domain of men, lawyers and doctors, as it was the case in the pre-coup period. The afore-mentioned professions predominated then and still do for exactly the same reasons: namely that, given the lack

of a well-developed grass-roots organisation—in other words when political parties only serve as vehicles for election purposes and do not function as separate organisational and ideological entities—lawyers and doctors are most likely to create personal electoral clienteles for assuring their political career. Moreover, in the post-1974 period the liberal professions predominate over salaried categories both in ND and PASOK, although in the latter case salaried employees are more numerous. Beginning with ND's 1991 central committee, however, the predominance of the legal and medical professions appears to be decreasing, which may be a first indication of some organisational autonomy. It remains to be seen whether the party organisation will become properly structured in the near future and develop to such a degree as to play an independent and distinctive role of its own, to clear the way for rank-and-file members to reach the top party organs, and to elaborate and produce a viable and coherent ideology.

Under the leadership of C. Karamanlis, New Democracy united in its ranks and represented all those who had traditionally considered themselves conservatives, as well as those who believed in Karamanlis personally. In time the party was joined and supported by a good many advocates of a cautious, step-by-step consolidation of democratic institutions, an opening of the political system, the modernisation and liberalisation of Greek society.⁽⁸⁵⁾ These latter elements, uninspired by the old-fashioned image of the Centre and alarmed by PASOK's rhetoric and the ultra-radical stance it has adopted on various issues, considered Karamanlis' New Democracy as the only chance for attaining their ideological ends. In the absence of any other political currents, Karamanlis' charismatic appeal and all-powerful position within the party served during the early years after 1974 as the unifying element for keeping ND together, distancing it from its predecessor's malpractices and policies, laying the foundations for its future

organisational growth and development, and furnishing it with a more centrist, social-justice oriented ideology.

After Karamanlis's withdrawal from the party leadership and his subsequent accession to the Presidency, New Democracy, although plagued by internal turmoil, weathered the shock and little by little became better organised while simultaneously moving further towards ideologically liberal principles. Some of its prominent party members could not acquiesce in these changes, and started launching their own political views and personal ambitions, since no party leader after Karamanlis ever enjoyed his omnipotent position and immense prestige. This meant that several political sub-groups grew up unofficially inside the party. Taking advantage of already existing ideological differences and in the absence of concrete mechanisms that would allow tendencies and factions to acquire a recognisable form and come out into the open, the party statutes containing no relevant provisions, personal differences have often been concealed by a cloak of ideology.

To sum up, we would stress the fact that it was the party's political personnel, and especially its founder and leader, who dictated ND's projected image and ideology, and not vice versa. However, while New Democracy can look back on more than eighteen consecutive years in Greek politics, it cannot yet be said to have created a distinctive identity of its own; it is still going through a transitional period, carrying the burdens of the so-called Karamanliist political tradition, together with fresh characteristics of growing-pains that vary with the personality of its leader. It remains to be seen whether New Democracy will manage to rid itself of these burdensome defects and acquire a distinctive and permanent identity of its own, irrespective of whoever its leader may be. It has yet to develop a well-structured grass-roots organisation, and to elaborate a well-defined, concrete, and coherent ideology.

CHAPTER FOUR: ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

1. Introduction

Organisation is not perhaps its best feature for New Democracy to be proud of. Although by now reasonably developed, the party's organisation still lags far behind that of PASOK, not to mention other party organisations, especially those of ND's West-European counterparts. There are, of course, several explanations for this late development and the frequent mal-functioning of ND's organisation, which we shall try to elucidate in the present chapter. For all that, it remains a fact that, with respect to the party's organisation, there is much left to be done.

What is striking on the positive side is that New Democracy is the first non-communist party in Greek history that has survived its leaders' withdrawal. In terms of party organisation, this is the most remarkable if one bears in mind that Karamanlis was not an executive risen from the ranks, but a charismatic, exceptionally prestigious, omnipotent and paternalistic personality. One need only recall the fate of the People's Party when Marshall Papagos formed the Greek Rally, or what happened to the latter after Papagos' death and the creation of ERE by Karamanlis. Furthermore, when Karamanlis founded New Democracy in 1974, ERE —headed until then by a close Karamanlis' colleague and ex-premier, P. Kanellopoulos— quietly disappeared altogether, although it was never officially dissolved.

More important still: New Democracy not only survived its founder's withdrawal, it also managed to overcome successfully two further changes

in its leadership after it had lost the 1981 election. All in all, the party's parliamentary group elected the party leader four times, and the last such election was ratified by the delegates at the second party congress. Except for the formation of the DIANA splinter group in 1985, which cannot be considered to have seriously affected ND, the party remained united while in opposition, and in April 1990 took office again. There can be no doubt that much of this unity and ultimate electoral success is due to the growing development of the party's organisation.

The foundations for the creation and development of ND's organisation were laid as early as 1977 by C. Karamanlis. Enjoying unprecedented knowledge of and experience in Greek politics, and having lived for eleven years in self-imposed exile in Paris (where he was able to reconsider his political aims and attitudes), he felt sure that without a well-structured and functioning organisation, the party would quickly disintegrate after his eventual departure. So he opted for some kind of institutionalisation, in this way bequeathing to the party a proper organisation instead of the charismatic power that was his alone. It is this distinctive aspect in the creation of the ND leadership that has made some scholars comment that

"...thus, somewhat paradoxically, certain aspects of institutionalisation appear to have been handled more successfully by a 'conservative' party than by a 'socialist party'" (in English originally).⁽¹⁾

It is exactly for this reason that we shall start our examination by first analysing and evaluating Karamanlis' role, contribution and influence, and only then embark on a detailed presentation of the ND organisation. More specifically, we shall see to what extent ND has managed to build a mass organisation comparable to that of its West-European counterparts, and in how far it differs from the other Greek

political parties, PASOK in particular. Furthermore, since New Democracy's statutes --as well as to some extent its ideological principles-- were amended by the party's second congress, we shall look at the major changes and explain their relative importance and how they have affected ND's organisation. Finally, we shall examine the party leadership's special position in and influence exerted over the organisation after Karamanlis left active politics to become President of the Republic.

2. Karamanlis' post-1974 Personality, and his Contribution to the Creation of ND's Organisation

As discussed in the previous chapter, New Democracy —exactly like the pre-coup ERE— was a personal creation of its leader,⁽²⁾ but it was by no means a mere revamping of ERE. There are two major factors responsible for this: first, the social and political conditions in 1956 were very different indeed from those following the collapse of dictatorial rule in 1974; and secondly, Karamanlis himself had also changed. His vision of the country's future, as well as his political attitudes for transforming this vision into reality, were very different from his beliefs in 1956. This means that post-dictatorial characteristics of ND cannot be understood without a comprehensive picture of Karamanlis' personality as it developed over the years.

To begin with, we should recall that although Karamanlis in 1955 had been chosen by the King to head the conservative camp, by 1963 he was unwilling to play a subservient role, and resigned after a clash with the King over curbing the royal powers in politics (see ch. 1, section 2.2.2.c). More specifically, Karamanlis had proposed some amendments to the constitution, but met with strong opposition from both the Centre

Union and the EDA, which accused him of authoritarian tendencies, as well as from the Palace, which saw its power position seriously threatened. ERE's electoral defeat in 1963 proved the final blow, which resulted in Karamanlis stepping down and withdrawing into self-imposed exile in Paris for the next eleven years.⁽³⁾

Throughout the seven-year military dictatorship Karamanlis opted for silence; he helped the anti-dictatorial struggle more by acting behind the scenes than by open, anti-junta polemics.⁽⁴⁾ His rare interventions greatly contributed to widening the gulf between the military junta and "...the most competent part of the traditional conservative camp".⁽⁵⁾ Moreover, Karamanlis had softened during this period in exile, and he now envisaged a new role for Greece within the Western world. He admitted he had become more tolerant, mainly because, as he had put it, "...different circumstances force us to adapt to the new realities".⁽⁶⁾

When he returned to Greece in 1974 he was, in many respects, a different man. According to D. Katsoudas,⁽⁷⁾ he was aware of the political and social developments that had gained momentum during the dictatorship, and that had led to the conservatives' rupture with some of their traditionally cherished values. This rupture was due to the dictatorship,

"...which made clear to most of the conservatives how dangerous such a pure right-wing stance might prove (i.e. state anti-communism, diverse forms of discrimination, anti-communist hysteria)".⁽⁸⁾

Karamanlis was now ardently siding with social democracy and cultural development, concepts which before he had never as much as mentioned. In addition, although he had started his efforts towards this end in 1958, he made it clear for the first time in public that he intended to work for Greece's entry into the European Community.⁽⁹⁾

Once he had completed democratic restoration within Greece, Karamanlis considered the country's EEC entry a mission he absolutely had to fulfill. He can be said to have been obsessed by this issue and, after overcoming many serious difficulties and obstacles,⁽¹⁰⁾ he finally met with success: on 28 May 1979 the entry-agreement was signed in Athens, and on 1 January 1981 Greece became the tenth full EEC member. As ex-premier G. Rallis has written,

"...the entry-agreement was exclusively his own achievement. We, the rest, were just executives and assistants".⁽¹¹⁾

Within this context —i.e. the struggle for democratic restoration as well as the country's entry into the EEC— Karamanlis had to make a choice: he could pursue these two goals as either the leader of a political party or as a nation-leader, either as prime-minister or as president of the republic. He finally opted for the former, mainly because he wanted to have a better grip on actual policy-making. However, his covert ambition to become the head of state continued unabated if latent,⁽¹²⁾ and emerged more openly only when his two big objectives, democratic restoration and EEC membership, were accomplished.

However, although Karamanlis had opted for the premier's position, it is his presidential ambitions that "...account for the serious and disastrous neglect of party ideology and organisation".⁽¹³⁾ He sincerely believed that in Greece "...only one person should be in command",⁽¹⁴⁾ so he took all the decisions alone and simply announced them afterwards to the appropriate collective party organs, which rubber-stamped them. Within ND, he enjoyed the power and respect of an absolute monarch, inspiring in his colleagues feelings ranging from "awe" to "idolisation".⁽¹⁵⁾ He himself wished to be considered as a *pater patriae*, having a very special relationship with his people; when the

opposition accused him of tailoring the constitution to his own designs in order to become, in due time, head of state, he replied:

"Whether or not I shall become President of the Republic is a matter that concerns exclusively myself and the Greek people. They have entrusted me with power; they did not dictate the conditions on how I shall exercise this power".⁽¹⁶⁾

Overall, then, his characteristics as an ERE leader, which were basically those described already in the first chapter of this study, remained the same during his second six-year term as premier, from 1974 until 1980; the same elements of authoritarian behaviour, paternalism and also messianism⁽¹⁷⁾ were again clearly identifiable during this period. But there was a difference: now he wished to see Greece's democratic institutions functioning properly, the way they did in Western Europe; he wanted to establish a really sound democracy, not the quasi-parliamentarian, police democracy the country had known during the post civil-war decades. To accomplish this task, he worked simultaneously on two main objectives: the country's EEC entry,⁽¹⁸⁾ and ND's survival after his departure.

Warning bells rang for Karamanlis as early as 1976, when the Volvi Movement was formed and launched its demands for democratic party organisation. Karamanlis had already (by the end of 1975)⁽¹⁹⁾ appointed an administrative committee of 21 members, but the Volvi Movement faction kept accusing him of creating rubber-stamp organs. On 2 April 1977, when the party held its preliminary congress in Chalkidiki, Karamanlis for the first time tried to define —somewhat vaguely, as we shall see in the next chapter— ND's ideological principles.⁽²⁰⁾ He also stressed the fact that

"A political party needs time to accomplish its mission. But a political party cannot exist for any reasonable length of time unless it is democratically organised; that is, it must not identify its fate with that of its leader".⁽²¹⁾

Although this preliminary congress was meant to lay the foundations for the development of ND's party organisation, this still remained a dead letter almost one year later. As a member of the Volvi Movement declared:

"Between Karamanlis and the Greek people stands a political establishment that prevents the party from creating a democratic organisation. It consists of the 'bosses' in Athens and their 'delegates' in the provinces, who, feeling their posts and power position threatened, would not let our premier's vision become reality".⁽²²⁾

On the other hand, speaking to the members of the administrative committee, Karamanlis himself admitted indirectly that the party had not yet developed its organisation, but assured them that

"We are taking cautious but definite steps towards our party's organisation, in spite of obstacles due to our governmental responsibilities".⁽²³⁾

Two months before the negotiations for EEC membership were to be completed, Karamanlis urged his colleagues to arrange for the immediate convocation of the party's first congress.⁽²⁴⁾ He wished for his party to present a modern and Europeanised outlook, and because he was ready, shortly after signing the membership treaty, to withdraw from party-politics to become head of state. Accused of calling the congress only for the purposes of impressing the public —charges which were justified to some extent— Karamanlis nevertheless tried to institutionalise intra-party procedures which would help New Democracy to remain united, to successfully elect a new leader and continue to exist after his departure. In the end, ND's first congress was held in Chalkidiki on 5-7 May 1979, the EEC membership treaty was signed three weeks later in Athens, and in May 1980 Karamanlis was elected by parliament to the Presidency of the Republic.

It has to be admitted that New Democracy did not really develop its organisation to any considerable extent under Karamanlis' leadership. As D. Katsoudas has observed:

"As late as 1979, ND still suffered from the traditional evils of Greek conservatism: ideological vagueness and feeble organisation" (in English originally).⁽²⁵⁾

It would seem, however, that Karamanlis intended to merely lay the organisational foundations, and leave the party to develop them further:

"...he moved cautiously, knowing that he could not transform a traditional party of notables into a party of principles within twenty-four hours, without causing serious repercussions".⁽²⁶⁾

Indeed, under Karamanlis' auspices the process for the organisation of ND was launched, its foundations laid, and the party actually held one preliminary and one national congress, thus becoming the first non-communist party ever to have done so in Greek political history.⁽²⁷⁾ Last but not least, and despite whatever organisational drawbacks, New Democracy has managed to overcome its founder's departure and, by building up its organisation to a considerable extent (as we shall see) to disentangle the party from its future leaders.

Karamanlis' goal as a party-political leader was accomplished: after having restored democracy and having ensured the country's entry into the EEC, he not only reconstituted and reformed the conservative camp, but he also inaugurated the start of a new era and a new role for it.

3. The Party Organisation

3.1 Creation and early development of ND's organisation: the 1977

Preliminary Congress and the 1979 first National Congress

When New Democracy was created in September 1974, Karamanlis made only a vague statement concerning the party's foundation (see Appendix I). A few principles of democratic intra-party organisation were published together with that declaration, but not given due consideration by the public at that time.⁽²⁸⁾ Serious steps were taken towards the elaboration of the party's statutes before and during ND's preliminary congress in April 1977. A first charter was drawn up by a special committee,⁽²⁹⁾ and distributed to ND's provisional departmental committees (about 100 at the time), which were asked to make their comments and propositions and, finally, a revised version of this charter was presented to the preliminary congress. The delegates were expected to elaborate a final version for presentation to the party's first national congress, where ND's statutes would be officially ratified.⁽³⁰⁾

We shall not examine in detail the first charter nor its amended version, since the ND statutes obtained their concrete and final form only with the party's first national congress. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics in this 21-article charter worth noting. First, the word "party" appears nowhere in the text. Exactly like Karamanlis' 28 September 1974 founding declaration, New Democracy is at all times called a "front" (parataxis), or "movement", or even "concept". Secondly, the language used is the so-called katharevousa (the "pure" Greek, artificially build up on the basis of ancient Greek),⁽³¹⁾ and the terminology suggests more the regulatory principles of a corporation or a limited company than a party.⁽³²⁾ Thirdly, according to Article 5, this "front" is headed by a "leader" (and not by a president). Although

the charter provided for this leader's election by the general assembly,⁽³³⁾ the regulations and procedures concerning the latter's candidacy nomination and election were missing. Finally, it should be also noted that this first charter launched a new emblem for the party, abandoning the photograph of Karamanlis which had served as such until then.⁽³⁴⁾

Although still in its organisational infancy, the ND base responded quite vigorously to the provisions of the proposed charter. All in all, 72 departmental committees as well as 13 individuals (the latter during the preliminary congress) proposed a total of 174 amendments.⁽³⁵⁾ The majority of the amendments (41, or 24 per cent) concerned party organisation at the provincial and departmental levels,⁽³⁶⁾ another 33 (19 per cent) referred to the composition and functioning of the administrative committee as the central party organisation,⁽³⁷⁾ and 16 amendments (9 per cent) were on the composition of the general assembly.⁽³⁸⁾ In conclusion, the party base reacted to this rather authoritarian, centralised and parliament-oriented charter that was directed and controlled from above by

"...being inclined to get rid of the hitherto absolute politician's dominance --that is, of what had characteristically been called 'deputocracy' (vouleftokratia). The rank-and-file members endeavoured, through the party's organisational structure, to participate in the decision-making mechanisms and, by acquiring a say in nominating a candidate, aimed at achieving access to the party leadership and so to power".⁽³⁹⁾

As J. Loulis has observed,

"The slow and painful development of the ND's party organisation during the years 1975-1977, its limited success in attracting new members, and, finally, the apathy and inactivity of most of these members should be attributed to a single and most important factor: namely that the party was far less significant as a mass organisation than as a group of leaders and professional politicians" (in English originally).⁽⁴⁰⁾

In this sense, then, the preliminary congress was indeed a major step in ND's efforts to organise. But not much else was really done before the 1977 election to provide ordinary members with actual power, or the party with a definite charter. Therefore, ND supporters continued to be

"...linked with the party not through the organisation but —exactly as in the past— through the local MPs, who continued to distribute personal favours strengthening patron-client ties". (in English originally).⁽⁴¹⁾

Not surprisingly, in consequence,

"...most ND members owed their appointments in the party to powerful patrons, to whom they sacrificed their political independence... On the eve of the 1977 elections, all powers still rested in the hands of the party leadership and the parliamentary group" (in English originally).⁽⁴²⁾


The final decisions over the party statutes were made during ND's first national congress on 5-7 May 1979, which was again held in Chalkidiki, two years after the preliminary one. Before we proceed to a detailed examination of certain provisions and regulations, we should first note the major amendments that were finally incorporated in ND's statutes, thus differentiating them from the earlier, provisional charter.

First of all, the entire text was rewritten in the common everyday language, to the satisfaction of most party members. Secondly, it was agreed that the head of the party should be called "president" instead of "leader", "...to stress the fact that the party is being organised on democratic bases".⁽⁴³⁾ Thirdly, New Democracy officially accepted, at last, to be called a political "party" instead of a political "front" (or "camp", or "movement"), so taking the first timid steps towards accepting that it was in fact part of the political system and not some kind of a self-sufficient entity that stood above it.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Last but not least, and contrary to the first charter's provisions, it was decided

that it would be the ND parliamentary group, instead of the congress, which would in the future elect the party's president.

Figure 4.1 below presents a diagram of the party structure, as this appeared after the statutes' ratification by the first congress. According to this, the highest instance in the party is the national congress, which should be held once every two years, in October.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The congress consists of the party president, the parliamentary group as

Figure 4.1: Diagram of ND Structure According to the 1979 Statutes



[—————> = elects, - - - - -> = appoints.]

well as the candidates who were not elected, the administrative-committee members, ND ex-deputies, 300 representatives of the departmental committees, 60 representatives of ND's youth organisation (ONNED) and 50 representatives of the party occupational organisations.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Its main tasks, according to Article 4, are to ratify ND's political programme, to elect the administrative-committee non-parliamentary members, and to discuss the report of the outgoing administrative committee. There is also a provision for an *ad-hoc* congress to be held in extraordinary circumstances, and after an administrative-committee decision.⁽⁴⁷⁾

The administrative committee is the highest organ between congresses, though this latter is not clearly stated within ND's statutes.⁽⁴⁸⁾ It comprises 70 members including the party president, plus the vice-president (if one is appointed by the party president, in which case, the administrative committee has 71 members), the parliamentary group secretary-general and the ONNED president,⁽⁴⁹⁾ 49 members elected by the party congress (35 to originate from the Greater Athens' conglomerate, and 14 from the provinces), as well as 18 MPs appointed by the parliamentary group. The administrative committee then elects the nine-member executive committee (which, in turn, elects a five-member financial committee), seven working committees (youth; farmers; workers and employees; artisans and merchants; scientists; technicians and economists; and international relations),⁽⁵⁰⁾ and it can also create occupational organisations.⁽⁵¹⁾ Lastly, according to the party statutes, the administrative committee should sit once every two months, and also serves as the highest disciplinary council for its non-parliamentary members.⁽⁵²⁾

At the grass-roots level, the party statutes provide for the creation of local organisations. The sum total of the latter, within a particular provincial department, constitute the departmental assembly

which elects the departmental committee (administrative, executive and financial) and a three-member disciplinary council.⁽⁵³⁾ As already mentioned, ND's departmental committees send 300 delegates to the party congress. The constitution, election of departmental organs, their rights and duties, as well as all relevant details concerning ND's peripheral organisations, were left to be set later by a peripheral organisation regulation (KPO), which would have to be ratified by a party congress.⁽⁵⁴⁾

New Democracy did not elect a president during its first congress, since it was clearly stated in the party statutes, "The president of the party is the party's founder".⁽⁵⁵⁾ The main innovation adopted was, that in future the president should be elected by the party's parliamentary group; Article 5 reads, "...the president of the party is elected, in secret ballot, by the parliamentary group, in accordance with Article 37 of the Greek Constitution".⁽⁵⁶⁾ Moreover, the most important of the considerable powers of the president of the party concerns the choice and final say in the nomination of ND's candidates and the composition of the party's electoral lists;⁽⁵⁷⁾ he can also appoint a vice-president to represent him in party-organisational affairs.⁽⁵⁸⁾

The above presentation shows that the 1979 party statutes established a tri-partite power-structure within ND's organisation, constituted by the party congress, the president and the parliamentary group. Not surprisingly, the real and main powers lay with the president—and, in secondary place, with the parliamentary group—rather than with the congress, since the party organisation was not an outcome of popular, grass-roots expectations and demands, but had been created from above. Despite the amendments for the first charter's reform on democratisation and upgrading of the party base, the statutes which were finally adopted featured a centralised organisation, directed and

controlled by the president and the parliamentarians in Athens. The congress in general, as well as the various committees stemming from it in particular, were vested with merely symbolic duties and powers. In consequence, the party's peripheral and more local organisation was left incomplete, its development at risk and its role seriously underplayed.

Throughout its initial seven-year period in office (November 1974 to October 1981), New Democracy underwent significant changes as regards its organisation. Until 1979, when the first national congress was held and the administrative-committee members were elected (as were also all party delegates who participated in that congress),⁽⁵⁹⁾ all higher party members had been appointed by Karamanlis, owing their rise in the party-ranks to their unconditional attachment to the leader; furthermore, the overwhelming majority of party delegates who were sent to the 1977 preliminary congress were appointed by higher party officials, and not elected by the ND base. The administrative committee appointed by Karamanlis in March 1975 never met, whereas the one elected by the 1979 congress did so a few times, if only for *ex posteriori* ratification of decisions already taken by the party leader. The same held true for both the executive and the financial committees, as well as for every other central organisation party organ.

At the departmental and local levels New Democracy, albeit developing late, did much better. Having only 50 departmental committees (NE) and 40 local organisations (TO) in 1975, the party claimed shortly before the first congress in 1979 that 62 NEs and 380 TOs had been elected by over 150,000 rank-and-file party members, as well as 25 occupational organisations (EKO); moreover, ND's youth organisation (ONNED) possessed at that time 70 local branches in Athens, and another 150 in the provinces.⁽⁶⁰⁾ The ground was prepared, therefore, to drastically reduce the power positions enjoyed by local party notables and deputies who, given the total absence of organised rank-and-file

members, were the unique mediators between the leadership and the party's base.

Whatever the organisational inefficiencies and drawbacks, two extremely important developments stand out. For one thing, New Democracy managed to become the first non-communist, bourgeois party to have held a national congress;⁽⁶¹⁾ moreover, the creation and development of its grass-roots organisation (although the whole procedure started much later and the organisation grew at a slower rate than in the case of PASOK) for the first time brought its supporters together to meet, to share views, and to discuss party or wider political issues.⁽⁶²⁾ This slowly led to the adoption of a more formal and concrete party-political mentality, which in turn was to play a distinctive role towards further development, upgrading and better functioning of the party organisation. Second and equally important, ND ultimately managed to overcome the shock of Karamanlis' departure, and it has successfully survived his absence not only under his immediate successor George Rallis, but also under Averoff's leadership (1981-1984) and under Mitsotakis (September 1984 until October 1993), as is discussed below.

3.2 ND's organisational enlargement and its 1986 second national congress

When Karamanlis became the head of state, the parliamentary group for the first time elected ND's party leader, duly following the procedures set down in the 1979 statutes: on 8 May 1980, G. Rallis beat the other candidate, E. Averoff, by a margin of four votes.⁽⁶³⁾ Under his leadership, the party made a great effort to fight the forthcoming (1981) election, and to combat the expected rise of its main rival, PASOK. Many regional congresses were held between 1979 and 1981, impeccably following democratic procedures and open to criticism.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Nevertheless, as D. Katsoudas observes,

"...it was too late for New Democracy to change either the popular desire for change or its own image... The General Election of 1981 was fought with the same dated and unsophisticated methods, albeit with more mobilisation of a now more conscious and active party base" (in English originally).⁽⁶⁵⁾

Between its first congress and the 1981 election, New Democracy tried hard to develop its departmental organisation. The party elaborated a so-called peripheral organisation regulation (KPO), which was ratified by its administrative committee, and aimed at translating the party statutes into actual practice. It was hoped that the party base would be properly organised, in time to be mobilised to help ND fight the forthcoming election. In reality, very little indeed, if anything, was accomplished. As an administrative-committee member admitted,

"Almost nothing of the entire KPO is either in use or respected... New party members are registered in defiance of KPO rulings. Subscriptions are not collected... Intra-party elections have been postponed four or five times, and for the most part have not yet been held. Where they were held, the relevant procedures provided for by the KPO were not followed... The administrative committee..., supposed to meet every two months, actually does so very seldom...".⁽⁶⁶⁾

Moreover, according to the same member,

"Not one out of the more than a dozen suggestions and propositions [on organisational issues] I submitted [to the Executive Committee] has ever been seriously taken into account when it should have been, let alone properly applied". In consequence, "It seems that ND's organisation functions like the old-fashioned fire brigade did, which appeared on the scene, only after the fire has been put out".⁽⁶⁷⁾

New Democracy's defeat in the 1981 election caused severe repercussions within the party, triggering internal dissent that ultimately led to Rallis' resignation and Averoff's election to the leadership.⁽⁶⁸⁾ As a staunch hardliner, Averoff was considered the most capable of the candidates to combat Papandreou's PASOK and to return ND

to office; Rallis was viewed as too moderate, and so partly responsible for the 1981 electoral defeat.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Nevertheless, it is largely due to him that a mild political climate prevailed during the electoral struggle, and the change in office took place for the first time ever in a perfectly orderly and peaceful manner. ND's new leader was (for the second time) democratically elected by the party's parliamentary group, and the party's unity preserved.

A major consequence of the party losing office was that due attention was finally paid to the importance of the organisation. As the ND director-general admitted (and his views were shared by a good many prominent ND members),

"...if ND had been better organised —not just during the last few months but all along— we would have come up with a better election result".⁽⁷⁰⁾

Several of the administrative-committee members acknowledged that, the departmental organisation apart, the central party organs had not played the role provided for by the party statutes.⁽⁷¹⁾ So, as the then director-general put it, the party

"...must build up its organisation. It will have to continue its fight as the official opposition party. There can be no doubt that we must activate our organisation at once, ...so that, through the latter, new cadres will emerge to staff ND in the future...".⁽⁷²⁾

Another major flaw in the existing organisation was, in Rallis' words, that

"...it is an endemic sickness of our camp to lack any eagerness for organisation, which simply goes on in the same old, feeble manner... There is organisation in theory, but it is not enough. What is badly needed is some intense activity by our supporters, which is missing from our party altogether, whereas it abounds in PASOK and in the Communist Party".⁽⁷³⁾

This particular feature of the conservative camp has always been remarked on by prominent conservative figures. For the conservatives, the concept of party-political organisation smacked of demonstrations, social unrest and communist agitation, and all which were utterly incompatible with the values of social tranquillity, law and order, traditionally exalted and upheld by the Greek Right.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Rallis, therefore, discerned a latent hostility towards party organisation, which he described as the

"...dominant mentality in our camp: they [the party members and supporters] want to have everything without risking any effort of their own, and they cannot understand that with such a mentality, the game is lost before it has ever started".⁽⁷⁵⁾

During Averoff's term as ND's leader (December 1981–September 1984), the party's organisation developed spectacularly. Whereas in 1981 the party had 150,000 members and about 500 inactive local organisational branches (TOs), by December 1983 over 2,000 TOs were functioning throughout the country, and over 70,000 new members had in the meantime joined the party.⁽⁷⁶⁾ A separate ND women's organisation was set up in 1982, and the administrative committee created a working committee exclusively oriented towards women's questions.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Furthermore, by June 1983, the party had elaborated a new peripheral organisation regulation (KPO), which was considered as "...a very important part of our efforts towards the modern organisation of our party".⁽⁷⁸⁾

However, this unprecedented organisational activity did not stem from some kind of inner-party dynamics. It was mainly an outcome of the fact that ND members and supporters, in opposition for the first time, realized the impossibility of countering PASOK's intense anti-right rhetoric and policies unless they were competently organised themselves. This is corroborated by answers from 158 rank-and-file ND members in the Department of Larissa in 1989,⁽⁷⁹⁾ as presented in Table IV.1 below.

Table IV.1: Development of ND's Grass-roots Organisation

Question	Answer	number	%
Is there organisational difference between the 1974-1981 period and today (1981-1989)?	Yes	135	85.44
	Some	12	07.60
	No	3	01.90
	Don't know	8	05.06
	Total	158	100.00
If yes/some, what does it consist of?	1974-81 non-existent, but well developed after 1981	107	67.72
	Better after 1981	19	12.03
	Other	21	13.29
	Total	147	93.04

According to the overwhelming majority of the rank-and-file ND members in Larissa (85.44 per cent, or 93 per cent including those members who think that there was at any rate some difference), the party's grass-roots organisation after 1981 differs considerably from that between 1974 and 1981. Almost 68 per cent of the party members believe that during ND's first period in government, party organisation was virtually non-existent; it developed only after their party went into opposition, mainly in order to combat PASOK, which was much more effectively organised. The percentage of those who thought that there was no difference between the two periods is negligible (1.90 per cent), and nineteen members (12.03 per cent) believed that the organisation underwent a merely qualitative change.

Table IV.2 below is another corroboration, showing that most of the rank-and-file members in the Department of Larissa joined the party after 1981. During the 1974-81 period, only 51 (25.95 per cent) joined ND, the remaining 107 (74.05 per cent) did so after 1981, when the party had lost the election and became the official opposition; 65 members joined ND between 1981 and 1985, and another 52 from 1985 until 1989 (fieldwork time).

Table IV.2: Larissa ND Members: Year of Registering in the Party Ranks

<u>Year of registration</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Before 1977	27	17.09
1977-1981	14	08.86
1981-1985	65	41.14
<u>After 1985</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>32.91</u>
Total	158	100.00

While in office for seven consecutive years, New Democracy relied almost exclusively on the so-called spoils-system. This is the traditional usage of the party in office for securing the popular vote by distributing favours, and fully exploiting the advantages governmental office entails; it results in incorporating the people in politics in a dependent manner, through vertical clientelistic relations, and not independently/impersonally through the party organisation and ideology. To quote R. Macrides,

"A modern party must be in contact with the people through its organisational structure and its ideological principles... In my opinion, ND's most serious defect is that it was never transformed into a party. Consequently, when its leader moved to the Presidency of the Republic, it 'collapsed'..."⁽⁸⁰⁾

Nevertheless, most scholars are agreed that during Averoff's leadership the party experienced an unprecedented organisational expansion, registering thousands of new and active members in its lists. According to D. Katsoudas,⁽⁸¹⁾

"...local branches opened almost everywhere and the degree of members' active participation grew sharply, giving the impression that ND's return to power was almost imminent".

But this was not the case in the June 1984 Euro-election. Averoff's decision to meet ND's challenge to PASOK across the whole spectrum

(going as far as heading the party's ballot himself and in vain urging Papandreou to do likewise) did not result in the hoped improvement in the party's fortunes. ND's share of the vote increased by only two percentage points compared to the October 1981 national election, and triggered fresh criticism and resentment in the party.⁽⁸²⁾

Three months after that election Averoff resigned, and a new leadership contest took place between C. Mitsotakis and C. Stephanopoulos. ND's parliamentary group, duly following the statutory provisions, convened on 1 September 1984 and elected Mitsotakis as the new party leader (with 71 votes as against 40 for Stephanopoulos). Although this was the third time New Democracy acquired a new leader, the party remained united and, in that respect, its organisation did indeed function properly. After Mitsotakis' election to the leadership, ND's most prominent members (including Rallis, Averoff, Stephanopoulos and Boutos), decided that the new leader should be assisted in major political issues by an unofficial body, consisting of leading ND parliamentarians, and named "political council". In late 1984, this organ consisted of C. Papakonstantinou, C. Stephanopoulos, J. Boutos, and A. Kanellopoulos.⁽⁸³⁾

On 3 February 1985 Mitsotakis had a manifesto⁽⁸⁴⁾ published, to serve as the somewhat amended basis of the party's ideological principles and as ND's springboard for contesting the forthcoming June 1985 election. Although the party did better than in the 1984 Euro-election, it again lost to PASOK, which remained in office for a second consecutive term.⁽⁸⁵⁾ In the aftermath of this election, Stephanopoulos left the party to form DIANA, and only then Mitsotakis resigned, asking ND's parliamentary group for a vote of confidence (exactly like Rallis had done four years earlier). ND deputies elected him again to the leadership,⁽⁸⁶⁾ and the party moved towards its second congress on 14-16 February 1986.

Seven years had passed since ND had held its first congress in 1979, and the reason for this second congress coming so late were, according to the party, that

"...the consecutive elections —i.e the 1981 national election, the 1982 municipal election, the 1984 Euro-election and, again, the 1985 national one— did not allow for convening the congress within the statutory period".⁽⁸⁷⁾

Directly after the last of those election, therefore, ND created four committees (of organisation, statutes, ideology, and programming) as well as an organisational sub-committee to thoroughly prepare for the second congress, so that it would "...inaugurate the renewal of the party's organisational structure and ideological principles".⁽⁸⁸⁾ Moreover, the party mailed a questionnaire (15,000 copies) to all ND organisations —departmental, local, occupational— in Greece and abroad; the questions concerned its basic organisational, ideological and policy-programme issues, and the ND members' answers were compiled and taken into serious account in the preparation for the congress. Last but not least, 126 preliminary departmental conferences, six preparatory peripheral assemblies, and five panhellenic convocations were also held (with more than 5,000 elected ND delegates participating), before ND's second congress in Salonica in February 1986.⁽⁸⁹⁾

While at ND's first congress no press coverage was allowed, nor were Greek or foreign representatives of other parties invited,⁽⁹⁰⁾ the second congress had full press coverage and a good many representatives attended its proceedings.⁽⁹¹⁾ Moreover, apart from the almost 1,000 elected ND delegates, there were representatives of ND's women's departments, invited to attend as observers, since, the 1979 statutes made no provisions for their full participation. The congress concerned itself mainly with three issues: organisation, ideological principles, and the general political platform. In the next section, we shall

discuss exclusively the organisational questions, leaving those of ideology and the political programme until the next chapter.

3.3 Statutory changes in 1986

According to the 1986 party's director-general, A. Bratakos, ND's statutes needed revision because, certain positive features aside, the party still suffered from four basic organisational weaknesses. These were,

"(a) the corporate structure of ND's collective organs; (b) the total absence of personal responsibility in the collective organs, i.e. total absence of vertical structures; (c) too many organs of central organisation, and too much autonomy in decision-making, which confuses areas of responsibility in departmental organisations, and this, in turn, causes a great deal of parallel action; and (d) lack of a consistent policy preventing the correct timing and actualisation of decisions taken".⁽⁹²⁾

Most of these weaknesses had also been mentioned by other prominent party members and deputies who, among other things, had advocated a more balanced distribution of action and responsibility between party organs and deputies; a more active role of ND's huge grass-roots organisation, and better communication between the party base and the higher organs (up to the party leadership), through the appointment of medium-rank party officials; and, finally, greater say for the party's rank and file in both the nomination of MPs and the party leader's election.⁽⁹³⁾ As we shall see, most of the above propositions were taken into account, and voted in by the second congress.

Before we proceed to a more detailed discussion of the changes in ND's organisational structure, it should be noted that the 1986 statutes introduce four basic organisational and operational principles,⁽⁹⁴⁾ intended to remedy the afore-mentioned organisational weaknesses, and to "...govern the organisation and functioning of a modern, democratically elected, and reliable party mechanism".⁽⁹⁵⁾ These were: the principles


of decision-making by majority, of organisational unity, of party-operational decentralisation, and of each and everyone's personal responsibility. The dominant role in ND was declared to be that of the party's members, given that "...all organs are constituted by party members, spread from the grass-roots towards the top and communicating with each other both ways".⁽⁹⁶⁾

Figure 4.11 below presents a diagram of the party structure as this appeared after the second congress in February 1986. First of all, ND's organisation is sub-divided into central and peripheral; ND's central organisation comprises the congress, the party president, the parliamentary group, the central committee (as the administrative committee was now renamed), the executive committee, the central disciplinary council, and the central finance committee.⁽⁹⁷⁾ The peripheral organisation breaks down into local (TO), provincial (EO), and departmental (NO), and within its context, special party (i.e. occupational, EKO), heterocitizens,⁽⁹⁸⁾ and Greek-immigrant organisations can also be established.⁽⁹⁹⁾


Contrary to what was the case in 1979, the revised statutes of 1986 declare decisively that "The congress is the party's highest and dominant organ".⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ It consists of the incumbent president, former presidents, parliamentary-group members (in Greece and Europe), central-committee members, ex-MPs and Euro-MPs, non-elected candidates at the last election prior to the congress (for both national and Euro-parliaments), representatives from departmental organisations elected by every departmental committee (not appointed by the respective departmental committees, as under the 1979 statutes), each sending to the congress as many delegates as there are parliamentary seats in the department concerned.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Moreover, the congress includes 36 representatives from the party's organisations abroad, 70 representatives of occupational organisations (as opposed to 50 under

Figure 4.11: Diagram of the ND Structure According to the 1986 Statutes

I. Central Organisation



II. Peripheral Organisation



[—————> = elects, - - - - -> = appoints.]

the 1979 statutes), 120 ND youth-organisation (ONNED) representatives (twice as many as under the 1979 statutes), and one woman from each departmental administrative committee (70 women in all).⁽¹⁰²⁾

The main tasks of the Congress, according to Article 11, are:

- to define ND's ideological principles.
- to ratify ND's political programme.
- to confirm the party's broader policy lines.
- to sanction and amend the party statutes.
- to discuss the report of the outgoing central committee.

—to elect the new central-committee from both parliamentary and non-parliamentary members, and

- to make decisions on every item on the agenda.⁽¹⁰³⁾

The congress should normally be held every three years, following a central-committee decision, and in extraordinary circumstances, and after a decision by the president, or by a two-thirds majority of the central committee, an *ad-hoc* congress may be held.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

Between congresses, the central committee is the highest organ of the party, as the 1986 statutes now definitively stipulate.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ It consists of the party president, ND's parliamentary speaker, the parliamentary group's secretary-general, the youth-organisation (ONNED) president (all of whom participate in the central committee *ex officio*), and 75 elected ND members for a three-year term (25 of which are MPs elected by the congress and not appointed by the parliamentary group, as under the 1979 statutes).⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Being the highest party organ between congresses, the central committee should sit once every two months (or *ad hoc*, if special circumstances make it necessary), and, aside from electing the executive committee as well as the central disciplinary council (eleven and five members respectively) and appointing the departmental disciplinary councils, it plays much the same role, although more frequently, as the party congress.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

The executive committee consists of the above four party members who sit *ex officio* on the central committee, together with eleven elected members (six of whom are non-parliamentarians) for an eighteen-month term. Normally, it is called to session once a week by ND's president, and *ad hoc* in special circumstances. The executive committee is the highest instructive party organ between central committee sessions, responsible for every issue concerning party-political tactics, organisation and functioning. Moreover, it appoints all seven members of the central finance committee, and can decide whether or not to establish special party (EKOs), heterocitizen, and Greek-immigrant organisations. (108)

At the peripheral level, ND's organisational structure did not change very much from that of the 1979 statutes. Local organisations (TOs) constitute the nucleus of the party's grass-roots, their organs being the local assembly (TS) and the local committee (TE); women's departments are set up within the local organisations' context. A second rank of the peripheral organisation (missing from the 1979 statutes) are provincial ones, in the form of provincial assemblies (ES) and provincial committees (EE). Finally, departmental organisations (NO) constitute the third organisational grade, and consist of the departmental assembly (NS), the departmental administrative (NODE), the departmental executive (NOMEKE), and the departmental finance committees (NOE) and, lastly, of the three-member departmental disciplinary council (NOPS). (109)

By and large then, the new statutes provided for a much greater participation by ND's rank and file in the party's higher central organs. However, the main innovation introduced by the 1986 statutes—not irrelevant to the afore-mentioned upgrading of the grass-roots—concerned the president's election and the nomination of the party's parliamentary candidates. As we shall demonstrate, New Democracy came

closer to a more democratic, European-type party organisation by involving part of its base in the election of the party president, and by allowing it more say in drawing up the party's electoral lists.

According to Article 13 of the 1986 statutes, then, the president leads and represents the party in general; he expresses its policies on every political and ideological matter; he supervises and co-ordinates the party's organisation; he presides at meetings of the central and executive committees as well as of the parliamentary group, and he bears full responsibility for the proper realization of all decisions taken by the congress, the central and executive committee and the parliamentary group; moreover, he is responsible for the party's national conference being convened —normally once a year, or *ad hoc* if he considers it necessary.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

In the 1979 statutes the party president was the party's founder; now the "President of the party is the one duly elected".⁽¹¹¹⁾ The vice-president's position has been abolished seeing that no particular problems were created for the party organisation by this position remaining vacant ever since.⁽¹¹²⁾ Furthermore, it is not ND's parliamentary group that now elects the president, but a special electoral body, consisting of the party deputies and representatives of ND's peripheral organisation elected in each department. More specifically, unless the president's election is held during a congress every departmental assembly convenes *ad hoc*; it consists of the members of the departmental administrative committee, and the president, vice-president and secretary-general of every local and ONNED committee in the department; and, finally, this special departmental assembly elects one representative. All these departmental representatives (70 at the time of writing), together with the parliamentary group and the Euro-MPs, constitute the special electoral body, that is responsible for electing the party president.⁽¹¹³⁾ Thus,

"...since the peripheral organisation, through its elected representatives, can decisively influence developments concerning the critical issue of the president's election, its role becomes a crucial one—in the sense that it is upgraded to the centre of internal-party procedures and activities, and so is responsible for promoting and safeguarding the party's future progress".⁽¹¹⁴⁾

According to Article 19 of the 1986 statutes, the party's parliamentary group comprises both national and Euro-MPs (since the country is a full EEC member), normally sits once a month—or in extraordinary circumstances *ad hoc*—and appoints its own disciplinary council, which consists of the five most senior deputies of ND's parliamentary group.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Due care was exercised so that the new statutes would guarantee

"...the much needed equilibrium between the two main organisational branches of our party, namely the parliamentary group and the rank-and-file party members".⁽¹¹⁶⁾

It was for this reason that the party base was given direct participation in the formation of ND's electoral lists.

Apart from the candidates for the European Parliament, and those on the State-list whose selection and nomination remains at the absolute discretion of the president, ND's grass-roots have now a say concerning the nomination of all the rest.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ More specifically, each departmental assembly—composed of the same members as who will decide department's representation on the special electoral body for the president's election—draws up a list of twice as many candidates as there are available parliamentary seats in the department concerned, according to the preference votes received by each of them from the afore-mentioned departmental-assembly members. This list, drawn up with the party's incumbent MPs in the department, is sent to Athens headquarters, where the executive committee submits it to a first screening. After that, the list reaches the president, who "...finally

selects the candidates and forms the electoral lists, basically from among those proposed by the departmental assemblies".⁽¹¹⁸⁾

There can be no denying that the 1986 statutes have allotted a much more important and decisive role for the party's grass-roots than did those of 1979. The ND president himself admitted that "...in the previous statutes, there was no guarantee whatsoever for the essential participation of the party's rank and file in the candidates' nomination".⁽¹¹⁹⁾ Certain prominent ND deputies have, however, resented this upgraded role of the rank and file, and denounced the new statutes as counter-parliamentarian.⁽¹²⁰⁾ For all their objections, the request by ND's rank and file for the adoption of democratic party procedures and their own greater share in decision-making had emerged as early as 1976 —when the Volvi Movement faction was formed— and became more pressing as time went by. This is confirmed by the data presented in Table IV.3 below on the opinions of ND members in the Department of Larissa in 1989.⁽¹²¹⁾

Table IV.3: ND Members' Views Regarding the Party Candidates' Nomination


		number	%
<u>Should this be the party president's exclusive responsibility ?</u>	Yes	58	36.71
	No	100	63.29
	Total	158	100.00
<hr/>			
<u>If not, what would you personally prefer?</u>		number	%
(a) Exclusive responsibility by the party's grass-roots organisation		18	11.39
(b) Formation of the electoral lists by intra-party elections prior to the president's decision		82	51.90
	Total	100	63.29

As we can see, more than 63 per cent of ND's rank-and-file members in Larissa believed that the party base should have a greater say in the candidates' nomination, as opposed to almost 37 per cent who approved of the president having exclusive responsibility in this respect; a little

over 11 per cent of the former want the party's rank and file to be exclusively responsible for ND's electoral lists, whereas the majority (almost 52 per cent) acknowledge the president's right to have the final say —with the proviso that the party lists should be formed on the basis of prior intra-party elections, i.e. that they absolutely agree with the respective provisions of the 1986 statutes.⁽¹²²⁾ The latter have been tested in practice, first during the 1986 congress, when the party delegates ratified Mitsotakis' 1984 election to the leadership by ND's parliamentary group, and, again during the June 1989 election, when the choices of candidates by departmental assemblies were respected (isolated exceptions apart);⁽¹²³⁾ for the November 1989 and the April 1990 elections all parties more or less used the June 1989 electoral lists again, as there was not enough time for preparing new ones.

Aside from the new and more important role assigned to the party base by the 1986 statutes, and further aside from the steps taken for a well-structured and better functioning organisation at peripheral level, ND tried to similarly improve its central party services in Athens for the purposes of proper supervision and better co-ordination of the whole organisational apparatus. A whole nexus of secretariats and special offices was set up a few months after the 1986 congress by the ND director-general, and a detailed picture of the party's new organisational scheme is presented in Figure 4.111 below. We can see that eight separate secretariats were established, responsible for the sectors of political planning, programming, organisation, women, farmers, trade unionism, information, and for administrative/financial services; they were headed by seven ND deputies and one non-parliamentarian, all selected and appointed by the party president. However, most importantly, six of these secretaries were newcomers to politics (that is, their political career began after 1974), whereas only two had been affiliated with the pre-coup ERE. This was the first

Figure 4.111: New Democracy's Organisational Scheme



time that the ND leadership brought relatively new politicians to the foreground and entrusted them with serious tasks and responsibilities —indicating that the much promised renewal of persons and ideas in the party ranks would, quite probably, be more than words. Under the secretariats, eight special offices were established (in charge of studies and gallup polls, elections, education and training of party cadres, the press, heterocitizens, international relations and information, immigrants, and mobilisation), and they were all headed —as also were the secretariats— by some of the party's youngest politicians, all of whom started their careers after 1974.⁽¹²⁴⁾

All of the efforts, which had begun with the second congress and aimed at the rapid organisational development of the party to upgrade its rank and file to greater participation in party-political issues, as well as bringing younger cadres into the higher party echelons, bore fruit as early as October 1986, when ND met with its first election success vis-à-vis PASOK since it had lost in 1981. ND saw its own candidates elected as city mayors in the three biggest cities of the country, Athens, Salonica and Piraeus.⁽¹²⁵⁾ Although the next national election was not scheduled until 1989, this election triumph, as ND supporters considered it, proved a unifying factor and a major boost for both high-ranking and ordinary party members. It signalled a period of optimism and intensive activities geared to winning the forthcoming national election and returning to office.

This organisational take off soon after the 1986 congress affected all ND branches, especially the party's youth organisation ONNED, and the women's departments. As we have already mentioned, the first women's department was created in 1982 at central level, and since the second congress there has been a separate women's department in each local organisation, which sends one representative to the party congress. With

respect to ONNED, and in contrast to late 1975, the year of ONNED's foundation when, in Katsoudas' words,

"...the young man belonging to the liberal camp..., soon became a pathetic case..., ideologically deficient and, more often than not, pointed at in scorn",⁽¹²⁶⁾

ONNED has developed spectacularly. It already has two national congresses behind it, and today claims more than 80,000 members and 20,000 elected officials (see Appendix III). Following the same trends, ND's university-youth organisation (DAP-NDFK), which in 1980 had polled its lowest percentage ever of a little over 10 per cent, reached an unprecedented 28.29 per cent in 1986, and has ever since 1987 been the largest group in the university polling, taking at times, as much as 45 per cent of the vote.⁽¹²⁷⁾ In general, ONNED has been considered as the most notable ND success. ONNED and the women's departments are viewed as the party's two most dynamic campaigning groups, their importance having increased tremendously since 1981.⁽¹²⁸⁾

One final point should be made before we close this section, concerning the relationship between ND's organisations and other social groups, specifically with the trade unions. Although it is not possible to present here in detail the course and development of the trade-union movement in Greece, suffice it to mention that before the restoration of democracy in 1974, trade unions were either under the control of the state—in which case most trade-union leaders were appointed directly by the Ministry of Labour and a system of spoils and favours kept the trade-union movement under tight state control-- or, but to a considerably lesser extent, they were controlled by the communists. In the former case, trade unions and their leaders were connected more with the government than with the ruling party, given that ERE had no grass-roots organisation. After 1974 the communists, always maintaining a well-structured and effective organisation, kept control of certain

trade unions (then as now the construction workers, and also several unions in light and heavy industry, most of which were later lost to PASOK). New Democracy, having failed to develop its own organisation during the years it was in office, followed the policies of its predecessor, i.e. it fully exploited the spoils system to keep trade unions loyal to the government; in other words, it did what it could to incorporate them in a dependent manner, instead of trying to create connections and linkages that would lead to a more equal and balanced relationship between the party and the trade-union movement.⁽¹²⁹⁾

After ND lost the 1981 election, and knew it could never compete with PASOK unless it developed an effective organisation, the party tried to approach the unions more closely and to exert its influence from within. For this reason it made serious efforts to rejuvenate and activate its occupational organisations (EKO) which, in turn, would act as a bridge between ND and the unions; in this the party did well, seeing that its 25 EKOs in 1981 had grown by a factor of eight five years later (see Appendix III). Furthermore, a separate labour organisation, affiliated to ND (DAKE), was created after 1981, to express and disseminate the party policies within the trade unions. All these efforts bore fruit, since ND managed to obtain a foothold in and even achieve a decent representation in quite a few of the trade unions. Since, however, as the party's main recruits come from the upper and most wealthy social and occupational categories—as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter—ND's overall performance and influence in the labour movement lags far behind the one enjoyed, if not monopolised, by PASOK and the parties of the Left.⁽¹³⁰⁾

In terms of the development of ND's organisation, the pre-1981 years and more recent ones are hardly comparable. We shall not present the differences again, nor the efforts towards a fuller development and effective functioning of the party's organisation. It should be

mentioned, however, that the party nowadays claims 3,500 local organisations throughout the country, 70 departmental committees, 106 EKO's and almost 400,000 members; this makes a ratio of 1:7.7 between members and voters, a ratio very close to that of the Communist Party, which is 1:6.⁽¹³¹⁾ It is impressive that what in 1974 was a party of notables has been transformed into a mass-party, with a huge organised base that enjoys a high degree of participation in party politics, through having a say in electing the president and in forming the electoral lists.

Unfortunately, this is not the complete picture. Despite all this development and progress, there are still some not inconsiderable shortcomings that deprive the organisation from functioning properly. They confine its role to that of a mobilising force for election campaigns, while during the interim periods the organisation remains dormant. Apart from the ND supporters' innate and latent hostility towards party organisation (as seen by Rallis), there are much more important reasons why the party has still not managed to reach the standards and efficiency of the PASOK organisation, not to mention that of the Left.

First of all, despite the numerous and detailed stipulations of the party statutes, a host of irregularities can be discerned in the central organisation. To begin with, although it is mandatory for the congress to be held every three years, the third congress, scheduled for 1989, is still overdue. In the same fashion, the central, executive, and every other committee, as well as the parliamentary group, are not called into session as provided by the statutes, simply because they have no important decisions to make. In practice, all major powers are reserved for and exercised by the president, together with a small group of his closest colleagues. The only difference with the pre-1981 period is quantitative, not qualitative: whereas under Karamanlis' leadership all

higher party organs played a purely decorative role, nowadays they meet rather more often (but still infrequently and at irregular intervals) to discuss minor political issues and to be informed about major decisions already taken.⁽¹³²⁾

Very much the same features are to be found on the peripheral level of ND's organisation. Although the party has claimed 400,000 members, it seems reasonable to adjust this figure in practice. New members always appeared in the lists shortly before intra-party elections, because candidates recruit their relatives, acquaintances and friends to vote for them; after the election is over, most of these new members fall by the wayside, having no other party-political interests.⁽¹³³⁾ This assumption receives support from the fact that in 1991 New Democracy collected from its local organisations throughout the country only 72 per cent of the expected subscription fees.⁽¹³⁴⁾

This lack of continuation and regularity in the grass-roots organisation causes a host of other problems. As Table IV.4 below shows,⁽¹³⁵⁾ more than 75 per cent of the party's rank and file in the Department of Larissa thought in 1989 that their organisation had one or

Table IV.4: Most Important Problems Faced by TOs
in the Department of Larissa

Major problem	number	%
Financial problems	74	46.84
Lack of professional party officials	24	15.19
Lack of disciplined party members	23	14.56
Poor communication between base and higher party organs	21	13.29
Lack of internal democratic procedures	18	11.39
General inactivity/inefficiency	17	10.76
Difficulties in attracting new members	11	06.96
Other	5	03.16
None/Don't know	35	22.15

more problems, whereas only a little over 22 per cent thought otherwise. The majority of the former regarded financial shortages as the most serious difficulty, but a good many party members identified also other major flaws, such as lack of professional cadres and discipline among the rank and file, mal-communication between the base and the higher echelons of the party hierarchy (in other words, the views and expectations of the base were not being correctly channelled to party headquarters and vice-versa), and lack of respect for intra-party democratic procedures in decision-making—all of these leading to grievances and complaints concerning the general inefficiency of the local organisation.

Generally speaking, since on the one hand the statutory regulations on the functioning of the higher central party organs are not regularly observed and, on the other, national elections are normally held every four years, the local and departmental party organisations see their respective roles confined to that of mere campaign groups for mobilising ND supporters and voters during demonstrations and elections. Thus, local and departmental committees function mainly as *ad-hoc* propaganda organisations in the pursuit of certain party-political ends, rather than as party institutions organising action, devising policies and exerting their own influence on political affairs. It is this last characteristic which, we think, mainly accounts for the mal-communication between the grass-roots and the higher party ranks.⁽¹³⁶⁾ Despite the 1986 appropriate provisions of the statutes, the organised party base has not yet been given the chance to secure and institutionalise democratic procedures within its ranks, nor its role as a policy-shaping and decision-making body; in consequence, communication between lower and higher organisational levels and, more so, upward mobility, is still limited for the rank and file.

Before discussing the relationship between the organisation and the party leadership, we would like to remark briefly on a subject already touched on in the previous chapter, namely the so-called bureaucratic clientelism or party-directed patronage. It will be remembered that this phenomenon was first noticed after PASOK had come to office in 1981; it was an outcome of the party organisation having taken over —mainly from the MPs but also from other notables— the task of distributing spoils and favours to the party's followers, and of controlling public appointments.⁽¹³⁷⁾

New Democracy having experienced an unprecedented organisational expansion after its second congress and by late 1991 having doubled its members, plus the statutory upgrading of ND's base and its right to participate and so influence the candidates' nominations and the president's election, meant that when the party finally took office again in April 1990, its organisation played almost the same role PASOK's had done nine years earlier: it was now ND membership that guaranteed one a public appointment, something much needed and long expected by rank-and-file members through their party's many years in opposition. The only difference with PASOK's record in this respect was that in ND it was not only the organisation which performed this task, but also a few senior party notables and deputies, whose personal clienteles assured them of a certain degree of autonomy both towards the leadership and the organised party base.⁽¹³⁸⁾ So the ND grass-roots organisation after 1986 acted mainly as the party's vanguard in mobilising its supporters and disseminating political propaganda while the party was in opposition, whereas after ND had returned to office, its organised base insisted —in return for its help with the party's eventual rise to power again— on a decisive role in the distribution of spoils and the colonisation of the public bureaucracy with its members.

It is difficult to assess the exact degree of institutionalisation of bureaucratic clientelism in the ND organisation; neither parties nor MPs and other party notables publish data on personal favours and obligations to their voters.⁽¹³⁹⁾ Nevertheless, it is only fair to say that the ND rank and file do have a say in the distribution of favours and spoils, and in arranging for party members' jobs in the public sector. Notwithstanding its late development and ill-functioning, ND's organisation has shown itself better able than other social institutions (trade unions, occupational and other citizens' associations) to offer faster and safer upward social and occupational mobility —just as PASOK had done nine years earlier. For all that, from the time of ND's creation and at least until the time of writing, the rank and file has remained the weakest element in the party, despite its numerical superiority much weaker than the parliamentary group, and of course the party leadership.

4. The Party Leadership

ND's leadership has been the most salient feature of the party ever since its foundation, and has affected party affairs in ways and to an extent not comparable by any standards to its West-European counterparts. It has always marked the party with its own particular imprint, which has varied with each leader's personality.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ As may be expected, the role and influence of the leader did not remain the same throughout the years; for all that, with the exception of Rallis, no ND leader has ever been a *primus inter pares*. As we shall try to show below, while only Karamanlis was vested with omnipotence during his term, the authority enjoyed today by Mitsotakis, despite ND's

spectacular organisational development, is still a (much weakened) reflection of that predominance.

We have already examined Karamanlis' contribution to the creation of ND's organisation, and we have also outlined some of the more important aspects of his post-1974 personality. It may be added here that Karamanlis projected the ideal-typical example of the traditional party leader in Greek politics: a messianic, charismatic figure who establishes, owns and leads a political party, and so constitutes its only source of power and only decision-making centre. Typical examples of this kind of leader are, for the conservative camp, P. Tsaldaris, A. Papagos, and C. Karamanlis; and for the liberal camp, E. Venizelos, G. Papandreou, and (further to the left) his son A. Papandreou.⁽¹⁴¹⁾

In his days as ND leader, Karamanlis hardly concerned himself with party affairs. He was too occupied with making all the major decisions more or less alone, and sometimes aided by his closest and most loyal colleagues. All of the higher party organs --e.g. the first administrative committee appointed in 1975, and those that emerged after the first congress in 1979, as well as the parliamentary group at all times-- were simply rubber-stamp mechanism.⁽¹⁴²⁾

Standing at first between democracy and the return of the tanks, Karamanlis used his immense prestige to restore democratic institutions and lead the country into the EEC. His supporters seem to agree that he made the right choices. As Table IV.5 below shows, ND's party members in the Department of Larissa in 1989 do not at all consider that their party neglected them, or that their views were not given due consideration at the time.⁽¹⁴³⁾ Indeed, only 27.85 per cent of them consider the democratic organisation of the party as a major achievement, and even fewer (10.75 per cent) think so about the convention of the first congress. Conversely, the large majority (almost 70 per cent) regard Greece's EEC entry as the most important

Table IV.5: ND's Greatest Achievements while in Government

Achievement	number	%
EEC entry	108	68.35
Restoration of democracy	103	65.19
National reconciliation	69	43.67
Democratic organisation of the party	44	27.85
ND governmental policies	43	27.22
Legalisation of the Communist Party	36	22.78
The first party congress in 1979	17	10.75
Other	4	02.53

achievement, while 65.18 per cent give greater weight to the restoration of democracy; ranked third in the list of achievements is the establishment of national reconciliation, a view shared by 43.67 per cent of the rank and file. On the other hand, only 27.22 per cent of the party members consider ND's policies in government successful, with only just over one-fifth (36 party members, or 22.78 per cent) enthusiastic over the 1974 legalisation of the Communist Party.

The authoritarian leadership style and autocratic behaviour of Karamanlis notwithstanding, his vast personal contribution to the creation and development of ND's organisation cannot be denied. As already mentioned, Karamanlis managed to institutionalise basic democratic procedures and even establish a modicum of internal democracy in the party ranks before he left the ND leadership for the presidency of the republic in 1980. Although the party did not manage to organise properly under his command, it did so eventually, and his much earlier views on party organisation (of the ERE) were realized in the case of New Democracy:

"It is only when we cease to govern that we'll manage to organise the party. As long as we're in office, the centre of gravity lies in government, not in party organisation".⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

After its founder's withdrawal, ND's parliamentary group elected George Rallis to the party leadership, by a narrow majority of four votes over E. Averoff. Rallis expressed the moderate, centre-right wing of the party at the time; Averoff represented the right-wing, conservative hardliners.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ This leadership contest was the first and only one fought over broader ideological issues. Rallis' election led the party to a more modern outlook and moved it further towards the centre and liberalism; whereas Averoff's election would have meant ideological regression and the adoption of old-fashioned, ultra-conservative policies —something that actually happened later, when Averoff succeeded Rallis, as we shall see below.

Rallis, unlike Karamanlis, came from a tzakia family of political notables. His father and two grandfathers in their time had all held the premiership, and he himself was elected to parliament almost continuously since 1950. When he took over the party leadership and premiership at the age of 62, he proved a decent but uninspiring personality, totally unlike Karamanlis. A deeply sincere democrat, he always consulted with the higher party organs before he made a decision,⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ but there was simply not enough time to re-educate the party as well as to cope with PASOK knocking at the doors of government. Trapped between the radical demagogy of Papandreou and the fanaticism of ND's right-wingers, Rallis was unable to prevent his party's election disaster. He resigned. Unsuccessful as Rallis might have been as a party leader, his great contribution lies elsewhere: (i) he was the first political leader who duly respected the provision in the Greek Constitution which stipulates that a national election must be held once every four years;⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ (ii) he succeeded to a considerable extent in establishing a calm and civilised political climate during the whole pre-electoral period, and to conduct the election in an impeccable and orderly manner; and (iii) and most important, he immediately accepted

his party's defeat, and transferred power to PASOK in an unprecedentedly honest and peaceful manner. It was only then that the political system of the new regime, which Karamanlis had established in 1974, was fully legitimised and consolidated.

After a long stretch of being in power —almost uninterruptedly since 1946— the conservative party now found itself on the opposition benches. Poorly organised and with only a vague ideology, ND went into a transitional phase, trying to work out what went wrong, to revamp its image, and to issue a new challenge to PASOK. It began its efforts at the top and, on 9 December 1981, ND deputies elected Averoff as the new party leader after Rallis failed to obtain a vote of confidence two days earlier.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ Party members as well as deputies considered Averoff ideal for performing an anti-Papandreou role, as they saw it, capable of fighting and ousting him from power.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾

Averoff, like Rallis, was descended from a prominent political family in the Department of Ioannina, where he had created an extensive personal clientele; elected to parliament ever since 1946, he became ND party leader at the age of 71. Although he had begun his political career as a Liberal Party deputy (joining ERE in 1956), his attitudes and tactics suggested him to be more of an old-fashioned politician, unable to give ND a more modern identity. Indeed, although he fanatically attacked the PASOK leader and his policies, it was by simply rejecting them *in toto*, without constructively presenting a convincing alternative. This made ND's propositions end up as scaremongering; suggesting that the country was headed towards a one-party dictatorship of the Left, and that a new, serious national schism was imminent.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾

As might be expected, Averoff's rise to the leadership lost the party the centre-right orientation given it by Karamanlis and Rallis, and imposed a more right-wing conservative attitude. As a central-committee member attested,

"...after Averoff had succeeded Rallis, the Greeks and all of us in New Democracy thought that the party had moved further to the right".⁽¹⁵¹⁾

So for instance New Democracy participated dynamically, together with ultra-rightist and other minor fascist groups, in ceremonies organised to commemorate all those "slaughtered by communist rebels" during the civil war, and it left parliament *en masse* when PASOK entered to vote in a bill on the official recognition of the national resistance movement during and after World War II.⁽¹⁵²⁾ It was not surprising, then, that P. Bakoyiannis could write:

"...since the 1981 election ND has moved so far to the right that today the party is more conservative than the pre-coup ERE, and bears very little resemblance to its 1974-1980 political identity. It unfortunately gives the impression of trying to resuscitate the past".⁽¹⁵³⁾

Despite his moving ND to the right, Averoff's major contribution lay with the party's organisational development. As we have already explained, it was under his leadership that ND managed to establish a local organisation in almost every one of the country's departments and to achieve a substantial increase of its rank-and-file membership. On the other hand, Averoff's handling of party affairs, limited by his old-fashioned and outmoded political mentality, left little room for the central party organisation to operate; ND's higher organs, contrary to the statutory provisions, neither made decisions nor conferred regularly; last but not least, whereas the second party congress was often promised as imminent, it never actually met.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

The relatively poor performance of the party in the June 1984 Euro-election struck the final blow to Averoff's already shaky position as ND's leader.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ and the party MPs duly convened on 1 September 1984 to elect a new leader. The candidates were C. Mitsotakis (66 years old) and C. Stephanopoulos; the former had joined ND in 1978 and was believed to

enjoy Averoff's favour; the latter had been an elected ERE deputy in 1964 and one of ND's founding members. The 111 ND deputies gave Mitsotakis 71 votes and Stephanopoulos 40.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾

Mitsotakis, like Rallis and Averoff, originated from a prominent tzakia family in Crete, in the Department of Chania, being himself a grandson of the legendary E. Venizelos; his father, both his grandfathers, and his uncles had all been members of parliament. Mitsotakis himself exercises an important influence over a very large personal clientele in Chania; he had been elected to parliament ever since 1946 on the liberal ticket, and was one of the most prominent centrist politicians in the 1960s and a founding member of the Centre Union in 1961. Colleague and at the same time major rival of Andreas Papandreou in the 1963-65 Centre Union governments, he joined and played a leading but obscure role in the group known as the apostates, i.e. those who defected from G. Papandreou's party.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ In 1974 he failed to enter parliament with his Party of Neo-liberals (this was the only election he ever lost). He eventually succeeded in 1977, and in 1978 he joined ND to become Minister of Co-ordination and later of Foreign Affairs. In September 1984 he was elected to the leadership and has remained in that position until today.

Under his command, New Democracy has been moving further towards neo-liberalism, and for the first time articulated a coherent and concrete body of ideological principles, which greatly helped the party present a new profile to the people and to perform a more positive and constructive role in parliament (all these points will be discussed in detail in the next chapter). Moreover, the party grass-roots organisation experienced an unprecedented development, both quantitatively but mainly qualitatively. In February 1986, and after the party had again lost the (1985) national election and allowed PASOK a second term in office,⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ ND held its second congress. Here Mitsotakis' election

as party leader was ratified by the delegates, and new statutes voted in to provide for greater participation of the rank and file in party affairs and for their general upgrading in the decision-making processes. Election success followed: as already mentioned, in the October 1986 municipal election ND saw its own candidates elected in the three biggest cities of Greece, namely Athens, Salonica and Piraeus, but it took the party four more years and three electoral fights to return to office in April 1990.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾

As Table IV.6 below shows, the rank-and-file members (in the Department of Larissa in 1989) are more concerned with party-political than broader national issues when asked to name ND's greatest achievements while in opposition. Not surprisingly, the majority mentioned the election victory in the 1986 municipal elections, since this was the first such victory after continual defeats ever since 1981 (ND lost the 1982 municipal, the 1984 Euro, and the 1985 national elections). Almost half of the rank and file (48.73 per cent) viewed their party's new role in parliament as a major achievement. Having been in office for seven consecutive years, ND was relatively inexperienced as the leading opposition party in 1981; in any case, its behaviour in parliament was certainly not "decent, mild and constructive" under Averoff. Furthermore, a strikingly high percentage (66 members, or 41.77 per cent) appreciated the development of the party's democratic organisation, compared to only 27.85 per cent who had thought so while ND was in government (see above, Table IV.5). There is a similar discrepancy between the number of those who considered the convention of the second party congress a major success (15.19 per cent), and those who thought so about ND's first congress (10.76 per cent) —see Table IV.5. There was also a considerable number of members (35, or 22.15 per cent) who considered the smooth transition in party leadership a major achievement. Finally, the percentage of those who saw the articulation

Table IV.6: ND's Greatest Achievements while in Opposition

<u>Achievement</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Electoral victory in the 1986 municipal election	84	53.16
Decent, calm and constructive opposition in parliament	77	48.73
Democratic organisation of the party	66	41.77
ND's political and economic programme	50	31.65
Smooth transition in the party leadership	35	22.15
The second party congress in 1986	24	15.19
Other	6	03.80
<u>None/Don't know</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>03.16</u>

and projection of ND's political and economic programme as more important while ND was in opposition, was greater than for the time the party was in power (31.65 per cent and 27.22 per cent respectively).

To summarise: after Mitsotakis' election to the party leadership, the party seemed to come out of the 1980-84 transitional period of ideological uncertainty, and its flirtation with the ultra-right. The new leader endowed ND with a concrete ideological identity and, despite his personal clientelistic record, shifted the centre of gravity more towards the party organisation and its non-parliamentarian cadres, rather than the parliamentary group (as was the case before). Without losing his predominant position within the party—which was never as pronounced as that of either Karamanlis or Papandreou—he gave greater weight to the role and importance of the organisation, thus weakening the relative autonomy traditionally enjoyed by several party notables towards both the leadership and the party.

