Mediating the Nation:
News, Audiences and Identities in Contemporary Greece

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the relationship between media and identities in contemporary Greece. Acknowledging the diversity of Greek society, the study follows the circulation of discourses about the nation and belonging and contrasts the articulation of identities at a local level with the discourses about the nation in the national media. Through a series of case studies I examine how people of Greek, Cypriot and Turkish origins living in Athens articulate their identities through everyday practices and media use. At the same time I investigate the television news discourse which is nationalized, largely projecting an essentialist representation of identity that does not reflect the complexity of the society it claims to describe. The study follows the shifts in peoples’ discourses according to context and observes that it is in their encounters with the news media, compared to other contexts, that some of the informants express a more closed discourse about difference and belonging. This points to the power of the media, through a number of practices, to raise the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion in public life. Hence, while for the majority of the Greek speakers the news is a common point of reference, for the Turkish speakers it is often a reminder of their 'second class citizenship' and exclusion from public life. Public discourse, much dominated by the media in the case of Greece, is a complex web of power relations, subject to constant negotiation.

This is an interdisciplinary study that draws upon a number of theories and approaches by means of a theoretical and methodological triangulation. The thesis aims to contribute primarily to two literatures, namely media and audience studies – particularly the developments towards a theory of mediation – and the literature that addresses the relationship between media and identity. In the light of the analysis of the empirical findings the study argues that neither of the hitherto dominant paradigms in theorising the relationship between media and identity (namely, strong media/weak identities and weak media/powerful identities) is adequate to describe what emerges as a multifaceted process. What is proposed is an approach that takes into account both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective. Media and identities should be understood in a dialectical fashion where neither is foregrounded from the start. The concepts of culture and the nation are understood through a historical perspective that recognises their constructedness and diversity. Identity is conceptualised as relational and performative rather than fixed and stable.
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1. Introduction

On April 26 1999, thousands of people gathered in the central square of Athens for a concert, albeit a rather unusual one. People were holding flags of all sorts: Greek flags were prominent, often tied together with Serbian ones; there were also flags symbolising the Byzantine Empire and those of the communist party. People were also holding candles and posters with anti-military and anti-American slogans. On stage paraded over sixty of Greece's artists, mainly musicians, singers and actors. In the end they all sang together under the direction of Mikis Theodorakis, a famous Greek composer. The concert which lasted five hours was a peace concert against the NATO bombings in Kosovo and Serbia. It was co-organised by one of the private television channels and was broadcast through live links by almost all terrestrial channels.

Images like this were rather common in Athens in 1999. And indeed throughout the 1990s there were several occasions for protest marches and rallies in defence of 'national rights'. The reader may be familiar with the vastly attended rallies during the Macedonia controversy in 1993. Television has been omnipresent in these events, sometimes not only broadcasting but also co-organising them (as happened in the case of the peace concert above). It was through observing such instances in Greek public life that the ideas for this thesis were born. Were the media responsible (and if so, to what extent) for the gathering of one million people in the centres of Athens and Thessaloniki in 1993?

1 Mikis Theodorakis is a composer. He became one of the symbols of resistance during the Colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974) and is still a widely respected public figure. He has also served as an MP in recent years for both the conservative administration and the socialists.

2 Kosovo and Kosova are the Serbian and Albanian names of the province respectively. The choice is politically charged (as well as that between Kosovars or Kosovans, the names of the people of the province). In Greece only the Serbian name was used. In the thesis I use the name Kosovo on the grounds that this has been the name most commonly used to refer to the conflict in the relevant literature (see among others, Ignatieff, 2000; European Journal of Communication, Special Issue on the reporting of the Kosovo conflict, September 2000).

This thesis investigates the relationship between media and identities in the context of Greece. My interest in this topic stemmed from observations regarding the resurgence of nationalism\(^4\) in Greece in the 1990s, and the deregulation and commercialisation of its broadcasting system\(^5\). These two issues are related as private television channels played a central role in orchestrating and broadcasting public rituals as well as adding a sensationalist touch to the reporting of national issues during that period. These observations were coupled with an existing theoretical interest in the relationship between media and identity dating back to my first degree when I participated in a research project on refugee identities in Greece. In my MSc degree I continued in the same vein by investigating the negotiation of identities among British Cypriots in London through practices of cultural consumption. In these theoretical and empirical explorations I was increasingly interested in identifying an approach that would allow for the dynamism of identities to emerge without reifying them.

The nationalistic orientation of the broadcast media, and television in particular, became even more apparent after distancing myself from Greek media and politics during the last six years. The benefit of developing an “outsider’s” point of view was a more critical eye on media practices and public life in Greece and an ability to discern the hegemonic quality of nationalism. During various national crises involving Turkey I was in London, constantly comparing the news from Greece with what I read in the British or other European media. My brief experience in the European Commission’s Spokesman’s service in Brussels in 1997 also contributed to the shaping of my initial research questions. It was particularly through the contact with Greek journalists that I started thinking about the mediation of national issues.

So the initial research question was whether the media and television in particular is a catalyst for belonging to the nation. How do viewers interpret what they see on their

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\(^4\) This does not mean that national issues were not on the agenda previously. On the contrary, Greek-Turkish relations are renowned for their fragility. The events in Cyprus in the 1960s and the invasion of the island in 1974 put a further strain on the relationship. But in the 1990s the agenda of national issues did not only include the disputes with Turkey and the Cyprus problem, but also the so-called Macedonia issue (these issues are discussed further in Chapter 3).

\(^5\) The Greek broadcasting landscape underwent some serious transformations during the 1990s. After deregulation in 1989, private terrestrial channels proliferated creating a chaotic broadcasting environment with no regulation in the beginning. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 4 — section 4.3.3.
screens? What does it mean for their sense of nationhood? How can their interpretations and critical competences be determined? Does television provide some kind of ‘social glue’, binding people together, as the relevant literature suggests?

In order to identify ways of theorising the media and identity relationship it became increasingly clear that I had to start from identity and what it means. The more I read on identity, and identities in Greece in particular, the more it became apparent that it was difficult to speak about a common and homogenous Greek identity. A historical perspective on identities in Greece revealed their changing and dynamic character through time. Such explorations were partly driven by a more personal realisation that involved my own family history and the fact that my great-grandfather, a Greek speaking Christian, lived in the Istanbul suburb of Tarabia until the turn of the 19th century. The awareness of the constructedness and changing character of identities in the Greek context emerged in stark contrast to the official discourses about the nation found in the media and school textbooks.

To ignore these historical trajectories and the diversity within the nation would be to start with a false assumption. Moreover, focusing on an isolated national case and its media emerged as problematic: Greek audiences do not rely solely on national news sources to become informed; they have access to a variety of resources, from global channels (like CNN) and the foreign press, to the internet and their personal experiences through travelling, working or studying abroad.

Taking the constructedness of identities as a starting point, I became increasingly interested in the different ways in which identities acquire legitimacy and become naturalised. Recognising that such constructions are ongoing, I decided to focus on the ways in which people articulate their identities and how they shift from more open to more closed discourses. To use Robins’ words, I decided to explore the

\[\ldots\] possibilities of dynamism and openness in cultural identities, and consequently \[\ldots\] what inhibits and resists such qualities, promoting in their place rigidity and closure (Robins, 1996b: 61).

In this context, I became particularly interested in whether the media have any role to play in these discursive shifts, from openness to closure and vice versa. Instead of asking whether the media catalyse a sense of belonging, I decided to ask what impact,
if any, the media have on the ways people talk about themselves and the nation. Such an approach respects the dynamism of identities and the diversity within the nation.

Media in this study are understood both as technologies/objects and as texts. Through a series of case studies I explore how people of different cultural or ethnic backgrounds living in Athens, namely the Greeks, the Cypriots and the Turks, articulate their identities both in relation to the media that they use and in relation to the news. The following paragraphs will justify some of the decisions relating to the topic and the research design. The research centres on two related case studies: the first focuses on the reporting of a relatively routine incident ('the violation of Greek airspace by Turkish planes' which took place in October 1998). Such incidents have been common in recent years, and in that respect may be considered routine. The second case study focuses on the reporting of an international crisis (the NATO offensive in Kosovo and Serbia in Spring 1999). The idea behind the inclusion of the two events in the research draws from the arguments on ‘banal nationalism’ and ‘media events’ (Billig, 1995 and Dayan and Katz, 1992, respectively).

There are three reasons that led me to consider the ‘Kosovo crisis’. First of all, the events in Kosovo caused a lot of concern in Greece and had a large impact at a public level (for example, demonstrations and protests against the bombings became an everyday routine). The fact of geographic proximity and a concern about the instability of the Balkans also ‘internalised’ the problem. On the other hand, Kosovo was still an event of international concern, which encouraged people to use alternative (to national) resources to get informed (such as the internet, foreign press and television channels). More importantly, the Kosovo study introduced a local/global dimension in the analysis, allowing me to explore the ways in which viewers living in Greece articulate their identities both in relation to the Greek and global media.

The other issue that requires justification is why I decided to consider people from minorities in this study. There are many reasons for this, the first being that it seemed problematic to look at an increasingly multicultural society without taking into

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6 It is indicative that the daily newspaper Ta Nea (the newspaper with the highest circulation figures) moved the reports about Kosovo from the International Affairs pages to the Greece/Politics pages on 28/3/1999.
account the minorities in the sample. Second, following Anderson’s argument in *Imagined Communities* (1983), that the media bind the nation together, one wonders how that may work in the case of a minority group. Moreover, if nationalism is hegemonic, then the marginalised and oppressed should be included in the research design. Most importantly, minorities contest the naturalisation of the nation state and provide an interesting case study to explore issues of inclusion and exclusion.

To talk about minorities in Greece is a thorny issue. First of all, Greece does not recognise any national or ethnic minorities. The only minority it recognises is a religious one, the Muslim minority of Western Thrace. This study includes informants from the Turkish minority living in Athens, who are Greek citizens. They are members of an invisible minority about which little has been written. It is indicative of their annihilated status within Athenian society that, whenever I mentioned that I was interviewing Turks living in Athens for my doctoral research, people would reply ‘but there are no Turks in Athens’. Chapter 3 discusses the case of the Turkish minority in more detail.

Conversely, Greek Cypriots are often regarded by the official discourse as belonging to the same nation [*ethnos*] as Greek people although Cypriots living in Greece are not necessarily Greek citizens. Nonetheless, despite the links with Greece (language and cultural traditions being the most obvious), as Loizos has remarked, ‘to attempt to classify Cyprus sociologically as a “region of Greece” is to follow a line of thought that concludes that the Turkish minority had no rightful place in the 1960 independent republic’ (Loizos, 1976: 361). Cypriot identities are rooted in a history of competing nationalisms and conflict. The Cyprus problem and the competing ideologies surrounding identity issues are discussed in Chapter 3. Here I will only make a note referring to the names Cypriot and Greek Cypriot which I use alternatively. The choice of names, as in the case of the Turkish minority above, is difficult as each choice is associated with different political ideologies. I mainly use the term Cypriot to refer to the interviewees and Greek Cypriot when it is used by the informants, or when the context requires this clarification, for instance to differentiate from Turkish

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7 Greek Cypriot is linked to Greek Cypriot nationalism, Cypriot to Cypriotism. These ideologies will be discussed in Chapter 3 together with the historical contexts in which they were produced.
Cypriots. This choice is intended to be neutral and one that can accommodate the identity discourses articulated by the informants in the empirical chapters.

**Description of the thesis**

The first part of the thesis deals with the theoretical (Chapters 2 and 4) and methodological (Chapter 5) issues. It also provides the historical context (Chapter 3). Chapter 2 argues for a new direction towards the theorisation of the relationship between media and identity. Chapter 4 is about rethinking media theory and Chapter 5 is about rethinking method. The linearity that this structure implies does not reflect the trajectory of the PhD process, which has been marked by oscillations between theory, fieldwork and data analysis.

A number of theories discussed in Chapter 2 are the result of the attempts to find a pertinent theoretical framework to understand the complexity of the empirical data. Chapter 2 takes issue with the dominant theories of the relationship between media and identity. Primordialist and modernist theories equally have failed to take the media seriously. While this is not surprising for primordialists, it is in the case of modernists and constructionists (with the notable exceptions of Deutsch [1953], Anderson [1983], Hobsbawm [1992] and Gellner [1983]). The modernist vein is also criticised for adopting, perhaps unintentionally, an essentialist approach to identity, ignoring the local discourses that often contest the homogeneity of national identity. Media studies, on the other hand, often suffer from a degree of technological or textual determinism thus failing to incorporate a historical perspective on identity. Technology (and texts) are seen as active – identity as passive, unwittingly invoking a linear model of communication as transmission (cf. Carey, 1989). In Chapter 2 I argue that what have been undertheorised in the approaches to media and identity are the concepts of culture and identity themselves.

The initial research question, 'is television a catalyst for belonging to the nation' needs to be rephrased in order to emphasise the interplay between identity and the media. In this chapter I argue for a bottom-up perspective that will examine identities as lived and as performed, rather than just taken for granted. The juxtaposition of the bottom-up and the top-down approaches is part of the effort to identify the power of the media. In other words, to reply to the questions: whether, and in what ways and
contexts do the media influence identity discourses? What role do the media play in relation to inclusion and exclusion from public life? Are the media, and television in particular, a catalyst for shifts in people’s identity discourses (from more open, constructional discourses to more essentialist ones)? The challenge here is to question essentialism and at the same time recognise its existence in people’s lives.

Chapter 3 provides a historical account of identities in Greece and an analysis of their changing and dynamic character. Instead of a singular and homogenous Greek identity, this chapter highlights the diversity within the nation state and the different layers and experiences of identities that co-exist giving rise to different sets of discourses of identity and belonging. By focusing on some particular instances of recent Greek history this chapter performs the additional function of introducing the *dramatis personae* of this thesis, namely the Greeks, Cypriots and Turks who live in Athens, thus providing the context for the study.

Chapter 4 deals directly with media theory. Following the emphasis on a bottom-up perspective in Chapter 2, here audiences are theorised. Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between viewers, texts and technologies by reviewing developments in media theory, and audience studies in particular, in the last decades. Chapter 4 suggests an integration of different levels of analysis in order to achieve theoretical triangulation and empirical confirmation (Livingstone, 1998a). Such an integrated approach echoes the recent efforts for the development of a theory of mediation (Silverstone, in press) and understands the media as process. Also in this chapter different approaches to the study of the news are discussed, as well as the particular characteristics of the news in Greece (ubiquitous presence, long duration, high viewing rates, ‘live’ reports, interruptions of broadcasting schedule) which justify its choice as a focal point in the study.

In Chapter 5 the focus is on methodology and in particular on issues relating to ethnography, reflexivity and anthropology ‘at home’. The chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of the thesis and explains the ethnographic turn in my study which was necessary in order not only to gain access to the Turkish community but also to make sense of these mediational processes. My role as an insider/outsider is discussed as an essential component of the research process. I argue that the debates
surrounding anthropology 'at home' should not be overlooked in cultural and media studies, not because of some perverse type of disciplinary meticulousness but because they are important from a theoretical, methodological and ethical point of view. The chapter also provides an account of the procedure of data collection (in depth and group interviews with 67 informants, as well as informal interviews and fieldnotes). Chapter 5 also discusses the sampling and the analysis of television news reports.

Chapter 6 maps out the various media used by the informants, the people’s 'communications infrastructure' (Ball-Rokeach et. al., 2001). The aim of this chapter, however, is not to be only descriptive. I discuss if and how different communications infrastructures relate to the informants’ identity discourses. Are identities shaped by technologies? Are technologies shaped by identities? And, of course, how do all these relate to existing material and power structures? The focus of Chapter 6 is on the media as technologies, not texts. As there are separate chapters on the news and its reception, this chapter can be seen to complement what follows as it provides the context in which the reception and the interpretation of the news takes place. But it also stands on its own as an exploration of the relationship between identities and the media as objects and technologies. In the end there will be the inevitable comparison: does the sheer presence of the media impact on identities, or is it rather in relation to the (textual) representation that identities are articulated, contested and negotiated?

The fluidity of identities (albeit grounded in material conditions and limitations) explored in Chapter 6 is in sharp contrast to the news discourse about the nation discussed in Chapter 7. Drawing on the analysis of 473 news reports during two different periods, one on the routine reporting of Greek Turkish relations and the other on the Kosovo conflict, the chapter discusses how the nation, the common ‘we’, is continually invoked both through the text and the form of the news. The analysis also takes into account the televisation of public rituals in the context of the news (in this case the broadcasting of a concert against the bombings in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict). With the inclusion of the Kosovo reports, Chapter 7 explores the global dimension of identity articulations. The Kosovo conflict being an international crisis inevitably introduces concerns about how Greece positions itself in the world and how it defines itself in relation to its others (particularly as Greece, for a NATO ally, had an exceptional stance towards the conflict, marked by intense anti-
Americanism). The analysis shows how the conflict was nationalised and internalised and points out that the essentialism in the anti-American reports during the Kosovo crisis was also a reaction to the essentialist representation of the Balkans as a volatile and flammable area where ‘anything can happen’. Chapter 7 also includes a section on the sampling and methods (qualitative and quantitative) applied to the analysis of the news reports.

Chapter 8 focuses on the viewers’ reactions to, and interpretations of, the news reports analysed in Chapter 7. The analysis is based on theories of identity (discussed in Chapter 2) and developments in audience reception research and observes the shifts in the informants’ identity discourses. In their interpretations of the routine event reports, Greek audiences displayed a high degree of sophistication pointing to the constructedness of reports and making remarks about objectivity and realism in the news. This critical activity was coupled with a critical approach to the nation and its relations with Cyprus and Turkey (mentioned in the reports). Many informants contested the reports and, at a more general level, the official policy concerning Turkey and Cyprus. During the Kosovo conflict, however, the Greek viewers reacted in a more emotional way while retaining their critical outlook towards the media. Greek Cypriot viewers, on the other hand, were emotional in both cases as they saw their own histories and experiences reflected in the reports. They were also critical of the media, exhibiting the same collision between emotional/rational as the Greek audiences, although their criticism often stemmed from what they saw as the misrepresentation of the Cyprus problem in mainstream Greek media. Finally, Turkish audiences reacted differently in both cases, often ‘commuting’ to their community’s own problems and ‘real issues’. The news reports were interpreted as either irrelevant or frustrating and often people contested them by narrating their own personal experiences. Watching the news infuriated some of the informants who told me that it is when ‘they become Turks’, a word-play in Greek that has a double meaning: apart from the literal meaning it also connotes anger about their exclusion from society. In this context, ‘becoming a Turk’ is more a claim to citizenship and legitimacy, rather than a statement about one’s ethnic identity.

Discourses about the nation (through the news media) are not homogenous and uniform, but rather are dynamic and relational. This does not mean that people
become Greek and then Turkish; it rather implies that in some contexts people contest discourses about the nation and its representation in the media, while in some others, especially when challenged externally, they rely on a more emotional framework that essentialises themselves and their others. Chapter 8 (and Chapter 6) also point out to the power of the media to raise the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion in public life. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Turks who in other everyday contexts, express a more open discourse about their position in the Athenian society.

Chapter 9 draws the thesis to a close by returning to the initial research questions. The answer, however, to the question of whether the media bind people together is not a singular one. While the news media provide a common point of reference for some of their audiences, they simultaneously exclude others, thus reflecting existing material and social inequalities. In Chapter 9 I discuss the contributions of the thesis to media and audience studies (and in particular the developments towards a theory of mediation) and to the literature that addresses the media and identity relationship.
2. Rethinking identities in a mediated world

This chapter argues for a new direction in the theorisation of the relationship between media and identity in order to understand what role — if any — the media play in the articulation of identities. The proposed direction is the result of a synthetic approach that draws on the existing theoretical approaches for the exploration of the relationship between media and identity. After discussing the contribution of both nationalism and media theories to the understanding of their relationship, I identify their limitations, which I attempt to overcome by drawing on an anthropological perspective on identity.

Existing theories on media and identity, regardless of whether they are situated in the nationalism or media literatures, seem to be divided according to the dichotomy between powerful media and weak identities, or alternatively, strong identities and weak media. Such dichotomies echo the oscillations in media theory between theories that privilege powerful media and those that argue for powerful audiences (Katz, 1980; Morley, 1992). Another common theme running through a number of theories concerned with the media and identity relationship, is that they either privilege a top-down or a bottom-up approach. Theories that argue for powerful media most often adopt a top-down perspective, that is they do not investigate empirically the nature of audiences and their identities as lived and as performed. On the other hand, theories that argue for powerful audiences and identities are grounded on audience research. In this chapter I argue that both these approaches are inadequate for they essentialise identities, culture and in some cases the media themselves. What is needed is a new way to think about these processes.

What have remained largely undertheorised in many of the existing theories on the media and identity relationship are the concepts of culture and identity themselves, which are often objectified. Underlying many theories concerned with the relationship between media and identities is the assumption that cultures are distinct and
homogenous entities. Consequently, the world is seen as a collection of such entities, like exhibits in a museum or billiard balls on a global pool table, to paraphrase Wolf (1982: 6). Such an approach fails to conceptualise the fact that cultures — and identities — are processes rather than naturally occurring objects. The idea of a pristine culture, not only today, in the era of mobility and global transformations, but always, has been deeply flawed. To see culture in such a historical perspective means to recognise the openness of cultures and their inherent syncretism as well as the existence of cultures within cultures, an approach that has gained increasing prominence in recent years (Carrithers, 1992; Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Hall, 1996 and 2000; Hannerz, 1992; Said, 1993; Wolf, 1982).

In this context, a theoretical framework is needed that will allow the dynamism and diversity that the concept of identity contains to emerge. This chapter draws on anthropological theory of ethnicity and culture⁸ to argue for a discursive approach that allows identities to be conceptualised without being reified. Identity and culture are thus understood as performed and experienced. This calls for the inclusion of a bottom-up perspective. The starting point is the diversity within the nation-state and not an assumption about its — often fictive — unity and homogeneity. Another reason for this approach is the effort to avoid a media-centric approach: foregrounding the role of the media from the start inevitably influences the conclusions of a study. This is why the top-down approach will be examined in parallel to the bottom-up as an attempt to find a middle ground in the study of the media and identity relationship.

The chapter will begin with the discussion of the two dominant traditions for theorising identity and nationalism, following Schlesinger’s advice that,

 [...] we now need to turn around the terms of the conventional argument: not to start with communication and its supposed effects on national identity and culture, but rather to begin by posing the problem of national identity itself, to ask how it might be analysed and what importance communicative practices might play in its constitution (Schlesinger, 1987: 234).

Only by starting with identity and how it is theorised can one avoid the media-centrism found in a number of theories. Indeed, identity is the starting and final point

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in this chapter: I will return to it after reviewing the theories concerned with the media and identity relationship, in order to work against the existing theoretical dichotomies and develop an approach that will capture its dynamism. This chapter proposes a kind of theoretical triangulation by combining elements from different theories, mainly the bottom-up and the top-down perspectives in order to understand media and identity as part of a dialectic process.

2.1 DOMINANT PARADIGMS IN THEORISING IDENTITY AND THE NATION: PRIMORDIALISM AND MODERNISM

Unsurprisingly, there is no such thing as a single theory of nationalism, for, as Calhoun has remarked, 'nationalism is a rhetoric for speaking about too many different things for a single theory to explain it' (1997: 21). Different theories provide different definitions for identity, the nation and its origins and nationalism (Ozkirimli, 2000). No single discipline monopolises the study of nationalism, making it an interdisciplinary field. History, sociology, political theory, anthropology and political economy have offered various definitions and explanations for the rise of nationalism. There is a large distance between the work of Kedourie (1960), who considered nationalism as an inherently evil doctrine and the writings of Smith (1986; 1991; 1995), who has argued that nations are the result of persisting ethnic identities. There are three interrelated concepts here: identity, nation and nationalism, all of which are understood and defined differently depending on the perspective and the discipline of each author. In general, identity refers to the cultural realm whereas nationalism refers to the political realm. I will resist defining nation, nationalism and identity in this introductory note, as the different approaches to be discussed understand these concepts in very different ways.

In general, two major traditions can be distinguished in theorising identity and nationalism, namely primordialism and modernism. There are other alternative names attached to the modernist school such as, constructionist, situationalist or contextualist. The main difference is that modernist theories emphasise the modern character of the nation-state and the constructedness of identity. Conversely, primordialists emphasise the ancient roots of nations and the fixity of identity as a quality given by birth. Of course, there are differences within these traditions, which have led some authors to identify more than two major approaches.
2.1.1 Primordialist theories

Primordialism is not a single theory, but rather an 'umbrella term' that contains a number of theories. According to Geertz, primordial attachments stem from the 'givens'—or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens'—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves (Geertz, 1973: 259).

The fact that Geertz stresses in his definition the 'assumed givens' has led authors to argue that he is in fact a constructionist rather than a primordialist (Ozkirimli, 2000: 72-3; Goldmann et al. 2000: 13). Nonetheless, what needs to be retained from this definition is the emphasis on 'the congruities of blood, speech and custom', which constitute the basic tenet of primordialist theories. Identity, ethnicity and culture are given prominent status in primordialist approaches as they legitimate the political existence of nations and their claims to territory and autonomy. For the primordialists, nations and ethnic identities precede the nation state. The nation is seen as a cultural community that has survived from time immemorial and finds its political recognition in its 'historical homeland' (Smith, 1998: 22-3). In addition to nationalism theorists, such views are shared by nationalists themselves.

There are different theories that can be grouped under the primordialist category. The socio-biological approach examines the links between biological ties, kinship and ethnicity (see van den Berghe, 1979). Perennialists emphasise the continuity of ethnic groups through time, but they differentiate themselves from primordialists in that they do not assert that ethnic differences are natural and given (see Armstrong, 1982; Llobera, 1994). For perennialists, like primordialists, nations are 'seamless wholes, with a single will and character' (Smith, 1998: 23). Under the primordialist 'umbrella term', I also include the ethnosymbolist approach. Ethnosymbolists adopt a milder approach than the perennialists, while accepting one of the fundamental principles of modernism, that nations are modern phenomena: Nations are modern, ethnosymbolists argue, but they have their roots in primordial attachments from time immemorial. Smith, together with Hutchinson, the other main proponent of this approach, makes a
point of distinguishing ethnosymbolism as a distinct school. Although their approach is synthetic, they are placed here within the broader primordial tradition, as most of the research in ethnosymbolism focuses on the survival of primordial attachments and symbols (see Smith, 1986 and 1999). Summing up, primordialists see ethnic differences and identities as natural and given; perennialists accept that there is continuity through time although differences are not necessarily given. Finally, ethnosymbolists accept the continuity of ethnic traits but recognise their transformation through modernity.

**Criticisms**

The ethnic origins of nations rooted in antiquity and the primordial attachments that they entail are the only way for Smith to explain the readiness of people to sacrifice in the name of the nation (1986: 11; 1995: 7). This argument has been criticised for stealthily re-introducing an ahistorical, hitherto abandoned perspective (Lekkas, 1992: 103). In an article of his translated into Greek, Smith argues that the roots of the Greek nation and nationalism are located 'in elements from previous centuries that go back to the Ancient Greeks and their anti-Persian Panhellenism' (Smith, 1993: 9). This is an evidently essentialist approach and as some commentators have remarked, 'it invalidates any sense of historicity and serious historical analysis' and for the contemporary Greek researcher 'it would mean a retreat to the Paparreghopoulos era and the acceptance of the most extreme ideological manipulation of Greek history' (Kitromilides, 1993: 15-16, for similar comments, see Aggelopoulos, 1997: 43). Eley and Suny have remarked that an ethnoreligious formation (such as the ancient Jews or the medieval Armenians) was not yet (nor could be) a modern nationality with its self-conscious sense of the value of ethnic or secular cultural (as opposed to religious) traditions and with consequent political claims to territory, autonomy, or independence, arising from a more modern discourse authorising the claims of nationality to self-determination (Eley and Suny, 1996: 11).

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9 Taxonomy is not clear-cut in this literature. For Smith and Hutchinson, Armstrong is a perennialist, while for Hutchinson, both Smith and Armstrong are 'ethnicists' (see Ozkirimli, 2000: 168). Armstrong does not use the term ethnosymbolism himself (although his arguments are strikingly similar to those by Smith).

10 Breuilly, a modernist theorist himself, has described ethnosymbolism as a less radical version of primordialism (1996: 150).

11 Constantine Paparreghopoulos is the 19th century historian credited with the task of writing the official history of the Greek nation that argued for an undisrupted continuity from Ancient Greece, through Byzantium to modern times. These issues will be further explored in Chapter 3.
In short, as the same authors note, 'earlier histories of classes and nations should be read not simply as prehistories, but as varied historical developments whose trajectories remained open'\(^{12}\) (ibid.). In this context, to speak of a historic homeland to which nations are entitled to becomes problematic both historically and politically.

Such arguments are often the result of a terminological chaos that one encounters in the ethnosymbolist camp as a number of authors have remarked (see Ozkirimli, 2000: 183). Ethnicity and nation are sometimes used interchangeably. O'Leary has remarked that

\[\text{it is not too surprising to find nationalism in the 1500s if one grants the term such empirical range. Most of those who discuss nations before nationalism are in fact establishing the existence of cultural precedents [...] which are subsequently shaped and re-shaped by nationalists in pursuit of nation-building (1996: 90).}\]

The strongest objection, however, to all primordialist approaches to identity is their adverse political consequences. This becomes more obvious in the context of those recent conflicts and wars that are popularly labelled as 'ethnic conflicts'. Underlying the term ethnic conflict is the assumption that the causes of the conflict are based on ethnic difference. Consequently, conflicts are seen as inevitable since their causes lie in what are considered 'natural' and thus insurmountable ethnic differences. Another consequence of such an ahistorical approach is that 'by reducing the social and economic realities and the complex historical causes that underlie and prolong these conflicts, to "ethnicity" de-politicises them' (Seaton, 1999: 42). Such explanations collude with the protagonists’ nationalistic interpretations of history and often make their authors complicit in the human suffering they legitimate. Such views, that seem to be gaining prominence\(^{13}\), have been expressed by Huntington and his controversial theory of the *Clash of Civilisations* (1996), Kaplan (1993) and Moynihan (1993).

Kaplan, who in his book *Balkan Ghosts* (1983) described the wars in former

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\(^{12}\) Greeks in the classical period were not — and could not be — a nation in the modern sense of the term. Whatever their degree of linguistic cohesion, Greeks did not constitute a political entity making claims to self-administration and statehood. In fact, ancient Greek cities were fighting against each other as vehemently as they did against the Persians.

\(^{13}\) Primordialist discourses about identity have proliferated in the media and public life in recent years. Their use has been heightened after September 11 and the context of the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The popularity of such discourses is explained because they provide a simple explanation for conflicts and other complex social problems, such as crime (see the debates about asylum seekers in the UK and across Europe in 2002).
Yugoslavia as the result of innate hatreds, is thought to have dissuaded the Clinton administration from its initial interventionist line in Bosnia (Allen, 1999: 27). Huntington (1996) argued that the world is made up of seven civilisations, namely the Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western and Latin American. These civilisations are inherently different and ethnic and cultural divisions are rigid. According to Huntington, democracy is the creation of Western civilisation and cannot be transplanted into other civilisations. Advocating a policy of non-interference, Huntington suggests that the US should not intervene in conflicts around the world, as ethnic differences and enmity are inherent and the conflicts that they produce unavoidable and insoluble.

The problem with such approaches is that they have direct political and material consequences for the lives of the people that they describe. At a more abstract level, primordialist approaches fail to capture the changing and often contradictory character of identities through time. By stressing the given and fixed nature of identity they sit uncomfortably close to theories that have privileged race and biological differences. The school of thought that developed partly as a response to these limitations was that of modernism, or constructionism.

2.1.2 Modernism

Modernism is not a homogenous tradition. The common denominator in modernist theories is that, contrary to the beliefs of primordialists, they assert that nations are modern phenomena. If, for primordialists, identity precedes the nation state, for the modernists it is the other way round. Modernists make this argument in varying degrees, as will be discussed below. In general, however, it can be argued that in modernist theory emphasis is placed on the nation as a political entity and not on the cultural traits that primordialists focus on. Moreover, underlying the work of many modernists (and this is another significant difference with the primordialists) is the assumption that there will be an inevitable decline of the nation state and national identities. As Hobsbawm graphically put it: 'the owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism' (1992: 192).
Different theories emphasise different aspects in accounting for the emergence of nations and nationalism. In general, three broad approaches can be discerned in the modernist tradition (although this is not an exhaustive categorisation), namely the economic, the political and the sociocultural. Some authors have linked the rise of nationalism and national identities to economic factors and the economic interests of individuals (Hechter, 1975). Other authors have emphasised the role of power (through processes involving the state and its institutions, the role of the elites and war) for the emergence and maintenance of nationalism (Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1993). The sociocultural perspective is exemplified in the work of Gellner (1983) who argued that nations and nationalism are the result of a ‘high culture’, which in turn is linked to modernisation and industrialisation.

Gellner understood nationalism as the political ideology resulting from the advent of industrialisation and the complex division of labour it entailed (Gellner, 1983). Industrialised societies called for a more sophisticated division of labour provided by a homogenised education system. Education was the major conveyor of collective identity, or else nationhood. According to Gellner, nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (1983:1). Importantly, the political principles of nationalism appear as if they were natural.

Two other influential authors, who draw upon a Marxist perspective as well, can be included in the broader sociocultural category. Hobsbawm holds that nationalism is an invented ideology that, as a false consciousness, legitimates the capitalist order (1992; see also Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Cultural traditions are not given, but are invented and manipulated in order to legitimate the political dimension of nationalism (claims to autonomy and territory). According to Hobsbawm ‘nations do not make states and nationalism, but the other way around’ (1992:10).

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14 The debate about the relationship between the nation and the state is a lengthy one. Calhoun has remarked that ‘it would be a mistake to imagine that either state formation or ethnicity could provide a master variable accounting for the whole rise and character of modern nationalism’ (1997: 66). Although it is important to question the nationalistic principle that holds nations to construct states, it is equally important not to accept the opposite unquestionably. Hobsbawm (1990: 10, 44-5) falls in this trap when he argues that the state, through the state-building processes, is responsible for the creation of the nation. It seems that it is more of a dialectical process, where the state clearly participates in the process of building the nation, but the nation, as a reality and an ideal plays an equally important part in
Anderson sees nationalism largely as the consequence of the convergence of capitalism and print technology (1991). In his seminal book *Imagined Communities* (1983), Anderson understood the nation state as a modern construct, an imagined community, and nationalism as a cultural artefact (1991: 4). According to Anderson, nations are imagined political communities because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (1991: 6). Moreover,

the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them...have finite boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. It is imagined as sovereign, [...] as well as a community, or a fraternity, which masks the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each (ibid.: 6-7).

**Criticisms**

Different modernist theories have invited different criticisms. It is not possible to refer to all these, so I will focus on the most prominent points. Overall, many modernist theories have been criticised of being reductionist as they often emphasise one aspect, over many others, in the explanation of the emergence of nations. Gellner (1983) has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on industrialism. Mouzelis and O'Leary have pointed out that in some cases, such as the Balkan states, nationalism emerged before industrialisation (Mouzelis, 1998: 158; O'Leary, 1998: 73). Another criticism on which many authors converge is that Gellner's theory is too functionalist in that 'it very often seemed as if he means to say that industrial society's need for social and linguistic homogeneity was the cause of nationalism' (Hall, J. 1998b: 8, and for a detailed discussion of this point see Hall, J., 1998a; O'Leary, 1998; Laitin, 1998).

Another weak point of modernist theories is that they fail to explain the spell of nationalism, or else, the appeal of nationalism to the extent that people are prepared to sacrifice their lives for the nation\(^\text{15}\). This is the criticism commonly repeated by the process of creating the state (Danforth, 1995: 16). There is a varying degree of emphasis on either the 'state' or the 'nation' in each national case.

\(^{15}\) This is a criticism addressed to Gellner's work on nationalism. He, however, has eloquently refused to accept it. The following excerpt is illuminating:

I am deeply sensitive to the spell of nationalism. I can play about thirty Bohemian songs (or songs presented as such in my youth) on my mouth organ. My oldest friend who is Czech and a patriot, cannot bear to hear me play them because he says I do it in such a schmaltzy way, 'crying into the
ethnosymbolists (Smith, 1998). This limitation is explained by the fact that modernists have ignored the perspective from below, the ways identities are experienced and performed. This way they cannot confirm any assumption about the spell, or even the contestation of nationalism.

The emphasis on a top-down perspective also implies that all nationalisms, all identities and expressions of belonging, are the same, 'cut from the same European cloth' (Herzfeld, 1996: 10). Nationalism appears as a monolithic force that has homogenised populations in a uniform way, regardless of historical, economic and social conditions. Hobsbawm (1992), a modernist himself, has criticised other modernist writers, particularly Gellner, for ignoring a bottom-up approach. Although he does not develop one himself, his understanding of the role of the media is indicative of his interest in the lived experience of the nation (see next section). The relationship between the top-down and bottom-up perspectives is central to this study and will be discussed later in this chapter together with the issue of essentialism. First, however, I will examine the contributions of media theories to the understanding of the relationship between media and identity.

Primordialists and modernists understand the role of the media in very different ways. It has to be noted, however, that there is a striking absence, even in the recent proliferation of writings on nationalism and identities, of analysis concerned with the role of the media. This is not surprising in the case of primordialists (or perennialists, or ethnosymbolists for that matter): if identities are given by birth and the nations are rooted in an ancient past, what role can the media possibly play? This absence is more conspicuous in the case of modernist writers, who apart from a few notable exceptions, have failed to take the media seriously as possible actors in the processes of identity and nation building.

Thus, the following section will focus on those few modernist theories and authors that have considered the media in their analysis. Such examples are Deutsch (1966

mouth organ’. I do not think that I could have written the book on nationalism which I did write, were I not capable of crying, with the help of a little alcohol, over folk songs, which happen to be my favourite form of music. I attended folklore performances from choice, but go to Covent Garden or the Narodni Divadlo from social obligation or snobbery (Gellner, 1996: 62).
[1953]), Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983) and Hobsbawm (1992). This approach is also known as the ‘social communication approach’, drawing its name from Deutsch’s theory (1966 [1953]). Along with nationalism theories, the contributions of media theories will be discussed as there are many similarities among them.

2.2 Media and identity: strong media/weak identities

The approach that privileges powerful media is so prevalent that it is almost enjoying a consensus\textsuperscript{16}. The majority of media theories of identity seem to fall in this category, although there are differences of degree to the power granted to the media. Nationalism theorists in the modernist vein, are also discussed in this section. This choice perhaps requires some explanation as none of the authors involved have argued that the media, print or electronic, are solely responsible for the spread of nationalism. Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1992) only make short references to the power of the media, which they consider, among other forces, as disseminators of a common culture and language. Anderson (1983) is a case on his own, as he does pay considerable attention to the media, although he still sees them as part of a wider process. However, these media-related contributions, if taken in isolation, bear similarities to a number of media theories and will be thus juxtaposed for the purposes of discussion.

2.2.1 Nationalism theory and the media

Deutsch is the first author that took the role of communication into account in his theory of nationalism. He developed what is known as social communication theory: for Deutsch, it is social communication, the shared cultural and communicative practices, that strengthens the identity of a group, creates boundaries and thus makes the nation state possible.

The essential aspect of the unity of a people ... is the complementarity or relative efficiency of communication among individuals – something that is in some ways similar to mutual rapport, but on a larger scale (Deutsch, 1953 [1966]: 188).

\textsuperscript{16} The various approaches that address the relationship between media and identity are summarised in Table 7.1 at the end of this chapter. As inevitably happens with all summaries this mapping cannot do justice to all the nuances present in the theoretical approaches. It is meant as an attempt to compare the two dominant paradigms in the relationship between the media and identity with the approach that this thesis adopts which is discussed in the two final sections of this chapter.
As Schlesinger has remarked, 'Deutsch's underlying concept of social communication [...] lives on strongly, mostly half-recognised at best, in [...] Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* (Schlesinger, 2000b: 21). As discussed previously, Gellner attributed central importance to the role of culture in the spread of nationalism. Through the education system an elite, high culture became available to the masses who started recognising themselves as part of the same nation. In this context, Gellner makes a fleeting argument about the role of the media. Interestingly his argument echoes McLuhan (1964) as he writes that media matter in nationalism not for what they say, but for what they are. This is perhaps surprising given the fact that Gellner lived through World War II and its consequences and one would expect to find in his writings an explicit concern with propaganda. He says that,

The media do not transmit an idea that happens to have been fed into them. It matters precious little what has been fed into them: it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralised one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted. The most important and persistent message is generated by the medium itself, by the role which such media have acquired in modern life. The core message is that the language and style of the transmissions is important [...] what is actually said matters little (Gellner, 1983: 127).

A similar argument is made by Anderson (1991[1983]). Anderson is one of the writers who has elaborated the role of the print media and their contribution to the emergence of nationalism. He saw print capitalism as the catalyst for the emergence and consolidation of nation-states:

The convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation. [...] National print languages were of central ideological and political importance’ (Anderson, 1991: 46).

For Anderson the print media have provided the social 'glue' that made the nation possible. Print capitalism allowed for a simultaneous mediated communication across the nation-state. People all over the country would read the same newspapers or novels and recognise themselves as part of an imagined community. This simultaneity made possible by the media gave 'a hypnotic confirmation of the solidity of a single community, embracing characters, authors and readers [...]’ (1991: 27). Print capitalism is also closely linked to the standardisation of languages and the
formalisation of education. People had to speak and read the same language in order to read the same paper and novel.

It is easy to misinterpret Anderson’s argument as a technological determinist one. However, this would not do justice to his position as Anderson emphasises print capitalism, that is, the mass-production of books and newspapers as industrial commodities (1991: 34, 46), and not just print technology in the spread of nationalism. Moreover, in his most recent work, Anderson (1998 and 2001) sees the development of new technologies as enabling what he calls ‘long distance nationalism’ (2001: 42). New technologies do not undermine nationalism in favour of a global, homogenous society, as a technological determinist approach would argue, but rather rework and redefine nationalistic politics and attachments in a global context.

Anderson’s theory is speculative. Indeed, most theories in the modernist vein do not focus on empirical research from below. By assuming a top-down perspective, they assume a common identity for all the people that they investigate. In a somewhat ironic way, modernist theory, which started as a reaction to the essentialism of primordial theories, ends up reifying identity itself. Nations are the products of a top-down process, whereby an elite discourse is taken up by people at a local level. Such a perspective ignores the fact that people might contest the nation and its official ideology. It also leaves open the question of how people come to embrace the official discourse. Moreover, modernist grand theories tend to assume that all nationalisms are the same, thereby underestimating the complexity and historical specificity of particular empirical cases.

Hobsbawm (1992), a modernist himself, has criticised other writers in the same vein, particularly Gellner, for ignoring a bottom-up approach. Although he does not develop one himself his understanding of the role of the media is indicative of his interest in the lived experience of the nation. Like Gellner, Hobsbawm does not elaborate the role of the media but he does consider them as one of the significant forces that have shaped nationalism and identity in the 20th century. Hobsbawm is the only nationalism theorist that has observed that what the media achieved, apart from disseminating and in some extreme cases exploiting political ideologies, is to link the public and private worlds by making national symbols part of people’s everyday lives. Media have thus
managed to break down the traditional divisions between the national public sphere and the private lives of citizens (1992: 142). It is because of the media and their rituals, such as the royal broadcast, instituted in 1932, that the British royal family evolved into 'a domestic as well as a public icon of national identification' (Hobsbawm, 1992: 142).

2.2.2 Media studies: strong media/weak identities
As noted earlier, theories developed within media studies that have been concerned with the relationship between media and identities seem to follow the swings of the powerful media/weak media pendulum. There are two major assumptions that underlie most theories: either that powerful media shape weak identities, or that weak media are shaped by powerful identities. It should be noted, however, that the former theories have been more prominent while the latter were often developed as a reaction to the former.

The research that argues for the catalytic role of the media in forming and maintaining national, ethnic and cultural identities is not homogenous. There are in fact, many differences among the different studies, which will be unpacked in this section. There are theories that focus on the role of media in the processes of nation-formation (McLuhan, 1964; Eisenstein, 1979; Innis, 1951; Martin-Barbero, 1992) and globalisation (McLuhan, 1964; Meyrowitz, 1985), while others focus on nation maintenance and reproduction (Billig, 1995; Scannell, 1989; Morley and Brunsdon, 1999). The former theories tend to focus on the media as technologies, while the latter focus more on the form or content of the media. Of course, these distinctions are not clear-cut and often theories draw on more than one tradition. Thus, for instance, the proponents of the cultural imperialism thesis examine both the sheer presence and quantity of (North American) media and the content of these particular media to make arguments about the emergence and sustenance of cultural homogenisation. These positions also have political and practical implications, as they are often associated with official policies about culture, media and representation.

Strong technologies/weak identities: technological determinism
For medium theorists, language has been a focal point linking identity and the media. Eisenstein saw national consciousness and culture as a result of the standardisation of
vernaculars through printing (1979: 117). She even considered the media more pivotal than religion to the rise of nationalism. McLuhan (1964), Innis (1951) and Ong (1967) have considered nationalism as related to print media mainly through the standardisation of language. McLuhan has famously characterised typography as the architect of nationalism (1987 [1964]: 172).

For McLuhan the media shape the forms of communities that people have. If typography was the architect of nationalism, then electronic media would create a 'global village' (ibid.). Similar arguments have been made by a second generation medium theorist, Meyrowitz, who has argued that electronic media have altered the significance of time and space for social interaction. Physical presence is not a prerequisite for social experience as information can travel instantly across great distances. 'As a result', Meyrowitz notes, 'where one is has less and less to do with what one knows and experiences' (1985: viii, italics in original).

The advent of new technologies has been considered by a number of authors to be the driving force which creates infinite possibilities for people's identities (inter alia see Turkle, 1996 and Poster, 1995). Although the arguments here are not about homogenisation, technology is granted an omnipotent status, driving social and personal changes in a relentless manner. Such arguments are part of what Robins and Webster have termed technological utopianism (1999: 67) and the 'ideology of technoculture' (Robins and Webster, 1999).

Strong technologies/weak identities: phenomenology

In a similar vein, although more grounded in media history and phenomenology and less technological determinist, Martin-Barbero has stressed the key role of the mass media in the emergence of collective identities in Latin America (1988; 1993). He has argued that 'film in many countries and radio in virtually all countries gave the people of the different regions and provinces their first taste of the nation' (1993: 164). It was only through mass culture that the political idea of the nation could be transformed into the daily experience and feeling of nationhood. Mexican films in the 1930s until the 1950s formed Mexicans into a 'national body', 'not in the sense of giving them a nationality but in the way they experienced being a single nation', by seeing
'themselves' on screen (ibid.: 166). A similar argument for the case of radio in Colombia, is made by another Latin American historian that Martin-Barbero cites:

Before the appearance and growth of radio, the country was a patchwork of regions, each separate and isolated. Before 1840, Colombia could very well call itself a country of countries rather than a nation. Hyperbole aside, radio allowed the country to experience an invisible national unity, a cultural identity shared simultaneously by the people of the coast, Antioquia, Pasto, Santanter and Bogota. (Pareja, cited in Martin-Barbero, 1993: 165).

In the British context, Scannell and Cardiff have advanced similar arguments in their social history of the BBC (1991). Scannell has even argued that public service broadcasting provides the space for a contemporary public sphere (1989). According to Scannell, public service broadcasting has contributed unobtrusively to the democratisation of everyday life. By placing political, religious, civic, cultural events and entertainments in a common domain, public life was equalised in a way that had never been possible before (1989: 136).

[...] Consider the FA Cup Final, the Grand National or Wimbledon. All these existed before broadcasting, but whereas previously they existed only for their particular sporting publics they became, through radio and television something more. Millions now heard or saw them who had direct interest in the sports themselves. The events became, and have remained, punctual moments in a shared national life. Broadcasting created, in effect, a new national calendar of public events (Scannell, 1989: 140-1).

Yet one might ask how 'public' or, in the case of the BBC, how British the public sphere that Scannell describes is. It seems that, in his example, 'British' is conflated with 'English', overlooking the other nations, or ethnic minorities who are citizens of the UK. Such a perspective implies a national homogeneity, the 'inclusive and extensive sociability' as Scannell calls it (ibid.: 136), which may not exist. As Morley (2000) has observed, to think of broadcasting as a common and singular public sphere, as Scannell does, ignores the fact that all public spheres are inevitably exclusive. 'By the very way [...] a programme signals to members of some groups that it is designed for them and functions as an effective invitation to their participation in social life, it will necessarily signal to members of other groups that it is not for them' (ibid.: 111).

In searching for answers about belonging and inclusion, it becomes equally important to ask questions about exclusion. These criticisms echo the criticisms that Habermas' theory of the public sphere (1989) has received, pointing to the fact that all public spheres, starting from the ideal type, are inevitably exclusive (cf. Calhoun, 1992; Eley, 1992; Fraser, 1992; Robbins, 1993; Schudson, 1992).
Textual determinism, national reproduction and identity maintenance

An influential study on the relation between nationalism and the media was developed by Billig, who put forward an argument for what he names Banal Nationalism and which focuses on the reproduction of nationalism in the established nations, i.e., 'the states which have confidence in their own continuity, and that, particularly, are part of what is conventionally described as the West' (1995: 8). Through his analysis of the national press Billig identifies the routine and familiar forms of nationalism, which he calls banal nationalism and which contribute to identity maintenance.

In the established nations there is a continual flagging, or reminding, of nationhood. [...] However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building (ibid.).

This ideological reproduction of nationalism 'can still call for ultimate sacrifices' (ibid.), and most importantly construct the way 'we' perceive the 'others'. Perhaps the ultimate power of nationalism is that it is naturalised to the extent that it becomes invisible.

Arguments about the daily reproduction of nationalism have been made by Morley and Brunsdon in their Nationwide Television study (1978; 1999). In the introduction to a recent re-publication of the study, the authors, drawing on Anderson, argue that Nationwide and other programmes which succeeded it in the same vein (such as This Morning), are one of the sites in which the ‘horizontal camaraderie’ that is national identity is constructed and reconstituted daily’ (1999: 12). In This Morning they describe how a map of England’s outline fills the screen, with little illuminated points showing where the viewers call from, thereby enabling the imagining of the nation as a collection of different regions and cities (1999: 12-13).

The work by Katz and Dayan on Media Events (1992) is another important contribution to our understanding of how television can perform rituals that enhance a sense of belonging to a nation. In contrast to Billig’s ‘banal reminding of nationhood’, Katz and Dayan argue that it is through the broadcasting of special occasions, what they call the ‘high holidays of mass communication’ (1992: 1), that the sense of
collective identity is heightened. The banal reproduction of nationalism (Billig, 1995) and the celebration of the nation through the festive viewing of media events (Dayan and Katz, 1992) are not contradictory, but can be occurring in parallel. One of the aims of this study is to examine their interrelationship and more importantly, to ground this in empirical evidence with audiences.

In this category one can place the theory of cultural imperialism which is largely based on the mapping of international communications that reveals a one-way flow of cultural products, from the West (or rather, the US) to the rest of the world (Tomlinson, 1991). The assumption is that this imbalanced flow will lead to cultural homogenisation and the decline of national cultures.

**Criticisms**

The main criticism towards the aforementioned studies is that they do not ground their assumptions on empirical research at a local level, thus leaving their assumptions largely unsubstantiated. Some of the above theories, particularly medium theories, are speculative and have no empirical confirmation. When they are tested, they have favoured a top-down perspective, focusing mainly on textual or formal analysis (Billig, 1985; Morley and Brunsdon, 1999; Dayan and Katz, 1992). Scannell’s phenomenological approach falls in the same category (1989; 1996). The lack of an empirical confirmation about the effects of these processes on audiences explains why the theories’ assumptions about homogeneity are often contradicted by empirical realities: as Waisbord has noted, ‘the distribution of media throughout large territories has not always fostered cultural homogeneity’ (Waisbord, 1998: 382).

Moreover, culture and identity are treated as complete entities. When global forces are taken into account they are in turn, homogenising and monolithic. However, such a perspective ignores the fact cultures have always been based on exchanges and mixings.

Another criticism mainly addressed to media theory is that it implies a transmission model of communication, taking us back to contested models such as the hypodermic needle. Media are powerful, identities are weak. This happens paradoxically, as questions about culture and identity fall, almost by definition, in the ritual or cultural
model of communication (cf. Carey, 1989). Indeed, many authors explicitly identify themselves with the ritual or cultural model of communication, only to offer conclusions that are based upon a transmission model. Such cases are the writings of medium theorists who write within a historical perspective. The determinism in their approach, however, is openly suggesting a linear model that is not far from the hypodermic needle models of media effects. Perhaps conclusions are predetermined from the onset as the research questions foreground the role of the media.

Such criticisms, however, should not lead us to jettison these theories altogether. Although the approaches that favour strong media may not capture identity in its complexity, they offer a number of important insights that need to be investigated empirically. One element that is common to most of the above approaches, whether they favour technologies or texts, is that the media enabled the merging of the hitherto distinct public and private spheres. Media may have created a language available to people to think and talk about the nation. This of course, can only be investigated empirically from a bottom-up perspective. This assumption will be incorporated in the synthetic approach proposed here. Moreover, the modernist perspective in which they are grounded is the prerequisite for all current developments in the identity literature. In this chapter I argue that the assumptions suggested by the modernist tradition should be investigated by focusing on empirical research with audiences and answer to such questions: is banal nationalism actually reproduced as Billig claims it to be? Do media events bring the nation together?

### 2.3 Weak media/Strong identities

At the other end of the continuum from the 'powerful media' approach, is a perspective that favours weak media and robust identities. This is a less popular paradigm, although one could include under this heading numerous studies that have focused on the (mainly content) analysis of different media cultures. Underlying such studies is the assumption that media reflect cultural or national values. Although there is some truth in this assumption (and these studies are important in their own right), this is not particularly helpful theoretically as it does not explain cultural difference.
A study that has been very influential in the strong identity paradigm is the *Export of Meaning* study, which was intended as a response to the media imperialism thesis and concomitant fears of cultural homogenisation. Liebes and Katz studied the reception of *Dallas* among different ethnic groups in Israel, as well as with American and Japanese audiences (1993). *Dallas* was widely considered *par excellence* the product of American cultural imperialism in the 1980s. The study showed that people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds appropriated the programme in different ways according to their cultural experience. For example, Israeli Arabs and Moroccan Jews emphasised kinship relations, while Russian émigrés saw characters as manipulated by the writers and producers of the programme. Kibbutz members and American viewers took a critical view — but interpreted the programme in psychological terms, as an ongoing saga of interpersonal relations and intrigue. Conversely, the Japanese audiences found it difficult to deal with *Dallas*’ inconsistencies. This was, according to the authors, a reason that *Dallas* failed in Japan.

Despite the importance of this study in raising doubts about the homogenising forces of Western popular culture, one issue needs to be considered. It seems that the authors are arguing that people interpret *Dallas* in particular ways *because* they are Israelis, Californians or Japanese. Such an approach glosses over other parameters that also shape media reception, such as gender, age, class and the text itself. By attributing explanatory power to cultural difference, culture is reified and taken for granted, instead of something that needs to be explained itself. Culture is implied as a complete and coherent whole. A quote from the book illustrates these points:

The two more traditional groups — Arab and Moroccan Jews — prefer linearity. They retell the story in a modified Proppian form. They select the action-oriented subplot for attention, defining a hero’s goals and his adventures in trying to achieve them. [...] The Russians [...] ignore the story line in favour of exposing the overall principles which they perceive as repeated relentlessly, and which in their opinion, have a manipulative intent. Like the Arab Moroccans, their retellings are closed and deterministic, but the ideological force is ideological rather than referential. [...] Americans and kibbutzniks tell the story psychoanalytically. They are not concerned with the linearity of the narrative, but with analysing the problems of characters intrapersonally and interpersonally. Their retellings are open, future oriented, and take into account the never-ending character of the soap opera (Liebes and Katz, 1993: 80-1).
It seems that in the *Export of Meaning* differences in interpretations are grounded in ethnicity and culture, with no further analysis of how they themselves are shaped and determined by other factors. This is an unintentional consequence of the study, but the problem with such arguments become salient in the context of identity politics. Is the suspicion that Russian viewers express towards the meaning of Dallas, an inherent Russian quality? Are Arab and Moroccan Jews inherently ‘traditional’? Note that the term traditional often carries a negative meaning associated to backward. As Harindranath has noted ‘the modern-traditional dichotomy was intrinsic to the values system which […] supported the creation of a hierarchy of cultures and races during colonialism’ (2000: 151). This criticism is not to deny that there were differences among the groups in question, but rather to question the way these differences are accounted for. Explanations that rely solely on culture or ethnicity sometimes sit uncomfortably close to perspectives that favour race or biological differences. In other words, by attributing explanatory power to culture, a term that is not thoroughly theorised in *The Export of Meaning*, other numerous (political, social and economic) factors that shape the experience of being an Arab, a Jew or an American are neglected.

Although the *Export of Meaning* has assumed a paradigmatic status as a response to the limitations of the theories that favour a top-down perspective, it in fact reproduces some of the same shortcomings. Culture is reified and considered a homogenous unit.

### 2.4 Global – Local Dialectic and Diasporic Media

The way culture and identity have been theorised in the previous examples confirms Schlesinger’s comment that in media studies identity often functions as a residual category (1987: 233). However, a new generation of studies drawing on recent theories of globalisation has stressed the dialectic relationship between local (cultures) and the global (media), without privileging either of the two. Examples include the studies by Abu-Lughod (1989 and 1993), Miller (1992) and Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994). Studies on diasporic and transnational audiences also fall into this category (Gillespie, 1995; Hargreaves, 1997; Aksoy and Robins 2000 and Robins and Aksoy, 2001). In these studies, globalisation is understood not as homogenisation, but as the intensification of the relationship between the global and
the local (Thompson, 1995), or the intensification of global interconnectedness (McGrew, 1992: 62).\footnote{Similarly, Tomlinson defines globalisation as the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterise modern social life (Tomlinson, 1999: 2). Giddens defines globalisation as the dialectic between the global and the local, that is the oppositional tendencies between local involvements and globalising tendencies (Giddens, 1991: 22, 242).}

In her fieldwork among the Bedouins of Western Egypt, Abu-Lughod observed that the advent of media technologies, namely, tape-recorders, radio and television, did not cause social relations to atrophy as had been feared (1989: 8). On the contrary, sociability was enhanced in some occasions, as people gathered to listen to the radio or watch television. The impact of media technologies on social relations was that they brought about ‘the mixing of the sexes and the muting of age hierarchies’, as people watched programmes together (ibid.). Apart from this ‘democratising effect’ of television, tape recorders enhanced cultural creativity, as they revitalised the fading poetry reciting tradition, when Bedouins discovered that they could tape themselves, a practice that eventually led one of them to pop-stardom (1989: 10). Finally, for many Bedouin women Egyptian soap operas were emancipatory as they gave them access to ‘stories of other worlds’, hence coming into dialogue with the local culture (1989; 1993). Television’s central importance is that it brings a variety of vivid experiences of the non-local into the most local of situations, the home. Similarly, Miller observed the local appropriation of a US soap opera, the ‘Young and the Restless’, in Trinidad. Trinidadians interpreted the soap opera through the key for Trinidadian culture, term ‘bacchanal’, which connotes scandal, confusion and truth (Miller, 1992: 170-6).

Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) observed that in the context of the Iranian revolution, it was small media\footnote{Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi define small media not as non-mass media, but as alternative, participatory media (1994: 20-1). The emphasis in their definition is on the emancipatory uses of media rather than their production (ibid.).} that led to the big revolution in the late 1970s. Small media promoted an indigenous identity and created opportunities for participation, which were oppositional to the autocratic state and its mass media (1994: 193). As the authors note, ‘the greatest irony was that the theocratic state then imposed religious identity against the expression of all other identities, and severely limited political and communications participation’ (ibid.). This work exposes the complex negotiation of identities by showing how religion and religious media were
invested with one set of ideological connotations in one moment of political struggle and ‘reinvested with completely the opposite connotations at a subsequent, but differently defined, political moment’ (Sreberny, 2000a: 109). Thus, as Sreberny observed, while the veil was a sign of resistance under the Shah’s regime, it became a sign of oppression at another point in time (2000a: 109). Such observations suggest that identities and their symbols need to be understood in a dynamic way that takes into account their historical and political context.

In a similar vein, a number of studies on diasporic or ethnic minority media have managed to overcome some of the aforementioned problems of linearity and determinism. Of course, studies on media and migration do not form a homogenous literature. For instance, Ogan (2001) has argued that satellite television from Turkey is impeding the assimilation of Turks in Amsterdam, directly reverting to the strong media-weak identities paradigm, this time with political consequences as she confirms the fears of conservative politicians and thinkers about the non-assimilation of immigrants (cf. Hutmeiyer cited in Aksoy and Robins, 2000).

