

**Integration Theories and Economic Development: A Case Study of the
Political and Social Dynamics of ECOWAS**

By

Douglas Kudzo-Kota Zormelo

**PhD Thesis Presented at the University of London, 1994.
The London School of Economics and Political Science.**

UMI Number: U077572

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U077572

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES



F
7190

x211415390

Table of Contents

	Pages
Acknowledgements	1
Abstract	2
List of Tables	3
Introduction	4
 Chapter One: <u>Reasons For Regional Integration: A General Overview</u>	 20
1.1 Introduction	
1.2 Primary Goods and Deteriorating Terms of Trade	
1.3 Export of Primary Goods and Economic Growth	
1.4 Terms of Trade and Industrialisation	
1.5 Economic Framework of Regional Integration:	
1.6 Dynamic Theory of Regional Economic Integration	
1.7 Conclusion	
 Chapter Two: <u>International Theory of Regional Integration</u>	 70
2.1 Introduction	
2.2 Functionalism	
2.3 Neo-Functionalism	
2.4 The Communication Approach	
2.5 The Federalist Approach	
2.6 The Contribution of Integration Theories	
2.7 Conclusion	
 Chapter Three: <u>The Political Context of West African Regional Integration</u>	 141
3.1 Introduction	
3.2 General Characteristics of West African Politics	
3.3 Antecedents to ECOWAS	
3.4 The Formation of ECOWAS	
3.5 Regional Politics after the formation of ECOWAS	
3.6 Domestic Politics and Regional Integration	
3.7 Political Variables in the Analysis of Regional of Regional Integration Among Developing Countries	
3.8 Institutional Structure of ECOWAS	
3.9 Conclusion	
 Chapter Four: <u>The Social Context of West African Regional Integration</u>	 210
4.1 Introduction	
4.2 Ethnicity: Definition, Concepts and Characteristics in West Africa	
4.3 Ethnicity, Political Structure and National Unity	
4.4 Ethnicity and Intra-Regional Integration	
4.5 Trade Unions	
4.6 Business Groups	
4.7 Conclusion	

Chapter Five: <u>The Extent of Regional Integration in West Africa</u>	262
5.1 Introduction	
5.2 Extent of Regional Collective Decision Making	
5.3 ECOWAS since 1975	
5.4 Trade as a Measure of Integration	
5.5 Conclusion	
Chapter Six: <u>Reasons for Slow Progress of ECOWAS</u>	306
6.1 Introduction	
6.2 National Interest, Dependence and Demand Flows	
6.3 Intra-Regional Relations and Demand Flows	
6.4 Internal Politics and Demand Flows	
6.5 Resources and ECOWAS Integration	
6.6 Leadership and ECOWAS Integration	
6.7 Conclusion	
Summary and Conclusions	362
Appendices	377
Bibliography	386

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis would not have been written without the support of my wife Betty. Her willingness to act as a sounding board for my arguments and conclusions was invaluable in the testing of my arguments. To attempt listing all that she has done to make the study possible would fill pages. My deepest thanks therefore go to her. My children, Elorm and Delali, also deserve special thanks. They have been very patient with me and been deprived of my full attention during the period of the study.

A special thanks goes to my supervisor, Professor James Mayall, without whose help I would not have started the study in the first place. During the time of the project itself, his guidance and painstaking scrutiny of the writing helped in making the finished work what it is.

I also received moral support from my good friend Bill Puplampu and John Mgbere, themselves PhD candidates at the time that I was writing my thesis. David Shaw, Brian Barker, Tony Gilpin, Judith Zormelo and several others were all very supportive during these past years. Their prayers have been invaluable. My parents, the Right Rev. A.K Zormelo and Mrs C.A Zormelo also deserve special thanks for their support.

The scholarships office of the London School of Economics helped me a lot and the award of the Montague Burton Studentship was an invaluable source of inspiration and income for my study. The African Educational Trust also provided much needed funds for the final preparation of the thesis for presentation.

God's grace kept my body and soul together over the duration of the thesis, and I give Him the glory for His love and care over the period.

ABSTRACT

The study is a multidimensional analysis of regional economic integration with special reference to the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). It looks at the interaction between economics, politics and society in the context of integration and asks if the predominantly economic and mainly *a priori* advantages postulated by integration theory are feasible in West Africa.

The thesis is both descriptive and analytical. First it paints the political and social landscape of West Africa in broad strokes. Using the picture thus created, it analyses integration in the sub-region by measuring the extent of integration achieved by ECOWAS since its formation in 1975. A heuristic paradigm, originally proposed by Leon Lindberg, is used to measure and explain the level of integration achieved so far. Field research, of a preliminary kind, is also used to examine the impact of society on national politics and intra-regional relations, and hence on regional co-operation and integration.

The conclusions of the thesis include: the need for a revision of the dynamic theory of regional integration to formulate process mechanisms that can be implemented by developing countries; regional collective decision making is extremely difficult in unstable political systems; the need to tone down the exaggerated expectations of regional integration among developing countries; that tribes across borders have both positive and negative implications for integration; and that the ideology of the dynamic theory of integration is rapidly becoming obsolete in that dirigisme is no longer a viable policy option for most governments.

Despite the need for higher levels of economic interaction among developing countries there is no reason, from our study, to believe that such relations will be different from those that pertain in international relations generally. The issues of national interest are just as salient in the interaction between developing countries as they are in the relations between the developed and developing countries. The study did not find any overwhelming desire among West African countries to co-operate. Neither did it find a cosmopolitanism that puts the regional good over the national interest. It therefore calls into question the premise on which integration among developing countries is based; that states ought to rationalise their industries.

List of Tables

1. Indexes of Terms of Trade of ECOWAS countries.
2. Indexes of Export quantities of ECOWAS countries.
3. Relationship Between Trade and Government Revenue.
4. Vector Representation of the Functional Scope of ECOWAS, 1975-1990.
5. Schedule of Tariff Reduction in ECOWAS.
6. Intra-Regional Trade of ECOWAS.
7. Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Product of ECOWAS.
8. Minimum Agenda Implementation Status of ECOWAS.

INTRODUCTION

The evolution of development theorising and the subsequent proliferation of paradigms, each advocating a different way to the economic development of third world countries is indicative of the complexity and near elusiveness of the economic goals that such countries have sought since independence.

Much of the recasting of development paradigms and the changes in emphasis in development theorising is a response to systemic political and economic changes and mirror the strivings of the developing countries to cope with such changes. Thus the changes in emphasis from the missing component and linear growth paradigm of the Rostow¹ years when developing countries were expected to replicate the development path of the West, through the delinking theories of the dependency school,² to the mutuality of interests³ and the calls for a new international economic order, have been attempts by both theoreticians and practitioners to adjust to the changing economic and political milieu at the systemic, regional and national levels and the realities of implementing theoretical concepts.

A method which became more and more popular as modernisation and import substitution industrialisation at the national level failed to yield the goals envisaged for

¹ To Rostow all societies pass through a single unique sequence of stages. The five stages he identified were based on an analysis of the British industrial revolution and felt that an increase in the rate of capital investment was essential for transition from traditional to modern society. See W. W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1960.

² See Frank, A.G., 'Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America', New York: Monthly Review, 1967.

³ See Brandt, W., North-South - A Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, Pan Books, London, 1980, also known as the Brandt Report.

them has been regional economic integration. This method gained emphasis, first, in Latin America (where most of the developmental theorising by third world scholars originated) as autarky became more and more difficult to sustain,⁴ and eventually in Africa after independence.

We must emphasise, though, that we are not suggesting that regional integration theories came to replace national centred methods. What they did was to become more and more popular as an alternatives to the more narrow national plans. Indeed in pre-independent Africa the colonial administration had integrated the individual territories and achieved a certain amount of interaction between them. Post-independent Africa emerged with the dilemma of what independence should entail in terms of such services as, for example, the West Africa Currency Board. The resulting debate that followed this dilemma has persisted to today even though many of the common services have been dismantled, especially those among the former English colonies. Indeed the West Africa Chamber of Commerce for instance, has as since 1992 been calling for a re-establishment of the services that had been dismantled.⁵

The debate in Africa about co-operation has never been about whether it was desirable but about what form it should take and the geographical area it should cover. Whilst some thought it ought to be limited to a loose co-operation at the regional level initially before

⁴ Sakamoto, J., 'Industrial Development and Integration of Underdeveloped Countries', in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. VII, No.4, June 1969.

⁵ The President of the Federation of West African Chamber of Commerce stated in an interview in 1990 that '...we want to have those old institutions that united us resuscitated , such as the West African currency, West African airlines, and the Maritime Agency, as well as the re-insurance co-operation'. Contact, A Publication of ECOWAS, Vol. 2, No. 3, November 1990.

eventually expanding to fuse the various regions on the continent, others saw anything short of continental federation as undesirable.

The former view prevailed and inherited colonial structures that previously linked the various possessions of the imperial powers came to provide the foundation, both in terms of form and scope, for integration and co-operation schemes among the newly independent countries. This was especially so amongst the former French colonies and the East African protectorates and colonies. The English speaking countries of West Africa, on the other hand dismantled their common services.⁶

Many of the schemes that were initially based on the structures that were inherited from the colonial system have failed and been replaced by others. In general most schemes have remained essentially symbolic. Despite this general failure integration schemes continue to proliferate to the extent that a continental scheme, the African Economic Community was formed in Abuja, Nigeria in June 1991. A question that arises from the paradox of failed schemes and increasing proliferation of new ones is why they continue to be formed when those already existing have had such little success in their substantive aims. A second question which relates specifically to the African Economic Community, is how a continental scheme can be expected to succeed where regional ones have failed. The more immediate and relevant question to us, and which guides the thesis, is why regional schemes have had such little success.

⁶ Mazrui, A.A., and Tidy, M., Nationalism and New States in Africa, Heinemann, London, 1984, p. xv.

Though integration schemes continue to proliferate in both the developing and developed regions of the world⁷, and old ones are being enlarged⁸, the paradox is that since the late 1960s integration theorising has stagnated and most current writings on the subject have been policy oriented. It has meant that sustained critical appraisals of existing theories have been limited. The broad assumptions contained in the movement from a free trade area through a custom union and a common market to an economic union with a final outcome of, hopefully, a totally integrated area is almost universally accepted as the economic model for regional economic integration. This model continues to inform the implementation of most schemes.

The political aspects have also been predominantly neo-functional and have not been replaced by any newer models that take account of, for example, the shortcomings that have resulted from the empirical evidence of the EEC's difficulties at arriving at a consensus about federation, much less of the failed attempts in the developing countries.

What the failure of theory to keep up with practice has resulted in is a reliance on theoretical frameworks that are sometimes not appropriate for the region concerned.

It is hoped that this study will serve a dual purpose. First it will look critically at both the economic and political theories of regional integration in the context of West Africa. It will thus examine the validity of the arguments for integration in the region, and also the potential viability of the Economic Community of West African States. Secondly, it will, it

⁷ See Taylor, P., 'Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed' in Frameworks for International Co-operation, Taylor, P., and Groom, A.R.J., (ed.), Pinter, London, 1990, p. 161.

⁸ The recent conclusion of accession agreements between the European Union and Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden in May of the year (1994) is an example.

is hoped, contribute to a reviving of a dormant area of international relations research and hopefully stimulate interest in integration theorising to match its proliferation in practice.

Insofar as writers have concentrated on policy oriented research without much revision of existing theories means little has been done to advance the study of the field. What, for example, are the aspects of regional integration need revising? How universally applicable are the propositions of the various theories? These and other related questions need examination by students of integration.

The Economic Framework for Integration

Regional economic integration among developing countries, such as that between the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is rationalised on the prospective gains that can be derived from the so-called dynamic effects. These include; industrialisation, increased bargaining power in international trade, economies of large scale production and efficiency⁹. These gains rather than those derived from static advantages form the basis of the argument for the desirability of such schemes.

The conclusions of orthodox economic integration theory are rejected by those who advocate such schemes amongst developing countries as being irrelevant. This, they point out, is because the underlying assumptions apply mainly to developed countries. The main argument for this position being that trade creation and trade diversion which are used as the main measures of the viability of a prospective integration scheme are based on static

⁹ Balassa, B., 'Toward a theory of Economic Integration' in Latin American Integration: Experience and Prospects, Wionczek, M.S., (ed.), Praeger, New York, 1966.

equilibrium analysis which use as their criterion the reallocation of existing resources to the most efficient producer within the region.¹⁰

Development economists have argued that such static analysis overlooks the potential dynamic effects that market enlargement can have on industrialisation through the opportunities for exploiting internal economies of scale. Proponents of regional integration in West Africa, as in other parts of the developing world, therefore justify the desirability of such schemes on the prospective gains to be derived from them; the so-called dynamic theory of regional economic integration.

The economic arguments underlying regional integration have thus been extended in order to incorporate developing countries as candidates for integration schemes. Trade diversion, which according to traditional integration theory is a sign that regional integration will not be beneficial, has been rationalised on the basis that it can act as the foundation for a policy of import substitution industrialisation at the regional level to replace national level policies which had failed to yield the expected results.¹¹

Even though these arguments have been proposed as a justification for regional economic integration in developing regions, what has not happened is the proposal of a framework within which the process of change can occur. The process of change from a situation of very low economic interaction among prospective partners to a situation of relatively high integration is still expected to occur within the traditional framework of

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ Two other reasons: (1) the impossibility of accelerating the rate of economic growth by improving the foreign sector because of its frequent deficit position among developing countries; (2) that such a deficit situation exists together with unemployment and under-utilisation of resources. See Sakamoto, J., *op. cit.*, p. 283.

moving through a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union to hopefully, total integration. This framework is clearly demonstrated by the stages that are usually listed in the treaties of such schemes.

The rationale for moving from lower to higher levels of integration are found in the benefits that can be derived from increasing and intensifying trade among members as the free movement of factors increase. However replacing static reallocational arguments with dynamic arguments does not change the fact that such advantages need as a minimum requirement, a free trade area which in turn needs a fair amount of pre-integration trade among the participants.¹² Whether regional integration among developing countries can be justified on the basis of regional import substitution industrialisation or not, does not detract from the implications of using a process mechanism that assumes that trade is going to be the driving force behind the capacity to derive those gains. In a region where tradable goods of domestic origin are limited, the question to ask, therefore, is how attainable the gains of integration are.

The fitting of the dynamic theory of regional integration into traditional process mechanisms is therefore, to us, like 'putting new wine into old wineskin'. This is because the old framework and process mechanism remain the same.

¹² It is erroneous to use the supposedly high level of informal trade that takes place in West Africa, for example, before and after the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed as an indication of a high level of pre-integration trade within the region. This is because such trade is a result, among other things, of overvalued currencies by some of the countries. Moreover such trade is in imported goods that originate from outside the region and cannot act as the basis for increased trade or become formalised because it is categorised as trade deflection.

Despite the arguments of development economists, static gains still need to accompany and indeed act as the basis for dynamic gains. Though it might be useful to distinguish between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency for analytical purposes, the former is actually a necessary precondition for the latter.¹³ Since the economic theory of regional integration does not see much scope for developing regions deriving static benefits from regional economic integration, the basic misfit, the fitting of dynamic arguments into a static framework may be a major reason why integration schemes have failed to yield any so-called dynamic advantages so far.

The Political Framework for Integration

In addition to the economic framework within which regional economic integration is expected to occur, the whole process also has a political dimension. In fact, the setting up of an integration scheme is a political decision. What the economic arguments do is to provide grounds for the desirability of a scheme that has tremendous political implications.

The political implications of regional integration are described in the various theories of international political integration.¹⁴ As with its economic counterparts, international political integration theories expect a qualitative evolution from low to high regional collective decision making.¹⁵

¹³ Killick, T., Policy Economics, Heinemann, London, 1981, p16.

¹⁴ The main theories include neo-functionalism, federalism and transactionalism. Refer to Groom & Heraclides, 'Integration and Disintegration' in International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory Light, M., and Groom, A.J.R., (eds.), Pinter, London, 1985, pp 174-193.

¹⁵ Taylor, P., 'Conceptual Typology of International Organisation' in Frameworks for International Co-operation, Groom, A.J.R., & Taylor, P., (eds.), Pinter, London, 1990.

The regional decision making process that is expected to evolve is essentially a projection of decision making at the national level to the regional level.¹⁶

This therefore implies certain implicit general assumptions. At the national level it assumes a decision making process which is bureaucratic and participatory. It also assumes an independent policy formulation and policy choice environment in which national economic decisions are formulated by governments independently of external influence such as the IMF, World Bank, or GATT, or even foreign governments. At the regional level it assumes that decisions are taken on an impersonal basis where foreign policy transcends the personal idiosyncrasy of and disagreement between national leaders. It also assumes that citizens of the community are able to interact freely despite personal differences between leaders; furthermore that national borders between neighbouring countries do not get closed. At the global level the individual countries are assumed to have a high level of independence in determining their political and economic relations. Individual countries are therefore supposed to be able to choose whom they trade with and to retain flexibility in foreign policy orientation. It is also assumed that their collective impact on international political economics is large enough to influence decisions in their favour or at least leave them at a pareto optimum position.

The open social and political systems assumed at both the national and regional level do not exist in developing regions. In West Africa, for example, regional coalitions have been quite rigid since independence and are largely shaped around former colonial

¹⁶ Issue areas listed by Lindberg for measuring the extent of regional political integration are mainly issues that are usually the prerogative of national parliaments or decision making machineries. Refer to Lindberg, L., 'Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon...' in Integration: Theory and Research, Lindberg L., and Scheingold S.A. (eds.), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge mass., 1971.

ties. The anglophone/francophone¹⁷ divide is therefore very significant in determining interaction between states and also their foreign policy orientation.¹⁸

The desire to outdo each other in developing their individual countries and competition for external assistance also means that no cosmopolitan desire for overall regional development exists and decisions are taken mainly with the national interest in mind. If this is the case, it implies that a strategy which depends on a prospective rationalisation of industries at a regional level¹⁹ and in which the effects might be a further impoverishment of certain members because of polarisation²⁰ and backwash effects is unlikely to succeed. Secondly a process which encroaches on sovereignty in a situation where they are still very fragile makes national leaders very reluctant to implement regionally derived decisions. Also, preoccupations at the national level, make regional goals secondary despite the assumption that regional integration is a panacea for industrialisation. Moreover, not only is there not an overriding sense of the regional good over national interest, but its lack is exacerbated by the regular closure of common borders as accusations of sedition are levelled against neighbouring countries. West African countries are also highly dependent economies with political structures that are vulnerable to external influence, and lack the collective impact to influence international economic and political relations in their own favour.

¹⁷ John Chipman gives a very detailed account of the extent of francophone dependence on France in French Power in Africa, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.

¹⁸ Mazrui, A.A., and Tidy, M., op. cit., p. xvii.

¹⁹ Robson, P., The Economics of International Integration, Allen & Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 194-196.

²⁰ For a comprehensive treatment of this concept and backwash effect see (1) Hirschman, A.O., The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, Conn: Yale University, 1958. (2) Myrdal, G., Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, Methuen, London, 1963.

On the basis of the above, are the dynamic advantages of regional economic integration achievable? To what extent will it, for example, be able to increase the bargaining position of West African countries and help them to overcome the constraints on development? Will increased opportunities for trade result in improved trade relations among member countries and thus reduce their dependence on Western markets? What are the chances that integration will result in economies of scale? Are there any grounds for believing that the theoretical assumptions of a rationalisation of prospective industries are valid? If there is no region wide desire to federate, can we assume that national goals will be submerged while regional goals that benefit some countries at the expense of others will be supported? Can West African countries formulate a compensatory and redistributive mechanism that helps those states who are affected adversely by regional policies to continue being members of the scheme?

Hypothesis and Research Questions

It is our belief that unless the political and social milieu of West Africa (and their implication for integration) are taken into consideration when the prospective economic advantages are being considered, regional integration in West Africa will eventually either become defunct or at best remain symbolic, as has happened elsewhere in the developing world. The hypothesis guiding this research is, therefore, that economic integration as it is envisaged in the charter of ECOWAS is not achievable unless the political and social milieu are taken into consideration when policies are being formulated.

The bases of this hypothesis can be found in the following questions:

- 1) What are the theoretical foundations of ECOWAS , and how sound are they in relation to the political and social environment of the region?
- 2) Are the goals envisaged for regional economic integration compatible with the individual aspirations of member states?
- 3) Can a process that assumes supranationality succeed in the political environment of West Africa?
- 4) To what extent are national governments willing to fund a regional organisation whose prospects are uncertain? Are they willing to risk being overthrown because of a lack of concentration on national goals?
- 5) Can the low level of capacity utilisation in West Africa be explained by an absence of a large market or are there more immediate reasons? If there are, then how does that affect the theoretical arguments for regional integration in the region?
- 5) Should West African countries be aiming at total integration? Would they not achieve more through project and functional co-operation?
- 6) How does the foreign policy orientation of West African states affect their willingness to participate in a regional organisation?

The need to examine the theoretical basis of regional integration among developing countries means chapters devoted to the theory will need to go beyond the conventional treatment of the predominantly economic literature. We will instead analyse in detail both the economic and political theories of regional integration. Our contention has been that the framework for regional economic integration is provided by the political structures

that member states build to facilitate the achievement of goals. However apart from the framework, the process itself is highly dependent on the interaction between sovereign states, as well as interaction with an organisation which aims to control national processes. Such interaction can result in the development of strong ties between the states. On the other hand it can result in friction. Normally both outcomes go side by side with each other. But the extent of friction or harmony depends on the political milieu.

States in any circumstance seek to limit the influence of an international organisation on their domestic policies as much as possible. The political, economic and social environment therefore need to be assessed to see how integration will fare. The first four chapters are devoted to a thorough examination of the theoretical framework of integration, as well as a detailed description and analysis of the West African political and social environment. These will lay the foundation of our analysis in later chapters.

The first chapter will discuss the economic arguments and assumptions for regional integration. It will examine the relationship between international trade and economic development and the resulting arguments for the formation of regional integration schemes. We will attempt to analyse the validity of the argument that economic integration is a necessary means of promoting economic development.

Chapter two is devoted to an examination of the international relations theories on regional integration. Again the theoretical assumptions and *a priori* postulations will be examined to indicate their applicability to West Africa. This chapter is of crucial importance because the theories lay the basis for the modality of interaction between the

states. As we have indicated above how do the assumptions they make match the West African environment? This necessitates more than a brief review of the literature. It also necessitates an examination of individual theories in order to glean the individual insights they give to the functioning of regional integration. At the end of the chapter we will list the generalisations that integration theorising has come up with so far. These will be tested to see how west African integration conforms or deviates from them.

The third chapter covers the political context of West African integration. It details the historical development of intra-regional relations and how this affects integration. It also looks at the foreign policy orientation of the countries and how these impact on the underlying ideology of regional integration- cosmopolitanism. The historical antecedents of West African politics, systemic influences and sub-national actors are all looked at with the aim of gauging their impact on national politics and hence on regional integration.

Chapter four looks at the social structure of West Africa, especially the existence of tribes across political borders and their effect on intra-regional relations and hence on regional integration. For this purpose we use the Ewes of Ghana and Togo as an example. The Ewes are chosen because among the various tribes that were divided by international boundaries during the colonial period they had been the most active in fighting for reunification. The failure of the colonial powers to grant this desire at independence led to expectations of irredentism and secessionist activities among them. Since independence they have settled in the countries of which they now form a part. There have been no overt desire or extensive campaigning for separation. Does this mean that the straddling of tribes across borders does not pose any problems for the territorial integrity of states in the

region? Does the straddling of tribes across borders affect national integration? Another aspect of ethnicity that is examined is how the diverse ethnic composition of states affects national unity and hence regional integration.

In chapter five we attempt to gauge the extent of integration that has been attained among ECOWAS countries since the organisation was formed. In this attempt we use three measures. In order for states to work together in an integration scheme they agree to work together by taking decisions together regularly on areas of mutual interest. The first measure is therefore collective decision making. To attempt to measure the extent of decision making among ECOWAS countries, we will use a heuristic model proposed by Lindberg. He operationalises decision making into *level*, *animators* and *consequences*. In chapter five we use the various properties of *level* of collective decision making to gauge the extent of co-operation in ECOWAS. Animators and consequences are used in chapter six as explanation variables to attribute reasons for the extent of integration attained in the region since the organisation was formed. In addition to measuring the extent of collective decision making we also look at the impact integration has had on the substantive goals of the organisation, i.e., trade diversification from external to the regional markets, and industrialisation. Decision making creates the framework which facilitates trade and industrialisation. The three measures are therefore complementary.

Based on the conclusion of chapters five, chapter six looks at the reasons for the level of integration that has been achieved.

The reasons for using Lindberg's model are many and are explained in chapter five. One of the reasons is the fact that it gives the most comprehensive list of variables available. This helps in describing the extent of integration and explaining the factors necessary for the process to move forward. As discussed in chapter five, even though it has its limitations, the model provides a good yardstick for gauging the extent of regional integration and a systematic way of accounting for progress, stagnation or failure. The less restrictive definition of integration makes it possible to apply his model to West Africa. To him, the 'sure sign of political integration is in a system which can make authoritative decisions for the entire community regardless of whether these are military, economic, or social welfare decisions'.²¹ Thus the actual content of collective decision making may differ from scheme to scheme without any significant impact on the variables needed for effectiveness.

In the summary and conclusion we assess our findings and see how they validate or disprove the empirical generalisations that were listed at the end of chapter two. The conclusions include the implications of the study for the theory and practice of regional integration. It also attempts to answer the question about whether a customs union is an appropriate model of integration for West African countries, and whether the fundamental issue of restriction of Western markets and hence of the need for integration is not exaggerated in the context of international provisions such as the Lomé Convention and the General System of Preferences.

²¹ Lindberg, N.L and Scheingold S.A., Europe's Would-Be Polity, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970, p32.

CHAPTER ONE

REASONS FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A GENERAL

OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction:

Countries in West Africa are poor, and are beset by numerous problems. Since the attainment of independence from the late 1950s to the present time they have adopted and attempted various economic models and policies geared toward achieving growth in their economies and improving the standard of living of their people.

However more than 30 years later, all these countries are faced with huge balance of payment deficits, massive foreign debt burdens, and social as well as political problems that together seem to make the prospects of development more elusive than ever. The numerous models that have been tried by the individual countries in the attempt to remove themselves from the 'horns of economic, political and social difficulties on which they seem to be impaled' have not yielded the desired results and the search for that elusive method for development continue.

One such model, which has and is still being tried, is regional economic integration. The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has as its objectives;

...to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, and social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.¹

¹ECOWAS Treaty signed in 1975.

Tied within this broad consensus position were the individual national objectives. Some of these objectives were more obvious than others. National goals ranged from the predominantly economic to a mix of motives, such as Nigeria's desire to stabilise her external environment after the Biafran war. Through regional economic integration, Nigeria did not only hope to create a market for her nascent industries, but also to neutralise her regional opponents, and reduce French influence in the region.²

Apart from Nigeria's concern for her national security³, there were no other very obvious political reasons for wanting to embark on a regional economic integration scheme except perhaps the desire of Heads of State to be seen to be attempting to restructure international economic order⁴. Unlike the European Community which, among other things, sought to solve the Franco-German problem through regional economic integration, the West African Economic Community was established as a means of developing the industrial capacity of the countries within the region, and to promote self-sufficiency in their economies.

An assessment of ECOWAS must, therefore, be done on the basis of the economic objectives that the member countries had for setting it up. Political objectives have always posed problems for regional integration. As will be examined in chapters three and six, it was the political implications of the formation of ECOWAS that were largely responsible

² Bach, D.C., 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21, 4, (1983).

³ See pp 209-211 in Chapter Three.

⁴ This was a predominant theme at the time ECOWAS was formed. In the 1970s 'Collective self-reliance' was a major policy alternative to the redistributive philosophy of the Group of 77 led new international economic order.

for its initial rejection by the French speaking countries within the region. They, among other things, feared Nigerian preponderance and hegemonic potential⁵ in the region and even went to the extent of pre-empting the formation of ECOWAS by their own linguistically based regional economic group, the *Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO), to counteract Nigeria's potential influence in the proposed organisation.

It was also the political overtones of previously proposed integration schemes that had been responsible for their not being formed. Pan Africanism, for example, failed to take root because the newly independent countries wanted to retain their sovereign prerogatives. Political integration was not part of their agenda for development. Economic co-operation was what the countries were interested in. The fight between those who favoured political integration and economic co-operation was particularly intense in West Africa between Ghana's Nkrumah, on the one hand, and Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Liberia, on the other.⁶

If a political reason should be sought for the formation of ECOWAS, it is that economic development is itself an overriding political theme and preoccupies the mind of leaders within the region. To that extent the economic reasons themselves become pseudo-political.

The point being made here is that an overtly political organisation would not have gained support. The increasing nationalistic perspective on economic and political

⁵ See Chapter Three, pp. 199-201.

⁶ For a more detailed account see Chapter Three, pp. 181-184.

development in the region after independence meant that a region wide consensus on a politically oriented organisation would have been difficult to form. This does not, however, preclude hidden political reasons for participation by some potential members. Insofar as the political reasons are not known we will be second guessing if we imputed them to the formation of ECOWAS. What we can say with a high degree of certainty is that ECOWAS was formed to help overcome some bottlenecks in economic development just as the EEC was formed to solve the main problem facing Europe at the time - maintaining peace.

Though economically motivated, subsequent years have seen new goals, of a political nature, such as non-aggression and mutual military co-operation added to the treaty of the community.⁷ The treaty, however, remains an economic formula for industrial development. Thus our analysis of the validity of the reasons for integration will be economic. Politics and society will be looked at, not as motives for integration, but rather for the opportunities and constraints they provide for the achievement of the goals contained in the treaty.

Economic integration is seen as an imperative, a *sine qua non*, for industrial development. The poor performance and failure of earlier attempts at integration within the West African region and the collapse of the East African Community did not deter the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. Since the leaders were aware of the failure of earlier attempts at regional integration⁸, not only in the region but in other parts of the developing world, they must have been confident of being able to overcome the difficulties that had

⁷ See Appendices 1 and 2.

⁸ See pp. 184-186 in Chapter Three.

plagued those earlier attempts. It cannot be suggested, as Davies does, that no lessons had been learnt from the East African Community's experience.⁹

The treaty establishing ECOWAS, signed in Lagos in 1975, stipulated that the implementation of the protocols would result in a customs union by the year 1990.¹⁰ Eighteen years on, the region has not been able to form a free trade area let alone a customs union. Like earlier attempts it has failed to keep to its schedule or to realise the expectations its advocates had for it as a tool of industrial development and trade diversification.

Despite this failure, governments, international organisations, and prominent individuals continue to assert that the countries within the region cannot develop without regional economic integration.

In this chapter we will examine the reasons why West African countries and those who advocate regional integration feel it is an imperative for development. The purpose will be to see if the reasoning behind the formation of such schemes are valid. If they are valid then the obvious question will be why they fail. Failure will then have to be attributed to the background conditions and the process mechanisms. This will confirm the assertion made by those who say that developing countries do not have the background conditions for forming regional integration schemes. This confirmation will not only be because ECOWAS has failed to keep up to schedule but rather that it has joined an already existing list of failures in regional integration among developing countries. If on the other

⁹ Davies, A., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis within ECOWAS' in *The World Today*, vol. 39, no 5, May 1983.

¹⁰ Article 12 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.

hand the reasons are not valid then we will have to conclude that regional economic integration may be necessary but not a sufficient condition for the industrial development of West African countries, or that it may not be a necessary condition at all.

Since the second world war, industrialisation, especially manufacturing has experienced faster growth than any other sector of economic activity.¹¹ It has also increased its share of internationally traded goods, and the inability of developing countries, especially those in sub Saharan Africa, to share in the gains from such growth, has been cited as a major factor accounting for their slow growth.¹²

This assertion presupposes that resources that were earned through other means were invested optimally by the developing countries and therefore that they would have developed even faster if they had shared in the growth that occurred in industry. It also presupposes that the level of primary exports was maintained and export earning capabilities maximised. Additionally, unless primary export levels were maintained and earnings used properly connections between primary goods exportation and low economic performances are spurious.

However, regardless of the validity or otherwise of such presuppositions, industrialisation is seen as a channel by which the growth potential of West African countries can be realised. Integration is seen as the path to becoming industrialised.

¹¹ Begg, D., Fischer, S., and Dornbusch, R., Economics, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 1987.

¹² Iyoha, M.A., 'Economic Development and Trade Theories: Relevance and Implication for ECOWAS' in Trade and Development in Economic Community of West African States, Orimalade, A., and Ubogu, R.E., (ed.), Vikas, Delhi, 1984.

The argument used by developing countries to justify the need for industrialisation, and hence integration schemes, are found in the arguments about the asymmetrical distribution of the gains of international trade in favour of manufactured goods relative to primary goods.¹³

The importance of this issue to the development debate makes a thorough examination of the arguments necessary, because they underpin the validity of embarking on integration as a strategy for industrialisation.

1.2 Primary goods and Deteriorating Terms of Trade

The four main issues seen as affecting the export earning capacity of primary goods are; deteriorating terms of trade, unstable prices, agricultural protectionism in developed countries, and the over dependence on a narrow range of commodities.

Before the pioneering but separate works of Prebisch and Singer, it was believed that diminishing returns in agriculture and mining would lead to rises in the prices of primary goods compared to those of manufactures.¹⁴ This phenomenon was expected to lead to an equalisation of factor prices.

¹³ In a keynote address to the Nigerian national seminar entitled the 'ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme', held in Kano, Nigeria, in June 1992, the Nigerian Minister of Trade and Tourism said '...efforts to encourage the development of intra-regional trade, is a positive counter measure to our unfavourable terms-of- trade with the developed countries....' quoted in The Trade Liberalisation Scheme of the Economic Community of West African States, Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Spring Communications, 1992.

¹⁴ MacBean, A., and Nguyen, D.T., Commodity Policies: Problems and Prospects, Groom Helm, London, 1987.

However, according to the Prebisch and Singer thesis the reverse was the case. Prebisch, for example, based his conclusions on statistical computation he did using the merchandise trade figures of the United Kingdom between 1876-80 to 1938. He inferred that the falling prices in the imports of the United Kingdom and the rising prices of her exports over the period implied a secular deterioration in the net barter terms of trade of primaries. He considered that because the UK's export of manufactures constituted the major proportion of total trade in manufactured goods, and was also the main importer of primary goods over the relevant period, trends in the terms of trade could be inferred from its import and export prices.

For the purpose of his study Prebisch divided the countries of the world into two analytical categories; the Centre, representing the industrialised countries, and the Periphery, representing the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The argument he used was that trade unions in the Centre were more able to secure for themselves the benefits of increases in productivity by demanding higher wages. Thus in periods of increasing productivity they bargained for higher wages, but in periods of slow growth were unwilling to accept wage cuts. This resulted in increasing prices of the goods they produced. This, together with the fact that income and price elasticities of demand for primary goods were much lower than that of manufactures, implied that the increase in wages in the Centre was not reflected in increased demand for primary goods from the Periphery.

Singer, also, felt that whilst increases in productivity accrued to manufactured goods as higher incomes, oligopolistic market clearing mechanisms for agriculture

resulted in lower wages for producers of agricultural goods. As a consequence of this, technological progress and productivity increases resulted in price rises for manufactured goods but led to falling prices for agricultural goods. As importers of primary goods and exporters of manufactured goods therefore, the developed countries reaped the benefits of rising prices for their exports and falling prices for their imports thus resulting in the asymmetrical response of prices to productivity increases.¹⁵

Much controversy was generated by the Prebisch/Singer thesis. MacBean and Nguyen give a good listing of some of the economic arguments levelled against Prebisch in particular.

One widely held criticism was that a good inference could not be made from using the trade figures of one country as a proxy for all industrial countries, and therefore that the United Kingdom's trade figures were unrepresentative. Another one was that primary commodities imported by the UK over the relevant period included commodities produced and exported by other industrialised countries. Others have pointed out that since exports were valued f.o.b. and imports valued c.i.f., the deterioration in the net barter terms of trade of primaries could be, wholly or to a significant extent, explained by the reduction in freight costs and not to falling prices. It was also criticised on the grounds that the improvement in the quality of manufactures and the introduction of new ones were not taken account of. It was argued that because improvements in quality resulted in an upward bias of the price index of manufactures the secular improvement in the United Kingdom's terms of trade could be explained this way.

¹⁵ *ibid.*

Despite these criticisms recent studies of the secular movement of prices by Spraos¹⁶ and Sapsford¹⁷ seem to corroborate the declining terms of trade thesis which asserts that exporters of manufactures benefit more from international trade than primary producers.

In an attempt to resolve the issues raised by the deteriorating terms of trade controversy, Spraos, for example, concluded that a deteriorating terms of trade for primaries was indeed detectable in the data but that its magnitude was smaller than had been suggested by Prebisch. Even though Spraos found no statistically significant deterioration in the terms of trade over the 70 year period between 1900-70, Sapsford did find statistically significant figures for the sub periods 1900-30 and 1950-70. This underlines the effect disaggregation of the data can have in the conclusions that are drawn. Most studies on the trend in the net barter terms of trade indicate the need to be careful in drawing conclusions from aggregated figures. However, constructions by Kindleberger suggest that the primary goods exported mainly by developing countries have experienced a bigger fall in their terms of trade over the 1872-1938 period.¹⁸

Other arguments that were levelled against the Prebisch/Singer hypothesis were not altogether valid. The argument that the c.i.f. and f.o.b. valuations of imports and exports, for example, may be the explanation of the deterioration was not sufficient. As Macbean

¹⁶ Spraos, J., 'The Statistical Debate on the net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities and Manufactures: A Comment and Some Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal, vol. 90, 1980.

¹⁷ Sapsford, D., 'The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities and manufactures: A Comment and some Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal, vol. 95, 1985.

¹⁸ MacBean and Nguyen, op. cit.

and Nguyen argued, unless the fall in freight cost is proportionately greater than the decrease in f.o.b. prices, decreases in c.i.f. prices will not lead to a deterioration in the net barter terms of trade. They also considered it a fallacy to assume that the qualities of commodities do not improve over time. Quoting Krug and Poerch, and the US Department of Trade figures they pointed out the proportion of the highest grade of coffee (AA) had improved from 0.2 per cent in 1957-8 to 16.3 per cent in 1964-5. Secondly, the proportion of Greek cotton output with a staple length of 28mm or more was only 11.3 per cent in 1954 but rose to 97.3 per cent in 1970. Thus if quality improvements were to be taken into consideration no presumption can be made *a priori* concerning a bias in the terms of trade from this source.

More recent studies by Grilli and Yang also support the Prebisch/Singer thesis. They used newly constructed index of commodity prices and the modified indexes of manufactured goods prices and found that from 1900 to 1986 the relative prices of commodities fell on trend by 0.5 per cent a year. They therefore concluded that:

Our results strongly support the inference made by Spraos about Prebisch's original data: the price series he used exaggerated the adversity of the trends in the relative price of all primary products. Yet our data indicate, from the beginning of the present century to date, a cumulative trend fall of about 40 percent in the market prices of nonfuel primary commodities relative to those of manufactured products and a cumulative trend decline of about 36 percent in the market prices of all primary commodities.¹⁹

Data compiled by the Department of Economics of Princeton University on African countries and adapted in Table 1 suggests that generalisations cannot be made for all

CHAPTER ONE

REASONS FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction:

Countries in West Africa are poor, and are beset by numerous problems. Since the attainment of independence from the late 1950s to the present time they have adopted and attempted various economic models and policies geared toward achieving growth in their economies and improving the standard of living of their people.

However more than 30 years later, all these countries are faced with huge balance of payment deficits, massive foreign debt burdens, and social as well as political problems that together seem to make the prospects of development more elusive than ever. The numerous models that have been tried by the individual countries in the attempt to remove themselves from the 'horns of economic, political and social difficulties on which they seem to be impaled' have not yielded the desired results and the search for that elusive method for development continue.

One such model, which has and is still being tried, is regional economic integration. The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has as its objectives;

...to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, and social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.¹

¹ECOWAS Treaty signed in 1975.

Tied within this broad consensus position were the individual national objectives. Some of these objectives were more obvious than others. National goals ranged from the predominantly economic to a mix of motives, such as Nigeria's desire to stabilise her external environment after the Biafran war. Through regional economic integration, Nigeria did not only hope to create a market for her nascent industries, but also to neutralise her regional opponents, and reduce French influence in the region.²

Apart from Nigeria's concern for her national security³, there were no other very obvious political reason for wanting to embark on a regional economic integration scheme except perhaps the desire of Heads of State to be seen to be attempting to restructure international economic order⁴. Unlike the European Community which, among other things, sought to solve the Franco-German problem through regional economic integration, the West African Economic Community was established as a means of developing the industrial capacity of the countries within the region, and to promote self-sufficiency in their economies.

An assessment of ECOWAS must, therefore, be done on the basis of the economic objectives that the member countries had for setting it up. Political objectives have always posed problems for regional integration. As will be examined in chapters three and six, it was the political implications of the formation of ECOWAS that were largely responsible

² Bach, D.C., 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21, 4, (1983).

³ See pp 209-211 in Chapter Three.

⁴ This was a predominant theme at the time ECOWAS was formed. In the 1970s 'Collective self-reliance' was a major policy alternative to the redistributive philosophy of the Group of 77 led new international economic order.

for its initial rejection by the French speaking countries within the region. They, among other things, feared Nigerian preponderance and hegemonic potential⁵ in the region and even went to the extent of pre-empting the formation of ECOWAS by their own linguistically based regional economic group, the *Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO), to counteract Nigeria's potential influence in the proposed organisation.

It was also the political overtones of previously proposed integration schemes that had been responsible for their not being formed. Pan Africanism, for example, failed to take root because the newly independent countries wanted to retain their sovereign prerogatives. Political integration was not part of their agenda for development. Economic co-operation was what the countries were interested in. The fight between those who favoured political integration and economic co-operation was particularly intense in West Africa between Ghana's Nkrumah, on the one hand, and Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Liberia, on the other.⁶

If a political reason should be sought for the formation of ECOWAS, it is that economic development is itself an overriding political theme and preoccupies the mind of leaders within the region. To that extent the economic reasons themselves become pseudo-political.

The point being made here is that an overtly political organisation would not have gained support. The increasing nationalistic perspective on economic and political

⁵ See Chapter Three, pp. 199-201.

⁶ For a more detailed account see Chapter Three, pp. 181-184.

development in the region after independence meant that a region wide consensus on a politically oriented organisation would have been difficult to form. This does not, however, preclude hidden political reasons for participation by some potential members. Insofar as the political reasons are not known we will be second guessing if we imputed them to the formation of ECOWAS. What we can say with a high degree of certainty is that ECOWAS was formed to help overcome some bottlenecks in economic development just as the EEC was formed to solve the main problem facing Europe at the time - maintaining peace.

Though economically motivated, subsequent years have seen new goals, of a political nature, such as non-aggression and mutual military co-operation added to the treaty of the community.⁷ The treaty, however, remains an economic formula for industrial development. Thus our analysis of the validity of the reasons for integration will be economic. Politics and society will be looked at, not as motives for integration, but rather for the opportunities and constraints they provide for the achievement of the goals contained in the treaty.

Economic integration is seen as an imperative, a *sine qua non*, for industrial development. The poor performance and failure of earlier attempts at integration within the West African region and the collapse of the East African Community did not deter the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. Since the leaders were aware of the failure of earlier attempts at regional integration⁸, not only in the region but in other parts of the developing world, they must have been confident of being able to overcome the difficulties that had

⁷ See Appendices 1 and 2.

⁸ See pp. 184-186 in Chapter Three.

plagued those earlier attempts. It cannot be suggested, as Davies does, that no lessons had been learnt from the East African Community's experience.⁹

The treaty establishing ECOWAS, signed in Lagos in 1975, stipulated that the implementation of the protocols would result in a customs union by the year 1990.¹⁰ Eighteen years on, the region has not been able to form a free trade area let alone a customs union. Like earlier attempts it has failed to keep to its schedule or to realise the expectations its advocates had for it as a tool of industrial development and trade diversification.

Despite this failure, governments, international organisations, and prominent individuals continue to assert that the countries within the region cannot develop without regional economic integration.

In this chapter we will examine the reasons why West African countries and those who advocate regional integration feel it is an imperative for development. The purpose will be to see if the reasoning behind the formation of such schemes are valid. If they are valid then the obvious question will be why they fail. Failure will then have to be attributed to the background conditions and the process mechanisms. This will confirm the assertion made by those who say that developing countries do not have the background conditions for forming regional integration schemes. This confirmation will not only be because ECOWAS has failed to keep up to schedule but rather that it has joined an already existing list of failures in regional integration among developing countries. If on the other

⁹ Davies, A., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis within ECOWAS' in *The World Today*, vol. 39, no 5, May 1983.

¹⁰ Article 12 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.

hand the reasons are not valid then we will have to conclude that regional economic integration may be necessary but not a sufficient condition for the industrial development of West African countries, or that it may not be a necessary condition at all.

Since the second world war, industrialisation, especially manufacturing has experienced faster growth than any other sector of economic activity.¹¹ It has also increased its share of internationally traded goods, and the inability of developing countries, especially those in sub Saharan Africa, to share in the gains from such growth, has been cited as a major factor accounting for their slow growth.¹²

This assertion presupposes that resources that were earned through other means were invested optimally by the developing countries and therefore that they would have developed even faster if they had shared in the growth that occurred in industry. It also presupposes that the level of primary exports was maintained and export earning capabilities maximised. Additionally, unless primary export levels were maintained and earnings used properly connections between primary goods exportation and low economic performances are spurious.

However, regardless of the validity or otherwise of such presuppositions, industrialisation is seen as a channel by which the growth potential of West African countries can be realised. Integration is seen as the path to becoming industrialised.

¹¹ Begg, D., Fischer, S., and Dornbusch, R., Economics, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 1987.

¹² Iyoha, M.A., 'Economic Development and Trade Theories: Relevance and Implication for ECOWAS' in Trade and Development in Economic Community of West African States, Orimalade, A., and Ubogu, R.E., (ed.), Vikas, Delhi, 1984.

The argument used by developing countries to justify the need for industrialisation, and hence integration schemes, are found in the arguments about the asymmetrical distribution of the gains of international trade in favour of manufactured goods relative to primary goods.¹³

The importance of this issue to the development debate makes a thorough examination of the arguments necessary, because they underpin the validity of embarking on integration as a strategy for industrialisation.

1.2 Primary goods and Deteriorating Terms of Trade

The four main issues seen as affecting the export earning capacity of primary goods are; deteriorating terms of trade, unstable prices, agricultural protectionism in developed countries, and the over dependence on a narrow range of commodities.

Before the pioneering but separate works of Prebisch and Singer, it was believed that diminishing returns in agriculture and mining would lead to rises in the prices of primary goods compared to those of manufactures.¹⁴ This phenomenon was expected to lead to an equalisation of factor prices.

¹³ In a keynote address to the Nigerian national seminar entitled the 'ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme', held in Kano, Nigeria, in June 1992, the Nigerian Minister of Trade and Tourism said '...efforts to encourage the development of intra-regional trade, is a positive counter measure to our unfavourable terms-of- trade with the developed countries....' quoted in The Trade Liberalisation Scheme of the Economic Community of West African States, Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Spring Communications, 1992.

¹⁴ MacBean, A., and Nguyen, D.T., Commodity Policies: Problems and Prospects, Groom Helm, London, 1987.

However, according to the Prebisch and Singer thesis the reverse was the case. Prebisch, for example, based his conclusions on statistical computation he did using the merchandise trade figures of the United Kingdom between 1876-80 to 1938. He inferred that the falling prices in the imports of the United Kingdom and the rising prices of her exports over the period implied a secular deterioration in the net barter terms of trade of primaries. He considered that because the UK's export of manufactures constituted the major proportion of total trade in manufactured goods, and was also the main importer of primary goods over the relevant period, trends in the terms of trade could be inferred from its import and export prices.

For the purpose of his study Prebisch divided the countries of the world into two analytical categories; the Centre, representing the industrialised countries, and the Periphery, representing the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The argument he used was that trade unions in the Centre were more able to secure for themselves the benefits of increases in productivity by demanding higher wages. Thus in periods of increasing productivity they bargained for higher wages, but in periods of slow growth were unwilling to accept wage cuts. This resulted in increasing prices of the goods they produced. This, together with the fact that income and price elasticities of demand for primary goods were much lower than that of manufactures, implied that the increase in wages in the Centre was not reflected in increased demand for primary goods from the Periphery.

Singer, also, felt that whilst increases in productivity accrued to manufactured goods as higher incomes, oligopolistic market clearing mechanisms for agriculture

resulted in lower wages for producers of agricultural goods. As a consequence of this, technological progress and productivity increases resulted in price rises for manufactured goods but led to falling prices for agricultural goods. As importers of primary goods and exporters of manufactured goods therefore, the developed countries reaped the benefits of rising prices for their exports and falling prices for their imports thus resulting in the asymmetrical response of prices to productivity increases.¹⁵

Much controversy was generated by the Prebisch/Singer thesis. MacBean and Nguyen give a good listing of some of the economic arguments levelled against Prebisch in particular.

One widely held criticism was that a good inference could not be made from using the trade figures of one country as a proxy for all industrial countries, and therefore that the United Kingdom's trade figures were unrepresentative. Another one was that primary commodities imported by the UK over the relevant period included commodities produced and exported by other industrialised countries. Others have pointed out that since exports were valued f.o.b. and imports valued c.i.f., the deterioration in the net barter terms of trade of primaries could be, wholly or to a significant extent, explained by the reduction in freight costs and not to falling prices. It was also criticised on the grounds that the improvement in the quality of manufactures and the introduction of new ones were not taken account of. It was argued that because improvements in quality resulted in an upward bias of the price index of manufactures the secular improvement in the United Kingdom's terms of trade could be explained this way.

¹⁵ *ibid.*

Despite these criticisms recent studies of the secular movement of prices by Sproas¹⁶ and Sapsford¹⁷ seem to corroborate the declining terms of trade thesis which asserts that exporters of manufactures benefit more from international trade than primary producers.

In an attempt to resolve the issues raised by the deteriorating terms of trade controversy, Sproas, for example, concluded that a deteriorating terms of trade for primaries was indeed detectable in the data but that its magnitude was smaller than had been suggested by Prebisch. Even though Sproas found no statistically significant deterioration in the terms of trade over the 70 year period between 1900-70, Sapsford did find statistically significant figures for the sub periods 1900-30 and 1950-70. This underlines the effect disaggregation of the data can have in the conclusions that are drawn. Most studies on the trend in the net barter terms of trade indicate the need to be careful in drawing conclusions from aggregated figures. However, constructions by Kindleberger suggest that the primary goods exported mainly by developing countries have experienced a bigger fall in their terms of trade over the 1872-1938 period.¹⁸

Other arguments that were levelled against the Prebisch/Singer hypothesis were not altogether valid. The argument that the c.i.f. and f.o.b. valuations of imports and exports, for example, may be the explanation of the deterioration was not sufficient. As Macbean

¹⁶ Sproas, J., 'The Statistical Debate on the net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities and Manufactures: A Comment and Some Additional Evidence', in *Economic Journal*, vol. 90, 1980.

¹⁷ Sapsford, D., 'The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities and manufactures: A Comment and some Additional Evidence', in *Economic Journal*, vol. 95, 1985.

¹⁸ MacBean and Nguyen, op. cit.

and Nguyen argued, unless the fall in freight cost is proportionately greater than the decrease in f.o.b. prices, decreases in c.i.f. prices will not lead to a deterioration in the net barter terms of trade. They also considered it a fallacy to assume that the qualities of commodities do not improve over time. Quoting Krug and Poerch, and the US Department of Trade figures they pointed out the proportion of the highest grade of coffee (AA) had improved from 0.2 per cent in 1957-8 to 16.3 per cent in 1964-5. Secondly, the proportion of Greek cotton output with a staple length of 28mm or more was only 11.3 per cent in 1954 but rose to 97.3 per cent in 1970. Thus if quality improvements were to be taken into consideration no presumption can be made *a priori* concerning a bias in the terms of trade from this source.

More recent studies by Grilli and Yang also support the Prebisch/Singer thesis. They used newly constructed index of commodity prices and the modified indexes of manufactured goods prices and found that from 1900 to 1986 the relative prices of commodities fell on trend by 0.5 per cent a year. They therefore concluded that:

Our results strongly support the inference made by Spraos about Prebisch's original data: the price series he used exaggerated the adversity of the trends in the relative price of all primary products. Yet our data indicate, from the beginning of the present century to date, a cumulative trend fall of about 40 percent in the market prices of nonfuel primary commodities relative to those of manufactured products and a cumulative trend decline of about 36 percent in the market prices of all primary commodities.¹⁹

Data compiled by the Department of Economics of Princeton University on African countries and adapted in Table 1 suggests that generalisations cannot be made for all

¹⁹ Grilli E.R., and Yang, M.C., Primary commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices, and Terms of Trade of Developing Countries: What the Long Run Shows' The World Bank Economic Review, vol 2, no 1, 1988, p9.

countries. The figures also imply that even for the same country care has to be taken in suggesting the connection between primary goods exportation and underdevelopment. However, from the figures above it can be concluded that the countries forming the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have experienced deteriorating terms of trade, though some more than others.

From these conclusions on the secular trend of the relative terms of trade of primaries and manufactured goods, to what extent can the slow growth and lack of economic development in the less developed countries be attributed to declining prices of primaries, and how do these support the calls for industrialisation?

1.3 Export of Primary Goods and Economic Growth

Even though the figures in Table 1 below suggest that West African countries on average are disadvantaged in international trade, such figures alone are not sufficient for conclusions of the sort the question asks. To arrive at a conclusion that shows a positive correlation between deteriorating terms of trade and slow growth one will have to prove that the countries involved would have fared better if they had not been participating in international trade. It would also be necessary to demonstrate the ways in which the declining trend has affected their development goals. Some of these goals include economic ones such as: growth in per capita income or product; domestic distribution of income, and wealth; and economic power; utilisation of production capacity and cyclical stability in real output; price or nominal stability; and international economic position.²⁰

²⁰ Adams, G.F. and Berhman, Commodity Exports and Economic Development, Lexington Books, 1982.

Furthermore, whilst aggregate price trends may indicate a particular trend, different commodity groups and commodities within such groups differ in their performance over the long term.

According to MacBean and Nguyen²¹, a breakdown of the principal nonfuel commodities prices into; food prices, nonfood prices and raw materials, would indicate that over the 1900 to 1986 period the last two categories experienced a much stronger decline in their prices relative to manufactures.

Table 1

INDEXES OF TERMS OF TRADE OF TRADE FOR ECOWAS

COUNTRIES (1960-73 = 100)

Country	<u>Terms-of-Trade</u>		
	1974-79	1980-81	1982-85
Benin	85	62	57
Burkina-Faso	102	89	92
The Gambia	100	85	97
Ghana	150	106	81
Ivory Coast	131	116	118
Liberia	63	43	45
Mali	105	93	97
Mauritania	66	53	53
Niger	85	60	55
Nigeria	332	583	526
Senegal	159	112	101
Togo	234	141	124

Source: Adapted from The Economies of Africa and the Prices of their Exports, by Gersovitz, M., and Paxson, H., C., Princeton Studies of International Finance, no. 68 Oct 1990, p7.

²¹ op. cit.

While food prices declined at 0.36 per cent a year, that of metal and nonfood agriculture raw materials declined at 0.82 percent and 0.84 per cent respectively. However within the aggregated negative trend of food prices, tropical beverage raw materials (coffee, cocoa, and tea) experienced a positive trend of 0.63 percent a year whilst agricultural foods experienced a negative trend of 0.54 percent relative to manufactures. The larger weight of other foods in the aggregate index, however, swamped the effect of secularly rising prices of tropical beverage raw materials relative to manufactures.²² The divergences indicated between and within commodity groups imply that before conclusions can be drawn about the policy effects of international trade consideration will have to be given to the export mix of a particular country. This is because while the prices of some of its exports may be declining those of others may be rising, in which case the foreign exchange earning capacity may remain unchanged, be improving or declining depending on the relative price changes. Thus unless earnings can be shown to have been affected, arguments about the effects of deteriorating terms-of-trade will only be partially true. A constant level of earnings implies that the country will be able to maintain its level of investment and services provision if population remains constant. The need to disaggregate overall figures becomes even more important if one considers that between 1960-69 cocoa prices experienced a growth rate of 4.1 per cent and 5 per cent between 1970-81 whilst coffee experienced a growth of 3.4 per cent over the 1960-69 period and a decline of 4.1 per cent over the 1970-81 period. Tea on the other hand experienced a decrease of 3.4 per cent and 2.9 percent over those two periods. Over the 1950-81 period tea experienced the worst trend of 3.1 per cent decrease,

²² Grilli and Yang, *op. cit.*

followed by coffee with an annual decrease of 1.3 per cent with cocoa prices remaining constant.²³

Furthermore, even though overall figures indicate falling trends for cereal, in 1950 the real price of maize grew at 6.7 per cent per annum, whilst those of rice and wheat decreased at 2.9 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively. In the 1960's the real price of maize fell to a growth rate of 1.1 per cent, whilst rice increased at 4.6 per cent and wheat remained constant.²⁴

The volatile movement in the figures above and the effects of the disaggregation of commodities on the trend they experience justify the need for caution in drawing broad based inferences from overall figures.

Apart from the differences that may exist between different commodities, another point worth noting is the effect of price movements on different regions within the developing world. This point is relevant because of the tendency to sometimes lump countries together under the label of "underdeveloped" and then proceed to make generalisations based on this categorisation. Such categorisation may lead to wrong conclusions because while, for example, over the 1953-83 period the non-oil export commodity prices remained important in the net barter terms of trade for Southeast Asia and Africa, it did not for Latin America. Additionally, while the relative importance of non-oil commodity prices increased for Africa over the period, they seem to have declined

²³ MacBean and Nguyen, *op. cit.*, p62.

²⁴ *ibid.*

in importance for Southeast Asia because of the increasing importance of manufactures in their exports.

At the country level, countries such as the Republic of Korea and the former Yugoslavia have a negative relationship between nonfuel commodity prices and net barter terms of trade because of the importance of manufactures in their exports. They therefore experience improvement in their net barter terms of trade when prices of primaries are falling.²⁵

Since developing countries export different mixes of primary products with differing price trends and fluctuation rates, and the net barter terms of trade of primaries is of more significance to some than others, generalisations cannot be made to cover them all. Moreover, because developing countries are net exporters of the raw materials tropical beverages and net importers of other foods, the net effect of price trends of cereals, for example, on the purchasing power of their exports must also be taken into account.²⁶

Conclusions as to whether trends in the net barter terms of trade have affected the growth potential of any particular country or group of countries must also show whether there is an aggregate relationship between net barter terms of trade and lower purchasing power if quantity increases fail to compensate for the fall in prices.

²⁵ Grilli and Yang, *op. cit.*

²⁶ *ibid.*

Table 2

INDEXES OF EXPORT QUANTITIES OF ECOWAS COUNTRIES

(1960-73=100)

Country	<u>Export Quantities</u>		
	1974-79	1980-81	1982-85
Benin	85	100	81
Burkina Faso	159	189	157
Gambia	149	71	109
Ghana	78	71	60
Ivory Coast	159	154	146
Liberia	172	166	141
Mali	210	288	278
Mauritania	177	196	290
Niger	335	795	487
Nigeria	161	123	87
Senegal	91	71	92
Sierra Leone	69	67	51
Togo	108	156	128

Source: Adapted from The Economies of Africa and the Prices of their Exports, by Gersovitz & Paxson *ibid.*, p7.

From tables 1 and 2 above, it is clear that some countries in West Africa were able to maintain their export earnings over the periods quoted. Between 1974 and 1979 Burkina Faso, for example, experienced an average 2% rise in its terms-of-trade and a 59% increase in the quantity of exports. Her merchandise trade increases from 18 million dollars in 1965 to 161 million dollars in 1980 and to 198 million dollars in 1987.²⁷ Increase

²⁷ Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crises to Sustainable Growth, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 1989, Table 1, p221.

in export quantities more than compensated for deteriorating terms-of-trade between 1980 and 1985. The low growth rate of 2.5% over the 1973 to 1987 cannot be attributed to lower export earnings. A corollary to the fact that price trends differ for different commodities is the fact that price changes are inevitable in a market situation as a response to supply and demand conditions. Thus for any particular product, falling prices may only be a reaction to supply and demand conditions (whether competitive, oligopolistic or monopolistic). It is only when price trends follow a declining path over time and supply and demand elasticities are such as to make increases in supply unable to compensate for falling prices that conclusions can be made for unprofitability in that particular commodity. Evidence shows that between 1900-13 the purchasing power of all primary commodities in terms of manufactures increased at a rate of 4.5 percent a year. This fell to 0.4 percent between 1921-38. From 1955 to 1983 growth was 4.2 percent a year. The purchasing power of nonfuel prices also increased at 2.8 percent a year between 1955 and 1983 even though terms of trade declined at 0.4 percent a year. This negative trend was compensated for by a 3.2 percent increase in export volumes.²⁸

In view of the increase in the overall purchasing power of commodity exports, and the income terms of trade of nonfuel exporting developing countries, one cannot conclude that trade per se or trade in nonfuel commodities has been harmful to countries specialising in their production. Any conclusions that one draws must be country and commodity specific. Growth must also take account of factors such as government pricing and investment policies and their effect on output in the export sector, autonomous factor supply growth, and market structures.

