

**The Security Concept in Southern Africa:  
Prospects for the Post-Apartheid Era**

**A Thesis Submitted by :**

**Agostinho M. Zacarias**

**For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in Economics/ International Relations**

**London School of Economics and Political Science**

**June 1996**

UMI Number: U087011

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U087011

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against  
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES

F

7314



x210595514

To the Memory of my father:  
*Marcelino Bonifacio Zacarias*  
who did not live longer  
to share this experience with me  
and

to my mother *Hortencia*, and to  
*Luisa* and *Jose*, all of whom made immense  
sacrifices for my education.

## **Abstract**

The thesis examines the concept of security that states and other actors in Southern Africa have acted upon. It argues that Southern Africa, due to its peculiar colonial history and apartheid, and the regions' links with great powers, embraced the traditional concept of security, a concept that was unsustainable and inappropriate for its specific conditions. The traditional concept seeks to protect states and domestic societies from outside threats. This concept was inherently militaristic, nationally focused, state-centric and narrow in scope. The emphasis is on immediate problem-solving rather than on a sustained attempt to identify the underlying causes of insecurity. Its application to Southern Africa led to regional confrontation and produced more insecurity than security. Southern Africa needs a new concept which is broader and long term in its outlook in order to restore stability and prosperity. The new concept should essentially be people centred, because people are the only object of security. The new concept should take into account the diverse factors, military and non-military impinging on the security of people.

Placing people at the centre, when conceptualising security, requires focusing on making the environment secure rather than on the threats to and the vulnerabilities of the state. The environment of security is defined by the coexistence of three pillars: order, justice and peace. Thus the task of building security in Southern Africa should be orientated towards the strengthening of these pillars. In the final analysis the pillars need to be supported and reinforced by a political process which seeks to promote the good of all members of society as the final goal of all policy. This cannot be achieved without building legitimate states, i.e. states regarded as protectors of their citizens interests and strengthen social agents other than those merely around the state. The task of building a legitimate state and strengthening civil society then become primary steps in the process of building the desired security community in Southern Africa. National integration of different political communities within the states and regional co-operation are essential.

This implies strengthening domestic and regional institutions. While domestic institutions are necessary to reduce internal conflicts, regional institutions are essential to allow the predictability of peace in relations among states. The economic and social inequalities between the states and the military asymmetries, will hamper states quick integration, hence the building of the security community. Regional institutions will tend to drain the resources of the relatively richer states, even though there is a strong will to avoid the confrontations of the past. This thesis suggests that a security system, defined as a pattern of relations aimed at assuring the sharing of common values and interests, should be followed in the process of building security in Southern Africa.

## **Contents**

	<b>Page</b>
Abstract	i
Abbreviations	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
What is Security	3
The Security debate	6
Security and the third World	9
Security and Southern Africa	13

## **Part I - The Idea of Security and Southern Africa**

### **Chapter 1**

<b>Historical overview of the concept of Security</b>	<b>23</b>
The Realist School	24
The Liberal School	37
Collective Security	44
The Marxist School	51
Southern Africa and the Concept of Security	57

### **Chapter 2**

<b>The Making of the Southern Africa Security Complex:</b>	
<b>Regional Factors</b>	<b>65</b>
The Discovery of Diamonds and Gold	67
Towards the Monopoly of Means of Violence and power	74
South Africa and the Search for Regional Power	83
The Impact of Nationalist Struggle	91
Consolidation of the Bloc System	90

### **Chapter 3**

<b>The Making of the Southern Africa Security Complex:</b>	
<b>Extra -Regional Factors</b>	<b>108</b>
NATO Ambiguous Policies and Southern Africa	110
Britain and South Africa	118
The Socialist Bloc and Southern Africa	126
The Replication of East West Divide in the Region	138

## **PART II - Legacies and Inadequacies of Traditional Approaches To Security**

### **Chapter 4**

<b>The Legacies of the Southern Africa Security Complex</b>	151
The State and Security	151
The Southern African States	156
The Successor Colonial States	159
The Physical Base and Institutions	161
The Military Related Legacies	169
Economic Legacies	176

### **Chapter 5**

<b>The Inadequacies of the Traditional Concept</b>	184
The Traditional Concept	185
The Nature of the State	190
The Endemic Nature of Problems Impinging on Security	199

## **PART III - Towards New Approaches to Security**

### **Chapter 6**

<b>Towards A New Concept of Security</b>	207
The Foundations of the Concept of Security and their Inter-relations	215
How to Guarantee the Equilibrium Between Pillars	221
The Nature of Agents: Changing the Nature of States	225
Strengthening the Civil Society	229
How to Assure the Balance Between Competing Interests	232

### **Chapter 7**

<b>From A Complex to a Community?</b>	238
The Region and The Idea of Community	240
The Variables of Security	248
Power	249
Fear and fragmentation	253
Interdependence	257
Managing the Variables	260
How to Ensure a Security Society	264
States	265
The Civil Society	271
The Role Of International Donors	273

**Chapter 8**

**Conclusions** 277

Bibliography 302

Annex I 329

Annex II 339



## Abbreviations

APLA	Azania People Liberation Army
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
ARMSCOR	Armament Corporation of South Africa
CMA	Common Monetary Area
COMESA	Common Market For Eastern and Southern Africa
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation of Europe
FADM	Mozambique's Defence Force
FLEC	Front for Liberation of Cabinda Enclave
FLS	Front Line States
FRELIMO	Front for Liberation of Mozambique
FPLM	Mozambique's Armed Forces
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
GOR	Government of Rwanda
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LLA	Lesotho Liberation Army
MK	Umkonto We Swizwe ( ANC, Armed Wing)
MEDO	Middle Eastern Defence Organisation
MPLA	People's Movement for Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS	National Intelligence System
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OSCE	Organisation of Security of Europe
PAC	Pan - African Congress
PIDE	Portuguese Secret Police
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance
RMA	Rand Monetary Area
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Co-ordinating Conference
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAN	South African Navy
SAND	South African National Defence Force
SAP	South African Police
SATO	South Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TVBC	Transkei, Venda, Baputhatswana and Ciskei
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UDF	Union Defence Force
UN	United Nations
UNITA	Total Union for Liberation of Angola
US	United States of America
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People Revolutionary Army

## **Acknowledgements**

My foremost acknowledgement is to the British Government, represented by Maeve Fort and Richard Idis both British Ambassadors to Mozambique, for having enlisted me as a candidate for the Chevening Scholar Awards to conduct this study at the London School of Economics.

This study would be of lesser quality had it not been for the close supervision of Professor James Mayall. I owe immense gratitude to his thought provoking comments, questions, support and encouragement throughout the research. This space seems appropriate to thank my friend Dr. Mark Simpson for having suggested the LSE. Indeed, if it had not been here where else?

Various lectures and seminars at the LSE were crucial in expanding my intellectual horizons during this research. It is difficult to single out all of them here, but lectures, seminars, and discussions conducted with Professor Halliday, Mr. Michael Banks, Mr. Mark Hoffman and Dr. Margot Light, all made a strong contribution to my work. I am also indebted to my colleagues of the Africa Workshop and the following seminars: Peace and Conflict, Concept and Methods in International Relations and Modernity and International Relations, all of which have influenced the direction that my work has taken.

A number of colleagues and friends read, commented and edited drafts of chapters of this work. I am thankful to my friend, Michi Ebata, who found the time to edit the entire text at all stages of drafting. I am also immensely grateful to Malory Green, Comfort Ero and Bernice Lee. It is thanks to them that my ideas could be understood by others. Jennifer Kavanagh helped me to overcome some of my computer nightmares, which I deeply acknowledge.

Many members of staff and students of Department of International Relations have been very supportive throughout the period of my research. Although I do not single out anyone in particular, No one has been forgotten. I am grateful to all of them.

My life in London was made easier by a lot of friends in the Department and outside the school. Again the list is too long to mention all of them. Americo and Candida Xavier, Ana Rute and Jose Morais were indeed my extended family, not less Dominique Jacquin and Jeremy Larkins.

Finally, my family, Stella, Monica and Wacelia had to put up with most of the burden and pressures resulting from my engagement in this research. But their support and understanding gave me solace and encouraged me continue when obstacles and frustrations appeared to hamper any progress. I am very indebted to them.

## Introduction

In the present study, the term Southern Africa refers to the territory occupied by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This region is largely inhabited by Bantu people, but it has undergone a process of occupation by Europeans since 1495 which culminated in the formation of the present states and it has attracted the migration of arabs and Asians. Over the last century, this region was the scene of intense political, military, diplomatic and economic activity that developed it into a coherent system of relations.<sup>1</sup> In addition to economic imperatives, two other phenomena have helped to shape the formation of the system: the struggle of the African peoples for emancipation and the resistance shown by the settler communities; and the attempt by South Africa to maintain a regional order based on principles of domination, exploitation and inequality. These phenomena have resulted in a climate of confrontation which lasted until the beginning of the 1990's and its main consequence was a climate of confrontation throughout the region.

Indeed, over the last 30 years, security has eluded Southern Africa. Millions of people have died, been dispossessed, or forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, because of constant war, conflict, destabilisation, poverty and natural disasters. Social and political unrest, high levels of criminal activity and economic

---

<sup>1</sup>Hedley Bull believes that a system of states is formed "when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions". Hedley Bull *Anarchical Society: The Study of Order in World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 9-10; For an account of the Southern African system see Larry Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa", *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 12: 3, 1969; See R. T.Libby, *The Politics of the Economic Power in Southern Africa* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987).

decline characterised the region over most of this period. At present, 3 out of the 10 poorest countries in the world are in Southern Africa while the remaining are classified as low income countries.<sup>2</sup> Economic decline in the region has accentuated the levels of poverty, social and political instability and weakened states and their institutions. States have found it difficult to maintain law and order and attract foreign investment to alleviate the problem of unemployment, poverty and social disorder. They find it difficult to act as a source of security. Southern Africa is also beset by other social problems such as environmental concerns, the AIDS epidemic and other diseases, frequent national disasters, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, all of which place an additional strain on the security of people. None the less, in the last 3 decades, governments and nationalist movements in the region, spent large sums of money acquiring and developing weapons, training large armies and police forces in an attempt to make their states secure.<sup>3</sup> Large military expenditures, for strong defence and police forces supports the 'realist' conception of security in international relations, which became dominant. A strong defence force is a symbol of national power, it allows the state to acquire international respectability prestige and keeps the enemies at bay, argues the 'realist' conception.<sup>4</sup> However, the evidence in Southern Africa, suggests that this observation is not accurate and that there is a contradiction between what the concept of security recommends and the reality it produces. Large military

---

<sup>2</sup> See The World Development Report, The World Bank, 1995, pp. 162-228.

<sup>3</sup> Statistics suggest that states in Southern Africa were spending between 6-45 % of their GNP in military activities, see for example, *United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer*, 1989, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989.

<sup>4</sup> See for example, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Mac Graw Hill, 1993), pp. 31-149.

expenditures, in Southern Africa, far from deterring enemies, have encouraged confrontation and led to destruction, accentuated poverty, the rise of crime, the proliferation of illegal light weapons, the mining of territory - in short insecurity in the region. The situation of Southern Africa, in the last 30 years, thus forces a re-examination of the concept of security, its objects and its ends, if social and political stability, economic prosperity and development are to be turned into a reality . However, in order to re-examine the concept of security, it is necessary to consider the question of what is security.

### **What is Security?**

Security studies is a western post-World War II concept, that emerged in response to the needs and conditions of western states and the ideological division of the world. Its main concern was to avoid the damages that western states had inflicted upon each other and to protect liberal democratic values and the way of life they represented from competing ideologies. The historic epoch and circumstances in which security studies emerged has contributed to the underdevelopment, and the narrowness of the concept of security. In International Relations, the concept of security has always assumed the division of the world into competing sovereign states, a state of affairs in which anarchy, as opposed to law, guided their relations. Thus, the notion of *raison d'etat* has always underpinned the concept of security. State goals and state interests have occupied the agenda of security. In most post-World War II literature, the term security has often been interchanged with the term of defence, reinforcing its military character. Those who argued for the broadening

of the agenda and talked about the security of ‘human collectivities’,<sup>5</sup> or ‘societal security’<sup>6</sup> implying a paradigm shift or a multiplicity of objects of security, were still constrained by the assumptions of the state-system approach, thus failing to explore the environment for security.

Security is, a concept resulting from a complex web of interactions among individuals, in different spheres of social life, such as the political, economic, social, military and environmental. This interaction is mediated by a number of structures, institutions and interests. It is a concept that cannot be defined in the absence of human beings. The essence of security whether it concerns single individuals, communities or states is the assurance of human beings of their ability to predict and to fulfil their aspirations without incurring the danger of physical damage or sacrificing their core values. Thus, the predictability of peace in their relations with other individuals is fundamental.<sup>7</sup> In fact, in predictability, lies the basis of the distinction of the concept of security from peace, whether peace is conceived of, in classical terms, as the absence of war; the absence of structural violence<sup>8</sup>; or even, a process of conflict management,<sup>9</sup> or even as justice, order and harmony<sup>10</sup>. Security

---

<sup>5</sup> See for example, Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* (London: Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1991), Hereafter referred to as: *An Agenda for International Security Studies*.

<sup>6</sup> See Ole Waever, ‘Societal Security: the Concept’ in Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: MacMillan, 1993) pp.15-40.

<sup>7</sup> See K. Deutsch, Sydney Burrell, Robert Kann, Maurice Lee Jr. Martin Lichterman, Raymond E.Lindgreen, Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagnen *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> This definition characterises situations such as that of apartheid South Africa in the 1960’s and 1970s in which signs of war or physical violence in the street of South Africa were invisible yet the system of apartheid was founded on racial basis and cultural violence. See details in Johan Galtung “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.6:3, pp. 167-191.

<sup>9</sup> See Michael Banks, “Four Conceptions of Peace” in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.) *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications* (London : Pinter, 1987), pp. 258-274.

reflects the assurance that peace and the fulfilment of aspirations will not be disturbed either by a natural or human phenomenon. People need this assurance in order to predict and plan their progress and continuity of their 'way of life'; communities and states<sup>11</sup> need security also to guarantee their continuity and progress in their relations with others. The lack of predictability of peace in relations among individuals, societies and states impinge upon diverse factors affecting their stability. It disrupts the basis of sociability and co-operation in the attainment of society goals; it impedes states from maximising the potential benefits in their interactions and it is one of the major detractors of foreign investments. The lack of predictability of peace also encourages high military expenditures, which in addition to being a drain of resources may enhance tensions in relations. The search for security is thus, a fundamental component of relations between individuals, societies and states because it provides a measure of continuity, progress and the improvement of people's and state goals.

However, security is not readily obtained, nor does it solely depend on the capacity of individuals, their aggregates, being states or not. As mentioned above, security is the outcome of multifaceted and complex relations. Since these relations are not static and are subject to many variations, security cannot be defined in the absence of its object, human beings. Contrary to Buzan who believes that the concept is easy to apply to things other than to human beings, security is a concept only applicable to human beings. As Shaw observes, "the things in question, money and other material goods, have only a meaning in relation to people who own

---

<sup>10</sup> In this definition I deliberately exclude peace as state of mind because this may lead to war and confrontation which is what this study is seeking to overcome.

<sup>11</sup> Understood as a number of individuals bound together by the national idea, See James Mayall, *Nationalism and the International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.3



them.” Therefore it does not make sense “to talk of security of things as opposed to the security of individuals.”<sup>12</sup> In fact it is a concept which depends on the perception of the referent, whether this is an individual, community or representatives of a state. In the study of international relations, the main actors have, for a long time, been assumed to be states, and traditionally security is understood as an outward looking concept, seeking to protect states, or domestic societies from outside threats. Because of its close attachment to the dominant international theory this view of security has been a subject of contestation and has generated a debate within the international relations discipline.

### **The Security Debate in International Relations**

For a long time, the security debate has polarised the discipline of international relations. It is founded on the development of the European system of states. Two main strands of thought came to dominate the debate: the strand deriving its ideas from classical thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, termed realism and the strand that derived most of its ideas from thinkers such as Grotius and Kant, that came to be known as idealism.

Realists<sup>13</sup> centred their analysis on the state and defined security relations, between the members of the international system, rooted on states’ self-help and the pursuance of states’ particular interests, according to their capacity. Thus, security,

---

<sup>12</sup> See Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 91

<sup>13</sup> These theorists derive their conception of International Relations from scholars such as E.H. Carr, and Hans Morgenthau. Classical texts are E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1946); and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, op. cit.*, quote n-4.

for the realist strand has become synonymous with power, and in many instances, military power to enable them to deal with external threats they face. It assumes the internal cohesion of states to act as a single locus of power. States existed to maximise their power and security was derived from this power.<sup>14</sup> The implication was that absolute power would lead to absolute security. However, this view of security, failed to provide security to all. Instead, it has promoted a zero-sum conception of security. Pushed to its extreme, the implication of this conception is that the absolute security of one member of the system implies absolute insecurity for all the other members. For realists, security for all in the international system can only be assured through the balance-of-power, that is to say a condition of equal power for all members of the system that would avoid mutual overthrowing.<sup>15</sup> The balance of power would assure the protection of weak states and the independence of all members of the system, by assuring that power is equally distributed in the system. However, as we shall see later, the idea of the balance-of-power failed to work in a system which rests on unequal power relations between members. The idea of balance-of-power did not provide for satisfactory mechanisms for power redistribution within the system. None the less because of the fears spawned by the two World Wars and the simplicity of the realist argument, its conception of security became dominant and known as the traditional conception of security.

At the other end of the spectrum is the alternative view expressed by idealists. Although they agreed with realist on the centrality of the state for the provision of security, they rejected the idea that power was synonymous with

---

<sup>14</sup> See for example, E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-140.

<sup>15</sup> See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-240.

security. They argued that the accumulation of power was a self-fulfilling exercise and instead of leading to international security, led to war. Realist strategies, such as the balance of power or nuclear deterrence, rather than assuring security led states to the 'balance-of-terror' assuring mutual destruction and insecurity. Idealists believed that security in the international system was possible to attain if states reduced their differences by adopting common constitutional principles; adhering to international law and conventions regulating the behaviour of states and disarming the world. This would restrain the indiscriminate use of power and the possibility of war. Idealists placed an emphasis on institutions, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, to promote collective security and the objectives of peace. Thus, in the post World War II period, they saw peace research as an alternative capable of providing an answer in the search for a more secure world.<sup>16</sup> However, both the realist and idealist focused on one issue, war, which tended to produce a fragmented view of security dominated by military power.

The realist conception of security was found to be problematic by many authors. One problematic element, was the "security dilemma" identified by John Herz in 1959.<sup>17</sup> He argued that the mere fact states pursue their own security, regardless of their intentions, increases the insecurity of other states. The security dilemma appears to be a permanent feature of a system of states which was replicated as the system expanded to other geographical regions.<sup>18</sup> This fact raises a fundamental question on the nature of relations among various actors participating

---

<sup>16</sup> See B. Buzan, *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op. cit.* p.3.

<sup>17</sup> See John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

<sup>18</sup> See Adam Watson and Hedley Bull (eds.) *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

in the domestic and international spheres of social life especially the position of the weak members. In other words, are individuals, communities and states capable of relating to each other in a way which leads to security of all? or will they always be interlocked into the 'security dilemma' ?

The fundamental challenge raised by the question of security is how to assure the security of all without jeopardising the security of any. This challenge assumes particular importance, due to the inequality of power and the lack of an overall authority in the international system to act as a source of order, justice and common good for all.

### **Security and the Third World**

The question of assuring the security of all raises special challenges in the Third World where states, in addition to problems derived from the security dilemma, are plagued with political, social, economic and military problems that weaken their domestic cohesion. The lack of internal social cohesion makes the 'realist' conception of security difficult to apply. In fact the concept of security that most states in the Third World acted upon is a product of their colonial history rather than their own specific conditions. Most of these states, as I will argue further, are a result of the evolution of the international system. They are junior members of this system having only been established over three decades ago. Despite their weak position in the spectrum of power and their accentuated domestic problems, Third World states have tended to act, behave like and look at security in the same way it is looked at in by those in the West, i.e. the First World.

However, this has not resulted in their security. Thus, the situation of the Third World deserves special consideration within the security debate particularly with regard to the question whether the traditional conception of security is or is not applicable for their conditions.

The incidence of violent conflict in the Third World in the 1970's and 1980's generated an interest among international relations scholars searching for answers to the problems of instability, conflict, war and insecurity. However, most of the writings about the security of the Third World were very much influenced by the Cold War context and tended to see security within the context of superpower competition for power in strategic regions.<sup>19</sup> Thus security problems in the Third World were primarily seen from the point of view of American and Soviet interests. A number of scholars concentrated on domestic instability attributed to inter-ethnic rivalry or religious factions,<sup>20</sup> while others focused more on empirical work, but made little effort to understand security in the Third World from the conceptual point of view.<sup>21</sup> There were, however a few exceptions. Barry Buzan's work, *People States and Fear*, set the stage for future discussion.

Buzan argued that, to be useful, the concept of security needed to be considered on three levels, the individual, the state (national) and international system. In the international system security is primarily about the "collectivities" of human beings organised in sovereign territorial states and the anarchical structure of the international system can lead to a stable security regime provided that states are

---

<sup>19</sup> See for example, Robert Litwak and Samuel Wells Jr. (eds) *Super Powers Competition and the Third World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988)

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*; see also Bruce Arlinghaus (ed) *African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity* (Colorado, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984)

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

strong. Strong states are those with strong socio-political cohesion - the ideal type are nation states such as Japan and Denmark.<sup>22</sup> The security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental. Buzan asserted that in international relations, the security of the state, or the concept of national security, was the most important because it tended to organise the other two levels.<sup>23</sup>

Building on Buzan's work, in the 1980s an increasing number of studies began to focus on the inadequacies of the traditional concept of security. In fact a number of scholars interested in security of Third World states tended to ask the same question : Can security in the Third World be understood as having the same meaning as in the Developed World<sup>24</sup>? Caroline Thomas argued that "security in the context of the Third World does not simply refer to the military dimension as is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole dimension of states existence which are already taken care of in the more developed states".<sup>25</sup> This argument was echoed by Azar and Moon who noted that "defining the concept of national security in terms of physical protection of nation-states from external military threats is not only narrow but also misleading". The threats facing the Third World are diverse and complex, so are the dimensions and content of national

---

<sup>22</sup> B. Buzan, *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op. cit.*, p. 19

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1

<sup>24</sup> See for example, Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security, The Third World and International Relations* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987); Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* ( Centre for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland, 1988); Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988); Robert Litwak and Samuel Wells Jr. (eds) *Super Power Competition and Security in the Third World*, *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> See Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security*, *op.cit.* p.1

security.<sup>26</sup> They observed that issues relating to legitimacy, integration and policy capacity are more important in the security of the Third World than physical power.<sup>27</sup>

In a later work, Buzan argued that the concept of national security was easy to apply to strong states, those with strong socio-political cohesion and difficult to apply in weaker states, those with weak or no socio-political cohesion what he termed “anarchical”. These types of states are plagued with domestic problems with no machinery for political succession. He writes:

but as we go down the spectrum towards weaker states, the referent object for national security becomes harder to define and the primarily external orientation of the concept gives way to an increasingly domestic agenda.<sup>28</sup>

He concluded that for the Third World, the concept of national security does not make sense unless strong states can be created.

A strong attack on the traditional concept of security also came from socio-economists and environmentalists. The former argued for the need to expand the traditional concept of security to include economics, sustainable development and resource politics. The latter insisted that the state system was inadequate to deal with the environmental challenges facing the world. Sovereignty and the national interest hampered common approaches to environmental security. For the Third World, socio-economists argued that military power was an inadequate response to

---

<sup>26</sup> See Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Rethinking Third World National Security”, in Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats op. cit.*, p.11.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> See B. Buzan, “People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World” in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, *National Security in the Third World op. cit.* p. 23, Hereafter referred to as: “The National Security Problem in the Third World”.

domestic crises of legitimacy, failed economic development and poverty.<sup>29</sup> The traditional understandings of security cannot be applied to the Third World and therefore the concept requires re-examination.

### **Security and Southern Africa**

The traditional conception of security needs re-examining in Southern Africa, because as mentioned above, the security policies of the regional states and non-state actors have stimulated conflict, which was exacerbated by the East-West confrontation.

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980's, encouraged new developments in the region. Dialogue replaced confrontation and allowed former contenders to reach agreements on ending many of the conflicts in the region. The conflict over Namibia that led South Africa and Angola to confrontation came to an end when the New York agreements were signed.<sup>30</sup> Peace settlements were reached in Mozambique and Angola, while dialogue in South Africa culminated in the first multiracial elections in May 1994. These elections marked the end of the long standing source of insecurity in the region, the apartheid regime. States increasingly spoke of co-operation even in the area of security. The drive for co-operation was facilitated by the ascension to power of the ANC government seen by its neighbours

---

<sup>29</sup> See for example, Fantu Cheru, *The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy* (London: Zed, Press, 1989); A. M. Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985); Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?" *International Affairs* Vol 60:1, pp. 41-51; I. Rowlands, "The Security Challenges of the Global Environmental Change", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 14:1, 1992, pp. 99 -114; Caroline Thomas, *The Environment in International Relations* (London: RIIA) 1992, pp.115-120.

<sup>30</sup> See Robert Jaster, "South Africa and Its Neighbours the Dynamics of Regional Conflict", *Adelphi Papers* 209 (London : International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986).



as friendly and supporting principles of justice and equality. Since then, there have been developments in the region signalling the desire to increase co-operation in the area of security whose foundations have been laid out by the SADC Treaty.<sup>31</sup> The Declaration by the SADC Heads of States and Governments on the Treaty notes “that war and insecurity are the enemies of economic progress and peace and mutual security are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration.”<sup>32</sup> SADC has also taken important steps to increase co-operation in the area of security. Its 1993 program of action recommends the adoption of a new approach to security which emphasises the security of people and other non-military dimensions of security including the creation of a forum for mediation and arbitration; reduction in force levels and military expenditure, the introduction of confidence and security- building measures and non-offensive defence strategies.<sup>33</sup> In 1994, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Governments approved the Creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations and Security, and in January 1996 an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was established within SADC.

Southern African states face the challenge of curbing the insecurity problems which are numerous and diverse in scope. Some of these, such as the character of the states, are historical and inherent in the international system; and others such as the nature of armies, crime, economic decline are partly a result of 3 decades of confrontation yet others are specifically related to the end of the bipolar

---

<sup>31</sup> The SADC Treaty was signed in Windhoek in August 1991 by Heads of States or Governments of the Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa joined formally SADC in 1995 Annex I in this study.

<sup>32</sup> See *Towards Southern Africa Development Community Declaration of Heads of State and Governments of Southern Africa states*, Windhoek, August 1992, Annex I to this study.

<sup>33</sup> See *SADC Programme of Action*, SADC Secretariat 1993.

structure of the international system. The end of Cold War had a special impact on single party states. It encouraged the emergence of multiple actors and interests and changed the nature of politics in these states. Notable among these was the replacement of monopartyism by multipartyism which tended to exacerbate the politics of distribution and redistribution and polarised national politics by highlighting sub-national divisions.<sup>34</sup> In South Africa the question of the devolution of power from central to regional authorities occupies the centre of politics. Equally important is the question of redistributing resources among those who have for a long time, been deprived by apartheid. In fact, the differences on the level of development between regions of the same state make redistribution and power devolution the centrepieces of politics in Southern Africa in the post Cold War era. In most instances the claims for redistribution have led to violent conflicts such as rioting and looting. The problem of democratisation merits special attention since elsewhere in Africa where monopartyism came to an end, explosive violence led to the collapse of state structures and disintegration of the social fabric.<sup>35</sup> The rest of Southern Africa is characterised by weak economies overdependent on the West especially in terms of markets, technology, and pricing policies which affects their stability and often causes conflicts over the distribution of resources. Some survive because of external aid provided under certain conditionality which makes their security dependent upon extra-regional actors.

The militarisation of society from regional confrontation has had adverse consequences. One such consequence was to divert resources that could be used in

---

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* At the time of writing there has been a call to liberalise politics in Lesotho and Swaziland.

<sup>35</sup> This is the case of Liberia, Somalia and Zaire, see details in Marina Ottaway, "Democratization in Collapsed States" in I. W. Zartman (ed) *Collapsed States* ( London: Lynne Reiner, 1995). pp.221-235.

the development. Now that most of the wars have ended the region has to deal with many of the legacies of militarisation to restore stability. Among these legacies is the disarmament of societies. A significant number of light weapons have fallen out of control of authorities during the period of confrontation. This heightens the propensity for crime in a region where the possibilities for employment are low. The abundance of former soldiers who are not fully integrated in social life is another source of instability, especially in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and Namibia.

The facts described above makes the need to understand security in Southern Africa imperative and it is against this background that the present study is conducted.

This study seeks to address two questions: (i) can the traditional concept of security work in Southern Africa, given present conditions, and (ii) if it cannot, is there an alternative concept which may lead to stability and prosperity for the Southern African societies?

This study will argue that the traditional concept of security is inadequate for Southern Africa and that the broadening of the agenda to include non-military phenomena in the understanding of security is not sufficient. The region needs a different approach to security, one that is better informed about the environment for security. Since this environment is created through a political process, this implies, making it more responsive to the common good, needs and aspirations of people. Building security in the region requires an approach founded on philosophical idealism and theories pertaining to the 'good life'. This study also argues that because most states in the region are faced with problems such as political

fragmentation, poor national integration, absence of compatible values, shortage of economic resources, attempts at building regional security should aim at establishing a 'security society'. This approach seeks to ensure that common principles, values and interests are shared by states and most people in the region.

The argument is structured in three parts: Part I deals with the history of the idea of security, the strengths and weaknesses of the various concepts. It is intended to show how the concept of security has historically evolved and the impact of these ideas on Southern Africa. Chapter 1 shows how the traditional conception of security has been shown to be inadequate for the European system of states. It notes that the Machiavellian and Hobbesian conceptions of security, founded on a strong sense of order, led states to the 'security dilemma'. Although statesmen believed they could maintain their security and independence through the balance of power, they were soon proved wrong. The balance-of-power provided states with all sorts of excuses to wage wars against others, thus undermining security, while their internal affairs were constantly being disturbed by those seeking to understand to which side the balance was tilting and force weak states to form alliances with strong states. The inadequacies of the traditional conception of security led Kantians and the like to advocate similar constitutional principles and introduce the notion of collective security. The notion of collective security did not also work because, essentially states could not subordinate their national interest to the collective interest. In addition, the concept of collective security, was not always translated into strong alliances against a weaker aggressor. This undermined the very basic assumption of the concept<sup>36</sup>.

---

<sup>36</sup> See For example, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, op. cit.*, pp. 451-461.

The traditional concept of security was often found to protect a status quo rooted in domination of some sections of society by others. This fact led Marxist theorists to attack it. The Marxist saw in the state system a perpetuation of domination of a capitalist class over a proletarian majority. They proposed as an alternative, the creation of a world communist society founded on non-exploitation and on ethics of solidarity of the proletariat. They argued that only a classless society would eliminate wars and bring security to people. However, the methods envisaged to achieve this goal entailed most of what the realist understood as building security. Chapter 1 argues that Southern Africa through its colonial heritage, and the conflictual environment in which its colonisation proceeded led actors guided by different principles, interests and ideology to see the use of force as synonymous with security.

The argument that security interaction resting on the traditional concept of security in the region brought more instability and insecurity than security is followed through and developed in Chapter 2, where the dynamic of the formation of the Southern African security complex is discussed. It shows that the process which triggered the formation of the Southern African security complex pre-dates state-making. State boundaries had their roots in the need to protect the welfare and expand the wealth of the settler communities. This gave rise to the need to dominate the natives which in turn yielded militaristic conceptions of security. The security interaction that followed was rooted in clashes founded on the will of the settler communities and the will of natives. Confrontation became inevitable and militarisation was the consequence of this disagreement. The starting of the anti-colonial armed struggle marked the beginning of a duopoly in the Southern African

security complex, as the colonial regimes and South Africa increased economic and military co-operation in an attempt to offset their opposition. The situation in the sub-continent compelled the liberation movements to co-ordinate strategies and co-operation in their struggle inviting more confrontation in the region.

Chapter 3 discusses the role of extra-regional powers in the formation of the Southern African security system. It attempts to show that the traditional concept of security was underpinned by extra-regional actors, who fuelled confrontation on the basis of their perceptions. Portugal believed that it could avoid decolonisation by defeating the nationalist movements through force. It therefore embarked on policy of militarisation and hoped that NATO would support this move. The most that NATO could show was ambiguity, turning a blind eye on the use of its weapons in the Portuguese colonial wars, while Britain, due to its historical links with South Africa, maintained close economic, defence and security ties with South Africa. Britain played an important role in modernising the South African Armed Forces and developing its manufacturing sector. Other Western countries such as Italy, France and Germany helped to create the South African military complex by guaranteeing licences for manufacturing military hardware. The links with the West made South Africa claim the status of a bastion of Western interests in the region. These facts helped to shape the perception of nationalists and their supporters that the West favoured the continuation of colonial regimes and apartheid in Southern Africa. This perception led to more militarisation as the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies and China supported the liberation movements and later the so called 'progressive' states. The liberation movements' perception also helped to strengthen an outward looking concept of security founded on confrontation. The action of the

extra-regional powers helped to consolidate the bipolar system in the region and fuelled the spirit of confrontation which lasted until the end of Cold War.

Part II of this study discusses the legacies of the Southern African security complex, namely the weak character of states, weak character of the armies, the abundance of light weapons outside the control of the authorities, the large numbers of demobilised people, economic deprivation, political fragmentation and other social factors. Chapter 4 examines how these legacies are likely to affect the process of building security in Southern Africa. It notes that fragile armies and police force will make the task of maintaining order difficult, since the armies themselves may be a source of conflict. Most of the armies in the region came into existence through the merger of former contending forces. Their stability is contingent upon the extent to which they will remain depoliticised and loyal to governments of the day. The existence of large numbers of demobilised people who may have an easy access to abundant light weaponry and weak economic performance are likely to perpetuate instability in the region while military asymmetries and economic inequalities encourage an adversarial approach to security. Chapter 5 shows how these factors make the traditional concept of security inadequate for Southern Africa.

Chapter 5 argues that the traditional concept cannot work because it relies very much on states, while states in Southern Africa are weak and are plagued with domestic problems that prevent them from adopting an outward looking concept of security. In fact understanding security as threats and vulnerability of the states does not tell us much about the conditions of human beings that live in those states.

Thus the concept of vulnerability loses its heuristic value, while what is conceived to be threats to the state may not be threats to people.

Chapter 6 argues for a new approach to security, one concentrating on the environment for security. It underlines that the environment of security has three pillars order, justice and peace. These virtues need to coexist in equilibrium for security to be ensured. To achieve this in Southern Africa will require concentration on the political processes, since it is the political process that ensures the pillars of security environment. It will also require building, consolidating and improving institutions that can protect principles and values underpinning the political process, state and non state. The openness and transparency of the political process is the key to the process of building security in the region.

Chapter 7 deals with the implications of adopting a new concept of security in Southern Africa. It recognises that security is best assured by a community of security in which the main variables affecting the Southern African system: power, fear, political fragmentation and interdependence are managed in a way to assure stability. The chapter argues that the process of building a security community requires the stabilisation of power and its use in the promotion of positive change; elimination or reduction of fear and political fragmentation and strengthening interdependence. This will require regional and domestic institutions that can promote common principles and values and foster the integration of national communities. It argues that national integration in Southern Africa cannot be assumed, state institutions are not functional as were European institutions in the aftermath of World War II; the level of interdependence among states is not significantly high and common values are not yet shared by most people. This



reality and the lack of financial resources will constrain the security community building in the region. The task of building security compels Southern Africa to achieve, as a first step, a 'security society' which will aim at ensuring that common values are shared by most, that institutions are in place and the existence of more assets to integrate.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the argument and explains the main claims of the study as being: the inappropriateness of the traditional concept of security for Southern Africa; the need for a new approach founded on philosophical idealism and theories pertaining to the 'good life'; the need to focus on political process as and to adopt the security society approach.

The study assumes that the present insecurity of Southern African states and the instability of their societies is partly due to the way in which security was conceptualised, that is to say, adopting uncritically the traditional concept, without examining the specific conditions of the region. By proposing a new concept of security founded on common principles and interests and suggesting ways in which the development of crises can be avoided this study hopes to contribute to the understanding and subsequently provide ideas that can ameliorate the conditions of the Southern African peoples.

---

<sup>37</sup> The concept of society of states was coined by Hedley Bull, See Hedley Bull the *Anarchical Society*, *op. cit.*, p.13 .

**PART I**  
**THE IDEA OF SECURITY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA**

## **Chapter 1**

### **Historical Overview of the Concept of Security**

This chapter examines the historical evolution of the concept of security and the impact of the different conceptions on the Southern African region. It seeks to demonstrate that the traditional concept of security has been found inadequate since the seventeenth century. A reaction to these inadequacies gave rise to two other schools of thought: The Liberal and the Marxist. This chapter seeks also to demonstrate that conceptions of security related to realist thinking dominated Southern Africa for historical reasons. The need to respond to crises and security concerns of the colonial powers led to practices that increasingly equated security with power. The chapter is divided into 4 sections. The first section discusses the Realist school; the second and third deal with the Liberal and the Marxist respectively, while the fourth examines the impact of these ideas on Southern Africa.

The writings on security can be grouped into three main schools: the Realist, the Liberal and the Marxist. The Realist school dominates the literature on security and is best represented by classic writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. These have influenced recent writers such as Carr, Morgenthau and Buzan and the whole generation of scholars of strategic studies. The realist school believes in the centrality of power in the maintenance of security and the state as its main source. The Liberal School is less homogeneous than the Realist since it includes

writer who acknowledge the role of power and those who do not. The classic writers of the Liberal School include Grotius, Rousseau and Kant who subsequently influenced a number of writers such as Woodrow Wilson and other contemporary actors. They share one common assumption, that security is best assured by regulating relations among states and creating institutions that can police the international behaviour of states and promote common goals. Finally, the Marxist School, represented by the writing of Marx Engels and Lenin proposes a classless society and an international solidarity of the proletariat as a way of achieving global security.

### **The Realist School**

There are differences between earlier writings and most recent writings of this school. Early writers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes focus on the domestic security, while most recent writings are on inter-state security. This is because at the time of their writing the state system had not yet been crystallised, and domestic order was a major problem. The exception is ancient Greece, where the two rival city states, Athens and Sparta seemed to constitute the first international system we know of.

Thucydides, in his accounts of the Peloponessian Wars, points out that what made war between Athens and Sparta inevitable was the rise of Athenian power and the fear that this caused in Sparta<sup>1</sup>. Athens' power superiority guaranteed its

---

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides, *The Peloponessian Wars* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1979), pp. 402; see further details in Michael Doyle, "Thucydidean Realism", *Review of International Studies*, July 1990, pp. 224 -227.

security, but it caused fears and insecurity in Sparta, so the accumulation of power by Sparta to match its rival was a necessary condition for Sparta's security. Thucydides also shows the primacy of power in conducting international affairs in his account of the Athenian response to the Melians. The latter pledged for fair play between Athens and Sparta to avoid the state of war between these two city states. The Athenians replied : "The Strong do what they have power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept".<sup>2</sup> It is clear, from this, that to woo away any kind of threats power was central and that Athenian security meant Spartan insecurity. Any attempt at reversing or balancing this situation led to war. For Sparta, war was a way to reduce its insecurity by humbling the power of Athens, while for Athens war was the means of maintaining its security.

Machiavelli writing in 1514 and Hobbes writing in 1651 were primarily concerned with questions of domestic order, that is to say, how to ensure domestic security. One reason for this is because they were reacting to domestic situations and the other is that the state system had not yet been consolidated at the time of the writing.

When advising the Prince of Medici on how to achieve order and stability, Machiavelli wrote:

The main foundation of every state,...are good laws and good arms; and because you cannot have good laws without good arms, and where there are good arms, good laws inevitably follow, I shall not discuss laws but give my attention to arms.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian Wars*, *op. cit.*, p. 402

<sup>3</sup> Nicolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1961), p. 77.

The above statement suggests that Machiavelli believed that power, more crucially, military power was vital to the survival and the security of the state. It is the force of arms that creates order internally. A state with strong military power will be more stable and more secure than a state with weak power. By implication power will deter external enemies from any attacks.

The centrality of power for security is also recognised by Hobbes, whose main writings were a reaction to the English Civil War. Hobbes argued that it was a part of human nature for man to struggle for power which ceases only with his death: “Man seeks power because it represents the means of acquiring those other things which make life worthwhile. It is through power alone that we can achieve a contented life (felicity)”.<sup>4</sup>

He believed that human nature is influenced by three main factors: competition which makes people disregard the rights of others for gains; diffidence which makes people strike against others for defence and glory which makes the people violate others' liberty for the sake of reputation. The combination of these three factors generates a situation of complete insecurity since every man is in a state of war against every man. Hobbes argued that “what is missing is a common power to keep people in awe”. From this it follows that security within the state can be reached if every man can surrender his individual freedom to a *Leviathan* (the mighty power) who would define the rules for intra-societal relations and oversees who breach them. Hobbes drew an analogy between the state of war among individuals and state of war among nations, states and he observes:

---

<sup>4</sup> T. Hobbes, *The Leviathan* ( Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1981), p. 161.

...Kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency are in continual jealousies, are in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours.<sup>5</sup>

However, Hobbes does not believe in the need of a Leviathan at the international level since Kings and Sovereigns could grant international security by upholding the industry of their subjects and control the evil of men in a state of nature<sup>6</sup>.

Although both authors see power playing an important role in the security of communities, fundamental differences between Machiavelli's and Hobbes' perspective of security can be found. Machiavelli sees power as an instrument of policy. The state has to increase its power in order to become more secure winning friends to its side and subjugating enemies, through the power of swords, a line of argument that leads inevitably to power competition and an arms race. This is because each state will try to maximise its power to achieve security. From Machiavelli's perspective, it follows that international security is zero-sum. Security of one state will mean insecurity of another state. Hobbes' perspective however, sees a way out from this zero-sum perspective. It calls instead, for individuals to renounce freedom and power within the state or community, in order to create an organised form of society in which men are bound by rules defined by the Leviathan. It also calls for Kings and Sovereigns to establish a more secure international system by eliminating the state of nature in their individual states or communities.

---

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.186-188.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

The idea that power was central to security also became popular among twentieth century writers. Carr writing in 1939, reacting to those calling for cosmopolitanism and harmony of interests in conducting international affairs, argued that these claims were utopian. They were a mere attempt to dominate by promoting one's own views as though they were in the interest of all. To attain security, states should not concern themselves with individuals' morality. They should only be driven by the morality of states which is the pursuit of national interest. For this the maximisation of power was fundamental for survival in the anarchical international system.<sup>7</sup> Morgenthau, described international politics as a struggle to keep or to increase power and glory among sovereign states. He argued that under these circumstances the duty of each state is to take whatever action to protect its physical, economic and cultural identity.<sup>8</sup> This line of argument gave rise to a generation of scholars known as strategists who were fundamentally concerned with managing power to ensure security in the system. Thus traditionally security has always been understood as power derived. However, if each state was recommended to maximise power, for its security a question that remained to be solved is how could this lead to the security of all.

### **1.1.2 The Balance of Power**

The traditional response to this question was the concept of balance-of-power which implied a system with a self-correcting mechanism for the excess of

---

<sup>7</sup> See E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, op.cit.*, pp. 232-234.

<sup>8</sup> See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, op. cit.*, pp. 4-18.



power concentrated in one or more members of the system. In other words, if a state accumulated power to the extent that it became a threat to the remaining members of the system, a countervailing mechanism ought to be found by the latter in the form of an alliance to thwart the hegemonic ambitions of this particular member.

Defoe explains:

...No power whether friend or foe should be accorded the opportunity to dominate the affairs of the continent as France has recently done. Every power that over-balances itself, makes itself a nuisance to its neighbours. Europe being divided into a great variety of different governments and constitutions, the safety of the whole consists in the due distribution of the power, so shared to every branch of government that no one may be able to oppose and to destroy the rest. A threat to this balance should thus be met by potent confederacies among the weaker powers to preserve and secure the tranquillity of the rest...<sup>9</sup>

From Thucydides accounts on the Peloponessian Wars, it becomes clear that the concept was used even in 1000 years B.C. Diplomatic manoeuvring, consolidation or splitting of alliances in inter-war and war periods, was part of the game to establish a more secure system and avoid a hegemonic rule in the prevailing bipolar system. However, it was not until the post- Westphalia system of states that the concept was formally used as a ground to theorise the maintenance of international security. States such as Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1712-1713, had also already advanced the concept as a ways of creating general order in Europe, but it failed to crystallise and to become widely accepted as a security doctrine in the European state system.<sup>10</sup> Before Westphalia the mechanism was very

---

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Defoe, *Review of the State of Nation*, Vol III, June 1706, pp. 261-63 ; see also Evan Luard, *The Balance of Power System* ( London : MacMillan, 1992), p.10.

<sup>10</sup> Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1645-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.73-76.

much disturbed by religious allegiance. Protestant states of Europe would show allegiance to other Protestant states and would tend to constitute their alliances along these lines. Similarly, Catholic states would also tend to ally themselves with other Catholic states, thus preventing an effective balance born out of necessity. The Christian States of Europe would not seek alliance of non-Christian states<sup>11</sup>, since the church was still regarded as the supreme authority of states. Another reason that prevented the functioning of the balance prior to Westphalia was the hegemony of Spain in 1559 over the European continent, which was not matched by any power.<sup>12</sup>

However, in the Post-Westphalia system states tended towards secularisation and the Spanish Power was humbled.<sup>13</sup> The concept began to be popular. States no longer felt constrained by religion and other loyalties and began to seek short-term alliances that would best promote their interests. Britain who found herself, in 17th century, in wars with the Southern provinces, was allied with them against Louis XIV. Austria was at War with Spain between 1718 -1720 was her ally in 1725.

After the Napoleonic Wars of the eighteenth century, Frederick Von Gentz<sup>14</sup> formulated the principles that the mechanism was to rest upon, advocating order in conducting international affairs as opposed to the disorder that characterised most of the eighteenth century. He was reacting to the horrors of war caused by the hegemonic ambitions of France and the disorder caused by the French Revolution. He argued that Europe was advancing towards more perfect system in which the

---

<sup>11</sup> See Evan Luard, *The Balance of Power System, op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7

<sup>14</sup> Frederick Von Gentz : *The State of Europe Before and After French Revolution, Being an Answer, to L'Etat de la France a la Fin d'L' An VIII*, London, 1809, pp. 258-262.

law of nations prevailed. It was only necessary to resume the progress towards the perfection of the system and this would come with the restoration of equilibrium,<sup>15</sup> that is to say, with the balance-of power.

In the historic Congress of Vienna of June 1815, he presented the ideas that were to become the principles under which the security of states was to be achieved through the balance of power.<sup>16</sup> Gentz idealised a system in which there would not be a place for abuse of power by a preponderating state thus guaranteeing that the equality of power would be the principal basis of conduct of the system.<sup>17</sup>

He argued that no single power should predominate in the system, that is to say, become so powerful as to coerce all the rest put together. Gentz believed that any member disrupting the system should be coerced, not only by the collective threat of the remaining members but by any majority of them. A state that sought to increase its power to defy the union, should be treated as a common enemy. He further recommended a constant alertness and readiness to intervene at an early stage to defend a state under attack.<sup>18</sup>

Gentz saw the states of Europe as forming one single system whose stability could be preserved by the doctrine of the balance-of-power. For the balance to become effective it would need a dedication of all members of the system and the will to curb injustice. Force was still the preponderant element that would legitimate pre-emptive attacks that would make sure that the system worked, though

---

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.65-91

<sup>16</sup> See F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1963) pp. 153-186

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225

consultation and concentration was the new rule that would help to preserve it as implied by Gentz:

...We must hear of no insularity systems, no absolute neutrality, no unconditional seclusion from any important transaction . The more industry and vigour is employed in checking the first acts of injustice and violence the less frequent will be the cases in which it will be necessary to march forth to fight against them in the field, the more steadfastly they hold themselves in a state of preparation, the greater reluctance will be felt to challenge them to combat...<sup>19</sup>

The balance-of powers primary concern was to prevent the establishment of a universal empire. The concept did not disregard the role of international law. Instead, states thought that the mechanism should be the last preserve of international law. If law was respected by all members of the system there would be no need, for any member of the community to intervene in other states affairs. However, if law was breached the instrument that would preserve it was the balance -of-power. The balance of power took different forms. There were instances that the it took a form of alliance, bilateral and multilateral, voluntary and compulsory, defence arrangements that normally lasted for a short time. The balance was maintained through the intervention of individual states through diplomatic arrangements, economic action, let alone military action.

Compensation was the other form in which the balance was carried out. Compensation meant matching the increase of power in one side by the increase of power of the opposing side. This included the swap or seizure of territories, provision of trade concessions and rights to extract spoils, and the establishment of

---

<sup>19</sup> Frederick Von Gentz, *Fragments of the The Balance of Power System* (London ,1806) pp.105-106.

spheres of influence or buffer zones. The further manner in which the balance was maintained was using the divide and rule method and the balance of terror aimed at preventing potential enemies from forming an alliance. This form can be encountered in the Greek state system as well as in the European state system up to the present era.<sup>20</sup> With the introduction of the concept of balance-of-power, the idea of permanent allies yielded to the idea of permanent interests. There was only one thing that mattered, that was the preservation of the system. This had implications. The need not to destroy totally the enemy state since it would be needed for tomorrow's alliance. Seizure of territory, in general, began to be abandoned as a practise following the military victory. Assets, colonies and trading rights became the compensatory mechanism for the overall balance. Another implication of the balance of power is that bilateral wars involving two disputants became uncommon. Instead, wars that would normally include alliances against others became the main feature instead. The continent was thus in wars that involved almost all members, since neutrality was not wished. Therefore, the system could not protect independence. Never the less, war was understood as the last resort. The concept led to the belief that somehow war would not be necessary, since it would be deterred by threatening a collective action against breachers of the prevailing order.

The concept of balance-of-power helped to consolidate the state system, although its effectiveness in maintaining security is still questionable. The ambiguity of the term led to various interpretations inconsistent with the objective of maintaining security in Europe. It was in the name of the balance of power that

---

<sup>20</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations op.cit.*, pp. 198-9.

one time wars were fought and in other times peace was claimed. It was also in the name of the balance of power that some weak states were protected and others were invaded and partitioned. Thus, the principle of balance-of-power to some states meant not equilibrium but weighing the balance in their favour.<sup>21</sup> The concept also implied that all states would know to which side the balance was tending so as to compensate. It also implied that the concept of power could be clearly defined. However, the definitions of power that one finds in the literature of international relations have multiple meanings and are vague. The term balance is found to have a multiple meaning<sup>22</sup> and it is also unclear whether by power, the proponents of the concept meant military power, economic power or other forms of power.<sup>23</sup> From this, it follows that states were left to interpret the concept the way they wished, which made it difficult to provide it with an accurate meaning.

The mechanism presupposed constant vigilance and surveillance of members and their activities, so as to know whether the balance was being shifted from one member of the system to another.<sup>24</sup> However, constant vigilance of the neighbours, allies and non-allies did not prevent them from organising secretly their armies and wage war against other states. In this process weaker states were an easy target.

The system took it as a given that power could be easily measurable and this would be done by different members of the system. However, this was not so.

---

<sup>21</sup> Inis Claude, *Power in International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 40-51.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.40-86. In this section the author discusses different concepts and meanings of the concept: balance-of power. Sometimes the concept is applied to mean some kind of equilibrium, some other times to mean a process, or to mean superiority.

<sup>23</sup> See the different characterisation of power in Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, *op.cit.*, pp. 117-133.

<sup>24</sup> See Evan Luard, *The Balance of Power System op. cit.*, p. 21.

As suggested by the Johan Von Justi writings in 1758, this measurement of power turned out to be subjective and instead of serving the purpose of creating security amongst the members of the system it ended up creating a status of insecurity since it could provide an inexhaustible source of justification for any state wishing to wage a war against another.<sup>25</sup> Justi saw in the concept of balance of power a rationalisation that could be put forward by any state which wished to justify the use of force against another power, as he sums up in the following passage:

When a state which has grown more powerful... is attacked... in order to weaken it, such action is motivated least of all by the balance of power. This would be a war which is waged by the several states against a strong states for specific interests, and the rules of the balance of power will only be a camouflage under which these interests are hidden... States like private persons are guided by nothing but their private interests, real or imaginary, and they are far from being guided by chimerical balance of power. Name one state which has participated in a war contrary to its interests or without a specific interest, only to maintain the balance of power.<sup>26</sup>

Although the mechanism was meant to preserve peace security and stability, these aims remained unachievable. Being one of the reasons the fact that war was always seen as a possibility, a legitimate mechanism for a state to achieve security in case it felt threatened by an opponent. This meant it could be started at any time whenever states thought it appropriate and when they had the means and the will to do so. The fact that the concept of balance-of-power produced a multipolar system, war occurred with a certain degree of frequency. The system, thus lacked an

---

<sup>25</sup> J.H. Justi, *Die Chiamara des Gleichgewichts von Europa*, Atloma 1758, quoted in Evan Luard: *The Balance of Power System*, *op. cit.*, p.15.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

instrument and a procedure for the formulation of consensus for collective action. The balance-of-power system rested upon the belief that security was achievable if all members of the system knew what the other members of the system were up to. In other words, the system should be in a state of equilibrium similar to the Newtonian equilibrium of the solar system, whereby each member of the system while preserving its independence would know its right place in the system. It implied a static equilibrium of powers, as if power was evenly distributed amongst the members of the system. Thus, the system denied room for progress, the driving force for social life. The balance of power mechanism, throughout this time, became synonymous with a world in which outcomes were determined by threat, display or use of force serving primarily the interests of stronger states. In the end the mechanism of balance of power did not serve the purpose of maintaining security.

The concept of balance-of-power influenced a generation of writings that came to constitute the subfield of strategic studies, which was preoccupied with the question of how to ensure national security. Modern strategists stressed the understanding of security as an outward looking concept and saw security in very narrow, militaristic and state centric terms which led to the underdevelopment of concept.<sup>27</sup> This underdevelopment was first recognised by Buzan.<sup>28</sup> Buzan sought to

---

<sup>27</sup> See for example, Joseph Nye Jr., "The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges" *Adelphi Paper Series* n-235 (London: IISS, 1989); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", *International Organisation*, Vol. 36: 2, 1982; by the same author "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, Vol. 30: 2, 1978, pp.167-264; Alfred Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991); Michael H.H. Louw, *National Security*, (Pretoria, ISS-University of Pretoria, 1978); Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol.8:3, 1983, pp.129-153; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68:2, 1989, pp.162-179.

<sup>28</sup> Barry Buzan, *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op. cit.*, pp.3-12.



understand the concept of security by analysing the logical and objective dimensions of security at the level of individuals, states and the system. He concluded that the state can be both, source and threat to the security of individuals.<sup>29</sup> He also dwelt on the question of national security versus individual security, noting that there is no necessary harmony between the two.<sup>30</sup> Buzan argued that security should not be understood narrowly; the concept of security implied webs of interconnection at different levels of social life, such as political, societal, military, economic and environmental.<sup>31</sup> He argued for the need to treat the concept of security from an integrative perspective,<sup>32</sup> a question I will return to in subsequent chapters.

## **1.2 The Liberal School of Security**

Grotius, among other thinkers in the seventeenth century, believed that the maximisation of state power was not the key to security. Instead, he believed that this could be achieved by making war unlawful and creating norms that would regulate relations among states. He argued that there was a basis to create these norms because the international arena was not fully anarchical. It operated according to a set of norms customary to states.<sup>33</sup> Each state had the sense of what was right and what was wrong. The lack of an overall sovereign did not justify

---

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p.50.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 363.

<sup>33</sup> Hugo Grotius, *The Laws of War and Peace* (translated by F.W. Kelsey), (London: Wildy & Sons, 1969), pp.16-20.

maximisation of power for states security.<sup>34</sup> In their relationships they were constrained by a set of community interests and a corpus of international law. Moreover, all states calculated their self-interest in terms of their own long-term interests such as the preservation of sovereignty and independence.<sup>35</sup> Within the international community there was an understanding that the independence of states should be preserved and this constituted the basis upon which relations between states should rest.

Grotius rejected the preponderance of force as a means of achieving security though not totally. He believed in international law establishing norms and rules that would regulate the relationships of states. Like Locke, he saw the recourse to force as justifiable only under special circumstances. For him these are those conditions capable of jeopardising the interests of the entire system or society, in which case self-defence is legitimate. Sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention should be the basis of conduct in interstate relations.

Another contribution to new thinking on security came from Kant. Writing in the eighteenth century, Kant dismissed the pessimistic realist view that there was no progress in history. He asserted that there was room for change in international relations, depending upon how much governments were prepared to put up with morality, or to create a space for it, since morality and war were incompatible inasmuch as war was responsible for the lack of progress in the international society. Unlike Grotius, he refused to accept Aquinas' proposition of just war, and

---

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-4.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 51-57.

the idea that security can be achieved through legislation, as the following passage shows:

As far as the law that is directly applicable to states is concerned, no state can sit in judgement over another and can be no such thing as just and unjust war inasmuch as justice in international life is subjectively defined. In a state of nature the right to make war is the permitted means by which states prosecute its rights against another. Thus, if a state believes that it has been injured by another state, is entitled to use violence for it cannot in state of nature gain satisfaction.<sup>36</sup>

He also dismissed the effectiveness of the balance-of-power mechanism. His proposition to end war between states and hence, achieve security was moralist, cosmopolitan and universalist. It lay in the creation of an international federation of states *volkerstaat*, that share the same constitutional principles, through a universal union of states *ein alegemeiner staatenverein*.<sup>37</sup> Thus, states should renounce their savagery and form a *civitas gentium* (international federated state ) which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraces all the peoples of the world<sup>38</sup>

War was not an incurable evil, he argued. It derived from a selfish tendency and the moral wickedness of men in a state of nature, the despotic and bellicose character of domestic governments as well as the anarchical nature of the international system. While this situation prevailed, no peace could be achieved. There was a need for an agreement of all nations to establish an international federation of Republics.<sup>39</sup> As long as humankind was separated in small units

---

<sup>36</sup> I. Kant "Perpetual Peace" in Hans Reiss (ed) Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p.167 Hereafter referred to as : Perpetual Peace in Hans Reiss

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 74

named states, in a state of nature, security was unachievable, because the root cause of insecurity was not the frequency of war but the state of nature:

... peoples who have grouped themselves into states may be judged in the same way as individual men living in state of nature, independent of external law; for they are a standing offence the very fact that they are neighbours.<sup>40</sup>

For Kant the answer lay in believing in morality and education of human beings and society so that they could be “enlightened”. Then they would automatically abandon savagery and enter the federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest could expect to derive security and rights, not from its own power, or its own legal judgements but solely from this great federation.<sup>41</sup> This federation would be the authority in charge of defining the rules for the coexistence of the members of the community through a united power and from law governed decisions. This was the only way that security and tranquillity of the universal society could be maintained.