His different style of party leadership was acknowledged by the large majority of the rank-and-file members (Department of Larissa, 1989) as Table IV.7 shows.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ Whereas only 10.76 per cent of them thought that there is no difference between the ND leadership and that

Table IV.7: Is there a difference between the ND Leadership and that of other Parties?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes	117	74.05
Some	20	12.66
No	17	10.76
Don't know	4	02.53
Total	158	100.00
<hr/>		
<u>If yes/some, in what way?</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
More serious, credible, reliable	85	53.80
More democratically elected	56	35.44
Other	9	05.70

of other parties, (and 2.53 per cent did not express their opinion), the remaining over 86 per cent believed otherwise. More specifically, a little more than half of the party members saw the main difference to be the seriousness, credibility and reliability of the ND leadership, whereas 35.44 per cent consider it to lie in the way the ND elects its leadership. As mentioned already, this applies to all ND leaders after Karamanlis, but particularly to Mitsotakis, who is the only non-communist political leader whose election has been directly ratified by his party's rank and file (at the second party congress in 1986).⁽¹⁶¹⁾

The picture is very different with respect to internal democratic procedures in the decision-making process at leadership level. Discontinuity and inconsistency in the close observance of statutory regulations are greatly responsible for a centralised and personalistic exercise of leadership power. Aside from the continual postponement of the third congress (due in 1989), neither does the central committee act as the highest party organ between congresses, nor is any other higher party organ asked to confer at regular intervals to discuss party

affairs and government policies, and to appraise the party's general course, its strategies and tactics. This means that all major decisions are made by the party leader alone, who exercises his powers virtually without control. It is only for show, to present ND to the public as a developed and well-functioning organisation, that party organs are ever called into session, but even on these infrequent occasions no particular dialogue takes place, nor are any decisions made; instead, the party leader usually makes a speech, or, sometimes party members are informed *post festum* about his actions and his decisions.

It would appear, then, that the ND party leader enjoys a more powerful position towards ND's higher organs than provided for by the statutes. On the other hand, there are several prominent deputies who hold a similarly semi-autonomous position vis-à-vis the party leadership and the organisation, chiefly because of their traditional connection with and extensive use of clientelistic practices. It remains to be seen whether ND's high-ranking members as well as the organised rank and file will manage to develop sufficiently to play an autonomous and independent role of their own in party affairs. If they do, they will transform ND into a genuinely democratic, organised mass-party, like its West-European counterparts.

5. Conclusion

Enjoying governmental power for seven consecutive years after 1974, and led by a charismatic, omnipotent, and authoritarian leader, New Democracy projected the picture of a personalistic party of notables; without a grass-roots organisation, it has depended heavily on that leader's charisma on the one hand, and on clientelistic practices on the other. The special social and political conditions that prevailed in the aftermath of the collapse of the dictatorship, and a discriminatory distribution of governmental spoils and control of public appointments allowed the party to remain in office for two consecutive terms.

After the 1977 election, and in view of his anticipated departure from the party leadership, Karamanlis laid the foundations for the development of ND's organisation, certain that, unless his party managed to organise, it would inevitably suffer the fate not only of its direct predecessor, but of all other personally-created political instruments—it would inevitably disintegrate. Under his leadership, New Democracy held two congresses, a preliminary (1977) and a national (1979) one. Although it is only fair to argue that ND took no major steps towards its organisational development in those early years, it is equally fair to acknowledge that Karamanlis managed to instil a modicum of democratic procedures into this inexperienced infant organisation. Despite its elementary level of organisational development, the party survived the shock of its leader's departure by duly electing his successor and preserving its unity.

Harassed by its ultra-conservative, rightist faction and the progressive, radical demagogy of the opposition leader, New Democracy under the leadership of the decent, moderate but colourless Rallis, had neither the time nor the ability to avert PASOK's rise to power. It met with grave defeat in the 1981 election, and for the first time crossed

over to the opposition benches. The party was now expected to learn and perform a task that proved enormously difficult because not only had ND always operated in government and was without experience of the opposition role, but especially because in PASOK it had to challenge a party which was led by a strong and charismatic leader, and had developed an extensive, well-functioning and militant organisation.

New Democracy was obliged to enter a transitional period, while trying to elaborate a concrete ideology and to restructure and develop its organisation, to something like that of PASOK's. Averoff, who had meanwhile succeeded Rallis, took the first major steps towards organisational expansion, and it was to a considerable extent due to these efforts that ND acquired a larger and more active party base. On the other hand, Averoff's old-fashioned, rigidly ultra-conservative outlook, caused resentment, fear and distaste among both some ND groups and centre-right and moderate voters. This undermined the whole effort at organisational restructuring, and ND performed very poorly in the 1984 Euro-election, so that Averoff finally resigned the party leadership.

The transitional period of ideological regression and organisational stagnation ended when Mitsotakis succeeded Averoff in September 1984, and a new era of recovery started for ND. It was only then that the party began a period of real progress, acquiring a concrete ideological identity, and a both quantitatively and qualitatively dynamic organisational growth. Especially after the second congress in 1986, New Democracy managed to establish an organisational branch in every corner of the country; to bridge the gap between the party and the trade-unions and various other organisations; to make its presence strongly felt where it had been virtually non-existent (e.g. the universities and among the country's youth), and to increase its membership to a new record. Moreover, under the 1986 statutes, the organised rank and file

was given a more important and active role in party affairs, and a greater say in the decision-making and policy-shaping processes. New Democracy could finally call itself a democratically organised mass-party, the only non-communist party with a leader properly elected by ND's parliamentary group and his election ratified by delegates of the rank and file, and with perhaps the most democratic constitution, equally balanced between the MPs and the non-parliamentary branches of the organisation.

Our examination of the ND organisation has shown, however, that in practice this is not the true picture. In reality, it is the ND president who occupies the dominant position, makes all important decisions, and runs the party—and the government, when the party is in office—virtually without control. All the higher party organs—that is, the central and the executive committee and also the parliamentary group—confer infrequently and at irregular intervals, and not to discuss party and/or governmental affairs and to express their views, but usually to listen to the leader's speech or to be informed and asked for their approval of decisions already taken and policies already enforced.

Given that, on the one hand, the current ND president has neither Papandreou's charisma nor, on the other, the PASOK leader's special position and autonomy in respect of his party's organisation, it has to be admitted that ND's statutory regulations are not being observed as they should be—in any case with regard to the functioning of the higher party organs—precisely because this would seriously hinder the ND leader's uncontrolled exercise of power. In other words, whereas PASOK's higher party organs confer more often and more regularly (except for its party congress), its president's predominant position has never been questioned and the powers he alone exercises have never been threatened. The New Democracy party, on the other hand, systematically

evades observance of the statutory regulations on consultation with the higher party organs, in order to safeguard the leader's dominant role and to maintain his powers intact.

Today, New Democracy possesses an exceptional organisational framework, a well-developed grass-roots organisation and an active rank and file which, nevertheless, is asking for more participation in party affairs —that is, more respect for democratic procedures in decision-making, and better communication between the various branches of the organisation, most particularly between the grass-roots and the leadership. On the other hand, New Democracy has elaborated a constitution which provides for the creation and functioning of several higher party organs, reserving for them both extensive rights and grave responsibilities. Unless the party is ready to lawfully respect the statutory regulations, to transform the latter's theoretical provisions into everyday practice, the much-heralded democratic party organisation and the role of the rank and file will remain a dead letter. ND still has a long way to go before it has become a truly democratic and organised mass-party like its West-European counterparts.

1. Introduction

A non particularistic ideology based on universalist principles, has never been a feature of the Greek Right. On the contrary, as already discussed in ch. 1, the most persistent characteristic of both the Greek Rally and ERE has been ideological vagueness, if not an innate dislike and mistrust of ideology as such; "nation-mindedness" and passionate anti-communism in the realm of ideas, matched with the enforcement of authoritarian, paternalistic and statist policies with regard to the social and economic sphere —these are what has best expressed the ideological arsenal of the Right during the early post-war years until the imposition of military rule in 1967.

The situation became very different after the restoration of democracy in 1974. All other evils apart, the seven-year dictatorship had left behind it a widespread distrust and deep-felt hostility against whatever values and ideas the junta regime had —or appeared to have— represented. As a result, there was a dramatic swing to the Left (especially by the country's intellectual elite and the educated youth), and an intense "ideologification" of political life. As G. Rallis observed at the time,

"...one of the greatest evils caused by the juntist dictatorship is that for most young people who were developing psychologically during that period, authoritarianism, the loss of basic freedoms, and the loss of human dignity were identified exclusively with the dictatorial Right. As an extension of this (an absurd but nonetheless almost unavoidable extension), the opposite of

such sufferings, the most precious of values, freedom, was identified with the communist Left" (in English originally).⁽¹⁾

Despite this intense radicalisation and flirting with leftist and communist ideas, when ND fought the 1974 election, for a good many reasons already discussed (ch. 2) it not only retained its appeal, but actually scored an electoral triumph, gaining an absolute majority of votes and over two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, as with the grass-roots organisation, it was now a matter of major importance for ND to elaborate a concrete and coherent ideology, as well as to modernise and Europeanise its outlook, and to transform itself from a party of notables into an institution of principles.

In this chapter we shall first examine ND's ideological principles as they were elaborated and presented by Karamanlis at the 1977 preliminary congress; due consideration will be given to their theoretical dimension, and also, through the examination of ND governmental policies (economic and foreign particularly), to how they were expressed and implemented by the party while in government. These principles were reaffirmed by the 1979 first congress, when they were also grandly stated to be unalterable, and served as ND's official ideological line for almost the whole of the first ten years of its existence.

Thereafter we shall give a detailed presentation of ND's ideology as this appeared after Mitsotakis' manifesto, "A new proposal for freedom" in February 1985, which to a certain extent amended Karamanlis' ideological formulation, and caused considerable uneasiness in some party quarters. What effect this had on shaping ND's governmental policies can be assessed only provisionally, since at the time of writing it is only three years since the party returned to office again in 1990. We shall, however, briefly examine the Greek version of

compromesso storico —that is, the short-lived coalition government formed, after the June 1989 elections, by New Democracy and the communist-led Alliance of the Left and Progress (SYN), which lasted until November 1989 when fresh elections were held— to see whether this was an outcome of a broader ideological and political convergence, or merely a simple *ad-hoc* manoeuvre in political tactics, without ideological implications.

2. Karamanlis' Contribution to the Elaboration of the Party's Ideology

2.1 Radical liberalism: Theoretical foundation

After the restoration of democracy in 1974 and until ND's preliminary congress in 1977, the party no more concerned itself with ideological issues, than with its organisational development. It did not even follow the old traditional ideological pattern, according to which

"...the ideology of the conservative camp, of the paternalist Right, did not consist of affirmative principles but of negations of the ideas of the Left. Worship of the ancient Greek heritage and "nation-mindedness" pretty well proved the conservatives' inability to offer worthy and reliable alternatives to socialism and Marxism, leaving these to monopolise the domain of ideas".⁽²⁾

In the context of the early post-1974 social and political reality, of an intense "ideologification" of politics in general,⁽³⁾ with PASOK and the communists leading in the realm of ideology and the respective theoretical discourse, New Democracy rather adopted a passive stance, relying on its founder's immense prestige and his personal handling of practical everyday governmental affairs. Nevertheless, Karamanlis' proclamation of 28 September 1974 on the political front of New Democracy (see Appendix I), and also several Articles of the Greek

Constitution⁽⁴⁾ with implications for the character of the country's economic and political system that have been understood as basic rights in the economic sphere,⁽⁵⁾ do provide a very general outline of ND's ideology.

According to the September 1974 proclamation then, which has rightly been called "a somewhat vague document" and "a woolly and unsubstantial text",⁽⁶⁾ New Democracy pledged itself to serve the true interests of the people—and the nation, of course, since these two were considered identical—which could not be categorised as Right, Centre, and Left.⁽⁷⁾ It declared itself to consist of experienced, but also of new progressive political forces. It would select and preserve from the past only what time had shown to be useful. It would ignore the old political schisms, and it would strive for the country's economic development by establishing a free market economy, with the proviso that the economic freedom in which it believed "would not exclude the widening of the economic sector controlled by the state". Last but not least, ND strongly affirmed its European orientation, in the sense that the party believed that Greece deserved a distinguished place in the Europe to which she belonged and would, therefore, contribute in every way to the idea of its political and economic unification.⁽⁸⁾

Similar ideas, principles, and basic civil rights appear again in the June 1975 Constitution, in the same generalised formulation: all Greek citizens are free and equal before the law, free to form associations, trade unions and other organised interest groups; private property and private economic initiative are both respected and protected by the state. Nevertheless, the citizens' right to property may not be enjoyed if it is against the general public interest, and private economic initiative must never contravene freedom and human dignity, neither be to the detriment of the country's national economy.⁽⁹⁾

There does seem to have been a definite intention to produce a balance between economic freedom and social justice. Still, in the partnership between private initiative and a widening of the economic sector controlled by the state, it was the latter who had the upper hand, not only according to the September 1974 declaration, but also under the constitution, which stated explicitly:

"The State programmes and coordinates the country's economic activity for the establishment of social justice and protection of the public interest, and works to secure the economic development of all sectors of the national economy".⁽¹⁰⁾

With drawing up and ratifying the 1975 constitution, ND made its first efforts towards a more concrete elaboration of its ideology. This was a task Karamanlis undertook himself, in co-operation with some of his closest associates. Having been sanctioned by the party's parliamentary group and the first appointed administrative committee,⁽¹¹⁾ ND's ideological principles were published in July 1975. Nonetheless, during the early years of its existence, and at least until the 1977 preliminary congress, the party did not concern itself much with ideological matters. On the contrary, as J. Loulis has argued, it suffered from two basic "defects" that, whether deliberately or not, encouraged paternalism: "considerable ideological vagueness on the one hand, which resulted in the retention of the overriding importance of the 'leader'"; and on the other, for its economic policies ND adopted a "pseudo-progressive ideological and socio-economic approach, which ultimately favoured extensive state intervention".⁽¹²⁾ As we shall try to show in what follows, New Democracy failed to overcome these defects during its seven-year term in office. Nevertheless, the party did at least manage to elaborate its six basic ideological principles, which were sanctioned by the 1979 Chalkidiki congress and have ever since been considered as the backbone of its ideology.

During the 1977 preliminary congress, a speech by Karamanlis discussed the record of his first three-year term in government, and spoke generally about democracy and political parties. After arguing that for political parties to fulfill their mission they must have "a coherent ideology and constant orientation", "a deep sense of responsibility", and "an internal democratic organisation", he went on to present ND's ideology for the first time. In a way very much reminiscent of his pre-coup political attitude, he claimed that "ND's foundation has been an outcome of national necessity" and enumerated six ideological principles, the same that were later to be officially sanctioned by the 1979 congress; he placed the "national ideal" above all other ideological values, and proclaimed ND's belief in social democracy—in other words, he said that for the party social justice and freedom were one and the same thing.⁽¹³⁾

Two years later, at the first national congress in 1979, after having emphasised that "ND's political philosophy is firmly associated with Greece's true national interests",⁽¹⁴⁾ Karamanlis moved on to a somewhat more detailed definition of ND's six ideological principles. He declared that ND believed, first, "in the national ideal", in other words that the nation constitutes a supreme value, that nothing and nobody is of sufficient worth to stand outside the national framework; ND therefore, promised to safeguard the country's territorial integrity and its national independence, since the latter is a prerequisite for democracy.

He gave ND's second belief as "the peaceful coexistence of peoples", in the sense that the party was opposed to violence and all kinds of intervention in other countries' internal affairs; furthermore, it considered that Greece's place was within the Western world and so within the EEC, an objective that the party had already managed to

realize, since it adhered to the ideal of a United Europe and wished to contribute towards this end.

Third, he gave assurances that ND believed in parliamentary democracy, more specifically "in a democracy that combines freedom with order, and order with social justice"; but this time Karamanlis did not claim that ND identified political freedom with social justice, as he had done two years earlier. ND, he added, stood firmly against communism or any other kind of dictatorship. It did not accept that there could be any objectives for which freedom should be sacrificed, but neither should it be abused by the individual. ND did not identify with the interests of some particular social class, he said, but represented all classes of Greek society. It considered the Right-Centre-Left classification as arbitrary and absurd, and identified with and served only the national interest, in whatever ways are best at the time—"even the most radical ones, when these are dictated by the national interest". Serious differences occurred only between democratic and totalitarian parties, but if there really were differences among the former, these concerned "the extent of state intervention which, however, they all accept in principle".

ND's fourth belief he announced to be "social justice", since only if each citizen partakes of the national product in proportion to his contribution to its creation does democracy have any real meaning. When people are burdened with uncertainty for the future—when they have no permanent employment, fair pay for their work, full assurance of their own and their children's future—then they become vulnerable to totalitarian propaganda, and democracy is undermined.

Fifth, he said that ND believed "in a free democratic economy", although this freedom cannot be unlimited but should combine individual with social interest; it was exactly this balance that ND's economic philosophy represented. According to the party's ideology, excessive

free competition threatens the foundations of a country's economic as well as social life; in consequence, "the state should intervene and balance economic and social antitheses; it should reduce inequalities, and step in to replace private initiative whenever economic and social reasons dictate such a course".

Sixth and last, he concluded that ND believed "in the country's cultural potential". Providing care and education, particularly for the young, the party would create the preconditions for the development of intellectual and cultural values, which would greatly help the country find a more permanent and better place for itself in international society. In this respect ND believed that the country's entry into the EEC offered our young people a unique ideal, namely participation "in the crusade for a United Europe, and through the latter to the transformation of modern life".⁽¹⁵⁾

Although as an ideological exposition, the text seems "generally weak and asymmetrical",⁽¹⁶⁾ Karamanlis' formulation of these ideological principles, their presentation at ND's preliminary congress, and their sanction two years later by the party's first congress, represented a remarkable break with the almost total ideological vacuity of ND's first term in office (1974-1977). The 1979 congress was the first time Karamanlis gave at least some kind of a definition of the party's ideology—a catch-all party ideology—which he described as "radical liberalism, lying between traditional liberalism and democratic socialism".⁽¹⁷⁾ This quite clearly meant, that ND was not a social-democratic party and, moreover, abandoned the term "social democracy", he had used two years earlier.

The overwhelming majority of ND officials did not, however, follow his lead, and hardly ever concerned themselves with the party's ideology. The few who did managed only to confuse the matter instead of

contributing to its clarification, as will be shown below. As J. Loulis has argued repeatedly:

"Within the party there was little critical analysis of these ideological principles (at least until 1977) or discussion capable of giving them depth and scope. Instead, most party cadres appeared content simply to parrot Karamanlis and repeat simplistic party slogans" (in English originally).⁽¹⁸⁾

Before embarking on a detailed examination of ND's economic and foreign policies while the party was in government—which will provide a more accurate picture of ND's ideological orientation—we think it is important to comment briefly on ND's ideological principles as drawn up by Karamanlis, not only because they express his personal political philosophy, but also because they have indelibly stamped the party with the so-called Karamanlis legacy, which still weighs heavily on it even today.⁽¹⁹⁾

The most striking characteristic permeating the whole set of ND's ideological principles is undoubtedly Karamanlis' obsession with the importance of the nation and the national ideal. ND was the outcome of "national necessity", so it believed in the "national ideal"; the essence of its political philosophy was Greek, it was the party not of some particular social class but of all Greeks; it would not hesitate to adopt whatever solutions were necessary at any time as "dictated by the national interest"—and so it stood above ordinary party squabbles and beyond the Left-Right spectrum. It was, in other words, a purely "national" party.

This identification of narrow party-political with broader national interests was never questioned as long as Karamanlis led ND. Major criticisms came only after his accession to the presidency, mainly from J. Loulis, who argued that

"Karamanlis seemed to claim that ND's belief in the 'idea of the nation' set it 'above' the other parties, which

alone occupied the left-right spectrum —a view that was dangerously paternalistic and arbitrary";⁽²⁰⁾

and also that

"There is, of course, no such thing as a 'national' party 'above' other parties, and to insist on the existence of such a party is dangerously authoritarian" (both in English originally).⁽²¹⁾

The party's all too general and vague belief in the peaceful coexistence of peoples and in the country's cultural potential aside,⁽²²⁾ ND stood against all brands of totalitarianism and believed in parliamentary democracy, based on a free economy but at the same time characterised by social justice —in other words, in a democracy that is a fair combination of freedom, order, and social justice. Although it was never spelled out which of these three elements was the most important, it would appear that the centre of gravity was the state's obligation to offer and guarantee social justice, since it was abuse of freedom that was considered mainly responsible for the disintegration and collapse of a democratic regime. As a prominent ND deputy has argued, the party's ideology could be labelled as a "social liberalism within which the element of social justice predominates".⁽²³⁾ This would mean that state intervention in the economy should limit inequalities and take the place of private initiative, when economic and social reasons demand it.

As with regard to the party's position in the political spectrum, however, Karamanlis has never defined the precise limits of state intervention, or how far it should go; he was content to exercise his own skills in the matter and, as we shall see below, enforced extensive interventionist policies whenever he himself thought appropriate. Virtually uncontrolled as he was, he never had to inform the party in advance of what he was going to do, neither did he have to account to anybody afterwards. In consequence all ND members and deputies were

totally confused and contradicted each other freely whenever they attempted to explain their party's ideology.

In view of the above it is not at all surprising that a leading ND member stated that political parties could be differentiated by whether they are "democratic or anti-democratic", "modern or outmoded" and "Marxist or non-Marxist", and he concluded that ND was "a modern, democratic, non-Marxist" party.⁽²⁴⁾ Another one wondered why "we should classify ND with the socialist or social-democratic or other democratic parties of Europe. We are not willing to replace our national and progressive ideology with empty ideological recipes".⁽²⁵⁾ Yet another claimed that ND was "a progressive party of the centre, rightist when tackling national issues, and leftist when dealing with social issues".⁽²⁶⁾ Since with regard to state intervention Karamanlis himself had repeatedly declared (immediately after the 1974 election, and again during the 1977 preliminary congress) that ND believed in social democracy, one of the party's prominent deputies stated that "ND's ideology is so broad that it can draw its ideological weapons from the quivers of both the Right and the Left",⁽²⁷⁾ whereas another leading party member hastened to add that

"ND looks unafraid and unprejudiced at non-Marxist socialism of the Western kind, as a socio-economic system within the limits of a free democratic regime. And although ND is not, at least until now, a socialist party, it does not hesitate to adopt and implement socialist measures when these are useful, devoid of adverse consequences, and applicable to the national economy".⁽²⁸⁾

Even after the 1979 first congress when, according to some scholars,⁽²⁹⁾ the party's ideology had been clarified and given due consideration, there was still considerable confusion concerning exactly what ND believed. Although several party members had already warned the party that its presence in politics was "anaemic"⁽³⁰⁾ and that there was no "reliable elaboration and expression of its

ideology",⁽³¹⁾ the minister of labour probably felt quite proud in 1979 when, in a speech addressed to the party delegates, he declared that ND,

"...doing away with dogmatic absurdities, has managed to create, from the antitheses of the principles of unlimited liberalism on the one hand and, on the other, from the communal economy (sylogiki oikonomia), a modern social policy that means realistic application of the principles and imperatives of economic and social democracy".⁽³²⁾

To summarise: at least during its first three-year term in office, ND hardly, if at all, concerned itself with ideological issues. During the 1977 preliminary congress and during the 1979 first congress, Karamanlis first elaborated and presented a set of six generalised ideological principles, which were to form the party's official ideology under the name of radical liberalism.

As ND had failed to organise properly, and no higher collective party organs existed at the time, the clarification, further development, and dissemination of ideology was in the hands of leading party members. They freely expressed their own personal opinions which, however, not only did not contribute to the formation of a concrete and coherent ideology, but very often were contradictory of one another. Radical liberalism, its pro-Western and pro-European stance apart, remained beset with vagueness and uncertainty as to its deepest theoretical implications —whereas in practice it meant extensive state intervention and enforcement of statist, paternalistic, and authoritarian policies in the economy, as will be discussed in detail in the following section.

2.2 Radical Liberalism applied: ND's programme and strategy 1974-1981

2.2.1 Economic policy

The 1973-1974 international oil crisis combined with the heritage left by the dictatorship, struck the country's economy a serious blow: in late 1974, inflation ran at 26.9 per cent, GNP, investment and industrial production were declining at an annual rate of 3.8 per cent, 25.6 per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively, and the national per-capita income was U.S. dollars 2,165. Employing a policy "firmly wedded to the Keynesian model of effective final aggregate demand",⁽³³⁾ Karamanlis in just one year managed to bring inflation down to 13.4 per cent, while industrial production rose by 4.4 per cent and by 10.6 per cent in 1976; the price-index over the 1975-1979 period went up by 93.0 per cent, or 18.3 annually and, by 1979, the average income was almost double that of 1974, standing at \$4,163 (a 92.3 per cent increase); this meant a substantial improvement in the people's living standard.⁽³⁴⁾

This substantial economic growth was due to a broad investment programme realized at Karamanlis' bidding, much as had been the case from 1955 to 1963, the so-called eight golden years (see ch. 1, section 2.1.1). In other words, it was again the state that provided the bulk of all the basic financing needed for the country's development, leaving the free entrepreneurs to pocket the profits. Between 1974 and 1981, public expenditure rose from drs 110 billion to 552 billion and, according to the national accounts, total expenditure (which had represented 30.8 per cent of the GNP in 1974) went up to 35.2 per cent in 1978, and round 42 per cent in 1979.⁽³⁵⁾ For all that, the period under consideration has been described as one of "...economic stagnation and non-increase of industrial production".⁽³⁶⁾

In practical terms, all ND governments in the 1974-1981 period seemed to believe that the place of private initiative can easily and

harmlessly be taken by growing state intervention in every sector of the economy. These interventionist policies eventually gained such a momentum, that ND was widely accused of "sociomania" (socialmania) —that is, of intense persecution of private initiative, coupled with widespread state control of the economy.⁽³⁷⁾ Karamanlis himself said in 1979 that ND

"enforced certain policies that represent an outline of its economic philosophy. It carried out a programme of bold interventions within the framework of the free economy... And it did so not out of dogmatism, but from economic and social necessity. So, ND nationalised Olympic Airways, the Aspropyrgos Refinery, the Commercial Bank group, and urban transport. It also established a great number of state industries in such fields as sugar, fertilisers, petrochemicals, armaments, as well as others".⁽³⁸⁾

A prominent ND deputy and cabinet member at the time was proud of his party's record of nationalisations, and claimed that by June 1980 ND had done so much in this direction that there was little left for PASOK,

"...since the state now controls 95% of the banks, 100% of the energy companies, 100% of communications, 100% of the companies related to national defense, 100% of the public-utility companies, 100% of transport, 100% of railway and air travel, 60% of the insurance companies, 50% of the refineries, 50% of the shipyards, and 70% of the fertiliser companies".⁽³⁹⁾

All this nationalisation resulted in an excessive expansion of the public sector, of course, and this in turn in seriously harming the competitiveness of the Greek economy and sabotaging of its private sector. As Table V.1 below shows,⁽⁴⁰⁾ between 1974 and 1978 the number of employees of the public sector as a whole rose by almost one-third; the largest increase was in employees in public corporations (79 per cent), due mainly to the wave of nationalisation after 1974, and partly to the creation of new public enterprises. The public sector kept on growing even after 1978, and there were 38 public corporations by 1981

Table V.1: Number of Persons Employed by the Public Sector 1974-1981

Public sector	1974	1978	% change 1974-1978	1981	% change 1974-1981
Central government	146,896	164,453	12%	183,690	25%
Public corporations ^(a)	73,000	130,996	79%	---	--
Social security	25,000	28,194	13%	58,514	17%
Local government	25,000	27,052	8%		
Total	269,896	350,695	30%	---	--

Note (a): figures refer to the 20 biggest public corporations.

—commercial banks not included, although 80 per cent of all banking business in Greece was done by banks under state control at that time.⁽⁴¹⁾ Moreover, ND governments after 1979 were unwilling to disclose data concerning the number of people employed in public corporations. An estimate made in 1981 noted that the exact growth of the public sector as a whole could not be compared in any way with that of any other EEC country, since "...relevant data in our country are totally unreliable".⁽⁴²⁾

Despite ND's state-paternalist and interventionist policies and the ensuing broad nationalisations, the average GNP rate went up by 4.9 per cent annually, during the second oil crisis between 1974 and 1979 (against an average of 2.6 per cent for the other EEC countries), and the level of unemployment was kept at the very low annual rate of around 2 per cent. It was mainly due to the favourable psychological climate created by the successful transition to democratic rule, that the Greek economy had done so well. There were strongly positive changes in several of the economic indices concerning industry, agriculture, the merchant marine and tourism; and it was almost entirely due to the personal commitment of C. Karamanlis that the country entered the European Community.⁽⁴³⁾

Although after the second oil crisis in 1979 there was no further nationalisation, intervention in the economy continued (as for instance in the form of price and rent controls), as did paternalism (e.g. in the form of wide-ranging directives issued by the ND government). The paternalistic mentality, which so often has led to political authoritarianism, was most evident in the way the state intervened and kept a tight grip on local organisation, trade unions and —most important perhaps— on the electronic mass media, which were all state-controlled and always closed to pluralism. Karamanlis himself admitted at the time, that party politics on television "divide the nation", and one of his critics wrote that

"ND's distinction between party politics and governmental policies was seriously flawed... Time and again the channels presented ND's governmental activities, and various ministers explained in long monologues their aims and the effects of their policies" (in English originally).⁽⁴⁴⁾

All in all, then, radical liberalism in the economic and social sphere meant the creation of a good many enterprises owned and controlled by the state, broad nationalisation —all of it leading to the creation of a huge, overinflated, and hence unproductive public sector— and paternalistic, but sometimes also authoritarian, state intervention in certain spheres of everyday life where private initiative and civil society should have been left alone to act and develop on their own (for example in the trade unions, local organisation, the mass media). Lacking a coherent political-philosophical identity, ND's radical liberalism proved merely empiricist, manifesting itself differently each time as the varying social and economic conditions necessitated. This is to say that it was at all times the socio-economic conditions that shaped ND's governmental policies, and never the other way round.

When socio-economic circumstances deteriorated after 1979 and with the second oil crisis, ND's governmental record followed suit. By 1980, inflation had gone up to 19 per cent, and in 1981 to 26 per cent; the average annual rate of economic growth dropped to 3 per cent in the years 1978-1980, and fell to zero in 1981. The country was now faced with growing unemployment, a widening of the balance-of-payments deficit, low investments in manufacturing, expansion of the public sector and a simultaneous lowering of its productivity, not to mention outrageous tax evasion and the existence of a huge hidden economy⁽⁴⁵⁾ —two problems the ND governments failed to deal with altogether.⁽⁴⁶⁾

At the time of the 1981 elections, therefore, the country was beset by mounting economic problems, and New Democracy had to combat the anticipated rise of PASOK and parry its catch-all slogan promising "Change!" Lacking specific ideological weapons as well as creative policies for the future, ND kept stressing its past achievements, particularly in consolidating democracy and leading the country into the EEC. In overall terms, the party was fighting from a negative stance, simply "leaning against the predominant heresy of the day", that of the socialist promise of change which ND viewed as extremely dangerous for the nation. In fact, ND's famous radical liberalism deteriorated into plain scaremongering, with frequent allegations about PASOK intending to abandon the country's traditionally pro-Western orientation, and to abolish democratic institutions in favour of a socialist one-party state of the third-world type.⁽⁴⁷⁾ In the end, ND's election strategy proved quite inadequate; it could neither keep ND in office for another term, nor could it even prevent the huge electoral failure (comparable only to that of ERE in 1964) of the "anti-PASOK and anti-marxist camp".⁽⁴⁸⁾

Before moving on to an examination of ND's foreign policy, it should be mentioned that during the whole time ND was enforcing its interventionist policies in the economy, the private sector

(industrialists, businessmen and other entrepreneurs) was quite unwilling to involve itself in new ventures, and it remained an acquiescent spectator of the state initiatives.⁽⁴⁹⁾ In answer to S. Manos (an industrialist and former ND minister of industry, who in November 1983 had criticised his party's governments in a speech to the Centre of Political Research and Information for their excessive state intervention and their social-democratic and statist economic policy), ND's retired secretary of press and information, N. Delipetros, wrote:

"Mr. Manos told only the half truth, if he indeed told any: He said that the overblown public sector was due to 'some social-democratic tendencies' of New Democracy —tendencies that, of course, even if they existed, would not constitute an ideological sin— but he forgot to mention anything about the unwillingness or, at any rate, the inability of the representatives of the private sector to invest substantial capital... Maybe ND was mistaken in two or three instances, and nationalised some businesses that should have been left outside state control... ND not only did not persecute private businesses, on the contrary it protected them, to the extent the organised entrepreneurs permitted. ND offered them motives, tax exemptions, and financial subsidies —and, last but not least, ND offered them Mr. Manos as minister of industry".⁽⁵⁰⁾

2.2.2 Foreign policy

As we have said already, ND's radical liberalism was much more consistent and effective with regard to the country's international affairs. Inspired, formulated and implemented mainly by Karamanlis, ND's foreign policy rested on the principle that "Greece belongs to the West"; the main difference with ERE's foreign policy in the pre-coup period —which can be said to have been total loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and more specifically to its American allies— was that Greece now followed a multi-dimensional policy, especially vis-à-vis the countries of the East Bloc (its Balkan neighbours particularly), the Arab Middle East and the Third World.

The "clientelistic relations" between Greece and the U.S. during almost two decades after the civil war⁽⁵¹⁾ seemed to have come to an abrupt end as early as August 1974, when the country withdrew from NATO's military branch, on the grounds that NATO had "not only proved incapable of stopping the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but had also tolerated such an action".⁽⁵²⁾ As Karamanlis declared at that time, Greece would not rejoin the Alliance, unless the occupation troops withdrew from Cyprus. After long negotiations, over more than six years, Greece finally returned to the military branch of NATO in October 1980, although the Turkish occupation had not ended —and still has not, at the time of writing.

Greek-Turkish relations were always a central problem for ND's foreign policy (as also for all PASOK governments), and one which remains unresolved until today. The Cyprus question apart, there was friction with Turkey itself over the Aegean Sea, the continental shelf of the Aegean islands as well as their armament, and over the Moslem minority in the Department of Thrace in northern Greece. Karamanlis chose to deal with these questions through peaceful negotiations with Turkey, but in a considerably more independent, self-contained and militant way than had been usual in the pre-coup period, when the influence, and at times overt intervention, of the U.S., was always obvious. As he declared in April 1978,

"The American government has the right to regulate its relations with Turkey according to its own judgement. But it must not do so to the detriment of the interests of Greece and Cyprus".⁽⁵³⁾

Greek-American relations underwent extensive reconsideration, and came to be based on more egalitarian and mutually beneficial grounds. All agreements made between the U.S. and the dictatorship regime —chief among them those concerning shipyard and anchorage facilities for the

American Sixth Fleet— were annulled, and fresh negotiations begun to regulate the status and functioning of U.S. military bases in Greece. To the fierce criticism of PASOK, which launched the slogan that "Greece belongs to the Greeks" and clamoured for withdrawal from NATO's military and political branches as well as for closing down all the U.S. military bases, Karamanlis replied that "Greece belongs to the West". E. Averoff, as minister of national defence, told the ND provincial congress in Salonica in January 1981:

"We want the U.S. bases of NATO to remain in our country, because we consider their presence useful, not only for the Alliance but also for our own national safety... The only thing we want is to reach an agreement leading to a deal that will serve our national interests better than the older ones, and similar to those other countries have already made... In those circumstances, the bases will stay here, for we consider them useful".⁽⁵⁴⁾

Concerning Greece's relations with the Balkan and other countries of the East Bloc, and also with the Arabs and various third-world countries, Karamanlis believed that despite its close links with the Western Alliance, the country should promote an "independent, though not a non-aligned policy".⁽⁵⁵⁾ Moreover, he pointed out that all East-European countries were still "*terra incognita*" for Greece —"as if the so-called iron curtain, which was torn out long ago for most Westerners to make room for close economic and trade relations, had remained up only for us".⁽⁵⁶⁾

It was within this context, that minister of foreign affairs G. Rallis went to Moscow in 1978 and initialled an agreement that provided for shipyard facilities in Greece for the USSR merchant fleet. One year later, in October 1979, it was Karamanlis' turn to visit Moscow (the first Greek premier ever to do so), before going to Budapest, Prague, and Peking in November. Furthermore, he inaugurated a multi-lateral co-operation pact among the Balkan countries —the first Balkan conference

since World War II took place in Athens in early 1976-- and he revitalised and expanded Greece's political and economic relations with most countries of the Arab World, and many others of the third world in Africa and Asia. ('57')

Above all else, though, the greatest efforts of the government and particularly Karamanlis himself were channelled towards Greece's entry into the European Economic Community. ('58') Karamanlis, who had always been a fervent supporter of the idea of a United Europe, moved both circumspectly and rapidly, and finally succeeded in overcoming all difficulties, and to see his vision of Greece as a full EEC member realized. He had the lukewarm support of G. Mavros and his party (the Union of the Democratic Centre, EDIK), but was fiercely opposed by PASOK (and the Left), which saw the EEC as representing the economic side of NATO and, instead of joining, advocated some special agreement with the Common Market to "guarantee our being able to practice a free trade policy, control capital flow and ensure a national programme for our economy" (in English originally). ('59')

It would appear that plain economic reasons were of only secondary importance to Karamanlis. He laid much greater stress on the political aspect, and made this clear on various occasions. After the reactivation of the 1961 Association Agreement in December 1974, Karamanlis submitted Greece's formal application for full membership on 12 June 1975. He called the ambassadors of the nine EEC countries to his office immediately afterwards, and told them:

"I would like to stress that Greece does not wish to enter [the EEC] for exclusively economic reasons. She does so mainly for political reasons, which are related to the stabilisation of democracy and to the future of the nation". ('60')

On another occasion later, in a speech he made to the governmental council of economic and social policy on 27 June 1978, he was somewhat more specific:

"...beyond safeguarding our national independence, joining a United Europe will guarantee our democratic institutions, for the whole structure of the EEC presupposes the existence and functioning of democracy in all member-states. This means that no coup against democracy will ever again be possible. Because they who would risk it, would know that the very next day they would be thrown out of the Community, and this, in turn, would have dire consequences for the country".⁽⁶¹⁾

The Accession Treaty was finally signed in Athens on 28 May 1979, and Greece became the tenth full EEC-member on 1 January 1981, ten months before PASOK came to power.

One last point that should be made before we close this section refers to ND's mechanisms for decision-making in matters of foreign policy. During the first seven years ND was in power, it seems that the shaping and implementation of foreign policy was the exclusive privilege of the prime minister, aided by his diplomatic office, but overriding the central bureaucratic services of the ministry of foreign affairs. On the one hand, the premier's predominant role secured various advantages: flexibility, swift decision-making, and absolute control over even the most subtle and sensitive issues of foreign policy. The disadvantages, on the other hand, were: first, that all factors relating to and exerting influence on foreign policy remained obscure, since no bureaucratic processes existed to identify and record them. Secondly, implementing the final decision in practice became more difficult, because the responsible services had had no say in shaping that decision. Finally, and perhaps most importantly as it turned out after PASOK took over in 1981, the country's foreign policy lacked continuity, and so credibility, on issues of national importance —such as the Cyprus question and relations with Turkey. In other words, issues of

broad national interest, which should have been kept separate from party-political squabbles, often became the subjects of amateurish irresponsibility and simplistic slogans, instead of receiving serious consideration in terms of long-term planning and strategies. This personalised policy-making in foreign affairs, the so-called secret diplomacy, has often been objected to by party leaders when in opposition, particularly so by Papandreou and Mitsotakis; but immediately after acceding to office they forget all about these drawbacks and their objections, and themselves follow exactly this pattern again. ('62')

3. ND in Opposition (1981-1989): Seeking for an Ideological Identity

3.1 The 1985 manifesto "A new proposal for freedom", and the shift towards neo-liberalism

The election of E. Averoff to the party leadership almost two months after PASOK took office in October 1981 meant ND moving further right along the political spectrum, and adopting ultra-conservative positions often very similar to those of ultra-rightist and fascist groups. Except for the new leader's efforts to expand and develop the party's grass-root organisation, not much else of importance was done. There was no scrutiny of past mistakes, no new programmes, no adoption of modern strategies and tactics, and no elaboration of specific and convincing alternatives to PASOK's policies. ('63')

For the greater part of ND's first term in opposition, therefore, (Dec. 1981-Sep. 1984), the party seemed to be in a state of general confusion, particularly concerning its attitude to the economic policies being enforced by the government. This was indeed the case, primarily because ND lacked firm ideological foundations and an unequivocal

economic philosophy (let us remember that, while it was in power, the most common manifestations of its "radical liberalism" in the economy were empiricist and unchecked state paternalism and intervention); secondly, it was of course awkward to criticise PASOK's interventionist policies, when ND itself had so greatly contributed to the state's growing importance and role in economic activities. So when the very same persons who had enforced policies of state intervention in the economy when they were ruling the country turned round and berated PASOK for doing likewise, not only failed to improve ND's general image, but also created yet one more problem: namely that of "a lack of credibility, which necessitated, *inter alia*, renewing the political personnel to a much greater extent than had ever been done before".⁽⁶⁴⁾

The party showed no sign of recovering from this state of lethargy and ideological confusion, if not regression, until C. Mitsotakis' rose to its leadership in September 1984. Originally from the broader liberal political camp (he had joined ND in 1978), he tried to give the party a more centrist orientation, which became evident in February 1985, when he presented a new ideological declaration, entitled "A new proposal for freedom". Before we examine this text —which abandoned traditional Karamanlis tactics of ideological recruitment— we shall first take a brief look at how this ideological declaration came about, and also the role played by the Centre for Political Research and Information (KPEE) in its formulation.⁽⁶⁵⁾

One of Mitsotakis' first actions after taking over the party leadership was to set up a special election committee, to organise ND strategy in the forthcoming October 1985 national elections.⁽⁶⁶⁾ This committee was headed by prominent ND member, ex-minister of industry, S. Manos, assisted by political analysts and other specialists of the research department of KPEE. The creation of this committee had two reasons: first, if ND was to have any chances of winning the election,

it would have to do away with all the characteristics and practices that had caused its defeat in 1981 and its poor performance in the 1984 Euro-election; this required that it should present a new profile and a modern identity. Secondly, the election committee would have to find and adopt modern tactics for disseminating ND's message to the public, since the traditional huge party demonstrations prior to each election brought tension and fanaticism into the political atmosphere instead of attracting new voters for the party.

The election committee accordingly used the most up-to-date techniques, taking full advantage of the scientific and computer-analysis assistance of KPEE. Analysis of all election results since 1974 identified the constituencies with the greatest percentage of floating votes; extensive opinion polls clarified which were the most serious problems, and how the people were hoping to see them solved. The results of these polls showed that the majority of the people considered economic problems, and particularly unemployment, to be of primary importance; and that inflation, taxation, and the national health system should be given greater weight in the parties' political programmes. To questions concerning their political identification, most of the people interviewed described themselves as centrists or liberals, who valued moderation, tolerance, dialogue, meritocracy, and equality before the law.⁽⁶⁷⁾

Having completed this first stage of research, the election committee tried to develop policies that would reflect the needs and expectations of the floating vote. New opinion polls were conducted to find out whether people thought that less state intervention, the privatisation of public enterprises, private initiative, and the establishment of a market economy were measures that would revitalize the economy, and the majority replied affirmatively.⁽⁶⁸⁾ It was at this point that the president of the election committee himself drew up ND's

ideological declaration, the principles of which provided ND's 1985 election platform.

As mentioned already, the special election committee was greatly assisted by the research department of the Centre for Political Research and Information (KPEE). KPEE is an Athens-based, private institute. It was founded in early 1976, its primary aims being (a) "the broader promotion of the fundamental principles of a pluralist democratic society"; (b) "the strengthening of liberal values, individual initiative, and the tenets of a free market economy"; and (c) "the continuing study and research of contemporary social, political and economic phenomena". Since January 1978 its activities have included the originally bi-monthly, now quarterly publication of Epikentra, a journal of political and economic affairs; it has also brought out occasional scientific monographs, organised seminars, symposiums and public debates, done research on public policy, studied public-opinion trends in Greece, and collaborated closely with organisations or individuals with similar objectives. ('69')

Contrary to what one might expect, liberalism was not central to KPEE's interests when it was founded. As the president of the Centre put it,

"When we started, Greece had only Marxism and anti-Marxism... We thought that KPEE could not function properly unless it had a, so to speak, scientific structure... We tried to recruit scientists who would work on a systematic, full-time basis... As their work was progressing we began little by little to get to know better the philosophy of liberalism". ('70')

Finally, in May 1981, KPEE held its first International Symposium in Athens on "New Liberalism", aiming to introduce a new school of thought in Greece which, according to KPEE, was "rapidly gaining advocates in the West among scholars and political activists". It was announced at that time that

"KPEE aimed at encouraging an exchange of ideas on 'neo-liberal' philosophy and practice. The 'school' in question which could be labelled 'neo-liberalism' emphasizes the freedom of individuals' private initiative, the functioning of a free, or market economy, and the limitation of the role of the State" (in English originally).⁽⁷¹⁾

Ever since its establishment, KPEE served as a think-tank for ND, of a kind unheard-of for a bourgeois party in Greece. Although KPEE has always denied that it is in any way dependent on ND, it would appear that the Centre was set up as part of Karamanlis' efforts to modernise his party.⁽⁷²⁾ As time passed and, particularly after 1981, when KPEE advocated neo-liberalism and favoured the latter's adoption as ND's official ideology, the old guard of the party reacted negatively, because "the larger the public sector the greater the opportunities for political patronage".⁽⁷³⁾ Thereafter, KPEE's formal links with ND began to lessen, but it created new ones with the at the time unofficial Liberal Forum faction, which doggedly promulgated the same ideological principles.⁽⁷⁴⁾ But it was not until C. Mitsotakis assumed the ND leadership that KPEE was associated with a really important project, the elaboration of the manifesto "A new proposal for freedom"; its involvement helped to put a neo-liberal stamp on the ND party's ideology.⁽⁷⁵⁾

Contrary to Karamanlis' keeping the balance between order, social justice and individual freedom —with the centre of gravity in social justice— it was freedom that was now proclaimed as constituting the cornerstone of the party's ideology. The very beginning of the February 1985 ideological declaration stated quite explicitly that ND promised the Greek people that freedom would constitute the overriding principle of every ideological consideration and everyone of its political actions. Without order and social justice being dismissed, these two were now considered as of less importance than freedom: "ND believes

that freedom is assured through order —an order, however, that 'is not the mother, but the daughter of freedom', an order for, and not against, freedom". There can be no doubt of ND's ideological priorities, when it was announced that, for ND,

"...the overriding ideal, directing its political path is freedom. ND condemns the denial and undermining of freedom in the name of other, supposedly higher, values. Freedom certainly cannot stand on its own and must coexist with other important values, such as equality of opportunity, social justice, and order. But for ND freedom is not simply a means to a greater end; it is itself the highest political aim."

It was on this basis that ND's newly adopted liberal ideological principles were further articulated and explained. At the same time, serious efforts were made to reassure the more conservative and Karamanliist members and voters; not only were there four quotations from Karamanlis' speeches to the preliminary and the first congress, but it was also stated categorically that New Democracy at the 1979 Chalkidiki Congress "determined... the ideological framework that constitutes radical liberalism... New Democracy is, and always will be, unequivocally committed to these principles." Nevertheless, as we shall see below, ND's departure from the Karamanlis tradition has been more than obvious.

According to the 1985 manifesto, it was "the rapid swelling of an already overblown public sector with low productivity", which had caused "high inflation, increased unemployment, greater bureaucracy, heavier taxation, and a growing foreign debt", that was the country's most pressing problem, and PASOK was criticised for having exclusively contributed to "the growth of a centralised, bureaucratic and arbitrary state, which easily passes into the tight control of the government party and becomes a means for the perpetuation of its power position".⁽⁷⁶⁾ ND charged that this had led to Greece's greater economic

dependence, and to an unprecedented arrogance of power such as unavoidably brings "the weakening and marginalisation of every Greek citizen", and the party-state's refusal to acknowledge the individual as a free and independent personality.

ND argued that Greece had no need of a vast state apparatus, and would be much better served by a more "competent state, smaller in extent and controlled by democratic legality". It believed that liberal solutions, centred on freedom and "based on the principles of equality of rights and meritocracy", were the most appropriate and effective, and promised to create and guarantee a "political framework that encourages dialogue, moderation, tolerance, consensus, and which will give young people the chance to develop their abilities and to create a new, modern, and open society".

The manifesto then spelled out ND's programme and political priorities if the party were returned to office. It pledged itself to totally disentangle the machinery of state from that of the ruling party; that state expansion particularly in the economic sector, would be reduced; that party-political appointments to positions in the judiciary would cease and the legal system would really become independent; that the role of parliament would be upgraded consonant with its high mission, so that it would cease to be of merely marginal importance; that the mass media would be opened up to dissenting views, to become free and objective so that an end be put to the present pitiful situation; and, finally, that the trade unions would be encouraged to be independent, not the puppets of party-political machinations.

In connection with individual personal freedom, ND stressed that a market economy and the personal ownership of property were essential preconditions of political freedom: it is precisely where "free economy and private ownership have been abolished", that "an omnipotent state

has been created, civil liberties have been violated, society has withered and economic development has been obstructed." For all that, said the manifesto, the state did have a legitimate function, ND's ideology was not that of the "undiluted liberalism of the last century. The state has an important role to play in the economic sector: in assuring and in encouraging competition, guarding against every kind of monopoly, providing incentives for economic development, and offering protection to the weak". In contrast to past considerations and practices, ND was now giving an essentially different meaning to social justice, namely equality of opportunities in "the political, economic, and social life... Social justice in this sense —and not some utopian equality of income— is unbreakably linked with liberalism. Because liberalism is the foe of every privilege, and seeks the just recognition of every person's abilities."⁽⁷⁷⁾

The last part of the 1985 manifesto contains some very important definitions of ND's political identity. It is stated that the party, "because it is both radical and liberal" is "the standard bearer of the liberal renewal which the country needs". ND is radical, not because, *à la* Karamanlis, it reserves the right to implement "even the most radical solutions when these are dictated by the national interest",⁽⁷⁸⁾ but because "it aims at the daring modernisation of our political, economic and social life" in readiness for the twenty-first century. It is liberal, because "it goes about this renewal by ensuring greater freedom, more emphasis on the individual, and greater confidence in the Greek and his abilities". ND, therefore, was not a conservative but a progressive party because, above all, "it does not fear change". Furthermore, ND choosing to be "liberal is progressive *par excellence*", because it means not being bound by dogma... but allowing free play to "the creative strengths of men and women, to enrich the possibilities of choice, to rid the individual of both state centralisation and of the

blank conformity that results from everybody embracing a single belief"; it was ready to "combine the objective of change with responsibility"; and, last but not least, it believed "in the wider co-operation and brotherhood of man" in the context of a United Europe.

With all the above characteristics, the liberal ND could be described, according to the manifesto, as "the party of dialogue, of moderation, of the middle way and of fairness", that will not revenge but conciliate when it resumes office. It was once again stressed, that "it is only if we liberate the creativeness, the genius of the Greek, that we shall emerge from the crisis, that we can succeed in the economic revival of our country." To that end it was necessary to put the Greek citizen above the party state. Dealing successfully with the most critical problems of the country, i.e., "unemployment, inflation, intolerable taxation, state bureaucracy, and the vast external debt, calls for greater, not less, economic freedom".

Overall then, less of a state and more of a free market economy, as well as greater economic freedom and personal choice for the individual, were the essence of the February 1985 manifesto and the focus of ND's wide-ranging attempts to offer credible and attractive alternatives to PASOK's policies, and to exchange its past statist and paternalistic practices for a modern liberal outlook, so as to stand a chance in the forthcoming June 1985 election.

"A new proposal for freedom" has proved the event of the greatest consequence in the life of the party, and has been compared to a "liberal ideological revolution".⁽⁷⁹⁾ It was the first time that, instead of ideological woolliness ND presented a clear-cut political and ideological identity. It now had a text to which it could refer to demonstrate its ideological principles. Also, as Katsoudas argued recently:

"...this is the most important political text ND has ever published throughout its fifteen years of existence, because it has generated a tendency in a specific direction, aside from whether this tendency is observed in everyday political practice... The Manifesto was a properly structured liberal text following the right order of principles, and as such the first of its kind in Greece".⁽⁸⁰⁾

During the June 1985 elections, liberalism became the watchword of ND, and the party's name was always prefixed by phileleftheri (liberal);⁽⁸¹⁾ moreover, all party brochures laid great emphasis on ND's liberal principles, and C. Mitsotakis' liberal origins were stressed to promote the electioneering.⁽⁸²⁾ But the most striking characteristic of ND's campaign was that, for the first time in its existence, the party had an economic programme consistently based on its ideological manifesto, and could support all its proposed policies with ideological backing. Also —again for the first time ever— ND admitted certain "misdeeds" in the past (for example, its extensive state intervention in the economy), and explained in detail the new policies it would implement if it were elected to resume office.⁽⁸³⁾

While the adoption of neo-liberal principles rescued ND from its past outmoded position and gave it a modern political outlook, this did not mean that all party members and MPs felt themselves committed to these new ideas. There was still much confusion, because neo-liberalism was given different meanings by different party officials, and at the same time, "in reality, a considerable portion of ND officials and voters remained deeply conservative".⁽⁸⁴⁾ Furthermore, time was too short to bring the message home to the people credibly and convincingly.

As Katsoudas wrote:

"The Averoff period with its *revanchisme* was too fresh in the memory of the electorate. Nevertheless, New Democracy with more than 41% of the vote rose to the status of one of Western Europe's strongest centre-right parties. It is noteworthy that while the basic liberal positions (less state interference, prevalence of freedom, more economic freedom for facing unemployment, inflation) were accepted

by the voters, ND had not convinced them that it was sincere in its advocacy of these principles" (in English originally).⁽⁸⁵⁾

Credibility was ND's basic problem, then, in the sense that the majority of the people considered PASOK more consistent and, therefore, more competent to hold government office. ND's newly adopted principles were dismissed as a mere pre-election trick, meant to conceal the party's right-wing tendencies.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Although ND received 40.85 per cent of the vote (compared to 35.86 per cent in 1981), PASOK secured a clear 5 per cent more and remained in office. Ideological refurbishment apart,

"Another problem that ND should look at more seriously, is its [political] past. Its achievements are many and considerable, but its sins have, rightly or wrongly, weighed disproportionately. A critical evaluation of this past, and an outright disentanglement from already outworn methods and practices, will give credibility to the new profile that ND has been trying to present in this election".⁽⁸⁷⁾

3.2 The 1986 congress and ND's temporary ideological retreat

The smooth transition of the party leadership in September 1984, the promulgation of the "New proposal for freedom", and the unprecedented mobilisation of the grass-roots organisation in the course of the 1985 election campaign had made the ND voters and the rank and file feel that victory was imminent. In consequence, the defeat at the polls was especially bitter and had severe repercussions in the party ranks, the most serious of which was the defection of Stephanopoulos and ten other ND MPs, and the formation by them of the Democratic Renewal (DIANA) splinter group.⁽⁸⁸⁾ The conservative wing of ND considered that it was what they saw as the party's new-tangled liberal extremism that was responsible for the poor performance at the polls, and demanded (successfully, as we shall see below) that at the forthcoming second party congress ND should firmly declare that Karamanlis' speech at the

first congress delineated the party's one and only ideological identity.⁽⁸⁹⁾

In February 1986, in his address to the delegates at ND's second congress, party leader C. Mitsotakis acknowledged that ND's election campaign had not been wholly successful, since the party had not managed to convince the electorate that liberalisation of the economy was a *conditio sine qua non* for social and economic development; in other words, as he put it, "Only where there is income, can one have social justice and a welfare state".⁽⁹⁰⁾ Furthermore, he accepted that ND had perhaps not sufficiently emphasised the social side of its programme, and this enabled PASOK "to create doubts for our party, particularly amongst the elderly, who depend more directly on the state".⁽⁹¹⁾

However, "A new proposal for freedom" was not abandoned altogether, as hoped by the party's conservative wing. Retreating carefully and in an attempt to have it both ways, Mitsotakis declared:

"ND's ideology is well known in theory as in practice. The ideological principles elaborated at our first congress in Chalkidiki were and remain our basic ideological text. The new proposals for freedom, published by ND a year ago, are completely consistent with those of 1979."⁽⁹²⁾

The majority of the party delegates remained unconvinced. Eventually, when the new party statutes were voted on, ND's ideological principles were again in first place, just as in 1979;⁽⁹³⁾ but instead of adopting and officially sanctioning the "New proposal for freedom" (since it was said not to contradict the 1979 ideological principles), the party adopted and sanctioned the ideological formulation presented by P. Lambrias —a founding member of ND and one of Karamanlis' closest colleagues— in his own speech to the congress. This fact the KPEE group considered an "ideological retreat",⁽⁹⁴⁾ but it can also be seen as a tactical concession to the party's old guard, and a temporary return to its Karamanliist beginnings.

In his effort to re-designate ND's *real* political identity, Lambrias tried to resuscitate the 1979 ideological tenets and, in a phraseology greatly reminiscent of Karamanlis' own, said that nowadays people had to make a choice between two extremes: the enormously growing state, and the limitless selfishness of the individual. He asserted that the political philosophy of ND opted for neither one nor the other but for a midway course, and yet again stressed that ND wished to establish a democracy that, as Karamanlis had described it, combines freedom with order, and order with social justice —because "there can be no freedom without order, just as there can be no order without social justice".^{'95'} Within this context, he proceeded to analyse and present ND's true ideological principles.^{'96'}

According to Lambrias, "ND is a democratic and modern, popular and social, radical and liberal, European and national political party". As a democratic party "it believes in democracy, ...a militant democracy, and not one that is paralysed". As a modern party "it corresponds to the needs and concerns of our time". It is a popular party that "originates from the people, works for the people, and identifies with the people", because it is "a party of the people as an entity, and not a party representing a certain class or dependent on a particular interest group". As a social party "it considers economic development not as an end in itself, but as the most realistic means towards the realization of social justice". As a radical party it always "reserves the possibility of adopting the best solutions, even the most radical ones, when these are dictated by the interests of the nation and the people". With regard to social and economic policies, radicalism meant "the state's obligation and [its] ability to intervene and balance economic and social antitheses, to reduce inequalities, and to stand in for private initiative wherever the latter does not respond, or whenever economic and social reasons dictate such a course". ND was a liberal

party because "it denies that there can be social and economic objectives for the achievement of which democratic freedoms are worth sacrificing", and also because "it seeks to reinstate the free economy in its dominant role in production, to safeguard fair competition, to combat monopolies, to abolish prerogatives (often created by the state's thoughtless intervention), and everything that has proved to cause malfunctioning in the economy to the detriment of the people". ND was a European party, because it "has accomplished... Greece's entry into Europe as an equal partner", and because it "has a permanent and long-term pro-European policy"; and it was a national party because "it is imbued with the vital awareness that demands the continuation of the nation's historic course as the highest of missions".

All the above characterisations of ND's ideology go back to Karamanlis' speech to the first party congress, with one exception: the reference to ND's liberal aspects, which clearly comes from the "New proposal for freedom" manifesto. So, while Lambrias tried to make the party present a unified ideological outlook, including statist as well as liberal principles, the result heavily favoured the former. However, ND's neo-liberal orientation was only temporarily stymied; thereafter, the party laid greater importance to the further dissemination and clarification of its policies on social welfare, without abandoning its basic tenets for privatisation, reduced state intervention, and full operation of a free market economy —issues that remained at the heart of its political platform until it resumed office in April 1990.

One of the most important developments after the second party congress, and one that deserves special attention, is the elaboration of detailed governmental policy proposals, drawn up by the responsible secretariat, which was set up under the auspices of ND's director-general.⁽⁹⁷⁾ The first publication, concerning ND policies for the farmers, appeared in April 1987, and initiated a series of many other

such publications setting out ND policies on a wide range of issues. The most striking characteristic of these publications, apart from their analytical and detailed approach towards every issue they dealt with, was that they were consistent with the liberal principles adopted by the 1985 "New proposal for freedom", while paying due attention to the social and protective aspects of the proposed policies.⁽⁹⁸⁾

The most detailed and, we think, the most important such publication referred to ND's policy proposals for the country's economy. It was a tersely but very clearly structured text in three parts: Part I gave an account of the *status quo* and the crisis the Greek economy was said to have undergone during the five years of PASOK government (1981-1986), as well as the reasons for this predicament as identified by ND. Part II presented the party's basic economic principles and how they could be implemented to boost economic activity and development; Part III made a tentative assessment of the economic results to be expected if ND's proposed measures were adopted.⁽⁹⁹⁾

According to the party analysis, the Greek economy had entered a stage of stagnation and deterioration from the moment PASOK took office, which by any standards was incomparably worse than not only the situation in the other EEC countries, but even with respect to the country's economy in the past, and especially during the 25 years from 1955 until 1980.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ The chief reason for this was said to lie with the PASOK administration and its mal-practices:

"The government favoured a strong public sector at the front line of the developmental effort, which seemed always to be in competition with the private sector, while it should be obvious that co-operation of the two is necessary in any economy. Meanwhile, anonymous bureaucrats were preferred to entrepreneurs, and were given the responsibility for economic development... The responsibility for these sad developments rests heavily with the government. The unproductive expansion of the public sector, the hostile attitude towards private enterprise, and the sudden and conflicting changes introduced by the government have all caused upheaval in the market".⁽¹⁰¹⁾

ND promised that, to correct all these economic problems, it would pursue a very different developmental course, based on its strong attachment to the free market economy, the interrelation between wages and productivity, and on the profit motive. In doing so, ND would bear in mind four basic objectives: (a) ND will ensure the freedom of choice in every sector of everyday life which is the only safeguard of personal and social freedom; (b) ND will liberate the economic, social, and academic spheres from state protection and involvement, and so restore the citizens' trust and set free their productive capabilities; (c) ND holds that smooth operation of the economy is founded on emulation and competition, with equal chances for all; and (d) ND bases its developmental effort on the productive initiative of the private sector.⁽¹⁰²⁾

Contrary to its past attitude towards state paternalism and intervention, ND specified the role of the state clearly and precisely for the first time, and enumerated six responsibilities: (i) exclusive responsibility over national defence, public order, the civil service and justice; (ii) safeguarding healthy competition and equal rights for all Greeks; (iii) securing social justice by redistribution of income, and the levelling of social and economic differences; (iv) assuring the necessary infrastructure (transport, communications, energy, etc.) for the country's social, economic, and cultural development; (v) providing social services of high standards to all citizens regardless of their income, but without excluding the private sector from providing similar services; and (vi) continuous and constructive dialogue with professional, commercial, and cultural organisations, so that proposals for improving the system's productivity can be accepted and used.⁽¹⁰³⁾

The policy proposal was quite definite:

"We believe in the superiority of private initiative as a means of economic development and progress. With the exception of the infrastructure and public utility

services, as well as of the defence industry, the state must not compete with private enterprise as far as productive investments are concerned; it must only supplement these activities when private enterprise cannot or will not take part because of prohibitive costs or great risk."⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

The analysis continued with ND's specific policies for reactivating the economy: privatisation, liberalisation of the labour market and protection for the unemployed, free collective bargaining, reforms in the tax system, the establishment of a liberal financial and credit system, productive investments, exports, and incentives for development. These were among ND's measures which, if enforced, were expected to create enough new jobs, to halve unemployment by the end of the four-year term, and to make it negligible thereafter; to improve competitiveness by increasing productivity; and to re-establish a climate of trust in the future of the Greek economy.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

All of the party's policy proposals were elaborated along lines like this, and on the eve of the June 1989 election ND had a full and detailed governmental programme. Its ideology was then further clarified, focusing on three major and inter-related elements: supreme priority was given to freedom—that is, reducing the state apparatus, and freedom of choice for the individual—as promulgated in "A new proposal for freedom". Freedom would then lead to the establishment of a free market economy, which fostered productive "creativity" based on personal skills and private initiative, and this would provide social surplus—the much-needed assets for "social protection", and justice. Freedom, creativity, and social protection became the three cardinal points of ND's governmental programme.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

Another important development played its role in giving the party a modern political outlook, very different from ND's past ideas and practices. It was after the second congress and as the 1989 election was coming closer that ND recognised, for the first time officially, that

certain of its past policies must by all means be avoided in the future.

Mitsotakis himself declared:

"Many past practices and theories have been abandoned... But life goes on, and a big party seeking power has to keep up with it in order to be able to express the new realities. In the past, we had only state-controlled television, with several nationalised enterprises. Today we will do exactly the opposite. We had rent controls. In the future we will liberalise them gradually, while at the same time we will increase the supply of housing."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

Moreover, ND improved and developed its relations with the other opposition parties, particularly with those of the communist Left, thus bridging the traditional rift between the two political camps, the origins of which dated back to the 1944-1949 civil war. This was undoubtedly to the good of their co-operation in the subsequent short-lived coalition government.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

4. Ideology and Members' Attitudes

Having outlined the major basic tenets and their respective modification in ND's ideology, we shall now turn our attention to what influence they have had on the party members. First, the opinions of members at the top of the party hierarchy and at parliamentary level will be summarised, (having been discussed already in the examination of ND's political personnel). Thereafter we shall look in greater detail at those of the rank and file.

As noted earlier, ideological differences were often a pretext for concealed personal interests. They nevertheless did exist to some extent in the four groupings within the party, namely the ultra-rightists, the neo-liberals, the Karamanliists, and the liberals, the first two former always constituting a minority with hardly any influence, and one or

other of the last two dominant, depending on the person of the party leader each time.

Needless to mention that Karamanliists, who faithfully adhered to radical liberalism and considered the element of social justice as the most important, were most numerous in ND when Karamanlis himself was leading the party; the importance of the ultra-rightists was greater during the early days of ND than later on, since after 1977 the National Camp (EP) party was formed and attracted many of those who believed in "nation-mindedness" and anti-communism. Today, ever since Mitsotakis assumed the party leadership with the emphasis on personal freedom, it is the liberals who constitute the majority; they have been joined by many Karamanliists who, although they are hostile towards neo-liberal ideas, do accept that the state should not intervene in the economy to the extent it had done in the past. As a founding member of ND has written:

"ND's ideology is radical liberalism as determined at the Chalkidiki congress, and nothing else —neither 'neo-liberalism', nor classical social democracy... There is no such thing as a neutral state, and ND does not believe in anything like it. ND believes that the state should play a regulatory role... It should limit its activities affecting production and the circulation of goods, but increase them as regards social welfare, education, and health... We believe in the free-market economy and in private initiative, but not in their unbridled operation".⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

The predominant liberals are flanked by staunch Karamanliists, fervent supporters of state intervention as implemented by Karamanlis;⁽¹¹⁰⁾ and by the neo-liberals, led by A. Andrianopoulos, the founder of the Liberal Forum faction and prominent ND member, who advocates a minimal state since "neo-liberalism is different from classical liberalism to the extent that it accepts some unavoidable state intervention for safeguarding the social equilibrium".⁽¹¹¹⁾ Neo-

liberals have often been accused of tending to split the party, and a prominent liberal ND member has warned them that

"Those who wish to safeguard liberalism as a system of liberal choices and maximization of social product, must, in terms of time and organically, integrate within it the element of social justice that will avert the dynamics of the system from being evolved into dynamics beyond the system: excessive increase of the economic or social power of certain social strata invites socialist experimentation."⁽¹¹²⁾

Before reporting on ND members' attitudes and opinions on ideological issues, let us note that, notwithstanding the analytical policy proposals and the detailed elaboration of ND's ideology in general and its economic programme in particular, there is one point for which the party officials have perhaps not had due consideration and respect. To put it succinctly: it was not only that ND failed to stress the social aspects of its policies, but it seems it never really bothered to determine when and, most importantly, how the state should intervene. Carried away by its newly-adopted liberal ideas, the party claimed that limitation of state intervention and the establishment of an open and free market were, in themselves, enough to generate economic development; while the state had only a very limited part to play in this, its role as redistributive agent, although not ignored, was not given detailed explanation.

ND's failure to define the role of the state as it envisioned it, considerably obfuscated the party's ideological identity.⁽¹¹³⁾ Moreover, the party did not consider a very important issue, one pointed out by W. Eucken, the intellectual godfather of post-war German economic policy:

"...the question of the role of the state in the economy was wrongly put, if it was to be reduced in quantitative terms. It did not matter whether the state intervened much or little, but how it intervened" (in English originally).⁽¹¹⁴⁾

Along the same lines, N. Mouzelis has argued that, in the Greek case,

"The solution, if there is one, lies less in the liberalisation of market mechanisms, and more in the modernisation of the state: that is, in the creation of a system where the interests of the administrative machine do not oppose but identify with economic development, and where state intervention, in close collaboration with private initiative, tries to benefit from the important opportunities offered by the Common Market, by the new international distribution of labour and by modern technologies, to all those who are willing and imaginative enough to take advantage of them".⁽¹¹⁵⁾

It may be said, therefore, that like radical liberalism, which was characterised by vagueness and empiricism, the post-1985 new liberalism has not been explicitly defined either, so causing considerable confusion as to exactly what kind of a liberal party ND is. Furthermore, the party organisation has never had a say on ideological issues, let alone been allowed to become the main forum for the discussion, formulation and elaboration of ND's ideology. Radical liberalism and new liberalism were personal creations of Karamanlis and Mitsotakis respectively, and this may well account for the fact that ideology has never been an important mobilising factor for ND members and supporters; neither has it ever been considered as the party's most valuable asset, as we shall see below while examining the party members' views and attitudes on these issues.