²⁸ *ibid.*

A positive correlation between declining net barter terms of trade and growth cannot therefore be assumed *a priori* because there are large differences in the net barter terms-of-trade of developing countries and between commodities. It is difficult to make useful generalisations between world primary products and world manufactured products. The only valid generalisation that can be made is that trends tend to be against underdeveloped countries and in favour of developed countries.²⁹

Though it has been suggested above that deteriorating terms of trade alone cannot explain the poor economic growth of developing countries in West Africa, the political strength such arguments hold are very significant. Table 1 does indicate that West African countries have on average experienced deteriorating terms of trade. Even if increased export quantities compensated for the fall in prices relative to manufactures, the point still remains that they are disadvantaged. More significant to West African countries, is that terms of trade have deteriorated for the majority of them since independence. The past thirty or so years are the years that are important to these countries, not the period from the nineteenth century. The politically significant years have been from the 1960s which have been shown by Spraos, Sapsford, and Grilli and Yang, among others, to have been a period of deteriorating terms of trade for nonfuel exports especially.

Another generalisation that can be made is that if such a general decline in the terms of trade of primaries continues, then the import capabilities of the countries exporting such commodities concerned will be impaired. For such countries, especially

²⁹ Kindleberger, C.P., 'The Terms of Trade and Economic Development', in Review of Economic and Statistic Supplement, vol 40, 1958.

those specialising in a narrow range of primaries the solution might be to diversify.

However, diversification does not necessarily result in a steady or increasing trend in the terms of trade. If it results in a widening of the range of primary exports, the effect might be an overall steadying of export earnings if the new products do not experience declining trends themselves. In this case the new products will be compensatory in their effect. On the other hand if the new products have declining or stable trends then they will either aggravate the situation or leave it unchanged.

We can conclude, from the above arguments, that volatility in the export earnings of developing countries does not necessarily derive from economic factors, although it might. Neither does poor economic performance derive from deteriorating terms of trade alone. Secondly, diversification will not necessarily alleviate the problem through less concentration on a single product, although it might because the new product might be an unstable crop and therefore additive in its effect or compensatory if it is not unstable.

The experience of independent West Africa has been one of fluctuating earnings from export of primary products. It is, however, important to ascertain whether the instability in the export earnings of a particular country is really a result of economic forces or whether political forces are the real reason. If one of the reasons for integration is to increase the bargaining position of member countries in international trade, a country whose problems are mainly political is unlikely to benefit from concerted bargaining efforts of the integrated bloc. This is because advantages derived from such bargaining will not by themselves result in increased economic performance of that country. Even if more stable prices were negotiated, domestic policies may hinder the ability to take advantage of the

new opportunities. However, for those countries that face unstable market conditions, economic integration may be a way of regulating the market if many producers of the commodity are within the integrating area. Even then, since price stabilisation involves substantial capital, the ability of the participating countries to regulate the market may prove to be very difficult and expensive, and may indeed be beyond their financial capabilities.³⁰

Even though export diversification and price stabilisation methods being used as a way of overcoming the difficulties and uncertainties posed by exporting primaries, many in the developing countries feel that the best way to move forward is by industrialising. This would be the advantage of restructuring their economies and therefore tackle the fundamental problem of dependence on primary exports. A policy of industrial development does not imply an entire shift from agricultural production to industrial production. Indeed it need not be zero-sum. The continuing exportation of primaries is necessary to provide income and provide employment as industrialisation proceeds. Industrialisation is expected to help overcome the over dependence on the exportation of a limited range of export products. It is also expected to enable the developing countries to overcome the difficulties of primary producers not being able to respond to changing demand conditions. Because the ability to reallocate national resources in response to international exchange opportunities and to new technological possibilities is necessary for competitive advantage, this would imply that developing countries, including those in West Africa cannot fully exploit the advantages of international trade. This is because of the rigid supply and demand

³⁰ The International Cocoa Agreement had to curtail buffer stock operations owing to lack of funds. West African countries are unlikely to be able to fund the cost of infrastructure, and operational costs that price stabilisation entails.

conditions they face. Expanding, reducing or changing from the production of one primary good to another is therefore very difficult.

The flexibility needed to respond to market signals by combining factors in different proportions according to price signals and profit incentives can only be achieved by removing the excessive rigidity in the economic structure of the developing economies. Because the industrialised countries seem to be able to respond more quickly and to take advantage of opportunities more easily, developing countries feel that by emulating the developed countries they will be able to escape from instability and uncertainties.

As was shown above, even though the connection between primary products exportation and poverty cannot be made without careful analysis, the point remains that most policy makers in the third world tend to assume that their difficulties are a result of not being industrialised. Industrialisation therefore tends to be a major policy objective of all primary goods producers.

1.4 Terms-of-Trade and Industrialisation

In addition to its being a policy objective of most developing countries, industrialisation has also been a policy advocated by those who subscribe to the conclusions of the deteriorating terms of trade argument. It was also an argument which was both overtly and tacitly accepted by African political leaders and referred to in their speeches. Import substitution industrialisation was therefore embarked upon by quite a few countries of West Africa after independence.

Even though West African countries, such as, Ghana embarked upon import substitution industrialisation in the early 1960s, the policy did not succeed for several reasons. Among the well known factors, in the case of Ghana, were the heavy dependence on foreign inputs and the lack of linkages with the domestic economy. The high dependence on suppliers credit, neglect of the traditional foreign exchange credit, neglect of the traditional foreign exchange earning sector as a result of the diversion of funds to industry, high infrastructural investment requirement and the installation of output capacities that were far in excess of what the domestic market could support, lack of the entrepreneurial, management and labour skills, shortage of raw material inputs, together with a lack of co-ordination led to an industrialisation programme, laced with a heavy dose of modernisation which proved wasteful, unsuccessful and positively detrimental to the balance of payment position of the country.³¹

Even though not all West African countries embarked upon industrialisation and modernisation with the same vigour as Ghana did,³² there is no doubt that many would have faced similar problems, partly as a result of the inherent problems of the import substitution paradigm itself and because of other problems internal to the countries themselves. The failed case of Latin American import substitution industrialisation attest to this.

Structural change in developing countries, therefore has its problems. As the experience of import substitution industrialisation has shown, the diversion of funds from

³¹ Berg, E.T., Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism: Recent Trends in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, in Foster, Philip, J., and Zolberg, Aristide, R., Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on modernisation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971.

³² *ibid.*

other sources and uses to the new industrial sector results in a neglect of those sectors and also to huge balance of payment deficits. As Roxborough pointed out,³³ the "quasi-capital" character of the neglected sectors was usually not taken into account, so that eventual deterioration in foreign exchange earning capacity resulted in the heightened inability to sustain the industrialisation programme.

From the above we can conclude that despite what is seen as the unfavourable distribution of the gains of trade for primary producers, trade with developed countries is strategically important to developing countries because it enables them, among other things, to import goods that they cannot produce themselves, but are necessary for the maintenance and expansion of production.³⁴ However the combination of demand and supply conditions, coupled with agricultural protectionism, discovery of synthetic substitutes, decrease in raw material input requirements per unit of output as a result of increasing technological development, together with increased agricultural productivity in the developed countries mean that the developing countries cannot expand their exports to the level that will help maintain their present import needs and finance new industrial programmes.³⁵ The experience of developing countries has been a foreign exchange gap which results from their needs and their capacity to earn foreign exchange.³⁶

The graduated nature of tariffs in the developed countries also means that even if the developing countries tried to improve the market conditions of their products by

³³ Roxborough, I., Theories of Underdevelopment, Unwin, 1978.

³⁴ Linder, S., 'Custom Unions and Economic Development', in Latin American Integration: Experience and Prospects, Wionczek, M.S., (ed), Praeger, 1964.

³⁵ MacBean and Nguyen, op. cit. See also Balassa, B, Economic Development and Integration, op. cit.

³⁶ Linder, S., Op.cit.

exporting processed goods they will meet formidable barriers which will make them uncompetitive. West African countries however have preferential access to the EEC market through the Lomé Convention and under the General System of Preferences. As Linder pointed out, the real constraint faced by developing countries' exports of manufactured goods are shortcomings such as quality, design, degree of standardisation, and compliance with contracted delivery dates. Such shortcomings make it difficult for them to be able to compete effectively for consumer choice in the markets of the developed countries.³⁷ This poses an important question for West African integration. Will integration result in a better trading regime for the members than what they have under the Lomé Convention and the various GSPs? This issue will be examined later.

To overcome the dilemma posed by the constraint of foreign exchange through import substitution industrialisation, it is suggested that industrialisation would be more feasible if it is done on a regional basis within the context of a custom union.³⁸ This, it is hoped will create a regional market of sufficient size to make the setting up of industries possible without the need to rely on the markets of the developed countries. It is, also, expected to help in the realisation of economies of scale, and make it possible for the countries to conserve foreign exchange through the imposing of prohibitive tariffs on "luxury" goods.³⁹ From these perspectives it is felt that industrialisation would be more sustainable and viable within the context of regional integration.

Whether the enlarged market that results from regional integration is to the advantage of member states or is exploited by multinationals depends on the rules of origin

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ Balassa, B., *op. cit.*

that guide trade between member countries. As is pointed in chapter three, regional integration schemes among developing countries seek to avoid creating enlarged markets for multinational corporations. This is because local industries are unable to compete with the might of such companies. The growth of local industry will therefore be hampered by unfair competition from foreign investment. Additionally, developing countries believe that without the rules of origin their desire to reduce dependence on foreign direct capital will not be fulfilled. This is one of the reasons why ECOWAS, for example, has elaborate guidelines about rules of origin. It is to prevent the re-exportation of imported goods and, as previously explained, to ensure that local participation is adequate before goods are eligible for preferential treatment.

To examine whether regional integration is able to act as a tool for development through regional level import substitution industrialisation, we will need to first look at how such schemes are supposed to function. In the next section , we will look at the economic framework of regional integration.

1.5 Economic Framework Of Regional Integration: Traditional Theory

Economic integration has been defined as a process and a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it encompasses various measures abolishing discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states. Viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.⁴⁰ There are various degrees of economic integration, and depending on the

⁴⁰ Balassa, B., 'A Theory of Regional Integration' in Latin American Economic Integration, Experience and Prospects, Wioncek, M. S., (ed.), op. cit.

extent to which the partners are willing to work with each other, it can vary from a free trade area to total integration with supranational institutions.⁴¹

Economic integration schemes are usually categorised according to the level of integration achieved, and there are five main stages. The first of these is the free trade area. Within a free trade area, members agree to remove tariffs against the products from each others' country. However, each member remains independent in setting the tariff level on goods imported from non-member countries.

The second stage is the custom union. The main features of this stage are; the elimination of tariffs of the imports from non member countries and the adoption of a common external tariff on the imports from the rest of the world, together with apportionment of customs duties. The main differences between a free trade area and a custom union. The first of these is that whereas members of the former retain independence in fixing external tariffs, members of a custom union adopt a common one. Secondly, a free trade area is equipped with rules of origin designed to confine intra-union free trade to products originating mainly within the area. The rules of origin are meant to operate against trade deflection which might result from the redirection of imports through the country with the lowest tariff to partner countries in order to exploit the tariff differential.

The third stage of economic integration is the common market. In addition to the characteristics of the custom union, a common market allows for the free movement of the

⁴¹ Robson, P., The Economics of International Integration, Allan and Unwin, London, 1987.

factors of s $X_{\frac{1}{2}} \pm 8 \hat{a} \hat{p} \hat{A} \hat{p} \hat{A} \quad \hat{A} \quad \hat{A} \hat{p} \hat{p} \hat{p} \hat{p} \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2} \quad | \cdot | \cdot \hat{a} ? \hat{a}$ production. Economic union co
 tog th r with th unification of mon tary, fiscal, and oth r polici s. Th final stag of th
 proc ss is a total conomic int gration and is achi v d wh n a supranational institution is
 form d which tak s binding d cisions on b half of m mb rs.

Economic int gration, according to conomists, is a m ans to an nd, and not an
 nd in its lf, and what motivat s it is th prosp cts of conomic gain r sulting from an
 incr as in conomic activity and a fast r rat of growth of output.⁴² This, seemingly
 economic objective hides the political implications of such scheme. Development goals are
 not purely economic. The desire to participate, more actively, in international relations is
 seen as being enhanced by economic development, because it will create the freedom with
 which the countries can act. Despite the latent political goals that underlie economic
 objectives, regional integration can only help in fulfilling such goals if it is successful.
 Failure of an integration scheme may be a result of political, social or economic factors and
 can have negative effects on relations between member countries and retard development
 objectives. Positive attitudes toward regional integration are more likely to be enhanced by
 achieving the stated objectives of the treaty setting up a scheme. Since such treaties are
 essentially economic, it is valid to assume that economic success can make the
 achievement of other objectives that are not purely economic possible.

Orthodox theory judges the probable effectiveness of a custom union in meeting
 these development objectives in terms of the trade creation or trade diversion that may
 result from the formation of the union.

⁴² Balassa. op. cit.

Trade creation refers to a union induced shift from the consumption of higher-cost domestic products to lower-cost domestic products from a partner country. This causes the reduction or elimination of domestic high-cost production. Secondly, it results in increased consumption of the good as it becomes cheaper because of the switch from home produced to cheaper sources within the integrated area.

The reduction or elimination of high-cost production gives rise to savings in real cost of goods produced domestically and is called the production effect. Consumers' surplus also result from the substitution of cheaper imports for high-cost means of satisfying wants, and gives rise to what is called the consumption effect. Both the production effect and the consumption effect constitute the trade creation effect of a union. Trade diversion on the other hand is a union induced shift from lower-cost external sources of supply to higher-cost partner sources. Just like trade creation, trade diversion also has two aspects to it. The first of these is the increase in the cost of imports that result from switching importation of goods from abroad to higher-cost partner goods. The second is the loss in consumer surplus resulting from the substitution of higher-cost for lower-cost imports. These two effects constitute the trade diversion effect of a union.

Traditional theory of custom union bases the viability of economic integration schemes on the welfare gains and losses deriving from trade creation or diversion that arise as a result of the reallocation of resources following the formation of the union. Welfare gains are also expected to derive from other sources such as; economies of scale, improvement in the terms-of-trade of the group, forced efficiency due to increased

competition, and a change in the rate of economic growth.⁴³ Inward investment, another possible source of gain, is, as has been pointed out in the previous section, defeated by the rules of origin in the West African case. Thus though this was seen as an important source of gain in the East African Community, it became of diminished relevance to the ECOWAS scheme. The gains from industrialisation are expected to derive from indigenous activity rather than from foreign companies.

The foregoing implies that for economic integration to be beneficial to West African states it must be a trade creating one. To what extent can this be expected in the ECOWAS case?

Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in West Africa

A recourse to orthodox theory will help lay the outline for assessing this. It is only after we have examined the laid down framework according to existing theory that we can begin to judge the appropriateness of the criteria used within the context of West Africa.

Market size

According to the traditional theory of custom unions certain general conditions are conducive to trade creation. The first of these is that a union is likely to be a trade creating one the larger is the economic area it covers, and the larger the membership of the union, the greater will be the scope of its trade creating abilities. The logic of this is that there would then be a higher probability of the least-cost producer being a member of the union.⁴⁴

⁴³ Balassa, B., Economic Development and Integration, Centro De Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, Mexico, 1965.

⁴⁴ Balassa, op. cit.

The difficulty that arises though is how the size of the economic area is to be measured. Should it be by population or by geographical area? An economic area measured by the former criterion would suggest that India, and China are bigger than the United States of America.⁴⁵ An appropriate measure should take account of gross national product exclusive of the subsistence sector, difference in taste, and the cost of transportation. The more diversified the tastes of a population, and the greater the cost of transportation, the smaller will be the effective size of the market for a given source of marketable output.⁴⁶

Taste is fairly homogeneous in West Africa, and this is reflected in the kinds of staple food crops that are grown and the manufactured goods produced within the region, and imported from outside.

Taste as an indicator, therefore, does not subtract from the effective size of the market. On the other hand, transportation cost may be high because of the scanty network existing between and within individual West Africa states. The state and direction of the communication networks reflect to a certain extent, the extra-regional orientation of the commercial policy of countries within the region. It also reflects the recent history of the region as a parcelled out property of colonial Britain, France and Portugal. The major roads and railway networks are those that were built to link export goods producing areas to ports whilst the post and telecommunication network is more effective in linking the individual countries to their former metropolis. Though new roads have been built since

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

The difficulty that arises though is how the size of the economic area is to be measured. Should it be by population or by geographical area? An economic area measured by the former criterion would suggest that India, and China are bigger than the United States of America.⁴⁵ An appropriate measure should take account of gross national product exclusive of the subsistence sector, difference in taste, and the cost of transportation. The more diversified the tastes of a population, and the greater the cost of transportation, the smaller will be the effective size of the market for a given source of marketable output.⁴⁶

Taste is fairly homogeneous in West Africa, and this is reflected in the kinds of staple food crops that are grown and the manufactured goods produced within the region, and imported from outside.

Taste as an indicator, therefore, does not subtract from the effective size of the market. On the other hand, transportation cost may be high because of the scanty network existing between and within individual West Africa states. The state and direction of the communication networks reflect to a certain extent, the extra-regional orientation of the commercial policy of countries within the region. It also reflects the recent history of the region as a parcelled out property of colonial Britain, France and Portugal. The major roads and railway networks are those that were built to link export goods producing areas to ports whilst the post and telecommunication network is more effective in linking the individual countries to their former metropolis. Though new roads have been built since

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

independence and roads built in the colonial era are by no means entirely and rigidly utilitarian in the respect stated above, the major roads still either link production areas to the cities and ports and one administrative area to another. Transportation is therefore inadequate for fostering effective trade, and efficient location of industry within the region.⁴⁷

Finally, GNP varies considerably for individual countries within the region. Nigeria for example, accounts for over 65 per cent of the region's GNP. At the same time, its high population of over 115 million people leads to a lower per capita income than the Ivory Coast.⁴⁸ Per capita GNP is generally very low in the region, and raises questions about the extent to which even the combined markets can support certain industries.

Regional Integration and Economies of Scale

As Brown has noted,⁴⁹ 'the most important single consideration about the development of manufacturing, ... is the size of the market required to support production on an efficient scale'. What underlies import substitution industrialisation, and protection of infant industries at the regional level is the assumption that the partner countries are not able, generally, to compete efficiently on the world market for manufactured goods until they have learned-by-doing within a sheltered regional market. The regional market is thus expected to be a sort of half-way house to full participation in the market for industrial goods. However, when industrialisation is referred to in the treaties establishing regional

⁴⁷ Obadan, M.I., 'Regional Trade of the ECOWAS: Characteristics, Problems and Prospects', in Orimalade and Obogu, op. cit.

⁴⁸ Iyoha, M.A., op. cit.

⁴⁹ Brown, A.J., 'Separation versus a Common Market in Developing Countries', Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research, 1961.

integration schemes, they are referred to in rather general terms and a general assumption is made that the combined market of the member countries will support the industries once they are set up. Such *a priori* assumptions are made for ECOWAS also. It is assumed both in the treaty and rhetoric that once an integrated market is established, the combined market will be able to support industrialisation. However because industrialisation can range from simple manufactures to complex technologically based products, it is essential to specify what goods are being referred to. Since the reaping of economies of scale forms the major dynamic reason for forming such schemes in developing regions, it is important to pay particular attention to this issue.

The question which arises, therefore, in the ECOWAS context is whether the combined markets of the member states will help in supporting the industries that cannot be supported by the national markets. In other words, what should be the minimum size of a market before it is able to support the minimum level of efficiency in various branches of industry.

Using the rather old but very relevant point made by Brown in 1961 in his study of the defunct East African Community, *prima facie* a country offering less than one hundredth of the market which is available for goods such as blast furnace, butter and margarine, electric cookers and heating apparatus, machine tools, railway wagons and carriages, wholesale bespoke tailoring, iron and steel tubes, aircraft and prime movers, to mention a few examples, in Britain would find itself severely handicapped in establishing such industries. It will also be considerably handicapped in producing such goods as umbrellas, rolling and smelting, cocoa and sugar confectionery, even if it did not seek to

establish more than one plant in each industry. Economies of scale are crucial to the survival of these industries.

Though the study is dated the general point it makes remains relevant. If anything at all, economies of scale have become even more important because of the improvement in technology. In high technology goods production no manufacturer depends solely on the home market for its survival. The market offered by the USA, for example, though large is not sufficient for the vast numbers of similar goods that are produced by different firms. In West Africa, the individual markets of the member countries cannot support most of the industries that derive from revealed comparative advantage. Compared to the UK's £14,610 GNP per capita, Sierra-Leone's is £220, Nigeria's is £250, Ivory Coast's £790 and Guinea's £430.⁵⁰ The ratio of the GDPs of Sierra-Leone, Nigeria, Mali to the UK's is 1/860, 1/24 and 1/345 respectively.⁵¹ The figures are not very different for the other countries that form ECOWAS. This indicates that none of the member countries offers a market of sufficient size to support those industries in which economies of scale are important. The combined markets do indeed offer a relatively larger market if we combined the GDPs of the member countries of ECOWAS and calculated the ratio of their GDPs to the UK's.

However this does not indicate that an effective regional market exists for manufactured goods. This is because even if trade is liberalised it does not automatically lead to individuals being able to afford goods that give competitive advantage in international trade- modern technologically based goods.

⁵⁰ World Development Report, Table 1, 1991, p204.

⁵¹ Calculated from *ibid.*, Table 3, p208.

A comparison of the structure of consumption of some countries of the West African region with those of the developed countries indicates that whereas an average of between 78% of household consumption is made up of food, clothing and shelter in the former, the figure is 37% for the latter. Whereas an average of 1.5% is spent on the purchase of automobiles in the three West African countries cited above, a figure of 4.3% is spent in the developed countries. Compared to the 4% that is spent on consumer durables in West Africa, an average of 7% is spent by households in the developed countries.⁵²

A consideration of these figures, together with absolute GNP per capita income figures indicate that not only are incomes much lower in West Africa but that the structure of demand is biased toward basic needs. The tentative conclusion can therefore be drawn that the manufactures that will succeed in West Africa are those that meet the demands for the narrowly defined three basic needs, food, clothing and shelter. The combined market of ECOWAS will not change the underlying consumption patterns within the region in the short to medium term. One therefore doubts the validity of the argument that trade liberalisation will create the market necessary for industrialisation. This is especially so if one considers that at the present time it is not always the size of the market that is causing the under-utilisation of capacity but rather the lack of inputs.

⁵² *ibid.*, Table 10, p222.

Hence a combined West African market will not necessarily result in an adequate demand for modern industrial goods or services although it will result in an expanded market for the goods that most West Africans normally spend their incomes on.

In addition, there is another aspect of economies of scale that needs to be considered. As Pratten and Dean⁵³ pointed out, when economists are discussing economies of scale they usually think in terms of single product plants. However, firms and plants are multi-product and must have the appropriate number of each product produced to take advantage of economies of scale. In printing, for example, first copy costs need to be spread over an appropriate number of books for economies of scale benefits. Thus unless sufficient markets exist for the various models, styles or copies that a firm produces there will be no economies of scale. Regional integration seems to assume single-product lines. That would seem to suggest that the market would be supplied with the same good/product without variety. The reverse argument would suggest that in the situation where there is variety, the market will have to be supplied by very few firms or even a single firm in some instances. Such a situation is no more desirable than consumers having only one brand of a good to buy, because it will result in monopolistic or oligopolistic market condition with all its attendant probabilities.

Finally, the dovetailing of firms within an industry is an important consideration in assessing the availability of conditions for economies of scale. Plants producing an intermediate product may not be able to get a sufficient market for their goods if the plants that use their goods are too small or too few to absorb all of their output.

⁵³ Pratten, C and Dean, R.M., The Economics of Large-Scale Production in British Industry, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965.

Intermediate goods producers might in such instances find that there is not a sufficient market in the final goods segment of the industry to absorb their products. There is therefore no guarantee that that firms within an industry will dovetail into each other as neatly as is taken for granted.

From the discussions above, we can conclude that *a priori* assumptions cannot be made about regional integration and economies of scale. Studies will have to be conducted on which industries can actually hope to gain from large scale production in the region.

Pre-Union Tariff levels and Integration

A second criterion that is used to judge whether a union will be beneficial or not is to look at pre-union tariff levels. If pre-union levels were high, then the union is likely to be a trade diverting one. On the other hand, low pre-union tariffs imply that the members are relatively efficient competitors in the world market, and the pre-union tariffs are not prohibitive tariffs set up to protect inefficient and high-cost internal production.

Since the removal of trade barriers in a union changes relative prices within it, trade that results from the removal of prohibitive tariffs between partner countries does result from high-cost partners buying goods from the cheapest source. They may indeed be buying from a cheaper source relative to its own production cost, but the exporting partner country only gains its comparative advantage because the common external tariff or positive discrimination in favour of its goods makes it difficult for non-members to compete. A high pre-union tariff between member countries means the removal of such

tariff will lead to increased trade, but the net effect will depend on whether this trade results from diverting trade from non-member countries.

Other measures such as exchange rate policies, quotas, and other quantitative and qualitative, and administrative restrictions also need to be looked at in addition to tariffs to determine the effects of tariff levels on trade creation because they all compose the potpourri of measures used by governments to protect their domestic markets.

At an *a priori* level however, because costs of production in West Africa are high it can be assumed that trade that results from the formation of an integrated area will be diverted trade.

An important aspect of tariffs in West Africa is that they are used as a source of government revenue, and as a policy measure to protect infant industries. This means that integration will affect the income of participating countries very seriously. If integration results in imports quantities being reduced, that will mean a corresponding decrease in government revenue. The combined effects of higher tariffs on imports from non-member countries and a lower tariff rates for member countries will be reduced government revenue.

As the table below indicates, governments in West Africa depend heavily on exports and imports duties. This means that governments will be losing one of their main sources of revenue once external barriers are raised and regional ones removed. Thus in

addition to integration resulting in trade diversion, an important source of government revenue will also be lost.

Table 3
Relationship Between Trade and Government Revenue (in *percent*)

Country	<u>Share of</u>		
	Trade Taxes in Total Revenue	Export Taxes in Total Export	Import Duties in CIF Import
Benin (1979)	61	5	25
Burkina Faso	38	3	18
Gambia (1982)	76	4	25
Ghana	46	25	25
Guinea (1983)	57
Guinea-Bissau	32
Ivory Coast	40	5	24
Liberia	31	0	18
Mali	23	5	5
Mauritania (1979)	35	1	14
Niger (1980)	43	3	19
Nigeria (1978)	26	0	16
Senegal (1983)	38	1	16
Sierra-Leone	42	3	18
Togo	31	1	15

Source: Adapted from Gersovitz and Paxson op. cit., p39. Note: Data are for 1984 unless indicated by date in parentheses.

The possibility that integration will result in the loss of revenue for member countries is a major difficulty for integration among developing countries. It will indeed be a severe test of the commitment of the member countries of ECOWAS when they get to the stage of a custom union. This will be because the benefits of integration will not be as

immediate as its costs. It will mean setting up compensatory mechanisms for those who will lose most from regional integration. Such a fund will have to depend on a redistribution of revenue income generated from the resulting trade from integration. However this can be expected to be a very difficult issue to resolve.⁵⁴ It is also one of the issues which will determine whether the scheme will succeed or not.

Competitiveness and Complementarity

It is also believed that trade creation is more likely if the member countries of an integration scheme have competitive economies. Competitiveness is defined as "correspondence in kind of high-cost industries between the different parts of the custom union which were protected by tariffs ... in member countries before custom union was established".⁵⁵ It means that the higher the overlap in protected industries, the more likely it is that there will be trade creation. This is because since production in member countries had previously taken place behind high tariff protection, the possibility of a more efficient reallocation of resources is higher with the removal of tariffs. On the other hand, the smaller the overlap, the less likely it will be that there will be a reallocation of resources after integration.

If however, the economies are complementary, that is, they produce a different range of goods, then there will be no reallocation of resources. After the removal of tariffs the more likely situation under such circumstances will be that trade will be diverted to a high-cost partner country. However complementarity will not lead to trade diversion if the region includes the lowest cost producer.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ The ECOWAS compensation scheme came into effect in January 1990 after years of negotiations between the member states.

⁵⁵ Viner, J., The Custom Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950, p51.

Applying this to West Africa, it must be pointed out that even though the countries in the region are highly competitive in the goods they produce, such competitiveness does not necessarily lead to trade creation. This is because, like most developing countries, West Africa countries export primary goods. Benin, Sierra-Leone, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria and Ivory Coast, for example, produce cocoa. Gambia, Mali, Niger, Senegal together with Nigeria produce groundnuts. The goods are not consumer goods but raw materials which are sold mainly in Western industrialised markets. These countries compete on the world market for the products. The quantities produced of the two examples mentioned above are more than can be processed and consumed within the region. They are also exported largely in unprocessed form. As Balassa pointed out, this type of competitiveness might lead to reallocation of resources only in instances where the production of the good is carried on with the aid of price supports. But since the producers of these primaries will not be competing for the internal market of the integrated area, there will be no need to reallocate resources.

Secondly, even where price supports are used as an incentive to produce, those policies are usually adopted to achieve goals such as product diversification. It is therefore unlikely that partner countries will be unwilling to specialise even further than they already did before integration policies were implemented. This would be because if they did, it will leave them exposed to the risks of over specialisation, a situation that they are trying to overcome with industrialisation. Reallocation will therefore be unlikely. Given that the member countries are striving to cushion themselves from the uncertainties of future

⁵⁶ Balassa, *op. cit.*

demand and price fluctuations of primary goods the conclusion can be made that reallocation of primary goods production will occur.

An additional factor that makes the reallocation of primary products difficult is that some of them are naturally endowed. Thus primary goods such as gold, phosphates, diamond and petroleum which are produced within the region cannot be reallocated no matter how inefficient their productions are within the individual countries.

Even though clear conclusions are difficult to come to about competitiveness, West African countries would seem to indicate a trade diversion situation. There is however the possibility of resource reallocation in the production of import substituting goods which have a high degree of overlapping in West Africa.

Pre-Integration level of Trade

Another criterion for determining the likely benefits of regional integration is the level of pre-integration trade between the member states. It is assumed by orthodox integration theory that the higher the level of intra-regional trade relative to extra-regional trade prior to integration, the higher will be the likelihood of trade creation.

There is an assertion made by many that the high level of unrecorded trade between West African countries indicates the potential for increasing intra-regional trade after integration. Though unrecorded trade may be high, official trade itself is low. It is official trade which is important to integration.

The reason why official trade which acts as a barometer for future trade potential is because of the rule of origin. Since non-originating goods do not qualify for community treatment, they cannot act as an indicator for potential trade between the member countries.

The question that arises, therefore, is how much of such trade is in goods that originate from within the region? Most unofficial trade is in goods originating from outside the region. Thus it is trade deflection in which traders are taking advantage of tariff differentials, exchange rate differences, and other quota and quantitative as well as administrative restrictions that are imposed on imports by individual countries. These are prohibited under the ECOWAS treaty. Recorded intra-region trade of goods originating within the region is low. Once barriers are lifted and tariff barriers harmonised the profitability of such trade will diminish. Such trade can therefore not form the basis for integration.

From the above considerations, traditional theory seems to suggest that West Africa does not have the conditions needed for trade creation to occur. If these observations are true and the analysis used for illustrating the feasibility of economic integration indicate that this is the case, then why do so many scholars in both West Africa and elsewhere believe it is a *sine-qua-non* for the development of the region?

1.6 Dynamic Theory of Regional Economic Integration

Many see the emphasis on resource reallocation as a limiting feature to the usefulness of traditional economic integration theory. They instead emphasise the after

effects which are barely considered in traditional analysis; terms of trade, economies of scale, faster rate of economic growth and increased productivity. These, they assert, are the issues relevant to developing countries. These so-called dynamic effects are, therefore, what justify such undertaking in less developed areas.

As Balassa, among others, has pointed out, the emphasis on reallocation of existing resources and the criterion of universal free trade, makes, the traditional theory of economic integration of limited relevance to developing countries whose main purpose for integrating is to change the existing structure of production, and not to take it as given. The question to ask then is whether the desire of developing countries to change the structure of their economies through integration nullifies the conclusions of the traditional theory?

Traditional theory of integration is essentially a disguised argument for free trade and the fact that pre-union protection exists suggests that free trade is not viewed as desirable by many countries. What integration does is to lower trade barriers where they previously protected national markets in a region. However, the grounds on which a custom union is said to be superior to non-discriminatory protection are precisely those grounds on which a union is necessarily inferior to universal free trade.⁵⁷

Thus even though certain economies might be able to adapt the orthodox theory of regional integration more easily than others. All countries contemplating integration will need to justify it on grounds other than trade creation. This is because the arguments that

⁵⁷ Cooper, C.A., and Massell, B.f., 'Toward a Theory of Customs Union for Developing Countries', in *Journal of Political Economy*, vol 73, 1965.

are used for indicating whether an integration scheme will be trade creating or trade diverting are the same arguments that would indicate that trade creation, itself, is inferior to international free trade.

As mentioned earlier, according to orthodox theory, trade creation as opposed to trade diversion as a way of judging the feasibility and viability of custom unions would indicate that such schemes would be unfruitful in developing countries. However it has also been pointed out that this conclusion has been criticised because of the static equilibrium analysis on which the conclusions depend. To the extent that the objective function of orthodox regional integration is the reallocation of static efficiency, while that of such schemes among developing countries is the maximisation of economic growth, trade creation is of limited relevance to them.⁵⁸

The preconditions for effective integration which were examined earlier on, and which would appear to indicate that of such schemes will not be viable are seen as irrelevant. Orthodox theory proposes, for example, that increased trade will be more likely the greater the pre-union trade. Efficiency and specialisation will also result more readily through reallocation if the individual countries are competitive rather than complementary. Even though it is true that the level of trade between West African countries is low, it is precisely this undesirable situation which, the argument goes, economic integration is expected to correct. Thus the objectives of regional integration are used as arguments to negate the conclusions of orthodox theory. Economic intercourse

⁵⁸ Balassa, B., A Theory of Regional Integration.

between developing countries is low because of their low levels of development. This is expected to change with progressive levels of integration.⁵⁹

It has been suggested that for a regional integration theory to be relevant to developing countries it must examine "the interrelationship of integration and the transformation of economic structure in the process of economic growth with consideration for large scale economies that can be obtained in an enlarged market".⁶⁰ The question which arises is whether the results hoped for by developing countries from integration can be used as sufficient grounds for dismissing traditional theory.

Several factors indicate that this may not be so in the West African context. As was pointed out above the main expected result of integration among developing countries is that the larger market which results as a consequence of the removal of barriers will lead to expanded trade. This is based on the assumption that firms will be able to exploit economies of scale. This assumption would seem to imply that market size places an effective ceiling on the establishment of certain industries. However the main cause of existing under-utilisation of productive capacity in many West African countries is the lack of capital, raw materials, inadequate storage facilities, corruption, and sometimes inept policies of governments. In countries where these happen to be the case, integration will not result in expanded production.⁶¹

Secondly, most of the existing plants in the region are those which were installed very soon after independence. They are therefore, obsolete and inefficient. They will

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p31.

⁶¹ Refer to pp 60-65 above for a discussion about economies of scale.

therefore would not be able to act as a strong base for the sustained effort that will be required over the usually long initial period before the impact of integration is spread throughout the other sectors of the region. The immediate impact of industries in the integration of West Africa will therefore be limited. If the gains are to be derived from new and rationalised industries within the region, the question is where will the finance be coming from? How efficient will such industries be with such high level of government involvement? Where will the industries be located? Will such location be politically acceptable to all the governments? Will there be enough industries to go round? What will be the bases for locating industries? Will it be equity in distribution or efficiency? These are some of the questions which will need to be answered before the so-called dynamic theory of integration can be used as a basis for justifying integration in West Africa.

In addition to the issues raised in the questions above, another expected source of gain which needs to be questioned is the belief that integration that will make it possible to establish industries that would otherwise not be viable in within the small confines of the individual national boundaries. This expectation assumes a high level of cosmopolitanism among the member states. It elevates the regional interest above the national interest. It also implies a high level of dirigisme.

Additionally, the above expectation is contradictory to one of the sources which make it possible for economies of scale to operate. The absence of competition in such an industry leaves it with a monopoly situation. Production, in such circumstances, could be kept artificially low. Integration may therefore result in the protection of inefficient firms.

Another factor that may affect effective competition is that the geographical spread of the economic area covered by the integration scheme. ECOWAS covers 16 countries and is quite large. This might make the setting up of several similar industries necessary. The low level of transportation between the members means there will not be an effective rationalisation of industries. Several sub-optimal firms will continue to exist throughout the region.

Even though regional trade liberalisation will increase productive investment opportunities it will also result in the factors of production moving to those areas which are already more developed. Unless there are such areas in most of the countries of the integrating region, this would lead to capital and skilled labour being concentrated in the more economically developed member states. Such polarisation could result in capital flight and labour flight from some of the member states. It may also lead to external investment being directed at the growth poles. Whether this will be economically and political acceptable to those states that stand to lose is debatable. Our opinion is that it will not be acceptable.

On the other hand, polarisation and the accompanying increased economic activity may result in higher incomes and therefore increased savings in those areas thus further reinforcing and perpetuating the disparities. It is argued that the spread effect that may results from such growth poles will outweigh the short-run backwash effect of capital and labour movement. Nevertheless, polarisation will make integration a politically very difficult decision to take. Because the adverse effects of integration may be immediate,

national politicians may feel reluctant in advocating regional policies that may turn out to be politically suicidal.

From the above it becomes obvious that the dynamic effects of integration require huge sacrifices to be made by the member states in the short term in the hope that integration will eventually lead to regional development. The outcomes of such schemes are by no means certain. As has been shown throughout the chapter the assumptions made for integration among developing countries are *a priori*. Thus the dynamic analyses which are used as counters against the orthodox theory do not really offer very definite grounds for optimism.

1.7 Conclusion

The attraction of integration lies in the role it is seen as playing in the structural transformation of the individual countries of the region. Despite the difficulties enumerated above, industrialisation remains a policy goal for all countries within West Africa. It is seen as providing the opportunity for promoting that sector without diverting funds from other sectors and leading to a more hopeful situation of protected industries developing to the point where they might not need protection because they would have 'learnt-by-doing' within the region. Additionally because the developing countries are unable to meet the exacting standards demanded of manufactured goods in the markets of the industrialised countries, a regional market may offer them the opportunity to restructure their economies.

There is no doubt that West African countries need to restructure their economies and also to diversify their markets. Whether regional economic integration can help in achieving these and other developmental goals will have to be assessed. As has been pointed out earlier, the *a priori* bases for justifying integration need to be put to the test. Results so far have not been encouraging.

Economic integration is needed most by the developing countries who do not seem to have the conditions that would make such schemes viable. The hope continues to be that the dynamic gains that might result from integration would lead to a transformation of the economies of the participating countries. Thus, many have proposed that trade diversion may be an undesirable but inevitable consequence of attempts to industrialise. Measures such as integration which might have short-run negative impacts on world welfare and severe problems for the participating countries, are considered as necessary and inevitable.

In the context of the above to what extent can such negative impacts be tolerated and such schemes be expected to contribute to the eventual development of West African countries?

In the next chapter we will look at the politics of international integration just as we have done for the economic theory. This is important because the economic dynamics of regional integration are not sufficient for analysing integration schemes. The political and social context are just as important. Hence the need to look at the political theory and to compare it to the political milieu of the West African region.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION

2.1 Introduction: Definition and Concepts

There are several things that strike anyone doing a literature review of international integration theory. They are that the literature is dated, there is a lack of conceptual clarity regarding what integration is, and there are differences in how scholars conceptualise the terminal state¹ of regional integration. Policy makers, also, use integration, co-operation and community, interchangeably. Intellectuals are also unable to agree on whether the word applies only to the end result of a process or to both the process and the end state.²

Amitai Etzioni, for example, defines integration as a self-sustaining mechanism and attribute that helps a community to maintain itself, its existence and its form by its 'own processes' without having to depend on external processes of its member units. Thus, he sees a political community as a community that possesses three kinds of integration. These are namely; that 'it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence, it has a centre of decision making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community, and it is the dominant form of political identification for a large majority of politically aware citizens'.³ From his definition, it can be seen that, Etzioni treats integration as a terminal state and not as a process.

¹ See also Nye, J.S., 'Comparing Regional Integration' in International Organisations, Autumn, 1968.

² Haas, E.B., 'The Study of Regional Integration', in Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Lindberg, L and Scheingold, S.A., (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.

³ Etzioni, A., Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, Holt, Rinehart

Karl Deutsch, on the other hand, sees integration as a process. He sums up the goals of integration as; maintaining peace, attaining peace, accomplishing some specific tasks, and gaining a new self image and role identity. The process, according to Deutsch, leads either to an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community depending on the main goals.⁴

Haas in defining integration sees it as a 'process for the creation of political communities described in institutional and attitudinal terms.'⁵

The three definitions cited above are examples of the different meanings that individual scholars attach to the word.

In addition to the difficulties encountered in finding a universally accepted definition for integration, there is also, as has been mentioned, a lack of conceptual clarity about the dependent variable. This, according to Nye has given rise to two problems. First, it makes it difficult to relate the concepts of different scholars. This has the consequence that integration theorists tend to 'talk past each other'. Even in instances where theories have confronted each other, the differences in conceptualisation have made resolution of differences unnecessarily difficult. The second problem that arises with the differences in conceptualisation is that it makes comparison of different regional integration processes difficult. This is because differences in infrastructure, market mechanisms, external dependence, administration, national consciousness, and ideology,

and Winston, New York, 1965, p4.

⁴Deutsch, K. W., The Analysis of International Integration, Prentice Hall, London, 1988.

⁵Haas, op. cit.

for example, make formulations and propositions made with developed countries in mind difficult to apply to developing countries.⁶

The difficulties caused by the imprecise usage of the word are further exacerbated by the positive connotation that is assumed for it. Implicit in common parlance, and the theoretical literature is the assumption that integration leads to peace and prosperity. However, as some have noted, the high level of trade in the former COMECON, for example, was achieved at the expense of the greater welfare which could have been made possible through greater participation in world trade.⁷

Despite the differences in approach and conceptualisation, all the theories have a common denominator. They all expect integration to result in a change in the context of decision making. This is expected to be from the national to the regional level, and is expected to be brought about without coercion. The methods for achieving such change differs, however, from theory to theory. It will therefore be appropriate at this point to examine the main theories in detail to see the propositions they make, and how they propose integration can be achieved.

2.2 FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism is a theory of international organisation which was formulated by Mitrany. It proposes the organisation of national and international life along functional lines. What this means is that individuals with common needs come together to perform the tasks that will help satisfy those needs. Thus, it sees groups and individuals as the

⁶Nye, op. cit.

⁷Pryor, F. L., The Communist Foreign Trade System, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1963.

focus of international organisation. In terms of international relations theory it is akin to the Kantian perspective. The difference though is that while the Kantian perspective expects ideology to be the binding force in the relations between individuals and groups across international boundaries, functionalism sees the satisfying of welfare needs as the cementing element of such international cosmopolitanism.

Functionalism expects the form that such international organisations will take and the geographical area they cover to depend on the task they are expected to perform.

Mitrany's work spanned many years, but the most significant and the one which details his thoughts on international organisations most comprehensively is A Working Peace System,⁸ first published in 1943. This work was essentially prescriptive and normative. It was a proposal on how to consolidate the unity that had grown between the allies during the second world war and how they could expand such collaboration.

The theory reflected the utopian⁹ perception that conflict between states was inevitable as long as the balance of power system formed the basis of order in international society. To him peace and unity were desirable goals for nations to aspire to. Such peace could only be found if the nation-state was not the primary unit of interaction in the international system.

⁸ A Working Peace System, in The Functional Theory of Politics, Martin Robertson, 1975.

⁹ Utopian is used here as it is used in the literature to distinguish between the inter-war, mainly Wilsonian prescriptions for international relations and the post-world war two approaches to international relations.

He considered three possibilities for the refashioning of international society. The first could be an association of nations along the lines of the League of Nations. Such an association would leave the identity and policy of states almost intact. The second method could be to form a federal system. This would have the advantage of providing the cohesion that would have been lacking in an association of nations. The third method could be a functional approach that sought to break away from the traditional link between a political entity and a definite territory as would have continued to be the case with the first two alternatives.

He discounted the first two on the basis that they would not be able to secure world peace. As Mitrany saw it, an association of nations would merely suggest the need for a measure of material integration without achieving it. On the other hand even though a federation would create the cohesion an association lacked it would do so within the limits of some new continental or regional group and so would divide the world into several potentially competing units.

The functionalist approach, on the other hand, would as he saw it, resolve both dilemmas of either creating too loose or too narrow an international organisation. It would do this by building up authorities that would be both comprehensive and solid in selected fields of common life.

By discounting federalism on the basis of its inability to eradicate potential competition, possible consequences of rivalry, and future wars, and proposing instead a scheme that is not limited to a region or continent Mitrany endorsed a universalist

approach to international organisation as the only method that held any prospects for sustainable international peace. He therefore went beyond the Wilsonian perspective of ensuring peace through international law, open diplomacy, national self-determination and the downgrading of the balance of power. This he does by proposing a world which did away with national boundaries and organised along functionalist lines, very much like the Marxist proposal of ideology transcending national boundaries.

An obvious difficulty with such a proposal was how such a system would be regulated. As an anticipation to this question functionalists expected the organisations that are formed to be executive agencies with autonomous tasks, and powers. Such organisations would not only be discussing issues but implementing policies. By concentrating on specific needs, as for example, the Security Council of the United Nations concentrates on law and order, such an approach to international collaboration would be free from dogma and would avoid the crippling limitations of a more broadly designed association or a hard and fast system that a federation would provide.

An important prerequisite for the formation of an international organisation, according to functionalism, is that those contemplating it must be ready for consensus. To be effective, substantive tasks would have to be entrusted to the organisation. However, such organisations cannot expect authority to be delegated to them freely - at least not while the nation-state remains the predominant actor in international relations.

What must therefore be hoped for in the transition period when such authority is being transferred is that national governments will be willing to act as agencies of incipient

international authority. However, until national boundaries and authorities are done away with, the elements of power - raw materials and manpower, industrial potential and strategic positions, will remain within the domain of national governments and therefore make it difficult to cede formal authority to an international body.

Hence though functionalists proposed that some form of task transference from governments to the new agency has to occur, it did not mean that a constitutional transfer of the tasks of government had to be entrusted to it. The new organisations would be expected to derive their strength from a gradual transfer of authority from national governments according to social needs and political developments prevailing at the time. An accumulation of such partial transfers would in time cause a translation of the true seat of authority.

Though functionalism was not proposed for regional integration and was actually against such formations, Mitrany's ideas about international organisation as outlined above, nevertheless have important conceptual implications for international integration. These are examined below.

First, it introduced the elements of gradualism and incrementalism which were used later in neo-functional theories. Secondly, it recognised the unwillingness of governments to transfer sovereignty to an international organisation. Thirdly, it indicated that there were differences between initiating conditions and the process mechanisms for maintaining the process. Fourth, it asserted that limiting an international organisation to a geographical area limited its ability to achieve optimum output. And finally, that the

organisational structure and geographical extent of an international organisation ought to fit a function and not be delineated or fashioned arbitrarily. These implications could be restated as questions. To what extent are regional integration schemes limitations on the universal approach to problem solving? Is the region a good geographical limit for international organisations? Are regions coextensive with problems ?

As has been pointed out above, the functionalist perspective envisages both a gradual and incremental approach to international organisation. It starts with people coming together to solve problems that are common to them. A specific organisation is formed to tackle a specific problem area. The efficiency with which the organisations solve problems, it is expected, will result in demands being made for more of such specific purpose organisations.

The expansion of both the roles and geographical extent of an organisation is expected to be a result of attitudinal changes - what Paul Taylor and others see as the development of a social-psychological community.¹⁰ Such organisations, by concentrating on specific tasks and performing them efficiently are seen as generating supportive popular attitudes, thus modifying loyalties to the state in favour of the international organisations.

This consolidates the international organisations and creates a group whose members are made up of people from different countries. Such an organisation of people on an international scale would impose restraints on the 'disruptive ambitions of governments' through the supportive attitudes they engender. The cumulative effect of

¹⁰Taylor, P. 'The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process', in Journal of Common Market Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, Dec. 1968, Vol. VII, No 2.

demands for more and more international institutions to satisfy needs would result, in time, in sovereignty being transferred gradually from national governments to the international institutions.

Functionalism thus assumes that loyalty to the state is habitual and deeply entrenched, and therefore that once such loyalty is refocused, peace will prevail. It also takes it for granted that functional organisations are necessarily efficient and that such efficiency will, therefore, definitely underpin the attractiveness of such organisations and thus make the transfer of loyalty easier.

As is pointed out later in chapters three and four, individual and group loyalty to the relatively young states of West Africa is still incipient. Since loyalty to the state is neither entrenched nor habitual in the relatively young states of West Africa, assumptions underlying the effects of loyalty to the state are reversed. Functional organisations ought therefore to be easier to form in West Africa if the main impediment to them is loyalty to the state. However, functionalism requires more than the overcoming of allegiance to the state. It requires, among other things, very advanced organisational capabilities.

As mentioned above, the incremental approach that functionalism proposes as a method for gradually augmenting the authority of international organisations is not only because of the difficulties of transferring individual loyalties but also because of the reluctance by governments to transfer sovereignty to such organisations. However because no sudden transfer of total authority occurs, national governments are not expected to feel threatened. Instead governments are expected to see sovereignty as being shared rather

than being usurped by the emerging international organisations. This point is important because it highlights the unwillingness of governments to endow an international organisation with supranationality. Empirical evidence suggests that governments are very reluctant to delegate authority to an international organisation if such action is perceived as being capable of leading to an undermining of their sovereign prerogatives.

Functionalism recognised that instances which will indicate to governments that an empowered organisation might encroach on such domestic prerogatives will make the initiation and maintenance of such organisations difficult.

This pragmatic assumption caused functionalism to approach the relationship that will develop between governments and international organisations in a rather circuitous way. The theory does not confront governments directly nor does it expect that they will make commitments that they do not approve of.¹¹

In the early stages, pressure from and changes in popular attitudes are what are expected to promote integration. Since the areas tackled are issues that are expected to be concerned with welfare, and are therefore less contentious, governments are not expected to feel threatened. As integration proceeds there is expected to be the deepening realisation by citizens that national frameworks are an impediment to goal achievement and so institutions will emerge across frontiers according to the requirements of the particular function. The expanding role of the international organisations and the educative and reinforcing effect of successful integration would in time result in a reduction of the differences in the salience between high and low politics. Eventually,

¹¹ Taylor, P., 'Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany', in Frameworks of International Co-operation, Taylor, P. and Groom A.J.R., (ed.), Pinter, London, 1990.

perceived differences in the salience between high politics and low politics will diminish and governments themselves will become involved in the integration process. The issue of whether or not to delegate authority to international organisations in matters to do with defence, and foreign policy would therefore have become irrelevant as welfare issues begin to be defined in their broadest sense.

Since authority is transferred incrementally to several functional international organisations in response to emerging collective needs, no single centre emerges to which sovereignty is transferred. Governments are therefore not threatened by an emerging supranational institution. The authority of any particular organisation will be dependent on what it needs to be able to function efficiently. The initial steps toward integration could come from individuals, private groups, or national governments. However, once the process is started, the greater amity that results among the participants engender a community feeling. As people see the effectiveness with which tasks are performed by existing functional organisations they are expected to demand that more such similar organisations be set up to take care of other issue areas, thus putting pressure on governments to co-operate.

Clearly, functionalism, sees early achievement in specific functional areas as an important incentive to further integration. Both the willingness to transfer popular loyalty and governmental prerogatives are dependent on tangible achievements by previously formed organisations. Both the gradual and incremental process, and the spill-over that occur as a result of the expansion into functional areas, have implications for the initial stages as detailed above and also the maintenance of the organisations that are formed.

The dual results of attitudinal change at the popular level that are expected to result from effective task performance and problem solving and benefits derived from participation in such institutions, and the enmeshment effects resulting from interpenetration of national life are seen as important for the maintenance of the organisations.

The interdependencies and interpenetration of governments, which result from their eventual participation, are expected to be reinforced as functional integration continues. As governments are enmeshed, they will come to regard the cost of severance by war too costly and too high. Thus war would be eliminated from international society. International society will instead be made up of several functional institutions that form a web of overlapping network whose geographical extents depend on the most efficient areas needed to guarantee efficient task performances.

Functionalism and Regional Integration in West Africa

From the above assumptions we can attempt to answer the three question we posed earlier about the relationship between functionalism, regionalism, and the appropriate geographical area for collective problem solving.

Functionalism, as has been indicated above, is a proposal that sees the emergence of functional organisations whose geographical extension and competence are determined by the task that are to be performed. This means that the area covered by an organisation could be contained within or extend beyond the boundaries of a country. If optimality is to be achieved, then flexibility would have to be the key in forming such organisations. This also means that projects undertaken within the framework of an international

organisation need not involve all the members at all times. Problems are therefore identified and solutions tailored according to the necessary geographical extent, whether within a state or across several states. This is in contradistinction to schemes such as ECOWAS where policies, such as trade liberalisation, are expected to be implemented by all member states. The inevitable effect of this is that policies tend to contain compromises because of the need to reach agreements acceptable to all parties concerned. Package dealing, reciprocity, and trade-offs tend to dominate the bargaining procedure and outcomes in such multi-purpose organisations which are formed to cover regions, and which contain states with differing and multiple objectives.

The functionalist idea of 'form following function', therefore, implies that international organisations may not fulfil their full potential if confined to a region - a region here implying a geographical area such as West Africa. Functionalism is therefore opposed to regionalism because it sees it as imposing limitations on the ability for form to follow function, and therefore on efficiency. How, for example can one be sure that the countries that form ECOWAS cover the correct geographical extent needed for specific tasks that the treaty envisages for the Community? Regionalism may from the functionalist perspective result in sub-optimality. The main opposition to geographical limitation is because regionalism is seen as replicating the competitive tendencies among states at the regional level. This means that peace, which is the main objective of functionalism, will not be eliminated because regions will take the place of states but will not change the mode of interaction. Moreover, because form is not allowed to follow function, the demonstrative effect which efficiency is expected to engender will not be forthcoming. This will mean that the method will fail to achieve its purpose.

From a functionalist perspective, regional integration in West Africa with its emphasis on a defined geographical area is therefore an inappropriate structure for the solving of problems. Determining the geographical extent of ECOWAS was a problem for member countries in the initial stages of the organisation. Senegal wanted Zaire to be a member of the organisation,¹² principally, because of what was perceived as Nigeria's preponderance. Even though this was politically motivated rather than driven by efficiency considerations, it is nevertheless indicative of the difficulties that arise when the region is being defined.

The difficulty of assuming that governments will allow transnational organisations to take over the provision of welfare services is also highlighted by ECOWAS. In a region where states are solidifying their boundaries, governments are unlikely to allow an undercurrent of organisations to undermine their authority by demonstrating that they are not as competent as they should be, assuming that such organisations will indeed be more efficient.

Political considerations will have two effects if functionalism were to form the theoretical underpinning for international organisation in West Africa. The desire to build the nation will make it difficult for functional organisations to be acceptable forms of economic and social organisation. Thus, even if loyalty to the state is not entrenched and therefore not an impediment to international organisation, the fact that West African governments see the state as the organising unit which must be protected from

¹²For more detail see chapters three and six.

interference, implies that functional organisations will have difficulty in taking off.

Secondly, and deriving from the first reason, because governments will inevitably be involved, the issue of foreign policy orientation will play a part in how the geographical area is determined. Traditional ties, such as those based on common colonial ties, will play an important role in this respect. The inevitability of government involvement will not only be because functionalism expects the authority the organisations need to come from governments but also because of the dirigiste approach to planning in the region. Added to this dirigisme, we may add that, the financial needs of such organisations will be beyond the public and will therefore have to have governments financing. Thus governments will have to be involved.

Functionalism also holds that tasks can be solved better individually. Thus the area covered by various institutions are not seen, by the functionalists as being coextensive with each other even though they overlap in a cobweb fashion. Thus functionalism rejects the idea that functions should be lumped together and be solved by a single institution with a general competence within a single territory.¹³ Thus while functionalism lays emphasis on institutions geared toward single tasks, regionalism on the other hand emphasises the territory as being the space that is suitable for the attainment of a range of goals within a single institutions. Regionalism is therefore a compromise between the appropriate geographical area an organisation should cover and the need to perform multiple tasks within a single institutions. Regionalism takes the nation-state as its building block while functionalism seeks to undermine the state.

¹³ Taylor, P., 'Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed', in Frameworks of International Co-operation, Taylor, P., Groom A. J. R., (ed.), Pinter, London, 1990.

In addition to the above limitations of the applicability of functionalism in West Africa, it has also been criticised more generally. These general criticisms include the improbability that the eradication of material wants will guarantee world peace.¹⁴ This criticism, it has been pointed out, is unjustified because it is a partial interpretation of what Mitrany said. Mitrany, according to his sympathisers, did not say that the fulfilment of material wants is a condition for peace. It is rather that functional response to felt needs within the framework of an international institution with its resultant formation of a psycho-social community and enmeshment of governments will prevent war.¹⁵ Whether this is true remains to be tested in the West African context. It can however be argued that co-operation in the European Community has to a certain extent mellowed the historical antagonism that characterised the classical balance of power period. Though other reasons could be given for the peace that has prevailed since the second world war, the suggestion can nevertheless be made that co-operation has been a contributory factor. Even though the existence of ECOWAS did not prevent the flare-ups between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1985, or the degeneration of relations between Ghana and Togo in 1986, it could be suggested that full and prolonged war was avoided because of the mediation efforts of ECOWAS and *Accord de Non-Aggression et d'Assistance en Matiere de Defense* (ANAD)¹⁶. Thus though it cannot be asserted that a psycho-social community is responsible for the relative peace in the West African region, the participation in a common organisation has been helpful. Perhaps it is the attitudes of leaders to each other that has changed rather than attitudes at the popular level.

¹⁴ Claude, I., *Swords into Ploughshares*, Third Edition, University of London Press, London, 1964

¹⁵ See Taylor, P., 'Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany', in *Frameworks of International Co-operation*, op. cit.

¹⁶ ANAD is the institution emanating from CEAO's Defence Protocol which was signed in April 1977. The ANAD Accord set up a Conference of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers and a Secretariat with each playing a different role in managing the organization. Chipman, J., *French Power in Africa*, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 177-79.

The difficulty in applying Mitranian functionalism in respect of attitude changes suggested above is that it sees it as emanating mainly from the popular level. Governments are not really restrained in the Mitranian sense from war mainly because of changed attitudes but because their enmeshment with each other makes recourse to war too expensive. Primary emphasis is therefore placed on attitude changes at the popular level. Critics have, however, asked whether participation in an international organisation, or experiencing the effects of international institutions can bring about changes in attitudes. As Paul Taylor, pointed out,¹⁷ conventional wisdom does suggest that the worst forms of hostility, usually based on ignorance or prejudice, tend to be less extreme when people associate with each other.¹⁸ Because regional integration in West Africa is not according to Mitranian functionalism it is difficult to say whether functionalism would have been successful or not. As we pointed out above, the inevitability of dirigisme in the approach to regional organisation, in addition to being a criticism of functionalist theory, is also indicative of the possibility that contrary to functionalist theory attitude changes will occur at the government level before changing at the popular level.

Another criticism about functionalist theory which applies to West Africa is the separation of high and low politics. The politicised nature of west African economic issues both at the international, regional and domestic levels make such dichotomy spurious. Since this distinction is crucial to the gradualist approach, the functionalist process is

¹⁷ Taylor, P., *ibid.* See also Wolf, P., 'International organisation and Attitude Change: a Re-examination of functionalist Approach'. in International Organisation, vol. 27, no. 3 - Summer 1973, pp 347 - 372.

¹⁸ Taylor, *ibid.*

therefore unlikely to start at all. This in turn means there will be no process dynamics that will lead to integration in other areas.¹⁹

Sympathisers of functionalism have however countered this argument by pointing out that the issue is not so much between high politics and low politics, but rather the identification between less and more contentious political issues.

Other critics have pointed out that the issue of the enmeshment of governments is unlikely to occur. This as they pointed out, is because despite the increased interactions of governments in economic and welfare issues in recent years, all that it has resulted in is that it has produced new arena for states to flex their muscles. The disputes that have arisen through such co-operation are as intractable as those that occurred in disputes over territory in earlier periods particularly since more issues in national life are becoming politicised.²⁰

Though this criticism is valid to a certain extent, the fact that co-operation among states stresses economic or development issues rather than the acquisition of territory is in itself a response to expectations at the popular level. Moreover, disputes centre more on acceptable international frameworks for co-operation than on pugnacious and jingoistic attitudes. Thus, as Professor Morse has pointed out, 'foreign policies under modernised conditions approach a pole of co-operation rather than a pole of conflict. Conflictual or political activities therefore take place within the context of predominantly cooperative

¹⁹ Haas, E. B., *Beyond the Nation-State*, Stamford University Press, 1964.

²⁰ Puchala, D., and Fagan, S., 'International Politics in the 1970s: The Search for Perspectives' in *International Organisation*, Spring 1974, vol. 28, no 2.

arrangements.²¹ Functionalism therefore is not negated by bargaining methods that accompany international co-operation.

The relevance of functionalism to ECOWAS lies mainly in the structure of the institution. Because of its universalist orientation, functionalism cannot be practised in its pure form within a regional context. Thus, though regional integration groups may use functional methods in their approach to tackling individual problems, the fact that the theory sees regionalism as insufficient for and even detrimental to the maintenance of peace and the efficient allocation of resources means it is not applicable to ECOWAS or any other regional integration scheme.