He also rejected the idea that there was no connection between domestic and international politics.

So long as international anarchy continued attempts at establishing political liberty domestically would be frustrated. The problem of solving a perfect civil constitution is subordinated to the problem of law-grounded external relationship with other states and cannot be solved unless the latter is solved<sup>42</sup>

Kant’s proposition of international security is novel in the sense that it adds to the Westphalian international system the need to adopt, in each state, common

---

<sup>40</sup> *Perpetual Peace* in Hans Reiss, *op. cit.*, p.102.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and Kantian Paradigm in International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, July 1990, p. 180.

constitutional principles, that would form a basis for international federation in which the rights of the citizens would be acknowledged. The international federation was the basis for international harmony, since any problem arising in individual state would be dealt with from the same basis, reducing therefore the risks of antagonising the nature of constitutional organisation. Kant's contribution to security studies is also novel in the sense that it propounds a paradigm shift from a state centred-approach to a people centred approach.

In the eighteenth century, Rousseau continued Locke's theme of social contract. Unlike Hobbes and Kant, Rousseau thought that human beings are born innocent. Greed, selfishness competition pride and the desire for glory were evils that human beings learnt from living in a society with others. By analogy, he also thought that the evils of international society were not dependent upon individual's human nature. They were as much a result of the anarchical nature of international environment which was dominated by the self-interest of the states.

At the domestic level where states had governments to regulate relations among nationals, the system was functional because there was a social contract between the rulers and the ruled. Leaders were leaders because there was a consent of the people to govern and governed. There was a legitimate authority providing protection and granting security to all citizens.<sup>43</sup>

His idea of social contract between the rulers and the ruled transcends the state level and it is brought to bear on the international society. He denies that

---

<sup>43</sup> Howard Williams, *Rousseau in International Relations in Political Theory* (London: Open University Press, 1992), p.70.

authority, and by implication security, can be derived from force. He concludes that conventions are the key factor to international harmony, as he explains:

Domestic and international society can function harmoniously if they are founded on the consent of their participants.<sup>44</sup>

Rousseau sees as a solution to the problem of war the establishment of an international social contract, although he thinks that this is not achievable due to the primacy of self-interest of states:

No state is prepared to give up the possibility of gaining individual advantage over the rest, even if this leads to a more stable international environment. States are unfortunately inclined to put their particular wills first rather than pay heed to the general will.<sup>45</sup>

His idea of the international social contract was that states could accord to general will while preserving their independence. He envisaged that all sovereign powers of Europe could create an alliance to fight a common enemy: the war. Decisions regarding this struggle to eliminate war, would need to be taken in an international parliament whereby states could send representatives to discuss those issues. Clearly, with this proposal, Rousseau aimed at a confederation of states which would govern European affairs. These states should be subjected to law which should treat them as equal:

if there is any way of reconciling the dangerous contradictions between states, it is only to be found in such a form of federal government as shall unite nations by bonds similar to those which already unite their individual members and place the one no less than the other under the authority<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> See J.J. Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", in the *Social Contract Discourses*, translation by G.D. H. Cole, London, 1968, p. 161.

<sup>45</sup> Howard Williams, *Rousseau in International Relations in Political Theory op. cit.*, p.74

<sup>46</sup> Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States, op. cit.*, p.74.

If this confederation would have been attainable the preservation of peace and security would be attainable. Rousseau envisaged a confederation that would have a power of enforcement and a right to secession in case a state disagreed with the established order. He ends up defeated by his proposition of World government since he thinks that the princes will not concede to it:

... all that is needed to establish the federation is the consent of the princes who, unfortunately with their might any proposal for its creation.<sup>47</sup>

The recurrent theme in the Liberal school is the idea of collective action, institutions to protect common interests and common principles underpinning these institutions which gave rise to the notion of collective security.

### **1. 2.2 Collective Security**

The Kantian ideas inspired younger writers in subsequent centuries, particularly those writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, who developed the concept of collective security. Collective security idea is understood as being “one for all and all for one”. It meant a creation of a treaty system binding its signatories to protect any member of the system who is a victim of aggression. Unlike the balance-of-power, it did not rely upon a military alliance haphazardly arranged, but on a permanent commitment of all members of the system bound by treaty obligations.

---

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 75.

The idea of collective security can be traced as far back as the seventeenth century in the Treaty of Osnabruck.<sup>48</sup> Article 17 provided for the defence of all and each by all of the contracting parties against whomsoever it may be. However, it was not up until the failure of the mechanism of balance of power that scholars and statesman, turned their attention to the concept. At the earlier part of the present century, inspired by the horrors of the Word War I, the doctrine of collective security gained its importance and popularity and culminated in the establishment of the League of Nations.

It was the American President Woodrow Wilson who played the most important role in the creation of the League. Wilson advocated the idea that international security could not be based on haphazard precarious and selective arrangement of certain states. It had to be an inclusionary system of all states. However, he did not dismiss the preponderance of force within the system. The preponderance of force was to be available to every state for defensive purposes but to none for aggressive purposes. Thus, small and weak states could be protected. The concept of collective security could be achieved if the international community would create an international institution capable of supervising and co-ordinating the policies of states in the interest of maintaining general order. Wilson understood that military power could not be ruled out of the system but believed that the international institution would decrease the frequency of use of force and eventually reduce it to its minimum level since the system would be composed of enlightened governments who understood the inconveniences of war:

---

<sup>48</sup> G. Finch, *The Sources of Modern International Law* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1937), p.64.



...You cannot establish freedom my fellow citizens without force, and the only force you can substitute for an armed mankind is the concerted force of the combined action of the mankind through the instrumentality of all the enlightened governments of the world. This is the only conceivable system that you can substitute for the old order of things which brought the calamity of this war upon us...<sup>49</sup>

With the League, Wilson was proposing a system of deterrence that would obviate the need of fighting by the promise to fight.<sup>50</sup> The system would be consolidated by highlighting morality which would then undermine the use of force:

My conception of the League of Nations is just this, that it shall operate as the organised moral force of men throughout the world and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them. We shall now be drawn together in a combination of moral force that will be irresistible... It is moral force as much as physical that has defeated the effort to subdue the world.<sup>51</sup>

The Doctrine of Collective Security was called into question mainly after Britain and France, the strongest powers in the League, having failed to take action against Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Three years before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria largely succeeded because the rest of the world did little other than condemn these actions within the League and to apply insignificant sanctions. The rearming of Nazi Germany and the re-occupation of the Saar region

---

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in Ray Baker, and E. Dodd, *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace* (New York: Harper, 1927), p.234.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p.114

<sup>51</sup> See A. Hecksher, (ed) *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Harper Collins, 1956), pp. 255; see also J.B. Scott, *President Wilson's Foreign Policy* (Oxford :Oxford University Press ,1918), p. 114

in a clear violation of Versailles Treaty were also met with little more than verbal condemnations by the League.

E.H.Carr criticised the League as a Utopian dream whose founders based it upon the conception “that public opinion was the voice of reason and only reluctantly admitted the need for real sanctions”.<sup>52</sup> However, Rosseau had already identified and illustrated the dilemmas of collective security with his famous fable of the stag hunt.<sup>53</sup> Rousseau found the analogy between the stag hunt and the behaviour of states in the international system. He argued that national interest in inter-state relations will prevail over over collective interests and this was a liability for co-operation in collective security. Indeed, states will always tend to maximise their individual security in their relations with others. When they find themselves in a position of having to choose between the security of the whole community and their individual security. They would without any doubts, defect the rest of the community to protect their security interests.

Critiques to Collective Security have indicated that the League system was predicated on wrong assumptions: i)that the principle assumes that the military power of the rest of the community can overwhelm that of the potential aggressor or coalition of aggressors; ii) that the states that would form a coalition against the aggressor would have the same conception of security that are supposed to defend; iii) that defending states under aggression is in the interest of the rest of the system

---

<sup>52</sup>E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>53</sup> In this fable, four hunters were supposed to co-operate to catch a stag which would guarantee food for all four and their families. Rousseau concluded that the probability that the stag would be hunted through the cooperation of all was low. There was a high probability that one of the hunters would abandon co-operation after he had seen a rabbit which he thought was sufficient for himself and his family. This leads to the conclusion that states' self interest will predominate in relation to collective interests.

iv) that all the states will be willing to subordinate their national interest to the common good. As Morgenthau points out the odds are against such an eventuality. It is highly unlikely that all these elements can converge to protect a state suffering from aggression.<sup>54</sup>

Morgenthau's suspicion is confirmed by few examples within the UN system. There have been some cases such as, the occupation of South Lebanon by Israel, the South African invasion of Angola in which members of the UN system suffer aggression from other members despite the UN provisions according collective security to all its members. At the time of writing Israel occupied South Lebanon Only a few exceptions have attracted common military action from the rest of the community to repel the aggression. These exceptions are often motivated by the pursuit of national interests although questions pertaining to global order are not to be neglected, as was the case of the Gulf War.<sup>55</sup>

However strong is the criticism against collective security, it does not invalidate the reason why it sprang forth. Among these are the issues that cannot be dealt with only within the nation-state model such as the economic security in the face of a growing interdependent world which impose international co-operative efforts in the realm of trade and finance and environmental security which is a global concern. Approaching these issues from the national security perspective is conflict prone. Indeed, the nation-state model appears to be inadequate to deal with problems such as desertification, global warming, air pollution and the loss of

---

<sup>54</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations op. cit.*, p.452.

<sup>55</sup> See James Mayall, "Non-intervention, Self-Determination and the New World Order", in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (eds) *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention* (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp.167-176.

biodiversity, and the like, since the respect for sovereignty, and divergent interests within the community of states makes it difficult to have an international legislation for the environment.<sup>56</sup> On the other hand, societal issues concerning human-kind such as economic development and refugees, that have a direct bearing on security, cannot be curbed within the boundaries of the nation-state, they need a transnational effort and collective responsibility.

Herz was among the contemporary liberal writers to recognise this need for collective responsibility. He recognised that in the nuclear age, the survival of human species may depend upon nations defining their interests in terms wider than those of self-interest. Herz argued that engaging in new thinking in an effort to define the nature of international politics is crucial for international security.<sup>57</sup>

David Mitrany advocated functionalism as a way to international security. Mitrany observed that philosophers such as Hume, Burke and Mill, believed that there was an ideal system of relations between state and society and among individuals, and that they had spent time searching for this ideal system. Yet, the society changed so fast that any attempt to fix it was prone to failure. This is because there was a growing complexity of highly technical and non political tasks facing governments, which rendered traditional political institutions obsolete and inadequate. This was the heart of crises, war and insecurity. He proposed the development of institutions, national and international in areas of activity which directly affected the lives of human beings, such as health, energy and transport to be led by technicians with no political interest, but the function of serving the

---

<sup>56</sup> See for example, Caroline Thomas, *The Environment and International Relations*, op.cit., p.121.

<sup>57</sup> See John Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State" *World Politics*, Vol.9:4, 1957, pp.473-493.

people. Organisations such International Labour Organisation (ILO) were the ideal and could lead to more stability and security<sup>58</sup> among states existed because development and technological advancements have created new functions that lay beyond the reach of national politicians.

Kenneth Booth suggests an approach to the concept of security from an emancipatory angle. He argues that emancipation should be given precedence over power and order, since power and order are at someone's else expense. The idea of maximising power to achieve absolute security implies the absolute impotence of all others. He emphasises the Kantian idea people should be treated as ends not means and states should be treated as means not ends. His proposition is that the security theory should encapsulate the idea of community, since in community building we are concerned in breaking down the distinctions between in-groups and out-groups. This process of community development should be realised hand in hand with power diffusion and the transformation of states into a global mesh of norms and rules, decision making structures, complex economic interdependence, non-territorial and territorial communities and overlapping identity patterns. He suggests that we should move beyond Bull's anarchical society to an anarchical global community of communities.<sup>59</sup>

The Liberal School, has argued for the need to liberate security from the state monopoly and has attempted to redefine the very notion of “political

---

<sup>58</sup> See for instance, David Mitrany *A Working Peace System*, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943; see also David Mitrany, “Political Theory of New Society” in A.J Groom and Paul Taylor, *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations* (London: Univerity Press, 1975), pp. 25-37.

<sup>59</sup> Kenneth Booth, *Security In Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practise*, An Inaugural Lecture, The University College of Wales Paper, May 1993, p.14.

community” in view of the problems that escaped the scrutiny of the narrowly state centric and power-political focus. It sought to formulate the concept based on moral transformation of society. For Rousseau moral values should change the depravity of man gained in society, and for Grotius and Kant, moral values would help to create a more stable society free of war. Kant went far in associating the reasons of war with the nature of the international system. It was the system of state that was the main source of insecurity, because it allowed higher degree of independent action, yet it lacked mechanisms to curb moral wickedness. Universalism and education were key for the creation of a more secure system in which there will not be a need to resort to war.

The criticism faced by this school is that it based its assumptions on metaphysical aspirations far from the real world. In this world states had to articulate their actions and to envisage their relations with others. In the writings of both authors in the pre-state era and the post Westphalia era, the security debate seemed to revolve around two different ideas. One was the realist proposition that argued that the state-system and power are the main sources of international security; the other, the Kantian proposition which defended the idea that insecurity was inherent and pervasive in the state system. However, both Grotius and Rousseau, agreed with Kant on one point namely that that there is room for change and that education, international law and co-operation are the sources for change. Whereas utopians see as a common enemy war which is immoral, most realists especially those of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see as their main enemy the

rise of hegemonic power. Thus, for strong states, military power became synonymous with security.

### **The Marxist School**

Marx did not write specifically about security, but his ideas have serious implications for it. Marx concentrated on economic relations and his writings are a reaction to the prevailing order in the nineteenth century which he found to be unjust, oppressive and founded on exploitation. Exploitation was by one section of the society, the capitalist who owned the means of production, of the rest, i.e. the proletariat which owned nothing but its labour force. He argued that social and political relations -national and international- are conditioned by changes in material productive relations. Marx understood production as a process of a appropriation of nature.<sup>60</sup> Different appropriation of the nature would tend to create different conflicts. The prevailing order was a result of the capitalist mode of production. As in the past history, the prevailing political and social relations epitomised a class struggle between the oppressors and oppressed. Indeed history has been nothing more but the struggle between oppressors and oppressed: the slave-masters and slaves, the patricians and plebeians, the barons and serfs, the guildmasters and journeymen. Marx recognised the superiority of the capitalist mode of production in relations to previous modus of production such as feudalism. Capitalism created wealth , it brought together a world society through the

---

<sup>60</sup> See K. Marx, *The Critique of Political Economy -The 1857 Introduction*, Grundrisse Foundation (London: Penguin Books in Association with New Left Review, 1973), p.87.

expansion of trade and markets and shaped a global culture. However, capitalism was full of contradictions. It tended to overproduce, it created high levels of unemployment, and it alienated the working class, the creator of wealth, and the wealth was unevenly distributed. Capitalism was global force creating a global market, strengthening the division of societies into classes. The exploitation of people was facilitated by the state which was an expression of the dominant capitalist class. These were the reasons behind insecurity, conflict and war. Marx believed that conflict and war will prevail as long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist. Peace and security could only be achieved through an international solidarity of the proletariat to overthrow the capitalist mode of production and create a new society.<sup>61</sup> As he explains:

... For us the issue cannot be the alteration of private property but only its annihilation, not the smoothing over of a class antagonisms but the abolition of classes, not the improvement of existing society but the foundation of a new one...<sup>62</sup>

Building on Marx, Lenin noted that there was a growing imperialism, an economic imperialism which expressed itself through the concentration of production and creation of monopolies; fusion of banking and industrial capital which created financial oligarchy; export of capital; the formation of capitalist monopolies which share the world and the division of the world among the great powers. Lenin argued that the overproduction and the inequality of wealth distribution dampened consumption and reduced the potential for profitable

---

<sup>61</sup> See for example, K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Communist Manifesto" in *Selected Works in One Volume* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988), pp.35-40, see also in the same volume, "A Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", pp.182-83.

<sup>62</sup> Marx, K. and Engels, F. "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League (March 1850) in *Selected Works* ( Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955), Vol.1, p.110.



investments in the industrialised capitalist countries. These were then obliged to look for markets abroad. The capitalist class did not only enter into conflict with the proletariat within the national border of the state, but also with the capitalist classes of other states, since some are more stronger than others and hardly satisfy their greed for capital. When they perceive their interests threatened they wage wars to protect their capital, or its expansion. This is why they were interested in establishing colonial empires, especially in Asia and in Africa. The capitalist mode of production was thus a source of global conflict. The state system was the way in which the capitalist classes organised themselves to maintain dominance in the world. Lenin also believed that a classless society, without oppressors and oppressed would be conducive to peace and security since it would eliminate the global conflict.<sup>63</sup>

This tradition of theorising continued to influence contemporary writers. Wallerstein's contribution was in identifying how capitalist states remained secure and free from an all out challenge from an underdeveloped world. For this he examined the structure of the international system and concluded that the world capitalist system includes the division of states into three categories: the core, semi-periphery and periphery. He challenged the view that, modernisation, progress and industrialisation would bring benefits to all including the underdeveloped states, because the semi-peripheral states was of particular political importance. They were exploiters and exploited at the same time and this prevented a unified

---

<sup>63</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism The Highest Form of Capitalism* (Moscow: Progress, Publishers, 1969) pp. 81-92.

opposition to the dominance of core states. The semi-periphery acts as a buffer states of the underdeveloped world.

The challenge to Marxist thinkers, has always been how this new classless secure society can be achieved. They argued that this was to be achieved through a revolution when the two classes have reached the highest stage of antagonism. This would also require the annihilation of bureaucratic power:

... Preliminary condition for every real people's revolution is no longer to transfer the bureaucratic power from one to another but to smash it...<sup>64</sup>

However, Marxists understood that the state could not be eliminated immediately. Its elimination would be gradual, it would last until the day that capitalist class would be totally defeated. This was a necessary pre-condition since the proletariat would continue to need the state to fight its enemies:

..So long as the Proletariat continues to use the state it does not use it in the interest of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the state as such, ceases to exist...<sup>65</sup>

For Marx the revolution would bring the peaceful world inasmuch as it would change the ethics of domination and exploitation and replace them with the ethics of solidarity, since the new society founded on the communist mode of production would eliminate stratification of society vertically and horizontally

---

<sup>64</sup>K. Marx, "Letter to Kugelmann" in *Marx & Engels Selected Works* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955) Vol. 2, p. 463.

<sup>65</sup> Engels, F., "Letter to Bebel" (1875) quoted in *Lenine State and Revolution (1917) - Marx & Engels Selected Works* ( New York: International Publishers, 1943), Vol.7 p. 60

across the frontiers of states. This line of argument follows from Marx's reasoning that the material world created conflict in societies and this needed to be addressed. Marxist theory appeals to a high degree of morality in its theoretical construct. But its methods were not peaceful. Like the realist they regarded war as their instrument of policy. War was the instrument that they would utilise to achieve their objectives, that is to say the peaceful society in which each and everyone would feel secure, as Marx explains; "... Force is the midwife of historical change..."<sup>66</sup>

This idea is refined in Lenin who is discussed in more detail in the Chapter 2. Here, it will suffice to quote him as follows:

...War cannot help but arouse in the masses the most stormy feelings which disturb the usual condition of sleeping psyche. And without being in conformity with these new, stormy feelings a revolutionary tactic is impossible...<sup>67</sup>

Thus the Marxist theory of security, although it was articulated from a different stand point it led to the same conclusion arrived at by realists that in today's world power is a preponderant instrument of policy to achieve security. This view, however, was changed in the 1990's with the emergence of so called the "new thinking" in security which understands the limitations of the military power in ensuring security and its role in creating the security dilemma and arms races. The new thinking holds that security is indivisible, international and interdependent.

---

<sup>66</sup>Marx, K. Nauchnii, *Kommunizm Slovar* (Scientific Communism, A Dictionary), Vol.1 (Polizdat, Moscow, 1980), pp.176-177

<sup>67</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works* Vol. 26, pp. 290-291, quoted in the Albert Weeks (ed) *Brasseys Book on Soviet Communist Quotations* (London: MacMillan for Brassey's), p. 315

More security for one state produced more security for all members of the system and unless there is international security there can not be any national security, because insecurity in a certain region compels the intervention of other members of the system. Since these are guided by self-interest, they are likely to be rivals in their intervention which increases the insecurity of the system.<sup>68</sup> The implication of this idea is that security is best ensured through the cooperation of all states in the system which does not seem to be feasible and practical due to the diversity of the world in terms of interests, resources and capabilities. Indeed, some may not have the capacity. The idea seems only to translate the reality of those states which are a global force and have global ambitions.

### **Southern Africa and the Concept of Security**

The participation of Southern Africa in the international system begins with its colonisation by European powers. Colonisation introduced new modes of political and military organisation; it brought, capital and new technology which expanded intra-regional and extra-regional trade. Colonisation, particularly the developments of the last two centuries set the framework within which security thinking and praxis was shaped. From the outset, of colonial occupation, security was never conceptualised to meet the needs and aspirations of the people in the region, but the interests of the colonial powers. These interests included the expansion of trade opportunities, control of trade routes and resources that could be sold in European

---

<sup>68</sup> See for instance Vladimir Petrovsky, *Sovetskaya kontsepsiy vseobshchei beopasnosti* ( Soviet Concept of Global Security), Memo 1986, n-6, pp.3-13

markets, which were rarely achieved without the use of force. To this one should add the fact that security has always been associated with crisis management arising mainly from competing political, economic and social orders between the settlers and native Africans which legitimised the application of realist conceptions of security. Most of Southern African territories attained independence in the last thirty years. Consequently they were unable to develop a security thinking independent from their colonial powers. In fact, the realist understanding of security was a consequence of relations with Europeans influenced by this school of thought. At independence the new states had inherited ideas, institutions, structures designed not to deal with their security problems, but those of the colonial powers. These factors and the environment created by the bipolar system of international relations, that began to operate after 1945, helped to entrench the traditional conception of security in the region.

The implications of the Marxist and liberal ideas of security will be examined in the subsequent chapters. The liberal ideas have been seen by a number of analysts as an alternative to realist conceptions of security in the post Cold War period. In this section I will only examine the roots of how the realist conception of security came to dominate Southern.

The Portuguese presence on the west coast of Southern Africa has been recorded since the late 1400's and expanded to the east coast in the early sixteenth century.<sup>69</sup> The Dutch and English presence in the region followed during the seventeenth century Dutch wars, although Dutch settlements in the region did not

---

<sup>69</sup> See Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years*, (London:Hurst& Co, 1981), pp.1-13.

start until 1652, the year the first group of settlers landed at the Cape.<sup>70</sup> Britain's permanent presence began with their taking over the Cape Colony in 1795.<sup>71</sup> The peoples of Southern Africa had traded with Indians, and Arabs prior to the Portuguese arrival, but, neither the Indians nor Arabs had any ambition to conquer, occupy or establish vast empires in Southern African territories and peoples. To some degree, neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch or British showed this ambition until later in the nineteenth century. The European powers were interested in establishing stations from which they could trade and control trade routes with their African and Asian partners. The Cape was used as a calling station for the Dutch East India Company's freight which had its eastern headquarters in Java. Economic considerations made the Company to encourage settlements in 1657, from which it relied upon for food supplies for its ships.<sup>72</sup> The Portuguese established positions in the west and east coasts of Southern Africa in what today is Angola and Mozambique, to trade with Africans in slaves, paper, ivory, iron and gold. The British were also interested in expanding their trade with Africa but the Cape had other priorities. Its rulers used it as a frontier fortress for their eastern empires.<sup>73</sup> After the Napoleonic wars, the British occupied most of the French and Dutch territories except those of their allies, Portugal and Spain. They were prepared to return the majority of these territories to their former possessors, except the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena and Mauritius. The decision was based on their strategic value and not on their economic importance. The British government

---

<sup>70</sup> See T.R. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p.29.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p.18.

<sup>73</sup> See I. E. Edwards, *The 1820 Settlers in South Africa: A study of the British Colonial Policy* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1934), p.18.

believed that a blockade capable of disrupting its trade interests with India could be organised from the Cape and this was a compelling reason to station its troops and installations to service its fleets. The Cape was also a location from which they could send reinforcements to India in the event of an outbreak of war, as Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of War and Colonies explains :

Cape was a military 'depot', to which troops might be sent from Great Britain in the event of an outbreak of war in India.<sup>74</sup>

However, trade with Africans was not always pacific, especially the slave trade which proved to be lucrative for most. It caused competition and rivalry between backwoods traders, crown expeditions and powerful African chiefs. At the heart of competition lay the attempt to establish monopolies. The competition often led to violent conflict which required a constant presence of the military. The Portuguese brought troops to attack African communities, to penetrate the interior, and gain more access to slaves, resources and control trade routes. For the same reasons they fought wars against the settlers and Arabs.<sup>75</sup> Likewise, the British competed with the Boers and Khoisan people to control the slave trade, land, mineral resources and other goods that could be sold in the European markets. The search for more trade opportunities required a constant European presence and for this, several European expeditions were dispatched to the interior in the 18th century, while other communities, such as the Boers trekked expanding the white frontier through conquest. The increased access to trade opportunities and resources brought to bear the need for protection of either the routes or the goods from rivals,

---

<sup>74</sup> Hansard xxxiii, 235, London, 15 March 1816

<sup>75</sup> Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa op.cit.*, pp.1-13.

bandits and pirates.<sup>76</sup> European military presence was thus increased to fulfil these objectives. The other reason that justified an increased European military presence was the perception that developments in the occupied territories could jeopardise the strategic goals of using the territories as calling stations. One such development was the conflict between the Boers and Khoisan people. The heart of the problem was the use of grazing and farming lands. The Boers increasingly occupied grazing and farming lands that were originally used by the Khoisans. They introduced the notion of private land ownership, a concept that was strange to the Khoisan people. In turn it forced most of the Khoisan people out of these lands. This gave rise to violent conflict resulting in casualties on both sides. This forced the British to intervene, to maintain order to safeguard the use of the Cape of Good Hope as a strategic calling station. However, the British attempt to maintain order, was not always welcomed by the Boers who regarded the British, as partial towards the Khoisans. They often protested using acts of violence. Episodes of this nature required a reinforcement of troops to maintain order.<sup>77</sup> The Portuguese were also in constant dispute with settlers who controlled large extensions of grazing and farming land (*prazos*). These disputes were founded either on refusal by the owners of the *prazos* (*prazeiros*) to pay levies on goods they traded, and the implementation of the legislation abolishing slave trade and the *prazos*. Slave trade was abolished in Portugal but it continued in Mozambique and Angola until 1912. Portugal wanted to abolish the *prazos* because they brought very little revenue to the Portuguese government. The abolition was resisted by the force of

---

<sup>76</sup> See Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa* (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1968), pp. 1-20.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.20-21.



arms by the *prazeiros*. In order to quell armed opposition an increased Portuguese military presence was required. It was in this context of dealing with crises that the use of force was legitimised and became the only method of maintaining security.

European powers also encouraged massive immigration to the territories, both for economic and security reasons. A massive European presence could help increase the production of cash crops and exert better control over resources, thus benefiting European markets. European immigration would also help to match the number of Africans who often attacked and waged wars against settlers. European immigration would help to expand white frontiers, help the protection of trade routes thus safeguarding the original strategic objectives. However, an increased European immigration intensified the conflict between the settlers and Africans, since it implied that land, resources, and employment opportunities had to be divided among a greater number. This often led to violence which encouraged further use of force to maintain order. In fact, the use of force became the only vehicle that could ensure the security of the settlers. They used force to quell revolts, uprisings, grievances or disputes with power holders over civil rights or resources. Thus, security from the outset, seen in terms of antagonistic interests between the settlers and the natives and access to power, particularly military power, was the way in which it could be achieved. Invasions of African kingdoms by Europeans, of African Kingdoms by others, and of Europeans by Europeans continued in the region well after the conclusion of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 and the Concert of Europe in 1815. Sovereignty and the balance-of-power were European concepts that were not extended to African kingdoms and territories. The

Anglo-Boer wars, the pacification wars undertaken by the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the Mphecane wars fought between Africans, testify how the quest for power became important for security. Europeans conspired to topple African kingdoms, and Africans allied with Europeans to topple other Africans;<sup>78</sup> Backwoods traders and *prazeiros* formed alliances to topple others. However, this situation allowed power fragmentation and the development of independent power was indiscriminately used. Slave masters, *prazeiros*, Boer farmers and backwoods traders used their private forces, to maintain order, mainly among the Africans; to resist orders from the government which they disagreed and fight the rivals. This generated a sense of chaos and questioned the authority of governments. Governments were compelled to take strong measures to reduce and cut the privileges of this independent power which was often met with dissatisfaction.<sup>79</sup> Some settlers, particularly the Boers, were prepared to accept the principle of equality among them but were not prepared to extend it to Africans. When arrested by abusing Africans they protested, and used quotes from Grotius and Locke to claim principles of justice and equality.<sup>80</sup> But they inferred only, equality and justice among settlers. Special privileges should be accorded to them with respect to Africans. This created a conflict between these settlers and those who really believed in the liberal principles of equality of human beings who called for the abolition of slavery, recognition of cosmopolitan principles and observation of Christian principles. Conflicts of this nature polarised the society and they were not

---

<sup>78</sup> See, T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History, op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>79</sup> See Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa, op. cit.*, pp.10-1; see also, T.R.H Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History, op. cit.* p11-13; I. E. Edwards, *The 1820 Settlers, op. cit.*, pp.20-22.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p.27-28.

resolved with the emergence of the state. In fact states in Southern Africa were founded and operated behind the rationale of the need to protect the security interests of the settlers and the European metropolises. Colonial states continued to observe this pattern of discriminating between the interests of the settlers and natives. This was also the case of South Africa, the first state in the region to participate as an independent member in the international system. South Africa continued to understand security in terms of Europeans versus Africans. It undertook policies deepening the faultlines of its domestic society promoting racism and ethnicity,<sup>81</sup> and encouraging domination and exploitation of Africans. South Africa also saw itself as an extension of an European state which was in the region to represent European interests. The clash with the majority of South Africans who were victims of this type of state became inevitable. South Africa and the other colonial states clashed also with other Africans who saw in them a symbol of injustice. The nature of the colonial and South African states contradicted the principles of order which Europe sought to establish in 1648, since these states were not founded on the spirit of the nation. This contradiction was superimposed by the conflict resulting from different conceptions of international order between liberals and realists. Colonial states and racism in South Africa were resisted by those who believed in the principles of freedom, equality and justice. The environment of conflict allowed the emergence of movements, forces informed by liberals and Marxists who tried to influence the resolution of the conflict. The nature of interaction among actors guided by different interests, values and

---

<sup>81</sup> See Leroy Vail, *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p.30.

principles, gave rise to the Southern African security system which I discuss in the next chapter.

## Chapter 2

### The Making of the Southern African Security Complex: Regional Factors

The concept of a 'security complex' is owed to Buzan, but it is derived from Hedley Bulls concept of a system of states.<sup>1</sup> It refers to a distinctive pattern of security relations in a certain region conditioned by geographic proximity, interdependence and a degree of interaction. The security perceptions and concerns of states involved in a complex are so intense and interlinked to the extent that their national security problems cannot be analysed independent of each other.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter argues that the SADC states, with the exception of Mauritius, constitute such a complex. Although its features and contours became more evident in the 1970's, its making started long before the present states were formed, with the Portuguese, Dutch and British occupation of the subcontinent in the fifteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively. The complex came about as a result of economic, social, political and military interaction. The use of force played a key role in imposing colonial and apartheid orders and securing the monopoly of instruments of violence by the European settlers. The fact that the order imposed by the European settlers were offensive to millions inspired confrontation between the native Africans and the settlers and later between the black majority-ruled states and the white regimes conditioning their security interaction.

---

<sup>1</sup> Hedley Bull argues that "a system of states is formed when two or more states have sufficient impact on one another's decisions to cause them to behave at least in some measure as parts of whole" See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>2</sup> See B. Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer, Ole Waever., *The European Security Order Recast: Scenario for the Post Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990), pp.13-14.

The events in what is now South Africa dominated the making of the complex from the nineteenth century and gradually brought to a closer interaction the Portuguese settlements in Mozambique and the Dutch and British settlements. Towards the end of the nineteenth century Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were drawn into the complex following the British occupation of these territories. After World War I, the complex was expanded to Namibia and Angola, following the South African occupation of Namibia in 1915 and the discovery of diamonds in Angola in 1920. Tanzania's integration into the complex started with the beginning of the nationalist armed struggle in the 1960's. Its support of the ANC, PAC, FRELIMO, MPLA, and SWAPO drew it into a closer association with the south. The need to access resources that could be sold in European markets, and protect the welfare and privileges of the settlers, led to a conception of security in the region in a zero-sum fashion, achievable only if they could establish a monopoly over the instruments of violence.

Four main factors can be seen as having influenced the making of the complex. First, the discovery of diamonds and gold. This discovery facilitated the occupation and domination of the Africans as it provided reasons and resources for quick militarisation and tilted the balance towards the European settlers. It also led to a search for mineral riches which culminated in the partition of the subcontinent by the European powers in the 1884/5 Berlin Conference. The second factor was the need to protect the settlers' welfare status. This led successive South African leaders to seek an expansion of the colony frontiers, to seek legitimation abroad by developing closer relations with African states and establishing closer co-operation with the West in defence and security and acquiring weaponry that would allow South Africa to enjoy military superiority. The third factor was the emergence of

the national liberation movements in Southern Africa which challenged the white regimes by force. This forced the strengthening of the alliance among the white minority regimes, increased military and economic co-operation and shared intelligence. The fourth factor was the emergence of new states that formed an alliance to oppose South Africa's domestic order and its proposals for regional order. The emergence of new states tilted the regional balance and increased more confrontation between these states and South Africa.

### **The Discovery of Diamonds and Gold**

The discovery of diamonds at Kimberly in 1867 and gold in the Witwatersrand area in 1886 brought changes to the peoples of Southern Africa. It gave an opportunity to the settlers to improve their quality of life and increase their wealth. It changed the nature of the economy of the white communities from agricultural and pastoral to mining and industry based; expanded intra-regional and extra-regional trade; it invited massive immigration of Europeans and it increased South Africa's labour markets. The discovery of mineral riches attracted investments in the transport and industrial sector and allowed new technology to be imported.<sup>3</sup>

Investments in the transport sector soon linked Port Elizabeth, East London and Cape Town with the diamond fields. New railways were built across the region linking the South African colonies and the then called Native Reserves of Basotholand (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland. New railways were built linking Transvaal with the Delagoa Bay port (Lourenço Marques) in the

---

<sup>3</sup> See, O. Doughty, *Early Diamond Days: The Opening of Diamond Fields in South Africa* (London: Longman, 1963).

Portuguese controlled territory of Mozambique and the Mozambican central city of Beira with Rhodesia.<sup>4</sup> By 1910 about 10 million miles of railways had been built in the region which facilitated regional trade and enhanced the interaction among people.<sup>5</sup> The development of rail and road infrastructure facilitated the contacts amongst white colonies, and between the white colonies and the African chiefdoms drawing them into closer interaction. It made possible the expansion of markets for agricultural and pastoral produce of farmers.<sup>6</sup>

The discovery of mineral riches also had a significant impact on the military. Prior to the arrival of the British, the Dutch military comprised commando formations which were supported by civilian militias that involved all the farmers, coloured and Khoi people, who were compelled or voluntarily joined the force, to undertake both military and police functions. They were equipped with rifles, small artillery and had a modest cavalry unit consisting of horses privately owned by farmers. This was an advantage in relation to their main enemies the Khoisan people who were equipped with cutting weapons and had no other means of mobility than their feet. Frontier wars of the eighteenth century forced the transformation of the commando into a regiment, but the mixed colour composition of the force survived. Even with the British arrival (1895-1803) and consequent substitution of the Boer commando by the Cape Regiment, the recruitment of coloured and Africans was maintained. There were a number of reasons that accounted for this. First there was a reluctance of the colonial metropolises to send European soldiers to the subcontinent. There was also the resistance of settlers to participate in the military activities. In fact a significant number of desertions has

---

<sup>4</sup> See J. D. Omer Cooper, *History of Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1994) pp.101-103; see also R.T. Libby, *The Politics of Economic Power*, op. cit., pp.19-36.

<sup>5</sup> See A.J. Christopher, *Southern Africa* (Hamden, Conn: Archon, 1976), p.248.

<sup>6</sup> See, J. D.Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, op. cit., p.101.



been recorded perhaps because farmers found it difficult to combine military and farming activities.

Africans and coloureds were, however, confined to auxiliary functions such as moving equipment, loading the second rifles and attending to horses. The trekking Boers relied upon the commando formations wherever they settled, but wars with locals forced their transformation into regiments. The regiment was preferred by most farmers because it alleviated them from military activities and allowed them to dedicate more time to farming. However, the regiments remained inefficient because of their amateur nature. Their commander was elected and they lacked a professional support system for the soldier which often resulted in low combat performance because of living in harsh conditions. Thus, thefts, corruption and non-sanctioned violence was a common practice among soldiers. The commando structure also had the disadvantage of arming almost all the citizens which made the task of maintaining order difficult, since protests over application of certain laws were often transformed into armed protest. The commandos did not show levels of distinctive discipline in combat which affected their performance and their battle plans were subjected to vote in the council which made it difficult to ensure discipline in the army.

Such reasons made the British reluctant to keep the commando formations when they took over the Cape in 1806. Their dilemmas were resolved in favour of maintaining the commandos as a subsidiary force. The British military organisation was far more advanced and its structure resembled the present professional army.<sup>7</sup> They distinguished operational functions, those aimed at preparing the soldier for combat, from support functions, aimed at ensuring good organisation and high

---

<sup>7</sup> See P. Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution: South Africa's Total Strategy", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol.18/3, October, 1980, p.14.

performance of the army. These included medical services, quartermasters, and strategic planners. Within these services they established different hierarchies and ranks. The British also distinguished policing from military functions.<sup>8</sup> This organisation and the fact that they had access to new technology ensured their military superiority.

Military superiority allowed the British to deal more effectively with frontier wars against the Khoisan people, quell armed revolts of the Boers against their rule, and attack the two Boer Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State whenever they felt it was necessary, since there were major and minor clashes between the settlers. Among the causes of these clashes were the questions of how labour should be treated and disagreements over the question of representation between the British and the Boers. The British liberals introduced legislation abolishing slavery in 1834 and favoured free competition of labour.<sup>9</sup> Sections of the British community, especially the missionaries, were keen to propagate liberal ideas of equality among human beings and favoured the education and conversion of Africans to Christianity. They also extended mineral licences to non-whites<sup>10</sup> and, when the British decided to allow a degree of self-government in the Cape, they insisted on a colour blind franchise. This was resented by the Boers who extracted most of their revenues from exploiting cheap labour. Thus, the anti-slavery legislation meant giving up their source of profit without any apparent replacement. Mining activity also absorbed most of the available African labour in the white colonies, since work conditions and the payment were relatively better. However, this generated a shortage of labour, especially in the farms where

---

<sup>8</sup> See Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine* (London : IDAF, 1986), p.6.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example C. Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of South African Peasantry* (London, Heineman, 1979), pp. 200-204.

<sup>10</sup> See J.D. Ommmer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 103-105.

labourers were treated as slaves. This caused dissatisfaction amongst the Boer farmers who feared losing their labourers to mining companies, railways, industries and other public works which often led to confrontation. The problem of labour was severed by the farmers need of expanding their appropriation of land. Their favoured method was to squeeze native Africans off the land which was opposed by missionaries, land companies and landlords who extracted rent from Africans and merchants whose livelihood came from trading with African peasants.<sup>11</sup>

Diamond and gold were the causes of the two major Anglo-Boer wars (1898-1902) which culminated in the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. In the early stages, diamond digging involved simple operations by individuals with little capital, assisted by a handful of labourers. As excavations became deeper, sophisticated equipment was necessary to mine lower levels and minimise the risk of human loss, but small scale miners did not have the capital to make the necessary investments. Unrestricted mining made diamond prices fall. The largest British company proposed an amalgamation of companies which was opposed by small operators. Low prices of diamonds caused dissatisfaction among the white population. The dissatisfaction was also caused by the fact that they had black and coloured competitors in the diggings. The white community argued that extending licences to non-whites made it difficult to control diamond thefts.<sup>12</sup> Resentment in this issue led to revolts which disrupted mineral production and forced the British industrialists to complain and blame the authorities of the Boer Republic. The situation was worsened by the discovery of gold in the Republic of Transvaal. Gold deposits in the Witwatersrand were on average of low grade and were only economically viable because they were very large. Low grade deposits

---

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.102.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p.107.

require an appropriate technology which was expensive and could not be afforded by the majority of companies which had initially acquired licences. As the experience in the diamond fields has shown, to stay in business they needed to be grouped into holdings. Labour shortages made the holdings to come together to regulate matters related to the recruitment of labour, measures to increase productivity and attract investment. However, the policies of the government in Transvaal worked against the interest of mining companies. Their licensing tended to raise transport costs which in turn raised the cost of equipment. The administrative system in Transvaal was cumbersome and unable to facilitate labour supplies or recruitment to the mining industry. It was unable to deal with questions such as gun sales to non-whites which was thought to be responsible for the increase of banditry around the pits and drinking habits responsible for lower productivity. Those problems led the British to think of a confederation in which they could reform the Boer state with a much more dynamic one, and unify the British assets in the development of South Africa. When this project was resisted war between the British colonies and the Boer Republics became inevitable. With capital coming from diamond and gold revenues and access to modern technology and better military organisation the British had enjoyed superiority. Revenues from gold and diamonds enabled them to purchase breachloading rifles, machineguns and artillery equipment, which allowed them to thwart any Boer resistance. Even when the Boers were well armed they had a difficulty to resupply because the Royal Navy (RN) assured that this did not happen.

There is little evidence, however, suggesting the will to totally subjugate each other in the wars fought between sections of the white community. On the contrary, these wars were often followed by the signature of treaties calling for

truces, cessation of hostilities, reconciliation and compensation. Rebels were given short periods of imprisonment and obliged to pay small fines.<sup>13</sup>

News of gold and diamond deposits reached most Western European capitals, who were keen to increase their wealth and find raw materials for their industries. This precipitated a frenzied search for minerals in the subcontinent and massive European immigration into the region. However, the new arrivals needed more land and cheap labour. As a result African peasants were increasingly squeezed off the land and exported as labour, despite the opposition of groups, that had vested interests in their remaining on the land. These included missionaries, landlords and land companies who extracted rent from African tenants; merchants whose livelihood came from trade with Africans and farmers who rented their property to African tenants.<sup>14</sup> The squeezing out of Africans created periodical revolts and rebellions. Protection, mainly of those Europeans who ventured to live on the white frontier became increasingly an important issue. The frenzied search for minerals led to the need to regulate and establish an effective control of land and resources so as to extract more benefits. This led the European powers to agree on the form in which they would share African resources in the 1884-85 Berlin conference.<sup>15</sup> The European powers recognised the need for collaboration to avoid wars among them and enable effective control of the territories. In the Berlin conference, European powers established borders based on the spheres of influence and claims of effective occupation of the territories. The establishment of borders compelled them to introduce legal and political order for an effective

---

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p166.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p.102.

<sup>15</sup> See, D. M. Sreuder, *The Scramble for Southern Africa 1877-1895: The Politics of partition Reappraised* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); see also Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa, op.cit.*, pp. 64-84.

administration. However, the occupation of territories, the control of resources and the extension of the administrative system was often resisted by military action, either by Africans or by the settlers who felt that the new order curtailed their privileges. The stakes involved were so high, however, that the colonial authorities had no option but to resort to violence. Militarisation became the answer to the problem and it was not beyond their capacity thanks to the regional economic boom in the late 1800's and early 1900's.

### **Towards a Monopoly of the Means of Violence and Power**

As gold and diamonds injected fresh dynamism into the South African economy, it created conditions for generating loans and subsidies to the farmers, thus, strengthening the unity between the farmers and the mine owners.<sup>16</sup> The unity between farmers and mine owners changed the nature of conflict in South Africa. Class interests overshadowed ethnic divisions between the Dutch and the British. The richer sectors of the Boer community, now favoured reconciliation and good relations with the British although the poor sectors stressed nationalism. But they all agreed on a number of things: first, that abundant and cheap non-European labour was essential for the prosperity of the farms and mines; second, that the arming of non-white people was undesirable. In fact, in the Boer Republics, constitutional clauses prohibiting arms trade with non-whites were passed. The breachers of these clauses, suffered penalties ranging from being thrown out of the country, being sacked from office, to having their property looted.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> See J. D. Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

<sup>17</sup> See L. Thompson, "Cooperation and Conflict: The High Veld" in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (ed) *The Oxford History of South Africa: Vol I South Africa to 1870* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.425.

The concentration of large non-European labour and its urbanisation, jeopardised the security of the white communities, it was argued, since a sudden uprising of underprivileged blacks was a possibility.<sup>18</sup> There were real bases for these worries. Traders had supplied African chiefdoms with substantial quantities of weapons. With the money they earned in the diamond pits most Africans purchased guns which they carried when traversing white territories en route to the pits<sup>19</sup>. To alleviate their heightened fears whites demanded black disarmament and restricted gun selling. For the security of the pits they created security guards and part-time regiments. The existing army contingents were doubled and the pass laws were reinforced to restrict the circulation of the black population in white areas and hence their urbanization.<sup>20</sup> They also undertook measures to alleviate the dilemmas arising from the urbanisation of African labourers. These included bringing migrant labour from the so called 'native reserves', of Bechuanaland, Basotholand, and Swaziland and from Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Nyasaland.<sup>21</sup> Migrant labour proved to have several advantages. The labourers were encouraged to come without their families, which allowed companies and farmers to pay low wages. They stayed in camps where para-military discipline was introduced. Reduction of drinking habits, free movement in leisure time resulted in high productivity, since the workers would be available to work beyond the normal hours without any extra pay. The fact that they were not locals also meant that they would not get involved in local disputes involving land and they would keep down the burden of social costs that the industries would otherwise have to bear.

---

<sup>18</sup> See J. D. Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa, op.cit.*, p.103.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> See T. D. Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 249

<sup>21</sup> See Francis Wilson, *Labour in South African Gold Mines 1911-1969* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

Once the problem of labour had been resolved, the major challenge the settlers faced was to establish a monopoly over the instruments of violence. This implied the disarming of blacks in the territories they occupied including independent chiefdoms. In the Portuguese territories disarmament also included backwood traders and farmers. This was accomplished through the pacification wars, which led to systematic violence in the whole subcontinent. The British fought wars against Xhosas and Zulus to subjugate them to their dominion. Their modern military equipment was vital for winning these wars and altering the military balance of power that existed until 1870 between the Zulus, small number of Boers and the British.

Portugal undertook a pacification campaign in Mozambique crushing the crumbling Gaza Empire in Southern Mozambique in 1895, Sena and Barue resistances in the 1900's and leaving behind large numbers of dead.<sup>22</sup> In Angola Portugal fought a 30 years war of pacification aimed at extending its authority to the entire territory which culminated in the defeat of the Congo kingdom.<sup>23</sup> In the pacification of Namibia the Germans killed 80 % of the Hereros and Nama peoples to accomplish effective occupation in South West Africa (Namibia)<sup>24</sup> and Tanganyika around 300,000 of Maji-Maji people.<sup>25</sup>

Force became the only instrument the settlers resorted to ensure their security. As long as they maintained power superiority their security would be guaranteed. But, power superiority would also be ensured through economic

---

<sup>22</sup> See T. Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History op. cit.*, pp.75-79; see also Jeanne Penvenne " We Are All Portuguese: Challenging the Political Economy of Assimilation: Lourenço Marques 1870-1933" in Leroy Vail, *Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>23</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese, op. cit.*, p. 20

<sup>24</sup> See Tilman Dederig, "The German-Herero War of 1904 Revisionism of Genocide or Imaginary Historiography?", *The Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 19 March 1993, pp. 83-84

<sup>25</sup> See John Illife, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 200.



discrimination, inferior standards of education and barred access to state institutions and limiting the circulation of the natives. The British, the Boers and the Portuguese were reluctant to include non-whites in the army, except when major wars were fought in Europe. However, even in these circumstances, Africans were confined to a non-combat roles.

A discriminatory system of education replicating the stratification of the colonial society in generations to come. In South Africa this was entrenched through apartheid legislation such as the Group Areas Act, the Land Act and Reservation of Separate Amenities Act which would ensure the inherent racial inequality.<sup>26</sup> In the Portuguese territories power monopoly also was ensured by a combination of policies and legislation.

Portugal lacked capital, technology and human resources, to develop its colonies. Portugal opted for chartering its territories to British, South African and German companies on a concessionary basis. The economy in its territory remained agriculture based and it provided service and labour to the most dynamic economies of the region. Chartering helped Portugal to extend its authority over the territories it claimed to control and reduce the threats for seizure of its territories by other powers.<sup>27</sup> But this control was not effective. Warlordism and the lack of labour policies continued to disrupt order and was one of the reasons that kept the colonies poor.

Most of the white Portuguese population in Angola and Mozambique until the early 1900's were exiled convicts, *degradados*, married locally and mixed with the local population. The *degradados* occupied posts in the army, police,

---

<sup>26</sup> See J.D. Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa op.cit.*, pp.193-96

<sup>27</sup> Portugal faced an ultimatum from Britain in 1895 to occupy effectively its territories. A failure to meet this requirement would result in seizure of its territories. See details in Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa op.cit.*, pp. 201-31.

administration and controlled most of the retail trade. They had played an important role in penetrating the hinterland of the colonies, escorting royal expeditions and expanding Portuguese trade networks. They also participated in the coffee, tea, cotton and sisal production which brought most of the revenues to the Portuguese state and because of this Portugal was interested in encouraging more immigration.

Portugal passed a series of laws according privileges to settlers, especially in exploiting African labour, accessing the most fertile land. In the early 1900's specific legislation was introduced in Angola and Mozambique defining specific zones to be set aside for the exclusive use of Africans.<sup>28</sup> This allowed European peasants and *degradados* to take over most of the farming land. Most of the land awarded to the settlers, however, had to be taken back at the end of the year due to their failure to cultivate the percentage defined by the state.<sup>29</sup> To farm the land, white farmers needed cheap labour, and since the formal abolition of slavery, labour was not easily available. To resolve this handicap the Portuguese state resorted to forced labour.<sup>30</sup> The 1800s legislation introduced the vagrancy clause, which considered all non-productive Africans as 'vagrants', who should be subjected to non-paid 'contracts'.<sup>31</sup> The definition of what was to be considered non-productivity was ambiguous and left to local administrators, who often found vagrants to fill the needs of private farmers.<sup>32</sup> As late as 1928 labour laws stipulated that Africans should work for a paid wage during a certain period of each year, and in case they failed to volunteer to work they should be 'contracted' by the state<sup>33</sup>.

---

<sup>28</sup> See Jose Gonçalo de Santa Rita, "O Contacto das Raças nas Colonias, Seus Efeitos Politicos e Sociais" *Legislação Portuguesa no Congresso do Mundo Português*, Vol.15 part II, 1955, p. 47-48

<sup>29</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese op.cit.*, p. 149

<sup>30</sup> See M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa op. cit.*, pp. 106-115.

<sup>31</sup> See J. M. Silva Cunha, *O Trabalho Indigena* (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1955, 2nd ed), pp. 147-148.

<sup>32</sup> Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese op. cit.*, p.139

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p.141

Public works, were generally accomplished by Africans thought to fit this category. The Portuguese authorities also introduced a system of taxation through labour in which they permitted the *prazeiros* to 'employ their peasants for two weeks work a year in lieu of tax'.<sup>34</sup> In Mozambique African farmers were forced to grow cotton and other export-crops, while in Angola coffee was the obligatory crop.<sup>35</sup> The labour surplus resulted from weak development of the colony was sub-contracted to South African companies and farms on cheap rates to allow profits for the state. This became one of the main sources of income for the Portuguese government. However, the Portuguese economy remained agricultural based and 90 per cent of population in the colonies depended upon subsistence agriculture. The economy of the colonies had no other function but serving the economy of the metropolises. In Angola diamonds, iron, oil and coffee plantations, all owned by the Portuguese funded most of the Portuguese economy.<sup>36</sup>

The situation did not change much even when Salazar introduced state reforms in the 1950's. Salazar's government ensured that no African could have access to business. Portuguese settlers enjoyed a privileged economic and social status relative to native Africans but like the natives they had no political rights. No substantial political power was devolved to them by the metropole, since the majority of the settlers after World War II were peasants with little political ambitions when compared with settler community in neighbouring South Africa and Rhodesia. In fact, the Portuguese colonial authorities met any forms of nationalist manifestation with repression, imprisonment and torture. There were no

---

<sup>34</sup> See M. Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p.407.

<sup>35</sup> See Alan and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, (London: Westview, 1983), pp. 53-59.

<sup>36</sup> See J. Marcum, "Angola: Perilous Transition to Independence" in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara (eds) *Southern Africa the Continuing Crisis* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 177-180.

strikes, freedom of speech or of association. Absolute power remained vested in a governor-general appointed in Lisbon, backed by large contingents of police and troops and a ruthless secret police (PIDE). The Portuguese maintained that the education of natives would facilitate subversion and illiteracy was preferred as a way of maintaining the status quo. Statistics show that in Mozambique in 1964-65 only four Africans had access to university and 636 out of the total of 8 000 secondary students were Africans. In Angola, the government was spending 0.1 cent per capita in 1956 on the education of natives.<sup>37</sup>

Like the South African and Rhodesian armies, the Portuguese army did not wish to recruit among the natives. Their armies had one thing in common: they were there to deal with an internal enemy whose military challenge was negligible. However, their segregation and repressive policies and their intransigence in recognising majority rule in the territories they controlled, inspired nationalist revolts. With his constitutional reforms to create an 'estado novo' (new state), Antonio Salazar who became the Portuguese premier in 1932 sought to incorporate Angola and Mozambique in the Portuguese nations by a process of assimilation. This included granting certain political and civil rights to native Africans who became honorary Portuguese citizens. Writing and speaking Portuguese and having four years of basic education were among the pre-requisites to become *assimilado*. The *assimilados* enjoyed other privileges, they had better pay than the non-assimilados or the *indigenas* as the Portuguese government used to call them. Yet, by 1950's the number of assimilados both in Mozambique and Angola remained small: it amounted to less than half percent of the total African population.<sup>38</sup> This

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp. 180-181.

<sup>38</sup> See M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa, op. cit.*, pp.181-188; see also Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese, op. cit.*, pp. 158-164.

exploitation caused revolt and massive immigration of Africans into neighbouring countries which severely affected the Portuguese economy. However, the authorities managed to consolidate their power, reinforcing repression and discrimination at all levels.

The situation was by no means different in neighbouring Rhodesia. After the nineteenth century wars of conquest against Mashonas and Matabelis, repression and exploitation of native Africans was entrenched to allow settlers to consolidate their privileged position. In 1930's a separate development policy for Africans and for whites was officially adopted. Although this policy was abandoned on paper in the 1940's, its principles continued to marshal Rhodesian political thinking and practice. The government established separate areas for development of the two racial groups and adopted a Land Apportionment Act that excluded Africans from the right of permanent ownership of land in areas reserved only for Europeans. Under this Act the white minority was entitled to occupy more than 50 per cent of the land which meant a further reduction of the 21 000 acres that the 1923 constitution had reserved for use by the Africans.<sup>39</sup> Pass laws were also adopted and reinforced by successive Rhodesian governments. The colour blind franchise of 1898, which had been modified to give the right to vote to native Africans with ten years of education was substituted by a dual-roll voting system, which placed the settler community in the higher weight A roll and blacks in the lower weight B roll.<sup>40</sup> Nationalist responses by Africans were banned. Attempts to create political parties with nationalist aspirations were repressed by the regime. Until 1977, the armed forces were an exclusive white reserve. It was the fear of

---

<sup>39</sup> See, P. O'Meara, "Rhodesia / Zimbabwe: Guerrilla Warfare or Political Settlement" in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara (eds.) *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis, op. cit.*, p. 22.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23-24.

losing the acquired privileges that led to segregationist policies. These fears also led to the regime's rejection of the federation project with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The federation meant among other things that whites would have to deal with a larger black majority. In fact when Zambia and Malawi became independent in 1963, the regime tried to secure the status quo by cutting links with its metropole, which favoured majority rule in Rhodesia. The combination of discrimination and repressive tactics, the destruction of African political, social and military institutions enabled the settlers to retain power superiority, thus enhancing their security at the expense of the insecurity of the Africans. However, this system rested on very shaky ground and proved difficult to sustain in the long run. South Africa was among the first to realise that unless its domestic order was accepted abroad, it would not be sustainable. This realisation of its liabilities led South Africa to seek from the outset, expansion of its frontiers to protect its core assets; its way of life, and to seek sympathy abroad.

### **South Africa and the Search for Regional Power Status**

While Portugal developed efforts to consolidate its power in the colonies, the British in South Africa were more ambitious. They tried to expand their dominion and influence beyond their borders.

When he became the Prime Minister of the Cape colony in the 1880's, Cecil Rhodes of the British South African Company was not only disappointed with the gold discovery in the Boer Republic of Transvaal, but also with the German occupation of the Angra Pequena Bay (Namibia) in 1883. He soon initiated a series of diplomatic dealings with the King of Ndebeles, Lebengula to be granted exclusive mineral rights in their territories. A few years later in the 1890's, the

British flag was being hoisted in Mataberland and Mashonaland (modern Zimbabwe).<sup>41</sup>

However, Rhodes did not intend to stop with the conquest of Mataberland. His men continued to head north conquering territories across the Zambezi river.<sup>42</sup> Strongly motivated by the search for minerals they established the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland. His idea was to unite the whole of Africa under the British flag linked by a railroad from the Cape to Cairo and a telegraph system.<sup>43</sup> He recognised the importance of allying with the United States and Germany to dominate the world in the interest of peace progress and humanity.<sup>44</sup> He saw his role as providing financial resources to those prepared to carry out the expansionist project. Financial power could be acquired if organisation in the companies would improve through efficient and united white rule.