To begin with and concerning ND's ideological identity, the majority of the rank-and-file members in the Department of Larissa believe that it is best characterised as a liberal party. Table V.2 below shows that more than 60 per cent of the rank and file are of this opinion, just over one-fourth of them would describe ND as centre-right, 14.56 per cent as neo-liberal, and 10.76 per cent as conservative. There is also a small percentage (8.22 per cent) who think ND should be labelled christian-democratic, and even fewer members who think it is a popular, centre, or social-democratic party. Looked at from a different perspective, however, almost 40 per cent of the rank and file in 1989 do

Table V.2: ND's Ideological Identity: Views of the Party Members in the Department of Larissa in 1989

<u>ND designated as:</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Liberal party	96	60.76
Centre-right party	41	25.95
Neo-liberal party	23	14.56
Conservative party	17	10.76
Christian-democratic party	13	08.23
Centre party	6	03.80
Popular party	6	03.80
Social-democratic party	1	.63
Other	6	03.80

not consider ND a liberal party, thus reflecting the same vagueness and confusion that characterises the top-party hierarchy.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

It seems that ideology has been the major reason why party members have joined ND. As is shown in Table V.3, personal ideological identification was the most important factor for more than half of the rank and file (59.49 per cent); traditional familial identification came second (47.47 per cent); a quarter of the party members joined ND inspired by Karamanlis' charismatic personality, another 12.66 per cent of them because they wished to be associated with ND's organisational development and growth, and a few others (5.06 per cent) because they were alarmed by the organisation and efficiency of PASOK. Almost one in ten members joined ND because of some party official's or deputy's personal quality, and a very small minority (3.16 per cent) because they were influenced by their relatives and friends. The picture looks very different when the 94 members who claimed they joined ND because of personal ideological identification, are asked what ideological label in their view suits ND best. The data given in Table V. 3a below illustrate that, even among those who claim that they have joined ND because of

Table V.3: Most Important Factors Impelling ND Members to Join the Party in the Department of Larissa

<u>Factor</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Personal ideological identification	94	59.49
Family ideological identification	75	47.47
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal	41	25.95
Organisational development of ND	20	12.66
Personal quality of party officials/deputies	15	09.49
Counterbalancing PASOK's organisational performance	8	05.06
Influence of friends and/or relatives	5	03.16
Other	8	05.06

personal ideological identification, there is anything but unanimity concerning the party's ideological stand. The majority (68.09 per cent) considers ND a liberal party, barely nine per cent more than the general average (Table V.2). For the remainder, the picture is almost the same as that of Table V.2, with again a more than 30 per cent minority that does not endorse ND's official ideology.

Table V.3a: ND's Ideological Identity: Views of the 94 Party Members who reputedly joined ND because of "personal ideological identification"

<u>ND designated as:</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Liberal party	64	68.09
Centre-right party	24	25.53
Neo-liberal party	14	14.89
Conservative party	9	09.57
Christian-democratic party	11	11.70
Centre party	5	05.32
Popular party	5	05.32
Social-democratic party	1	01.06
Other	4	04.26

When the party members were asked to explain what, in their view, were the special reasons accounting for ND's appeal to the ordinary voters, they put ideology in second place. As shown in Table V.4 below, half of the rank and file in the Department of Larissa considered ND's reliability and sense of responsibility as most important in ND's appeal to the electorate; ideology was second with 42.41 per cent, closely followed by ND's proposed governmental policies (39.87 per cent). More than one-fifth of the rank and file (23.42 per cent) believe that the party's appeal to the electorate is due to its leadership, 16.46 per cent that it is due to its organisation, and another 14.56 per cent think it is the activities of the party MPs in their constituencies.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

Table V.4: Most Important Reasons for ND's Appeal to the Electorate

<u>Reasons</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
ND's reliability/sense of responsibility	79	50.00
ND's ideology	67	42.41
ND's political and economic programme	63	39.87
ND's leadership	37	23.42
ND's organisation	26	16.46
Activities of ND deputies in their constituencies	23	14.56
Other	14	08.86

Although ideology is given as the second most important factor accounting for ND's appeal to the voters, the majority of the rank and file in the Department of Larissa are not familiar with the party's basic tenets as elaborated in the 1985 ideological manifesto. As Table V.5 below shows, whereas 43.67 per cent of the ordinary party members in the Department of Larissa had studied the "New proposal for freedom", 24.05 per cent acknowledged that they were not fully familiar with it, and another 32.28 per cent admitted they had never

Table V.5: Party Members' Acquaintance with the 1985 Ideological Declaration

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Have you personally read the ideological declaration of the party (" <u>A New Proposal for Freedom</u> ", of 3 Feb. 1985)?	Yes	69	43.67
	In part	38	24.05
	No	51	32.28
	Total	158	100.00

read it. We see, then, that on the eve of the June 1989 election, ND not only did not sufficiently stress the social aspects of its proposed policies, but had failed to inform even its own members of the exact reach and meaning of its political platform.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

This point is further corroborated by Table V.6 below, with only a 38.61 per cent of the rank and file in the Department of Larissa considering that ND's political programme had been sufficiently disseminated, explained to, and understood by the electorate; whereas the majority think this was achieved only in part (41.77 per cent), or not at all (14.56 per cent). Nevertheless, most of those who acknowledge that ND's proposed policies were not sufficiently disseminated and understood, do not hold their party as mainly responsible for this. On the contrary, 41.77 per cent of the rank and file believe that it was due to a lack of appropriate means of propaganda —for example, use of

Table V.6: Degree of Dissemination/Explanation of ND's Political Programme

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Do you think that ND's pol. programme has been sufficiently disseminated, explained and understood?	Yes	61	38.61
	In part	66	41.77
	No	23	14.56
	Don't know	8	05.06
	Total	158	100.00
If no/in part, what do you think are the reasons for this?	Lack of appropriate propaganda	66	41.77
	Party officials' inefficiency	24	15.19
	Organisational inefficiency	20	12.66
	Leadership inefficiency	5	03.16
	Other	11	06.96

the mass media, which were state-owned and under the tight control of the ruling party, so that ND was not given the chance of informing the electorate properly on these issues. However, there were some party members who did attribute responsibility to the ND officials' (15.19 per cent), to the grass-roots organisation's (12.66 per cent), and to leadership's (3.16 per cent) inefficiency.

Finally there is the question of whether or not ND represents a particular social class. As we have discussed already, no ND leader or deputy or member of the top-party hierarchy has ever declared ND to identify with the interests of a particular class. On the contrary, it has been stated again and again that ND is a national party, a popular party, that it represents the interests of the Greek society at large, and that, therefore, it cannot be described as a party of the Centre, the Right, or the Left. It transpires that this official party position is not unanimously shared by the rank and file in the Department of Larissa. Table V.7 below shows that, although the majority of the party members (63.92 per cent) do subscribe to the official party analysis, almost 30 per cent of them do not. Most of these members (20.25 per cent) think their party represents mainly the interests of the middle class, another 10.76 per cent those of the upper middle class, and a 8.23 per cent those of the upper-class bourgeoisie. (For more details on these points see below ch. 6, section 3.3, Table VI.24).

Table V.7: Class Representation and ND: Party Members' Attitudes

Question	Answer	number	%
Are there any social classes that you would say ND mainly represents?	Yes	47	29.75
	No	101	63.92
	Don't Know	10	06.33
	Total	158	100.00
If yes, which one(s)?	Middle class	32	20.25
	Upper-middle class	17	10.76
	Upper-class bourgeoisie	13	08.23
	Other	4	02.53

By and large, then, it is reasonable to argue that the majority of the rank and file is to a considerable extent informed on and in agreement with the basic ideological tenets of the party, although it seems that liberalism and the predominance of freedom is given less importance than other, more traditional conservative values, such as reliability and a sense of responsibility, commitment, and the preservation of social order. A notable exception to the general approval of the official party analysis is certainly that a considerable part of the rank and file believe that ND more or less identifies with, and represents the interests of, the middle or other upper social classes. We would suggest that regardless whether or not these members identify with one of these classes, this reflects a belief that their party cannot—or, at least, does not—express the interests of the lower working classes, so leaving them vulnerable to recruitment by PASOK and the parties of the communist Left.⁽¹¹⁹⁾

5. From Opposition Back into Office

5.1 The Greek case of historical compromise

Although ND emerged victorious from the June 1989 election (with 44.25 per cent of the vote and 145 seats in parliament), it was unable to form a government, not having a majority of the parliamentary seats. As set out in Table V.8 below, PASOK had kept the bulk of its 1985 supporters and secured 125 seats; the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN, consisting of mainly the KKE Communist Party of Greece and the Euro-communist Greek Left EAR) received 13.12 per cent of the vote and elected 28 deputies; C. Stephanopoulos' DIANA managed to get its leader elected in the First District of Athens, and an independent candidate was returned in the Department of Rodhopi in Thrace. The negotiations

between the president of the republic and the political parties, for a coalition government were successful. ND and SYN agreed to form and support a temporary government (which lasted from 1 July to 7 October), consisting of politicians from both parties, presided over by T. Tzannetakis, a fairly well-known ND deputy.⁽¹²⁰⁾

Table V.8: 18 June 1989 Parliamentary Election

<u>Parties/Coalitions</u>	<u>number of votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>seats in parliament</u>	<u>%</u>
New Democracy	2,885,548	44.25	145	48.33
PASOK	2,553,086	39.15	125	41.67
SYN	855,564	13.12	28	09.33
DIANA	65,867	01.01	1	.33
Independent	25,131	.39	1	.33
<u>Other</u>	<u>136,367</u>	<u>02.08</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>
Total	6,521,563	100.00	300	99.99

[Source: 18 June 1989 Election, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1989 (in Greek), p. 132.]

This coalition government was made up of twenty-five members, twenty of them from ND, one diplomat, and four members from SYN (all from its Euro-communist wing, not from the KKE). As agreed from the outset, this coalition government was to stay in office for not more than three months, which was considered the minimum time needed for the task of what was called "catharsis" (measures of a "cleansing" or remedial nature) and the democratisation of the country's political life.⁽¹²¹⁾

Despite the limited tasks and duration of this government, the fact that these two antipodal camps collaborated officially for the first time was in itself of major significance. Although ND was certainly no replica of the pre-coup ERE, there were still members in both its higher and lower ranks whose ultra-rightist attitudes and staunch anti-communism would have seemed enough to prevent such a convergence.

Besides, it was not long ago that Karamanlis himself had said in a speech to ND's parliamentary group:

"Broadly speaking, all those are nation-minded who believe in the idea of the nation, that is in the homeland. In this sense all Greeks are nation-minded, except of course those who believe in Moscow more than they believe in Greece. In a narrower sense, the nation-minded are those who never, directly or indirectly, have collaborated with communism. And it is those in particular who nowadays constitute New Democracy. We are the only party, the only camp, that has never in its whole history collaborated with the Left".⁽¹²²⁾

Still, the leadership's decision to form this coalition government, neither met with resentful criticisms from the party ranks, nor did it cause any trouble or turbulence. On the contrary, it was viewed as an *ad-hoc* temporary governmental alliance, put forward by ND only in order to remove PASOK from power and to purge public life of phenomena of political decadence —such as bribery and embezzlement. As an ex-member of ND's administrative committee commented at the time:

"...collaboration between ND and SYN was a product of necessity after the June 1989 election had resulted in political and governmental deadlock. But neither before that election nor after it, nor during the government's collaboration in Tzannetakis' coalition government, has it ever occurred to ND or SYN to agree to any kind of broader and permanent future collaboration."⁽¹²³⁾

It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that the Greek case of historical compromise, if one can call it that, does not bear even the slightest resemblance to the Italian prototype. In Italy, the historical compromise can be understood as the formation of a broad political and social alliance between the communist, socialist, and popular Catholic forces within the context of a long-term strategy, for the democratic modernisation and development of the country;⁽¹²⁴⁾ whereas the collaboration between ND and SYN in Greece,

"...while showing catharsis and democratisation on its frontispiece, had for its binding nothing but the tactical

coincidence of two different strategies: for ND, this was the creation of the preconditions for its autonomous return to power under totally new political legitimacy; for the Left, it was the transformation of political relations within the broader democratic camp, so that it could acquire a more hegemonic and influential position... and perhaps the only thing they really had in common was that their collaboration was a temporary truce between two rival shopkeepers, so that they could appropriate for themselves the spoils and the clientele of an antagonist".⁽¹²⁵⁾

Some voices were heard in favour of a broader and more permanent future collaboration between the Right and the Left. It was argued that as an EEC-member the country would be faced with several serious problems before long. Most, if not all, of these problems were not linked with the interests of a particular class, but were rather of a more general character, related to the overall development and modernisation of Greek society, in its attempt to attain the standards of its more advanced European partners. This effort would demand an economic take-off, that required a so-to-speak qualitative state intervention and regulation, one that would reinforce rather than boycott private initiative and economic competition. This task could best be carried out by a Right-Left coalition, since by themselves alone neither the former's neo-liberalism nor the latter's state paternalism would be able to cope with these problems successfully.⁽¹²⁶⁾

Regardless of whatever truth there may be in these arguments, it seems that ND at least never bothered to give it any consideration. After eight consecutive years in opposition, the only thing it was interested in was how to return to power; we think that this was the chief reason why the coalition government was formed in the first place —not some broader strategic plan for the modernisation of the country, which would definitely presuppose some kind of ideological convergence and a much more dramatic transformation of ND's political identity. In fact, this seemed to be very much unchanged, as demonstrated when J.

Varvitsiotis, a prominent ND deputy and minister of national defence in Tzannetakis' coalition government, did not want the communists to take over the highly sensitive ministry of national defence:

"You are asking me if I would approve of a communist as a minister of national defence. Well, it depends. I wouldn't, of course, object to informing the Communist Party representatives on every issue concerning the ministry of defence. But I would accept a communist minister or deputy minister of national defence only under extraordinary circumstances, and only for a limited period of time—for example, in a national-unity government, or in case of foreign invasion, or if Turkish troops invaded Cyprus, or in case of war generally, to mention just a few instances offhand".⁽¹²⁷⁾

Nevertheless, and despite its conjunctural dimensions, this short-lived collaboration between ND and SYN was an event that had a very special importance *per se*. The two camps had never been able to forget their bloody enmity in the civil war, and since those who fought each other then are still alive today, their mutual hatred has continued to smoulder. In other words, this collaboration was the best possible expression of true political dialogue and consent (never known in Greece before), as it had resulted from the respective change and transformation of the broader political mentality and attitude towards the rules of democratic functioning. N. Diamandouros summed it up very well:

"...if 1949 signalled the military end of the civil war, and 1974 the legal one, the year 1989 expresses the political end of the second national schism of Greece in the twentieth century".⁽¹²⁸⁾

5.2 ND's 1990-1993 governmental record: A tentative assessment

Although ND did better in the 5 November 1989 national elections than in June, it still did not manage to form a one-party government; so it collaborated with PASOK and SYN in a national-unity government, presided over by renowned elderly economist X. Zolotas. It was agreed

that this government would remain in office until early April 1990, when new elections would be held. On that occasion, finally, the third election in nine months, the voters gave ND almost 47 per cent, and with a narrow parliamentary majority the party was able to take office.⁽¹²⁹⁾

The ideological amendments introduced by the "New proposal for freedom" manifesto, and the ensuing shift towards neo-liberalism, did not affect ND's position with regard to foreign-policy issues. The party remained faithfully attached to its European and pro-western stand, to Greece's membership in the NATO alliance, and the preservation of American bases on Greek soil. But concerning its social and economic policies, ND promised to implement from the very outset measures considerably different from those of its 1974-1981 years in government. We shall try to give a tentative assessment of the extent to which it has managed to do this.⁽¹³⁰⁾

In the public sector ND had promised to limit the entrepreneurial activities of the state, reduce the number of its employees and expenses, and at the same time provide better civil services. Indeed, as soon as it returned to office it established a special committee, which was to decide which of the public enterprises were and had always been problematic, and to close them down; the profitable ones it was to sell to the private sector.

The results were far from dazzling. The ND government not only did not close down any of the problematic enterprises, but only one of the others, Greek Civil Transport EAS, i.e. the Athens buses, was sold to the private sector.⁽¹³¹⁾ Moreover, while pledged in theory to limiting state intervention, in practice it declared that it would set up a Natural Gas Company, to employ 6,000 people (thus increasing the number of public employees by almost one per cent). As might be expected, the productivity, functioning, and services of the public sector generally

in no way changed for the better, although its expenditures kept going up and up and up.⁽¹³²⁾

In the private sector, ND's proposed free-market economy remained a dead letter. Instead of liberalising the market as it had promised, the government maintained the *status quo ante*, i.e. it kept rent and other market prices under state control, and not only did not reform the tax system, but actually voted in a law under which private enterprises had to pay an extra tax on their profits —and retroactively! Furthermore, its policies on the relation between domestic and foreign currency did not favour the export trade, and so the expected "big bang" in the economy never happened. In overall terms, state control and intervention in the economy increased so much that, as a prominent industrialist argued,

"...the Greek economy has been so intensely deformed that it is impossible for the state or the public sector to play a positive role in the foreseeable future [for its recovery] let alone to finally give it a proper orientation".⁽¹³³⁾

It therefore appears that state paternalism and intervention in the economy continued as traditional features of ND during the early 1990s, although it had been hoped and expected that the new ND government would liberalise the market and limit the state to a qualitatively better, and simply regulatory role. Although it is too early to predict that there will never be any such changes, it must be acknowledged that ND's policies so far have been more conservative than neo-liberal. It remains to be seen whether this is due to innate difficulties —right-wing power has traditionally been tied up with the state, and statism has ever been a salient feature of the Greek economy— or if at heart ND does not really believe in a liberalism, as outlined in its February 1985 ideological declaration.⁽¹³⁴⁾

6. Conclusion

The collapse of the dictatorial regime in 1974, the restoration of democratic institutions, and the reactivation of Greece's Association Agreement with the EEC, which was ultimately to lead to full membership in the European Community, signalled the end of a 25-year period that was characterised by the political domination of an authoritarian, reactionary, paternalistic, and at times violent Right. In the realm of everyday politics this meant that after 1974 all political parties—including the Communist party, which had been outlawed since 1947—were free to operate, to openly disseminate their policies and canvas for supporters, and to participate in the elections. This meant that staunch anti-communism was wiped out as the ideological trade-mark of the post-war Right, and would cease to affect the political life; in consequence, the ideological equilibrium would shift more to the left. In terms of Karamanlis' New Democracy party, this would have to rid itself of what had been the most salient characteristic of its predecessor, and adopt a more modern ideological image if it wished to be considered a forward-looking party with new horizons, instead of never letting the people forget the sins of its past.

This much-needed ideological renewal did not actually take place, at least not during the early post-1974 years. Instead, anti-communism retreated somewhat, while socialist and Marxist ideas, adopted by the parties of the left opposition, gradually came to the fore. Karamanlis, as the only person who could have helped his party acquire a new political identity, had no time to concern himself with ideology, since he was totally absorbed in establishing the new regime, purging public life from the recalcitrant elements of the ultra-Right, and arranging for the country's EEC entry. In consequence, ND remained in an ideological vacuum, unable to present alternatives to the opposition parties' more modern, attractive and inspiring ideologies. ND did its

utmost to capitalise on its founder's charisma and prestige, and so managed to offset its shortcomings in terms of ideology.

When finally Karamanlis, meaning to give his party a modern profile, drew up its basic ideological principles, it soon became evident that what he called ND's radical liberalism (an ideology lying somewhere between classical liberalism and social democracy) was nothing more than an *ex posteriori* justification of his record as ERE leader and premier. More specifically, radical liberalism consisted of the policies of his pre-1967 premiership (1955-1963), which were a combination of state paternalism and private initiative, with the accent on social welfare and justice. Lacking long-term planning or concrete future perspectives, and characterised by empirical *ad-hoc* handling of affairs, ND's post-1974 radical-liberal recipe was different from past practices only to the extent that anti-communism was not one of its basic ingredients.

The same could be argued with respect to the country's foreign relations and orientations. From the very outset ND claimed that it was a pro-western and pro-European political party, and that since traditionally Greece belonged to the West, there was no question of withdrawing from the NATO alliance or expelling the U.S. military bases from Greek soil. The only difference to ERE practices was that Greece's foreign policy was more independent and multi-dimensional. So Karamanlis developed relations with countries of the East bloc, the Arabs and the third world, and successfully steered Greece into the Eurorean Economic Community.

When Karamanlis left party politics to become president of the republic, ND's ideological nakedness could no longer be concealed. Neither was the dramatic failure of the 1981 election enough to bring about an ideological renewal. Unlike PASOK, which kept remodelling its policies so that the closer it came to power the less radical the image it presented, ND underwent a change in policies and tactics only after C. Mitsotakis' election to the party leadership in September 1984. One

of his first tasks was the drawing up of the ideological manifesto "A new proposal for freedom", which signalled a significant break with ND's past, and oriented the party in a more liberal direction. While pro-Europeanism and pro-Westernism kept their importance as ND's basic tenets, a most important ideological change was announced when ND condemned state intervention and paternalism, and declared that only the establishment of a free market economy, denationalisations/privatisations, and greater freedom for private initiative would create the ideal preconditions for economic development.

A minor ideological set-back was due to ND's Karamanliist flank, which resented the party's relatively poor performance in the June 1985 election, and insisted that during its second congress in February 1986 ND reaffirm its loyalty to the ideological principles as elaborated by Karamanlis in 1979. For all that, it was the tenets of the manifesto that constituted ND's ideological backbone until it finally resumed office in April 1990. To avert being charged with adopting excessively liberal positions, ND took pains to publicise the social aspects of its proposed policies, but at all times it maintained that what the economy needed was more personal freedom and private initiative, and less state intervention and paternalism.

The party's governmental record since April 1990 does not yet permit definite conclusions on whether ND has faithfully observed its election promises and to what extent it has succeeded. Speaking provisionally, it seems that ND has failed. The majority of liberal advocates, whether ND members or simply supporters, consider that ND has not done enough to liberalise the economy, and where it has tried, done so abortively and unconvincingly; the most negative result of ND's performance is, in their view, that liberalism is being blamed for failures that in reality stem from the enforcement of the old conservative statist policies.

The above criticisms aside, it can be argued that ND's insistence on considering state intervention the scapegoat for all evils in the

economy, and projecting the reduction of such state activities as its ultimate goal, made the party underestimate two very important questions that are highly relevant to the Greek case —and which, in our opinion, should have been given more serious consideration. The first of these is whether the economic solution really lies only between state intervention and market economy; the second is the question of whether ND, even if the answer to the previous question were affirmative, is the most suitable party to reduce state intervention and establish a free market economy.

The first question has theoretical implications we shall not deal with here. Suffice it to say that although ND had been advocating a less intrusive and qualitatively better state apparatus, in reality the party was more interested in theory than practice; although it accepted that the state had a certain economic role to perform, it never bothered to define when and to what extent it was legitimate for the state to intervene. Moreover, the question of how state intervention that undermines private initiative could be abandoned in favour of a more constructive policy that would help and monitor capitalist growth, has never been one of the party's considerations.

The second question has greater practical significance, since it deals with the nature of the ND party itself, and also with the nature of the Greek social formation. As was pointed out in the first chapter of this study, the growth of the state preceded the development of industrial classes in Greece; capitalism was imported, the indigenous bourgeoisie never took the lead in the country's industrialisation and economic development (on the contrary, it was the state that undertook this task), and the working class played in itself a far less important role than its west European counterparts. Other historical reasons apart, the parties of the Right (especially in the post-war period) enjoyed remarkable longevity through controlling the state mechanism, i.e., by appropriating and selectively distributing the spoils entailed

in governmental power. Their main concern was not capitalist development but keeping the power positions that came with winning elections, and this way accomplished by an extensive use of vertical, clientelistic means of political control, rather than by developing their ideology, which was largely that of a rigid anti-communism.

After 1974, ND did not much more than to remain consistently linked up with the state. The adoption of liberal ideas later made only a verbal difference; the ideological change (if change it really was) was imposed from above, leaving the rest of ND almost indifferent. The party had elected a new leader, but itself remained virtually the same. Despite two national congresses and smooth successions in its leadership, despite its organisational expansion and development, it was never ND's grassroots where ideology was spontaneously produced, debated and formulated; the rank and file just accepted it passively, as they had done before with Karamanlis' statist tenets, as they had always done. In any case, it was not ideology that had the greatest appeal to them, but other more traditional reasons and practices (reliability, responsibility, order, security), which remained dominant at all times.

Vacillating between its traditional statist attitudes and the newly adopted neo-liberal ideas, New Democracy has not been able to commit itself to a new ideology. Ever since the party lost its prestigious and charismatic first leader, whose presence in politics proved strong enough to counterbalance all other shortcomings, it has failed to present a new image and project an alternative and convincing vision for the Greek society of tomorrow. In other words, statism to a large extent and clientelism to a lesser, have always characterised the New Democracy party, which has failed to modernise in the face of an old but never solved contradiction: namely, that to transform itself into a modern party of the Right, it had to deny the basis of its current existence.

1. Introduction

So far we have examined the origins, foundation and particular characteristics of the New Democracy party at the national level —its political personnel, organisation and leadership, ideology, tactics in government and in opposition. In this chapter we shall take a closer look at its special features at the local level, and so complete our analysis with a more specific picture of the party. For socio-economic as well as political reasons the Department of Larissa was considered as the most suitable for our fieldwork research.

Larissa lies in the north-eastern part of Thessaly, occupying an area of 5,354 square kilometers (see maps in Appendix IX); it is the biggest department in this area, and the second biggest in the country after Aetolia-Akarnania. Its population of 254,295 is the fourth largest in Greece, (after the Departments of Attica, Salonica and Achaia).⁽¹⁾ It has four cities, 160 communities and 272 other minor settlements. The city of Larissa itself (pop. 102,048) is by far the most important urban centre (with the fifth largest population in all of Greece, after Athens, Salonica, Piraeus and Patras); Tyrnavos (pop. 11,118) is the second largest urban centre in the department, and the smaller towns of Farsala with pop. 7,211, and Ellassona with 7,146 are best described as semi-urban centres. Larissa, Tyrnavos, Farsala, Ellassona and Aghia (a rural municipality with pop. 3,454) are the respective centres of the five eparchies into which the Department of Larissa is divided; although

strictly speaking, an eparchy is no longer an administrative unit, the term is still used for the five geographical subdivisions of the Department.

The whole of Thessaly and the Department of Larissa particularly, has always been highly fertile.⁽²⁾ The latter has the largest cultivated acreage in all of Greece, and produces huge quantities of wheat, barley, lentil, sugarbeet, etc. In the north, where the country is mainly mountainous, the Olympus and Ossa ranges allow for cattle-raising as well as forestry; to the south, where the Pinios river flows through the fertile plains of Larissa, the on the average relatively large land holdings, and much-mechanized farming methods account for a high per-acre productivity.⁽³⁾ Alongside the well-developed agriculture there is a considerable industrial sector in and around the city of Larissa, chiefly concerned with processing and canning. Its sugar plant is the biggest of the three in the country, its paper-mill is the only one of its kind in Greece, and there are also factories making lime and cement, carpets and furniture as well as handicraft establishments (clothing, popular art, etc.). As a result, Larissa has become a large administrative, industrial, and transport centre, and is one of the fastest growing urban centres in the country.⁽⁴⁾

Table VI.1 below compares the occupational background of the labour force in the Department of Larissa and nationwide.⁽⁵⁾ Speaking generally, and agriculture aside (which accounts for 41 per cent of the work force), labour distribution in the Department of Larissa does not differ much from that at national level. Following the farmers, the next-largest occupational group are craftsmen and workers (26.63 per cent), with rather fewer scientists (7.26 per cent) and other liberal professionals, merchants (6.75 per cent), etc. Overall, the salaried and liberal professions (39.29 per cent and 41.97 per cent respectively), are more or less balanced. The latter category, which includes the self-

Table VI.1: Occupational Background: A Comparison Between the Country as a Whole and the Department of Larissa

Occupation	Greece		Department of Larissa	
	number	%	number	%
Scientists/other liberal professions	403,400	10.38	6,648	07.26
Managerial jobs, higher administration	62,600	01.61	1,306	01.43
Office staff	334,500	08.60	6,160	06.72
Merchants/Dealers	365,900	09.41	6,187	06.75
Various services	325,100	08.36	5,441	05.94
Farming/cattle-raising	1,027,500	26.43	37,553	41.00
Craftsmen/Workers	1,060,400	27.28	24,390	26.63
Unemployed	286,900	07.38	3,811	04.16
No data	21,400	.55	103	.11
Total	3,887,700	100.00	91,599	100.00
SALARIED PROFESSIONS	1,774,200	45.64	35,990	39.29
LIBERAL PROFESSIONS	1,272,300	32.73	38,446	41.97
INTRA-FAMILY LABOUR	554,300	14.26	13,498	14.74

employed farmers, is slightly larger due to the predominance of agricultural activities in the area, whereas the numerical opposite is true at national level —where the largest group is that of craftsmen and workers (27.28 per cent), closely followed by farming/cattle-raising (26.43 per cent). The Table shows, that the social and economic characteristics of the Department of Larissa combine the features of an important agrarian, as well as a considerable urban and industrial sector— despite the fact that although it has access to the Aegean in the east, it does not have a commercial harbour of its own that would have boosted economic development. (6)

Under the chiflik system prevalent until the land reforms introduced by Venizelos, politics was traditionally in the hands of the notables, the tzakia families, who owned the land and dominated the peasants. (7)

It is not surprising, therefore, that before World War I and even during the interwar years, the majority of the local politicians were influential landowners, who had established personal clienteles and secured their parliamentary seats through the extensive exploitation of vertical, clientelistic relations. This situation has not basically changed with regard to either the conservative or the liberal parties in the post-war years, as we shall see in more detail below;^{'8'} in the absence of mass-organised parties, lawyers and doctors predominated on the party political scene, as well as landowners, who continued to exert considerable influence on the electorate to secure their parliamentary seat.

It should be mentioned that, until its eventual 1949 defeat during the civil war, the Greek Liberation Army ELAS, (which was the military branch of the communist-led Greek Liberation Front EAM) operated from the mountainous areas of central and northern Greece, a substantial part of it in the Olympus and Ossa ranges. For reasons outside the scope of this study, ELAS recruited its forces from among the indigenous population, deployed an intense activity in the area, and exerted great influence on a large section of the inhabitants. In consequence, although the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was outlawed in 1947, the United Democratic Left EDA (formed in 1951) always had one national deputy elected in the Department of Larissa, even after 1974.^{'9'} Moreover, although the election-result profile of the Department of Larissa much resembles the national one, the role of the KKE since 1974 has always been a little better than the party's average record nationwide (see Table VI.3 below).

The 5 March 1950 national election was held almost immediately after the end of the civil war, and resulted in a majority for the centre and liberal forces, which were to establish coalition governments and remain in office until 1952. Not one of the ten elected deputies in the

Department of Larissa belonged to the Democratic Camp (a coalition of the Left, before EDA was created). Seven were of various liberal parties (three of EPEK National Progressive Centre Union, another three of the Liberal Party, and one of George Papandreou's Democratic Socialist Party), and three belonged to the People's Party.⁽¹⁰⁾ In the following election a year later (9 Sept. 1951), five out of the eleven deputies in the Department represented the Greek Rally, another five various liberal parties (four EPEK, one the main Liberal Party), and one the United Democratic Left (EDA).⁽¹¹⁾

Since 1952, the Department of Larissa has been represented by eight deputies in the national assembly —except for the 1956 election, when the Departments of Larissa and Magnesia were conflated into a single 14-seat electoral district (as were also the two Departments of Karditsa and Trikala). In both 1952 and 1956 the seats were shared equally between the Greek Rally and the Liberals in the first case, and between the National Radical Union (ERE) and the Democratic Union (a major coalition of all parties of the opposition including EDA) in the second.⁽¹²⁾ It is noteworthy that with the exception of one ERE deputy (namely, D. Iatridis, a retired army officer and newcomer to politics at the time), all the others had previously been affiliated with either Papagos' Greek Rally or the Liberal Party. Indeed, five out of six of them were either former MPs or candidates of the Greek Rally, whereas one (the doctor N. Papageorgiou) came from the Liberal Party. With regard to the origins of ERE's political personnel in the Department of Larissa, therefore, it can be said that this consisted mainly of former Greek-Rally deputies and politicians —as was the case at national level.⁽¹³⁾

Table VI.2 below presents an overall picture of the allocation of parliamentary seats between the Right, the Centre, and the Left in the Department of Larissa during all elections after the creation of ERE by

C. Karamanlis (with the sole exception of 1956 when, as already mentioned, the Departments of Larissa and Magnesia were conflated). The figures show quite clearly that the election performance of ERE in the Department, followed a pattern very similar to the national one (as presented in section 2.2.5 in ch. 1). They also attest to the exceptional performance of EDA in 1958, when it secured three seats while the parties of the Centre failed completely. After the creation of the Centre Union in 1961, and the subsequent election of violence and fraud in the same year, ERE's strength dropped dramatically, until it received only two seats in the 1964 national election.

Table VI.2: Allocation of Parliamentary Seats in the Department of Larissa during all National Elections after the Creation of ERE

Party/coalition	Election of 19 Feb. 1956	Election of 11 May 1958	Election of 29 Oct. 1961	Election of 3 Nov. 1963	Election of 16 Feb. 1964
Right ^a	7	5	5	4	2
Centre ^b	7	--	2	3	5
Left ^c	--	3	1	1	1
Total	14	8	8	8	8

- Notes: (a) This means ERE in all elections, except in 1964, which ERE fought in coalition with Markesinis' Party of Progressive People (KP).
 (b) In 1956 this was the Democratic Union (DE), a broad coalition of the opposition parties including EDA; in 1958 it was the Liberal Party together with the Progressive Rural Democratic Union (PADE); in 1961 it was a Centre Union/KP coalition; and in 1963 and 1964 it was the Centre Union alone.
 (c) In 1958, 1963 and 1964 this was EDA alone; in 1956 EDA allied with DE; and in 1961 it was a coalition of EDA with the National Rural Party (EAK).

The composition of ERE's parliamentary personnel did not change very much over the 1956-1964 period. In 1958, four of the five deputies had been elected previously (these were the lawyers S. Efstratiadis, G. Kakayiannis and C. Rodopoulos, and the military officer —retired— D. Iatridis); the one newcomer was a journalist (C. Grammatidis). In 1961, ERE again had five deputies elected (the same three lawyers and

journalist, plus the physician A. Messinis).^{'14'} In 1963 the party secured three seats (C. Grammatidis, C. Rodopoulos, and C. Kitsidis, who was a higher civil servant, namely a government-appointed prefect); and by 1964 it managed only two deputies, C. Rodopoulos and C. Kitsidis.^{'15'}

Concerning the party organisation in the Department prior to 1967, it must be said that there was none during the whole period. In the beginning, due to the special local socio-economic circumstances, it was the big landowners who had manipulated the popular vote and assured their political career; later, during the 1950s and '60s, when industrial and capitalist development gathered momentum —although in a manner that differentiated it from capitalist development proper (i.e., failure to modernise agriculture, a weak secondary sector, and the creation of an unproductive, corrupt and overinflated tertiary sector, as outlined in section 2.1.1 in ch. 1)— it was primarily lawyers and doctors who had succeeded the landowners in dominating the popular will by establishing vertical clientelistic relations. Neither the ERE nor the Centre Union attempted to create local organisations, and the only intermediaries between the voters and the parties were various local political barons, serving one or another deputy.^{'16'} This also explains why the prominent ERE deputy C. Grammatidis was able to abandon ERE in 1964 and still manage to hold on to his parliamentary seat as a Centre Union MP (see footnote 15 above).

As was also the case with ERE, ND's election performance in the Department of Larissa followed a trend very similar to that at national level during all national elections held since 1974. Furthermore, as shown by Table VI.3 below, the Department of Larissa closely resembles the country as a whole where New Democracy and PASOK are concerned; the figures for these two parties are slightly below their national record, whereas the communist Left and the ultra-Right are over-

represented —a long-lasting consequence of the internecine terror of the 1945-1949 civil war.⁽¹⁷⁾

Table VI.3: Post-1974 Election Results in the City of Larissa, Kalohori, Department of Larissa, and Greece

Year	City of Larissa			Kalohori			Dept of Larissa			Greece		
	ND	PASOK	LEFT ^c	ND	PASOK	LEFT ^c	ND	PASOK	LEFT ^c	ND	PASOK	LEFT ^c
1974	49.31	11.97	16.78	52.39	21.22	05.17	53.66	13.37	11.88	54.37	13.58	09.47
1977	38.41	19.97	24.63	39.11	31.98	13.29	36.90	22.31	17.38	41.84	25.34	12.08
1981	31.19	46.38	19.44	33.19	52.73	12.81	36.20	45.06	16.32	35.87	48.07	12.27
1985	38.20	43.15	17.65	42.97	45.17	11.11	39.21	44.00	15.57	40.84	45.82	11.73
1989 ^a	40.96	35.27	20.58	44.96	42.63	11.10	42.25	38.47	16.89	44.25	39.15	13.12
1989 ^b	43.80	37.47	17.60	47.20	42.13	10.13	44.91	39.53	14.48	46.19	40.67	10.97
1990	44.20	35.89	16.99	47.23	42.07	09.70	45.04	38.39	14.45	46.89	38.61	10.28

Notes: (a) 18 June 1989, and

(b) 5 November 1989 national election.

(c) In 1974 this was the United Left (EA); in 1977, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) together with the Alliance of the Left and the Progressive Forces; in 1981 and 1985, KKE and the Euro-Communist KKE of the Interior; and since 1989 the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN).

Overall then, as evident from Tables VI.1 and 3, both the socio-economic and the political characteristics in the Department of Larissa closely matched the national ones. This is not to say, of course, that this department was and is merely the exact image on a reduced scale of the national model. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that the views and attitudes expressed by the rank-and-file party members (which are dealt with in greater detail below), have not only reflected ND's in this particular department but may, in a more comprehensive sense, be seen as quite typical of ND-grassroots characteristics at the national level.⁽¹⁸⁾

2. ND's Political Personnel and the Creation and Development of the Organisation in the Department of Larissa

As discussed earlier (see section 1 in ch. 3), ND was a personal creation of Karamanlis himself, who in 1974 chose not to revive his old ERE party but to set up what he claimed was an entirely new one. Prior to the existence of any kind of party organisation Karamanlis depended on a considerable number of politicians who had begun their careers before the 1967 take-over by the military dictatorship; he also included in the party lists a good many young and relatively unknown newcomers without any political past whatsoever (see Tables III.1, 1a, 3, and 3a, in ch. 3). This pattern is perfectly clear also in the Department of Larissa, as discussed below.

After the fall of the junta in 1974 there was quite simply too much to do trying to restore democracy to leave room for any real party organisation or ideological campaign —in Larissa as elsewhere. (The communist parties were freer in this respect, and to a lesser extent also PASOK, and in consequence were the only organised political formations at the time.) So the newly formed New Democracy was manned by the politicians who had belonged to ERE before 1967, as well as some newcomers who were just entering politics in 1974. Shortly before the November 1974 national election, the party's ballot for the Department of Larissa comprised eight candidates, three of whom had established their political careers before 1967, and five newcomers: The older politicians were S. Efstratiadis (lawyer and ERE deputy in 1956, 1958 and 1961), V. Karabilias (lawyer, Greek Rally deputy in 1952, and ERE-candidate thereafter), and V. Papazissis (doctor, Liberal Party deputy in 1956, and candidate for the Liberal Party in 1958 and for the Centre Union in 1961 and 1964).⁽¹⁹⁾ The newcomers were the landowners G. Garanis and V. Fassoulas, lawyers E. Kyriakou and D. Papagiannis, and

civil engineer G. Souflias. ND secured five out of the eight seats, and it is interesting that of the three established politicians only Efstratiadis was elected, whereas four of the five newcomers were sent to parliament.⁽²⁰⁾

It was around the more or less prominent political figures in the area that some kind of party organisation initially developed. Although ND had established its first departmental organisation in Larissa as early as 1975, this never functioned as an impersonal, bureaucratic institution, nor did it perform the role of intermediary between the higher party echelons and the rank and file. Instead, party MPs and local politicians kept creating clientelistic networks, and so controlled the popular vote through the selective distribution of favours and spoils inherent in governmental power. As the first president of the departmental committee in Larissa said,

"From the moment I became president of the departmental committee I saw that the party deputies enjoyed the greatest power, keeping a tight control over the local organisations by appointing their own men to key-posts. But in this way, they discouraged all serious, trustworthy, and respectable people, who could really have offered a great deal if they had joined the party".⁽²¹⁾

Thus deputocracy and patron-client relations flourished in the area in the early post-1974 years almost to the same extent as before 1967. The four deputies ND sent to parliament in 1977 were: civil engineer A. Efstratiadis, who had inherited the political clientele of his brother who had died in the meantime; journalist C. Grammatidis, who had transferred his allegiance and personal voters from the Centre Union to ND but was easily elected all the same;⁽²²⁾ G. Souflias, whose second term in parliament this was and whose political career is still continuing today; and lawyer E. Kyriakou, who had failed to be elected in 1974 and was now entering parliament for the first time.

The creation of the Volvi Movement shortly before the 1977 election was the only sign that there were some members in the party ranks who advocated a proper party organisation, ND's disentanglement and independence from the personality of its leader, and the general modernisation and transformation of ND from a personalistic party of local political barons to a political organisation of principles.⁽²³⁾ Nevertheless, the party leadership proved stronger than the Movement, and at the first open Volvi congress in Larissa in 1978 all its members were expelled from the party overnight. One year later, and in view of the ominous rise of PASOK, most of the Volvi supporters rejoined ND; their demands for proper organisation and political modernisation remained to be dealt with at some future time.

It is interesting to note that many of the Larissa ND members chose to follow the Volvi Movement in 1976, and that almost all of them returned to the party in 1979. Even those who did not officially join the Volvi Movement in practice agreed with most of its demands.⁽²⁴⁾ This may be one of the main reasons why the organisation in the Department of Larissa never split, neither was there mutual animosity among its ND members on this score. On the contrary, as long as personalistic politics, deputation and clientelism were able to flourish, the Movement's demands for modernisation were heard —as late as even shortly before the June 1989 election, almost ten years after the Volvi Movement had been dissolved.

ND, following its nationwide expansion strategy, fought the 1981 election in the Department of Larissa enlarged on both its right and left wing. Out of its ten candidates, two had fought the previous election under the banner of the ultra-right National Camp (EP), another two originated from the Centre Union/New Forces and the Union of Democratic Centre (EDIK) respectively, four were former ND deputies, and another two came from the local organisation, namely lawyers N. Katsaros

(former president of the departmental administrative committee) and E. Groussopoulos (a member of that committee). In this election, which ND failed to win, the party lost the fourth seat in the Department to PASOK, and had three deputies elected —G. Souflias, N. Katsaros, and A. Efstratiadis. The same picture emerged from the 1985 election; PASOK remained in office for another four years, and ND again had the same three deputies from Larissa. (For the election results in all these elections see Table VI.3 above.)

As already discussed, real power —at least during ND's first period in office (1974-1981)— lay with prominent party-political figures, and it was around the local offices of the ND deputies that organisation in the area began to develop. This continued until 1985, when the party itself made a more serious effort to organise properly. According to an ND-candidate for the June 1989 election:

"After 1981, under the leadership of E. Averoff, the party began to organise. Nevertheless, even shortly before the 1985 election (which ND eventually lost), the party still suffered from immense organisational weaknesses and inefficiency..., both of which to some extent persist today".⁽²⁵⁾

Nevertheless, little by little after 1981, and particularly after 1985, the party began to develop its grass-roots organisation and to establish the first local branches which, as we shall see below, coexisted alongside the offices of ND deputies and politicians in the area. By 1989, ND had established 96 local committees (TE) and claimed a membership in the Department of Larissa of almost 7,000.⁽²⁶⁾

Before we examine the views and attitudes of the ND party members in detail, something must be said concerning the party organisation in the city of Larissa and the village of Kalohori, where the fieldwork research was conducted. The ND departmental committee in Larissa city claimed 4,828 members in 1989, serving on over fourteen local

committees. Larissa and suburbs consists of fourteen separate neighbourhoods including the city centre, and there is one local committee in each neighbourhood. All local committees and their membership are shown in Table VI.4 below.⁽²⁷⁾

Table VI.4: ND Organisation in Larissa and Kalohori in 1989: Local Committees and their Membership

Local Committee (TE) in:	Number of Members		
	Men	Women	Total
Philippoupolis	330	150	480
Neapolis	145	55	400
Anthoupolis	200	100	300
Ag. Konstantinos	---	---	600
Pyrovolika	---	---	127
Hippocrates	---	---	233
Averoff	78	30	108
Ag. Georgios	130	100	230
Ambelokipoi	118	80	198
Nea Smyrni	---	---	175
Neraida	---	---	209
40 Martyres	170	100	270
Haravghi	---	---	238
City Centre	---	---	1260
Total	---	---	4828
TE of Kalohori	40	10	50
Sum total	---	---	4878

In the rest of this chapter we shall examine in detail the personal specifics of the rank-and-file members (sex, occupation, age, party age, etc.), and also their views and attitudes concerning the party organisation and its policies (the pros and cons of the local party-organisational structure and functioning, participation in the decision-making process, attitudes towards the party MPs and leadership, and so forth). All information and data are based on the answers given by 158 party members (137 from Larissa and 21 from Kalohori), and are presented analytically in Appendix VIII of this study.⁽²⁸⁾ It must be stressed however, that due to the practical limitations imposed on the author while conducting this research, the data obtained should be treated as illustrative and be always interpreted with caution as to its statistical precision (see footnote 28 above).

3. The Local Party Organisation in Larissa and Kalohori

3.1 Party members' socio-economic and political particulars

As we noted when examining women's representation in parliament and the central and departmental committees of ND (section 3, ch. 3), politics has remained the almost exclusive domain of men. In Larissa and Kalohori, however, women have been much more to the fore (Table VI.5 below) although men still outnumber them easily. As is to be expected, the women are most numerous in Larissa (whose ratio to men is almost 1:2), given that in a city traditional habits can more easily give way to modernisation and change. (This cannot be said of Kalohori.) The average percentage of 30.38 is the highest representation of women in any ND party organ we have come across so far.⁽²⁹⁾

Table VI.5: Men and Women in the ND Organisation in Larissa and Kalohori

Sex	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Male	92	67.15	18	85.71	110	69.62
Female	45	32.85	3	14.29	48	30.38
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

The mean age of the members (Table VI. 6) resembles that of the party's parliamentary group in 1989-1990 (see Table III.8 in ch. 3), but with 44.12 years is even more youthful in the grass-roots organisations. Almost one-third of the party members both in Larissa and in Kalohori are between 35 and 44 years old, the second largest group is between 45 and 54, and those under 35 are more numerous than those over 55. It seems, however, that the party does not appeal as much to students, young professionals or unemployed and younger people generally (see also Table VI.7 below), as it does to adults with an established job. This is corroborated by the fact that although ONNED, ND's youth organisation,

claimed 400 members in Larissa in August 1989, this far from dazzling number, meant very little indeed in terms of ONNED's impact.⁽³⁰⁾

Table VI.6: Age Distribution of ND Members in Larissa and Kalohori

Age	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Under 35	25	18.25	6	28.57	31	19.62
35-44	41	29.92	10	47.62	51	32.28
45-54	38	27.74	4	19.05	42	26.58
55-64	22	16.06	1	04.76	23	14.56
65-over	3	02.19	--	---	3	01.90
No answer	8	05.84	--	---	8	05.06
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00
Average	44.62		41.05		44.12	

An unusual picture emerges when we examine the occupational composition of the rank and file (Table VI.7 below). Lawyers are missing altogether, and the representation of doctors, engineers and industrialists is insignificant.⁽³¹⁾ Instead, middle and lower-rank employees constitute the largest group, amounting to almost 30 per cent, farmers and workers together total 26 per cent (in Kalohori, which is predominantly agricultural, farmers alone amount to 57.17 per cent), and 14.56 per cent are housewives; merchants and artisans make up smaller occupational categories (little more than 6 and 3 per cent respectively), whereas some 9 per cent of the total did not mention any occupation, and only two members in Larissa said that they were unemployed.⁽³²⁾

Contrary therefore to the occupational background of ND's parliamentary group and other higher party organs (see Tables III.11, 12, 13 and 16 in ch. 3), the liberal professions no longer predominate in the grass-roots organisation of the Department of Larissa. It is


Table VI.7: Occupational Background of ND Members in Larissa and Kalohori

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Lawyers	--	---	--	---	--	---
Doctors	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Engineers	4	02.92	--	---	4	02.53
Ship'g/Industry	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Businessmen	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
Merchants	1	.73	1	04.76	2	01.27
Landowners	--	---	--	---	--	---
Farmers	9	06.57	12	57.15	21	13.29
High Rank Emp.	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27
Middle/Lower Emp.	45	32.84	1	04.76	46	29.11
Workers	19	13.87	1	04.76	20	12.66
Univ. Prof.	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Teachers	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Students	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27
Artisans	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
Military	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27
Miscellaneous	3	02.19	--	---	3	01.90
Housewives	21	15.33	2	09.53	23	14.56
No data/unemployed	8/2:10	07.30	4/-: 4	19.04	12/2:14	08.86
<u>Total</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>100.00</u>
SALARIED PROF.	71	51.82	2	09.53	73	46.20
LIBERAL PROF.	35	25.55	13	61.90	48	30.38
HOUSEWIVES	21	15.33	2	09.53	23	14.56
NO DATA/UNEMPLOYED	10	07.30	4	19.04	14	08.86
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>100.00</u>

people engaged in business, large or small, who constitute the largest category (see Table III.17), together with people from a petty-bourgeois or middle- and lower-class background. The party members in salaried professions, although they do not constitute the absolute majority, still amount to over 46 per cent, and are much more numerous than their counterparts in ND's 1991 central committee and 1990 parliamentary group (12.99 per cent and 18.42 per cent respectively, see Tables III.12 and 16 in ch. 3). There is then a significant imbalance between the higher, middle, and lower party echelons with respect to their occupational and social backgrounds, which is very obvious in the diagram in Figure 6.1 below.

The horizontal axis represents the party ranks, and the vertical axis marks the percentage of professions. We take our sample of the Larissa grass-roots (158 members) to represent the lower party ranks, the 70 elected presidents of ND's departmental committees in 1991 as the

Figure 6.1: Distribution of Salaried and Liberal Professions across ND



middle, and ND's 1990 parliamentary group (152 deputies) as the higher ones. (See also Table VI.7 above, Tables III.16, and III.12 in ch. 3 for the lower, middle and higher ranks respectively.) The picture we obtain shows that salaried and liberal professions are more equally distributed in the lower and middle party ranks, but diverge considerably in the higher party echelons. Moreover, the salaried professions decline as we move from the lower to the higher party ranks, whereas exactly the opposite is true for the liberal ones. By and large, then, we may consider ND as the catch-all party its leadership claims it to be, since its social base does not represent some particular class or classes, but comprises people from a wide socio-economic background. As far as its highest echelons are concerned, it seems that ND is staffed by people with an upper-class, bourgeois social origin, and this holds true not only for the party's 1990 parliamentary group but —contrary to the case of PASOK— also for its 1991 central committee (see Table III.16 in ch. 3).

The establishment and development of the organisation in Larissa followed the same trend we have already identified nationwide. During the entire first period of ND in government (1974-1981) the party neglected almost everything to do with its organisational base; despite its preliminary and full congresses in 1977 and 1979, ND had failed to attract a sufficient number of party members to develop an active organisation, like that of its main rival PASOK. Table VI.8 below presents an illuminating picture of the situation. More than 40 per cent of the rank-and-file members in the Department of Larissa joined ND between 1981 and 1985 (that is, after the party had ceased to govern), and another 32.91 per cent did so after 1985. Conversely, only 17 per cent of the party members can be considered as founding members, having joined in the early years of ND's existence, while very few indeed joined between 1977 and 1981. The somewhat different picture in

Table VI.8: Year of Registering ND Membership

<u>Year of registration</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Before 1977	22	16.06	5	23.81	27	17.09
Between 1977 and 1981	6	04.38	8	38.09	14	08.86
Between 1981 and 1985	57	41.60	8	38.09	65	41.14
After 1985	52	37.96	--	---	52	32.91
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00
Average party age	6.65		9.7		7.06	

Kalohori, is explained by remembering that it is generally easier to organise in a small village, where people more or less know each other and communicate on a more permanent and frequent basis.⁽³³⁾

The overwhelming majority of the rank and file had no previous party political participation whatsoever, as the data in Table VI.9 indicate. Not one member in Kalohori and only five (3.65 per cent) in Larissa had previously been members of other political parties (all had belonged to Karamanlis' National Radical Union, ERE, and/or its youth organisation,

Table VI.9: Previous Party Political Participation

<u>Other party membership</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
No	132	96.35	21	100.00	153	96.84
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

EREN). As regards non-political affiliations, on the other hand, the data in Table VI.10 below show that the majority (55.06 per cent) of the rank-and-file in the area do not belong to such organisations as trade unions, co-operatives, etc. In Larissa, most of those who mention participation in non-political organisations are trade-union members

(21.90 per cent), whereas the majority of their colleagues in Kalohori (42.86 per cent) belong to agricultural unions and co-operatives. Tables VI.8, 9 and 10 show, therefore, that the great majority of ND members in the Department of Larissa have had no previous political participation and experience, that they entered politics rather late, and most of them directly through their party and not through other social or labour organisations.⁽³⁴⁾

Table VI.10: Participation in Non-Political Organisations

Non-political membership	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes	57	41.61	14	66.67	71	44.94
Trade union	30	21.90	1	04.76	31	19.62
Agricultural union/co-operative	9	06.57	9	42.86	18	11.39
Employers' federation	--	---	--	---	--	---
Professional association	15	10.95	4	19.05	19	12.03
Non-professional association	15	10.95	--	---	15	09.49
No	80	58.39	7	33.33	87	55.06
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

Lastly, it should be remembered that it was ideological identification with ND as well as family tradition that were major factors impelling party members in the Department of Larissa to join (see also Table V.3 in ch. 5). Karamanlis' personal charisma to a greater extent, and the quality of party officials and deputies to a lesser, have also played their part in motivating potential members to join the party (25.95 per cent and 9.49 per cent respectively), as the data in Table VI.11 below show.⁽³⁵⁾

Table VI.11: Major Reasons for Joining the ND Party

<u>Reasons for joining ND</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Personal ideological identification	85	62.04	9	42.86	94	59.49
Family ideological identification	67	48.91	8	38.09	75	47.47
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal	36	26.28	5	23.81	41	25.95
Organisational development of ND	20	14.60	--	---	20	12.66
Personal quality of party officials and deputies	13	09.49	2	09.52	15	09.49
Counterbalancing PASOK's organisational performance	7	05.11	1	04.76	8	05.06
Influence of friends and/or relatives	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
Other	8	05.84	--	---	8	05.06

3.2 Party members' appraisal of their local organisation

When we discussed the party's political personnel, organisation, and ideology in previous chapters of this study, we also took into account the views and attitudes of the party base, albeit rather broadly. In this section, we shall show in much more detail how today's rank and file in Larissa and Kalohori view their party organisation and how they perceive the basic tenets of its ideology and various policies. To begin with, let us recall that the overwhelming majority—a little over 93 per cent—of the rank and file both in Larissa and Kalohori acknowledge that the party's grass-roots organisation since 1981 differs considerably from what it had been between 1974 and 1981; a mere 1.9 per cent think differently (see Table IV.1 in ch. 4 and Appendix VIII). Of the majority, a little over 12 per cent think that the organisation underwent a merely qualitative change and simply became better after 1981; the bulk, however (almost 68 per cent of the party members), believe that during ND's first period in government party organisation was virtually non-existent, and that it was developed only after their

party had gone into opposition —and mainly in order to combat PASOK which was organised much more effectively.

The large majority of Larissa party members claim that they attend ND meetings regularly and fairly often, although in Kalohori over half of the members do not attend regularly. The reason for this may be, that in a village people communicate and socialise with each other on a much more continuous and permanent basis than in a city; or, that the local organisation in Kalohori does not perform the role provided by the statutes, for reasons we shall explain below.

By and large, some 80 per cent of the rank and file claim that they spend much time on local organisational activities, as against the remaining 20 per cent who do not. Nevertheless, the general impression gained from numerous discussions with mostly ordinary members but also higher party officials in the area is that this picture does not exactly reflect reality; intense organisational activity is observed mainly before general elections when new members register, most likely in order to establish a future personal claim —of a clientelistic character, it is true— in case the party is voted into office;⁽³⁶⁾ or, more often, just before intra-party elections, when new members are taken in *en masse* and contrary to the statutory provisions, solely in

Table VI.12: Party Members' Attendance at Organisation Meetings

Regularity of participation	Larissa		Kalohori		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes	117	85.40	9	42.86	126	79.75
Once a week or more often	47	34.30	--	---	47	29.75
Once a fortnight	26	18.98	2	09.52	28	17.72
Once a month	34	24.82	5	23.81	39	24.68
Every three months or less often	10	07.30	2	09.52	12	07.60
No	20	14.60	12	57.14	32	20.25
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

order to vote for their relatives, friends and acquaintances.⁽³⁷⁾ In both cases, once the election is over, their party-activities are also.

Since elections were not very far away at the time of the interviews, organisational issues in general —better co-ordination and communication, the functioning and efficiency of the local organisation— were the most important issues the majority of the Larissa party members (39.24 per cent) said their organisation had dealt with during 1988 (see Table VI.13 below).⁽³⁸⁾ The second major issue mentioned was information and briefing on ND's political programme and future governmental policies, and on the present political situation (37.34 per cent and 22.15 per cent respectively). This was closely followed by efforts made by the local committees to collect the subscription fees, but also by the rank and file and other supporters to raise funds for financing the party's election campaign (32.28 per cent). Additional activities of the local organisations were the

Table VI.13: Major Activities of the Local ND Organisation During 1988

Most important issue	Larissa		Kalohori		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Organisational issues (communication/co-ordination, efficiency, new members' registration)	60	43.80	2	09.52	62	39.24
Information and briefing the party members on ND's political programme	58	42.34	1	04.76	59	37.34
Financial campaign of the party	50	36.50	1	04.76	51	32.28
Dissemination and propaganda (inform people about ND's political programme, attract new voters)	36	26.28	2	09.52	38	24.05
Briefing on the current political situation	34	24.82	1	04.76	35	22.15
Talks and public meetings on local issues (agriculture, labour, etc.)	22	16.06	5	23.81	27	17.09
None/Don't know	11	08.03	8	38.09	19	12.03
Other	6	04.38	3	14.29	9	05.70

dissemination of and propaganda for the party's programme and policies in order to attract new voters (24.05 per cent), as well as public meetings and talks concerning issues of special local interest (17.09 per cent).

Although prior to elections all party organisations are in full swing, with new members appearing in the party register, and some who have become inactive returning to the front-line, over 8 per cent of the rank and file in Larissa and, most surprisingly, 38 per cent of those in Kalohori said their organisation had dealt with virtually nothing important during the past year or, at least, that they had no idea whether it had or not. Notwithstanding the specific problems and shortcomings concerning ND local organisations in the area, which we shall discuss below (and which to some extent explain the ND members' indifference), it should be noted that the majority of these members both in Larissa and in Kalohori admitted that they never attended any meeting of their local organisations (seven and six members respectively).

The data of Tables VI.14 and 15 below reveal, we think, a highly illuminating picture concerning the activities, efficiency and overall development of ND's organisation in the Department. As is shown in Table VI.14, more than 75 per cent of the party's rank and file think that their organisation has one or more problems, whereas only a little over a fifth think otherwise. The drawbacks of major importance —i.e., insufficient financing, lack of professional cadres and discipline among the rank and file, poor communication between the base and the higher echelons of the party hierarchy, and lack of respect for intra-party democratic procedures in decision-making— are precisely the characteristics of a relatively new organisation that is not yet institutionalised and has to overcome a good many mal-practices and outmoded traditions —they can be summed up under the label

Table VI.14: Current Major Problems of the Local Organisation

<u>Problems of the local organisation</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Financial problems	72	52.55	2	09.52	74	46.84
None/Don't know	31	22.63	4	19.05	35	22.15
Lack of professional party-officials, renewal in general	23	16.79	1	04.76	24	15.19
Lack of disciplined and politically educated party members	14	10.22	9	42.86	23	14.56
Poor communication between base and higher party organs	16	11.68	5	23.81	21	13.29
Lack of internal democratic procedures, personal antagonisms, nepotism, and <u>paleokommatismós</u>	18	13.14	--	---	18	11.39
General inactivity/inefficiency	14	10.22	3	14.29	17	10.76
Difficulties in attracting and registering new members	9	06.57	2	09.52	11	06.96
Other	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16

paleokommatismós.⁽³⁹⁾ Indeed, when financial shortage is regarded as the most important problem (which simply means that party members do not even pay their standard subscription fees), it follows that this kind of local organisation is anything but efficient; when party members themselves fail to meet their minimal obligations, then the organisation as a whole will suffer from general indifference, inactivity, lack of professional and disciplined members, and poor communication between the higher and lower party levels.⁽⁴⁰⁾

This does not mean, of course, that if there were no problems of a financial nature all the others would be solved automatically; in the local organisation of Kalohori it is the lack of politically educated and disciplined party members that is given major importance, and poor communication between the party base and the higher party organs as well as general inefficiency and inactivity are considered more serious than

financial shortages (which are ranked in fourth place, alongside the difficulties of attracting and registering new members). It would appear that all the characteristic features of traditional party politics—prevalence of patron-client relations, the predominance of the local deputies, political barons and personalistic politics in general, and the absence of any form of impersonal party organisation in the area—have been indelibly stamped on people's minds and habits, and are still affecting ND's organisational functioning and further development.⁽⁴¹⁾

The above argument is supported by the ND party members' general attitude vis-à-vis their local organisations in the Department of Larissa, as this is set out in Tables VI.15 and 15a below.⁽⁴²⁾ Notwithstanding minor differences—the majority of the rank and file in Larissa (57.66 per cent) are satisfied with the overall performance and activities of their local party organisations, whereas only a minority (33.33 per cent) is in Kalohori)—the general impression is that members' opinions are divided: a little over half of them are more or less satisfied, with the remainder only partly so (37.34 per cent) or not at all (8.23 per cent). The most widespread wish among the latter is that they would like their local organisation to be more active, lively and efficient; more information and briefing on issues of political and ideological interest to the rank and file comes second, and greater emphasis on democratic principles and meritocracy in the functioning and decision-making within the organisation is third. Lastly, ND members

Table VI.15: General Attitude Towards the Local ND Organisation

Degree of Satisfaction	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Satisfied	79	57.66	7	33.33	86	54.43
Partly satisfied	49	35.77	10	47.62	59	37.34
Dissatisfied	9	06.57	4	19.05	13	08.23
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

Table VI.15a: Major Expectations of the Rank-and-file Party Members

Major expectations	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
More efficient activity and liveliness of the local organisation	32	23.36	3	14.29	35	22.15
More information and briefings on political and ideological issues to rank-and-file members	21	15.33	2	09.52	23	14.56
Emphasis on democratic principles and meritocracy instead of nepotism	14	10.22	1	04.76	15	09.49
Renewal of party-officials, greater professionalism	11	08.03	2	09.52	13	08.23
Other	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16

would like to see their party employ new political personnel of a professional and managerial kind and more modern methods, and to dissociate itself from the traditional political barons and their outworn practices.

A further point to be made concerning the rank-and-file members' attitude vis-à-vis the party leadership is this: '43' although the majority believe the ND leadership to differ —entirely or in part— from that of other parties, there is a significant divergence of opinions between the Larissa and Kalohori members. As shown in Table VI.16 below, only 5.84 per cent of the Larissa ND members see no difference whatsoever, as against a startling 42.86 per cent of their counterparts in Kalohori who thereby prove themselves to be more pragmatic and better informed on this issue. (For a discussion of the way the ND leadership functions and makes decisions, see section 4 in ch. 4.) Moreover, party members in Larissa consider the differences to be more a matter of values such as seriousness and responsibility, tradition, logic, dignity, etc. (all of which they see as characterising the ND leadership), and less a matter of observing internal democratic

Table VI.16: ND Members' Attitudes Towards the Party Leadership

Difference between the ND leadership and that of other parties	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes	110	80.29	7	33.33	117	74.05
Some	17	12.41	3	14.29	20	12.66
No	8	05.84	9	42.86	17	10.76
Don't know	2	01.46	2	09.52	4	02.53
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

If yes/some, this is because:

it is characterised by seriousness and responsibility, descent performance, dignity and morality, tradition, logic, prestige and quality	83	60.58	2	09.52	85	53.80
it is democratically elected, its options can be questioned, it is not autarchic	49	35.77	7	33.33	56	35.44
Other	8	05.84	1	04.76	9	05.70

procedures in decision-making —whereas the Kalohori party members think exactly the opposite. All in all, for the majority of the party members in the Department of Larissa the ND party leadership differs from those of the other parties —particularly that of PASOK and its leader A. Papandreou (who was generally denounced for being autarchic, despotic and unethical)— not so much because it functions democratically, but because, in their view, it presents a more congenial and familiar profile that reflects all the values they have traditionally considered as true, important, and trustworthy.

This point of view is born out by the party members' replies (in Table VI.17 below) concerning the specific reasons for ND's appeal to the voters.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Half of the rank and file (46.71 per cent in Larissa, and 66.67 per cent in Kalohori) believe that the most important reason for ND's appeal to the electorate is the very same one that, in their

Table VI.17: Most Important Reasons for ND's Appeal to the Electorate

<u>Reasons for ND's voter-appeal</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Reliability/sense of responsibility, ND's option for tranquility, order and security, anti-extremism	64	46.71	14	66.67	79	50.00
Ideology	66	48.17	1	04.76	67	42.41
Political/economic programme	63	45.98	--	---	63	39.87
Leadership	35	25.55	2	09.52	37	23.42
Organisation	25	18.25	1	04.76	26	16.46
Activities of ND deputies in their constituencies	22	16.06	1	04.76	23	14.56
Other	10	07.30	4	19.05	14	08.86

view, characterised and differentiated the ND leadership from that of the other parties (see Table VI.16 above); the party leadership itself is given second place in Kalohori and fourth in the Department, and the organisation ranks fifth. The ND ideology is considered as the second most appealing feature (by 42.41 per cent of the rank and file), mainly because for Larissa party members ideological reasons have the highest priority (48.17 per cent). The party's political and economic programme ranks third in importance in the Department (39.87 per cent), although not a single member in Kalohori thought it worth mentioning. Last but not least, the activities of ND deputies and politicians in each constituency are thought to contribute to shaping an appealing profile for the party by 14.56 per cent of the rank and file. This brings us to the issue of clientelistic relations as perceived by the party base in the Department, which is discussed in what follows.

3.3 Party members' attitudes towards more general political and ideological issues

One of the most salient characteristics of Greek politics prior to the imposition of military rule in 1967 was the absence of any form of party-political organisations, and the total control politicians exerted over their voters through the extensive use of clientelistic relations. In the early years after the restoration of democracy in 1974 this situation cannot be said to have changed much; since ND had failed to create a mass-organisation, patron-client relationships and personal favours in exchange for the people's vote (rousfeti) continued to play an important role.⁽⁴⁵⁾ That the Department of Larissa was no exception in this respect is shown by the data in Table VI.18 below.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Table VI.18: Maintenance of Clientelistic Relations Under ND Governments 1974-1981

	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Was there clientelism?						
Yes	39	28.47	15	71.43	54	34.18
No	9	06.57	1	04.76	10	06.33
In part	54	39.41	2	09.52	56	35.44
Don't know	35	25.55	3	14.29	38	24.05
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

If yes/in part, to what extent?

The same as before	23	16.79	14	66.67	37	23.42
A shift to some degree of meritocracy and the rationalisation of political life	62	45.25	2	09.52	64	40.50
Other	8	05.84	1	04.76	9	05.70

If no, what has happened instead?

<u>Rousfeti</u> was abolished in favour of meritocracy	7	05.11	1	04.76	8	05.06
Other	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27

A mere 5.06 per cent of the party members in the area believe that rousfeti has been abolished, and clientelism ceased to be of any importance in everyday political life after 1974 and during the whole first period of ND in office. Notwithstanding the relatively high percentage of those who chose not to give a definite answer (38 members, almost a quarter of the total),⁽⁴⁷⁾ the large majority (nearly 70 per cent) considered that clientelistic practices were still operating. However, many (40.50 per cent), thought clientelism had begun to lessen, and that political contacts and acquaintances no longer secured access to public appointments etc. to the extent they had in the past; little by little criteria of merit were also being taken into account now. A smaller percentage (23.42 per cent) thought that there had been no change at all, and that clientelism after 1974 had kept its full importance from the pre-coup period.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Concerning the existence of clientelistic relations during PASOK's period in office, it seems at first glance that the opinions of the rank and file in Larissa are deeply divided. As Table VI.19 below shows, half of the party members believe that patron-client relationships continued to exist to more or less the same extent as in the past, whereas one-third (31.01 per cent) think differently. However, closer examination of the latter's opinion reveals that they have identified the remarkably distinct phenomenon, we have already described as "party-directed patronage", or "bureaucratic clientelism". In other words, under PASOK government the special relationship between the deputy and the voter disintegrated in favour of the organised party machine, which has now become the main patron for the distribution of spoils and favours to the party followers, and for control over public appointments.⁽⁴⁹⁾

All in all, the overwhelming majority (slightly over 80 per cent) of the rank and file agree that not only did patron-client relations

Table VI.19: Maintenance of Clientelistic Relations Under PASOK Governments 1981-1989

	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
<u>Was there clientelism?</u>						
Yes	52	37.96	17	80.96	69	43.67
No	47	34.30	2	09.52	49	31.01
In part	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
Don't know	28	20.44	2	09.52	30	18.99
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

If yes/in part, to what extent?

The same as before	44	32.12	17	80.96	61	38.61
A shift to some degree of meritocracy and the rationalisation of political life	12	08.76	--	---	12	07.60
Other	6	04.38	--	---	6	03.79

If no, what has happened instead?

<u>Rousfeti</u> was institutionalised by PASOK's local and other organisations	46	33.57	2	09.52	48	30.38
Other	1	.73	--	---	1	.63

continue to exist during PASOK's period in government, but that they were institutionalised via the organised party machine. On the other hand, PASOK proudly claimed that it had struck clientelism a considerable blow with the introduction of the so-called list system, whereby it was the party that decided who would stand for parliament. In other words, the electorate could no longer match a preference-cross for one particular candidate, but only vote for the party as a whole; the lists of candidates and, most important, their order of appearance, were to be drawn up solely by each party leadership separately.⁽⁵⁰⁾

It seems that for most of the rank and file in Larissa the abolition of the old preference-cross and introduction of the new system did not serve the purpose its inventors expected.⁽⁵¹⁾ As shown in Table VI.20

below, only 22 per cent of them thought that the new list system promoted political morality and modernised the country's political life. More specifically, under 9 per cent believed that the political struggle in general was improved and rationalised; 6.33 per cent said that rousfeti practices were no longer quite as common as in the past; and

Table VI.20: ND Members' Views Concerning the Abolition of the Preference Cross (by PASOK in 1985)

Modernisation/ Improvement of Politics	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes	19	13.87	6	28.57	25	15.82
In part	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
No	102	74.45	12	57.14	114	72.15
Don't know	6	04.38	3	14.29	9	05.70
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

If yes/in part, why?

