

**Neutrality and Alignment: Selected Aspects of Swedish and Norwegian  
Foreign Policies toward the Soviet Union, ~~1947-1949~~, 1987-1991**

by

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### *Abstract*

The chief aim of the thesis is to develop a clearer understanding of the factors which affect a state leadership's tendencies to behave in particular ways towards other states. It seeks to compare and contrast the effect of different security policy choices upon the Swedish and Norwegian leaders' attitudes, approach and diplomatic style towards the Soviet Union. The aim is to observe important differences and similarities in the responses to largely equivalent stimuli across a cross-section of issue areas most relevant for the Scandinavians' respective bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union. More precisely, what difference does Sweden's choice to pursue neutrality and Norway's decision to become a member of NATO make in their respective relations to a superpower?

Based upon the secondary literature on alliances and neutrality, several working hypotheses which are proposed to affect Sweden's and Norway's relationship with the Soviet Union were generated: most important to a neutral power is that it be seen to pursue a credible policy of indifference in relation to the East-West Cold War; actions which may be interpreted as being partial to either side of East-West conflict will be avoided; as a neutral Sweden must defend its territorial integrity. Finally, Sweden's neutrality can also be promoted through playing the role of impartial mediator in conflict situations, advocating disarmament in international fora, and resorting to international norms and organisations in its relationship with the Soviet Union.

NATO member Norway must make sure that it pursues policies which are partial to its alliance members. Much of what Norway does with respect to the Soviet Union is motivated by a desire to demonstrate NATO's credibility as a cohesive, credible deterrent force to the Soviet threat. Here, demonstrations of loyalty to alliance ideals and solidarity with alliance partners are key to understanding why Norway acts as it does in relation to the Soviet Union. Policy co-ordination and consultation between NATO members are important parts of maintaining a cohesive viable deterrent against the Soviet Union. Finally, Norway has shunned arrangements which could result in isolation from fellow NATO members in order to further insure NATO credibility and its position within the NATO organisation.

The body of the thesis examines crucial bilateral issues in two time periods: 1947-1949 and 1987-1991. In 1947-1949 the Swedish and Norwegian decisions to participate in the Marshall Plan and general trade questions are discussed. Also examined in this period are both leaderships' reactions to the Communist coups in Eastern Europe, and Norwegian and Swedish interpretations of Finland's destiny. In the period 1987-1991 the Norwegian and Swedish leaderships are contrasted over their handling of the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Proposal, border security issues, legal-maritime disputes, the Baltic recognition question, trade, environmental and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Finally, Swedish and Norwegian interpretations of the changing Soviet military threat are also compared and contrasted.

The thesis concludes that although commitments to neutrality and alignment provide powerful explanations for why Swedish and Norwegian leaders behave in observed ways, they can only provide one such explanation. The hypotheses provided at the outset are, in the main confirmed, and help to illuminate the junctures where neutrality and alignment actually do play important roles in determining Swedish and Norwegian attitudes, diplomatic style and approach toward the Soviet Union.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>An Introduction: Neutrality, Alignment and the Soviet Union</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Neutrality and Alignment under development: 1947-9</b>	<b>28</b>
	A brief historical introduction	29
	Timetable of events 1947-9	31
	Historical background-Norway	31
	Historical background-Sweden	33
	Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of Finland	35
	The Finnish Argument	35
	The Finnish FCMA	37
	Concrete efforts to affect Finland's destiny	38
	Opposition to the effort	39
	Norwegian consideration of Finland	41
	Norway, Finland and bad timing	42
	Rumours, rumours and more rumours	43
	Press offensives as tool of Soviet influence	45
	Swedish and Norwegian reactions to East Europe	46
	The Prague Coup	46
	Reactions within Swedish officialdom	48
	Norwegian elite perceptions	51
	Sweden and Norway weigh defence alternatives	54
	Soviet view of neutrality	56
	Perception of Soviet threat	58
	The Scandinavian Defence Union	59
	Post-SDU	60
	Norway and the SDU	61
	Russian 'note' and Norway's Atlantic choice	62
	Norwegian threat perception	63
	Economic relations between Sweden, Norway and USSR	65
	Swedish-Soviet economic relations	65
	Miljardkredit	66
	Content	67
	Divisions of opinion	68
	Criticism begins	69
	Norwegian-Soviet economic relations	72
	Volume, composition and character of trade	73
	Swedish road to the Marshall Plan	75
	Political divisions	76
	Discussion in Government	77
	Norway and the Marshall Plan	79
	Norwegian debate	79
	Trade statistics	82
	Timetable of events ~1957-1991	84

3	The Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal	86
	Background	86
	Brief history	87
	The Undén Plan	89
	The Kekkonen Plan	90
	1980-present	92
	The Evensen initiative	92
	Consensus building after Evensen	95
	Swedish reactions post-Evensen	96
	NNWFZ descends political agenda	99
	Nuclear-Free Baltic proposal	101
	Why the Soviets pressed the issue	104
	Inconsistent view of Nordic cooperation	106
	Soviet Union, NNWFZ and Scandinavia: issue on hold	107
	Reason for de-prioritization	111
	Norwegian fear of Soviet droit de regard	115
	NNWFZ: success or failure	117
4	Sweden, Norway and Security-related Boundary issues	120
	Swedish boundary violations	120
	"Whisky on the rocks"	121
	Incursions in perspective	122
	Nationality question	124
	Unchanged military motivation?	126
	Identification: process of elimination	129
	Reacting as a neutral	130
	The Soviet explanation: to believe or not?	134
	Norwegian-Soviet boundary issues	137
	Submarine issue in Norway	137
	Other border violations	139
	Norwegian-Soviet Incidents-at-Sea Treaty	142
	Port calls: to declare or not to declare	151
	Superpower port call policies	153
	Port calls to Sweden	154
	Port calls to Norway	156
	The political debate	157
	Guarantees and enforcement	158
	Effects of tighter port call policy	160
	Future prospects of port call policies	161
5	Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes with the USSR	165
	The Swedish approach	168
	Overview of events	169
	Evolution of the Agreement	171
	Baltic Agreement concluded	173
	Attribution of Soviet motivation	175
	The Agreement's significance	175
	The Barents Sea Delimitation question	181

The Players	182
The Norwegian approach	184
The Soviet approach	185
Evolution of events	187
Oslo trip: unfulfilled expectations	188
Norwegian explanations of lack of movement	192
Explanation of Soviet change of position	195
Future prospects	198
6 Aspects of Norwegian and Swedish recognition policies in the Baltic independence question	199
Historical background: the awakening	199
Discussion when subject not popular: 1986-88	201
Sweden's official position	201
The initiators	202
Early debate in Sweden	203
Baltic support: Perestroika endangered	207
The seeds of consensus 1988-1989	209
Concretizing cooperative forms	211
Government's foreign policy collision course	212
The Lithuanian declaration of independence	216
Background: the problem of recognition	216
Swedish approach and behaviour	217
Norwegian approach and behaviour	223
Oil diplomacy	224
Polishing Norwegian support	228
Balticum on the Nordic agenda: 1990-1	231
Ronneby Conference	234
Baltic case sealed	235
Swedish and Norwegian reactions to violence	236
Nordic cooperation flourishes	244
Recognition of independence	247
7 Norwegian-Soviet, Swedish-Soviet Trade relations	249
Statistics	250
Political involvement in trade questions	257
Foreign aid policy	258
Trade financing	259
Export promotion	259
Role of parliaments	260
Élite characterizations of Soviet trade	261
Degree of interest	261
Complicating factors	262
Where does fault lie?	262
Decisional confusion	264
Payment problems	265
Swedish and Norwegian export credit decisions	267
In the aftermath of decisions	269

Payment patterns and improvement	273
Foreign currency problems	276
Interest incompatibility	278
Overcoming problems: multinational advantage	279
Facilitating factors	281
Soviet trade priorities	282
Norwegian and Swedish trade possibilities	284
Trade with centre or periphery	286
COCOM: head of political debate	291
Different points-of-departure	292
Actors	293
Issues at stake for Norway and Sweden	293
Norway: the legality question	293
Sweden: legality and neutrality	295
Swedish debate in the 1980's	298
COCOM, Sweden and Norway under Gorbachëv	299
The Norwegian KV Affair	300
Sweden tightens the bolts	302
Soviet and American views	304
Developments 1989-1991	305
Soviet economic problems: is hi-tech panacea?	307
First signs of Norwegian change	309
Swedish opinions of lightening	312
Élite perceptions of COCOM: help or hindrance?	314
COCOM: a veritable trade barrier?	314
Impact on Sweden	314
Hardest-hit industries	315
Impact on Norway	318
COCOM complexity as hindrance	320
COCOM loyalty no insurmountable hindrance	321
 8 Environmental, economic and Scientific cooperation	
in the North: the Murmansk initiative	324
Chief loci of inquiry	324
Speech content	325
Background and significance	327
Comparing Swedish and Norwegian reactions	328
Realistic proposals and follow-up	329
Soviet follow-up	329
Steps towards increased scientific cooperation	331
Swedish follow-up	331
Lack of follow-up	333
Norwegian follow-up	333
Attempts at further developing economic cooperation	334
Plaguing environmental concerns	336
Nuclear tests resume on Novaya Zemlya	337
Norwegian reaction	339
Swedish reaction	331

Mutual Nordic follow-up	342
Gorbachëv's Helsinki visit 1989	342
Nordic efforts to rectify problems at Nickel	345
<b>9 Sweden, Norway and Soviet strategic issues, 1987-</b>	
Introduction	351
Soviet disarmament: word and deed	354
The Stockholm Conference	354
The early years of disarmament	356
Disarmament in the North	358
Swedish reactions	361
Developments in Soviet military policy 1987-8	363
Murmansk initiative	363
Swedish reactions	364
Norwegian reactions	366
INF	370
Naval disarmament: continuous disappointment	372
Developments late 1987-8	373
Soviet Northern build-up enhanced	373
Gorbachëv's UN speech 1988	376
Developments 1989-90	380
Political and economic disarray in USSR	382
CFE negotiations	385
Swedish perceptions of Soviet disarmament in their vicinity	389
Drawing conclusions	393
Explanation of Soviet motivation	397
Western strength	398
Economic weakness	400
Military interests	402
The societal good	402
Personality factor	403
<b>10 Conclusion</b>	<b>404</b>
Bibliography	429

## *Preface*

When I began work on this thesis in the Fall of 1988, I, like many specialists in the field of Soviet affairs, could not have imagined that the collapse of the Soviet Union would come as quickly as it did. Indeed, Soviet experts and International Relations specialists were caught dangerously off-guard by the scope and speed of events which first led to the end of Soviet dominion over East Europe, then to the loosening of the Soviet Union symbolized by the independence movement of the Baltic countries and culminating in the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991.

These whirlwind events took away the breaths of world audiences and left international politics transformed. The East-West conflict affected conflicts in every corner of the globe. The East-West orientation which dominated International Relations scholarship in the post-War period was a result of these trends. Now, International Relations scholars which had once concentrated their energies on this stage must focus on less military-oriented aspects of the former Soviet Union or totally re-orient themselves into other areas.

I feel particularly honoured to have not only lived in, but have also been faced with the task of documenting and analyzing a period of history which may not have a counterpart as far back as the French Revolution. Neither have many researchers of International Relations had the dubious distinction of having the object of their thesis disappear before their eyes. Although my angle on this transformation has been limited by a narrow conceptual framework which only included Sweden and Norway, I hope that this study will serve as a small, yet meaningful contribution to the understanding of the period.

This study analyzes the effect of neutrality and alignment on the attitudes, approach and diplomatic style of national leaders. I have chosen Sweden and Norway as convenient points-of-entry for the examination of this question. I have also chosen to study Norwegian and Swedish behaviour towards the Soviet Union through looking in detail at the most pressing issues in their respective bilateral relationships, in two of the most tumultuous time periods in modern history. While drawing upon the formative post-War period 1947-1949, this thesis focuses upon the final four years of the Soviet Union, up until the end of the Norwegian and Swedish Parliamentary terms in the Summer of 1991. This thesis stops short of covering the final period leading to the Soviet Union's dissolution in December of 1991. However, the seeds of the U.S.S.R.'s demise were firmly implanted during the period of this thesis.

As is traditional with Ph.D. theses, a great many thanks are due to a large amount of people in a variety of places. However, due to the nature and extent of the research involved, I have depended to an untraditionally large degree upon outside help. The best assistance has been provided internally by my chief supervisors, Mr. Ron Barston of the LSE's International Relations Department and Mr. John Madeley of LSE's Government Department, who have been unwilling to stop short of crossing all "t's" and dotting all "i's" and who have served as tremendous sources of encouragement and guidance through several long years. Dr Christopher Hill of the International Relations Department also deserves a special thanks for ushering in the first several phases of the thesis.

Other academics and practitioners of diplomacy, in the Nordic countries, the UK, and in the U.S. have read selected parts of the thesis and have graciously provided their comments and criticisms. Here I would like to particularly thank Dr Clive Archer of the University of Aberdeen, Drs Christer Jönsson and Kristian Gerner of the

University of Lund, Dr Ingemar Lindahl and former Ambassador Lennart Myrsten of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Dr Anders Åslund of the Stockholm School of Economics, Mrs Tiina Nordlöf(now deceased) of Göteborg University, Mr Rune Castberg of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and Dr Finn Sollie of the Northern Perspectives Group, Oslo. The greatest debt of gratitude here nevertheless should go to all of those individuals, which at the end of the thesis numbered close to 400, who contributed either by interview, written critique or other correspondence to the shaping of the thesis' approach or to the thesis' body. The earlier phase of this thesis included many interviews in Denmark and Finland; I would like to thank all of those who took the time to participate in this phase of the thesis, and whose assistance affected the final thesis product in an indirect way. None of the above can be held responsible for any mistakes, whether grammatical, substantial or judgemental, contained within the thesis, as the fault lies with the author alone.

I extend my hearty thanks to the Norwegian Marshall Fund, the Letterstedtska Föreningen, the University of London's Central Research Fund and the Overseas Research Student fund scheme administered by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom for all financial assistance rendered during my years at the LSE. In that vein I must also thank my uncles Julien, Berry and René, my aunts Antoinette and Odile for believing in me and supporting my efforts to the greatest possible extent. Also, I thank my family-in-law, the Svensons, for although it was at times difficult for them to understand why I spent all of those hours closed off from them, they nevertheless prodded me forward in positive directions.

I am very grateful to particular institutions which have provided me with space in which to collect my thoughts and transform them into something readable. First and foremost I must thank my former employer, the Chamber of Commerce of Southern Sweden's East European Trade Office--and especially its chief, Reiner Fölster, for unflagging moral support, office space and a flexible approach to my work schedule such that the dissertation had some chance of being completed. Also important were NUPI, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute of Polhøgda, Norway for granting me office space during my various stays in Norway. Finally I would like to extend a very special thank you to the whole staff of the City Library of Karlskrona, Sweden. The staff did everything within their means, not the least of which was filling orders of close to 500 inter-library book loans, to help me bridge the geographical gap between where I was actually living/working and where the materials necessary for the thesis were located.

I would like to make a four-partite dedication of this thesis. The most important and most patient individual has been my wife, Anna, who has never for a moment questioned my long hours in front of the computer terminal or any other of my efforts at completing "my life's work." Without her love and dedication the thesis would not have been realised. Also, I wish to say thank you to our nine-month-old son, Alexander, whose smiles and laughs have propelled me more effectively than anything else could. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my father and mother. Had they lived, I wonder if they could have imagined the path in life which I actually chose.

*Trevor Gunn  
Washington, D.C. in April, 1992*

## **Introduction: Sweden, Norway and the Soviet Union**

### **The Task**

The chief aim of this thesis is to develop a clearer understanding of the factors which affect a state leadership's tendencies to behave in particular ways towards other states. It seeks to compare and contrast the effect of different security policy choices upon the Swedish and Norwegian leaders' attitudes, approach and diplomatic style towards the Soviet Union. The aim is to observe important differences and similarities in the responses to largely equivalent stimuli (Frey, 1970:243) across a cross-section of issue areas most relevant for the Scandinavians' respective bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union. More precisely, what difference does Sweden's choice to pursue neutrality and Norway's decision to become a member of NATO make in their respective relations to a superpower?

### *Focus on Diplomatic Style, Approach and Attitudes of Neutral and Aligned Leaders*

One is best able to gain access to the diplomatic style and approach by focusing upon the **formal policies and particular policy decisions** which Swedish and Norwegian leaders have pursued towards the Soviet Union. It is proposed that neutrality and alignment affect leaders resort to particular solutions, to handle questions in particular ways,

Also an interesting focus are the countries' leaders' attitudes, or its leaders' **interpretations and reactions** to both Soviet proposals and policies of varying character and magnitude. Here we assume that leaders attitudes have an important connection with policy,<sup>1</sup> without necessarily specifying the nature of this link. One must recognize that leaders, whose decisions affect the destiny of nations, do not respond solely to the "objective" facts of the situation, but

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<sup>1</sup> There is an extensive literature which establishes this connection: see Burgess (1967); Greenstein (1967, 1969); Hermann, R. (1986) Hermann, M.G. (1974, 1976); McClosky (1967); Shapiro and Bonham (1973); Walker (1977). We therefore find it unnecessary to re-establish what is a well-researched fact.



rather to the "image" of the situation(Boulding, 1969). Attitudes may have multiple origins: the leaders' personality(e.g. Alker, 1972, Hermann, 1976), from his position in the bureaucracy(e.g. Iversen, 1971) to take two examples. Most interesting for this thesis however, is the fact that operating in different security policy environments which entail particular foreign policy commitments, as is the case with Sweden and Norway, also leaves its mark on the way leaders react to and interpret the behaviour of other nations.

### *Argument*

To date, there exists no comprehensive study which attempts to compare and contrast neutral and aligned countries' behaviour towards other nations or towards one particular nation. Existing studies, which we will discuss later, generally confine themselves to comparing neutral countries or comparing aligned countries--while perhaps not stopping to analyze the inherent similarities between them. One is always able to see the characteristics of a particular object more clearly when it is compared with other objects. If neutrality and alignment are compared and contrasted with each other, we propose, the strength of the comparative enterprise is evident. A comparison is able to "tease out," if one so wishes, some hidden and some evident aspects of neutrality and alignment. In fact, Swedish neutrality and Norwegian NATO membership are security commitments theoretically juxtaposed to each other, but which nevertheless possess one key link--neutrality is partly and alignment is defined entirely in terms of Soviet threat.

This study can also be seen as an attempt to broaden the existing literature about the Scandinavian foreign policies. In the past, Amundsen(1989) concentrated on Soviet strategic interests in the North, while Archer(1988) adopted a multi-issue framework for analyzing the economic and strategic aspects of Northern waters. Ausland(1986), Jensen(1984), Johansen(1986) have made attempts at treating the relationship of the Nordic area-as-a-whole with the Soviet Union. However, these studies have limited value in understanding the period of immense Soviet change, and do not sufficiently examine specific issue areas. Jervas(1973) and Sundelius(1983) provide us with practically the

only worthwhile attempts at analyzing the full spectrum of the Nordic foreign policies. However, even these are of too general of a nature to understand the foreign policies towards the Soviet Union. The fact stands that no large study has grappled with Scandinavian foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in a comprehensive manner. This study aims to fill this void.

This study can also be seen as a contribution to contemporary history. This thesis attempts to take account of the tremendous change which has led to the Soviet Union's demise. One might say that herein is contained the last picture of the Soviet Union as a state. It also takes a fresh look at 1947-1949, the formative period of the Nordic foreign policies. Although many studies have treated the period, a new treatment based upon some previously un-used sources, which establishes a focus on the Soviet factor in these developments, should be welcome.

#### *Controlled, paired comparison*

This thesis attempts to bring forth the differences and similarities between Swedish and Norwegian behaviour by using paired, controlled comparison. The comparative method's greatest yield can be found when a choice of cases is made where a great number of components can be held constant while varying others in order to see the subsequent result.<sup>2</sup> In common-sense terms a comparison between relatively similar countries sets out to neutralize certain differences in order to permit a better analysis of others (Dogan and Pelassy, 1984:118), the heart of the comparative method.

One can start by focusing on countries of similar cultural traits, historical experience or geographical position<sup>3</sup>. One can extend the list further into the nations' social, political and economic characteristics. Thus the number of experimental variables, although admittedly still unknown and still large, is

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<sup>2</sup> Lijphart (1970:687). Przeworski and Teune (1970:32) call it "the most similar systems design"; Holt and Turner term it "specification" (1970:11); Eckstein (1975:113-123) calls it the "crucial cases study."

<sup>3</sup> Sewell (1967:208-218) or Quandt (1970:181)

minimized(Przeworski and Teune, 1970:32). Thus, one is more able to bring forth the differences which can be accounted for by, say security policy orientation. It is both important to remember as well as reassuring to be reminded that 'most similar' cases are not the same as 'identical' cases.

The proper selection of case studies, in our case countries, is an essential element of a comparative study. Gunnar Heckscher writes that 'area studies are at the very essence of comparative government...the large number of variables, while frequently still very large, is at least reduced in the case of a happy choice of area.'(Heckscher, 1957:88) The nations which make up the Scandinavian area are often seen by outside observers as being cut out of highly similar cultural, geographical, linguistic, political moulds. Elder, Thomas and Arter(1983:2) point out that

...historical interrelationships, cultural similarities and cultural diffusion have between (the Scandinavian countries) produced a strong regional consciousness..."

However, the Scandinavian states have recognized that these ties, which eventually have led to close economic, cultural and political cooperation, do not extend into the realm of formal security and defence policy.<sup>4</sup> Thus, for the sake of this thesis, we can effectively hold many economic, political, cultural, geographical, historical variables constant, while examining one of the most important differences between them: their differing security policy choices.

It is strange, against this background, that the number of comparative studies of the foreign policies of the Nordic countries is extremely small(Faurby, 1976:154). Clearly, writes Faurby, "here is untried potential for testing the value of the most similar systems design..." Przeworski and Teune(1970:32) point to the Scandinavian countries as good examples for this sort of comparative exercise since they share many economic, social, cultural and political characteristics. Lipset(1963:515-531) sees the Scandinavian area as one of the

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<sup>4</sup> The concept of "Nordic Balance," where the Nordic nations look to each other for cues of how to best promote their mutual regional security, suggests informal cooperation and coordination of their respective foreign policy stances.

few areas where one could establish the crucial controls needed for the comparative method which has not been exploited.

Sweden is an excellent example of a neutral country because of its long historical tradition of neutrality. Also, as contrasted with Finland<sup>5</sup>, Sweden's decision to pursue neutrality was a choice fully attributable to the leadership's choice. Norway is a prime choice for a NATO state, having a long historical past of Soviet relations--related to its role as a front line state within NATO. Whereas Norway has undergone minor crises relating to its position within NATO, it clearly is a better example of a staunch ally than Denmark, which has become known within the Alliance for its footnote(or 'conditional') Alliance policy.

### **The literature on alliances and neutrality**

Although we are aware that there are multiple alternative explanations as to why Norway and Sweden approached their Soviet relationships in a particular way, this thesis attempts to test how far Sweden's neutrality and Norway's NATO membership can go in explaining why the leaderships acted as they did in particular circumstances towards the Soviet Union. As was pointed out earlier, the literature is remarkably weak in making the linkage between the theory and the reality of foreign policy behaviour. The literature instead concentrates on such questions as: why do alliances form? how are alliances sustained? what characteristics bring alliance partners together? In the case of neutrality, much of the literature is dedicated to clarifying the concept of neutrality and the legal standing of neutral states.

Thus the literature does not present readily-available hypotheses which may be tested. However, there are certain traits of neutral and aligned states which do stand out from the literature. We propose that these are the pillars of neutrality and alignment, and thus will appear and affect, albeit in varying forms and degrees, Sweden's and Norway's diplomatic style, approach and

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<sup>5</sup> Vital(1971:111) contrasts Finnish neutrality saying that Finnish neutrality is unmistakably neutrality against the enemies of the Soviet Union

attitudes towards the Soviet Union. It could be argued that in a majority of Norway's political, economic and military questions with the Soviet Union, its status as NATO member affects its behaviour. In Sweden's case, neutrality plays a similar role, whereby all foreign policy decisions are taken on basis on security considerations(Miljan, 1977:231).

### *Neutral states*

Some confusion has arisen as to the actual meaning of the term neutrality. Sweden's policy, officially stated as "non-alignment in peace with a view to neutrality in war," implies that a policy of neutrality only applies during wartime. A source of further confusion is that "neutrality" is chiefly a term with legal content--spelling out the neutral state's obligations in relation to the belligerents when armed conflict comes. Terms such as "neutralism"(Wells, 1982:22) basically denoting a neutral state's refusal to be involved in the East-West controversy, or the former Cold War, further clouded the field. Neutralism itself does not entail any concrete obligations in time of war and is not bound by rules of international law, because it solely has political content(Wells, *ibid*). Surely, the Swedish brand of "neutrality" is a mixture of the above formulations.

However, rather than resort to a war of words over the question of definition, we have chosen to follow Hakovirta's(1983) lead in this area:

"the term 'neutrality' is not used here in the conventional manner, but as a general label covering many related terms such as "neutralization," "neutralist<sup>6</sup> trends and tendencies," "neutral options," and so forth.

A state's decision to pursue neutrality has wide-ranging ramifications for its conduct of its foreign relations. In fact, in the Swedish case, there is no area of foreign policy which is exempt from leaders' scrutiny, establishing the

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<sup>6</sup> Lyon (1963:20) differentiates "neutrality," which is non involvement in war, from "neutralism" which is non-involvement in THE Cold War. We clearly are more interested in neutralism, for it applies well to the security policies of the Scandinavian countries.

compatibility or incompatibility with Swedish neutrality. In such a way, Sweden's trade relations, political relations, and military relations with foreign nations should serve to promote Sweden's definition of neutrality abroad. The chief consideration for Swedish post-War neutrality is to establish balance between its relations with West and East and express an indifference in the outcome of the political, economic and military battle that ensued between them.

*Some working hypotheses about the behaviour of neutral Sweden*

A crucial concern of neutral state leaders in the post-War period is that they be seen by actors in the international system as pursuing a credible **policy of indifference in relation to the East-West Cold War**. Although the Cold War was not a physical war per se, the nature of the conflict bore traits very similar to World War Two: the armament spiral, a clear definition of enemies, to name only two. Impartiality however, does not imply ideological thought control or commitments to so-called 'moral neutrality' on the part of its leaders(Frei, 1968:207-214). Indeed international law does not prohibit neutral state leaders from displaying verbal sympathy or condemnation.<sup>7</sup> But the moment these displays move from the verbal to the practical sphere, the spirit of neutrality has been violated(Karsh, 1988:24)

The question of neutrality's **credibility** is paramount in this connection. As Frei<sup>8</sup> states the issue: the credibility of neutrality concerns how far a neutral state can make it credible that it is indifferent regarding the outcome of a conflict between other powers. The neutral country must additionally resist diverse demands which are seen to be **incompatible with neutrality**(Ogley, 1970:16). The perception of a neutral state's policy as credible can only be strengthened by consistent, tangible steps of the neutral state's leadership(Miljan,1977:233). In this context, Sweden's willingness to uphold and

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<sup>7</sup> Boczek (1989:10) writes that "the permanently neutral countries are ideologically Western democracies..."

<sup>8</sup> Frei(1969) as quoted in Amstrup(1976:167-8)

defend the principle of **territorial integrity** plays a key role. Active neutrality obliges the neutral to prevent rival parties, by use of force if need be, from exploiting its territory--land, sea or air--for military purposes(Karsh, 1988:24) If the neutral state does not respond the state is guilty of a violation of neutrality as set forth in legal practice(Johansson and Norman, 1989:33). Another way to bolster neutrality's credibility, and directly linked to the defence of territorial integrity as just outlined, is the maintenance of a **strong, deterrent defence force**. Pravda wrote in 1940 "unarmed neutrality is no neutrality"(Thunborg, 1986:70) Swedish ambassador to Washington, Thunborg wrote:

"a belligerent state will care little for neutrality, if the advantages of an attack are considered to outweigh the disadvantages resulting from violating the rights and interests of a neutral state"(Thunborg, 1986:70)

Another way to enhance the credibility of neutrality is an active policy pursuing, within fora which have no specific attachment to either Cold War bloc, **goals which are not associated with any aspect of the East-West conflict**. Sweden's role as 'mediator'(Holsti, 1970) or 'fair broker'<sup>9</sup> in a host of issue areas serves to strengthen the perception held by the rival states, that the neutral state favours neither side. Sweden's attempts to promote **disarmament**(Brodin, Goldmann and Lange, 1972:38-9; Sjöstedt, 1983), to promote **legal treaties**<sup>10</sup>, and its resort to **supranational**<sup>11</sup>, **international organisations**, and **norms**<sup>12</sup> can be seen as efforts to weaken the Great

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<sup>9</sup> See Hakovirta(1982:95) or Birnbaum(1976:148-9)

<sup>10</sup> Thunborg (1986:69) writes that for the neutral "the principles of law are both sacred and indivisible."

<sup>11</sup> "The United Nations has fully legitimized neutrality's existence as a security-political guarantee, standing alongside the alliances," write Johansson and Norman (1986:37)

<sup>12</sup> Barston (1971:46) speaking of small states wrote: "a small state can use international organisation to mobilize support for their policies by widening the (continued...)

Powers(Liska, 1962:37-9), while fostering stability and calm in its own neighbourhood.

*Some working hypotheses about NATO member Norway*

Alliance membership is diametrically opposed to neutrality. Whereas a neutral state aims to pursue a credible policy of impartiality in the East-West conflict, a NATO member desires and is expected to be **partial to its alliance members**. Osgood(1969:19) writes:

An alliance reflects a "latent war community, based on general cooperation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the signatories must continually cultivate in order to preserve mutual confidence in each others fidelity to specified obligations.

Here, as in neutrality, a key consideration is the alliance's **viability**(Walt, 1987:3,40) in the eyes of the outside world. The very essence of alliances is that members should be **loyal to alliance ideals, goals and should demonstrate solidarity** with each other(O'Neill, 1988:12). It is necessary that there be cohesion between the members in respect of these objectives(Holsti, Hoppmann and Sullivan, 1962:94).

Norway has pursued a policy towards the Soviet Union that simultaneously promotes alliance solidarity and strength--stressing the importance of common deterrence towards the Soviet Union--while also having adopted a set of self-imposed restraints--namely a peacetime ban on foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory--as a precautionary, confidence-building policy towards the Soviet Union.

The strength (and hence credibility or viability) of an alliance, such as NATO is partly results from **fear of sanctions** from its other members if the one state should step out of line. For example, allied governments render themselves liable to US displeasure if they take initiatives which have wider implications

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<sup>12</sup>(...continued)  
arena of debate and criticism," something which certainly holds true for Sweden.



for American security interests.(O'Neill, 1988:12) A bloc member in good standing thus adheres to certain **predictable patterns of behaviour** with other members of the alliance, the leading nations in the bloc, nations within the opposing alliance and nonaligned states(Holsti, Hoppmann and Sullivan, 1973:176)

Alliances exist chiefly to provide institutions within which nations may combine their capabilities in defence against a common external enemy(Holsti, 1973:88) Cohesion within an alliance, one could say, could be directly affected by the perceived threat emanating from this enemy(Ward, 1982:32) **Policy coordination and consultation** between members(Rothstein, 1968:49), in relation to the threatening state, the Soviet Union, was one of the main pillars of NATO membership. Policy coordination and consultation allows fellow NATO members to share and benefit from other members' past experiences with the Soviet Union. Policy consultation and coordination thus provides a united front within NATO by which Norway may resist external pressure from the Soviet Union.

Aligned Norway, both for fear of sanctions from its fellow members and because of its realisation of its unilateral weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, **avoids arrangements which may result in isolation** from its allies. Norway has realized, that as a small state, the solution to its security dilemma must, as Liska(1962:24-5) maintains, come from the outside--an external source.

Whereas from one perspective, an alliance constitutes a serious derogation of independence and loss of prestige and status(Rothstein, 1968:259), membership does provide **the ultimate guarantee** of Norwegian sovereignty. Knowing that Norway has an alliance backing allows it to place Soviet démarches into perspective, knowing well that, if it maintains the alliance line, it has a security guarantee. As Defence Minister Holst put it, deterrence within NATO, involved making credible the proposition that an attack on Norway would not be confined to a fight with Norway(Holst, 1986:79)

### *The possible validity of alternative explanations*

In attempting to explain why the Swedish and Norwegian style, attitudes or approaches towards Soviet foreign policy differed one should be mindful that official security policy does not provide an all-purpose explanation for the similarities or differences which are revealed by the case studies. In fact, national security policy can only furnish ONE credible explanation or PART of an explanation as to why Swedish and Norwegian leaders acted, or reacted in the ways we observe. Neutrality and alignment can provide adequate explanations for behaviour in certain circumstances and at specific junctures. An attempt to illuminate those intersections is one of the goals of this thesis.

There is no lack of alternative explanations for why national leaderships act as they do. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1969:203) conveniently divide factors which can affect a state's leadership into internal and external. Especially relevant for this thesis, with its plethora of different actors and interests is that behaviour can be partially attributable to a bureaucratic 'give and take' between the relevant actors in a particular question(e.g. Allison, 1969:690). Such factors could provide a partial explanation of the outcome of the Swedish-Soviet Baltic Sea delimitation treaty. Particular Norwegian or Swedish personalities' influence<sup>13</sup> cannot either be discounted as having affected either nation's behaviour towards the Soviet Union. Norwegian Ambassador Evensen's personal *démarche* in favour of the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, effectively demonstrates how much one official may affect the destiny of the nation. The pressure of public opinion on decision-making élites(e.g. Almond, 1973) could reasonably provide one explanation for the quick steps both Norway and Sweden took towards recognizing Baltic independence. K.J. Holsti's(1970:237) proposition that nations' national role conceptions are powerful in explaining their conduct in international affairs could explain the period of transition from Norway's bridge-building role to NATO membership from 1947 to 1949. Domestic political variables such as political culture(Verba,

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<sup>13</sup> The effect of personality on behaviour is elegantly argued in a number of studies: Greenstein(1967), Hermann, H.(1976), Burgess(1967), Hermann, R.(1967), Spiegel(1985), Rosati(1984).

1965) or national historic tradition could help to explain why Sweden chose to continue its policy of neutrality after World War Two.

External factors and conditions, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin(ibid) propose, have their origin beyond the territorial boundaries of the state, especially the actions and reactions of other states. The aim of this thesis is not to assess the effect that environmental factors(Sprout and Sprout, 1957:309) have upon Swedish and Norwegian decision-makers. Even these factors could be seen as supplementary or complementary explanations to the ones proposed in the thesis.

One such factor is the influence of Soviet foreign policy outputs upon Norwegian and Swedish behaviour. While they have an undeniable impact, the points of influence are not easily specified. In this context it could be suggested that a more or less unified Soviet NORDIC strategy in certain questions,<sup>14</sup> could explain why Swedes and Norwegians have reacted similarly over select issue areas--such as the strategic buildup or environmental cooperation. But there are also times when Soviet policies towards Sweden and Norway have differed. At such junctures one must take the fact that the Soviet leadership's approach may play a key role in accounting for variance in Swedish and Norwegian perceptions. For example, the Swedes and the Norwegians differed over the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal partially because the Norwegians attributed more sinister Soviet motives than did Sweden.

The influence of geopolitics(Mackinder, 1904) could be posited as an explanation of the different responses to all specifically security-related issue areas under consideration in this thesis. Morgenthau's writing(1948) regarding *realpolitik* could appear to play some role in explaining why the Swedes and Norwegians have reacted in certain ways regarding border violations or the Soviet military buildup. The effect of international systemic variables(e.g. Singer, 1969) could also be posited as partial explanations for Norwegian and Swedish behaviour in particular circumstances.

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<sup>14</sup> See Jensen (1987) or Berner (1986:2).

### *The Choice of Time Periods*

Two blocks of time are analyzed in particular depth in the present thesis: 1947-9 and 1987-91. It is proper to look peripherally at 1946, for many of the issues which were then under discussion were carried over into 1947-9. It is also fitting to tangentially examine 1985-1986 as a prelude to Soviet Union's final four years. However it was only in 1987-1988 when Western leaders first realized that Gorbachëv's initiatives and the ostensible changes in Soviet foreign policy were more than cosmetic.

The chief consideration which motivated these choices was that both periods were largely comparable, both being distinguished from the years 1950-1985 as times of comprehensive change and transformation. In both periods, the Swedish and Norwegian leaderships struggled with the desirability, the viability and the meaning of neutrality and alignment. Also, in both cases, how the Soviet Union behaved towards other nations, and towards them in particular, was a central consideration in the debate surrounding neutrality and alignment.

This choice is interesting from a historian's point of view. Soviet foreign policy towards Europe entered a new phase directly following the war--wartime cooperation with the West rapidly gave way to competition. 1987-1991, in a sense, signalled the end of this segment of history. Thus, 1947-9 may be seen as the left-handed parentheses while the latter period could be called the end parentheses of a period which left distinguishable marks upon Europe.

The Scandinavian area found itself at a security-policy crossroads immediately following World War Two. The period 1947-9 was a time of maximum international volatility--a critical juncture where Norwegian and Swedish leaders were confronted with an array of security policy choices. The choices taken in this period, either to pursue neutrality or alignment were to form the basis for the entire post-War North European security pattern. The essential elements of this model would remain unchanged until the late 1980's.

With the advent of Mikhail Gorbachëv, the European security environment would be thrown so far off that in December of 1991 the RSFSR would publicly express a wish to join NATO. It was a time when the established policies set forth following the War were challenged, re-interpreted, polished and

transformed. It is above all important to have an understanding of the Swedish and Norwegian diplomatic style, approach and attitudes towards the Soviet Union in order to make sense of change and stability in these aspects of their behaviour forty years later.

### *The choice of issue-areas*

A judicious choice of issues, areas of Soviet foreign policy which posed somewhat similar questions for both the Swedish and Norwegian leaderships, lies at the core of this comparative task. Although absolute comparability between the issue areas is un-attainable the case studies do make possible a dynamic, paired comparison and contrast study. It may be argued that greatly analogous Soviet foreign policy outputs towards both Sweden and Norway make a dyadic comparison approach valid.

Norwegian and Swedish interpretations of Soviet foreign policy in Eastern Europe and Soviet behaviour towards Finland stood at the very core of Norwegian and Swedish security policy deliberations. However, given the tense climate of the period, a span of time when the post-War East-West political cleavage would be defined, even economic policy came to be seen through the lens of security policy. Swedish and Norwegian discussion concerning the compatibility of their participation in the Marshall Plan with previous foreign policy commitments was a crucial issue for debate. Mainly for the Swedes, but also to a lesser extent for the Norwegians, the question of how to adapt trade with the Soviet Union to their overarching foreign policy goals, was also an important subject.

To complement 1947-1949, a modern period of time was chosen in which to examine again selected aspects of Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet relations. By selecting a broad, cross-section of foreign policy issue areas relevant to both Sweden's and Norway's relations with the Soviet Union, one should be able to more clearly discern the areas, the junctions where neutrality and alignment can help explain differences in their behaviour towards the Soviet Union. Likewise, it should clarify the parts of Norwegian and Swedish

Soviet relations in which security policy considerations play less of a role in the leaderships' behaviour.

Clearly, the issues of greatest import in Scandinavian-Soviet relations are of a military character. In one case, the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, we have been forced to go even further back in time to the issue's birth in the late 1950's. The Soviet Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Proposal of 1957 is the most prominent, single, recurring theme in Norwegian-Soviet or Swedish Soviet relations since World War Two. How did these leaders, with a view to their security present security commitments, interpret, approach and act upon the proposal? Another serious question which is considered is how Sweden's neutrality and Norway's NATO membership have affected leaders' handling of security-related boundary questions? Yet another question under scrutiny is how Norwegian and Swedish leaders have interpreted the process of Soviet-U.S. and disarmament in its neighbourhood. Has one or the other state favoured specific solutions to the problem? Has one state seen the events in a more positive light? Neutrality and alignment have surely played a role in the way leaders' have interpreted these, at times, galloping developments.

Also worth discussion are the bilateral issues in the political realm. Although indirectly related to military-security policy, it will be interesting to see if, and if so where, military-security policy interests affected the diplomatic style, attitudes and approach of Sweden and Norway in their relations with the Soviet Union on the political plane. In this case, the most important bilateral issues were chiefly of a legal nature.

When Gorbachëv assumed the CPSU leadership in 1985, the Soviet Union stood at odds with both Sweden and Norway over sea delimitations in the Baltic and the Barents Sea. How did Sweden's neutrality and Norway's NATO membership affect the leadership's attitudes and approach to these problem areas? Another political issue, namely that of Norwegian and Swedish policies towards the Baltic independence issue, came to a head in the late 1980's. This inquiry will attempt to analyze the role of neutrality and alignment along the road to Norway's and Sweden's recognition of the Baltic states' independence in 1991.

One of the chief signs of change in Soviet thinking towards the Nordic area was Gorbachëv's Murmansk speech of October, 1987. The speech, the chief elements of which were environmental-scientific cooperation, security policy and common resource utilization, seemed to be a re-evaluation of several questions which had been taboo in the past—such as environmental cooperation, as well as a regurgitation of some old security policy themes such as the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In the past, significant Scandinavian cooperation in environmental questions was governed by a restrictive Soviet security interpretation of such cooperation. The question worth considering is the role of Swedish and Norwegian security considerations played in leaders' responses to the proposals forwarded in Murmansk.

Finally, the thesis will turn to a discussion of Soviet-Norwegian and Soviet-Swedish trade relations in the late years of Gorbachëv's tenure. Again, the chief question concerns the effect which Swedish security commitments, as opposed to Norwegian alliance membership had upon the conduct of trade relations.

## Methodology

### *Selection of Actors*

It is critical to understand who is doing the acting—for this will help to establish a clearer focus upon the proper level analysis(Singer, 1969) for the questions posed. The decisions to pursue neutrality or alignment, as well as the responsibility to maintain and defend these decisions, lies effectively with the élites of Sweden and Norway. Norway's decision to seek NATO membership, and Sweden's decision to follow neutrality were political decision of the highest rank. In subsequent years there has been consensus that these decisions should be maintained, greatly independent of change of government and political and economic vacillations, and that élites within the economic, political and military realms should bear the chief responsibility for seeing that the chosen security paths are followed.

The group most interesting in the context of this study were those élites which most influenced the direction of Sweden's and Norway's economic, political and security policy towards the Soviet Union. Three separate approaches in political science have evolved in the search for those individuals which are most influential in decision-making processes. Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby have become closely identified with the Pluralist approach, which maintains that power may be tied to the study of particular issue areas(Polsby, 1980b:115). Polsby urges the consideration of situations where power is exercised(Polsby,1980a:476), asking: 'how can one tell, after all, whether or not an actor is powerful unless some sequence of event, competently observed, attests to his power(Polsby, 1980b:60) The institutional view of power, represented by C. Wright Mills holds that one should first locate the institutions of power in society(Mills, 1956:11), followed by an intimate look at those individuals of power within them. Floyd Hunter, the leading proponent of the so-called 'reputational theory of democracy,' felt one could best find individuals in prominent positions in a few groups that are assumed to have power connections. He writes: 'from the recognised, or nominal, leaders of the groups mentioned, lists of persons presumed to have power in the community were obtained (operational location of his elites)(Hunter, 1953:11). 'Through a process of selection, utilizing a cross-section of 'judges' in determining leadership rank and finally by a further process of self-selection, a rather long list of possible power leadership candidates was cut down to manageable size for the specific use of this study,' he continues.

However, the selection of the élites combines these three methods, adhering to the suggestion of Putnam(1973:8-12), that deciding a cut off point between elites and the rest is, in the end, a matter of ad-hoc judgement. The reputational, decisional and institutional schools, Putnam contends, all have difficulty in reaching consensus, demonstrating the actual interdependence of theory and method.

An essential part of the thesis' initial phase was subsumed by preliminary interviews with journalists, decision-makers and academics with logical connections to the group most influential in forming Swedish and Norwegian



Soviet policies. The core question in each of these interviews was who the interviewee felt, in general, were the most influential in forming their country's Soviet policies. A follow-up question inquired as to the most influential élites in particular decision-making instances. Finally, bureaucratic charts were analyzed with a view to finding those positions within certain key organizations which logically handled Soviet questions. These three methods were combined in arriving at a list of élites who had both visible and concealed power in influencing the direction of Swedish and Norwegian foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

### *Selection of Sources*

Several sources have been drawn upon in order to bring forth evidence of the diplomatic style, approach and attitudes of these élite groupings. In the period from 1947-9 several excellent studies have been written, and we have taken the liberty to draw upon those. Furthermore, *Riksdag* and *Storting* records have been utilized for the same period. A third source, original Foreign Ministry records from the British embassies in Oslo and Stockholm, and original Swedish and Norwegian Foreign Ministry reports have also been utilized to provide a further check on the evidence gathered. Additionally, a small group of decision-makers who were active during the 1947-9 period were interviewed with a hope to gaining a final, living, check on the evidence gathered from other sources.

In the period from 1987-1991, primary weight has been placed on open-ended, 'qualitative' interviews with approximately 60 élites per country and parliamentary records mainly from 1986 through to the Summer of 1991. In terms of the interviews, there were general élites—or those generally influential in a number of foreign policy questions towards the Soviet Union. Then, there were those élites which were specifically connected to certain questions. There was a set of general questions which were posed to all interviewees, which was complemented by specialized questions depending upon the particular élite's involvement in a particular question. A third check was provided by articles drawn from the Norwegian dailies *Arbeiderbladet* and *Aftenposten* and the

Swedish dailies **Svenska Dagbladet** and **Dagens Nyheter**. Finally, second-hand accounts and the existing literature were utilized to the extent they were relevant to the questions under consideration.

## Chapter Two

### Neutrality and Alignment under development: Swedish and Norwegian Élite Perceptions of Soviet Foreign Policy

#### *1947-1949<sup>1</sup>: A Brief Historical Introduction*

On 5 March, 1946, Winston Churchill had made his famous Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri—the Cold War had begun. The "Truman Doctrine" made clear that Greece's and Turkey's governments should be supported against the threat of Communist-backed insurgency or economic collapse in 1947. The battle lines for the Cold War were drawn. It was in relation to this division of Europe that NATO and neutrality were framed. These events would feed into the landmark decisions to pursue neutrality or alignment, which would influence Norwegian and Swedish leaders' perceptions of and behaviour towards the Soviet Union in the post-War years.

Several issues which did not have any direct bearing upon Swedish and Norwegian decision-makers also influenced Swedish and Norwegian leaders' thinking regarding the practicability of certain security solutions. In the period 1945-1947, local Communists under Soviet supervision took power in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia (1948). The Red Army thus backed up the regimes in these countries, while single-list elections of Communist candidates were held. Swedish and Norwegian élites, excepting the Communist parties of the two countries, were uniformly critical of these trends. These events became decisive for Norway's decision to pursue NATO membership. On the economic front, the "Marshall Plan" posed difficult

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<sup>1</sup> Some of the existing works on the period are worth mention. In the case of Norway, see Skodvin (1971), Eriksen (1972). One can go as far as to say as that there is no standard work which discusses the period in the Swedish case. From the Nordic angle, Wahlbäck (1973) published a "standard" work. Among those who have concentrated on the Scandinavian angle may be counted Hirschfeldt (1949), Haskel (1976) on the Scandinavian defence talks and Lundestad (1980).

problems for both the Norwegian and Swedish leaderships. The most important dilemma was whether participation in the Plan could be interpreted as being compatible with Norwegian and Swedish unwillingness to contribute to 'bloc-building' in Europe.

In the end, and irrespective of the different security solutions chosen, Norway and Sweden made positive decisions over the question. Also in the economic realm, Sweden pursued a policy aimed at significantly enhancing its trade volume with the Soviet Union--perhaps in an effort to boost credibility of its neutral line. The vision which this policy contained was never realized, as trade remained at levels as low as Norway, which made no such political push.

The later War years and the early post-War years witnessed a serious deterioration in the outlook for Soviet-Finnish relations. The Finns, which had chosen to fight the Soviet Union on the side of the Germans, were most likely to become the next target for absorption into the Soviet East European sphere of influence. A treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed in 1948, formalizing the future state of Soviet-Finnish security policy intercourse. Swedish and Norwegian leaders took into consideration their possibilities of affecting the Finnish destiny in their discussions of which security policy to adopt. Thus, neutrality and alignment were used as tools of influence to affect a neighbouring country--and the security policy future of Northern Europe.

This division was crucial to the Nordic region for the respective countries had historically seen themselves as teetering between East and West. Sweden and Norway had been neutral prior to the war. The Swedish and Norwegian vision of maintaining this position in world affairs was pursued until the time when their preferred (again with the exception of Finland) alternative, the Scandinavian Defence Union, became untenable and negotiations broke down. Norway, with her declared will to "build bridges" prior to the war, was forced

to break with the past; the Norwegian will to never again experience a "9 April"<sup>2</sup>, coupled with a feeling that a Scandinavian solution would simply not provide sufficient security guarantees saw Norway turn to NATO to satisfy her needs. Sweden simply resumed its historically-based policy of neutrality--only re-defining its neutrality in terms of the new belligerents--the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

### **TIMETABLE<sup>3</sup> of events**

1940	Sweden recognizes incorporation of Baltic nations into Soviet Union
1944	The "Baltic deportation"
1946	"Billion-Credit" granted to S.U.
Jan 48	Bevin proposes defense cooperation between Western European states; Scandinavia not mentioned.
Beg. March 48	Rumours that various Scandinavian countries "next on the list" spread.
8 March, 48	H. Lange asks for U.K. and U.S. military guarantees.
17 March 48	Brussels Pact founded.
End March 48	U.S., Canada and Britain start talks about Atlantic Security.
End April 48	Sweden proposes SDU talks.
24 Sept. 48	U.S. informs DK and N that they will be approached sometime soon re: Atlantic Pact

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<sup>2</sup> A common expression in both Norway and Denmark, symbolizing the German invasion of both countries.

<sup>3</sup> Partly extracted from Petersen (1979:208).

15 Oct. 48	Scandinavian Defence Committee established.
10-24 Dec. 48	AP negotiations resume.
3 Jan. 49	Denmark and Norway invited to join AP negotiations.
15 Jan. 49	Report of Scandinavian Defence Committee pub.
22-24 Jan 49	Scandinavian defence conference in Copenhagen; defence talks are deadlocked.
29-30 Jan 49	Scandinavian Defence Union falls.
7-11 Feb 49	Lange visits U.S. primarily to discuss AP
19 Feb 49	DNA votes for AP membership.
4 Apr 49	AP signature.
Nov. 1949	COCOM is formed
Spring 1950	Norway joins COCOM

### *Historical Background: Norway*

Norwegian pre-War and Wartime experience with the Soviet Union differed from its bilateral relationship in the time leading to the Norwegian NATO decision. When important strata of Norwegian opinion, especially inside in *Den Norske Arbeiderparti* (DNA), turned against the Soviet Union from 1948 until 1949,<sup>4</sup> this constituted a break in its historical tradition both with respect to its pre-War perception of the Soviet Union and regarding its own role, the

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<sup>4</sup> According to N50, TUC Chairman Konrad Nordahl "really knew the Communists and was willing to fight." Another example was Tranmael, editor of the influential labour daily, *Arbeiderbladet*, who "moved from being extremely suspicious of talk of Scandinavian 'balkanisation' in 1942 to being a supporter of NATO in 1948." (Udgaard, 1973:29)

transformation of its "role" perception from neutralist to "bridge-builder."<sup>5</sup> The DNA did not encounter sizable opposition from the bourgeois parties in this reorientation,<sup>6</sup> a fact which lightened the task in Norway's search for a new security path.

The Norwegians, under Foreign Minister, Trygve Lie's "bridge-building" policies, strove for harmonious relations between the developing superpower blocs, through unqualified support of the United Nations (Udgaard,1973:228). The same Norwegian Labour Party which took the decision to enter into NATO had up until 1921 been a member of the Moscow-led Third International.<sup>7</sup> The Finnish-Russian War of 1939-40 and domestic events in the Soviet Union in the 1930's lay the groundwork for the Labour Party's alienation from both local communists<sup>8</sup> and the Soviet Union's Communist Party. The Soviet withdrawals from Denmark<sup>9</sup> and Norway had undeniable impact on élites perceptions, demonstrating a Soviet tendency to retreat from what might have been wartime territorial gains. The Soviet drawback from Northern Norway left a special

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<sup>5</sup> I support Haskel's(1976:57) conclusion, that "bridge-building" seemed close to Norway's prewar role of neutral mediator and conciliator.

<sup>6</sup> N53

<sup>7</sup> N50 said: "we in the DNA knew them (the Soviets)...we had met Bukharin, Karl Radek and others in the 1920's and had fought with them, therefore there was no real fear of them...they were human beings too."

<sup>8</sup> The Scandinavian communist parties registered steadily lower statistics immediately following the War. The NKP had 12.5% in 1945, 6% in 1949 and 5% in 1953 (Gilberg, 1975:22), while the Swedish VPK had 10.3% in the 1944 parliamentary elections, 11.2% in 1946's local elections, it also made a serious decent, to 6.3% in 1948's parliamentary elections.(Allmänna Valen, 1970,:10)

<sup>9</sup> The Soviet Union still had a presence on the strategically important Danish island of Bornholm and Iran in 1946. Dau(1970:79) states: "the withdrawal from Denmark and Norway may be viewed as a Soviet pattern with respect to Scandinavia, as opposed to that of the Balkans, with which the Soviet Union dealt with in a far more decisive manner in 1945-1946."

mark on the population there. Even today, the citizens of Finnmark and other parts of Northern Norway have a markedly more warm regard for Soviet cooperation of varied sorts.

The Norwegian government, which had its seat in London during World War Two, had a clearly Western-Atlantic orientation once the war was concluded. The Soviet-Norwegian dispute over sovereignty of the islands of Jan Mayen and Svalbard, two issues which would come to have lasting importance for Soviet-Norwegian relations (1944 and 1947), would inject an early element of "realism" into the relationship. However, it was not until the beginning of 1948 that negative perceptions of these events combined with Soviet misbehaviour in Eastern Europe and Finland to translate into a concrete Norwegian defence policy.

The psychological aspects of Norway's reorientation are important—not least because Soviet foreign policy did play its part in this evolution. Norway's faith in neutrality (and its attendant principles) was extremely strong in the pre-War period. Norway gradually lost faith in being able to uphold and carry through this line, especially against the background of "April 9." Although the Norwegian leadership from the outset clearly preferred a Western-oriented solution to its security situation, the leadership first wanted to exhaust any hope for an all-Nordic alternative arrangement. The early Norwegian abandonment of this alternative in favour of a Western alliance guarantee caused great worry in Moscow. In order to prevent unnecessarily alerting the Soviets about their motivation underlying this re-orientation, the Norwegians conceived of a string of confidence-building measures, of which the policy of non-basing of foreign troops and the prohibition of nuclear arms on Norwegian soil are the most prominent.

#### *Historical Background: Sweden*

Sweden had a longer historical experience with neutrality than Norway. In theory, it has succeeded in remaining neutral in all wars since 1814. Sweden



had varying degrees of success in defining its neutrality in terms of the belligerents at hand.<sup>10</sup> The Swedish-Soviet relationship has a lengthy historical dimension--a past filled with wars, trade, and political dealings.<sup>11</sup>

Compared to Norway, Sweden held out its hope for a Scandinavian solution until the last possible moment. The Social Democratic leadership was, even in Sweden, the motor which propelled Sweden's decision to remain neutral in the face of an ominous split between East and West. It was only when the Nordic alternative finally became untenable, that Denmark and Sweden initiated bilateral defence discussions. These discussions did not result in a Swedish-Danish neutral alliance. Sweden seemed to have little doubt that given the now-visible East/West split, and in absence of other realistic alternatives, it was best to tread its traditional path of neutrality. A clear Governmental assumption was that remaining on an even footing between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance would provide the best security guarantee for Sweden.

## Swedish and Norwegian Perceptions of Finland's Looming Destiny

### *The 'Finnish Argument' in Swedish Foreign Policy*

The Swedes, unlike the Finns in the East, had several foreign policy alternatives open to them in the post-War period. It seemed clear, from the outset, that the Finns would have some form of close understanding with the Soviet Union--what was not clear is which exact form and which degree this would take. The Swedes saw one of their roles as assisting the Finns in developing a stable, working relationship with the Soviets, not only for the

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<sup>10</sup> There is some evidence that Sweden nonetheless collaborated with the Germans during World War Two.

<sup>11</sup> For details see Hornborg(1942).

Finns' and Soviets' own good, but specifically for the peace and stability of the Nordic region. A moderate Finnish post-War foreign policy would also contribute to the efforts of those Swedes who desired a continuation of Sweden's pre-War neutrality policy; the cause of an independent Finland became a prerequisite for Swedish neutrality.

There was general agreement amongst the Swedish leadership, a consensus which transcended traditional ideological and political lines, that the Finnish fate was in great part Sweden's.<sup>12</sup> That the Swedes and the Norwegians had three different security alternatives: a Scandinavian Defence Union, neutrality or NATO membership, rendered them able to influence the direction of Soviet foreign policy towards the Nordic region in general and Finland in particular and unique ways. The Swedes and the Norwegians, at important junctures, threatened to punish the Soviet Union by "going West" if it did not demonstrate a moderate line towards its Western neighbour. What lay at the core of this effort was the Swedish perception and assumption that Soviet decision-makers were influenced by Swedish thinking of and potential behaviour towards them. In turn Swedish leaders observed Soviet foreign policy behaviour and made judgements whether a continuation of neutrality was practicable. Sweden's active posture towards Finland was permissible given the neutral framework since such a cause was not explicitly anti-Soviet.

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<sup>12</sup> There are several basic reasons for the Swedish engagement. Many Swedes have traditionally seen the Finns as their "little brothers," bearing in mind a several hundred year Swedish rule over Finland. Demographically parts of the Finnish population are related to the Swedish. Partially for these reasons, many Swedes voluntarily took part in both the war for Finland's independence and the two wars against the Soviet Union in World War Two.

### *The Finnish FCMA*<sup>13</sup>

In the view of Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén, a Finnish pact with the Soviets was to some degree inevitable. He expressed that "while a military alliance between Finland and the Soviet Union would be disagreeable for Sweden, I regard Finland, in any case, as within the Russian orbit."<sup>14</sup> While the FCMA was unpalatable, it would have to be accepted as a 'necessary evil.'<sup>15</sup> After signature, Undén was to conclude that "the mere existence of such a pact emphasized that a powerful protector had come into the picture."<sup>16</sup>

Talk of the Finnish FCMA triggered rumours in other Nordic capitals of the possibility of similar offers. Rumours circulated in following weeks that Sweden, Denmark and Norway also had received similar pact proposals.<sup>17</sup> The British Ambassador in Moscow in fact passed on the rumour to Sweden's Moscow Ambassador Rolf Sohlman that "Sweden was the next on the pact list."<sup>18</sup> Sweden, like Denmark, never received a pact proposal. Norway, however, did receive a note from the Soviet Union asking for a non-aggression pact on 5 February, 1949, once the Soviets had begun to seriously anticipate Norway's drift Westwards. As a result of rumours, Western and Soviet diplomats investigated the respective Scandinavian positions to see which position the governments would take if the such a pact were proposed. It soon

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<sup>13</sup> "The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," of May, 1948.

<sup>14</sup> Undén, FO 371.71723.N2369/637/63, 8 March, 1948.

<sup>15</sup> FO 371.71451.N3336, 19 March, 1948.

<sup>16</sup> About what he meant, Undén elaborates: "...and all that could be said was that a protector was a protector." (FO 371.71724.N4884, 22 April, 1948).

<sup>17</sup> For example see report from Washington embassy, 16 March, 1948 (UDS HP 1 ER, 49:B/103).

<sup>18</sup> Sohlman from Moscow, UDS HP 1 ER, 31 March, 1948, D:31:8/1967.

became clear that if a Soviet proposal were received in any of the Scandinavian countries, the response would be uniformly negative.<sup>19</sup>

### *Concrete Efforts to affect Finland's destiny*

Significant consensus pervaded the Swedish foreign policy establishment over the pursuance of "the Finnish argument." Erlander spoke to the British ambassador saying that "I am glad to repeat the statement that the Swedish attitude towards Finland remains unaltered and consideration for Finland still influences our policy thought and actions."<sup>20</sup> Rolf Sohlman fought for this cause in Moscow in direct conversations<sup>21</sup> with Soviet officials, attempting to engage Vice Prime Minister Zorin<sup>22</sup> and Madame Kollontay<sup>23</sup> to his favour. Sohlman seems to have been the only member of the Moscow diplomatic community who tried to influence events to the Finnish advantage.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> For an example of the Swedish "contingencies" on this point see Undén's statement to British Foreign Office (FO 371.71724.N3244/g, 18 March, 1948: "In the case Sweden was approached by a pact suggestion it would refuse without hesitation." Similar statements are reported by the Foreign Office by Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen (FO 371.71383.N3377, 17 March, 1948) and the Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange (FO 371.71504.N3040, 13 March, 1948).

<sup>20</sup> FO 371.77710.N3504, 11 April, 1949.

<sup>21</sup> After speaking to Zorin, Sohlman reported on 26 February, 1948 (UDS HP 1 ER) that "my personal viewpoint was that the Swedish government's possibilities to realize its 'no-bloc' policy *de facto* could be influenced by developments in Finland." On 18 March, 1948, Sohlman stated in Zorin's company that "a happy conclusion to the Finnish (FCMA) negotiations would contribute to calming opinion in Sweden." (UDS HP 1 ER, 31:D/58).

<sup>22</sup> Vice Foreign Minister who, beginning in January, 1948 (UDS HP 1 ER, 20 January, 1948, Sohlman) "was responsible for treatment of Nordic-related questions." (HP 1 ER, D 31/592, 20 December, 1948).

<sup>23</sup> One of Stalin's closest advisors in foreign policy matters and former Soviet ambassador to Stockholm, several years earlier.

<sup>24</sup> Sohlman (UDS HP 1 ER, 22 March, 1948, D:24/3-1948:81) remarks, "I have seemingly been the only one in this city to make efforts to influence the  
(continued...)

Ambassador Gunnar Hägglöf, in the company of Undén, said that Finland "definitely has a need to clarify its relationship to Moscow, since there were people in the *politburo*, like Zhdanov, who were clearly hostile to Finland." (Hägglöf, 1973:83) Leading figures, present in and around the Swedish Foreign Ministry at the time, admitted the consideration Sweden gave the question—one saying that it 'moderated us.'<sup>25</sup>

The Swedish decision to influence the Soviet position also appeared in other forms. One former politician, mentioned that during the SDU negotiations, one of the reasons for not opting for "option number 1" (the popularly known Western option) and, instead, choosing "number 2" was because "we wanted to help out Finland in all imaginable ways."<sup>26</sup> In any case support for Finland fulfilled Swedish idealistic goals—not least the hope of upholding neutrality.

#### *Opposition to the effort*

Was the argument ever challenged? This is an important question because one sees on one hand those who presented Swedish neutrality as being contingent upon Soviet good behaviour towards Finland and those who favoured neutrality under all circumstances—independent of external factors. Swedish Commander-in-Chief, Helge Jung, who seemed a maverick in contrast with other important Swedish officials, a man not particularly known for a "friendly" view of Soviet intentions,<sup>27</sup> attempted to deflate the argument.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>(...continued)

Russians to Finland's advantage—a, in the present context, tragic position...not even the Finnish ambassador (Sundström) has brought up the question with them."

<sup>25</sup> S51, S55, S54

<sup>26</sup> S54

<sup>27</sup> His speech on 25 November, 1949 could be seen as a sizeable break in the credibility of Sweden's neutrality. He spoke in terms such as: "behind the iron curtain we can see a depressing picture of ruthless dictatorship, of police and (continued...)"

Even Undén, on one occasion, was quoted as saying that even if there were a Communist coup in Finland, it would have no effect on Swedish neutrality.<sup>29</sup> Ernst Wigforss, Swedish Finance Minister,<sup>30</sup> in a speech given 4 April, 1948, in a peripheral reference to Soviet policy towards Finland, said he felt that "behind the shifting reactions to foreign policy lay the reflection of difference in the different parties' views of the Soviet Union."<sup>31</sup>

The Americans, if they saw logic in and/or sympathized with Sweden's neutrality argument at all, were much less convinced of talk of "buffer states," and "bridges" than they were of the viability of the Finnish argument. The Americans felt that the Swedish position could play a role in which policy the Soviet Union adopted.<sup>32</sup> The Soviet Union, however, did not appreciate what

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<sup>27</sup>(...continued)

terror control, of contempt of life of the individual and denial of his right to personal freedom..." (FO 371.77710.N10358, 1 December, 1949). The Soviet reaction is exemplified in a discussion between Sohlman and Soviet MFA representative: "Jung's speech must be seen as serious in these quarters, due to the speaker's official position and his urging of war against the Soviet Union." (UDS HP 1 ER, D 35:B/136, 8 December, 1949).

<sup>28</sup> To British Defence Minister by the Swedish Military Attaché in London (FO 371.77400.N1041, 31 January, 1949): "in the military services, neutrality was unable to be supported; the services' considered appreciation that the argument that Swedish neutrality safeguarded Finland from Russian occupation was fallacious and the Russians would occupy Finland when and if it suited it."

<sup>29</sup> Molin(1988:1). The quote seems to contradict the Swedish Government's line ("Finnish argument").

<sup>30</sup> Finance Minister Wigforss was one of most influential in shaping Social Democratic Soviet policy. Wigforss' neutralist thinking that superpowers possessed the same motives and thus the Soviet Union should be judged no more harshly than the United States pervaded key Social Democratic circles. (Berge (1989: 334f,439), citing Wigforss' memoirs, 1954)

<sup>31</sup> Möller(1986:309-11) writes "perhaps Wigforss had in mind the experiences of World War Two, when the Western powers, under the cry of "assistance to Finland", tried to pull Sweden into the war.

<sup>32</sup> Molin(1988:9) finds in FRUS document (18.2.1948 758 00/2 1848 NARS) that the "Americans preferred to rely upon the Finnish argument, that is to say, that a Swedish move West would increase Soviet pressure on Finland."

the "Finnish argument" assumed about Soviet behaviour. Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Tchernychev, said to Undén: "When Finland pursued an anti-Russian policy during the war, Swedish opinion felt calm, but when Finland wished a good relationship with the Soviet Union, Swedish opinion was uneasy."<sup>33</sup>

#### *Norwegian Consideration of Finland*

While the Norwegians were, like the Swedes, concerned about the ways in which their final security policy choice would affect Finland's destiny, the Norwegian consideration played a more subdued role in Norwegian officials' minds than in the Swedish.<sup>34</sup> One Norwegian even hinted that there was less objective truth in the Swedish "Finnish argument" than was propagated. Indeed, this argument might have been used in an attempt to prevent the Norwegians from going West.<sup>35</sup> While the Norwegians had no illusions that the Norwegian advocacy of the Western line would receive any more than a chilly reception in Moscow,<sup>36</sup> Norway nevertheless felt particularly exposed to Soviet capabilities and intentions and thus, perceived a need for a comprehensive security guarantee which could be utilized if threat perception became reality.

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<sup>33</sup> P.M. written by Undén, on the occasion of Ambassador Tchernychev's visit to him.(UDS HP 1 ER, 8 April, 1948).

<sup>34</sup> Reports from the Norwegian embassy in Helsinki spoke of nervousness in Finnish political circles over the possibility of Norway's membership in the Atlantic Pact. (UDN 38.3/3 19 January, 1949, 14 February, 1949; file 25.2/63, Jnr. 15221).

<sup>35</sup> N53

<sup>36</sup> Minister of Justice, O.C. Gundersen, said "The Soviet Union takes it for granted that the Western powers are aggressive, and if we go in for a Western alliance, we will be considered to be members of an aggressive alliance." (Forhandler i Stortinget, 4 March, 1949).

*Norway, Finland and 'Bad' Soviet timing.*

Seen from the Norwegian viewpoint, the timing of Soviet foreign policy démarches towards Finland could not have been worse. What is more, the timing of the Czech coup coincided with the Soviet pact proposal to Finland to create a nearly explosive climate of élite opinion in Norway. The uproar surrounding, in particular these two events, provided the final impetus for a Norwegian NATO membership application.

Soviet proposals for a formal security arrangement were not new to the Norwegian élites. As far back as the 31st of May, 1928, the Soviet Union had presented a draft of the German-Soviet friendship and neutrality treaty of 24 April, 1926--stating this could serve as a model for a corresponding Norwegian-Soviet agreement.<sup>37</sup> The Soviets had made the same invitation to the Finns, but as far as one can see, some time later. Trygve Lie had, four years earlier, received a request from Molotov that Norway and Soviet adopt a joint-defence arrangement on Svalbard in 1944,<sup>38</sup> a question raised again by Molotov in 1946<sup>39</sup>, a thought which was in the front of Norwegian minds when the Soviets made their move in Finland. The Soviet historical strategy of attempting to secure similar treaties on Soviet border states created, in the minds of Norwegian decision-makers, an expectation that this would become a recurring trend in Soviet foreign policy. The Norwegians were interested in establishing a pattern of the Soviet pact proposals.

Stalin's note to Finnish President Paasikivi on 23 February, 1948 re-awoke fears that Norway might receive a similar offer. According to Skodvin, all messages received from the Helsinki embassy presumed that a pact proposal to Norway was "in the making." (Skodvin, 1971:94) Now, through Stalin's letter

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<sup>37</sup> UDN 25.2/72i, Notat, 3 August, 1948.

<sup>38</sup> Lange, in speech to *Storting* 8 April, 1948 (UDN 25.2/63, Jnr. 012748).

<sup>39</sup> The negative response was much stronger this time, since both the Government and the *Storting* supported this line.



to Paasikivi, "the Soviet Union has shown renewed interest in the question of its security on the Northern flank."<sup>40</sup> Whereas the Norwegians were seemingly as worried as the Finns with respect to Soviet intransigence which might, in time, lead to a unilateral Soviet imposition of Rumanian or Hungarian-type pact terms (Hetland, 1984:8), the Finnish Pact was seen as distancing itself from the "standard agreements" the other East European states had previously concluded.<sup>41</sup> The Norwegians nevertheless detected some consistency between the Finnish-Soviet FCMA and the "East European models."<sup>42</sup>

#### *Rumours of a Soviet pact offer*

Directly following the "Czech coup" and while one knew that Soviet-Finnish FCMA negotiations were already in motion<sup>43</sup>, many messages arrived at the MFA in Oslo to the effect that Norway would be the next to be offered a pact.<sup>44</sup> The messages arrived from Norway's delegations in East Europe and the U.S.<sup>45</sup>, but strangely, not from Norway's Moscow embassy.<sup>46</sup> Eriksen

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<sup>40</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 8 April, 1948.

<sup>41</sup> Ambassador Berg writes (UDN 25.2/65, 11 April, 1948 Jnr. 0132219): "already in the pre-amble there is talk of Finland's wish to remain outside of the Great Powers' conflicts of interest." Another essential difference, according to "SV" is that the Pact "does not contain any rules which require periodical consultations about important foreign policy questions."

<sup>42</sup> A similar clause was "Article 1 which discussed the military obligations in the case of attack from Germany or any other state allied with Germany." (ibid) A second similarity was that "Finnish troops may not be used outside of Finland's borders" (UDN 25.2.65, 16 April, 1948) Thus, Finnish military obligations were limited, similar to Rumania and Hungary.

<sup>43</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 8 April, 1948.

<sup>44</sup> For example see cable from Warsaw UDN: 25.2/63 Jnr. 008917 UD 1948, 7 March, 1948.

<sup>45</sup> UDN 25.2/63, Washington, 17 March 1948, Jnr. 009417: (Admiral) Vinson raised the point that he was worried about "Soviet pressure on Norway, specifically with respect to the rumours circulating in Washington."

claims that the rumours regarding a potential pact proposal received at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry were explained in two ways.(Eriksen, 1972:72-73) First, the rumours were an attempt to prevent a Norwegian move Westward and second, to investigate how Norway would react to an eventual pact invitation.

Norwegian Ambassador Berg reported from Moscow that other rumours were circulating indicating that the Soviet Union, through a military agreement, would gain access to air force bases in Northern Finland.<sup>47</sup> If there was any truth to the rumours at all, they surely did not concretize at the anticipated point in time<sup>48</sup> and in the anticipated form—in retrospect they appear to support the theory that they were mere "bait" by which the Soviets intended to "sound out" the possibilities in such a *démarche* without any concrete commitment. According to one individual, perhaps one of the reasons why a Pact invitation never was extended was because the Soviets knew very well that such an offer would be declined.<sup>49</sup>

The psychological repercussions of the rumours were nevertheless significant. Ambassador Berg writes from Moscow<sup>50</sup> that since "Norway has become the only country with a border with the Soviet Union that had not received an invitation regarding the conclusion of a pact or an agreement in another form, it was only natural that I would try to make use of my Russian contacts, to seek

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<sup>46</sup> N52.

<sup>47</sup> UDN 25.2/65, Jnr. 007292, 23 February, 1948.

<sup>48</sup> Confirmed by UDN document entitled "Ryktene om sojvetnote til Norge" on 23 March, 1948 (further documentation illegible).

<sup>49</sup> N52. He added that the Soviet intelligence must have been adequate enough to reach that conclusion.

<sup>50</sup> UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 008991, 17 March, 1948.

to orient myself to what extent these plans might affect us."<sup>51</sup> Even though the reports of a possible Russian request for a pact with Norway might be regarded as a war of nerves, the Government thought it possible that it would be exposed to some Soviet pressure.<sup>52</sup> Attempts at ascertaining the truth in the messages nevertheless proved fruitless. One concrete result of the rumours was an immediate and extraordinarily large increase in the Norwegian defence budget to 100 million kroner for defence needs, approved on 16 March, 1948 by the *Stortinget*<sup>53</sup>.

### *Press Offensives as tool of Soviet Influence*

Pressure on the Norwegians mainly took the form of Soviet press coverage, in fact mild and almost complementary by comparison to Soviet attacks on Denmark and Sweden.<sup>54</sup> In Sweden, General Jung and Colonel Hjelm had both been "strongly criticized" and periodical accounts attacked "American influence on the Swedish business community."<sup>55</sup> The Norwegians had in

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<sup>51</sup> It was added that "no positive information was received...but then, when I heard during one conversation that previously there had been discussion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, I thought I would point this out to the Foreign Ministry." (same communiqué)

<sup>52</sup> Lange quoted in FO 371.71485.N3816, 19 April, 1948.

<sup>53</sup> It is noteworthy that approval was received without going through committee. (Brundtland, 1964:185).

<sup>54</sup> Berg reports that "It has been striking to what extent that the Norwegian relationship has been handled in the Soviet press, especially the way it has tried to solve a great deal of concrete issues, in accordance with our wishes." Berg continues "Norway almost got a rose, especially for its dismissal of American attempts to 'sail towards us old and worn out ships.' (UDN 25.2/63, 17 March, 1948, Jnr. 008991.) This positive treatment did not agree with Swedish accounts (Swedish Ambassador Sohlman writes that in the Soviet press in January, 1949 there were "sharp attacks against Martin Tranmael and his clique, which included Bratteli, Lange and Hauge, as working for the creation of U.S. bases in Norway." (UDS HP 1 ER, date illegible, January, 1949, D:30/28).

<sup>55</sup> UDS HP 1 ER, date illegible, January, 1949, D:30/28.

essence escaped this Soviet polemical offensive, conceivably because it prioritized the effort to keep Norway out of NATO.

## **Pushing it over the edge: Swedish and Norwegian Reactions to East European Violence and Turbulence**

### *Swedish Élite Perceptions of the Soviet East European Policy*

Although Swedish officials never saw a communist coup in Sweden as a realistic possibility, the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe soiled the name of the Soviet Union and the Swedish Communist Party. In 1945 there was a "steel workers strike," an event seen as crippling to one of Sweden's most crucial industries, but more importantly as being instrumented by the Swedish Communist Party. This event has significance from two points of view. First, it came to symbolize one of the darker sides of the competition between the governing Social Democrats and the Communist Party. Also, the event was one of the main determinants of the poor showing the Communist party made in the 1948 election. Events in Eastern Europe only acted to further speed the decline of the Swedish Communist Party.

The Prague coup had such importance for Swedish neutrality since any invasion of a state's sovereignty and borders--for whatever reason--runs sharply against the spirit of neutrality. For neutral states, borderlines are sacrosanct. To an extent this same principle affected Norway's reaction to the Prague coup, especially since its bridge-building tradition had not yet been fully abandoned.

### *The Prague Coup: The Political Debate*

Previous to the Prague coup, the difference of opinion between the Swedish political parties ran between the Social Democrats and the Bourgeois parties on the one hand and the Communist party on the other. Following the coup, the political spectrum became more clearly divided between Bourgeois, Social Democratic and Communist camps. A whole debate was dedicated to the issue

of the Prague Coup and related matters in the Swedish *Riksdag*. Östen Undén, in connection with this debate, painted the background for East and West Europe's division darkly.<sup>56</sup> J.Å.T. Wiberg, a Conservative M.P., remarked that, over time, "we have seen how a whole set of previously free and independent states have either been swept away as independent states or have assumed such a position of dependence on a foreign power, that they have become mere vassals."<sup>57</sup> The Social Democratic M.P., H.M. Hallén, found that the Soviet Union was in a state of "un-matched aggressive imperialism."<sup>58</sup> A source close to Social Democracy at the time summed up Social Democratic thinking thus: "at the end of the war there were great hopes that the Soviet Union, especially with consideration to the Soviet Union's position during the War, would strive for good neighbourly relations and democracy." He continued that "after Prague there was a feeling of insecurity" which put these goals into question.<sup>59</sup> Many, such as Centre MP Carl Andersson, took a strongly negative view of the

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<sup>56</sup> Undén in *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 4 February, 1948: "the manifesto of Cominform tells that two camps have been formed...the imperialistic and the anti-democratic camp, which harbours the intention of establishing world hegemony for American imperialism and to crush democracy..." Undén states that "it is clear to me the this sort of tendency for bloc-building bodes an important deterioration of the political atmosphere in the world..."

<sup>57</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 4 February, 1948.

<sup>58</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, February 4, 1948.

<sup>59</sup> S53

Communists<sup>60</sup> But the Communists hardly sat by the sidelines, responding to the charges in kind.<sup>61</sup>

### *Reactions within Swedish officialdom*

It could hardly be said that their reactions were 'impartial' towards these events. Although MFA Political Director, Grafström, reports that "after a talk with (Prime Minister Tage) Erlander, his views are in full agreement with Russian propaganda over what has happened in Hungary," (Grafström, 1989) he reports that Erlander, in reaction to Czechoslovakia, saw that "with one blow the political situation has changed...the Russians' new advances in Czechoslovakia and Finland have awakened sentiment in our country."<sup>62</sup> Grafström himself immediately reached the conclusion that "events in Czechoslovakia, more than anything else demonstrated that a good will policy towards the Soviet Union is not worth the effort."<sup>63</sup> Undén, who was, prior to

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<sup>60</sup> 14 February, 1948, Riksdagsprotokoll: Andersson hints that there even ought to be Swedish legislation which allotted resources to prevent a Czechoslovak-type Communist coup in Sweden, adding "that which has happened in Czechoslovakia has, more than anything else, opened our eyes to what sort of intentions Communists in every country, even here in Sweden, harbour."

<sup>61</sup> Karl Hagberg, Swedish Communist Party (Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 April, 1948) responded: "Even if it is repeated a thousand times that it was a coup d'état which occurred in Czechoslovakia, in accordance with the Hitlerian precept that if a lie is repeated enough times it will be believed-- one cannot escape certain elementary facts. Who took the initiative to put asunder the Czechoslovak government? The Communists? Nyet, it wasn't; they were representatives for precisely the same parties who were appointed by the previous Government..."

<sup>62</sup> Erlander(1973:364,371). Erlander speaks as follows: "The Soviet Union built up its security system by annexing the Baltic states and through constructing a system of buffer states."

<sup>63</sup> Grafström(1989) entry for 16 March, 1948.

Czechoslovakia,<sup>64</sup> seen to hold a relatively "naïve" perception of Soviet motives,<sup>65</sup> was seen by Grafström as "coming around to greater clarity"<sup>66</sup> as a result of Soviet behaviour towards Finland and Czechoslovakia. Undén himself viewed the clash, symbolized by the division of Europe to be chiefly of an ideological character. Undén characterized the takeovers such:

"A new strata of Socialists, with values different than our own, has taken power in many countries, which, through revolution, trampled institutions ruthlessly underfoot in their rise to power."<sup>67</sup>

Sweden's neutral status did not hinder Undén from speaking out. Neutrality, according to Undén, was a concept-in-practice of International Law, which made no specific connections with 'ideological neutrality.'<sup>68</sup> "We have made it clear that "ideologically we are members of the West...which we have not tried to hide," wrote Undén.<sup>69</sup> The military staff at the Moscow embassy argued<sup>70</sup> that the Soviet authorities ought to be convinced that, especially after the "Prague Coup," Sweden's sympathies lay with the West. Comments such

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<sup>64</sup> Möller(1986) contends that Undén was characterized by demeaning words such as: "America-fright," "submissive towards the Soviet Union," "Russia-friendly."

<sup>65</sup> Grafström writes (quoting "Quensel") on 9 July, 1947 that one explanation for Undén's attitude towards the Russians was that he had assured Wigforss that he would follow a "Russian-friendly" policy.

<sup>66</sup> Grafström (1989), 16 March, 1948. As a result, said Grafström, Undén held a speech wherein he went significantly further than he had in the past relevant to cooperation within the Marshall Plan.

<sup>67</sup> FO 371.71452.N5678, 13 May, 1948.

<sup>68</sup> Möller(1986:314-5) quoting Undén.

<sup>69</sup> Möller(1986:301-2)'s quote of Undén's 16 March, 1948 diary entry.

<sup>70</sup> UDS HP 1 ER, 22 March, 1948.

as these had great import in clarifying the bounds of post-War Swedish neutrality at a formative stage in the policy's development.

There seemed to be a difference of opinion between civil servants and the military. It could be said the Swedish military had traditionally made the most sinister attributions of Soviet motivation amongst the various professional foreign policy élites— a trend consistent with the post-War period. The military, at times, was uninhibited in their judgement of Soviet motivation in Eastern Europe. For example, in a report by the Swedish military attaché in Moscow, Major General C.H. Juhlin-Dannfelt<sup>71</sup>, the conclusion is drawn that, seen from the Soviet viewpoint, the East European states functioned as a "safety girdle." The report goes on to analyze and account for the methods which both the Red Army and Cominform used to "politically and militarily strengthen and utilize the weapons in the people's democracies for its own purposes."

This tone of expression ran contrary to what high-ranking Swedish officials were saying about neutrality. It seemed as though Social Democratic MP's were more critical than were officials who, by virtue of being civil servants, had to defend the viability of maintaining neutrality. One such example was Moscow Ambassador Rolf Sohlman, arguably the chief source of Soviet information for the Swedish Government and the Foreign Ministry.<sup>72</sup> Sohlman mentions very little of East European events directly from his reporting post. One exceptional opportunity is one report to Undén, where he writes:

"After the upheaval in Czechoslovakia, Moscow seems to find itself close to completion of a chapter in its European post-War policy: a military and political *cordon sanitaire* had, bit by bit, been soldered together from the Arctic to the Mediterranean...many people wonder what the next chapter will be."<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> UDS 17 December, 1949, HP 1 ER D 223/3960.

<sup>72</sup> Sohlman was an important character since, according to Ingemar Hägglöf, a civil servant in the MFA, "Undén's, Wigforss' and (Gunnar) Myrdal's advisor was Sohlman." (Hägglöf, 1984:282)

<sup>73</sup> UDS 5 July, 1948, HP 1 ER D 31/342.



Finance Minister Wigforss seemed irked by the debate surrounding the Soviet Union's "aggressive policy, most recently witnessed in the Czechoslovak case."<sup>74</sup>

### *Taking Prague Personally: Norwegian Elite Perceptions*

Norway had made a tremendous personal investment in fraternal relations with Czechoslovakia. It is unlikely that any other Western country took the Prague coup as personally as did key sectors of the Norwegian foreign policy establishment. The deep personal relationships which both Trygve Lie (Foreign Minister until 1946) and his successor, Halvard Lange (Foreign Minister 1946-1965) had with the Czechoslovak leadership were arguably without parallel in the West. Lie himself had built up a strong personal tie with one man--Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. Lange had been with Masaryk during the war, in fact inheriting the personal relationship from Lie.<sup>75</sup> As late as Mid-Summer 1947, Masaryk had been in Norway in order to sign a cultural agreement between Norway and Czechoslovakia.<sup>76</sup>

Masaryk's death, more than any other single event, explains why Norway changed its neutralist, bridge-building-orientation to a security policy strongly embedded in the West. The effect of Masaryk's death on Lange cannot be overrated. Wrapped in Lange's reactions were feelings of the loss of a personal, close friend, coupled with the feeling of sorrow for a "crushed"

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<sup>74</sup> According to Bertil Ohlin, Liberal Party M.P. and highly influential in parliamentary foreign policy matters, judgement, "according to the hard criticism which both the conservative and liberal papers are levelling, Wigforss reacted by hinting that both parties perhaps were prepared to drift away from Sweden's neutrality policy." (Ohlin, 1975:164)

<sup>75</sup> N50

<sup>76</sup> At the same time, said N50 they had an opportunity to talk over Bevin's initiative. (towards the establishment of the Economic Commission for Europe). Also, Masaryk was "in heaven because Molotov had accepted the invitation to Paris."

democracy. "I always date Lange's conversion to my line of thinking to this event," said one of his fellow party members, who was, previous to this event, supportive of Norway's Western-oriented line.<sup>77</sup> Lange's personal "conversion" played an arguably greater role than any other event in Norway's path towards NATO membership. Lange soon became known as the person who carried the DNA and Norway into NATO. In front of an assembled *Storting*, Lange clarified his ideas on the meaning of Czechoslovakia:<sup>78</sup>

"The meaning of the events in Czechoslovakia is found on both the political and psychological planes. It demonstrates that the Czechoslovak communists, in connection with their declaration at the founding meeting of *Cominform* have left the thought of 'bridge-building' between East and West--between communism and democracy...the death of Jan Masaryk made it clear that the policy of cooperation, to which he had dedicated his life, no longer had any possibilities in the new Czechoslovakia."

For DNA-at-large, "it is totally clear that these events were the basis for the shift in Norwegian foreign policy." (Skodvin, 1971:90) To one key DNA member, events were especially painful for the DNA leadership because one, Czechoslovakia had attempted to conduct the same policy as Norway, with respect to the Soviet Union, but also because Czechoslovakia was a democracy.<sup>79</sup>

Jens Christian Hauge, the Minister of Defence and the so-called "architect of Norwegian NATO membership," took a staunch Western line from the outset. His thinking on defence matters was based on the idea that "Norwegian security was tied to the West."<sup>80</sup> According to one former official, up until

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<sup>77</sup> N50

<sup>78</sup> *Storting* debate on 8 April, 1948, UDN, 25.2/63 Jnr. 012748.

<sup>79</sup> N50

<sup>80</sup> N50

Czechoslovakia, Hauge felt it his responsibility to "drag Lange along,"<sup>81</sup> towards a Western initiative. However, there is evidence that Hauge saw Soviet military policy in a more positive light than his staunch advocacy of alliance would lead us to conclude.<sup>82</sup>

Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen's views of Soviet foreign policy had been public since 1947. One of the most important indicators of Soviet behaviour for Gerhardsen was the Czechoslovaks being "forced by Stalin to say no to the Marshall Plan." (Solumsmoen and Larsen, 1967:60) The Prime Minister, as did other Labour leaders of the time, saw the issue in partially domestic political terms, as a fight against domestic communist party influence.<sup>83</sup> Czechoslovakia was not like the other states who had been "conquered by the Soviet Union--Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Albania and Yugoslavia--Czechoslovakia had a unique position as a modern, West European democracy."<sup>84</sup> Gerhardsen saw in Soviet policy that although the "methods were new, the realities were the same."<sup>85</sup> Gerhardsen saw the Norwegian Communists as "*Comintern-Cominform-Communists*, who, like their brothers-in-

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<sup>81</sup> N50

<sup>82</sup> Hauge quoted in Skodvin(p.116): "There are grounds to point out that the Soviet Union has not set in motion direct military operations against any country in the Post-War period, and that it has concentrated, to a great degree, on security concerns which have been previously defined and clarified." This standpoint contrasted with a statement approximately a year later (19 February, 1949): "We must have the courage to admit and give expression to the fact that we fear the Soviet Union's expansive foreign policy--for whatever motives underlie it...this fear is the chief motive for our foreign policy..." (Åmlid, 1966:48)

<sup>83</sup> Gerhardsen(1971:197): "We couldn't have any confidence for the communists, because they defended what had happened in Czechoslovakia."

<sup>84</sup> Gerhardsen quoted in Solumsmoen and Larsen(1967:72).

<sup>85</sup> Gerhardsen quoted in Solumsmoen and Larsen(1967:72).

arms in other countries...are, in their hearts, supporters of terror and dictatorship."<sup>86</sup>

The Norwegian parties' reactions to Eastern Europe followed a pattern similar to Sweden. A significant difference of opinion ran between the Norwegian Communist Party and the remaining parties. While the far Left did not approve of the methods Stalin utilized, the essential reasons for his actions were "understandable," said one former official.<sup>87</sup> The NKP members saw that the Soviets had defensive motivations in mind in Czechoslovakia, as one individual pointed out: "clearly the Soviet Union's motivation was defensive in Czechoslovakia, although I was not in sympathy with either the coup or the bad way the Russians handled the situation there."<sup>88</sup> "The Russians were afraid of German policies...the Soviet Union was anxious...therefore, it wasn't all that curious that Stalin acted in the way he did," he said, singling out Haakon Lie as "very aggressive" and Lange as a man who "nearly wanted a preventative war."<sup>89</sup>

### *Sweden and Norway Weigh the Defence Alternatives*

#### *Sweden: Caught between the Scandinavian Defence Union, Neutrality and the Western Option*

One of the more important outcomes of Soviet behaviour in East Europe was that it prompted the Swedish government to take the initiative towards the formation of a Scandinavian Defence Union.<sup>90</sup> For Undén<sup>91</sup> there existed a

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<sup>86</sup> Gerhardsen speech 29 February, 1948, FO 371.71450.N2369.

<sup>87</sup> N51

<sup>88</sup> N51

<sup>89</sup> N51

<sup>90</sup> Defence Minister Voug, as reported in FO 371.77710.N6485, 12 July, 1949.

clear connection between events in Czechoslovakia and the SDU initiative. Sweden pursued the SDU pathway for several reasons. First, Sweden did not want to see either Norway or Denmark follow a North Atlantic option. Instead, Swedish policy should do all it could to, together with Scandinavia, build the SDU—a solution which would likely guarantee the Swedish desire to remain neutral.<sup>92</sup> Yet another reason for attempting a collective solution was the realization that an effective unilateral Swedish defence against Soviet attack would be impossible.<sup>93</sup>

At the same time, Ernest Bevin's speech on 22 January, 1948, advocating a Western alliance, ignited a debate in Scandinavia about the possibilities for a second alternative: the Atlantic Pact. But the SDU's potential aggressor was no different than the Atlantic Pact's: the Soviet Union.<sup>94</sup> The negotiations failed,

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<sup>91</sup>(...continued)

<sup>91</sup> Letter cited in Möller(1986:323), dated 11 October, 1954. Undén wrote: "It was the great unease in Norway based on the Czechoslovak coup and the attendant tendency for Norway to commit herself to the West, which triggered the initiative for a Scandinavian Defence Union."

<sup>92</sup> S54

<sup>93</sup> Social Democratic M.P. T. Nerman, (Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 February, 1949): "Everyone, including the military and civilians, is in agreement that an isolated Sweden could not defend itself against Russia for more than a short time, in a so-called "delayed defence." From a military standpoint, "obviously a coup-like attack has great chances of success in present circumstances, for there is practically no military strength in Norway-Denmark and a low level of readiness in Sweden." (UDS HP 1 ER, 22 March, 1948).

<sup>94</sup> The Scandinavian Defence Committee's final report, released as late as 1988, made it clear who the "eventual aggressor" actually was: the Soviet Union. Social Democratic MP T. Nerman (Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 February, 1949) points out that, in the SDU's "Defence Inquiry" "no one in the democratic parties, no one in the government or Riksdag, no military person, or anyone in the SDU's 'Defence Inquiry' has for a second considered that Norden would be attacked by any other power than Russia." (ibid).

most probably because they were "doomed to fail."<sup>95</sup> There had been earlier attempts at uniting parts of *Norden* before<sup>96</sup> but the prerequisite conditions had been absent.