Rhodes' expansionist ambitions were also due East. His primary target was to seize Delagoa Bay port in Southern Mozambique due to its strategic location. This plan was frustrated in 1875 through international arbitration by the French general Mac-Mahon.<sup>45</sup> However, the Portuguese territories in Africa continued to feel the economic and military pressures of their neighbours which culminated in the British ultimatum to Portugal to effectively occupy its colonies or to face the danger of losing them. Rhodes' main objective was to accomplish united white rule in the subcontinent, and saw as its first stage the establishment of the Union of South Africa. Rhodes was proved right, the consolidation of united white rule in South

---

<sup>41</sup> See Robert Rotberg with Miles of Shore, *Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 288-319.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 320-338.

<sup>43</sup> See J. D. Omer Cooper: *The History of Southern Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 123

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> See Kenneth Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in South Africa op cit.* pp. 26-36, 231-233.

Africa had brought some efficiency in the state and allowed reforms in the armed forces. The commando system of the Boer army was substituted by a more structured type, the Union Defence Force. A 2500 Permanent Professional Force was established. These were to be supported by regiments made of conscripts and volunteers integrated into Citizens Forces relying on the farmers' private guns. The establishment of the Union marked also the separation of the policing functions from the military.<sup>46</sup> The Union Defence Force (UDF) was created against the background of containing the uprising of the majority of native Africans which, at the time, was perceived as the immediate threat faced by whites.<sup>47</sup> Thus, its main activity was to curtail internal subversion.<sup>48</sup> Controlling internal subversion would lead to internal stability and would create conditions for the country to attract more friends overseas, with whom the Union could do business. Attracting friends abroad was important for South Africa, especially after World War II, because it was the foreign press and in international fora such as the UN and the Commonwealth where complaints about South African domestic order were being made.<sup>49</sup> This led successive leaders in South Africa starting with General Jan Smuts to pursue a vigorous foreign policy.

---

<sup>46</sup> See Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: the Apartheid War Machine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>47</sup> See, *The Cavalry Journal* (London: 1909) pp. 188-89.

<sup>48</sup> 5000 Indians were arrested for going on strikes and demonstrating against the Supreme Court's decision to invalidate Indian marriages in 1912. The Defence Force and the police were called in to crush about 140,000 Africans and Indians in Natal in 1913 including 180,000 white miners striking in the Rand Region. Similar incidents were repeated in the following year when the white labour federation presented a list of grievances including wage cuts, poor working conditions and retrenchment. Strikers were besieged and the entire executive was arrested. Martial law was declared in the whole country. For details see: Brigdal Pachai, *The South African Indian Question 1860-1971* (Cape Town: Struik, 1971); J. Simons and R. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (London: IDAF, 1983), pp. 156-61, 286-96.

<sup>49</sup> See Jack E. Spence "South African Foreign Policy: The Outward Movement", in Christian P. Pholton and Richard Dale (eds) *Southern Africa in Perspective* (London: MacMillan, 1972), pp. 46-58



Against the will of many Afrikaners, Smuts helped the British to fight the Germans in World War I. He occupied the German territory of South West Africa in July 1915 and supported the British in East Africa and in Europe. Smuts did see some pay-offs for this support. His security ideas were no different from Cecil Rhodes'. What he had in mind was to establish a hegemony in the entire region, expand its resources, power and influence through the incorporation of more territory into South Africa, especially the High Commission Territories.<sup>50</sup> Military power was to play a significant role in pushing the defence lines further north, west and east away from South African borders. He argued that the Defence Act of the Union, the term South Africa referred to all of Southern Africa south of the Equator. He argued that the Defence line of South Africa had to be pushed as far north as Kenya:

... The Line of Limpopo cannot be held.... Our northern boundary cannot be held If you want to defend this country you will have to proceed a greater distance beyond it. Those who know this continent know that the proper line of defence is in the highlands of Kenya...<sup>51</sup>

After World War I, Smuts managed to secure a seat in the Imperial War Cabinet and in the British War Cabinet. He managed to get the League of Nations' mandate to govern South West Africa, but he failed to convince the League to allow its incorporation into the Union. Smuts also strengthened the UDF. In 1919 the British government donated one hundred aircraft to Smuts' government. British officers helped train South African pilots and other officials of what later became

---

<sup>50</sup>Bechuanaland ( Botswana) Basotholand (Lesotho and Swaziland, were called at the time the High Commission Territories. They were governed by a British High Commissioner stationed in South Africa who, at the same time served as the Representative of the British Government to South Africa. South Africa tried several times to incorporate these territories into the Union but Britain in many occasions rejected these proposals. South Africa tried also to form a confederation with Southern Rhodesia The last attempt was rejected in 1923.

<sup>51</sup> Quoted in Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: Apartheid War Machine, op cit.*, p. 9.

the South African Air-Force. The British also helped to set up the Seaward Defence Force in 1922 which did not develop until late in the 1940's. The Defence of the coastline did not preoccupy Smuts' government as it was left to its ally, Britain which was still interested in securing the sea route to India.

In the late 1940's, Smuts helped the British to fight the Nazis and played a role in the founding of the UN. He then sought to enhance South Africa's status by coaxing the Western powers into a defence alliance. He first made attempts for South Africa to join NATO when it was formed in 1949.<sup>52</sup> This projection was based on the assumption that the West, particularly Britain, had security interests in Africa, namely, the colonial territories and its necessity to secure a transit base for military operations east of the Suez.<sup>53</sup> South African leaders argued that future wars could take place beyond the confines of Europe in Africa, and the Western powers who held territories in Africa could not possibly defend them without the assistance of South Africa.<sup>54</sup> Britain's needs in the Middle East were, however, secured by the admission of Turkey and Greece into the North Atlantic Alliance and the strong American presence in the area.<sup>55</sup>

South Africa perceived itself as a Western country which happened to be, by chance in Africa. It has always regarded the Western powers as its security partners. This explains South Africa's participation in the Berlin airlift of 1948/1949 and in the Korean War in 1950<sup>56</sup> and its attempt to join NATO when it was formed. When

---

<sup>52</sup> See Amy Vondebosch, *South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 131-132.

<sup>53</sup> See Ritchie Owendale, "The South African Policy of the British Labour Government 1947- 1951" *International Affairs*, vol. 59:1, Winter 1982/83, p. 45.

<sup>54</sup> Quoted in James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy -1945- 70* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 82.

<sup>55</sup> See *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-1951* (Notre Dame: Indiana, University Press, 1953), pp.164 -165

<sup>56</sup> See Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force, op cit.* p.12

South Africa was not invited to join, The South African Premier, General Malan was prepared to settle for auxiliary status . However, South Africa's commitment to racial policies impeded Britain and other Western powers from regarding it as an ally in the face of growing awareness of democratic values and human rights that followed in the aftermath of the World War II. None the less, Britain remained a close partner of South Africa both in bilateral arrangements and in the search for a multilateral defence alliance.<sup>57</sup> Britain accepted South African participation in its proposed Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), a defence arrangement that would involve Britain and other African and Third World allies. However, South African membership in the Organisation was prevented by the Afro-Asian lobby, especially India some of whose nationals were subjected to oppression and discrimination in South Africa.<sup>58</sup> As the attempt to participate in MEDO was thwarted, the South African government and Britain sponsored a defence-conference in Nairobi in 1951 to which representatives of Britain, France, Portugal and Italy were invited. The United States and Southern Rhodesia were present as observers.<sup>59</sup> The emergence of different interests in this conference was apparent. South African representative spoke of a possible partnership in the event of communist aggression in Africa, while the British representative spoke of contingent plans to move equipment and people to the Middle East in case circumstances required it.<sup>60</sup> France spoke of the need to include West Africa. Other European powers adopted a more cautious attitude, suggesting that the

---

<sup>57</sup> See details in J. Barber and J. Barrat, *South African Foreign Policy, op. cit.* pp. 55-61

<sup>58</sup> See Balla Pillay, *British Indians in the Transvaal: Trade Politics and Imperial Relations 1885-1906* (London:Longman ,1976)

<sup>59</sup> See C. Coker, "South Africa and the Western Alliance 1949-1988: A History of Illusions" in Stephen Chan (ed), *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern African* (London: MacMillan, 1990), pp. 249-265

<sup>60</sup> See Amy Vandebosch, *South Africa and the World: the Foreign Policy of of Apartheid, op. cit.*, pp.131-132

meeting should simply make recommendations and not decisions.<sup>61</sup> Three years later, South Africa sponsored another conference of this kind in Dakar which was attended by Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal. The conference failed once more to convince the European powers that South Africa faced an immediate danger from the communists and needed a defence alliance. The North Atlantic Alliance was not extended southward beyond the Tropic of Cancer and the Western powers retained their scepticism about South Africa.

Several reasons accounted for this. First, South African racial policies were met with suspicion since the European powers were preparing to decolonise Africa. South African's refusal to arm blacks or to have mixed race armed forces undermined the possibilities of co-operation with other African and Asian states. All this antagonised Britain within the rest of Commonwealth. The European powers also feared the burden of training and equipping, since the Union had passed laws restricting defence expenditure to 8 per cent of the revenue budget; finally the fact that the South African armed forces had not been strongly developed, despite all the rumbling about the communist threats, suggested that the government did not really conceive of any immediate danger. The European powers were convinced that all South Africa wanted was to legitimise its internal order.<sup>62</sup>

With the beginning of independence, particularly when the British decided to grant independence to the High Commission territories, South Africans realised that it would have to abandon its expectations of becoming an auxiliary of Western countries dependent on British or Western support. Their future lay in Africa and their security would be guaranteed by developing ties with African states. Their economic and technical assistance to the new states could prevent them from from

---

<sup>61</sup> C. Coker, *Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa op. cit.*, p.73

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

being hostile to the Republic. They extended their support to states such as Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana and later to Malawi with the objective of mobilising sympathy and gaining more acceptance.<sup>63</sup> But they also tried other defence initiatives such as establishing a regional defence alliance with white regimes in the South Atlantic (SATO) to supplement the role of NATO.<sup>64</sup> For this, South Africa held secret meetings and improved its ties with a number of Latin American countries, but the idea was eventually thwarted, once more, thanks to the African lobby in the UN and in the non-aligned movement.<sup>65</sup> The other initiative included the development of nuclear capability. With this South Africa would deter a conventional warfare waged by a coalition of forces of African states and it would enjoy privileged security relations with the West.<sup>66</sup> It developed closer co-operation with US and German firms which helped to establish a nuclear reactor, by 1965, to develop the skills needed to master research in the nuclear field,<sup>67</sup> and it used its supply capacity of uranium to get access to enrichment technology. By 1975 the Valindaba reactor and enrichment plant was already in operation and the US had agreed in 1974 to help to construct the Koeberg plant.<sup>68</sup> Although the Valindaba and Koeberg were governed by the rules of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)<sup>69</sup>, South Africa constantly refused to open the Valindaba plant

---

<sup>63</sup> See J. E. Spence, *South African Foreign Policy the Outward Movement*, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-51.

<sup>64</sup> See Robert Jaster *South Africa's Narrowing Option* (London:IISS Adelphi Paper, 1985) pp. 19-20.

<sup>65</sup> See R. Rotberg, *The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa*, Studies Program, The George Town Centre for Strategic and International Studies n-22, 1983.

<sup>66</sup> See, J.E. Spence, "International Problems of Nuclear Proliferation and the South African Position", *Occasional Paper Series* (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1980) see also J. E. Spence, "South Africa: The Nuclear Option", *Report in African Affairs* Vol.2 n-4, 1980, p.445.

<sup>67</sup> See details in *South Africa's Plans and Capability in the Nuclear Field*, Doc. A/35/402 (New York : Uited Nations, 1981)

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> See, C. Coker, *South Africa's Security Dilemmas* ( New York: Praeger for CSIS, 1987), p.87.

for international inspection and repeatedly refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>70</sup>

Although South Africa never admitted publically that it possessed nuclear weapons and delivery capacity, the suspicion that this was the case helped to increase its recognition as a regional power. In any event the West accorded it a special status. The US, especially during the Reagan Administration years improved relations with South Africa, which was reflected by the level of collaboration in their nuclear programs and hesitation in applying sanctions against the regime. Periodic high-level meetings took place between the two countries which facilitated the flow of uranium supplies and nuclear technology. Nuclear related exports from the US to South Africa increased dramatically to the point that South Africa became in 1981, their third largest recipient.

### **The Impact of Nationalist Struggles**

In 1961 the African nationalist forces started an armed struggle in Angola. This was followed by an insurrection by FRELIMO in Mozambique in 1964. The armed struggle caught the Portuguese by surprise since they only had about 3,000 troops stationed in Angola and 2,000 in Mozambique.<sup>71</sup> In the following six months the number of Portuguese troops in Angola was increased to 50,000, and in

---

<sup>70</sup> See the UN Report: South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field, 1981.

<sup>71</sup> See M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years*, *op. cit.* p. 230.

Mozambique from 2,000 in 1961 to 50,000 in 1965.<sup>72</sup> The Portuguese response to insurgency in Angola demonstrated that it did not wish to compromise with the nationalists. While the troops were being flown in from Portugal, the government armed the settlers who organised into vigilante groups. They undertook a campaign of indiscriminate killings directed at the peasants and other civilians.<sup>73</sup> Napalm bombing, imprisonment and physical annihilation of suspected supporters became the preferred strategy of the authorities, a strategy which proved functional only in the short run. The bombing of villages and the killing campaigns caused the peasants to flee to neighbouring Congo (Zaire). Here, they joined the nationalists who were re-grouping and improved their military organisation.<sup>74</sup> They started more systematic military operations of guerrilla warfare. This change in tactics and the start of guerrilla warfare in Mozambique forced Portugal to change its strategy. It had to introduce counter-insurgency training tactics to fight an anti-bush war. Portugal also decided to launch a diplomatic campaign against its enemies in the Western capitals and international fora. For this purpose, they portrayed the nationalists as Soviet puppets. By this time Portugal's military expenditure had claimed 15 % of its gold reserves.<sup>75</sup> The new strategy also included a package of reforms in the colonies aimed at overcoming shortcomings that Portugal was being accused of in both the domestic and international arenas. These reforms included the 1961 decrees which formally abolished forced labour, illegal land

---

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese: Myth and Reality*, *op. cit.*, pp.158-59.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 165-66.

<sup>75</sup>

expropriation and other forms of discrimination to which the natives were subjected. However, in reality these decrees had very little effect because as it became clear later they were propaganda instruments rather than genuine reforms. Military strength continued to be the preferred Portuguese method of maintaining security of the Portuguese settlers in the colonies. At the beginning of the armed struggle in Angola and Mozambique troops were almost exclusively brought from Portugal. However, as the war continued the Africanization of the armed forces increased and by 1974 60% of the armed forces stationed in Angola and in Mozambique were Africans.<sup>76</sup> From the Portuguese point of view, this strategy proved to have some advantages. It reduced the number of white casualties, and it increased the number of troops. It reduced the costs of training and transport and it provided a way of rebutting to the accusation that Portugal was fighting a racial war in the colonies. The government augmented the number of police contingents and para-military forces. The Portuguese secret police (PIDE) increased in number and powers. Among its powers was the imprisonment of any suspect without a trial for as long as was deemed necessary. PIDE also tried to control the population through the establishment of a network of spies and informers who were either forcefully or voluntarily recruited. Incentives to join PIDE's network included exemption from taxes and a small sum monthly that could rise according to the importance of the information they provided.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>76</sup> See *Report on the Commission of Inquiry on the Massacres in Mozambique*, New York: The UN General Assembly Report A/9621, 1974.

<sup>77</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese, Myth and Reality*, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164.



Portugal's military strategy consisted of restricting the war to its border areas, far from urban centres, the main communication routes and vital economic centres.<sup>78</sup> This strategy was facilitated by the action of the liberation movements. They operated from the neighbouring countries where they had their re-supply bases and arms depots. Their combat tactics allowed very little contact with the civilians inside their national territories, and limited their recruitment basis and the spread of the struggle. However, by 1966, a shift was noticed in their tactics. They intensified their recruitment and strengthened their alliance with the latter. Instead of concentrating their effort in one region, they spread into larger areas and established bases inside their national territories. This helped to push the Portuguese back from their rear bases. The Portuguese responded by re-locating the population in strategic hamlets known as *aldeamentos*, villages surrounded by barbed wire. The *aldeamentos* were intended to provide an organised local defence and prevent the nationalist guerrillas from establishing random or systematic contacts with the peasants., thus allowing the Portuguese forces to better plan their defence. Small military quarters were deployed in the *aldeamentos* but the bulk of the defence relied upon the militiamen trained by the military and equipped with bows and arrows and spears. These were to protect resettlement areas while the military concentrated on the defence of vital strategic points. They did not carry fire weapons because the Portuguese maintained that arming Africans would be an easy way of fomenting subversion and re-supplying the insurgents.<sup>79</sup> They also believed that fomenting divisions, and concentrating the Africans in the *aldeamentos* would help to arrest their recruitment by the guerrillas:

---

<sup>78</sup> See M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa : The Last Hundred Years*, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-232.

<sup>79</sup> Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese: Myth and Reality*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-162.

It would be beneficial to obtain their [native Africans] collaboration and take advantage of every opportunity to provoke a division between them and the enemy through their participation in the public acts such as speeches at civic ceremonies and through their participation in self-defence, organized militia, etc. Once compromised they will begin to fear reprisals from the enemy and consequently will seek our protection.<sup>80</sup>

Indeed, this proved to be their favourite strategy but the *aldeamentos* were to serve other purposes in economic and social spheres. They would allow the provision of social and economic services that were otherwise difficult to provide to the dispersed population. Employment opportunities, health care and education could be enhanced in the *aldeamentos*. The government would also facilitate its task of collecting taxes often disrupted by the lack of transport and access to the most remote areas,<sup>81</sup> but the *aldeamentos* also helped to vacate fertile land that could be allotted to new settlers arriving from Portugal.<sup>82</sup> These measures failed, however, to stop the progress of the guerrilla struggle.

The struggle in Angola and in Mozambique sent strong signals to South African security planners. It reminded them that white regimes in the region were not immune from challenges and that the buffer white strip that had always protected South Africa from African encirclement could be removed. This compelled Pretoria to seek to increase its ties with African states and to strengthen co-operation with the white regimes in the subcontinent. South Africa realized that the developments in the region determined its security options. It began to favour diplomatic tactics, increased aid and trade in exchange for peaceful relations with

---

<sup>80</sup> *Secção de Estudo da Secção I, Plano de Contra-Subversão: Relatório, Conclusões e Sugestões apresentados ao Symposium sobre Contra-Subversão*, January 1969, p. 13.

<sup>81</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese, Myth and Reality*, *op.cit.*, pp. 163-164.

<sup>82</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*, *op. cit.*, p. 64; M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years*, *op. cit.* p. 231.

its neighbours. These would be complemented by the signature of bilateral non-aggression pacts which would ensure the survival of apartheid in a system of new relations in the subcontinent. South Africa also thought that the diplomatic missions the regime purported to establish with the African states would help to discourage the emergence of liberation movements and the spread of communism throughout the region.<sup>83</sup> In 1968, the South African government established a special fund to aid friendly African governments and renegotiated the 1910 Customs Union agreement with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1969. The new agreement accorded more favourable terms to the latter.

Efforts to increase relations with African states were not all that successful. Malawi remained the only state to maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa no African state signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa.<sup>84</sup> Tanzania, Zambia and to a large extent Botswana remained unwilling to increase their relations with South Africa. Tanzania and Zambia were among those who mustered the Lusaka Manifesto, a document which committed 14 states from East and Central Africa, to the total liberation of Southern Africa and the rejection of compromise with apartheid South Africa.<sup>85</sup> These states offered sanctuary and re-supply bases, and allowed the guerrilla movements to establish training camps in their territories. Tanzania also hosted the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee, essentially used as a vehicle to channel the aid including military, to the

---

<sup>83</sup> According to James Barber, Prime Minister John Vorster, informed the Parliament that he had established diplomatic ties with Malawi because the communist who had infiltrated Tanzania, might extend their influence from East to West. See James Barber, *South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 op. cit.*, p. 251.

<sup>84</sup> See Kenneth Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 231-266

<sup>85</sup> See Emmanuel M. Dube, "Relations Between Liberation Movements and the OAU" in Nathan E. Shamuyarira (ed.) *Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Tanzania: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), pp. 25-64.

liberation movements. Thus, The OAU Liberation Committee was instrumental in shaping a collective consciousness of fighting a common enemy, domination and oppression in the subcontinent. The question of a common enemy raised the need to co-ordinate strategies and sharing training and combat tactics among the liberation movements. The formal and the informal meetings among the liberation movements in the international diplomatic fora, cultural gatherings, universities and political rallies were also an important vehicle to extend mutual solidarity, consolidate co-operation and a common identity which laid the foundations for a common Southern African front against colonial domination and apartheid.

Given these circumstances, the bid to strengthen the alliance with the white regimes became the only escape route left for South Africa to strengthen its security. Economic measures as well as military appeared to be essential to counter the advance of the guerrillas in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. From 1968 regular contacts between the three white governments in Southern Africa became more open and came to dominate regional politics.<sup>86</sup> Portugal signed the Cunene River Basin Scheme agreement with South Africa. The plan aimed at irrigating 328,000 acres of land for agriculture and 865,000 for cattle grazing along the Cunene River. The Cunene river project was also aimed at supplying cheap energy to the area and South Africa was promised the entire output of 1,200 megawatts.<sup>87</sup> With development of the Cunene basin Portugal hoped to be able to host 500,000 new settlers arriving from Portugal. It was hoped that ranching would be their main economic activity and that would rescue a ravaged economy. The

---

<sup>86</sup> See M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years*, *op. cit.* p. 235; see also J. E. Spence, "South African Foreign Policy the Outward Movement", *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>87</sup> See *Diário do Governo*, First Series 250, Lisbon, 28 October 1970; see also Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, *Aspectos do Colonialismo Português* (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1974).

hope was also that it would subsequently inspire development of small industries, which could provide more jobs for Africans. These material incentives would stop Africans from rebelling and from joining the nationalist struggle. Portugal also sought investments for the iron mines in Cassinga and oilfields in the Cabinda enclave.<sup>88</sup> The oil production in Cabinda would help South Africa to meet 40 % of its internal needs, which had been satisfied at a very high cost since the 1963 UN embargo.<sup>89</sup> In Mozambique, a similar project to that of Cunene was developed in the Zambesi Valley. It led to the construction of one of the largest dams in the world which would irrigate most of the valley and provide electrical power not only to Mozambique but also to neighbouring countries south and north of the Zambezi. Western investment was secured for all these projects.

South Africa also increased economic relations with Rhodesia following the latter's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). South Africa agreed to initially take over 20% of Rhodesian exports which was increased to about 85% by 1969. It also lent money to the Rhodesian reserve bank to meet the with foreign exchange deficit and helped to circumvent sanctions especially the oil embargo. Pretoria also tried to establish a free trade area with Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, as it was argued in the National Party leading newspaper Die *Trasnvaaler*:

...It is possible that the Afrikaner may attain his rightful place all the sooner if he takes the lead in the formation of an economic bloc extending north of the Zambesi and Cunene... with eye to the security of the Republic and its economic welfare such a bloc is of the utmost importance...<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese*, *op. cit.*, p.193.

<sup>89</sup> See Jack E. Spence, "South African Foreign Policy, The Outward Movement", *op. cit.*, p.50.

<sup>90</sup> Quoted in Robert Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options" in R. Jaster (ed), *Southern Africa, Regional Problems and Perspectives*, *op. cit.*, p.54.

However fears of domination by South Africa made Portugal and Rhodesia agree to cooperate only in specific security projects and indeed, economic measures were complemented by the military.

Pretoria dispatched 1.000 troops to Mozambique to help fight the guerrillas. Military officers were also deployed both in Mozambique and Angola to help planning, launching and coordinating military operations against the guerrillas and strengthen collaboration of their intelligence services.<sup>91</sup> A joint Portuguese South African command centre was established to direct air strikes against the nationalist guerrillas in Angola in 1968.<sup>92</sup> Special commandos were trained to strike against the guerrillas even beyond their national borders. The Smith regime in Rhodesia, accepted South Africa's offer to deploy its troops in Rhodesia in September 1967. South Africa then warned the Zambian government that providing sanctuary to guerrillas could provoke air strikes against military targets.<sup>93</sup> A sizable contingent of police force specialised in anti-insurgency tactics was also deployed. South African troops in Rhodesia amounted to 2,700 in 1969 and in 1979 there were nearly 4000<sup>94</sup> which included two airborne units with Puma helicopters and equipped armoured cars.<sup>95</sup> The three white minority regimes held regular consultations on military issues, coordinated intelligence and undertook joint military operations.<sup>96</sup> They had a clear perception that their security depended on their increased co-operation among them. The increased co-operation among the white regimes however, stimulated increased co-operation among the liberation

---

<sup>91</sup> See *The Economist*, London, 6 March 1969.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> See C. Coker: "South Africa: A Military Role in Southern Africa 1969-82" in R. Jaster (ed) *Southern Africa Regional Security Problems and Prospects op. cit.*, pp. 142-147

<sup>94</sup> *The Economist*, London, 6 March, 1969.

<sup>95</sup> *The Financial Times*, London, 11 March 1980.

<sup>96</sup> *The Times*, London, 12 March 1968.

movements and this gave rise to the spirit of confrontation and a consolidation of the perception of security as a zero-sum.

### **Consolidation of the Bloc-System**

The fourth important factor to be considered in the making of the Southern African security complex was the new reality brought about by the independence of the former Portuguese colonies. This tilted the regional balance towards the liberation forces and led South Africa to engage in relations of confrontation in its bid to safeguard its domestic order and the regional status quo. The confrontation involved two subregional blocs. The demise of the Portuguese empire left Rhodesia as the only buffer state in the north but this was also being attacked by two nationalist movements, the Zimbabwean National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwean Patriotic Union (ZAPU). By the end of 1970's Rhodesia was forced to negotiate a settlement which culminated with Zimbabwean independence in April 1980. Towards the end of the 1970's, however, South Africa believed that its security could be ensured by consolidating its homeland system, at the domestic level, and by getting the new states to agree to join the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) through which it could extend its economic and technical co-operation to the new states.

The independence of Mozambique and Angola encouraged and facilitated the nationalist struggles against the Rhodesian and the South African regimes. Mozambique allowed ZANU to establish military bases in Mozambique, and made an effort to unite ZANU with ZAPU combatants into ZIPRA to better co-ordinate their struggle. It also committed some of its troops to the struggle for Zimbabwe.

Angola followed Mozambique's footsteps. It provided sanctuary to SWAPO guerrillas and helped to establish military bases to undertake combat against South African forces in Namibia. The independence of Mozambique and Angola changed the security perceptions in the region, as South Africa came to accept the reality of independent African states. It expressed its desire to coexist with these new states provided that they did not interfere in South Africa's internal affairs.<sup>97</sup>

South Africa changed this stance when it realised that the newly independent states were not prepared to recognise the legitimacy of apartheid and its proposed regional order and that they favoured the establishment of a new regional order based on equality of the sovereigns.<sup>98</sup> The emerging differences between South Africa and the new states were responsible for shaping regional security relations which lasted until the 1980's. Competition and confrontation became the essential features of these relations.

John Vorster, who had come to power in 1965, favoured *detente* in dealing with the new African states. Through *detente* he sought to assert South African political leadership in regional affairs using economic incentives, aid, and friendly relations with black African states. This would lead to stability and would prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas in the region. His ultimate goal was to preserve the *status quo*. He offered support and economic aid to Samora Machel's government in Mozambique. Vorster was conscious of the economic advantages Mozambique extracted from South Africa, such as the convention to remit in gold at the official

---

<sup>97</sup> See Martin Meredith, *The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI* (London: Pan Books, 1980) p. 151.

<sup>98</sup> See *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, Declaration by the Governments of Independent States of Southern Africa* Lusaka, April 1980. This declaration was signed by the Heads of State of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland and Zambia.



rate 60 per cent of the earnings of the migrant labour; the maintenance of the railways and the ports in Mozambique; the level of trade between the two countries; the amount of Mozambican labour in South Africa and the Cabora Bassa which would not be viable without the sale of power to South Africa.<sup>99</sup> He quickly tried to renew economic and technical assistance contracts entered to at the time of the Portuguese rule. In relation to Angola he hoped that the spirit of co-operation and friendly relations would prevail, since he had little leverage over Angolan affairs. As a sign of a good will for new regional relations, Vorster, agreed to withdraw South African troops from Rhodesia that had been deployed from 1969 and decided to broker, together with president Kaunda of Zambia, high level secret talks with the black leaders aimed at resolving the Rhodesian crisis.<sup>100</sup> The Rhodesian Premier, Ian Smith, came under pressure from Vorster to free the black leaders to take part in the talks. All these actions met the scepticism of African leaders. It was interpreted as an attempt to convince Africa to capitulate to apartheid. In view of this President Nyerere sponsored the Dar Declaration' which was signed by 16 African states. The Dar Declaration reinforced the OAU anti-apartheid standpoint and rejected any concessions to the apartheid regime. The declaration called also for black Africa to consider a military option, should peaceful means to end apartheid prove unworkable.<sup>101</sup>

The secret talks Vorster sought to broker between the nationalists leaders in Zimbabwe and the Smith regime collapsed in August 1975 and this also marked the beginning of the collapse of his détente policy. Guerrilla warfare intensified in

---

<sup>99</sup> A statement made by the South African Minister of Finance quoted in *Africa Contemporary Records, 1975-1976* (London: Rex Collings, 1976)

<sup>100</sup> See James Barber and John Barrat, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1988*, *op. cit.* pp. 181-186.

<sup>101</sup> See details in R. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options" in R. Jaster. (ed) *Southern Africa Regional Problems and Prospects op. cit.*, p. 58.

Zimbabwe and Namibia and so did sabotage operations in South Africa. This led Pretoria to tighten its security. It dedicated more attention to Namibia extending the application of all the legislation meant to discourage subversion. Thus the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Suppression of Communism Act or its renamed version the State Security Act were all applied in Namibian territory. South Africa also increased its surveillance of the border between Angola and Namibia, deployed police contingents who had experience in counter-insurgency and it resettled the frontier population in areas protected by the SADF much in a fashion of the *aldeamentos*.<sup>102</sup> The period of national service for whites in South Africa and in Namibia was changed from one year to two years. Pretoria created special forces composed of different African tribes to deal with the guerrilla and in preparation to resist pressures for change and confront its enemies. By 1978, its military expenditure had increased by fourfold the levels of 1974.<sup>103</sup> South Africa invaded Angola in an attempt to cripple SWAPO and discourage the MPLA government from supporting the nationalist struggle in Namibia.<sup>104</sup> Internally it intensified its repression with actions such as the 1976 Soweto massacre signaling its lack of will to concede to pressures for change.

---

<sup>102</sup> See A. du Pisani, *Beyond the Barracks: Reflections on the Role of the SADF in the Region*, The SAIIA Occasional Paper, 1989 pp. 6-8.

<sup>103</sup> See R. Davies and D. O'Meara: "The Total Strategy in Southern Africa, An Analysis of South African Regional Policy", *The Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol.11 n-2 April 1985, p.188

<sup>104</sup> South Africa occupied parts of Angola until 1984 when the Lusaka Accord was signed with the MPLA government. This Accord provided for South African withdrawal from Angola in an exchange for the MPLA government to dismantle SWAPO bases in Angola.

Mozambique and Angola responded to these developments by strengthening their ties with the Soviet Union. They signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Moscow which committed the Soviet Union to their defence.<sup>105</sup>

If situations arise that threaten peace or break peace, the high contracting parties will immediately get into contact with each other to co-ordinate their positions in the interest of eliminating the rising threat or restoring peace

The treaty entitled them to receive equipment and benefit from the defence and security advice of the Soviet Union. The Angolan government invited 20,000 Cuban troops to help deal with the South African invasion and by the mid eighties the number of troops had doubled. These states also increased the size of their armies and concentrated in the formation of popular militiamen.

Mozambique asserted that the destruction of hegemony of the two white bastions was a *sine-qua-non* condition in order for its revolution to triumph and for this the reduction of economic dependence on South Africa was necessary.<sup>106</sup> Angola, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia echoed this demand for economic liberation. They also realised that their economic liberation would not be possible while the Rhodesian and South African regimes continued to exist. This led them to form, together with Mozambique, the diplomatic coalition, the Frontline States. This coalition was instrumental in mobilising support for ZANU, ZAPU, SWAPO and the ANC, to increase pressure on the South African and

---

<sup>105</sup> Article 4 of the Treaty reads: "In the interest of reinforcing the defence potentials of the high contracting parties, They will continue developing - cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of appropriate agreement"

<sup>106</sup> At independence, Mozambique's dependence on South Africa was 20% of its imports, 45% of its GNP and 60% of its foreign currency earnings.

Rhodesian regimes. They also set up a Joint Defence and Security Committee to coordinate their strategies against these two regimes. The Rhodesian regime collapsed in 1979 and the independence of Zimbabwe followed in April 1980.

However, South Africa's internal condition continued to deteriorate. The Soweto massacre, and the war in Angola caused more unrest and brought greater dissatisfaction at the domestic level. The independence of Zimbabwe had produced one more enemy for the regime. At the international level, Pretoria faced an increasing pressure for change as sanctions, economic and cultural boycotts were imposed. In an attempt to appease public opinion and "win the hearts and minds" of its neighbours it proposed as a basis for regional order an anti-Marxist Constellation of Southern African States, (CONSAS) south of the Cunene-Zambezi line. This was its last attempt to legitimise apartheid. South Africa realised that it could not count on its Western allies. Its attempts to involve itself in a regional defence arrangement with the West had failed. Its involvement in Angola against the Marxist government did not attract intervention by the US or any other Western ally. South Africa was determined, however, to fight for its survival, even if this meant fighting on its own against all its enemies.<sup>107</sup> The constellation was intended to be a self-sufficient regional security and economic bloc.<sup>108</sup> Its core objective was to bring together South Africa - which would play a dominant role in the organization - and its Homeland System of Transkei, Venda and Baputhatswana together with the BLS states, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Its strong anti-Marxist overtone was aimed at justifying the alliance of African states with apartheid South Africa. Pretoria realised that apartheid was an obstacle but an anti-communist stance was an

---

<sup>107</sup> See R. Price, "Pretoria's Southern Africa Strategy" in S. Chan (ed.) *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978-1988*, *op. cit.*, pp.145-188.

<sup>108</sup> See Deon Geldenhuys and D. Venter, "The Constellation of Southern African States," *International Affairs Bulletin*, December 1979, p. 149.

incentive to form alliances with neighbouring states.<sup>109</sup> The anti- Marxist label was also intended to mobilise support from the West, since South Africa never ceased to see itself as the champion of Western interests in the region which included the promotion of economic projects between South Africa and other states in the region which would stop the advance of communism.<sup>110</sup> It became clear for many that this was yet another attempt to protect the welfare of whites and their security by shielding South Africa with buffer states which should refuse to offer sanctuary, training and transit facilities to the anti-apartheid combatants and the opening of offices in their territories.<sup>111</sup>

The idea collapsed in July 1979, when the 1976 established diplomatic alliance, known as the Frontline States (FLS), issued the Arusha Declaration announcing their intention to create a rival organisation, the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The idea took shape in April 1980, when the Lusaka Declaration was signed after the FLS became sure that Zimbabwe will come to independence under Robert Mugabe. The SADCC was formed to promote economic emancipation of its members, and reduce external dependence particularly dependence on South Africa.<sup>112</sup> SADCC objectives are in line with the understanding that the security of its members depended on their emancipation. The SADCC project attracted Malawi, the only country which maintained diplomatic relations with the regime and the BLS states. It also mobilised considerable Western financial resources. The scenario of an independent

---

<sup>109</sup> R. Davies and D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", *op. cit.*, pp. 189 -190

<sup>110</sup> See Deon J. Geldenhuys and Denis Venter, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A Constellation of States?", *International Affairs Bulletin*, SAIIA December, 1979, p. 52.

<sup>111</sup> Deon Geldenhuys, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relations for the Republic of South Africa" *Strategic Review*, Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria (ISSUP), January 1981, p. 20.

<sup>112</sup> See the *SADCC Lusaka Declaration op cit.*, p. 1

Southern Africa with stable economies and infrastructure opposed to apartheid was contrary to Pretoria's interests.<sup>113</sup> It perceived this as a threat to its security.

Pretoria moved quickly to adopt the military option, this time mobilising human and material resources, transforming its institutional capacity into what came to be known as the *Total Strategy* to protect its national aims threatened by communists,<sup>114</sup> Institutional reforms resulted in a strong centralisation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister, diminishing the powers of the legislative bodies and the Cabinet. The formulation and implementation of all domestic and external security policy was charged to a special body -the National Security Management system composed of the Chief of the SADF cabinet members and senior officials of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Foreign Affairs, Defence, Law and Order and the Commissioner of Police, answerable directly to the Prime Minister.<sup>115</sup> The SADF strategies and role were also revised. New structures were put in place and it was equipped with new instruments. It became a highly mobile force trained to undertake quick anti-guerrilla strikes and conventional warfare. It was equipped with Special Reconnaissance Commando units, mercenary units to sabotage the economic infrastructure in neighbouring countries and to carry out selected assassination of nationalists and anti-apartheid leaders.<sup>116</sup> South Africa also found new tactics to deal with its neighbouring states. It adopted offensive counter-revolutionary warfare, tactical escalation, economic bludgeoning and the utilization of proxy forces. New allies included UNITA in Angola, Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) in

---

<sup>113</sup> See Bernard Weimer, "Europe, the United States and the Frontline States of Southern Africa: The Case for Closer Co-operation", *Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 2, 1984, pp. 67-87

<sup>114</sup> *The Defence White Paper*, Department of Defence, The Government of South Africa, 1977

<sup>115</sup> R. Davies and D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa" *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192

<sup>116</sup> Quoted in R. Davis and D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", *op. cit.*, p.195

Lesotho the Mashula in Zambia and Super ZAPU in Zimbabwe. All these groups were portrayed as indigenous 'resistance movements' and in fact, the bulk of their recruits were nationals of the countries concerned. However, these nationals were trained, equipped, directed and re-supplied by the South Africa Defence Force and acted like its extension. They had no political objective but to make the country ungovernable.<sup>117</sup> This new tactic came to be known as *destabilisation*.<sup>118</sup> and its strategic objective was now to coerce the Front Line States to comply to South Africa's regional security objectives.

As South Africa interacted more with the rest of the region, patterns of dependence, vulnerability, alliance and identity became more distinctive showing the feature and contours of the Southern Africa security complex. These features make it difficult to isolate the security perceptions and concerns of one state from all the others.

---

<sup>117</sup> See S. Jenkins, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa", *The Economist*, London, 16 July 1983

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Making of the Southern Africa Security Complex: Extra-Regional Factors**

The making of the Southern Africa Security System was also influenced by extra-regional factors. Chief among these were: NATO's ambiguous relationship with Portugal and South Africa which allowed the latter to build a large arsenal of arms; the bilateral relationships of some Western governments with South Africa; and the relationship between the Socialist bloc with Southern African nationalist movements.

NATO members and the Warsaw Pact states helped to create a framework for regional confrontation between two opposing blocs. They provided the different regional actors with the means which helped them to conceive security relations in inherently military terms.

NATO's interest in the Azores base led it to accept Portuguese membership despite the fact that Portugal was not a democratic state. NATO was also forced to turn a blind eye to the transfer of its arms to Portuguese colonial territories and it was unable to stop Portugal's use of NATO arms to suppress the struggles for self-determination and freedom in Southern Africa. This created conditions for prolonged confrontation in the region, a scene reinforced by Britain's special relations with South Africa.

Britain's historic links with South Africa led the latter to believe that it could enjoy a special relationship with NATO. South Africa hoped that it would be asked to join NATO, or be granted the status of an auxiliary. NATO refused, however, to extend its membership beyond the Tropic of Cancer and accord South



Africa this role, but this did not stop the Republic from strengthening its defence and security cooperation with Britain and other members of NATO. Britain's strategic and economic interests and its long-established relationship with the Republic led it to sign the Simonstown agreement with South Africa in 1955, and led NATO to establish the Silvermine Communications base, in the Republic in 1974. The Simonstown agreement and the Silvermine Communications base as well as other secret arms sales allowed the Republic to develop a relatively large and better equipped defence force in the region. South African and Portuguese military powers helped to sustain the white regimes' repressive policies in the subcontinent and increased their perception of security albeit in zero-sum terms.

NATO's close links with Portugal and British links with South Africa led the African States and the liberation movements to perceive NATO as an organisation not committed, if not actually opposed to the idea of self-determination for Africans. This perception provided an excellent opportunity for the Soviet Union and its allies to penetrate and explore the dividing line between regional actors forcing a cold war framework on regional security conceptions.

The Warsaw Pact states established and strengthened their relationships with the newly independent states and the liberation movements and increased their military capabilities. The USSR signed comprehensive Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Mozambique and Angola. These included co-operation in the area of defence and security which helped to shape security relations rooted in confrontation. At the end of the 1980's the superpowers began co-operating to solve major conflicts. This process in turn encouraged new inter-regional security relations, as confrontation gave way to dialogue and the will to reinforce relations of co-operation.

## NATO's Ambiguous Policies and Southern Africa

The question of expanding the NATO area south of the Tropic of Cancer, from the outset aroused controversy within the Atlantic Alliance. The intention to include Africa in the Alliance was strong in members such as Britain and France who had possessions in Africa. They only stopped short from pressing the other members on this issue, when they realised that the United States would be unable to persuade Congress.<sup>1</sup> The argument that NATO's southern flank could not be protected unless North Africa was included, was expressed by France many times. However, France failed to convince its allies to take any concrete action, even when its authority was being challenged in Algeria in 1954<sup>2</sup>. The lack of sensitivity shown by its partners with regard to this issue was one reason that led to France's withdrawal from NATO's military framework in 1966<sup>3</sup>. The Portuguese again raised the issue of expanding NATO's area, again in the 1960's, but NATO once more failed to commit itself to concrete action. Indeed, if Africa was a priority for some members, it never was for the Organisation. NATO was about the North Atlantic especially Europe which maintained important trade links with the US.<sup>4</sup> There was yet another motive for the Organisation to concentrate on European defence. The Alliance treaty committed its members to the principles of freedom liberty and democracy, and saw communism as the only immediate threat<sup>5</sup>. These principles were also contrary to the spirit of colonial domination, which was the reality in Africa.

---

<sup>1</sup> See C. Coker, *Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa, op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> 1954 was the year that the struggle for independence started in Algeria.

<sup>3</sup> See C. Coker, *NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa, op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Denis Brogan, "The Illusion of American Omnipotence" *Harper's Magazine* 205, December, 1952.

<sup>5</sup> See the preamble and Articles 2, 3 and 4 of *the North Atlantic Treaty*, April 1949.

Moreover, when NATO was established, four European powers (Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal) controlled the entire continent, which at the time, presented itself with no vital strategic interests for NATO. In fact, NATO, as an actor found little it could do that the colonial powers were unable to do on their own, since there were no serious threats to Western security that could arise from an attack on or from Africa. The principle of self-determination advocated first, by the League and then by the United Nations had reached Asia and the Middle East . There were strong reasons to believe that this would soon reach Africa. The logic seen from some NATO member's perspective was to prepare for decolonisation.

These facts, however, did not stop Portugal from insisting that NATO's defence perimeter should be extended to include Africa. The Alliance was never fully convinced of this need, but its interest in maintaining Portugal in the Alliance led it into an ambiguous relationship with Portugal. The appearance of communist movements in Southern Europe made the US realise that it should attract as many Southern European states as possible into NATO, if the defence of the southern flank was to be ensured. Portugal was the only founding member of the Alliance which was undemocratic, and its own admission was controversial. The government of Antonio Salazar was as totalitarian as those that NATO was prepared to fight against. This discomforted the other founding members, such as Canada, Denmark and Norway. Canada was, however, the only member to oppose Portugal's membership on the grounds that "an opposition to communism was not by itself sufficient. Common belief in the principles of democracy, freedom and liberty were important<sup>6</sup>. Portugal did not subscribe to the principles of democracy, liberty and

---

<sup>6</sup> See Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope, The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty* (Toronto: MacLelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 199.

individual freedom, enshrined in the 1949 Atlantic Treaty<sup>7</sup>. Its reluctance to recognise the right of African peoples to self-determination was embarrassing and made the Alliance more enemies than friends.

Matters of military consideration however, proved to be more important, than NATO's political ideals. The Lajes naval base in the Azores was the main interest for the US in keeping Portugal in the Alliance. From this base NATO was able to track submarines within a radius of 1000 miles, a distance out of which the enemy's position could be detected by other US bases on its East coast. Two airbases were also located in the Azores archipelago in Terceira and Santa Maria. These bases were capable of handling 40 flights a day and were important for the airlift and supply the American forces serving in the Mediterranean sea and the Middle East.<sup>8</sup>

In the 1950's when other members were preparing to withdraw from Africa, NATO realised that Portugal did not favour self-determination of the continent and that this could jeopardise NATO's credibility. From 1951 until 1955 when it joined the United Nations, Portugal was busy with constitutional reforms which transformed its colonies into overseas provinces in an attempt to circumvent decolonisation<sup>9</sup> and convince its allies to extend NATO's defence perimeter to include Africa. It asserted that the Azores and Cape Verde archipelago were important for the defence of NATO's southern flank because it was vulnerable to Soviet penetration should the latter occupy the Island of Sal in the Azores. It claimed that NATO defence lines should be extended to the whole coastline from

---

<sup>7</sup> For details see Oliver Holmes, Portugal Atlantic Pact, *American Perspective*, Winter ,1950

<sup>8</sup> See John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution 1950-1962, Volume I* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969), p.183.

<sup>9</sup> See Gerald Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese, op.cit.*, pp. 141-143.

the Azores down to Angola.<sup>10</sup> Portugal argued that “there cannot be an effective defence of the North Atlantic region if the South is not secure”.<sup>11</sup> Behind all this rhetoric lay the fact that there were already contacts between the Soviet Union and nationalist forces in Algeria, Guinea (Conakry) and Mali and significant Soviet presence in Egypt.

In an attempt to win sympathy from its friends and show its commitment to NATO objectives, in 1956 Portugal placed at NATO’s disposal two airfields, Espinho and Montijo in continental Europe and assigned more troops to the service of the Organisation. However, the outbreak of war in Angola in 1961, forced Portugal to scale down its commitments to NATO. With the weakest economy in the Alliance, Portugal was unable to sustain its defence costs in Europe and in all its colonies. It had assumed that tying NATO to Africa would help it to secure its long term commitment to govern the colonies which were the main source of revenues for the Portuguese state. However, NATO would not commit itself to fight colonial wars.

In the same year, Portugal called for the deployment of NATO troops in its colonies and pleaded for the use of NATO arms in the colonial struggle. NATO agreed to transfer some divisions that were initially assigned to it to the struggle in Southern Africa but it refused to agree on any arms transfer. However, Portugal transferred NATO’s arms despite the strict rules that these should only be used in Europe. Not surprisingly the failure to control the use of its arms in the liberation wars upset many African states.

---

<sup>10</sup>See, Franco Nogueira’s Speech (Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs) at NATO’s Oslo meeting, May 1961, Government Archives .

<sup>11</sup> See, Geoffrey Ripon: “South Africa and Naval Strategy : The Importance of South Africa” *The Round Table*, 239, 1970, p. 308.

The pressures exerted by the nationalist struggle in Southern Africa, however, forced Portugal to all but abandon its defence commitments in Europe and dedicate its attention and resources to the region.<sup>12</sup> The Portuguese authorities never pretended otherwise even when NATO's first command in Portugal was established in 1967. They insisted that their priorities were in Southern Africa.<sup>13</sup>

Portugal increased its military strength in Angola and Mozambique. The numbers of troops deployed in these territories rose quickly. From a total of 5000 in 1965, it reached 140,000 by the mid 1970's when the government of Marcelo Caetano was overthrown. Portuguese military expenditure rose to about 40% of the total budget by 1968<sup>14</sup>. From the lessons of the French intervention in Algeria, it was clear that this situation was unsustainable in the long run, and this may have discouraged those in NATO who sympathised with Portugal's claims of a lack of solidarity. Portugal also rushed the construction of airfields in its colonies, it modernised its air-force and deployed its paratroops in the colonies. By 1968, only a few units of the Portuguese armed forces remained deployed in Europe. The majority were trying to stop the nationalist struggles in Southern Africa. Those units that remained in Europe often found themselves in combat missions in Africa or transporting reinforcements to Southern Africa.<sup>15</sup>

Justifying the apparent reduction of its commitment to the defence of Europe, Portugal asserted that its efforts were temporarily shifted to the frontline for the benefit of the Alliance, and whenever it had an opportunity the government chose to demonstrate that it remained close to the Alliance, as was the case when relations between Britain and Rhodesia were severed.

---

<sup>12</sup> See M. Newitt, *Portugalin Africa: The Last Hudred Years*, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-237.

<sup>13</sup> See Rupert Emerson, *Africa and US Policy* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967), p.157

<sup>14</sup> See William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), pp. 71-72

<sup>15</sup> See C. Coker, *NATO the Warsaw Pact and Southern Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

When Britain applied sanctions against the Smith regime in 1965 following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Portugal sided with Britain and condemned Smith. It also closed down the Lonhro owned pipeline supplying Rhodesia with oil. In 1969, Portugal offered NATO the use of its naval bases and air fields in Cape Verde, St. Tome, Luanda, Lourenco Marques (Maputo), Beira, and Nacala in Mozambique. The Nacala base in northern Mozambique was even built to the specifications of the United States. Portugal then asserted that it was fighting an anti-Soviet war in Southern Africa which needed the support of its NATO allies:

The North Atlantic Alliance should not remain indifferent to the preservation for the West of vital strategic positions. We have never understood how one can separate the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic, or how can one ensure the security of one without taking into account the security of the other.<sup>16</sup>

NATO refused, however, to transfer its arms to Southern Africa, although individual member states argued for transfers under bilateral arrangements. Publically, NATO insisted that the Alliance did not supply arms for colonial wars; and that weapons supplied under bilateral treaties fell outside its responsibilities, a position that the liberation movements and their supporters found it hard to understand. Indeed arms transfers from NATO states would not be difficult to secure under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty, since this provided for its members to supply arms to one another for the purpose of promoting integrated defence in the the North Atlantic area.<sup>17</sup> The US also supplied arms to Portugal under the bilateral treaties signed in 1960 which included weapons production, the

---

<sup>16</sup> Portuguese Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira, cited in Geoffrey Ripon, *South Africa and Naval Strategy: The Importance of South Africa*, *The Round Table*, 239, 1970, p. 308.

<sup>17</sup> See Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty ; see also William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

exchange of patent rights and the exchange of information for defence purposes.<sup>18</sup>

The Azores bases continued to be the reason why Portugal obtained these arms:

The importance of Portugal lies primarily in the importance of US base rights in the Azores and secondary in the membership of Portugal in NATO<sup>19</sup>,

Germany also became a large supplier of arms to Portugal in addition to Britain and France, although the latter supplied smaller quantities and in a less structured way.

NATO states' continuing supply of arms to Portugal worried the African states and the liberation movements especially when these enabled Portugal to make military incursions into the neighbouring states supporting the nationalist struggles.<sup>20</sup> Portugal's intervention into neighbouring African states led to vigorous denunciations of its colonial policies in the UN by both African and non-African states. The attacks became an embarrassment to its NATO allies as the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in December 1970, passed a motion of condemnation of all states particularly NATO members who sustain Portugal in her colonial aggression by their continued assistance to her.<sup>21</sup>

Norway, Netherlands and Denmark were among the NATO members who refused to sell arms to Portugal. At the same time the United States, Germany, Britain and France showed few signs of substantive pressure on Portugal to stop the use of NATO arms in the colonial wars in Africa. Norway, Netherlands and Denmark faced pressures at home to distance themselves from Portugal. Their

---

<sup>18</sup> See J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>19</sup> See Maxwell Taylor, *The US Policy Towards Portugal and Republic of South Africa*, *Memorandum for Secretary of Defence From Joint Chief of Staff*, JCSM, 19 July 1963.

<sup>20</sup> Several times Portuguese troops crossed the border into Tanzania and Zambia persecuting the nationalists fighting in Mozambique and Angola. But it was the intervention in Guinea in 1970 that caused an uproar in the United Nations.

<sup>21</sup> See C. Coker, *NATO the Warsaw Pact*, *op. cit.*, p.57.



national constituencies found it hard to reconcile the fact that Portugal should be allowed to remain in the Alliance, while waging savage wars against African nationalists movements seeking self-determination. As a result these constituencies forced their governments to move from imposing an arms embargo on Portugal to providing non-lethal support to the liberation movemnts.<sup>22</sup>

Portugal felt isolated from its European allies and was forced to look for other alternatives in Southern Africa. It dropped the sanctions against Rhodesia and established cooperation with the regime in defence and security. Cooperation was also increased with South Africa as discussed in the previous chapter.

Portugal's isolation did not mean cutting links with NATO. Armament from NATO states continued to be supplied, although in the lesser quantities until 1974.<sup>23</sup> Indeed the West had already made substantial investment towards the end of the 1960's that made it difficult to cut all links<sup>24</sup>

United States links with Portugal, Britain and France's arms sales to the Caetano regime, led the Southern African liberation movements and states to look at NATO as the main sustaining force of the Portuguese colonial empire. Southern African states and the liberation movements viewed with contempt the reliance of Western Powers solely on diplomacy which they regarded as a smokescreen concealing Western preference for the status quo. They wanted a clear sign that the West had distanced itself from Portugal's lack of commitment to self-determination. Furthermore, they called for Portugal's expulsion from the Alliance and for Britain to use force against the Rhodesian regime. However, NATO's muted response and its reluctance to stand firm on the issue of self-determination

---

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 66-70.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.110- 112.

<sup>24</sup> See William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West*, *op. cit.*, pp.114-124, 128-144

helped to crystalise the view, among Africans, that there was little to be expected from the West. If minority rule was to be brought to an end in the region, this would have to come through armed struggle, that is, guerrilla warfare. NATO's attitude left them with the only option of turning their attention to the Soviet Union and its allies to ask for support.

### **Britain and South Africa**

The other important factor in the making of the Southern Africa Security System was Anglo-South African relations especially post World War II. These relations were partly historic due to the British link with the South African colonies from 1806<sup>25</sup> onwards and partly a consequence of Britain's understanding of South Africa's importance to its economy.

There were a number of reasons accounting for close British defence and security links with South Africa. British investments in South Africa amounted to £1 billion and accounted for 52% of all foreign investment. Britain also accounted for 30% of South African imports and 28% of its exports. South Africa was also the major gold producer in the world which was important for Britain's economic recovery after World War II.<sup>26</sup> Gold also helped to address the dislocations and imbalances in the international monetary system caused by a concentration of 70% of gold reserves in the United States during World War II. In the 1950's South Africa had also become an important uranium producer which supplied British and US nuclear industries. All these factors led Britain to regard South Africa as a

---

<sup>25</sup> This is when the British returned to the Cape to stay. See C. J. Omer Cooper, *The History of Southern Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 101-55.

<sup>26</sup> See Jack E. Spence *Foreign Investment in South Africa, The Political and Military Framework, Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia* (Uppsala, 1975), p.8

potential ally, a country that Britain could count on in war, as South Africa had demonstrated in the past two World Wars. These reasons contributed to a special relationship for South Africa with Britain.

Britain signed the Simonstown agreement with South Africa in 1955. Under this agreement, Britain increased its naval co-operation with South Africa. The Simonstown base was expanded to allow its use not only by the Royal Navy (RN) but also by all ships serving the RN and its allies in any war in which Britain was involved.<sup>27</sup> Through the agreement Britain continued to guarantee its access to and use of the base in a war even if South Africa was not involved. South Africa strengthened its navy (SAN) which effectively became part of NATO's contingency plans since in war time South Atlantic command was extended to include both South Africa and the Mozambique Channel.<sup>28</sup> South Africa also gained access to NATO signals and NATO Naval Doctrine. The agreement facilitated the purchase of British ships, helicopters and provided for the training of South Africa's Fleet Air army according to NATO regulations. As a result of the agreement South Africa enjoyed military superiority over its neighbours and gained confidence that it was in the region to champion Western interests. South Africa now believed that the West was prepared, to some degree, to turn a blind eye to apartheid and establish closer security links with the Republic. Above all, Pretoria felt confident that Britain would come to defend it in case things went wrong with its African enemies or communists. It believed that the agreement reached with Britain would soon be followed by other Western allies and this would confirm South Africa as the representative of NATO interests in the Southern hemisphere.<sup>29</sup> Trilateral meetings

---

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

<sup>28</sup> C. Coker, "South Africa and the Western Alliance 1949-88" in Stephen Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-265.

<sup>29</sup> See J. Barber and J. Barrat, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1948-1988 op. cit.*, pp. 55-59.

took place, at least once a year between the United States, Britain and South Africa but these never led to any formal admission of South Africa into NATO nor did they lead to the formal recognition of the Pretoria government as the NATO representative in Southern Atlantic seas.

Closer contacts with Britain also allowed the Republic to strengthen its Defence Force. This seemed justifiable in the face of new developments the domestic, regional and international levels which increased threats to the apartheid government. These developments included an increasing recognition in the 1950's and 1960's of the right to self-determination of peoples which impacted strongly on the domestic environment.