There are a number of helpful insights in this literature that can be applied to the present study. Several studies have argued against the homogeneity of immigrant communities and their monolithic consumption and use of the media. Gillespie (1995) and Hargreaves and Mahjoub (1997) have observed significant differences among different generations of immigrants. The different experience of belonging and identity is also reflected in media consumption patterns. Similar concerns have led Sreberny in her study of Iranians living in London to talk about the elusiveness of community (2000b). Sreberny challenges

the easy slippage into the notion of a single ‘diasporic community’ by highlighting not only the generational or gender divisions that run among Iranians living in London, but also [...] political factionalism, different waves of migration, and internal linguistic and ethnic differentiation: all have their own media, own gatherings, community structures and disputes (2000b: 195).

Robins and Aksoy have argued convincingly against the fictive unity through which immigrant groups are often understood (2000 and 2001). Drawing from their fieldwork among Turkish-speaking groups in London, they have stressed that media consumption is not determined ethnically, but rather, socially. Turkish television
culture is ordinary, they argue, thus countering fears about the growth of Islamic fundamentalism through Turkish media that some authors have advocated (cf. Hutmeiyer, cited in Aksoy and Robins, 2000). Turkish speaking viewers move across cultures and are more cosmopolitan than the sedentary autochthonous audiences (Robins, 2000: 294). Given their findings they argue for a shift of focus from 'identity' and 'community', to 'experience' and 'resources' in an attempt to find a new and more pertinent language to describe processes of migration, belonging and media consumption (2001: 705).

Studies on migration and the media thus echo Stuart Hall's writings on identity, especially in a diasporic context. Hall, as the following quotation suggests, does not understand identity as a complete whole but as an ongoing process that always remains incomplete.

Identity is actually something formed through unconscious processes over time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always something 'imaginary' or fantasised about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always 'in process', always 'being formed'. [...] Thus rather than speaking of identity as a finished thing, we should speak of identification and see it as an ongoing process. Identity arises, not so much from the fullness of identity which is already inside us as individuals, but from the lack of wholeness which is filled from outside us, by the ways we imagine ourselves to be seen by others (Hall, 1992: 287)

Recent studies on media consumption in the context of diasporas and immigrant communities have contributed to overcoming a number of the previously mentioned limitations. First of all, these studies are grounded in much needed empirical work that takes a bottom-up perspective into account. Second, most of these studies have emphasised the changing and dynamic nature of identities. The term often used to describe the multiple identifications of the diasporic experience is that of hybridity, which has proved to be a useful term as it has moved the discussion about identity away from static and essentialist assumptions.

Nonetheless, a number of points need to be considered here: despite its advantages, hybridity is a problematic term as it often implies the existence of two pristine cultures that have contributed in producing the hybrid. Sreberny raises this point when she notes that hybridity seems to 'depend on constructing the originary moments or set of cultural belongings as overly separate and disconnected' (Sreberny, 2002: 219).
Second, hybridity can be reified as well. Once hybrid identities are formed out of the 'parent' cultures, they are often considered as static and fixed. In this sense, hybridity does not help us overcome the objectification of identities. This is more apparent in the context of romanticisation of hybrid identities, which often takes place in popular and academic discourse. In this context, hybridity is simply a euphemism for ethnicity. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, hybridity, like ethnicity, emphasises culture while glossing over other parameters and inequalities that are in play, such as social class, age and gender. Culture is understood as an explanation, and not something that needs to be explained. Such observations have led Anthias argue that hybridity is in fact an 'old', as opposed to new, concept (2001: 619). Finally, research on diasporas and hybridity often imply a national centre, a pristine home culture of which diasporas are satellites. This is problematic for it implies that the nation is a natural, given and homogenous entity and that immigration is the exception, the deviation from the rule.

This study argues that the fluidity of identities needs to be recognised and studied within the nation-state. Diversity, rather than homogeneity, needs to be the starting point (cf. Robins, 2001). However, before examining what role, if any, the media play in enhancing diversity or homogenisation we need to return to the concepts of identity and culture.

2.5 FROM IDENTITIES TO IDENTITY DISCOURSES

It seems that the existing dichotomies that have prevailed in theorising identity and culture are not adequate. Comaroff has remarked that what is surprising is the sheer tenacity of these binary schemes (modernism vs. primordialism) pointing to the poverty of theory (Comaroff, 1996: 164). A common thread runs through most modernist theories, despite their various differences. Although they emphasise the constructedness of identity they treat identity and culture as entities. Once identity is 'made', it remains fixed. This is a dominant discourse that is evident in a number of areas: policymaking, media, minority rights organisations, academia and people themselves. Constructionist approaches favour a top-down approach therefore reifying identity. Cultures seem frozen in time as distinct entities, whereas in fact as research has forcefully demonstrated they are always the result of a 'mish-mash, borrowings, mixtures that have occurred, though at different rates, ever since the beginning of

Perhaps then the problem lies with the term ‘culture’ itself, as it implies a homogenous, coherent, timeless and discrete whole (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 147). The greatest advantage of the concept of culture was that it shifted the explanation of difference away from the notions of race and nature and the biological connotations they entail. Yet, as Abu-Lughod has remarked, despite its anti-essentialist intent, culture ‘tends to freeze difference’ in a similar way such as the concept of race has (1991: 144). Indicative of this paradox is some of the writing on difference and identity that has been devoted to the political project of recognition and the struggle for ‘cultural survival’ (Taylor, 1994). Despite the noble intentions of such movements there is something uncomfortable about this discourse. Appeals to cultural identity may be used to ‘mobilise passions atavistically’, calling people to wars (Said, 1993: 42). It is indicative that fascism and the supporters of apartheid used ‘identity’ in order to emphasise difference.

In short, there is a paradox lying in the heart of the multiculturalism and ethnicity literature. The arguments start from a critique of the essentialist theories of identity and culture. But by adhering to the concept of difference, essentialism enters through the back door. The irony of stressing difference as a means of repudiating the popular belief that identities are natural, is that one reproduces the same ideology one purports to question. As Kuper has noted, ‘the insistence that radical differences can be observed between people serves to sustain them’ (1999: 239).

Furthermore, there is another issue related to the above debates, that of cultural determinism, where ‘culture shifts from something to be described, interpreted, even perhaps explained, and is treated instead as a source of explanation in itself’ (Kuper, 1999: xi). By reducing everything to cultural differences the researcher falls prey to the same mistakes she has set out to criticise. This critique applies to the reductionism in the use of social categories in research. The problem of essentialism becomes of central importance. In order to overcome the serious problems it poses, it helps to define what it means:
To essentialise is to impute a fundamental, basic, absolutely necessary constitutive of quality to a person, social category, ethnic group, religious community, or nation. It is to posit falsely a timeless continuity, a discreteness or boundedness in space, and an organic unity. It is to imply an internal sameness and external difference or otherness (Werbner, 1997: 228).

The threat of essentialism has led, however, to a series of conundrums as Werbner has observed (1997: 228). ‘If to name is to represent, to imply a continuity in time and place, then it follows that all collective namings or labellings are essentialist and all discursive constructions of social collectivities — whether of community, class, nation, race or gender — are essentialising’ (ibid.). This makes any research enterprise obsolete. Moreover, the acknowledgement that difference can (and has been) manipulated should not make us deny difference altogether. This runs the danger of colluding with a strand of conservative thinking and politics that promotes assimilation and refuses to grant minority rights to people who feel different.

It is a problem as well then, to ‘essentialise essentialism’. As Herzfeld has remarked: ‘distrust about essentialism in social theory should not blur our awareness of its equally pervasive presence in social life’ (1996: 26). And indeed both majorities and minorities use essentialist categories, as much as the media and the official discourse do. To address essentialist discourse not the same as endorsing essentialism. As Eagleton reminds us, the fact that a social category is ‘ontologically empty’ does not mean that it cannot ‘exert an implacable political force’ (Eagleton, 1990: 24). It is the task of the social scientist to investigate how identities become essentialised and how their qualities become objectified (Comaroff, 1995: 250).

In order to find a way out of this impasse, I draw on two interrelated lines of thought. First, I draw on the work of Barth, who in his seminal work on Ethnic Groups and Boundaries argued that ethnicity is a form of social organisation that results from the interaction between group and environment (1969b). This meant that ‘the critical focus for investigation [becomes] the ethnic boundary that defines the group rather than the cultural stuff that it encloses’ (1969b: 15). Barth argued that ethnic group membership must depend on ascription and self-ascription, rather than in possessing a certain cultural inventory. In this context, identities are understood as relations rather than objects. It is in relation to something or someone else, that the boundary is drawn. This study benefits from Barth’s theory in that instead of focusing on difference and
thus taking it for granted, the focus will be on the processes that create boundaries and thus difference. Do the media play any role in creating boundaries?

The second line follows what has become a recent trend among some anthropologists. Dominguez suggested that instead of focusing on groups and identities as complete wholes, research should focus on the process of objectification itself and the ways in which people describe, re-describe and argue who they are (Dominguez, 1989: 38). To do so, a shift is proposed: instead of focusing on identity in the singular, this thesis will focus on discourses about identity and belonging. Discourse here is understood in the broadest sense as any form of spoken interaction, formal and informal (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 7).

This is the strategy followed by Baumann in his ethnography of Southall, a multicultural London neighbourhood (1996). Baumann identified two discourses about culture and identity: a dominant discourse that reifies culture and identity and a demotic discourse that challenges and works against existing reifications. Although these are separate discourses, they co-exist as people fluctuate between the two according to context. Baumann describes how the same people who contest the rigid boundaries of the official discourse, will revert to it when it suits their interests (1996).

This discursive oscillation in relation to identity is well-documented in anthropology. Wallman (1979) has argued that people articulate their ethnicity differently at home and at the workplace. Malkki (1995), in her fieldwork with two groups of Hutu refugees in Eastern Tanzania who had fled the mass killings of 1972 in Burundi, observed radical differences in the way identity, history and exile were experienced. The group of people living in a segregated refugee camp developed an 'overarching historical trajectory' that rendered themselves as 'the rightful natives' of Burundi (1995: 3). They mythologised their collective identity in such a way that it could hardly be separated from a personal, individual identity. Conversely, the group of people living in the more cosmopolitan town of Kigoma did not construct such a categorically distinct collective identity, but rather tended to seek ways of assimilating and inhabiting multiple identities. As Malkki writes:

The identities managed in Kigoma were situational identities embedded in pragmatic concerns and in shifting relations with a very rich variety of different
social actors. Sometimes fictional, sometimes not, these adoptive identities were cloaks of protective coloration that lent their bearers security and a range of options in complex social arenas. Hence these identities involved elements of individual choice and calculation. [...] In Kigoma, the play of identities operated on a more individual basis and was thought of as responding to the practical needs of the immediate, lived present (1995: 169).

Malkki’s study echoes Barth’s theory (1969), as the articulation of identities among the refugees, did not depend on some inherent quality but was rather situational. The city provided the space for personal identities to be expressed. This, however, should not be interpreted as a free-floating practice by was partly determined by the demands and competitiveness of a complex social environment. These theories are strikingly close to Stuart Hall’s writings on identity as a discursive practice.

Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constructed unity – an ‘identity’ in its traditional meaning (that is an all inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation (Hall, 1996: 4).

In order to make sense of the paradoxes, ambiguities and perplexity of the identities in Greece today – and in order to find a way to deal with the tension between essentialism and particularism – I borrow the term ‘cultural intimacy’ from the work of the anthropologist Herzfeld (1996). Cultural intimacy refers to the tensions between collective self-knowledge and collective self-representation. In other words, cultural intimacy refers to the cultural traits that define insiderhood, but are also felt to be disapproved by powerful outsiders, and so to ‘the aspects of cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment, but that nevertheless provide insiders with the assurance of their common sociality’ (Herzfeld, 1996: 3). The distinction between the public and the private is of paramount importance here. Although cultural intimacy is not particular to Greece (but rather present in most cultures in various guises and degrees), there are some particular features that shape the Greek version. An expression that casts light on this is a popular Greek saying ‘ta en oiko mi en rhimo’, which means that ‘the affairs of the house should not be brought into the public sphere’. Domesticity is commonly used as a metaphor for the nation in the Greek context. It is within the confines of the nation-state, ‘at home’ as it were, that
dissent and rebelliousness are accepted as long as they are not brought into public display, to the attention of the outside world. In this context Greek people may refuse to pay their taxes, criticise the army and the government’s handling of the affairs with Turkey but will present (or will be expected to do so by fellow Greeks) a homogenous and harmonious identity to the outside world.

Cultural intimacy allows for a dynamic conceptualisation of identity that accommodates contradiction and ambiguity. Perhaps the most appealing element of the concept is that it cannot be understood without taking the other (the ‘West’, ‘Europe’, ‘Turkey’) into account as identity is performed differently at home, ‘internally’ and ‘externally’, in relation to the other. Thus, identity has to be understood in a comparative context and not in isolation. Cultural intimacy also allows us to deal with essentialism, which is recognised as a basic discursive strategy. As discussed previously, identity politics are all about essentialising and counter-essentialising. This is particularly relevant in the case of Greece as the essentialist self-identity pronounced by the Greeks is often a reaction to equally essentialising stereotypes about Greece and the Balkans by the West. The challenge for the researcher is to identify the meaning and the shifts in these essentialisms rather than dismiss the term altogether.

The concepts of identity and culture are still valid theoretical tools, as long as they are relevant to people’s lives. In order to examine how and why they are used in particular ways we need to focus on a bottom up perspective and see culture and identity as lived and as performed. As Baumann has put it:

Culture is not a real thing, but an abstract and purely analytical notion. It does not cause behaviour, but summarises an abstraction from it, and is thus neither normative nor predictive. [...] Culture thus exists only in so far as it is performed, and even then its status is that of a pointedly analytical abstraction (Baumann, 1996: 11).

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20 Cultural intimacy is similar to what Mouzelis has termed ‘reactive nationalism’ (Mouzelis, 1994: 41) referring to the Greek case. This type of nationalism is characterised by an almost paradoxical national identity that oscillates between the glorification of an ancient past, to feelings of inferiority towards the ‘modern’ and the ‘new’. The result is a contradictory attitude towards the nation-state as patriotic sentiments are not linked with actual needs, obligations and practices at an everyday level. In other words, there is an observable discrepancy between how ‘Greek’ Greeks claim and are proud to be and the extent to which they fulfil their duties as Greek citizens (e.g., pay taxes).
This study contrasts the top-down and bottom up discourses, the dominant and the demotic. When do people use the dominant discourse and when do people contest it with the demotic? Do media have anything to do with this? And more, is it media as technologies or media as texts that affect these discourses? Where can we locate the power of the media?

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<th>Media and identities in context</th>
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**Table 1.1: Synopsis of the Theoretical Approaches Regarding the Relationship Between Media and Identity.**
This chapter has argued that in order to understand the relationship between identities and the media a new approach is needed. This means to rethink radically both identity and the media. This chapter has mainly dealt with identity, while the media and the theory of mediation will be discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 3, which follows, complements this chapter as it discusses identities in Greece, grounding the theories discussed here in the Greek context.

This chapter has argued that identities are inherently relational and ambiguous, often resembling palimpsests, as Martin Barbero has put it (1997), and thus can only be investigated as performed. Given the difficulty of the empirical task, the challenge is to theorise identity while respecting its diversity and dynamism. In order to do so, the emphasis will be on identity discourses, the ways that people talk about themselves and the others. The point is to investigate when people express a more open discourse about their identities (a 'demotic discourse'), and when they articulate a more closed and essentialist discourse, what Baumann has termed a 'dominant discourse' (1996 and 1997). Finally, the challenge for this study becomes to explore whether the media have any influence in these discursive shifts. In order to do so, the study will follow the circulation of discourses about the nation, both at a local level and in the media, as an attempt to investigate the power of the media.
3.

Identity can't be compartmentalised. You can't divide it up into halves or thirds or any other separate segments. I haven't got several identities: I've got just one, made up of many components combined together in a mixture that is unique to every individual. Sometimes, after I've been giving a detailed account of exactly why I lay claim to all my affiliations, someone comes and pats me on the shoulder and says 'Of course - but what do you really feel, deep down inside?' For a long time I found this oft-repeated question amusing, but it no longer makes me smile. It seems to reflect a view of humanity which, though it is widespread, is also in my opinion dangerous. It presupposes that 'deep down inside' everyone there is just one affiliation that really matters, a kind of 'fundamental truth' about each individual, an essence determined once and for all at birth, never to change thereafter. As if the rest, all the rest - a person's whole journey through time as a free agent; the beliefs he acquires in the course of that journey; his own individual tastes, sensibilities and affinities; in short his life itself - counted for nothing (Maalouf, 1998: 3-4).

This chapter is intended to complement Chapter 2, by providing a historical account of identities in the Greek context. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the changing and dynamic character of identities and the historical contexts in which they were shaped. This is why this admittedly brief account will start from the origins of Greek nationalism and the nation-state extending to the Ottoman past. Such an approach de-naturalises the concept of the nation and allows the situatedness and syncretism of identities to emerge. It should be noted however, that the constructedness of identities does not imply that identities are false or spurious. Once constructed, identities can become forceful. This, in turn, does not mean that they will remain so forever. In other contexts they will be re-constructed thus making cultural change possible. An apposite metaphor is that by Martin-Barbero who has described identities as palimpsests: identities are made of layers of identities, cultures and experiences (1997).

This chapter aims to reveal how these layers and experiences of identities co-exist in the Greek case, giving rise to different sets of discourses of identity and belonging. These discourses can be 'dominant' or 'demotic' as discussed in Chapter 2. The following text will also draw on the theory of Barth (1969b) and the other
anthropologists whose work was discussed in the previous pages in order to illustrate how identities were constructed through a number of historical, political, social and economic processes. I shall give a brief historical account and discuss examples from ethnographies in Greece.

Three aspects of Greek history will be highlighted to illustrate the processes through which national homogeneity and difference are achieved. These are the arrival of refugees in Greece in 1923 as a result of the population exchange with Turkey, the 'Muslim' minority and finally the issue of Cyprus. These each shed light on the actual research questions particularly as people from the 'Muslim' minority and Cypriots are included as informants in the study. In this sense this chapter performs the additional function of introducing the dramatis personae of this thesis, namely the Greeks, Greek Cypriots and the Turks that live in Greece.

To write about the history of Greece seems always to necessitate a clarification: is it ancient or modern Greece? Popular perceptions of Greece, both within the country and abroad, often involve an association between the 'glorious' ancient past and the present. Such a linearity is present in some of the writings of Smith (1993) who, as discussed in previous pages, has been criticised for an ahistorical perspective that entails a number of political problems, the most important of which is that the ancient past is used to legitimate the force of nationalism as a political ideology. This image neglects the more recent past, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.

3.1 THE OTTOMAN LEGACY, THE NEW STATE AND THE 'GREAT IDEA'

The Ottoman Empire succeeded the Byzantine Empire after the fall of Constantinople [Istanbul] in 1453. Yet, it would be mistaken to think of Byzantium as a 'Greek' Empire. Although Greek language and Christianity were dominant, other languages and religions were present. Byzantium was by no means a homogenous Empire, neither across its vast territory nor through time. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, what is today known as Greece became part of the Ottoman Empire for almost four centuries.
In the Ottoman Empire there were no ethnic or national identities, although there was linguistic and religious diversity. Religion and language, however, did not correspond to ethnic differences. The Ottoman administrative system organised populations through the *millet* system, which classified inhabitants on the basis of religion: the Orthodox ‘Rum’ millet, the Jewish millet and the Muslim millet were some of the dominant groups. ‘Rum’, meaning Orthodox Christian, included all Orthodox Christians regardless of their language, and thus included Albanian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Turkish and Greek speakers (Danforth, 1995: 59). Thus to assume that ‘Rum’ equalled Greek, as reinterpreted by Greek nationalists, is flawed. Similarly, it would be equally flawed to assume that language corresponded to ethnicity; for example, Greek was the language of trade and would be spoken by all those involved in commerce or holding administrative positions. During the Ottoman period, therefore, terms like ‘Greek’ or ‘Bulgarian’ were not used to designate different ethnic or national groups but rather broad sociocultural categories (Danforth, 1995: 59). Millets were administrative rather than territorial jurisdictions and had their own regulations (Karakasidou, 1997: 78-9). Recent studies now point to the fact that there was a wide degree of autonomy in the different millets (Clogg, 1992).

What is interesting is to observe how these sociocultural categories came to acquire political significance. This is explained by the development of Greek nationalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, initially by Greeks living in Europe, that eventually led to the revolution in 1821. Greek and Turkish nationalisms developed asynchronously. The Muslim millets of the Ottoman Empire, being the dominant ones, developed their nationalisms later than the rest. On the contrary, the Christian millets, which included Greek speakers, developed their nationalisms earlier, partly due to the awareness of their subordinate position.

Given the multicultural environment of the Ottoman Empire, it is not surprising that the first Greek state that comprised of the Peloponese (the southern part of mainland Greece) was not exclusively Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian. Hobsbawm notes

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21 Danforth notes that ‘likewise the term “Bulgarian”, which had earlier been used to refer to all the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire, came to mean Bulgarian in a nationalist sense’ (Danforth, 1995: 59). It should be noted, however, that the Greek speakers were the majority within the Rum millet.
that Albanians (more precisely, Albanian speakers) were some of the most formidable fighters against the Turks (1992: 65). A number of languages were juxtaposed including Greek, Albanian, Slavic, Vlach (a Romanian dialect) and Turkish. The Greek nation was made ‘by a sum of minorities’ (Tsoucalas, 1977: 50). This is by no account a Greek phenomenon and brings to mind the famous phrase by Massimo d’Azeglio after the Risorgimento. ‘We have made Italy’, he said after the country was politically unified; ‘now we have to make Italians’ (quoted in Hobsbawm, 1992: 44). Minorities emerged synchronously with the nation-state because the borders of the state hardly corresponded with those of the nation. This is why for every expansion of the borders of the Greek state, the Guarantor powers\(^{22}\) demanded the guarantee of the protection of minority rights\(^{23}\). However, the minority issue was heightened after the end of the Balkan wars in 1914.

The ideology that provided the raison d’être for the young Greek kingdom was that of the ‘Great Idea’, literally an irredentist ideology that aspired to the annexation of Greek speaking territories that previously made up the Byzantine Empire (Kitromilides, 1990; Skopetea, 1988). This was part of the nation-building process and was justified by the fact that only a small proportion of the Christian Orthodox Greek speakers were included within the borders of the new state. However, as Kitromilides notes, the ideology of the Great Idea ‘was motivated by concerns about social and ideological cohesion, at least as much as, if not to a considerably greater degree than, by aspirations of territorial aggrandisement’ (Kitromilidis, 1990: 59).

After its independence Greece embarked on a number of successive wars to liberate the Greek speaking lands from the Ottoman Empire, the last of which was the war between Greece and Turkey in Asia Minor after the end of the First World War\(^{24}\). Turkey emerged victorious and the war is popularly and officially referred to in Greece as the ‘Asia Minor catastrophe’ of 1922. Greece and Turkey signed the Treaty\(^{22}\) Guarantor powers were Britain, Russia and France, i.e., the states that signed the Treaty of London (1827) initiating a policy of peaceful interference to secure Greek autonomy (Clogg, 1992: 42).\(^{23}\) For a discussion of the legal framework of the minority protection in Greece, see Divani (1995).\(^{24}\) The coasts of Asia Minor were populated by a significant number of Christians and Greek speakers making parts of Asia Minor more ‘Greek’ than the recently annexed parts of Northern Greece. For example, Thessaloniki, now the second largest city in Greece, was a predominantly Jewish city with a large Muslim community at the turn of the 19th century. See Map 1 in Appendix V for an illustration of the making of modern Greece.
of Lausanne in July 1923. This Treaty sealed the fate of the populations in Greece and Turkey as the peace deal comprised a forced population exchange between the two countries. It was the first time in the history of International Law that such a forced population exchange took place (Troubeta, 2001), the purpose of which was to create two ‘ethnically homogeneous’ nation-states. Approximately 1.4 million Orthodox Christian ‘Greeks’ came as refugees to Greece and 500,000 Muslim ‘Turks’ went to Turkey from Greece (Karakasidou, 1995: 71).

3.2 CONTESTED/CHANGING IDENTITIES I: ANATOLIAN REFUGEES

It is a myth that the population exchange ensured an uncontested and harmonious national homogeneity or that the refugees became integrated into Greek society in an unproblematic way. The criterion used for the population exchange was that of religion, in line with the tradition of the millet system. In many instances, the refugees could hardly speak Greek\(^{25}\) and had often been reluctant to leave their lands and homes where they had lived for generations.

Although the refugees from Asia Minor are often collectively referred to as a single group [proslyghes, meaning refugees], in fact they came from various cultural, linguistic, social and regional backgrounds. Perhaps the only shared experience of all refugees was their Orthodox Christian religion (Karakasidou, 1997: 148). Herzfeld (1991), Hirschon (1989) and Karakasidou (1997) have documented how mainland Greeks would often call the refugees ‘Turks’, or ‘Turkish seeds’ [Tourkosporous]. Among the refugees were the Pontic Greeks who came from the Black Sea area. Even today there are still numerous jokes about Pontic Greeks in circulation that have their roots in the 1920s. Other refugees came from a more cosmopolitan environment and were despised in Greece for bringing new mores and traditions with them.

Herzfeld (1991) discusses the impact of the arrival of the Asia Minor (Greek speaking, Christian) refugees on the Greek population of the island of Crete. By 1924 all Cretan Muslim-Turks had left Crete as part of the population exchange. Drawing

\(^{25}\) There is the case of Karamanlides, a predominantly Turkish speaking Christian Orthodox people with no apparent national consciousness, who were forced to go to Greece although they did not necessarily identify ‘ethnically’ with the Greeks. At the time of the exchange they numbered as many as 400,000 (Clogg, 1992: 55).
on personal history narratives and parallel research in the town archives, Herzfeld
writes that the Muslims' departure was accompanied by immediate hostility toward
the refugees who had taken their place.

For the refugees, though suddenly destitute, were more cosmopolitan than the
indigenous Cretan population, especially the villagers recently arrived in town.
Unlike the departed Turks, they were, simply, not Cretan. Intense mutual dislike
resulted. The refugees lamented a fate that placed them among rude peasants, while
rural Cretans called the refugees ‘Turks’- a clear acknowledgement that in some
ways they were more alien than the Turkish Cretans (Tourkokritiki) who had
departed

(1991: 64). Herzfeld quotes a Cretan historian, Prevelakis, who noted that the ‘Turkish’ flavour of
the market street actually intensified when the refugees replaced the Muslims (1991:
64). Van Boeschoten, writing about the Macedonian context where most refugees
actually settled, points out that the local Slav-speakers (another minority) refer to the
arrival of the refugees as the time when ‘the unbaptised Turks left and the baptised
Turks came’ (2000: 37). I remember myself the story of a school-friend who, back in
the late 1980s, started dating a boy that came from the same island as her. When the
relationship became known to her grandmother she expressed her disapproval by
pointing out the fact that the young man was ‘a refugee’. His grandparents had indeed
come from Asia Minor as a result of the 1922 war and population exchange; three
generations were not enough to erase the stigma of the refugee in the eyes of my
friend’s grandmother. Today, three generations after 1923, there are no tensions
between refugees and locals. Interestingly, patterns similar to those discussed above
emerged in the 1990s upon the arrival of Pontic Greeks from the former Soviet Union

26 Herzfeld also notes that a similar fate awaited the departing Muslim-Turks. Upon their arrival in
Turkey, ‘the local Turks called them “chattels”, a term usually reserved for the infidel Christians’
(Herzfeld, 1991:64) Herzfeld writes that most of the Muslims:
[... ] had indeed been very reluctant to leave. All that their forced departure achieved was to ensure
homes for the arriving Christians, who did not think much of these dwellings either then or later.
[... ] Forced to leave Crete, some Muslims suddenly began to tear the wooden window boxes
(kioska) and other ornaments off their houses, not wishing to leave them behind or give them to
strangers and enemies from Asia Minor (Prevelakis, 1938). Gradually however, nationalistic history
recasts these events even in the popular memory. Today, some Rethymniots claim that it was the
Christians who destroyed all the window boxes, so that all these –now obviously ‘Turkish’ traces
would vanish. Here, once again, the official fear of Turkish claims echoes increasingly in the recast
memories of everyday life (ibid.).
Republics who were ‘repatriated’ to Greece to search for better lives. These ‘new refugees’ are commonly called Russian Pontics [Rossopontii].

Another point to be considered is what Hirschon observed about refugees who settled in hostile neighbourhoods. In the Yerania neighbourhood in Pireaus, where Hirschon conducted fieldwork, refugees became particularly vocal about their Greek identity in order to legitimise their presence (1989). Karakasidou notes that ‘in a dramatic twist of fate, these refugees were both the victims of nationalism as well as the unwitting agents of its legitimation’ (Karakasidou, 1997: 150).

Examples like these show the substantial artificiality and arbitrariness of the top-down definitions of who is Greek or Turkish and who is not. They also suggest that the idea of home and the sense of attachment to place are socially constructed and not dictated by blood or some primordial attachment to territory. What is also interesting in the above examples is that people modify their discourses of belonging according to the context, echoing Malkki’s work on Hutu identities in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995, see Chapter 2). The same people who fervently asserted their Greekness would also refer to Asia Minor as their home-country [patridha]. This oscillation should not be interpreted as a false consciousness: both discourses are true as they reflect people’s different experiences of identity.

Through processes of official top-down policies of nation-building and through the institutions of education, the church, the army and bureaucracy, people have constructed their identities as Greeks. Such processes are not unique to Greece. On the contrary, most modern nation states have undergone similar processes. What is interesting, however, is how these processes do not always succeed in incorporating everyone. This is what the next section will discuss by exploring the case of the Turkish, Pontic and Roma minorities in Greece, officially known as the ‘Muslim minority’.
3.3 CONTESTED/CHANGING IDENTITIES II: THE TURKISH, POMAK AND ROMA MINORITIES – THE 'MUSLIM' MINORITY

From the population exchange, the Muslim population of Western Thrace as well as the Greeks of Istanbul (and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos) were exempted. The Treaty of Lausanne designated the existence of a ‘Muslim minority’ in Western Thrace that set the framework for subsequent Greek policy. However, the name ‘Muslim minority’ implies one homogenous group of people while in fact contains three different minorities, namely the Turks, the Pomaks and the Roma.

The Turkish minority is a vestige of the Ottoman past (Karakasidou, 1995) and a reminder of the fact that identities do not always fit in the categories determined by international politics. The Turkish speaking Muslims of Western Thrace are descendants of various Turkish groups that settled in the area after the Ottoman conquest in 1361 AD (Karakasidou, 1995: 71). The Pomaks are a transitional group of Slavic speakers that converted to Islam in the 17th century. The Roma people of Thrace, known as Gypsies, are distinguished from the Roma of Southern Greece in terms of religion and language. Most Muslim Roma speak Turkish and only a small group speak the Romani language (Karakasidou, 1995: 71).

These minorities, having preceded the nation, are interesting because they challenge the artificiality of borders and the arbitrariness of international politics. This case resembles the Russian speakers living in post-Soviet republics that Laitin calls a ‘beached diaspora’ in the sense that they never crossed any international borders. What happened rather is that the borders receded after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Laitin, 1998). In a similar fashion, the Turkish minority in Thrace is a vestige of the Ottoman past, a beached Turkish diaspora that was the result of the making of a

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27 Thrace is the North-Eastern region of Greece, bordering Turkey and Bulgaria (see Map 1, Appendix V).
28 The Pomak language, which is not a written language, is similar to Bulgarian. A large Pomak minority lives in Bulgaria. This is the reason that three neighbouring countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey) had an interest in Pomaks: Bulgaria because of the language, Turkey because of the religion and Greece because of the geography. This resulted in the 'sensitivity' with which their existence was surrounded. Until 1989, they remained isolated in their mountain villages as one needed a special permit from the police in order to enter or exit their designated area. They remain mainly an agricultural population although a large number have moved to the urban centres of the region. Being part of the Muslim minority they had their right to religious expression but had to go to Turkish schools which resulted optimistically, in them becoming trilingual (speaking Pomak at home, Turkish at school and Greek for dealing with the authorities), although a more realistic approach is that illiteracy reigns high.

58
new nation-state and the collapse of an empire. In other words, the Turks of Greece
never left Turkey, they are Greek citizens born in Greece and this is one of the most
significant differences between them and other Turkish communities living outside
Turkey.

In the absence of any official data, there are competing figures about the size of the
minorities. A sober estimate is that the ‘Muslim’ minority numbers around 110,000-
120,000 people (Human Rights Watch, 1998; MRG, 1992). The European
Commission report on the linguistic minorities in Europe (known also as the Siguan
report [Siguan, 1990]) notes that the Evros prefecture is composed of 144,000
Christians and 11,000 Muslims among whom 2,000 are Turkish speaking, 2,000 are
Pomaks and 7,000 are Roma. In the prefecture of Rhodopi there are 67,000 Muslims,
among whom 46,000 are Turkish speaking, 12,000 are Pomaks and 9,000 are Roma.
The Christian population is about 51,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, the prefecture of
Xanthi is composed of 42,000 Muslims, among whom 11,000 are Turkish speaking,
25,000 are Pomaks and 6,000 are Roma. The Christian population of Xanthi is 46,800
inhabitants. These figures, which are dated as they are based on 1970 data, provide an
indication of the ratio of the different groups within the Muslim minority: 49.1% were
Turks, 32.5% were Pomaks and 18.3% were Roma.

Name trouble
Greece does not recognise any ethnic or national minorities apart from a religious
minority, the ‘Muslim minority’ of Thrace. The Treaty of Lausanne referred to the
minority as Muslim and Greece always refers to the Treaty in defence of the official
name policy. However, the name ‘Muslim’ has to be understood in the context of the
millet system as a broad sociocultural category, rather than simply connoting religion.
This has led some commentators to suggest that the intention of the Treaty was not to
connote a religious minority but an ethnic one (on the basis of the millet system)
(Herakleidis, 1997: 32). It has to be noted, however, that the attitude towards naming
this group has depended on the quality of Greek-Turkish relations. In the 1950s, the
policy of the Greek government was to call the minority Turkish (Minority Rights

29 The last Greek census to give data on religious affiliation and mother tongue was in 1951.
Group, 1992: 4; Human Rights Watch, 1999: 2), providing yet another indication of how ethnic categories are shaped historically and politically.

The name of the minority/ies emerges as an urgent issue. The official name ‘Muslim’ is deeply problematic for a number of reasons. First, it implies a homogenous minority which, as just argued, is a false assumption. To lump three groups under the same name is problematic as it conceals differences and the right to self-ascription. Moreover, the name ‘Muslim’ makes the religious dimension central even though some members of the minority might not be religious.

Other names that have been used are those ‘of Turkish descent’ [Tourkogeneis] or ‘Turkish-speaking’ [Tourkofonoi]. Both are problematic: the former suggests a biological, or genetic criterion for identity and the latter includes other ethnic groups that speak Turkish. The term ‘Turkish speaking’ is also problematic, as it does not necessarily include the younger generation of Turkish people who live in Athens and speak primarily Greek.

I refer to the minorities as Turkish, Pomak and Roma respectively. Since the latter two are not controversial I shall only justify the former choice. I chose to call the minority Turkish as this is the term that the majority itself chooses for self-ascription. Turkish need not imply secession, something which the majority of the minority do not want anyway. A number of my informants described themselves as Greeks. In the text, I always use the definition that people use, whether it is ‘Greek’ (often connoting Greek citizenship), ‘Turkish’, ‘Greek-Turkish’, ‘Muslim’, or ‘Greek Muslim’. I refer to the minority as Turkish when I refer to the minority as a whole. I also use the term ‘Muslim minority’ in inverted commas when referring to the official name. Of course, the aim in the empirical chapters is that the voices of the participants will give shape to these names.

30 During the Cold War there was considerable sensitivity surrounding the Pomaks because Bulgaria (where the majority of Pomaks live) was considered the national threat. Since the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations after the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the name Turkish, and hence the minority, have been perceived as threatening.
However, it is a challenging question to examine how the Muslim identity of the past became the Turkish identity of the present? As Verdery has argued, ethnic identities develop from national identities and not the other way round, because of the homogenising effects of nation-building that heighten the visibility of the non-conforming Other (Verdery, 1994: 47). The homogenising and assimilating melting pot that the state is, poses a threat to difference (and vice versa). According to Eriksen, threat, or perceived threat, can explain the emergence of ethnicity (1993: 68). In the case of the minorities in Thrace threat is felt by all those involved: Greeks feel that the minorities pose threats to their homogeneity; the ‘Muslims’ are threatened not only symbolically but through a number of state-sponsored processes, the majority of which have now been eclipsed, but have nonetheless left a legacy of distrust.

The minorities were marginalised economically in a number of ways. This has to be seen in the context of Thrace being one of the poorest areas in the EU in terms of per capita income (Anagnostou, 1999: 70) with agriculture being the major source of income. There are, however, some striking divisions within the region. The southern coastal part of Thrace, which contains a fertile zone and is more prosperous, is mainly populated by Christians, while the northern, mountainous, arid and much poorer zone is almost exclusively populated by Muslims, who mainly cultivate tobacco. Muslims cultivate 97% of the tobacco produced in Thrace (Anagnostou, 1999: 73).

Moreover, until 1991, the state directly curtailed some of the minority’s economic and social rights. Muslims needed a special permission in order to build or modify their property or to expand their business. An effect of this policy of marginalisation was that people from the minority channelled a significant part of their activities towards Turkey, while some people migrated to Turkey permanently. Furthermore, for reasons related to the Greek educational system and its limited opportunities for the minorities, many students chose to study in Istanbul rather than in Greek universities. In 1984 Greece’s Supreme Court decreed that the adjective ‘Turkish’...
should be banned as it created a false impression about the existence of foreign nationals within Greece.

The emergence of the ‘independents’ movement’ in the 1980s was partly a response to these exclusions. The ‘independents’ movement consisted of politicians from the Turkish minority who were fighting for the lifting of discriminatory policies and the recognition of the name ‘Turkish’. However, the independence of this movement was questionable as it is generally accepted that the independents were actually receiving financial support from Turkey and were actively promoting Turkish nationalism. The controversial local politician, the late MP Ahmet Sadik, referred to the then Turkish Prime Minister Ozal as ‘my Prime Minister’, a comment that caused turmoil in the Greek political scene. In 1990, as a response to the rise of the ‘independents movement’, a law introduced the 3% threshold of the national vote in order to enter Greek parliament. This percentage was larger than the minority’s proportion of the population and it meant that the ‘independent’ candidates could not be represented in parliament.

The ways in which Turkish and Greek nationalism have reinforced each other is exemplified in the clause of bilateral reciprocity (kathestos amiveotitas) that the Lausanne Treaty dictates. This means that the status of the state policies towards the Muslim minority of Thrace and the Greek orthodox minority of Istanbul are bound by a mutual obligation of Greece and Turkey to institute and protect the minorities. The most serious drawback of this clause was that the minorities suffered when the relations between the two countries were tense. This clause was also interpreted to mean that any infringement of the Treaty by one of the two countries would give the right to the other to intervene. This resulted in the minorities being the object of political calculation and manipulation, a process that directly affected peoples’ lives. In Thrace this is exemplified through the (nationalist) activities of both the Turkish

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33 The most vocal representative of the independents movement, Ahmet Sadik, appealed about this decision to the Council of Europe on the grounds that this decision prevented his re-election and infringed the minority’s right to representation. The Council ruled that the 3% threshold intended to create more unified electoral formations representing larger sums of the electorate, which it considered a positive goal and thus dismissed Sadik’s claim (Giakoumopoulos, 1997).

34 Indicatively in Istanbul, of the 120,000 strong community only a few thousand have remained.
Consulate in Komotini and the Orthodox archbishop, who are major players in this political game. Overall, one could say that Greek nationalism, as promoted by successive governments of all political orientations, and Turkish nationalism, as expressed in the movement of independents, have reinforced each other, thus heightening segregation and mutual distrust.

The Turkish, Pomak and Roma minorities in Athens

The Turkish minority in Athens is the result of internal migration which started in the 1960s. In the 1980s the Greek government offered (mainly clerical) jobs in banks and public administration institutions in Athens to the members of the minority in Thrace, allegedly to weaken the minority in Thrace. The truth is that the people who accepted these jobs were deprived of their minority rights when they came to Athens. This is why there are no mosques and no Turkish language schools in Athens to cater for the Muslims and Turkish speaking people. Moreover, the special quotas that apply to the minority students from Thrace for entering university, do not apply to their Athenian peers. Immigration from Thrace to Athens also includes Turks, Pomaks and Roma people.

Generally, the people who came to Athens from Thrace were the least affluent, mainly people without their own land to cultivate. Unemployment among the minority is quite high (there are no official data) but this was the most common complaint heard in the coffee-houses and clubs in the neighbourhood in which I conducted fieldwork. Apart from the men who were given jobs by the government in the 1980s, the rest are finding it hard to make ends meet. As unskilled workers, they also encountered what they describe as strong competition from large numbers of illegal immigrants who arrived in Greece in the 1990s and get paid much less than the minimum wage without any social security or legal protection. The members of the minority complained that, although ‘they were Greeks they were treated worse than all the “foreigners” that had flooded Athens in recent years’ (an oft-repeated phrase)35.

People from Thrace have moved to a number of neighbourhoods in Athens. People from the same town or village have tended to move to the same neighbourhood.

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35 This points to the increasing number of racist incidents in Gazi against immigrants.
People in Gazi are primarily from Komotini and to a lesser extent from Xanthi; People from Didymoteiho36 have settled in Drepetsona37 and Keratsini while people from Alexandroupoli have settled in Eleusina. Of course, these distinctions are not clear cut, but this was the general consensus among informants. This information is based on interviews I had with a number of informants. There are no official data on how many people from Thrace live in the Athens vicinity (Attica). There are different estimates that vary between 7,000 and 10,000 people. A recent report (2001) estimated that there are around 2,500 people living in Gazi only38.

Interestingly, when I mentioned to someone from Komotini that I did fieldwork with Turks living in Gazi he mentioned: ‘Oh, they are not Turks in Gazi, they are Gypsies’. Someone added: ‘they are Pomaks’. I was surprised because this was coming from a Turk living in Komotini. I was used to similar comments, as will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 8, coming from Greek people, echoing the official Greek policy on the issue, which is that there are no ethnic minorities, only religious. So, a typical phrase would be that there are no Turks in Greece, only ‘Muslims’. But why would a Turk make a similar comment? It is true that Pomaks and particularly Roma people have migrated to Attica from Thrace. But the majority in Gazi claim to be Turkish.

The Athenian Turkish community can be seen as a liminal category to use the term by Victor Turner (1967) and Van Gennep (1960). By leaving Thrace and integrating in chaotic and diverse Athens, where there are no institutions to hold the community together (there is no mosque), people are seen as dirty, impure and even dangerous (Douglas, 1966). Athenian Turks are seen as losing the traditional markers of ethnicity (the boundaries) that, according to some, hold the Turkish communities in Thrace together. In Athens women do not wear the veil, younger people do not speak fluent Turkish, there is no mosque and no cemetery. By moving to Athens, the Turks have symbolically ‘betrayed’ their community and transgressed its boundaries in the eyes of some Thracian Turks at least. This is particularly interesting as it indicates the fluidity and social construction of categories such as ethnicity.

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36 Didymoteiho and Alexandroupoli are cities in Thrace.
37 Drepetsona and Keratsini are neighbourhoods in Piraeus. Eleusina is an industrial city close to Athens.
38 Published in the daily newspaper Eleutherotypia (10.4.02).
It becomes clear that ethnicity is not a given category, but that it is rather constructed and re-constructed according to context. The Greek speaking Orthodox refugees in Piraeus or Crete were called 'Turkish seeds'. The Pontic Greeks are called 'Russians'. The Turks in Gazi, 'Gypsies' by fellow Thracian Turks. The Turks in Gazi often call themselves Greeks, while the Greeks call them Muslims. All these categories shift according to context and according to who is the other in relation to whom one defines oneself. In the following section these constructions of belonging and exclusion will be examined in relation to Cyprus.

3.4 CONTESTED/CHANGING IDENTITIES III: CYPRIOT IDENTITIES

The problem of Cyprus is probably one of the most intricate diplomatic and apparently intractable conflicts. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to include a comprehensive account of the history of Cyprus, it is useful to present a brief history of the conflict as background information on the state of affairs today. The following paragraphs will also discuss how the Cyprus issue is linked to Greek nationalism.

The Cyprus problem has been on the agenda for the second half of the century and has gone through different phases gaining attention at different times of crisis. Lately, the Cyprus issue has returned to the agenda partly due to the Cypriot Government's application for membership in the European Union. Cyprus is an island in the eastern Mediterranean close to the coasts of southern Turkey and Syria. Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire for more than 300 years. In 1878 Turkey handed Cyprus over to Britain and Cyprus became a British colony. Independence was gained in 1959. The London-Zurich agreements set up the Cyprus Republic in February 1959. In 1960, of an estimated population of 573,566, 442,138 (77.1 per cent) were Greek Cypriots, whereas 104,350 (18.2 per cent) were Turkish Cypriots. The remainder, apart from around 17 thousand Britons were smaller minorities, such as Maronites and Armenians (MRG, 1997:5).

The Cyprus problem is a story of postcolonialism and competing nationalisms and a historical approach helps to get a grasp of the problem. Greek and Turkish
nationalisms must be seen as they developed from the multicultural environment of
the Ottoman Empire which was based on the coexistence of different cultures and
languages through the millet system. Evidence of this coexistence can be found in the
geography of Cyprus until the violent uprootings of 1967 and 1974. Before these
events most villages were mixed and there was no concentration of a single ethnic
group in any area of the island (Kitromilides, 1977: 37).

In Cyprus the Christian millet was organised around the Church and in particular
through the Archbishop, who was also the ‘Ethnarch’ (i.e., the leader of the nation).
Greece played the role of the national centre. It is in this context, as a facet of Greek
nationalism, that the ideology of enosis (of union with ‘motherland’ Greece) that has
determined Greek Cypriot politics, should be understood. On the other hand, the
Turkish-Cypriots had not developed a nationalist consciousness (Attalides, 1979: 1).
During the British rule this gap widened. The fairly liberal internal policy of the
British allowed the Greek Cypriots to enhance their national consciousness and
eventually organise the struggle for independence. The Turkish Cypriots who had just
started developing a national consciousness (the Turkish state was formed in 1923)
had a very different relation to the British. As a numerical minority and as an
opposition to the dominant ideology that demanded union of the island with Greece
(enosis), they largely conformed to the colonial rule.

Thus the struggle for independence from the British colonial rule was basically run by
Greeks and in particular by two men, Makarios, the Archbishop since 1950, and
Colonel Grivas, a Greek Cypriot known for his anti-communist actions in the Greek
Civil War, who was head of the underground army EOKA (the National Organisation
of Cypriot Fighters). In 1958 the Turkish Cypriots formed the TMT (Turkish Defence
Organisation) and both guerrilla organisations focused on reciprocal violence, which
ended in an intercommunal cease-fire in August 1958.

Great Britain relinquished sovereignty over the island except for two bases in Akrotiri
and Dekkeleia in 1959. Setting up the new republic meant that the Greeks who had
fought for enosis would give up their aspirations for union with Greece, and the
Turkish Cypriots, subsequently, would give up taksim (partition) (Panteli, 1984: 345).
Moreover, the two ethnic groups would have to collaborate, something which was
very difficult largely due to the recent enmity between EOKA and TMT. Hence, soon after the constitution of the new Republic leaders from both sides engaged in a power game demonstrating their adherence to their nationalisms (ibid.: 345-6). The already complex situation was worsened by the problems caused by the new constitution (Polyviou, 1980). The new republic was set up through a 'very elaborate and rigid' constitution and three Treaties, all of which were interrelated (MRG, 1997: 9). It would require a detailed analysis to go through the constitutional and legal problems that impeded the survival of this bicommmunal state. It is perhaps sufficient to mention the problems associated with the Treaty of Guarantee, which was signed by the three guarantor states, Britain, Turkey and Greece. Under this Treaty 'each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by this present Treaty' (MRG, 1997: 9). It was on the pretext of this Treaty Article that Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, after a coup inspired by the military junta in Greece, took place on the island.

The major disputes between the two ethnic communities concerned issues such as the ratio in public services, taxes, the army, the administration of separate municipalities and the status of the vice president (MRG, 1997: 10). The situation became completely dysfunctional. President Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution, which were rejected as they were perceived as demoting Turkish Cypriots to the status of a minority and subsequently preparing for enosis. The tension led to the eruption of violence in 1963 and 1964. The UN cease-fire that followed an armed conflict in Kokkina in June 1964 allowed for a period of comparative calm. But in 1967, after the peace process failed, and largely due to the provocative moves of the colonels' junta in Greece, violence erupted again. Following the coup in the relations between Makarios and the junta deteriorated. Makarios' position became more difficult as he had to fight multiple fronts: internal opposition and paramilitary organisations still in favour of enosis; the Greek colonels who accused him of betraying Hellenism; the Americans who detested his policy of non-alignment and wanted the 'Castro of the Mediterranean' out of the picture; and

39 In the end of 1963 and the first half of 1964, 191 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greek Cypriots were killed. At the same time 209 Turks and 41 Greeks were reported missing. Many Turkish villages were abandoned in many cases as ordered by the Turkish paramilitaries (MRG, 1997: 12). These 'moves' that appeared as spontaneous in the first instance, were the necessary territorial basis for partition.
the Turkish nationalists who wanted to proceed with their plans for partition. There has been substantial evidence to support the widely held assumption within Greece that the USA were supporting the Greek junta and subsequently the paramilitary in Cyprus (MRG, 1997; Attalides, 1979).

On 15 July 1974 the Greek junta from Athens staged a coup d'etat against Makarios and Nicos Sampson was installed as a puppet president. On 20 July Turkey invaded Cyprus. On the same day the military junta in Athens collapsed and democracy was restored under the presidency of Constantine Karamanlis. On 13 August, after the Geneva conference broke down, a new Turkish attack started, which rapidly occupied 36.5 per cent of the land which still remains under Turkish occupation.

The effects on the Greek Cypriot population after the Turkish invasion were traumatic. There were around 180,000 refugees out of a population of 574,000. It has been estimated that 3,000 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turkish Cypriots were killed in a month. Moreover, to this list we should add 1,619 missing people whose fate has been ignored ever since (MRG, 1997: 19). On 15 November 1983 Denktash proclaimed the independence of the ‘Turkish Republic of North Cyprus’ (TRNC) which has not been recognised by any state other than Turkey. Bilateral discussions under the aegis of the UN have been taking place since 1974.

**Competing identities**

One of the consequences for the Greek Cypriot side of the military defeat of 1974, was the temporary marginalization of Greek Cypriot nationalism and the parallel rise of Cypriotism, an ideology that envisaged Cyprus as an independent and distinct political unit. The political priority in the post-1974 era became the independence of the island, and not unification with Greece (enosis). The ideology of enosis was held responsible for the events of 1974. Cypriotism stands in opposition to the nationalist ideologies, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, which regard Cyprus as the extension of Greece and Turkey respectively. Consequently, Cypriotism and Greek Cypriot nationalism have opposing interpretations of the causes of the Cyprus problem and perspectives on its possible solutions. The contrast between Greek Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism broadly corresponds to the political opposition between left and right (Mavratsas, 2001: 152), the right being associated with Greek Cypriot...
nationalism and the left with Cypriotism. The two slogans that these competing ideologies employed are indicative of their underlying principles. While for the proponents of Greek nationalism, ‘Cyprus belongs to Greece’, for those adhering to Cypriotism, ‘Cyprus belongs to its people’ (Papadakis, 1998: 149).

Mavratsas notes that the ‘emphasis upon Cypriot independence led to significant shifts in Greek Cypriot official historiography and to the reinterpretation of certain aspects of the island’s recent political past’ (Mavratsas, 2001: 157). For example, after the events of 1974, the EOKA movement began to be interpreted as an anticolonial independence struggle rather than as a movement aiming at union with Greece. Perhaps most significantly, after 1974, the Cypriot flag began to be publicly displayed on a large scale and to displace – or at least, to be placed next to – the Greek flag, which had, until 1974, expressed the attachment of the Greek Cypriots to the mainland and their ambivalence toward Cypriot independence (Mavratsas, 2001: 157). Moreover, it was only after 1974 that the day of independence began to be celebrated as until then the emphasis was on the national commemorations of the Greek state (ibid.). However, Greek Cypriot nationalism has proven to be highly resilient and has gained prominence again in the 1990s.

Greek-Cypriot nationalism today is expressed through the efforts to strengthen the ties between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. It is in this context that the common defence dogma between Greece and Cyprus should be understood. According to Mavratsas the common defence dogma must be seen ‘as the institutionalisation of the position that Greece constitutes the most genuine, or even the only ally and protector of the Greek Cypriots’ (2002: 163). The airspace incident which is the basis for the first case study of news analysis and viewers’ decodings took place in the context of a military exercise as part of the common defence dogma between Greece and Cyprus (see Chapters 7 and 8).

3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter offered a historical account of identities in Greece and an analysis of their changing and dynamic character. It also discussed the Cyprus problem and how it is linked to Greek nationalism. In so doing, it provided some concrete examples for
the abstract concepts introduced in Chapter 2. Instead of a singular and homogenous Greek identity this chapter revealed different layers and experiences of identities that co-exist, thereby giving rise to different sets of discourses of identity and belonging. By focusing on some particular instances of recent Greek history this chapter performed the additional function of introducing the *dramatis personae* of this thesis, namely the Greeks, Cypriots and the Turks that live in Greece, thus providing the context for the study.

The next chapter addresses media theories and identifies a possible way in which the media can be investigated in relation to the complex field of identity discourses and politics.
4.

Texts, audiences, contexts: Towards a theory of mediation

In the previous chapters the literatures that link nationalism, identities and the media were discussed. Two broad approaches were identified – one that stresses powerful media over weak identities and another that emphasises strong identities over weak media. Within the former, one strand of thought argues that the sheer presence of the media plays a role in the emergence and maintenance of national identities, while another strand stresses the role of media content in maintaining and reproducing identity. These approaches, albeit insightful, were criticised for essentialising identity. What is proposed instead is an approach that focuses on identity as a lived experience. This bottom-up approach is seen in conjunction with a top-down perspective that examines the role of media as technologies and objects and as texts. The integration of the bottom-up and the top-down approaches, or, the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of communication (Morley, 1996), is part of the effort to examine the power of the media. The aim is to reply to such questions as: whether, and in what ways and contexts, do the media influence identity discourses? Are the media, and television in particular, a catalyst for shifts in people's identity discourses (from more open and constructional to more essentialist discourses)? Do the media play any role in relation to inclusion and exclusion from public life?

To understand identity as lived and as performed leads to an investigation of the role of audiences. However, the focus is not solely on audiences but rather on the relationship between audiences and media as technologies and as texts. The aim is to understand the media as a process of mediation, a process that takes into account the viewers, the text, the technologies and the context.

The concept of mediation can be traced back to the work of Raymond Williams (1977) and has been developed in media studies by Martin-Barbero (1993), Thompson (1995) and Silverstone (1999 and in press). All these authors emphasise that we should think of the media as a dialectical process. Silverstone defines mediation as a:
fundamentally dialectical notion which requires us to understand how processes of communication change the social and cultural environments that support them as well as the relationships that participants, both individual and institutional, have to that environment and to each other. At the same time it requires a consideration of the social as in turn a mediator: institutions and technologies as well as the meanings that are delivered by them are mediated in the social processes of reception and consumption (Silverstone, in press: 3).

Such a holistic approach requires that the focus of research extends beyond the point of contact between texts and audiences and considers instead the ‘circulation of meaning’ (Silverstone, 1999: 13). This thesis seeks to examine the circulation of discourses about the nation and identity in the media and in people’s lives. The aim is to contrast these official and local, public and private discourses and make an argument about the mediation of the nation, the different ways in which the nation is conceived and talked about and how these discourses are interrelated. The attempt to see the media as a process of mediation is not without problems, both theoretical and methodological. How can the ‘circulation of meaning’ be examined empirically? Where is the meaning located? This chapter aims to identify a working approach towards a theory of mediation. It does so by proposing a synthesis of the existing theories and methods, drawing on existing work and proposals by media theorists (Livingstone, 1998a and 1998c; Morley, 1992; Silverstone, 1994 and in press).

The seeds for a mediational approach to communication can be found in the early days of media studies. Lazarsfeld and Merton as early as 1948 wrote about the need to examine the effects of the sheer presence of the media in social life. Although they concluded that such a question is simply impossible to examine empirically, this chapter argues that such an investigation is possible. The challenge is still present and perhaps more urgent than ever, as media studies and its sub-disciplines face a number of criticisms, both internally and externally.

Arguments for a theory of mediation echo the cultural or ritual model of communication (Carey, 1989). Perhaps the field that has come closer than any other to developing a mediational and ritual approach is that of audience studies which I shall take as a starting point. It was with audience studies that the two previously antagonistic research traditions, the critical and administrative, converged in an attempt to take into account both media power and the possibility for resistance on the
part of the audiences. This is evident in Morley's suggestion, drawing from Hall (1988, cited in Morley, 1996), to 'incorporate both the vertical and the horizontal dimension of the communication process', or else, '[the integration of] the analysis of questions of ideology and interpretation with the analysis of the uses and functions of television in everyday life' (Morley, 1996: 323). This is why this chapter will take the tradition of audience research as a starting point and will explore how it can be the basis for a mediational perspective.

In the following paragraphs, I will focus on some of the moments that constitute the mediation process, namely the audiences, the media as technologies and objects and the media as texts. Audiences are included because identity is understood as lived and as performed. Texts are included as they contain a set of public (if not official) discourses about the nation that might be significant in generating discourses about identity at a local level. Technology and text are included because a number of theories point to their centrality in shaping identity (an assumption that needs to be examined empirically). These distinctions are of analytical value, for the point is to see all these moments as part of the same dialectical process. The aim of this chapter is to examine how they are interrelated. Their synthesis will be left for the end of the chapter. First, it is useful to look at these moments separately as they are already laden with theories and meanings that need to be unpacked. Moreover, these are not the only constitutive moments in the mediation process, although arguably they are very central. Economics, institutional analysis or the production side of the mediation process are not included in the study, although there is an effort to provide some context about the development of news programmes after deregulation in Greece as a first step towards the inclusion of the political economy of the news media. This will be included in the section on texts, which incorporates the discussion of news that is part of the focus of this study.

4.1 AUDIENCES AND MEDIA POWER

To see identity as lived and as performed, and to observe the local and media discourses about the nation entails a theorisation of audiences. Audiences have always been important in media studies although they were not always in the limelight. Even so, they have always been implied in so far as all research about the media is also
about their audiences, even if they do not feature explicitly in the research design. Only in the past two decades have audiences been more systematically theorised and empirically examined, thereby exiting their phantom status\textsuperscript{40} (Fejes, 1984).

The 1980s saw the development of a new field of research, namely, audience reception studies, that was the result of the convergence of different and previously antagonistic research traditions. Audience studies drew on cultural studies (Hall, 1980), the social psychological research on uses and gratifications (Blumler and Katz, 1974; Levy and Windahl, 1985), and literary criticism (Iser, 1978; Eco, 1979), and brought together the critical tradition’s concern with issues of power with a focus on audiences (which was the concern of the administrative tradition).

The beginning of the ‘new audience research’ is often associated with Morley’s empirical study \textit{Nationwide Audience} (1980). Influenced by Hall’s ‘encoding/decoding’ model, which in turn drew on Parkin’s political sociology, assuming different textual decodings by different readers according to their social class, Morley examined the different interpretations of the same popular current affairs programme, \textit{Nationwide}, by different groups. The study demonstrated that the readings of the text were based on ‘cultural differences embedded within the structure of society — cultural clusters which guide and limit the individual’s interpretation of messages’ (Morley, 1992: 118). Thus the ‘meaning’ of a text or message was understood as being produced through the interaction of the codes embedded in the text with the codes inhabited by the different sections of the audience (ibid.).

Audience research documented that audiences are not a homogenous, uncritical mass but are, rather, plural and inventive in their decodings, thereby challenging the assumptions of the then dominant structuralist paradigm. The most significant achievement of audience studies is that they ‘made visible an audience which has hitherto been devalued, marginalized and presumed about in policy and theory’ (Livingstone, 1998c: 240). As Livingstone remarks, this visibility matters

\textsuperscript{40} The emphasis here is on the systematic research on audiences that resulted from the convergence of the critical and administrative traditions in what has been termed ‘new audience research’. Of course, audiences were the focus of the effects tradition. However, in much of that work audiences were epiphenomenal.
theoretically, empirically and politically (1998a: 195). The empirically grounded assumptions have significant consequences, also for theories on nationalism and identity. If audiences are not passive recipients of media messages, but actively and at times idiosyncratically, interpret and appropriate media products, do nationalist media texts have any effects? Does audience research provide a convincing answer to all the theories that have argued that media shape identities? The next paragraphs address these questions by examining the relationship between audiences and power.

The 'new and exciting phase in audience research' (Hall, 1980: 131) has not been immune from criticisms. Most critiques converge on the argument that audience studies have celebrated and glorified audience activity as exemplified in Fiske's phrase 'semiotic democracy' (1987). Critics have argued that audience research has ignored issues of power, neglecting questions concerning the economic, political and ideological aspects in the production and distribution of media texts. This concern has been mostly expressed by political economists, who accuse 'new audience research' of a lack of a radical critique of mass communication (Curran, 1990; Murdock, 1989a).