### *The Importance of the Soviet View of Swedish Neutrality*

At the essence of neutrality policy is *credibility*. A neutral state must be seen by the potential belligerents as following their chosen path without detour. Thus, the Soviet view of Swedish neutrality was crucial to Swedish élites.

The Soviet Union looked upon the talk of and cooperation in the Scandinavian Defence Union, NATO or the Marshall Plan as, in varying degree, collusion with the West--particularly with the Anglo-Saxon countries. Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Zorin stated the Soviet view succinctly, saying: "Scandinavian plans for enhanced military cooperation cannot be seen in isolation from the ongoing trend of front-building (versus the U.S.S.R.)."<sup>97</sup> Soviet apprehensions about Swedish neutrality were only kindled when the Scandinavian Defence Union's "defence inquiry" continued its work, even when it became clear to the Soviet Union that Norway was no longer neutral.<sup>98</sup>

The Swedes "held no illusions of the Russian attitude to Sweden joining the Atlantic Pact or the formation of a Scandinavian bloc."<sup>99</sup> Here the issue of bases was crucial. Undén's thinking was crystal clear on this point: "any form

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<sup>95</sup> Wahlbäck's conclusion that "the Norwegian and Swedish viewpoints were incompatible" is in concord with this author.(1973:89)

<sup>96</sup> There were Finnish-Swedish negotiations 1937-1939, which occurred as a "part of a more vague discussion regarding cooperation amongst the four Nordic countries." Wahlbäck continues: "but these four countries did not fear the same enemies, and did not put faith in similar methods to meet the threat..." (summarized from Wahlbäck, 1973:92).

<sup>97</sup> Zorin, in conversation with Sohlman, UDS, HP 1 ER, D 31:B/168, on 27 December, 1948.

<sup>98</sup> Sohlman, UDS 5 January, 1949, HP 1 ER, 33:D/2.

<sup>99</sup> British Ambassador Farquhar in FO 371.77400.N893/g, 20 January, 1949.

of military understanding with the Western powers or offers from the U.S. will evoke in the Soviets the impression that the United States has received a promise for bases on our territory...nothing could possibly be more harmful to our peacetime relationship with the Soviets."<sup>100</sup> Defence Minister Vougst saw the issue in a broader, Scandinavian context, saying it was "essential that no foreign bases be established during peacetime in Norway and Denmark."<sup>101</sup> The Bourgeois opposition did attach the same importance to the Soviet viewpoint--Sweden should tread its own path.<sup>102</sup> Perhaps if the Soviet Union had known that their initially staunch opposition to the SDU's formation in effect catalysed the splitting of *Norden* into separate security commitments (and that two would be NATO), it would have favoured the SDU alternative.<sup>103</sup>

According to Sweden's Ambassador to London, Boheman, "if the Russians were satisfied that the Western powers could not use Scandinavian territory as a base it would be in their interest to leave Scandinavia alone."<sup>104</sup> From the Soviet perspective, unilateral Swedish neutrality was clearly preferred over the Scandinavian alternative, however the Soviet press offensive paints a somewhat different picture.<sup>105</sup> Undén felt sure that the Soviet authorities, "with their

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<sup>100</sup> Möller(1986:326) citing Undén's diary, 3 May, 1948.

<sup>101</sup> Vougst in FO 371.77710.N6485, 12 July, 1949.

<sup>102</sup> Liberal M.P. Ohlin states in *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 2 June, 1948: "if Moscow continues to oppose any form of Scandinavian (military cooperative) cooperation, this should, as a matter of course, not effect Sweden's position."

<sup>103</sup> Undén, quoted by an old Danish politician (Hermod Lanung) as telling him "I would have definitely preferred the Danish-Swedish alternative, but I couldn't get the military people over to my side."

<sup>104</sup> British Ambassador Farquhar in FO 371.77400.N893/g, 20 January, 1949.

<sup>105</sup> Ohlin concludes: "If one listens to the (Soviet) criticism of every form of Scandinavian cooperation on Soviet radio and in the press, one could nearly draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union would prove equally antagonistic towards a Scandinavian Defence Alliance as it would towards Scandinavian participation in the Atlantic Pact or the like." (9 February, 1949, *Riksdagsprotokoll* ).

suspicious minds, would conclude from the Swedish press reactions that Swedish efforts to normalize relations were not sincere.<sup>106</sup> Swedish military *faux pas* by no means aided the credibility of Swedish neutrality.<sup>107</sup> Soviet suspicion of Sweden could be awakened by seemingly minute events.<sup>108</sup> The conclusion one must draw is that the Soviets valued the Swedish decision for neutrality, but, especially in the beginning, felt it could have been "cleaned up" in certain ways, so as to remove its inconsistencies (criticism of the Soviet Union, must importantly).

### *Perception of Soviet Threat*

The Swedish perception of the Soviet threat is interesting because it gives an idea of whether leaders felt that a neutral policy was sufficient, faced with a threat from the East. Undén noted particularly Soviet policy towards Bornholm, Finnmark, Spitzbergen as points of potential conflict.<sup>109</sup> In Undén's mind there was every possibility that Sweden could be "dragged into a conflict if the Soviet Union were to mount an attack on Nordic territory and try to place some bases there...and if it resulted in Norway adopting defensive measures against Russia."<sup>110</sup> He further felt that the Soviet Union must see Norden as a deployment area if the Scandinavians put Scandinavian territory at the

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<sup>106</sup> FO 371.71724.N3244/g, 16 March, 1948.

<sup>107</sup> Case-in-point Commander-in-Chief Helge Jung's speech, UDS HP 1 ER, D 35:B/136, 8 December, 1949.

<sup>108</sup> For example, Undén was confronted by the Soviet Ambassador over a planned "Estonian Song Festival," 26-27 June, 1948. Undén said he "tried to explain that this festival, seen from the Swedish viewpoint, was a natural attempt to hold together people from the same country." (UDS HP 1 ER, P.M.,1746, Undén, 30 June, 1948).

<sup>109</sup> UN (Utrikesnämndens Memorialprotokoll), 11 December, 1948: Defence Chief Swedlund was cautious in his advocacy of alliance with the West: "It can be dangerous to become involved Westwards when we don't as yet know anything about American help."

<sup>110</sup> UN, 17 January, 1949.



disposition of the West.<sup>111</sup> Ernst Wigforss thought that it was clearly more understandable that the Western powers would seek "attack bases" on Swedish territory than that the East would pursue the line of attack through Scandinavia.<sup>112</sup>

### *The SDU's Potential Western Connection*

There was no doubt that the Americans and the British were attempting to secure the participation of the Swedes in the coming Atlantic Alliance.<sup>113</sup> It is now clear that certain parts of the Swedish leadership also tried to solicit assistance from the West. One of the important questions with respect to a policy of "armed neutrality" was whence the war *materiel* would come.<sup>114</sup> To one participant the issue was quite clear: the SDU would receive war materiel on "advantageous financial terms," but with no "political obligations."<sup>115</sup> The Opposition parties continued to hope that the connection with the West would become more solid. Wigforss found it "difficult to cooperate with members of another defence alliance...therefore (such cooperation) is not of current

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<sup>111</sup> "Protokoll från Nordiska samarbetskommitén, 7-8 February, 1948, quoted in Möller(1986:323).

<sup>112</sup> Wigforss' speech, 4 April, 1948, quoted in Möller(1986:309). Again, Wigforss saw the possibilities of Sweden abandoning its neutrality by being "dragged into war" on the pretense of some event or cause.

<sup>113</sup> UN, 27 October, 1948: Undén admits "the official position of the English or the Americans is that they are dissatisfied with our (neutrality) ...but the occurrence of such cannot be understood as constituting 'pressure.'" This conflicts with Grafström's quote of Undén (diary, 18 November, 1947): "Undén said, that the Americans have now declared an open diplomatic war against the U.S.S.R., carrying on propaganda in order to scare and collect supporters."

<sup>114</sup> Rickard Sandler, Social Democratic M.P. and Foreign Minister (1932-39) felt that the connection between neutrality and war materiel was a secondary question, when "the most un-neutral which has been discussed so far is (our) thinking." (UN, 20 January, 1949).

<sup>115</sup> S5

interest."<sup>116</sup> Per Edvin Sköld, the Minister of Finance 1949-1955, saw "Sweden being dragged into a Western Pact." Under those conditions, "Sköld no longer wanted to (be a part of the Government)."<sup>117</sup>

### *Post-SDU*

The NATO option was never seriously debated within the Swedish Government, and appeared to be last on the Swedish list of security policy alternatives. Besides, from the Swedish perspective, Sweden would get many of the benefits of the Atlantic Treaty Organisation without having to pay for it by becoming members.<sup>118</sup> Once it became clear that the conditions were not ripe for a close intra-Scandinavian defence effort, the Swedes talked for some time about joining in a bilateral effort with the Danes (Petersen, 1979:196), who allotted highest priority to a neutral SDU. Norway had prioritized a West-oriented SDU. Danish Premier Hedtoft asked Erlander to research the possibilities for a closer joint Swedish-Danish effort.<sup>119</sup> However, seen from Erlander's perspective, this too would be seen by the Soviets as a "masked Swedish Western alliance."<sup>120</sup> Even this effort eventually led to failure.

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<sup>116</sup> UN 11 December, 1948.

<sup>117</sup> Undén's diary, 5 July, 1948. (the "Sköld Crisis."--See Möller(1986:311-2); Jonasson(1976).

<sup>118</sup> Norwegian Commander-in-Chief Berg, in conversation with Swedish General Swedlund, (FO 371.77713.N3850, 26 April, 1949), seemed angry at Swedlund's boasting that Sweden got most of the advantages of NATO without having to sign the Atlantic Pact.

<sup>119</sup> Erlander's first response came on 23 February, 1949. Erlander responded that he did not think the conditions were ripe. *Dansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1948-1966, Fremstilling*, p.33.

<sup>120</sup> Erlander paraphrased by Möller(1986:351).

### *Norway and the SDU*

Evidence exists that, as early as the 22nd February, 1948 the Norwegians attempted to seek a Scandinavian solution for their defence woes. In a conversation with the Norwegian Moscow military attaché, Danish Commander Madsen reported that the Scandinavians were already under attack by the Soviet press on the grounds that they had concluded a secret military pact with Great Britain and the United States.<sup>121</sup> But even if these statements were untrue, the Soviet Union was still seen as being extremely wary of the West utilizing Scandinavian territory in an eventual conflict between East and West.<sup>122</sup>

One of the major divisions of opinion between Norwegian officials, on the one hand and Danish and Swedish on the other was the Norwegian wish that any eventual Scandinavian Defence Union should be guaranteed by the West.<sup>123</sup> Hauge was perhaps the most interested in eliciting guarantees from the British.<sup>124</sup> Two incompatible Norwegian wishes manifested themselves: the Scandinavian option of common neutrality, and support and guarantees from the West. Sweden objected to the second. Therefore, on this point alone, it seems as though the fate of the SDU was already sealed. One could not "have the cake and eat it too."

Lange's argument was built on two important points, crucial to understanding the essential Western role in any future Norwegian defence solution. (Brundtland, 1964:179) First, Norway alone was not large enough to

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<sup>121</sup> UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 007922, 1 March, 1948.

<sup>122</sup> UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 007922, 1 March, 1948.

<sup>123</sup> Skodvin(1971:97-8) reports on Lange's inquiries for British and American support in early 1948.

<sup>124</sup> FO 371.71445.N4194, 7 April, 1948, Hauge to Foreign Office: "the Soviet Union knows that it cannot attack the Scandinavian peninsula without war with the Western democracies."

deter a superpower. Also, the construction of a Norwegian defence required outside assistance, the so-called "supply problem."

The Norwegian assessment of the Soviet threat was not much different than the Swedish or the Danish, although it perhaps was phrased in different terms and over different issues, which would make the search for a common solution difficult.<sup>125</sup> What distinguished the Norwegians from the Swedes or Danes was their determination of the solution which was most practicable under the given domestic and international circumstances. In fact, according to the final report of the Scandinavian Defence Commission, there was no doubt who the enemy was.<sup>126</sup>

#### *'The Russian Note' and Norway's Atlantic Choice*

Once it was clear in Soviet minds that Norway had abandoned the Scandinavian option and had formally begun a search for a Atlantic solution, the Soviet embassy in Oslo delivered a note asking for a clarification of Norway's position in the matter.<sup>127</sup> The note requested to know the Norwegian Government's position with respect to the NATO question, in light of Norwegian press reports of Norwegian intentions to join the Atlantic Pact.

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<sup>125</sup> Lange in secret speech to *Stortinget* said: "the three Nordic countries are not faced by identical security problems, which creates difficulties in trying to reach a common line." (UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 012748, 8 April, 1948). Lange elaborated saying "there are different interpretations as to the CHARACTER of the union which is possible to bring about." He attributes this to the different approaches to "our geographical situation...our historical experiences," which led to the countries to "different judgements about central foreign policy and security policy questions." (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 27 January, 1949, )

<sup>126</sup> The Final Report of the Scandinavian Defence Commission (UDN 38.3/3, 15 January, 1949), each of the Scandinavian countries is presents in turn a clear scenario for Soviet attack.

<sup>127</sup> UDN note received at MFA, 15.00 on 29 January, 1949, no document number).

Furthermore the note inquired whether Norway's planned to host foreign air and sea bases on Norwegian territory.<sup>128</sup>

The Norwegians responded to the note on 1 March, stating that both the Government and the *Storting* had agreed to initiate preparatory discussions leading to the specific formation of an Atlantic Pact. The response contained the words: "the Government wants to make clear in the most categorical terms that it will neither work for a policy that has aggressive objectives or to open up Norwegian territory to foreign powers' air force or navy bases, so long as Norway is not attacked or exposed to the threat of attack."<sup>129</sup> While the Soviets were clearly not pleased, reaction in Moscow was tempered by what was seen as a "wise and deft formulation in the response" (Hetland, 1984:20-1).

The Norwegian basing policy was thus established prior to Norwegian NATO entry. The first consideration of the basing policy was to calm Soviet speculations about Norway's intentions vis-à-vis the AP. Another consideration in the Norwegian formulation of the basing policy was an internal one, that a foreign troop presence in the country could lead to internal friction.<sup>130</sup>

#### *The Consideration of a Soviet Attack on Norway*

Top Norwegian decision-makers such as Hauge<sup>131</sup>, Lange<sup>132</sup> and Lie<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid Note 127. A key Soviet query concerned whether Atlantic Pact membership would mean foreign bases on Norwegian territory. The Norwegian Government "keyed into" this phrase in its response.

<sup>129</sup> UDN 1 March, 25.2/72 i.

<sup>130</sup> N53

<sup>131</sup> UDN, March 19, 1949, 25.2/72: Hauge forwarded the argument that "one of the minor imaginable consequences of Norway's membership to the Atlantic Pact would be that the Soviet military made a military assault on Norway."

<sup>132</sup> Lange(1966:44) states that it was precisely because of "sensitivity" to Finland that Norway made a last attempt to reach a Scandinavian solution in February, 1949."

of extending a substantial credit to the Soviet Union.<sup>143</sup> This discussion ended in an extension of said credit on the 13th of November, 1946.

Behind the Agreement lay a mixture of explicit commercial, political and altruistic motivations. One motive which was not stated was that this credit extension could indirectly enhance the view of Sweden in the Soviet Union as being balanced in its economic relations. First, there was a widely-shared hope that the Soviet Union would break out of its isolation and undergo a transformation to democracy--a strong political motive(Åberg, 1978:541). The financial motive was that there existed unexplored and unexploited markets which could profit Sweden's export and import activities.<sup>144</sup> Third, there was a strong feeling of empathy for the Soviet Union, which had lost 20 million men, having suffered more than any other of the War's victors.<sup>145</sup> Economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union as a goal in-and-of-itself was considered desirable from the standpoint of Baltic and/or Nordic stability. Finally, there were domestic Swedish economic goals, such as that the Agreement's possible utility as indirect insurance against a coming depression(Hägglöf,1984:207).

### *The Content*

The Agreement laid down in very precise terms the responsibilities of the signatories--a trait of fixed trade agreements which would not disappear until the late 1980's. The Agreement called for SEK 300 million in exports to the

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<sup>143</sup> These discussions were said to have occurred between Madame Kollontay and Ernst Wigforss (S56)

<sup>144</sup> S56; Hägglöf(1984:187) writes: the idea was to "create a larger trading situation with the Soviets and to establish a more secure footing in the Soviet market--an old wish and cherished hope within Swedish industry."

<sup>145</sup> See Hägglöf(1984:282); Undén thought that Sweden should demonstrate "good will" on two grounds: because of the Soviet fight against Nazism and the Soviet loss of 20 m. lives. See Möller(1986:268). Erlander aligned himself with this view(Erlander, 1973:273).

Soviet Union,<sup>146</sup> and the Soviet Union bound itself to ordering equipment and supplies from Swedish industry with the intention of reconstructing the Soviet economy. Deliveries would be spread over a period of five years, at the value of SEK 200 million per year(Hägglöf, 1984:185). Re-payment would occur within a period of fifteen years, at an interest rate in any case not exceeding 2%.(Hägglöf, *ibid*) (which finally ended up being 2 3/8%, with the first three years being "interest free.")<sup>147</sup>

### *Divisions of Opinion*

The "battle lines" in relation to the Agreement were drawn much according to the political blocs, with the Bourgeois party establishment in opposition and the Social Democratic Government, with the support of certain hopeful business circles, in favour. The chief point of Bourgeois opposition was that after the war Sweden had to "deal with its own problems."<sup>148</sup>

Those individuals who became known as the "founders" of the Agreement, Gunnar Myrdal and Ernst Wigforss, in fact **inherited** the Wartime promises of Wartime Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson to the Soviets.<sup>149</sup> These inheritors hardly saw it reasonable that they should turn on their vow. Their chief function was to catalyse support for the Agreement, clarify its goals and parameters, execute and to some extent defend the ideas embodied in it.

The Agreement was a product of a Swedish vision and a Swedish commitment, not a result of a careful examination of the potential costs, benefits

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<sup>146</sup> Hägglöf(1984:186), involved in the negotiations, writes "for this time period, these were wildly large amounts..at the time the Swedish totals were in the tens of thousands of Kronor."

<sup>147</sup> MP G.N. Ljungkvist, Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 June, 1948.

<sup>148</sup> S54

<sup>149</sup> S56

and risks that the Agreement would run.<sup>150</sup> No one knew, to be sure, how the Agreement would function in practice. Gunnar Myrdal, Minister of Trade 1945-1947, started in May 1946 drumming up support for such a plan. Myrdal foresaw "a significant increase in our trade Eastwards(Hägglöf, 1984:208)," avoiding however to mention the Agreement by name. By November, the Agreement had been passed by the Swedish Parliament.

### *Criticism Begins*

Only a short time had passed before criticism of the Agreement began. In 1947 there was "only a couple ten thousand million SEK in trade in each direction"(Ohlin, 1975:64), although the Agreement had envisioned 200 million. Statements made in 1948, such as one by Minister of Trade Gjöres,<sup>151</sup> expressing that the terms of the Credit Agreement were not being fulfilled to the extent anticipated, were growing more and more frequent. Gjöres mentioned that the Swedes had exported goods valued at 30 million<sup>152</sup> and had imported 55 million SEK.<sup>153</sup> Criticism was especially harsh from the

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<sup>150</sup> Hägglöf(1984:282) is critical here: "When one judges this episode in Swedish foreign policy one should not forget that at the end of the war, when the promise was made, the Swedish perception of the victorious Soviet Union was dominated by an illusion: 'rosenröd (altogether too hopeful) or blue-eyed' (naïve)..it varied...and of a deep lack of knowledge."

<sup>151</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948: Gjöres attributed the lack of trade and why the credit had not been utilized to: "sellers and buyers in most of the cases have not been able to agree on prices, or conditions." Because of this, "many of the Swedish offers have lapsed, because the Soviets disregarded them." He continued, "the aforementioned conditions, in any case for the foreseeable future, do not point to a realisation of the export envisioned under the Credit Agreement."

<sup>152</sup> Soviet representatives requested goods from the machine industry, the metallic industry and the shipbuilding industry.

<sup>153</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948.



Bourgeois side, but even the Communists<sup>154</sup> acknowledged that the Agreement was not proceeding as planned.

A severe trade imbalance<sup>155</sup> developed: the Soviet Union was exporting significantly more to Sweden than the reverse.<sup>156</sup> This imbalance would continue unabated through at least the late 1980's. Swedish decision-makers had to satisfy themselves with Soviet agreement to accept payment in goods, instead of dollars, for the outstanding trade on the Credit Account.<sup>157</sup>

This growing gap between perception and reality can perhaps be explained by a combination of factors: First, domestic ones: psychological dispositions<sup>158</sup> of Swedish industrial leaders,<sup>159</sup> and the impossibility of Swedish firms to make the requested Soviet deliveries. Furthermore, the Soviet delegations were

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<sup>154</sup> Herr Johansson i Stockholm, Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 February, 1949: "We also know that trade between Sweden and the Soviet Union has not been as comprehensive as what was visualized in the Trade Agreement."

<sup>155</sup> Not only Sweden "suffered" from a lack of orders from the Soviet Union; but other Western companies as well (FO 371.71718.N9377, 19 August, 1948).

<sup>156</sup> Confirmed by Undén, Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 June, 1948. He attributed this to the fact "it has been easier for the Russians to offer us products that we want than it has been (the reverse)." J.E.G. Fast further remarked that "the Agreement has revised itself, and the deliveries have now fallen far under anticipated levels...they have not only sunk to one-half of what was expected, but far lower than that."

<sup>157</sup> Swedish Trade Representative Böök, FO 371.71718.N10200, 8 September, 1948.

<sup>158</sup> Erlander's explanation was such: "There was hesitation in business circles, not to speak of aversion, towards opening up a foreign market, such as the Russian when there existed dependable Western markets." Further he noted business leaders' scepticism regarding "break(ing) in a new, unsure piece of territory, which was directed by a socialistic, inimical ideology" (Erlander, 1973:274)

<sup>159</sup> Managing Director of ASEA, Mr. Övergård, (FO 188.603.87/2c/47, 24 February, 1947): "The Russians had been very serious, without humour of any kind and obviously very suspicious. When it was pointed out that we could not make immediate deliveries the Russians immediately accused us of sabotaging the Trade Agreement."

consistently requesting goods that the Swedes either did not want<sup>160</sup> or could not export to them.<sup>161</sup> The Russian negotiating style was also seen as foreign.<sup>162</sup>

Soviet representatives grew increasingly anxious for Swedish Government intervention, in order to apply pressure on the Swedish firms to enforce the Agreement's terms.<sup>163</sup> However, the Swedish Government's policy was clear: agreements were reached between Soviet organisations and private Swedish firms, and the Government would have nothing to do with enforcement, since it could not guarantee the performance of Swedish firms.<sup>164</sup>

The Bourgeois parties, rather than immediately advocating a revocation of the Agreement, first suggested that certain adjustments<sup>165</sup> be made and

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<sup>160</sup> An unsigned report stated: "One of the greatest objections from the Swedish industrialist's point of view is his fear of industrial espionage to which his firm will be subjected by the numerous controllers in Russian legation in Stockholm to supervise contracts." (FO 188.603, no marking, 11 January, 1947).

<sup>161</sup> Ambassador Sohlman felt that the Soviet authorities were "surprisingly uninterested" in the goods available to them from Sweden. (FO 371.77718.N10431, 30 November, 1949).

<sup>162</sup> Those who were sent to negotiate with the Swedes were seen as "tools" who had little freedom of movement, always having to consult with Moscow before any decision could be made. (S56) The head of a Swedish Trade delegation, Mr. Modig, also characterised two particular Soviet negotiators as being "formalistic and bureaucratic, fussing over little details and having to refer everything...but nevertheless not unreasonable." (FO 371.77718.N10431, 30 November, 1949).

<sup>163</sup> A member of the British legation in Moscow, G.G. Buzzard reported (FO 371.66497.N10187, 26 August, 1947) that "A Swedish delegation which has just returned from Moscow...has been meeting with pressure from the Russians to guarantee deliveries."

<sup>164</sup> FO 188.603.35/3/47, 26 August, 1947 or FO 371.77718.N10431, 30 November, 1949.

<sup>165</sup> Conservative Party Leader F. Domö, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 4 February, 1948: "It is much better to openly try to bring about necessary revisions of the Agreement than to find ourselves in a situation where we suddenly find ourselves in a position of not being able to fulfil a binding agreement."

pressure<sup>166</sup> brought to bear on the Soviets in order to salvage the Agreement. In essence, many hoped the Russians would alter their strategy and begin ordering goods in much greater quantity.<sup>167</sup> It is interesting that the will to salvage, rather than discard, the Agreement was shared across the political party spectrum. However, these arguments for adjustments and pressure came to no avail: after five years had lapsed the Agreement had yielded a SEK 554 million, far below all expectations(Möller, 1986:272).

### Norwegian-Soviet Economic Relations

Spectacular efforts to promote Soviet economic welfare or Soviet trade have been absent from the Soviet-Norwegian economic relationship. In fact, the political angle of Soviet-Norwegian trade is ambiguous in this period. As one person near the Norwegian negotiations of the period remarked, "trade with the Soviet Union always had a political angle." The political angle seemed to be best reflected in the sort of goods the Soviet Union wanted to trade. "The Russians were always trying for hard-to-get materials, not because they desperately needed them, but just because they wanted to prove they could obtain them,"<sup>168</sup> recalled one MFA official. As opposed to Stockholm, commercial terms were the key concept for Oslo and the Government had little plans to intervene for purposes of trade promotion.

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<sup>166</sup> Ohlin, Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 June, 1948, said "we have to demonstrate to the Russians that we care about keeping up the value of our trade with them...that on the Russian side they have to exert themselves to create the conditions for a fruitful trade between our countries which everyone has hoped for."

<sup>167</sup> There was reason to believe this was not forthcoming. Sohlman (FO 371.77718.N10431, 30 November, 1949) said that "the Soviets wanted trade to occur in goods because Swedish prices were high and the Soviet authorities reluctant to sign contracts for which payment would, in the majority of cases, not fall due for several years...by which time the price of Soviet exports might have fallen."

<sup>168</sup> N49

*The Volume, Composition and Character of Trade: Sweden and Norway Compared*

Norwegian trade with the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1949 lacked the idealism present in Swedish-Soviet trade following the '*miljardkredit*.' The flow of Norwegian-Soviet trade relations was above all dictated by commercial considerations—grand plans of trade promotion were absent in Oslo. As such, trade was not used to support or enhance Norway's chosen foreign policy line.

One similarity with Sweden was that the Norwegian relationship was defined by formal trade agreements. A Norwegian-Soviet trade agreement was signed on 6 January, 1948, which had been preceded by a two-year trade agreement reached in 1946. Even Norway kept a relatively formalized, planned trade strategy with the Soviet Union. As with Sweden, this structure would disappear in the late 1980's.

As contrasted to the Soviet trade requests from Sweden for manufactured goods such as generators and other electrical goods, the Soviet Union desired raw materials from Norway. One former official expressed that the Soviets were particularly interested in obtaining these "strategic materials,"<sup>169</sup> requests which gave some political flavour to Norwegian-Soviet trade. Here the Soviet Union particularly desired molybdenum<sup>170</sup>, aluminum and lithium. The Soviet Union was also interested in a somewhat broader selection of goods: whale oil<sup>171</sup>, grain<sup>172</sup>, salted herring, sulphur pyrite<sup>173</sup> for example. The

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<sup>169</sup> N49

<sup>170</sup> A silver-white brittle metallic element used in steel in the making of high-speed tools. The Soviet interest for this element is mentioned throughout the Foreign Ministry archives, for example see UDN "Notat" 44.4/99, 5 March, 1949, Jnr. 03969: "Mr. Petrov was especially interested in molybdenum...and said that if a contract was not signed including this the Soviet authorities would react strongly."

<sup>171</sup> UDN 44.4/99, 1 September, 1947.

<sup>172</sup> UDN 44.4/99, 17 June, 1948.

<sup>173</sup> UDN 44.4/99, Jnr. 00489, no date.

Norwegians were also interested in an assortment of products from the Soviet Union, which included: Glycerine, Montanvoks, gold, copper, brass, lead, sheet bars, steel bars, wirerods and wirebars, iron reinforcing bars, amongst other things.<sup>174</sup> Although Moscow-based Ambassador Berg<sup>175</sup> writes that the Soviet Union, in the aftermath of the War, was mostly interested mostly in importing capital goods, such as electrical motors, water turbines and machine tools, Norway's strength did not lie in these areas.

The Norwegian pattern of trade with the Soviet Union seemed markedly more balanced than the Swedish directly following the War. In great part, the Norwegians would, through to the early 1990's have a much smaller trade deficit than the Swedes with Moscow. The Foreign Ministry remarked that "our trade with the countries within the Russian sphere of interest has witnessed a significant increase after the war."<sup>176</sup> A report remarked further that the "value of our trade with the Soviet Union in 1947 was over six times larger than the average trade between the 1935-1938."<sup>177</sup> The Norwegian Trade Delegation reported that trade between the two countries "had developed as had been envisaged."<sup>178</sup> In 1949, the Foreign Ministry commented that trade with the Soviet Union had been somewhat larger than had been expected, especially with respect to Norway's imports from the Soviet Union.<sup>179</sup> In terms of contracts, the Soviets demonstrated a consistent interest in entering into long-term

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<sup>174</sup> 6 June, 1947 (UDN 44.4/99, Jnr. 57239).

<sup>175</sup> UDN 45/99.2, Moscow, 25 April, 1948.

<sup>176</sup> UDN 44.4/99, 2 April, 1948.

<sup>177</sup> UDN 44.4/99, 2 April, 1948. *ibid.*

<sup>178</sup> UDN 44.4/99 Jnr. 00489, (no date, approx. beginning of 1949).

<sup>179</sup> UDN 44.4/99, 25 November, 1949.

agreements with the Soviets<sup>180</sup>, but the Norwegians seemed to be much more interested in keeping them on one-year terms.

Again contrasted with Sweden, Norwegian trade officials expressed an overall satisfaction with respect to the level and composition of their Soviet trade. It seems as though trade goals which were set were met, although the level of trade was never significant. This satisfaction also extended to the Soviet authorities.<sup>181</sup> The Norwegians remarked that the Soviets had made deliveries ahead of time, a punctuality which the Norwegians had difficulties in reciprocating.<sup>182</sup> But the authorities professed to understand the risks of the East-West conflict on their possibilities to develop further trade relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>183</sup>

## The Marshall Plan

### *The Road to Swedish Adoption of the Marshall Plan*

It is interesting to note that the Credit Agreement never had any explicit overtones relating to Sweden's security commitment. However, it was assumed that the Credit Agreement was an attempt to bring Sweden's relationships between the developing superpower blocs into balance. A closer study of the Swedish leadership's perceptions and behaviour leading up to Swedish participation in the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan, however portray a Swedish leadership intensely grappling with the dilemma of its chosen security policy's compatibility with economic necessity and desire.

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<sup>180</sup> UDN 44.4/99, 1 September, 1947.

<sup>181</sup> "Both sides had expressed satisfaction over the trade and were in agreement that it should be expanded." (UDN 44.4/99, 1 September, 1947).

<sup>182</sup> UDN 44.4/99 17 June, 1948.

<sup>183</sup> UDN 44.4/99, 17 June, 1948.

### *The political divisions*

Was a Swedish acceptance of the Marshall Plan compatible with the overarching Swedish foreign policy goals? While the governing Social Democratic Party seemed to be the most sensitive to this particular angle, it would be misleading to say that Marshall's invitation to Sweden and other countries for financial assistance to re-construct a wore-torn Europe created a well-defined division of opinion between the Swedish political blocs. In fact, the Social Democratic Party itself was divided over the issue, the Bourgeois in general had supported it from the outset, while the Communists stringently opposed it. In time, consensus did arise within the Social Democratic ranks, leading in time to Swedish participation, but not before some preliminary discussion of the Marshall Plan's groundwork had been covered.

### *Molotov's "Nyet"*

Molotov's impending attendance at the Paris Conference was met with hope in Sweden.<sup>184</sup> If the Soviet Union also participated, surely Sweden could not be seen as taking sides. With Soviet participation, the offer could have been considered on its economic merits. Instead, the proposal became a bone of political contention in the Cold War.

When Molotov later chose to leave Paris, his departure was met with great disappointment.<sup>185</sup> From the Swedish viewpoint, Russian suspicion, unwillingness, and the closed nature of Soviet society, made Molotov's refusal to participate seem logical<sup>186</sup>--but not ideal. Prime Minister Erlander perceived the withdrawal of the East European states' as very serious.<sup>187</sup> MFA Political Director Grafström appeared clear over the reason for the Soviet Union's

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<sup>184</sup> S53

<sup>185</sup> S53

<sup>186</sup> S53

<sup>187</sup> Möller(1986:293), quoting Erlander.

negative answer in Paris, later writing, "the antagonism between East and West has never been as naked (exposed) as it is at present."<sup>188</sup>

### *Discussion within the Government*

Two central considerations needed to be weighted against each other within the Government: the price Sweden would have to pay in terms of foreign policy credibility vis-à-vis the Soviets and the realisation that "Sweden could not stay out of the Marshall Plan" (economic necessity argument).

The Government was not entirely united in its initial responses to the question. It was reported<sup>189</sup> that Undén was extremely suspicious<sup>190</sup>, not unexpected given Undén's complex notion of neutrality.<sup>191</sup> As for the initial reactions of other key figures, Gjöres reportedly favoured, Wigforss opposed,<sup>192</sup> but Erlander was in favour. Moscow Ambassador Sohlman's position was difficult to pinpoint, but Grafström intimates that he was in opposition.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Grafström(1989), 3 July, 1947.

<sup>189</sup> S51

<sup>190</sup> "It was like taking sides..the OEEC was an instrument for the Western powers," (S53)

<sup>191</sup> Ivar Andersson said both Wigforss and Undén had been affected by Moscow's harsh campaign of opposition of the Marshall Plan—he attributed it to "their socialistic beliefs, as well as the increasingly strong division between East and West." (Möller, 1986:295)

<sup>192</sup> Bertil Ohlin's writes(1975:160): "Even Ernst Wigforss, who has tended to perceive the Soviets behaviour with unparalleled understanding declared the 14 of March, 1947 that while the Marshall Plan has 'clearly a political element to it...the principle motive of the assistance is such that we will surely like the anticipated result."

<sup>193</sup> Grafström(1989), 5 July, 1947: "Sohlman's contribution has been to put the words, this time into the mouth of the Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires, who says that the Marshall Plan is feared for its chiefly political aims, namely to isolate the Soviet Union..."



Swedish Minister in London, Boheman, reported that earlier Swedish fears of its Russian relationship were gradually being replaced by the conviction that effectiveness of West Europe's standing up to the Russia depends on the degree of success in deploying the Marshall Plan.<sup>194</sup> British Minister in Stockholm, Farquhar, mentioned that "the Swedish MFA has acquitted the USA of any political motives in extending Marshall Aid."<sup>195</sup> The Marshall Plan was perceived by some supporters as not contributing to "bloc building" any more than the Soviet-Swedish Credit Agreement did.<sup>196</sup> But as was commonplace the Communists had quite different ideas about what the Marshall offer implied.<sup>197</sup>

Consensus-building surrounding the Plan was successful and Sweden decided in favour of participation.<sup>198</sup> While Sweden would surely have to pay

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<sup>194</sup> FO 371.71723.N1290, 4 February, 1948.

<sup>195</sup> FO 371.71967.UR.3624, 22 July, 1948.

<sup>196</sup> Ohlin, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 4 February, 1948, explicitly said: "our country's participation in the Marshall Plan does not mean that we have joined a Western bloc any more than our embarking on the Swedish-Soviet Credit Agreement meant joining the East Bloc." This view shared by Social Democratic MP, O. Harald Åkerberg(*ibid*), saying, "We have a comprehensive trade agreement with the Soviets...does this mean that we have joined the Eastern Bloc?" He continued, "the Agreement with the U.S. implies, being formulated as innocently as it is, a great deal less involvement than the Soviet-Swedish Agreement."

<sup>197</sup> Karl Hagberg, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 July, 1948: "Sweden, through its agreement with the U.S. and the Marshall countries, has involved itself in an American bloc with a military angle."

<sup>198</sup> An interesting change was, according to London Ambassador Boheman, Undén, who was to have "stiffened his attitude in the right direction...now, I am authorized to say, the Swedish Government wholeheartedly supports the Marshall Aid programme and regards it as a step forward in the eventual understanding with Russia." (FO 371.71723.N601, 20 January, 1948 with similar evidence in FO 371.71723.N767, 20 January, 1948) It is likely that events in Czechoslovakia and Finland had increased Undén's support for the Plan. (see Grafström(1989), 16 March, 1948)

a political price to the Soviet Union, economic necessity was seen as sufficiently acute so as to give the Swedish Marshall supporters the upper hand.

### *Only a Slight Doubt: Norway and the Marshall Plan*

To understand Norwegian perceptions, and especially Norway's initial hesitancy towards the Marshall Plan, one should consider Norway's pre-War foreign policy orientation, embodied in its "Bridge-building policy." Bridge-building, both in theory and in practice, carried overtones very similar to neutrality as debated in Sweden. In Norway, as in Sweden, there were marked differences of opinion within the ruling Labour Party. The struggle between politicians and officials was chiefly a battle over the degree to which Norway's acceptance of Marshall aid could damage both its own foreign policy values and credibility--specifically with respect to the Soviet Union.

### *Responsible Norwegian Debate*

According to a figure close to Lange, Lange was immediately negative to the plan with the attitude "stay out if we can."<sup>199</sup> Then, according one observer, "Stalin tipped the scales...and we decided to participate."<sup>200</sup> On 9 July, 1947 Lange maintained that Norway's decision on the Marshall Plan should not be construed as any form of bloc-building. Quite the opposite, it could contribute to strengthen and increase economic cooperation between East and West.<sup>201</sup> Specifically, a positive decision to join the Marshall Plan should not be seen as allying politically with the Western bloc, neither should a negative response mean a decision to join a political, Eastern bloc(Lie, 1985:204). The fact that Lange felt he needed to make a statement, which just as well could have come

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<sup>199</sup> N50. The explicit reasoning was that Norway would become a "prisoner of events."

<sup>200</sup> N50

<sup>201</sup> UDN 25.2/63, 8 April, 1948.

from the mouth of a Swedish Governmental official, is telling that Norway's formerly neutral role was not dead.

In the *Stortinget* Lange mentioned that though the Soviets had been in contact with him over the Marshall Plan and "they had not expressed a preference in one direction or the other."<sup>202</sup> In fact, Helgeby intimated that the Soviet Union in fact might have regretted not taking part in the Marshall Plan.<sup>203</sup> It must have been personally painful for Lange to witness the Soviet request of the Czechoslovaks to withdraw their application to join the Marshall Plan. Gerhardsen mentioned that the day that Czechoslovakia was forced to "say no" to the Marshall Plan was the day it ceased being an independent state. (Salumsmoen and Larsen, 1967:60-1) Lange stressed on April 19, 1948<sup>204</sup> that "the fact that the Soviet Union and the Communists have rejected the Marshall Plan has not prevented Norway from taking part..."<sup>205</sup> A key Labour figure, Martin Tranmael, supported the Marshall Plan(Lie, 1985:208), seemingly from the outset--although he admitted that it entailed political obligations(Lie, 1985:255). At the public level support for the Marshall Plan was considerable.<sup>206</sup>

The Minister of Finance, Erik Brofoss, was one of the main pillars of opposition. While Lie(1985:207) argues that Brofoss was afraid of external

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<sup>202</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, as quoted Udgaard(1973:211).

<sup>203</sup> UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 017061, 7 June, 1948: "Perhaps they are finding reason to ask themselves why they couldn't attain more, by instead of attacking the Marshall Plan had joined in the systematic opposition, so that the Plan could not reach its goals."

<sup>204</sup> FO 371.71485.N4816, 21 April, 1948.

<sup>205</sup> Confirmed in another of Lange's speeches, reported in FO 371.71485.N1791, 11 February, 1948. He adds that "It is clear in the Norwegian case that its foreign economy is oriented towards the U.S. and the other countries who took part in the Paris conference."

<sup>206</sup> Lie(1985:224): In a Gallup Poll, 85% of those who knew what the Plan was about, supported it...this included about 50% of the Communist Party voters.

pressure to liberalise the Norwegian economy which would put the Norwegian planned economy in danger, Udgaard finds the answer in a deep mistrust of American economic policy.<sup>207</sup> Udgaard's is an interesting argument because it seems that Norway may have used "bridge-building" as a shield (and all of the possible Soviet reactions as a sword) in an attempt to shelter a planned Norwegian economy from the economic policies of countries governed by a different economic ideology(Udgaard, 1973:219). Another tangible point of opposition was the untimely nature of the Marshall proposal, coming, as it did, on the heels of the Truman Doctrine. As such, the Marshall assistance was partially seen as a continuation of the Truman doctrine, and as symbolizing a further widening of the gap between East and West(Lie, 1985:208).

The Communists were not as critical of the Plan itself as they were of the way assistance was rendered. In fact, the overall tone of Norwegian Communist opposition was less critical than in Sweden. The Communist party proposed at one stage that Marshall Aid be funnelled through the United Nations,<sup>208</sup> a logical step in view of Norway's strong convictions about the role of this body. Communist M.P., Vogt, felt that "it was correct to say that the Marshall Plan for (Norway) does not imply any sort of aggression against an Eastern bloc...it is a natural form of economic and cultural cooperation with what we call the Western democracies."<sup>209</sup>

It should be emphasized that when Norway first decided to enlist the Marshall Plan's assistance, it had only requested \$100 million, which the American Government promptly increased to \$170 million. One of the reasons which has been forwarded for this is that Norway made a conservative estimate, since it only wanted to make a minor political commitment. Irrespective, the

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<sup>207</sup> Udgaard(1973:218): "Brofoss said the Marshall Plan countries risked importing not only American goods, but also an American depression."

<sup>208</sup> Communist Party leader, Emil Løvlien quoted in *Aftenposten*, July 11, 1947, as quoted in Udgaars(1973:227).

<sup>209</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 12 February, 1948.

Norwegian decision to participate was one of the first landmarks of her convinced Western orientation—which would not be formalized until two years hence. Norway's initial approach leading to its participation in the Marshall Plan was similar to Sweden's. At this early stage, 1946-7, Norway's and Sweden's security orientations were alike--both countries pursued neutralist policies--although Sweden called it neutrality and Norway called it bridge-building. In practice, this meant that the core concern that the Marshall initiative could collide with neutralist aspirations, first had to be resolved.

## TRADE STATISTICS<sup>210</sup>

*Composition*<sup>211</sup> (in terms of the three most prominent product groups)

### Exports

#### *Norway*

1947	1949
Plant oil,fat 58%	Plant oil,fat 68%
Fish 39%	Fish 20%
Fish oil 6%	Aluminum 6%

#### *Sweden*

1947	1949
Transp equip 45%	Machine-app 58%
Machine-app 15%	Non-prec metal 37%
Fur-leather 13%	Transp equip 2%

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<sup>210</sup> Trade volume for 1947, 1949 is given in chapter on Soviet trade 1987-1991.

<sup>211</sup> *Utenrikshandel* (Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå; Sveriges Offentliga Statistik, Handel (Stockholm: Kommerskollegium) and *Utrikeshandel* (Stockholm: Statistiska Centralbyrå).

## Imports

### *Norway*

1947	1949
Grain 63%	Grain 87%
Fuels 9%	Ore 4%
Ore 9%	Fuels 2%

### *Sweden*

1947	1949
Fur-leather 31%	Min prod's 76%
Min prod's 30%	Veg mat's 12%
Non-prec met's 19%	Fur-leather 5%

## TIMETABLE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS: 1957-1991

1957	Soviet "Baltic as Sea of Peace" proposal
1958	Bulganin's Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal
1959	Östen Undén's response to Bulganin's proposal
1961	The 'Undén Plan' launched
1963	'Kekkonen Plan' launched
1968	Non-Proliferation Treaty signed
1975	Norwegian "Bratelli Doctrine" on Port calls formulated
1978	Norway signs Grey Zone agreement with S.U.
1979	NATO's Double Track Decision
1980	Evensen NNWFZ "initiative"
1981	Soviet U-137 incident in Karlskrona
1983	Olof Palme speech clarifying Swedish stance on NNWFZ
1984-6	Stockholm Conference on CSBM
1985	Inter-parliamentary group founded to study NNWFZ
3/1986	Swedish ordinance regarding export control (COCOM)
9/1986	Inter-MFA group founded to study NNWFZ
10/1986	Reykjavik Summit: U.S.-S.U.
7/1987	Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk scandal becomes public
10/1987	Gorbachëv's Murmansk speech
12/1987	INF signed
1/1988	Swedish-Soviet Baltic delimitation treaty signed
12/1988	Gorbachëv UN speech announcing unilateral cutbacks
3-6/1989	Soviet submarine accidents in Norwegian Sea

11/1989 Gorbachëv speech in Helsinki

11/1989 FM Andersson trip to Baltic republics

1/1990 Lightening of COCOM regulations

3/1990 Lithuanian declaration of independence

4/1990 Lithuanian PM Prunskiene trip to Scandinavia

5/1990 Superpower summit in Malta

6/1990 Lightening of COCOM regulations

9/1990 Ronneby conference with SU and Baltic participation

9-10/1990 Serious Soviet payment problems begin

9/1990 Soviet proposal and Swedish rejection of Incidents-at-Sea Treaty

10/1990 Nuclear testing resumes at Novaya Zemlya

10/1990 Soviet-Norwegian Incidents-at-Sea Treaty signed

11/1990 EKN and GIEK decide to restrict export credit guarantees to SU

11/1990 CFE Agreement signed in Paris

1/1991 Violence, result. in deaths in Baltic capitals

2/1991 Nordic Council's support for Baltic cause heightened at 39th session

3/1991 'final' report of inter-MFA grp on NNWFZ presented

3-6/1991 Swedish and Soviet Defence Ministers; Defence Chiefs resume visits

5/1991 Lightening of COCOM regulations

19-22.8.91 Soviet coup d'état

25.9.91 Norwegian recognition of Baltic state independence

27.9.91 Swedish recognition of Baltic state independence



## Chapter Three

### **Soviet disarmament proposals in historical perspective: The Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone**

#### *Background*

The Soviet proposal for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) has been one of the longest lived themes in Soviet-Nordic relations,<sup>1</sup> effectively spanning from the mid-1950's to 1991. However, varying Nordic perceptions regarding Soviet motivations and intentions which underlay the proposal have undermined its credibility and potentially constructive aspects. Much of the reason the Nordic countries have been unable to reach agreement is that the region is dominated by divergent security policies. The proposal has run contrary to central elements of Norway's alignment policy. Key Swedish élites have long supported the establishment of an NNWFZ, but even here it has fallen along the wayside partially because it also violated certain key aspects of neutrality. Namely, an NNWFZ had to be seen, not from a limited geographical perspective, but rather in a wider international perspective--and including the participation of both superpowers.

An in-depth examination and comparison of Norwegian and Swedish élite perceptions of the Soviet Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone forms part of this inquiry because of the tremendous spectrum of Soviet foreign policy behaviour that it encapsulates. The NNWFZ is also a proposal with strong historical referents. Finally, the issue has proven to be a recurrent and resilient theme in the relations between Norway, Sweden and the Soviet Union.

The debate in Sweden and Norden has focused upon three central themes: the zone's extent: both geographically and in terms of weapons, centring about the status of the Baltic Sea, and which measures the Soviet Union should take

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<sup>1</sup> The literature on the NNWFZ is substantial. See Lindahl (1988), Maude (1983), Möttölä (1983), Tunberger (1982).

with respect to its own territory; guarantees from the nuclear powers: discussed from the standpoint of Sweden's neutrality and independence; the eventual connection between the NNWFZ and the greater, European context and to the military balance(Braconier and Christiansson, 1985:218).

### **Brief History**

The first Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal, forwarded by Soviet Premier Bulganin in a note to his Norwegian and Danish colleagues in January, 1958,<sup>2</sup> occurred against the background of a string of Warsaw Pact-inspired nuclear free zone initiatives--the most famous of which was the Rapacki Plan. In Riga in 1959, Khrushchev made clear the NATO connection:

"It would be very advantageous for the Scandinavian peoples if the Nordic area could be a nuclear-free zone, wherein there are no foreign military bases...I hope that this will be correctly interpreted by Norway and Denmark if I say that these countries have ended up in NATO as a result of a mistake."  
(Dahlberg, 1990:167)

Thus, it was no wonder that the original target of the plan was perceived by the Nordic region to be the NATO countries. The proposal was immediately seen as an attempt to split off Norway and Denmark from NATO, and thus interpreted by some leaders as attempting to upset the reigning security policy *status quo* in the Nordic region. It was further seen as an attempt to rid the Scandinavian area of the NATO presence--and if this was not possible, at least to neutralize its effect. These initial perceptions would pervade all later Soviet efforts to press the issue in Norway. Even for Sweden, a Norway isolated from NATO would have serious consequences for stability in the region.

Many of the first Swedish and Norwegian reactions witnessed puzzlement of why Soviet territorial areas were not included. A speech by Foreign Minister

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<sup>2</sup> Lindahl (1958:52) writes "the 1958 move can be considered as a Soviet "feeler," while it would not be until Khrushchev held a speech in Riga in June, 1959 that the feeler would become a "major initiative."

Undén<sup>3</sup> in 1959 lay the basis for Swedish policy until the early 1980's. A speech in the same vein was given by Undén in 1960, where he reminded the Soviet Union:

"for the time being the only state on the Baltic coast which has nuclear weapons is the Soviet Union...I find it hard to imagine that the Soviet Union would be willing to ban nuclear weapons from a significant zone of her territory in conjunction with an eventual establishment of a nuclear-free Baltic!"<sup>4</sup>

Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen, responded: "I cannot neglect to mention to you Norway's bewonderment regarding the expression of interest in such a (zone), without any hint or reference to the part of Northern Europe that lies within the Soviet Union's frontiers"(Holst, 1967:116).

Since the proposal's launching, advocacy for the measure has been mostly on the side of the Nordic neutrals Finland and Sweden, while the bastion of opposition has been the Nordic NATO members, Norway the most prominent. The Soviet proposal aimed at splitting Norway off from common NATO strategy. A basic difference between Sweden and Norway is that nuclear weapons play a key part in NATO's military strategy, whilst being largely absent from Sweden's strategy. As said one former Norwegian official, "(the NNWFZ) would mean that the flexible response strategy would not cover Norway."<sup>5</sup> The proposal also was said to hinder one of NATO's core strategies, the so-called "flexible response" strategy. For Sweden, it was important to point to and actively work against the spread of nuclear weapons in public fora. Thus the NNWFZ provided a suitable opportunity to publicize a foreign policy goal, the achievement of which would not be perceived to benefit either bloc

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<sup>3</sup> "Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1959" (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1960), p.26

<sup>4</sup> *Utrikesfrågor* (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1960), p.2.

<sup>5</sup> N4

more than the other. However, the Swedish leaders had to be very sensitive not to push the issue so hard that they could be interpreted as taking sides, in what was chiefly seen to be a Soviet proposal.

### *The Undén Plan*

The first positive reception of the Soviet Union's proposals came from the Swedish side in the form of the so-called "Undén plan" presented to the United Nations on October 26, 1961. Foreign Minister Undén mentioned that he would like to see a ban on nuclear testing, as well as mentioning certain regional zone arrangements (including the Baltic Free Nuclear Zone (hereafter BFNZ) proposal. For the times, the proposal seemed futuristic, for the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (1968) and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would not come until several years thereafter. The UN's General Assembly approved Undén's plan. According to it, the UN's General Secretary was to inquire which demands the nuclear-free zone states would put, in order to (promise) to refrain from manufacturing, or by any other way obtain, nuclear weapons or to accept nuclear weapons on its territory on another party's behalf."<sup>6</sup> At the time, the Swedish position on the NNWFZ reflected Sweden's general opposition to nuclear weapons and its desire to see the issue discussed in larger international fora.<sup>7</sup>

Norway could not hide its displeasure. The initial Norwegian reaction would be repeated, in varying forms throughout the life of the NNWFZ proposal. Foreign Minister Lange responded that the problem with a NNWFZ was two-fold.<sup>8</sup> One, it would require Norway to commit itself not to receive nuclear arms on Norwegian territory under any circumstances. This option may

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<sup>6</sup> "En kärnvapenfri zon i Norden" (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1984:8)

<sup>7</sup> Another motivation was of a domestic political character, namely opposition to the development of an independent Swedish nuclear capacity. (Tunberger, 1982:35)

<sup>8</sup> Gerhardsen (1972) cited in Lindahl(1988:70).

be seen as 'a card up its sleeve' in the case of Soviet aggression against Norway. As a matter of policy, Norway forbids the placement of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory. But Norway enjoys the option of revoking this policy if the Norwegian threat perception were to change drastically to the negative. The second problem was that the plan seemed to have as a consequence the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, resulting in a radical shift in the balance of power. Former Labour Party leader Haakon Lie wrote that the result would be an inherent imbalance in the favour of one side(1983:97).

#### *The 'Kekkonen Plan'*

Finland also responded in a positive vein to the Soviet proposals. The Finns, and especially President Urho Kekkonen, may have been more vocal than any other Western nation over the proposal due to the possibilities which an advocacy of this proposal gave to "gain points in Moscow." The problem for the Finns came when the Nordic countries started to take the measure seriously.<sup>9</sup> Finland may even have caused some minor tensions in this region by making proposals and adopting roles that strained its relations with its Scandinavian neighbours(Hakovirta, 1985:29).

Kekkonen launched his own "Kekkonen Plan" in 1963, an initiative which shared many points with the Undén Plan launched two years previously. In fact, Kekkonen called his plan "a localized adaptation and application of Undén's proposal,"<sup>10</sup> a typification which the Swedes disliked. However, there was a substantial difference between the two: while Undén's was an

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<sup>9</sup> Interview, Finn Sollie in Norway. Additionally, one Swedish official said that in the 1970's "Kekkonen renewed the idea, assuming that general Nordic reactions would be negative. But he created a process not anticipated by Kekkonen and his advisors, something that the Soviet Union nevertheless tried to exploit." (S30)

<sup>10</sup> *En kärnvapenfri zon i Norden* (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1984), p. 9.

international proposal, which reflected the Swedish Government's overall efforts to stem the spread and use of nuclear weapons, the Finnish proposal was, although also reflective of Finland's advocacy against nuclear weapons, was interpreted as being foremost regional in character and thus was seen, in certain circles, as promoting the Soviet strategy to split the Nordic area.

The Norwegian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both issued statements saying the initiative was imbalanced.<sup>11</sup> Gerhardsen pointed directly to whom he perceived as the source: "the initiative has come from the Soviet Union."<sup>12</sup> Both the Swedes and the Norwegians pointed out that the question of European nuclear-free zones must be seen in a broader context: together with efforts to achieve a test ban and disarmament concerns more generally.<sup>13</sup> This position, of the necessity of seeing the issue in a wider geographical and conceptual context would be repeated when the proposal was formally "put to sleep," in 1991.<sup>14</sup>

Between 1963 and 1978, Kekkonen's personal involvement in the question was minimal (Tunberger, 1982:70). However, in 1978 he made a speech in Stockholm pointing to the importance of an NNWFZ chiefly, he said, because rapid technological developments meant that nuclear weapons could now reach *Norden*. Then-Centre Party Foreign Minister, Karin Söder, politely shelved the issue by declaring that the issue needed further study, noting the nuclear weapon-bearing Soviet Golf-class submarines which had, in the meantime, moved into the Baltic Sea (Tunberger, 1982:74). Norway's then-Foreign Minister,

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<sup>11</sup> Lange, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 10 October, 1963 and Gerhardsen in *Arbeiderbladet*, 21 April, 1964 (Holst, 1976:185-6, as quoted in Lindahl, 1988:82)

<sup>12</sup> *Dagbladet*, 14 March, 1964, as quoted in Lindahl, 1988:82.

<sup>13</sup> Holst (1967:184) and *Dagens Nyheter*, 30 May, 1963 as quoted in Tunberger (1982:40)

<sup>14</sup> By the Inter-Nordic MFA Group formally investigating the possibilities for an NNWFZ. *Rapport från Nordiska ämbetsmannagruppen för undersökning av förutsättningarna för en kärnvapenfri zon i nordiskt område* (Karlshamn: Swedish Foreign Ministry, 23 March, 1991).

Knut Frydenlund, said he shared Kekkonen's worries about the pace of technological advancement, however adding that the Norwegian viewpoint in the matter was unchanged.<sup>15</sup>

#### *Intermittent Interest from 1980 to the Present*

Moscow conducted, in the early 1980's an intensive campaign for a regionally-delimited NNWFZ, which became Moscow's standard solution to the Nordic security policy problem (Jonson, 1990a:144). One Norwegian advisor explained that a part of this activity might have been attributable to "the Russians becoming increasingly disturbed by some particular U.S. naval exercises by carriers near the Lofoten islands."<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, it was suggested, they also thought that the nuclear threat was increasing with the presence of the U.S.S. Iowa in the Baltic.<sup>17</sup> Yet another official considered that this effort coincided with a Soviet effort to 'get at the INF's in West Germany.'<sup>18</sup>

#### *The Evensen Diversion*

Perhaps the most important departure from the Norwegian NNWFZ opposition of some twenty years (Tamnes, 1983:225) came in the form of a speech by Norwegian Labour Law of the Sea Minister, Jens Evensen,<sup>19</sup> held at

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<sup>15</sup> J. Tunberger's quote of Frydenlund (found in Norwegian Foreign Ministry's Press Release, 2 June, 1978): "The thought of putting a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone into treaty form should be seen in a wider geographical framework than (solely) the Nordic countries."

<sup>16</sup> Finn Sollie, 17 January, 1991.

<sup>17</sup> During a large NATO manoeuvre in 1985 the Iowa sailed into the Southern Baltic and exercised. (Dahlgren, 1990:170)

<sup>18</sup> Written comment by I. Lindahl.

<sup>19</sup> Evensen's full view on the NNWFZ can be found in his article, "Refleksjoner omkring atomvåpen og atomvåpenfrie soner i Europa," in Eckhoff and Owe, 1983.

the Chemical Association on October 3, 1980<sup>20</sup>. Evensen's initiative broke open a debate on the issue which had been largely absent in Norway. Evensen advocated discussions between the Nordic countries on the possibilities of formally creating an NNWFZ. Evensen likewise warned of the consequences of the Norwegian decision to increase the quantities of heavy NATO armament in Trøndelag in Northern Norway(Lindberg, 1980:28).

Such was the climate at the time that Evensen and other supporters of the NNWFZ initiative could not have foreseen neither the fallout nor the attraction the move would bring forth(Tunberger, 1982:79). Norway's NATO allies, the U.S., West Germany and the U.K. inquired whether a change in the Norwegian NATO policy and its attitude to the NNWFZ was to be expected(Lindberg, 1980:29). The Norwegian leadership split over the initiative, dividing a leadership which had previously presented a united front of opposition to the NNWFZ idea. Foreign Minister Frydenlund was quoted as having said "I feel personally offended...I don't understand why he had to come out with his initiative at this very moment."<sup>21</sup> Frydenlund's successor, Sverre Strøm, the new Conservative Norwegian Foreign Minister from 1981, was likewise negatively disposed to what seemed to be a one-man *démarche*, alongside but not parallel to Norwegian official policy<sup>22</sup> and threatened to let Evensen go.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Bring (1987:169) writes that Evensen advocated the establishment of an NNWFZ; in exchange the nuclear states would give the signatories guarantees not to attack or threaten these countries with nuclear weapons.

<sup>21</sup> Tunberger, 1982:80; *Aftenposten*, 11 October, 1982.

<sup>22</sup> N.M. Udgaard, "Norge, Evensen og Barentshavet," *Aftenposten*, 15 October, 1980.

<sup>23</sup> B.I. Bye, "Jens Evensen er truet med sparken," *Arbeiderbladet*, 29 October, 1981. The threat to remove Evensen, the chief negotiator in the Barents Sea jurisdictional dispute, became a, what may be regarded in some quarters as, major domestic political battle with relatively clear political lines: The Labour Party and Trade Union, LO, on the one hand and the Conservative Party, on the other.



There were two chief reasons that the *démarche* drew so much attention: Evensen's strategic position as Law of the Sea Minister and his connection with Arne Treholt, the diplomat who had negotiated the Norwegian-Soviet Grey Zone Agreement (arrested for espionage in 1985).<sup>24</sup> That an individual of such high official standing could publicly go against the grain of accepted NATO and Norwegian practice and policy was unthinkable.

There were several other causes for heightened interest in the NNWFZ in the early 1980's. One proximate cause could have been the Double-Track decision which NATO took in 1979.<sup>25</sup> The issue became contentious in the Labour Party, due to some comments by U.S. officials about nuclear war and the feasibility of nuclear weapons, further fuelled by harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric and a general chill of East-West relations.<sup>26</sup> In the Fall of 1982 the Labour Party decided not to appropriate money for the part of NATO's Infrastructure Program which would fund the deployment of U.S. intermediate missiles in Europe in 1983.<sup>27</sup> A later element which contributed to the heightened interest in the early 1980's was, according to one Swedish Foreign Ministry source, Brezhnev's indicated willingness to include Soviet territory into such a zone arrangement.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> N.M. Udgaard poses the essential question: "How do Ambassador Jens Evensen's opinions and his position as the Chief Negotiator with the Russians, affect the Kremlin's anticipations and the policy formulated in the Kremlin?" ("Norge, Evensen og Barentshavet," *Aftenposten*, 15 October, 1980).

<sup>25</sup> J.J. Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy," in Holst, Sjaastad and Hunt (1985:226, 239)

<sup>26</sup> Kelleher, "Norwegian Defense Policy," in Kelleher and Mattox (1985:308).

<sup>27</sup> Kelleher(1985:308).

<sup>28</sup> S40. This willingness was expressed in a June, 1981 interview with Finnish Suomen Sosialdemokratti; *Pravda*, 27 June, 1981.

### *Consensus Building in the Government*

A key step in the battle to re-gain consensus within the Norwegian leadership was the then-Labour Party Chairman, Reiulf Steen's, announcement on 2 December, 1980 that "Norway wants to work towards a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, as a part of the work for nuclear free zones in a wider European context"(Tunberger, 1982:81). Summing up the period 1982-1984 one Norwegian diplomat said: "the left wing of the Labour Party supported the demands of the peace movement"<sup>29</sup>--their new lease on the NNWFZ was part of that."<sup>30</sup> The issue then was officially placed on the Norwegian political agenda. The 1981 Labour Party Congress resulted in a formulation practically identical to Steen's statement--except the formulation "disarmament efforts in a wider European context" replaced "nuclear free zones in a wider European context."<sup>31</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Storting* clarified the issue three years later (May, 1984), when it made a clear distinction between an "isolated zone" and a NNWFZ in "a broader European context."<sup>32</sup>

Conservative Prime Minister, Willoch, would distance himself from the Labour Party line.<sup>33</sup> In fact, Brundtland and Willoch, as representatives of their respective parties, would debate the issue despite the ostensible parliamentary

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<sup>29</sup> According to Tamnes, Holst was one of the chief architects of the new Norwegian Labour Party zone concept in the early 1980's (Tamnes, 1983:242)

<sup>30</sup> N3

<sup>31</sup> Tunberger (1982:86) One high Norwegian Labour official said, "when we changed our line in 1981, we meant that it should be developed in cooperation with the other NATO countries--but we also meant that a part of the Soviet Union should be included!"(N27)

<sup>32</sup> Lindahl (1988:133): The Committee stressed the necessity of such a NNWFZ proposal taking place in the context of Norway's NATO membership. As such, indeed, the zone proposal's breakthrough in Norway did not mean as much--since the U.S. and the U.K. had earlier made it clear to Norway that the idea was incompatible with her NATO membership.(Ausland, 1986:57-8)

<sup>33</sup> "Gro Harlem Brundtland om zonen: Aktiv norsk regering tar kontakt för handlingsplan," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 8 December, 1984.

consensus which ostensibly existed over the issue.<sup>34</sup> Willoch's standpoint was clarified in 1986, when Willoch clearly singled out the Soviet factor in the NNWFZ.<sup>35</sup> At the core of Willoch's personal and much of the Conservative Party's general opposition is found in the effects (an NNWFZ) would have on Norway's NATO ties and upon the underlying consequences for Norwegian-Soviet relations the conclusion of such an agreement would have.

In 1985 the Norwegian Foreign Ministry issued a feasibility study of the NNWFZ called the "Colding-Committee Report." The report itself was interpreted in varying ways in Norway. From the Socialist Left Party, Theo Koritzinsky said the report "should have been entitled 'The dangers of a nuclear free zone in Norden' instead of the real title 'The question of a nuclear free zone in Norden.'"<sup>36</sup> Centre Party's Johan Buttedahl called the report "interesting; it illuminates both questions and possibilities of an NNWFZ."<sup>37</sup>

#### *Swedish Reactions in the Aftermath of Evensen*

In Sweden, enthusiasm for the zone idea gained an audience in the aftermath of the Evensen initiative. However, Evensen's move did cause some splintering of opinions across the political spectrum.<sup>38</sup> There also occurred an important

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid, *Hufvudstadsbladet*. Brundtland points out that "even the (Conservative) Party is ready to (join) in the work for an NNWFZ."

<sup>35</sup> 7 April, 1986 (NUPI, 1986): "our point of departure in the question of the zone is that nowhere in the Nordic countries are stored nuclear weapons. A declaration of an NNWFZ would mean supplementing this reality with a guarantee that a Soviet attack of the Nordic area would not be met by the use of nuclear weapons."

<sup>36</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 9 December, 1985.

<sup>37</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 9 December, 1985.

<sup>38</sup> The Conservative Party has spoken out most boldly against the NNWFZ. Carl Bildt (on 21 June, 1981, *Svenska Dagbladet* called the NNWFZ proposal a 1950-style solution to a 1980-1990-style problem." For Bildt, the greatest Soviet nuclear threat did not come from nuclear weapons based in Norden's vicinity, rather the SS-20's which were placed near the Urals.

division of opinion *within* the Social Democratic ranks.<sup>39</sup> The Swedish *Riksdag's* Foreign Affairs Committee,<sup>40</sup> expressed a desire for the "Swedish Government to establish contacts with its fellow Nordic Governments to examine the possibilities of reaching common ground, towards the establishment of a (NNWFZ), as a link in the (more general) work for a nuclear free Europe."<sup>41</sup>

However, the grounding of a Soviet submarine in Karlskrona in 1981 sounded the death knell of all but the most utopian aspects of an NNWFZ for Sweden.<sup>42</sup> The contradictory nature of Soviet policies was illuminated by the fact that the submarine was said to have contained nuclear weapons onboard.(Leitenberg, 1982:17-28) The recurrent Soviet declarations that the Baltic should be free of nuclear weapons<sup>43</sup> had been put into a new light.<sup>44</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee report of 27 May, 1982 contained a reference to

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<sup>39</sup> Inga Thorsson, a powerful Social Democratic figure in disarmament questions--put into question the proposal's realism. According to her a zone in Norden would hardly lead to a nuclear-free Europe. *Svenska Dagbladet*, 30 January, 1983.(Braconier and Christiansson, 1985:222)

<sup>40</sup> *Riksdagstryck* 1980/81: UU26), 3 June, 1981.

<sup>41</sup> "En kärnvapenfri zon i Norden," (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1984), p.11.

<sup>42</sup> The submarine incursion had two direct effects on the NNWFZ: in the first place it forced--for a while--the plan to be placed on the backburner by supporting Nordic states and the Soviet Union. Secondly, it forced all Swedish political parties into a consensus that the Baltic Sea would have to be included in any zone arrangement. (Lindahl, 1988:173)

<sup>43</sup> See the first Swedish official statement in 1978 by then-Foreign Minister, Hans Blix, *Utrikesfrågor* 1987 (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978).

<sup>44</sup> Brundtland writes ("Nedrustning i Europa vår utfordring," in Jagland and Johansen, (1982:386): "The episode in the Fall of 1981 of a Soviet submarine in the (Karlskrona) archipelago did not extinguish the 'thought of an (NNWFZ.'"

the Karlskrona incident's impact on viability of the NNWFZ proposal.<sup>45</sup> It became clear that if the Soviets felt they could violate the neutral Sweden's sacrosanct borders, especially with nuclear weapons, little credibility could be allotted Soviet disarmament proposals.

The shift to a Bourgeois government in 1982 would sound the starting gun for a new Social Democratic NNWFZ promotion drive.<sup>46</sup> These drives were important, for they enhanced the declaratory value of Sweden's neutral policy--in a way that many would regard as impartial. On 1 June, 1983<sup>47</sup> Palme again<sup>48</sup> took up the NNWFZ. The speech's timing coincided with the first concrete Soviet proposal to provide guarantees for an NNWFZ.<sup>49</sup> According to Palme the NNWFZ proposal should not be subordinated to the developments in the European negotiations (Palme, 1983:10). Palme wrote: "we are not able to judge how a particular duty from one side will be reciprocated by a measure on the other side, such that the basic security-political stability in Norden will not be damaged." This speech bears remarkable similarities to the statement contained in the final report of the Nordic Foreign Ministry Study Group in late 1991.

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<sup>45</sup> Riksdagstryck 1981/82:UU23, 27 May, 1982: "...through the occurrence of the Soviet submarine's violation in Swedish militarily-restricted area...(this event) focused attention on the Baltic's status in connection with a (NNWFZ). A natural demand would be that the Baltic be made nuclear-free."

<sup>46</sup> Braconier and Christiansson (1985:224) write that the responsibility for its advocacy now fell on Sweden's shoulders. Swedish Liberal Party MP, Hans Lindblad, said that "Palme's taking over the question upset the Finns."

<sup>47</sup> One Swedish Foreign Ministry advisor said "the re-surfacing of the initiative 1982-3 emerged amongst the advancement of (a barage) of other Soviet peace initiatives." (S31)

<sup>48</sup> Several Social Democratic interview politicians and party officials referred to this speech as the turning point in Social Democratic policy towards the issue.

<sup>49</sup> Nordic Social Democratic Group for study of NNWFZ, (1988:22)

Variations of Palme's thoughts would be repeated in following years<sup>50</sup>, however not without the usually attendant divergent opinion.<sup>51</sup> This speech would effectively eliminate any remnants of neutral Sweden's previous attempts to advocate a zone detached from the trends in other parts of Europe. Now it was important to have the support and guarantees from NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral states alike. This seemed a sheer impossibility in the case of an isolated NNWFZ.

#### *NNWFZ Descends the Political Agenda: 1985-1991*

With Gorbachëv's ascent to power, the NNWFZ as a bilateral issue between Sweden or Norway and the USSR, faded into the background. However, there occurred two important events during Gorbachëv's tenure. One was the formation of a Nordic parliamentary study group of the proposal, essentially a Social Democratic-Centre Party-Left Party<sup>52</sup> grouping--founded by former Danish Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen in 1985. The group has entered into several discussions in Moscow in recent years.<sup>53</sup> One of the group's functions is to emphasise the amount of consensus between the political parties that the initiative has mustered.<sup>54</sup> The group can however not boast participation from all of the Nordic political parties--most notably the Conservative parties--those which have thought most positively of the NATO role in the area. According

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<sup>50</sup> Riksdagstryck 1983/84:UU1, 13 December, 1983.

<sup>51</sup> Bourgeois Foreign Minister Lennart Bodström in *Svenska Dagbladet*, 8 April, 1983, wrote an NNWFZ "should be judged upon its own merits, and should not become dependent on developments in other parts of Europe." (a statement which contrasted to the Palme line)

<sup>52</sup> In Norway, the Centre Party participates as observers and Christian People's Party participates as member.

<sup>53</sup> Nordic Social Democratic Group for study of NNWFZ (1988)

<sup>54</sup> Olof Johansson (Centre Party), Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987: "a unified *Riksdag* has united itself behind the thought of an NNWFZ."

to Conservative Swedish MP, Margaretha af Ugglas, a formal parliamentary group over the question "has not fit into the Nordic political pattern...this is a question for the Government."

A second event was the founding of a formal inter-Nordic Foreign Ministry study group at the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting on 15 August, 1986 in Copenhagen.<sup>55</sup> The group's formal work got underway in 1987 over the NNWFZ proposal. The goal of the ongoing study was to arrive at a consensual document regarding the background to and possibilities of forming a NNWFZ. The group's work was significant not because of what it produced, but rather because of the group's formal nature in an area of cooperation which was generally regarded as forbidden terrain.<sup>56</sup> The NATO position with respect to the group's undertaking was well expressed by Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen that a thorough study of the issue would get more people to understand that the (achievement of a NNWFZ) is more difficult than it may seem.<sup>57</sup> The group was headed by the Chiefs of the respective Nordic political departments within the Foreign Ministries--the most sensitive department within any of the foreign ministries. Sweden and Norway's positions with respect to the study group were alike in that both saw a need to develop a formal response to a Soviet proposal which had never received such a reaction.

Speculation as to release of the Group's final document came to an end with the Foreign Minister Meeting in Karlshamn, 22-23 March, 1991.<sup>58</sup> The report,

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<sup>55</sup> "Utredning av atomfri sone ble utsatt," *Aftenposten*, 15 August, 1986.

<sup>56</sup> But, as the Swedish Foreign Minister emphasised, the "civil servant group must of course respect the Nordic countries' different points of departure in their work." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987).

<sup>57</sup> "Utredning av atomfri sone ble utsatt."

<sup>58</sup> "Atomvåpenfri sone er utredet," *Aftenposten*, 24 March, 1991 or K. Eneberg, "Kärnvåpenfri zon till ESK," *Dagens Nyheter*, 24 March, 1991.

an examination of the "conditions for a nuclear free zone in the Nordic region,"<sup>59</sup> contained no surprises. The report placed a NNWFZ in a much wider framework, a mere formalisation of what Sweden, Norway and the other Nordic countries had been speaking about for quite a long time. The wording of the document was familiar to those who had studied the zone question for any amount of time:

"The answer to the question must continue to be found in the dialogue between the Nordic countries, both Neutral and Aligned, between the Nuclear powers, in the international community."

The report read further:

"In the ongoing negotiation process, aimed at the creation of a new European security policy architecture, the thoughts of special zone arrangements have as yet not been treated...Against this background it is not possible to decide to what extent the idea of a Nuclear Free Zone in the Nordic area could be fit into this process in the long run."

#### *An Old Proposal Dusted off: a Nuclear-Free Baltic*

In order to neutralize the nuclear threat near their borderlands, the Soviet Union, starting with their concept of the Baltic Sea of Peace in 1957, repeatedly advocated a nuclear-free Baltic. Many have seen this proposal as naturally linked to Soviet enjoyment over Swedish and Norwegian debate regarding the regulation of port-calls. Both issues may be seen as attempts to delimit US/NATO influence in a sea, which, without them, would only have one naval power presence.

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<sup>59</sup> Rapport från Nordiska ämbetsmannagruppen för undersökning av förutsättningarna för en kärnvapenfri zon i nordiskt område (Swedish Version) (Karlshamn: Swedish Foreign Ministry, 23 March, 1991).



New life was breathed into the proposal with Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze's, letter to the Swedish Foreign Minister on April 28, 1990.<sup>60</sup> The Swedish news service, TT, described the letter's content as follows: "...in a letter to Sten Andersson and a number of other Foreign Ministers, (Shevardnadze) has offered to refrain from the (deployment) of nuclear weapons in the Baltic in peacetime, in connection with the effort of making the area a nuclear-free area." Further, the proposal allegedly contained a desire to, in the future, not have any nuclear-armed vessels or planes in the Baltic, nor to place nuclear weapons on the sea-bottom in peacetime. Signals conflicted, for only one year earlier, Shevardnadze was quoted as having said "The Baltic is naturally not the only body of water on the beaches of Northern Europe. It is clear that the question of the nuclear race at sea should be resolved on much broader and radical grounds."<sup>61</sup>

Carl Bildt responded that "the substantial question is not new...the Soviet Union has always wanted to have some sort of controls upon the navies in the Baltic." When Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori was asked by TT why he would not make the details of the letter public, Schori responded: "Lots of letters are exchanged."<sup>62</sup> To be sure, this was not the first time the Gorbachëv leadership had raised the matter.<sup>63</sup> Theoretically, the Swedish view of the NNWFZ has consistently always included a nuclear-free Baltic.<sup>64</sup> But it has not been until

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<sup>60</sup> Swedish News Service, TT, report, 16 June, 1990, "Sovjetiskt brev till Svenska regeringen om ubåtar i östersjön,"

<sup>61</sup> Dahlgren (1990:169)

<sup>62</sup> TT, "Utrikesdepartementet tiger om brev från Sovjet," 16 May, 1990.

<sup>63</sup> Raised during a trip in 1988 by the Parliamentary Committee study group. (Nordic Social Democratic Group for study of NNWFZ, (1988:22); O.T. Storvik, "Moskva med nytt sone-utspill," *Aftenposten*, 7 October, 1988.

<sup>64</sup> "Sverker Åström om Östersjön som kärnvapenfri zon: 'Viktigt för oss att driva frågan.'" *Svenska Dagbladet*, 25 February, 1983. Sweden has, according to Åström, "always stood for the idea that an eventual zone should comprise, not only the four (or five) Nordic countries' sea or land territories..."

fairly recently that the Soviet Union has demonstrated a genuine willingness to accept regulations pertaining to their own territory.

Singling out the Baltic area has not been received positively in Sweden.<sup>65</sup> This attempt at geographically isolating the issue may be a result of, on the one hand, a failure of reaching a more comprehensive Nordic solution, or an attempt to secure the Nordic countries' participation in more regionally-oriented arrangements. The proposal only served to strengthen the Swedish perception that what the Soviet Union had in mind was to isolate Sweden's position. For a neutral country it is of the utmost importance that such a wide-sweeping measure, with an appeal to many nations, be dealt with in a forum befitting this character.

With the blooming of previously-forbidden forms of Nordic foreign policy cooperation, voices have been raised that the proposal of a nuclear-free Baltic should be handled as a cooperative effort amongst the Nordics. But consistently, these formal efforts over the Baltic, like efforts over the NNWFZ generally, have been resisted.<sup>66</sup>

Yet a new Soviet proposal was sent by the Soviet Union on 18 October, 1990<sup>67</sup> whose addressees this time were: all the Baltic states, France, Norway, the U.K., and the U.S. Both Finland and Sweden responded in much the same vein, both referring to the ongoing Nordic foreign ministry group study of the NNWFZ.<sup>68</sup> One consultant to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Finn Sollie,

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<sup>65</sup> Even Disarmament Ambassador Theorin, as early as 9 December, 1986 (Riksdagsprotokoll), expressed an aversion to the idea of making the Baltic a nuclear free zone: "it's an impossibility," she said, "because the Baltic is a free sea--if we were to include the Baltic in a NNNWFZ it would make the Baltic a Russian possession."

<sup>66</sup> Swedish Foreign Relations Committee position paper: "Nordiskt samarbete," (1990/91:UU9), December, 1990, p.98 for such an example.

<sup>67</sup> "Sovjetfrågor för Norden," *Dagens Nyheter*, 27 October, 1990.

<sup>68</sup> TT, "Finland: Kärnvapenfri östersjö också längst kusterna," 12 November, 1990.

summed up the Norwegian response to the Baltic proposal, "it's all shared nonsense...how could the Soviet Union argue for such a thing?...what it meant was that Sweden and the Soviet Union could prevent non-Baltic (nations) from getting in."<sup>69</sup>

## **Why the Soviets Pressed the Issue**

### *What lies behind the Soviet NNWFZ proposal?*

Why, if the NNWFZ has, at certain key junctures, mustered enthusiasm in Norwegian and Swedish decision-making circles, did the proposal never become reality? As described above, one should first look at the relationship between what the NNWFZ required of Sweden and Norway and what was acceptable given their existing security policy commitments. Norway was clearly more restrained by its NATO ties than Sweden's neutrality. Also, an understanding of leaders' perceptions of what lay behind the Soviet proposal--namely that Soviet motives were more "sinister" than what they said publicly--provided one major explanation of Swedish and Norwegian Swedish scepticism towards the NNWFZ. On this point, Norwegian and Swedish elite attributions of Soviet motivation were shockingly similar.

### *The Strategic-Historical Angle*

Some explained that the NNWFZ proposal was rooted in the Soviet Union's historical experience and geographical position. One Swedish diplomat argued, that "it is because of the concentration of the population in those areas and the (fixation) of the population on peace...thus they desire stability (in the

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<sup>69</sup> Sollie, interview.

region)...that's the reason for the proposals."<sup>70</sup> From a more negative standpoint, he argued, there is a clear "military-strategic interest in keeping NATO, and especially the U.S.<sup>71</sup> as far away as possible."<sup>72</sup> One Norwegian official said succinctly: "this would be making a country which is already de-facto nuclear undertake legal-political commitments to uphold a situation which has been the same since 1950."<sup>73</sup> One senior Swedish military source simplified the Soviet Union's motivation: "it was because of the Soviet Union's own, egotistical need for security—they are scared that (the aggressor) can quickly reach the country's heart."<sup>74</sup> This was echoed by a Norwegian military source who was said, "it was entirely a propaganda measure, which was to the Soviet advantage; to state the obvious, the intention was to tie our hands, while they were able to move their forces freely back and forth."<sup>75</sup> This Swedish official developed the theoretical basis somewhat, saying that "the creation of *lebensraum*" was an important consideration in this respect.<sup>76</sup> One individual in the Swedish defence establishment summed up Soviet motivation thus:<sup>77</sup>

1. the Soviets saw the strategic importance of the area—even before the advent of nuclear weapons-bearing submarines.
2. the Nordic area is close to vital Soviet areas.

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<sup>70</sup> S5

<sup>71</sup> According to one senior military official (S32) "it's the control aspect: 1. how can we make sure that the Baltic remains a free sea? 2. how will we be able to get NATO to adhere under those conditions? 3. how willing are (the powers) to show and account for the weapons they have?"

<sup>72</sup> S32

<sup>73</sup> N24. One senior Labour Party official: "the situation in which it was proposed is much different than now." (N27)

<sup>74</sup> S32

<sup>75</sup> N10

<sup>76</sup> N10

<sup>77</sup> S30

3. the Nordic area is an area of U.S. strategic bombers.
4. the Soviets wish to influence Nordic policies--through any number of channels--(and to see which one is successful).

Another factor was the traditional Soviet encirclement theory. One Norwegian Socialist Left MP explained: "while the U.S. talks of being an island with big security problems, the Soviet Union has the feeling of being surrounded by enemies, having been attacked several times; thus, they feel that NNWFZ would improve their security."<sup>78</sup> Another Swedish Foreign Ministry advisor pointed out that "the basic reasoning at the beginning was to impede NATO if it got any ideas of going into the Baltic with nuclear weapons."<sup>79</sup>

#### *The Inconsistent Soviet view of Nordic Foreign Policy Cooperation*

For all practical purposes, the Soviet Union has historically opposed every major step at Nordic foreign policy cooperation.<sup>80</sup> Against this background, it is logical to ask why the Soviet Union encouraged cooperation over the NNWFZ proposal while criticizing all other Nordic joint foreign policy cooperative efforts.

In fact, the proposal which, from the outside looks like it is supposed to promote Nordic cooperation was perceived to be motivated by quite the opposite intention: to split the Nordic region and split NATO.<sup>81</sup> One respected Swedish Sovietologist and former Foreign Ministry official, Anders Åslund, said that the NNWFZ proposal should "be seen as part of the de-nuclearization of

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<sup>78</sup> Chaffey, interview.

<sup>79</sup> From the Soviet perspective, said this advisor, the position of NATO was "unfavourable, being that NATO had nuclear weapons on ships, while the Soviets had them on their territory." (S31)

<sup>80</sup> NORDEK negotiations, Customs Union negotiations, Nordic Council negotiations, joint stances on the EEC question, Nordic Defence Union, are amongst the most prominent examples.

<sup>81</sup> The Soviet Union has objected to the existence of the conception of "Nordic Balance." The most detailed account appeared in Hegge (1979)

the Nordic area."<sup>82</sup> "The Soviet Union has been interested in the fragmentation of the West," he continued, "while the Soviet Union has been against all defence cooperation--that's why the Soviets are so positive on the NNWFZ."<sup>83</sup> Carl I. Hagen, head of the Progressive Party put it simply: "it was a part of Soviet divide and rule strategy."<sup>84</sup> As one well-placed Swedish military man simply stated, using the explanation which, in varying forms, was repeated in nearly all interviews: "the proposal bore the intention of creating and being able to utilize cracks and points of opposition between the Nordic nations."<sup>85</sup> Others would argue that the proposal was intended to create cracks in the NATO alliance. One Swedish Social Democrat said the NNWFZ proposal was obviously a proposal directed right at the NATO options in the North."<sup>86</sup> "The issue," he said, "was a good example of how to exploit--not coordinate--discussion on Nordic matters."<sup>87</sup>

### Why the Soviets, Norwegians and Swedes have Issue 'on Hold'

#### *NNWFZ De-Prioritized*

Practically as important as understanding why the Soviet Union has advocated the proposal in the past is an investigation of why, recently, the

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<sup>82</sup> This logic was re-stated, though in modified form by Willoch (interview): "the Soviet aim was quite simple: create cracks in NATO, and might be a step in the neutralization of the Nordic area."

<sup>83</sup> Åslund, interview.

<sup>84</sup> Hagen, interview.

<sup>85</sup> S7. A very serious charge indeed, from the perspective of the Nordic Balance. The oft-repeated logic that in planning cooperative foreign policy ventures, the Nordic countries continuously emphasize that their points of departure are *the differing security policy solutions*.

<sup>86</sup> S10

<sup>87</sup> S10

Soviet Union seemingly has de-prioritized the issue. One of the chief reasons for the low priority on the Nordic agenda was the issue's connection with the Double Track decision in 1979. Another reason is that Gorbachëv has not wanted to provoke NATO sentiment since 1986-7, in such a way that could go against his foreign policy reform strategy. Perhaps a third reason, especially pertinent in the Swedish case, the Soviet Union did not want to accentuate the distance between policy and practice—by advocating nuclear disarmament while submarine incursions in Sweden continued. There seems to have arisen a silent, un-pronounced consensus that as general disarmament has taken positive strides, the advantages gained from advocating the NNWFZ have decreased. Norwegian and Swedish diplomats even perceive that the Soviets themselves have de-prioritized the issue "although they would never admit this."<sup>88</sup>

This contention is strengthened by a Norwegian Foreign Ministry official who had the opportunity of regularly following Soviet publications: "I haven't felt that it's a priority...there was an article in *Pravda* or *Izvestiya* last year--from that article (it was clear) that the issue didn't show any high-level support any longer...however, this doesn't mean it's forgotten!"<sup>89</sup> A well-placed Swedish ambassador said, "there hasn't been much said about it lately from the Soviet side, while they *have* talked about this Baltic nuclear weapons free proposal." He continued saying that, in any case, the proposal is only important "given the general Soviet foreign policy line."<sup>90</sup> Further support is gained from a former senior Norwegian Foreign Ministry official, who said that "in my conversations with Shevardnadze and the embassy in Oslo, they presented some ideas from Shevardnadze from time to time before the CSCE in New York, and among

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<sup>88</sup> S44

<sup>89</sup> N28

<sup>90</sup> S36

those was an NNWFZ this was never the top of the list, being only mentioned sometimes."<sup>91</sup>

#### *NNWFZ: De-Prioritized in Norway in Sweden?*

Whereas one retired Swedish diplomat said, "the NNWFZ is not topical any longer, though the Soviet Union still favours the initiative,"<sup>92</sup> some sectors of official Sweden<sup>93</sup> were still busy, through the Gorbachëv years, expressing the traditional willingness both to discuss and bring about an NNWFZ. The same could not be said in Norway. Socialist Left Party MP, Paul Chaffey said, "it's been buried in the bureaucracy." "The Labour Party put it in a part of its party programme, then it disappeared," Chaffey added. One representative of the Swedish Left Party, Gudrun Schyman, said "now the old thought of the NNWFZ has been successfully buried and de-politicized by the civil servant (Foreign Ministry group)"<sup>94</sup>.

The Swedish and Norwegian political parties have not been willing to emphasise unity over this question. Privately, there has evolved a silent consensus<sup>95</sup>; an agreement over the question that few of the parties would

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<sup>91</sup> N41

<sup>92</sup> S5

<sup>93</sup> The consensual, annual position-papers of the Swedish *Riksdag's* Foreign Affairs Committee on disarmament (1984/85:UU16, UU1986/87:UU4, 1987/88:1, 1988/89:UU4, 1989/90:UU6) and the Official Document SOU 1985:23 and SOU 1990: 5), p. 57 reflect this trend. The latest of the Committee's papers on disarmament reads in part(1990/91:UU4, 18 October, 1990, p. 21-4):

- the efforts towards the establishment of an NNWFZ have as an ultimate goal to strengthen Sweden's and the other Nordic countries' security--and should be seen in an *European context*.

- a nuclear free zone cannot be concluded in the form of a formal Agreement with the nuclear powers.

<sup>94</sup> Schyman, interview.

<sup>95</sup> Consensus is not total. Witness Theorin: "I don't see the Soviets as being positively or negatively more/less eager than before. They have always been (continued...)"



publicly admit.<sup>96</sup> To now turn one's back on the NNWFZ, just because it is no longer a Soviet priority, would be tantamount to saying that the issue never had any domestic Swedish or Norwegian support. When we speak of de-prioritization in the Swedish case, it is proper to date such a change to at least 1986/7. As late as 10 October, 1985, Foreign Minister, Lennart Bodström, said "I want to confirm that on practically every opportunity of bilateral contact with the Soviet Union either I have taken up the NNWFZ or my conversation partner has done so, in any case if my talk has been of any greater length."<sup>97</sup>

Possibly as early as 1986 Norwegian élites dismissed the NNWFZ proposal,<sup>98</sup> and the issue would not arise again until June, 1987<sup>99</sup>. However, when Gorbachëv placed the issue of the NNWFZ prominently onto his agenda in Murmansk<sup>100</sup> in October of the same year, Norwegians again took an

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<sup>95</sup>(...continued)

interested." (interview). Neither would Norwegian Socialist Left Party's Paul Chaffey agree: "the Soviet proposals, are, in any case, in our own interest—both the Nordic and the Baltic zones are of interest here." (interview)

<sup>96</sup> See Foreign Minister Sten Andersson's speeches in *Riksdagsprotokoll* on 19 March, 1986 and 18 March, 1987 to the extent that "Sweden is working to promote Nordic stability through working for an NNWFZ."

<sup>97</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 10 October, 1985.

<sup>98</sup> It is noticeable that reference to the issue clearly takes a back-seat to the discussion of the Soviet military buildup in the Nordic area in 1986 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*), 16 June, 1986. Neither is the issue raised by Foreign Minister Frydenlund in his Foreign Policy statement on 3 December, 1986, by Defence Minister Holst, or by Prime Minister Brundtland.

<sup>99</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg allotted only a minute place to discussion of the NNWFZ in his foreign policy statement of 1 June, 1987 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*). Stoltenberg expressly says that he does not want to go into the issue in any greater detail, referring to the Foreign Relations and Constitutional Committee's position paper, St. Meld. nr. 58 (1986/87), 15 May, 1987.

<sup>100</sup> One highly-placed Norwegian diplomat said "while it was his first measure in the Murmansk speech, the NNWFZ part of it was not pursued actively; reason being that nuclear arms were treated in other fora." (N1)

interest.<sup>101</sup> It might be suggested that the re-initiation of nuclear testing on the island of Novaya Zemlya in the Fall of 1990 has taken the Soviet NNWFZ proposal off the Norwegian agenda for the foreseeable future.<sup>102</sup> This problem is especially acute for Sweden, which has been extremely active in pursuing a superpower test ban.

### *Reason for De-Prioritization*

The reasoning for the issue's fall on the foreign policy agenda must be sought in the amelioration of the international climate as a whole (and especially in the context of changed U.S.-Soviet relations). As such, neutrality-in-practice should have been adjusted--and one would expect that the superpower rivalry element would have been diffused--thus increasing the chances of NNWFZ realisation. But for Norway, this new climate did not eliminate its basic commitments to NATO strategy and practices.