In the past, white South Africans only lived with a vague fear of a putative internal uprising of native Africans. With the emergence of nationalist groups these fears were real. Many African states became independent and they could wage a conventional war against South Africa or support the South African Liberation movements that would topple white rule in the region. At the UN and Commonwealth meetings Ghana, Liberia, and Tanganyika were in the forefront attacking South African racial policies.<sup>30</sup> The possibility of an African conventional war against South Africa became the new challenge for the regime from the mid 1960's. South Africa responded with a military program to expand its strength. The Defence Minister Fouché justified this expansion as the need to meet new challenges and explained that in the past the SADF was intended to be a complementary force to the West, but that present conditions demanded that it stand on its own feet.<sup>31</sup> However, the idea of delinking from the West in defence and security was never considered. Indeed, the Simonstown agreement was the vehicle

---

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>31</sup> Cited in Eric Walker, *A History of South Africa* (London: Longman Green, 1957), p. 793.

through which South Africa maintained pressure to continue its defence and security links with the Britain to consolidate its internal order and deter regional enemies as Minister Fouche explained:

Our new military program is aimed at: i) preserving internal security; ii) support the West; iii) to counter military threats across the borders.<sup>32</sup>

The defence budget increased from 7 per cent of the total budget in 1959-1960 to 17% of the total budget in 1967. The armed forces increased from 11,500 in 1960 to 42,000 in 1967. With police and commandos the South African government totalled a force of 120,000 men, most of them conscripts<sup>33</sup>. Regular forces were increased and reserve units extended. Military training was extended to the police. New training schools were established. The Cape Coloured units disbanded in the 1940's, were reinstated in 1964, though confined to non-combat roles<sup>34</sup>.

South Africa did not enjoy Britain's support unconditionally and endlessly. The 1961 Sharpeville massacre embarrassed even those who maintained the need for defence links with South Africa. The ascendance of the Labour government to power in Britain in 1964 meant that closer ties in defence were dramatically reduced. The Labour government decided to adhere in full to the 1963 UN arms embargo against South Africa and drastically downsized its arms sales to the regime<sup>35</sup>. But Pretoria had anticipated the embargo and managed to secure 127 manufacturing licences with foreign firms. British submarines, fighter bombers, Centurion tanks and anti-aircraft missiles were illegally sold to the regime. French frigates, and British helicopters found loopholes in the imposed embargo and strengthened the South African Defence Force. Arms manufacturing expenditure

---

<sup>32</sup> Quoted in Robert Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options in Robert Jaster (ed.) *Southern Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects* (Aldershot: Gower 1985), p. 45.

<sup>33</sup> See Kenneth Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986), pp. 19-33.

<sup>34</sup> See James Barber and John Barrat, *South African Foreign Policy op. cit.*, p.100.

<sup>35</sup> See Christopher Coker, *Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 75-80.

rose from R315,000 in 1960 to R33 million in 1964-65.<sup>36</sup> During the embargo South Africa established a structure for defence production with a budget of R100 million in 1964, which was subsequently transformed into the Armament Development Production in 1968 and the Armament Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) in 1977.<sup>37</sup> Its main purpose was to subcontract to major armament manufacturers around the world and lots of local companies. By 1964 South Africa was self-sufficient in small arms production such as automatic rifles; by 1966 the first jet aircraft (Impala) was produced in South Africa and in 1971 self-sufficiency was achieved in surface to air missile (Cactus) and armoured cars (Eland)<sup>38</sup>.

The security interests brought a new dynamism to the economy. It showed remarkable growth during the late 1960's and early 1970's and it managed to attract important foreign investment. With the growing strength of the economy, Pretoria felt more confident and hopeful that the combination of economic growth and military pressure would make the world, including its enemies, accept it. South Africa now threatened that if Britain did not meet its responsibilities under the Simonstown agreement it would find another partner.<sup>39</sup> This threat generated a debate in British political circles, between those who advocated the maintenance of closer security links with the Republic and those that opposed these links.

Those who favoured links with Pretoria sang the old tune that South Africa was strategically located for the pursuance of West's interests. They argued that South Africa could guarantee the protection of the Cape route following the expulsion of the British in Libya and Egypt and in other African states. The links appeared to be justifiable since the Cape route had become an important artery for

---

<sup>36</sup> See Philip Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil and Military Relations in South Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 80

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>39</sup> See C. Coker, *Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa*, *op cit.*, p.77.

the West's trade with Africa, Asia and the Middle East, especially after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. Oil from the Middle East, raw materials and foodstuff from Asia, Africa and Australia all transited the Cape route en route to Western Europe. In addition to Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand were also heavily dependent on trade within the Indian Ocean region. They saw South Africa as playing an important role in protecting Western ships transiting the Southern oceans from a communist blockade on grounds that: i) South Africa was a stable polity despite the criticisms it faced from its opponents; ii) it was a highly industrialised society and its trade with the West was of significant importance; iii) its armed forces were modernised and had reached a degree of self-sufficiency in many areas of production; iv) in the event of nuclear warfare the South African navy and air forces would be invaluable in the containment and detection of sea-borne and second strike nuclear capacity; and v) its geographical location and its full commitment to anti-communism were fundamental for the defence of the Cape Route.<sup>40</sup>

South Africa argued in its turn, that it possessed the indispensable command communications system for the control of operations of merchant shipping in the Southern oceans. While South Africa's military strength and the importance of the Cape Route to western economies was clearly understood by the Western allies, the political objectives that would be achieved by a Soviet attack on Western shipments generated divisions amongst the allies.<sup>41</sup> It was this reason for their reluctance to sign a defence pact with Pretoria. Their reluctance was further enhanced by calls in the UN and other international fora to put pressure on South Africa to dismantle

---

<sup>40</sup> For details see J. E. Spence, *Strategic Significance of Southern Africa* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1970); see also by the same author, "South Africa and the Defence of the West", *Survival*, London : IISS Vol. XIII, n-3, March 1971, pp. 79-85.

<sup>41</sup> See J.E. Spence, *Foreign Investment in South Africa op.cit.*, pp.12-18

apartheid. Thus, the British and the West in general continued to distinguish the defence of the Southern oceans and the defence of South Africa.

The Simonstown agreement was revised in 1967 and enabled South Africa to acquire new naval equipment and secure maintenance contracts. Britain withdrew its Command-in-Chief for the South Atlantic and the frigate which had been at the base since the 1950's, but it agreed to appoint a liaison officer to be responsible for the command of the entire South African Navy in war time.

The provision of arms through Simonstown and the links that the Republic maintained with other Western states increased South Africa's military confidence and gave it assurances that it was in a position to confront its enemies and develop the feeling that however much the West disliked apartheid, South Africa was an important partner, which the West could not let fall into the hands of communists. This perception that it was an extension of the West, helped both its aggressive policy and its zero-sum view of security. Needless to say, South Africa's strong militarisation and its resistance to change helped to increase its antagonism with nationalist forces in the region and their Eastern bloc countries supporters.

On the basis of this perception South Africa renewed its claims for integration into NATO or some form of defence organisation with Western states, or help in establishing the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) with Brazil and Argentina.<sup>42</sup> The frequent visits by Soviet fleets to the Indian Ocean led South Africa to increase co-operation with New Zealand and Australia but this did not lead to any formal defence arrangement. However, the constant presence of Soviet fleets in the Indian Ocean added new dimensions to the West's perception of Soviet intentions in the region. The West began to understand that the USSR could

---

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, p.12.



threaten their interests in the Southern seas through the radicalisation of Southern African nationalist forces if not by imposing a blockade on Western shipments. This perception led to an agreement within NATO to establish a communications base at Silvermine, a short distance from Simonstown in 1974. This base was built by Germany and installed with the NATO codification system but possessed equipment supplied by Britain, Germany and the United States. These included communications equipment necessary to acquire data and to maintain a continuous picture of all ships traversing the Indian Ocean region up to New Zealand and on the Atlantic side up to Brazil. Silvermine was also equipped with offices to accommodate NATO naval officers in war time.<sup>43</sup>

Silvermine added to the the Simonstown agreement's impact on South Africa's security. It helped South Africa maintain surveillance of maritime traffic in the Southern Oceans. Through Silvermine, South Africa acquired information about the type and size of ships and the size of their mobile navies far from its maritime frontiers. By knowing the type and size of ships, South Africa could also learn about the discharging of war materials in the region, hence anticipating its enemies military capabilities. However, more importantly, both Simonstown and Silvermine signaled to South Africa that the West considered it as an ally. This and the licences it acquired to produce armaments locally despite the UN arms embargo helped it to restructure its security forces at the domestic level and to pursue policies of repression. Its links with the West, although ambiguous, and its relative military superiority helped to raise its confidence in choosing to confront its enemies rather than searching for a compromise and accept to reform apartheid.

---

<sup>43</sup> See C. Coker, "South Africa and Western Alliance", *op. cit.*, pp. 260-265

NATO's links with colonial Portugal and Western links with Pretoria, helped to shape the view that the West was engaged, through Portugal and later South Africa, in an aggressive imperialist war against the Africans, a view exploited by the Soviet Union when it established links in the region. This view helped to consolidate the divisions within the region into two opposing blocs: those in favour of the liberation of Africa and those who opposed it.

### **The Socialist Bloc and Southern Africa**

The Soviet Union and its allies' involvement in the region is the other factor to be accounted for in the making of the Southern African Security complex. This involvement started in the early 1960's with the beginning of the nationalist armed struggle in the subcontinent. Soviet interests in the subcontinent, however, are best understood in terms of its security interests.

After the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union proclaimed itself as the leader of the socialist-bloc and established the Third Communist International (Cominter).

By the mid 1950's the USSR had acquired nuclear weapons and a superiority of conventional forces which conferred upon it the status of a super-power.<sup>44</sup> As a superpower, the Soviet Union understood its security, among other things, in terms of its ability to have a global reach; its capacity to export the Soviet socialist model beyond its borders; the consolidation of its position in the global economy and finally, its ability to fight imperialism and convert capitalist states to socialism.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> See D. E. Albright, "Moscow's African Policy of the 1970's in D. E. Albright (ed.) *Africa and International Communism* (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 37-38

<sup>45</sup> See D.E. Albright, *Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's* (Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1983), p.78; see also Sam Nolutshungu, "Soviet - African Relations : Promise and Limitations" in Robert Cassen (ed.), *Soviet Interests in the Third World* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985), pp. 72-86.

All these factors led it to conceptualise its interests in southern Africa in zero-sum terms. The USSR's goals in the region were to be achieved through its support to the liberation movements, since these provided an excellent opportunity to further its goals in the global security equation

Southern Africa could supply the Warsaw Pact states with raw materials already scarce in their internal reserves;<sup>46</sup> and the consolidation of socialism in the region would improve the prospects for long-term economic relations since it would increase the number of socialist states around the globe with which trade could be maintained. With the independence of the Southern African colonies, the Soviet Union could enhance its security and that of the Warsaw Pact states since it would expand its sphere of influence. The mineral riches, found in Southern Africa made it especially attractive to Soviet ambitions because it could ensure the long term survival of its industries including the military.<sup>47</sup> Its ultimate objective in spreading its tentacles to the region was to win allies and eventually convert them into socialist states. Realising this objective would increase its power and undermine that of its enemies, therefore enhancing its security.

It was not until China began to lend support to the regional liberation movements, however, that the Soviet Union showed interest in supporting them. Indeed, when socialist revolutions in Africa emerged in the late 1950's, they had ceased to be a priority for Moscow. In the 1920's the Bolsheviks had shown their interest in colonial independence because they assumed it would accelerate the socialist revolution in the metropolises. They were soon faced with the question as to

---

<sup>46</sup> See V. Bryshnikov, "Raw Materials Resources of Africa", *International Affairs*, Moscow, December 1974, p.28

<sup>47</sup> The Soviet economic relations with newly independent states in Southern Africa were centred in mining. In Mozambique, Soviet interest centred on pegmatite minerals (sources of Tantalum and Niobium) and some radioactive metals and rare earths. In Angola, Oil was the key commodity. Both in Angola and Mozambique, the Soviet Union showed little interest in the search for diamonds.

whether they should sponsor communist and socialist parties in the colonies or the nationalist movements. At its Second Congress, the Third Communist International decided to support the bourgeois nationalists because these were more likely to succeed in the bid for independence.<sup>48</sup> The liberation movements received support rather than the local communist parties where these existed. Marxist parties which took over in various parts of the world in the 1930's received no substantial support from Moscow. This policy was to be changed, however, after 1933, because the USSR has turned its attention towards the establishment of collective security system in Europe; and it concentrated its efforts on combating fascism<sup>49</sup>. In Europe it recommended broad coalitions between communists and any forces that opposed fascism, and in the colonies an anti-imperialist popular force against the European powers.<sup>50</sup> This represented a contradiction in terms, because the European powers that the USSR was trying to fight in the colonies through its support to anti-imperialist forces, were the same as those with which it sought to ally with in Europe to fight Nazi-Germany.<sup>51</sup> This made Soviet Union decide against the liberation struggle and concentrate its efforts in Europe. After World War II, support to the liberation movements continued to be minimal. The Soviet Union concentrated on economic recovery and the consolidation of its position in Eastern Europe.<sup>52</sup> The situation remained unchanged until the 1950's when Khrushchev came to power. Khrushchev held that the ex-colonies and the socialist countries were 'natural allies'. They fought the same enemy, imperialism. If the Soviet Union

---

<sup>48</sup>For details see Demitrio Borsener, *The Bolsheviks and the National Colonial Question 1917-1928* (Westport: C.T. Hyperion Press, 1982).

<sup>49</sup> See S. Neil MacFarlane, "Success and Failure in Soviet Policy Towards Marxist Revolutions 1917-1985" in Mark Katz (ed), *The USSR Centre for Scholars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 6-50.

<sup>50</sup> See Margot Light, Moscow's Retreat from Africa, *The Journal of Communist Studies* Vol. 8 n-2, June 1992, p. 24 .

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

provided support to liberation movements, after independence they would remain Soviet allies. This led Krushchev to renew his efforts towards supporting liberation in Africa<sup>53</sup>. Egypt was the first state to benefit from Soviet aid and arms transfers but the record of this support left deep scars in Soviet policy toward Africa. Nasser proved to be unreliable. He did not make any effort to transform Egypt into a socialist state. On the contrary he persecuted communists and left them languishing in jails despite Soviet pleas for clemency<sup>54</sup>. Egyptian involvement in the Suez canal conflict was the second set-back for the Soviet policy. It was a conflict with great powers that could only be faced with immense Soviet Support. The fact that Moscow would not provide this support, meant that it would inevitably lose prestige in the region.<sup>55</sup> The liberation movements that emerged in the 1950's were to suffer the effects of the Egypt syndrome.

Indeed, when in the late 1950's it had become clear for the African nationalists from the Portuguese colonies exiled in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, that Portugal was not willing to concede independence to its colonies, they approached Soviet Embassies in North Africa to request support in order to start an armed struggle. After consultations with Moscow, the Embassies informed them that the Soviet Union was unable to lend any material support. The little experience it had with African states had shown how the lack of a strong proletariat made it difficult to envisage a socialist revolution in Africa, since the potential pool for recruitment for a revolutionary army would be the peasantry.<sup>56</sup> The Soviet refusal of support led the African nationalists to turn their attention to China which

---

<sup>52</sup> See Margot Light, *Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Brighton : Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp. 44-64.

<sup>53</sup> See Margot Light, "Moscow's Retreat from Africa", *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>54</sup> See Brian Porter, *The USSR in the Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945- 1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.16-17.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>56</sup> Interview with the late Mário de Andrade, First president of MPLA, in September 1988.

immediately provided financial support and offered to train nationalists in guerilla warfare techniques.<sup>57</sup>

Within a few years, armed struggles were launched in Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea. Chinese military instructors were sent to several training camps in Africa. In Southern Africa, they were stationed in Tanzania. In fact, Tanzania became the place where most of the Southern African liberation movements gathered for their military training and political co-ordination. The Chinese guerrilla tactics were acceptable for the African guerrillas because they were largely based on the mobilisation of peasants as had been the case in the Chinese revolution. Their pragmatism in fighting wars with light weaponry and small groups of men made it even more popular<sup>58</sup>. Maoism also offered a different interpretation of Marxism and a different path of development. Maoists argued that it was possible to go from feudalism to socialism without the intervening phase of capitalism. This made Chinese ideas more attractive to most Southern African liberation movements since their societies were not industrialised and were largely composed of peasants. Chinese tactics seemed to be more appropriate to the liberation movements due to their ability to adjust to local conditions<sup>59</sup>. Indeed, the question of introducing modifications to Marxism-Leninism to enable it to adjust to local conditions became the fundamental point of difference and source of conflict between Peking and Moscow during the 1960's.<sup>60</sup>

Maoist China criticised the USSR for its new standpoint of peaceful co-existence with the West. It accused the USSR of practicing revisionism and

---

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Marcelino dos Santos, Frelimo's vice- President 1969-1977, March 1990.

<sup>58</sup> Eduardo Mondlane, quoted in *Mozambique Revolution*, Dar-es-Salam, 1 December 1963, p. 190.

<sup>59</sup> See K. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa* (New York: Grosman, 1971), p.51, 55.

<sup>60</sup> Mark Simpson, *The Soviet Union and Afro-Marxist Regime: The Path to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation*, Ph.D Thesis, LSE, 1989, pp. 154 -155

capitulating to the enemy, since it had abandoned the original Marxist-Leninist doctrine of inevitability of war against capitalism. Chinese involvement in Southern Africa made the USSR realise that China, instead of the Soviet Union, could be the patron of Africa liberation which in the long run could undermine Soviet leadership of the Socialist bloc and jeopardise its position as a global power. This forced the USSR and its allies to intervene in support of the liberation struggle. Its main policy objective was to undermine Chinese efforts, to introduce Soviet thinking in the liberation movements and win them over from Chinese influence. In the mid 1960s, the USSR expressed solidarity with the nationalist struggle and provided the liberation movements with material support including weapons.<sup>61</sup>

Except for a few cases such as Mozambique where the Sino-Soviet rivalry was not allowed to penetrate the movement<sup>62</sup>, from the mid 1960's Soviet intervention meant creating a parallel or rival liberation movement. In the eyes of the USSR, Chinese efforts needed to be countered to prevent it from becoming a serious contestant of the Soviet-bloc in its search for global power status and its position as a patron of African liberation. It is in this context that the Soviet Union decided to provide material support and strengthen links with the MPLA in Angola which already had ties with Moscow through the Portuguese Communist Party, rather than the FNLA and UNITA which maintained links with China. The USSR provided substantial support to Frelimo in Mozambique while it sought to undermine its Maoist inclination.<sup>63</sup> In Zimbabwe, ZAPU became its main client rather than ZANU which had links with China; and in South Africa, the USSR

---

<sup>61</sup> See for example Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 98-107.

<sup>62</sup> Frelimo leadership sought to maintain equidistance in its dealings with China and the USSR. See for example Mark Simpson, *op. cit.*, p.153-159.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p.167; see also S. Kulik, "Mozambique: On the Road to Progress, *New Times*, n-15, Moscow April 1977, p. 26.

supported the ANC and not the PAC which also maintained links with China. The material support they provided was enough to convince Southern African nationalists of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact allies commitment to African self-determination.

Support was not only material. The USSR also provided military instructors and strategists to help with guerrilla tactics. Since Soviet strategists had little experience with guerrilla tactics, Cubans and Algerians were brought in to help the nationalists in Southern Africa<sup>64</sup>. With Frelimo and MPLA Moscow developed a strong relationship to the extent that it provided them with political scientists to help them shape their ideology and draw them closer to Soviet ideology in preparation for the creation of socialist state in the post independence period. It trained their cadres in military strategy, economics and in political science.

Following the increase in incursions by Portuguese and Rhodesian forces into Zambia and Tanzania in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the USSR and its allies increased their material support in quality and quantity. From rifles, hand-grenades and mines, the liberation movements were now being equipped with heavy mortars, machineguns, anti-aircraft guns. By 1970's the majority of weapons used by the guerrillas in Mozambique and Angola were Soviet<sup>65</sup>.

The confrontation between the liberation movements and Portuguese forces escalated during the 1970's, and by 1974 support from the Soviet bloc had contributed in undermining Portuguese military strength which demoralised Portuguese troops and led to the coup in Portugal itself. The coup provided a framework for negotiations which culminated in independence for both Mozambique and Angola in 1975.

---

<sup>64</sup> See K. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa op. cit.*, pp.53-54

<sup>65</sup> See, M. Simpson *The Soviet Union and Afro- Marxist Regimes, op cit.*, pp. 137-144, 200-206



After the independence of Mozambique and Angola, the USSR and its European allies sought to consolidate their relations with Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola. While China did not detach itself from Frelimo its influence on the movement had decreased and its relationship with Angola was undermined by its controversial support to UNITA and the FNLA during the 1975 struggle for power between the three nationalist movements. Since the FNLA and UNITA maintained close links with Pretoria the support they received from China helped to jeopardise China's relations with the rest of the subcontinent.<sup>66</sup>

The USSR had accomplished its objective with respect to China. It could now turn its full attention to the support of the MPLA and Frelimo which were identified as Marxist organisations.<sup>67</sup> Brezhnev realised that not supporting them would create a vacuum to be filled by one of its enemies, China or the United States. This led him to intensify Soviet support for these countries to become socialist states. By this time, support included also their bid to power. Thus, Soviet support was crucial for the MPLA government to come to power and defeat its main contenders, UNITA and FNLA.

In 1977, Frelimo transformed itself from a coalition of nationalists into a Marxist-Leninist party, while the MPLA proclaimed itself a workers' party. From then on the two parties concentrated on building socialism in their respective countries. The relations of these two states with the USSR and its Eastern European allies continued to grow significantly. The level of trade between these two states and socialist bloc countries increased substantially, and as Angola and Mozambique faced a shortage of hard currency, this was conducted through barter schemes.

---

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. 193-196.

<sup>67</sup> This term was preferred by Brezhnev to non-capitalist development; see Margot Light, "Moscow's Retreat from Africa," *op. cit.*, p. 26

Their collaboration in the area of defence and security also increased. The USSR supplied these states with weapons, it helped them to organise their defence forces and trained their officials. It advised them on the size of the army and helped to set up defence schools in their territories. It supplied Angola and Mozambique with aircrafts carriers, bombers, helicopters, radarscopes and anti-aircraft equipment. It trained their pilots and their engineers. Military supplies to Angola and Mozambique in the 1970's totalled \$ 1,3 billion.<sup>68</sup> The Soviet navy surveilled their coastlines and it helped to structure their navies. Moscow signed Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation (TFC) with the two countries signalling a long term commitment to their cause. As mentioned in the previous chapter, these treaties provided for consultations and co-operation in the area of defence and security and committed the USSR to co-ordinate strategies in the event of external aggression.

The involvement of the Socialist bloc increased in the late 1970s. Other Eastern European allies of the USSR were also brought in to help these new states in education, health and to run several branches of their economies. The record shows that the members of the Warsaw Pact performed different roles and functions in Moscow's security strategy towards Africa.<sup>69</sup> Besides seeking to strengthen economic ties, The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was involved in military advice and training, 'in-situ' and in the GDR. The GDR was also charged with specific military missions, such as organising an armed opposition in Zaire in 1978 and 1982, and running the intelligence services of its African allies. There is little evidence of Bulgaria's involvement in intelligence and defence, apart from training military officers and supplying arms. Other states such as, Hungary,

---

<sup>68</sup> See David Albright, *Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited* (Washington D.C.:Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1987), pp. 15-17.

<sup>69</sup> See Christopher Cocker, "Pact Pox or Proxy : Eastern Europe's Security Relationship with Southern Africa", *Soviet Studies* Vol. XI. 4 October 1988, University of Stellenboch, pp. 573-584

Czechoslovakia and Romania confined themselves to economic activities which did not rule out arms sale, since the expansion of trade with Southern Africa became one of the top priorities of the socialist bloc states in the 1970's. The USSR was also involved in local conflicts that tended to jeopardise its security in the overall balance. The West became suspicious that the Soviet Union had used détente to penetrate the areas which traditionally fell within the Western sphere of influence. This precipitated Western support to local parties that opposed communism and forced the Soviet Union to become further involved beyond its economic capacity in situations where its allies could not force a military solutions. As Margot Light observes, the situation was such that Moscow could not pull-out without endangering the position of its allies.<sup>70</sup>

Increased trade with Africa also proved to be problematic. Africa did not have the hard currency to pay for the goods imported from the WTO states, while foreign exchange was important for the WTO imports from Western economies. Foreign exchange was key for the modernisation and competitiveness of the Soviet economy which for long time had remained technologically backward and stagnant. But hard currency was also necessary for the African states to import accessories from the West to service most of their equipment and the industrial installations inherited from the colonial days. This meant that the support to African socialist oriented states became expensive and unaffordable for the Soviet Union. Trade with Southern African socialist oriented states demanded large subsidies which the Soviet Union could not sustain. This fact prompted revision of Soviet policy toward Africa.

---

<sup>70</sup> See Margot Light, "Moscow's Retreat from Africa", *op. cit.*, p.27.

Indeed by the end of 1970's it was clear that Soviet expectations were far from being achieved. There were many examples of the socialist-oriented states having their economic conditions deteriorated from the moment they adopted socialist reforms. In the 1980's, Soviet theorists began to recognise particular problems in the socialist oriented states such as the the increased level of poverty, the undifferentiated class structure, and the high rates of illiteracy which hampered the functioning of the vanguard parties. They also realised that although the leadership of these parties could easily articulate Marxist-Leninist ideology, the masses could hardly follow what they were talking about. This had a negative effect. Parties existed only at the 'superstructure' level thus creating a gulf between the masses and the ruling elites.<sup>71</sup> They admitted that tribal divisions and nepotism by the ruling elites hindered the establishment of true Marxist-Leninist parties and concluded that pluralism was an appropriate way through which true Marxist parties could emerge. The lack of an independent technological base tied socialist oriented states to the Western economies. This implied that socialist states could be easily built if the new states were closely assisted by their metropolises. Thus, development and modernisation were a global problem which required interdependent solutions.<sup>72</sup> In other words, the attempt to build socialist states in Africa was a futile exercise. These states remained highly indebted and survived only through the Soviet aid which contributed to ruin the Soviet economy. In addition to this there were new ideas about security. Soviet thinkers maintained that military means alone could not ensure security which was a political problem. Indeed security could only be achieved by political solutions, that is to say, political co-operation

---

<sup>71</sup> See details in Alksei Kiva, *Socialist Orientation: Reality Illusions, International Affairs*, Moscow, 1988 n-70, p.86.

<sup>72</sup> See David Albright, "Soviet Economic Development and the Third World", *Soviet Studies* Vol. 43:1 1991, pp. 27-59.

rather than confrontation was one way of overcoming a zero-sum conception of security.<sup>73</sup>

When Gorbachev came to power in the mid 1980's, the issue of supporting the socialist oriented states in Africa was weighed against the issue of the security of the Soviet state. The decision was taken to enhance the security of the Soviet state. This meant stopping getting involved in local conflicts in the Third World, since these were expensive and increased rivalry between the USSR and the West.<sup>74</sup> The USSR concluded that the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation were very expensive and could not be maintained. It abandoned its 1970's strategy of concentrating support on socialist-oriented states and radical liberation movements and adopted a more pragmatic approach. It saw no advantage in insisting on a centrally planned economy and the socialist project. It allowed its African partners to undertake reforms and embrace a market economy while it sought to maintain strong influences in the area of defence and trade. It cut its long term commitments with the region in favour of short term ones. It extended its relationships to non-traditional allies such as Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho on a more commercial basis.<sup>75</sup> By the mid 1980's, the USSR could do very little but establish a symbolic presence in Southern Africa. It had failed to transform its allies into socialist states. Although its global security concerns contributed to alter the nature of relations in the region from domination to confrontation, in the long run this confrontation became unsustainable, since the TFCs were unable to protect African allies against the undeclared war waged by South Africa and its surrogates. The US\$ 1.5 billion

---

<sup>73</sup> Cited in Margot Light, "Moscow's Retreat from Africa", *op. cit.*, p.30

<sup>74</sup> See A. Kolosvisky, "Regional Conflicts and Global Security" in Steve Hirsh, (ed.), *MEMO: New Soviet Voices on Foreign and Economic Policy* (Washington, D.C.: BNA Books, 1989), p. 503-515.

<sup>75</sup> See C. Coker, "Pact, Pox or Proxy: Eastern Europe's Security Relationship with Southern Africa", *op cit.* p.582.

of military aid channelled to the region between 1980 and 1985 could not address the most fundamental needs of economic development of the Southern African states.

### **The Replication of the East-West Divide in Southern Africa**

Soviet support for the liberation movements, NATO's ambiguous relations with Portugal and Britain's historic links with the South African Republic contributed to the region entering the mid 1970's with opposing blocs, thus replicating the bipolar structure of the international system.

Although the West built the Silvermine Communications base in 1974, British defence and security links with South Africa were drastically reduced throughout the rest of the decade. The Conservative government which replaced the Labour government in Britain in 1979 suffered an immense pressure in the Commonwealth to reduce its close links with South Africa<sup>76</sup> and indeed, the only formal military tie between Britain and South Africa, the Simonstown agreement, was halted in 1974. South Africa's intervention in Angola in 1975-76 and the massacre it perpetrated against children in Soweto in 1976 thwarted Britain's and US efforts to persuade the Frontline States (FLS) to cooperate with South Africa in forcing the Rhodesian regime into negotiations with its nationalists opponents.<sup>77</sup>

South Africa began to enter a period of international isolation as its domestic unrest shook its relative stability. These facts helped to shape the South

---

<sup>76</sup> See J. E. Spence, "The West and South Africa" in R. O'Neill and R. J. Vincent (eds), *The West and the Third World* (London: MacMillan, 1990), p.111.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

African view in 1979, that the free world was facing a Marxist 'onslaught' orchestrated by Moscow in Southern Africa.

In view of this situation, South Africa called for an economic and political alliance of moderate states to counteract the Marxist 'onslaught'. The alliance would among other things, signal that the West was wrong in dismissing the communist assault because of its imperial guilty consciousness motivated by exploitation of blacks. The alliance included co-operation in economic projects. The success of economic aspects in the anti-Marxist constellation would constitute an incentive to win over the African states away from socialist influence. The alliance would then be consolidated by the signing of non-aggression pacts which would then lead to the establishment of mutual defence pacts.<sup>78</sup> These defence pacts and economic ties would then deepen relations between South Africa and the African states thus consolidating avenues for Western interests in the region. The ultimate objective of the proposed alliance, as explained by the then Foreign Minister Roelof Botha, was to have a common regional approach to security.<sup>79</sup>

Although South Africa's argument was not fully accepted in the West, Soviet-inspired activity in Southern Africa raised increasing concerns there. The Cape route argument was re-opened, and there is no doubt that Soviet intervention in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, the Gulf and Angola in 1975, alarmed the West. In addition, there was a build-up of the Soviet Navy<sup>80</sup> in the Southern oceans, continuing Socialist-bloc support for the liberation movements in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia and the significant presence of Cuban troops in Angola. All this led to an increased east-west view of politics. Indeed, it raised

---

<sup>78</sup> See D. Geldenhuys and D. Venter, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa", *op. cit.* p.52

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54

<sup>80</sup> The Minsk cruiser cum aircraft carrier visited Angola in April 1979 while President Neto was abroad. See details in J. Barber, J. Blumefeld and C. Hill, *The West and South Africa* (London: Routledge for the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1979), p.12.

Western suspicion that the Soviet Union could disrupt the defence of Western Europe if it imposed a blockade on oil shipments in the Indian ocean. Added to Western economic interests in South Africa, this led to the West's sheltering of the South African regime even if it disagreed with its apartheid political philosophy. Evidence for this conclusion includes the fact that while the West and Britain in particular showed an increasing interest in resolving the question of majority rule in Rhodesia, they were not convinced that South Africa could follow the same route. The view was hardened especially after the ascendance to power of Ronald Reagan in the US and Mrs. Thatcher in Britain, both of whom viewed the world in terms of competing power blocs.<sup>81</sup> This view increased the geopolitical, economic and military importance of Southern Africa in which South Africa re-surfaced as a Western ally. Even if the region did not represent vital Western interests, it was something to be denied to the USSR and its allies. The ascendance of Reagan reinforced this view by basing its policy toward Southern Africa on the 1969 National Security Council Memorandum (NSSM 39), which placed an emphasis on the role of regional powers in helping to defend and assert Western interests in contest with the USSR.

South Africa's proposal for an anti-Marxist constellation of states was rejected by the newly independent African states since, at the domestic level, the proposal did not address the fundamental problem of apartheid, while at the regional level it showed no signs of changing the patterns of military and economic domination. Added to this strategic set-back, Britain and other Western allies distinguished between their will in maintaining economic relations with S.A from an unconditional support of the regime.<sup>82</sup> Their economic and cultural links

---

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 10- 11.

<sup>82</sup> See J. E. Spence, *Foreign Investment in South Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 32-35.



with South Africa were already being contested at home, while the claim of a Marxist 'onslaught' failed to convince the West that its interests would be jeopardised if a formal military alliance with South Africa was not established. Among the Marxist states the West distinguished those which had a significant presence of foreign Marxist combat troops, i. e. with an offensive capability, and those who embraced Marxism from their own convictions but without any offensive capacity.<sup>83</sup> Even those that had this offensive capacity fell short of posing a threat to Western interests. They advised that the solution in dealing with either of these two types of states lay in negotiations. Instead of supporting South Africa's led CONSAS they advocated change and imposed cultural boycotts and selective sanctions to press for this change. As a result, apartheid South Africa felt increasingly isolated.

These factors would not deter South Africa from carrying out its plans. On the contrary, they were a greater incentive for apartheid's struggle for survival. South Africa understood the dilemma of its Western allies. Although Western states could not come to its support they were not prepared to put their material interest at risk. South Africa exploited this dilemma because it sensed that the West would continue to provide covert support even though it could not guarantee open support. The South African government effectively blackmailed those who had commercial interests in the country by threatening to retaliate if sanctions were imposed. On a different front, South Africa used its economic and military power to coerce neighbouring states to accept its objectives. It introduced reforms in the state machinery which allowed its regional foreign policy goals to be determined by the

---

<sup>83</sup> See, P. Baker, *The United States and South Africa: the Reagan Years* (Washington, D.C.: South Africa Update Series, 1989), pp.12-28.

military under the *Total Strategy*.<sup>84</sup> Its military was increased with the development of special forces, such as the Reconnaissance Commandos, Ethnic Battalions, and surrogate forces to meet the costs of developing new armaments in areas where vulnerability was felt.

The Reconnaissance Commandos and the Ethnic Battalions were charged with conducting raids against neighbouring states in support of the surrogate forces whose main task was to make these states ungovernable. These forces became vital instruments for the implementation of South Africa's destabilisation policy.<sup>85</sup> Under this policy, South Africa conducted raids into neighbouring countries against military, economic and civilian targets and sabotaged transport routes and other economic and social infrastructures. South Africa also applied selective sanctions against neighbouring states through the reduction on the level of their migrant labour in South Africa, and forcing delays in their exports and imports from or via South Africa. With this South Africa aimed at increasing the SADCC states' dependence on South Africa with the hope of ultimately making the SADCC project unviable. The intention was to keep neighbouring governments busy at home and so prevent them from staging attacks against the Republic. This would consequently enhance its security. To validate the proposition that South Africa faced a Marxist onslaught, the government concentrated its destabilisation efforts on Angola and Mozambique, the two declared Marxist states in the region.<sup>86</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup> See K. Grundy, "The Rise of the South African security Establishment: An Essay On the Changing Locus of State Power *Bradlow Series n-1*, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1983, p. 39

<sup>85</sup> See, A. du Pisani, *Beyond the Barracks*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-8; see also R. Davis and D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", *op. cit.*, pp. 201-206.

<sup>86</sup> The 1988 UN Economic Commission for Africa Report assessed destabilisation to have caused \$60 billion of damages. See *South African Destabilisation, The Economic Cost of the Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

The FLS states tried to resist this coercion by strengthening SADCC through an increased mobilisation of international support to SADCC projects especially those in the transportation sector. Their response also involved strengthening their diplomatic community by reaffirming their commitment to the principles of emancipation of the peoples of the region, their opposition to racism and to domination. They were able to obtain support for their economic projects from Western financial sources while the bulk of their defence capability still came from the Soviet Union and its allies. They called for increased co-ordination of their strategy in the struggle against apartheid and decided to increase their co-operation in the area of defence and security and reassessed their tactics. South African policies towards the region have led them to conclude that they faced a common enemy and that their security could not be ensured until apartheid was completely dismantled. Their Ministers of defence now met regularly to assess developments in the region and to coordinate strategies against apartheid. They now decided that Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe should facilitate the struggle of their regional allies in South Africa and Namibia who would carry out the struggle from inside as the Chinese did, while the rest concentrated on economic stabilisation.<sup>87</sup>

The understanding that they fought a common enemy led Mozambique to facilitate the infiltration of the ANC guerrillas through its Natal and Transvaal borders and allow their rear bases to be established on its territory. Angola undertook the same steps in relation to SWAPO, while Zambia and Tanzania allowed these movements and others including the PAC to establish training camps and schools for exiles.

---

<sup>87</sup> See Julius Nyerere, "North - South Dialogue", *The Third World Quarterly* Vol.6, n-4, 1984, p. 836.

In response to the ANC's increased sabotage operations, South African president P. W. Botha, warned:

... We wish to extend non-aggression pacts to any neighbouring state... we have no quarrel with the forces of peaceful neighbours but we do have a quarrel with terrorists who use the neighbouring states as spring boards to launch attacks against South Africa, and if a neighbouring state allows itself to be drawn into the aggressive behavior of terrorists, it will have to pay the price.<sup>88</sup>

In January 1981, following increased destabilisation by Renamo, the Government of Mozambique was forced to sign a defence pact with Zimbabwe. This led to the deployment of 1200 Zimbabwean troops along the Beira corridor in November 1982. Mozambique also established a defence pact with Tanzania in May 1981 which would allow Tanzania to help its ally against what was considered aggression by reactionary forces against the free world :

... The attacks on Mozambique pose a threat to the whole of free Africa, especially neighbouring states. So we shall do what we can. At the very least we stand to be counted on the side of freedom... we have come to the conclusion that the problems caused by internal reactionary forces supported by imperialist forces can only be overcome through military and economic cooperation.<sup>89</sup>

Tanzania committed 2 battalions to help train the Mozambican Armed Forces (FPLM). Both Zimbabwean and Tanzanians troops participated in joint operations against Renamo. Botha's warning was followed by a raid to Maputo in January 1981. The Maputo raid forced the FLS to reassess their strategy against

---

<sup>88</sup> Quoted in Neil Marais "South Africa's Foreign Policy and International Practice During 1980 as Reflected in Speech and Parliamentary Statements and Replies" *South African Year Book of International Law* (Pretoria: Verloren van Themaat Centre for International Law, 1980), p.186.

<sup>89</sup> See the Tanzanian *Daily News*, 5 May 1981.

South Africa. They came to conclude that South Africa would not respect the policy of stabilization<sup>90</sup>. This forced them to increase the level of their commitment to the struggle in South Africa and step up military support for the ANC. International support was mobilised on behalf of the ANC to enable it to intensify the armed struggle. This opened up an opportunity for the USSR to increase its support for the ANC, supplying it with new arms. The USSR also stepped up its support to the Frontline states. MI-21 helicopters and fighter bombers MIG 21 and MIG-23. The Soviet Union also stepped up their military support to Zambia and Tanzania.

The number of Cuban troops in Angola continued to increase. In view of the situation the West was faced with the dilemma of continued confrontation and escalation in the region or pressing the South African regime to dismantle apartheid. The regime was facing condemnation from every quarter and indeed, it had become an embarrassment for any state to maintain close ties with it. The Southern African states were now calling for mandatory global sanctions against the regime. The West perceived the danger that not supporting reforms in South Africa could radicalize the domestic conflict inside South Africa and the conflict between South Africa and its neighbours. The radicalisation of the conflict could lead to the possible destruction of economic and political interests which would take years to restore. However, if reforms were to be conducted in an uncontrolled manner there was also a risk of jeopardising Western interests in the region. This led the West to shelter South Africa once again. The argument continued to be the same as in the past. Isolating South Africa from the international community did more harm than

---

<sup>90</sup> See, Julius Nyerere "North and South Dialogue", *op. cit.*, p. 836.

good, in fact this would prevent the West from exerting a positive influence, since cutting links left it without any political clout.<sup>91</sup>

On the other hand, the wars in Mozambique and Angola were having disastrous consequences. The confrontation had led the region to economic stagnation if not deprivation. Most of the equipment received by the Frontline States was inappropriate to stop incursions by South African commandos and the guerrilla activities pursued by its surrogate forces. Destabilisation affected the SADCC project as the war deteriorated in Mozambique and Angola and other states were hit by occasional raids and selective sanctions applied by South Africa.

The US advocated diplomacy to remedy the situation. Under the Nixon Doctrine, South Africa was seen as a traditional ally. This view was now re-assessed. Although National Security Memorandum 39 became the basis for US policy, its premises were changed. The argument that there were no hopes for the blacks to gain political rights and that constructive engagement could only come through the white regimes in Southern Africa was abandoned. The view that the US strategic interest in the region emanated from the need to secure the use of the Simonstown base was no longer credible. Instead the the Reagan Administration concentrated its analysis on Africa's fragile political institutions. They noted that what was necessary in Africa was strong, more durable and less politicised institutions. They envisaged a wider role to be played by the US to encourage changes and to create solid institutions. Their main idea was to engage constructively in Southern African affairs bringing the opposing parties together, as opposed to backing one side only:

It is difficult to see how interests in racial accommodation expanded markets and resource access, and improved standards of human welfare can be advanced by taking a back seat in Africa whenever its

---

<sup>91</sup> Indeed there is no difference between the argument of the 1980s and that of the past years with respect to South Africa, See for example, Ritchie Owendale, *The South African Policy of the British Labour Government, 1947-1951*", *International Affairs*, Vol.59, Winter, *op. cit.*, note 53, Chapter 2, above.

tensions explode into conflict. By the same token, US interests will suffer if the doctrine of African solutions to African problems is translated to mean that American policy will back whatever changes emerge on the ground without U.S. participation.<sup>92</sup>

This became the focal point of 1980's US foreign policy towards the region, currently known as constructive engagement. In outlining the policy, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, stressed that the case for a constructive engagement lay in the stark choice 'between the twin dangers of abetting violence in the Republic or aligning ourselves with the cause of white rule'.<sup>93</sup> Opting for either of these two extremes seemed to be inappropriate for US policy.

The constructive engagement policy created a climate for negotiations between opposing blocks in the region. Faced between ruin and compromise, the government of Mozambique was forced to sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa known as the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord committed South Africa to stop its support of Renamo in exchange for the Mozambican government's dismantling of ANC bases in Mozambique. The Nkomati agreement was followed by the signature of the Lusaka Accord between Angola and South Africa in May 1984. This provided for South African withdrawal from the Angolan territory in an exchange for dismantling of SWAPO bases in Angola. In neither cases did South Africa honour its part of the agreement. In Mozambique it continued to supply Renamo long after the signature of the Nkomati Accord, while in Angola South Africa stepped up its support to UNITA following

---

<sup>92</sup> See Michael A. Samuels et al. *Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for US Policy* Washington D.C.:1979, pp. 59-63

<sup>93</sup> See Chester Crocker, South Africa: a Strategy for Change, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59:2 1980, pp. 323-351; see also Chester Crocker, African Policy in the 1980s *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1980, pp. 72 - 86.

the government offensive against UNITA's main base in Mavinga. South Africa interrupted its withdrawal and came to rescue UNITA. Confrontation in Angola increased following US support of UNITA after the repeal of the Clarke amendment by the US Congress in 1986. By supporting UNITA the US aimed at forcing a 'mutual hurting stalemate'<sup>94</sup> in Angola and to force the MPLA government into negotiations<sup>95</sup>.

However, US support to UNITA coincided with a change in Soviet foreign policy towards Southern Africa, as the Soviet Union began to face domestic economic crisis. Indeed, by the end of the 1980's Soviet political clout in Southern Africa declined to a point where its policy was de-ideologised. Thus it reversed its long term commitments to short term ones. This rationale forced it to extend its relations with non-traditional partners such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana.<sup>96</sup>

As regards the South African conflict, the USSR adopted a more pragmatic approach. Instead of concentrating its support on the coalition of the South Africa Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC, they sought to extend it to other black organisations such as the Inkatha Freedom Party<sup>97</sup>. Soviet policy planners began to admit that black movements apart from the ANC had an important role to play in the struggle against apartheid.<sup>98</sup> They began to establish contacts with apartheid leaders and other white organisations since they reached the conclusion that there

---

<sup>94</sup> The Constructive engagement policy was predicated on the assumption that there should not be losers in the process of regional conflict resolution. The reaching of mutual hurting stalemate was seen as the key factor in addressing the regional conflict in Southern Africa. For details in theory see I. W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

<sup>95</sup> See, Chester Croker, *High Moon in Southern Africa, Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood* (New York: Norton & Company) 1992, pp. 72-73.

<sup>96</sup> See Margot Light, "Moscow's Retreat From Africa", *op cit.* pp. 33-36.

<sup>97</sup> Cited in David Albright, *Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*



were sections of the white population who no longer upheld apartheid. Foreign Minister Schevernadze attended celebrations of Namibia's independence in March 1993. There, he held a private meeting with the US Secretary of State James Baker to agree on a framework which would lead to the resolution of the Angolan civil conflict. Schevernadze also held a meeting with President de Klerk of South Africa to explore grounds for future diplomatic relations with South Africa. Schevernadze then travelled to Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania to explain the changes that had taken place in the Soviet policy.

The painful experience of its involvement in Southern Africa and in Afghanistan accelerated Soviet disengagement from Southern Africa as domestic constituencies began to question the rationale of Soviet commitments abroad.

The changes in US and Soviet foreign policies in the region enabled their cooperation with regard to the resolution of regional conflicts. They had come to the conclusion that neither had vital strategic interests in the region although both had legitimate interests.<sup>99</sup> Their cooperation stimulated a process of negotiations culminating in the signature of the New York Accord that provided for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This was followed by a process of negotiation that led to the 1991 Bicesse agreement in Angola between UNITA and the MPLA government and the 1992 Rome agreement in Mozambique that brought together the Frelimo government and Renamo. At the same time, Pretoria was brought to the negotiating table with nationalist forces, a process which culminated in free elections in April 1994, bringing apartheid to an end in South Africa.

---

<sup>99</sup> This spirit was reflected in the Communiqué signed by President Konstantine Chernenko and President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia during the latter's visit to Moscow in March 1984. See, *Pravda*, 3 April 1984.

All these factors contributed to shaping security relations in the region. While the 1970's and the 1980's were marked by competition and rivalry, the 1990's were characterised by the will to reduce the confrontation and create a basis for reconciliation. Three decades of confrontation in the region have produced animosities and concerns, alliances and enemies. The interaction of different actors also stressed common vulnerabilities in the region and highlighted common aspirations. The interaction of state and non-state actors in the region and the interaction between regional and non-regional actors produced a pattern of specific security relations which can be considered security complex.

**PART II**  
**LEGACIES AND INADEQUACIES OF TRADITIONAL**  
**APPROACHES TO SECURITY**

## Chapter 4

### The Legacies of the Southern African Security Complex

This chapter discusses the legacies of the Southern Africa security complex which include, weakened states, military, economic and social problems. It argues that these legacies will remain the major sources of insecurity in the region and that, until they are addressed, a pattern of regional interaction promoting regional stability and greater prospects for security cannot be fully attained.

### The State and Security

As we saw in Chapter 1, the state is widely regarded in the International Relations literature as a source of security. Thinkers such as Hobbes recognised that the state of nature and foreign invasions posed threats to human beings and that the constitution of a state was the only way to avoid war of all against all.<sup>1</sup> The state as a source of security is also acknowledged by Locke who postulated that the “desire of men to put themselves under government is to defend their property (including lives, liberties and estates)”.<sup>2</sup> Recent writers such as Buzan, argue that the state is the “principal referent object of security because it is both the framework of order and the highest source of governing authority”.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, in most recent societies the role of the state as a source of security is taken for granted, and, for a long time, the debate revolving around the state has been about finding an ideal type of state, that is, the kind of state that can best guarantee security for the people living in it. Hobbes, argued for a maximalist state,

---

<sup>1</sup> See Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

<sup>2</sup> John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, *op. cit.*, p. 406-407.

<sup>3</sup> See B. Buzan, *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

founded on a social contract between individuals and the *Leviathan*. Hobbes saw the concentration of power in an overall sovereign, as the necessary pre-condition for advancing the well-being of any human collectivity, while Locke, believed that the minimalist state, resulting from a social contract between rulers and ruled was the best option. Although the advocates of maximalist and minimalist states differed in their conceptions, they shared the basic assumption that the order and stability of societies can only be achieved through some form of supra-individual organization binding people together in a state.

Thus, the importance of the state to security stems from the fact that at the domestic level the state is the overarching source of order and authority which claims to represent the interests of the whole society. It is assumed that it has the monopoly of the means of violence which makes it the only organisation capable of maintaining order by mediating relations between members of society and of providing protection to its citizens against foreign aggression. The fact that the state is also the basic unit of the international system establishes a close connection between domestic and international security, since the domestic condition of the state has an impact on the international system and vice-versa.

This is not to say, however that all states are capable of guaranteeing security to their citizens. As Buzan argues, some are not only unable to provide security, but are themselves a source of insecurity.<sup>4</sup> He asks what conditions states need to fulfill in order to become sources of national security? He depicts three components of the state which he believes are important for the formulation of the concept of national security. They are: i) the idea of the state; ii) its physical base; and, iii) its institutions. As Buzan explains, the idea of the state refers to the political identity existing in the minds of its people. It encapsulates the sense of purpose, what binds together the collectivity, what the state exists to do and its relationship with society it contains. To provide a strong sense of

---

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39-54.

national security, Buzan argues that the idea of the state needs not only to be coherently articulated, but to be widely held,<sup>5</sup> since:

... a state without a binding idea might be so disadvantaged as to be unable to sustain its existence in a competitive international system.<sup>6</sup>

The physical base of the state is understood as being the geographical extent, the population, its physical assets including what is owned by the people and both the authorities. The institutions comprise governing bodies in executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state.<sup>7</sup> Buzan distinguishes strong states - i.e., those with strong socio-political cohesion - from weak states with weak socio-political cohesion.<sup>8</sup> He argues that when the idea and institutions of the state are both strong, the state will be in a better position to act as a coherent unit seeking security in an anarchical international system. Conversely, when the idea of the state and institutions are both weak, "then that state is in a very real sense less of a state", and it will be more vulnerable to many kinds of threats, internal and external than strong states, therefore unable to pursue national security:

Where the state is strong, national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threats and interference.... Where the state is weak only its physical base and sometimes, not even that, may be sufficiently well defined to constitute a clear object of national security. Because its ideas and its institutions are contested to the point of violence, they are not properly national in scope, and do not offer clear referents as objects of national security, because by definition, they are not properly national scope....Because of this, it can be more appropriate to view security in weak states in terms of the contending groups, organisations and individuals as the prime referents of security.<sup>9</sup>

Buzan's discussion raises a fundamental question regarding the concept of national security which I shall return to in subsequent chapters. However, it is

---

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-66.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-107.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-101

appropriate here to comment upon his suggestion that national security is a function of the strength of the idea and institutions of the state. While a correlation between the strength of the institutions, their legitimacy and their stability can be established, these factors, cannot be attributed to the fact that the purpose of the state is popular and widely held as Buzan claims. Buzan's formulation leaves one under the impression that state institutions are a result of a constant plebiscite between governments and their societies with respect to what the state exists to do. However, empirical evidence suggests that governments hardly concern themselves with this question.<sup>10</sup> Their main concern and that of civil society are ideas that can be provided to the institutions to maintain and expand their power rather than to obtain consensus on the purpose of the state.<sup>11</sup> Tax collection, policing, the provision of education and health, conscription or professional recruitment of youngsters for the army are not dependent upon stable government or on providing a clear answer to the question what does the state exist to do? Rather it is the manner in which these functions are conducted that determine social-cohesiveness. Once institutions are established they follow their own dynamic and become less preoccupied with ideas underpinning their existence. Indeed in many cases governments go and come while institutions continue unabated with their routine functions that binds the society together. By and large, the percentage of citizens which knows details about what the state exists to do, even in the developed societies of the West, is very small, yet state institutions enjoy legitimacy and stability. In Africa, high illiteracy rates, and the lack of an open society tradition make this percentage even smaller. This fact permits institutions to manipulate state ideology making it responsive to wishes of governments regardless of whether the ideas underpinning the state are popular or not. Nazi Germany's ability to wage war against the great powers of Europe

---

<sup>10</sup> See for example, Samir Al-Khalid, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Hutchison: California University Press, 1989).

<sup>11</sup> See Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results" in John Hall (ed) *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 115-122.

and the United States and use its citizens to commit atrocities epitomises the extent to which institutions can be manipulated to suit the interests of the dominant elites and the way their efficiency can be used to mold the society rather than the popularity of the idea underpinning the state. The power of Nazi institutions played an important role in knitting German society together behind Nazi objectives, thus making it impossible for any counter-acting ideology to emerge.<sup>12</sup> However, whether these institutions became stronger due to the coherence and popularity of Nazi ideology is open to question. The other point weakening Buzan's argument is that historical evidence shows that state ideology swings like a pendulum and take the masses along with it. The Bolsheviks who led the revolution that culminated in the creation of the Soviet state enjoyed popularity among the majority of Soviets; so did the idea of the Soviet state. However, this popularity crumbled over time when institutions failed to deliver what the state had set for itself to do.

This suggests that the idea of the state does not have the importance that Buzan seeks to accord in the definition of strong and weak states, that is to say, for strong or weak socio-political cohesion. Indeed, it is taken for granted that states exist to mediate relations among human beings and provide protection for all people contained in them. The problems of many states start when this perception drifts away or when there are perceptions that state power can be usurped to serve sectional interests and not the other way around. Indeed while the perception that states are there for all its citizens prevails, strong or weaker socio-political cohesion becomes a function of the efficiency of institutions and less of the coherent idea of the state. This efficiency is determined by a number of factors, such as culture, level of training of civil service, type of discipline introduced in these institutions and the availability of resources to make them work. Indeed the strength of the modern state is not its ideology but its capacity to

---

<sup>12</sup> See Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 151-168.



of resources and people and the bureaucratic machinery that makes each one of its citizens inescapable to its pressures.<sup>13</sup> Modern states in the majority of the Third World show greater insensitivity to peoples' opinions and new ideas to the point that the impact of government policies on state institutions is minimal, unless there is a revolution or a total break down.

Buzan's discussion on state and security provides, however, a useful framework for analysing the nature of states and their role in security in Southern Africa.

### **Southern African States**

On Buzan's criteria, Southern African states are weak states. Even the relatively powerful South Africa would be considered a weak state. With the partial exception of South Africa, they are all successor colonial states. They resulted from the recognition by the major victorious powers of World War II, of the right to self-determination of peoples of the colonies and belong to the category that Robert Jackson calls 'quasi-states'. They have juridical sovereignty as a result of recognition by the rest of international society, but their empirical statehood is either weak, ill-functioning or non-existent.<sup>14</sup> These states have been weakened by several internal and external factors. Their physical bases, socio-political cohesion and institutions were severely affected by either colonial policies, internal disputes or by regional wars. Therefore, they face difficulties in realising their security objectives, primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from domestic and external threats; and secondly, in terms of protecting the region from intra-regional and extra-regional threats. Although the degree of vulnerability varies across the region, taken together, the Southern

<sup>13</sup> See "Politics as a Vocation" in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) *From Max Weber: Essay in Sociology* (London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 78-128.

<sup>14</sup> For details about quasi-states, see R. Jackson, *Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

African security complex show high vulnerabilities to both military and non-military threats.

The apartheid state in South Africa is an example of a weak state whose purpose was contested right from the outset. It effectively created a peculiar situation of one state within another. A state that existed to protect white minority interests in a Republic supposed to be shared by all races. Although successive defence papers (1973, 1977, 1979) identified the Republic of South Africa, the 'country' and the community who live in it to be the objects of its national security policy,<sup>15</sup> this was not reflected in the domestic policies of the apartheid government and in the country's legislation. In the domestic realm, the apartheid state distinguished the white population from the blacks. In fact the terms 'Republic', 'country' and community implied as objects of national security in the White papers on defence were euphemistically used as synonymous for the white minority. From South African government's list of threats to its security it becomes clear that its conception of the purpose of the state was a threat to one of its essential components, the physical base since these threats included:

...leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies... black racism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one vote...boycotts, isolation, demonstrations, undermining activities and limited violence.<sup>16</sup>

While apartheid's conception of the purpose of the state was strongly held by a majority of a small minority, it found no echo with the vast majority of non-white South Africans.<sup>17</sup> Thus its concept of national security became a target of internal and external sources and could only be expressed in terms of divergent

---

<sup>15</sup> See South African Government, *White Paper on Defence*, 1973, p. 8.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1.

<sup>17</sup> See, Alexander Johnston, "Weak States and National Security: The Case of South Africa", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17: 1, 1991, pp. 149-169.

group interests. Moreover, the particularistic purpose of the state articulated by the minority conflicted with the majority's idea, and their security interests threatened necessarily those of the remaining South Africans. Conversely, the all-inclusive idea of the state articulated by the South African Communist Party-African National Congress (SACP-ANC) coalition antagonised the Afrikaners and their conception of national security. Yet, the exclusivist idea of self-determination propounded by the PAC and Black Consciousness movements threatened not only the interests of the Afrikaners but even the whites within the ANC. All these allowed the concept of national security to be expressed in terms of divergent group interests.<sup>18</sup>

Although the end of apartheid paved the way for the creation of an all-inclusive and unitary state in South Africa, a shared purpose of the state continues to face challenges from many quarters. Chief among these are different expectations and weak socio-political cohesion, which encourages different political formations to articulate different ideas of the state. Specific interests of conservative and extremist Afrikaners, exclusive interests of Zulus and other radical black organisations lead to opposing views of the nature of the state that should be created away from all the unifying factors around the concept of national security.

The other factor affecting the idea of the state in South Africa pertains to the politics of redistribution. Years of apartheid have created deep economic asymmetries within South African society.<sup>19</sup> Although most South Africans agree that these asymmetries need to be resolved, there is not yet a consensus on how they should be addressed. While the underclass resulting from years of domination, favours a state which will address their particular condition, the coalition government that was established following the 1994 elections was

---

<sup>18</sup> See, H. Giliomee, "Afrikaner Politics 1977-87: From Afrikaner nationalist Rule to Central State" Hegemony in J. Brewer, (ed.) *Can South Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight*, (London, 1989), p. 132.

<sup>19</sup> See, T. Ohlson and S. Steadman, *The New Is Not Yet Born*, *op.cit.*, pp. 265, 266.

sensitive to dangers of any radical policies. This form of competition tends to reinforce the argument that national security in the weak states cannot primarily be seen in terms of protecting the state against external threats.<sup>20</sup>

### **The Successor Colonial States**

The rest of Southern Africa consisted of colonial states, primarily conceived to safeguard the interests of the colonial powers. Consequently they sought to undermine the interests of societies in which they operated. It should be noted however, that Imperial Britain introduced in the nineteenth century, the principle of paramouncy which sought to safeguard the will of the local population. None the less, the colonial authorities never questioned the legitimacy of their rule or the nature of their relationship with domestic societies.