Curran argues that the 'new revisionism' is responsible for a return to the 'discredited' limited effects paradigm (1990: 153). If audiences are active in producing their own meanings, then why should researchers worry about media power and the responsibility of producers? The concept of audience activity has been blamed for redeeming the realities of oppression and as defending the industry's status quo. In the same vein Murdock observes that the position that argues for audience idiosyncrasy 'is simply another version of the market system's own claim that the ultimate power lies with the consumer [and] it conveniently ignores the ways in which demands, desires and identities are shaped by what is on offer' (1989a: 229). It is in this context that Seaman described audience research as 'pointless populism'. The problem that researchers should be addressing, he argues, is not the diversity of audience interpretation, but rather 'what is available for interpretation' (1992: 308).

What needs to be noted here is that such criticisms have centred upon the rather extreme cases and concepts such as 'semiotic democracy' (Fiske, 1987) and do not do justice to the diversity within audience studies. The celebration of the popular and the
neglect of power were certainly not the intention of most scholars working within the new paradigm. Audience studies researchers have been concerned with issues of power from the beginning, as is evident in Hall’s model (1980) and Morley’s study (1980). In fact, numerous audience-centred studies have made arguments about media power (see among others, Jhally and Lewis, 1992; Lewis, 1990; Kitzinger, 1993 and 2000; Philo, 1990). Thus, the perception that to research audiences means to write power off the agenda is untrue. On the contrary, it is only through researching audiences that evidence about media power and its effects can be substantiated. As Lewis has observed:

If media criticism is to engage in politics, it must consider the audience, which in turn means doing audience research [...] Audience research is, in this broad definition, the accumulation of evidence about the meaning of things. The question we should put to textual analysis that purports to tell us how a cultural product ‘works’ in contemporary society is simple: where is the evidence? Without evidence, everything is merely speculation. [...] As analysts we need to be clear about what we are doing when we are doing what we’re doing – to put it another way, it is because I am interested in politics that I am interested in audiences (1994: 20).

However, there is some truth in the criticisms that audience studies have failed to address power thoroughly. Corner has pointed out that in a number of empirical reception studies the issue of media power ‘has slipped almost entirely off the main research agenda’ (1991: 267). He identifies ‘a form of sociological quietism’, or loss of critical energy in which increasing emphasis on the micro-processes of viewing relations displaces (though rarely explicitly so) an engagement with the macro-structures of media and society’ (1991: 269). Similar concerns are also expressed from within this new tradition of research. This is indicative of the different trends that co-exist under the label ‘audience research’. Not all ‘new revisionist’ researchers (a characterisation a number of them would refuse, see Ang, 1996: 8) have wholeheartedly and exclusively embraced and celebrated the concept of audience activity. The degree of activity attributed to the viewers varies according to the approaches of different researchers. As Morley points out, ‘the power of viewers to reinterpret meanings is hardly equivalent to the discursive power of centralised media institutions to construct the texts which the viewer then interprets’ (1992: 31). Or, as Ang succinctly puts it: ‘it would be out of perspective to cheerfully equate “active” with “powerful”, in the sense of “taking control” at an enduring structural or institutional level’ (1996: 140).
Ang's position is important in this debate for she does not understand the concept of the (active) viewer as necessarily antagonistic to the consideration of media power (1996: 10). 'A more thoroughly cultural approach to reception [...] would not stop at the pseudo-intimate moment of the text/audience encounter, but address the differentiated meanings and significance of specific reception patterns in articulating more general cultural negotiations and contestations' (Ang, 1996: 137). Therefore, Ang argues that 'what we need is more ethnographic work not on discrete audience groups, but on media consumption as an integral part of popular cultural practices, articulating both “subjective” and “objective”, both “micro” and “macro” processes' (ibid.). Ang proposes a return to the problematic of hegemony, as it can be found within the popular. It is with the contribution of a critical ethnography of media audiences that the 'unrecognized, unconscious and contradictory effectivity of the hegemonic within the popular and the relations of power inscribed within the texture of reception practices' will be revealed (ibid.: 142).

It emerges, then, that it is not that audience theorists were not interested in power, but that they were perhaps looking for it in the wrong place. Despite their insights, audience and reception studies did not extend their focus beyond the point of contact between audiences and texts. They retained a highly mediacentric approach that did not look at wider social, economic and cultural processes of which the media and their reception are part. Audiences can (and do) interpret texts in idiosyncratic ways but what does this tell us about changes at a wider social and cultural level? In short, while self-ascribing to the ritual model, underlying the work of some reception theorists was a transmission model of communication. Concepts such as the ‘active’ audience, which have been unhelpful and perhaps misleading on some occasions, are indicative of this approach (Livingstone, 1998). As Silverstone has put it:

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41 The concept of hegemony was developed by Gramsci to explain why revolutionary movements failed in Europe in the early twentieth century. Gramsci argued that political power depended less on the coercive apparatuses of the state and more on the prevailing cultural system (including institutions such as the family, the church, the educational system and the media) which legitimates the status quo. This is the reason why, according to Gramsci, Western capitalism survived despite the social and economic crises in Europe in the 1920s. Hegemony operates at both a symbolic and a material level embedded in everyday practices and ways of conduct, or as Raymond Williams has put it is 'a lived system of meanings and values' (Williams, 1977: 110). This is where the strength of the concept lies: it addresses both power and the possibility of resistance.

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The concept of the active viewer can no longer be sustained because it no longer has (if it ever did) a clear enough reference. Activity can, and does, mean too many different things to too many people. [...] For buried beneath the manifestations of audience activity – in reading, watching, listening, constructing, learning and taking pleasure – are the conflicting and contradictory constraints of different forms of temporality and multiple social, economic, and political determinations. Instead of a simple term we need a theoretically motivated account of the dynamics of the place of television in everyday life (1994: 157-8).

The concept of the critical viewer is perhaps more helpful as it captures the increasing sophistication and media literacy with which audiences approach media texts (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994). 'Critical designates a distanced, informed or analytic approach to programmes, rather than simply a negative or rejecting one' (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 71). The concept of the critical viewer is also relevant to this study as it poses the question of whether critical viewers are more sceptical of the (nationalistic) television message. Distinguishing between the aesthetic and the content parameters of interpretation may provide one way to explore viewers' 'activity' at different levels. This distinction echoes that between critical and referential readings proposed by Liebes and Katz (1990) and Liebes and Ribak (1991).

However, what these distinctions and the critical viewer concept lack is a way to conceptualise the affective dimension of communication. This is particularly relevant for this thesis, as the discourses about belonging and identification are largely emotional as will be shown in Chapter 8. It is quite surprising that the emotional aspects of communication have been somewhat ignored (for an exception, see Ang, 1985) as emotions play such a central role in mediated communication. This is perhaps because underlying studies of communication are normative ideas of how audiences should function as well-informed citizens. Research seems to often approach intimate processes with a distant and somewhat cold approach. This

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42 According to a recent report, media literacy is defined in a threefold manner, with access considered as a prerequisite to the development of media literacy skills. Media literacy includes technical competencies, the ability to view and evaluate material critically (critical reception practices) and the ability to produce content (the latter is linked primarily to the internet and the development of personal web-pages (Livingstone and Thumim, 2002: 2,7).

43 Uses and gratifications was the first theory that addressed the issue of emotions especially in terms of how the media can instigate an emotional release (see Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch, 1974). This approach, however, was individualistic and functionalist. A recent and innovative study on the emotional dimension of communication is the work of Lunt on Jerry Springer as an emotional public sphere (Lunt, 2001).
approach, moreover, ignores the fact that media are not always used in an attentive or purposeful way. Media are so integrated in people’s everyday lives that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between mediated and non-mediated moments.

Another aspect of the mediation process that had been overlooked for some time is one that takes into account the moments when the audiences are neither critical, nor emotional nor even attentive. I am referring to the countless mediated moments, when the media function as part of the background of everyday life without any active engagement on the part of the audiences. These countless moments comprise perhaps the majority of our mediated experience as it becomes increasingly difficult to find a non-mediated instance of everyday life.

It seems necessary in order to answer questions relating to the reception process, that we need to first find out more about the ‘how’ questions. In other words, in order to know how people relate to media as texts we need to know how they use the media as objects in the first place. This leads to a consideration of questions of media as technologies and objects. The concept that takes the integration of media in everyday life into account is that of users and consumers which some authors have proposed should replace that of audiences (Silverstone, 1996). This approach that consequently sees media as technologies and objects covered an area that was initially neglected by reception studies and has now become a parallel strand of research within audience studies. This strand will be examined in the next section as part of the effort to identify a synthetic approach.

4.2 MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES AND EVERYDAY LIFE

Technologies are shaped socially as much as they shape society (MacKenzie and Wacjman, 1999). This binary function, present in all forms of mediated interaction, seems elusive as theorists tend to focus on either the social shaping of technology or the technological shaping of society. It is in this case, too, that the pendulum swings from models of powerful technologies (exemplified in medium theory and technological determinist arguments) to models of sophisticated consumers, who tailor and appropriate technologies to their own needs and cultures. Both are partially true, but it seems that authors always privilege one over the other in order to offer theories
that can be operationalised and applied in a straightforward way. Medium theory privileges a top-down perspective while studies of consumption privilege a bottom-up. Medium theory is mainly speculative while bottom-up studies are empirically grounded.

The separation of the two approaches is problematic because as MacKenzie and Wacjman have put it: 'it is mistaken to think of technology and society as separate spheres influencing each other: technology and society are mutually constitutive' (MacKenzie and Wacjman, 1999: 23). MacKenzie and Wacjman, however, are not too swift to dismiss technological determinism as it contains a partial truth (1999: 3).

As a simple cause-and-effect theory of historical change, technological determinism is at best an oversimplification. Changing technology will always be only one factor among many others: political, economic, cultural and so on. [...] A 'hard', simple cause-and-effect technological determinism is not a good candidate as a theory of social change. [...] However, [...] to say that technology's social effects are complex and contingent is not to say that it has no social effects (MacKenzie and Wacjman, 1999: 3-4).

The challenge, then, becomes to ground the claims and assumptions of medium theory in empirical research. This study will combine both approaches by investigating the assumptions about the omnipotent role of the media in shaping identities and cultures in everyday life practices. There are now a number of studies that have examined the use of media as an integral part of everyday life, producing a wealth of empirical data, although admittedly mainly in the context of Western Europe and North America (exceptions include Abu-Lughod, 1989; Lull, 1988; 1991). Studies of patterns of media use suggest significant diversity in the way technologies (old and new) are used in the context of the household. At a first level this diversity of consumption and appropriation patterns stands in contrast to the assumption that technologies shape a homogenous identity. Consumption here is understood as the internalisation of culture in everyday life (Miller, 1988: 212). Consumption of media technologies is a particular case as media goods are both material and symbolic.

Research on the consumption of media as technologies starts from the observation that media are an integral part of everyday life (Bausinger, 1984; Silverstone, 1999). As Bausinger has put it, everyday life is characterised by the 'conspicuous omnipresence of the technical' (Bausinger, 1984: 346). This focus on the sheer presence of the
media and their incorporation within the household, shaping and transforming it while being shaped by it, had been overlooked for some time. Research on media as objects is important as it denaturalises their otherwise commonplace presence in the household. It is the taken-for-granted role of television and the fact that it is such an integral part of the household that we need to focus on the 'physics' of television as Morley has put it (1995). This is the only way to make sense of the 'experience' of the media (Silverstone, 1994: 2).

4.2.1 Understanding viewing patterns: the how questions

Technology is inevitably linked to patterns of use (and viewing in the case of television) and how these are grounded in material structures and social relations. The emphasis here is on the how questions as Morley has put it (1996). It is very often the answers to this how question that complicate the more deterministic approach that technologies shape identities. Media ethnographies that have focused on the consumption of media in the context of the home have emphasised a number of parameters that shape the viewing process.

A key finding, on which many studies converge, is what Bausinger has termed 'parergic media activity' (Bausinger, 1984: 349). Media are hardly ever used in a pure and complete way with our full concentration (Gunter and Svennevig, 1987; Gauntlett and Hill, 1999; Morley, 1995). This complicates the assumptions made about the effects of the media and the methodology used to investigate them. Perhaps more research is needed on what Lull described as the structural uses of the media. The structural uses include the moments when television functions as an environmental source or background noise, as well as its role as a regulative source, that punctuates time and activity (1990: 35).

Bausinger has argued that an ethnography of media use should not just focus on one medium but on the 'media ensemble' with which people engage (1984: 349). A similar argument has been made by Ball-Rokeach et al. (2001), who develop the concept of the 'communications infrastructure', indicating that the whole range of

44 The other social uses of television are 'relational', involving television's capacity to facilitate communication or conflict (Lull: 1990: 35).
available media has to be taken into account in order to understand consumption and how it might relate to identity. This is also important in the context of globalising technologies (Tomlinson, 1999) which are becoming increasingly available to people. Are global media undermining the effects of national homogenisation that research on national media has implied? This can be only answered empirically and through the investigation of the plethora of media with which people engage.

Another significant dimension that is often neglected in bottom-up work is the issue of availability and access. Although this is a concern traditionally associated with political economy, access and availability are central to the consumption process and can be relevant to identity articulations, especially when availability of alternative-to national-media is restricted. This might be relevant both for minorities and majorities. An investigation of availability and access at the level of consumption is one of the instances when research with audiences can come close to a political economic perspective, a prospect encouraged by some authors both from within the political economy perspective (Mosco, 1996; Golding and Murdock, 1996) and media ethnographies (see among others Miller and Slater, 2000).

Studies on consumption point to the diversification of audience engagement. Gender is a category that has been found to cut across a number of other parameters that contribute to the viewing process (Morley, 1996; Gray, 1987 and 1992). Morley in his *Family Television* study focused on media consumption among 18 families in South London. One of the central findings of the book was that gender was the category that cut across all the differences between the households in the study. Viewing television was a gendered process, in the sense that men tended to dominate the viewing decisions. Morley identified gender differences in relation to (1) power and control over programme choice, (2) styles of viewing, (3) planned and unplanned viewing, (4) television related talk - women talk more about television, (5) uses of technology, (6) solo viewing and guilty pleasures - women watching when men are not there; (7) programme type preferences, e.g., factual or fictional, (8) national vs local news programming (1986; 1992). Gender differences have also been identified in other studies (Gray, 1987; 1992 and Hobson, 1982). However, more recent studies did not find significant gender differences in viewing patterns and uses of technologies (Gauntlett and Hill, 1999).
This indicates that time is another factor which needs to be considered. Consumption patterns and social relationships change over time as media technologies (and media content) themselves change. Livingstone and Bovill have identified the rise of a 'bedroom culture' in media consumption (Bovill and Livingstone, 2001). This individualism in media consumption is in contrast to the theories that held that television was the hearth of the household (cf. Barthes, 1980 cited in Morley 1995). Change is also important in relation to age. There are significant generational differences in the ways people use and interact with media, with younger generations portrayed as more media literate (Gauntlett and Hill, 1999).

In the context of this diversification across audiences and through time, arguments that technologies determine identities seem hard to sustain. Chapter 6 will examine this tension among the Greek, Cypriot and Turkish informants.

4.3 TOWARDS A MEDIATIONAL APPROACH TO THE TELEVISION TEXT

The text, hitherto the focus of the bulk of media research, has recently received a somewhat bad press. This can be explained as the exclusive focus on texts had dominated the research agenda for a number of years and in some cases impeded other, primarily sociological, concerns about media from developing. Moreover, and more importantly, the problem with many text-based studies is that they make wider inferences about media and their effects on society. This textual determinism is what has led audience theorists to question the validity of the sole focus on texts in media research (Livingstone, 1998b; Morley, 1992).

There are also other problems related to the analysis of textual research. In an increasingly media saturated world it is not at all obvious which text should be the focus of analysis: why focus on some particular texts, rather than others? And even more importantly, why should an arbitrary selection and analysis of a particular media text tell us something meaningful about the complex societies in which we live? Moreover, the notion of a text in itself has been seriously contested. Intertextuality is highly significant and cannot be overlooked in the context of continuous flows of media texts. Is it possible to analyse a text without taking its (often endless) intertextual references into account? There are also problems regarding the role of the
analyst who can 'magically extract the meaning of texts' (Couldry, 2000a: 136). This last point echoes the persistent problem of the 'preferred reading' of the text. As Morley has put it: 'is the preferred reading a property of the text, the analyst or the audience?' (1992: 122).

Another related problem involves the linearity that textual analyses often imply. This is the case even when the reception, as a form of textual realisation, is taken into account. Textual analyses, even when accompanied by reception studies, often imply a linear model of communication. This is a criticism addressed to Hall's encoding/decoding model (1980) and its empirical application in Morley's Nationwide (1980). As Morley himself put it in a critique of his own study, 'the encoding/decoding metaphor is unhappily close to earlier models of communication in the sense that it implies a conveyor belt system of meaning that is far from fulfilling the promise for a cultural, cyclical model of communication' (1992: 121).

All these apparent limitations of textual analysis should not lead us to abandon the notion of the text altogether. What they imply is that the existing assumptions and research questions associated with textual analysis are flawed and inadequate. What we need, then, are new questions that can still take into account the meanings of the text and the power of its representations. We need also to decide whether and in which cases the text can offer insights to the questions we are trying to understand. A more sociological approach to texts is needed, which starts from questioning the texts themselves. Which texts become meaningful and under what circumstances? Text has been traditionally conflated with content although it can be more than that. We could think of text as genre and form and even as technology (Silverstone, 1988).

The challenge at this point is to incorporate the text into a mediational approach to communication. I argue that the text is an inextricable part of the communication process. It cannot be studied in isolation, for this would be incomplete, but to study the process whilst ignoring it would be equally flawed. Of course, it all depends on the

45 As Hall himself has admitted: 'the encoding/decoding model wasn't a grand model. [...] I don't think it has the theoretical rigor, the internal logic and conceptual consistency for that. If it's of any purchase, now and later, it's a model because of what it suggests. It suggests an approach; it opens up new questions. It maps the terrain. But it's a model which has to be worked with and developed and changed' (1994: 255).
questions being asked and the empirical case itself. The text need not be included in all media studies. But in this study, the text is included for a number of reasons that point to its indispensable inclusion.

The first reason that the text was taken into account was the suggestion by a number of theories that nationalism and identity are reproduced through media content, a claim that calls for empirical investigation. Second, the importance of representation in the articulation of identity discourses pointed to the inclusion of the text in the analysis. As Hall reminds us, ‘identity is always constituted within, not outside, representation’ (Hall, 1990: 222). Here the interest is not only in representation as a textual property, but also in the reactions it generates. How do people react to the ways they see themselves mirrored in the media? This is particularly relevant in the case of minorities and in relation to their inclusion or exclusion from public life. Finally, another criterion for the inclusion of media content was the observation about the particular character of the Greek news, including its centrality as information source and increasing popularity among people. The features of Greek television news will be discussed in more detail in the next section. First, the case of the news will be discussed, particularly what Silverstone (in press) has termed the mediational approach to television news.

4.3.1 Why television news?

After outlining the reasons why the text was retained as one of the fields of analysis, what remains to be answered is why a focus on television news and not on fictional or entertainment programmes. Admittedly the same issues could be looked at through a popular culture genre, like soap operas, television drama, or even game shows, or ideally a combination of fictional and factual genres, an option that was not possible in this context as it would extend beyond the limitations of doctoral research

As mentioned in the introduction, the interest in the relationship between media and identity stemmed from my observations about the development of television news in Greece and the parallel resurgence of nationalism. These two issues seemed related as

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46 This remark takes into account the efforts devoted to the comparative focus of this study among the different ethnic and cultural groups and between the news case studies.
private television channels played a central role in orchestrating and broadcasting public rituals as well as adding a sensationalist touch to the reporting of national issues during that period. The special features of Greek television news programmes (their dramatisation and the extended duration of programmes), its omnipresence in the programme mix and increasing popularity added extra reasons. A more theoretically informed reason was an interest in contributing to the development of mediational approach to the news genre (Silverstone, 1999; in press) which will be discussed in the next section.

4.3.2 News

News is the most heavily researched genre. The literature on news is not homogenous as different studies are located within different traditions with diverse research agendas. Schudson (2000) identifies three major traditions that have dominated the news literature, namely political economy, the social organisational and the cultural approach. As in all typologies there are overlaps and exceptions, but Schudson's distinction is a useful starting point to understand the different approaches to news.

As Schudson has remarked, the most traditional approaches to news 'rarely depart significantly from an - often unwitting - normative view that the news' primary function is to serve society by informing the general population in ways that arm them for vigilant citizenship' (2000: 194). Schudson also notes that what is missing from the sociology of news is an account of its audiences and publics. This is not exactly correct, however, as there are a number of studies, some of which were path-breaking in their time, on the interpretation of news (inter alia see Gamson, 1992; Lewis, 1991; Philo; 1990; Liebes, 1997 and Liebes and Ribak, 1991; for the interpretation of a news magazine programme see Morley, 1980 [1999]). According to Silverstone, what is missing is not research on news viewers, but rather a more ritual and mediational approach to news as a dynamic component of social and cultural life (in press: 17).

News as mediation

Silverstone suggests that we should focus on news as a social phenomenon that has become an indispensable component of everyday life. This, according to Silverstone, is what a mediational approach to news entails. He observes that
[news'] particular, and remarkably globally homogenous, structures of storytelling, accounts of heroism and disaster, narrative closure, construction of the newsreader as the nightly reader of tales, and its fixed position in the radio and television schedules together define the genre as crucial in this subject (Silverstone, in press: 19).

It seems that for Silverstone form is almost more significant than content (the most heavily researched aspect of the news). How something is said is as, if not more, important than what is said. Moreover, in this vein, the news is a ritual that punctuates time and everyday life thus providing an almost paradoxical reassurance to its audiences. Silverstone sees the news as the 'key institution in the mediation of threat, risk and danger' from the outside world (1994: 17). For Silverstone it is 'the dialectical articulation of anxiety and security' that results in the creation of trust (Silverstone, 1994: 16), a perspective shared by Robins who has observed that the television screen 'masters anxiety' (1996: 80).

Our nightly news watching is a ritual, both in its mechanical repetitiveness, but much more importantly in its presentation, through its fragmentary logic, of the familiar and the strange, the reassuring and the threatening. In Britain, no major news bulletin will either begin without a transcendent title sequence [...] nor end without a 'sweetener' — a 'human story' to bring viewers back to the everyday (Silverstone, 1988: 26).

This study draws from this mediational perspective on the news that also echoes the work of Scannell in relation to public service broadcasting and the BBC (1989). Such a perspective is significant as it adds a new dimension to media texts that extends beyond sheer content to incorporate form and phenomenology. However, it is also criticised for assuming the social effects of ritual news viewing among a homogenous audience, a criticism which echoes the critiques that Scannell's work has received (Morley, 2000 – see also discussion in Chapter 2). The only way to solve this is to match the analysis of the news with audience research and thus achieve theoretical and empirical triangulation. This is something that had been suggested by Fiske and Hartley (1987 [1978]) through the concept of 'bardic television'. Fiske and Hartley developed the concept of 'bardic television' in order to encompass the integration of the analysis of messages as much as the institutions that produce them and the audience's response and the communicator's intention (1987: 85). Television is paralleled to a bard, who functions as a mediator of language (1987: 85, italics in original).
The analysis of the news in this study (presented in Chapter 7) draws on the mediational perspective just discussed, particularly in the analysis of news form. Moreover, the analysis of the news is also informed by the work of Billig on *Banal Nationalism* and the discursive strategies through which nationalism is reproduced (1996) and the work on media events (Dayan and Katz, 1992). Chapter 8 will discuss the audiences' interpretation of the news and the discourses news generates at a local level.

Before discussing the attempt to combine the analysis of texts, technologies and audiences in the conclusions, the case of the news in Greece will be discussed as a necessary background for the understanding of the news and its reception.

### 4.3.3 Television news in Greece: the dominant information source

*Setting the context*

Greece was the last country in the European Union to deregulate its broadcasting system. Until 1989 Greek television was under state monopoly with two public channels ERT 1 and 2 (now renamed ET-1 and NET). Since then, there has been a gradual proliferation of channels, national and local, peaking to 150 in the mid 1990s (Papathanassopoulos, 1999: 381). Most of these channels started operating without a licence creating a chaotic and crammed broadcasting landscape. The deregulation of the Greek broadcasting system was, as Papathanassopoulos has noted, a political and contingent decision rather than the product of planning and public policy (1990: 387). This, along with the symbiotic relationship between the media and politicians, explains the loosely regulated broadcasting system.

The development of broadcasting and the loosely regulated system is reflected in the style and form of the news. The advent of the first two private channels, MEGA and ANTENNA, in 1989 brought about many changes to the style and content of the news which became more dramatised and visually sophisticated, while ERT's rates dropped

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47 Deregulation of the Greek broadcasting system took place in 1987 for radio and 1989 for television.

48 This is a large number for a small market of 11 million inhabitants confirming Papathanassopoulos' view that there is an excess of supply over demand (1999: 381).
dramatically to one-digit figures. In recent years a significant change concerns the duration of news programmes which have been notably prolonged. This was a trend set by one of the private channels (SKAI, now renamed ALPHA), but the other national commercial channels followed suit. The duration of the news broadcast often exceeds one hour and in some cases has reached two and a half, or even three hours. Another prominent feature of the news is the extended use of ‘live’ links to cover events as they unfold. There is also a significant number of ‘live’ studio discussions about the events of the day, which make the news bulletin resemble more of a talk show. Aspects of this development process, particularly in relation to the transition from state monopoly to commercial channels, are common in other broadcasting systems (Corner, 1995: 59). What is distinctive in the case of Greek television is that these changes took place recently, over a short period of time and with little public planning or policy.

A short history of television news in Greece

Papathanassopoulos distinguishes three periods in the history of Greek television news (1996: 276). The first period, which is the longest in duration, extends from the birth of Greek television in 1968 to the end of the state monopoly of broadcasting in 1989. The second period extends from the first years of broadcasting deregulation in 1989 to 1994, when the broadcasting landscape was dominated by the two largest private channels, MEGA and ANTENNA. The third period, from 1994 to 1996, includes the arrival of more private channels, most notably SKAI and STAR.

During the first period the news broadcasts emphasised the verbal instead of the visual. There was little visualisation of news events, except in the case of international

49 In the pre-1989 era, ERT’s news was not particularly visualised. Hallin and Mancini (1984) made the same observation about Italian news (in comparison with US news bulletins). After deregulation, ERT changed many aspects of the news to follow developments set by the commercial channels, although there are still clear differences in the presentation style and duration of the programmes.

50 The longer duration did not necessarily bring more diversity in terms of content compared to the previous years. A comparative study focusing on the changes in news content between different periods found that the average number of reports in each broadcast remained almost the same, while what changed was the duration of each item (Papathanassopoulos, 1996: 289-90).

51 Such an example was the first day of the NATO strikes in Yugoslavia (ANTENNA and MEGA, 24.3.1999) which is included in the news sample analysed in Chapter 7.
news, images of which were obtained by international news agencies. This picture is similar to the prevalence of print journalistic conventions in the Italian news in the early 1980s as described by Hallin and Mancini (1984: 838). A large proportion of the news during that period concerned the presentation of the work of the government and statements from politicians (Somaritis, 1991: 267-275). The news was simply read by the anchormen (without any accompanying visual images) and it is indicative that, while people today refer to them as news presenters, until 1989 they were commonly called ‘announcers’.

The major changes took place with the advent of the first two private channels in 1989. During this period the two major private channels, MEGA and ANTENNA, dominated the sphere of information. News broadcasts became flagship programmes for the channels. The presenter assumed a more active role in the broadcast and became a figure identified with the channel and its identity. Broadcast time for the main evening news changed from 9:00 to 8:30 pm. This did not prevent viewers from swiftly changing viewing habits, while ERT’s rates dropped dramatically to one-digit figures. These changes were accompanied by a proliferation of images and more sophisticated editing, compared to the previous phase. In terms of content, the emphasis was no longer on the government and its policies, but rather on the confrontation and contrasting of different opinions and political views (Papathanassopoulos, 1996: 282-3). Moreover, there were fewer items on international affairs and cultural issues than before (ibid.).

The third period dates from 1994 to 1996 and was marked by the entrance of other private channels, mainly by that of SKAI TV (now ALPHA). SKAI brought a number of changes to television news by introducing a rather different news broadcast, of longer duration (sometimes lasting two hours) and with a lot of commentary, sometimes resembling more of a talk show. This became popular and the other channels followed suit, adopting the changes. However, the longer duration did not necessarily bring more diversity in terms of content compared to the previous years. In a study focusing on the changes in news content throughout these three periods, Papathanassopoulos found that the average number of reports remained the same, while what changed was the duration of each item (1996: 289-90). What increased
dramatically during this period was the use of 'live' links and 'windows', where different guests appeared to comment on the news. During a news broadcast a number of people (politicians, celebrities, journalists and witnesses of the events discussed) would parade in these 'windows' giving their opinions on the events of the day.

News on Greek television during the period of fieldwork (1998-99) and today (2002) is still undergoing further changes with increased use of live links and 'windows' especially by the private channels. It is now common to have the screen split into four 'windows' (with the newscaster and three other commentators or journalists) talking to each other about the issues on the agenda. This practice is common to all private channels. The programme duration is still quite long, but this varies according to the agenda. The use, however, of 'windows' is not confined to periods of crisis; it is a routine practice, even if the issue discussed is a new fashion collection or the wedding of a popular singer. Moreover, the start time of the evening news has changed: It starts a few minutes after 19:30, although all private channels call their news broadcasts 'the news at 20:00'. The public channels continue to have standard times for their news programmes with more or less fixed duration, from 21:00 to 21:30 for NET and 23:00-23:30 for ET1.

The dominance of television

According to the Eurobarometer survey, 71% of the Greek population watch the news on an everyday basis compared to the EU mean which is 68%. The dominance of television news, however, is particularly evident from the low percentages of newspaper readership and radio news listenership, where Greece holds the lowest position in the EU. Only 17% listen to radio news on an everyday basis (the EU mean is 68%) and only 16% read newspapers everyday (the EU mean in 42%).

52 By windows I refer to the boxes that appear on news programmes, especially during live links. They are like screens within the screen and usually feature the correspondents during live links talking to the presenter. See Image 8 in Appendix VII for such an example.
53 The full percentages for Greece are: 71% watch the news daily, 18% watch the news several times a week, 6% once a week or more often, 4% less often and 1% never. 16% of the population read a daily paper everyday, 14% several times a week, 16% once or twice a week, 25% less often and 29% never. 17% of the population listen to the news on the radio everyday, 14% several times a week, 14% once or twice a week, 25% less often and 30% never. The respective figures for the EU countries are: 68% watch the news daily, 19% watch the news several times a week, 7% once a week or more often, 4% less often and 2% never. 42% of the population read a daily paper everyday, 17% several times a week,
to the AGB Hellas' audience survey for Greece, television is regarded as the most important medium for getting informed about a multitude of issues, ranging from social, political, economic, current affairs and cultural to show business news (AGB Hellas, 1998: 88-89).

Television in turn has a large number of news and information programmes as is evident from the programme mix of the different channels. In 1998-99 (the period of the fieldwork) news programmes consisted of 40% of the total output of MEGA, 43.5% of ANTENNA, 53% of SKAI, 35.5% of ET1 and 76.7% of NET (AGB Hellas Yearbook, 1999: 37). These figures are better understood if compared to the equivalent for the British terrestrial channels. In 2000, the percentage of news programmes for BBC1 was 37.54%, for BBC2, 14.26%, for ITV, 29.09%, for Channel 4, 7.35% and for Channel 5, 9.13% (BARB/TNSofres, 2001). An interesting observation at this point is that the private channels in the UK have fewer news programmes than the Greek ones. This can be attributed to particular features of the news in Greece, namely news dramatisation and sensationalism. While the news genre in the UK is associated mainly with 'serious' programming and the ethos of public service broadcasting (underlying which are the assumptions on the role of the media as a public sphere), in Greece the news of the private channels are more populist, conveying a highly emotional discourse where the boundaries between information and entertainment are blurred.

The dominance of television in the information domain is not challenged by the availability and use of non-national media (internet and 'global' media). As far as the internet is concerned, Greece holds the last position in the European Union in relation to connection rates and use. In 1999 the connection rate to the internet was 6%. Despite the increase in the use of the medium in the two subsequent years, Greece

14% once or twice a week, 14% less often and 13% never. 42% listen to the news on the radio everyday, 16% several times a week, 11% once or twice a week, 16% less often and 15% never (Eurobarometer, 2000).

An industry spokesperson succinctly characterised Greek television as the 'collective CNN', indicating that it is now possible to watch a continuous flow of news across different channels 'from the early morning till late at night' (To Vima, 29.10.2000).

These data are for 2000. The figures incorporate those of current affairs programmes so as to make the comparison more accurate. AGB Hellas includes both news and current affairs programmes in the data.
remains the country with the lowest internet use in the EU. At the same time the demographic profile of the internet users is confirming a digital divide: internet users are most likely to be educated to university level, middle or upper class, young, male and living in urban centres. So, despite its potential, the internet cannot be considered a widespread information medium.

A number of satellite channels (including CNN) are available in Greece terrestrially, as some of them are re-broadcast by the public channel ERT. These channels, however, have a limited audience consisting mainly of opinion leaders or ‘influentials’ worldwide (Thussu, 2000b: 355) and Greece is no exception to this pattern.

4.4 TOWARDS THEORETICAL TRIANGULATION?

This study follows the circulation of meaning in the context of discourses about the nation and belonging. This involves understanding communication as a process of mediation. In so doing I will focus on the deeply interrelated processes of texts and their reception, and media and their use, in the context of everyday life. The aim is to compare the discourses generated in each moment of the mediation process in an attempt to locate the power of the media. The selection of the processes highlighted here is purposeful but justified. Moreover, by comparing the top-down with the bottom-up perspectives, previously untested assumptions about the power of the media will be investigated empirically. In this way, the extremes of textual

56 Internet penetration reached 12% in 2001 (VPRC survey, cited in Sunday newspaper To Vima, 18.11.2001).
58 BBC World and CNN are also available through digital television which was introduced in Greece in December 1999. However, the penetration of digital television is still limited and in any case was not available in 1999 during fieldwork. BBC World is not freely available terrestrially as CNN is.
59 It is nonetheless important to note that global news networks (such as CNN) and agencies are vital sources for national channels, including the Greek. Television news pictures, when they are not locally produced, are provided to broadcasters worldwide by three commercial news agencies and some co-operative news exchanges (Patterson, 1998: 79). This means that Greek viewers, even indirectly, watch material from global networks. This practice is even more common during conflicts or crises in places where broadcasters did not—or could not—send correspondent teams. Due to geographical proximity all national channels in Greece had correspondents in Kosovo and Serbia during the conflict. However, Greek channels still used pictures from international news agencies and global channels, notably CNN. Visual material from Serb television was also used. In Chapter 7 the proportion of the use of global pictures in Greek news and the way they were appropriated in that context will be examined.
determinism and the glorification of audience power will be avoided. Both text and context must be taken into account as one complicates the assumptions of the other and the examination of their interrelationship might shed light on the process of mediation.

Although this is something that has been suggested before (inter alia, see Morley 1986 and 1992), in practice the focus has commonly been either on the uses of technology or the reception of texts. Livingstone has observed that 'in their writings Silverstone and Morley do not, in practice, return from their focus on media-as-object to a concern with media-as-text' (Livingstone, 1999: 8). And she continues:

Indeed one begins to wonder whether, for today's ethnographic audience researchers, it matters what is showing on the television screen at all, or whether researchers are only interested in where, how and why television, as the box-in-the-corner is viewed? (ibid., emphasis in the original).

I argue that it is vital to retain both dimensions in our attempts to develop a theory of mediation as they are inevitably interconnected. The investigation of the uses of media as technologies (with the indispensable examination of issues of availability and access) grounded on material structures are inevitably linked to issues of trust and access to alternative resources that shape the reception of media output. This connection becomes particularly salient in the case of media and identity, when discourses about belonging and exclusion are grounded on material conditions and trust of the media. As Livingstone remarks, the focus on text and context 'cannot be an either/or choice but remains a tension at the heart of the field which should be productive not destructive of understanding the connections among audiences, media and contexts' (1998c: 251).

The key to a mediational approach is the integration of levels of analysis in order to achieve empirical confirmation. In this sense the synthesis of different strands and subfields, such as reception and consumption and reception and context is encouraged. The integration of the levels of analysis is also linked to the micro/macro relationship mentioned earlier in section 4.2. The distinction between the micro and macro levels of analysis, in terms of exploring the ideological aspects in communication processes that Corner (1991) mentioned in his critique of audience studies, is not very helpful.
As Morley notes, echoing Giddens' structuration theory (1979; 1984), 'the macro structures can only be reproduced through micro-processes' (1992: 19). Micro and macro levels are intertwined and to study the one involves studying the other. Livingstone has argued that the aim should be to integrate the micro and the macro levels in order to achieve empirical confirmation across levels (1998a: 206). The ethnographic perspective on audience reception is valuable 'precisely in so far as it can inform our understanding of media power as it operates in the micro-contexts of consumption – without divorcing those issues from those of macro-structural processes' (Morley, 1992: 40).

By attempting to integrate different levels of analysis, reception research can attempt to connect with the broader questions of political, social and economic organisation, thus strengthening relations with neighbouring disciplines to audience studies. This way audience studies can perhaps overcome what Corner has termed the 'lack of consequentiality in the findings and an uncertainty of tone, perhaps even a diffidence in the research conclusions' (Corner, 1996: 298-9). The theoretical triangulation proposed here is not only of analytical value. Its results can have a more political or practical dimension, especially in the context of identity politics which are the focus of this study.

Such a theoretical formulation raises a number of methodological issues. How is mediation to be investigated empirically? This is what the next chapter will discuss, before the presentation of the empirical data.

60 The concept of structuration was developed by Giddens (1979; 1984) as an effort to bridge the gap between theoretical perspectives that foreground structure and those that emphasise action and agency. Giddens considers structure as a duality that includes constraining rules and enabling resources. Structure both constitutes action and is reproduced by it. Structuration therefore describes a process by which structures are constituted out of human agency. One of the important characteristics of structuration theory is the prominence it gives to social change, seen here as an ubiquitous process that describes how structures are produced and reproduced by human agents who act through the medium of these structures.
5. From theoretical to methodological triangulation: mediation in the field

Sometimes I think that ethnography is to social sciences as jazz is to music (Agar, 1980: 92)

Chapter 4 laid the theoretical foundations for a mediational approach to communication. This chapter will answer the ‘how’ question by discussing how mediation can be studied empirically. It argues that mediation can be studied only through a multifaceted process. The theoretical triangulation suggested in the previous chapter has to be coupled with a methodological one that will include a study of audiences, media content and uses of technology.

The fieldwork, which centred on two case studies, includes (1) the sampling and analysis of television news, (2) their subsequent decodings in group and individual interviews and (3) participant observation of media use in private and public spaces. The first case study took place in October and November 1998. The reports sampled concerned what was described in the introduction as a routine event. At the same time I organised focus group discussions about the reporting of this event. The second case study took place in April and May 1999 and concerned the reporting of the Kosovo conflict (and its impact on Greek society). Interviews, group and individual, also followed the sampling of news broadcasts this time. These two studies will hereafter be referred to as the ‘airspace incident’ and the ‘Kosovo’ case studies. I also conducted participant observation and informal interviews in the interviewees’ homes, these being more extensive in the case of the Turkish community. Participant observation took place in parallel with the case studies and continued intermittently until spring 2001. During this period I also collected relevant secondary sources: data concerning audience ratings and newspaper circulation numbers as well as articles on media use in Greek society. In short, I was doing what Hammersley and Atkinson

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61 'Case study' is used here in the broadest sense, signifying research conducted in a particular time frame revolving around a specific theme.
have described as the role of the ethnographer: ‘collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issue he or she is concerned about’ (1983: 2).

The following paragraphs account for all the above choices whilst showing that research in this study, as so often, is hardly a linear process. Apart from the oscillations between theory, fieldwork and data analysis discussed in the introduction, this research has benefited from a degree of improvisation as the project evolved. Approaches and methods had to be adjusted to meet the empirical realities which were not always predictable. The two empirical case studies mentioned above were not identical in their design. The extent of participant observation and the numbers of interviews were not necessarily even, although effort was made to retain as much balance as possible. This is largely related to the issue of accessing audiences, which involved difficulties especially in the case of the Turkish people. This is the reason that the third section in this chapter is entitled ‘Accessing Audiences’. It is an account of how I approached the informants and interviewees and the difficulties encountered in each setting. This section will also describe participant observation in the Turkish neighbourhood and the Greek and Cypriot households.

Before describing the overall process and the methods involved, I shall discuss the broader methodological issue of triangulation upon which this study draws. Then the focus will shift to ethnography and the issue of researching one’s own culture. What follows is the section on ‘accessing audiences’, which includes a description of participant observation. The section on interviewing (individual in-depth interviews and focus groups) and why it was relevant for this study comes next, followed by issues on sampling of news reports and broadcasts. Finally, there is a section on

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62 Improvisation provides the link to the comparison of jazz with ethnography, in the quotation opening this chapter.

63 The Turkish neighbourhood in Gazi is a community, at least in the geographical sense of the term. This is by no means the case for the Greek and the Cypriot informants. In Gazi I hung around the public spaces which people were frequenting. I even did some of my interviews in the coffee houses, or the cultural clubs as it is usual for men to watch television (or videos) together in the clubs. This is a gendered practice – interviews with women took place in their homes.
analysing and generalising from qualitative data. The last, concluding section is a summing up of the different data collected for the purposes of the study.

5.1 METHODOLOGICAL TRIANGULATION

The combination of methods discussed in this chapter derives from the overall theoretical framework of mediation as discussed in Chapter 2. In other words, the theoretical triangulation that the concept of mediation entails, inevitably leads to a methodological triangulation. Different methods were necessary to study the different facets of the communication process, namely the text and its reception and the media and their consumption. Focusing on the different moments of this dialectic process allows one to understand how they might, or might not, influence each other.

Moreover, behind the combination of different methods in the collection and analysis of data lies the methodological principle of triangulation, in which each method complements the shortcomings and limitations of the other so as to achieve broader and better results (Denzin, 1989). The methodological choices in this study were also driven by the need to complement the weaknesses of the other methods used. Individual interviews were carried out in order to go further in-depth and probe more issues compared to the focus groups, which aimed at breadth. Participant observation contributed to the ecological validity of the study, which would have been weaker without observations in a natural setting (Morgan, 1997: 8).

The combination of different qualitative methods in this study also reflects its ethnographic perspective. This is evident in the discussion to follow on self-reflexivity and doing research 'at home'. It may also be seen as ethnographic insofar as it combines several qualitative methods, including participant observation and informal interviews. Fieldnotes were an important component of the data.

This study took an ethnographic direction for the following reasons. The first is an interest in the uses of media in everyday life and how they relate to identity discourses. The second reason for the ethnographic 'shift' was more particular to my experience with the Turkish people.
As with all groups, participant observation was relevant to the gathering of contextual information and more specific information about the uses of media in everyday life. But, more importantly, an ethnographic approach was necessary in order to gain access to, and get a good understanding of the community in question. Organising focus groups would have been an impossible task had I not gained the trust of people first. Participant observation and informal interviews were, in the first steps of the fieldwork, but also later on, the main means of gaining information about this community, their patterns of media use and comments on news broadcasts. This need for an ethnographic turn emerged after my initial immersion in the field. Although I became aware of this through my contact with the Turkish informants, I soon realised that it was equally important for all groups. The reason for this was that participant observation allowed me to observe a broader set of discourses than the interviews allowed and than I had anticipated. In short, the ethnographic perspective enabled the ambivalence of identity to emerge.

Participant observation allows for an unobtrusive approach which is important in the context of identity articulations. To ask people to reflect on their identity in an interview context might unwittingly direct the respondents to think in a particular way. In this context, interviews have to be coupled with observations of people’s actions, something that Couldry has also remarked upon (2001: 10). This echoes Bourdieu’s arguments for the development of a reflexive sociology and a soft approach to interviewing (Bourdieu, 1999; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

5.2 ETHNOGRAPHY IN MEDIA STUDIES

The interest in media consumption echoes the developments in audience studies in the direction of what Ang (1996) and Radway (1988) have termed ‘radical contextualism’. Morley (1992; 1996) and Silverstone (1989) have also argued for a contextualised understanding of television both as a ‘text’ and as a ‘technology’. The attempt to investigate how the media, and television in particular, are enmeshed in people’s everyday lives inevitably brought up the issue of methodology. The method that was adopted as pertinent to study not only how people make sense of the media, but also how they interact with and integrate them in their daily practices was that of ethnography. Hitherto the preserve of social anthropologists, ethnography entered the
field of media studies, providing the researcher with an integrated means for understanding the everyday world of social groups and their uses of mass media (Lull, 1990: 31). Morley and Silverstone describe ethnography as 'a multifaceted process in which the requirements of detail and richness, rigor and systematicity have to be carefully balanced, and where there is no single, adequate methodological procedure' (1991:160).

Ethnography is an 'empirical description and analysis of cultures based on intensive and extensive fieldwork in a selected local setting' (Gillespie, 1995: 1). Ethnography does not involve a single method, but rather a combination of methods usually 'organized around participant observation, the use of informants, and in-depth interviewing' (Lull, 1991: 31). Hammersley and Atkinson hesitate to distinguish between ethnography and other sorts of qualitative inquiry (1995: 2). They use the term in a liberal way, referring primarily to a particular method or set of methods, where the 'ethnographer is participating, overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions [...]’ (1995: 1).

However, ethnography in mass communication studies has been a contested issue as there is some disagreement over whether it is a form of ethnography, in the traditional, social anthropological sense of the term. Some have remarked that the term is often used to indicate qualitative methods in general (Lull, 1988; Nightingale, 1993), while only a few researchers have conducted participant observation, which requires a long immersion in, and investigation of, the culture studied and which is considered as an original ethnographic method (Gillespie, 1995).

Radway, in a form of auto-critique, draws our attention to another problem associated with the application of ethnography in media studies. She recognises that media scholars tend to exclude questions that do not fall in their immediate interest or 'preoccupation with a particular medium or genre’ (Radway, 1988: 367). And she continues:

[...] we have remained locked within the particular topical field defined by our prior segmentation of the audience of its use of one medium or genre. Consequently, we have often reified, or ignored totally, other cultural determinants beside the one specifically highlighted’ (ibid.).
Although these are valid criticisms they should not prevent researchers from using ethnography, for there have been studies that have managed to balance the emphasis on media consumption and the description of everyday life (e.g., Gillespie, 1995). Moreover, there is an increasing number of ethnographies, some by anthropologists (cf. Abu-Lughod, 1989; 1993; 1995; Miller, 1992; Mandel, 1998; Mankekar, 1999). Indeed a new sub-field seems to be slowly emerging (cf. Askew and Wilk, 2002).

Besides the concern for the 'proper' application of ethnography, other issues have been raised regarding its value for audience studies, such as the concern about the unwieldy nature of contextual information, the disappearance of the text from the research agenda (Livingstone, 1999) and the need for more self-reflexivity on the part of the researchers who mainly study their own societies (Press, 1996). Of these issues, after briefly discussing the first two, I shall focus mainly on the latter as it applies to this study and relates to the concept of cultural intimacy discussed in Chapter 2. This is an important issue as it affects the outcome and quality of research.

Where does context end?

A problem related to ethnographic media research is the apparent endless character of contextual information. Livingstone has pointed out 'the impracticality of fully contextualised research' as 'everything is connected to everything else' (Livingstone, 1999: 9). The gathering of contextual information becomes an unwieldy task and issues regarding the focus of the research are raised. It seems that in some cases the danger lurking is to miss the wood for the trees.

The amount of contextual information is not a new problem for anthropologists who have long ago acknowledged the inherent limitations of the ethnographic enterprise. Geertz has noted that: 'Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete' (1973: 29). Or else, 'at best an ethnography can only be partial' (Agar, 1980: 41). It is mistaken to think that ethnographies in the 'proper' anthropological sense focus on every possible detail. Most often there is a focus on a specific aspect of the society under study. This provides an answer for media studies ethnographers who have an explicit interest in the media but for whom a knowledge of context might broaden what is often a media-centric perspective.
In this project the contextual information was sought in order to understand the uses of media in everyday life and in order to obtain discourses about identity in natural settings.

*The loss of the text*

It is true that the text, described previously as the vertical dimension of communication processes, is receiving less attention by researchers than in the past (Livingstone, 1999). This can be problematic, as to ignore the text is often to ignore the power dimension of the media. Nonetheless, the exclusive focus on texts is also problematic as discussed in Chapter 4. It has already been argued why the focus on texts will be retained in this study coupled with an ethnographic perspective on audiences. This, however, should not be taken for granted as the inclusion of texts or audiences, for that matter, should derive from the research questions. Overall, the inclusion, or not, of the text in the research agenda is not a result of an ethnographic perspective but should rather derive from the research questions.

*On insiders, outsiders, and doing research ‘at home’/ self-reflexivity*

The following paragraphs address the concern about self-reflexivity in ethnographic research, particularly when researching one’s own culture. This is also related to the problems of applying ethnography in media studies, as media scholars have not engaged in this debate, which has been ongoing in anthropology in the last decades.

Doing research ‘at home’ became a central part of the methodological problematic surrounding this project, from its conceptualisation to the writing phase. And of course during the fieldwork, there were constant reminders of my position in the society I was studying. The first question to ask is why this particular research interest; the second is how my identity, as a researcher and as a member of the society that I am studying, affects my interactions in the field and the writing processes.

Press is right to point out the lack of attention paid by media ethnographers to the problem of studying one’s own culture (1996: 116). Doing ethnography ‘at home’ is a long standing debate among anthropologists. Communications researchers with an ethnographic approach have not exhibited the same amount of self-reflexivity, tacitly assuming their role as insiders as taken-for-granted. This is probably a result of the
interdisciplinary roots of communication and audience research. Sociology, social psychology and political theory (in general, most social scientific disciplines) have traditionally focused on researching the ‘home’ society. Why then should this become problematic when using ethnography as a method?

What matters here is the particular features of ethnography that distinguish it from other social scientific methods. Ethnography places the researchers at the heart of the research environment. It is through their interactions that they come to understand the culture in which they are interested. Furthermore, it is not possible to evaluate one’s ethnography with reliability or other quantifiable criteria. Ethnography is based on the dialogue between the ethnographer and the researched community.

Doing ethnography ‘at home’, or ‘indigenous anthropology’ (Hastrup, 1995), or ‘auto-anthropology’ (Strathern, 1987 and 2000) as it is also called, is still a contested issue within the anthropological field, although it is now considered as a possible and valid ethnographic approach. It is not in the scope of this chapter to exhaust these debates. Nonetheless, it is useful to look at some of the protagonists’ arguments as they cast light on the concepts of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ that are relevant in this research. I am in line with Press (1996: 116) when she argues that there is more need to reflect on our roles as researchers and as insiders and outsiders in different contexts. Self-reflexivity is also important regarding the basic assumptions and research interests that give birth to a research proposal, as was discussed in the introduction. As Ang has put it, ‘our curiosity about the audience is never innocent’ (1996: 66).

If we look back at the history of anthropology as a discipline, when the white western ethnographer sailed to explore other distant, ‘primitive’ cultures, it is clear that for a long time anthropology was identified with the exclusive study of ‘other’ cultures. In recent decades anthropologists seem to have abandoned their ‘exotic’ perspective on culture and consider all societies (including the home) as possible objects of critical analysis (see Clifford and Marcus, 1986). This is not a result of the disappearance of primitive tribes in an increasingly homogenised world, but rather the result of new epistemological debates (Hastrup, 1998: 339).
One of the influential movements in recent anthropological theory is that of 'Cultural Critique', which was marked by the publication of two books by Fischer and Marcus (1986) and Clifford and Marcus (1986). Authors working within this movement have emphasised subjectivity, self reflexivity and, most importantly, the awareness that (ethnographic) knowledge is historically, culturally and socially defined (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 87, 113). Recent anthropological theory considers the concepts of culture, of the 'self' and the 'other', not as fixed entities, but rather as categories of thought (Abu-Lughod, 1991; Hastrup, 1995). As Hastrup has remarked:

In anthropology therefore it is not the personal credentials and linguistic competence that determines whether a particular ethnographer works 'at home' or elsewhere. ‘Home’ is a conceptual category with shifting reference. The only way to measure or define anthropology at home seems to be by way of the resulting writings (Hastrup, 1995: 152).

Many of the ethnographers who have played an active role in the debate start by stressing that indigenous ethnography is impossible (or a 'contradiction in terms' as Hastrup notes [1998]). This does not always mean that they consider doing anthropology in one's own culture impossible. What is contradictory in the term 'indigenous anthropology' is that it is impossible for an ethnographer to be both a 'native' or an 'insider' (to speak as a native and for the natives) and an objective ethnographer/self.

From this it emerges that studying one's own society is a valid enterprise as long as the researcher can embody the distance needed to look for otherness within the familiar (Marcus and Fischer, 1996: 111-136). Loizos has noted that in the end what matters is not whether the position of the ethnographer is privileged (or not) in the culture s/he studies, as this is not measurable anyway, but rather the adequate awareness of his or her position in the culture studied (1992: 170).

Many ethnographers have written on the advantages and disadvantages of doing anthropology at home. It has been argued that the ethnographer may possibly enjoy a more privileged access to some aspects of the local culture, mainly regarding 'the emotive and other intimate dimensions' (Ohnuki-Tiernay, 1984 cited in Hastrup, 1995: 157) and an understanding of the subtle links and nuances within a culture more easily than a stranger. This was relevant in my fieldwork. I remember viewing on
television the 'peace' concert in Athens' central square (26/4/1999) during the period of the Kosovo crisis, during which songs of resistance were sung evoking memories from the resistance to the junta in the 1960s and 1970s. Born in 1973, I had been brought up with these songs which invoked particular family memories and experiences. In the research context I was at once in tune with the public display of emotions, and at the same time distancing myself in order to understand what was going on. I was singing and at the same time keeping notes in my diary. In this instance I was privileged to be able to be in tune with public emotion; at the same time I was objectifying myself constantly, trying not to miss any important detail from the broadcast and its connotations with which I was not identifying. It is an exhausting experience to be full of emotions and at the same time scrutinising them, always keeping a critical eye on oneself.

Another dimension relating to researching one's own culture is the immediate positioning of the researcher within existing social categories and, more importantly, the larger pressure for conformity to the local norms (Hastrup, 1995: 158). People immediately knew where to place me in Athenian society and were expecting a certain type of behaviour from me. This might have opened doors in some cases, when people agreed to be interviewed by me, while in others it created tension.

I had an experience in Gazi with two of my female informants who, at our second meeting, became very critical of the fact that I am not married. They would shift the discussion constantly to that matter, avoiding all my efforts to open up the discussion. By the end of the visit I was feeling frustrated and perhaps a bit embarrassed as I did not want my personal life to be discussed in that context. I always kept notes about each of my visits and tried to use such difficult/uneasy moments of communication as a means to understand the content of the interview as well. I interpreted the above case as an indication of the initial unwillingness of the two women to participate in the interview. They were somehow testing me, perhaps in the same way that they thought I was testing them through my questions. Their intrusion into my private life can be interpreted as a response to what they perceived as my intrusion into their private life.

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64 This concert is analysed as a media event in Chapter 7 as part of the analysis of the news. The image described at the opening paragraph of the thesis is also taken from this same event (Chapter 1).
spheres. Perhaps the uneasiness I felt as a result of their scrutinising questions was similar to the way they felt when I approached them for an interview.

Another dimension in which the insider-outsider relationship becomes important is the recognition that our societies are not homogenous not only ethnically, but also socially and culturally. This is particularly salient in urban contexts. What is very interesting is that many anthropologists who decided to do ethnography in their home society chose to study marginalised communities (for example see Agar, 1973). In my research in Greece I was both an insider and an outsider depending on the context. In my visits to Gazi, I was an outsider, but less so in my encounters with people of younger generations (Nihat, Yilmaz, Murat, Suleyman). Interestingly, I was more of an outsider with women. With the Cypriots in Greece my role was ambivalent: I was an insider or an outsider depending on the context of the discussions or interviews. The same happened among some Greek informants, such as the working class housewives.

These debates become meaningful in the context of the concept of cultural intimacy, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Cultural intimacy was defined in previous chapters as the ensemble of cultural traits that define insiderhood but are also felt to be disapproved of by powerful outsiders (Herzfeld, 1996). Consequently, as an insider, I could easily relate to the ‘dirty laundry of the nation’ to which, as an insider, I was granted access. As an insider, I could expect people to confide in me as a ‘family’ member. Problems arose however, about making (through writing this thesis) this information public to people who are considered outsiders. This way I was betraying the unwritten rule upon which insiderhood and strangerhood were based. When I told Marianna, a Cypriot woman in her fifties, that I was also interviewing Turks living in Gazi she told me: ‘Be careful what you write about these issues abroad’. Her warning did not just involve my talking to what she saw as the ‘outsiders’ within the nation, but also that I would make this information public ‘abroad’, outside the confines of the ‘national family’.

Cultural intimacy can become an impediment in the research and writing process if the researcher feels attached to the cultural traits that make up her culture. Taking something out of context is problematic in itself and this is accentuated when contested habits, rituals or practices are involved. Cultural intimacy can work in a
twofold way. As an insider the researcher is already familiar with practices and discourses. At the same time this same quality of insiderhood might prevent her from presenting these practices and discourses in a critical fashion. Familiarisation and defamiliarisation are of paramount importance here. The following section on accessing informants and doing participant observation aims to illustrate this discussion.

5.3 ACCESSING AUDIENCES/DOING PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

This study focuses on people who live in the city of Athens. They can broadly be divided into three categories in terms of their ethnic and cultural background: Greek, Cypriot-Greek (Cypriots who live in Greece) and Turkish (members of the Turkish minority in the region of Thrace have come to Athens in the last two or three decades). This seems to be an unwieldy population, difficult to manage empirically. For this reason I had to make some pragmatic decisions, aspiring at the same time to the maximum degree of diversity and representativeness. As in most qualitative work, I cannot make claims for the general population. Yet this was never the goal of this project. To support this I borrow again from anthropology, and in particular from the work of Mead. What she did was to turn the sampling issue around, instructing us to contextualise the cases we sample.

Anthropological sampling is not a poor and inadequate version of sociological or sociopsychological sampling, a version where n equals too few cases. It is simply a different kind of sampling, in which the validity of the sample depends not so much upon the number of cases as upon the proper specification of the informant, so that he or she can be accurately placed, in terms of a very large number of variables ... Each informant is studied as a perfect example, an organic representation of his complete cultural experience (Mead, 1953: 654-655).

Selecting individuals to participate in the group discussions and interviews was different for each population and thus the process will be described separately for each group. In the following paragraphs I shall also give an account of how I did participant observation which, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, was unevenly done in each group. A decision that needs to be defended here concerns the inclusion of different informants in the two case studies. Focusing on the same interviewees in both case studies would have provided more depth in the analysis. The choice to include new interviewees in the second case study was driven by the equally important effort to increase diversity within the sample.
The Gazi experience

My experience with the ‘Muslim minority’ began with a visit to Thrace in spring 1998. This was an exploratory trip in the context of developing ideas about the thesis and the research questions. The interviews conducted during that trip and the data gathered have informed the study although they were not ‘officially’ part of the data. As mentioned in Chapter 3 the majority of the minority lives in Thrace.

Gazi is one of the neighbourhoods to which people from the Muslim minority (mainly Turks) migrated in the 1980s and the 1990s. It is the only of the neighbourhoods, to which people from the ‘minority’ have moved, that is very close to the centre, literally two miles from one of the central square of Athens. It is also one of the first areas to which people from Komotini came. Until recently, Gazi was a very deprived area, mainly due to the gas power station that was operating until the late 1970s. In the last couple of years the area has been undergoing dramatic changes as it has become a trendy spot in the city’s nightlife. A new metro (underground) station is due to open before 2004 and gentrification is under way. Local residents, mainly constituted of Turkish people, are afraid that they will soon be forced to leave for more remote suburbs because of the continuing increase in the value of property in the area.

Yet, up until May 2001 when I last visited the neighbourhood, none of my informants had left. All the coffee houses and clubs that cater mainly (but not exclusively) for the Turkish minority continued to function normally juxtaposed to the rapidly proliferating trendy restaurants, bars and night clubs. Perhaps the most obvious change of the last few years was that the park where most of the Turkish women would hang out, especially during the summer months, has now been closed as this is the building site for the new metro station.

My feelings were mixed when I first visited Gazi in early October 1998. As I had no contacts to introduce me to people in the neighbourhood, the only means of actually meeting people was to go and find them. Excitement on the one hand, and the

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65 For a description of the Turkish minority in Thrace and in Athens see Chapter 3.
66 Gazi means gas in Greek.
intimidation one can experience at the onset of fieldwork were mixed. I felt like a complete stranger. I sympathised later with Agar's comment on a possible reaction when arriving at the field: 'it's little wonder that people sometimes hide in a hotel room and read mysteries' (1980: 83)! But I did not hide, nor did I leave. Instead I hung around in the male dominated coffee houses [kafeneia] and I visited one of the two existing cultural clubs/societies. This way I met people who came and talked to me first.