In the first instance, pressure groups are not developed enough and neither are individual influences strong enough to act as the dynamics of a functional institution. Popular awareness is usually minimal and is usually limited to the elite. Secondly ECOWAS is, to a large extent, expected eventually to be able help the member countries to countervail the economic and political power of the developed countries and therefore has to be a clearly defined institution that functions in what is seen as an essentially competitive world. Thirdly territoriality is an imperative ingredient in an economically integrated area because of the common external tariff which is expected to play such an important role in creating the enlarged market that is necessary for industrialisation. Finally, the political realities of West Africa, such as, the jealously guarded newly won sovereignties, also make functionalism an unlikely basis for institution building.

²¹ Morse, E. L., ' The Transformation of foreign politics: modernisation, independence and externalisation' World Politics, April 1970, p382.

On the basis of the above, functionalism though an important contribution to the theory of international organisation cannot be used as the organising concept behind integration in West Africa.

2.3 Neo-Functionalism

Neo-functionalism is a body of theory that attempts to describe, explain and predict regional integration schemes. Its main architect was Ernest B. Haas²² who offered it as 'an academic rationalisation of the strategy and goals' incorporated in the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community.²³

The main tenets of neo-functionlism can be gleaned from M. Schuman's Declaration which he made on 9 May 1950 as an introductory proposal for the formation of the European community:

Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single, general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity.... The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately provide for the setting up of common basis for economic development as the first step in the federation of Europe.²⁴

From the above quotation we can identify important elements of neo-functionalism.²⁵ First, there is the gradualist and incremental approach that is adopted from functionalism. Secondly, the approach envisages that increases in the functional scope of a community are to be consolidated by concrete achievements in earlier ventures.

²² The form in which Haas offered his theory in its original form is contained in The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, 1958.

²³ Harrison, R. J., 'Neo-functionalism' in Framework for International Co-operation, op. cit.

²⁴ Quoted in Harrison, *ibid*.

²⁵ Our using the quotation as a basis for teasing out the elements within neo-functionalism derives from the fact, as stated earlier, that The Uniting of Europe is essentially an attempt to validate the method adopted by the ECSC.

This proposition that achievements would act as proof that the pooling together of resources in an attempt to solve common tasks will result in a *de facto* solidarity was also anticipated by the functionalists. Thirdly, regional integration must start with tasks that are important to national governments, and have expansive capacity. The choice of coal and steel for the European Coal and Steel Community was therefore because of its importance to the economic life of France and West Germany. Additionally coal was chosen, as Lindberg pointed out, because integration in that product was expected to result in an integration sufficient to reduce the war making capacity of either nation and thereby make war 'materially impossible' between them.²⁶ This again would seem to have been anticipated by the idea of enmeshment postulated by functionalism. Finally, the quotation specifically mentions federation as the goal being aimed at in the long run, a position opposed to functionalism because of its inability to ensure peace.

Another part of the same declaration points out that: 'The French government proposes that the entire French-German production of coal and steel be placed under a common high Authority, in an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.'²⁷ This quotation implies a supranational institution, a structure which is almost taken for granted by neo-functionalism. This was a proposition Mitrany disagreed with very much because he felt this together with territorial demarcation would only lead to the creation of supra-states with their attendant competitive outlooks, and tendency toward war.

²⁶ Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970. A major problem with neo-functionalism is its closeness to the European Communities and therefore the difficulty in separating the two.

²⁷ Schuman Declaration quoted in Lindberg, *ibid.*, p14.

To vindicate the close parallel we have drawn between neo-functionalist theory and the ideas expressed in the Schuman declaration we will now examine Haas' own definition of integration. To him, integration is,

...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.

The various elements referred to above, namely: supranationality and the shifting of loyalties (achieved through the creation of a *de facto* solidarity) are common to both the propositions in the Schuman declaration and in Haas' definition.

Neo-functionalism endorses regionalism. Thus whilst functionalism implies free trade and global liberalism with individuals and groups conducting trade and interacting with little interference from governments, neo-functionalism, on the other hand, would seem to suggest that such liberalism be limited to a region.

Another difference between the two approaches is that they differ in the process mechanism they propose and the agents they emphasise as important for community formation. Neo-functionalism lays emphasis on political actors, changes in their attitudes and centralised decision making capability of a supranational organisation.

A basic philosophical premise upon which Haas' neo-functional theory is based is the parallel that is drawn between politics at the national level and the international level.

The similarity between these two levels, as Haas pointed out, are found in the type of actors who are active in both spheres. As he stated;

We assume that the ends of foreign policy are qualitatively similar to ends implicit in any other field of politics. Whatever 'laws' of political behaviour, group conduct, and elite leadership that can be isolated and identified in the domestic field are therefore considered applicable to the international field as well. In both areas the agent of action is man acting within a group. We doubt that this group is necessarily identical with what is called the nation, hence we have attempted to synthesise the study of political behaviour and social action with an analysis of international relations as one manifestation of group aspiration.²⁸

The assumption then is that the essential dynamics of national political interaction can be transferred to and replicated at the regional level and therefore that group interaction provides the essential dynamics for regional integration. This is because they provide the pressures that lead from integration in one task area to another. However it is especially groups that are involved in the economic sector that provide the necessary impetus or takeoff for integration. They are seen as the groups that are in the forefront of those who clamour for the recognition of common needs. Thus because economic issues are important in national life, an integration of economic tasks also creates the necessary strains and distortions that need to be adjusted. Since the groups in the economic sphere are the most active, they clamour and demand adjustment. This adjustment results in further integration and therefore, leads to an expansion in the scope of the supranational organisation's functions.

This mechanism provides the logic for what is called spill-over. The groups that interact, according to Haas, do not need to have coincidental aims. However, their aims

²⁸ quoted in Harrison, op. cit. See also Taylor, P., The State in the European Community in the 1970s: the limits International Integration, Ph.D. thesis presented to the University of London in 1982, p1.

need to be compatible. This means that the satisfying and adjustment process that follows previous integrative steps may result in various groups within the sector asking for their interests to be satisfied. The satisfaction of the different though compatible aims therefore is what leads to a spill-over in scope.

Spill-over from this perspective is therefore a harnessing of pressures produced by competing groups within issue areas. However, this phenomenon is seen as occurring between issue areas also. As Lindberg pointed out, Haas reasoned that because economic problems were interconnected, the solution of one will necessarily lead to the need for joint action in the resolution of other related areas. This kind of spill-over, referred to by some as functional spill-over,²⁹ also leads to an expansion in the scope of the international organisation. An example of such a spill-over will be one that results from the removal of tariffs between members of a free trade area. The free trade area may however result in trade deflection and therefore necessitate policies that counteract it. These policies need to be made centrally at the supranational level and therefore extend the scope of collective decision making at the regional level. The movement from negative integration i.e., the removal of tariff barriers, to positive integration i.e., the adoption of co-ordinated and common policies is a manifestation of such a spill-over.

Thus the snowball effect that is expected to be created by the realisation that the inter-connectedness of various aspects of economic task will mean more and more issue areas will have to be integrated provides the essential dynamics or automaticity of the spill-over logic which is central to neo-functional theory.

²⁹ See Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the light of the new dynamism of the EEC.' *Millennium*, Spring 1991, vol. 20, no 1, pp 4-6.

Though the process starts with the collective solving of central economic tasks, it is expected to spill-over into the political sphere also. As Haas pointed out, 'economic integration, however defined, may be based on political motives and frequently begets political consequences.'³⁰ It is the gradual extension of the scope of central collective decision making to 'take in economic pursuits not initially 'federated', which gives rise to the growth of a political community.³¹ The movement from economic integration to political union is possible, because 'under modern conditions the relationship between economic and political union [are] best ... treated as a continuum'. The integrated tasks therefore spill-over automatically from welfare issues into political issues.

Additionally because the formation of a political community, is expected to, depend on the expectations and loyalties of political actors, the assumption that their values will change, and interest redefined in terms of regional rather than national orientation is crucial to the maintenance of the supranational organisation. The change in values, and loyalties is seen as possible because the existence of multiple loyalties is assumed possible. Thus, though loyalty to the nation does not change drastically, participation in an international organisation which in the beginning demand a different set of loyalties eventually and gradually supersede that to the individual nation.

Groups are however seen as the main elements who transfer loyalty to the supranational organisation. Through the necessity of their working together in a

³⁰ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, op. cit., p12.

³¹ *ibid.*

transnational institution their values and doctrines merge thus uniting groups across frontiers.

The gradual shifting of loyalties together with concrete results of former integration measures result in political actors turning to the supranational institution because of their uncertainty about being able to achieve their political and economic interest from national frameworks.³²

Once political actors are involved in decision making at the regional level, the method of conflict resolution itself, it is suggested, can help in gauging the progress of the integration process.³³ Three conflict resolution methods have been identified for their increasing integrative potential. The first is 'an accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denomination.' This is seen as the least demanding, and entails partners reducing their antagonism by demanding exchange concessions of highly equal value. Gains and losses are easily identified but the impact of the transactions do not go beyond what the least cooperative bargaining partner is willing to concede.

The second method is that which involves 'splitting the difference'. This also involves concessions being made to bargaining units but this time the conflict is not resolved by conceding to the least co-operative but is settled somewhere between the formal bargaining positions.

³² *ibid.*

³³ Haas, E., 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', in International Organisation, vol. 15, no. 3, Summer 1961.

The third, and the one with the most potential for increasing the level of integration is that which upgrades the common interests of the parties. This is seen as close to what happens in a national parliament where full legislative and judicial jurisdiction gives the decision making body the clout it needs for such decisions. It implies that the parties succeed in redefining the conflict and are able to work out a solution at a higher level. However, to do so the mandate or task of the international organisation will have to be expanded. The impact of this method of negotiating results in maximising the spill-over effect of decisions.

With the necessary powers to make decisions binding, such a method of negotiations indicates 'supranational' decision making, and therefore represents a high level of integration.

Neo-Functionalism and Regional Integration in West Africa

Having examined neo-functionalism in some detail, the question to ask now is how relevant it is to regional integration in West Africa. To help us answer this question it will be useful to examine how it fared in Western Europe where the conditions for its success were present. This will then be compared to the West African region where presumed conditions such as pluralism are absent. Why, for example did the automaticity of 'spill-over' did not result in political community in the European Community within a decade of its inception as Haas had predicted in 1958?

First, politicisation was checked by both institutional factors and the less than expected level of group participation in the community. Second, sovereignty proved to be

a very intractable and difficult characteristic to transfer or erode from national to the regional level. Thus Harrison, for example, pointed out that the European Community which was the concrete test of neo-functionalist theory proved disappointing.

If institutional factors and group participation contributed to the failure of neo-functionalism in the European Community, it is unlikely to fare any better in West Africa. This is because the institutional framework of the EC is more sophisticated than that of ECOWAS. Additionally interest group activity in the EC is more pervasive than in ECOWAS.

The structure of the Community has had an adverse effect on the achievement of incremental politicisation. The commission was supposed to play an important initiatory and creative role. This role was to create a dialogue between itself (the Commission) and the Council of Ministers. In neo-functionalist conceptions it was to be the focus of the 'informal pressures of the various national groups', and European wide 'umbrella' organisations. The activities of these groups and their demands for adjustment and redress for imbalances resulting from earlier integrative steps was to carry on the spill-over effect. The involvement in the commission would also ensure that the commissions initiatory role was conducted in a way that would maximise the involvement and support of as wide a range of groups as possible.

The difficulty with this assumption is that it presupposes pluralism, a condition which is missing both at the state level in terms of political participation and in terms of group participation in decision making in West Africa. The pluralistic assumptions indicate

the difficulty of applying Eurocentric postulates to other regions of the world. The idea that regional integration could be embarked upon by extending national political frameworks and dynamics to the regional level is therefore limited to the extent that the building blocks underlying the theory are informed by a particular political structure or perspective. Thus the pluralism which neo-functionalism assumes makes the theory of limited relevance to West Africa which until recently was dominated by military regimes, and closed systems of decision making. These issues are discussed in the next chapter.

Furthermore, the Commission in the neo-functionalist conception was expected to play a role similar to those played by national administrative machinery. Backed by the Treaty provisions the commission's administrations were expected to play their initiating role in the integration process. Being community, rather than national or state oriented, the Commission was also to play an arbiter and mediator role. Together with and using the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committees, the Commission would then ensure that the pressures of spill-over were worked out productively.³⁴

These theoretical conceptions of the role of the Commission were not borne out in practice. The residing of ultimate decision making with the Council of Ministers curtailed the significance of the initiating and amendment roles of the Commission. In order to put forward proposals that would pass through the unit-veto procedure of the Council, the Commission has had to consider the power configuration within the Council. Thus, proposals made by the commission have been mainly quasi-diplomatic sounding out of

³⁴Harrison, R.J, op. cit.

national governments' attitudes and opinions and the incorporation of the appropriate concessions and compromises.³⁵

Secondly, the administrative and bureaucratic competence of the Commission which was based on the extrapolation from national level, proved to be incomplete. As has been pointed out by Harrison, bureaucratic competence without the support of political leadership tends to be ineffective, incapable of taking charge of problem situations and giving direction and purpose to their solution.³⁶

Thus political weight could not be provided by the Commission which had become subordinated to the Council.

ECOWAS has no organ that is equivalent to the Commission of the EC. The ECOWAS secretariat has neither the capability nor the resources to enable it to play a role similar to the Commission's. Both in terms of administrative capacity and treaty provisions the ECOWAS institutions are handicapped.

By assuming that the study of regional integration was concerned with tasks, transactions, perceptions and learning, and not with sovereignty, military capability, and balance of power, Haas seriously underestimated issues of formal power and sovereignty in the process of integration in the European Community. Leaders such as De Gaulle, and Margaret Thatcher have prevented consequential measures from being proposed, and

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ *ibid.*

fragmented public opinion on the issue of 'Europeanism'. The important role envisaged for the political parties and pressure groups has not materialised.

The main elements that were to be the engine of the spill-over were therefore, not quite as effective as the neo-functionalists had hoped. Another criticism that is levelled at neo-functionalism is that it does not give proper recognition to exogenous influences on the integration process. Based on his doctrine of the Logic of Diversity, Hoffman for example, in writing after the 1965-1966 crisis, intimated that differences in domestic determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims acted as countervailing influences on the logic of integration.³⁷ Even though the effects of the global system impinged on nations differently, its overall impact was general, hence it will be impossible to insulate a particular region from its influence. External factors, and the sensitivity of high politics which were not carefully considered by neo-functionalism, according to Hoffman, impede integration and leave the hard core of sovereignty intact.

If neo-functionalism, which was tailored to fit Western European conditions failed to identify important process variables and to predict outcomes, can we expect it to work in West Africa where, as has been pointed out above, the political, social and economic systems are different? Additionally can ECOWAS with a much weaker institutional framework, less delegated legislative capacity, less resources and manpower succeed in implementing neo-functionalist tenets?

³⁷ Hoffnam, S., 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the case of Western Europe, *Daedalus*, vol. 95, 1966.

In addition to the underlying assumptions that there was internal political pluralism in the member countries, the theory also presumes that there is harmony of national interests at the regional level; incrementalism could not be reversed; that groups, political elite and governments would assume that interdependence between states is good for national and personal development; and that political evolution ought to result in larger units emerging from previously smaller ones- very much like the assumptions of social Darwinism.

Political pluralism was to make possible the participation of interest and pressure groups and political parties at the regional level. This, presumably, would have helped in legitimising regional institutions to the extent that demands emanate from a cross section of the population of the member states. The regional supranational institution would thus have a legitimacy which would have gone beyond governmental recognition to a *de facto* endorsement by groups representing popular interests. This, it can be suggested, is an attempt to by-pass the parochialism of statecentric international relations to a pluralistic approach which involves more than just states. This approach, we further suggest, is not primarily because of the recognition that units other than states are important in international relations. It is more because of the assumption that transnational activity is more likely to tone down the power politics of governments, and hence result in easier authority and legitimacy transfer. This would seem to suggest that the statesman *qua* statesman acted differently in his political behaviour from the individual *qua* individual. Indeed the suggestion that the loyalties that individuals would give to the regional organisation are qualitatively different from those that individuals direct at the state not only underlies this but complicates it by implying that loyalty that is engendered by

economic expediencies are necessarily different from those that emanate from political affiliation.

Perhaps it is the difficulty of clinically transferring different aspects of loyalty to different centres that make it difficult for neo-functionalist postulates to be replicated in practice. Though it cannot be doubted that the European Community has achieved a certain amount of supranationalism, the degree of governmental subordination to the decisions of the European commission is far less than was expected by neo-functionalists.

If, as we have suggested, supranationalism was supposed to be, essentially, a product of group and hence popular legitimization endorsed by elite activities, then it is possible to suggest that the low level of pluralism at the national level, and the virtual absence of region wide umbrella groups in West Africa will make supranationalism very difficult to achieve among ECOWAS countries. Parochialism of national governments can be expected to predominate regional decision making since there will be no strong and impartial body to allocate resources in an authoritative manner.

To assume that the active participation of groups would somehow have pushed forward the spill-over effect of integration and therefore resulted in an increased role for regional institutions takes for granted the assumption that members of groups share a common attitude toward regionalism and supranationalism. Political parties are identified as one of the groups that will push forward regional integration. Politicians were also expected to switch loyalties as the state proved to be less competent than the region at meeting their needs.

As we have noted loyalty to the state predominates all across West Africa. Politicians have not switched sides but instead display varying levels of support for regional decision making according to the issue that is involved.

Groups in Europe have themselves, in certain instances, coalesced both at the national and at the regional level to impede supranationalism. Thus the assumption that groups share a collective desire to transcend the state overlooks the fact that some groups are based on an ideology of political and economic nationalism. It is indeed paradoxical that in Western Europe where the theory assumes that governments can only be trapped into integration, the governments are now sometimes even more enthusiastic about integration than groups and individuals within their countries. The belief that loyalty to the state is necessarily undermined by other poles of identification solely on the basis of welfare provision is therefore not tenable. Nationalism involves both tangible and intangible elements which neo-functionalism does not pay adequate attention to.

In addition to the difficulties inherent in the assumption made about group participation, neo-functionalists also assume that harmony of national interests coincides with the region. As has been shown in the case of the European Community, member states have interests that can drastically affect the framework of regional integration. France's interests, and later the UK's, resulted in the external tariff, that protects the economic interest of member states from non member countries, being altered to accommodate such interests. Thus the Younde and later, the Lome Convention give access

to the European market for goods originating from African Caribbean and Pacific countries.

In West Africa, external political and economic dependence makes external influence very important in the calculation of the benefits and costs of participation.

Another assumption that underlies neo-functional theory is that super states or a merging of states results in improved capabilities. Indeed, the reasons given for regional integration in all cases seem to subscribe to this position. In the case of Western Europe, the assumption was that integration would help increase the capability of its members *vis-à-vis* the United States and the former Soviet Union. Though it was not based on a questioning of the viability of the individual member states as national units, it nevertheless assumed that bigger states implied greater capability and influence.

In West Africa, regionalism is actually predicated on the supposed lack of viability of the states within the region. Size is often cited as the cause of such unviability. Unlike regionalism in western Europe, integration in west Africa is based not primarily on what it can help the members to achieve in terms of extra-regional actors, or in merely improving already existing capability, but instead on the very survival of the states as a viable unit. If founded on this assumption, then integration will only succeed if all the member states share the belief that integration is the most viable way of overcoming such a constraint. Disagreement on either the purpose or method will result in an in failure.

In addition to questioning the idea that bigger states are more viable, a more specific question with regard to west African countries would be whether size is really the cause of the lack of development. Even though there is no doubt that a country should preferably be of a minimum size for economic and political viability, it must be pointed out that some of the countries in West Africa are bigger than some in Europe both in terms of population and geographical spread. Furthermore, the case of Japanese development and economic strengths suggests that size is not a *sine qua non* for development. More specifically, we could say that the difficulties faced by Nigeria in pursuing her development ambitions cannot be attributed to size.

Thus, though it might be true that a certain minimum size is desirable for a nation-state in order for it to function effectively in a competitive international system, it is equally true that size is not a necessary condition for success. Since viability of a state can be altered by, for example, the discovery of petroleum, the criterion for viability cannot be predetermined on population, size or the geographical spread of the country.

Neo-Functionalist Reactions to Criticisms

Faced with the empirical invalidation and theoretical criticisms, neo-functionalists reacted in various instances by improving independent variables for increasing integration and acknowledging the influences of external factors and the effects of political leaders.

Haas and Berrera, for example, improved on the operationalisation of an earlier list of independent variables produced by Haas and Schmitter. These variables were made up of: background conditions; conditions at the time of economic union; and process

conditions. Background conditions was originally operationalised to include: size of the unit; rate of transactions; pluralism; and elite complementarity. To these was added a fifth; perceptions of dependence.

To the two operational variables; governmental processes, and powers of the union, which constituted 'conditions at the time of economic union', was added 'external pressures'. This same variable was also added to 'process conditions,' which was previously made up of; decision making style, rate of transactions, and adaptability of governments.³⁸

All of these revisions do not really change the initial assumption of a fairly advanced political and economic structure within member states and a high level of pre integration interaction between them. Thus these revisions do not make the theory any more relevant to the countries of West Africa even though they improve our understanding of why integration would not be feasible in the region.

Schmitter also proposed a redefinition that focused on the relation between well defined variables, and suggested further that there could be the possibility of different outcomes to the process.³⁹ By calling the dependent variable 'actor integration strategies' he related the outcome of the process to the desires of participants. He then proposed seven possible actor strategies that will determine the outcome of the process. These strategies and their possible effects are: (1) spill-over; these include strategies that increase

³⁸ 'The Operationalisation of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration: A Casework Note'. in International Organisation, vol. 23, no 1, Winter 1969, p153.

³⁹ 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration', International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 1970, pp 705 - 737.

both the scope and level of commitment of the actor, (2) spill-around; these are strategies that are geared to increase the scope of the scheme while holding the level of authority constant, 3) buildup strategies - those that increase the decisional autonomy or capacity of joint deliberations but deny the entrance into new issue areas, 4) retrenching strategies - those that are meant to increase the level of joint deliberation but withdraw the institution(s) from certain areas, 5) muddle-about; these are strategies that let the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their actual capacity to allocate values, 6) spillback strategies - strategies that cause a retreat in both scope and level possibly returning to, the status quo ante, and finally 7) encapsulation - a situation in which the actors respond to crisis by marginal modification within the zone of indifference.

By relating outcomes to actor strategies, Schmitter deviated from the automaticity of spill-over and the inevitable enmeshment of national governments that earlier formulations had suggested. However, whether member states deliberately set out to pursue the above policies or whether they happen fortuitously is a debatable issue. Their effect in promoting, stagnating or retrenching integration will depend on; whether the strategy is supported by a majority of members, what the voting procedure within the community are, and treaty provisions.

Other neo-functionalists such as Lindberg had always been more cautious about the inevitability of eventual politicisation. Indeed, his view that politics is defined by process rather than by substance gives his definition of 'political integration' more latitude and therefore protects him from being backed into a corner as Haas was. As he stated, 'the

sure sign of political integration is in a system which can make authoritative decisions for the entire community regardless of whether these are military, economic, or social welfare decisions.⁴⁰ He therefore saw political integration in terms of the level of authority of the regional organisation which is in turn reflected in such variables as scope, range of decision making stages and the relative decisiveness of community decisions *vis-à-vis* national governments.

Haas, on the other hand, had by the mid 1970s grown disenchanted with integration theorising in general and neo-functionalism in particular for its failure in the context of the European Community. In the first instance he downgraded integration theories to the status of pre-theories and subsequently asserted that the familiar regional integration theories are obsolete in Western Europe and obsolescent though still useful in the rest of the world. Why it was still useful for the rest of the world when he considered it obsolete for Europe is not clear. But whether it was indeed obsolete for Europe is debatable given the new dynamism of the European Community and the desire of some to see a federal Europe. The proposals in 1991 for the formation of a federation seems to have propelled federal goals unto the agenda of the Community, and despite the different interpretations of what that might mean, has put a directly political element into the debate. Second, the collective response of the European Community to the crisis in Yugoslavia in June 1991, and the other trouble spots around the world, could be interpreted as a movement into collective decision making in foreign policy, an area normally regarded as the preserve of national governments.

⁴⁰ Lindberg, N.L and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970, p32.

Haas, it therefore could be suggested, may have been hasty in saying that integration theory is obsolete in Western Europe. What he should have suggested, was a revision of the theory to better describe and explain the integration phenomenon without predicting a definite outcome. Thus a revision of theory to incorporate the various postulates that had been arrived at by other students of integration would have been more helpful than abandonment.

Despite its shortcomings, the incremental and gradualist economic determinism with political minimalism which neo-functionalism entails continues to be the main method adopted by regional integration because it enables different aims to be brought to the collective decision making arena. Centralisation of decision making is a strategy that has been adopted by the ECOWAS. The prospective benefits of integration in West Africa are expected to be derived not only from negative integration but from the progressive intensification and co-ordination of decision making. The movement along the Balassa continuum which the Treaty proposes implies progressive inter penetration of economic activity, and the shaping of domestic politics to align with and make possible the realisation of Community goals. Neo-functionalism provides the framework that suits such a strategy. It makes possible the initial co-operation of sovereign states and enables them to postpone the taking of political decisions to the future.

2.4 The Communication Approach

This approach to regional integration lays emphasis on the changes that occur in attitudes and values at the popular level. Such changes provide the dynamics and stability of the emergent system.⁴¹

It uses as its principal indicator, the transaction between people, and postulates that the most promising general method of moving toward integration would be for there to be increasing and better communication.⁴² Such communication comprises not only greater exchange of goods, services, and persons but also ideas, and more institutions for carrying on consultations between governments and, where possible, for making joint decisions. It also includes the appropriate legal and institutional safeguards that will be needed when the mobility of persons increase.

From the historical study they conducted, they found that of two possible outcomes of integration, pluralistic security community and amalgamated security community, the former was more easily achieved. The conclusion they drew, therefore, was that pluralism offers the best method for regional integration. A pluralistic security community according to Deutsch is one that retains the legal independence of separate governments. On the other hand an amalgamated security - community involves the 'formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation'.⁴³ This common government could be federal or unitary. According to their study the reason why pluralistic security-communities turned out to be easier to attain, and preserve was due to the larger number of background conditions and political processes required for the attainment of an amalgamated community. Indeed they go as far as to suggest that to pursue pluralism would not preclude amalgamation but to attempt a one-step amalgamation (as, for

⁴¹ Taylor, P.A., 'Conceptual Typology of International Organisations' in A Framework for International Co-operation, op. cit., pp 18-19.

⁴² Deutsch, K. W., et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton University Press, 1957.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p8.

example, suggested by federalism) might well postpone for a considerable time even the attainment of a pluralistic integration.

To sustain integration, Deutsch et. al. suggested that the responsiveness of governments and political elite of member countries to each others' need and desires was extremely important. Such responsiveness, they stated, requires increased attention, fuller and more accurate understanding and more rapid and effective action. The increased responsiveness would be brought about firstly by increased capabilities of the governments concerned in the areas of administration, policy formation, decision making, and action. They concluded that weak governments did not lead to stronger supranational institutions. This conclusion would seem to contradict the neo-functionalist thesis which suggests the opposite.

This contradiction is not so strong however if one realises that the federal outcome which Haas envisages entails a diminished role for national governments whilst the pluralistic security community which Deutsch advocates requires very capable national governments.

A second and overlapping ingredient required for increasing responsiveness is 'a greater and wider range and volume of communications and other transactions between countries concerned.'⁴⁴ This should be made up of transactions associated with rewards and 'expectations of rewards.' Thirdly, responsiveness must include a strengthening of social groups, institutions, and organisations 'that functions as unbroken links of social

⁴⁴ *ibid.* p200

communication between the member countries. A final element of such a policy should be one which seeks to greatly increase the mobility of persons throughout the area.⁴⁵

From the prescriptions above, they identified the following background conditions as essential for establishing a regional amalgamated security-community. These conditions are: (1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political elite; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transactions. Three other conditions were found to be essential; (10) a compensation of flows of communications and transaction; (11) a not too infrequent interchange of group roles; (12) considerable mutual predictability of behaviour.⁴⁶ They stated however that none of these conditions was by itself sufficient and the presence of all of them was no guarantee to successful amalgamation. Deutsch et al nevertheless concluded that any territory which fulfilled all the essential conditions should be a good part of the way to successful amalgamation.

Compared to the 12 background conditions necessary for an amalgamated security community to be formed only three are required for a political security community to succeed. These are; (1) the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision making; (2) the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p58.

⁴⁶ *ibid.* p58.

each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence; and (3) mutual predictability of behaviour. On the other hand they also found that certain conditions which had often been considered essential for the formation of an amalgamated security community turned out to be overrated. Though helpful, they were found not to be essential and included (1) administrative and dynastic union; (2) ethnic or linguistic assimilation; (3) strong economic ties and; (4) foreign military threats.

The relative ease with which a pluralistic security community could be formed makes it an attractive method for countries considering regional integration. This is because it does not need too many predetermined conditions for success. Secondly, it ought to appeal to those regions where political unification is not a goal, and where member states are unwilling to enter into supranational arrangements in order to reap economic benefits.

Compared to the essentially federalist postulations of neo-functionalists, communication theorists see integration as being possible within a pluralistic international system. It must be pointed out that pluralism is just one of two possibilities that integration, according to the communication theorist, could result in. The only reason why they de-emphasise an amalgamated security community, whether unitary or federal, is because it is more difficult to achieve and its pursuit might make the achievement of even a pluralistic security community difficult. The latter has a lower threshold than the former. It is therefore not quite correct to categorise communication theory as pluralist theory or perspective as Pentland did.⁴⁷ All that Deutsch et. al do is to emphasise the relatively less demanding conditions and easier attainment of a pluralistic security community.

The communication theorists are primarily concerned, like functionalists, with peace and security. The framework within which this is achieved is secondary. Thus Deutsch stated:

Since our study deals with the problem of ensuring peace, we shall say that any political community, be it amalgamated or pluralistic, was eventually successful if it became a security - community - that is if it achieved integration - and was unsuccessful if it ended eventually in secession or civil war. ⁴⁸

Integration is therefore a goal, a terminal condition in communications theory. It is also the condition that will ensure peace among member states. The minimum condition that ought to pertain for integration to be present is a pluralistic security community in which the independence of member states is retained.

The process of integration itself is paralleled to an assembly line. The integrated communities 'are assembled in all their essential elements and aspects in the course of history, somewhat as an automobile is put together'.⁴⁹ According to this analogy, the sequence in which the elements are added does not really matter. Just as the performance of an assembled car does not depend on the sequence but instead on the fact that all the elements have been added so integration does not depend on defined consequences. Thus Deutsch concludes:

⁴⁷ Pentland, C., International Theory and European Integration, Faber and Faber, London, 1973.

⁴⁸ Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, op. cit., p3.

⁴⁹ Deutsch, W. K., The Analysis of International Relations, op. cit. p275.

Functionalism and functional arrangements..., have little effect by themselves upon the eventual success or failure of efforts to establish and generate security communities. The outcome in each case is most likely to depend on other conditions and processes, particularly on how rewarding or unrewarding were the experiences associated with functional arrangements. The most that can be said for functionalism is that it avoids the perils of premature amalgamation, and that it gives the participating governments, elite, and peoples more time gradually to learn the habits and skill of more far-reaching, stable, and rewarding integration.⁵⁰

This would seem to negate the spill-over concept which is so central to both functionalism and neo-functionalism. Implicit in the logic of spill-over is the development from the simple to the complex; an organic complexity which is achieved as enmeshment and engrange cause integration to move from less contentious issues to previously untouchable areas of high politics. Additionally, the mechanistic approach the Deutsch analogy suggests, implies that the elements (parts) which should be assembled to arrive at the end state are clearly recognisable and are available. The process itself would only facilitate a terminal state for which favourable conditions were already available to be put together as the parts of a car are available to be put together. This implies that the background conditions are crucial and are to be likened to the parts of a car. Once they are absent, integration becomes impossible.

It is obvious from the above that such a mechanistic approach is not possible, given that there is no agreement on what constitutes the parts that should be put together, and that the form of the terminal state is something that member states do not always agree on. We would suggest that it is the interplay between the process and background conditions that would determine relative success.

⁵⁰ *ibid.* p. 227.

The process itself, according to the communication theorists, often begins around a core area which is made up either of a unit or a collection of units which in some significant respects are stronger, more developed, and more attractive than the rest. Political leaders of such core areas then act as the elite/unifiers for the emerging integrated political system. As the process develops the political divisions within the emerging amalgamated security community become weaker and shift away from the boundaries of the participating units. The previous political divisions are replaced by political life which cut across the originally political units. The more varied and salient these mutually crosscutting divisions are, the better for the acceptability of the emerging union. On the other hand if old pre union cleavages are paralleled and reinforced by the cleavages of language, religion, ideology, economic interest, and social class, then integration might actually be halted or reversed.

Whilst core areas might act as active leaders during the initial stages, the process itself is more likely to be given leadership by a cross-class coalition which allied the most outside of the insiders and the most inside of the outsiders. The first group is made up of those alienated members of the ruling class while the latter group include the newly emerging politically aware of the masses. The logic behind this is that these two groups if left out of the process are likely to contend for power later and therefore act as disruptive influences on the process. By securing their support, future frustration or alienation is curbed.

In addition to such coalition formation, integration according to Deutsch involves, from the very outset, major compromises since it is not absolute like-mindedness which is

necessary but complementarity of ideas and the willingness to work together or at least add their contributions together . The skill to make compromises is essential. Such compromises must be those which seek ways to exchange political favours instead of those that are mutually obstructive. The favours exchanged must also dovetail 'genuine and substantial concessions to one another's vital interest.'⁵¹

As a result of the difficulties involved in establishing mutually viable patterns of accommodation, the process takes a considerable time. This time span can be divided into three stages during which leadership is provided by different groups. In the initial stages leadership is provided by intellectuals, then follows leadership by great politicians and finally, the stage of mass movements politicians and/or large-scale elite politics.

As a political process integration is supposed to have a takeoff period when it changes from proposals put forward by a few prophets and scattered individuals to a more co-ordinated movement with significant power behind it. Such takeoff can be assumed to occur as soon as a major social or political group, or political institution is committed to it. Takeoff is supposed to be followed by the attainment or abandonment of integration within two generation (between 20 - 60 years), even though they could take as long as five generations (150).

Events that might contribute to takeoff are increasing loads or demands upon the capabilities of governments by their population. When such increased demand cannot be met by the individual governments and it is recognised that a new kind of unit is needed

⁵¹ Deutsch, An Analysis of International Relations, op. cit., p278.

for greater responsiveness, performance and greater services, integration may be viewed as leading to the forming of the new unit. Thus integration is seen as a means of overcoming the limitations of the nation-state as a form of social organisation.

A second set of events suggested as providing an impetus for takeoff is the existence of an external challenge which requires some new and joint response. Finally integration may become acute, and takeoff occur when a new generation arrives on the political scene, and are willing to take earlier degrees of common interests and outlooks for granted, and ready to take it as the starting point for new political action.

In his assessment of the contribution the communication approach made to the study of regional integration Haas stated that the hypotheses upon which the assertions rested were falsifiable. The hypothesis quoted was that 'if the rate of transactions is such and so, under conditions of balanced loads and capabilities, then elite responsiveness increases. If elite responsiveness increases then a security community will arise....'⁵² This hypotheses is falsifiable, according to Haas because it is not possible to assign causative significance to variables that are associated with human perceptions and motives.

This criticism of Deutsch's historical interpretation of regional integration is unjustified. This is because in several places in Political Community Deutsch emphasised the importance of certain essential background conditions which need to be present for a security community to emerge. As pointed out earlier, the formation of a security community results from the interplay of these background conditions, some of which have

⁵² Haas, E. B., The Study of Regional Integration, op. cit., p22.

little to do directly with human perceptions and motives. Neither do the other variable such as those responsible for takeoff, and those responsible for maintaining the process i.e. the balance between capabilities and loads. Additionally, Haas seems to lay a lot of emphasis on transactions without stating what these transactions are. The stress put on economic transactions in Haas's assessment of Communications theory is skewed since Deutsch et al emphasised that transactions which lead to Community formation must include not only the exchange of goods, services and ideas, but also more institutions for carrying on consultation between governments, and where possible for making joint decision. Thus even if the East African Common Market broke up despite the high level of transaction, as Haas cited, this was largely because the emphasis was placed on economic exchange without adequate attention being paid to compatibility of values or even to the building of mechanisms for responding effectively to each others grievances.

Even though Haas' criticism of Communications theory is excessively severe, he does point out two very important considerations which limit the use of Communications postulations as a theory. The first is the difficulty of using transaction flows as a proxy variable for measuring perceptions that lead to behaviour. The second is that the approach is retroactive rather than predictive. There is no relationship between the content of messages and the evolution of capacity on the part of regional institutions. But having said that, the assertion that communication theory does not explain when and how trust and responsiveness among actors, elite as well as masses, are to occur is not entirely correct because Deutsch listed four overlapping policy procedures for increasing responsiveness. Trust is treated as a corollary of the emergence of crosscutting divisions.

Communications Theory and West African Integration

West Africa, it would seem, from the elements that constitute responsiveness is fairly well placed to be successful at regional integration. The straddling of tribes across borders means there are already in existence unbroken links of social communication between the member countries. Moreover, boundaries do not reinforce the underlying social structure and cleavages within the region. Tribes straddle common border of neighbouring countries, and hence make the political boundaries incongruent with the actual social cleavages. The Ewe straddle the Ghana and Togo border while the Yoruba straddle the Nigeria and Benin border. As we conclude in the next chapter, this makes it possible for interaction between the members of the different countries.

Increased administrative capability, and volume and range of communications as elements of responsiveness are not background conditions. They are factors that are expected to help in sustaining the process. They are, therefore, expected to develop as the integration process continues, even though it does not preclude the fact that where they are already present the attainment of integration might be easier. Administrative capability within and between West African countries is weak. Indeed the weakness of the state in West Africa is to a certain extent, a result of the limited scope of governmental responsiveness to the needs of their population. Thus though social communication would seem to encourage integration, administrative weakness and the limited range of communication between the countries of the region would seem to mitigate against it. Though Deutsch and his colleagues do not think strong economic ties are essential for the formation of integration, it has to be pointed out that such an observation is made in the context of integration being pursued for peace and not for economic development. In an

instance where the aim is predominantly economic strong economic links can indeed prove decisive in how fast goals are achieved. A major difficulty of the West African region is the low level of trade between the member countries. This, as has been pointed out in the first chapter, is responsible for the slow pace of integration in the region.

To the extent that administrative capability and the volume and range of communications as elements of responsiveness are expected to develop over time, the low capability of West African governments may not be a limiting factor in the growth of ECOWAS. The problem however arises where such capabilities do not develop fast enough for governments to be able to respond to the stresses within the system. An example of such a case occurred when as a result of the free movement of people within the community, Nigeria found itself being flooded by citizens from member countries. Because governments did not have the capacity to check the number of their people going to Nigeria, or educate their citizens about the 90 days limit to staying in other community countries, the consequent repatriation of illegal immigrants from Nigeria caused a lot of ill feeling within the community. It could be suggested that the inability of other governments to respond to the growing pressure on the Nigerian government to do something about the growing number of foreigners was in part responsible for the problem. Nigeria's own incapacity to keep track of such migrants also contributed to the problem. The important point here is that for integration to be an effective tool for regional collective decision making in West Africa, administrative capability and the volume and range of communications has to increase. So must the responsiveness of governments to each other.

Whether applied strictly to regional integration, or to internal political development in West Africa, the above suggests that integration is a long term process. The recognition of new centres of political identification to replace or even coexists with the pre-existing ones ought therefore to be expected to take longer, according to this theory, than the 30 odd years since independence. Tribal loyalties and allegiance to traditional rulers would have to be replaced by loyalty to the state within a context of increasing responsiveness. Internally, what political integration seeks to achieve are amalgamated security communities, and as we suggest in chapter three this is gradually taking place. Within the regional context, even though reference is made to unity in the Treaty of ECOWAS, the member states envisage a framework which retains their independence- a pluralistic reorganisation of relations within the region. In both cases, communications theory suggests that enough time will have to be allowed for integration.

ECOWAS was promoted most strongly by Nigeria with the help of Togo. These two countries, but especially the former, could be regarded as the core area around which the organisation was formed. Since the overthrow of General Gowon, the level of Nigerian leadership of the organisation has oscillated with some of the country's leaders even going to the extent of questioning its benefits in relation to its costs.⁵³

Communications theory also states that a regional coalition is necessary for integration. Whether a cross - class coalition across the region will be able to give leadership to ECOWAS is doubtful. In the first instance, the idea of integration is limited mainly to people who are either directly involved with ECOWAS, or are interested for one reason or

⁵³ Gambari, I., 'ECOWAS, Time for National Appraisal' cited in Bach, D., 'Politics of West African Co-operation', in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 21, Part 4, 1983, pp 605-623.

another. They form a minority. In other words there is not sufficient awareness of the organisation among the general population, as is indicated in chapter six. Secondly, there is no mechanism that brings these people together as was the case with Jean Monnet and the Action Group in the formation of the European community. Thus it cannot be expected that a cross - class coalition will be able to give direction to the development of the community. Hence, unless a member state , such as Nigeria but preferably a coalition of states give leadership to the organisation, it will be difficult to harness the necessary impetus to enable the organisation to grow.

Additional to the above, if we were to subscribe to the three background conditions that the communicationists put forward as the ones necessary for the formation of a pluralistic security community, West African countries meet none of them. Differing ideologies of governments mean there is no compatibility of major values relevant to political decision making, neither is there the capacity to respond to each others needs, messages, and actions quickly(as mentioned above), nor is there mutual predictability of behaviour because of the frequent changes in governments, border closures or external orientation.

Even though these background conditions are for the formation of security communities, they nevertheless, we suggest, apply to any scheme in which members are interested in acting collectively. Trade and the rationalisation of industries require predictability, and compatibility of values.

From the above it can be concluded that West African countries do not meet the criteria for increasing the level of transaction between them. But as has been pointed out in the first chapter, integration among developing countries is for creating conditions. The assumption of a static situation where all the necessary conditions already exist is negated by the desire to create those same conditions through regional integration. Integration in West Africa therefore takes as its starting point, a situation which is opposite to those assumed by transactionalist theory. However, whether ECOWAS will indeed create the conditions is a different issue altogether.

2.5 The Federalist Approach

Federalism is seen as a multi-dimensional concept of principles, doctrines institutions and processes that deal with the problems of concentration, diffusion, and sharing of political power.⁵⁴ The federal principle is the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each within a geographical sphere co-ordinated and at the same time independent.⁵⁵ Federalism, according to Mally can be divided into three conceptual types, federation, confederation, and a supranational community.

A federation is a political system of governance based on a constitution which allocates powers between a central sovereign government and autonomous provincial and local governments. The central government represents the state externally and has jurisdiction over all members of the subordinate provinces. A confederation is an association of sovereign states who are linked together by a treaty. The central power formed in this case is given certain powers of policy co-ordination but retains final decision

⁵⁴ Mally, G., The European Community in Perspective, Lexington, London, 1973.

⁵⁵ Wheare, K. C., cited in Welch, C. D., Dream of Unity, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1966.

making with the individual states who retain the autonomy in veto powers. Confederation unlike a federation has only limited external sovereignty with all decisions being implemented indirectly through member states.

Finally a supranational community is made up of elements of both confederation and federal type of administration. It has both unanimous and veto-voting procedures and partial autonomy that is exercised through common organs.

Federation, as a method for international organisation was especially popular in Western Europe after the second-world-war, and in Africa in the 1960s. Its main tenets are the building of regional institutions and solidarities. The methods advocated for achieving these goals rest on the normative assertions based on the faith of the propagator.⁵⁶ Successful federal political institution such as those of the U.S.A are used as illustrations of what can be achieved. As Paul Taylor pointed out, federalism assumes that diversities which necessitate the formation of large political entities have a clear geographic distribution.⁵⁷ Thus the advocacy of a united Africa for example, assumes that the problems facing individual countries can be solved once the nation-state is transcended. As we have noted above, in our examination of neo-functionalism, the extent to which size contributes to effective economic and political efficiency is a question which has vexed leading academics even though it is agreed that there is a minimum size is required for economic viability and subsequently for profitable participation in international trade and politics.

⁵⁶ Haas, E., 'The Study of Regional Integration', in *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*, Lindberg and Scheingold, op. cit., p 20.

⁵⁷ 'Conceptual Typology of International Organisations', in A Framework for International Co-operation, op. cit.

Applied to regional integration, federalism sees the attainment of such goals in the drawing up of constitutions, and the transfer of power to regional institutions through such means as the provisions of a Treaty. In other words, and contrary to neo-functionalism, federalism views regional integration as a *de jure* rather than a *de facto* undertaking, especially in the initial stages. It does not envisage a gradual building of an actual solidarity as the step toward political union, but rather sees such solidarity as a consequence of the formation of regional governments. Though no federations have been formed in recent contemporary history, the desire for a certain amount of supranationalism is seen as desirable for effectiveness in regional integration schemes. As was pointed out earlier, the aim of some protagonists of Europe integration was the desire to form a federal Europe. However, the method that was adopted for its achievement was not a federal and binding constitution which will ensure a single step formation of a federal Europe, but rather a compromise economic deterministic approach which found theoretical validation in neo-functionalism.

The Treaty of ECOWAS originally stated in the preamble that 'the ultimate objective of the efforts' are accelerated and sustained economic development of their states and the creation of homogeneous society, *leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa*.⁵⁸ One can conclude that a form of federation, whether supranational, confederate or unitary, was originally envisaged for the region.⁵⁹ Though this clarifies the type of unity the member countries are interested in, it nevertheless does not preclude supranationalism.

⁵⁸ Emphasis is ours. The new Treaty clarifies this to mean economic union.

⁵⁹ The revised treaty of the organisation changes this to '... our final goal is ... the economic union of West Africa;' quoted from the Draft Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, drafted by Legal Experts, ECOWAS, Lagos, October, 1992.

It is more a pluralistic economic community⁶⁰ rather than a unitary state that is being pursued.

Regional political federation and eventually continental federation had, as mentioned earlier, been a goal of pan-Africanists such as Nkrumah of Ghana. This had been widely opposed by people, such as, Balewa of Nigeria, Tubman of Liberia and Houphat-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire. They favoured economic co-operation. The subsequent division of the region, along these lines, into two groups, the Monrovia group (the regional equivalent of the continental Brazzaville group) and Casablanca group, was a direct result of this. The Monrovia view of incremental integration prevailed. Thus the method being used by the ECOWAS countries is one that had been extensively debated since independence.

Federalism, as we have seen, was widely debated in West Africa in the 1960s. The majority of states refused to federate. Economic incrementalism was seen as the best way to enhance the economic prospects of the member countries. The institutional structure of ECOWAS is essentially neo-functional. Though both neo-functionalism and federalism include supranationalism, the difference between them is the methods they advocate for regional unity. While neo-functionalism sees supranationality as a goal that is arrived at the end of a process of integration, federalism sees it as the beginning of the process. Federalism therefore does not attempt to imply legitimisation at the group level, but instead sees authority and legitimacy transfer as something that governments decide on and do. It is a statecentric perspective of reordering the international system. Other forms of

⁶⁰ The communication theorists talk about a pluralistic *security* community, which lays emphasis on peace and security and not on economic development.

relations are subordinated to the centrality of states as the units that constitute the building blocks in international relations and their representatives as the ones who determine how it is shaped. From this perspective, it is assumed that once governments take the decision, the rest of their citizens will inevitably follow. This may perhaps be true in a situation where a supra-state is desired and where nationalism has not taken root. The limitation of this perspective, however, is that it de-emphasises popular loyalty and therefore implies that the permanence of such schemes are dependent on the orientation of governments.

As Haas pointed out, events since 1954 in Europe and since 1960 in Africa 'have effectively contradicted descriptions, explanations and predictions', and concluded that this approach in its pure form is probably discredited'.⁶¹

Though no federations have been formed in recent history, the assertion that this falsifies federalist postulates to international organisation is based on the assumption that federalism ought to result in a state with a central administration. This supposition, however, limits the definition of federalism. As we noted earlier, a federation can range from a relatively loose supranational organisation, through confederation to an amalgamated state. The fact that most integration schemes have aspired to some form of supranationality can be taken as a continuing survival of the concept. This assertion becomes even more plausible if we subscribe to Forsyth's definition of a federation as one which is based on a *foedus* or a treaty between states.⁶² The notion of a federation which is defined retrospectively misses the evolution of such structures. A prospective definition,

⁶¹ Haas, 'The Study of Regional', p 21.

⁶² Forsyth, M., Unions of States, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1981, p 1.

on the other hand, is able to accommodate the modern attempts to move 'beyond the normal restricted circle of interstate relations.'⁶³

From the above it can be suggested that regional integration schemes are better described in federal terms than in neo-functional terms. This is especially so if we consider a federation as being a structure that can be formed not necessarily for security purposes but also predominantly for economic ones. As Forsyth properly recognised elsewhere in his book:

the Zollverein is indeed significant because it demonstrates how strong and relatively autonomous the welfare motive to confederation had become by the first half of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century the strength and relative autonomy of the welfare motive has again been demonstrated by the establishment of the Benelux Union in 1948 and the European Economic Community in 1958, as well as by the creation of various common markets -such as the West African Economic community, the Central African customs and Economic Union, and the Central American Common Market - in the developing world.'⁶⁴

What federal theory does very well in to describe the initial process of the formation of an integration scheme. It however does not explain the actual process dynamics as the process unfolds. Thus far from being falsified, it contributes substantially to an understanding of how governments actually start the process of integration.

2.6 The Contribution of Integration Theories

The emphasis on predictive capacity of social science theory is a long standing debate, and Haas' desire for such scientific accuracy for integration may have contributed

⁶³ *ibid.*, p 4.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p 161.

to his discarding of integration theory as obsolete for Western Europe and obsolescent for the developing countries. Human behaviour is largely determined by an interplay of factors which because they are in the future cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy. Thus even though the presence of certain variables may aid prediction, the constancy of such behaviour is itself dependent on unforeseen circumstances. As Puchala pointed out, even though transactional analysis attracted controversy it has in a dialectical fashion improved understanding. Exponents have recognised its limitations, and its early critics have accepted its usefulness. Like all the other theories, transactional analyses are useful for investigating some aspects of regional integration, and less useful for investigating others.⁶⁵

The various theories of integration address different aspects of the integration phenomenon.

Since functionalism does not endorse regional integration, its main relevance to the subject lies in its contribution to neo-functionalism. Federalism explains the treaty component of integration schemes better than either neo-functionalism or communicationism. It however fails to explain the process mechanisms because of its concentration on the constitutional aspects of unification.

The communication and neo-functional theories are the two theories which explain the process of integration best. Their similarities are found in the identification of certain independent variables as being important for regional integration or disintegration. Both

⁶⁵ Puchala, D. J., 'International Transactions and Regional Integration', in Regional Integration: Theory and Research, op. cit.

theories recognise the importance of regional transactions and the gains and losses associated with them by actors. They also see the need for verbal and symbolic communication among crucial elite. There is also the identification of mutual responsiveness between elite and mutual expectations of rewards as important elements in regional integration. Finally they see the adequacy of institutions to handle the transactional and communication load as important.

They however differ in how the variables are defined and operationalised. Whereas communications theory treats all transactional variables as equally salient, neo-functionalists identify some as more salient than others. The transactions associated with such issue areas are therefore treated as crucial variables for studying particularly salient regional tasks.

Apart from the differences in the theoretical assumptions which underlie the definition of variables, there are also differences in the concepts which are used to organise the data and interpret the outcome. Thus the concepts of responsiveness and spill-over determine conclusions that are drawn from data by communicationists and neo-functionalists respectively.

As Haas pointed out in The Study of Regional Integration the strength of the communication theory lies in its generality and its systemic character whilst neo-functionalism derives most of its virtue from its closeness to the actors. Both theories have however been unable to demonstrate positive prescriptive processes outside Western Europe. Neither are they individually able to predict or describe the integration process.

Because they address the issue of regional integration from different levels of abstraction, it is difficult to complement the successes of the theories. Communications theory is highly descriptive and does not address the issue of causation, whereas neo-functionalism concentrates on showing causality.

A common criticism levelled against the two theories is that they both fail to recognise the importance of high politics. Thus questions such as the effects of extra-regional influences on regional units is understated. Such critics point out that while common markets might be effective between a group of countries, this does not mean that such unions will lead to political union, thus undermining the spill-over concept of neo-functionalism.

This throws into perspective, the difficulty of accepting the Balassa model which starts with a free trade area and ends up in supranationalism. This difficulty derives from the neat separation that the classification adopts in categorising the various stages of integration and the assumption that one step leads to a next and higher stage of integration. It is difficult to identify where economics merges into politics. Political involvement is much earlier than the Balassa continuum would seem to imply. The assumption that economic union has a lower threshold than political union permeates theorising about regional integration. This assumption also leads to the expectation that economic integration leads to political integration.

Nye, for example, proposed⁶⁶ that the concept of integration be broken down into; economic integration, social integration, and political integration. The three could then be

divided into subtypes each associated with a clear measurement. By stressing type rather than levels of integration, Nye hopes this disaggregation will enable theorists to relate the various usage of integration to each others 'without having to decide a priori which is prior or more easily achieved.'

Integration among developing countries, as has been pointed out, is usually embarked upon because of the multiple desire of achieving; economic development, increasing the participants bargaining power, and avoiding international marginalisation. Secondly integration schemes among developing countries are usually modelled along EEC lines. ECOWAS for example, is based on gradualist and incrementalist, economic deterministic lines i.e. neo-functionalism.

To the extent that the framework that is used and the concepts underlying regional integration were formulated mainly with the European political, social and economic context in mind, to what extent can such theory act as a basis for successful integration in places such as West Africa?

It is our contention that the historical and contextual differences between Western Europe and West Africa, imply that theories formulated for the former will in the main be inapplicable to the latter. Secondly, the high emphasis laid on attaining and maintaining peace reduce the relevance of these theories. Work done on integration among developing countries have, however, yielded some empirical generalisations⁶⁷ which we will seek to validate or falsify with our own study of the Economic Community of West African States.

⁶⁶ Nye, J., 'Comparing regional Markets', op. cit.

⁶⁷ Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration', op. cit., pp 9-17.

That way, we will be in a better position to push the study of regional integration among developing countries forward.

These generalisations could act as the hypothesis for future research in regional integration theorising. They have been reproduced below .

General Empirical Findings: Global

1. As transactions between members of a regional grouping increase as compared to third countries, they perceive themselves as being increasingly interdependent.

2. Actors will evaluate interdependence as negative if they feel their regional partners are profiting more than they are, and positive if they feel benefits are equally distributed in some areas though not necessarily in all or in all simultaneously.

3. Differences in the size of partner countries is not a good predictor of the success or failure of an integration scheme. The preponderance of a particular country may not have negative influences on the perception of smaller partners if that 'cove area' can provide special payoffs. But if such payoffs are not forthcoming then differences in size can hinder integration. Additionally the size differentials may cause increased diplomatic activity among the smaller partners if they perceive the control of the cove area as important for the regional organisation.

4. An increased emergence of both governmental and non-governmental channels of communication stimulates interdependence. But the positive evaluation of such channels by members cannot be predicted.

5. Resulting conditions, caused by integrative activities in a number of issue areas, which may result in *de facto*, or *de jure* political union is difficult to predict.

Seemingly positive integrative activities, after successful accomplishment, may result in 'self-encapsulation,' organisationally and attitudinally, and therefore may not provide new incentives which support integration. The accomplishment of tasks may result in the setting up of rival organisations whose activities do not contribute to overall integration, leading instead to a 'spillaround' situation which does not succumb to political centralisation. Self-encapsulation has been observed in activities relating to telecommunications, transportation, the protection of human rights, military strategy and procurement, and public health.

6. Of all issue and policy areas commitment to create a common Market is the most conducive to rapid integration and the maximisation of spillover. Arrangements for the setting up of common scientific and technical ventures tend to lead to self-encapsulation. On the other hand, organisations with mandates short of creating a common market have great difficulty in influencing the policies of their members.

Empirical Generalisations : Developing Nations

1. Integration in Africa has been largely symbolic; joint policy making with economic objectives does not follow the European pattern:

a) Actor expectations are prematurely politicised thus preventing incremental bargaining on relatively non controversial shared objectives.

b) Bargaining with reciprocal benefits, especially where payoffs have to be deferred, is all but impossible because of the limits on resources. Since issues cannot be kept separate easily, national differences in size and power become divisive. c) The absence of pluralism makes the formation of voluntary groups on a regional basis very

difficult. Ideological ties between leaders, where they exist, are helpful to integration; ideological cleavages are most divisive and cannot be overcome by shared economic aims.

d) Countries that are poorly integrated make poor partners in a regional integration process because of the reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home.

2. Even though non economic integration in Latin American countries is also largely symbolic, economic integration efforts usually share many characteristics with the European pattern: a) Countries whose size and resources base make them self sufficient take very little interest in regional integration. Power and size under these conditions inhibit integration. b) Differences in social and economic development inhibit the development and evolution of regional elite responsiveness (LAFTA). On the other hand, similarities of both social and economic development promote elite complementarity and responsiveness (CACM & the Andean Group)

c) Where there is a diffuseness of administrative and organisational functions at the national level, coexisting within a setting of poor local integration and weak nationalism, regional integration tends to be dominated by technocrats (CACM). Strong central government and nationalism limit the operation of technocrats in regional integration (LAFTA).

d) The logic of incremental decision making and the spill-over phenomenon operates even in regions where national integration of individual countries is weak despite a persistent aura of economic crisis (CACM). This is explained by 2(c). From those empirical generalisations Haas concluded at that time that future hypotheses for the study of regional integration should be formulated in the context of common markets.

Empirical Generalisations: The External World.

A regional integration (subsystem) could be influenced very strongly by its relations with the external world (system). Three main distinctive and identifiable configurations have been identified as important strands in the interaction between the subsystem and the system: (1) The global system within which the regional grouping perceives itself as struggling may be the main concern of actors, e.g. economic integration among developing countries. (2) A single state (or its elite) may be seen as the extra-regional force which hinders or aids integration. (3) Another regional counter system may be the extra-regional force which explains integration or disintegration. From these three configurations come the conclusions that; (a) countries who perceive themselves as being victimised by the global system will be motivated toward integration as a means of "getting out from under". (b) On the other hand perceptions of dependence on extra-regional systems may if it is pervasive act as a disincentive to integration.

4(a) The role of an extra-regional state in explaining regional integration is indeterminate. An extra-regional state with hegemonic tendencies may undermine regional integration through its payoff capacity.

(b) At the same time regional integration among developing countries sometimes survive mainly through the support of extra-regional states.

(5) Other regional counterunions are a definite though temporary incentive for integration; (a) regional unions which are of a military kind survive only as long as there is a rival external grouping. Those of a diplomatic character also disintegrate under such

circumstances. (b) Economic integration of an industrial region may survive simply because they find the strength they need in dealing with another such union.

As Haas pointed out the empirical generalisations which have been culled from the various theories seeking to explain, describe and predict integration processes are a 'mixed bag' of statements which exist at various levels of meaning. The theories are therefore imperfect because, for one thing, it is not clear what level of abstraction they are supposed to operate at. Secondly, each theory has its own internal hierarchy because there are no universally accepted key concepts, term, or constructs around which they interpret their variables. Thus the independent variables which are thought to be of causative significance are particular to the theory and therefore may not explain the integration process as it is perceived by other theories or indeed predict outcomes which are deemed valid by other theories. The closeness of the variables (both dependent and independent) to the particular theory and also to particular schemes make them limited in their universal applicability.

Some of the difficulties of integration theorising arise from the closeness of intellectuals to processes which are still happening and which do not have previous precedence with which to compare them. The various definitions have been propounded by using the structure of national politics as a model, or historical observations of community formation which do not necessarily hold true at the regional level or in modern times. Further, projections made from and modelled on a particular form of national political structure are bound to be limited in its applicability. Neo-functionalist theories have therefore been applicable to pluralistic political systems. The applicability of

communications theory on the other hand is limited because of the background conditions which, for example are deemed essential for the formation of pluralistic communities. These conditions were present within certain historical contexts which political economic and social configurations at the present time make difficult to replicate.

Seeing that the social, economic and political context within which various integration schemes operate are different, the question then arises as to the desirability of overarching variables.

It is our proposition that because of the indeterminate nature of social processes it is ill advised to propound definite process mechanism and outcomes. Instead the possibility of different process paths and outcomes should be recognised.

Conclusions

As we have seen from above, the literature on integration is a motley collection of not easily reconcilable data. Theories are mainly Eurocentric, and address different levels of abstraction.

Among other things, it is felt that the economic, political and social differences of Western Europe make the theories nearly irrelevant to developing regions such as West Africa. Pluralism from example, is seen as essential for the validity of neo-functionalism in West Africa. This being the case to what extent has military regimes and lack of pluralism affected regional integration in West Africa? Since the Treaty of the ECOWAS is essentially an adoption of a gradualist approach similar to the EEC's and is therefore neo-functional, one may suggest that missing factors found in pluralistic systems but missing in the dictatorial West Africa environment will affect the extent of integration that

can be achieved by this means. This is because the decision making and bargaining style inherent in pluralistic society are essential to regional integration by gradual means.

However, to the extent that political and economic institutions in West Africa have aspired to Western European models and politics is becoming pluralistic, one may hazard to say that neo-functionalism, so long as it does not aspire to federalism, is not entirely a dead horse but rather a crippled one which with changing situations in West Africa may eventually be healed. Of immediate relevance to us is the extent to which the application of Eurocentric theories by West African countries as the underlying theories guiding regional integration has affected the effectiveness of integration in the region. By testing the *a priori* assumptions and propositions of the theories as outlined above and in chapter one we will be in a better position to detail what is applicable and what is not. Having done that we will then be in a better position to determine, with empirical evidence, what aspects of international integration theory are not applicable in the West African context.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

3.1 Introduction

The embodiment of a regional integration scheme is found in the institution that is formed by the member countries to regularise and facilitate decision making on mutually relevant and regionally based issues. The capabilities of such an institution and its future prospects are therefore circumscribed by opportunities and constraints that the member countries make available to it or use in checking it. The willingness of member countries to endow the regional organisation with increased capabilities is itself circumscribed by their individual domestic social, economic and political conditions, as well as, by systemic factors beyond their control.