Personal favours are not as common as in the past	8	05.84	2	09.52	10	06.33
Intra-party democracy is strengthened and institutionalised	9	06.57	--	---	9	05.70
The political struggle has been improved and rationalised	10	07.30	4	19.05	14	08.86
Other	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16

If no, why not?

The leader has become omnipotent	45	32.85	6	28.57	51	32.28
Voters are not free to select the candidate of their choice	71	51.82	7	33.33	78	49.37
Deputies have no freedom of opinion, do not care about their voters	46	33.57	2	09.52	48	30.38
Clientelism (<u>rousfeti</u>) has been institutionalised by the professional and other organisations of the party in government	34	24.82	1	04.76	35	22.15
Other	7	05.11	--	---	7	04.43

5.7 per cent thought that inner-party democracy had been strengthened and institutionalised. On the other hand, the large majority (over 70 per cent) believed exactly the opposite; almost half of the rank and file complained that, due to the new list system, the voters were no longer able to indicate the candidate of their choice. This gave the party leader a position of omnipotence (according to 32.28 per cent of the ND members), and the MPs for their part were interested only in manifesting their obedience to him (so they would be included in the next list) —thus losing their independence as well as their interest in their voters. This view was shared by 30.38 per cent of the rank and file. Last but no less important, a little over one-fifth of the party members in the area (22.15 per cent) believed that, despite the above shortcomings, the introduction of the list system encouraged the transformation of personal clientelistic relations into party-directed patronage.⁽⁵²⁾

By and large then, the majority of the party members in the Department of Larissa believed that clientelistic relations did continue to exist, albeit to a lesser extent, during the first period of ND's government; that they became intensified during PASOK's term and transformed into bureaucratic clientelism; and that the situation worsened further, due to PASOK's introduction of the list system in 1985 and the abolition of the preference-cross. However, ND was not considered blameless in the matter, for it had failed to provide its grass-roots organisation with the necessary procedures that would guarantee intra-party democracy and give the rank and file a better say in the decision-making process. This is manifested by the data in Table VI.21 below.⁽⁵³⁾

We see that more than half of the party members both in Larissa and Kalohori (51.82 per cent and 52.38 per cent) want intra-party elections on the electoral lists drawn up by the party base, prior to the final

Table VI.21: ND Members' Attitudes Towards Candidates' Nomination Procedure

Should this be the ND president's exclusive responsibility?	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes	52	37.96	6	28.57	58	36.71
No	85	62.04	15	71.43	100	63.29
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

If no, what would you personally prefer?

(a) Exclusive responsibility by the party's grass-roots organisation	14	10.22	4	19.05	18	11.39
(b) Formation of the electoral lists by intra-party elections prior to the president's decision	71	51.82	11	52.38	82	51.90

decision by the ND president. Fewer members (10.22 per cent in Larissa and 19.05 per cent in Kalohori) expressed a much more radical view, namely that the party president should have nothing at all to do with these lists. Conversely, and despite the general condemnation of clientelistic practices and disapproval of the list-system introduction, a considerable percentage of the rank and file (almost 38 per cent in Larissa and 28.57 per cent in Kalohori) would accept that, thus themselves play no part in drawing up the list of candidates.

As regards the party members' attitudes towards other general political and ideological issues, we have already come across most of them earlier when examining ND's political personnel, organisation, and ideology. Suffice it to recall here that the overwhelming majority of the rank and file viewed ND as something new in Greek politics (and not as a continuation of the pre-dictatorship ERE), inspired, created, and influenced solely by its strong and charismatic leader, C. Karamanlis.⁽⁵⁴⁾ It was mainly —if not exclusively— he who was credited with the re-establishment and smooth functioning of democratic

institutions during the early post-1974 years and with the country's entry into the EEC, both of these being considered as ND's major achievements during its first term in office. While in opposition, it was the 1986 municipal-election victory, when the party saw three of its best-known deputies elected as majors of Athens, Salonica and Piraeus, that was viewed as the party's greatest triumph (and as signalling ND's imminent return to office), plus its decent, restrained and constructive opposition in parliament, and the democratic organisation of the party. (55)

However, the question that requires special examination at this point is the party members' acquaintance with ND's ideology, both because the neo-liberalism/neo-conservatism put forward in 1985 was something new and relatively unknown, and also because it was quite different from the so-called radical liberalism that had been ND's official ideology under the leadership of C. Karamanlis. Most important, it should be remembered that neither the ND members and supporters during the party's early years and until its first congress in May 1979 (when radical liberalism was officially introduced), nor the organised rank and file later and until the second congress in February 1986 (when the newly adopted neo-liberal principles of the manifesto "A new proposal for freedom" were sanctioned), ever had a say in elaborating and formulating the party's ideology. Just like radical liberalism had been imposed from above solely by Karamanlis, so the 1985 manifesto was debated and formulated by a small team of specialists of high standing in the party, leaving the rest of ND uninformed and uninvolved. (56)

Indeed, as Table VI.22 below shows, fewer than half of the rank and file in both Larissa and in Kalohori (43.79 per cent and 42.86 per cent) said they were familiar with the party's basic tenets as elaborated in the 1985 ideological manifesto. (57) On the other hand, almost one in every three members (31.39 per cent in Larissa and 38.09 per cent in

Table VI.22: Party Members' Familiarity with ND's Ideology

Are you acquainted with ND's ideology (1985 manifesto)?	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes	60	43.79	9	42.86	69	43.67
In part	34	24.82	4	19.05	38	24.05
No	43	31.39	8	38.09	51	32.28
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

Kalohori) admitted they had never read ND's ideological manifesto, while another considerable percentage both in Larissa and in Kalohori (24.82 per cent and 19.05 per cent) said they had only partial knowledge of it. With the above in mind, it is hardly surprising that party members' opinions concerning the ideological identity of ND vary to a very considerable extent, as is shown by Table VI.23 below.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Table VI.23: Party Members' Views of ND's Ideological Identity

ND designated as:	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Liberal party	87	63.50	9	42.86	96	60.76
Centre-right party	31	22.63	10	47.62	41	25.95
Neo-liberal party	23	16.79	--	---	23	14.56
Conservative party	17	12.41	--	---	17	10.76
Christian-democratic party	10	07.30	3	14.29	13	8.23
Centre party	5	03.65	1	04.76	6	03.79
Popular party	6	04.38	--	---	6	03.79
Social-democratic party	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Other	6	04.38	--	---	6	03.79

What is remarkable at first glance, is that the majority of Larissa party members (63.5 per cent) think of ND as a liberal party, whereas their counterparts in kalohori (47.62 per cent) see it as a party of

the centre-right; conversely, 42.86 per cent of the latter would describe ND as a liberal party, while only 22.63 per cent in Larissa view it as a party of the centre-right. But what seems most important to us is that, whereas 16.79 per cent of the rank and file in Larissa designate ND a neo-liberal party, not one member in Kalohori thought likewise (nor did any of the latter think of it as a conservative, social-democratic, or popular party). Overall, however, and despite the confusion in the party members' minds on this issue (similar to the confusion with regard to the party's top hierarchy —see sections 2 and 3 in ch. 5), almost 40 per cent of the rank and file in the Department of Larissa as a whole do not —in plain defiance of the official ideological declarations of their leadership— consider ND a liberal party.

Another specific issue on which the official position of ND is quite definite concerns the question of whether or not ND represents a particular social class; time and again all ND leaders and higher party members and deputies have reiterated that ND is a popular party in the sense that it appeals to all and everybody, and represents no special interests or class whatsoever.^{'59'} However, our research in the Department of Larissa showed that this position was not unanimously shared by the rank and file, as shown by Table VI.24 below.^{'60'} As might have been expected, the majority (63.92 per cent) of party members agree with the official ND declaration and deny that their party identifies with or represents a certain social class; on the other hand, almost 30 per cent of the rank and file think otherwise. Most (20.25 per cent) of these members are persuaded their party represents mainly the interests of the middle class, another 10.76 per cent those of the upper-middle class, and a 8.23 per cent those of the upper-class bourgeoisie (this last is meant to comprise big capitalists, shipowners, industrialists, etc., in other words the plutocracy, with which,

Table VI.24: Party Members' Opinions Concerning ND and Class Representation

<u>ND and class representation</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes	44	32.12	3	14.29	47	29.75
Middle class	29	21.17	3	14.29	32	20.25
Upper-middle class	16	11.68	1	04.76	17	10.76
Upper-class bourgeoisie	13	09.49	--	---	13	08.23
Other	4	02.92	--	---	4	02.53
No	83	60.58	18	85.71	101	63.92
Don't know	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

according to PASOK's and the opposition's allegations and accusations, ND identifies and mainly represents). Whether or not they personally identify with one of these social classes lies beyond the scope of this study. What matters here is that these members subscribe to the opposition's accusation that ND neither identifies with nor expresses the interests of the lower working class, which is better served and represented by PASOK and the parties of the Left.

Finally there was the issue of the rank and file's personal expectations from their party, if it should resume office in the near future (as in fact it did). ND declared that it sought to govern again so as to rid the country of PASOK and its disastrous policies, that it would restore economic activity, boost development, establish a free market, and encourage personal economic and private initiative. In other words, ND's return to power would benefit all of the people and the country at large. As shown in Table VI.25 below, ⁽⁶¹⁾ 35.04 per cent of the rank and file in Larissa and more than half in Kalohori agreed with these aims, and declared that they did not expect anything specifically for themselves: they considered a return by ND to office as good for

Table VI.25: Party Members' Personal Expectations in Case ND Resumes Office

Members' personal expectations	Larissa		Kalohori		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes	89	64.96	10	47.62	99	62.66
Economic benefit	44	32.12	5	23.81	49	31.01
Social benefit	70	51.09	5	23.81	75	47.47
Other	13	09.49	--	---	13	08.23
No	48	35.04	11	52.38	59	37.34
Total	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

the common welfare. More than 60 per cent of the party members in the Department of Larissa as a whole, however, admitted they did hope for some personal benefit or another; almost half of them expected some benefit of a social kind (to find a job or better employment, or even to be given the opportunity to exercise their particular skills and develop their potential in a socially and economically healthy environment), whereas nearly one-third (31 per cent) wanted some kind of direct economic benefit (a pay raise, or a decrease in inflation due to the liberalisation of the market and the large-scale privatisation of public enterprises ND was promising). As M. Kontonassiou-Tsigani (ONNED president in Larissa) said,

"This is the characteristic mentality of many of the party members, especially those who recently joined the organisation: they expect to benefit personally when ND resumes office, instead of looking for meritocracy and the 'Europeanisation' of our political and social life. Although several talks have been addressed to the party members on this issue, this specific mentality seems to persist, and most probably cannot be expected to disappear overnight".⁽⁶²⁾

4. The National Elections of 18 June 1989

As the time for the parliamentary election of 18 June 1989 was coming closer, all the country's political parties intensified their preparations, but especially the two big rivals. PASOK was campaigning for a third consecutive term in office; ND was about to fight its most crucial battle, because another defeat inflicted by its chief opponent was likely to put its very existence in serious jeopardy.⁽⁶³⁾ Moreover, for ND this was the first chance to test in practice the provisions of the revised 1986 statutes, and especially those that gave more power to its rank and file (concerning, for example, their overall active involvement in the campaign, and the composition of the election lists). In this section we shall deal with all the above issues, as they manifested themselves in the Department of Larissa.

Preparations for the election campaign started as early as six months before polling day; it was the first time the party had elaborated a detailed and specific plan, which it intended to observe closely all the way to the end. First of all, a special election-campaign committee was set up, consisting of the most active members of the organisation in the area; it was at all times under the guidance of the departmental committee in Larissa. The Department was separated into 17 distinct sectors, each eparchy consisting of three such sectors and the city of Larissa of two; head of each sector was a member of the departmental administrative committee (NODE), instructing four to five "political executives" (see below), who were to visit as many villages of their sector as possible, to propagate and explain ND's political programme. The whole effort was to be supervised and co-ordinated by the NODE president, lawyer E. Groussopoulos.⁽⁶⁴⁾ In other words, the political executives, the party MPs and candidates and their personal political entourage, and the various local committees and the grass-

roots organisation in the Department of Larissa would all be working together at the same time. (Although this may well be common practice elsewhere, the concept was an innovation in Greek right-wing politics.)

The new element in the electoral campaign was of course the institution of the political executives. According to a decision made by the ND president alone, any member of the party could simply go to a committee (composed of four ND deputies) and ask to become a political executive.^{'65'} But even if his/her application was accepted, this did not mean automatic inclusion in the candidate lists, neither was being a political executive necessary for such candidature. Nevertheless, being selected as a political executive was considered of major importance by all who applied for it, who hoped that their selection would build up their political image and prestige, and give them an edge over others who remained more or less anonymous.^{'66'}

In the Department of Larissa, applications from 64 party members were approved, and only a handful were finally rejected. The new political executives formed small teams of 4-5 persons, to make up to 60 speeches a month in the villages until polling day. The prime objective was the widest possible dissemination of ND's ideology and political programme. The speeches were to be pre-scheduled and the departmental administrative committee in Larissa informed in advance, so that the local organisations could be notified, and they in turn would announce it to the people in their area and organise the occasion.^{'67'}

For a number of reasons, the new institution of political executives did not perform as expected, neither in the Department of Larissa nor anywhere else in the country. First of all, the absence of specific criteria in their selection resulted in a number of people being chosen who lacked the skill for the task;^{'68'} there were cases when the speakers could not even answer the questions from their audience, thus obfuscating rather than clarifying ND's programme and seriously damaging

the party only a few months before the elections. Secondly, some local organisations of ND, especially those under the influence of certain MPs or politicians, refused to co-operate and make the necessary preparations, so that many speeches were never made or, worse still, ended in fiasco. Thirdly, the majority of the people in the countryside responded to the political executives' activities with skeptical resentment, since these practices reminded them very much of the old traditional clientelistic methods and, in a broader sense, of deputation and paleokommatisμός.^{'69'} Last but not least, this newly adopted institution caused grievances and unrest within the party itself, because (a) it was based on a decision taken by the president unilaterally, (b) it was not provided for by the party statutes, and (c) it by-passed the grass-roots organisation, since the latter had no say in the political executives' nomination. As we shall see below, the options of the rank and file concerning the party candidates' nomination were not always respected by the party president, thus causing turmoil and discontent within the party ranks.

Almost two months before the June 1989 election, the special departmental assembly duly convened in Larissa in order to draw up the ND candidate list in the Department.^{'70'} All administrative-committee members from the 96 local committees, 14 representatives of ND's youth organisation (ONNED), together with the 24 members of the party's departmental committee in Larissa (655 members in all), assembled on 23 April 1989 and voted in a list of 16 candidates (excluding ND's former deputies), which they sent to party headquarters in Athens for final selection.^{'71'} Since the three incumbent deputies in the Department (G. Souflias, N. Katsaros, and A. Efstratiadis) could, according to the statutes, automatically stand again for election, the executive committee and finally the party leader were to select the remaining five from this list, "basically from among those proposed by the departmental

assemblies".⁽⁷²⁾ When finally the ND president himself selected which candidates the department should field, he did not, as was expected, choose the first five listed, but rejected the second and fourth in favour of the sixth and seventh.⁽⁷³⁾

The two excluded candidates were G. Bisbas and C. Karayiannis, both from the eparchy of Elassona. They enjoyed considerable grass-roots support, and were esteemed as among the youngest and most dynamic party members in the area. This holds true particularly for G. Bisbas, a dentist, who had twice (in 1982 and in 1986) been elected mayor of the small community of Livadi, and became a member of ND's local organisation in 1974.⁽⁷⁴⁾ J. Papadimopoulos and D. Fakis who were chosen to be included also came from Elassona, but were older and well-known ND politicians of the most traditional kind (they could rely on personal clienteles, and for this reason were not particularly popular in the local organisation). It would appear that this was the reason their candidacies were preferred to those of Bisbas and Karayiannis.⁽⁷⁵⁾

The announcement of the final candidates' list four weeks before polling day caused severe repercussions in the party ranks of the Department of Larissa, most important of which was the mass resignation of ND's local-organisation committee in Livadi; several ONNED members in the area resigned as well, and five NODE members from Elassona followed suit. The exclusion of Bisbas and Karayiannis also had other side-effects, among them the resignation of the entire local-community council in Livadi, and of various councils of other organisations, such as the local agricultural co-operative and the builders' trade union. All this brought ND's pre-election activities to a temporary halt and damaged the party's image to some extent. Before long, however, the agitation subsided, especially after Bisbas' public declaration that everybody should set personal ambitions and grievances aside and simply help the party resume office.⁽⁷⁶⁾

Once ND's candidate-list had become official and order was restored in the party's Department of Larissa, the three incumbent MPs and the five new candidates took on the main share of electioneering; most of the 64 political executives withdrew from the political struggle altogether, and those who did not helped on the sidelines, together with the various local committees and the rank and file.⁽⁷⁷⁾

The main difference between ND's 1989 and earlier election campaigns was that now the party enjoyed a much better grass-roots organisation, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the city of Larissa, for example, it was almost exclusively the women's department that carried out the tiresome door-to-door delivery of party brochures and answered questions about ND's political programme and specific priorities if voted into office.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Moreover, all local organisations in Larissa successfully mobilised their members whenever a local candidate or other higher party official was scheduled to give a speech. Their activities reached a peak during ND's central rally for Thessaly (which was held on 28 May 1989 in Larissa), when party leader C. Mitsotakis gave a speech there in front of a huge audience.⁽⁷⁹⁾

In the villages, however, the party apparatus and local organisations were much less active. The pace was set mainly by ND's incumbent deputies —Souflias, Katsaros and Efstratiadis. With long parliamentary careers behind them (Souflias was first elected in 1974 and continually thereafter, Efstratiadis in 1977, and Katsaros in 1981), they had well-established personal clientelistic networks and relied on them rather than on the local party organisations. In fact, they had themselves manoeuvred to prevent the formation of local organisations in several villages where, according to the statutory regulations, there were enough members to warrant it.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Instead, they arranged for these members to enroll in Larissa, so that through them they could more easily control the more influential city-centre organisation, and so

also the departmental administrative committee (NODE), which was responsible for really important decisions.⁽⁸¹⁾

All in all, therefore, the pre-election campaign revolved around the political offices of the ND deputies and candidates in Larissa and their branches in the major provincial cities, and proceeded along the traditional, pre-dictatorship political pattern.⁽⁸²⁾ As polling day was drawing closer, people swarmed into these offices, impatiently waiting their turn to see the MP or candidate privately, in order to express their own and their wider family's support in anticipation of some future favour for themselves or their friends and relatives. Moreover, it was these offices—in collaboration with the MPs' and candidates' trusty "watchmen" in the villages—that organised the politicians' pre-election programme (speeches, interviews with the press, radio and television, etc.). The party organisation played only a secondary role. As one ND parliamentary candidate put it,

"If a deputy wants to make a political speech in some village, he doesn't inform or rely on the respective local organisation there (if one exists at all) but his/her own personal *protégés*. The local party organisations have recently begun to complain about this, but that's paradoxical because they don't really seem to want these 'watchmen' to disappear altogether, but content themselves to exist and act in parallel with them".⁽⁸³⁾

One last but important point is that, together with the re-appearance of clientelistic practices and the reactivation of patronage networks, personal antagonisms among the ND party candidates also came to the fore, seriously damaging ND's collective effort as well as the party's public image. Not only was each and every candidate trying to establish personal relationships with the electorate so as to secure as many preference-votes as possible to guarantee him a parliamentary seat; but they were all also competing against their colleagues, and adopted every possible strategy, fair or foul. Personal success was paramount,

and best served by failure of the others. So, if a candidate could not attract personal votes, he would try his best to stop people from voting for his competitor. (This happened, for example, in the eparchy of Elassona, where the intense struggle between Papadimopoulos and Fakis—who both came from there and contended for the votes of more or less the same people—accounted for the failure of both of them.) On the other hand, those candidates not included in the party list had reasons of their own to hope, if not directly to work for, the failure of those who were, since an eventual defeat of a listed candidate could open up the road again for their own future entrance into politics.⁽⁸⁴⁾

The most intense battle between two ND politicians was fought out by the civil engineer G. Souflias and the lawyer N. Katsaros. Souflias was one of the newcomers Karamanlis had included in the party list in 1974; he had been elected continuously ever since, and also served as undersecretary of internal affairs (1977-1980) and as undersecretary of co-ordination (1980-1981) in Karamanlis and Rallis governments respectively.⁽⁸⁵⁾ He was esteemed by both his party colleagues and by his political opponents for his mild, technologically modern demeanour; during ND's years in opposition he presided over the special committee for planning and elaborating detailed governmental policy proposals, a highly complicated and difficult task he carried out with marked success.⁽⁸⁶⁾

The lawyer N. Katsaros was a newcomer to politics when first elected in 1981.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Without any previous political experience, he initially built up his career through the party organisation; in the late 1970s he was presiding over the Larissa NODE, and it was shortly before the 1981 election when he let it be known he would be ready to stand. At that time his candidacy seemed to pose a potential threat to Souflias who strongly opposed it and, since he exercised a better control over ND's organisation in Larissa, actually managed to arrange for Katsaros'

exclusion from the list. When one of the other candidates withdrew from the campaign, however, Katsaros could by-pass the formal procedures and move in to occupy the vacant place at the last moment. He was elected. Notwithstanding his debt to the party organisation, however, Katsaros thereafter consolidated his political career and secured his re-election by setting up and taking full advantage of clientelistic relations, while faithfully supporting the party leadership at all times.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Ever since 1981, then, personal relations between the two men had been coldly formal, characterised by mutual hostility and distrust. For Souflias as one of the most senior and founding-members of ND, Katsaros presented a threat to both his supremacy in the Department of Larissa, and to his privileged position within the party and a future ND government. Katsaros, for his part, was struggling against his rival for exactly the same reasons: if he could increase his vote-appeal and receive more preference votes in the elections than Souflias, this would seriously undermine the latter's local standing on the one hand, and on the other most probably bring with it a much more important post within the party and a future ND government.⁽⁸⁹⁾

While ND was in opposition, the personal differences and antagonisms between Souflias and Katsaros remained latent, the first and most important aim being to oust PASOK from power and the return of ND. The 1985 election (won by PASOK) did not change this situation, because PASOK's introduction of the list system had made competition among candidates pointless. But the June 1989 election, and the re-introduction of the preference-vote system, finally presented Souflias and Katsaros with the opportunity to compete for supremacy in their area and to further strengthen their standing within ND.

Their mutual hostility became increasingly intense and reached its peak in the last month of the campaign. Their political offices were feverishly trying to establish unofficial alliances with, and so gain

the support of, various ND political executives and candidates not on the list, and at the same time they did all they could to sabotage the speeches and other political activities organised by the rival office. Souflias capitalised on his status of modern technocrat as well as on his high rank within ND, while simultaneously re-establishing his personal relationships with the voters whom he had had to neglect while he was kept in Athens to elaborate ND's governmental programme. Katsaros, on the other hand, was chasing after every possible vote in order to increase his clientele, and was playing the part of a politician loved and esteemed by all the people.

The struggle was very closely fought, how close became evident once the votes were counted: Souflias again came first, and had 19,110 preference votes (only slightly improving his 1981 record of 18,176 votes), whereas Katsaros in second place had more than doubled his preference votes (from 8,998 to 18,105). The extent to which the political struggle was monopolised by these two contestants is demonstrated by the third and fourth ND candidates elected: N. Mammonas and A. Efstratiadis received 8,921 and 7,165 votes respectively. PASOK results in the Department of Larissa were completely different, given that its candidates had no clientelistic networks to rely on, and its grass-roots organisation in effect channelled and distributed the people's vote more equally among the candidates. Three PASOK deputies were elected in the Department of Larissa (G. Adamopoulos, J. Floros and N. Farmakis), who received 14,931, 14,506 and 11,947 preference votes respectively.⁽⁹⁰⁾

5. Conclusion

We chose to conduct our fieldwork research in the Department of Larissa because its social, economic, and particularly its political features largely reflect those of the country as a whole. In all the above respects, and notwithstanding minor differentiations, we believe the Department of Larissa to constitute perhaps the most ideal place to study ND, since, apart from providing interesting illustrations at the local level, one is permitted to make more general assumptions concerning ND' characteristics, functioning and nature within the national context. In our case, however, the research data should be regarded with caution, because (a) we cannot altogether vouch for the obtained representativeness of our sample, and (b) we were prevented from completing our work.

In an area like that of Larissa where, due to its socio-economic conditions, impersonal bureaucratic structures were lacking altogether and clientelistic relations have traditionally been intense, ND—at least in the early years of its existence—followed its overall pattern in terms of political personnel: it relied on already well-known ex-ERE politicians as well as a good many newcomers. While in government, the party failed to organise in the area (as elsewhere), and secured popular backing through the patronage networks of its deputies and party notables in the region, and through the charismatic personality and immense prestige of its then leader, C. Karamanlis.

The real organisational effort began after ND had lost office in 1981, under Averoff's and later under Mitsotakis' leadership. The party eventually developed a remarkable grass-roots organisation, which little by little started to play a larger role in disseminating political propaganda and mobilising supporters during election campaigns. Although it appeared late on the scene, the party organisation as such had

another important consequence: it meant the introduction of bureaucratic principles and collective action, elements and procedures with which the overwhelming majority of the party members in the Department were totally unfamiliar.

Although the organisation developed remarkably in size, this was not accompanied by a similar qualitative progress. Party members in the Department of Larissa are not particularly proud of their organisation, and do not consider it ND's most striking success. In fact, quite a number of them complain that there is general inactivity and inefficiency, bad communication with the higher party organs and the leadership, a lack of professional and experienced higher members as well as discipline in the ranks, and, most important, that internal democratic procedures are neither institutionalised nor respected. Moreover, it seems that at local level the organisation operates more in an executive manner, in the sense that no discussions —let alone decisions— concerning the elaboration of ideological issues, or the party's political strategy, or its governmental policies, take place there.

This last point brings us to the members' attitudes to their party's ideology, where one encounters the same confusion and uncertainty that characterises the view of the party's hierarchy at the top, exactly because the grass-roots were left to contribute nothing whatsoever to ND's basic positions; instead, ND's ideological tenets were imposed by the top ready-made. So, whereas most party members describe ND as a liberal party, it is likely that they have only a vague idea of liberal tenets. Poorly informed if not actually mis-informed, they showed themselves unfamiliar with the basic concepts and ideas of ND's ideology, especially in the countryside where ND was characterised in the simplistically traditional manner as a party of the centre-right.

One very important point has emerged in respect of the party members' attitudes towards ND, and the extent to which it was the party's ideology that motivated them to join in the first place. Taking into account, (i) that most members consider ND as something completely new in Greek politics, having no relation with the pre-coup ERE; (ii) that a great many of them joined the party drawn by the charismatic personality of its leader; and that (iii), there was much and widespread confusion among the rank and file as to ND's exact ideological identity, one must conclude that all these people were not so much attracted by ND's liberal principles, radical or neo-liberal or whatever, but that apart from Karamanlis' personal appeal, on the positive side it was the time-honoured values the conservative camp has always represented—reliability, a sense of responsibility, social order and justice, security, anti-extremism, dignity and traditional morality—that in the last analysis motivated and unified ND voters and supporters, whereas on the negative it was anti-communism that completed this task.

Clientelism, which historically has been a salient characteristic of the whole Thessaly area, cannot be said to have disappeared altogether during the post-1974 years. Despite ND's organisational enlargement and the proliferation of local party branches throughout the Department of Larissa, the party mechanisms were never transformed into an impersonal bureaucratic body that would act autonomously and have a decisive say concerning all party affairs in the Department; the local ND politicians, who had created and heavily relied on their personal clientele for electoral success and communication with the electorate, always had the upper hand. In consequence the individual did not so much come into politics through institutionalised mass structures, but to a considerable extent through clientelistic networks; the party organisation meanwhile acted in a parallel and rather auxiliary fashion,

controlled and administered by the MPs, the local politicians, and other party notables.

The last point to be made concerns personal antagonisms and ideological differences in the Department of Larissa. Contrary to the case elsewhere, where personal rivalries and/or alliances were either interwoven with or deliberately hidden behind alleged and rather fictitious ideological differences, in Larissa they were fought out venomously on a purely personal level. The reason for this was that the most important aim of the ND politicians in the department has always been, not simply to ensure election to parliament, but also to attract as many personal votes as possible so as to reinforce his/her position within the Department and the party. The backing of a strong and numerous popular support would later be translated into a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the higher party echelons, and particularly the leadership, when it came to disposing of influential party and/or state posts which, in turn, would help the MP satisfy and further increase his/her political clientele.

At the local level, then, clientelism intensified personal antagonisms and vice-versa. It was political survival first, and the ouster of immediate rivals as a close second, that more or less drew ND politicians into this vicious circle. The situation is very likely to continue unabated in the near future, unless bureaucratic and impersonal procedures are finally respected and institutionalised, and the grass-roots organisation is given some real responsibility so that it can perform its role without that interference that so far has been the cause of its relative stagnation and inefficiency.

1. Introduction

In chapter 1 of this study we examined in detail the social, political, and economic conditions dominant in Greece from the end of the World War II until the imposition of the seven-year military rule in 1967. Within this context, we have shown how the Greek Right was initially reconstituted —under P. Tsaldaris' Popular Party and under Marshal Papagos' Greek Rally party— and have then focused on the National Radical Union (ERE), which was founded by C. Karamanlis in 1955 and led by the same man for eight consecutive years until his resignation from the premiership in 1963. It was shown that ERE was the direct successor of the Greek Rally, and also that it dominated not only in the government but in politics in general, during the whole period from its formation until the collapse of democratic institutions in 1967.

For the social, political and economic developments, as these emerged after the disintegration of the military dictatorship in 1974 and the restoration and consolidation of democratic rule, we have presented a much more detailed and analytical account. Once more, our analysis centred on the reconstitution of the conservative camp. We saw that it was again C. Karamanlis who founded the New Democracy party (ND), which took and has consistently kept the lead in representing the right-wing political forces; and we examined the party's political personnel, its organisation and ideology, its policies, strategies, and

tactics in government (1974-1981) and in opposition (1981-1989) at both national and local level, over the sixteen-year period from 1974 until ND resumed office in 1990.

This last chapter will conclude our study by presenting a more systematic account of the course and development of the Greek Right. The analysis will be in two parts: concerning the narrower party level, we shall try to describe and explain ND's similarities with and differences from ERE, and so identify specific elements of continuity with its predecessor, and/or the extent to which ND has managed to transform and dissociate itself from ERE's practices and characteristics and present a different, more modern and European-like political outlook. ND's exact political identity will be further elucidated by comparisons with other major Greek parties (particularly with PASOK), and with its West European counterparts. With respect to the wider socio-political level, we shall consider the major changes and transformations that have appeared and gained momentum since 1974, the extent to which the party tried to respond to these developments, as well as ND's relationship with party politics and society in general since 1974.

2. Continuities and Change in Greek Conservative Politics

2.1. The party level: From ERE to ND

One of the salient features that characterises ERE and ND is precisely that both of them are legitimate creations of C. Karamanlis. However, although he had been appointed to the premiership by the King, and indirectly so to the Greek Rally leadership after Papagos' death in 1955 when he founded ERE, it was under very different circumstances that he was welcomed to Greece as a political saviour in 1974 to restore democracy, supervise the process of democratic consolidation, and create

the New Democracy party. As it had done during the years of his first premiership (1955-1963), his masterful, father-figure personality (inevitably authoritarian at times) loomed heavily after 1974 as well. However, not only had his intentions and beliefs been changed by the changing circumstances (as he himself admitted), but there was a host of other differences concerning the creation, policies, and overall performance of ND which accounted for the latter being a more modern identity, not merely the ERE under another name.⁽¹⁾

Karamanlis manned his newly formed party with a considerable number of his closest pre-coup associates, former MPs, and prominent ERE members. The participation of these politicians demonstrates quite clearly that there was indeed some kind of relationship and continuity between ND and ERE, especially since the core of the first ND governments consisted almost exclusively of these former ERE members. However, the percentage of the "old guard" was considerably lower in the ND ranks than it had been for the ERE or the Greek Rally when they were formed. Moreover, more than half of the ND parliamentary candidates and eventually its deputies were newcomers to politics, who gave the party a more liberal, modern, youthful and technocratic image, and came to predominate within its ranks as time went by. Last but not least, it should be stressed that the Centre Union/New Forces (EK/ND), the chief rival of ND in the early post-1974 period, was much more closely related to its pre-coup predecessor (the Centre Union) than ND was to the ERE, whereas PASOK really did make a spectacular break with the past, not only in respect of its political personnel but also in terms of grass-roots organisation and ideology. It quickly made its presence felt, when only three years later (in 1977), it doubled its vote and so managed a quite numerous parliamentary representation.

The massive influx of newcomers into the ND ranks was not, however, accompanied by a corresponding differentiation with respect to the party

personnel's social and occupational background. Of course, ND deputies were on the average younger and better educated than their ERE counterparts, but it was still male lawyers, doctors, and other self-employed (liberal) professionals of bourgeois origin who continued to outnumber MPs with a salaried occupation or from a lower-class social background. In this respect, ND differed from ERE only quantitatively (in the latter the salary-earners were represented hardly at all), and resembled much more the British Conservatives in 1974, when lawyers and doctors, as well as industrialists and higher administrative employees constituted the two largest groups within the British party's parliamentary group.⁽²⁾ With respect to PASOK, which brought into politics and relied predominantly on newcomers, the salaried occupations were better represented and so were politicians from a lower, working-class background, although the self-employed were still in the majority.

In line with its predecessor (and also with PASOK, albeit for different reasons)⁽³⁾, ND always polled more votes in the semi-urban and rural areas than in the urban centres, mostly due to traditional clientelistic practices, which have never been abandoned altogether. Furthermore, ND (like the ERE before it) can be considered as a catch-all party, in the sense that it appealed to every social class in Greek society at all times; nevertheless, the highest socio-economic groups tend to vote more for ND than PASOK, and vice versa for the lowest ones, with the two parties sharing the middle-class vote almost equally. Last but not least, especially after 1985 when ND switched its ideological orientation towards neo-conservatism, it is likely people employed in the private sector of the economy will tend to vote for ND, whereas their counterparts in the public sector will be more inclined to the parties of the Left.⁽⁴⁾

In the course of democratic restoration after 1974, there was not a great deal of room for developing any party organisation or ideology, at

least in respect of ND which was most involved in rebuilding democracy. (The communists traditionally enjoyed a very well structured party machine, of which they could now take full advantage, and PASOK was able to develop one of its own right from the start.) After seven years of military rule, the overwhelming majority of the Greeks opted for political stability and peaceful transition to democracy, not for political experimentation. Consequently, ND could secure two consecutive terms in government, drawing much of its electoral support from the immense prestige of its leader (who was considered the only man capable of standing between democracy and the return of the tanks). Another considerable part of its electoral strength derived from the personalistic relations and clientelistic practices exercised at local level by most of the party's prominent members, who either had already established such relationships as former ERE deputies, or who inherited political clienteles from close relatives who had meanwhile retired from politics. The leader's national prestige and local clientelism were both employed by ND as a substitute for its lack of organisation, and to make up for its inability to mobilise the electorate and rally mass support through other means.^{'5'}

In this respect, then, ND did not, at least during its early years, differ much from its predecessor. Although the ERE did have fully elaborated party statutes, they remained a dead letter at all times; moreover, it also made extensive use of clientelistic relations and selectively distributed spoils to its supporters in an effort to remain in office.^{'6'} As all other parties at the time (apart from EDA), ERE was a clientelistic party of personalities and notables, gathered around an all-powerful and virtually uncontrolled party leader.

As became obvious not long after 1974, parties relying on clientelism and patronage could not survive under the different conditions in the newly established political system. Once fears of the

return of the tanks were laid to rest, and once Karamanlis would be able to leave his party for the presidency of the republic (something he had in mind ever since he returned to Greece), ND would be obliged to deal with the leftist ideas that were steadily gaining momentum in reaction to the military dictatorship (at all times considered as a "right-wing" dictatorship), and with the radicalised masses demanding more rapid progress and "change" (left largely unspecified), a demand that had been brought into politics for the first time through militant and powerful organisations established mainly by PASOK.

Karamanlis was perfectly aware of these new developments, and did all he could to assure the survival of his party after his own departure. Since it is extremely difficult to transform a party of notables into an organisation based on political principles, he had to move slowly and cautiously and, judging *ex posteriori*, he succeeded. When he left finally, ND had established its first departmental and local organisations, it already numbered several thousand members, and it had organised one preliminary and one full congress, thus becoming the first conservative party to have done so in Greek political history. It also survived Karamanlis' departure by duly electing a new leader, and it neither split up nor disintegrated after it had lost the 1981 election to PASOK.

Ever since then, and while in opposition, ND has developed its organisation further; it has held another national congress, and it has upgraded the role of its rank and file by drawing them into the procedure for the election of the party leader, and the nomination of ND's parliamentary candidates. In the course of the 1980s its local, professional, and other organisations proliferated, their membership grew unprecedentedly, and the clientelistic characteristics of the early post-1974 ND, so much reminiscent of the pre-coup ERE's, began to fade and slowly made room for those of a mass party. (7)

It is fair to conclude that today ND is no longer a clientelistic party, but it is equally true to say that it has not yet been transformed into a real mass party. Of course, statutes, regulations and various provisions concerning organisational affairs all exist, but at the same time are not fully respected. At the local level, personalistic politics and clientelistic practices have not disappeared altogether, and continue to exist side by side with the activities and functioning of the grass-roots organisation —at times in a complementary, at other times in conflicting manner. At the national level, the party leader remains largely unchecked, if not to the same extent as in the past, and the top party organs more often than not merely rubberstamp his decisions.⁽⁸⁾

In terms of party organisation, ND was as much a late developer as were most other conservative parties in Europe. It is also true that the party did in fact organise more effectively when it had to meet the challenge from PASOK. The latter had from the very outset established a well-structured organisation, and it was through this, not through clientelistic means, that it mobilised its supporters and brought them into politics. Notwithstanding certain populist elements in PASOK's political discourse, it has been argued that there has been some kind of organic complementarity between charismatic leadership at the centre and organisational local activism, in the sense that they have both acted as channels for rallying mass support and advancing the party's ideology and policies.⁽⁹⁾ In other words, the relationship between the PASOK president and the party organisation was (and still is) a complementary one, since the special position and powers of the president have never been questioned.

The relationship between the New Democracy party leader and the organisation is very different, given that no ND leader since Karamanlis has enjoyed the institutional autonomy of A. Papandreou in PASOK.

Consequently, more power to the organisation would automatically mean fewer prerogatives for the leader, whereas more power to the leader (as is the case today) means a feeble, muzzled, and relatively weak organisation; it means, moreover —apart from helping to mobilise voters prior to elections— the ND grass-roots organisation has failed to institutionalise procedures that would guarantee cross-checks and controls, communication, and mobility from the bottom to the top of the party hierarchy and vice versa. This last point is corroborated by a comparison of the social and occupational background of ND's rank and file with that of the top party members; representation of both self-employed and salaried occupations is much more balanced at grass-roots level than the highest party echelons (parliamentary group, central committee). The overall picture of the social composition of ND's lowest ranks much resembles that of Greek society at large, in spectacular contrast to the social and occupational backgrounds at the highest party level.

As with its organisation during the early years of its existence, ND also failed to develop a specific ideology of its own, thus leaving the realm of ideas dominated by PASOK and the parties of the Left. For a considerable time much uncertainty concerning the exact identity of the party, further blurred by Karamanlis' claims that ND stood outside and above the misleading labels of Right, Centre and Left, and that it was the sole party to identify only with the true interests of the nation at all times.⁽¹⁰⁾ Apart from elements of latent paternalism and authoritarianism very much reminiscent of ERE's record in this respect (if ND was really the only party to identify with the interests of the nation, what was the role of the other parties in a democratic regime?), one might see the negation of ideology as a deliberate principle, with the party's stance and policies dictated in every instance and in *ad-hoc* manner by the national interest. This ideology Karamanlis dubbed radical

liberalism (lying somewhere between classical liberalism and social democracy), and since its theoretical definition has never been undertaken, it must be deciphered from actual practice during ND's first period in office (1974-1981).⁽¹¹⁾

Leaving the particulars aside (a detailed analysis was presented in ch. 5, section 2.2), ND government policies were indeed very similar to those of its predecessor; namely, the party coped with the day-to-day problems in an empiricist manner, without long-term planning, without concrete future targets, aiming vaguely at revitalising the economy and raising the standard of living. In other words, radical liberalism consisted of well-tried ERE policies which were a combination of state paternalism, state intervention, and private initiative, with the accent on social welfare and justice. All in all, ND's post-1974 radical-liberal recipe differed from past practices only to the extent that anti-communism was no longer one of its basic ingredients.

This ideological deficiency could not continue to be glossed over when ND occupied the opposition benches. The strong leadership and personal authority of Karamanlis had been able to compensate for the absence of party organisation and ideology,⁽¹²⁾ but after his departure ND was dismayed to discover that it had no policies to project, not even slogans that could appeal to the electorate. Just as ERE in the early 1960s, when it lost power to the George Papandreou's Centre Union, kept accusing the latter that he was surrendering the country to the communists, the ND, under Averoff's leadership, kept scaremongering that PASOK meant to establish a proletarian dictatorship and lead the country either towards third-world underdevelopment or behind the iron curtain.

After a transitional period of dangerous flirtation with the ultra-Right, which seriously harmed the more liberal and modern identity Karamanlis had tried to impose on ND in 1974, C. Mitsotakis was elected to the party leadership. He was a prominent party MP at the time and a

former minister, who originated from the pre-coup liberal camp. At the same time he was a controversial personality, stigmatised as the politician chiefly responsible for the events that led to the dissolution of the Centre Union in 1965, and so ultimately to the imposition of the military dictatorship. With respect to ND's ideological orientation, Mitsotakis' election signalled the party's departure from its Karamanlis tradition and a shift towards neo-conservatism. As had been the case with the radical liberal values of Karamanlis, the new ideas adopted by ND were conceived, formulated, and imposed from above by the leader, some of his closest associates, and ND's think-tank (the non-committed Centre for Political Research and Information). The difference was that they were theoretically well thought out and properly defined, and published in manifesto form as ND's ideological declaration, which became widely known as the "A new proposal for freedom".

ND's re-orientation as regards its ideological principles was not, of course, exclusively due to its new leader. With a man at its helm who had a long tradition as a liberal, the party was very likely to move closer to liberalism, and indeed Mitsotakis has lost no opportunity to reiterate that he himself was a staunch liberal and that ND is a liberal party. But the new ideological declaration went a great deal further. Dismissing ND's old governmental record altogether, and most probably responding to the international trend of neo-conservatism and in preparation for future attacks on PASOK (which, while in power, continued to enforce interventionist policies just as ND had done), the party now discovered that excessive state intervention, taxation and regulation were bad, and freedom of choice and private initiative were good.

It would seem that in its attempt at ideological transformation ND was motivated much by the consecutive governmental and electoral

successes of Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. and president Reagan in the U.S. during the 1980s. Moreover, in almost all of the European countries it was some brand of neo-conservatism that was dominating politics; Spain and Greece, both governed at the time by socialist parties, were the only exceptions, their conservative forces still having "to develop a 'modern' identity to challenge the Left".⁽¹³⁾ Thus ND hoped that the adoption of neo-conservative principles would give the party a more modern and European profile, and a good opportunity to compete in the realm of ideas, which it had abandoned to left-wing domination since 1974; in other words, it was expected that, as had happened in Britain, neo-conservatism would enable the party to set the agenda of political debate in the country rather than only acting to initiatives from its opponents.⁽¹⁴⁾

Nevertheless, the elections of 1985 showed that the party failed in its objectives. As might have been expected, it proved very difficult to convince the electorate (not to mention its own members and voters) of its sincerity, since nobody ever bothered to explain whether ND had been right or wrong to enforce state interventionist policies while in power. Also, while corruption and inefficiency in the public sector, as well as the need to modernise the administration in general (and coping with unemployment, inflation, payment deficits, etc.) were considered the most important issues by the majority of the Greek voters, PASOK was credited with being reliable and capable of dealing with these problems, and was re-elected for a second term in office. As a result ND was temporarily plagued by internal party turmoil and dissent. Many members considered the party's shift to neo-conservatism as a major break with its Karamanlis tradition, and as such chiefly responsible for ND's election defeat. Nevertheless, the party adhered to its newly-adopted principles, but when it succeeded in resuming office in 1990, this was

due more to popular discontent with PASOK than to some positive acclamation of its programme.

All in all, and with respect to ideological (and organisational) issues, ND (like ERE) showed considerable weakness, its shortcomings in that respect nearly always being counterbalanced by the personal authority of the leader on the one hand, and by some selective distribution of governmental spoils on the other. Like ERE, ND regarded itself as the natural party of government, and it was only when it found itself in opposition that it began to pay attention to its ideological identity, but did so rather hastily and unconvincingly. As has been shown, at grass-roots level ND not only failed completely to convince its own members of the necessity to adopt neo-conservative doctrines and their respective values, but it confused them further as to the exact form of the liberalism it was advocating. Since it resumed office in 1990 and until the time of writing, ND attempted to enforce policies for the disentanglement of the state from the economy through privatisations in such a dubious and amateurish manner that the stormy and vociferous opposition from its own ranks, and from trade unions and other organisations affiliated to the party, in many cases forced it to retreat. Where it stood firm, the results were far from dazzling.

Confining our analysis strictly to the party level, it may be argued that ND is undoubtedly the heir of conservative tradition in Greece. Whether under the banner of Tsaldaris' Popular Party, or Papagos' Greek Rally, or Karamanlis' ERE, the conservative forces remained pretty well united during the pre-coup period, led by powerful and at times popular leaders, and for most of the time in government. The Greek Rally was nothing more than a reconstitution of the Popular Party, and the ERE in its turn was little more than the Greek Rally under Karamanlis. In other words, ND's direct predecessor was a political formation, the only source of power and legitimation of which lay with the personality of

the leader. It lacked a grass-roots organisation and so relied on clientelism to draw electoral support, and it also lacked a distinct ideology of its own. Strong leadership at the centre, clientelism at the local level, and selective distribution of governmental spoils nationwide, all made for ERE's unity, longevity, and consecutive re-election to office.

After the fall of the junta, ND inherited the political tradition of ERE, in the sense that it unified and represented the conservative forces after 1974. Nevertheless, it was not a simple reconstitution of its predecessor, it was not the ERE under another name. Although its relationship to the latter was manifest in respect of both its founder and a considerable part of its political personnel, the differences were equally evident; renewed to an unprecedented extent due to the massive influx of politicians without previous experience, it projected from the very outset a more liberal and modern version of conservatism. At the same time tendencies could be discerned towards a democratic party organisation, the disentanglement of the party from the personality of its leader, as well as towards an elaboration of a specific and clear-cut ideological identity.

Looking back over the years that followed, it can be said that ND went a long way towards these ends; for all that, the party is still in a period of transition, and the process of its transformation into the type of non-personalistic mass party as prevails in most West-European party systems is yet to be accomplished. In order to obtain a complete picture of the party's identity and a better understanding of its similarities with and differences from its predecessor, our analysis must also take into account the totally different social environment and the respective political developments that obtained after 1974, compared to the pre-coup socio-political reality. This will show that ND's political identity has been largely affected by these developments, and

that its overall course and transformation can best be explained within that context.

2.2. The socio-political level: From pre-coup repressive parliamentarism to the post-1974 open democratic regime

A. As shown in ch. 1 of this study, the political system established in Greece after the end of the civil war in 1949 and until the imposition of the military coup in 1967 was, of course, that of a parliamentary democracy, although very different from that prevailing in other West European states. It was authoritarian, a "police" or "guided democracy", imposed by the victors of the civil war —namely the throne, the army and the bourgeois parties in parliament— who fought together against the communist forces led by EAM/ELAS (with the army the dominant, and parliament the weakest partner). However, the main responsibility for the pretorian state consolidated after the civil war lies with the right-wing parties (the Greek Rally and ERE), since it was they that held office for most of this period. The liberal forces came to power rarely and only for very short intervals; the rest of the time they were excluded by a variety of legal and illegal means or systematically persecuted by the state machine as fellow-travellers.⁽¹⁵⁾

It was within this socio-political context that the formation, specific features and overall performance of ERE was examined. More specifically, it was argued that ERE operated in —but to a great extent also shaped and supported— a political system which excluded its opponents from any political participation whatsoever, or incorporated them through clientelism in a vertical, heteronomous and dependent manner.⁽¹⁶⁾ To put it differently: within the post-war authoritarian, "police-democracy" regime, ERE was a personalistic and clientelistic party of notables, which systematically used exclusionist and/or incorporative means of political control in order to gain electoral

support and remain in government. The neutralising of political opponents and deporting them to remote concentration camps, as that of hysterically anti-communist propaganda, the intimidation of the populace (especially in the rural areas), and the rigging of elections, was assisted by the supposedly neutral throne, the armed forces, and a host of quasi-terrorist, para-state and para-military organisations.

It should be stressed that with respect to rallying mass support and bringing people into the political arena, ERE did not greatly differ from the other bourgeois parties and particularly not from its main rival during the early-1960s, the liberal Centre Union (EK). In terms of party organisation, they were both personalistic and clientelistic parties of notables and local political barons, led by powerful and charismatic leaders, and altogether lacking impersonal and bureaucratic organisational structures. Let us point out once more that —as it has been the case in the turn of the century— both parties relied extensively on their respective political barons' broad clienteles, and secured votes by the proliferation of patronage networks. All these practices were the remnants of oligarchic parliamentarism and traditional, personalistic party politics, and came to be called paleokommatismós. The only difference with the situation prevailing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is that the political barons no longer enjoyed the autonomy of the local families of notables vis-à-vis the national leaders. In that sense, the traditional decentralised clientelism had been transformed into somewhat more centralised forms of party- and state-oriented patronage.⁽¹⁷⁾

The organisational similarities apart, the ideological orientation of the ERE and the Centre Union exhibited quite a few common elements. When in office, both parties adopted and enforced paternalist and state-interventionist policies in the economy; concerning international relations, both parties accepted and never questioned Greece's position

within the NATO alliance and, in general, the western world. Moreover, they both counted staunch supporters of the King in their ranks but were not royalist parties, and they both adhered lawfully to constitutional monarchy.

This is not, of course, to say that ERE and EK were simply two sides of the same coin. ERE expressed and represented the forces of the wider conservative camp, whereas EK was heir to the liberal tradition and represented the republican forces. Although Karamanlis' ERE was not a royalist party, it was closely affiliated with the Crown, as were its predecessors and particularly the inter-war People's Party;⁽¹⁸⁾ after the Asia Minor debacle in 1922 it was in the forefront of the monarchist movement, its policies and ideology being defined mainly in opposition to those of its main rival, the Liberal Party. The ERE certainly inherited this pro-royalist tradition, which reaffirmed its strong existence in the party ranks when during the 1965 political crisis, and the subsequent clash between the Centre Union and the King, the ERE openly identified with the interests of the latter. Furthermore, like its ancestors the ERE was very closely identified with the state, and extensively employed its mechanisms to consolidate its power and expand its clientelistic networks.⁽¹⁹⁾

Another important difference between the two parties was also that the liberal EK took a more modern and progressive position concerning broader social and economic issues. This became very evident during the early 1960s, when political and economic developments brought new and more radicalised forces --modern businessmen, higher employees, scientists, students and intellectuals-- to the political foreground, who demanded greater and bolder changes and modernisations in the economy, but also liquidation of the post-war "police democracy" and an opening up and democratisation of the political system. Their appearance coincided with the rise of the EK which identified with and adopted

these demands. It was only then that basic differences between the ERE and EK came into sharp focus. The former employed all the means at its disposal to suppress the popular demands and preserve the authoritarian status quo (the rigging of the 1961 election results, and the assassination of MP G. Lambrakis two years later by members of para-state organisations, constitute the most striking examples of the ERE's unscrupulous practices); whereas the Centre Union stood staunchly not only against its party rival, but also against the "police-democracy" regime as such, and pledged to modernise society and politics, and so to establish a more liberal and open democracy.

During the EK's short term in government from February 1964 to July 1965, the incorporative means of political control were not affected noticeably, but the persecution and exclusion of political opponents ceased, efforts were made to heal the wounds of the civil war, and a process was set in motion towards the liberalisation of the political system. But the new political climate was not allowed to last for long. The pillars of the post-war establishment —i.e., the throne, the army, and this time only the ERE faction in parliament, not all of it as had been the case before— were alarmed to see their respective power positions seriously threatened. ERE took the first step, by supporting in parliament a government formed by EK deputies who had defected from their party, and it was hoped that this would erode the popular support for G. Papandreou and the Centre Union, so that the ERE stood a better chance in the next elections. But matters had reached a deadlock. Since the mechanisms of exclusion and incorporation could no longer cope effectively with the popular threat from below, the system had either to be rearticulated thoroughly and opened up (which the Centre Union had failed to do), or it had to be reinforced by the total abolition of parliamentary rule. The armed forces opted for the second alternative,

and the colonels stepped in and established a military dictatorship in April 1967.⁽²⁰⁾

To summarise: Greece's post-1949 political regime established by the victors in the civil war (the throne, the army, and parliament, but the right-wing forces in particular) was an authoritarian system of repressive parliamentarism or "guided democracy". Party politics were allowed to continue openly, except for the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) which had been outlawed; the people were brought into the political game by the use of a combination of incorporative and/or exclusionist mechanisms of political control.

Within this system, ERE was the leading representative of the Right. Under an autocratically powerful leader, it was a conservative party of notables and local political barons. It tried to compensate for its total lack of any bureaucratic organisational structures by heavily relying on clientelistic relations and patronage networks, as well as on selective distribution of governmental spoils so as to rally mass support and remain in office; and to conceal its lack of any real ideology by transforming its traditional anti-liberal stance into an anti-communist hysteria that did not stop at persecuting and excluding from political participation every type of political opponent, whether leftist or liberal.

In overall terms, and in line with the political regime which was more repressive than it was parliamentary, more exclusionist than incorporative, and more authoritarian than democratic, ERE's identity and political performance projected, by and large, a version of authoritarian conservatism:⁽²¹⁾ the party persecuted and excluded its opponents rather more than it relied on patronage networks, it was more anti-communist than paternalistic and, last but not least, it was much more authoritarian than conservative.

B. The regime established in the country in 1974, after the dictatorship had handed power back to the politicians, was again that of a parliamentary democracy, but its relation to the pre-coup one was as different as night and day. This time it was a full and competitive parliamentary democracy, by far the most open that the country has known in modern history. The whole political system underwent a major liberalisation and democratisation, and can now be legitimately compared to most other West European parliamentary regimes.

This fundamental change in the political system affected every aspect of social and political life. This included, of course, the reappearance and performance of the political parties and particularly ND, which constituted a liberal reform of the Greek Right, not simply a regrouping of ERE under a different label (as has been argued already in the previous section). What matters most of all is the huge difference between the two political systems, rather than that between the pre-coup and post-1974 political parties. Since the parties are, in a way, a reflection of the system, and since their full understanding (especially of the ERE-ND relationship) presupposes a thorough knowledge of the post-1974 political regime and the way in which it was established, the focus in the rest of this section will be on the post-1974 political system, and the special characteristics that allow us to identify elements of change (but also of continuity) at the party level.⁽²²⁾

To begin with, we must stress once more that the transition from dictatorship to democracy, and the subsequent consolidation of an open and democratic regime was carried out by one single man as leader of one single party, namely Karamanlis and his *Nea Dimokratia*. Moreover, it should be remembered that (a) all these developments took place within a very short period of time, and (b) both the transition and the consolidation processes were entirely successful.

The post-1974 political system, then, was set up on a very different foundation. The army, which had been the dominant partner in the pre-coup tri-partite alliance (army-throne-parliament) that upheld the system of repressive parliamentarism, was soon sent back to barracks and ceased to play a dominant political role. The Communist Party of Greece was legalised and allowed to operate into the open; communism was no longer considered an enemy to the nation but only to democracy. Concerning the monarchy, Karamanlis called a national referendum, which gave a clear majority for the republic. Whereas almost all other parties stood publicly against the institution of the monarchy and urged their supporters to vote accordingly, the ND leader kept his party officially out of this controversy, and instructed his party colleagues to keep their personal opinion on the matter to themselves. ND's neutrality during this referendum, therefore, marked the end of the close identification of the Greek Right with the Crown, while at the same time the party, whose conservative tradition meant that it numbered many royalists among both its leading members and its voters, put this thorny issue aside and remained united.

The new 1975 constitution, then, which was elaborated and voted for exclusively by ND, was designed to establish a presidential democracy—that is, a political system where the main power lay with parliament, on the one hand, and on the other with the president of the republic, who was vested with broad and very important powers, including the right to dissolve parliament if he felt that it no longer reflected the true mood of the people. However, as long as Karamanlis was the leader of ND, the real power lay with parliament, or more accurately with the governing party and its leader and premier, since the president (elected solely by ND deputies who duly followed their leaders' instructions) was one of Karamanlis' closest associates, who would never think of exercising the special powers vouchsafed him against his party.

Essentially, then, the post-1974 political system was, so to speak, a "prime-ministerial" democracy, in the sense that at least the most important powers (if not all) lay with the premier. This situation was formalised by PASOK's 1986 constitutional reform, which deprived the president of the republic of all important powers he alone had enjoyed under the 1975 constitution.

All in all, the post-1975 prime-ministerial democracy was more centralised and oligarchic at its top than was the pre-coup police-democracy regime,⁽²³⁾ but —and this is the main difference— much more open, free, competitive and democratic in all other respects: political and civil rights were guaranteed and protected; freedom of the press, of opinion, of the trade unions was duly respected; elections were conducted fairly and honestly, and all parties, including the communists, were free to exist in the open, to canvass support, and to compete for power; most important of all, this new political system showed that it could survive changes and alternations in governmental power, something in which the pre-coup regime had failed completely.

The profound change of the political system could not but affect the relations of domination as well. The most evident difference has been, of course, the elimination of exclusionist methods; political dissent ceased to be banned, ideological differences and party-political preferences were accommodated and respected, and nobody was persecuted or discriminated against because of his political beliefs. However, the most important issue the new regime was faced with was to employ the political transformation inaugurated in 1974 for the creation of a new system, free of incorporative, personalistic and clientelistic elements —a political system of the West-European kind, where mass politics and horizontal, bureaucratic and impersonal organisations would finally disrupt and in the end replace the old vertical networks.

Within this open, non-exclusionist and competitive system, New Democracy emerged as the standard bearer of the conservative political tradition, but it also proved that it had undergone a decisive break with its authoritarian, royalist and reactionary past. It was indeed a new party in many respects, a party of the modern and moderate Right. On the positive side, its largely new political personnel projected a liberal conservative identity, and its ideology became defined as radical liberalism; it promised to follow a programme of bourgeois modernisation and committed itself to leading the country into the European Community. On the negative side—which emerged when ND tried to realise its policy programmes—this overall projected modernity did not come up to expectations. The party once more enforced the old state-interventionist and paternalist policies to cope with almost all social and economic issues, relied and capitalised extensively on the personality of its leader, and totally neglected to construct itself an ideological identity and an organisational structure.

Karamanlis was aware from early on that ND would not survive his eventual departure (which he and almost everybody else expected as a foregone conclusion), unless it developed from a party of notables, which would always require a charismatic personality to keep it together, into a modern party of principles. For all that, he failed to imprint upon his party a concrete set of ideological principles and to establish the foundations of an organisational structure. He only confused ND's ideology further when he tried to define its principles, and concerning the party organisation, instead of letting it grow gradually and democratically from the bottom, he tried in a rather authoritarian manner to create it from above. For all that, "the package of new ideology, organisation and programme imprinted by Karamanlis upon his party has been unevenly and incompletely digested and assimilated (or even deliberately subverted) by the lower echelons",⁽²⁴⁾ some degree

of institutionalisation of bureaucratic, organisational procedures was achieved: ND did survive its founder's departure, elected a new leader, and remained united.

During the party's term in opposition, the process towards organisational development gained momentum, but ideological issues still remained neglected. As a result, the party's identity and performance was unduly coloured by the arch-conservative personality of its then-leader E. Averoff, and temporarily began to resemble the ERE. Hysterical anti-communism became ND's main slogan, and the party's most recalcitrant, ultra-Right elements, both in terms of persons and ideas, came to the fore. In the end, the relentless challenge from PASOK—which continued to increase its polling figures, dominated in the realm of ideas, and it had developed a well-structured mass organisation—motivated ND to elect the liberal C. Mitsotakis for its new leader. He held a second party congress, which resulted in the upgrading of its grass-roots organisation and the adoption of a concrete, neo-conservative Thatcherite ideology.

The main point here is that, despite all these developments, previously quite unthinkable for a right-wing conservative party, ND completely failed to transform itself into an impersonal, bureaucratically organised political organisation. To use a different terminology: it failed to become an integrative political force of the Right.⁽²⁵⁾ Whether under Karamanlis' leadership or that of Mitsotakis, the efforts for modernising ND may have been perfectly genuine and sincere, but they all were abortive. In terms of ideology, both radical liberalism or neo-conservatism were imposed from above in a personalistic manner by the party leader and a small group of close associates; not discussed, elaborated and formulated by the party organisation, they remained vague and controversial. There were deep disagreements at the higher party echelons, especially over the post-

1985 adoption of the neo-liberal principles, and at grass-roots level there is still uncertainty and considerable confusion as to exactly what the party stands for. In terms of organisation, on the other hand, ND has acquired only a minimum of institutionalised, bureaucratic procedures, since the respective provisions and regulations of the party statutes have not been respected. It was only the parliamentary group that, three times in all, elected the new leader, and the other higher party organs were left to play a secondary, merely decorative role; the rank and file, although quite numerous and militant, served mainly as a mechanism for the distribution of party propaganda and for the mobilisation of voters and supporters during political rallies and demonstrations.

What all of this amounts to is that ND, ever since its foundation and until today, remains a party with something of a split identity: characteristics of continuity with its direct predecessor, as well as characteristics of change and departure from traditional conservative practices coexist side by side. ND can be seen as neither a complete transfiguration of, nor a mere face-lift of the traditional Greek Right. Nobody can deny that ND has greatly contributed to the consolidation of democracy by establishing the post-1974 democratic and non-exclusionist political regime; that it has introduced new personnel into Greek politics; that it endeavours to project a modern, centre-right moderate image, and an ideology other than ERE's pro-royalism and anti-communism; that it attempted to create a mass-organisation, and has held one preliminary and two full national congresses; and that, last but not least, it has in fact respected the rules of democracy and duly transferred power to PASOK when it lost in the election, thus contributing further to the post-1974 regime's consolidation and well-functioning. In all these respects, ND has presented a totally different

picture from that of its direct predecessor, and has certainly shown itself as a new expression of the country's conservative forces.

On the other hand, our analysis of the party also shows elements of continuity that tie ND directly to the ERE. Aside from the fact that Karamanlis founded and led both the ERE and ND, the latter party, while in office, relied heavily on the resources of the state machinery and used them for party purposes; moreover, its handling of most social and economic issues did not differ much from ERE's paternalistic and state-interventionist approaches. Furthermore, its failure to elaborate a concrete ideology, is largely responsible for ND not having managed so far to get rid itself of the most reactionary, ultra-conservative members in its ranks, who nostalgically aspire to the pre-coup social repression and authoritarianism. Most important of all, ND's failure to articulate and formulate a coherent ideology, and to create an effective mass organisation has meant that the party still remains more an association of certain leaders and professional politicians, than a mass-organised, integrative political institution. In consequence, all the characteristics of personalistic and inclusionist politics, (undue dependence on the leader whose broad powers are well beyond constructive criticism and control, disrespect and virtual defiance of organisational procedures and democratic inner-party politics, and the survival and use of clientelistic relations and patronage networks for gaining electoral support) co-exist and continue to operate alongside more horizontal, impersonal, but not yet institutionalised political mechanisms. It must be stressed however, that the personalistic and clientelistic characteristics present in ND today are by no means as strong and extensive as in the case of ERE.

3. General conclusion

The chief objective of this work was to study the origins, composition and particular characteristics in terms of political personnel, ideology and organisation at the national and local level of the conservative political forces in Greece as they appeared under the banner of the party of *Nea Dimokratia* after the end of the seven-year military dictatorship and the restoration of democracy in 1974. In order to provide a full and more comprehensive picture of ND's specific features and also the extent to which the latter reflected patterns of continuity and/or change from the past, we also took into account the historical process by which the party came into being, extending our analysis to ND's predecessors and especially to the National Radical Union (ERE), which had dominated Greek politics for more than a decade before the imposition of the dictatorship in 1967.

Our examination of the ERE and ND, and the comparisons that elucidated the question of whether ND was something completely new in Greek politics (as claimed by its founder) or merely the ERE in a new guise (as most of its critics argued) was not restricted to these two parties but extended to the broader social and political systems—very different from one another—in which they were respectively created and within which they operated. Thus we took into account the specific social and economic developments that contributed to the formation of these particular party-political identities and affected their general party-political performance. We also took into account and emphasised the significance of the respective political features dominant within each system, arguing that a better presentation and fuller understanding of the particular characteristics and specific course of the Greek Right must be considered in this context. It was finally argued that, in a narrower sense, there has been significant interrelation between the two

parties on the one hand, and the respective political systems within which they emerged and operated on the other; and, in a more general and broader sense, that the course and transformation of the Greek Right has been greatly affected by the country's overall economic and political development, and followed a very similar course.

Our analysis showed, first, that ERE emerged and operated within a repressive parliamentary, socio-political system characterised by both exclusionist and incorporative means of political control. In terms of the prevailing relations of political domination this meant that all those openly opposing this system or simply unwilling to comply with its terms were excluded from political participation through the use of repressive and authoritarian means. The rest, while allowed to participate in politics, were incorporated in a vertical, personalistic and dependent manner through clientelism, not independently through bureaucratically impersonal institutions. Secondly, ERE was both affected by and itself shaped and further strengthened this system, not only by refusing any reform, but also by taking the fullest advantage of the exclusionist and incorporative mechanisms. We concluded that ERE was an authoritarian conservative party, lacking in a coherent ideology and an effective mass organisation, which relied on personalities and local political barons who established and used patronage networks to rally electoral support.

With respect to ND, we argued that it was set up and operated in an open, fully competitive and democratic system. Political dissent was legitimised, because the system could survive regardless of whether people wished to participate, remain neutral or openly oppose it. It was also shown that ND was both affected by this modern political reality, and itself greatly contributed to its further shaping and institutional strengthening. Our examination of the party has shown ND as a more liberal, modern and moderate version of the Greek Right, both in terms

of ideology, which it tried to elaborate in a positive and coherent manner, and in terms of its attempted mass organisation to rally mass support; but while these respective processes towards modernisation have been set in motion, they are far from complete.

Our picture of the party and its specific features can be further elucidated by the trajectories of economic and political development in Greece. It has been widely accepted that the country's economic development, did not follow the Western European trend but took a distinctive course of its own, resulting in elements of both modernisation and underdevelopment. Without going into detail, let us point out that, (a) it was the state and not a particular social class that took the lead in the country's industrialisation; and (b) that the outcome of this developmental process has been that large capitalist industrial units did not become dominant but always co-existed side-by-side with the underdeveloped, backward economic sector (for example, a vast mass of artisanal, highly inefficient family concerns).⁽²⁶⁾

Similar trends may be observed concerning the course of political development. Contrary to what happened in most of the developed West European states, where the process of economic development and industrialisation preceded that of state expansion, in Greece the opposite is true: parliamentarism and democratic institutions in general emerged and functioned long before there was any large-scale industrialisation.⁽²⁷⁾ In the sphere of the means of political control and the relations of domination, this meant that in Western Europe the process from oligarchic to mass politics followed and was affected by that of the reformed and already modernised labour and other economic relations; as a result, the people there were no longer willing to let themselves be incorporated into politics through traditional clientelism when the latter had been seriously eroded due to economic development, modernisation and prosperity. This meant that the political parties

could no longer remain coteries of personalities and local barons. They too had to modernise and establish other means for rallying mass support and running for office —they had to develop concrete ideologies and to create powerful impersonal and bureaucratic mass-organisations.