In my initial visits I came across what has been termed 'gatekeepers' (Lee, 1995: 20), or 'professional stranger handlers' (Agar, 1980). 'Stranger-handlers' function as unofficial spokespersons for groups when dealing with outsiders. As Agar has put it: 'Such stranger-handlers are natural public relations experts. They can find out what the outsider is after and quickly improvise some information that satisfies him without representing anything harmful to the group' (Agar, 1980: 85). Such an encounter was with the then head (the locals called him 'president') of the cultural club, where I made my first contacts in the neighbourhood. Every time I paid a visit I had to talk to the 'president' first. He would often ask me, 'Why do you want to speak to anyone else? I can answer all your questions'. Indeed I probably interviewed him half a dozen times. Having listened to his opinion I was then free to talk to other people as well. Politics in the community is a big issue for many of the people. It was a difficult task not to be overtaken by this. It was also a delicate balance I needed to keep, between keeping distance from being patronised and not appearing arrogant, or insulting.

It took many visits to find my way through the networks of people. Organising focus groups was a difficult task: people were very friendly at the first level, but were rather reserved in inviting me into their homes. It was only after numerous visits that I managed to use a tape recorder for some of the interviews. Even then people expressed their discomfort with it. I remember three interviews when the participants would ask me to 'turn the “machine” (sic) [tape-recorder] off', in order to tell me something important67. All this time I was using notebooks to write down my

67 This attitude is associated on the one hand with the politics within the community, and on the other with their distrust towards journalists due to previous negative experiences (this issue is discussed in the empirical chapters). Although it was made clear from the beginning that I was not a journalist and all the material collected was confidential for my own research, people were still negative about the use of the tape recorder. In my fieldnotes I have an account of a meeting with the deputy-head of the other
observations and accounts of the discussions I had with people. It became a routine during the months I spent in Athens, to pay a visit, either to the club, or the café, or to simply hang around in the square at least a few times a week.

Another difficulty involved meeting women. Public space is particularly male dominated. Women hang around a small park in the warm months with their babies and stay at home in the winter. But these days the park is being transformed into the new metro station (as part of the redevelopment in the area) and this activity was restricted during the two summers of fieldwork. Interestingly, the men who mentioned their willingness to help me and talk to me, explicitly stressed ‘don’t ask me to introduce you to women’ (Murat, Nihat, Orhan, Suleyman, Yilmaz).

I shall illustrate this with an example. I had met Nuriye, a woman in her fifties, who agreed to give me an interview with her sister-in-law. I went to her house on the agreed day. Her son, who opened the door, started asking me questions about what I wanted and who I was working for. After I introduced myself and my research he asked: ‘and are you going to record all that?’. I replied positively, only to make him start shouting. By the time he left time had passed already, the sister-in-law had to go (or at least felt she had to) and I didn’t even dare mention the tape recorder. We had a chat instead. Trust was the issue here (and sometimes fear) not only and not so much towards me, but mostly in their relation to the rest of Greek society and also among themselves.

In total I conducted three group interviews for the ‘airspace incident’, and five interviews for the ‘Kosovo’ case study, two of which were individual (see tables at the end of this chapter). The material from the focus groups only partly reflects the amount of data collected. I relied as much on the fieldnotes that I kept after every visit and on the numerous informal chats, the last of which took place in May 2001. It is difficult to quantify these visits and interactions but I should note that I visited cultural club, who opened his drawer and took out a tape recorder himself. He said: ‘I brought one as well. Whenever a journalist asks me for an interview, I will record it as well. And if they write nonsense, I will sue them’. ‘I don’t want to say matches and them to write cigarettes’, another man told me. Another way people would associate me with the media was by asking me to write a positive piece that would support the interests of the ‘community’. These reactions are indicative of the power of the media, something that will be discussed in Chapter 6.
frequently two households (average 10 visits) and I met frequently with the same informants in public spaces (average 20 meetings).

_Cypriot viewers_

There are around 55,000 Greek Cypriots in Greece\(^{68}\) most of whom live in Athens. They are highly assimilated within Greek society, sharing the same language, religion and customs with the Greeks. There are quite a few Cypriot associations and societies in Athens (as well as in the rest of the country) that organise events for active members of the community. Many of these have as a main cause the organisation of information campaigns about the ‘Cyprus issue’. A number of these societies and associations are deeply politicised, something that has distanced many Cypriots who feel tired of the polarised Cypriot politics\(^{69}\). The Embassy and the Cultural Institute of Cyprus in Athens are very energetic and organize events that are addressed to a wider audience, but serve nonetheless as a meeting point for many of the expatriates. Finally, there is a large number of students from Cyprus studying in Greek universities. Cypriot students have their own associations and societies which are deeply politicised as well and usually reflect the political parties in Cyprus. These societies are very active, publish newsletters and bulletins and organise events and talks usually on topics around the political situation in Cyprus.

I approached people from the above organisations and the Embassy and conducted two interviews. But I met the people who took part in the discussions and the individual interviews through networks of friends and acquaintances. As with all group interviews in this project I met one person who was my key contact and asked them to arrange a meeting with their friends. As with all interviews I kept a balance regarding gender, age, social status\(^{70}\) and number of years in Greece. I had some interesting and informative chats with people I did not interview, about which I kept notes which later helped me get a better grasp of the whole picture. In total I conducted three group interviews in October and November 1998 and three more in April and May 1999, one of which was individual. The people interviewed were

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\(^{68}\) This number was given by the Cypriot Embassy.

\(^{69}\) See section 3.4 (Chapter 3) for a discussion of the competing ideologies of Greek Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism.

\(^{70}\) The Cypriots living in Greece are a relatively homogenous group in terms of social status: most people are middle class professionals.
middle class and included university students, professionals and artists (See Tables 5.1-5.3 at concluding section of chapter).

Stranger handlers in this case were the people from the organisations and associations who were promoting their interpretation. I did not meet stranger handlers the way I came across them in Gazi because in the case of the Greek Cypriots I was not physically entering a neighbourhood like in the case of Gazi. I was visiting peoples’ homes and hence the experience was different. Participant observation⁷¹ was more restricted in this case. I visited the homes of some people (Anna, Lia, Yannis, Yiorgos) more than once (average three visits); the rest I only saw once. But through my notes of the chats I had with people in the embassy and the organisations (the official gatekeepers, or stranger handlers, to contrast with the Turkish group), the leaflets for events that were sent to me, and my observations in people’s homes, I was able to recognise the politics that are particular to the community and the existing institutional and information networks. My fieldnotes consisted part of the qualitative data collected in this study and were analysed the same way (see section 5.6).

**Greek viewers**

To write a section about ‘Greek viewers’ feels quite uncomfortable. This was the case in the previous groups, but the diversity among the Greek informants was most salient to me. The difficulties in approaching and asking people to participate in the research were different in this case. The sample was based on a ‘purposeful selection’ (Lindlof, 1995: 126). My basic criteria were to retain a balance in terms of gender, age, social class and education.

My network of friends and relatives was particularly helpful in this case. It is through them that I met all the interviewees and informants, as well as those who in the end refused to give an interview. The procedure was rather standard. I approached a key informant and after an initial introductory meeting explaining what my research was

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⁷¹ It seems that the necessity for participant observation was more pronounced in the cases where I was more of an ‘outsider’. My knowledge of the Cypriot community was built on my previous acquaintance of the British Cypriot community of London where I had previously done research (Madianou, 1996).
about, I would ask them if they could organise a meeting with some friends. In some cases the meeting was for an individual interview.

But still, who to look for, who to ask for an interview, was an issue. Where can we find ordinary people? I shall account for the choices made to give the reader an understanding of the ‘behind the screens’ work. Two of the groups were arranged through the headmaster of a high school, where I interviewed a group of teachers and a group of students in their final year. I also decided to interview a group of lawyers from a middle-range firm. I also interviewed a group of housewives, who live in the same street in a working class neighbourhood and often watch television together. Another interview was with taxi drivers. I also included in the sample a group of soldiers serving their mandatory military service (normally professionals in architecture, advertising etc). The reason for this was because this ‘institution’ that lasts on average 18 months is such an integral part of the male, and indirectly, the female experience of being Greek. These were the interviews conducted for the airspace study. Of the above people I met again with the key informants from the groups of lawyers, soldiers and the taxi driver.

For the Kosovo case study I conducted four interviews, one with a group of army professionals (medical assistants to contrast with the more ephemeral experience of the two year military service), one with a couple of pensioners (the man had fought in the Greek Civil War and was exiled for many years in the 1940s and 1950s), one with university students who study in London (to gain insight into the lives of people with alternative to Greek media sources). Finally I also did an interview with an entrepreneur who had also fought in Cyprus in 1974.

I wish to make a point here against the reification of these occupational and socio-demographic categories for all groups of interviewees. This was also evident in the words of the interviewees: ‘I do not consider myself as typically Greek’ (Vassilis); Or,

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72 In Greece there is no distinction between a barrister and a solicitor: a lawyer would be both. The Athens Bar Association numbers around 15,000 members. This is a large number even for a city of 4.5 million; to make a comparison, there are more lawyers in Athens than Turkish people.

73 Studying abroad has become common in recent years and the UK is perhaps the most popular destination. In London only there are approximately 15,000 Greek students (figure given by Greek Embassy in London).
'I do not consider myself as being a representative taxi driver' (Thodoris). The analysis does not understand these categories (nor the ethnic categories for that matter) in a determinist way, but takes them as suggestive of some contextual information that is accompanied by the informants own voice.

Participant observation took place in a number of the above interviewees' homes (in total with 12 informants). I visited people's homes more than once (average three visits) and would normally watch television and have informal chats together. I took notes of all these visits, as well as anything that would catch my attention being relative to media use. Notes were kept of the remarks that were made before and after the interview too. These observations were analysed in the same way as the interviews and helped me to map out the media that people use as well as the ways in which they are used.

The next section will focus on group and in-depth interviews which were the core methodological tool in this study.

5.4 INTERVIEWING

The core methodological tool employed in this study was that of in-depth group interviewing. After getting acquainted with most of the informants (through informal chats and visits to their homes and/or neighbourhood) and keeping notes of these observations, I conducted semi-structured interviews that focused on the decodings and the retellings of the television news.

All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. Interviews took place in October and November 1998 for the 'airspace event' and April and May 1999 for the 'Kosovo' reporting (see Appendix II for the interviews topic guide). Their duration was 60-90 minutes, they were tape-recorded and were transcribed shortly after they were taken, so as to draw on a clear memory of the context of the discussion.

Interviewing (be it group or individual) is the par excellence method to study the reception of television programmes. In the first case study I conducted focus groups only. In the second I coupled them with individual in-depth interviewing. The reason
for this concerned the issue of doing research on sensitive issues, which I will explore below.

Focus Groups – Peer group discussions

Focus Groups have emerged as the new fashion in mass communications research (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996). This trend can be traced back to Morley's *Nationwide* study (1980), although it is right to say that the focus group as a method first emerged in the field of media studies back in the 1950s. It is true, however, that much has changed since the time that Merton, Fiske and Kendal coined the term (Merton, et al. 1990 [1956]). They considered the discussion as focused 'in the sense that it focuses on the particular situation in which all the subjects had been previously involved' (1990: 4). This approach is considered rather dated and limited today (Morgan, 1997: 4). The popularity of the focus group can be explained in a number of ways including the fact that a large bulk of data can be produced in a relatively short period of time. Most importantly, there is a 'social' dimension to the data produced, as a result of the group dynamics. This is why the 'focus-group' has been described as the 'miniature of the thinking society' (Moscovici, 1984: 16; Farr, 1995: 6).

A lot of practical information has been written on how to set up, moderate and analyse focus groups (see inter alia: Morgan and Krueger, 1998; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999; Morgan, 1993; Morgan, 1997). Although there are general rules of thumb, there is a lot of diversity in the conduct and the analysis of focus groups, which increases, as Lunt and Livingstone have remarked, 'as the use of the method increases' (1996: 80). The focus groups in this research project took place in a naturalistic setting (usually the house of the interviewees). The participants were familiar to each other. In some cases it was common for the participants to watch television together (as in the case of housewives or the men in the club in the Turkish neighbourhood), or discuss the news of the previous night in the office (see groups of lawyers and high school teachers). Common television viewing was also a practice among the family members that I interviewed (e.g., Ilias and Eugenia, Lia and Yannos). This echoes the approach of Liebes and Katz, in their study of the reception of Dallas. They were 'less interested in random selections of a sample of each community members than [...] in clusters of community members who are in close contact and among whom television programs are likely to be discussed' (1990: 23).
The procedure involved asking one key informant to invite some friends at a convenient time and place (in most cases one of their homes) for a discussion of television news. This method has been used in previous cases in audience research (Gamson, 1992 and Neumann et al., 1992 for the reception of television news; also Liebes and Katz, 1990). As mentioned in Gamson (1992), the issue of turn-out was important. I was aiming for an average of between four and five participants and ended up with a mean of around 4 (groups varied from 2 to 6 participants, see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). It is quite common for projects to have a smaller—than the usual rule of thumb that suggests 6-8—number of participants (Michell, 1999: 31; Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999: 8; Gamson, 1992; Liebes and Katz, 1990). In the end, this worked very well as all participants had enough time to express their views.

There were differences in the way that I conducted focus groups in the two ‘case studies’. In the ‘airspace incident’ I watched two of the reports sampled together with the group and then the discussion would follow. In the ‘Kosovo’ case, the discussion focused on the participants’ ‘retellings’ of the events in question. In this case there was no prior viewing of ‘retellings’ of the news reports. The reason for this was mainly the accumulated information on Kosovo. Moreover, it was not at all obvious why to focus on one day and not another. I also wanted to probe more the issue of alternative-to-national sources of information. So I decided not to draw their attention to a particular channel or broadcast, but rather to open up the discussion and ask people where they got their information from. The ‘retelling’ of a television text has been used in audience studies in regard to the genre of soap opera (Livingstone, 1991), but not in the reception of news. The Kosovo crisis offered an excellent example to explore the retelling as a means of obtaining viewers' interpretations of television news. The events in Kosovo developed their own narrative with its protagonists and dramatic twists.

The last point concerns the actual term ‘focus groups’. Sasson (1995: 19) proposes the term ‘peer-group discussions’ instead of focus groups, for the case of naturally

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74 This means that there was an extra requirement in the organisational procedure; the place where the interview took place needed to have at least one television set to watch the news. I would bring a portable video if there was not such a facility.
occurring groups (i.e., groups whose members are familiar to each other – for example, a group of friends, or colleagues). This term better describes the essence of these discussions in the case of naturally occurring groups and avoids the common association with marketing research, where the use of focus groups is proliferating. As the groups interviewed for this study were naturally occurring ones I shall also use the term ‘peer group discussions’.

**Peer group discussions on sensitive topics**

First of all – why is this topic sensitive? Was it sensitive with respect to all groups? The definition of what makes a topic sensitive is very relevant here. National issues and identity are not necessarily sensitive issues, but they might be depending on the context or on who is concerned. The identity of an individual who belongs to a minority, be it ethnic, political, cultural, religious, linguistic, or all these together – is a sensitive issue, especially if this identity is repressed. In my research the topic emerged as a sensitive issue among the Turkish people. To approach and talk to people in Gazi was difficult in itself, let alone to discuss national issues in television news. In this case the sensitivity issue is linked with the other problem involving focus group discussions, that is how to obtain the views of minority groups.

Morgan and Krueger (1993: 8) hold that it has been one of the long-standing myths surrounding focus groups that they are an unsuitable method for doing research on sensitive topics. They quote the popularity of the focus group in research on AIDS (ibid.). Researchers using focus groups have agreed that people are likely to self-disclose or share personal experiences in group discussions, often more than in an in-depth interview setting (Morgan and Krueger, 1993; Kitzinger, 1993; Zeller, 1993). I agree with them in principle although I believe that the usefulness of focus groups depends on the particular characteristics of each empirical project.

In particular Zeller elaborates three points that are essential in the success of group discussions on sensitive topics, namely taking advantage of the principle of reactivity in the screener questionnaire, the self-disclosure of the moderator in the introductory comments, and the legitimation in reaction to participants’ comments (1993: 168). In the peer group discussions in the Turkish neighbourhood I employed two of these criteria: the interviews started with a rather lengthy personal introduction and I would
pay special attention to each speaker, especially during the initial phase of the discussion.

*Obtaining the views of minority groups*

Focus groups have also been criticised for obtaining the views of minority groups. Studies that have used focus groups to obtain the views of minority groups have usually employed a moderator that belongs to the same minority (Chiu and Knight, 1999). The issue of language is important as well, which is why bilingual moderators are preferred. This is not an option for a PhD student with limited funds, and often, time. So, I tried to overcome these problems mainly by employing complementary methods. I discussed previously how participant observation, mainly in the case of the Turkish community, helped in establishing a rapport between the informants and myself that created a relationship of trust. The other resort was individual interviews.

Language was not a problem as everyone I met in Gazi spoke fluent or adequate Greek. I do recognise, however, that fluency in Turkish language would have been useful in the context of fieldwork as my limited Turkish did not allow me to follow completely the discussions in the coffee houses or in the streets or sometimes during an interview, when the interviewees would momentarily speak to each other in Turkish.

*In-depth individual interviews*

In-depth interviews were employed as a means of achieving a more intense rapport with the interviewee, so as to enhance self-disclosure. This was particularly useful in the case of the Turkish interviewees. I was noticing some awkward moments of silence in the focus groups especially when the discussion came to issues of identity or minorities. I remember a characteristic case with one of the group. When I asked the participants ‘why are the Albanians leaving Kosovo’, there was a sudden silence. Members of the group were looking at each other and then Suleyman said: ‘We do not know’. Someone added: ‘Because they are afraid’. ‘Afraid of what?’, I insisted but another pause followed. Then the discussion shifted to the bombings (after a comment someone made) and the pauses decreased. It seemed that the issue of minorities was touching upon something very sensitive that could not be expressed in the context of
that interview. This might have been my own role or presence. But it might also be a result of the group dynamics.

This sensitivity was particularly relevant to the ‘crisis’ case study. So I did two in-depth interviews with people from the minority, plus one with a Cypriot and one with a Greek (who was sent to Cyprus in 1974). The topic guide centred again on the retelling of the crisis and the different information sources used. But there was also more space for personal histories to be narrated, in the context of the ‘commutings’ (how people discursively ‘moved’ from the events in Kosovo to their own personal histories).

The interviews lasted from 60-70 minutes and achieved the purpose for which they were selected. The discussion flowed and it emerged from the analysis that there was generally more emphasis on issues of identity, memory and personal history than in the focus groups. In-depth interviews were not necessarily a more pertinent means to explore the topic, but they did complement the focus groups in an interesting way. This is in line with the finding by Mitchell (1999: 31), when she combined focus groups and in-depth interviews to explore teenagers’ experiences of school and found that the girls would disclose information about bullying only in the setting of an individual interview.

5.5 ANALYSING QUALITATIVE DATA: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS AND FIELDNOTES

At a first level the approach taken was an immersion into the data, which were then thematically coded. ‘Coding means assigning tags or labels to data, based on our concepts. Essentially [...] condensing the bulk of our data into analysable units’ (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 26). The procedure is similar to that advanced by the proponents of grounded theory (Glazer and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987). The analysis starts early and new data are constantly compared with the existing ones. The great difference is that, in this study, there is a theoretical framework that informs both the selection procedure and the interpretation of the data collected. However, the research questions are rather open and exploratory, so I tried to allow as much space as possible for surprises and the unexpected in the analysis. The emergence of themes was a result of a dialectic process between the theoretical framework that informs the
study (top-down) and the data itself (bottom-up) or else the combination of an inductive and a deductive approach.

The option of using the computer packages that support the analysis of qualitative data (such as Nud*ist and Atlas-Ti) was not possible, as these programmes do not recognize Greek fonts. The procedure I followed was similar to that of the Nud*ist programme, except that I had to deal with the untidiness of endless pieces of paper, post-it notes and highlighters (See Appendix III for the coding frame for the analysis of interview transcripts).

5.6 SAMPLING THE NEWS

I decided to organise two case studies each centring on the reporting of an issue in the news. The reason for having two sampling periods was in order to compare the reporting in a time of crisis and the reporting of a relatively common incident. Focusing on only one case would probably give a distorted image of news reporting and its reception. The issues that I was looking for were the so called ‘national issues’ omnipresent in Greek public life during the 1990s. Such issues are the relations with Turkey, the Cyprus issue, the relationship of Greece to other Balkan countries and generally discussions that concern minorities in the region and in Greece itself. There have been a number of studies exploring the reporting of Greek national issues in the press (see Armenakis et al. 1996; Panagiotopoulou, 1996, on the reporting of the Macedonian Issue), but no studies have yet focused on television and its audiences.

The airspace incident was a routine event, in the sense that it is reported regularly. In this sense another event could have been sampled as an example of ‘banal nationalism reporting’. The reporting on this issue lasted 3-4 days (depending on the channel) in October 1998 and I collected all the main evening news broadcasts from the two largest private channels and ET-1, the public channel.

As far as the crisis reporting was concerned there were a number of issues that gripped the Greek news media in 1999. First there was the reporting on the S-300 missiles that Cyprus had purchased from Russia in January 1999; then the sudden and unexpected events concerning the PKK leader Ocalan in February and March 1999. And finally the reporting on the Kosovo crisis and the NATO attack against Serbia. At a first
thought, the latter may seem remotely connected with Greek ‘national issues’. It was an issue that captured the interest of the whole international community. However, it gained an extra dimension within Greek society, partly due to geographical proximity (the media and some of the people I interviewed referred to it as ‘the war in our neighbourhood’, or ‘the war on our doorstep’) and also due to the fact that it mobilised a huge reaction within the Greek society against the NATO involvement (at demonstrations and concerts). Moreover, the fact that the Kosovo crisis was a conflict about minorities that indirectly touched upon the issue of Greece’s minorities. I believed this was a good chance to probe on the issues of identity that had emerged in the first phase of the fieldwork. Finally, the Kosovo study introduced a local/global dimension in the analysis, allowing for an examination of the ways in which the informants defined themselves in relation to an international event.

The war in Yugoslavia lasted for 79 days. Were my sole interests the quality of reporting of the crisis in Kosovo, I would have included each daily news broadcast on the war in my sample. But for the purposes of this project and the amount of data accumulating this was not an option. I decided to divert from the model of the previous case study and ask the interviewees to retell the crisis and reflect on the role of the media and journalistic objectivity. I sampled 10 days from the first month of the conflict from the same three channels as above. The selection criteria on these dates were based on the retellings of the interviewees. I sampled the first three days of the conflict and then days that were mentioned in the interviews making sure that dates from each week were represented Appendix VI includes a chronology of the events in Yugoslavia and Kosovo (including the background) and the dates sampled.

5.7 NEWS ANALYSIS

The textual analysis of the news aims to identify any thematic and discursive patterns in the reports. The focus is on the discursive construction of a common ‘we’ (and inevitably of a common ‘other’) and the differences between public and private channels. Two corpuses of data are analysed textually, the Kosovo and the airspace reports. Content and interpretive analysis were used to analyse the former, while only interpretive analysis was used for the latter. The reason for this is that there were only 9 relatively brief reports on the airspace incident, which were thus manageable in the
context of an interpretive analysis. Moreover, the population number was too low for statistical analysis (such as the cluster analysis that was performed on the Kosovo items — see Chapter 7). The two methods are intended to be complementary in an attempt to achieve methodological triangulation.

The analysis of the news was based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, namely thematic content analysis and interpretive analysis. Content analysis in the context of this research is used in the broadest sense, as the quantification of the occurrence of selected themes within a sample of news reports. This approach was considered pertinent for the analysis of the reports mainly due to their unwieldy number. Thematic analysis permitted data reduction and quantification systematised what would otherwise be fleeting or impressionistic comments. Moreover, through the statistical analysis of the themes for which each item was coded, a cluster analysis was performed that allowed the identification of discursive patterns in the reports.

There have been numerous definitions of content analysis in past years. From Berelson’s quite tight definition of content analysis as ‘the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (1952:18) to the more open definitions like the one mentioned above which reflects the approach that has informed this study. The emphasis on ‘objectivity’ in Berelson’s definition has been widely criticised as positivistic and literally impossible, as all research enterprises have theoretical assumptions or hypotheses that inform the questions that they are trying to answer through content analysis. The positivist notion of objectivity has been one of the foci of criticism that the method has received. Other common criticisms are the loss of context, the fragmentation of the textual whole and the method’s lack of a theory of meaning (see inter alia, Hansen et al., 1998: 91). These are valid and important criticisms that have informed the use of the method in this context. First of all, as content analysis is used in conjunction with a qualitative, interpretive analysis of the news, the two methods complement each other. Interpretive analysis is understood in this context as a hybrid technique drawing on different traditions, namely those of grounded theory (Strauss, 1987) and discourse analysis (Billig, 1995; van Dijk, 1985; 1988; 1991). Content analysis offers a methodological rigour to the qualitative analysis while the qualitative analysis adds more context and depth. It should be noted that these data could also be described as
qualitative in the sense that they are dependent on qualitative judgements as they have to be assigned to a specific thematic category\textsuperscript{75} (Morley and Brunsdon, 1999).

The approach I followed is similar, is what has been termed ‘ethnographic content analysis’ (Altheide, 1987: 68). This approach allows for more interaction between the researcher and the theories and concepts that inform the project and the data analysed. For instance, data are collected while the study is in progress, and the analysis sometimes leads to reconceptualisations which, in turn, require additional data. This is particularly relevant when the data are contemporary (as in the case of news). Moreover, the coding categories are not established exclusively prior to the analysis, but partially emerge from the data and the context which is taken into account (Altheide, 1987: 69). This is reminiscent of grounded theory (Glazer and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987), and there is a phenomenological thrust in both approaches, except that in ethnographic content analysis there is room for theory that interacts with the data.

5.7 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Evaluating qualitative research in the social sciences has been an ongoing debate. The two criteria usually employed to measure the quality of the data collection processes and the data analysis are those of reliability and validity, which are often seen as complementary aspects of objectivity. But the problem with these concepts is that because they were developed within the paradigm of quantitative research in order to evaluate quantitative work, they are less suitable for the evaluation of qualitative research.

Reliability refers to ‘the extent to which a measurement procedure yields the same answer however and whenever it is carried out’ (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 16). It seems hard to escape the connotation that, if our work is not reliable, then it is unreliable.

\textsuperscript{75} For some of the categories discussed in the following section a considerable degree of interpretation is required to decide into which category an item falls. This is because a number of the categories are evaluative, as they require the coder to consider the overall style and tone of the item. This is the case with variables such as caption, music (whether they are dramatic or sensationalist) and NATO (whether it is portrayed in a positive, neutral, negative or mixed way). In these cases the interpretive guidelines are discussed along with the presentation of the variables.
However, qualitative researchers have long defended their work in terms of the inappropriateness of reliability as a criterion for research evaluation. As Wolcott notes, 'reliability redirects attention to research processes rather than to research results' (1995: 167). And he continues: 'similarity of responses is taken to be the same as accuracy of responses' (ibid.). And indeed, it seems irrational to apply the criterion of reliability to the evaluation of participant observation. How could the same procedures or experiences be repeated twice (and most importantly by two different researchers)?

How can we then evaluate qualitative research? The first answer is that we simply cannot. As mainly postmodern anthropologists would argue, research is measured in the quality of the writing — and the writing cannot but be subjective (Marcus and Fischer, 1996). Although I sympathise with this view I am aware that it will not satisfy the sceptic.

Triangulation, is another way to secure the quality of a research project. Of course, this is inevitably linked with how methods are triangulated, that is, the quality of triangulation. But triangulation may serve as a safety valve in respect to the shortcomings of each single method. So, for example, had I only conducted focus groups for the 'crisis' case study, I would have gained less insight into the processes involved.

Another indicator of quality in qualitative research is that mentioned by Lunt and Livingstone (1996: 92) concerning the rate of information gains in focus group research. By organising several focus groups the data reach a point of saturation, where not much new information is added to what has already been said in previous groups (this somehow echoes the procedure in 'grounded theory'; the saturation of data is an indication to end the data collection phase). This drop in information gain was observed in the different phases of the empirical work, not only in focus groups but in participant observation as well. The moment that the notes become shorter and when there is no longer any need to probe constantly asking for clarifications is probably when the researcher should gradually bid farewell to the field and its people.
Validity appears as a more useful concept than reliability in the evaluation of qualitative data as it looks at whether a researcher has measured what the research purports to measure. As Lunt and Livingstone have argued, ‘qualitative methods compensate for their lack of reliability with greater validity’ (1996: 92).

Perhaps in this context Bourdieu’s invitation to a reflexive sociology is poignant: ‘I believe that the sociology of sociology is a fundamental dimension of sociological epistemology’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 68). Or, as he noted more recently:

[…] the crucial difference is not between a science that effects a construction and one that does not, but between a science that does this without knowing it and one that, being aware of its work of construction, strives to discover and master as completely as possible the nature of its inevitable acts of construction and the equally inevitable effects those acts produce (Bourdieu, 1999: 608)

5.8 SUMMING UP

In sum I conducted 20 focus group interviews and four individual interviews. I also interviewed informally other people in the context of participant observation. A list of all informants with changed names and some contextual information can be found in Appendix I. Tables 5.1-5.3 summarise the group and individual interviews. The ‘textual’ data collected are nine news broadcasts for the routine event and 31 for the crisis reporting (a total of 40 news broadcasts). For the routine study I sampled the broadcasts of the news from the two most popular private channels (MEGA and ANTENNA) as well as from the public service channel (ET-1). I followed the reports on the issue for the days that it was reported. For the crisis study, I sampled ten news broadcasts (each containing a number of news reports on Kosovo and the reactions it triggered) from the same three television channels. I also sampled one news broadcast, from SKAI channel, now renamed ALPHA.

SKAI became ALPHA in September 1999. In the months following that date the ownership changed as well. Due to the take-over processes the SKAI channel changed its policy and did not provide me with the full sample of video-tapes as agreed. Nonetheless, one particular broadcast was sampled and analysed as it was representative of a televised public ritual on Greek television.

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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Group Interviews in Airspace incident case study</th>
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**TABLE 5.1: GROUP INTERVIEWS IN AIRSPACE INCIDENT CASE STUDY**  
Total 44 participants

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Group Interviews in the Kosovo case study</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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**TABLE 5.2: GROUP INTERVIEWS IN THE KOSOVO CASE STUDY**  
Total 24 participants
### Individual Interviews in the Kosovo case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Social Status/Occupation</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Greek</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Cypriot</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>female</td>
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<tr>
<td>234</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2: Individual interviews in the Kosovo case study**

Total people interviewed: 68 (focus groups) + 4 (in-depth interviews) = 72 people.
6. Mediated everyday lives: media consumption and identity experiences

In April 1998 I visited the city of Komotini in Thrace, Northeastern Greece, as part of an exploratory trip before starting fieldwork. Komotini is the capital of the region where the majority of the Turkish minority lives. From the top floor of the hotel where I was staying in the main square, I had a topographical overview of the whole town which, seemed to be split into two (I soon found out that there were in fact more divisions). There was no wall or barbed wire; there were no police patrols; it was rather a difference of landscape, a matter of aesthetics. In front of me was a neighbourhood of low-rise buildings, mainly houses connected through a maze of alleyways and dead ends. Houses had high facades and front doors, and often unorthodox extensions: an extra room behind the kitchen, in the internal yard, on the roof. And on the roofs, an almost mandatory presence, satellite dishes. Throughout the sea of dishes in the low built town were scattered numerous minarets [minareler], that seemed to compete with each other for height. Behind me lay the rest of the town with reasonably organised roads, medium rise concrete apartment buildings of four to five floors, Athens style. Through these buildings also rose bell-towers [kambanaria], themselves competing for height and glamour with the minarets. In this part of the town there were no satellite dishes.

Back in Athens, satellite dishes helped me find my way to the Turkish neighbourhood when I started fieldwork. Walking in the streets behind the old gas station during my first visit, I could tell where Turkish people lived from the presence – or not – of satellite dishes. Their presence was a reassurance that I was in the right place. The dishes served as a marker of recognition; in a sense, they objectified the community and its boundaries. It was only after entering people's homes that I realised that what was perceived as so different, was in fact rather ordinary.
During that visit to Komotini in 1998, a Turkish journalist told me that satellite television is the 'umbilical cord' linking the minority to Turkey. This is a view that has become prevalent across Europe, among conservative thinkers, politicians, policy makers, minority leaders and the media themselves (Aksoy and Robins, 2000: 351). The consequences of this approach are far-reaching and significant as they shape public policies, mould stereotypes and affect people's lives. Such a perspective echoes theories about strong media and, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, is often challenged by the findings of empirical audience research.

This chapter, based on interviews with, and participant observation among, Turks, Greeks and Cypriots living in Athens, challenges the assumption that media determine identities, thereby proving an 'umbilical cord' to identity. The uses of media and their integration in people's daily lives is a more complex process that involves a number of parameters, material, social and individual. However, although media do not determine identities, they do contribute in creating symbolic communicative spaces that either include or exclude, thereby affecting audiences' lives and discourses about their identities. This is the core argument of this chapter. In order to make this case, I will map people's 'communications' infrastructure' (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001), or their 'media ensemble' (Bausinger, 1984) and examine how they are integrated in the informants' everyday lives. The emphasis here is on media as objects and the context of viewing. In this sense this chapter performs another function, complementing and contextualizing Chapters 7 and 8, which address news content and news reception respectively. What needs to be noted here is that the distinction between media as objects and media content is not clear-cut. Attitudes towards the media, and the related issue of trust, often depend on media content. So even though the primary focus of this chapter is on the role of media as objects, media content will, inevitably, also be addressed.

6.1 THEORETICAL PREMISES

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the 'strong media/weak media' dichotomy runs through the different theorisations about the relationship between media and identity. On the one hand, there is medium theory, while on the other, there are ethnographic studies of people's media consumption patterns. Medium theory assumes a causal
relationship between technology and identity. Media ethnographies challenge this assumption through findings that suggest that there are a number of complex parameters involved in the viewing process (e.g., age, class, gender, education, to name but a few). The former approach is largely speculative in its claims and essentialist in its understanding of identity as discussed in Chapter 2. The latter is empirically informed and emphasises the social shaping of media technologies and the diversity of consumption practices and of the media themselves. This chapter draws on both literatures in order to examine how actual media consumption complicates assumptions about forceful media shaping identities.

The overall theoretical framework here is mediation. Media are understood as a process and emphasis is placed on their integration in everyday structures and the limitations posed by material conditions. Although media in general will be discussed, the emphasis of the chapter is on news media. This chapter takes into account the issue of access and availability of media resources, before examining their integration in everyday life. This chapter will also explore attitudes towards the media and issues of trust, themes that will be further elaborated in Chapter 8. Trust is often shaped by personal experiences with the media or journalists and these will be discussed here as well.

The data in this chapter come from group and in-depth interviews, and fieldnotes from participant observation in the informants’ households. Interviews took place both during the ‘airspace incident’ and the Kosovo conflict, so the differences in media usage according to period will also be discussed. Participant observation continued intermittently until May 2001. Effort has been made to give voice to as many informants as possible, although selection was inevitable. This chapter should be read together with the description of the informants in Appendix I.

The chapter is divided into three main sections, one for each group. This division does not imply that there are essential differences among the three groups. On the contrary, one of the aims of the chapter is to identify themes common to informants of different backgrounds.
6.2 MEDIATED EVERYDAY LIVES: GREEK AUDIENCES

Any discussion of the uses and appropriations of the media needs to start with the issue of availability and access. This section will begin by mapping the media that Greek audiences use. Television is one, albeit the most dominant, of the available media. Special emphasis will be placed on news media. Chapter 4 discussed the development of the news genre on Greek television in the context of broadcasting deregulation. Here I will discuss the other available information sources.

The Greek media system is characterised by what Papathanassopoulos has described as an excess of supply over demand. 'By the mid 1990s there were about 160 local, regional and national daily newspapers, as well as 800 popular and special interest magazine titles, 150 national and local television channels and 1,200 radio stations for a market of 11 million inhabitants' (Papathanassopoulos, 1999: 381). Of these, a significant percentage is based in Athens. It should be noted that the broadcasting landscape is volatile as it is subject to constant changes. An interesting feature of the Greek broadcasting system is that a number of satellite channels (including CNN, MTV and Eurosport) are re-broadcast terrestrially for free. The Cypriot public channel is also re-broadcast terrestrially.

The Greek media system is also characterised by a strong national orientation — apart from the channels re-broadcast terrestrially, satellite penetration is very low. There is no cable television and digital television only began transmitting in December 1999, so it was not available during the two case studies. There is one subscription channel with a decoder that reaches 9.5% of households (AGB, 2000: 30). This subscription channel shows only films, sport and children’s programmes.

Of the 31 Greek informants, only six had access to the internet. These were the only informants in the whole sample that had access to the internet thus reflecting the low percentage of internet penetration in Greece (6%) during the time of the fieldwork. Of these informants, however, only three used it for reading news, albeit not regularly (Michalis, Sophia and Sergios), while the other three never used it for news — but mainly for email and entertainment (Nicos, Alexandros and Haris). The former three

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77 Satellite viewing amounts to less than 2 per cent; see AGB Hellas Reports 1999 and 2000.
occasionally searched the internet for information about issues in which they were interested in, as these were not adequately covered in mainstream Greek media. Michalis, for example, was receiving images of the Pathfinder’s mission to Mars during October 1998, when I interviewed and visited him at home. None of the informants were actually reading Greek news online with the exception of Sergios who read Greek newspapers on the internet when he was an Erasmus student in Portugal during his undergraduate studies. It was during the Imia crisis that he was dependent on Greek news online as his sole means of finding out about what was happening at home. During my fieldwork none of these internet users went online in order to find out either about Kosovo, or about the airspace incident. In these cases, the internet was not really an alternative medium; however, this is likely to have changed as internet penetration has increased significantly in the last few years.\textsuperscript{78}

A number of reasons explain why the internet is not widely used. The telecommunications infrastructure is less developed in Greece than in other EU countries, although this has changed in recent years. Still however, the price for internet connection and subscription to a service provider is more expensive than the EU average. It is fair to say that the Greek internet was in its infancy during my fieldwork although the number of sites is steadily growing. Finally, given that the bulk of the internet is in English\textsuperscript{79} (Thussu, 2000a), a number of informants, especially the older ones, who are not competent enough in reading and writing in English, are excluded from using the medium.

Of the mainstream available media, television is the most popular and heavily used. Radio came second and newspapers third. Sports programmes were highly popular mainly among men but also among younger women. Soap operas and sitcoms were popular particularly among elder interviewees, men and women. The most popular genre among all informants, however, was the news. Most informants listen to the radio on a daily basis. This takes place mainly in people’s cars while commuting to and from work. Athens’ heavy traffic guarantees that those who use their cars spend a considerable amount of time in them. It is common for those who do not live in the

\textsuperscript{78}See Chapter 4 for the most recent figures.

\textsuperscript{79}According to a 1999 survey of the internet, more than 86\% of all Web pages were in English (Thussu, 2000a: 252).
centre, or who live in the centre but work in a different neighbourhood, to spend up to two or even three hours in their cars. Almost all informants said that they listen to music, news and discussion programmes on the radio (exceptions among interviewees included the high school students and those studying abroad). For some informants, radio is also the preferred medium at home (Tasos, Giota).

6.2.1 A popular news culture

In Chapter 4, Greek television was described as producing a 24-hour news culture. This section will focus on whether the availability of news programmes is matched with an equally impressive viewership. As one would expect, none of the informants followed the constant flow of news programmes throughout the day on television and in the other media. Some informants, however, were heavier news viewers than others.

Ilias' and Eugenia's daily schedule seems to follow television programming as they watch the news and other programmes throughout the day. This is combined with the consumption of other media such as newspapers and radio. Both are pensioners and thus have more free time than the rest of the informants. Their days start by having a coffee whilst watching the early morning news programmes. Later in the morning, Ilias visits his friends at the coffee house where he also reads his newspapers. He normally buys two newspapers, but may read more. Eugenia skims through one or two papers when she visits her sister who lives nearby. At 19:30 Ilias watches the news, most often together with Eugenia. Only during the summer months, they sometimes skip the evening news to have dinner in their garden.

Haris, a high school teacher in his forties, describes his daily schedule as revolving around different media:

[…] The moment I get in the car I will switch on the radio to listen to the news. Later, I'll read a newspaper, I might borrow it from someone at school, or I'll buy one to pass the time, or because I want to read about something in particular. Now, in the evening, as far as the news is concerned, I flick through channels.

80 This is a general pattern: television viewing drops significantly in the summer months according to the AGB Hellas survey (AGB Hellas, 2000: 16-7).
Even if people do not watch the news continually, they usually watch it at some point during the day. The most common time is between 19:30 and 22:00 when the evening news bulletins are scheduled. Television sets are commonly switched on during news broadcasts even if people are not attentive to the news. In many instances it seemed that news programmes punctuated viewers’ daily lives.

In Haris’ house, the television is on during most afternoons and evenings, even if nobody is watching at a particular time. Haris always watches the news, most often together with his wife and children. Many of the informants often watch the news whilst having their dinner (Sophia, Spyros, Michalis, Nicos, Andreas). Spyros described this as a vulgar habit especially when watching violent reports. Lena mentioned that this perhaps generates a sense of security, an affirmation that ‘I am well, thank God, I have my family, my job, I am healthy, secure and removed from the world’s madness’ (Lena). Spyros cannot sleep without the television on. His nighttime viewing most of the time includes the last news bulletin, broadcast at around midnight. He often falls asleep with the television on.

Watching the news emerges as something more than simple viewing. People do not just watch the news in a purposeful way, in order to get informed. Watching the news is also a habit, a routine, the same way that watching television in general is.

Marilena: We watch out of habit, sometimes we are so drained and because we are so tired we cannot read a book, so we prefer to watch television to relax. We really do not have many choices, when all the channels show the same stuff, so you end up watching all that violence. It’s a human habit.

News is also associated with cosiness and relaxation (even if some people described this as a hideous or vulgar habit). As mentioned above, because of its scheduling, news coincides with the time people have dinner. In this context, the phrase ‘watching the news’ is perhaps misleading, as not everyone in front of the screen is watching. People often talk to family members about other issues; other informants talk on the phone, while others watch with the sound off and put it back on when an image attracts their attention. Older people (Ilias), or those living on their own (Michalis), turn the television on to keep them company.
'Addicted to news'

Michalis describes his interest in news as 'sick'. He watches the news every evening, especially when he is alone at home. He usually watches SKAI, which lasts up to two hours, but tells me that he does other things in the meantime. It is a type of intermittent viewing, where he will get into and switch off from the programme according to what is being discussed. What is important for him and most other informants is that they switch on the television during the news. Michalis summarised this somewhat gnomically: 'News is addictive, it is an addiction [ethismos]', a comment echoed by other informants.

Tasos: Without news it feels strange, that you have cut yourself off.

Fotini: It happens when I'm on holidays on the islands that I want a newspaper, and sometimes they cannot get them on time, they never arrive before the afternoon at the earliest, so I'm left uninformed. Sometimes it is only possible to get the newspapers of the previous day. For a time I say, finally, I'll have some peace [na isyhasei to kefali sou], but then I return [to Athens] and I feel I have missed a week of reality [eheis hasei mia evdomada apo tin pragmatikotita].

In this context, not watching the news is described as 'detoxification' (Fotini, Michalis and Vassilis). Nonetheless, all these informants return to their usual viewing habits after such periods of abstinence.

For some of the viewers watching the news is associated with being in touch with reality (Tasos, Fotini, Michalis). Even people who are critical of the news (and particularly of the sensationalist news of the private channels), mention that they watch the programmes because they reflect Greek society. Nicos, Alexandros, Andreas and Christos are such examples.

Nicos: One needs to watch SKAI. This is what our country produces, even if we don’t like it. [...] If you want to be in touch with what is happening in your country you need to watch a bit of everything, including SKAI.

Alexandros: It is interesting to watch SKAI and the other private channels in order to see how they promote what they think are the pure characteristics of the Greek people. Sentimentalism, patriotism, the simple people [o aplos laos], and so on...

News, however, is not just on television. As mentioned previously most people listened to the news on the radio while driving their cars. Thodoris, a taxi driver, mainly listens to the radio during his eight hour shift in the car. For some informants, radio is the preferred news medium at home. Giota, a housewife, listens to the radio
whilst cooking and doing the household chores. Radio provides the background for her daily routines. As she is always busy preparing dinner or washing the dishes during the time of the evening television news, she mainly listens to the news on the radio, or listens to the news on television, thus using television in an aural way. In Giota’s case the choice of radio is a gendered one.

Tasos is characterised by his son Michael as a radio news maniac. Tasos wakes up at 5:30 in the morning and listens to the news programmes on various stations until 8:15 when he leaves for the office.

Tasos: I listen to the radio a lot. I wake up early in the morning and because I know that some stations will have more information, some emphasise different aspects of the news, I have noticed that there are stations that say more than others, there are also stations that are faster than others in breaking the news. I wake up early. I listen to ANTENNA at 5:30. At 6:00 I will listen to ERA1. At 7:00 SKAI. At 8:00 PLANET81. [...] From 5:30 until 8:15 when I leave for the office. This way I have a complete picture of what is happening [eho pliri eikona].

People use the different media in varying degrees. Fotini watches the late night bulletin before going to bed. She watches the 8 o’clock news if she is at home, but she is often out at that time. Even if she stays at home, she never watches the whole programme, but rather parts of it. She never watches SKAI because, in her own words, ‘in order to do that, you have to have three spare hours. Who can do that? I do not have the time’. She buys newspapers everyday, but sometimes is so busy that she will only skim through them, or even not read them at all. She told me that she had recently been so busy that she only found out that there was a cabinet reshuffle when a friend told her. Michalis found out about the reshuffle from the coffee house waiter [kafetzis].

Fotini: [...] This last month I was so busy, that even if there was a war I would not have found out about it. A friend only told me yesterday that the cabinet had been reshuffled.

It can be argued that the different media combined provide a constant background in people’s everyday lives. People listen to news bulletins on the radio; some also listen to studio discussion programmes about current affairs that are aired throughout the

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81 All names in capitals refer to Athens radio stations. ANTENNA and SKAI are radio stations belonging to the same company that owns the identically named television stations. ERA1 is one of the three public service stations (part of ERT).
day. Many of the informants read newspapers, and most watch the news on television, which they often discuss afterwards. In this highly mediated environment, even if a news story escapes someone, they will find out through their friends, colleagues or people in the street. As previously noted, Fotini, who was too busy to watch the news, found out about the reshuffle the day after it happened, which is not a particularly long period considering that the news concerned a rather common affair in Greek politics. In this sense, news extends beyond the television programme and the screen and becomes an integral part of everyday life, in constant circulation: from the studio to the living-room, the car, the workplace, the streets, the coffee houses and often back to the studio.

6.2.2 Direct experiences with the news media
What seems to add to the cosiness and informality of the news is the possibility of seeing oneself, or an acquaintance, on the news. This is more possible in Greece than in other broadcasting systems such as the British, first, because of the ratio of population and channels (many channels for a relatively small country), and, second, because of the prolonged duration of news programmes. Most interviewees had seen someone they knew on the news at least once. This does not take place in exceptional circumstances, but rather in the context of routine reporting. Shortly before I met Georgia, her son had been on the news as a witness to a fire near his workplace. The reporters covering the incident interviewed him and Georgia saw him on television that evening. Tasos' neighbour was on television the day I visited his house, giving an interview as the head of the anti-smoking campaign. Nicos saw the daughter of his former French teacher who was being interviewed as a Greenpeace activist. The examples are endless. This perhaps explains why many interviewees referred to the news as gossipy (Giota, Georgia, Rena, Yiorgos, Thodoris, Katerina).

Overall, Greek informants recounted positive (or, more accurately, not negative) personal experiences with the media. Television is also seen by some people as the vehicle for voicing complaints or criticisms. Yannis told me how a family acquaintance appeared on television to complain about an inflated bill he received from the water supply company. Only after he appeared on television, Yannis added, was his complaint taken seriously. Nicos told me that a relative of his called the authorities with whom he had a dispute, threatening with calling 'the channels' to
complain. This case is not a direct experience with the media, but rather an indication of how the media can be used in a non-media related context for non-media related purposes, often with successful results. It appears that the news, apart from information, is an integral part of everyday life providing many people with a common point of reference. This is contrasted to the experience of Turks when they see themselves misrepresented on television, which is a frustrating rather than a cosy, or positive, experience (see section 6.4).

6.2.3 ‘News programmes are no longer watchable’: Viewing paradoxes
There are, however, a number of ostensible paradoxes associated with television viewing.

Paradox 1: private channels are ‘no longer watchable’ – people are addicted to them.
‘News programmes are no longer watchable’ is a phrase that I have heard plenty of times in the past years, often interchangeably with ‘television is no longer watchable’. At a first level it is in stark contrast to the high viewing rates news programmes attract and the heavy news consumption. How can one be addicted to news and then declare that the news is no longer ‘watchable’? This contradiction becomes less puzzling by distinguishing between two levels: ‘news is no longer watchable’ refers to the quality of news as information and is related to the critical stance of viewers, whereas ‘news is an addiction’ refers to the habitual, routine viewing of news programmes, every evening at the same time. The word ‘addiction’ also carries a negative connotation of a habit that cannot be controlled.

This paradox points to a particular collision between the critical faculties of the viewers and their actual practices. This ostensible paradox will be discussed further in Chapter 8 in relation to the emotional aspects of news mediation. This section extends beyond media as technologies and touches upon the role of media as texts, suggesting that distinctions are not always clear-cut. Although these themes will be discussed further in Chapter 8, their introduction here is justified in terms of the implications of these paradoxes on the informants’ trust of the different media (which in turn shapes the appropriation of media technologies).
Paradox 2: ‘ERT is the best channel’ – but nobody watches it.

This paradox is further complicated in relation to the public channels. Although a large number of informants mentioned that ET-1 and NET were the most decent channels, very few actually watched them. Some informants pointed out that ET-1 and particularly NET, which largely focuses on current affairs programmes and documentaries, is the best channel. However, very few admitted to actually watching it, and in fact in none of my visits to people’s homes were they watching the NET news. Marilena told me that sometimes she even forgets that ERT exists. Sophia described ERT’s style as primitive compared to that of private channels, which ‘have turned news into a spectacle’. [...] ‘It’s sad, but ERT does not sell’, Sophia added. This was a phrase repeated by many informants.

Thodoris: Yes, people watch [SKAI] a lot. Because they like it. Everybody criticises SKAI, and everybody watches it. [...] they like the dramatisation [...] the gossip.

Other informants described ERT as a government mouthpiece. This is reflected in the use of the adjective ‘governmental’ which is used instead of ‘public’, or ‘state’, to describe ERT (Stelios, Giota, Ioanna, Aggeliki). Thodoris mentioned that he does not expect impartiality from the ERT channels as their position will be inevitably biased. Vassilis is sceptical of the clientelistic relationships between ERT’s administration and politicians and points to the number of ERT’s employees. ‘The state is corrupt and inept because it employs 10,000 people in ERT whom we pay as taxpayers. They do nothing, they just sit on chairs’.

Most of the other informants, however, discerned a significant difference in ERT’s news programmes and overall output in comparison with previous decades. They attribute this change to the privatisation of the airwaves and the proliferation of channels that increased competition for audiences (Lena, Marilena, Vassilis, Chryssa and Andreas). The ending of ERT’s monopoly brought about more polyphony, also within ERT’s own programmes (Marilena, Aggeliki, Vassilis, Katerina). However, many people were unconvinced about the quality of this diversity and expressed

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This is confirmed by a recent survey about viewers’ satisfaction with television channels. The public channels had the highest percentage (NET, 72.1% and ET-1 69.5%) in terms of viewers’ satisfaction followed by MEGA (67.1%) and ANTENNA (65.1%). Recall that the public channels’ ratings are in constant decline (Taylor Nelson Sofres Metrisis, published in the daily Eleutherotypia, 29.5.02). All the interviewees in this study mentioned that ‘ERT does not sell’.
strong suspicions about the covert interests [symferonta] that still determine broadcast news (Thodoris, Alexandros, Vassilis).

Thodoris: Since we have a free broadcasting system, journalists should be critical. They shouldn't write whatever they are told. They are not ERT, which will say what it has to say. It is MEGA, ANTENNA, whatever. There must be a perspective and not this fake opinion, representing a political party. You can tell it is fake. That's when they're trying to take you for an idiot.

Paradox 3: deregulation enhanced polyphony — everything is determined by covert 'interests'.

This last remark by Thodoris points to the final paradox. On the one hand privatisation enhanced polyphony, and on the other, as many informants say, there is little diversity: 'All channels show the same things' some informants told me (Sergios, Nicos), a comment reminiscent of Adorno's arguments about the culture industry (1991; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979). Moreover, some of the informants, notably those with middle class background, expressed their dissatisfaction about the populist style of news presentation.

Sophia: Overall I cannot watch SKAI because it makes me depressed. [...] I cannot stand it when they degrade [xeftilizoun] the issues. Especially in the case of national issues. Because in the case of others, about which I do not care, I can see it in a detached way.

Nicos: Sometimes I am disgusted [and] I cannot watch for more than a couple of minutes. It's not worth it. OK, perhaps you can have a laugh because it is ridiculous, but it is perhaps a bit too much.

Zoe: Private channels are driven by profit. They make news a spectacle, copycat of the American style.

In a rather different vein, Sergios, Stelios and Vassilis said that the proliferation of channels provides people with choice: one can watch TILETORA, a channel well known for its far right positions, or the channel of the Communist Party. Andreas contested the homogeneity of television news by arguing that there is more diversity in the post-deregulation era. Andreas said that the particular format of the news, with its long duration and succession of invited guests, allows for a number of voices to be heard, even if this is for the sake of sensationalism and attracting viewers.

Andreas: Do you know what I believe about the Greek channels? That the news is certainly biased, but there are talk shows and the moments when news programmes become like talk shows with all these 'windows', and there you can get indirect information about the background of the issues. This is where you can see some
weirdos, some Albanians, Skopjians, Bulgarians, who tell their own story. OK? This is when you can think about the other side of the events.

6.2.4 Alternative-to-national media/non-Greek media

People do not rely just on national television, radio and newspapers for their daily information and entertainment. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Greek audiences have access to a number of satellite channels that are retransmitted terrestrially via ERT. Digital television, through which subscribers receive a number of global media, had not been introduced at the time of the fieldwork. The other available medium was the internet.

Changing attitudes to 'foreign' media

Global media are not so new. A historical perspective in audience studies, recently proposed by Livingstone et al. (2001), can cast light on what is often a static understanding of media use. In this case, the historical perspective casts light not only on the use of technology but on the different attitude towards its content. People have been accessing non-Greek media from the mid-war period. Some of the older informants pointed out that at some point in their lives they relied solely on foreign (non-Greek) media for their information. Tasos told me how his family would gather around the radio during the German occupation in the Second World War (and later the Civil War), in order to listen to the BBC news. In those turbulent times, local Greek media were not reliable and people could only find out about their own country from abroad. Tasos remembers that during the Civil War, in the town where he lived as a teenager, the left-wing coalition that controlled the area would put the BBC on loudspeakers and people would gather in the square to listen to the nine o’clock bulletin in Greek. He remembers nostalgically how people would gather at the square in the middle of the winter to listen and discuss the news.

Aggeliki and Marilena point to a similar experience during the junta between 1967 and 1974. They remember listening to the Greek programme of Deutche Welle in order to find out about what was happening in the world and their own country. People would stealthily tune their sets to these stations often when gathered together at friends’ homes. Similar patterns were observed by Mankekar in her ethnography of television consumption in India. She notes that before the advent of transnational
television and when Doordarshan (i.e., the Indian public television channel) was censored by the state, 'when something momentous happened people would turn to the BBC World Service on their transistors to get the “true story”' (Mankekar, 1999: 354).

Such experiences, often narrated with nostalgia, are contrasted with the informants’ recent experiences with non-Greek media. While once the BBC and Deutsche Welle were regarded as the symbols of impartial journalism and people would turn to them to find out about their own country, today, Western media are highly contested. CNN stands out from the rest of European and North-American media as it received most negative comments.83

Tasos: Do you remember what happened in the Gulf War. CNN had dominated the world. We switched on the television and we would see that everything was burning, bombs were falling etc. We are never on CNN. They never show these air-fights. Their attitude is: 'let them eat each other'.

But even when CNN reports from Greece and the region, many informants regard its approach inadequate. Foreign media and CNN in particular were accused of ignoring the context and not going into depth when reporting Greek-Turkish relations. They just say ‘tension in the Balkans’, Fotini said.

Fotini: [Foreign media presented the Imia crisis] in a general and vague way, like tension in the Balkans and tension in Greek-Turkish relations. Now, who, for what reason, and why, they do not care. They just mention the two parties, Greece and Turkey […], they do not go into depth [den mbainoun stin ou sia], they just say tension. So the other [foreign] people think, [Greece and Turkey] are fighting, but on an equal basis. [This is why] we should not care that much about what others think about us […] I realised this during the recent turmoil of national issues [kataigismo ethnikont] that we had during a period, with Skopje84, with Turkey, with Cyprus, and all that, and they were saying, they regarded each crisis, each incident, as: ‘enough with these Greeks and their demands’ [aman pia autoi oi Ellines, olo diekdikoun]. In the end, each state acts according to its political interests [skopimotites]. So, the Germans, who have a certain bond with the Turks, will see it completely differently from the Russians, or the Americans, who also have interests in the region. They will […] aim to defuse the crisis, but looking after their own interests, or the general politics of the region, the Balkans, the Middle East and so on. They will not go in depth to

83 Recall that CNN is freely available in most households (whereas channels such as BBC World require subscription on digital television which in any case was not available before the end of 1999; see Chapter 4.
84 Skopje is the capital of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Many Greeks refer to the country and its people as Skopje and Skopians. Similarly the Macedonian Issue was often called ‘The Skopjian [Issue]’ both by lay people and the media (Armenakis et al., 1996; Demertzis, 1998)
examine whose fault it is, and for what reason [this is happening]. [...] They do not care. The only ones who care are us. And we have to care about ourselves.

Michalis sees that this is to an extent the result of successful Turkish propaganda that aims to shape American public opinion. 'It is known that they pay to get things in Time Magazine and so on...', he says.

Negative views about foreign media and CNN in particular were intensified during the Kosovo crisis. The comment by Andreas is indicative: 'CNN definitely distorts [events]. CNN is the apex of biased information [to apokoryfoma tis meroliptikis enimerosis]'.

Media use is shaped by attitudes towards content, indicating that objects and texts are not always successfully separated. The use and appropriation of Western media is shaped by Greek viewers’ attitudes towards their content and particularly their representations of Greece. It is in relation to Western media that discourses about identity and Greekness come to the surface. Although it has been argued on the previous pages that news creates a common point of reference, identity did not appear as a distinct category. These examples illustrate that it is always in relation to the other — and the other’s representation of oneself — that identity is articulated, confirming that identity is relational.

**6.2.5 Switching off**

Not all informants were addicted to the news. Thodoris, a taxi driver, told me that he had recently decided to stop watching television on a regular basis. He mainly attributed his decision to his lack of trust of journalists and media. ‘It’s all fake’, he told me. And he added, ‘I often feel television takes me for a fool [vlaka]’.

Television treats me like a fool. It tells me, ‘you are an idiot’. ‘Look, you are stupid’. That’s how I feel I’m treated. How can I put it; I felt this way in the recent [local] elections when I looked at those posters in the streets with all those prefects, mayors, and other candidates standing over a design, discussing the major road-works. Of course this did not happen for real. They don’t even care about the roads. It’s all fake. It is in this way that television also calls me a fool. Literally. In my face: ‘you are a fool’.

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85 Thodoris refers to the local elections in October 1999 (held a couple of weeks before my first visit to his house).
Thodoris did not read newspapers for similar reasons. He preferred to listen to the hourly news updates on the radio which he considered less biased and, thus, felt less manipulated this way. Thodoris described himself as a former heavy viewer, who watched the news regularly. However, even if he denied watching the news he was well informed about current affairs.

Nonetheless, Thodoris made an exception in watching sports programmes and especially football. Even if he did not follow whole games, he had to find out the results the same day. Conversely, he did not feel the same urgency about finding out the results of the elections. 'Because I am not interested in politics, I do not care who got elected Mayor of Athens. 'I don’t care when I find out such things'. Even if Thodoris asserts that he does not care, he is bound to find out, because he lives in a network of mediated everyday life. Even if he does not proactively switch on the television he will find out the latest news through friends, family, or clients. This is a difference with the Turkish viewers among whom these mediated networks are weaker as the following section will show.