ECOWAS as a regional organisation, therefore, functions within an environment made up of the socio-political and economic milieu of the sub-region. However, the regional environment itself is very much influenced by the international political and economic order. In chapter one we examined the reasons for regional integration. The conclusions we arrived at were that regional integration is embarked upon for two main reasons. First, developing countries see it as a means for industrial development. Secondly, they see it as a means of reducing their dependence on western markets and international finance. Article 2 of the treaty establishing the organisation states that:

It shall be the aim of the community to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the field of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and

maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.¹

The aims are themselves preceded by the stated desire and conviction that such development must take place within a context of 'self-reliance'.²

The formation of ECOWAS in May 1975 was the culmination of several attempts by West African governments to unite all the countries of the region and to transcend the administrative legacy of colonialism by bridging the gap between the linguistic zones which had become polarised after independence because of the inability to agree on what the collective agenda for the region and indeed the whole continent should be. Unity, an important theme for the relations between the newly independent states posed a problem to them because it meant different things to the various leaders. It comprised several values to individual leaders and included;

unity to find appropriate African solutions to problems and prevent the intervention of non-African powers, unity to express a common outlook, unity to bring about the rapid termination of colonial rule, and unity to lessen the weakness caused by underdevelopment.³

Thus though there was agreement about unity, there was difficulty in defining what form such unity should take. Exponents of Pan-Africanism, such as Ghana's Nkrumah, seemed willing to consider a radical transformation of the political map, and defined unity accordingly. To him, Pan-Africanism meant unity and unity meant political unification. Thus Pan-Africanism meant nothing unless it transcended the artificial barriers and

¹ Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ECOWAS treaty.

² Preamble of the ECOWAS treaty.

³ Welch, C. E., Jr., Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and the Political Unification of West Africa, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1966, p 2.

boundaries imposed by colonialism. The ideology entailed the outright scraping of frontiers.⁴ The close identification of Pan-Africanism with political unification resulted, largely, from the activities of Nkrumah.⁵ However, not all African nationalists, and subsequently Heads of State subscribed to political unification as the goal to be sought in African unity. Others interpreted it to mean economic or technical co-operation.⁶ Indeed, long before independence, there was disagreement between Nigerians and Gold Coasters about the prior unification of the colonies before independence was sought. The Nigerian members of the African Students Association of America and Canada, where Nkrumah's political activities began, did not agree with the idea of fighting for independence on a collective basis. They felt that there was no question of considering African or West African unity at that stage of the anti-colonial struggle. Instead, each colonial territory was to be left alone to struggle for itself, 'each working out its own salvation as best it could,...'.⁷ No inter-territorial political parties were formed between nationalists from English and French speaking colonies. The Ewe unification movement was the only example in the region.⁸ Pan-Africanism, in the Nkrumah sense, had to be sold to the French speaking nationalists within the region on the eve of their own independence.

Nkrumah's strong belief in the pre-eminence of political unification was based on the perception that political, economic, cultural, or technical co-operation without political unification would be inadequate for the task of building Africa. To him industrialisation, and planned use of resources required more than,

'the kind of tinkering that limits us to inter territorial associations within customs unions, trade agreements,

⁴ West Africa, London, May 20, 1961, p. 555.

⁵ Welch, op. cit.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Bankole, T., Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, Nelson, London, 1957, p.43.

⁸ Welch, op. cit.

intercommunications services, and the like, ... such tinkering ignores the crucial requirement of continental integration as the essential prerequisite for the most bountiful economic progress.⁹

Africa, he felt, required a common political basis for the integration of policies 'in economic planning, defence, foreign and diplomatic relations.'¹⁰ Thus, to him co-operation of any sort required political unity to succeed.

A final observation that must be mentioned about Nkrumah's interpretation of Pan-Africanism was its evolution from an endorsement of regionalism, to opposition to it. Initially, he thought;

the self-determination of the dependent territories was the prerequisite to the federation of self-governing states on a regional basis, leading ultimately to the creation of a United States of Africa.¹¹

Political unification at the regional level was to be a step toward eventual continental political unification. However, this view changed because he came to see regionalism as being an impediment to continental unity. This was because of the possibility that it would engender loyalties which will give rise to power politics between the various regions.¹² Pan-Africanism failed to gain support.

After independence, the desire for closer association conflicted with the desire to retain the separate identities of the new states. Once the nationalist came to power they focused on internal development and national integration. Unwillingness to subordinate, what came to be perceived as the national interests, after independence, led to an emphasis on economic and technical co-operation. The failure of the Mali Federation, and the

⁹ Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, quoted in Welch, op. cit., p.19.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 20.

¹¹ *ibid.* p.22.

¹² *ibid.*

Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, the overthrow of Nkrumah, (all of which more later), among other things, resulted in economic and technical co-operation becoming the theme for unity among the countries of the region.

Several attempts have been made by West African countries to form integration schemes. Those that were formed have been between the French speaking countries of the region. The English speaking countries have never really come together to form an economic grouping since independence.¹³ The first economic grouping among the francophone West African countries, Union Douaniere del'Ouest (UDAO), was formed in June 1959, and was between Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, and Niger. The main purpose was to redistribute the custom duties which the coastal states collected on transit trade with the landlocked members.¹⁴ This was replaced in June 1966 by Union Douaniere de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UDEAO) with the same membership. UDAO was disbanded because the members could not find a generally acceptable formula for the distribution of the custom revenue collected on imports, and because it favoured the more industrialised economies of Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire whose manufactured exports benefited from special tariff concessions. The imports of Ivorian products by Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin involved losses that amounted to 6 percent, 3.7 per cent, and 3.1 per cent of their respective total customs revenues during 1967.¹⁵ At a meeting in Bamako in May 1970 the majority of the seven members opposed any further expansion of existing arrangements. A protocol agreement was instead adopted which stated that any new Francophone economic community should reflect some equity such

¹³ Asante, S. K. B., *The Political economy of Regionalism in Africa*, Praeger, New York, 1986.

¹⁴ Bach, D. C., 'Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS' in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 21, Part 4, 1983.

¹⁵ Bach, *ibid.* p. 606.

that trade liberalisation would be linked with the co-ordination of development plans and the establishment of compensation measures.¹⁶

UDEAO was also dissolved and its place taken by Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) in May 1970 and was launched by a protocol agreement. The treaty establishing the community was however not signed until 17 April 1974 in Abidjan. Its economic aims were to accelerate the industrialisation of its members, to facilitate trade in manufactured goods and raw materials, and to improve the infrastructure of the area through the development of transportation and telecommunications.¹⁷

As we have indicated above, co-operation schemes were usually along linguistic lines and were mainly among the French speaking countries. Those that crossed the linguistic barrier were either stillborn or dormant. The West African Free Trade Area which was initiated between Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire in 1964 did not get off the drawing board. Other examples include the Ghana-Guinea and later the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union.¹⁸ The formation of ECOWAS, which includes English, French and Portuguese speaking countries is, therefore, a significant step. The way impediments were overcome and suspicions allayed before it could be formed will be looked at in more detail later on in the chapter. But before we do that and in order to be able to appreciate the significance of the formation of ECOWAS sufficiently, we need to understand the political milieu of West Africa, both in terms of its development and its historical antecedents.

¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷ Asante, S. K.B., 'CEAO/ECOWAS: Conflict and Co-operation in West Africa, in The Future of Regionalism in Africa, Onwuka, R. I., and Sesay, A. (ed.), Macmillan, London, 1984.

¹⁸ Asante, Regionalism in Africa, *op. cit.*

3.2 General Characteristics of West African Politics

To attempt a listing of common characteristics of West African politics is to analyse issues at a high level of abstraction. This is because since independence the politics of West African states have undergone a lot of experimentation both with regimes and the adoption of ideologies. However, underlying all the divergencies, the experimentations and flux that characterised the politics of the region are certain common characteristics. The obvious and fundamental of these is their colonial experience. From this common denominator the various countries of the Community have experienced a varied set of political regimes which can broadly be divided into military regimes and one-party states. Regime changes, in most instances, have been accompanied by ideological reorientation at the state level and the formation of new coalitions at the regional level. Each regime has also been accompanied by a leadership style that the incumbent of office has deemed expedient and appropriate for governance.

Leadership styles have included such types as charismatic, patriarchal, technocratic, and populist/prophetic which produced authoritarianism, patrimonialism, patronage,¹⁹ and a mix of these. A brief listing and description of the generalities will, it is hoped, enable a better understanding of the issues that form the basis of political behaviour in the region, and hence the issues that have affected and still affect intra-regional relations.

¹⁹Chazan, N., et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (2 ed.), Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1992, pp 161-168.

Colonial Experience

Historical factors more than anything else have been very influential in determining both the structure and shape of the states within the region. Colonial rule in particular has been the most significant in terms of the shape of politics since independence. As has been pointed out by many historians, the nation-state in Africa is a European creation, and West Africa stands out as the most heavily demarcated region, in terms of the size and number of states, on the continent. It reflects more than any region in the world, the legacies of colonial demarcation and today contains some of the poorest countries in the world.

The region was colonised mainly by the French and the English. Post independence West Africa is therefore made up mainly of francophone and anglophone countries. Of the 16 countries that make up ECOWAS, five are English speaking, two are Portuguese, and the rest are French speaking. However, despite the preponderance of French speaking countries in the region, the very high population of Nigeria (two-thirds of the population of the region) compensates for the fewer number of English speaking countries.

Of particular salience in the colonial legacies are the artificial boundaries that today determine the geographical extent of each individual country. The effects of this has been the separation of ethnic groups into different countries. It has also created countries with very dissimilar economic resource bases and economic viability. The dividing of the same tribal group into different countries and the agglomeration of different ethnic groups into the same country has created ethnically differentiated and amorphous states.

This situation was expected by several observers to result in a proliferation of secessionist movements and irredentism after independence. However, after an initial spate of ethnically inspired opposition of ruling governments, the situation settled down to what might be called a manageable equilibrium. Thus, apart from the Biafran war of secession (1967-70), the survival of colonially inherited boundaries has been remarkable.²⁰

One reason that may be responsible for the relative stability of the highly ethnically heterogeneous African state is that the agglomeration of diverse but numerically small groups within individual states has created a situation in which none of them dominates the political sphere to a disproportionately large enough extent to cause the other groups to view their continued political survival as threatened perpetually. In instances where large and homogeneous groups exist and where there seems to be a disproportionate distribution of the benefits of independence, as was the case in Nigeria, communal conflicts occurred. A second reason for the survival of colonial boundaries is that West African leaders like all other leaders on the continent very jealously guarded the political independence of their territories and in instances where such independence was threatened either by internal dissension or external aggression were not averse to protecting the boundaries and territorial integrity by calling on the assistance of the former colonial masters.²¹ Leaders have helped each other, where they found it in their interest, to quell internal dissension.²²

Finally the OAU entrenched in its charter in 1963 the principle of preservation of existing colonial partition boundaries, whilst the notion that territorial integrity is identified

²⁰ Chabal, P., *Power in Africa*, Macmillan, London, 1992. See also Chazan, et al, op. cit.

²¹ Chipman, J., *French Power in Africa*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.

²² The Senegalese intervention in the Gambia in July 1982 is a case in point.

with the state system became a basic premise of the emerging code of African international law.²³ Thus colonially inherited boundaries could not be redefined without effectively going against the spirit of the OAU. Hence few attempts on colonial boundaries have ever been attempted, and 'where they have been, the only conceivable way of resolving them has been by reference to the colonial order. Attempts at secession, that is challenges to the colonial legacy, have failed largely because they have had virtually no support from other African countries.²⁴ The result today is the existence of states where domestic politics is maintained by a careful distribution of state benefits in such a way as not to invite accusations of ethnic partiality.

It may be suggested however, that the idea that homogenous groups have been divided between countries and lumped together thus creating potentially unstable states is somewhat exaggerated. Most ethnic groups are themselves highly differentiated group. The Ewes and the Akan of Ghana, the Yoruba and Ibo of Nigeria , and other tribes in the region are made up of similar but different groups who speak different dialects. The Asante Empire was anything but a nation made up of a consenting, willing and homogenous group. Therefore the colonial demarcation of the region should be seen not from a non factual and sometimes romantic perspective of how the region would have been made up of peaceful coexisting ethnic groups since that can never be proven.

It is actually very difficult to see how national boundaries could have been drawn to coincide with tribal boundaries. As the map on the next page shows West Africa in very heterogeneous. If tribal boundaries had been followed the sizes of states in the region

²³ Young, C., 'The Colonial State and Its Political Legacy' in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, Rothchild, D., and Chazan, N., (ed.), Westview Press, London, 1988.

²⁴ Chabal, P., Power in Africa , Macmillan, London, 1992, . 122



would have been even smaller than they are today. Thus it would have been difficult, no matter who demarcated the region, to have had ethnically homogeneous states. The ethnic, and more specifically, the tribal diversity of states is inevitable given the patchwork of tribal boundaries in the region. It can indeed be said that the straddling of tribes across borders is also inevitable. What was not inevitable is the size of the countries. It is this rather than those mentioned above which reflect the colonial scrambling for territory.

The empirical issue is that the balkanisation of West Africa has created economically unviable entities whose continuing dependence on their former colonial masters for sustenance has undermined their ability for independent action and influenced intra-regional relations. The fear of Nigeria by the French speaking countries of the region, for example, is orchestrated mainly by France²⁵ in her attempt to retain her political influence in the region. It has in certain instances coloured their assessment of co-operation proposal advocated by that country.

Another effect of the unviability of the post colonial state is the inability to meet the needs of their people. States have inherited societies within their boundaries who demand from their governments the basic necessities of existence especially since these were promised as the rewards of independence. The inability of most of these states to meet the demands made on them because of their economic weakness has been, to a large extent, responsible for the rapid regime changes that have occurred in the region after the initial euphoria of independence had died down.²⁶ An interplay of this burden of economic

²⁵ Chipman, J., *ibid.*

²⁶ ECOWAS states account for less than one-third of the membership of the OAU but between 1958 and 1990 they accounted for half the military take-overs. As Welch pointed out, the incidence of coups

weakness and scarce state resources combined with inappropriate economic policy and corruption to create a further dependence on foreign aid and a preoccupation with domestic development. The instability that has plagued West African politics has in most instances been economically determined. Such preoccupation with the need for immediate domestic economic development means governments pay more attention to schemes that promise quick returns, and less to schemes, such as regional integration, whose benefits are long term.

Another effect of colonialism on the state of politics in contemporary West Africa is the fragility of state institutions that governments inherited at independence.²⁷ West Africans inherited institutions that were both alien and undeveloped. During the colonial period the administrative apparatus that existed had been "the minimum required to secure a semblance of control".²⁸ Within these administrative sectors indigenous people had usually occupied the lower echelons, and at the time of independence lacked the experience that was needed for conducting the affairs of state. To meet their various needs such as the provision of services and development, almost all the governments on assumption of office expanded the bureaucracy by creating various ministries and parastatal organisations. They also promoted inexperienced people into high positions. Both of these had the effect of expanding the public sector and therefore increasing public expenditure, as well as inefficiency.²⁹

d'etats among ECOWAS States are not as evenly spread as overall figures might suggest. Of the 16 members of ECOWAS, two-thirds of the successful coups took place in five countries. Benin and Burkina Faso (6 each), Ghana(5), Mauritania and Nigeria (4 each). Welch C.E, Jr., " The Military Factor in West Africa: Leadership and Regional Development" in Okolo, J.E, and Wright, S., West African Regional Co-operation, PP. 157-183.

²⁷ Chabal, P., Power in Africa, op cit.

²⁸ Chazan, et al. p 28

²⁹ Tordoff, W., Government and Politics in Africa (2 ed.), Macmillan, London, 1993.

The effects of this on the overall decision making process of the individual country varied and depended on both the leadership style and the ideology of the incumbents of office. At an abstract level, however, the general offshoot was that party functionaries were appointed to man administrative positions. The party in such instances became the route to personal advancement and enrichment.³⁰

As a result the extended family system in many of these countries people who either because of their education or party affiliation found themselves in positions of authority suddenly realised that their traditional obligations necessitated their employing kinsmen.³¹ Where it was not employment that was demanded of them, these relatively better off people found that their salaries had to be used to help other less fortunate members of their families either by sponsoring their education, training or through direct remittance. Corruption which today is a major problem in most of these countries can to some extent be traced to demands made on the salaries of these public servants and therefore to the interplay between inherited structures and the indigenous social system.³² Nepotism on the other hand resulted from demands made on incumbents of office from their kinsmen. The elaborate network of patronage can also be traced to the way party and ethnic affiliations to an important public figure became the root to personal advancement.

³⁰Lamarchad, R., 'The Changing Structure of Patronage Systems' in The Precarious Balance, op. cit.

³¹Nigerian politics has to a large extent been influenced by the utilisation for 'personal benefit of officeholders as well as that of the reference group'. Joseph, R., Class, State and Prebendal Politics

³²Other factors account for the crippling corruption in West African countries, such as, dwindling real incomes, inappropriate government policies. What we are stating here is how colonialism merged into the post-colonial state to create fairly lasting characteristics in West African politics.

Politics itself in instances where it was affected indirectly by these pressures became highly personalised and corrupt as nearness to decision making and state resources became an imperative to one's ability continue showing such favour to kin and party. The fragility of inherited institutions therefore combined with kinship pressures, partycentrism and individual dishonesty to create a political culture of nepotism, corruption, tribalism, patronage, and personalised politics, which weighed heavily on an overburdened public sector.

The result of all these was that state resources became closely linked with the financial aspirations of the political elite. They were therefore suspicious of any schemes that might hinder their closeness to state resources.

Another aspect of the colonial legacy that needs mentioning is the absence of a constructive political culture on the eve of independence. Colonial rule had been authoritarian and had been supported by an army that was used to ensure compliance of the indigenous population. Government itself was imposed and not participatory, hortatory rather than consultative.³³ On the eve of independence untried constitutions were drawn up by the departing colonialists and imposed on those coming into office. They were expected to use rules and regulations of governance which they had not seen their former masters use in their own administration.

As soon as the new governments were confronted with ethnic dissent in the initial stages of independence, and opposition to their ideologies they resorted very quickly to

³³ Chazan, et al., Politics in Contemporary Africa.

the more familiar authoritarianism and the use of the army as a means of governance that the colonialist had used quite effectively.³⁴ The impedance of opposition forces, such as other political parties, the judiciary, regional assemblies, and traditional authority structures by ruling governments were meant to enable the building of structures that the incumbents saw as necessary for nation building. The undeveloped nature of West African politics today is to an extent explained by the curbing of political dissent in the early days of independence. The one party state which most of these states experimented with at one time or another is also a response by many governments to what was viewed as impediments to policy implementation and inappropriate political structures for ethnically heterogeneous political communities. Some of the legacies of such rule is that access to the political centre became highly circumscribed and opposition, where it exists, finds it nearly impossible to operate. The military therefore became the main instrument of political transition. Many of the member countries of ECOWAS have experienced military coups several times since independence. These have also left their mark on the politics of the region. They have impeded the development of bureaucratic styles of decision making and long term strategic planning is difficult because military governments tend to rule by decrees and are usually inclined to jettison the programmes of their predecessors. They have affected intra-regional relations to the extent that they created unpredictability in regional politics and lack of confidence in the implementation of treaties. Repudiation of agreements by previous governments, such as Acheampong's repudiation of loans contracted by the Busia regime in Ghana when the former overthrew the latter in 1972 is a case in point.

³⁴ Kasfir, N., 'Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview' in Manhood, P., (ed.) Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa, John Wiley Publishers, New York, 1983.

The points noted above should not by any means be seen as an attempt to exonerate incompetent and corrupt governments but rather as a detailing of the ways in which the colonial legacy affected politics in the early days of independence and subsequent regimes in the region. The diverse experiences of West African politics have been gained within the lifespan of a generation of political leaders. Doubtless, the changes occurring all over the region at the present time will be informed by these experiences just as the initial attempts at self-governance were informed by the methods of colonial rule.

Whereas colonial politics influenced political structures and modalities in West African countries in the early period of independence, it is the post colonial regional political environment that provides the crucible for regional integration. Thus an analysis of this period of West African political history is essential for understanding the milieu in which ECOWAS is operating.

Intra-Regional Relations in Independent West Africa.

International relations within West Africa is a product of history, the processes leading to decolonisation and post-independence political developments. The historical antecedents derive from the regions colonisation by Europeans. Apart from Cape Verde and Guinea- Bissau the rest of the countries participating in the economic community were colonised either by France or Britain.

The first result of this is that it created an anglophone/francophone divide within the region with the result that coalition in regional negotiations is usually along these

linguistic lines. The francophone countries, particularly, tend to act collectively by using regional arrangements and organisations in their negotiations with the anglophone countries.³⁵ This is exemplified by the way members of the West African Economic Community's (CEAO) co-ordinated their activities in the negotiations leading up to the formation of ECOWAS and subsequently in its activities within the organisation.

This is not to imply that the French speaking countries within the region always act together and always agree on strategy. Guinea under Sekou Toure, until recently, had been an outsider in post-independence intra-francophone relations. By voting against the French proposed Franco-African Community he got his country ostracised by both France and the French speaking countries within the region.³⁶ Additionally, for ideological reasons Guinea had aligned itself to Ghana and Mali until the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah and Keita in 1966 and 1968 respectively.³⁷ Even intra-CEAO relations usually showed strains and disagreements. A two day CEAO Head of States meeting which was scheduled to take place in Niamey from 22 January 1975 was postponed because of the withdrawal of the Mali delegation. The reason was that they would not attend a meeting with the Burkinabe because of the border dispute between them.³⁸ Thus where the national interest was concerned, the individual countries normally conformed to what pertained in international relations behaviour,³⁹ and put the national interest first. This however, does not detract from the broad coalescing of countries along anglophone and francophone lines.

³⁵ Bach, D., 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in *Journal of African Studies*, 21, 4(1983).

³⁶ Mazrui, A., and Tidy, M., *Nationalism and New States in Africa*, Heinemann, London, 1984.

³⁷ These countries subscribed to radical Pan-Africanism, and semi-socialist policies.

³⁸ *West Africa*, 27 January 1975.

³⁹ The refusal of Mali to work with the then Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) within CEAO because of border disputes in January 1975 is an example. *West Africa* 27/1/75.

The anglophone countries within the region, especially Ghana and Nigeria, had always considered such polarisation as an indication of the dependence of the French speaking countries of the region on France and an impediment to regional co-operation. The balkanisation of French West Africa during the decolonisation process with the Loi-Cadre policy was viewed by certain West African leaders of the time, such as Ghana's Nkrumah, as a deliberate policy to create a neo-colonial situation which perpetuated the dependence of the French speaking states within the region on France.⁴⁰

Such a view affected his relations with these states when they became independent because he saw continued dependence on France as an impediment to Pan-Africanism. The siding of the newly independent French speaking states with France against Algerian nationalists in the UN General Assembly of 1960,⁴¹ and their stance during the Congo crisis only went to buttress the perception that they were puppets of their former colonial masters.

The French speaking countries have always adopted a moderate attitude towards European presence and influence in Africa. Their support for Morocco in the OAU in 1983 against the Saharawi Arab Republic(Polisario Front) only crystallised the long held view that unlike the more radical countries these moderates did not see foreign domination as undesirable and were unwilling to question the structural legacy of imperialism. Their usually moderate stance meant that the French speaking countries within the region invariably found themselves arguing for the need to keep links with

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ Nkrumah, K., *I Speak of Freedom* cited in Mazrui and Tidy *ibid.*

extra-regional actors. This difference in the view of the majority of francophone West Africa, and that of anglophone countries toward extra-regional actors created differences in their approach to interaction with extra-regional actors especially between 1957 and 1966 and intermittently since then. Thus to the extent that one of the aims of regionalism is to reduce dependence, such divergence of attitudes toward the issue was bound to affect the willingness and commitment of the two groups to reduce it.

A second effect of colonialism is that it created discontinuous linguistic zones. Ghana, for example, is separated from its anglophone counterparts both in the east and the west by French speaking countries. The same could be said of Nigeria, and The Gambia. It is only Liberia and Sierra Leone the border each other. There is therefore the feeling among the English speaking countries of the region of being hemmed in by French speaking states who by virtue of their colonial experience are different. The French speaking countries on the other hand form a more spatially continuous zones. This spatial discontinuity buttressed the mutual feeling of suspicion that arose soon after independence. For Ghana, under Nkrumah, the problem of being surrounded by what was regarded as puppet states of France hindered close collaboration. For the francophone countries Nkrumah's attempt to get a no-vote against the Franco-African union in the decolonisation process, pronouncements of the desire to absorb Togo into Ghana, and subsequent suspicion of his complicity in the assassination of President Olympio of Togo led to a lot of unease about possible Nkrumah aided subversion of their governments.

Such discontinuity also made the Ghana-Guinea Union meaningless because of the distance that existed between the countries and the linguistic barrier to communication.

Though colonialism had a divisive influence on post independence regional relations, it also reduced the number of languages spoken within the region covered by ECOWAS to three and thus facilitated communication in a way that would not have been possible with the multiplicity of languages that are spoken within the region. Colonialism therefore to that extent facilitated rather than impeded communication and interaction.

It is usually posited that African countries would have been better off without colonialism and that the actual effect of the advent of the colonialist was to stymie indigenous development. This is a counter-factual statement that cannot be verified. However as in all cases of cultural contact, colonialism has, in the context of regional relations, both facilitated and hindered co-operation.

However even if we were to insist that colonialism created difficulties for West African co-operation the relevant question to ask in our context of regional co-operation is what independent West African countries did after independence to reduce the negative effects of colonialism?

At independence one of the main issues that confronted West African countries was how to regulate relations with each other. Extreme Pan-Africanists such as Ghana's Nkrumah favoured the total uniting of the whole continent under a Union Government. He therefore viewed regional integration as an impediment to such continental goals.⁴² Regionalism to him was just another form of balkanisation which would end up in

⁴² Mazrui and Tidy, op. cit.

compartmentalising the continent. This argument was similar to the Mitranian objection to regional integration found in functionalist theory of international organisation. Others, such as, Cote d'Ivoire's Houphouet-- Boigny on the other hand opposed a one-step transition to continental federalism. This was not surprising since Houphouet - Boigny had earlier opposed the formation of a post colonial federal system among the French speaking countries of West Africa and had actively participated in frustrating the proposed Mali Federation because of the fear that his relatively prosperous country would be saddled with subsidising the poorer countries within such a federation.⁴³ This raises the question of whether the cosmopolitanism that elevates the regional goal above national aspirations, and which regional integration theory takes for granted and is assumed for member countries really exists among West African countries. Granted, Cote d'Ivoire later participated in regional groupings in which attempts were made to implement distributive measures, however this normally resulted in stagnation or dissolving of such organisations. The question of whether ECOWAS will be able to transcend such particularism is one objective of this thesis.

Another reason for the failure of continentalism was that all the new leaders were anxious to protect their newly won positions of influence. Some actually saw Nkrumah's suggestions of an African Union government as an ill disguised ambition to rule Africa.

Nkrumah's views were supported, initially, by the Casablanca group consisting of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, and Egypt. The moderates (the Brazzaville group),

⁴³ Chipman, J., op. cit.

consisting mainly of the French speaking countries together with Nigeria and Liberia supported a loose association of independent states in Africa.

West African countries were, by belonging to these continental cleavages, divided into these two camps by their perceptions of what they thought ought to be the form of the relationship between the newly independent states. It must be noted that while Nkrumah, the advocate of Pan-Africanism, was opposed to regional integration, the moderates favoured nothing more than a co-operative framework without supranationalism. The two positions were not reconcilable particularly because of the methods advocated by the two groups and also because of the mutual suspicions of the moderates on the one hand and the more radical, particularly of Nkrumah of the other.

The unwillingness of the French speaking countries to vote against a federation with France, their support for France against Algerian nationalism, support for a loose federation in Congo and support of Moise Tshombe, and their opposition of a united Africa convinced Nkrumah about what he perceived to be the shallowness of their independence. He therefore encouraged dissident groups from neighbouring French speaking countries to undermine their rulers by giving them financial assistance, and by allowing them to use Ghana as a base for their seditious activities.⁴⁴ These activities deepened suspicions and made regional co-operation between the countries more difficult.

Another post-independence development was that West African heads of state (anglophone ones) broke up common currencies and dissolved common services, such as

⁴⁴Thompson, W., Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, Princeton University Press, 1969.

the West African Airways corporation, the West African Cocoa Research Institute, and West African Currency Board, that had linked them together during the colonial period. Thus in certain instances West Africans themselves adopted policy measures which effectively reduced the level of co-operation that existed previously and also hampered future co-operation. The francophone countries however did retain such links with each other and with France (possibly because of the co-operation agreements they signed with the latter during the decolonisation process).

Many of the countries balkanised themselves further by creating regions that further disaggregated the state along ethnic lines thus eventually making national integration even more difficult. The Mali Federation between Senegal and the then Soudan (now Mali) also broke up because of personal and ideological differences between Senghor and Keita just as politics in Nigeria was stymied by the personal differences between Awolowo, Azikiwe, and Amadu Bello. Thus West Africans could not sustain co-operation in instances where it was attempted and broke up even more in certain instances where it had existed prior to independence.

The evidence that exists does not support the view that colonialists alone were responsible for the present pattern of spatial allocation and lack of co-operation in West Africa. The above then were the initial occurrences that laid the foundation for West Africa inter-state relations.

Corollaries to some of the post-independent developments such as the ideological competition between socialists and pro-western regimes resulted in each seeking to prove

the superiority of its system, and thus further aggravating regional cleavages.⁴⁵ Such national rivalry still exists among the countries within the region both at the elite and mass levels.

Furthermore military coup d'état within the region later created a situation of unease and uncertainty as neighbouring countries accused each other of harbouring dissidents from each other's country. Mutual distrust developed. The early part of independence in West Africa was therefore a period of competition and rivalry between the leaders of the region.

From the above we can conclude that even though colonialism played an important role in creating numerous micro-states in West Africa inter-state relations within the region could have been less acrimonious if African leaders had had the will to do something about it. The personalisation of politics very early on in the post-independence period combined with the situation created by the decolonisation process to create a situation which divided West African countries along linguistic and ideological lines and thus made it difficult for them to build on co-operative ventures that had been established to facilitate colonial rule, and made it difficult for ease in communication and consensus building among the leaders.

⁴⁵ The famous wager of Boigny with Nkrumah in 1957 that the conservatism of his country will make Cote d'Ivoire economically better off in ten years is an explicit example. Zartman, W.I., and Deldago, C.L., *The Political Economy of Ivory Coast*, Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 1.

Extra-Regional Influences on International Relations

In addition to colonialism, extra-regional influences in West African post-independence inter-state relation could also be traced back to the early 1960s and the association of the francophone countries within the region to the EEC through France. Both Ghana and Nigeria viewed this with suspicion. For Ghana that was a perpetuation of colonialism, and prevented the eventual uniting of the African continent. For Nigeria it blocked the potential to become a regional power with a regional market for its nascent industries.

Nigeria's lukewarm attitude to the EEC only improved after negotiations for the Lome convention. Some have attributed the federal government's change of attitude to its need to secure and neutralise its French speaking neighbours.⁴⁶ French support for the Biafrans, the use of Dahomey (now Benin) by the International Red Cross Society to supply the secessionists with medical help, and Cote d'Ivoire's recognition of the breakaway territory heightened the need for the federal government to secure its borders and sovereignty against future upheavals.⁴⁷

French support and presumably that of its West African client states was a result of the desire to see Nigeria's dominance of the region broken. They therefore saw the Biafran secession as a step in that direction. Likewise, the fear of domination of the region by Nigeria led Cote d'Ivoire (France's main ally within the region) to also support the Biafrans.

⁴⁶Bach, D., op. cit.

⁴⁷Ogunbadejo, O., 'Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States: From Vision to Reality', in African Contemporary Records, Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, African Publishing Company, New York, 1988, pp. A124 - A140.

This throws into perspective the seemingly illogical actions of political leaders. If the Biafrans had succeeded it could easily have triggered off a spate of such demands in other countries within the region, including the Cote d'Ivoire, because of the ethnicised politics of the period. Shrewd politicians such as Houphouët Biongny could not have failed to realise such possibilities. We can only conclude that his support for French policy towards the federal government provided potential benefits that, in his calculations, outweighed the precedent that the break-up of Nigeria could have set. Additionally, because of the guarantee of French intervention in preserving his government, Houphouët Biongny felt secure enough not to worry about secessionism within his own borders. Another interpretation that could be given to the desire to see Nigerian influence broken would be to interpret the support from a *realpolitik* perspective and to view intra-regional relations as one dominated by the quest for dominance.

Whatever the reason for the mainly francophone support for the Biafran secession, it heightened Nigerian suspicion of France and its intention within the region.

The federal government's renewed activities after the civil war to regroup and form a regional organisation incorporating both anglophone and francophone countries should, to a certain extent, be seen as a means of pre-empting such occurrences in the future. Additionally the proposal by a meeting of Nigeria's ambassadors of the need for the federal government to undermine francophone solidarity by forming a regional organisation that would supplant the Organisation commune africaine et mauricienne (OCAM) and create a

market for Nigerian industry supports the assertion that Nigeria saw French intervention is the region as an impediment to its national interest.⁴⁸

The main obstacle to a region wide integration scheme before ECOWAS were how to reconcile the francophone/anglophone divide and its political ramifications, the linguistic differences, Pan-Africanism versus co-operation, ideological differences and the desire to cling to national sovereignty. These obstacles had to be overcome for ECOWAS to be formed. How this was done forms the subject of the next section.

3.3 Antecedents to ECOWAS

As was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, several attempts were made to create a regional organisation which transcended the various language barriers in the region. ECOWAS was a culmination of such attempts. The first efforts that were made toward multi-linguistic regional integration was through a 1962 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) initiative for joint industrial development programmes in the region. At the first meeting of its Standing Committee on Industrial, Natural Resources and Transport it was decided to help governments to industrialise through specialisation within the region. This was to be done through harmonisation of industrial development plans and joint studies.⁴⁹ As a consequence of this decision, a mission of the organisation was sent to West Africa to investigate the possible areas of industrial co-operation. A conference was held in Lagos in November 1963 on Industrial Co-ordination in West Africa as a result.

⁴⁸ Stremlan, J., The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Princeton, 1977.

⁴⁹ ECA, Report of the West African Industrial Co-operation Mission, E/CN. 14/246, January 7, 1964, p. 1.

Three years after the Lagos Conference, 11 states attended a conference on Economic Co-operation in West Africa in Niamey in October 1966. At this meeting, various recommendations relating to co-operation within the region were adopted.⁵⁰ Following this, another meeting, the West African Conference on Economic Co-operation was held in Accra between 27 April and 4 May 1967. At this conference the then executive secretary of ECA, Robert Gardiner, presented the Articles of Association which were adopted at the Niamey conference for adoption and signature. This brought into being the Economic Community of West Africa.

At the Accra Conference, 12 out of the 14 countries in the sub-region signed the Articles thus establishing the Community. They included; Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ghana, Darhomey (now Benin), Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.⁵¹ The Gambia and Guinea were absent. Thus a multi-lingual scheme was started. Subsequently, efforts were made to establish a region wide organisation which embraced all states. As a result a meeting Heads of State in April 1968 in Monrovia established the West African Regional Group. An Interim Ministerial Council was also formed. At this meeting Nigeria and Guinea were given the task to prepare priority areas for co-operation among the members of the organisation. Senegal and Liberia were also given the task of preparing a draft treaty and an accompanying protocol on a customs union.⁵²

⁵⁰ Gruhn, I.V., 'The Economic Commission For Africa', in African Regional Organisations, Mazzeo, D., (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 41- 47.

⁵¹ ECA, E/CN. 14/9, Annex VII

⁵² Asante, S.K.B, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa, op. cit.

Though Nigeria and Guinea submitted a report, the Interim Council of Ministers meeting that was to consider it together with the Senegal/ Liberia proposal for a custom union never met. Between 1968 and 1973, when the next Conference of Ministers took place in Lome, no other meeting had been convened to consider the priority studies or the draft treaty discussed in 1968. There was thus a complete lull in region wide co-operation efforts between 1968 and 1973.⁵³

During this period there was a renewed effort by Cote d'Ivoire to revitalise the UDEAO. Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Dahomey (now Benin), and Togo had been absent from the Monrovia meeting of heads of state but had subsequently claimed that the pace of a region wide integration scheme was being rushed. There was the fear of anglophone domination, particularly of Nigerian domination. At France's suggestion they sought to counterbalance Nigerian influence in the region. This may have formed the background to Nigeria's Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction to observe at the 1973 conference of Minister for the proposed West African Economic Community that: 'Sometimes, our attitude toward economic co-operation has been ambivalent; sometimes it has been downright negative. We have allowed ourselves to be persuaded that our future lies in seeking salvation outside our continent'.⁵⁴ France's influence in West Africa, the civil war in Nigeria, domestic preoccupations and national politics, to mention a few, were some of the factors that hindered the formation of an organisation that embraced all states in the region.

⁵³ Usoro, E. J., 'Past and Present Attempts at Economic Integration in West Africa', in Economic Integration of West Africa, Edozien, E. C., and Osagie, E. (ed.) Ibadan University Press, 1982, pp. 38 - 58.

⁵⁴ Adebayo Adedeji quoted by Nwabuzor, E. J. O., 'Politics of African Economic Integration', in Edozien and Osagie, op. cit., p. 92.

As we have indicated above, co-operation among francophone countries suffered several set backs and many became defunct. Efforts to incorporate both English and French speaking countries in a scheme also floundered in 1968. In 1975, however ECOWAS was formed. Below we consider some of the factors leading to the formation of the organisation.

3.4 The formation of ECOWAS

It has been suggested that Nigeria's willingness to use her influence to stop the incursion of Libya into the region by sending troops to Chad,⁵⁵ her support of the anti apartheid movement in South Africa and MPLA in Angola,⁵⁶ the ending of the Yaounde Convention, changing Nigerian/French relations and the leading role Nigeria played in negotiations leading to the Lome Convention⁵⁷ all had a part to play in reducing the feeling of suspicion of the possible effects of Nigeria's influence within the region. The decision to work for a West African integration was, therefore, an important aspect of redefining Nigerian post civil war geopolitical space because it implicated it in issues that went beyond economic co-operation.

Hence Nigeria's attempts to ostracise the populist military governments of Rawlings (Ghana) by the Obasanjo government and later of Doe (Liberia) and Sankara (Burkina Faso)⁵⁸ by the Shagari regime helped in reassuring the more conservative leaders within the region of the willingness of the federal government to restore the *status-quo*

⁵⁵ Chazan, et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.

⁵⁶ This brought Nigeria into conflict with Senghor of Senegal who was accused of being reactionary for supporting the FLNA and UNITA.

⁵⁷ Mayall, J., 'The Impact For Africa of the Enlarged European Economic Community', in The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development, Shaw, T. M., and Heard, K. A., (ed.), Longman, Bristol, 1979.

⁵⁸ Agyeman-Duah, B., and Ojo, O.L., 'Interstate Conflicts in West Africa: The Reference Group Theory Perspective', in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24, 3, Oct. 1991.

ante, and thus winning them over to accept her foreign policy as benign and mutually beneficial. But it also meant the various Nigerian governments went beyond economic issues, and into judging the legitimacy of governments.

Once it became clear that the formation of ECOWAS would not undermine old privileges, such as francophone links with France, or be a vehicle for Nigerian domination, anglophone/francophone interactions could converge and did so during the negotiations of Lome 1. Nigeria's dominant role in the negotiations leading to the Convention further indicated the advantages to the region of having an emerging power as an ally.

The above arguments however give an exaggerated impression about Nigeria's influence on intra-regional relations in West Africa. Some of the actions taken by Nigeria to allay suspicion of its intentions, such as the willingness to maintain the existing order were taken after ECOWAS was formed. Thus though Nigeria was important in revitalising the idea of an all encompassing regional organisation, it must be remembered that such an organisation would probably have been formed earlier if the federal government which had been one of the countries, together with Guinea, assigned with the task of preparing a priority study on possible areas of co-operation within the region had not been distracted by the civil war soon after the April 1968 meeting in Monrovia.

Secondly, external influences brought about by the 1972 oil price shocks may have influenced decisions to join ECOWAS since Nigeria is an oil producing country. The other countries within the region were probably working in their own interest just as Nigeria was.

Thus several reasons, including the ones listed above combined with the supposed economic advantages of regional integration to help in overcoming the cleavages that divided the region into coalitions along the various cleavages.

The above description does not imply that all interactions in independent West Africa were based on coalitions along linguistic differences. As was mentioned earlier, Guinea, Ghana and Mali formed a union which transcended these barriers. Nigeria, and Liberia joined the Cote d'Ivoire in thwarting Nkrumah's plans for an African Union Government. Moreover differences did occur between states belonging to the same linguistic zone as the break-up of the Mali Federation indicated. Just as the period from independence to 1963 (the formation of the OAU) saw turbulent rivalry between states and diplomatic coalitions crystallised in the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups(Monrovia group at the regional level) so did 1963 to 1970 see a settling of such high profile jockeying. For one thing Nkrumah had been overthrown by a group of conservative oriented military officers who eventually handed over power to Busia , who among other things was a friend of Houphouet-Boigny.

Like all other African countries, those in West Africa were preoccupied with the crisis in Zaire, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia's white minority and the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria. There was also a shift from the desire to consolidate the individual state's external sovereignty vis-à-vis other countries within the region to the desire to define the direction of the continental system that was emerging particularly after the formation of the OAU.⁵⁹ This shift may have been because of the

OAU's stance on colonially inherited boundaries. Once it had been settled that the boundaries were to remain as they had been at independence, pan -Africanism lost its impetus as a viable ideological challenge to the new states. Economic rather than political unification became the theme for West African co-operation, thus paving the way for such working together.

The solidarity that drove all third world countries, especially between 1970-75 to demand a New International Economic Order engulfed West African countries also. Despite the impact of the oil price shocks, the strong identification with OPEC countries in the third world was nearly universal because of the belief that such occurrences could be replicated in other sectors of international trade in primary goods. Thus though the impact on developing countries was relatively more severe, they nevertheless supported the OPEC price hikes. There was also the wide spread break in diplomatic relations with Israel and apartheid South Africa.⁶⁰ The effects of these occurrences were that they showed West African countries that joint action could help their cause in international relations. On the other hand the countries within the region had had their concerns shifted from regional politics. Their attention had been caught by the various occurrences in the international system to the neglect of regional goals. The new third world co-operative ethos had to be translated to the regional level. This was done by Nigeria in her promotion of ECOWAS.

ECOWAS came into being therefore because of a redefinition of the goals of co-operation from the mainly federalist meaning it had in the 1960s, to economic and technical co-operation within the context of pursuing a new international economic order.

⁵⁹ Chazan, et. al., op. cit.

⁶⁰ Chazan, et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa

It was also facilitated by the feeling among the francophone countries that they were more able to counterbalance Nigeria weight through collective action in CEAO. The impact of the oil price shock of 1973 also played a part to the extent that it created the need to ensure a source of supply, but more importantly indicated to the countries what collective action can achieve for commodity prices and bargaining in international political economy. However, it could be suggested that if Nigeria, for own her reasons, had not pursued integration as strongly as she did after the Biafran war, and been willing to foot the bill for promoting it, the Economic Community West Africa would probably have remained on the drawing board.

3.5 Regional politics after the formation of ECOWAS

Apart from the main political constellations crystallised around radical/revisionists and the pro-western conservative regimes in West Africa, especially in the early part of independence, relations within the region have been stable. The uneasy equilibrium has only been disturbed by occasional skirmishes such as those between Mali and Burkina Faso over land disputes in 1983. Borders have also been closed intermittently by various governments because of accusations of neighbours of harbouring political dissidents.⁶¹ Smuggling has also caused difficulties and soured relations on occasions. But overall external sovereignty has been largely respected within the region despite the linguistic, ideological and regime type cleavages that have divided the region.

⁶¹Border dispute exist between Mali and Burkina Faso, Ghana and Togo, and Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.

The period between 1975 to 1983 saw tensions develop over Western Sahara, and the crystallisation of old coalitions. The period also saw the near break-up of the OAU and the institutionalisation of a yearly summit between France and the francophone African countries. However, widespread drought and severe economic difficulties saw most of the governments concentrating on domestic issues except for the flare up between Ghana and Togo over accusations that the former was aiding Togolese dissidents, and France's intervention with her troops to support Togo.

During the same period Ghana and Nigeria closed their borders while the latter expelled citizens from other countries in 1983 and 1985. To the extent that most indigenous trade is done by road in the region, such closures affected the level of interaction between the citizens of the countries within the region. Thus apart from the political ill-feeling that such closures engendered, they also discouraged the formation of a regional community.

Generally, relations within the region were consensual when outside threats were perceived as the common enemy, especially in economic issues. In the main, however, relations were and are based on calculations of cost and benefits in relation established patron-client benefits between external forces and regional entities. France's role as protector and economic supporter is very salient in francophone calculations of costs to be incurred and the benefits to be derived from regional co-operation.

External affiliations have played a part in the evolution of West African intra-regional relations. The almost enforced association of francophone countries of the

region with France created difficulties in relations between countries such as Guinea and the rest of the former French colonies within the region. The desire to cling to the special relations between it and its former colonies drove it to adopt disastrous policies such as the support for Biafran secessionism. It also perpetuated the colonial division of the countries in the region into linguistic zones which are still very salient in intra-regional relations.

Intra-regional relations in West Africa have improved over the years. There has been a rapprochement between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea is back within the fold of the francophone group, changes in leaders have thawed acrimonious relationships while Nigeria's ability to influence regional relations has continued to wane with its dwindling resources. Global political changes have also affected politics within the region. France is more discerning than it used to be about its association with certain regimes within the region. Above all the collapse of the Soviet Union and the falsification of the socialist ideology has reduced the schism that existed between pro-western regimes and populist/socialist regimes. It is bringing about a change in political leadership within the individual countries with their own dynamics for economic and political development and consequently for regional relations. These may have repercussions for ECOWAS. The domestic politics of individual countries will determine to a large extent the level of commitment to regional goal. Thus, in the next section, we move to the domestic level of analysis in our bid to describe the environment of regional integration in West Africa.

3.6 Domestic Politics and Regional Integration

Several factors at the state level of analysis contribute to the success of regional integration schemes. It is therefore important that our examination of the factors constituting the environment of ECOWAS takes account of the domestic politics of the countries in order to see how they either facilitate or impede the functioning of the organisation.

Two related issues of political will and political commitment have been identified as essential for regional integration. These essential ingredients underpin the legitimacy and authority that are accorded to politically relevant actors who negotiate and enter into binding decisions on behalf of their countries. But the extent of the authority given to delegates and representatives derive from the legitimacy of incumbent governments. Hence, an *a priori* assumption can be made that there is a relationship between commitment to regional organisations, internal political structures and the authority of national representatives.

Apart from affecting decisions taken at the regional level, internal political structures also determine the extent to which the public and elite are able to participate in regional decision making at the state level. The extent to which national elite or the informed public participate or influence decisions taken at the state level, before they reach the regional level, therefore, depend on access to the decision making centre.

The theory of regional integration postulates that regional elite complementarity of values across the region contribute to the success of regional schemes. This is because

they indicate the expectations and determine the evaluation of gains and losses that will be attributed to participation in such schemes. Participation by a broad spectrum of relevant elite; political, academic and those from the business sector, are therefore seen as important to a better calculation of benefit and costs and hence to a more rational decision on whether to join a scheme, agree to certain decisions or indeed continue participating in the organisation. This is not to imply that all elite groups from all sectors of the society will have the same view about what the variables that should be used in the calculations of benefits and cost should be. However such participation will mean that a thorough examination of the various interests would have been considered before decisions are made.

The extent to which functionally differentiated and formally organised groups within member states are capable of articulating and influencing policy outcomes independent of control by authority groups is however dependent on the level of pluralism at the state level. Similarly, the flexibility that national representatives have when negotiating at the regional level very much depends on the autonomy that they have and which is in turn dependent on recognition by other participants that such autonomy is backed by appropriate authority at the national level.

Schmitter,⁶² for example, has produced a matrix which attempts to predict the effects of the interplay between voting modalities at the regional level and the autonomy enjoyed by national representatives, and the types of decision making this entails for regional integration. Where treaty provisions provide for unanimity rather than majority

⁶² Schmitter, P.C. 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration' in Regional Integration: Theory and Research Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971, p249.

voting, and the autonomy of national representatives is low, it is envisaged that negotiator will tend to adopt proposals of the least cooperative member's position. This is because they lack the authority to make concessions. On the other hand, where enforced unanimity is low i.e. majority voting is accepted, and national representatives' autonomy is high, negotiations can result in policies that upgrade the different positions of the actors and hence result in extending the scope and level and hence the authority of the organisation beyond the original area of competence.

Obviously, the more autonomy representatives enjoy and the less enforced unanimity there is, the more probable it will be for the process to advance and the more likely the possibilities there will be for organisational growth.

Political decision making has varied within West Africa with changes in regimes since independence. Various social groups, incipient classes, a variety of local community, professional associations, trade unions, women's organisations, and religious organisations⁶³ have with varying degrees of effectiveness affected decision making differently at different times within each country.

Apart from the varied impact of groups, on internal politics, political parties have also affected decision making differently in the member countries of ECOWAS.

At the general level however, because most West African governments at the attainment of independence embarked upon the consolidation of power and on institutional

⁶³ These social organisations are examined in more detail in the next chapter.

building, it resulted in an expanding of the bureaucracy, a downgrading and impeding of opposition parties and a strengthening and expansion of the coercive apparatus. This as pointed out earlier, resulted in party functionaries being promoted to head administrative and coercive structures especially since the political loyalties of people who were previously in such positions were not always clear.

The party therefore came to be used as an instrument of bureaucratic supervision. Moreover because the administration was central in decision making, the posting of party functionaries into administrative positions implied the encroachment of the party in decision making e.g. Ghana. In other instances such as in Cote d'Ivoire, the party was subordinated to government institutions and thus occupying a symbolic rather than a central role in decision making.

Leaders in West Africa have over the past three decades of independence been occupied with what rules and patterns of decision making to encourage in order to increase their power. They have also been concerned with how to gain compliance from their citizens. Individual political centres have been propelled by quite distinct principles and operated in different ways despite the common constraints they all faced at independence. Individual leaders have therefore put their particular imprint on the manner in which politics is conducted. At a general level however, experimentation, and trial and error have guided political activity and decision making since independence. The rules and institutions of governance, as Chazan et. al. put it: 'have been filtered through the ambitions, interests, limitations, and capabilities of the political elite'.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Chazan, et al, op.cit p148.

To a large extent, the differences in rules and practices that emerged and that underlie political practice could be found in three elements. These are; principles for decision making, the locus of decision making, and the manner of decision making. The first element includes political vision and ideology which together influenced the goals set, and also affected the plans for governing. The second element was the type of leadership style and the mode of operation adopted by the elite in the implementation of objectives. Finally, the establishment of rules of the political game dictated the manner of decision making.

All three elements have had implications for regional integration. As mentioned earlier, differing ideologies in the early days of independence determined intra-regional cleavages between countries. The often differing ideological underpinnings influenced the extent to which national goals were compatible. Even where they were compatible, the strategies adopted for achieving such goals were markedly different. This was exemplified by the impact of Ghana's African Socialism and Cote d'Ivoire's Pragmatism on the process paths adopted for economic development under Nkrumah and Houphouet - Boigny respectively.

Experimentation with African Socialism which dominated the political landscape of Africa as a whole in the early 1960s was more wholly embraced by Ghana, Guinea and Mali. The remaining countries within the region adopted a pragmatic position *vis-à-vis* the dominant ideologies even though this invariably implied association with the West.

Liberal democracy was also practised in Ghana and Nigeria at various stages of independence while Gambia and Senegal have been able to maintain a kind of democracy since independence. In all other instances autocratic civilian and military governments rule in systems of single or no-party situations. ECOWAS countries account for less than a third of OAU membership, but have accounted for more than half of the military take-overs on the continent. During the early years of the organisation, between 1976 and 1984, for example, there were 18 attempted coups in the region. Eight of these failed and ten succeeded.⁶⁵ Indeed, one of the reasons given for the overthrow of the Gowon regime of Nigeria by commentators on 29 July 1975 was that:

... many ... had become disenchanted with Gen. Gowon's style of government-particularly his preoccupation with grand schemes like ECOWAS when so much more needed to be done to improve the lot of the average Nigerian.⁶⁶

Thus in addition to the unpredictability that such rapid regime changes engendered, regional integration was itself a reason for such change. The more important implication of this reason for regime change is that it affected the core country of the regional organisation. Since Nigeria, under Gowon, was the main protagonist of ECOWAS, his departure was a blow to regionalism especially since those who took over power did not share his enthusiasm for it.

In addition to the predominantly authoritarian and autocratic forms of governments that emerged in West Africa, politics became highly personalised. Relations among leaders and coalitions among countries within the region were affected by the personal friendship

⁶⁵ For details see Cook, C., and Killingray, African Political Facts Since 1945, 2 nd (edition), Macmillan, London, 1991.

⁶⁶ Hills, P., in The Times(UK), July 30/7/75.

and animosities of leaders rather than by economic expediency. This obviously affected regional integration. As Agyeman-Duah and Olatunde observed, ECOWAS had come to constitute a reference group 'with rights and privileges for member states, particularly their leaders; conflict occurs when a regime is perceived by others to have violated group norms and values and is pressured to observe the sub-regional code of conduct ... as interdependence increases ... abrupt social changes such as overthrow of "respectable" heads of state or radical economic reforms become the basis of conflict because they upset the existing equilibrium'.⁶⁷ A shortcoming of the theory of regional integration, however, is that the process conditions envisaged for the achievement of goals do not take into account the impact that the personalisation of political power can have on such schemes.

Another form of political practice that has emerged in the sub region since the late 1970s is a form of radical populism. Starting from Ghana, it spread through emulation to Liberia and then Burkina Faso. The radicalism and rhetoric that usually accompanied this ideology created animosity in neighbouring countries who feared emulation of such trends within their own borders.

This has had the effect of reintroducing the ideological differences that prevailed in the early days of independence. The difference, however, was that it was more the fear of emulation rather than being averse to continental unity that made it create conflict between these leaders and the old guard. To the extent that it led to the exclusion of the leaders of Ghana, Liberia and Burkina Faso from meetings, it had a negative impact on co-operation efforts. Since regional integration depends for its initiation and progress on elite

⁶⁷ Agyeman-Duah, B., and Olatunde, O., ' Interstate Conflict in West Africa: The Reference Group Theory Perspective', in Comparative Political Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, Oct. 1991, pp. 303 - 304.

complimentarity of values, such a post-ECOWAS development buttressed the assertion made above about the effect the personalisation of power has on commitment to regional goals and subsequently on progress toward a more integrated region. Liberia, for example, threatened to withdraw from the organisation because of the embarrassment it caused Sgt. Doe.

Another *a priori* assumption that is made is how frequent military changes in both ideological leanings and leadership affect regional integration. Often heads of state, despite the autonomy they might enjoy in decision making fora, find that the uncertainty that they will be around long enough to implement policy decisions mitigates against their willingness to wholeheartedly guarantee the implementation of regional integration decisions, especially those that might have immediate short term costs for their country. As the Gowon case indicates this may indeed be a pragmatic attitude, to the extent that it may lead to a military take over being rationalised on that basis.⁶⁸ On the other hand the lack of such guarantees subtracts from the weight that regional decisions should normally have. Another effect of such political changes is that since new governments sometimes decide not to honour the commitments made by their predecessors, participating countries may feel that resources that they devote to regional schemes will be wasted. They are therefore unwilling to commit state resources to obligations that may only go to waste.

Hence it is not only decision making at the national level but the whole of the political structure of member states that is important to regional integration. Because there are no regularised forms of political transition, and military governments tend to be

⁶⁸ cf. p. 42.

erratic, there is usually no guarantee that incoming governments will honour commitments made by those they come to replace. Uncertainty and unpredictability are heightened at the regional level.

Such political unpredictability and uncertainty are particularly inimical in situations such as West Africa where the type of integration that is postulated, *a priori*, as being able to overcome dependence, lead to industrialisation and increase trade within the region needs to have a high level of government involvement. The inherently dirigiste presuppositions underlying third world integration implies that governments must actively participate in integration through actual investment into industry and other joint ventures. Unpredictability about whether investment embarked upon will be completed or where completed will be approved by successive governments are therefore bad for integration.

Another result of the fluidity of national politics in the region is that various forms of regimes emerged in post-independent West Africa. These include what have been categorised as administrative-hegemonial, party-mobilizing, pluralists, and party centralist regimes.⁶⁹ However, regardless of the regime type that emerged in the individual countries, in instances where civilian rule was maintained, the one party system was adopted, and political elite circulated in a way which reflected party loyalty, ethnic affiliation and/or expertise. Closeness to leaders was essential for individual advancement. Power is often concentrated in the hands of the leader either of the party where it was civilian or, in the hands of the military head of state.

⁶⁹ These have been detailed extensively in Chazan, et al., Politics in contemporary Africa, op. cit.

Whether military or civilian, access to the political centre is severely circumscribed. Participation in decision making is severely restricted so that the impact of the masses, and interest groups in policy decisions is minimal. Trade union activity is censored while the predominantly state owned news media has little effect as a source of pressure on governments. However, even though such regimes give a picture of exclusivity in decision making, they nevertheless involve a wide variety of actors in the process. To the extent that key interest groups such as ethnic, regional, classes and occupational groups are perceived as more likely to co-operate with government institutions, they are incorporated into the decision making process.⁷⁰ Nevertheless governments choose whom to involve in politics. This again means government participation is crucial to integration because of its preponderance in decision making.

It has been suggested that governments with high political capacity are more able to pursue and implement policies and economic readjustments programmes, such as the kind that integration entails, than governments with low "capacity". If strong governments could be equated to authoritarian ones then one can suggest that most West African governments since independence have been fairly politically capable and should have been able to undertake integrative policies. However, the examples of the Ghana-Guinea Union suggests that decisions taken by political leaders to integrate without the involvement of politically relevant elites and the politically aware section of the masses quickly become defunct with the removal of such leaders from power. Such organisations tend to be unsustainable. Besides, it is erroneous to think authoritarian and imposed governments are strong. As Killick, for example, pointed out, because such governments 'lack a publicly

⁷⁰ Chazan, et al., p 133.

accepted claim to a right to govern, [they tend to] be particularly nervous of public opinion'.⁷¹ Autocratic governments are, therefore, not necessarily strong governments. This explains, to a certain extent, why they tend to be hesitant about committing state resources to regional goals.

If strong governments alone are not the crucial and deciding factor in the perpetuation of integration schemes then to what extent does popular support affect the longevity of such schemes? Research has mainly been geared towards finding the causal link between popular support for integration schemes and the formation and maintenance of such schemes. Not much research has been done into finding the link between political structure and integration. But as has been suggested above, decisions taken at the highest level of the political structure without elite involvement or popular support tend to fail. The suggestion has been made that when the political elite and the masses support such schemes, such support is predicated, to a certain extent, on perceived advantages to be derived from the scheme. Such utilitarian support may therefore help to maintain the scheme after an incumbent is no longer in power because both groups see an advantage in maintaining the scheme. Thus where such unions are not entered into by leaders for symbolic measures but are done with the view of improving the lot of their countries, such schemes will be more likely to succeed.

Since there is no intrinsic commitment to the region as such, regional co-operation is pursued because of its potential advantages for national development. Political stability and economic welfare of a particular country can be severely affected by events in

⁷¹ Killick, T., Policy Economics, Heinemann, London, 1981, p. 20.

neighbouring countries, and the national governments, in addition to overt economic gains, might therefore enter into integration schemes to stabilise their environment. On the other hand where integration might disrupt the economic, political or social environment of the state, national governments are unlikely to support it even if the long term gains are likely to outweigh the negative short term effects. There is in this instance an interactive effect of national politics and regional integration is that regional goals will only be supported when on balance national interests are not harmed by such goals. Hence, taking into consideration the differential impact of regional integration schemes, as long as national leaders regard the individual state rather than the region as the political unit, economic integration which benefits some to the detriment of others will not be supported by those who stand to lose.

In the preceding pages we have detailed the political context both before and after the formation of ECOWAS. We also looked at how obstacles were overcome for the organisation to be formed. The question to ask is how the political dynamics of the organisation will affect its functioning and hence the achievement of the goals envisaged for it. The preceding analysis has concentrated on the West African political milieu, and how this affected the formation of a region wide integration scheme. In other words, now that the organisation has been formed, what will be its political dynamics? To be able to analyse the political dynamics of the organisation, we need an analytical framework which helps us to pinpoint the impact of politics on regional integration.

3.7 Political Variables in the Analysis of Regional Integration Among Developing Countries.

As we examined in the first two chapters the theories of integration that have been formulated to explain and sometimes to predict regional integration outcomes were formulated with a European context in mind. Even though a few studies were devoted to developing countries, generalisations derived from them serve more to elucidate the difficulties that such schemes face ⁷² than to explain the formation, maintenance, and process paths of integration among developing countries.