One Swedish ambassador said that "the proposal has been taken over by the speed of events in the nuclear area (especially U.S. reductions)--as such, the issue has been marginalized."<sup>103</sup> One Swedish diplomat made the point: "the coupling with other things in Europe, for example conventional disarmament,

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<sup>101</sup> Stoltenberg, in his assessment of the Murmansk speech in October skipped over reference to the NNWFZ in his address of 2 December, 1987. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*). However, Christian People Party leader, Bondevik, stressed the positive aspects of the zone, as a step in the direction of the "thinning out of nuclear weapons" altogether. Also note the relative absence of mention of the NNWFZ in the following Foreign Ministers' addresses of 13 January and 18 December, 1989, 22 May, 1990.

<sup>102</sup> One Norwegian military official said, "If the initiative had come from the Nordic countries things would have been different--it would probably go on." But, "the Soviets have got credibility problems: as long as nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya and efforts to define parts of the Kola as outside the geographical area continue." (N35).

<sup>103</sup> S43

dilutes the issue--by default."<sup>104</sup> One should bear in mind that at the time the initiative was spearheaded, as well as the points at which the proposal assumed a prominent position, international tensions were high. Seen in this context, the NNWFZ was only one of a series of proposals which at face value *seemed* sufficiently lofty and realistic to gain support, while at the same time "chipping away" at the international peace and security (seen from a narrowly Soviet perspective). Swedish Centre Party politician, Pär Granstedt, pointed out that "on the one hand- détente has taken away the political leverage behind the zone," and on the other "there is not at all the same sort of political press from (our domestic opinion)."<sup>105</sup> One Swedish Foreign Ministry official gave an interesting analysis of the position the NNWFZ took in the overall fold of Soviet proposals:<sup>106</sup>

"the Soviets made a tremendous amount of proposals from 1986 onwards. These were the days of proposals--but there was no coordination between them. Some were only declaratory: you couldn't negotiate on them, since you don't get the 'negotiatory basis' on which to discuss. But some were serious--those were negotiable."

In Norway, Willoch typified the situation such: "disarmament negotiations have brought such success in recent times, in such a way as to confirm that drives for the NNWFZ lie to the side of the constructive way of attacking problems." "If we adopt a special position within NATO, through our participation in a special zone together with neutral countries, this (act) will desert the opportunities (which we could have) in influencing the policies of the

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<sup>104</sup> S44

<sup>105</sup> S25. This reflection was echoed from one defence official who said "the Soviets don't play on national opinions (in the same way) anymore." (S30)

<sup>106</sup> S40. The reason behind the Soviet position was, according to one Swedish diplomat, "to always keep the pot boiling... let things boil, they said...it's a 'process.'" (S44)

alliance, while simultaneously pointing out ourselves as a special target for Soviet influence," added Willoch.<sup>107</sup>

Swedish Centre MP Granstedt pointed out "the possibility of realisation of the idea has grown enormously," pointing to two factors: "One, the Soviet Union as a military threat has declined--(witness) their preparedness to withdraw Golf submarines<sup>108</sup> from the Baltic,<sup>109</sup> and two, a change of Western doctrine--from where the biggest resistance came--the nuclear component is less important now, and (we have met) a more flexible attitude from the U.S."<sup>110</sup>

However, most élites felt as did Norwegian advisor Finn Sollie about the removal of the Golfs: "in any case the Golfs were very dated--they made the offer to withdraw the Golfs when they were slated to be withdrawn in any case."<sup>111</sup>

Another stream of thinking held that with the transformation of Soviet foreign policy thought from confrontation to greater cooperation, the motivation of trying to create "splits" in the facades of disliked organisations, e.g. NATO, decreased or altogether vanished. As Kåre Willoch mentioned, "what good would it be for them to create new cracks?" "They have, for the time being,

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<sup>107</sup> Forhandlingar i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987

<sup>108</sup> Granstedt pointed out that the withdrawal of Golf submarines was a reflection of the Soviet's intention of utilizing a "leaner, meaner policy," since the submarines were "no good," and "not up to date." Thus, they "stood to gain politically out of it." *Militærbalansen 1990-91* showed that 86 tactical nuclear weapons were still present in the Baltic. (See "Sovjet har gott om kärnvapen i Östersjön, *Blekinge Läns Tidning*, 11 March, 1991.)

<sup>109</sup> According to Tamnes (1983:228) the answer must be "no." Tamnes, quoting *Dagens Nyheter*, 8 March, 1983, Soviet General, Nicolai Chernov, in a Swedish television interview, said the Soviets could contemplate the withdrawal of their six Golf-class submarines...in connection with the establishment of a Nordic zone."

<sup>110</sup> Granstedt, interview.

<sup>111</sup> Sollie, interview.

given up their confrontational policies--the possible gain for reducing the coalition in NATO is now less," Willoch added.<sup>112</sup>

Yet others saw the NNWFZ proposal against the background of other Soviet proposals for confidence-building in the North. A prime example is Gorbachëv's October, 1987's speech in Murmansk in which was mentioned a Soviet willingness to "guarantee" an eventual NNWFZ solution.<sup>113</sup> But one former Norwegian defence figure, said that "I wrote at the time that a Soviet guarantee was pretty dicey," and above all "a Soviet guarantee would not be good enough to use as an argument via our allies."<sup>114</sup> Former Norwegian Chief-of-Defence, General F. Bull-Hansen argues that a "Soviet offer to all of the Nordics to go in for a NNWFZ is limited to a guarantee that the Soviet Union will respect the zone... if one has even had a limited military-political and political experience with this question, the chances of this must be seen as weak"(Bull-Hansen, 1988:10). Norwegian Centre Party's Johan Jakobsen related the proposal to "Soviet long-term thinking and strategy," linking the issue with "efforts to drive wedges between the NATO countries (e.g. Barents Sea delineation)."<sup>115</sup> Norwegian Labour MP, B.T. Godal, explained that the Soviet Union "welcomed any arrangement that was against U.S. interests; one can see the idea of a unilateral NNWFZ in that vein."<sup>116</sup>

On the other side of the spectrum were officials which saw an unchanged Soviet interest in the NNWFZ today. These individuals felt the Soviet leadership was still advocating the idea however by using different methods. One Swedish diplomat said, "indeed the NNWFZ (today) represents a change

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<sup>112</sup> Willoch, interview.

<sup>113</sup> N.M. Udgaard, "Sovjet-besøk med 'ny tenkning,'" *Aftenposten*, 9 January, 1988.

<sup>114</sup> N7

<sup>115</sup> Jakobsen, interview.

<sup>116</sup> Godal, interview.

of position: they thought that in order to get it moving--they know the U.S. attitude--they had to encourage Nordic contacts (in the matter)."<sup>117</sup>

### *Droit de Regard*

Norwegian suspicions that the Soviet Union desires a 'say' or *droit de regard* in Norwegian affairs has negatively coloured Norwegian reactions to Soviet initiatives generally and to the NNWFZ in particular. One former Norwegian defence official said: "we don't want to give the Soviet Union a legitimate right to interfere in Norwegian domestic politics on a bilateral basis."<sup>118</sup> So, when discussing the Soviet proposal Norway has attempted to **clarify the terms and implications** that such an agreement would have for Norwegian-Soviet or NATO-Soviet relations. What obligations would accompany such a treaty? What sort of say would such an arrangement give the Soviets in Norwegian domestic affairs? How could the NNWFZ be used as a Soviet political tool to pressure the Norwegians on solutions to, say, the Svalbard question, or the Barents Sea delineation? Norwegians have despised every hint of ambiguity in their affairs with the Soviets and with NATO. One senior Norwegian Labour Party official stressed that the "Soviet proposal was much the same--although somewhat more sophisticated...the Soviets have always tried to engage Norway in bilateral fields (e.g.dividing line)."<sup>119</sup>

Another reason that the Norwegians never mustered enough interest was because the NNWFZ was not seen to give full consideration to Norway's NATO responsibilities. Norwegian Undersecretary of State, Oddmund Hammerstad<sup>120</sup> declared on 25 June, 1985 what had long been clear: agreement

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<sup>117</sup> S9

<sup>118</sup> N4

<sup>119</sup> N27

<sup>120</sup> A. Seeland, "Sverige vil arbeide for nordisk sone," *Aftenposten* 27 June, 1985.

from NATO was an absolute 'must' for the Norwegians to enter into any eventual NNWFZ arrangement. Then-Prime Minister, Brundtland, stated that "it is difficult to imagine the realization of a zone arrangement, independent of the understanding and the participation of the U.S." According to Brundtland, the zone should be developed as a part of a change in NATO's strategy, and also requires reciprocation from the Soviet Union.<sup>121</sup> There exists consensus across the political scale in the pursuit of this goal.<sup>122</sup>

A high point in the Norwegian debate over the NNWFZ was 1986-1987, where the NATO connection achieved clarity. On 13 August, 1986, then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Kåre Willoch commented that a Nordic commission to study the NNWFZ would mean that "neutral states such as Sweden and Finland were going to examine a vital question in Norwegian security policy...it is, from the standpoint of the Conservative Party, an inescapable pre-requisite: we must have the participation and understanding of our allies."<sup>123</sup> Labour Party's Vice-Chairman, Einar Førde, clarified Labour's line on the NNWFZ thus: "the Norwegian Labour Party is not out on a one-handed adventure to the Soviet Union, Sweden and Finland, regarding nuclear-freedom in *Norden*." "Nobody in the Labour party believes that a NNWFZ can come about as a result of an agreement between the Nordic countries and the Soviet Union, " added Førde.

What also tended to decrease the importance of the issue in the Norwegian eyes was that no change in NATO strategy was in the making, even in the midst of a full-scale amelioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. Then-Foreign

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<sup>121</sup> "-Sone bør ha USA-aksept," *Aftenposten*, 10 September, 1986

<sup>122</sup> It is surprising to see that this consensus even extends to the Socialist Left Party parliamentarians. According to two Socialist Left MP's, the NNWFZ should be discussed in cooperation with NATO and the Nordic countries. (M. Malmø and R. Øhman, "Atomfri sone 'ikke forenlig med NATO-forpliktelsene'" *Aftenposten*, 28 June, 1982).

<sup>123</sup> "Willoch imot nordisk atomutredning," *Aftenposten*, 13 August, 1986

Minister, Stoltenberg, pointed out that, in consultations with his NATO colleagues, if changes were to occur, it would most certainly take time (things don't change in foreign policy overnight).<sup>124</sup>

### *The NNWFZ: Success or Failure?*

States generally only pursue foreign policies to which are attached a material dividend. After looking back at their almost 23 years of experience with it, the Soviet Union had to make an audit: did their NNWFZ line achieve its desired result? Depending on the definition of the result, the answer in almost all cases from the Swedish and Norwegian sides, would have to be 'no.'

One of the logical reasons why one has not seen a continuation of the Soviet NNWFZ offensive is that its value as a foreign policy instrument has diminished. Kåre Willoch hinted that the Soviets' hopes of realizing their proposal were linked to expected political benefits within the Norwegian political system. However the Soviet anticipation of splitting the Norwegian parliament for the most part had failed<sup>125</sup>; one reason less for advocating a NNWFZ. As one official explained "the Soviets have realized that there is no way to split Sweden internally...the Social Democrats won't push the issue—they just keep delaying it."<sup>126</sup> In Norway, the anti-nuclear sentiment was high and

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<sup>124</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 9 June, 1987. Even the anti-nuclear group, "Nei til atomvåpen" stated on 2 April, 1987 that an NNWFZ would be incompatible with NATO's then-strategy. (A. B. Godager, "NATO-strategi-problem for sone?" *Aftenposten*, 3 April, 1987).

<sup>125</sup> "In the Norwegian Social Democratic Party," Willoch said, "there were some people for and against: on the left wing shrewd idealists and the people on the right wing were frustrated." "The Soviet Union may have thought that with the fall of the Conservative Government in Parliament that it might result in a majority of supporters for an NNWFZ," he continued in interview.

<sup>126</sup> S30



the Soviet knew this.<sup>127</sup> But even here the Soviet Union has been unable to mobilize public opinion in support of such a zone. Whereas the overall fear of nuclear weapons has decreased with U.S.-Soviet *détente*, so has the Soviet Union realized that the use of such measures would be less effective.

Both Norwegian and Swedish leaders saw one of the chief Soviet motivations as being to cause havoc in NATO. Even this effort must be seen as a failure. Norwegian Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, explained that "the purpose of the Soviet advocacy has been political (the division of the Western alliance)--and that's why they are not really interested anymore."<sup>128</sup> As the head of the Norwegian trade Union, LO's, international secretariat, Kåre Sandegren said, "the Soviets never thought that it was realizable without negotiations between the alliances."<sup>129</sup>

From another perspective, the NNWFZ proposal did, as one Swedish Foreign Ministry official said, "keep the pot boiling."<sup>130</sup> As such the NNWFZ initiated a debate and quite successfully kept the issue on decision-makers' agendas. "Previously," said one former Swedish Foreign Ministry official, close to the question, "the Soviets just wanted to see what the reaction would be." "Today," he continued, "the Soviets are satisfied with gaining political points of it."<sup>131</sup> One Social Democrat said "from time to time these proposals just had a

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<sup>127</sup> Both one Norwegian Conservative MP (N13) and Finn Malvig of the Defence Department emphasised this point. One Norwegian source close to Government said "it was an element of propaganda from the very beginning--wanting to attract the popular opinion of various countries, knowing that we have a soft opinion on nuclear arms." (N48)

<sup>128</sup> Petersen, interview.

<sup>129</sup> Sandegren, interview.

<sup>130</sup> S44

<sup>131</sup> S38

declaratory value--their proposals were numerous; thus one had to question just how serious they were."<sup>132</sup>

However, as Soviet foreign policy style has gradually changed from a declaratory to a more action-oriented foreign policy in arms control, the propagandistic import of "empty words" has sharply diminished. A Swedish Social Democratic official said "the issue has less value today because it's not propagandistic--they see it as we see it: linked to the European situation."<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> S37

<sup>133</sup> S37

## Chapter Four

### Sweden, Norway and Boundary Issues with the Soviet Union: the Security Realm

#### *Boundary Violations*

Sweden--because of its neutrality and Norway--because of its NATO commitments have approached their boundary-related affairs with the Soviet Union in different ways. This chapter seeks to illuminate the effect of security policy upon the perceptions and behaviour of Swedish and Norwegian leaders towards the Soviet Union in the realm of security-related boundary issues.

The inviolability of boundaries is a central principle in a neutral state's foreign policy. Incursions put into question the viability and credibility of a neutral state's defence commitment, making a state feel isolated and defenceless. All small states have an inferiority complex with respect to their own military potential. Norway is compensated for this by its NATO membership, while in Sweden this feeling is only partially made up for by maintaining a strong defence force. Violations of neutral state boundaries transform this inferiority complex into a major self-confidence problem with serious ramifications for both elite perceptions and behaviour.

Sweden finds maximum security in the consensus it is able to generate for certain causes in the international community. Sweden thus plays upon the violating nation's fear of being discovered and exposed to an international audience--an extremely embarrassing situation for a great power in which to find itself. Violations run counter some of the basic tenets of international law to which a neutral state is wed. Therefore, every violation, where intentional, shall be met with the full force of protest. By referring to international legal principles, it is able to muster maximum consensus among states while still appearing to be impartial.

The presence of an international legal regime or international opinion, while comforting, is a secondary resort in certain aspects of the Norwegian security

policy. Norway has the luxury of relying on the consensus, in the first case, which it can muster within the NATO community. Norway relies on its policy of deterrence and confidence-building, two policies embedded in the NATO backbone, to assess the gravity of territorial violations and to determine the proper responses. With this support, it can be much more magnanimous in interpreting boundary violations and more flexible in finding solutions which are pragmatic and suitable.

### *The Shock of "Whisky on the Rocks"*

A Soviet, Whisky Class submarine went aground in the archipelago of Karlskrona, Sweden's second largest Naval base, in the Fall of 1981.<sup>1</sup> What may be called the "Karlskrona phenomenon" is the psychological shock dealt the Swedish élites and general public as a reaction to the grounding of the submarine, with markings 'U-137.' The dilemmas posed the Swedish leadership by this event and subsequent incursions illuminate some essential aspects of a neutral state leadership's perceptions and behaviour towards the Soviet Union.

The Norwegians have no such single event to which they can point in their relations with the Soviet Union. Norwegian-Soviet relations are markedly free of such shocking occurrences--not least because the Norwegians have learned to live with threat scenarios which incorporate such an event actually occurring. Especially for the Swedish public, U-137 was a solemn reminder that her strategic position in the Baltic was of importance for the Soviet Union.

Several scenarios had been constructed previous to the event--but it is fair to say that few seriously predicted that such an event would become reality. One of the reasons that the possibility was not seriously pondered by élites was that such a scenario would confront a neutral state with a true crisis. Such a

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<sup>1</sup> There have been three 'confirmed' violations by submarines until present (1981 in Gåsefjärden and 1982 in Horsfjärden--both confirmed to be of Soviet origin) and Hävringe in 1988 (of unknown nationality). (A. Öhman, "ÖB:s stab tvivlar på kränkningar," *Dagens Nyheter*, 31 August, 1991).

scenario could be liable to split a national élite, between on the one hand a political élite intent on maintaining the facade of neutrality and on the other hand, a military élite whose pride had been wounded and which was intent on following military standard-operating-procedures in the matter.

The Karlskrona event brought this very dilemma to the fore, and posed some very complex and sensitive questions for the Swedish leadership. The Swedish Government had to answer one recurrent question: Would its behaviour in the issue be interpreted as **becoming of a neutral state**? Sweden's behaviour would thus be measured in relation to some of the following questions: What should the Swedish proper response be? How should extra-military relations with the Soviet Union be affected?<sup>2</sup> How would the Soviet Union react to any potential Swedish military moves? How should this event be interpreted against the background of other Soviet foreign policy behaviour? What sort of impact would it have on the credibility of Swedish neutrality generally?

#### *Incursions in perspective*

Submarine incursions in Swedish territorial waters are not a novel phenomenon. Soviet submarines have violated Swedish territorial waters since the late 1960's and 1970's, the first incursion being registered in 1962 (Salicath and Støren, 1988:95-7), with other commentators estimating that such events have occurred since the 1940's.<sup>3</sup> No one would question the fact that the submarine ordeal has burdened Swedish-Soviet relations over a long period of

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<sup>2</sup> A case-in-point of the balancing rope Sweden was forced to walk during then-Soviet Premier Ryzhkov's visit to Sweden in 1988 where Sweden both deeply desired an agreement regarding the economic division of the Baltic Sea and felt a need to protest regarding continuing submarine incursions. (L. Christiansson, "Kränkningar dilemma vid samtalen med Ryzhkov," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 10 January, 1988).

<sup>3</sup> Agrell (1986:197). This contention is supported by Carl Bildt (M. Holmström, "Sovjetisk ubåtsstyrka organiserar spaningar," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 5 December, 1990.)

time. However, most élites would agree that not only the submarine issue-per-se's importance has declined during Gorbachëv's tenure, but further that a study of numbers would likewise even confirm a numerical decrease.<sup>4</sup> One strategically-placed official in the Foreign Ministry, felt that "the issue of submarines has rather receded from the forefront of our relations with the Soviets,"<sup>5</sup> as a part of an overall issue shift in Swedish-Soviet relations.

### *The Nationality Question? One Dilemma of Neutrality-in-Practice*

The official Swedish standpoint in the nationality question has much in common with the common legal principle "assumed innocent until proven guilty." The theory of neutrality dictates that in the face of uncertain evidence, one must assume that the chances of the violator being a Warsaw Treaty member are at least equally as large as the possibilities of the violator being from NATO. The Swedish press corps, for example, have convincingly presumed that the violator was the Soviet Union and thus breaking this legal principle.<sup>6</sup> However, even Swedish officials have made every insinuation that the submarines which continue to violate Swedish territorial waters are of Soviet origin. One of neutrality's dilemmas is how to appear impartial, while being confronted with a combination of subjective-objective evidence pointing to only one superpower.

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<sup>4</sup> According to General Gustafsson, quoted in the article, "Stormakt bakom intrång," *Svenska Dagbladet* 12 March, 1990, in 1989 there was a decrease in "the number of observations," which could be explained by "a changed security-policy climate." The number of violations in 1989 was less than both 1987 and 1988, though (M. Holmström, "Ubåtskränkningar ökar åter," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 28 February, 1991). This is nonetheless a subject of dispute.

<sup>5</sup> S9

<sup>6</sup> Chief-of-Defence Gustafsson hinted at this point, while pointing out the nuances of national identification in his article "Ingen idé peka ut något land," *Dagens Nyheter*, 14 March, 1991. One of the reasons why the Swedes (by implication) have not pointed out which nationality is responsible is because it is not international praxis. "Norway does not publicly accuse the Soviet Union or any other state for her 'proven' incursions during the 1980's," he writes.

The Norwegians, by contrast, have a much easier equation to solve. Quite simply, who would want to violate Norwegian territorial waters besides the Soviet Union? Therefore, the question of determining the nationality is not a mystery--rather a question of whether it occurs at all. While Sweden is uncertain both about the number of actual violations and the national origin of the violators, Norway is only unsure about the number of actual violations.(Agrell, 1986:198)

### *The Nationality Question in Practice*

The Soviet Union has officially been pointed out as the violator on two occasions: 1981 and 1983<sup>7</sup>--this as differentiated from "private speculation."<sup>8</sup> Since then, the Swedish Chief of Defence has not been able to pinpoint the national origin(s) of the violating submarines.<sup>9</sup> Neither have the political leadership or professional foreign policy officials felt the time ripe or evidence compelling enough to draw any official conclusions about the nationality question.<sup>10</sup> Official Sweden has been, in short, quite uncommittal about the

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<sup>7</sup> The Soviet Union violated Swedish airspace over Gotland in the Summer of 1984--this was admitted by the Soviet Union and confirmed by Sweden. See R. Aschberg, "Sex frågor om Sverige-Sovjet," *Expressen*, 5 February, 1985 or S. Åström, "Misstag eller nonchalans är ingen ursäkt," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 17 September, 1984.

<sup>8</sup> According to Environmental Party MP Per Gahrton (*Riksdagsprotokoll*, 2 February) "Sten Andersson made a positive suggestion to convene a commission of experts, with Soviet participation, but the Chief of Defence dismissed this..."

<sup>9</sup> A typical report states: "during the course of 1989 (we) have been unable to procure evidence of the national origin of the violating submarines." ("Stormakt bakom intrång," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 12 March, 1990.)

<sup>10</sup> The various "updates" given through the years by the Foreign Minister with respect to the nationality question essentially follow the same line of his statement of 16 March, 1988, (*Riksdagsprotokoll*): "...one has not been able to secure evidence regarding the violator's or the violators' national origin. Sweden will never accept violations of her territorial integrity." Defence Minister, Roine Carlsson, gave similar statements through the years (e.g. *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 4 February, 1988 and 2 February, 1989.)

national origin of the intruders. The 1984 Defence Committee, in a section discussing submarine activity pointed out that:

"There have been two types of general violations of Swedish territorial waters in the past years: on the surface and under the water. (the first category) violations were relatively equally divided between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The majority of these violations have been made by civilian vessels."<sup>11</sup>

The work within the 1988 Defence Committee reflects many of the same conclusions and explanations as its predecessors. Aside from its re-statement of extreme concern regarding underwater violations, because of their intentional nature, the Committee writes:

"In the official analyses which were..performed during the during the 1980's...the reason for (the continued violations) should, in essence, be some form of preparations for future crisis and war situations. The fact that underwater violations have even continued through the past years is a reminder that even in the future, military realities must be factored into a comprehensive judgement of the security-political developments in our part of the world."<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, the *working assumptions* in practically all quarters--whether understood or explicit--has been that incursions have been of WTO, and more specifically, of Soviet origin. The power behind assumptions is that while they cannot be either disproved or proved, they penetrate every dimension of any relationship. Some individuals have been more forthcoming in revealing the nationality which feel is violating Swedish waters. While there is a detectable

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<sup>11</sup> SOU 1985:23:41. It should be noted that this Defence Committee consists of representatives from across the political spectrum. The document this Committee produces is a consensus document.

<sup>12</sup> SOU 1990:5 Remarkable here is the flag which the Committee raised, indicating that although there may be comprehensive political change (especially in the Soviet Union--which is discussed intensively and in-depth throughout the report), the military realities can and do remain.



official consensus that the violator is a "superpower,"<sup>13</sup> for the most part, that is where the *official* consensus ends, if it ever existed at all. Assumptions and official policy have collided. What is the substance of these assumptions and what effect have they had on Sweden's relationship with the Soviet Union?

#### *Unchanged Military-(political?) Motivation*

In the absence of concrete evidence, élites have reasoned themselves to the conclusion that the intruder must be the Soviet Union. Some individuals argue that while there has been undisputed political-economic change in the Soviet Union, it has not extended into the military realm. Akin to this thinking is the argument that the Baltic Sea is of continuing strategic importance, such that the Soviet Union needs to maintain free passage and movement of its submarines and to insure the security of its forward bases and existing air defence warning systems in the region.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the military's former mandate to plan for different war scenarios remains in great part unchanged today.

Depending on one's view on military-political relations in the Soviet Union, the military may in fact be the sole decision-maker with respect to the alleged incursions. A majority of the interviewees acquitted the Soviet political establishment of any sinister motives in the incursions. One Centre Party MP, Pär Granstedt, felt that "the operation of submarines in the archipelago is a continuing ambiguity," adding that "this may be proof that (military) planning is still going on with respect to attack on Sweden."<sup>15</sup> Carl Bildt has

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<sup>13</sup> R. Magnergård and M. Holmström, "Stormakt bakom intrång," *Svenska Dagbladet* 12 March, 1990. Gustafsson put forth several theories of why violations were continuing. The common factor in Gustafsson's theories was that "a superpower with a special responsibility for security" was the cause for incursions.

<sup>14</sup> S30

<sup>15</sup> Pär Granstedt, interview. Furthermore, Granstedt interpreted the incursions as "the military trying to keep its options open--whereby at some time they could switch to an offensive strategy."

maintained that the Soviet Union's military is keeping on at the same pace as previously."<sup>16</sup> According to Bildt, the Soviet military has lied to the political establishment, and in turn, the political establishment has lied to the outside world."<sup>17</sup>

Bildt was immediately challenged on his conclusions, by Swedes<sup>18</sup> and Soviets<sup>19</sup> alike. Per Gahrton, foreign policy spokesman for the Environmental Party, said "I don't think that the Soviet submarines are a 'left-over' from old Soviet foreign policy...but if things are as Bildt has described, this is a very serious matter and leftover from the past...nonetheless I tend to be a sceptic."<sup>20</sup> Örjan Berner, twice Swedish Moscow ambassador dismissed the theory that political pressures were the cause of submarine incursions.<sup>21</sup> If the Russians wanted to apply political pressure (on Sweden) they would have hinted that they wanted changes in Swedish policy. With only few exceptions, such has not been the case, according to Berner.<sup>22</sup> Gudrun Schyman, a Communist Party parliamentarian, urged that the Swedish budgetary contribution to the

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<sup>16</sup> Speech, 4 December, 1990, "Ubåtskränkningarna mot Sverige- Bakgrund, Mönster och Motiv."; M. Holmström, "Sovjetisk ubåtsstyrka organiserar spaningar," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 5 December, 1990.

<sup>17</sup> Carl Bildt, speech held at Spegelsalen, Grand Hotel, Stockholm, 4 December, 1990.

<sup>18</sup> O. Alsén, "Bildt har gått på grund," *Dagens Nyheter*, 17 December, 1990.

<sup>19</sup> The most scathing criticism was dealt by Vitaly Ivanov, Commander of the Soviet Baltic Fleet (S. Olofsson, "Sovjetamiral angriper Bildt," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 24 February, 1991): "Carl Bildt's speech was uncomfortable and was replete with misleading information...Bildt is trying to get the Swedish taxpayers to open their wallets for increased military expenditures."

<sup>20</sup> Gahrton, interview.

<sup>21</sup> "Handfasta metoder får Sovjet på reträtt," *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 December, 1984.

<sup>22</sup> "Handfasta metoder får Sovjet på reträtt."

submarine chase should be seen in relation to the visits of certain American vessels which carry nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup>

Chief of Defence Bengt Gustafsson gave a relatively open analysis of what he thought lay behind the incidents.<sup>24</sup> Gustafsson forwarded the following three theories:

- a. intelligence organisations work in the long-term and then decide upon a policy. The policy may not later be re-evaluated and keeps on in old, worn tracks which it has always used—irrespective of fluctuations in international tensions.
- b. that the incursions have been sanctioned by the violating state's politicians, but that they had not changed the operative paradigm. In that case the motive must be that the area must be regarded as an extremely important security question for the public and the state itself.
- c. that there exist organisations in countries which are not under full political control.

Anders Åslund reasoned that "it is likely that the submarine incursions have occurred because of a decision made in the 1970's by the *Politburo* that the Baltic Fleet was allowed to perform such exercises--then, the decision held, year after year."<sup>25</sup> He continued, "it is possible that the new incursions, of a novel character, mean that the *Politburo* has made a decision to forbid exercises in Swedish waters... But since they continue after all, it could mean that another organisation is acting here. The KGB's international department has its own navy in its frontier troop units—it could be they who are acting now."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1988. Schyman felt such efforts were "remarkable, especially when one compares the incredible energy put into the effort of identifying submarines which violate our borders."

<sup>24</sup> "Stormakt bakom intrång," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 12 March, 1990.

<sup>25</sup> L. Björkvall, "Gorbatjovs sista strid," *Expressen*, 19 December, 1989.

<sup>26</sup> "Gorbatjovs sista strid."

### *Not the U.S.: Process of Elimination*

Another school of individuals concluded the Soviet Union was the violator through a process of eliminating the U.S.. "If it were NATO, they would have sent in much better material than an ageing submarine, with loud motors, directly into the Swedish archipelago,"<sup>27</sup> said one interviewee. Others argue that the reason which underlies the incursions is a need for war-time planning. "If NATO wanted this information it could (and does) get it through conventional channels," said another interviewee.<sup>28</sup> Carl Bildt, in reference to allegations of formal intelligence-gathering cooperation between the U.S. and Sweden responded: "the Americans don't need our help with that sort of activity."<sup>29</sup> Built into these statements are, inter alia, assumptions of Soviet clumsiness, explicit Soviet designs on Sweden, a need to go through extraordinary channels to obtain information which it could not otherwise obtain. Almost by default, the Soviet Union, or one of its allies, becomes the culpable party. Logically one could say that Swedish élites are far from impartial in analyzing the continuing nature of submarine incursions.

In the theory of neutrality, when one lacks evidence, one must fall back on its original threat perception--that threats can emanate equally from West and East. However, in practice it seems quite clear that responsible Swedes assume that the violator is none other than the Soviet Union--and as will be demonstrated in the next section, have taken concrete steps to support this assumption.

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<sup>27</sup> S30

<sup>28</sup> S30

<sup>29</sup> M. Jaresand and B. Stenquist, "Staben väljer att tiga," *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 October, 1990.

## *Reacting*

What is the most effective way for Sweden to react? This is one of neutrality's trickiest questions, for Sweden's manoeuvrability is circumscribed by the fact that it must appear to be acting as a neutral. A neutral must be vocal and firm in indicating where violations of sovereignty occur, but must simultaneously keep communication channels open with its chief international partners. It is doubtful whether Sweden's leadership could cope with isolation. Sweden must likewise bear in mind that it is a small nation, with small resources and with limited capacity to affect the behaviour of her enormous neighbour. Harsh responses, for example by cutting diplomatic ties, or minimizing economic exchange, would undoubtedly be met by equivalent measures from the Soviet side. The more reserved Sweden's response, surely one could anticipate a less violent reaction from the Soviet Union. However, the deterrent effect upon perceived Soviet submarine operations (if any) would be minimal.

It is of the essence to react quickly to the events. One highly placed Foreign Ministry official said "of course we've got all these provocations from submarines, but I feel it is important to react strongly as a sovereign country and to do so within a *short* time--why should you keep shooting yourself in the foot by curtailing parts of bilateral relations which are also in your own interest?"<sup>30</sup>

Sweden has attempted to employ a complex mixture of reactions, all the while treasuring the hopes that either the motivation for the incursions would disappear and that its sanctions would have some impact on "Soviet" behaviour. Private and public protests (and constant reminders) to the Soviet Government, the scaling back of certain exchanges: cultural, political and military, changes

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<sup>30</sup> S5. This interviewee mentioned agricultural exchanges as an example.

in law, among other measures have been undertaken.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, the standards of evidence required to officially claim an incursion were raised in 1989.<sup>32</sup>

The Swedish response has been especially pointed with respect to military exchanges—curtailed until their resumption in the Spring of 1991. In response to the question of why there had been no official Soviet naval visits since 1981, one official with a prominent military background responded: "when we have chased 'territorial water intruders' for ten years, it's a psychological question towards your personnel whether you will permit visits from nations which 'could be the potential intruder.'"<sup>33</sup> From this quote, one may conclude that the Soviet Union (or related countries) are "the intruder," since there have been several U.S. military (especially naval) visits since then. An advisor within the Defence bureaucracy pronounced clearly: "there have not been any Soviet port visits in the 1980's at all-- due to the submarine issue."<sup>34</sup> As Ambassador Sverker Åström put it, "the submarines cut off the conversation for a time, and

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<sup>31</sup> There were two official Swedish ordinances passed, either as a direct or indirect consequence of the 1981 Karlskrona incident. SFS 1982:755 ("The Passage Ordinance.") and SFS 1982:756 (the "IKFN Ordinance"). Swedish Foreign Ministry's international law expert, Bo Johnson Theutenberg, stated that these were an attempt to tighten the legal boundaries of Sweden. Another consideration was that, given these boundaries, the Swedish Government and military was granted more power for enforcement. (Klara och entydiga signaler mot kränkningar," (*Svenska Dagbladet*, 28 October, 1983)

<sup>32</sup> A. Öhman, "Fortsatta rapporter om ubåtar," *Dagens Nyheter*, 2 March, 1991; S. Olofson, "Inga konstaterade kränkningar," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2 March, 1991; B. Gustafsson, "Ingen idé peka ut något land," *Dagens Nyheter*, 14 March, 1991

<sup>33</sup> S32. We must note that there has been an exchange of military delegations since 1981 nonetheless. Until 1985 Soviet invitations were declined. (Lindblad, interview). Lindblad added that "when we travel (over there) like in the case of the Head of the Swedish Air Force, while we know that submarines are still violating our waters, this gives them the wrong signal."

<sup>34</sup> S19

there will not be any increased amount of rejoinder again until the violations (by whatever state it may be) cease.<sup>35</sup>

In the early 1990's there was a resumption of some exchanges. In the Summer of 1991 the Soviet Defence Minister, Yazov, returned a Moscow visit by Swedish Defence Minister, Roine Carlsson--the first visit by a Soviet Defence Minister in over twenty years.<sup>36</sup> In addition, in April of 1991 Chief-of-Defence, Bengt Gustafsson, travelled to the Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup> A reciprocal visit from his colleague, Moiseyev, was planned.

The submarine incidents have likewise coloured Swedish leaders' reception of various Soviet proposals. One of the chief ones is the proposal for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Another proposal in a similar vein is the Soviet proposal for a Nuclear Free Baltic Sea region. In the first case, the grounding of U-137 coincided precisely with a high point in Soviet advocacy of its thirty-year old proposal. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, rhetoric ran dangerously counter to actual Soviet behaviour. In the second case, the Soviet Union attempted to further regionalize the nuclear free zone idea--an attempt vehemently opposed by small, neutral states, which see such idea's realisation only in the context of multilateral diplomacy and wider geographical framework.

In a third proposal oriented to Norway and Sweden in the Summer of 1990, the Soviet Union proposed a treaty regulating incidents at sea. The Swedish handling of the treaty is interesting for it is revealing about how small, neutral states see proposals from big, superpower neighbours. The Swedes were

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<sup>35</sup> S. Åström, "En svensk Östeuropapolitik efterlyses," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 24 July, 1988.

<sup>36</sup> S. Olofson, "Jazov till Sverige i sommar," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 March, 1991.

<sup>37</sup> S. Olofson, "ÖB reser till Sovjetunionen," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 28 February, 1991: Gustafsson and his Soviet colleague, Moiseyev, agreed in April, 1990, to a two-year exchange programme--the first step was Gustafsson's Spring, 1991 trip to Moscow.

formally offered such a treaty during Defence Minister, Roine Carlsson's, trip to the Soviet Union in September, 1990.<sup>38</sup>

Carlsson promised to "take a look at the proposal," however saying "I have already presented our principal view on the subject, which is that we have consistently pursued our preference for a multilateral treaty in the United Nations."<sup>39</sup> Prime Minister Carlsson was to have stated in reference to the bilateral proposal: "In the Baltic, there are more than two states."<sup>40</sup> The proposed treaty held out a definition of the rules of conduct towards Sweden in an area which Swedes felt never had been respected before. The Soviet motivation for such a treaty was perceived as being, on the one hand, more lofty goals such as confidence-building measures between Sweden and the Soviet Union, but on the other, less complementary side, as an attempt to gain a military *droit de regard*. Small states have been taught to be cautious when big powers offer an agreement in order to safeguard their 'common interests.' Foreign Ministry officials<sup>41</sup> and military officials echoed this realisation, one military official saying, "the day we start signing separate bilateral agreements is the day we relinquish collective security."<sup>42</sup> As one highly placed Foreign Ministry official said, "it's always a sensitive issue to be in bed with a huge country with strategic interests--and especially so since the submarine

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<sup>38</sup> This particular visit was the first by a Swedish Defence Minister for 19 years. The Soviet proposal was formally put forth by the Soviets on 24 September, 1990. (T. Hamberg, "Inget incidentavtal med Sovjet," *Arbetet*, 28 September, 1990.)

<sup>39</sup> Sten Andersson, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 2 February, 1989; see elaboration on Swedish attempts in 1989. See UN Documents A/CN.0/121 and A/CN.10/129, quoted in Prawitz (1990a); A. Steinvall, "Svenskt nej till Sovjetavtal," *Dagens Nyheter*, 27 September, 1990

<sup>40</sup> T. Hinnemo, "Klar signal till Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 27 September, 1990.

<sup>41</sup> S40.

<sup>42</sup> S32.



violations...it's a sound reticence."<sup>43</sup> Norway, as we will examine in a subsequent section, with the presence of its NATO backbone, took a positive decision to sign a bilateral treaty near in content to the one proposed to Sweden.

*U-137: To believe or not believe the Soviet explanation*

The Soviets have repeatedly, and in varying forms, maintained that the U-137 incident was an accident-- a result of navigational error. But key Swedish leaders have shown little signs of re-evaluating their beliefs that the Soviet submarine intentionally entered the Karlskrona archipelago. Whereas this belief in and of itself could be defended on several objective grounds, one of the chief reasons why Swedish élites have continued not to believe their Soviet counterparts is because they do not see this incident as an isolated event.<sup>44</sup> Rather, they see it as a recurrent phenomenon which fits into the greater picture of Soviet foreign policy behaviour.

Irrespective of who lies behind the continuing incursions, the Soviet Union has been forced to pay the price tag for every reported incursion. One might even say that NATO submarines could quietly probe the Swedish archipelago, and if they were detected--but not identified, they knew the Soviet Union would be perceived as the culpable party.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> S5.

<sup>44</sup> Fälldin, who was Prime Minister during 1981, said "the whole submarine affair was so incredibly embarrassing for the Soviet Union that it would clearly be in the military service's interest to try and demonstrate that this was an isolated misfortune." ("Släpp hemligstämpeln," *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 February, 1991.

<sup>45</sup> Commander Karl Andersson supports this particular point of view. (C. Svahn, "Kommendören tror på en svår omvärdering," *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 February, 1991)

The Soviet efforts to convince Sweden of its innocence (that is, above and beyond navigational negligence) have received cold receptions in Sweden.<sup>46</sup> With a barrage of Soviet-authored articles on the Debate pages of *Dagens Nyheter* have come various forms of revelations relating to the 1981 incident. Today one could reasonably conclude that the Soviet Union has made as much information public about the incident as it ever intends to do. The traditional Soviet argument of mis-navigation was forwarded by Vasiliy Besedin, then-Political Officer on U-137.<sup>47</sup> The effort reached its crescendo with the publication of a previously unreleased report, authored by a Soviet commission set to examine the events surrounding the U-137 incident which seemed to provide objective evidence that confirmed the navigational error theory.<sup>48</sup>

The Swedish reaction to these public revelations is representative of the arguments which have appeared since 1981 regarding whether or not to believe the Soviet explanation. On the one hand, Karl Andersson who was, at the time of the incident, Chief of Staff for Karlskrona Naval Base (and who also led the interrogations with the crew), has reached the conclusion that the newly-published report is truthful.<sup>49</sup> However, Andersson points out that "too much prestige and too many public statements from the Swedish side regarding Soviet espionage will make it difficult for the Government and the Defence establishment to change their view."<sup>50</sup> Sweden's commitment to the Soviet

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<sup>46</sup> A good example: B. Ståhl, head of the Swedish Marine Staff's nautical section, "Osannolik felnavigering," *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 March, 1991.

<sup>47</sup> What is of interest in what Besedin writes is that if the Swedes made any attempt to capture the boat, Soviet warships, waiting off the coast, had orders to intervene. ("Vi navigerade fel," *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 November, 1990).

<sup>48</sup> V. Verbitsky, "Dags sätta punkt i fallet U 137," *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 February, 1991.

<sup>49</sup> C. Svahn, "Kommendören tror på svår omvärdering," *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 February, 1991; K. Andersson, "Kan bli en arbetsam omprövning," *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 February, 1991.

<sup>50</sup> "Kan bli en arbetsam omprövning."

incursion theory made a thorough revision, short of the presentation of irrefutable evidence, unthinkable. Sweden's neutrality had been wounded and it would take something dramatically positive to make the élites change their minds.

Former Marine Chief Bengt Schuback presents a more sceptical view: "the (Soviet) explanation sounds totally incredible for a professional...that's not the way things happen...it seems likely that the Soviets no longer dare to provide an explanation other than that of navigational error."<sup>51</sup> Another sceptic is Commander Emil Svensson, who has analyzed the report about the grounding: "U 137 navigated to the scene and the crew knew very well where the submarine was located."<sup>52</sup> In response to a Soviet claim that a new policy had been instituted prohibiting Soviet submarines not to go nearer than 50-70 kilometres from a foreign state's coastline,<sup>53</sup> one of the submarine-debate leaders, von Hofsten, writes, "We know that foreign submarines are carrying out large-scale operations deep in our territorial waters--and have been doing so with great frequency and for a long time." "Aside from that," continues von Hofsten, responding to a Soviet colleague, "we are convinced that they are your submarines...Even during these days the bear doesn't stay on his side of the bed."<sup>54</sup> In a somewhat later article<sup>55</sup> von Hofsten asks: "How do you expect me to have confidence in a country which energetically, routinely and even in the face of repeated, powerful diplomatic protests (feels it necessary) to have its attack units train all the way in our harbours?"

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<sup>51</sup> "Kan bli en arbetsam omprövning."

<sup>52</sup> "Kan bli arbetsam omprövning."

<sup>53</sup> V. Myashnikov, "Ryska flottan är numera defensiv," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 20 January, 1989.

<sup>54</sup> "Talar björnen sanning," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2 February, 1989.

<sup>55</sup> "Varför, Valerij, varför," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 23 March, 1989.

### **Norwegian security-related boundary issues with the Soviets**

Norway has also been faced with boundary violations, but to some extent the leadership has responded differently. It can be said that the Norwegians have viewed boundary violations less menacingly than the Swedes. Norway's NATO membership is a powerful explanatory factor for this. In NATO the competitive behaviour of the superpowers is a given--thus when one superpower infringes on the other's rights it is seen as part and parcel of what superpowers do to each other. It is not a question of identifying the violator--or assessing its motives--both of these are givens. Neither are violations as serious for a nation which has the armed backing of its allies. The measure of its security is not whether, on isolated opportunities, another state violates its boundary--but rather that a collective force of nations will respond if a threat materializes. Thus, there has been no reason for the Norwegians to call on international norms or a greater international public to the same extent as the Swedes in order to attract attention to an issue which it sees as minor in the wider perspective of its relations with the Soviet Union.

#### *The Soviet submarine violation issue in Norway: Insignificant or Absent?*

The whole issue of incursions in territorial waters in Norway has not assumed nearly the same significance nor generated the amount of heat as has the issue of submarine incursions in Sweden. In fact both Norwegians and Finns judge the many submarine hunts in Sweden as somewhat senseless; not as much because they feel that the Swedes are searching for objects that don't exist as much as that the Swedes do not accept incursions as a fact-of-life with which all states must bear. One Norwegian military official summed up Norway's experience with violating submarines well, saying:

"I think we could go in and count ...concluding that 96% of the reports are not for submarines at all. NATO guidelines are very strict on this matter. There is a strict

categorization scheme: where one has 'confirmed' and 'possible' subs. We have seen many incidents where rotating fishing buoys are often reported as 'possible' submarines. We don't want to reject the possible presence of third-nation submarines (non-WTO or NATO) either. In sum, we don't reject that we have 'visits'--but they are few and there do not exist any confirmed reports. For the political establishment they are significant while they are insignificant for the military."<sup>56</sup>

From this quote, it is interesting to contrast Sweden's position where the reputation of the military's interest is seen to be high, while the political establishment has seen to be low. One can also see the contrast in standards--whereas NATO has common, established policies regarding identification of submarines, Sweden's policy, only in the past ten years has undergone at least two instances of tightening.

Then-Labour Party Leader, Brundtland, in an interview<sup>57</sup>, was asked about the importance of the Swedish submarine incidents. She pointed out two significant details:

1. "the Swedish submarine incidents have clearly affected (us) indirectly, giving us the impression that a superpower is trying to force itself in an unacceptable manner on the Nordic area.
2. the Norwegian incidents are supplementary to the Swedish incidents, which are the most serious. Soviet submarines have not able to be identified in Norway in as (clear) terms as in Sweden."

One should not totally discount that the Soviet submarines have intentionally performed different missions vis-à-vis Sweden than Norway to explain the lack of Norwegian preoccupation with the submarine issue. An important difference between the Baltic and the Northern Fleets is the absolute dependence which

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<sup>56</sup> N34

<sup>57</sup> "Aktiv norsk regering tar kontakt för handlingsplan," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 8 December, 1984.

the Soviet Union places upon the Northern Fleet's nuclear missile-bearing submarines in time of war--the strategic perspective. One may rightly argue that the Baltic Fleet's submarines have been much more interested in intelligence gathering in the Soviet "backyard." Another factor may be a simple, inexplicable difference in Soviet behaviour between the two Fleets. Or it may be as one Swedish military figure proposed, a simple result of the "better behaviour of Soviet submarines in the Norwegian Sea."<sup>58</sup>

#### *Other boundary violations*

In the recent past (1983-) there have been two incidents which have left their mark on Norway. These two incidents were of no outstanding military importance. Rather they were symbolic--telling of the tense security-policy climate that exists in the area, and especially what sort of security interest the area attracts. These events are also results of varying interpretations of national interests and objective boundaries--not to say the utter absence of rules of conduct in the area.

One incident involved an accidental firing of a Soviet missile which on New Year's 1984/5 flew over Norwegian airspace, landing in a Finnish lake. The second incident involved a Soviet frigate which cut the cable from a Norwegian seismic vessel operating "well inside the Norwegian mainland zone." (Sollie, 1988:40) Following an official Soviet apology, the Norwegian Government chose to disregard misdoing in the affair, stating that the ship operated on the 'safe side of a margin of error.'<sup>59</sup> It might be said that most élites would share one Norwegian military official's conclusion that the cable incident was a "mid-management decision, rather than any continuing trend..."<sup>60</sup> It would be

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<sup>58</sup> S41

<sup>59</sup> See also related articles: "Akseptabel unnskyldning," *Aftenposten*, July 20, 1985; "Krenkelse," *Verdens Gang*, 12 July, 1985; G. A. Johansen, "Splittet i kabel-affæren," *Arbeiderbladet*, 16 July, 1985.

<sup>60</sup> N34

reasonable to propose that one major difference between the Norwegian and Swedish border incidents is that the Swedes see the repetitive, intentional nature of such, while the Norwegians, in great part, explain such behaviour as erratic and/or accidental.

The picture of non-maritime border violations painted by Norwegian élites strengthens this argument, as the Norwegians more often portray themselves as being the *violators* rather than the *violated*. The Swedes do not paint such pictures--at least not publicly. Sweden has never publicly admitted to violating another nation's air or sea space.<sup>61</sup> Next to maritime violations, land-based violations must be seen as the most serious. Being that Norway has a land boundary with the Soviets, border incursions are nonetheless a fact of life with which Sweden will never have to come to terms. In 1987 the Norwegian Frontier Commissioner, Colonel I. Torhaug, reported that there had been 25 border violations, of which one-third could be regarded as being of "a serious nature."<sup>62</sup> A well-placed military figure characterized the Soviet behaviour as being generally "very careful...except in 1968 when two (Soviet) divisions crossed the Norwegian border." He continued "it is actually remarkable how little of this we have seen."<sup>63</sup>

It is interesting to note the tone of cross-border relations between the Norwegians and the Soviets in the far North. When asked if there was any

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<sup>61</sup> Here the Catalina Affair is an interesting case-in-point. The Swedes have, to date, maintained that the DC-3 was shot down over international waters, while Soviet officials have held that the aircraft was over Soviet airspace at the time.

<sup>62</sup> O.S. Storvik, "Krenkelser utfordrer Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 13 October, 1987. Torhaug says that "the Soviets see this sort of occurrence as very serious indeed," further recommending Norwegians to "put themselves more into Russians' thinking...they see it as a violation of the 'motherland' in a way which Norwegians don't."

<sup>63</sup> N7

degree of decreased readiness as a result of the "North Norway feeling,"<sup>64</sup> one military figure with direct experience in the area responded "not very much... although it is important to understand that this ("North Norway feeling") is a good basis for communicating with the Russians--for, if we can really understand what World War Two meant to the Soviet Union, we can use this (knowledge) in an efficient way to establish good forms of dialogue (e.g. give appreciation for what the Soviets did at the time.)"<sup>65</sup> Above and beyond the usual mishaps<sup>66</sup>, there seems to be a general perception of Soviet border violations being few and far in between.

Even in the air, officials pointed to Norway as being more frequently culpable than the Soviet Union. One senior military official said "it's much more proper to talk about the Norwegian violations of Soviet airspace or territory than the reverse...we are far more to blame than they are--we infringe on their borders more than they."<sup>67</sup> From time to time this judgement is also uttered publicly.<sup>68</sup> In the airspace over both Norway and Sweden, there seems to be a shared perception that the Soviets follow their borders, to such an extent that incursions can usually be classified as navigational errors.<sup>69</sup> The Swedes

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<sup>64</sup> A reference to the positive feeling towards the Soviet Union in the North of Norway (Trøms, Finnmark etc.), as a consequence of the Soviet liberation of that area from German occupation during World War Two.

<sup>65</sup> N35

<sup>66</sup> Example: there was an apparent border crossing by Soviet border guards, where they shot at a Norwegian fisherman, in July, 1990. See M. Danbolt, "Norsk-Sovjetisk grensebefaring," *Aftenposten*, 13 July, 1990; M. Rød, "Uenige om grensekrenkelse," *Aftenposten*, 9 July, 1990.

<sup>67</sup> N10

<sup>68</sup> O.S. Storvik, "Norge krenket Sovjet-farvann, hevder militære," *Aftenposten*, 17 March, 1989: the Norwegian intelligence-gathering vessel, "Marjata" was said to have crossed into Soviet territorial waters.

<sup>69</sup> "On the subject of air incursions," said one Norwegian military official, "we are speaking of 2 over the past 20 to 30 years. In those cases, it would be fair to conclude that the cause was navigational error." (N10)



are willing to admit to more frequent air incursions by the Soviet Union, which were, according to one official, approximately one a year, which was "not that many."<sup>70</sup> The most publicized overflight by a Soviet aircraft took place over the island of Gotland in 1984.<sup>71</sup> In a later incident, when a Soviet aircraft went down in international waters off Gotland on 7 January, 1991, one official felt that "everything went well...the Soviets were relaxed about it"--attributing the success to the new international climate.<sup>72</sup>

#### *The Norwegian-Soviet Incidents-at-Sea Treaty (1990)*

Something very important happened between Norway and the Soviet Union in the Fall of 1990, but which was hardly even recognized in the press.<sup>73</sup> The event is interesting for it reveals a significant difference that Norway's alignment makes in its behaviour towards the USSR. On 1 October, 1990 the Norwegians and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral, so-called "Incidents-at-Sea Treaty" with the Soviet Union. The treaty was an attempt to prevent episodes at sea and in the air outside of territorial waters.<sup>74</sup> The agreement comprises the relationship between military ships and planes outside of territorial waters, as well as to civilian ships and planes. The agreement further sets down rules of behaviour and communication between the partners.

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<sup>70</sup> S41, who added that the Soviet fliers average about as many air hours as they always have. With respect to the Soviet Air Force's exercise pattern, "They are still flying out of Germany and Poland, but even there we now may be seeing a weaker tendency to exercise from these spots."

<sup>71</sup> Åström, "Misstag eller nonchalans är ingen ursäkt," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 17 September, 1984 for background.

<sup>72</sup> S41

<sup>73</sup> For the *Storting* debate on the background of the first nuclear accident see *Forhandlingar i Stortinget* 12 April, 1989.

<sup>74</sup> *Aftenposten*, "Sovjet-avtale undertegnet igår," 2 October, 1990.

The most proximate cause of discussion leading up to the treaty was a series of Soviet nuclear submarine accidents<sup>75</sup> which perked the ears of Norwegian public officials and citizens alike.<sup>76</sup> Since 1977 there had been an average of one such submarine incident per year. In total there were fourteen such incidents outside of the territorial sea which have been made public.<sup>77</sup> Two of those incidents took place in 1989 outside of Norwegian coastal waters. One of the key failures in connection with the incidents was the lack of communication or tardiness in Soviet notification of the proper Norwegian officials.

*Who made the proposal, and why?*

It is difficult to specify who originally proposed the treaty, though the most reliable information reveals that it was in fact a *Soviet* proposal, to which the Norwegians were first in presenting a draft, in all likelihood in the Summer of 1989.<sup>78</sup> One of the first mentions the Foreign Minister made of the matter was in January, 1989, before any of the incidents occurred.<sup>79</sup> Nonetheless, a high

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<sup>75</sup> These accidents were caused by one, a reactor fault (M. Fyhn, "Reaktorfeil på ubåten," *Aftenposten*, 18 July, 1989) and two, by a fire on-board (T. Hay, "Forsvarets ubåtsrapport avviser utslippfare," *Aftenposten*, 19 April, 1989).

<sup>76</sup> The amount of reactivity in the submarine was about 40% that of that released by Chernobyl--a mere 250 SSW of Bear Island. (the April 7 incident). (Barnaby, 1989:296-7)

<sup>77</sup> 28 August, 1977(in the Pacific); 19 August, 1978 (Northwest of Scotland); 21 August, 1980 (East of Okinawa); September, 1981(Baltic Sea); June, 1983(at Kamchatka Peninsula); September, 1983(Northern Pacific); 31 October, 1983(East Coast of U.S.); 21 March, 1984(Japan Sea); 20 September, 1984 (Japan Sea); 21 September, 1984 (Gibraltar); 13 January, 1986(Northwest of Okinawa); 3 October, 1986(East of Bermuda); 7 April, 1989 (North Sea); 26 June, 1989(North Sea). (O.T. Storvik, "...-Alarmen går i Moskva," *Aftenposten*, 1 July, 1989.)

<sup>78</sup> One MFA official proximate to the different texts (N28).

<sup>79</sup> Stoltenberg's foreign policy declaration, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 13 January, 1989: "The Government has placed considerable weight on trying to establish the worth of confidence-building measures which can contribute to (continued...)

Foreign Ministry official stated that it in fact was a *Norwegian* proposal.<sup>80</sup> One could also argue that the string of similar treaties signed between the USSR on the one hand and the US (1972), the UK (1986) and the FRG on the other were concrete Soviet steps towards normalisation of maritime relations with the West.<sup>81</sup> Formal negotiations got underway on 12 December that very year.<sup>82</sup>

According to one Norwegian Foreign Ministry official, the background of the agreement included a "Soviet (affinity) for bilateral agreements."<sup>83</sup> As had become commonplace in negotiations with the Soviet Union, all suspicions of a Soviet attempt at gaining a *droit de regard* had to be resolved so that consensus could be reached.<sup>84</sup> According to several sources, none of whom could be attributed, the Soviets had first proposed texts which in varying degrees gave them, as perceived by the Norwegians, a foothold in Norwegian domestic and foreign policy-making.

#### *The Character of the Proposal*

There were items in the early Soviet drafts which immediately put Norwegian officials on the defensive. "The Soviet Union especially wanted to

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<sup>79</sup>(...continued)

prevent episodes-at-sea...among those measures being considered are so-called 'Incidents at Sea' treaties...the Government intends to start work towards a treaty to prevent such episodes both at sea and in the air over sea areas."

<sup>80</sup> N24

<sup>81</sup> Oldberg (1990) supports the conclusion that there was a Soviet naval revision of thought over maritime conduct in this area.

<sup>82</sup> "Norge og Sovjet vil forhindre sjø-episoder," *Aftenposten*, 13 December, 1989.

<sup>83</sup> N30

<sup>84</sup> N30

include points on military actions, said one MFA official."<sup>85</sup> According to one high Foreign Ministry official, "we could not have any military provisions (in the text) which could in any way limit the use of these waters beyond either the practical needs nor beyond the proposed agreement."<sup>86</sup> These clauses were eliminated from the final draft. A separate examination of those sentences or phrases that *did not* appear in the final draft, would surely reveal more details of the present Soviet security policy interests in the area.

### *The Norwegian Leadership's Perception of Opportunity and Necessity*

It was the coalescence of, on the one hand Norwegian élites' perceptions of an opportunity to better define their Soviet relationship and on the other hand, the same leadership's perception of the necessity of having a treaty which would formalize procedures in the event of future sea emergencies which led the Norwegians to favour a Sea Incidents treaty.

The Agreement was an outgrowth of a number of yet smaller factors. First, the Agreement was the logical attempt at resolving a military reality: of the amount of submarine traffic through the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) Gap, as well as the overall increased strategic importance of the aquatic areas off of the Norwegian coast for both the U.S. and the Soviets<sup>87</sup>. This in turn may have led to the realisation that the strategic importance of the Soviet submarine fleet would in any case not decrease in the proximate time span. Furthermore, a re-invigorated climate of discussion with Moscow opened

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<sup>85</sup> N28. Two examples: the opportunity to close parts of the Barents Sea during military manoeuvres: discussion of possibility of agreement on dangerous military behaviour (with a basis in the Soviet-American agreement).

<sup>86</sup> N24

<sup>87</sup> This particular submarine was said to have been returning (in all likelihood to Kola) from a routine patrol in the Mediterranean. ("Argusøyne på Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 1 July, 1989)

new doors of opportunity. Finally, the Norwegians saw the matter as very much in their own political (for some political party-related) interest.

In all likelihood the Norwegians had such an agreement in the back of their minds at least since the occurrence of the first accident in April, 1989.<sup>88</sup> The attainment of such an agreement became more credible through the Gorbachëv years, given that the Soviets had been significantly more forthcoming in exchanges of information, monitoring<sup>89</sup> and verification--central aspects of any future treaty.

While Soviet Oslo ambassador, Teterin, characterised the second incident as "sad,"<sup>90</sup> the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Stoltenberg was saying that "it is obviously unacceptable that a superpower does not brief the Norwegian officials in such a situation."<sup>91</sup> The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Janis Bjørn Kenavin, said "The Russians should have understood that the occurrence would become known in Norway and would cause (negative) reactions--not least because of the two serious accidents only a short time ago."<sup>92</sup> One senior diplomat argued that "you must also see the event against the background of the Soviet nuclear detonations on Novaya Zemlya--there was a growing threat, which also combined nuclear environmental waste attached to the strategic weapons systems deployed on our doorstep...for that reason we proposed them a treaty in December of 1989 in New York."<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> *Aftenposten*, while not revealing the source, points out that a draft of an agreement to prevent these sort of incidents is already in the works. (18 July, 1989).

<sup>89</sup> With respect to the Nickel project, which we will discuss in more detail later on, Norwegian decision-makers perceived "major changes in what sort of on-site monitoring of environmental data the Soviets would accept." (N44)

<sup>90</sup> "Det gode naboskap," *Aftenposten*, 18 July, 1989.

<sup>91</sup> "Det gode naboskap," *Aftenposten*, 18 July, 1989.

<sup>92</sup> M. Fyhn, "Reaktorfeil på ubåten," *Aftenposten*, 19 July, 1989.

<sup>93</sup> N1

### *The Importance of Precedent*

These perceptions of necessity and opportunity however likely would have fallen on infertile ground if the Norwegians felt they were circumventing the NATO framework in order to gain a solely bilateral advantage. Thus, the fact that various other NATO countries had signed similar treaties with the Soviet Union provided important background to the Norwegian decision to proceed in pursuing such an agreement. The first of these agreements was the "USA-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas" signed in 1972. It is widely regarded as a success, having reduced the frequency and severity of superpower naval incidents while building greater trust and confidence at sea (Lynn-Jones, 1990:203). This Agreement provided a model for similar bilateral agreements in 1986 between the USSR and UK<sup>94</sup> and in 1988 between the FRG and the USSR. The 1972 Agreement sought to limit the number and dangers of naval incidents through regulation of dangerous manoeuvres, restriction of other forms of harassment, increased communication at sea and finally convening regular naval consultations and exchanges of information (Lynn-Jones, 1990:205). The Norwegian-Soviet treaty<sup>95</sup>, is, both in terms of spirit and the letter, identical to these other agreements.

Had this precedent been absent, it is unlikely that the Norwegians would have accepted the wording and the spirit of such a "bilateral" treaty. As one FM official recounted, "we tried to have an agreement very similar to the other (UK, USA, FRG) because we wanted to avoid--in our contacts with the Soviet Union--to have too much bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union on security in the

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<sup>94</sup> This treaty differs from the US-USSR in that it includes non-military vessels and refers to 'beyond the territorial sea' instead of 'high seas', reflecting the fact that the 1982 UNCLOS establishes other categories such as the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, which is neither territorial waters or high seas. (Lynn-Jones, 1990:214-5)

<sup>95</sup> "Avtale mellom Kongeriket Norges Regjering og Regjeringen i Unionen av Sovjetiske Socialistiske Republikker om forhindring av episoder till sjøs utenfor territorialfarvannet," 1 October, 1990. (courtesy MFA, Oslo)

North." "If we have problems with the agreement," he added, "we will know that since there are similar NATO agreements we will have this support."<sup>96</sup>

According to Norway's present Stockholm ambassador<sup>97</sup> the logic was such:

"The Soviet Union wanted something more comprehensive, something tied to confidence building measures. There was precedent in the form of the United Kingdom-Soviet Union treaty and other similar treaties--as such we had a pattern on which we could base our decision. It was a good idea which served a useful purpose. In the first case we could hope to avoid incidents which were uncomfortable for us, and in the second case it opened contact in a new area."

One individual close to the matter recounted some important details of this changed Norwegian approach:

"Although we consulted both the U.S. and U.K. on this matter--we had always considered that, *for us*, it was less appropriate. We could only have a discussion of this issue by weaving it into a wider multilateral framework."<sup>98</sup>

The Soviet Union later took the Norwegian-Soviet agreement and held it up to the Swedes--in an attempt to use precedent to solicit Swedish acceptance of a similar agreement.<sup>99</sup> This effort failed.

A changed international climate and changes within the Soviet Union in particular brought about a change in the Labour Party's approach and estimation of what was possible under the conditions. As one official explained:

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<sup>96</sup> N55

<sup>97</sup> Olav Bücher-Johannessen, long time Moscow ambassador and diplomat. Ambassador Bücher-Johannessen agreed to be cited under the condition that any quote which was used in the thesis had to be regarded as his "personal views."

<sup>98</sup> N26

<sup>99</sup> V. Myashnikov, "Avtal med Sovjet ökar säkerheten," *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, 25 September, 1990,

"During early 1989 there was a shift from the emphasis on a multilateral framework in the speeches of both (Moscow Ambassador) Dagfinn Stenseth and Johan Jørgen Holst. The Government, and especially (Foreign Minister) Stoltenberg pronounced that the climate changed and now we have to start looking at these things more flexibly. Stoltenberg's personal change played the main role in this change of direction. Before we had done things with the Soviet Union according to certain firm, particular principles."

The same official stated that Stoltenberg's reasoning incorporated two central considerations. First, the political climate had been changed ("we'd moved into a new atmosphere") and additionally, the fact that the treaty was purely *technical* in character--no political pressure could be applied. "If there would have been a political consultation clause, things would have turned out differently," mentioned this official.<sup>100</sup>

Seen from the domestic Norwegian political standpoint, the treaty was also well-timed. One interviewee expressed a "need for an agreement as big as this."<sup>101</sup> Another Foreign Ministry official related that "Norway needed the treaty for political reasons," continuing that "some politicians felt that we needed such a treaty in order to be able to say to some segments of public opinion that we had achieved something in naval disarmament."<sup>102</sup> One Norwegian contrasted Sweden's position saying, "Sweden is free to say that she favours naval disarmament--and has been very active in pursuing it."<sup>103</sup> One

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<sup>100</sup> "Avtal med Sovjet ökar säkerheten."

<sup>101</sup> N24. One could draw the conclusion that Norway needed an agreement with the Soviet Union based on the significant frustration she has suffered over the Barents dividing line issue.

<sup>102</sup> N23.

<sup>103</sup> One can read here that although certain segments of Norwegian opinion have favoured naval measures that NATO--and especially the U.S. reticence to enter into naval arms control, has placed limits on how far Norway could go in advocating the same. "As a practical-technical agreement," he continued, "it was an easy way out of a tricky question." (N23)



military figure hinted that "maybe (the treaty) was more for political than 'real' reasons."<sup>104</sup>

*One Aspect of the Agreement's Significance: An Exceptional Shift from Multilateral to Bilateral Diplomacy*

The signing of the Soviet-Norwegian Incidents-at-Sea Treaty marked an aberration from the traditional Norwegian disdain of entering into bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union in the security policy realm. At the same time, the agreement symbolized a concrete step towards resolution of an extremely dangerous problem-area.<sup>105</sup> While the treaty was in-and-of-itself an objectively interesting move, the perceptual and behavioural shift from multi- to bilateral diplomacy is of paramount interest for this project. It is clear that Norway's NATO membership made this exception possible.

The background has several dimensions. One of the basic tenets of Norwegian Soviet policy has been to avoid Soviet attempts to regionalize or isolate their bilateral relationship--such that the superpower counterpart could gain what they perceived as being undue advantage. Historically the Norwegians have dismissed Soviet efforts to negotiate the jurisdictional issue on Svalbard, have avoided Soviet attempts to solve the dividing line in the Barents Sea by anything less than a clear division. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has proposed "zones of confidence," "joint condominium" among other concepts. The Norwegians have also resisted Soviet attempts to regionalize such issues as arms control, with the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal as case-in-point.

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<sup>104</sup> N34. "Our experience with the Soviets was that when we checked their ships they were indeed following international law," he said. "In fact, they probably obey the rules of the sea as well as anyone else...even if the Russians had not signed the Agreement they would have reported (such an incident) today," he continued. He concluded "But for political reasons, and because of the unease in the Norwegian population we needed a treaty."

<sup>105</sup> TT, "Ubåt orsak till massdöd," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 7 March, 1991.

Neutral Sweden refused a Soviet incident treaty and Norway accepted. In principle the Norwegians would have also objected to both the text, intention and spirit of such an incident's treaty with the Soviet Union--and, what is more, for many (if not all) of the same reasons as Sweden. However, officials confirmed that the NATO backbone gave Norway a different manoeuvrability in the issue which Sweden could and would not enjoy. One Swedish official said simply, the Norwegians had the confidence of being under the NATO umbrella.<sup>106</sup> One Norwegian arms control specialist added, "seeing things within the NATO context, we could afford to be more magnanimous."<sup>107</sup>

## **Port Calls: To Declare or not to Declare?**

### *Introduction*

A close examination of the issue of port calls by potentially nuclear weapons-bearing ships reveals critical junctures where neutrality and alignment impact upon the way Swedish and Norwegian leaders perceive and behave towards the Soviet Union. Norway has not regarded such visits as "violations" in the same way as Sweden has.

Sweden's core principle of territorial inviolability is key to understanding why the Swedes have been so adamant in demanding guarantees from visiting vessels that they do not carry nuclear weapons. For Sweden, it is not as important to prove that a ship is carrying nuclear weapons--for obtaining this information would entail violating international law and praxis. What is important is that the visiting state makes a declaration, which coincides with Swedish principles. By "following" this practice, and demanding guarantees "on

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<sup>106</sup> S4.

<sup>107</sup> N30

paper" Sweden appears to be simultaneously maintaining impartiality<sup>108</sup> and enforcing an important pillar of its foreign policy. In Sweden there presently exist two options: "to trust the visitor or refuse the visit."<sup>109</sup> The Swedish Social Democrats have made an anti-nuclear port call regime a central theme of their foreign policy. This policy has, in theory, gained political points with a deeply anti-nuclear sentiment, while simultaneously acting to strengthen Sweden's neutral policy.

Norway has a far less formal policy. While a policy has been laid down, it has not been followed. The key point is that Norway is unwilling to surrender its "Atlantic lifeline" for what some quarters feel is ideologically and morally desirable. Another central Norwegian dilemma is to what extent it can apply rules to selected areas of its foreign policy, such as the visits of nuclear ships, without being interpreted within the alliance as being an disloyal member. How many restrictions can Norway impose without being considered a bad member of the club? Membership carries with it responsibilities. Norway, as an ally of the U.S., has never felt it proper to go against its ally in this very sensitive area. Only certain sections of the left-flank of the Norwegian Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party have been vocally opposed to port calls--both as political issues in and of themselves, and as an attempt to please the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Norway.

The port call issue is of much greater importance for the U.S. and NATO than for the Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. has a need to demonstrate its presence in Northern Waters. The Soviet Union, by geographical default, is a permanent fixture of that same environment. The port call issue does not directly concern the Soviet Union to any great degree on a

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<sup>108</sup> Foreign Minister Bodström stated "the Government regards naval visits as a question between the host country and the visiting nation...we don't want to have the issue of naval visits be regarded as a matter between Sweden and one or another military pact." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1985).

<sup>109</sup> Prawitz (1990b:15)

day-to-day basis. The only real impact can be found in the spin-off effect that these countries' port visitation policies have on wide-scale Soviet military planning. This is illustrated in the number of U.S.-NATO port calls--which far outnumber Soviet-WTO force visits.<sup>110</sup> In fact there have been no Soviet naval visits to Sweden since the Karlskrona incident of 1983.<sup>111</sup>

### *The Superpower Port Call Policies*

Unlike the U.S. policy of "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons on board its ships, the Soviet policy towards port visits has been ambiguous from the start. But presently Soviet "policy" seems to be in a state of clarification and transition. Reportedly, the Soviets had a policy of NiCNod (Neither Confirm Nor Deny) policies until at least the mid-1980's. The litmus test of this Soviet policy occurred in two instances: once when a stranded Soviet submarine was towed through Japanese territorial waters in August of 1980. As a response to a Governmental request, and once the submarine had cleared Japanese territorial waters, the Soviet Union declared that they had no nuclear weapons on-board (Prawitz, 1990b:4). In the case of the Karlskrona incident, the Soviets responded that "the Soviet submarine U-137 carries, as do all other naval vessels at sea, the necessary weapons and ammunition."<sup>112</sup>

In more recent years, the Soviet position has become somewhat clearer. Commenting on the extraordinary general election in Denmark in 1988, Soviet General Batenin stated that Soviet ships generally respect nuclear weapon-free

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<sup>110</sup> Since 1980, 239 naval visits have taken place in Sweden. Of those only two of them have been from the Warsaw Pact--one from East Germany, 1988, and one from Poland, 1989, while 209 have been from NATO countries. Of NATO vessels, 8.5%, on the average, are said to "in all likelihood" carry nuclear weapons. (Öberg, 1989:546). A conflicting account is found in J. Prawitz, O. Tunander, O. Wæver, P. Joenniemi, S. Lodgaard (1990).

<sup>111</sup> Measurements of U-137's hull for radiation indicated the probable presence of nuclear weapons on board. (Prawitz, 1990a:13)

<sup>112</sup> Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1981. (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), p. 81-101; O. Sundström, FOA-Tidningen, (December, 1981).

zones and the policies of the host countries: "When Soviet ships call on foreign ports, e.g. in Mexico, Ireland or Greece, their captains declare, on request, that the ships have no nuclear weapons on board."<sup>113</sup> Finally, in June 1988, Edward Shevardnadze stated before the United Nations Assembly that "on the basis of reciprocity with the United States and other nuclear powers, the USSR is prepared to announce the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board its naval vessels calling at foreign ports."<sup>114</sup> Other statements even hint at a change in the direction of abandoning Soviet NiCNoD policies.<sup>115</sup> According to Jan Prawitz at the Swedish Defence Ministry, "it seems that the Soviet policy has become one of denunciation instead of non-disclosure." (Prawitz et al, 1990:340)

#### *Port Calls To Sweden*

One of the reasons that there have been no naval visits to Sweden from the Soviet Union since the early 1980's is because of an informal ban on such visits due to the submarine issue. Another possible reason is the respect that the Soviet Union holds for Sweden and Norway's non-nuclear policies. A third reason could be that the Soviet Union has never felt port calls to be important because it already occupies a central strategic location in the North.

The thinking which underlies the Swedish policy on port calls is similar to New Zealand's decision in 1985<sup>116</sup> which makes a comprehensive ban on

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<sup>113</sup> G. Batenin, 20 April, 1988 as quoted in Prawitz et al (1990:340).

<sup>114</sup> UN Document A/S15/PV.12 as quoted in Prawitz et al. (1990:340).

<sup>115</sup> "There will be no nuclear weapons aboard the ships going to Norfolk; it is not the policy of the Soviet Union to bring nuclear weapons into another country," a senior Soviet official said. Feinstein (1989:32) as quoted in Prawitz et al (1990:340).

<sup>116</sup> Maj Britt Theorin (Social Democrat), *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 7 December, 1988: "it is clear that the difference between Sweden and New Zealand is not terribly large."

nuclear-carrying or powered vessels.<sup>117</sup> However, in Sweden, the principle of no naval nuclear visits has never been translated into law. Prior to 1983 the issue was not considered a problem, (Prawitz, 1990b:17) only entering the parliamentary agenda in 1987. One law, called the "law about nuclear-technical activity," seems to touch the periphery of the issue, but is of doubtful application in this problem-area.<sup>118</sup> "Instead," argues Öberg, "the nuclear weapon ban is based upon an express *political* desire to keep nuclear weapons away from Swedish territory." (Öberg, 1989:550) This desire is then anchored in international law through the right which each sovereign state possesses to, on its own terms, decide over the utilization of its territory.

When a warship informs Sweden that it has the intention of visiting, the permission which Sweden extends bears the reminder:

"there is a general prohibition against foreign naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons when visiting Sweden...the Swedish Government assumes that this prohibition will be strictly observed..."

The Swedish Government has found solace in its oft-repeated phrase that "We have no reason to believe that this particular policy has ever been abrogated."<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Thakur (1987:16). New Zealand's move entailed: a prohibition of visits by nuclear-powered ships of any country; prohibition of visits by nuclear-armed ships of any country; permits visits by ships which are neither nuclear-propelled nor nuclear-armed; permits visits by conventionally-powered ships which are capable of carrying nuclear arms, but are known not to be doing so.

<sup>118</sup> Öberg (1989:550). Öberg argues that the grounds for this are: the law is not intended for this purpose and second, the law requires permission-- not a ban. The law is contained in SFS 1984:3 Sect. 5 (12 January, 1984). According to the law the transfer of uranium and plutonium into Sweden requires permission by the Government. (Prawitz, 1990b:17)

<sup>119</sup> For example, Foreign Minister Andersson, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 24 October, 1985.

### *Port Calls to Norway*

Norwegian policy on port visits was formulated in 1957, on the occasion of an impending visit from the *USS Nimitz*. The risks were not considered worth the visit, which the Government accordingly cancelled (Thakur, 1987:19). However, a formal Government articulation of the policy would have to wait for the tenure of Labour Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli. In 1975 Bratteli, in cooperation with Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, formulated what has been called the "Bratteli doctrine," which would serve as a milestone for Norwegian port call policy:<sup>120</sup>

"Both our Allies and other nuclear powers are familiar with this policy. Our terms have been and are that nuclear weapons shall not be carried on board foreign military vessels during port calls in Norway. The Norwegian authorities presume both our Allies and other nuclear powers respect this policy."<sup>121</sup>

According to Bratteli, if foreign warships were to carry nuclear weapons into Norwegian harbours, this would not constitute any "legal deviation" from Norwegian nuclear policy (Prawitz et al, 1990:343).

Unlike the Swedish policy, the Norwegian is markedly less concerned about a strict administration of the Bratteli doctrine. The spirit and the principle of the Norwegian port call policy seems significantly less stringent than the Swedish. Norwegian letters of clearance, unlike Swedish letters, do not reiterate the established guidelines. Norwegians have felt that the publicity of its port call policy by diplomatic channels is unnecessary, simply assuming the policy

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<sup>120</sup> As one Progress Party politician, Hans Røsjorde, explained (the doctrine) was formulated because "Bratteli was forced to calm the leftists in the Labour Party—he was forced to have a peace agreement in his group." He continued "while he didn't expressly forward the 'do's and the don'ts' of his policy, he did believe that all allied forces knew the Norwegian policy towards nuclear weapons (on ships)."

<sup>121</sup> Thakur (1987:19) further points out that this does not imply that countries should abandon their own confirm or deny policies.

is known through international seminars, commentaries in the media and the like.(Prawitz et al., 1990:344) Contrasted to the Norwegians, the Swedes have a recurring need to demarcate the independent nature of its foreign policy decision-making. The Norwegians, by contrast, have to demarcate their attachment to alliance principles and de-emphasize desirable goals which may run counter alliance policy.

### *The Political Debate*

The Swedish Left Party and the Environmental Parties have been willing to go further than any of the other parties in demanding a more stringent enforcement of the Swedish port call policy.<sup>122</sup> The Swedish Communist Party has in past years gained much support from the Environmental Party in this striving, a political support which Norway lacks. Thus, formal opposition to the existing policies has been difficult to muster and maintain given the overwhelming majority of the political spectrum which is less vocal about the policy. The Social Democratic Party has also been an ardent supporter, however the question of port call policy enforcement has split the party. Even the Centre Party<sup>123</sup> and to a lesser extent the Liberal party<sup>124</sup> have also

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<sup>122</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*: for the Left Party see, MP Viola Claesson on 23 January, 1986 or Gudrun Schyman on 7 December, 1988. For the Environmental Party see Carl Frick or Elizabeth Franzén (29 May, 1989) or Per Gahrton (29 November, 1989).

<sup>123</sup> In a reservation to Foreign Affairs Committee position paper, "Om Nedrustning," *Riksdagstryck*, 1989/1990:UU6 (9 November, 1989) the Centre Party (Hambraeus and Söder) joins hands with the Environmental Party (Gahrton) and the Left Party (Hurtig) in stating: "...while waiting for international results, Sweden should not feel hindered in demanding notification that during naval visits Sweden's law is being respected--or in some other way assured that such happens."

<sup>124</sup> Ingela Mårtensson has been the most vocal. E.g. see motion in Foreign Relations Committee document "Nedrustning" *Riksdagstryck*, 1990/91:UU4 (18 October, 1990).



played an important role in the debate, at times demanding a tighter port call regime.

The debate has taken on another interesting dimension in both Norway<sup>125</sup> and Sweden<sup>126</sup>: the local authorities versus the national authorities over legal jurisdiction over the port call issue. Since in both countries the central government bears the formal responsibility for foreign policy, these moves have been interpreted as mere displays or outbursts of public opinion.

In Norway the issue has been much more contained politically. It would be fair to say that, as in Sweden, the Norwegian Socialist Left party has in fact led the crusade<sup>127</sup>, with only minimal support from the Labour Party over the issue. The Norwegian Socialist Left party has campaigned for a ban on nuclear visits, but this particular standpoint must be seen against the background of its advocacy of a total break with the common NATO nuclear strategy.<sup>128</sup>

#### *Guarantees and the Problems of Enforcement*<sup>129</sup>

Neutrality introduces certain complications into the enforcement process. The Swedish policy places a premium on the production of evidence before making a judgement. Swedish neutrality dictates that objective facts, not

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<sup>125</sup> Hans Røsjarde, head of the *Stortinget's* Defence Committee mentioned that several municipal boards have been voting for proposals which have the same text, as that proposed by the Socialist Left party.

<sup>126</sup> J. Nygren and P. Schori, "Vi kan bara ha en utrikespolitik," *Dagens Nyheter*, 19 April, 1989.

<sup>127</sup> Year after year Socialist Left politicians have posed difficult questions to the Norwegian leadership. An example was Paul Chaffey's question in the *Storting*, "...and what about the proposals for nuclear free zones, nuclear-free harbours and disarmament in the Northern areas?" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 January, 1990).

<sup>128</sup> Theo Koritzinsky, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>129</sup> Lin (1990:105-6) illuminates the question of reliability connected with any less than obtrusive verificatory procedures.

assumptions, should be the basis for excluding foreign ships from Swedish territorial waters. This standpoint is perceived by Sweden as the only way to judge the issue on its objective merits--but also to avoid accusations of Swedish partiality in the East-West conflict.

Senior Swedish<sup>130</sup> officials have warned of the political and technical dangers of accepting evidence which is any less than definitive. The heart of this reservation stems from the stated lack of technical possibilities to check the actual presence of nuclear weapons on-board. Sweden has repeatedly pointed out the technical complications related to verifying whether a ship does or does not carry nuclear weapons.<sup>131</sup> There are even international legal statutes, to which Sweden is undeniably wed, which have to be respected in this context.<sup>132</sup> Carl Frick of the Environmental Party said that "given what the Foreign Minister has told about the absence of technical capabilities to see whether there are nuclear weapons on-board...(this) is a pretty strange statement against the background of what happened in Karlskrona a few years ago...where we stated we were able to establish that there were nuclear weapons on-board."<sup>133</sup> Another representative of the Environmental Party, Elizabeth Franzén, asked whether this statement was a political judgement.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Sten Andersson, stated "Carl Frick has referred to a detailed and comprehensive Greenpeace study. Our analysis is that it does not present evidence that nuclear weapons have been on-board (visiting vessels) in Swedish harbours...the Government cannot act on the basis of suppositions and indications." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1990).

<sup>131</sup> Andersson, 2 February, 1989: "We cannot be sure, short of boarding the vessel," (whether the vessel contains nuclear weapons.") (Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 February, 1989)

<sup>132</sup> Andersson (Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 April, 1989): "The question of whether we should demand guarantees, and whether such guarantees should be delivered, is determined by international immunity, which gives no right of inspection of naval vessels to check the actual state of affairs."

<sup>133</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 May, 1989.

<sup>134</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 May, 1989.

Norwegian officials<sup>135</sup> have no grounds to draw different conclusions. The real difference is that while the Swedes have used the technical argument as the underlying objective reason why it cannot enforce stiffer regulations, the Norwegians have essentially let this point rest, instead emphasizing its NATO commitment as the objective hindrance for a more aggressive enforcement policy.<sup>136</sup>

### *Consequences of a Strict Port Call Policy*

One of the main points of opposition to a tighter port call policy in both Norway and Sweden is that such a move would restrain what is seen as the necessary freedom of superpower movement in the states' territorial waters and adjoining high seas, leading in turn to isolation for both Sweden and Norway.

Sweden's Baltic face poses particular problems for Sweden. Sweden has historically advocated freedom of navigation through this water body since the 18th century. While both Sweden<sup>137</sup> and Norway both strongly favour upholding the principle of freedom of movement in the seas, Sweden has perhaps felt more uncomfortable about proposals relating to the port issue, because their full implementation would mean that Sweden would be closed

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<sup>135</sup> "We have no technical possibility to see if the ships carry nuclear weapons." (N27)

<sup>136</sup> Anders Sjaastad, 22 January, 1986 *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*: "I want to remind that it is of decisive importance for Norway's security to maintain an allied naval presence in the waters off the Norwegian coast. It is these allies which will guarantee our connections between Norway and our allies in times of crisis or war. It is for that reason, not of present importance to institute rules which will make it more difficult or impossible to maintain exchange with and support from allied sea forces."

<sup>137</sup> The Swedish Foreign Relations Committee states ("Nedrustning" *Riksdagstryck* 1988/89:UU4): "...it is also in line that Sweden would like to maintain the Baltic as a free sea." See also Anders Thunborg's statement that "all states, including the U.S. are welcome to sail (in the Baltic)...it creates a balance in the Baltic." He added that "it is partly for this reason we want port calls." (L. Christiansson, "Åren i Moskva tillgång för Thunborg," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 12 July, 1989)

into a sea system where the only other sea power would be the Soviet Union.<sup>138</sup> Many intimate<sup>139</sup> that were the U.S. shut out of the Baltic, the superpower nuclear balance would be offset in the region.<sup>140</sup>

The Norwegian "lifeline over the Atlantic"<sup>141</sup> would be endangered by enforcement measures more strict than the Bratteli policy sets forth. Such a policy would undeniably have an impact on its relations with the Soviet Union. On the positive side, a stricter Norwegian policy would receive a warm welcome in Moscow—being that it entails a greater regulation of sea-bound NATO nuclear weapons traffic in its immediate neighbourhood. Seen from the Soviet perspective, one negative aspect could be that it would put a tighter clamp on the freedom of Soviet nuclear weapons traffic in its most important strategic arena. Seen from yet another perspective, it is clear that Norway's historical desire to act as a bridge-builder between East and West would be enhanced by a more strict port calls policy.

#### *Future Prospects of the Port Call Policies*

It is unclear which steps will now be taken on the question in Sweden. In the Swedish Social Democratic party different voices have been heard. At the

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<sup>138</sup> One Foreign Ministry official said that the Soviet motivation behind proposing the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone was expressly "to impede NATO if NATO gets the idea of going into the Baltic with nuclear weapons." (S31)

<sup>139</sup> "Nedrustning," *Riksdagstryck* (1988/89:UU4): "Sweden does not have any interest in shutting out any nation's seapower from the Baltic."

<sup>140</sup> One senior military official summed up several aspects of the issue: "what sort of position will we be in to check up on these ships if the Baltic is supposed to be a free sea?" Also, how will we be able to get NATO in on it, if we have such controls? Lastly, how ready is NATO or the Soviet Union to account for their weaponry. (I often say that even Sweden is averse to revealing which weapons we have!") (S32)

<sup>141</sup> Johan Buttedahl, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

time of the 1990 Social Democratic Party congress, it was said that Foreign Minister had taken a relatively "conservative" approach to the matter.<sup>142</sup>

Andersson's speech in the *Riksdag* 16 November, 1990 strengthens this assertion:

"Port calls are a part of a larger and important pattern: military exchanges increase confidence between countries, and confidence is an absolutely necessary element in our work for peace and disarmament...The Baltic is international water and port calls should be welcomed, as long as Swedish law is respected...such a move would result in not being able to continue the dialogue with those states which we are trying to influence."<sup>143</sup>

Andersson's position was rumoured to have been opposed by such figures as Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin who demanded a more rigorous enforcement of the port call policy.<sup>144</sup> For one flank of the Social Democratic Party<sup>145</sup>, said one observer, "they wouldn't mind if you put nuclear arms on ships--what people are irritated about is not knowing, because this constitutes a violation of confidence."<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> According one Defence source, "Andersson's preference was that Sweden be permitted to tackle the larger issues, and forget about the smaller issues (such as port calls--which were only two a year on the average)....if harsher measures were adopted Sweden would be 'frozen out.'"(S19)

<sup>143</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 16 November, 1990; see also Andersson, "Besöksförbud ingen lösning," *Arbetet*, 8 September, 1990.

<sup>144</sup> Theorin: "We haven't had many Soviet ships visiting here...if they can demonstrate that they are not bringing weapons into Sweden and you are able to check that, we have no argument." She continued: "I have proposed that marine disarmament issues generally be brought up in the General Assembly of the UN--all have voted 'yes' but the U.S." "I feel that the Soviets will follow the U.S. in this regard." (Theorin interview)

<sup>145</sup> Called in Swedish "*gråssossar*," usually meaning bourgeois-leaning Social Democrats.

<sup>146</sup> S19

At the 1990 Congress, the Party's Governing Board declared, as it had done before on at least one other opportunity,<sup>147</sup> if the nuclear powers do not abandon their principle of denying to give notice about the presence of nuclear weapons on-board of visiting naval vessels, (we intend) to demand an express notification that no nuclear weapons are present on board."<sup>148</sup> At the time of writing no change of the sort had been enacted in the policy realm. With the change to a Centre-Right coalition Government in September, 1991, the outlook for a tighter port call policy seemed dim.

The future of the policy is much clearer in Norway. According to one senior Norwegian foreign policy source<sup>149</sup>, one Labour Party figure and one Socialist Left Party figure desire a change in the policy. "But at our last convention we refused...to demand declarations from the vessel's captain, since this is a part of NATO nuclear strategy." One Norwegian Defence official said, "in any case, nowadays, nuclear weapons on naval vessels are less popular than yesterday (at least for the U.S.), since they are such a nuisance on-board."<sup>150</sup>

If a tougher regime were to come about, it would likely be enacted in a wider context, perhaps as a part of a coordinated Nordic strategy. Unilateral Swedish moves have been frowned upon by certain quarters.<sup>151</sup> An important question," said Swedish Liberal MP Hans Lindblad, "is whether

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<sup>147</sup> Schori and Nygren, "Vi kan bara ha en utrikespolitik," mention that the 1987 Social Democratic congress adopted a similar posture towards the problem area.

<sup>148</sup> Protocol document from the Social Democratic Party Congress, 1990. The document reads further that "such a declaration should be demanded prior to the issuing of permission..."

<sup>149</sup> N27

<sup>150</sup> N4

<sup>151</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee felt that one consequence of making a unilateral Swedish move would bring about a systematic cancellation of naval visits, this create long-term difficulties of vindicating the principle of the Baltic as a free sea." ("Nedrustning", *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 1990/91:UU4, 18 October, 1990).

Norway would follow suit if Sweden made a tough decision."<sup>152</sup> If stricter measures did succeed in getting through the *Storting*, he said, "this would have an extremely destructive impact on the United States' behaviour towards Norway," translating Norway into a New Zealand case scenario.<sup>153</sup> If Norway were to make such a move, Norway would become "a second class NATO member" said one former Norwegian official.<sup>154</sup> As Socialist Left MP Chaffey put it "the Norwegian problem is a problem of our status in NATO becoming debatable." He continued, "we are party to NATO/US's nuclear capacity, e.g. Norwegian airports are ready for nuclear strike of U.S. planes on the Soviet Union--all of these aspects would have to be changed," if a stricter policy were to be instituted.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Nygren and Schori, "Vi kan bara ha en utrikespolitik,": "a transformed Swedish policy...runs the risk of having a spin-off effect on Denmark and Norway" where "foreign naval visits play a much different role than for Finland or Sweden. For them, naval visits and common training manoeuvres are an important part of their NATO memberships...the Norwegian Government desires a certain presence of the NATO navy off of her coasts, in a way that strengthens the credibility of Norwegian capabilities and will to strengthen Norway in a crisis situation..."

<sup>153</sup> Hans Lindblad, interview. "We know," he went on, "that the Norwegian Government considers it very important that it doesn't have this effect in Norway."

<sup>154</sup> N4

<sup>155</sup> Chaffey, interview.

## Chapter Five

### Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes with the Soviet Union

#### *Introduction*

When Gorbachëv came to power in 1985 he found himself confronted with serious jurisdictional disputes with Sweden and Norway. Norway had two problems: one, a delimitation disagreement of 155,000 square nautical miles and two, a dispute over the utilization of the Svalbard shelf (Churchill, 1988:44).<sup>1</sup> Sweden disputed an area in the Baltic Sea of 13,500 square kilometres. While the zones were significant from both the economic and legal viewpoints, what really was at stake was who was in control of two key Nordic bodies of water. What is interesting to ascertain is whether neutrality influenced Sweden's perceptions and behaviour on the issue differently than NATO did Norway's position--and if so, where these points of influence lie.

#### *Differences and Similarities of the disputes*

One of the chief differences between the two is that Sweden solved its problem in 1988, while Norway still is grappling with the problem today. Here it is interesting whether élites perceived the Soviet Union as having either a unified or two separate approaches--perhaps connected with Swedish and Norwegian security policy--to the two questions. Another important difference between the two cases is the clearly more strategic positioning of the Barents over the Baltic, especially given the strategic importance allotted the Kola Peninsula. However, seen from the vantage point of intelligence platforms, the Kola and the Baltic play equally as important roles.<sup>2</sup> A third difference, while

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<sup>1</sup> For more on the Svalbard question see Østreng (1974) and (1978).