Most of the political and the administrative power was concentrated in the hands of civil servants who came from the metropolises. Colonial authorities made little effort to incorporate natives in state functions and their main concern was to set up a small structure to undertake functions such as the collection of revenues, infrastructure organisation, education and health provision, and the maintenance of public order. When undertaking these functions, civil servants did not seek to legitimise their action through political activity. They saw no need for political action because they could govern through decree without meeting serious challenges to their authority. In fact political action was thought to be unnecessary as Kasfir indicates:

Political culture bequeathed by colonialism contained the notions that political activity was merely a disguised form of self-interest subversive of the public welfare.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> B. Buzan, *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op.cit.*, pp. 79-99.

The legitimization of policies in the colonial state relied on extensive military force backed by the police force including the secret police. These were called in from time to time to quell insurgent nationalist forces, workers revolting because of low pay and harsh working conditions and claims of injustice.<sup>22</sup>

The continuing alienation and repression of Africans created the conditions for the colonial states to be viewed as an alien organisation designed to dominate the natives. This situation allowed the emergence of nationalist movements which articulated alternative views of the state. Thus, the colonial state failed to attract popularity among the majority of Africans, thus allowing the concept of national security to be expressed only in terms of divergent interest groups.

As elsewhere in Africa at independence, southern African statesmen were confronted with a number of problems which contributed to weaken the state in their countries. Independence in Southern Africa, meant the transfer of power to political elites but with little change in the nature of states. African statesmen virtually replaced the colonial civil service with Africans but the nature of institutions and political structures remained the same. As Chazan observes:

The formal agencies transferred to African hands were alien in derivation, functionally conceived, bureaucratically designed, authoritarian in nature and primarily concerned with issues of domination rather than with issues of legitimation.<sup>23</sup>

The colonial inherited structures were inadequate to meet the aspirations of those who expected to improve the quality of their relations with the state by having a government composed of active nationalists. These structures were increasingly

---

<sup>21</sup> See N. Kasfir, "Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview in Philip Mahwood" (ed.) *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa* (New York: John Wiley, 1983), p. 34.

<sup>22</sup> See for example: M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 106-120; see also J. D. Omer-Cooper, *The History of Southern Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

<sup>23</sup> See Naomi Chazan, et al. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), p.43.

seen as illegitimate, as sub-national loyalties weakened national unity and consequently the state. Internal disputes over participation and resources, and civil wars, disrupted the processes of nation-building and the attempts to create unitary and all-inclusive-states. The prevailing idea about the purpose of the state left it challenged and subsequently weakened by those who felt excluded in the national process. As a consequence, the idea of national security became synonymous with the security of governments and its agencies.

### **The Physical Base and Institutions**

The importance of the physical base of the state to the concept of national security stems from the fact that it constitutes its physical foundation. No state can exist without population, territory and other physical assets. The destruction of its assets, or the seizing of its territory can threaten the collectivity of individuals living in it.

The importance of the interconnection between the physical base of the state, its institutions has already been established.<sup>24</sup> Institutions are a physical expression of the state. They regulate the realm of society defining norms through which the members of a collectivity should interact and develop mechanisms for the protection of the physical base of the state. According to Buzan, these functions, however, can only be legitimised by the idea of the state itself. Buzan adds that in cases where this idea is so weak that it cannot legitimise state institutions the concept of national security, is likely to be only expressed in terms of governments' interests:

... is it possible to have a state in which the idea of the state is very weak or non-existent, and in which the institutional component has to take up all its functions?... In this situation the interests of the state would be defined solely in terms of the interests of the ruling elite, and, the coherence of the state would be

---

<sup>24</sup> B. Buzan, *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-69.

preserved by instituting the state's coercive power against its citizens.<sup>25</sup>

Johnston sees Buzan's postulation as representing an extreme case, since the reality, as the South African example shows, is translated by cases in which institutions tend to compensate for the idea of the state.<sup>26</sup> In fact when institutions are strong, little room is found for self-expression of the idea of the state. However, in most Southern African states, institutions themselves are weak. They have a limited geographical extension, very few resources and untrained personnel. Illiteracy rates in some of these states are as high as 70%, which is reflected in the poor quality of the civil service. The lack of a qualified civil service affected some states in the region since independence, following the massive exodus of expatriates after the independence. Tanzania for instance, had only 10% of the civil servants it needed when it became independent.<sup>27</sup> Poor education and poor training of natives made the task of state-building in the post-independence period almost impossible.<sup>28</sup> Decolonisation meant solely the transfer of decision-making centres from metropolises to African capitals. However, the new decision-making centres had no previous experiences of policy design and implementation. With the exception of South Africa in which imperial capacities were maintained and eventually improved, most Southern African states had to train their civil servants initially from scratch. The other exception is represented by states such as Zimbabwe and Namibia whose independence came late and where therefore, there was time to train the civil service and reduce the illiteracy rate.<sup>29</sup> These states also had much lower rates of professional emigration than elsewhere in the region. However, the general pattern was for state institutions to be stronger in the capitals and a few urban centres. The

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>26</sup> See, Alexander Johnston, "Weak States and National Security: The Case of South Africa in the Era of Total Strategy", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17:1, 1991, p.158.

<sup>27</sup> See R. Hodder Williams, *An Introduction of Politics to Tropical Africa* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 86.

<sup>28</sup> See C. Thomas, *In Search of Security*, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>29</sup> See Naomi Chazan et. al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, op. cit. p. 43.

further one moved away from the capital, they tended to weaken until they became virtually non-existent.

This situation is worsened by the lack of resources to develop infrastructure such as roads and railways that would facilitate communication between the urban centres and the countryside.

The absence of state institutions in some areas meant that the idea of the state could not be extended to citizens living in these areas. As a result, sub-national loyalties in these areas tended to overshadow state objectives, since the absence of the state allowed the development of local politics, riddled with a value system and priorities that most times did not coincide with the values and priorities of the state. This tended to reinforce the differences between the local and the national which often led to internal conflicts between governments and different interest groups. Such conflicts, often exacerbated by the necessity for governments to adjust to a hostile international environment at the same time they were struggling to secure their legitimacy at home made it difficult for them to act as representatives of an homogeneous population.<sup>30</sup> To curb conflicts, some governments chose to introduce pluralist institutions, while others continued with the authoritarian structures inherited from colonialism. Those who adopted pluralist institutions, such as Botswana soon discovered that these collided with the way their political understanding was shaped,<sup>31</sup> as these institutions tended to exacerbate sub-national divisions and required some balancing with traditional institutions.<sup>32</sup> Those who opted for authoritarian rule such as Malawi seemed to their fellow citizens little better than the previous colonial rulers. Both these options attracted a lot of criticism and provided room for domestic challenges which further deepened the fragmentation of societies. These divisions were exacerbated by economic conditions of dependence on the former colonial powers

---

<sup>30</sup> See C. Thomas, *In Search of Security*, *op. cit.* pp. 10-35

<sup>31</sup> See Bogosi Otlogile "How Free and Fair" in Mopho G. Molomo and Brian T. Makopagosi, *Multiparty Democracy in Botswana*, (Harare: SAPES, 1990), pp. 23-38.

<sup>32</sup> See Naomi Chazan et. al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, *op cit*, p.45.



which prevented African governments from building a national economic base which could help them to win legitimacy from the different constituencies. Thus, the formation of national consciousness in these states was hampered from the outset,<sup>33</sup> and as a consequence state-building failed to market itself as a viable project.

Thirty years of confrontation in Southern Africa tended to reinforce the weak character of Southern African states. Peculiarly, the South African state in some aspects is an exception to this rule. The case of South Africa seems to confirm the rule that 'War is the great stimulus to state building'.<sup>34</sup> The constant threat of confrontation against neighbouring states and the putative threat of a black uprising domestically provided South Africa with an opportunity to create a strong state. The confrontation caused the state to become more efficient in revenue collection; it forced apartheid leaders to improve administrative capabilities and created a climate and symbols to unify its main base, that is, white society, through the promotion of Afrikaner ideology and the imposition of discriminatory legislation. The environment of constant threat throughout Southern Africa also forced the state to militarise the society and provided the military establishment with an opportunity to gain direct access to power. This situation further stimulated the participation of the military establishment in the decision making-process in all areas of civil life. The idea of confrontation further stimulated the South African state to strengthen its security forces and its domestic institutions of law and order. It also stimulated the development of a nationalist oriented economy.

The situation in the rest of the Southern African states was different. Regional confrontation forced the other states to shift their attention from state and institution building to face the impact of war and destabilisation. They were

---

<sup>33</sup> See Yves Person, "L'état nation en Afrique", *Le Mois en Afrique 190/191*, 1981, pp. 27-35

<sup>34</sup> See, S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p.123.

forced to spend their scarce resources improving their military capabilities. None the less, they remained weak and were unable to face stronger armies such as the SADF and its surrogates. But as South Africa inflicted more damage on their countries, they continued to overspend on defence. The diversion of resources into military activity led to a further polarisation of societies as resources shrank while the needs of different national constituencies increased. The climate of confrontation wrecked the economies of some states and made the region less attractive to foreign investment. As a result economies showed levels of continuing decline and stagnation reaching the lowest levels in the 1980's.<sup>35</sup> This forced them to become more dependent on foreign aid. Aid dependence sustained their juridical sovereignty, but their empirical sovereignty became increasingly restricted.

The years of confrontation severely reduced the state's ability to provide security to the population. State institutions were further weakened and the physical infrastructure was left to crumble and decay. The consequences were diverse. States that were not directly affected by war remained unable to reduce their vulnerability to poverty, natural disasters and epidemics, while those directly affected faced the disintegration of their societies to a point which increasingly approximated the Hobbesian state of nature. In countries such as Mozambique and Angola, the state was forced to physically withdraw from the countryside as its infrastructure was destroyed and its officials forced to abandon state functions. The withdrawal of its functionaries from the countryside left behind large areas without any state institution to undertake basic functions, such as administration, the maintenance of law and order, the provision of education and health services, the regulation of trade, the organization of productive capacity and tax collection. This situation exacerbated the flooding of the population from

---

<sup>35</sup> See details in *South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, op.cit., pp. 3-18; see also *Children in the Frontline, The Impact of Apartheid Destabilisation and Warfare on Children in Southern Africa*, UNICEF, 1989, pp. 34 - 39.

the country-side to urban areas. Uncontrolled population movements further undermined the security of these states, by disrupting their productive capacity, increasing the level of unemployment, criminality and the deterioration of public health. In the end, some of these states faced the challenge of building credible political structures that could guarantee the participation of all and legitimate institutions that could assure order and stability, other faced challenges of extending those institutions to all parts of their national territory and to improve their performance. However, their capacity to do so would depend upon other factors including their economic recovery.

### **Military- Related Legacies**

The military-related legacies of the Southern Africa security complex include weak and fragile armies and police forces, proliferation of large quantities of light weapons outside the control of state authorities, the existence of large pools of demobilised combatants; and, military asymmetries between states. Weak security forces make it difficult for the states to maintain domestic order, deal with internal crises and curb domestic threats, whereas the existence of large numbers of demobilised but still armed combatants in an environment characterised by a socio-economic deprivation leads to the rise in crime and instability. On the other hand, the existence of pronounced military asymmetries may lead the states to renew their efforts toward militarisation at the expense of development. This situation tends to increase insecurity.

The armies of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and possibly Angola are the product of mergers of formerly rival forces with different doctrines, levels of discipline, ethnic composition, organisation and structures. The process of merging these groups into a coherent functional structure has been problematic. Although the nature of the problems varies from one country to

another, taken together, in a regional context, they result in a complex matrix threatening the stability of the entire region.

The end of apartheid and confrontation has provided the states with an opportunity to re-assess the role of their security forces and to restructure them to meet the challenges of the new strategic environment. These are identified by many as: i) the defence of the nation against foreign aggression; ii) to deal with internal crisis and uphold constitutional rule; iii) to control national borders.<sup>36</sup> There is general consensus across the region that to fulfill these functions the armed forces should be professional, depoliticised and non-partisan.<sup>37</sup>

The willingness of the states to end regional confrontation is signaled by their membership in multilateral institutions such as the UN, OAU, and SADC which bind their members to settle their disputes amicably.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore the chances for a stable Southern Africa are strengthened by the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all governments in the region. However, the stability of the region partly depends upon the nature of the armed forces being created, their ability to curb internal crises and conflicts starting in other states. For this, they need to acquire the necessary legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In Southern Africa, legitimacy is also related to the ethnic and racial composition of the armed forces, which implies the need to recruit from all quarters and to reconcile and integrate the former contenders into an effective structure. This process would not be easy even if criteria such as professionalism, non-

---

<sup>36</sup> See for example: L. Nathan, *The Restructuring and Reorientation of the South African Defence Force*, Paper Presented at the Conference on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Southern Africa, Institute of International Education, Harare June 1993 pp.12- 15; see also W. Gutteridge, "South Africa's Defence and Security Forces: The Next Decade" in J.E. Spence (ed.) *Change in South Africa*, (London: RIIA/Pinter), pp. 59-63; Susan Willet, *South African Defence Forces: How Much Real Change?* Paper prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on The New South Africa , March 1995, pp. 3-7.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, see also Protocol VI of the October 1992 *Rome Peace Accord* signed by the Government of Mozambique and Renamo; the *Bicesse Accord* between the MPLA Government of Angola and UNITA. This principle was reaffirmed during the *Lusaka Accord* signed between the Angolan government and UNITA in 1994.

<sup>38</sup> See Article 6 of the *UN Charter*; Article 3 of the *OAU Charter* and Article 12 of the *SADC Treaty*, Annex II in this study.

discrimination, the maintenance of standards, and equal opportunities could be established as guiding principles. As Gutteridge observes, there will always be quarrels substantiated and unsubstantiated:

Non discrimination is easy to assert but difficult to exercise and even more difficult to prove to those who believe themselves victimized or discriminated against.<sup>39</sup>

The process of integration of previously opposing military forces has followed different routes in the region. Although the majority of states followed the principle of creating new national armies by retraining parts of the different military forces involved in conflicts, there were variations on the procedure. Zimbabwe, opted for training potential leaders of the new army from selected members of ZANLA and ZIPRA and providing an equal opportunity to any former guerrilla, or member of the Rhodesian army wishing to be part of the new army.<sup>40</sup> Mozambique followed the procedure of retraining the new defence force (FADM) to which each of the warring factions would contribute 50 %.<sup>41</sup> However, South Africa chose to integrate the former members of the ANC and PAC military wings and members of TBVC armies into the structure of the SADF.<sup>42</sup>

The creation of new armed forces through mergers involved bringing together people of different ethnic groups and races, different cultures, and forces with different training experience, traditions of recruitment, motivation, discipline and operational experience. In states such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, these

---

<sup>39</sup> See W. Gutteridge, "South Africa's Defence and Security Forces: The Next Decade", in Jack E. Spence, (ed) *Change in South Africa op. cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>40</sup> See T. P. Toyne-Sewell, "Zimbabwe and the British Military Advisory and Training Team", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, January 1991, p. 54.

<sup>41</sup> See Protocol IV of the *General Peace Accord* signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo, October 1992.

<sup>42</sup> See "Soldiers Threaten to Resume Armed Struggle", *South Scan*, Vol. 9:43, 18 November, 1994, p. 338.

mergers meant blending almost a dozen military traditions into one. In Mozambique, eleven politically and culturally diverse countries, namely, the Soviet Union, Britain, Cuba, North Korea, the People's Republic of China, France, Portugal, the German Democratic Republic, Tanzania and South Africa were involved either in training sections of armed forces, or of the dissident forces. Bringing people trained under different military traditions into an efficient structure has proved to be a difficult task since it affects the homogeneity of the force and their operational capacity.

The process of merging in Southern Africa faced a number of problems which tended to undermine the quality of the armed forces. The principles of quality, military merit, non-racialism, non-partisanism established as guideline for the creation of the South African Defence Force were often not observed. Unqualified individuals were appointed as high ranking officers on the basis of their political allegiance to the ruling party, to the detriment of better qualified individuals. Elsewhere in the region the process also allowed the domination of the armed forces by certain ethnic and racial groups, and, by individuals trained by a specific military school and tradition. These factors undermined unity within the armed forces and their capacity to act as coherent institutions. Instead, they were transformed into juxtaposed clusters of individuals with different allegiances and different motives. The consequence was widespread corruption since these armies were penetrated by nepotism and run by mafia-style groups.<sup>43</sup>

The process of integration that followed the creation of the South African National Defence Force was problematic since it has not led to any significant restructuring. In fact the structure of the new SANDF has remained the same as its predecessor the SADF. Although the SANDF is now subordinated to a civilian controlled Department of Defence, the procurement of weapons is still under the

---

<sup>43</sup> See, G. Mills, *The Process of Integration of National Armies in a Post Conflict Situation: Lessons from Other Countries*, Paper prepared for the Conference on "Mozambique Post-War: Challenges and Realities" of the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais, December 1992, pp. 4-6

responsibility of ARMSCOR, which remains outside the Department of Defence. Both the SANDF and the ARMSCOR continue to be dominated by the Afrikaner old guard. The situation has attracted criticism and complaints, especially from former MK, APLA and TBVC members.<sup>44</sup> Their grievances include, among other things, the continuing dominance of whites of the SANDF and the subsequent discrimination to which lower ranking black and coloured officers are subjected. While the senior cadre of MK were accorded high ranks and good working facilities, junior officers on the lower ranks were subjected to poor living and working conditions. This caused protests and complaint that culminated in the Wallmannstal base incidents in October 1994.<sup>45</sup> It has been suggested that the discrimination of ex-members of the MK was a tactical move by the SADF old guard to keep power and control of the SANDF by dividing senior ANC cadre from their men.<sup>46</sup> However, the SANDF senior establishment argue for the need to maintain the standards and the quality of the armed forces, and, they see this as the main impediment to recruiting amongst blacks who are generally less well educated.<sup>47</sup> None the less, this explanation does not seem to satisfy those who believe that the discrimination they suffered under apartheid was the reason behind their failure to get access to quality education. Pragmatism and affirmative action have been recommended as a solution to the problem. However, these still do not address the question of reconciliation. The Africanisation of SANDF, the attempts to restructure it, and affirmative action have caused frustration and

---

<sup>44</sup> See W. Gutteridge, "South Africa's Defence and Security Force", in J. E. Spence, (ed) *Change in South Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>45</sup> About 2000 MK who had joined the SANDF stayed away without leave in protest of the discrimination they were subjected to in the Walmannstal base. They were consequently expelled. The Commission of inquiry set to investigate the incidents found their grievances justifiable. See for example, "Crime Fears as over 2000 MK Fighters Leave Camp", *South Scan*, Vol. 9:42, 11 November, 1994, p. 330.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> The South African former Minister of Education, Kobie Coetzee announced during the parliamentary debate on September 1993 that an initially one-year call up of volunteers would be introduced and that if the number required was not complete a ballot system drawing on males from all races who had reached Standard 10 of education would be introduced.

dissatisfaction, especially among white officers who see their jobs being threatened by less competent black political appointees to SANDF ranks.<sup>48</sup>

The integration and restructuring of armed forces in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola showed a number of particular problems, as the transformation of the guerrilla army into a national army required strict routines of financing, accountability and logistical organisation which their governments were not capable of offering.<sup>49</sup> One particular aspect of these difficulties was to determine the criteria for the allocation of ranks. The guerrilla forces had an unclear military ranking structure and lacked objective criteria through which progress in the military was to be achieved. Regular forces were better structured and had clearer ranking generally based on military merit, but deciding on the designation of ranks still proved difficult, since different forces had different ranking systems. The translation of one rank structure into another including military educational requirements generated more conflict than agreement.<sup>50</sup> Thus, the maintenance of standards within the armed forces became a contentious issue. It is viewed by some as blocking affirmative action and integration, while others fear undermining professionalism. Although professionalism is regarded as important, the experience in the region shows that there are risks of defining it in a very narrow sense which may jeopardise settlements and inspire conflict.

However, the dangers of harming professionalism are many. Politicization of the armed forces or some sections of them is a real possibility. Most armies in the region result from a transformation of guerrilla forces which operate through political mobilisation involving its members. These forces are used to intervene in politics and some may continue to do so. In Mozambique and Angola and to a certain extent South Africa, the picture is worsened by the fact that the forces

---

<sup>48</sup> See "MK Soldiers Threaten to Resume the Struggle", *op. cit.* p. 328

<sup>49</sup> See G. Mills, *The Process of Integration of National Armies In a Post Conflict Situation: Lessons from Other Countries*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-12.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*; see also L. Nathan, "Marching to a Different Drum," *The Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper Series*, University of Western Cape, 1991, pp. 10-19



forming the core of national armies, have for a long time, operated under different political allegiances.<sup>51</sup> Although the spirit of corporate neutrality is enshrined in the doctrines and constitution of most states region, their practice is yet to be observed. However, it can be anticipated that the potential for different political parties to exert their influence on sections of the armed forces is high which can severely affect professionalism and neutrality. This will tend to increase instability since the democratically elected governments cannot count on the full backing of their armed forces to uphold constitutional rule.

The other aspect affecting the quality of armies is the high rates of illiteracy in the majority of states. These rates impede the ability of the armed forces to recruit among the best educated cadre, as they have to compete with civilian and economic sectors for personnel with secondary and tertiary education. As a consequence, the number of officers who would qualify for high level training is tiny. This situation affects the most specialised sectors, those needing special skills. The end result is that often only infantry battalions are often fully operational. Sections such as logistics, maintenance of equipment and mechanized divisions are the most affected and reduce the operationality of the armed forces. The situation encountered by one Zimbabwean MP sums up the general state of the regions armies:

... Our visit to various brigades and various battalions was an eye opener... Some of our armed forces actually are squatting... But what is probably most disturbing is... the state of immobility of the armed forces. Throughout our tours, we encountered hundreds of unserviceable vehicles, engines and other equipment... In every unit we visited the soldiers told us that if war were to break out today we would find it very difficult to defend the country. The situation is so bad that barely a unit or a

---

<sup>51</sup> Until the new constitution was promulgated in 1990, The Mozambican Armed Forces (FPLM) were subordinated to the ruling party Frelimo, and until the implementation of the Bicesse Accords in Angola the Angolan Armed Forces were subordinated to the MPLA. The loyalty of the SADF to the apartheid project of the national party has also been long established; and the Commander of the armed forces and most high ranking officers in Zimbabwe and Namibia were members of ZANU and SWAPO.

brigade has got more than a third of its requirements and even that is an exaggeration. I would say a quarter of its fleet of vehicles is on the road.<sup>52</sup>

The situation described in Zimbabwe is a common phenomenon in Zambia and Tanzania, but seems to be worse in countries such as Mozambique and Angola due to the impact of war and destabilisation.<sup>53</sup>

The prospects for improving this situation are limited, since most of these states lack the financial resources to invest in the improvement of domestic training facilities and education of officers. Indeed, these armies suffer from budgetary constraints which are also likely to impede the armed forces from meeting the requirements for restructuring in order to enable them to take up their new functions. Modernisation of ground air and naval equipment and their servicing appears to be crucial for the new domestic and regional security functions. Budgetary constraints will also tend to reinforce military asymmetries which will impede arms control and confidence building. Current figures indicate that South Africa's military expenditure accounts for two thirds of the total defence expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa. This implies that disarmament in the region cannot be realized unless unilaterally. However, pressures for the reduction of military expenditure in South Africa encounter resistance in the military sectors.

Military asymmetries tend to heighten threat perceptions. The existence of militarily superior neighbours especially in an environment whereby friendly neighbouring governments are likely to be replaced by hostile ones cannot but help to raise the level of mistrust. This fact may force states who feel militarily disadvantaged to abandon their disposition to conceive their defence in terms of minimal deterrent force, and, encourage them to look into ways of raising their

---

<sup>52</sup> Quoted in *Parliamentary Debates*, Harare, Government Printing and Stationary Office 18, 57 col. 4114 - 4116.

<sup>53</sup> See for example, A. M. Zacarias, *Relações Entre os Militares e Civis na Mitigação do Conflito Moçambicano* Paper Presented to XII Lisbon International Conference on Democracy and Integration of Lusophone Countries, December 1992.

military might. The opportunity cost of military expenditure in these states is already high particularly in relation to prevailing levels of economic development and the socio-economic needs of the people. More military spending will certainly be at the expense of development resources. The likely result is domestic insecurity and conflict with a high risk of spill-overs beyond national borders.

The process of creating new armies forced the retrenchment of large numbers of former combatants. The paradox is that while unemployment figures and the fragility of the societies press for the maintenance of the present size of armies, these seem to be too large for their security needs.

While on the one hand, demobilisation becomes an important tool for the reduction of military confrontation, throwing into civilian life large numbers of individuals who have nothing but military skills enhances the prospects for instability. The largest number of demobilised combatants in the region comprises semi-skilled and unskilled people.<sup>54</sup> Some were trained in guerrilla tactics of sabotage, others in repressive and aggressive tactics, yet others were part of hit squads, clandestine groups involved in cross-border operations, arms deals and other covert operations. For the demobilisation to fulfill its function of conflict reduction it needs to be accompanied by the process of reintegration of former combatants into society. This means, among other things creating conditions for their employment. However, experiences of the process of demobilisation throughout the region show limited capacity for integration of former soldiers in the civil sphere. Due to lack of skills, most of them have been encouraged to engage in agriculture while few others were given the opportunity of starting small businesses or to seek employment in cities. However, a large number of

---

<sup>54</sup> See for example, J. Coelho and A. Vines, *Pilot Study on Demobilisation and Re-integration of Ex-combatant in Mozambique*, Refugees Studies Programme, University of Oxford.; See also S. Willet, *South African Defence: How Much Real Change? op. cit.*, p.5.

those demobilised have already learnt to enjoy urban life and shown reluctance to live in the countryside.<sup>55</sup>

Reintegration of the demobilised into the productive sphere is further hampered by the declining and stagnant nature of economies in the region. The economies are unable to generate jobs and provide the large numbers of demobilised with employment opportunities. This situation increases the likelihood that the demobilised will engage in criminal activities, including syndicate crime. The potential for cross-border syndicate crime cannot be ruled out especially in situations where armies are weak and are not properly equipped either to contain conflicts within state borders or prevent criminal syndicates from spilling-over into their territories from neighbouring countries. This enhances the propensity for demobilisation to increase regional instability and conflict.

The prospects for instability are worsened still further by the proliferation of weapons outside the control of the authorities responsible for law and order especially light weapons such as AK-47 rifles.<sup>56</sup> The wars of the 1970's and 1980's encouraged the importation into the region of weapons by the warring factions, which they distributed to individuals whose records are not known. The loss of legitimacy by the state, the erosion of its power, coupled with economic hardship, created conditions for corruption in the armed forces. The lack of control led to huge illegal sales of armaments and other military equipment.<sup>57</sup> Recent peacekeeping operations in Mozambique and Angola and internal peacekeeping in South Africa revealed how difficult it is to disarm not only former factions but also members of the public. The challenges involve, on the one hand, the creation of incentives for the civilians to give up their arms and establish disincentives to violence, on the other. The evidence is that the warring

---

<sup>55</sup> J. Coelho and A. Vines, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-57.

<sup>56</sup> See G. Mills and C. Clapham, "Southern African Security After Apartheid: A Framework for Analysis", *The Centre for Southern African Studies of the University of Western Cape, Working Paper Series n-8*, 1991 pp. 3-8.

<sup>57</sup> See, G. Mills, *The Process of Integration of National Armies In a Post Conflict Situation: Lesson from Other Countries* *op. cit.* p. 6.

factions never disarm completely and the impact of incomplete processes of disarmament is felt long after the peace process is terminated. However, the level of reconciliation at the domestic level is fragile and continues to threaten to plunge states back into conflicts. The threat of protracted conflicts is enhanced by the absence of strong domestic institutions and regional institutions that can mitigate conflicts through mechanisms such as crisis prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution.<sup>58</sup>

### **Economic Legacies**

For the last three decades Southern Africa has been a laboratory for the most diverse development strategies ranging from radical views based on Marxist theory to neo-liberal theories of market forces. With few exceptions these strategies have produced few positive results. Southern African economies are characterised by a low and declining GDP per capita, and negative or stagnant growth rates. In 1992, two countries in the region, Mozambique and Tanzania had the lowest per capita GDP in the world,<sup>59</sup> while other indicators such as illiteracy rates, infant mortality, disease and malnutrition place Southern Africa among the poorest regions in the World.<sup>60</sup>

The factors accounting for the low performance of Southern African economies have been well documented.<sup>61</sup> They range from economic to non-economic. The non-economic factors include the inability of the region to deal with natural disasters such as droughts, floods and cyclones which periodically affect agricultural production. Natural disasters have damaged physical

---

<sup>58</sup> See, T. Ohlson, "Trick or Treat, Conflict Resolution, Security and Development in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa", *The Centre of Southern African Studies of the University of Western Cape, Occasional Paper 3*, 1992 pp. 24.

<sup>59</sup> See the *World Development Report*, The World Bank 1994, p.162.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> See for example Gavin Maasdorp and Adrian Saville, "The SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa", *The South African Institute for International Affairs, Occasional Paper Series n-2*, July, 1994.

infrastructure and caused severe losses of food and cash crops and livestock. In addition political instability caused by domestic strife in countries such as South Africa, and, the impact of destabilisation on South Africa's neighbours has taken its toll.<sup>62</sup> The destruction of transport infrastructure in states such as Mozambique affected the regional trade since Mozambique is used as a gateway for four of the landlocked countries in the region.<sup>63</sup>

The second factor found to be responsible for the lower performance of the Southern African economies are government interventionist policies. These resulted in inefficient resource management and allocation, establishment of economically unviable parastatals and over regulation of the private sector. This set of policies limited the initiative of the private sector and expanded the state sector and consequently state consumption.<sup>64</sup>

However, the major cause for economic decline in Southern Africa is the lack of personnel with skills including management skills. After independence most of the countries in the region saw a massive exodus not only of colonial civil servants but also of skilled manpower.<sup>65</sup> Some governments attempted to replace experienced expatriates with nationals with little experience in economic management. Low performance of these economies is also due to the falling of international prices of primary product exports which are the region's main source of revenue.<sup>66</sup> Foreign debt and high rates of inflation also account for the low economic performance, as Maasdorp and Saville observe:

Apart from exchange controls, governments have also followed policies of price, wage, investment and interest rate controls. The net result has been a general

---

<sup>62</sup> See *South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost to the Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19 - 23.

<sup>63</sup> See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville "SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa" *op. cit.*, p.3

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> See *Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A Macro Framework Study Report*, Southern Africa Development Community, 1993, p.14-15.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p.15.

stifling of private sector activity which has been worsened by high individual and corporate tax.<sup>67</sup>

The factors discussed above led the region to become less attractive for foreign investment especially in the last decade in which foreign investment reached its lowest level.<sup>68</sup> However, from the late seventies on, only Botswana experienced positive economic growth, while the rest of the region showed either stagnant or declining growth rates.<sup>69</sup> Poor economic performance increases the chances for further polarisation of societies, since some of these economies are still unable to provide the basic needs of food and health to their people. It also raises the levels of unemployment and enhances the chances for criminal activity. In an environment where resources are scarce, while the competition over their allocation and distribution is fierce, the result is likely to end in a domestic conflict.

Southern African economies also suffer from dislocations which need to be adjusted. The IMF World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that most states have adhered to place a special emphasis on adjustment of exchange rates, reduction of budgetary and balance-of payments deficits through liberalisation and de-regulation of markets. However, as the experience of Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola show,<sup>70</sup> the time frame required for recovery is longer than had been anticipated. Creditor states have not allowed sufficient debt relief to the countries implementing SAPs to enable them to devote their resources to development rather than debt servicing. This has made

---

<sup>67</sup>See G. Maasdorp and A. Seville, "SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa", *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>68</sup> See A. Hawkins, "Economic Development in the SADC Countries" in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds) *Towards a Post-Apartheid Future, Political and Economic Relations in Southern Africa* (London: MacMillan), 1992, pp. 105-131.

<sup>69</sup>See R. Bethlehem, "Economic Development in South Africa" in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (ed.) *Towards A Post-Apartheid Future, op. cit.*, pp. 62-81; see also the World Bank National Economic Indicators and National Estimates for 1994", *World Development Report*, World Bank 1993.

<sup>70</sup> See the country concerned of the *Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 1993/1994*; C. Colclough "Zambia: Economy"; M. Smith Morris, "Mozambique: Economy" and L. Van Buren "Tanzania: Economy" all in *Regional Surveys of the World: Africa, South of Sahara* (London: Europa Publications, 1993)

the financial resources available for the programs inadequate. As a consequence, cuts in public spending in sectors such as education, health, security and defence have been recommended which not only cause socio-political strain but also stimulates chaos.<sup>71</sup> The more vulnerable sectors of the population, mainly in urban areas, are thus forced to live in absolute poverty, as a direct consequence of rises in import prices and interest rates. The poorest sectors of the urban salaried have been unable to benefit from any assistance from the state since this is forced to cut public spending.<sup>72</sup> Governments also feel strained and cannot decide on resource allocation according to what they believe to be a priority. The result of SAPs in many countries has ranged from demonstrations, strikes, absenteeism, to the most violent forms of rioting and looting, as in Zambia in the mid 1980's.<sup>73</sup> Cuts in defence and security spending have prevented governments from addressing some of the basic issues in the security forces such as the improvement of logistics, payment of adequate salaries and the modernisation of armed forces. This makes the maintenance of law and order within the state borders very hard. The situation of permanent instability does not allow for the consolidation of national consciousness and national identity which is crucial for the survival of states. Poor conditions in the security forces have forced some members to abandon the service, to organise mutinies or to protest against low pay and their working harsh conditions.

The strain caused by the implementation of SAPs on the vulnerable sectors of the population also stimulated the emergence of large informal sectors. These sectors often are not subjected to taxation which disrupt the normal market structure. The situation is worsened by the existence of parallel exchange rates which are higher than the official rates and have encouraged bribery, corruption in

---

<sup>71</sup> See *Regional Relations and Cooperation Post Apartheid : A Macro-Framework Study Report SDAC. op cit.* pp. 14-15.

<sup>72</sup> See for example B. Walker and G. Dava, *The Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) In Mozambique*, One World Action Report, September 1994, pp. 3-15.

<sup>73</sup> See for example Austin M. Chakaodza, *Structural Adjustment in Zambia and Tanzania* (London: Third World Publishing Company, 1993).



state institutions and economic inefficiency. Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe show parallel exchange rates higher than the official rates at 500%, 55%, 15 %, 26 %, and 18 % respectively.<sup>74</sup>

One of the striking features reached by any analysis of the Southern African economies is their asymmetry. While the South African economy is 2,5 times larger than the rest of SADC economies taken together, the gap between South Africa and the weakest economies of Malawi and Mozambique and Tanzania and the rest of the region is even larger. Economic asymmetries have a twofold impact. One, is that they may increase fears of domination by the strong economies on weaker economies which hinges on regional arrangements; and, second, it encourages the emergence of economic refugees. Economic refugees emigrate from the poorest and less prosperous countries to the richest and more stable parts of Southern Africa. These most stable parts feel threatened by this emigration since the refugees add to the already existing socio-political strain. South Africa has been an obvious target for economic refugees. It had attracted refugees not only from neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, but also from distant countries such as Angola and Zaire. Economic refugees may encourage domestic unrest and xenophobia, since they are in competition with natives for employment. This may lead governments to pass tough emigration laws which in turn, may jeopardise regional relations.

The other economic legacy worth mentioning is the existence of overlapping and competitive regional integration institutions. The oldest of all is the South African Customs Union (SACU) whose membership comprises, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho Swaziland and Namibia; the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) includes the members of SACU plus Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) includes a total of

---

<sup>74</sup> See, *Africa Analysis Current Checklist*, n-192, 1994a.

19 countries stretching from the Horn of Africa to Southern Africa. Botswana and South Africa are the only non-members.<sup>75</sup> Although conflicting membership exists only between COMESA and SACU, different states have shown preference for membership of some institutions over others. Zimbabwe for instance, the dominant member in COMESA, has tended to show more devotion to this institution than other states in the region, while South Africa decided to join SADC and reject COMESA. However, at the time of writing, South Africa is negotiating new terms for SACU. These negotiations are considering some issues that are dealt with within the framework of SADC, such as energy, transport and communications while SADC is planning to move towards trade liberalisation, an area considered to be SACU and COMESA responsibility. This situation can not but lead to stalemate, unnecessary competition and misapplication of the scarce regional resources. The fact that some countries are members of some institutions while others are not, makes it difficult to maximise regional co-operation and may lead to institutional rivalry. This may force states to opt for bilateral arrangements with South Africa to further their own national interest. Indeed, some countries have proposed the establishment of bilateral trade agreements with South Africa while institutions are working to establish multilateral mechanisms.<sup>76</sup> Apart from pre-empting regional arrangements, this may increase regional inequalities, exacerbate the levels of poverty, domestic and regional conflict.<sup>77</sup>

The socio-political, military and economic legacies discussed above impinge upon the domestic security of Southern African states in a complex web of inter-relations overlapping colonial and recent conflicts. The nature of these conflicts is not easily identifiable in each state. However, the fact that states are

---

<sup>75</sup> See G. Maasdorp, "The Role of the South African Economy in SACU, CMA and Other Regional Organisations", in A.M. Zacarias (ed) *Repensando Estratégias Sobre Moçambique e África Austral*, (Maputo: ISRI), 1990, p. 289.

<sup>76</sup> See R. Davies, *Building a New Relationship in Southern Africa: The Challenge Facing South Africa's Government of National Unity*", A paper prepared for the for United Nations University/ World Institute for Economic Research The New Regionalism and International System, Jerusalem, April 1985, p.5.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6.

weak means that they will have difficulty in maintaining the order and stability necessary for peaceful relations in the region. Weak armies and police make it difficult for states to curb criminal activities, e.g. syndicate crime. Weak states find it difficult to contain national conflicts within national borders. Southern African states will find it hard to prevent the movement of refugees and the spread of dangerous diseases such as AIDS. The disease has already reached epidemic level in some countries.<sup>78</sup> The spread of AIDS puts an additional strain on the already poor health facilities available in the region and threatens the productive force. The number of HIV positive in the region is very high with Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe being the most affected. The most affected age group is that between 20-39, i.e., the most productive population group<sup>79</sup>. The movement of refugees turns the task of controlling AIDS at national levels very difficult and threatens the stability of the entire region.

The situation described above shows that the recipes prescribed to remedy the economic problems of the subcontinent are conflict-prone since they advise strong cuts on the state sector, which implies that the prospects for strong states in Southern Africa are remote. The absence of a strong state will impede economic efficiency since it implies that the distortions of the market cannot be regulated. It will also tend to stimulate domestic conflict reduction since the state will not be able to intervene to correct market imbalances and dislocations. This situation stimulates chaos and an environment of constant unrest and instability. The fact that Structural Adjustment Programs impose reductions on defence and security spending will also curtail the capacity of states to maintain stability, law and order, addressing the question of disarmament of civilians, control of the circulation of illegal weapons, combat crime and violent dissent. Violent dissent becomes a real possibility, particularly in situations where political tolerance has

---

<sup>78</sup>See S. Cross and A. Whiteside, *Facing Up to AIDS: The Socio-Economic Impact in Southern Africa* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p.15

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

not yet been entrenched in the minds of citizens and where socio-economic conditions are appalling. If the situation continues, it is unlikely that foreign investors may be attracted and without foreign investment it is also unlikely that socio-economic conditions may improve.

Certainly the effort to remedy the situation should come primarily from the states concerned and indeed it is impossible to conceive any remedies in which they would not play a primary role. However, what needs to be done seems to go beyond their national capacity.

## **Chapter 5**

### **The Inadequacies of the Traditional Concept of Security**

This chapter re-examines the application of the traditional concept of security in Southern Africa. It argues that states in Southern Africa are weak and unable to act as the sole mediators of relations between domestic societies and the outside world in areas pertaining to security. Indeed, they find it increasingly difficult to provide the most basic public goods. They are also plagued with socio-economic problems - different in each case- that surpass their capacity or are difficult to curb within the confines of the territorial state. This makes the traditional concept of security, which is primarily oriented to deal with external threats and vulnerabilities of the state, difficult to apply.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Part one discusses the inadequacies of the traditional concept. The second section demonstrates why states in Southern Africa are not suitable to implement the traditional concept and why the traditional concept is inadequate for Southern Africa. Section three focus on the endemic nature of domestic problems faced by the state. The chapter argues that the nature of states and their endemic domestic problems are the main difficulty for the application of the traditional concept.

## **The Traditional Concept**

As indicated in Chapter 1, traditionally security is taken to mean the absence of threats, especially military threats to states. It is predicated on the assumption that the insecurity of people living within a given state can only come from outside. It assumes that citizens and all other actors in domestic society agree with both the prevailing order and the nature of justice within their own state. Therefore, in the traditional approach, security is conceived of as the state's ability to preserve its core values; to defend itself from potential aggressors; or to have strong military capability. This idea is best captured in Lipmann's statement:

a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.<sup>1</sup>

The major problem with this conception is that it is "status quo" oriented. The obvious implication when the challenge to the prevailing order and status quo come from within, is that the conception of national security, which is conceptionally outward looking, is not easily applicable. Indeed, when threats to the state come from within its borders, it often redirects its power against internal groups. Under these circumstances, the notion of national security is viewed in terms of one group against the other. Since the traditional concept places an

---

<sup>1</sup> See W. Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown, 1943) p.51

emphasis on power particularly military power, groups who feel threatened by others will seek power superiority or monopoly as a way of assuring their security which is too much war-prone. Because the traditional concept places an emphasis on military power, it also tends to neglect socio-political aspects equally pertinent to security such as social cohesion, economic stability and justice.

Critics such as Walt, have pointed out that military power does not guarantee the well-being either of the individual or of the society and that non-military phenomena can also threaten states and individuals.<sup>2</sup> Hence, any conceptualisation of security that does not entail the well-being of the society and individuals is at best incomplete. In fact, the view that security should be understood as a multidimensional concept that should include topics such as poverty, AIDS, border control, environmental hazards, drugs abuse and the like, is recurrent in recent theoretical international relations literature.<sup>3</sup> Buzan has subdivided the concept into 5 main sectors of social interaction, namely political, military, social, economic and environmental.<sup>4</sup> This subdivision of the concept, although valuable in indicating where the vulnerabilities of the state lie, raises a number of problems:

The subdivision implies that security is divisible to the extent that individuals, communities or states may be able to say that they are secure politically, but insecure economically and socially which is not always possible. In weaker states such as Angola the economic causes of insecurity are so entwined

---

<sup>2</sup> See Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35:3, 1991, pp. 211-239.

<sup>3</sup> See N. Brown, "Climate Ecology and International Security", *Survival*, Vol. 31, 1989, pp. 519-532

<sup>4</sup> Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security In the Twenty First Century" *International Affairs*, Vol. 67:3, 1991, pp. 429 - 431.

with political causes of insecurity and vice versa.. The subdivision also raises the question as to whether a hierarchy of sectors should be established. That is, which aspect of security is more important, economic, political, social or military? By compartmentalising the concept, one misses out on the dynamic of interaction between sectors whose outcome defines security. While the method appears to be useful to establish the different degrees and types of vulnerability of the state, it does not tell us much about the condition of security. In other words, the subdivision undermines the fact that security results because of several interacting factors, military, socio- economic and political.

In addition, Buzan, only recognises the state as a source of security, that security can only be assured within the state framework. He does not acknowledge the autonomous role of individuals and other social forces in affecting the security of others. Because of this, other scholars have suggested that the state, acting alone, is unable to address all the security requirements of its citizens and that development and international co-operation are vital for the attainment of a greater sense of security, at the national, regional and global levels.<sup>5</sup>

Adding to the criticism, Azar and Moon have argued that focusing attention on the security environment and on 'hardware', that is to say, on threats and capabilities respectively, distorts the real security problem of the Third World. More attention needs to be paid to the software side of security, which includes the political context, and policy capacity through which national values are defined and

---

<sup>5</sup> See for example, R. Ulman, "Redefining Security" *International Security* Vol. 8:3, 1983, pp. 129-153; J. Mathews, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 68 n-2, 1989, pp. 162- 179; T. Sorensen, "Rethinking National Security" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69:3 1990, pp. 1-18.



threats and vulnerabilities are perceived.<sup>6</sup> The focus on legitimacy, national integration and policy capacity reveal the complexities involved in defining security in the Third World.<sup>7</sup> This approach is supported by Ayoob who stresses that security should be defined in terms of vulnerabilities that threaten, or have the potential to weaken significantly the state structure, both territorial and institutional.<sup>8</sup> The more a state or regime falls toward the invulnerable end of the vulnerable-invulnerable spectrum, the more secure it is.<sup>9</sup> Although these two approaches shift the focus away from military power, they are still hostage to the competition of the international system in rigid billiard-ball terms. On this view the state is inevitably seen as the single referent object of security. Ayoob's approach is also faced with the difficulty that there is nothing to measure vulnerabilities against that can help to reveal the condition of security. While vulnerabilities of a certain state can be established when that state is compared to another, it is still difficult to establish whether that vulnerability means insecurity to the state in question. In other words, one can only say that referent A is vulnerable in aspect x when compared with referent B, but one can never determine the conditions making A vulnerable when a comparison is not established. In applying Ayoob's concept, in Southern Africa, for example, one would need to agree on the account of what it is to be vulnerable and invulnerable. This would perhaps involve a comparison with strong members of the present society of states. This comparison would necessarily

---

<sup>6</sup> See E. Azar and C. Moon, "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The Software Side of Security" in E. Azar and C. Moon (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Aldershot: Edward Eglar), 1988, pp. 77-98.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> See Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of The Third World" *World Politics*, Vol. 43:2 1991, p. 259.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

lead to the conclusion that communities and states in Southern Africa have reached a status of absolute insecurity due to the number and degrees of vulnerabilities they face. This conclusion would be misleading because states and communities in Southern Africa are not on the verge of disappearing from the international system although they are troubled.

The need to broaden the concept has also been expressed by Southern African scholars who see the end of apartheid as providing an excellent opportunity to redress interstate relations: from relations of confrontation to relations of co-operation.<sup>10</sup> They call for an adoption of a broad concept of security founded on co-operation and development.<sup>11</sup> Others have suggested a framework of co-operation identical to the CSCE/OSCE as a solution.<sup>12</sup> However, little attention has been paid to the agents of this new security thinking. The paradox is that the new thinking criticises state-centrism while it relies on the OSCE institutional framework founded on inter-governmental co-operation. None the less, the question of agents, particularly the state, is fundamental for any conceptualisation of security. And, as it will be shown in the next section its malfunctioning is one of the main reasons why the traditional concept cannot work in Southern Africa.

---

<sup>10</sup> See, L. Nathan, *Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa*, Prepared for Asian Peace Research Conference, New Zealand, 1992; see also A. Du Pisani, "Security and Peace in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa, *International Affairs Bulletin* n- 1992 pp. 5-15; and P. Vale, "The Case for Conference on Security and Co-operation in Southern Africa (CSCSA)" in Van Nieukerk & Van Staden (eds) *Southern Africa at the Cross Roads: Prospects for the Political Economy of the Region* (Bramfontein: SAIIA, 1991), pp. 154 -71.

<sup>11</sup> P. Vale, "The Case for Co-operation in Southern Africa ( CSCA)" *op. cit.*, pp. 154 - 171; see also A. du Pisani, "Security and Peace in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa in *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 16, n.3, 1992, pp. 5-16, South African Institute for International Affairs; A. Du Pisani, *Security and Peace in Post Apartheid Southern Africa*, Paper Prepared for a Conference on *Security and Peace in Post Apartheid Southern Africa*, Arusha, Tanzania, 20-23 July, 1992

<sup>12</sup> See P. Vale, "The Case for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Southern Africa, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 -71; P. Vale, *The Case for Baskets: The Watershed Years* (Cape Town: Leadership Publication, 1991), pp. 152-4; B. Weimer, "South Africa and the Frontline States: From Confrontation to Confidence Building", Harare, *SAPEM Magazine*, August 1990.

## 1. The nature of the state

The fundamental reason rendering the traditional concept of security inadequate in Southern Africa is the nature of the state. While in some parts of Angola and Mozambique the state is not a socio-political reality,<sup>13</sup> in other parts they have been weakened to the point that they only maintain juridical sovereignty. They continue to exist because the rest of the international community continues to recognise them as independent political entities and because their domestic societies have not found alternative sources of order or of the 'common good'. They exist by default rather than by merit. They lack an empirical statehood<sup>14</sup> in the sense of European states. Their capacity to mobilise resources, collect taxes, and provide protection to their citizens is very limited. As Jackson argues, states such as those in Southern Africa have fewer means and resources with which to implement and enforce their decisions and consequently must face harder choices in relation to what they concentrate their resources on.<sup>15</sup>

Jackson's concept of 'quasi- states', however, places states such as Somalia, Lesotho and Angola in the same category, whereas there is a need to distinguish between them. There are states that have collapsed, such as Somalia;

---

<sup>13</sup> State institutions tend to have a strong presence in the capital cities, in urban areas and a weak presence in rural areas. In fact in some remote areas, the state is not represented and it does not provide normal state functions, such as maintenance of law and order, tax collection, and health care, etc. Some of these functions are carried out by local community structures outside the framework of the state.

<sup>14</sup> The term empirical statehood is borrowed from Robert Jackson. See Robert Jackson, *Quasi States, International Relations and the Third World*, *op.cit.*, pp. 26-31.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177.

some regions but not in others, and states whose statehood resulted from the 'benevolence' of international society, such as Lesotho and Swaziland but still enjoy several restrictions on their internal sovereignty such as Lesotho or Swaziland.

Although there is a need to differentiate among states in Southern Africa, there is a common root to many of their problems. They are all states in gestation whose governments find it hard to consolidate and acquire internal legitimacy.<sup>16</sup> Ayoob argues that, contrary to their European counter-parts, states in the Third World have not been allowed sufficient time to consolidate. They are still in the stage of primitive accumulation of power and legitimacy. If they are given a sufficient amount of time they will be able to develop to the extent of the European states.<sup>17</sup>

While the argument about time is plausible, there is no evidence that the situation is likely to improve in the foreseeable future. In fact, the evidence seems to indicate quite the contrary. One of the fundamental factors impeding the consolidation of post-colonial states is the nature of the international system. It has been demonstrated that the European statehood was developed in the context of a competitive international environment, whereby states needed to mobilise resources and collect taxes to continue to defend their existence.<sup>18</sup> This meant that they needed to become infrastructurally strong in order to mobilise resources for war making. In

---

<sup>16</sup> See details in C. Thomas, *In Search for Security, op.cit.*, pp. 15 - 26.

<sup>17</sup> See Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World", *World Politics*, Vol. 43, January 1991, pp. 257-83.

<sup>18</sup> See C. Tilly, "Making and State Making as Organised Crime" in P. Evans, D. Ruechmeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-74.

the process they generally became despotic.<sup>19</sup> Despotism at the domestic level became the way they ensured the eradication of their domestic rivals, strengthened their ability to make war and protected their chief supporters.<sup>20</sup> And war making ensured their continuation in the international<sup>21</sup> system by yielding enemies' armies, navies and supporting services. Their domestic environment had little interference from external forces because in order to defend and protect their existence, they had to eliminate internal opposition by force.<sup>22</sup> Tilly demonstrates how the development of a mercantile class in the European states was a dialectical process: mercantile class strengthened state-making in Europe and vice-versa property owners sought protection of those who had instruments of violence, but in order to provide protection, the owners of instruments of violence needed to develop instruments of surveillance and control within their territory. It was the need to have an organised war making machine that brought fiscal, accounting structures and other institutions into being.<sup>23</sup> Tilly's work is complemented by Stepan's analysis of the rise of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America. He concluded that the repressive methods used by these regimes were important for the reduction of internal opposition and the power of civil society which resulted in the consolidation of state power and ideology.<sup>24</sup> However, statehood in the Southern Africa developed out of the recognition by the international community of the right

---

<sup>19</sup> See, M. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results", *op. cit.*, pp. 109 - 136.

<sup>20</sup> See, C. Tilly, "War Making State Making as Organised Crime", *op. cit.*, p.181.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p.174.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169-74.

<sup>24</sup> See A. Stephan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in Southern Cone of Latin America", in P. Evans, D. Ruechmeyer, and T. Skocpol ( eds) *Bringing the State Back In*, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-340.

to self-determination.<sup>25</sup> Although some nationalist forces confronted armed resistance to their independence, the international environment in which they operated was favourable to their existence provided they accepted the colonial borders and did not threaten already established states.<sup>26</sup> At the time of their creation, they lacked a strong mercantile, or business classes that could finance activities aimed at consolidation of the state. Yet their domestic environment was plagued by rival political claims that impeded governments to articulate all-inclusive national projects. Thus, the contemporary international system presents a different environment than what was the case when most European states developed in the sense that international predators are discouraged. Viable states coexist with unviable, powerful and weak are also allowed to coexist by the system. In most cases, it is not empirical statehood, but the reverse, i.e., juridical that is encouraged by the system.

Although the international environment in which the majority of Southern African states were established was not militarily hostile,<sup>27</sup> it was hostile in many other ways. The right to self-determination was not fully acknowledged by the already established international system. Self-determination was often translated in a right to a territory, a government, and juridical sovereignty, but with little room for empirical sovereignty'. This situation is contrary to the contention made by many international theorists, of an international system consisting of equally sovereign states, with anarchy maximising their independence and allowing room

---

<sup>25</sup> See R. Jackson, *Quasi States, op. cit.*, pp. 22-25.

<sup>26</sup> See, James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Relations, op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>27</sup> The term 'non-militarily hostile' here is used to denote a situation of absence of other state willing to wipe out from the international political map other states as in the Imperial Europe.

for security.<sup>28</sup> Sovereignty for the newly created states in Southern Africa, was limited. Jackson points out, they had a negative concept of sovereignty<sup>29</sup> imposed by a system founded on hierarchical power relations. This is demonstrated, for example, by the difficulties these states had in exercising political freedom. Marxist neighbours were unacceptable to South Africa and the United States and indeed they had strained relations with the majority of Western powers. The system in which new states were to operate and the rules of engagement had already been established and they could not be changed as demonstrated by the oil crises in 1973 and 1979.<sup>30</sup> To maintain international legitimacy and recognition these states had to conform to these rules, yet at the domestic level, competing ideas on how the state should be organised and run and, what issues should have priority left little room for governments to legitimise their policies.<sup>31</sup> The Cold War context in which most of these states were created forced these states to choose sides between the main Cold War contenders, which not only polarised further their domestic societies but increased their vulnerability to the external interference.

This interference compromised the security interests of their domestic societies since issues pertaining to the Cold War took precedence over domestic concerns. Their political space was often transformed into a battle ground of external actors' ideas and interests while their own, were kept in silence.

---

<sup>28</sup> See B. Buzan, "Is International Security Possible?" in K. Booth (ed) *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins), 1990, pp. 31-55.

<sup>29</sup> See Robert Jackson, *Quasi States, op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>30</sup> The attempt by members of OPEC to raise the oil prices was met by the increase in prices in many manufactured goods, that most developing countries could not afford.

<sup>31</sup> See C. Thomas, *In Search of Security, op. cit.*, pp. 10-38.

This interference was facilitated by their economic dependence upon their former colonial powers. Their economies had been conceived as auxiliary to that of their metropolises to which they sold primary commodities. They had to deal with a structure in which trade, banking, shipping, port facilities and insurance were controlled by foreigners.<sup>32</sup>

A variety of factors ranging from inadequate policies, economic sabotage, and indebtedness to natural disasters and wars impeded them from developing.<sup>33</sup> Foreign aid remained the only way they could be maintained in the system. This situation further curtailed their *de facto* sovereignty.<sup>34</sup>

In the 1980's the level of external intervention increased as a consequence of deteriorating social and economic conditions. At the inter-state level, aid conditionality imposed by international financial institutions and foreign governments became one of the most powerful forms of intervention. Aid dependent states in southern Africa lost their decision-making and policy formulation capacity to the point that their national budgets could not be internally agreed prior to consultation with donor institutions.<sup>35</sup> Western states and their agencies ran democratisation programmes as part of their aid programs. These Programs required them to tell recipient governments how to govern their countries, which human rights constituted priority and which did not, under the so called

---

<sup>32</sup> See for example, A. Zacarias in "The New Has to Be Struggled For" *Silver Jubilee Papers n.12*, Sussex Institute of Development Studies, 1991, pp. 3-4.

<sup>33</sup> See for example A. Saville and G. Maasdorp, "SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa", *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5

<sup>34</sup> A *de facto* sovereignty, refers to empirical sovereignty.

<sup>35</sup> States with huge debts who are currently undergoing an IMF/ World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs such as Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have an annual meeting with a group of donor countries which impose cuts in their budgets and define the conditions of rescheduling their debts.



agenda for good governance.<sup>36</sup> They defined how aid money and borrowed money from international donors was to be spent. Therefore they helped to shape domestic politics empowering social agents who they thought would support the prevailing system. This determined the way the polity is organised and gave an international criteria priority over domestic concerns whenever the two were in conflict.<sup>37</sup> Their governments were powerless and unable to produce a centralised source of authority responsive to the needs of different constituencies in their countries.

One of the essential requirements for the emergence of a strong state, is the national consensus especially during the gestation phase. The embryonic phase, as the European case demonstrates, requires an accumulation of central state power rather than its diffusion.<sup>38</sup> However, in situations where national consciousness has not been consolidated and entrenched and where the available resources are not sufficient to assure the subsistence of most members of a society, multipartyism and liberalisation tends to encourage centrifugal forces that seek allies abroad rather than the intended plurality of ideas.<sup>39</sup>

The IMF and World Bank have also been instrumental in undermining the power and domestic legitimacy of these states since their adjustment programmes are based on demands of international markets rather than on needs of domestic societies. Although Maasdorp remarked that 'Sub-Saharan' Africa's economic problems should not be blamed on SAPs and that the position would have been

---

<sup>36</sup>See, Helen O'Connell, *Good Governance: Report on One World Action Seminar*, London, One World Action, 1994, pp. A1-A10.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> See Yossef Cohen, B.R. Brown, and A. F. K. Ogasnki, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, n-4, 1981, pp. 901-910

<sup>39</sup> See details in Marina Ottaway "Democratisation in Collapsed States" in I. W. Zartman (ed) *Collapsed States* (London: Lynne Ryner, 1995), pp. 235-250.

worse without them',<sup>40</sup> their immediate effects have failed to produce incentives for the domestic societies to support them. This further contributes to the inefficiency of the state and to alienation of its population.