Despite some of the very important findings of the traditional theories their European centredness limit their use in four very important ways. First, because European countries are not dependent economies the theories omit the consequences of political and economic dependence on integration. Second, because Western European states were already industrialised on the onset of these schemes the threshold from which they started and which the theories take for granted make them limited in their application to developing countries. Third, the political structure - pluralism - which international relations theorists assume for the process conditions of regional integration are absent in most developing countries. Fourth, the highly politicised nature of economic development issues are not appropriately recognised by integration theory except cursorily and therefore make existing theory inadequate.

⁷² Nye, J., 'Comparing Common Markets'

To be able to explain the political context of West African integration adequately, we have to relate the objectives of the integration scheme to the political economy of the region.

Integration among developing countries is, as already noted, primarily a means to development and not a means to countervailing the strength of superpowers, mitigating the spread of communism, or of maintaining regional peace as was the case in Western Europe. These reasons together with those noted above go to underline the inadequacy of Eurocentric models as explanatory frameworks for analysing regional integration models among developing countries.⁷³

Because of the aims envisioned for them, such schemes are predicated on the economic advantages that can be derived from the dynamics of the process. What therefore happens is that its advocates concentrate on the perceived economic advantages that can be derived from them. To support their arguments economic justifications are made for the desirability of embarking on such schemes. However, the context within which economic integration schemes function is made up not of what is economically desirable but by what is politically feasible.

Like any international economic relation, economic integration has the potential of creating interdependencies that sometimes conflict with the sovereign prerogatives of the member states. It could also result in changes that may have consequences for regional

⁷³ The activities of ECOWAS in peacekeeping efforts in the Liberian civil war is not a primary aim of the organisation and is not included in the main treaty. The ECOWAS monitoring group(ECOMOG) is based on a defence protocol which was signed after the treaty itself came into force. Thus though regional security may have been an implicit desire of the founders of the organisation, it was not the basis for the formation of the organisation. See appendix 1.

resource allocation, and distribution of wealth. Furthermore, it has the potential of resulting in change that could result in social, economic and political dislocation of the member countries. Thus while seeking to maximise their advantage from such schemes, national governments will also attempt to limit the negative effects of such schemes through intervention at various levels. As Gilpin, for example noted,

behind seemingly technical issues of trade or international money lurk significant political issues that profoundly influence the power, independence, and well being of individual states. Thus, although trade may well be of mutual benefit, every state wants its own gains to benefit disproportionately to its advantage,.... to have its say in decision making....'⁷⁴

The agreements that form the basis of such organisations and the extent to which decisions are complied with and implemented are a reflection of what the individual countries consider as being the costs and benefits that such schemes have for them. The highlighting of the advantages without a careful consideration of the feasibility of such schemes tend to make the achievement of the desired goals difficult.

A careful examination of the political feasibility of a region economic integration scheme is therefore important when such programmes are being analysed for their effectiveness in achieving their goals.

As already detailed in the introduction of the thesis, the hypothesis guiding this study is that economic integration schemes such as the ECOWAS will not achieve their goal unless the political and social dynamics of the region are also taken into account when the possible economic gains that can be derived if they succeed are being considered.

⁷⁴ Gilpin, R., The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, p24.

If, as has been mentioned above, the Eurocentric framework is inadequate for analysing regional integration, then it will be appropriate to use one that meets our need better. The four limitations that we identified as making such theories inadequate means that for regional integration to lead to development in West Africa, it must be able to act as an engine for industrial development, and as a means of overcoming dependence. The process itself must be able to take place within a political milieu that is still developing, and in a situation where economic issues are salient to the extent that they can be categorised as high politics.

Analytical Framework

Since these issues have only been cursorily addressed in the available literature, the suggestion, made by Axline, that the politics of third world integration be analysed by using tools that reflect both the type of integration needed for development, and the negotiating modalities of such schemes is of particular relevance.⁷⁵

He suggested two models, originally, used by Mytelka and Haskel as frameworks for such an analysis. Mytelka's analytical framework sort to categorise integration schemes into three models. Each subsequent category incorporates the previous one and includes additional measures that make it more complex and extensive than the previous one.

The first type involves a laissez-faire free trade area which is based on neo-classical liberal economic theory. This type resembles the European model and emphasises trade

⁷⁵ Axline, W.A., *Caribbean Integration, The Politics of Regionalism*, Francis Pinter, London, 1979.

liberalisation. This kind of integration, it is suggested, leads to an unequal pattern of exchange, and polarisation among developing countries. The consequences are the creation of a disequilibrium situation which tends toward instability, and disintegration.

The second model includes all the features of Type 1 but incorporate measures that seek to correct the negative effects of laissez-faire trade liberalisation. Redistributive measures are adopted to take care of the unequal gains, while compensatory measures are used to combat polarisation. This model requires a high level of governmental commitment in regional integration by member countries and implies a dirigiste approach.

The two elements of commitment and dirigisme are needed if the setting up of mechanisms such as solidarity funds, fiscal compensation schemes, a regional development bank and regional allocation of industries to facilitate the redistribution and compensatory measures are to be possible.

The third model (Type III) involves the free trade area of Type I, the compensatory and redistributive mechanisms of Type II and measures to combat and eventually overcome dependence.

If it is to be effective, regional integration has, in addition to the relatively short term goals of trade liberalisation, to incorporate such long term developmental goals into its framework in order for it to be congruous with national aspirations. Type III integration which incorporates trade liberalisation, redistributive and compensatory

measures and regional policies, as well as measure to combat dependency as described above, is the ideal form that regional integration among developing countries should take.

However, even though it provides the most benefits, Type III schemes are the most difficult to achieve. This is because of the more complex institutions that are required, the wider scope of decision making, and the greater commitment to regional co-operation that it entails than the first two types. Such requirement must be met in the context "where all questions of economic development are in the realm of 'high politics' and the where particularism is an extremely strong force, and where the definition of dependence is sometimes problematic.

Dependence in this context is referring to its historical, functional and structural manifestations. As with most developing countries, the production of primary goods for export in West African countries is not a result of free market forces allocating comparative advantages to various regions of the world, but is a result of conscious political decisions taken in the colonial era to grow these products for Western domestic and industrial consumption. One result of this, discussed quite extensively in chapter one, is that West African economies are dominated by the production of single or a narrow range of crops. The consequence of this is that they experience sometimes quite severe fluctuations in their export earnings. This historical antecedent has consequences for dependence to the extent that the markets of these countries have been and remain the former colonial masters.

Another manifestation of this historical shaping of the economies of these countries is that a large part of West Africans are peripheral to the exchange economy. This is because the majority of the citizens live in rural areas either not conducive to the production of the main export crop or were not introduced to its cultivation. Their main occupation is subsistence farming with minimal exchange being undertaken. Both the methods of cultivation, the size of farms, and land allocation methods make the quantity of goods produced small. What is therefore sold of the total harvest is able to fetch a very meagre income for the farmers. Indeed what is sold is determined by the immediate needs of the household, such as the need to buy basic essential such as fuel, clothing, pay school fees and debts. Small quantities of crops and household fowls are carried to the weekly market for sale to meet such immediate needs. Little money is left for savings or investment or even as funds for emergency since the crops actually act as proxy banks. The result of this is that countries in the region are typically structure with a small urban and commercialised cash crops producing sector on the one hand coexisting with a rural, predominantly subsistent sector.⁷⁶

The resulting dualistic⁷⁷ nature of the economies has consequences for nation building because resources that originate mainly from the commercialised cash crops producing areas have to be redistributed to benefit the whole country. This is because people from such cash crops producing areas tend to resent the siphoning of resources to other part of the country.⁷⁸ People from the producing areas have often felt that they

⁷⁶ This categorisation like any is to a certain extent restrictive, especially to the extent that it does not, for example indicate the changes that are taking place. However, it does, describe the general structure of the economic structure of these countries.

⁷⁷ Dualism is not being used in the Marxist sense of exploitation of a periphery by a centre but rather is a description of two coexisting structural forms.

⁷⁸

subsidise governments disproportionately and tend by their utterances and behaviour to antagonise others who do not come from that region. To the extent that ethnic divisions within the state are coterminous with such productive zones they tend at various times and for various reasons to aggravate ethnic cleavages.⁷⁹

The accepted comparative advantages of today's West African countries which are really a colonial creation, to the extent that they are not natural resources but agricultural products, and the structural legacies of such colonially contrived comparative advantage have continuing consequences for politics and development. If development is taken in a holistic sense to include not just economic but political and social progress of the general population, then regional integration ought to include measures that seek to correct the structural anomaly described above. To ignore such issues will be to ignore a potential source of political instability and thus the 'noise' that interferes with responsiveness to regional objectives since governments tend to be distracted from long term goals which regional integration embodies to concentrate on nation building thus undermining regionalism and transfer of sovereignty.

Another aspect of dependency is the excessive reliance on foreign capital flows for development purposes and balance of payment adjustment. As a result of this West African countries of this now spend a large proportion of the foreign exchange earnings in repayment of loans. The repercussions have included not being able to properly finance development projects with recurring borrowings with debilitating consequences. Apart from the effect such financial dependence on development programming, its secondary

effects on national pride, outside interference in economic sovereignty have detrimental effects and consequences. The large proportions of earnings spent on repayment of loans means that little is available for spending on regional integration with its long term yields.

The issues that will form the basis of negotiation in a Type III scheme are the agreement on a regime for direct foreign investment, increasing the ratio of regional to external trade, shifting exports toward the manufacturing sector, promoting industrialisation, and increasing the bargaining power of the region.

As a guide to what to expect from such negotiations, Axline adopts Haskel's analytical tool which categorises integration policies into those that are expansive and those that are distributive. Expansive policies are those which are based on trade liberalisation and benefit the relatively more developed countries within the region. The more developed countries (MDCs) are therefore likely to support such policies. The less developed countries within the region (LDCs) on the other hand, more likely to support distributive measures that seek to share out the benefits derived from trade liberalisation since they are more likely to lose from regional trade liberalisation.

The ECOWAS treaty categorises the countries within the region into three groups instead of two and thus deviates slightly from Haskel's model. Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, constitute the most developed countries. The second group is made up of Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, and Togo. The least developed group is made up of Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The last two groups can be collapsed, however, for analytical purposes.

If the type of integration envisaged by ECOWAS members is similar to Type III and negotiation positions resemble the Haskel model, the questions that arise are whether the institutional framework of the community is adequate to cope with the extensive and comprehensive policies that that type of integration scheme implies? Secondly, if the LDCs are unlikely to support expansive regional policies without adequate distributive policies, how are the essentially medium to long term benefits that are expected to accrue to the MDCs reconciled with the need for short term distributional policies demanded by the LDCs as a condition for their participation? Do the MDCs find it worth their while to participate in a scheme that places immediate financial burdens on them and in which the magnitude of the benefits are uncertain? How, on the other hand do the LDCs reconcile the inability of the community to provide adequate redistributive and compensatory measures with the possibility of the relative disadvantages that they might face.

The fact that the community has survived 18 years implies that the members have been able to find common grounds for working together. National goals do converge to the extent that development is a common aspiration for all of them.

To Axline, the negotiations that lead to the adoption of the mechanisms and measures of a scheme constitute the politics of regional integration. In addition to the negotiation modalities actors at the domestic, sub-national, and the systemic levels have been identified by the framework as important. Since we have already described the domestic and international environment of ECOWAS, we will look at the institutional framework of the organisation. This will enable us to assess, in chapter six, the effect the structure of the organisation has had on the integration process.

3.8 Institutional Structure of ECOWAS

As Cox and Jacobson pointed out 'decision making in international organisations occurs within a context comprising the functions, the institutional frameworks and basic procedures and the historical developments of the agency'.⁸⁰ While providing the arena for interaction by the member states, the organisation is itself a reflection of the compromises that had to be made and the expectations that the members have for it. Whether such expectations are going to be met will depend on the amount of authority that is conferred on it or the constraints that are put on it. These are usually reflected in the treaty establishing the organisation. As Feld and Jordan pointed out the nature and shape of the institutional framework 'must obviously relate to the task performance and functions an IGO is expected to carry out, but political desiderata may impose on purely rational considerations to set up an effective management model'.⁸¹ Thus an attempt to analyse the achievements of ECOWAS must necessarily include a description of the framework within which decisions have been and are taken as an essential first step toward an assessment of the impact of regional integration on the economies of the member countries.

If, as we have mentioned above, the type of integration scheme that will help in development requires very comprehensive decision making within an extensive institutional framework, then whether ECOWAS is able to act as an engine for growth will depend to a certain extent on the adequacy of the institutional framework and the level of authority at its disposal.

⁸⁰ Cox, W.R., and Jacobson, H.K., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-making in International Organisations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1974, p5.

⁸¹ Feld, J.W., and Jordan, R.S., International Organisations: A Comparative Approach, Praeger, New York, 1983, p85.

The ECOWAS treaty, as we have shown above, envisions the achievements of a Type III integration scheme. This means that the organisation must be able to facilitate trade among the member countries, must have the capacity to implement compensatory and distributive measures, and be able to restructure the economies of the member countries to overcome external dependency and corrects the legacies of colonial patterns of production within the member countries. The question that we are seeking to answer, which we asked earlier, in this context, therefore, is whether the institutional framework of ECOWAS is adequate for the achievement of the goals of its members.

ECOWAS is made up of five main institutions. These are (1) the Authority of Heads of State, (2) the Council of Ministers, (3) the Executive Secretariat, (4) the Tribunal of the Community, and (5) the Technical and Specialised Commissions.

The Authority of Heads of state is the 'principal governing institution' of the Community and is responsible for the performance of the executive functions of the Community. It has a rotating Chairman who is selected annually from among its members. Its directions and decisions are binding on all other institutions of the Community but the treaty does not state whether such power extend to members countries.

The Council of Ministers is the next in hierarchy. It consists of two representatives of each member state. Its responsibilities include reviewing the functioning and development of the community in accordance with the provisions of the treaty; recommending policies that will ensure the efficient and harmonious functioning and

development of the community; giving direction to all subordinate institutions of the community; and exercising other powers assigned to it by the treaty.⁸² Such powers include recommending the removal of the Executive Secretary and the External Auditor,⁸³ determining the terms and conditions of appointment of the employees of the community⁸⁴ and of the External Auditor as well as his/her powers.⁸⁵

Unlike the once a year meeting of the Authority, the Council meets twice a year with one of them immediately preceding the annual meeting of the Authority. Its decisions are binding on subordinate institutions unless otherwise determined by the Authority. Decisions are taken by unanimous vote.⁸⁶ Where there is an objection by any member to a proposal the issue is referred to the Authority. Like the Authority it has a rotating Chairmanships.

The ECOWAS like most international organisations has an Executive Secretariat which is headed by an Executive Secretary who is assisted by two Deputies. Members of the Secretariat owe their loyalty to the Community entirely. A Financial Controller also forms part of the Secretariat together with other officials deemed necessary and appointed by the Council. The Executive Secretary is responsible for the day to day administration of the community and its institutions. He or she is expected to service and assist the institutions in the performance of the duties, keep the functioning of the community under continuous examination and making reports of such observation to the council of

⁸² Article 6 of the ECOWAS Treaty

⁸³ Article 8, paragraph 3.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, paragraph 6.

⁸⁵ article 10 para. 2.

⁸⁶ Article 6, par. 6.

Ministers, as well as submitting reports of activities to all sessions of the Council. The Executive Secretary also has initiatory powers conferred on him by the Treaty.⁸⁷

In addition to the above institutions the original Treaty made provision for four Technical and Specialised Commissions which shared responsibility for reporting and making recommendations to the Council through the Executive Secretary on matters in their field of competence. These included: the Trade, Custom, Immigration, Monetary and Payment Commission; the industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission; the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission; and the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission.⁸⁸

The Treaty has since its inception been amended to include a Defence Council as one of the principal institutions of ECOWAS and a Defence Commission added as one of the specialised commissions.⁸⁹

Finally, the Community has a Tribunal which ensures "the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty". It is also responsible for the settlement of disputes such as may be referred to it.

The authority structure of the Community is such that the Treaty invests ultimate power in the Authority of Heads of States. It, alone, is responsible for determining the procedures of the dissemination of its decisions and directions, those of the Council of

⁸⁷ Article 8, par. 10 a to d.

⁸⁸ Article 9 of ECOWAS Treaty.

⁸⁹ ECOWAS Document A/SP2/5/81, 'Additional Protocol Amending Article 4 of the Treaty of the Economic community of West African States Relating to the Institution of the Community', in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 3 (June 1981), pp 7-8.

Ministers, "and for the implementation of such decisions and directives". This means that disagreements within the Authority will paralyse the Community. Furthermore, it means that, apart from differences that may arise over policy, personality clashes and differences in perceptions might result in the organisation's inability to reach agreement. To the extent that the Authority cannot make binding decisions, this can have a negative effect on the functioning of the Community. These may therefore have the effect of reducing the effectiveness of the Community the oscillations of personal idiosyncrasies of participating individuals.

As was mentioned above the treaty of the Community incorporates trade liberalisation, compensatory and distributive measures, and policies to overcome dependency. As we noted from the analytical frameworks, this means an extensive and powerful institutional framework is required. That simply means an institution with supranational powers, and the capability to gather information and resources to disseminate it, expertise to formulate pertinent policies and to see that they are implemented, ability to monitor progress adequately, ability to cultivate and influence public opinion, and rendering judgement regarding obscure or ambiguous, factual or legal situations.⁹⁰ Secondly, it also means a high level of commitment to regional goals and a dirigiste approach to regional development planning. As has also been stated above, unanimity rules are used in the Council of Ministers meetings and presumably by the authority also since nothing is said about voting procedures for the Authority. In any case, since decisions of the Authority are not binding on member states, unanimity will be needed.

⁹⁰Feld, J.W. and Jordan, R.S., International Organizations: A Comparative Approach Praeger Special Studies, New York, 1983.

The two elements of dirigisme and unanimity which are found in the Treaty, and the need for supranationalism for the goals of the Treaty to be achieved are very difficult to combine in a system of sovereign states with their national interests.

3.9 Conclusion

In this chapter we have described the general political milieu of ECOWAS. We have also indicated that ECOWAS integration requires an extensive institutional structure. The political milieu is made up of the domestic politics of the various countries, their foreign policy orientations, the impact of systemic factors, competing regional organisations and negotiation modalities that, *a priori*, are expected to be adopted by the member states depending on how they expect to be affected by policies. Based on the experience of other, now defunct, West African regional organisations, such as UDAO, UDEAO,⁹¹ and the East African Community,⁹² we can confidently assume that negotiation positions will be similar to the Haskel model, and the less developed countries will stress compensatory and redistributive measures while, the more developed will, generally, be in favour of expansive measures.

The internal politics of the states within the region are changing. Ghana, Senegal, Togo, and Benin, to mention a few, have had multi-party elections. They are also pursuing

⁹¹ See p. 7 above.

⁹² A constant complaint by Tanzania and Uganda about the organisation was that Kenya gained disproportionately to them.

IMF imposed structural adjustment programmes with varying degrees of vigour. Change in political leadership in France has reduce her willingness to support wasteful, corrupt and autocratic regimes. At the same time the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the discrediting of socialism has reduced the salience of ideological divisions within the region.

Since ECOWAS has not yet become a fully fledged free trade area, it is difficult to analyse the impact of negotiating modalities. Nevertheless, this framework together with Lindberg's paradigm for measuring regional collective decision making, will enable us to measure the extent of collective decision making that has been attained in the region and be able to assign reasons for the level achieved so far in chapters five and six respectively.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

4.1 Introduction

The link between society and regional integration is not as obvious as that between it and economics or politics. This is because the various aspects of the social system which impinge on the process are indirect, and only find expression through their influence on political stability and economic structure of the member states. Hence state and society interaction to provide the crucible within which social forces impact with the more obvious political and economic influences to affect the speed and extent of regional integration.

In order to examine the way in which state institutions interact with society, we will need to delineate the relevant aspects of the social system, and trace how they affect institutions and policy outcomes. Having elucidated what the impacts usually are, we will then be in a position to examine how they influence regional integration. Since regional integration is an interface between domestic and foreign policies, the question that will guide the enquiry into the impact of society on regional integration is how the social structure of the individual countries affect their willingness to co-operate at the regional level, and to implement regionally derived policies.

As Naomi Chazan has stated, political life in Africa is conducted through a complex web of social forces, institutional settings, and interpersonal relationships¹. Social

¹ Chazan, N., et al, Contemporary Politics in Africa, p 71.

groups are identified as furnishing the building blocks of political action and interchange. It is therefore necessary that those aspects of society that have implication for foreign policy decision making are examined in order to explore their possible impact on regional integration.

Social groups in general can be categorised to include those based on ethnic, regional, religious, generational, class and race affiliations. Though these broad categories hide the actual subcategories within which social interaction actually occur on a day to day basis in West African societies, we will concentrate our analysis on them. The reason for this is that they are more relevant to our purpose.

The ethnic group, for example, is a large and unwieldy sort of social organisation. Within it are a motley collection of more intimate territorial, religious, and political affiliations. However, the nearer one moves toward the more intimate level of social interaction the less effective they are in terms of their impact on policy at the state level. Hence a village elders meeting or even a traditional court is less likely to influence political decisions than the possibility of ethnic unrest.²

The vertical interaction between society and the state is facilitated by the structure and various mechanisms of political intercourse that were described in the previous chapter. As was noted, the patron-client relationship in African politics provides the link between politics at the state level and the lower levels of society through intermediaries

² As Olzak and Nagel noted, 'Competitive theories suggest that economic and political modernisation encourages collective action based on ethnic identity because these two processes favour organisation on the basis of large-scale identities rather than on the basis of kinship, village, tribal or some other small-scale identity.' Olzak, S., and Nagel, J., Competitive Ethnic Relations, Academic Press, London, 1986.

who sometimes represent the interest of ethnic groups. These intermediaries take various forms in different countries but are the main avenue for formal articulation of ethnic support or disenchantment.

Since intra-group interaction does not impact quite as strongly on public policy as inter-group interaction, and group and public interchange, the analysis will hence forth be concentrated on the last two forms of social interaction, their effects on national policy, and how these translate into foreign policy.

The questions which have been stated on the previous page as guiding the impact of society on regional integration could be restated as follows; first, to what extent do public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set of national decision-makers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase (or diminish) regional integration? Secondly, does the public have any influence on foreign policy?

Integration theory answers the second question in the affirmative. As Inglehart³ pointed out, the public can have an influence on regional integration to the extent that the polity permits free elections, referenda, and demonstrations in the streets. However, the amount of influence that the public can exert and under what conditions is not clear. It can however be assumed that such influence will be more where governments are dependent on the public for their continuing existence in office. In situations of military rule and one-party states(which predominate in West Africa) government sensitivity will probably

³ Inglehart, R., 'Public Opinion and Regional Integration' in Lindberg and Scheingold (ed.) Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.

be more heightened by the fear of public dissent culminating in counter-coups or military overthrow respectively.

So far we have given the impression that the impact by society on foreign policy and hence regional integration is one way. However, just as public opinion can exert some degree of pressure on national decision-makers it seems equally evident that opinion leaders can often influence public opinion.⁴ Thus it is important that in assessing the influence of the public on regional integration, that we are conscious of the fact that public opinion itself is shaped by government through the mass media, television, speeches, and various propaganda instruments.

The relationship between public preferences and political decision-makers should therefore be viewed in terms of a feedback model in which both sets of people influence each other. The relative impact of society and the state on each other, we propose, will be dependent not only on the extent to which free elections, referenda, and demonstrations are allowed as Inglehart suggested, but also on the relative resources available to the two groups i.e., the public and society. Thus ownership of the media, or other means of propaganda will determine whose arguments are aired.

Thus relative importance of societal input depends on; first, the structure of the decision-making institutions, that is, whether it is pluralistic or monolithic, the norms and perceptions of elite decision-makers, whether decision-making is open or closed, and if there is institutionalised competition between alternative groups. It will also depend on the

⁴ *ibid.*

distribution of political skills, that is, whether the public is uninformed or informed about the issue, and whether the group attempting to exert the influence is politically relevant or irrelevant. Finally, the relative importance depends on the degree to which the given decision relates to deep-seated values among the public or evokes only relatively superficial feelings.⁵

To answer the question about the extent to which public preferences influence decision-makers we will have to attempt to find answers empirically. To do so we will describe the social system of West African countries generally in order to see the extent to which they impact on decision-making itself. Since we have already described the political make-up of the member states of ECOWAS, this chapter will concentrate on a more detailed description of those social aspects that were mentioned cursorily as affecting politics in the previous chapter. A repetition of certain aspects of politics is therefore inevitable. Of particular importance to this chapter will be the issue of ethnicity, professional associations, trade unions and the mass media. These categories are the ones that reflect most effectively the relative impact of opinion on domestic and foreign policy.

4.2 Ethnicity: Definition, Concepts and Characteristics in West Africa

The diverse ethnic composition of West African states is seen as having multiple ramifications for national unity, political stability, leadership styles, and regimes in the region. In all instances where an explanation of the political and economic malaise of Africa is attempted, ethnicity usually features as an important variable whose impact is

⁵ *ibid.*

seen, largely, as negative. As the most prominent feature in the literature about the social structure and organisation of West African states it is appropriate that we, also, examine the phenomenon to ascertain the validity of the assertions made about it and the effects attributed to it. It is our contention that though ethnicity has and continues to be important in the economic, social and political organisation of the state in West Africa, the available literature has not taken changing conditions into consideration, and culture, of which ethnicity is an aspect has been assumed to be static since independence. It is also assumed that ethnicity is necessarily a bad thing. This negative connotation pervades the analysis of its impact on the states. After surveying the literature, we will attempt to indicate from qualitative fieldwork we conducted in Ghana that ethnic affiliations have mellowed since independence and also argue that contrary to popular belief, ethnicity was an important organisational principle prior to colonialism and in the early days of state formation in West Africa. This is because it provided an easily recognisable structure for governments to use in their interaction with their societies.

Ethnicity as a concept is laden with difficulties. Rudolf and Thompson, for example, have identified three problems as posing difficulty in defining it.⁶ The first is how to delineate it from other distinctions based upon language, racial characteristics, culture, historical traditions, nationality, or various combinations of these factors. Second, is the difficulty of comparing various types of ethnicity to one another. This is because the definition of ethnicity suggests an interrelationship between 'such types as indigenous populations, immigrant groups, religious minorities, linguistic minorities, and nationalities'. There is thus a lack in distinction between the political and sociological aspects of the

⁶Thompson, R.J., and Rudolf Jr, J.R., 'Ethnic Politics and Public Policy' in Western Societies: A Framework for Conceptual Analysis in Ethnicity, Politics and Development, Thompson, D.L, and Renan, D., (ed.) Lynne Rienner, 1986.

concept, and also in how they relate and interact with each other. Finally, there is imprecision in the relationship between ethnicity and other forms of identification and conflict. 'Just as different types of ethnic conflict may overlap..., so do ethnic and social class conflict'.⁷ To understand ethnicity, therefore, it is important that the interrelationship between it and other forms of social organisations is made clear.

This problem with definition, it has been suggested, is because of the multidisciplinary approach in the study of the concept. Various perspectives, ranging from those of anthropologists to political scientists, sociologists and historians, to mention a few, have all been cited in the literature thus providing a kaleidoscope of insights into the concept.

We have chosen two examples of the perspectives for our analysis. The first is by Thompson and Rudolph who see ethnicity as 'a type of cultural segmentation that may also intersect class and territorial segmentation'.⁸ This view covers the nebulous nature of the phenomenon. These authors also list the bases of ethnic distinction as including the possession of a symbolically different geographical origin. This could be historical or recent, and is of prime importance because it provides the basis of differentiation. Other elements in their elaboration of the perspective include; historical traditions, social customs, languages, physical appearance and religion. However, the essential element in ethnic distinctiveness is that it is ascriptive and describes an overlap between cultural, social-class and territorial segmentation of society.

⁷ *ibid.* p28.

⁸ *ibid.* p39.

The second perspective sees ethnicity as 'organised activities by persons ... who jointly seek to maximise their corporate political, economic and social interests'.⁹ What this suggests is the deliberate exploitation of ascriptive affiliations, and introduces a dynamism and utilitarianism to the concept that the previous perspective does not highlight. Apart from the ascriptive criterion which forms the basis of the organisation of ethnic groups this perspective also makes little distinction between the activities and goals of ethnic groups and the activities of other interest groups such as trade unions.

Both the dynamic and static aspects of ethnicity that have been highlighted by the definitions cited above will be examined later in the chapter, but the importance of ethnicity to regional economic integration can be traced to its effect on internal and intra-regional political interaction. First, the multiethnic composition of individual states (described in chapter 3) has meant a concentration by national governments on nation-building and the forging of state unity. Regional integration which, according to integration theory, involves the transfer of a certain amount of sovereignty is therefore seen as being incompatible with the aim of nation-building because of its alleged ability to further undermine the already precarious cohesion within the countries.¹⁰ It has also been suggested that the straddling of ethnic groups across borders of neighbouring countries creates situations of possible irredentism and secessionism, and hence that governments are unwilling to further subvert their territorial integrity by reducing the salience of boundaries as a means of state demarcation. Added to these, because the straddling of

⁹ Chazan et. al., *Contemporary African Politics* p2.

¹⁰ Etzioni for example noted that 'the integration process... involves at the least some reduction of the integration of the member-units as they become increasingly incorporated into the system.' See Etzioni, A., *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 196(?), p16.

See also Gordon, L., 'Economic Regionalism Reconsidered', in *World Politics*, vol. 13(1961), pp 235-236.

ethnic groups make international boundaries permeable, such occurrences are seen as having implications for national security.

The first proposition that ethnic heterogeneity is destabilising for the internal structure of countries is based, implicitly, on the idea of the ethnic group being an interest group which seeks to promote the collective goal of the group at the expense of other groups within the country. This corresponds to the Chazan et. al. definition cited above, and which sees inter-ethnic interaction mainly as conflictual.

If the ethnic group is indeed a consciously organised group which seeks to further the interest of its members, then the framework within which such groups function, the rules governing state/society interaction, and the characteristics of the public domain in terms of the scarcity or the availability of distributable resources could be posited as important elements in ethnic organisation, compromise and conflict. The framework which makes up the level of ethnic segmentation and determines the intensity of the interaction between the various groups and between them and the state is provided by the relative size of ethnic groups within the country, the number of such groups, their settlement patterns within society, and the extent of overlapping or cross-cutting. Additionally, the way in which the state is organised, in terms of leadership style, ideology, and institutional structure, will affect the salience of ethnic conflict in determining access to distributable resources. The intensity of ethnic co-operation and conflict and its salience in resource distribution, is affected also by broader societal factors such as, socio-economic change, political organisation, or government policies.¹¹

¹¹ Thompson and Rudolf op.cit. p32.

Thus the impact of ethnic affiliation on political stability has to be looked at multidimensionally, and from a dynamic perspective, as we pointed out at the beginning of the chapter.

The discussion so far has portrayed the ethnic group as unified and cohesive. However some characteristics listed by Chazan et al., do not confirm such an impression. These include its fluidity and lack of homogeneity and its lack of cohesiveness. These are in addition to its espousal of the common (indivisible) interest of its members.¹² The lack of cohesiveness and the espousal of common interests may sound contradictory and paradoxical. Such discrepancy is because government resource allocation is designed, where it is meant to curb actual or potential conflict, to appeal to the group as a whole and not to individuals since individuals are in themselves are not as threatening to national unity as the group is.

The fluidity of the ethnic group, it has been suggested, derives from its recent roots. In the words of Chazan et al 'it is less accurate to characterise the ethnic group on the African continent as having a fixed , centuries old, primordial consciousness'. They place the root of ethnic self-definition at the period between late colonial and post colonial period, and attribute the vying and competition for power, status, economic resources and social services as the main factors leading to ethnic identification.

¹² Chazan et al. op.cit. p102.

Though we may agree with the view that the ethnic group is characteristically fluid, the idea that ethnicity is of recent origin, in our opinion, cannot be made so categorically.¹³ The view that ethnicity is new to Africa is mainly derived from the utilitarian definition of the ethnic group and perhaps on the assumption that it is linked with parliamentary democracy. Even though it removes the sometimes pejorative connotations that the concept has and the implicit portrayal of ethnic conflict as an innate quality, inborn in the African, it will not be entirely correct to characterise ethnicity in Africa as a colonial experience. Such an assertion would seem to imply that intra-group interaction in pre-colonial Africa was always consensual, a view that though desirable is unlikely in any human society. It also assumes that pre-colonial collective identification was very narrow and hence rudimentary.

If ethnicity is viewed as an organised collectivity for achieving group goals then ethnicity among the Anlo Ewes of Ghana, for example, could be traced to long before the advent of the Europeans. According to Ewe history it was the suppression of ethnic rights that precipitated their exodus from Notsie in today's Benin under King Agorkorli to their present-day habitation in Ghana.

Similarly, ethnic groups functioned actively in the Ashanti kingdom long before the advent of Europeans. Collective group action can therefore not be said to have started with late European rule or with the post independence era. Such an assertion would seem to ignore traditional political forms and actions before colonialism. In the light of the

¹³ Since the definition of ethnicity includes identifying characteristics such as language, religion, and a shared culture to mention a few, the underlying delineating features that distinguish one ethnic group from another can indeed be said to include some primordial elements. In any case though ethnic identification may be fluid, the extent of the fluidity is narrowed by the ascriptive qualities.

above, it can be hypothesized that ethnic groups function in unified political systems. Hence that colonialism by incorporating different and independent groups under one umbrella saw a resurgence of ethnic pressure in the days before independence as the various groups fought for dominance, equality or at least for assurances from their colonial master. Thus colonialism, by centralising authority and bringing previously disparate groups together, encouraged group bargaining which is normal in any political transformation process. The recent fighting in Bosnia, the break-up of Czechoslovakia and factional and communal conflict in many parts of the former Soviet Union is similar to what happened in Africa on the eve of independence. The perception of politics as a zero-sum game perhaps aggravated ethnic bargaining and resulted in a situation that created excessive tension as groups vied for dominance.

The second characteristic of ethnic groups is their heterogeneity and the lack of cohesion. This means that individuals identify themselves with a segment of the group in certain instances and with the whole group on other occasions. In Ghana, for example, the individual may identify himself with the Akan as opposed to the Ewe at the state level. However, at the cultural, linguistic and territorial levels he may identify himself as an Ashanti as opposed to a Fanti even though both groups fall under the broader Akan ethnic group. The ethnic group in West Africa in certain instances is therefore a broad category. Even though Ewes can be classified as an ethnic group, differences exist in dialects, religion, cultural observances, etc.. Variables are therefore capable of being refined even further to differentiate between co-residence in a region, economic activity and other types.¹⁴

¹⁴ Though such subtleties exist within ethnic groups, conflicts such as the Biafran secession tend to follow the broader fault lines rather than the more finely defined identifications. Thus intra-ethnic heterogeneity tends to be less obvious and subordinated to the larger interest of the group. This may indeed

The heterogeneity of the ethnic group also means that individuals belonging to different ethnic groups are able to identify with each other in other groups formations such as social class, religious groups and trade unions all of which cut across ethnic boundaries. Thus an analysis of the role of groups in the politics of West African countries must be done with their internal structure in mind.

Despite the internal divisions and the changing form ethnic groups adopt under different circumstances, they have and still continue to be highly significant politically. What intra-ethnic schisms indicate is the complicated politics of the region. An example of such internal disunity was, for example portrayed by the rivalry between Chief Lakode Akintola, an Oyo Yoruba and Chief Obafemi Awolowo an Ijebu Yoruba in the early days of Nigerian independence.

Another aspect of the internal diversity is its impact on intergroup exchange. Instead of a two way bargaining process between ethnic groups and central government, there is in most instances a two level interactive process. The first takes place within the ethnic group itself at the required level and its centre, and the second part being that between the ethnic bloc intermediaries and national leaders at the top.

The third and final characteristics of the ethnic group that we need to look at is that it promotes the communal interest as opposed to the individual interests of its members. Through them demands by an ethnic group to secure railway facilities or roads

be inevitable since those with whom the ethnic group is in conflict tend to regard the larger group as a unit rather than as a collection of identifiable units. The ethnic group is to that extent not as voluntary as may be indicated above.

are made. Such demands are indivisible. However, though ethnic intermediaries represent collective demands at the governmental level it is not uncommon to find government ministers appropriating resources for their area of origin (hometown) sometimes to the exclusion of other segments of the same ethnic group. This is because the intermediary tends to get the most political support from his immediate hometown.

As was mentioned earlier, ethnic demands are usually articulated by the elite and are usually urban led. The demands normally take the form of a reciprocal exchange between central authority and the intermediaries who represent ethno-regional interest according to what they perceive those interests to be. Ethnic cleavages are regarded by most leaders who oppose them as divisive. In a lot of instances national leaders have voiced their opposition to such arrangements. Because of the negative effects attributed to it national leaders, in the quest to foster national unity, have used several devices to reduce its salience in national politics. This they did by attempting to weaken ethnic linkages, and by creating common national ties, remembrances and values. Thus public policies abolishing chieftaincy in Guinea, and ethnically based political parties in Ghana were all attempts to overcome divisions and to keep such cleavages in check. So were the banning of movements in Nigeria of ethnic groups that were aimed for the creation of ethnically homogeneous states. The formation of single-party states all across the region were attempts to overcome what, among other things, were perceived to be the detrimental effects of ethnic fragmentation.

Despite the public pronouncements against ethnicity, leaders usually took and still take proportionality principles into account when dispensing political appointments and in

fiscal allocations. Thus though central-state elite sometimes view ethnoregional negotiations as burdensome (even in instances where they are openly acknowledged, as in the Cote d'Ivoire) they still regard it as a necessary form of political exchange. This is to a certain extent explained by what has been called the softness of the West African State. The inability to impose its regulations, and thereby exact compliance by threatened coercion makes ethnic allocations a useful means for enhancing legitimacy.

4.3 Ethnicity, Political Structure and National Unity

The role of the elite in ethnoregional bargaining and the structure of politics at the centre have implications for national unity and subsequently for regional integration.

It must be remembered that the elites who champion ethnic causes are themselves members of the ruling class and that the impact of ethnic bargaining is different in single-party and no-party states. It must also be remembered that ethnic conflict does not only occur when resources are perceived as being disproportionately allocated in favour of a particular group. Ethnic groups may conflict with central government as the latter seeks to overrule the prerogatives of traditional rulers. In such issues as land redistribution and ownership West African governments have often clashed with traditional leaders. Additionally, regionalisation may accentuate conflict if such regions are coterminous with ethnic boundaries or if the region is dominated and identified with a particular linguistic group.

The relative role of the political elite and the public in making ethnicity a salient aspect of politics in West Africa is another aspect that is important. Political aspirants have

and continue to use the ethnic group as the focus of their support and usually articulate their campaign rhetoric in a manner that is meant to appeal to ethnic sentiments. Symbols and remembrances are evoked to buttress the idea of ethnic cohesion and the need for unity. The 'we' versus 'them' has come to dominate West African politics because of the tendency for the political elite to depend on their ethnic group for support. Election to parliament depends very much on being able to win the vote of one's ethnic group. This has gradually had the effect of leading the public to expect parliamentarians to champion the particularistic interests of the ethnic group. It is our contention that post-colonial ethnic conflict is elite led.

In multi-party systems regional representatives might find themselves on the opposition benches. This means that regional/ethnic interests are not represented in the ruling party. The result of such a situation is that it takes a lot of logrolling to get fiscal allocations. This is mainly because governments tend to allocate resources in a way that will enable them to retain their support base. In an instance when most of the MPs from a region find themselves in opposition and where such a region coincides with ethnic allegiances, conflict between central government and the region may arise as the ethnic group feels itself discriminated against.

Another scenario that may arise is where parties are not entirely ethnically based. In such a situation some MPs from the region might find themselves able to guarantee the government the allegiance of the group they represent because of their closeness to resources and their ability to give substantive returns to the group. Multi-party politics

could therefore result in ethnic resentment and conflict if the first situation obtained or into intra-ethnic factional conflict if the second situation was the case.

In an instance where ethnic conflict is fuelled by a lack of closeness to resources , leaders may tend to concentrate their attention on resolving such conflict. With the scarcity of distributable resources being the norm in West Africa countries, the demands made on the limited resources might make it difficult for state leaders to allocate any for regional integration programmes. Political commitment is also reduced as energy is concentrated on nation building.¹⁵ As we saw in the previous chapter, both vast resources and commitment are essential to an integration process whose aim is to promote industrial development, restructure existing structure national economies and reduce dependency. A situation such as this will therefore make the attainment of the goals of the regional organisation impossible.

This conclusion however presupposes a constancy in the salience of ethnicity. But as has been mentioned earlier, the salience of ethnicity is contextual and is dependent on such factors as socio-economic and political orientations and alignments at any particular time. In a multi-party system, governments change and so do resources and methods of their allocation. Ethnic intermediaries are themselves only able to sustain their position if they are able to reciprocate ethnic allegiances. The ethnic group may therefore switch its allegiance to others who are perceived as being more effective in championing group interests.

¹⁵ Etzioni, A., op. cit.

To the extent therefore, that ethnic organisation is fluid and heterogeneous, and politics itself dynamic, it is difficult to assess the direct impact of ethnicity on national unity. As Rupert Emerson, for example noted, 'the notion of a single national culture, shaping the community and embracing all its people, is an admirable one whose principal shortcoming is its remoteness from historical fact'.¹⁶ This is important because it implies that ethnic diversity does not preclude the formation of a political community. The United Kingdom, Canada or Spain, for example, are not ethnically homogeneous states. Despite the conflicts that arise between different ethnic groups in these countries they are nevertheless regarded as constituting political communities. Cultural homogeneity is therefore neither a prerequisite for political unification nor a sufficient condition. West African countries are therefore not beyond the pale. We suggest that it is only in instances where political parties are polarised along ethnic lines, and ethnic groups are the main groups that political parties appeal to and one particular ethnic group always dominates the decision-making machinery that ethnic conflict might become endemic and therefore hinder political unification. It is, for example, inconceivable that a countries such as Chad or Sudan could devote themselves to regional goals even if they wanted to because of the ethnic and factional conflicts within them.

In one-party states and military regimes where ethnoregional intermediaries tend to be close to decision-making, the dangers of ostracisation that may result from supporting an opposition party do not arise. However, because regional representatives are appointed invariably by the governments they may lack the independence to represent the ethnic

¹⁶Emerson, R., *From Empire to Nation*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960, p 149. See also Harrison, S.S., 'The Challenge to Indian Nationalism', in *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1956, pp 620ff.

group correctly. This is because to safeguard their positions they tend to please central government.

Whereas the position of an intermediary in a civilian regime where local elections are held is dependent on local endorsement, military regimes impose their own lieutenants as intermediaries. But even so such appointees tend to be members of the ethnic region that they are selected to represent. Thus regional commissioners under the Afrifa, Acheampong, and the Rawlings regimes in Ghana have all emanated from the regions they represented at the centre. This has been the case in Liberia under Doe and in Burkina Faso under various military regimes.

4.4 Ethnicity and Intra-Regional Relations

Nation-building in West African countries has gained ground since independence and identification with the state has increased while the salience and probability of ethnic irredentism has waned and has reduced as governments devised ways and means of distributing resources.

Since independence there has been a lot apprehension about the effects that inherited colonial boundaries would have on the stability and durability of the states within the region.

Such apprehension was based on the fact that the arbitrariness of the colonial divisions had resulted in states with ethnically differentiated social systems, and that in

some cases the same ethnic group had been separated to by boundaries with the resulting straddling of the same ethnic group across common borders. The fear of these two aspects of ethnic composition within West Africa was that it would lead to secession and irredentism.

The implications of weak boundaries for regional integration well known and is that such states devote more time to nation-building than to regional goals.¹⁷

It is true that ethnic diversity posed very serious problems for West African states in the first decade of independence as each ethnic group sought to assert itself politically. It is also true that an actual secession attempt was made by the Biafrans of Nigeria which led to war between 1967 and 1970. Furthermore, it is undeniable that politics, even today, is still influenced by to a large extent by ethnic loyalties. Irredentist claims made on the Ewe speaking section of Togoland after the latter's independence caused a lot of apprehension in the 1960s and led to a souring of relations between the two countries. However, despite all the problems that arose and still are, the colonial boundary has become a permanent feature of the region with no modifications. Indeed they are seen as one of the most resilient colonial inheritances to date. This issue is in our opinion important enough to warrant an extended comment.

It is generally agreed that West African states survived their early year of independence more as a result of the system of recognition in international society than through the legitimacy derived from popular sovereignty. However, to assume *a priori*

¹⁷ Feld, J. F., and Jordan, R. S., International Organisations,

that African states persist today simply because of the system of recognition in international society as Jackson and Rosberg¹⁸ do is misleading. It is misleading because their conclusion is not based on research, and the philosophical underpinnings to their arguments presuppose the idea of a nation and social integration as given and not as processes that develop over time. What constitutes the empirical bases of states in their opinion is the possession of a stable community and an effective government.¹⁹ This definition of the state reflects the tendency in the West to believe that national integration is already an accomplished fact,²⁰ a *de facto* condition.

It is our contention that such a definition of the state while purporting to form the empirical basis of statehood is limited and static and ignores the process of the development of national consciousness. A definition of statehood must necessarily include aspects of nationalism to be viable and to reflect its dynamic nature. If we agree with Hinsley's explanation, nationalism does not come to exist where it has not existed before, nor does so because men have discovered a political loyalty which they previously lacked. What it does imply is that political loyalty has been transferred from other structures to the nation. Nationalism is therefore just one form of political loyalty [which] may be expressed in other ways than loyalty to the nation - in attachment to the clan, the tribe, the city-state, the empire.²¹

¹⁸ Jackson, R.H. and Rosberg, C.G., 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood' in *World Politics*, vol. xxxv, no. 1, Oct. 1982.

¹⁹ This is based on the Weberian definition of a state being a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organisation, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including 'all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction'. Weber, 'The Theory of Social and Economic Organization', ed. by Talcot Parsons and cited by Jackson and Rosberg, *ibid*.

²⁰ Duverger, M., *The Study of Politics*, Nelsons, London, 1972.

²¹ Hinsley, F.H., *Nationalism and the International System*, Hodder and Stoughton, London < 1973, p. 13.

From this, an *a priori* conclusion can be drawn that contrary to the expectation of *de facto* nation-states in Africa, exhibiting effective governments and stable communities, it is indeed the *de jure* that paves the way for the establishment of a state defined in the Western sense. Since the state in Africa is part of the globalisation of Western forms of political organisation which developed in Europe from the 17th century it is inevitable that it has to develop to approximate the maturity it has reached in Europe. There is therefore nothing unique about the relative lack of 'statehood' in Africa. Even though there are differences in the historical context, the basis of sovereignty and the actual dynamics of nation-building in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the nation-state as it is perceived today took time to evolve just as it is doing in Africa today. Indeed it was the signing of these treaties that laid the basis of the sovereign state system in Europe and its various attributes, such as territoriality, and internal and external sovereignty. The consolidation of the state at the expense of Christian cosmopolitanism was a process not a given condition. Indeed, as Deutsch, for example, postulated from historical studies of the amalgamation of Britain, the United States, Germany and others, political unification takes between three generations and 160 years for previously diffuse communities to get to a position of stable expectation of peace where conflict is resolved by peaceful means and not through war. The consolidation of the state in Africa at the expense of ethnic affiliations, former imperial powers and other external actors ought to be expected to take some time to evolve.

Our argument that a political community was in the process of being formed in West Africa seems to be supported by preliminary qualitative research conducted to test the extent of nationalism among West Africans. Though only tentative conclusions can be

drawn from the research because of the non-random nature of the sample, and the smallness of the sample size, the answers are instructive to the extent that they are indicative of a growing sense of nationalistic feelings toward the state in West Africa. Nationalism is gradually taking root. To examine the issue of the idea of the nation we asked Ghanaians, Nigerians, Togolese, Ivorians, Sierra-Leoneans and Liberians living in London whether they saw themselves as different from other people from other states of the region. There was an unequivocal and unanimous yes response from all the respondents. Not even one respondent differed from this position.

We then asked if they were willing to fight for their country against other countries such as Burkina Faso, Togo, Nigeria and Mauritania, apart from those who were pacifists, the answer was again yes.

In a second research conducted in Ghana²² we tried to build on these preliminary answers by attempting to gauge the locus loyalty. It was an attempt to see whether the state or the ethnic group commanded more loyalty among citizens. What came out was that Ghanaians questioned saw political allegiance in relation to two levels of comparison; the international and the national. Ghanaians from all ethnic groups saw themselves as Ghanaians when the comparison was with people from other states (foreigners). At the national level social and political differentiation were not so clear-cut. Not all people from an ethnic group identify with the same political party even though the tendency was to support candidates from ones own ethnic group. From the research²³ we concluded that

²² The number of ethnic and tribal groups in West Africa countries is so high that it would be impossible to test each group in every country. This would have been superfluous. The Ghanaian sample in our opinion a fair indicator of the general situation in other countries of the region.

²³ Again rudimentary in terms of its level of scientific sophistication; non random sample, sample size of 110 people altogether, and qualitative questions.

ethnic affiliation is predominantly a social differentiation which spills over into political identification if political parties are ethnically based. The reasons given for identifying with political parties that are dominated by people from the same ethnic group range from affective feelings to utilitarian expectations that resources and political positions will be more likely to be distributed in favour of people from the ethnic group of an incumbent. Others supported political parties solely on the basis of whom they thought could do the job better.

At the national level it was clear that those questioned did not see the ethnic group as more important than the state. The ethnic group and the state were not seen by those questioned, especially the more educated, as being in conflict. The two were different social constructs which overlap at certain times. The validity of the state was not being questioned by ethnic conflict. Neither is ethnic conflict endemic. Conflict arose when inequity was perceived in the distribution of resources in favour of the incumbent's ethnic group. From these we concluded that ethnic diversity, by itself, did not pose a danger to the survival of the state. It was difficult to determine where the locus of loyalty lies.

The conclusion that ethnic identification and political allegiance do not always coincide is supported by a third research conducted among the Ewes of Ghana and Togo. In addition to showing the complicated nature of the dynamics of ethnic affiliation and nationalism, the research also buttresses our opinion that states are becoming *de facto* entities and are not persisting because of outside recognition. We used the Ewes as our sample because of the historical desire to form a to be amalgamated into the same country and to overcome their demarcation that had resulted from the defeat of Germany in the

1945. If the straddling of ethnic groups was to be problematic for nation-building, the Ewe unification movement and its activities, including representations at the UN, should have been a cause for concern in post independent Ghana and Togo after the incorporation of the English Trans-Togoland into The Gold Coast and subsequently into Ghana after the latter's independence. The Ewes are therefore important because it was a case which was expected to result in difficulties for the national governments concerned. What has happened since independence is therefore instructive for understanding the effect of ethnic diversity and the straddling of tribes across borders on the domestic politics of states within the region.

The research was initially carried out to test the validity of the assumption that the straddling of tribes across borders creates irredentist and secessionist tendencies and therefore leads to instability. The research revealed that the straddling of tribes across borders did not necessarily result in secessionist tendencies among the general population of those tribes.

When we asked Ghanaian Ewes the question; 'Whom do you identify with more, Togolese Ewes or people from other tribes in Ghana?', the majority of people in the age group 40 to 65 years responded that they identified with Togolese Ewes more than with people from other tribes in Ghana. When the same question was put to Togolese Ewes of the same age group, 84 of the 100 people questioned said they identified with Ewes across the border than with other tribes in Togo. There was therefore mutual identification with each other across the common border. When the same question was put to people between 15 and 39 the answer varied with the level of education, the distance they lived

away from the border, their perceived future prospects, where they attended school, and whether they could speak the Ewe language. Though a similar number of people were questioned the qualifications make it difficult to quantify.

We found, however, that the further the informant lived from the border, the higher the level of education, if he or she attended school in other parts of the country other than Ewe areas or there was a good mix of ethnic groups, if one perceived his or her prospects to be good and not threatened, and if he or she could not speak the language then the level of identification with those across the border was minimal or even non-existent. They did not see any overwhelming sense of belonging together culturally, and neither did they see their futures converging. On the other hand, those who lived closer to the border or had relatives in either country, were less educated and could not speak the languages of the other tribes, and had not mixed extensively with people from other tribes tended to identify with the tribesmen across the border. However their identification was cultural rather than political.

When we asked the 40 to 65 age group why they identified with each other more than with people from other ethnic groups from their own countries, the predominant answer was that because they shared the same culture, language, religious practices and that they had relatives living on the other side of the border. Particularly for Ghanaian Ewes who did not speak English or any of the languages of other tribes in Ghana and Togolese Ewes who were in the same position, language was a very important criterion for identification. The Ghanaian Ewes actually felt more at home in Lome the capital of Togo and went there more frequently than to Accra because Lome is in an Ewe speaking part of

Togo. Another reason, especially among the elite of both countries was that they felt discriminated against by other tribes from their own country.

When asked whether they felt the Ewes of both countries should be united into one country (Ghana or Togo) or secede from both countries and form their own new state, all except one person said no.

The reason for the apparent ambivalence was explained by separating socio-cultural identification from political identification. Most of those questioned did not see any special advantages accruing from such a move. A large number thought such an occurrence would actually lead to retrogression. One reason for the perceived negative impact of such a move was that since official business was conducted in European languages in the region they would have to adopt either french or english as the lingua franca. If english were adopted, the Ghanaian Ewes would be at an advantage in terms of jobs and political office and vice versa. Thus the common language factor would not produce any substantial advantages except in social communication.

The separation of political and cultural affiliation was validated by the fact that Ghanaian and Togolese Ewes were willing to fight each other if war erupted between armies of the two countries. The reason for their willingness to fight was that they would not go around asking if an enemy was from their ethnic group or not. The enemy from the neighbouring country will be treated collectively rather than as possibly members from ones own tribe.

Another reason that was given for not wanting to join to form a separate state was intra-ethnic rivalries. It was pointed out that the Ewes did not constitute a homogenous group except from a distance. Beside Ghanaian Ewes generally felt superior to their counterparts in Togo while the Togolese Ewes felt Ghanaian Ewes were scamps.

Both groups of Ewes also felt they had lived so long in their individual countries and therefore identified with the state and other groups within it politically. Of the more than 100 people interviewed only one person was willing to fight a war of secession, but expressed the improbability of the need or occasion ever arising. It was also pointed out that having established economic, social and political links with other groups in the individual countries since independence, it was indeed very difficult to envisage giving it all up for the possibilities of living in an ethnically homogenous state, a situation which did not promise any obvious advantages.

Neither group of Ewes was therefore particularly interested in forming a separate state of their own even though they expressed a liking for the idea of free interaction between them as a result of regional integration.

Even though there is clearly no desire on the part of the Ewes of Ghana and Togo to either separate to form their own state or be united with their affine in either country, their straddling of the Ghana-Togo border has contributed to the sometimes acrimonious relationship between the two countries. Though the Ewes expressed the desire to be united after the second-world-war, and even made representation to the United Nations on the issue, such demands have become dormant. The present generation of Ewes have lived in

the respective countries since they were born and have therefore become politically integrated into those countries. This we deduced explains, to a certain extent, the difference in the answer of the two age groups.

From the above we concluded that *de facto* political communities are being formed in West African countries. Though the ethnic group remains an important group for individual identification and group action, political loyalty was with the state rather than the ethnic group. A nascent political loyalty to the state is developing which makes the assertion that African states lack empirical statehood anachronistic. Borders are now accepted as permanent features of the political landscape at the formal level.

If the Ewe experience is added to the fact that apart from the Biafran war of secession, no country in West Africa has been faced with break-up because of ethnic diversity, then we can conclude tentatively that the state is an empirical reality. Governments continue to be the only legitimate users of coercive force. In the Liberian civil war, the issue is not about the legitimacy of the state but about power and resource distribution, and ethnic discrimination. But even in this case ethnic groups continue to identify with the state.

Our conclusion therefore is that states are not at risk of disintegrating because of their diverse ethnic composition. Neither is the straddling of tribes across borders a threat to the survival of the state in the region, though it might be a threat to regimes. The only reason why a regional organisation might not get the attention it desires from its member states is because domestic planning and development issues take precedence over regional

goals. This is not peculiar to ECOWAS because even in such advanced integration schemes such as the EEC, domestic political, social and economic issues get primary attention from ruling governments.

Politicians in West Africa are aware that the state is no longer a mere inheritance from the colonial era. They are however mindful of the effects of their policies on perceptions about equitable distribution of political appointments, executive positions in parastatal organisations, project and resource allocation and also careful of making utterances that would be construed as indicating ethnic bias.

Hence to the extent that politicians continue to regard ethnic cleavages as important in policy formulation it can be suggested that such perceptions will affect their level of participation in regional organisations. Ethnic diversity, it is thought leads to social disintegration and therefore threatens the survival of the state. Thus in instances where national decision-makers see the national interest, in this instance, the security of the state, as threatened, they will take decisions to counteract them. In a situation where resources are limited and internal demand on them is high, national governments will be unlikely to allocate such resources to regional goals despite the long term advantages of such regional allocation.

It must be stressed that though the idea of the nation is gaining ground slowly, the ethnic group continues to be an important object of identification. It is the predominant reference group in social organisation, and has not been replaced by class identity on a sufficiently general level. Even in the urban areas where social assimilation has been

highest, individual ethnic/tribal societies perpetuate the links with the hometown and the ethnic group.

The usually negative connotations that interaction between ethnic groups has attained in West African politics has to a certain extent been influenced by the racial undertones it has acquired, especially in the West. Ethnic organisation is, in our opinion an important organising principal which could serve very well in a political situation where pressure groups and lobbies are not well developed. Governments adopted a negative attitude to ethnic demands, in part, because many politician's could not come to terms with potential alternative centres of autonomous power,²⁴ and, we suggest, did not know quite how to incorporate and assimilate such sources of opposition to the ruling party's proposed structure of the state or the bureaucracy during the early days of independence. Without ethnic pressures it is difficult to envisaged how governments would have been mindful of equity in the spatial distribution of resources without a bias in favour of areas where they got the most votes. Our conclusion on ethnic pressures is that it was a useful means of expressing general demands. It's conflictual and potentially disintegrative impact on national politics and the survival of the state, could to a certain extent, be because nationalist governments failed to realise that the nascent pluralistic political systems that had been introduced on the eve of independence by the departing imperial powers was in part dependent on finding compromises between groups and bargaining between conflicting interests.

²⁴Hodder-Williams, R., An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1984. See also Collier, P., 'Africa's External Relations: 1960-90, African Affairs: vol. 90, no. 360, July 1991.

Since the second wave of multi-party politics that started in the 1990s after a combination of factors including internal pressures for more open government, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the subsequent linking of Aid to good governance by Western donor countries, many governments have used the ethnic factor as a defence against the introduction of pluralism. They have tended to assume that ethnic conflict is endemic. A defeatist determinism colours the perception about their approach to ethnic issues.

The perspective that we have suggested here is that ethnic groups can be an important means of ensuring an equitable distribution of resources, and of governing. Consociationalism, because of its overt compartmentalism, would however not be an appropriate method of creating a compromise between social cleavages and the need for nation-building. The appropriate form of incorporation would require research which has as its basis not a presumption that ethnicity is detrimental but that it can be a legitimate form of social organisation and hence an aspect of governance.

If it is true that for regional integration to be successful it must, among other things, be able to lead to an incorporation of the informal, largely rural, non-commercialised sections of West African countries into the exchange economy, then in the absence of pressure groups, ethnic pressures are necessary for bringing the effects of integration on rural areas to the attention of governments. Regional policies that target rural areas for the provision of social amenities, employment opportunities, and the inculcation of methods of improved productivity can, we suggest, only be appropriately identified by those who live and work in those areas. Appropriate development methods

are more likely to be suggested by those who know the lifestyle of the rural areas than by bureaucrats in Lagos or state capitals without first hand knowledge of those areas. It is now widely believed that the more residents of an area are involved in the planning and implementation of a development programme the more likely it is to succeed. Thus a combination of the technical expertise of bureaucrats and social knowledge of those such programmes will affect is ensured, in the latter case, by a form of social representation which for the rural areas can only be done by the ethnic group.

We are working on the assumption that ethnic conflict is a symptom rather than a cause of internal political conflict. Ethnic conflict in West African is therefore indicative of the failure of the political system to find ways of accommodating existing and converging linguistic, territorial, religious, cultural and historically based social organisation of life within countries. The superimposition of a political system on previously existing systems must necessarily take account of them. The fragile political structure of countries in the region are partly a result of this failure.

This last point leads us to ask how the free movement of people across borders, a right to reside in any of the member countries of the region and also the right of establishment in any member country²⁵ is hampered by the fear that it will undermine national sovereignty. The question that arises in this instance is whether the shifting of loyalties to regional institutions, seen by integration theory as essential²⁶, will undermine the already fragile sovereignty of the individual states within the region.

²⁵ Article 27, Treaty of ECOWAS.

²⁶ Both the supranationally oriented neo-functionalist theories and the pluralist theories expect either a shifting of loyalty or the building of region wide identification among citizens of the member countries.

The possibility of a retrenchment as individual states feel their sovereignty threatened can only be speculated on but the high possibility of that happening is indicated by what has happened in the European Community at various time in its history. The differences, however, between Western Europe and West Africa are obvious. The arguments in the European Community are over the authority of national parliaments to take political and economic decisions in the national interest. In addition to these problems, West African states have the possibility of undermining their nascent nation-states by giving too much distributive and legislative powers to a regional body.

The answer to these questions, however, depends to a very large extent on the philosophy that governments and the public subscribe to as the principles that should govern their relations with each other. If ECOWAS members feel that the future development of the region lies in the uniting of the states into a single state then the forging of ties that eventually replace the developing nationalistic loyalties pose no problems and the shifting of loyalties or the transfer of sovereignty to a supranational body can help bring that about. Secondly, the straddling of tribes across borders will only help in facilitating that process. This is because the positive effects of territorial contiguity²⁷ will be buttressed by linguistic and culturally contiguous border areas.