<sup>2</sup> Viklund-Persson (1988): "from the military point of view it is significant that no Soviet oil platforms are built near the Swedish territorial waters (continued...)"



of potential interest for seabed mining or other resource purposes, the Baltic does not have proven oil reserve potential, such as dominates the Barents Sea problem area.<sup>3</sup> The Baltic Sea's chief economic draw was its fishing.

Precisely this reason reveals yet another point of difference: in 1978 Norway signed<sup>4</sup> a provisional "Grey Zone" agreement, Sweden resisted such tendencies.<sup>5</sup> One of the recurring themes of small state foreign policy is a striving to achieve certainty in its relations with large neighbours. This foreign policy principle dominated the Swedish insistence on a clear demarcation, and opposition to a grey zone arrangement.<sup>6</sup> Thus in lieu of a clear agreement, the

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<sup>2</sup>(...continued)

frontier...this would increase the Soviet Union's possibilities of placing radar and reconnaissance equipment there."

<sup>3</sup> Said Anders Åslund, "I do not believe geologists think that there is oil on the Swedish side --but it is possible that close to Lithuania there might be." (Interview). Swedish MFA Legal Department Head Hans Corell (Corell, 1989:106) wrote, the agreement gave "our oil prospectors and our fishers better possibilities to plan for the future."

<sup>4</sup> The Grey Zone constituted one small portion of the disputed sea and some undisputed water. The Agreement involved fishermen adding together their catches and dividing them equally--a step towards clarity in relations between the countries, but remarkably short of true certainty

<sup>5</sup> A Swedish inter-departmental review has however recommended that an exclusive economic zone be established. See *Sveriges ekonomiska zon* (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990), Document Ds 1990:41

<sup>6</sup> Many officials argued such as one Swedish official: "It is always more difficult to be neutral and cooperate with a non-neutral than to do so as party to an alliance...especially between a large and small power, where the rights and duties are not spelled out." (S22) Pierre Schori pointed out that "we found that there were 'foreign policy reasons' which spoke against a grey zone, where we would share supervision in an area which extended up to our territory, with a superpower." (Schori, 1988)

disputed area became a "white zone."<sup>7</sup> This consideration is especially strong for a neutral state which has no backing of its allies.<sup>8</sup>

That having been said, there are almost as many remarkable similarities which unite the two as there are differences which separate them. The coincidence of political, military, economic factors penetrated both of the disputes, and as such the disputes were somewhat more complex than they may seem at first glance. Thus, the issue is, in many senses, a perfect comparative and contrast case study of Swedish and Norwegian élites' perceptions of Soviet foreign policy. Both the Swedish and the Norwegian negotiations have taken place side-by-side historically. By 1988 the Swedes had negotiated nineteen years and the Norwegians for fourteen.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the Norwegians and the Swedes had ample opportunity to share their experiences regarding the Soviet positions towards the issue.<sup>10</sup> A final similarity is that both may be subject to similar Soviet foreign policy variables.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> A clearly-plotted delimitation between two states, such as is characteristic of state-to-state borders; a "grey zone," whose borders are the disputed areas. Within this grey zone, the disputing parties have common jurisdiction, effectively locking out third parties; and a "white zone," whose borders are clearly demarcated, but which nevertheless remains part of the high sea and consequently is open for exploitation by third countries.

<sup>8</sup> "I remember several incidents involving Soviet trawlers—which were very easy to explain in terms of traditional Soviet behaviour—this is the precise reason why we did not want a grey zone agreement," one Swedish official said. (S18)

<sup>9</sup> Thorvald Stoltenberg (1988:10) argues that the Norwegians have been negotiating for 17 years, while Churchill (1988:45) maintains that formal negotiations started in 1974.

<sup>10</sup> While one Swede said "(the Norwegians and the Swedes) had different interests (between the conflicts), we did have an agreement with respect to the Continental Shelf in Skaggrak—it was quite natural that we cooperated and discussed." (S22)

<sup>11</sup> Churchill (1988:52) the Soviet Union's traditional aversion to referring jurisdictional disputes to arbitral tribunal as one such tendency.

## The Swedish Approach.<sup>12</sup>

### *The players*

For both Sweden and Norway the delimitation negotiations were of a highly sensitive nature. While interviews revealed that *Riksdag* and *Storting* members were kept abreast of the progress of negotiations at set intervals, the amount of individuals directly connected with the negotiations was intentionally minimal. Both negotiations involved the political department of the respective Foreign Ministries, and in particular the head of the Soviet and East European Affairs Department, the Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry. In the Swedish case, the delegation was led by a Chief Negotiator. In the Norwegian case, the negotiations were at times led by the chief of the Foreign Ministry's Legal Department, even by a Sea-use Minister and Undersecretary until 1985. Both negotiating teams utilize(d) expertise both from inside and outside of the Foreign Ministry.

There were two main interest groups in Sweden: the fishermen and the military. Fishermen<sup>13</sup> wanted to be granted as liberal movement as possible in order to increase their catches, and personal security in the area. The military establishment's main concern was intelligence. An advantageous agreement for the Swedes would provide better access to Soviet radio and other intelligence traffic, chiefly over the Baltic. A stingy *Östersjöavtal*=Baltic Delimitation Agreement or ÖA, could broaden the possibilities for Soviet monitoring of their counterparts, in the Swedish Intelligence Radio Service.

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<sup>12</sup> For more detail on the Swedish and Soviet approaches, see Mahmoudi (1989).

<sup>13</sup> There are two perspectives on this point. One official said "the fishermen were not so important, there were not so many individuals involved...the West Coast is of greater economic importance--the Baltic is meagre." (S22) Corell(1989:104) argues that "there were more and more frequent demands from the fishing side towards the realisation of an agreement leading to a joint administration of the disputed area."

### *Overview of events*

The area of dispute concerned a continental shelf delimitation and an economic border between the Soviet Union and Sweden.<sup>14</sup> Sweden began formal negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1969, once it became clear that Sweden had established agreement in principle over the delimitation issue with Finland (Magnusson:1988:6).<sup>15</sup> Further formal negotiating rounds were held in 1970, 1974, 1982 and 1986-88. The respective Soviet and Swedish positions were clear: both parties agreed that the median line principle should be employed (unlike the sector principle in the case of the Norway-Soviet conflict). However, Sweden stood by the principle that the island of Gotland should be incorporated into its jurisdiction Eastward, while the Soviet Union maintained that the point-of-departure should be the Swedish mainland.<sup>16</sup> For precedent, it called upon earlier delimitations and in particular upon international legal standards:

"according to the 1958 and 1982 conventions and in the practice between states, it has become clear that islands, which are

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<sup>14</sup> The interest of Sweden and the Soviet Union in research into environmental problems and windpower cannot be fully discounted as further reasons to seek delimitation. See *Riksdagstryck 1987/88:UU33* ("Om godkännande av en överenskommelse mellan Sverige och Sovjetunionen om avgränsning..."), 19 November, 1987.

<sup>15</sup> The *Riksdag's* Foreign Affairs Committee clarifies that "the reason why we have not been able to conclude delimitation agreements with Poland and the Soviet Union is because there exists disagreement over the weight that Gotland should be allotted." (*Riksdagstryck 1985/86:UU10* ("Om fisket i zonen öster om Gotland"), 28 November, 1985. The Committee notes successful delimitations with Finland, Norway, East Germany and Denmark.

<sup>16</sup> Magnusson (1988:6) notes that the Swedes and the Soviet Union have held parallel positions, e.g. in its dispute with the Danes over the inhabited island of Hesselø, (Corell, 1989:103) points out that this consideration included the islands Læsø and Anholt) did not consider the island in negotiations. Furthermore, the USSR employed the median line principle from her island of Osmejniy, in the context of a dispute with Rumania in the Black Sea. (Magnusson, *ibid*)

inhabited and have an independent economic life, should be taken into consideration during delimitations."<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, Sweden's principle stance was that the unresolved matter could effectively be referred to the International Court of Justice. But as one former official said "we tried from the 1970's to suggest to the Soviets that we go to the ICJ--but the Soviets stated that 'we don't do this on border issues.'"<sup>18</sup>

As Magnusson states, the turning point in the Swedish position was the abandonment of a "100-0%" solution (Magnusson, 1988:6). There were many Swedish and Soviet changes in position throughout the years leading up to solution on January 11, 1988,<sup>19</sup> resulting in an agreement in principle between

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<sup>17</sup> Riksdagstryck 1985/1986: UU10 ("Om fisket i zonen öster om Gotland").

<sup>18</sup> S22

<sup>19</sup> Magnusson (1988) charts the development:

1. 1982 change from "100-0" to "92-8" in Swedish favour (proposal by Foreign Minister Ullsten)
2. Soviet proposal of "10%-90%" in Soviet favour, then immediately to "23%-77%."
3. At this point, the Conservative Party put a stop to negotiations, by stating they would not accept less than 100-0. The Russians defied Swedish efforts to bring the matter in front of the ICJ in Den Haag.
4. Several trips by Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori to Moscow in 1985 resulted in two changes: The Russian softening of positions to 75% in their favour, followed by a change in Spring, 1986 whereby the Soviets lessened their demands to 50%.
5. On the initiative of Soviet Premier Ryzhkov, in a letter to Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson, Moscow was said to be prepared to accept a 35% portion of the zone. This particular 'concession' put some spin on the negotiations.
6. The Swedish Government's demands, after further negotiations, sunk to 80-20% in Swedish favour.  
(according to the Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee, Riksdagstryck 1987/88:UU7, the first negotiating prior to December was in January, 1987),
7. 2 December, 1987: the Soviets were said to be able to accept a 70-30% solution.
8. December 15: Carlsson wrote to Ryzhkov, in support of a 75-25% solution.
9. 31 December: the Soviet delegation held their 70-30% solution.
10. During Ryzhkov's trip to Stockholm, 11 January, the Russians agreed to a 75-25% division, in Swedish favour.

Ryzhkov and Carlsson on 13 January, 1988. Small details, for example the exact extent of the fishing quotas, would make the final signature wait until the 18th of April, between then-Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Sten Andersson (Schori, 1988).

#### *Evolution of agreement, 1985-*

At the time Gorbachëv took power, the Baltic delimitation question was high on the Swedish *Riksdag*'s agenda. Agreement between the parties was high over the desirability of an agreement and the overall Swedish approach. Centre MP, Pär Granstedt, in union with other parliamentarians spoke in late 1985 of wishes to "regulate fishing in the Baltic, such that we can, in the long-term retain worthwhile fish families, who are in rapid decline because whoever so pleases can fish as much as they want in the area."<sup>20</sup> Complaints of Soviet misbehaviour towards Swedish fishing vessels only added to the pressing nature of the dispute. Speaking of one particular case, Conservative Party's Carl Bildt<sup>21</sup> said "there is absolutely no excuse for the Soviet behaviour. No matter how much the fishermen were listening to the radio and how much the radio stations had forwarded the message, this should not have (legitimized) that which is incorrect about the Soviet behaviour." Granstedt said: "the Soviet Union has no right to escort (the fishing vessels) away from international water. We have to get guarantees from the Soviets that they will behave correctly towards Swedish fishermen in international waters---this is not a Soviet fishing zone!"<sup>22</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee noted that Sweden, in various contexts had made efforts towards a ban on submarine activity in fishing zones--the

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<sup>20</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1985.

<sup>21</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 February, 1986.

<sup>22</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 February, 1986.

ostensible reason being that (seemingly Soviet) submarines in underwater position had been creating havoc with fishermen's nets.<sup>23</sup>

The Swedish *Riksdag*'s Foreign Affairs Committee contented itself with timely reminders to the Government of its pressing interest in seeing a negotiated settlement. On 28 November, 1985 the Committee echoed<sup>24</sup> these concerns, and reminded the *Riksdag* that "since 1982 four rounds of negotiations have been held with the Soviet Union...continued sounding-outs and contacts have also taken place."

One of the consistent themes in the Swedish negotiatory position was that an unclear relationship over the issue was unacceptable to a small neutral Sweden. "When we started to negotiate in earnest in 1985," said one official, "one of the things (the Swedish side) did not want was a grey zone arrangement--because it could create incidents of who is boss in the Baltic."<sup>25</sup> According to one official, the amount of incidents was, on the average, two a year.<sup>26</sup> These violations acted to sensitize the question of territory and space for neutral Sweden. A Grey Zone may have acted to legitimize further Soviet misbehaviour in the area.

#### *Baltic Agreement Concluded: Élite Reactions*

The public reactions of élites was limited, for all intents and purposes and excepting the Moderate Party, to laudatory remarks regarding the ÖA's outcome. Conservative Party Leader, Carl Bildt, criticized what he saw as the

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<sup>23</sup> *Riksdagstryck* 1985/6: UU24 ("Om ubåtsövningar i fiskeområden"). "We should remember," writes Corell (1989:103) "the occurrence with U-137 in the Fall of 1981 did affect the negotiating climate." Schori argues that negotiations were broken off because the "Soviet position was so far away from our own that we thought it best that we take a break in the negotiations." (Schori, 1988)

<sup>24</sup> *Riksdagstryck* 1985/9886:10 ("Om fisket i zonen öster om Gotland").

<sup>25</sup> S18

<sup>26</sup> S22

Government's abandonment of the median line principle, an allegation which both the Foreign and Prime Ministers denied (Rönnow, 1988:6).<sup>27</sup> In fact the agreement would be finally concluded without reservations from all but the Swedish Moderate Party.<sup>28</sup>

The Foreign Minister felt that the Conservative criticism was unwarranted based on international legal practice:

"there exists total agreement amongst international legal experts that the so-called median line principle (which would give Sweden '100% right' to the disputed area) has been weakened through the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention...international legal *praxis* has never given any quarrelling state 100% of the disputed area. Neither would Sweden receive (100%) if the case were referred to international arbitration..."<sup>29</sup>

Sweden, as a small, neutral, exposed state so close to a superpower truly saw the Agreement as a foreign policy triumph. Interesting is that while Norway points to precedent in acceding to security-related agreements, Sweden emphasized an independent line on the issue. "There is no previous model," Prime Minister Carlsson said, "where a small state has so advantageously vindicated its interests with respect to a superpower in such a vital area"<sup>30</sup>...it

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<sup>27</sup> According to A. Hoff, "Sovjet får for mye i Østersjøen," *Aftenposten* 7 January, 1988): "there are many in the (Swedish) Conservative Party who feel that this is going too far--not least bearing in mind the recurrent submarine incursions in Swedish territorial waters."

<sup>28</sup> A. Hoff, "Dagsorden i Oslo: Gråsonen," *Aftenposten*, 14 January, 1988.

<sup>29</sup> *Svenska Dagbladet*, 7 January, 1988, quoted in Rönnow, (1988:5) clarifies some of the questions surrounding the median line principle. Schori confirms the weakening effect that the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention upon the median principle: "the UN convention stipulated that the international legal principle of 'with the intention of reaching a reasonable solution.'" (Schori, 1988) See also Chief Negotiator L. Myrsten, "Nu är det slut på utfiskningen," *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, 13 January, 1988.

<sup>30</sup> Anonymous, "Avtalet bidrar till stabilitet," *Tempus* 2 (1988).



is a unique agreement between a superpower and small country."<sup>31</sup> Liberal Party MP, Ingemar Eliasson said the Government "deserved a feather in their hat for the agreement."<sup>32</sup> Centre Party Leader, Olof Johansson termed the agreement "acceptable in terms of international law."<sup>33</sup> A high degree of élite consensus regarding the Swedish approach greatly contributed to success. "The ÖA is a current example of the value of concord in last year's negotiations," said Foreign Minister Sten Andersson.<sup>34</sup> Social Democratic Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Stig Alemyr said "...I want to express my satisfaction over the fact that twenty years of negotiations have now led to a beneficial result for Sweden."<sup>35</sup> Conservative MP, Jens Eriksson elaborated somewhat on the practical consequences of ÖA thus:

1. Sweden must have expanded possibilities for fishing in the area.
2. The threatened remainders of cod and salmon must be protected.<sup>36</sup>
3. Sweden has a responsibility to make sure the Soviet Union has the possibility of fishing up to the agreed-upon quotas.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> "Nu är det slut på utfiskningen."

<sup>32</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

<sup>33</sup> Anonymous, "Fp och centern nöjda," *Tempus* 2 (1988).

<sup>34</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

<sup>35</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 June, 1988.

<sup>36</sup> One Swedish official said the main concern was cod and salmon. While people in the Baltic republics were fond of eating "sprat" (herring) and fished that, we took the Baltic herring and things were alright." (S22)

<sup>37</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 June, 1988.

Diplomats, whether of known right or left-wing political persuasion, lauded the Government over the Agreement. One known Conservative diplomat said "I felt it was in our own interest to go back to a 50-50% solution--(seeing the result) it's a great tribute to Swedish negotiating skill."<sup>38</sup>

While Sweden usually preferred to bring matters of such a sensitive nature to higher levels of international consensus, this particular bilateral negotiation reached the desired result. To negotiate on a bilateral basis traditionally puts the smaller power in a disadvantageous position. Said Foreign Minister Andersson

"the ÖA's significance is found in the clarity it creates in an important area which could have caused future security problems.<sup>39</sup> Since it promotes stability between our countries and is economically advantageous...it eliminates the risk for exploitation...it guarantees continued fishing rights for Swedish fishermen for many years...it provides advantageous conditions for environmental protection in a very sensitive sea-area."<sup>40</sup>

## Attribution of Soviet Motivation

### *ÖA's Significance*

Diplomats and officials who were active in foreign policy at the time pointed to a plethora of factors which were significant in bringing about the ÖA. "The agreement was significant because of the long time it took to negotiate, because of the very firm Soviet position and because the Soviet forfeited its economic interests," one trade official mentioned.<sup>41</sup> As such, the ÖA effectively put an end to any remaining elite doubt that serious change was occurring in the Soviet Union. Liberal Party leader, Bengt Westerberg said, "while the issue was not important for our relations,

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<sup>38</sup> S5

<sup>39</sup> (Magnusson, 1988:6-7)

<sup>40</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

<sup>41</sup> S8

it was important in order to *improve* our relations."<sup>42</sup> "The Soviets accepted our point of departure (75-25%)<sup>43</sup>...this was the first concrete illustration that something had changed in the Soviet Union."<sup>44</sup> Part of the Swedish negotiating strategy, according to one official, was to try to press the Soviets for proof or validization of the sincerity of their announced changes: "if you want good relations, do this! we said," a strategy which was very sensitive for the political opposition," he said.<sup>45</sup> The ÖA "may be the most satisfying moment of my career," said one well-placed official. "If I may be a little egotistical in answering (your) question (which events were the most important indicators for you that there was fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy): I would definitely have to say the ÖA," this official continued.<sup>46</sup> "More than anything else," said one higher élite, "the ÖA symbolized Soviet foreign policy change for me personally."<sup>47</sup> Another part of the agreement's significance for Sweden was summed by one official: "it demonstrated that a nineteen-year stalemate could be broken even in the midst of strained 'submarine relations.'"<sup>48</sup>

#### *ÖA as Soviet foreign policy aberration*

Some élites did not see the event as fitting into the overall pattern of Soviet foreign policy change. As one élite recounted: "at the time, it could not be seen against the background of a comprehensive foreign policy change—Soviet foreign policy had not

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<sup>42</sup> Westerberg, interview.

<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that many of those closely familiar with the chain of events leading up to ÖA mentioned that "nobody thought it realistic that we would get 100%," (this can be discounted from Swedish negotiating strategy.) (Examples: S22, S45)

<sup>44</sup> Westerberg, interview.

<sup>45</sup> S43. It should be noted that according to another figure the use of this strategy was denied.

<sup>46</sup> S43

<sup>47</sup> S8

<sup>48</sup> S43

changed."<sup>49</sup> Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori said "in the Fall of 1985 we could not see the contours of any new Soviet foreign policy...I think it is fair to say that the first signs of new movement in terms of Soviet foreign policy thinking only appeared during the first half of 1986."(Schori, 1988) "The event was a concession given the background of Soviet foreign policy," said one former official.<sup>50</sup> As another official recounted "the sign of a new foreign policy (that the initiative presented) were brushed aside as the proposal was initially seen in a traditional light of a general Soviet unwillingness to negotiate."<sup>51</sup>

### *ÖA as Consistent with Soviet foreign policy*

In interviews, the Soviet willingness to change its position was accorded a dominant place in analyses of how the ÖA came about. But attributions also lauded Swedish perseverance and steadfastness. "I was under the impression that the Soviets were ready to negotiate about ten years back; Sweden was in fact the hardline state here-not the Soviets."<sup>52</sup> Apart from this, said one official, "the Swedish (Moscow) embassy was markedly more dogmatic than those in Stockholm--it was from Stockholm that the creative initiatives emanated, not from the embassy."<sup>53</sup> But once change came about it seemed clear that increased flexibility had a high Swedish Governmental sanction. This demonstrates that there were conflicting indications of the Soviet position and some division in the Swedish decision-making bureaucracy over the issue.

However, most élites attributed change to an explicit, Soviet-determined change. As one official maintained, "I don't think the old régime would have ever

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<sup>49</sup> S18

<sup>50</sup> S18

<sup>51</sup> S18

<sup>52</sup> S5

<sup>53</sup> This élite named in particular Cabinet Secretary Schori's meeting with Ryzhkov in March (1987)--"the press didn't even get wind of that," he said. (S18)

accepted...we would have been lucky with 50-50% under the old régime."<sup>54</sup> One official saw it as one part of a general trend "to come to terms with the West."<sup>55</sup> Another official told, "the common denominator of all of the indicators points in the direction...of the needs of the Soviet leadership, coinciding with *perestroika*." Related to this strain of thought one official called the ÖA a "logical consequence of cost-benefit analysis."<sup>56</sup>

The real turning point for one official was "when we first realized the Soviets were willing to (forfeit) over 50%--at that point it became a real gesture from their side."<sup>57</sup> The Soviet chief negotiator and Law-of-the-Sea expert, Rybakov, "was certainly not going to give anything away--it was quite clear that when he forwarded proposals he was trying to reach a more propitious position."<sup>58</sup> One has to remember that both Rybakov<sup>59</sup> and Myrsten worked on the instructions of their governments, one official reminded.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> S22

<sup>55</sup> S22

<sup>56</sup> S31

<sup>57</sup> S45

<sup>58</sup> S18

<sup>59</sup> Following the ÖA, Rybakov was quoted as saying that the ÖA was "more than a compromise from our perspective," adding "I should probably say that we lost." (A. Hoff, "Dagsorden i Oslo: Gråsonen")

<sup>60</sup> One official typified the Soviet negotiating style "much more centralized than in a democracy--where, if you could find a way to a result, you could explore it." The Soviet side created a civil servant atmosphere which did not give the diplomats freedom of movement--all important issues had to be constantly checked with the centre before being brought forward, the official said. As such, he said, "we should remember that superpower such as the Soviet Union seldom finds itself in a situation (except with another superpower) where it felt the need to improvise--it was in *their* hands whether a result would be arrived at," he emphasised. (S22)

### *High-Level Soviet Political Support for ÖA*

There was consensus that without high-ranking Soviet political establishment support, there would have been little, if any, movement on the issue. "(The ÖA) was 200% in the Soviet hands the whole way," said one official--international law had no bearing here--it was purely a question of political interest."<sup>61</sup> "It was not until the matter reached a high political level," said one official, "that the technical details went quickly."<sup>62</sup>

The change came when "someone high above started asking new questions, e.g. don't look from the traditional maritime point-of-view, but rather towards visions such as 'the new Europe' or 'integration,' or that 'we don't have any other problem with Sweden.'"<sup>63</sup> One official made clear that "it was not anyone in the (Foreign Ministry's) Legal Department or the (Ministry's) Northern (Europe) Department--surely someone who did not deal with sea delimitations or with Scandinavia."<sup>64</sup> It is very much in line to guess that Ryzhkov himself was one of the chief players, in fact.<sup>65</sup> "I can imagine," said one official, "that Ryzhkov was instrumental in bringing (this) about."<sup>66</sup>

But it is clear that the Soviet side also shared some serious practical concern regarding the area's status as a white zone. There were certain Soviet foreign policy trends which were reflected in Soviet behavioural patterns in the Baltic. Sweden, as the Soviet Union, disliked the white zone arrangement which allowed for the usage

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<sup>61</sup> S22

<sup>62</sup> S31. Schori employed a similar logic, writing "negotiations of this sort are in the end of a political character." (Schori, 1988)

<sup>63</sup> S18

<sup>64</sup> S18

<sup>65</sup> As one Swedish official recounted, "Ryzhkov, when he went to Olof Palme's funeral (March, 1986), met Carlsson and there was high bravado surrounding his visit to Swedish industry--where he caught his fancy." Since then, "there has been a special interest in Sweden for Ryzhkov," said S18.

<sup>66</sup> S22

by third parties. But the Soviet Union chose a different method to show its displeasure.<sup>67</sup> "They were inclined to chase Germans, and the Danes away and cause difficulties for us," he added.<sup>68</sup> As he explained, "when the Russians chased away, say, a Dane, and the Danes called this illegitimate based on the presence of a white zone, we felt obliged to take the Danish party."<sup>69</sup> International waters were from the Soviet Baltic perspective Soviet sovereign interests.

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<sup>67</sup> S22

<sup>68</sup> S22

<sup>69</sup> S22

## **The Barents Sea Delimitation**

### *Introduction*

The Barents Sea delimitation problem concerns both the continental shelf boundary between Norway and the Soviet Union and the placement of the 200-mile economic zones between them. The inability of Norway and the Soviet Union to reach agreement regarding the delimitation of the Barents Sea is a problem which, both in the past and in the present, has precluded cooperation in a host of areas and an amelioration of relations generally. The Barents Sea delimitation question is today the greatest outstanding bone of contention between the Norwegians and the Soviet Union. The Norwegian position in the negotiations has been indirectly influenced by the experiences of their fellow NATO members in similar situations. Additionally, as Sweden, the Norwegian position has been greatly influenced by international law.

Both the Swedes and the Norwegians have shared an aversion to entering into agreements which bind themselves to cooperation with a superpower on ostensibly unfavourable and perhaps unclear terms. For these reasons, small states, such as Sweden and Norway, strive for clarity in their relations with superpowers in areas which are of interest to both partners, striving for the precise definition of relevant details.

The Barents Sea delimitation question and Northern territorial questions generally (e.g. the Svalbard shelf) are, for Norwegians, prime examples of an expression of Soviet willingness to expose and exploit a small state through demanding firm cooperation, but without detailing what this cooperation actually entails. Furthermore the Barents Sea question is an example of the ability of superpowers to live with outstanding conflicts, irrespective of the price they have to pay for this reticence. Small powers perceive always having to pay a larger price under such conditions and thus have traditionally striven for rapid, effective and propitious solutions to outstanding disputes with other states.

However, Norway's NATO status has given it an extra amount of leeway in the question vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: Norway has been able to enter into a compromise



agreement with the Soviets over the Grey Zone--an arrangement which the Swedes fervently resisted in the Baltic. Also, the NATO backing has infused the Norwegians with some 'superpower' patience of their own: they could stand the lack of clarity since Norway had the NATO backbone. The tolerance limits of small states may be extended if they have guarantees (e.g. alliance ties) which support the justice of their claims.

As was pointed out earlier, Swedes saw the Norwegian situation as being different from their own, not least owing to the NATO membership in the Norwegian favour. One could argue that the NATO connection has proved helpful in resisting Soviet attempts to link the Barents Sea question with other issue areas--keeping it as a legal dispute. The Soviet Union has nevertheless resisted suggestions that the disputes be referred to the ICJ.

Through this guarantee, the Norwegians have been, some would say successfully, able to hold the Soviet Union at arms length over the question of closer cooperation in oil exploration, a key area key for obtaining hard, foreign currency<sup>70</sup>. Also, through the NATO presence in the high seas, the Soviet Union has not succeeded in challenging Norwegian interests there (i.e. Swedish fishing boats were often chased out of the White Zone by Soviet boats).

### *The Players*

As in Sweden, the military and the fishermen played the primary roles in the dispute. The fishermen, since the Grey Zone Agreement of 1978 have been calmed somewhat--however even this is no optimal arrangement, since catches are finally divided between the parties. It is clear that even the fishermen, the professional grouping which is a stable link in the Norwegian economy, would benefit morally, spiritually and materially from a clear dividing line further East than the Westernmost part of the Grey Zone.

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<sup>70</sup> Alstad(1985:20) points out that in 1984 West Siberia accounted for some 62% of Soviet oil production.

From all that one could glean, the military pressure on successive Norwegian governments has been equally as high if not as high as the Swedish military pressure over the Baltic delimitation question. As one Norwegian Defence Ministry official, Finn Malvig said, "military interests (this is just outside the playground of the Northern fleet) and economic issues both pull in the same direction."<sup>71</sup> Both the Norwegian and Swedish militaries were primarily interested in increasing their own intelligence capabilities while diminishing the Soviet chances to do the same. But there exist other, less obvious details. One official pointed out "the delimitation question is linked with the possibility for submarines to get in and out of the area, essentially a question of ocean floor topography."<sup>72</sup>

The role of the *Storting* was approximately equal to that of the *Riksdag*. *Storting* members spoke of having been continually apprised and consulted when positions had changed.<sup>73</sup> But, very much as in Sweden, for reasons of both sensitivity and the need to call upon specialists, the decision-making and advisory power was moved to the Foreign Ministry.<sup>74</sup> It was important that the political parties unite behind the banner of the national good<sup>75</sup>; the Norwegian political parties however seemed more unified than the Swedish. As Conservative MP, Jan Petersen told, "we usually don't say very much more than the official line because the question has to do with Soviet-Norwegian bilateral relations; in such important negotiations we think it is proper to

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<sup>71</sup> Malvig, interview.

<sup>72</sup> N10

<sup>73</sup> Socialist Left MP Chaffey noted "we get to know about these things through the "Det utvidede utenriks- og konstitusjonskomité"). However Chaffey noted that "we have not been called in by the present Government at all—the reason being that nothing happened." (interview)

<sup>74</sup> Centre Party MP Jakobsen said "my impression is that the Soviet Union is more interested than before to have an agreement...but I can't say much more about that (I was a member of Government...)". (interview)

<sup>75</sup> Indications of this found in *Stortings Meld. 11, 1989-90* ("Om utviklingstrekk i det internasjonale samfunn og virkninger for norsk utenrikspolitikk"), as well as in the case of Svalbard *St. Meld. 40 (1985-86)*.

allow the Government to do what they must."<sup>76</sup> Nonetheless, one cannot totally exclude timely reminders that, for some, the issue was a hot 'political potato.'<sup>77</sup>

Year after year, the Foreign Minister has mentioned the issue in his foreign policy address, usually as part of general developments in the Northern areas. However until 1986 these declarations were filled with dashed expectations.<sup>78</sup>

### *The Norwegian Approach*

In Norway, much like in Sweden, the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention created a need to better define Norway's shelf status with respect to the Soviet Union. The Swedish and Norwegian conflicts with the Soviet Union differ in that Norway-Soviet Union concerns a question of which basic line-drawing principle is valid. Unlike Sweden, where the question of whether Gotland should be considered was paramount, the Norwegian dispute concerned Soviet insistence on utilizing the so-called 'sector line principle,'<sup>79</sup> born into Soviet thinking in 1926(Østreng, 1986:134). One Conservative MP dismissed the resemblance between the Swedish and Norwegian cases, saying "the principal Soviet standpoint in the Baltic was so

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<sup>76</sup> Petersen, interview.

<sup>77</sup> See Labour Party MP, Oddvar J. Majala, 9 December, 1985 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*) for an example of the political battle over the issue. See also the exchange between Labour MP, Finn Knutsen, Labour MP, Gunnar Skaug, and Prime Minister Brundtland in *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 9 June, 1987.

<sup>78</sup> See a marked change in Stoltenberg's address on 9 June, 1986 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*): Stoltenberg here accounts for changes on many fronts in the Soviet Union, hinting that this may, in turn, affect the situation in the Barents case.

<sup>79</sup> Swedish Foreign Ministry International Law specialist, Bo Johnson Theutenberg (1988:308) writes that the origin of the Soviet utilization of the sector principle dates back to 1926. The sector principle degree sets out all areas between the Western and Eastern boundaries of Soviet territory, drawn sectorally up towards the North Pole, including, in the words of the document, 'all land and islands in the Arctic,' as being under Soviet sovereignty.

unreasonable and so clearly in violation of international law, that the (Swedes) had probably not expected to get more than what they actually got."<sup>80</sup>

All the while the Norwegians have maintained the rectitude of the 'median line principle.' The Norwegians have precedent in the delimitation of the North Sea continental shelf in agreements with the U.K. and Denmark in 1965(Østreng and Traavik, 1977:354). The area which lies between these two lines totals some 155,000 square nautical miles.<sup>81</sup> "I have never felt that the Soviets were equally as committed to the Baltic as they were the North--thus they employed the sector line concept, which does not apply to the Baltic," said one official. "In the Baltic the median line principle would not cost the Soviet Union--(it) would not have to go back on principle."<sup>82</sup>

It must be nonetheless noted that the NATO angle can only be said to have had an indirect effect upon the Norwegian bargaining position. Worth noting is that the U.S. position of dismissing the use of sector lines in negotiating disputes<sup>83</sup> has provided support to the Norwegian position. Østreng writes, it can be argued that the USSR has demonstrated great caution in its relationship with the USA on the boundary issue--another source of strength for the Norwegian stance(1986:147-89). Negotiations with respect to the Northern Shelf in the early 1980's also provide another point of NATO influence on the Norwegian position.

### *The Soviet Approach*

While the Norwegians have based themselves on legal arguments and the Continental Shelf Convention as a points-of-departure, the Soviets have argued that

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<sup>80</sup> H.C. Erlandsen, "Kåre Willoch, "-Fellesområde dødfødt tanke," *Aftenposten*, 15 January, 1988.

<sup>81</sup> K. Dragnes, "Norge på dagsorden i Kreml," *Aftenposten*, 15 November, 1986.

<sup>82</sup> N4

<sup>83</sup> Harris (1983:181); Skogan and Sjaastad (1976:291)

the median line principle is invalid for the area contains 'special circumstances.' The Norwegian Government has made public<sup>84</sup> the Soviet claims which revolve about first, the Soviet Union's greater size, and second, the greater population on the Kola Peninsula (compared to Northern Norway) and its security interests. Furthermore, the Soviet position<sup>85</sup> is tied to the notion of 'historical waters' to which the Soviet Union itself feels it has a historical, legal right.<sup>86</sup> Official Soviet maps, in fact, depict the sector lines as boundaries for 'Soviet Arctic areas.' (Østreng, 1979:165-182)

Seen in a wider geographical perspective the opposing Soviet argument--namely that of the security aspects of the area, was the chief difference between the Norwegians and Swedes during interviews. A dominant theme during interviews was, as one Foreign Ministry official put it, "the strategic unity of the area."<sup>87</sup> One military official clearly pointed to the issue as "strategy being the key issue--not the fish, not the legal aspects, as much as many in Norway believe in this tendency."<sup>88</sup>

The question of economic cooperation has dangled like a carrot in front of hungry Soviet eyes. The Norwegians have, at least in the 1980's when the true oil explorative potential<sup>89</sup> of the area became public, made sure to remind the Soviets that if the

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<sup>84</sup> UD Informasjon 30, speech of Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund: "Nordområdene i norsk utenrikspolitikk" (22 June, 1977): pp. 18-23.

<sup>85</sup> Churchill (1988:51) concludes that, based on the available evidence and the factors presented by the Soviets, "the sector line is clearly not a special circumstance."

<sup>86</sup> Soviet legal minds Lakhtine (1930) and Vyshnepolsky (1950's) were two of the earlier loud proponents of the sector principle. (Theutenberg, 1986:308)

<sup>87</sup> N1

<sup>88</sup> N7. For an opposite opinion on the importance of fishing interests see Centre Party MP, Gudmund Restad speech, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989; *Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidende* leader, 17 October, 1980.

<sup>89</sup> The Soviets have begun oil exploration in a field just East of the disputed area, in the Stockmanovskaya field. There have also been reports over the years of the Soviets drilling West of the line which Norway claims should be the dividing line. For an example of such see E. Kjekstad, "-Bekymringsfull russisk oppførsel," *Nationen*, 3 May, 1983. The first sale of offshore technology and  
(continued...)

delimitation question could be resolved, concrete benefits were waiting on the other side.<sup>90</sup> The Swedes could never hope to, and never did employ the same marketing technique in their negotiations. An example of typical Norwegian logic was provided by one well-placed advisor: "the Soviets could benefit immensely from economic cooperation up North--we could provide the technology for exploitation--but we are careful as long as the border question remains unsettled."<sup>91</sup> The Norwegians have attempted to engage private actors in order to limit Soviet influence in the area. According to one researcher: "There was one group of opinion which thought it was very important to involve the U.S. companies, give them favourable conditions (operator-status) in the North Sea--this was opposed to another view that because of security sensitiveness of the area, we should keep them out and from doing something bad against the Russians."<sup>92</sup>

### *Evolution of Events*

While the Norwegians first requested negotiations with the Soviet Union over the continental shelf in 1967, and in 1970 informal discussions on the matter got underway, formal negotiations would have to wait until 1974.<sup>93</sup> Since then negotiations have occurred sporadically.<sup>94</sup> Unlike Sweden, in Norway (Churchill,

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<sup>89</sup>(...continued)

services for exploration on the Soviet undisputed part of the continental shelf took place in April, 1983. ("Norsk-Sovjetisk avtale," *Arbeiderbladet*, 18 April, 1983.

<sup>90</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg hints at this strategy, 1 June, 1987 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*) Stoltenberg elsewhere (1988:8-9) clearly exposes the 'carrot' in the form of oil exploration.

<sup>91</sup> N3

<sup>92</sup> One researcher who refused to be cited by name.

<sup>93</sup> N.M. Udgaard, "Veien til Rysjkovs sone-utspill," *Aftenposten*, 18 January, 1988.

<sup>94</sup> It is difficult to ascertain how many formal negotiating rounds have come to pass since 1974. Up until 16 December, 1986, A. Willersrud writes, ten rounds had taken place (including the one at that present time) "Ny runde om dele-linjen i Moskva," *Aftenposten*, 16 December, 1986.

1988:47), the task of reaching agreement has been complicated by the establishment by both Norway and Sweden of 200-mile economic zones.

In order to resolve the problem of clashing fishing interests in the disputed area, Norway signed a "Grey Zone" agreement with the Soviet Union in January, 1978.<sup>95</sup> Sweden resisted such a move with full force. The fact nevertheless remains, like in the earlier-studied case of an Incidents-at-Sea Treaty: the Norwegians did it while the Swedes resisted.<sup>96</sup>

### *The Oslo Trip: Unfulfilled Expectations*

There was minimal activity on the problem until well into Gorbachëv's tenure. Gorbachëv's Murmansk speech was one of the first indirect signs of motion on the issue. Thorvald Stoltenberg, in a foreign policy address not long after Gorbachëv's speech told the *Storting* that, during his discussions with Shevardnadze earlier in the Fall, Shevardnadze had forewarned Stoltenberg that Prime Minister Ryzhkov would be arriving in January (1988) with some "new assessments" of the (delimitation issue)<sup>97</sup>.

It could be argued that Premier Ryzhkov's trip to Oslo from 14 January, 1988 was perhaps the most important event in Norwegian-Soviet relations during the Gorbachëv years. The trip was so very important since Ryzhkov flew directly from Stockholm, after signature of the ÖA, to Oslo. This naturally created expectations

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<sup>95</sup> For more on the Grey Zone, see Skogan (1978:459-469). We should note the Norwegian Conservative Party's opposition to the Grey Zone agreement here. (N.M. Udgaard, "Veien til Rysjkovs sone-utspill," *Aftenposten*, 18 January, 1988)

<sup>96</sup> Churchill (1988) points out the rules that govern the treaty: the agreement is temporary, (annual, but has been extended yearly since then); the agreement sets out various regulatory measures (e.g. fishing gear and minimum fish sizes); each party may exercise jurisdiction only in respect to its own fishing vessels; total allowable catches are summed and roughly divided between the parties, with some quotas going to third states upon mutual consultation.

<sup>97</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 2 December, 1987; these hopes also echoed by Labour MP, Gunnar Skaug, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987

from the Norwegian public and élites for a favourable resolution of their outstanding dispute in the Barents.<sup>98</sup> It was clear that the Government expected a concrete initiative, which showed signs of will to compromise.<sup>99</sup>

It would not be unfair to say that Ryzhkov's proposed solution was perceived as 187 a mere extension and modification of the already-existing Grey Zone arrangement. As one source said, "the Soviets have been satisfied with the Grey Zone arrangement, we have not..."<sup>100</sup> Ryzhkov, while saying the discussions he had entered into were a "good beginning,"<sup>101</sup> pointed out that there were in fact important differences between the Baltic and the Barents, not least an historical difference, which led to the Swedes getting a modified median line solution.<sup>102</sup>

Finn Sollie claimed that "it was a total surprise that (Ryzhkov) did not have anything in his baggage."<sup>103</sup> Instead, said Sollie, "Ryzhkov said 'things are so mixed up in the Barents Sea that the Soviet Union is not willing to accept a fixed border': a

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<sup>98</sup> "When we got our ÖA," said one Swedish official, the Norwegians were a bit unhappy...but in fact the negotiations were product of two different concepts. In the Barents you had the strategic situation with nuclear submarines, while in the Baltic it was an economic zone," he continued. (S45)

<sup>99</sup> It is interesting to note the public signals which added to the highly charged climate of expectation. (M. Fyhn, "Norge venter delelinje-utspill fra Rysjkov," *Aftenposten*, 11 January, 1988. Further signals came during Foreign Minister Stoltenberg's trip to Moscow in September, 1987 that Ryzhkov would have with him "new evaluations " regarding the issue when he would come in January, 1988.

<sup>100</sup> "Norsk skuffelse- ingen løsning i nord," *Aftenposten*, 15 January, 1988.

<sup>101</sup> "Norsk skuffelse- ingen løsning i nord," *Aftenposten*, 15 January, 1988.

<sup>102</sup> "Norge holder fast på klar delelinje," *Aftenposten*, 16 January, 1988.

<sup>103</sup> Also see Sollie, "En iskald dusj fra Rysjkov," *Aftenposten*, 4 March, 1988.



surprising statement."<sup>104</sup> Brundtland called Ryzhkov's proposals as "belong(ing) to the past history of negotiations."<sup>105</sup>

It seemed the Soviet Union, as had become traditional in its foreign policy, wanted a 'package solution.' One élite expressed Ryzhkov's thoughts thus: "he said 'we don't think that a distinct dividing line is important here...instead, let's have a joint, common zone of cooperation and mutual trust' another word for condominium."<sup>106</sup> By this, said Sollie, the Soviet Union introduced a new principle in international law: "the zone of mutual confidence and cooperation, which in practice meant 50-50% resource utilization—very close to the grey zone idea."<sup>107</sup> In effect, said Sollie, "this would give the Russians a 50% vote in determining projects, determining the parties which would join in (e.g. ELF, Statoil), the areas which to develop in the zone—in short the when, where and who in offshore developments."<sup>108</sup>

Brundtland commented, saying the 50-50% "model of common utilization (is a proposal) to which we cannot agree," explaining "the situation is such that it is important to clarify responsibilities and juridical relationships in this area..."<sup>109</sup> But when asked why the Soviets had solved the problem with Sweden on a differential basis, Brundtland responded, "that question is best answered by the Soviet

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<sup>104</sup> Sollie, interview. Sollie elaborated why it was such a surprise such: there were statements by the Soviet Union of the will to compromise, but also the last couple of years there seemed to be movements in the Soviet position. Thus there seemed to be a real modification of the Soviet position--leading (some) to think that we could go much further.

<sup>105</sup> "Norsk skuffelse- ingen løsning i nord," *Aftenposten*, 15 January, 1988.

<sup>106</sup> N4

<sup>107</sup> Sollie, Interview.

<sup>108</sup> Sollie, interview.

<sup>109</sup> "Norge holder fast på klar delelinje," *Aftenposten*, 16 January, 1988.

Union."<sup>110</sup> Conservative MP, Kåre Willoch called the idea of "common area over the continental shelf in the North stillborn."<sup>111</sup>

The Soviet view of Norway's alliance membership may also be a factor which influenced the Soviet position. When Conservative MP Kåre Willoch and certain *Storting* members travelled to Moscow three months following Ryzhkov's trip, Willoch was asked whether "it (was) not unrealistic to think that the Soviet Union (could) agree to agree to a dividing line as long as Norway is a base for NATO."<sup>112</sup>

But this trip was not totally absent of positive signs. For Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, the Ryzhkov trip "confirmed a Soviet will to push relations further and to develop cooperation in areas of common concern."<sup>113</sup> But he made clear that "from the Government's side, we cannot accept cooperative arrangements which push aside the central question regarding delimitation."<sup>114</sup> This judgement would be shared across the political scale and would continue over party lines.<sup>115</sup> Stoltenberg however noted a new positive element in the "slight modification of the sector line in the North...(which was presented) as a proposal in addition to Ryzhkov's proposal of common resource usage."<sup>116</sup> Prime Minister Brundtland would call the modification

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<sup>110</sup> Norsk skuffelse- ingen løsning i nord."

<sup>111</sup> "Kåre Willoch: -Fellesområde dødfødt tanke."

<sup>112</sup> T. Andreassen, "-Nødvendig med delelinje i nord," *Aftenposten*, 9 April, 1988.

<sup>113</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 13 January, 1989.

<sup>114</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, *ibid*.

<sup>115</sup> Foreign Minister Bondevik's address on the Barents Sea delimitation for an example of continuity between the Labour Government's and the Bourgeois Government's standpoint in the issue. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 18 December, 1989).

<sup>116</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 13 January, 1988. A further change of position occurred immediately before Christmas, 1988, during a special Soviet entourage's trip to Oslo, with the message: "The Soviet Union, for the first time, can (imagine accepting, a diversion in (her) demands that the point-of-departure for delimitation should be the sector line." (Fyhn, "Sovjetisk delelinje-utspill," (continued...)

"the first time the Soviet Union has presented such a proposal."<sup>117</sup> Christian People's Party's Kjell Magne Bondevik agreed with Stoltenberg in that "it is a positive and interesting signal when the Soviets have announced that they are willing to accept a certain divergence from the sector principle."<sup>118</sup> Centre Party's Johan Buttedahl here joins in the views of Bondevik and Stoltenberg.<sup>119</sup> Even Progress Party's Røsjarde said "the last initiative from the Soviets could mean that it now is possible to go further (on the issue) now."<sup>120</sup>

### *Norwegian Explanations of the lack of movement in the Soviet Position*

Many individuals felt that the Soviet sense of history regarding the area best explained Soviet unwillingness to change on the Barents Sea question. These same individuals explained Soviet foreign policy stability in terms of constants--history, national interests, as both chief considerations and determinants alike. Finn Sollie explained the core of Soviet motivation in the Baltic agreement such: "The Soviet demands in the Baltic were a result of Soviet greed: she wanted to get as much she could of the Baltic." He added, "they never considered a 'package agreement,'<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>116</sup>(...continued)

Aftenposten, 17 January, 1989). This initiative was to have been followed by a trip to the Soviet Union by Brundtland before Summer, 1989. But as M. Fyhn writes ("Kreml har ikke tid til norsk besøk," Aftenposten 1 July, 1989) the Government gave up hopes for such a visit later in the year.

<sup>117</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>118</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>119</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>120</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>121</sup> Sollie said "while they never officially said they would like to see a linkage between a border agreement and other issues, they nevertheless pursued a policy that demonstrated they wanted a package deal: a collusion between foreign policy strategists and military strategists; the mix of a juridical  
(continued...)

and stuck to their 'ink guns' to get as much as possible; the line they pursued with respect to Öland and Gotland was evidence of this."<sup>122</sup> Kåre Willoch felt that the Russian tendency to think in terms of spheres-of-influence<sup>123</sup> was still present<sup>124</sup>: "in smaller proportion...the Soviet model for solution of the border question...can be seen against the background of traditional Russian thinking."<sup>125</sup>

Explaining the difference between the Baltic agreement and the Barents Sea discussions, one élite made the situation sound clear: "traditional history does not have the same weight in the Baltic as it carries in the North."<sup>126</sup> "You have to go back to the Seventeenth Century," said one official "when this area was very important to Russia--Russia was then confined on its Western border by Lithuania and its Southern border by Turkey and thus the only route of communications was through the North."<sup>127</sup> Since the War, said one former defence official, "the Soviet Union has toyed with different concepts to manage the situation in the North--not least the joint condominium proposals for Svalbard and Bjørnøya--especially the

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<sup>121</sup>(...continued)

settlement with political understanding in the North and military advantage," Sollié said.

<sup>122</sup> Sollié, interview: "I think the Swedes gave too much--the Russians felt that it might be possible to use disagreement as a lever to other agreements." He further noted the Grey Zone as evidence of this motive: "if you look, about one-third of the Grey Zone is to the West of the sector line."

<sup>123</sup> See also I Ytreland, *Aftenposten*, 26 January, 1988.

<sup>124</sup> Labour's Einar Førde mentioned that this tendency could not be called specifically Russian. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989).

<sup>125</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>126</sup> "The line is so deeply ingrained into them," said one élite, "on a Moscow weather map the second line (their sector line) is clearly drawn." (N4) Another Norwegian élite said "they can't pull back because this is defined as the Soviet border--and the Soviet Union holds its borders; this is a part of the 'whole' of the Soviet Union." (N28)

<sup>127</sup> N4

attempts made in 1944 with Trygve Lie and by Bratteli in 1974."<sup>128</sup> As said one élite, "If you get Norway to accept this special position between Norway and the Soviet Union, you get Norway to accept the joint condominium idea--theoretically giving Norway influence on decisions and vice verse...but in practice this is something which gives the Soviet Union a way to pressurize Norwegian decisions."<sup>129</sup>

The arrest of Norwegian Arne Treholt for espionage in connection with his position as delegate in the Norwegian negotiations between the Soviet Union and Norway opened up the issue to the outside world. As one élite said "the Soviets originally wanted joint jurisdiction in a defined area (another word for 'condominium'), in line with the border dispute" adding that he had "evidence that Treholt tried to get Evensen to accept the idea--Evensen resisted nevertheless."<sup>130</sup>

One can also explain stability in Soviet policy towards the area as principle-based. Socialist Left MP, Theo Koritzinsky attributed the lack of progress to a mixture of one, Soviet stubbornness on the border principle and two, a low priority."<sup>131</sup> "Although gradually the Soviet Union stopped referring to the sector principle as an argument, its proposals nevertheless clearly followed the sector line," said one élite familiar with the negotiations.<sup>132</sup> Interesting is the Soviet argument of 'special circumstances.' One high official, commenting on the Soviet claims, said "we find these most extraordinary."<sup>133</sup> In the process of dismissing the population argument, this official refuted another traditional Soviet claim on how the East-West line should be drawn, saying: "the coast does not go in a straight East-West direction...the natural and logical

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<sup>128</sup> N4. Solle added the "Tsarist unwillingness to accept Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard when it was proposed in 1871--Russia was the only nation to object to Norwegian sovereignty on Spitzbergen.

<sup>129</sup> N4

<sup>130</sup> N9

<sup>131</sup> Koritzinsky, interview.

<sup>132</sup> N4

<sup>133</sup> N24

thing is that the boundary should follow the (contours of the coast)."<sup>134</sup> With respect to the population argument, said one official, "the larger population only came about during the 1930's--thus, I can't find that argument so strong since such (variables) change over time."<sup>135</sup>

#### *Norwegians Explain Change in the Soviet Position*

Several élites indicated progress on the Norwegian-Soviet talks, both sides giving in some of their claims.<sup>136</sup> One senior official mentioned that there had been progress since 1986 onwards."<sup>137</sup> According to one individual in-the-know, "there was real progress in the negotiations...I had met with Shevardnadze and he promised that he would follow the matter personally."<sup>138</sup> One élite saw wider change in the traditional Soviet positions. "They did not stick to their original claims in the Baltic; over the years they have widened their perceptions of the (significance) of islands, continental shelf, and developed such concepts as 'special international waters' in their stead," he told.<sup>139</sup> One senior official said "we have always expressed our willingness to compromise (between median and sector lines)--but they haven't responded until recently, where only now they are at least sitting down with maps."<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> N24

<sup>135</sup> N28

<sup>136</sup> N28

<sup>137</sup> N46

<sup>138</sup> N41. Thus, for this individual, "a change in Soviet Foreign Ministers could mean the negotiations will take more time."

<sup>139</sup> N4

<sup>140</sup> N24

Others saw change against the background of East-West changes, coupled with a strategy of Soviet willingness to resolve outstanding conflicts.<sup>141</sup> For Conservative MP, Anders Talleraas, Gorbachëv's Helsinki address in Fall, 1989 "indicated that the Soviet Union is willing to see with new eyes on the negotiations."<sup>142</sup>

Socialist Left MP, Paul Chaffey said "we have seen a more compromising view in later years, but the problem at the moment is that we don't know who to talk to in Moscow."<sup>143</sup> To this added one Conservative MP, "maybe we should just wait the whole thing out until we just have Russia to deal with."<sup>144</sup> Chaffey thought that the changed situation on Svalbard illustrated Soviet foreign policy change. "The Soviet Union, by treaty, has rights to demonstrate '(a presence)--but now we hear that the towns might be shut down because of economic reasons...this could show a shift from military-strategic interests in Northern areas to more pragmatic considerations," Chaffey added.<sup>145</sup>

Still other élites felt a change in Soviet approach was attributable to economic necessity. One high official explained it simply, "they probably need oil and gas for their currency."<sup>146</sup> In a sense, said this official, "they are a bit over the barrel: they want resources, on the one hand, but they also fear provoking a Norwegian reaction on the other."<sup>147</sup> "The Soviet Union is not independent in energy terms and the Soviet Union wants a better energy supply," expressed Centre Party MP, Johan J. Jakobsen, as one of the reasons for a Soviet change. If the Soviet Union is in deep economic problems and is desperate for assistance in offshore, they might be tempted

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<sup>141</sup> N41. It should be noted, though, that such logic however was much more prominent in Sweden.

<sup>142</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>143</sup> Chaffey, interview.

<sup>144</sup> N13

<sup>145</sup> Chaffey, interview.

<sup>146</sup> N24

<sup>147</sup> N24

to buy support over and beyond true economic considerations—but they are too busy today to think about these things," Sollie said.<sup>148</sup>

But as one Conservative MP noted, "it's a question of timing: the Soviets will use all available time to get the result they desire."<sup>149</sup> Even Labour MP, Bjørn Tore Godal joined in this logic saying "normally in these sorts of questions the Soviet Union has a lot of time—it is a vast country, and they usually deal with things on a one-by-one basis." A small country, he contrasted, "could be more hurried...but we are not in a hurry though."<sup>150</sup> One official pointed out the value in demonstrating that Norway had time.<sup>151</sup> Although Norway was a small country, it was also a NATO member, which minimized the danger of leaving the matter unsolved. NATO membership limited the universe of tools of pressure alternatives which could be brought to bear on Norway from the Soviet Union (Traavik and Østreng, 1977:361).

Sollie summed up a portion of opposing thinking, saying: "some in Norway see 'a window of opportunity' and perceive an opportunity while Gorbachëv is still there: before he either becomes a dictator or succumbs to the military."<sup>152</sup> One official pointed to the negative outcome of the Union's disintegration, saying "lately views have been presented that if the Soviet Union breaks up, maybe the RSFSR will not be interested in giving it away."<sup>153</sup> Another high official pointed to pressing Norwegian environmental concerns as one of the factors which could indirectly influence the timing of the Norwegian position. "The Norwegians have also been

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<sup>148</sup> Sollie, interview.

<sup>149</sup> N13

<sup>150</sup> Godal, interview.

<sup>151</sup> N41

<sup>152</sup> Sollie, interview.

<sup>153</sup> N28



more forthcoming and aggressive in extending cooperative offers," "there is no way they can solve these problems alone--we must do it together."<sup>154</sup>

### *Prospects*

The Norwegian public and many élites were still hoping for a godsend during 1990 and 1991. First hopes were attached to Gorbachëv's impending trip to Oslo to accept the Nobel Peace Prize in December, 1990.<sup>155</sup> When this became unrealistic due to internal political turmoil, remaining hopes for a rapid solution were pinned to Gorbachëv's impending Nobel address, preliminarily set for May-June, 1991.<sup>156</sup> As Røsjarde mentioned, Gorbachëv's trip "could be an important opportunity to signal, by 'bringing something in his bag.'"<sup>157</sup> One high élite said "we expect that there will be new talks in the Spring, and as a matter of fact today (29 January, 1991), Brundtland will bring the matter up with (Soviet Vice President) Yenaev."<sup>158</sup> Gorbachëv's Nobel speech on 5-6 June was accompanied only by symbols of a more flexible Soviet attitude and progress on the negotiations.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> N26. The linkage between environmental concerns and the jurisdictional dispute is made clear by Stoltenberg's, 13 January, 1989 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*).

<sup>155</sup> "Gorbatsjov i tale," *Aftenposten*, 18 October, 1990.

<sup>156</sup> M. Fyhn, "Håp om løsning for delelinjen," *Aftenposten*, 3 November, 1990: the last negotiation round occurred in Moscow two weeks earlier: "We are well past halfway regarding reaching compromise on a reasonable division of the disputed area," one 'well-informed' source was to have said.

<sup>157</sup> Røsjarde, interview.

<sup>158</sup> N48

<sup>159</sup> M. Fyhn, "Stoltenberg snart til Moskva," *Aftenposten*, 3 April, 1991. This article points out that the Norwegian Government was hoping to stage a Foreign Minister visit, which would have been the first in eleven years, to Moscow before Gorbachëv's arrival in Oslo. Even the Swedes took the opportunity to invite Gorbachëv to 'stop by' Sweden on his way to Oslo ("Gorbatjov snart till Sverige," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 14 May, 1991).

## Chapter Six

### **The question of recognition and adaptation to new political realities: aspects of Norwegian and Swedish policies towards the Baltic independence question**

#### *The Awakening*

In a span of two years, the goal of Baltic independence became the Swedish and Norwegian cause. Comparing Gorbachëv's earliest two years with the period from at least early 1989 onwards, Swedish perceptions of and behaviour towards the Baltic question have undergone total transformation. Norwegian behaviour in the question has essentially been a question of a dramatically increased degree of involvement in the Baltic question. Both efforts logically culminated in full diplomatic recognitions of the three Baltic nations in late August, 1991.

There were several shared dilemmas which confronted the Norwegian and Swedish élites. The answers to these questions reveal interesting aspects of Norwegian and Swedish élite perceptions of Soviet foreign policy. An examination of Norwegian and Swedish behaviour in the question also exposes two similar, yet different approaches to the same problem--which have part of the origins in the differing security policy environments of Sweden and Norway. In this, neutrality in Sweden and alignment in Norway played a small, yet important role. The questions revolve around how best to unify otherwise incompatible foreign policy goals. How could they adapt support for independence for a 'brother people' while retaining the benefits of dealing with a unified Soviet Union? How could they best unite their desire to see independence for the appendages while maintaining a working relationship with the centre? How could one leadership's approach be adapted/coordinated to other nations' approaches in the same question? Another challenge was to balance the past with that which was desirable in the future.

While the evolution of the Swedish approach to the Baltic nations can be called a dramatic re-orientation, the Norwegian approach can be dubbed a 'shift

of emphasis' in its foreign policy priorities. The Swedish re-orientation was essentially a product of three factors: one, it resulted from an emotive analysis of the situation in *Balticum* (and as a 'natural reaction' to want to help 'brothers in need.')

A second factor was the realisation that the Soviet Union could not forever remain intact. Thus, wouldn't it be more logical and strategically intelligent to develop strong ties with ostensibly, soon-to-be countries? A third factor which was very important for the Swedes was the desire to '*göra upp*'<sup>1</sup>) past history. Sweden, after Nazi-Germany, was the first country to recognise the incorporation of the Baltic states<sup>2</sup> into the Soviet Union in Summer, 1940. This decision, coupled with the *Baltic Deportation of 1944*<sup>3</sup>, and the surrendering of an Estonian gold reserve<sup>4</sup> in 1940 acted to create a bad national conscience of immeasurable proportions. Sweden's historical past with the Baltics generally stands in stark contrast to Norway's.<sup>5</sup>

Norway, in union with the majority of other NATO countries, did not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. Neither

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<sup>1</sup> A common Swedish expression. Could be translated as a combination of the following: take responsibility for, pay for, come to terms with, settle the count with.

<sup>2</sup> D. Isacson, "Sverige, Baltikum och guldreserven," *Uppsala Nya Tidning*, 25 June, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> The 1946 deportation from Sweden to the Baltics of slightly less than 200 refugees. An event which first surrounded promises allegedly by the Swedish Government in 1945-6 that Balts fleeing from Soviet consolidation would be welcome to seek refuge in Sweden. It so happened that the Swedish Government later reversed this decision, and the Balts were sent back, and that with foreseeable results.

<sup>4</sup> "Sverige måste ersätta Estland för guld," *Dagens Industri*, 26 August, 1991. The Swedish Wartime Government surrendered the reserve in connection with Sweden's recognition of the Baltic countries' annexation. The current value of the reserve is estimated to between SEK 300-400 Million.

<sup>5</sup> Most Norwegians would agree with Norwegian Stockholm-based Ambassador, Olav Bücher-Johannessen: "Sweden has a long history of concrete involvement in the Baltic and relations with the Baltic nations, while we have been traditionally oriented to the West, especially the United Kingdom."

did Norway need to make up lost time for an unpleasant historical past. These two facts allowed for greater policy manoeuvrability and imposed certain restraints upon the Norwegian-Baltic relationship. So, when the Norwegians finally became active in the Baltic question in 1990, it was really only a question of raising the Baltic question relative to its hierarchy of foreign policy priorities. One former high Norwegian official contrasted the Norwegian and Swedish approaches thus: "the Balts have expressed scepticism to the Swedish policy; so to get into a position where the Balts trusted them they had to use harsher words...they already trusted Norwegian leaders."<sup>6</sup>

#### Discussion when the topic was not popular: 1986-1988

##### *Sweden's official position*

Sweden's official position in the Baltic matter was laid down by Foreign Minister, Christian Günther on 13 December, 1944. He described the chain of events such<sup>7</sup>:

"We have based our relationship to these states on the fact that when their incorporation into the Soviet-Russia took place, the present Baltic states' ministers surrendered their legations to the Soviet-Russian legation and notified me, that they had ceased to be representatives for any Government in the respective countries. This is, in other words, a fact, in which our country did not take the initiative, but which we, on the other hand, could not refuse to accept."

In 1968 the Foreign Minister further clarified Sweden's stance:<sup>8</sup>

"the Soviet Union, on the eve of the incorporation of the Baltic states, was considered to have actual control over these areas and to be in a position to exercise sovereign powers there."

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<sup>6</sup> N41

<sup>7</sup> B. Westerberg, "Ofattbart och oacceptabelt," *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 November, 1989.

<sup>8</sup> Riksdagstryck 1985/86:UU28.

## *The Initiators*

In Sweden, the far Right Bourgeois parties, especially the Moderate Party, were the first to take the initiative in the Baltic question.<sup>9</sup> It was in fact only much later that the Social Democratic<sup>10</sup> and the Communist Parties joined these efforts-in fact falling in behind the Conservative Party's, and to some extent, the Liberal Party's efforts rather than blazing their own route in the question.<sup>11</sup>

The road to consensus in Sweden proved to be far rougher than in Norway. The content of the first true Norwegian Parliamentary debate about the area in 1990 could be characterized as 'consensual' compared with the Swedish debate. There was no reason to change policy for the Norwegians, only to strengthen and articulate it. It is interesting to note that in a methodical survey of *Storting* debate, only two references to the Baltic question could be found prior to 1990. It is worth pointing out that both of these references emanate from the Christian People's Party and both chiefly concern human rights violations in the Baltic region.<sup>12</sup> Not even the Foreign Minister, in his accounting of progress on the CSCE-process and human rights in particular, ever stopped at the Baltic question in any one of his bi-annual foreign policy Addresses well into the Gorbachëv years.<sup>13</sup> The first reference we have located of the Foreign

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<sup>9</sup> One Swedish élite characterized the chain-of-events: the Liberals and the Moderates have led the way for support of Baltic groupings...all the other parties just hung on for the ride." (S38)

<sup>10</sup> We note that the decision to recognise incorporation in 1944 was made by the interparty Wartime Government, whereas the *Baltutlämning* was the decision of a Social Democratic Government.

<sup>11</sup> S. Leijonhufvud, "Sverige har bytt fot i utrikespolitiken," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 29 January, 1991, points out the deeper historical roots of this question could be found as far back as 1981.

<sup>12</sup> MP Bondevik, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986 and 19 January, 1989.

<sup>13</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 26 November, 1986; 1 June, 1987; 2 December, 1987.

Minister's raising the issue was on 18 December, 1989, but even there, only in passing.<sup>14</sup> The first major debate over Norwegian Baltic policy in fact took place as late as late as 31 May, 1990. To be sure, this debate in 1990 could be called consensual contrasted with the Swedish.

#### *Early discussion of "Balticum"<sup>15</sup> in Sweden*

The problem of Baltic expatriates provided one of the early sources of debate in Sweden. The question of Baltic immigrants was a uniquely Swedish question; there were only sparse amounts of Baltic immigrants in Norway. The key issue was that Baltic citizens were still seen by the Soviet Union as Soviet citizens. Conservative MP, Birger Hågård provides one early manifestation of this concern in April, 1986:

"...it is the source of much humiliation and concern that tens of thousands of Swedes of Baltic heritage, even in their second and third generations, are still regarded by the Soviet occupation forces as being Soviet citizens."<sup>16</sup>

Even at this early point the sharp contrast between the Left and Right was clear.<sup>17</sup> This sort of question did bring attention to the fact that the far-right parties felt that the Soviet presence in the Baltic republics was an occupation and that the states were annexed by the Soviet Union. The Conservative typification of conditions in and the status of the Baltic republics was replete

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<sup>14</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 18 December, 1989. The issue was also taken up by Norwegian Centre Party MP, Edvard Grimstad, on 4 January, 1990, but even there, in passing.

<sup>15</sup> A Scandinavian word comprising Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

<sup>16</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 18 April, 1986.

<sup>17</sup> Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg (interview) mentioned that before 1988 and Gorbachëv "the Social Democrats preferred better relations with Moscow over relations with Riga...they always wanted to reach *Balticum* through Moscow."

with unmistakably bold language. The tone is not unlike that of élites following the Czech coup of 1948. MP, Per Olof Strindberg:

"What I am soliciting...is an opinion which constantly points out the oppression in the once-free nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; these nations are still occupied by the Soviet Union, although the Second World War ended forty-two years ago...In a reply, the Foreign Minister implied that the situation in South Africa is unique, since oppression has been occurring for decenniums. Well, that has also been the case for Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia."<sup>18</sup>

The Social Democratic tone was qualitatively different. Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson<sup>19</sup> confirmed "there are large numbers of those with Baltic origin, the majority of them against their will," however reminded that "we cannot hope to change the Soviet citizenship laws..."<sup>20</sup> While Social Democratic MP, Bengt Silverstrand, felt that one should continue to be critical of the Baltic peoples' situation within Soviet frontiers, he felt that "it does not serve the Baltic peoples to make vain, public declarations." This precise division of opinion between the political parties would penetrate Swedish domestic debate over the Baltic question until at least 1989-90. This precise tone, to accept the 'reality of the situation,' and to 'satisfy oneself with the status quo,' would be the consistent Governmental message to the Swedish public and the Balts.

Social Democratic MP and Chief Spokesman for the Party in foreign policy matters, Sture Ericson<sup>21</sup>, saw that "there are those that are looking to stir up

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<sup>18</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.

<sup>19</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 15 May, 1986.

<sup>20</sup> Baltic double-citizenship is discussed by the Foreign Affairs Committee in Riksdagstryck 1985/1986:UU28 ("Om balters dubbla medborgarskap"), Riksdagstryck 1987/88:UU7. Within the first position paper, several motions, especially by the Liberal Party (MP's Cars, Bergdahl and Ahrlund) urge the Government to apply pressure on the Soviet Union to release Baltic citizens from their Soviet citizenship.

<sup>21</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

turbulence in the Baltic area," mentioning that "a Moderate member of the *Riksdag's* Foreign Affairs Committee<sup>22</sup>, in an article, felt that Sweden should act to break off Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia from the Soviet Union." "It is dubious that these (crazy) foreign policy (suggestions)," Ericson<sup>23</sup> added in a now-famous statement, "extended further than extreme-Moderate circles."<sup>24</sup> If that wasn't enough, Ericson later added more must, stating: "such foreign policy initiatives, such as attempts to create three new states on the Baltic is nothing other than craziness which is naturally fostered on the extreme-Moderate (flank), in order to capture Baltic exile votes in this Fall's election."<sup>25</sup> The piece by Gunnar Hökmark pointed out some sharp contrasts between the Conservative and Social Democratic viewpoints on the issue:

"there is a serious shortcoming in Swedish foreign policy...the Baltic countries' situation, which is (physically) closer, has been contracted in order to make room for other conflict areas, which are much further away, and in which the chances to play a meaningful role are significantly less...Sweden, in connection with the follow-up work of the Helsinki Convention and in her bilateral contacts with the Soviets, should forward its position that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should be given the right to, in open, democratic forms, decide if, in the future, they would like

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<sup>22</sup> Gunnar Hökmark, "Sverige bör agera för att bryta loss Estland, Lettland och Litauen från Sovjetunionen.." *Norrköpings Tidningar*, 26 February, 1988,(*Riksdagsprotokoll*, 16 March, 1988.)

<sup>23</sup> Håkan Holmberg mentioned that Sture Ericson was the most active of the Swedish Social Democrats in the Baltic question--"he has seen his task as defending the Government." (Holmberg, interview).

<sup>24</sup> Ericson, *ibid*. Andres Küng found it strange how the Government encouraged wars for independence in other parts of the world, while simultaneously discouraging the Balts not to do anything without asking Moscow for permission. (Küng, "Sverige skadar balterna," *Dagens Nyheter*, 23 October, 1989).

<sup>25</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 16 March, 1988.



to belong to the Soviet Union<sup>26</sup> or to establish national independence.'<sup>27</sup>

Even three Moderate MP's, Margaretha af Ugglas, Anita Bråkenhielm and Ivar Virgin<sup>28</sup> stated that the right of self-determination for the Balts had been violated through the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union, citing the 1966 United Nation's convention regarding citizens economic and political rights and the CSCE declaration. The suggestion to raise the matter to a higher international level of consensus is one of the chief traits of neutrality. In this issue, the Liberal and Moderate parties would not be joined in their request to internationalize the question until early 1990. Thus the debate actually concerned one of the pillars of neutrality.

It is interesting to note Governmental opposition for this move:<sup>29</sup>

"Sweden has not taken the issue up the question of the Baltic states' right to self-determination in the CSCE context, neither do we harbour any intention of doing so. But this does NOT mean that we calmly accept violations against human rights in *Balticum*—we will never tolerate such encroachments, not in the Soviet Union nor elsewhere."<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Liberal MP, Hadar Cars emphasizes that the right to self-determination is guaranteed by the Soviet constitution. Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988.

<sup>27</sup> Anita Bråkenhielm, Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

<sup>28</sup> Riksdagstryck 1985/86:UU28 ("Om balters dubbla medborgarskap").

<sup>29</sup> Backed by the Foreign Affairs Committee (Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU3 ("Sveriges relationer till de baltiska republikerna"), 8 November, 1988): "It can however not be Sweden's task to awaken the question of the various republics position within the Soviet Union within international organs..."

<sup>30</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988.

The Social Democrats and the Environmental Party seemed to stand on the same side of the question<sup>31</sup>

*Baltic support: Perestroika Endangered?*

No party in either Sweden or Norway was interested in endangering the Soviet reform strategy. But the interpretation of how much pressure would be counterproductive varied. The Swedish Government took a traditionally conservative inventory of the costs and benefits of increased Baltic support. Foreign Minister Sten Andersson said, "...if Sweden, in the present situation, behaves in such a way that the positive development which is now taking place is stopped, we will not have done anything that either the Baltic peoples or the Swedish will be able to appreciate."<sup>32</sup> Andersson does however allow some light to shine on Baltic independence hopes.

"There is a positive process now occurring in the Soviet Union, and the Baltic peoples' possibilities to give expression to an enhanced degree of self-determination is dependent upon the continuation of that positive process...this is being a realist--to do the possible to achieve a decisive goal."<sup>33</sup>

Centre Party's Pär Granstedt attempted to balance the interests stating: "...since there are limits to what the leadership in Moscow can accept, especially those things they can except very quickly...we don't want to appear as any *provocateurs*."<sup>34</sup> However, as Granstedt made clear, "we feel it is important that

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<sup>31</sup> Per Gahrton felt that "Hökmark's ultimate desire was to pull these countries into the West European cooperative structure--in other words, just an extension of the classical cold war." Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988.

<sup>32</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988.

<sup>33</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988.

<sup>34</sup> Granstedt, Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988. As late as 23 March, 1990, the Foreign Minister still subscribed to this same school of logic. (Svenska Dagbladet, 23 March, 1990).

the Soviet Union be made aware that it will have to pay a significant political price if more or less violent methods are employed in bringing the Baltic developments to a halt."<sup>35</sup> To say publicly that the Government favoured a break-up of the Soviet Union would also have ramifications for Sweden's desired position as an impartial actor in the process.

An investigation of the risks involved in supporting the Baltics may explain some differences between the Swedish and Norwegian approaches to the question.<sup>36</sup> NATO adopted a 'wait and see' attitude towards the developments, not least because a disintegration of the Soviet Union could have meant catastrophe for U.S.-Soviet disarmament and cooperation on other questions. As contrasted to Swedish Government statements, which indirectly imply that increased Swedish support for the Balts would endanger Soviet-Swedish relations, the Norwegian Government, represented by Thorvald Stoltenberg, mentions that his main concern is that Norwegian support should not endanger the Baltic-Moscow negotiations.<sup>37</sup> However, Stoltenberg shared with his Swedish counterparts the feeling that increased support would not serve the purposes of the Baltic peoples. Only once the situation is stabilized, states Stoltenberg, could Norway imagine sending an ambassador to the Baltic states--<sup>38</sup> a move which Sweden seemed to be intent on taking sooner.

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<sup>35</sup> Granstedt, *ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> As a sidenote, one Norwegian Foreign Ministry involved with these questions found that "the difference is not between the political parties in Norway, rather between degrees of activity amongst the different political personalities." (N5)

<sup>37</sup> M. Fyhn, "Norge vil styrke Sovjet-kontakten," *Aftenposten*, 1 November, 1988.

<sup>38</sup> M. Fyhn, "Norge vil styrke Sovjet-kontakten." Norway, in keeping with *praxis* and not international legal understandings, has accepted the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. Thus, Norway made the decision to never send any Embassy officials on official missions there.

## **The Seeds of Consensus: Fall 1988-Fall 1989**

Massive political demonstrations occurred from late 1988, in the Baltic republics, especially Estonia. Estonia, in late 1988 found itself in a drawn out constitutional conflict with Moscow. The announcement by the Lithuanian Communist Party led by Brazauskas, in December, 1989 of its independence from the Soviet Communist Party was one of the first highlights of the Baltic independence movement(Jonson, 1990b:4).

With respect to domestic developments in the Baltic area, said Sture Ericson, "until now, the Baltic leaders have stood the test: they have acted wisely with authority and self-restraint..."<sup>39</sup> However, Ericson said, "there seem to be two restrictions which provide the framework for continuing developments in the Baltic: that the republics will remain parts of the Soviet Union and that the Communist Party will retain its leading role in a one party-state... the Balts are not helped by Governmental statements which in actuality imply direct involvement in the current constitutional debate in the Soviet Union."<sup>40</sup>

Moderate Party leader, Carl Bildt felt that when Gorbachëv spoke of the "Common European House...this house presupposes that one has cleaned up a little around the grounds...when this house is finished it will become obvious that there can be no locks on the doors between the rooms."<sup>41</sup> Liberal Party's Håkan Holmberg<sup>42</sup> placed a premium on Soviet moderation in the Baltic

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<sup>39</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988. Ericson adds the traditional Finnish argument: "We should always bear in mind that what is in the Finnish interests in terms of relations Eastward is, for all practical purposes, also in Swedish interests."

<sup>40</sup> Sverker Åström points out ("I det blinkande gula ljuset från Moskva," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 November, 1988), "even if the Soviet constitution formally leaves the possibility for withdrawal from the Soviet Union, one should assume that such a possibility, in practice, should be seen as out-of-the-question, even for the present 'liberal' party leadership."

<sup>41</sup> Bildt, "Estland har embryot till ett flerpartisystem," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 18 January, 1989.

<sup>42</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.

conflict, saying, in union with his party leader, Westerberg<sup>43</sup>: "I think it is both important and correct to say that *perestroika* over the whole Soviet Union will either (succeed or fail) with the success of the Baltic states." Communist Party, Bertil Måbrink's, speaking style in the same debate stood in marked contrast to Ericson's and, strangely, much more like Bildt or Holmberg's:

"It is years of discrimination, encroachment and so-called Russification that the Baltic peoples are openly revolting against. They demand their apparent right to self-determination. They demand the right to freely be permitted to exercise their culture. They demand an end to the profound environmental destruction."<sup>44</sup>

Official statements slowly began to give way to more concrete proposals for cooperation across the political spectrum from 1988 onwards. The Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee in late 1988 stated the following:

"For a number of years it has not been possible to maintain as close relations with (the Baltic republics), as was both desirable and natural. Now there is reason for the Government to make an overview of Sweden's relations with the Baltic republics, so as to explore new areas and closer contacts."<sup>45</sup>

By late 1989 practically all political parties had established either formal or informal discussion channels within the Baltics.<sup>46</sup> It is much clearer which connections the opposition parties had, while the Government, perhaps intentionally, and in keeping with its traditional 'quiet diplomacy' line, vaguely

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<sup>43</sup> "Svenskt statslån till Estland!" Svenska Dagbladet, 25 August, 1989.

<sup>44</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988.

<sup>45</sup> Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU3 ("Sveriges relationer till de baltiska republikerna"), 8 November, 1988.

<sup>46</sup> The Environmental Party and Centre Party accounted for their contacts in Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.

continued to speak of increasing 'contact networks.'<sup>47</sup> But Andersson, in the same breath, was cautious to remind that "in the meantime this question must be handled within the context of the framework of our agreements with the Soviet Union."<sup>48</sup> The Swedish Government showed no hints of wanting to circumvent Moscow in its attempts to increase Baltic support.

### *Concretizing Cooperation*

Great emphasis came to be placed on economic and cultural exchange with the Baltics. Economic and cultural aid could hardly be interpreted as compromising neutrality--and could only--with a stretch of the imagination--be interpreted as an attempt to assist the Baltics away from the Soviet Union. But even the Government gave these issues a low priority in the beginning. The Moderate Party proposed a 10 million SEK portion of the Foreign Ministry's budget to stimulate contacts and cultural exchange between Sweden and the Baltics.<sup>49</sup> But in 1989 only a budget of 2 million SEK, and that with at least one accompanying condition<sup>50</sup>, was the Government's contribution for Baltic-Swedish cultural exchange.<sup>51</sup>

The Swedish Foreign Ministry had in the past directed its contacts with the Baltic republics through its Consular Office in Leningrad. From late 1988 there was serious discussion within the Foreign Ministry of expanding its contact network South- and Westwards in the Soviet Union. The Liberal Party,<sup>52</sup> the

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<sup>47</sup> "Breda kontakter med Baltikum," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 4 December, 1988.

<sup>48</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 9 December, 1988.

<sup>49</sup> Conservative MP, Alf Wennerfors, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 17 May, 1989.

<sup>50</sup> The money should be connected with popular movements. (Alf Wennerfors, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 17 May, 1989).

<sup>51</sup> Wennerfors, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 17 May, 1989.

<sup>52</sup> Håkan Holmberg, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 17 May, 1989.

Centre Party<sup>53</sup>, and surely also the Conservative Party looked favourably upon efforts to establish Baltic branch offices extending from Leningrad—but chiefly only as 'stepping stones' to something more formal and official.<sup>54</sup> In late 1988, Andersson hinted at such a development saying: "we have a frontier-trade agreement which might be able to facilitate Baltic trade...an expansion of our Baltic contacts could very well lead to the establishment of an official presence there."<sup>55</sup>

Norway could not enter into any such discussion. Norway's official opinion was that the Baltic states were not a part of the Soviet Union, thus its diplomatic contacts to the area could not run through Moscow. Any attempt to use Leningrad or Moscow as a hub for extending a Norwegian diplomatic presence into the Baltics could be interpreted as following the 'Moscow route.' In light of this, no Norwegian Ambassador could officially ever visit the Baltic capitals. A Norwegian diplomatic presence could only be contemplated in the context of three independent states.

*The Government's foreign policy collision course with the opposition, November, 1989.*

On a trip to the Soviet Union in early November, Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson clearly said that which many had long assumed the Government's position to be on the legal status of the Baltics: "the Baltics are

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<sup>53</sup> Pär Granstedt, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.

<sup>54</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee mentions knowledge of planned strengthening of the General Consulate in Leningrad. (Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU21 ("Sveriges relationer till de baltiska republikerna"), 20 April, 1989.)

<sup>55</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 December, 1988; Riksdagsprotokoll, 27 October, 1988.

not occupied."<sup>56</sup> This standpoint stood in opposition to the declarations of the Baltic parliaments made shortly after Andersson's return to Sweden. The statement caused a considerable uproar in Sweden which would not abate until well into 1990.<sup>57</sup>

It was not this message, as much as what it symbolized in terms of the Government's overall stance on the Baltic question, which was most significant. During the trip, Andersson was reported to have spoken to the Balts about "political maturity," and "satisfying oneself with the possible" rather than achievement of independence.<sup>58</sup> Andersson likewise cited directly and without reservation from Foreign Minister Günther's 1944 statement on Baltic diplomatic status--an indication that conditions indeed had not changed since World War Two. However, in the political battle which followed Andersson's return to Sweden, there was some indication that the Government was willing to re-think its policy towards *Balticum*.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> O. Santesson, "Motsägelsefulla budskap i Baltikum och Sovjet," *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 November, 1989. An interesting contrast with Sten Andersson's later statement: "there is not an international legal expert in this country who thinks anything but that the Baltic republics were occupied, in terms of international law, during one month in 1940...then the Baltic states were annexed..." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991).

<sup>57</sup> Bengt Westerberg, in an interview traced the cause of Andersson's statement, saying: "he didn't know what to answer when asked about the occupation of Baltics, and therefore he denied." (that they were occupied) He added, "he was advised by foreign policy experts and then decided to re-word what he had said from the beginning...he realized he used the wrong phrases." One MP said "he then realized he was 'out of touch...from then on, Andersson and the Foreign Ministry tried to play catch up." (S33)

<sup>58</sup> O. Santesson, "Motsägelsefulla budskap i Baltikum och Sovjet."

<sup>59</sup> B. Scheutz, "Svensk östpolitik måste omvärderas," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 16 November, 1989.



The Government's<sup>60</sup> approach following the statement re-oriented the debate to the future tense, rather than to concentrate on the past.<sup>61</sup> Ingvar Carlsson said that "the important question is not whether *Balticum* is occupied, but rather what Sweden can do to promote the developments there."<sup>62</sup> "My ambition is, for the Baltics sake, for the sake of *perestroika*, and Sweden's sake, to attempt to re-set Swedish foreign policy concord."<sup>63</sup> "If I would have said that Estonia was occupied," said Andersson, "I might just as well go home," explaining that "we had not been even able to open the Consular offices,<sup>64</sup> we couldn't have discussed future improvements for business opportunities there and we would not have been able to discuss tourism and environmental issues."<sup>65</sup> In another statement, Andersson said "if I, as Swedish Foreign Minister had come to *Balticum* and said that you are occupied, I would have pointed out those who want to cooperate with the Soviet Union as *quislings* and *cooperateurs*."<sup>66</sup> Andersson further points out that "one cannot recognise a country as a part of another country while simultaneously maintaining that it is occupied by this other country."<sup>67</sup>

It is interesting to note a shift in tone from the previous emphasis in Andersson's statements upon assurances that Sweden's policy should not upset

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<sup>60</sup> Prime Minister Carlsson positioned himself squarely behind Andersson's treatment of the matter. (TT, "Får stöd av statsministern," *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, 19 November, 1989).

<sup>61</sup> B. Scheutz, "Svensk östpolitik måste omvärderas."

<sup>62</sup> TT, "Får stöd av statsministern."

<sup>63</sup> S. Svensson, "Måste se riskerna," *Dagens Nyheter*, 17 November, 1989.

<sup>64</sup> We note that a Swedish Consular office was opened in mid-1991.

<sup>65</sup> S. Svensson, "Måste se riskerna."

<sup>66</sup> D. Ljungberg, "Vår inställning ger kontakter," *Dagens Nyheter*, 17 November, 1989.

<sup>67</sup> "Låt oss se framåt ifråga om Baltikum."

the ongoing *perestroika* process to statements ostensibly containing a more balanced assessment of the chances for *perestroika* and *glasnost*'s success.<sup>68</sup> These statements may denote that the Government was now willing to balance its approach to the Soviet Central Government with its approach to the Baltic republics.

The reaction from the bourgeois parties was expectedly harsh. Moderate Leader, Carl Bildt, felt that Andersson's attempts at explaining his stance in the *Riksdag* "only made matters worse"<sup>69</sup>... it is totally clear that the picture of Swedish foreign policy has come a bit astray through several unfortunate statements."<sup>70</sup> Bildt mentioned further that "it seems as though Sweden prefers to halt rather than support the popular fight in the direction of freedom, democracy and increased self-determination which is taking place in *Balticum* as in the heart of Europe--Germany."<sup>71</sup> Liberal Party Leader, Westerberg joined, saying "it is totally unacceptable that Sweden's Foreign Minister publicly expresses himself that he thought the Balts wilfully merged with the Soviet Union and surrendered its legations in Sweden."<sup>72</sup> "This recognition," said Centre's Pär Granstedt, "does not mean approval."<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989: "*Perestroika* has equally large chances to fail as it has to succeed." "Therefore," continued Andersson, "it demands that, in the midst of the joy surrounding the positive developments in East Europe, a certain (sane) judgement."

<sup>69</sup> "Dags att tiga, Sten!" *Barmometern*, 22 November, 1989.

<sup>70</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989.

<sup>71</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989.

<sup>72</sup> "Ofattbart och oacceptabelt," *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 November, 1989. Sten Andersson finds himself in agreement with the Foreign Affairs Committee's (Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU3) judgement that the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union using forceful forms (methods). (Andersson, "Låt oss se framåt ifråga om Baltikum," *Skånska Dagbladet*, 22 November, 1989).

<sup>73</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989.

By late 1989, even leading Social Democrats, such as the previously outspoken Sture Ericson, were beginning to lighten their polemics. However Ericson, speaking of "(giving) our Baltic neighbours a real hand in their work towards construct(ing) their economy and increas(ing) their self-determination," still reminded that it would be wise "to not involve ourselves in the ongoing constitutional debate between Moscow and the three Baltic capitals."<sup>74</sup>

### **To Recognise or Not: Test Case Lithuania, March, 1990.**

#### *Background: the problem of recognition*

Each country applies different criteria for recognition of newly independent states. Two legal terms, *de facto* and *de jure*<sup>75</sup> recognition are key in this context<sup>76</sup>. Some states allow themselves to be influenced by subjective factors, such as a feeling of empathy with the particular state's independence drive. Other states may apply strictly objective criteria. Yet others may employ a combination of factors. One thing is certain: there exists no universally accepted standard measure of a state's independence. Sweden has been wed to following a set of established principles in its approach to the recognition question: the "universality and effectivity" principles. Norway's approach has been, in a sense, much more pragmatic--and tending to adjust its position in concert with

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<sup>74</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 13 December, 1989.

<sup>75</sup> N. Gustafsson, "Sålles för 20 miljoner?" *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, 19 November, 1989. *De facto* recognition occurs when another state considers that the Government is the prevailing one, without taking a stance as to its legal or constitutional rights. *De jure* recognition occurs according to the law, formally and properly--the opposite of *de facto*.

<sup>76</sup> Quoting a Foreign Ministry international law expert, Environmental Party MP, Inger Schörling, notes that Sweden, on a number of opportunities, has allowed political considerations to enter into the recognition question. (Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990).

its Western allies and its one principal standpoint: the Baltic states are occupied and not a part of the Soviet Union.

### *The Case of Lithuania*

What is a pre-mature or a timely recognition of a state as independent? When is it opportune to establish diplomatic relations? These precise questions were highlighted in the case of the Lithuanian *Sajudis*' independence declaration of March 11, 1990. The issue of recognition was debated by élites in both Norway and Sweden. In Sweden's case, the March 11 event would be needed to finalize a working consensus between the parties over the Baltic issue. For Norway, it would not be totally unfair to say that the Lithuanian declaration of independence was the **one single event** which truly awoke Norwegian debate over the Baltic question.

### *Sweden: Establishing Consensus*

Through the meetings of the Swedish Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee (*Utrikesnämnden*)<sup>77</sup> and the *Riksdag*'s Foreign Affairs Committee, the Swedish foreign policy establishment strove for a common understanding of the Lithuanian declaration of independence.

The Government's official stance was that the three conditions necessary for a Swedish recognition of an independent Lithuania had not been fulfilled. The Committee would, up until the time of an official Swedish recognition, repeat these criteria:<sup>78</sup>

"With regards to the recognition of states, Sweden draws upon the so-called universality and effectivity-principles. (The first) means that we recognise all states which fulfil the international legal criteria for a state: a. the possession

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<sup>77</sup> Neither the Swedish Communist Left Party nor the Environmental Party is allowed a vote in these gatherings.

<sup>78</sup> Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU19 ("Svenskt erkännande av Litauen").

of a defined territory, b. on this territory should be located a population, c. a Government must exercise effective authority over the territory in question...Effectivity means a test which solely takes into consideration the existing conditions. The test does not consider to what degree we feel political sympathy or indicate support for the new state."

This exact position was repeated in the time following by Foreign Minister Andersson.<sup>79</sup> As Lena Jonson perceptibly points out, the Foreign Minister's thinking was dominated by the imaginable consequences if Sweden pushed the Baltic cause further. Several of the most important aspects are mentioned here(Jonson, 1990b:24):

- a. the USSR could in this way be provoked into taking further coercive measures which, in the worst instance, could lead to the resort to military force
- b. Sweden could lose its chance of mediating between Moscow and Vilnius<sup>80</sup>
- c. Sweden's relations with the Soviet Union could deteriorate
- d. the enemies of *perestroika* would be strengthened

But the Social Democratic ranks were not without some difference of opinion. Former Social Democratic Defence Minister and Washington Ambassador, Anders Thunborg, was quoted as saying that if Sweden is forced to choose between support for the Baltic states' freedom and a (for Sweden) good relationship with Moscow, the choice should be clear: in that case (Sweden) would support the Baltic cause.<sup>81</sup> Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori was

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<sup>79</sup> Echoed by Sten Andersson, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 14 March, 1990: "...expressed in a less diplomatic way, a recognition of Lithuanian independence is not a declaration of love, rather a recognition of the actual conditions--namely that power has been left in other hands, that there now are new authorities which can establish and work with bilateral questions etc."

<sup>80</sup> A role key to Sweden's policy of neutrality--related to impartiality.

<sup>81</sup> L. Christiansson, "Vi skall ge balterna ett helhjärtat stöd," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 23 March, 1990.

somewhat more reserved in saying "I would prefer not to irritate an already loaded situation."<sup>82</sup>

It took only three days, and the *Riksdag* was full of activity. A full-scale debate over the March 11th declaration ensued.<sup>83</sup> The Moderate Party leader, Carl Bildt<sup>84</sup>, found it "clear that Sweden should recognise and respect these nations' right to national self-determination."<sup>85</sup> But, perhaps quite to the surprise of many observers, Bildt stopped short of advocating full Swedish diplomatic representation in Lithuania, calling such a step "the last, rather than the first step in a process where different steps must be taken, one-by-one."<sup>86</sup> There was remarkable political party agreement that the Swedish principles of recognition should be followed.<sup>87</sup> For Bildt, the first step should be a recognition by Sweden that it does not accept the Soviet understanding that the conflict was solely an internal matter.<sup>88</sup> Centre MP, Pär Granstedt, felt that it was important that "we maintain a high degree of preparedness for a recognition of Lithuania...seen from the perspective of international law and in

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<sup>82</sup> S. Olofson, "Vi vädjar om förhandlingar," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 23 March, 1990.