Significant interference in the domestic arena is achieved through expatriate Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) and Charity Organisations. The main rationale for their actions is humanitarian due to the incapacity of the state to extend its services to all sections of the society. However, these organisations often have their own policy agendas and often do not design their programs to complement the activities of the state. They usually target certain sectors of a society and certain locations rather than the whole country and society. They are also often unaware of similar efforts made either by the state or other NGO's. This situation has in many instances, resulted in duplication of efforts or implementation of projects that cannot be continued by the state and local community structures. Because the state in some parts of Southern Africa has been unable to provide basic functions to all its citizens such, as education, protection, and health care, including emergency relief, or because it is reckoned to have no financial capacity, it is often alienated and put in a situation in which it has to compete with the external Non-Governmental Organisations for a political space. This situation has also tended to retard the state-making process.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, "The SADC economies Waiting South Africa", *op. cit.*, p. 13

<sup>41</sup> See for example, Reginald H. Green, "Poverty Rehabilitation and Economic Transformation: The Case of Mozambique", Paper presented at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1 November 1990; see also Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots* (London: James Currey) 1991.

The experience of European states cannot be replicated in Southern Africa. The inconvenience of authoritarianism,<sup>42</sup> as a method of state-making although not totally eradicated from the international system, is increasingly being recognised. Authoritarian Marxist regimes, such as those in place in Angola and Mozambique until the 1990's and totalitarian regimes such as those of Malawi, met hostile external opposition. The role of this opposition was instrumental in developing and shaping the internal opposition to authoritarianism.<sup>43</sup> As a result, authoritarian states in Southern Africa found it difficult to maintain the monopoly of violence, and impose themselves on their opponents by force, while they remained heavily dependent economically on external sources. They were therefore forced to yield to external pressures and compromise through constitutional reforms. By the 1990's, authoritarian regimes were regarded as illegal in Southern Africa. Indeed their, continued use was regarded as justification for external military intervention, as the case of October 1994 crisis in Lesotho shows.<sup>44</sup> This, in part, explains the rush towards constitutional reform undertaken by Southern African states at the beginning of the present decade.<sup>45</sup>

In most Southern African states, constitutional reforms came before the consolidation of the bureaucratic state and its institutions. The consolidation of the bureaucratic apparatus would ensure routine state functions in a multiparty domestic

---

<sup>42</sup> Often the term authoritarian is equated with the single party structure. This assumption is not accurate because it implies that power is centralised in one individual, while there are opportunities for decentralisation, and sharing of power in a single party system.

<sup>43</sup> Support, provided by the Soviet-Union and its allies to wage war against dictatorial regimes in the region is well documented, see for example C. Coker, "Proxy Pox and, *op cit.* pp. 573-584. On the other hand it is also known that Renamo, UNITA, FNL and Super ZAPU, LLM received support from external sources to topple their governments under the pretext that these were authoritarian.

<sup>44</sup> Details of this crisis are provided in Chapter 7.

<sup>45</sup> The reforms sweeping across the sub-continent started with Zambia's adherence to multipartyism. It was followed by constitutional reforms in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and Malawi.

arena. However, multipartyism has not led to the efficiency of the state. It has tended to reinforce the interests of political party elites, that is, personal benefits rather than the common good.

The fact that states have not been able to consolidate their power, due either to the present international setting in which it is considered important to comply with the human rights agenda or to continued interference by external agents in their domestic environment impedes them from conceiving of national security in the traditional fashion of protecting domestic society vis-à-vis the outside world. States have been unable to seal-off societies from external threats or to act as the sole mediators of relations between the domestic society and the outside world - e.g. expatriate NGO's interact directly with sections of societies without any control by the state- foreign governments have direct access to their public political arena. economic dependence also poses severe restrictions for autonomous policy development. These states are often on the defensive, left to perform minimal functions. They are thereby rendered unsuitable to carry out the functions of required by the traditional concept of security.

## **2. The endemic nature of problems impinging on Security**

The other reason for the inadequacy of the traditional concept for Southern Africa is the abundance of intractable societal problems within the territorial confines of the state. There are those that are the legacy of 30 years of confrontation, such as low economic performance, the proliferation of light

weapons, large numbers of demobilised soldiers and high levels of crime threatening to spill-over into the entire region. Added to this are patterns of dependency and interdependency resulting from decades of interaction in the area of labour, transport systems and trade; and vulnerabilities caused by the AIDS epidemic, frequent natural disasters such as droughts, cyclones and floods, whose consequences threaten even the most stable parts of the subcontinent. No state has the capability to deal with these issues on its own. They require a transnational approach, while the traditional concept is nationally focused. Syndicate crime involving drugs and light weapons has already been shown to require a co-ordinated strategy and co-operation of the security forces of various states; while the lack of framework for co-operation in the use of region's water resources is already rising tensions between Mozambique and Zimbabwe and between Mozambique and South Africa.

Poor economic performance in the region has been associated with several factors, economic and non-economic. They range from natural disaster, political instability, economic mismanagement to inappropriate macro-economic policies.<sup>46</sup> While some of these factors such as economic mismanagement could well be addressed by individual governments, political instability and natural disasters may not be resolvable within the national frontiers. The political instability of the past was associated with apartheid destabilisation policies, and of the present, with its legacies. Because state macro-economic policies, are largely dependent on foreign exchange availability to stabilise the terms of trade,<sup>47</sup> they cannot be resolved by a

---

<sup>46</sup>See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, "SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa", *op cit.* pp.3-9.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p.8.

single state. Natural disasters such as cyclones, droughts and floods although not predictable, are frequent in the region and states have inadequate capacity for dealing with their effects on their own. The 1992 drought affected the entire subcontinent and required the co-operation of most regional members to deal with its effects.

The proliferation of light weapons and the existence of large numbers of demobilised ex-combatants effected several states. While arms circulate from one country to the other, demobilised ex-combatants pose similar threats, by raising the level of violence and increasing crime in different states. Because of their potential disruption in the entire region, they require a common or a co-ordinated strategy and a co-operation between security forces.

The level of dependence and interdependence is also an important reason for abandoning the traditional concept and embrace a co-operative approach to security. Migrant labour has a long history in the region. From the last century South Africa and Zimbabwe developed into the most dynamic economies and attracted most of the labour from other parts of the region.<sup>48</sup> However, at the beginning of the present century things began to change. South Africa became the only country that continued to attract migrant labour. By the 1970's the number of migrant labourers in South Africa totalled 500,000.<sup>49</sup> This figure however, does not include large numbers of illegal immigrants working in the farms and other industries. The pressures to introduce technological innovation as well as the need to address the

---

<sup>48</sup>See Libby, *The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>49</sup> See Alan Whiteside, "Labour Flows, Refugees, AIDS and the Environment" in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds), *Towards, a Post-apartheid Future, op cit.*, p.156.

growing problem of unemployment within the black population<sup>50</sup> have compelled the South African authorities to reduce drastically the number of immigrants. This is taking place at a moment when the region faces increasing demands for employment opportunities caused inter alia, by population increases and low job creation. Lesotho for instance can only employ 5.7% of its work force, while Zimbabwe, can only provide jobs to 1.6 % of the total of 120,000 leaving school every year, and, the unemployment rates in South Africa among the black communities is over 50%.<sup>51</sup> However, the reduction in the number of foreigners in South Africa has not solved the problems. In fact it has led to an increase in the number of illegal immigrants who are more difficult to control. The dependency of the states of Southern Africa upon South African labour markets, created over the years is not negligible since it is likely to increase the vulnerabilities of some states in case labour relations are radically altered. The increase of misery and crime in these states would be the most likely outcome with a high probability of making whole region unsafe and unstable.

Patterns of dependence and interdependence are also strong in the area of trade. After World War II, South Africa, through its mineral riches, was able to pursue import substitution industrialisation in which the development of manufacturing sector played a key role. As the South African manufacturing sector grew, regional markets became important. South African manufactured products were not competitive in international markets and the lack of transport infrastructure in the

---

<sup>50</sup>See F. de Vletter, "Foreign Labour on the South African Gold Mines : New Insights on an Old Problem" *International Labour Review*, 126(2), 1987. p. 200; see also P. Pillay, "Future Developments in the Demand for Labour by the South African Mining Industry" *International Migration for Employment Working Paper 34*, Geneva : International Labour Organisation, 1987.

<sup>51</sup> See Alan Whiteside, "Labour Flows, Refugees, Aids and the Environment", *op. cit.*, p.159.

region made it difficult for Southern Africa states to access competitive products manufactured overseas. South Africa was able to increase its regional markets for its manufactured products, often selling at almost monopoly prices.<sup>52</sup> In 1990 for example, Southern Africa absorbed about 10 % of South Africa's total exports and around 32 % of its manufactured products,<sup>53</sup> while South Africa absorbed only 5% of the rest of Southern Africa exports. The trade among the other SADC states is also 5%.<sup>54</sup> However, this trade imbalance is unsustainable in the long run, since it is one of the factors responsible for regional economic stagnation. The growth of South Africa's exports to regional markets is significantly affected by the rate of overall growth of the whole region.<sup>55</sup> In fact, it is difficult to see the region growing without an increase in intra-regional trade, particularly the trade with South Africa. For this reason the economic recovery of South Africa is very much tied up to regional markets. These facts point to the need to restructure regional trade and orient towards a more balanced and sustainable economic growth.

The instability of the region is increased by the question of refugees. In 1990 there were over 1,7 million refugees in Southern Africa, in addition to a substantial number of internally displaced people.<sup>56</sup> Most of these were political refugees attempting to escape the horrors of war and destabilisation, but some were

---

<sup>52</sup> See R. H. Green, *How to Add Ten And One: Some Reflections on Attaining Creative Economic Interaction, Between Africa and the New South Africa*, Paper Prepared for Africa Leadership Conference in Windhoek, Namibia, 1991.

<sup>53</sup> See R. Davies "Emerging South African Perspectives on Regional Cooperation and Integration After Apartheid", in Bertile Odén (ed.) *Southern Africa After Apartheid* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1993), p. 73.

<sup>54</sup> See A. Hawkins, "Economic Development in SADCC Countries," in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside, *Towards a Post- Apartheid Future, op. cit.*, pp. 105-131.

<sup>55</sup> See R. Kamplinsky, "The Manufacturing Sector and Regional Trade in a Democratic South Africa", in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds) *Towards a Post-Apartheid Future, op. cit.* p. 98.

<sup>56</sup> See *the Economist*, 23 December 1989; *The Economist*, 4 January 1990.



economic refugees escaping poverty, and natural disasters.<sup>57</sup> Since 1993, the number of political refugees has tended to diminish despite the war that followed the collapse of the first multiparty elections in Angola. However, the number of economic refugees has increased as a direct consequence of economic decline and stagnation. In addition to disrupting the process of development and the stability of their countries of origin, refugees drain the resources of host countries, since they require land, shelter, food and health care which often are not readily available. They also strain the existing infrastructure. Recent developments in the region, especially in South Africa, have proved that economic migration from the less prosperous states to the most prosperous is difficult to control through the policing of borders. It requires a radical and comprehensive strategy which would entail among other things, poverty alleviation, job creation, and a transfer of capital from the most prosperous to less prosperous areas in order to prevent refugees from leaving their countries of origin. Examples such as the agreement between the Government of Mozambique and Afrikaner farmers, to provide the latter with arable land in Mozambique seem likely to produce positive results reinforcing security.<sup>58</sup> Projects of the sort entail the transfer of technology and capital from South Africa to Mozambique and helps to create jobs and increase regional food production. They are therefore likely to stop the flow of refugees from one country to another.

Closely linked with the problem of refugees is the question of natural disasters which are frequent Natural disasters have frequently destroyed social and

---

<sup>57</sup> See A. Whiteside, "Labour Flows, Refugees, and Environment" in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds) *Towards a Post Apartheid Future op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

<sup>58</sup> See *AIM Report*, London, Mozambique News Agency, n-65, 24 August 1995.

economic infrastructures and reduced agriculture and livestock production, hence affecting the capacity for food security.<sup>59</sup> Natural disasters, have also caused environmental stress by destroying habitats and ecosystems and forcing populations and animals to migrate. They force the resettlement of these populations in new areas not previously destined for habitation and agricultural production. The resettlement of populations has often led to environmental damage such as deforestation, imposed by the need to farm land for agriculture purposes and the need for energy.<sup>60</sup> This further leads to prolonged droughts and desertification. Poverty has prevented adequate protection and rational utilisation of the environment, thus, jeopardising the long term survival of the human species.

The rational utilisation of the environment is further hampered by the focus on national interest which is also likely to produce conflict. The claims of Zimbabwe and Mozambique on the use of Pungue water resources provides a stark example of possible conflictual situation. Zimbabwe wants to use Pungue river to supply the city of Mutare. However, this would reduce the flow into Mozambique thus affecting the water supply to the Mozambique's second largest city, Beira. Low river flow would also mean that the sea water from Mozambique could reach further areas upstream which would destroy sugar cane plantation in the Mafambisse region.<sup>61</sup> Resolving problems such as these requires looking beyond the national borders and state self-fulfilling interests.

---

<sup>59</sup> See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, *SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa op. cit.*, p.13.

<sup>60</sup>See R. K. Dutkiewicz, *Progress Report of the Energy Sector*, prepared for the Southern African Fund for Economic Research (SAFER), Energy Research Institute, University of Cape Town, 1992.

<sup>61</sup> See *AIM Report*, London: Mozambique News Agency n-65, 24 August, 1995.

The AIDS epidemic is also an important threat to regional security. AIDS drain resources and threatens the productive capacity of states and therefore their existence. Although there are only two states in the region which the disease has reached the level of an epidemic, Malawi and Tanzania,<sup>62</sup> the lack of adequate resources coupled with constant flow of refugees and illegal migrants make it difficult to control the spread of the disease thus threatening to expand to the entire region.

The issues discussed above, namely, the weak nature of states and their ability to act as the main mediators of relations between domestic societies and the outside world; the endemic nature of the socio-political and economic problems which impinge on security make the traditional concept of security inadequate for Southern Africa. Below a new concept of security, which seems more likely to lead to stability is introduced.

---

<sup>62</sup> See D. W. Fitzsimons, The Global Pandemic of Aids in S. Cross and Alan Whiteside (ed.) *Facing Up to AIDS: The Socio Economic Impact in Southern Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-33.

**PART III**  
**TOWARDS NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITY**

## **Chapter 6**

### **Towards a New Concept of Security**

This chapter introduces a new way of thinking and approaching security in light of the present reality in Southern Africa. It argues that because security problems in the region are endemic and interconnected in a complex web of interdependencies, security is best approached from theoretical perspectives and philosophical idealism pertaining to the 'good life'. Since security also implies predictability of the 'good life', these theoretical perspectives should place an emphasis on processes and structures that can assure this predictability.

In the new approach it is assumed that human beings are the only referent objects of security rather than states as in the traditional concept. However, this assumption, in itself is not sufficient to guarantee security. It is the quality of structures that mediate the relationship between human beings, processes and mechanisms designed to assure security that matter. These play an important part in the creation of environment for security. Therefore building security in an environment such as Southern Africa, implies focusing primarily on processes.

The point of departure in this enquiry are questions raised by Buzan regarding national security in the Third World. In discussing Buzan's ideas in this section, my intent is to show why his analysis is an inadequate basis for reconceptualising security in the subcontinent. Buzan's main argument is that domestic threats in the Third World cannot be considered part of national security,

since they are endemic in states with no machinery for political succession<sup>1</sup>. He suggests that it might be easier to apply the concept of state security as opposed to national, for the conditions of the Third World countries, since the former is less ambiguous than the latter . It 'puts more emphasis on the state as centralised governing organisation, and less on individuals and social groups existing within the state'.<sup>2</sup> For Buzan, national security means "the security of whole socio-political entity. It is about country as well as about states. It concerns the way of life, of self governing people, including their social, cultural, political and economic modes of organisation and their right to develop themselves under their own rule"<sup>3</sup>. Buzan concludes his analysis observing that "because the countries of the Third World are mostly weak states, it is much harder to identify the referent object of security than in the case of strong states of the West ... under such conditions national security may define a long term aspiration but is not achievable in short term and it does not anyway capture the revisionist aspirations that govern policy in many Third World countries"<sup>4</sup> In an earlier work, Buzan indicated that the term 'national' implies that the referent object of security is the nation<sup>5</sup>. He is clearly aware of the tensions raised by the question of national security, that is, whether it pertains to state or nation. In an attempt to resolve these issues he sees the nation-state, as one in which political boundaries coincide with ethnic and cultural boundaries, and he regards this coincidence as the ideal source for national security<sup>6</sup>: "when the territories of the state and nations coincide, one can look for the purpose of the state

---

<sup>1</sup> See Barry Buzan, "The National Security Problem in the Third World", *op. cit.*, p. 23

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid* , p.16

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41

<sup>5</sup> See B. Buzan *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op.cit.* p.70. Buzan works with a concept of nation understood as a ;a group of people sharing the same cultural, and possibly ethnic and racial heritage, who normally constitute the majority population of the same core territory.

in the protection and expression of an independently existing cultural entity”<sup>7</sup>. Buzan stresses that the concept of national security becomes harder to define as one goes from strong states (those with strong social cohesion) to anarchic states ( those with very weak or no cohesion at all), because an obvious referent of national security can not be found<sup>8</sup>.

Buzan’s argumentation raises a number of questions. First is whether it makes any sense to define the concept of national security in such a rigid and narrow manner, denying the countries of the Third World to aspire to it in the short term. Buzan’s preference to work with the concept of state security in the Third World also raises a number of questions: first, whether the concept of state security gives a better account of what security entails in this part of the globe; second, whether the differences he observes in the nature of states are sufficient to justify the preference for state security; and third, whether the concept of state security offers better insights of approaching security in the Third World.

Viewing national security in Buzan’s terms is problematic and misleading. Indeed, it is difficult to substantiate his argument. European and the Third World History is full of examples of coalitions that were especially formed to face up to external threats. These were not threats directed to state machinery. Governments mobilised coalitions because the threats were seen to be directed at all individuals living in a certain territory and their way of life, regardless of whether or not this was homogeneous. Unravelling the question of the way of life in Western societies, does not always points to homogenous cultural expression that needs to be defended from external threats. Often in these societies, there are different and most times

---

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p.19.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p.70.

<sup>8</sup>See B. Buzan, “The National Security Problem in the Third World”, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

competitive ways of life. Those who think of themselves as belonging to the Moslem nation in the USA, they see their way of life different from that defended by Republicans and they do not seem to share the view point that their security is threatened from outside. A similar argument can be made with respect to a large number of inhabitants of Quebec. Both the US and Canada cannot be expected to ignore questions pertaining the internal order in their discussions of national security.

The argument is also misleading in other respects. It cannot be substantiated, on very solid grounds, that the primary referent of security in Japan is more clearly defined than in the United States, because the former is a nation-state and latter is not<sup>9</sup>; and it is difficult to show why and how a nation-state such as Denmark would be a better source for security than a state nation, such as Switzerland. The flaw in the argument arises from the fact that Buzan works with a very rigid concept of nation, which is far removed from the reality of the present world. He seems to rely upon the notion that ethnic and linguistic and cultural affinity leads to a greater socio-political cohesion, hence to a greater security. There is a lack of historical and actual evidence to support this view. Indeed, while the idea of strong social cohesion seems essential for a number of individuals to think of themselves as a community it does not follow from here that nation-states are better sources for national security. The term civil war is itself a denial of this line of argument and it describes wars fought within nations such as the English civil War in the seventeenth century and the Portuguese civil war (1832-1834). Both were wars fought within the same nation.<sup>10</sup> The category 'Bosnians' as opposed to

---

<sup>9</sup> Buzan considers the US a state-nation and not a nation-state

<sup>10</sup>See details in Gerald Bender *Angola Under the Portuguese, Myth and Reality*, *op. cit.*, p.63.



'Moslems' used in Bosnia Herzegovina, was invented to distinguish people who shared a cultural heritage, language, history and ancestry.<sup>11</sup> On these grounds, the primary outward orientation of the concept of national security, to deal with external threats becomes absurd. Indeed, nations fought civil wars to define the national interest, i.e., to define what is 'national' and in this sense national security is about the national question, what binds the nation together. Moreover, the idea of nation-states as the best referents of national security is also inadequate since pushed to the extreme, it means that ethnic cleansing is a pre-condition for security. The implication of this is an international system composed of smaller units, often politically and economically unviable which could not escape stronger predators. Buzan's criteria leads inevitably to the conclusion that there can be no security in the Third World, until nation-states or 'strong states' are formed.<sup>12</sup> It should also be added that there are no obvious reasons as to why the concept of national security would work better in the Third World, since state-making has proved difficult as nation-building<sup>13</sup>

Buzan's concept of national security is very much centralised on the state and it treats it as a completely separate entity, which has little to do with society at large. It does not pay sufficient attention to actors that do not approximate to either state or nations; or those within the state that have an influence on security, while human collectivities organised along the lines of ethnicity, gender, class and other

---

<sup>11</sup>This is the current definition of nation. See details in A. D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 14.

<sup>12</sup>Strong States in Buzan's conception means those with strong socio-political cohesion. See Buzan *An agenda for International Security Studies*, pp. 96-97.

<sup>13</sup>See Caroline Thomas, *In Search for Security the Third World and International Relations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-35.

interests have generated security concerns.<sup>14</sup> Indeed Buzan's concept of national security subordinates individual security to states and inter-state relations. As Smith observes, Buzan sees states as ontologically prior to other candidates.<sup>15</sup> The problem with this is that the collectivities of human beings or individuals are prevented from knowing what is going on with regard to their security until they are constituted in states or nations, while they may be daily preoccupied with their survival. It should also be noted that his observation about the sources of insecurity in the domestic arena of the Third World countries is under-explored. Buzan assumes that insecurity in these countries is solely caused by illegitimacy of governments, ethnic rivalry, and adoption of wrong ideology, a view too simplistic to represent the whole Third World. Yet, the Third World security problems also include economic development, state and nation-building, excessive external dependence, and interference interacting in complex webs. This observation suggests the absence of obvious reasons why a concept of state as opposed to national would work better in the Third World. Buzan's view of national security as a concept organising around the nation does not reflect the present world. An alternative view could be derived from James Mayall's proposition of the national idea<sup>16</sup>. On the basis of this proposition national security would not necessarily have an external orientation. It would continue to deal with classical issues such as territorial integrity, sovereignty, lives and cultures of the people,<sup>17</sup> but would also seek to value, consolidate and protect what holds together the community that

---

<sup>14</sup> Here the term national security is used in a loose sense as pertaining to the community living in a certain territory. It has also to do with the way of life, and values, but is not necessarily externally oriented.

<sup>15</sup> Steve Smith, 'Mature Anarchy', quoted in Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives*, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>16</sup> See James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, *op. cit.* p.3.

<sup>17</sup> See B. Buzan, *The National Security Problem in the Third World*, p.24.

shares the same territory and aspirations as a result of the national idea. These are as important as the classical issues. Buzan's concept of national security is essentially state centric and top down preoccupied only with the external environment. However "states are diverse in character, and some are in business of security while others are not", as Booth observes.<sup>18</sup> In fact, in parts of Southern Africa states are still being built. This makes Buzan's analysis an inadequate basis for the reconceptualisation of the concept in Southern Africa.

Ayoob tries to deal with Buzan's query by shifting the focus of his analysis to vulnerabilities and threats. He sees security as the absence of these in the economic, political and social spheres. He believes that internal threats and vulnerabilities become part of national security if they are acute enough to take on political dimensions, threatening state boundaries, state institutions or regime survival<sup>19</sup>. Ayoob, is only interested in the nature of threats and vulnerabilities where these are capable of affecting the status quo. He is not interested in the conditions that lead to security, which makes it difficult to understand conceptually security. Like Buzan he sees the security of human beings as subordinate to and derived from the state.

Ayoob, like Buzan, deals with the negative definition of security: 'the absence of threats and vulnerabilities' which can only lead to reactive and short term problem solving approaches rather than the conceptual ones. Thus, his approach fails to capture the diversity of people's aspirations and concerns since the concept of vulnerability loses its heuristic value.

---

<sup>18</sup> See Ken Booth 'Security and Emancipation', *op. cit.*, p. 320.

<sup>19</sup> See Mohamed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World", *World Politics*, Vol. 43 January 1991, p.259.

The negative conception of security, coupled with state centrism and outward looking primary orientation are reasons behind Buzan's doubts whether or not internal threats in the Third World are part of the national security. If there is a shift on the focus from the state to people, as suggested by Booth, it will not be difficult to see that domestic threats are part of national security. This is because the primary referent then becomes the entire population living in a state<sup>20</sup>.

There is therefore a need to move from the negative to positive conception of security which implies a change on the focus from the state to the political process as a source of security and a change of the primary referent from the state to people, since as Bull argues individuals are:

“...the ultimate units of the great society... individual human beings which are permanent and indestructible in a sense in which groupings of them of this or that sort are not”<sup>21</sup>

This view is echoed by Vale and Booth who, inspired by the Kantian idea, that people should be treated as ends and not means, argue that security should be viewed as emancipatory, a freedom from any political constraints to fulfil human aspirations.<sup>22</sup> Using this proposition, I define security as a condition of continuous fulfilment of human aspirations as guaranteed by a certain enabling environment, in which the human beings who inhabit it, are assured that it will not be disrupted especially by human action. However, making the assertion that security is about human beings is not sufficient. The ultimate object of security for Hobbes and other realists would still be human beings, yet security was not assured. Therefore,

---

<sup>20</sup> I do not use the word ‘national’ in a strict sense of Buzan. I use it to refer to an concerning internationally recognised territorial boundaries.

<sup>21</sup> See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical society*, *op.cit.* p.22.

<sup>22</sup> See, P. Vale and K. Booth, Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism, *International Affairs*, Vol. 71: 2, 1995, pp. 285-304.

placing human beings at the centre of the conception requires reinforcing conditions enabling human beings to realise security. But, in order to better understand the nature of these conditions there is a need to address the question of foundation of security. The concept of security, discussed below, may be applicable to other parts of the world, but as Southern Africa is my subject, I will confine my discussion to this region.

### **The foundations of the concept of Security and their relationship**

The notion of security rests on three pillars: order, justice and peace. The term order here refers to a predictable pattern of relations which may or may not involve a hierarchy. This pattern is achieved through a commitment of individuals to a certain level of repression. The repression we are talking about here is minimal and it is aimed at assuring the existence of an organised society at all. It is distinct from surplus repression, i.e, one aimed at assuring a particular sort of society.<sup>23</sup> The difference is fundamental since the latter tends to limit severely freedom and creativity. As Marcuse observes, in the absence of surplus repression, basic human needs and drives are transformed from being egotistical and self-centred to co-operative and creative<sup>24</sup>. Co-operation and creativity are essential to security, since no human being, alone, is capable of realising all human necessity by him/herself. However, co-operation and creativity are unlikely to bring fruits to bear in the society in the absence of an organised framework. What makes an organised framework, different from a non-organised one is the existence of order, rules and

---

<sup>23</sup> See Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilisation* (London: Sphere) 1969, p. 203

<sup>24</sup> Cited in Raymond Plant, *Modern Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell) 1992, p.63

norms that govern the behaviour of its members. Order can not be achieved if members do not regulate their behaviour by agreed norms and rules founded on certain principles. In the absence of norms competitive and individual desires may take precedence over society goals. In a an environment in which everyone behaves according to his/her competitive instinct and desires there can be no common accepted principles. The non-existence of common principles results in chaos, lack of common expectations and predictability<sup>25</sup>. However, common expectations are important for the predictability of relations and an assurance that obstacles for the fulfilment of human aspirations, i.e. security can be overcome.

The concept of justice fits Gallie's description of essentially contested concepts. As he explains, these are "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper use on the part of their users".<sup>26</sup> The implication is that it is very difficult to arrive at any conception which is substantially founded, value free and neutral. Partly because the concept of justice is shaped by many factors, material and non-material, and subject to many interpretations of a subjective nature, which depend upon perceptions and culture, it is often seen as contextual and not automatically replicable. Never the less, justice is one of the most prevalent political virtues at core of any societal life. It is the basis of order and it determines the stability of relations in a society. The concept of justice is prominent and overriding in social life yet it is so contested. This makes it difficult to present a view of justice widely accepted, that can claim neutrality before rival claims<sup>27</sup> Because there are different levels of analysis and different spheres where the concept operates it makes people see it differently. There are

---

<sup>25</sup> See Evan Luard, *International Society* (London: MacMillan, 1990), pp. 61-65, 201.

<sup>26</sup> See W.B. Gallie, *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding* (London: Chatto and Winds 1964) p.158 the argument is developed in the entire chapter, 8 ,i.e., pp .157-191.

<sup>27</sup> See Tom Campbell, *Issues in Political Theory* ( London: MacMillan 1988), p. 3.

those who adopt a legalistic view, seeing it as concept only valid within a certain legal framework.<sup>28</sup> There are also those who look at justice as a 'set of principles assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and defining the appropriate distribution of benefits and the burdens of social co-operation,<sup>29</sup> or as a summation of social values achieved through dialogue or justice as rights.<sup>30</sup> Never the less, each of these views, carries the risk of arriving at a restrictive analysis which excludes rival claims. However, by no means should this be taken to suggest that an agreement on a collective view of justice can not be reached. Indeed, the evidence suggests quite the contrary. Collective views have been arrived at by imposition, indoctrination, education and dialogue. However, these can be of different nature and their impact on security is varied. They can be restrictive, contentious and unpopular thus, leading to insecurity as the apartheid system; or widely accepted, less contentious and popular such as the idea of equality among sovereigns thus leading to security. However, there are collective views of justice which are widely accepted that can lead to disasters. The 'ethnocide' in Rwanda conducted by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority, although it can be considered an exceptional extremist case, reveals some of the risks carried by some collective views of justice. These risks can be minimised by grounding the collective views on principles that value human beings; encouraging processes that are all-inclusive and by the creation of institutions that can promote and protect human values. However because justice is such a contested concept, a collective view which will bring order can be obtained only through the definition of a

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>29</sup> See J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.4.

<sup>30</sup> cited in Tom Campbell, *Issues in Political Theory op.cit.*, pp. 36-57, 96-117.

framework and overarching rules within which people can conduct the inevitable disputes over the meaning of justice.

Like justice the term peace can be employed to mean different things: the classic absence of war; peace as justice; peace as stability and tranquillity, peace as order;<sup>31</sup> absence of structural violence<sup>32</sup> or a political process of conflict management.<sup>33</sup> However, in all these cases it refers to the minimal condition of understanding between real or potential adversaries in which co-operative effort becomes possible. Implicit in the condition of absence of war, is the fact that former contenders co-operate by complying to the rules of coexistence; while the present absence of structural violence in South Africa means that blacks and whites may co-operate in carrying out society interests together. Similar meaning could be ascribed to the understanding of peace as justice, stability or process of conflict management.

When these concepts are reduced to their practical meaning their common denominator is the possibility for co-operative effort. When it is said that a peace accord has been signed in Angola it does not mean that the conflict that opposed the MPLA government to UNITA has been resolved, that they have reached tranquillity or that they have reached an equitable, i.e. 'just' redistribution of wealth. It means that parties to the conflict have committed themselves to undertake certain actions that will allow members of Angolan society, to pursue collectively in different ways, society interests, that is, they have created a basis for co-operative effort between members of the society. Peace is essential to security because it defines

---

<sup>31</sup> See different perspectives of peace in Howard Kainz (ed) *Philosophical Perspectives on Peace: An Anthology of Classical and Modern Sources* (London MacMillan, 1987); see also Michael Banks, "Four Conceptions of Peace", *op. cit.*, pp. 258-274.

<sup>32</sup> See Johan Galtung, "Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969, Vol. 6:3 pp.167-191.

<sup>33</sup> See M. Banks, "Four Conceptions of Peace", *op. cit.*, p. 269.



the environment in which co-operation, creativity and predictability of life becomes possible. In fact the relationship between these three pillars to security is symbiotic. Order is important because it provides the framework for the realisation of justice; while justice legitimises the existing order; and, peace provides the comfort that the virtues of justice can be enjoyed, that is to say, the assurance, that human beings can realise their aspirations. However, framing the problem in this way is not sufficient, building security in Southern Africa is finding the right equation as much as devising solutions.

These three pillars, order justice and peace need to coexist in a society, in a condition of equilibrium in order for security to be realised. They are therefore the building blocks of the environment for security. No state or community can claim to have reached security without these three pillars coexisting in a condition of equilibrium. By equilibrium, I mean that they should lead to stability by not undermining each other.

States that tended to see security as synonymous with order, particularly Hobbesian order and neglect justice, such as the Soviet Union, failed to create this environment; while those that insisted in a certain type of justice such as South Africa and Rwanda during Habyarimana<sup>34</sup>, have also failed to provide the environment for security. On the other hand, communities which insisted on a certain type of peace that tended to ignore order and justice; and sought absolute harmony, personal tranquillity and absence of conflict, such as advocated by the hippies in the late 1960's failed to achieve security. As Michael Banks observes, "their practice was not more than self-indulgent diversion, since conflict in a

---

<sup>34</sup>Habyarimana undertook a policy of discrimination against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda on the basis that he was doing justice to the Hutu Majority. See for example, Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of Genocide* (London: James Currey, 1996), pp. 74-92.

society is both inevitable and necessary and pretending that it does not exist does not solve the problems of the society”.<sup>35</sup> However, the observation that conflict is necessary is open to question as it requires clarification as to what level of conflict is tolerable and necessary. Clearly, violent conflict is undesirable, and indeed some levels of conflict has to be accepted in the interest of open society and freedom and certainly preferable to the theoretical security that might be provided by a totalitarian regime.

The equilibrium among pillars is not static; it is a dynamic one. It changes over time. It changes because perceptions change. People’s concerns, priorities and interests change over time and the environment has to be able to accommodate these changes. In fact in the process of interaction with the environment different people will attempt to influence it to their advantages and according to their capabilities, in most diverse ways. In this attempt, the pillars are affected and change. The Hobbesian conceptions of order and peace, the idea of colonial domination, or the division of labour between man and women once regarded as just are today rejected in most states. Providing it is assumed that justice is an essentially contested concept, order a result of regulated pattern of laws and rules and that peace is a process of conflict management these changes should not surprise us. The changes express the evolutionary character of the society. The pillars also affect each other in their interaction and this allows their mutual accommodation. That is to say, the view of what constitutes justice in a society requires to be accommodated by the intended order and the conditions of peace and vice-versa. However, in order to produce an environment for security, the change in

---

<sup>35</sup> See Michael Banks, “Four Conceptions of Peace” *op. cit.*, p. 260.

the conceptions should not disrupt the equilibrium among the pillars. On these grounds, it is argued that the security of people is realised if the environment resulting from this process of interaction and change can still assure the same or better conditions for fulfilment of human aspirations. Approaching security from inquiring about its environment, allow us to learn a little bit more about the effect of the policies that have been devised and the structures on the collectivity of human beings living in territorial state. Having defined and discussed how security should be approached I will now turn to the question how the coexistence of order, justice and peace can be assured.

### **How to guarantee an equilibrium between pillars ?**

The equilibrium among pillars, that is to say, the creation of an environment for security is assured by the quality of the political process, that is, an interaction amongst various social agents aimed at making decisions that affect all. The nature of the political process determines what should guide the functioning of the society and which values are important and need protection. It defines the allocation of resources, which development projects may be executed, the size of the army and police force and the priorities. The political process ultimately determines whether or not there will be peace; whether or not the existing order is favourable for justice and whether or not the existing notion of justice is widely accepted so as to legitimise the existing order. Therefore building security implies concentrating on the improvement of the quality of the political process, since this is the ultimate determinant of the security environment.

By a political process, here, I mean the interaction amongst various social agents (state and non-state), aimed at reaching decisions about society goals. In order to ensure security this process needs to allow predictability that there will not be an impediment in the realisation of human aspirations. In other words, the process needs to be effective in dealing with society problems and responsive to its aspirations.

The implication for Southern Africa is the acceptance of the principle of replacing old values, those inspiring conflict, war and instability by those inspiring peace, stability and prosperity. There is also a need of assuring the compatibility of these values among people and societies. This can be achieved through building institutions that can propagate and protect these values and ensuring the participation of most in the decision-making process and common culture. Common values are important because they provide the reason why a society should remain together; aspirations provide the motivation to strive for these values. Finally, culture provides symbols that help to shape identities that bind together a society. It has been demonstrated that symbolic acts of powerful forces can lead to the emergence of culture of war. These may include the manipulation of sentiments of citizenry by honouring or rewarding those willing to fight and punishing those who are reluctant; indoctrinating youngsters, or creating role-models to be emulated thus influencing the behaviour of other members. These symbolic acts and processes help to change the belief system of a community or a society<sup>36</sup>. As M. LeCron Foster observes, 'warfare is not a natural phenomenon like earthquakes and floods; it is a human institution, institutionalised and sustained by means of symbolic

---

<sup>36</sup>See Walter Goldschmidt, *Inducement to Military Participation in Tribal Societies* in Robert A. Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster (eds) *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict: Culture in International Security* (Boulder: Westview), p. 58.

structures which are mutually reinforcing<sup>37</sup>. The implication is that this symbolic structure can be changed by the conscious effort of members of the society. Most cultures have changed over time as a result of new perceptions, influence or by revolution. The compelling reason for changing a symbolic structure is the fact that people in Southern Africa share a recent history of decades of confrontation, destruction and racial hatred. This recent history has resulted in nothing but insecurity and economic backwardness. It is therefore an example of what should be avoided. A deep-seated culture of peace is likely to deter individuals and communities from resorting to violence in settling their disputes; offending each other; nations from waging wars against others. It is the ultimate tool providing confidence to all members of the society that war and violence are not an option. The point being made here is that security is not a self-creating structure. It is built through a conscious effort of the community of people recognising the benefits of living in a society and strive for its betterment. Building security in this sense requires engaging in a conscious effort of shaping the environment for it, that is to say, reinforcing, peace, order and justice and their coexistence. The experience shows that societies founded on principles of pluralism and tolerance, of either Western or non-western character, an equilibrium among order, peace and security is more likely, while those founded on authoritarianism and totalitarianism the equilibrium is undermined, and conflicts and instability have occurred.<sup>38</sup> This observation suggests that there are compelling reasons for encouraging processes promoting pluralism, full participation and all-inclusiveness especially in

---

<sup>37</sup> See Mary LeCron Foster, "Expanding the Anthropology of Peace and Conflict" in Robert A. Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster (eds), *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict, Culture in International Security, op. cit.*, p. 188.

<sup>38</sup> Here I am referring to the developments of the beginning of the 1990's that sought to replace authoritarianism, and one party system by pluralism. For a general reference of the argument, see Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (London: Routledge, 1995).

fragmented societies, or with history of civil war such as those of Southern Africa. In fact the promotion of tolerance and pluralism in these societies is part and parcel of building security. Exclusive process or those that are not transparent are likely to generate conflicts, while those encouraging ample participation and transparency tend to be more stable. Openness and transparency accord legitimacy to the process, while ample participation assures that the diversity of ideas and interests is taken into account. Transparency also allows members of the society to understand the process, to recognise its strengths and weaknesses, to question it or to propose changes. Processes that are open, flexible, all-inclusive and transparent are in better position to accommodate changes, since they guarantee an independence of opinion, creativity and freedom either to concede or to extend solidarity to other members of society. Voluntary concessions and solidarity reduce polarisation and fragmentation and allow unity around common objectives, which enhances stability. In the final analysis, the quality of the political process will be assessed through, the values it promotes, its openness, transparency and its ability to meet society's goals. However, these objectives cannot be guaranteed if the quality of agents can not be assured. The quality of agents is important in the process of building security since these are the mediators of relationships of human beings. In fact the notion of the 'good life' and the question of its predictability can not be addressed without discussing the nature of agents, an issue that I discuss in the next section.

## **The Nature of Agents:**

### **1. Changing the Nature of the State**

The new proposition of approaching security, forces a re-examination of the nature of agents since these, as I argued above, play an important role in defining the environment for security. Indeed, a pertinent question, at this juncture, is who are the agents of the new approach? Does the state in Southern Africa, given its weakness and inability to resist the pressure of the international system, act as a source of domestic 'common good' and have a role to play? Weberians might even argue that some states in Southern Africa, lack some of the main conditions of statehood, such as the monopoly of instruments of violence and a capable bureaucratic machinery. Others might also argue, convincingly, that the state does not have a full autonomy in establishing the concept of order it wishes as it is forced to negotiate domestic conditions with other actors in the international system; and that the prevailing concepts of order, justice, and peace in the domestic societies are thus, sanctioned by various foreign actors.

However, despite these objections the answer to the same question is yes; the state continues to have a fundamental role. In fact it would be untenable to suggest that any political community can be viable in the present international system without meeting the fundamental criterion of being a state. It is merely the primacy of the state in any given circumstances as a referent or source of security that is questionable. As pointed out above, understanding security and the concept of national security in terms of individuals versus the state is an inadequate rendering of the problem. Both the state and the individuals living within its boundaries, form a collective entity whose relations are mediated by many agents including the state. The state should be seen rather as a facilitator of relations

among human beings and security a result of these relations. In this context the state is important for the creation of an orderly environment reducing the injustices and inequalities in the society. It is still an important instrument for various social agents such as classes, interest groups, corporations, individuals, etc., who can not find a better alternative to it as a source of the common good. These social agents find it important to operate in a legal framework created by the state and want it to legitimise their activities, despite the disputes in regard of whether or not it can adequately perform certain functions. Transnational corporations seek state protection for their interests in the domestic environment but especially abroad and the claimants of justice resort to it in their plea for justice in the domestic arena.<sup>39</sup>

Other members of the international society still regard the state as an important counterpart to mediate their interaction with domestic societies elsewhere. Tasks such as the maintenance of order, observance of international conventions and rules and maintenance of peace still cannot be entrusted to other entities than states. For other members of the international system, the state is the only guarantor that order among domestic social agents will prevail or, if mutated, international rules will be obeyed. As Fred Halliday observes, revolutions and social upheavals make established states apprehension.<sup>40</sup> In other words, states prefer homogeneity in the international society as it legitimises their domestic social orders, as the example of Southern Africa suggests. In the 1980's Marxist regimes in Southern Africa became intolerable for the system; in the 1990's the single party states were forced to organise multiparty elections and undertake economic

---

<sup>39</sup> See Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda" *op. cit.* p. 200-203.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204



liberalisation<sup>41</sup>. In fact the debate surrounding the state is more about the type and quality of the state rather than the attempts to find alternatives for it. The implication being that rather than supplanting the state, there is a need to improve its quality, make it more legitimate and effective in the role that it is assigned to it.

As we saw in chapters 1 and 4, states in Southern Africa have been illegitimate partly due to their colonial history, and partly due to the bipolar structure of the international system, which tended to privilege, in their domestic society, the interests of the great powers rather than of their peoples. However, the waning of the Cold War brought a new international environment, while the demise of apartheid brought a new climate offering a window of opportunity for restructuring relations and making states more legitimate.

The state will be legitimate if it is seen as protecting the interests and aspirations of its citizens and act as a source of their 'common good' and it will be effective if it can assure that citizens problems and aspirations are dealt with in the most satisfactory manner. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state are important for the quality of the political process, and as mentioned above, this legitimacy is not acquired only by what the state does or purports to do, but how it does it. What makes the difference in the quality of the state are ideas, institutions, leadership and values that sustains it. Ideas are important to identify what the region needs in long term in order to feel secure and leadership to undertake concrete actions leading to where people desire to be. Southern Africa offers few examples of this capacity and leadership in dealing with its problems as epitomised by the

---

<sup>41</sup> Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia were single party states and pressure was exerted on them by external state and non-state actors to undertake political and economic liberalization.

way regional conflicts and the question of apartheid were solved.<sup>42</sup> In fact, a few years ago it was difficult to imagine a peaceful transition in South Africa from apartheid to a multiracial democracy. It required leadership to lay down the fundamental steps for peace and courage to implement them. Leadership was also required for settling most regional conflicts, by identifying concrete steps leading to peace, either by disarming rival armed groups or creating conditions for their transformation into political parties or pragmatism that demanded political concessions.<sup>43</sup> Leading ideas are also required in identifying concrete steps leading to security.

As most experiences show, however, leadership alone is insufficient. It needs to be complemented by the action of institutions with the capability of putting ideas into practice and suggesting policies that make these ideas more effective. Institutions are also key for the promotion and protection of society values. This implies that governments have a special task of strengthening states institutions. These institutions are in the final analysis, the ultimate guarantors of the quality of the political process. It is through their activities that it can be assessed whether or

---

<sup>42</sup> In 1980, the independence of Zimbabwe was achieved. It required holding talks at Lancaster House in London which included observers of the region about the future of Zimbabwe; In 1984, two accords were signed the Lusaka Accord aimed at bringing the cessation of hostilities between the South African and Angolan governments; the Nkomati Accord that provided for the cessation of hostilities between the Mozambican and Angolan government; In 1988, the New York agreement, between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, was reached and provided for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and paved the way for the independence of Namibia; in 1990 The South African government started to negotiate with the ANC and other parties mechanisms of ending apartheid; in 1991 the Bicess Accord was reached between the Angolan warring factions and in 1992 an the Rome Accord was reached between the warring factions in Mozambique.

<sup>43</sup> The Rome peace agreement signed between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo in October 1992, provided for the International Community to help to transform Renamo into a political party. The operation costed over \$ 17 million. Substantial political concessions were made by the National Party Government and the ANC in order to secure peaceful elections in South Africa.

not society's interests are marginalised or neglected; whether order and justice are practised; or whether peace and harmony is promoted.

### **Strengthening the Civil Society**

However, the state is not and it should not be the only agent of security. It has limited initiative and resources. It does not constitute the totality of social life. There are other agents equally important for security that complement the activities of the state and it is their empowerment that it is likely to make a difference in security. These include societal organisations such as civic, charity, and the various other interest groups normally referred to as civil society. For example, the evidence shows that the position of women and homosexuals in Western societies has been improved by social movements rather than on the state's initiative. Similarly, the influence of the peace movement on questions such as the Nuclear Disarmament in Europe, reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe, human rights, and environmental concerns and other range of issues dealt with in the Helsinki process framework, should be recognised. The activities of these organisations and the like, have enhanced individuals' participation in the socio-political process and empowered them to interact better with the fellow human beings and with the state in setting up the security agenda. In Southern Africa, tasks such as education, health care, clean water, emergency relief are not solely dealt with by the state. A substantial number of individuals rely on community organisations, which are sometimes independent national and sometimes transnational NGO's. Some of these have made positive contributions in enhancing the profile and dealing with the issues pertaining to the security of communities.

They have also enhanced the ability of individuals to interact among them and with the state. Their actions have resulted in making the state more responsive to human needs and aspirations. In the final analysis, they have helped to strengthen the political process. There are risks, however. Some of these organisations are guided by self interest, and ideology and pursue a particularistic agenda that may jeopardise the common good of the entire society. Some fundamentalist religious groups, those preaching a racial ideology, ethnic separation and cleansing are likely to disrupt the process of security building. This is why the state is still important to mediate the relations between individuals, to define values and assert principles that safeguard the common good of all, that is to say to balance between freedom or sectional interest and security.

Never the less, risks are not only confined to organisations representing sections of the society. Buzan has illustrated various ways that the state can threaten the security of other sections of the society<sup>44</sup> and this problem is expected to be even more acute in the case of illegitimate states. In order to assure security, a right balance, between sectional interests and the common good of the whole society; and the power distribution between the state and other social organisations, need to be found. It is this balance that allows 'good life' and its predictability hence, security. It was pointed out elsewhere in this text that the balance is assured by a political process. However, particular arrangements need to be made in each society to ensure that the political process is conducive to society goals. Indeed, the question of strengthening other social organisation raises the question of who is going to do it, especially in states with weak institutions and poor organisational record.

---

<sup>44</sup> B. Buzan, *An Agenda for International Security Studies*, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-50.

The strengthening of the civil society demands responsibilities at state and non-state levels, that is to say, private organisation and the donor community. The state is responsible for creating a legal framework, supervising the rule of law, promoting values and ideas, that is, an environment in which civil organisations and other popular initiatives can thrive. These initiatives were precluded during the colonial and post-colonial period, because of the high degree of statism<sup>45</sup> particularly in security and foreign policy agendas, which allowed very little or no input from the base. It was this lack of input from the base that encouraged states to pursue their self-interest disregarding people's concerns for security. To benefit from the input from the base the state would have to undertake measures to ensure that an appropriate environment which will encourage social organisations is created. Individuals in the society and concerned groups will need to put forward their ideas, and learn the skills of organisations to achieve their society goals. Their organisation may be hampered by things such as high illiteracy rates and economic hardship discussed in chapter 4. This is where the role of the international donors can become important. They can provide support to various popular initiatives provided that these are aimed at enhancing stability and security. They can help with education programs aimed at strengthening the community, the economy, peace, social values and political stability. The need for this seems to be paramount in societies with long histories of division and fragmentation<sup>46</sup> such as those of Southern Africa, to assure balance between competing interests

---

<sup>45</sup>This term is employed here to describe the belief by some governments that there is no politics beyond the state, which made them only rely on the opinions of the bureaucrats for their policies.

<sup>46</sup>The term fragmentation is used to mean the lack of homogeneous political culture in a particular society, i.e., lack of consensus on the governmental structure and process. See for example, Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change", *American Behavioural Scientist VI, June 1963*, pp. 9-10.

## How to assure the Balance between competing Interests

The study of societies, with a history of civil wars, beset by deep suspicions and divisions, or characterised by a fragmented political culture threatening social cohesion shows that special arrangements based on 'consociation' need to be made to ensure an environment of co-operation and stability<sup>47</sup>. These arrangements are designed to enhance mutual confidence of the elites from different political subcultures to compromise their views so as to reduce the causes for conflict, avoid mutual domination and exploitation and co-operate in the creation of a stable system, enjoying the legitimacy of all. This co-operation becomes possible thanks to psychological cross-pressures resulting from individuals' memberships in different groups with diverse interests and outlooks, which leads them to moderate attitudes.<sup>48</sup> Thus consociation relies upon moderation to build social stability and it is based on the understanding that the lack of co-operation between various political subcultures brings disadvantages and may lead to crises and this constitute an imperative to remove the immobilising and unstabilising effects of culture fragmentation.<sup>49</sup> Co-operation at the elite level can lead a country to a degree of stability out of proportion to its social homogeneity.<sup>50</sup> Thus Belgium in the nineteenth century and Austria after World War I are examples of this co-operation. The recognition of these benefits are among the main motives for consociation. Lijphart points out that special conditions have to be met for the

---

<sup>47</sup> For See for instance Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", *World Politics*, Vol. 21 n-2; 1969 pp. 223-33. For general reference see also Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

<sup>48</sup> See Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (New York: The Garden City, 1960), pp. 88-89.

<sup>49</sup> See Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", *op.cit.*, pp. 224-25.

<sup>50</sup> See, Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1968)pp. 1-15, 197-211.

consociation to work : first, the elites have to have the ability to accommodate divergent interests and demands of the subcultures; second they should have the ability to transcend cleavages and thirdly, they have to be competent and committed to maintain the system. Mutual confidence is thus likely to be enhanced if the elites involved perceive the established political environment as just, the state as legitimate and that political process leading to decisions affecting the entire society as just. However, in order to create a more solid base co-operation needs to transcend the elite level down to the grass-roots organisations and masses. Indeed if co-operation is replicated in all levels of society, when conflicts erupt at the elite level the basic structure of co-operation will remain in place. Consociation can take various forms: it can take a form of coalition as it was the case of Austria, after the World War II;<sup>51</sup> equal representation in the constitutional committees, co-participation in the branches of government, equity in the legislative bodies, constitutional arrangements that maintains balance among elites as its main goal. However, consociation may bring frustrations if the decision-making structure is cumbersome and ineffective, without any apparent advantages. Some consociation arrangements may also be too rigid, that is, not allowing a space for other political forces, which are not party of the agreement to operate.

However, consociation suggests a wider participation in the decision making process, transparency and pluralism. This may be advantageous to apply in societies with tendency for fragmentation along racial and ethnic lines such as South Africa as well as those plagued by deep suspicions resulting from long history of civil war, such as Angola. In order to achieve this in Southern Africa governments need to make efforts to de-centralise state power. Decentralisation

---

<sup>51</sup> Kirchner, "Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes", quoted in A. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", *op.cit.*, pp. 228-229.

would act as confidence building measure reducing conflicts on resource allocation, insensitivity, tensions on regional and ethnic domination and exploitation. The decentralisation of power also ensures ample participation. This would mean that power not only should be decentralised vertically but also horizontally, not among echelons of government but to include other organisations, such as cultural, civic, professional and community organisations in the decision making process. That is to say, that decentralisation can follow different models, territorial or community based, its essence is to ensure participation of all in the decision-making and to build bridges between various political subcultures. If some of these subcultures are not represented in the political process or if their concerns or the needs represented by these are not considered, it will be difficult to talk about security for all within the same country.

There is a certain measure of consociationalism enshrined in the South African constitutions, both the one operated during the transitional period as well as the one envisaged to come to force in 1994. An important amount of power is devolved to the regions and local governments, there is a protection of rights of minorities, especially cultural rights, and special clauses have been included to impede that simple majority is used as pretext for domination.<sup>52</sup> Consociation was also behind the Lusaka Protocol signed between the Angolan Government and UNITA in 1994. The protocol provides for power sharing in the central offices, provincial and district levels, diplomatic missions in addition to police and armed

---

<sup>52</sup>See *Bill: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, 23 April 1996. Article 177 makes a special provision of the constitution to strengthen constitutional democracy such as : Public Protector, The Human Rights Commission, Commission for the Promotion of Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic; Commission for Gender Equality, Auditor Commission and Electoral Commission.



forces.<sup>53</sup> The accord has found practical implementation due to personal ambitions of the Leader of UNITA, but the fact that it succeeded in bringing about peace in Angola since 1994, suggests that it address the fundamental problems that have led both UNITA and the MPLA government to confrontation. However, measures of the sort need to be complemented by the creation of institutions that can help to exercise a qualitative judgement on the society values, including those capable of divulging and protecting these values. Institutions to deal with crises are also necessary to manage conflicts. However, as Burton argues, '*provention*'<sup>54</sup> is a better approach than prevention. The former seeks to eliminate the causes by looking ahead and dealing with their sources<sup>55</sup>. Focusing on sectional interests, or placing the state at the centre when theorising about security is inadequate, because it does not reveal the dynamics in the society which exposes different individuals or groupings to security and insecurity. This approach will tend to dismiss internal causes of insecurity as unimportant or not part of the concept of national security. It follows from adopting a rigid definition of 'nation' and an understanding of the international system in accordance to the notorious billiard ball model. However, national security viewed as a consequence of the national idea allows also an inward orientation of the concept of national security whereby the primary referent is not the state, but the society in general including the state. An inward looking concept of national security allow us to look at all internal problems jeopardising the

---

<sup>53</sup> See the Annex III of Lusaka Protocol on the Bicesse Accords, specifics of division of power are detailed in Document Relating To Unita's Participation in the Central, Provincial and Local Administration and in the Diplomatic Missions in Accordance with Article of the Modalities of National Reconciliation.

<sup>54</sup>This term was reinvented by John Burton as a means of distinguishing decision-making aimed at merely "preventing" conflicts by coercive means such as police in the streets from those that seek to eliminate the causes of conflict. "Pro" has a connotation of looking forward rather than at the present see, John Burton, "Conflict Provention as a Political System" in John A. Vazquez et al (ed) *Beyond Confrontation, Learning Conflict Resolution in Post Cold War* (Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1995), p.115.

condition of human life or the one impeding the fulfilment of human aspirations as national security problems. The endemic nature of the sources of insecurity in Southern Africa,<sup>56</sup> forces us to approach the problem of security from the spirit of philosophical idealism and political theory pertaining to good life. This implies focusing on political processes ensuring the creation of an environment of security. This environment can be assured if these processes lead to the coexistence of order, justice and peace. This will require building legitimate states and a conscious effort of political accommodation.

This approach would be preferable for Southern Africa because states show weak social cohesion and are threatened with disintegration which looms over societies across Southern Africa, menacing to worsen the security condition of people. The violence in the province of Natal in South Africa partly results from fears of domination of the Kwazulu by the central government in Pretoria, thus posing the challenge of finding the right measures bridging the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC government, so as to remove the causes of the political immobility in Natal. There are also residual fears of domination in the Afrikaner community by the back majority, especially among those who have traditionally championed extremist views. This has made them demand a separate state, a *volkstaat*. The civil war in Angola has exposed deep divisions between the Southern and Northern communities. While armed groups representing minorities such as Frente de Libertação de Cabinda (FLEC) still threaten the country with secession. Across the region countries are still beset by resentments arising from the distribution of resources, power and opportunities which have caused faultlines

---

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 115-130.

<sup>56</sup> See Greg Mills and Christopher Clapham, "Southern African Security After Apartheid: A Framework for Analysis", *op cit.*, pp. 1-6.

within and among communities. These circumstances of Southern Africa call for the adoption of a security approach which takes into account all its problems, i.e. social, political military, economic and environmental.

States in Southern Africa need to reduce social conflict, rationalise, resources and strengthen their domestic institutions. They also need to rationalise resources, make savings and concentrate on economic development to improvement of their standards of living. Given these circumstances and others affecting the societies of Southern Africa discussed in chapter 4 , it is very difficult to see how can all this be achieved without adopting a wider view of security, that is, as a matter of 'good life'.

## Chapter 7

### From Complex To Community of Security ?

This chapter examines the implications of adopting a new approach to security with regard to the current efforts at building a security community in Southern Africa. It argues that the process of building a regional security community requires an encouragement of processes that can help to overcome constraints, such as power instability, political fragmentation, economic imbalances, and fears, that is to say the vagaries in the variables<sup>1</sup> of the Southern African Security system. This is because the nature of changes in these variables determines whether the 'security community' is likely to be strengthened or weakened. The inconsistencies in the variables are likely to be eliminated if regional order is founded on compatible values, common principles and interests. However, this should be ensured at the domestic level.