However, if the status quo is seen as the philosophy, and nationalism which fosters a collective ethos in citizens is seen as the organising principle, then the lack of focus that may be engendered by diverting attention from the state to regional institutions is likely to

²⁷ Etzioni, A., Political Unification.

impair such goals. The developing nationalism will be undermined because, as we have stated above, a complete transfer of loyalties from ethnic groups to the state has not occurred yet. The increasing political identification of tribes that straddle borders with the states they have belonged to since independence may also be undermined.

It is very difficult to speculate on the future philosophical orientation of states or opinion formers. What seems to be the case now is that many question the economic viability of the state in the region, indeed the whole continent, without questioning the territorial limitations that contribute to continuing poverty. From all indications, the states, as the region is constituted now, are likely to remain for quite some time to come. Whether larger states will be formed is something that is impossible to predict at the moment. It is however probable that if a unitary state which incorporates the existing countries is envisaged as the future political structure of West Africa, then the more nationalistic the countries become the more difficult that will be to achieve. On the other hand if a pluralistic political system, based on either a federation or confederation, is envisaged then the consolidation of the state does not pose as much difficulty if the majority of people think that is the structure they will prefer.

From our discussion, we can conclude that ethnicity is neither a threat to the survival of the state nor to regional integration. Political conflict is the cause rather than the effect of ethnic conflict. Ethnicity can actually lead to equitable spatial distribution of the gains of regional integration and mitigate against its adverse effects if ethnic groups are able to highlight the effect integration is having on it. Tribes across borders can also facilitate regional integration in several ways to the extent that they act as culturally

continuous zones between different states and have facilitated interaction despite the introduction of international borders.

There is no doubt that dissidents escape from one country to another all over the region, and that this is sometimes facilitated by the straddling of common borders by the same ethnic group. Tribes across borders have not in every instance been a problem for neighbouring countries. The Ghana/Togo Border, for example, has experienced one of the most protracted tension because of this issue. However, from our research we found that the tension was not caused by the straddling of the same ethnic group across the common border but by coincidences that have combined to make that boundary important in the strategic calculation of both countries.

The factors that have combined to cause tension on the Ghana/ Togo border include; the nearness of the Togolese capital to the border, the internal impact of ethnic identification of politics, and the difficulties that arose between Nkrumah and Olympio over the unification of Ghana and Togo after the latter's independence.²⁸

The capital of the Togolese Republic is only about four miles from the border with Ghana. This means that dissidents find it very convenient to penetrate the country from Ghana. The capital is also situated in Ewe territory. Ayadema, the president of Togo regards the Ewes as his main political opponents. A large majority of Ewes also feel that Olympio, an Ewe, was overthrown by the active participation of Ayadema, a Kabre. Part of the Olympio family, and the first president's son, who has pretensions toward ruling

²⁸ Amenumey, D.E.K., The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political History, Ghana University Press, 1989.

Togo lives in Ghana. Thus even though the general Ewe speaking population around the border are apolitical, the coincidence of the factors listed above have combined to create suspicion of the Ewes in Togo by the ruling predominantly Kabre government. The border is therefore regularly closed and accusations of political connivance are made regularly, especially, by the Togolese government. As long as the Togolese authorities perceive an Ewe threat the border will continue to feature highly in Togo's strategic calculations. Indeed the situation could actually be reversed if rulers of Ghana perceived their main opposition to be the Ewe and there is an Ewe president in Togo.

The straddling of tribes across borders does not therefore pose the problem attributed to it in the region. The problems is mainly a result of the personalisation of politics and in the Ghana/Togo case a combination of historical, cultural and ideological factors.

Apart from ethnic groups, other social groups that are expected to affect decision-making at the regional level are those formed around associational interests. Such associations include occupational groups such as lawyers, teachers, farmers, workers, engineers, police, soldiers, traders and entrepreneurs.

These groups are able to affect regional economic integration to the extent that they are able to influence political decision-making at the national level and lobby regional decision-makers at the regional level. But being able to influence decision-making is itself not enough to make a group able to effective in affecting the direction of regional

integration. Groups will only attempt to influence policy decisions if they perceive their interest as being either promoted or threatened by regional integration.

Thus while certain groups might be indifferent to the impact of regional integration, others will seek to influence government decision positively or negatively depending on how their interests are affected.

Groups that are most likely to try and consciously promote or impede regional integration are those that will be affected by treaty provisions such as trade liberalisation, the common external tariff, and rights of residence and establishment. Other interest groups may lobby governments to push for policies that promote their interests within the framework of the regional organisation. Such lobbying will depend on how effective groups are in pressing their demands, how organised they are, the resources available to them, their closeness to decision-makers, and their level of awareness about the effects of regional integration. It also depends on how seriously political decision-makers take such groups, and how important such groups are in determining the continuing stay in power of holders of office.

Groups that may therefore be of importance to regional integration are Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, Manufacturers Associations and perhaps student groups to the extent that they sometimes constitute a well informed group within domestic society in developing countries.

4.5 Trade Unions

Trade Unions were among the first non-elite bodies to coalesce in the region during the colonial period, with workers organisations being formed around sources of labour, such as, the railways, and major urban concentrations.²⁹

Trade unions in West Africa like elsewhere work primarily to protect and advance the interest of their members. However they have certain characteristics which conform to their situation in developing economies.

First, trade unions are relatively limited in membership in West Africa. This is because of the narrow industrial base of the region.³⁰ Unionised labour therefore forms a minority of the total working population of the region. In addition to a large self-employed non-waged labour employed mainly in subsistence agriculture, fishing and petty trading activities, there is also a large population of non-unionised wage labour employed in small firms. Where labour is unionised they have tended to have a limited advantage compared to the unskilled workers in other sectors of the economy as a consequences of organisation.

Government employees form the largest part of organised labour in these countries, and are mainly found in the public sector and parastatal organisations. Their actions are therefore mainly directed at government policies.

On the one hand they are able to disrupt the functioning of state establishments, and are able to catch the attention of the government because the latter is the main

²⁹ Chazan, et al. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*.

³⁰ Jeffries, R., *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railwaymen of Sekondi*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.

employer in the countries of the region. On the other hand, their closeness to government has affected their independence. Attempts have been made by officials to standardise criteria for membership, control wages, and exact loyalty from labour leaders.³¹ Like any employer, Governments have sought to and do exert influence and control over trade union activities by co-opting trade union leaders and thereby subordinating trade unions. However despite such manipulation and effort to subordinate trade unions to state policies and to co-opt leaders, as many people have entered the labour market, and individual unions have pressed for better conditions for their members, unions have persisted and have reorganised and in many cases been invigorated especially in the 1980s.³²

Through strike actions, withdrawal, slowdowns, sabotage and other forms of protest they have frequently created a mood of discontent in countries. They have consequently been in a position to make governments more accountable, though they have not been able to bring substantial political transformation.³³

Thus the experience of 'organised labour has been one of increased government intervention and periodic dissension'.³⁴

Trade unions do not however always work in opposition to government and have sometimes been instrumental in according acceptability to military take-overs. Depending on the disposition of their leaders they sometimes work to promote government policy

³¹ Chazan et al. op. cit. p87

³² *ibid.*

³³ Cohen, R., 'Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers', *Review of African Political Economy*, 19(1980):822.

³⁴ Sandbrook, R., and Cohen, R., (ed.), *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action*, London, Longman, 1975.

whether they perceive the situation of workers as being improved by government policy, they can either act as essential supporters of government policy or as opposition. In instances where union leadership is closely associated with the political leadership a patronage relationship develops.

It must however be noted that trade unions are not a homogenous entity despite the fact that they sometimes belong to an umbrella group. Whereas certain sections of the trade union movement might be supporting government policy, others might be opposing it. Hence the impact of their activity on government depends to a large extent on the internal cohesion of the movement, the extent of government influence on the leaders, how informed they are about a particular issue in terms of its overall impact on their members, and the general economic condition within a country at the time.

Regional integration and trade unions impact on each other in a two way process. The impact of regional integration on trade unions might be felt through the provisions of free movement for community citizens, rights of residence, and establishment, all of which are contained in the treaty of ECOWAS. Trade unions on the other hand can affect regional integration at two levels; national and regional. In the first instance they can act as pressure groups to affect government disposition toward particular politics. At the regional level they can lobby regional policy initiators to adopt policies that are to their advantage and sometimes contrary to national politics. Regional bureaucrats can also use trade unions and other pressure groups to cajole governments into accepting policies that they would otherwise not adopt.

In the instances where unions feel the jobs of their members will be threatened by provisions, such as, right of establishment and employment for community citizens, they might organise to oppose such policies, especially in instances where there is already a high number of unemployed labour competing for positions. West Africans countries have a high level of unemployment and trade unions are likely to press governments to stem migrant workers from member countries. This has happened twice in Nigeria since the formation of ECOWAS, once in Ghana prior to the formation of ECOWAS, and in various instances through discrimination policies directed at foreign nationals in the Ivory Coast. If two of the four so-called more developed countries within the region, Nigeria³⁵ and Ivory Coast, have found it necessary to adopted discriminatory policies, then it is doubtful that the spread effect that is expected to mitigate the tended toward unequal development, through labour movements, is unlikely to materialise.

The particular action taken to exert pressure on policy makers depend on the type of regime that is in power. The desire for national development makes national goals more important to government. Thus where trade unions are justified in the fear of unemployment resulting from regional policies, such views are likely to converge with that of national decision-makers anyway. It can be assumed a priori therefore that it is unlikely that governments and domestic unions will clash over regional policies.

The current low level of activity is probably because ECOWAS is not advanced enough to impact directly on the lives of individuals or groups. As it develops and its level

³⁵ Nigeria expelled illegal community immigrants but it nevertheless was an indication that if there was difficulties, such as, unemployment in the national economy foreign community citizens could be targeted for expulsion.

and extent of penetration increases, interest groups such as trade union might become more active.

A higher level of union activity will depend, however, on the resources available to the unions and how much national and regional cohesion there is between unions. The capability of pressure groups to represent their members in the European Community is very much facilitated by their ability to establish offices in Brussels and other parts of the community countries where regional decisions are made. They are also able to employ experts who keep them informed about policy proposals that might impact on their members. The developed lobby system is also extensively used at both initiation, decisional and post-decisional stages of community decision-making.³⁶ In 1985 there were an estimated 500 such groups working on behalf of various interests. All of these cost their members a substantial amount of money which unions in the ECOWAS region do not have.

The extent of trade union activity in ECOWAS activities is low, and will continue for a long time to come. Like national governments, they are also preoccupied with domestic issues. Perhaps an increase in the decision-making capability of the Community will propel them to act but until then their potential impact is yet to be felt.

³⁶Butt, A., Pressure Groups in the European Community, UACES Occasional Papers 2, 1985.

4.6 Business Groups

Despite the relatively undeveloped nature of Business interest groups in West Africa, they were instrumental in encouraging governments to pursue the formation of an economic community which had been abandoned in 1968.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, between 1968 and 1973 efforts toward regional integration had come to a standstill. During this lull a Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce was established in November 1972 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Its members included Liberia, Niger, Togo, Dahomey (now Benin), Guinea, The Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria. Though Upper Volta and Cote d'Ivoire were represented, they did not join till the following year in Accra, Ghana.³⁷ It is a representative body of the organised private sector of the economy in the region, and seeks to provide a link between the national Chambers of Commerce and national Associations of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Mines in West Africa.

Among the aims of the federations was to 'promote the establishment of an economic community and a common market in the West African region and encourage the speedy re-establishment of supranational commercial institutions'.³⁸

As a result of its composition, and through various meetings held in both French speaking and English speaking countries of the region the federation played an important part in transcending the language barrier in the region. Representations made to the heads

³⁷ Fajemirokun, H., 'The Role of West African Chamber of Commerce in the Formation of ECOWAS' in Readings and Documents on ECOWAS, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Macmillan, Lagos, 1984, pp 76 - 90.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p 78.

of state of the countries where the meetings were held, first in Sierra Leone to Siaka Stephens in 1972 , in Ghana to I.K. Acheampong in 1973, and in Cote d'Ivoire to Houphouet-Boigny in 1974 together with others were used to advocate the resuscitation of the idea and desirability of the formation of a West African economic community.

The Federation therefore played an important role in reviving the abandoned desire to form an economic community that included all countries of the region.

The political backing that was necessary for the actual formation of the organisation is what was spearheaded by the Nigerian and Togolese governments who included members of their chambers of commerce as part of their official delegations or as advisers to the governments at the meetings leading to the formation of ECOWAS.³⁹

Since its formation the Federation of West African Chamber of commerce has established ECOBANK Transnational Incorporated. This commercial bank is the first to have branches in five neighbouring capitals namely Lagos, Cotonou, Lome, Accra, and Abidjan. It also plans to establish a West African Airline to facilitate intra-regional travel, an African Mineral Resources Development Fund, and a Maritime Transport Company.⁴⁰

Despite these achievements the business interest groups have not been as active as they perhaps ought to be. The possible reason are examined below and again because of the lack of documented material will be based on theoretical propositions of the interaction between business associations and regional integration schemes. Business Associations for

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Contact, ECOWAS, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1990.

our purpose can be divided into two groups; Commercial and Manufacturers Associations. As has been indicated above both commercial and manufacturers are represented in the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce. However, for ease of analysis we will maintain the categories above. This is because despite working in a common organisation, the impact of integration on them will be different.

Among the first group could be listed Chambers of Commerce, and Market Women's Associations. The activities of these groups centre on the selling of either imported or locally manufactured goods. Generally, commercial activity is organised in a two tier hierarchical structure with the big commercial houses such as G.B. Ollivant at the top and the majority of small scale retailers and petty traders at the bottom.

In most of West African countries both foreign manufactured and locally produced goods pass through the established commercial stores to the petty traders who do not usually have direct access to the sources of supply. This is because the majority lack either capital, the education or contacts to effectively participate in formal channels of marketing. Though a few enterprising individuals manage to procure goods for themselves directly from manufacturers or from abroad, the large majority of traders are dependent on purchases they are able to make from agents of the foreign and local manufacturers. This means that they are usually unable to influence pricing or distribution policy of manufacturers directly except through the consequences of the prices they charge for their goods in the market.

In conformity to the two tier structure of the commercial sector, the bigger and established stores usually have more access to government decision-makers than the petty traders. The reason for this is because the business elites in West African countries are usually closely associated with the political elite. Indeed, in most instances it is the business elite that sponsor political parties, and constitute the founding members of such parties, and politicians are sometimes businessmen themselves.

There is usually, therefore, an interdependent relationship between political elite and their counterparts in the commercial sector. The exchange of favours such as the allocation of import licenses, and foreign exchange for monetary kickbacks means a close working relationship between these two groups. They are therefore in a position to influence policy. Even where they do not influence policy, they are invariably the ones who gain from import licences.

Part of the policy framework of regional integration has the effect of opening up the domestic market to regional competitors through the elimination of tariffs among member countries, and the reduction in imports from non-member competitors through increasing tariffs on goods from foreign sources.

In the case of a lifting of restrictions on imports from partner countries, regional integration has the effect of flooding the market of less competitive producers, making available goods in a quantity that wipes out some or all of the excess profit previously enjoyed by traders as a result of shortages in the domestic market. It also has the effect of opening up the protected market for local manufacturers. Unless increased quantities sold

by local traders of community originated goods compensates for the reduction in profit margins, the overall impact of tariff elimination may be negative for the domestic commercial sector. Though it may result in increased welfare for the region in absolute terms, its overall impact in terms of jobs losses in the commercial sector, and bankruptcies and redundancies in the manufacturing sector must be considered. Also, its effect on overall industrial development must be taken into account in welfare calculations.

The adoption of a common external tariff (CET) results either in import duties being higher than previously or lower. Higher tariffs will result if averaging results in community tariffs being higher than what pertain domestically prior to integration. This will also have the effect of increasing the profit margins for importers if there are no cheaper community substitutes to replace imports. In this case quantities imported will not change very much if the demand for such goods is inelastic. On the other hand, if tariff averaging results in a reduction in tariffs then the profit margins will fall, with consequences similar to those discussed above.

Depending therefore on what tariff levels are before a CET is adopted, an informed pressure group of commercial business will press for an adoption of tariff levels that will increase their profit margins or leaves them unchanged.

The extent to which pressure groups in the commercial sector are able to affect policy is limited because of the style of decision-making in West African countries, the technical knowledge that is required and the resources needed for effective lobbying. The highly centralised decision-making style and the specialised nature of such decisions

together with the lack of transparency in policy decision-making means that despite the closeness of the political elite and the business elite, the latter is unable to affect decision. Additionally, pressure groups are only able to affect decisions if they are informed about the decisions and their consequences, and have the resources to lobby governments on a collective basis. Moreover, the structure must be conducive to lobbying. As mentioned above, because of the secrecy with which most policies are formulated, adopted and implemented, affected sectors are usually unaware of such measures until they are implemented.

Additionally, commercial activity in the region is not usually organised as an interest group on a competent and efficient level because of the lack of qualified personnel and resources.

Finally, the lack of political pluralism means that the political structures are not conducive to pressure activity and effectiveness within West Africa.

Policies that form an integral part of regional integration may affect manufacturers differently. Treaty provisions on the freeing of trade, the establishment of a CET and the definition of rules of origin may have different impacts on different types of manufactures.

A common external tariff can be a two edged sword for manufacturers. While protecting them from competition from non-members, it also has the effect of increasing the cost of foreign inputs. Protected industries will enjoy a regional market free of competition from the rest of the world. A tariff averaging may however reduce tariffs in

countries thus exposing them to imports from the rest of the world and from partner countries.

Domestic manufacturers will tend to want tariffs that help in protecting them even further or maintaining the pre-integration status quo.

Freeing of trade will as elucidated in chapter one affect different manufacturers differently whilst the rules of origin may affect industries with a high level of foreign ownership.

Again the same situation as those enumerated for the commercial sector hold for the manufacturers. But it must be noted that the commercial sectors and the manufacturing sector may sometimes find themselves fighting on opposite sides.

4.7 Conclusion

So far the commercial and manufacturing sectors have not had the level of impact that integration theory would advocate in the ECOWAS region. This is partly because the integration process is itself not advanced enough to have the consequences that will necessitate vigorous concerted action by interest groups. The lack of transparency in policy formulation both at the regional level and the national level also means these groups are not involved in the day to day policy evaluations, except on an occasional basis.

The propelling influence that interest groups are supposed to have of regional integration is therefore lacking. Regional integration is predominantly the politicians' toy with a very low level of awareness among the commercial sector.

Though the treaty of ECOWAS stresses social development as one of its objectives the emphasis has been on recreational activity, though some advances have been made in mobilising women, attempting to harmonise education policy and co-operation in research activities. Social policies, such as regional development programmes have not yet been integrated into policy documents of the community. Thus though the possibility of unequal development is recognised, the recognition is that of differential development at the national level. Ethnic demands may therefore eventually be the force that brings this into focus.

The emphasis being laid on encouraging interaction between the nationals of the member countries through sports could help create the social community needed to underpin economic integration but sports activities can also generate strife and rivalry and therefore actually hamper regional integration.

We can conclude therefore that ethnic straddling of borders can actually facilitate regional integration though its impact on regional policy is indirect. On the other hand because of the dirigiste nature of commercial and manufacturing activity and centralised policy formulation in West Africa, groups in that sector have little strength in affecting government policies, especially since they are not seen as a real threat to the survival of governments.

The empirical impact of these groups on the pace of integration will be examined in chapter six, but before we do that it will be appropriate to measure the extent of

integration achieved so far in order to use the frameworks we have been detailing in this and previous chapters.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Extent of Regional Integration in West Africa

5.1 Introduction

Regional economic integration is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. As we pointed out in the first chapter, the reason for embarking on ECOWAS was , primarily, economic and social development. Economic integration involves regional collective decision making which is expected to lead to joint action for goal achievement. As we saw in chapter three, the decision making aspect of economic integration is of crucial importance to the outcome of the process because it determines the framework for trade liberalisation, specifies distributive and compensatory measures, and shapes the modality of relations with non members. Collective decision making is therefore indicative of the extent of joint action to solve problems. It is therefore a good measure of the extent of regional integration.

Decision making, however, only facilitates regional economic co-operation, co-ordination and all the other forms of interaction that a regional integration scheme entails. The measurement of success or failure is mainly reflected by the achievement of the actual goals stated in the treaty establishing the integration scheme. Thus in the case of ECOWAS, the reduction in dependence on Western markets for import and export requirements and the increasing of intra-regional trade are the substantive goals that collective decision making is to facilitate. To these should be added industrialisation which is the ultimate aim of the member states and which, it could be suggested, will determine the long-term sustainability and desirability of regional integration.

In attempting to gauge the extent of integration achieved among ECOWAS countries so far, we will, therefore, use the extent of collective decision making, change in the direction of external trade and in the volume intra-regional trade, and the impact of economic integration on industrialisation within the region to measure how far it has progressed in the region.

To enable us to measure collective decision making, we will use certain aspects of a model proposed by Lindberg for gauging regional decision making.¹ The other measures will be done by comparing relative figures of the various indicators over the period the organisation has been in existence.

5.2 Extent of Regional Collective Decision Making

International integration, according to Lindberg, is the 'process whereby larger groupings emerge or are created among nations without the use of violence'. The groupings can be said to 'exist at different analytical levels' and each level can be conceived of as 'a number of nations linked to each other in certain salient ways'.² Such analytical levels include social community, security community and economic union. Political integration is another such level of analysis and is said to occur when the linkage between the nations 'consist of joint participation in regularised, ongoing decision making'.³ These decisions are not only made regularly but are binding and include the implementation by various means such as collective institutions and/or processes rather than by formally autonomous national means. Elaborated, it means a number of governments begin to

¹Lindberg, L.N., 'Political Integration As A Multidimensional Phenomenon' in Regional Integration, Lindberg and Scheingold (ed.), Harvard Univ. Press, Mass., 1971, pp 45-127.

²ibid., p45.

³ibid.

create and use common resources in the pursuit of common objectives and in doing so lose some factual attributes of sovereignty and decision making autonomy.

Thus political integration describes the institutionalisation of collective decision making at the regional level. It constitutes both the institutional framework and/or process that is involved in joint endeavours by a group of countries. By implication, it forms the matrix that is filled or animated by the particular type of issues that characterise decision making in the region concerned. From this perspective political integration lays the framework within which joint economic, social, security decisions or a combination of these are taken by a group of countries for their mutual benefit. It involves the decisional process which enables issues to be discussed, decisions taken and implemented collectively. The link between economic and political integration, we suggest, is therefore that the latter provides the framework within which the desires, and aims of economic integration are articulated.

The model lists ten properties which have been identified as those that constitute a collective decision making process. Each of these is defined as a range of variation. Political integration is then conceptualised as the 'gradual build-up over time of a variety of such properties or a combination of them'. The properties are seen as bearing a systematic relationship to each other at any given point in time and over time. The ten properties that are identified by Lindberg are further clustered into three overall categories according to a systems paradigm and referred to as level, animators and consequences of a collective decision making system.

The level of a collective decision making system is then described by looking at the *scope of decision making*, the *range of decision making stages*, and whether collective decisions in any issue area or at any decision making stage are *more decisive* than similar decisions taken at the national level, i.e., the importance of regional decisions in relation to national ones on the same issue.

Animators 'describe the energy available to the system at the time of analysis'⁴. They are made up of *demands* for action emanating from the constituent parts and are the driving force that activate the system. These demands flow from relevant political actors. It also includes the response of collective decision-makers to these demands. The extent to which the demands can themselves be processed depend on the *resources* available to the collective decision makers, the way in which the leaders make use of them' and the propensity of national *bargainers* to use these resources for the maximisation of collective as against individual interests.

The third and final set of categories are collectively called consequences of collective decision making. This is made up of the extent to which decisions *penetrate* the system, the level of *compliance* with the decisions and the *distributive consequences* of the decisions.

From the above clusters, the following ten properties can be identified: functional scope, range of decision making stages, the relative importance of regional decisions, demand flows, resources, leadership, bargaining modalities, penetration of decisions, level

⁴ *ibid.*, p49.

of compliance with decisions, and the distributive consequences of the decisions. All of these properties interact to describe, and explain the dynamics of integration.

The paradigm enables us to identify variables that can be used in a systematic analysis of ECOWAS. It also makes it possible to describe West African regional economic integration multidimensionally by looking at how political, economic and social factors interact to produce the level of achievement that has been attained since the organisation was formed.

It must be remembered, though that none of the properties by themselves indicate success or failure of integration. A high level of problem recognition does not necessarily mean that the resources, manpower, or national motivation are there for them to be implemented. Neither does a high level of decision making stage, e.g. imply that governments will ensure that they are carried out. National decision making in the issue areas may be more important and actually conflict with regional decisions. There may also be a lack of co-ordination and transmission mechanisms that ensure that decisions taken are transmitted to the member country for implementation.

The individual measures however indicate what is causing neither a stagnation in the process or contributing to the dynamism in the scheme. They therefore make it possible to suggest, in policy terms, an improvement in performance. They may also indicate that the theoretical framework being used is inappropriate for the particular political, social and economic environment. As we mentioned earlier, it is our contention that despite the demise of neo-functional theorising since the late 1960s, the underlying

theoretical foundation of most integration schemes that aspire to custom unions combine economic gradualism and incremental decision making both of which are essentially neo-functional. Though the desired final outcome may not be the political union that neo-functional theories suggested, it nevertheless usually implies a significant delegation of sovereignty. Willingness to delegate such authority coupled with the resources, leadership, bargaining modalities and the political, economic and social structure combine to make regional integration a success.

5.3 ECOWAS since 1975

The level of achievement or the extent of failure of ECOWAS since its inception can be gauged by the first three properties of a collective decision making system, i.e. functional scope, range of decision making stages, and the relative importance of regional decisions vis-à-vis national decisions. The functional areas have been reproduced below. The remaining properties help in explaining why integration has progressed, has stagnated or regressed, and are used in chapter six.

Scope of decision making

In operationalizing scope Lindberg identified four functional areas which together had 22 issue area listed under them. These are listed below:

External Relations Functions

1. Military security
2. Diplomatic influence and participation in world affairs
3. Economic and military aid to other polities
4. Commercial relations with other polities

Political-constitutional Functions

5. Public health and safety and maintenance of order
6. Political participation (i.e. symbolic participation, voting, office-holding)
7. Access to legal-normative system (equity, civil rights, property rights)

Social and Cultural Functions

8. Cultural and recreational affairs
9. Education and research
10. Social welfare policies

Economic Functions

11. Counter-cyclical policy (government expenditures, prices and wages controls, budgetary policies)
12. Regulation of economic competition and other government controls on prices and investment
13. Agricultural protection
14. Economic development and planning (including regional policies, aid to depressed industries, public finance, guarantees of investments etc.)
15. Exploitation and protection of natural resources
16. Regulation and support of transportation
17. Regulation and support of mass media and communication (including post-office, television, radio, etc.,)
18. Labour-management relations
19. Fiscal policy
20. Balance-of-payment stability(exchange rate, lending and borrowing abroad, capital movement)
21. Domestic monetary policy(banking and finance, money supply)
22. Assurance of free movement of goods, services, and other factors of production(not including capital).

This operationalization is essentially an extrapolation of the tasks of governments and national parliaments to the regional level. It therefore assumes an advanced internal political structure and bureaucratic decision making among the members of the scheme. It also presupposes the gradual transfer of such tasks to the regional level, and is based on the assumption of an eventual predominance of regional decision making over national ones. This conclusion is arrived at because a look at the 22 issue areas include nearly all of a national government's duties.

An assumption that we made while counting the issue areas was that they were all regarded as of equal salience. This assumption was made because of the difficulty of assigning weights to individual issue areas. A second point to be kept in mind while interpreting the table is that a low level of threshold of *problem recognition* is used for inclusion in the counting of functional scope. Problem recognition according to Lindberg,

refers to those political activities involved in recognising that problems confront the group as a whole, that some sort of concerted or co-ordinated or joint action is called for. It includes the gathering and exchange of information and the processes of generating alternative solution or proposals for action.⁵

Hence inclusion does not mean that actual implementation has been taken collectively with regard to that issue area. The extent of collective action will be gauged in the next section where we look at the range of decision making stages.

⁵Lindberg, 'Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon', *ibid.*, p 66.

In selecting items for inclusion in functional scope, we also recognised, as Lindberg did, that the purpose of the listing is only to gauge how extensive the ECOWAS system is. The table is indeed a reflection of neo-functionalist assumptions of a gradual transfer of national decision making to the regional organisation. The use of the model is justified for two reasons. First, the political and economic theoretical framework of ECOWAS is neo-functionalist and gradualist. This means that despite the shortcomings in neo-functionalism, any other method that is used in assessing regional integration in the ECOWAS region would be incongruous with the process path that is envisaged both by the political and economic assumptions reflected in the treaty of the organisation and hence for the scheme.

This is so because the movement from a free trade area to an economic union is gradualist⁶ and implies progressively higher levels of joint decision making among the member countries. In addition to this resulting in an increasing preponderance of joint decisions in the issue areas covered by the treaty over national ones, it also implies increasing supranationalism because of the transfer of chunks of autonomy as a result of such policies as a single currency. Whether this results in federalism or not is debatable but as pointed out in chapter three, the original treaty did specify unity of the region as the ultimate goal. The revised treaty adopted in July 1993 in Cotonou, Benin clarifies this as economic.⁷ This does not detract from the argument however. That economic unity by limiting economic sovereignty,⁸ and spilling over into the commercial and trade policies of

⁶ Article 2 of the Treaty of ECOWAS, reads 'For the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph and as hereinafter provided for in this Treaty, the Community *shall by stages* ensure:...'. Emphasis ours.

⁷ The 1993 Revised Treaty states in the preamble that; the 'final goal is the is the accelerated and sustained economic development of Member States, *culminating in the economic union of West Africa*,...' cf., chapter two, p. 140.

⁸ In the revised Treaty member countries are 'Convinced that the integration of the Member States into a viable regional community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community within the context of a collective political will.' It goes on to indicate that the members

the participating countries encroaches on various aspects of foreign policy, social, and political-constitutional autonomy goes without saying. These are neo-functional tenets that are almost inevitable if higher levels of integration is required.

Secondly, by using national decision making standards as a means of gauging the extent of integration among ECOWAS countries, we are in a better position to indicate the importance of specific regional decisions ,i.e. whether national decisions are more important in the issue area than regional ones, and therefore be able to see whether regional integration is being taken seriously by member governments.

Since the treaty establishing ECOWAS mentions areas of decision making only in broad terms the above list aids in making it more definite. Moreover, because the end result of what collective decision making should be is not clear, we can assume that the most it can get to is that all decisions previously taken at the national level will eventually be taken at the regional level. Thus it can be assumed that the list is fairly inclusive and able to accommodate any level of competence that is delegated to the organisation by the member countries. It is, however, doubtful if member countries of any regional integration scheme can be specific in determining what areas the organisation should be competent in. The list also makes it possible to accommodate the expansion of collective decision making into previously autonomous areas. Finally, to the extent that national decision making is the most sophisticated model available to policy makers and international relations theorists, the paradigm helps in elucidating what regional decision making aspires to.

Despite having regarded the issue areas as equal in weight, we acknowledge that some are more salient than others, and that salience itself changes over time. Additionally, the categorisation into functional areas is for convenience. The overlap that occurs in reality is jettisoned because it makes the task more manageable. Finally, the preponderance of economic issues may be attributed to the fact that economic policy areas are more readily distinguishable,⁹ and, also, because ECOWAS is predominantly concerned with economic development.

Using the list of issue areas, and giving them equal weight, the issues covered by ECOWAS since its inception can be counted to see how they compare with the model.

From the table below we can see that from a situation of not working as a group, the ECOWAS countries have gradually increased the issue areas which they recognise as needing a common approach to solve.¹⁰ Moving from an initial situation where no decisions were taken by all 15 countries of West Africa together in a single forum, the member countries were able to decide on 6 issues areas by 1980. This figure increased to 12 issue areas in 1985 and to 17 in 1990.

The predominant area of common interest is economic, followed by social-cultural issues then political-constitutional and external relations with one issue area each.

⁹Lindberg, L., & Scheingold, S., Europe's Would Be Polity, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1970, pp 67-68.

¹⁰ As has been mentioned earlier, collective decision making is a continuum that moves from problem recognition, through deciding on an alternative to implementation.

Table 4

Vector Representation of the Functional

Scope of ECOWAS; 1975-1990

Year	Cultural/ Social Function	Political- Constitutional Functions	Economic Functions	External Relations Functions
1,975	0	0	0	0
1,980	0	0	5	1
1,985	3	0	8	1
1,990	5	1	10	1

With the qualifications mentioned in mind, we can conclude that regional economic integration among West African countries has managed within a period of 15 years to cover an impressive 17 issue areas.

This level of problem recognition compares very favourably with that of the European Community between 1957 and 1970. Both the EEC and ECOWAS had a total of 17 issue areas over a 13 and 15 year period respectively. If the level of problem recognition is about the same in the two Communities over a similar length of time, the question that arises is whether they achieved a similar level of effectiveness in decision making over that period.

Effectiveness depends on more than problem recognition alone. The quality of collective decision making goes beyond the mere counting of issues discussed in the

collective arena. Below we look at whether things moved beyond the problem recognition stage for ECOWAS.

Looking at the scope of decisions alone as a measure of economic integration would seem to indicate that collective decision making is becoming very important to the member countries of ECOWAS. Such a conclusion would, however, be misleading because counting the number of issue areas does not give an indication of whether issues discussed in the collective arena have had an impact on national decision making. To see how effective regional decision making is to the member countries we will have to gauge the range of decision making stages collective decision making covers and the relative importance of regional decision making vis-à-vis national decision making. These are considered below.

Range of Decision making Stages

The range of collective decision making can be gauged by looking at the depth of collective action taken in order to realise the aims of a decision. This can range from problem recognition through decision to application. This distinction between the various stages of decision making was first made by Laswell and adopted by Lindberg.¹¹ The latter operationalised it and scored the various stages on a scale of 1 to 6. These vary from collective problem- recognition to collective implementation and enforcement. Below is a reproduction of the range scores for each decision stage and the coding instructions that go with it.

¹¹Lindberg, 'Regional Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon', op. cit.

<u>Range Score</u>	<u>Stage of Decision</u>	<u>Coding Instructions</u>
1	Collective problem-recognition	Formal recognition by governments of their representatives that problems are common and that concerted, co-ordinated, or joint action is desirable. Intergovernmental meetings are held or collective institutions meet to discuss ways and means of concerting, co-ordinating, or deciding jointly. Joint information gathering is initiated with object of concerting national policies as distinct from carrying out a service for one or more governments.
2	Specific action alternatives defined collectively	Some policy options are defined as acceptable, others as not. National decision-makers agree to a range of compatible policies. Most politically relevant elites must be mobilised. Study sessions of civil servants are of little moment in fields where great interest group associations are dominant and decisive, unless their leadership is also engaged in the process. On the other hand, the relevant elite for monetary policy or for capital movements will be smaller and the role of governmental actors more decisive.
3	Collective decisions on policy guidelines	Intergovernmental bargaining and choice of a type of policy (e.g., anti-inflationary economic policy), leaving it up to national authorities to translate into policy (e.g., to hold government expenditures stable or freeze wages or prices).
4	Detailed collective goal-setting implementation by national rules	Choice of policy actually limits national authorities to passing legislation implementing a detailed collective decision. Some discretion due to interpretation.

5	Decisions on policies and rules directly binding on individuals	No national discretion since intergovernmental decision requires no translation into national law via national processes. Actual implementation and enforcement by national authorities.
6	Collective implementation and enforcement	Common institutions are created to administer and enforce detailed binding rules as adopted by collective decision.

Below we score each issue area that has been specified in the previous section to give us an idea of the extent of collection problem solving. Higher scores imply that decision making becomes progressively binding and regional institutions more supranational.

External Relations

ECOWAS collective decision making in external relations functions is limited to military security within the region. It has not as yet been able to involve itself in the military security of the region external to itself. A protocol on Non-Aggression was signed on April 22 1978¹², and that on Mutual Assistance in Defence in 1981.¹³ The Protocol on Non-Aggression incorporates provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Scored against the range of decision making these two protocols would receive six points. Though these protocols were signed nearly ten years ago, they were not implemented until 1990 in the wake of the Liberian crisis. Despite the late implementation of the protocols, even though flare-ups had occurred between Ghana and Togo at various times, Burkina Faso and Mali in early 1984 and 1985,¹⁴ Senegal and Mauritania, and Liberia and Sierra Leone

¹² The actual value of this protocol is the symbolic value of intent toward each other.

¹³ Three instances of military action are given when the protocol would be enforceable: Aggression from a non-member state; Conflict between member states; and Internal conflict in a member state.

¹⁴ Chipman, J., French Power in Africa, op. cit.

before the Liberian civil war, the important point for our purpose is that actual implementation involving a peacekeeping initiative of ECOWAS under its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was instituted by the organisation. This action is mainly an implementation of the Mutual Assistance Protocol, but helped to revive the Protocol on Non-Aggression which had not been implemented on occasions, such as those mentioned above when tensions within the region had been high. Indeed, the implementation of ECOMOG contradicted earlier expectations expressed about the feasibility of implementing a defence protocol in the region. Chipman for example felt that,

'... the ECOWAS Defence Protocol [was] an important step forward but few practical results [were] likely to emerge for sometime. It is not easy to imagine anglophone and francophone states acting together to defend a member state from external aggression, and it is equally unlikely that the Defence Protocol itself would be invoked to allow for diplomatic action of a kind which would ease tensions among member states.'¹⁵

What has happened in Liberia negates this view.

In addition to the intra-regional peacekeeping initiative, ECOWAS members have been able, on one occasion, to concert to work towards the preservation of the OAU when the organisation was faced with collapse as a result of the continuing presence of Polisario's Saharan Arap Democratic Republic (SADR) delegates.¹⁶ The previous year two attempts to convene an OAU in Tripoli failed(Tripoli I in August and Tripoli II in November 1982) over the issue.¹⁷ They decided to respond positively to an appeal to heads of state of Africa to attend the nineteenth summit of the OAU in June 1983. This is significant because ECOWAS membership that reflects the political cleavages between

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p177.

¹⁶ *African Research Bulletin*, African Research Ltd, Exeter, July 1-31, 1982, p 6512. See also the June 1-30, 1983 issue, p 6860.

¹⁷ It must be stated that the venue and Gadaffi's intervention in the Chad dispute between Goukouni and Habre had as much to do with boycott as the re-emergence of continental cleavages.

radicals and moderates. Whilst some of the members¹⁸ of ECOWAS had given diplomatic recognition to the SADR, others,¹⁹ mainly supporters of Morocco, had objected to it delegates being recognised. To get both parties within ECOWAS to go to the OAU meeting was an achievement because of the long running disagreement between the two camps. However the significance of the organisation's intervention was that it probably helped to save the OAU since a third successive failure to convene a meeting would probably have destroyed the organisation.²⁰ This of course did not mean that the member states of ECOWAS agreed to adopt a united front at the continental meeting. At the meeting itself the continental cleavage and the different national foreign policy orientations emerged again with Guinea, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo joining a continental coalition which agreed to boycott the plenary meeting if the Polisario front was represented.

An interesting thing about the Polisario issue was that Guinea had moved from the radical camp to the moderate position akin to the majority of French speaking countries in ECOWAS. This could be because of the desire of the Sekou- Toure governments to rejoin the French system of international relations. This has indeed happened, and the importance of French assistance to the survival of her former colonies is demonstrated by the reversal of Guinea's foreign policy.

A second resolution also sought to intervene in the Chad crises by appealing to the international community for material support to offset the cumulative effects of drought

¹⁸ Those who had recognised SADR included, Guinea Bissau, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali.

¹⁹ These included; Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, the Gambia, Liberia and Upper Volta

²⁰ A/RES. 1/5/83, Resolution on the OAU, official Journal of the ECOWAS, vol. 5, June 1983, p13.

and war.²¹ This was also part of a continental agenda which created severe difficulties for the OAU. Two delegations had sought to represent the country in Tripoli. Both Habre and Goukouni, supported by Libya, felt they ought to represent that country. Though reflecting a continental concern, the intervention of the Authority of Heads of State of ECOWAS after an appeal by the outgoing OAU chairman to help preserve the organisation saw a region wide agreement being reached to attend the OAU summit and thereby helped to save the continental organisation.

These two attempts at coalition formation could be categorised under the issue of diplomatic influence and participation in world affairs. The extent of such resolutions could be scored at two. However, these resolutions were one-off occurrences. The organisation has not been very active in world politics.

ECOWAS does not give economic or military aid to other polities, neither has it been able to act as a body for collective bargaining on commercial issues for its members *vis-à-vis* other polities. Such issues remain the prerogative of national governments.

From the above we can conclude that, though ECOWAS collective decision making in its external relations with other polities was very precise in defining and implementing its objectives, these rare cases have been in instances which involved political issues on the African continent itself. They have been diplomatic manoeuvres to preserve the OAU. In the Chad case cited, it was really only appealing to external sources for assistance. None of the cases so far has involved bargaining with other economic blocs

²¹ *ibid.*, RES 2/5/83.

or individual countries. ECOWAS has since its formation not been able to negotiate tariff reductions with trading partners nor managed to get itself recognised as a major player in international economic relations. It has instead been limited to appealing to the international community for assistance to open up markets for goods from developing countries. It has mainly been a conduit of aid and finance from external sources outside the region.²² On this basis ECOWAS has not yet been able to increase the bargaining position of its members.

Political-Constitutional Functions

Of the three issue areas listed under this functional area, health has been the only one which has had decisions taken on it. Protocol A/P.2/7/87 rationalised the West African Health Community (WAHC) and the Organisation de Coordination et Endemies (OCCGE) into a single organisation designated the West African Health Organisation. In effect it brought together an anglophone and a francophone health organisation and incorporated Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde - countries which, originally, did not belong to either group. Thus a health institution incorporating all ECOWAS members was formed. The West African Health Organisation was constituted as a specialised agency of ECOWAS with clearly defined objectives and functions and spelt out modalities. The range of the decisions taken in conjunction with the WAHO could be given a maximum score of six.

²² For example, the Fund signed a financing contract with the European Investment Bank for the telecommunications programme launched by the community. Consequently, it was able to finance loan agreements it entered into with member countries within the project framework. West Africa Magazine, London, 1984, pp 2329 - 2332. The ADB and the EEC have also provided funds for the construction of bridges over the Cavheu and Mansoa rivers in Guinea Bissau where the trans-coastal highway crosses them. West Africa Magazine, 27 July - 2 August, 1992, p 1262.

The remaining two political-constitutional functions remain firmly within the purview of national governments. Issues relating to political participation and access to the legal-normative system by individuals was determined during the period under consideration, solely, by national governments.

Social-Cultural Functions

ECOWAS countries have gone a long way in taking collective decisions in social and cultural matters. Several recreational activities have been instituted. These include the institutionalisation of football, tennis, a universities games and basket ball since 1983.

A soccer series has since been launched by the Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sport with a Houphouet-Boigny trophy for the senior division and a Shehu Shagari trophy for the junior division. A basketball federation cup has also been donated by Abdou Diouf. This is given a score of six.

Two other social developments are the formation of the West African Women's Association in 1987 which is intended to mobilise women across the region, and West African Youth Union in 1990. This will also receive a score of six.

Education and Research has also received attention in the collective decision making of ECOWAS. An ad-hoc committee formed to look into harmonising education qualifications across the region made recommended on the equivalence of certificates in 1982. It was also recommended, in the same year that joint research be encouraged and scholarships be awarded to academics in the region. These have, however not been followed up. A score of one is therefore assigned to this.

Even though the games have been launched with the purpose of improving social contact between citizens of the region and in so doing create a sense unity, games have actually created animosity in several instances within the region. The most recent has been the retaliatory beating of Ghanaians in Cote d'Ivoire for the rough treatment an Ivorian team got from football fans in Ghana in December 1993. It caused an exodus of Ghanaians from Cote d'Ivoire and also resulted in the death of several Ghanaians. From this perspective though the games received a score of six, they have not achieved their purpose and have instead caused rivalry rather than a sense of community feeling.

Thus whether social activities such as games will bring the citizens of the member states together remains a debatable issue.

Economic Functions

Among the issue areas listed, those found under the broad category of Economic Functions have had more decisions taken on them than in any other policy area. The reasons for this are, first and as stated above, that unlike all other policy areas in national policy formulation, those that are economic related have been more extensively classified and are more easily distinguishable. Second, ECOWAS is basically an economic integration area and therefore has a treaty that is predominantly made up of policy issues that seek to promote regional trade and industry.

Most of the issue areas listed in Table 1 under Economic Functions have had decisions taken on them. In 1979, following the two year period that was used in deciding

on issues such as the location of the offices of the organisation, the appointment of personnel, initial funding and other basic functional matters, the six priority areas that decisions were taken on; trade and customs, fiscal and monetary, transport and communications, immigration, industrial co-operation and agricultural co-operation, were all concerned with economic issues that would facilitate trade liberalisation.²³ The emphasis was, from the very beginning, economic. Various decisions have been taken to further clarify these broad areas and to extend the scope of economic co-operation activity among member countries. Indeed for almost ten years, ECOWAS policy decisions were concerned mainly with these priority areas.²⁴

On customs and trade matters decisions have been taken and protocols both at Council and Authority level to define and clarify the application of the Community Rules of origin²⁵. A decision of Heads of State and Governments set targets relating to the minimum level of local participation that would qualify products for preferential taxation. From May 1983, indigenous capital ownership was expected to be at least 20 percent, from May 1986, this was to rise to 40 percent, and from May 1989, it was to be 51 percent.²⁶ Decisions on how assessment of loss of revenue within the community is to be calculated²⁷, and on the re-exportation of goods within the community²⁸ have also been taken. A score of five is given for this level of activity because it leaves no discretion to national governments but does leave the enforcement to national governments.

²³ Ten Years of ECOWAS, Published by the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS, June 1985, p11.

²⁴ Ten Years of ECOWAS, op. cit.

²⁵ Article 15, paragraphs 1-2 of the Treaty of ECOWAS. This was a Protocol on the Rules of Origin. Authority decision A/DEC 9/5/79, taken in May 1979 sought to reconcile the English and French texts and to align the French version with the English concept of 'value added'. Official Journal, vol. 1, June 1979.

²⁶ Decisions A/DEC 1/5/80 and A/DEC 1/5/83, Official Journals, vol. 2, June 1980, and vol. 5, June 1983.

²⁷ Authority decision A/DEC 17/5/80, of 28 May, 1980, Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.

²⁸ Council of Ministers decision, C/DEC 7/11/79 of 19 November, 1979, *ibid*.

Decisions have also been taken by the Council of Ministers²⁹ and The Authority³⁰ on harmonisation of customs documents and procedures within the region to facilitate trade co-operation programmes. A time table has also been drawn for the movement from the establishment of a Free Trade Area to a Common Market. A total of 15 years was envisaged as being required for the establishment of the common external tariff that would bring this into being. In addition to this, traded goods were categorised into three groups for revenue loss and compensation purposes. The first two; unprocessed and traditional handicrafts do not qualify for compensation for revenue loss because of the removal of tariff and barriers while the third group, industrial products qualify for compensation³¹

Steps to define both non-tariff and tariff barriers and set a timetable for their reduction and their eventual elimination on goods that qualify were also embodied in various decision taken by central decision making institutions. An Authority of Heads of State and Governments decision A/DEC 18/5/80 stipulated the elimination of all non-tariff barriers in four years starting from the 28th of February 1981.

For the purpose of elimination of import duties and taxes on industrial goods member states were categorised into three groups depending on their relative level of industrial development, importance of customs revenue in national budgets, and accessibility difficulties, i.e., transport problems.³² Group Three is constituted of the most developed countries of the region and is made up of Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and

²⁹ C/DEC 7/11/79 and C/DEC 3/5/80, *ibid.* C/DEC 3/11/82, *Official Journal*, vol. 4, June 1982.

³⁰ Convention A/P 4/5/82, and A/P 5/5/82, *Official Journal*, vol. 4, June 1982.

³¹ Council and Authority Decisions C/DEC 8/11/79 and A/DEC 1/5/81.

³² West Africa Magazine, London, November 1984, p 2325.

Senegal. Group Two is made up of Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo. The least developed states were put into Group One and is made up of Guinea Bissau, The Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.³³ Industrial goods were, also, classified into Priority and Non-Priority Industrial Products for the purpose of tax elimination.³⁴

From 28 May 1983 all taxes and tariffs were to be gradually eliminated. This is unlike the one step elimination adopted for unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts. The table below shows how the elimination was to be accomplished by the different groups of states for the different categories of industrial products. A score of five is given in this instance also because it is agents of national governments who enforce the rules laid down in the decisions rather than a collective institution.

Table 5

SCHEDULE OF TARIFF REDUCTION IN ECOWAS

Country Group	Priority Industrial Products (P1)	Non-Priority Industrial Products (P2)
G1	8 years on the basis of 12.5% reduction each year	10 years on the basis of 10% reduction each year
G2	6 years at 16.66.% reduction each year	8 years at 12.5% reduction each year
G3	4 years at 25% reduction each year	6 years at 16.66% reduction each year

Source: Ten Years of ECOWAS 1975 - 1985, ECOWAS, op. cit., p25.

³³ Official Journal, vol. 5, June 1983.

³⁴ Council decision C/DEC 3/5/82, Official Journal, vol. 4, June 1982. Broadly speaking priority sectors include agriculture and agro-industry, communications and industrial infrastructure while the others constitute the non-priority sector.

Compensation procedures for loss of revenue, timing and mode of payment are also clearly spelt out in Authority decision A/DEC 19/5/80.³⁵ This deserves a score of six because the Fund is responsible for implementing the decision.

From the above it can be seen that decisions are detailed and goals are set for implementation by national governments. Though Authority decisions are not binding on member states, the decisions on trade liberalisation do not need interpretation by national governments because the various classification and categories indicate what particular states are supposed to do. Coding will therefore be 5 in the range score.

ECOWAS collective decision making does not yet impact directly on domestic monetary policy formulation. However several decisions have been taken to improve payment for regionally traded goods. To that end a monetary programme has been decided on,³⁶ to eventually reduce the 10 currencies in the community to a single one. The creation of a single monetary zone is a long term goal which is expected to be preceded, first, by improving facilities for effecting payments through a West African Clearing House. This will lead to a medium term goal to achieve convertibility of the individual currencies, and finally, to a long term goal of the single ECOWAS currency. Regional balance of payment policy could be given a score of three because though policy alternatives have been defined, methods of achieving convergence have been left largely in the hands of national governments.

³⁵ Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.

³⁶ Council decision C/DEC 5/5/81, Official Journal, vol. 3 1981, and Authority decision A/DEC 6/5/83, Official Journal, vol. 5, June 1983.

The member states have also embarked on collective implementation of transport,³⁷ and telephone and other telecommunications infrastructural building as a means of connecting the individual countries and to facilitate trade and socio-cultural interaction. These links are also expected to correct the existing situation where communications links are mainly with former imperial states with few between the states within the region. In terms of range of decision making stages the area has been the most extensive in collective regional decision making. Apart from the actual building of the trans West African Highways, various decisions covering all aspects of road, air and maritime transport have been taken, including the harmonisation of laws and regulations. Collectively, all the decisions when scored would receive a score of 6 on the scoring scale.

Other areas of economic co-operation include agriculture,³⁸ economic development planning and support for mass-media. Decisions in these areas are extensive and would score 4 each in terms of the specificity of the programmes on which decisions have been taken on.

Agricultural co-operation has resulted in the establishment of regional centres for selected seeds and cattle species. Pilot projects have also been done on; how to take advantage of different climatic zones within the region, forestry, irrigation dams, river basin development, processing and preservation of food, agricultural pricing and development of distributive and marketing channels for agricultural produce. The Schemes are to act both as a way of demonstrating new farming practices to farmers and also to implement community policies.

³⁷ Authority decision A/DEC 20/5/80, Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.

³⁸ C/DEC 1/5/81, Official Journal, vol. 3, June 1981, and A/DEC 4/5/82, Official Journal, vol. 3, June 1982.

The Community has also targeted the year 2000 as that in which the region should become self-sufficient in food production, and for raising agriculture as a priority area rather than the neglect it has suffered in most parts of the region since independence. Agriculture has therefore been covered very extensively by Community decision making. This gets a score of six, since common institutions have been set to implement the decisions.

Industrial co-operation has identified certain areas such as food production, agrochemical, agricultural machines, construction materials, petrochemicals, pharmaceutical, iron and steel and automobiles and related industries as priority areas.³⁹ Various guidelines for promoting regional enterprises have also been decided on and are embodied in the Regional Development Co-operation Policy and Co-operation Programmes.⁴⁰

Unlike other issue areas such as agriculture, transport and telecommunications, industrial policy is still at the general guidelines level and does not as yet involve specifics or joint projects. Scoring will be 1 on the scale.

From the above we can conclude that collective decision making has been extensive and that some issue areas have been more broadly covered than others. Some have had decisions taken that are more specific and involve actual implementation by collective institution whilst implementation in other areas are left to governments. Others,

³⁹ Council Decision C/DEC 8/11/79, Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.

⁴⁰ Authority decisions A/DEC 4/5/84 and A/DEC 3/5/83, Official Journal, vol. 5, June 1983.

especially industrialisation, have had only general decisions taken at the problem recognition level.

Despite the high level of decision making stage of some the issue areas, conclusions cannot be made about the effectiveness of regional decisions until we look at the importance national governments attach to them. If the salience of regional decisions are high then it is more likely that governments would create the frameworks needed at the national level to facilitate their implementation. A low salience on the other hand may, *a priori*, result in non-ratification of regional protocols, a neglect of decision or even impedance of regional decisions by governments. Below, we attempt to gauge the importance of regional decisions to national governments and decision makers.

Relative Importance of Community Decisions vis-à-vis National Decisions

Though decisions have been taken both extensively and sometimes at a high decision making stage, it does not necessarily mean that the decisions are always complied with or implemented or indeed that they are even ratified by national governments.

A major problem that has been recognised in the functioning of ECOWAS is that decisions are either not ratified or are just not implemented by member states. One reason for this is because national planning still takes precedence even in areas where governments have taken collective decisions. But significant strides have been made by ECOWAS countries since the community was formed. These strides are particularly evident in transport and telecommunications. We use a revised⁴¹ measure devised by

Lindberg to gauge relative effectiveness of the collective arena *vis-à-vis* national decision making. This measure reproduced below gives attributes that indicate the terms of decision making scoring 1 for preponderance of national governments and 5 for a preponderance of community decisions;

Low Integration

1. All policy decisions are made by individual governments by means of purely internal processes or are made in other nonnational settings.
2. Only the beginnings of West African level decision authority have appeared.
3. Substantial regular policy-making goes on at the West African level, but most matters are still decided by purely domestic processes.
4. Most decisions must be taken jointly, but substantial decisions are still taken at the nation-state level.
5. All choices are subject to joint decisions in the West African system.

High Integration.⁴²

Though the usual difficulties of using such discreet measures for measuring continuous variables arise in this case, it is possible to give an indication in the various issue areas of the relative importance of national decision making. Enumerating the individual issues areas and scoring each according to the scale above would be the appropriate thing to do but the non availability of data makes this difficult. However, a general score of 2; only the beginnings of West Africa level decision authority have appeared, could be given. In other words , even though decisions may score very high on the decision making stage scale, actual implementation is low because of a preponderance of national decision making which compete with the decisions made at the regional level.

⁴¹ The revision entails substituting West Africa for region to make it more specific.

⁴² Lindberg, 'Regional Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon', op. cit., p 69.

This score is supported by 1981, six years after the formation of the community only one out of six protocols that had been signed by the Authority had come into effect since they were signed in 1978. By 1984 only two out of eleven protocols had been ratified by at least seven member states, that is, the minimum number of states required for ratification. No member state had ratified all the protocols whilst six members had ratified none - nine years after the formation of the organisation.⁴³ Thus even though in table 5 12 issue areas had been listed as having had decision taken on them, little tends to be done beyond the conference itself.

In addition to using the level of decision making as a measure of regional integration in West Africa, it will be appropriate to see the extent to which decisions have changed the pattern and level of trade within the region. As was elaborated in the first chapter and reiterated several times, ECOWAS is attempting to facilitate regional development through regional trade based on the assumption of economies of scale and the so-called dynamic effects of third world economic integration. It should therefore be expected that the functioning of ECOWAS will result in the manifestation of some of the dynamic effects such as industrial development, expanded intra-regional trade, increased efficiency in production, and reduced dependence.

However, because integration is still at the free trade stage assessments will have to be limited to the extent to which ECOWAS has affected trade within the region, and redirected trade from its dependence on western markets to the region. But the failure to

⁴³ West Africa Magazine, London, 1984, p 2324.

move beyond attempts at trade liberalisation is itself indicative of how little has been achieved relative to the schedule set out in the Treaty.

5.4 Trade As a Measure of Integration

Since regional economic integration implies a movement from a free trade area to total economic integration with a common external tariff being adopted, ECOWAS effectively means the extrapolation of the arguments for protection to the regional level. As was argued in chapter one, the belief is that protection at the regional level has several advantages over similar measures at the national level. Import substitution industrialisation, for example, is expected to be less disruptive for the highly dependent economies because the pooling of resources for regional industrial development would mean less cost for each individual state than would otherwise have been the case if they embarked on such programmes individually.

Industrial development however is predicated on the availability of a market of sufficient size to absorb goods produced. A regional market is expected to result in an enlargement of the market. Indeed the theoretical essence of a regional integration scheme is that industry will be able to take advantage of economies of large scale production as a result of such an enlarged market. The market must therefore exist for both intermediate and final goods for regional integration to succeed.

A regional market is, however, not created until there is interpenetration by the member states of each others market. This interpenetration is expected to increase as the

scheme moves from a free trade area to a common market. Since the setting of a common external tariff (CET), and the creation of a common market was expected to be in place by the end of 1992 it will be instructive to see how the direction of trade flows has changed as ECOWAS moved progressively toward a common market.

Before regional integration begins to yield results, the initial stages usually result in costs to the members as they set up institutions and divert funds from national programmes to the region. The eventual reaping of benefits do not, however stop costs from accruing to the participants, albeit, at different rates. Some may be able to offset these cost by the benefits they derive from their participation. Since regional economic integration has costs for the participating countries in terms of more expensive goods, lost revenue, as well as the effects of economic polarisation, a perpetually protected but inefficient regional market and industries would impede rather than accelerate regional development in the long-run. The question that arises is what sort of time frame participating countries are willing to wait before reaping the benefits of the scheme? In other words how long would members be willing to protect regional industries that may not necessarily be in their countries?

From the section on regional collective decision making we came to the conclusion that various decisions have been taken and implemented to facilitate regional trade. These include monetary issues, the building of roads and telecommunication networks, harmonisation of tariff procedures, the defining of the rules of origin, the classification of countries into stages of development categories, and of goods into priority groups. How these have facilitated trade can be gleaned by comparing regional trade before and after the creation of ECOWAS. Such a measure will not only indicate how much has been

achieved, so far, but will also help us in assessing the future effectiveness of ECOWAS as a tool for economic development. The successful achievement of implementation targets will imply that projects do not overrun their cost projections and opportunity costs. Though delay may not be the only cause of increased cost of various aspects of integration, unsuccessful implementation will mean continued funding the programmes that invariably turn out to be more expensive than anticipated, especially in instances where sunk cost considerations propel continuing implementation when abandonment would be a more sensible option to adopt.

To emphasise these costs is not to labour the point, particular since the political and social impact of such cost must be borne in mind in a region where resources are scarce and where the individual countries need such diverted foreign exchange for domestic programmes.

Though regional integration among West African countries has tremendous obstacles to overcome and trade has to be established where only little had existed before, a measurement of intra-regional trade would indicate just what the impact of trade facilitating decisions have achieved and how they are influencing change in the direction of trade of member states, improving intra-regional interdependence, and reducing dependence on foreign markets.

Apart from presenting statistics on regional trade flows it would be even more instructive to see the role manufactured goods are playing in intra-regional trade. Because agricultural export produce are duplicated in the various countries of the region, it is

unlikely that intra-regional trade will be significant in these commodities. This is because the region does not have the capacity to process and produce consumer goods out of them for the regional market, which in any case is too small to absorb all the derivatives of such raw materials.

To the extent that the main export produce of West African countries have their markets abroad, and also from the above argument that the regional market is unlikely to eventually replace the present markets of these primary goods, regional integration has to be based on non-traditional export goods. For the dynamic effects of regional integration to be manifested in ECOWAS regional integration will have to be based on industrial goods. It must be remembered that goods are usually exported if there is an excess of it in the domestic market. But since West African countries are on average net importers of food, exchange of food cannot underpin integration either. In addition to these arguments, it is clear from both theory, and the ECOWAS Treaty that the member countries are more interested in using the scheme as a means of industrialising their economies.

To reiterate therefore, a measure that shows how manufactured goods production are increasing to take advantage of the enlarged market is an important indicator of level of success achieved so far and a good indicator of future success. Table 7 below shows the percentage distribution of trade by ECOWAS countries from 1985 to 1991. 1985 is chosen as the base year because it is two years after the freezing of Community tariffs. This means that the effect of such freezing and gradual elimination tariffs⁴⁴ ought to have started having an impact. It also gives us four years before 1989, when all tariff barrier

⁴⁴ cf. Table Six, p. 353 above.

between members were to have been abolished. 1985 is also ten years from the signing of the treaty of the community. That gives sufficient time for intra-regional trade to be showing signs of diversification and improvement. Post-1989 should, after the elimination of barriers, and 15 years after the formation of the organisation, show an indication of increased trade between the member countries.