<sup>83</sup> One Swedish élite noted that 11 March was a 'watershed in Swedish foreign policy,' noting that 'at that time we were very formalistic regarding what we could or could not do.' (S18)

<sup>84</sup> See also S. Leijonhufvud, "Svensk optimism trots Gorbatsjovs hot," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>85</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>86</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 14 March, 1990. In "Alternativet en kinesisk lösning," *Hufvudstadsbladet* (Finland), 7 April, 1990) Bildt says: "we should have immediately sent a political representative there to create a clearer picture of the situation...(a move that would also have been) a political signal, an official dialogue with the new Lithuanian Government."

<sup>87</sup> The Swedish embassy attempted to send a representative there on 21 March, but the Soviet Foreign Ministry refused this request. (*Svenska Dagbladet*, 23 March, 1990)

<sup>88</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 14 March, 1990.

keeping with the operational principles (of Swedish foreign policy).<sup>89</sup> In keeping with the Foreign Affairs Committee, states Granstedt: the Swedish policy of recognition must be built upon the realities in Lithuania: the presence of Soviet troops,<sup>90</sup> defence structures and all-Soviet companies in Lithuania.<sup>91</sup> The Environmental Party, which had previously accused Conservative efforts to support the Balts as 'trying to pull them into the Western fabric' now turned on the Government saying "the Government, faced with the Lithuanian declaration of independence, has been so scared of harming and (giving the impression) of provocation, that it, instead, has acted such that one gets the impression of obsequiousness."<sup>92</sup>

In 1989 the Supreme Soviet declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 illegal. Liberal Party's Ingemar Eliasson, saw that in view of that decision, "the formal legal grounds for the incorporation of the Baltic states should have fallen,"<sup>93</sup> adding that two of the three conditions for a recognition have been fulfilled: "I should hasten to remind the Foreign Minister to not altogether too hastily emphasize the points of opposition towards the third criteria."<sup>94</sup> Hökmark however pointed out that "the fact that the country can be blockaded, that there are Soviet UNION and KGB border troops present and due to the

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<sup>89</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>90</sup> Liberal Party's Holmberg rejects as untenable Granstedt's argument that the presence of Soviet troops as hindering Swedish recognition of Lithuania, citing the particular case of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>91</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>92</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>93</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990. Same logic is used by Environmental Party's Schörling, Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.

<sup>94</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.

economic situation" all prove that they are not in control of their own territory."<sup>95</sup>

#### *Further Progress towards Change*

The Government continued to state that the first two conditions for recognition had been fulfilled, stating that the third condition of sovereign and effective control over territory was still in question.<sup>96</sup> Excepting the Environmental Party, there remained inter-party agreement that the time was still not ripe for a Swedish recognition.<sup>97</sup> However the *Utrikesnämnden* did make a declaration that the democratically-elected parliaments were determined to be the legitimate representatives of the respective republic's popular will.<sup>98</sup> Another major consensual step was to transform an old Conservative Party proposal into a declaration for support for Lithuania's right to independence--specifically calling upon the spirit of the Helsinki document.<sup>99</sup>

As Moscow began to use debatable methods to show its displeasure with Lithuania, the oil spicket was turned off, amongst other dramatic moves. Perhaps what these moves best demonstrated was the absence of effective control by the Lithuanian authorities over said territory.<sup>100</sup> Prime Minister Carlsson was however not without criticism for the "Soviet behaviour towards

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<sup>95</sup> Hökmark, interview.

<sup>96</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.

<sup>97</sup> Eliasson, Granstedt, Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.

<sup>98</sup> Eliasson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990; Cabinet Secretary, Schori, "Om den baltiska frågan. Månens baksida- och jordens," *Arbetsbladet*, 27 April, 1990.

<sup>99</sup> Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU19; 'Press Statement by Foreign Minister Sten Andersson following the March 13 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs' quoted in Jonson (1990b:21)

<sup>100</sup> Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU19.



Lithuania."<sup>101</sup> Swedish Communist Left Party's Bengt Hurtig was more precise, saying that the "Soviet leadership is now dangerously considering the utilization of military methods...to a certain extent military personnel are being used to pressure Lithuania."<sup>102</sup> There was agreement over, as Liberal MP, Charlotte Branting put it: "the attempts to shut out Western journalists and diplomats, and to occupy buildings."<sup>103</sup> Even the Nordic Council, which had been planning a trip to, among other places, Lithuania between 10-16 May, was declared 'unwanted in Lithuania' by the Soviet authorities.<sup>104</sup> The Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee, in a position paper<sup>105</sup>, stood behind the Prime Minister's speech, following the *Un's* meeting on 28 March: "all violence or threat of violence is unacceptable...the intervention of the Soviet military in Lithuania risks making an already bad situation worse."

One of the more symbolic, yet surprisingly concrete outcomes of the Lithuanian independence declaration was the founding of the so-called 'Monday meetings,' at Norrmalmstorg in Stockholm.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.

<sup>102</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.

<sup>103</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 8 May, 1990.

<sup>104</sup> G. Salvesen, H-P. Fagerli, "Nei fra Norden," *Aftenposten*, 18 April, 1990. The trip was subsequently cancelled. See also M. Nyby, "Nordisk rådet en inspirationskälla," *Dagens Nyheter*, 17 August, 1990. (*Nordisk Rådet* was going to try again in the Fall).

<sup>105</sup> Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU16 ("Samarbete med Baltikum, Central- och Östeuropa"), 3 April, 1990.

<sup>106</sup> These meetings, taken up on the initiative of Conservative MP, Hökmark, and Liberal MP, Holmberg and attended by decision-makers and masses alike came to be known as one of the most effective thermometers of elite and public Swedish sentiment in the Baltic question.

### *Norway and Lithuanian independence*

Norway naturally did not have nearly as many problems as did Sweden with the Lithuanian independence declaration--simply because Norway never<sup>107</sup> admitted the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet political web.<sup>108</sup> Thus, the Lithuanian declaration did not imply a change in that country's international legal status vis-à-vis Norway.<sup>109</sup>

### *Some preliminary reactions*

The real question for Norway was what position to take towards the events and just whether and/or how best to support the Lithuanian 'cause.' Conservative Prime Minister Jan Syse, in concert with many Swedish leaders, felt "Lithuania will be a test for the future and the credibility of Mikhail Gorbachëv's reform policy," adding "the developments in Lithuania demand our support."<sup>110</sup>

The preliminary official Norwegian reactions to demonstrations of Soviet force were somewhat more reserved than Sweden's. Foreign Minister, Bondevik, said "the increasing military pressure from the Kremlin leader on the Lithuanians is not seen as especially unsettling...we still operate upon the assumption that the Soviet leadership excludes the use of military force."<sup>111</sup> The Government's preliminary positions stood in marked contrast with Progress

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<sup>107</sup> A possible exception was the brief discussion regarding a Norwegian-Soviet agreement of 1959, which in certain circles was interpreted as representing a recognition of sorts of Baltic annexation into the Soviet Union. (H. Width, "Tause om norsk avtale med Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 25 April, 1991).

<sup>108</sup> M. Fyhn, "Nå vil Litauen ta tilbake tapt selvstendighet," *Aftenposten*, 10 March, 1990.

<sup>109</sup> "Nå vil Litauen ta tilbake tapt selvstendighet."

<sup>110</sup> T. Andreassen, M. Fyhn, "-Prøvesten, mener Syse," *Aftenposten* 13 March, 1990.

<sup>111</sup> U. Andenæs and G. Salvesen, "Bondevik ønsker dialog om Litauen," *Aftenposten*, 23 March, 1990.

Party's Carl I. Hagen, who was quoted as having said: "the Norwegian Government's position towards Gorbachëv and the Soviet Union's continuing occupation of Lithuania is humiliating." Hagen continued, "in a situation where a small, occupied country is begging for its freedom, the Government, with Bondevik, slapped away this begging hand."<sup>112</sup>

### *Oil diplomacy*

Sweden played a minor role in then-Prime Minister, Prunskiene's, trips to the West to seek material<sup>113</sup> and moral support for the Lithuanian cause.<sup>114</sup> But Sweden's ability or willingness to supply Lithuania with oil were similarly limited. The issue became a Norwegian topic. One of the only Swedish reactions came from Moderate MP, Margaretha af Ugglas, calling Prunskiene's trip and meetings with Western leaders, in *praxis*, support for Lithuania's independence drive.<sup>115</sup> During her time in Stockholm, however, an account, where all interested parties were encouraged to contribute, was opened by the party leaders who had invited her to Stockholm. Prunskiene stated that the reason that this occurred in Stockholm and not in Oslo or Copenhagen was that "it gave the Swedes a chance to clear up the mistake with respect to the gold-reserve."<sup>116</sup> One may read Prunskiene as meaning more broadly that Sweden

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<sup>112</sup> "Bondevik ønsker dialog om Litauen." Similar statements were repeated by Hagen (G. Salvesen, "Norsk protest mot oljeblokaden," *Aftenposten*, 20 April, 1990).

<sup>113</sup> The issue of foreign aid is discussed at some length in *Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU16* and *Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU7* ("Samarbete med Östeuropa och vissa internationella miljöinsatser").

<sup>114</sup> V. Landsbergis, "Appell til Norden," *Aftenposten*, 17 April, 1990; A. Willersrud, "Litauen ber om støtte," *Aftenposten*, 13 March, 1990.

<sup>115</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 23 May, 1990.

<sup>116</sup> N.C. Helle, "Sterk litauisk appell til Sverige," *Aftenposten*, 24 April, 1990.

needed to resolve some historical problems in relation to the Baltic republics which Norway and Denmark did not.

As Kazimiera Prunskiene arrived in Oslo on 18 April after a one-hour stopover in Stockholm, Moscow had made the formal decision to cut oil supplies to the republic.<sup>117</sup> On the eve of the Prime Minister's voyage, it seemed clear that the Norwegian Government would be unwilling to supply Lithuania with oil, in the case of a blockade.<sup>118</sup>

One interesting detail of the trip was that she was welcomed to Oslo, not by their Government, in the capacity as ministers, but rather by Syse, Johan J. Jakobsen and Bondevik as party leaders.<sup>119</sup> This provides a contrast to the Swedish reception and underlines the fact that the situation of recognition was not as simple as many would have it sound.<sup>120</sup> The invitation to visit Sweden was extended by other Party leaders, but one could be sure that Ingvar Carlsson would seize the opportunity of meeting the Balts once they arrived.<sup>121</sup> This also stood in contrast to the invitation extended by Denmark's Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (as Foreign Minister)<sup>122</sup>, where the Prime Minister Prunskiene was to visit after Norway.

Norway's principle stance in the question was that the Lithuanians should deal directly with the oil suppliers. The Government denied having made any

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<sup>117</sup> A. Willersrud, "Moskva skurr igjen oljekran," *Aftenposten*, 19 April, 1990.

<sup>118</sup> G. Salvesen, H-P. Fagerli, "Nei fra Norden," *Aftenposten*, 18 April, 1990.

<sup>119</sup> H. Hegtun, "Søker støtte i Norge," *Aftenposten*, 19 April, 1990.

<sup>120</sup> In a humorous cartoon on the op-ed page of *Aftenposten*, 23 April, 1990, Prunskiene, looking at Landsbergis, says "but the Chairman of the Conservative Party asked me to say hello from the Prime Minister." (Here of course, the Conservative Party Chairman was the Prime Minister).

<sup>121</sup> K. Eneberg, "Diskret diplomati med baltiska ledare," *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 June, 1990.

<sup>122</sup> H. Tjønn, A. Willersrud, "Litauens danske håp," *Aftenposten*, 21 April, 1990.

promises to intervene on the Lithuanian behalf.<sup>123</sup> Bondevik thought it "obvious that we cannot use the oil supply as a tool of foreign policy pressure."<sup>124</sup> There was unity between the Norwegian parties in the *Storting's* Extended Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee on this point, with only the Progress Party being strongly opposed.<sup>125</sup> The major Norwegian oil suppliers, e.g. Statoil, however refused to sell oil to Lithuania on any less than commercial terms.<sup>126</sup>

The most concrete argument which was mounted towards a politically-inspired (subsidized) sale of oil to Lithuania were statements by those who saw Norway as having played such a role with Nicaragua two years previously.<sup>127</sup> To an extent, the Norwegian Labour Government, like the Swedish had gathered a reputation for funding and favouring far-lying countries in its aid policy. Norwegian MFA officials confirmed an offer, made under a Labour Government, when Nicaragua became the target of an U.S. oil embargo against Nicaragua.<sup>128</sup> But sources soon pointed out that not only was the offer not taken up, but that authorities had only offered the oil as a part of an already-existent foreign aid package.<sup>129</sup> The Labour Party Chairman, Gro Harlem Brundtland, denied any parallels between the Lithuanian and Nicaraguan case,

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<sup>123</sup> O. Nygaard, "Syse: Ingen løfter om oljesalg," *Aftenposten*, 19 April, 1990.

<sup>124</sup> "Norsk protest mot oljeblokaden."

<sup>125</sup> T. Andreassen, "Norsk soloutspill uaktuelt," *Aftenposten*, 24 April, 1990.

<sup>126</sup> "-Statoil selger til full pris," *Aftenposten*, 19 April, 1990.

<sup>127</sup> H. Tjønn, "Hjemmel for å selge olje," *Aftenposten*, 20 April, 1990.

<sup>128</sup> G. Salvesen, "Nicaragua får olje, ikke Litauen," *Aftenposten*, 21 April, 1990.

<sup>129</sup> "Nicaragua får olje, ikke Litauen."

saying that the difference lay in the foreign policy pressure instrument angle in the Lithuanian case.<sup>130</sup>

One of the less pronounced reasons for Norway's reserved position towards Lithuania was the NATO angle. One representative of the Norwegian Government, Undersecretary Kai Eide said: "while there should be no doubt of Norway's position towards the Lithuania conflict, the time is not right for unconsidered or spontaneous decisions."<sup>131</sup> Eide pointed to Norway's efforts in bringing up the issue in NATO, but added we have to watch ourselves a bit against being brought into a conflict where we can lack backing amongst our NATO allies, for the policy which we follow."<sup>132</sup> According to Foreign Ministry sources, Norway had been warned against going any further, after NATO had formally discussed the question.<sup>133</sup> Conservative MP, Anders Talleraas, while stating that "we can be at the head (of NATO) in our reactions," noted that "when it comes to concrete measures we have to operate on the same level as our allies..."<sup>134</sup> Another line of thinking assumed that Soviet pressure on both Norway and its oil companies had led to moderation in Norwegian oil support.<sup>135</sup>

When Prunskiene left Norway, her arms were void of material Norwegian assistance, but full of moralistic support for Lithuania's cause. After the trip

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<sup>130</sup> "Nicaragua får olje, ikke Litauen."

<sup>131</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Ingen ensidig Litauen-støtte," *Aftenposten*, 19 April, 1990.

<sup>132</sup> "Ingen ensidig Litauen-støtte."

<sup>133</sup> "Norsk protest mot oljeblokaden."

<sup>134</sup> "Klok linje i Litauen-konflikten," *Aftenposten*, 27 April, 1990.

<sup>135</sup> E. Egeland, "Store ord og små nasjoner," *Aftenposten*, 20 April, 1990. Anders Talleraas, "Klok linje i Litauen-konflikten," mentions several questions which may be left open with respect to this angle, amongst them:  
- Which reaction was to be expected from the Soviet Navy, since Norwegian ships will be seen as going into what Moscow considers Soviet territorial waters? Will Norway have the backing of NATO for such a policy?

concluded there was talk from both sides that oil *never was* the issue for the Prime Minister's trip to Oslo at all.<sup>136</sup> Thus, Prunskiene felt satisfied with moral support from Norway.<sup>137</sup>

*Polishing Norwegian Support for Balticum: May, 1990*

It became clear that the Norwegian Government, before the Norwegian *Storting* recessed for the Summer, felt a need to clarify its way forward with respect to the Baltic question. One, if not THE clearest debate on the Baltic question in Norway would occur in late May, 1990. There, Foreign Minister Bondevik's foreign policy Address laid down the Government's view of the situation. Because of the statement's significance, clarity and scope, it is proper to reproduce key parts of it here:<sup>138</sup>

"The Baltic peoples have traditionally been close to *Norden*. This, together with the fact that Norway has never accepted the encroachments which the Baltic peoples have suffered through forceful annexation, provide the background for the Government's involvement, today, in these questions. It is the Government's clear desire that the Baltic republics must be put in a position whereby they can recover their lost independence. We have placed emphasis on developing contacts with the new political leadership in the Baltic republics, we have initiated dialogues regarding the possibilities for creating practical cooperation in the economic sphere, the environmental sector and with respect to cultural exchange...We have on a number of occasions encouraged the Soviet Union to refrain from the use of political, military and economic pressure and instead enter into dialogue with (the Baltic republics). From the Norwegian side we have focused the spotlight on *Balticum* in international fora."

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<sup>136</sup> Prunskiene herself said that the intention of the trip was not to solicit concrete Norwegian support. (H. Tjønn, "-Tilfreds med moralsk støtte," *Aftenposten*, 20 April, 1990).

<sup>137</sup> "-Tilfreds med moralsk støtte."

<sup>138</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 22 May, 1990.

Bondevik's statement was all the more important because it correctly represented a consensus across the political spectrum, excepting, as usual, the Progress Party. It was not important because it represented a change from descensus to consensus—for Norway had been traditionally characterised by one, low political involvement and two, minimal political splintering regarding the Baltic question. This stood in stark contrast with our previous exposé of the Swedish case. But in union with Sweden, Norway decided to bring the issue up onto the international level.

A small debate did take place in unlikely places: between the Conservative and Progress Party. Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, said he "positioned himself squarely behind the line which the Government has chosen in the question,(of recognition)" however cautioning that "although Norway has been amongst the countries which have demonstrated the most sympathy to *Balticum*, we must not promise the Balts anything which we can not fulfil...this would not be honest on our part and would not serve the Baltic cause."<sup>139</sup> The Progress Party, much like the Swedish Environmental Party, were the chief dissenters. Party Leader, Carl I. Hagen, wanted to make sure that the Government thought about financial support for the Baltics, and advocated support for the Baltics in the United Nations.<sup>140</sup> But as opposed to Sweden's aid package which was said to be for 'Central-and Eastern Europe, including *Balticum*,' Petersen pointed out that *Balticum* could not be subsumed under East European aid--rather, it should be treated in a humanistic aid package of its own.<sup>141</sup> Conservative MP, Annelise Høegh, criticised the Progress Party, saying "today they want to place the whole reform process in danger by demanding concerted allied action to 'help' Lithuania, to an extent greater than the (Balts), themselves, have

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<sup>139</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.

<sup>140</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990. See also St. Innst. 181.

<sup>141</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.



requested."<sup>142</sup> During this period, bilateral relations both between Sweden and the Baltics and Norway and the Baltics would come into their own. The amounts of official and unofficial visits became so numerous as to be literally impossible to track.

Among the most important developments one could count: the increase in Parliamentary exchanges,<sup>143</sup> cultural exchanges, economic cooperation. An interesting development was the establishment of Baltic informational offices in Norway and Sweden.<sup>144</sup> It is important to note that the Lithuanian information in Oslo, opened on 7 October, 1990 was the first of its sort in Western Europe.<sup>145</sup> The information offices in Stockholm and Oslo were accorded no specific protection under the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (Akehurst, 1987:114), but proved useful in terms of underhand informational exchanges between the Scandinavian Governments and Baltic representatives present in Sweden and Norway. By Fall, Sweden was alone in being the only country which had personnel, chancelleries and residences in all three Baltic capitals. Just before Sweden's recognition of Baltic independence in August, there were six civil servants already in Tallinn, four in Riga and one in Vilnius.<sup>146</sup> Norway's decision not to recognize the Baltics' annexation into the Soviet Union prevented any such presence for Norway.

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<sup>142</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 31 May, 1990.

<sup>143</sup> Several Swedish interview subjects mentioned that after Sten Andersson's statements about Baltic occupation in November, 1989, ushered in a time of greater *Riksdag* involvement in the Baltic question---previously handled uniquely in the Foreign Ministry. (S9)

<sup>144</sup> I. Lindmarker, "UD vill utöka i öst," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 24 November, 1990: Chief for the Political Division of the MFA says establishment of Swedish presence in Lithuania was most urgent; An official diplomatic presence was planned for Tallinn in Spring, 1991 ("Svenskt kontor i Tallinn," *Dagens Nyheter*, 27 November, 1990).

<sup>145</sup> S.B. Bentzrød, "Litauen på plass i Norge," *Aftenposten*, 8 October, 1990.

<sup>146</sup> "Sverige erkänner de baltiska republikerna" (Stockholm: Foreign Ministry Press Release, 27 August, 1991)

### *Balticum* creeps onto the Nordic agenda: 1990-91<sup>147</sup>

One of the most visible new trends in Norwegian and Swedish foreign policies over late-Summer and Fall was their pronounced role within the Nordic Council over the Baltic question. Partial credit for opening this particular corridor of cooperation can in fact be attributed to Mr Gorbachëv himself, and in particular his Helsinki speech on 26 November, 1989 where he proposed cooperation between the Supreme Soviet and the Nordic Council(NR). The proposal was strange, given the historic Soviet opposition to Nordic foreign policy cooperation. From the Nordic side, the initiative for coordinated Nordic support for the Baltics arguably emanated from Danish Social Democratic MP, Anker Jørgensen.<sup>148</sup>

Norwegian Foreign Minister, Bondevik, only one month following the Helsinki speech, alluded to the Baltic angle, in an overall analysis of the Helsinki initiative.<sup>149</sup> Labour MP's, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Bjørn Tore Godal, and Progress Party's Pål Atle Skjervengen, in their speeches also made indirect references to increased 'opportunities for cooperation with East Europe' that Gorbachëv's initiative presented.<sup>150</sup> Progress Party's Hagen was more specific, saying "...the invitation from Gorbachëv for cooperation between the *Nordiska Rådet* and the northerly Soviet republics should be accepted positively."<sup>151</sup> Somewhat later,<sup>152</sup> Socialist Left MP, Kjellbjørg Lunde, made

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<sup>147</sup> Motions supporting coordinated Nordic Council efforts for Baltic support were heard as far back as November, 1988. For motions in the Swedish Parliament see Swedish Liberal MP's Erling Bager and Lars Leijonborg motion 1989/90:U2. Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU9 ("*Nordiskt samarbete*"), 7 December, 1989).

<sup>148</sup> Erling Bager, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 October, 1989.

<sup>149</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989.

<sup>150</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>151</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>152</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.

it clear that there the Nordic Council should play an active role in developing contacts especially with the Baltics, and that the Nordic Council should have given a much warmer reception to the Gorbachëv initiative than it had.<sup>153</sup>

In Sweden, Minister of Agriculture, Mats Hellström, as late as 17 October, 1989 dismissed formal participation by the Baltics in Nordic Council deliberations.<sup>154</sup> This supports the argument that a clear Soviet "go ahead" was necessary for substantive, formal Nordic foreign policy cooperation. Even before Gorbachëv's official initiative in November, early initiatives to bring the Balts into NR work were presented by Conservative MP, Carl Bildt and Labour MP's Erling Bager and Lars Leijonborg.<sup>155</sup> Centre Party MP, Pär Granstedt felt that a situation of closer European integration necessitated an increased cooperative emphasis on the Baltics, Poland (especially its Northernmost part), perhaps also Northern Germany, the Leningrad area and Karelia.<sup>156</sup> In its position paper written in April, 1990<sup>157</sup>, the Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee, noted that "Gorbachëv's initiative has given an impulse to increased contacts between NR and the Supreme Soviet." However, the Committee notes that 'even before then, NR's Presidium had given the Presidium's Secretariat instructions to work out concrete proposals as to how NR's contacts with Baltic and Soviet parliamentarians could be developed." In a particular reservation to this position paper, the Swedish Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party joined in a reservation which read:

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<sup>153</sup> *Forhandlingar i Stortinget*, 31 May, 1990.

<sup>154</sup> The grounds being that the so-called 'Helsinki Agreement' of 1962 forbade direct participation from external parties. *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 17 October, 1989.

<sup>155</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 17 October, 1989.

<sup>156</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>157</sup> *Riksdagstryck* 1989/90:UU16 ("Samarbete med Baltikum, Central- och Östeuropa"), 3 April, 1990.

"While the NR should, on its own, make a decision on the question of giving the Baltics the possibility to follow NR's work...it is urgent that there be established direct contacts between NR and the Baltic parliaments, *without any unnecessary detour through Moscow*"<sup>158</sup>

The NR's connection with the Baltic states would be touched upon in the context of NR's 38th session in Reykjavik between 27 February-2 March, 1990<sup>159</sup>. At the Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting in Molde, Norway, 11-12 September, the Ministers issued a *communiqué* which expressed the hope that the "negotiations between the Baltic republics and the Soviet leadership will contribute to realizing the independence towards which the Baltic peoples strive."<sup>160</sup> In November, 1990, at a NR meeting in November, 1990, the Swedish Agricultural Minister, Hellström went as far as to introduce the idea of establishing a 'Baltic Council' for cooperation around the shores of the Baltic.<sup>161</sup> Parliamentary exchanges would be stepped up to unheard of levels, forcing the expansion of Swedish and Norwegian Parliamentary bureaucratic structures.<sup>162</sup>

The CSCE Conference, which took place in Paris in Mid-November, 1990, was interesting for the attention which Sweden and Norway dedicated to the question of Baltic representation. The Swedish delegation, ostensibly on its own initiative, as well as under certain political pressure from the opposition parties,

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<sup>158</sup> Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU16.

<sup>159</sup> Riksdagstryck 1990/91:UU9 ("Nordiskt samarbete"); H. Hagwall, "En vision av Norden i Europa," Svenska Dagbladet, 28 February, 1990.

<sup>160</sup> "Communiqué from the Meeting of the Council of the Baltic States and the Delegation from the Nordic Council" (Stockholm and Tallinn: Nordic Council Secretariat, 19 October, 1990).

<sup>161</sup> Riksdagstryck 1990/91:UU9.

<sup>162</sup> S. Svensson, "Talmannen i en ny roll," Dagens Nyheter, 14 December, 1990.

agreed to raise the sensitive question of Baltic participation at the meeting.<sup>163</sup> Under Soviet protest, Ingvar Carlsson, much like the French Government, said the Baltic states were in Paris as "prominent guests...it is our hope that they will be able to join in, as full members, in the near future, after necessary negotiations."<sup>164</sup> Carlsson said further "the German people have re-established their full sovereignty and freedom...in the same way we look forward the day when Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia achieve the same goal."<sup>165</sup> The Norwegian Government was slightly more reserved saying, "the Baltic Governments travel to Paris with high expectations...they should have the opportunity to participate in the process."<sup>166</sup> The new Swedish tone was recognizable and provided further evidence that the Government now felt it proper to pursue the Baltic issue in international fora.

#### *Ronneby*

Even though Sweden and Norway's desire to cooperate with the Baltics continued to grow, both Governments continued to have their hands tied by diplomatic formality. Such was the case when Sweden hosted<sup>167</sup> an international environmental conference on the Baltic, in the South Swedish city of Ronneby, in September, 1990. Ingvar Carlsson could not, regardless of his otherwise assiduous personal relationships with the Baltic politicians and the Government's view that they were natural participants, formally invite the Baltic

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<sup>163</sup> S. Svensson, "Carlsson tar upp den baltiska frågan," *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 November, 1990.

<sup>164</sup> N.M. Udgaard, "Uenighet om Baltikum," *Aftenposten*, 21 November, 1990.

<sup>165</sup> P. Bratt, "Carlsson stödjer balterna," *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 November, 1990.

<sup>166</sup> "Uenighet om Baltikum."

<sup>167</sup> One Swedish advisor said, "Ronneby gave the Swedes the opportunity to push the Baltic cause on their behalf...although unsuccessful...the Government got very used to this task of 'speaking for the Baltic republics.'" (S18)

Governments.<sup>168</sup> The official invitation would welcome Nikolai Ryzhkov, whom was kindly asked to keep the Baltic representatives in mind.<sup>169</sup>

Even after opposition from Moscow, the conference resulted in the participation of Latvia and Estonia, while Lithuania decided not to attend in protest.<sup>170</sup> A final conference document was passed by unanimous vote, and in such a way, avoided an open conflict between the attending Baltics and the Soviet representative.<sup>171</sup> It is worth noting that the Soviet Union dropped its opposition to Baltic participation in the Ronneby follow-up conference in early Summer 1991.<sup>172</sup>

#### *The Baltic Case Sealed: January-February, 1991*

Between 1 January and 8 January Norwegian and Swedish support for Baltic independence became complete. In Riga the Press House was occupied, Soviet paratroopers landed in Lithuania 'to look for Army deserters,' and significant Soviet troop movements into the Baltics took place. Early signals, reported by élites in mid-late December remained only that.<sup>173</sup> It would not be until

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<sup>168</sup> K. Eneberg, "Diskret diplomati med baltiska ledare," *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 June, 1990. It is however interesting to note that Ingvar Carlsson did officially invite Lithuanian P.M., Prunskiene for talks in Stockholm in mid-October, 1990. (K. Eneberg, "Priset förpliktar," *Dagens Nyheter*, 18 October, 1990).

<sup>169</sup> "Diskret diplomati med baltiska ledare."

<sup>170</sup> S. Leijonhufvud, "Optimism präglar Östersjö-möte," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 3 September, 1990. One month later, P.M. Carlsson invited Kazimiera Prunskiene to Stockholm chiefly to discuss the Lithuanian view on Baltic ecology ("Priset förpliktar")

<sup>171</sup> S. Leijonhufvud, "Ett genombrott för ekologin," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 4 September, 1990.

<sup>172</sup> "Balter deltar i Östersjömöte," *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 April, 1991.

<sup>173</sup> Swedish Defence's Commander-in-Chief, Bengt Gustafsson, reported troop movements in order to bring in full Presidential powers (the same day Shevardnadze had warned for an impending dictatorship in the Soviet Union) (M. Holmström, "Sverige klarar inte analys av utvecklingen," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 14 January, 1991)

immediately after New Year that the public became firmly aware of what was actually occurring across the water.

*Norwegian and Swedish Reaction and Action*<sup>174</sup>

The Swedish and Norwegian reactions were immediate, and to-the-point. The respective Foreign Ministers, Sten Andersson and Thorvald Stoltenberg, called up the respective Soviet ambassadors, Uspensky and Teterin, to them.<sup>175</sup> Sten Andersson did so already on 8 January,<sup>176</sup> expressing that "pressure, violence and threats of violence cannot be accepted...the existing points of opposition must be solved using political measures and negotiations."<sup>177</sup> "I see the events as a clear violation of the principle of self-determination set forth in the Helsinki document...and the Baltic peoples' liberation as a matter of international import,"<sup>178</sup> said Andersson on another occasion. Prime Minister Carlsson publicly attempted to clear up doubt about Sweden's stance, saying "every attempt to maintain that Sweden does not clearly express support for the Baltic people's right to self-determination is groundless."<sup>179</sup> "If Gorbachëv has not sanctioned this," Carlsson added, "we will have to ask ourselves whether he has lost control altogether--otherwise he has told us a blank lie and we can't trust

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<sup>174</sup> One of the most noticeable Swedish private reactions after the paratroopers had landed was that people started to speak of 'the breaking point' and 'the limit of tolerance' had been reached. (S43, S44). I had only infrequently heard these expressions previously.

<sup>175</sup> The Soviet Stockholm Ambassador, Uspensky, said that the Swedish Government was listening to Lithuanian propaganda (S. Leijonhufvud, "Känslomässig reaktion," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 15 January, 1991).

<sup>176</sup> E. Crona, "Markering mot Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 9 January, 1991.

<sup>177</sup> "Markering mot Sovjet."

<sup>178</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 15 January, 1991.

<sup>179</sup> "Markering mot Sovjet."

his words."<sup>180</sup> Centre Leader, Olof Johansson, felt that Sweden should implant a burn-mark on Soviet behaviour—"it is the Central Government that bears the responsibility..(this) is proof of *perestroika*'s failure."<sup>181</sup> Similar reactions by all party leaders were registered at the Monday meeting at Norrmalmstorg on 15 January.<sup>182</sup>

Norwegian élites reacted in similar terms. Prime Minister Brundtland was quoted as saying: "brutal encroachments on the Lithuanian population threaten East-West relations," simultaneously threatening to withdraw aid money.<sup>183</sup> She added, "there should be some relationship between the aid we provide and what is actually happening in the Soviet Union..."<sup>184</sup> Thorvald Stoltenberg, felt "these encroachments are violations of the duties which the Soviet Union has accepted, e.g. the CSCE, as well as other documents."<sup>185</sup> Reminiscent of the Swedish line, Stoltenberg reminds, "the conflict must be solved through dialogue and negotiations."<sup>186</sup> Socialist Left's Chaffey felt the encroachment "could turn the clock back to the 1960/1970's."<sup>187</sup> Even some serious discussion regarding Gorbachëv's reception of the Nobel Peace Prize was heard

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<sup>180</sup> M. Holmström, "Sverige klarar inte analys av utvecklingen," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 14 January, 1991.

<sup>181</sup> D. Ljungberg, "Protest till Sovjet," *Dagens Nyheter*, 12 January, 1991.

<sup>182</sup> "Militärt intåg väntas i Lettland," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 15 January, 1991; M. Ribbing, "Sorgflor på flaggorna," *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 January, 1991; B. Westerberg, "Blod på Gorbatjovs fingrar," *Dagens Nyheter*, 26 January, 1991; S. Bøe, "Våldet fick tala," *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 January, 1991.

<sup>183</sup> A. Bonde, T. Holmqvist, "Øst-vest-forholdet er truet," *Aftenposten*, 14 January, 1991.

<sup>184</sup> "-Øst-vest-forholdet er truet."

<sup>185</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 January, 1991.

<sup>186</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 January, 1991.

<sup>187</sup> Chaffey, interview.



in certain quarters.<sup>188</sup> The discussion went as far as to found an alternative, called the 'People's Peace Prize';<sup>189</sup> the leading candidate for which was Vytautas Landsbergis.

### *The Parliaments busy with discussion*

As events unfolded, key Baltic representatives were present in Stockholm<sup>190</sup>. Foreign Minister Sten Andersson went further than he had ever gone before in extending the Baltic representatives the invitation to create exile governments in Sweden.<sup>191</sup> This move was interesting not least because Foreign Minister Östen Undén, directly after the War, explicitly forbade exile-Baltic activity of a similar sort in Sweden.<sup>192</sup> A similar statement was previously issued by Danish Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen on 23 January; a decision that one top Norwegian advisor favoured because 'it took the weight off of Norway' to do the same.<sup>193</sup> The *Riksdag* was quick to appoint an investigative committee<sup>194</sup> and the Foreign Minister sent his

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<sup>188</sup> E. Holte, "Sandegren skuffet," *Aftenposten*, 14 January, 1991; T. Nordeng, "LO-kritikk av Litauen," *Aftenposten*, 8 February, 1991).

<sup>189</sup> Moderate Party MP Jan Petersen, FFF Party's Anders Aune, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>190</sup> "Riksdagen tog emot balter," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 17 January, 1991. Estonian Foreign Minister, Meri, Latvia's Vice President, Danis Ivans and Foreign Minister Jurkans, and Lithuania's Vice President, Kuzmickas were all present in Stockholm in mid-January.

<sup>191</sup> Andersson remarked that there was money earmarked for that cause. (S. Svensson, "Sten Andersson välkomnar exilbalterna," *Dagens Nyheter*, 18 January, 1991; K. Eneberg, "Sverige bas för Balter," *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 January, 1991). Denmark's Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen extended a similar offer to the Balts.

<sup>192</sup> K. Eneberg, "Krokig väg till enighet," *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 February, 1991

<sup>193</sup> N26

<sup>194</sup> S. Svensson, "Politiker till Litauen," *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 January, 1991; "Riksdagsmän till Baltikum," *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 January, 1991.

Cabinet Secretary<sup>195</sup>— to orient themselves with the situation there. Amidst this, former Foreign Minister and Centre MP, Karin Söder, promised Nordic Council parliamentary support as a "human shield against the oppressors."<sup>196</sup>

One of the final major debates on the Baltic question occurred on 20 February.<sup>197</sup> Sten Andersson stated "Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have, in democratic order clearly expressed a desire for independence...we wholeheartedly support this..."<sup>198</sup> Carl Bildt felt that "in the long run there is no middle-way between an admission by Russia of Baltic independence and new Russian attempts to depress and suffocate all of their freedom."<sup>199</sup> Bengt Westerberg felt "the fact that hundreds of thousands of people are taking to the streets is a sign that the situation is not totally hopeless."<sup>200</sup> Centre Party's Olof Johansson proposed a concrete Swedish commitment of 300 million SEK (outside of the existing aid budget) for the Baltics—mainly for environmental uses.<sup>201</sup> The Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee in mid-April decided the majority of 50 million SEK in aid for Central and East Europe should be earmarked to Baltic-related projects.<sup>202</sup> Environmental Party's Åsa Domeij

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<sup>195</sup> K. Eneberg, "Schori reser till Lettland," *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 January, 1991. While in Tallinn, Schori promised concrete Swedish economic and political support. (M. Kubu, "Schori utlovar hjälp," *Dagens Nyheter*, 27 January, 1991).

<sup>196</sup> "Schori reser till Lettland." See also, N.C. Helle, "Utsendinger til Litauen," *Aftenposten*, 29 January, 1991.

<sup>197</sup> The final major debate on the Baltic issue in the *Riksdag* took place in *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 2 May, 1991. The final *Storting* discussion of the issue also took place in May, 1991.

<sup>198</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>199</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 February, 1990.

<sup>200</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>201</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>202</sup> E. Crona, "50 milj i stöd till Baltikum," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 15 April, 1991.

persistently reminded that her Party was the only one "who listened to the Lithuanians' request for a Swedish recognition of Lithuanian independence."<sup>203</sup>

For neutral Sweden, reliance on international institutions for the resolution of conflict has been a central foreign policy tenet. However, in Sweden, only a small portion of the political spectrum showed early support for making the Baltic cause an international matter. Now it seemed to be a contest of which party could most effectively internationalize the issue. Carlsson stated that "Sweden is prepared to support every initiative which is taken with a view to raising the Baltic problem to an international level."<sup>204</sup> While the Government preferred the CSCE context,<sup>205</sup> the Left<sup>206</sup> and Environmental Parties<sup>207</sup> seemed to emphasize a preference for the United Nations. We note though, the Government's intention to take up the matter for the UN's Committee on Human Rights, in February, 1991.<sup>208</sup> Even the Council of Europe, under the leadership of Swedish Conservative MP, Anders Björk, would become active in the Baltic question.<sup>209</sup> All of this occurred amidst Stockholm-based Soviet

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<sup>203</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>204</sup> K. Eneberg, "Försiktig kritik mot baltledare," *Dagens Nyheter*, 18 January, 1991.

<sup>205</sup> This seemed to also be the Conservative Party's priority. (L. Lundquist, "M kräver extra ESK-möte," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 23 January, 1991; Å. Ekdahl, "Baltikum fråga för ESK-samtal," *Dagens Nyheter*, 23 January, 1991).

<sup>206</sup> M. Ribbing, "Baltisk självständighet svensk fråga till ESK," *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 January, 1991.

<sup>207</sup> P. Gahrton, Å. Domeij, M. Gisselberg, J. Axelsson, "Litauen frågan till FN," *Dagens Nyheter*, 16 January, 1991. A related standpoint was again expressed in P. Gahrton, "Litauen väntar ännu på Sveriges svar," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 19 February, 1991.

<sup>208</sup> "Schori på väg mot Lettland." This was accomplished on 4 February, 1991 (G. von Hall, "FN bör fördöma Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 5 February, 1991).

<sup>209</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 February, 1991. See also, E. Crona, "Europarådet skickar delegation," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 5 February, 1991.

Ambassador, Uspensky opposition, under the familiar protest that the problems were an internal Soviet matter.<sup>210</sup>

Unlike the Swedes, who sent an official Governmental representative (Pierre Schori) to the republics, Norwegian official behaviour was reserved. Foreign Minister Stoltenberg sent one Professor of Law, Torkel Opsahl, and one Human Rights activist, Asbjørn Eide, to examine the situation.<sup>211</sup> Again unlike Schori, their role was not to give political advice to the Government. As in Sweden, there were some top-level political visits to the Baltics following the violence in January.<sup>212</sup>

When asked about the possibility of Norway establishing a diplomatic presence, a move desired by fellow NATO member Iceland<sup>213</sup>, Stoltenberg, despite rumours that former P.M., Syse had supported an "evaluation of the possibilities to recognise the three republics,"<sup>214</sup> denied such a move citing a "difference in the neighbourly relationships."<sup>215</sup> NATO decided not to either

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<sup>210</sup> K. Eneberg, "Oro i Baltikum Sovjets ensak," *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 January, 1991.

<sup>211</sup> B.E. Engesland, "Frykter en væpnet Baltikum-konflikt," *Aftenposten*, 29 January, 1991.

<sup>212</sup> H. Borud, B.E. Engesland, "Ingen endring av vår Baltikum-linje," *Aftenposten*, 12 February, 1991.

<sup>213</sup> On 12 February, 1991 Iceland became the first Western nation to fully recognize Lithuania's independence. Denmark and Iceland arguably played the most active role in Baltic support, Finland the most reserved and Sweden and Norway somewhere in between. (M. Fyhn, "Norden og balternes kamp," *Aftenposten*, 15 November, 1988).

<sup>214</sup> H. Borud, B.E. Engesland, "Ingen endring av vår Baltikum-linje," *Aftenposten*, 12 February, 1991.

<sup>215</sup> Å. Breian, "Norsk UD ikke til Baltikum nå," *Aftenposten*, 27 January, 1991. One high Norwegian labour source and another source close to Stoltenberg mentioned what may have been in Stoltenberg's thinking was the pressing Kola project, the negotiations of which would be felt to be in danger. (N26,N27) Another high official echoed Stoltenberg's concerns, saying "our possibilities to carry on a general political dialogue over: the Barents Sea (continued...)"

break diplomatic bands with the Soviet Union nor cancel Gorbachëv's impending trip to NATO Headquarters.<sup>216</sup> "There is not much NATO as a whole can do...each country has to take responsibility for its own actions," one NATO source was quoted as having said.<sup>217</sup>

Instead, Norway, in keeping with Sweden, was set on working within both a wider Nordic context<sup>218</sup> and the framework of the CSCE.<sup>219</sup> Part of the confusion in Norway might have been connected with the change from a Bourgeois to Labour Government in December, 1991. Stoltenberg's personal advisor stated however that "as soon as the Baltics are able to stand on their own two feet, Norway will be first in line to establish an Embassy there."<sup>220</sup> In concrete terms, the Norwegian Government earmarked NOK 9 million to the region, with a special emphasis on human rights promotion.<sup>221</sup>

A full-fledged Norwegian Parliamentary debate would wait until 4 February. Social Democratic leader of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Godal, while seeing signs of a "pull-back from Vilnius and Riga as positive," however reminded that

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<sup>215</sup>(...continued)

question, the question of Naval forces in the North, our dialogue on disarmament and peace, would be influenced," further noting that 'having a border with the Soviet Union was accompanied by a need to keep the political dialogue alive. (N41)

<sup>216</sup> S. Petzell, "NATO bryter ej med Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 19 January, 1991.

<sup>217</sup> "NATO bryter ej med Sovjet."

<sup>218</sup> "Ingen endring av vår Baltikum-linje."

<sup>219</sup> "Norsk UD ikke til Baltikum nå."

<sup>220</sup> "Norsk UD ikke til Baltikum nå."

<sup>221</sup> The Norwegian Conservative Party (H-P. Fagerli, H. Width, "Høyre vil sende hjelp til Litauen," *Aftenposten*, 2 February, 1991) and the Nordic Conservative parties collectively (G. Magnus, "-Send utstyr til Baltikum," *Aftenposten*, 5 February, 1991) were united in their desire to send technical equipment for communication and mass media uses to the Baltics.

"these do not provide any guarantee against further encroachments."<sup>222</sup> Party colleague, Brundtland, quite strangely led off her remarks with a reminder that without the Gorbachëv the Baltic possibilities to fight for independence would have been circumscribed.<sup>223</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg cautioned that "we must constantly balance our interests in our relationship with the Soviet Union and the Baltic republics--in this there is no complaisance involved."<sup>224</sup> Stoltenberg never clarified which interests these were, but several analysts felt that amongst other issues Stoltenberg was referring to the negotiations surrounding the yet unresolved Barents Sea delimitation.

Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, in concert with most who spoke on this opportunity, emphasized a politically united Norwegian approach to the question.<sup>225</sup> Socialist Left's spokesman, Paul Chaffey, in no uncertain terms, condemned the "use of violence," while simultaneously supporting "the recognition of the Baltic states' right to self-determination."<sup>226</sup> Chaffey felt the process of Baltic cooperation with the Nordic Council should be increased<sup>227</sup> Christian Democratic Party representatives, Kåre Gjønnes and Bondevik both expressed that, irrespective of how much Gorbachëv was put under pressure, the use of violence was unacceptable.<sup>228</sup> Centre Party's Anne Enger Lahnstein affirmed that the Government's decision to pursue the CSCE route was

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<sup>222</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>223</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991. A similar viewpoint was expressed by MP, Anders Aune.

<sup>224</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>225</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>226</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>227</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>228</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.

correct.<sup>229</sup> Practically "out of the blue," several cries to return to Norway's 1921 recognition of the Baltic states' independence were heard from the *Storting's* plenary chamber.<sup>230</sup>

#### *Nordic Cooperation Flourishes: København and Karlshamn*

The 39th Session of the Nordic Council was a landmark in Nordic foreign policy cooperation towards the Baltic states. The invitation extended to Baltic representatives by the Nordic Council, not by the separate Governments, to attend,<sup>231</sup> effectively sealed a future Baltic role, informal or otherwise, in the NR's work. Closer Nordic cooperation over the Baltic issue acted to unite different countries' approaches to the same problem, which were partially determined by their varied security policies.

The meeting, which began in on 25 February, was inundated with Soviet protests.<sup>232</sup> Ingvar Carlsson said "we are listening to whatever the Soviets say, but that does not change our principle understanding of the Baltic situation."<sup>233</sup> Carlsson added that "it is because of a fundamental consensus between (the participants) that we...encourage real negotiations between the

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<sup>229</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>230</sup> Labour MP, Gunnar Skaug, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 February, 1991; Progress Party's Terje Nyberget, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 February, 1991; Christian People's Party's Per Sævik, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 February, 1991.

<sup>231</sup> The Finnish position on this point was made clear by P.M. Harri Holkeri. (Å. Ekdahl, "Varning avvisas," *Dagens Nyheter*, 26 February, 1991).

<sup>232</sup> "Sovjet varnar för inblandning," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 26 February, 1991). Another account told of 'secret notes' to all of the Nordic capitals, speaking of 'deep breaks in the relations between the Soviet Union and Northern Europe.' (E. Crona, "Hemlig sovjetisk varning till de nordiska länderna," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 28 February, 1991.) See also K. Eneberg, Å. Ekdahl, "Ny skarp protest," *Dagens Nyheter*, 28 February, 1991. .

<sup>233</sup> Å. Ekdahl, "Varning avvisas," *Dagens Nyheter*, 26 February, 1991.

Baltic countries and the Soviet Union over the subject of independence."<sup>234</sup> Moderate MP, Bildt, said in welcoming the Baltics during the first plenary session "our welcome greeting is even warmer, when seen against the background of the cold warnings from Moscow."<sup>235</sup>

"I am not here to (slow the efforts down)," said Gro Harlem Brundtland.<sup>236</sup> Brundtland merely referred to the content of the Soviet notes as "opinions and requests."<sup>237</sup> Denmark's Prime Minister, Poul Schlüter, commented: "if we in fact are involving ourselves in (Soviet internal affairs), we are doing so on firm legal grounds."<sup>238</sup>

Ten representatives from the Baltic republics with Estonia's Rüütel, Latvia's Gorbunovs and Lithuania's Kuzmickas in the lead, were in attendance at the Nordic Council's meeting.<sup>239</sup> There was discussion of the Baltic leaders' status from the outset. Agreement was reached that none of the representatives would be allowed to speak at the opening, plenary session.<sup>240</sup> However, on the 27th, the Baltics were allowed to address the NR,<sup>241</sup> and spoke of a will to

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<sup>234</sup> G. Salvesen, "Avviser advarsel fra Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 26 February, 1991.

<sup>235</sup> K. Eneberg, "Välkomna trots allt," *Dagens Nyheter*, 27 February, 1991.

<sup>236</sup> "Avviser advarsel fra Sovjet."

<sup>237</sup> E. Crona, "Hemlig sovjetisk varning till de nordiska länderna," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 28 February, 1991.

<sup>238</sup> "Avviser advarsel fra Sovjet."

<sup>239</sup> K. Eneberg, "Nordiskt stöd till Baltikum," *Dagens Nyheter*, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>240</sup> K. Eneberg, "Strid från start," *Dagens Nyheter*, 26 February, 1991.

<sup>241</sup> It is interesting that directly following the conclusion of NR's 39th Session, the NR extended a formal invitation to the Supreme Soviet to visit the Nordic Council's Presidium in Stockholm in October, 1991. ("Högsta sovjet till Stockholm," *Dagens Nyheter*, 2 March, 1991)



have an international conference on the Baltic issue.<sup>242</sup> One of the larger accomplishments of the meeting was the formal birth of Nordic Information Offices in the three Baltic capitals.<sup>243</sup> The status of these offices was similar to the nations' (republics') offices in Oslo and Stockholm. However, as of June, 1991 the representatives had only been able to obtain tourist visas for limited stays.<sup>244</sup>

In South Swedish Karlshamn on 22 and 23 March, yet another Nordic meeting was held between the Nordic Foreign Aid ministers and Governmental representatives. Further aid to the Baltic was discussed, but did not appear in the final document from the meeting.<sup>245</sup> The Swedish Foreign Aid Minister noted that while there was discussion, the question of aid administration was handled differently in the different Nordic countries.<sup>246</sup> The meeting demanded the initiation of substantial negotiations between the Baltic and Soviet Governments, with a view to realising Baltic independence.<sup>247</sup>

### *Recognition*

The Soviet coup attempt, beginning with the takeover by a Conservative *junta* in the early morning of 19 August, 1991 would constitute the final step on the way to Norwegian and Swedish diplomatic recognition of the Baltic states

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<sup>242</sup> E. Crona, "Balter vill ha konferens," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 28 February, 1991; K. Eneberg, "Ockupation pågår än," *Dagens Nyheter*, 28 February, 1991.

<sup>243</sup> "Nordiska rådets farlighet betydligt överdriven," *Dagens Nyheter*, 27 February, 1991.

<sup>244</sup> K. Eneberg, "Sovjet sinkar nordisk insats i Baltikum," *Dagens Nyheter*, 30 May, 1991.

<sup>245</sup> K. Eneberg, "Nordiska ministrar eniga om Sydafrika," *Dagens Nyheter*, 23 March, 1991.

<sup>246</sup> I. Yxell, "Demokrati en förutsättning för hjälp," *Blekinge Läns Tidning*, 23 March, 1991.

<sup>247</sup> I. Yxell, "Ministermöte av stor vikt," *Blekinge Läns Tidning*, 25 March, 1991.

as free. When Gorbachëv returned to Moscow on the 22nd, it became immediately clear that Western recognition of Baltic independence was close at hand.

NATO member Iceland, followed by Denmark were the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to the Baltic countries, while Denmark was the first to physically place an ambassador in the region: in Riga. Norway<sup>248</sup> was before Sweden in its diplomatic recognition, doing so on the morning of 25 August.<sup>249</sup> The Swedish Government had proposed a full recognition during the same week-end. However, final approval was received in the *Utrikesnämnd* for such a move on 27 August. The question of Baltic diplomatic status in Sweden and Norway would most likely be resolved by converting the Baltic information offices in Oslo and Stockholm to either consulates or embassies, with full diplomatic immunity and privileges.<sup>250</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg's comment on the event was a calm repetition of Norway's policy all along:

"Norway never accepted the annexation of the Baltic states. For that reason we avoid going through the backdoor regarding a recognition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which a number of countries are forced to do."<sup>251</sup>

On the 27th of August, the three Baltic flags were flying in front of the Swedish Foreign Minister on Gustav Adolfs Torg. However formal bilateral diplomatic

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<sup>248</sup> It should be noted that Norway's position on the coup attempt was in concert with NATO's approach. (A. Bonde and G. Salvesen, "Gemyttlig kritikk i Utenrikskomitéen, *Aftenposten*, 23 August, 1991); N.M. Udgaard, "Baltikum nærmere Norden," (ibid), 24 August, 1991.

<sup>249</sup> R. Taylor, "Baltic states join Nordic family," *Financial Times*, 27 August, 1991.

<sup>250</sup> Å. Ekdahl, "Erkännande i morgon," *Dagens Nyheter*, 26 August, 1991.

<sup>251</sup> "Sverige erkänner Baltikum på tisdag," *Dagens Industri*, 26 August, 1991; E. Holte, "Norge på vei til Baltikum."

relations would not formally come into force until 28 August. Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson called the Swedish move "perhaps the happiest and positive decision the Government has ever made."<sup>252</sup> Conservative leader Carl Bildt dubbed the *Utrikesnämnd* meeting on the 27th "the most harmonious I have attended in the past decennium." Sten Andersson mentioned on 25 August that the two most important conditions for independence were now fulfilled.<sup>253</sup> The Government grounded its decision upon the fact that "international legal prerequisites for recognition were now fulfilled," presenting several examples which demonstrated that the Baltic countries now had control over their own territories.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> K. Eneberg, "Baltstaterna erkända," *Dagens Nyheter*, 28 August, 1991.

<sup>253</sup> E. Holte, "Norge på vei til Baltikum," *Aftenposten*, 26 August, 1991.

<sup>254</sup> Press Release, "Sverige erkänner de baltiska staterna," (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 August, 1991).

## Chapter Seven

### Norwegian-Soviet, Swedish-Soviet Trade Relations

Trade relations between the Soviet Union and either Norway or Sweden have assumed a relatively unimportant place in their interstate relations.<sup>1</sup> In looking for the reasons one would be well served by first looking at economic realities and not at political factors, such as neutrality and alignment. Norwegian and Swedish security policy orientations have had the most effect in particularly sensitive niches of trade. While these areas are discussed in greater length, their significance relative to the overall amount and composition of goods is small.

The main cause of weak trade relations must be sought in traditional economic factors: profitability, market complexity, market structure, cost/benefit analyses *inter alia*. Trade with the Soviet Union from 1987-1991, as contrasted with 1947-9 can be seen as chaotic--characterized by Soviet domestic turmoil, vying economic interests of the republics, the de-centralisation of the locus of trade activity from the state to private interests or from the centre to the periphery, the emergence of new actors, among other factors. The charged East-West political climate, which had especially dominated trade considerations between Sweden and the Soviet Union directly after the war, has been gradually defused during the Gorbachëv years--placing commercial considerations at the fore of trade relations.

Several central questions will be addressed in the following section. First, how have Sweden's and Norway's respective security political commitments affected Soviet trade, and if so, in which areas? Also, where and how does the trade question fit into Norway's or Sweden's relationship with the Soviet Union? A third point of inquiry is how Norwegian and Swedish élites

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<sup>1</sup> For example, only between forty and fifty Norwegian companies have regular business with the USSR and the different republics (N25), while in Sweden there are at least 170 companies with Soviet interests. (J. Selander, "Lättare att få betalt från Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 March, 1991.)

perceive the factors affecting Soviet trade and how they characterize their Soviet business transactions generally.

Those who attempt to explain the reasons for the volume and composition of Soviet trade usually think in terms of factors which *help* trade and those which *hinder* it. In fact the majority of writing about the topic of Swedish or Norwegian trade relations with the Soviet Union argues either with a view to the factors which *encourage* or *discourage* trade. These themes penetrate the views and behaviour of élites analyzed in this section on Soviet trade.

## Statistics

A presentation of statistics regarding trade volume and composition provide a useful starting point for this section. The statistics may prove misleading, because business dealings, of any magnitude in a West European context stick out, as one élite expressed "like sore thumbs," because there are so few transactions occurring with the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

## SWEDEN

### *Volume*

### Exports and Imports

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Exp	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7
Imp	2.3	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.4

(the Soviet Union's proportion of total Swedish Exports and Imports)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> e.g. the Norwegian shipbuilding industry.

<sup>3</sup> "Exportfakta: Sovjetunionen," *Svensk Export* 8 (1990), p. 15; *Statistics Sweden* (Stockholm: Swedish Trade Council, March, 1991).

Year	Exports (real figures)	Trade Balance (1,000SEK)
1985	2,688,028,000	-2,927,579
1986	2,134,497,000	-1,403,036
1987	1,826,321,000	-3,056,020
1988	1,771,230,000	-2,761,477
1989	2,458,155,000	-2,690,365
1990	2,500,731,000	-1,965,025

#### IMPORTS (in real figures)

1985	5,615,607,000
1986	3,537,533,000
1987	4,882,341,000
1988	4,532,707,000
1989	5,148,520,000
1990	4,465,756,000

There are several things which should be noted in the statistics: Swedish exports to the Soviet Union have always accounted for only a small portion of Sweden's total trade with the Soviet Union. In fact, mainly due to Sweden's large fuel imports, Sweden's imports have traditionally been at least twice the amount exported.

Seen either from the perspective of Soviet imports or Swedish exports, the statistics tell a bleak story. The key figure for us is the proportion of trade which the Soviet Union accounts for, against Sweden's total exports. For all intents and purposes one must conclude that Soviet trade is insignificant in real figures or as a percentage of total exports or imports.

Finally, the SEK amount of Soviet imports and exports has been remarkably stable.

### *Composition*

#### **Exports** (percentages of selected products and branches)

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Food	27	18	8	7	14	18
Fuels	2	3	.07	1	1	.003
Ppr&Brd	8	3	2	3	11	6
Engineer	23	39	42	56	42	51

Here it is interesting to note, in keeping with 1947-9, the prominent place that engineering exports have had in the overall Swedish export profile. Traditionally, machines for special industries, heating and cooling equipment, mechanical handling equipment and non-electrical machinery have been among the most interesting from the Soviet horizon. We also notice the prominent place that food exports to the Soviet Union have held. In recent years, the paper and board industry has become increasingly more important, as is also the case in the Norwegian case. Furthermore we should note that export of scientific instruments, in recent times, have been about 6% of total export (consistently the largest export in the "other manufactured goods" category.

### **Imports**

The single most important import from the Soviet Union has been oil products. In percentage terms, oil imports from the Soviet Union increased in the

proximate 1988-1990 period.<sup>4</sup> Two other important sources were first, raw materials and second Chemical products:

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Fuel	75	66	67	50	53	65
Raw	7	15	18	24	21	13
Chem	12	12	9	14	13	9

## **NORWAY**

### *Volume*

#### **Exports and Imports (total percentages)**

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Export	0.3	0.5	0.42	0.61	0.62	0.50
Import	1.0	0.52	0.64	0.74	1.1	1.3

(percentage of Norway's total imports from Soviet Union and percentage of Norway's total exports to the Soviet Union)

#### **NOK Amount of Exports and Imports (Soviet Union)** (stated in millions of NOK)

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Export	629	672	618	896	1,162	1,069
Import	1,449	794	980	1,120	1,719	2,385
Bal	-820	-122	-362	-224	-557	-1316

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<sup>4</sup> Statistics Sweden.



*Export Composition*<sup>5</sup> (proportion of selected products)

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Pprpulp	13	30	44	47	41	15
Pstebd	35	24	26	16	23	13
Mach+ Transp	16	13	5	13	13	17
Chempr	25	19	10	9	4	6
Fish	.04	5	11	10	4	1
Industr Machin	7	6	2	4	4	5

*Import Composition* (selected products)

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Raw oil	48	16	33	10	2	14
Nonferr <sup>6</sup> metal	6	10	14	26	30	9
Chem	5	14	8	8	10	9
Petrol <sup>7</sup>	23	27	10	5	17	19

Since 1985 there have been several significant shifts in the structure of Norwegian exports and imports from the Soviet Union. The most important of Norway's exports is today pulp and paper. In fact pulp and paper is one of the only markets where Norway's market share has increased.(Ferreira, 1990:51)

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<sup>5</sup> Norwegian Trade Council, 1991. Self-calculation of percentages. Note: machine, transp. does not include ships.

<sup>6</sup> Note sharp rise in the amount of import of iron ore and metal scrap from the Soviet Union, which was 21% of imports in 1989 to 31% in 1990.

<sup>7</sup> There is an inconsistency in two Norwegian official statistics for petroleum imports for 1989. One points to it being 5%, while the other points to 17% of imports.(Norwegian Export Council, 1991).

We see here that exports to the Soviet Union dropped significantly, mainly due to Soviet payment problems throughout 1990.

It is also noteworthy to see that the trade imbalance between Norway and the Soviet Union is less sharp than between Sweden and the Soviet Union. In great part this can be accounted for by the large Swedish fuel imports from the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> We also note the similarity between the portion of Sweden's and Norway's total exports to the Soviet Union, but should also observe the quite marked differences on the import side. Final attention should be drawn to sharp decreases in the import of Soviet oil, relative to total Norwegian imports over the period 1985-1989--in fact, taking those proportions and looking at 1989, oil imports as part of total imports decreased 90% since 1985. With the decrease in Soviet oil exports to the COMECON countries in 1990, brought about by the demand for hard currency trading, we again witness a significant rise.

### **A wider historical perspective on trade**

Although this thesis covers the periods 1947-9 and 1987-91 it may be nonetheless interesting to quickly chart the development of trade during the years which are not under direct consideration in order to gain a fuller view of the subject:

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<sup>8</sup> Oil-based imports topped Norwegian imports from the Soviet Union, at one time topping 67% of total Norwegian exports from the Soviet Union (1985). (S. Elsrud, C. Norland, M. Woldsdal, "Voksende handelsunderskudd med Øst," *Aftenposten*, 15 January, 1988.)

Most important **imports** from Soviet Union (as percentage of total trade)

*Sweden*

1955	1965	1975
Min prod 65%	Min prod 61%	Min fuel 70%
Veg prod 8%	Raw mat 12%	Raw mat 17%
Foodstuff 8%	Food 5%	Metals 6%

*Norway*

1955	1965	1975
Grain prod 61%	Timber 28%	Min oil prod 27%
Transp prod 14%	Min oil prod 19%	Fertilizer 26%
Iron 11%	Aluminum 13%	Ships/boats 15%

Most important **exports** to Soviet Union(as percentage of total trade)

*Sweden*

1955	1965	1975
Transp Mat 45%	Machine-app 52%	Machine-app 45%
Machine-app 15%	Iron-steel 29%	Paper/papp 36%
Skins-leath 13%	Paper waste 8%	Paper waste 8%

*Norway*

1955	1965	1975
Plant Oil 62%	Oil Fat 49%	Chemicals 25%
Fish 36%	Fish 26%	Paper papp 24%
Animals .03%	Paper mass 9%	Machine app 10%

#### Portion of total export dedicated to Soviet Union

	1947	1949	1955	1965	1975
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N	3.3	5.4	2.3	1.28	1.3
S	1.26	1.84	0.8	1.26	1.68

#### Portion of total import dedicated to Soviet Union<sup>9</sup>

	1947	1949	1955	1965	1975
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N	1.4	2.8	1.6	1.27	0.80
S	6.77	2.48	1.6	6.0	2.9

#### Government and Political Involvement in Trade Questions

While the Norwegian and Swedish Governments have resisted getting unnecessarily involved in Soviet trade questions, the Soviet Union has consistently, as far back as 1947-9 insisted upon Swedish and Norwegian official involvement in the area. From the Norwegian and Swedish sides, there has existed an understanding that the judgements of risks and opportunities, and the enforcement of contracts are best left to the interested companies and their own judgements of the market on their own terms. However, the state has involved itself in certain circumscribed realms.

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<sup>9</sup> Sveriges Offentliga Statistik, Handel (Stockholm: Kommerskollegium) and Utrikeshandel (Stockholm: Statistisk Centralbyrå).

## *Foreign Aid to the Soviet Union*

The first exception has been the structure of foreign aid policy--which debatedly does not fall into the realm of trade policy at all.<sup>10</sup> One locus of discussion with respect to foreign aid is: for which purposes should aid be used? Until the late 1980's the question of aid was not important. The question of catastrophic food aid to the Soviet Union has been highlighted since 1990. With a rapidly approaching Winter in the Soviet Union (1990-91), and an decreasingly effective food distribution system, Soviet cries for immediate assistance were heard in Scandinavia and the whole Western world.<sup>11</sup> The question fell in that the situation never reached imaginable proportions<sup>12</sup> and political violence in the Baltic made Scandinavian leaders re-think their offer.<sup>13</sup> Another key question was where the aid might be best spent. Especially in Sweden, but to some extent in Norway, there were strong pressures that the aid should be oriented away from far lying areas and shifted towards the countries' proximate geographical needs: for Norway to the Kola<sup>14</sup> and to *Balticum* and

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<sup>10</sup> Excepting, as one Norwegian trade unionist termed it "business as aid." (Sandegren, interview).

<sup>11</sup> In Sweden see S. Olofsson, "Staten betalar Sovjetfrakt," *Svenska Dagbladet* 13 December, 1990, L. Porne, "Kommission garanterar rätt adressat," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 December, 1990. In Norway see O. Mathismoen, "Norsk Sovjet-hjelp planlegges," *Aftenposten*, 17 November, 1990; B. Egjar Engesland, "Norsk krise-plan för Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 23 November, 1990. For the chief parliamentary debate on the matter see *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 14 December, 1990.

<sup>12</sup> S. Bøe, "Inget svenskt katastrofbistånd till Sovjet," *Dagens Nyheter*, 14 December, 1990.

<sup>13</sup> In Norway, G. Magnus, "Syse: Hjelpen til Sovjet-må vurderes," *Aftenposten*, 10 January, 1991. In Sweden see Centre Party's Olof Johansson, "C vill frysa Sovjetbistånd," *Dagens Nyheter*, 24 January, 1991.

<sup>14</sup> O. Mathismoen, "Norsk kola-lån på en milliard," *Aftenposten*, 10 October, 1990.

for Sweden to the Eastern Europe generally<sup>15</sup> and to the Baltic states in particular.

### *Trade Financing*

Trade financing was another fertile area for Government involvement. The Norwegian and the Swedish parliaments have dealt a very slim mandate to the state credit guarantee institutions to "stay out of the red." However, beginning in the Spring-Summer, 1990, reports of serious Soviet payment delays made this mandate increasingly difficult to uphold. The credit guarantee institutions, the Swedish *Exportkreditnämnden (EKN)*<sup>16</sup> and the Norwegian *Garanti Institutt for Eksport Kreditgarantier (GIEK)*, operating under their tight parliamentary mandates, made the decision to table medium to long-term credit guarantees. The question in both countries became: would the respective Governments step in with so-called politically-inspired credit guarantees or credit so as to maintain the present level of trade? Given the 1946 Swedish 'Billion Credit' decision, one would expect that the Swedes would be more favourably disposed to this sort of action.

### *Export Promotion*

The Soviet case has traditionally demanded more energy than in other more 'natural' markets such as Germany or the U.S. for many of the same reasons as were present in 1947-9. First, the Soviet market is yet relatively uncharted territory for Swedish and Norwegian firms. Yet another reason has been

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<sup>15</sup> Of the Government's proposed aid to Central and East Europe, more than 50% was intended for the Baltic republics. See Foreign Aid Minister, Hjelm-Wallén, Riksdagsprotokoll, 12 February, 1991.

<sup>16</sup> According to one official, EKN has played a pronounced role in providing export credits to the Soviet Union since at least the first part of 1989, when, as he put it "the period when banks became risk-averse." "Now only governments provide credit guarantees (to the Soviet Union)--a complete reversal of a trend." (S12).

political— increased trade adds a different, perhaps supportive dimension to political relations between nations, establishing in its turn, useful contact nets between business and governmental élites. A third reason is that the Swedish and Norwegian leaders have seen it necessary to draw, from time-to-time, upon its knowledge and financial resources in order to promote domestic well-being in Sweden and Norway.

Export promotion has been the express goal of both the Norwegian and Swedish *Exportråds* or Export Councils. Quasi-official groups, such as the Swedish *Främjande Kommittén för öst/västhandel*<sup>17</sup>, have acted upon their own mandate to create an atmosphere where common opinions, initiatives, problems may be discussed. Both Sweden and Norway have Governmental 'Mixed Commissions' together with the Soviet Union. Traditionally the Swedish Minister of Industry and the Norwegian Minister of Trade and Shipping led the respective Mixed Commissions, backed by experts from inside and outside the bureaucracy. Meetings of the Commission have been opportunities for the airing of difficulties and the launching of new initiatives between both the countries.

### *Parliamentary Role*

The *Riksdag* and the *Storting* have played minimal roles with respect to trade policy toward the Soviet Union. The categories of debate about Soviet trade can briefly be summarized. Most frequent were MP statements of what everyone already knew: Soviet trade is modest.<sup>18</sup> For the Norwegians, the greatest trade

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<sup>17</sup> The new name: Swedish-Soviet Trade Council.

<sup>18</sup> See *Riksdagsprotokoll* for the following MP's and dates: Swedish Conservative MP, Per Westerberg, 20 April, 1989; Swedish Centre MP, Per-Ola Eriksson, 12 April, 1991; Trade Minister Anita Gradin, 23 April, 1987; Moderate Party's Sten Andersson i Malmö, same date. Liberal Party MP, Ingemar Eliasson, 22 February, 1989. Social Democratic MP, Reynoldh Furustrand, 13 December, 1989; Liberal MP, Håkan Holmberg, Moderate MP, Margaretha af Ugglas, Centre Party's Pär Granstedt, Left Party's Bengt Hurtig, 8 May, 1990. (continued...)

question was oil exploration. But that possibility was blocked by the outstanding Barents Sea delimitation question.<sup>19</sup> In the Gorbachëv years there have also been numerous debates regarding the success, failure and progress of Soviet economic reforms, but only infrequently have trade questions been discussed.<sup>20</sup>

## Élite Characterizations of Trade with the Soviet Union

### Degree of Interest

Never has there been any lack of 'intellectual' interest in doing business in the Soviet Union. Many of the objective factors for trade already exist: ethnic similarities (in the Baltic case), geographic proximity, inexpensive materials and manpower being foremost amongst them. These natural reasons led to, as Anders Åslund said, "all Swedish companies are surveying the market."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>(...continued)

See also Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU7 ("Samarbete med Östeuropa och vissa internationella miljöinsatser").

For Norwegian examples see *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*: Progress Party MP, Hans Røsjarde, 19 January, 1989; Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, 13 January, 1989; Bjørn Tore Godal, 4 January, 1990; FFF Party MP, Anders Aune, 31 May, 1990.

<sup>19</sup> Labour MP, Finn Knutsen, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>20</sup> See Norwegian Foreign Minister, Bondevik, and Conservative MP Petersen in *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 18 December, 1989 and 4 January, 1990 respectively regarding the progress of Gorbachëv's economic reform strategy and the possibilities for increased Soviet-Norwegian trade. In Sweden see Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 May, 1988: Social Democratic MP, Stig Alemyr and Liberal Party's Hadar Cars, 4 May, 1988; Swedish Minister of Trade, Gradin, 12 April, 1991.

<sup>21</sup> Åslund, interview.



However, interest in the Soviet Union has not been able to go the distance. Whereas some of these factors have driven Swedish-Soviet or Norwegian-Soviet trade up to the existing level, they have not been decisive in lifting trade out of these established levels and patterns.

It so happened that Swedish and Norwegian domestic economic difficulties conveniently coincided with Gorbachëv's *glasnost* and *perestroika*. What set the train in motion was, of course, change in the Soviet Union and the awakening of a nearly three hundred million man strong market--with all the conceivable pitfalls and benefits. Very soon, though, it became obvious that production and the acquirement of raw materials from Sweden and Norway was very expensive. Companies became interested in gaining benefits--and many preferred to do that by first looking in their immediate neighbourhood. While larger conglomerates had a very clear idea of the risks and the pitfalls involved, medium and smaller companies, many naïvely, approached the Soviet market in particular and the East European market generally.<sup>22</sup>

### Complicating Factors

#### *Where does the Fault Lie?*

Complicating factors are those factors that either complicate a decision to enter the Soviet market or, if already established, make the company's existence more difficult. Johnson Concern's Managing Director, Göran Ennerfelt, put it well in saying "there are many examples of failures on the Soviet market--but the real question is whether they can be a guide for the future."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> A typical characterization of the naiveté of firms planning to go onto the Soviet market was given by one Norwegian: "all sorts of small firms, claiming to know people in the Soviet Union, but that nonetheless having no experience with export to any country, want to start by exporting to the Soviet Union...and they want to export their firm out of troubles." (N22)

<sup>23</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

Traditionally, élite attributions of Norwegian and Swedish lack of success in Soviet business centred about around a combination of factors: lack of courage/daring, a lack of persistence and patience,<sup>24</sup> a lack of Swedish, Norwegian and Soviet effort generally, the absence of proper cooperation or suitable projects, or finally a lack of information and comprehension of the Soviet market.<sup>25</sup>

As one élite said, "in the old system getting credit was much less of a problem than getting companies to take risks."<sup>26</sup> "Unless someone has either a religious commitment to do business with Eastern Europe or is assured extraordinary profit, businessmen will abstain from trade in Eastern Europe," said one prominent élite.<sup>27</sup> There are two alternatives, as Anders Åslund pointed out "either to plan with a long-term perspective (e.g. Tetra Pak, ABB) or trade in the short term, commodities trading)—it is difficult to justify anything in between today."<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> There was general agreement that, as one Norwegian said, "it is not easy to build up a new business in the Soviet Union—you need a lot of patience and a lot of hard work." (N56) Another Norwegian pointed out that "small firms which are struggling to survive see the Soviet Union as their possible chance because it is near and that Norway has had good relations with the Soviet Union." Profit only comes in the long run...contrary to the desires of these firms, who need profit at once." (N22) These same sentiments echoed by Norwegian Trade Board's Terje Nilssen, "-Vår eksport vil øke," *Aftenposten*, 15 January, 1988.

<sup>25</sup> See T. Ek, Chairman of the Swedish Small Business Organisation, "Satsa på Sovjethandeln," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 30 August, 1989.

<sup>26</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>27</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>28</sup> Åslund, interview.

*Decisional confusion, decisional complexity and lack of decisional power*

Seen from both the Norwegian and Swedish perspectives, the trade issue has to some extent filled the void left by the previously paramount security policy emphasis on Norwegian-Soviet or Swedish-Soviet foreign relations.<sup>29</sup> This has in its turn placed increasing demands on Norwegian and Swedish domestic bureaucracies to show increasing flexibility and adapt to the new situation.

Sweden and Norway have begun to move away from acting as unitary actors towards the Soviet Union. Prior to 1985, "there was a tight circle of people involved in Soviet trade," said one businessman, "because of the working of the Soviet system, we felt a need to act 'as a country' so that we could unify the Swedish position." "Today," he added "there are more players in the field, and it is difficult to have an overview."<sup>30</sup> Previous institutions in both Sweden and the Soviet Union have outlived themselves, as one business élite underlined, "(the bureaucrats) are dealing with a reality of fifteen years ago, which no longer exists."<sup>31</sup>

Many Swedish and Norwegian officials and advisors felt decisional confusion on economic matters in the wake of political transformation as a chief hindrance to trade. One of the most common complaints is politically-related decisional apathy. As one Norwegian diplomat said, "no one has the power to make any decisions any more."<sup>32</sup> The perceived problems had a great deal to do with a near-total transformation of the way Soviet trade machinery worked. One official thoughtfully outlined:

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<sup>29</sup> As one élite said: "the Soviet Union has been transformed to an unknown (entity) to something known--and thus less threatening." (S11)

<sup>30</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>31</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>32</sup> N3

"In the old system you never had any contact with the end users.<sup>33</sup> The only thing you had to do was find the key person in the trade organisations, who steered Soviet trade. It was easy to find market channels. Now the Trade Ministry has (exaggerated) 20-25 bodies under her and they have lost their monopoly. Now there are masses of trading houses fighting for survival."<sup>34</sup>

A related, relatively common factor was well summed-up by one élite saying "the words they speak are the same, but we detect that there is much less authority from the centre...even when we talk at Prime Minister level."<sup>35</sup> "All of our contacts have disappeared," claimed one Director, "and with that all of the purchasing organisations."<sup>36</sup> The Ministries, one individual mentioned, "have no control over what they used to have control over; we cannot rely on what we hear—we have to double check everything."<sup>37</sup> The conclusion drawn by one élite with great experience in the market was naturally, "we are very careful with whom we deal today."<sup>38</sup>

#### *Getting paid: the most pressing problem*

One of the greatest difficulties in trading with the Soviet Union became the Soviet payment problem in 1990. Norsk Hydro Vice President, Tor Sverre Jacobsen, recounted the chain of events leading up to the Soviet payment problem thus: "first it started with delayed payments, then they just started

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<sup>33</sup> As one Norwegian businessman said, "we still talk to exporters much as in the past—but now we are much more aware of the end-consumers, which have a stronger say in the product's use and purpose." (N56)

<sup>34</sup> S13. Norwegian Trade Minister, Kaci Kullmann Five also elaborates on this phenomenon in *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 10 October, 1990.

<sup>35</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>36</sup> S. Ryman, "Leverantörer drabbas av kaos i öst," *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 November, 1990.

<sup>37</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>38</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

paying the interest and in the third step they decided to stop paying altogether."<sup>39</sup> The problem did not solely concern Scandinavia, in fact comprising Soviet trading partners worldwide.<sup>40</sup> No matter how the Soviet authorities tried to play the issue down in various fora,<sup>41</sup> the issue continued to plague Western exporters, albeit with some lightening,<sup>42</sup> until the time of this writing.<sup>43</sup> Even the previous-dependable Soviet Foreign Trade Bank, *Vnesheconombank*, was teetering on the edge of depleting its foreign currency reserves in late Fall, 1991.

#### *Swedish and Norwegian Decisions in the wake of payment problems*

In the Swedish case action was taken on November 8, 1990<sup>44</sup> resulting in the Swedish Export Guarantee Board, *EKN*, informing the Swedish Government that it was tabling all credits in excess of one year.<sup>45</sup> This was a dramatic step,

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<sup>39</sup> Jacobsen, interview.

<sup>40</sup> "Small U.S. Firms Stung By Soviet Union's Delays," *International Herald Tribune*, 23-24 March, 1991; G. Graham, "Soviet banker rejects debt payment fears," *Financial Times*, 9-10 March, 1991.

<sup>41</sup> G. Graham, "Soviet banker rejects debt payment fears," *Financial Times*, 9-10 March, 1991. Here Alibegov of *Vnesheconombank* pegs the total amount of outstanding external debts at "around \$60 Billion," while rejecting Western payment fears. See also, "Sovjet ska betala skulder," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 29 November, 1990. A similar statement is given by Soviet Vice Minister for Economic Ties, Oleg Davidov in K.O. Evensen, "Vi skal betale, lover russerne," *Aftenposten*, 22 May, 1990.

<sup>42</sup> One Swedish Trade official (S56)

<sup>43</sup> As late as 12 June, 1991 the Soviet Union still owed Norway NOK 128m (K. Fossli, "Norway protest on Soviet debt," *Financial Times* 12 June, 1991.

<sup>44</sup> According to one official, the payment problem began in May-June, 1990. (S14)

<sup>45</sup> M. Sundberg, "Dråpslag mot Sovjethandel-- inga mer kreditgarantier," *Dagens Industri*, 10 November, 1990; "Tvärstopp för Sovjetgarantier," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 20 December, 1990.

since never previously had the situation in the Soviet Union become so serious<sup>46</sup> that EKN felt itself forced to establish such a rugged approach.<sup>47</sup> For business transactions of less than one year there was another regulation<sup>48</sup>: EKN would only guarantee transactions which already are counter-guaranteed by *Vnesheconombank*.<sup>49</sup>

The Swedish decision was explained by one of EKN's directors, Ragnar Sohlman thus: "how does one know with whom one will write a contract...even if one knows who the other contracting party is how do we know that this party will exist in three years, let alone that it is willing and able to pay?" According to Sohlman, EKN was of November 10 obliged to pay out SEK 27 million. That debt stood in marked contrast to outstanding Soviet debt to Norway of approximately 70 million NOK in January, 1991.<sup>50</sup> Sohlman mentioned that when the situation hit its high point, 55 billion SEK were in question.<sup>51</sup> The EKN decision is significant because it is a negative judgement of the current risk for exporting to or investing in the Soviet Union--and could

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<sup>46</sup> Most agreed that the Soviet payment problem came as a surprise to most who were used to a dependable Soviet payment track record. As Swedish Jan-Olof Nyström said, (in rough translation) "many Swedish businesses were caught with their pants down, since the Soviets had always been such dependable payers." (*Svensk Export* 4 (1991). A similar Norwegian perception found in R. Mæhle, "Åpner for norsk eksport-satsning," *Aftenposten*, 14 January, 1988.

<sup>47</sup> One Swedish official pointed out that the first time the problem had ever been raised with the Soviet Union was in the Mixed Commission in the end of 1989. (S14)

<sup>48</sup> New export credit guarantees were provided for the rest of Eastern Europe by EKN on 9 January, 1991 ("Ny exportgaranti för Östeuropa," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 10 January, 1991).

<sup>49</sup> Norwegian élite called *Vnesheconombank* "a bank that acts like a bank," taking no orders from the Soviet ministries.(N18)

<sup>50</sup> N16

<sup>51</sup> *Dagens Industri*, 10 November, 1990.

be used as a guideline for Swedish banks to follow.<sup>52</sup> It should also be noted that the decision was taken without considerations to what was politically desirable, rather a clear cost-benefit analysis.

Not a totally dissimilar decision was made in Norway on 28 November, 1990.<sup>53</sup> But the differences in the Norwegian decision were four-fold: first, it was a decision by the Government, and thus was taken up in the *Storting*.<sup>54</sup> Second, the decision had no special time limit. Third, the decision was final,<sup>55</sup> and finally the credit framework was limited to NOK 750 million.

According to one high Norwegian official "until April of 1990 Norwegian industry was so confident of Soviet payment ability that they never deemed it important to secure a guarantee."<sup>56</sup> The Norwegian decision was, in the words of one Foreign Ministry official a simple result of political uncertainty and payment problems.<sup>57</sup> As one individual said "the banks are glad that they are not faced with the companies and they like to get rid of risk."<sup>58</sup> "All

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<sup>52</sup> EKN's Fridtjofsson pointed out, "only a small portion of Sweden's trade is guaranteed by the EKN." (interview). "Before," Fridtjofsson added, "the Soviet risk was seen as so small that banks themselves felt prepared to take on the risk." Carl Bildt pointed out in 1989 that "...bankers still consider the Soviet Union as credit-worthy...the Soviets have supposedly loaned relatively large amounts...but it appears that they haven't used this money." (*Sparfrämjandet*, 1989:152)

<sup>53</sup> One official said continuous contacts were held between the Norwegians, the Danes and the Swedes in the matter. (E. Heiio, GIEK). According to one GIEK official, "some of the earlier signs started to show in late 1989 with the huge payment difficulties to (e.g. Siemens). (Ingebretsen, interview)

<sup>54</sup> Decision taken by the *Storting*, 28 November, 1990. See also "Regeringen vedtar landramme for eksportkredittgarantier til Sovjetunionen på 750 millioner kroner," (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, 29 November, 1990).

<sup>55</sup> N31

<sup>56</sup> N14

<sup>57</sup> N31

<sup>58</sup> S12

Norwegian banks are closed on the Soviet Union now," according to one financing expert.<sup>59</sup>

*In the Aftermath of the decisions*

There were several ways out of this situation. One of the possibilities lay in the extension of politically-inspired credits by the Swedish<sup>60</sup> or Norwegian Government.<sup>61</sup> This step would of course mean circumventing the strict EKN or GIEK mandates and mean a clear political intervention in trade questions.

"In Sweden," said one high trade official," there is no particular willingness to subsidize trade, although we know that other countries, for political reasons, have subsidized, for example, capital investments."<sup>62</sup> A similar observation was presented by one trade promoter: "Germany, Italy and France<sup>63</sup> have been very generous with their credit guarantees--Sweden must also show generosity...our political parties, the world around us and companies will act to pressure the Government."<sup>64</sup> Two businessmen agreed saying, "...look at what is going on in the EEC...the Swedish Government can't just sit back and wait;

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<sup>59</sup> N18

<sup>60</sup> But, said Ennerfelt, "for long-range commitments (in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) what is needed is a different attitude from the Swedish state" ("Staten bör stödja investeringar i öst!" *Handelskammartidningen*, 21 December, 1990)

<sup>61</sup> Norwegian Trade Minister, Nordbø, was prepared to consider the question of a separate guarantee framework for the Soviet Union. Finance Minister, Sigbjørn Johnsen confirmed that "Norway will establish a guarantee framework of NOK 750 million with (*Vnesheconombank*)." The chief motivation Johnsen gave was that the Government protect the approximately 2,000 paper-industry positions in Østfold, which are so dependent on Soviet export. ("Egen garantiramme for Sovjetunionen," *Eksportfinans*, December, 1990)

<sup>62</sup> S8

<sup>63</sup> EKN's Fritjofsson noted that "all the French decisions are taken on a political basis." (Interview)

<sup>64</sup> S13



it would be better for the Government to do it itself (extend credit guarantees), rather than be asked to change."<sup>65</sup> "In times like this, where Swedish industry has significant problems in marketing goods in the Soviet Union there is always pressure on the Government to change the situation,"<sup>66</sup> said one official. Regardless of these expectations, action taken on the issue until the time of this writing was well summed up by one trade official: "Of course the Swedish Government could do more, but the (domestic) political and economic conditions are not conducive to that."<sup>67</sup>

One Norwegian élite said, "Norway is in the same position as Sweden, as differed from countries like Spain, Germany and Spain) which offer heavy credits to help the Soviets pay for imports."<sup>68</sup> One Norwegian FM official pointed out a double-stance in Norway: "Although official Norway is reluctant to encourage people to go ahead and does not want to raise too much enthusiasm for (Soviet trade) we also say it is important to position oneself now in order to be successful--if not we will be lost in the queue and Japan and the U.S. will exploit this opportunity."<sup>69</sup>

Another alternative pathway would be, as one official put it, that the reasons for making the decision disappear and that "certainty is re-established."<sup>70</sup> As time pushed on, the re-establishment of certainty was not on the horizon-so this alternative could also be discounted. A third alternative pathway was simply that the EKN would announce that it was moving its decision from being a

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<sup>65</sup> S42

<sup>66</sup> S24. This individual added that one must remember that "it's the taxpayers' money you are gambling with."

<sup>67</sup> S14

<sup>68</sup> N1

<sup>69</sup> N15

<sup>70</sup> S12

decision to table to totally closing down on the Soviet Union.<sup>71</sup> One individual close to the matter found this alternative the most likely.<sup>72</sup>

### *Actual impact of the decision*

The fall-out of the decision had several expected and unexpected results. "We would have expected all sorts of pressure on us to bring about a change in the decision," one official said, "but there is not much lobbying at all...there is an understanding of our position."<sup>73</sup> However, another individual with a slightly different organisational perspective said that "Alfa-Laval (a major player in Swedish-Soviet trade) complained lividly about the EKN decision."<sup>74</sup> "Some Swedish companies are very badly hit here," said one official, "even those who have always looked at the Soviet Union as a very stable market."<sup>75</sup> "Some companies," one official countered, "are finding creative sources of getting around the problem, such as buyback agreements or utilizing other funding facilities."<sup>76</sup>

In Norway, there was talk of GIEK's negotiating a guarantee agreement which individual firms could use--but if negotiations failed, according to one source, "we could go into a softer guarantee system."<sup>77</sup> But now, said one

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<sup>71</sup> S12

<sup>72</sup> S12

<sup>73</sup> S12

<sup>74</sup> S14. Other sources confirmed that informal pressure to change the EKN decision was underway(S42)

<sup>75</sup> S14

<sup>76</sup> This individual claimed knowledge of a Swedish financing company in London which specialized in finding financing for the Soviet Union. (S14)

<sup>77</sup> The most fertile ground for soft Norwegian credits were projects which related to Soviet environmental problems. But as one Norwegian Foreign Ministry official pointed out:(to extend soft credits) "would be a long step to (continued...)

official, "it would be harder to introduce such measures since it would weaken multilateral efforts (e.g. in the G-24)."<sup>78</sup> In Sweden there was no particular industry which could be said to have been particularly hit. However in Norway, the paper and pulp industry was particularly affected by payment difficulties.<sup>79</sup> One individual confirmed that pressure was being applied on the authorities to establish a line of credit to finance export of products--adding "(paper and pulp exporters) can't just switch from the Soviet (market) overnight."<sup>80</sup> Thus, he pointed out, many have found untraditional ways of financing, the foremost being countertrade.<sup>81</sup> But, he added, "we must make a decision either to keep on relying on the Soviet Union or to change production." One Governmental official reflected this concern: "we need to keep up these markets for paper and pulp."<sup>82</sup>

It is worth noting that, against the background of payment problems, Norwegian Trade Council's representative in Moscow, Jarle Forbord, reported a 12.5% overall trade<sup>83</sup> increase up until October, 1990.<sup>84</sup> This starkly contrasts

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<sup>77</sup>(...continued)

take, since this would mean direct payment from the taxpayers." (N39)

One Norwegian MFA official confirmed that there was significant pressure on the Ministry to use the seven billion NOK aid for the Soviet Union and East Europe. Said this official, "an extension of broader soft credits has been suggested by the Ministry--but sent down again." (N31)

<sup>78</sup> N14

<sup>79</sup> The question was still burning in May of 1991 amidst lay-offs, ostensibly directly attributable to Soviet economic difficulties. (K. Aaserud, "Greaker permitterer," *Aftenposten*, 3 May, 1991).

<sup>80</sup> N56

<sup>81</sup> N16

<sup>82</sup> Conservative Trade Minister, Kullmann Five, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 10 October, 1990.

<sup>83</sup> Note that Norwegian exports were off 32% in 1990 as compared to 1989 (K. Fossli, "Norway protest at Soviet debt," *Financial Times*, 12 June, 1991)

with Sweden's total Soviet trade, which from 1989 to 1990 decreased from SEK 7,606,675,000 to 6,966,487,000.

These decisions left fairly narrow options open to Swedish and Norwegian exporters:<sup>85</sup> cash transactions, pre-payment, letters of guarantee, with counter guarantee by *Vnesheconombank* in the short term, countertrade, keeping capital gains in a Soviet company, formation of a joint ventures, much favoured by the Soviet authorities. Two Norwegians added other, more creative ways to establish security: either opening of escrow accounts or taking physical goods (e.g. a part of a Soviet fleet) as security.<sup>86</sup>

#### *Payment patterns and improvement?*

In late 1990-early 1991, there were preliminary indications of an amelioration in the Soviet payment problem.<sup>87</sup> Some perceived the changing situation as a result of changing Soviet domestic priorities. There was wide agreement that the Soviet priority was to assure the production and distribution of consumer goods.<sup>88</sup> Thus, those companies which concentrated on this sector were

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<sup>84</sup>(...continued)

<sup>84</sup> Broken down into exports and imports that indicated an import increase of 17.7%, while a fully-expected export decrease of a mere 5.2%. (K.O. Evensen, "Øket handel med Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 18 December, 1990.)

<sup>85</sup> One Norwegian financier said, "you cannot find unsecured loans for investment in the Soviet Union." (N18)

<sup>86</sup> N18

<sup>87</sup> In Sweden see J. Selander, "Lättare att få betalt från Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 March, 1991. According to a survey of 42 of 170 Swedish companies with dealings with the Soviet Union, outstanding claims were significantly reduced since Fall, 1990. The total amount of outstanding claims had decreased from SEK 400 million to SEK 256 million. A lightening trend in the Norwegian situation, was confirmed by GIEK's Elen Heio (telephone, 17 April, 1991).

<sup>88</sup> For example see the debate between Swedish Cabinet Secretary Schori, Moderate leader Bildt, and Axel Johnson President Ennerfelt, (*Sparfrämjandet*, 1989:141-2) Schori finds that farming is the highest prioritized sector of the  
(continued...)

perceived to have been paid earlier than others.<sup>89</sup> As one Norwegian involved in the matter said, "we have noticed that greaseproof paper, commonly used in food production, is a prioritized product—and thus they usually get paid first."<sup>90</sup> Another individual pointed to other papers, such as silk paper (used in jacket linings) as a low priority, adding by contrast that "without greasepaper they are unable to distribute butter and margarine."<sup>91</sup> One Norwegian élite, interviewed in late January, 1991 said: "up until a couple of months ago consumer products and distribution-related items were they only things which (the Soviets) paid for."<sup>92</sup> At this point, any existing agreement about patterns in Soviet payment broke down.