The other group of interviewees who did not follow the news regularly was that of the high school students, who attributed their lack of interest in the news to their loaded schedule as most of them were preparing for their final exams. Another reason for their disinterest, however, is that they lacked the contextual information with which to interpret the news, particularly the news on national issues. This made them more detached and less keen to follow the news and current affairs programmes, a phenomenon related to age and also evident among younger Turkish viewers (see following section). The lack of contextual information that the high school students referred to is also related to their limited information resources, which is also a class issue. For example, the group of students studying in London who came from middle class families, had access to a plethora of media and were highly interested in and ‘addicted’ to the news, while being only four years older than the students in the working class Athens neighbourhood.
Gendered consumption: women switching off

When I met Giota and her friends (housewives) and tried to arrange an interview, I was explicitly asked not to visit them during the early evenings, as this is normally the most busy period in the day for Giota and Georgia. ‘Don’t you watch the news at that time?’, I asked. ‘Oh no, my girl, we only steal a glance at it every now and then [sta klefta]’. ‘At that time we’re preparing dinner. There’s no time for news. Only in passing [sta orthia] we might catch a glimpse of what is going on’. Giota made a comment later that echoed Thodoris’ words: ‘Perhaps it is because [the news] makes a fool of us that we don’t watch [epeidh mas koroidevoun]’.

Giota, Georgia and Rena told me that it was different for their daughters, ‘who are educated, have their careers and know more about the issues’ (Giota). However, the same gendered pattern in media consumption is confirmed by younger professional women. Aggeliki, a high school teacher, told me that she does not have time to watch the news, although ‘her men’ (husband and sons) who do watch, tell her what has happened. Marilena, a teacher as well, also said that she has limited time to read the newspaper and sometimes even to watch the news.

Gender differences do not only apply to the lack of time but also to the power over choice or, rather, the remote control. Katerina cannot watch her preferred channel as there is only one set in the house and she has to watch the news on her parents’ favourite channel. In the case of the news it is her father who holds the remote control. A similar story is told by Sevasti; in her case it is her husband, Thodoris, who has a say over the choice of channels (or, over deciding whether to watch, or not).

Such patterns seem to confirm the findings of British researchers on gendered media use (Morley, 1986; Gray, 1987; 1992). However, gender differences do not pertain to all informants. In middle and upper middle class families and generally among the more educated informants gender differences are no longer salient. In general, what emerges as the difference that cuts across all others is that of class as it relates to all the above cases of ‘switching off’. It has to be noted, however, that these differences apply to issues of access and choice and do not necessarily translate into differentiated interpretations of the news programmes, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.
6.2.6 Differences between the ‘airspace incident’ and the Kosovo conflict

During the Kosovo conflict news viewership was somewhat heightened. People told me that they either watched the news programmes more intensely, or more attentively than usual, or, that they would make sure they watched at least one news bulletin each day. Ioanna, who described herself as a light television news viewer (she preferred to listen to the news on the radio), watched television news systematically during the Kosovo conflict. However, such differences were not significant for the majority of informants. As Andreas put it in our discussion: ‘I’m very interested in the events in Kosovo. I watch [the news] a lot. But then, I did not watch much less before’.

Another observation relates to the increased use of CNN, which people watched more. Sophia watched CNN regularly, as she wanted to check what ‘others had to say about something that was happening in her region’.

6.3 Mediated Everyday Lives: Cypriot Audiences

All the media available to Greek audiences are also available to Greek Cypriots, who also have access to RIK (the Cypriot Public Service Channel) and CYP SAT (Cypriot Satellite Television), which are retransmitted terrestrially for free via ERT. There are also a number of newsletters which are circulated by the various Cypriot organisations and societies in Greece. Finally, there are also newspapers from Cyprus that are available in kiosks in central Athens that distribute the foreign press. It has to be noted here that Greek and Greek Cypriot media are in fact closely connected: for example, a number of Cypriot media are owned by Greek media conglomerates. Such an example is ANTENNA Cyprus, which airs a proportion of its Greek programmes in Cyprus (although the news is produced locally). ERT also broadcasts in Cyprus a programme modified from that broadcast in Greece. None of the Cypriot informants was a regular internet user at the time of the fieldwork (although this changed after the interviews took place).

Despite the reasonable presence of Cypriot media in Greece, most informants relied on mainstream Greek media for their daily entertainment and information. They said that they use Cypriot media when they are in Cyprus, and Greek when in Greece (although this distinction is not always meaningful as indicated above). Many mentioned that they switch to RIK’s news when something particular happens
(Yiorgos, Orestis, Anna, Myrto, Dina, Elpida). 'When I know that there will be something important on Cyprus, I will watch RIK', Anna told me. People exchange frequent phone calls with relatives and friends in Cyprus and this way stay in touch with what is going on. Most of the informants mentioned their families and friends in Cyprus as important sources of information on Cyprus.

Anna watches the news every evening on her favourite channel, MEGA. Sometimes she will watch NET. She reads Greek newspapers regularly and never misses the Sunday editions. She only reads Cypriot newspapers when she is in Cyprus.

Anna: I am not the typical case of the Cypriot who lives in Athens, because I know from other Cypriots, they hang out together, they gather in the [Cypriot] student parties, they read the [Cypriot] newspapers, they watch PIK every evening. I'm not like that. You might think that I’ve renounced [aparnithika] my Cypriot identity, but I won’t accept that. I'm just very involved in life here in Athens. And I watch the news to get informed, I want to be informed, I like watching the news and I try to watch at least once a day, both the local news and that from Europe. [...] When I'm in Cyprus it's very different. Because the Cyprus issue is such a major issue, even if I do not want to, I get information daily. Everyday you wake up and you know that Cyprus is what it is and you wait to listen to the news, to see if there are any developments, if there is something negative, that's how it is.

Despite Anna’s – somewhat guilty – assertion that she is not a typical case, her routines are similar to those of other informants. Chryssa prefers to watch the news on NET and to a lesser degree the two largest television channels (MEGA and ANTENNA). She thinks that the news on NET goes more into depth and she attributes this to the increasing independence and impartiality of public television. Apart from Greek language media she watches CNN and reads British newspapers (she lived there as a student herself and her two sons are now studying abroad). Jenny, Myrto, Dina and Stavros follow the private Greek channels, read newspapers and listen to the radio on their way to work. Marianna listens to the radio throughout the day, reads a number of newspapers daily and watches the news every night.

Lia and Yannos have both lived abroad for some years. Yannos lived in the USA and they both lived in England during their studies. Lia found great differences between the experience of being Greek Cypriot in England and in Greece. This is because:

86 Anna watches ERT when in Cyprus; ERT is broadcast in Cyprus the same way RIK is broadcast in Greece. ANTENNA owns a station in Cyprus bearing the same name; many of the programmes are the same.
Lia: England is a foreign country \[\textit{xeni hora}\] and there is a need for the members of the community to bond. We do not feel the same as the Greek Cypriots in England. At least this is how we feel about this. Here we have families and we are close to them. We have friends. It’s not like when you are in England and you feel nostalgic about your country. We feel at home in Greece.

Yannos adds that

In England, because we lived in a completely foreign environment, we had to be part of the community, it was a defence mechanism. We feel Greece is our home \[\textit{tin Ellada ti niothoume patrida}\]. Same language, same religion, same mentality.

Despite the centrality of mainstream Greek media in people’s communications infrastructure, some informants are more likely to watch RIK and CYP SAT than others. Such cases were Orestis, Eva and Elpida who watched RIK regularly. A reason that contributed to this choice is that they, of all informants, had come to Athens recently in order to study. An exception is Yannos, who used to watch RIK and CYP SAT regularly even though he has lived in Greece most of his life (also in Britain and the USA). Orestis also bought Cypriot newspapers, something none of the other informants would do proactively. Yannos told me that he will read a Cypriot newspaper if he ever comes across one.

Most of the Cypriot people in the study were not members of, or otherwise involved in, the various Cypriot organisations. They found them too politicised and too involved in the local Cypriot politics. Yannos had first hand experience as he used to be a member of one of the organisations but, in his words, was kicked out: ‘They were too right wing for me, I was too left wing for them’. Eva was involved in one of the student organisations and Marianna was actively involved in another.

Both Marianna and Ioanna did not observe many differences between the private and the public channels. In relation to how Cyprus is covered they stressed that both private and public channels ignore the issue. They believe, however, that this is happening for different reasons. The private channels are afraid that Cyprus does not sell well. Journalists have even told Marianna that Cyprus does not sell because people are tired of the issue. For ERT, however, the reasons are different. Marianna said that ‘the governmental channels are keeping their lips sealed’ \[\textit{ehoune valei tsiroto sto stoma}\].
6.3.1 Switching off

When I contacted Lia to arrange a joint interview with her husband, the first thing she told me is that they had no television at home. When we met, she and Yannos, her husband, told me that they had not watched television for almost two months. At a first level, this was surprising since this visit took place during the Kosovo conflict, when many of the other informants were hooked to their screens. Yannos told me that when their television broke down they never fixed it, nor bought a new one. His brother brought them an old portable one, which they kept in the store room and never used. Lia and Yannos were disappointed with how (Greek) television had covered the S-300 missile crisis and the Ocalan fiasco. They felt disenfranchised with the sensationalist and often politically motivated coverage on all Greek channels and they decided to switch off.

Lia: Television affects us emotionally. The power of the image. So, we prefer to read the newspaper. [...] We do not miss it [...] We are just trying to be peaceful.

Yannos and Lia used to watch RIK regularly before they decided to ban television. Yannos described how he did not trust ERT, as it would often interfere in the transmission of RIK, when sensitive issues were mentioned.

During the ‘anniversaries’ – when I say anniversary, I mean the anniversary of the coup, the invasion [in Cyprus] and so on – whenever sensitive issues were mentioned in RIK’s broadcast, the programme would be interrupted. [...] This was not by accident, because it only happened when sensitive things that should not become public were said.

Yannos added that in Cyprus all these ‘sensitive issues’ are discussed. ‘Everything, the truth is said in Cyprus. Even during the dictatorship in Greece, we got different information from the people on the mainland’.

What is different in the case of the Cypriot viewers is that the reasons for switching off are less gendered or class-based as they are for the Greek informants but they are rather grounded on the dissatisfaction with the reporting of the ‘national issues’, particularly when Cyprus is involved. Another reason that is related to the informants’ dissatisfaction with the media, although it does not necessarily lead to ‘switching off’ is their personal experiences with the media.
6.3.2 Personal experiences with the media

Marianna expressed some bitterness towards Greek media and journalists because they do not cover adequately the Cyprus issue and related initiatives. Her experience is first hand, as she is involved in an organisation that aims to increase awareness about the Cyprus problem.

Marianna: Whenever we asked the media to cover our events, they hardly ever did. They don’t even cover the political aspect of the issue. They just don’t cover it. They prefer to have a report on two missing cows rather than something on Cyprus.

Her friend Ioanna adds:

They simply won’t come [whenever we invite them to our events]. Neither the channels, nor anyone. We will send 50 invitations and press releases to television channels, radio stations, newspapers and magazines and only two journalists will come, and they will not be from high circulation papers.

Marianna: They simply do not care. That’s it. There is a conspiratorial silence [synomotiki siopi].

Marianna attributes this ‘apathy’ to the lack of education and awareness on the part of the journalists’ who, she claims, are not well educated or trained. She adds, however, that responsibility also lies with the editorial policies of the media. Both Marianna and Ioanna say that this comes ‘from above’: ‘There is a line that someone dictates [mia grammi pou pou pernaei]. [...] Otherwise how come all the newspapers and all the channels do not give priority to the Cyprus issue?’

Ioanna: ‘Wouldn’t the journalists otherwise investigate and look into the details of the issue and then realise its importance? If they went in depth they would be able to see how important it is’.

The case of Marianna and Ioanna is the only one with a negative direct experience with the media and journalists. Interestingly, however, in contrast to the Greek informants, Cypriot viewers did not report any positive experiences with the media. This is perhaps an indication that Greek viewers are closer to the mainstream that the media represent without this of course applying to all viewers.

6.3.3 Differences between the ‘airspace incident’ and the ‘Kosovo conflict’

There were not any notable differences in viewing patterns between the ‘airspace incident’ and the Kosovo conflict. As in the case of many Greek viewers most informants said that they watched the news more attentively during the Kosovo conflict.
6.4 Mediated Everyday Lives: Turkish Audiences

Turks have access to all mainstream Greek media. There are no local Turkish language media in Athens. None of the informants had access to, or used, the internet. The Turkish press is available in central Athens kiosks together with the international press, but nobody in Gazi was reading it. There is also a video club in Gazi from where one can rent Turkish videos, although during the fieldwork its business had declined mainly due to the rise in popularity of Turkish satellite television channels. In the last decade, the installation of satellite dishes in order to get television channels from Turkey has become very popular. In the mid 1990s, a dish cost around 60,000 Greek drachmas, an affordable price even for low income households.

I started by assuming that all people had access to Turkish channels, but I was quickly proven wrong as the picture was more complex than I had initially thought. Not all households had Turkish channels – and not all households had Greek. Younger couples do not always install satellite dishes, although they often watch Turkish channels at their parents’ houses.

Murat: My parents have satellite television, I don’t. When I go there I sometimes watch [the Turkish channels]. But usually I watch the Greek [channels]. Most times, to be honest, I do not understand the Turkish. They speak [the language] differently, more clearly. When we speak and you tell me something that I don’t understand, I will look it up in the dictionary and I’ll find it. But in Turkish I cannot make out what the word means. [...] I understand Greek better than Turkish.

A reason younger people do not always have, or do not watch, Turkish satellite television is because of the language. Educated in Greek, the younger generations in

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87 In Thrace there are numerous local Turkish language media including newspapers and radio stations.
88 Turkish satellite television channels started broadcasting in 1990. They were initially based outside Turkey and were targeting the home market which was then monopolised by the Turkish public service broadcasting channel (TRT). As Aksoy and Robins have noted the introduction of private channels opened up the opportunity for a shift from official Kemalist culture to real culture, i.e., a culture that reflected more the diversity within Turkish society (1997).
89 This is equivalent to 173 euros (the new currency), or £110. The price today is higher, but still affordable.
90 Recall that the Cypriot public channel is re-broadcast terrestrially for free.
91 There is no Turkish-language school in Athens. A pilot programme has started in the last five years in the primary school in Gazi (called the multicultural school), to which pupils of different ethnic backgrounds go (Turks and also children of immigrants who live in the area). Pupils follow the Greek
Gazi are more confident in Greek than in Turkish. Moreover, they often told me that the Turkish they speak is not like the Turkish spoken on television.\footnote{This is also related to the differences between the Turkish spoken by the minority in Thrace and modern Turkish. There are differences in expressions and accent.}

Murat: I understand most things on television, most things. But there are some words that, not that I don’t understand, but that I haven’t heard before. So, I look them up. […] I open the dictionary and I look them up. But in Turkish it is very difficult to find the word when there is no book or dictionary.

Murat’s comment points to the lack of resources in Gazi. It is not, of course, that there are no Turkish language books and dictionaries in Athens, but rather that these are not accessible to the informants. Lacking a working knowledge of written Turkish, Murat and his peers, do not feel these dictionaries would be of much use. Moreover, as there is no bookshop in the area they would have to go to the central bookstores to get the dictionaries, which is not something they would do for Greek books either. While the younger people feel more comfortable with Greek, older informants prefer Turkish. Nuriye, a woman in her 50s whose mother tongue is Turkish although she also speaks Greek, told me that she feels better watching Turkish programmes. ‘It’s my language. I understand better’. In the early nineties, Nuriye and her husband bought a satellite dish to get Turkish channels. They have no aerial and therefore do not receive any mainstream Greek channels. Their son, who lives next door with his own family, has access only to Greek channels. Nuriye visits her son’s house whenever she wants to watch the news in Greek.

Language is an important factor here: it is the reason Nuriye prefers to watch Turkish channels and the reason Murat and Yilmaz prefer to watch Greek. It is also the reason why the majority of people of all generations do not watch English language media such as CNN, as they are not competent in English. Nonetheless, linguistic boundaries are not rigid. Everybody in Gazi spoke fluent Greek (admittedly some more fluently than others). People shift between languages in everyday conversation and in relation to the media they use. Sometimes this is also related to the shifts between public and private spaces. People speak Turkish at home and a mixture of Greek and Turkish when they are in public, especially when Greeks are present.
I noticed (and most informants confirmed this) that men watched significantly more television during the winter months. From April to mid October, men were hardly ever at home in the early evenings. They would go for walks, to the cafeterias, or to the square. This was a pattern among Greek audiences as well, although among them it was not as widespread and gendered. In general, gender differences were more salient in Gazi than among Greek audiences. Women spent more time at home and were less educated and less fluent in Greek than Gaziot men. Generally, there was a discernible gender segregation reflected in the uses of spaces and the uses of media: men play cards at the clubs, or drink coffee or beer in the square, while women go to the playground with the younger children, or stay at home. Younger men go out to cafeterias in different parts of Athens, while younger women have to be chaperoned by their husbands, brothers or male relatives to go out in the early evenings.

While men spend their time in the square or around the city, women often exchange visits, or gather in their backyards to chat and gossip. Houses in Gazi are relatively small. It is common for different generations of a family to live under the same roof. Even if they live in separate flats or houses, these are close to each other and are sometimes connected through a common backyard. People exchange visits regularly and television is often a reason, or a pretext, for such visits which take place mainly during the daytime. In the evenings the family gathers together around the television set. Younger people, who are less likely to have satellite television, sometimes go to their parents' place to watch Turkish channels. Nuriye, in turn, goes to her son's flat, to watch the Greek channels. Her house is connected to his through a common backyard. Nazli (Nuriye's daughter-in-law) and Bahar (her mother), who also live nearby, visit Nuriye regularly and watch together soaps, or video clips in Turkish. During most of the visits, the television is on in the background as the women talk and gossip in Turkish, drinking coffee or ayran (a yogurt drink) in the summer. On these occasions television is used mainly aurally, often showing video-clips of Turkish pop songs.

93 This was particularly common among older women, some of whom had never been to school, like Nuriye. Bahar had only been to some grades of elementary school. Younger women, however, such as Sevgi, have been to high school for some years although not all have completed the 9 years of compulsory education.
Television's aural use is quite prevalent in Gazi households, especially during daytime and among women. This is partly explained by the lack of Turkish radio. In order to listen to Turkish language or music, people have to switch the television on. Recall how Giota, one of the Greek housewives, would listen to the radio while doing the household chores and how other women described listening to the news from the kitchen, while preparing dinner. This is perhaps more of a gender and class pattern, rather than an ethnic difference.

With the exception of Nuriye (and a few others) who mainly watch Turkish channels, there are more similarities than differences in patterns of media use with Greek and Cypriot audiences. Having a satellite dish does not imply that people watch the news in Turkish, or only in Turkish. In fact, the most popular programmes in Gazi households are soap operas, television shows and films. Yilmaz, who described himself as a ‘television addict' and owns a dish, mainly watches films on Turkish channels, usually Hollywood films dubbed into Turkish. He also watches sports programmes – football games in particular – but he hardly ever watches the news. Hasan describes a similar pattern. People in Gazi watched the news mainly on MEGA, ANTENNA and SKAI. ERT was hardly ever mentioned (and I never spotted it on any of my visits), although some informants mentioned that they liked some of the documentaries it showed, especially those of Jacques Cousteau. Yilmaz and Murat listen to the radio on their way to work – they live nearby and work at the same small factory. They also buy Greek newspapers quite regularly, a habit that other men share (Orhan, Nihat, Hamdi, Mumin, Murat, Yilmaz). Many men bought sports newspapers (Suleyman, Faruk, Murat, Nazim and Levent). No one seemed to be reading Turkish (from Turkey) newspapers although they are sold in kiosks in the main streets of the city, together with the foreign press. Television viewing is mainly associated with relaxation for most informants. Exceptions involved mainly news programmes that contained negative representations of the neighbourhood (see next section). Sports programmes are highly popular among the young and older males. Younger teenagers (Faruk, 16 and his friend, Levent) are less interested in the news, in the same way that Greek students were.

94 A big part of that area has been closed down in the last two years due to works for the opening of a
A revealing comment comes from Sevgi, a woman in her twenties, who watches both Greek and Turkish channels. ‘Turkish television is the same [as Greek]. Same game-shows, same music’. ‘It’s [just] television’, she added. Such comments echo Oncu’s argument that Turkish television, after deregulation, is banal (Oncu, 2000). Indeed, Turkish and Greek commercial channels share (together with many countries across the world) a number of programmes, such as the ‘Wheel of Fortune’, and ‘Who Wants to be a Millionaire’, the difference being the actual production and language.

It is only in relation to news programmes that people identified differences between Turkish and Greek channels (Suleyman, Orhan, Hasan, Metin, Nuriye, Ayse). As the example below reveals, one of my informants, Nuriye, gave me an account of the Ocalan affair that was completely opposite to that described in the Greek media. In my first visit to Nuriye’s house, around 7 o’clock on a spring evening, I found her ironing clothes in front of the TV. It is probably redundant to say this as in her house, which consists only of one room and an adjacent kitchen and bathroom, everything is in front of the eternally switched on television screen. The television was showing the news in Turkish. She told me that this was her favourite time of the day as her husband and son are at the coffee house and she can do housework and watch her favourite drama series (‘stories’ she calls them) in peace before they come for dinner. We were having a chat about her everyday routines when she suddenly increased the volume of the television. It was a news report, and I recognised the familiar face of the captured leader of the PKK, Ocalan. I asked her to tell me what the reporter was saying and she replied that Ocalan is evil and should be hanged. I told her that some people in Greece felt rather sympathetic towards him but she did not believe me. ‘The whole world knows he is a criminal. No one likes him’.

Nuriye’s case is exceptional as most people who have access to satellite television do not only watch the Turkish channels. Hasan and Umut watch the news on the Greek channels.

new station in the Athens metro network.

95 The visit took place in May 1999, during Ocalan’s trial in Turkey. The Ocalan affair was extensively reported in the Greek media as a crisis. Ocalan was captured hiding in the premises of the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1999. During that time there was public sympathy towards him in Greece particularly among nationalists.
Umut: Because I live here, and I want to learn about the country in which I live. Perhaps I will watch [the Turkish channels] when something weird happens. But I don’t normally watch the whole bulletin.

When I probed Hasan and Umut to tell me where they get their information from, Umut replied, somewhat offended: ‘We live in this society as well, you know’. Hasan stressed in the context of the ‘airspace incident’ discussion, that he served his compulsory military service in Cyprus, reminding me indirectly that he is a Greek citizen. ‘I have discussed all these [issues] with Cypriots’.

Hasan: Depends on the time. Sometimes you watch a Turkish film and they show the news [afterwards]. But we are not concerned if someone plants a bomb in Turkey. Who are they who planted a bomb? We do not know.

Although news programmes are not as popular in Gazi, as they are among Greek informants, a talk show called ‘Jungle’ [zougla] (broadcast on SKAI) is very popular among Gaziots. This programme, tackles social issues and exposes the authorities in a rather sensationalist manner. Highly critical of the government and those in power, it perhaps resonates with the general dissatisfaction in Gazi relating to issues of unemployment, poverty and lack of resources. Triandafyllopoulos, the journalist-presenter, is voicing the criticisms and concerns that people in Gazi are unable to raise themselves. Men often mentioned Triandafyllopoulos and his programme in everyday conversation: ‘as Triandafyllopoulos said…’, or, ‘he is the only one who tells the truth’.

6.4.1 Negative personal experiences with media and journalists

In one of our meetings Umut recounted an incident: he was once attacked by someone and fought back; both were arrested and taken to the police station for questioning. They later let him go. He stressed that the police arrived at the scene together with a journalist who asked him a few questions and took some notes. The next morning he read an article in the newspaper and realised that to his surprise everything was ‘the opposite to what had actually happened’. He was presented as the attacker who intended to rob. Umut was particularly offended that they had described him as a homosexual. ‘They have destroyed my life’, he told me.

People from Gazi feel that there is distortion and falsification whenever the neighbourhood, or its inhabitants are represented in the media. Watching oneself or
one's acquaintances on television does not invoke familiarity as it does for the Greeks, but rather exclusion. Reports on Gazi generated tension, frustration and even anger. ‘We’ve been in magazines so many times, and there hasn’t been a positive article even once’, Yilmaz told me. ‘They write whatever they feel like’, said Suleyman.

Suleyman: Journalists will hardly ever tell the truth. Once there was a show about the minority here and they interviewed me, they even showed me on television. The stuff I said that they did not like, however, they did not show. And this for me, is the proof that all journalists are liars. All of them. They just don’t show the truth.

Interestingly, there were a number of articles in magazines and reports in the media relating to the satellite dishes. A recent article in ‘Dolce Vita’ magazine claimed that the dishes are provided by the Turkish Consulate or Embassy, for free. Orhan remembers when the journalists came to Gazi and were taking pictures of the houses and satellite dishes. ‘They did not bother to talk to anyone, they just took the pictures’, he said.

Another controversy involved Ciao magazine where there was a piece on the Muslim weddings in Gazi. ‘What they wrote is exactly the opposite to what is happening here’, said Yilmaz. ‘They were saying that we have guns and that we fire into the air, which does not happen’.

While Greek informants only had positive direct experiences with the media to refer to, Turkish informants recounted only negative ones. This is a fundamental difference between the different groups (recall that Cypriots had no direct experiences apart from that reported by Marianna and Ioanna) that shapes trust in the media and the overall interpretative framework as will be discussed in Chapter 8. The ordinariness with which Turkish informants use the media, both Turkish and Greek, is in stark contrast to the ways in which the Gaziot informants see themselves represented in the media. The next section further explores this symbolic exclusion of the Turkish viewers.

6.4.2 Objectifying media

Watching satellite Turkish television may be an ordinary viewing experience for the majority of the informants, but it is a highly contested practice in the eyes of fellow Athenians. Satellite dishes are seen as markers of difference, reminders of the Other within the ‘mythically homogenous’ nation-state, and hence are perceived as polluting
and dangerous (Douglas, 1966). Their threat lies perhaps in contesting the roots of national homogeneity and thus the identity of all Greeks.

The articles and reports about satellite dishes are in stark contrast to the actual use of these technologies at home. Turkish informants watch television, Greek and Turkish, socially not ethnically, echoing Robins' remark in relation to satellite television among Turkish immigrants in Berlin that 'Turkish television culture is ordinary' (2000: 291). A perspective that objectifies Turkish channels as an umbilical cord that links the minority to Turkey (and sometimes allegedly even to Islamic fundamentalism) is deeply flawed as it ignores the fluidity and movement between languages and media settings. There are more similarities between Greek and Cypriot audiences than differences; there are also striking similarities between working class Turks and working class Greeks.

A comment made by Nuriye is revealing in this context: 'I love Turkey the same way a boy loves a girl'. And she continued: 'I thought that all people there live like they do on television. But when my son visited he told me that it is not like this'. Nuriye has never been to Turkey. For her it is a mental space to which she escapes through television. It is important to understand where she escapes from: an everyday life (grim and unglamorous in many cases), but also, in her case, a difficult everyday life characterised by unemployment and exclusion. In this context, Nuriye does not escape from her Greek identity to her Turkish but rather, from a real space, with all the difficulties it entails, to an imaginary, fantasised space which allows for all sorts of possibilities and solutions to her problems.

It is not so much the technology itself that shapes identities, but the fact that it is taken so much for granted (by lay people and also by academics) that makes it powerful. Much of the theory and policy and public opinion about the impact of technologies on identity is driven either by speculation – or speculative theory – or by moral panics. Satellite television from Turkey does not make people 'more Turkish'; nonetheless people outside the Turkish community perceive the satellite dishes as a marker of difference. I started with this assumption myself as is evident in the introduction to this chapter. Satellite dishes objectify consumption, making what is usually a private practice, public. This is an observation made by Brunsdon and the moral panics
associated with the introduction of satellite television in the UK (1996). Hargreaves (1997) also described how satellite dishes among the immigrant communities in France were objectified by the authorities and the public. '[...Satellite dishes] have become the symbol of [...] immigrants as an alien cultural presence, threatening the integrity of French national identity' (Hargreaves, 1997: 460-1).

Objectifications of media technologies as unquestionable markers of one's ethnicity ignore a dimension that is more evident in peoples' discourses: that of citizenship. I suggest that people are making claims to citizenship (and equal treatment) rather than to ethnicity when they complain about distorted representations of Gazi.

When I asked if people in Gazi had thought of setting up a Turkish language radio station in Athens Orhan said: 'we haven't thought about it. And even if we plan it, I don't think we will be able to. They will probably shut us down'. This phrase exemplifies a number of points that pertain to the minority. First, the remark that they had never considered setting up their own community media is indicative of the lack of confidence and assertiveness within the community. This lack of confidence is manifested in the projection of a negative result. Such a projection, however, is justified if one takes into account the accumulated negative experiences with journalists and the media and the authorities in Greece in general. This is an example of the mediation process, where different media-related experiences are connected and affect people's lives. Media power (in this case power to exclude) is not located only in one moment of the mediation process, but is seen at different, although interconnected levels. Thus, the negative experiences with the journalists, affect the informants' trust in media, which in turn shapes the decoding of the news. Moreover, as seen in the case above, the negative media experiences and the lack of trust affect the confidence in establishing media that can make their voices heard, considering that this had been a persistent complaint during fieldwork.

6.4.3 Differences between the 'airspace incident' and 'Kosovo'
Overall, there were no noticeable differences in the two case studies in terms of media usage. As noted earlier, although Gaziots watch a lot of television news programmes are not as popular among them as they are among Greek and Cypriot viewers. Some informants, however, particularly those who expressed an interest in current affairs in
general, were more involved in following the news relating to Kosovo. Interestingly these were the informants with more resources (Nihat, Murat, Orhan and Yilmaz). These were the informants that were more educated than the rest and who had access to more media (they would read newspapers, listen to radio and watch current affairs programmes apart from those which were particularly popular among Gaziots).

6.5 IDENTITY DISCOURSES, BELONGING AND CITIZENSHIP

It emerged earlier in this chapter that the media create some form of common communicative space (Schlesinger, 2000a), that was termed as the creation of a common point of reference, in which the majority of the Greek informants participate. In this context informants did not feel the need to express their identity. It was in relation to the Western media, and particularly in relation to the non-Greek media’s representation of Greece, that some Greek informants became more vocal about their identity.

Cypriot informants fell into two categories. Those more integrated into Greek society were those who mainly used Greek media. They often felt they had to justify this practice as Anna’s comment suggested: ‘I watch Greek television but this does not mean that I have denied my identity’. The other category included those who have been in Greece for a shorter period of time, such as the university students, and those who for personal reasons are more involved with what is going on in Cyprus and who use the Cypriot media more frequently. Such was the case of Yannos who is deeply interested in Cypriot politics. His attitude is marked by his experience as a refugee in 1974. Overall, however, there were no differences between Greeks and Cypriots especially in relation to entertainment programmes. This is also reflected at a macro level as there is synergy and cross ownership between Greek and Cypriot channels. In this context many informants expressed an affinity with Greece, as Lia’s comment indicates: ‘We feel Greece is our country’. Recall that Greek Cypriots are not Greek citizens.

This phrase by Lia is in stark contrast to what the Turkish informants, Umut and Nihat told me: ‘Greece is our country – but we do not feel it’. Turks are Greek citizens, but
they 'do not feel it' in the context of social marginalisation and media exclusion. This exclusion was also expressed in relation to Turkey. When Suleyman and Mumin went to Turkey they called them 'bastards' or 'Greeks' [Yunanlı]. Turks continually negotiate their identity both towards the Turkish and towards the Greek media and they often feel excluded from both. As Chapter 3 suggested they are sometimes even excluded from the minority in Thrace when they are seen as a liminal category that does not keep the traditions of the minority. These negotiations are exemplified in Suleyman's phrase: 'We are in the middle'.

In the context of such negative experiences many Turkish informants repeated the phrase: 'when this happens, I become a Turk'. This phrase is revealing, as it is a word-play with the word Turk; in Greek 'to become a Turk' also means to become angry. I interpret this phrase, not as a claim to ethnicity, but principally as a claim to citizenship, equal treatment and access to resources. Turkish informants emerged not only excluded from the common communicative space that the news created, but were sometimes even mistreated. In this sense their reaction is interpreted as a struggle for membership and participation in the community (Held, 1999: 20). In the following paragraphs I include a couple of examples in which Gaziots negotiate their position in Greek society, continually shifting positions.

A number of practices reflect these negotiations between identity positions among the Turkish informants. Many Turkish men have two names, a Turkish and a Greek, which they use interchangeably. Turkish women sometimes have a Greek name as well, but this is less common. This is explained by the fact that Greek names are primarily used in public and in relation to the Greeks, so it is mainly women who work outside the household that adopt a Greek name. The only two female informants who had Greek names were Ayse and Sevgi, who I first met in their workplace. Many of the informants initially introduced themselves to me with their Greek names. Double names provide the Turks with some flexibility. This practice, however, is not something to be celebrated: it is a result of a dominant view that privileges Greeks with Christian names in the job market. Double names are a pragmatic decision, rather than a freewheeling choice and expression of hybridity. On the other hand, once forced into this system, people cope rather well and sometimes in unpredictable ways. Thus, when I met Suleyman he introduced himself with his real (Turkish) name, only
to hear his Turkish friends call him later with his Greek name. In some circumstances and for some people, double names, initially a hegemonic practice, became a casual practice that is not necessarily taken that seriously — although this should not be interpreted as some form of empowerment. People learn to move across spaces and identities and this is often determined by needs and practical purposes. It can also become playful. Identities again prove to be relational.

People’s loyalty to football clubs is also revealing. Many men in Gazi support Greek teams. They also support Galatasaray\textsuperscript{96}, particularly at a European [Champions League] level, as it performs better than Greek teams in recent years. But, as they told me, if Galatasaray played with their Greek team, they would support the Greek team. Some men have strong feelings about teams from Thrace, where they are originally from. Xanthi’s team, the second largest city in Thrace, is doing well in the Greek premiership and has many fans among Gaziots.

6.6 CONCLUSIONS

The perspective ‘from below’ that this chapter is based on, suggests that media and identity are not linked by a causal relationship. The use of media and their integration in people’s daily lives is a more complex process that involves a number of parameters, material, social and individual. Although media do not determine identities, they do contribute in the creation of symbolic communicative spaces (Schlesinger, 2000a) that either include or exclude, thereby affecting audiences’ lives and discourses about their identities. Television is a common point of reference, but as inevitably happens in all public spheres it is more common for some than for others.

One such communicative space is that of the news, which not only is a constant background to Greek viewers’ lives, it is also a part of their lives. People often see themselves in the news and use such programmes in order to make their voice heard. Greek viewers are ‘addicted to news’ and conflate news viewing with ‘being in touch with reality’\textsuperscript{97}. Moreover, news seems to be in constant circulation. Fotini did not find

\textsuperscript{96} Galatasaray is the most successful of the Istanbul football clubs.
\textsuperscript{97} The audiences’ need to ‘keep up’ with reality is confirmed by two other studies on news (Gans, 1979 and Jensen, 1998: 58).
out about a cabinet reshuffle from the actual news programmes, but from a friend of hers. Michalis heard about the Imia crisis from the café waiter. Andreas discussed the news from Kosovo and previous crisis with his colleagues on a daily basis. The life of some news stories does not begin and end in the living-room, or wherever viewing takes place; news stories often become subjects for discussion and retelling in an everyday context. In this sense, news can be seen as a common point of reference.

However, this is not a process which all people living in Greece experience the same way. Whereas news invokes comfort and cosiness to some, confirming arguments by Silverstone (2001), it excludes those who ‘feel like fools’ when watching the news (Rena, Giota, Georgia, Thodoris). The cases when people switch off are the most revealing. They involve people who do not connect to the media and the news in particular. Although the reasons that have led people to withdraw from the dominant news culture are diverse, this withdrawal is not determined ethnically; rather what these informants share in common is their feeling of disenfranchisement. Thus their decision to disengage with mediated information is a reaction to a discourse that does not reflect their reality. Such examples are Giota, Georgia, Rena (the Greek housewives); Thodoris (taxi driver); Lia and Yannos (Cypriot middle class) and Nihat, Suleyman, Mehmet, Murat, Yilmaz (Turkish working class).

Although it is difficult to sustain a causal relationship between technologies and identity, technologies are enabling. They offer choice and enable people to switch to different languages and broadcasting systems. Satellite television brings ‘a bit of the world’ to Turkish interviewees homes. In this sense, technologies are enabling rather than determining. For the Turkish people television facilitates moving across spaces, between Greece and Turkey. Turkey is for many of the Gaziot Turks an imaginary place, a place where they do not come from, but a place that they symbolically escape to, in avoidance of their everyday reality. This is not necessarily an ‘ethnic’ practice, but rather an escaping from the difficulties of everyday life and social exclusion (Nuriye, Bahar).

Most Turkish informants watch the news about the country in which they live. Shifts in viewing patterns do not necessarily relate to strategies about belonging, but are often contingent and pragmatic decisions. There are also material limitations to the
use of technologies relating to one's education and literacy. Language is of paramount importance here. Some of the younger informants' limited Turkish prevent them from following the news on Turkish channels (e.g., Murat, Yılmaz). Nuriye understands better the Turkish channels which she prefers to the Greek. Television provides comfort to some of the elder Turks who feel more comfortable speaking in Turkish. The extended use of television as an aural medium partly explains this. Conversely, younger Turks feel more comfortable in Greek and aspire for more integration in Athenian society. Choosing Greek media is an indication of their wish to participate in Greek society.

In this chapter exclusion is evident in the context of the direct experiences with the journalists and the media. It is in this context that the ordinariness of television viewing observed in the Turkish households and coffee houses is transformed into frustration and sometimes anger. In this sense the media manage to raise the boundaries for exclusion as interviewees revert to a 'us and them' binary scheme of thought. This function of the media echoes Barth's theory on the construction boundaries in the formation of ethnic identities discussed in Chapter 2 (Barth, 1969). It should be noted, however, that the exclusion that the media bring about in this case is not only their responsibility. Media operate at a symbolic level that reminds informants of their exclusion at a material and other symbolic levels as well.

This finding connects with the work of Couldry on lay people's interactions with the media institutions (2000b). Couldry approaches media power not as a property which media institutions simply possess, but as a broad social process that operates at many levels (2000b: 39). The similarity with the work in this chapter is that he identifies media power in people's direct interactions with the media. As Chapter 8 will discuss, this is part of the mediation process, the different moments of which are interconnected. People's direct experiences with the media frame shape people's trust of the media, which in turn influences the interpretation of the news content. But first, Chapter 7 will examine news content itself.
This chapter focuses on identity discourses in news, analysing news programmes as one of the key moments in the mediation process. The reasons for the focus on news have been explained in Chapter 4. In this chapter the aim is to examine the extent to which and the ways in which the news projects a common identity both through its textual characteristics, its particular form and place in television programming.

A number of studies have examined the role of the media in the symbolic construction of a common identity. Morley and Brunsdon have shown how the nation is evoked through the analysis of a current affairs programme (1999). Billig has argued that the nation is constantly flagged through the national press (1995). Scannell has stressed the role of public service broadcasting in shaping national identity (1989) and Dayan and Katz have demonstrated how media events bring the nation together (1992). Silverstone has argued for a mediational perspective that examines news as a central cultural component of social life that punctuates everyday schedules and offers ontological security (1988; 1999 and in press).

The research presented in this chapter draws on this literature and attempts to combine different aspects of these works by means of a theoretical and methodological syncretism. The aim is to investigate the construction of a common ‘we’ both through the textual features of television news in Greece and an analysis of news form. Most of the studies on media and identity have focused on media texts as the locus of identity construction. Although there are studies that have examined the relationship between media and identity by focusing on form, broadcasting context and technology, there are few studies that have combined both the emphasis on texts and on form.
Form in this context refers to the generic characteristics of the news broadcasts, including the mode of presentation and the ‘live’ and lengthy duration of the broadcasts. The argument put forward in this chapter is that the news genre in Greece borrows elements from other types of programming, notably talk shows. This results in news programmes having a particular form, which is also the result of a loosely regulated broadcasting system. In this sense form is also related to the particular broadcasting culture in which the news is produced. This is why the flexibility in programming and even the domination of news broadcasts in the programme mix will be discussed, as broadcasting context affects news form.

This chapter focuses on one of the moments in the mediation process and should be seen in relation to the chapters that discuss the reception of the news (Chapter 8) and the integration of media in the daily lives of the viewers (Chapter 6). Instead of extracting with certainty the meaning of the news in order to make assumptions about its effects on the audiences, this chapter describes some features of the news, which will be then examined in relation to the viewers’ responses. This is an important distinction as the point here is not to argue that television is projecting a common identity, which is then unquestioningly adopted by the audiences. The aim, rather, is to stress the dialectic nature of communication and mediation.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first deals with the textual properties of the news. The second analyses news as genre and form. The third brings the two previous sections together in the analysis of a media event. The analysis draws on different groups of data that have been analysed by a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods (see Table 7.1). In the paragraphs that follow I discuss the selection of the events and the reports on which the analysis is based before proceeding to the actual presentation of the data.

Even though the reports sampled are divided into four types for analytic purposes (see Table 7.1), they represent news from two periods as discussed in Chapter 5. One involved the ‘violation of national airspace by Turkish planes’ in October 1998 and the other the events in Kosovo and Yugoslavia during the first month of the NATO intervention in March-April 1999. As before, these reports will be referred to as the airspace incident and the Kosovo conflict case studies for reasons of convenience.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section of chapter</th>
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<th>Dates and channels</th>
<th>Number of reports</th>
<th>Type of analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News as Text (Section 1)</td>
<td>1. Reports on airspace incident</td>
<td>October 1998, 4 days sampled, 3 channels (ANTENNA, MEGA, ET-1)</td>
<td>9 reports</td>
<td>Interpretive analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reports on Kosovo conflict</td>
<td>March-April 1999, news from 9 days sampled, 3 channels (ANTENNA, MEGA, ET-1)</td>
<td>464 reports</td>
<td>Content analysis using SPSS Interpretive analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News as Form (Section 2)</td>
<td>3. All the above reports plus 3 news broadcasts from the first day of the NATO strikes in Kosovo and Yugoslavia.</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Content analysis</td>
<td>Interpretive analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Event (Section 3)</td>
<td>4. 'Live' broadcasts from a concert/media event in the context of the Kosovo conflict</td>
<td>26 April 1999, 4 channels (Antenna, MEGA, ET-1 and SKAI)</td>
<td>4 broadcasts</td>
<td>Interpretive analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.1: Presentation of the different groups of data and types of analysis.**

The two case studies have similarities and differences and are intended to complement each other in the analysis. At a first level the *airspace incident* represents a relatively routine event and the *Kosovo conflict* a crisis. This is evident from the media attention that they received. While the Kosovo conflict literally took over news programmes during the 79 days for which it lasted (news often featured items only on this issue), the airspace incident was reported for a maximum of four days (on ANTENNA) and a minimum of two (on ET-1). Moreover, the events in Kosovo had wider repercussions in Greek society (especially the reactions towards the NATO air-campaign; such reports were also included in the sample) while the airspace incident caused no obvious controversies.

While to an extent the routine/crisis distinction is valid and will be discussed again later on, it should be mentioned that it is not definite as there is an element of crisis in the *airspace incident* and a routine element in the *Kosovo conflict*. The *airspace incident* should be seen in the context of the relations between Greece and Turkey,
which have seen a number of eruptions in the past years (the most notable being the *Seismic* crisis in 1986 and the *Imia* crisis in 1996). Greece and Turkey have a set of ongoing disputes over a number of issues, the most notorious being the Cyprus issue and control over areas of the Aegean Sea (Rozakis, 1988). Incidents like the one described in this chapter are common, especially during military exercises by the two countries. Thus it could be argued that this incident is routine, to the extent that it takes place regularly. By the standards of other Western European countries, however, it would be considered a serious crisis as such incidents often involve casualties and have sometimes brought the two countries to the brink of war as they involve a significant proportion of the countries' armed forces. Maybe a better way of describing these events is that they are routinely not routine.

Conversely, the Kosovo conflict did not involve Greece directly or pose any immediate threats to Greek sovereignty. However, it was widely perceived as a crisis. The difference between the Kosovo coverage in Greece compared to the coverage in other Western media, was that a large number of the reports did not just focus on Kosovo as a regional and international conflict, but rather on related but not urgent issues, such as the Greek minority in Albania, or the popular expressions of anti-Americanism in Greece and other places in the world. The conflict triggered a number of reactions and reports that could be characterised as routine or banal, in the sense that there is nothing critical about them.

To summarise, through the airspace incident it is possible to observe the reporting of the nation in a routinely not routine internal issue. Through the reporting of the Kosovo conflict the nation is evoked in the context of an international crisis in which Greece was only involved indirectly (as a neighbouring country and a NATO ally).

First, the interpretive analysis of the airspace incident will be presented. Then the content analysis of the Kosovo conflict will follow together with a discussion of the method and the procedure followed. The quantified data will be illustrated with examples from the interpretive analysis of the same reports.
7.1 NEWS AS TEXT

7.1.1 Interpretive analysis of the airspace incident
The incident took place in the third week of October 1998 and involved ‘the violation of Greek airspace and Athens FIR in the area of the Aegean Sea by Turkish military planes, during a joint military exercise of Greece with Cyprus’. This is the definition provided by the actual reports of the channels. ANTENNA covered this incident most extensively with four reports in four consecutive days (22-25/10/1999). ANTENNA’s reports were also longer (see Table 7.13). MEGA reported on this incident in three days’ broadcasts (22-24/10/1999). Finally, ET-1 had two reports (22 and 23/10). The mean duration of the reports on MEGA and ET-1 was identical (see Table 7.12).

As in most reporting that involves conflict an ‘us and them’ scheme was present in these reports. A number of studies on news (Gamson, 1992; Liebes, 1997; Neuman et al., 1992) have established the construction of an ‘us and them’ frame in the news in general, and news about conflict in particular. As there are three main actors involved in the incident (Greece, Cyprus and Turkey), I shall apply discourse analysis to see how the ‘us and them’ binary scheme is constructed. In particular, I shall examine the uses of pronouns through a deictic analysis (Billig, 1995).

Deixis
The term ‘deixis’ (which comes from the Greek word for ‘pointing’ or ‘indicating’) is used in linguistics to refer to the function of personal or demonstrative pronouns, of tense and of a variety of other grammatical or lexical features which relate utterances to the spatiotemporal co-ordinates of the act of utterance. By deixis is meant ‘the location and the identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee’ (Lyons, 1977: 636-7).

Although the use of pronouns in the context of face-to-face conversation is usually straightforward, as it is clear who is talking and who is being addressed, in the case of political or journalistic discourse, deixis is more complex. ‘We’ does not just include
the speaker and the hearers: ‘We’ may be extended to include the party, the community, the nation or the people. Deixis in media or political discourse may become the vehicle to imagining the nation. The deixis of homeland invokes the national ‘we’ and places ‘us’ within ‘our’ homeland (Billig, 1995: 107). Billig, in his study of the national press in the UK shows how the newspapers employ a routine ‘deixis’, which continually points to the national homeland as the home of the readers (1995: 11). Of course this also has the opposite effect. If nationalist discourse reminds us who ‘we’ are, it also tells us who we are not. As much as it is inclusive, this discourse is also exclusive, as Morley and Robins have noted (1995: 25).

In the following paragraphs I will discuss how a common identity is projected through an ‘us and them’ frame sustained by deictic expressions.

_Deixis in the airspace incident_

Deictic words were commonly used in the reports to demarcate ‘us’ (in this context the Greeks and Greek Cypriots in the joint military exercise) and ‘them’, the Turks, who were reported to be obstructing the exercises. Two examples illustrate this: ‘Our aircraft managed to break through the Turkish air barrier after intense and dangerous air-fights’ (ANTENNA, 24/10/1999).

Dozens of Turkish aircraft attempted today to obstruct the flight of the aircraft of our airforce to Cyprus. The third wave of Greek planes passed the Turkish ‘wall’. The Turks responded swiftly. The provocations of the Turks did not prevent the Greek and Cypriot forces from continuing with the exercises. Ground forces and units of our navy managed to complete the exercises with live ammunition’ (MEGA 24/10/1999).

This quotation, typical of the discourse of these reports, points to ‘us’, the nation and ‘our’ aircraft. It is ‘our’ aircraft that are battling with the Turkish. This possessive pronoun, used in the reports of both private channels but not on ET-1, makes the contrast between us and them even more salient. The ‘us’ implied in these reports extends to and embraces Cyprus as well. Greece and Cyprus are seen as a united force against the common enemy. The following quotation is indicative of this climate. It contains the statement of the then minister of defence, Akis Tsohatzopoulos on ANTENNA, 25/10/1999. ‘Turkey has to understand that Greece will not tolerate its threats [den pernane oi apeiles]. Neither will Cyprus’.
Another word in the reports that connotes the special relationship between Greece and Cyprus is *Meghalonisos* (literary meaning 'Large Island'), used to refer to Cyprus. This word was mentioned in both ANTENNA and MEGA programmes, but not by ET-1. Its use, instead of the proper name Cyprus, implies a relationship of intimacy. This is enhanced by the fact that in some reports Cyprus is not referred to as a separate state. The following quote is indicative: ‘The Turkish aircraft attempted unsuccessfully to cut off Meghalonisos from the mainland’ (MEGA, 25/10/99 and ANTENNA, 24/10/99). ‘Meghalonisos’ appears as an integral part of Greece that can be cut off only with the intervention of Turkish planes. The following quotation is in the same vein (see also Image 1, Appendix VII for a graph depicting the triangle between Cyprus and the two Greek islands, Rhodes and Crete, suggesting a continuity of space):

Turkey is orchestrating a war scene in the triangle between Cyprus, Rhodes and Crete. Ankara, through the Turkish Airforce, is actively contesting the common defence dogma between Greece and Cyprus. The intention of the Turkish pilots was to intercept each Greek airplane that was heading to Cyprus (ANTENNA 23/10/99).

The sense of tension is heightened with other phrases such as ‘Turkey orchestrated a war scene over the Aegean again today [...] with 200 super-modern and armed aircraft’ (ANTENNA, 24/10/1999), and ‘Ankara’s audacity has no limits’ (ANTENNA 24/10/1999). The ‘us and them’ frame is made more salient through the visual material that accompanies the footage. Most of it contains images from air force exercises and air-combats (this is archival material although it is not explicitly mentioned), creating a feeling of tension and threat. There are some shots where we see the pilot in the cockpit and in the background can hear him saying ‘I have locked them’ [*tous egglovis*] to refer to him targeting the Turkish planes in a dogfight. This is not clearly heard but even the sound of the anxious voice creates tension (see Images 2-7, Appendix VII).

Most importantly none of the reports mention the background to the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean. The reports do not even mention the background to the related issue of the Cyprus problem and the ‘common defence dogma’ with Greece in the context of which the military exercises take place. The lack of
contextual or background information is common practice in news in general and does not apply to the Greek case solely (Philo, 1990).

The airspace incident reports are an example of banal nationalism where small words and pronouns establish and naturalise the nation and its others (Billig, 1995). Moreover, because these reports were about conflict that involved the armed forces, visually they extended beyond the 'banal nationalism' thesis as they showed images that evoked war. The images used in the reports mainly consisted of archival footage from past military exercises and in the case of ANTENNA images from a flight simulator programme and a video game (Image 3, Appendix VII). In short the images that accompanied the banal reports were nothing but banal, in the sense that they emphasised a clear separation between 'us and them' that evoked conflict and war (Images 1-7, Appendix VII).

It needs to be noted, however, that there were significant differences among the channels with ANTENNA being more vocal about the dangers of the incident and Turkey's threat, and MEGA and ET-1 being more restrained.

7.1.2 Thematic analysis of the reports on the Kosovo conflict

A note on method: sampling
The sample contained 27 news broadcasts from three channels (the two major private channels, ANTENNA and MEGA, and the public one, ET-1) and totalled 464 items. The programmes represent the main evening news bulletins of these channels for 9 days during the first month of the conflict. The dates were selected purposefully on the basis of two criteria: first that they covered the first days of the strikes and at least one day of each week of the first month and second, that they contained some of the incidents that were repeatedly mentioned in the viewers' interviews (the interviews took place before the sampling of the news from the channels' archives).99

98 Refer to Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of methods applied, particularly the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques.
99 See Appendix V for the days sampled.
The unit of analysis (henceforth, *item*) was defined as every news story, 'live' or recorded (including its introduction by the presenter) within the news programme. An item could also be a live studio discussion within the context of the programme. Items were of varying duration. Only the items relating to Kosovo were coded. An item was identified as relating to Kosovo if it had a direct or indirect reference to the conflict. This also included items which focused on the reactions towards the NATO strikes and the effects of the conflict in Greece and the region. The intention was to examine the whole range of discourses and issues that this conflict produced. In total 464 items were coded and analysed (see Appendix IV for the coding framework).

C**oding procedure and selection of variables**

What follows is a presentation of the variables and the categories that were used for the coding of the units of analysis. The presentation includes both the definitions of the categories and the relation of each variable to the research questions. What appears in parentheses with capital letters is the name of the variable used in the SPSS analysis when this was not the same as its proper name. These are included here as they appear in the dendrograms (Figures 7.1-7.3)

**Standard identification variables**

- **Channel.** Identifies on which of the three channels (ET-1, MEGA and ANTENNA) the item appeared.

- **Date.** Identifies the date of the broadcast.

- **Total number of items in the broadcast** (ITEMTOT) and **total items on Kosovo** (ITEMKOS) serve as a means of comparing the proportion of the Kosovo coverage in relation to other news items.

- **Order of item in the broadcast** (ORDWB) identifies the place of the item in the news programme (i.e., beginning, middle, end).

- **Type of report** (ITEMTYP). This variable identifies the geographical location of the reports and whether they were live or recorded.
  2. commentary/analysis
4. video-clip/pastiche
5. titles/introductory comments/newscaster

Variables relating to news form

- Duration of news broadcast (TOTDUR). This variable is significant in relation to arguments about the 'liveness' of news in Greece and the flexibility of broadcasting programming. The duration of the broadcast excluded sports coverage, financial news and weather reports.

- Duration of item (ITEMDUR). As mentioned above, items could be of any duration. In fact there were items in the sample that lasted for as little as 40 seconds and others which lasted for 40 minutes. This variation made the coding of item duration important as a means of understanding which issues received lengthier coverage. Duration was calculated in minutes and seconds.

- Caption. This category reveals a particular feature of the news on Greek private channels. Often before the beginning of a report there is a caption/headline accompanied by music. These headlines were first coded as present or absent and, if present, were coded into the following categories inferred from the data:

- Live. This variable identifies the number of reports that were broadcast live. Coded as present or absent. The issue of 'liveness' in television broadcasting is discussed in the section on news form.

- Music. This variable identifies the presence or absence of music in the item.

Thematic variables

- Focus. This includes the primary focus of each item – usually one of the themes discussed below.

All following themes are coded as present or absent for each item unless other categories are mentioned:

- Bombs and Casualties (BOMBCASU). This variable includes items with a reference to the NATO strikes and their casualties.
- **Serbs.** This includes any reference to the Serb people and their plight. Both this variable and the previous one emphasise the perspective of the Serbs in the conflict.

- **Military issues** (MILITARY). This variable includes references to the military aspect of the conflict as well as details about the operations.

- **Refugees.** This variable includes all references to the refugees, from reports on their living conditions and health issues to mere remarks about the number crossing the borders.

- **Reasons refugees are leaving** (REFUGREA). The categories are: 1. because of NATO strikes, 2. ethnic cleansing, 3. mixed reasons, 4. reasons not mentioned.

- **NATO.** This category refers to the way the reports present the coalition. The items were coded as **negative**, **neutral**, **positive**, **combined** (negative and neutral) or **absent**. The combined category was needed as some reports contained a mixed portrayal. Negative refers to any objections or ironic comments towards the coalition and its actions. Neutral refers to a descriptive item that does not make evaluating remarks about NATO when presenting its actions. Two further categories were derived from this, NATONEG (the negative depiction of NATO) and NATONEU (the neutral items), both coded as present or absent. NATONEG is linked to anti-Americanism and the ‘us and them frame’.

- **Diplomacy** (DIPLOM). Includes items which refer to the diplomatic efforts at all levels.

- **Regional Destabilisation.** (DESTREG) This refers to fears for regional destabilisation, change of borders and movements of population.

- **Effects in Greece** (GREFFECT). The effects of the conflict in Greece; effects on the environment, the economy and tourism.

- **Initiatives** (GRINITIA). The initiatives of the Greek government and Greek NGO’s at a diplomatic and humanitarian aid level.

- **Reactions against the bombings** (GREACT). The reactions against the strikes in Greece, both at a political and general population level.

- **Neighbourhood.** Includes items which refer to the region as ‘our neighbourhood’.

- **Cyprus.** Includes items with references to Cyprus as a reverse parallel to Kosovo (i.e., why did NATO not intervene in the 1974 invasion or even today).
- **North Epirus** (NORTEPIR). Comprises of items that made references to the Greek minority in Albania and how it may be affected by the events in Kosovo and the settlement of refugees in the region.

- **Church.** Includes items referring to the common religion between the Serbs and Greeks (Orthodox Christians) as well as initiatives and/or reactions of the Church of Greece towards the bombings.

- **Flags.** Items with images of flags were coded in this variable. Categories include 1. Greek flags; 2. Serb flags; 3. US flags; 4. none.

- **Russia.** This includes items with a reference to the role of Russia in the diplomatic efforts and its reactions to the NATO strikes.

- **Ethnic cleansing.** Items with references to ethnic cleansing or genocide.

### Reliability

In order to determine whether the coding was consistent, reliability was checked by inviting another coder to code a section of the sample (three programmes in total out of 27, i.e., 51 items out of 464). Reliability was calculated as follows: 

\[ r = \frac{a}{a+d} \]

where \(a\) = number of cases of agreement, \(d\) = cases of disagreement.

Reliability for each variable was: 

- **focus** 0.96, **NATO** 0.84, **Serbs** 0.78, **destabilisation** 0.81, **bombs/casualties** 0.81, **diplomacy** 0.84, **effects in Greece** 0.90, **initiatives** 0.96, **reactions** 0.93, **neighbourhood** 0.87, **Cyprus** 0.96, **flags** 0.93, **military issues** 0.93, **UCK (KLA)** 0.96, **role of Western media** 0.93, **WWII** 0.93, **cold war** 0.96. All other variables achieved 100% reliability. The overall reliability was thus 0.95, a percentage that was considered satisfactory.

### Cluster analysis

Cluster analysis identifies relatively homogeneous groups of cases or variables based on selected characteristics. More specifically, a clustering method is a multivariate statistical procedure that starts with a data set containing information about a sample of entities (in this case a sample of variables) and attempts to organise them into homogenous groups (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984: 7) The procedure uses an

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100 Reliability in this context refers to the procedure for testing the consistency of the coding. Inter-coder reliability (the consistency between different coders) was calculated which is thought of as stronger than intra-coder reliability (the consistency of the individual's coding over a period of time) (see Hansen et al., 1998: 121). For a more general discussion of the issues of reliability and validity in the social sciences, see Chapter 5.
algorithm that starts with each case or variable in a separate cluster and combines clusters until only one is left.

For the analysis of the data set, an agglomerative hierarchical method was performed in order to identify clusters of variables. The method used was Ward’s method (a popular method in the social sciences according to Chatfield and Collins, 1980) using Squared Euclidean distance as a measure of dissimilarity. It has been observed that different clustering methods produce different results when applied to the same data (Aldenderfer and Blashfield; Chatfield and Collins, 1980). Indeed it is sometimes suggested that the analyst should try different cluster methods and, if they all reveal the same groupings, then one can be confident that natural groupings really do exist (Chatfield and Collins, 1980: 229).

An analysis using single linkage method, the most popular method in cluster analysis, was also performed in order to confirm the groupings that Ward’s method revealed. Despite the disadvantage of the ‘chaining effect’ that the single link method often produces (as it did in this particular data set), it still grouped together the same variables, indicating that there are indeed some distinct groupings in the data set.

The clusters are depicted in the graph in the shape of a tree called a dendrogram. Determining the number of clusters from the dendrogram produced, that is deciding where to ‘chop’ the tree in order to attain the optimal number of clusters, is a thorny issue in this type of analysis. Aldenderfer and Blashfield note that heuristic procedures are by far the most commonly used methods (1984: 54). Where the tree is cut is decided by subjective examination of the different levels. This procedure has been considered biased towards the views of the researcher and indeed has been considered one of the main drawbacks of the method (ibid.). The application of cluster analysis in the context of this research, however, was complementary to a qualitative analysis that also identified thematic patterns. The fact that the thematic variables grouped together through cluster analysis were the same as those identified through the interpretive analysis and the cross-tabulations of pairs of variables\textsuperscript{101} was a strong criterion for

\textsuperscript{101} These will be presented in the following section.
accepting the heuristic approach unproblematically. In this case triangulation of methods of analysis proved important in establishing the findings.

Results: Identifying discursive patterns
From the content analysis, it emerged that the most prevalent themes were those of bombs and casualties (32.1%) and NATO negative (25.2%). Interestingly, NATO positive was not mentioned even once. NATO neutral, on the other hand, was more popular with 21.6%. Diplomacy was also a prevalent theme, especially in the case of the public channel where it was the most common variable, as it reached 34.8% while the overall percentage of the theme was 21.8%. The least prevalent theme was that of ethnic cleansing (2.8%).