Table 6. INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE OF ECOWAS

Percentage of total Exports going to other Member States

<u>Countr y</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>
Benin	2.40	6.30	9.10	14.40	9.00	9.40	9.40
Burkina Faso	19.90	20.50	23.60	17.70	19.20	17.70	17.90
Cape Verde	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.50	1.70	2.20	N/A
Ivory Coast	10.70	11.70	13.70	15.40	20.50	17.50	22.80
The Gambia	16.80	11.90	8.20	6.30	4.90	4.60	5.20
Ghana	4.30	1.00	2.40	1.80	1.90	1.80	2.10
Guinea	0.50	1.60	1.70	2.30	2.00	2.20	2.40
G-Bissau	17.70	1.80	2.40	1.70	2.90	1.70	1.10
Liberia	3.00	0.40	0.03	0.40	0.07	0.03	0.08
Mali	5.20	7.20	9.60	5.70	5.20	4.10	4.40
Mauritania	3.50	6.90	5.30	6.20	8.10	4.20	4.20
Niger	17.00	6.70	4.90	5.90	8.40	8.40	10.50
Nigeria	3.30	3.80	3.80	5.10	4.30	3.30	3.50
Senegal	18.00	13.20	17.10	15.10	11.60	12.00	13.00
Sierra Leone	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	N/A	N/A
Togo	5.40	7.50	9.20	7.70	8.10	9.70	10.50

Source: Calculated from UN Direction of Trade Statistics.

On average the member countries of the regional organisation export most of the goods to the industrialised countries of western Europe and the United States. As the following tables indicate, by 1991 this situation had not changed much. Gambia, for example, was exporting 5.5% of a total of 166.22 million dollars worth of exports to its ECOWAS partner countries. This compares with 90.5% to the industrialised countries. Guinea exported 2.4% of its total exports of 637.78 million dollars to ECOWAS countries relative to 85.5% to the industrialised countries.

The state with the highest proportion of its exports going to other member states of ECOWAS is Cote d'Ivoire with 22.8% out of a total of 2,077.8 million dollars. The least exporter to the region is Guinea Bissau with 1.1 in 1991, out of a total of 19.665 million dollars.

On average, the francophone countries participate in intra-regional trade more than the anglophone countries. Between 1985 and 1991 Benin, for example, increased its percentage share of total exports going to the region from 2.4% to 9.4%, with a high 14.4% in 1988 which is an increase of 12%. Burkina Faso has maintained a fairly stable share of between a low of 17.7% to a high of 23.6% for the internal market. Cote d'Ivoire has increased its share of exports going to the internal market from 10.7% in 1985 to 22.8% in 1991.

The anglophone countries on the other hand have not increased exports to the regional market by any significant amount. From 3.3% of its exports going to the regional market in 1985, Nigeria reached a high of 5.1% in 1988 and fell back to 3.5% in 1991.

Ghana on the other hand started from 4.3% in 1985, got to a low of 1% in 1986, and thereafter hovered between 1.8% and 2.1% reflecting a fall on the 1985 figures.

The expansion in trade between some francophone countries and the lack of any such expansion for the anglophone countries reflect the higher level of pre-integration trade that existed between them before ECOWAS was formed. Various regional organisations among them had facilitated a certain level of trade. The English speaking countries on the other hand had broken up common institutions at independence and therefore reduced interaction among themselves. The increase in francophone trade on the other hand is mainly a result of increased percentage volumes exported to traditional trading partners. The impact of ECOWAS in such instances is therefore difficult to assess. What it does indicate, however, is that there is a potential for increased trade among the partner countries. According to the Secretariat, a major reason for the failure of the scheme to date is the non implementation of the scheme.⁴⁵

The failure of integration to have an impact on direction of trade flows has resulted in the relaunching of a trade liberalisation scheme in 1990. If tariff reductions had followed the original timetable of the Treaty, 15 years should have seen the formation of a customs union. 1990 should therefore have been the year when a common external tariff should have been imposed. The inability to start the process of eliminating tariffs and moving gradually from a free trade area, to a custom union both in 1981 and 1983 respectively means January 1990 has become the new date for relauching the process.

⁴⁵ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS: A Conducive Political Environment - The Basis for Regional Integration', Article prepared by the Information directorate of the Secretariat, West Africa Magazine, 27 July - 2 August, 1992, p 1264.

New guidelines for achieving trade liberalisation⁴⁶ have been issued. For the purpose of elimination of tariff barriers, goods have been classified into three broad groups. These are handicrafts, unprocessed goods and industrial products. From January 1990, member states were to stop levying duties on any unprocessed good or handicraft products originating from the Community. These goods must, however, be accompanied by an ECOWAS Certificate of Origin, issued by the authorities of the exporting member state as proof that the goods originate from within the region. Industrial goods will have tariffs reduced according to the time table outline earlier in this chapter.

Trade liberalisation in industrial products started off with twenty-five approved products selected from eight member countries. These include non-cocoa based confectionery, foam mattresses, refrigerators, air conditioners, matches, plastic bags, hides, natural leather shoes, synthetic leather shoes, kitchen utensils, bleach, vinegar, lime, emulsion paint, floor paint, billets, laminated steel, tiles, biscuits beer, stout, insecticides, fungicides and limestone. The countries whose firms got access to the regional market are Nigeria and Benin with the highest number of goods; six and five respectively, followed by Ghana, Senegal, Niger and Mali with three products each, and Burkina Faso and Cape Verde with two products each.⁴⁷ By 1992 this had gone up to one hundred and thirty products.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ this has been defined by the Secretariat as comprising the following stages: 1) the consolidation of custom duties and charges of equivalent effect and non-tariff barriers; 2) immediate liberalisation of unprocessed goods and traditional handicraft; 3) gradual liberalisation of industrial products originating from member states; 4) gradual establishment of a common external tariff.

⁴⁷ ECOWAS, *Contact*, September, 1990, vol. 2, no 2, p 6.

⁴⁸ ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS: A Conducive Political Environment', op. cit., p 1264.

Trade liberalisation is therefore not an across the board freeing of trade for all firms to take advantage of the regional market. Firms have to apply by the 26 February deadline if each year for its products to be approved for community tariff treatment.⁴⁹ Trade liberalisation is therefore going to depend on local manufactures being aware of the procedure for gaining community treatment.

In certain instances the none implementation of agreed policies may be said to contribute to the low level of trade amongst the member countries. Though the treaty expected the removal of all tariffs and other barriers with equivalent effect,⁵⁰ members continue to maintain such barriers against each other.

Nigeria, for example, maintains an import prohibition list of goods whose importation from Ghana are banned. These include: (1) live or dead poultry; (2) vegetables; (3) processed wood excluding wood in the rough; (4) fruit, fresh or preserved, and fruit juices; (5) textiles fabrics of all types and articles thereof excluding, (a) nylon tyre cord, (b) multifilament nylon chafer fabric and tracing cloth, (c) mattress tickings, (d) narrow fabrics, trimmings and linings, (e) made-up fishing nets, mosquito netting materials, (f) gloves for industrial use, (g) canvas fabrics for the manufacture of fan belts, (h) moulding cups and lacra, elastic bands and motifs, (i) textile products and articles for technical use, and (j) transmission or conveyor belt or belting of textile materials. Others include (6) domestic articles and wares made of plastic, (7) mineral waters, soft drinks and beverages, (8) rice and rice products, (9) maize and maize products, (10) wheat and wheat products, (11) sparkling wines, (12) vegetable oils excluding linseed and castor oils used

⁴⁹ ECOWAS Contact, September, 1990, vol. 2, no. 2.

⁵⁰ Article 12 of the ECOWAS Treaty.

as industrial raw materials, (13) aluminium sulphate including alum, (14) retreated and used tyres, (15) branched alkyl benzene, bentonite ad barytes, (16) mosquito coils, (17) meat (whether frozen or not), (18) fish (whether frozen or not except those caught and landed by vessels licensed and authorised by appropriate Nigeria Authority), and (19) expired or contaminated food products (whether in can or any other packages).⁵¹

Ghana also applies seasonal quotas, such as, those on fish between May and September.⁵² Other restrictive practices used by the member countries are custom clearance delays, discriminatory customs tariffs, documentation and registration procedures.

Indeed apart from the perennial non implementation factor, two reason given in 1992 by a monitoring missions for the slow pace of the relaunched scheme are that even though trade is taking place in the specified industrial products, it is doing so 'outside the scope of the liberalisation scheme and without the necessary documentation, e.g. certificate of origin etc...'. The second reason is that there were delays in removing barriers by member states.

It would have been interesting to show how trade in the goods listed for Community treatment have fared since the scheme started in 1990, and especially how the companies that have been approved to trade have performed. Unfortunately figures are not

⁵¹ CTA, Economic and Export Analysts Ltd., The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, A Project Report to the Commission of the European Communities and the Government of Ghana, CTA, Reading, 1992, p. 4.4.

⁵² *ibid.*

available. However the monitoring group's observations indicate that things are not as encouraging as the Secretariat would have liked.

An interesting thing about the figures we have considered is that contrary to initial fears, Nigeria has failed to take advantage of the wider market created by the formation of ECOWAS. Though it is still too early to make concrete judgements about the impact of ECOWAS on the direction of trade of the partner countries, evidence so far has not shown any appreciable diversification of markets or increased trade flow between partner countries. ECOWAS countries, in some cases, rely even more heavily on Western industrialised countries as the main export markets.

5.5 Industrialisation as A Measure of Integration

Another revealing set of figures provides us with an idea of the extent to which industrialisation has progressed within the region. Since, as mentioned above, the purpose for regional integration is to accelerate industrialisation, it will be helpful to see whether it has actually occurred since 1975.

Table 8 below shows the structure of production in ECOWAS countries for the years 1965 and 1989. Since ECOWAS could not, reasonably, have been expected to show any real impact on industrialisation immediately after its formation, we deliberately chose 1989, a 14 year lapse. This year is compared with 1965 which gives an adequate period prior to the formation of the community and is therefore capable of showing changes in the structure of the economies of the member countries.

Table 7.

Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Product

Country	GDP(millions US\$)		Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing		Services	
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1989</u>
S- Leone	320	890	34	46	28	11	6	6	38	42
Nigeria	5850	28920	54	31	13	44	6	10	33	25
Mali	260	2080	65	50	9	12	5	6	28	38
Niger	670	2040	68	36	3	13	2	8	29	51
B-Faso	350	2460	37	35	24	26	11	15	39	39
Benin	220	1600	59	46	8	12	N/A	5	33	42
Ghana	2050	5260	44	49	19	17	10	10	38	34
Togo	190	1340	45	33	21	23	10	8	34	44
Guinea	N/A	2750	N/A	30	N/A	33	N/A	3	N/A	38
Liberia	270	N/A	27	N/A	40	N/A	3	N/A	34	N/A
Senegal	810	4660	25	22	18	31	14	20	56	47
I- Coast	760	7170	47	46	19	24	11	17	33	30
<u>M'tania</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>910</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>38</u>	

Source: World Development Report 1991, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 208.
(Figures for the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde were not available).

The figures show that industrialisation in the ECOWAS countries experienced a decline as a proportion of GDP in some countries, while some increased appreciably and others stagnated relative to 1965 figures.

Those that experienced a decline in proportion of industry to GDP include Sierra Leone, from 28% in 1965 to 11% in 1989, Ghana from 19% to 17% and Mauritania from 36% to 24%. Those that experienced significant increases include Nigeria which increased

substantially from 13% of GDP to 44% and Senegal from 18% to 31% of GDP. Others registered increases of between 2% and 5%.

It is difficult to attribute the increases, where they occurred, to regional integration. The conclusion can, however, be drawn that ECOWAS has not had any substantial impact on industrialisation in member countries. Since 1965 to 1989 includes periods before ECOWAS was formed, it is inclusive of all the years that the organisation has been operational, and therefore ought to have shown signs, where they exist, of improvement in the industrial prospects of the member states.

Indeed, the separate figures given for manufacturing indicate that even those countries which showed substantial increases did not increase the manufacturing base very much over the period. The region, therefore, has a long way to go in turning the assumptions made about industrialisation into reality.

Combined with the level of trade within the region, the conclusion that can be drawn is that industrialisation, and manufacturing in particular has not increased its share of GDP in the region. The purpose for wanting to create a larger regional market has remained unfulfilled.

5.6 Conclusion

The assessment of the achievements of ECOWAS has centred on three main criteria: the level of collective decision making, the impact of the community on the

direction of exports of member countries, and the extent to which it has affected industrial development.

The conclusion we came to, after assessing the level of collective decision making was that a wide scope of decisions have been taken together. However, though problems have been recognised as needing collective action, and decision taken together on policy guidelines, they have been lacking in actual implementation. Goals have been set for the formation of a custom union, the free movement of community citizens and the introduction of a single currency. But the implementation of policy guidelines leading to the fulfilment of such goals have not been very encouraging for several reasons which will be examined in the next chapter.

Though the non implementation of collective decisions affect the impact on intra-regional trade and industrial development, that alone cannot be taken as the reason for the low level of regional trade and industrialisation. Included in the reasons are the initially low level of intra-regional trade and industrialisation prior to the formation of ECOWAS and structural rigidities, such as dependence, which are endemic in the sub region.

In the following chapter, we will argue that the reasons for the low level of achievement have as much to do with political and social factors as with economic factors.

CHAPTER 6**REASONS FOR SLOW PROGRESS OF ECOWAS****6.1 Introduction**

In the last chapter we measured what level of integration has been achieved by ECOWAS since it was formed in 1975. The general conclusion was that regional collective decision making covered a wide breadth of issues. Among the 22 issue areas listed by Lindberg, ECOWAS covered 17. Despite such a wide coverage of issues, most collective decision making did not lead to action in the issue area. In moving from problem recognition, through options choosing to actual implementation stages of the decision making continuum ECOWAS mostly stopped at the second stage. Problems are recognised as needing regional collaboration. Various options are examined and decisions taken. But when it comes to governments implementing the decisions little action is taken.

In this chapter we will examine the factors that account for such non implementation. We will also attempt to examine why even though many governments and practitioners believe that joint action is the only way in which West African countries can develop important decisions concerning industrial, commercial, fiscal and social policies are not directed to the regional level for collective decisions.

In order answer the questions of why regional decision making is extensive but shallow, we will look at the properties that have been identified as necessary for dynamism in collective decision making and mentioned in the previous chapter. These are the cluster

of properties that are collectively termed the *activators* or *animators* of collective decision making activity.¹ They include demands, resources, and bargaining modalities.

Collective decision making systems respond to the demands for action from the constituent parts. The processing of such demands for action depend on the resources that the system possesses. Such resources are used by leaders for demand aggregating, coalition formation, and compliance inducing functions"² Collective decision making is also affected by the systems bargaining modalities. That is the strategies they adopt, whether they are zero-sum or cooperative, and which reflect the aims and expectations of actors *vis-à-vis* each other.³

In addition to the activators, the final cluster of properties referred to collectively as the *consequences* of collective decisions⁴ help in indicating why collective decision making does or does not penetrate constitute subsystems, why compliance is low, and why the changes that occur at the national level as a consequence of collective decision in ECOWAS are minimal.

These two clusters will help us explain the slowness of ECOWAS integration. The method that will be adopted here is to see the way the political and social environment affects the animators and consequences of collective decision making.

6.2 National Interest, Dependence and Demand Flows

¹Lindberg, Political Integration as a multidimensional Phenomenon. p53

²Lindberg, p53.

³ibid., p54.

⁴ibid. p54

Demand according to David Easton is defined as: 'an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so'.⁵

There are two elements in the above definition which need to be highlighted. First the "expression of opinions" is done (or expected to be done), according to integration theory, by national governments, interest groups and pressure groups. Thus the flow is from the state to the regional organisation.⁶ Secondly, such expression of opinion should carry with it the authority for the regional organisation to perform the function. To this extent even though opinions may be expressed by groups other than governments, it is really only the latter who can, as custodians of the national interest (gate keepers) delegate such authority. The opinions that are of most relevance to the functioning of regional organisations such as ECOWAS are therefore those that emanate from national governments. This is particularly heightened in the ECOWAS region where no effective region-wide interest and pressure groups exist to press for particular interests at the regional level as pertains in the EEC. It is also heightened by the decision making structure of the organisation. All decisions are decided on by either the Authority of Heads of State or the Council of Ministers. Initiating powers of the secretariat are monitored, and are thus only effective where national political and economic interests or programmes are not affected.

⁵ Easton, D., quoted in Lindberg, N. L, *ibid.*, p75.

⁶ On this all theoretical perspective of regional integration agree.

The extent to which the opinion of national governments converge is therefore of crucial importance to the effective functioning of ECOWAS despite the fact that national interests may converge without leaders wanting to do business together in which case demands may not be forthcoming. One of the reasons for the low performance of ECOWAS is because of a lack of demand flows from member states.

Having asserted that the Secretariat of ECOWAS and interest groups are relatively less important to the functioning of the organisation than governments in terms of the authoritative allocation of responsibilities to the regional organisation, we will now turn to ask why there is a lack of flow of demands to the collective arena from the constituent parts and what the effects are on integration.

As we noted above, out of the 22 universal issue areas listed, ECOWAS has covered 17 of them. That is a remarkable achievement for an organisation which was only formed in 1975 and did not really start functioning till 1977. What we also noticed was that though such a wide number of issues had been covered, such coverage was usually limited to the problem recognition stage and a few to the decision making stage.

The large number of issue areas covered is an indication of the identical and convergent goals that most governments in West Africa have. At a very general level West African countries are united by the desire for economic development. These goals have been expressed in fora such as the OAU⁷, UNCTAD and indeed the U.N general assembly. The Lagos plan of Action⁸ after recognising the need for collective action on

⁷ One of the aims of the OAU, expressed in Article (1(b) of its Charter is "to co-ordinate and intensify" the co-operation and efforts of its members to achieve a better life for their people and African in General

development issues divided Africa into three regions. These regions are expected to work together toward collective self-reliance.⁹ The unity of ECOWAS countries, found in their desire to develop economically, is reflected in the fact that out of the 17 issue areas they decided on collectively 10 of them were connected with economic functions, followed by 5 cultural and social functions, and 1 external relations function and 1 political function.

ECOWAS member States have from the foregoing therefore accepted, that certain decisions should be made jointly. Such an attitude is underpinned by the feeling that they are individually unable to achieve some of the economic goals by themselves.¹⁰ The desire to move from an underdeveloped and under privileged position in the world make them willing to pay attention to the goals of ECOWAS.¹¹ This desire has however not been translated into demands in the Eastonian sense of governments directing problems to the regional arena for collective solution. Issues related to industrial development are considered at the national level. Since integration among developing countries is rationalised on the basis of its ability to produce dynamic benefits for the participating countries through industrial co-operation, a failure to rationalise emergent industries or to co-ordinate commercial policies mean that possible benefits such as economies of scale, and increased bargaining power will not materialise.

⁸ The 1960 Lagos Plan of Action and the special UN Session on Africa in 1986 were all conferences which accorded priority to regional co-operation and integration.

⁹ These regions were Africa, Central Africa, and East and Southern Africa.

¹⁰ The second Nigerian development plan for example contained an entire chapter on the need for co-operation entitled "Economic Integration and African Unity". Second National Development Plan 1970-74: Programme Of Post-War Reconstruction and Development (Lagos Federal Ministry of Information, (1970) Chapter 9.

¹¹ Achi A, 'Regional Economic Integration and Foreign Policy' in The Political Economy of Ivory Coast, Zartman & Delgado C (ed.) Praeger, NY 1984.

Though it will be a generalisation to imply that all decisions of ECOWAS resemble aspirations more than objectives, it is true to say that even in instances where choices have been made between alternatives, there is widespread and sometimes general non implementation by member countries of the decisions.

Qualitative demands that would tie the economies of ECOWAS countries together in a strategic planning process are usually not directed at the regional organisation. Plans for industrial development, structural adjustment programmes, the implementation of international financial institutions' conditionalities are undertaken with the context of the national economy in mind without much thought for their impact on regional goals. Nigeria Benin, and Ghana, for example, are each implementing IMF/World Bank sponsored adjustment programmes. These are however being done independently of each other as well as the other members of the organisation and of the general objectives of regional integration.

Thus there are the twin problems of a lack of demand flows to the regional arena and in the reverse direction a lack of implementation of collective decisions. Below we will attempt to explain why this is so.

Among other things, this situation reflects the priority given to national goals over regional ones. The emphasis placed on national goals is an indication that where the fine print of national objectives clash with the more general regional goals and objectives, the former will take precedence over the latter. Even though this is not peculiar to West African countries, it nevertheless contradicts the assumed 'cosmopolitanism' that underlies

integration theorising and practice for and among developing countries. Thus countries who, broadly speaking, see themselves as losing overall from regional integration because of its polarisation effects will be slow in directing demands to the ECOWAS especially when the economic, social and indeed political cost cannot be immediately and accurately determined and where compensatory measures are not readily available. The now defunct East Africa Community is an example in this regard. Apart from the ideological differences between Tanzania and Kenya, and the personal animosity between Nyerere and Amin one of the problems that responsible for the break up of the organisation, regarded at one stage as the most advanced among developing countries, was what was perceived as the unequal distribution of benefits.¹² Though this problem is not peculiar to integration among developing countries, it tends to have a higher impact on the because of the lack of resources to compensate those who are affected negatively as a result of particular policies. Thus even though member countries share the desire to develop economically, it is doubtful whether any of them is willing to forego its own industrial development for the sake of an absolute industrial development of the region as a whole.

There is another reason for the lack of demand flows to the regional organisation and why national policies take precedence over regional goals even if they are compatible and could probably be better implemented as part of a regional programme. It is that the member countries are highly dependent on foreign aid and technical assistance as a result of their poverty.

¹² Reminger J. P, Multinational Co-operation for Development in West Africa, Pergamon, New York., 1979.

One aspect of such dependence is that it brings to the fore the contradiction in attempting to be less dependent while at the same time realising that one has to depend on the very same people from who one seeks independence.¹³ ECOWAS countries have also been plagued by this contradiction between the desire for self reliance and the need for dependence since independence. Thus just as Nkrumah, for example, while denouncing western imperialism envisioned that new investment in capital for development would be obtained from western public and private sectors;¹⁴ ECOWAS member states continue to appeal to states outside Africa for assistance to help them over their burden of 'neo-colonialism'. The final communiqué of the Authority of heads of state of ECOWAS, issued after their 1990 summit is a typical example of the dilemma. It stated among other things;

....The inadequate support given by the international community to Africa under UN-PAAERD against the growing economic recovery and development needs of the sub-region. The authority noted that recent global events, especially the dramatic economic and political changes in Europe, would increase the marginalisation of the countries of the sub-region unless specific measures were taken to safeguard West African interest. To this end the Authority made an urgent appeal to the international community, and the EEC and its members countries in particular, to appreciate the serious development challenges facing West Africa and provide adequate support to supplement the economic recovery and reform efforts of West African states.¹⁵

The above quote indicates how the ideology that underlies regional integration among developing countries' calls for regional solidarity to overcome dependence and neo-colonialism is undermined by their poverty.¹⁶

¹³ Card E, "The Political Economy of Ghana" in The Political Economy of Africa, Harris R (ed.), Schenkman, Cambridge Mass, 1975.

¹⁴ *ibid.* p53

¹⁵ Final Communiqué of the Authority of Heads of State of ECOWAS, Contact, vol. 2, no. 2, September, 1990, p14.

¹⁶ Mayall, J., "Britain and the Third World" in The West and the Third World, O'Neill R & Vincent R. J, Macmillan, London, 1990.

Apart from undermining the integrity of such schemes it also makes ECOWAS countries cautious about policies that might actually result in aid being spread thinly through regional organisations over which they have little control instead of coming to them directly.¹⁷ It also results in caution about policies and generally in organisations that might lose them their traditional advantage in the markets of benevolent developed countries. The formation of ECOWAS as an example was itself only endorsed by francophone speaking associates of the EEC after the Lome Convention was signed. The signing of the Lome Convention by the Commonwealth 'associable' states and Guinea together with the members of the expired Yaounde Convention of the region lifted a stumbling-block from the path of ECOWAS in that it unified the basis on which all independent West African States would pursue trade relative to EC countries.... For the francophone countries who had been associated with the EEC through the Yaounde Convention, this meant that the ECOWAS Treaty could no longer represent a potential threat to their access to the markets of Western Europe.¹⁸ What made it even more acceptable to these countries was that the Lome Convention unlike the Yaounde Convention preceding it earmarked specific funds¹⁹ to encourage ACP regional projects²⁰ and was therefore not going to use up funds that would have gone to the member countries directly.

¹⁷ Lister M, The European Community and the Developing World, Avebury, Aldershot, 1988.

¹⁸ Bach D. C, 'Francophone Regional Organisations' in West African Regional Co-operation and Development.

¹⁹ Articles 156 to 166 of the Lome Convention is devoted to specifying how regional co-operation in the ACP countries will be done. Article 156, paragraph 3, for example states that " in order to promote and strengthen the ACP states' collective capabilities, the Community shall provide effective aid enabling them to strengthen regional economic integration and consolidate co-operation of a functional type', Fourth ACP-EEC CONVENTION, signed in Lome on 15 December 1989.

²⁰ *ibid.* p60

The dependence on aid and markets, and the perceived advantages of maintaining traditional links with former colonial powers hinder the single minded pursuit of integration in the sub-region. Demands therefore do not flow to the collective decision making arena as they ought.

Contrary to the impression that the above may give, external actors from the developed regions of the world usually encourage regional integration in West Africa and among developing countries in general. Most of these actors have a benevolent attitude toward such organisations. France is however peculiar in certain respects in that though it encourages such arrangements it discourages groupings that it sees as affecting its vital interests within any particular region. Francophone sub-saharan Africa is important to France's pretensions to great power status. Its attitude toward ECOWAS was therefore to encourage a countervailing francophone group - the West Africa Economic Community (CEAO) to be formed to forestall the preponderance of Nigeria in ECOWAS.²¹ This has had a lasting negative impact on ECOWAS.

Related to the point above, the existence of CEAO as a major and more efficient rival of ECOWAS together with many other similar groups within the region mean that demands flow to many other organisations apart from ECOWAS. There is therefore a lack of concentration on one organisation, and instead attention is divided between several groupings.

²¹Bach, D. C., The Politics of West African Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in Journal of African Studies, 21, 4 (1983).

Since it is widely accepted that the CEAO is more effective than ECOWAS²² it can be expected that until the latter is able to provide the benefits that the former is able to give to its members demands will continue to be directed by CEAO members to it.

In addition to this impact France has had in advocating the formation of CEAO the bilateral co-operation agreements between France and the francophone ECOWAS members means that they tend to direct demands to France rather than to organisations within the region. As long as defence and technical assistance agreements exist between France and some francophone West African countries matters concerning these issue areas will be directed at France.

An example of this is that when commandos passed through Ghana to overthrow the Eyadema regime in 1986 it was not ANAD - the CEAO equivalent of the ECOWAS Defence Protocol - or ECOWAS that was used as a basis of intervention but French troops who stifled the conflict.²³

In actual fact the belonging of members states to different regional groups may sometimes result in actions that duplicate efforts unnecessarily. The signing of the ECOWAS Defence Protocol in 1981 was what "spurred" the francophone countries to accelerate their own negotiations for the adoption of a CEAO Defence Protocol.²⁴ The CEAO defence protocol however did not only rival that of ECOWAS but was better and more relevant to the countries at the time. An important element that was part of CEAO's

²² World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa, from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, World Bank, Washington D. C 1989.

²³ Chipman, J., *French Power in Africa*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.

²⁴ *ibid.* p177.

Defence Protocol that was lacking in ECOWAS is a clause in Article 7 in which members understood not to shelter or tolerate on their territories active opponents involved in subversion activities against governments. Thus the CEAO Defence Protocol addressed a specific and predominant fear that the more general ECOWAS protocol does not. Defence matters arising in ANAD countries will obviously be referred to CEAO take the ECOWAS even though all the members of the former also members of the latter. From previous French military activity in the region such as the one cited above, it is doubtful if ECOMOG would have been used if Liberia had been one of the francophone countries which had maintained its ties with France.

As an aside, even though it is true that France has a lot of influence in West Africa and by its policy of limiting Nigerian influence²⁵ impeded the functioning of ECOWAS through duplication of integration schemes,²⁶ the extent of such influence must not be exaggerated. France has not got unlimited leeway with its allies in the region. That would be assuming that francophone West Africa leaders have no mind of their own. France is allowed the leverage it has by its client states because the relationship is mutually beneficial. Those countries that maintained relations with France, since independence fared better in terms of resource transfer than Sekou Toure's Guinea which did not.

²⁵ As Chipman has stated in French Power in Africa, French support for the Biafran government, though never official, extended to disguised arms transfer made through Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire was extensive. 'President de Gaulle's private view, (not necessarily shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), was that the break-up of Nigeria, a potential African great power, was in the French interest.... France was prepared to defend this geopolitical interest even when its defence might put French economic investment at risk. Chipman, J op. cit., pp 126 - 127.

²⁶ In addition to believing that CEAO could provide wider markets for their manufacturing sectors, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire shared a common concern of Nigeria's new political and economic influence in the region should be checked. An association of francophone states to replace the troubled *Organisation commune africaine mauricienne* (OCAM) was therefore deemed necessary for that suppose. 'The project was immediately encouraged by President Georges Pompidou of France who went as far as to declare that the francophone states should co-ordinate their efforts to counterbalance the heavy weight of Nigeria.' Statement in Jeune Afrique (Paris), 12 February 1972, p 23, cited in Bach, op. cit.

From the above it can be said that the existence of several rival organisations in the region (30 in all) together with an extra-regional rival who is developed and can afford to give to its affiliates advantages that ECOWAS cannot hope to match have the effect of reducing the flow of demands to ECOWAS.

Apart from France's negative impact on ECOWAS another source of difficulty for regional organisations in the developing world is the funding policies of development agencies which sometimes affect the attention ECOWAS receives from its member states. A larger share of aid is donated to individual countries than to regional organisations. Country programming receives first priority in UNDP allocation of resources. 'At least 82% of net resources are set aside for country programming, and at most 18% for inter country programming...'.²⁷

Such allocation policies inadvertently affect the priority states accord to regional organisations despite the fact that programmes designed for regional economic and social integration have first claim on resources for inter-country programming. The issue here is that if regional integration is a *sine qua non* for economic development then resource allocation ought to be reversed. A counter argument could of course be used that since a lot of countries share the amount going to states, such proportions are realistic. We would argue that if integration is that important even the recipient countries themselves should be advocating a scaling down of country support in favour of regional programmes.

²⁷ Remminger, op. cit., p75.

We can conclude on the basis of the above that even though external actors encourage and even sponsor regional integration, sometimes in an attempt to promote the realisation of a new international economic order, external dependence of the states in the region make it difficult to focus attention on projects leading to regional integration. ECOWAS member states adopt policies that conform to requirements of international finance more readily than they do long-run policy goals of ECOWAS. The francophone countries allow an extra regional foreign policy orientation because the dividends are immediate relative to the probable and uncertain long term benefits from regional integration. This situation must not be judged as an uncritical willingness to kow-tow to France but rather as part of the effects of dependence.

It might even be suggested that such attitudes are realistic and pragmatic given the needs that they have. But such a view would imply a passive acceptance of the status-quo. The more probable explanation is that economic pragmatism together with the links forged during the colonial period combine with security concerns to make the francophone states willing to depend on French military, economic and technical assistance.

As we have argued, the external environment is largely benign toward integration in West Africa, the deliberately divisive French policy and inadvertently negative impact of disbursement policies of agencies such as the UNDP notwithstanding. However, poverty and dependence make it difficult for West African countries to focus on regional goals.

6.3 Intra - Regional Relations and Demand Flows

If as we have noted above, a lack of concentration on ECOWAS by member states prevents governments from directing demands to the regional organisation, then how should we explain the large number of issue areas that have been decided on? Who brings them to the attention of collective decision makers and how does the sources of such demands affect the effectiveness with which decisions are carried out?

Most issues that have been decided on are predominantly issues that are already broadly stated as goals in the Treaty of the organisation and relate to decisions that are implied by the broad process of regional economic integration. The Specialised Commissions of the organisation and the Secretary General are the main sources of dynamism in the organisation.

In order to explain why regional policies emanate from the Secretariat more than from national capitals we need to look at other factors. Why, for example, did francophone countries accept to form the CEAO, at France's suggestion, as a countervailing influence against Nigeria even though such a pre-emptive step would obviously affect a wider organisation. Was Nigerian preponderance a threat to the security of other states within the region? Were there indications that it would use its strength to gain an unfair advantage over its partners?

As Aluko noted in *The Foreign Policy of African States*²⁸, power distribution among all states in Africa is more or less even. In ECOWAS, West Africa however

²⁸ Aluko O, "The Detriments of the Foreign Policy of African States" in The Foreign Policy of African States, (Ed) Holder & Stoughton, 1977 pp 1-24.

Nigerian population and GDP is more than that of the rest of the other member states put together. This gives it an enormous potential political power which it can use as a leverage if it so desired. However, West African countries like most countries in Africa have rarely employed force to settle disputes.²⁹ That of course does not mean that Nigeria could not do so in the future and therefore that other states ought not seek a regional balance of power. The immediate and possible reason for the fear of Nigeria, especially by Cote d'Ivoire and Niger³⁰ could be because the former supported Biafran secession and feared reprisals while the latter is very dependent on Nigerian markets and ports for its foreign trade. Not all francophone countries, however, saw Nigerian preponderance as negative however. Senegal and Togo, for example, saw it as playing a stabilising role within the region, with her power serving as a sort of deterrent against external powers.³¹ However, at a general level the majority of countries, not just the French speaking ones, view it with suspicion. This suspicion was, to a certain extent, justified because Nigeria saw the presence of French bases as an impediment to its own progress toward regional great power status.³² Indeed, the ECOWAS Defence Protocol calls for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from the region once ECOWAS can guarantee mutual defence. That is probably seen as increased Nigerian military activity within the region, hence the countervailing Defence Protocol signed by CEAO members soon after the ECOWAS Defence protocol. The question that arises is, whether the presence of French troops in

²⁹ *ibid.* p12

³⁰ Chipman, J. *op cit.*

³¹ Libyan activity in Chad was a case in point, while South African Strength was another

³² As Chipman noted, 'For most of the period since 1960, an intense fear of the power of Nigeria has helped francophone African states deal with each other, and has provided a special reason for their acceptance of a French residual role in West Africa. The need to counterbalance Nigeria has never been a declared policy of francophone African states, but it is clearly implied by their willingness to reintroduce French political, economic and military power into the region. What is more important, Nigerians have always perceived France as intent on acting as a countervailing force in West Africa. they have put pressure on the francophone African states to behave more independently of France. This itself, may have helped to strengthen the links between weak francophone African states and their strong, extra-continental protector. French Power in Africa, pp. 231 - 232.

francophone West Africa has a negative impact on regional integration. The answer to this is that it does so only to the extent that the French government uses such assistance as a leverage to coerce its client states to pursue anti-integration policies. France's reaction toward the formation of ECOWAS as noted earlier, was not anti-integrational. Its fear was that Nigerian influence would need to be countervailed because it posed a threat to her own influence in the region. But the method it advocated was another integration scheme.

It is inconceivable that the francophone countries themselves did not realise that there was a power struggle between Nigeria and France. It is further improbable that the French desire for influence over its former colonies did not create unease among the francophone leaders. The dilemma for the francophone countries was whether to allow themselves to be influenced by France or by Nigeria. The calculations of the benefits and costs with regard to national security and economic interest by the francophone countries was probably influenced by two factors. First the advantages of supporting France were more than Nigeria could provide. Secondly, because of proximity Nigerian preponderance posed more problems for security than did France. Retaining French influence was akin to "killing two birds with one stone" despite the fact that they would be called puppets of France. The first advantage was that French troops guaranteed internal security, and secondly, that such troops would repel any hegemonic tendencies that Nigeria might have or even display.

The formation of CEAO meant they could derive all of the benefits of an integration scheme and at the same time retain French economic and military aid. French

opposition actually worked to the advantage of the Francophone countries. Thus to conclude that any economic group which did not favour French interest would not survive as Atsian³³ does is to give little credit to African political leaders whom such a statement portrays as giving unqualified leeway to France, and does not consider that the francophone countries may actually be working in their own interest and that they gain advantages because of their orientation toward France in their foreign policy.

The repercussions on ECOWAS of such orientation, as mentioned above, is that demands (problems) tend to be passed to France for solutions and resolutions. For the region as a whole it has the negative tendency of further accentuating the mainly anglophone/francophone divide thus making co-operation between them more difficult.

However, to the extent that after the formation of ECOWAS Nigeria attempted to introduce the notion that votes should be based on how much a state contributes to ECOWAS thus giving it a virtual veto power in the organisation vindicated the fear that others had of its intentions. It also brings to the fore the different intentions and attitudes that successive leaders of an individual state might have toward an international organisation. Whereas Gowon did everything possible to dispel the fear of Nigerian motives, his successor made it very obvious that Nigeria would only be willing to act as the core support for the community if it derived commensurate benefits. Though this may be a realistic posture to adopt it served to undermine Nigerian credibility as a leader for regional integration.

³³ Atsian A, Regional Economic Integration and Foreign Policy in The Political Economy of Ivory Coast, Zartman I. W & Delgo C (ed.) Praegar, NY, 1984 p185.

The fear of Nigerian preponderance in the regional organisation was prominent just before and during the early years of ECOWAS. As mentioned above it managed under Gowon, through various bilateral arrangements, to lessen the suspicion of its opponents. Though still seen as the overwhelming power in the region, Nigeria's inability to convert her oil wealth (generated by the OPEC price hikes) into general development of the country reduced its prestige. Furthermore a deepening debt created constraints on her pretensions to regional great power status. There are two ways in which this could be explained. First her dwindling resources relative to her own needs reduced her ability to offer side payments to other countries within the region.

In the period leading to the formation of ECOWAS, the Nigerian president, Gowon's diplomatic style largely succeeded in allaying fear of a Nigerian dominated ECOWAS. This was mainly because of a display of a willingness to contribute to the success of the organisation without reaping immediate benefits. In addition, targeted side payments, including financial aid to drought-stricken neighbours, and the supply of oil on soft credit terms to a number of countries including Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo.³⁴ It also embarked on several joint parastatal projects with individual countries within the region. These included mining with Guinea and Niger, petrochemicals with Senegal, and cement and sugar with Benin.³⁵ Dwindling resources also meant the increasing inability to convert wealth into influence within and outside the region. Secondly, Nigeria as an indebted country lost prestige. This was aggravated by the widely held view that it was a

³⁴ Aluko, O., 'Options in Nigerian Foreign Policy', Conference of the Canadian African Studies Association, Winnipeg, May 1979, p. 18

³⁵ Ojo, O.J., 'Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS', in *International Organization*, xxxiv, 4, Autumn 1980, pp. 590 - 600.

country in which corruption and mismanagement were endemic. The overall effect has been that pronouncements by Nigerian leaders have been less and less bold.

However, despite the problems it has faced over the past 15 years Nigeria stills remains the predominant though not pre-eminent power in the region. Her participation is still very crucial to the future of ECOWAS. It could even be hypothesised that without Nigeria's active participation the organisation would stagnate.

Another constraint that affects the flow of demands from the member states to the regional organisation is the level of trust between the members. Trust among West African countries is quite low. This is reflected in the constant border closures between neighbouring states. It is also reflected in the intermittent accusation by leaders of each others complicity in undermining national security and stability. Border disputes exist between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Mauritania, Mali and Burkina Faso and Ghana and Togo.³⁶ In October 1992, 5 Ghanaians were shot dead by Togolese soldiers on the Ghana/Togo border. Ghana's protestation included a statement by the foreign ministry that "Ghana had no interest in destabilising any of its neighbours especially those with which it shared kinship and blood relations."³⁷ Senegal at various times has accused Guinea Bissau of encouraging and arming Casamance separatists from Senegal.³⁸ Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire have also been accused of helping coup plotters in Liberia.³⁹

³⁶ Chipman J, *op cit.* p191.

³⁷ Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, quoted in African Research Bulletin.

³⁸ African Contemporary Records, 1986-87 vol. xix

³⁹ In 1985 Doe accused Ivory Coast of helping dissidents. Sierra Leone was also alleged

The effects of such border disputes is that it has combined with the personalised nature of politics to create animosity between particular leaders. This inevitably affects the willingness to direct problems to the region for collective decision making. Such instability and the fear of possible undermining of national security by neighbours creates unpredictability in the relationship between the states of the region and also make national leaders unwilling to further increase the permeability of their already porous boundaries having to eventually implement basic policies of regional integration such as free movement of people and goods. The possibility of incursions from neighbouring states will prevent national leaders from 'joint decisions' which imply reducing the salience of borders because that may undermine national security.

Animosity is not only created by distrust in issues related to subversion and boundary disputes but also because leaders fear that political change in neighbouring states will spill over into their own territory. The rise of populist regimes from the late 1970's in Ghana, Liberia and Burkina Faso caused leaders such as Houphéouët Boigny to press for the ostracization⁴⁰ of the leaders of these countries from participating in regional and continental organisations. The foreign minister of the Doe government was for example banned from attending an OAU economic Summit in Nigeria. About a month later the head of State himself was excluded from an ECOWAS Authority meeting. Though the reasons given were ostensibly because of the executions that had taken place after Doe's coup d'état, the fear of emulation in their own countries was another reason for such attempts to isolate the new leaders. It goes without saying that even if such difficulties are removed later on, suspicions and ill-feelings remain. The watch dog group that was set up

⁴⁰ West Africa Magazine, 2 June 1980.

after Doe's exclusion from the Lome summit to monitor activities in Liberia eventually met Doe and led to his eventual acceptance as a head of state. That however did not stop him accusing Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone of subverting his government. It also made him decide not to participate in ECOWAS proceedings immediately after the period following his humiliation.

Petty jealousies also exist among West African countries. The desire to outdo each other has always been present since the early days of independence. Rivalries between Ghana and Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Ghana, to mention just two, have sometimes undermined the desire or ability to work together. The unwillingness to encourage a scheme that might actually lead to the further underdevelopment of ones own country whilst facilitating the development of others may also be partly responsible for the low level of demands flowing from governments to the collective decision making arena.

Apart from disputes arising from accusations of subversion and borders, the more prosperous, and economically stable countries within the region also fear the influx of migrant workers or displaced populations from their less prosperous or less stable neighbours. Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria have served as a magnet for migrant workers all over the region. In 1993 Ghana had to accommodate Togolese nationals fleeing from political upheavals within that country. The presence of 1.2 million Burkinabe in the Ivory Coast between 1984-87 was seen by Ivorian leaders as a security risk because of the revolutionary policies of Thomas Sankara, the then Burkina Faso leader. Nigeria on the other hand had to expel millions of Ghanaians illegal immigrants from its territory because of resulting unemployment of Nigerians and increasing difficulties for the government.

The management of migrant populations, and the desire to control agent provocateurs, have been a policy of both of francophone and anglophone leaders,⁴¹ and makes it difficult to envisage how the movements of people that must accompany regional economic integration is going to be implemented by the member countries.

Though a protocol on free movement has been signed among ECOWAS countries, it has remained mainly symbolic because individual governments continue to adopt policies that prevent citizens of the region moving between states. Road blocks litter the main international highways that connect the countries to each other while border guards demand bribes openly from drivers in transit. In certain instances passengers have had to contribute money towards the payment of such bribes or else are left behind at the border to fend for themselves.⁴² This situation makes trade between the different nationalities difficult and makes it difficult to accept that regional integration is seen as crucial for development.

In addition to how intra-regional political relations, foreign policy orientation, distrust, and unpredictability, among others, affect regional integration, domestic politics also plays an important part in the extent of regional integration attained so far. Below we consider in detail how this happens and has contributed to the slow pace of ECOWAS integration.

⁴¹ Chipman J, op cit. p171

⁴² An account given by Ghanaians travelling to Cote d'Ivoire including the writer's own brother and father. This situation is the same on all the major roads.

6.4 Internal Politics and Demand Flows

As was stated earlier, the higher priority given to national development policy means regional goals are relegated into the background. It is indeed inconceivable that national governments would give more priority to regional goals whether in West Africa or anywhere else. However, in addition to this factor political upheavals have also contributed to the lack of demand flows to the regional body. A concentration on domestic security makes leaders less attentive to regional goals. Coup d'état and counter coups have not only reduced the capacity to concentrate on regional developmental goals but have also resulted in border closures.

Expectations of national leaders have also lessened from their height in the mid 1970s. Originally, ECOWAS was seen as fulfilling various goals. In 1976 the Senegalese president, Senghor, expressed the hope that ECOWAS would be the springboard to the formation of a Continental Union, transcending linguistic, monetary and administrative differences.⁴³ Others expressed similarly high expectations for the grouping. But by 1988, most leaders were expressing frustration about the lack of progress and elusiveness of regional integration and doubt that it will lead to economic emancipation and economic development or as the first step toward the building of a United States of Africa. This recognition that ECOWAS is not yielding the benefits expected contrasts very much with the attempts to form a continent wide integration scheme with regional schemes such as ECOWAS acting as the building blocks. In any case, the increasing disillusionment of leaders has also played and continues to play a part in the lack of flow of demands from heads of government to the regional arena.

⁴³ Fraternite - Matim quoted in African Research Bulletin, March 15 - April 14 1976. Dr H. Limann, President of Ghana talking about the prospects of ECOWAS in 1980 also had similar aspirations for it, quoted in African Research Bulletin, March 1 - 31 1980.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, ECOWAS collective decision making has covered several issues especially in those related to economic functions. The apparent implication of that would be a high level of demand flow to the regional organisation. From our treatment of demand flows we have stated that the contrary is the case. Then how do problems get recognised as needing collective action? The answer is that most of the decisions by the Authority of Heads of State or the Council of Ministers are made on issues proposed or brought before it by the Specialised Commission as needing attention. In the main demands do not originate from national capitals even though the West African Federation of Chambers of Commerce sometimes plays a part in highlighting issues that need attention. As has been suggested earlier, using the Easton's definition of demand, the lack of demands from governments means that issues discussed are not always necessarily those that of priority to the members.

However, even though problem identification does not, in the main, emanate from the member countries themselves, the fact still remains that issues are recognised as needing collective attention. Why then has there been so little action? Though the lack of authoritative demand flows from the constituent members to the organisation plays an important part in explaining the low level of impact the organisation has had so far on the development goals of the member countries, other factors also contribute to both the low threshold of decision making and compliance with decisions by member countries. In the following sections we will look at some of the other factors that contribute to this state of affairs.

6.5 Resources and ECOWAS Integration

Resources are conceived of as the 'variety of means available to collective decision makers that enable them to process demands'⁴⁴ They are seen as important for the implementation of decisions in a collective decision arena. Since integration is a non-coercive, voluntary and consensual decision making process, the ability of decision makers to gather support for decisions and form coalitions that support particular proposals is facilitated by the resources they have. This is because for a proposal or cluster of proposals to get all the way through the process supporters must be recruited and potential opponents neutralised. This is done by 'either adjusting the proposals to meet additional demands, by eliminating objectionable portions, by promising other things in other areas or at future times and so on'.⁴⁵ The main problem that faces integration is to induce political actors to join coalitions at different levels and stages of the decision making process.

By enabling the manipulation incentives and highlighting of the opportunity costs of not supporting a particular proposal, resources provide the wherewithal for the achievement of the various regional objectives embodied in the goals which may not always be compatible with individual national goals.

Resources as Lindberg pointed out may consist of certain aspects of the system itself: the extent of prior agreement among participating governments in what can be handled collectively; rules and norms that prevail among governments and other collective decision-makers and that define the procedures 'that are expected and acceptable in the

⁴⁴Lindberg L. N, *Politics International As a Multidimensional Phenomenon...* p 79.

⁴⁵Lindberg and Scheingold quoted in Lindberg, *ibid.*

processing of demands; the extent to which supranational decision structures have been able to develop appropriate expertise and autonomy; and the extent to which the system is able to dispose of monetary resources (acquired either by government allocation or by taxation).

Apart from the resources that are part of the system, collective leadership is also able to use resources that are analytically outside the system and that enter it from the continent systems. These resources include expectations of future gains or acceptable outcomes on the part of elite or groups bases on past experiences with the system (specific support) and secondly the expectation that those to whom collective outcomes are addressed will comply with them, either because they accept the collective arena itself as legitimate (diffuse support) and there is a high level of mutual political identification among the populations of the constituent units.

Internal Resources

As has been pointed out in the previous section, the Secretariat of the ECOWAS is instrumental in setting the agenda for the fulfilment of the general goals outlined in the Treaty. It does this by translating the treaty provisions into more tangible policy proposals for endorsement by either the Council of Ministers or the Authority of Heads of State. It's ability or inability to get the two decision making organs to move forward or to resolve conflicts has depended very much on not only on the financial resources at its disposal but also on the prior agreements contained in the Treaty on what can be decided on collectively, the norms, rules, and conventions that have been laid down on how conflicts should be resolved, the extent of supranationalism, and the extent of popular support for

the organisation. All of these constitute the resources that are available to a regional collective decision making process.⁴⁶

The ECOWAS Treaty lays down a well defined time table for the achievement of the objectives that will enable the member states to achieve their economic and social development objectives. Articles 12 to 18 give the duration for moving from a free trade area to the establishment of a customs union among the member countries. A period of 15 years after the definitive entry into force of the Treaty is envisaged for the establishment of a Customs Union.⁴⁷ The first two years was a grace period during which no member was required to reduce or eliminate import duties. On the other hand members were not to impose any new duties or taxes, or increase existing ones.⁴⁸ The 8 years following the 2 year grace period was to see the progressive reductions, and ultimate elimination of import duties in "accordance with the schedule to be recommended to the Council of Ministers by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payment Commission of the Secretariat."⁴⁹

The clearly articulated timetable for the achievement of objectives and the assigning of responsibility to various organs of the Community give an internal dynamic to the organisation. Thus even though the process has been delayed, the delay has not been very long. Though the organisation was formed in 1975, it was not until 1977 that the Secretariat was set up. Furthermore the first decisions regarding the implementation of the Treaty were adopted in May 1979 in Dakar. The ten years needed for the freezing and eventual elimination of tariffs started in 1981 after an initial need to gather statistics and

⁴⁶ Lindberg, *ibid.*, pp 79-91.

⁴⁷ Article 12

⁴⁸ Article 13 paragraph 2

⁴⁹ Refer to table ? in chapter 5, p..?

conduct studies on the various aspects of co-operation. Trade liberalisation was therefore supposed to be in place by 1990 after starting in 1981. The liberalisation programme was re-launched in 1983 because it had failed to move forward. The latest relaunch came into effect in January 1990.⁵⁰

Whilst the delay could be taken as a pointer to the problems faced by ECOWAS, the issue that concerns us here is how in spite of member governments non implementation the process manages to move forward at all. Part of the answer could be found in the detailing of the timetable and objectives in the Treaty in a form that gives it an internal dynamic of its own and therefore acts as a resource that enables decisions to be taken on various aspects of the scheme. Thus the little progress that has been made so far is made possible by the prior agreements in the Treaty. It could therefore be argued that without such a detailed scheduling in the Treaty, progress would be even slower.

Even though such prior agreements exist and ought to act as the blueprint for progress the lack of other complementary resources have been responsible for the long delay in liberalising trade and achieving economic union.

One such resource that is important for the effective functioning of an international organisation and is internal to it is the extent of its supranational powers. Even though some scholars, such as Lindberg, express scepticism about supranationalism⁵¹ as a resource, it is our contention that such influence is important in the case of ECOWAS. Lindberg's scepticism is based on the empirical evidence that no supranational institution

⁵⁰ Contact, Publication of ECOWAS, Vol. 12 No. 2, September 1990, p 6.

⁵¹ These are the "possession of clear decision making jurisdiction and authority or ability to impose sanctions". Lindberg *ibid.*, p84

possesses this resource. To him, the ability of supranational organisations to play an important role in the decision making process, participate in all aspects of the stages that influence policy choice and goal preferences is determined more by the way the organisation's officials interact with national political actors, representatives and government officials "by providing services and skills that are in demand"⁵², rather than in supranational attributes *per se*.

Such a view overlooks the actual decision making process of service intergovernmental organisations. In such organisations as opposed to forum organisations⁵³ decisions are usually taken by either heads of State or Council of Ministers. Such decisions are binding once they go through the legitimising procedures laid out by the Treaty establishing the particular organisation if it provides for such authority. The secretariats on the other hand usually play an initiatory role. In most instances commentators tend to equate the powers at the disposal of the secretariat with the influence the organisation has. However, real authority of an IGO rests with the supreme decision making organ, such as the Security Council of the UN and the Council of the EEC rather than the general assembly or the commission, despite the enormous influence they have on decisions. These executive organs are subject to laid down rules that enable them to take binding decisions. Hence, it can be alleged that the inability of the Authority of ECOWAS to take binding decisions does indeed deprive the organisation of an important resource. Thus the lack of even the smallest amount of endowed supranationality severely hinders the functioning of the organisation.

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ Feld, J.W., and Jordan, R.S., give a good distinction between the two categories in International Organisations: A Comparative Approach, Praeger Special Studies, New York, 1983.

It is our contention that the delay of the process could be partly explained by the deficiency that is caused in the decision making process by a lack of supranationalism of any kind in ECOWAS. Non implementation is partly because Authority decisions are not binding on member states.⁵⁴ Collective decisions may therefore be ignored by member states without any sanctions being imposed on them.

Another aspect of this issues was given by Dr Bundu, the Executive Secretary in his 1990 report as being responsible for the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS. He pointed out that representation at Council sessions (the only other decision making organ of the community) were sometimes by persons not of ministerial status. Decisions taken by the council therefore lacked the authority that was required.⁵⁵

Another effect was that the link between the community and member States was weakened since those taking decisions sometimes had no immediate access to their national decision making apparatus. Above all such a reduction in the rule making competence of the Council is indicative of the low level of importance members accord to the regional organisation.

From the above we can conclude that a certain amount of supranationalism must be present for decisions to be effective.

Another factor that the paradigm identifies as important for organisational effectiveness is the level of expertise that it has. The level of technical expertise available

⁵⁴ Article 5, paragraph 3 which details the power of the Authority makes its decisions binding only on other areas of the Community and not on other member States.

⁵⁵ Contact, *ibid.* p8

to ECOWAS is low. Regional economic integration is a highly technical process which requires an equally high level of professional expertise. Even though the Secretariat has a good crop of competent employees, the often over-stressed desire to balance the geographical spread of Community employees, thus putting equitable distribution of employment opportunities before competence of employees means the latter is sometimes sacrificed for the former.

In addition to the shortcomings of emphasising equitable distribution of employment opportunities among member countries instead of employing the most qualified and experienced and or capable people, ECOWAS does not possess information that sets it apart as a centre of regional economic and political data. National information centres have more adequate information gathering bureau than does the regional organisation. This reduces the attributed prestige that national governments give to it in terms of requests for assistance from or 'expressions of confidence in or reliance on supranational actors, because they have the best ideas, provide initiative and guidance or are indispensable'.⁵⁶ The low level of technical expertise and information databank at the regional level was partly responsible for the delay in getting started. Outside experts had to be drafted in from Europe and other international organisations such as ECA. At various stages in the process, such as the setting up of a computer network for the organisation, the organisation has depended and continues to rely on outside help. The regional organisation therefore does not enjoy the respect that it would if it was the main source of certain kinds regional information that national leaders and policy makers as well as bureaucrats depend on for their own work.

⁵⁶ Lindberg, p.85

The effect of these shortcoming is that national governments feel they are more capable of pursuing individual development objectives. Another effect is that it reduces the initiating capabilities of the Secretariat. Though the Treaty confers such capabilities on the various Commissions, a lack of information and expertise makes it difficult to propose policies without having to conduct extensive research and information gathering first. This delays the schedule of the organisation, including the harmonisation of tariffs, and non tariff barriers.

The recognition of the important role of "information in the sub-regional integration process" and the need for a more organised system of gathering, processing and disseminating it in the region that promoted the Authority to sanction the Executive Secretary to expedite action on the formation of the ECOWAS information policy programme.⁵⁷

The resources mentioned so far are those that are internal to ECOWAS itself. They derive from treaty provisions, and the power that are a part of supranationality. Supranationality here referring not only to the legal jurisdictional provisions given to the organisation by the treaty but also from the perception national actors have of the legitimacy of the organisation to participate in decision implementation.

The cumulative capabilities of ECOWAS deriving from treaty provisions and perceived legitimacy are however closely dependent on and are reflected by the extent of

⁵⁷ Final Communiqué of Authority of Heads of State issued at the end of their May 1990 Summit held in Banjul.

transactions between the regional organisation and the member States. By transactions is meant the interactions between ECOWAS and collective authority structures on the one hand and national authority structures on the other. The actual impact of regional economic integration on the economic development of the member countries can only result from the penetration of national policy decision making structures and implementation processes by ECOWAS decisions. As integration moves from the collective problem recognition and information gathering stages to policy implementation,, national governments and regional institutions would be expected to interact more and more.

Such increasing interaction between the institution and member⁵⁸ states forms the essence of the whole process. Without such interaction, it is unlikely that ECOWAS will have, or indeed develop the authority or skills, or human resources that it needs. Thus we agree with Lindberg' assertion that regional problem-recognition, decision and application requires an even increasing intensity of interaction between the organisation and its member states.

Such increased interaction between the organs of the ECOWAS and representatives of government in decision making may reduce nationalistic feelings to the extent that a kind of camaraderie develops, though this may not necessarily be so. Increased interaction may actually increase conflict as differences between governments become more apparent.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Lindberg op cit. p86

⁵⁹ Taylor P

Though such a possibility exists, it is equally possible that such increased interaction will yield norms of conflict resolution between member states which will facilitate joint problem-solving.⁶⁰

Finally, because the support and recognition ECOWAS gets from the public in member countries is highly dependent on how much information is provided and the attitudes expressed by national authorities and elite, the level of participation by national governments is important in legitimising it in the eyes of the public. Since there is a preponderance of governments in the functioning of the organisation, and in political and social organisation in general, their active participation is essential in creating an awareness of it to the public.

If these, mainly, theoretical postulations are true, then the very low level of interaction between the regional organisation and national governments has important repercussions for the integration process. In most instances the offices that co-ordinate the activities of ECOWAS and disseminate information to decision-makers at the national level is manned by a senior civil servant who is below the rank of a permanent secretary. Together with a very small number of very junior staff. Such outfits form a very low level authority group with very little impact on policy formulation.

In Ghana, for example, they constitute an office in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. When we asked for documents of ECOWAS, the office did not have either the complete set of ECOWAS protocols, the publications of the secretariat or

⁶⁰ Lindberg op cit.

information that set them apart as a specialist office. In place of substantive information from the ECOWAS Secretariat, they were able to produce only photostat copies of articles from West African Magazine for perusal. They did not have a full set of the protocols of the organisation or the specialised information that ought to be available from such an office.

Additionally, High Commissions and Embassies of member countries in London could not provide specialised information about the organisation. Apart from the Nigerian High Commission library no other member State could produce literature. Most did not even have the address of the Secretariat (again apart from Nigerian High Commission, understandably).

From the above, it can be concluded that member states give very low priority to ECOWAS and do not either promote its activities effectively to either citizens or harmonise national decisions very effectively with regional one. Secondly, to the extent that High Commissions embody the foreign policy of member states, such lack of basic information is also indicative of the low knowledge and hence priority given to the organisation by personnel and decision makers. The fact that there is no separate ECOWAS body to co-ordinate the organisation's activities and monitor implementation of decisions in member states means it does not feature any higher than any other international organisation in their strategic calculations. It becomes difficult to accept the premise that regional integration is a panacea to economic development in West Africa. President Jawara in 1990, the year he was made the Chairman of the organisation, suggested that there was a need to 'consider the establishment in all Member States of

adequately equipped mechanism for the translation of collective resolutions and decisions into operational Community programmes while at the same time ensuring that they are not at variance with national programmes'.⁶¹

This problem and its repercussions have been recognised both by outside observers and the Secretariat of the organisation. In connection to the issue of the absence of efficient mechanisms for transforming ECOWAS policy measures into national policies and programmes, the Secretariat acknowledged that one of the reasons for this is that ECOWAS is still "very marginal to ...major national preoccupations...."⁶²

The less than adequate level of attention given to the organisation is further indicated by the non ratification of protocols by member states. By September 1990, only three member states,(Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Togo)⁶³, of the organisation had ratified all 23 protocols of the community.⁶⁴

Both the lack of transmission mechanisms and the lack of commitment it indicates in the non-ratification of treaties are acknowledged by the Heads of States themselves. Even in instances where Protocols have been ratified, a high degree of non-implementation prevails.

⁶¹ *Contact*, September, 1990, p. 18.

⁶² Ten years of ECOWAS 1975-85, ECOWAS, 1985 p99.

⁶³ Nigeria and Togo were primarily responsible for the bringing together of the two major language groups together under ECOWAS and their ratification of the protocols indicates a certain amount of consistency, despite the fact that the Buhari regime had been less than optimistic about the organisation after it had overthrown the Gowon regime. It is also indicative of the differing attitudes of individual leaders toward integration and the important impact the personal likes and dislikes of political leaders can have on the process.

⁶⁴ Executive Secretary's Address to Summit in May 1990, *Contact*, ECOWAS, Sept. 1990.

In 1992 when the World Bank, for example, was approached by ECOWAS for assistance, the Bank decided that Member States ought to show more commitment than they had hitherto shown before any assistance would be given. It therefore proposed the Minimum Agenda for Action (MAFA 1) as a means of Member States to demonstrate such commitment. Based on their performance over a period of one year, they would then decide whether to support integration under ECOWAS or to support a proposed Francophone Economic Community.