Deutsch defines a 'security community' as a group of people which has become integrated. That is to say, a group of people which has attained a sense of being bound together by an agreement that common social problems must and can be resolved by process of peaceful change; and attained institutions and practices strong enough to assure for 'long' time dependable expectations for peaceful change<sup>2</sup>. According to Deutsch and his colleagues a 'security community' is created by mutual compatibility of values; strong economic links and expectation of more; multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions; a growing amount

---

<sup>1</sup> The term variables is used in Buzans sense meaning significant factors affecting conceptions and policies. See Buzan et. al. *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post Cold War*, *op. cit.*, p.165.

<sup>2</sup> See K. Deutsch et. al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

of institutionalized relationships; mutual responsiveness, greater mobility of people and mutual predictability of behaviour.<sup>3</sup>

These conditions, however, are not yet in place in Southern Africa. The region is faced with constraints such as weak states in which communities are poorly integrated, domestic politically fragmented, with weak institutions and a lack of financial resources. The nature of these constraints requires an adoption of policies that can easily be implemented by governments and supported by people, while serving as a building block for further co-operation. This points to the necessity of building a 'security society' as a first stage of building a 'security community'.

The term 'security society' is derived from Hedley Bull's concept of a society of states, which according to him, exists

“... when a group of states, conscious of common interests and common values form a society in the sense they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share the working of common institutions”<sup>4</sup>

However, the term security society goes beyond Bull's conception of society because it implies the establishment of reactive institutions with an intervening capacity to deal with crises whenever they occur in one member of the society.

This chapter is divided into 3 sections. The first part examines past and present attempts at regional community building and highlights the reasons of their failure. The second section discusses the main variables affecting the Southern African System and the necessary transformations; and the third part attempts to set at the stage the way their management could lead to the 'security community'.

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 115- 154.

<sup>4</sup>See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, *op. cit.*, p.13.

## **The Region and the idea of community: strengths and weaknesses**

Attempts at building a 'security community' in the region have been underway since the beginning of this century. The agreement establishing the South African dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU) between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, in the 1910, epitomises this effort. In the 1970's South Africa led a new effort which resulted in the establishment of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) which included Lesotho and Swaziland. A third attempt came with the Frontline States (FLS) in 1980 when they established the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC). All these attempts and others mentioned elsewhere in these text have failed to establish a security community. At the core of the reasons for failure was the lack in their members of compatible values, the existence of weak social, economic, political and cultural links and mobility of people. These factors and the severe shortage of financial resources in case of SADCC curtailed efforts towards further cooperation and spillover. This impeded the predictability of behaviour of the members, hence the existence of the security community.

By virtue of being the largest economy in the region, with the largest and thriving white population, surrounded by an unfavoured black majority, South Africa has always sought to legitimise its domestic situation by increasing its acceptance abroad. This fact led it to conduct a number of regional initiatives. One such initiative was the Southern Africa Customs Union, established to expand trade in the area of the Union. Namibia which had been a member by virtue of being a South African colony, formally joined the Organisation after its independence in 1990. It provides for free movement of goods and services among member

countries and the application of common external tariff to non members. However, South Africa's domestic policies impeded membership expansion and to the strengthening of co-operation.

Soon after World War II, South African efforts were aimed at gaining recognition from its Western allies as a regional power. Its intention was to act as the guardian of Western interest, thus influencing the course of events in the dependent African territories<sup>5</sup>. In this regard, the South African Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, proposed the creation of a commission composed of colonial powers and those that had economic and military interests in Africa to devise a common policy for Africa<sup>6</sup>. This idea was met with the suspicion by South Africa's potential allies. The adoption of apartheid as an official state policy and South Africa's campaign against decolonisation proved to be the main disincentives. The idea of cooperation with black Africa gained a new momentum in the 1950's, when Verwoerd and Strijdom recognised the importance of Africa for South Africa's future.<sup>7</sup> They spoke of technical co-operation, as a way of preserving South Africa's white identity and establish mutual trust and understanding.<sup>8</sup> The idea took a practical form through South Africa's participation in organisations such as the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of Sahara and in the Scientific Council South of Sahara and the Inter-African Bureau for Soil Conservation. However, the idea of South Africa acting as Africa's power collapsed when the OAU was formed without South Africa in 1963, and the organisation absorbed most of the function

---

<sup>5</sup> See for example, J. Barber and J Barrats, *The South African Foreign Policy : The Search for Security*, *op cit.* p. 6

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in G. Mills, "The History of regional Integrative Attempts: The Way Forward", in Greg Mills and Alan Begg (eds.), *South Africa in a Global Economy* ( Bramfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 217.

<sup>7</sup> Foreign Minister Eric Louw spoke of South Africa's future as one of African power but taking care not to break the ties with the West. See for example, Jack E. Spence, *Republic Under Pressure* ( London Oxford university Press, 1965), p.74 .

<sup>8</sup> See James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy op.cit.*, p.106.

that South Africa had set for itself. Its apartheid legislation of the late 1940's and the 1950's and the Sharpeville massacre kept the rest of Africa distant. SACU remained the only transnational arrangement in which South Africa participated. Its membership was kept due to economic incentives provided for by South Africa. In 1969 SACU was re-negotiated. South Africa conceded more advantages to its partners but these were not sufficient to attract new members. Southern Rhodesia, Zambia Malawi and the colonial Mozambique kept apart. The situation did not improve even with the signing, of the 1974 agreement establishing the Rand Monetary Area between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland.<sup>9</sup> This arrangement provided for free capital flows and implementation of common exchange controls in the area of the Union.

RMA/CMA like SACU rested only on common economic interests and could not lead to a community of states. It was not founded on a compatibility of values among the members. In fact, apartheid underscored the existence of different values between South Africa and its partners. The question of apartheid discouraged social, cultural and political links, a greater mobility of people and the development of strong institutional relations. Among members common rules and the predictability of peaceful relations could not be assured. The BLS supported the opposition to apartheid and South Africa raided their territories in search of its opponents. In fact co-operation between South Africa and its partners in the area of security and defence lacked foundations. Political unity with the rest of Africa was contrary to the philosophy of apartheid. In fact, South Africa and the rest of the members were divided as to the motives that led them to adhere to the organisations. While South Africa was seeking a legitimisation of its internal policies,

---

<sup>9</sup>This was replaced by the Common Monetary Area in 1986, see details in for example, Gavin Maasdorp Trade Relation in Southern Africa : Changes Ahead, in Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, (eds) Towards a Post Apartheid Future, *op cit.* pp. 142-144.



the rest of the members saw a possibility of extracting benefits from cooperating with the dynamic economy in the region. These integrative attempts represented a compromise defining a survival 'modus vivendi' rather than an expression of cooperation founded on common values, objectives and principles.

The first attempt at building a community of security in the region, based on shared common principles came with the creation of SADCC. The Lusaka Declaration<sup>10</sup> called for the economic liberation of Southern African states and for economic cooperation and integration as an important sequel of the political emancipation of the region which had already been attained.<sup>11</sup> In order to achieve this goal the Southern Africa states designed a strategy aimed at: i) reducing economic dependence, particularly, but not only on South Africa; ii) forging links to create genuine and equitable regional integration; and iii) mobilising resources to promote the implementation of national and regional policies. SADCC viewed the pursuance of the dependence-reduction strategy as a way of creating just economic relations in the region. It argued that the existing economic relations in the region were not a result of natural economic interaction or driven by market forces. They were a result of the deliberate policies of incorporating the majority of the Southern African states into colonial and sub-colonial structures<sup>12</sup>. This justified its twofold objective of, on one hand, fostering the economic development among its members and reducing, on the other hand, the dependence on South Africa.

The effort to reduce economic dependence on South Africa, however, distorted and eventually undermined SADCC's development efforts. SADCC's substantial effort was re-directed to counteract the impact of South Africa's destabilisation policies aimed at undermining its development. Although SADCC

---

<sup>10</sup> See *the SADCC Lusaka Declaration, op. cit.*, pp. 1-4.

<sup>11</sup> See the preamble of *the SADCC Lusaka Declaration*, April 1980.

<sup>12</sup> Simba Maconi, the SADCC Executive Secretary, addressing the SAPES Annual Meeting in Gaborone, February 1991.

was founded on the principle of equality among sovereigns, shared economic interests, prosperity and promotion of stability and emancipation of the region, political values of the members were heterogeneous. Liberal democracies such as Botswana coexisted with dictatorships such as Malawi; unrepresentative monarchies in Lesotho and Swaziland, coexisted with the Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique and single party states with mixed economies, like Tanzania and Zambia. In fact the question of political values could not be raised since it represented a sensitive point that might jeopardise the entire arrangement. Thus, political cooperation was limited, while the lack of resources imposed limits on economic and cultural links and mobility of people. SADCC's cooperation methods were based on decentralised sector coordination. It showed inability to develop supranational functional institutions. The non-existence of a binding treaty regulating the activities of the members within SADCC, impeded compliance to common rule.

SADCC lacked the necessary ingredients to become a security community. Poor institutional capacity, lack of political convergence, feeble integration of domestic communities, and weak states could only turn SADCC to an inter-governmental co-operation institution with weak foundations. Thus, for a long time SADCC was confined to governmental circles, very alive in its annual meetings, but almost non-existent on a day to day basis. While the lack of political convergence, for instance, did not impede the countries from working together, it was a key factor in impeding transnational cooperation outside governmental circles and compelled member states to approach co-operation on the basis of lowest common denominator. While communications and transactions grew modestly there were few economic assets and links that could ensure a full commitment of its members to SADCC policies of reduction of dependence on Southern Africa.

Indeed a combination of military, economic and political pressure against some SADCC members made them yield. As a result, the predictability of peaceful behaviour of its members could not be assured. This can be illustrated by the example of Malawi, which harboured, for a long time, an armed opposition against the government of Mozambique, as a result of pressures from South Africa. However, the end of the Cold War introduced a new dispensation in the region which gave rise to renewed efforts at building a security community.

In August 1992, the Heads of State and Government of SADCC signed the treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Declaration accompanying the treaty identifies the existing cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations as constituting their motivation to 'promote regional welfare, collective self-reliance and integration in the spirit of equity and partnership'<sup>13</sup> as important steps for the attainment of the economic well-being, improvement of the standard and quality of life, freedom and social justice, peace and security.<sup>14</sup>

In contrast to SADCC, the inter-relations of SADC were regulated by a treaty. This treaty established supranational institutions such as the Summit of Heads of State to make and direct policy and control SADC functions; the Council of Ministers, to oversee the policy implementation, the functioning and development of SADC; special commissions answerable to the Council, to guide and coordinate policies and programs in designated sectoral areas; the Standing Committee of Officials to advise the Council on policies; the Secretariat to plan,

---

<sup>13</sup> See *Towards The Southern African Development Community, A Declaration by the Heads of State or Governments of Southern States*, Windhoek, August 1992, Annex I in this study.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p.1.

manage and implement Community programs and the Tribunal to oversee all legal aspects related to its activity and settle the disputes between members<sup>15</sup>.

While the treaty defines certain principles, sets specific goals and identifies certain aspirations and interests of the peoples of the region, its foundations are not laid on existing reality. It does not seek to protect existing or acquired values. These are simply aspirations. The compatibility of values is yet to be assured, within the national boundaries as well as among the states. Lesotho and Swaziland are still unrepresentative monarchies, yet the rest of the members have opted for multiparty democracy. In fact, even in the multiparty states, democratic values cannot be assured to be shared by all people. Republican constitutions coexist with autocratic lineage structures, testifying the existence of a two value system. SADC also faces financial problems. Like its predecessor SADCC, about 90% of SADC projects are externally financed. Locally generated funding proves to be difficult since the economies of the region are either facing stagnation, modest growth, or are still yet to recover from the impact of past confrontation. The modest recovery of the economies has limited cross-border cooperation among business groups, political parties and other private initiatives. The lack of financial resources also poses constraints in the development of institutions, thus affecting policy formulation capacity, co-ordination and implementation. This suggests that policy-making is likely to continue to be haphazard and decision-making processes unclear. The lack of clear policy and deficient control mechanisms means that SADC programs may not be fully implemented, while members cannot be held accountable.<sup>16</sup> Although bodies such as the Standing Committee and Secretariat are charged with the

---

<sup>15</sup> See Articles 9-16 of the *Treaty of Southern African Development Community* ratified in Windhoek August, 1991 Annex II in this study.

<sup>16</sup> See the address of president Masire of Botswana at Lusaka Summit, August 1991; see also *SADCC The Second Decade, Enterprise Skills and Productivity*, SADCC Conference Document 1990.

responsibility of designing and implementing projects, they face functional difficulties. While the Standing committee meets only once a year and the officials in charge may not dedicate their full time to SADC business, the Secretariat does not have sufficient powers or mechanisms to control the progress of ongoing projects or to act quickly to correct possible errors in these projects. It has to await the decisions of the Council or Summit that only meets once a year.

These factors hamper attempts to establish priorities of projects within SADC which could allow effective use of funds to strengthen the community. The shortage of financial resources thus limits economic, cultural, social and institutional links and the mobility of people, hence, the consolidation of community.

The efforts to strengthen the community are also hampered by institutional duplication and overlap. There are several institutions in the region attempting regional integration in many different manners. Besides SACU and SADC, there is also the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) which includes states such as Djibouti in the Horn of Africa down to South Africa. COMESA is aimed at promoting trade among member states through removal of barriers and the applying of a common tariff to products manufactured outside of the region. The great difficulty COMESA has faced is that of the lack of tradable goods. States such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and South Africa which already have a manufacturing sector in place are likely to benefit more from COMESA than those whose exports are confined to primary products. It should be noted however, that the former three states, are unlikely to compete with South Africa in COMESA in conditions of full liberalisation of trade. Moreover, institutional duplication in the

region has contributed to competition<sup>17</sup>, rivalry and inefficient use of region's resources.

The prevailing tendency of encouraging interstate institutions, based on the assumption that these will lead to a greater co-operation and security has not been matched by similar efforts at the domestic level. Since its creation SADC has taken important steps in the area of security. Its 1993 programme of action recommended a strategy for advancing regional security which includes : the adoption of wider definition of security ; the establishment of a forum for mediation, arbitration and reducing the level of military expenditure.<sup>18</sup> These steps were followed in 1994 by an agreement to create a sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations Defence and Security<sup>19</sup>; in 1995, talks were underway to create the Association of the Southern African Security to deal with the operational side of security; and in 1996, the idea of establishing ASAS was abandoned to give way to the Organ for Politics Defence and Security functioning under SADC.<sup>20</sup> However, these measures have not been sufficient to deal with the vagaries of - power, fear, interdependence and political fragmentation - the variables of the Southern African Security System, operating at domestic as well as at the regional level. Unless these variables are positively affected, security is unlikely to prevail in the region.

---

<sup>17</sup> SADC Secretariat wishes to push the organisation to introduce trade liberalisation, and it has prepared a proposal to be tabled in the SADC Summit in 1997. However, COMESA believes trade relations it is its exclusive area. There are also frequent quarrels between the Secretariats of both organisations accusing each other of blocking co-operation between them. See for example, Joe Chilaizya and Lewis Machipisa "Tension Mounts Between Rival trading Blocs" *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, 8-14 November, 1995.

<sup>18</sup> See "Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community", SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, pp. 24-25.

<sup>19</sup> See "Military and Economic Pressure from South Africa forces King Yield" *South Scan*, Vol. 9, 16 September, 1994, p. 270.

<sup>20</sup> See the *BBC, Summary of World Broadcast AL/2515A/3* 22 January 1996.

## The Variables

Power, fear, political fragmentation and interdependence are identified as affecting the Southern African security system. Whether the security community aspired to by SADC can be achieved, will be determined by the nature of changes taking place in these variables. The question posed therefore is whether these changes can be oriented towards reinforcing co-operation, consensus, and stability thus, strengthening the sense of community? Or on the contrary will they continue to unleash domestic political fragmentation, fierce regional competition and national self-interest thus, strengthening the patterns of conflict and instability?

### Power

Power, defined as aggregate capabilities in the social, political, military and economic sectors to conduct state and community interests internationally<sup>21</sup> is also an important variable in the Southern African security system. Buzan drawing on Waltz outlines the condition of being powerful as follows:

“ ... to possess a broadly-based relatively large and reasonable economy; controlling advanced technology and supporting a sufficient military establishment to sustain a plausible self-defence against other powers; having a sufficient socio-political cohesion so that these assets can be maintained, controlled and their influence turn outward.”<sup>22</sup>

The implication of this conception, as Buzan points out, is that “the locus of power is a cohesive and centralized political entity”<sup>23</sup> The application of this criterion to determine the status of power in Southern Africa, assumes a consensus that South Africa can act as a regional power. In the post World War II period South Africa

---

<sup>21</sup> See For example, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* op. cit., pp. 86-96, see also Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading Mass: Addison Welsly, 1979), pp. 131, 192.

<sup>22</sup> See for example, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading Mass: Addison-Welsely 1979), pp. 131, 192; see also Buzan et al. *The European Security Order Recast* op. cit., p. 166.

<sup>23</sup> B. Buzan et al., *The European Security Order Recast*, op. cit. p. 166.

consolidated its position as a regional power thanks to its mineral riches which financed the quick development of its manufacturing sector.<sup>24</sup> At present, its GNP per capita is 2.5 times the average regional per capita GNP<sup>25</sup>, while its defence expenditure is 3 times the rest of Southern Africa added together.<sup>26</sup> It also possesses a manufacturing sector far more advanced than the rest of the region. However, in the past, its military and economic strength could not be effectively used to secure domestic socio-political cohesion so as to maintain and control the assets of power and turn their influence outward. South Africa's adoption of apartheid in 1948, proved to be a liability preventing it from developing a strong and cohesive domestic society. Apartheid faced opposition at home and abroad, thus South Africa's power assets could not be directed to further accumulation of power. In fact significant amounts of its resources were diverted to deal with the opposition at home and abroad.

The domestic opposition to apartheid continued to increase and in the 1960's coinciding with an increase in anti-colonial struggle. In fact from then on, the status of power in the region has been strongly determined by the intent to protect the system of apartheid in South Africa and resist decolonisation elsewhere. This forced South Africa to seek alliance with the remaining white regimes in the continent and increase its co-operation with them in the economic, military and security frame<sup>27</sup>. This alliance determined the mobilised resources, re-orientated domestic policies and economic strategies and increased its military capabilities to face its opponents.

---

<sup>24</sup> See for example R. Bethlehem, "Economic Development in South Africa" in Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside (eds) *Towards a Post Apartheid Future*, *op cit.*, pp. 62-64.

<sup>25</sup> See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, *The SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa*, *op cit.* p.16

<sup>26</sup> See the Military Balance, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies pp. 249-55

<sup>27</sup> See C. Coker, "A New Military Role In Southern Africa 1969-82" in R. Jaster (ed) *Southern Africa : Regional Security Problems and Prospects*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-50.



This changed the regional power configuration as it precipitated further increases to the opposition's power. The anti-colonial and anti-apartheid forces did not have fully indigenous sources of power and they could not rely on the support of the newly independent states. Most of these states were economically and militarily weak in comparison to South Africa and its regional allies. But they were politically strong, since they could foster large political solidarity. Their political strength enabled them to mobilise significant resources and people in the region for the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Indeed, their political power was gradually transformed into a military power which enabled them to challenge the colonial and apartheid regimes.

The fact that the newly independent states and other anti-colonial and anti-apartheid forces in Southern Africa, did not have an independent source of power, meant, however, that their strength could only be enhanced by drawing on the support of foreign powers. The Cold War context facilitated this support and replicated its pattern in the region. The Soviet Union and its allies and China lent their support to the newly independent states and the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid forces,<sup>28</sup> while South Africa, Rhodesia and colonial Portugal continued to maintain close economic and defence links with the West.<sup>29</sup> The regional duopoly emerged and was consolidated as the adversarial spirit increased.

The environment of confrontation enhanced the region's militarism. South Africa consolidated its strength by acquiring the capacity to manufacture military hardware, increasing co-operation with the West and finding loopholes to the arms embargo. However, its economy was affected and went from modest growth to stagnation as the environment of domestic unrest discouraged investment and

---

<sup>28</sup> See W. Kuhne, "Africa and Gorbachev's New Realism" in I.W. Zartman and F. Deng, (eds) *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 42-67.

<sup>29</sup> See C. Coker, South Africa: "A New Military Role in Southern Africa 1969-82", *op. cit.* pp. 142-48.

technological renovation<sup>30</sup>. Its domestic society also remained fragmented and polarised.

The newly independent states, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid forces, relied upon arms supplied by the Eastern bloc countries. The fire power they acquired was sufficient to pose enormous military and economic pressures on Portugal and Rhodesia who eventually subsided during the mid 1970's.

Their economies, however, remained either stagnant or experienced sharp declines increasing their levels of poverty. The environment of confrontation and the vagaries of the use of power helped to increase the fragmentation of their societies, eroding their political power base. The amount of destruction caused by regional wars increased the power gap between South Africa and its neighbours, a feature which became salient at the end of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War had an adverse impact on the regional power structure. On the one hand, it alleviated South Africa from excessive defence and security spending and helped to reduce the burden of sanctions on its economy. It thus provided South Africa with an opportunity to consolidate and increase its power. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War increased the vulnerability of the rest of Southern Africa states, since they could no longer rely on barter schemes from the Eastern bloc countries to maintain their military power and obtain economic aid. The withdrawal of the Soviet bloc's support to most Southern African states helped to pave the way for South Africa's re-emergence as the single dominant power. The task of building a 'security community' depends in part on the ability to employ this power to elicit positive change and restrain fears.

The variable power in the region, however, is to a large extent a result of interaction between regional members and the international system, especially in

---

<sup>30</sup>See R. Bethlehem, "Economic Development in South Africa", *op. cit.*, pp. 64-79.

the domain of finance, technology and military capabilities. The major sources of finance, technological innovators and arms producers, are not located in the region. The question as to whether Southern Africa can develop a rapport leading to large capital inflows, transfer of technology and arms remains a question mark. Arms sales and technology transfers can only be expected to take place if they do not represent a danger to their suppliers.

### **Fear and Fragmentation**

Fear, in the context of this chapter is related to the idea of domestic or regional polarisation and inter-state conflict caused either by military attacks or any other forms of domination.<sup>31</sup> This includes concerns of weak states being overwhelmed or undermined by strong states in multilateral fora and their reluctance to surrender some of their sovereignty.<sup>32</sup>

The recent history of instability in Southern Africa is not associated with wars caused by border disputes, entrenched rivalry between states, peoples or tribes, but to colonialism and apartheid. Indeed, from the late 1970's instability, and the fear and fragmentation it generated were particularly related to apartheid's struggle for survival and led to South Africa's hegemonic ambitions.

These ambitions were spawned by fears of a privileged white minority completely surrounded by a black majority and black-ruled majority states. This white minority lived under the fear of losing all privileges it had acquired. To protect its privileges, it sought to consolidate its power at home through repression and through expanding its dominion in the region. As seen in chapter 2,

---

<sup>31</sup> Buzan et al, *European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War*, op. cit., p. 168

<sup>32</sup> The Boer nationalism and Zulu nationalism in South Africa epitomises the reasons for fears of fragmentation.

it attempted to incorporate parts of Mozambique, Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories into the Union.<sup>33</sup> When incorporation became impossible, the fears led South Africa to resort to strategies such as getting its neighbours to agree to peaceful coexistence with apartheid. The strategy sought to include South Africa in regional arrangements where its economic muscle could silence opponents abroad thus legitimising its policies at domestic level. The resulting arrangements, were thus motivated by historic economic ties rather than genuine political will and remained a pragmatical arrangements, a strategy of survival for the weaker and strong members alike. Indeed, the empirical evidence<sup>34</sup> shows that the hostilities suffered by SACU members from South African attacks is relatively low when compared with amount of destruction in the non SACU members. This suggests that SACU and RMA helped to shield the BLS countries from South African's bellicose policies since Pretoria had a direct interest in them. None the less, these institutions did not succeed in stopping South Africa's constant intimidation. The BLSN states were raided several times by South Africa in search of its opponents and were threatened with sanctions and military retaliation if they provided sanctuary to them.<sup>35</sup> Fear continued to drive South Africa's regional policy throughout the 1970's and 1980's. In 1979, Smuts idea of 'knitting together the parts of Southern Africa' was revived in Botha's Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), which was a renewed attempt at perpetuating the existence of apartheid and relations of domination, subordination and inequality in South Africa and in the entire region.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> See J. D. Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 188-211.

<sup>34</sup> See *South African Destabilisation The Economic Costs of Apartheid Resistance, op. cit.*, pp. 36-43.

<sup>35</sup> See for example David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *Destructive Engagement* (Harare: SARDC, 1988).

<sup>36</sup> See R. Davies and D. O'Meara "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978" *op.cit.*, pp. 183-207.

Fear precipitated political fragmentation as the South African regime tried to appease domestic opposition by creating the Homelands system and encouraging subversion and dissidence in neighbouring countries.<sup>37</sup> This action enhanced the division of communities in these states into sub-national structures, thus hampering the emergence of national communities.

Fear also played a part in the policy and actions of the other Southern African states. Military and economic domination by South Africa has always been a possibility and this drove most of their policies. It took the creation of the diplomatic loose coalition, known as the Frontline States, to coordinate policies against apartheid. They also created among themselves a Defence and Security forum to exchange information and enhance cooperation in this domain. Fears of economic domination led these states to create SADCC to reduce economic dependency, particularly the dependency on South Africa. Fears also led the BLS states, to join a rival organisation which sought to reduce dependence on South Africa. Indeed South African goods dominated the markets of non-SACU and rest of SACU members and to the extent that it had to pay compensation to the latter for their poor industrial development.<sup>38</sup> SACU's revenues, excise duties and import surcharges were also administered by the South African Reserve Bank which showed little sensitivity to the concerns and interests of other members.<sup>39</sup> As McCarthy remarks, "in contrast to other schemes of integration in the Third World, the objective of developing other SACU members was not entrenched in the customs union history of Southern Africa"<sup>40</sup> which shows the intention of

---

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 184 -189.

<sup>38</sup> See G. Maasdorp, "Trade Relations in Southern Africa -Changes Ahead" in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds.) *op cit.*, pp. 132-155.

<sup>39</sup> See S. G. Hoohlo, "The Southern African Customs Union and the Post Apartheid South Africa: Prospects for Closer Integration in Seohai Santho and Mafa Sejanemane, *Southern Africa: After Apartheid?* ( Harare, SAPES Trust, 1991), pp. 96-98.

<sup>40</sup> Colin McCarthy, *SACU in the Changing Economic and Political Environment*, unpublished paper, Stellenboch University, 1991.

continuing domination of their markets by South African goods. South Africa's neighbours also feared that South African action of fomenting subversion and proxy wars could result in further fragmentation of their polities.

The end of apartheid brought to an end the ideological and identity clash in the region thus eliminating fears of military aggression by South Africa. With the exception of Swaziland and Lesotho, multipartyism has been adopted by all states in the region, thus reducing the chances for inter-state political conflict. Market economics has also been embraced by all Southern Africa states as their economic philosophy, which eliminates the conflict between centrally planned and liberal economics.

Residual fears of economic domination by South Africa, however, still persist and are likely to continue as the gap between the South African economy and those of the rest of the region remain large. Fear in the region also remains in relation to those states riven by protracted domestic conflict, such as Angola, or those that reached a fragile peace such as Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia. The problems in these countries may remain a permanent destabilising factor impeding change conducive to greater security, and are likely to spillover into neighbouring countries thus leading to regional instability. South Africa, the strongest regional economy fears migration from neighbouring countries and other African countries and the fact that its resources may drain away in financing regional initiatives. Fears are also caused by military asymmetries, even though there is not an obvious military threat in the region. This fact, however, continues to encourage countries such as Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, to increase their military budgets<sup>41</sup> since they continue to feel disfavoured in relation to Zimbabwe and South Africa. Although these states agree in participating in regional arrangements, they

---

<sup>41</sup> See *The Military Balance*, International Institute of Strategic Studies 1995/1996, pp. 248-268

argue that it would be better if they participated on equal footing, rather than on subordinate position.<sup>42</sup> Part of fears arise from issues not completely resolved in some states, such as the existence of dissident groups in Mozambique threatening to attack Zimbabwe, the continuing fighting in parts of Angola, the existence of large numbers of readily available weapons, violence and secessionist movements in parts of South Africa.

### **Interdependence**

The other important variable in the Southern Africa security complex is interdependence which in this text is used to describe mutual dependence between members of a system or as Nye and Keohane put it, “reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries”.<sup>43</sup> However, as they explain interdependence does not mean that the dependence is symmetrical. It only expresses the capacity of mutual affect to different degrees among members of the system. The assumption being made here is that interdependence and the behaviour of governments affect each other mutually. While interdependence may condition the behaviour of government in formulating its security policies, government activities, may affect the degree of interdependence making it stronger or weaker.<sup>44</sup>

Conventional wisdom argues that because interdependence is founded on mutual interest it restrains conflict and correlates inversely with the pattern of

---

<sup>42</sup> Interview with the Director for Defence Policy in the Mozambique’s Ministry of Defence, 7 December, 1995.

<sup>43</sup> See R. Keohane and J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p.8.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

military fear: “When fear is high, interdependence will be low ; unless fear is low interdependence is unlikely to be high”.<sup>45</sup> The implication of this is that strong interdependence within a system, will act as a deterrent to military attack, and would reduce military fears, therefore enhancing security.

The Southern African case, however, does not seem to fit accurately into Buzan's formulation. There was a significant level of interdependence between the Frontline states and South Africa particularly in the area of trade, migrant labour and transport routes. Although the degree of interdependence impeded the Frontline states from taking a firm stand in favour of sanctions against South Africa, it was not sufficient to prevent conflict between the Frontline states and South Africa. The Frontline states were militarily weaker and extracted more benefits from South Africa than the latter from them. Yet this did not stop them from harbouring anti-apartheid combatants, waging international campaigns against apartheid and seeking ways of reducing their dependence on South Africa. The example of Southern Africa, thus suggests that it is not sufficient to have a significant level of interdependence to restrain conflict, but its nature, which is important. Whether it binds states around common principles thus, creating commitment; or it is based on fears. Although the levels of interdependence was significantly high, the type of regime established during the years of apartheid became ethically unacceptable to the majority of South Africa's neighbours and subsequently became a source of conflict.

Amongst the Frontline states interdependence was low. The levels of trade, capital and labour flows from one state to another were insignificant, and despite the fact that Malawi had a history of collaboration with what other states regarded as the common enemy, this did not inspire violent conflict between Malawi and the

---

<sup>45</sup> See B. Buzan et al., *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post cold War*, *op. cit.* p. 171.



rest of Southern Africa. Paradoxically, interdependence was high between Mozambique and Rhodesia. Mozambique collected important revenues from Rhodesia, since a significant amount of Rhodesian trade was transmitted through Mozambican ports.<sup>46</sup> It also controlled oil supplies to Rhodesia through its pipeline linking Beira and Machipanda. However, this did not restrain conflict between these two countries.<sup>47</sup> Mozambique closed its borders to Rhodesia in 1976 and it provided support and sanctuary to Zimbabwean guerrillas. The Rhodesian government stepped up its hostilities to Mozambique and set out to create an armed resistance to topple the government of Mozambique.<sup>48</sup> The example of Southern Africa shows that interdependence does not always restrain conflict, especially if it is regarded as a historical accident, not founded on mutual interests and common values. It leads one to conclude that it can only be a strong incentive for co-operation and integration if it is perceived to promote the common good and common interests. However, the level of interdependence in the region is still low and economic inequalities high. The low level of interdependence does not encourage cooperation while economic inequalities generate flows of refugees from less prosperous to more prosperous areas.

The post-independence era in Southern Africa was marked by developments that tended to increase interdependence among the newly independent states. The creation of SADCC was founded on the principle of emancipation and equity, regarded by the leaders of Southern Africa as necessary conditions to reduce conflict, promote stability and prosperity.<sup>49</sup> SADCC became an important forum of consultation and concertation of strategies and an important

---

<sup>46</sup> See William Winter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (London: Zed Books, 1995), pp. 27-28, 264-267.

<sup>47</sup> See for example, Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly* (London: John Murray, 1987).

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.; see also William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*, *op. cit.* pp. 264-267.

<sup>49</sup> See *The Lagos Plan of Action*, Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa 1981; and see also the *SADCC Lusaka Declaration*, April 1980.

centre for political, diplomatic and economic interaction between the region and the external world. It managed to maintain a strong sense of political solidarity among its members and to mobilise an investment of \$ 3 billion. Most of this was applied in the development of infrastructure in the area of transport and communications, energy, mining and fisheries<sup>50</sup>. Modest achievements were also attained in the co-operation between universities, trade unions and business groups.

The demise of apartheid is likely to strengthen further the level of interdependence since it reduces barriers to racial harmony and cooperation. The fact that South Africa and Mauritius joined SADC in 1994 and 1995 respectively indicates that there is a strong regional convergence on the necessity to build the community. There is certainly a chance for South Africa to play a positive and influential role, sharing its resources, skills, technology and experience with other members. The question remains, however, whether interdependence can be strengthened by increasing co-operation aimed at promoting the common good.

### **Managing the Variables**

The task of building a 'security community' in Southern Africa implies adequate management of the variables power, fear, political fragmentation and interdependence in order that stability, harmony and positive change can be achieved. The variable power needs to become stable to reduce fears and inequalities. Excessive concentration of power in one regional member is likely to maintain or induce further dislocations, imbalances and rivalries. Indeed, states will find it difficult to stop the flow of refugees from the least stable and least

---

<sup>50</sup>See E. Maphanyane, "SADCC Future Challenges, in Bertil Oden (eds) *Southern Africa After Apartheid, Regional Integration and External Resources*, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-183.

prosperous parts to the most stable and prosperous if efforts at reducing the inequalities of economic power are not made. There is a limit to the reduction of power imbalances and dislocations. Both from their territorial extension, population and resources, states such as Lesotho and Swaziland cannot aspire to become as powerful as South Africa. What they need to be assured of for their security, is that their fate and aspirations is not dependent on how the power holder in Pretoria and elsewhere use their economic and military muscles. They need not to be afraid of having powerful neighbours. This implies that governments need to adopt policies and make an effort to remove all the threatening aspects of power. Unrestrained power may also encourage relations of domination and subordination which heighten fear, dissidence and conflict. When fears are high co-operation is low and integration can only be achieved through force rather than concord. Therefore, the variable fear needs to be kept low. As indicated, the demise of apartheid is an important step towards lowering fears, but it is insufficient to encourage further co-operation, peace and the building of community.

Interdependence needs to be strengthened to the point that the settlement of disputes between states by force becomes not only unviable but unthinkable and peaceful relations predictable. Strong interdependence is also crucial to strong regional identity and harmony. As seen above, to lead to security, interdependence needs to be based upon common principles, values and shared interest. The spirit of interdependence is likely to enhance security if it can guide relations between states, peoples and individuals.

The stability of power, low fears and the increased interdependence can be achieved through increasing co-operation between states at economic, social, political and military levels. But this is assuming that states have the ability to do it both in terms of resources and institutional capacity; that their domestic

environment is stable and that the threats to their security result from differences with their neighbours. Indeed, the idea of integrated community of states presupposes the existence of integrated domestic societies which allows states to interact as single cohesive units. However, national integration is not yet a given reality in Southern Africa. Common values, interests and strengths to participate are yet to be assured within the same territorial state, while domestic peace is not yet predictable. Multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions and institutionalised relationships within the national borders of states are still also weak. States are still ravaged by suspicion, disputes over the distribution and allocation of resources and institutional rivalries and these are a liability to the process of regional community building. Unlike the European example in the late 1950's, political fragmentation in domestic societies did not exist. In fact, state and non-states institutions were largely functional. Southern Africa is still characterised by strong economic inequalities with few assets to integrate. Europe had also displayed technological advancement, low illiteracy rates and higher levels of education.

The constraints faced by organisations such as SADC include the lack of financial resources; poor institutional capacity at the domestic and regional level; difficulty in identifying priority tasks<sup>51</sup> and guiding co-operation towards actions that can serve as building blocks for further co-operation while eliminating residual fears. This situation poses the challenge of identifying policies that can be easily implemented by individual states and institutions that can assure solid and gradual progress towards the building of community. It does not suffice to have policies that are popular at regional level. They also need to reflect the reality and be popular at the domestic level, while institutions need to assure all the communities

---

<sup>51</sup> See Anthony Hawkins "Economic Development in SADCC Countries" in G. Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside (eds) *Towards a Post Apartheid Future*, *op. cit.* pp. 105-131.

that steps taken towards co-operation bring joint rewards. Regional institutions and policies will be popular if they are not seen as alien but as a continuation of domestic institutions and policies. In other words, it becomes meaningless for the conditions of Southern Africa to have a regional forum for conflict resolution if institutions that can ensure conflict management on a daily basis are not in place in domestic communities. It also becomes difficult to think of a strong regional community if national communities are poorly integrated or, if political actors in a given state do not share the same outlooks of the region. Domestic integration must be ensured if the regional community is not going to be merely a community of governments. In fact weak domestic institutions and weak national integration are likely to delay the process of regional integration. Moreover, it is difficult to talk about integration when there is little that can be integrated. Financial resources need to be generated to allow the creation and guarantee the functioning of all necessary regional institutions and fund economic projects that strengthen security. The policies need also to deal with regional economic imbalances, poverty, epidemic diseases and frequent natural disasters.

This implies that the logic of moving from the present conditions to an integrated security community in Southern Africa is untenable. In fact, concentrating on regional institutions, as a way of building security in Southern Africa is to continue to admit the existence of serious inter-state threats and is to accept that a prima outward orientation of the concept of security; and in the final analysis is to prioritise the security of government and states. An understanding of security as an environment allowing the predictability and the continuing fulfillment of human aspirations would require a different approach. An approach that allows the rationalization of what can be achieved and that this be matched with the amount of resources that can be mobilised and obstacles that may be

encountered and here lies the limit of the idealistic approach. The assessment of these difficulties as well as the level of resources suggests that Southern Africa would be better off if it aimed to establish a 'security society'<sup>52</sup> as the first stage of building the security community. As noted above, the concept of 'security society' differs from Hedley Bull's conception of 'society of states' in the sense that it would allow members of that society to intervene formally on each other's affairs whenever crises occur in one or more members of the society. It does not therefore entail amalgamation of communities, nor does it imply the integration of states, or insensitive relations, but collective responsibility of relations between members. It implies agreeing to certain rules and conventions that ensure that principles and values underpinning the society and its interests are protected. Therefore, far from forcing states to hasten integration only at governmental level, this approach seeks to encourage them to work towards assuring each other that common interests and values are shared by all or by the majority of members in their domestic societies.

### **How to Ensure a Security Society**

The idea of building a 'security society' has practical implications for encouraging processes of structural transformation and institutional building at domestic and regional levels. Among these, processes and institutions that can reduce conflict, fragmentation and polarisation in domestic societies, as well as those that can help to raise confidence of people by improving their standards of living and drawing them closer to each other should be given priority. They pave the way for greater stability and contribute to solid foundations for integration. It also implies that states should act more responsibly in relation to each other by

---

<sup>52</sup>See the introduction to this chapter, p. 245.

observing the principles on which society is founded and by ensuring that their resources are spent in the development of environment assuring the existence of order justice and peace. The creation of a security society, will thus require transformations at the military, political and economic levels. For the specific conditions of Southern Africa this implies responsibilities by states, the civil society and the international donors:

### **States**

States are primary responsible for transformations at the military level ensuring that power will only be used to elicit positive change and not for domination and subordination of others, since this is an essential condition to restrain fears. One such step capable of raising confidence of people and ensure the use of power for positive change is increasing military interdependence by committing states and communities to comprehensive non-aggression.

The spirit of comprehensive non-aggression goes beyond the signature of non-aggression pacts. It implies refraining from fomenting dissension and subversion in neighbouring countries; it requires states to harmonise their foreign policies and to avoid disruptive conduct to each other; and it requires states to promote military transparency. This could be achieved through an agreement specifying the type and quality of equipment to be deployed in the region; establishment of joint training centres for officials; adoption of similar military doctrines; undertaking joint military exercises, and opening military installations for mutual inspection.

Strengthening the spirit of non-aggression at the domestic level will require an effective representation of regions, races and the various ethnic groups in the national army and police forces. Since these are important symbols of national

unity, the military structures and their force level need to be arranged in such a way, that no region, community or ethnic group, should offset the others, yet the combination of the military capability should be sufficient to defend the country.<sup>53</sup>

However, the spirit of non-aggression also means responsibility of not letting the domestic conflicts reach crises or affect others. Situations such as the 1992 post-election tragedy in Angola and the 1994 Rwandese tragedy are examples of what the spirit of security society should seek to avoid. The fundamental implication here is the need to reach agreement on when the principle of respect for sovereignty should not apply; agreeing on the responsibilities of the intervenor and on the conditions to reinstate it. This also imply the creation of capacity to deal with crisis, such as peacekeeping. However, to respond effectively to crises, Southern African states need to develop a regional capacity and mechanisms through which their actions can be facilitated, and seen to comply with the rule of law. There is no better lesson in this regard than the recent experience of Southern Africa. When the political situation deteriorated in Lesotho following the military coup in 1994, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe applied pressure to restore constitutional rule and avoid the development of further crises.<sup>54</sup> Following this event, the Frontline States met in Harare a few days before the 1994 October Mozambican multiparty elections to assess the possible post-elections developments. Having reached the conclusion that peace might be disturbed by virtue of one of the contenders rejecting the results, they sought to prevent a further deepening of the crisis. They warned the contending Mozambican parties elections of their willingness to do everything in their hand, including military actions, to restore

---

<sup>53</sup> Here the Swiss experience can be relevant, since no Canton is allowed to have a number of permanent force above the levels that have been agreed to.

<sup>54</sup> See "Military Intervention Recedes", *South Scan* Vol. 9:32, 2 September 1994, p. 253



peace, should one of the parties undermine the peace progress<sup>55</sup>. When Renamo attempted to boycott the elections, the Frontline states sent a high level delegation to Maputo to reaffirm its position and dissuade Renamo<sup>56</sup>. Their actions proved to be a major deterrent for further crises in Mozambique, since it curtailed Renamo's chances of following Unita's footsteps replicating the Angolan post 1992 elections tragedy.<sup>57</sup> The Frontline states' action also sent signals to the rest of world that they repudiated the deepening of crisis in the region and that they were prepared to do everything to stop this from happening.

The Frontline States' 'gun boat' diplomacy sounded convincing because the states involved had the capacity to take military action. However, it did not result from an existing arrangement in the region. The Frontline states acted on an ad-hoc basis having assessed low risk in the countries where their 'gun boat' diplomacy was tried. They had no contingency plans in case the situation deteriorated. They also lacked instruments and mechanisms that would facilitate corporate military action, like the availability of contingents and logistics. They also lacked legal instrument through which they could justify their actions. In addition lack of planning would have made their response difficult and exhausting should the crises have deepened.

The commitment to non-aggression, can therefore create conditions for the variable power to remain stable and be used to foment positive change. The spirit of non-aggression also reduces the fears for military conflict and domination between states, thus enhancing the potential for co-operation. It also establishes the basis for a reduction in military spending and the enhancement of co-operation in the area of

---

<sup>55</sup>See "South African Delegation Runs Home Message Stability", *South Scan* Vol. 9:42, November, 1994, p. 335.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> After elections held in September 1992, one of the Angola warring factions, UNITA refused to accept the result of elections. Angola was plunged back to civil war that destroyed most of the country and killed millions.

disarmament, collective defence, thus ensuring that regional resources are correctly applied to the defence of the region. It also discourages the adversarial spirit among regional members brought about by offensive defence and it restrains arms build-up since it would also encourages agreements on the type of armament to be deployed in the region, schemes and mechanisms for their acquisition or development

States will need to take practical steps aimed at strengthening interdependence. This is justified by the endemic nature of security problems in military, political, economic and social spheres, and the lack of capacity in the individual states, to deal on their own, with these problems. The strengthening of interdependence implies measures at domestic and regional levels. At the domestic level, interdependence among communities is important for national cohesion and identity. This can be achieved by encouraging cooperation and transactions between different communities. The state has a particular responsibility in creating a legal framework and investment in the development of infrastructure that would facilitate the transactions since Deutsch observes the essence of community building is improving and increasing social, cultural and political communication.<sup>58</sup>

Indeed, the need to increase the level of social communication in Southern Africa, starts at domestic level. In fact, large numbers of people in remote areas have few contacts with their fellow nationals, and because of artificial borders and in some cases because of alienation by the state they can not even distinguish whether they are citizens of one state or the other, yet few will know they have a capital city and central government responsible for their security<sup>59</sup>. The lack of adequate systems of transport and communications have increased the isolation of communities within national boundaries and strengthened differences rather than

---

<sup>58</sup> See K. Deutsch et. al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* p.149.

<sup>59</sup> See I.B. Lundin, "*Projecto Autoridade Tradicional, Documento Pesquisa*, DAA/UEM, 1992 pp.3, Unpublished Report, Centre of Strategic and International Studies, Maputo.

similarity and cohesion. Cultural exchanges sports and business, tourism, consolidation of national identity can not take place without extending transport and communications to the use of everyone. Building a security society also implies improving transport facilities and communications network within the national borders and across the region.

States have responsibilities in improving transport and telecommunications, since these are crucial to the increase of intra-regional trade, and essential to keep the idea of community alive. However intra-regional trade is largely dependent on transportation routes and communications within national borders, since these are key to bringing goods from the most remote areas to their getaways and vice-versa. This strengthens the sense of interdependence and community.

Strengthening interdependence also requires an identification of mechanisms in which regional co-operation can be increased further. Some parts of Southern Africa are richer in some resources than others; while others have more skills in certain areas than others; yet others possess better infrastructure. When states are taken individually, some show greater weaknesses in some areas than when the region is taken as a whole. Indeed, when regional resources, infrastructure and skills are added together, it enhances the region's potential and capacity to ensure security. Through SADC, the Southern African states have made important progress in improving transport, port facilities and communications networks, which strengthens interdependence among them. However, the improved system of communication still needs expansion, so as to bring domestic communities closer. The example of SADC projects in the mining sector needs to be encouraged. Mining projects have sought to increase participation of the people in their domestic environment by encouraging small scale mining. While this has helped to alleviate the problem of unemployment and allowed the development of small business, little

has been achieved, however, in terms of adopting a common- strategy for the development of mining. The existing mineral wealth of the region justified the establishment of regional plants for mineral beneficiation, which apart from creating new jobs would increase the value added of minerals, thus contributing for the economic prosperity and greater security.

Regional projects such as the one aimed at constructing a power grid across the region from the Cape to Zaire;<sup>60</sup> water resources management, such as the project bringing together South Africa and Lesotho<sup>61</sup> have the merit of increasing regional interdependence promoting complementarity and providing jobs to a large numbers of people. Similar initiatives have followed between Mozambique and South Africa and are vindicated by the provision of farming land in Mozambique to South African farmers to help Mozambique to increase its food production and exports.<sup>62</sup> The other idea involves the development of the Maputo corridor with the object of setting agrobusinesses and petrochemical industrial complexes in the corridor linking Mozambique and South Africa. Joint economic rewards are the major spur for this undertaking involving transfer of resources and technology from the most developed to the least developed members. Cheap production and transportation costs and the prospects of enlarging market are the major incentives to the investors. The security motivation for these projects is that they help to stop the flow of refugees from less prosperous to the most prosperous areas. Projects of the sort help to improve the quality of life in the region as they create better incentives for people to live and work together. They generate income which can support further cooperation in other areas including the consolidation of national

---

<sup>60</sup> See, R.K. Dutkiewicz, Progress Report of the Energy Sector, SAFER op cit. in chapter 5 of this study.

<sup>61</sup> Cited in Booth and Vale, "Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism" *op. cit.*, pp. 285-304.

<sup>62</sup> See "Extensive Pact Agreed Ahead of October Elections" *South Scan*, Vol. 9 29 July 1994.

and regional defence and security institutions. Co-operation in the area of defence or policing can only bring positive results if economic co-operation is successful. However, no economic success can be guaranteed without the minimal conditions of order and peace, and the sharing of resources, co-ordination of strategies and common clear political objectives. The process of building a security society in Southern Africa also means identifying policies aimed at strengthening national communities.

### **The civil Society**

Economic transactions in the region are likely to increase if greater emphasis is placed on community development. Community organisations together with states share the responsibility of encouraging production based on simple technology, local raw materials which is capable of enhancing creativity. The attainment of this objective requires that special attention is paid to education, particularly the education of women, since they play a special function in the education of children, especially at pre-school age thus shaping the learning environment of the new members of the society. Women are the major contributors of food production, and they are key to the attainment food security.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, their role in food security, goes beyond farming to encompass hygiene, health, nutrition and welfare of the family, yet most development policies are male-orientated.<sup>64</sup> The civil society has a special responsibility in getting those responsible for the development policy to redirect or balance these policies in order to enable women to improve their skills and capacity in food production to reduce poverty in the

---

<sup>63</sup> See R.M. Mkandawire, "Women, Food Security and Agriculture Policy in the SADCC Region: A Case Study of Malawi", in R. Mkandawire and Khabele Matlosa (eds) *Food Policy and Agriculture in Southern Africa* ( Harare: SAPES, 1993), pp. 209-218.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p.213.

region and provide better education to children. Education is also key to enhance creativity and participation of all human beings in the production and other society goals. The increase of production and creativity enhances the potential for transactions, mutual economic benefits and better quality of life.<sup>65</sup> These act as catalysts for regional integration.<sup>66</sup>

Civic organisations such as Youth can play an important role in enhancing stability, by promoting educational programs promoting peace, human rights, other social values, sports and other activities that would keep the youth away from criminal activities. Human rights organisations have a special task of assuring that states, and other members of civilian society comply with respect for human rights and this has an implication of broadening the agenda of security, by a constant interaction with the state and raising people's concerns.

The civil society has yet another responsibility in assuring the improvement of civilian-military relations. Although progress towards the neutralisation of the use of force in the region has been made, truly democratic civil-military relations are not yet a reality. The military still are not trained to respect human rights, indeed in many states, defence and security are secret preserves of the state. However, behind the spirit of secrecy lie the opportunities for misusing public funds, practicing illegality and inappropriate using of military power other security forces, which threatens democracy. The civil society can help to bring about democratic civil-military relations, making sure that the military are accountable to the civilian authority, the public and the parliament by promoting debate over the defence and security issues such as military professionalism, the role and responsibilities of the military in society, weapons policy, armament industry, encouraging academic and non-academic research on issues such as military doctrines and threat perceptions.

---

<sup>65</sup> See K Deutsch et al., *Political Community and North Atlantic Area* p. 141.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

These actions are likely to enhance the respect of legality, restrain violent behaviour in soldiers and correct application of public funds for security and defence policy.

Finally if the civil organisations can build regional networks, and co-operate with their counterparts, they would strengthen their capacities thus improving the potential for a better interaction between the civil society and the state across the region.

### **The role of International Donors**

Power and fears at regional level can also be managed by a positive influence of extra-regional power and their commitment to the spirit of non-aggression. The impact of states such as the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and other members of the group of G7 on regional systems can not be ignored. As Bull noted, major powers play an important role in maintaining order by seeking to limit and contain conflicts.<sup>67</sup> The number of conflicts in the region aggravated by some form of intervention of major powers is significant, as it is the list of conflicts that were resolved thanks to their efforts. Furthermore, the number of examples showing the failure of regional arrangements to resolve regional conflicts is also high.<sup>68</sup> The reasons for this failure are varied. They range from the lack of resources, lack of skills and mechanisms, inability of winning trust of the parts to the conflict, to the lack of regional solutions. These are reasons to rely on outside help provided that this help can strengthen regional arrangements and initiatives.

---

<sup>67</sup> See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 207.

<sup>68</sup>The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia is an example of the failure of regional arrangements in resolving local conflicts; other example is the 1982 OAU intervention in Chad.

Extra- regional powers can therefore, act as brokers in stalemate situations. They can also generate ideas leading to long lasting peace, apply a variety of pressures and force positive changes. They can also act as arbiters of regional power relations by establishing defence pacts either in bilateral arrangements or multilateral such as the Commonwealth that can help to raise confidence of people by improving their standards of living and draw them close to each other.<sup>69</sup> They can also conduct preventive deployment to stop the escalation of crises.<sup>70</sup>

To perform these tasks effectively, however, they would also have to be fully committed to non-aggression. This means that they can enter formal agreements with regional and sub-regional organisations supporting the repudiation of dissension and subversion. This includes, among other things, not supplying arms outside the officially established schemes and channels of military co-operation, either bilateral or multilateral. They can also play a role in encouraging multilateral agreements regulating arms trade and improving the control mechanisms of armament circuits and agreeing on certain levels of armament production and international inspection.

The international donors can also help in developing capacity and institutions for crises prevention and management that is, institutions for peace making and peacekeeping. The post 1991 crises in Angola show how hazardous and costly it is to rely on the UN mechanism for peacekeeping. Had the region had a capacity to intervene, crises might have not escalate as they did. Yet, the peacekeeping experience in Somalia provided a pretext for the reluctance of the states to send troops in peacekeeping missions to places where peace is not there to

---

<sup>69</sup> This experience seemed to have produced good result in the ASEAN countries. See for example Michael Leifer, *ASEAN, and the Security of South East Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 52-87.

<sup>70</sup> Preventive deployment was applied in Macedonia in 1993 and deterred further crises from escalating. See the report of the UN Secretary General, S/24923, 9 December 1992



be kept. This justifies the development of a regional capacity to manage crises. The Great Powers could help states to establish regional centres, train peacekeepers, develop the communications network, and organise logistics. As seen in previous chapters regional states lack resources and skills to this capacity.

International donors do not have a role to play only in interstate relations. Governments have their agendas and preoccupations which often do not coincide with that of the civil society. Therefore strengthening the civil society might not be their priority. As we argued in chapter 6 and in the above sections, building security in Southern Africa requires, a vigorous civil society to better interact with the state and define a security agenda that it takes into account all people. The role of the international donors in strengthening the civil society is very important, in providing funds for the organisations promoting peace, human rights, community development, encouraging the various organisations to meet with their counterparts in the region and abroad and encouraging them to hold national debates on issues pertaining to security. The intent is to empower them so that they can better interact with state and fulfill their role in the society.

Building security cannot only be charged to states. It is a responsibility of all those living or participating in the development of a society such as state functionaries, civic organisations individuals and foreign donors. The recognition of the role of each one of these agents is likely to lead to better policies which can lead to the strengthening of the regional community.

The identification of clear political objectives and co-ordination of strategies requires that states function effectively at the domestic level and that they devise regional policies that can enjoy support at home. This support is unlikely to come if policies aimed at reducing polarisation, fragmentation and isolation of domestic communities from one another are not adopted. This implies that strengthening

## Chapter 8

### Conclusions

This study of the security concept in Southern Africa and prospects for the post-apartheid era has sought to answer two questions: first whether the traditional concept of security can work for the conditions of Southern Africa; and second if it cannot work what are the alternatives that allow us to draw some general conclusions.

This study makes four central claims. The first is that Southern Africa, partly due to its peculiar colonial history and that of apartheid and partly due to the region's links with the great powers, embraced the traditional concept of security which was unsustainable and inappropriate for its specific conditions. This concept was state centric, inherently militaristic, nationally focused, and narrow in scope. Its application to Southern Africa led to regional confrontation, instability and hence insecurity rather than security. Thus, the region needs to adopt a new concept of security. The second claim of this study is that the adoption of new concept of security requires breaking with past traditions, attitudes and ways of thinking about security in favour of views deriving from philosophical idealism.<sup>1</sup> Philosophical idealism allows us to question our assumptions and methods independent of the constraints imposed by reality and is clearly a way of searching for ideal solutions.

---

<sup>1</sup> We understand as the Kantian tradition associated with the project for perpetual peace and the proposition advanced by human rights thinkers that rights should form the foundation of any political process.

The third claim of this study is that Southern Africa should aim at building a 'security society' as a first approach of building the community. This approach seeks to assure that common values and aspirations are shared by all and that efforts to regional do not undermine or overshadow the domestic political process of integration and finally the fourth claim is that ensuring security implies building legitimate states and breaking the state monopoly over security.

The climate of confrontation that characterised regional relations over the last 30 years was founded on disagreement over alternative projects of regional order. These were, first, the colonial order that opposed native peoples and the settler community; and second, the order designed by apartheid South Africa to perpetuate relations of racial domination, subordination and inequality which met the opposition of the newly independent, majority-ruled states. This conflict of interests and outlooks was responsible for the region to embrace the traditional concept of security.

This study argues that the traditional approach to security is a reflection of negative thinking, i.e., about the threats to and the vulnerabilities of the state. This view of security cannot but lead to short term problem-solving approaches which hamper the development of a long term conceptual framework of thinking about security. Yet the situation in Southern Africa, such as the weak nature of states and the endemic character of the political social and economic problems faced by these states, and the lack of functional institutions, requires new thinking, concepts and approaches. Concepts that will need to approach security in all its social, political,

military, economic, social and environmental dimensions This makes security an issue to be dealt with from political perspectives associated with theories about the 'good life'. However, because theories of the 'good life' lead to holistic approaches, they often mask the question of predictability which is the key to security. Looking at the problems of the subcontinent from the security angle has the advantage of identifying what needs to be done to ensure the predictability and progress in the 'good life'. The proposition which has been advanced in this study is that the changes at the conceptual level should consider people as the only referent object of security and see states and other social institutions as vehicles mediating the interaction among the main referents of security. In other words states and other social institutions are simple instruments creating an environment for security.