Although the above frequencies are indicative of the tendencies in the data set they are simply descriptive. What is important is to identify discursive patterns in the news, that is groups of themes that often co-occur in the same report. The cluster analysis revealed two clusters, or groups of themes, as can be observed in the dendrogram in Figure 7.1.

The themes that form the first cluster are: bombs and casualties, Nato/negative, Serbs, reactions, flags and live. Live was included in the cluster analysis despite the fact that it is not a theme, so as to see which themes received extended live coverage. The second cluster consists of the variables: diplomacy, Nato/neutral, Greek initiatives, refugees, destabilisation, effects (of the conflict in Greece), Russia and military.

The themes which co-occur in this Cluster 1 are as follows: references to the bombs and casualties of the NATO strikes usually co-occur with a negative portrayal of NATO, with references to the Serb people and with the reactions to and demonstrations against the air strikes. Images of flags also occur in the context of the above themes (mainly with reactions). Conversely, in Cluster 2 references to the diplomatic activity surrounding the conflict co-occur with neutral ones towards NATO

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1. Only variables that were prevalent in the data set were included for the cluster analysis (that is variables whose frequency was > 5%. This is because when all the thematic variables were included in the analysis the less prominent ones tended to cluster together.
2. Live reporting will be discussed in section 6.2.
and references to the initiatives of the Greek government and NGOs (at a diplomatic and humanitarian aid level). These also cluster with references to refugees, destabilisation, the effects of the crisis in Greece, the role of Russia in the conflict and military issues.

In most cases, themes from the two clusters do not co-occur in the same item. For example, *refugees* are commonly referred to either in the context of diplomatic activity or in the context of regional destabilisation (i.e., concerns about the settlement of refugees and how that may affect the populations of other Balkan countries and in particular the Greek minority of Albania). On the other hand, *Serbs* are presented as either the victims of the NATO strikes or as the people who are courageously attending concerts in the squares of Belgrade despite and against the bombings. Similarly, NATO is presented in a negative way in the context of what is happening to the Serb people and in a neutral way in the context of diplomatic activity and collaboration with the Greek government.

These thematic patterns are further confirmed in the cross-tabulations of theme couples. In Table 7.2, the relation between *destabilisation* and *refugees* mentioned above appears as statistically significant (p<0.0001, see Table 7.2). The same goes for the relationship between *NATO-negative* and *Serbs* (p<0.0001, see Table 7.3) and *Serbs* and *Church* (p<0.0001, see Table 7.4). These relationships between themes suggest the existence of a particular frame of identification, an 'us and them' frame. The Greeks are presented as close to the Serbs through religion [*church*], resistance to foreign interference [*reaction* and *NATO negative*] and *flags*. The Kosovan refugees are presented in a more detached way [*diplomacy*], or even as a threat [*destabilisation*]. Greece is negative towards NATO in relation to the bombings and the casualties of the Serb side [*bombs-casualties and Serbs*], but neutral in relation to diplomacy and governmental co-operation [*Greek initiatives*] (see Table 7.5).
**FIGURE 7.1: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis For All Channels (ANTENNA, MEGA, ET-1)**

Squared Euclidean Distance used
Dendrogram using Ward Method

Cluster 1 appears in bold; Cluster 2 is in normal type face

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE</th>
<th>0</th>
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<th>10</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>25</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Num</td>
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<td>LIVE</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**TABLE 7.2: Crosstabulation of Thematic Variables Refugees and Regional Destabilisation (DESTREG) for All Channels and Chi-Squared Test**

\( \chi^2 = 27.554, \text{df}=1, p<0.0001 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>REFUGEES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>ABSENT</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTABILISATION</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40.3%)</td>
<td>(59.7%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSENT</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.9%)</td>
<td>(86.1%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.7%)</td>
<td>(82.3%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7.3: Crosstabulation of Thematic Variables NATO Negative and Serbs for All Channels and Chi-Squared Test ($X^2 = 22.051$, DF = 1, $p < 0.0001$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERBS</th>
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<th>ABSENT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>42 (43.8%)</td>
<td>54 (56.3%)</td>
<td>96 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSENT</td>
<td>75 (20.4%)</td>
<td>293 (79.6%)</td>
<td>368 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>117 (25.2%)</td>
<td>347 (74.8%)</td>
<td>464 (100%)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Table 7.4: Crosstabulation of Thematic Variables Serbs and Church for All Channels and Chi-Squared Test ($X^2 = 33.907$, df=1 $p < 0.0001$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHURCH</th>
<th>PRESENT</th>
<th>ABSENT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>14 (73.7%)</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSENT</td>
<td>82 (18.4%)</td>
<td>363 (81.6%)</td>
<td>445 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>96 (20.7%)</td>
<td>368 (79.3%)</td>
<td>464 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7.5: CROSSTABULATION OF THE THEMES DIPLOMACY AND NATO NEUTRAL FOR ALL CHANNELS AND CHI-SQUARED TEST ($x^2 = 30,843$, df=1, $p<0.0001$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO/NEUTRAL</th>
<th>PRESENT</th>
<th>ABSENT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIPLOMACY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>42 (41.6%)</td>
<td>59 (58.4%)</td>
<td>101 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSENT</td>
<td>58 (16%)</td>
<td>305 (84%)</td>
<td>363 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100 (21.6%)</td>
<td>364 (78.4%)</td>
<td>464 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences among channels

An important finding from the content analysis concerns the differences between private and public channels. Differences included both the distribution of theme frequencies and the overall presentation style, although this section discusses only the former. A useful reminder in this context is that the audience ratings for the public channels have dropped dramatically since deregulation and their audience share is only a small fraction of that of the private channels. In terms of the theme frequencies, ET-1 had significantly fewer references to the themes Serbs and NATO negative (see Tables 7.6 and 7.7 respectively, $p<0.001$ in both cases). Conversely, the themes diplomacy and Greek initiatives were more prevalent on ET-1 (the differences are statistically significant, $p<0.0001$ in both cases, see Tables 7.8 and 7.9). These findings indicate that the public channel chose to emphasise the diplomatic activity surrounding the conflict and the related initiatives of the Greek government, while the private channels stressed the effects of the air campaign on the Serb people and projected a stronger anti-American stance.

The ‘us and them’ frame takes a different shape in the context of ET-1. The public channel stresses the Greek side, but in relation to the diplomatic initiatives of the government towards the resolution of the conflict. The identification with the Serbs is
not as strong as on the private channels, nor is there evident unfriendliness towards the refugees or NATO. Instead ET-1 adopts a reassuring stance towards the conflict, which was to a large extent that of the government at the time. ET-1 emphasizes the work of the government at the diplomatic level and the role of Greece as a stabilizing factor in the region (instead of emphasizing effects and destabilization). ET-1’s ‘reassuring’ frame is evident in the dendrogram for the particular channel (Figure 7.2), where the first cluster contains the themes bombs-casualties, diplomacy and Greek initiatives. This clustering suggests that the bombs are seen in relation to how they might be stopped [diplomacy], and not as an expression of sympathy and identification with the Serb people. However, thematic patterns such as destabilization and refugees are evident on the public channel as well, only to a lesser extent (see Figure 7.2). Interestingly, the clusters identified in the dendrogram for the two private channels are identical with those for all three channels (see Figure 7.3).

The relationship of ET-1 to the government and the particular features of public service broadcasting in Greece are interesting especially in relation to arguments about the public sphere. In this context the relationship of the channel with the government is important especially in relation to the issue of trust towards the media. As discussed in Chapter 6, some informants referred to ET-1 as the governmental channel instead of the public channel. This observation that reflects the history of broadcasting in Greece, casts new light on the possible observation that ET-1 was the alternative channel that provided more balanced reporting on the Kosovo conflict avoiding zealous confrontations between ‘us and them’. 
Figure 7.2: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis for ET-1
Squared Euclidean Distance used
Dendrogram using Ward Method

Cluster 1 appears in bold; Cluster 2 is in normal

<table>
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<tr>
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Figure 7.3: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis for Mega and Antenna
Squared Euclidean Distance used
Dendrogram using Ward Method

Cluster 1 appears in bold; Cluster 2 is in normal

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CASE</th>
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## Table 7.6: Crosstabulation of Variables Serbs and Channel and Chi-Squared Test ($X^2 = 13.893$, df = 2, $p < 0.001$)

<table>
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<th>CHANNEL</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>ABSENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEGA</td>
<td>39 (23.1%)</td>
<td>130 (76.9%)</td>
<td>169 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
<td>47 (26.1%)</td>
<td>133 (73.9%)</td>
<td>180 (100%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-1</td>
<td>10 (8.7%)</td>
<td>105 (91.3%)</td>
<td>115 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>96 (20.7%)</td>
<td>368 (79.3%)</td>
<td>464 (100%)</td>
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</table>

## Table 7.7: Crosstabulation of Variables NATO-Negative and Channel and Chi-Squared Test ($X^2 = 12.804$, df = 2, $p < 0.002$)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>CHANNEL</th>
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</thead>
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<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>ABSENT</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEGA</td>
<td>53 (31.4%)</td>
<td>116 (68.6%)</td>
<td>169 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
<td>49 (27.2%)</td>
<td>131 (72.8%)</td>
<td>180 (100%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-1</td>
<td>15 (13%)</td>
<td>100 (87%)</td>
<td>115 (100%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>117 (25.2%)</td>
<td>347 (74.8%)</td>
<td>464 (100%)</td>
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TABLE 7.8: CROSSTABULATION OF VARIABLES DIPLOMACY AND CHANNEL AND CHI-SQUARED TEST ($X^2=18.022$, DF =2, $P < 0.0001$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNEL</th>
<th>DIPLOMACY</th>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>ABSENT</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEGA</td>
<td>36 (21.3%)</td>
<td>133 (78.7%)</td>
<td>169 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
<td>25 (13.9%)</td>
<td>155 (86.1%)</td>
<td>180 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ET-1</td>
<td>40 (34.8%)</td>
<td>75 (65.2%)</td>
<td>115 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>101 (21.8%)</td>
<td>363 (78.2%)</td>
<td>464 (100%)</td>
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</table>

TABLE 7.9: CROSSTABULATION OF VARIABLES GREEK INITIATIVES AND CHANNEL AND CHI-SQUARED TEST ($X^2=23.012$, DF =2, $P<0.0001$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNEL</th>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
<td>20 (11.1%)</td>
<td>160 (88.9%)</td>
<td>180 (100%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-1</td>
<td>35 (30.4%)</td>
<td>80 (69.6%)</td>
<td>115 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>75 (16.2%)</td>
<td>389 (83.8%)</td>
<td>464 (100%)</td>
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</table>

'Us and them'
The main function of the 'us and them' frame in reporting is the simplification of a significantly more complex situation. This frame is common in the news (Neuman et al., 1992) and even more so in the reporting of conflicts and wars (see inter alia, Liebes, 1997; Katz, 1992). The 'us/them' frame was dominant in the Western media as well, where it was coupled with references to World War II. Katz (1992: 5) has remarked that World War II took over as a dominant frame since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the ideological frames between the Western and Eastern...
blocs. Thus, Milojevic was commonly referred to as 'Hitler' and the fleeing of the refugees was paralleled to the Holocaust (Norhstedt et al., 2000: 394-5). The Greek media, especially the private television channels, also made references to World War II. In this case, however, the roles were reversed: in the Greek media Clinton was Hitler, the plight of the Serbs was paralleled to the Holocaust and the American flag was sometimes depicted with a swastika (3.4%).

A common framing mechanism associated with the 'us and them' frame is that of 'personalising', which Liebes defines as the 'asymmetrical portrayal of the humanity of the two sides' (Liebes, 1997: 73-4). The human suffering of 'our' side is emphasised (the victims have names, age, families), while the 'others' are depersonalised. In the sampled reports there was a strong emphasis on the plight of the Serbs as the victims of the NATO strikes, while the refugees were seen in the background of the crisis. Moreover, the images of the Serb and Greek flags that often appeared tied together were a metonymy for the friendship of the two nations (Billig, 1995: 41). The identification with the Serb people is also invoked by the references to the church and the common religion, and by the visits of Greek people in Belgrade to participate in the daily concerts against the air strikes.

This 'personalisation' is evident from the analysis of the titles that introduce the reports on Serbs: 'The Mum of a Hero', 'Both Serb and Refugee', 'The Damned of the Balkans', 'They are still singing' and 'The Calvary of the Serbs'. In these reports the Serbs narrate their stories while the camera focuses on their faces and eyes with close-up shots. Dramatic music often accompanies these images. Sometimes the dramatisation is enhanced by the use of the slow motion technique. In some cases the journalist speaks in Serb and the protagonists send their messages to the Greek nation on camera.

Before discussing the depiction of the refugees, some examples will illustrate this process of personalisation and identification with the Serbs. In the report entitled 'The

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104 It is common practice on the private channels to start each report with a title/caption often accompanied with music. The examination of these titles/captions is interesting as they often condense the dominant frame of the news into a few words. In Barthes' terms, it is the caption that anchors the meaning (Barthes, 1977). For examples of such captions in the news see Images 9-11 in Appendix VII.
mum of a hero’, the focus is on the family and particularly the mother of a Serb soldier who died whilst on duty. The journalist comments off the screen that the family is ‘in deep mourning [to penthos einai vary] as is appropriate in the Serb tradition’. He adds: ‘The name Tepanovac (the family’s name) will not be continued’ (the ‘mother of the hero’ had no other sons). This emphasis on mourning and the continuation of the family’s name, Greek traditions as well, underline the identification with the Serbs. This dramatised report is also rather long, lasting four minutes and 16 seconds (ANTENNA, 15/4/99), and was the sixth item in order of appearance in the particular broadcast.

Another similar item begins with the caption ‘Both a Serb and Refugee’. The music that accompanies the report is an ethnic motif, gradually turning into melodramatic. This is a report focusing on a family of Serbs from Kosovo who fled because of the bombs and the tension. The camera follows the children playing in the only room, while their mother is crying and describing the ‘nightmare of the bombs’. The father is still back in Kosovo, fighting with the Serb forces. The camera uses slow motion, and focuses on the woman’s and children’s faces (ANTENNA, 31/3/99 – see Image 9 Appendix VII).

The empathy with the Serbs was also asserted in the numerous items reporting the courage of the Serbs through the daily concerts in the squares of Belgrade. Some of these concerts were attended by Greek artists. In one, the camera focuses on the Greek flags that are being waved (among the Yugoslavian ones and the placards). The reporter asks one of the Greek artists how he feels about being there: ‘this is proof of the Greek-Serb friendship. Do you know what the slogan of the Greek youth fighting in the Civil War was? We fight and we sing’. This is another example of the identification with the Serbs, this time with a clear reference to the civil war evoking Greek history and memory (ANTENNA, 23/4/99).

Identification with the Serbs was evident in other reports such as the following: the Archbishop of Athens Christodoulos, Head of the Greek Church, while attending an event in Southern Greece was offered by the town’s mayor ‘bread and salt, a Serb tradition’, as the reporter stresses. In this case, the frame of identification with the Serbs is not imposed by the channel, but by the authorities who organised the event.
However, this was such a 'banal' event that it would not have been included in the news agenda if it were not for this symbolic exchange (ANTENNA, 15/4/99). This event was broadcast on all three channels that particular day.

The common religion between the Serbs and the Greeks was invoked in a number of reports. Such is a video clip broadcast on 25/3/1999 which opened the news broadcast of ANTENNA. That was the second day of the bombings which coincided with a Greek national holiday (commemorating the anniversary of the revolution against the Ottoman rule). The events in Yugoslavia and the national character of the day merged in the symbols juxtaposed in the video clip which started with the caption 'Freedom or Death' which was one of the slogans of the Greek revolution. The caption appears in Serbian (Cyrillic) fonts against a background of Byzantine Christian icons (connoting the common religion) and then in Greek fonts (against a visual background of military planes). Then a Greek flag is double-printed on an image of the Acropolis, before we see the Head of the Greek Church making some statements about the NATO offensive (see Images 9-11, Appendix VII).

There were even a number of explicit pro-Serb reports. In one, while we are watching images of the mock funeral of NATO with a swastika on the coffin enacted by Serbs, the reporter says: ‘Serbia must stay strong; Kosovo must remain Serbian; it is the cradle of their civilisation’ (ANTENNA, 24/4/99). In the same vein, in another report from Prizren the journalist says ‘Kosovo belongs to the Serbs’ (MEGA, 24/4/99). The private channels sometimes screened propagandistic video clips from the Serbian television (see Images 13 and 14, Appendix VII).

Conversely, report titles referring to the Kosovan refugees were descriptive rather than emotionally charged: ‘New wave of refugees’; ‘Diplomatic Mobilisation for the refugees’; ‘Kosovars in Italy’ and ‘The caravan of the refugees’. In these reports the refugees are only seen in the background while other people speak on their behalf (politicians or NGO representatives). There are very few reports where the refugees talk directly to the camera narrating their stories. Moreover, there were even cases where refugees were presented as a possible threat, as the dendrogram (Figure 7.1)
and Table 7.2 have suggested. Such an example is the caption: ‘Northern Epirus’\textsuperscript{105}: the settlement of refugees poses new threats [to the Greek minority]. Indeed all the reports from Southern Albania, where there is a Greek minority, describe the arrival of the refugees as a threat to the ethnic homogeneity of the region\textsuperscript{106}. Although there are not many such reports (12 in total, corresponding to 2.6% of the sample), it is interesting to examine them as they project a particular discourse about the conflict, invoking an essentialist understanding of difference and belonging. The representation of refugees as a threat and danger has also been observed by other researchers (Malkki, 1995). Refugees are seen as the stateless people who challenge the naturalisation of the nation-state and its borders and are thus considered as a threat to national security and harmony.

In one of these reports from Southern Albania, ANTENNA's reporter mentions that ‘there are plans to change the population’ (i.e., the Greek population of the region) (ANTENNA, 31/3/99). This concern is also raised in a report on, the otherwise rather moderate, ET-1. This item voices the concern to ‘protect the rights of the minority... in order to avoid demographic changes [changes in the population mix]’. It should be noted that ET-1 does not use the term Northern Epirus but Albania instead (ET-1, 31/3/99). These items link with another theme, that of ‘conspiracy theory’. In this context, the arrival of refugees is not accidental; rather it is the result of a planned strategy to change the population mix of the region. There is no specific reference to who is behind this strategy. But what emerges from this item is a way of thought that combines the projection of insecurities and fears about the stability of the region, that are grounded in the history of previous Balkan conflict and competing nationalistic projects. Conspiracy theory will be discussed in the next section.

Refugees were mentioned in 17.7% of the items. What is important, however, is the way they were represented. In the majority of these items (64.4%), there was not a single reference to the reasons refugees were leaving Kosovo. When reasons were mentioned these were ethnic cleansing (14.9% of the category and 2.8% of the

\textsuperscript{105} ‘Northern Epirus’ is what Southern Albania, where the Greek minority lives predominantly, is popularly called in Greece.

\textsuperscript{106} The report entitled ‘Northern Epirus: Settlers pose new threats’ stresses that the Greek minority needs to be protected [by the Greek authorities] (MEGA, 31/3/99). Another item is captioned:
sample), the NATO bombings (9.7% and 1.9% respectively)\textsuperscript{107}, the combination of
the two previous categories (8.7% and 1.7%) and, finally, other reasons (2.1% and
0.4%). It should be noted here though that ethnic cleansing was usually mentioned in
passing or within the discursive pattern: ‘as the refugees themselves claim…’, or, ‘as
NATO allegedly claims…’, thus weakening the credibility of the explanation. The
following is such an example:

[The refugees are fleeing] terrified from the NATO strikes, but also from the Serbs,
as they themselves are claiming [...]. Their stories, recorded by foreign journalists
as the refugees cross the borders, make the round of the world in order to justify to
public opinion NATO’s attacks against Yugoslavia, through the emotions that
human suffering creates’ (ET-1, 31/3/99).

Another report from the capital of Macedonia, Skopje, is indicative of the way the
refugees were depicted. It begins as a report on the fleeing of refugees and their arrival
in Macedonia. The caption that accompanies the report is ‘Caravan of refugees’,
followed by ‘The misery of the refugees’. However, the focus of the report gradually
shifts to a discussion of the destabilisation in the area. The reporter says that ‘the
situation may get out of control’ with the ‘indirect involvement of Skopje’ and the
‘forces of UCK/KLA\textsuperscript{108} that are organising violent incidents’ (ANTENNA, 31/3/99).
Similar reports emphasise the number of refugees and the increase in numbers of
UCK members (MEGA, 14/4/99), and the tension in neighbouring countries caused
by the arrival of refugees which may eventually destabilise the region (MEGA,
31/3/99).

The following is an item about Pristina and refugees on 31/3/99, one of the days in
which the number of refugees fleeing Kosovo was increasing dramatically. In one of
the long and concluding scenes (the item’s duration is six minutes and 51 seconds) we
see a man waving farewell to his child and his mother. The woman and the child are

\textsuperscript{107}Examples of this are as follows: In an item entitled ‘merciless hammering’ \([aneleito sfyrokopina]\),
referring to the NATO airstrikes, the reporter mentions: ‘In the meantime the Calvary of the refugees is
continuing here in Kosovo. Many inhabitants, whose houses were destroyed in the intense bombings,
are abandoning them, leaving in search of other homelands’ (MEGA, 24/4/99). Similar reports
mentioned that the refugees were leaving because of the NATO strikes (ANTENNA, 14/4/99) and that
‘the refugees are seeking shelter from the bombs’ (ANTENNA, 14/4/99).

\textsuperscript{108}UCK are the original initials of KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army).
on a bus with many other people and the man is standing outside looking at them through the window. The woman is crying and the man is talking to them. What is interesting is that the man, dressed in a Serbian army uniform, speaks Serbian and the journalist (after the bus leaves) talks to him in Serbian. Although this is seemingly a report on refugees (one would readily assume that this meant Kosovan Albanians) it is, in fact, about Serbs. It is easy for the viewer to conclude that the refugees are Serbs. If this is a report on refugees, and everyone in it is Serb, then the refugees must be Serb. The report was captioned: 'The Damned of the Balkans’ followed by a second title: ‘The moment of farewell’. In the same report there was also a scene where the journalist talked to a Serb soldier about the problems in the city. The crew (journalist and cameraman) are at some point greeted by some Serb soldiers patrolling in the city. A Serb soldier says in front of the camera: ‘I want to send my greetings to the Greek people and the Orthodox Church for all they’ve done for the Serb people’. Then the journalist ‘follows the men from the Serb Forces’ in the city while mentioning that the UCK fighters are lurking; finally she talks with more Serb people in the shelters. The damned of the Balkans are the Serbs. The refugees are mentioned, but it is easy to think that the refugees are the Serbs who are leaving Pristina because of the bombings and the tensions (MEGA, 31/3/99).

The ‘us and them’ theme runs through the above reports. The identification with the Serbs on many occasions (mainly in reports that refer to the people, not their leadership) emerges as the unified ‘us’, sharing the same traditions, religion and spirit. The ‘other’ in this context is NATO. These reports project onto the crisis in Yugoslavia and the NATO intervention the relatively recent experience of the Greek Civil War (1945-49). Foreign intervention was renowned and played a catalytic role in the resolution of the conflict. Foreign interference (mainly American) in Greek politics continued in the following decades leading to the military dictatorship and the events in Cyprus. There is widespread bitterness in Greece that the Americans supported the military regime that is held responsible for the invasion of Cyprus.

Nationalisation and conspiracy theories

The way in which the refugee issue was represented was one of the most important differences among the Greek and Western media. Regardless of one’s position towards the NATO bombings, and despite the refugees being used for both NATO and
Serb propaganda (Thussu, 2000b), the fact that there was a mass fleeing of refugees is undeniable. The lack of an account by the Greek media as to why the refugees were fleeing gave rise to a number of conspiracy theories in order to explain why NATO was bombing Yugoslavia, thus increasing the levels of anxiety. By not providing a reason in more than half of the reports on the bombings, NATO’s intervention appeared irrational and incomprehensible. This explanatory gap allowed for conspiracy theories to emerge. A report claimed that NATO was dropping bombs in order to dispose of the missiles which would become redundant by the millennium bug (ANTENNA 23/4/99). This was a theory that is also confirmed by another study on Kosovo (Brown and Theodossopoulos, 2000). Most commonly, there were references to the ‘secret interests’ that were the real cause of the military intervention. In this context of irrationality, comments that ‘Greece would be the next victim’, and that ‘borders would be redrawn’ were heard (ANTENNA, 26/3 & 26/4/99). The fear of the effects of the crisis in Greece internalised the conflict thus making it a national issue as well. This explains the fervent climate that characterised some of the protests against the bombings (an example of which was the concert that opened the article). The issue here is not the quantity of these items but their emotional intensity. Interestingly, even channels and media in general, with conservative political orientation, adopted these frames. This element, however, is not so new. A study found that anti-Americanism was prevalent in the conservative press (that had traditionally supported the US in previous decades) during the controversy surrounding the name Macedonia in the mid 1990s (Demertzis and Armenakis, 1998: 130).

Recently, Marcus and others have argued for the understanding of the concept of conspiracy theory not as an irrational and paranoid mode of thinking ‘but within reason, as a reasonable component of rational and commonsensical thought and experience in certain contexts’ (Marcus, 1999: 2, emphasis in the original). Many of the above reports, along with those that are negative towards NATO, echo popular perceptions and feelings about foreign intervention in Greek politics, especially in relation to Cyprus and the military dictatorship (1967-74). In other words, there was an evident emotional realism in the ostensibly unrealistic conspiracy theories.
Global sources, local meanings

The content analysis revealed that a significant proportion of the visual material used in the news came from international news agencies and television networks, most notably CNN (30.4%). This percentage does not include the images re-transmitted from Serbian television, which formed a category of their own (18.5%). The figure of 30.4% reflects the globalisation of news and news images and suggests that Greek viewers, even indirectly, watch non-Greek, ‘global’ images from the international networks and agencies. What is interesting here is to examine the ways in which these images were appropriated by the Greek channels.

The two most prominent themes in the visual material originating from ‘global sources’ were those of Diplomacy and NATO neutral, with percentages of 51.5% and 50% respectively. Considering that the majority of Western media did not object to the NATO air campaign, the prevalence of the above themes indicates some consistency with the intentions of the original producers of the material. However, the theme NATO negative appears in 33.3% of this material. This suggests that there was a parallel oppositional usage of the ‘global’ images and a local appropriation of their content. Conversely, such oppositional usage is not observed in the images from Serbian television.

An alternative discourse

The coverage of the events in Kosovo was not homogenous or monolithic. There were many neutral items on NATO (21.6% in total), particularly in the context of diplomacy and the initiatives of the Greek government and NGOs (see Table 7.8). In these items the European identity of Greece as a member of the EU and NATO was stressed. Greece was also portrayed as a significant and stabilising force in the region. The presence of these themes suggests that there was an alternative discourse about the crisis, which complicates the above ‘us and them’ frame. These reports maintained a reserved attitude towards the air campaign without ever endorsing it. Instead of Greece (us) opposing NATO (them), as was evident in the anti-Americanism of the previous examples, Greece is presented as an active member of NATO and the EU. However, this alternative discourse, that was more prominent on the public rather than private channels, did not carry the emotional weight of the previous frame and involved fewer, shorter and recorded (rather than live) reports.
How the others see 'us'

A number of reports (4.5%) were concerned with the way foreign media (Western European and North American) reported the conflict. These reports were most often critical or even sarcastic (3.4%) and also commented on how Greece and its regional role were portrayed. This is particularly interesting as such reports are indicative of the local-global dialectic and the media’s view on (or, rather, response to) Greece’s perceived position in the world. The negative references to Western media are often reactions to the ways they had portrayed Greece and the Balkans in the context of this conflict. Greek journalists often implied that Western media, and the West in general for that matter, are ignorant of the particularities in the region and were making erroneous judgements while ignoring local history and politics.

Three reports on the same topic (present on all three channels) are indicative of the reactions to negative representation of Greece in the foreign media. The reports were all in the broadcasts of 26/3/99 and were about a report that had been broadcast on CNN about a possible spill-over of the Kosovo conflict into the Balkans that could draw in Greece and Turkey. All channels showed the visual part of the report from CNN with an added voice over that commented on the original report. In MEGA’s report which was entitled ‘Arsonist propaganda’, the journalist stresses that many questions are raised with CNN’s ‘maps of fire’ trying to involve Greece in a possible spill-over. He dismisses these claims which he interprets as ‘Western propaganda in order to justify the war’ (see Image 15, Appendix VII). ANTENNA’s report is captioned ‘The maps of fire’ (ANTENNA) and makes similar points. Both channels gave priority to this item as it was fifth in order on MEGA (duration four minutes and 27 seconds) and third in order on ANTENNA (duration three minutes and 27 seconds). ET-1’s reporting was more reassuring, emphasising that a spill-over was not a real danger.

109 Only four reports were neutral towards Western media (0.9%) while one was combined (neutral and negative [0.2%]). There were no positive reports on Western media. These percentages include only the reports that explicitly make references to the role played by Western media. They do not include reports that show footage taken from non-Greek media. This category also does not include Serb media. References to these were coded separately. Reports with references to Serb media were 3.9%. Interestingly, most of them were positive (1.7%), while 1.3% were neutral and 0.9% were negative.
Cultural intimacy and the moral prohibition of dissent (abroad)

The image of the country abroad is the topic of other reports including those that focus on Greek diplomatic initiatives. There was one particular item, a live studio discussion, which is quite revealing of the sensitivities regarding the image of Greece abroad that also relates to the concept of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 1996). The discussion was between MEGA channel's most prominent newscaster (and chief news editor) and Andreas Andrianopoulos, a former minister with the conservative government in the early 1990s, about an article that Andrianopoulos wrote in the New York Times which criticised the stance of the Greek media during the crisis. Hatjinicolaou, the newscaster, asked Andrianopoulos:

Why did Mr. Andrianopoulos criticise the Greek media during such a critical period [...] when Greece is on a tightrope [...] and when the national interest is under threat [...] and all this in a newspaper abroad that is not renowned for its pro-Greek sentiments (MEGA, 28/4/99).

With this phrase the journalist emphasises the dominant view and the importance of national homogeneity. The Kosovo crisis is presented as a national issue and dissenting views are not acceptable especially outside the confines of the nation-state. This example is indicative of the concept of cultural intimacy that Herzfeld has developed (1996) to explain the paradox of how a country where dissent and rebelliousness towards the state are considered the norm, will not allow the same practice to foreigners. Discussing internal affairs of the state abroad is like exposing the 'dirty linen' of the house in public. Cultural intimacy means that rebelliousness and dissent are allowed only within the confines of the nation-state. So, although it may be acceptable to avoid paying one's taxes, it is condemnatory for a foreigner to know and criticise this practice.

Observing the 'us and them' frames prevalent in the news reports, and particularly the identification with the Serbs through religion and customs, one is reminded of theories such as Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* (1996). Is it that perhaps there is something truthful in this much contested and discredited theory? The last two reports discussed might shed some light on this issue. First of all it helps to be reminded that historically Greece has not always had peaceful relationships with its Christian Orthodox neighbours (the Balkan Wars in 1912-13 are a case in point) (Clogg, 1992).
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Pomak minority issue was more sensitive in past decades due to hitherto hostile relationships with Bulgaria. More recently the dispute over the Macedonian issue was another example of the ‘us and them’ binary shifting to exclude Orthodox Christians who then became the enemy.

Greece is also not monolithically anti-Muslim; the support it has been showing towards the Kurds and the Palestinians (especially in the context of the recent Intifada) is proof of this. It is perhaps more useful to think of the identification with the Serbs as an expression of the deep anti-Americanism in Greece which is rooted in US interference in Greek politics in the recent past. Interestingly however, many Greeks, including the Greek media, attributed this differentiated reaction towards the conflict to a cultural affinity with the Serb nation. This is perhaps because such explanations have become particularly prominent as the dominant discourse about culture has become central in popular discourses (Baumann, 1996). Moreover, the extract from the Andrianopoulos interview and the reports of the journalists’ reactions to Western reifications of Greece and the Balkans are indicative that identification with the Serbs cannot explain the prevalence of the ‘us and them’ binary. Apart from the historically grounded anti-Americanism it seems that the essentialist approach to culture and the media in the Greek media is a reaction to the equally essentialist Western media. The global-local dialectic becomes an exchange of essentialisms and counter-essentialisms. In this context the ‘us and them’ frame is not determined by culture but rather by politics. What is important, however, is that it masks itself as a cultural issue because explanations grounded in culture and ethnicity have gained credibility and can thus attribute legitimacy to their causes.

Conclusions

The Kosovo conflict was mediated from a national point of view. This happened despite the significant proportion of global images on which the news was based. Alternative voices, including that of the public channel, were not as strong and did not gain momentum. The proportion of the news discourse that projected the European identity of Greece was significant; however, it did not have the same emotional force.

110 A similar argument has been made by Sutton who argued that the attitudes of Kalymnians (inhabitants of the Greek islands of Kalymnos) towards the war in Bosnia were shaped by existing attitudes towards the ‘Great Powers’ and particularly the USA (1998: 167).
and intensity as the dominant 'us and them' frame of identification with the Serbs and anti-Americanism. This is further confirmed by the expression of these sentiments by media that belong to all sides of the political spectrum (including right-wing media that traditionally supported US interests in Greece).

In the light of these findings the chapter is in agreement with the perspective that globalisation is the intensification of the relationship between the local and the global. Globalisation does not equal cultural homogenisation and does not undermine the relevance of the nation-state in the articulation of identities. On the contrary, the increasing connectivity may enhance the wish to assert one's identity during times of conflict and crisis. It should be noted, however, that in the context of other cultural activities, identities are not necessarily expressed with such fervent passion.

7.2 NEWS AS FORM

The focus in this section is on the particular form of the news in Greece. Three issues will be highlighted in this context: the use of 'live' links and reporting in news broadcasts; the length of the broadcasts themselves in the context of a loosely regulated system that allows flexibility and interruptions of programming; and the mode of presentation which borrows elements from other genres, such as talk shows or current affairs programmes. The overall argument is that, through its particular form, news naturalises its own practice. By seemingly following the events in real time, interrupting the broadcasting schedule to transmit the latest news and by addressing the audience in a chatty and informal way, news programmes create a sense of immediacy and perhaps a common point of reference. In the previous sections the focus was on how the television text points to a common identity through the 'us and them' frame and deixis. In this section the argument is that the form and the technology of the news and television are implicitly invoking a common 'we'.

The 'us and them' frame and particularly the nationalisation of the Kosovo crisis were also invoked through the form of the news. Form in this context refers to the generic characteristics of the news broadcasts, including the mode of presentation, the 'live' and lengthy character of the broadcasts, and the interruptions in the programme schedule. It also includes the broadcasting of public rituals in the context of a news
bulletin. These features are common to commercial television channels in general; the difference in the Greek ones is a matter of degree. This discussion applies only to the private channels and not ET-1, whose news broadcasts adopt a more conventional format (fixed duration, moderate use of live links, etc).

Live news

It has been noted that, during conflicts, television channels in their quest to broadcast ‘live’ neglect the more critical and analytic dimensions of journalism. This is something that Katz noted about the ‘live’ coverage of the Gulf War by CNN (1992: 13) and can be applied easily to the Greek media during the Kosovo conflict. There is also another dimension associated with the ‘liveness’ of the news. ‘Live’ plays with the connotation of ‘real’, as if the immediate transmission removes the constructedness of the programme (Feuer, 1982), attributing an aura of objectivity and naturalness to the broadcast. Television producers are aware of this dimension and emphasise it when they stress that they are ‘bringing the news as it really happens’. Considering that the items that were reported live were those of cluster 1 (see Figure 7.1), it is possible to assume that this was an indirect way of adding emphasis. Live is also linked to urgency. On the first day of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia the broadcast was full of interruptions. One live link would succeed the other. In this sense live television creates a sense of obligatory viewing. Moreover, ‘live’ reports were the reports that were most easily dramatised (human impact stories, bombings and casualties’ updates and protest marches and rallies) and the live coverage enhanced their emotional framing, making the distinction between ‘us and them’ more salient. This is further stressed by the observation that the live reports were also the longest ones in the sample (Table 7.10). Approximately one-third of the reports of the private channels were ‘live’ (32%).

Debunking the concept of live television is quite important in this discussion. Corner has observed that ‘most “unscheduled” events, especially where action is central to their significance, have happened by the time the journalists arrive on the scene, so in these cases news typically recounts what happened against images which show spaces and places after the event’ (Corner, 1995: 59, italics in original). Feuer is also very critical of the claims about the ‘live’ character of television. She argues that,
to equate 'live' television with 'real life' is to ignore all those determinations standing between the event and our perception of it—technology and institutions to mention two. Television's self referential discourse plays upon the connotative richness of the term 'live', confounding its simple or technical denotations with a wealth of allusiveness. Even the simplest meaning of 'live'—that the time of the event corresponds to the transmission and viewing times—reverberates with suggestions of 'being there'... 'bringing all to you as it really is' (Feuer, 1983: 14).

These remarks echo the debates about realism and the classic realist text (cf. MacCabe, 1981). As MacCabe has argued, in realist cinema the story is told in such a way that the viewer is unaware that the narrative has a narrator. In the classic realist text, narrative conceals its status as a discourse and is presented as complete knowledge. The story speaks for itself; As MacCabe has put it, the 'real is not articulated, it is' (1981: 221). It is in this context of 'seeing is believing' that arguments about the power of the visual media developed (cf. Philo, 1990).

Feuer remarks that network television never truly exploits its capacity for instantaneous and unmediated transmission. She recognises that 'only the ideological connotations of live television are exploited in order to overcome the contradiction between flow and fragmentation in television practice' (1982: 14). Although this is true to a great extent, news in Greece seems to be making an effort to exploit the actual capacity for instant transmission, which explains why items might last for up to 40 minutes (e.g., MEGA 26/3/99). Still this does not mean that what is actually presented as 'unmediated and unedited' material is necessarily eventful or particularly meaningful. In the report that lasted for 40 minutes, the screen was showing scenes from some—not particularly violent—incidents during a demonstration against the NATO air-strikes in Athens. The report consisted of images of protesters and policemen gathering outside the US Embassy. In fact, not much happened in these 40 minutes (ANTENNA had two reports on this—live as well—that lasted 18 minutes and 53 seconds and 10 minutes and 18 seconds respectively). By reporting 'live' an event for 40 minutes, television is attributing importance to a (rather uneventful) event. Perhaps what was most eventful about these incidents was their reporting. Interestingly, at some point during the 40 minute coverage, the presenter of MEGA channel notes in disappointment that 'these events at the centre of Athens are taking valuable time away [steroun] from the coverage of the significant events in Kosovo', thereby confusing the incidents themselves with the channel's decision to broadcast.
them live for 40 minutes. In other words, there was nothing natural or self evident in
the channel's decision to focus on these incidents for such a long period of time.

Similarly Scannell (1996), when describing the ordinariness of television
programming, starts from the almost rhetorical phrase 'anything on the telly?' and the
typical answer, 'no, nothing', he notes that:

It is not, of course that there is, in some literary way, nothing to watch. Rather, that
there is nothing out of the ordinary; merely the usual programmes on the usual
channels at the usual times. Nor does this necessarily imply a disincentive to
viewing. We do watch a lot of 'nothing' on television, in fact we watch it nearly all
the time. Broadcast output – like daily life – is, for the most part, largely
uneventful, punctuated now and then, in predictable and unpredictable ways, by
eventful occasions (Scannell, 1996: 6).

Greek television with its live links and programme interruptions may seem in the first
instance to be contradicting this quote while in fact it is just pretending to be eventful.

| TABLE 7.10: DURATION OF LIVE AND RECORDED ITEMS IN THE KOSOVO CASE STUDY (ALL
<p>| CHANNELS) IN MINUTES AND SECONDS |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Live'</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recorded</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Marathon news? Lengthy broadcasts and flexible programming*

Long reports usually imply long broadcasts. The duration of the news programmes,
which have at times reached 3 hours, bears many similarities to the phenomenon that
Liebes calls 'disaster marathons' (Liebes, 1998: 71-2) where the anxious society
gathers around the television set to follow the news as it unfolds. Long broadcasts
mean that the rest of the schedule will change, giving absolute priority to the news.
Long broadcasts and live reports, especially when most commercial channels
broadcast at the same time, create a sense of obligatory viewing as there is not much
else on television anyway, invoking the concept of simultaneity and its relation to the
construction of imagined communities (Anderson, 1991 [1983]).
These live broadcasts bear many similarities to media events. They are broadcast live, interrupting the regular television schedule as well as the audiences' activities as they gather to watch the events unfold. However, they are distinct in other aspects and Liebes is right to wonder if this could 'be considered a new sub-genre of media events, or are its characteristics so different that we are witness to a new genre?' (ibid.).

It seems that the differences from media events are more than the similarities. A major difference relates to the absence of the pre-planned and official element that characterises televised ceremonies. As Liebes notes:

To put it bluntly one might say that during media events the political establishment takes over the media (and the public) whereas during a disaster – such as urban rioting, terrorist attacks, army etc [... ] oppositional forces (internal to the society or external to it) take over the media (and the public) (Liebes, 1998: 72).

Greek television has also developed the genre of 'television disaster marathons'. The programme is interrupted and often suspended to follow the events as they unfold. Such cases have been natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, the trials that marked the political corruption scandals in 1989, the Imia crisis with Turkey on the rock island Imia in 1996 and even political speeches and announcements, to name but a few. There is no doubt that some of the events mentioned were very significant. However, the practice of suspending the original programming to broadcast live the development of events is quite common, even if the event concerned is of minor importance.

Although news programmes in Greece do not exactly resemble 'television disaster marathons', they do share some of the characteristics of this genre. The most obvious similarity is that the duration of some news broadcasts has reached up to three hours (this was the duration of the news broadcast on one of the private channels on the first day of the Kosovo conflict). In this case, the news programme is pre-planned; the television schedule, however, is interrupted and modified as a consequence. Although this is not everyday practice, it reveals that there is a flexibility of programming that allows channels to prolong their news broadcasts accordingly. As in the case of the 'disaster marathons' the anxious society gathers around the television sets to watch the news. It should be noted that all but the public channels start their news programmes
at the same time, so there is not much diversity of programming during the news slot (roughly from 19:30 – 21:30). The two public channels stand out, as they have fixed times for their broadcasts and they do not extend the allocated time.

**Table 7.11: Duration of News Broadcasts for all Channels for the Kosovo Case Study (in minutes and seconds)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEGA</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>72.11</td>
<td>12.64</td>
<td>46.32</td>
<td>94.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>73.13</td>
<td>14.72</td>
<td>60.10</td>
<td>98.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-1</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>34.61</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>28.21</td>
<td>42.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>63.21</td>
<td>20.42</td>
<td>28.21</td>
<td>98.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.12: Duration of News Items during the Kosovo Case Study (in minutes and seconds)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEGA</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>40.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>18.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-1</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>40.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.13: Duration of News Items during the Airspace Incident (in minutes and seconds)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEGA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mode of presentation

The long broadcasts and the live studio discussions and links have contributed to the development of a particular mode of presentation that is based on a chatty informality that is perhaps more typical of news magazines and talk shows (Brunsdon and Morley, 1999 [1978]). Also the journalistic style is more informal, especially in the items that emphasise the human impact of the NATO strikes. Correspondents emphasise their own experiences in Belgrade and Pristina thus personalising the reporting. ‘In our wanders in the city, our only companion is the moonlight and loneliness’, says MEGA’s correspondent in Pristina (26/3/99). Five minutes and a half later the reporter is having drinks with a group of Serb soldiers who toast Greece while the camera closes up to one soldier’s face in slow motion as he says on the verge of tears: ‘Greece, I love you’.

7.3 Celebrating the nation

This section focuses on the analysis of a media event, a public concert for ‘peace in the Balkans’ in the context of the reactions against the NATO strikes in Yugoslavia and Kosovo that took place in the central square of Athens on 26 April 1999. It was co-organised and broadcast live by one of the private channels (SKAI TV, now renamed ALPHA), although all other channels, private and public, repeatedly interrupted their news broadcasts and programmed schedules to transmit parts of the event. This is the event described at the beginning of the thesis. The reason this event is presented separately from the other data is because it brings together a number of issues discussed previously, namely the textual and formal characteristics of the news. At the same time this section introduces another feature of broadcasting, that is the ritualistic character of television.

This event can be seen as a ‘media event’ in the sense that it was broadcast ‘live’, interrupting the broadcasting routine and creating an atmosphere of ceremonial viewing (Dayan and Katz, 1992: 5-8). The concert in Athens was undoubtedly a moment that projected and celebrated the nation, confirming the consensual character of the media event (Dayan and Katz, 1992, ibid.). This is evident from journalists’ comments such as, ‘this war has united us’ (ANTENNA, 26/4/99). It is also evident
from the juxtaposed symbols, of diverse ideological origins, representing different sections of Greek society: the flags of the Byzantine Empire (associated with nationalist and religious groups) and those of the communist party. This consensus is symbolised in the leading figure, Theodorakis, who has served under both socialist and conservative administrations and is highly recognised for his music. The nation is celebrated as united and homogenous and it asserts its identity to itself and to the world\textsuperscript{111} (See Image 17, Appendix VII).

However, the event was also differentiated from the Dayan and Katz canon. For them, media events are ‘interruptions of routine intervening in the normal flow of broadcasting and our lives’ (1990: 5) the same way a holiday halts everyday routines. The second feature of media events is that they are live and organised outside the media ‘while the media [...] only provide a channel for their transmission’ (ibid.). By ‘outside’ Dayan and Katz mean ‘both that the events take place outside the studio, in what broadcasters call ‘remote locations’ and that the event is not usually initiated by the broadcasting organisations’ (ibid). The event discussed here was actually co-organised by one television channel\textsuperscript{112}, which is also perhaps indicative of the central role the media play in Greek public life. Furthermore, the concert did not have a monopolistic character, in the sense that Dayan and Katz define it. One of the private channels SKAI was broadcasting it live (as well as co-organizing it); the other channels, public and private, made frequent links to the location during their news broadcasts.

This event can be seen in the context of other public rituals that took place in Greece on different occasions (i.e., the rallies against the recognition of the neighbouring state of Macedonia (FYROM) in 1992 [Sofos and Tsagarousianou, 1993; Tsagarousianou, 1997] and the funeral of the cinema star and politician, Melina Mercouri [Tsaliki, 1995]). The media event that Tsaliki (1995) describes bears many similarities to the

\textsuperscript{111} The semiology of the symbols in this public event is particularly interesting. The events in Kosovo and Yugoslavia happened during a period of successive crises in Greece. A few weeks before the beginning of the NATO air strikes there was public concern about the Ocalan affair, while before that there was a national preoccupation with the S300 missiles that Cyprus had bought from Russia. These events were incorporated into the reactions to the NATO air strikes. This explains the presence of some flags depicting the leader of the PKK Ocalan and the slogans written on self-made placards.

\textsuperscript{112} The other organizing body was an artists’ association named ‘The citizens’ initiative of the 1\textsuperscript{st} of March’.
classic model developed by Dayan and Katz (1990). It was a televised ceremony officially pre-planned, announced and advertised in advance (ibid: 7).

Perhaps most importantly, and similar to the original definition of media events, the concert stood for a consensus in Greek society. ANTENNA's main newscaster at the time, Terence Quick, remarked that this consensus reaches people with both conservative and progressive political affiliations. Prompted by the journalist of ANTENNA, one of the members of the organising committee states the message of the event:

The message is that a people [ο λαός] who have history and memory, like the Greek people, do not forget what they have gone through in various prosecutions [dioxeis]. Of course, we are wholeheartedly standing by our friends, the Serbs, for the injustice that has been inflicted on them by Europe and the Americans.

Another journalist from ANTENNA, the private channel with a centre-right wing orientation, stresses:

What must be mentioned, as you can see on your screens, is that there are people [here] of all ages, of all political and party affiliations. Because, as the organisers of the concerts said in the beginning: This war has united us [αυτός ο πολέμος μας ενοσε].

ET-1's reporter says emphatically: 'Greek history is encapsulated in these moments [...]’, while we are listening to 'the songs with which the post war generations were brought up'. He continues: 'Three generations of Greeks meet here today'. These songs brought immediate memories from the civil war, the military junta of the 1960s and the first years after its fall [μετapoliteusi]. Television framed the conflict in a straightforward way by anchoring the events in Greek history and collective memory.

Another way of evoking the nation was the presence of flags at the concert. There were mainly Greek flags, but also some Serb. Towards the end of the concert the two flags were tied together, and there were many instances when the camera focused on them (see Image 16, Appendix VII). This is a clear metonymy for the nation, as Billig has remarked (1995: 41, 86). In this case the nation is aligned with the Serbian nation, confirming once more one of the dominant themes in the reporting of the conflict discussed above. 'We' the Greeks and our brothers the Serbs are unified against 'them', the Americans and NATO. Interestingly, the ritual of the burning of the American flag, the epitome of the 'us and them' theme that was televised in some of
the reports on the demonstrations against the NATO strikes, did not take place at this event. This could be because, as Dayan and Katz have remarked, even when media events are about conflict, they emphasise reconciliation (1990: 8). This event had a celebratory character and the burning of flags would not have been fitting as it was in the case of other rallies or demonstrations against the bombings that were discussed previously. This uncanonical media event was more about celebrating the nation, than condemning the ‘other’.

7.4 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has discussed the construction of a ‘common we’ through the analysis of the textual features and form of the news. It is, however, interesting to examine who belongs to this common ‘we’, as its confines appear to be porous. The first obvious category is that of Greeks, although this begs for some clarifications. In the airspace incident, ‘us’ included Greece and Cyprus. Cyprus appeared as a natural extension of Hellenism, in the same way that the Greeks of Southern Albania appeared in the reports in the Kosovo case study. In the Kosovo reports, religion emerged as a determining parameter: ‘us’ in many reports included Serbs as Orthodox Christians. The alignment with Serbs was also justified more generally through the sharing of common traditions and experiences. Interestingly, however, there was no reference to Greek citizens irrespective of religious affiliation. Moreover, in some of the Kosovo reports, ‘us’ included Europe and the West (in the context of Greece’s membership of the EU and NATO). These reports, however, did not have the emotional intensity of those that emphasised the ‘national/cultural’ attributes.

This chapter has suggested that the emphasis on a cultural definition of belonging (i.e. a definition that is grounded on cultural traits that are considered as givens\footnote{Note the similarity with Geertz’s definition of the primordial attachment in Chapter 2.}) should not be interpreted as a confirmation of Huntington’s theory of the Clash of Civilisations (1996). This theory cannot explain a number of instances when Greece has been involved in disputes with other predominantly Christian Orthodox nations (the more recent example being the Macedonian issue), and moments when Greece has aligned itself with Muslim populations such as the Kurds or the Palestinians. The
discourses emphasising cultural homogeneity should be seen in the political context of anti-Americanism that is present in Greece for historical reasons. Moreover, the mediation of the conflict in Greece can be interpreted as a popular reaction to a reified discourse about the Balkans and Greece itself in the Western media.

The consequence of this largely emotional discourse is that it might draw the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion. While it includes a large part of the society, it also excludes people, particularly from minorities, who may not identify with this dominant discourse. However, this remains to be investigated empirically in the next chapter on the discourses that the news generates at a local level.

What is surprising is the homogeneity of the private channels. While it has been argued that the media have become more polyphonic after deregulation in 1989 (Tsaliki, 1997), it seems that when it comes to national issues there is an overwhelming consensus across the channels. Although it is true that the media have made public aspects of Greek culture that were downplayed in the pre-deregulation era, this does not seem to be paralleled with a wider polyphony on national issues (as the incident with the reaction to the article by Andrianopoulos has suggested). It seems that the diversity that deregulation brought about was limited. The Greek media are still highly concentrated in Athens. It is indicative that, today, it is almost impossible to hear any other accents in the broadcast media apart from the Athenian.

It is perhaps surprising that the only alternative voice in the reporting of the two case studies, and particularly in the Kosovo case study, was that of the public service broadcaster, ET-1. This should be linked with ET-1's significantly smaller percentage of news in the overall programme mix compared to that of private channels (see Chapter 4).

This chapter has not attempted to locate the preferred reading of the news. Rather it has looked at the various narrative patterns and the transformations of the 'us and them' scheme in different instances (airspace and Kosovo) and on different channels (public and private). Although I embrace the scepticism about extracting the meaning of texts with certainty, a number of features point to the emergence of a particular discourse in the news. This is determined by the prevalence of some thematic patterns
(for instance, the claim that refugees are most often associated with destabilisation or threat). In a similar fashion, absences from the news reports also point to a degree of closure. Absences here include the lack of any reference to the background of the Cyprus issue in the airspace reports, or to the background to the Kosovo conflict. All this should also be seen in the context of the particular form of the news which naturalises its practice.

Examining the circulation of discourses about the nation, it is possible to discern a certain discourse in the news about who belongs to the nation and who does not. It is also possible to identify who is implied as the natural audience for the news. But what becomes imperative now is to examine how these public discourses are interpreted by the people, the actual audiences. The next chapter will examine the types of discourses that the news generates at a local level as part of the exploration of the mediation of discourses about the nation.
8.
Negotiating the nation: critical viewers, cultural intimacy and identity experiences

Chapter 7 described how a collective, homogenous 'we' was evoked on different televised occasions which, despite its shifting confines, left little room for diversity. In this chapter, the focus shifts to the viewers' reactions and interpretations of the news broadcasts. The aim is to analyse the types of discourses that the news generates at a local level, and compare them to the discourse in the news. In this chapter it is argued that discourses about the nation are not as homogenous as television news. People experience the nation and their position within it in different ways, which are in turn reflected in the decoding of the news.

This chapter brings together the theoretical framework on identity discussed in Chapter 2 and the research on audiences (Chapter 4), in order to examine whether the news influences the ways people talk about the nation and their position within it. In particular, what happens to the rather open identity discourses identified in Chapter 6, when they come into contact with the dominant discourse about the nation analysed in Chapter 7? Do critical or sophisticated/media literate viewers contest the 'banal nationalism' (Billig, 1996) and the essentialist projection of the nation in the news? In which circumstances do people become more essentialist about their own identities and those of others? Are there differences between the two case studies? Is there a discrepancy between the rational/critical and emotional aspects of mediated communication?

Chapter 2 argued that the theories which support the reproduction of nationalism adopt a top-down approach. In this chapter I examine the perspective from below in order to ground this assumption in empirical evidence. Does the nationalism in the news affect viewers’ discourses, and if so when? In order to answer this question I draw on the developments in reception studies as discussed in Chapter 4 and particularly on the concept of the critical viewer (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; Liebes and Katz, 1993).
Liebes has noted that theories of communication are full of dichotomies 'that seem to be inspired [...] by some notion of open and closed' (1996: 178). She reviews the major dichotomies, starting from Eco's distinction of naïve and smart readers, which echoes his open/closed dichotomy (Eco, 1985). While the 'naïve' reader takes reality as given, the 'smart' reader discerns the constructedness of the text and is thus capable of re-opening the narrative. It is clear that Eco's preoccupation is with the aesthetics of the text and the reader's work and not the political or ideological influence of the text.

Another dichotomy, between the interpretive and the analytic viewer, is proposed by Neuman. The interpretive viewer relates the programme to his/her life or to broader issues of society and culture, while the analytic focuses on the syntactic elements of the text and the quality of scriptwriting and acting (Neuman, 1982: 471-487). Oppositional takes a completely different meaning, i.e., aesthetic, in Neuman's model, which is concerned with the viewer's cognitive ability rather than anything political or ideological (Liebes, 1996: 179). On the other hand, there is Hall's Encoding/Decoding model (1980) and Morley's empirical confirmation of the model in the Nationwide study (1980). Hall's concern is with the political and ideological elements in communication. Drawing on Gramsci's theory of hegemony and Parkin's model of meaning systems, Hall identified the oppositional, negotiated and dominant decoding positions. This model does not examine decoding at an aesthetic level.

The above dichotomies seem to be divided in relation to aesthetic and ideological concerns. Liebes and Katz (1993), in the Export of Meaning, proposed a fourfold typology as an attempt to integrate elements from all the previous dichotomies and in particular to integrate the aesthetic/ideological divide. They distinguished between the real, ludic, ideological and constructional positions. Liebes has applied this typology to the reception of the news (Liebes and Ribak, 1991 and Liebes, 1997). Real decodings are hegemonic, as they take for granted the depiction of reality in the news. Ideological readings attempt to uncover the ideological manipulative message hidden in the text. Ludic decodings view characters and events in the news as entertainment, while constructional decodings read news critically, pointing to the journalistic and generic conventions that 'determine the relationships between reality and its construction on the screen' (Liebes and Ribak, 1991: 206).
There are, however, some difficulties with the application of this typology to the news. The ludic category seems to be more easily applied to fiction and drama reception than to the news (although some viewers may develop playful or imaginary relationships with people in the news). Moreover, the term ‘real’ is not necessarily opposed to both ‘ideological’ and ‘constructional’. Finally, this typology does not include a category that addresses exclusively viewers’ reactions to media content. All categories are related to media content but also include an aesthetic dimension. A category that addresses reactions towards media content is significant for this study as it is in relation to media content that discourses about identity are articulated.

In this chapter, the dichotomy will be between critical (or not) readings in relation to news as a genre and journalistic practices, and critical readings (or not) in relation to news content. Viewers who are critical about the news, recognising its constructedness (through journalistic and generic conventions), operate primarily at an aesthetic level, although this is not always the case. For instance, when viewers make comments about the economics of television and media’s symbiosis with the political system, and how they affect news presentation, the decoding is both ‘ideological’ and ‘aesthetic’.

The category of critical readings towards news content is subdivided into further categories. In this study, the focus is on identity discourses, thus viewers who accept the dominant, official discourse about the nation and its ‘culture’ presented in Chapter 7, are making ‘dominant’ decodings. Conversely, interviewees who contest this dominant discourse make ‘demotic’ decodings. Viewers who have a contextual knowledge of the events presented in the news make contextual readings. Viewers who juxtapose their historical knowledge of the events presented in the news make historical decodings. Finally, analytic viewers are those who attempt to read through the events and provide the reasons for their presentation – or not – in the news (this category is similar to what Liebes names ‘ideological’ [see above, Liebes and Ribak, 1991]). These distinctions are analytical and effort will be made to examine how they interrelate.

114 See Appendix III for the coding framework in the analysis of interviews.
The analysis presented here draws on another distinction between interpretation and comprehension developed by Livingstone (1998). Comprehension focuses on the 'extent to which texts, however complex, may be said to convey information, or the extent to which certain readings may be judged correct or incorrect' (Livingstone, 1998: 176). Interpretation, on the other hand, 'focuses on the ways in which texts involve narrative or conventional frames, create connections or resonances and implicate mythic and ideological meanings' (ibid.). As Livingstone notes, 'interpretation cannot be judged correct or mistaken, but is rather seen as a product of the reader's experience' (1998: 176). Both processes are deeply interrelated. In the analysis, I examine the cases in which comprehension (or rather miscomprehension) affects interpretation and how the context (and contextual knowledge) affect comprehension. This is related to extra-textual factors such as the availability of alternative resources and the contextual knowledge surrounding the news reports.

Another concept that informs this chapter is that of 'commuting' developed by Liebes and Katz (1993). By commuting they referred to the ways in which the reception of *Dallas* involved a continual shifting between the story and the viewers' lives. Commuting takes place at an interpretative level. People relate to the news through their personal experiences. It is during these moments that identity discourses and experiences are articulated. In viewers' 'commutings' it is possible to observe the types of discourses that the news generates at a local level and whether there are any shifts from dominant to demotic discourses and vice versa. All the interviewees commuted to their personal experiences throughout the interviews (and often to other media texts or media related experiences) indicating that decoding and context are deeply intertwined and cannot be separated.

The chapter is divided into two parts, one for the airspace incident and one for the Kosovo decodings. Each section is further divided according to the three different groups. This sectioning should not be interpreted as necessarily stressing differences between the groups; in the concluding section the aim will be to draw links between the different groups. The material used comes from the group and in-depth interviews. This chapter, like Chapter 6, should be read together with the description of the informants (Appendix I). Effort has been made to represent all informants. Moreover,
I include excerpts from group discussions and full quotes so as to let the interviewees' voices be heard.

8.1 AIRSPACE INCIDENT DECODINGS

8.1.1 Greek viewers: contesting banal nationalism

The first observation in the airspace interviews is that most interviewees described the incident as routine. This contrasts with the tone of the news reports where words such as ‘provocative’, ‘dangerous’, ‘worrying’ and ‘intense’ were used (see Chapter 7).

Christos: It was simply a report on some plane interceptions [anahaitiseis].
Stelios: This is a common situation.
Christos: Ordinary sensationalist reporting.

Irini: OK, people are used to this ... every week they watch the same reports.

Michalis: I am not impressed by these [reports], nobody is, there is a general indifference and apathy.

Although most interviewees agreed that these incidents are routine, some voiced a concern about the dangers involved.