Amongst other things members were to implement (1) free movement of persons, (2) free movement of goods, and (3) payment arrangements. Despite the stakes, members were unable to fulfil the programme. As the table below indicates the member states could not show that they were able to implement the basic policies for trade liberalisation. At the start of the second phase of MAFA there was substantial carry over of policies to be implemented. The complementary programme (MAFA II) which sought to implement measures; to ensure inter-state road transit of vehicles; coordination of regional air/sea transportation and freight; and to improve intra-trade payments and settlements systems had to be implemented together with the previous policies which had not been carried out. The table on the next two pages show the extent of implementation the program had achieved.

Part of the reason for such a situation may to a certain extent be explained by the decision making procedure of the member states. As has been explained in Chapter 3, foreign policy and major policy issues have to be sanctioned by the Head of State in the absence of an effective legislature. The majority of member states had either a military

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS

[illegible]

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI
vehicles and reduction of Customs processing time	Yes	Yes	(2)	-	(5)	Yes	(7)	No	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Y.
3. <u>Payment Arrangements</u>																
a/ Elimination of restrictions on the use of local currencies by Community citizens in payments for the following travel expenses:																
- Hotel bills	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Y.
- Airport tax	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Y.
- Purchase of air tickets	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Y.

FOOTNOTES

1. Member States requiring entry and exit records for certain travellers.
2. Some of the actions included in the Agenda (transit procedure, special counters, are not relevant in the case of Cape Verde, which is an island.
3. Information obtained during the awareness seminar on the scheme held in December 1992.
4. The certificates are in the process of being printed.
5. Installation of counters are under consideration. Transit procedure does not, however, exceed 3 hrs
6. The certificate of origin is yet to be printed.
7. No information available.
8. Check-points are positioned at entry and exit points.
9. Being studied by the Central Bank, in collaboration with other banking agencies.
10. No information due to prevailing situation within country.
11. Instructions given for reduction but not fully implemented.

government or a dictatorship civilian one party government. Autocratic and personalised decision making at the highest levels of government means issues have to be brought to the personal attention of the ruler. In such a situation, overloading of the executive usually occurs. Personal opinions also play a higher role in these instances than in a situation where such issues are openly discussed and opinions reshaped. Besides these is the problems of personal dislikes of leaders being projected to become national positions on issue. Additionally, there is also the feeling that the monetary cost of ECOWAS can be postponed by procrastinating with protocol ratification.

Though personalised politics and decision making styles have played a negative role in ECOWAS, in instances where a leader identifies very highly with the goals then the personal decision making style becomes advantageous to regional integration. Empirically this had been the case with Gowon of Nigeria and Ayadema of Togo who were instrumental in the formation of the group.

On balance, the effect of the internal non-financial resources considered above have been mainly negative.

The final resources which is listed by Lindberg as being internal to the system that we will consider in our analysis is the monetary resources at the disposal of collective decision makers. Issues relating to financial matters of ECOWAS are found in Articles 50-55 of the organisation's Treaty.

The ability of ECOWAS to respond to demands and induce compliance or support for its activities will be greatly enhanced if it can provide financial resources for the provision of public services and goods to its members. The concept of collective self-reliance which underlies the Treaty presupposes the harnessing of regional resources for targeted and judicious reallocation to promote development within the region.

Harnessing funds for regional development is however not the only use for which monetary resources are needed. The day to day running of the Secretariat, the sponsoring of research and information gathering activities and salaries of staff are expected to be met by resources derived from contributions from member states.⁶⁵ Other areas that need financial input include compensation for loss of revenue due to trade liberalisation, losses 'suffered as a result of the location of Community enterprises', as well as funds for the financing of projects in member states. Another need for which financial resources is needed is to promote development projects in the less developed Member States of the Community.

⁶⁵ Articles 53-54 of ECOWAS Treaty

The compensatory and redistributive role that the Community is expected to play as the process develops have been delegated to the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development. Redistributive and compensatory mechanisms are essential for the continuing survival of regional integration. As has been pointed out in chapter three, private and foreign finance capital and industries tend to conglomerate or be, attracted to the more developed regions of such a system in order to be able to take advantage of external economies of scale. The net effect is that certain less developed areas become even more impoverished as they experience backwash effects because of the movement of capital and productive labour to the growth poles within the region. The deliberate compensatory and redistributive measures are an acknowledgement of the inability of free market forces to produce enough spill over effects through profit repatriation and remittances to counter the move of factors to the growth poles.

If such effects are not taken care of, they create difficulties for the process. An example of the negative impact polarisation is that it was among other factors the cause of the break up of the now defunct East African Community. To the extent that the actual impacts of integration have not been manifested in the ECOWAS region yet because of the low level of integration, the above example ought to be sufficiently indicative of what could happen.

As has been mentioned above, funds are also needed for the smooth running of the community. The revenue of the Community budget is to be derived from contribution from member states. As at August 1992, non-payment of contributions by members has resulted in arrears amounting to \$28m. This according to the Executive Secretary

amounted to twice the annual budget of the Secretariat.⁶⁶ With such severe financial constraints the community is hard put to function efficiently. Staffing, among other things is difficult with such delays.

The reasons for non-payment of contributions to the Secretariat's budget could be attributed to several factors. Among the more pertinent are the general poverty and shortage of hard currency in the member countries. The external debt burden accumulated over the years and national priorities on the limited funds available make ECOWAS funding of less urgency to member states.

The Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development on the other hand does not rely entirely on contribution from members. The Treaty specifies three other sources for acquiring funds. These include income from community enterprises, receipts from bilateral, and multilateral sources as well as other foreign sources, and subsidies and contributions of all kinds and various sources.⁶⁷

The Fund helps with project preparation, appraisal and financing. As detailed in the previous chapter, various projects have been embarked upon by the Fund. The Fund has in accordance with the priority programme of the Community helped in the procurement of finance for member states to build physical infrastructure and also to train personnel. A telecommunications project which is part of the Panafield programme is intended to link the members of the sub-region together and also reduce their dependence

⁶⁶ Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 29 No 7, July 16 August 15 1992

⁶⁷ Article 51 of ECOWAS Treaty.

on telecommunication systems in London and Paris is on course, with a \$50m assistance from the EEC.⁶⁸

The road project which is co-financed by BADEA, ADF, BOAD and the Fund is nearing completion. Other projects such as the funding by UNIDO of a training programme of the Fund's own staff and personnel from member countries on how to use computer models for project analysis have also been undertaken. The Fund however faces many difficulties in getting access to information from member countries, the co-operation of members in implementation of programmes and even in members taking up loans negotiated on their behalf.

In 1990 the Managing Director, in his address pointed out some of the difficulties the Fund encountered in its operations. The Fund could not, for example, undertake project preparation work in Niger, Guinea, Togo or Ghana because these member states did not communicate the relevant information and documents to it. Neither could it embark on projects appraisals because it had applied sanctions on the members who were not meeting their loan commitments. Though loans had been arranged by the Fund from the ADB/ADK for which charges were being incurred, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal had failed to sign the loan Agreements negotiated on their behalf despite numerous reminders.⁶⁹ Such procrastinations result in lack of implementation and consequently in a delay in effective achievement of regional integration goals.

⁶⁸ West Africa, 28 May - 3 June 1990, p883.

⁶⁹ Ten Years of ECOWAS, Op. cit.

Though reasons were not given by the Fund for such difficulties as those enumerated above, the low and sluggish take-up rate of loans points to the low absorption capability of member countries. This situation results from the inability to prepare adequate projects for funding. The EEC's development Fund faces a similar problem with its dealings with the ACP group.

Absorption capacity is affected by the decision making structure. The absence of adequate representation of ECOWAS at the national level, a lack of personnel, and slow take up rate of loans means that work in connection with projects tend to get delayed.

Thus in certain instances it is not really a lack of funding that causes delays in Community programmes but rather the slowness or inability of members to utilise the facilities made available to them by the regional organisation and its institutions.

In addition to the resources considered above, some resources emanate from the environment itself. These are those which reinforce any political system and come mainly from the population. Such 'support', as Lindberg points out is particularly vital in democratic or pluralist system that are based to a large extent on the "consent of the governed".⁷⁰

Though several scholars have pointed out that there is no direct causality between social assimilation at the regional level and Institutional development and effectiveness⁷¹

⁷⁰ op cit. p87

⁷¹ Fisher, International Organisations Vol. 23, No 2 pp 285-286 & Puchalla, International Organisation Vol. 24, No 2 pp 183-208, quoted in Lindberg op cit.

the existence of emotional and identitive affinities between peoples does create conditions within which governments can work toward more positive international -co-operation.⁷²

Our findings from field work in Ghana, Togo, and interviews conducted among nationals of ECOWAS countries in London indicate that there is a "permissive consensus" in West Africa among the general public and elite groups about the desirability of ECOWAS.⁷³ This endorsement does not influence national decision makers to the extent that it should. This is because politics in West Africa is not based on voting. Thus regardless of the general populations' endorsement, little pressure can be brought to bare on politicians to take decisions that are favourable for economic integration. To the extent therefore that governments are not accountable to an electorate, public opinion is not essential in foreign policy and hence not to regional integration either. This does not imply that popular participation will result in support for regional schemes. As explained below, the permissive consensus may change to antagonism toward regional integration if nationalistic tendencies develop to counter the possible encroachment of the organisation on national prerogatives.

Additionally the knowledge the mass public has of international integration is very limited, and to the extent that the majority of the population are illiterate and live in rural areas, policy decisions are affected mainly by the section of urban elite who are able to comment on such technical issues. Among such elites in West Africa there is the overwhelming assumption that regional integration will be beneficial to the region. In our survey that sought to gauge attitudes toward regional integration, a high proportion of

⁷² Puchalla op. cit.

⁷³ Refer to questionnaire in Appendix ?

respondents thought ECOWAS was able to solve the problems of the region if it was given the chance. Hence it can be concluded those who were aware of ECOWAS would in the main support their states' involvement in ECOWAS. The impact of changes in the political structure occurring over the member countries of ECOWAS may however mean that popular opinion becomes more and more important as decision making at the national level becomes more transparent. A government which is seen as obstructing or obstructing or impeding national development through non-implementation of, say, ECOWAS decisions may in such instances suffer electoral defeat. That of course assumes the development of a pluralistic society similar to what pertains in the more developed regions of the world. It also presupposes that the general public becomes more knowledgeable about the implications of policy choices.

Both of these are unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Thus it can be hypothesised that the general public and even some elites, other than the political elite will be largely excluded from influencing the future development of the organisation.

The above conclusion drawn from our survey though valid for the short term cannot be extended far into the future. The populations of individual member states cannot be expected to support the regional organisation against their own governments indefinitely. At the present time those able to comment on the issues support regional integration and feel their governments are obstructive. They are either unaware of the implications for national political and economic sovereignty of supranational organisation or a single currency. This situation is likely to change as allegiance to the state increases and as pluralism results in public scrutiny of policy implications. The development of

nationalism to cover economic issues will depend on the increasing awareness of both economic policy makers and business elites of the implications for them of the shifting of the locus of decision making to the regional organisation, and the movement of capital and labour to growth poles respectively. In respect of policy makers it can be suggested that in instances where they see themselves being displaced by regional bureaucrats their opposition to regional goals will increase. Such opposition will percolate to the general population as they seek to influence public opinion in their favour. The success of such influence attempts will as has been suggested above depend on how open political debate becomes. If the process of structural change going on in most of these countries is sustained then it can be expected to lead to situations such as those in Western Europe where politicians are able to draw support for either opposition to or endorsement of regional goals. The time frame for such a development is anybody's guess but will take decades because of the near absence of a pluralistic political culture in the region.

Political pluralism therefore could eventually work either to the advantage or disadvantage of regional integration. The political environment certainly will be more complex but the success or failure of the regional organisation will at least be less dependent on the whims of heads of state.

6.6 Leadership and ECOWAS Integration

The final element that is postulated as determining the success of a regional integration scheme, according to the paradigm we have used so far, is the leadership available to it. It is seen as one of the most vital determinants of survival and growth of a

regional organisation. This is because it is the leaders who use the resources available to the organisation to process demands and treaty provisions. As has been found from initial studies of the European Communities⁷⁴ and historical studies of voluntary integration schemes⁷⁵, integration is facilitated by the assumption of leadership roles by some elite or combination of elites.⁷⁶ These "leaders" after justifying their role and making it acceptable to the others are then able to cajole, push or even dominate the process. Such techniques are however carefully balanced by the leadership showing sensitivity to the needs and concerns of the members and a willingness to respond to their presuppositions.⁷⁷ Increased responsiveness is seen as one of the necessary conditions for success of integration schemes.⁷⁸ In addition to individual elite and elite groups offering direction and leadership to the process, individual member States or group of States can also be crucial in performing that role.⁷⁹ Where it is a single state the situation would resemble one of a hegemonic state attempting to give direction to international political and economic relations by underwriting the costs of the process and giving direction to the system through collaboration with other power within it.⁸⁰

The role of collective leadership would be to identify and solve problems, ensure that differences between members states are handled in acceptable ways, evaluate output and store and retrieve information and articulate goals for the collectivity and symbolise such goals effectively.

⁷⁴ Haas & Lindberg

⁷⁵ Etzioni & Deutsch

⁷⁶ Lindberg, *Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon*.

⁷⁷ Lindberg L. *Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon*.

⁷⁸ Deutsch K. *The EC and the North Atlantic Area*, cf. p

⁷⁹ Haas E, *Core area and Regional Integration*.

⁸⁰ Gilpin R, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press.

To be effective, they ought to be able to build support for their own legitimacy, engineer consent of the other authorities and elite by organising bargaining and exchange of concessions and creation of output that are satisfactory to member states. They ought also to be able to stimulate belief in a common interest and conviction that they are able to evaluate and articulate such interest accurately and therefore qualify to be its major spokesman.

Though Lindberg's paradigm concentrates on supranational and political actors as providing and constituting such leadership, we have added states as another variable. These two types of actors perform different roles. Supranational and political actors make use of the various resources available to the system, including: prior treaty agreements; norms of conflict resolution; supranational structures and the prestige they command; their power and expertise; financial resources, and support. States on the other hand provide the resources that are used by the former group.

Three determinants of effective leadership have been identified by Haas. These are the ability to define the organisational ideology, commitment to the ideology and supporting coalitions and alliances between the member states for the organisational ideology and the proposals and actions of supranational leaders.

ECOWAS personnel have from their utterances and reports articulated the ideology of collective self reliance over the years. They have in certain instances gone as far as to suggest that ECOWAS is a panacea to the problems of development in the subregion. As his predecessors, Abass Bundu, for example, stated in his 1990 report that

'no individual Member States in the sub-region will achieve any significant growth, much more economic independence, except through the collective strength of the whole'.⁸¹ This statement is congruent with the rhetorical expression of expectations (especially the early years of the organisation) political leaders. It is therefore not a counter ideology to what leaders have. In consequence therefore, this should make for supranational effectiveness. Neither do the actual proposals of the ECOWAS personnel (referred to as supranational leaders) differ from statements and proposals, of national leaders. However, what we have noted above is that actual preference do differ from political rhetoric. Thus even though national political considerations, traditional trading ties and foreign policy orientation contradict the underlying cosmopolitan ideology of ECOWAS, the assumption of collective solidarity continues to underpin the process.

Though commitment of supranational leaders is congruent to the ideological orientation of regional integration among developing countries, concerns have been expressed about the allegiance of leaders to the regional organisation. This concern was given expression when Bundu proposed that all Community appointees be made to take an oath of secrecy and loyalty to the Community.⁸² This was prompted by what the Executive Secretary saw as the conflict of interests of employees of the secretariat. Such a concern is indicative of the probable shallowness of commitment to regional goals. Since regional goals sometimes contradict national interests of member states, nationals employed by the regional organisation may tend to alert their governments about issues that might affect them adversely. This will, if it occurs, impede bargaining and compromise, and might result in pre-emptive measures on the part of national leaders.

⁸¹ Abass Bundu, quoted in *West Africa Magazine*, 20th May - 3rd June 1990, p 899.

⁸² *ibid.* p902.

The final element that makes for effective leadership of a supranational organisation is its ability to cultivate support from coalitions and alliances among individuals, groups and organisations from the member national systems. Individuals would include opinion formers, and preferably substantive decision makers. In democratic societies where political decision makers change with elections it is relevant to have prominent opinion forming politicians backing integration, but in places such as West Africa the situation might be quite different. In such instances the absence of elections, closed nature of decision making and the largely illiterate population means that a very small elite made up mainly of the ruling government and their lieutenants are the ones to cultivate.

As has been mentioned above the changing nature of politics might change all these characteristics if the regional organisation survives long enough. It however demands a lot of political acumen from the Executive of the Secretariat.

In addition to supranational actors, national actors also play an important role as leaders for the regional organisation. Such potential and actual leaders must occupy authoritative roles at both the collective and national levels. Gowon of Nigeria and Eyadema of Togo played such a role during the formative years of the organisation. Since such leaders in performing their gate keeping functions are in a position to determine what is decided at the regional level. Such support facilitates the growth and survival of the process especially when they are willing to convince their compatriots from other states. This is even more salient in West Africa where intra-regional politics has been, and still is

so highly personalised. It is also important because high power political position is essential to break through the invisible anglophone/francophone barrier that hinders co-operation within the region.

Nigeria's role as a state actor was essential to the formation of ECOWAS. As was detailed in chapter three, it was also important in resolving difficulties such as Senegal's insistence that Zaire ought to be a member of the organisation. It was also instrumental in providing accommodation for the organisation and made substantial contributions to the organisation especially under the Gowon regime.

The situation changed, however, under the Buhari regime when the Federal government refused to host the Summit meeting of the organisation.⁸³ It had earlier expelled Community citizens. These have made it difficult for that country to symbolise the regional ideology that it had embodied in the early years of ECOWAS. The reasons for changing attitudes in Nigeria include the deteriorating economy and the large balance of payment deficit faced by the country. It also was a result of the relative lack of benefit derived from regionalism compared with the large sums of money it gave. Finally, it could also be suggested that Nigerians do not feel as insecure as they did immediately after Biafran civil war and hence do not see the stabilisation of the immediate external environment as a top foreign policy priority.

ECOWAS has not as yet evolved an effective leadership either at the supranational or state level. Difficulties with funds, personnel and a closed political system make it very

⁸³ Bach, *op. cit.*

difficult for the Secretariat to function effectively or build coalitions and support in member countries for the organisation.

National actors are also lacking for reasons which include the autocratic decision making style in member countries. Pressure groups, and interest groups are not sufficiently informed about ECOWAS to be influential either the organisation or member governments. Additionally the links for effective communication between the organisation and such groups are minimal hence making it difficult for groups to operate on a permanent basis with the regional organisation.

States themselves (because of their preoccupation with domestic affairs) have where they were initially enthusiastic become apathetic or at best lukewarm as changes in government have brought in new rulers whose attitude toward the organisation is different from those who started it. National outlook has tended to be inward looking. This has depended very much on the government in power. As is normally the case no national government has elevated the regional decision making system over national decision making in any issue area or at least given it equal status. This really challenges the rhetorical pronouncements that leaders make about regionalism being indispensable to development.

6.7 Conclusion

Our analysis of the activators that determine whether a regional organisation would grow, stagnate regress or even disintegrate show that ECOWAS at best will continue to be very marginal to the development strategies of the participating countries given the political environment the organisation is functioning in.

Demands have not emanated from the member states, and the process has been propelled mainly by the Secretariat which is depending mainly on the Treaty's provisions. The implication is that national governments are formulating their development strategies independently of the process envisaged in the collective ethos of ECOWAS.

It also means that governments are not as committed to programmes as they would be if they had requested the pursuit of programmes themselves. The energies they devote to persuading other governments and offering side-payments and using package deals are low because of their relative apathy in view of the rather high hopes they usually express from the regional organisation and the type of integration that is needed to achieved the multidimensional goals of ECOWAS.

Resources are also inadequate for processing demands or pushing forward the process timetable. The reasons as detailed above are essentially because of the low level of co-operation that existed prior to the formation of ECOWAS. They are also due to fragility of the institutional framework of ECOWAS itself. The difficulty of exacting compliance with regional decisions and implementation of projects results in low support because the benefits that would otherwise result and would reinforce the favour with which the regional organisation is viewed is lacking.

Leadership is also weak at the supranational level and the national level because of the style of decision making and personalised politics in the region. Additionally, Nigeria

by its actions and changing financial fortunes has been unable to sustain its position as the prime mover of regional integration.

As has been noted changing politics at the national level may change the working of ECOWAS as its relation with member states is altered with transformed decision making styles and structures.

Whether that necessarily makes ECOWAS a viable institution depends on the exact role the organisation is expected to play. Role definition may change with changing post-Soviet ideological orientation as neo-colonialism becomes an archaic political jargon. As state/society interaction becomes one that is open, and more and more people are incorporated into the formal economy, government decisions will come more and more under public scrutiny while governments become sensitised to the extent of ensuring that they implement ECOWAS projects and comply with decisions.

Summary and Conclusion

The thesis started with a discussion of the rationale behind regional integration among developing countries. The arguments have centred on structuralist descriptions of international economic relations which take as their starting point the division of the world into developed/industrialised countries and developing/primary goods producing countries. From this dichotomy, the assertion is made that the former gain unfairly from international trade whilst the latter are disadvantaged because of the widely fluctuating prices of primary goods on the international market, the deteriorating trend in the terms of trade of primary goods and the desirability of industrialisation as an end in itself and as a means of overcoming all of these problems.

The problem however is that most of the developing countries lack the internal market that is required to support efficient utilisation of industrial capacity, both in terms of income per capita and effective demand, and in terms of total population. Apart from markets, the individual countries in the developing world lack the capital and the other factors that are needed for a sustained programme of industrialisation. To overcome the problem of small markets and low availability of capital, development economists advocate a combining of national markets and a pooling of capital within the context of regional integration as the answer to the problems. By pooling their capital and rationalising their industrial programmes, these countries, so the argument goes, will be able to develop their industrial capacity. Their combined markets will be large enough to absorb the outputs of the industries. Economies of

scale will be derived as a result of the market size thus reducing overall cost of import substituting industrialisation.

Regional integration is therefore based on an acceptance by the participating countries that they are individually unable to develop industrially, or that industrialisation will be faster if they combined their efforts.

The need for collective action is usually buttressed by an underlying feeling of being disadvantaged in international economic relations and as a consequence in international political relations also. This disadvantage, it is believed, plays an important part in their continuing underdevelopment. We saw in chapters one, three and six, that this perception of disadvantage has been one of the main reasons given by West African countries for the need to integrate. It validates the empirical generalisation cited at the end of chapter two concerning a region and the external world; mainly that *the perception of disadvantage by a subsystem in its interaction within the system may be a strong motivating factor in the formation of regional integration among developing countries.*

The basis of such perceptions may or may not be valid. As we saw in the first chapter, though fluctuating prices and deteriorating term of trade may affect government revenue from exports, and thus make strategic planning difficult, there is no evidence that it is the cause of the slow growth in the region. Evidence suggests that most of the countries within the region were able to maintain their real earnings despite falling prices. Where revenues fell it was usually because quantities exported could not compensate for falling prices. Such falling quantities of exports were usually a result of government policies, such as diversification

programmes and overvalued currencies. Though it is true that the countries have to export more to maintain their levels of real revenue, the fact remains that there was no sustained growth even in instances where revenues were improved. As we saw in chapter one, though Nigeria's terms of trade improved by 232 per cent for 1974-79, by 483 per cent for 1980-81 and 426 per cent for 1982-85, based on 1974-79 as the base years, such substantial increases did not translate into tangible economic development.

However whether the arguments were valid or not, the countries within West Africa, particularly the English speaking ones, saw themselves as being victimised by the global system and were therefore motivated toward integration as a means of 'getting out from under'. The common cementing element that united the countries was the belief that they were disadvantaged by the structure of international society.

For economic integration to enable these countries to extricate themselves from their perceived common predicament, the *a priori* claims made by economists concerning economies of scale, accelerated development, increased bargaining power and efficiency would have to be realised through the implementation of joint decisions taken at the regional level by national governments. This is a political process which determines, in our view, whether regional economic integration will be successful or not. This is because it provides the broad framework within which economic integration functions. We therefore set out to show that regional economic integration will not succeed unless the political and social structures of the region are taken into account when the prospective economic gains of the process are being considered.

This view was based on the empirical evidence that since the formation of ECOWAS, the timetable has had to be reviewed several times because of the lack of political will to pursue decisions through to implementation.

The basic assumption of the hypothesis was that the political and social structures provide opportunities but also act as constraints on regional collective decision making. Both domestic, and foreign policy of the individual countries have implications for the desire to work together. By concentrating on nation building and national economic development governments tend to pay less than adequate attention to regional objectives despite rhetoric to the effect that regional policies hold the key to national development. At the same time the overwhelming desire of governments to be seen by their citizens as doing something about development makes it possible for them to participate in integration without excessive nationalism. Thus regardless of the actual motives of governments, the national interest both provides opportunities and constrains regional integration.

This paradoxical situation however results in a situation where each country seeks to extract maximum benefits even before they start to accrue to the group. The fear of Nigerian preponderance in a region wide organisation by the francophone countries and the formation at France's instigation of CEAO as a countervailing organisation to curb such influence is a case in point. This together with other factors such as the high proportion of tariff revenue in the total income of governments tend to result in early politicisation of the integration process. This again validates another generalisation in the West African context. It is that *actor*

expectations tend to be prematurely politicised thus preventing incremental bargaining on relatively non controversial shared objectives.

Intra-regional relations also determine how willing governments are to work with each other to solve common problems. The foreign policy orientation of individual countries and the ideology of governing elite determine whether they will co-operate. In chapter three we saw that ideological differences between the Pan Africanist and socialist oriented regimes on the one hand and the more conservative and pragmatic regimes on the other made it difficult for a region wide organisation to be formed. These together with the differing view of dependence on external factors make it difficult to agree on common policies for reducing dependence. This conflict between radicals and conservatives affected interaction and the desire to associate with each other. This also validates the generalisation that: *ideological ties, where they exist, are helpful to integration; ideological cleavages are most divisive and cannot be overcome by shared economic aims.*

Though this was especially the case in the period before ECOWAS was formed integration between francophone and anglophone countries could only be formed after pan Africanism had ceased to be an important issue in intra-African relations.

As we saw in chapter three, apart from the common colonial heritage, West African countries are divided along linguistic lines, their political ideologies differ, and their attitudes toward external involvement in the region are not compatible. Whilst the French speaking countries are highly dependent on France, the English speaking countries see such dependence as

undesirable. The different attitudes toward extra-regional actors makes it difficult to agree on whether dependence itself was good or bad. As we pointed out earlier, the fact that France was able to convince her former colonies to form CEAO as a countervailing organisation to check Nigerian preponderance in ECOWAS suggests that countries in the region are sometimes more willing to succumb to external suggestions than they are willing to co-operate to do something to reduce the influence of such actors on regional and domestic politics. In such an instance external actors become important in the success or failure of regional integration. In addition to the influence that is exerted on the francophone countries, the formation of ECOWAS itself was very much facilitated by the signing of the Lomé Convention.

These two issues also show that the generalisations made about the external impact on regional integration holds true for West Africa also. These are that: *(1) a single state (or its elite) may be seen as the extra-regional force which hinders or aids integration; (2) another regional counter system may be the extra-regional force which explains integration or disintegration.*

More importantly, the different attitudes toward the desirability or otherwise of dependence on extra-regional actors tends to impede ECOWAS decision making. The dependence of the francophone countries on France for economic, financial and political support, and of the region in general on international markets and finance, makes an ideology of de-linking difficult to pursue. Thus the assertion that *perceptions of dependence on extra-regional systems may if it is pervasive act as a disincentive to integration* holds true in the region. In

the relationship between France and the francophone countries of the region, the generalisation that *an extra-regional state with hegemonic tendencies may undermine regional integration through its payoff capacity* also holds true as is evidenced in our detail of the role of France in chapter three and its impact on regional integration in chapter six.

The social structure of the region on the other hand affects regional integration in two ways. The diverse ethnic composition of countries within the region means that nation building becomes very salient. Though the nation, in its political sense, is developing, the desire to progress to the position where the nation coincides with the state, among other things, concentrates the minds of national governments on nation building rather than regional processes.

At the same time the straddling of tribes across borders has both negative and positive repercussions on regionalism. Tribes across borders provide territorial continuity where political boundaries have undermined it. Interaction is therefore extensive at the informal level. Since such interaction, both social and economic is facilitated between countries by such straddling, ethnicity could have a positive effect on integration.

However because the straddling of tribes across borders makes the international boundaries porous, governments are fearful of its effect on the territorial integrity of their states. As we have shown the straddling of the Ghana and Togo border by the Ewes has created difficulties for both countries. The relatively low level of national integration therefore places limitations on regional integration. The frequent closure of borders makes interaction and trade difficult and at the decision making level creates animosity between the governments concerned. Again

this proves in the West African context that *countries that are poorly integrated internally make poor partners in a regional integration because of the reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home.*

From the above we can see that almost all the generalisations made about third world integration hold for West Africa also.

A question that arises therefore is whether regional integration is a viable strategy for national economic development? Two other related questions are: why despite the failure of integration schemes they continue to attract such high following; and would ECOWAS members consider dismantling the regional organisation if it continues to be such a poor performer?

Before we can answer the first question we need to know how effective ECOWAS has been in achieving its objectives.

When the organisation was formed in 1975, it was stated in the Treaty that a custom union should be formed within 15 years after the definitive entry into force of the treaty. As we have seen in chapter five, though ECOWAS has achieved a lot in terms of providing a common forum for West African countries to discuss economic, social and political issues, little has been achieved in terms of the substantive development goals set out in the Treaty. The timetable for trade liberalisation is running seven years behind schedule, and little has been achieved industrially.

To its credit the organisation has enabled the member countries to move from a position of no decision making among them prior to 1975, to a position where as many as 17 issue areas had been discussed by 1990. In addition: ECOWAS has for the first time since independence created a fairly permanent forum for collective decision making which incorporates all francophone and anglophone countries; substantial physical infrastructures have been built and research centres set up; there has been a rationalisation of separate francophone and anglophone research centres; official interaction at the regional level has increased substantially; there are also the beginnings of West African countries taking responsibility for security issues arising in the region as is exemplified by the ECOMOG peacekeeping efforts of the organisation in Liberia.

The achievements are more political than economic. However these political achievements are superficial. Paradoxically, political difficulties have been responsible for non achievement of economic objectives. As pointed out in chapters three and six the dilemma of having to ask those from whom they want to be independent for the means of such independence plagues ECOWAS countries. Financial difficulties make them dependent on financial support for projects. Dependence has however had a more debilitating effect. It has made it difficult to pursue policies that would make the members less dependent on the West.

The more important reason though is that the members lack the will to implement policies because of the fear of dislocating their economies. Eliminating tariffs means loss of revenue for member countries. Without an adequate compensatory scheme trade liberalisation will be ineffective.

These constraints, coupled with other domestic and foreign policy orientations and goals make implementation difficult. Thus though many issues are discussed, very little gets implemented.

Those discussions that are effectively implemented are foreign financed. Going back to the question asked earlier about the viability of ECOWAS, the answer would be that based on evidence so far it has not been able to achieve its aims and has therefore not been viable if measured against the provisions of the Treaty. Whether it is a viable strategy depends on the time frame within which it is expected to begin to yield results. So far the timetable has been too tight given the low level of co-operation prior to the formation of the organisation. As we pointed in chapter two, political integration as Deutsch et al. pointed out in their historical study takes anything between 60 years to 150 years. If that is accepted then we can at least assume that regional economic integration would also take a fairly long time.

As has been pointed out the institutional framework required for the type of integration needed by developing countries must be elaborate, even more so than that found in the EEC. This is an unrealistic proposition because of the resources required to set it up and run it. If ECOWAS and its treaty provisions cannot ensure trade liberalisation, industrialisation, provide compensation and redistribute resources within the region as well as help in overcoming dependence then it is unlikely to fulfil the desires of overcoming the disadvantaged position of these countries in international relations.

The change in emphasis from trade liberalisation to industry in the revised treaty continues to assume a regional cosmopolitanism, which does not exist, and a dirigiste approach to industrial development which contradicts the readjustment and restructuring programmes that are currently going on in almost all the member countries. The falsification of the Soviet model of development has also severely undermined this approach. Involvement of government in

manufacturing in West Africa has been disastrous for the economy of the countries, whilst co-operating to set up industries have not been very successful either as the CIMA O project under which clinker would be produced jointly by Togo, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire has shown. Thus the theoretical assumptions of cosmopolitanism and dirigisme are not compatible with the West African experience and situation.

Our suggestion would be that for short term to medium term goals of industrialisation ECOWAS countries ought to take advantage of the preferences that they have under the Lome Convention's trade concessions and more generally pursue the advantages they have under the General System of Preferences. ECOWAS countries do not face any barriers for their industrial exports to the EEC which is an existing market where purchasing habits are geared toward industrial goods as opposed to the more basic needs orientation of West African markets. Non-tariff barriers are faced by the South East Asian countries but they have been able to penetrate the European market to the extent that barriers are now being imposed under the GSP. Even if governments in the EEC were to remove the barriers consumers will have to be aware of the goods and shops willing to stock the goods. Quality and marketing are therefore essential for penetration of export markets.

A more gradual development of ECOWAS without too high an expectation and an emphasis on functional co-operation will provide the framework for a more elaborate integration scheme. Efforts ought to be concentrated on creating the legal, economic and political framework for private investment, whilst at the same time pursuing an export promotion programme to both regional and external markets. As we saw in chapter six, the building of infrastructure has been one of the areas where ECOWAS has been most successful. Actual projects therefore ought to concentrate on building transport and telecommunications network

between the countries of the region. Actual co-operation in production ought to be left to joint ventures between entrepreneurs.

This research has indicted a low level of achievement of regional integration in West Africa relative to the goals set in the Treaty. This failure is an addition to the list of other documented failures and poor performance of other integration schemes among developing countries, such as the East African Community, and those in Latin America. This indicates that the economic and political frameworks are not suitable for developing regions and need to be re-examined.

From the case study we can conclude that regional integration in developing regions, such as, West Africa face two related problems; 1) a theoretical misfit between an economic proposition and its framework and process mechanism, and 2) an economic, political and social environment which make it difficult for regional collective decision-making.

Why integration continues to attract such wide following is a more difficult question to answer. One reason is that there seems to be very few alternatives to choose from. If the desire of developing countries is to be less dependent on the markets and finance of the developed countries, then the only way open to them is through greater interaction among themselves. The framework that commits countries to achieving greater interaction is regional integration. Other forms of co-operation tend to rely too much on intentions. Integration on the other hand commits members to fixed timetables and programmes.

A second possible reason is that the *a priori* postulations are still taken for granted by many of those who advocate such schemes. There is the tendency to believe that the causes of

failure in other regions can be avoided. However, as we have tried to show, there are certain theoretical difficulties that need to be addressed if integration is to be viable among developing countries. Until that is done, failure cannot be attributed to background conditions alone.

Whether ECOWAS members would consider dismantling the organisation if it continues to fail to achieve its goals, is a question for there are no obvious answers. In the first instance, the present level of failure is to a certain extent a result of the exaggerated expectations that members have for regional integration. The time frame, as has been pointed out, is too short for any substantial trade links to have developed among the members of the organisation. The institutional framework has also not developed sufficiently to enable it to play the role it ought to play in collective decision making. Thus the question is from a theoretical point of view premature. However, judged against the Treaty's aims the question is important. It does highlight the need for a more realistic approach to goal setting and a realisation that regional integration is not a panacea to industrial development. It is a method that should accompany others.

If, however, we were to assume that the time frame set out in the Treaty of ECOWAS was realistic, it is unlikely that the organisation would be dismantled. Sunk cost considerations make it difficult for organisation to be dismantled once they have been set up. The vast amount of resources already spent make it very difficult to contemplate such action.

Additionally the opportunity cost of disbanding would be the absence of a firm commitment to forge south-south trade relations. Even though we advocate a more functional co-operation method of co-operation, this ought to be within a legal framework that commits members to more than just ad-hoc co-operation.

As we have also indicated the political achievements of the organisation might make it difficult, indeed unwise, to wind down the organisation. As the new draft Treaty of the organisation shows, the organisation is being deepened, with a proposed economic and social council, and an extension of the authority of the secretariat. Thus contrary to the question, the organisation is being strengthened rather than streamlined.

Implications for Theory and Practice of Regional Integration

There is a need to reformulate the economic and political framework to fit the level of political development if it is to be applicable to developing regions. This may have the possible effect of making it difficult to propose overarching general theories for international integration that are applicable to all regions. But this may not be such a bad thing if it makes theory more relevant to practice.

There is also the secondary need to identify the independent variables that are relevant for integration among developing countries.

Thirdly, there is a need to research into the connection between political and economic integration more extensively.

At the regional level it is necessary to research into how coalitions for regional decision-making are formed. It will also be important within the West African context to examine how the structural adjustment programmes are affecting the relevance of integration as a tool for development.

Also at the regional level research will have to be conducted into whether rationalisation of prospective industries does not introduce too rigid an industrial structure into the region. Will not the siting of industries in region according to comparative advantages be stultifying the creation of contrived comparative advantages? What will be the effect of such regional policies on the development of national competitive advantage.

The research has from using ECOWAS as a case study, shown that the so-called dynamic theories of regional economic integration theory have failed to yield the *a priori* advantages claimed for them. We have also shown that the claims made by classical economic theory that developing countries lack the conditions for economic integration has been validated by our research.

The reason for this, as we have tried to show, is because of the limitations of the dynamic theories of economic integration and the Eurocentricity of international political integration theories. It is also because political and social repercussions of economic integration have not been sufficiently taken account of in initial proposals for economic integration.

For integration to be viable in West Africa and other developing countries, the underlying theories have to be reworked to take account of the failure of trade liberalisation and dirigiste industrialisation strategies. It also needs to highlight the interaction between political, economic and social variables. The political, economic and social environment of the region concerned must also be very carefully considered and theory tailored accordingly.

Appendix 1**Protocol on Non-Aggression****THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES**

CONSIDERING that the Economic Community of West African States, (hereinafter referred to as the ("Community")), set up by virtue of the Treaty of may 28, 1975, cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member States of the Community;

RECALLING Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter which provides that all Member States shall refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or independence of any State, or any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

RECALLING Article 3 (3) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity which provides for the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and its inalienable right to independent existence;

RECALLING the Resolution of the Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Community held in Lome on 5 November, 1976 regarding the signing of an Annexed Protocol on non-recourse to force by Member-States of the Community,

AGREE AS FOLLOWS:**ARTICLE 1**

Member States shall in their relations with one another, refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the organisation of African Unity against the territorial integrity of political independence of other Member-States.

ARTICLE 2

Each Member-State shall refrain, from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity of the other Member-States.

ARTICLE 3

Each member State shall undertake to prevent Foreigners resident on its territory from committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other Member-States.

ARTICLE 4

Each Member-State shall undertake to prevent non-resident Foreigners from using their territory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member-States.

ARTICLE 5

1. Member States pledge to respond to all peaceful means in the settlement of disputes arising among themselves.
2. Any dispute which cannot be settled peacefully among Member States shall be referred to a Committee of the Authority. In the event of failure of settlement by the aforementioned Committee the dispute shall finally go to the Authority.
3. The composition of the mandate of the Committee referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be decided upon by the Authority.

ARTICLE 6

- (1) The Protocol shall come into effect provisionally on signature by the Heads of State and Government, and definitively on ratification by at least seven signatory States, in conformity with the constitutional regulations of each Member-States.
- (2) This Protocol, as well as all the Instruments of Ratification, shall be deposited with the Executives Secretariat who shall transmit certified true copies of the Protocol to all Member-States informing them of the dates on which the Instruments of Ratification have been deposited. The Protocol shall be registered with the Organisations approved by the Authority.
- (3) Any Member State may accede to this Protocol and the instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Executive Secretariat.
- (4) This Protocol shall be annexed to and form an integral part of the Treaty.

The Protocol was signed on the 22nd of April 1978.

Appendix 2

PROTOCOL RELATING TO MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ON DEFENCE

PREAMBLE

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES.

RECALLING Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which calls upon all Member-States to refrain in their international relations from resorting to the use of threats or force either against the territorial integrity or the independence of all States in any manner that is incompatible with the aims of the United Nations or from interfering in the internal affairs of other States.

RECALLING Article 3 of the Charter and of the Organisation of African Unity which calls upon Member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and its inalienable right to an independent existence;

MINDFUL of the Treaty setting up the Economic Community of West African States;

RECALLING the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in Lagos on 22nd April 1978 in accordance with which Member States resolved not to use force as a means of settling their disputes;

CONVINCED that economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the necessary security are ensured in all Member States of the Community;

CONSIDERING that Member States belong to the same geographical area;

CONSCIOUS of the serious risks that the presence of foreign military bases on the African continent may constitute as support forces to external aggression;

FIRMLY RESOLVE to safeguard and consolidate the independence and the sovereignty of Member States against foreign intervention.

CONSCIOUS of the fact that external defence of their states depends entirely on each sovereign state, and that such a defence will be more effective with the co-ordination and pooling together of the means of mutual assistance provided by respective Member States within the framework of this Protocol;

DESIROUS of maintaining the ties of friendship existing amongst Member States and of strengthening their cooperation in all fields on the basis of equality, mutual interests and respects;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS

Article 1

Within the context of this Protocol

"Treaty " means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States;

"Community" means the Economic Community of West African States;

"Authority " means the Authority of Heads of States government as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty;

"Member States" or "Member States" means a Member State or Member States of the Community.

"Executive Secretary" means Executive Secretary of the Community as defined in Article 8 of the Treaty;

"Aggression" means the use of armed force by any State against the sovereignty and territorial integrity or political independence of another State or by any other manner incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and OAU;

"Assistance on Defence" means all military aid (material, technical and personnel).

CHAPTER III

Article 2

Member States declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community.

Article 3

Member States resolve to give mutual assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression.

Article 4

Member States shall also take appropriate measures such as specified in Article 17 and 18 of the present Protocol in the following circumstances:

- (a) In case of armed conflict between two or several Member States if the settlement procedure by peaceful means as indicated in Article 5 of the Non-Aggression Protocol mentioned in the Preamble proves ineffective;
- (b) In case of internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire community. In this case the Authority shall appreciate and decide on this situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member States concerned.

CHAPTER III INSTITUTIONS

Article 5

The institutions for the implementation of this Protocol shall be:

The Authority

The Defence Council

The Defence Committee

SECTION I - THE AUTHORITY

Article 6

- 1 The Authority on the occasion of the annual ordinary meeting of ECOWAS shall examine general problems concerning peace and security of the Community;
- 2 The Authority may also hold extra-ordinary sessions on defence matters when circumstances so require;
- 3 The Authority shall decide on the expedience of military action and entrust its execution to the Force Commander of the Allied Forces of the Community (AAFC);
- 4 Decisions taken by the Authority shall be immediately enforceable on Member-States.
- 4 Decisions taken by the Authority shall be immediately enforceable on Member-States.

SECTION II - THE DEFENCE COUNCIL

Article 7

- 1 A Defence Council shall be established by the Authority.
- 2 It shall consist of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Member States. However, in cases of crisis, the Defence Council shall be enlarged to include any other Minister from Member States according to the circumstances. The Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of military matters shall be in attendance at the meetings of the Council.

Article 8

- 1 The Defence Council shall meet on the convocation by its Chairman to prepare the item of the Agenda of Sessions of the Authority dealing with defence matters.
- 2 In an emergency, the Defence Council shall examine the situation, the strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention to be used.

Article 9

In case of armed intervention, the Defence Council assisted by the Defence Commission shall supervise with the authority of the State or States concerned, all measures to be taken by the Force Commander and ensure that all necessary means for the intervention are made available to him. The actions of the Force Commander shall be subject to competent political authority of the Member State or States concerned.

Article 10

At the end of the operation, the Defence Council shall write a factual report to be addressed to the Authority.

SECTION III - THE DEFENCE COMMISSION

Article 11

- 1 The Defence Commission shall be established by the Authority and shall consist of a Chief of Staff from each Member State.

2 A Defence Commission shall be responsible for examining the technical aspects of
defence matters.

3 The Defence Commission shall establish its Rules of Procedure especially in respect of
the convening of its meetings, the conduct of the business and the implementation of
duties as assigned to it by the Defence Council.

CHAPTER IV ADMINISTRATION

Article 12

- 1 The Defence Council shall appoint a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) at the
Executive Secretariat for a period of four years renewable only once.
- 2 The Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) shall be a senior serving military officer.
- 3 He shall be in charge of the administration and follow-up of the decisions taken by the
Authority and in accordance with the present Protocol and under the authority of the
Executive Secretary.
- 4 He shall update plans for the movement of troops and logistics and initiate joint
exercises as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 13 below.
- 5 He shall be assisted in the discharge of his functions and personnel as determined by
the Defence Council.
- 6 He shall prepare and manage the military budget of the Secretariat.
- 7 He shall study and make proposals to the Executive Secretariat in respect of all
matters relating to personnel and equipment within his jurisdiction.

CHAPTER V MODALITIES OF INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE

Article 13

- 1 All Member States agreed to place at the disposal of the Community, earmarked units
from the existing National Armed Forces in case of any armed intervention.
- 2 These units shall be referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC)
- 3 In order to better realise the objectives set forth in this Protocol, the member States
army organise, from time to time, as may be approved by the Authority, joint military
exercises among two or more earmarked units of the AAFC.

Article 14

The Allied Armed Forces of the Community shall be under the command of the Forces Commander appointed by the Authority on the proposal of the Defence Council. He shall be entrusted with powers that are conferred upon him by the Authority. He together with the Chief of Defence Staff of the assisted country, shall be the joint Chief of Defence Staff of the Allied Armed Forces and shall be responsible for the implementation of armed intervention and assistance as decided by the Authority. He shall have at his disposal all the necessary means of defence.

Article 15

- 1 Intervention by the AAFC shall in all cases be justified by the legitimate defence of the territories of the Community.
- 2 It shall therefore be carried out in accordance with the mechanism described in Articles 16, 17 and 18 below.

Article 16

When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member State of the Community, the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to other Members. This request shall mean that the Authority shall decide in accordance with the emergency procedure as stipulated in Article 6 above.

Article 17

When there is a conflict between two Member States of the Community, the Authority shall meet urgently and take appropriate action for mediation. If need be, the Authority shall decide only to interpose the AAFC, between the troops engaged in the conflict.

Article 18

- 1 In the case where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively maintained and sustained from outside, the provisions of Article 6, 9 and 16 of this Protocol shall apply.
- 2 Community forces shall not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal.

CHAPTER VI SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Article 19

The implementation of this Protocol shall be supplemented by additional Protocols.

Article 20

- 1 Undertakings devolving from the provisions of this Protocol shall not be interpreted to as being against the spirit of Conventions or Agreements binding one member State to another third State or States; provided each Convention and Agreements are not in conflicts with the spirit of this Defence Assistance.

2 Nonetheless, a Defence Agreement concluded with some other State shall be denounced by the Member State or concerned as soon as such other State shall have been identified by the Authority as an aggressor against a member State.

3 Member States shall undertake to end the presence of foreign military bases within their national territories as soon as the Community is in the position to meet their requirements in matters relating to defence.

CHAPTER VII GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 21

- 1 Any Member State which accedes to the Treaty automatically accedes to this Protocol and to the Protocol of Non-Aggression signed in Lagos on the 22nd April, 1978.
- 2 On the other hand any Member State signatory to this present Protocol and having ratified it, or having acceded to it, becomes party to the above-mentioned Non-Aggression Pact.

Article 22

- 1 Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Protocol.
- 2 Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary who shall communicate them to other Member States not later than thirty days after their receipt of such proposals. Amendments or revisions shall be considered by the Authority after member States have been given one month's notice thereof.

Article 23

- 1 Any Member State wishing to withdraw from the Protocol shall give to the Executive Secretary one year's written notice. At the end of this period of one year, if such notice is not withdrawn, such a State shall cease to be a party to the Protocol.
- 2 During the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, such a Member State shall nevertheless observe the provisions of this Protocol and shall remain liable for the discharge of its obligations under this Protocol.

Article 24

- 1 This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally at the signing by Heads of State and Government, and definitively after ratification by not less than seven (7) signatories, in accordance with the Constitutional Laws of each Member State.
- 2 This Protocol, as well as all instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Executive Secretariat which shall transmit certified true copies to all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall register it with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as the United Nations (UN) and any other organisation as the Authority shall decide.
- 3 The Present Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part of the Treaty.

Done at Freetown on 29th May 1981.

Bibliography

Books

- Achi, A., 'Regional Economic Integration and Foreign Policy' in The Political Economy of the Ivory Coast, Zartman, I. W., and Delgado, C., (ed.), Praeger, New York, 1984.
- Adams, G.F., and Bernhman, Commodity Exports and Economic Development, Lexington Books, 1982.
- Aluko, O., 'The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of African States', in The Foreign Policy of African States, Aluko, O. (ed.), Holder and Stoughton, 1977.
- Amenumey, D.E.K., The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political History, Ghana University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
- Asante, S.K.B., 'CEAO/ECOWAS: Conflict and Co-operation in West Africa', in The Future of Regionalism in Africa, Onwuku, R.I., and Sesay, A., (ed.), Macmillan, London, 1984.
- Asante, S.K.B., The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa, Praeger, New York, 1986.
- Atsian, A., 'Regional Economic Integration and Foreign Policy' in The Political Economy of Ivory Coast, Zartman, I. W., and Delgado, C., (ed.), Praeger, New York, 1984.
- Axline, W.A., Caribbean Integration, The Politics of Regionalism, Francis Pinter, London, 1979.
- Bach, D.C., 'Francophone Regional Organisations' in West African Regional Co-operation and Development
- Balassa, B., 'A Theory of Regional Integration', in Latin American Economic Integration: Experience and Prospects
- Balassa, B., Economic Development and Integration, CentroDe Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, Mexico, 1965.
- Bankole, T., Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, Nelson, London, 1957.
- Begg, D., Fischer, S., and Dornbusch, R., Economics, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, England, 1987.
- Berg, E.T., 'Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism: Recent Trends in Ghana and the Ivory Coast', in Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization, Foster, P., and Zolberg, A.R., (ed.), University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Card, E., 'The Political Economy of Ghana', in The Political Economy of Africa, Harris, R., (ed.), Schenkman, Cambridge Mass., 1975.
- Chabal, P., Power in Africa, Macmillan, London, 1992.
- Chazan, N., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, (2nd ed.), Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1992.
- Chipman, J., French Power in Africa, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
- Claude, I., Swords Into Ploughshares, Third Edition, University of London Press, London 1964.
- Cook, C., and Killingray, African Political Facts Since 1945, (2nd ed.), macmillan, London 1991.

- Cox, W.R., and Jacobson, H.K., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International Organizations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1974.
- Deutsch, K. W., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton Univ. Press, 1957
- Deutsch, K. W., The Analysis of International Relations, Prentice Hall, London, 1988.
- Duverger, M., The Study of Politics, Nelson, London, 1972.
- Edozien, E.C., and Osagie, E., (ed.), Economic Integration of West Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
- Emerson, R., From Empire to Nation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.
- Etzioni, A., Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1965.
- Fajemirokun, H., 'The Role of West African Chamber of Commerce in the formation of ECOWAS', in Readings and Documents on ECOWAS, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Macmillan, Lagos, 1984.
- Feld, J.W., and Jordan, R.S., International Organizations: A Comparative Approach, Praeger, New York, 1983.
- Forsyth, M., Union of States, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1981.
- Gilpin, R., The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987.
- Gruhn, I.V., 'The Economic Commission For Africa', in African Regional Organisations, Mazzeo, D., (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.
- Harrison, R.J., 'Neo-functionalism', in Framework for International Co-operation, Taylor, P., and Groom, A.J.R., (ed.), Pinter, London, 1990.
- Hass, E.B., The Uniting of Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958.
- Hass, E.B., Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964.
- Hass, E.B., 'The Study of Regional Integration', in Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, S.A., (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
- Hodder-Williams, R., An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1984.
- Mazzeo, D., (ed.), African Regional Organisations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.
- Nwabuzor, E.J.O., 'Politics of African Economic Integration', in Economic Integration of West Africa, Edozien, E.C., and Osagie, E., (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
- Iyoha, M.A., Economic Development and Trade Theories: Relevance and Implication for ECOWAS, in Trade and Development in Economic Community of West African States, Orimalade, A., and Ubogu, R.E., (ed.), Vikas, Delhi, 1984.

- Inglehart, R., 'Public Opinion and Regional Integration' in Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, S., (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
- Jeffries, R., Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railwaymen of Sekondi, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
- Kasfir, N., 'Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview' in Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa, Manhood, P., (ed.), John Wiley Publishers, New York, 1983.
- Killick, T., Policy Economics, Heinemann, London, 1981.
- Lamarchad, R., 'The Changing Stricture of Patronage System' in The Precarious Balance, : State and Society in Africa, Rothchild, D., and Chazan, N., (ed.), Westview Press, London, 1988.
- Lindberg, L., 'Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon', in Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, S., (ed.), Harvard University Press Press, Cambridge, 1971.
- Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, S., Europe's Would-Be Polity, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1970.
- Lister, M., The European Community and the Developing World, Avebury, Aldershot, 1988.
- MacBean, A., and Nguyen, D.T., Commodity Policies: Problems and Prospects, Groom Helm, London, 1987.
- Mally, G., The European Community in Perspective, Lxington, London, 1973.
- Mayall, J., 'Britain and the Third World', in The West and the Third World, O'Neill, R and Vincent R.J., (ed.), Macmillan, London, 1990.
- Mayall, J., 'The Impact for Africa of the Enlarged European Community', in The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development, Shaw, T.M., and Heard, K.A., (ed.), Longman, Bristol, 1979.
- Mazrui, A., and Tidy, M., Nationalism and New States in Africa, Heinemann, London, 1984.
- Obadan, M.I., 'Regional Trade of the ECOWAS: Characteristics, Problems and Prospects', in Trade and Development in Economic Community of West African States, Orimalade, A., and Ubogu, R.E., (ed.), Vikas, Delhi, 1984.
- Olzak, S., and Nagel, J., Competitive Ethnic Relations, Academic Press, London, 1986.
- Pryor, F. L., The Communist Foreign Trade System, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1963.
- Pratten, C., and Dean, R.M., The Economies of Large-Scale Production in British Industry, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965.
- Puchala, D.J., 'International Transactions and Regional Integration', in Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, S., (ed.), Harvard University Press Press, Cambridge, 1971.

- Reminger, J.P., Multinational Co-operation for Development in West Africa, Pergamon, New York, 1979
- Robson, P., The Economics of International Integration, Allan and Unwin, London, 1987.
- Roxborough, I., Theories of Underdevelopment, Macmillan, London, 1979.
- Sandbrook, R., and Cohen, R., (ed.), The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action, London, Longman, 1975.
- Schmitter, P.C., P.C., 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration' in Regional Integration: Research and Theory, Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, S., (ed.), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1971.
- Stremlan, J., The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Princeton, 1977.
- Taylor, P., The State in the European Community in the 1970s: The Limits of International Integration, PhD Thesis presented to the University of London in 1982.
- Taylor, P., and Groom, A.J.R., Frameworks For International Co-operation, Pinter, London, 1990.
- Taylor, P., 'Conceptual Typology of International Organizations' in A Framework For International Co-operation, Taylor, P., and Groom, A.J.R., (ed.), Pinter, London, 1990.
- Thompson, R.J., and Rudolf Jr., R.J., 'Ethnic Politics and Public Policy' in Western Societies; A Framework for Conceptual Analysis in Ethnicity, Politics and Development, Thompson, R.J., and Rudolf Jr., R.J., (ed.) Lynne Rienner, 1986.
- Thompson, W., Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, Princeton University Press, 1969.
- Tordoff, W., Government and Politics in Africa, (2 edn.), Macmillan, London, 1993.
- Usono, E.J., 'Past and Present Attempts at Economic Integration in West Africa', in Economic Integration of West Africa, Edozien, E.C., and Osagie, E., (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
- Viner, J., The Custom Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950.
- Welch, C.E., Jr., Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and the Political Unification of West Africa, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1966.
- Welch C.E., 'The Military Factor in West Africa: Leadership and Regional Development' in West African Regional Co-operation and Development, Okolo, J.E., and Wright, S., (ed.),
- Young, C., 'The Colonial State and Its Political Legacy' in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, Rothchild, D., and Chazan, N., (ed.), Westview Press, London, 1988.
- Zartman, W.I., and Delgado, (ed.), The Political Economy of Ivory Coast, Praeger, New York, 1984.

Zolberg, A.R., and Foster, P., (ed.) Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization, University of Chicago Press, 1971.

Journals

- Agyeman-Duah, B., and Ojo, O.L., 'Interstate Conflicts in West Africa: The Reference Group Theory Perspective', in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, Oct. 1991.
- Aluko, O., 'Options in Nigerian Foreign Policy' Conference of the Canadian African Studies Association, Winnipeg, May 1979.
- Bach, D.C., 'The Politics of West African Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 21, Part 4, 1983.
- Brown, A.J., 'Separation versus a Common Market in Developing Countries', in Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research, 1961.
- Coehn, R., 'Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers', in Review of African Political Economy, vol 19, 1980.
- Coolier, P., 'Africa's External Economic Relations: 1960-90', in African Affairs, Vol.90, No. 360, July 1991.
- Contact, Publication of ECOWAS, vol 2, no. 2, Sept., 1990.
- Contact, Publication of ECOWAS, May, 1990.
- Cooper, C.A., and Massell, B.F., 'Toward a Theory of Customs Union for Developing Countries', in Journal of Political Economy, Vol 73, 1965.
- Davies, A., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis within ECOWAS' in The World Today, Vol. 39, No. 5, May 1983.
- Gambari, I., 'ECOWAS, Time for National Appraisal'
- Harrison, S.S., 'The Challenge to Indian Nationalism', in Foreign Affairs, July 1956.
- Hass, E. B., 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', in International Organization, Vol. 15, No.3, Summer 1961.
- Hoffman, S., 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the case of Western Europe', in Daedalus, Vol. 95, 1966.
- Jackson, R.H., and Rosberg, C.G., 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist; The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood' in World Politics, Vol. xxxv, No. 1, Oct. 1982.
- Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, The Trade Liberalisation Scheme of the Economic Community of West African States, Spring Communications, Lagos, 1992.
- Kindleberger, C.P., 'The Terms of Trade and Economic Development', in Review of Economic and Statistics Supplement, Vol. 40, 1958.
- Linder, S., 'Customs Union and Economic Development', in Latin American Integration: Experience and Prospects, Wionczek, M. S., (ed.), Praeger, London, 1964.

- Morse, E.L., 'The transformation of foreign Politics: Modernisation, Independence and Externalisation' in World Politics, April, 1970.
- Puchala, D., and Fagan, S., 'International Politics in the 1970s: The search for Perspectives' in International Organization, Vol. 28, No. 2, Spring 1974.
- Ogunbadejo, O., 'Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States: From Vision to Reality', in African Contemporary Records, Annual Survey and Documents, 1986-87, African Publishing Company, NY, 1988.
- Ojo, O.J., 'Nigeria and the formation of ECOWAS', in International Organization, xxxiv, 4, Autumn 1980.
- Sapsford, D., 'The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities and Manufactures: A Comment and Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal, vol 95, 1985.
- Spraos, J., 'The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities and Manufactures: A Comment and Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal, vol 95, 1980.
- Taylor, P., 'The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process' in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 7, no. 2, 1968.
- Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the light of the new dynamism of the EEC' in Millenium, Vol. 20, No.1, Spring 1991.
- Wolf, P., 'International Organisation and Attitude Change: A Re-examination of Functionalist Approach', in International Organization, Vol. 27, No. 3, Summer 1973.

News Papers and Newa Magazines

- African Contemporary Records, Vol. xix, 1986 - 87.
- African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd., Exeter, March 15 - April 14, 1976.
- African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd., Exeter, March 1-31, 1980.
- African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd., Exeter, July 1-31, 1982.
- African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd., Exeter, June 1-30, 1983
- African Research Bulletin, vol 29, no 7, July 16, August 15, 1992.
- West Africa Magazine, 20 May 1961.
- West Africa Magazine 27 January 1975
- West Africa Magazine, 2 June 1980 .
- West Africa Magazine, 2 June 1984 .
- West Africa Magazine, November, 1984 .
- West Africa Magazine, 20 May 1990.
- West Africa Magazine, 27 June 1992.
- West Africa Magazine, July 27 1992.

Official Documents

- Butt, A., Pressure Groups in the European Community, UACES Occasional Papers 2, 1985.
- ECA, Report of the WestnAfrican Industrial Co-operation Mission, E/CN. 14/246, January 7, 1964.
- ECA, Articles of Association of the Economic Community of West Africa, E/CN. 14/9, May 1967.
- 'Economic Integration and African Unity', Second National Development Plan, 1970-74: Programme of Post-war Reconctruction and Developemnt, Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information, 1970.
- Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, December 1989.
- Grilli E.R., and Yang, M.C., 'Primary Commodity Prices, manufactured Goods Prices, and Terms of Trade of Developing Countries:mWhat the Long Run Shows', World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1988.
- ECOWAS, Ten Years of ECOWAS, Published by the Secretariat of ECOWAS, 1985.
- Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, signed in Lagos in April 1975.
- World Bank , Sub-Saharan AFrica, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1989.
- World Bank, World Development Report, 1991.
- ECOWAS, Official Journal, vol. 1, June 1979.
- ECOWAS, Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.
- ECOWAS, Official Journal, vol. 3, June 1981.
- ECOWAS, Official Journal, vol. 4, June 1982.
- ECOWAS, Official Journal, vol. 5, June 1983.