In Greece, this political development did not occur. Although nineteenth- and early twentieth-century oligarchic parliamentarism became transformed in the post-war period into a reactionary, repressive and authoritarian regime, and after the military dictatorship took its present form of democratic parliamentarism proper, the processes of the transformation of relations of political domination, or of the political culture in more general terms, were far less spectacular. In other words, all the political parties that emerged after 1974, although they tried to adopt and project concrete ideological outlooks and to create impersonal and bureaucratic structures, ultimately did so only in part. Of course, their success varied, since some parties managed from the start to elaborate a very distinct ideology and a strong organisation (e.g. PASOK), others met with more limited success (e.g. ND), and others again (e.g. EK/ND) failed completely.⁽²⁸⁾ In effect, elements and practices reminiscent of the pre-coup traditional political culture did not disappear altogether, but re-emerged and co-existed with elements of political modernisation. So ND's pro-republican, liberal, centre-right ideology quite often had pro-royalist, anti-communist, and ultra-conservative overtones, whereas its ill-developed, mal-functioning and non-institutionalised mass organisation operated side-by-side with clientelistic networks. PASOK, although it projected a much more modern ideological and organisational identity, soon proved that it was the charismatic personality of its leader, coupled with generous doses of populism of the Latin American kind, that mainly accounted for the mobilisation of the masses and its election successes.⁽²⁹⁾

Just as the country's economic and political development took forms other than the Western European model that were characterised by the co-existence of both traditional and modernising elements, so did the course and transformation of the Greek Right, and of the political parties in general. Ever since its foundation, New Democracy presented and still presents old traditional elements that evidence continuity with the past, as well as new and modern features that mark its break with traditional practices and its transition towards political modernisation. In terms of its political personnel, the introduction of a good many newcomers to politics differentiated ND from ERE, but its leadership showed distinctive continuity with its predecessor. In terms of ideology, the adoption of liberal, centre-right or neo-conservative ideas showed that ND did try to articulate a coherent ideology that would appeal to the electorate, but the fact that the party's overall outlook has always been and still is dependent on, influenced and shaped by the personality of its leader has hindered efforts towards modernisation and perpetuated ND's similarities with ERE. In terms of party organisation, the creation and development of bureaucratic and horizontal structures, that is of an effective, non-personalistic mass organisation, has not yet been completed, so that ND continues to have to rely on clientelism and various party-political personalities with extensive patronage networks. In sum, ND presents a split identity, exhibiting both elements of political modernity and tradition —or, as said of the transformation of the conservative forces and the creation of ND, "as one should expect from such a transformation, the animal exhibits the disquieting features of a cross-breed mutant".⁽³⁰⁾

We do not pretend to be able to predict ND's future course. Whether the party will move towards political modernisation of the West-European kind and reform itself to become a party of the moderate and liberal Right, or whether it will regress to the old paleokommatisμός and

traditional politics is a matter for speculation; there is a host of factors both within the party and in the broader political context that may precipitate the one outcome or the other. What can be said tentatively and provisionally with respect to the post-1974 political system of open and democratic parliamentarism (or the "prime-ministerial" democracy, the characteristics of which we have presented above), is that it is approaching a critical point. It has coped successfully with the liquidation of the dictatorship, with transition to democracy and also with the establishment, respect and consolidation of democratic institutions; but it has ultimately failed in dealing with the mounting and pressing economic and social problems. In other words, it has failed to set the country on the road towards economic development and social modernisation. Greece has been a full EEC member since 1981, but its economy has not yet transformed the public sector by purging it of corruption and bureaucracy, upgraded the quality of its services, created criteria of meritocracy for state employment, permanently abolished clientelistic, rousfeti practices, established genuine respect for civil rights, more liberal legislation, democratisation of political parties, etc.

Greece's prime-ministerial democracy remains dependent on the personality of the premier, with party politics in post-1974 Greece overwhelmingly affected and influenced by the immense prestige of C. Karamanlis and the dazzling charisma of A. Papandreou. Although C. Mitsotakis enjoys neither such prestige nor such charisma, the fact that, originating from the broader liberal camp, and as an apostate from his party who is considered the politician chiefly responsible for the imposition of the dictatorship, he nevertheless managed to become the leader of one of the two largest parties and the country's prime minister, can leave no doubt of his extra-ordinary skills.

Today 86-year Karamanlis is serving his second five-year term in the presidency of the republic; it will end in 1995, and the constitution does not allow for a third one. Mitsotakis at 75, is premier, and 74-year Papandreou is leader of the official opposition (the early elections held on 10 Oct. 1993 changed this picture somewhat; PASOK won and Papandreou became once more the premier, whereas ND lost, Mitsotakis resigned from the ND leadership and the party is now moving towards electing its fourth leader). It does seem likely that, alongside the challenges for social change and modernisation set from above by the international environment (mainly by the EEC and the need for the country to respond successfully to efforts at broader European unification), and by the national environment (the above-mentioned social demands for more rapid change and modernisation), the eventual retirement of these three politicians may well initiate processes and procedures that will also lead to changes within the political parties. When this happens, ND will be expected to show whether is in itself capable of finally accomplishing its transformation and become a fully democratic and modern conservative party, similar to its West-European counterparts.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1: After the end of the civil war in 1949, the traditional conservative political forces were reconstituted under P. Tsaldaris' Popular Party. In 1951, the Greek Rally under Marshal Papagos took the lead in representing the Right, by absorbing the greatest part of its predecessor's political personnel; and after Papagos' death, in 1955, his successor C. Karamanlis founded the ERE, which was virtually the Greek Rally under a new label. The ERE stayed in office for eight consecutive years until 1963, was in opposition for another two, and after 1965 it supported minority governments and participated in coalitions until the imposition of the military dictatorship in 1967; but most importantly (as argued in ch. 1 of this study), ERE identified with the most backward, ultra-rightist and reactionary elements of Greek society after the civil war that followed hard on the heels of the country's liberation from the German occupation, and it is the ERE which is considered as chiefly responsible for the consolidation of the post-1949 authoritarian, repressive, and exclusionist political system.

2: For an approach to ND's identity which is almost a hagiology of Karamanlis and his party, see for instance Lambrias P., For Democracy, Athens: author's publication, 1977 (in Greek); for an opposite view, openly libellous, see Katris J., "New Democracy: ERE-originated, neo-Rightists and monarchists", in the political review Anti, Period B', no. 13, 22 Feb. 1975 (in Greek), pp. 7-8.

3: In this study, the terms Right, Centre and Left are used to denote only the three main political camps or families; see Mavrogordatos G., "The emerging party system", in Clogg R. (ed), Greece in the 1980s, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 70-94. It should be remembered, however, that --mainly due to the post-civil war authoritarian and reactionary record of the conservative parties (and particularly that of ERE, as argued in ch. 1)-- the term Right has acquired and is still burdened by negative, derogatory connotations, implying (beyond conservatism) a sense of injustice and oppression. So, by identifying ND with ERE, the opposition launched the slogan "The people don't forget the record of the Right" (in Greek this rhymes), and most often attacked ND on the grounds of this past record, rather than on ND's own post-1974 performance.

4: Issues relevant to PASOK have received broad coverage by not only Greek but also by British and American analysts, and there is a vast bibliography, including Anglo-American Ph.D. theses, giving detailed descriptions of PASOK, and various analyses, arguments and counter-arguments of specific features (e.g., whether it is socialist or social-democratic, a mass or a populist, a class-representing or a catch-all party). A good number of these writings has been taken into account in the present study to draw comparisons and complement our own picture of ND, and full references can be found in the bibliography out of these pages. By contrast, the Greek bibliography on ND is very sparse, and the most comprehensive of the very few articles in English was written by J. C. Loulis (ND's scientific counsellor at the time and therefore closely affiliated with the party): "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National

Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, pp. 49-83.

5: For most data concerning ND congresses, grass-roots organisation, and ideology I am greatly indebted to G. Malouhos, one-time junior officer in ND's press office; for the party publications, especially the earliest ones and also some very rare documents published by ERE in the 1950s, I was much helped by P. Bakoyiannis, party deputy at the time, who was assassinated on 26 September 1989 in Athens by the so-called "17 November" terrorist organisation. Full references of the names of the interviewees and their positions in the ERE and/or ND ranks can be found in the footnotes to each chapter. We decided not to interview higher party members and MPs because the more prominent among them had already given numerous interviews to the daily press and other mass media, or published books on the subject, so that their views on a wide range of party-political issues was already known.

6: The result of a pilot study, conducted in Larissa between September and October 1988, when some twenty party members were interviewed, was the basis for the final questionnaire formulated in London in early November of the same year.

7: For more details on this fieldwork research see ch. 6, and especially footnote 28 to the same chapter. A copy of the questionnaire, the answers of the party members, as well as a list of the names of the interviewees in the Department of Larissa, are given in Appendix VIII of this study.

CHAPTER ONE

1: See Mouzelis N., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1978, 2nd edition, December 1979, p. 14, (hereafter Mouzelis a.). (Henceforth, all quotations are in our own translation from the original Greek, unless otherwise stated).

2: Ibid, p. 22.

3: See Kaklamanis G. S., On the Structure of the Modern Greek State, Athens: author's publication, 1986 (in Greek), p. 99.

4: For more details see Mouzelis a., pp. 22-7.

5: See Mouzelis N., Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America, London: Macmillan, 1986, p. 4, (henceforth Mouzelis b.).

6: See Diamandouros P. N., "Greek political culture in transition: Historical origins, evolution, current trends", in Clogg R. (ed), Greece in the 1980s, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 47-8, where he argues:

"...the imposition of political institutions which were ultimately the products of capitalist social formations with powerful middle classes upon a pre-capitalist social order which lacked the structures to receive them created in Greece a tense and sterile symbiotic relationship between state and society that was to have lasting consequences on the modern Greek political system" (in English originally).

See also Mouzelis N., "Modern Greece: Development or underdevelopment?", in Monthly Review, vol. 32, no. 7, December 1980, pp. 13-25, (henceforth Mouzelis c.), where (p. 20) he observes:

"The Greek pattern indicates a weak, atrophied civil society, which is incapable of acting as a bulwark against state arbitrariness or as a solid base for bourgeois liberties and culture" (in English originally).

7: See Mouzelis c., p. 21, op. cit.

8: As regards the importance of the role of the state at this period, one should not exaggerate; it was by no means a totalitarian state. It played a predominant role along with, for example, foreign powers' interference, diaspora capital, etc. For the states' moderating, arbiter's role see Mouzelis N., "Neo-liberalism and development: Realities and myth", in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 6 September 1987; and also, by the same author, "How useful is state intervention?", in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 25 October 1987, (both in Greek).

9: See Mouzelis c., and also his "Capitalism and the development of the Greek state", in Scase R. (ed), The State in Western Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 241-73.

10: See Thucydides, "Greek politics: Myth and reality", in Political Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1970, pp. 455-66.

11: See Mouzelis a., p. 21, op. cit., and also his "Continuities and discontinuities in Greek politics: From Eleftherios Venizelos to Andreas Papandreou", in Les Temps Modernes, Athens: Exantas, 1986 (in Greek), pp. 149-62.

12: See Mouzelis a., p. 16, and also Mouzelis b., where the author speaks about "oligarchic parliamentarism", p. 182.

13: See Bakoyiannis P., Anatomy of Greek Politics, Athens: Papazissis, 1977 (in Greek), pp. 96-7, who argues:

"The characteristic feature of the parties of that period... was their personal character. Their differing elements were shaped from the particular characteristics of their leaders' personality".

See also Dafnis G., The Greek Political Parties: 1821-1961, Athens: Galaxy, 1961 (in Greek), p. 79.

14: See Mouzelis a., p. 16.

15: See Vournas T., History of Modern Greece, Athens: Tolidis Bros, 1977, six vols, (in Greek), vol. I, pp. 9-10; and also Mouzelis a., p. 106.

16: See Mouzelis N. and Attalides M., "Class structure and development in Greece", in Archer M. S. and Giner S. (eds), Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971, pp. 162-97.

17: See Manassis A., "The evolution of political institutions in Greece", (in Greek), in Les Temps Modernes, op. cit., pp. 15-9.

18: See Mouzelis N., "Continuities and discontinuities...", op. cit.

19: Ibid. See also the same author's "Class and clientelistic politics: The case of Greece", in Sociological Review, August 1978, pp. 471-97.

20: These were D. Gounaris, P. Tsaldaris, P. Protopapadakis, S. Stais and I. Sissinis; see Diamandopoulos T., "Major stages in the history of the conservative camp", in the quarterly review Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), pp. 16-21.

21: I.e., tzakia families who headed respective personal parties; see Diamandopoulos T., op. cit.

22: Due to a disagreement with King Constantine over the country's entry into World War I.

23: King Constantine, by appointing D. Gounaris to the premiership, indirectly also appointed him to the leadership of the conservative-royalist camp; see also Dafnis G., op. cit., pp. 126-7. The same practice was followed forty years later, when (as we shall see below) King Paul appointed C. Karamanlis to the premiership.

24: The designation Right was introduced and established much later, in 1950, when EPEK (National Progressive Centre Union) and the Liberal Party won the national elections and formed a coalition government. At that time the newspaper Eleftheria called these parties "centre

parties"; by contrast, then, the People's Party became the Right. It was during the post-war period that this name of the Right acquired negative, derogatory connotations, comprising —beyond conservatism— a sense of injustice and oppression, and finally becoming offensive altogether, even to conservative people. In this study the terms Centre and Left will be used only in the sense of indicating the place of a party in the political spectrum. In addition to this, the term Right will also denote the power complex that includes the supra-state or para-state organisations that, together with the monarchy, army and foreign interference ultimately resulted in what has been called "dualistic power" in post-war Greece (see below, this chapter). For the meaning and use of the terms Right and Left see Efthini, no. 136, April 1983, articles by Kassimatis G., Pasmazoglou J., Vlachos G., Lambrias P., Tsouderou V., Daskalakis G., Georgakopoulos L., Metaxas A., Foteas P., Tournaviti N., Makris N., Makrakis M., Aron R., Koestler A., Duverger M., Pingaud B., Prezzolini G. and Quarantotto C., and Tournier M., (all in Greek).

25: See Meletopoulos M., "Genealogy of the Greek Right, 1909-1989", in the quarterly review Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), pp. 22-32.

26: See Diamandopoulos T., "The basic characteristics of the conservative camp", ibid, pp. 11-3.

27: See Trombetas T. P., "Consensus and cleavage: Party alignment in Greece, 1945-1965", in Parliamentary Affairs, vol. XIX, no. 3, Summer 1966, pp. 295-311.

28: A good picture of the identity of the Greek conservative camp of this period (1922-1936) is given in the famous article written by G. Vlachos, publisher of the newspaper Kathimerini, prominent royalist and anti-Venizelist:

"The People's Party is the party which will respect the law even to the detriment of the country, the party of old habits, old methods, old traditions, [the party of] parliamentarism, the ideals of housekeeping, [the party of] order, with all the properties, pros and cons of these characteristics. The People's Party will probably not accomplish great things, but it will not cause a catastrophe. It will not initiate great policies but it will also not have to pay for the big and unbearable consequences that such policies bring in their wake".

See the newspaper Kathimerini, 22 June 1932.

29: It is true that Greece has never experienced a totalitarian regime of a fascist or a nazi type. Although the Metaxas dictatorship resembled the fascist type, it cannot be characterised as fascism proper. The Colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974), as well as other post-war military dictatorships in some of the countries in Latin America and elsewhere, should be considered as bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. For details see Mouzelis b., pp. 177-83.

30: This means the use of political controls that aim at excluding the popular forces from participating in the political process, at the same time as incorporating other forces in vertical, non-autonomous (e.g. clientelistic) fashion. For an elaboration of the term see Mouzelis b., pp. 170-7.

31: For a detailed examination of these events see Linardatos S., Towards the 4th of August Regime, Athens: Papazissis, 1975 (in Greek).

32: The People's Party opposed the Metaxas' dictatorship, although it had traditional links with the latter (in the sense that many of its members collaborated and participated in the dictatorship's governments); see Vournas T., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 455-9.

33: See Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint, Athens: Karanassis, 1974 (in Greek), pp. 67-8.

34: See Vournas T., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 455-9.

35: Ibid, vol. IV, (The Civil War). See also Richter H., 1936-1946: Two Revolutions and Counter-revolutions in Greece, Athens: Exantas, 1975, two vols, (in Greek).

36: See Vournas T., vol. IV, (The Civil War), op. cit.; there is a vast bibliography about the Greek civil war mostly presenting the facts through a left or leftist prism. A good work from the other side is that of Averoff-Tositsas E., Fire and Axe, Athens: Estia, 1974 (in Greek).

37: See Tsoukalas C., "The ideological impact of the civil war", in Iatrides J. O. (ed), Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis, Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1981, pp. 319-41.

38: Ibid.

39: Ibid. See also Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, Athens: Nea Synora, 1981 (in Greek), p. 103, where he argues that

"..if anti-communism as a political perspective was the common denominator of the whole 'free world', in Greece it imbued every element of social as well as cultural life, and this should be considered as the major political victory of the Right in Greece".

40: See Mavrogordatos G., "The emerging party-system", in Clogg R. (ed), op. cit., p. 74, and Wittner L. S., American Intervention in Greece: 1943-1949, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 291-2.

41: See Mouzelis a., p. 25.

42: For more details ibid, and also Mouzelis N. and Attalides M., op. cit.

43: See Mouzelis N. and Attalides M., op. cit., and also Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., p. 51, who argues that "...the Greek bourgeoisie remained and functioned outside the Greek territory: it was a 'bourgeois class of the exterior'".

44: As Maritsas D. argues, "...in Greece we have not had industry but only factories". See his unpublished paper "The Problem of Informatics Know-How Transfer to Greece (or New Bottles for the New Wines)", Patras University, Computer Technology Institute, Patras, October 1986. Along these lines another scholar added:

"In Greece, in particular, the working class has never managed to play the role of a social vanguard; since, very simply, there has never been a numerous and solid working

class, due to the respective lack of industrial infrastructure. There were workers in Greece, but there has never been a working class proper".

See Kargakos S., "Proposals for a different left", in Politika Themata, no. 765, 26 January 1990, p. 21.

45: See Mouzelis N., "Capitalism and the development of the Greek state", in Scase R. (ed), op. cit.; see also the "Report on Greece" of the Twentieth Century Fund (1947) where it is stated: "The industrialists and the entrepreneurs are not willing to invest money in enterprises which promise less than 40% profit, since they can make that profit through speculation in foreign currency"; cited in Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., pp. 86-7.

46: See Vergopoulos C., "The emergence of the new bourgeoisie: 1944-1952", in Iatrides J. O. (ed), op. cit., pp. 298-318.

47: Cited ibid.

48: Ibid.

49: See Wittner L. S., op. cit., p. 105.

50: See Vergopoulos C., op. cit., p. 318.

51: See Mathiopoulos V., Geschichte der Socialen Frage in Griechenland, p. 164, cited in Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 87. As Mouzelis N. argues, "...contrary to its western counterparts, in Greece there is less such organic complementarity between the capitalist and non-capitalist sectors", and he gives another example of unequal distribution of wealth, namely that "...after deduction of taxes and social security benefits, 9.5% of the national income goes to the 40% of the lowest income groups, whereas 58% is channelled to the 17% in the top income brackets" (in English originally); see Mouzelis N., "Capitalism and the development of the Greek state", in Scase R. (ed), op. cit., pp. 241-73; see also Mouzelis C.

52: Between 1944 and 1952, 23 different governments alternated in office; see Evert M., Karamanlis: The Reformer, Athens: author's publication, 1987 (in Greek), p. 9.

53: Ibid, pp. 24-5.

54: Ibid, p. 81.

55: Ibid, p. 81.

56: See New Economy, June 1956, author's underlinings, cited in Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 117. See also Macridis R. C., "Elections and political modernization in Greece", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 3, where he writes:

"However, given the particular character of investment—mostly from the United States— this remarkable growth did not always correspond to the needs of the country: it was concentrated in a few manufacturing firms, tourism and

construction, and in general in enterprises likely to provide high short-term returns" (in English originally).

57: As Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 121, says:

"...the real causes of industrial stagnation were more social and psychological rather than economic. The fear of insecurity, even if it was unjustified, exerted an important influence to the residents of a country which had just passed a great ordeal".

58: For example, in 1955 there were 10,150 tractors in agriculture as compared to 38,000 in 1963, an increase of 274.4%; see Evert M., op. cit., pp. 39-44, who nevertheless acknowledges that this modernisation was limited both in quantitative and qualitative terms. As Mouzelis N. argues, agricultural modernisation in Greece was unsuccessful, since it neither led to a considerable raise of productivity, nor was it ever articulated with the industrial sector in such a way as to create a local market for industrial goods and boost industrial development; for a more concrete elaboration of these points, see his "The state in late development", in the bi-annual Greek Political Science Review, no. 1, January 1993 (in Greek), pp. 53-89.

59: See Vaitos K. and Yiannitsis T., Technological Transformation and Economic Development, Athens: Gutenberg, 1987 (in Greek), p. 17, figure 2: in 1950 the agricultural sector represented 28.5% of the gross national product, the industrial sector 20.2%, and the tertiary sector 51.3%; whereas in 1960 the percentages were 22.8%, 25.7%, and 51.4% respectively.

60: See Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., p. 63.

61: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 115: of the urban population, 62.1% was concentrated in the Athens and Salonica agglomerations.

62: See Tsoukalas C., "The Ideological impact of the civil war", in Iatrides J. O. (ed), op. cit., p. 322. It is characteristic that the Greek civil service grew from 63,000 civil servants in 1944, to 132,000 in 1970. See also Vergopoulos C., "The emergence of the new bourgeoisie", in Iatrides J. O. (ed), op. cit., p. 310.

63: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 116; there were also a number of people who were not registered. Without giving any concrete figures, the author estimates that over half of them were also absorbed by the tertiary sector.

64: For more details see Mouzelis N., "The state in late development", op. cit., pp. 53-89.

65: It is perfectly true that the government really did attempt to solve some of these problems. With respect to the farmers' co-operatives, they tried to support but also wanted to control them. An American anthropologist describes the government's orientation as follows:

"Because the idea of co-operativism was very much reminiscent of collectivism on the communist model, the government investigated very thoroughly before granting a

loan, just to make sure that behind this idea there were no subversive forces".

See Sanders A. T., Rainbow in the Rock, cited in Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 125.

66: See Serafetinidis M., The Breakdown of Parliamentary Democracy in Greece: 1947-1967, Ph.D thesis, London School of Economics, 1979, p. 284.

67: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 125. It is characteristic that in a 1957 publication of ERE (Twelve Months of C. Karamanlis Government), in ch. 6 (in Greek), p. 43, (The Workers' and Employees' Position Improved) has these lines:

"For the workers' relief, on the one hand, the emigration of workers to Belgium was facilitated (1,767 have already emigrated there) and, on the other, an effort was made for the Unemployment Office's better operation".

68: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 126.

69: See Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., p. 64.

70: See Vaitzos K. and Yiannitsis T., op. cit., p. 18.

71: See Mouzelis N., "Capitalism and the development of the Greek state", in Scase R.(ed), op. cit., p. 253.

72: Ibid, p. 254.

73: See Vergopoulos C., "The emergence of the new bourgeoisie", in Iatrides J. O. (ed), op. cit., p. 299.

74: In footnote 24 above, it was explained that the term Right was established in 1950. To this we should add an important fact, namely that the terms Right and Left are, in Greece, defined and shaped historically and not socially; people who fought with EAM were Left, and people who were on the side of the government were Right. Hence the phenomenon of families where the father was Left and the son Right, or one brother Left and the other Right, simply because they found themselves—in most cases by sheer luck—in rival camps.

75: See Mouzelis N., "Capitalism and dictatorship in post-war Greece", in New Left Review, March-April 1976, pp. 57-104.

76: See Petropoulos J. A., "The traditional political parties of Greece during the Axis occupation", in Iatrides J. O. (ed), op. cit., pp. 27-36.

77: See Mavrogordatos G., "The emerging party-system", in Clogg R. (ed), op. cit., p. 183, and Wittner L., op. cit., pp. 36-7.

78: See Mavrogordatos G., "The emerging party-system", in Clogg R. (ed), op. cit., pp. 185-6.

79: President Truman pledged the United States support to Greece as a country whose existence was threatened "...by terrorist activities of several thousand armed men led by communists". See Katephores G., The Barbarians' Legislation, Athens: Themelio, 1975 (in Greek), p. 62.

80: According to the historian Vournas T., "Americanocracy then became established in Greece, which acquired an official character in September 1951 when the country entered the NATO alliance", op. cit., vol. IV, (The Civil War).

81: On the British interference in Greek politics, see especially the report of the British Ambassador to Greece in 1957, Sir Roger Allen, who stated:

"As a result of the Truman Doctrine we left, little by little, the responsibility to the Americans. The British navy, army, air-force and police missions were withdrawn one by one. The British embassy did not appoint and dismiss Greek governments any longer. The American period had begun..."

See his "First Impressions from Greece", Sir Roger Allen to Mr. Sellwyn Lloyd, no. 192, Confidential, Athens 24 September 1957, (in Greek), published in the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 19 February 1988. See also Kanellopoulos P., My Life, Athens: Yiallelis, 1985 (in Greek), p. 92, where he states that "...on the 22nd of November [1945], I was forced to resign. British intervention was so blunt that it forced Regent Damaskinos to resign as well".

82: For the liberal/centre-right governments of the 1950-52 period and American interference, mainly through U.S. Ambassador J. Peurifoy, see Wittner L., op. cit., pp. 283-91; and Roubatis P. J., Tangled Webs: The US in Greece: 1947-1967, Athens: Odysseas, 1987 (in Greek), especially chapter IV, pp. 99-110. See also N. C., "Political changes in Greece", in The World Today, vol. VIII, January 1952, pp. 26-38.

83: See Samatas M., Greek Bureaucratism: A System of Socio-political Control, Ph.D thesis, New School for Social Research, 1986, pp. 166-7.

84: See Alivizatos N., The Political Institutions in Crisis: 1922-1974, Athens: Themelio, 1986 (in Greek); see especially Part II: Freedoms and Suppression during the Postwar Period: Dialectics between Constitution and Para-Constitution, pp. 447-600.

85: See Samatas M., op. cit., pp. 166-7.

86: Ibid, p. 172. A most common penalty imposed by the courts at that time was the defendant's deportation to remote concentration camps. The following Table gives the numbers of deported people from 1951 until 1967, and shows that under the 1952 Constitution and until the imposition of the 1967 military dictatorship, there were a total of 1,722 deportations, 1,310 by Public Security Committee decision and 412 by court decision:

1951-1967 Deportations

<u>Year</u>	<u>By Public Security Committee's Decision</u>	<u>By Trial</u>
1951	128	6
1952	63	5
1953	163	8
1954	153	18
1955	135	13
1956	75	14
1957	119	18
1958	133	11
1959	62	11
1960	55	9
1961	47	84
1962	113	63
1963	74	62
1964	32	28
1965	35	28
1966	30	23
1967 (until 21/4)	21	7

Source: Alivizatos N., op. cit., pp. 580-1.

87: See Alivizatos N., op. cit., Part II, pp. 447-600.

88: See Manassis A., op. cit., p. 24.

89: See Vegleris P., "Greek Electoral Law", in Penniman H. R. (ed), op. cit., pp. 21-48; after 1926 (and until June 1989) no two consecutive elections have been carried out under exactly the same electoral system.

90: See Nikolakopoulos E., Parties and Parliamentary Elections in Greece: 1946-1964, Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 1985 (in Greek), pp. 210-29.

91: We shall return to these events below, when we shall show the electoral performance of the ERE party. For the 1961 elections, see Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., pp. 255-81; Vournas T., op. cit., vol. V, pp. 157-60; Papandreou A., op. cit., pp. 155-67; and also Karanikolas D. G., Rigged Elections in Greece: 1844-1961, Athens: author's publication, 1963 (in Greek), pp. 429-70.

92: See Wittner L., op. cit., p. 4; and also Campbell J. and Sherrard P., Modern Greece, London: Ernest Benn, 1968, p. 185.

93: See Coulombis T., Greek Political Reactions to American and NATO Influences, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

94: See Wittner L., op. cit., pp. 291-2.

95: See Paraskevopoulos P., George Papandreou, Athens: Typos, 1988 (in Greek); and also Papadimitriou N., From the Centre Union to Apostasy, Athens: Roes, 1986 (in Greek).

96: See Macrides R. C., Greek Politics at the Crossroads: The Socialist Experiment, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in Greek), p. 46.

97: See Mouzelis a., p. 27.

98: See Markesinis P. S., "The Greek Crown and Its Ministers", in Parliamentary Affairs, vol. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1972-73, pp. 57-69.

99: Cited in Campbell J. and Sherrard P., op. cit., p. 291. In Papandreou A., op. cit., pp. 365-8, we find the king's proclamation to the Greek people, addressed on 13 October 1967. There, he said, among other things:

"I also declare that there will be no accommodation with the communists, who seek the ruination of the country. During the last twenty-five years the communist minority has sought the overthrow of our social and political institutions by violent and insidious means. It has brought destruction and desolation, it contaminates the youth of the country and imperils the very existence of our race".

100: See Manassis A., op. cit., p. 26, where he notes:

"After the civil war, the role of the Parliament and, more specifically, of the parliamentary majority remained secondary: the real power-blocks were the Monarchy and the Army, both in close relations with the USA (the latter particularly through the NATO alliance)".

101: See Mouzelis a., pp. 131-3.

102: Ibid.

103: See Veremis T., "The Army in Politics in the Post World War Period", in Les Temps Modernes, op. cit., pp. 135-48. According to Wheeler M., "Greek Political Perspectives", in Government and Opposition, vol. 3, no. 3, Summer 1968, pp. 339-51:

"The Army's role in modern Greek history was not always conservative. It played a major part in the overthrow of the Monarchy and the establishment of the Greek Republic (1924-1936). It was with the Metaxas' dictatorship and the dismissal of the republican officers, that the Army acquired a clearly conservative orientation" (in English originally).

See also Mouzelis a., pp. 131-3.

104: According to the agreement, the two leaders would try to overcome the deadlock of the political situation by leading the country to new elections. For more details see Vournas T., op. cit., vol. V, pp. 269-93; see also Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., pp. 265-75.

105: See Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., pp. 84-5; see also Meynaud J., Political Forces in Greece, Athens: Byron, 1966 (in Greek), pp. 261-4. We shall return to these events later in this chapter.

106: For this secret organisation see, among others, Papandreou A., op. cit., pp. 131-4.

107: See Mouzelis a., pp. 116-7. See also Dimitrakos D., Mitsotakis C.: A Political Biography, Athens: Papazissis, 1989 (in Greek), vol. I, p. 340.

108: See Theotokis I. S., Political Reminiscences, Athens: Eptalofos AVEE, 1980 (in Greek), p. 135.

109: EDA (United Democratic Left) was created in August 1951 and served primarily to shelter and accomodate the persecuted supporters of the outlawed, since 1947, Communist Party (KKE). For a more comprehensive account see Meynaud J., op. cit., pp. 192-229. See also Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., pp. 218-9.

110: EDA managed to get such a high percentage of the vote for mainly two reasons: first, the growing inequalities and unbalanced prosperity had resulted to popular dissatisfaction and unrest; and second, the Liberal parties, due to continuous quarrels and splits, did not provide a reliable and promising alternative to ERE and, moreover, they had tired the electorate with their ceaseless squabbles.

111: The links between IDEA and CIA are today well documented. Suffice it to say that the dictator, G. Papadopoulos, was a leading IDEA-member and his name is found in CIA payrolls since 1952; see Wittner L., op. cit., p. 300. And as Papandreou A. op. cit., p. 337, says,

"Papadopoulos, a long time friend of the CIA and the KYP's [the Greek counterpart] liaison officer to that organisation, was the chosen instrument of plan "Prometheus". [This plan was set in motion in April 1967 for the imposition of the seven-year military dictatorship.] To my knowledge, he has the distinction of being the first intelligence agent to become a European dictator. And his coup was made illustrious by the fact that it was the first successful military putch in the European continent".

112: See Wittner L., op. cit., p. 299. The author goes on to argue that

"...the Greek Central Intelligence Agency, KYP, engaged in widespread wiretapping, mail-tampering and political surveillance operations which extended to all government agencies including the Prime Minister's Office"; and he concludes that KYP "...was organized, funded and advised by CIA" (in English originally).

Ibid., p. 305.

113: TEA were first instituted by J. Rallis (who was the Prime Minister during the Axis occupation and collaborator with the Germans), and were reorganised by the Sophoulis' liberals in 1947.

114: See Vournas T., op. cit., vol. V, pp. 160-2, Papandreou A., op. cit., pp. 134-46 and Roufos R. ("Athenian"), Inside the Colonels' Greece, London: Chatto and Windus, 1972.

115: For a detailed examination of most of these organisations see Lendakis A., The Para-state Organisations and the 21st of April, Athens: Kastaniotis, 1975 (in Greek).

116: Ibid., p. 153.

117: See Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., p. 74. For the role of shipping, finance, and merchant capital during this period, see Serafetinidis M.,

op. cit. For the "power-dualism" see also Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 86 and Katephores G., op. cit., p. 48.

118: As Tsoukalas C. observed, "The conservative camp, instead of ridding itself of the Metaxas, the German, and the civil war inheritance, on the contrary reinforced it"; see The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 135. See also footnote 213 below.

119: After D. Gounaris' death, and during the turbulent period from the Asia Minor debacle until the 1936 imposition of the Metaxas dictatorship, P. Tsaldaris became the new party leader —and also the country's prime minister from 1933 until 1935.

120: "They [the Americans] called Tsaldaris, who was Prime Minister and the leader of the parliamentary majority, and informed him that they would stop economic aid unless he resigned in favour of Sophoulis' liberal coalition, which had been created within 24 hours"; see Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 94. See also Dimitrakos D., op. cit., vol. I, p. 280, and Theotokis I. S., op. cit., p. 127.

121: See Roubatis J., op. cit., pp. 99-110, and Linardatos S., From the Civil War to the Dictatorship, Athens: Papazissis, 1977, five vols, (in Greek), vol. I, pp. 97-159 (henceforth Linardatos a.).

122: See Campbell J. and Sherrard P., op. cit., p. 250. For Papagos' life and personality see also Papandreou A., op. cit., pp. 126-34, and Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 281ff.

123: See Meletopoulos M., "Genealogy of the Greek Right", in the quarterly review Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), p. 27.

124: See Meletopoulos M., "The leaders of the Greek Right", ibid, pp. 34-7. It is noteworthy that the only discordance within the party was in late 1954, when S. Markesinis, the main consultant of Papagos, left the party because the latter had accused him of binding the country to detrimental contracts with two big West German enterprises. Together with Markesinis 22 deputies left the party also, in this first albeit not very serious, split within the conservative camp. Markesinis founded a new party, the Party of Progressive People (KP), with which he contested all the following elections until 1964, either alone (1956, 1963) or in coalition both with the ERE (1964) and with the Liberal parties (1958, 1961).

125: One must not forget that the civil war had ended very recently, and that such a task was particularly difficult. On the other hand, the Communist Party bears its own responsibility for keeping this wound open, due to its underground organisation, its radio-broadcasts from abroad, and mainly the so-called "Keep the guns ready" slogan of its Secretary-General, N. Zachariadis, after the end of the civil war. The slogan meant that the communist forces should be absolutely ready to start the war again, at the first opportunity.

126: The most notorious of the concentration camps was on the island of Makronissos where, by extensive use of torture, isolation, and blackmail, the detainees were forced to sign a statement denouncing communism. The minister of national defence at that time, P. Kanellopoulos, called this camp a "New Parthenon"; see Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 133. The same minister, in answer to criticism why the government was insisting on enforcing the institution

of administrative banishment when there were courts for those who break the law, said:

"Democracy can not remain indifferent vis-à-vis even typically non-active communists. Because even a typically inactive communist (that is, a communist who is not committing murder), although he might not act violently, nonetheless thinks violently. His whole cast of thought is not democratic or normal, it is violent. In consequence, the thought being violent, it is virtually an act and not a simple thought".

See the Parliamentary Minutes, 21 February 1955, cited in Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. II, p. 271; see also Katephores G., op. cit., p. 67.

127: See also Dimitrakos D., op. cit., p. 287: "...the term 'State of the Right' came into use later, in the most negative sense imaginable. The State of the Right (and it was not only of the Right, but of the Centre as well) is, mainly, a creation of the civil war, and so of those who triggered it".

128: The accession of C. Karamanlis to both the premiership and the conservative camp's leadership, is not yet well documented. Most of the scholars agree that it came about largely due to royal favour in combination with American interference. As Queen Frederica wrote to General G. Marshal:

"Within a few hours my husband appointed to the premiership of Greece a young, self-made man from Macedonia. To help him, he gave him also the right to dissolve parliament, and arrange for new elections in case he failed to get a majority vote. Mr. Karamanlis, today's Premier, had been a Minister —exceptionally successful— in Papagos' government. The country felt as if it had drunk champagne. Within seven hours a new government was formed, sworn in and presented to parliament".

Cited in Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. IV, p. 384. For the specific reasons that led to the sudden Karamanlis accession, see Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. IV, ch. 10, pp. 346-85; Roubatis J., op. cit., pp. 174-7; Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., pp. 138-9; Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 96; Dimitrakos D., op. cit., p. 327; Theotokis S., op. cit., pp. 144-5; Kanellopoulos P., op. cit., pp. 135-7; Wittner L., op. cit., pp. 271-2; Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., pp. 210-1; Alivizatos N., op. cit., pp. 242-51; Markesinis S., "The Greek Crown and Its Ministers", in Parliamentary Affairs, vol. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1972-73, pp. 57-69; Katsoudas D., "The constitutional framework", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), Political Change in Greece: Before and After The Colonels, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 14-33 and the same author's "The conservative movement and New Democracy: From past to present", ibid, pp. 85-111.

129: A party publication wrote a year later:

"Even though he [Karamanlis] could have stayed in office for 13 more months, he did not. He opted for new elections, he alone against all other political leaders... united in one front, the already known Democratic Camp... Karamanlis did so, endangering almost everything with the 1956 election, because he deeply sensed the absolute

necessity for creating a new political life in the country, one that would not be a carry-over from the past".

See Twelve Months of Karamanlis' Government, Athens: ERE publication, 1957 (in Greek), p. 4.

130: See Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. III, p. 96; and also Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., pp. 210-29. This electoral law was described by the government as a "majority system with limited minority representation".

131: See Evert M., op. cit., p. 12.

132: Another Karamanlis biographer agrees as far as the meaning of the terms "Radical" and "Union", but argues that "National" meant that the new party did not obey foreign interests. See Genevoix M., The Greece of Karamanlis, Athens: Sideris, 1972 (in Greek), p. 183.

133: See Loulis J., "The Greek conservative movement in transition: From paternalism to neo-liberalism", in the New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S., Athens: Centre for Political Research and Information, International Symposium, May 1981, p. 14.

134: See Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. III, pp. 49-50.

135: For this presentation we shall heavily rely upon Meynaud's work, op. cit., pp. 234-75, since, to the author's knowledge, there has been no other scholarly analysis of the pre-dictatorial conservative parties. All and any new information or data that may make their appearance meanwhile will, of course, be given due consideration.

136: See Roubatis J., op. cit., p. 177.

137: See Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 234.

138: Before Karamanlis' resignation in 1963 due to a disagreement with the king, the latter sent him a letter beginning as follows: "Mr. Prime Minister, Seven years ago I selected you as the country's Premier, and both this selection and my confidence in you personally have been fully justified". See Woodhouse C., Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy, Athens: Morphotiki Estia, 1982 (in Greek), p. 189.

139: See Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 239.

140: According to C. Kallias, a prominent figure in the conservative camp during the ERE era (and a deputy also of the post-1974 New Democracy party), there was not intra-party democracy whatsoever. The only institution that came close to functioning democratically —where discussion was possible at least— was the parliamentary group at its meetings. Interview with the author, 4 July 1988.

141: See Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 240. Karamanlis once said bluntly in an interview he gave to C. Schultzberger that "Greeks do not have a democratic mentality. They need a very capable leader". See Kartakis E., C. Karamanlis' Epigrammatic Phrases, Athens: Roes, 1986 (in Greek), p. 25.

142: See Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 240.

143: See Lendakis A., op. cit., pp. 157-294. Most of EKOF's founding members collaborated with the colonels' junta, while others openly attacked it; most of the latter belong today to the New Democracy party. What is also important to note is that —as Lendakis A., op. cit., argues on his p. 13:

"When EKOF was founded, it managed to absorb a good many students who had belonged to ERE or EREN [the youth organisation of ERE], but they were by no means fascists and did not really know what EKOF was all about. Most of them later abandoned EKOF, and others openly denounced the organisation".

144: Ibid, especially pp. 311-9 and p. 102.

145: Ibid, pp. 103-10, where the author enumerates 54 para-state organisations. It is noteworthy that following EDA's electoral triumph in 1958, when it polled 24.45% of the vote, Karamanlis called and presided over conferences with officials from KYP, the Security Corps, and the army's security services in order to elaborate the best method for combatting the Left. One of the participants and later editor of a junvist newspaper, S. Konstandopoulos, wrote:

"I remember that a few days after the [1958] election Karamanlis invited some friends to his house in Kifissia... We were about ten people: higher public officials, politicians and journalists. A broad conversation took place about the government's progress. Nobody had mentioned anything about the communist threat and the exceptionally worrying electoral results until Mr. Karamanlis acknowledged that this was a most serious issue... This conversation motivated Karamanlis to set up an obscure committee of distinguished intellectuals, in order to study the communist problem theoretically and politically. On this committee I met for the first time today's Prime Minister G. Papadopoulos and had the opportunity to appreciate his thought".

From the newspaper Eleftheros Kosmos, 11 August 1968, cited in Linardatos a., op. cit., p. 344, who adds:

"From that time onwards, the para-state organisations gained momentum; they started by organising 'anti-demonstrations' during Centre Union or EDA demonstrations, and concluded with the orgy of the 1961 elections and the murder of G. Lambrakis in Salonica in May 1963".

146: See Tsatsos C., The Unknown Karamanlis, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1984 (in Greek), p. 91.

147: See Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 244; and Kanellopoulos P., op. cit., p. 172.

148: See Loulis J., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 15.

149: See above, footnote 128.

150: It cannot be accidental that, whereas there is no scholarly analysis for the conservative camp (Meynaud does not deal exclusively

with this subject), fourteen books have so far been written in Greek for C. Karamanlis only: Genevoix M., The Greece of Karamanlis, Athens: Sideris, 1972; Massip R., Karamanlis: The Distinguished Greek, Athens: Sideris, 1972?; Yiovannis C. (ed), Nation-Leader Karamanlis, Athens: Yiovannis Publications, (supervised by P. A. Papadakis and the editor), 1975; Lychnos G., Nation-Leader Karamanlis, Athens: Yiovannis, 1977; Markoyiannis C., About C. Karamanlis and His Disastrous Policy, Athens: author's publication, 1977; Woodhouse C., Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy, Athens: Morphotiki Estia, 1982; Tzermias P., The Karamanlis of the Anti-Dictatorial Struggle, Athens: Roes, 1984; Tsatsos C., The Unknown Karamanlis, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1984; Ginis J., The "Other" Karamanlis, Athens: Nastos, 1986; Kartakis E., C. Karamanlis' Epigrammatic Phrases, Athens: Roes, 1986; Evert M., Karamanlis: The Reformer, Athens: author's publication, 1987; Lambrias P., In the Shadow of a Great Man, Athens: Morphotiki Estia, 1989; Tzermias P., C. Karamanlis' Political Thought, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1990; and Paraskevopoulos P., Karamanlis during 1974-1985, Athens: Fitrakis/O Tipos A.E., 1991.

151: See Dimitrakos D., op. cit., p. 327.

152: See, for example, some excerpts from Karamanlis' biography, published and distributed by the Prime Minister's Office in several foreign languages in May 1957, quoted in Meynaud J., op. cit., pp. 246-7.

153: See Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., pp. 255-81. For adverse opinions see Woodhouse C., op. cit., pp. 176-9; and Varvitsiotis J., Restoration of Historical Realities, Athens: author's publication, 1986 (in Greek), pp. 33-8. According to the then prominent liberal MP, C. Mitsotakis,

"...it is indisputable that during the 1961 elections there was violence and fraud. I do not know to what extent this happened, but I am sure that it did happen. In effect, this violence and fraud were exercised not by Karamanlis but by the Palace, which believed that this would play into the hands of both the ERE and the Centre Union... The whole plan, in my opinion, must have been elaborated in para-state circles..."

See Dimitrakos D., op. cit., pp. 452-3.

154: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 162.

155: Karamanlis insisted that his government bore no responsibility for this event. It is said that, when he was informed about the murder, he exclaimed: "For God's sake, who governs this country?"; see Roubatis J., op. cit., p. 193.

156: For the entire amendment programme see The Constitution of Greece, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1987 (in Greek), pp. 239-45. See also a letter Karamanlis sent to C. Tsatsos in 1966, where he wrote:

"I would surely be naive if I believed that the amendments alone would cure all the diseases in our country. But it would definitely help to clean up and modernise our public life if there were capable forces to take advantage of".

See Tsatsos C., op. cit., p. 176. Generally speaking, with the changes he envisaged he meant to put some limits to the throne's intervention in

politics on the one hand, and to the people's civil rights (e.g. strikes) on the other. According to Alivizatos N., op. cit., p. 547, Karamanlis' central aim was to incorporate within the revised constitution the emergency legislation from the time of the civil war.

157: See Kartakis E., op. cit., pp. 140-1, and Woodhouse C., op. cit., p. 222.

158: In this context it is interesting that in early 1962 the king told army officers in Salonica: "God united us. I belong to you and you belong to me"; see Woodhouse C., op. cit., p. 188. Much later, on 18 December 1967, Karamanlis said in an interview with C. Schultzberger: "All Greece's misfortunes stem from the mistakes of the Throne." See Kartakis E., op. cit., p. 31.

159: See Woodhouse C., op. cit., p. 218.

160: For details see Kanellopoulos P., op. cit., p. 173. Kanellopoulos, during the years of his ERE leadership, often gave the impression that he did not actually mean what he said and did. As he himself admitted, "Of course, my whole political career, from the civil war until today, was more or less a deviation from my deeper thoughts and principles"; ibid, p. 173.

161: As Loulis J. stated:

"One fails to comprehend, for example, why a politician like Maniadakis (Metaxas' Minister of Security) was accepted within the ERE ranks together with a number of other extremists of the Right. Such groups basically favoured an all-powerful paternalistic state which would conduct the anti-communist campaign. They were xenophobic, populist and hardly looked favourably on free-market economics".

See "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 16. See also Lendakis A., op. cit., p. 77.

162: For more details see Meynaud J., op. cit., pp. 255-6.

163: In fact, it remains unresolved until today. At the time under discussion the issue triggered a lot of controversy. Some of Karamanlis' political opponents argued that he had been chosen for the premiership by the Americans, solely to accept a solution for the Cypriot Problem that was detrimental to Greece; their charge has never been substantiated. For the latest exchanges on the subject see the articles by G. Mavros, "Mr. Averoff's Zurich", and by E. Averoff, "The Zurich Agreement: Cost and advantages", in the newspaper To Vima, of 20 November 1988 and 27 November 1988 respectively (in Greek).

164: On 25 July 1985, U.S. Ambassador to Greece B. Keeley, testifying in the Senate's Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on European Affairs shed some interesting light on the past:

"And I think that we might establish a base for a different kind of friendship and a different relation, being more equal allies so to speak, rather than a clientelistic relation, which was the case during almost two decades, as regards our relations to Greece after the World War II... I would like us to proceed to something

new and better, something we can live better with and something the Greeks can live better with as well".

Published in the newspaper To Pondiki, 5 June 1987.

165: See Evert M., op. cit., pp. 68-71, and Kanellopoulos P., op. cit., pp. 146-8.

166: See Roussos G., Modern History of the Greek Nation, Athens: Elliniki Morphotiki Estia, 1975, seven vols, (in Greek), vol. VII, pp. 545-6.

167: See Greece over the Six Years 1955-1961, Athens: ERE publication, 1963 (in Greek), ch. 1, p. 5.

168: See Evert M., op. cit., pp. 81-2. We shall not concern ourselves with the economy in detail here; see our analysis in section 2.1.1 of this chapter.

169: See Co-ordination Minister P. Papaligouras' speech in parliament, on the ratification of the Accession Agreement between Greece and the EEC, published in the newspaper Naftemporiki, no. 9802, 26 January 1962.

170: See P. Papaligouras speech, addressed to the members of the Greek Chamber of Commerce and Industry published in the newspaper Naftemporiki, no. 9818, 14 February 1962.

171: See Katsoudas D., "The Conservative Movement...", op. cit., p. 90.

172: See Drakos R. G., Industry in Greece, Athens: 1980, p. 73, cited in Loulis J., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 16.

173: See Meynaud J., op. cit., pp. 261-9. After the party had lost the 1963 and 1964 elections, parliament decided to establish a special committee to investigate whether some ERE Ministers (including Karamanlis) bore any responsibility for damages to the state in connection with public works. The committee finally decided to send the case to the courts since, in its view, there was sufficient indication that serious embezzlement had taken place. Nevertheless, the George Papandreou government declared that all offences —if any— had been cancelled by lapse of time.

174: Ibid, p. 261.

175: In 1971 Karamanlis declared that not only had he taken no measures of repression and exclusion of the Left, but he actually reduced those already existing: "I found 4,498 imprisoned communists and when I left there were 6...". (See Woodhouse C., op. cit., p. 221; Varvitsiotis J., op. cit., p. 12; and Genevoix M., op. cit., p. 225). Tsoukalas C. argues, without presenting concrete figures, that thousands of people continued to be exiled in concentration camps until the end of Karamanlis' period, while Alivizatos N. (op. cit., p. 577) maintains that by 1963 there were 1,100 political detainees in Greece. Unwittingly contracting his party leader, ERE Minister of the Interior T. Makris, said in parliament on 5 December 1958: "...the measures which have existed for decades to preserve the country's security have been constitutionally safeguarded". Concerning the political detainees in exile, he said that they remained in exile by choice, since a simple verbal declaration that they would "live in obedience to the law", would

let them go home. He charged EDA with sheltering in its ranks the supporters of the outlawed Communist Party, and warned that the government would not abolish the "security measures" against the Left, but rather enforce them more systematically and extend them to fellow-travellers as well. See Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. III, p. 377.

176: See P. Kanellopoulos, op. cit., p. 183.

177: Early elections were the rule for the whole of the post-war period. The difference in the case of the ERE is that the latter always formed one-party governments, whereas virtually all governments before had been coalitions ones. The only exception was the Greek Rally, which formed a one-party government in 1952. Nevertheless, when Marshal Papagos died, Karamanlis did not continue in government until the end of the term, but opted for new elections.

178: See Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., p. 213.

179: According to the 1940 census, the rural areas, where traditionally the right-wing parties enjoyed greater popularity, were over-represented in parliament. As already explained, however, the internal emigration that began in the early 1950s, concentrated the main bulk of the country's population in the urban centres.

180: See Linardatos a., op. cit., p. 213.

181: Ibid, pp. 75-6.

182: Ibid, pp. 77-8.

183: See Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., p. 224; and Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 271.

184: It should be noted here that the increase in EDA's vote did not come all of a sudden. It is reasonable to suppose that it would be identifiable, if to a lesser extent, in the 1956 elections if EDA had contested them by itself. Furthermore, the continual quarrels of the Liberal Party's leaders had disillusioned many voters who therefore opted for EDA in 1958. For more details see Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. III, pp. 320-5.

185: See Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. IV, p. 30; and Roubatis J., op. cit., pp. 185-6.

186: The precise reasons for the early resignation of Karamanlis' government were never explained. There was only an official announcement, saying that "The government, considering the international situation, in combination with the psychological climate within the country, has decided to suggest... the immediate dismissal of parliament", see the newspaper To Vima, 20 September 1961, quoted in Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., p. 257.

187: See Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., p. 17. For the Pericles contingency plan, see Lendakis A., op. cit., pp. 46-8. The view that no violence ever existed and the 1961 elections were fair, or at least, that some irregularities did take place, but not to the extent that ERE's opponents try to present, is supported by C. Woodhouse, (op. cit., pp. 175-9), where Karamanlis says that this "stupid plan" had been set in motion by the "intelligence agencies" and he for one knew nothing about it. On the other hand, Kanellopoulos P., (op. cit., pp. 152-3),

admitted that there "had been some violence on behalf of the ERE" —he estimated that it increased the vote by 4%— but added that, "even if the elections had been a hundred per cent fair, the ERE would have won anyway". Varvitsiotis I., (op. cit., pp. 33-8), basically agrees with Kanellopoulos, but also says that the Pericles contingency plan had nothing to do with the elections. Nevertheless, most historians are agreed that the Pericles plan was set in motion for the 1961 elections; the only question that is debatable is to what extent it influenced the results. C. Mitsotakis also accepts that there was violence and electoral fraud in 1961, and admits Centre Union responsibility. He argues that the electoral fraud was organised by the palace, and not by Karamanlis. See Dimitrakos D., op. cit., pp. 452-3; see also footnote 153 above.

188: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 162.

189: Disagreement over a state visit to London by King Paul and Queen Frederika was only a pretext. In fact, Karamanlis wanted to make some trenchant reforms of the constitution (basically to limit the power of the throne on the one hand, and people's civil rights on the other), in order to be able to govern more efficiently and to manage to steer Greece towards full industrial development; see also footnote 156 above.

190: Nevertheless, the king called G. Papandreou to form a government, even though the latter's party did not enjoy an absolute majority in parliament. This king's decision was severely criticised by the ERE. See Kanellopoulos P., op. cit., pp. 159-61.

191: EDA did not present any candidates of its own in 24 out of the 55 electoral districts, and so indirectly supported the Centre Union. See Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., pp. 307-8.

192: Ibid, p. 230.

193: Many ERE leading members, and Kanellopoulos himself, kept reporting directly to him when he was in Paris, and in his replies Karamanlis used to express his opinions and to give advice on various issues; see Woodhouse C., op. cit., pp. 228-9.

194: See Loulis J., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 15.

195: See Meynaud J., op. cit., p. 271. A striking exception is that of the four electoral districts in Crete where the ERE, due to the long Venizelist tradition, polled its lowest percentages. On the other hand, in other electoral districts (as, for example, Lakonia in the Peloponnese), the ERE always polled much higher than its national average; see Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., pp. 210-309.

196: According to Janda K. (Political parties: A Cross National Survey, The Free Press, New York 1980, pp. 19ff), there are five criteria for measuring the degree of a party's stability/institutionalisation: (i) the life-duration of the party, (ii) the impersonality of its character, (iii) how frequently it has changed its name, (iv) party organisational continuity, and (v) the stability or instability of the party's parliamentary and electoral strength. The latter is measured by a mathematical formula devised by Janda himself. This calculates the stability of a party's strength on a 0-1 axis, where the two end values show absolute stability (zero change), and the theoretically greatest possible deviation from the average party's

strength. For this calculation, Janda adds the absolute values of deviations from the party's average electoral strength, he divides the sum by the number of elections the party has contested and, again, divides the quotient by the party's average electoral strength. The closer to zero the final result, the more institutionalised the party, and vice versa. The mathematical expression of this formula is:

$$\text{Degree of party (in)stability} = \frac{\sum \frac{|Y_j - \bar{Y}|}{k}}{\bar{Y}}$$

where Σ means sum, Y_j the percentage of the vote the party polled in each election, \bar{Y} the party's average electoral strength, and k the number of elections the party has contested. In a more analytical way, the formula is as follows:

$$\text{Degree of party (in)stability} = \frac{\frac{|Y_1 - \bar{Y}| + |Y_{ii} - \bar{Y}| + \dots + |Y_n - \bar{Y}|}{k}}{\bar{Y}}$$

197: See Wittner L., op. cit., p. 298.

198: See Campbell J. and Sherrard P., op. cit., pp. 260-1.

199: According to Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 118, 20% of the cities' active population were unemployed.

200: Ibid, p. 118.

201: See Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. IV, p. 140.

202: See Roufos R. ("Athenian"), op. cit., and Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 169.

203: See Linardatos a., op. cit., vol. IV, p. 412.

204: See Tsoukalas C., The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., pp. 167-8.

205: At that time, the Centre Union leader's son, Andreas Papandreou, was accused of having established a para-military organisation within the army. The Prime Minister did not have full confidence in his Defence Minister and asked him to submit his resignation so that he could appoint another, more loyal to him, to conduct the investigation into the matter. For details see Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., ch. 6, pp. 173-210.

206: Unfortunately, George Papandreou denounced the king's stance only when he lost the royal favour.

207: S. Stephanopoulos had been Marshal Papagos' Vice-Premier in 1952. His 1965 government was supported by 152 MPs in parliament. For details see Papadimitriou N., op. cit., pp. 237-349.

208: Papadimitriou N., op. cit., pp. 14-7, presents twelve cases where minor splits took place within the Centre Union before the fatal and definite series of July-September 1965.

209: See Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., pp. 241-2.

210: On this matter, see Woodhouse C., The Rise and Fall of the Colonels, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1982; Katris J., The Birth of Neo-fascism in Greece, Athens: Papazissis, 1974; Karagiorgas G., From IDEA to Junta, Athens: Papazissis, 1975; Koussoulas D., Political Responsibilities: 1964-1974, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1988; Paraskevopoulos P., 1963-1967: How We Ended to the Dictatorship, Athens: author's publication, 1974; and Grivas K., Greece: 1940-1974, Athens: author's publication, 1974 (all in Greek).

211: As Wittner L., op. cit., has said:

"The extent of American responsibility for the 1967 coup cannot be assessed with any exactitude, for the records and conversations leading to the event are still shrouded in secrecy; nevertheless, it is clear that American policy provided a vital ingredient without which the coup could not have occurred" (in English originally).

212: See Mouzelis a., pp. 131-3 and also Roufos R. ("Athenian"), op. cit., who argues that "...the putch could almost be defined as a move by the officers' 'trade-union'".

213: At this point let us stress once more that the civil war was won both by the right-wing and the liberal forces. George Papandreou, who as Premier at the time fought the communists in Athens in December 1944, was himself a staunch anti-communist. (He had described the Communist Party as "a party of treason and crime", see Theotokis J., op. cit., p. 136). But after the civil war, the Liberal parties were in office for only four years, and during that time they showed on the one hand, a tendency towards leniency and for healing the wounds of the past and, on the other, whenever they did take anti-communist measures, it was only after enormous pressure (see some examples in Dimitrakos D., op. cit., p. 312 and p. 360; and also in Lendakis A., op. cit., p. 396). The right-wing forces, in contrast, governed for a total of thirteen years and, besides the civil-war legislation, created and reinforced the so-called para-state and para-military organisations—in other words, the State of the Right. They used electoral violence and fraud in the pursuit of their overriding ideology of anti-communism. To a certain extent, the Liberal forces and the Left must bear the responsibility for the post-war regime. It need only be remembered that the Centre Union remained diplomatically inactive during the electoral violence and fraud of 1961, hoping thus to receive the left vote; or that the outlawed Communist Party's radio broadcasts from abroad sometimes gave the impression that a revolution was about to erupt in Greece (see Alivizatos N., op. cit., p. 523).

214: See Loulis J., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., pp. 8-9.

215: See Roufos R. ("Athenian"), op. cit.

216: See Mouzelis a., p. 131.

CHAPTER TWO

1: After the restoration of democracy in Greece, the British, Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers met in Geneva to reach an agreement on a ceasefire in Cyprus. However, on 14 August 1974, and for reasons that lie outside the scope of the present study, the conference came to a deadlock, and Turkish troops were unleashed for a second major attack against the island (a venture that became known as Attila II). The very same day Premier Karamanlis ordered the Greek Air Force and Navy Chiefs of Staff to send in certain units to repel the invaders. It was only then that the latter admitted that the armed forces were totally inadequate, disorganised, and unable to fulfill any military mission whatsoever. In effect, Premier Karamanlis later had to withdraw the country from the military wing of NATO. For more details see Psicharis S., The Seventy Critical Days, Athens: Papazissis, 1976 (in Greek), pp. 15-25.

2: See Stern L., The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy, New York, 1977, p. 129; and also Psomiades H. J., "Greece: From the colonels' rule to democracy", in Herz J. H. (ed), From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, ch. 11, pp. 252-3. As another author argues,

"...the Greek military's decision to withdraw from power in July 1974... seems to have involved a combination of both external factors (the deterioration of the military's Cyprus policy) and internal ones (pressure from within the military and tactical volunteerism). The overriding consideration behind these factors was the military's efforts to safeguard its professional interests" (in English originally).

See Danopoulos T., Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece, Chapel Hill: Documentary Publications, 1984, p. 129. (Henceforth, all quotations are in our own translation from the original Greek, unless otherwise stated).

3: With the exception of Centre Union politician G. Mavros, the six participating civilians were representatives of the conservative Right. For more details about that meeting see Psicharis S., The Change Viewed From Behind the Scenes, Athens: Papazissis, 1975 (in Greek), Part V, pp. 132-65, and also Yiovanis C. (ed), Nation-Leader Karamanlis, Athens: 1975, Yiovanis Publications, vol. I, pp. 179-92.

4: See Psomiades H. J., "Greece: From the colonels' rule to democracy", op. cit., p. 253.

5: For details, see Psicharis S., The Change Viewed..., op. cit., pp. 159-63 and especially pp. 184-95, where the author cites E. Averoff-Tositsas' personal testimony; see also Paraskevopoulos P., Karamanlis between 1974 and 1985, Athens: Fytrakis, 1991 (in Greek), pp. 24-7.

6: For this period of his life, see Tzermias P., The Karamanlis of the Anti-Dictatorial Struggle, Athens: Roes, 1984 (in Greek).

7: See Diamandouros P. N., "Transition to, and consolidation of, democratic politics in Greece, 1974-1983: A tentative assessment", in

West European Politics, vol. 7, April 1984, no. 2, pp. 50-71. The same author argues that Karamanlis

"...enjoyed an unquestioned appeal to a wide spectrum of the population, which perceived him as a *deus ex machina* that could save the country from its external crisis and steer it in the direction of an uneventful 'normalisation' of political life. This won him the support of large segments of the traditional centre, while to the royalist right opposed to the military regime he was clearly the lesser of two unenviable options" (in English originally).

Ibid, p. 55. See also Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., p. 26.

8: For details on the formation and composition of the national-unity government see, among others, Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., pp. 28-9; Yioannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 58-64; and Diamandouros P. N., "Transition to...", op. cit., pp. 56-7.

9: See Diamandouros P. N., ibid, p. 57.

10: A more comprehensive assessment of this question cannot be made as long as issues of Greek-Turkish relations are not totally resolved.

11: Overall, 108,000 civil servants and other officials and employees had been dismissed, transferred, or otherwise disciplined by mid-January 1975; see Psomiades H. J., "Greece: From the colonels' rule to democracy", op. cit., p. 255.

12: See Karamanlis' announcement, cited in Yioannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 86-7.

13: As we saw in ch. 1, KKE was outlawed under Law 509/1947. This law was abolished by Karamanlis two months after he took over, namely on 23 September 1974 under Legislative Decree 59. See Yioannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, p. 278, and also Lambrias P., For Democracy, Athens: privately published by the author, 1977, pp. 23-9, where one can find a concise but comprehensive presentation of measures taken by Karamanlis' national-unity government during the first two months after the fall of the military junta.

14: See Woodhouse C. M., Karamanlis: Restorer of Greek Democracy, Athens: Morphotiki Estia, 1982 (in Greek), p. 285.

15: See Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., 1991, p. 47; also Samatas M., Greek Bureaucratism: A System of Sociopolitical Control, Ph.D., New School for Social Research, May 1986, pp. 277-83. On this matter evidence was given in a press conference by George Mangakis, Secretary of Justice in PASOK governments, 1982-84; see the daily newspaper Ta Nea, 8 July 1989.

16: As the Defence Minister, E. Averoff confessed,

"From the first moment I stepped into the Pentagon... [the Greek Ministry of Defence] ...on the evening of July 24, 1974, it became clear to me that the government was virtually captive and that nothing could be done unless the Armed-Forces issue was settled".

See Psicharis S., The Seventy Critical Days, op. cit., p. 111.

17: This major step was taken on 11 August 1974. That day, "... the National Unity Government's captivity was terminated". Ibid, p. 124.

18: Ibid, pp. 134-45. In dealing with the army in general, Karamanlis was immensely helped by two of his colleagues who both enjoyed the respect and trust of the military. One was E. Averoff-Tositsas (a prominent ERE member and ex-foreign minister in the 1955-1963 governments) who, because of his efforts during the dictatorship to come to some sort of terms with the dictators, was derogatorily called "the bridge-maker". The other was S. Ghikas, who was a retired army officer, Armed Forces Honorary Chief of Staff, ex-minister in Karamanlis' pre-coup governments, staunch anti-communist and, most important, leader of the IDEA para-military organisation in the Middle East during the axis occupation of Greece. Last but not least, Ghikas considered the 1967 coup as "...an outcome of insuperable national necessity, aimed at preventing the country's disappearance behind the iron curtain". On E. Averoff's relations and communication with the dictatorship see ex-premier George Rallis' Hours of Responsibility, Athens: Evroekdotiki, 1983 (in Greek), pp. 7-8; see also the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 19 June 1987, especially pp. 26-7. On S. Ghikas' IDEA membership, see Psicharis S., The Seventy Critical Days, op. cit., pp. 129-30, and on his opinions about the military dictatorship see the political review Anti, Period B', no. 6, 16 November 1974, pp. 5-6.

19: Quoted in Clogg R., "Karamanlis' cautious success: The background", in Government and Opposition, Summer 1975, p. 340.

20: See Diamandouros P. N., "Transition to...", op. cit., p. 58. Karamanlis' fears and hesitation vis-à-vis the junta seem in retrospect largely justified. As he said to the Sunday Times correspondent:

"I want you to know that of all persons, I am the most exposed to the wrath of the junta. And I have repeatedly had to face problems of personal security since I took over. For 20 nights I slept in a caique (boat) to avoid assassination. They tried to kill me several times" (in English originally).

(Quoted in Danopoulos T., op. cit., p. 135). According to the same author, the February 1975 abortive conspiracy was the fourth such attempt since the military relinquished its power in July 1974 (ibid, p. 134). Furthermore, even during the early years of the socialist PASOK party in office following the 1981 parliamentary elections,

"Two reported disturbances or abortive countercoups in the last two years provide evidence that the Greek military, though out of power, is not altogether out of politics. The first disturbance occurred on May 31, 1982 and the second one occurred February 28, 1983" (in English originally).

(Ibid, p. 147).

21: After the death sentences had been commuted there were widespread rumours that the government would finally grant amnesty to the junta. Karamanlis rejected these accusations by stating categorically: "...when we say life imprisonment we mean life imprisonment" (cited in Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., 1991, p. 180).

22: See Psomiades H. J., "Greece: From the colonels' rule to democracy", op. cit., p. 265.

23: Composer Mikis Theodorakis, although at that time a staunch communist and a candidate of the United Left, declared a few days before the elections that they presented a choice between "Karamanlis or the tanks" — "...so giving lively expression to what every democrat should be aware of after the collapse of the dictatorship", as one of Karamanlis' lieutenants commented; see Lambrias P., op. cit., p. 116.

24: Quoted in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, p. 294. According to Raymond Aron, the way in which Karamanlis restored democracy is characterised as a "masterpiece of political art"; see quotation in Lambrias P., In the Shadow of a Great Man, Athens: Morphotiki Estia, 1989 (in Greek), p. 109.

25: Election-speech addressed to the people of Athens cited in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, p. 496. On 30 September 1974, in his election address to the people of Salonica, Karamanlis said:

"As you already know, I came a month ago at a dramatic moment. I came in the eleventh hour before a national catastrophe. I came, prepared to shoulder grave responsibilities. I came, because I felt that I was historically indebted to come..."

Ibid, p. 259.

26: See Macridis R. C., "Elections and political modernization in Greece", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, pp. 12-3.

27: There was, of course, a different kind of pressure, namely that of the historical conjuncture: the fear of a military come back and the need to protect the newly born democracy led many non-conservative people to vote for Karamanlis; the real social divisions appeared later in the 1977 election, when ND lost almost one-fourth of its vote, polling 41.84 per cent, as against 54.37 per cent three years earlier.

28: See Psomiades H. J., "Greece: From the colonels' rule to democracy", op. cit., p. 260. See also Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., 1991, p. 91 and p. 100, where he asserts that "C. Karamanlis at that period was expressing the calm force of democracy".

29: Karamanlis instructed both his ministers and his MPs not to express themselves publicly either for or against the issue. He did so for two purposes: to depoliticise the issue, and to keep his party together. See below in this chapter.

30: See Vegleris P., "Greek electoral law", in Penniman H. R. (ed), op. cit., p. 38; see also Psomiades H. J., "Greece: From the colonels' rule to democracy", op. cit., pp. 261-2. It is noteworthy that the validity of all six of these referendums had been generally doubted by the public.

31: See his pre-electoral speech addressed to the people of Athens on 15 November 1974, cited in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, p. 495; see also his television speech of 30 October 1974, where he explains why he had established the party of New Democracy, ibid, pp. 410-5.

32: See Diamandouros N. P., "Transition to...", op. cit., p. 58.

33: For details of the 1975 constitution see The Constitution of Greece, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 7th edition, 1989 (in Greek).

34: See Macridis R. C., Greek Politics at the Crossroads: The Socialist Experiment, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in Greek), p. 51.

35: Many years later, P. Kanellopoulos wrote:

"One day I read in the newspapers that he had formed New Democracy. At the time I was the leader of ERE and had been the ERE leader for eleven consecutive years. Nobody ever informed me that ERE was to be dissolved in favour of a new party, namely the party of New Democracy. I must say that at the time I felt personally offended; I thought it would have been better, if I had been informed that a new party was to be established".

See Kanellopoulos P., My Life, Athens: Yiallelis Publications, 1985 (in Greek), p. 197.

36: This proclamation is cited in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 338-41, and a translated version of it is presented in Appendix I of my thesis. (All following excerpts in the text are from this proclamation and the translations are mine). Another translated version can be found in Clogg R., Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987, pp. 223-5.

37: See Yiovannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 338-41.

38: Ibid.

39: Ibid.

40: Ibid.

41: Ibid.

42: Ibid.

43: See his pre-electoral speech on 30 October 1974, in Yiovannis C. (ed), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 408-15.

44: Ibid., p. 415.

45: Ibid. Nevertheless, fifteen years later, Karamanlis publicly admitted that the Greeks had not seen any difference between ERE and ND at that time —see the daily newspaper Messimvrini, 2 May 1989.

46: See Kanellopoulos P., op. cit., p. 197.

47: See Macridis R. C., "Elections and political modernization...", op. cit., p. 10.

48: For PASOK, see Lyrintzis C., Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Ph.D thesis, University of London, LSE, November 1983, especially ch. 3, pp. 126-47; see also

Spourdalakis M., PASOK: Structure, Intra-party Crises and Centralised Power, Athens: Exantas, 1988 (in Greek), especially ch. 2, pp. 65-120.

49: This view was widespread and shared by the political opposition and supporters of New Democracy. The most inimical criticism came, as might be expected, from PASOK leader A. Papandreou who, at times, did not hesitate to identify Karamanlis and his party with the junta (see Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., 1991, p. 181). On the other hand, the view that ND was nothing more than ERE under another name can be found in, among others, Kanellopoulos P., op. cit., p. 197; Theotokis S., Political Reminiscences, Athens: Eptalofos AVEE, 1986 (in Greek), p. 245; and Bakoyiannis P., Black and White, Athens: Kaktos, 1983 (in Greek), p. 31.

50: See Woodhouse C. M., op. cit., 1982, p. 284. This opinion is also shared by Paraskevopoulos P., op. cit., 1991, pp. 72-4.