Fotini: This was very intense, there were 100 aircraft involved, and they were sending another 80, and I am thinking that perhaps someday something will happen. It is almost inevitable.

Sergios: Parents are concerned and it’s understandable. We just saw [in this report] instances from a war. Someone who did not understand Greek, or had been cut off from Greece for the last two or three years, would think that we are at war. The reporter was saying that the aircraft were on their way to Cyprus, some were intercepted, there were air-fights. [This is] a war.

Note that Sergios said that someone ‘would think that there was a war, if they had been cut off’. The point is, however, that viewers are not ‘cut off from Greece’ or, rather, its televised communicative space; on the contrary, as Chapter 6 showed, people are often addicted to television news. Even when they are not, they are informed through the interpersonal networks of which they are part. It is because people are familiar with Greek reality, both mediated and unmediated, that they express indifference towards such reports.

There is a degree of gender differentiation in the reactions to these reports. Women, like Fotini above, are more concerned than men about the dangers involved in such
incidents. Men draw on their experience in the army to justify their interpretation. By contrasting their experience in the army to what they watch on television, men challenge the reports. All the men made references to their military service experiences and not just those who were in the army at the time of the interview.

Christos: As a specialist, I did my service in the airforce and I was in Chania\textsuperscript{115}, I can say this: this situation is just a game [...]. The same way they violate our airspace, we violate theirs. It is part of the game, a rehearsal. Very simple. [...] In Crete it is routine. [...] It’s just a game, nothing terrible. [...] I’ve heard from some [Greek pilots] that they know the Turkish pilots by name. They talk on the radio. They’re playing a game.

Thodoris: What I see in these reports is that they are all the same. [...] When I was doing my service, I was in the navy, and we were patrolling off the shores of Turkey, between Samos, Chios\textsuperscript{116} and Turkey, and the Turkish ships would approach us, we would approach them, they would then threaten to ram us. It was like a game, without any substance.

Haris: [Incidents like these] take place everyday. [...] When I was in the army, these happened on an everyday basis.

It emerges that it is difficult to distinguish between personal experience and interpretation of the news as people draw on the former to make the latter. In this context contextual knowledge affects comprehension and interpretation and even explains the gender differentiation mentioned above. This finding connects with Philo’s empirical study (1990) on the reception of the reporting of the miners’ strike in 1984 to 1985. Philo found that people with first hand knowledge of the strike remembered the picketing as peaceful, while those who depended on television had perceived it as violent (ibid.).

\textit{Viewers critical towards journalists and generic conventions}

All Greek interviewees expressed criticisms towards the journalists and the media and were largely aware of the generic conventions of the news. Most interviewees described the news reports as sensationalist. News was described as a show (Marilena) and a movie (Lena). Interviewees also recognised the institutional power exerted on journalists. ‘Channels are financial organisations – they only care about their profit’ (Spyros).

\textsuperscript{115} A town in Crete.
\textsuperscript{116} Samos and Chios are Greek islands in the East Aegean Sea.
Most interviewees recognised that the reports used edited images from old footage from past exercises (Georgia, Michalis, Fotini, Sergios, Christos, Lena, Marilena, Haris). Some pointed out that the report by ANTENNA used computer graphics and images from a flight simulator in the report to reconstruct the air-fight (Michalis, Fotini, Christos, Haris, Spyros). Only the oldest informant, Tasos, did not recognise the use of animation, suggesting that media literacy might be related to age.

Haris recalled a documentary on the fabrication of news stories broadcast by NET that other interviewees had watched as well (Lena, Aggeliki). ‘In an hour they showed all the tricks [kombines] that they can do with images’, Haris said. Haris’ example suggests that media literacy is linked to media use. It is through watching television that he became critical of the news, its conventions and journalistic practices.

Haris: It also showed how the news is manufactured. And in the end it showed that even Greek journalists are not innocent. They showed what happened in Albania [...] after the collapse of the pyramids scheme. The Greek journalists reporting the unrest that followed were asking local Albanians to gather around the camera at 8:30, when they were on air, and start shooting with their rifles. The shootings reported live from Albania those days were not for real. It was all staged.

Other interviewees said that the report used images and perhaps even text that was taken from the Ministry of Defence, suggesting a close relationship between media and the government.

Christos: This video was taken from the Ministry [of Defence]. Obviously they also got the text from the Ministry.
Sergios: Not necessarily the text. At least not the whole text.
Stelios: But the video [they got] for sure.
Christos: Because how else would the journalists know?
Stelios: Sure.
Christos: They must have taken it from the Air-Force.

Some of the interviewees expressed a social constructionist perspective on the news and the reporting of such incidents. Some argued that the issues themselves would not exist if television did not emphasise them.

Thodoris: If there was no television there would be fewer air-fights like these. Because of television more of them happen and are made more salient; [...] if there was no television no one would know about them. Like, all these years ago, when something like this happened nobody found out.
Michalis: Everything is blown out of proportion. Television creates an issue [where there is not one]. For example, the tone of the broadcast with the cries of the presenter creates an atmosphere as it was 28 October 1940. It creates a war atmosphere.

Moreover, people were aware of the economic conditions of television and how they affect the content and the agenda of news programmes. The group of school teachers expressed a political economy perspective.

Haris: They show incidents like these to fill up the duration of the programme. When they have one and a half-hour of news, they have to find some issues to fill it up.

Lena: They have to make up something. That’s what it comes to. But we should not fool ourselves, we should not think that those working in the media are socially altruistic [leitourgous tis enimerosis].

Spyros: They are companies.

Lena: Exactly. And companies have to have profits. Otherwise what’s the point. They’ll shut down. This is what we need to remember. In order to make profits they will do anything, even ‘bad’ things, should I say, illegal?

Analytic viewers

One of the dominant patterns in the interviews with the Greek viewers was the identification of the reasons why the reports were seen to be presented in a sensationalist manner. Another dominant theme was the identification of the deeper causes of the air-fights themselves. This was something that the ‘airspace incident’ reports themselves did not address, pointing to the fact that viewers were more analytical than the news.

In accounting for the reasons behind the airspace incident, and other such incidents in general, people said that it was related to the politics between Greece and Turkey and their governments’ attempt to divert attention from social and economic issues (Michalis, Fotini, Dafne, Giota). Giota said that ‘this is some form of terrorism so that we do not speak up’. Other informants argued that such incidents are the result of Turkey’s opportunistic foreign policy (Marilena, Michalis, Tasos). What is interesting is that most interviewees implied a synergy between the media and the government.

117 On 28 October 1940 Italy declared war on Greece after it refused to surrender. Greece won the war against the Italians but was subsequently defeated in the Nazi invasion. The 28th of October is one of the two national holidays of Greece.

118 The word *leitourgoi* has no direct translation into English. It signifies employment that involves dedicated public service. It is often used to describe the work of teachers or priests.
This is often expressed through the use of the pronoun ‘they’, that includes journalists, media owners and politicians. ‘They show these incidents because they want to distract our attention from other matters, like the local elections’, Dafne said. ‘They want us to be in constant tension with Turkey’, Fotis added. ‘They are misleading us’ (Giota). All the informants mentioned that there are covert interests [skopimotites], often implying a symbiosis between politicians and the media. ‘We cannot even imagine the hidden interests’, Irini said.

A frequent explanation for the prevalence of such reports in the news and what the interviewees interpreted as its sensationalist style, was the commercialisation of the media and the concomitant competition for audiences and advertising revenue. ‘They do it for the ratings’, was an oft-repeated phrase. ‘These are everyday incidents which the media exaggerate in order to attract viewership’, Dafne, Michalis, Fotini, Spyros, Stelios and Christos argued.

Viewers are analytical in attempting to add the missing pieces to the incomplete puzzle that is the news. They seek and provide explanations for the events and try to identify the causes, something the news did not do. Of course, as most of the interviewees admit, this kind of thinking is often speculative and only those involved know what the ‘hidden interests are’. ‘We can only guess’, Lena and Haris said.

Historical interpretations and comprehension
The interpretive analysis of the ‘airspace incident’ reports in Chapter 7 revealed that there was no reference to the historical context of Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations. Many viewers juxtaposed their historically informed perspective with the ahistorical news, and based their critical interpretations on their knowledge of the issue. Tasos, one of the older informants, gave a historical perspective on the Cyprus problem that challenges its naturalisation in the news. ‘When I was young, there was no Cyprus issue. There was only the ‘Northern Epirus’ Issue back then’. The following excerpt from one of the group discussions is revealing:

Sergios: The pretext for the invasion was a Greek coup in Cyprus orchestrated by the colonels’ junta in Athens. And, this is my personal view, Turkey had the right to intervene, she was covered by the Treaty. She was one of the guarantor powers.
I: Do people know about this?
Christos: I think that most people of our age know about this.
Sergios: Not of our age. Older people do.
Stelios: I did not know.
Sergios: It is not well known. It has been carefully hushed up [aposiopoitei].

Not all the interviewees were familiar with the historical context. The younger interviewees, such as the high school students, did not know what had happened in Cyprus in previous decades and what caused the events of 1974. This is not something taught at school and, as Sergios mentioned above, it is not something that is often discussed publicly. It is even common for people in Stelios’ generation (mid-twenties) not to know the background of the events. Stelios heard some of the facts surrounding the Cyprus conflict for the first time in the context of the interview.

Lack of contextual knowledge is not only related to age; it is also a generational issue, affecting people who were born after 1974. This means that young people, who did not experience the conflict, have limited resources to learn what happened. Since the media do not present the historical context of such conflicts, students rely on either education or personal networks. However, as two of the students remarked: ‘The history we are taught at school does not cover the Cyprus issue’ (Tatiana). Dafne added: ‘the history we are taught at school only mentions the achievements and the triumphs of the Greeks’. Even older interviewees such as Rena, who had experienced the events in Cyprus, expressed frustration with her lack of knowledge. She feels that there is nowhere to turn to when she wants to find about things. She admits that she does not even try to ask, but at the same time she said: ‘Of course, I would like to know more. It’s like when you ask a blind person, do you want to see?’

In some cases the degree of contextual knowledge is related to comprehension. At the end of the interview, when I asked the high school students to summarise what they had seen, Aliki thought that the military exercise was Turkey’s. In the end, they all agreed on one sentence: ‘Turkish planes were unlawfully entering the Greek national airspace’ (Fotis). But most students did not know or understand why this had happened, or why the planes were there in the first place. Here Livingstone’s (1998) distinction between interpretation and comprehension is pertinent. Comprehension and interpretation are interrelated. The lack of contextual knowledge in this case provides an example of how it affects comprehension.

Recall the high school students’ limited communications infrastructure (Chapter 6).

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Ambivalent viewers

This critical performance (both at an aesthetic and at a content level) is coupled with a feeling of confusion: ‘We are left in the dark’, noted Irini, a 17 year old high school student. And she continued: ‘We can never know [what happened]’. Dafne added, ‘we do not know what to believe in this case’. We never listen to the other side’. ‘Whoever knows the truth can judge’ (Fotis). Confusion and ambivalence in the case of the high school students is linked to their limited communications’ infrastructure and lack of contextual knowledge.

Nonetheless, other interviewees voiced this concern as well. Spyros from the group of high school teachers recognised that we ‘live with scenaria’ […]. And, regarding a previous issue in the news, he added: ‘one month has passed and I still do not know what happened’. ‘We are only speculating’, Marilena added. ‘We don’t know what happened’ Stelios – we don’t even know what happened at Imia120.

Demotic discourses about the nation

Greek viewers contested the discourses about Cyprus in the news. In the airspace news reports there was a constant deixis, a rhetorical pointing to the nation that included Cyprus and Greece. Cyprus was referred to as ‘Meghalonisos’, the ‘Big Island’, as part of the national imagery. Conversely, interviewees contested the official discourse that advocates continuity between Greece and Cyprus. When I asked Thodoris if he thought Cypriots are Greeks, he replied: ‘I believe they are. I am not sure if they do’.

Thodoris: When it happened, [Cyprus] was a national issue. Today, I don’t think it is. Because Cypriots themselves don’t want us to have them as a national issue, and the Greeks are also tired of this Cyprus issue. The Cyprus issue, the Cyprus issue, the Cyprus issue. It will never be resolved. What is the Cyprus issue? That half of Cyprus is Turkish. It will always be. Or, will Denktash ever leave Cyprus? It is more probable that he will take the whole of Cyprus. Not just more probable… if there are 100 chances that [the Turks] get the whole of Cyprus, there are zero of him going. He will never go. There is no Cyprus issue for me. I think that they have accepted this; this is how things are. Either things will stay the same, or they will worsen. […] What I’ve been listening to since I was a child is the ‘resolution

120 The Imia crisis was a dispute between Greece and Turkey, over a complex of rock islets in the Aegean. The two countries came to the brink of war in January 1996.
of the Cyprus issue’. Before Cyprus they put the word resolution. But I don’t think this will ever happen. The resolution of the Cyprus issue will never take place.

'So why is there a fuss every time Cyprus’ application to the EU is challenged?', I asked Thodoris. 'There isn’t a fuss. If you do a survey I believe that not everyone will react. Especially young people. Even Cypriots do not care if Greece reacts or not'.

This view was shared by other informants who also thought that Greece cannot do much about Cyprus (Yannis).

Dafne: We are in a desperate situation [in Greece] right now. We have so many problems. I’m not saying that we should not be involved with Cyprus, I’m not saying it’s not worth it, but perhaps we should resolve some other issues first and then look at Cyprus.

Stelios: What I am saying is that we shouldn’t be too preoccupied about the Cyprus issue because the Cypriots are not particularly preoccupied with us. Why should we be the parents of the Greek Cypriots? [...] The educational level in Cyprus is very high, they don’t need us.

Interestingly, Michalis wonders why such a prevalent attitude is never heard on television, revealing the power he attributes to the media. His question can also be interpreted as how can something so prevalent not be part of media reality.

Michalis: I do not know how, because I’ve never watched such a thing on television, but in the last 20 years a negative attitude towards Cypriots has developed, which I cannot understand [...] So all these years, wherever I go, people of my age don’t like Cypriots, there is some kind of racism, as there was once against the Jews, something like this. Everybody scorns [vrizoun] the Cypriots. And if you ask them [why] they do not know.

Fotini: I have heard this as well. At university. A Cypriot would ask a question in the amphitheatre and it would cause gales of laughter [hamos].

Michalis: [Greek people] make fun of their accent. Similarly, Cypriots do not like us at all and have their reasons for this. Because of the ’74 invasion. They don’t care which government was in power then and who inspired it, who let this happen. They don’t care if it was the Greeks, the government, the junta... I went [to Cyprus] and spoke to kids, they don’t know it was the junta [that orchestrated the coup].

The following excerpts are interesting as they point to a demotic discourse about the nation, while in parallel they reveal an ‘us and them’ dichotomy that renders the Cypriot as the ‘other’. In this sense the following quotes are ‘demotic’ and at the same time essentialist as they objectify Cypriot people.

Meanwhile, Cypriots do not like us, and at a practical level they have nothing to gain from us, they are much better off on their own. If they were a part of Greece they would be just like Crete, in the best of cases, an affluent region of Greece with
a high standard of quality of life [viotiko epipedo], in terms of money, way of life. Even though they have bad taste and they are nouveau riche... Go to Platres\textsuperscript{121} to listen to the nightingales, as Seferis\textsuperscript{122} wrote... There are no nightingales in Platres, there is Barclays. It's a nouveau riche society. But they are having a good time. They have no reason to want Greece.

Tasos: Can I add that they had quality of life. They had culture. And they lived as Europeans.

Michalis: The same way the Indians lived like Europeans\textsuperscript{123}.

Michalis: They feel Greek when it's in their interest.

Fotini: This is what I suspect as well, and I am not sure if it is true, but I sense it, not because I've been to Cyprus, but once I gave private lessons to a Cypriot family, and their relatives, aunts and uncles would come by. Cypriots have strong solidarity among them. And they would all refer to Greece in the third person. They never said ‘us Greeks’. Never. This is clear-cut.

Cyprus is not the only issue about which demotic discourses concerning the nation are expressed. Sergios referred to the army as a ‘dump’, while Christos called it ‘a brothel’. Andreas, who works in the army, describes himself as a civil servant. ‘There’s nothing exceptional in working in the army. It’s an ordinary job’. Everyday personal experiences contest a nationalist perspective in which the armed forces are considered the bastion of the nation.

Moreover, some informants challenged the assumption that it is only Turkey which violates Greece’s airspace. Many interviewees mentioned that they know that when Turkish planes violate Greek airspace, Greek planes violate Turkish space (Aggeliki, Lena, Giota, Christos, Haris). Aggeliki heard this from a friend in the army. Haris referred to a Turkish friend he had met at an exchange programme when he was at university. She had told him that the news on Greek television was just like the Turkish – only the roles were reversed. All the interviewees acknowledged that they did not expect to hear this on the news. It emerges that informants were aware that the news presents a more formal account of events, a dominant discourse. As Giota said, ‘perhaps we are violating their space as well. But we never hear such things in the news’.

\textsuperscript{121} A resort in Cyprus mentioned in one of Seferis’ poems.

\textsuperscript{122} Yiorgos Seferis is one of most eminent twentieth century Greek poets. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1963.

\textsuperscript{123} Michalis’ comment refers to the common colonial past of Cyprus and India.
The students also noted the ideological effects of this report, that people will say, ‘look at the Turks, they did the same stuff again’ (Irini). ‘And then we end up hating the Turks’, Dafne added. Lena, a teacher, also made a similar comment:

Lena: Last year, or perhaps the year before, some Turkish businessmen came to Thessaloniki for a meeting. Some [Greek] nationalists went and there were some incidents. They only showed those on television. While what could become the pretext for discussion and information, the fact that some people came from Turkey, some Greeks here are interested, there might be some collaboration, to come closer, all this went unnoticed. The only thing that they showed was the incident. And I am left with this impression that things are not good, there is tension, we are afraid, some people have to sell something. The only thing we know is that us and Turkey are enemies. Full stop. This is the information. That things are not good. Now, how, why, whether there are other talks, or some diplomatic effort, void. There is no information.

Dominant discourses

Not all Greek informants challenged the dominant discourse of the news. Tatiana, a high school student, regarded ‘Cyprus’ as a national issue. Note that she considers Cyprus a part of Greece that could be ‘lost’ if Greece is not interested.

Tatiana: Greece has to be interested in the continuation and preservation of the Hellenism of Cyprus. We need to make sure that we will not lose other lands.

Georgia also expressed a dominant perspective taking the ‘us and them’ dichotomy in the news for granted.

Georgia: We’ve seen incidents like this before, Turks chasing our planes, because we are enemies, Turks and Greeks and we seek to harm each other. We don’t really want to, but the Turks chase us so…

Rena: I am Greek and I will defend Greece’s rights – not Turkey’s.

Marilena argued that the news cannot show everything because national security has to be taken into account. According to her a form of censorship would be acceptable in order for the national security and interest not to be compromised. Her case is similar to that of the ‘deniers’ that Liebes describes (1997). Deniers are the viewers who believe that the news is credible, but nonetheless support censorship (Liebes and Ribak, 1991: 209). By putting the national interest above everything else, Marilena does not challenge the dominant categories of the news and thus makes a dominant interpretation.

Greek viewers generally were critical of media practices and journalistic conventions. This critical stance was coupled with a critical perspective concerning news content.
The majority of the Greek interviewees contrasted the dominant discourse in the news to a more analytic and historical perspective. They challenged the exaggeration in the news with their own experiences. The viewers’ accounts were more historical and political than the news. People were aware that the news presented a dominant perspective and expected this to be the case. Frustration arose among the less historically informed viewers (such as the high school students and some of the housewives) who challenge the news with more difficulty. These interviewees are often critical, but there is ambivalence in their discourses. ‘We are in the dark’. People are not always critical and often oscillate between discursive positions within the context of the interview.

From the analysis it emerges that the banal nationalism in the news is not reproduced in a straightforward way. Informants often contested the meanings of words and symbols linked to the nation that were present in the news. A more conclusive answer to the banal reproduction thesis will be provided after the examination of the responses to the Kosovo conflict which will be discussed later in the chapter.

8.1.2 Cypriot viewers

The ordinariness attributed to the airspace incident reports by the Greek viewers is in stark contrast to the reaction of most Cypriot viewers’ reaction. Cypriot viewers were critical of the news, albeit in a different way from the Greeks. Most interviewees thought that the incident had been downplayed in the Greek media and contrasted the reporting with their personal experiences in Cyprus, where most of the interviewees have spent part of their lives. They also compared the report to the information they get from Cyprus (through the satellite channel and family and friends). While Greek viewers contrasted their reality to what they described as an exaggerated report, Cypriots interpreted the report as one that did not reflect the seriousness of the issue and their experiences in Cyprus. There were, however, differences between those who have lived in Athens for longer and those who left Cyprus more recently (students). In the following excerpt the university students, who had been living in Athens for four years at the time of the interview, stressed that mainstream Greek news reflects a reality that is different from theirs.

Orestis: It was not stressed. In Cyprus it would have been first on the agenda.
Eva: For us this is important, it should have been first.
Giorgos: It should have been first. [...] We are performing a military exercise and they have the power to prevent us from completing it properly.

Eva: This is not an issue that concerns only Cyprus, it concerns the whole of Greece. It is the infringement of Greece’s right to have an alliance with Cyprus. It is the common defence dogma.

Elpida: They are not as interested here. They consider it less important.

Orestis: Generally when you watch Greek news, you notice that the priorities are very different. They start with the robberies...

[...]

Orestis: SKAI might not show it at all.

Yiorgos: The channels here start with robberies, or prostitution, or the police. Yesterday they were looking for someone who had escaped.

Elpida: Today they had this woman who was threatening to jump from her window to commit suicide. 40 minutes of live reporting.

The students object to the coverage of the airspace incident by contrasting their experiences from Cyprus with the report. It has to be noted, however, that these informants shared ‘Greek reality’ as well, as they live in Athens, watch the news and remembered which issues were reported on the day of the interview. It is in the context of the airspace incident – a report that involved Cyprus – that dissatisfaction was expressed. A similar comment was made by Anna who had lived in Athens for a decade at the time of the interview.

Anna: They show what is happening, they do not distort it. But it is detached. As if this happened miles away. In Cyprus they would present it as the event of the day. There would be interruptions in the programming. Here it’s like, look this is what happened in Cyprus, this is miles away. [...] When I am in Cyprus, whether I want it or not, because this is a major issue, I get informed everyday. Everyday you wake up and you know that Cyprus is as it is and you say, let’s see what the news is today, if there are any developments.

Other interviewees, however, were more detached. Dina, having lived in Greece for longer, was more detached from Cyprus and found the report exaggerated. Myrto thought that the report was neither exaggerated, nor understated.

Dina: It was a war [report]. If you saw it and did not listen to the commentary you would think that something was happening. A war, somewhere.

Myrto: I thought [the report] was OK. They presented the events that took place. It was not exaggerated. [It was] as it happened in Cyprus. I was in Cyprus last week when Nikiforos took place, and my sister’s husband had to join, it is compulsory, and he told me that the Turks were very provocative. They are always provocative.
Viewers critical towards journalists and generic conventions

At the same time all the Cypriot interviewees demonstrated a critical ability in recognising the generic conventions of the news. They pointed out that the images used in one of the reports were from archive footage. Orestis recognised exactly where this footage had come from. They also pointed out the fact that the report contained images from a computer ‘flight simulator’ programme (although some described it as ‘virtual reality’ – Orestis, Yiorgos, Elpida). Dina noted that ‘with technology, nothing is honest anymore’.

The critical views that the Cypriot interviewees expressed towards the media were also the result of their low trust in the Greek media in relation to how the Cyprus issue had been reported. This does not mean that the Greek Cypriot informants were not sophisticated. On the contrary, they combined media literacy with their existing attitudes towards the media. Elpida noted that the report was sensationalist. Instead of focusing on the political aspect of the crisis which, according to her, was the important one, they showed ‘all these fancy images’.

Contextual and historical knowledge

Interviewees were not just critical at an aesthetic level. Orestis objected to the report as it was only a description of the incident and it did not show the reactions it caused in Cyprus, or in the diplomatic field. The respondents gave me all the background about the reactions of the politicians in Cyprus and the procedure that is followed at a diplomatic level every time such an incident takes place. The students criticised the report for being too short and for not giving the necessary background and context. For example, Orestis said:

[The reporter] said that [Turkish] aeroplanes flew over Paphos124 – he only mentioned it though. He should have said that they flew over and that they photographed the airport and the missile base. I know, I did my military service there.

Orestis: The reporting was flawed. They spoke of interceptions. Do people know what interceptions are, what a dogfight is [emplōki]? We can think of up to four different meanings of with this word. I know from an airforce pilot, that a dogfight is when you follow a plane and you ‘trap it’ on your screen.

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124 City in Cyprus.
The Cypriot students in particular were particularly knowledgeable about the political and military aspects of the process and found that the report lacked all this information. All Greek Cypriot informants had a historical knowledge of the background of the Cyprus issue which determined their interpretive framework. In the following excerpt, the students argue that, because the coverage of the Cyprus issue is flawed, Greeks do not understand what the problem is.

Orestis: The Cyprus issue is played down on Greek television.
Elpida: Yes, yes.
Orestis: There is a message, but it’s not the right one for the Greek people. They need to understand that the Cyprus problem exists, and it is an everyday problem. It is being experienced by Greeks, who live at the other end of the Mediterranean, but it is a Greek issue.
Eva: Because there are Greeks who know nothing about the Cyprus issue.
Elpida: On Greek television only occasionally, like now with the exercise, or when there were some events, like that concert with Rouvas and Kurt. And the reporting is always problematic. Some things are presented wrongly. They ignore some things. I've never met anyone who knows what 'federation' means, or which are the possible solutions from which we have to chose. The political aspect of the problem is unknown. They only know the problem.
Yiorgos: That the Turks came and harmed the Greeks.
Elpida: Some people think that we still want union [enosis] with Greece. Things that are completely untrue...

From this excerpt it also emerges that the Cypriot interviewees, albeit emotional about the incident itself, were not ‘in line’ with the report, but were challenging it both at a content and an aesthetic level. The interviewees contested the way the Cyprus problem is reported (in this particular instance and generally) stressing that the media never discuss the political aspect of the issue. In this sense, the interpretations of the Cypriot interviewees are close to those of the Greek informants who were historically informed. In the case of the Greek Cypriot informants, however, there are no age or generational differences as there were with the Greek viewers. The Cypriot university students who were 21 or 22 were all familiar with background information about the conflict, because it had affected and still affects their lives. Conversely, the Greek high school students and one of the soldiers (Stelios, 28) did not have any knowledge about Cyprus, apart from what Yiorgos (above) stated apothegmatically, ‘that the Turks came and harmed the Greeks’. This is an indication of media power, as the Greek viewers relied mainly on the media for such information (see previous section).
Analytic viewers

Some interviewees attempted to identify the reasons why the Cyprus issue is downplayed in the Greek media. One of the reasons emerges from the previous excerpt; most Greeks ignore the situation in Cyprus and the media are partly responsible for this. All the interviewees made such comments and some mentioned the educational system as well (Myrto, Stavros). Interviewees also noted that 'there was always prejudice about Cyprus from the Greeks here' (Jenny). Myrto said that 'Cyprus is too costly. Nobody cares'.

**Commuting: The reality of experience**

In their interpretation of the report, all the Cypriot interviewees commuted continually to their experiences in Cyprus. Men referred to their army experiences, which often involved violence and conflict.

Yiorgos: I served in the Green Line\textsuperscript{125}, this is an experience \textit{[vioma]}.

Orestis: It is an experience. I saw Turks, I spoke to the Turks across the line.

Yiorgos: You see the Turkish flag when you wake up in the morning.

Orestis: Four months before I was moved to a new army base, a soldier had been killed. They tricked him and he entered the Green Line to exchange cigarettes for spirits; someone there was waiting to kill him. This is how it is. When I went there his best friend was in that checkpoint [fylakio].

Overall, gender differences are not prevalent among Cypriots. People referred to a common 'reality' of tension that transcends gender differences.

Anna: I live opposite a military base in Cyprus. Our boys, when they finish high school, they go directly to the army. Sometimes I hear them at four o'clock at night when they are doing exercises. You cannot escape in Cyprus. When I go there I say, here I am. Today we are well, tomorrow there might be war.

Dominant readings

The 'us and them' dichotomy was present in all the interviews, even among those who were more detached. For most interviewees these dichotomies and essentialist discourses were grounded in personal experiences. People said that they had lost relatives and friends in the conflict, some even recently. 'Every family has lost someone in the conflict, some families more than one' (Myrto). Anna's family became refugees in 1974 (she was two years old) and lost their home and assets. Her uncle is still one of the 'missing people'. Orestis noted that he knew one of the people that got

\textsuperscript{125} The Green Line is the UN buffer zone that separates the Greek and the Turkish side of Cyprus.

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killed in 1996 in the Green Line during an incident. This has become a well known case because he died while television was filming an annual protest.

Orestis: Solomou was my mother’s second cousin. It is through these things that we hate the Turks, or we are against the Turks. Greeks and Cretans hate them in a more abstract way.

Most of the Cypriot interviewees were emotionally involved in the decoding of the report. They contrasted their own reality to that portrayed in the news and found it unsatisfactory. Those informants that have lived in Athens for longer are less emotionally involved. The emotional interpretation of the content of the news does not mean that Greek Cypriots are not critical viewers. On the contrary they were very critical, both at an aesthetic and content level. Cypriot viewers were particularly critical of media practices and news presentation and emotional about media content, indicating that these two dimensions do not always correlate. The emotional dimension of the interpretations by the Cypriot interviewees’ should not be conflated with an acceptance of the banal nationalism of the news. The affective dimension in their interpretation stemmed from their experiences in Cyprus and the fact that these are not reflected in the Greek news.

8.1.3 Turkish informants

A significant difference between the Turkish viewers and those discussed previously is that they watch the news, albeit to varying degrees as Chapter 6 showed, on both Greek and Turkish channels. Although none of the interviewees had watched the ‘airspace incident report’ on the Turkish channels (nor on the Greek for that matter) they had seen similar reports on airspace violations in the past. Most of the Turkish interviewees said that through watching both Turkish and Greek channels they knew that Greek planes violate Turkish space as well. Ayse told me that in the Turkish media this would normally be presented as a violation of Turkish airspace by Greek planes. Bahar and Nuriye told me that such reports are very common on Turkish television.

Orhan: You never hear on the Greek news that Turkish airspace has been violated by Greek planes. They never say, look, we violated their airspace. But I see it on Turkish news.

Hasan: They have reports like this on the Turkish channels. Here it said that the [Turkish] planes were intercepted. In the Turkish news they will say that they did not know that there was an exercise in Cyprus. That Greece is accusing us wrongly. It’s all propaganda.
Watching the news on two broadcasting systems, or two 'national media systems', makes viewers more sceptical, but does not provide any certainty. As Ayse remarked, 'who knows the truth'?

Hasan: Sometimes I watch both. [...] Here they hide [information], and we compare when we watch the Turkish. Where is the truth? We have to think, what is their interest, what is our interest...There is nothing else we can do, to untangle the tangled knot. We just have our opinion, we watch, but we are not always convinced. God said that you need to see it with your own eyes to be convinced. Not just to listen.

**Analytic viewers**

The Turkish viewers attempted to provide explanations for the reasons these incidents both take place and are shown on the news. Orhan, in the same vein as some of the Greek interviewees, identified a symbiotic relationship between the media and the political establishment. The difference in Orhan's comment is that, compared to those of Greek informants, it is based on his experience with two different broadcasting systems.

Orhan: These incidents are presented whenever we have internal problems. It's the same in Turkey. We are privileged to have the [satellite] dishes and we watch the news from there. Whenever we have an internal problem in our country we stress these incidents to distract the public's attention. Simitis has a problem, the Turkish government has a problem, they show these, and then people do not think about the government and the problems. They worry about the air-fights. They scare the audience.

The Turkish interviewees noted that there are 'interests' involved in Greek-Turkish relations and it is in this context that Hasan's comment 'it's all propaganda' should be understood. For the Turkish informants, both the Greek and Turkish channels present whatever is in the interests of the media and the respective governments (Mumin, Metin, Hasan, Orhan). Such comments echo those of the Greek viewers who implied a symbiotic relationship between the media and the government.

**Viewers critical towards journalists and generic conventions**

The Turkish viewers were aware of journalistic conventions. Not all of them identified where the footage came from and that computer animation had been used, although some did (Orhan and Mumin). The critical stance of the Turkish interviewees stems

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126 Kostas Simitis has been the Greek Prime Minister since 1996.
largely from their negative experiences with journalists (see Chapter 6). Interviewees constantly referred to such experiences whenever the issue of trust and objectivity was raised. All men had a story to tell. Women also expressed their dissatisfaction with journalistic reporting, although they mainly repeated the stories where men were the protagonists. Most comments ended like this: ‘Journalists are all liars, they only write lies’ (Ayse).

*Historical decodings*

Most of the Turkish male informants were familiar with the historical context surrounding the Cyprus issue and drew on this when discussing the airspace reports\(^\text{127}\). Hasan had fought in Cyprus in 1974 and had first hand experience of the events (see next section).

Mumin: Who went to kill Makarios? The Turks [ironic]? They [the Greeks] bombed the palaces where Makarios was staying. […] Greece started it all. Not Turkey. The landing\(^\text{128}\) in Cyprus happened afterwards. And I’ve heard that many Turks got killed. I heard in the news about a five year old child, who got 40 bullets. A little girl. All this in the Turkish news, of course. Here, they do not mention this.

Such views were not expressed by the Turkish women. Like some of the Greek high school students and housewives, they seemed to lack the historical and political knowledge with which to interpret the events. In the interview Ayse, Bahar and Nuriye repeated constantly: ‘Who knows? We do not know these things’. Apart from their more limited knowledge (compared that of men) women lacked the confidence to express their views and for this reason commuted continuously to other topics with which they felt more comfortable.

*Discursive oscillations: dominant and demotic*

In his account of his experience in Cyprus in 1974 Hasan told me that ‘they [the army] had changed his name\(^\text{129}\). ‘I was not Hasan. I was Haris Vlachos’, he said. Hasan told me that he did not know with whom he was fighting. ‘With the Greeks? With the

\(^{127}\) In the airspace incident case study I did not interview any young Turkish people, at least not as young as the Greek high school students. Orhan and Umut, who were familiar with the Cyprus issue, are in Stelios’ generation.

\(^{128}\) It is perhaps worth mentioning that Mumin uses the word ‘landing’ to describe the Turkish incursion whereas all the Greeks used the word invasion.

\(^{129}\) See section on double names in Chapter 6. This, however, is a different case as the decision about Hasan’s Greek name was not his but rather taken by the Armed Forces.
English? With the Americans? With the Turks, or with the Turkish guerrillas?’. Through his personal experience, Hasan underlines the complexity of Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus problem and his own position in this situation (a Greek Turk, fighting under a Greek name, against the Turks in Cyprus). Through his personal experience he expresses dissatisfaction with the dominant divisions which do not reflect his complex reality.

Often, however, interviewees oscillated from a demotic to a dominant discourse, as some Greek interviewees did in the previous section. In the following extract Hasan challenges the dominant definition of who is Greek and proposes a new definition based on the concept of citizenship. Mumin, however, reverts to an ‘us and them’ scheme, objectifying and reifying the Cypriots (‘some call themselves English’).

Hasan: In relation to what we just watched, Greece and Cyprus, are they relatives? Are we cousins? What are we? […] For me they are just Cypriots, not Greek Cypriot. There are no Greeks and Cypriots. They are [just] Cypriots. Haven’t they got their own flag? Haven’t they got their own currency? How, then, can Cypriots be Greeks?
Mumin: Some even call themselves English.
I: Some call themselves Greek.
Hasan: And we say that we, who were born here, are Greek.

These comments echo some of those made by the Greek interviewees. Similarly, the comments here reflect both a dominant and a demotic discourse. On the one hand, people are challenging the dominant discourse about the nation but, on the other, they are reifying the Cypriots (‘they call themselves English’).

**Commuting**
The male Turkish interviewees commuted to their army experience. Their difference from the Greek interviewees is that they used this experience not to challenge the reports, but to express the negative experiences that the reports brought to mind. Turkish interviewees commuted to their everyday life in Greece – in the same way that the Greek Cypriots talked about their Cypriot reality. The comment by Hasan in the previous section (‘we say that we, who were born here, are Greeks’) is illuminating. Turks in Gazi are Greek citizens, while Greek Cypriots are not. It is as Greek citizens that the Turkish interviewees react to a discourse that does not reflect their reality. In short, what the Gaziots are saying is that the news is more concerned
about the non-citizen Cypriots than about the citizen Turks, who have real problems. It is in this context that Ayse’s comment has to be interpreted: ‘Why should we feed the Cypriot children, if we cannot feed ours?’

Ayse found the airspace incident report irrelevant to her reality. Umut (below) made similar comments. What these interviewees are saying is that the report is banal compared to their problems of everyday life. Moreover, their problems, even though they are ‘grave’ (Ayse) never make it to the news.

Umut: God has forgotten about us here, as Muslim Greeks. We want jobs. […] Not these lies, they come here, they make promises, and after the elections no one ever comes. It is as if we do not exist. This is evident in the news. It is as if we do not exist. They don’t even mention us. […] Sometimes I feel I have no desire to live anymore. I’d rather die than have a life like this. Nobody can give us a job. We have served [the army] here, we grew up here. We will die here. They have slammed many doors in my face because my name and my religion are different. But I do not cease to be and to feel Greek, maybe even more than you, maybe more than anybody. […] They call us Greeks but in practice they are kicking us around. That’s what I know.

The Turkish interviewees in their commutings make claims to citizenship and equal rights. They also claim that their reality should be represented in the news. The Turkish interviewees’ interpretations and overall critical stance is more anchored to their own personal experiences and not so much in the decoding of the text, although one group put emphasis on how the news is constructed and the fact that the footage in the relevant report is a pastiche of archival material and computer graphics. Most of their criticisms derive either from their absence/symbolic annihilation from media discourse (‘as if we do not exist’ [Umut]), or their negative/unfair depiction by television and the press in some cases.

8.2 THE RETELLINGS OF THE Kosovo crisis

8.2.1 Greek informants

Emotional and critical viewers
The ordinariness of the news and its reception in the first case study is contrasted to a more emotional reaction in the Kosovo retellings by some Greek interviewees. The emotional reaction toward the content (the events in Kosovo and Yugoslavia) affected some interviewees’ attitudes towards journalists and the media.

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Ilias: They have to show you the news. The buildings. The corpses. How can these be lies, all these things that they show on television. The camera cannot lie. It shows the building destroyed.

In Ilias’ eyes, the fact that journalists get emotional is further confirmation of the reality that television conveys. He noted, ‘how can they not be emotional when they see people digging in the rubble to find their loved ones? Is this a lie? ‘All these monstrosities that I see on television I believe them all. They are not exaggerated’ (Ilias). ‘Of course, we believe them’, added Eugenia. Interestingly, the above informants were the older interviewees.

Other interviewees, however, expressed more critical views towards the media and journalists. People were aware of media conventions and journalistic practices, as was the case in the airspace interviews. Informants mentioned that there is no objectivity in the news. ‘It is biased and hypocritical’ (Vassilis). Sophia said that the media are ‘the last thing that one will trust in their life’. Andreas noted that Greek television is well known for ‘trading in horror’ and this practice is attributed to the commercialization of television. ‘The more horror, the higher the ratings’, Andreas said. He also remarked, rather cynically, that he believed that there was a tariff for each sigh and sob in the news. ‘A sob, 300,000 drachmas', two sighs.... Journalists will do whatever to sell their goods’, he added.

As in the airspace incident interview, it was through media use that people criticised the news. The more people watch, the more critical/literate they become towards media practices. Andreas said that ‘during the Gulf war, the channels that supported the Alliance, as well as the Greek channels, showed a picture of a heron that was covered in tar and crude oil’. In the end, this picture was proven to be from a different incident, but was used to show the ecological disaster in the Gulf War. This is something that Andreas read in a magazine which made him very sceptical of journalistic practices. ‘Journalists uncovered other journalists’, he said. Similar stories were told by other interviewees.

130 Around £550.
131 Recall the similar story mentioned by Haris in the airspace incident interview.
Viewers were also aware of the economics of media production and their effects on
media products and use, articulating a political economy perspective.

Alexandros: The media in Greece are controlled by a small group of people, Mega
is owned by Vardinogiannis, Antenna by Kyriakou, Channel 5 by that guy who
publishes Avriani, Kouris, and so on. They are all elites, the ruling classes, they
have lots of money and interests. Through their media, they promote a certain idea
about Greece.

Interestingly, even the informants who were critical of the media in the reporting of
the conflict often agreed with the content of the news. There is a paradox here – while
people were critical of media and journalistic practices, they watched the news and
were convinced by its emotional reality. The reason that people identified with the
media (even those who expressed doubts about the objectivity of the news) is that the
media echoed emotions, popular perceptions and fears prevalent in Greek society. In
other words, the exaggerated reports had an emotional realism for the viewers. The
quote by Andreas is illuminating: ‘Of course the coverage is biased. Of course I know
this. But I am pro-Serb’.

Dominant and demotic negotiations
Not all the viewers were emotional or convinced by the news content. In two of the
groups there was differentiation and dissent as is evident in the following examples.

Alexandros: I cannot stand this populist stuff, we have the impression, and the
media reinforce it, that we are Orthodox, and Serbs are Orthodox, and Bulgarians
are Orthodox, and Russians are Orthodox, so we are all a happy family.
Sophia: But isn’t this the culture of our people?
Alexandros: This is the culture of our people that the media convey and reinforce.
The media reproduce this idea because their owners have interests and this is what
they want. They cannot accept any other idea.

Katerina: Maybe we are only looking at one side of the story, because we think
that [the Serbs] are being wronged in this case.
Andreas: Look, the Greeks were always the people who were driven by emotions.
On the other hand there is the historical relationship that binds us with the Serbs.
Zoe: The same religion...
Andreas: The emotions prevail.
Katerina: If it is only emotional then why aren’t we emotional in relation to the
others [the Albanians]? [...] Aren’t they people as well? They leave their homes
and their belongings and they are even bombed while they are on the road.
Andreas: Let’s not forget that the Greeks were always on the Indians’ side and not
that of the cowboys. Always.
In these excerpts it is possible to observe the competing discourses about the nation and its culture and how they relate to perceptions about the role of the media. While in the routine case study there was relative homogeneity within the groups and most interviewees challenged the news and the incident itself, here the voices were more mixed. Some viewers were more skeptical and critical of the coverage, while others drew on a dominant view of Greek culture to justify their stance and that of the media. In the second extract, it is possible to discern the reasons (or one of the reasons) why the Greek viewers were more sympathetic towards the Serbs in the Kosovo conflict. Andreas' comment about 'cowboys and Indians' suggests that it is anti-Americanism, rather than 'culture', that determined the support for the Serbs. Andreas is projecting his experience and knowledge about US involvement in Greek politics in past decades, in his interpretation of the conflict, a comment made by many of the informants.

One informant, however, Vassilis, was clearly oppositional to the coverage and the pro-Serb feelings expressed in the Kosovo reports.

Vassilis: Channels distinguish according to religion. I can't understand this. This is the most ridiculous thing ever. We, the country of spirit and the arts, should not say such things. We should not distinguish between Christians, Buddhists or Muslims. Why should we become racist? Christ himself was not racist. This is tragic and disastrous.

Resourceful viewers

Another difference from the previous case study is the increased use of foreign media (especially CNN). The issue of access is important here, as not all the interviewees could follow foreign language media. However, even informants who did not really watch channels such as CNN expressed opinions about their coverage based on how this was reported in the Greek media. The group that used British and global media extensively was that of the students in London. At a first level this particular group had access to non-Greek media by definition. In this case, however, the use of non-Greek media was dictated by the topic itself (it was an international issue) and the interviewees used foreign media while in Greece during the Easter vacation. It is, however, acknowledged that this was a particularly resourceful group, whose communication infrastructure escapes the national confines. In this sense, their
Having access to both Greek and non-Greek media provided Alexandros with a measure of comparison. On the one hand he identified problems in the Greek coverage but, on the other he also identified problems with the British media.

Alexandros: Another interesting issue is that the British media have, perhaps with NATO’s orders, ignored the role that Greece plays in this conflict. Nobody in England knows that George Papandreou, Greece’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited numerous European capitals as part of a larger diplomatic effort together with Finland and Russia. [...] I heard reports mention Finland’s peace initiative, but nothing about Greece’s.

Alexandros’ comment here is analytic, in that he tries to identify the reasons why the British media ignore Greek initiatives. It emerges that analytic interpretations are made when viewers are dissatisfied with the content of the news. Although Greek viewers were critical about media practices in the Kosovo case study, they did not elaborate the reasons why this was happening and what role the media play, at least not to the degree that they did in the airspace interviews. This confirms the dissonance between the critical level of interpretation towards media practices and the sympathetic, if not emotional, interpretation of media content.

**Historical interpretations/contextual knowledge and alternative resources**

As in the previous case study, many of the viewers’ interpretations attempted to identify the causes of the conflict, thereby appearing more historical than the news, even if there were occasionally inaccuracies in their accounts. All the informants noted that the conflict had its roots in past decades although some expressed a more open narrative than others. The difference was between those who had alternative resources for finding out about the conflict and those who were more dependent on the media. Vassilis’ account was an open one, avoiding the ‘us and them’ dichotomies that were prevalent in the news.

Vassilis: Years ago, Serbs and Kosovars had no problems living together. It was a few years ago that people, with their own interests, created nationalist sentiments on purpose and the confrontations began. The Civil War started as a result. Two
peoples lived together in the same land for 1000 years without a problem and now there is a problem. [...] People do not have inherent problems with each other. For years they co-existed and lived on the planet, even if they had different nationalities [sic].

Vassilis said that he knew that there was ethnic cleansing against the Kosovars from the Serbian army and this was the reason they were leaving. He had heard this from some Albanians in Greece whom he employed in his business. Reflecting upon his own history (his mother’s family had arrived from Asia Minor in 1922), he told me that ‘These things have always been happening. In Greece here we are all refugees and foreigners’, echoing aspects of Greek history discussed in Chapter 3. This comment is very different from the group of news reports that depicted refugees as a destabilising threat (Chapter 7).

Alexandros said that he knows about the Kosovo conflict and its background through a branch of his family that live in the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) whom he sees every summer when they visit his home town in Northern Greece. Alexandros knew that there was ethnic cleansing against the Kosovans; his family in Macedonia had also been harassed because they were part of the Vlach minority – a linguistic minority that lives in Greece as well. Alexandros’ experience is indicative of the arbitrariness of the national and ethnic boundaries. His family is divided into two parts, one living in Macedonia and one in Greece. This is the same family that found itself on different sides of the border, when the borders were drawn.

Some other interviewees mentioned that the refugees were leaving because of ethnic cleansing and prosecution by the Serbian army (Nicos, Andreas, Katerina). The rest said that the refugees were leaving because of the NATO strikes (Zoe, Ilias, Eugenia, Sophia). The following section examines how they related the conflict to their experiences and knowledge.

Commuting and dominant discourses

Some of the informants drew a parallel between the intervention of NATO in Kosovo and its lack of intervention in Cyprus in 1974, or thereafter. Interestingly, while Greece’s relationship to Cyprus was contested in the ‘airspace incident’ interviews, it was reinstated in the Kosovo case study. Note how Sophia used the personal pronoun
to include both Cyprus and Greece in her discourse. ‘What did the Americans do for Cyprus? They left us alone then’ (Sophia).

All the interviewees (apart from Vassilis) made a parallel with Western Thrace, expressing a fear that there might be problems with the Turkish minority there. The parallel was made to justify the Serb reaction to the development of KLA. Most of these discourses are ‘dominant’, identifying and reifying communities. The use of pronouns is indicative of the ‘us and them’ dichotomy that evokes segregation.

Ilias: The same way we have the Turks in Thrace. If the Turks ever revolt and demand their own state, will we say, of course, go ahead? We will not. That was the problem.

Katerina: Are you worried about the Turkish minority?

Andreas: I know that something will happen. I know that something will happen. I am not afraid that we will have war with Turkey over this issue. Because we are a member of the EU. [...] In the worst case scenario, they already have their mufti in Komotini and in Xanthi, in the worst case scenario we will give them new representation in Parliament. And nothing else.

Sophia: The same way we have Greek Muslims. They are not Turks. They are Greek, only Muslim in their faith.

These quotes reveal an underlying tension and also an obvious essentialist discourse on ethnicity and belonging. The minority is objectified and is considered a threat because it threatens ethnic homogeneity and thus contests the very essence of the nation which is thought of as natural and taken for granted. To use the terms that Douglas has developed (1966), minorities are thought of as impurities polluting the pure state; they are a symbolic danger threatening the discourse on which the nation is based. The power of naming (Muslims not Turks) and the use of pronouns is very significant. By insisting on calling them Greek and Muslim, people symbolically reduce the threat. These examples are reminiscent of the reports about Northern Epirus discussed in Chapter 7, although Northern Epirus was not mentioned in the interviews.

Fears and collective memory were continually projected onto the Kosovo events (Andreas, Ilias, Eugenia, Sophia). In the Kosovo interviews commuting is constant and takes up a lot of the narrative’s space. Ilias commuted to the Greek Civil War and resistance to German occupation in the Second World War. He also commuted to his
experience in exile as a communist. He grounded his sympathy towards the Serbs to anti-Americanism – a result of his personal experiences. Vassilis commuted to his experience in Cyprus.

Overall, the discursive patterns identified in the news analysis (Chapter 7) were not repeated identically in the viewers’ interpretations. However, there were some similarities especially among those informants who had no other alternative resources for finding out about the conflict. Thus, some interviewees reacted to the refugee issue as if it were a threat. The difference is that, while the news reports focused on Northern Epirus, the interviewees focused on Western Thrace and drew a parallel to the events in Kosovo.

Cultural intimacy

In the context of discussions about media objectivity and the possibility of expressing different opinions about the conflict, some interviewees recalled the controversy with the former conservative Minister Andrianopoulos and the article he wrote in *The New York Times* (analysed in Chapter 7). Ilias said that ‘Andrianopoulos is an agent of the Americans’, with Eugenia agreeing: ‘He has sold himself to the Americans’ [*poulimeo tomari*]. Interestingly, Alexandros and Nicos, who were both critical of the Greek media coverage were against an open criticism of the Greek media abroad. I will return to this issue in the concluding section.

Alexandros: The fact that [Andrianopoulos] said that reporting is biased in Greece and this caused such a storm, was a good thing, somebody had to say those things.
Sophia: Yes, but did he have to say this in America? Couldn’t he just say it in Greece?
Nicos: Yes, precisely, because it had such negative repercussions.
Alexandros: Of course.
Nicos: This is half of the truth, and this is how a negative image is created about Greece.

8.2.2. Cypriot viewers’ interpretations

Many informants reacted to the reporting of Kosovo in an emotional way which was reflected in their assessment of the coverage.

Marianna: [...] Not only were [the journalists] objective but they also added their own emotional reaction, without which, the reporting would be flawed. You cannot see corpses mutilated and burnt for no reason and not react as a human being. If you do not, then you are a subhuman as Shea and Clinton and all the rest.
In the same vein, the correspondent who reported the bombing of the Chinese Embassy was praised for crying. Marianna and Ioanna said that this way 'he proved that he is a human being'. They added that they themselves were crying as well when they were watching the report. They even noted that this is the objective information that should travel around the world. Such views are echoed by other informants and are reminiscent of the comments made by Ilias and Eugenia earlier.

Some of the Greek Cypriot interviewees identified similarities between the events in Kosovo and the invasion of Cyprus, thus commuting to their own personal experiences.

Marianna: There are similarities. Turkey invaded Cyprus and now NATO unlawfully invades Yugoslavia.
Ioanna: In a sovereign state, a foreign, third party comes and invades just because they want to [me to etsi thelo].
Marianna: The ethnic cleansing committed by the Turks is not condemned by NATO. And then we say that Milosevic did ethnic cleansing.
Ioanna: NATO did not even react then. When 200,000 left Northern Cyprus.
Marianna: [They were] refugees. I have many doubts about the ethnic cleansing of they accuse Milosevic. Because this is what the English [sic] and Americans told us. We don't have enough information.

Apart from anchoring the Kosovo conflict to the events in Cyprus, the two Greek Cypriot interviewees expressed their distrust towards 'the English and the Americans', a comment that includes both politicians and the media. Distrust is grounded again on experience and the lack of support and attention that the Cyprus issue received.

Yannos, who is a refugee himself from the Northern part of Cyprus, makes a similar comment. 'We feel there is hypocrisy. When they speak about human rights and I cannot go to my home, then what human rights?' (Yannos).

Yannos: The problem is that the Great Powers apply double standards. They say that Kosovan Albanian refugees are different from Cypriot refugees. In Kosovo they run to protect the rights [of the minority], but they don't care that in Cyprus there are refugees who cannot return to their homes. There is a UN resolution which says that the refugees can return, but it is never applied. This is how it is for us. You can't help making the comparison. Even Greece has double standards. We are hurt because we see that we are the weak ones, at the end of all this. Cyprus is divided de facto, but there will probably also be a de jure as things go. When they take away your last hope, that we are not going to go back to the house where we were born, what can I say, humanitarian rights are great, but reality, unfortunately, is not compatible with them. [...] When did the Great Powers come to support Greece? Never. Greek people support Serbia out of a gut feeling.
Critical viewers

Not all the interviewees made emotional interpretations. Chryssa was critical about some aspects of the Kosovo coverage, although overall she thought that the Greek media were more objective than the Western.

Chryssa: Journalists have to be objective when they confront emotional events such as death, or what is considered an injustice. They have to fight from inside to retain objectivity. Isn't that so? I hear a lot of superlatives in their reports. Of course, they are emotionally charged at those moments. Then on television they use the images. Often the commentary weakens the intensity of the image.

Yannos and Lia, the other two informants, could not assess the coverage because they did not have a television set and did not watch the news during the crisis. Yannos made several comments, however, about how Greek media have reported Cyprus, thus echoing remarks from the previous case study.

Yannos: I see analyses that they write about my country, Cyprus. And I realise that we see things very differently from them. I am talking about past events. The way they present them is completely different from the way we experienced them.

Commuting

Commuting was constant in the Kosovo interviews and all the Cypriots commuted to the Cyprus issue and the way they experienced history and displacement as the quotes above indicated. The other issue to which the interviewees commuted, was that of the minority of Thrace, something the Greek interviewees did as well.

Ioanna: Why are the refugees leaving?
Marianna: Because they [NATO] are bombing. Of course, this is widely known. 20 per cent left before the air campaign started and now 80 per cent is leaving. It's obvious.
Ioanna: And why did the 20 per cent leave before?
Marianna: Because there was some fighting between the Serbs and Kosovars.
Ioanna: The separatist groups of KLA were formed there. They operated for some time and they caused troubles; they were a source of anomaly. Let's make a parallel with things in Greece. If there was a separatist group in Thrace, where we have many Muslims. Because Kosovars, we call them Albanians, but they are not Albanians, they are Albanian-speakers. They belong to the Yugoslav State. They are Yugoslavians.
Marianna: They are Yugoslavians.
Ioanna: The same way we have Greek Muslims. They are not Turks. They are Greek, only Muslim in their religion.
Marianna: They are Muslim Greeks.
Ioanna: Even if they learn their own language and Turkey intervenes to cultivate the feeling that they are a Turkish minority etc.
Demotic discourse

One of the interviewees reflected upon her personal history in Cyprus and articulated a more open and historical discourse. This indicates that it is not culture that determines the decoding or the associated identity discourse, but rather experience and the ways that it can be transformed into something constructive. I should note here that this is not always possible, or rather, it is more possible for those with the necessary resources.

Chryssa: The experiences do not simply go away. If there was a degree of hatred between the Serbs and the Kosovars, now this has multiplied. This is no solution to such problems. More tensions are created. The same happened with the Cyprus problem. [...] In order to be able to live with someone, you have to familiarise yourself with them. This also applies to the Muslims of Thrace. They can very happily live with Orthodox Greeks, as long as we respect them. This attitude towards minorities, which the Greek governments upheld to a certain point, was mistaken, extremely mistaken, as well as a source of misery. Because there would still be some nationalists among them [...] But if the majority of the population were happy and living in dignity, there would be no reason [for tension]. Now everybody is talking about Thrace and the danger of Thrace. But why ‘the danger of Thrace’? [...] Not assimilate, I do not talk about assimilation, because assimilation means that I change you in order that you become like me. But I do not want you to become like me. To respect means that although different, we will be able to live together. You have to integrate the others as citizens, respecting their differences, their religion, their cultural processes, and everything else. The word assimilation is horrible. You know, it is, I am making you become like me. This cannot happen.

8.2.3 Turkish viewers

The emotions expressed by some Greek and Cypriot interviewees were not present among the Turkish informants. The retellings of the Turkish interviewees were often characterised by a degree of hesitation which can be attributed to their lack of confidence and contextual knowledge and also to their difficulty in expressing views that might be considered controversial. The emphasis in the following extract is not on the bombings and the plight of the Serb people, themes that were prevalent among Greek and Cypriot interviewees – albeit at varying degrees as noted previously – but on the persecutions of the Kosovan minority by the Serb authorities.

Yilmaz: There is a minority [in Kosovo].
Murat: There is a small minority in Kosovo. Yugoslavia did not allow them to be autonomous.
Faruk: And what did Clinton want? War?
Murat: He wanted to give freedom to the Albanians.
Yilmaz: That’s it.
Murat: To have their own freedom.
Yilmaz: So that Kosovo belongs to the Albanians. Wasn’t this how it all began?

*Critical viewers*

As in the airspace incident interviews, the Turkish viewers had a double perspective, having access to both Greek and Turkish media. This informs their judgements of the journalists’ role (‘they only show that NATO is bombing’). Many of the male interviewees argued that the news is sensationalist because of the increased commercialism and hidden interests.

Mehmet: I believe that they write whatever suits them. Whatever is more sensational, whatever will attract higher ratings, that’s what they show. Sometimes they choose not to show some things and they show only what NATO is doing [i.e., the bombings – MM]. You know, television cannot show us everything. But OK, they show what is in their interest.

Yilmaz: Whatever is in our interests, you are right to say.

A lot of the criticism was grounded on the fact that most informants had access to the Turkish channels. Many informants noted that ‘they did not see both sides’ on the news although, again, such comments were not made by women.

Mehmet: I feel that some of the things they show are right. Others they shouldn’t show because we become anti-NATO […] Perhaps NATO is right and we are only presenting the other side. We only give justice to the others [the Serbs].

Murat: The issue is that we do not see both sides. We only see one side. You cannot get the truth like this.

Yilmaz: First we should find out what is happening and then we should be against NATO.

Yilmaz: We in Greece support Yugoslavia. We do not show some of the things that Yugoslavia has done, so we only show what NATO has done by invading Yugoslavia.

For Murat the Turkish channels are also driven by interests. Watching both Turkish and Greek channels makes people more sceptical but still does not provide any certainty. Many of the interviewees, and women in particular, were hesitant to express opinions about the events because they found them confusing and they thought they did not possess the necessary knowledge to express an opinion. For some of the informants, and particularly the women, this is related to the limited resources and the lack of contextual knowledge.

Murat: On the Turkish channels, I don’t really watch the news, I am not a maniac trying to see who is saying what, but I know that everyone looks after their own interest. There are different opinions. You cannot conclude.
Bahar: There are differences between the channels. CNN presents the news differently from our channels. They have different news. But we don't watch CNN. Not all houses get CNN in Gazi. I get it but cannot understand the words.

**Commuting**

Turks commute to their everyday severe reality of marginalisation, unemployment and poverty. An experience from my fieldnotes is indicative. I was watching the news with a group of young men in the back room of a Karate club, which was also one of their hangouts. We were watching some protest rallies against the bombings, of a similar climate to the media event analysed in Chapter 7. Their reaction was silence. After a few sporadic remarks, Ismail said: 'Let us show you something'. They showed me a videotaped documentary aired on one of the private channels (ANTENNA) a few months before the interview. It was after this that the discussion became heated, centring on the inaccuracies in the programme. All those present expressed their disappointment, and in some cases anger, about the distortion of reality. Characteristically, Nihat said: 'I watch this and I become a Turk. They make me a Turk' (refer to section 6.5 for a discussion of this phrase). Some of the informants were interviewed for the documentary and what they had said had been turned around.

How is this related to the reporting of the Kosovo air strikes? It shows that the Turkish informants were ostracised and alienated from this dominant discourse, as they did not relate to the emotional intensity of the reports. This symbolic exclusion evoked other instances of their material exclusion from Greek society and explains why they showed me the video.

These informants were the same people who in our other interactions often told me: 'I am a Greek'. What the above example suggests is that the reporting of the Kosovo conflict raised the boundaries for exclusion in a similar way that the negative experiences with the journalists did (Chapter 6). People reverted to an essentialist discourse about belonging and difference as a response to an equally essentialist representation of identity and difference. This did not apply only to the Turks; it was the same for most of the informants regardless of their nationality. The difference is that, while the Greek and Cypriot informants who reverted to essentialist categories as a reaction to the news coverage were included, Turkish informants were excluded from the common communicative space that the news projected.
The following quotation reveals how Turkish interviewees used a dominant discourse and an 'us and them' binary scheme in their commutings to Western Thrace as a parallel to the Kosovo conflict. Suleyman was an informant who had repeatedly told me that he felt ‘in the middle, both Greek and Turkish’. Note the difference in content with the commutings of the Greeks and Cypriots to the issue of Western Thrace.