Excepting the food-related sector, individuals perceived an array of other domestic Soviet factors which affected the payment problem. One EKN official, Lennart Skarp, felt that the temporary amelioration of the payment problem could have been due to the increase in oil prices during the Kuwait crisis.<sup>93</sup> Others felt that there were Soviet political motives involved. EKN director, Ragnar Sohlman said, "although I do not have a firm basis for saying this, (Soviet payments) seem to go quicker with the governmentally-'guaranteed' business transactions," (rather than private companies) hinting that the Soviets' payment pattern could have something to do with the willingness to retain

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<sup>88</sup>(...continued)

Soviet economy, while Bildt also felt that food supply was Gorbachëv's largest political problem.

<sup>89</sup> The successful conclusion of the negotiations between Soviet authorities and Swedish firm, Karlshamns AB, to build a factory for the production of margarine, cooking fats and animal feed resulting in Lipetsk is a sign of the priority the food sector was given. (L. Hallberg, "Klart med fabrik i Sovjet," *Blekinge Läns Tidning*, 13 March, 1991).

<sup>90</sup> Ellen Heiio, telephone interview.

<sup>91</sup> N18

<sup>92</sup> N14

<sup>93</sup> S12

government-to-government relations at an even keel.<sup>94</sup> Akin to this thinking was a former member of the Swedish military staff, Leif Kihlsten, who felt the Soviets "(had) a sudden interest to pay their foreign debts," mentioning that Sweden was a privileged country seen from the Soviet standpoint.<sup>95</sup> "I see the groping attempt to re-pay as efforts to assure that they do not end up outside" of the economic and political developments in Europe, said Kihlsten. This conjecture runs counter the Swedish and Norwegian experience in the Mixed Commissions. However, this political motive seemed unrelated to security policy. Reportedly, the Norwegians had better success at extracting payment than the Swedes.<sup>96</sup>

It could also be denied that any patterns existed. EKN's Lennart Skarp stated that "quite to the contrary, we have seen the that there is a 'patternless pattern' (in Soviet payments)--even with respect to selected items."<sup>97</sup> It was important, as many pointed out, that one not attribute but a part of the responsibility for the improved payment climate to seemingly more lofty goals from the Soviet side. As Swedish Export Council's Nyström pointed out, "the Swedish companies (and EKN) have become much more cautious...now

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<sup>94</sup> Sohlman, telephone interview, 18 April, 1991.

<sup>95</sup> Kihlsten, interview, 26 March, 1991. In a later telephone interview one month later (16.4.91), Kihlsten noted that the trend had reversed: "the Soviets saw they could not handle it any longer--the Soviets are frightfully currency-poor."

<sup>96</sup> One Norwegian official confirmed "we received 65 million NOK in connection with the last meeting (October, 1990) of the Mixed Commission." (N25). The situation seemed different in Sweden, said Nyström: "the situation has not changed to the better in spite of the fact that Industry Minister, Rune Molin, raised the problem at the so-called Mixed Commission meeting in May (1990) in Moscow." (P-Y Bengtsson, "Sovjets skuldkaos," *Svensk Export* 8 (1990), p. 6.

<sup>97</sup> Skarp, telephone interview, 18 April, 1991.

demanding payment in advance or letters of credit."<sup>98</sup> But, according to Nyström, although 16 of 25 Soviet foreign trade associations which had outstanding payments in September, 1990<sup>99</sup> still remained 'on the list' in March, 1991,<sup>100</sup> the Soviets had also "learned the rules of the game."<sup>101</sup> Refuting perhaps a pattern of payments to a certain country, Lennart Skarp inferred that other credit guarantee institutions in Western Europe had, barring only slight variations, similar experiences as did Sweden in the matter.<sup>102</sup>

### *Foreign Currency problems*

Another area of difficulty is the exacerbation of the traditional problem surrounding shortage and/or mismanagement of foreign currency. As one élite said:

"The control instrument has disappeared. Before, when you received an order you knew funds could be allocated--otherwise there would have never have been an order. Now there is no control whatsoever. Now you have all sorts of companies with currency and no one really knows where the currency is located: it's like eight persons who are writing out checks on eight different accounts and no one keeps track of anything."<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> J. Selander, "Lättare att få betalt från Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 March, 1991.

<sup>99</sup> P-Y Bengtsson, "Sovjets skuldkaos," *Svensk Export* 8 (1990), p.4-6.

<sup>100</sup> *Svensk Export* 4 (1991).

<sup>101</sup> "Lättare att få betalt från Sovjet."

<sup>102</sup> Skarp, telephone interview, 18 April, 1991. The evidence Skarp mentioned was his conversations at an OECD group meeting in mid-December where Soviet payments were raised.

<sup>103</sup> S4

Other individuals pointed to constantly changing currency retention quotas as problematic points, for Scandinavian and Soviet companies alike.<sup>104</sup> This point only acted to further complicate the profit-loss margins in calculating future enterprises. One Norwegian financing official illustrated the problem, pointing out that in the Soviet fishing industry only approximately 5% of the value of catches could be exported as desired.<sup>105</sup> "Clearly," said one official, "the retention quotas of 100% are one of the chief reasons why companies choose the joint-venture route."<sup>106</sup>

A key problem is that of convertibility. Most agreed in both Norway and Sweden that it was premature to speak of convertibility even in the medium-range future. One Norwegian élite said that convertibility would take "not less than five years--probably ten years--the difference between the real rate and the official rate is so enormous, and the economic problems so basic, that we can't see how they could accomplish it any quicker."<sup>107</sup> In an interesting Swedish debate in 1989, Moderate Party's Carl Bildt estimated convertibility would take "for example 24 or 36 years," Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori estimated it would occur in the "year of the dragon" (which one not specified), economist Stefan Hedlund estimated "perhaps between 20 and 25 years," Ennerfelt to "the beginning of the next century-year 2001," and Soviet historian Kristian Gerner to "five years following the convertibility of the Estonian Krona."(*Sparfrämjandet*, 1989:179)

#### *A leftover from the past: delivery problems*

A prominent complaint was delivery problems, hardly a new problem during the Gorbachëv period.(*Sparfrämjandet*, 1989:161) As Göran Ennerfelt outlined,

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<sup>104</sup> N18

<sup>105</sup> N18

<sup>106</sup> N18

<sup>107</sup> N14



under the former system, "we knew the product which we had purchased would be delivered, even if it was not delivered in a timely manner." As one Norwegian advisor told, "you just can't be sure you will get the goods in time." However, he pointed out that "those experienced in Soviet trade 'factor' this into their equation--but the positive side is that the Soviets understand if Norwegian firms are late in making deliveries."<sup>108</sup> These comments provide a contrast with the situation in 1947-9 when Soviet deliveries were much more reliable than, say, the Swedish.

### *Interest incompatibility*

Another perceived difficulty was the sheer incompatibility of buying or selling interests: the Scandinavians were not interested in what the Soviets were selling as well as the opposite--a common theme even directly following World War Two. In interviews, one often hears the expression, "the central question is finding suitable projects." "Sweden," said one élite, "prefers package deals including maintenance--which means a long-term cost and investment...the (Soviets) can't appreciate this."<sup>109</sup> Alfa Laval, a major player in Swedish-Soviet trade, is a fitting example of a company which sells package solutions. But, as one élite pointed out, "the Soviets have never liked this."<sup>110</sup> But even positive change has been seen here, in the context of Alfa-Laval's signature with two Moscow companies of a service joint venture in 1990.

One Norwegian élite felt that this problem was at the core of Soviet-Norwegian trade difficulties: "we just can't find the products, plus, the Soviets are not competitive in terms of quality or service."<sup>111</sup> As a sidenote, the

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<sup>108</sup> N16

<sup>109</sup> N47

<sup>110</sup> S42

<sup>111</sup> N14

Norwegian Trade Council's office in Moscow had registered only fourteen Norwegian-Soviet joint-ventures by New Year, 1990.<sup>112</sup>

*Overcoming the problems: The Multinational edge*

Larger companies can afford to see the Soviet market in a much wider perspective than can small and medium sized Norwegian and Swedish companies. To a certain extent, the worldwide reach of larger Swedish or Norwegian companies, such as Norsk Hydro, Statoil, Asea Brown Boveri,<sup>113</sup> Electrolux, SAAB, Volvo or Ericsson, allowed company officials to survey the possibilities worldwide.<sup>114</sup> Smaller companies, by contrast, often tried to limit themselves to nearby markets. It was thus natural that smaller companies should seek export and import markets in their neighbourhood (which, some say, includes the Soviet Union). An example of the flexibility of the larger actors is that they have holding companies in third countries which can circumvent the problems connected with foreign currency.<sup>115</sup> As LO's Kåre Sandegren summed it up "Norwegian businesses are too reticent and reluctant--

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<sup>112</sup> G.A. Johansen, "Fortsatt stor sovjet-intresse," *Økonomisk Rapport*, 4 January, 1991.

<sup>113</sup> "ABB:s chanser ökar i Sovjet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 6 January, 1991.

<sup>114</sup> The 'industrial culture' in Norway is traditionally weaker than in Sweden, Norsk Hydro being one of the only true industrial, multinational giants. As one élite confirmed, Hydro was far and away the largest single participant in Soviet-Norwegian trade. (N14). Another individual adding "the Norwegians are much bigger on raw materials, while the Swedes are much more into industrial goods." (N18)

<sup>115</sup> Ericsson Telecom, has a Yugoslavian holding company, Nicola Tesla, for solving, amongst other reasons, its currency problems. "The company has worked the U.S.S.R. since the stone age," said one individual." As one individual pointed out, going through third countries which have strong bilateral trade agreements (e.g. ABB's Finnish subsidiary), one is able to draw on the dependability of those agreements--both in terms of payments and deliveries. (S50, S23)

they may be too lazy; a common trait for medium-sized Norwegian companies is that they have insufficient capabilities and insufficient follow-up."<sup>116</sup>

Those who suffer are the medium and short term investors and medium and small-sized national companies. Larger firms are able to view risks and benefits in the long term. Confronted with problems, such as was the case since November, 1990, when GIEK and EKN closed themselves to the Soviet Union, as one élite said, "our larger industrial companies have started, especially over the last months, to make their own Soviet policy."<sup>117</sup> "If we speak of multinationals, they will quickly turn to the export credit guarantee facilities of other countries," one official said.<sup>118</sup> As Tor Sverre Jacobsen of Norsk Hydro said, "the GIEK decision has no effect on us, since we have done business on a cash basis, against irrevocable letters of credit confirmed by a first-class West European bank, or countertrade(not so common.)"<sup>119</sup>

However, even the largest firms have been reticent to 'go East.' There have been many companies, such as Volvo during the late 1960's/beginning of 1970's which entered into negotiations. But, as one élite said, the talks never came to fruition because of a lack of daring on the part of Volvo at the time." "Those companies, like Volvo, which could take a risk, much rather would go West," this businessman added.<sup>120</sup> We note that Volvo itself finally received a sizeable order from the Soviets in January, 1991 for 300 automobiles.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Sandegren, interview.

<sup>117</sup> S11

<sup>118</sup> S11

<sup>119</sup> N43

<sup>120</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>121</sup> "Sovjetisk order till Volvo," *Dagens Nyheter*, 12 January, 1991; P. Düsing, "Volvo nära jätteaffär," *Göteborgs-Posten*, 9 January, 1991.

## Facilitating Factors

### *Domestic Soviet potential*

No interviewees downplayed the *potential* importance of the Soviet market. Aside from comprising a population of just under 300 million people, the Soviet Union was first and foremost seen as a country whose primary attraction was its natural resources.<sup>122</sup> But, as one individual pointed out "these resources are only valuable if somehow brought to market or worked."<sup>123</sup>

A perception which was shared across the spectrum<sup>124</sup> was that the Soviet Union, as an exporter, is not unlike the underdeveloped countries of today. But, as one Swede said, at both a large RSFSR-Swedish conference in Örebro in late 1990 and during the Mixed Commission meetings, the key message was that "Russians do not want to be treated like a developing country which only delivers raw materials."<sup>125</sup> While we are reasonably sure that the character and volume of exports will remain relatively stable in the near future, a more interesting question is the eventual possibility of the Soviet economy lifting itself beyond the raw materials exporter stage. As one individual said, next to raw

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<sup>122</sup> Two prime examples: opinion articles respectively authored by former Minister of Industry, Åberg, "Sovjet- en underskattad marknad," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 22 March, 1986 and Göran Ennerfelt, "Kraftgången i sovjethandeln kan brytas," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 20 January, 1988.

<sup>123</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>124</sup> One exception: Anders Åslund. When asked about Soviet credit-worthiness, Åslund responded: "the Soviet Union is not credit worthy--it is not able to take care of anything." (Åslund, interview). A similar viewpoint was held by AB Svensk Exportkredit's Arnhof, who felt it would take at least ten years before the East European economies, including the Soviet Union, would be considered fully credit-worthy. (P-Y Bengtsson, "Stoppa risk-karusellen," *Svensk Export* 9 (1990), p.20)

<sup>125</sup> S48. This individual continued "the Russians have really tried hard to sell machinery to modernize the steel industry, and otherwise tried to diversify (e.g. supplying helicopters and crews for the raising of electrical lines) but it seems like Swedish buyers are a little reluctant."

goods "you would have to look at industries which are drawn from raw goods" for potential export-industries.<sup>126</sup> "The Soviet Union is good at supplying raw materials: wooden articles, minerals, non-ferrous metals and oil,"<sup>127</sup> one official concluded. The possibilities were varied: the heavy machine industry, cars, trucks, textile, and forest industry, all were perceived to potential sources of Soviet export strength.<sup>128</sup> But, clearly, some industries bore more potential than others.

*Norway and Sweden: Soviet trade priorities?*

An interesting question to pose is the priority and reputation held of Norway and Sweden in Moscow. Earlier were presented some examples of Sweden's ostensibly favoured trade status. One official summed the Soviet perspective: "we always used to hear that Swedish trade was given a priority--especially since we had the first bilateral trade agreement with the Soviets in 1924."<sup>129</sup> But in reality, as one élite reminded, "Sweden is small, although it's close. We don't have any illusions about our being small when compared to such substantial giants as Japan, Germany and the U.S."<sup>130</sup> "In conversations with

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<sup>126</sup> S14

<sup>127</sup> Since the middle of the 1980's oil prices have decreased significantly. " (Oil) is no small point, rather a large percentage of the foreign income for the Soviet Union---this has led to the extreme decrease in Soviet scope of action." (Ennerfelt in Sparfrämjandet, 1989:143) The Economist ("On the brink," 16 March, 1991) illuminates the question: "crude oil production dropped from 12.5m barrels a day in 1987 and 1988 to an estimated 11.4m b/d last year...this year output could fall to around 10.5m b/d--a 16% fall from the peak, at a time when oil prices are weak," pointing out that "oil also accounts for 60% of (Soviet) export revenues."

<sup>128</sup> S4

<sup>129</sup> S11. This argument also forwarded in V. Leushkanov, "Svenskarna först-igen," Dagens Industri, 27 June, 1990.

<sup>130</sup> S4

them," said one official, "Germany is the most tasty; they are very impressed by the Germans."<sup>131</sup>

To make matters worse for Norwegian and Swedish exporters, Soviet buyers perceived their products as expensive, both in-and-of-themselves<sup>132</sup> and with respect to world prices.<sup>133</sup> According to Göran Ennerfelt, some countries did have greater significance than others--e.g. the U.S.--thus, it is fair to say that with the opening of dialogue with such countries as the U.S., Sweden fell into a diminished position."<sup>134</sup> Soviet trade to Sweden, according to one trade official, has traditionally been regulated by Soviet political whim--quite pragmatically."<sup>135</sup> The ideological tint in trade has become less important. As evidence, one individual mentioned that the Soviet Union had seen a political-economic advantage in tying Sweden to natural gas deliveries through the planned constructions of a pipeline network through Scandinavia.<sup>136</sup> Before, he explained, "it was a political victory to supply energy, since it was so vital for basic national needs."<sup>137</sup>

The historical roots of Norwegian-Soviet trade were likewise strong and acted to affect the perception of business ties. "There has always been extensive trade between the Kola and Northern Norway--we still have special Russian expressions in our vocabulary which formed to a common language between

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<sup>131</sup> S48

<sup>132</sup> As one official said: "they are always satisfied with Sweden but we are expensive and we sell ten-year solutions." (S48) Another official said, "although we have been known for high technical sophistication, Sweden's prices have for a long time been higher than other countries." (S8)

<sup>133</sup> N14

<sup>134</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>135</sup> S13

<sup>136</sup> S48

<sup>137</sup> S48

them: eg. *Pomore* trade ('seabound' trade),<sup>138</sup> said one trade official. As one Foreign Ministry official said "there are many employment difficulties in this area (Finnmark), and people see that there are two million people on the other side of the border, and ask themselves 'why not trade with them?'"<sup>139</sup> The Norwegians have been traditionally very supportive of measures to increase trade between Troms and Finnmark and the Soviet Union.<sup>140</sup>

*Possible Swedish and Norwegian inputs on the Soviet market*

Where could Swedish and Norwegian companies best make their input on the Soviet market? One individual felt that farming equipment, forestry, transportation, the construction industry and the consulting business were the most hopeful Swedish exports to the Soviet Union.<sup>141</sup> "We know," said one official "that they really have to squeeze out more effectivity from already existing machinery."<sup>142</sup> "Maybe there is a market for simple machinery, but that's not for sure--is there a market?" said one official.<sup>143</sup> Swedes were often fond of telling stories of how the Soviets had imported products which remained in their original packaging because of the lack of technical expertise connected with their operation.<sup>144</sup> Thus, the Swedes, said one official, could

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<sup>138</sup> N15

<sup>139</sup> N25

<sup>140</sup> K.O. Evensen, "Balstad: Sovjet kan bli betydelig handelspartner," *Aftenposten*, 13 October, 1989. Minister of Trade, Balstad, says "in the Northernmost counties we must convince ourselves the Soviet market is our home market."

<sup>141</sup> S13

<sup>142</sup> S13

<sup>143</sup> S24

<sup>144</sup> S13

tap the short-term potential to effectivize the machinery. One élite illustrated the problem, saying:

"say a factory was running at 60% of its operating capacity. Instead of revamping, it has always been politically more glorious to buy a new factory instead of making repairs on the old one. Once this new plant is built it becomes a 'monument' to the people. But, today, even the USSR admits that this is too big. As they get more market oriented they will gradually change their way of thinking to buying more components and they will start buying smaller plants."

The Norwegians feel they could make their best contribution in terms of oil exploration in the Soviet-Norwegian continental shelf area. Norwegian BOCONOR (Barents Offshore Consortium of Norway), a consortium of eight oil-related industries, has traditionally shown a great interest in oil exploration in the Soviet Union.<sup>145</sup> There has only been minimal movement on the question due to restrictive COCOM regulations and the unsolved delimitation question.<sup>146</sup> In fact, in connection with its role as a coordinator of oil and gas deliveries from the Soviet Union, BOCONOR has also developed a 'master-plan' for potential oil field development in the Barents Sea.(Alstad, 1985:26) In these efforts, as pointed out earlier, there has been no absence of Soviet interest. But as the Barents Sea delimitation question remained unresolved, Norwegian companies, Statoil<sup>147</sup> and Ellingsens, have shown interest in developing undisputed areas--such as potential oil reserves in Estonia.<sup>148</sup> The Baltic was

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<sup>145</sup> M. Woldsdal, "Stor interesse for oljeoppdrag i Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 23 August, 1985.

<sup>146</sup> H. Henriksen, "Ja til industriavtaler med Sovjet," *Arbeiderbladet*, 12 August, 1982.

<sup>147</sup> "Svensk statoil in i Estland," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 21 March, 1991. Swedish statoil here is reported to form a daughter-company in Estonia.

<sup>148</sup> A. Jonsson, "Norsk teknik ger Estland egen olja," *Dagens Industri*, 7 March, 1991.



seen by limited numbers as bearing potential exploitative potential even by other neighbours.<sup>149</sup>

### *To Trade with the Centre or the Periphery?*

There existed a trade off between Norwegian and Swedish interests in trading through the separate bureaucratic machinery in the republics, as opposed to going through the Central Government in Moscow. To an extent, the dilemmas posed with favouring one over the other pathway mirrored the political dilemma of which side to emphasize: relations with the centre or relations with the periphery.<sup>150</sup> This created a special dynamism between that which was politically, economically and perhaps socially desirable and that which was politically possible. Part of the financial problem is the sovereignty problem, as one Norwegian official expressed.<sup>151</sup>

In practice, both Norwegian and Swedish companies and Governments have strategically kept several fires burning simultaneously. But great care has been taken not to outstep politically sensitive Government policies. Thus, while informally listening and discussing with potentially break-off republics (e.g. RSFSR and the respective Baltics being especially important for Norway), companies were still trading through the central trade machinery. As one Norwegian official told, "as long as there is no Russian counterpart we must deal with the Soviet Union, even though we see the RSFSR as the greatest (potential) partner (most of the natural resources being located there)."<sup>152</sup> Both Norwegian political élites and businessmen admitted having extensive,

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<sup>149</sup> Finnish oil company, NESTE's, Hietarinta, in G. de Lange, "Ivrer for nordisk gassnett," *Aftenposten*, 13 March, 1991. For NESTE the 'Baltic area' is the next area for development, if the peaceful developments in the region continued.

<sup>150</sup> A similar dilemma is treated in the case of Baltic independence in a separate section.

<sup>151</sup> N15

<sup>152</sup> N15

informal contacts with the RSFSR,<sup>153</sup> while the Swedes had extensive contact with representatives from the Baltic republics. One Foreign Ministry official mentioned that the MFA had received three official visits by the RSFSR as of January, 1991.<sup>154</sup> Asked of the character of these Soviet approaches, Chairman of the Norwegian *fråmjandekomité* or "Soviet Trade Promotion Committee," Odd Henrik Robberstad, confirmed "we have been approached by the Soviets many times before, who consistently suggest: 'we are both practical people--don't preoccupy yourself with what the politicians say--let's make a deal and then we can discuss it with our governments.'"<sup>155</sup> One industrialist added that the Soviet representatives "act as if in accordance with the RSFSR, and pretend of good contacts with RSFSR authorities and that they are acting with the understanding of those authorities; they say they are the most likely ones to be in charge."<sup>156</sup> Thus, in discussing potential business relations, "we are free in telling them that we also discuss with other authorities; they appreciate that--they know we have to look out for our own interests."<sup>157</sup> This picture provides a sharp contrast with much of the post-War period, where all decisions had to first be checked with the central authorities in Moscow.

One individual concerned with trade facilitation pointed out, "Norwegian industry tries very hard in North Norway, and companies want to concentrate on the RSFSR and the Soviet Union's Northwest."<sup>158</sup> Another élite expressed that the Baltic market was replete with difficulties. Quotes such as: "the Baltic is very difficult since there are only small markets,"<sup>159</sup> were very common.

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<sup>153</sup> N15. One MFA official pointed to discussions regarding joint oil and gas exploration ventures and the exchange of delegations e.g. from Leningrad.

<sup>154</sup> N25

<sup>155</sup> N47

<sup>156</sup> N47

<sup>157</sup> N47

<sup>158</sup> N16

<sup>159</sup> N15

Others argued that "there is little infrastructure<sup>160</sup>—although being otherwise important on the political and social side."<sup>161</sup> In any case, as one financing expert put it, "Russia, eventually, because of its resource base, will become a much better risk than the Soviet Union is today," pointing out that "it is not possible to speak of a separate risk for, say, Lithuania."<sup>162</sup> These words, spoken in January, were overwhelmed to an extent by Baltic independence later in 1991.

Individuals stressed that Sweden's best contribution could be achieved through restricting itself to its special relationship with the Baltic.<sup>163</sup> However, economic and political realities have also forced the Swedes to travel the old Moscow bureaucratic route.<sup>164</sup> Said one Swedish trade official, "there are mixed motives for the Baltic emphasis: pecuniary on the one hand and sympathy (the Balts are prepared to expose themselves) on the other."<sup>165</sup> But as the Swedish Foreign Ministry's *Kommerskollegium* has noted<sup>166</sup>, although the amount of purely trade-related contacts has been significant, other statistics do not point to any great changes in trade patterns due to convertibility problems,

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<sup>160</sup> N16

<sup>161</sup> N15

<sup>162</sup> N18

<sup>163</sup> See Centre Party MP Per-Ola Eriksson and Left Party's Rolf Nilsson regarding the special trading priority the Baltic area (especially the Baltic republics) should be allotted in Swedish trading priorities (*Riksdagsprotokoll*, 12 April, 1991)i

<sup>164</sup> One prominent example is Tetra Pak-Alfa Laval's establishment of three production facilities in Lipetsk, Kiev, Podolsk. (J. Thornhill, "Unpacking a fresh challenge," *Financial Times* 2 September, 1991).

<sup>165</sup> S14

<sup>166</sup> "Svenska kontakter med Baltikum. Rapport från kommerskollegium," p. 11 (Stockholm: Kommerskollegium, January, 1991): A thorough accounting of Swedish official contacts, in all fields, with the Baltic republics.

lack of risk capital and a reformed banking system.<sup>167</sup> There are no indications that Norwegian trade with the Baltic has advanced significantly,<sup>168</sup> irrespective of sustained interest from the Norwegian side.<sup>169</sup> The political instability in the Baltic republics was seen as yet a further reason for both Norwegian and Swedish reticence to invest and trade.<sup>170</sup>

One Norwegian financing expert pointed out the difficulties with the Baltic area thus: one, they have never had any export of their own of any significance, two, the Baltics have been partly subsidized in the exchange of goods, and three, their limited scope along the road of development of market economies.<sup>171</sup>

### *Soviet Trading Interests*

The Soviet Union harboured varied interests in trading with Norway. But certain patterns and priorities can be discerned. The clearest and most traditional need, as easily can be discerned from the statistics where usually about 2/3 of Norwegian exports lie, is for paper-related products: cellulose, paper, paper pulp foremost amongst them. Potentially, "what the Soviet Union

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<sup>167</sup> Lars Landemar, President of AxTrade East (Axel Johnson Concern), in A. Lundqvist, "Ax-Trade handlar som vanligt," *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 January, 1991 notes that AxTrade's trade with the Baltic republics has been of only a minimal nature. Via the company NaxTrade, there is some exchange with Latvia--mostly in wood products, while trade with Estonia and Lithuania is close to non-existent.

<sup>168</sup> B. Westlie, "Norge Svikter handelen," *Dagens Næringsliv*, 28 November, 1989. Norway was unrepresented in the statistics of both state-owned Lithuanian, *Litimpex*, or Latvian *Interlatvia* trading associations.

<sup>169</sup> Norsk Hydro's Moscow office Director, Reed: "Many (Norwegians) regard *Baltikum* as a gateway to the rest of the Soviet market," however reminding that "there are also great opportunities on the other side of the Soviet Union e.g. in Baku..." (K.O. Evensen, "Efterlyser nytenkning om handelen med øst," *Aftenposten*, 5 December, 1989)

<sup>170</sup> K.O. Evensen, "Unngå investeringer i Sovjet-Unionen," *Aftenposten*, 15 May, 1990.

<sup>171</sup> N18

wants," related one Foreign Ministry official, "is tourism, shipping, telecommunications, agro-equipment and ready-made houses."<sup>172</sup> The Soviet authorities had further expressed an interest in aluminum technology.<sup>173</sup> One Norwegian presented an entirely different perception: "(those in trade delegations) mainly want to come to a foreign country, to shop and have a nice time at the hotel. Extensive entertainment, although required to do business with them is no guarantee you will get business with them."<sup>174</sup>

The most obvious point of potential Soviet-Norwegian collaboration concerns oil exploration. As we pointed out during an earlier chapter, joint exploration efforts have heretofore been blocked by the inability to reach agreement over a clear delimitation in the Barents Sea. But other Norwegian contributions could be made in mineral exploration, offshore,<sup>175</sup> fishing, and in the shipping industry, according to most élites interviewed.

What does the Soviet Union most desire when it looks to Sweden? One individual stated the interests succinctly: one, high technology, traditional export industries (oil mining from Atlas Copco) and especially now consumer goods (which could be provided by Alfa Laval and Tetra Pak).<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> N15

<sup>173</sup> A. Willersrud, "Sovjet vil ha norsk teknologi," *Aftenposten*, 3 April, 1987: Soviet representatives expressed an interest in smelting technology and Norsk Viftefabrikk's cleansing (filtering) process.

<sup>174</sup> N22. Quoting from a Norwegian businessman, he said: "Now I start our conversation with terms of payment...then I talk of deliveries...just to be sure the delegation's work is not wasted...however this was an exceptional case."

<sup>175</sup> N47: "most things in Norwegian offshore have a competitive edge."

<sup>176</sup> S24

## COCOM: The Core of Political Debate<sup>177</sup>

### *Introduction*

As opposed to trade regulated by traditional, commercial interests, a study which compares Norway's and Sweden's relationship to COCOM will reveal just how much each of the countries' security policy orientations can affect their Soviet trade ties. Not only has the question of participation and allegiance to COCOM differed the two from each other but has also clearly divided domestic opinion in both Sweden and Norway.

In November, 1949 the founding nations, U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands<sup>178</sup> created the 'Consultative Group,' which in its turn formed a permanent, working level Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM (Fungiello, 1985:4). The logic for the Committee's founding was to maintain a jointly acceptable list of goods and services of potentially military application which were subject to denial to the Soviet bloc. COCOM became the economic arm of Western (chiefly NATO) military interests.

The central question in this section is: How has Sweden's neutrality commitment, mediated by its adherence to the COCOM regime, led to perceptions of and behaviour towards the Soviet Union, different than that of NATO member Norway? Several related questions will inform this inquiry. How much influence do security policy orientations have upon the way Soviet trade is handled? Is there such a thing as 'trade neutrality?' How do these

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<sup>177</sup> The so-called "COCOM lists" contain three groups of products: Ammunition; Products relating to the nuclear power industry; 'Dual-Use' products and technology (military and civilian purposes). (S. Riishøj, "COCOM under revision," *Vindue mod øst* (Denmark) 11 (1990), p.1-2.

<sup>178</sup> Denmark, Norway, the FRG and Canada joined COCOM in the Spring of 1950, Japan and Portugal joined in 1952, while Greece and Turkey joined in 1953. (Jacobsen, 1985)

commitments affect what sort of trade is or is not undertaken? Do élites feel that Sweden's and Norway's relationship to COCOM has hindered trade with the Soviet Union—if so, how and in which areas? What role has COCOM played in Sweden's or Norway's overall foreign relations with the Soviet Union?

### *Different Points-of-Departure*

There is an essential difference between the Norwegian and Swedish relationships with COCOM: Norway participates formally in COCOM policy-making as member,<sup>179</sup> while Sweden, a non-member, has nonetheless promised to adhere to policies which COCOM sets forth. Norway's position in NATO could only be seen as a natural enhancement of its robust NATO commitment. This benefited Norway, for Norwegian participation in COCOM also enforced the credibility of Norway's NATO commitment in the eyes of the outside world. Thus, whatever pain Norway felt from the COCOM regulations would be of a commercial, and not of a political nature: potentially profitable goods and services could not be sold to the Soviet Union.

Sweden was faced with certain sensitive questions related to neutrality which were irrelevant for Norway's NATO policy. From the very start, COCOM has proved to be an 'achilles heel' for Swedish foreign and trade policy. A good relationship with Moscow assumed that there would be no obvious formal or informal obstacles in their interaction. Swedish post-War neutrality clearly dictated that Swedish behaviour which could be interpreted by either military bloc as 'taking sides' in the Cold War had to be seen as compromising Sweden's foreign policy principles. At the same time, Swedish industry was highly dependent upon gaining the very technology which the West had regulated as

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<sup>179</sup> Perhaps Friedrich Futschik of Philips, put it best, calling it "a gentlemen's agreement." (M. Agerberg, "-Riv teknikmuren, fienden har försvunnit," *Ny Teknik*, 14 (1990).

being politically sensitive.<sup>180</sup> Sweden would be forced to make difficult choices, and adjustments to both its neutrality and its dependence on Western high technology.

### *The Actors*

In both Sweden and Norway the debate has engaged diverse sectors of decision-making. Businessmen, averse to restraints on free trade, have seen the COCOM regulations, at best, as understandable and a necessary evil. In both the Norwegian and Swedish parliaments, the main gulf of opinion exists between Norway's Left Wing and Sweden's Left and Environmental parties and the rest of the political spectrum. Whereas other political parties have shown occasional irritation over COCOM, it has been the far Left parties which have provided the core of opposition to not only the idea of COCOM's existence in principle, but to its constitutional and legal status altogether. In terms of executing COCOM statutes, the civil servants is that group which is charged with analyzing developments which could lead to changes in the rules, making recommendations, enforcing existing regulations and assisting exporters to export as much as possible--within a prescribed framework.

### **The Issues at Stake for Sweden and Norway**

#### *Is Norway's COCOM Membership legal?*

One of the most important issues in some Norwegian circles was whether Norway's participation-adherence with respect to COCOM regulations also has legal-constitutional grounding. For Sweden, the question of the country's position, especially given its neutral commitment, vis-à-vis COCOM has been

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<sup>180</sup> To better understand where the COCOM rules affect Soviet trade it would be logical to look to those industries which are both internationally competitive and utilize technology: for Sweden an example would be computer technology or machine tools, for Norway, oil platform and exploration technology.



the centre of debate. The question has been markedly more sensitive in Sweden for the Government, prior to 1986 never clearly stated that it was abiding by COCOM regulations. Since there was no Swedish policy on COCOM, the debate risked undermining Sweden's position vis-à-vis COCOM altogether. As a member, Norway has greatly avoided this discussion by virtue of its explicit membership in COCOM's decision-making organ. Thus, prominent challenges put to the Government by the Norwegian Socialist Left Party were mere points of argumentation versus an historically-established Government practice.

The underlying logic of Norway's participation in COCOM, according to one *Storting* document, rests upon:

"an admission that strategic products cannot be exported freely, rather must be placed under certain restrictions under the control of authorities. Norwegian authorities have a need that the West have coordinated rules for preventing export of products, services and technology which can contribute to a change in the international strategic balance. This has importance for our national security. The authorities further wish to place controls on products which can contribute to the military escalation in areas of cooperation which otherwise are not comprised by COCOM. It is therefore due to our own foreign and security policy interests that Norway participates in COCOM. It is also necessary that Norway be seen as a credible (trustworthy) trade partner, in order to secure the requisite access to products, especially technology."<sup>181</sup>

Norwegian Socialist Left politicians Theo Koritzinsky and Hanna Kvanmo provided the core of the opposition to COCOM on legal-constitutional grounds.<sup>182</sup> In one 1987 debate<sup>183</sup> with Arent M. Henriksen (Socialist Left),

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<sup>181</sup> *Storting St. Meld. Nr. 11 1989-90*, p.145. There is political consensus about this text.

<sup>182</sup> An example of the Party's concrete efforts to press Government on the issue came in the form of a challenge to a certain legal *Odelsting* proposition (1987-88), whereby SV requested the Government withdraw its proposition on the grounds that "a new presentation of evidence should contain a *thorough* (continued...)

Einar Førde (Labour), Kjell Magne Bondevik (Christian People's Party) Kåre Willoch and Jan Petersen (Conservative), Carl I. Hagen (Progress)<sup>184</sup>, Koritzinsky clarified his position on the issue thus:

"There exists no distinct line between so-called 'COCOM-country lists' and 'other countries.' The whole COCOM 'thing' has never been discussed or passed in Parliament. Our COCOM commitments were never formalized- thus it was an informal arrangement. Therefore it never had to be dealt with in formal constitutional terms when making international deals. It's so complex and detailed--yet it is informal!...Even (Conservative Party Leader) Willoch admitted that my argument had constitutional merits."<sup>185</sup>

#### *Swedish Adherence to COCOM: Legality and Neutrality*

While the legality argument was used in Sweden, it was peripheral to the main stream of debate. The chief unanswered question was: what was Sweden's exact relationship to COCOM? Related questions such as: Was Sweden a mere bystander or was it participating? To what degree could one 'abide by' the process, but be perceived to remain either neutral or non-participant? Was Swedish practice in COCOM compatible with neutrality? also plagued the Swedish leadership.

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<sup>182</sup>(...continued)

*evaluation of the constitutional aspects of the relationship between Norway and COCOM.*" (Stortings Inst. S. nr. 20 (1987-88)).

<sup>183</sup> Forhandler i Stortinget, 19 November, 1987.

<sup>184</sup> Hagen found it "difficult to understand what could have gone wrong in the formal relationship between the Government and the *Storting* (over the COCOM matter)" (Forhandler i Stortinget, 19 November, 1987).

<sup>185</sup> Koritzinsky, interview.

Sten Andersson's statement to parliament<sup>186</sup> could be used as a point-of-departure for the Swedish Government's view on COCOM:

"There are no restraints on Swedish technology. If we were to participate in a so-called technology war, even the export of Swedish technology would be put under the umbrella of restrictions and forbidden. On the other hand we have a duty to prevent Sweden from being utilized as a transit country for exported technology which the country of origin has decided shall be forbidden...I would naturally like to see the day of amelioration of relations between the superpower, such that the ban on technology transfer will be lifted."

Andersson added the Soviet factor:

"Clearly the Soviet Union has a large and warranted interest in obtaining all sorts of foreign high technology, not only the Swedish but also the American. The Soviet Union naturally wants to be able to purchase such technology from us directly...but that is forbidden according to American law. In order that we can assure ourselves of access to high technology, we must make sure that Sweden is not utilized as a transit country."

The Foreign Relations Committee stated the policy thus:

"...there is no existing treaty or other agreement between the U.S. and Sweden in this area. As an alliance-free country, Sweden stands outside of COCOM. The voluntary agreements between companies which have been concluded, the Decree of a ban on the (export), and the earlier mentioned arrangement under the Defence Material Agency's tutelage, have the ultimate intention of assuring Swedish industry's access to foreign advanced technology."<sup>187</sup>

When compared with Swedish 'policy' on COCOM, Theo Koritzinsky's characterization of Norway's participation in COCOM as 'informal' could be

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<sup>186</sup> Two separate statements combined, found in Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1989.

<sup>187</sup> Riksdagstryck 1987/88:UU10 ("Om export av högteknologiska varor"), 19 November, 1987.

better called "ultra-formal." One would have to wait well into the 1980's<sup>188</sup> for a somewhat clear articulation of Sweden's policy on its adherence to COCOM. The topic of 'trade neutrality' is far from new. At least since the day that COCOM was born in 1949 there has been a debate about the topic.<sup>189</sup>

While Swedes were quick to point out their dependence on Western technology, few of COCOM's critics were prepared to pay the price of adherence which COCOM-countries required. This dilemma was illustrated by once-Undersecretary of Trade, C.J. Åberg: "on the one hand we, as a neutral country, cannot participate in anything that looks like a trade boycott of the Eastern countries." "On the other hand," added Åberg, "we don't want to miss out on American technology, which always is a couple of strides ahead of our own."<sup>190</sup> Gudrun Schyman, Left Party MP said: "Today Sweden is totally dependent upon the import of either American or some other NATO country's technology in order to manufacture several of our 'Swedish' weapons systems...if the U.S. or NATO wanted to pressure Sweden in a particular question the technology weapon would prove very effective..."<sup>191</sup>

But neutrality does not make any specific provision for trade questions, as Gudrun Schyman herself points out: "according to international law, neutrality is a legal status, which rests upon (the assumption) that states will refrain from all forms of participation in war between other states and remain impartial to

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<sup>188</sup> For a detailed accounting of Sweden's COCOM policy until 1984-5, see von Sivers and Holmström (1985)

<sup>189</sup> The question of 'secret' Swedish postwar collusion in the American-led trade embargo on Eastern Europe was a hot topic of contention. The chief (though not exhaustive) *Dagens Nyheter* debate participants were: P. Cole, "Neutraliteten gavs upp," 31 October, 1990; S. Åström, "Undén ingen Mr Hyde," 7 November, 1990; B. Nilsson, "Vi spelade dubbelt," 6 November, 1990; Y. Möller, "Ingen kapitulation," 27 November, 1990.

<sup>190</sup> A. Hoff, "USA-press mot svensk lekkasje av teknologi," *Aftenposten*, 24 October, 1985.

<sup>191</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 22 February, 1989.

warring states."<sup>192</sup> Environmental Party's Per Gahrton, referring to the famed Hague Convention, states clearly that the international legal aspects of neutrality are only valid in war--therefore invalid in the case of (peacetime) COCOM.<sup>193</sup>

*Sweden: 'Participation' or 'Adherence:' The Debate in the 1980s*

A recurrent question throughout the Swedish COCOM debate in the 1980's (and to an extent earlier) is whether Sweden is either 'adhering' (passive) or 'participating' (active) with respect to COCOM. Irrespective of its ideological stance on COCOM, each Government-in-office has had to defend its position against those who accuse Sweden of infidelity to neutrality relating to the organisation. The fact remains: Sweden, although hesitatingly, is obliged to follow American rules of re-export of COCOM-regulated items if it wants to assure the future flow and access of those items. On the other hand, Sweden must prove to COCOM that it is a reliable, credible trading partner which will neither directly nor indirectly violate the COCOM statutes. Why should Sweden need to prove its loyalty to COCOM--the underlying ideas of which debatedly run counter to neutrality? Is it not a question of proving loyal to both COCOM and neutrality simultaneously?

This face-off is evident in Per Gahrton question in the *Riksdag* on the occasion of Pierre Schori's alleged denial of Swedish participation in the American embargo policy. At the same time, Undersecretary for Trade, Sohlman, pronounced himself, in Gahrton's words that 'indeed we do participate in the U.S. embargo.'<sup>194</sup> In his support Gahrton asks:<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 22 February, 1989.

<sup>193</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1989.

<sup>194</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1989.

<sup>195</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1989.

"Is it not true that 400 Swedish companies have been inspected by the Swedish authorities in order to check if they were following American regulations? We are cooperating with the Customs authorities in the U.S. The U.S. demands import certificates, on which is clearly stated that the Swedish importers must (follow and approve of) the COCOM list and even the export-control of such technology!"

For reasons of COCOM credibility, Sweden cannot be seen as a *transit* country for COCOM-regulated goods. If this were to happen, Sweden could risk trade discrimination or be cut off from the COCOM goods stream altogether. Michael Sohlman states "the Government has executed all of its tightenings with the intention of ceasing "'transit,' nothing else."<sup>196</sup> Sohlman backs up his argument by pointing to the consistency in the intention of Governmental statements throughout the years, citing present Agriculture Minister Mats Hellström, 1983, then-Undersecretary for Trade, Carl Johan Åberg, 1986 and Trade Minister, Anita Gradin in 1989.<sup>197</sup>

## COCOM, Sweden and Norway During the Gorbachëv Years

### *Tightening the bolts: 1986-88*

During the early part of Gorbachëv's tenure, both Norway and Sweden tightened their rules, administrative procedures and practices with respect to COCOM. It would be fair to say that this was **not** a result of an increasingly pessimistic perception of Soviet foreign or military policy. Rather, the tightening trend was a result of one, particular cases of COCOM violations which caused

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<sup>196</sup> T. von Sivers, "Visst deltar Sverige i USAs embargo," *Ny Teknik*, 37 (1989), p. 16.

<sup>197</sup> Michael Sohlman states that "until the present Sweden has not been discriminated against." (von Sivers, "Visst deltar vi i USAs embargo," p. 17. Ebba Dohlman nevertheless points out that "throughout the postwar world, Sweden has remained on a U.S. list of countries whose exports must be carefully monitored." (Dohlman, 1989:106-7)

both Norway and Sweden to sacrifice credibility in the eyes of COCOM countries. Second, this constituted an attempt by both the Swedish and the Norwegian Governments to clarify the regulations such that a clearer line was drawn between what could be permissibly exported and what was regulated. This step was motivated by desires to increase exports, decrease barriers while simultaneously boosting Norwegian and Swedish credibility throughout the COCOM community.

### *The 'KV Affair'*

For the Norwegians, the most important single event in their participation in COCOM was the state-owned Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk ordeal.<sup>198</sup> The Norwegian Government claimed this was the first and only violation of COCOM which it ever committed. Whereas the real 'damage' in the affair occurred some years earlier, the KV scandal reached its high point in mid-July, 1987. The essence of the issue concerned the unexpected 1986 discovery of a Soviet submarine which had effectively evaded U.S. underwater listening devices, a technology which had previously been able to detect submarines from as far away as 200 miles.<sup>199</sup> It was soon revealed that the Japanese company Toshiba, during 1983-84 and Norwegian KV,<sup>200</sup> during 1982-84, had shipped computerized milling machinery capable of producing supercontoured propellers and computer control systems respectively to the Leningrad shipyards.<sup>201</sup> The upshot of the affair was a U.S. Senate vote on 1 July, 1987

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<sup>198</sup> For a thorough survey of the press' reactions to the KV affair, see NUPI (1987:484-500)

<sup>199</sup> "Toshiba Bashing," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 July, 1987.

<sup>200</sup> One Norwegian official said, "KV was really hurt by this since they produce numerically controlled drawing machines: both in terms of sales and politically." (N16)

<sup>201</sup> "Toshiba Bashing." It should be noted that the connection between the final product and Toshiba's and KV's contributing role therein is not without  
(continued...)

banning sales to the U.S. by Toshiba<sup>202</sup> and KV for at least two years.<sup>203</sup> In great part all individuals who were in some way directly involved in the affair denied any more than sloppiness as a cause for the break.<sup>204</sup>

The central issue at stake was Norwegian credibility amongst its NATO allies and COCOM co-members. According to one source, after initial efforts by the Norwegian Government to downplay the affair, the Government then became busy making assurances that there would be no repetition.<sup>205</sup> The Government, and Trade Minister Mosbakk in particular, while proposing higher penalties (e.g. increased jail terms) and the strengthening of eleven other statutes, denied that it was the KV affair which had brought about the change in law.<sup>206</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee agreed with the Government on the

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<sup>201</sup>(...continued)

debate.(O.T. Storvik, "KV-teknologi hjalp ikke Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 22 July, 1987)

<sup>202</sup> One Norwegian official said, "we felt that the point with the KV scandal was that the U.S. was after Japan...perhaps if it had concerned a direct delivery between Norway and the Soviet Union it would have never become a crisis."(N14)

<sup>203</sup> One outcome of the KV affair was that Norway accepted a greater responsibility in keeping track of Soviet submarine traffic in the Barents. (O.T. Storvik, "Norge samler data i nord," *Aftenposten*, 20 April, 1991).

<sup>204</sup> M.H. Simonsen, "COCOM-reglene ble aldri drøftet," *Dagens Næringsliv*, 10 July, 1987: KV Director Qvenild claims that COCOM rules were never discussed at the time the COCOM offense occurred. See also, J-E Nyland, "Glem COCOM-reglene," *Arbeiderbladet*, 7 October, 1988.

<sup>205</sup> P. Sherrid, "Such good friends: an old alliance under pressure," *U.S. News and World Report*, 5 October, 1987.

<sup>206</sup> G. De Lange, "Strengere Cocom-straffer," *Aftenposten*, 9 October, 1987. For an illustration of the Government's motivation in pursuing the new law see the speech given by Foreign Policy Counsellor Kjeld Vibe on 27 November, *UD-informasjon* 24 (1987). One of Vibe's main points is that one must appreciate the security political significance for Norway of technological progress in the military sector in the Soviet Union. (e.g. the Kola Base complex)



need for a new law in its position paper, presented to the *Storting* on 19 November, 1987.<sup>207</sup> Discussion of the matter followed on 7 December, 1987.<sup>208</sup>

### *Sweden Strengthens the Rules*

When Sweden tightened its belt and clarified its position with respect to COCOM regulations in the form of a 1986 decree, it was not the immediate result of any 'ordeal.'<sup>209</sup> Rather, the move by the Swedish Government seemed to be the result of a gradual build-up of several considerations, not least the necessity of making clear to manufacturers, customs authorities, and Governmental officials exactly what the COCOM rules said. After all, the original COCOM rules, somewhat aged after having been authored in 1946, could have been a contributing cause, but not an excuse, for both the Norwegian and Swedish 'affairs.'

Part of the reason for the change must be attributed to U.S. eagerness to see a tightening of the COCOM regime in so-called 5(K) countries,<sup>210</sup> and the

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<sup>207</sup> Innst. O. Nr.6 (1987-88) ("Instilling fra utenriks- og konstitusjonskomiteen om lov om kontroll med eksport av strategiske varer, tjenester og teknologi" (Ot. prp.nr.9, 19 November, 1987.

<sup>208</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, same date.

<sup>209</sup> Although Sweden has had its share of 'ordeals': one in Helsingborg in the early 1980's, when Swedish authorities foiled an attempted export of computer products and two, in an infamous Data-SAAB affair. (von Sivers and Holmström, 1985) *International Trade Review* also mentions the case other Swedish violations (17 February, 1988): one of SUNITRON AB where from January, 1980 to November, 1982 the firm re-exported U.S. origin components from Germany, through Sweden to the Soviet Union.

<sup>210</sup> The 5(k) countries are broadly speaking the 'neutral countries': Austria, Finland, Ireland, Singapore, S. Korea, Sweden and Switzerland. 5(k) status is advantageous, extending privileges such as: allowance of export of all strategic items (except super computer and crime control and detection instruments) to national government agencies of cooperating governments without the need for validated license; a fast 15/15 day processing rule for licensing applications; (continued...)

Swedish desire to attain 5(k) status. It is interesting to note that of the six formal 'benefits' of the 5(k) by 1 June, 1991 Sweden<sup>211</sup> had achieved only four, while Austria, Finland and Switzerland had received all six.<sup>212</sup> Part of the background leading up to a 1986 ordinance on export control was given by one official intimately involved with analyzing the U.S. standpoint<sup>213</sup>:

"Sweden was somehow deluded into thinking it had a super-doooper system (of controls). They wanted the regional chambers of commerce to take care of the regulations. The Central Government was always reluctant to take responsibility for the regulations: no penalties, no backup from the Government. The Swedes danced around for a while, it must have been politically motivated. Sweden is good at manoeuvring--it's a little like having the cake and eating it too. Sweden is quite naïve, they also would say 'no one would ever do that.' Sweden continued behind a vague notion of neutrality...but we know it's an interdependent world--goods do flow over borders."

The resultant decree entitled *Förordning om förbud mot viss utförsel* was implemented on 27 February, 1986.<sup>214</sup> Certain selected points in the official Governmental motivation were familiar:<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>210</sup>(...continued)

(Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration, 22 January, 1991, DOC/BXA/OTPA/CP/1/22/91).

<sup>211</sup> **International Trade Reporter** 12 June, 1989 (p.1590) notes that as late as 12 June, 1989, Swedish Undersecretary for Trade, Sohlman said Sweden hopes eventually to obtain 5(k) status. ITR reports on 22 August, 1990 (p.1297) that the U.S. had in principle agreed to offer Sweden 5(k) status, a decision reported in the **Federal Register** two weeks hence.

<sup>212</sup> U.S. Commerce Department USDOC/BXA/OTPA/CP, 22 May, 1991.

<sup>213</sup> U.S. Commerce Department official, non-attributional 23.7.1991.

<sup>214</sup> **Svensk Författarsamling** (SFS 1986:89), 11 March, 1986.

<sup>215</sup> Agriculture Minister, Hellström. See "Regeringens förordningsmotiv. Utrikesdepartementet. Utdrag 1986:1 (Protokoll vid regeringssammanträde), 27 February, 1986.

1. the decision was a result of attempt to secure access to advanced high technology. A small country has limited possibilities to create the research resources and production capacity within all areas.
2. transit considerations, which led to countries trying to circumvent other countries' export regulations.
3. the decision concerned knowledge as well as products of high technological character.

Well worth noting here is the seemingly more explicit Swedish decision (relative to the Norwegian) in outlining what was acceptable to export and what was not. This could be an indication that the Norwegian COCOM lists of acceptable goods was sufficient, while the Swedish list was not. The Norwegian law chiefly seemed to be aimed at 'tightening the lid' on firms and individuals who violated the COCOM regulations, while the Swedish decision was an **explicit** formalization of much of what had been in practice for some time.<sup>216</sup> One important part of the Swedish decision was thus that it appeared **on paper**.

#### *Soviet and American Reactions*

The Soviet Union was obviously not pleased. As far back as 1985, Kuznetsov<sup>217</sup> claimed that Washington was worried by 'the development of economic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden and by the fact that in many fields contacts and cooperation had been developing of late.'

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<sup>216</sup> This conclusion may be exaggerated given the author's limited knowledge of COCOM technicalities. Aside from the SFS document **SFS 1986:89**, which lays down the general guidelines, one would have to refer to **Tullverkets författningsamling**, TFS 1986:22, V:2 (Stockholm: Swedish General Customs Board, 16 May, 1986), which became effective 1 June, 1986 or the from the same source, TFS 1987:37, V:2 (Stockholm: Swedish General Customs Board, 17 December, 1987), which was valid from 1 January, 1988 for the more technical specifications of the regulations.

<sup>217</sup> **Pravda**, 8 September, 1985, quoted in Jonson (1990c:7)

In a prelude to the decision, **Pravda** attacked the Swedish Government's plans in January claiming that the new regulations would threaten Swedish foreign policy 'at its base.'<sup>218</sup> Irrespective, Soviet representatives clearly indicated that they would have liked to see an enhancement of high technology trade with Sweden.<sup>219</sup> The USSR nevertheless seemed to be informed of the consequences the move would have on Swedish-Soviet trade-- once on a trip to Moscow on 14-17 April, 1986 and via a Governmental Commission (Mixed Commission) meeting in Stockholm 20-23 May, 1986.<sup>220</sup> One representative of the Soviet Trade Ministry summed up the Soviet reaction thus: "we are both disappointed and surprised that Sweden bent under American pressure," adding "the new Swedish law regarding export of civilian high technology runs contrary to your non-alignment."<sup>221</sup>

However, the U.S. was satisfied with both the spirit and practice of the 1986 Swedish ordinance. U.S. Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration, Freedenberg returned on 3 July, 1986 from a trip to four European capitals "very much encouraged" by the improvements in national security export controls, specifically citing the Swedish law of 1 June.<sup>222</sup>

### *Developments 1989-1991*

At the very essence of the debate surrounding an easing of COCOM regulations from approximately 1989 until the present, lay different evaluations

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<sup>218</sup> **Pravda**, January, 1986, quoted in Jonson, (1990c:7)

<sup>219</sup> Jonson (1990c) quoting **Dagens Nyheter**, 1 March, 1986.

<sup>220</sup> T. von Sivers, "-Svenska lag strider mot neutraliteten," **Ny Teknik** 30 (1986), p. 8-9. One former Swedish official warned that the article "got (the interview subject, Piskolov J. Vasilyevich, of the Soviet Foreign Trade Department) into much trouble." He added "the Soviets did not react against this and the article did not represent majority opinion." (S50).

<sup>221</sup> "-Svensk lag strider mot neutraliteten," p. 8.

<sup>222</sup> **International Trade Reporter**, 9 July, 1986, p.892-3.

of Gorbachëvian foreign policy. Previous to 1989 significant changes in COCOM regulations were not under serious discussion. Also, up until 1989, the motivation to change the COCOM rules was mostly in the direction of tightening--and that for chiefly *domestic reasons*.<sup>223</sup> COCOM members now became more willing to adjust its regulations in concert with perceived optimistic change in Soviet foreign policy.

Questions such as these were central: When was Soviet foreign policy 'change' sufficient to guarantee that previously-regulated technology would escape being used for purposes which the rules were meant to prevent? Has the original purpose of COCOM been served? What future does COCOM cooperation hold?

Political party membership was one determinant of how individuals answered these questions. From a systematic, yet unstatistical survey of the debate, it does seem that the further to the left one is on the political scale the *earlier* and *more comprehensive* have been the cries for the easing of COCOM regulations. The far Right parties based their advocacy of COCOM change on objective change in Soviet foreign policy intention and military capability. The far Left also joined in this reasoning but placed additional emphasis on the fact that Western technology was *necessary* for proper Soviet economic development early on.

During a time when profound change in Soviet foreign and military policy was, at best, still debatable, the Swedish Left Communist Party's Lars Werner was already busy advocating a total break in Sweden's participation in COCOM.<sup>224</sup> Of the mainstream parties, the Swedish Social Democratic voices began to be heard next favouring a lightening of strategic products and services. Social Democratic MP, Lennart Pettersson, felt in May, 1989, that "it is important

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<sup>223</sup> One international factor which contributed to the strengthening in the late 1970's was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, 1979-1989.

<sup>224</sup> Motion by MP Lars Werner, Riksdagstryck 1986/87:U542.

that a certain easing be brought about in connection with the export of high technology products from West to East" because "the transformation which is now occurring in those countries needs that type of technology."<sup>225</sup>

### *The Soviet Economic Panacea: High Technology?*

One of the common threads amongst those who advocated an early change of the COCOM rules was that high technology could quickly and effectively solve fundamental Soviet economic ills. In the early stages of *perestroika* and *glasnost* there was little doubt that the Soviet authorities, quite naïvely one could argue, saw that rapid economic development as being linked with the attainment high technology.

Not only the Soviets were misled. Key Swedish and Norwegian élites also shared this vision. Naturally, the Left Party, and in particular Bertil Måbrink was a prominent voice here. It is noteworthy that Bourgeois Party politicians' voices in this context were low and inaudible if not altogether silent.<sup>226</sup> In a reservation to a Foreign Relations Committee position paper, Måbrink felt the Committee should have stated:

"The Committee concludes that a continued liberalisation of the restrictions for export of certain high technology products to the East, which is still being employed by the Western countries, would also facilitate the development in Eastern Europe--in the environmental sphere as well as from the general economic perspective."<sup>227</sup>

Cabinet Secretary, Pierre Schori urged:

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<sup>225</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 3 May, 1989.

<sup>226</sup> Norwegian Labour MP, Hallvard Bakke, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>227</sup> Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU7 ("Samarabete med Östeuropa och vissa internationella miljöinsatser").

"you have got to give Central Europe a hand. I am especially thinking of the high technology sphere. It is absurd to maintain a set position or even sharpen the COCOM lists, especially since a partial reason given for the sharpening (or rules) was the war in Afghanistan...It is in nobody's interest that the gap in high technology between East and West be widened<sup>228</sup>...no longer is it a question of *kalashnikovs*, rather of 'computers.' It is precisely in this area where the Soviet Union has its great dilemma: the technology gap."(Sparfrämjandet, 1989:177)

Swedish Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson, felt similarly although basing his judgement more on Soviet foreign policy outputs: "in the transformation of military to civilian production and services, there could be increasing burdens placed on the already-split economies in Eastern Europe," such that "easing of the West's technological embargo and economic aid contributions should be given a high priority."<sup>229</sup>

A somewhat similar debate took place in Norway. During the famed debate regarding the constitutionality-legality of Norwegian participation in COCOM, Labour MP, Einar Førde, expressed a need for a discussion over the whole topic of COCOM-participation, "in light of both the current (Soviet) developments and developments within COCOM cooperation."<sup>230</sup> A debate between Labour MP, Sigurd Verdal and Conservative MP, Jan Petersen further illustrates the technology-as-panacea argument.<sup>231</sup> Verdal argued:

"Petersen knows that technology is especially important for raising the living standard, for developing the economy, for advancing the societal structure, and for taking care of environmental problems...my point is that advanced

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<sup>228</sup> Pierre Schori in Sparfrämjandet (1989:156-7)

<sup>229</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 November, 1989.

<sup>230</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 November, 1987.

<sup>231</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

technology is probably the most important (factor) which will help East Europe raise the level of all important societal sectors which we desire."

A similar Labour argument was provided by Norwegian Labour

MP, Hallvard Bakke:

"There seems to be broad agreement that an important pre-requisite for Gorbachëv's success is that he can give the Soviet people a better living standard. Here, we in the West also bear a responsibility...The only thing (Progress Party's) Hagen forgot was (to bring up) a revision of the COCOM rules, such that the Soviet Union and the other East European countries can gain access to *necessary* advanced technology."<sup>232</sup>

Petersen responded:

"...the point of COCOM, namely to hinder the ('cutting edge' class) of Western technologies from being used for military purposes is a point of departure which I feel we should retain...(and) I would like to add that I do not feel that this is the technological area in which we can count on the East needing knowledge in order to advance its economy."

#### *First Signs of Change: Norway*

First signs of an easing of COCOM started to be registered in Norway in December, 1989. The U.S. review seemed to be triggered by Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.<sup>233</sup> In a question by Labour MP, Kirsti Kolle Grøndahl<sup>234</sup>,

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<sup>232</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>233</sup> The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan set off discussion of COCOM lightening. According to Charles Redman, U.S. State Department, after Afghanistan "it was decided that all requests for exceptions to the COCOM strategic embargo should be denied, irrespective of the strategic significance of the export in question: the so-called 'no exception policy' of 1980." (State Department Report, 7 February, 1989). Paul Freedenberg, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration mentioned, "with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan it is certain we'll have a review of 'no-exceptions policy.'" (Worldnet Broadcast, interview, 12 December, 1988; source: USIS, Stockholm).



Conservative Trade Minister, Kaci Kullmann Five, reports that "Norway will, in the near future, place particular weight upon work designed to re-evaluate COCOM's product-lists." The motivation being, as several interview objects in Norway phrased it "to have higher fences around fewer products."<sup>235</sup> Kullmann Five indicated that Norway was taking an active part in speeding the revision process through bilateral consultations with its fellow members, participation in list revisions, and COCOM discussions generally.<sup>236</sup> Conservative Party MP, Jan Petersen joined in his party's colleague's stance saying "there is a need for a re-evaluation of COCOM-rules." Petersen was accompanied by Christian People's Party's Kåre Gjønnes, who also favoured a relaxation of the COCOM rules,<sup>237</sup> with one motivation being, interesting enough, "the rules are a sign of the division of Europe into two military alliances." Gjønnes saw that division being mended.

Meetings between Western leaders over the issue also pointed to a growing consensus among Western allies to relax the forty-year old COCOM-rules.<sup>238</sup> On 19 January, the American Commerce Secretary officially stated that the export control system was functioning unsatisfactorily and promised a liberalisation of the rules.<sup>239</sup> Norwegian Undersecretary of State, Sven-Erik Svedman called it "an adjustment of the regulations to a new reality," rather than "a heavy liberalisation," which, according to Svedman, "sounds too radical in

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<sup>234</sup> (...continued)

<sup>234</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 December, 1989.

<sup>235</sup> N25. A variation of this principle is elaborated upon by Kullmann Five, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 December, 1989.

<sup>236</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 December, 1989.

<sup>237</sup> E. Øverli, "-Ny gjennomgang av Cocom-reglene," *Arbeiderbladet*, 5 January, 1990.

<sup>238</sup> Riishøj, "COCOM under revision," p.1.

<sup>239</sup> "-Riv teknikmuren, fienden har försvunnit."

relation to that which is actually occurring."<sup>240</sup> According to one source, before the Summer 1990 COCOM meeting, Bush had suggested slashing 30 of 120 product categories, and simplifying the administration of 13 others.<sup>241</sup>

While companies were anxiously anticipating further liberalisations in Paris, the Norwegian MFA and the Customs officials were seeking to tighten the control over the products which still were present on the COCOM lists.<sup>242</sup>

A shared COCOM policy has been to place more stringent controls on fewer amounts and types of products. Although this policy was more clearly annunciated in Norway, Sweden in practice also adopted such a policy--particularly for the promotion of exports. One should footnote the effect which the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had upon discussion of COCOM relaxation. As Norwegian Progress Party's Røsjarde pointed out "we have learned in the past days the full worth of high technology."<sup>243</sup>

Those who had long advocated an easing and clarification of the COCOM regulations were renumerated in the Summer of 1990. It would not be exaggerating the case to say that this meeting constituted the single most important slimming of COCOM regulations since COCOM's founding. Only one week following the Bush-Gorbachëv summit, and during a meeting in Paris on 6-7 June, 1990,<sup>244</sup> COCOM adopted a liberalisation regarding the export of computers, telecommunications equipment and machine tools<sup>245</sup>--a move much more important for Sweden because of its specialization in these sectors. Most

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<sup>240</sup> G. Salvesen, "COCOM-regler skal endres," *Aftenposten*, 22 January, 1990.

<sup>241</sup> S. Dahllöf and M. Thorén, "Cocom fasad spricker," *Ny Teknik* 22 (1990).

<sup>242</sup> A.M. Jonassen, "Cocom liberaliserar, men skjerpet kontroll," *Aftenposten*, 11 April, 1991.

<sup>243</sup> Røsjarde, interview.

<sup>244</sup> *International Trade Reporter* 20 June, 1990, p.935.

<sup>245</sup> "COCOM myker opp, USA strammer til," *Dagens Næringsliv*, 8 June, 1990.

Scandinavian officials agreed that, as much as they pushed for COCOM change in the past it was not until Bush took the initiative that "things began to move."<sup>246</sup>

### *Swedish opinions of the lightening*

It seemed as though special consideration was being taken to Sweden's position as 1990 drew to a close. According to one source, Swedish companies in November, 1990 received 'relaxations' regarding their import of American high technology; the grounds ostensibly being to assist the companies to be more competitive in the international arena.<sup>247</sup> In Sweden, there were rumours circulating that Sweden was preparing a final and decisive adaptation to the U.S.'s and COCOM's technology embargo.<sup>248</sup> As the Summer Paris meeting of COCOM approached, rumours of further liberalisation of the COCOM statutes appeared in the press. But it seemed unlikely that the Soviet Union would be able to benefit from these developments, still being deemed a strategic threat.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> N25

<sup>247</sup> Finland and Switzerland were reportedly granted relaxations which in actual fact gave their industries the same advantages as COCOM-member industries. (K. Eneberg, "USA underlättar import av högteknik," *Dagens Nyheter*, 21 November, 1990.)

<sup>248</sup> Swedish Left MP, Nilsson, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 12 April, 1991: "there is still a demeaning limitation on trade with the East European countries and a hinder for further development of trade with these countries."

<sup>249</sup> A.M. Jonassen, "Nye markeder for høyteknologi-varer," *Aftenposten*, 11 April, 1991, points out that the changes seemed destined to affect trade with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. (See also L. Kehoe, W. Dawkins, "Computer groups do their sums on sales to the east," *Financial Times*, 19 June, 1991.)

### *Current Developments*

COCOM, as a result of its meeting in Paris 24 May, 1991 agreed upon a revised Core List, slated to be implemented on 1 September the same year.<sup>250</sup> The general features of the Core List included greater specificity in the description of items controlled; alignment of control parameters with current technical standard; decontrol of readily available 'off-the-shelf' items in everyday commerce; and improved harmonization with the Customs tariff system.<sup>251</sup>

As the summer came to a close, all indicators pointed to future easings of the COCOM rules.<sup>252</sup> In this atmosphere, Norway took an uncommon, unilateral decision to soften its rules on high-tech exports to the neutral 5(k) countries.<sup>253</sup> Previously sales of questionable goods to these countries were subject to individual approval by Norwegian authorities. The reasons given were two: first, the Foreign Ministry expressed satisfaction of these countries' effective implementation of export control routines. Also, Bjørn Blokhus of the Ministry said "in the wake of détente between east and west it was natural to look at trade relations with those countries which stand close to us."<sup>254</sup> However, a more comprehensive COCOM re-evaluation was slowed by the attempted coup attempt in the Soviet Union on 19 August.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> W. Dawkins, "CoCom eases curb on high-tech sales," *Financial Times*, 25 May, 1991. U.S. Commerce official, Allan Wendt, clarifies the policy of "higher fences around fewer products."

<sup>251</sup> *International Trade Reporter*, 29 May, 1991.

<sup>252</sup> A. Maitland, "Cocom eases rules on hi-tech exports," *Financial Times*, 13 August, 1991.

<sup>253</sup> K. Fossli, "Norway to ease rules on high-tech exports," *Financial Times*, 8 August, 1991.

<sup>254</sup> "Norway to ease rules on high-tech exports."

<sup>255</sup> A. Maitland, L. Kehoe, "CoCom change may be delayed," *Financial Times*, 22 August, 1991.

## Élite Perceptions of COCOM: Help and Hindrance

### *COCOM: A veritable trade barrier?*

One stands to wonder if the existing COCOM regulations--seen from those who are daily faced with the matter-- have in fact resulted in the stifling of either Norwegian-Soviet or Swedish-Soviet trade. There can be no doubt that COCOM has been a hindrance, for any Governmental intervention in an otherwise free process hampers its natural development. The answer is not whether, rather **under what conditions, with which effect, on which industries?**

The logical place to look for the answer is within those sectors, and within those companies which are assumed to have a competitive edge worldwide and which are COCOM-regulated. We must assume the perspective of those who affect the policy (officials and politicians) and those who must abide by it (the business élite). Thus, interviews will be the chief source of data for the following section.

The spontaneous reaction of most individuals interviewed was in fact that the regulations had no decisive effect on either the volume or type of trade that was transacted with the Soviet Union. But, when probed further, most cautiously admitted that COCOM's existence may have, in 'certain industries,' and during 'certain time periods'<sup>256</sup> affected Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet trade patterns.

### *Impact on Sweden*

Just before Gorbachëv took the helm, the Swedish Defence Committee made the answer to the question of impact seem crystal-clear. While pointing out that

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<sup>256</sup> A. Hoff, "USA-press mot svensk lekkasje av teknologi," *Aftenposten*, 25 October, 1985: Swedish Trade Undersecretary, Åberg said "the 'affairs' have hurt Swedish industry," however pointing out that "once they reached solution the Americans let everything go on as before."

Swedish neutrality did not mean 'psychological neutrality' the Committee painted a sombre picture of the existing situation:

"The embargo on high technology has created special problems for Sweden. The U.S. seeks to maintain its edge in relation to the countries in the East through preventing access to (such) material, components and technological expertise(SOU, 1985:15)...A factor which will become increasingly important in the East-West relationship and relationship between the alliances is the uneven development in the high technological sphere. There is reason to believe that high technology trade will be, to an increasing extent, utilized as a political instrument during the rest of the 1980's." (SOU, 1985:61)

It is interesting to note that in the next of the Committee's papers, presented five years later, COCOM is not even mentioned.<sup>257</sup>

#### *Hardest-hit industries*

The Swedish sectors most influenced by the COCOM regulations were the telecommunications industry, the electronics industry and industries dependent on those technologies. Another traditionally hard hit area was precision machine tools. It is perhaps useful to draw a contrast between those industries that would potentially export single, COCOM-regulated products to the Soviet Union('primary exporters'), and those industries which *draw upon* high technological products only as a *part* of overall production ('secondary exporters'). The difference here being that secondary industries are not wholly dependent on the interworkings of COCOM, and are capable of finding alternative solutions if one aspect of their product happens to come under the umbrella of COCOM. Primary industries are constantly interested in what

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<sup>257</sup> "The West's thorough technological advantage has created increasingly more problems for the Soviet Union. Therefore (the Soviet Union) will increasingly be scared of losing contact with the military-technological development in the West." (COCOM never specifically mentioned). (SOU, 1990:41-2)

COCOM is doing and are intimately affected by changes in the COCOM statutes. Technology which does not draw on COCOM-regulated technology and which is manufactured in Sweden is only subject to Swedish regulations (e.g. nuclear technology).<sup>258</sup>

In Sweden, the main Soviet trade players Tetra Pak, Alfa Laval and Axel Johnson have only been marginally affected. In the last case, in the words of one industrialist, "we simply don't deal in high technological products."<sup>259</sup>

One must remember that Sweden is only one country in a competitive market, simultaneously regulated with the rest of the West by very similar COCOM statutes. Therefore, as one individual pointed out "the Soviet Union is dependent on the West for Western components--but Sweden is not different from any other Western country in this respect."<sup>260</sup> One senior Foreign Ministry official pointed out that "the potential easing of the regulations would not put Sweden in a better position, since the regulations would not be relaxed more than our main competitor nations."<sup>261</sup> "There could be some companies that offer COCOM-controlled products," said one official, "but they do so simultaneously with other West Europeans, such as Siemens."<sup>262</sup>

"The Soviets," said one Swedish official, "have had this hysterical interest with hardware."<sup>263</sup> "The technological gap," another individual pointed out "between the existing (hardware and software) standards and that which can be offered from Western Europe is so large," that only recent-past machinery

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<sup>258</sup> However, S. Dahllöf, "Cocom lättar," *Ny Teknik* 24 May, 1990 quotes Hanne Simonsen from the Board of Industry and Trade as saying "we have been forewarned that Sweden will initiate export controls of Swedish technology."

<sup>259</sup> Ennerfelt in *Sparfrämjandet* (1989:161)

<sup>260</sup> N47

<sup>261</sup> S8

<sup>262</sup> S48

<sup>263</sup> S13. This advisor said this was grounded, not in industrial necessity, but personal interest.

should be taken up and used, instead of going to totally new technology."<sup>264</sup> Only minimal domestic production of computer technology occurs in Sweden--and that for Japanese-British NOKIA-ICL. Thus, the transit considerations are perhaps the most important in this regard.<sup>265</sup>

The Swedish situation contrasts somewhat with the Norwegian case, where one has one of the formerly major players in computer hardware, Norsk Data. Although representatives from Norsk Data were not interviewed, we nevertheless gleaned from interviews a vague impression that their Soviet export has suffered. Software production is markedly higher in Sweden and Norway. But for example Norwegian Data West has had growing opportunities to sell onto the Soviet market.

Arguably, the company most influenced by COCOM has been Ericsson Telecom.<sup>266</sup> To some extent, the regulations may have affected Ericsson's Soviet market potential. However, it did not seem that Ericsson had been any more hampered than any other Western country on the Soviet market, one official said. "No other exchanges from, e.g. Siemens are in operation," although adding "there are outstanding orders."<sup>267</sup> We know that one of the more controversial complex, multilateral COCOM cases was the refusal by the U.S. in mid-1990 to approve a Trans-Siberian fibre optic link.<sup>268</sup>

One individual recounted "I know (COCOM) was an obstacle before, in 1984-1986, but not in the case of the Soviet Union." For Ericsson, the approval of a

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<sup>264</sup> S14

<sup>265</sup> "Cocom's fasad spricker," p.12, however, point out computer exports are the least of the problems, pointing out that it is a question of telecommunications and machine tool technology.

<sup>266</sup> Ericsson Telecom has traditionally had low sales to Eastern Europe.

<sup>267</sup> S23

<sup>268</sup> Discussion of an easing of regulations over this project began in the Summer of 1991. (W. Dawkins, "West to back trans-Soviet telecom link," *Financial Times*, 21 June, 1991.)



major international exchange for use in Budapest in early 1989 was a turning point. Ericsson had previously installed the Moscow telex exchange in 1977. Said one official, "since that approval there has not been any hindrance."<sup>269</sup> "In any case," said this one official, "Ericsson deals in civilian systems." But, as one official told: "Ericsson did not even try to work these countries until two years back,"<sup>270</sup> perhaps hinting at the coincidence of COCOM-related timing factors. With the development of their revolutionary AXE switching system, they have only now been able to begin chipping away at the East Europe and Soviet market.<sup>271</sup> Alfa-Laval is one industry which is able to work with different solutions in order to find the one that best fits both the COCOM rules (on the one hand) and the final consumer's wishes (on the other). One individual familiar with the Alfa-Laval case said, "if the Soviets desire a factory and have to have it automated, they *do* use American computers...in some cases they are *forced* to use U.S. computers...and usually they have been able to choose things which *would be licensed* (choosing older, lower computers, PC's etc.)" "The problem for Alfa-Laval," one said, "was not technical, but rather administrative."<sup>272</sup>

### *Norway*

Patterns emerged in an examination of Norwegian perceptions of which industries had been and would remain most affected by COCOM. First, Norsk Hydro, the primary Norwegian actor in Norwegian-Soviet trade, did not feel that their trade with the Soviets was of such a character that it would have been affected by COCOM, being mostly based on fertilizer and raw chemical

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<sup>269</sup> S23

<sup>270</sup> S23

<sup>271</sup> "Cocoms fasad spricker."

<sup>272</sup> S42

trade.<sup>273</sup> In fact, most agreed with one Foreign Ministry official who said "there are very few Norwegian companies which are COCOM candidates."<sup>274</sup>

But in the same breath, most officials<sup>275</sup> added that "marine-technology was an exception,"<sup>276</sup> adding that in the future, and with a lightening of COCOM, the *scope* of trade would be broader.<sup>277</sup> Trade in 'marine technology' lay in the potential and not in the actual: mainly oil exploration equipment (stabilization equipment for platforms, drill bits), but also such products as navigational equipment, geological equipment (seismic measuring equipment). One official said that:

"our real possibilities have been in offshore, and we have presented all the aspects for many years...the Soviet Union does not seem to feel that the equipment would have made any difference in the COCOM context, but we have noticed there haven't been any contracts in the field."<sup>278</sup>

One of the Norwegian solutions in offshore, said one key official, "could be that we hand over a package, to which are attached Norwegian control mechanisms-granting no Soviets access at all," however pointing out the problem that "the Soviet authorities nevertheless have said they want part of the package."<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>273</sup> N47, N43

<sup>274</sup> N25

<sup>275</sup> A. Moe maintains however that Western perceptions of profitability would go before considerations such as the COCOM rules, which "seem unlikely to create any serious difficulties for such deals." (1988:274-5) See also Bergesen, Moe and Østreng (1987)

<sup>276</sup> N36

<sup>277</sup> N36

<sup>278</sup> N25

<sup>279</sup> N31. This possibility was expressed as early as 1982, in M. G. Spang, "Norge eksporterer olje-pakke," *Verdens gang*, 14 August, 1982.

### *COCOM complexity as hindrance*

Both Norwegian and Swedish élites argued that the sheer existence of COCOM only added to the, as previously outlined, extensive difficulties and complexities involved in Soviet trade, to provide only one more deterrent for entering the Soviet market. As one high Swedish official said "some companies we deal with have just said 'we rather don't bother with the Soviet Union, it's so difficult to figure out what is allowed and what is forbidden.'"<sup>280</sup> This was supported by Norwegian Socialist Left MP, Theo Koritzinsky, "the requirements are so very difficult and complex to grasp and then to control."<sup>281</sup> One Norwegian industrialist confirmed that "the sheer presence of the rules scares people away because that means even more preparation and investigation."<sup>282</sup> Another Norwegian official called the Norwegians "bad exporters." "All these restrictions can easily deter them, however pointing out that "Norwegian exporters have suffered markedly less than other European exporters--Norway has a need for high technology only in niches," he added.<sup>283</sup>

### *COCOM as an excuse for different company/government priorities*

Some Norwegian and Swedish governmental and business officials used COCOM regulations as a scapegoat in explaining their non-engagement on the Soviet market. As one trade official related, "companies who were not engaged in the Soviet market before are reluctant in any case to start in with the uncertain situation."<sup>284</sup> One high Norwegian official joined in this reasoning saying "yes, the COCOM lightening should have an effect--but that would have to be in the long-term, since few firms today can see themselves adopting a

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<sup>280</sup> Ennerfelt, interview.

<sup>281</sup> N20

<sup>282</sup> N47

<sup>283</sup> N36

<sup>284</sup> S11

long-term perspective," adding that "the Soviet priorities are just not there...they put their earned foreign currency elsewhere today."<sup>285</sup> As one Norwegian official put it: "COCOM does not affect their economy, since it is especially dependent on rudimentary organisation, market economy, infrastructure, having little to do with COCOM actually."<sup>286</sup> The question of influence was in fact a theoretical one.

Therefore it was common to hear comments such as that of one Swedish official "the economic effect of COCOM has been marginal," yet adding, "theoretically COCOM has affected." But the real problem, this official pointed out, is that "the market is just not there," (a factor which of course has origins within the country--NOT related to COCOM).<sup>287</sup>

#### *COCOM loyalty no insurmountable hindrance*

Another perspective was provided by those officials who pointed out that companies adapted to the rules quite naturally, only viewing the rules as minor, either in-and-of-themselves, or better, as contrasted with other much more formidable complications present in pursuing the Soviet market. As one Swedish Foreign Ministry official said, "most of the companies have simply adapted their activities to the rules," however pointing out that the Soviet officials often complained that the "Swedes were creating trade hindrances through not transferring technology of sufficiently high standard."<sup>288</sup> This official pointed to Ericsson as a prime example, outlining "Ericsson has adapted themselves, they simply have avoided working certain parts of the market."<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>285</sup> N14

<sup>286</sup> N36

<sup>287</sup> S24

<sup>288</sup> S4

<sup>289</sup> S4

Within this adaptation process Swedes<sup>290</sup> and Norwegians,<sup>291</sup> especially in the wake of the "scandals," in fact felt a need to be more active than COCOM-regulations required. "With respect to those companies which had a lot of contact with the U.S., they have never wanted to stretch their contacts, preferring not to annoy the Americans," one official said.<sup>292</sup> "Firms in Sweden had learned," said one official, "that it is better to say no to contracts than risk being blackmailed from the U.S. market."<sup>293</sup>

An interesting question for the Norwegians is to investigate is which role the Norwegian saw themselves playing in COCOM, relative to the other members of the club.<sup>294</sup> The Norwegians, even as prominent COCOM members, and the Swedes must prove their loyalty to the U.S. and its fellow COCOM members; even for Norway, the credibility question was central. Koritzinsky stated that "after the KV/Toshiba (event) sometimes the Norwegian officials acted hysterically in order to prove that Norway was 110% COCOM-loyal."<sup>295</sup>

Perhaps the hysteria was necessary. To be sure, improvements in Swedish and Norwegian export controls have indirectly contributed to a more relaxed U.S. attitude towards them. One strategically-placed official confirmed that "today's laws and regulations (in Norway) are stricter than other countries' statutes and limits," adding that "we have also dramatically increased the

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<sup>290</sup> S12

<sup>291</sup> N36

<sup>292</sup> S48

<sup>293</sup> S12

<sup>294</sup> This was at times opposed by Norwegian top officials, who, like one top official, said "Norway is moving with the consensus, and the consensus is moving very fast indeed." (N46)

<sup>295</sup> Koritzinsky, interview.

amount of people working in the area."<sup>296</sup> One high official pointed out what could be seen as a balancing effect, namely that "we favoured COCOM because we noticed that the other parties' did not take it as seriously as we did," adding that "the reason is in the Norwegian political culture, we follow the rules if we have joined an international agreement."<sup>297</sup> Probing further, this official said that "as a small state, being criticized by the big powers makes one feel very vulnerable—and thus in order to avoid problems with the larger parties Norway was more true to the rules than others."<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> N25. Several individuals confirmed that this entailed the distribution of a manual on the COCOM regulations, the holding of seminars on COCOM, and in general greater assistance and service to the affected enterprises. In terms of personnel, one individual said in the COCOM department there are 20 people working, "constantly in contact with industry—and in general there are no complaints." (N36)

<sup>297</sup> N14

<sup>298</sup> N14

## Chapter Eight

### Environmental, Economic and Scientific Cooperation: Gorbachëv's Murmansk Initiative, 1987

#### *Introduction*<sup>1</sup>

On October 1, 1987, Mikhail Gorbachëv launched a major Nordic foreign policy offensive with his so-called "Murmansk speech." The speech was chiefly intended for domestic political consumption.<sup>2</sup> However, the speech's foreign policy section was highlighted in the Nordic countries. The speech was important because it in itself hinted at a comprehensive re-assessment of key features of the Soviet approach to Nordic politics. Students of Soviet politics have traditionally learned to study speeches by Soviet leaders as junctures of policy change or re-affirmation of chosen policy. The speech also had value in that it placed both neglected and previous "non-issues" onto the Soviet-Nordic foreign policy agenda.

#### *Chief Loci of Inquiry*

There is consensus today that the chief target of the speech was Norway. Some have argued that this attention provides evidence of Norway's prominent place in Soviet foreign policy relative to Sweden. The central task of this section is to compare and contrast neutral Sweden's and NATO-aligned Norway's reaction and behaviour towards the Murmansk proposal. Did Sweden's neutrality influence its reaction to and behaviour toward Gorbachëv's proposals in different ways than did NATO membership the Norwegian behaviour?

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<sup>1</sup> The best two studies to date are: Archer (1989) and Scrivener (1989). See also Bomsdorf (1989) for a closer study of the Murmansk speech.

<sup>2</sup> Sten Andersson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 December, 1987; Thorvald Stoltenberg, (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 2 December, 1987): "the possibilities we see in more positive developments with respect to the East-West relationship are closely connected with the domestic reform process which has been initiated in the Soviet Union under (Gorbachëv)."

It was chiefly over the security-policy aspects of the October speech that different Norwegian and Swedish attitudes prevailed.<sup>3</sup> However, Gorbachëv also proposed cooperation in the economic, environmental and scientific realms--proposals which we will discuss in greater depth in this section. It is not immediately obvious what role neutrality and alignment play in responding to proposals of the non-security policy sort. These proposals became important when Gorbachëv intertwined them with security policy proposals--as such, they provide background to the security policy considerations in Northern areas. Sweden's neutral policy and Norway's NATO membership governed certain aspects of their respective reactions to the security aspects of the speech--a topic dealt with in a later chapter.

### *Speech Content*

Security-policy considerations aside, one of Gorbachëv's main themes was **Arctic cooperation**.<sup>4</sup> As Gorbachëv said, "we attach great significance to peaceful cooperation with respect to the safeguarding of Arctic resources."<sup>5</sup> Another specific suggestion Gorbachëv forwarded was to create a conference

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<sup>3</sup> Reactions to Gorbachëv's security-policy proposals are dealt with in a later section.

<sup>4</sup> For the broad Norwegian perspective on the issue, see *St. Meld. nr. 11, 1989-90* ("om utviklinstrekk i det internasjonale samfunn og virkninger for norsk utenrikspolitikk")

<sup>5</sup> I quote heretofore from Magnusson's (1987) translation of Murmansk speech. Gorbachëv spoke of "exchange of experience and knowledge." Gorbachëv proposed a unified energy-programme for Northern Europe. "According to available sources," he says, "the oil and gas potential in the area is practically unlimited...(to this end) technical structures which are able to survive the polar climate must be manufactured." Gorbachëv mentioned "mixed-companies in Canada and Norway for the extraction of oil and gas on our Northern continental shelf" as potential participants.



whereby the sub-arctic states can coordinate their exploration of the Arctic.<sup>6</sup>

Another theme was the **environment**. Here Gorbachëv envisioned "a special emphasis on environmental cooperation with the countries in the North," stressing the "need is obviously pressing." The positive experiences which mutual environmental measures have had between the seven participating Baltic littoral nations, should, according to Mr Gorbachëv, spread to the "Northern areas." In concrete terms, Gorbachëv proposed a "supervisory system for the environment and regional radiation-security." He also expressed a willingness to re-consider Soviet nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya.<sup>7</sup>

Another important area which Gorbachëv mentioned was his willingness to "open the Northeast passage for foreign vessels with Soviet ice-breaker assistance." However, Gorbachëv's willingness to do such was contingent upon "how things were going with the normalisation of international relations."<sup>8</sup>

Gorbachëv nevertheless passed over subjects of importance for élites. For example, an omission of the Barents Sea delimitation problem in the Murmansk speech was noted in Norway.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Gorbachëv stressed the Soviet Union's willingness "to impart our experiences," and in exchange, "we are interested in ongoing research in the Nordic and sub-arctic states...we already have a research exchange underway with Canada."

<sup>7</sup> "We are trying to figure out how we will solve this complicated problem for us--since we have invested such large amounts of money in it." "This could be solved immediately, if the U.S. would agree to stop nuclear tests--or at least start reducing them to a minimum--both in terms of quantity and strength," he added.

<sup>8</sup> Here we note this point only in passing, and will not discuss this issue in detail. The first Western ship to pass through the Northeast passage did so in the Fall of 1991.

<sup>9</sup> Conservative Norwegian MP, Tore Austad, *Forhandler i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

### *Background and Significance*

The speech's timing added to its impact on the Nordic audiences. This particular speech took place four days prior to a visit from Finnish President Koivisto and a little more than a week before a large Norwegian trade delegation was to visit Moscow. Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg held a major address at the Nordic Forum for Security on the subject of the "Northern Areas," only eight days prior.<sup>10</sup> From a security perspective, the speech could not have been delivered at a more symbolic location than Murmansk: a place which, more than any other, symbolized Soviet-U.S. naval rivalry.

The Murmansk speech cannot be seen in isolation--and must be seen against the background of a string of regionally-oriented speeches which Gorbachëv delivered. Previously, Gorbachëv had held an important speech in the Soviet far East--in Vladivostok (28 July, 1986)--which was geared to Asian and Pacific rim audiences. He also held a less-publicized address in Belgrade (16 March, 1988), which dealt with Mediterranean issues. These "appeals" or "initiatives" were of particular note for the extent to which they dealt in an interrelated manner with military security problems and prospects for economic, environmental and scientific issues and cooperation.

The Murmansk speech provided one of the few signs that the Soviet Union was thinking of the Nordic region at all. As Anders Åslund pointed out "the Nordic countries were not prioritized by Gorbachëv whatsoever." "Usually," said Åslund, "a trip to Finland would be taken by an incoming Soviet leader shortly after beginning his tenure...it took two and one-half years for him to get to Finland."<sup>11</sup> Carl Bildt<sup>12</sup> pointed out that "it is not for the Nordic countries

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<sup>10</sup> NUPI, 1987:411-12. The similarities between the basic points which Stoltenberg advocated and the Gorbachëv address are striking.

<sup>11</sup> Åslund, interview.

<sup>12</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

to become the object of the type of attention which we witnessed in Gorbachëv's speech in Murmansk." The speech was mentioned until at least 1990 by Nordic and Soviet officials, is, in-and-of-itself, a sign of the speech's lasting character.<sup>13</sup>

One should guard against assuming that the Murmansk initiative presented dramatically new proposals. For example, concrete proposals for action on Arctic cooperation were at least ten years old.<sup>14</sup> As an example, one Norwegian official who worked intimately with related questions informed the author that then-Chairman of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, James Zumberge took up the first initiative regarding cooperation on the Arctic.<sup>15</sup> What was new was active Soviet support for and participation in these efforts.<sup>16</sup>

#### *Comparing Swedish and Norwegian Reactions*

What was remarkable was the dampened tone of the Swedish reaction. Clearly, Gorbachëv first targeted Norway, then Finland and Sweden. What the Swedes reacted to most negatively, insofar as they reacted at all, were to the security policy proposals Gorbachëv forwarded. They reacted luke-warmly to most of the other proposals dealing with economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation--partially because the Arctic was peripheral to their chief interests--the Baltic. As an explanation of the lack of Swedish interest said one senior Swedish diplomat: "the general political atmosphere (at the time the speech was delivered) was not inspired to move on it; we were not ready to enter into large

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<sup>13</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, 13 January, 1989 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*); Progress Party MP, Røsjorde, 19 January, 1989. In Sweden, see the Swedish Defence Committee's report SOU (1990).

<sup>14</sup> Archer (1990) points out that many organisations for cooperation e.g. the Nordkalott Committee, founded in 1977, have been active in these questions for some time.

<sup>15</sup> N21

<sup>16</sup> Soviet participation in the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) is one example. (Archer, 1989:30)

scale cooperation."<sup>17</sup> As Åslund put it, "the Soviets were struck by the fact there was no reaction from the Nordic countries." Further, he said, "when there was no positive reaction from the Nordics there was no point in getting involved--here he could do a quick 'touch-up' job on the Nordic countries, then forget about it."<sup>18</sup> One possible reason the Norwegians received more attention was because of their outstanding jurisdictional dispute with the USSR in the Barents Sea.<sup>19</sup>

As for the *spirit* of the speech, reactions from both Norway and Sweden were uniformly positive. But here one must be careful to draw a line between, as one Norwegian Foreign Ministry official summed it up: "some parts which were more realistic than other, more idealistic ones."<sup>20</sup> From the Norwegian, and to an extent also the Swedish horizon, the 'realistic' proposals included those of a non-security nature. "Idealistic" proposals were security-related proposals and are dealt with in a later section on strategic issues.

### 'Realistic' Proposals and the Follow-up of Murmansk

#### *Soviet Follow-Up*

An interesting point to discuss is to what extent Gorbachëv's speech has been followed up--from the Soviet,<sup>21</sup> Swedish and Norwegian sides. At the time

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<sup>17</sup> "Swedes are pragmatic," he said, "we move from one point to another, we don't like grand designs." (S43)

<sup>18</sup> Åslund, interview.