CHAPTER THREE

1: More specifically, three of them had run in the 1964 elections as independents, eleven belonged to the Centre Union (1964), one to EPEK (National Progressive Centre Union, 1952), one came from the Party of Progressive People (KP) and one from the Union of Peoples' Parties (ELK, 1958); for EPEK and ELK, see ch. 1 above, Tables I.2 and I.5 respectively.

2: To give just one but striking example: in the First District of Piraeus, one of New Democracy's candidates was Andreas Andrianopoulos, aged 28 at the time, who was participating for the first time and with 15,500 preference votes was elected first from among eight other candidates. Being himself a scion of a well-known political Piraeus family, he had inherited the electoral clientele of his uncle, George Andrianopoulos, who had been consistently elected to parliament since 1956 (in that year with the People's Party, and thereafter —i.e. in 1958, 1961, 1963, and 1964— under the banner of ERE). The cases of the other 37 "newcomers" are more or less similar. A more specific presentation of the data shown in Table III.1 should therefore be as follows:

Table III.1a: ND Candidates' Political Background
for the 17 Nov. 1974 Election

<u>Pre-coup political affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
ERE	100	33.33
Other	17	05.67
Relative newcomers (Political heirs)	38	12.67
<u>Absolute newcomers</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>48.33</u>
Total	300	100.00

The above offers a more accurate picture of the ND candidates' previous political affiliation, and still attests to the fact that the party's political personnel had been renewed to a considerable extent: almost half were completely new to politics and without any previous political participation.

3: In some areas, elections were held again on 20 April 1975, and slightly changed the distribution of parliamentary seats: New Democracy secured 216 seats, Centre Union/New Forces 61, PASOK 15 and the United Left 8.

4: As far as these relative newcomers are concerned, Table III.3a below (compiling data from Tables III.2 and III.3 above) provides further evidence for our claim, namely that they are not so new as some scholars assert. See for example Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 59. For a different consideration, see Karras E., "New Democracy: The anatomy of a party", in the political review Anti, Period B', no. 42, 3 April 1976, (in Greek), pp. 13-6. Therefore, our option for treating them as a separate category of relative newcomers is, we think, justified.

Table III.3a: A Comparison between ND Candidates and MPs
in the 1974 Election

Previous party affiliation	number of candidates	number of MPs	%
ERE	100	84	84.00
Other	17	12	70.59
Relative newcomers	38	30	78.95
Absolute newcomers	145	90	62.07
Total	300	216	72.00

Of all the party's candidates, 84% of those who had been affiliated with ERE succeeded in getting elected, whereas only 62.07% of the absolute newcomers entered the parliament. Conversely, almost 79% of the candidates who, in one way or another, had inherited an electoral clientele were elected MPs, doing even better than politicians affiliated with other than ERE parties and falling only a little behind those directly related to the pre-coup ERE.

5: In the parliamentary group of the National Radical Union (ERE) after the 1956 elections, MPs affiliated with the Greek Rally party constituted the vast majority (more than 70%), whereas the newcomers amounted to only 9.09%; this compares with 38.39% and 55.56% respectively for ND. See Table I.3 in ch. 1 and Table III.3 above.

6: Still, the percentage of ERE's representation within ND was relatively high (38.39%) but, as we shall see below, has been decreasing steadily ever since, and by today has become quite insignificant.

7: This last remark holds true for PASOK as well, but this was mainly due to the fact that in 1974 PASOK had only fifteen MPs elected. From these, eight entered parliament for the first time (53.33%), three for the second (20.00%), and four for the third time (26.67%). Aside from those who were elected for the first time, all had been Centre Union deputies before 1967 (46.57%). For details, see Lyrantzis C., "The rise of PASOK and the emergence of a new political personnel", in Tzannatos Z. (ed), Socialism in Greece, London: Gower Publishing Company Ltd, 1986, pp. 114-29.

8: The case was similar for PASOK in 1974, when the party had only very few MPs elected: two of its deputies were between 35-44 (13.33%), seven between 45-54 (46.67%), five between 55-64 (33.33%) and one was over 65 years old (6.67%); their average age was 52 years. The situation changed dramatically after the 1977 election, as is clearly shown in Table III.5. It should be noted that in 1981 the PASOK parliamentary group was dominated—to the extent of 65 per cent—by MPs under 50 years old. (Ibid.)

9: The EK/ND parliamentary group included thirty-one MPs who had contested pre-coup elections under the banner of the Centre Union (i.e. 50.82%), and thirty newcomers (or 49.18%). Taking into account our distinction between relative and absolute newcomers (see above, footnotes 2 and 4), twenty-two were real newcomers (36.07%), the rest eight being relative newcomers (13.11%).

10: Between 1974 and today, six national elections were held in Greece, namely: 20 Nov. 1977, 18 Oct. 1981, 2 June 1985, 18 June 1989 (hereafter called 1989A), 5 Nov. 1989 (hereafter 1989B), and 8 April 1990. (Shortly after the completion of the present study, early elections were held on 10 Oct. 1993, which ND lost and PASOK took office; for details concerning the events that led to early elections and their result see footnote 84 below, and footnote 130 to ch. 5.)

11: The June 1989 election resulted in the highest percentage of newcomers/the lowest percentage of deputies previously affiliated with ND. This happened because in the previous election of 1985 the electorate was not given the chance to cast their preference vote for a candidate, and was limited to vote simply for the party as a whole. The electoral lists and, most important, the order of the candidates within them, were drawn up solely by the party leaderships. It seems then, that in the June 1989 election the voters opted for a drastic renewal within parliament, a trend that can also be identified within PASOK: 24% of its deputies were newcomers, 73% were affiliated with the party previously, whereas 3% came from other political groups.

12: Their relatively big percentage in 1981 is due to, first, the disintegration of EK/ND and the absorption by ND of many of its politicians; and, second, to the assimilation by ND of the ultra-Right which had polled almost 7% in the 1977 election. In 1981, then, thirteen of the ND deputies had previously been affiliated with the Centre parties, and five with the ultra-Right. In 1985, when the Union of the Democratic Centre EDIK (as EK/ND was renamed) was dissolved altogether, ND's parliamentary group comprised seven politicians who had come from EDIK, and three who had left PASOK.

13: It is interesting to note, for example, that the first government formed by Karamanlis after the 1974 election comprised 35 ministers and deputy-ministers: 23 (or 65.7%) were in the past affiliated with ERE, the rest 12 (or 34.3%) being newcomers.

14: The average ages for the other major party, PASOK, for these six elections were 46.23, 47.74, 51.64, 50.29, 49.48 and 50.00 years respectively.

15: On 1 January 1981, Greece became the tenth EEC member, and ever since there has been represented in the European Parliament (EP) by 24 deputies. Elections for the EP were held in 1981 (simultaneously with the national election), in 1984 (EP only), and in June 1989 (again simultaneously with the national election). In all Greek parties the Euro-candidates are appointed by the leadership, and are elected according to the rank they hold in the party electoral lists—that is, without a preference vote from the individual voters. ND Euro-MPs belong to the European People's Party since 1982.

16: The same is true for PASOK as well. In 1981 half of its Euro-MPs were newcomers, and only one came from the pre-coup Centre Union. Furthermore, the average age of PASOK's elected Euro-MPs—ten in 1981, ten in 1984 and nine in June 1989—was 48.6, 54.6 and 51.8 years respectively.

17: See among others Rallis G., Political Confessions: 1950-1989, Athens: Proskinio, 1990, (in Greek), p. 185, where he asserts: "Of course, I voted for the King. But I never told anybody that I would do so". (Henceforth, all quotations are in our own translation from the original Greek, unless otherwise stated). See also Theotokis S.,

Political Reminiscences, Athens: Eptalofos AVEE, 1986, (in Greek), pp. 241-55. It is noteworthy that Theotokis, who had been a ND deputy in 1974, resigned immediately after the referendum because of Karamanlis' handling of the monarchy issue.

18: We saw that almost 31% voted for the King, although the majority opted for a republic. Most scholars agree that the royalist vote came exclusively from people who had voted for ND in the November 1974 election; see Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., p. 63; see also Psomiades H. J., "Greece: From the colonels' rule to democracy", in Herz J. H. (ed), From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, ch. 11, p. 262; and Mavrogordatos G., "The emerging party-system", in Clogg R. (ed), Greece in the 1980s, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 92-3.

19: As he later declared, he was forced to do so by his associates, and mainly by the then vice-president E. Averoff; for details, see Rallis G., Hours of Responsibility, Athens: Evroekdotiki, 1983 (in Greek), pp. 270-1, where he states that

"I believe that all those who had collaborated with the dictatorship have really caused damage to the country, more so to our camp, and that public opinion will respond negatively if we include them in the party lists".

See also the same author's Political Confessions, op. cit., pp. 211-3.

20: Such an incident occurred in parliament in November 1991, when some ND MPs branded as national traitors all those who had fought against the Axis occupation under the banner of the left-wing National Liberation Front (EAM); see the daily newspaper Ta Nea, 30 November 1991.

21: The most prominent among them were C. Mitsotakis, who was to become the party leader seven years later; and A. Kanellopoulos, who had been a professor of economics, deputy of the pre-coup Centre Union, and, after 1974, an MP of EK/ND and EDIK. For a comprehensive account of events that led to EK/ND's disintegration and absorption by ND of a good many of the latter's politicians, see Diamandakos P., From the Centre Union to New Democracy, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in Greek).

22: As already mentioned, there are no relevant data for this period. Nevertheless, using for our computations almost half of the ERE MPs in 1964 (ERE had 99 MPs elected in the 1964 election and our sample here is constituted by those 49 ND MPs in 1974, who had also been elected with ERE in 1964), we found that lawyers and doctors represented 61.23% and 16.33% of ERE's parliamentary group respectively (see Table III.11). The same holds true for other Western European conservative parties as well; see for example Hartman J., "Great Britain", in Raschke J. and Katsoulis H. (eds), Western European Political Parties, Athens: Paratiritis, 1990 (in Greek, 2 vols), vol. 2, p. 222, where he argues:

"Businessmen or higher private employees in business administration and liberal professionals predominate, making for almost half of the British conservative MPs in the House of Commons [in 1974]".

23: See Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., p. 60.

24: Ibid

25: This is mainly due to the fact that the party moved ideologically towards neo-liberalism and the free-market economy, and so attracted a good many scholars and supporters of market liberalisation and disentanglement from state interference in the economy. For details, see below, ch. 5.

26: Post-graduates among PASOK's Euro-MPs in 1981, 1984 and 1989 accounted for 80, 40 and 44.44% respectively.

27: It is interesting to note that this feature holds true also for PASOK.

28: See the speech addressed to the party's first Preliminary Congress by ND Director-General, G. Missailidis, "The party organisation, way of functioning, headquarters' report and future objectives", in 1st Preliminary Congress of the Party: Minutes, vols A'+B', Chalkidiki, 2-4 April 1977, New Democracy Publication (in Greek). As Bakoyiannis P. reports in The Anatomy of Greek Politics, Athens: Papazissis, 1977 (in Greek), p. 143, this committee comprised four lawyers, two industrialists, two doctors, two business managers, two actors, one private trade-unionised employee, one trade-unionised farmer, one engineer, one journalist, one author, one retired army general, one social worker and one former telecommunications employee. According to J. Loulis (see his "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., p. 69), it included no MPs, and seven of its members formed the executive committee. Furthermore, according to the same author,

"The Administrative Committee's actual power within the party remained minimal, particularly since the party leadership failed to provide it with the necessary leverage vis-à-vis the elected politicians" (in English originally).

Ibid.

29: The overwhelming majority of PASOK's central committee members were politicians affiliated to the two biggest anti-junta resistance organisations, so reflecting the dominant role they had played in the creation of PASOK; for details see Lyrantzis C., Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Ph.D thesis, University of London, LSE, November 1983, p. 273.

30: Between 1986 and 1991, there were three national elections, which brought changes that were duly reflected in the composition of the central committee.

31a: In this Table we present the occupational composition of PASOK's first elected central committee (PASOK 1977) and that of ND (ND 1979); we also present the data referring to ND's second central committee as it appeared right after the second party congress (ND 1986), as well as it came to be after the three consecutive elections in June and November 1989 and April 1990 (ND-91A).

31b: In column ND-91B we also give the data concerning the occupational background of the elected presidents of ND's 70 departmental committees throughout the country. At the time of writing,

the departmental-committee elections are still the most recent (they were held in May and June 1991).

32: The party statutes drawn up at ND's first congress in 1979, stipulated that the congress should be held every two years. Actually, it took the party seven years (until 1986) to hold its second one, when it was decided that party congresses should be held every three years. Nevertheless, the third congress is still to be convened.

33: The Department of Larissa was selected because both its social and political statistics (e.g., composition of its population, labour distribution, election results) largely reflect the national ones. The data of Table III.17 are based on the answers to a questionnaire from 158 party members, randomly selected —some of them were also interviewed personally by the author between January and June 1989. For more details on this fieldwork research, see ch. 6 below and Appendix VIII.

34: The different occupational composition of ND's higher (parliamentary and other), middle, and lower members was discernible since as early as 1977, when the first Preliminary Congress of the party was held in Chalkidiki (from 2 to 4 April 1977). Given that the participants were mostly appointed by higher party officials and not elected, since the party had not yet developed its grass-roots organisation, their occupational composition was markedly different from that of the first elected central committee, formed two years later. The data provided by ND (see 1st Preliminary Congress of the Party: Minutes, op. cit., p. 3), refer to 1,033 of the 1,751 participants (percentages were computed for the total number of participants):

<u>Profession</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Lawyers	230	13.14
Merchants	183	10.45
Private Empl.	92	05.25
Farmers	90	05.14
Businessmen	87	04.97
Pensioners	84	04.80
Doctors	70	04.00
Workers/Artisans	65	03.71
Engineers	60	03.43
Automobilists (Taxi owners)	37	02.11
Economists	35	02.00

This obvious discordance between the grass-roots and the higher party organs in terms of their respective social and occupational backgrounds (which reappears at the second party congress, i.e. between the 1986 elected central-committee members and the 1991 elected presidents of the departmental committees), will be discussed in considerable detail in the next chapter.

35: A detailed analysis of ND voters' specific characteristics (in terms of class identification, sex, age, occupation, urban/rural origins etc.) is in itself a very difficult task and would demand a separate study, especially so as relevant data are indeed scarce and hard to obtain. In the rest of this section we shall mainly rely upon analyses made by the Centre of Political Research and Information (see footnote 82 below), based on election results but also opinion polls conducted by this Centre.

36: The data presented in Tables III. 20 and 21 are compiled from the following Epikentra publications, all special election issues (and in Greek): no. 1, Mar.-Apr. 1978, pp. 12-21; no. 22, Sep.-Oct. 1981, pp. 4-72; no. 44, May-Jun. 1985, pp. 4-71; no. 58, undated, pp. 5-59; no. 60, Dec. 1989, pp. 6-63; and no. 62, Jun. 1990, pp. 11-90. See also Katsoudas D. K., "Vote and ideology", in Epikentra, no. 65, March 1991 (in Greek), pp. 30-5.

37: Since the data presented in this section are incomplete and rather sketchy, one cannot make detailed comparisons with other Western European parties; it seems though fair to argue that as regards its social base, ND presents a fairly similar picture to that of other major conservative parties in Europe, as are for example the Gaullist RPR in France, the CDU in Germany and the Conservatives in Great Britain; for these parties see respective chapters in Raschke J. and Katsoulis H. (eds), op. cit.

38: By "current" we do not mean faction or tendency within the party. The term refers to political forces that have generally been regarded as quite separate in the Greek political spectrum. So PASOK claimed itself to be the continuation of three political currents: the traditional Left and EAM movement, the Centre Union, and the resistance struggle against the junta; see Lyrintzis C., Between Socialism and Populism:..., op. cit., p. 289.

39: Politicians previously affiliated with the Centre Union were not only almost negligible, but came mostly from among those who had abandoned George Papandreou during the July 1965 crisis to join the so-called apostates group; they were immediately expelled from the Centre Union party at that time.

40: To the question, "Which of the following forces, in your opinion, exerted any influence on the New Democracy party?" party members were allowed to choose more than one option.

41: The question was: "In your view, is ND the heir and descendant of the pre-dictatorship ERE, or do you think it is something new in Greek politics?". It was a follow-up question to the previous one (see footnote 40).

42: See Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., p. 144, where the author asserts that

"In conclusion, it can be stressed that today's [1977] New Democracy typically constitutes the indispensable instrument for Karamanlis to exercise his power".

43: As another scholar argues,

"[Karamanlis] took steps to reconstruct the Right afresh, by founding ND. I think the term fresh reconstruction (anadómissi) is correct because ND, although a descendant of the traditional Right, is a complete inversion of it. Its political philosophy and practice, its radical liberalism (as the party called it), that is its liberal capitalism, is more the philosophy of free capitalist enterprise and capital accumulation rather than that of an authoritarian rule depending mainly on coercion, as the Right had exercised during the first post-war decades. ND seeks to be national party, not nation-minded

(ethnikofron). It is anti-communist, but does not need institutionalised anti-communism. In short, it has a modern bourgeois political philosophy, more 'relaxed' than the provocative stance of its precursor".

See Elephandis A., In the Constellation of Populism, Athens: Politis Publications, 1991 (in Greek), p. 281.

44: In the 1974 election for example, out of the 216 ND deputies, 79 had been MPs also before the dictatorship, so they may be considered to have relied on patronage networks to become elected again, just like another 17 who were parliamentary candidates in the pre-coup period. On the other hand, those 30 ND deputies we have designated as relative newcomers (see footnotes 2 and 4 above), belonged to established well-known political families, and were therefore most probably heirs to political clienteles. The remaining 90 newcomers owed their election to the landslide in favour of Karamanlis, under whose ticket they were contesting this first election; As A. Andrianopoulos admitted:

"Our camp has been for years developed through certain political groupings and 'elitist' centres... The popular base of the Right has been never given the chance to have a say concerning its parliamentary representation; it could not select deputies. Let us not pretend: to join the party lists or to get a political or administrative post, you should have contacts. Me myself, who owe everything to Karamanlis, if I had not had an uncle who was a politician, would Karamanlis have ever had the chance to know me, in order to decide whether I deserve a parliamentary seat?"

See his interview in Tahydromos, 10 December 1987, pp. 20-2.

45: According to the first party statutes (1979), the nomination of candidates had been virtually the exclusive privilege of the party leader (see ND: Ideological Principles-Party Statutes, Athens: ND Publication, 1979, p. 30, Article 17). According to the revised party statutes of 1986 (see New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, Salonica, 14-16 February 1986, Athens: ND Publication, 1986, pp. 250-1, Article 20), the procedure became as follows: after elections within each departmental committee, a list of candidates is drawn up, consisting of twice as many candidates as there are available parliamentary seats in the Department concerned. This list is sent to party headquarters in Athens, where the executive committee submits it to a first screening. Finally, the list reaches the party leader, who then makes the final decisions.

46: We choose this election because, as we have already mentioned, it was then that the highest percentage of newcomers entered parliament after 1974; for the particular reasons why this occurred, see footnote 11 above.

47: During the first party congress, and before the election for the central committee, the voters were reminded that Karamanlis favoured the election of certain party members —who, of course, were voted in. See the political review Anti, no. 125, Period B', 12 May 1979, p. 16.

48: Since the clientelistic relationship between deputies and voters is strictly personal, concrete data are lacking. Nevertheless, from information acquired during our fieldwork research in the Department of

Larissa (see below ch. 6), and from numerous reports in various newspapers, it seems fair to conclude that ND deputies still try to create and use patronage networks to maintain and enlarge their personal clientele and, therefore, to strengthen their position within the party by ensuring their re-election.

49: In common speech this special service offered by the politician to the voter in exchange for the latter's vote is called rousfeti. Documentation for this kind of exchange can be found, *inter alia*, in the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 6 October 1989, and especially in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 29 September 1991, where many such incidents are reported and well documented. Immediately after ND had taken office in April 1990, the rousfeti issue became so serious that a New Democracy MP submitted a question in parliament, asking the government whether they were planning to enforce certain measures against this phenomenon; see the daily newspaper Eleftherotypia, 12 May 1990.

50: It is worth noting that clientelism has been struck a considerable blow, especially after PASOK's rise to power in 1981. This consisted of PASOK (the overwhelming majority of whose politicians did not rely on or had no patronage networks), which from the start had developed a well-structured grass-roots organisation, introduced a list system whereby it was the party that would decide who was going to stand as candidate for parliament:

"This development may exclude the possibility of clientelism developing at the parliamentary level, but it creates the risk of reversion to what has been described as 'party-directed patronage', in which the party machine becomes the main patron, distributing spoils and favours to the party's followers and controlling public appointments" (in English originally).

See Lyrintzis C., "The rise of PASOK...", *op. cit.*, p. 126, and also the same author's "Political parties in post-junta Greece: A case of 'bureaucratic clientelism'?", in West European Politics, vol. 7, no. 2, April 1984, pp. 99-118. This phenomenon of "party-directed patronage" or "bureaucratic clientelism" also occurred within New Democracy after the latter had developed a grass-roots organisation, and we shall concern ourselves with it in detail in the next chapter.

51: There were very few politicians indeed in 1974 PASOK who had been elected with the Centre Union in 1964, or belonged to established political families. The overwhelming majority were newcomers, who owed their election mainly to the rise in their party's popular appeal, its organisation, and to the charisma of its leader.

52: Today the first two are ND MPs. Mitsotakis who has been party leader since September 1984, whereas Boutos changed sides in 1989 and has been a PASOK MP ever since, elected in the latter's state-list.

53: E. Averoff and E. Kefaloyiannis have bequeathed their parliamentary seats to their nephews, J. Averoff (election of June 1989) and M. Kefaloyiannis (election of April 1990) respectively; G. Stamatis and A. Taliadouros to their sons, D. Stamatis and S. Taliadouros (both since the June 1989 election). A striking example of such "bequests" occurred in the Department of Ilia in the Peloponnese, where six deputies are elected. In 1990, ND and PASOK secured three seats each: ND elected C. Kanellopoulou, daughter of A. Kanellopoulos, who was also elected with the party's state-list; V. Kondoyiannopoulos (elected since

1974), son of N. Kondoyiannopoulos, who became a Greek Rally MP in 1952 and an ERE one in 1963; and T. Stephanopoulos (first elected in 1974, lost the 1977 and 1981 elections and since 1985 he is continuously elected), nephew of S. Stephanopoulos, who had been elected continuously since 1946 with various centre parties. On the PASOK side, not one MP inherited the parliamentary seat in this department.

54: Factions and tendencies should not be confused with political currents. The term "faction" refers to a group of party members, MPs particularly, held together by a certain amount of organisational discipline, who seek to further a broad range of policies through consciously organised political activity. The term "tendency", on the other hand, refers to attitudes expressed by MPs or party members inside and outside parliament about a wide range of issues, all of which share in a more or less coherent political philosophy. In this sense, a faction may be viewed as an organised tendency; see Lyrintzis C., Between Socialism and Populism:..., op. cit., p. 461.

55: Volvi is the name of a lake in the Department of Salonica, where 30 members of this group held their first public meeting, in June 1976.

56: This information was given to the author during an interview (in Larissa, 22 October 1988) with C. Beis, a prominent member of the Volvi Movement in 1976 and ex-member of ND's local departmental committee. See also "The Volvi Movement: Who is afraid of the phantom of the lake", in the political review Anti, Period B', no. 120, 3 March 1979, pp. 14-9, (in Greek). Conversely, G. Rallis considers the Volvi Movement as an ultra-Right faction, simply because an ex-member of it (G. Sourlas from the Department of Magnisia, Volos) was among Averoff's nominees for the electoral party lists in 1981; see Rallis G., Political Confessions, op. cit., p. 282 and footnote 19 above.

57: Most of the movement's members came from the departments of Thessaly (that is from Larissa, Volos, Karditsa, and Trikala), and certain departments of Macedonia (mostly Salonica and Katerini). According to another member of the movement,

"This was due not to some local particularity, but to the fact that there was not sufficient communication at that time between the various branches of the party organisation, since the latter was not yet properly developed, if not lacking altogether".

Interview with G. Katsaras, conducted by the author in Karditsa, 8 March 1989.

58: In this first congress, 850 ND members participated, representing 42 Greek provinces. It was only then that New Democracy characterised the Volvi Movement as a "ridiculous issue", and announced that all its members were expelled from the party. The congress was preceded in March 1978 by a conference in Salonica of 300 representatives from 32 provinces; a good many of them were members of various ND's departmental committees.

59: These groupings should be considered as tendencies revolving more around certain political personalities and less around ideological or other, wider policy issues. This is to say that the underlying reasons for these intra-party divisions were personalistic/clientelistic, not based on any concrete, impersonal principles. G. Rallis has claimed that when he was fighting for the party leadership after Karanalis'

accession to the Presidency in 1980, his rival candidate E. Averoff tried to catch votes by promising governmental and other public posts to MPs, in case he was elected. See Rallis G., Hours of Responsibility, op. cit., pp. 10-3.

60: C. Stephanopoulos was a prominent political figure of both ERE (he was elected in 1964) and New Democracy (elected continuously in all elections from 1974 until August 1985, when he left the party to form DIANA). He had held various ministerial posts in ND governments, and had competed twice for the party leadership, the first time in 1981 against Averoff, and the second time in 1984 against Mitsotakis; in both cases he was the runner-up. The last post he held before leaving ND was that of the party's parliamentary spokesman.

61: In the June 1985 election PASOK polled 45.58% of the vote and secured 161 parliamentary seats, whereas ND polled 40.85% for 126 seats. For details, see Stephanopoulos C., For an Open Society, Athens: Epopsteia Publications, 1986 (in Greek), and particularly Part I, "Why we have left New Democracy", where the founding declaration of DIANA is also given on pp. 11-59.

62: Three of them left DIANA again and returned to ND two years later.

63: See Stephanopoulos C., op. cit., pp. 13-4.

64: Ibid, p. 18.

65: Ibid, pp. 45-56.

66: In 1981, after ND had lost the election, Rallis resigned as party leader and Averoff was elected to the position by the party's parliamentary group, receiving 67 votes; Stephanopoulos and Boutos, who had also contested this election, received 37 and 12 votes respectively. In 1984, there was another intra-party election for the leadership, fought out between Mitsotakis (who was finally elected with 71 votes) and Stephanopoulos (40 votes).

67: That this was indeed the case is corroborated by the fact that two of the MPs who joined DIANA had been parliamentary candidates of the ultra-right royalist reactionary National Front in 1977, so would hardly identify with the renewal, modernisation and progress DIANA declared itself in favour of. Moreover, three other MPs who had joined DIANA left it again two years later to return to ND: the time was coming for new elections and they wanted to ensure their return to parliament.

68: In June 1989, Stephanopoulos topped the vote in the Second District of Athens, and DIANA secured one seat in the European Parliament as well. The party did not contest the November 1989 election. In that of April 1990, it had one deputy elected in the District of Attiki (in the Athens suburban area), who later joined New Democracy.

69: The PASOK organisation has often been plagued by internal turmoil and distress; for the early crises in 1975, see Lyrintzis C., Between Socialism and Populism:..., op. cit., pp. 148-98. What is most striking in PASOK's case is the leader's charisma and the powers vested in him, as well as the strength and importance of the party's organisation: nobody who has ever left PASOK managed to get re-elected. To cite only two recent examples; in the aftermath of the 1985 election two prominent

PASOK politicians, G. Arsenis and A. Tritsis, both of whom had held governmental posts in the past, were expelled from the party for different reasons. They both founded new parties to contest the 1989 election, the former leading the Greek Socialist Party (ESK) and the latter the Greek Radical Movement (ERK). They both met with electoral fiasco. After their defeat, Arsenis returned to PASOK and Tritsis succeeded in getting elected as City Mayor of Athens with the full support of New Democracy.

70: That declaration is given in Appendix V of this study.

71: The ND party statutes, like those of PASOK, do not allow the establishment and operating of factions. At the second Congress of ND's youth organisation (ONNED) a resolution was proposed by some of its members concerning the recognition and institutionalisation of factions within ONNED; the majority of the congress participants rejected it. See Vamvakaris T., "The lost chance", in the weekly review Politika Themata, no. 857, 17 January 1992, p. 36. Nevertheless, the Liberal Forum was given verbal recognition as a faction by the ND leader and prime minister, in a speech he addressed to parliament on 20 March 1992; it has yet to be so recognised by the official party organisation.

72: See Andrianopoulos' interview with the daily newspaper Kathimerini, 29 March 1992, p. 4. Andrianopoulos wittingly uses the more neutral term "tendency" instead of the term "faction", since the latter, bearing connotations of future defection and creation of a splinter party, might provoke troublesome criticism and ring the alarm in the ND party-mechanism.

73: See Kathimerini, 9 February 1992, p. 2.

74: See Kathimerini, 23 February 1992, p. 7.

75: See Varvitsiotis' interview with the daily newspaper Eleftherotypia, 20 December 1987, pp. 6-7; see also M. Evert's interview with the weekly Epsilon, no. 59, 31 May 1992, pp. 36-41. As Bakoyiannis P., The Anatomy of Greek Politics, op. cit., p. 125, claims,

"Ever since the early years after the November 1974 election, two tendencies could be identified within ND's parliamentary group: one constituted by the old ERE-party members, and the other by the newcomers".

According to another prominent ND member,

"There exist tendencies within the ND ranks... I believe that our party must not only tolerate, but take full advantage of them".

See Kondoyiannopoulos' interview with the daily newspaper Ethnos, 27 February 1990, p. 10. It is worth mentioning that all these leading members, who have acknowledged the existence of tendencies within ND and favour their institutionalisation and functioning within the party, did so only after Karamanlis withdrew from the party leadership for the Presidency of the Republic in May 1980.

76: See Varvitsiotis' interview, op. cit. Another prominent ND member, M. Evert, declares:

"I believe in Karamanliism, which does not only constitute

a simple political or ideological stance but also a certain way of political thought and action".

See Evert M., National Choices, Athens: author's publication, 1986 (in Greek), p. 13.

77: See ND: Ideological Principles-Party Statutes, 1979, op. cit., p. 12, and Appendix IV of this study, where a translated version of the party's six ideological principles is given (see also Clogg R., Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987, pp. 225-8, where the author presents a shortened and amended version of the official English translation of Karamanlis' whole speech in the first congress of ND). It is worth noting that ND's ideological principles have first place (ibid, pp. 7-14), followed by the party statutes (pp. 17-30). The same procedure was adhered to at the second party congress in Salonica in 1986, when the ideological principles underwent some change (a translated version of the latter is given in Appendix VI). We shall concern ourselves in much detail with these matters in ch. 5, where we examine the party's ideology.

78: See Liapis M., For a Radical Renewal, Athens: Estia, 1987 (in Greek), p. 190; see also Papaligouras A., Arguments of Doubt, Athens: Odysseas, 1986 (in Greek), pp. 18-9. Liapis and Papaligouras are both ND MPs; the former is C. Karamanlis' nephew and the latter is the son of P. Papaligouras, former ERE and ND MP, one of the closest Karamanlis' colleagues.

79: There are reports concerning many such politicians in the daily press of the time. For a detailed and well-documented presentation, see especially To Pondiki, 16 June 1989 and Ta Nea, 23 May 1989, and 31 October 1989.

80: See for example footnote 20 above.

81: As Mitsotakis himself has declared, "I was, I am, and I will always be a liberal". See New Democracy: A Liberal Leader, a Liberal Policy- Programme, Athens: ND Publication, 1985 (in Greek), p. 3.

82: In 1976 the Centre for Political Research and Information (KPEE) was created which, though not directly related to New Democracy, mainly served as a think-tank and as a mechanism producing ideology for the party. The Centre's identity, operation, and influence, as well as the political review Epikentra it publishes, will be discussed in ch. 5 below.

83: Advocation and dissemination of the so-called neo-liberal ideas has provoked serious criticism inside the party, mainly from its Karamanlist politicians. M. Liapis writes, "Neo-liberalism, as well as any other ideological offshoot, ... lies outside our official and firm ideological line"; op. cit., p. 191. A. Papaligouras adds, "The overwhelming majority of our supporters remains loyal to the founding declaration of ND, and rejects the imported neo-liberalist jargon"; op. cit., p. 27. And a few days before the second ND congress (held in Salonica, 14-16 February 1986), Paleokrasas warned:

"...a congress's decision concerning ideological issues is out of the question. A party's ideology is always stable and indelibly woven with its very existence. If the congress's majority will demand changes concerning ND's ideology, then it is not ideology that will change but the

party itself, including its name. If, on the other hand, the congress's minority will not agree with certain ND's ideological principles, then they should themselves move to some other party, if they so wish".

See his interview with the daily newspaper Mesimvrini, 21 January 1986, p. 12.

84: At this point we should only briefly refer to another splinter party that has been founded very recently, so it is yet too risky to try and present its exact identity, its ideological and other characteristics and especially its future course. The splinter party of Political Spring (*Politiki Anoixi*, POLAN) was founded by A. Samaras, an ND deputy in the Department of Messinia, Peloponnese, since 1977 and foreign minister in ND's post-1990 government. Due to a disagreement with the prime minister over the country's policies and relations with the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Samaras—who kept an ultra-nationalistic stance—was dismissed on 23 April 1992. In October he resigned his parliamentary seat and on 30 June 1993 he founded his new party and presented its political and ideological principles albeit in a very general and vague manner (see POLAN's founding declaration in the weekly newspaper To Pondiki, 1 July 1993, in Greek, pp. 6-7); the very next day another ND MP resigned in order to join the new party; and two weeks later A. Lendakis, an EDA member and deputy elected under the banner of the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN, see below, ch. 5, section 5.1) also resigned his parliamentary seat to join POLAN. In early September, two more ND deputies declared their independency and joined POLAN; ND was left with 150 MPs in parliament and party leader Mitsotakis asked for early elections which were scheduled for October 10, 1993 (for their result, see footnote 130 to ch. 5). As regards POLAN, the only comment we can now make is that although Samaras spoke of "transgression", of a break with personalistic politics and paleokommatisμός in general, he initially projected nationalistic slogans; he himself created a party much in the same mould as it was the case in the past; and it was only *post festum* that he tried to vest his attempt with an ideological cloak, no matter how vague and oblique the latter proved to be.

85: As a ND 1986 central committee ex-member, N. Delipetros, has put it,

"Today's liberal democratic camp represents a wide spectrum of the population, from the old royalists to those who stand somewhere near the ideological borders with the Left".

See Politika Themata, no. 718, 20 January 1989, p. 9.

CHAPTER FOUR

1: See Lyrintzis C., Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Ph.D thesis, University of London, LSE, November 1983, p. 194. (Henceforth, all quotations are in our own translation from the original Greek, unless otherwise stated).

2: This was officially recognised by ND director-general G. Missailidis at the preliminary congress in 1977; see his speech "The party organisation, way of functioning, headquarters' report and future objectives", in 1st Preliminary Congress of the Party: Minutes, vols A'+B', Chalkidiki, 2-4 April 1977 (in Greek), ND Publication, p. 30 (hereafter 1977 Preliminary Congress).

3: As Paraskevopoulos P. observes, with reference to the 1955-1963 years:

"Karamanliism was the political continuation of the victors in the civil war. C. Karamanlis founded a centralised, authoritarian and one-party state of the Right on the ideological principles of anti-communism. His anti-communism played into the hands of the para-state of the ultra-Right. When he realized this, it was really too late. His disentanglement from the para-state networks was accompanied by his complete political defeat".

See his Karamanlis between 1974 and 1985, Athens: Fytrakis, 1991 (in Greek), p. 5.

4: For a detailed account of his actions during that time see Tzermias P., The Karamanlis of the Anti-dictatorial Struggle, Athens: Roes, 1984 (in Greek). It is worth mentioning that in the course of the seven-year dictatorship he expressed his opinion publicly only five times.

5: Ibid, p. 118.

6: Ibid, p. 35; see also Woodhouse C. M., Karamanlis: Restorer of Greek Democracy, Athens: Morphotiki Estia, 1982 (in Greek), p. 284.

7: See Katsoudas D., "The ND congress and the Greek opposition: Some useful conclusions", in the then bimonthly review Epikentra, no. 8, May-June 1979, pp. 50-5, (in Greek).

8: Ibid, p. 54.

9: See Woodhouse C. M., op. cit., p. 291.

10: The difficulties the Greek premier met with during the negotiations for the country's entry into the EEC, were not noted at that time. For a most recent presentation of some of the latter, see the article "The sick man of Europe", in The Economist, vol. 323, no. 7758, May 9th-15th, 1992, pp. 27-8; see also Tsardanidis C., "The foreign policy of ND, 1974-1981", in Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), pp. 120-31, and Verney S., "Greece and the European Community", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), Political Change in Greece: Before and After The Colonels, London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 253-70.

11: See Rallis G., Political Confessions: 1950-1989, Athens: Proskinio, 1990 (in Greek), p. 204.

12: See Tzermias P., op. cit., p. 24.

13: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement and New Democracy: From past to present", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), op. cit., pp. 85-111.

14: Cited in Bakoyiannis P., Anatomy of Greek Politics, Athens: Papazissis, 1977 (in Greek), p. 130.

15: Ibid, p. 131. The ND director-general has characterised Karamanlis as the "big boss" and "unique leader"; see Missailidis G., "The party organisation...", op. cit., p. 36.

16: See C. Karamanlis' Speeches and Statements, July 1974-May 1976, ND Publication (in Greek), p. 166.

17: Although according to Tzermias P., [see his The Political Thought of C. Karamanlis, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1990 (in Greek), pp. 15-30], the rejection of messianism lies at the root of Karamanlis' political thought, but this may be so only theoretically. In practice, the reverse may be said to be true. In his election address to the people of Athens on 15 November 1974, Karamanlis clearly stated: "...you called me here... to save the country". See also footnote 25 to ch. 2.

18: As Karamanlis said on 12 June 1975, in a message to the Greek people:

"However, beyond financial priorities, Greece's immediate entry into the EEC is dictated by political, not to mention national necessity. Because it is clear that Greece, becoming an EEC member, reinforces its national sovereignty and safeguards its democratic institutions".

See C. Karamanlis' Speeches and Statements, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

19: See Missailidis G., "The party organisation...", op. cit., p. 31, where he writes:

"During this first organisational period, the leader with his colleagues instructed and supervised the party organs, determined their membership, their functioning, their area or sector of responsibility, their ways and methods of action".

20: These six principles are presented in Appendix IV of this study (see also footnote 77 to ch. 3); for a presentation and analysis of ND's ideology in general, see below, ch. 5.

21: See 1977 Preliminary Congress, op. cit., pp. 22-3, where Karamanlis adds:

"In Greece... political parties have always been personalistic and short-lived. Not because their leaders wished it so, but because a party's democratic organisation is, objectively, difficult to realize in our country. This in turn is due to the fact that, on the one hand, we lack the appropriate tradition and, on the other,

because the Greek temperament does not incline to collective efforts... Therefore, we will have to change our political mentality if we really want democratically organised parties in our country, parties which will secure political stability as well as normal political developments".

22: See the statement by Dr. C. Zarkadas (he was a prominent member of the Volvi Movement and ex-president of ND's departmental committee in Katerini, Department of Imathia) in the daily newspaper To Vima, 9 March 1978, where he says:

"I resigned when I was convinced that the so much advertised ND's democratic organisation was only a smoke-screen, which served unidentified expediencies; the party's democratic organisation proved impossible to create from above".

23: See the newspaper To Vima, 3 March 1978.

24: This decision provoked criticism from some party members because, as they saw it, if Karamanlis really cared about intra-party democracy, he would have called the congress immediately after the preliminary congress in 1977, and in that case there would be sufficient time for its proper preparation; see Papoutsakis C., "ND's first congress: The contradictions of a modernisation", in the political review Anti, Period B', no. 125, 12 May 1979 (in Greek), pp. 13-7.

25: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 94.

26: See Stratigis S. (at the time a member of ND's administrative committee), "The ND statutes: Democratic procedures within the party", in Epikentra, no. 8, May-June 1979 (in Greek), p. 42.

27: It is worth mentioning that although PASOK had developed a very well-structured organisation much earlier, uncomparable by any standards to ND's one, it did not hold its first congress until 1984. Nevertheless, ND followed the general trend as this is described by Karl von Beyme:

"Only rarely --one case was France during the Restoration-- have Conservative parties been the first to emerge with a recognisable organisation. Generally, they have been the second party to develop, the organisational response to the challenge of Liberalism and Radicalism. Conservatism is a movement to defend positions which are threatened or --as in the French Revolution-- already lost". More specifically, "In the Federal Republic of Germany the Christian Democrats only developed into a membership party in opposition, when they were not in a position to allocate offices on the national level. In Italy the Democrazia Cristiana has always participated in the government, but it had its greatest recruitment successes in 1969/70, during the 'hot autumn', when its position in the system appeared to be in jeopardy..." (in English originally).

See von Beyme K., Political Parties in Western Democracies, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, p. 46 and pp. 173-4.

28: See Stratigis S., op. cit., p. 41, who argues that the role and importance of these principles had been rightly ignored by the public at that time, since pre-coup parties also had their organisational charters that always remained a dead letter.

29: There is no concrete information on the exact number and identity of the members of this committee. However, it was presided over by two ND administrative-committee members (T. Louis and S. Stratigis), who were also leading figures of the Centre for Political Research and Information (KPEE), the latter serving as a think-tank and as an apparatus for ideological propaganda for ND, though not directly related to the latter; for details about this Centre, see ch. 5 below.

30: On the first charter, remarks and amendments proposed by ND's departmental committees, and for its final adopted version, see 1977 Preliminary Congress, op. cit., pp. 77-103.

31: On katharevousa and demotiki (the popular, living language), as well as their respective effects and implications, see Mouzelis N., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1978, ch. 8, "On Greek formalism: Political and cultural aspects of underdevelopment", pp. 134-48.

32: For example, the terms "general assembly" and "administrative committee" are meant to denote the party congress and the central committee respectively.

33: See Article 4.1a in 1977 Preliminary Congress, op. cit., p. 98.

34: A photocopy of ND's ballot paper for the Second District of Athens in the 1977 election is presented in Appendix IIa, with Karamanlis' photograph serving as the party's emblem. The new emblem (see Appendix IIb) proposed by the first charter consisted of a circle containing the capital letters "ND" (standing for New Democracy) with a flaming torch between them.

35: See 1977 Preliminary Congress, op. cit., pp. 78-80.

36: They were asking the party leadership to entrust local organisations and departmental committees with greater rights and responsibilities.

37: Amendments here aimed at a greater representation on ND's highest committee of party members from the provinces.

38: According to the proposed charter, the party parliamentarians, former and active, were rather over-represented in relation to non-parliamentarians; the amendments sought the latter's better representation on the party's highest organ.

39: See Stratigis S., op. cit., p. 43. Nonetheless, not one written amendment was proposed on the party leader's power position, nomination, election, etc.; see 1977 Preliminary Congress, op. cit., p. 85.

40: See Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National Election of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 72.

41: Ibid, p. 73, where he writes:

"Efforts to preserve such relationships actually led some MPs to oppose the expansion of the party organisations in their electoral districts, in the hope of retaining personal control over contacts with prospective voters" (in English originally).

For additional evidence on such practices see also section 4 in ch. 6 below and footnote 81 to that same chapter.

42: Ibid, p. 73.

43: As C. Stephanopoulos, at the time president of the Statutes' Elaboration Committee, declared; see New Democracy: First Congress, Minutes, Chalkidiki, 5-7 May 1979 (in Greek), ND Publication, p. 91 (hereafter 1979 Congress).

44: This point will become more evident in the following chapter, where we shall examine the party's ideology. Suffice it to mention here that, due to several official party statements concerning ideological issues, one was left with the impression that ND was standing over and above party politics, since it often identified its narrow party interests with the broader national ones. As von Beyme K., op. cit., p. 13, observes,

"...the very word 'party', deriving from the Latin *pars*, or 'part', suggests that a democratic party can never claim to represent the whole, however much it may stress the general interest in its propaganda or even develop a tendency to see itself as the 'natural party of government'" (in English originally).

45: See Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, Athens: ND publication, June 1979 (in Greek), p. 20, Article 4.2 (hereafter 1979 Statutes).

46: Ibid, pp. 18-9, Article 3.1.

47: Ibid, pp. 19-20, Article 4.1 and 2.

48: Ibid, pp. 22-5, Articles 7 and 8. Conversely, in the PASOK statutes it is stated unequivocally that "The central committee is the movement's highest organ between congresses...". See PASOK's statutes (Article 61), cited in Bakoyiannis P., op. cit., pp. 323-39.

49: According to Article 7.2 of the 1979 party statutes (see 1979 Statutes, op. cit., p. 22), all the afore-mentioned members participate on the administrative committee *ex officio*.

50: Ibid, Article 8.3, pp. 24-5.

51: Ibid, Article 12.1, p. 27.

52: Ibid, Articles 7.6 and 8.1, pp. 23 and 24 respectively.

53: Ibid, Article 11, pp. 26-7.

54: Ibid, Article 11.3 and 4, p. 27.

55: Ibid, Article 5.2, p. 21.

56: Ibid. Article 37 of the Constitution refers to the formation of a government and the duties of the President of the Republic. However, in the fourth paragraph of this Article, there is a direct reference to the procedures for leadership of a party: "...if the party has no leader or representative, or if the party's leader or representative has not been elected to parliament, the President of the Republic gives the mandate to the person proposed to him by the party's parliamentary group...". See The Constitution of Greece, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 7th Edition, 1987 (in Greek), p. 75.

57: See 1979 Statutes, op. cit., Article 17, p. 30.

58: Ibid., Article 6, pp. 21-2. According to this Article, the vice-president should not be a member of government when the party is in office. As C. Stephanopoulos had argued, by having a vice-president, New Democracy tried to follow the West-European trend, as this manifests in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC), where the premiership and the party presidency are not held by the same person; and he has stated that

"...the [ND] party needs a vice-president, a prestigious member of its parliamentary group, free of governmental burdens, to devote himself wholeheartedly to the development of the party's organisation".

See 1979 Congress, op. cit., pp. 92-3. Nevertheless, the vice-presidential position remained vacant at all times.

59: Ibid., p. 11. There was, however, criticism concerning the election of certain party delegates, because in some departments the local deputies had crudely interfered to ensure the election of their personal *protégés*; see Papoutsakis C., op. cit., p. 16.

60: See Missailidis G. (ND director-general), "ND headquarters' report and suggestions on organisational issues", in 1979 Congress, op. cit., p. 36. For a comprehensive presentation of ND's —as well as ONNE's— membership (and ratio between members and voters) since its creation, see Appendix III.

61: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 99, where he observes:

"Whatever the shortcomings, the first ND congress was a historic occasion for it was the first (and democratic) congress ever of a Greek non-communist party" (in English originally).

It should also be noted that the actual organisation of the Chalkidiki congress was entrusted, not to party officials, but to professional conference organisers; see Clogg R., Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987, p. 161.

62: The overwhelming majority of ND supporters (contrary to the case with PASOK), must be considered as having been totally unfamiliar with these issues of political behaviour, since their only chance of getting together informally was at pre-electoral party demonstrations.

63: For more details on this election, see Rallis G., Hours of Responsibility, Athens: Evroekdotiki, 1983 (in Greek), pp. 7-15.

64: During this time, 14 regional congresses were held. The most important was a special *ad-hoc* congress held in Athens (27-28 June 1981), four months before the general election; it was meant to serve mainly as a unifying factor for ND members and supporters, shortly before the electoral fight. For a brief account on this event, and for a presentation of the most important speeches addressed to the 1250 participating delegates, see the newspaper Vradini (daily at that time), 29 June 1981 (in Greek), pp. 5-7.

65: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 100.

66: See Diamandakos P., From the Centre Union to New Democracy, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in Greek), pp. 155-6.

67: Ibid, pp. 112-7.

68: On 7 December 1981, Rallis asked ND's deputies to reconfirm their trust in him by a vote of confidence. Out of 112 deputies, 61 voted against, 41 for, nine cast blanks and one vote was invalid. Rallis resigned and on 9 December E. Averoff, C. Stephanopoulos and J. Boutos contested the election for the new party leader: Averoff was given 67 votes, Stephanopoulos 32, and Boutos 12.

69: As he bitterly declared after he had lost the vote of confidence:

"I was right to ask for it. Now, they [the ND deputies] will do well to find a new leader that suits them better".

See the daily newspaper Ethnos, 8 December 1981 (in Greek), p. 12, and also Rallis G., Political Confessions: 1950-1989, op. cit., pp. 277-89.

70: See G. Voukelatos' interview with Ethnos, 3 November 1981, pp. 16-7. As D. Papaspyrou, former Speaker of Parliament, has put it,

"There was no communication with the party base... I believe that we were not all systematically organised —in contrast to PASOK".

See his interview with Ethnos, 26 October 1981, pp. 12-3; and according to the ex-Secretary of Shipping and Trade, J. Fikioris,

"...although ND has developed its democratic organisation by taking more worthwhile and remarkable steps than any other party, it has not managed to establish a proper communication with the party base".

See his interview with Ethnos, 31 October 1981, pp. 12-3 (all in Greek).

71: See Diamandakos P., op. cit., p. 156; also G. Stephanakis' interview with Ethnos, 2 November 1981, pp. 12-3, where he stated:

"Although New Democracy was a bourgeois party in which the parliamentary group played the dominant role, it elected delegates and organs to its congress which, in turn, elected an administrative committee... but the latter has only acted as a rubber-stamp organ...".

72: See G. Voukelatos' interview with Ethnos, 3 November 1981, op.cit., pp. 16-7.

73: See Rallis G., Hours of Responsibility, op. cit., pp. 116-7.

74: See for example footnote 28 to ch. 1.

75: See Rallis G., Hours of Responsibility, op. cit., p. 143.

76: See (parts of) Averoff's speech addressed to the administrative committee on 16 December 1983, as published in Ethnos, 17 December 1983.

77: According to K. Bourdara, a prominent member of this committee,

"ND has become the only party where women have an organisational group of their own, and not outside it through separate satellite women's unions".

See her interview with the weekly periodical Eikones, no. 396, 3 June 1992, pp. 47-8. The other major party, PASOK, had no women's organisation, but had created the Women's Union of Greece (EGE), which was separate from the party and was presided over by Papandreou's wife Margaret.

78: See Peripheral Organisation Regulation (KPO), Athens: ND Publication, June 1983 (in Greek), p. 5; the first ND's KPO, which had been applied until then, was elaborated by the party's first congress in May 1979.

79: The question here was: "Concerning ND's grass-roots organisation, is there, in your view, any marked difference between the 1974-81 period (when the party was in government) and that from 1981 until today (i.e. 1989)? If yes/some, was it that (a) during 1974-81 it was virtually non-existent and only after 1981 became a necessity for counterbalancing PASOK's power? or (b) did it simply become better after 1981?" For the reasons why the Department of Larissa had been chosen, see footnote 34 to ch. 3.

80: See Macrides' interview with Epikentra, no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983 (in Greek), pp. 64-6.

81: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 100. Averoff's contribution to the development of ND's organisation was officially acknowledged by Mitsotakis himself during the second party congress; see his speech addressed to the party delegates, in New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, Thessaloniki: 14-16 February 1986 (in Greek), ND Publication, pp. 37-8, (hereafter 1986 Congress).

82: In the 1984 Euro-election, New Democracy polled 38.05% of the vote, compared to 35.86% and 31.53% in the 1981 national and Euro-election respectively (the national and Euro-elections were held simultaneously in October 1981); PASOK's respective percentages are 41.58% (Euro-1984), 48.06% (national 1981), and 40.29% (Euro-1981) of the vote.

83: See Let's Reconstruct Together, Athens: ND Publication, December 1984 (in Greek), p. 35. On 11 October 1985, four months before the second congress, an internal party election was held for political-council membership (most of the party's leading deputies chose not to stand for it); this new council comprised *ex officio* the president, ND's parliamentary spokesman (A. Kanellopoulos), and the parliamentary group's secretary-general (A. Tsaldaris), as well as six MPs, elected by ND's parliamentary group (these were A. Samaras, J. Kefaloyiannis, N.

Klitos, S. Kouvelas, G. Sourlas, and G. Tzitzikostas); see the daily newspaper Kathimerini, 12 October 1985. After ND' second congress this organ was abolished; as C. Mitsotakis has put it,

"I think that the existence of the political council must be left to the president's discretion, since we all agree that it is merely a consultory organ".

See his speech addressed to ND's parliamentary group, published in Mesimvrini, 6 February 1986.

84: This was entitled "A New Proposal for Freedom", and a translated version is given in Appendix V of this study.

85: In June 1985, ND polled 40.85% of the vote and had 126 deputies elected, whereas PASOK secured 45.82% of the vote and 161 parliamentary seats.

86: Stephanopoulos left the party on 24 August 1985; the very same day Mitsotakis resigned, to be re-elected five days later (82 deputies voted for him, 37 cast blanks and one vote was invalid); when, on 6 September 1985 Stephanopoulos announced the foundation of DIANA, nine ND deputies left the party to join Stephanopoulos' splinter group.

87: See 1986 Congress, p. 13.

88: Ibid, p. 13.

89: Ibid, pp. 14-8 and also newspaper Vradini, 29 January 1986, p. 16.

90: See Papoutsakis C., op. cit., p. 14.

91: See 1986 Congress, pp. 156-76.

92: See the speech by A. Bratakos ("Party statutes"), addressed to the party delegates, ibid, p. 141.

93: See interviews of Dimas S., Papakonstantinou M., Samaras A., Souflias G., Tzitzikostas G. and Hatzinikolaou P. with the daily newspaper Mesimvrini, 21 January 1986, pp. 12-3 (for Dimas and Papakonstantinou), and 22 January 1986, pp. 12-3 (for the rest).

94: From the very beginning indeed, see Article 2: "Basic organisational and operational principles", in ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, Athens: ND Publication, 1986 (in Greek), pp. 11-2 (hereafter 1986 Statutes).

95: See Bratakos A., "Party statutes", op. cit., p. 144.

96: See 1986 Statutes, Article 2.b, p. 12.

97: Ibid, Articles 7 and 8, p. 15.

98: A heterocitizen is someone whose permanent residence is in one place but who is registered for voting in another. (For example, according to the 5 April 1981 census, 3,027,331 people were living in the Greater Athens and Piraeus area, whereas only 1,827,430 —or just over 60%— were entitled to vote there). Such people are urged by all the Greek parties to go to the place where they are registered for

voting when an election takes place; to help them do this, most parties offer financial aid (bus, railway, airplane tickets, etc.). For some peculiar reason, neither ND nor PASOK have ever disclosed relevant information on this subject, although both parties consider these heterocitizens' mobilisation and voting crucial in all elections—most especially in national ones—and have set up special offices to deal exclusively with this issue (see also Figure 4.III).

99: See 1986 Statutes, article 9, pp. 15-6.

100: Ibid, Article 10.1, p. 16.

101: 300 representatives in all, as was the case under the 1979 statutes. A new provision—see Article 10.I, II, and III, ibid, pp. 16-7—stipulates that if there are one, two or three parliamentary seats available to a certain department, the respective departmental committee sends two, three or four delegates respectively (i.e. one extra); if there are four, five or six seats, the committee sends six, seven or eight (i.e. two more); and, lastly, if there are over six seats available, the committee sends ten or more delegates to the congress (i.e. three more). Consequently, there is a much higher representation of the party's grass-roots (and more generally of the non-parliamentarians vis-à-vis the parliamentarians) compared to that established by the 1979 statutes.

102: Ibid, Article 10.η, θ, ι, and ιδ, p. 17. According to the most recent data available (December 1991), ND claims 70 departmental committees throughout the country, whereas at the time of the 1986 congress the party had only 62 (see Appendix III).

103: Ibid, Article 11, pp. 17-8.

104: Ibid, Article 12, p. 18.

105: Ibid, Article 16.1, p. 22.

106: Candidates for the central committee are registered in three different lists: the first and second lists comprise ND non-parliamentarians, the former those from the Greater Athens and Piraeus area, and the latter those from the provinces. The third list comprises candidates from the party's parliamentary group. The first 25 members from each list (in terms of preference votes) are elected to the central committee; ibid, Article 15, pp. 20-2.

107: Ibid, Article 15.4 and 16, pp. 22-3; all five members of the central disciplinary council are non-parliamentarians, and the same holds for the departmental counterparts (which consist of three members). See also Inner Regulation of the Central Committee, Athens: ND's print-out for internal party circulation, 28 April 1986 (in Greek), author's records.

108: See 1986 Statutes, Articles 17-18, 24-26 and 30, pp. 23-5, 28-9 and 31-2 respectively. See also Bratakos A., "Party Statutes", 1986 Congress, pp. 145-6, and Inner Regulation of the Executive Committee, Athens: ND's print-out for internal party circulation, 28 April 1986 (in Greek), author's records.

109: See 1986 Statutes, Articles 21-23, pp. 27-8. For more details, see the new Peripheral Organisation Regulation, Athens: ND Publication,

26 March 1987 (in Greek), which amended the previous one (of June 1983, see footnote 78 to this chapter).

110: See 1986 Statutes, Article 13, pp. 18-9. The national conference is a new institution, not provided for under the 1979 statutes. It consists of the ND deputies, the central-committee members, the presidents of ND's departmental administrative committees and its occupational organisations, the ONNED executive-committee members, and the presidents of ONNED's departmental committees. A national conference aims mainly at "...political and organisational briefing on the party's activities, and also the latter's best possible co-ordination"; ibid. See also Bratakos A., "Party statutes", in 1986 Congress, op. cit., pp. 146-8.

111: See 1986 Statutes, Article 14.1, p. 19.

112: See Bratakos A., "Party statutes", in 1986 Congress, op. cit., p. 146.

113: See 1986 Statutes, op. cit., Article 14.2-3, p. 20; according to the same Article, the party's parliamentary group alone cannot elect but only disapprove of a particular president; ibid., Article 14.4, p. 20. See also Special Regulation for the Election of the Party President, Athens: ND's print-out for internal party circulation, 28 April 1986 (in Greek), author's records. According to this regulation (Article 12.7, ibid.), ND's parliamentary group alone may elect the president only in the case of Article 37.4 of the Greek Constitution; see footnote 56 to this chapter.

114: See Bratakos A., "Party statutes", in 1986 Congress, op. cit., p. 147.

115: See 1986 Statutes, op. cit., Article 19, p. 25, and also Inner Regulation of ND's Parliamentary Group, Athens: ND's print-out for internal party circulation, 28 April 1986 (in Greek), author's records, Article 21.

116: See Bratakos A., "Party statutes", in 1986 Congress, op. cit., p. 149.

117: See 1986 Statutes, op. cit., Article 20.1.A, pp. 25-6. (The State-list consists of 12 candidates for each party, who are not voted in by a preference-cross vote; instead, their election to parliament depends, on the one hand, on their party's electoral performance at the national level and, on the other, on the rank they hold in the party list. The same is true for Euro-candidates; see also footnote 15 to ch. 3).

118: Ibid., Article 20.B.σ, pp. 26-7.

119: See C. Mitsotakis' speech to ND's parliamentary group and the deputies' reactions, published in the newspaper Mesimvrini, 6 February 1986, pp. 16-7.

120: Ibid.

121: The question was as follows: "As you know, the final nomination of ND candidates for parliament is exclusively the party president's responsibility. Do you personally agree with this procedure? If not, what is your personal suggestion?"

122: During our fieldwork research in Larissa in 1989, the 1986 statutes were, of course, in operation. However, there had been no general election since June 1985, and so the rank-and-file members had not yet experienced the new procedures for drawing up ND's candidate lists; in fact, all relevant decisions were still taken at party headquarters in Athens.

123: Such an instance, among others, occurred in the Department of Larissa shortly before the June 1989 election; the second and fourth candidates (in terms of preference votes) on the electoral list the departmental committee sent to party headquarters, were not finally included, in favour of the sixth and seventh. This resulted in the resignation of all members of ND's local committee in Ellassona (fourth biggest town in the Department of Larissa). In the Department of Salonica, members of ONNED occupied the ND central offices to protest the leadership decision to exclude from the electoral list certain candidates the department's assembly had elected among the first. See the newspapers Eleftheria, 24 April 1989, and Eleftherotypia, 19 May 1989.

124: For more details concerning the secretariats and the special offices, see the newspaper Mesimvrini, 26 May 1986, pp. 12-3.

125: Athens (after 1978), and Salonica and Piraeus (after 1975) had always elected mayors supported either by PASOK alone, or by an *ad-hoc* PASOK/Left alliance; ND's success becomes more important if we remember that Stephanopoulos' splinter party, DIANA —and to a lesser extent, ultra-rightist groups as well— supported its own candidates during the October 1986 municipal election.

126: See Katsoudas D. K., "Youth and New Democracy: Questions and perspectives", in Epikentra, no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983, pp. 50-5. These remarks were reconfirmed by S. Mavros during an interview with the author in Athens, 23 March 1988; at that time Mavros was responsible for the provincial organisation, and from 1989 until 1991 he was president of ONNED.

127: For electoral results since 1974 see the newspapers Ethnos, 20 March 1988, and Pondiki, 23 March 1990; relevant information was also acquired during C. Hatzidakis' and V. Kavalos' interviews with the author, on 23 March 1988, when both were leading ONNED members, responsible at the time for the universities and the higher technical schools respectively.

128: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., pp. 107-8; also the speech addressed to ND's second national conference by the party's director-general Bratakos A., "Presentation of ND's programme of action", Athens, 2 October 1988 (in Greek), author's records, p. 2.

129: For more details and information concerning the trade-union movement in Greece see, among others, Katsanevas T., Trade Unions in Greece: An Analysis of Factors Determining their Growth and Present Structure, Athens: National Centre for Social Research, 1984; Katephores G. and Tzannatos Z., "Trade unions in Greece: 1949-81 and 1981-83", in Tzannatos Z. (ed), Socialism in Greece, Vermont, USA: Gower Publishing Company Ltd, 1986, pp. 130-41; Fakiolas R., "Interest groups: An overview", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), op. cit., pp. 174-88; and Mavrogordatos G., Between Pityokampes and Prokrustes:

Professional Organisations in Today's Greece, Athens: Odysseas, 1988 (in Greek).

130: By and large, the three main trade-union organisations (GSEE for wage-earners, AEDY for salaried civil employees, and PASEGES for the farmers)

"...do not identify with some particular political party. They are all connected with all of the parties, since their role has been reduced to the battleground where various organised groups —controlled and directed by the respective political parties— challenge each other".

See Mavrogordatos G., "Social prerequisites for coalition governments", in a publication of the Hellenic Society of Political Science, Elections and Parties in the 1980s: Developments and Perspectives of the Political System, Athens: Themelio, 1990 (in Greek), p. 124.

131: See Kafetzis T., "ND 1974-1987: The embryo that became a giant and the 'challenge of politics'", in the political review Anti, Period B', no. 357, 9 October 1987 (in Greek), pp. 33-5. ND's membership density in 1992 (1:7.7 or 13%) resembles much that of the British Conservative Party in 1974 (12%) and the Italian Democrazia Cristiana in 1983 (11.2%); see von Beyme K., op. cit., Table 3.4, pp. 184-5.

132: Since ND resumed office in April 1990, no important governmental decision has been taken by one of the higher party organs. As a result, several major bills and law-decrees submitted in parliament have been fiercely opposed by ND deputies themselves, and also by various other branches of the party organisation —particularly so by DAKE and ND's trade-unionised members.

133: This information was disclosed during an interview of C. Georgosoulis (then secretary-general of the departmental committee in Larissa) with the author in Larissa, 30 November 1988.

134: See the interview of V. Goutsis (responsible for ND's financial affairs) with the newspaper Ta Nea, 18 May 1992, p. 15. Since 1984 political parties in Greece are subsidised by the state and are obliged to make public and detailed financial statements every year; however, they do so in a particularly vague and inconsistent manner. For more details, see Drettakis M., "Political parties' financing", in Ta Nea, 5, 6 and 7 July 1993 (in Greek), who argues that state funds amount to almost half of both ND's and PASOK's total income (45.4 and 45.3% respectively).

135: The data presented here are compiled on the basis of the answers from 158 rank-and-file party members, interviewed by the author in the Department of Larissa in 1989. The specific question was "In your opinion, which, if any, is/are the most important problem(s) your local organisation is facing at the moment?" Interviewees were allowed to mention more than one problem; for more details see ch. 6 and Appendix VIII.

136: This is best expressed by a comparison of the occupational background of high-ranking (including MPs) and rank-and-file members. Not surprisingly, ND recruits the former among the socially higher and better-paid occupational categories (such as lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.), whereas the latter present a picture of a more evenly balanced and representative occupational background; see Tables III.11,

12 and 16, compared to Table III.17, footnote 32 to ch. 3 and also the diagram presented in Figure 6.1 in ch. 6 below.

137: See footnote 50 to ch. 3. What should be noted here, is that during the first years of the PASOK government, its organised base has made quite extensive use of this ability; according to Spourdalakis M., PASOK: Structure, Intra-party Crises and Centralised Power, Athens: Exantas, 1988 (in Greek), pp. 314-5,

"...the Greek State has experienced perhaps the most extensive clientelistic mass appointments ever in its entire existence. ...being a member of a PASOK professional organisation became the guarantee for securing a job. ...only PASOK members enjoyed a public appointment. ...PASOK did not hesitate to institutionalise this practice by transforming the 'Solidarity Office' into an employment-securing agency".

138: Many such instances can be identified, by simply going through the daily press after April 1990. One of the most recent and remarkable examples was reported by ND's Minister of Public Order, T. Anagnostopoulos, in an interview with the weekly newspaper To Vima, 17 May 1992. When asked how he intended to cope with a good many rousfeti requests that had swarmed into his office, he said:

"All and everybody who voted for New Democracy were expecting something in return: one to be employed as a director, another to become a higher civil servant, a third to see his daughter appointed in some public-sector job, and yet another to be assigned with a public-works contract. Is there nobody who voted for ND simply for ideological reasons? If I were to deal with all this nonsense, I would not be able to do the job I am here for".

139: On the contrary, they fiercely deny such allegations: each time PASOK and ND formed a government, they reassured loudly the people that they would enforce impartial, non-discriminatory policies, and that all public appointments would be made on the basis of examinations open to everybody, with only meritocratic and never party-political criteria taken into final account.

140: Let us recall that New Democracy was led by C. Karamanlis (October 1974-May 1980), G. Rallis (May 1980-December 1981), E. Averoff (December 1981-September 1984), and C. Mitsotakis (September 1984 until October 1993).

141: For these points, see also Papathanassiou C., "Party leaders and their successors", in the daily newspaper Ta Nea, 19 February 1992, p. 6. It should be added here that Karamanlis' charisma cannot be said to consist of populist elements whatsoever, like that, for example, of A. Papandreou in Greece or Peron in Argentina; Karamanlis' father-figure-like personality resembles more that of De Gaulle in France and Adenauer in post-war West Germany.

142: As Clogg R., op. cit., p. 159, writes,

"The parliamentary group [under Karamanlis' leadership] of ND scarcely acted as a collective organ. During the first two years after the 1974 elections, it had only seven

meetings, with Karamanlis himself being present at only five of them. Moreover, the meetings scarcely resulted in a dialogue between the party leader and the parliamentary party" (in English originally).

143: The question was "In your opinion, what were ND's greatest achievements while the party was (a) in government? and (b) in opposition?", and the 158 party members of the sample were allowed to give more than one reply. For their answers on ND's achievements in the opposition, see below in this chapter.

144: See Tsatsos C., The Unknown Karamanlis, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1984 (in Greek), p. 91.

145: The fact that everybody in ND, including Karamanlis himself, felt certain Averoff would win the election for the leadership (as Rallis clearly implies in his book Hours of Responsibility, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-15), and Rallis' surprising and very narrow victory (88 votes to 84) resulted in Averoff refusing to co-operate with Rallis in any way during the latter's seventeen months as party leader and premier. Averoff could never accept his defeat, and ceaselessly opposed and undermined Rallis, causing the latter to remark bitterly:

"I am expected to lead ND to electoral victory while being challenged by my political opponent [A. Papandreou] and, at the same time, attacked from behind as well as from all sides".

Ibid, p. 278.

146: Since the major issue at the time was the forthcoming election and the anticipated rise of PASOK, Rallis consulted exclusively with the council of ministers and with ND's parliamentary group, and not with the higher non-parliamentary party organs, which continued to play a nominal role.

147: See Article 53.1 in The Constitution of Greece, *op. cit.*, p. 103; it is worth mentioning that the 1977-1981 Greek parliament was the first such assembly to achieve the completion of the whole four-year term since 1946.

148: On these events, see footnote 68 to this chapter.

149: Today, Andreas Papandreou is the only, and perhaps the last Greek political leader who may be compared to Karamanlis in terms of his charismatic personality and the all-powerful position he has always enjoyed in PASOK —despite the full and effective organisational development of his party. On his powers and special position, see Spourdalakis M., *op. cit.*, pp. 123-64.

150: See Clogg R., *op. cit.*, p. 165.

151: See Diamandakos P., *op. cit.*, p. 184. ND's turn to the right under Averoff's leadership became very pronounced during the 1982 municipal election, when the party supported, or even co-operated with, several junta candidates. In Piraeus in particular, ND chose not to nominate a candidate of its own (although it did so for Athens and Salonica), and so left its supporters the choice of voting either for the respective candidates of PASOK and the Left, or for the

"independent" Skylitsis, who had been appointed mayor of Piraeus by the colonels' junta; *ibid*, p. 217.

152: For ND participation in such ceremonies, and speeches by its deputies and members in memory of the civil war, see the daily newspaper *Ethnos* of 5 December 1982, of 22 November and 4 December 1983; for ND's withdrawal from the parliament chamber, see *Ethnos*, 18 August 1982.

153: See Bakoyiannis P., *Black and White*, Athens: Kaktos, 1983 (in Greek), p. 33. Paul Bakoyiannis was the son-in-law of today's ND leader C. Mitsotakis and from November 1985 until October 1987 his political counsellor; in June 1989 he was elected MP for ND in the Department of Evrytania, and four months later, on 26 September 1989, assassinated in Athens by the so-called "17 November" terrorist organisation.

154: See Diamandakos P., *op. cit.*, p. 148, saying that the second party congress will certainly be held exactly as stipulated by the 1979 statutes. See also Clogg R., *op. cit.*, p. 165, where the author gives an example of Averoff's contempt of the higher party organs and internal party democracy,

"...when he summarily expelled an MP from the party [who had openly called for a party conference to discuss the leadership issue] with a despatch worthy of Papandreou himself" (in English originally).