Suleyman: One day they will have a problem here in Greece as well. With whom? With the Muslims.

The coverage of the crisis led another informant, Mehmet, to express what he already knew from personal experiences. The difference from the previous informants is that Mehmet challenged the coverage as it was based on dominant categories that did not reflect his complex experience. Like Suleyman in the previous quotation, Mehmet distanced himself from the Greeks, referring to them in the third person (‘they’). So, even if Mehmet did not reproduce a dominant discourse himself, his comment reveals that the news coverage made him distance himself and perhaps feel excluded from the dominant discourse.

Mehmet: Greek journalists distinguish according to religion. The Albanian speakers are Muslim. Greeks only help the Christians. Even the ‘Medicins sans Frontiers’ only help the Christians.

8.3 CONCLUSIONS

A number of issues raised in this chapter will be brought together in this last section. The emphasis will be on the themes of critical viewers, personal experiences and cultural intimacy. First, however, the differences and similarities between the two case studies and among the groups of informants will be discussed.

Differences between case studies: Greek viewers

The Greek informants were more detached and critical of the news content in the airspace incident case study while they were more emotionally involved in relation to the Kosovo reports. While most interviewees challenged the banal nationalism and dominant identity discourse present in the airspace incident decodings, they reverted to a dominant discourse themselves in their interpretations and commutings of the Kosovo conflict. The emotional reaction and the dominant discourses that the Kosovo
news coverage generated coexisted with critical comments about media practices and journalistic conventions, indicating that there can be an emotional and cognitive dissonance in news reception. The difference between the airspace and the Kosovo case studies was explained partly through the theory of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 1996). The airspace incident was an affair that concerned Greece and Turkey — but, overall, it can be described as a local affair that was present on the news. People interpreted it as an internal affair that concerned the army and Greece’s relation to Cyprus — rather than to Turkey. In this context, they were highly critical of the news and its depiction of the army and Cyprus. To use a metaphor, people were discussing the dirty laundry of the nation within the confines of the ‘home’. This internal consumption of the news allowed people to be critical of the nation and some of its symbols and thus challenge the dominant discourse in the news.

Conversely, Kosovo was not a national issue but an international and regional affair that was heavily reported in Greece, often in an emotional way. As the news analysis suggested, the Kosovo news reports were highly nationalised and were based on the ‘us and them’ dichotomy. ‘Us’ included the Serbs and the Greeks, while ‘they’ were the Americans and in some cases the Kosovan refugees. In this context, Kosovo was an affair whereby Greek viewers defined themselves in relation to the world and particularly NATO and the United States. This explains why some viewers commuted to experiences or historical instances that were related to US involvement in Greek politics and the effects this had on people’s everyday lives. For many of the interviewees, NATO’s offensive in Kosovo and Serbia paralleled the invasion of one state into a sovereign country. One interviewee recalled instances from the Greek Civil War. For other interviewees, Kosovo was a reminder that NATO ‘applies double standards’ in its interventions: an interviewee commuted to the events in Cyprus in 1974 when neither NATO, nor the UN, intervened to stop the humanitarian disaster. Finally, some interviewees sympathised with the Serbs and their attitude towards the Kosovan Albanians, by projecting their fears of succession by the Turks of Thrace.

In this context, many of the Greek interviewees interpreted the events in Kosovo as a threat to their identity. Thus, in the Kosovo retellings people were not as critical as they were in the airspace decodings of the news content. On the contrary, in the Kosovo case study, many interviewees wanted to assert their identity and their
experiences to the rest of the world. They were reacting to an international conflict (instead of a local affair) and in this context there was not much room for challenging identity and national symbols.

One might ask how these identity articulations are related to the news. Would people relate the same way to the events in Kosovo, even if they were not mediated? This question begs an impossible answer. We cannot even think of ‘unmediated’ wars these days. Without the media, perhaps wars would be altogether different and here the discussion enters the hypothetical sphere. What is important is that the news offers viewers a continuous flow of discourses and representations to which they can relate, or not. It is as if the media instigate a continuous (potential) reflexivity. People are invited to articulate their identities and to juxtapose their own experiences to every report and news item. In the Kosovo case study, people related to news reports that were, in their majority, highly nationalised. Moreover, during the Kosovo conflict the media were the main source of information for most informants, notwithstanding a few exceptions (Alexandros, Vassilis and Nicos), who either had contrary personal experiences or access to alternative resources. In the light of this observation, the viewers’ reactions to the conflict itself are reactions to its mediated coverage, insofar as people did not have any other means of finding out about the conflict. This is another difference between the two case studies as, in the ‘airspace incident’, most informants’ decodings (and those of men in particular) were informed by personal experiences in the army. It emerges that interpretations depend on the range of available information resources, mediated and unmediated.

Differences were observed between those who had more resources and those who had fewer (e.g., high school students). Students said that they were ‘in the dark’ implying that they did not have alternative resources with which to interpret the news. Although they were critical at an aesthetic level, they did not have the confidence to confront the news with their experiences and historical knowledge. Nicos, a middle class student in London, who also lacked historically grounded experiences, benefited from a richer communications infrastructure, which informed his interpretations. On this basis, he had the confidence to challenge the news and did not express frustration or disappointment with his lack of knowledge.
People were critical about television news and journalistic practices and at the same time they watched the news a lot – in some cases they depended on it as their sole source of information. On many occasions it is through media exposure that people have become critical of the media (media literacy). Younger people were critical of media output (engaged with media with more literacy), while older people were sometimes more emotional in their encounters with the media (Ilias and Eugenia), or less media literate (Tasos). Younger people, on the other hand, depended more on the media to get informed, than older people, whose experiences provided the interpretative framework within which the decoding took place. In this context, the variety of resources affected interpretation and comprehension.

Being critical towards news at an aesthetic level does not imply a more critical approach concerning its content. Many critical decodings were as essentialist as the media texts themselves, particularly in the Kosovo case study (Sophia, Andreas, Marianna and Ioanna). Andreas and Yannis, who were literate viewers (making comments about editing etc), interpreted Kosovo reports in an emotional way, pointing to a dissonance between different levels of decoding.

_Cypriot viewers_

Most of the Greek Cypriot interviewees were emotionally involved in the decoding of the airspace report. They contrasted their own reality to that portrayed in the news and found it unsatisfactory. However, Cypriots do not form a homogenous category. Those informants who had lived in Athens for longer were less emotionally involved. The emotional interpretation of the content of the news does not mean that Cypriots are not critical viewers. On the contrary, they were very critical, especially at an aesthetic level.

Greek Cypriot informants were also emotional in their interpretations of the Kosovo coverage, drawing a parallel in their commutings to the Cyprus problem. In short, there were not as many differences, as there were among the Greeks, between the interpretations of the two case studies. The concept of cultural intimacy can be applied to explain this case as well: while for the Greek interviewees the airspace incident was a banal, internal issue, for the Greek Cypriots it was an issue that they had to defend as it concerned their country and what they perceived as a misrepresentation of their
reality. In other words, had the airspace incident been discussed in Cyprus, in relation to the Cypriot media, some of the informants might have been less emotional and more critical about its content. In the case of the Kosovo conflict, the Cypriots' interpretations were very similar to those of the Greeks as discussed above. It is interesting, then, to note how Cypriots are excluded from the national narrative in one case (airspace incident) and included in the other (Kosovo). Finally, it should be observed that experience emerges as a key notion. It is not simply a common (in this case Cypriot) identity that determines the above interpretations, but the ways in which people have experienced their common history and political circumstances. This is why Chryssa expresses a balanced, anti-essentialist and learned opinion on the Kosovo conflict and the Cyprus problem, indicating that identity is not the prison-house from which there is no escaping.

Turkish viewers
The emotional, dramatised and nationalised presentation of the Kosovo conflict echoed the emotions and popular perceptions of the Greek and Cypriot viewers. However, for people in the Turkish minority there was little emotional identification. This presentation was for many of them a confirmation of their exclusion from society at other levels. It is also a reminder of their negative first hand experiences with the media. This is why they showed me the video about their neighbourhood. On this last point I should make two remarks. I cannot talk about the whole range of media and media texts available. It is possible that television drama might be more inclusive. But this observation is significant, since the news is a dominant feature of public discourse in Greece as discussed in Chapter 4. The drawing of the boundaries is relevant not only to the Turkish minority of Greece, but perhaps also to the large immigrant communities that have been living in Greece in recent years.

Criticisms at an aesthetic and content level were also related to trust and personal experiences with the media. Most Turkish viewers' decodings exemplified this point, which relates to the findings in Chapter 6 about the informants' personal experiences with the media. Recall that Greek informants had positive experiences, Cypriots had no personal experiences (with one exception), while Turkish informants only had negative experiences with journalists and the media. In this chapter it emerges that interpretations depend on the degree of trust people have in the media which is in turn
determined by their personal experiences with the media. In this context, an argument about mediation, the attempt to see the media as a process, is emerging: the interpretation of the media text is but one of the moments in this process, which is determined itself by other moments and processes.

At this point I return to the work of Barth on *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) which was discussed in Chapter 2. Barth argued that ethnic group membership depends on ascription and self-ascription, rather than on possessing inherent qualities. In this context, identities are understood as relations as it is in relation to something or someone else that the boundary is drawn. The findings in this chapter (as well as those in Chapter 6) suggest that the media, together with other institutions and structures, play a role in creating boundaries.

**The reality of experience**

The readings of the news content are influenced by existing interpretative frameworks which, in turn, are shaped by people's experiences and life histories. All the viewers juxtaposed their reality and experience with the representations on the news. People commuted to their own experiences and it was through these that they made sense of the news. This suggests that reception and context cannot be separated, but are part of the same process.

The concept of experience emerges as particularly useful here. Experience allows for both fluctuations in identity positionings and diversity within ethnic categories. It also foregrounds the personal dimension and the possibility that the same events can be experienced in different ways by different people (such cases were Chryssa and Marianna). People's interpretative frameworks were not determined by their ethnicity but by their experiences and the ways in which they had integrated them into their lives.

It is by focusing on people's experiences that the diversity within the groups can be explained. Greek Cypriots who had lived in Greece for longer felt more 'at home' in Athens (Anna, Dina, Stavros and Myrto). The Cypriot students, on the other hand, were more in tune with the reality in Cyprus' (Orestis, Yiorgos, Eva and Elpida). Yannis and Anna who were refugees from Northern Cyprus were more emotional in
their commutings. Chryssa, on the other hand, who had had similar experiences, had transformed them into a different perspective that accepted difference and avoided the 'us and them' dichotomies. Identity, thus, is not the prison-house from which there is no escaping. The notion of experience, I argue, is more successful in capturing the subtleties involved in such processes and does justice to peoples' discourses.

Similarly Nuriye, Ayse and Umut have a different perspective from Orhan and Mehmet. In their cases this depends on the degree of integration in Greek society. Turkish women in Gazi are more marginalized than men and experience the news as a confirmation of their exclusion. This is also experienced by men (Suleyman, Umut and Hasan), but to a relatively lesser degree. The frustration that some Turkish men and women experienced was similar to that expressed by some Greek interviewees (working class housewives and students).

In short, there was not a common Greek, Cypriot or Turkish interpretative framework. On the contrary, there were overlaps and differences that were determined by a number of factors: gender, age, experience. There was also similarity across ethnic groups. Differences in interpretation are not ethnically determined, but historically and personally grounded. Different layers of people's identities interact with media text.

Overall, however, it can be argued that viewers' decodings were more open than the encoding. Viewers' interpretations were more analytic and historical than the news itself. This happened more regularly in the airspace incident interviews, at least for the majority of the Greeks and Cypriots. The Turkish informants were equally critical in both case studies, although it has to be noted that the women were not particularly vocal in either case.

Given this diversity, it is not possible to identify a causal relationship between the media text and the reproduction of nationalism at a local level. People often and sometimes forcefully challenge the banal nationalism of the news. This does not mean that interpretations are random and arbitrary, but rather that they do not depend solely on the abstract categories of nationality and ethnicity.
Text did not determine interpretation. A number of extra-textual factors, such as historical and contextual knowledge, alternative resources and personal experiences, contribute to interpretation. There is, however, another, broader way that media content is related to interpretations and people’s discourses. The media make available a number of discourses and representations about the nation, its place in the world and its relationship to its ‘others’. Identities, being relational, are constantly negotiated in relation to media texts. There are, however, limits to this reflexivity. The concept of cultural intimacy casts some light on these discursive oscillations.

Cultural intimacy

The concept of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 1996) explains some of the seeming paradoxes that emerge from people’s discourses during the two periods. During the airspace incident (an internal incident that also involved Cyprus) people were critical of the role of the Greek army, the relationship between Greece and Cyprus and the politics between Greece and Turkey. Such discourses are very different from the more formal discourse about Cyprus in the news. Recall that in the news reports Cyprus was referred to as Meghalonisos, the ‘big island’ — Cyprus was part of ‘us’. In people’s discourses, however, Cyprus and Cypriots became ‘them’/‘the others’.

Conversely, in the Kosovo study, whenever the interviewees mentioned Cyprus spontaneously, it was in the context of ‘us’. Cyprus was incorporated into the symbolic national corpus in many of the respondents’ discourses (Ilias, Eugenia, Ioanna, Andreas and Sophia). When discussing identity and difference ‘within the home’, to make a metaphor for an internal issue, such as the airspace incident, people were keen to contest the dominant discourse about the nation and its symbols. Conversely, a different discourse emerges when identity is challenged from the

132 Another example of cultural intimacy comes from a story one of the interviewees told in the context of ‘commuting’ in the airspace incident. Christos, one of the highly critical respondents in the airspace interview both at an aesthetic level and at a content level, described an experience he had at a conference in Belgium. He mentioned that the Turkish delegation proposed that Northern Cyprus should be represented independently. ‘I was very surprised, to see people of my age, I was then 25, coming to the conference with this purpose, to convince the other delegates that Northern Cyprus is an independent state that should be represented as an independent state. And we [the Greek delegation] reacted to this, and I discovered that the rest of the people knew nothing about the Cyprus issue’. [...] ‘There was huge enmity on the Turks’ side. They were fanaticised’.

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outside. In Kosovo, many Greeks felt they had to assert their identity to what they thought was a threat to their culture and identity from the outside.

It emerges that identity is relational – television mediates discourses and thus provides the possibilities in relation to which people articulate their own identity discourses. Having said that, the dominant discourse in the news does have an impact on local discourses. This depends on what is at stake: when identity is asserted to the outside world there is more homogeneity among the interpretations. Frames of ‘us and them’ become more prevalent.

More importantly, the dominant discourse has an effect that is often ignored in the literature on media and identity: exclusion. Chapter 6 argued that television provides a common point of reference for a many of its viewers. However, because television news discourse relies on a closed understanding of identity (based on common religion, customs and blood – Chapter 7), it excludes those who do not conform to the ‘cultural’ definition of identity.

The findings in this chapter connect with those of other news reception studies. The first similarity is with the argument made by Morley in the Nationwide study that knowledge is always a matter of class, race and gender positioning, among other things (Morley, 1999: 139). The group of apprentices in the Nationwide study was cynical towards the programme while being at the same time ‘in line’ with the preferred reading of the text and accepting the perspectives offered by and through the programme’s presenter (Morley, 1992: 115-6). In this context the comprehension-incomprehension dimension of decoding emerges as significant. As Morley notes, we need to distinguish between the moments when people fail to make ‘dominant’ readings of the news because they lack the particular forms of literacy to read the news, or because they lack the resources to develop any coherent alternative perspective on the events reported in the news media (Morley, 1999: 140). In these cases an idiosyncratic reading is not something to be celebrated. This finding relates to the decodings made by the least resourceful informants who were critical of the media in a general way expressing a distrust towards their practices, but who could not argue thoroughly their differentiated interpretation (such examples were some of the Greek and Turkish housewives and the group of high school students)

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Another study with which the findings in this chapter connect is Philo's study (1990) on the coverage and reception of the miners' strike in 1984-5. Philo identified a clear correspondence between certain recurrent themes in the news' reporting of the strike and the viewers' accounts. Although in this chapter there was no clear correspondence between the themes present in the news and the viewers' interpretations, in the Kosovo retellings people reverted to an 'us and them' frame that was also present in the news. Philo's findings are related to the fact that there was a cumulative impact from the constantly repeated images and themes during the coverage of the prolonged miners' strike. The approach that Philo used in his study is similar to the one employed in the Kosovo case study. Given that the conflict and its coverage lasted for two and a half months, its cumulative impact might be another reason that explains the differences between the two case studies, particularly in the cases of the Greek viewers.

Another study which has made a similar observation to the one discussed here is that by Gillespie (1995) who, in her ethnography among Punjabi Indians in Southall, observed that during the Gulf War the young informants reverted to a binary mode of thinking about their identities when discussing the news. As she notes, her informants, despite the openness that characterised their identity discourses, 'in the face of events which represent a challenge to their sense of identity, became acutely aware of the range of options open to them and trapped in binary thinking themselves' (1995: 206).

Finally, this chapter is in dialogue with some of the top-down works on media and nationalism and particularly the work of Billig on *Banal Nationalism* (1996). The chapter attempts to integrate two levels of analysis, that of the text and its reception. In so doing it challenges the assumption that banal nationalism is reproduced unproblematically, as most interviewees challenged the nationalism in the news and the dominant identity discourses it projected. This contestation, however, has its limits. It was through the concept of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 1996) that the moments of contestation and the moments of rejection were identified.
9. Conclusions

This thesis started with an image of a televised public event and a question: do the media provide the catalyst for belonging to the nation? Although this question was subsequently abandoned in favour of a more nuanced one, it is still important to address the relationship between media and identity in the light of the empirical data. This is what this chapter will do, together with presenting a summary of the overall argument and the empirical findings. As this is an interdisciplinary study drawing upon a number of literatures to which it aims to contribute, the chapter will discuss the implications of the thesis for the relevant literatures, particularly that of media and identity. It will also assess the limitations of the thesis and its relevance outside the empirical context of Greece. Finally, I will consider some possible ways forward for the field.

9.1 The Argument and Summary of Main Findings

Chapter 2 argued for a new approach to the identity and media relationship. After examining the existing media and identity literature it concluded that what has been somewhat neglected is a perspective that examines identity as lived and as performed. Theories that have favoured a top-down approach have assumed strong media effects on identity, whereas theories that emphasise a perspective 'from below' have argued for powerful audiences and resilient local cultures. Both approaches, despite their insights, were described as inadequate insofar as they tended to essentialise culture and identity. What is needed is a dialectical perspective on identity and the media. In Chapter 2 I suggested that, instead of focusing on identity and how it is shaped by the media, I would focus on the ways in which people articulate their identities in different contexts. In particular I was interested in the shifts from more open to more closed discourses about identity and whether the media influence such oscillations. In order to do so I followed the circulation of discourses about the nation in the media and in people's lives. This study contrasts what was termed in Chapter 2 as the dominant and the demotic discourses on identity (Baumann, 1996). Dominant is the discourse that reifies culture and treats community or minority as given categories.
Demotic discourse is the one that challenges such reifications and aims to break down the barriers of segregation. Dominant and demotic discourses coexist\(^{133}\) and the challenge is to examine whether the media play any role in their occurrence. When do people use the dominant discourse and when do people contest it with the demotic? Moreover, drawing on the work of Barth (1969) and other anthropologists, I investigate whether the media play any role in raising the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion from public life.

Chapter 3 grounded the theoretical framework on identity proposed in Chapter 2, in relation to the case of Greece. Through a historical perspective it emerged that identities were constructed, relational and often ambivalent, thereby challenging the dominant assumption of a single, homogenous national identity. Chapter 4 argued that the relationship between media and identity should be understood as a process, thus echoing recent developments towards a theory of mediation. Such an approach, drawing on existing work in audience research and other fields in media studies, aims to achieve theoretical triangulation by combining the vertical and horizontal dimensions of communication with emphasis on texts, technologies and audiences. The theoretical triangulation proposed in Chapters 2 and 4 is coupled with a methodological triangulation in Chapter 5. To see the media and identity relationship as a dialectic process requires a combination of methods that can describe the multifaceted process. Ethnography was given a central role in this triangulation process as a pertinent method for the investigation of the media and identity relationship.

The second part of the thesis (Chapters 6-8) presented the empirical analysis. In Chapter 6 I mapped the available media used by the informants exploring how these were integrated in their everyday lives. Moreover, I examined whether media usage and media related experiences affected the ways in which people articulated their identities. It was argued that television does not foster identity in a causal way. For a number of informants, however, television news provides a common point of

\(^{133}\) Dominant and demotic should not be seen as synonyms for official/elite and local. As Chapter 8 showed, the informants articulate dominant discourses very often.
reference while for some others it is experienced as a form of exclusion. These points are summarised below.

(1) **Rethinking the media and identity relationship**

The analysis of the empirical data does not support the existence of a causal relationship between media and identity. Moreover, it has indicated that in some instances such an assumption would be misleading and might have adverse consequences. To say that the Turks become more Turkish because they watch Turkish television does not reflect reality and also encourages ethnic segregation. In Chapter 6 watching satellite television from Turkey appeared as an ordinary practice, challenging popular perceptions that Turkish television provides the umbilical cord to the 'national centre' and thus to Turkish nationalism. This finding confirms the arguments by Robins and Aksoy (2001) and Oncu (2000). The Turkish informants watched both Turkish and Greek television and some mentioned that there were not that many differences between the two national broadcasting systems. Differences were identified in relation to television news, but most informants said that they preferred to watch the news from the country in which they live. Recall that the Turkish minority in Greece is not an immigrant minority, that is, people never left Turkey to come to Greece; rather they are Greek citizens who were born in Greece. Technologies, therefore, do not determine identities. They do, however, enable the moving from one symbolic space to another, a process in which most informants engage. The informants' media use habits are differentiated according to gender, age and education. In this context it is not possible to talk of a homogenous community or minority.

(2) **Television news provides a common point of reference**

Greek television news provides a common point of reference for most of the interviewees. News stories are in constant circulation in people’s everyday lives. The Greek informants in particular are heavy news viewers, some describing themselves as addicted to the news. In some instances news programmes become an integral part of people’s lives as they watch themselves on the news and use it instrumentally in order to make their voices heard and achieve personal purposes (Chapter 6).
(3) News and exclusion
Not all the informants, however, shared this common point of reference. Disenfranchised informants, regardless of their ethnic background, who feel that television news does not reflect their reality, decided to switch off their television sets. Interestingly, this dissatisfaction is often expressed in ethnic terms although it primarily reflects social exclusion (the reasons for this will be discussed below).

Exclusion is also evident in relation to personal experiences with journalists and the media. This is most obvious in the case of the Turkish informants. Chapter 6 contrasted the ordinariness with which the Gaziots use both Turkish and Greek media, to the frustration and sense of injustice that they experience in their personal contacts with the media and journalists. The Turkish informants feel that whenever they see themselves in the media there is distortion and falsification. In turn, the exclusion that the Turks experience is in sharp contrast to the largely positive and banal media experiences of the Greek informants and the largely nonexistent experiences of the Cypriots.

(4) News projects a common identity
The openness of identity discourses described in Chapter 6 (notwithstanding the moments of exclusion) is contrasted to the relatively homogenous identity that the news reports project (Chapter 7). Chapter 7 examined two televised occasions, which were termed the ‘airspace incident’ and the ‘Kosovo conflict’ reports. The former was a relatively routine event that involved Greece and Turkey and indirectly Cyprus, while the latter was an international issue that was nationalised by the Greek media, revealing global, national and local dynamics. From the analysis of the news reports in both case studies it emerged that to a large extent television news projects a common identity based on primordial attachments rather than citizenship. In the mainstream Greek media, Greek is equated with Orthodox Christian and this tenet goes largely uncontested even though it suggests a retreat to the overtly nationalistic slogans of the Colonels’ dictatorship (1967-1974): ‘Greece belongs to Orthodox Christians’.

(5) Contesting the banal nationalism of the news
Chapter 8 examined the reception of the news reports among the interviewees and contrasted the discourse in the news (Chapter 7) to that generated at a local level. It
emerged that most of the interviewees challenged the news discourse based on their personal experiences and histories. This was particularly the case during the ‘airspace incident’ when almost all the interviewees were critical of the news content and media practices in general, and themselves made analytical and historically informed decodings of the largely ahistorical news reports. Thus, contextual knowledge and the existence of alternative resources emerged as the significant parameters that shape interpretation and allow for a possible contestation of the dominant discourse. Those informants with few media and educational resources, as well as those who lacked personal experiences (mainly because of age) that would provide them with knowledge of the historical context, were less likely to contest the news reports. In this sense context emerges as belonging to the vertical dimension of communication and not just the horizontal, as Livingstone has suggested (1998c: 251).

(6) Cultural intimacy

However, in the Kosovo conflict retellings, many of the interviewees shifted to a more essentialist discourse. In Chapter 8, I drew upon the theory of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 1996) in order to explain the shifts from more open to closed ways of articulating informants’ identities and their position in the nation state. I argued that the discursive oscillations are not contingent, but are rather determined by context – in relation to whom and what identities are articulated. Greek participants interpreted the Kosovo conflict as an external challenge to which they had to reply by asserting their identity. Thus, some of the national symbols that were challenged in the airspace decodings were accepted in the Kosovo case study. Similarly, the concept of cultural intimacy can partially explain the mass gatherings in the central squares of Athens and Thessaloniki in the early 1990s. The so-called ‘Macedonian Issue’ was largely perceived as an external threat to Greece’s sovereignty and identity. The mobilisation was so immense precisely because the threat was perceived as external (exacerbated by the popular feeling that the others, Europe and the US, do not understand Greece’s position).

(6) Exclusion again

In Chapter 8 it was argued that exclusion is also experienced in relation to the text (news content) whenever it projects an essentialist or dominant discourse. It seems that essentialism produces similar responses. Exclusion is heightened in the Greek
news because instead of being based on an all-embracing notion of citizenship it presents a primordial model of belonging based on 'national' homogeneity and unity. The strongest effect of the homogenising news seems to be the fact that it is experienced as exclusive by those informants who feel that they do not conform to this primordial identity. Drawing upon Barth’s theory of *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969a) I argued that in such instances the media contribute to the raising of boundaries for inclusion and exclusion from public life.

When informants reflected on their identities and place in society in the interview context or in their daily interactions there was often openness in their discourses. However, when they were confronted with closure in the media, some informants adopted a more 'closed' discourse themselves. The far-reaching effect is that such closure can have political and social consequences taking identity politics into a vicious circle. Of course, the media are not the sole forces raising boundaries. They reflect existing material inequalities. Importantly, the informants who seemed more vulnerable to revert to a dominant and essentialist discourse when confronted with closure, were those with fewer resources and weaker confidence. Examples include the Turks in Gazi, who did not feel confident enough to initiate a dialogue with the media and the journalists.

A similar point is made by Arendt, who argued that the only viable strategy when an identity is under attack in times of defamation and persecution, is to respond by embracing this very identity (1968: 17). Arendt continues by noting that

> [t]hose who reject such identifications on the part of a hostile world may feel wonderfully superior to the world, but their superiority is then truly no longer of this world; it is the superiority of a more or less well-equipped cloud-cuckoo-land (1968: 17).

Another significant observation is that, although the informants make claims to citizenship when they react to news content and their experiences with journalists, they often use ethnic categories instead in order to make this point. The finding that the dominant discourse is often challenged should not mask its pervasiveness at a local level. This is perhaps explained through the dominance of ethnic categories. Baumann observed in his fieldwork in Southall that the dominant discourse 'represents the currency within which people must deal with the political and media
establishments on both the national and the local level' (1996: 192). The dominant discourse then becomes 'a hegemonic discourse within which people from minorities must explain themselves and legitimate their claims' (ibid.).

Thus the question do the media bind the nation together, cannot be answered in a simple way. It is the wrong question. The media bring people together on some occasions while they might be experienced as exclusive by others. Inclusion and exclusion from the public communicative space that the media create take place in parallel both in relation to media technologies and in relation to media content. The news is considered to be an internal public sphere in which the 'dirty laundry' of the nation can be exposed, thus confirming Ellis' claim that television is the private life of the nation state (1982: 5). In this study, it emerged that it is within this private sphere that official discourses about the nation can be contested. At the same time, however, the news is also the bridge to the outside world. It conveys the representations of Greece abroad and in this sense provides a mirror against which the viewers have to measure themselves.

9.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY

From the summary of the main findings it emerges that neither of the two hitherto dominant paradigms (strong media/weak identities and weak media/powerful identities) are adequate to explain the relationship between the media and identity. It is proposed that the relationship between the media and identity is investigated as a process that takes into account both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective. In this context, the theory of mediation emerges as a promising possibility. Different moments of the media and identity relationship were described and analysed in the previous pages, including direct experiences with the media, consumption of the media as objects, the media as text, reception and context, all of which are parts of the mediation process. The media and identity relationship cannot be exhausted in one moment, but is rather a complex process that contains a number of often contradictory aspects. By examining as many moments as possible it is possible to achieve empirical confirmation across levels and so to make an argument about media power.
In this context, this thesis is an attempt to contribute to the growing interest in theorising mediation. A mediational perspective on the media and identity relationship emerged as pertinent as it can capture the dynamism of identity discourses and the processional nature of the media. To examine the articulation of identities only in relation to news decodings would mean ignoring all the other mediated moments during which identity discourses are articulated and which are inevitably interrelated. Thus, while informants contested banal nationalism in their decodings of the news and made sophisticated and analytical readings, they reverted to an essentialist dominant discourse in certain contexts (personal experiences with journalists and interpretation of the reporting on Kosovo).

This thesis also argues that representation (through the media text) is still important; we cannot abandon the text when investigating the relationship between the media and identity. It is a combination of the media (the sheer presence of them) and representations that affect discourses about identities. From the analysis of the news interpretations and the integration of the media in people’s lives, it emerged that the distinction between media as objects and media as texts is mostly an analytical one, confirming Livingstone’s arguments (1998b; 2001). Media as objects and media as texts are both deeply intertwined and both dimensions should be part of the mediational approach. Moreover, in the analysis the distinction between decoding and context emerged as analytical (cf. Livingstone et al.: 2001). Similarly, the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of communication cannot be separated easily either. As mentioned previously, context is understood both horizontally (as the surround of the moment of consumption) and vertically, insofar as consumption depends on availability and access to resources and material structures (Livingstone, 1998c: 251).

In this context, this thesis argues that the two strands contained within audience studies, namely reception studies and media ethnography, can be combined with beneficial effects.

These findings, confirming those in other studies, suggest that the development of a mediational perspective might provide a new challenge for audience studies and its theorisation of power. Such a development would also move the research agenda
beyond the confines of a research canon\textsuperscript{134}, which according to Livingstone can impede the progress of the field (1998c).

Another way that the field of media studies and audience studies in particular can benefit is by opening up to other disciplines. This study, in the context of the examination of the relationship between the media and identity, confirms the arguments by other scholars in the past two decades that ethnography is an appropriate method for the investigation of the role of the media in people’s lives (see among others, Morley and Silverstone, 1989; Gillespie, 1995). Because of the difficulties in accessing the Turkish informants, a different approach might have yielded different data in this study (see Chapter 5). Moreover, this study benefited from theorising the insider and outsider relationship which emerged as an important issue at an ethical and epistemological level.

The above point links to the development of a new sub-field of media anthropology that seems promising and exciting (Askew and Wilk, 2002). A truly interdisciplinary perspective would endow this new sub-field with the opportunity to overcome limitations in both media ethnographies and anthropological perspectives on the media. At the risk of oversimplifying, if media studies have often reified identity and culture (the object \textit{par excellence} of anthropological research) as Chapter 2 suggested, anthropologists have often reified media power (the concern of most media studies). A dialectical approach has been proposed here that might manage to overcome these shortcomings and acknowledge the complexity of these processes. In this thesis, the combination of media theories and the anthropological concepts and perspectives on identity proved very useful in understanding the data.

Finally, this study also makes a modest contribution to the identity and nationalism debates. Although it did not aim to make arguments about identity construction in Greece (at least not in isolation from media processes), the data gathered are inevitably related to this issue. For example, through the interviews with and

\textsuperscript{134} According to Livingstone the canon is ‘a small set of often-repeated examples of audience studies which are used both to justify the research enterprise – in which they have so far been successful – and implicitly or explicitly, to direct it; this is more problematic in the absence of a clear set of guiding questions or arguments’ (1998c: 241).
observations of the Turkish minority it is possible to contest the myth of the homogenous nation that occupies a ‘historic homeland’ (Smith, 1998: 22). As Ismail and Nazim put it: ‘I was born here, and so were my grandparents, great-grandparents and so on’.

The main contribution of this thesis however, is to the media and identity literature. This thesis has argued for a dialectic perspective in theorising the identity and media relationship. Neither identity nor the media should be foregrounded in research as this might affect the outcome of the study as Chapter 2 suggested. In Chapter 2, the concept of identity itself was challenged (together with that of culture), insofar as it implies a single and homogenous identity. Instead I chose to focus on discourses about identity and their oscillations between openness and closure. Drawing on the work of Baumann (1996), I used the terms dominant and demotic to describe two types of discourses about belonging. This way I avoided the essentialism of implying a single and coherent identity but also captured the moments when people rely on essentialist, dominant discourses to describe themselves and others. This theoretical framework that has been developed mainly by anthropologists might be a useful way to examine the relationship between media and identity and media and popular culture.

Three notions emerged as useful for this thesis and might be worth developing and theorising further, namely experience, resources and citizenship. The first two have also been identified by Robins and Aksoy in another study (2001).

Experience proved a useful term in this study as it added a personal dimension to the collectivity that the concept of identity implies. Similar events are experienced in different ways by different people who in turn transform their experience into a different set of ideas, perspectives and interpretations. Such an example was Chryssa whose experience of the Cyprus problem, and thus her decodings, were significantly different from those of the other Cypriot informants. The shortcoming of the notion of experience is that it might be reduced to relativism and thus cannot be theorised.

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135 The historical perspective and the findings in Chapters 6 and 8 challenged the existence of a single homogenous identity.
easily. However, the different ways in which events are experienced is not arbitrary but depends in turn on material and symbolic structures. In this sense experience is linked to resources (see below).

Resources are the symbolic and material means through which people make sense of the world. They are related to Bourdieu’s concept of capital (1984), although the concept is meant in a broader way. Resources include education and access to media and information. As Chapter 8 showed, decodings depended on contextual and other knowledge, and those informants who had this made more critical decodings. To return to the example of Chryssa in the previous paragraph, her differentiated interpretation of the events in Kosovo and Cyprus depended on her experience which in turn depended on her education and further training in counselling. The concept of resources might also provide a way to link – or explore further – the relationship between the vertical and the horizontal, the micro and the macro and media and identity.

Finally, the notion of citizenship takes the ideas developed in this thesis into the spheres of politics and policy. The informants who felt excluded by the dominant media discourse reacted to it by making claims to citizenship. Recall the comments by Nihat and Hasan: ‘we were born in this country’ and ‘I served in the army here’. However, as mentioned in the previous section, this exclusion is often expressed in ethnic terms (‘I become a Turk’). This was interpreted as a result of the prominence of ethnic categories in public life. If this thesis could make any sort of recommendations at a policy level in terms of media and exclusion, it is that we need to think more in terms of belonging to a community of equal rights and obligations rather than to one defined by primordial attachments and blood relations (which is the perspective advocated by the news in Greece).

Citizenship has been theorised recently as extending beyond the nation-state. It has been proposed that the meaning of citizenship is changing and ‘a new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organising and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging’ (Soysal, 1994: 1). Soysal urges us to recognise that national
citizenship is no longer an adequate concept upon which to base a perceptive narrative of membership. As she notes, 'postnational formations of membership challenge us to refurbish our definitions and theoretical vistas of and about citizenship and the nation-state' (1994: 167). Similarly, Held suggests a broad definition of citizenship 'as the struggle for membership and participation in the community' (Held, 1999: 20) which can adapt to a post-national perspective.

9.3 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY AND WAYS FORWARD

Although this study is about Greece, its findings are relevant to other empirical contexts. Of course, the theoretical framework can be applied to any context. What perhaps differentiates the Greek case is that the status of the Turkish minority is rather exceptional and politicised. At the same time the Greek broadcasting landscape bears many similarities to that of Israel (Liebes, 1998) and Turkey (Robins, 1996 and Aksoy and Robins, 1997) and it might be interesting to compare the differences and similarities between similar issues in these countries.

This study is also relevant to the increasingly multicultural dimension of Greek society although there are differences between ethnic minorities (as a result of immigration) and national minorities (often more politicised). This study suggests that exclusion from the media might be felt by other minorities and even regional identities in Greece. As mentioned in Chapter 7 it is indicative that only the Athenian accent can be heard on Greek television.\footnote{This was the case in British public service broadcasting until recently. Only in the past decade have regional accents as well as those of minorities gained some visibility, thus reflecting the multicultural dimension of British society (Scannell, 1997).}

It should be noted that the arguments about inclusion and exclusion in this study pertain to the genre of the news. It is possible that a focus on fictional genres might have yielded different data. However, the inclusion of fiction on top of the two case studies and participant observation was not feasible in the context of this thesis. The decision to focus on the news is defended by the central role that the news has in both television programming and viewers' lives.
The study focuses on the Turkish minority living in a particular Athenian neighbourhood. It does not reflect the entirety of the Turkish minority in Greece. In this context comparative research with the minority in Western Thrace, where there is more segregation, would provide further knowledge about this much neglected minority. My short experience/sojourn in Thrace in 1998 left me with the impression that there is more segregation there than in Athens, and it would be particularly interesting to compare the discursive shifts relating to identity in that context. What should be taken into account would be the contrast between the urban environment of Athens that facilitates change and the rural/border environment of Thrace where politics and nationalism are much stronger. Another dimension that links with the issue of community and alternative media would be to compare the two Turkish communities in Athens and Thrace in terms of their media resources. While the Athenian Turks are deprived of all forms of community media, their peers in Thrace enjoy a plethora of local – albeit often deeply politicised – media. These themes could be linked to the issues of resources and experiences.

The arguments put forward in this thesis could be further explored in relation to other genres or public events, such as the Olympic Games that Athens will host in the summer of 2004. The Games are widely referred to in the media and in surveys as a 'national issue' and an issue of 'national pride'. The case of the Olympics is interesting as it involves a national celebration and not a crisis (although a crisis is always possible in the context of the preparations, particularly meeting deadlines for the construction of sites, and scandals involving handling of budgets and commissions). Moreover, the spirit of voluntarism that the Olympic committee is keen to build might prove to be more inclusive for minorities, unless it is based again on a primordial interpretation of identity that excludes difference and supersedes citizenship. In other words, through the hosting of the Olympic Games, one of the two ideologies will prevail: the one that emphasises Greek antiquity and continuity or the one that is based on citizenship that embraces difference.

In this thesis I have attempted to add a story to the growing body of work on media and identities in the Greek and other contexts. I have tried to follow Said’s suggestion of thinking 'contrapuntally' about identities within the nation state (Said, 1993: 407-8), that is to recognise the diversity of traditions and the existence of otherness within
what is often considered as homogenous and complete. More work is needed in this field for what could become a wider political project extending beyond the confines of the nation state while recognising the interconnections and cultural change that are already taking place at a transnational level. Said, in the following extract, is urging us to take this path.

No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are no more than starting points, which if followed into actual experience for only one moment are quickly left behind. Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly, exclusively, white, black, or Western, or Oriental. Yet just as human beings make their own history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities. No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about. Survival in fact is about connections between things; in Eliot’s phrase, reality cannot be deprived of the ‘other echoes [that] inhabit the garden’. It's more rewarding – and more difficult – to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, about others than only about ‘us’. But this also means not trying to rule out others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly reiterating how ‘our’ culture or country is number one (or not number one, for that matter). For the intellectual there is quite enough of value to do without that (Said, 1993: 407-8).
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Appendix I
Description of informants

List in alphabetical order; all names have been changed
* indicates that participant observation was conducted in the house of the person).
(A) indicates that the participant took place in the airspace incident case study
(K) indicates that the participant took place in the ‘Kosovo’ case study

(A) Aggeliki is a 50-year-old high school teacher in a working class neighbourhood in Athens. She is married and lives with her husband and children.

* (K) Alexandros is in his early twenties and was an undergraduate student in London at the time of the interview. He comes from an upper middle class family and lives with his parents when in Greece.

(A) Aliki is a final year high school student from a working class neighbourhood in Western Athens, preparing for her exams to enter University.

* (K) Andreas is in his mid thirties who works as a paramedic in the army. He lives with his parents.

* (A) Anna is a woman in her late twenties. Born in Cyprus, she came to Greece to study and pursue a career as a classical singer. She lives on her own in central Athens.

(A) Ayse is 53 years old and works as a cleaner in one of the local government buildings in the centre of Athens. She is married and lives with her husband and children in Gazi.

* (A & K) Bahar is in her late fifties. She used to work as a domestic cleaner; in recent years she only works part-time. She lives in Gazi close to her daughter (Nazli) and Nuriye with whom she exchanges frequent visits.

* (A) Christos is an architect in his late twenties. At the time of the interview he had just finished his military service and started work in an architectural firm. He shared a flat with a friend in Athens.

(K) Chryssa is in her fifties and was born in Cyprus. She has been living most of her life in Athens apart from a period when she studied in London. She is a social worker and lives with her husband and two sons.

(A) Defne is a 17-year-old high school student from a working class neighbourhood in Western Athens, preparing for the final year exams.

(A) Dina was born in Cyprus and lives and works in Athens in a private company.

(A) Elpida was born in Cyprus and is an undergraduate student in Athens University.
* (K) Eugenia is in her sixties and used to be a primary school teacher. She has now retired and lives with her husband, Ilias.

(A) Eva was born in Cyprus and is an undergraduate student in Athens university. She is actively involved in one of the Cypriot student parties.

(K) Faruk is Suleyman's 16-year-old son. He attends a technical school and is involved with sports.

* (A) fotini is in her early thirties. A law school graduate, she is a junior partner in Tasos' and Michalis' firm. She lives on her own.

(A) Fotis is an 18-year-old high school student from a working class neighbourhood in Western Athens, preparing for his exams to enter University.

(A) Georgia is a housewife in her fifties. She lives with her husband in a working class neighbourhood in Athens.

(A) Giota is a housewife in her late forties. She has two daughters who now live on their own. Giota lives with her husband in a flat close to Georgia with whom she exchanges frequent visits.

Hamdi used to be the head of one of the clubs in Gazi. He is in his late fourties and works in a shipyard. He lives with his wife and kids.

(A) Haris is a high school teacher. He is in his forties and is married with two children.

* (A) Hasan is Umut's father. An unskilled worker he was receiving a pension which was the only regular salary in the extended household. In 1974 he fought with the Greek army in Cyprus.

* (K) Ilias is in his seventies. He had fought in the civil war and was subsequently persecuted for being left wing. He spent a large part of his life in 'exile', in the rock islands of the Aegean, as a political prisoner. Later, he also worked in a petrol station, which he co-owned. He lives with his wife Eugenia.

(K) Ioanna was born in Cyprus and has been living in Greece in the past 30 years. She is in her fifties and lives with her husband and children. She is is involved in charity work.

(A) Irini is a 17-year-old high school student from a working class neighbourhood in Western Athens, preparing for the final year exams.

Ismail is in his late forties. At the time of the interview he was working in a construction site. He lived with his wife and children in Gazi.

(A) Jenny was born in Cyprus but has lived in Athens most of her life. She works in a research company and lives with her husband. She is in her late thirties.
(K) **Katerina** is a medical assistant in an army hospital. She is in her early thirties and lives with her parents.

(A) **Lena** is a high school teacher in her early thirties. She lives on her own in central Athens.

**Levent** is 17 years old. He lives with his parents in Gazi and occasionally works in a garage.

* (K) **Lia** is in her early forties; originally born in Cyprus she has lived in Athens most of her life. She studied in London and now works in higher education and is also registered as a part-time PhD student. She is married to Yannos.

(K) **Marianna** is in her 50s. She was born in Cyprus but has lived most of her life in Athens. She studied in the United States and was a college lecturer in Athens. She has been actively involved in promoting awareness for the Cyprus problem.

(A) **Marilena** is a high school teacher. She is 45 years old and lives with her husband and children.

(K) **Mehmet** was finishing high school at the time of the interview and was preparing for his university exams. He lives in Gazi with his family.

(A) **Metin** is 38 years old, lives in Gazi with his wife. He is unemployed.

* (A) **Michalis** is a lawyer working in his father’s firm. He is 36 years old and lives on his own in central Athens.

(A) **Mumin** is in his forties and lives in Gazi. He has been working in various jobs with intermittent periods of unemployment. He used to be a sailor for 10 years before he came to settle in Athens with his wife.

(K) **Murat** is a man in his thirties. He is the only graduate in the Gazi neighbourhood. He has a degree in education and wants to work as a teacher, although during my fieldwork he was working in a small factory [viotehnìa].

(A) **Myrto** is in her late forties. She was born in Cyprus but has been living in Athens for almost thirty years. She works in a company in Athens.

**Nazim** is in his fifties. At the time of the interview he was working in the construction site for the new Athens metro. He has lived in Athens for 20 years and before then he was an immigrant worker in Germany.

* **Nazli** is Nuriye’s daughter-in-law and Bahar’s daughter.

* (K) **Nicos** was an undergraduate student in London at the time of the interview. He comes from an upper middle class family and lives with his parents when in Greece.
* Nihat is in his twenties and works in a garage. He had to give up school after the compulsory 9 years of education - despite the fact that he was a good student - in order to work and help his family out.

* (A & K) Nuriye is 55 years old. She used to work as a domestic cleaner in the past, but at the time of the interview she did not work outside the home. She lives in Gazi with her husband and younger son. Her elder son lives with his wife next door and they all exchange visits frequently.

* (K) Orhan is in his twenties and works in a small factory in Athens. Born in Thrace he has lived in Athens for most of his life. Educated in the Greek system, he had to leave school after the nine compulsory years in order to help out his family. He is married.

(A) Orestis was born in Cyprus and is an undergraduate student in Athens university. Before starting university he completed his two year military service in Cyprus. He is 24 years old.

(A) Rena is 60 years old. She is a housewife although she used to work as a seamstress in the past. She lives with her husband in a working class neighbourhood in Athens.

* (A) Sergios is in his mid-twenties and works in advertising. During the time of the interview he was completing his compulsory military service and still lived with his parents.

Sevgi is in her early twenties and works in her husband’s restaurant in Gazi.

(K) Sophia is in her early twenties and was an undergraduate student in London at the time of the interview.

(A) Spyros is in his forties and teaches in a high school in Athens. He is married with children.

(A) Stavros was born in Cyprus. He lives in Athens and works in his own company. He lives with his partner.

(A) Stelios is in his mid-twenties and was completing his military service at the time of the interview. Normally he works as a paramedic.

(K) Suleyman works as a clerk in a bank and also operates a karate school which was a hangout for a lot of the young men in Gazi. Many of the interviews took place there. In 2000 Suleyman had to close the school due to financial difficulties. He lives with his wife and kids.

(A) Tatiana is an 18-year-old high school student from a working class neighbourhood in Western Athens. At the time of the interview she was preparing for her exams to enter University.
* (A) **Tasos** is in his late sixties and works as a lawyer in his own firm together with his son. Although he is not as active as in the past in representing clients, he still goes to the office everyday. He lives with his wife in central Athens.

* (A) **Thodoris** is in his late thirties and works as a taxi driver. He lives with his wife Sevasti and at the time of the interview they were expecting their first baby.

* (A) **Umut** is in his thirties, married to Baris with one son. Umut, an unskilled worker, was often unemployed during fieldwork. He lives together with his wife, son and both his parents in a one bedroom flat in Gazi.

* (K) **Vassilis** is a man in his forties. He runs his own business which allows him to travel a lot and spend time in his holiday home in southern Greece. He is twice divorced with three children and lives on his own. In 1974 he fought in Cyprus.

(A) **Yannis** is a final year high school student from a working class neighbourhood in Western Athens, preparing for his exams to enter University

* (K) **Yannos** is married to Lia. He was born in Cyprus, in the Northern part that is now Northern Cyprus. He studied in the USA and Britain and now works in Athens University. In previous years, he had been involved in Greek Cypriot organisations in Athens. At the time of the interview he and Lia had decided to stop watching television at home.

* (K) **Yilmaz** is in his twenties and works in a small factory in Athens. Born in Komotini he came to Athens at the age of seven and was educated in a Greek school which he left after he completed the nine compulsory years. He is married and lives with his wife.

* (K) **Yiorgos** is an undergraduate student in his early twenties. He lives with his sister who has been living permanently in Athens for more than a decade. They were both born in Cyprus.

(K) **Zoe** is a in her late twenties and works as a paramedic at an army hospital. She lives with her parents and brothers.
Appendix II
Topic guide for interviews

In both case studies the interviews opened with my introduction to the research project. Then all participants would introduce themselves. The questions presented here are indicative – there were variations among groups as I tried to leave the discussion open in order for interesting and unexpected themes to emerge. The ‘airspace incident’ interviews included the screening of one of the sampled reports before the discussion kicked off. No external stimuli were used in the Kosovo case study as the method was that of retelling the events concerned.

‘Airspace incident’ case study

- What are your reactions to this report?
- Did you watch this (or any other similar) report?
- How do you assess television’s coverage of this incident?
- Where do you get information about national issues?
- What is a ‘national issue’?
- Is Cyprus a national issue?
- Do you consider yourselves informed about Greek-Turkish relations?
- How do you evaluate television’s coverage of national issues?
- Is there objectivity in the news?
- Do you trust the media?

Media use habits

- Do you watch the news? How often?
- Which is your preferred news medium? Why?
- Do you watch alone or with others?
- Do you discuss the stories while watching them?
- Describe your daily schedule and any media related activities.

- Do you have any further comments on the report or television news in general?

‘Kosovo’ case study

- What is happening in Kosovo these days?
- How did it all begin?
- What is the conflict about?
- Where do you get information about Kosovo?
- What do you think of the coverage in the different media?
- What do you think of the coverage on Greek television?
- Are you satisfied with the coverage?
- Is the coverage impartial and objective, or biased?
- What is the journalists’ role in reporting the conflict?
- Do you trust the media?
- Is there a difference between Greek and foreign media in the reporting of the conflict?
- Are there any images or stories related to the events in Kosovo and Serbia that have impressed you? Which? Why? Where did you see/hear them?
- Are you concerned about the events in Kosovo and Yugoslavia? Why?

*Media use habits*

- Do you watch the news? How often?
- Which is your preferred news medium? Why?
- Do you watch alone or with others?
- Describe your daily schedule and any media related activities.
- Do you discuss the stories while watching them?
- Do you discuss the events in Kosovo?
- Do you use any non-Greek media? Which? Why? In what context? How often?
- Have your news viewing habits changed in the last month?

- Do you have any further comments on the Kosovo television coverage or television news in general?
Appendix III
Coding Framework for the analysis of interviews and fieldnotes.

Standard identification variables:

Case Study
1. ‘Airspace Incident’
2. ‘Kosovo’

Method
1. Group discussion
2. Interview
3. Informal Interview/fieldnote

Gender (male, female)
Age
Ethnic group (Greek, Greek Cypriot, Turkish)
Occupation

Thematic categories

Media use patterns
Personal/direct experiences with the media and journalists

Attitudes towards Greek media

Attitudes towards news

Attitude towards non-Greek media

Critical towards media institutions and journalists
Awareness of generic conventions/construction of news/media ownership

Ignorance of generic conventions/construction of news/media ownership

Critical readings of the news content
- Analytic
- Historical
- Contextual knowledge
Uncritical readings of the news content

Dominant readings of the news

Demotic readings of the news

Commuting to personal experiences

References to identity
Appendix IV
Coding Frame for news reports in the Kosovo case study

Tape number: 	 Item number:

Total duration of broadcast: _______ (in minutes and seconds)
Total items in broadcast: _______ 
Total Kosovo items: _______

Date: _______ Channel:
 Order within the broadcast: _______ Item duration: _______ (in minutes and seconds)

Type of report:
6. commentary/analysis
8. video-clip/pastiche
5. titles/introductory comments/newscaster

Primary Focus:

Secondary Focus:

Is there music in the item?
1. yes 
2. no

If yes, what type:
1. titles
2. in intro
3. intro/dramatic
4. dramatic intro and throughout
5. from events reported

Are there special effects/graphics:
1. yes
2. no

If yes, which type:
1. close up
2. slow motion
3. graphics
4. combination of the above

Caption (copy verbatim):
Discrepancy between visual and spoken?  
1. yes  2. no  
focus visual: 
focus spoken:  

Which of the following are mentioned?  Code 1 for present and 2 for absent when no other categories are indicated:  

Bombings/casualties ____  
Military issues ____  

Serbs ____  
Refugees ____  

If refugees are mentioned which of the following is mentioned as the reason for leaving Kosovo?  
1. because of NATO strikes  
2. ethnic cleansing  
3. 1 and 2 combined  
4. reasons not mentioned  

NATO  
1. negative or ironic/anti-American  
2. neutral  
3. positive  
4. not mentioned  

Greek initiatives ____  
Effects of crisis in Greece ____  

Regional destabilisation ____  
Diplomacy ____  

Reactions within Greece  
1. political  
2. general  
3. none  

Flags  
1. Greek  
2. Serb  
3. American  
4. none  

Church ____  
Cyprus ____  
North Hepirus ____  

Neighbourhood ____  
Russia ____  
Cold war ____  

WWII ____  
UCK/KLA ____  
Ethnic cleansing ____  

Role of foreign/Western media  
1. positive  
2. negative  
3. neutral  
4. not mentioned  

Role of Greek media  
1. positive  
2. negative  
3. neutral  
4. not mentioned  

Role of Serb media  
1. positive  
2. negative  
3. neutral  
4. not mentioned  

Justification for bombings provided: ____  
1. yes  2. no  

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If yes, which?

Number of sources mentioned: _______

Sources

1. Journalist (correspondent)  
2. Experts/analysts  
3. Newscaster  
4. NATO official sources (press briefings, spokesman)  
5. Serb governmental sources  
6. Serb army sources  
7. EU official sources  
8. Greek government (and other official) sources  
9. CNN (or other international news networks)  
10. Serb TV  
11. Unspecified sources  
12. Witnesses, individual actors  
13. US officials  
14. UN officials  
15. NGOs  
16. Balkan govt. officials  
17. Turkish officials  
18. Russian officials  
19. European leaders  
20. Other/Specify: ____________

visual material sources:  
number: _______

1. channel's own  
2. channel's archive  
3. Serb TV  
4. International networks and agencies (CNN, ABC, Reuters)  
5. Unspecified  
6. Other (please specify)
Appendix V
Map of the expansion of the Greek state (1932-1947) and chronological table

Map 1: The expansion of the Greek State, 1932-1947. Taken from Clogg, 1992: 43
Copyright obtained from Cambridge University Press.

Chronology of events relating to the expansion of the Greek state
1821 Revolution begins
1822 Proclamation of the first constitution of independent Greece
1832 Greece comprising of Peloponese, part of central Greece and the Aegean islands.
1864 Greece gets Ionian islands from Great Britain
1881 Thessaly and Arta ceded to Greece by the Ottoman Empire
1912-3 Balkan Wars/Greeks enter Salonica
1920 Treaty of Sevres gains.
1922 Asia Minor War.
1923 Treaty of Lausanne reverses Greece’s gains by the Treaty of Sevres and forced population exchange takes place.
1947 Greece gets the Dodecanese islands from Italy.

1 The map is dated in that it does not show the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
Appendix VI
Chronology of Events in Kosovo

1968: First protests for Kosovo independence.

1974: Kosovo is declared an autonomous region within Serbia.


1981: Albanian nationalists organise protests demanding autonomy for Kosovo.

1989: Serbian President Slobodan Milošević waives Kosovo's autonomy. Violent protests leading to numerous deaths.

1990: Yugoslavia sends armed forces to the region. Serbia eradicates the Kosovo government.

1991: Kosovo declared a Republic, which Albania recognises.

1992: Ibrahim Rugova, a moderate Kosovan politician, is elected President of the Kosovo Republic.

1996: UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) is formed.

March 1998: Dozens of dead people after attacks of Serbian police against Albanian autonomists.

June 1998: UN General Secretary Kofi Annan warns NATO that any future intervention must get approval from the Security Council.


August 1998: UCA/KLA occupy more than 40% of Kosovo.


6-7 February 1999: First round of Rambouillet talks among Kosovan Albanian and Serbs ended in a deadlock.

February-March 1999: Serb Army attacks KLA in the North of Kosovo.

18 March 1999: 3 days after talks in Rambouillet are resumed, Kosovan Albanians sign a peace treaty and agree on the deployment of 28,000 NATO soldiers – Serbia refuses to sign.

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2 Source: The Guardian (www.guardianunlimited.co.uk) and clippings from the daily Greek, French and UK newspapers. The dates in bold fonts are the days sampled.
22 March 1999: Richard Holbrook announces that the negotiations have reached a dead-end after his meeting with President Milojevic. NATO Allies declare their consent to the prospect of bombings, while European and American diplomats leave Belgrade.

24 March 1999: NATO bombings begin.

25 March 1999: Belgrade claims that 40 targets were destroyed during the first night of the bombings. Serbian government demands that the journalists of the NATO countries leave (except for the Greeks).

26 March 1999: Yugoslavia is attacked during daylight. Italy and Greece raise concerns about the bombings.


28 March 1999: USA President Bill Clinton says that Serbs are committing a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ in Kosovo. Shootings in front of the American Embassy in Moscow.

30 March 1999: Milosevic in his talks with the Russian Prime Minister Y. Primackof offers to withdraw some of his forces in Kosovo if NATO stops the bombings. USA, Britain and Germany reject the offer.

31 March 1999: 3 American soldiers disappear near the borders of Macedonia and Kosovo. The UN High Commission for refugees announces that 125,000 people have fled Kosovo since the bombings began.

1 April 1999: The American soldiers are seen on Serb TV (and then globally) as hostages. Rougova meets Milojevic.

2 April 1999: Albania and Macedonia declare that they are overwhelmed with refugees. NATO announces that in the last 12 months more than 634,000 people, that is one-third of Kosovo’s population, have left their homes.

7 April 1999: 35,000 Kosovan refugees in Greek villages of Albania. Friendly football game organised in Belgrade between a local and an Athenian FC.

11 April 1999: 305,000 refugees in Albania, 121,000 in Macedonia and 61,000 in Montenegro.

12 April 1999: A NATO bomb hits the bridge outside the town Grebelica, while a train was passing.

14 April 1999: NATO bombing of the refugee convoy in Djakovica.

15 April 1999: NATO accepts responsibility for the convoy bombing which is described as a mistake.
22 April 1999: The refugee crisis continues. Bombing of one of Milosevic’s houses in a Belgrade suburb.

23 April 1999: Bombing of the Serbian TV station. NATO summit in Washington D.C.

26 April 1999: Concert in central Athens Square for Peace in the Balkans.

28 April 1999: Terrorist attack (with casualties) in Athens’ Intercontinental Hotel to protest against the government’s support of NATO’s positions.
Appendix VII
Images from the News Reports

Image 1: Antenna 24/10/1999
‘100 aircraft engaged in intense and dangerous dogfights in the triangle between Crete, Rhodes and Cyprus’. In this map Cyprus is depicted as part of a unified space that includes mainland Greece, and islands Rhodes and Crete. Maps, as Anderson argues ‘re fundamental mechanisms constitute one of the primary tools of nationalist symbolism’ (1991: 178)

Image 2: Antenna 24/10/1999
The view from the pilots’ screen during dogfights. The voices of the pilots shouting are heard off screen.
Use of computer graphics and images from a flight simulation programme in reporting the dogfights.

Image of the pilot during dogfights.
Images 5-7: Images from the air-fights and the military exercises (MEGA 23 and 24/10/1999).
An example of news ‘windows’. On the right box one of Greece’s most well known stand up actors is protesting against the bombings in Yugoslavia. The two posters he holds read: ‘A Monica a day keeps the people away’ and ‘Serbs are our brothers’
Mega Channel, 25/3/1999

Image 9: Antenna 14/4/1999
The caption reads ‘Both a Serb and a Refugee’
Image 13: Mega channel 14/4/1999 Propagandistic video clip from Serbian Television. Broadcast during Orthodox Easter week. Children are holding candles which is a traditional custom on Good Friday and Easter Day.

Image 15: Mega 26/3/1999
‘Maps of fire’. The caption reads: ‘Arsonist propaganda’

Image 16: Skai Channel: 26/4/1999
The Greek and Serbian flag tied together during the concert for peace in the Balkans. The caption reads ‘Live Link: Syntagma Square’
The crowd singing and waving flags in the concert for peace. The flags that are discerned are those of the double headed eagle (Byzantine empire), the ones depicting Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, those of the Communist Party as well as the Greek and Serbian ones.