<sup>19</sup> By October, 1987, the Soviet Union must have realized that an agreement with the Swedes in the Baltic delimitation question was imminent. One senior Swedish diplomat mentioned, "the speech occurred while we were negotiating the Baltic Agreement--we used some parts of it in our own negotiations (e.g. terms and concepts such as 'good neighbourhood' (*gott naboskap*))." (S45)

<sup>20</sup> N30

<sup>21</sup> After the speech the Soviet officials for at least two years following mentioned the speech in writing and speaking. (Jonson, 1990c:12-13)

these measures were proposed, the Soviet Union perceived itself still to be in relatively good economic health--relative to its situation today. With time, whatever intentions the Soviet authorities had to concretely contribute (finance) measures to control pollution, have today disappeared with the degeneration of the Soviet economy. From the Soviet side, it seemed as though scientific research was prioritized<sup>22</sup>. Voronkov<sup>23</sup> writes that many of the Scandinavian reactions have missed the central part of Gorbachëv's speech, namely, "that their should be created cooperation between the interested countries regarding a common use and exploitation of Arctic resources, environmental protection and cooperative scientific projects." But other issues, such as the opening of the North-East passage, also seemed to have serious, sustained Soviet support.

Perhaps the largest impediment to increasing scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union was the Soviet stand on access to Soviet scientific data. Norwegian, Swedish (or any foreign) attempts to examine data on the Soviet side (through visits to companies or through direct data measurement) constituted intrusions on Soviet national sovereignty and security. As one Norwegian advisor close to the questions told, "the Soviet decision-makers in Moscow, even though they permitted us to make experiments, did not accept or believe the data until such was verified by a *bona fide* Soviet institution."<sup>24</sup> Gradually however, the question of the credibility of the Norwegian data in Moscow showed improvement. "The decision-makers in Moscow would never

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<sup>22</sup> R.L. Larsen, "Sovjet ga Norge svarfrist," *Aftenposten*, 14 December, 1987 writes that the Soviet Union gave Norway four months to begin research cooperation with the Soviet Union in the area of space exploration. According to the article, a protocol for cooperation was signed between Norway and the Soviet Union the preceding week. The emphasis here was to be on the exchange of satellite "*fjernmålning*" and atmospheric research.

<sup>23</sup> L. Voronkov, "Murmansk-utspillet må nå bli utnyttet," *Aftenposten*, 1 December, 1987.

<sup>24</sup> N44

trust outside information unless it was approved by an internal Soviet research organ," one individual close to these matters related.<sup>25</sup>

#### *Steps towards increased scientific and environmental cooperation*

The most positive responses in Norway and Sweden were heard regarding the scientific and environmental parts of the Gorbachëv initiative.<sup>26</sup> Swedes who expressed a remarkably low interest in Gorbachëv's speech *in toto*, emphasized the positive aspects of Gorbachëv's scientific and environmental proposals. However, the environmental problems the Swedes had to deal with were oriented directly Eastward—to the Baltic,<sup>27</sup> which Gorbachëv only mentioned in passing, while the Norwegians were oriented Northwards and Eastward.

#### *Swedish Follow-Up*

Swedish research connections with the Soviet Union have traditionally been strong.<sup>28</sup> However it was not until 1987 that both Arctic<sup>29</sup> and environmental research was given a very much needed political push by the Soviet leadership. Cooperation in these realms was assisted by a more flexible interpretation of what was considered politically sensitive, both from the Swedish and the Soviet

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<sup>25</sup> N44.

<sup>26</sup> Scrivener (1989:37-44) notes that the Finns have "taken the Murmansk baton" to a much greater degree than any of the other Nordic countries.

<sup>27</sup> This fact clearly reflected in the amount of money which would be channelled into research in the Baltic (**Government Research Bill 1989/90:90. Main Proposals** (Stockholm: Cabinet Office, 1990), p.81).

<sup>28</sup> "Sverige och Europa- det vetenskapliga samarbetet," (Stockholm: Royal Academy of Science, September, 1989), pps 54-56. At least one agreement is from 1966, while others are distributed equally through subsequent years. Cooperation regarding space research is said to be particularly strong—and has been strong for several years.

<sup>29</sup> "Sverige och Europa..." p. 54.

viewpoints. Desirée Edmar, of the Prime Minister's Office, said,<sup>30</sup> "previously, we have had an extremely formalised system of cooperation with the Soviets." "We experienced that, before, many of the researchers who came (to Sweden) had political contacts...in the past years, we have seen an increasing proportion of *bona fide* researchers come to Sweden," Edmar added. The system became formalized because of a monetary problem, since they had very little to pay with, and instead offered services in exchange. A turning point for such cooperation occurred after the trip of former-Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt to the Soviet Union, resulting in a bilateral agreement on 28 April, 1989. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences was also informed by the Government that their resource base would be doubled--from five million SEK to ten million SEK.<sup>31</sup>

With respect to environmental research, one Swedish Foreign Ministry official pointed out that "although we have not seen any results in our area (naval confidence-building measures), you should go over and talk to the people working with Arctic questions and environmental questions where they probably have a better picture."<sup>32</sup> One retired Swedish diplomat said, "the environmental questions he raised are some of the most important questions today--the change is that the Soviets see it in the same light, although their resource base prevents them from participating financially."<sup>33</sup> The *Riksdag's* Foreign Relations Committee commented directly on the Murmansk speech, hinting that Gorbachëv's suggestions should be followed up by a larger international audience:

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<sup>30</sup> Edmar, interview.

<sup>31</sup> Government Research Bill 1989/90:90. Main Proposals (Stockholm: The Cabinet Office, 1990), p.32, 81.

<sup>32</sup> S44

<sup>33</sup> S5

"in the proposals which were forwarded two years ago, and later supplemented in several ways...there is a great deal to ('grab hold of'=*ta fasta på*) in terms of regional environmental and research cooperation. The security-policy questions which are of a wide-ranging nature should also be resolved within wide-ranging frameworks."<sup>34</sup>

#### *Lack of Follow-up*

One Swedish Foreign Ministry expert said the "Murmansk speech was not followed up--either from our or their side...the importance of the speech was that it was a sign of the times--not of any special practical value."<sup>35</sup> A Swedish Social Democrat confirmed that their had not been much follow up on the Soviet side. "In environmental questions," he related, "the initiative has been on our side."<sup>36</sup>

#### *Norwegian Follow-Up*

Norwegians saw Murmansk as a turning point in the Soviet willingness to enter into concrete scientific cooperation. "We have noticed that the Soviet Union's interest in the process changed from a rather reluctant stance to being actively interested in joining the whole process...the Soviet Union was, after ten years, finally prepared for practical cooperation," said one MFA official.<sup>37</sup> One senior Norwegian MFA advisor said one of the concrete results of the Murmansk speech was that "we got information regarding the economic structure up North," while simultaneously opening up negotiations on the environment and pollution.<sup>38</sup> A more sensitive question was the previously negative Soviet view of extra-regional participation in its vision of Arctic

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<sup>34</sup> Riksdagstryck, 1989/90:UU6 ("Nedrustning"), 9 November, 1989.

<sup>35</sup> S9

<sup>36</sup> S10

<sup>37</sup> N21

<sup>38</sup> N26



cooperation. One official added that whereas they had now arrived at an acceptable resolution, before "they were not interested in other countries, the Soviets had a strict view of making it a regional organisation,"<sup>39</sup> which of course carried overtones for Norway's NATO involvement. In these changed times, the U.S. and other NATO partners were encouraged to participate alongside the USSR, Norway, Finland and others.

The increased Soviet willingness to allow civilians, say Norwegian researchers, to perform otherwise "intrusive" experiments, must be seen as another important turning point. In this connection, the Soviet willingness to accept Western military inspections is also worth noting.<sup>40</sup> The formation of a Joint, Norwegian-Soviet Commission on the environment was one of the results of the signing of an Agreement between the two on 15 January, 1988. The first meeting of the Commission took place in August, 1988.

#### *Attempts at further developing economic cooperation*

Gorbachëv's proposal for increased economic cooperation was directed more towards Finland and Norway than at any other party. It would also be fair to say that Gorbachëv had oil exploration at the top of his priority list, since oil exports were the chief source of foreign hard currency.<sup>41</sup> Thus, Swedish industry's reactions have been dampened if not altogether non-existent towards

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<sup>39</sup> N21

<sup>40</sup> N.M. Udgaard, "Nøktern optimisme øst-vest," *Aftenposten*, 12 October, 1987. An example of this changing attitude is illustrated at a conference in Budapest: "the Russians made it clear that they wanted to go further along the road to military inspection and that they were going to present several numbers regarding (its) military strength."

<sup>41</sup> Scrivener points out Moscow's need to find a "successor to the West Siberian fields as the main source of oil production by the turn of the century." (Scrivener, 1989:20)

this part of the initiative.<sup>42</sup> Although Soviet interest in potential oil reserves in the Baltic cannot be totally discounted,<sup>43</sup> the issue was clearly not prioritized in Gorbachëv's speech.

Although the Norwegians were targeted in terms of joint oil-exploration, nothing ever came of this initiative, since Norwegians stood firm on their position of wanting a clear dividing line. The Governmental policy is clear<sup>44</sup>: cooperation in offshore activity must be in accordance with the following points: must be on commercial terms; must not be in violation of the COCOM strategic embargo; Soviet oil bases are prohibited in Norway; no third countries permitted to use Norwegian territory for purposes linked to Soviet Barents activity; cooperation by established oil sector firms is preferable to such activity by companies specially set up for trade with the U.S.S.R.; such cooperation must take place outside of the disputed area.

In the wake of Gorbachëv's Murmansk speech, a Norwegian mixed Trade Commission, under the leadership of Trade Minister, Kurt Mosbakk, travelled to Moscow. Mosbakk's reactions in Moscow illustrated the inability of Muscovite élites to concretise the potential forms for Norwegian-Soviet cooperation set forth in Murmansk. Specifically Mosbakk said "Gorbachëv's speech in Murmansk was mentioned, but there is a clearly detectable need to concretise the possibilities for cooperation." Furthermore, Mosbakk was not

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<sup>42</sup> The Swedish Foreign Ministry, well before Gorbachëv's speech, had already researched the possibilities of exploration on the Kola. One study was aimed at investigating the possibilities to tap resources of feldspars, nepheline and titani-ferrous metals on the Kola. (See Boliden Contech, "Feldspars, Nepheline and Titani-Ferrous Mineral-- Utilization, Availability and Market Conditions," 3 June, 1987; "Svenska affärsmöjligheter inom projektet 'Apatity' Kola halvön") The study's conclusion was that the products' quality did not correspond to market demand.

<sup>43</sup> According to the Vice President for Finnish Oil Company, NESTE, the company planned to go on to develop the Baltic (G. De Lange, "Ivrer for Nordisk Gassnett," *Aftenposten*, 13 March, 1991).

<sup>44</sup> *Norinform*, 29 October, 1989 (as in Scrivener, 1989:40)

reported to have registered any changed discussion climate at the Mixed Commission meetings as a result of Gorbachëv's "invitations."<sup>45</sup>

Although cooperation in the disputed area was forbidden, one Norwegian Foreign Ministry official mentioned the cooperation which now occurring in the Stockmanovskaya field as a possible outcome of the Gorbachëv initiative.<sup>46</sup> On Ryzhkov's trip to Oslo in January, 1988, Norsk Hydro's General Director, Torvild Aakvaag put in a special word for Hydro's drilling rig "Polar Pioneer," a display which could be seen as demonstrating Norwegian interest in future Soviet contracts.<sup>47</sup>

### *Plaguing Environmental Concerns*

In the environmental realm there were several concrete questions. One, was a concern about the resumption of nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya. Two, there was a general concern that, as one Norwegian put it "that the Soviets had been flushing their nuclear waste under the ice in the North."<sup>48</sup> A third problem was the general environmental impact which Soviet industry had on

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<sup>45</sup> A. Willersrud, "Sovjet: Egne krefter i nord," *Aftenposten*, 15 October, 1987. The COCOM scandal surrounding Kongsbergs Våpenfabrikk was taken up during the meeting, as were the possibilities for high-technology cooperation in the Barents Sea, "nothing was said other than that the Soviet Union was prepared to use its own resources in connection with 'what is occurring in the Barents Sea.'"

<sup>46</sup> N28. Stockmanovskaya is not in disputed area. From the Norwegian side the participant is Norsk Hydro.

<sup>47</sup> M. Fyhn, F. Pedersen, "Rysjkov: Vil gjerne tilbake," *Aftenposten*, 18 January, 1988.

<sup>48</sup> A senior Norwegian foreign policy advisor.(N26) This source mentioned that his conclusions were well-founded although they were contradictory with the official, public reports which had been published on the matter. It became public knowledge in November, 1991 that the USSR had, up to 1985, been storing nuclear waste in waters as shallow as 18-20 metres.(S. Lundberg, "Sovjet sänkte atomsopor i Ishavet," *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 November, 1991)

living conditions in the North--the smelting plant just over the Norwegian-Soviet border in Nickel being the main concern.

*Murmansk Contradicted?: The Resumption of Underground Nuclear Testing on Novaya Zemlya.*

The Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing on the island-group Novaya Zemlya at 15.58 on 24 October, 1990<sup>49</sup>--a contradiction, many said, to the spirit of Murmansk--and that, less than two months previous to his planned trip to Oslo to receive the Nobel Prize.<sup>50</sup> Previous to this resumption, the last explosion had occurred on 4 December, 1988.<sup>51</sup> The timing was especially shocking since the USSR, only seven months earlier, had announced that the tests would be moved to the North only in 1993.<sup>52</sup> There seemed to be at least two reasons for the move from the traditional Semipalatinsk site to Novaya Zemlya: public opinion pressure<sup>53</sup> and the revelation of shocking facts

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<sup>49</sup> According to Norwegian Prime Minister Syse, the Norwegians had intelligence information which pointed out that on 17 October the Soviets had constructed a restricted area on Novaya Zemlya--at that point the Norwegian authorities had concrete reason to fear an impending detonation (*Forhandler i Stortinget*, 24 October, 1990). Ryzhkov had only the day before the explosion, according to Syse, reported that the Soviets would detonate one device during the year.

<sup>50</sup> "Atomtrusel mot Norge," *Aftenposten*, 26 October, 1990--an article which represents key sectors of elite opinion over the issue.

<sup>51</sup> The strength of the blasts were 5.7 on the Richter Scale for both 1988 and 1990. (A. Bonde, T. Hay, R. L. Larsen, "Ny Sovjetisk prøvesprengning," *Aftenposten*, 25 October, 1990.)

<sup>52</sup> M. Fyhn, A. Willersrud, "Alle atomprøver i nord fra 1993," *Aftenposten*, 9 March, 1990. Six days previous to that Prime Minister Syse, on 2 March, 1990 raised his voice in over issue ("Atom-trusel mot Norge," *Aftenposten*, 3 March, 1990).

<sup>53</sup> "Atom-trusel mot Norge"; M. Fyhn and A. Willersrud, "Alle atomprøver i nord fra 1993," *Aftenposten*, 9 March, 1990; "Sovjetisk atomprøve provokasjon?" *Aftenposten*, 27 October, 1990.

regarding the health consequences of the blasts.<sup>54</sup> In the Spring of 1991 the Soviet authorities announced that in fact Novaya Zemlya would *replace* Semipalatinsk altogether.<sup>55</sup>

To complicate matters, the Soviet Union, in late 1990,<sup>56</sup> were accused by the Norwegians of having dumped nuclear waste at three separate places on the island. Quick discussions between the Norwegians and the Soviets were undertaken, resulting in Environmental Minister Thorbjørn Berntsen's proposal for a binding agreement for the mutual monitoring of the Barents Sea.<sup>57</sup> "The negotiatory climate is better than it has been in a long time," emphasised Berntsen.

Although the Swedish and Norwegian reactions to the resumption of testing were quite similar, Sweden and Norway have had different approaches to test bans previously. Swedish Defence Ministry official, Jan Prawitz contrasted Sweden's and Norway's position on test-bans such:

"Sweden has had a much higher verbal profile in the issue than Norway. This is partly attributable to the fact that Norway is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (is only an observer) and Sweden is. From the viewpoint of seismology, the Pentagon has funded (1969-70) a seismographic station far advanced relative to Sweden's. I think that the fact that Norway is a NATO state has not significantly dampened its reaction in the past, say five-six years. The Swedes and the Norwegians have had quite similar profiles in the Novaya Zemlya question and in the Special Committee for Test-Bans

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<sup>54</sup> C. Norén, "Atomprov drabbar en miljon," *Dagens Nyheter*, 2 November, 1990.

<sup>55</sup> "Sovjetiska kärnvapenprov ska genomföras nära Norden," *Blekinge Läns Tidning*, 19 April, 1991. This occurred amidst an invitation from the Soviets to permit Nordic experts to check the blast field there. (E. Veigård, "Får inspisere atomprøvefeltet," *Aftenposten*, 30 April, 1991).

<sup>56</sup> L.B. Tessem, "Dumping-påstander granskes," *Aftenposten*, 24 December, 1990.

<sup>57</sup> D. Fonbaæk, "Berntsen-invitt til Sovjet i nord," *Aftenposten*, 13 January, 1991.

and Seismology in Geneva, Sweden has long been Chairman and Norway Chief Secretary."<sup>58</sup>

### *Norwegian action and reaction*

The reaction from Norway was arguably more swift and violent<sup>59</sup> than in Sweden.<sup>60</sup> Prime Minister Jan P. Syse felt betrayed: "we thought the Soviets would behave differently after all of the discussions we have had...the test explosions are extremely serious."<sup>61</sup> Syse continued "it is especially since the detonation occurred so close to Norwegian territory<sup>62</sup> and that it occurred in an ecologically vulnerable<sup>63</sup> area that it awakens such worries."

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<sup>58</sup> J. Prawitz, telephone interview, 10 September, 1991.

<sup>59</sup> Debate in the *Storting* began the same day. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 24 October, 1990), in response to a question by MP, Anders Aune (Fremskritt for Finnmark Party), who, in representing the most exposed region of Norway, pointed out "we have seen that the Soviets connect this blast with the Americans' nuclear tests."

<sup>60</sup> One Swedish MP explained the accented Norwegian reaction by saying "somehow the Norwegians experience the destruction of the nature in Murmansk--well, they experience it more 'beneath the skin' (intimately) than in Sweden." (S15)

<sup>61</sup> A. Bonde, T. Hay, R.L. Larsen, "Ny sovjetisk prøvesprengning." The Norwegians availed themselves of the opportunities to express their displeasure--prior to the 24th (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 24 October, 1990): Syse mentions some of the most significant: March, 1990 to the Soviet Foreign Ministry; August-September, 1990 on a trip of Undersecretaries of State Eide and Vollebæk to Moscow; The Nordic Foreign Minister's resulting joint communiqué of 11 September (Molde, Norway); Foreign Minister Bondevik's conversations with Shevardnadze (New York), 1 October, 1990 and again by Vollebæk on 16 October.

<sup>62</sup> It should be noted that it is approximately equidistance from Novaya Zemlya to Svalbard as it is to the Norwegian-Soviet border.

<sup>63</sup> This particular point was allegedly pointed out in the joint-Nordic visit at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. ("Sovjetfrågor för Norden," *Dagens Nyheter*, 27 October, 1990).

Brundtland's reactions were similar. "It is especially regrettable because it occurs during a time that one was learning to do without nuclear testing."<sup>64</sup> "From the Norwegian side we have, with positive interest, registered the Soviet desire to step down the nuclear testing activity on Novaya Zemlya," Brundtland was quoted as saying. "The Government," she continued, "has previously expressed clear support for the conclusion of an agreement which entails a ban on nuclear testing."<sup>65</sup> As LO official Kåre Sandegren stated, "the reaction in Norway to Novaya Zemlya has been very strong and harsh...it's very bad indeed."<sup>66</sup>

There were however calls for moderation in the Norwegian reaction. One top advisor warned against blowing the issue out of proportion: "Novaya Zemlya is a minor issue compared with the contamination from vessels and factories on the Kola...it will be interesting to see the way people react when they become aware of this."<sup>67</sup> Even Jan P. Syse later felt there should be limits to the Norwegian official reaction, saying there was "no need to dramatise the situation."<sup>68</sup> It is unclear which position the Norwegians took towards the Soviet linkage between its resumption of tests on Novaya Zemlya and the U.S. nuclear tests. To be sure, the Norwegians felt that moderation was due, since they did not want to be seen as having a double-approach to the issue--one towards the Americans and one towards the Soviet Union.

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<sup>64</sup> "Sovjetfrågor för Norden."

<sup>65</sup> "Statsminister Gro Harlem Brundtlands kommentar 2. oktober 1987 til generalsekretær Mikhail Gorbatsjovs tale i Murmansk 1. oktober 1987. (UD-informasjon (24) 1987 as in NUPI, 1987:413)

<sup>66</sup> Sandegren, interview.

<sup>67</sup> N26

<sup>68</sup> "Ny Sovjetisk prøvesprengning."

### *Swedish action and reaction*

The Swedes reacted noticeably more calmly in the wake of the resumption of nuclear blasts on Novaya Zemlya. However, it is doubtful whether this was a result of its neutrality—rather, most likely it was a factor of its geographical remoteness from Novaya Zemlya. Said one MP, "the (Swedish) Government has protested, but little has been said about it in the mass media."<sup>69</sup> Sten Andersson<sup>70</sup> notes that "the issue has caused great worry in Sweden...for that reason, Sweden has, on three separate opportunities, raised the question with Soviet representatives (who respond that no decision has at yet been made)." The *Riksdag*'s Foreign Affairs Committee felt a need to be even-handed in the question, contrasting the "Soviet declaration of its preparedness to conclude an agreement regarding a total halting of tests, while the U.S. sees a ban as a remote goal in a gradual process."<sup>71</sup>

After the resumption became reality, Sten Andersson<sup>72</sup>, soon after the first new round of detonations had occurred, gave his view of the situation thus:

"The Government naturally regrets that, after a one year cessation, the Soviet Union has resumed its nuclear testing. This awakens great, warranted unease in Sweden and many other countries. The Government, not least against the background of different Soviet initiatives regarding a total ban on nuclear testing, had nonetheless hoped that the Soviet Union would refrain from continuing (its) tests."

Then Andersson made clear which steps had been taken:

"The matter has been taken up with the Soviet Union by Sweden and the other Nordic countries; the last time being in a concerted Nordic call (attendance) on 28 September. On 29

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<sup>69</sup> S15

<sup>70</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 8 May, 1990.

<sup>71</sup> Riksdagstryck, 1987/88:UU1 ("Nedrustning"). Note date: 7 October, 1987.

<sup>72</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 27 November, 1990.



October the five Nordic countries together paid a call on Karpov in the Soviet Foreign Ministry."<sup>73</sup>

Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, stated "the decision (to resume tests) was taken by the Soviet Defence Ministry--with the Government's knowledge."<sup>74</sup> "But this time," said Theorin, there was "real discussion, because it was the beginning of democracy."<sup>75</sup> Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson,<sup>76</sup> pointed out that there was reason to fear a continuation of testing in Novaya Zemlya, if the Soviet Union has, thus far in Semipalatinsk been unable to perform totally secure (in which no radioactivity leaks out) underground tests." "What this means," said Ericson, "is that there is an un-controlled spreading of radioactivity in the sensitive arctic environment."

## Mutual Nordic Follow-Up

### *Gorbachëv's Helsinki Visit*

Gorbachëv's trip to Helsinki and the speeches he delivered there in October 1989 may be regarded as attempts to follow-up the Murmansk initiative. Important for the Finns, and thus also important for the Nordic security pattern, was Gorbachëv's recognition of Finland's "unhesitating neutrality."<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> See also T. Hinnemo, "Atomprotest i Moskva," *Aftenposten*, 30 October, 1990. Swedish Foreign Minister Andersson gave further evidence that the subject was breached at the Nordic Foreign Minister meeting in Karlshamn, Sweden, 21-22 March, 1991 (Riksdagsprotokoll, 21 March, 1991).

<sup>74</sup> Strengthened by T. Hinnemo in "Kärnprov får frän kritik," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1 November, 1990.

<sup>75</sup> Theorin, interview.

<sup>76</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>77</sup> "Finland - ett neutralt nordiskt land," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 27 October, 1989; "Gorbatjov hälsade 'neutrala Finland,'" *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 26 October, 1989.

This trip is interesting for us since it encouraged open foreign policy cooperation between the Nordic countries, a practice which had been taboo until the arrival of Gorbachëv.<sup>78</sup> This Soviet effort in fact, perhaps inadvertently, legitimized closer Nordic cooperation on a number of questions, not least the environment and joint Nordic support for the Baltic republics. In this way, Norway's, Sweden's and the other Nordic security policy commitments would become unidentifiable, and to some extent defuse the security policy overtones in non-security policy areas. In his presentation, Gorbachëv said he envisioned closer forms of cooperation between the Supreme Soviet and the Nordic Council.<sup>79</sup> This was important given the background of Soviet opposition to the Nordic Council's formation. It also seemed as though Gorbachëv was mistaken in thinking the Nordic Council cooperated on foreign policy matters. In response to Gorbachëv's speech, an extraordinary session of the Nordic Council was called in Mariehamn, Åland in November.

One Swedish MP with intimate involvement in Nordic Council matters, related some of the factors which might have gone into Gorbachëv's thinking in Helsinki. "The Murmansk initiative," it was said, "was received much more coldly than the Helsinki speech."<sup>80</sup> Gorbachëv was sending out his lifelines at the time, he was in a very difficult domestic situation, this MP related. In fact, related one MP, "we had already been working on the environmental issues for at least a half a year back--thus, it was Gorbachëv who answered our call for cooperation--we know today that they knew about our work in the Soviet

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<sup>78</sup> Jonson (1989:20) points to the changing Soviet attitude towards closer Nordic cooperation; see also Jonson (1990a:143)

<sup>79</sup> "Sovjet vill närma sig Europa," *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 27 October, 1989. In a speech on 26 October, 1989, Gorbachëv proposed a "Commission of Experts between the Supreme Soviet and the Nordic Council, as well as the establishment of a permanent parliamentary group to discuss problems in North Europe with a wide following."

<sup>80</sup> S15

MFA."<sup>81</sup> But what was clear was that Gorbachëv, in making a call for cooperation with the Nordic Council, had his facts wrong--and one individual was willing to give Gorbachëv the benefit of the doubt: "maybe he did not know that we didn't cooperate in foreign policy matters."<sup>82</sup>

Norwegian Foreign Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, felt that the Nordic Council had given a positive response to Gorbachëv's proposal for Nordic parliamentary contacts. Bondevik pointed out that the area of environmental cooperation was especially fertile for parliamentary contacts.<sup>83</sup> Then-Prime Minister, Jan P. Syse, said "we feel we can develop a lot of positive things in working out the closest possible cooperation amongst the Nordic countries towards cultivating precisely those sort of measures towards the Soviet Union."<sup>84</sup> But Socialist Left Party's Kjellbjørg Lunde felt that there should have been a much more positive reaction in Mariehamn.<sup>85</sup> Labour Party's Bjørn Tore Godal felt one had to differentiate between two proposals Gorbachëv put forth in Helsinki: "one, was the exchange of parliamentary delegations between the Soviet Union and Norway (that we are all positive to)...But there was another invitation that of creating cooperation, to the Nordic Council as a forum."<sup>86</sup> As Minister Tom Vraalsen pointed out "Prime Minister Syse, other Governmental representatives and the Labour Party's Parliamentary leader, Brundtland, expressed identical views on the question which this (move by Gorbachëv) raised."<sup>87</sup> Even Norwegian Progress Party's Carl I. Hagen felt that

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<sup>81</sup> S15

<sup>82</sup> S15

<sup>83</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989.

<sup>84</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>85</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.

<sup>86</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>87</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

Gorbachëv's proposal could be responded to positively:<sup>88</sup> "the question of pollution alone should be sufficient enough to support Gorbachëv in his attempt to foster contacts with the Nordic Council."<sup>89</sup>

### *Mutual Nordic Efforts to Cure Soviet Environmental Ills*

Because Norway and Sweden are both small countries, it follows that their financial and manpower bases are insufficient to deal with large problems; the Soviet environmental catastrophe is one such case.

It was this realisation which led Norway and Sweden to rely to a certain extent on developing a common Nordic strategy towards the problem area--to supplement existing bilateral efforts. Norway never raised any formal opposition to signing bilateral environmental cooperation treaties with the Soviet Union--in fact encouraging more of this sort of cooperation. Thorvald Stoltenberg noted on 2 December, 1987, "there is already cooperation between Norway and the Soviet Union in several of the areas which the General Secretary mentioned in his speech." "At present," he said "we are working on bilateral treaties in the following areas: environmental preservation, early warning regarding nuclear accidents, scientific cooperation in the Northern Areas, rescue services for ship and plane crashes in the northern sea areas."<sup>90</sup> It seems clear that Norway went further on a bilateral basis with the Soviet Union than Sweden had in these, for the times, sensitive areas.

Sweden and Norway have approached the situation on a multilateral basis, joining hands with their Nordic counterparts in piecing together a solution to a problem of truly unimaginable proportions. Environmental pollution on the Kola generally (and the Nickel smelting works in particular) have been the Norwegians' main, albeit not sole concern. The Swedes have also worried much

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<sup>88</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>89</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

<sup>90</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

more about the environmental destruction in neighbouring areas, and the Baltic area in particular.<sup>91</sup> These geographical orientations have determined the respective countries' willingness to tackle parts of the huge pie of Soviet environmental disaster. The concrete financial inputs of the two countries have mirrored these priorities.

The Nordic Council has played a pronounced role in these efforts. At the Nordic Council's Minister Council's meeting in October, 1990 a working programme was adopted regarding the Central and East European countries, with emphasis on the Baltic republics.<sup>92</sup> The chief areas of concern were exchanges, education, and the environment, as well as efforts oriented towards opening Nordic information offices in the Soviet Baltic republics.<sup>93</sup>

The first Norwegian decision to undertake aid to Eastern Europe was made in November, 1989--in this case to Poland, in the amount of 70 million NOK (for food, environment and education purposes), as well as a export-guarantee framework of 150 million NOK.<sup>94</sup> In May of 1990 the *Storting* decided to make a contribution of 100 million NOK for bilateral contributions to Central and

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<sup>91</sup> The Swedish Government approved one billion SEK, over a three year period, as "strategic support towards strengthening the Central and East European countries' capabilities to execute the political and economic reform process...the Swedish support is oriented, in the first place, towards cooperation in the environmental sphere...and the majority of the aid will go to Poland, the Baltic republics as well as the area in Sweden's proximity." (Jacoby, 1990:24)

<sup>92</sup> "Samarbetet med Central- och Östeuropa i internationellt och svenskt perspektiv," (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs October, 1990), p.33.

<sup>93</sup> "Samarbetet med Central- och Östeuropa i internationellt och svenskt perspektiv," notes: "new investments will be made through a risk-capital company for environmental investments in Central and East Europe, called "NEFCO." (Decision taken by Nordic Council, March, 1990). Each of the Nordic countries was to contribute to the fund and the total amount, administered by the Nordic Investment Bank, was approximately SEK 289 million, to be paid over a six year period.(pps. 33-34).

<sup>94</sup> "Samarbetet med Central- och Östeuropa i internationellt och svenskt perspektiv," p.37.

Eastern Europe for that year. The 100 million NOK was to come from redistribution in the Norwegian national budget, and not from aid sources.<sup>95</sup>

#### *Norway's policy towards the Nickel smelting works*

Closer study of the approaches to Nickel smelting works problem is worthwhile for what it reveals of changing perceptions of a particular problem--for all concerned parties. One individual dubbed the project "a Norwegian initiative, based on a Soviet request for cleaning technology."<sup>96</sup> Swedes and Norwegians have agreed that the problem is essentially a Norwegian and Finnish one being that Nickel is located where it is.<sup>97</sup> At the Ronneby Conference on 2-3 September, the Prime Ministers of the represented Nordic countries appointed a group of experts to study the possibilities for a joint approach to the reconstruction of the Nickel plant.<sup>98</sup> The "working group" took note of a Finnish suggestion that industrial deliveries to the project should be divided hence: 50% Finland, Norway 25%, Sweden 19% and others 15%.<sup>99</sup>

According to one source close to the matter, Swedish agreement to participate on the Kola was a trade-off for a Norwegian pledge to participate in the Baltic.<sup>100</sup> Thus, "the Swedes promised to participate, on commercial terms, in the Kola," he recounted. At face value, this would not seem very

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<sup>95</sup> "Samarbetet med Central- och Östeuropa."

<sup>96</sup> N44

<sup>97</sup> Most involved are Finnish OUTOKUMPU and Norwegian ELKEM a.s..

<sup>98</sup> "Speaking Notes of the Kola-Projects," (Helsinki: Outokumpu OY, 21 September, 1990), p.1.

<sup>99</sup> "Working Group on Financial Support to the Nordic Kola Environment Project. Agreed Minutes" This division was agreed upon after 14 September, 1990 ("Report from the group of financial experts,") "Other" sources are deemed to be Germany, Austria and the USSR. ("The Renovation Proposition for Kola Nickel Smelters by Outokumpu.")

<sup>100</sup> N44

important. However, the Swedish and Norwegian credit guarantee institutes had previously suspended credit guarantees to the Soviet Union for the long-term. Thus, a Governmental pledge to extend such guarantees to a participating Swedish firm (rumours were that Svensk Fläkt AB or Asea Brown Boveri were top in the running) would be a *political* move of significance. The decision would have to be guaranteed by the *Riksdag* as a "special case." Since activity over the issue has risen to the Prime Minister level,<sup>101</sup> this type of intervention was possible—though no such steps had been taken as of this writing. However, in mid-1991 the project was showing signs of decreasing Swedish support within the intra-Nordic financing scheme.<sup>102</sup>

As of 19 September, 1990 the total cost of the project was estimated at 2,900,000,000 FIM.<sup>103</sup> In one report, the financial feasibility group concluded the following: "it is considered advisable to arrange the whole financing mainly through a combination of the national Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish export credit schemes and NIB, with possible complementary financing from non-Nordic export credit institutions (such as Germany and Austria) and/or untied loans (Germany)."<sup>104</sup>

One must remember, that, as one Norwegian Social Democrat, B.T. Godal, said, "each one of the Norwegian Governments has given the environment priority status."<sup>105</sup> Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, queried why the Norwegians were adopting such a low profile on the Baltic independence issue, responded that "there were other interests at stake."

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<sup>101</sup> Soviet Vice President, Yenaev, was due in Oslo the day following the interview (over the death of King Olav)—the interviewee told me that the issue would be taken up between Brundtland and Yenaev at that opportunity. (N44)

<sup>102</sup> M. Planting, "Svenskar bromsar Kola-projekt," *Dagens Industri*, 4 June, 1991.

<sup>103</sup> "Report from the group of financial experts," (19 September, 1990), p.1.

<sup>104</sup> "Report from the group of financial experts," (19 September, 1990).

<sup>105</sup> B.T. Godal, interview.

According one senior MFA advisor, a central consideration here was to have been fledgling environmental cooperation with the Soviet Union.<sup>106</sup> Thus, Governments in both Finland and Norway have seen the problem in such a serious light as to earmark parts of their budgets for efforts to rectify the situation.<sup>107</sup>

With respect to a Norwegian desire to chart the flow of pollution from the Kola Peninsula (air, land and water) Norway has developed some quite intimate forms of cooperation with Moscow. In fact, said one advisor, "we had only talked on one opportunity since the early 1970's."<sup>108</sup> "When we started to exchange drafts," he said, in the Fall of 1987—"we sat for one day and the Soviets accepted every word which was (in our proposed draft)."<sup>109</sup> As was pointed out earlier, the Soviet authorities were also increasingly willing to accept otherwise intrusive Norwegian monitoring on Soviet soil.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> N26

<sup>107</sup> S48, re-interview, March, 1991.

<sup>108</sup> N44

<sup>109</sup> Some crucial points of this interview are worth recounting: when the initiative came in 1987 (with the signature in January 1988), it was clear the initiative came from above;- there were some details in the Soviet proposal which were not acceptable from the Norwegian perspective (e.g. the overly theoretical nature of the draft, the Soviet desire for a contingency plan for oil accidents in the Barents) both of which were rejected (N44)

<sup>110</sup> The Soviets agreed to accept monitoring equipment, since the Kola Science Centre did not have adequate equipment to analyze the data. The following points are worth remarking: the equipment was installed in 1989 ("right in the middle of one of the most sensitive military areas--unheard of at this time;" "this marked the first time the Norwegians were receiving primary environmental data." (under EMOP, Norway had only received aggregate data, or as Soviet Union defined it they would give an aggregate figure for all pollution which passes their border); "this marked first time that Norwegian environmental data was accepted in Moscow." (N44)



### *Swedish involvement*

In December 1989, Prime Minister Carlsson presented a proposal for aid to Central and East Europe. In the Government's budget proposition for fiscal year 1990/91 one billion SEK was proposed for a three year period. 300 million of these were earmarked for Poland, while the rest would be distributed over Central and East Europe.<sup>111</sup> One of the most important documents on Swedish-Soviet environmental cooperation was presented to the *Riksdag* on 28 November, 1989.<sup>112</sup> Several crucial points should be noted with respect to this document.

.Sweden has bi-lateral environmental agreements with East European states DDR, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. (of a technical-economic sort).  
.the agreement with the Soviet Union, concluded on 1 May, 1989, was concluded between Governments and devotes particular attention to the environmental problems in the region. (the portions bordering on the Baltic)

On 2-3 September, 1990 a large conference, with participants from Poland, Denmark, then-DDR, Finland, FRG, Norway, the Soviet Union and the EEC-Commission, took place in Ronneby, Sweden. A declaration was the result, with a great many (19) proposals towards re-setting the ecological balance in the Baltic.<sup>113</sup> Greatest effort would be demanded from the Soviet Union, former-DDR, and Poland.<sup>114</sup> A follow-up meeting with the participation, at expert-level, of the Ronneby participants was held in Stockholm the following May (1991).

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<sup>111</sup> "Samarbetet med Central- och Östeuropa," p. 41.

<sup>112</sup> *Riksdagstryck* 1989/90:UU7 (Samarbete med Östeuropa och vissa internationella miljöinsatser").

<sup>113</sup> S. Leijonhufvud, "Ett genombrott för ekologin," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 4 September, 1990.

<sup>114</sup> "Samarbetete med Central- och Östeuropa," p. 46.

## Chapter Nine

### Norway, Sweden and Soviet Strategic-Military Issues, 1987-1991

#### *Introduction*

In the late 1970's and the 1980's both superpower alliances began to prioritize Northern areas, constituting an important shift from their previous military-strategic emphasis on the Central European theatre. According to one Norwegian expert the first significant upswing in the Soviet military capacity in the Nordic area occurred in 1968.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Union<sup>2</sup> and NATO today count the Nordic area as a primary strategic interest. While it seems clear that the intention of the Soviet Union is not utilize this strategic muscle against the Nordic countries<sup>3</sup>, its sheer proximity places a tremendous physical and psychological burden<sup>4</sup> upon the nearby nations, particularly Norway.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "We first indicated this to the *Storting* in 1968," he said, "but no one paid any attention to that." (N4)

<sup>2</sup> For example, 2/3 of Soviet submarine-based nuclear is potential based on the Kola Peninsula. (Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1988)

<sup>3</sup> Østreng (1987:1) writes: "In Norway there is a broad agreement that this huge naval power is not directed toward or still further, not built up because of Norway. It reflects the USSR's global engagement."

<sup>4</sup> J.J. Holst, 12 February, 1987: "the military forces which are assigned (to the Kola) must be seen, in the first instance, within the context of the confrontation and balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union's global power and interests...but their proximity logically causes special problems for the security of Norway." (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Årbog 1987 (Oslo: NUPI, 1987), p. 157.

<sup>5</sup> Skogan (1986) points out that the Soviet Northern Fleet has grown at a much quicker pace than the Soviet Baltic Fleet. It is also important to note that the Soviet Northern Fleet, one of the Soviet Union's strongest fleets, is based in Murmansk and often exercises in the high seas off the Norwegian coast.

The following section will attempt to bring forth the similarities and differences between the Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of and responses<sup>6</sup> to the issues related to the Soviet strategic buildup in the North. Naturally, changes in the U.S-Soviet relationship was also one of the central considerations for decision-makers, and needs to be considered. Did neutral Sweden receive and respond to changes in Soviet strategic issues differently than NATO-state Norway? There were other central questions: Are we overreacting? What intentions underlay the Soviet buildup? What effects do these trends have on Norwegian or Swedish defence/foreign policy planning?

To an extent, Norway and Sweden shared the same impression of these trends. To an extent the similarity between Norwegian and Swedish defence outlays is supportive of this statement.

#### Swedish<sup>7</sup> and Norwegian<sup>8</sup> Defence Spending as part of GNP

1985-6	1986-7	1987-8	1988-9	1989-90	1990-1
N 3.1	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.2
S 3.0	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.6

However, Soviet behaviour towards Norway and its behaviour towards Sweden have not been uniform. Thus, the Soviet Union's different approach and behaviour--whether intentional or not--has led to some different responses and perceptions. Sweden's neutral status and Norway's NATO status have

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<sup>6</sup> By 'response' is meant chiefly statements and perceptions connected to the changing strategic environment. No attempt is made to show a connection between, say, changing threat perception and military budget.

<sup>7</sup> *Försvarsstatistik 1990* (Stockholm: Ministry of Defence, 1990), p.12.

<sup>8</sup> *Försvarsstatistik 1990*, p.8 and *Norwegian Defence. Facts and Figures 1991 and 1992 versions* (Oslo: Royal Ministry of Defence). Figures for 1990/91 for Norway are estimated.

likewise conditioned the two states' reactions to and views of the Soviet military buildup.

*Swedish and Norwegian Threat Perception: A Brief Introduction*

While land and air-based invasion scenarios are important, the main threat was seen as coming from the Soviet Navy, especially from its submarines, with their twin threat of nuclear strike against the U.S. and enhanced ability to cut maritime supply lines. (Solle, 1988:18) Norway feels itself far more exposed by Soviet strategic planning in the North than does Sweden. The reasons for this are obvious and have little to do with its alignment policy today--but had very much to do with the Norwegian decision to apply for NATO membership. Today, the overhanging presence of the Kola Bases, the open Barents Sea delineation question, the proximity of Novaya Zemlya, proximate Soviet naval activity and a Soviet border, can be counted amongst the important factors. Norwegian decision-makers thus have an unmatched appetite for new developments in Soviet Northern military planning in areas near Norway--in particular the Leningrad Military District--to a degree uncharacteristic of Western countries, including its neighbouring Sweden.

Sweden, for logical geographical reasons, has traditionally been more concerned with the naval developments in the Baltic--in particular within the Baltic Military District. Historical experience can also explain why North and South have different preoccupations with Soviet security planning. Sweden is historically a Baltic naval power, while Norway has historically found its fate tied with nations across the North Sea and Atlantic. The decrease in Swedish interest can also be partly attributed to the Baltic Fleet's diminished position, while the Northern Fleet's significance has increased considerably through the 1980's and early 1990's.

## Soviet Disarmament: Word and Deed

In the 1980's and early 1990's, the Central European theatre counted most in terms of Soviet disarmament. There were no more than symbolic indications that the Nordic area held a priority on the Soviet disarmament agenda. It thus becomes important to consider the U.S.-Soviet arena in order to chart and analyze Swedish and Norwegian perceptions regarding both change and stability in Soviet military and disarmament behaviour in places where change indeed was occurring.

### *The Stockholm Conference*

While substantial reductions of forces would not materialize until 1985-6,<sup>9</sup> the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM),<sup>10</sup> which took place between 16 January, 1984 and 19 September, 1986 laid important groundwork for change in Soviet disarmament behaviour. Soviet behaviour during the Stockholm Conference was one of the first indications to Norwegian and Swedish élites of a Soviet re-orientation to disarmament.<sup>11</sup>

"Up until 1986," said one Swedish diplomat who was intimately involved in the CSBM talks, "the Soviets conceded on a case-by-case basis--it was still not possible to say they had changed their total position."<sup>12</sup> For many, the Soviet

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<sup>9</sup> Conservative Norwegian MP Jan Petersen points out that while there was "reason to rejoice in the Stockholm Conference's breakthrough with respect to proper control and inspection," "the Russian diplomatic offensive clearly has its limitations...the Soviet Union has neglected to meet us (half-way) on a number of areas which have great significance for us." (e.g. conventional disarmament, chemical weapons...) (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 3 December, 1986).

<sup>10</sup> For background on the conference see A. Kallin, "Stockholmskonferensen-förlopp och resultat," (Stockholm: Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1986). The main topics of the conference were: Non-use of violence, information/verification/communication, measures to limit military activity, prior notification, and observation.

<sup>11</sup> One Norwegian diplomat abroad (N3); one Swedish MFA official (S40).

<sup>12</sup> S40

acceptance of intrusive verifactory measures was the most important result of the treaty--something with which the CSCE, as one Norwegian diplomat related, had no success.<sup>13</sup> Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, felt the Soviet delegates "expressed a greater willingness to accept profound control measures...the problem is above all a political one."<sup>14</sup> A Norwegian diplomat mentioned Stockholm as a "dramatic move by Gromyko, personally, on inspections," adding "all our CSBM propositions are actually (included)!"<sup>15</sup>

The Swedish *Riksdag*'s Foreign Affairs Committee wrote "the more open attitude of the Soviet Union to accept verifactory measures has even affected other areas of negotiation (e.g. the follow-up of the convention on the use of biological weapons)."<sup>16</sup> One Norwegian diplomat related "before they never let anyone in--everything was so difficult because of their attitude towards on-site inspections; they didn't want people looking into their manuals." "This change is clearly brought on by *glasnost*" he explained.<sup>17</sup>

One of the more important Soviet openings, both indirectly and directly related to the CSBM, was Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's admission that the Soviet radar posting in Krasnoyarsk was, as the Americans had maintained for several years standing, in violation of the ABM Treaty.<sup>18</sup> The issues of verification and inspection brought up in the context of the CSBM were expanded and refined in Gorbachëv's October 1987 Murmansk initiative.

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<sup>13</sup> N3. This is confirmed by the experiences of one delegate to Stockholm, Kallin, "Stockholmskonferensen- förlopp och resultat," p.20-21.

<sup>14</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 19 March, 1986.

<sup>15</sup> N26

<sup>16</sup> Riksdagstryck 1986/87:UU4 (Nedrusting), 25 November, 1986.

<sup>17</sup> N37

<sup>18</sup> N37

### *The Early Years of Disarmament*

Swedish and Norwegian hopes for a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement reached a high mark in 1985-6.<sup>19</sup> However it seems that Norwegian élites, especially those on the far Right of the political spectrum adopted a more reserved attitude to the possibility for change than did the Swedes. This attitude went hand-in-hand with the far Right parties' advocacy of a strong Norwegian NATO commitment.

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan would serve to remind élites of what still needed to be done in Soviet foreign policy.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, a first summit was held between Reagan and Gorbachëv in Geneva during the Fall of 1985 which sent signals of hope to the outside world. A second summit in Reykjavik in 11-12 October, 1986 would further strengthen the impression that, even barring concrete result, the two world leaders could now at least speak together. The meeting was not important for what it accomplished, but rather what it symbolized.

The Norwegian Right, as contrasted to the Swedish Right, clearly attributed a changed Soviet disarmament approach to U.S. strength. Conservative Party Chairman, Syse, said that "it is against the background of American proposals for disarmament that one must see Gorbachëv's last effort in Reykjavik."<sup>21</sup> Kåre Willoch adopted the common American Conservative argument that the

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<sup>19</sup> Swedish Centre MP Karin Söder expressed the satisfaction that: "Reagan and Gorbachëv have agreed to meet again (has awoke) hope for a more secure world" (*Riksdagsprotokoll*, 19 March, 1986).

<sup>20</sup> Karin Söder: "It's deeply saddening that the leaders in Moscow have not re-evaluated their military intervention in Afghanistan." This logic was echoed by Swedish Communist Party Chairman, Lars Werner: "The Soviets must leave Afghanistan and all foreign involvement in Afghanistan must cease." (*Riksdagsprotokoll*, 19 March, 1986).

<sup>21</sup> *Forhandlingar i Stortinget*, 3 December, 1986.

American SDI proposal brought the Soviets to the negotiating table.<sup>22</sup> Earlier, Conservative Foreign Minister, Sverre Strøm<sup>23</sup> characterized proposals which Gorbachëv had made in an interview in *Pravda* on 8 April, 1985, regarding a moratorium of space-based attack weapons and a freeze of offensive strategic weapons, as fraught by imprecision and wondered why anti-satellite systems were excluded from the proposal. (NUPI, 1985:259)

This contrasted with Norwegian Labour opinion, which tended to attribute progress equally to both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.'s willingness to disarm.<sup>24</sup> Influential Labour MP, Reiulf Steen mentioned that "before the eyes of a dazed world both Gorbachëv and Reagan were placing as comprehensive disarmament plans on the table as had ever been proposed...it looked like the two leaders were competing to determine who was the most agile at painting a vision of future utopia."<sup>25</sup> Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, felt that there was some "radical new thinking towards nuclear weapons" at the meeting."<sup>26</sup> Centre Party's J.J. Jakobsen joined in this refrain: "the meeting (creates) hopes towards a reduction of nuclear weapons...(and with that) new expectations of concrete results from the negotiations."

Many Swedes saw progress at Reykjavik as a positive sign. The Swedish political party establishment's reception of the conference's result followed a pattern similar to Norway's, however U.S. credit was hardly given.<sup>27</sup> Swedish

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<sup>22</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 3 December, 1986; Labour MP's Førde and Reiulf Steen argue that, in the words of Steen, "we hear this at every crossroads, which is usually for supporting every new weapon-technological effort."

<sup>23</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 24 April, 1985.

<sup>24</sup> Most evident in the debate of the same day and *Stortings Meld. 11, 1987-88*).

<sup>25</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987; 19 January, 1989.

<sup>26</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 26 November, 1986.

<sup>27</sup> One of the most revealing debates on the issue in Sweden took place on 28 October, 1987 (*Riksdagsprotokoll*).



Liberal Party MP, Ingemar Eliasson's reaction correctly mirrors that sentiment: "up until Reykjavik a comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons was a theoretical construction of mind...(Reykjavik) can be seen as a confirmation that ideas regarding large reduction in the nuclear weapons arsenals are realistic."<sup>28</sup> Until Reykjavik talk of disarmament moved very slowly. From Reykjavik onwards, élites in both Sweden and Norway were, on the whole, unsure of where the process that Gorbachëv had set into motion, would end.<sup>29</sup>

### *Disarmament in the North: Norwegian Reactions*

While Reykjavik imbued Norwegian and Swedish élites with hope of a superpower *rapprochement*, qualitative and quantitative cutbacks in their backyards were moving in the opposite direction. The seriousness of the Soviet Kola bases arguably came into the public eye during 1985-6 and became increasingly visible later in the 1980's.<sup>30</sup> The Soviet buildup in the Norwegian proximity until 1985(Skogan, 1986) would continue relentlessly through 1986.<sup>31</sup> Even in light of these developments there were still isolated manifestations of innocence emanating from high military quarters about the serious nature of the bases.<sup>32</sup> Conservative MP Ingvald Godal's feeling that it now was obvious that the Soviets had taken it upon themselves to make the Norwegian Sea into a

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<sup>28</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.

<sup>29</sup> Swedish Communist MP Oswald Söderqvist, Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 October, 1987.

<sup>30</sup> Aftenposten leaders, "Kola-basene som nabo," 26 August, 1986; "Den økende trusel," 10 September, 1986; interview with Finn Sollie, "Nye Kola-baser vekker bekymring," Aftenposten, 26 August, 1986.

<sup>31</sup> O.S. Storvik, "I Kolas slag-skygge," Aftenposten, 10 May, 1986 for details of changes in the submarine structure on the Kola.

<sup>32</sup> See interview with General Tønne Huitfeldt, "-Sovjet-trusselen overdrevet," Arbeiderbladet, 6 February, 1986. The article points out that Huitfeldt's viewpoint diverges from such held by Chief of Defence General F. Bull-Hansen over the same issue.

*mare Sovieticum*<sup>33</sup> was popular both in and outside of Government. This increased presence moved Soviet defence lines both Southwards and Westwards, with the effect of concentrating firepower further and further away from its basing areas.<sup>34</sup>

Under these conditions<sup>35</sup>, Defence Minister Holst reaffirms "there is consensus in the *Storting* regarding the security policy line which Norway should follow." But several signals of political infighting over Soviet military policy nevertheless did exist.

While it would not be correct to say there ran a dividing line between the political parties over the seriousness of the buildup, a case could be made that the Conservative Government, which was in power until 1986, made the Kola complex into a debate item at a comparatively early stage. At the same time, the Conservative Party advocated quicker and more intense measures to meet this threat than did the Labour Party.<sup>36</sup> Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Willoch, felt that Western restraint had not had any impact on the Soviet buildup in the area.<sup>37</sup> Thor Knudsen, pointed out a clear political

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<sup>33</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986.

<sup>34</sup> Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Frøysnes' speech on 7 January, 1986. (NUPI, 1986:170)

<sup>35</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986.

<sup>36</sup> Defence Minister Anders Sjaastad's speech, 6 January, 1986, (NUPI, 1986:126-7); Undersecretary of State Frøysnes on 7 January, 1986 (ibid, p. 170).

<sup>37</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986. Same date: Conservative MP Thor Knudsen said the increased activity has been also mirrored in the Soviet exercise pattern--in both composition of forces and operational areas. See contrasting statement by Socialist Left MP Hanna Kvanmo: "-Nå eller aldri for nedrustning," *Aftenposten*, 22 July, 1987: "the Conservative Western leaders have become panicky, because they are afraid of the cohesion in NATO will let up."

cleavage: "especially from the Socialist Left Party,<sup>38</sup> whose aversion to our NATO membership is clear, the fault (for this trend) is placed on the increased activity of our alliance partners-- nothing could be more fallacious."<sup>39</sup>

No Norwegian Governmental official would deny the necessity of a U.S. presence to counteract this buildup. There was no doubt that what was called for was a unified NATO approach in the question. Defence Minister Holst continuously confirmed the need for such a naval presence in Northern waters, through both manoeuvres and port calls, aimed at offsetting possible Soviet dominance.<sup>40</sup> The Labour Government, however, was careful to avoid giving the Soviet Union any reason for further military buildup in the area--especially sensitive to the form or scope of Allied exercises.<sup>41</sup> Christian People's Party MP, Harald Synnes, left no doubt that the Soviet Union's naval buildup in the area sharpened the need for a military presence, and the need to consistently demarcate Norwegian territorial sovereignty in the Northern areas.<sup>42</sup> It is important to note, against this background, as Conservative MP, Kaci Kullmann

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<sup>38</sup> The Socialist Left Party was far more eager to place the blame for increasingly tense military situation in the Northern areas, close to equally on both alliances. See "SV: Konferanse om nordområdene," *Aftenposten*, 3 April, 1987.

<sup>39</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986.

<sup>40</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986.

<sup>41</sup> See Foreign Minister Frydenlund, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986; Prime Minister Brundtland points to the wide consensus behind this effort.(same date) Conservative MP, Sjaastad, denies that any new Allied marine strategy has come about and points out that from 1985 until the Fall of 1985 the American carriers had only operated in 33 (24-hour) days in this part of the world, contrasted with the Soviet Northern Fleet which has puts on large exercises every year and has continuous training activities in the area. (Sjaastad's speech on 6 January, 1986 (NUPI, 1986:127-8)

<sup>42</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 16 June, 1986.

Five points out, that the Allied presence in the Northern waters had in fact decreased over the previous ten to fifteen years.<sup>43</sup>

### *Nordic Disarmament: Swedish Reactions*

The Swedish debate regarding the increased importance of the Kola and forces in its immediate vicinity would be mild compared to Norway. Whereas the Baltic Fleet seemed to be of declining importance in terms of capacity, Soviet intentions towards Sweden were seen as constant. Conservative MP, Gunnar Hökmark,<sup>44</sup> argues: "... (this) is a time when the Soviet Union increasingly desires Baltic domination--both above and underwater..." "We know," said Conservative Party Leader Carl Bildt, "for all intents and purposes all Soviet Baltic shipyards have, since the end of 1970, changed from civilian to military production."<sup>45</sup> A need to counterbalance this trend was also advocated by the Swedish Conservatives, but more indirectly than the Norwegian Conservatives. One pathway was to discourage a curtailment of port calls. Said Hökmark "(a ban on port calls) is not in the interest of peace, disarmament or Sweden."

During 1985-1986, the Swedish debate was, much like the Norwegian, dominated by an intense interest in U.S.-Soviet disarmament. Also, similar to Norway, Sweden's chief interest was naval disarmament.<sup>46</sup> Similar to Norway, the far Left would place the blame for the lack of progress upon American inflexibility. Communist Party leader, Lars Werner, saw the cause as "the U.S.'s rigid position on disarmament negotiations," seeing it as "blocking disarmament negotiations generally," a reference alluding to the U.S. position on naval

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<sup>43</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986.

<sup>44</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 October, 1987.

<sup>45</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 22 February, 1989.

<sup>46</sup> E.g., Sten Andersson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 April, 1989.

disarmament.<sup>47</sup> Swedish Centre Party Chairman, Olof Johansson stated the obvious when he said:

"The naval race has caused great portions of the free seas to be used for exercises and other military presences. (With that) it has become increasingly difficult to get a birds-eye view on the military activity in Northern waters."<sup>48</sup>

The locus of concern and action on naval disarmament, would be, in the absence of significant U.S.-Soviet activity on the matter, shifted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC).<sup>49</sup> Sweden's activity in this body and in other multilateral fora for naval disarmament would be high.

The Swedes would also keenly sense and feel an obligation to react to their neighbour, Norway's exposed position.<sup>50</sup> Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson felt the increased interest in the Northern areas was partially attributable to the "military-technical development," for most, if not all of the specific reasons which Norwegian élites gave.<sup>51</sup> He thought that "the Soviet Navy required the control of North Norway's coast in order to secure its bases around Murmansk. One of the most difficult pathways to Northern Norway goes through the Northernmost part of our country." It is for this reason, said Ericson, that "we

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<sup>47</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.

<sup>48</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.

<sup>49</sup> See Foreign Affairs Committee, Riksdagstryck, 1990/91:UU4 (Nedrustning), 18 October, 1990, p.40. However, Jan Prawitz (1990a:27) points out that since "the issue of 'naval armaments and disarmament' will no longer appear on the agenda of the UNDC, it will be necessary to express Sweden's views on the UN-track in other ways."

<sup>50</sup> Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson: "Our most proximate neighbour's exposed geopolitical situation influences both our policies and the measures we adopt." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987).

<sup>51</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.

place our best equipment and strongest military units in Norrbotten."(far Northern Sweden).<sup>52</sup>

## Developments in Soviet Military Policy 1987-88

### *Murmansk: October, 1987*

Seen from a security policy perspective, Gorbachëv's speech in Murmansk on October 1, 1987 was for Norwegians and Swedes alike, the most important Soviet military policy *démarche* during 1987. The speech would provide one form of Soviet reply to Nordic concerns regarding Naval disarmament.

### *Speech Content*

Whereas Gorbachëv discussed environmental concerns, arctic and economic cooperation, security questions were clearly a central priority.<sup>53</sup> Gorbachëv's motivation was "the Soviet Union is for a radical decrease in the level of military confrontation in the region."<sup>54</sup> The first of Gorbachëv's proposals was a re-statement of Soviet willingness to form a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone, emphasizing that the participating states themselves had to decide how such a guarantee should be formulated: by multilateral or bilateral agreements, by Governmental declarations or in some other way.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

<sup>53</sup> I will quote directly from Gorbachëv's speech as translated by Magnusson (1987).

<sup>54</sup> Magnusson: "Let the northern part of the earth, the Arctic be a zone of peace! Let the North Pole be a pole of peace!" "We suggest," he said, "that the concerned parties should initiate negotiations towards limitations of military activity in the North--both in the Eastern and Western hemispheres."

<sup>55</sup> Gorbachëv said: "The Soviet Union has already unilaterally dismantled her launching capabilities for medium-distance missiles on the Kola Peninsula, as well as a large amount of launching devices belonging to the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts" and that "military manoeuvres close to Nordic borders have been restricted."

In Gorbachëv's second concrete point on security, he welcomed "President Koivisto's proposal to restrict the naval activity in areas which bordered on the Nordic area, proposing "consultations between the WTO and NATO regarding the reduction of the military activity and limitation of the extent of sea and air force activities in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Norwegian Sea and the Sea of Greenland—and that confidence-building measures would also spread to these areas."<sup>56</sup>

### *Immediate Swedish Reactions*

Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, assessed the speech as being "a chock for those in the bureaucracy...it was too early, too quick and not pre-negotiated."<sup>57</sup> According to Sten Andersson the problem which Gorbachëv proposed to resolve had its origins in both superpower camps.<sup>58</sup>

"The Government has followed with increasing concern the superpower alliances' naval buildup and development of their naval developments in Northern waters in the past decades. The buildup of the Soviet Navy and the basing area on the Kola, with the increase of defensive and offensive seapower, further coupled with emphasis by the Western alliance on the defensive elements of their Naval strategy, have led to increased interest in the seas around Northern Europe...it is

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<sup>56</sup> Here Gorbachëv proposed an agreement regarding the limitation of "racing" in the area of ASW, information about large naval and air force manoeuvres—and the invitation of all participating states (from the European process) to observe large naval and air force manoeuvres." "This," he said, "could be the first step towards the spread of confidence-building measures for the Arctic as a whole and to the northern regions of both hemispheres." Furthermore, Gorbachëv suggested "discussions regarding the ban of naval activity in mutually agreed-upon zones in international sounds and all along intensively-trafficked sea routes." (Denmark, as Magnusson points out, controls four sounds: the Little Belt, the Small Belt, Öresund, and Greenland Sound.)

<sup>57</sup> Theorin, interview.

<sup>58</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 December, 1987; see also "Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sten Andersson, with reference to General Secretary Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk," 2 October, 1987 (Swedish Foreign Ministry).

against this background, says Andersson, that the "Government welcomes the Soviet interest for Naval arms control and confidence-building measures which were expressed in the (Murmansk speech)."

Liberal MP, Ingemar Eliasson, felt that

"Gorbachëv's different proposals for negotiation ought to be studied in a positive vein. His proposals for negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact regarding limitations of naval and air activity in, amongst other places, the Baltic, are worth taking note of, especially when considered (against the background) of air and sea violations of Swedish territory."<sup>59</sup>

Conservative Party leader, Carl Bildt felt doubtful regarding the possibilities of limiting naval activity in the Baltic, North Sea and Norwegian Sea.<sup>60</sup> Conservative MP, Bråkenhielm felt the proposal flew in the face of the facts.<sup>61</sup> The statistics from 1985, said Bråkenhielm, reflected that "while the Soviet forces have spent 900 vessel (24) periods in the area under discussion, NATO has had 40 such periods-- was the move mainly an attempt to meet an anticipated stepping up of American naval presence in the area?"<sup>62</sup> One diplomat said, "we had a great deal of suspicion at the outset of many of the proposals--for they were diluted by other things that Soviet diplomats did (e.g. naval confidence-building measures were contradicted by Soviet thinking and speech making in other areas of disarmament)."<sup>63</sup>

The Government was less enthusiastic about Gorbachëv's proposal for banning naval activity in agreed-upon zones, stating, "the Government on a number of opportunities has pointed out that there should be mutual,

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<sup>59</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

<sup>60</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1987.

<sup>61</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 December, 1987.

<sup>62</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.

<sup>63</sup> S44



international interest that civilian sea-traffic should not be pushed aside by an increased military utilization of the seas."<sup>64</sup> For Sweden, such measures had to be treated in the international context. The *Riksdag's* Foreign Affairs Committee's statement read: "security political questions which concern wide-ranging areas should be tackled in the same wide-ranging form."<sup>65</sup> This Swedish response, similar to the official line of the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Proposal, attempted to insure that Sweden would not be isolated by the Soviet *démarche*.

This perspective was shared in military circles. One senior Swedish official placed Murmansk amongst other attempts by the Soviets (e.g. NNWFZ and Sea Incident Treaty) as initiatives which were aimed at "breaking off the Nordic countries from their affirmed multilateral perspective, either by having the Nordic countries deal with the Soviets, or dealing with the Soviets on a bilateral basis."<sup>66</sup> "We are not interested in going into regional arrangements," said one defence official while mentioning Sweden's willingness to participate in the proposed science and environmental efforts.<sup>67</sup>

#### *Immediate Norwegian Reactions*

The Norwegians, arguably the target of the speech, reacted in a cautiously positive manner. Prime Minister Brundtland, while relieved over the fact that Gorbachëv had raised the role of the two alliances in realizing the Murmansk

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<sup>64</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1987.

<sup>65</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll 1989/90:UU6 (Nedrustning), 9 November, 1989.

<sup>66</sup> S7. Furthermore, he reminded, all three measures have been dismissed and have not led to anything. One Swedish Foreign Ministry official reminded me that the reason for his cautious reaction was that "we have worked on European level and global level...thus, I could see no reason why we couldn't achieve our goals on those levels." (S40)

<sup>67</sup> S30

proposals, was on her guard against any attempt to gain a *droit de regard* by accepting any such proposal at face value.

Prime Minister Brundtland's initial reaction was almost complementary: "we have noticed that central parts of the Norwegian security and defence policy have been the subject of positive mention."<sup>68</sup> Thorvald Stoltenberg<sup>69</sup> said "(marriage) proposals should be taken seriously," pointing out that he felt that "Gorbachëv's proposals were a contribution to pacify and détente in the "Northern areas."<sup>70</sup>

From NATO quarters, sources put off any hint of an immediate response<sup>71</sup>, but clearly the speech was being handled seriously. The Government responded more negatively to other aspects of the initiative. Brundtland immediately noted that the "Barents Sea was not one of the sea areas mentioned for reducing sea-activity."<sup>72</sup> Johan Jørgen Holst showed his "interest in the new Soviet signals," while stating "we have some big interests to safeguard." Guarding himself, Holst added, "a reasonable balance between Soviet and

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<sup>68</sup> "Statsminister Gro Harlem Brundtlands kommentar 2. oktober 1987 til generalsekretær Mikhail Gorbatsjovs tale i Murmansk 1. oktober 1987." *UD-informasjon* (24) 1987, quoted in NUPI (1987:413) There was a somewhat delayed Norwegian/NATO assessment, attributable to the fact that several different drafts of the speech had reached the Norwegians and NATO (see "-Må vurderes av et samlet NATO," *Aftenposten*, 2 October, 1987).

<sup>69</sup> For Stoltenberg's broader view on changes in the Soviet Union, see "Stoltenberg: Gorbatsjov gir oss nye muligheter," *Aftenposten*, 6 October, 1987.

<sup>70</sup> B. Lindahl, "Norge. Frieri tas på allvar," *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 October, 1987.

<sup>71</sup> P. Nordrum, "NATO er nølende," *Aftenposten*, 3 October, 1987.

<sup>72</sup> M. Fyhn, "Norge til Gorbatsjov: -Positivt avventende," *Aftenposten*, 3 October, 1987. As one Norwegian diplomat recounted, "on the Ryzhkov trip, he brought up the idea of condominium again." "We are prepared to go on as equal partners, but refuse if we are to proceed on the basis of a fundamental disequilibrium," he said. (N30)

American navies must nevertheless be maintained in the Northern Areas, such that the Soviet Union does not assume a dominant position."<sup>73</sup>

Unlike Sweden which had advocated taking the proposals to a greater international audience, Norway showed evidence of first wanting to consult its allies. Brundtland clearly shed a sigh of relief when Gorbachëv not only mentioned, but emphasized the role of the two alliances in solving the problems which faced them.<sup>74</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg and *Storting* Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Willoch responded in much the same vein.<sup>75</sup> Willoch pointed out that "the security aspects of Gorbachëv's speech must be dealt within the NATO context."<sup>76</sup> This is echoed by Centre Party MP, Johan Buttedahl, who stated "the proposals on security-policy are not new...but they were more comprehensive than the previous ones and demonstrated a Soviet willingness to see security policy from an alliance perspective."<sup>77</sup> He is joined by Conservative MP Thor Knudsen, who quoted from the one particular spot in Gorbachëv's speech where this logic was brought out: "consultations between WTO and NATO towards the reduction of the military activity and the limitation of the extent of the naval and air activity in the Baltic Sea, North Sea..."<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 October, 1987.

<sup>74</sup> M. Fyhn, "Norge til Gorbatsjov: -Positivt avventende," *Aftenposten*, 3 October, 1987 or A. Willersrud, "Brundtland roser Sovjet i Pravda-intervju," *Aftenposten*, 14 January, 1988.

<sup>75</sup> "It is not guarantees for respect, but rather a strong and credible alliance with strong friends, which secures peace and independence in relation to a large, totalitarian neighbour." ("Willoch advarer Vestens ledere," *Aftenposten*, 14 October, 1987.)

<sup>76</sup> "-Må vurderes av et samlet NATO," *Aftenposten*, 2 October, 1987.

<sup>77</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>78</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

Progress Party's Hagen saw more sinister Soviet motives: "(the initiative is) an attempt to talk outside of the NATO system, thus must be seen as an attempt to break NATO apart."<sup>79</sup> Even Socialist Left Party's Theo Koritzinsky felt that "one of the criticisms was that he tried to split off Northern Europe from NATO interests was to some extent true." But Koritzinsky added that "maybe some of the thinking behind it was to get some of the Nordic countries to get the U.S. to move on naval arms control."<sup>80</sup>

The Norwegian military locked the Murmansk initiative into a room already full-packed with "unrealistic" Soviet proposals. Chief Commanders of Northern Norway, Vice Admiral Torolf Rein and Vice Admiral Carsten Lütken referred to the speech as a "political move which is hard to comment from the military side."<sup>81</sup> Rear Admiral Jan Ingebrigtsen commented that "you shouldn't let the Russians succeed in regionalizing security policy..the speech can hardly be interpreted as anything other than a clear propaganda (ploy)."<sup>82</sup> One Norwegian journalist, as a result of interviews with Norwegian military, typifies the reaction thus: "it can seem that (Gorbachëv) is trying to establish 'free zones' or 'bastions' in the sea, where the Soviets could operate freely, without running the risk of being threatened by Western naval forces."<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Hagen, interview.

<sup>80</sup> Koritzinsky, interview.

<sup>81</sup> *Aftenposten*, 3 October, 1987.

<sup>82</sup> Ingebrigtsen also mentions the speech in Vladivostok as motivated by the same concerns (O. T. Storvik, "Utspill kan splitte," *Aftenposten*, 3 October, 1987. Willoch, Centre MP J. Buttedal and Conservative MP Jan Petersen also emphasised this point (an attempt at a 'solo initiative'): see M. Fyhn, "-Nye Sovjet-toner i nord," *Aftenposten*, 5 October, 1987.

<sup>83</sup> O.T. Storvik, "'Frisoner' for Nordflåten?" *Aftenposten*, 5 October, 1987.

## INF

On the global arena, attention was turned to the superpower summit in Washington, D.C. (8-10 December), a meeting which resulted in the signing of the so-called "INF-Treaty." Both in Norway and Sweden, discussion of Nordic disarmament was effectively overshadowed by both the symbolic and concrete results of the renewed Soviet-U.S. willingness to disarm.

There was broad political agreement of the historical significance of the INF Treaty, the first superpower agreement which in actual fact reduced nuclear weapons.<sup>84</sup> To Swedish Social Democratic MP, Ericson, it was above all "due to the rapid changes in the Soviet negotiating positions that possibilities have been opened—not only in terms of the INF, but also in terms of a chemical weapons treaty, and in terms of numerical reductions in strategic weapons."<sup>85</sup> Conservative Bildt echoed a positive tone, calling it "the first genuine result on the disarmament front in the post-War period."<sup>86</sup> His party colleague, Anita Bråkenhielm, was not equally positive, wondering "how, seen from the Soviet perspective, NATO could be expected to compensate for the 'rip' in the flexible response doctrine which the INF implicate(d)?"<sup>87</sup>

Norwegian Defence Minister Holst termed it "evidence that it was possible for the Soviet Union and the United States to negotiate on nuclear weapons, in

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<sup>84</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, 2 December, 1987; Conservative MP's Kåre Willoch and Kaci Kullmann Five's addresses on 15 December, 1987; Labour MP, Liv Aasen, and Prime Minister Brundtland: same date, all reflecting the "historic nature" of the INF-Treaty. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*). The Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee's pronouncement, reflected a similar tone, *Riksdagstryck* 1987/88: UU1 (*Nedrustning*), 7 October, 1987.

<sup>85</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 28 October, 1987.

<sup>86</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 16 March, 1988. Bildt contrasted this with the "Brezhnev era's decenniums," which were characterized "in the first case by a striving to offset the so-called correlation of forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union—in the Soviet favour and to utilize the attained strength to move its positions forward."

<sup>87</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 16 March, 1988.

a way that takes into consideration Europeans' interests."<sup>88</sup> Foreign Minister Stoltenberg indicated that there was a change from the previous Soviet position, demonstrated in Reykjavik, of connecting Soviet disarmament to the question of SDI.<sup>89</sup> The Norwegian Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee, felt the INF Treaty was an "important contribution to disarmament negotiations," pointing out the principle of "asymmetrical reductions and comprehensive inspections" as essential elements,<sup>90</sup> which were, for all practical purposes echoed in its Swedish counterpart's statement.<sup>91</sup>

But Centre MP, Johan Buttedahl pointed out the birth of a trend which would continue to haunt Norwegian élites in the following year, namely that "an INF-agreement, which deals with land-based missiles, mostly placed in Central Europe, could mean that the military balances will place more importance on sea-based intermediate weapons and the **flanks** in Europe."<sup>92</sup> If indeed the INF had such a negative impact on naval disarmament, it would be, at best, what one Conservative MP Austad called "a mixed blessing,"<sup>93</sup> not to mention the potential impact on the Northern Flank.

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<sup>88</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>89</sup> Stoltenberg, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*. Labour Colleague, Liv Aasen, states, "the summit in Reykjavik broke up because the Soviets tried to connect every agreement with a demand that the U.S. should do away with its (SDI) (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987).

<sup>90</sup> *Stortings Meld. Nr. 59*, p. 7.

<sup>91</sup> *Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU4* ("Om Nedrustning"), 22 November, 1988.

<sup>92</sup> One of the earliest *Storting* references to a phenomenon called '*pølseteorin*.' (or 'sausage theory') (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987). Swedish Social Democratic MP Viola Furubjelke, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 29 November, 1989), paraphrased Stoltenberg's description of the theory: "If you squeeze a sausage in its middle, such that it looks totally empty, one can be assured that it will run out of the ends."

<sup>93</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

### *Naval Disarmament: Continuous Disappointment*

Naval disarmament was seen to be one of the most unyielding problems relating to the Northern military buildup. In general terms, Norwegian and Swedish élites have perceived more flexibility in the Soviet negotiating position over the issue than they have seen in the American. As one Swedish defence establishment official said, "American Naval men even refuse to be present at negotiations...the Navy is very independent-minded."<sup>94</sup>

The Norwegians, and to an extent also the Swedes, are faced with several dilemmas: There is a trade-off between what is desirable (lessening both military alliances' presence in surrounding waters) and reality (the Soviet Union has not, thus the Soviet buildup needs a NATO counterbalance). Another question concerns the question of the best reaction to achieve the desired result. If the Norwegians pressure NATO, this could cause a credibility crisis within the alliance. Thus, only the Socialist Left Party has strongly criticized American inflexibility. Those who agree with the Socialist Left party are sure to whisper, rather than shout, their opposition.<sup>95</sup> Socialist Left MP, Koritzinsky stated, the "Soviet Union has pronounced its willingness to enter negotiations regarding naval measures, the U.S. has until now been rather negative to such confidence-building measures and naval arms control."

The dilemmas the Swedes face are similar. While one could argue the Norwegian hands are tied by fear of being interpreted as unfaithful allies, the Swedish reaction is restrained by neutrality. While there is a visible Swedish displeasure with the U.S. Navy's position in Naval disarmament, one Swedish official said "we try to avoid looking as though we are in the Soviet camp on the issue."<sup>96</sup> "We have done this," almost by default, said one defence

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<sup>94</sup> S19

<sup>95</sup> Socialist Left MP Kortizinsky, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>96</sup> S19

establishment official, "through supporting the Soviet view here," he added.<sup>97</sup> The Swedes, as a counterbalance, have expressed<sup>98</sup> that they have no opposition to Norway's demands for an increased NATO presence in Northern waters, to balance the comprehensive Soviet naval presence in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. However the Swedes simultaneously attempted to promote naval disarmament in international fora, e.g. the UN, where their efforts could not be interpreted as siding with one alliance over the other.<sup>99</sup>

## Late 1987-1988

### *Soviet Northern Buildup Enhanced*

Irrespective of the overall tone of Soviet willingness to reduce global tension, there was little doubt that through the processes of addition, renovation, modernisation, and technological improvement, Soviet forces based on and around the Kola continued to improve throughout the Gorbachëv years. In this context one notices that during 1987 alone, contrary to Soviet statements,<sup>100</sup> Soviet military activity continued with unabated strength and scope.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> S19

<sup>98</sup> *Aftenposten*, "En viktig svensk utspill," 12 October, 1987.

<sup>99</sup> See, for example, Disarmament Secretary Theorin's speech to the UN, 8 November, 1990 "Statement by Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin, M.P....in the First Committee Assembly." One of the more recent Swedish UN efforts was made on 13 November, 1990, see UN document A/C.1/45/8/Rev.1.

<sup>100</sup> Norwegian Progress Party MP Røsjorde stated (15 December, 1987, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*): "this force buildup does not seem to correspond to the positions which the Soviet leaders express in connection with their new policy."

<sup>101</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Uforminsket sovjetisk militær aktivitet rundt Skandinavia," *Aftenposten*, 12 January, 1988. Storvik cites the addition of SU 27 Flankers and AWACS, Il-76 Mainstays, addition of Yankee class submarines, and two large  
(continued...)



Norwegians in 1987 perceived little change in "the military budget which Gorbachëv inherited from his predecessors."<sup>102</sup> While Gorbachëv continued to charm the United States<sup>103</sup>, in effect, all official Norwegian indicators told of an unchanged picture of Soviet strategic interests in the North. With the initiation of conventional disarmament negotiations between the Atlantic and the Urals, attention became increasingly drawn away from the Nordic area. Foreign Minister Stoltenberg(1988:14) expressed a desire to avoid "force reductions in Central Europe (being) circumvented by a buildup of forces on the flanks."

Norwegian Defence Minister Holst was quoted in Stavanger as saying, "the strategic picture in the North has not changed, but the Soviets' new investment in silent attack and rocket submarines in the Northern area is an important development."<sup>104</sup> In early 1987, General Inspector of the Norwegian Air Force

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<sup>101</sup>(...continued)

naval manoeuvres. Conservative MP Knudsen pointed out that the "exercise pattern has tended to move further West and South," the reason being "none other than a Soviet desire to gain better control over her supply lines from North America to Europe, and also to Asia." (15 December, 1987), a judgement shared by Defence Minister Holst (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989).

<sup>102</sup> Conservative MP Thor Knudsen, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>103</sup> "Atomavtale om et halvt år," or "Viktig Gorbatsjov-usspill," *Aftenposten*, 3 March, 1987 which reported Gorbachëv's willingness to remove intermediate distance missiles, SS-20, from the Soviet side.

<sup>104</sup> T. Bø, "Holst, Vi følger utviklingen," *Aftenposten*, 20 January, 1988; NUPI (1987:157). In "Sovjet klart styrket i nord," (*Aftenposten* 27 October, 1987), Chief of Intelligence, Rear Admiral E. Eikanger, confirmed Holst's basic point and made his own observations, amongst them: the transfer of the AWAC Mainstay to the Kola means the Soviets have significantly increased their possibility of a forward defence in the Northern area, Navy vessels are constantly becoming larger and more advanced and Air Force weaponry has become more high-technological.

pointed out a long term trend which now meant that Soviet fighter bombers could now reach the whole of Norway.<sup>105</sup>

It is especially interesting that this was the backdrop against which Mikhail Gorbachëv launched his Murmansk Initiative. Head of the Military Intelligence, Rear Admiral Egil Eikanger warned against the dangers inherent in three different trends (tangentially related to the Murmansk proposals), in addition to the issuance of a warning of the discovery of a new Soviet submarine base, not more than 40-50 km. from Norway.<sup>106</sup> First, he drew attention to the importance of being able to occupy the land areas surrounding the Kola bases--also as an offensive point of departure for control over the Norwegian Sea. Second, Eikanger warned that the expression "confidence-building measures" in connection with special buffer zones in the Norwegian sea restricted Western navies' freedom of movement. Eikanger finally was deeply worried especially because of Soviet cruise missile development.<sup>107</sup> Then-Vice Admiral and Commander for Northern Norway, Torolf Rein noted the following Soviet developments in early 1988:

1. More modern Soviet planes and weapons on the Kola put the Soviet Union in a position to push the front further out
2. Ground forces are constantly receiving more and more support from helicopters. This makes for more mobile and powerful land forces
3. Increased Soviet emphasis on its sea-based forces casts a dark cloud over Northern Norway<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Aamoeth further expressed the trend that attack helicopters, of the type "Hind," "Havoc," or "Hokum" were in the process of establishing local operations near the Norwegian border areas. (O.T. Storvik, "Sovjetiske jagerbombere kan angripe i hele Norge," *Aftenposten*, 24 March, 1987).

<sup>106</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Ny sovjetisk base nær Norge," *Aftenposten*, 19 January, 1988.

<sup>107</sup> Supported by Holst's speech in Bodø, (NUPI, 1987:157-8)

<sup>108</sup> L. Hegna, "Sovjet kan skyve fronten fremover," *Aftenposten*, 5 February, 1988; O.S. Storvik, "-Offensive Sovjet-planer i nord," *Aftenposten*, 13 November, 1989.

*Gorbachëv's United Nations Speech (1988):  
'Unilateralism' Comes of Age.*

By mid-1988, élites began confirming what many had feared: "the reduction in Soviet military ambitions in Central Europe coincides with an increased Soviet military emphasis on areas in Norway's proximity."<sup>109</sup> Defence Minister Holst stated that quite contrary to seeing signs of force reductions in our vicinity "we have seen a continuation of modernisation of the Soviet forces in the North."<sup>110</sup> Norwegian Centre Party MP, Buttedahl, stated that "we have not seen a reduction in the amount of boats in the Soviet Northern Fleet...neither any change in the strategic thinking of the superpowers in the North."<sup>111</sup> To this one could add perceptions of changes in weapons placement, and the lack of what seemed to be a slow down in the introduction of new equipment in the Soviet armed forces as a whole.<sup>112</sup> A fact particularly worrying for Norway and Swedes was, according to Koritzinsky, "the Soviet Union today possesses a 15:1 advantage in nuclear weapons with a range under 500 kilometres."<sup>113</sup>

These trends aside, 1988 turned out to be a vintage year for movement on East-West disarmament issues. M.S. Gorbachëv's *magnus opus*, his speech to the United Nations on 7 December, 1988, more than any other speech, represented

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<sup>109</sup> e.g. Kåre Willoch, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1988.

<sup>110</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>111</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>112</sup> Jan Petersen, "...900 fighters are added each year, while one new nuclear-powered submarine is being launched every 37th day." (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989).

<sup>113</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989. That very day, 19 January, Shevardnadze, according to Koritzinsky, had expressed a Soviet desire to withdraw all short-distance missiles from East Europe. (*ibid*).

the crescendo of Gorbachëv's drive for disarmament.<sup>114</sup> This speech still stands out today as the pinnacle of a changed Soviet disarmament approach. The speech was further significant for it represented a positive, unilateral military-foreign policy offensive attended by concrete action. As one Norwegian diplomat said, "prior to that people said that any nuclear disarmament would only be in the favour of the Soviet Union."<sup>115</sup> The speech had tremendously positive reverberations in the ears of Norwegian and Swedish élites alike.<sup>116</sup>

Gorbachëv first mentioned a list of "human problems," (e.g. ecological destruction), to which the United Nations is given a paramount role in attempting to find a solution. Among other important points he mentioned a transformation from the principle of over-armament to the principle of a reasonably, sufficient defence. Gorbachëv also promised that he would reduce Soviet forces-in-arms by 500,000 men over a two-year period and promised to withdraw and dispose of six tank divisions from the DDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. (The amount of troops in these countries would be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks.

For all intents and purposes, all Norwegian political parties now started clearly mentioning movement on Soviet disarmament. The Bourgeois parties then shifted to expressing reservations regarding the long-term conclusions one should draw from changed Soviet behaviour. Bourgeois leaders were now very open regarding change in Soviet military policy generally, but were nearly as interested in reminding where change did not occur. Willoch pointed to the "thought of asymmetrical reductions (500,000 men) as an important point of

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<sup>114</sup> *Anteckningar från Östgruppen*, (Stockholm: Försvarets Forskningsanstalt, 1/1991) p. 57-59.

<sup>115</sup> N3

<sup>116</sup> One exception was a high Swedish military man who said "this was a new example of taking advantage of economic necessity to reduce military force--which was carried out by withdrawing old equipment." (S39)

progress." But Willoch was careful to remind his audience that "we shouldn't (be blind to the fact) that this measure, once it is executed, still leaves the Soviets with close to one million more soldiers than the country had in 1960."<sup>117</sup> Willoch further points out the importance of Soviet commitments regarding human rights in the Vienna CSCE negotiations, a Soviet "yes" to inspection of disarmament treaties, the fight against terrorism, and the Soviet work against chemical weapons.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg dubbed it a "message of new thinking and that the reforms at home require international cooperation."<sup>118</sup> Stoltenberg further saw the Soviet decision to unilaterally withdraw troops and weapons from East Europe as a "good start towards conventional disarmament," while also being "an admission that there exists an overweight in conventional arms...in the East's favour."<sup>119</sup> Socialist Left's Koritzinsky perceived that the Soviet Union was also showing progress through its ban on nuclear testing and, more precisely, to reduce her conventional forces by 10%.<sup>120</sup>

Defence Minister, Holst, felt that Gorbachëv's announcement fit into the restructuring of Soviet land-based forces, which had already been underway for some time.<sup>121</sup> Further, he said "the offers (of reductions) would mean the danger for surprise attack has decreased, while stability has increased." Holst said, "there are indications from Soviet military that the tanks which will be

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<sup>117</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>118</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 13 January, 1989. While Stoltenberg pointed out increasing progress on Soviet human rights, Soviet involvement in regional conflicts and disarmament, he pointed to continued tensions in the North.

<sup>119</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 13 January, 1989.

<sup>120</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>121</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 19 January, 1989. These developments, according to Holst, included an increased emphasis on modern technology, stronger support units, and increased numbers of infantry in relation to combat units.

withdrawn will be scrapped...we should expect and suppose that this will take place with respect to modern, and not aged tanks, with tanks utilized by standing forces and not from the reserves."<sup>122</sup> But as had become commonplace, the Socialist Left attempted to draw attention away from debate which singled out the Soviet buildup, such that the debate would equally include the U.S.<sup>123</sup>

In Sweden, perceptions of the December speech were very similar to the Norwegian. Swedish Communist Party's Gudrun Schyman correctly represented a sector of euphoria:

"There is disarmament occurring in our vicinity. The Soviet Union is pulling back 40,000 men and 1,200 tanks in our Nordic area. The number of tanks will be halved. In the Baltic area the majority of the cutbacks will be achieved already by the end of 1989. A third of the Soviet forces in the Baltic and Leningrad Military Districts will be removed before 1991. These cutbacks are in percentage terms larger than those which have occurred in Central Europe...there are signs that there will be more."<sup>124</sup>

One senior Swedish military official called the speech "a watershed," for it "defined a new foreign policy and brought up the idea of a reasonably sufficient defence."<sup>125</sup> Former Swedish Foreign Ministry Soviet expert, Alf Edeen, felt that one of the reasons why the speech was important was that it "might be followed by more substantial *glasnost* with respect to Soviet military tendencies."<sup>126</sup> Swedish Conservative Party MP, af Ugglas, said the speech "declared an end to the war of ideologies...it was an attempt to find common

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<sup>122</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>123</sup> Koritzinsky, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>124</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 December, 1989.

<sup>125</sup> S7

<sup>126</sup> A. Edeen, "Gorbatjovs militära överskottslager," Svenska Dagbladet, 27 January, 1989.

ground."<sup>127</sup> A demonstration of a common cynical interpretation of Gorbachëv's promises and their impact on Nordic disarmament was surprisingly given by Social Democrat Sture Ericson:

"We don't know whether the Soviet pledges—I am thinking, for example, of the Soviet promise to reduce the number of heavy tanks in the Northern part of Leningrad's Military District to 200--will be executed. As long as we are unsure that this has occurred we should not let things get out of hand--making sure that we do not confuse promises made at the negotiating table with steps towards their execution. It is only in (1995) when we can concretely judge whether anything has actually occurred in our vicinity."<sup>128</sup>

Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, placed great weight in Gorbachëv's speech, saying that it "demonstrates, above all, that there is a lot of room for unilateral cutbacks."<sup>129</sup>

*1989-90: No Matter What Happens Russia (Soviet Union) Will Always be a Superpower*

The prospects for Nordic arms control looked bleaker than ever. The first priority remained sea-based forces. Norwegian Foreign Minister Bondevik again reminded that "sea-based forces cannot forever remain outside of the arms control process," however guarding himself against accusations of going against NATO noting "it is important to avoid doing something which could disrupt the Alliance's ability to defend and maintain its Transatlantic supply lines."<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> af Ugglas, interview.

<sup>128</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 November, 1989.

<sup>129</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 22 February, 1989.

<sup>130</sup> 18 December, 1989; Brundtland, 4 January, 1990 (Forhandlinger i Stortinget)

Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, and others were still speaking of Soviet force modernisation and strengthening in the North.<sup>131</sup> The Norwegians were nonetheless signalling progress on the European level; there the ongoing CSCE process<sup>132</sup> in Vienna was of paramount importance.<sup>133</sup> The U.S. and Soviet Union continued their romance with meetings in Malta, in Washington (31 May, 1990) amongst other meeting points. The CPSU Congress in July 1990 was an important landmark for it implanted in the Soviet leader's profile greater credence that there was indeed a plan and a sense of direction to Gorbachëv's foreign policy.<sup>134</sup>

Bondevik mentioned his personal satisfaction over the consensus regarding the principle of an upper limit of the number of sea-based cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.<sup>135</sup> However, on the Nordic scale, both the Norwegians<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 January, 1990. See Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee position paper, *Riksdagstryck 1988/89 (Nedrustning)*: "the Soviet Navy has gradually built up and modernised her Navy from a relatively low level."

<sup>132</sup> For background see N. Eliasson, "Konferensen om säkerhet och samarbete (ESK). Uppföljningsdokument i Wien 1986-1989" (Stockholm: Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1989).

<sup>133</sup> Jan Petersen outlined progress in three aspects of the negotiations: a more stable military balance at a lower level of tension, the economic: transformation of East European economies to market economies, and progress on the human rights question. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 January, 1990).

<sup>134</sup> One Norwegian diplomat (N3) quoted Gorbachëv such: 'have you forgotten 1986, 1987 etc...do you remember what we said?' ("in that way made his disarmament plans seem intentional, rather than haphazard—or even worse as reacting to events rather than acting to form them," he added.

<sup>135</sup> Bondevik pointed out the agreement's weakness: the ceiling is set so high that it does not include any reduction in existing weapons. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 31 May, 1990).

<sup>136</sup> Progress Party leader, Hagen said: "nothing special has happened on the Kola or in our vicinity...we should hope that the disarmament negotiations will get gather up some new speed..." (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 4 January, 1990). Force additions are detailed by Inspector General of the Norwegian Navy, Admiral Rolf Pedersen in Storvik, "Skeptisk til sjømilitær reduksjon,"



and Swedes<sup>137</sup> lay in waiting until the disarmament would also take their proximate, geographical interests into consideration. Progress in pulling back Soviet military resources from Eastern Europe would provide one point of encouragement,<sup>138</sup> while naval forces remained in great part unchanged.<sup>139</sup> The death of the much-feared 'Brezhnev Doctrine' added further credibility to the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.<sup>140</sup>

#### *Political and Economic Disarray and Revision of Soviet Military Intention*

Developments in Soviet domestic politics only made the situation more complex and disorderly. In 1989, the Soviet Union began showing signs of political, ethnic and environmental disarray--events which looked to many observers as the first clear signals of the Soviet Union's total collapse. An

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Aftenposten, 4 December, 1989.