155: See Clogg R., *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6; see also footnote 82 to this chapter.

156: Like the previous internal party election for the leadership, this one too was not fought on ideological issues. Most ND deputies voted for Mitsotakis less because he belonged to the liberal camp, but because of his formidable political skills; they considered him the only man capable of defeating Papandreou and leading their party to power in the forthcoming 1985 national election. See also Papandreou A., *Democracy at Gunpoint*, Athens: Karanassis, 1974 (in Greek), p. 37, where he wrote:

"This tall and ruthless Cretan is my Number One enemy, who has woven the threads of our tragedy —Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis".

When Mitsotakis became the ND leader, Papandreou did not hesitate to publicly call him *Ephialtes* —the name of the traitor who betrayed the Greeks to the Persians at the pass of Thermopylae in 480 B.C.; see Clogg R., *op. cit.*, p. 170.

157: Both the facts and reasons for, during and after the July 1965 political crisis that led to this large-scale defection and the eventual imposition of the military dictatorship are still shrouded in uncertainty (for a brief presentation, see section 3.2 in ch. 1). For more details, see (all works in Greek): Diamandopoulos T., *Mitsotakis C.: A Political Biography*, (Vol. 2: 1961-1974: From the "relentless struggle" to the dictatorship), Athens: Papazissis, 1989; Papandreou A., *op. cit.*; Papadimitriou N., *From the Centre Union to Apostasy*, Athens: Roes, 1986; Paraskevopoulos P., *George Papandreou*, Athens: Typos, 1988; and Leondaritis G. A., *Between the Two Extremes: The Course of the Centre, 1946-1967*, Athens: Estia, 1992. Suffice it to mention here that, regardless of where the truth may lie, C. Mitsotakis has ever since been stigmatised as the politician chiefly responsible for these events.

158: Nevertheless, Mitsotakis' position was not affected; immediately after the election he resigned the leadership, and was re-elected quite easily at the expense of Stephanopoulos, who left ND and, together with another nine ND deputies formed the Democratic Renewal (DIANA); see Clogg R., op. cit., p. 169.

159: In the June and November 1989 elections, ND emerged clearly victorious but did not manage to secure an absolute majority in parliament; in consequence, after the June 1989 election it formed a coalition government with the Alliance of the Left and Progress (SYN, which consisted mainly of the Communist Party of Greece and the Euro-communists' splinter group, the Greek Left —EAR, as this Communist Party of the Interior has been renamed). After the November 1989 election ND, PASOK and SYN supported a national unity government which consisted of politically neutral, non-parliamentarian technocrats. Finally, in April 1990 ND secured 151 of the 300 seats in parliament, and could form a one-party government. On the ND-SYN coalition government, which was the outcome of anything but ideological convergence, see below, ch. 5.

160: The question was: "In terms of internal democratic procedures in the decision-making process, do you think that the ND leadership differs from that of the other parties, and, if yes, in what way?"

161: A. Papandreou was also elected by his party's rank and file during PASOK's second congress in 1990, though not in a secret ballot but *viva voce*.

CHAPTER FIVE

1: Quoted in Loulis J. C., "The Greek conservative movement in transition: From paternalism to neo-liberalism", in the The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S., Athens: Centre for Political Research and Information, International Symposium, May 1981, p. 17. (Henceforth, all quotations are in our own translation from the original Greek, unless otherwise stated).

2: See Lomverdos J., "'A new proposal for freedom': The Liberal face of ND", in Epikentra, no. 43, March-April 1985 (in Greek), pp. 44-50.

3: The term "ideologification" of political life was first used by Loulis J. C. in his "ND and ideology: How the battle of ideas was lost, and how it can be won", in Epikentra, no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983 (in Greek), pp. 25-34, where he argues that

"ND's electoral gains were not an outcome of any predominance of the liberal ideas over socialist ones —and, unfortunately, this point has never been quite understood by the party... So, the ideological predominance of the Left during the 1974-1981 years finally became its absolute domination over the Right in 1981".

4: As we have already discussed in ch. 2 (section 2.2), elaboration and voting on the 9 June 1975 Constitution was the work of the New Democracy party exclusively; while there was a PASOK amendmend to it in 1986, this concerned only the special powers vested in the president. For a very detailed and comprehensive presentation of numerous issues related to the Constitution (Karamanlis' 1963 reform proposal, the 1975 Constitution, the amendmends proposed —but not voted in— by PASOK and the Communist Party, and the reformed 1986 Constitution), see The Constitution of Greece, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1987 (in Greek).

5: As the constitution is, for the most part, very similar to the 1949 West German one (with the notable exception of the part dealing with the powers of the president, where the Gaullist influence of the Fifth French Republic is manifest), for these special Articles see also Hrbek R., "Patterns of the West German policy and public policy strategies: Experiences and prospects", in The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S., op. cit., pp. 247-68.

6: See Clogg R., Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987, pp. 63 and 155.

7: Ideological vagueness, strongly reminiscent of ERE, was noticeable immediately. In a pre-election adress to the people of Athens Karamanlis had said on 27 October 1963:

"ERE is a new party, an outcome of national necessity, because the people have been trying to get rid of the old political formations. ERE has responded to these popular aspirations, because it is not a party of the Right, Centre or Left, but a party of progress."

See the political review Anti, Period B', no. 82, 15 October 1977 (in Greek), p. 4.

8: For all these points, see Appendix I.

9: See The Constitution of Greece, op. cit., mainly Articles 4, 5, 17.1 and 106.2, pp. 164-221.

10: Ibid, Article 106.1, p. 220.

11: See Kallias C. M., ND's Ideology, Athens: author's publication, March 1976 (in Greek), p. 5; see also the same author's New Democracy: Its Political Outlook and its Position in the Political Spectrum, Athens: ND Publication, July 1977, and also his Radical Liberalism, Athens: ND Publication, 1980 (both in Greek).

12: See Loulis J. C., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 19; for a detailed discussion of ND's economic policies see below in this chapter.

13: See 1st Preliminary Congress of the Party: Minutes, vols A'+B', Chalkidiki, 2-4 April 1977 (in Greek), ND Publication, pp. 21-8 (hereafter 1977 Preliminary Congress); all quotations in the preceding paragraph are from Karamanlis' address at that congress.

14: See New Democracy: First Congress, Minutes, Chalkidiki, 5-7 May 1979 (in Greek), ND Publication, pp. 16-23 (hereafter 1979 Congress); here again, all quotations are from Karamanlis' speech to that congress.

15: Here we concern ourselves only with Karamanlis' major arguments; for a detailed presentation, see Appendix IV in this study (which gives a translated version of Karamanlis' speech, referring only to ND's ideological principles). By and large, the parts of Karamanlis' two speeches (to the preliminary and to the first congress) that refer to ND's ideology are almost identical. The only change—of rather minor importance—is the order of the six principles: whereas the party's belief in the peaceful coexistence of peoples was placed last in 1977, it was put second in 1979.

16: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement and New Democracy: From past to present", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), Political Change in Greece: Before and After The Colonels, London: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 97. According to Katsoudas, this characterisation refers to the 1977 ideological principles; but since no major changes were made in 1979, we think its use here justified.

17: Ibid, p. 99, and also 1979 Congress, op. cit., p. 23.

18: See Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 62; see also the same author's "Liberalism in ND's political philosophy: An analysis of Karamanlis' speech", in Epikentra, no. 8, May-June 1979 (in Greek), pp. 29-40.

19: For the so-called Karamanliist political legacy, see section 4.3 in ch. 3; see also footnote 76 to ch. 3.

20: See Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., p. 61, and also footnote 44 to ch. 4 above. When Karamanlis

was still the head of ND, major criticism came only from the opposition, who refused to let him and ND monopolise nation-mindedness again, as he had done when leading ERE before the 1967 coup.

21: See Loulis J. C., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 20. Notwithstanding the obvious similarities with the respective nationalistic doctrines of ERE, which —together with passionate anti-communism— had served as the party's ideological cloak at the time, the reason why Karamanlis exalted these ideas in the period after 1974 was not, we think, because he meant to enforce a policy based on means of domination ensuring exclusive and authoritarian political control; his emphasis was probably due rather to the friction caused by his own dual role as both party and nation leader (for this point, see section 2 in ch. 3). After all, Karamanlis personally may well have wished to stay above and beyond party-political squabbles; New Democracy certainly did not.

22: For example, one fails to understand how and to what extent exactly ND was unlike other parties —say the Union of the Democratic Centre (EDIK) or the Party of Democratic Socialism (KODISO, or even PASOK, at least during its term in office (when it was in opposition, it fiercely opposed the country's entry into the EEC).

23: See Liapis M., For a Radical Renewal, Athens: Estia, 1987 (in Greek), p. 190.

24: See Kallias C. M., ND's Ideology, op. cit., p. 84.

25: This view was expressed by minister of co-ordination, P. Papaligouras on 16 November 1975, and it is quoted in Loulis J. C., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 20.

26: Speech of the minister of national defence, E. Averoff, in Patras, published in the daily newspaper Kathimerini, 24 April 1977; see also his interview with the daily newspaper Apogevmatini, 15 October 1977 (quoted in Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., p. 60).

27: Quoted in Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or liberalism: Evolution of ND's ideology", pp. 215-30, in Liberalism in Greece: Liberal Theory and Practice in Greek Society and Politics, (papers presented in an International Scientific Assembly organised in Delphi by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, September 1990), Athens: Estia, 1991 (in Greek).

28: See Kallias C. M., ND's Ideology, op. cit., p. 18. It is also important to note that ND's political platform for the 1974 election explicitly stated that "personal well-being depends on state measures and not on the development of private initiative"; see Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or liberalism: ...", op. cit., p. 216.

29: See, for example, Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or liberalism: ...", op. cit., pp. 225-7.

30: See N. Papadimitos' speech in the preliminary congress, "Some functional and organisational problems of the party", in 1977 Preliminary Congress, op. cit., pp. 96-7.

31: See V. Polydoros' speech in the preliminary congress, "Dissemination of ND's ideological principles", ibid, pp. 101-4; also D.

Sioufas' speech, "Organisational efforts and dissemination of ideology", ibid, pp. 104-9.

32: See C. Laskaris' speech in the first congress, "ND and the working people", in 1979 Congress, op. cit., pp. 133-42.

33: See Kolmer C., "The Greek economy at a crucial turning-point: Political reality versus social aspirations", in The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S., op. cit., pp. 285-314.

34: See Evert M., Karamanlis: The Reformer, Athens: author's publication, 1987 (in Greek), pp. 131-60; Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 92; and Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., pp. 65-6.

35: See Kolmer C., "The Greek economy...", op. cit., p. 295, where he claims that "In actual fact, however, public expenditure in Greece is much greater than the official figures indicate" (in English originally). According to Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., p. 66, public expenditure reached 60 per cent of GNP in 1981.

36: See Vaitzos K. and Yiannitsis T., Technological Transformation and Economic Development, Athens: Gutenberg, 1987 (in Greek), p. 51.

37: For the "sociomania of the Right", see Lampsas J., The Greek Nomenclature: The Privileged of Power, Athens: Roes, 1985, pp. 103-8, and also ND-PASOK: Two Parties, Two Programmes, Two Ways of Life, Athens: Centre of Political Research and Information, 1981, pp. 22-6; for a defense of these policies, see Papaligouras A., Arguments of Doubt, Athens: Odysseas, 1986, pp. 11-9 (all in Greek).

38: See Karamanlis' speech to the first congress, in 1979 Congress, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

39: See Evert M., in Nea Poreia, 16 June 1980 (in Greek), quoted in Christidis C., "How liberal is ND's economic policy?", in Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), pp. 112-8. See also Averoff E., Change: Yes, PASOK: No, The Bait of the "Green Change", Athens: author's publication, 1981 (in Greek), and especially the chapter "What is left for nationalisation?", pp. 53-6.

40: The data presented in Table V.1 are compiled from Kolmer C., "The Greek economy...", op. cit., p. 298, and from Georgiou A. P., "Fourteen—not seven— years of socialism in Greece", in Politiki Epopteia, no. 138, October 1988 (in Greek), p. 20.

41: See Kolmer C., "The Greek economy...", op. cit., p. 300. At this point it should be stressed that one should not be left with the impression that the expansion of the state sector happened during that specific period and expressed a deliberate policy of the ND government; on the contrary, state intervention in general and nationalisations in particular started as early as 1830 and spanned over a very long period (on these points see Mouzelis' analyses in his Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1978, 2nd edition: 1979). As far as ND is concerned, it enforced the same policies but in an *ad-hoc* manner, responding to political as well as to economic reasons; the former refer to the threat posed to ND by the radicalisation of broad popular masses after 1974 (see ch. 2 above), and the latter to the inability/

unwillingness of the private sector to step in and take the lead, as we shall see below in this section.

42: See Kolmer C., "Why the attack against expansion of the state sector has intensified. The painful reality", in Epikentra, no. 20, May-June 1981 (in Greek), pp. 21-3.

43: For all these points, see Christidis C., "How liberal is ND's economic policy?", op. cit., p. 115.

44: See Loulis J. C., in The Athenian, February 1984, p. 14, quoted in Katsoudas D. K., "The media: The state and broadcasting", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), op. cit., pp. 189-213; see also Loulis J. C., "The Greek conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 23, where he argues that

"...state control of the radio and television networks restricted the free flow of ideas on the airwaves, and inevitably reinforced the tendency to create a 'personality cult' around the leader" (in English originally).

45: According to Kolmer C., "The Greek economy...", op. cit., p. 309, "...the hidden economy generates a total income equal to 25% of the gross national product at factor cost" (in English originally).

46: All this information is taken from a study by Kolmer C., Tsoris N., and Christidis C., Tackling the Country's Economic Problem: The Supply Side, Athens: Centre of Political Research and Information, 1980 (in Greek), quoted in Loulis J. C., "New Democracy: The new face of conservatism", op. cit., p. 67, where it is argued that

"...the study also observed that lack of investment was due (among other reasons) to ND's unstable economic policy and to industrialists' caution after a policy which encouraged widespread nationalisations" (in English originally).

47: See Rallis' interview with the newspaper Vradini, 13 July 1981 (reprinted and distributed by ND in the same month, author's records).

48: This phrase was used by ND founding member and one of Karamanlis' closest colleagues P. Lambrias; see his "Mid-way between", in Epikentra, no. 34, Sep.-Oct. 1983 (in Greek), pp. 22-4.

49: Let us recall the same phenomenon taking place under the government of ERE; see section 2.2.3 in ch. 1, and also footnotes 169 and 170 to that same chapter.

50: See Delipetros N., "Ideological obsolescence of Liberalism", in Politika Themata, 18 November 1983 (in Greek), p. 9, quoted in Lampsas J., op. cit., pp. 104-5.

51: See section 2.2.3 in ch. 1 above, and especially footnote 164 to that chapter.

52: See The Political Views of C. Karamanlis. From his Speeches and Statements, July 1974-May 1976, Athens: ND Publication, 1977 (in Greek), p. 23.

53: See Kartakis E., C. Karamanlis' Epigrammatic Phrases, Athens: Roes, 1986 (in Greek), p. 104. For a detailed account of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Greece, Turkey and Cyprus from an American point of view, see Sterns M. (U.S. ambassador in Greece, 1981-1985), Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1992 (in Greek).

54: Quoted in Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), p. 117.

55: See The Political Views of C. Karamanlis, *op. cit.*, p. 23, and also Evert M., Karamanlis: The Reformer, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-6.

56: See Bitsios D., minister of foreign affairs in the first (1974-1977) ND government, Beyond the Borders: 1974-1977, Athens: Estia, 1983 (in Greek) p. 139.

57: For a detailed account on these issues and events, see Koufoudakis V., "Greek foreign policy 1945-1985: Seeking independence in an interdependent world - Problems and prospects", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 230-52 (and particularly pp. 235-40, where the author refers to the ND 1974-81 era). See also Tsardanidis C., "The foreign policy of ND, 1974-1981", in Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), pp. 120-31; for an inside comment, see Bitsios D., *op. cit.*

58: Political relations with the then six-member EEC had started on 8 June 1959, when Greece became the first country to apply for an Association Agreement, which was finally signed in Athens two years later (9 July 1961). This agreement, seen by the government as "a way to defuse the internal and external communist danger", came into effect on 1 November 1962, and provided for a ten-year transitional period before full-membership status, while the Greek economy attempted to reach a level acceptable by EEC standards. Due to the military dictatorship, the Association Agreement was suspended, to be reactivated in December 1974; see Verney S., "Greece and the European Community", in Featherstone K. and Katsoudas D. K. (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 253-70, and also section 2.2.3 in ch. 1.

59: See Papandreou's opening speech to the 1977 parliament, quoted in Lyrintzis C., Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Ph.D thesis, University of London, LSE, November 1983, p. 214.

60: Quoted in Bitsios D., *op. cit.*, p. 123.

61: Quoted in Kartakis E., *op. cit.*, pp. 105-6. In 1982, ND's Euro-parliamentary group officially joined the European Parliament's European People's Party, a federation of the Christian-democratic parties of the European Community; see Giannakou-Koutsikou M., "ND as a partner in a federation of European parties", in New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, Thessaloniki: 14-16 February 1986 (in Greek), ND Publication, pp. 189-93, and also Efsthathopoulos S., "Euro-elections and the European political groupings", in Epikentra, no. 38, May-June 1984 (in Greek), pp. 61-75.

62: For most of these arguments, see Tsardanidis C., *op. cit.*, pp. 129-30, where he says that

"Karamanlis --aided by his counsellor Ambassador P.

Molyviatis, and also by the Ambassadors V. Theodoropoulos and J. Tzounis, both experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the ministers E. Averoff, G. Rallis, D. Bitsios and, lastly, C. Mitsotakis— can be said to be the predominant, if not exclusive, centre of power as regards decision-making in foreign policy."

It should be added here that when PASOK took office in October 1981, and during its whole seven-year period in power, premier Papandreou followed exactly Karamanlis' practices concerning decision-making in foreign policy; the same holds also true for Mitsotakis, since ND returned to office in April 1990. For the latter's criticisms on secret diplomacy, see Papadopoulou S., "ND's positions on Greek foreign policy (1981-1988)", in Nea Koinoniologia, no. 5, Spring 1989 (in Greek), pp. 132-40.

63: On these points, see sections 3.2 and 4 in ch. 4.

64: See Christidis C., "How liberal is ND's economic policy?", op. cit., p. 116.

65: See Loverdos J., "The sacrilegious manifesto", in the monthly review Flash, no. 1, April 1992 (in Greek), p. 33.

66: Eventually, the election was held four months earlier, on 2 June 1985, on the grounds that the new parliament would be entitled to modify certain clauses of the 1975 Constitution (more specifically, those referring to the special powers vested to the President of the Republic).

67: For all this information, see Loverdos J., "Facing the elections: The electoral strategy of New Democracy", in Epikentra, no. 43, March-April 1985 (in Greek), pp. 4-7.

68: Ibid.

69: See Markou L., "KPEE: An 'ideology-plant of the Right'", in the political review Anti, Period B', no. 58, 13 November 1976 (in Greek), pp. 8-10.

70: See P. Stratos' interview with the political review Politiki Epopsteia, no. 114, July-August 1986 (in Greek), pp. 3-7.

71: See introduction to The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S., op. cit., pp. vii-viii.

72: See Clogg R., op. cit., p. 170. It should be remembered that T. Louis, the KPEE first president, was ND's director-general and later a member of its first administrative committee; the same holds true for another KPEE founding member, S. Stratigis (see also footnote 29 to ch. 4). Moreover, several other KPEE members were prominent non-parliamentary ND officials like, for example, L. Kyriakopoulos (technical advisor to the prime minister); P. Stratos, KPEE's second president (industrialist, relative of ND's minister of industry, C. Stratos); S. Marketos (secretary-general of the ministry of health); and J. Loulis, KPEE's research manager (ND's scientific counsellor).

73: Ibid., p. 158.

74: For the Liberal Forum faction and its ideological doctrines, see section 4.3 in ch. 3.

75: A translated version of the manifesto "A New Proposal for Freedom" is given in Appendix V of this study. (All excerpts in the text are from this manifesto, and the translation is mine). Another translated version can be found in Clogg R., op. cit., pp. 228-33.

76: As already discussed, this was only partly true; as Clogg R., op. cit., p. 167, argues, "...PASOK's conduct in this respect was essentially the mirror-image of that of the unreconstructed Right during the 1950s and early 1960s" (in English originally), and also of that of ND during its post-1974 terms in office.

77: It is worth mentioning that this was the first time that ND advocated equality of chances instead of equality of results, a fact that in the past had caused great confusion concerning the party's ideological identity, namely whether ND was a centre-right or a social-democratic party; see Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or liberalism: ...", op. cit., p. 228.

78: Let us recall at this point that this definition of ND's radicalism —originating from Karamanlis' speech to the 1979 congress— had caused considerable confusion among prominent ND members, and led one of them to argue that

"although ND is not, at least until now, a socialist party, it does not hesitate to adopt and implement socialist measures when these are useful, devoid of adverse consequences, and applicable to the national economy";

see section 2.1 above, and footnote 28 to this chapter.

79: See Louverdos J., "'A new proposal for freedom': The liberal face of ND", op. cit., p. 44, who argues that

"When, on 3 February 1985, ND president C. Mitsotakis announced to the Greek people the ideological declaration "A New Proposal for Freedom", very few indeed realized the specific importance of this fact. We were not dealing here with a simple clarification of ND's ideology, but actually face-to-face with a liberal ideological revolution, similar to those in the U.S., in Britain, and other Western countries during the last few years."

See also Christidis C., "ND's ideological declaration: An inspired text", in Epikentra, no. 43, March-April 1985 (in Greek), pp. 51-7.

80: See Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or liberalism: ...", op. cit., p. 227.

81: See Clogg R., op. cit., and also Appendix IIC, which shows the back cover of a party-propaganda leaflet, distributed shortly before the June 1985 election.

82: See New Democracy: A Liberal Leader, a Liberal Policy-Programme, Athens: ND Publication (election brochure, author's records), 1985 (in Greek), p. 3, where Mitsotakis declares: "I was, I am, and I will always be a Liberal"; the same brochure stressed his family connection with the

great liberal leader E. Venizelos on both his parents' sides, and also his own personal career as a prominent centrist politician from 1946 until 1967.

83: For a presentation of ND's economic programme, see Meletakos P., "ND's economic programme: Priority for Greece", in Epikentra, no. 43, March-April 1985 (in Greek), pp. 34-8, and ND Parliamentary Group (Office of Economic Studies), Information Bulletin: Developments and Perspectives of the Greek Economy, Athens: ND Publication, March 1986 (in Greek). For recognition of past mistakes, see for instance ND Election Committee, General Guidance for the Speeches of MPs and Party Officials, Athens: ND Publication, May 1985 (in Greek), pp. 14-5, where party speakers are asked to stress

"ND's future pursuits rather than past events. Of course, reference should be made to ND's past governmental achievements, but at the same time it should be emphasised that ND has learnt from its mistakes".

84: See Louverdos J., "'A new proposal for freedom': The liberal face of ND", op. cit., p. 48.

85: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 101; Katsoudas had succeeded Loulis as director of KPEE's research department, and in this case his information is based on data from opinion polls carried out by KPEE and published in Epikentra, no. 44, May-June 1985 (in Greek), p. 26.

86: See Loulis J. C., "Causes and patterns of the 1985 elections in Greece: First conclusions", in Epikentra, no. 44, May-June 1985 (in Greek), pp. 4-29.

87: See Loulis J. C. and Louverdos J., "New Democracy and the elections: Preliminary considerations", ibid., p. 62.

88: For more details on the creation of DIANA and its criticism of ND, see section 4.3 in ch. 3.

89: See Christidis C., "How liberal is ND's economic policy?", op. cit., p. 117, and also Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 102, where he argues that

"The very strong belief of the rank and file in victory made them prone to the discovery of scapegoats soon after the 1985 election defeat. 'Excessive' liberalism was said to be the problem by those who had never read the opinion polls which identified the problem as ND's credibility, though its ideas certainly appeared attractive" (in English originally).

In an attempt to appease and re-unite the greatly disappointed and angry party base, the ND leadership claimed that the 1985 election had been marred by fraud and violence, but it never managed to prove this allegation.

90: See Mitsotakis' speech in the second congress, in New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, Thessaloniki: 14-16 February 1986 (in Greek), ND Publication, pp. 36-74.

91: Ibid., p. 57; see also Evert M., National Choices, Athens:

author's publication, 1986 (in Greek), p. 19, where he argues that

"placing the epithet 'liberal' in front of the party's title has been basically correct, but it has been a mistake not to stress the political and social dimension of liberalism."

92: See Mitsotakis's speech in the second congress, in New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, op. cit., p. 67.

93: See ND: Ideological Principles-Party Statutes, Athens: ND Publication, 1979 (in Greek), pp. 7-14; see also footnote 77 to ch. 3.

94: See Katsoudas D. K., "The conservative movement...", op. cit., p. 102, and Christidis C., "How liberal is ND's economic policy?", op. cit., p. 117.

95: For all these points, see Lambrias P., "The issue of ideology", in New Democracy: Second Congress, Minutes, op. cit., p. 103.

96: A translated version of ND's ideological principles as they were sanctioned by the second congress in February 1986 —that is, a translated but shortened version of Lambrias' speech, "The issue of ideology", op. cit., pp. 100-8, and also ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, Athens: ND Publication, 1986 (in Greek), pp. 3-8— is presented in Appendix VI. (All following excerpts in the text are from this speech and the translations are mine).

97: After the 1986 congress, eight separate secretariats and eight special offices were established; the secretariat in charge of the party programme was headed by the ND deputy G. Souflias (for details on these issues see section 3.3 in ch. 4).

98: The secretariat for policy proposals elaborated and published the following (all in Greek, by ND in Athens): ND: Policy Proposals for the Farmers, April 1987; ND: Policy Proposals for Sport, May 1987; ND: Policy Proposals for the Economy, June 1987; ND: Policy Proposals for Shipping, September 1987; ND: Policy Proposals for National Health, October 1987; ND: Policy Proposals for the Civil Service and Local Government, December 1987; ND: Policy Proposals for Tourism, May 1988; and ND: Policy Proposals for Education, February 1989.

99: See ND: Policy Proposals for the Economy, op. cit.; it is also important to note that ND policy proposals on all issues were based on the Proposition of ND's General Policy Programme, elaborated and submitted by the programme committee to the second party congress for discussion and approval (Thessaloniki, February 1986, in Greek, ND's print-out for internal party circulation, author's records), where (p. I) it is stated:

"This plan —after its discussion, eventual amendments and final approval by the second congress— will become the constitutional charter of ND's policies concerning national and public life, the economy and the social organisation and formation. It will, therefore, become the general policy programme of our party, on which all special governmental programmes will be based, being consistent with it and with whatever situation prevails at the time."

100: See ND: Policy Proposals for the Economy, op. cit., pp. 5-9.

101: Ibid, pp. 7-8.

102: Ibid, pp. 10-1.

103: Ibid, p. 11.

104: Ibid, p. 12.

105: Ibid, pp. 48-9.

106: See Katsoudas D. K., "Conservatism and/or liberalism: ...", op. cit., pp. 229-30.

107: See Mitsotakis' interview in Epikentra, no. 55, December 1987 (in Greek), pp. 6-7; see also the official party brochure, Let's Share Some Thoughts Together, Athens: ND Publication (author's records), November-December 1988 (in Greek), where it is stated that "ND is not the same today as it was", and similar arguments are presented.

108: During the days of this government, parliament unanimously approved a bill abolishing all social discrimination originating from the civil war; ND leader C. Mitsotakis acknowledged publicly that it had been a grave mistake for ND to withdraw from parliament in August 1982 in boycott of the recognition of the National Resistance movement that was voted in by only PASOK and the Left during Averoff's leadership; see footnote 152 to ch. 4 and the newspaper Ta Nea, 31 August 1989 (in Greek), p. 12.

109: See Evert M., National Choices, op. cit., p. 5, and pp. 19-20; the same views are shared by ND deputy P. Sarlis, in his Ideology and New Politics, Athens: Politika Themata Publications, 1985 (in Greek). See also Tsouderou V., "Social liberalism: Searching for new solutions", in the newspaper Kathimerini, 8 November 1987, p. 4; and Hatzigakis S., "Social liberalism: The solution to our political deadlock", in the newspaper Kathimerini, 6 December 1987, p. 4, (both in Greek).

110: Most prominent among them are Papaligouras A., Arguments of Doubt, op. cit., and Liapis M., For a Radical Renewal, op. cit.

111: See Andrianopoulos A., Change of Vector, Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1984 (in Greek), p. 107; for a very detailed presentation of neo-liberal positions, and for a critique of ND in that respect, see also the same author's The Triumph of Democratic Capitalism, Athens: Libro, 1988, and This Is Liberalism, Athens: Libro, 1988 (both in Greek).

112: See Kanellopoulos A., For A New Ethos in Politics, Athens: ND Publication, June 1988 (in Greek), p. 11.

113: More specifically, ND has at times been seen as a liberal, and at other times as a neo-liberal party; although the more numerous liberals accepted state intervention in the economy, they failed to define when and how, so giving the impression that this was to be decided *ad hoc* for each case separately; the neo-liberals, on the other hand, who were advocating the tenets of classical liberalism, demanded that the state should not exceed its role of night-watchman.

114: See Hrbek R., "Patterns of the West German policy and public

policy strategies: Experiences and prospects", *op. cit.*, p. 255.

115: See Mouzelis N., "Neo-liberalism and development: Realities and myths", in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 6 September 1987 (in Greek), pp. 30-1. This article caused prominent ND member A. Andrianopoulos to argue that,

"This time, without pretenses, with historical knowledge and consideration of all relative information, it is state intervention as such that is to blame, and not the quality of its functioning".

See his "'Neo-liberalism' and capitalism: Development without the state", in To Vima, 20 September 1987, p. 45, and also Mouzelis' reply, "How useful is state intervention?", in To Vima, 25 October 1987, p. 12. On the relation between state and market in general, and in the Greek case in particular, see also N. Mouzelis' following articles (all in To Vima, and all in Greek): "Unemployment and state intervention", 5 February 1989, p. 10; "The end of the Thatcherite miracle", 11 February 1990, p. 24; "Greece marginalised: Who is to blame?", 30 December 1990, pp. 6-7; "Institutions and political culture", 23 August 1992, pp. 10-1; and "The future belongs to the modernisers", 30 August 1992, pp. 8-9.

116: The question was "Which of the following party labels would you choose to identify ND today?", and the party members were allowed to give more than one answer; all following Tables in this section compile data from research in the Department of Larissa, a few months before the June 1989 election. For more details, see ch. 6 and Appendix VIII.

117: As we have already seen when examining the party's organisation, the rank and file never considered the elaboration of ideological principles one of ND's greatest achievements, whether the party was in office or in opposition (see Tables IV.5 and IV.6 in ch. 4).

118: Let us recall that —as ND itself officially acknowledged— one of the reasons for loosing the 1985 election, was the party's failure to elucidate its liberal ideology and to stress the social welfare side of its programme; see above, section 3.2 and footnote 91 to this chapter.

119: When C. Stephanopoulos left the party to form DIANA in September 1985, he became the first to accuse ND of abandoning the working people; for details see section 4.3 in ch. 3. On the other hand, although PASOK leader, A. Papandreou has always denied that PASOK was representing a particular class, he did state that it

"embraces all non-privileged Greeks: farmers, workers, employees, craftsmen, the youth, all who are subject to odious exploitation by modern monopoly capital, local as well as foreign" (in English originally).

See the daily newspaper Athinaiki, 29 October 1975, quoted in Lyrintzis C., *op. cit.*, p. 220.

120: For a detailed account of the pre-election period, and for all events that led to the formation of the ND-SYN coalition government, see The Political Year 1989, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1989 (in Greek), pp. 11-55. It should be noted that almost three years before the formation of this coalition government, the two political camps had unofficially converged: it was during the 1986 municipal election, when for the first time since 1974 ND candidates M. Evert, S. Kouvelas, and

A. Andrianopoulos won in the three biggest cities (Athens, Salonica and Piraeus respectively); in each case this happened during the second round, when a considerable part of the communist voters switched to the respective ND candidate, instead of the PASOK one, as they had always done before in such cases. As an analyst wrote concerning the 1986 election:

"...both the liberal conservative camp, as well as the KKE, did convince us that they have got rid of a double-faced syndrome: the former, of anti-communism, ...the latter of the latent fear that the Right may sometime come back into power... Messrs Evert and Andrianopoulos, both of them advocating renewal, ...managed to give their party a new image that has been favourably accepted well beyond party-political confines. This becomes evident from the second-round election results, where some 16 per cent of the communist voters voted not for PASOK, but for the candidates of its rival party. It is hardly necessary to mention that the blank, and invalidated ballot papers, and the abstentions, all meant approval of ND."

The article was written by a special election analyst, who remained anonymous, "KKE: First signs of a new face", in Epikentra, no. 51-52, Autumn 1986 (in Greek), pp. 40-1, and also the same author's "Municipal elections 1986", ibid, pp. 5-10.

121: Without getting into much detail, it should be noted that the June 1989 election was fought mainly over the issue of an economic scandal, concerning the illegal activities of a private bank and its owner. It was not without effect on PASOK, because some of its most prominent members, including Andreas Papandreou himself, were charged with personal responsibility for first creating and fostering, and then concealing this case, with embezzlement of huge amounts of money, and with having accepted bribes. The ND/SYN parliamentary majority finally sent five PASOK members to the Special Supreme Court: A. Papandreou, A. Koutsogiorgas (former minister to the prime minister), D. Tsovolas (former minister of finance), G. Petsos (former minister of industry), and P. Roumeliotis (former minister of national economy). The trial started in March 1990 and ended in December of the same year, and in the course of it Koutsogiorgas died in the court room; Roumeliotis had been elected a Euro-MP and was never tried, Tsovolas and Petsos were given in minor sentences (found guilty not of bribery or embezzlement, but of minor bureaucratic misdeeds of the civil services under their supervision), whereas Papandreou was declared innocent and cleared of all charges.

122: See Karamanlis' speech to ND's parliamentary group, made on 30 September 1977, one month before the October 1977 national election; quoted in the political review Anti, Period B', no. 82, 15 October 1977 (in Greek), p. 4.

123: See Delipetros N., "A political and ethical deviation", in Politika Themata, no. 749, 6 October 1989 (in Greek), pp. 8-9. See also the editorial of a pro-ND daily newspaper, Eleftheros Typos, 4 September 1989 (in Greek), p. 5, where it is similarly argued that "the coexistence of ND and SYN within the Tzannetakis' government was necessary to neutralise PASOK and, of course, the specific election result".

124: For these points and for the Italian model in general, see

Berlinguer E., Historical Compromise, Athens: Themelio, 1977 (in Greek). See also Gundle S., "The PCI and the historic compromise", in New Left Review, no. 163, May-June 1987, pp. 27-35, and Abse T., "A reply to Gundle", in New Left Review, no. 163, May-June 1987, pp. 36-8.

125: See Efthymiou P., "The 'cordial understanding' is seriously tested", in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 1 October 1989 (in Greek), p. 13. For a leftist view on the Greek model of historic compromise see Androulakis M., Meta, Athens: Nea Synora, 1992 (in Greek), and Filinis C., "The causes of a spiral course: A reply to Androulakis", in the daily newspaper Eleftherotypia, 20 December 1992 (in Greek), p. 22.

126: For a much more detailed analysis and presentation of these points, see Mouzelis N., "Will ND and SYN collaborate in the future?", in the weekly newspaper To Vima, 1 October 1989 (in Greek), pp. 12-3. For adversary views, see Veltsos G., "Sophistry", in the daily newspaper Ta Nea, 7 October 1989, p. 38, and also Georgoulas C., "Inter-class investigations and theoretical inconsistencies", in the weekly newspaper I Epochi, 8 October 1989, p. 10 (both in Greek).

127: See Varvitsiotis' interview with the daily newspaper Kathimerini, 3 September 1989 (in Greek), p. 4.

128: See Diamandouros N. P., "The European vision and the Greek dilemmas", in Epikentra, no. 64, December 1990 (in Greek), p. 26.

129: For the 5 November 1989 election and the events that ultimately led to the formation of Zolotas' national unity government, see The Political Year 1989, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-250. For the 8 April 1990 election, see The 8 April 1990 Election, Athens: Pondiki Publications, 1990 (in Greek); for ND's electoral performance in all national and European elections since 1974, see Appendix VII to this study.

130: No proper assessment of this is as yet possible, since at the time of writing the party has been in office again for only three years. In the past, both ND and PASOK remained in office for two consecutive terms, and a government policy is best judged at the end of the ruling party's second term. Moreover, ND did not manage to stay in office for the whole term; riven by internal squabbles over its privatisation programme on the one hand and over a telephone-tapping scandal on the other, ND was struck the final blow from within its own ranks, namely by A. Samaras, who having resigned from both his governmental post and parliamentary seat (due to a disagreement with premier C. Mitsotakis over the country's policies and relations with the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia), and having founded POLAN (Political Spring), he caused the defection of two more ND deputies in early September 1993, and this led to ND's loss of parliamentary majority and early elections held one month later (for these events see also footnote 84 to ch. 3). Let us only add here for the record, that PASOK won the 10 Oct. 1993 election, polling almost 47 per cent of the vote and electing 170 deputies; ND moved once again to the opposition benches (39.3 per cent of the vote, 111 seats in parliament); Samaras' newly formed POLAN appeared as the third party, polling almost 5 per cent of the vote and electing 10 deputies. (KKE fought this election alone, it polled little more than 4.5 per cent of the vote and elected 9 deputies, whereas SYN polled a mere 2.94 per cent and so failed to gain parliamentary representation.) Shortly after ND's electoral defeat, C. Mitsotakis resigned and new intra-party elections for the ND leadership were scheduled for early November 1993.

131: It should be mentioned that EAS was sold only after its employees had rejected the government proposal that some of them should be dismissed so as to allow the enterprise to make a profit. KPEE and Liberal-Forum member C. Christidis wrote at the time:

"The argument that is continuously being reiterated by the ministers in charge to EAS employees on strike is this: accept measures designed to make EAS profitable (dismissals, etc.), otherwise we must sell it. This makes a boggy out of privatisation, like the one we use to scare naughty children if they don't eat their food. So ND is perhaps the only 'liberal' party in the world that considers measures aimed at the liberalisation of society to need the help of the devil."

See Christidis C., "The boggy", in the daily newspaper Ta Nea, 8 August 1992 (in Greek), p. 10; see also Vourloumis P., "Why is privatisation failing?", in Epikentra, no. 67, September 1991 (in Greek), pp. 28-30, who argues that "...negative reaction to privatisation... comes less from the socialist opposition than from within the ranks of the government itself".

132: See Kolmer C., "Pseudo-liberalism", in Epikentra, no. 65, March 1991 (in Greek), pp. 40-2, who notes that anticipated public expenses in the 1990 budget went up by 25 per cent, and reached some 50 per cent of the GNP, which was "an all-time record".

133: See Papalexopoulos T., former president of the Association of Greek Industries (SEV), "Economic and currency unification and Greece", in Epikentra, no. 64, December 1990 (in Greek), p. 67. For similar arguments, see also Bitros G. K., "From economic crisis towards the crisis of economic policy?", ibid, pp. 44-52, who writes that "...in general, the government was more liberal in theory and in its verbal post-election declarations, than it has been in practice".

134: C. Christidis believes the latter. See "The boggy", op. cit., where he argues:

"It is therefore evident, that ND has no right to appeal to liberalism. Unfortunately, the problem is not one of 'communication', as party officials seem to suggest, but a clearly structural one —in other words it refers to the creation, nature, and functioning of this party."

CHAPTER SIX

1: All data in this section are from the 1981 population census, see The Real Population of Greece According to the 5 April 1981 Census, Athens: National Service of Statistics of Greece, 1982 (in Greek). The 1991 census has not yet been published, but the first unofficial data show that the population of the Department has exceeded the 1981 number and reached that of 265,783 (that is, 4.5 per cent increase in ten years).

2: Thessaly was annexed to Greece in 1881; the *chiflik* system then prevalent in agriculture did not allow for high productivity until 1917, when

"Venizelos passed a series of decrees on land reform which were to become the legal basis for the break-up of the big estates and the extensive land distribution which followed the influx of refugees from Asia Minor in 1922" (in English originally);

(see Mouzelis N., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, December 1979, pp. 18-9. hereafter, all quotes are my translation from the original Greek, unless otherwise stated.) Seven years earlier, on 6 March 1910, the peasants had gathered in a small village in the eparchy of Larissa —at Kileler, today called Kypseli— and rose against the big landowners, demanding land redistribution and holdings of their own. The revolt ended in a massacre, but precipitated events that ultimately led to Venizelos' land reform. For a detailed account on these issues, see Karanikolas G. D., Kileler, Athens: Grammi, 1975 (in Greek).

3: For example in the Department of Larissa, the average per-acre productivity of wheat is 5 per cent higher than that of the three other departments in Thessaly together (Karditsa, Trikala and Magnesia), and as much as 50 per cent higher than the country's average.

4: Between 1940 and 1981, the population of Larissa more than tripled; in 1940 there were 32,686 inhabitants; in 1951, 43,225; in 1961, 56,010; in 1971, 72,332 and in 1981 102,048 (and in 1991, 108,237, according to the yet unpublished data of the 1991 population census). In 1928 Larissa was the sixteenth biggest urban centre, in 1940 the tenth, in 1951 and in 1961 the seventh, in 1971 the sixth, and in 1981 the fifth. Moreover, the Department of Larissa is the only one in Thessaly, and among the five in Greece generally (the other four being Attika, Salonica, Imathia and Heraklion), which has seen a continuous population growth since 1961. It should also be mentioned here that the Larissa-daily newspaper Eleftheria, founded in 1922, remains the biggest local daily in Greece. Financially independent and politically neutral, it employs 76 people and it sells 15,000 copies daily (which compares well with Ta Nea, the biggest Athens daily newspaper, which sells 80,000 copies a day). For more details about Larissa's local daily see Marinou E., "The newspaper 'Eleftheria': 'The Times' of Larissa", in the weekly Epsilon, no. 48, 8 March 1992 (in Greek), pp. 56-61.

5: The data for the country as a whole are from 1986 Labour Force Census, Athens: National Service of Statistics of Greece, 1987 (in Greek); the data for the Department of Larissa are from 5 April 1981 Census Results: Population and Households, Athens: National Service of Statistics of Greece, 1990 (in Greek), vol. V, no. 7: Thessaly.

6: The nearest harbour to Larissa is that of Volos, capital of the Department of Magnesia, which links Greece with Syria and the Middle East and has greatly contributed to the industrial development of Volos.

7: According to Karanikolas G. D., op. cit., pp. 157-8, shortly before the rural uprising in 1910,

"The landowners were the supreme party notables, and by serious threats in case of disobedience manipulated the peasant vote as they wished. Those who dared to vote contrary to their master's will had to reckon with being ousted from the *chiflik*, barred from all other *chifliks* in the area because of the landowners' trust, and evicted from their houses as the most lenient consequences... The peasant could rely on nobody's help, since the deputy's interest lay in faithful obedience to the will of the local landowner-party notable".

For a detailed account on the *chiflik* system and the standard and conditions of living in Larissa before the annexation of Thessaly to Greece in 1881, see Pharmakidis E. G., Larissa, Volos: Paraskevopoulos Publications, 1926 (in Greek).

8: However, no prominent Greek politicians came from the Department of Larissa in either the inter-war or the post-war years. The best-known political figure from the area was the lawyer C. Rodopoulos, who chaired the Greek parliament for ten consecutive years, from 16 Nov. 1953 until 15 Dec. 1963. (He was first elected in 1935 under the banner of the Greek Radical Party, and unfailingly elected thereafter until 1964, either as a Greek Rally or an ERE member.) Other deputies included the landowners G. Philippidis (Popular Party MP in 1935 and 1946), and N. Baltatzis-Mavrogordatos (Popular Party MP in 1935, 1936 and 1946); see Register of Senators (1929-1935) and MPs (1935-1974), Athens: Greek Parliament Publication, 1977 (in Greek).

9: For the creation of EDA see footnote 109 to ch. 1; for the most serious consequences caused by the civil war, see ch. 1, and for a more detailed bibliography concerning the civil war, see footnotes 35, 36 and 37 to ch. 1. EDA failed to have an MP elected from the Department of Larissa in only two cases: in the 1952 election (mainly due to the special majority electoral system), and in 1974 after the fall of the junta (due to the landslide for C. Karamanlis and his ND party).

10: The three People's Party deputies were the lawyers C. Rodopoulos, J. Kyrozis, and A. Nikolaidis; for a detailed account of the 5 March 1950 election, see Nikolakopoulos E., Parties and Parliamentary Elections in Greece: 1946-1964, Athens: National Centre for Social Research, 1985 (in Greek), pp. 156-73 and 394-421.

11: Both EDA and the Greek Rally were formed in August 1951, on the 1st and 6th respectively; all five Greek Rally deputies were, again, lawyers: A. Apostolidis, G. Kakayiannis, D. Koutsimpos, and the ex-People's Party deputies J. Kyrozis and C. Rodopoulos. For the 9 Sep. 1951 election, see Nikolakopoulos E., op. cit., pp. 174-91 and 422-47.

12: The four Greek Rally MPs in 1952 were the lawyers G. Kakayiannis, V. Karabilias, C. Rodopoulos, and the doctor N. Raptis. In 1956, Karamanlis' ERE secured seven of the fourteen seats in the Larissa-Magnesia Department with the election of five lawyers (A. Apostolidis, S. Efstratiadis, G. Kakayiannis, N. Mitrou, and C. Rodopoulos), one

doctor (N. Papageorgiou, who had been elected on a liberal ticket in 1950), and one retired military officer (D. Iatridis).

13: For a detailed account of the establishment of ERE, see section 2.2.2 in ch. 1 of this study.

14: The Department of Larissa was not immune from the electoral fraud and violence that marred the 1961 national election. According to D. Psathas, president of ND's local committee in Tyrnavos in 1989, shortly before polling day he himself, together with various other then EREN (the ERE youth organisation) members, threatened the people in villages that they would come to harm unless they voted for ERE by using the already marked ballots they were being given. (Interview with the author in Larissa, 17 March 1989.)

15: It is indicative of the strength of the clientelistic system that C. Grammatidis, who had been elected continuously with ERE from 1958 onwards, was elected just as promptly in 1964, although he had meanwhile changed sides to the Centre Union. As we shall see below, he did almost the same thing again after the restoration of democracy: in 1974 he was elected under the banner of the Centre Union/New Forces (EK/ND), and in 1977 with New Democracy.

16: As a then Centre Union deputy, T. Kardaras attested that S. Efstratiades had bluntly told him that "he leans exclusively on his local barons to guarantee his political future". See T. Kardaras' interview with the monthly review Stigmes (local Larissa edition), no. 31, April 1989 (in Greek), pp. 27-34.

17: In the 1977 election, ND polled a poor 36.90 per cent in the Department of Larissa, as opposed to 41.84 per cent nationwide; this happened because the ultra-right National Camp (which polled a 6.82 per cent nationwide and had five MPs elected) received a spectacular 10.31 per cent of the votes in the Department, i.e. its 16th best performance among the country's 56 electoral districts.

18: For all these reasons, the Department of Larissa has been selected to conduct our fieldwork research, that took place from September 1988 until July 1989. More precisely, the views and attitudes of the rank-and-file party members that are presented below refer to a simple random sample of 5 per cent of the party members in the city of Larissa together with those of another 21 (out of 50) members in the village of Kalohori (a predominantly rural area with 996 inhabitants in the eparchy of Larissa); for more details concerning the way this fieldwork research was conducted, see footnote 28 below.

19: C. Rodopoulos who, as we have already seen, was the most prominent political figure in the area during the postwar years, had died during the 1967-1974 dictatorship.

20: In the November 1974 election, the Centre Union/New Forces (EK/ND) party secured two parliamentary seats and elected the well-known C. Grammatidis (see footnote 15 above), and the dentist D. Kardaras, who had also been a Centre Union MP in 1963 and 1964. PASOK secured one seat with the doctor J. Floros, who was a newcomer to politics.

21: See C. Houliaras' interview with the author, 18 Jan. 1989 (in Greek), Larissa, author's records.

22: It is interesting that C. Grammatidis was elected as the most popular of the four ND deputies judging by his 11,128 preference votes; see 20 November 1977 Election Results, Ministry of the Interior, Athens 1979 (in Greek), vol. I, pp. 38-9; see also footnote 15 above.

23: For more details concerning the Volvi Movement, see section 4.3 in ch. 3.

24: This was also corroborated by leading Larissa party figures in interviews with the author; among them, A. Kondonassios, responsible for the trade unions, K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou, parliamentary candidate for the June 1989 election, C. Houliaras, first president of ND's departmental committee in Larissa, and D. Psathas, president of ND's local committee in Tyrnavos, to mention but a few. For one reason or another none of them ever joined the Volvi Movement, but all of them were in total agreement with the Movement's demands. See their interviews with the author, all conducted in Larissa on 15 and 19 Dec. 1988, 18 Jan. 1989, and 17 March 1989 respectively (all in Greek), author's records.

25: See K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou's interview with the author, 19 Dec. 1988 (in Greek), author's records. As the same candidate said in another interview: "Although I'd been a party activist since 1981, I took up official party membership in 1985 because I considered it only a formality"; see her interview with the local monthly Stigmes, no. 33, June 1989 (in Greek), pp. 26-7.

26: In the June 1989 election, ND received 75,910 votes in the Department of Larissa, a member-voter ratio of 1:10.8, that is considerably lower than its alleged national average of 1:7.7. See section 3.3 in ch. 4).

27: The number of members was given to the author by the presidents of each local committee. This is the reason why many numbers in the Table are rounded; not one president knew exactly how many members were registered at the time (not to mention how many were men and how many women). The reason they could not be more precise was either because no records were kept, or —most commonly— because nobody ever troubled to update any existing files. As the then secretary of the departmental administrative committee, the lawyer C. Georgosoulis, admitted,

"The number of the registered members the party claims in the area is fictitious; usually, new members appear in the lists shortly before local intra-party elections, because candidates recruit their relatives, acquaintances and friends to vote for them; after the election is over, most of these new members fall by the wayside, having no other party-political interests".

See his interview with the author in Larissa, 30 Nov. 1988 (in Greek), author's records.

28: Initially, the fieldwork research had planned drawing a 5 per cent simple random sample from the party membership in Larissa (241 interviewees), and 100 per cent of the party members in Kalohori (according to its TE president, D. Exarhos, the organisation there numbered 50 members). It was agreed that the interviews would be conducted face-to-face with the author. Eventually, though, only the 18 members from the city centre were chosen randomly, and only these 18 interviews were conducted as agreed (the remaining 45 were never held, because the party officials did not permit the author to continue, on

the grounds that the June 1989 election was close and party members should not be disturbed). Due to the absolute lack and/or the out-of-date party records, the local-committee presidents distributed the questionnaires themselves, assuring the author they would do their best to choose members in such a way as to provide a representative picture of their local organisation. To what extent they succeeded cannot be assessed, the more so since very few of them returned all the completed questionnaires; the majority returned fewer than received or even none at all. (Table VI.4a below x-rays, so to speak, this fieldwork research.) It is therefore obvious, that this fieldwork research cannot claim scientific precision. Nevertheless, it provides us with useful and important inside information, and so helps us acquire a better understanding of the structure and functioning of ND's organisation at the local level.

Table VI.4a: ND Organisation in Larissa and Kalohori in 1989: Number of Questionnaires Distributed and Returned

<u>Local Committee (TE) in:</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>Questionnaires Distributed to TE Presidents</u>	<u>Questionnaires Returned to the author</u>
Philippoupolis	480	24	24
Neapolis	400	20	20
Anthoupolis	300	15	None
Ag. Konstantinos	600	30	20
Pyrovolika	127	6	3
Hippocrates	233	12	3
Averoff	108	6	6
Ag. Georgios	230	10	None
Ambelokipoi	198	10	7
Nea Smyrni	175	9	6
Neraida	209	10	9
40 Martyres	270	14	14
Haravghi	238	12	7
Centre	1260	63	18
Total	4828	241	137
TE of Kalohori	50	50	21
Sum total	4878	291	158

29: See, for example, Tables III.18 and 19 in ch. 3. Nevertheless, all fourteen presidents of the local committees in Larissa as also the one in Kalohori, were men. (Hereafter, all Tables in the text represent data resulting from my own research —Sep. 1988 until Jul. 1989— unless otherwise stated.)

30: See the local review Thessalikes Epiloges (a monthly publication of the daily Eleftheria), no. 35, August 1989 (in Greek), p. 15, where it is also noted that during the 1987 and 1988 summer festivals organised by ONNED, it was mainly elderly members and supporters who attended rather than the younger generation.

31: On the other hand, it is noteworthy that at the time this fieldwork research took place, the president and the secretary of ND's departmental committee in Larissa were both lawyers, and the vice-president was a doctor. Moreover, out of the three MPs at the time (Souflias, Efstratiadis and Katsaros), two were civil engineers, and one lawyer.

32: It should be also added that 15 out of the 137 members in Larissa (10.95 per cent) were old-age pensioners, whereas there was not one in the organisation of Kalohori. (Let us also note here that in Table VI.7 as well as in the diagram of Figure 6.1, "salaried professions" represent salary-and wage-earners, whereas "liberal professions" the self-employed.)

33: Another fact that can explain this differentiation in Kalohori is that only 21 members answered the questionnaires, although the local TE president claimed that there were 50 registered members. It may then be assumed that those 21 members were the most conscientious and active ones, and not some who had joined the party later, due to personalistic utilitarian reasons or wider speculation.

34: As there are no relevant data concerning either the Greek population in general, or rank-and-file members of other parties, one cannot make comparisons concerning the degree of politicisation of ND members in Larissa. Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief that the members of the communist party (KKE) as well as those of PASOK are much more engaged also in organisations like the trade unions, agricultural co-operatives, and professional associations—in other words, that their political activities are not limited to the ranks of their party.

35: It is worth noting that while 14.6 per cent of the rank and file in Larissa joined the party in order to help its organisational growth and development, not one member did so in Kalohori; it seems that the organisation there had been created and formed well before this happened in the city of Larissa, which explains why the average party-age in Kalohori exceeded that in Larissa by three years (9.7 years to 6.65 years respectively, see Table VI.8 above).

36: This point was also made by K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou, ND parliamentary candidate for the June 1989 election, during an interview with the author in Larissa, 19 Dec. 1988 (in Greek), author's records.

37: According to the party statutes, a new member has the right to vote—or to be a candidate—only after six months from the day of registration; see Article 5.1.a (Rights and Obligations of Members), in ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, Athens: ND Publication, 1986 (in Greek), p. 13, and also footnote 27 above. Moreover, several presidents of ND local committees in Larissa admitted that only a percentage of the members in their organisations were active. G. Bohoris (Philippoupolis TE) said that less than half of the 480 registered members are really interested and active; G. Papanikolaou (Ag. Konstantinos TE), said that almost half (40%-45%) of the 600 members were inactive, whereas C. Zafiris (Ag. Georgios TE) claimed that only 5% of the 230 rank and file there abstained from local organisational activities. (Nevertheless, the first returned all, and the second part of the distributed questionnaires, while the third returned none at all, as shown in Table VI.4a in footnote 28 above).

38: Party members were asked to name the most important issues their local organisation had dealt with during the past year (that is, twelve months before the 18 June 1989 election), and were allowed to give more than one answer.

39: We have already discussed this term when examining the general record and performance of the National Radical Union (ERE, see section 2.2.6 in ch. 1). Suffice it to add here that paleokommatisμός, vouleftokratia (deputocracy), and rousfeti complement each other if they

are not actually synonymous, and have characterised all pre-1967 political parties except the communist ones. In the first few years after 1974, these phenomena were much less marked though still discernible within ND ranks; PASOK managed to dissociate itself from them to a considerable extent by a spectacular renewal of its political personnel and, mainly, by developing a well-structured and militant mass-organisation.

40: The local organisations in Larissa apart, ONNED too faces economic shortages. As M. Kondonassiou-Tsigani (ONNED president in Larissa) said, "The summer festival we organised in September 1988 in Larissa ended with a financial deficit, and ONNED is still having to raise funds to pay for it"; see her interview with the author, 3 Dec. 1988, and also Thessalikes Epilogos, no. 35, August 1989, p. 15 (both in Greek).

41: These remarks have been corroborated by numerous discussions with various TE presidents, but also with other higher party officials in Larissa. J. Bohoris, president of the Philippoupolis TE, told the author (interview of 29 Nov. 1988):

"Although there are 480 members registered in Philippoupolis TE, most of them are less than lukewarm. They are farmers and their mentality is totally different from, for example, that of workers, who rally more easily and are generally acquainted with organisational issues. Also, women members attend organisational meetings very seldom, because they fear their husbands, who deeply mistrust local-organisation meetings and activities. It's very difficult for us to mobilise our members, even when the cost [tickets, accomodation, etc.] is paid by the party".

For more details on the persistence of clientelistic practices primarily responsible for neutralising the local organisations in the eparchies and for the general indifference of the rank and file, see section 4 below in this chapter.

42: Party members were asked whether they were satisfied with the activities of their local organisation, and if not, what more they expected. The first part of the question was a closed one, requiring either "yes", or "in part", or "no" for an answer; the second was open, and members could list more than one expectation.

43: The question was "In terms of internal democratic procedures in the decision-making process, do you think that ND's leadership differs from that of the other parties? If yes/in part, in what way?"

44: The question was "Which, in your view, are the most important reasons that explain ND's appeal to the voters?", and more than one answer was accepted.

45: For these points in general, and for rousfeti in particular, see section 4.2 in ch. 3, and footnotes 48 and 49 to the same chapter.

46: The specific question ND rank and file were asked was: "In the pre-dictatorial period, when somebody wanted to get something important from the state (e.g., to find a job, to get a loan, to avoid lengthy bureaucratic red tape, etc.), he would most probably ask it as a personal favour from his local deputy in exchange for his vote. Has this

also been the case, (a) from 1974 until 1981? and (b) from 1981 until today?".

47: We should also note at this point that there is again a relatively high percentage of the rank and file who gave no answer concerning the existence of clientelistic relations during PASOK's period in office (30 members or 18.99 per cent, see Table VI.19 in the text); all in all, there are 22 members who gave no answer for either period. Table VI.18a below presents the age and party-age distribution of the "don't knows" for 1974-1981, for 1981-1989, and also for both periods (all numbers refer to members, L stands for Larissa and K for Kalohori).

Table VI.18a: Age and Party-Age Distribution of Members in Larissa and Kalohori (who gave no answer concerning the existence of clientelistic relations, see footnote 46 above)

Age	ND Period		PASOK Period		Both Periods		Party age	ND Period		PASOK Period		Both Periods	
	L	K	L	K	L	K		L	K	L	K	L	K
Under 35	6	--	5	--	3	--	0-4 years	21	--	19	--	15	--
35-44	8	3	8	2	5	2	5-8 years	7	3	5	2	2	2
45-54	12	--	8	--	7	--	9-12 years	2	--	2	--	2	--
55-64	7	--	5	--	5	--	13-15 years	5	--	2	--	1	--
65-over	1	--	2	--	--	--							
No answer	1	--	--	--	--	--							
Total	35	3	28	2	20	2	Total	35	3	28	2	20	2

Since during both periods most party members were of an age to have some knowledge of politics and everyday life, they should have been able to give some answer. (At the time of the fieldwork research the majority of them were between 35 and 54 years old, which means that even during ND's first period in office they were between 20 and 39). On the other hand, the large majority of them registered in the party only after 1985, and might not have been much acquainted with such issues before that. We think the second explanation is much less likely than the first, since patron-client relations and *rousfeti* requests are everyday experiences in Greek politics; consequently, and at the risk of overgeneralisation, we believe that most of these members simply refused to give a definite answer concerning this sensitive and, most often, strictly personal issue.

48: It is significant to note that the great majority of party members in Kalohori, who live in a smaller and less alienated society than their urban counterparts in Larissa, do not hesitate to acknowledge that clientelism characterised the first period of ND in office (71.43 per cent in Kalohori, compared to only 28.47 per cent in Larissa); moreover, 66.67 per cent in Kalohori believe that nothing has changed in this respect since 1974, compared to only 16.79 per cent in Larissa.

49: For the phenomenon of "bureaucratic clientelism" see footnote 50 to ch. 3, and also footnote 137 to ch. 4.

50: This system was used only for the June 1985 national election, when the electoral lists of PASOK and ND were drawn up solely by the party leaderships. In the Department of Larissa, ND polled 39.21 per cent of the vote and secured three out of the eight seats allotted for the whole area; the first, second, and third candidates on the party list were sent to parliament (Souflias, Katsaros, and Efstratiadis respectively).

51: The question "Do you think that the abolition of the preference-cross has contributed to the promotion of political morality and, in a broader sense, to the country's political practices?" was a closed one, followed by an open "If yes/in part, why?", or "If no, why not?".

52: As we have already discussed (see section 3.3 in ch. 4), party-directed patronage characterised also ND's organised base after the party resumed office in 1990. The only difference with PASOK's record in this respect was that in ND it was not only the party organisation that performed this office, but also certain senior party notables and deputies, whose personal clienteles assured them of some degree of autonomy towards both the leadership and the organised party base, as we shall see below.

53: The questions asked read as follows: "As you know, the final nomination of ND candidates for parliament is exclusively the party president's responsibility. Do you personally agree with this procedure? If not, what is your personal suggestion?" According to the revised 1986 party statutes (see ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, op. cit., Article 20, pp. 25-7), "The ND president finally selects the candidates and forms the electoral lists, basically from among those proposed by the departmental assemblies". Nevertheless, as no elections had been held between 1986 and the time of the fieldwork research, this specific provision had never been enforced (see also footnotes 122 and 123 to ch. 4).

54: For more details on these issues, see section 4.1 in ch. 3, Tables III.22 and 23. For an analytical presentation of their answers, see Appendix VIII.

55: See also section 4 in ch. 4, Tables IV.5 and 6. For an analytical presentation of their answers, see Appendix VIII.

56: For the elaboration of the 1985 ideological manifesto see section 3.1 in ch. 5.

57: The question (a closed one) was as follows: "Have you personally read the ideological declaration of the party 'A New Proposal for Freedom' of 3 Feb. 1985?"

58: Party members were asked "Which of the following party-labels would you choose to identify ND today?", and were allowed to give more than one.

59: This is explicitly stated in the party's 1986 revised statutes: "It is a popular party, a party of the people as an entity, and not a party representing a certain class or dependent on a particular interest group". See ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, op. cit., pp. 3-8, and Appendix VI of this study (see also footnote 96 to ch. 5).

60: The party members were asked whether they thought ND represented a social class or classes, and in case of an affirmative answer they were further asked to name which one(s) in particular.

61: The question read as follows: "As you know, ND fights for liberalism, where the free market economy is dominant. Would you expect some kind of direct, personal benefit, if ND resumed office? If yes, of what kind?" (the underlinings were mine).

62: See M. Kondonassiou-Tsigani's interview with the author, 3 Dec. 1988. The same views were shared by K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou, ND parliamentary candidate for the June 1989 election. See her interview with the author, 19 Dec. 1988 (both interviews in Greek, author's records). For the importance of "*material incentives... as an inducement to join a party*" see v. Beyme K., Political Parties in Western Democracies, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, pp. 172-3.

63: When ND lost its first election in 1981, its MPs replaced the leader, G. Rallis, with E. Averoff. When Averoff, in turn, lost ND the 1984 Euro-election, C. Mitsotakis became the new leader. In 1985, when ND lost the national election again, its leader kept his post, not only because he had held it for only a few months, but also because there was no one of sufficient stature left to succeed him. This meant that when after the party's next defeat he asked for a vote of confidence, he got it rather easily (see also footnote 86 to ch. 4). But when ND lost the 10 Oct. 1993 elections, Mitsotakis could no longer remain to the party leadership and he resigned (for the events that led to this election, see footnote 84 to ch. 3 and footnote 130 to ch. 5).

64: It should be mentioned at this point that E. Groussopoulos was a former EKOF member when he was a student in Salonica in the mid-1960s (for this organisation see section 2.2.2.(b)(ii) in ch. 1 above and also footnote 143 to the same chapter). For more details on the composition of this special election committee and the members heading each sector see Kalessis A., "New Democracy in Larissa: The bell for the final round has rung", in the monthly local review Thessalikes Epiloges, no. 28, January 1989 (in Greek), pp. 17-9.

65: The four deputies were A. Tsaldaris, A. Xarhas, C. Simeoforidis and A. Efstratiadis; there were no specific criteria for this committee to reach its decisions, but the applicant had to submit a *curriculum vitae*, and in some cases there was an oral examination concerning his/her knowledge of ND's political programme and broader personal political ambitions.

66: See Yiourmetakis A., "ND local organisation: 48 political executives 'record' themselves waiting for this 'recording' to pay off", in the local monthly review Stigmes, no. 29, February 1989 (in Greek), pp. 16-8.

67: Ibid.

68: According to the president of the LO of Tyrnavos, D. Psathas, this was the most important reason that the institution of political executives eventually failed; see his interview with the author, 17 Mar. 1989 (in Greek), author's records.

69: For these points see also the (unsigned) article "ND in Larissa: The project of political executives did not work", in Thessalikes Epiloges, no. 29, February 1989 (in Greek), p. 7.

70: For more details on the composition and functioning of this assembly, see section 3.3 in ch. 4).

71: See the local daily newspaper Eleftheria, 24 April 1989 (in Greek).

72: See ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, *op. cit.*, Article 20.B.σ, pp. 26-7.

73: The first seven candidates in the Department of Larissa were (with the votes they received in brackets): N. Mammonas (425), G. Bisbas (331), V. Voyiatzi-Mantzou (297), C. Karayiannis (275), J. Sotiriou (225), J. Papadimopoulos (218), and D. Fakis (217).

74: G. Bisbas had become famous for breaking the state-controlled television monopoly in December 1988, by setting up a satellite-TV antenna in Livadi, that received and transmitted two foreign satellite programmes over a radius of almost 50 kms; see his interview with A. Kalessis, "Livadi in the satellite era", in Thessalikes Epiloges, no. 28, January 1989 (in Greek), pp. 29-31.

75: Concerning the lawyer J. Papadimopoulos, who was chosen for the candidates' list, it should be noted that he had been appointed secretary to the Minister of Agriculture under the dictatorship, and had also been appointed mayor of Larissa at that same time; his inclusion in the list was intended to syphon votes from the ultra-right, which was fighting the election independently. In the end, he was not elected to the House, but succeeded in the subsequent election (November 1989), mainly because A. Efstratiadis had meanwhile retired from politics and—as it was widely rumoured—bequeathed Papadimopoulos his political clientele.

76: Bisbas' declaration was published on the front page of the local weekly newspaper Hora, no. 8, 29 May 1989 (in Greek). It should be added here that the ND president did not violate the party statutes when he decided to exclude these two candidates in favour of another two who had equally been voted for by the rank and file. When he made similar decisions in other departments (Ioannina, Imathia, Salonica, Chios, Serres, Xanthi, Kastoria), he caused resignations there too, storms of protest and demonstrations. In only one case, namely in the Department of Lakonia in the Peloponnese, was the candidate-list proposed by the rank and file totally disregarded and a completely different one drawn up by the president. Not even then were the party statutes violated, because they stipulate that the final choice should be made by the party leader selecting "basically from among those proposed by the departmental assemblies" (see footnote 72 above). Nevertheless, in all these cases, the declared will of the grass-roots was being set aside, and intra-party democracy badly wounded.

77: When ND's candidate-list was officially announced, most of the political executives either withdrew of their own accord or put in much fewer appearances, since it was obvious they would not now be included in the party list.

78: See K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou's interview with the author, 19 Dec. 1988 (in Greek), author's records.

79: In his public address, Mitsotakis mainly analysed ND's governmental programme for agriculture, as the area of Thessaly is a centre for farming and cattle-raising. Although the party had mobilised

members and supporters also from places other than Thessaly (a practice that was also followed by PASOK, because these rallies were televised, so both parties were trying to impress the electorate nationwide), objective and neutral observers attested that ND's 1989 rally was the biggest ever held in Larissa, much bigger than that of 1985, and bigger than even PASOK's. On Mitsotakis' speech and the rally, see the weekly local newspaper Hora, no. 8, 29 May 1989 (in Greek), p. 8 and pp. 17-8.

80: According to the statutes, 50 members constitute the minimum number necessary for the establishment of a separate local organisation; see ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, op. cit., Article 21.2, p. 27, and Peripheral Organisation Regulation, Athens: ND Publication, 26 March 1987 (in Greek), Article 6.2, p. 4.

81: Two of the most recent such instances were reported to the author by M. Kondonassiou-Tsigani (ONNED president in Larissa), namely concerning the villages of Myra and Omorphohori, where no local organisations were ever set up. This information was verified by ND candidate K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou (see their interviews with the author, 3 and 19 Dec. 1988 respectively). C. Houliaras (first elected as NODE president in Larissa in 1975, who nevertheless withdrew from ND in 1981) said that the party organisation in the Department of Larissa has quite often suffered from practices of this kind ever since 1975 (see his interview with the author, 18 Jan. 1989).

82: The re-emergence of traditional practices and clientelistic politics in the Department of Larissa shortly before the June 1989 election, was due also to the fact that the PASOK government, which had introduced the list-system (that was supposed to have been permanent, and designed to eliminate clientelistic relations), for reasons that were never explained had chosen to revert to the system of preference-cross voting (on these two different systems see footnotes 11, 15 and 50 to ch. 3 and footnote 117 to ch. 4). In consequence, trying to secure as many preference-crosses as they could, ND candidates quite frequently by-passed the party organisation and established personal contact with voters. PASOK politicians, for their part, also became rather more susceptible to clientelism, albeit to a much lesser extent, given that PASOK was better and more strictly organised and, at least at the local level, the party apparatus always had the upper hand.

83: See K. Voyiatzi-Mantzou's interview with the author, op. cit.

84: Concerning the example of the eparchy of Elassona, it is worth mentioning that Fakis after his defeat was not returned to the party list for the November 1989 and April 1990 elections, in favour of Bisbas who, nevertheless, failed both times.