<sup>137</sup> Swedish Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee (Riksdagstryck 1990/91:UU4 (Nedrustning), p.10: "the Soviet forces in Northern Europe have seemingly not been reduced significantly...quite to the contrary, there are signs of a certain military upgrading which could be occurring because of the past year's re-dispositioning and changes which have been already been decided upon."

<sup>138</sup> See Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee, Riksdagstryck 1990/91:UU4 (Nedrustning), p. 8: "During (1990) the Soviet Union has signed a treaty with Hungary and Czechoslovakia regarding the withdrawal of all Soviet forces before half of 1991 is over. Over one half of the 73,000 Soviet soldiers, previously stationed in Czechoslovakia have left the country..."

<sup>139</sup> Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee points out (ibid, p.11) that while the "question of agreement between (the U.S. and Soviet Union) is near--there is an unresolved problem of land-based Soviet Naval Air Force units, which the Soviet Union has not wanted to include in the agreement."

<sup>140</sup> Several interview objects pointed to the "death of the Brezhnev doctrine" as one of the most important turning points in Gorbachëv's foreign policy (N46). See Swedish Defence Commission Chairman, Åberg, "Ny neutralitet i nya Europa," *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 May, 1990 and SOU (1990:42,47), regarding the importance of this doctrinal abandonment.

important question became: how would internal unrest and the loosening of the Union structure effect military intent and capabilities?

From the Norwegian perspective, there was agreement that, irrespective of Soviet domestic political developments, the Soviet Union would remain a world-class military factor with which it would need to reckon. Many Norwegians were fond of speaking in the same terms as Foreign Minister Bondevik:

"Whatever happens in Soviet politics, the Soviet Union will remain a superpower neighbour which we will have to relate to as an important factor in our security and foreign policy. The dialogue and the contact we have established must be expanded."<sup>141</sup>

This feeling is further reflected in the thinking of former Conservative Norwegian Defence Minister Per Ditlev-Simonsen, who pointed out that, under the conditions of a militarily strong Russia or Soviet Union, NATO's *raison d'être* would persist:

"irrespective (of the changes) the Soviet Union or Russia will remain a military power which stretches itself from the Baltic to the Pacific...no matter what, the Kola Base will retain its strategic and military significance...no matter what, Norway will always have a border up North with a military superpower..."<sup>142</sup> NATO was created to be a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and either Russia or the Soviet Union remains..."

Neither did Swedish élites presage a rapid deterioration of Soviet military might. One Swedish Social Democrat said "the last thing the Soviets will ever

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<sup>141</sup> Forhandler i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989.

<sup>142</sup> Forhandler i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990. This same view is echoed in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 21 April, 1990 and "Intervju med forsvarsminister Per Ditlev-Simonsen," *Folk og Forsvar- Kontaktblad* 1 (1990).

give up will be the Kola, not least for air defence purposes."<sup>143</sup> For the same purposes, many élites felt that Russia or the Soviet Union would always have an interest in the Baltic coastline.

What remained a point of contention was whether the Soviet leaders still cherished its dream of withholding its superpower status. One Swedish diplomat said "the Soviet Union still treasures this idea of *velikaya derzhavats* (great power) status and will continue to do so."<sup>144</sup> One former Swedish diplomat related that "from a geographic standpoint the Soviet Union will have the same military, political and economic interests which follow from that."<sup>145</sup> Even the Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee joined in this line of thinking.<sup>146</sup> This standpoint was opposed by one influential Swedish Social Democrat, who proposed that "(Soviet) superpower status is a part of the past...it is now only (a superpower) in nuclear terms."<sup>147</sup> Several élites, in both Sweden and Norway, mentioned the scaling back of Soviet engagement in faraway places, especially from peripheral areas (e.g. Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique and Afghanistan as part of this pattern)--as evidence of a dimming of Soviet military ambition.<sup>148</sup>

Interviews were replete with references to a Soviet military which had lost its prestige, its reputation, a body which had been disowned and altogether lost its influence. One Swedish official pointed out "Gorbachëv has attacked the military for lowering the quality of life, there are ethnic conflicts and the

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<sup>143</sup> S10

<sup>144</sup> S5

<sup>145</sup> S5

<sup>146</sup> Riksdagstryck 1990/91 (Nedrustning), p.10: "Even after the amount of new expenditures (on the military) has ceased, Soviet military strength will continue to be a central factor in every European security-political analysis."

<sup>147</sup> S10

<sup>148</sup> Pär Granstedt, interview.

problems related to those soldiers returning home from Eastern Europe."<sup>149</sup> One Norwegian military figure mentioned that the forces returning home from Europe had been 'ganged-up upon.'<sup>150</sup> The picture was of a military establishment in disarray and/or a military establishment at clear odds with the political leadership.

Given these conditions, one could not dismiss the common élite impression that Gorbachëv had radically transformed the Soviet threat picture. One senior Swedish Centre Party official said "how could a country with such internal problems be a threat or be aggressive?"<sup>151</sup> One Norwegian General said "in NATO we don't speak of threat anymore, just capabilities (and we said so until at least last week)."<sup>152</sup> The paradox is, as one Norwegian diplomat put it, "while the Soviets have more arms in the North, it has, at the same time, no intention of using them."<sup>153</sup>

#### *Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations*

The effort to minimize NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe was yet another turning point in Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of Soviet foreign and military policy. One Norwegian military official painted the picture of the international climate directly following the signing of the CFE in Paris in November, 1990: "everlasting peace was on the horizon, CFE was around the corner, they were dismantling forces in the Urals, WTO forces in

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<sup>149</sup> S7

<sup>150</sup> N10

<sup>151</sup> S2

<sup>152</sup> N10

<sup>153</sup> N3

East Europe were being pulled back to the Soviet Union."<sup>154</sup> As of this writing the treaty had not been ratified by the U.S. Senate.

The progress which was perceived to have been made in the early-mid 1990 CFE negotiations gave way to problems of interpretation later in the year. There arose the following major categories of problems:<sup>155</sup> *data*: Western intelligence claimed that the Soviet Union still had a number of formations in place that its spokesmen said had been disbanded or removed; *Re-designations*: the USSR claimed that just before the treaty was signed it transferred several formations from the army to other branches of the armed forces, and that their equipment should not be counted against the allowed Soviet totals e.g. 77th motorized infantry division, transfer of aircraft from Air Force into Navy); *Equipment transfer* east of the Urals<sup>156</sup> and thus out of bounds of the CFE.

"We thought we had a common project in Paris, now certain signals we are receiving make us conscious that this is not a fact," said one senior Norwegian MFA official with respect to the CFE.<sup>157</sup> In the views of Western officials, the Soviet Union made a loose interpretation of the CFE such that it could, in the words of Finn Sollie, strengthen the Northern Fleet and to avoid the CFE limits.<sup>158</sup> As one top-ranking Swedish military man said, "such an agreement leaves room for manipulation of original intentions."<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> N34

<sup>155</sup> "All at Sea," *The Economist*, 9 February, 1991

<sup>156</sup> Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Torolf Rein wrote, "due to the regionalisation effect of the CFE, the Treaty does not oblige the Soviets to make reductions on the Kola." (T. Rein, "Forsvaret av Norge i lys av den senere tids utvikling," (Oslo: DNAK, 1990), p.6)

<sup>157</sup> N46

<sup>158</sup> Sollie, interview.

<sup>159</sup> S32.

These problems were duly registered in the Norwegian and Swedish Parliaments.<sup>160</sup> For example, Swedish MP, Carl Bildt<sup>161</sup> maintained that:

"even in our immediate vicinity...we have seen how the Third Mechanised Guard Division from Klaipeda and the 77th at Arkhangelsk have been totally exempted from arms control, through transfer from the army to--of all places--the navy. These are profound attempts to circumvent the CFE...bringing the arms control process to a halt. Then we risk rapidly being faced with a situation of a new cold war in Europe as a realistic possibility."

Centre Party leader, Olof Johansson, agreed with Carl Bildt, adding, "for Sweden's part, it is important to note that the military forces in Sweden's vicinity have hardly been reduced numerically--quite to the contrary."<sup>162</sup> Swedish Social Democrat, Sture Ericson and Conservative Eva Björne were in agreement with Bildt. Norwegian Centre Party official, J.J. Jakobsen concluded: "instead of withdrawing and destroying military units they are re-classifying them to avoid their Treaty obligations."<sup>163</sup>

#### *To Believe or Not to Believe?*

The official Soviet explanation for the shift was well summarized by one high Norwegian military man: "we (the Soviet Union) have to put them somewhere."<sup>164</sup> As 1990 drew to a close most élites had a bleak view of impending Soviet treaty compliance. As one Norwegian military official said:

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<sup>160</sup> Conservative Norwegian MP, Jan Petersen or Progress Party's Terje Nyberget, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 31 May, 1990; Swedish Conservative MP, Bildt, *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>161</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 February, 1991

<sup>162</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>163</sup> Jakobsen, interview. This perception of the Soviet reasoning was common in interviews.

<sup>164</sup> N10

"(to believe or not) depends on who you think is in charge—if Gorbachëv is in power, I would believe the official Soviet line; but if more conservative forces are in charge, I would tend to guard myself."<sup>165</sup> One Swedish military official said he could not discount "the movement of equipment from Central to Northwest of the Soviet Union in fact, in-and-of-itself constitutes a modernizing trend."<sup>166</sup> One senior Norwegian Foreign Ministry official said "the forces are a permanent fixture of the environment and we had better start living with that—most of all we should not measure our own security by whatever is happening up there."<sup>167</sup> One well-placed Norwegian official said "my impression that this is a permanent setback has been strengthened in the past few weeks(talking in January, 1991),"<sup>168</sup> indicating that "(treaty) infidelity" was a very novel phenomenon.

Soviet lack of faith in respect of the CFE Treaty, was seen by some as attributable to differing interpretations between the military and political establishment of the treaty's desirability and spirit. One well-placed Norwegian Foreign Ministry official mentioned "a strong military objective on the Soviet side to interpret the treaty in a less committing way, thus aiming to change the civilian attitude towards the treaty."<sup>169</sup> The same official said, "the Soviet negotiators in Vienna feel ashamed of the new (military) interpretation," in fact pointing to a clear split between "the civilian negotiators in Vienna and the military officials in Moscow."<sup>170</sup> The perception of a growing civilian-military split was not, according to one Norwegian official, in evidence in the START

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<sup>165</sup> N10

<sup>166</sup> S39, adding, "I have a pretty good guess that the old equipment in Central Europe is better than a part of the equipment in the Leningrad MD.

<sup>167</sup> N26

<sup>168</sup> N23

<sup>169</sup> N23

<sup>170</sup> N23

talks, where "the Soviets still have a unified approach."<sup>171</sup> One individual hinted that the CFE talks which were more vulnerable to domestic political disturbances than the ongoing START negotiations.

### *Swedish Perceptions of Disarmament in their Vicinity*

One Soviet move which received more attention in Sweden than in Norway, for obvious geographical reasons, was the announcement that the Soviet Union would withdraw its four ballistic missile-carrying Golf-class submarines from the Baltic.<sup>172</sup> This decision was also accompanied by rumours that the Soviet Union would cut back on their Baltic marine infantry corps.<sup>173</sup>

In the main, élites did not attach any military significance to these moves. The great majority of those interviewed in Sweden would agree with Centre Party's MP, Pär Granstedt, when he said "the submarines were no good (aged) anyway." He felt "the Soviets hoped to gain politically out of (the move)."<sup>174</sup> One senior military figure felt "you could either take or leave the submarines, since they were old in any case," stating "we have not seen any real signs of naval cutbacks in the Baltic yet--although one could see (a changed) situation with Poland and the former-DDR, in that the Soviets cannot use these bases any longer."<sup>175</sup> One high military figure said, in any case "they have been used as 'target submarines' in the Baltic--they have been weapons platforms...this move confirms what we already knew, that they were to be scrapped anyways."<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> N37

<sup>172</sup> B. Stenquist, "Sovjet drar bort fyra Golfubåtar," *Dagens Nyheter*, 19 October, 1989.

<sup>173</sup> B. Stenquist, "Sovjet skär ner mer," *Dagens Nyheter*, 21 November, 1989.

<sup>174</sup> Granstedt, interview.

<sup>175</sup> S32

<sup>176</sup> S7



Altogether, said one high Swedish military official, "the possibility for the Soviet Union in the coming years to 'move' on/in the Nordic area has not been reduced."<sup>177</sup> Several important points were made by those Swedes intimately familiar with changes in the Soviet portion of the correlation of forces in the North.

With respect to the air threat picture, one well-placed military official said "we have seen the Soviets reduce the level of their air exercises<sup>178</sup> (more towards Soviet coast)," however adding, "from a strictly military point of view, things have not changed in our part of the world."<sup>179</sup> One official saw remarkable stability in the air exercises, telling that "they spend about as many air-hours as they did in international water before, and the amount of their air violations have not changed (one a year)." "They are still flying from Poland and Germany--where they seem to be exercising even more than before--irrespective of their withdrawals of tanks," one official said.<sup>180</sup> However, "the threat picture from the South has changed," but "not in the North," one official added.<sup>181</sup> According to Liberal Party's Hans Lindblad, "before, no attack jets could reach Sweden--the use of the SU-24 Fencer changed all of that...now the Soviets are able to reach Sweden without refuelling from the Baltic area."<sup>182</sup> But Lindblad cautioned saying, "although the air force (threat) picture has worsened, the debate about it has been exaggerated." One official spoke of an

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<sup>177</sup> S7

<sup>178</sup> There was one large Soviet manoeuvre in the beginning of 1991, where 17,000 men partook. ("Gigant øvelse i nord," *Aftenposten*, 12 January, 1991).

<sup>179</sup> S41

<sup>180</sup> S41

<sup>181</sup> S41

<sup>182</sup> Lindblad, interview. Lindblad, as did Norwegian officials, mentioned the importance in the Soviet decision to move the 'Mainstay' bomber into the Nordic area.

"air defence upgrade, especially with respect to the MiG 29 and MiG 31's; accompanied by more offensive aviation through the whole 1980's."<sup>183</sup>

The Naval picture was perceived to be in a state of transition. In the Baltic today, according to one senior Swedish military official, there is less tonnage than previously,<sup>184</sup> the number of submarines has decreased— both as a part of a larger trend and of the Baltic Fleet's diminution in particular.<sup>185</sup> "We have witnessed little renewal of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic—in fact very little has happened for twenty years," said one official.<sup>186</sup> The main reasons that the Soviet Union still had a presence in the Baltic, aside from the sheer importance of maintaining a presence were three-fold, according to Lindblad: the shipbuilding industry, training purposes and the lack of docking areas for more than operational reasons. "This is because they have found that the smaller submarine systems have proved more effective (in the Baltic)," he concluded.<sup>187</sup> One also sees six Air Force divisions have been transferred from East Germany to the Baltic and Leningrad Military Districts, while more are being placed in the Naval Air Force, said Lindblad.

With these developments the plausibility of a coastal invasion scenario over the Baltic decreased,<sup>188</sup> an interesting change not least due to the paramount

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<sup>183</sup> S30

<sup>184</sup> S7

<sup>185</sup> Lindblad, interview.

<sup>186</sup> S30

<sup>187</sup> S7

<sup>188</sup> Lindblad, interview. Chief of the Army, Åke Sagrén, agreed, saying "the risk for coastal invasion, like other types of attack, are small at present." ("Jas måste få ifrågasättas," Svenska Dagbladet, 11 September, 1990) This point conflicts with the viewpoint of Chief of Defence Gustafsson. (M. Holmström, "Starka förband behövs i Syd" Svenska Dagbladet, 6 February, 1991).

place such an attack has held in traditional Swedish threat scenarios.<sup>189</sup> The traditionally worrisome, famed Soviet challenge to Southern Sweden has likewise decreased dramatically--a development whose importance can hardly be underestimated. As Lindblad said, "they just don't have the resources for this anymore."<sup>190</sup>

Swedish officials saw stability in terms of Soviet ground forces. "We have seen," said one Swedish official, "less of a change with respect to Soviet ground forces." "What we have seen are signs that the T-34 Tank might be in the process of being replaced by the T-72--and we might even be seeing a reduction in the numbers," this Swedish official recounted.<sup>191</sup> "We think we see an increase in the number of troops in the Baltic Military District, mainly due to the need (read:temporary) to find quarters for homecoming Soviet troops from Germany," he related.<sup>192</sup> With respect to ground force units, "we have," Lindblad related, seen a decrease in the amount of artillery and tanks stationed in the Baltic and Leningrad Military Districts, while we have seen the amount of missiles and armoured cars (tanks) increase in the Leningrad area. There had been no reductions in direct combat units, according to Lindblad.

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<sup>189</sup> As one senior military official pointed out, "an amphibious attack on Sweden is more difficult as East Germany is no longer available as a basing area." (S39). See Carl Bildt in the same vein, S. Svensson, "Stor invasion uteslutet," *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 May, 1990.

<sup>190</sup> S27 pointed out that "before, there were 400,000 Soviet troops in East Germany under one command from Leningrad to Lübeck." This year, he added, "the border has been moved back to Kaliningrad, a base that is more and more isolated from supplies." However, this one individual reminded that the "traditional picture for an attack in the North is in great part unchanged."

<sup>191</sup> S30

<sup>192</sup> According to one MFA official: "We don't know whether this move into the Baltic is temporary or permanent...we don't in any case see any reason for the increasing military presence." "They are probably just waiting for final assignment," he recounted. (S31)

### *Drawing Conclusions*<sup>193</sup>

In the face of these serious developments, Norway's NATO backbone provided reassurance. "We shouldn't dramatise things," said a known Norwegian Conservative foreign policy advisor, instead mentioning the benefits of a new Soviet notification régime.

"(The Soviet Union) is going to have a manoeuvre of 17,000 people in September (1991)—a comparatively large exercise, near our border. Some might say this is a bad sign, (however) they may see it as a new way to re-distribute exercises."<sup>194</sup>

He agreed with the leader of the *Storting's* Foreign Affairs Committee, Godal, who said "I wouldn't over-react to (the move of Central European military potential to the North," besides, they "have an understandable need of forces West of the Urals."<sup>195</sup> Norwegian LO's Kåre Sandegren said "I have a hard time saying that this is a scaling-up; we don't feel a strong transfer from the centre to the North."<sup>196</sup> The lowered tension was in evidence in a statement by a senior Norwegian official who said "this was the first Christmas we didn't keep 10,000 soldiers on alert in Troms (far North)—fourth-fifths or five-sixths could go home to spend time with their families."<sup>197</sup>

There existed a more favourable interpretation of actual Soviet behaviour towards Norway. "We have seen that the Northern fleet operates somewhat more in the background, said one top military official."<sup>198</sup> This statement was clarified by another senior Norwegian military official: "we have seen a Soviet

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<sup>193</sup> Resolution over the CFE seemed imminent in June, 1991 (D. White, "Arms compromise clears path towards CFE treaty," *Financial Times*, 15-16 June, 1991.

<sup>194</sup> N26

<sup>195</sup> Godal, interview.

<sup>196</sup> Sandegren, interview.

<sup>197</sup> N48

<sup>198</sup> N10

tendency to desire to train around, and deeper into the Barents, while they have done more around Kola specifically."<sup>199</sup> This same official pointed to the Soviet Navy having "given up" up the former "pincer movement (naval strategy), whereby the Baltic and Northern fleets should join hands."<sup>200</sup>

However, existing capabilities painted a contrasting picture. Given the numbers, one could logically conclude that the Norwegians and the Swedes have been left out of the broader context of European negotiations. Looking at closer range, it would not be unfair to say that the Norwegians feel, on the whole, more 'left out' of the disarmament business than do the Swedes. The Norwegian sentiment lends credibility to the *pølse-teori*.<sup>201</sup>

It was partly because the Norwegians did not perceive Soviet change and partly because of its unwillingness to pressure its allies that the Norwegians adopted a relatively conservative stance relative to the Soviet developments. Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, Torolf Rein, expressed his reticence to pressure the U.S. over naval arms control, for fear of Norwegian isolation.<sup>202</sup> One strategically-placed Norwegian mentioned that from the end of (CFE) negotiations--October, 1990 on-- we have seen a definite increasing pressure on our flanks...they have realized the importance of having increasing numbers of forces."<sup>203</sup> Finn Sollie from the Northern Perspectives Group, said "no matter what Gorbachëv says publicly about marine development, it is, for the present,

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<sup>199</sup> This is especially interesting since the Soviet Navy has tended to exercise further West and South. (N34) The reason given was "it makes it more difficult for Western intelligence to get at."

<sup>200</sup> The reason for this was according to this official, that the "Soviets experienced difficulty in getting out of the Baltic without heavy losses." (N34)

<sup>201</sup> The "Sausage Theory." Essentially the theory predicts that disarmament in Central Europe will cause forces to flow over onto the Flanks.

<sup>202</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Militær uro for norsk isolasjon," *Aftenposten*, 14 March, 1990.

<sup>203</sup> N23

a definite Soviet policy to maintain and improve her own naval assets (including Navy, Marine Infantry and Naval Air Force).<sup>204</sup> Although we have seen a reduction in tanks in the Leningrad Military District, one Norwegian Foreign Ministry official pointed out, "there has been a quantitative reduction in the amount of tanks, they have been compensated by other types."<sup>205</sup> Even Socialist Left MP, Paul Chaffey said "...the Soviet military capacity is so strong today that we are right in having a strong defence."<sup>206</sup> "With a rising military budget, it is hard to say that disarmament is a Soviet priority, it is just not credible," said one senior Norwegian military official.<sup>207</sup>

Towards the end of 1990 it became clear in Norway that the aircraft carrier, *Tiblisi* would join the Northern Fleet,<sup>208</sup> as would the destroyer *Admiral Kharlamov*<sup>209</sup>. Frightening reports of Soviet construction of airports near Norway<sup>210</sup>, reports of increasing numbers of Soviet Scud SS-21 missiles on the Kola,<sup>211</sup> reports of more tanks in the Northwest<sup>212</sup> and finally serious doubts

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<sup>204</sup> Sollie, interview.

<sup>205</sup> N30

<sup>206</sup> Chaffey, interview.

<sup>207</sup> N35

<sup>208</sup> T. Rein, "Forsvaret av Norge i lys av den senere tids utvikling," (Oslo: DNAK, 1990), p. 6.

<sup>209</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Nytt krigsskip till nordflåten," *Aftenposten*, 8 October, 1990.

<sup>210</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Sovjet har bygget felt-flyplasser tett ved Norge," *Aftenposten*, 13 February, 1991.

<sup>211</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Flere Scud-raketter på Kola," *Aftenposten*, 25 January, 1991.

<sup>212</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Flere Sovjet-stridsvogner i nord," *Aftenposten*, 2 January, 1991.

whether the Soviet military budget<sup>213</sup> was in fact decreasing<sup>214</sup>, added feelings of confusion and disappointment over Soviet Nordic military disarmament behaviour, despite continued Soviet assurances<sup>215</sup> that no military buildup was occurring in the Leningrad Military District.<sup>216</sup>

The Swedes, the Social Democrats particularly, were more cautious towards acceptance of the "sausage theory," not least because the 'theory' is manufactured in Norway and chiefly pertains to that country's security policy problem. Another reason is that neutrality in some way precludes subscribing to one of the central assumptions of the theory--the military buildup in the North is chiefly the fault of the Soviet Union. Swedish Defence Minister Roine Carlsson professed that "the sausage theory is something which I have in no way comprehended, assented to nor discussed."<sup>217</sup> In the same breath though, Carlsson said, "on the contrary we have not seen very much concrete disarmament at all in our vicinity."<sup>218</sup> Carlsson's party colleague, Swedish Social Democratic MP, Viola Furubjelke pronounced that there was nevertheless "reason to warn against what I once heard (Norway's Stoltenberg) once call 'the

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<sup>213</sup> The difficulties inherent in estimating the direction of the Soviet defence budget see Swedish Defence Commission Report, (SOU, 1990:40)

<sup>214</sup> O.T. Storvik, "Tvil om sovjetisk nedrustning," *Aftenposten*, 10 December, 1990 for conflicting Norwegian opinions over the Soviet military budget.

<sup>215</sup> "There will be no increase in the number of nuclear vessels in the North," said Soviet Admiral Feliks Gromov, quoted in "Sovjets nordflåte på ny kurs," *Aftenposten*, 13 March, 1990)

<sup>216</sup> But Lieutenant General Dagfinn Danielsen points out 50-500 km ground-to-ground missiles, which the Soviets claimed to have withdrawn as of November, 1989, were seen in military exercises near the Norwegian-Soviet border. (O.T. Storvik, "Norsk etterretning tviler på Sovjet," *Aftenposten*, 17 November, 1990).

<sup>217</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 11 December, 1989.

<sup>218</sup> *Riksdagsprotokoll*, 11 December, 1989.

sausage theory."<sup>219</sup> Yet another well-placed Social Democratic official said "there is no truth, I have never believed in the sausage theory."<sup>220</sup> Maj Britt Theorin asked the question "we have to ask what these troops who are moving are bringing with them--are they offensive weapons?...We also have to ask ourselves what is going on in Europe generally...there are practical reasons for doing this."<sup>221</sup>

One senior Swedish Centre Party MP countered, saying there "is a clear trend towards the sausage theory: "there is modernization, with the increasing quality of the troops and the equipment in the North."<sup>222</sup> Centre leader, Johansson, was quoted as saying "from the Swedish perspective, it is important to note that the military forces in Sweden's neighbourhood have not been reduced numerically--in fact quite the opposite."<sup>223</sup> Centre Party's Pär Granstedt said that one had to come to terms with the qualitative change in forces based in the North-- a change which meant the 'lowest' forces were taken away, a trend which left meaner and leaner power in the area.<sup>224</sup>

## Explanations of Soviet Motivation

It is important to understand the underlying reasons why the Soviet Union adopted either a change or *status quo* in its military policies--seen from the

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<sup>219</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 November, 1989.

<sup>220</sup> He elaborated: "In the process of withdrawing from e.g. DDR they have had logistical problems where to hold their equipment. While this must be observed, the situation is much better now than at any time before--especially due to European continental agreements." (S37)

<sup>221</sup> Theorin, interview.

<sup>222</sup> S2

<sup>223</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.

<sup>224</sup> Granstedt, interview.



perspective of Norwegian and Swedish élites. The willingness of Norwegians and Swedes to attribute change and stability in the Soviet Union differently can partly be explained by their different defence commitments.

*Soviet Change as a Result of Western Strength.* For obvious reasons this strain of logic was used much more frequently in Norway than in Sweden. One of the central reasons for Norwegian NATO participation in the beginning was Soviet expansionism, and a feeling of defencelessness, while the Swedish reason for neutrality is historical--and a question of the "success" of this policy. Norwegians have encouraged a closer knit with NATO, accompanied by a increase in its military budget, while Sweden has simply only discussed (publicly, at any rate), an increase in military budget--and then, only part of the reason for such can said to be Soviet change.

The Swedes, especially the far-Right parties, might passively applaud NATO's efforts in bringing about Soviet change--but they could not claim direct participation.<sup>225</sup> Their contribution would be in the form of its advocating Nordic stability, by both remaining neutral and militarily strong--such that neither of the blocs had to worry about who dictated Swedish policy. The value of Swedish strength is illustrated in the Nordic Balance context-- a *status quo* security pattern which the Soviet Union, during Gorbachëv's reign have demonstrated an interest in upholding. Sweden enjoyed being the fortress of stability in the face of monumental Soviet foreign policy change. Sweden's influence is thus typically of a psychological nature. A continued Swedish military strength, based upon neutrality, has always been clearly in the interest of the Soviet Union.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Swedish Cabinet Secretary, Pierre Schori in "Fult påhopp på Palme, Bildt!" *Dagens Nyheter*, 13 January, 1990 writes that "(Carl Bildt) even dismisses as illogical that it was Reagan's \$ 2,000,000,000,000,000,000 military investment during the 1980's which got Gorbachëv to re-think."

<sup>226</sup> S52

One of the traditional Norwegian explanations for "the Soviet Union's return to the negotiating table" was Western firmness and strength,<sup>227</sup> and based upon NATO cohesion.<sup>228</sup> What is important about this logic is that those who subscribe to it see it as a positive confirmation of, as well as a prescription for similar policies in the future.<sup>229</sup> As Norwegian Foreign Minister Bondevik pointed out "the developments in the Soviet Union and East Europe and the amelioration of the East-West climate does not mean that a break-up of NATO is on the agenda; the need for Atlantic cooperation, based on solidarity and within the alliance framework, is as important today as previously."<sup>230</sup>

In a *Storting* debate over the placement of U.S. intermediate-range missiles and Soviet SS-20's in Europe, Conservative Norwegian MP, Willoch, stated that one of the reasons the Soviets did not (1981-3) go into negotiations was that "they thought they could retain a monopoly on these weapons."<sup>231</sup> "The result," maintained Willoch, was that "the Russians ended back up at the negotiating table accepting the proposal which they once had thrown out." Labour's Einar Førde, counters saying "it is interesting to note that (in the debate) this argument was not emphasised."<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> It could be said the further one travelled towards the right of the political spectrum, the more common this logic was. See for example, Norwegian Progress Party MP, Hans Røsjorde, in discussing the reasons behind INF: "irrespective of disarmament developments, it is important to remember that it was only because of firmness that the present missile agreement came about." (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987)

<sup>228</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987: Christian People's Party, Kåre Kristiansen; Foreign Minister Stoltenberg ("cohesion in NATO as one of the factors contributing to a positive result of the INF negotiations"); Conservative MP, Annelise Høegh in *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 31 May, 1990

<sup>229</sup> MP Røsjorde in *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>230</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 18 December, 1989.

<sup>231</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987. He further argues that the placement of the rockets was intended to bring the Soviets to negotiations.

<sup>232</sup> *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, 15 December, 1987.

*Change as a Result of Soviet Economic Weakness.* There was in fact total agreement that what lay at the core of Soviet cutbacks was economic considerations. One top-ranking Swedish Centre Party MP said "the goal with the overwhelming amount of a lot of things which happen in the Soviet Union today, is to survive."<sup>233</sup> Norwegian Christian Peoples Party MP, Kåre Kristiansen, argued that the reason for Soviet change was "far from pragmatic--it is in the first case economic consideration which force the Soviets--and to a lesser extent the U.S.--to adopt a more sensible position over armaments."<sup>234</sup> Kristiansen felt that "the reasons for *glasnost* are not that communism or its leaders suddenly have been converted to humanism and democracy--as much as we hope that it might be so." Carl Bildt pointed out that "in the beginning of the 1980's Soviet national income began to decrease. It concerned a social and economic failure of historical dimensions."<sup>235</sup>

A representative analysis of the economic need to disarm was given by then-former Prime Minister Brundtland:

"Scientific and economic resources are needed in altogether more comprehensive dimensions today, in order to resolve the central problems connected with defensible use of energy, the development of a sufficient food production and an industrial development which does not undermine the fundamental resource base. This admission has clearly been both an important propelling force within the Soviet Union itself, for a new security-policy thinking and its working position towards the West, and a secure fundamental for a gradual dismantlement of the military sector."<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> S2

<sup>234</sup> Forhandler i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.

<sup>235</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988. Bildt quotes Gorbachëv as having recently (note date) said there has not been any growth in the Soviet economy for twenty years--if one does not consider oil price rises and the strong effects of increased vodka sales."

<sup>236</sup> Forhandler i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

Most would agree with Conservative Norwegian MP, Jan Petersen, saying that, rather than Soviet reforms being motivated by optimism, it was in fact "the bad results of the Soviet economy throughout the years--and from an admission that unless the Soviet economy reforms it will only further fall behind the West."<sup>237</sup> Swedish Liberal MP, Maria Leissner said quite simply that "*perestroika* was brought on by the Communist system's political and economic collapse--to get economic development going has been decisive for the Soviet leadership." With this, Leissner said, we have "detected a change in course in Soviet defence policy in the direction of an non-offensive defence."<sup>238</sup> As one Swedish official explained it "he needed cooperation in order to have a basis for reducing military capabilities and in order to obtain Western technology and financial support."<sup>239</sup>

Quite naturally, U.S. economic difficulties had a role in motivating and renewing Western disarmament efforts. The Left side of the political scale never neglected to mention that the U.S. also felt a sharp economic need to disarm. It was, according to many élites, a coincidence of Soviet and to some extent, American economic interests, which brought both to the negotiating table.<sup>240</sup> As one Swedish MP expressed it "it has been said that the original (U.S.) intention was to (arms) race the Soviets to death...but now the question is whether the U.S. is (arms) racing itself to death, as stock market trends and other indicators have demonstrated."<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987.

<sup>238</sup> Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1988.

<sup>239</sup> S30

<sup>240</sup> Labour MP, Gunnar Berge, says "during the 1980's we have seen the U.S. go from being the largest creditor nation to the largest debtor nation..." (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990).

<sup>241</sup> Swedish Left Party MP, Oswald Söderqvist, Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 October, 1987.

*Military Interests.* Traditional Soviet military interests accounted for most perceived stability in Soviet military policy. Many expressed the thought that today's Soviet military in fact retained much of its influence, in some cases making its own foreign policy. Christian People's Party's Bondevik, said that while "it is clear that the Soviet Union has both economic and security interests in the North," "if these two come into conflict with each other, all experience demonstrates that the military, defence-related interests will win out."<sup>242</sup> One former Norwegian defence official felt stability in Soviet policy could be explained by traditional Soviet Naval concerns. The reason for Soviet emphasis on the Northern Fleet, for example, was because of the Fleet's continuing and demonstrated suitability to carry out traditional naval missions.<sup>243</sup>

For Norwegian advisor Finn Sollie, the answer lay in continuing Soviet strategic interests. "We cannot discount that (today) Soviet thinkers are contemplating the question: what will we do if Germany becomes too strong," said Sollie. ("the Euro-strategic dimension"). Additionally, Sollie said he believed that the continuing trends were due to Soviet interests to maintain a strategic balance with the United States.<sup>244</sup> One former Norwegian military figure mentioned that Gorbachëv was prepared to make sacrifices such that he could preserve the Union intact--with the eventual goal of "whatever happens having a Soviet Union with a global influence."<sup>245</sup>

*Change Necessary for the Societal Good.* "We now have to admit that Gorbachëv is a societal reformer of dimensions...he has read the writing on the wall...a Communistic society, closed as it is, must of necessity be conservative," said

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<sup>242</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987.

<sup>243</sup> N4

<sup>244</sup> Sollie, interview.

<sup>245</sup> N7

Norwegian Labour MP, Finn Knutsen.<sup>246</sup> According to another Norwegian Labour MP, disarmament and less dedication of resources to military purposes were some of the more important bi-effects of the (societal transformation) process(rather than the cause.)"<sup>247</sup>

The Swedish Defence Commission, also concluded that societal interests were at stake, stating, "the fight to solve Soviet domestic problems incited the will to foster international détente." Further the Commission writes "the radical economic transformation of the social system, which was judged necessary by the present leadership, was not possible within the framework for the, on all key points, Stalinistic political system which was still alive."(SOU 1990:27-8) "The former system's incapacity to create solutions to growing problems of societal, ecological and political nature provided the basis for the *glasnost* and *perestroika* policies under Gorbachëv,"(SOU, 1990:28) the Committee writes.

*Personality Factor.* There may be some truth to what many individuals, at first, attributed change in the Soviet Union: Gorbachëv as a propellant in and of himself. Indeed M.S. Gorbachëv's reform strategy bore his own personal stamp. One former Norwegian Defence official hinted that Gorbachëv realized what he did not want, namely, "pre-Gorbachëv there was a tendency to think that military power could solve almost any situation--on any occasion it was an effective instrument for having a say."<sup>248</sup> This official thus attributed change to a final (seemingly personal) realisation that "power does not buy political influence." As Norwegian Conservative MP, Anders Talleraas, said "Gorbachëv has probably been the propelling power behind the most important events in the past ten years."<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.

<sup>247</sup> N40

<sup>248</sup> N4

<sup>249</sup> Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.

## Chapter Ten

### Conclusion

A paired comparison of Sweden and Norway's foreign relations with a changing Soviet Union has suggested the points where the respective states' commitments to either alliance or neutrality have affected the diplomatic style, attitudes and approach of the leaderships in selected questions. By capitalizing on the recommendations of the authors in the area of controlled comparison, this thesis has enriched the number of such studies and illuminated the utility of controlled comparison for future studies. The study has also provided an opportunity to study, in-depth, the ebb and flow of Scandinavian foreign relations with the Soviet Union, deepening the literature of Scandinavian foreign policies. As such, this study has hopefully enriched the study of international relations, the study of why nations behave in certain ways.

The core of this study has attempted to relate certain propositions found in the literature on neutrality and alignment with the behaviour of the Swedish and Norwegian leaderships. An examination of selected aspects of Swedish and Norwegian diplomacy towards the Soviet Union reveals that there is a meaningful connection between specified facets of the theory surrounding neutrality and alignment and the world of real diplomacy. It has also pointed to the aspects of their foreign relations in which security policy considerations play a minor, if not altogether absent, role. As was argued in the introduction, the study has aimed solely at suggesting the effect of neutrality and alignment, while recognizing that several other credible explanations of these nations' behaviour indeed do exist.

An in-depth analysis of selected issue-areas seems to confirm that a central pillar of an aligned state's foreign policy--partiality towards its fellow NATO members (i.e. loyalty to its allies, full participation in allied activities, coordination and consultation amongst fellow alliance members)--was indeed present in specified junctures of Norway's Soviet relationship. Norway has likewise drawn heavily upon the benefits of membership--such as allied

standards, practice and solutions--as useful guidelines in its relations to the Soviet Union. The analysis also bears evidence that NATO membership provides extra psychological insurance for Norway, allowing it more freedom in selected aspects of its relations towards the Soviet Union.

In the case of Sweden, perhaps the principal element of its foreign policy--impartiality--appearing to the outside world to lead a credible, independent and 'Cold War free' line in foreign policy--reappeared many times over a host of bilateral questions with the Soviet Union. The Swedish leadership's desire to back up this commitment has resulted in a strict interpretation and enforcement of its territorial integrity, a sizeable defence budget and its frequent desire to resort to supranational and multilateral norms, bodies, legal statutes and solutions in its foreign relations with the Soviet Union.

In 1947-9 these cornerstones of neutrality and alignment were only under discussion, revision and refinement, whereas in 1987-1991 they were in full practice. It was both in relation to past realities--historical experiences in the War and beyond, and contemporary challenges--the Cold War, American and Soviet behaviour that the choices to pursue neutrality and alignment were taken.

#### *Neutrality and Alignment in Practice: 1947-9*

Neutrality affected the way the Swedes acted towards the Soviet Union and the U.S. in a period of extreme turbulence in the immediate post-War period. Even though Sweden and Norway were faced by largely similar Soviet behaviour, Sweden felt its interests, and the interests of Nordic security were best served by maintaining a neutral line. In this way, the Swedish leadership could affect Finland's chances of retaining independence while remaining true to its historical tradition of neutrality. The central theme in Swedish neutrality-in-practice in the post-War period was impartiality in foreign relations. Actively pursuing the Finnish cause could not be construed as direct interference in Soviet affairs, and thus was not seen to affect Sweden's foreign policy credibility. Impartiality was again a central consideration in Sweden's economic relations. After much discussion of neutrality's compatibility with U.S.



economic assistance, and faced with the fact of Soviet non-participation, the Swedish leadership chose to participate in the Marshall Plan. A look at the Billion Credit Agreement also illustrated the neutral Swedish desire to pursue the desirable--to rejuvenate the war-torn Soviet Union while simultaneously acting to promote its impartiality by attempting to counterbalance Sweden's Western-dominated trading pattern. This measure could likewise be interpreted as an attempt to boost the credibility of Sweden's neutral choice.

At another critical juncture, during the Scandinavian Defence Union discussions, the Swedish leadership distanced itself from the Norwegian standpoint of the need for a U.S. guarantee of a future defence union--this would naturally be construed from the Soviet Union as 'taking sides' and could be seen as creating a dependence on the West. By contrast, a study of the SDU lends credibility to the hypothesis that states seek alignment because they see their own security as being linked with assistance from other states. Such was clearly Norway's motivation when it sought NATO membership in 1949. The Czech coup also illustrated Sweden's neutrality-in-practice. One of the pillars of Swedish foreign policy is territorial integrity. The Swedish leadership, seeing that Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity and rights had been violated, protested loudly, leaving no doubt as to its stance in the question.

As late as 1947, Norway showed many of the same neutralist tendencies which were present in Sweden. For example, discussion surrounding the Marshall Plan showed a trace of its previous orientation. Although there appeared sharp differences of opinion over the compatibility of the MP with Norway's overarching foreign policy goals, Norway finally decided to participate, having concluded that participation could not be construed as contributing to 'bloc-building.' Norwegian trade policy with the Soviet Union was however free from Swedish-style idealism. Even in consideration of the positive feeling towards the Soviet Union following its liberation of Northern Norway, the Norwegian government felt no need to interfere in or bolster commercial relations with the USSR. The Norwegian security choice of 1949 would eventually be accompanied by membership in COCOM in 1950--a grouping with unmistakable security policy overtones. This particular move

was seen in following years to increase and promote Norway's credibility as a reliable alliance partner vis-à-vis its fellow NATO members.

Soviet behaviour towards Czechoslovakia and Finland was the central impetus for the Norwegian Government's decision to seek security in a Western collective. This, combined with its historically Atlantic orientation and its Wartime experience of German occupation, propelled Norway away from its bridge-building and neutral traditions into an arrangement with formal ties with states of similar mind. The maintenance of the NATO 'lifeline' would remain one of the central elements of Norwegian policy. The Norwegian insistence upon obtaining a U.S. guarantee of a future SDU drove the final nail on the coffin of a neutral, all-Scandinavian defence union. While the Swedes emphasized the development of an independent capacity to obtain supplies, the Norwegians preferred a Western guarantee for the same. Norway, like Sweden, used the Finnish argument in ways which fitted its conception of the preferable security alternative. Norway threatened to "go Westward" if unacceptable Soviet pressure threatened Finnish independence.

#### *Neutrality and Alignment Revisited: 1987-1991*

A study of the most important issues in Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet relations in 1987-1991 also reveals important junctures where neutrality and alignment have affected the Swedish and Norwegian leaderships' diplomatic style, approach and attitudes towards the Soviet Union. For the first time since 1947-9, Norwegian and Swedish leaders were faced with the task of developing explanations, seeking solutions, and making policy which adapted its standing security commitments with a changed and changing Soviet Union.

A close study of the Norwegian and Swedish handling of the Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone raises some crucial differences between neutrality and alignment. That the NNWFZ proposal has not been realized is greatly attributable to differing security commitments in the Nordic area. Sweden's advocacy of the NNWFZ was designed to enhance its neutrality by promoting an issue which was important to it, while at the same time being careful not to appear 'one-sided' towards what was originally a Soviet proposal. At an early

stage, the Swedish Foreign Minister chose the United Nations as the body fitted to deal with such a proposal, demonstrating a reliance on international norms and institutions. The Swedes behaved negatively towards efforts to further regionalize the issue to the Baltic Sea--partially because the strategic superpower balance in the Baltic would be undermined, leaving Sweden isolated with only one superpower presence in the Baltic.

Norway, from the very outset, interpreted the proposal as a Soviet attempt to drive a wedge between NATO alliance partners. To be sure, the initiative was seen to run contrary to a several central elements in NATO policy--to discuss and find solutions within the NATO context, and not in isolated circumstances. It was also seen to dislodge Norway from its strategic link with NATO--in terms of the implementation of INF, with respect to the 'flexible response' strategy and finally in relation to NATO's port-call policy. A senior Norwegian diplomat's campaign for the NNWFZ demonstrated how one person could go against the established policy stream by putting into question Norway's loyalty to accepted norms of NATO behaviour. The resulting division in the governing party partially determined a Norwegian withdrawal of support for the NATO infrastructure programme in 1983--further putting into question Norwegian loyalty to NATO standards.

In the early 1990's the issue became a low priority--for Sweden and Norway as well as for the Soviet Union. With the significant easing of superpower tension in the late 1980's, both the Norwegians and the Swedes agreed that there could be no solely Nordic solution to the problem of nuclear weapons in the North--rather, as the inter-Nordic Ministry study group concluded in early 1991, that the answer must be found in continued dialogue between the superpowers and the Nordic countries in a broad international context.

The value of secure boundaries is assessed differently in neutral and aligned countries. Territorial integrity is one of the pillars of a neutral state's foreign policy. When this cornerstone is violated, as was the case for Sweden in 1981 and 1982, and arguably through the 1980's and early 1990's, the external credibility of the state's neutrality policy comes into question. The continual

nature of violations transforms this feeling of insecurity into a serious self-confidence problem for the leadership in question.

Such a situation confronts the neutral state with several difficult questions. One, the production of evidence which would objectively demonstrate that it was not 'assuming guilty before proving innocent' was important. In this respect, two strengthenings of the standards for submarine identification and sighting occurred in the 1980's. It was likewise a question of how to react--would the neutral state's reactions be interpreted by the outside world as being in accordance with neutrality? Sweden has satisfied itself with a high public profile, by protesting and referring to international laws and statutes. Thus, Sweden relied not on its military might, but rather the possibility of the intruder being exposed, and embarrassed before an international audience. Also, in the 1980's Sweden cut off its military exchanges with the Soviet Union as an expression of its displeasure--a move that, if taken too far, would have jeopardized Sweden's communications channels with Moscow. Neutrality dictates that, in the face of inconclusive evidence regarding the identity of an intruder, one must not make any judgement of nationality. Swedish leaders have failed this principle, privately *assuming* that the violator is the Soviet Union.

The strength of the Norwegian NATO backbone allows for greater flexibility in interpreting and reacting to border-related violations of Norwegian territory. NATO membership also imposes strict standards of evidence upon the Norwegian military in the case of territorial violations. For Norway, the identity of the eventual intruder is no mystery: the Soviet Union and Norway accept inter-alliance rivalry as a part of their daily existence. Even when territorial violations do occur, they can be put into the wider perspective of their relationship--namely that NATO nevertheless can defend Norway if the incursions become sufficiently serious. In fact, Norwegian leaders commonly point to Norwegian wrongdoing more often than Soviet in security-related border issues.

A closer comparison of the Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of and behaviour towards the Soviet invitations to sign bi-lateral Incidents-at-Sea

treaties also illuminates interesting differences between neutral and aligned state leaders' behaviour. For Sweden, the proposal was unwelcome for it was seen as trying to extricate Sweden from its multilateral approach on the issue. Sweden preferred, as in naval arms control generally, to have the issue brought up in large, international bodies such as the UN or multilateral bodies such as the forum of the CSCE. Swedish leaders likewise felt that to sign such an agreement would put them at a disadvantage with a superpower. Furthermore, signing a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union, and not with the United States, could be challenged from the standpoint of balance and impartiality.

The Norwegian approach to the issue was greatly affected by its membership in NATO. Most important for Norway was the precedent whereby other NATO countries had previously signed such bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union. If there were to be any question about the treaty-in-practice, it could best be resolved with the help of its alliance partners. Also, Norwegian efforts to limit the treaty to a document of strictly technical-consultative character cleansed it of points of potential political pressure on Norway. As such the Incidents-at-Sea Treaty avoided being perceived as leaving open the possibility of the Soviet Union receiving a *droit de regard* in its relationship with Norway.

A comparison of Norwegian and Swedish perception and policy on the port calls issue again reveals important junctures where the different effects of neutrality and alignment are felt. While both Sweden and Norway have formulated set approaches to the problem, it is only Sweden which has taken an active role, demanding, as it does, guarantees from visiting vessels that they are nuclear-weapons free. Again, at the root of this policy is a Swedish desire to maintain clarity in its border relations with the superpowers. In the view of the Swedish leadership, not being able to claim publicly that vessels entering its ports are nuclear-free damages Sweden's external credibility and ostensibly compromises Sweden's strict interpretation of territorial inviolability. Norwegian leaders, perhaps justifiably, believe that a stricter Norwegian approach would firstly result in isolation from its allies in times of crisis and secondly, call into question Norway's loyalty to accepted NATO policy. At the same time, banning NATO port calls would result in a potential diminution of

a Western naval presence in the Norwegian Sea, designed to offset the Soviet military advantage one of the key advantages connected with Norway's NATO membership.

Swedish leaders have pursued the ideal of a nuclear-free neighbourhood, consistent with its high profile in international disarmament more generally. In this they have been careful to pursue a policy which cannot be interpreted as being partial to either bloc. Thus, they have been satisfied with demanding written reassurances that visiting ships do not carry nuclear weapons. However, as is usual with neutrality, Sweden has been caught between that which is desirable--ridding the seas of nuclear weapons--and what is possible--namely obtaining undisputed evidence would mean violating international law while also closing the Baltic Sea to all but one nuclear power. The price Sweden would have to pay for a stricter practice would be accompanied by a compromise on its stance towards international law, its neutrality and its desired position mid-way between the superpower blocs.

While the respective Norwegian and Swedish maritime-delimitation disputes with the Soviet Union were chiefly of a legal character, even these questions had security policy overtones. A resolution of either the Baltic or the Barents problem-areas would have consequences in the countries' economic, political and security relationships with the Soviet Union.

At a relatively early stage, 1978, Norway, under strong pressure from fishing interests, deemed a 'grey zone' arrangement proper in a portion of the disputed area. A chief consideration was whether this would give the Soviet Union a say in Norwegian internal affairs. Considering Norway's NATO connection, such an influence could be greatly discounted. It could tolerate a degree of 'murkiness' in its relations with the Soviet Union so as to obtain something which was economically desirable.

The standpoint of Swedish leaders has been quite the opposite--clarity in the question was of the utmost importance. Signing such an unclear agreement would put Sweden on uneven footing with a superpower-- a position, for which, unlike Norway, it could not be compensated by a military protector. This illustrates the fact that it is much more difficult for a neutral country to

cooperate with a non-neutral than a country which is part of an alliance. Therefore, a 'white zone' arrangement reigned until the conflict's resolution in 1988.

Both Norway and Sweden have stood by their insistence to have the International Court of Justice decide the matter, and both states have defended a division according to the median principle. The Soviet Union traditionally objected to the use of international courts in the case of jurisdictional disputes. In the Norwegian case, the Soviet Union, referring to 'special circumstances' in the conflict, approached the question calling on the sector-line principle. The Norwegian resistance to the sector principle was strengthened knowing that the U.S. had also opposed this principle in previous disputes with the USSR.

In 1988 the Swedish delimitation of the Baltic Sea towards the Soviet Union was resolved. Swedish leaders attributed success not only to the skill of its negotiators, but also to its attachment to the principles of international law. While at the time of writing the Norwegian-Soviet dispute remained open, Norwegians were keen to remind that the strength from its NATO ties imbued it with a patience which allowed them to wait for a solution which was desirable rather than one which was pressed upon them.

The question of Norwegian and Swedish perceptions and behaviour towards the Baltic independence drive was also a political-legal problem with security-policy relevance. The Swedes at a very early stage recognized the annexation of the three Baltic states into the body of the Soviet Union. To complicate history, Sweden's Government reversed its promise of asylum to Baltic refugees, deporting, in 1946, those Baltic citizens which had arrived in Sweden to take up this invitation. Norway, in keeping with the majority of Western, future NATO members, refused to accept this incorporation. These differing historical perspectives created both opportunities and restraints regarding Swedish and Norwegian policy until both countries' establishment of formal diplomatic ties in late August, 1991.

Sweden adopted a much higher profile on the Baltic issue, at an earlier stage, than did Norway. At a very early stage the Baltic question became politically divisive in Sweden. Beginning with the Conservative Party, soon followed by

the Liberal Party's support, the opposition parties consistently criticized the Government's handling of the issue--referring to what was in Sweden one of the trademarks of neutrality: to raise the Baltic cause in international fora. The Government relentlessly dismissed the opposition's views as being politically-motivated and unreasonable, only in late 1990 deciding to advocate the question of Baltic independence in international fora. The Government also preferred to discuss the issue with the Soviet Union in quiet diplomatic terms, such that it would not be interpreted as being partial in the conflict. These differing perspectives created a major foreign policy conflict, finally resulting in the establishment of majority political party consensus on the way forward for Swedish policy towards the area.

Norway avoided such a political battle, taking the issue up for the first serious time only in 1990. There were no foreign policy crises relating to Norwegian Baltic policy. The Norwegians learnt from the Swedish handling of the question and experienced, relative to Sweden, an even road to its recognition of Baltic independence.

A central dilemma for the Swedish and the Norwegian governments was how to show support for the Baltics while still maintaining open dialogue with the Soviet central Government. One way for Sweden to foster its Baltic contacts while still been seen as 'impartial' was to open cultural and economic exchanges with the Baltic republics. Only indirectly could these efforts be interpreted as meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union--and thus as being partial to the conflict.

Sweden's official recognition of the Baltic states' annexation made possible visits and consular representation in the Baltics--and thus opened extra communication channels into the Baltic region. Norway, which had not recognized this incorporation, was unable to send official representatives from Moscow to visit the Baltic republics--they were, on paper, not a part of the Soviet Union. This difficulty of representation was further highlighted in the Swedish and Norwegian political parties' (not Governments') invitations to Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene to visit these countries in connection with Lithuania's independence declaration. Here, the Swedish Government's desire



to play the role of quiet mediator between Vilnius and Moscow became obvious. Playing this role would of course be seen as enhancing Sweden's ostensibly impartial stance in the conflict between the two capitals. Also, referring to Swedish principles of recognition--'universality' and 'effectivity'--and by inserting references to international law, Sweden could be seen as behaving according to objective standards in the recognition question.

Norway was restrained in its position over Lithuanian independence by several factors. Norway could not be seen as behaving out of step with NATO and its own bilateral interests with the Soviet Union. A high profile over the issue could potentially damage ongoing U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations, while simultaneously endangering Norwegian-Soviet co-operation on the environment, on the Barents Sea question, to name two examples. It was thus in consideration of these interests that members of the Norwegian Government, in their capacity as party leaders rather than as Government members, received then-Lithuanian PM Prunskiene. The Norwegian position might also have been compromised if the Norwegian leadership, acting in their role as a Government, would have interfered in the Lithuanian oil crisis. The Government aimed, and was rather successful, in channelling, what was a political request into the commercial realm.

Both the Norwegian and Swedish Governments played key roles in placing the Baltic issue high on the Nordic Council(NR) agenda. Norwegian and Swedish utilization of the Council partially acted as a shield against Soviet pressure on each of the states' respective bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, essentially diluting and mixing together each Nordic state's security commitments to their common gain on the first concrete opportunity in the post-War period. The beauty of mixing these commitments was that external observers could not tell which exact positions each state took in the process--thus, individual states could not easily be criticized for particular stances. This mixing would not compromise Sweden's impartiality and neither would it compromise NATO policy. Sweden was following its natural multilateral tendencies. NATO policy over Baltic independence had not been fully developed nor clearly enunciated. Nevertheless, it was hard to see how

Norway could accept being interpreted as acting discordant relative to its fellow NATO members. Invitations to attend the NR's meetings and the founding of NR representation in the Baltic capitals were two concrete steps in this process.

Following the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachëv in late August, 1991, Western nations, Sweden and Norway prominent among them, established formal diplomatic ties with the Baltic countries—formally ending an historical epoch. Sweden's declaration obfuscated a formal denial of its wartime annexation declaration—but did mandate a reference to the 'objective' principles of recognition being fulfilled. Norway's position was matter-of-fact, simply restating its historical stance of never having accepted the annexation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union.

Security policy orientation explains little of why Sweden and Norway trade as they do with the Soviet Union. Only in a closer study of Sweden's and Norway's relationship to COCOM is one able to discern differing perceptions and behaviour which have their explanation in neutrality and alignment. However, since COCOM-sensitive goods are few within Norwegian and Swedish trade with the Soviet Union, security considerations play a relatively minor role in the context of Sweden's and Norway's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. It is striking in fact how similar Swedish and Norwegian perceptions and behaviour are in the area of trade policy and practice. As in 1947-9, the explanation for the low level of trade relations lies in purely commercial factors and realities. However, unlike 1947-9 there were no notable efforts at bolstering trade relations with the Soviet Union.

Trade with the Soviet Union under Gorbachëv has been less impressive than at any other time during the 1980's. Total trade between the Norwegians and the Soviet Union rose 12.5% (1989-90) while Swedish-Soviet trade dipped 16%. As in 1947-9, the Swedish trade deficit with the Soviet Union was consistently sharper than the Norwegian, which has traditionally maintained a relative balance in their exports to and imports from the Soviet Union. The composition of Soviet trade differs much from Sweden to Norway. While Norway, like Sweden has based the majority of its imports on oil and gas, Norway has

exported paper and pulp while Sweden has exported consumer goods (especially food-related) and engineering goods.

Before Gorbachëv, the Swedish and Norwegian characterizations of trade with the USSR were chiefly dominated by perceptions of lengthy negotiations, tremendous bureaucratic exercises, and the lack of suitable projects. To this already discouraging picture was added, in the late 1980's, a row of destabilizing political and economic factors which Gorbachëv has indirectly or directly played a role in bringing about. Furthermore, Swedish and Norwegian 'lack of effort' and 'courage' has resulted in minimal business engagement with the Soviet Union.

With the exception of initial excitement and euphoria from mostly small and medium companies--in which only limited amounts of large firms partook, the Gorbachëv years have clearly given way to disappointment on many points. The balance in the Soviet market has been offset by chiefly domestic economic and political difficulties--throwing an otherwise stable trade régime with the West into chaos. The outcome of this process has been payment defaults from Soviet firms, convertibility problems, decision-making confusion, soaring inflation, and strikes, just to name a few.

As a result of these complications, Swedish and Norwegian domestic financing and guarantee institutions adopted extremely restrictive financing and guarantee schemes for firms trying to enter the Soviet market. The Norwegian GIEK and Swedish EKN both came under pressure from business to grant politically-inspired guarantees for exports. However, only the Norwegian Government decided to intervene politically--chiefly to assist suffering Norwegian exporters of paper pulp and cellulose in Østfold, due to their dependence on the Soviet market. However, one cannot say that these steps were, in the least, attributable to security policy orientations. At the same time, élites perceived an amelioration in outstanding Soviet debt--crediting the improvement to a combination of domestic Swedish and Norwegian factors as well as Soviet payment priorities, both in terms of country (Sweden seen as prioritized for political reasons) and in terms of product categories (food-related product payments as prioritized).

Norwegian participation in COCOM has acted to enhance Norway's security policy choice while Sweden's COCOM adherence has discredited Sweden's neutral line. In short, Norway's participation in COCOM has meant that Norwegian trade with the Soviet Union has been dominated by military-strategic considerations. Seen from the Norwegian perspective, COCOM membership has acted to strengthen its Western economic, military and political commitment. Sweden's dependence upon COCOM-regulated technology has obliged it to abide by the rules, however timidly. The underlying logic of COCOM's founding clearly contradicts one of neutrality's basic tenets: acting independently and impartially in the East-West conflict. Sweden's challenge was how to seem impartial, while conceding its dependence on Western high technology.

Sweden's adherence to the COCOM statutes have meant compromising the credibility of Swedish neutrality in Soviet eyes. This has been the price of building confidence with the providers of COCOM technology. Seen from the U.S. perspective, and barring minor violations, Swedish loyalty to the COCOM rules rose sharply in the late 1980's as compared to pre-Gorbachëv, resulting in the granting of privileged 5(k) status from COCOM. Norwegian COCOM membership has acted to re-enforce the credibility of its Western commitment in the eyes of both the Soviet Union and its allies.

When Norway became involved in the Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk scandal in 1987, Norway's credibility within COCOM was seriously compromised. Seen in a wider perspective, this meant Norway's loyalty to accepted NATO norms was also at issue. As in Sweden, Norway then proceeded onto a comprehensive tightening of rules, control procedures and penalties--with "good" result.

Sweden, not a COCOM member, has consistently struggled with clarifying its formal position vis-à-vis COCOM. Under criticism chiefly from the Environmental and Left parties, the Government has consistently attempted to establish that it was not 'participating' in the rules only 'adhering' to them--as was necessary given its Western technological dependence. This debate undermined the official position of subsequent governments on the issue, making unmanageable the task of defending neutrality against COCOM's

ideology. The debate regarding Norway's legal-constitutional position on COCOM revealed deficiencies in Norway's formal standing vis-à-vis its fellow member states. However, this debate was led by the Socialist Left party and took place of the mainstream of decision-making circles.

Swedish and Norwegian industry, generally speaking, claim not to have suffered because their respective trade structures with the Soviet Union have not been dominated by COCOM-regulated goods and services. However, a closer look reveals that Swedish telecommunications products, computers, engineering equipment sectors have suffered. In Norway, marine technology, oil exploration technology and computer technology, all of which have a international comparative advantage, have suffered from the COCOM regulations, providing a significant hinderance to free trade.

The COCOM factor is the most tangible political factor affecting Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet trade. It has not only affected their economic relations but has also played an important role in their general political relations. COCOM is merely an additional stumbling block to free relations between nations. COCOM imposes conditions on the way both Norway and Sweden interact with the Soviet Union. However, recent events have pointed to COCOM's diminishing importance in both the economic and political relationship with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachëv's Murmansk initiative of October, 1987, excepting its security-policy aspects, signalled a changed Soviet perception of and approach to important aspects of Nordic-Soviet relations. Previously, the Soviet willingness to co-operate on the environment lacked substance--not least because security and environmental concerns were organically related in the pre-Gorbachëv years. The follow-up of the Murmansk speech shows evidence of a comprehensive re-evaluation of the Soviet practice to see questions, in a host of areas directly related to cooperation in the scientific, economic and environmental realms, through the prism of security-policy concerns. This work demonstrated the degree of progress which took place when security concerns were not the chief consideration. When Gorbachëv spoke of increased scientific, resource, and environmental cooperation in the North, he hit a favourable chord

in the ears of Nordic élites. Gorbachëv's approach showed evidence of desiring extra-regional actor participation--specifically naming NATO-members Canada and the U.S.--which added to its positive reception in Norway.

In the environmental realm, Norwegian scientists were invited to partake in what previously was seen as obtrusive experiments and monitoring. The data which was collected by these researchers was interpreted far more favourably in Moscow than had been the case in the past. This atmosphere of increasing mutual trust, led to the greater Swedish and Norwegian willingness to participate in joint-scientific enterprises. The joint Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian proposal to make the Nickel smelting works on the Murmansk peninsula environmentally safe could be counted as a result of this development.

The follow-up of Gorbachëv's proposal for enhanced economic cooperation in the Arctic and in the North was weak. To the extent that Gorbachëv had in mind joint oil-exploration, this question was regulated by established Norwegian policy on the unresolved delimitation question and COCOM guidelines. For the Swedes, mineral exploration possibilities were minimal, as a study commissioned by the Swedish MFA demonstrated. A development of further economic cooperation also fell due to the increasingly weak economic structure in the Soviet Union.

A point of major concern for Swedish and Norwegian leaders was Gorbachëv's mention of Soviet willingness to re-think the issue of nuclear-testing on nearby Novaya Zemlya. The Soviet Union, contrary to what had been forwarded in the speech, resumed underground nuclear blasts in the Fall of 1990. Sweden and Norway, together with their fellow Nordic colleagues, adopted similar stances on the blasts, although Sweden had previously been more vocal over the test-ban issue. This joint-Nordic *démarche* was partially possible through Gorbachëv's Helsinki speech--which assumed formal Nordic foreign policy cooperation when there was in fact was none. One may argue that Norway's NATO membership allowed officials to put the explosions into a wider perspective of other serious problems--e.g. the storing of nuclear waste underwater. Norwegian officials had to be careful not to over-emphasize the

seriousness, since its ally the U.S. had indicated no intention of initiating a test-ban.

The period 1987-1991 witnessed significant change in American-Soviet military relations and disarmament. However, evidence of these changes was much more obvious in Central than in Northern Europe. A study of Swedish and Norwegian reactions to Soviet disarmament proposals and behaviour revealed some interesting differences and similarities between the way a neutral state and an aligned state behave when faced with a changing security-policy environment.

Some of the reactions to Gorbachëv's proposals and behaviour were not influenced by Swedish and Norwegian security policy commitments, while others were. Progress on U.S.-USSR disarmament in its various forms--through the summits, the Stockholm Conference, the CFE Agreement, the INF Agreement, through Gorbachëv's 1988 UN speech, was applauded from both Oslo and Stockholm. However there appeared differing explanations as to the reason for movement on disarmament questions. The far Right in Norway presented Soviet movement on disarmament as being attributable to U.S. strength, alliance cohesion and cooperation. It further saw this success as a mandate for NATO's continuation. The NATO backbone also had another benefit--it comforted: key leaders felt that the Soviet buildup should not be exaggerated. This perspective contrasted to the far Left parties, and to some extent the Social Democratic and Labour parties, who tended to attribute a change more evenhandedly to both U.S. and Soviet desires and necessity to disarm.

Discussion of the shift in Soviet military resources from the centre to the Northern and Southern European flanks, was shunned by Swedes while being supported by the Norwegians. Perhaps at the root of this disagreement were not the facts--for it was obvious that there had been no significant Soviet scaling back of forces in the Northern areas. Rather, it was the central assumptions which the theory made: the Soviet Union was not disarming, only shifting its force structure--and the guilt for the armaments spiral was on the Soviet Union, an untenable position for Swedish neutrality.

One of the most difficult points of arms control has been naval disarmament. Both Norway and Sweden are intent on seeing a reduction of military activity in their vicinities. However, Norway's NATO membership and Sweden's neutral status imposed restrictions as to how far leaders may go to advocate this desire. Both leaderships are in, sometimes silent, agreement that the U.S. position is less flexible than the Soviet. However, as was demonstrated in the case of the NNWFZ, and the port call policy, the Norwegian Government is careful not to jeopardize its position vis-à-vis its allies by publicly raising the issue of naval arms control. It is cornered between the necessity of having an allied naval presence along its coastlines and the desire to reduce naval forces of both powers. The dilemma of neutrality is somewhat similar. Swedish leaders point out U.S. inflexibility, aware of the fact that their high public profile, in international organs such as the U.N. and the CSCE, makes them seem impartial from the U.S. perspective. Successive Swedish leaderships have nonetheless proved willing to pay this price, rather than to remain silent about an issue of paramount importance for them.

A look at the security-policy aspects of Gorbachëv's Murmansk speech is also telling of differing Swedish and Norwegian interpretations based on their differing security policies. At the outset, Norway was unusually receptive to the tone and letter of Gorbachëv's security-related proposals. Gorbachëv received credit for having presented his ideas with a focus on how they could be handled in an alliance-context. Naturally, Norwegian leaders stressed that the first proper forum in which to discuss these proposals was none other than NATO. The Swedes however, although admitting to the positive spirit of the speech, felt that wide-ranging issues should be handled in wide-ranging fora--preferably the United Nations. One common denominator between the Norwegian and Swedish reactions appeared: the Soviet Union was trying to regionalize the issue (e.g. through raising the NNWFZ). Further, both the Swedes and Norwegians interpreted the proposals as a Soviet attempt to divorce these nations from their multilateral perspective on security-related questions.



Sweden's commitment to neutrality plays a significant role in explaining the way in which the country's leadership perceives and interacts with the Soviet Union. Norway's NATO membership has likewise influenced its approach and view of a wide range of issue areas with the Soviet Union. The question becomes not whether defence commitment has an influence, rather exactly where, at which junctures, concerning which questions. An attempt has been made at pointing to these key points in the course of the body of this thesis. Admittedly, neutrality and alignment are limited as explanations of why Sweden and Norway saw the issues and acted upon them in the way they did. A host of other domestic and external factors also acted upon the two countries to adopt at times similar, at times differing approaches. This thesis contributes to the knowledge of what neutrality and alignment actually mean in the practice of daily diplomacy. It has attempted to spell out and analyze the interface between international diplomacy-in-practice and academic theorizing regarding neutrality and alignment.

#### *Sweden, Norway and the End of the Cold War*

The Cold War embedded in Western and Eastern decision-makers the tendency to think of their security interests in a narrow, military sense. Thus it was natural that commitments to either an alliance or neutrality, although chiefly of military significance, would also affect other major, say "softer" areas of these states' foreign policy. Thus, it was highly uncommon that, for example, a Swedish foreign policy official would not consider the explicit or indirect implications for Swedish neutrality of such questions as environmental, regional or economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. In other words, all foreign policy questions were funnelled through a nation's standing commitments in relation to the Cold War.

During the duration of the thesis' writing, one witnessed the near-total unravelling of the Soviet Union and the formal end to the Cold War. The major consequences for both East European and Western countries was both threat re-definition and the proportion of resources which should be dedicated to meeting that threat. However one of the effects of these events has been that

questions which bore no explicit military overtones were increasingly considered on their own substantive merits, and not considered through the spectacles of military security interests. Today, for example, as compared with 1947-9, Norwegian-CIS/Russian or Swedish-CIS/Russian trade questions have been stripped of many of its core political aspects. The future of relations between these countries promises also to have a much more pragmatic, problem-solving--rather than rhetorical, politico-security--character.

### *Comparing the case studies*

For the Norwegians, several sets of questions were logically linked to each other by virtue of history and geographical proximity to Russia. There exist common denominators in the Norwegian approaches to the Barents delimitation question, environmental cooperation, strategic issues in the North Sea-Barents Sea, the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Proposal. The underlying Norwegian approach is to delimit the influence of and seek clarity in its relationship with neighbouring Russia over these questions. The Soviet Union has been seen from Norway as continually putting forth proposals which would result in placing the lesser partner of such an eventual agreement, Norway, into a reduced or disadvantageous position. In the Norwegian foreign policy-making community there has been agreement over the need to present a united, consensual front so as to strengthen the Norwegian position in these areas. To further strengthen Norway's position, it has frequently called upon policy precedent in the NATO context and attempted to introduce multilateral solutions, with the additional assistance of international legal norms.

In the Swedish case, the logical common denominator, or the thread by which foreign policy questions hang together, has been each contemplated policy move's compatibility or incompatibility with neutrality. To be sure, neutrality is a rather slippery and flexible formulation. Neutrality has been used both as an absolute measure of Swedish foreign policy by which Swedish responses can be judged and as a relative term which has to be adapted to the particular situation. At different times, all foreign policy questions are subordinated to the interests of upholding neutrality. In a sense, neutrality

more easily subsumes trade policy, political policy, and military policy under one roof than can NATO policy.

### *Why Change or Stability?*

There remains no doubt that domestic and foreign policy changes in the Soviet Union itself were mainly responsible for the 'progress' on a whole range of bilateral Swedish and Norwegian questions with the former Soviet Union--from the Baltic independence issue to the resolution of the Swedish Baltic delimitation dispute. In this, a more lenient re-interpretation of what constituted 'core security interests' played a major role. There was no doubt that the Russians held the key which unlocked difficult situations or disputes which had been pent up for, in some cases, decades. For example, it was only when an initiative from high in the Soviet political hierarchy came that there was movement on the Swedish-Soviet Baltic Sea question. It was not until the Soviet officials began to realise that the exchange of environmental data was chiefly of mutual practical, rather than security- or political value to the West--that environmental cooperation between either Sweden and Norway and the Soviet Union took strides forward.

No change on particular issue areas--here could be counted the stability in Soviet strategic and military interests/presence in Northern areas--was mainly attributable to continuing Russian interests of defending the Russian heartland and its accesses. Continuing reports of Soviet submarine incursions in Sweden provide one often-cited example of the maintenance of similar core security interests. The attitudes of Norwegian and Swedish leaders clearly reflected this realisation, although military expenditures, especially in Sweden, but also to an extent in Norway, would slowly decrease as a result of the reduced Soviet threat in other parts of Europe. Even the rapid pace and extent of political and economic reform movements in the Soviet Union added to leaders' understanding of a dramatically changed threat picture. A third example could be the previous immobility over the Norwegian-Soviet Barents Sea delimitation dispute; core Soviet security interests may be one powerful explanation as to the lack of movement previous to late 1991.

On other issue areas, the responsibility for change was shared. Baltic independence was thus a product of Swedish, Norwegian and other Western pressures upon the then-Soviet Union, as well as a Russian realisation of the untenability of holding onto the Baltic republics over the long run.

*Private vs. Public policy change?*

The examination of first-hand sources has provided an opportunity to make a comparison and contrast between what the Government and foreign policy community were saying publicly versus what they were communicating privately to each other and in interviews with the author. The contrast between the facade of Swedish neutrality and the attitudes upon which it was based was starker than in the case of aligned Norway. A widely divergent spectrum of opinions exist about neutrality's desirability, practice, and meaning. As was very much in evidence in the examination of leaders in 1947-9, behind the facade of impartiality lie some very sharply critical views of Soviet foreign policy, which some would say constitute a violation of the spirit of neutrality. In the latter period, consensus was nearly total about the desirability and meaning of neutrality until at least the beginning of the serious debate regarding Swedish EEC membership and the formal end of the Cold War. Whilst sharply conservative schools of thought did exist regarding Soviet foreign policy, there was general agreement that there was no more desirable path to security than through neutrality.

The divergence between public policy and private attitudes was much greater in cases such as alleged Soviet violations of Swedish territorial waters than in the case of the Soviet-Swedish Baltic dispute--where consensus existed in great part regarding the goals, approach relating to and the desirability of a Baltic delimitation agreement. Swedish neutrality, which dictates that in the face of inconclusive evidence, Sweden must accuse no country by name, was confronted with the reality of two confirmed Soviet violations. These violations continued to orient decision-makers allegations towards the Soviet Union, flying in the face of what could publicly be said regarding the suspected intruder's national origin. Furthermore, neutrality-in-theory and practice collided in our

examination of Swedish 'adherence' to COCOM. For the sake of economic necessity, Swedish leaders were publicly forced to comply with Cold War regulations, a step which if given the chance, leaders would have paid almost any price to avoid; the contrast between the dictates of neutrality and the COCOM-regulated trade practices was stark.

The gap between public policy and private attitudes was much more narrow in the Norwegian case. Norway, in many ways, has attempted to 'market' itself as more NATO than NATO itself. While the Conservative Party was the closest adherent and supporter of NATO, the Labour Party, barring few minor incidents and its somewhat more benign interpretation of Soviet foreign policy generally, has also 'toed the NATO line' in its policy towards the Soviet Union. Norwegian NATO membership quite clearly lays down the acceptable attitudinal and policy parameters of the Norwegian leadership's approach to questions vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union.

#### *Similarities between Norwegian and Swedish approaches*

Irrespective of the many differences in Swedish and Norwegian behaviour towards the Soviet Union chiefly determined by their varying security commitments, there are many similarities between Norwegian and Swedish behaviour towards the Soviet Union. For example, Swedish and Norwegian leaders basically mirrored each other's perceptions of changes in Soviet strategic-military interests and behaviour in their region and worldwide. In essence, little disarmament was occurring in their vicinity, while large-scale cutbacks were occurring along the Central front in Europe. Also, there are more similarities than differences in the way the Norwegians and Swedes, in-practice, handled the Baltic independence question. Excepting the COCOM area, Swedes and Norwegians experienced and combatted similar problems and issues with respect to trade with the Soviet Union. Both have experienced negligible trade throughout the post-War period. Irrespective of the efforts to change the picture, Sweden and Norway's trade has been dominated by low volumes and raw-materials oriented patterns. However, the composition of trade has been quite different. While the chief import of both countries are oil-based, Sweden's

export to the Soviet Union was traditionally dominated by engineering goods, while Norway's export was dominated by paper-related products. While one may analyze these differences in terms of Norway's COCOM membership, one could also point to the differences in competitive advantage as the reason for these differences. Also, one could point to political factors, such as the Soviet-Norwegian border dispute as one reason that the seemingly abundant potential in Norwegian-Soviet trade in terms of oil exploration, has never been capitalised upon. Nonetheless one cannot avoid the conclusion that trade with the former Soviet Union has played a declining role in the foreign policies of Sweden and Norway up until the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a state.

### **An Eye to the Future**

The treatment of Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet relations with a focus on two time periods has illuminated some of the central underpinnings of neutral and aligned nations' foreign policies. This study not only describes and analyzes the end of an historic epoch in international politics, it also can be used to give guidance as to the future of Swedish, Norwegian and to some extent Russian/CIS foreign relations. Many of the patterns of Swedish and Norwegian behaviour described over the course of the thesis are likely to endure in coming years. After all, Soviet decision-making has been dominated by "the Russians."

Neither the phenomenon neutrality nor alignment is novel, and it is likely that even after the fall of the Soviet Union that they will persist in the relations between nations. To say that neutrality and NATO have lost their places in international politics is to neglect that the origins of neutrality and NATO were only partly attributed to the superpower conflict. Swedish neutrality, for example, after all, has strong historical roots and Norwegian NATO membership was greatly a result of a surprise attack by Germany—not the Soviet Union. Furthermore, to say that the only reason for or benefit of forming an alliance or maintaining neutrality was to keep potential aggressors at a distance overlooks other benefits connected with these security choices. For example, neutrality has provided Sweden with tremendous flexibility in its foreign relations, many times it has been able to play "mediator" where other

states have been barred. NATO membership has provided a tremendous political, cultural and social exchange between Western European countries and with the U.S. and Canada.

If one were to take a more pessimistic view, a perspective relatively common with both Swedish and Norwegian officials, none of the changes which have come about in the former Soviet Union are totally irreversible. In fact, some of the most threatening parts of the former Soviet Union's existence--its military capabilities, its geographical proximity, its past historical relationship with the region--remain today. As former Soviet Premier Bulganin once said, "we cannot do anything about geography." Barring the newly-independent Baltic countries, irrespective of what form the land mass to the East of the Scandinavian peninsula takes, whether Russia, the CIS, or some other name, it will still remain the dominant military power centre in the region. This is a fact that will doubtless need to be considered by Norwegian and Swedish decision-makers for many years to come.

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### *Public Records*

The record of debates in the Swedish Parliament, abbreviated to "Riksdagsprotokoll" for periods 1/1947-12/1949 and 1/1985-5/1991 unless otherwise indicated in footnote

The record of debates in the Norwegian Parliament, abbreviated to "Forhandlinger i Stortinget" for periods 1/1947-12/1949 and 1/1985-4/1991 unless otherwise indicated in footnote

Swedish Foreign Ministry diplomatic dispatches and reports abbreviated to "UDS." The protocols of the Swedish Foreign Policy Advisory Committee(*Utrikesnämnden*) are abbreviated by "UN." Time period examined: 1/1947-12/1949 unless otherwise indicated in footnote. Actual records utilized are as quoted in footnotes, according to official, in-house Swedish MFA scheme.

Norwegian Foreign Ministry diplomatic dispatches and reports, abbreviated to "UDN" Time period examined: 1/1947-12/1949 unless otherwise indicated in footnote. Actual records utilized are as quoted in footnotes, according to official, in-house Norwegian MFA scheme.

British Foreign Ministry diplomatic dispatches and reports from Foreign Office London, from British legations in both Stockholm and Oslo. Available at Public Records Office, Kew, London. Time period examined: 6/1946-12/1949 Actual records utilized are recorded in footnotes.

### *Media Sources*

Norwegian dailies *Aftenposten* and *Arbeiderbladet* were examined and utilized for the period 1/1985-9/1991. Articles utilized are properly footnoted.

Swedish dailies *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Dagens Nyheter* were examined and utilized for the period 1/1985-9/1991. Articles utilized are properly footnoted.

Various other arterial periodicals were also utilized and are referenced accordingly in the footnotes.

## *INTERVIEWS*

### Key

1= subject partook in first round of preliminary interviews;  
subject's comments not integrated into text unless interviewed in second,  
final round--and as indicated  
Time frame for preliminary interviews (7/1988-8/1990)

2= subject partook in final, personal interview.  
Final interviews took place between 11/1990-2/1991 unless  
otherwise indicated in footnote. Only the results of  
these FINAL interviews are utilized in the thesis.

### A note on interviews

The status of each interview was clarified with the interviewee before beginning questioning. A clear majority of the interview subjects preferred to speak on a 'non-attributational' basis--meaning that his words could be cited, but not connected with his name. Interviews which are footnoted with a letter (either S or N for Sweden or Norway) and a number are such non-attributational interviews. The key to such a list, and the full-text of the interviews were made available to the examiners of this thesis. Other individuals spoke unconditionally and their names are fully quoted in the text.

### Key to Norwegian Interviewees

Arnljot Alfsen  
Soviet desk officer, Norwegian Export Council  
(2)

Svein Andreassen  
Northern Area Affairs, MFA  
(2)

Per Antonsen  
Department of the Environment  
(2)

Jon Bech  
Conservative Party MP; Chancellor: MFA, London  
(1)

Gunnar Berge  
Labour MP  
(2)

Bjørn Bjørnsen  
Soviet trade div., Norwegian Export Council  
(2)

Per Bondesen  
Eksportfinans A/S, Oslo  
(2)

Kjell Magne Bondevik  
Christian People's Party Chair; Foreign Min.  
(2)

Hans Brattestå  
Administrative head, *Stortinget*  
(1)

Jens Breivik  
Division Head, Trade Dept., MFA  
(2)

May Britt Brofoss  
Soviet affairs division, MFA  
(2)

Arne O. Brundtland  
Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Olav Bücher-Johannessen  
Ambassador: Moscow and Stockholm  
(2)

Trygve Bull  
Former Communist Party Official  
(2)

General V. Bull-Hansen  
Norwegian Armed Forces Comdr.-in-Chief, ret.  
(1,2)

Rune Castberg  
Fridtjof Nansen Institute  
(1)

Paul Chaffey  
Socialist Left MP  
(2)

Kjell Dalen  
MFA, Oslo and London  
(1)

Kai Eide  
Undersecretary of State; Advisor to Foreign Minister; Statoil  
(2)

Einar Førde  
Labour MP and Norwegian Television  
(1)

Bjørn Tore Godal  
Labour MP  
(2)

Ingvald Godal  
Conservative MP  
(2)

Carl I. Hagen  
Progress Party leader and MP  
(2)

Helga Hernes  
Undersecretary of State, MFA  
(2)

Tønne Huitfeldt  
General, Inst. for Defence Studies, Oslo  
(1)

Tor-Martin Ingebretsen  
Soviet desk, Guarantee Inst. for Export Credits (GIEK)  
(2)



Tor-Sverre Jacobsen  
Vice President, Norsk Hydro  
(2)

Thorbjørn Jagland  
Party Secretary, Labour Party  
(2)

Johan K. Jakobsen  
Centre Party Chairman, Member of Conservative Government  
(2)

Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl  
Fridtjof Nansen Institute  
(1)

Kjell Kjellsbæck  
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs  
(1)

Poul Koht  
Former (47-9) MFA Official  
(2)

Theo Koritzinsky  
Socialist Left MP  
(1,2)

Olav Fagelund Knudsen  
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs  
(1)

Haakon Lie  
Former (47-9) Labour Party Official  
(2)

Sverre Lodgaard  
Director, Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)  
(1)

Sten Lundbo  
Bureau Head, Export Control, MFA  
(2)

Ivar Lunde  
Former MFA Official  
(2)

Finn Malvig  
Expert, Defence Ministry  
(2)

Arild Moe  
Fridtjof Nansen Institute  
(1)

Øyvind Nordsletten  
Soviet division chief, MFA  
(1)

Are-Jostein Norheim  
International Organisations Division, MFA  
(2)

R. Næss  
MFA  
(2)

I. Nålsund  
Undersecretary for Trade, MFA  
(2)

Rolf Pedersen  
Inspector General, Norwegian Navy  
(2)

Jan Petersen  
Conservative Party MP  
(1,2)

Tomas Ries  
Institute for Defence Studies  
(1)

Olav Riste  
Institute for Defence Studies  
(1)

Odd Henrik Robberstad  
Vice President, Eastern Europe-Norsk Hydro  
(2)

Audun Rundhovde  
Soviet desk officer, MFA  
(2)

Hans Røsjorde  
Progress Party MP  
(2)

Svein Saether  
Disarmament Ambassador, MFA  
(2)

Carl Salicath  
MFA, Oslo  
(1)

Kåre Sandegren  
Int'l Secretary, Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions  
(2)

Turid Skancke  
Soviet Trade Division, MFA  
(2)

Arne Solli  
Inspector General, Norwegian Army  
(2)

Anders Sjaastad  
Conservative MP and former Defence Minister  
(1)

John Kristen Skogan  
Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Undersec'y- Defence Department  
(2)

Finn Sollie  
Consultant- MFA; Northern Perspectives Group  
(1,2)

Reiulf Steen  
Labour MP  
(1)

Dagfinn Stenseth  
Ambassador to Moscow and Head of Planning, MFA  
(1,2)

Svenn Stray  
Foreign Minister, Retired  
(2)

Anders Talleraas  
Conservative MP  
(2)

Kim Traavik  
NATO Division, MFA  
(2)

Per Tresselt  
Legal Department Chief, Consul General-Berlin  
(1)

Harald Tørum  
Soviet trade bureau chief, MFA  
(2)

A. Walby  
Organisation of Paper Producers, Oslo  
(2)

Kjeld Vibe  
Foreign Counsel, MFA and Ambassador to Washington, D.C.  
(1)

Helge Vindenes  
Foreign Counsel, MFA  
(2)

Geir Westgaard  
MFA: Soviet desk officer and Political Secretary, Moscow  
(2)

Kåre Willoch  
Conservative Party leader, MP, Local Politician  
(1,2)

Ole Ålgård  
Former MFA Official  
(2)

Bjørn Skogstad Aamo  
Undersecretary of State, Prime Minister's Office  
(2)

Olav Aamoth  
Inspector General, Norwegian Air Force  
(2)

Tor Østbø  
Eksportfinans A/S, Oslo  
(2)

Bjørn Frode Østern  
Bureau Head, Trade Department, MFA  
(2)

Willy Østreng  
Director, Fridtjof Nansen Institute  
(1)

### Key to Swedish Interviewees

Nils Andrén  
Stockholm University and Swedish Inst. for Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Göran Berg  
Deputy Political Director, MFA  
(1)

Örjan Berner  
Ambassador: Warszaw, Delhi, Moscow  
(1,2)

Thomas Bertelman  
Soviet desk officer, MFA and Chancellery Head, *Riksdag's* For. Aff. Comm.  
(1,2)

Carl Bildt  
Conservative Party leader; Prime Minister  
(1)

Kaj Björk  
Retired Social Democratic politician  
(2)

Katarina Brodin  
Security Advisor, MFA  
(1,2)

Dick Börjesson  
Navy-Marine Chief  
(2)

Staffan Carlsson  
Head of Soviet bureau, MFA; Counsellor, Washington, D.C.  
(1)

Lars Christiansson  
Svenska Dagbladet and Swedish Federation of Industries  
(1)

Sven Dahlman  
Former MFA Official  
(2)

Ingemar Dörfer  
Swedish Defence Research Institute  
(1)

Alf Edeen  
Soviet expert, MFA and retired  
(1)

Desirée Edmar  
Prime Minister's Office  
(2)

Hans Ekdahl  
Swedish Federation of Industries  
(2)

Björn Eklind  
Swedish Defence Research Institute  
(1)

Jan Eliasson  
Political Director, Swedish Perm. Rep to UN  
(2)

Göran Ennerfelt  
Chief Executive, Johnson Concernen  
(2)

Sture Ericson  
Social Democratic Party MP  
(2)

Andreas Ekman  
Head of Soviet trade division, MFA  
(2)

Per Forslind  
**Svenska Dagbladet**  
(1)

Björn Fridtjofsson  
Soviet desk officer, Export Credit Board (EKN)  
(2)

Per Gahrton  
Environmental Party MP  
(2)

Kristian Gerner  
History Department, University of Lund  
(1)

Pär Granstedt  
Centre Party MP  
(2)

Bengt Gustafsson  
Swedish Chief-of-Defence  
(2)

Nils Gylden  
Planning Chief, Defence Ministry  
(1,2)

Jan Hallenberg  
Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm  
(1)

Thomas Hart  
Swedish Institute for Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Stefan Hedlund  
Economics Department, Lunds University and Uppsala University  
(1)

Jan Hildingstam  
Soviet division, Alfa-Laval  
(2)

Jarl Hjalmarsson  
Former Conservative Party Leader  
(2)

Sven Hirdman  
Beijing Ambassador, War Materials Inspector, MFA  
(1,2)

Håkan Holmberg  
Liberal Party MP  
(2)

Bo Hugemark  
Colonel, Instructor-Swedish Military College  
(1)

Bo Hult  
Director, Swedish Institute for Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Gunnar Hökmark  
Conservative Party MP  
(2)

Thomas Hörberg  
Desk Officer, MFA and Head of International Secretariat, *Riksdag*  
(1,2)

Ruth Jacoby  
East European Aid Coordinator, MFA  
(2)

Erland Jansson  
Nordic Cooperation Committee  
(1)

Gunnar Jarring  
Advisor, Johnson Concernen  
(1)

Gunnar Jervas  
Swedish Defence Research Institute  
(1)



Olof Johansson  
Centre Party leader, Minister of Agriculture  
(2)

Lena Jonson  
Swedish Institute for Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Christer Jönsson  
Soviet desk officer, MFA; Political Science University of Lund  
(1)

Per Jönsson  
Editor, **Dagens Nyheter**  
(1)

Leif Kihlsten  
Soviet expert, Defence Staff; Swedish Defence Research Institute  
(1,2)

Gunnar Klinga  
Soviet trade office, War Materials Office, MFA  
(2)

Leif Lagerstedt  
Soviet affairs, Kommerskollegium, MFA  
(2)

Gunnar Lassinantti  
Peace Forum of the Worker's Movement  
(1)

Leif Leifland  
London Ambassador, Retired  
(1)

Hans Lindblad  
Liberal Party MP  
(2)

Bengt Lundell  
Department of Political Science, University of Lund  
(1)

Lars-Eric Lundin  
Officer, MFA  
(2)

Lennart Myrsten  
MFA: Belgrade Ambassador, Negotiator, ret.  
(2)

Lars-Åke Nilsson  
Prague Ambassador, Undersecretary of State, MFA  
(1)

Johan Nordenfalk  
Ambassador and Swedish Export Council  
(2)

Tiina Nordlöf  
Department of Political Science, University of Göteborg, deceased  
(1)

Jan-Olof Nyström  
Soviet division head, Swedish Export Council  
(2)

Bengt Olofsson  
Soviet desk officer, Industry Department  
(2)

Hans Olsson  
Soviet Desk Officer, MFA  
(1,2)

Jan Prawitz  
Expert, Defence Ministry  
(2)

Magnus Robach  
U.S. Trade desk officer, MFA  
(2)

Åke Sagrén  
Swedish Army Chief  
(2)

Henrik Sallander  
Disarmament division head, MFA  
(2)

Olof Santesson  
Editor, **Dagens Nyheter**  
(1)

Gudrun Schyman  
Left Party MP  
(2)

Peter Semneby  
Soviet trade officer, MFA and officer, Moscow Embassy  
(2)

Per-Olof Sjöstedt  
East European Market Chief, Ericsson Telecom  
(2)

Gunnar Sjöstedt  
Swedish Institute for Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Lennart Skarp  
Soviet desk officer, Swedish Export Credit Board (EKN)  
(2)

Michael Sohlman  
Undersecretary of State for Trade, MFA  
(2)

Åke Sparring  
Swedish Institute for Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Mats Staffansson  
MFA officer: Stockholm and London  
(1)

Ingjald Starråker  
Soviet Expert, MFA  
(1,2)

Gunnar Stenarv  
International Secretary, Social Democratic Party; Advisor to For. Minstr., MFA  
(2)

Bengt Sundelius  
Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm  
(1)

Mats Svegfors  
Political Editor, Svenska Dagbladet  
(1)

Jakub Swiecicki  
Swedish Institute for Foreign Affairs  
(1)

Bertil Swärd  
Retired diplomat  
(2)

Karin Söder  
Centre Party MP  
(2)

Daniel Tarschys  
Uppsala University and Liberal Party MP  
(1)

Maj-Britt Theorin  
Social Democratic MP; Disarmament Ambassador  
(1,2)

Anders Thunborg  
Minister of Defence, Ambassador-Washington, D.C.  
(1,2)

Margaretha af Ugglas  
Conservative MP, Foreign Minister  
(2)

Krister Wahlbäck  
Counsellor, Helsinki Embassy; Security Advisor, MFA  
(1)

Hans-Gustav Wessberg  
Spokesman, Military Staff Headquarters  
(1)

Bengt Westerberg  
Liberal Party leader, Social Minister  
(2)

Carl Johan Åberg  
Governor, Head of 1988 Defence Commission  
(2)

Anders Åslund  
Head, Östekonomiska Institutet, Economic Officer, MFA  
(1,2)

Sverker Åström  
Retired Diplomat  
(1,2)

Ove Öberg  
Vice President, Alfa-Laval  
(2)

Bengt Östh  
Air Force Chief of Staff  
(2)