85: In 1974 and in 1977, Souflias received 11,146 and 10,838 preference votes respectively and was elected second (after the ex-ERE deputy S. Efstratiadis in the former case, who received 13,555 votes, and C. Grammatidis, in the latter, who received 11,108 votes). In 1981, he received 18,176 votes and was elected first (far ahead of the second, N. Katsaros, who received 8,998 votes); and in 1985 he was elected without preference votes, positioned in first place in the party's candidate list in the Department of Larissa.

86: For a detailed presentation of the functioning of this committee and of ND's governmental policy proposals, see section 3.2 in ch. 5.

87: In 1981, Katsaros was elected second after Souflias, and in 1985 he was positioned second (again behind Souflias) in the party list.

88: Apart from the local organisations, Katsaros enjoyed the support of several religious organisations in Larissa. In order to catch as many votes as possible, he employed a populistically simplistic political discourse, not hesitating to endorse almost everyone's demands and expectations. Under the retrogressive and outmoded leadership of E. Averoff he participated in ceremonies organised to commemorate all those "slaughtered by communist rebels" during the civil war (for these events see section 4 in ch. 4 and footnote 152 to the same chapter), whereas only a few years later we find him among the first five ND deputies who followed the modern, neo-liberal C. Mitsotakis and putting forward his candidacy for the party leadership. On all these points see Yiourmetakis A., "N. Katsaros versus G. Souflias: The first round completed, the second will be more interesting", in Stigmes, no. 34, July 1989, pp. 14-6, and Apostolopoulou M., "N. Katsaros: Morality, consistency and continuity in the political arena", in Thessalikes Epiloges, 1989 Election Special Issue, 11 June 1989, pp. 24-5 (both in Greek).

89: It goes without saying that in a political system characterised by clientelism, a governmental post means considerable power because it involves control over the selective distribution of spoils to voters and supporters —and so makes for a larger political clientele and, more often than not, the incumbent's re-election.

90: As already mentioned, in the aftermath of the June 1989 election a short-lived coalition government was formed between ND and the left-wing SYN (for a brief presentation of the events that followed this election see section 5.1 in ch. 5), and new elections were to be held again in November of the same year. From June to November the pre-election climate persisted, and so did the personal conflict between Souflias and Katsaros —which, furthermore, came right out into the open. Until the official announcement of the final results in the Department of Larissa, it was widely believed that Katsaros had received more votes than Souflias and was elected first. This rumour, originating from ND's departmental committee in Larissa, became news and was announced as such by the radio stations, whereupon Katsaros made a public statement to thank the people for their support and confidence in his person. When in due course the mistake was acknowledged, Souflias made a statement in his turn, and expressed his disgust with such deliberate and unethical mis-information. A series of statements and counter-statements were made by the two politicians, because Katsaros took Souflias' denunciation personally and made a public reply, and so did Souflias again, thus revealing a long-lived mutual enmity that dated back to 1981. For a detailed account of these events, see Yiourmetakis A., "N. Katsaros versus G. Souflias:...", op. cit., and also the unsigned article "Crusades and crusaders: For Larissa's ND, the election was not for the party but for the candidates only", in Thessalikes Epiloges, no. 33, June 1989 (in Greek), pp. 8-9.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1: Concerning ND's foundation in 1974, one may point to similarities with parties created in other countries that emerged at about the same time from the rule by dictatorial regimes—for example the Spanish UCD (Democratic Centre Party) or the Portuguese Democratic Centre (CDS). Nevertheless, the UCD "...was an ideologically heterogeneous federation of Liberals, Christian Democrats and former Franco supporters with a strong orientation to leader personalities" and "it disintegrated in 1982" (in English originally); see von Beyme K., Political Parties in Western Democracies, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, p. 57. As far as New Democracy is concerned we agree with Macridis that ND "was, at least in its inception, a replica of the Union for the New Republic founded by Charles de Gaulle when he returned to French politics in 1958" (in English originally); see Macridis R. C., "Elections and political modernization in Greece", in Penniman H. R. (ed), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977, Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, p. 10. (Henceforth, all quotations are from English-language texts).

2: On the British Conservatives see Hartman J., "Great Britain", vol. 2, in Raschke J. and Katsoulis H. (eds), Western European Political Parties, 2 vols, Athens: Paratiritis, 1990 (in Greek), pp. 219-35.

3: The reason why PASOK polled better in semi-urban and rural areas was that one of its most important reforms while in government was the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, which revitalised the agrarian sector; see Kariotis T. C., "The rise and fall of the green sun", in Kariotis T. C. (ed), The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989, New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 1992, pp. 11-33.

4: As there are no relevant data available, these tendencies cannot yet be substantiated. Nevertheless, similar trends concerning better polling in rural than urban areas, and a greater appeal to the upper than the lower classes are found in other West European conservative parties; see, for example, Medhurst K., "Spanish Conservative Politics", in Layton-Henry Z. (ed), Conservative Politics in Western Europe, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, ch. 12. For private/public sector occupation as a socio-political cleavage affecting electoral behaviour, see Raschke J. and Katsoulis H. (eds), op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 456-62.

5: During its early years ND was a clientelistic party, but not on the scale of the Christian Democrats in Southern Italy; for this particular form of party organisation, see Caciagli M., "The mass clientelism party and conservative politics: Christian Democracy in Southern Italy", in Layton-Henry Z. (ed), op. cit., ch. 7.

6: At the same time ERE made use of a host of state and para-state organisations, to ensure the exclusion of its opponents from any political participation whatsoever, to intimidate the electorate, and so secure its vote; if all these means proved insufficient, the party did not hesitate to resort to electoral violence and fraud (for details see ch. 1). All these practices were inherent features of the post-war socio-political regime until 1967; the new regime established in 1974 by ND never once resorted to them.

7: In this respect, the specific course of ND resembles that of the French RPR which, within a decade (1975-1986), "transformed itself from

a party dominated by the old Gaullist guard (UDR) into a mass party", and also that of the German CDU between 1962 and 1971; for these points, see Raschke J. and Katsoulis H. (eds), op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 322-3 and 374-5 respectively.

8: This discrepancy between a theoretically fully developed party organisational structure, and poor (if any) respect for it in practice, can also be found in British politics:

"...and even after they had come to accept the party congress as a valuable instrument it took the British Conservatives a long time to transform this from a conveyor belt for the leaders' wishes into an organ of democratic will formation... Even the Conservative Party no longer follows Balfour's famous *bon mot* that on policy he would sooner consult his valet than a Conservative Party Conference. Though the Party Conference has not yet developed into a policy-making body the discussions are of some importance for the guidelines of politics. Since 1967 there have been formal resolutions after the debates, and since 1965 the Conservative Party leader has tended to be present the whole time and not appear only for a final speech to the delegates."

See von Beyme K., op. cit., pp. 233 and 364.

9: For these points see Lyrantzis C., Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Ph.D thesis, University of London, LSE, November 1983, especially ch. 4, "Organisation and Leadership", pp. 148-98.

10: In this respect, it seems that Karamanlis followed de Gaulle's earlier example when founding the RPF in 1947:

"He did not want to found a party but a *rassemblement*, a movement that Frenchmen from all walks of life could join and that would not represent a coalition of special interests or an ideological family but the whole nation".

See Lauber V., "Change and continuity in French conservatism since 1944", in Girvin B. (ed), The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism, London: SAGE Publications, 1988, pp. 35-54.

11: This fear of dogma in general, or even of a set of specific principles, has always been a characteristic of conservative parties; with respect to the British case, it has been argued (see von Beyme K., op. cit., p. 50) that

"Precisely because they were less bound to a programme than the Liberals... or the Socialists... the Conservatives have often proved freer and more flexible in adapting new items under political challenge from opponents and protest movements. They have been skilful in combining a new line with the 'national tradition' which they maintained that they were —naturally, as it were— representing. A diagrammatic representation of the positions of British parties showed that the Conservative Party has had much stronger fluctuations in its programme than the Labour Party".

12: Karamanlis' personal authority within ND can be compared to that of Konrad Adenauer's within the German CDU. As Franz Meyers (Minister-President of North-Rhine Westfalia) declared at the CDU's national congress in 1958, "The name of the Federal Chancellor is our programme"; cited in Grande E., "Neoconservatism without neoconservatives? The renaissance and transformation of contemporary German conservatism", in Girvin B. (ed), op. cit., pp. 54-77.

13: See Girvin B., "Introduction: Varieties of conservatism", in Girvin B. (ed), op. cit., pp. 1-12.

14: For the respective developments in the U.K. see Peele G., "British conservatism: Ideological change and electoral uncertainty", in Girvin B., op. cit., pp. 13-34.

15: It should be recalled at this point that the communist party was outlawed in 1947; for more details of the events that led to the imposition of this "police democracy" regime and the establishment of the so-called State of the Right, see ch. 1 and particularly section 2.1.2.

16: On the concept of incorporation (and on those of clientelism and populism as modes of political inclusion), see Mouzelis N., Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America, London: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 73-94.

17: For a detailed elaboration of this point, see Mouzelis N., "Continuities and discontinuities in Greek politics: From Eleftherios Venizelos to Andreas Papandreou", in Les Temps Modernes, Athens: Exantas, 1986 (in Greek), pp. 149-162.

18: This close affiliation with the monarchy most probably explains why during the early 1960s --when certain political developments affecting the relationship between the ERE and EK party leaderships and the King reached a deadlock-- Karamanlis chose to withdraw from politics, whereas G. Papandreou clashed with the King, and with the institution of the monarchy as such. For more details see section 3 in ch. 1.

19: For the role of the state as a powerful and omnipresent entity, as the chief agent that took the lead in the country's course towards capitalist development, and its predominance over civil society, see Mouzelis N., "Capitalism and the development of the Greek state", in Scase R. (ed), The State in Western Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 241-73.

20: For a detailed analysis on the rise of the 1967 military dictatorship in Greece, see Mouzelis N., Politics in the Semi-Periphery..., op. cit., pp. 134-45.

21: On authoritarian conservatism, see Girvin B., "Introduction: Varieties of conservatism", in Girvin B. (ed), op. cit., pp. 1-12.

22: A detailed account of the transition to and consolidation of democratic institutions after 1974 and the specific social and political features of the new regime is presented in ch. 2 of this study.

23: By this, we do not mean that it was an outright authoritarian regime. In a parliamentary democracy of the Western European kind (say the British democracy), it is not at all illegitimate for the premier to

enjoy a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis his party and parliament, the more so as he was elected to his post. However, the Greek case presents the peculiarity that, whereas in West European parties the power of the leader is seriously limited by strongly institutionalised organisational procedures and by the party's various governing bodies and assemblies, their Greek counterparts have never developed the respective mechanisms that would guarantee even a minimum control over their leaders' actions. Consequently, within such a prime-ministerial democracy, it is left to the premier's discretion whether to govern democratically or by employing repressive and authoritarian methods. Even after 1975 all Greek premiers, and particularly PASOK leader A. Papandreu, in total disregard of either party regulations or parliamentary procedures, have occasionally indulged in authoritarian measures in order to get things done the way they wished.

24: See Mavrogordatos G., "The emerging party system", in Clogg R. (ed), Greece in the 1980s, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 70-94.

25: By the term "integrative political force" (as opposed to incorporative or inclusionist) is meant a party that draws political support, and introduces the popular masses to politics, through impersonal, modern and autonomous means —as for example the elaboration of ideological principles and the creation of a well-structured and efficient mass organisation. By contrast, the designation of inclusionist or incorporative applies to a party rather poorly organised, which relies more on personalistic and dependent means (e.g. clientelism and/or populism) in order to rally mass support. For a detailed elaboration of inclusionist/incorporative and integrative means of political control, see Mouzelis N., Politics in the Semi-Periphery..., op. cit., pp. 73-94.

26: For a very detailed account of these points and for an analytical examination of the course of the country's economic developmental process, see Mouzelis N., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1978.

27: For a complete and detailed documentation of these points see Mouzelis N., Politics in the Semi-Periphery..., op. cit.

28: These points all apply to the bourgeois parties. The communists have had always a concrete ideology in Greece, as everywhere else, and the KKE created and developed a huge, but clandestine, mass organisation, since being banned for 27 years (from 1947 until 1974) this was the only way to keep the party alive. This highly impersonal, bureaucratic and militant organisation was free to act in the open after 1974, and was quantitatively and qualitatively beyond comparison with that of any other party.

29: Populism has not been a characteristic feature of the Greek post-war political culture. However, together with clientelism it is a feature of the traditional relations of political domination, and has been extensively used in countries of Latin America (which exhibit a similar development to Greece in terms of early parliamentarism and late industrialisation —on this point see Mouzelis N., Politics in the Semi-Periphery..., op. cit.) for drawing people into politics in a dependent, vertical, and heteronomous manner. On clientelism and populism as constituent parts of the traditional "underdog" political culture see Mouzelis N., "Institutions and political culture", and his "The future belongs to the modernisers", both (in Greek) in the newspaper To Vima, of 23 and 30 August 1992 respectively.

30: See Mavrogordatos G., op. cit., pp. 75-6.

APPENDIX I

Proclamation of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis on the Foundation of the Political Front of "New Democracy"

28 September 1974

The great issue of our time is democracy. Everybody talks of democracy but few understand it, and even fewer have the will and the ability to put it into practice.

Of the 140 countries that exist in the world, only 19 have a true democracy. This indicates that this marvellous and delicate form of government is difficult to implement, and that it presupposes special circumstances without which it cannot flower and bear fruit.

All peoples would wish to have democracy, but only those have it who, apart from an awareness of its advantages, also respect the terms of its functioning.

Modern Greece is one of the modern countries that have adopted democracy as its system of government. This was natural, for democracy was born in Greece. However, our modern democracy has functioned imperfectly and with frequent and long interruptions. One after the other there have been coups, revolutions, dictatorships, changes in the system of government, civil wars. The country's periods of democratic government on the other hand were few and short, bright intervals in the turbulent history of modern Greece.

If democracy has not functioned smoothly in Greece, this was due to the fact that the preconditions for its existence were missing or could not be created. These conditions are a mild political climate, peaceable

political mores, and institutions adapted to the particular circumstances of our country.

The Greeks have had a taste of all political situations, such a bitter taste, that new errors and mistakes are unforgiveable. We are already entering on a new period of our national life, and it is incumbent upon us, with the experience of the past, to create the necessary conditions so that, at last, achieve a healthy and lasting democracy.

If we do not take advantage of this unique opportunity, we shall in vain seek another in the future. The first phase is, however, already being negotiated with good prospects.

What has happened in Greece with the help of the people over the past two months truly borders on a political miracle, because the transition from dictatorship to freedom took place in painless fashion, although many had expected bloodshed and internecine strife. Many also believed that the dismantling of the mechanism of tyranny and the process of the return to democracy would be slow and painful. But this also took place within these two months.

This important work, which has been completed quickly and thoroughly does not, however, mean that the problem of Greek democracy has been fully resolved once and for all. Dangers will always remain. It will be necessary both to be vigilant, and to rally the people into powerful political formations, able to protect democracy not only from communism and fascism, but also from the causes that occasioned its downfall in the past.

With this precise national objective in view, I have considered it my duty to create a broad and vital political front —"*Nea Dimokratia*".

"New Democracy" is rooted in the belief —acquired through bitter experience by the older generation and strongly felt by the younger— that a new political life is necessary for the survival, the progress

and the success of Greece. It is founded on our experience of the past and envisions a better and more certain future.

The "New Democracy" front is composed of sound and experienced, but also of new progressive and radical political forces, harnessed towards the same end: to realize the *Nea Dimokratia* concept in Greece, —to give the country a new democracy.

"New Democracy" is the political front that identifies the nation with the people, the motherland with its inhabitants, the state with its citizens, national independence with popular sovereignty, progress with the common good, political freedom with the rule of law and social justice.

"New Democracy" is the system whereby the few and the named give a lead instead of engaging in demagogy, represent instead of oppress and, in the final analysis, serve the many and nameless.

"New Democracy" is the movement that selects and preserves from the past only that which time has shown to be true and useful. And it will continue to go forward with large, bold, but at the same time sure steps towards new and continually developing circumstances.

"New Democracy" is the political front that ignores the disputes and schisms of the past, which have so terribly riven our country, and is oriented towards broader and more powerful forms of national unity.

The "New Democracy" front seeks the co-operation of the Greek people and, in particular, of the younger generation, for the realization of its objectives, and it promises:

- That it will always and exclusively serve the true interests of the nation, which are to be found over and beyond the misleading labels of Right, Centre and Left.

- That it will always consider all Greeks not only as equal before the law, but with the same equality of rights to life's opportunities

and in the possibilities that are opened up by political, economic, and social life.

- That it will devote all its powers, the experience, the knowledge, and the enthusiasm of its older and younger cadres to the rapid development of Greece in all sectors.

- That the economic freedom in which "New Democracy" believes cannot exclude the widening of the economic sector controlled by the state; and that individual initiative cannot be justified without the parallel participation of the broader popular classes in the distribution of the national product. Every citizen of this country should be both a worker for and a participant in economic prosperity, and should feel assured of his future and the future of his children.

- That it will be continually renewed by the younger forces of the country, which it considers always to be privileged, because they express more directly the pulse of our time.

- That it will, not only in times of surplus but also of deficit in national wealth, invest in education, training and scientific research, for it believes that it is spiritual and cultural values that in the long run will determine the fate of the Greek Nation.

- That it will not flinch from effort and sacrifice in order to make Greece strong and unassailable. With modernised armed forces the independence of Greece will be strengthened. She will be respected by all, without the need for protectors other than the collective organisations in which she will participate of her own free will, and in accordance with the permanent interests of Hellenism, in which the fate of Cyprus is included.

- That it will fight for the full and total safeguarding of popular sovereignty and that, towards this end, it will aim at the harmonisation of the governmental system with the conditions of Greek reality.

"New Democracy" believes that Greece is not only entitled to, but can assure, the distinguished place and the happiness of her people within the Europe to which she belongs if she mobilises all her abilities, and if she makes use of all the virtues of her people.

Irrespective of her size, Greece with her intellectual heritage, the brilliance of Hellenism, together with the liveliness of her people, can contribute politically, morally and culturally to the realization of the idea of a united Europe.

A fundamental precondition, however, for all this is the rooting in our country of a genuine and up-to-date democracy. Towards this end the great front of "New Democracy" is totally and unequivocally dedicated.

I invite all those who share my anxiety about, and hopes for, the future, and who burn with the desire for a political rebirth, to enlist on our side. Addressing myself especially to the young, I invite them to become the vanguard in this sortie of national reconstruction. For a proud and happy Greece!

Constantine Karamanlis

APPENDIX II.a

ND's ballot (November 1977 election) in the Second District of Athens.

The portrait of Karamanlis served as the party's emblem from 1974 until 1979.



Ν Ε Α Δ Η Μ Ο Κ Ρ Α Τ Ι Α

Σ Υ Ν Δ Υ Α Σ Μ Ο Σ

Β' Α Θ Η Ν Ω Ν

ΒΑΡΒΙΤΣΙΩΤΗΣ ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ του Μιλτιάδου
ΒΟΥΚΕΛΑΤΟΣ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ του Κωνσταντίνου
ΒΡΕΤΤΑΚΟΣ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ του Λεωνίδα
ΔΑΒΑΚΗΣ ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ του Δικαίου
ΔΑΛΑΚΟΥΡΑΣ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ του Δημητρίου
ΚΑΜΠΟΥΛΑΚΗΣ ΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΣ του Σπυρίδωνος
ΚΑΡΑΘΑΝΑΣΗΣ ΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΣ του Δημητρίου
ΚΑΡΑΤΖΑΣ ΧΑΡΗΣ του Θεοφάνους
ΚΟΡΑΧΑΝΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟΣ του 'Ιωάννου
ΚΟΥΤΗΦΑΡΗ ΛΙΝΑ σύζ. Βασιλείου
ΚΡΑΤΣΑΣ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΣ του Γεωργίου
ΚΡΙΚΟΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΣ του 'Ιωάννου
ΛΑΣΚΑΡΗΣ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ του Γεωργίου
ΜΙΚΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ ΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΣ του 'Αλεξάνδρου
ΜΠΕΡΝΙΤΣΙΑΣ ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ του 'Ιωάννου
ΜΠΟΥΣΜΠΟΥΚΕΑΣ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ του Μιχαήλ
ΠΑΠΑΔΑΚΗΣ ΣΤΥΛΙΑΝΟΣ του Σταύρου
ΠΑΠΑΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΥ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ του Κωνσταντίνου
ΠΑΠΑΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΥ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΣ του Βασιλείου
ΠΑΠΑΡΡΗΓΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ του 'Ιωάννου
ΠΟΛΥΔΩΡΑΣ ΒΥΡΩΝ του Γεωργίου
ΣΙΣΜΑΝΗΣ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ του 'Αριστείδου
ΣΤΕΦΑΝΙΔΗΣ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ του Στεφάνου
ΤΣΑΛΔΑΡΗΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΣ του Κωνσταντίνου
ΤΣΟΥΚΑΝΤΑΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΣ του Γεωργίου
ΦΟΥΦΑΣ ΖΗΣΗΣ του Γεωργίου
ΦΥΣΣΙΑΣ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΣ του 'Ιωάννου
ΧΡΥΣΗΣ ΕΥΣΤΑΘΙΟΣ του 'Εμμανουήλ

APPENDIX II.b

ND's new emblem adopted by the party's 1979 congress. (Front cover of ND: Ideological Principles and Party Statutes, Athens: ND Publication, June 1979).

ΙΔΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΕΣ ΑΡΧΕΣ

*

ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΤΙΚΟ



ΑΘΗΝΑ
ΙΟΥΝΙΟΣ 1979

APPENDIX II.c

The prefix liberal (phileleftheri) has been added to the party's name.

(Back cover of a party-propaganda leaflet distributed shortly before the June 1985 election.)

«Για να καταπολεμηθούν τα πιο κρίσιμα προβλήματα του τόπου, η ανεργία, ο πληθωρισμός, η δυσβάστακτη φορολογία, η κρατική γραφειοκρατία, τα τεράστια εξωτερικά χρέος, χρειάζεται περισσότερη, όχι λιγότερη, οικονομική ελευθερία. Περισσότερη εμπιστοσύνη στον κάθε Έλληνα και στις ικανότητες του. Μόνο αν απελευθερώσουμε τη δημιουργικότητα, τα δαμόνια του Έλληνα, θα βγάλουμε από την κρίση, θα πετύχουμε την οικονομική ανάκαμψη της πατρίδας μας».

Από την Ισολογική Διακήρυξη της Νέας Δημοκρατίας

φιλελευθέρη

ΝΕΑ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ



APPENDIX III

ND MEMBERSHIP FROM 1974 UNTIL EARLY 1992

<u>Year</u>	<u>Local Organisations</u>	<u>Departmental Organisations</u>	<u>Professional Organisations</u>	<u>Party Members</u>	<u>Ratio Voters/Members</u>
1974	unavailable	unav.	unav.	unav.	unav.
1975	40	50	unav.	unav.	unav.
1977	150	51	8	20,000	107.3
1979	380	62	25	150,000	unav.
1980	unav.	62	25	150,000	unav.
1981	500	62	25	150,000	13.6
1983	2,000	unav.	unav.	220,000	unav.
1986	3,000	62	200	200,000	unav.
1988	3,300	66	unav.	unav.	unav.
1992	3,500	70	106	400,000	7.7 ^(a)

Note (a): The 1992 ratio (7.7, or 13%) is the quotient between the 3,087,348 people who voted for ND in 1990 and the 400,000 ND members in early 1992.

A more detailed presentation of the party's membership is as shown below:

1975

Departmental Committees: 50
Local Organisations: 40

Autumn 1976

Department of Women's Voluntary Work-Offer
300 members (of which 25: leading party members)
(Provisional) Departmental Committees: 100 approx.

Preliminary Congress 1977

Departmental Committees: 51
Local Organisations: 150
Professional Organisations: 8 with 3,500 members
Delegates: 1751 (155 women)
Members: 20,000

First Congress 1979

Departmental Committees: 62
Local Organisations: 380
Professional Organisations: 25
Delegates: 816
Members: 150,000

6 December 1980: Peripheral Congress, Athens, Hilton

Delegates: 1700

27-28 June 1981: Ad-hoc Congress, Athens

Delegates: 1250
Local Organisations: 500 (but inactive, according to ND's leadership)

December 1983

Local Organisations: over 2000
New members: 70,000 (=over 220,000)

Second Congress, 1986

Departmental Committees: 62
Local Organisations: 3,000
Professional Organisations (EKO): 200 approx.
Members: 200,000
Delegates: almost 1,000

Second National Conference, October 1988

Departmental Committees: 66
Local Organisations: 3,300

December 1991

Departmental Committees: 70
Local Organisations: 3,500 approx.
Professional Organisations (EKO): 106
Members: 400,000 (elect 23,000 party officials)

.....
ONNED's (New Democracy's Youth Organisation, founded in late 1975)
organisational development, is as follows:

1977

Local Offices: 97
Offices in Europe: 32
Official Newspaper: Dimokratiki Protoporia (Democratic Vanguard)
University Newspaper: O Spoudastis (The Student)

1978

Formulation of its first charter
Local Offices: 150 approx.

1979

Local Offices: 220 of which 15 were problematic, according to ONNED's
leadership (Athens: 70, Provinces: 150)

1981

Local Offices: 200 approx.

1986

Local Offices: 470 (Athens: 170, Provinces: 300)
Members: 50,000

March 1987

ONNED's First Congress (From this time onwards, ONNED's president is
elected by the youth organisation itself and not appointed by the party
president as previously.)

April 1989

Members: 80,000 approx.

January 1992

ONNED's Second Congress
Elected ONNED officials: 20,000
Departmental Committees: 62 (Athens: 34, Provinces: 28)
Local offices: 427 (Athens: 71, Provinces: 356)

APPENDIX IV

ND's Ideological Principles-1979

Drawn up by ND President C. Karamanlis, and sanctioned by the party's First Congress in Chalkidiki, 5-7 May 1979.

1. ND believes in the national ideal. It recognises and accepts that the nation remains the natural framework of the individual's life. No person and no party can consider itself sufficiently worthy, in moral, political or cultural terms, to function outside the national framework.

National awareness is awareness of a mission. It inspires the people and urges them to strive for their country's progress and independence, and to protect her even by sacrificing their lives.

ND is inspired by and follows the example of the brilliant cultural prototypes created by Greek civilisation in ages past. The essence of its political philosophy is Greek, and it combines healthy tradition with the best that modern thought has to offer.

ND considers its primary obligation as safeguarding national independence and the country's territorial integrity. It believes that the Greek nation can continue on its historic course and develop its natural culture only when it is free, independent, and sovereign, because national independence is a prerequisite for democracy. Of course, there have been and there are independent countries without democracy, but there have never been, and neither will there ever be, democratic countries without national independence.

2. ND believes in the peaceful coexistence of peoples. It condemns any violent and authoritarian act; any kind of intervention in other countries' internal affairs, and it unconditionally favours Greece's participation in the international organisations that aim at safeguarding world peace. Nonetheless, it also holds that these

organisations should be given the authority to enforce sanctions, so that they can defend the international order effectively.

ND believes that no people seeks war. That is why it considers national and political freedom a basic factor for the establishment of world-wide peace, because only when people are free can they express their desire for peace, and so influence the policies of their respective governments.

ND believes that Greece's place lies with the Western world with which she has long been connected politically, economically and defensively. She stands for the same ideals, and she has the same political philosophy as all the democratic countries that make up the Western world. This stance, though, has never prevented Greece from developing friendly relations with all peoples, and especially with her neighbours and the Arab world. Greece furthers the idea of multi-state co-operation in the Balkans as of benefit to the interests of the Balkan peoples and preserving the peace in that area.

ND has sought, and has succeeded in achieving, the organic integration of Greece in the European Community, because it believes in the ideal of a United Europe and wishes to contribute towards its realization. At the same time ND believes that Greece as a member of the Community, while preserving her national characteristics, will accelerate her economic and cultural development; will safeguard her democratic institutions; will reinforce her national independence; and that she will have a say, not only in her own fortunes, but in the future course of Europe, since she will influence Community resolutions through her vote.

3. ND believes in Parliamentary Democracy, that is, in a militant democracy, and not one that is paralysed; in a democracy capable of effectively defending freedom and the progress of the social whole; in a

democracy that combines freedom with order, and order with social justice. There can be no freedom without order, just as there can be no order without social justice.

ND does not accept that there can be economic and social objectives for the realization of which democratic freedoms are worth sacrificing. No objective is more sacred than the citizen's right to decide his/her own future. Nevertheless, ND equally denies the abuse of freedom that undermines democracy and finally leads to its disintegration. Democracy presupposes a free and self-disciplined citizen, since democracy is not imposed; it is a way of life, and it must be realized in the citizens' everyday existence. It presupposes respect for the principles of the majority and of law. If today democracy is at risk, it is mainly due to the abuse of that freedom that democracy so generously offers to every citizen.

ND stands against all forms of totalitarianism. It stands against Communism, because Communism considers the abolition of democracy a prerequisite for the implementation of its own programme; and because it denies the sanctity of the individual since it deprives him —along with all other freedoms— of the joy and hope of personal creativity. ND stands equally against all forms of dictatorship; because tyrannies, in addition to doing away with freedom, usually lead to disaster through adventurism.

ND rejects the theory of a party representing a class, as this results in national disintegration. ND does not represent the interests of a particular class. It represents all who follow it, and who come from all classes of the Greek people, and for all of whom it is working.

Free from dogmatism and messianism, ND maintains the possibility of adopting the best solutions at any time, even the most radical ones, when these are dictated by the national interest. That is why there is no place for ND in the absurd and misleading Right-Centre-Left fiction.

This arbitrary classification has only one essential distinction: the separation of parties into democratic and totalitarian. The differences among most democratic parties are either insignificant or artificial, dictated by a need to justify their presence in the political arena. Also their differences, where they do exist, are restricted mainly to the degree of state intervention which in itself, however, they all accept in principle.

4. ND strives for social justice, believing that democracy cannot be established, and cannot function normally, without social justice.

ND considers all Greeks equal not only before the law, but also with regard to the opportunities opened up by political, economic, and social life. Each citizen should partake of the national product in proportion to his contribution to its creation. If democracy is to have an essential meaning, then each citizen should be free from future uncertainty by securing permanent employment, fair pay for his work, and full assurance of his own and his children's future.

When a people cannot enjoy social justice within a democratic regime, confidence in the democratic ideal is shaken. Then totalitarian movements with their propaganda try to convince the people that by sacrificing their freedom they will gain some Never-never-Land. But the abolition of their freedom will never be rewarded by a better standard of living; on the contrary, deprivation will be added to slavery since, as has been proved in practice, totalitarian regimes are economically underdeveloped compared with democratic ones. Moreover, when people are at the mercy of an authoritarian administration, they lose all possibility of demanding respect for their rights through free criticism and trade-union activity.

5. ND believes in a free democratic economy, because it can bring about a steady improvement in the people's living standards, as experience has shown. A prerequisite for the development of a free economy is the continuous strengthening of the buying capacity of large segments of the population, given that mass-production presupposes mass-consumption. It actually happens in Western economies that the buying capacity of the population rises faster than its production, and that this is the basic cause of inflation. Inflation is mainly an outcome of over-consumption, and this is why it cannot be restricted without the understanding and co-operation of all citizens. ND believes that economic freedom cannot be unlimited. It must combine personal with social interest, and it is exactly this equilibrium, that the party's economic philosophy is striving for.

Economic development is not an end in itself, but a prerequisite and a means for social progress. Certainly, the happiness of human beings is not increased by a continuous accumulation of material goods. On the other hand, the ceaseless pursuit of material prosperity is, by its very nature, insatiable; it is one of the unhealthy symptoms of our time, and has caused the multi-lateral crisis which is evident in the developed countries. If it is not counterbalanced by other, morally higher objectives, modern societies will never be able to live free of anxiety. Man's happiness depends more on the quality of life than on material wealth. This does not mean, of course, that efforts towards better standards of living for our people should be diminished, especially with regard to the poorer social classes. These efforts must not neglect the qualitative element, however.

The economic philosophy of ND is oriented towards economic systems prevailing in those democratic countries of Europe with which our economy is closely linked. ND believes in the creative zeal of the individual whose productivity multiplies by the intensive use of his/

her abilities. However, it also believes that, just as anarchy abolishes freedom, so do excesses in free competition threaten the foundations not only of a country's economic, but also of its social life. For this reason, ND maintains that the state should intervene and balance economic and social antitheses; it should reduce inequalities and step in to replace private initiative, whenever economic and social reasons dictate such a course.

6. ND believes in the country's cultural potential. Political action should not be confined to dealing only with ordinary everyday problems. It should create the necessary conditions for the continuous intellectual development and the cultural brilliance of the nation. Education and, more generally, the care of our youth, constitute the means of this long-term policy. Education shapes free and democratic people, capable of contributing to the country's progress. ND believes that intellectual and cultural values will greatly help the country to find its place in international society in more permanent and more elevated fashion. The dynamism of the Greek civilisation has proved itself through the ages. The enthusiasm and the adequate education of the young generation is expected to create a prospering Greece at home and an intellectually brilliant one abroad.

Our entry in the European Community opens for us new perspectives in this respect. More specifically, it offers great chances to our youth for personal well-being. But above all, it offers them an ideal: to participate in the crusade for a United Europe, and through the latter to the transformation of modern life. Marxist or fascist theories are outmoded and do not offer ideals. They have been tested in reality and have been seen to lead to results opposite from those they claimed. Those who insist on adhering to them are not, as they may think, progressive, but backward.

APPENDIX V

Constantine Mitsotakis: A New Proposal for Freedom, 3 February 1985.

At its Chalkidiki Congress in 1979, New Democracy determined that the ideological framework that constitutes radical liberalism is faith in the idea of the nation, faith in parliamentary democracy, faith in the free democratic economy, faith in social justice, faith in the peaceful coexistence of peoples, and faith in the country's cultural potential. New Democracy is, and always will be, unequivocally committed to these principles.

New Democracy is an up-to-date progressive party, one that continues to develop. It feels the need today to proclaim its ideological priorities. ND pledges to the Greek people that its first objective is the strengthening of democracy and the broadening of freedom. ND undertakes, before all Greeks, the responsibility for freedom to constitute the overriding principle of every one of its ideological positions, of all its political activity. Its radical liberal proposal for the Greece of tomorrow, the Greece of the twenty-first century, is above all a new proposal for freedom.

At the Chalkidiki Congress the founder of ND, emphasising the significance of freedom, declared: "ND does not accept that there can be economic and social objectives for the realization of which democratic freedoms are worth sacrificing". At the preliminary congress of ND its founder emphasised again: "No objective is more sacred than the right of the citizen to decide his future for himself".

The ideological identity of ND, its liberal principles, constitute the surest guarantee that it is the standard bearer of renewal in our country. And the need for this renewal becomes daily more urgent as the country is regressing. The rapid swelling of an already overblown public

sector with low productivity has had as for its economic consequences high inflation, increased unemployment, greater bureaucracy, heavier taxation, and a growing foreign debt which lead us to greater economic dependence. It also has as a political consequence an unprecedented arrogance of power. The time has come to stop this decline. The country needs liberal solutions, revolving around freedom and man, based on the principles of equality of rights and meritocracy, a political framework that encourages dialogue, moderation, tolerance, consensus, and which will give young people the chance to develop their abilities and to create a new, modern, and open society.

1. Greater Freedom

Freedom exists when man's oppression of man, of each one of us, has become so weak that it is non-existent. Such oppression can be exercised by individuals, but chiefly it is exercised by the state and its mechanisms. The obligation of the state is to protect the people and their freedoms from the arbitrariness of other people. Who, however, will protect the people and their freedoms from the arbitrariness of the state? This question is especially critical for every Liberal. In the final analysis, an arbitrary state is much stronger, and consequently much more dangerous, than isolated individuals. The experience of the twentieth century has shown that wherever the state has been deified and has become omnipotent, where the doctrine "the interests of the state above all else" has prevailed—as in fascist, national-socialist and communist systems—there individual freedoms were abolished and the people led unavoidably towards totalitarianism.

In our own country during the last few years we have been witness to an especially disturbing phenomenon: the growth of a centralised, bureaucratic and arbitrary state, which easily passes into the tight control of the government party and becomes a means for the perpetuation

of its power position. This expansion of the state, the increased arrogance of those who enjoy it, is fed by the rulers' passion for more and more permanent power —which power leads unavoidably to the weakening and marginalisation of every Greek citizen, and finally to the refusal of the party-state to accept the Greek as an independent and autonomous personality. Our country, however, has no need of, nor does it miss such a state. On the contrary, it has a need for freer and consequently responsible citizens.

ND rejects the state with all-powerful executive power. It wants a competent state, smaller in extent and controlled by democratic legality.

It wants:

-The machinery of the state to be totally divorced from that of the ruling party.

-Reduction of state expansion, particularly in the economy.

-Justice to be truly independent and able, unequivocally and boldly, to guarantee the conduct of political power within the framework of the constitution.

-Parliament restored to its highest mission —and not marginal as it is today— so as to constitute a credible means of control over the rulers, and also a substantial factor in the political life of the country.

-The means of mass communication fully freed, independent, open to dissenting views, and in the service of objectively informing the Greek people, so that they not remind us of the present pitiful situation.

-Independent and unfettered trade unionism as a protector of the interests of the working people instead of being lackeys of a political party.

2. Liberal Principles

ND's new proposal for freedom is based on unalterable liberal principles:

-For ND the overriding ideal directing its political path is freedom. ND condemns the denial and undermining of freedom in the name of other, supposedly higher values. Freedom certainly cannot stand on its own, and must coexist with other important values such as equality of opportunity, social justice and order. But for ND freedom is not simply a means to a greater end; it is itself the highest political aim.

-At the heart of the liberal system is man. Society is not a reality independent of man; social institutions and the state exist to serve man, not the other way round.

ND is striving for social justice to prevail in our motherland. As was emphasised at the Chalkidiki Congress, "ND considers all Greeks equal not only before the law, but also with regard to the opportunities opened up by political, economic, and social life. Each citizen should partake of the national product in proportion to his contribution to its creation". ND aims at the widest possible distribution of wealth, so that those who are economically the weakest may be helped. The redistribution of income is a means for the protection of the weak, without this harming the economic development that is a precondition for the prosperity of us all. Social justice in this sense —and not some utopian equality of income— is unbreakably linked with liberalism. Because liberalism is the foe of every privilege, and seeks the just recognition of every person's abilities.

-ND believes in the rule of justice, in the implementation of the Constitution and of the laws protecting the individual and political rights of citizens. Every government must serve the state of justice and constitutional order and thus every Greek, not only those favoured by the party that governs. In the just state, the highest judge of

differences between the citizens and the state are the laws, the force of which no party or government expediency can annul. The legal state is based on the clear distinction of powers, on the legitimacy of the public administration. Its objective is the liberation from and protection against any party or trade-union arbitrariness, the assurance of respect for and service of the citizen.

-ND believes that freedom is assured through order —an order, however, that "is not the mother but the daughter of freedom", an order for, and not against, freedom. This order is not based on force, but on the rule of law, with laws that are clear, just, enforceable and few in number. Thus the law, instead of tyrannising the citizen, liberates him.

-Within the framework of our democratic constitution, the political minority's critique of a liberal government is necessary, and dialogue is a precondition for its decisions. The elected government has the right to rule. No organised interest can be allowed to prevent a democratic government from enforcing its programme. The opposite constitutes a denial of democracy.

-Free economy and personal property both constitute the soil where the seed of political freedom grows, where the individual's autonomy and independence from state power is maintained, where the material and cultural progress of all, and particularly of the working people, is assured. Wherever the free economy and private ownership have been abolished, it is precisely where an omnipotent state has been created, civil liberties have been violated, society has withered and economic development has been obstructed.

-A free economy is democratic since it is imbued throughout by the sovereignty of individual choice, free of the imposition of state bureaucracy and state monopolies. A free economy, which operates without state distortions and favours, knows nothing of privilege, nor

protection of interests, nor obstacles to the realization of the objectives of each individual.

-New liberalism is not the undiluted liberalism of the last century. The state has an important role to play in the economic sector: in assuring and in encouraging competition, guarding against every kind of monopoly, providing incentives for economic development, and offering protection to the weak.

-ND believes that freedom requires property, for property assures freedom. Property is not an end in itself, but a means for the ensuring and development of human liberty. Ownership of property vouchsafes the citizen the necessary "private area" of activity, where he can develop his personality, can express his social independence, can exercise his professional activities, and cast off economic insecurity. ND believes that every Greek should have property and should not be penalised on account of it. Property is the natural fruit of the work of the labourer, the peasant, the professional man, every man. This is why property-ownership is not a sin, but on the contrary part of man's striving. Property, especially when it is spread widely, is therefore a mechanism for the liberation of man.

-ND proceeds from the basic principle that the raising of the quality of life and the protection of the environment should be valued as a right of all citizens. Those who destroy the environment, in essence violate one of the basic rights of man, that of living in health. For this reason ND will protect the environment from every illegality, irrespective of whatever special interests may be affected by this policy. Another objective of ND is the creation of better conditions for the Greek people to employ their leisure time.

3. ND's Political Identity

ND is the standard bearer of that liberal renewal which the country needs, because it is both radical and liberal —radical because it aims at the daring modernisation of our political, economic and social life with the year 2000 in view, liberal because it goes about this renewal by ensuring greater freedom, more emphasis on the individual, and greater confidence in the Greek and his abilities.

ND differs from a conservative party because it does not fear change.

The liberal choice is progressive *par excellence* because:

-Progressive is he who does not subject man to superseded dogmas and outworn shibboleths, and who realizes that behind the facade of socialist experimentation of "change", real change is excluded.

-Progressive is he who seeks to liberate the creative strengths of men and women, to enrich the possibilities of choice, to rid the individual of both state centralisation and of the blank conformity that results from everybody embracing a single belief.

-Progressive is he who accords his fellow human beings their autonomy and responsibility; and above all, progressive is he who can combine the objective of change with responsibility. Hyper-revolutionaries are counter-revolutionaries.

-Progressive is he who believes in the wider co-operation and brotherhood of man, who believes that a United Europe is the best framework for such co-operation amongst the democracies of our continent.

ND is the party of dialogue, of moderation, of the middle way and of fairness. From its principles and beliefs stem the rejection of every extremism, every dogma, every messianic understanding, as also its faith in a climate of moderation and in democratic dialogue. ND rejects the devaluation of public life, the political animosity and fanaticism, the division of Greeks into "us" and "them" on the basis of class and party criteria.

When ND comes to power it will not operate as a destroyer. Its objective will be to build, not to pull down. Whatever exists today that is correct it will not overthrow, but will improve on and lead it to complete fulfillment. For this reason it will not appear as a revenger but as a conciliator. There is room in our country for all of us, whatever our ideological belief; and the state does not belong to some more than to others, but to all Greeks equally.

To confront the most critical problems of the country—unemployment, inflation, intolerable taxation, state bureaucracy, and the vast external debt—calls for greater, not less, economic freedom; for more confidence in every Greek and in his abilities; for diminished emphasis on impersonal state bureaucracies and the rule of a privileged ruling caste. It is only if we liberate the creativeness, the genius of the Greek, that we shall emerge from the crisis, that we can succeed in the economic revival of our country.

The time has come to give priority to the Greek citizen and not to the party state. We can have popular sovereignty and progress too, only if it is the Greek citizen who takes the many decisions and not the privileged who enjoy state power. ND's objective is a society that does not serve abstract totalities, but cares for each of the people who compose it. The centre of our world is not an impersonal state apparatus, but men—free men, who without let or hindrance observe, choose, decide and create.

The objective of a liberal government is not to impose from above some "enlightened" prototype on a citizenry unable to refuse. Its objective is, rather, to ensure the preconditions that will allow the Greeks themselves, without impediment, to create the society they want, so that they themselves may shape their own future and that of their children.

This is the new proposal for freedom that we make to the Greek people.

APPENDIX VI

ND's Ideological Principles-1986

The ideological principles, drawn up definitely by ND's founder C. Karamanlis and sanctioned unanimously by the First Congress in Chalkidiki in May 1979, constitute an intellectual heritage, a source of combative inspiration and a compass for our stable orientation. Party President C. Mitsotakis has declared in his February manifesto "A New Proposal for Freedom" that ND does, and will always, adhere to these basic principles.

(From the introduction to the Ideological Declaration
at the Second Congress, Salonica, 14-16 February 1986)

ND's Real Political Identity

ND is a democratic and modern, popular and social, radical and liberal, European and national political party.

-It is a democratic party, because it believes in democracy in its clearest sense and to its fullest functioning—in a militant democracy and not one that is paralysed; in a democracy that knows how to protect itself, and that renews the country's political personnel continuously and meritocratically. It believes in a democracy that guarantees parliamentarism and popular sovereignty, and that is integrated by respecting the citizen and his participation in social life. ND is the only political camp in Greece that represents principles rather than persons, and functions with full respect to pure intra-party democracy.

-It is a modern party, because it corresponds to the needs and concerns of our time; because it seeks for solutions that will ensure the country's prosperous course now and in the future; because it

disregards outmoded theories, dogmas and labels with which others preserve the passions of the past; because ND's structure and philosophy renders it always open to new ideas; because it gives priority to our youth, anticipating their future zeal, enthusiasm and sensitivity.

-It is a popular party, a party of the people as an entity, and not a party representing a certain class or dependent on a particular interest group. It wants the people to be sovereign at all times, and not only an occasional judge during elections. ND originates from the people, works for the people, and identifies with the people.

-It is a social party, because it considers economic development not as an end in itself, but as the most realistic means towards the realization of social justice. ND considers all Greeks equal not only before the law, but also before the opportunities opened up by political, economic and social life. It believes that each citizen should partake of the national product in proportion to his contribution to its creation. It believes that the state has to fulfill a social mission; it has to offer real medical care, real education, adequate insurance, fairly paid employment, comfortable housing, and satisfactory standards of living to every citizen.

-It is a radical party. Free from dogmatic bias, ND reserves the possibility of adopting the best solutions, even the most radical ones, when these are dictated by the interests of the nation and the people. With regard to social-economic policies in particular, radicalism means the state's obligation and ability to intervene and balance economic and social antitheses, to reduce inequalities, and to stand in for private initiative wherever the latter does not respond, or whenever economic and social reasons dictate such a course.

-It is a liberal party. It denies that there can be social and economic objectives for the achievement of which democratic freedoms are worth sacrificing. It seeks to reinstate the free economy in its

dominant role in production, to safeguard fair competition, to combat monopolies, to abolish prerogatives (often created by the state's thoughtless intervention), and everything that has proved to cause malfunctioning in the economy to the detriment of the people.

ND's radical liberalism considers active and autonomous local government, unburdened by the tight control of the party, an elementary aspect of democracy. It believes in economic decentralisation and in a healthy trade-union movement, not for the sake of bureaucratic over-inflation, but for the advance of the creative drive of popular participation.

-It is a European party. ND, with its founder's inspiration and prestige, has accomplished a great historic achievement: Greece's entry into Europe as an equal partner. Resisting all forecasts of doom from those who now take full advantage of this policy's benefits, ND has a permanent and long-term pro-European policy. It believes in the ideal of Europe's political unification, and it tries to the best of its ability to contribute to this end. It considers that the human values and civilisation that originated in our country will survive in a United Europe, and that there will be a healthy balance between the two opposing blocs' dangerous antagonism. For our youth, in particular, Europe not only offers wide career perspectives, but also provides them with a new Megali Idea: to contribute to the creation of a better world, and in so doing to honour our Greek culture and our history.

-Finally, ND is in particular a national party. It is imbued with the vital awareness that demands the continuation of the nation's historic course as the highest of missions. The nation remains the natural framework of individual and social life. No party can conceive of itself as existing outside the national framework, and this is why every Greek's supreme duty is to be ready to make any sacrifice to defend the country's national independence and territorial integrity.

Our entry into the democratic family of Europe guarantees our national sovereignty, and also the preservation of our national character and civilisation. But being in Europe, we must give every assistance to greater Hellenism, provide the possibility for Greek culture to shine, and to contribute decisively to the establishment of universal peace, respect and co-operation among all peoples.

We must create the preconditions for our people to advance with optimism and self-confidence towards the twenty-first century.

APPENDIX VII

ND's Electoral Performance

Year	Election	Number of Votes	% of Votes	No. of Seats	% of Seats
1974	national	2,669,133	54.37	216	72.00
1977	national	2,146,365	41.84	172	57.33
1981	national	2,033,584	35.86	115	38.33
1981	European	1,686,976	31.53	8	33.33
1984	European	2,266,568	38.05	9	37.50
1985	national	2,599,949	40.85	126	42.00
1989 ^a	national	2,885,548	44.25	145	48.33
1989 ^a	European	2,647,215	40.45	10	41.67
1989 ^b	national	3,093,055	46.19	148	49.33
1990	national	3,088,137	46.89	151	50.33

Note: (a): Both national and Euro-elections were held simultaneously on 18 June 1989.

(b): National election, held on 5 November 1989.

According to K. Janda's formulation (see footnote 196 to ch. 1), the degree of ND's stability/institutionalisation, in national elections only, is as follows:

$$\text{Degree of party (in)stability} = \frac{\sum \frac{|Y_j - \bar{Y}|}{\bar{Y}}}{\bar{Y}} = 0.09 \text{ (ERE's one was 0.12)}$$

If we also take into account the party's European record, then the degree of (in)stability/institutionalisation becomes 0.086; in both cases, ND's degree of stability is considerably high. The degrees of stability for the other major party, PASOK, are 0.26 and 0.19 respectively.

APPENDIX VIII

Party Members' Questionnaire, Views and Attitudes in the Department of Larissa (City of Larissa and village of Kalohori)

Question 1: Sex.

Sex	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Male.....	92	67.15	18	85.71	110	69.62
Female.....	45	32.85	3	14.29	48	30.38

Question 2: What kind of education did you receive?

Education	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
None.....	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27
Primary school.....	46	33.57	6	28.57	52	32.91
Nine-year compulsory education...	24	17.52	6	28.57	30	18.99
High school.....	39	28.47	5	23.81	44	27.85
Higher technical school.....	12	08.76	3	14.29	15	09.49
University.....	11	08.03	1	04.76	12	07.59
Postgraduate studies.....	3	02.19	--	---	3	01.90

Question 3: What is the year of your birth?

Age	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Born before 1930.....	12	08.76	--	---	12	07.59
Born between 1930 and 1945.....	59	43.06	5	23.81	64	40.51
Born between 1945 and 1960.....	53	38.69	16	76.19	69	43.67
Born after 1960.....	13	09.49	--	---	13	08.23

Question 4: What is your present occupation?

Occupation	Larissa		Kalohori		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Lawyers.....	--	---	--	---	--	---
Doctors.....	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Engineers.....	4	02.92	--	---	4	02.53
Ship'g/Industry.....	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Businessmen.....	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
Merchants.....	1	.73	1	04.76	2	01.27
Landowners.....	--	---	--	---	--	---
Farmers.....	9	06.57	12	57.15	21	13.29
High Rank Emp.....	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27
Middle/Lower Emp.....	45	32.84	1	04.76	46	29.11
Workers.....	19	13.87	1	04.76	20	12.66
Univ. Prof.....	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Teachers.....	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Students.....	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27
Artisans.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
Military.....	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27
Miscellaneous.....	3	02.19	--	---	3	01.90
Housewives.....	21	15.33	2	09.53	23	14.56
No data/unemployed....	10	07.30	4	19.04	14	08.86
Total.....	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00
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SALARIED PROF.....	71	51.82	2	09.53	73	46.20
LIBERAL PROF.....	35	25.55	13	61.90	48	30.38
HOUSEWIVES.....	21	15.33	2	09.53	23	14.56
NO DATA/UNEMPLOYED....	10	07.30	4	19.04	14	08.86
TOTAL.....	137	100.00	21	100.00	158	100.00

Question 5: Are you a member of a trade union, federation or other organisation?

<u>Other union membership</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	57	41.61	14	66.67	71	44.94
No.....	80	58.39	7	33.33	87	55.06

If yes, which?

Trade union.....	30	21.90	1	04.76	31	19.62
Agricultural union/co-operation..	9	06.57	9	42.86	18	11.39
Employers' federation.....	--	---	--	---	--	---
Professional association.....	15	10.95	4	19.05	19	12.03
Non-professional association.....	15	10.95	--	---	15	09.49

Question 6: In what year did you join New Democracy?

<u>Year of registration</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Before 1977.....	22	16.06	5	23.81	27	17.09
Between 1977 and 1981.....	6	04.38	8	38.09	14	08.86
Between 1981 and 1985.....	57	41.60	8	38.09	65	41.14
After 1985.....	52	37.96	--	---	52	32.91

Question 7: Have you ever belonged to any other parties (or to their youth organisations)?

<u>Other party membership</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
No.....	132	96.35	21	100.00	153	96.84

Question 8: What were the most important factors impelling you to join ND?

<u>Reasons for joining ND</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Family ideological identification.....	67	48.91	8	38.09	75	47.47
Personal ideological identification.....	85	62.04	9	42.86	94	59.49
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal...	36	26.28	5	23.81	41	25.95
Personal quality of party officials and deputies.....	13	09.49	2	09.52	15	09.49
Organisational development of ND.....	20	14.60	--	---	20	12.66
Counterbalancing PASOK's organisational performance.....	7	05.11	1	04.76	8	05.06
Influence of friends and/or relatives.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
Other.....	8	05.84	--	---	8	05.06

Question 9: Do you regularly attend the meetings at your local organisation?

<u>Regularity of participation</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	117	85.40	9	42.86	126	79.75
No.....	20	14.60	12	57.14	32	20.25

If yes, how often?

Once a week or more.....	47	34.30	--	---	47	29.75
Once a fortnight.....	26	18.98	2	09.52	28	17.72
Once a month.....	34	24.82	5	23.81	39	24.68
Every three months or less.....	10	07.30	2	09.52	12	07.60

Question 10: Are you satisfied with the activities of your local organisation?

<u>Attitudes towards the organisation</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Satisfied.....	79	57.66	7	33.33	86	54.43
Partly satisfied.....	49	35.77	10	47.62	59	37.34
Dissatisfied.....	9	06.57	4	19.05	13	08.23

If not satisfied, what would you hope to see?

More information and briefings on political and ideological issues to rank-and-file members.....	21	15.33	2	09.52	23	14.56
More efficient activity and liveliness of the local organisation...	32	23.36	3	14.29	35	22.15
Renewal of party-officials, greater professionalism.....	11	08.03	2	09.52	13	08.23
Emphasis on democratic principles and meritocracy instead of nepotism	14	10.22	1	04.76	15	09.49
Other.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16

Question 11: Which were, in your view, the most important issues that your local organisation dealt with during the past year?

<u>Local organisation activities</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Information and briefing of the party members on ND's political programme.....	58	42.34	1	04.76	59	37.34
Organisational issues (communication/co-ordination, efficiency, new members' registration).....	60	43.80	2	09.52	62	39.24
Financial campaign of the party..	50	36.50	1	04.76	51	32.28
Briefing on the present political situation.....	34	24.82	1	04.76	35	22.15
Talks and public meetings on local issues (agriculture, labour, etc.).....	22	16.06	5	23.81	27	17.09
Dissemination and propaganda (inform people about ND's political programme, attract new voters)...	36	26.28	2	09.52	38	24.05
Other.....	6	04.38	3	14.29	9	05.70
None/Don't know.....	11	08.03	8	38.09	19	12.03

Question 12: In your opinion, which, if any, is/are the most important problem(s) your local organisation is facing at the moment?

<u>Problems of the local organisation</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Poor communication between base and higher party organs.....	16	11.68	5	23.81	21	13.29
Lack of professional party-officials, renewal in general....	23	16.79	1	04.76	24	15.19
Lack of disciplined and politically educated party members.....	14	10.22	9	42.86	23	14.56
Lack of internal democratic procedures, personal antagonisms, nepotism, and <u>paleokommatisμός</u> ...	18	13.14	--	---	18	11.39
Financial problems.....	72	52.55	2	09.52	74	46.84
General inactivity/inefficiency..	14	10.22	3	14.29	17	10.76
Difficulties in attracting and registering new members.....	9	06.57	2	09.52	11	06.96
Other.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
None/Don't know.....	31	22.63	4	19.05	35	22.15

Question 13: As you know, the final nomination of ND candidates for parliament is exclusively the party president's responsibility. Do you personally agree with this procedure? If not, what is your personal suggestion?

<u>Candidates' nomination solely by the party leader</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes.....	52	37.96	6	28.57	58	36.71
No.....	85	62.04	15	71.43	100	63.29

If no, what would you personally prefer?

(a) Exclusive responsibility by the party's grass-roots organisation.....	14	10.22	4	19.05	18	11.39
(b) Formation of the electoral lists by intra-party elections prior to the president's decision.....	71	51.82	11	52.38	82	51.90

Question 14: Do you think that the abolition of the preference-cross has contributed to the promotion of political morality and, in a broader sense, to the country's political practices?

	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes.....	19	13.87	6	28.57	25	15.82
No.....	102	74.45	12	57.14	114	72.15
In part.....	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
Don't know.....	6	04.38	3	14.29	9	05.70

If yes/in part, why?

Personal favours are not as common as in the past.....	8	05.84	2	09.52	10	06.33
Intra-party democracy is strengthened and institutionalised.....	9	06.57	--	---	9	05.70
The political struggle has been improved and rationalised.....	10	07.30	4	19.05	14	08.86
Other.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16

If no, why not?

The leader has become omnipotent.....	45	32.85	6	28.57	51	32.28
Voters are not free to select the candidate of their choice....	71	51.82	7	33.33	78	49.37
Deputies have no freedom of opinion, do not care about their voters.....	46	33.57	2	09.52	48	30.38
Clientelism (<u>rousfeti</u>) has been institutionalised by the professional and other organisations of the party in government.....	34	24.82	1	04.76	35	22.15
Other.....	7	05.11	--	---	7	04.43

Question 15: In the pre-dictatorial period, when somebody wanted to get something important from the state (e.g., to find a job, to get a loan, to avoid lengthy bureaucratic red tape, etc.), he would most probably ask it as a personal favour from his local deputy in exchange for his vote. Has this also been the case,

—(A) from 1974 until 1981?

Was there clientelism?	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes.....	39	28.47	15	71.43	54	34.18
No.....	9	06.57	1	04.76	10	06.33
In part.....	54	39.41	2	09.52	56	35.44
Don't know.....	35	25.55	3	14.29	38	24.05

If yes/in part, to what extent?

The same as before.....	23	16.79	14	66.67	37	23.42
A shift to some degree of meritocracy, and the rationalisation of political life.....	62	45.25	2	09.52	64	40.50
Other.....	8	05.84	1	04.76	9	05.70

If no, what has happened instead?

<u>Rousfeti</u> was abolished, in favour of meritocracy.....	7	05.11	1	04.76	8	05.06
Other.....	2	01.46	--	---	2	01.27

—(B) from 1981 until nowadays?

Was there clientelism?	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes.....	52	37.96	17	80.96	69	43.67
No.....	47	34.30	2	09.52	49	31.01
In part.....	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
Don't know.....	28	20.44	2	09.52	30	18.99

If yes/in part, to what extent?

The same as before.....	44	32.12	17	80.96	61	38.61
A shift to some degree of meritocracy, and the rationalisation of political life.....	12	08.76	--	---	12	07.60
Other.....	6	04.38	--	---	6	03.79

If no, what has happened instead?

<u>Rousfeti</u> was institutionalised by PASOK's local and other organisations.....	46	33.57	2	09.52	48	30.38
Other.....	1	.73	--	---	1	.63

Question 16: Do you think that ND's political programme has been sufficiently disseminated, explained and understood?

<u>Dissemination of ND's programme</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	53	38.69	8	38.09	61	38.61
In part.....	61	44.52	5	23.81	66	41.77
No.....	18	13.14	5	23.81	23	14.56
Don't know.....	5	03.65	3	14.29	8	05.06

If no/in part, what do you think are the reasons for this?

Leadership inefficiency.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16
Party-officials' inefficiency....	24	17.52	--	---	24	15.19
Organisational inefficiency.....	18	13.14	2	09.52	20	12.66
Lack of appropriate propaganda (e.g., television and radio broadcasts).....	60	43.79	6	28.57	66	41.77
Other.....	9	06.57	2	09.52	11	06.96

Question 17: Have you personally read the ideological declaration of the party "A New Proposal for Freedom", of 3 Feb. 1985?

<u>Acquaintance with ND's ideology</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	60	43.79	9	42.86	69	43.67
In part.....	34	24.82	4	19.05	38	24.05
No.....	43	31.39	8	38.09	51	32.28

Question 18: Which, in your view, are the most important reasons that explain ND's appeal to the voters?

<u>Reasons for ND's voter-appeal</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Political/economic programme.....	63	45.98	--	---	63	39.87
Ideology.....	66	48.17	1	04.76	67	42.41
Leadership.....	35	25.55	2	09.52	37	23.42
Activities of ND deputies in their constituencies.....	22	16.06	1	04.76	23	14.56
Organisation.....	25	18.25	1	04.76	26	16.46
Reliability/sense of responsibility, ND's option for tranquility, order and security, anti-extremism.....	64	46.71	14	66.67	79	50.00
Other.....	10	07.30	4	19.05	14	08.86

Question 19: In terms of internal democratic procedures in the decision-making process, do you think that ND's leadership differs from that of the other parties?

<u>Attitudes towards the leadership</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	110	80.29	7	33.33	117	74.05
In part.....	17	12.41	3	14.29	20	12.66
No.....	8	05.84	9	42.86	17	10.76
Don't know.....	2	01.46	2	09.52	4	02.53

If yes/in part, in what way?

It is characterised by seriousness and responsibility, decent performance, dignity and morality, tradition, logic, prestige and quality.....	83	60.58	2	09.52	85	53.80
It is democratically elected, its options can be questioned, it is not autarchic.....	49	35.77	7	33.33	56	35.44
Other.....	8	05.84	1	04.76	9	05.70

Question 20: In your opinion, what were ND's greatest achievements while the party was (a) in government? and (b) in opposition?

—(A) in government:

ND's greatest achievement (1974-1981)	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Restoration of democracy.....	96	70.07	7	33.33	103	65.19
EEC entry.....	97	70.80	11	52.38	108	68.35
Legalisation of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE).....	33	24.09	3	14.29	36	22.78
National reconciliation.....	67	48.90	2	09.52	69	43.67
Democratic organisation of the party.....	39	28.47	5	23.81	44	27.85
Governmental policies (social, economic, etc.).....	41	29.93	2	09.52	43	27.22
The first party congress in 1979.....	17	12.41	--	---	17	10.76
Other.....	4	02.92	--	---	4	02.53

—(B) in opposition:

ND's greatest achievement (1981-1989)	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Decent, calm and constructive opposition and performance in parliament.....	69	50.36	8	38.09	77	48.73
Democratic organisation of the party.....	61	44.52	5	23.81	66	41.77
The second party congress in 1986.....	24	17.52	--	---	24	15.19
Smooth transition in the party leadership.....	35	25.55	--	---	35	22.15
The victory over PASOK in the 1986 municipal elections.....	76	55.47	8	38.09	84	53.16
ND's political/economic programme.....	50	36.50	--	---	50	31.65
Other.....	5	03.65	1	04.76	6	03.89
None/Don't know.....	4	02.92	1	04.76	5	03.16

Question 21: Why do you think ND lost the 1981 and the 1985 parliamentary elections?

—(A) ND lost the 1981 election because:

	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Continuous 7-year government, lots of mistakes.....	71	51.82	4	19.09	75	47.47
Lack of strong leadership.....	19	13.87	5	23.81	24	15.19
Lack of a convincing programme and ideology.....	16	11.68	2	09.52	18	11.39
Lack of an effective organisation.....	35	25.55	4	19.09	39	24.68
PASOK's strong leadership.....	14	10.22	2	09.52	16	10.13
PASOK's programme and promise for change.....	67	48.90	6	28.57	73	46.20
PASOK's effective organisation...	35	25.55	3	14.29	38	24.05
Other.....	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33

—(B) ND lost the 1985 election because:

	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Time-credit to PASOK in order to accomplish its programme.....	90	65.69	5	23.81	95	60.13
Lack of strong leadership.....	9	06.57	3	14.29	12	07.60
Lack of convincing programme.....	11	08.03	2	09.52	13	08.23
Lack of an effective organisation.....	19	13.87	3	14.29	22	13.92
Psychological intimidation of the electorate by PASOK.....	52	37.96	5	23.81	57	36.08
ND leadership's handling of the "presidential election" affair...	15	10.95	2	09.52	17	10.76
People were not convinced that ND was ready to govern.....	16	11.68	3	14.29	19	12.03
Other.....	9	06.57	1	04.76	10	06.33

Question 22: Concerning ND's grass-roots organisation, is there, in your view, any marked difference between the 1974-81 period (when the party was in government) and that from 1981 until today (i.e. 1989)?

<u>Was there a difference?</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	117	85.40	18	85.71	135	85.44
Some.....	12	08.76	--	---	12	07.60
No.....	3	02.19	--	---	3	01.90
Don't know.....	5	03.65	3	14.29	8	05.06

If yes/some, was it that:

(a) Difference in 1974-81 was virtually non-existent; after 1981 it became necessary to counter-balance PASOK and the party was effectively organised.....	92	67.15	15	71.43	107	67.72
(b) It simply became better after 1981.....	17	12.41	2	09.52	19	12.03
Other.....	20	14.60	1	04.76	21	13.29

Question 23: Are there any social classes that you would say ND mainly represents?

<u>ND and class representation</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes.....	44	32.12	3	14.29	47	29.75
No.....	83	60.58	18	85.71	101	63.92
Don't know.....	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33

If yes, which one(s)?

Middle class.....	29	21.17	3	14.29	32	20.25
Upper-middle class.....	16	11.68	1	04.76	17	10.76
Upper-class bourgeoisie.....	13	09.49	--	---	13	08.23
Other.....	4	02.92	--	---	4	02.53

Question 24: Which of the following party-labels would you choose to identify ND today?

<u>ND designated as:</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Conservative party.....	17	12.41	--	---	17	10.76
Social-democratic party.....	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
Christian-democratic party.....	10	07.30	3	14.29	13	8.23
Liberal party.....	87	63.50	9	42.86	96	60.76
Neo-liberal party.....	23	16.79	--	---	23	14.56
Centre party.....	5	03.65	1	04.76	6	03.79
Centre-right party.....	31	22.63	10	47.62	41	25.95
Popular party.....	6	04.38	--	---	6	03.79
Other.....	6	04.38	--	---	6	03.79

Question 25: Which of the following forces, in your opinion, exerted any influence on the New Democracy party?

<u>Impact of political currents</u>	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>%</u>
Venizelism.....	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33
Popular party.....	6	04.38	1	04.76	7	04.43
Greek Rally Party.....	11	08.03	--	---	11	06.96
National Radical Union.....	24	17.52	--	---	24	15.19
Centre Union (pre-1967).....	9	06.57	1	04.76	10	06.33
Anti-dictatorship resistance.....	1	.73	--	---	1	.63
C. Karamanlis' personal appeal...	102	74.45	20	95.24	122	77.22
Other.....	10	07.30	--	---	10	06.33

Question 26: In your view, is ND the heir and descendent of the pre-dictatorship ERE, or do you think it is something new in Greek politics?

ND's relationship to ERE	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Heir and descendent of ERE.....	21	15.33	1	04.76	22	13.93
A new political force.....	111	81.02	20	95.24	131	82.91
Other.....	5	03.65	--	---	5	03.16

Question 27: As you know, ND fights for liberalism, where the free market economy is dominant. Would you expect some kind of direct, personal benefit if ND resumed office?

Members' personal expectations	<u>Larissa</u>		<u>Kalohori</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Yes.....	89	64.96	10	47.62	99	62.66
No.....	48	35.04	11	52.38	59	37.34

If yes, of what kind?

Economic benefit.....	44	32.12	5	23.81	49	31.01
Social benefit.....	70	51.09	5	23.81	75	47.47
Other.....	13	09.49	--	---	13	08.23

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

This list contains the names of ND parliamentarians and party members but also other prominent supporters and sympathisers who provided useful information on a wide range of issues concerning the party in the Department of Larissa. Special reference is made to most of them in certain parts of this study, but there are also a few who are mentioned only here, since their contribution to our better understanding and explanation of ND in the Department of Larissa was of a more general kind.

- Beis K. : agriculturalist, ex-member of ND's departmental committee, also ex-member of the Volvi movement.
- Bohoris J. : shop-keeper (groceries and confectionery), president of ND's local committee of Philippoupolis.
- Exarhos D. : president of the local community of Kalohori since 1986, also president of the local ND committee.
- Georgosoulis C. : lawyer, secretary of ND's Departmental Committee.
- Grivas T. : trade-unionised railway employee, president of ND's local committee of Anthoupolis.
- Hatzigeorgiou E. : doctor, prominent local ND sympathiser and supporter, but not directly involved in politics.
- Houliaras C. : doctor, ex-president of ND's departmental committee and ex-party member.
- Katsaras G. : agriculturalist and merchant (chemicals), ex-party member (of ND in the Department of Karditsa), ex-member of the Volvi movement.
- Katsaros N. : lawyer, ND deputy since 1981.
- Kondonassios A. : pensioner, responsible of ND's trade-union department.
- Kondonassiou-Tsigani M. : housewife, president of ONNED.
- Korakaki M. : midwife, president of the trade-unionised midwives of ND.
- Papanikolaou G. : merchant (electric equipment), president of ND's local committee of Ag. Konstantinos.
- Psathas D. : notary, president of the local committee of Tyrnavos and member of ND's central committee.
- Souflias G. : civil engineer, ND deputy since 1974.
- Voyiatzi-Mantzou K. : teacher, responsible of ND's women department and parliamentary candidate in the June 1989 election.

APPENDIX IX

Maps

Map 1: Political Regions and Departments (Nomes) of Modern Greece.

(Source: Social and Economic Atlas, Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 1965).


Map 2: Region of Thessaly, its Departments and their Capitals.

Map 3: Department of Larissa, its Eparchies and their Capitals.


Map 1: Political Regions and Departments (Nomes) of Modern Greece.

NOMOI
NOMES
NOMES





Map 2: Region of Thessaly, its Departments and their Capitals.





Map 3: Department of Larissa, its Eparchies and their Capitals.



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