The proposition that people are the end objects of security, is not new. Thinkers such as Hobbes and all other apologists of the theory of balance of power were fully aware that the ultimate objects of security were human beings, and their theories were aimed at ensuring people's security. However, the difference between the approach advocated by this study and classical realist theory lies in the mechanism devised to assure security. Hobbesian prescriptions of surrendering sovereignty to a *Leviathan* do not themselves provide any checks to the development of and the nature of order established. This fact opens the way to tyranny, oppression and all forms of totalitarianism; while theories of balance of power led states to self-fulfilling exercises rather than focusing on people's

priorities. The lesson to be extracted from the observations is that good intentions are not enough to ensure security. Special attention should be given to mechanisms designed to ensure the attainments of goals. Placing people at the centre, therefore, requires focusing on environment enabling security rather than on threats or vulnerabilities of the state. The implication of this proposition is thus the need to build regional and domestic institutions that can deal with the historical legacies, the present reality while securing an improvement in the quality of life of human beings. This requires structures and institutions that can smooth the interaction of human beings while allowing them to predict the improvement in the quality of life and the nature of changes and the social dynamics, since it is in this interaction that the question of security arises. In other words, building security requires that special attention is given to the political process through which the continuing demands of order, justice and peace can be reconciled. The coexistence of order, justice, and peace define the security environment. This coexistence, however, needs to be in a dynamic equilibrium, i.e., it must accommodate both changes in the people's perceptions of the environment and changes in relationships amongst the three pillars of the environment. The political process will lead to the intended security environment if it is opened to the participation of all political actors in society and if a common good is given primacy in politics. In the final analysis, a people centred approach, therefore, requires focusing in improving the quality of the political process by empowering different actors than those traditionally around, if not merely agents of the state, and by reconciling and synthesising divergent

projects aimed at serving the common good. In the past there were many reasons which impeded states to serve the common good.

The nature of the states was one primary factor. In South Africa the state was there to serve sectional interests, dichotomising politics along racial and ethnic lines. Some colonial states in the rest of the region sought to take into account local people's interests<sup>2</sup>. The general rule, however, was to promote the settlers' interests. The successor state found it difficult to restructure and serve the domestic interests of their peoples. The second reason was the structure of the international system in the post- World War II period. In searching for balance between the global and domestic order, states were forced to take sides in the bipolar structure of the world, privileging the global rather than the domestic order. The third reason was that in post-colonial period, politics became a preserve of small circles of politicians placed at the top of party echelons in a single party systems. Although one may argue that party leaders consulted frequently with masses, this was over a prior-agreed agenda issue. The approach was top down, and reflected the views and priorities of the leadership rather than of the entire people. This approach also allowed very few inputs from the base which, was often amorphous. This lack of organisation of the masses according to the diversity of interests led to a weak interaction between the state and the civil society, and facilitated states to pursue their self-interests rather than society's goals. The post-Cold War international

---

<sup>2</sup> Here we refer to the principle of paramountcy adopted by the imperial Britain with respect to its colonies, which stated that aspirations of the majority of local people should be paramount in the political decisions. See details in chapter 4.

environment offers an opportunity to create legitimate states and take a wider view of security and regard politics as decision-making mechanism for society goals in which agency is the entire society.

In order to achieve this, governments and the civil society need to adopt a philosophical idealism. Of course, idealism creates tensions between what is desirable and what is likely, since at most times the ideal is not likely to be arrived at. The reality in the region vindicates this claim in spite of the acceptance by all SADC members of the need for change at the conceptual level and the actions undertaken by SADC towards the strengthening of regional security relations.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, while the developments of the last five years, such as the end of the Cold War, the end of apartheid and other conflicts provide the region with an opportunity to rethink its security relations and replace confrontation by co-operation, it is still faced with the many dangers well capable of plunging it back into the insecurity of the past. Historical and Cold War legacies ( see chapter 4 above) and the great demands for resources for institutional development and transformation are likely to affect the process of building security. The advent of practical difficulties impeding the realisation of the ideal leads to the necessity of placing an emphasis on and arguing for a strategy that does not lie beyond the capacity of states and other political actors. Implicit in this argument is the attempt to caution the tendency to recommend policy frameworks not sustainable in the

---

<sup>3</sup> See for example, *Creation of an Organ on Political Co-operation, Peace and Security*, Report 5 of the SADC Council of Ministers Meeting 28-29 January, 1996, Johannesburg, South Africa

long run. Experiences such as the short lived Eastern African Community (EAC) or the hesitation revolving around the adherence to monetary union by some European states are clear indicators of the need to reflect on and recommend institutions and policies consonant with expectations and implementation capacity of states. No state will be able to support institutions if these are not seen to bring benefits to it. Therefore, examples such as those of the EAC are clearly cases to be avoided since they discourage further co-operation. They increase the lack of confidence of governments and people in the need for co-operation and its institutional framework : as Haas observes, the decision to proceed with regional co-operation institutions is strongly determined by the expectation of gains of the actors involved<sup>4</sup>. To increase regional co-operation will require certain responsibilities by the state. First to realise that regional integration is unsustainable without domestic integration and second, that integration is about intergovernmental institutions as well as civil society institutions and other private sector interests. In addition to governments agreeing on principles guiding interstate relations, they need to define legal framework facilitating civil society's initiatives. They also need to agree on principles regulating the relations of various civic organisations, support those promoting good causes and define the way in which they can receive external help to limit donors' disruptive influence in the domestic environment.

Regional intergovernmental institutions are important in the task of building security, as argued above (see Chapters 6 and 7) They guarantee the transition from

---

<sup>4</sup> See E. B Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, *op cit.* p. 13.



a system of security to a community of security, provided they are strongly backed by people concerned. Regional intergovernmental institutions are required for the elimination of the security dilemma and to render obsolete the balance-of-power as a mechanism of maintaining security. These institutions are also important for the formation and consolidation of a regional identity which helps to reduce interstate conflict and bring closer different communities within and between states. Regional intergovernmental institutions would also facilitate the sharing of resources, experiences and capacities; and would facilitate the process of confidence building by providing a forum for the discussion of common problems and adoption of common approaches to problems affecting the region. Regional intergovernmental institutions appear to be particularly necessary due to the endemic nature of security problems that cannot be dealt with within the confines of nation-states or by each individual state (see chapter 4).

Ideal institutions for Southern Africa are those that can help to build and consolidate a 'security community' that is to say, institutions facilitating the reduction of civil and inter-state violent conflict and regional integration.<sup>5</sup> However, the experience of European integration shows that certain pre-conditions need to exist for the process to begin to unfold. Chief among these is the compatibility of values. In fact, Western European states after World War II were already liberal democracies when they embarked on integration. Multipartyism and parliamentary politics had already been adopted when the first steps towards

---

<sup>5</sup> See K. Deutsch, *The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, *op cit.* pp. 5, 141

integration were taken. Political parties, trade unions and other civic organisations were also in place, and helped integration by framing domestic and regional politics. Market economics was a reality in all the European states that established the European Coal and Steel Community and their industrialisation had also reached a certain level of development in addition to a considerable degree of interdependence in the coal industry, energy and transport sectors<sup>6</sup>. In other words, the Europeans had something to integrate in addition to a reason for integration set by the Franco-German problem, the questions related to the creation of the North Atlantic Organisation, and the will to remain independent from United States hegemony all of which provided compelling motives for the Europeans to embark on integration<sup>7</sup>.

The situation in which Europe found itself at the end of World War II contrasts with the present situation in Southern Africa in ways that are likely to impede the realisation of the ideal. To date, not all states in the region have embraced multipartyism<sup>8</sup>. Although multipartyism has been introduced in the majority it is not yet consolidated, which means that common political values are not yet shared by the entire region. Unlike the situation in Europe, state institutions cannot be assumed to exist or to function normally. While in some countries they need to be strengthened, in others they need to be re-created. Civic organisations

---

<sup>6</sup>See E. B. Haas *The Uniting of Europe op. cit.*, pp. 4-19

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.; see also J. Groom and P. Taylor, *Framework for International Co-operation, op. cit.*, especially chapters 8-11

<sup>8</sup>When the present study was being conducted Swaziland and Lesotho were still absolute monarchies.

acting outside the political space occupied by the state need to be consolidated in some countries while they need to be created from scratch in others. The region also shows high rates of illiteracy which are an obstacle to the functioning of state institutions and communication of political ideas. The level of interdependence in the region is not as high as the level of dependence which facilitates the salience of South Africa as a regional hegemon. Thus South Africa is likely to behave like any other hegemon regardless of the fact that a majority government is in power. This is likely to occur especially if South Africa senses that it gains very little from co-operation with unequal partners. These are factors that need to be taken into account when thinking of building a security community through a creation of intergovernmental institutions that may lead to integration. An important aspect of this process is that institutions and policy frameworks have to match the capacity of the region to create, consolidate and implement the devised policies. This makes the full application of the European integration experience inadequate for Southern Africa and by implication, any scheme recommending outright integration of units impinging on security. In fact while the idea of integration is full applicable, the approach to it needs to readjust to local conditions. Regional integration in Southern Africa, needs to be accompanied by a process of national reform conducive to national integration. This is a fundamental step if the region is to move from intergovernmental co-operation to integration of sectors and communities. Intergovernmental co-operation is unlikely to sustain itself in the long run, if it is not largely supported by people or the majority of national elites, who will provide

legitimacy to government policies and the actions of institutions. The lack of peoples participation in the process of integration is likely to replicate a top down model of approaching security which past experience has showed to be conflict prone and unsustainable for the region.

Southern Africa is still inundated by regional inter-governmental groupings competing with each other in the task of regional integration.<sup>9</sup> Rationalisation and complementarity would seem more appropriate for the circumstances of the region for maximisation of co-operation and correct application of resources. This is another responsibility charged to governments.

As implied above, regional institutions should go beyond the domain of governments. This can be achieved by mutual support of the various civic organisations and NGO's across the region and overseas and by the help of foreign governments. Some states have a more vigorous civil society than others, and some civic organisations are stronger in some countries than the others. In the interest of regional security, there is a need to increase co-operation among these organisations. The Trade Unions in South Africa have a better organisations than most countries in the region, yet women organisations in places such as Malawi and Mozambique seem to have a stronger organisation than their counterparts in the region. Co-operation among them could level the standards of organisation, agendas and priorities thus helping to build a vigorous civil society across the

---

<sup>9</sup> See Joe Chilaizya and Lewis Machipisa, "Tension Mounts Between Rival Trading Blocs", *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, 8-14 September, 1995

region. The Peace Movement and Human Rights Organisations in Europe, for example, have accumulated the experience in campaigning against nuclear confrontation and human rights abuse. Civil society in Western states has also made contributions in bringing about stable and democratic civil-military relations, and pursuing certain levels of disarmament in their own states. If their experience is passed on to their counterparts in the region it may help to strengthen the capacity of the civil organisations. Finally, some governments in the West have already succeeded in creating an atmosphere reducing the potential for inter-state confrontation, creating domestic stability and regulating their private sectors, and enhancing civil society initiatives. They could help to build security in Southern Africa if some of this experience can be passed to their counterparts, and relevant civic organisations. They can also help to build security by promoting co-operation between civic organisations and NGO's in the region and their counterparts overseas.

The fact that conditions for integration in Southern Africa is the reason for claiming that Southern Africa should aim at building a 'security society' as a first stage of building the community. The task of building a security community will primarily require the establishment of agreements assuring regional constitutional order and the reign of the spirit of non-aggression aimed at assuring the existence of common shared values. While an important step for assuring non-aggression is the signing of comprehensive non-aggression pacts ( see chapter 6 above) this act is not *per se* a guarantee that aggression will not take place. Concrete action aimed at

conflict reduction and the assuring the predictability of peace is required. SADC has initiated cooperation in key areas such as energy, transport, agriculture, mining, and human resource development, but the benefits of this cooperation have not yet enhanced the security of the majority of people in the SADC states. SADC's action is faced with the challenge of laying out foundations for long term relationships which can function as building blocks for security. This is dependent upon its ability to encourage and strengthen co-operation in areas that can be easily integrated while mobilising the interest and participation of all states.

Security building also needs an increase in the level of investment to improve the economic condition of the region which is unlikely unless political stability can be guaranteed. This implies the need to identify the point in which this vicious circle - the lack of economic development leads to insecurity and insecurity can not ensure the necessary climate for investment- related to the security problematic can be broken. This suggests that the priority lies on guiding efforts towards the consolidation of peace. The task of building security will be facilitated if steps leading to the consolidation of acquired peace can be assured. This requires socio-political undertakings such as political accomodation and creation of legitimate structures and institutions; military and policing measures to guarantee order and protection of what has been achieved; and economic measures to restore people's confidence, legitimation of policies and reduction of material causes of conflict. Neo-functional theory teaches that integration of some sectors generate

spillovers, thus expanding cooperation into other areas<sup>10</sup>. However, as the European example shows, certain economic and social acts do not spill-over into political sectors. Their increased functional integration in economic and social areas have failed to expand cooperation into common defence policy<sup>11</sup>. In fact cooperation in this area appears to be a matter of political will rather than a mere consequence of functional cooperation. The implication is that cooperation and integration in the area of security and defence is largely determined by the existence of clear benefits. In this case, it is whether the model of security community can guarantee both security and independence of defence in times of crisis. This suggests that political will is likely to be enhanced if co-operation and integration can quickly bring tangible benefits to serve as incentives for peace consolidation and further cooperation.<sup>12</sup>

As the European example suggests, regional integration without national integration is untenable. Therefore, efforts aimed at bringing communities living in the same national borders closer are indispensable. Building security requires strengthening domestic institutions and infrastructures of the states. The reality of Southern Africa thus points towards the need to opt for the path of strengthening the security system rather than creating hollow institutions of regional integration.

---

<sup>10</sup>See E. B Haas, *Beyond the Nation State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969) p. 47

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> See James. E Dougherty and Robert L. Platzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Harper and Collins, 1991), p.459

The thrust of the argument of this study leads inevitably to the conclusion that security in Southern Africa can only be ensured by building legitimate states, and breaking the monopoly that these have in setting up agendas and defining priorities on security.<sup>13</sup> The breaking of the monopoly entails sharing responsibilities in decision making with civil society, and this is particularly necessary to talk about the security of people. Legitimate states are key to the strengthening of political process by strongly interacting with society and being responsive to their interests and needs.

The state will continue to be the key agent of security as long as the state-system in international relations prevails. In fact, the argument voiced by the International Political Economy theorists that the state is withering away, as a result of expansion of global capitalist market<sup>14</sup> accounts for only one side of the history. The state does not seem likely to disappear in the near future. As Fred Halliday observes, the list of arguments pointing to the weakening of the state in the present society is as long as the one pointing to its strengthening.<sup>15</sup> The state provides a framework for order in which people and other society agents operate. Individuals and other agents of society also seek its protection and legitimation of their

---

<sup>13</sup> Breaking the monopoly of the state on security, should not be understood to mean that the state should cease to have monopoly over the means of violence. Instead, it means that procedures and rules regulating the use of means of violence, priorities and the security agenda should be established in consultation with agents other than those around the state.

<sup>14</sup> See for example Susan Strange, "Political Economy and International Relations" in Kenneth Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Today*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 169.

<sup>15</sup> See Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda" *op. cit.*, pp. 200-203.



activities abroad.<sup>16</sup> In security the state provides the balance between freedom and security. Therefore, no clear substitute for the state in the near future seems likely. The state, however, needs to be increasingly seen as a promoter of common good and source of common justice,<sup>17</sup> rather than pursuing a self-fulfilling agenda at the domestic and at the international level. It needs to recover its decision-making capacity, by strengthening its institutions and embracing popular policies. It should find widely accepted norms and principles for the use of its instruments of physical power. States in Southern Africa need to reverse situations such as those of finding their legitimation primarily in the implementation of policy demands of the international donor agencies rather than on their domestic constituencies. States' domestic legitimacy is a pre-condition for a sound political process, one deeply rooted on the will of their domestic societies.

The legitimacy of states is not solely achieved by correctly identifying state objectives, but also by devising appropriate mechanisms to check and change ways in which things are done. This makes paramount the necessity to guarantee the transparency of the process and enable members of a given society to understand it and critically assess what is being done. The opportunity to participate, including in the modification of the process, is important for the outcome and the stability of the society. It is through participation that people

---

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup>This passage refers to the Lockean common good, whereby the state performs the task of manager of the people will. For details see for instance, Iain Hampsher - Monk, *A History of Modern Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 69-116.

recognise the merits and difficulties, the strengths and the weaknesses of the process and on basis of which they concede, make sacrifices or extend their solidarity to other members of the society. If it is accepted that the logic of participation in a process helps to reduce conflict, ample participation can lead to an expanded stability hence enhancing security.

Ample participation will need decentralisation of power and empowerment of different social actors, however, to allow their full engagement in the political process. Several models of de-centralisation have been applied in societies that experienced problems of the sort troubling Southern Africa. They vary from completely decentralised systems with central authority performing symbolic functions, to models entailing a balance of power between the centre and regional units. Suitable models of decentralisation can be identified and applied according to the specific situation of a given state and in conformity with the will of the citizens and political actors. There are, however, some general principles that should be observed in pursuing decentralisation. Its general rationale is the mitigation of intra-state conflict by largely sharing power with the members of society, establishing clear mechanisms for the use of state power, therefore avoiding a situation in which the states embark on self-fulfilling exercises. This becomes a pre-requisite for building security in societies divided by tensions, of fear of domination, ethnic or regional rivalry, and it implies the identification of viable units to which power can be accorded. Secondly, decentralisation should also seek to safeguard larger units (region, province, state or community) having equal power

in order to avoid attempts of mutual domination; and thirdly, the system resulting from decentralisation should be functional and beneficial to all units to guarantee co-operation amongst them and safeguard the viability of the state as whole.

This study also stresses that the state is not the only agent. Grass-roots organisations, civic associations, individuals and other organisations operating in the social sphere independent of governments are also agents. They are promoters of people's aspirations and are essential in raising the awareness of governments about the important areas and issues impinging on security. Issues such as education, particularly the education of women are not often associated with the security building, but in Southern Africa they are essential for the stability of the society and for a balanced political process. The organisations composing the civil society need to be strengthened, by mutual support, and increasing co-operation with their counterparts abroad and overseas, to allow a greater interaction with the state and among states. The strengthening of agents other than those around the state will strengthen the political process, by allowing the society as a whole to make choices over what is best for the common good. As argued in the present study such interaction will accord more legitimacy to the state, and is likely to lead to a more orderly, peaceful and stable environment.

To summarise, the traditional concept of security is inadequate for conditions such as those of Southern Africa. What makes the traditional concept of security difficult to apply in Southern Africa is the primacy accorded to the state. Most states, as it is argued elsewhere ( see chapter 5) are weak, they are unable to

sustain large military expenditures and are plagued by many domestic problems. In vast areas of some countries state institutions are barely in existence and people live without state structures providing minimal functions such as education, health, tax collection and protection. The majority of states have also lost autonomy for policy-making and policy implementation and are economically heavily dependent on external sources. They are therefore unable to embrace a primarily outward oriented concept of security. States in Southern Africa have to negotiate with the external agents the conditions for their security. In fact, states such Angola, Malawi, Mozambique not only lost their regulatory capacity in their domestic environment, they no longer monopolise the instruments of violence.

This study notes that at present, most sources of insecurity in Southern Africa come from within the state and not from outside. This is a strong reason to advocate the adoption by the governments of a new concept of security which will take into account the domestic reality and the external environment. A concept enabling the understanding of the dynamic and factors for security and sources of insecurity at the domestic as well as at the external level.

The need for new approaches to security is shared by a considerable number of scholars who argue that the new concept, needs to go beyond the traditional concept which places an emphasis on military aspects. These scholars share the view that, at present most sources of insecurity are domestic and non-military and that states can not individually deal with the challenges they pose. They advocate, in addition to the expansion of the traditional concept to include

non-military phenomenon, the adoption of a transnational and people's centred approach. While the present study agrees with the need for new conceptions and approaches and the assumption that the objects of security are people, it seeks to go beyond the proposition that the important thing is the shift in the centre from state to people. To ensure the desired goals it requires concentrating on the mechanisms making the environment secure, i.e., the political process.

The proposition, of broadening the concept of security to include military and non-military phenomena raises a fundamental question about the boundaries of the field of security, in other words, when should a non-military phenomenon become a security concern. Indeed, pushed to its extremes, this conception implies that issues such as pollution, drug abuse, child abuse, disease, economic recession, border control and the like, become security problems. However, the excessive expansion of the concept of security to include non-military phenomena, as Walt points out, leads one to regard everything as a security problem. This conception, in addition to destroying the intellectual coherence of the discipline, makes it intractable in any logical sense, since its boundaries can no longer be defined<sup>18</sup>.

This points necessarily to the need to establish a criterion enabling us to distinguish when a non-military phenomenon should become a security problem, and who should make the decisions on this.

---

<sup>18</sup> See Stephan D. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, 1991, p. 212.

The traditional criterion used to differentiate security from non-security issues has been their capacity to cause physical damage, or threaten core values of communities, their way of life and/or existence. War and threats to war automatically qualify as security issues because they are perceived as capable of either causing physical damage, disrupting the core values of society or peoples' life styles. However, factors capable of causing damages and threats similar to those caused by wars or their threats are not limited to military phenomenon. Issues such as epidemic disease, natural disaster, policy measures can cause the same level of threat. For example, if AIDS reached an epidemic level as is the case of Uganda, or Tanzania<sup>19</sup>, a public policy, of the same level of importance as that caused by war will be required to deal with the problem. Similarly, if natural disasters such as droughts affect a state or a region, because they can cause death tolls as high as wars they will also require public policy. Policy measures such as the increase in maize prices, as the Zambian experience showed in the 1980's, has led to riots, looting and instability in the country<sup>20</sup>. In fact, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that some wars have caused fewer deaths, and posed fewer threats than some non-military phenomena. Ethiopia's 1985 famine, for example jeopardised more lives than the Ogaden War. Thus, evaluating from results it is difficult to argue a strong case why the Ogaden war should constitute a security problem for

---

<sup>19</sup> See Alan Whiteside, *Facing Up to AIDS: The Socio Economic Impact in Southern Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp.16-18.

<sup>20</sup> See Reginald Green, "Neo-Liberalism and the Political Economy of War: Sub Saharan Africa as the Case Study of Vaccum" in Cristopher Colclough and James Manor (eds) *States or Markets ? Neo- Liberalism and Development Policy Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 238-258.

Ethiopians and not the famine. In fact, it would be untenable to suggest that the impact of non-military phenomena is less, or that it potentially causes less damage than the military. Although in some cases, one may say that wars have the potential of making everyone vulnerable within a short amount of time, this would not be applicable to every war. Most guerrilla wars in Africa were fought far from their capital cities. People in urban areas were often oblivious to these wars since they made very little impact on their everyday lives. Guerrilla warfare was also conceived as prolonged war, thus without any capacity to place everyone in the country in the same danger. This feature of war is shared by the non-military phenomena such as droughts, floods, diseases and policy measures, which past experiences in Southern Africa show to have had a strong impact on the stability of parts of the society, but not the whole. Thus the criterion allowing the classification of military phenomena as security issues and non-military phenomena as not, cannot be argued on the basis of potential results but on the scale of damages that non-military phenomena can cause.

In an attempt to address the question as to when a non-military phenomenon should become a security concern, Ayoob suggests concentrating on analysis of vulnerabilities as implied in his definition of security :

... Different types of vulnerability including those of economic and ecological varieties, become integral components of this definition of security only if and when they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions or regime survival...in other words debt burdens do not become a part of security calculus for the purpose of this definition unless they threaten to have

political outcomes and that affects the survivability of (either in territorial or the institutional sense or both) or of governing elites within those states<sup>21</sup>

Ayoob's suggestion, however, provides little insight regarding the reasons why the problem of the Rwandese refugees should be treated as a security problem. Whether it is because of their impact on state institutions of the neighbouring country; their own state; or possibly because of their own plight. His writings suggest that they are a security problem because they threaten state institutions and the regime's survival in their own state let alone in the neighbouring countries. The paradox is that, at present, the state of Rwanda still exists and indeed, there are very few people who may have thought that it will disappear following the 1994 catastrophe. Very few people may also have thought that its borders were threatened. State institutions may have been affected by the flight of refugees but they still exist. However, it is difficult to claim that if the Rwandese in Zaire, or Tanzania drop their refugee status and go back to Rwanda they would live in security, since the state of Rwanda and its institutions still exist. This seems to suggest that the reason why the Rwandese refugees constitute a security problem is not primarily due to their potential impact on state institutions, state boundaries or threats to regime survival, but to their own plight. In fact it was due to their plight that the international community was motivated to lend its support rather than the threat they posed to states and state boundaries. However, it is difficult to find anything in Ayoob's

---

<sup>21</sup> See Mohamed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World" *op.cit.*, p. 259.



definition suggesting their plight as a security problem. In this definition, agents and the ultimate objects are silent if not completely absent. Ayooob's concept seems to place an emphasis on the phenomenon, but it is silent on the condition of the agent and object of security.

Because security is an outcome of relations and expresses a condition of the object in a relationship, this study suggests an approach which focuses on conditions enabling security. Concentrating on conditions enabling the realization of security avoids the distinction between the importance of military and non-military phenomena. It treats both as equally important and according to their potential impact on the environment for security, i.e. according to their impact on order, justice and peace.

Concentrating on the environment for security also allows people to have degrees of freedom in interpreting their relationship with the environment and establishing their hierarchies on what constitute security priorities. It also allows approaching security from conceptual framework rather than from a problem solving approach.

Many reasons were expounded above explaining why the traditional concept of security can not work in Southern Africa, while a proposition of focusing on the environment, i.e., on the political process, ensuring the existence of order, justice and peace is advocated. This study does not claim to have discovered a panacea for the security problems of Southern Africa. It offers instead a different perspective of looking into the problem of security within the region. Therefore, the

view of security expounded in this study needs to be improved and complemented by further research, especially in areas such as institution building, improvement of the quality of pillars of security, and on the political processes.

## Bibliography

- Adam, Heribert and Moodley, Kogila, *Democratizing Southern Africa: Challenges for Canadian Policy* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace, 1992)
- Adam, Heribert and Moodley, Kogila, *Negotiated Revolution, Society and Politics in Post Apartheid South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)
- Africa Analysis Current Checklist*, n-192, 1994a
- Africa Contemporary Records, 1975-1976* (London: Rex Collings, 1976)
- Africa Research Group “*Race to Power: The Struggle for Southern Africa*”, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974)
- AIM Report*, London, Mozambique News Agency, n-65, 24 August 1995
- AIM Report*, London Mozambique News Agency n-65, 24 August, 1995
- Al-Khalid, Samir *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Hutchison: California University Press, 1989)
- Al-Khalid, Samir, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Hutchison: California University Press, 1989)
- Al-Mashat, A.M., *National Security in the Third World* (Colorado Boulder: Westview Press, 1985)
- Alao, Abiodun, *Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994)
- Albright, D. E. “Soviet Economic Development and the Third World”, *Soviet Studies* Vol. 43:1, 1991, pp. 27-59
- Albright, D. E., “Moscow’s African Policy of the 1970’s” in D. E. Albright (ed) *Africa and International Communism* (London: MacMillan, 1980)
- Albright, D. E., “Soviet Economic Development and the Third World”, *Soviet Studies* Vol. 43:1, 1991
- Albright, D. E., *Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited*, (Washington D.C.: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1987)
- Albright, D. E., *Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980’s* (Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1983)

- Almond, Gabriel, "Political Systems and Political Change", *American Behavioural Scientist VI*, June 1963
- Anglin, Douglas, and Timothy Shaw, *Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978)
- Arlinghaus, Bruce E. and Baker, Pauline (eds) *African Armies, Evolution and Capabilities* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986)
- Arlinghaus, Bruce, (ed) *African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984)
- Aron, Raymond, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought Vol. I : Montesquieu, Comte, Tocqueville and Marx*, ( London: Penguin Books, 1967)
- Axelson, Eric, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa 1875-1891* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1968)
- Ayoob, Mohamed, "The Security Problematic of the Third World", *World Politics*, Vol. 43:2, January 1991
- Ayoob, Mohammed, "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?" *International Affairs* Vol. 60:1, 1991
- Azar, Edward E. and Moon Chung in (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988)
- Azar, Edward E. and Moon, Chung-in, "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The Software Side of Security" in E. Azar and C. Moon (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988)
- Azar, Edward E. and Moon, Chung-in, "Rethinking Third World National Security" in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Centre for Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland, 1988)
- Baker, Pauline, *The United States and South Africa: the Reagan Years* (Washington DC: Ford Foundation South Africa Update Series, 1989)
- Baker, Ray and Dodd, E. *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace* (New York: Harper, 1927)
- Ball, Nicole, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988);

- Bank National Economic Indicators and National Estimates for 1994”, *World Development Report*, World Bank 1993
- Banks, Michael, “Four Conceptions of Peace” in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.) *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications* (London : Pinter, 1987)
- Barber, J., Blumefeld, J. and Hill, C., *The West and South Africa*, (London: Routledge for the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1979)
- Barber, James and Barrat John, *South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990)
- Barber, James, *South Africa's Foreign Policy -1945- 70* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973)
- Barrat, John, *Eyes on the Eighties: The International Political Outlooks for Southern Africa* (Johannesburg: South African institute of International Affairs, 1985)
- Bauman, Zygmunt, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Oxford: Blackwell ,1989)
- Baynham, Simon, *Southern Africa: The Causes and Effects of Regional Instability*, Paper prepared for the Institute of International Education Southern Africa Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Project, (unpublished) Harare, 30 June -2 July 1993
- BBC, Summary of World Broadcast AL/2515A/3 22 January 1996*
- Bender, Gerald, *Angola Under the Portuguese, Myth and Reality* (London: Heinemann, 1978)
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (eds), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (Basingstoke Hants: MacMillan, 1992)
- Bethlehem, R. “Economic Development in South Africa” in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (ed.) *Towards A Post-Apartheid Future* (London: MacMillan, 1992)
- Bill: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 23 April 1996*
- Blumefeld, Jesmond, *Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa: From Conflict to Co-operation* (London :Pinter, 1991)
- Booth, Kenneth *Security In Anarchy Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice*, An Inaugural Lecture, The University College of Wales Paper, May 1993

- Borsener, Demitrio, *The Bolsheviks and the National Colonial Question 1917-1928* (Westport: C.T. Hyperion Press, 1982)
- Bowman, Larry, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa", *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 12: 3
- Brogan, Denis "The illusion of American Omnipotence" *Harper's Magazine* 205, December, 1952
- Brown, Chris, *International Relations Theory* (London: Haverster Wheatsheaf, 1992)
- Brown, N., "Climate Ecology and International Security", *Survival*, Vol.31, 1989
- Bryshinkov, V. "Raw Materials Resources of Africa", *International Affairs*, Moscow, December 1974,
- Bull, Hedley, *Anarchical Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976)
- Bundy, C., *The Rise and Fall of South African Peasantry* (London: Heinemann, 1979)
- Burton, John, "Conflict Provention as a Political System" in John A. Vazquez et al,(ed) *Beyond Confrontation, Learning Conflict Resolution in Post Cold War* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995)
- Buzan, Barry "People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World" in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, *National Security in the Third World* (Aldershot:Edward Elgar, 1988)
- Buzan, Barry, "New Patterns of Global Security", In the Twenty First Century *International Affairs*, Vol. 67:3 ,1991
- Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones, Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
- Buzan, Barry, Is International Security Possible? in K. Booth ( ed) *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins)
- Buzan, Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzibieta Tromer and Ole Waever. *The European Security Order Recast: Scenario for the Post Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990)
- Buzan, Barry, *People States and Fear, An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post World War Era* (London: Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1991)
- Campbell, Tom, *Issues in Political Theory* (London: MacMillan, 1988)

- Carr, E.H., *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1839*, (London: MacMillan, 1946)
- Carry Roger, and Salmon, Trevor C. (eds), *International Security in Modern World*, (London: MacMillan, 1991)
- Cavalry Journal* (London: 1909)
- Cawthra, Gavin, *Brutal Force The Apartheid War Machine* (London : IDAF, 1986)
- Chakaodza, Austin M., *Structural Adjustment in Zambia and Tanzania*, (London: Third World Publishing House, 1993)
- Charter of the United Nations, and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, New York, United Nations Department of Information, 1990
- Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortmer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Westview, 1992)
- Cheru, Fantu, *The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy* (London: Zed Press, 1989)
- Chilaizya Joe and Machipisa Lewis “Tension Mounts Between Rival trading Blocs” *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, 8-14 November, 1995
- Children in the Frontline, The Impact of Apartheid Destabilisation and Warfare on Children in Southern Africa*, UNICEF, 1989
- Christopher, A. J., *Southern Africa* (Hamden, Conn: Archon, 1976)
- Clark, Ian, *The Hierarchy of States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
- Claude, Inis, *Power in International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962)
- Coelho, J. and Vines, A., *Pilot Study on Demobilisation and Re-integration of Ex-combatant in Mozambique*, Refugees Studies Programme, University of Oxford, 1995
- Cohen, Yossef, Brown, B.R. and Ogasnki, A. F. K. “The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, n-4, 1981
- Coker, C., “A New Military Role In Southern Africa 1969-82” in R. Jaster (ed) *Southern Africa : Regional Security Problems and Prospects* (London : Gower, 1985)

- Coker, C., "Pact Pox or Proxy : Eastern Europe's Security Relationship with Southern Africa", *Soviet Studies* Vol. XI., University of Stellenboch, 4 October 1988
- Coker, C., "South Africa and the Western Alliance 1949-1988 a History of Illusions" in Stephen Chan (ed.) *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1977-88*, (London: MacMillan, 1990)
- Coker, C., "South Africa: A Military Role in Southern Africa 1969-82" in R. Jaster (ed) *Southern Africa Regional Security Problems and Prospects* (London: Gower for IISS, 1985)
- Coker, C., *Nato the Warsaw Pact and South Africa* (London : MacMillan for Brassey, 1988)
- Coker, C., *South Africa's Security Dilemmas* (New York :Praeger for CSIS, 1987)
- Colclough, C. "Zambia: Economy"; M. Smith Morris, "Mozambique: Economy" and L. Van Buren "Tanzania: Economy" all in *Regional Surveys of the World: Africa, South of Sahara*, (London: Europa Publications, 1993)
- Communiqué signed by President Konstantine Chernenko and President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia during the latter's visit to Moscow in March 1984. See, *Pravda*, 3 April 1984
- Creation of an Organ on Political Co-operation, Peace and Security*, Report 5 of the SADC Council of Ministers Meeting 28-29 January, 1996, Johannesburg, South Africa
- Crocker, Chester, African Policy in the 1980's *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1980
- Crocker, Chester, *High Moon in Southern Africa, Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood*, (New York: Norton & Company, 1992)
- Crocker, Chester, South Africa a Strategy for Change, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59:2 1980
- Cross, S. and Whiteside, A. (eds.), *Facing Up to AIDS: The Socio-Economic Impact in Southern Africa* (London: St. Martin's Press ,1993)
- Cuthberson, Ian M. and Robertson David, *Enhancing European Security*, (London: MacMillan,1990)
- Davies, R., "Emerging South African Perspectives on Regional Cooperation and Integration After Apartheid" in Bertile Odén (ed) *Southern Africa After Apartheid* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1993)



- Davies, R., and O'Meara, D. "The Total Strategy in Southern Africa, An Analysis of South African Regional Policy", *The Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol.11 n-2 April 1985
- Davies, R., *Building a New Relationship in Southern Africa: The Challenge facing South Africa's Government of National Unity*", A paper prepared for the for United Nations University/ World Institute for Economic Research The New regionalism and International System, Jerusalem, April 1985
- Davies, R., *South African Strategy Towards Mozambique in the Accord Phase: From March 1984 to September 1985* (Maseru: Institute of Southern African Studies, 1991)
- Dederling, Tilman, "The German-Herero War of 1904 Revisionism of Genocide or Imaginary Historiography?", *The Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 19 March 1993
- Defoe, Daniel, *Review of the State of Nation*, Vol. III, June 1706
- Deng Francis and Zartman, I. William, (eds), *Conflict resolution in Africa* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991)
- Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgreen, Francis L. Loenhein, Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957)
- Diário do Governo*, First Series 250, Lisbon, 28 October 1970; see also Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, *Aspectos do Colonialismo Português* (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1974)
- Donald Horowitz, Donald *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California, 1985)
- Dougherty, James, E. and Robert L. Platzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Harper and Collins, 1991)
- Doughty, O., *Early Diamond Days: The Opening of Diamond Fields in South Africa* (London: Longman, 1963)
- Doyle, Michael "Thucydidean Realism", *Review of International Studies*, July 1990
- Dube, Emmanuel M., "Relations Between Liberation Movements and the OAU" in Nathan E. Shamuyarira (ed) *Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa*, (Tanzania: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972)

- Dunleway, Patrick and O'leary Brenda, *Theories of the State, The Politics of Liberal Democracy* (London : MacMillan, 1987)
- Dutkiewicz, R. K., *Progress Report of the Energy Sector*, prepared for the Southern African Fund for Economic Research (SAFER), Energy Research Institute, University of Cape Town, 1992
- Economist Intelligence Unit :Namibia, 1993/1994*
- Economist intelligence Unit Country Profile: Angola, 1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Botswana, 1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Lesotho, 1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Mozambique, 1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Swaziland ,1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Tanzania, 1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Zambia, 1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Zimbabwe, 1993/1994*
- Economist Intelligence Unit Couture Profile: Malawi, 1993/1994*
- Edwards, I. E., *The 1820 Settlers in South Africa: A Study of the British Colonial Policy* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1934)
- El-Khawas, Mohammed, Cohen Barry (eds.), *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Westport Conn: L.Hill, 1976)
- Emerson, Rupert, *Africa and the US Policy* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967)
- Engels, F., "Letter to Bebel" (1875) quoted in Lenin State and Revolution (1917) - *Marx & Engels Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1943)
- Evans, M., *The Frontline States, Southern Africa Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1986)
- Finch.G., *The Sources of Modern international Law*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1937)
- Fitzsimons, Pat and Bloch, Jonathan, *Arms for Apartheid, British Military Collaboration With South Africa* ( London: Christian Concern for Southern Africa, 1981)
- Flower, Ken, *Serving Secretly* (London: John Murray, 1987)

- Franco Nogueira's Speech (Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs) at NATO's Oslo meeting, May 1961, Government Archives
- Frankel, Philip, "Race and Counter- Revolution: South Africa's total Strategy", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol.18/3, October, 1980
- Frankel, Philip, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil and Military Relations in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
- Franklin, Julian, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
- Gallie, W. B., *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, and Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
- Gallie, W. B., *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding* (London: Chatto and Winds, 1964)
- Galtung, Johan, "Violence Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.63:2 ,1969
- Geldenhuis, Denis, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relations for the Republic of South Africa" *Strategic Review*, Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria (ISSUP), January 1981
- Geldenhuis, Deon and Venter Denis, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A Constellation of States?", *International Affairs Bulletin*, SAIIA December, 1978
- Geldenhuis, Deon and Venter, D. "The Constellation of Southern African States," *International Affairs Bulletin*, December 1979
- Geldenhuis, Deon, and Gutteridge William, *Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa: South Africa's Role in Regional Security* (London: Institute of the Study of Conflict, 1983)
- Geldenhuis, Deon, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South Africa's Foreign Policy Making* (Johannesburg: MacMillan, 1984)
- Gelner, Ernest, *Culture Identity and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
- Gentz Von, Frederick , *Fragments of the Balance of Power System*, London, 1806

- Genz Von, Frederick, *The State of Europe Before and After French Revolution, Being an Answer, to L'Etat de la France a la Fin d'L' An VIII*, London, 1089
- Giliomee, H. "Afrikaner Politics 1977-87: From Afrikaner Nationalist Rule to Central State Hegemony" in J. Brewer, (ed.) *Can South Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight* (London, 1989)
- Goldschmidt, Walter Goldschmidt, Inducement to Military Participation in Tribal Societies in Robert A. Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster (eds) *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict: Culture in International Security* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1988)
- Green, Reginald, "Neo-Liberalism and the Political Economy of War: Sub Saharan Africa as the Case Study of Vacuum" in Christopher Colclough and James Manor (eds) *States or Markets? Neo-Liberalism and Development Policy Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
- Green, Reginald H. "Poverty Rehabilitation and Economic Transformation: The Case of Mozambique", Paper presented at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1 November 1990; see also Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots* (London: James Currey) 1991
- Green, Reginald H. *How to Add Ten And One: Some Reflections on Attaining Creative Economic Interaction, Between Africa and the New South Africa*, Paper Prepared for Africa Leadership Conference in Windhoek, Namibia, 1991
- Grotius, Hugo, *The Laws of War and Peace* (translated by F. W. Kelsey), (London: Wildy & Sons, 1969)
- Grundy, K., *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence*(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)
- Grundy, K., *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa* (New York: Grosman, 1971)
- Grundy, K., *The Militarisation of South African Politics* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986)
- Grundy, K., The Rise of South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power *South African Institute of International Affairs Bradlow Series n-1*, 1982
- Gutteridge, William, "The Case for Regional Security: Avoiding conflict in the 1990's *Conflict Studies n-217*, Lonon, Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1988

- Gutteridge, William, "South Africa's Defence and Security Forces: The Next Decade" in J.E. Spence (ed) *Change in South Africa* (London: Pinter for RIIA, 1994)
- Gutteridge, William, *South Africa's Defence and Security into the 21st Century* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996)
- Haas, E.B., *The Uniting of Europe Political Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)
- Halliday Fred, *Cold War , Third World: An Essay on Soviet American Relations* (London :Huchison Radius, 1989)
- Halliday, Fred, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda", *Millenium*, Vol.16, n-2
- Halliday, Fred, *Rethinking International Relations* (London: MacMillan, 1995)
- Hawkins, A. "Economic Development in the SADC Countries in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds) *Towards a Post-Apartheid Future, Political and Economic Relations in Southern Africa* (London: MacMillan, 1992)
- Hecksher, A. (ed) *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Harper, 1956)
- Herz, John, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State" *World Politics*, Vol. 9:4, 1957
- Herz, John, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)
- Hinsley, F. H., *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1963)
- Hobbes, T., *The Leviathan*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1981)
- Holmes, Oliver, "Portugal and the Atlantic Pact", *American Perspective*, Winter ,1950
- Holsti, Kalevi J., *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1645-1989*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
- Huntington, S., *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)
- Hurrel, Andrew, "Kant and Kantian Paradigm in International Relations", *Review of International Studies*, July 1990

- Illife, John, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979)
- Isaacman Alan and Isaacman, Barbara, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution* (London: Westview, 1983)
- Jackson, Robert, *Quasi- States: Sovereignty International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,1993)
- Jaster, Robert, “ South Africa’s Narrowing Security Options in Robert Jaster (ed) *Southern Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects* (Aldershot: Gower 1985)
- Jaster, Robert, “South Africa and Its Neighbours the Dynamics of Regional Conflict”, *Adelphi Papers* 209, London, IISS, Summer, 1986
- Jaster, Robert, *South Africa’s Narrowing Option* (London: IISS Adelphi Paper, 1984)
- Jenkins, S., “Destabilisation in Southern Africa”, *The Economist*, London, 16 July 1983
- Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, Vol. 30:2, 1978
- Jervis, Robert, “Security Regimes”, *International Organisation*, Vol. 36:2, 1982
- Johnson, Phyllis and Martin David, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report* (London: James Currey, 1989)
- Johnston, Alexander, “Weak States and National Security: The Case of South Africa”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, 1991
- Justi, J. H., *Die Chiamara des Gleichgewichts von Europa*, Atloma 1758
- Kainz, Howard, (ed) *Philosophical Perspectives on Peace: An Anthology of Classical and Modern Sources* (London MacMillan, 1987)
- Kamplisnky, R. “The Manufacturing Sector and Regional Trade in a Democratic South Africa”, in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds) *Towards a Post-Apartheid Future* (London: MacMillan, 1992)
- Kant, I. “Perpetual Peace” in Hans Reiss (ed) *Kant’s Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)
- Kasfir, N. “Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview in Philip Mahwood” (ed) *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa* (New York: John Wiley, 1983)

- Keohane Robert, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)
- Keohane, R. and Nye, J., *Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)
- Khadiagala, Gilbert, *Allies in Adversity, The Frontline States in Southern Africa Security 1975-1993* ( Ohio: Ohio University press, 1994)
- Kiva, Alksei, Socialist Orientation: Reality Illusions, *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1988 n-70
- Kolosvisky, K., “Regional Conflicts and Global Security” in Steve Hirsh, (ed.), *MEMO: New Soviet Voices on Foreign and Economic Policy* (Washington D. C.: BNA Books, 1989), p. 503-15
- Kuhne, W.,“ Africa and Gorbachev’s New Realism” in F. Deng, and I.W. Zartman (eds) *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1991)
- Kulik, S., “Mozambique: On the Road to Progress, *New Times*, n-15, Moscow April 1977,
- LeCron Foster, Mary “Expanding the Antropology of Peace and Conflict” in Robert A. Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster (eds), *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict, Culture in International Security* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988)
- Leifer, Michael, *ASEAN, and the Security of South East Asia* (London: Routlege, 1989)
- Lenin, V. I., Complete Works in the Albert Weeks (ed) *Brasseys Book on Soviet Communist Quotations* (London: MacMillan for Brasseys, 1994)
- Lenin, V.I., *Imperialism the Highest Form of Capitalism* (Moscow: Progress, Publishers, 1969)
- Libby, R.T., *The Politics of the Economic Power in Southern Africa* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1987).
- Light, Margot, Moscow’s Retreat from Africa, *The Journal of Communist Studies* Vol. 8 n-2, June 1992,
- Light, Margot, *Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Brighton : Wheatsheaf, 1988)
- Lijphart, Arend, “Consociational Democracy”, *World Politics*, Vol. 21 n-2; 1969

- Lijphart, Arend, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1968)
- Lippmann, W., *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown, 1943)
- Lipton, Merle, and Simkin, Charles, *State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1992)
- Litwak, Robert, and Wells Jr., Samuel (eds), *Super Powers Competition and the Third World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988)
- Locke, John, *Two Treatises of Government* (edited by Peter Laslett) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
- Luard, Evan *The Balance of Power System* ( London: MacMillan, 1992)
- Luard, Evan, *International Society* (London: MacMillan, 1990)
- Lundin, I. B. “*Projecto Autoridade Tradicional, Documento Pesquisa, DAA/UEM, 1992* (Unpublished Report), Centre of Strategic and International Studies, Maputo.
- Lusaka Protocol on the Bicesse Accords*, signed between the Government of Angola and UNITA, 1994
- Maasdorp, G., and Saville, Adrian, “The SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa”, *The South African Institute for International Affairs, Occasional Paper Series n-2*, July, 1994
- Maasdorp, G., “The Role of the South African Economy in SACU, CMA and Other Regional Organisations”, in A.M. Zacarias (ed) *Repensando Estratégias Sobre Moçambique e Africa Austral* (Maputo: ISRI), 1990,
- Maasdorp, G., “Trade Relations in Southern Africa : Changes Ahead”, in Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, (eds) *Towards a Post Apartheid Future* (London MacMillan, 1992)
- MacFarlane , Neil S., “Success and Failure in Soviet Policy Towards Marxist Revolutions 1917-1985” in Mark Katz (ed), *The USSR Centre for Scholars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
- Machiavelli, Nicolo, *The Prince*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1961)
- Maconi, Simba, the *SADCC: the Challenges* the SAPES Annual Meeting in Gaborone, February 1991



- Mann, Michael, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins Mechanisms and Results" in John Hall (ed) *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)
- Maphanyane, E., "SADCC Future Challenges, in Bertil Oden (eds) *Southern Africa After Apartheid, Regional Integration and External Resources*, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-183
- Marais, Neil, "South Africa's Foreign Policy and International Practice during 1980 as Reflected in Speech and Parliamentary Statements and Replies" *South African Year Book of International Law* ( Pretoria: Verloren van Themaat Centre for International Law, 1980)
- Marcum, J., "Angola: Peritous Transition to Independence" in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara (eds) *Southern Africa the Continuing Crisis* (Indiana University Press, 1979)
- Marcum, John, *The Angolan Revolution 1950 -62 volume I* (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969)
- Marcuse, Herbert, *Eros and Civilisation* (London: Sphere, 1969)
- Martin David, and Johnson, Phyllis, *Destructive Engagement* (Harare: SARDC, 1988) Hoohlo, S. G. "The Southern African Customs Union and the Post Apartheid South Africa: Prospects for Closer Integration in Seohai Santho and Mafa Sejanemane, *Southern Africa: After Apartheid?* (Harare, SAPES Trust, 1991)
- Marx, K., "Letter to Kugelmann" in *Marx & Engels Selected Works* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, Vol. II, 2, 1955)
- Marx, K., and Engels F., "A Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in *Selected Works in One Volume* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988)
- Marx, K., and Engels, F. "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League (March 1850) in *Selected Works* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, Vol.I, 1955)
- Marx, K., and Engels, F., "The Communist Manifesto" in *Selected Works in One Volume* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988)
- Marx, K., Nauchnii, *Kommunizm Slovar* (Scientific Communism, A Dictionary), Vol.1 (Politzdat, Moscow, 1980)
- Marx, K., *The Critique of Political Economy -The 1857 Introduction*, Grundrisse Foundation, (London: Penguin Books in Association with New Left Review, 1973)

- Masire, Keith, *Address to the SADCC Lusaka Summit*, August 1991;
- Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68:2, 1989
- Mayall, James, "Non-intervention Self-Determination and the New World Order", in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (eds) *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention* (London: MacMillan, 1993)
- Mayall, James, ( ed) *The Community of States : A Study of International Relations* (London :Allen & Unwin, 1982)
- Mayall, James, *Africa and the Cold War* ( London: Elk Books, 1971)
- Mayall, James, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
- McCarthy, Colin, *SACU in the Changing Economic and Political Environment*, unpublished paper, Stellenbosch University, 1991
- Meredith, Martin, *The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI* (London: Pan Books, 1980)
- Michael, H. H., *National Security* (Pretoria, ISS-University of Pretoria, 1978)
- Military Balance*, International Institute of Strategic Studies 1995/1996
- Mills, G., "The History of Regional Integrative Attempts: The Way Forward", in Greg Mills and Alan Begg ( eds) *South Africa in a Global Economy* (Bramfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995)
- Mills, G., and C. Clapham, C. "Southern African Security After Apartheid: A Framework for Analysis", *The Centre for Southern African Studies of the University of Western Cape, Working Paper Series n-8*, 1991
- Mills, G., *The Process of Integration of National Armies in a Post Conflict Situation: Lessons from Other Countries*, Paper prepared for the Conference on "Mozambique Post-War: Challenges and Realities" of the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais, December 1992
- Minter, William, *Portuguese Africa and the West* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967)
- Minter, William, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (London :Zed Books, 1995)

- Mitrany, David, "Political Theory of New Society" in A. J. Groom and Paul Taylor, *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations* (London: University Press, 1975)
- Mitrany, David, *A Working Peace System* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943)
- Mkandawire, R. M., "Women, Food Security and Agriculture Policy in the SADCC Region: A Case Study of Malawi", in R. Mkandawire and Khabele Matlosa (eds) *Food Policy and Agriculture in Southern Africa* ( Harare: SAPES, 1993)
- Monk, Iain, *A History of Modern Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
- Moodie, T. D., *The Rise of Afrikanerdom* ( Berkeley: University of California Press)
- Moreira, Adriano, *Portugal's Stand in Africa* (New York: University Publishers, 1962)
- Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Mac Graw Hill, 1993)
- Mozambique Revolution*, Dar-es-Salam, 1 December 1963
- Nathan, L., "Marching to a Different Drum," *The Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper Series*, University of Western Cape, 1991
- Nathan, L., *The Restructuring and Reorientation of the South African Defence Force*, Paper Presented at the Conference on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Southern Africa, Institute of International Education, Harare June 1993
- Nathan, L., *Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa*, Prepared for Asian Peace Research Conference, New Zealand, 1992
- Newitt, Malyn, *A History of Mozambique* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995)
- Newitt, Malyn, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years* (London: Hurst & Co, 1981)
- Nolutshungu, Sam, "Soviet - African Relations : Promise and Limitations" in Robert Cassen (ed), *Soviet Interests in Third World* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985)
- Nolutshungu, Sam, *South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy* (Manchester University Press, 1975)

- Noluttshungu, Sam C., *Southern Africa in a Global Context: Towards a Southern Africa Security Community* (Harare: SAPES Books, 1994)
- North Atlantic Treaty*, April 1949.
- Nye, Joseph Jr., "The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges" *Adelphi Paper Series* n-235 (London: IISS, 1989)
- Nyerere, Julius, "North - South Dialogue", *The Third World Quarterly* Vol. 6, n-4, 1984
- Nyerere, Julius, *The Crusade for Liberation* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1929)
- O'Connell, Helen *Good Governance: Report of One World Action Seminar*, London, One World Action, 1994,
- O'Meara, P. "Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe: Guerrilla Warfare or Political Settlement" in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara ( eds) *Southern Africa The Continuing Crises* (Notre Dame: Indiana University Press, 1979)
- Ogunsanwo, Alaba, *China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974)
- Ohlson, T. and Stedman S. "Trick or Treat, Conflict Resolution, Security and Development in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa", *The Centre of Southern African Studies of the University of Western Cape, Occasional Paper* 3, 1992
- Omer- Cooper, J. D., *History of Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1994)
- Organisation of African Unity, *Lagos Plan of Action*, Addis Ababa, 1981
- Otlogile, Bogosi, "How Free and Fair" in Mopho G. Molomo and Brian T. Makopakgosi, *Multiparty Democracy in Botswana* (Harare: SAPES, 1990)
- Ottaway, Marina, "Democratisation in Collapsed States" in I. W. Zartman (ed) *Collapsed States* (London: Lynne Ryner, 1995)
- Ovendale, Ritchie "The South African Policy of the British Labour Government 1947- 1951" *International Affairs*, vol. 59 n-1, Winter 1982/83
- Pachai, Brigdal *The South African Indian Question 1860- 1971* (Cape Town: Struik, 1971)
- Parliamentary Debates*, Harare, Government Printing and Stationary Office 18, 57 col, 4114 - 4116

- Patel, Hasu, "Peace and Security in Changing Southern Africa : A Frontline View", *Working Paper Series n-12*, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, 1992
- Penvenne, Jeanne, " We Are All Portuguese: Challenging the Political Economy of Assimilation: Lourenço Marques 1870-1933" in Leroy Vail, (ed) *Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1986).
- Person, Yves, "L'Etat nation en Afrique", *Le Mois en Afrique 190/191*, 1981,
- Petrovsky, Vladimir, *Sovetskaya kontsepsiy vseobshchei beopasnosti* (Soviet Concept of Global Security), ( Moscow: Memo, 1986)
- Pillay, Balla, *British Indians in the Transvaal: Trade Politics and Imperial Relations 1885-1906* (London: Longman ,1976)
- Pillay, P., "Future Developments in the Demand for Labour by the South African Mining Industry" *International Migration for Employment Working Paper 34*, Geneva : International Labour Organisation, 1987
- Pisani, Andre du, "Security and Peace in Post Apartheid Southern Africa in *International Affairs Bulletin*, South African Institute for International Affairs Vol. 16:3, 1992
- Pisani, Andre du, *Beyond the Barracks: Reflections on the Role of the SADF in the Region*, The SAIIA Occasional Paper, 1989
- Pisani, Andre du, *Security and Peace in Post Apartheid Southern Africa*, Paper Prepared for a Conference on Security and Peace in Post Apartheid Southern Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, 20-23 July, 1992
- Plant, Raymond, *Modern Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
- Popper, Karl *The Open Society and its Enemies* (London: Routledge, 1995)
- Porter, Brian, *The USSR in the Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945- 1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
- Price, R. Pretoria's Southern Africa Strategy in S. Chan (ed) *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978-1988* (London: MacMillan, 1989)
- Protocol IV of the *General Peace Accord* signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo, October 1992.
- Protocol VI of the October 1992 *Rome Peace Accord* signed by the Government of Mozambique and Renamo; the *Bicesse Accord*

between the MPLA Government of Angola and UNITA. This principle was reaffirmed during the *Lusaka Accord* signed between the Angolan government and UNITA in 1994.

Prunier, Gerard, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of Genocide* (London: James Currey, 1996)

Rawls, J., *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)

*Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A Macro Framework Study Report*, Southern Africa Development Community, 1993

*Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A Macro Framework Study Report*, Southern Africa Development Community, 1993

Reid, Escott, *Time of Fear and Hope, The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty* (Toronto: MacLelland and Stewart, 1977)

Report of the UN Secretary General, S/24923, 9 December 1992

Ripon, Geoffrey, "South Africa and Naval Strategy : The Importance of South Africa" *The Round Table*, 239, 1970

Rosemberg, Justin, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994)

Rotberg, R, *The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa, Studies Program*, The George Town Centre for Strategic and International Studies n-22, 1983

Rotberg, R., with Miles of Shore, *Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)

Rousseau, J.J., "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", in the *Social Contract Discourses*, translation by G.D. H. Cole , London, 1968

Rowlands, I., "The Security Challenges of the Global Environmental Change", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 14:1, 1992

Rubinstein Robert, and Lecron Foster Mary (eds) *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict, Culture in International Security*, (Boulder: Westview, Press, 1988)

Rugumagu, Severine, *Peace and Security Nightmares in Southern Africa Cold War Era*, Paper Prepared for African Studies Association of South Africa, Biennial Congress, (unpublished) Broedrstrom, South Africa, June 1993

*SADC Programme of Action*, SADC Secretariat, 1993.

- SADCC The Second Decade, Enterprise Skills and Productivity*, SADCC Conference Document 1990.
- Samuels, Michael A. et al. *Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for US Policy*, Washington D.C., 1979
- Santa Rita, José Gonçalo de, “O Contacto das Raças nas Colonias, Seus Efeitos Politicos e Sociais” *Legislação Portuguesa no Congrso do Mundo Português*, Vol. 15 part II
- Saul John, *Recolonisation and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990's* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1993)
- Scott, J.B., *President Wilson Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1918)
- Secção de Estudo da Secção I, Plano de Contra-Subversão: Relatório, Conclusões e Sugestões apresentados ao Symposium sobre Contra-Subversão*, January 1969, p. 13
- Seegers, Annete, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa* (London I.B. Tauris, 1996)
- Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (New York: The Garden City, 1960)
- Shaw, Martin, *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994)
- Silva Cunha, J. M., *O Trabalho Indigena* (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1955)
- Simons, J. and Simons, R., *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (London: IDAF, 1983), pp. 156-61, 286-96
- Simpson, Mark, *The Soviet Union and Afro- Marxist Regime: The Path to the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation*, PhD. Thesis, LSE, 1989
- Smith, A.D., *National Identity* (London : Penguim, 1988)
- Sorensen, T., “Rethinking National Security” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69:3 1990
- South Africa's Plans and Capability in the Nuclear Field*, Doc. A/35/402, New York. United Nations, 1981
- South Africa: The Sanctions Report*, Prepared for the Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, Penguin, 1989

- South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, The UN Economic Commission for Africa for Africa, 1989
- South Scan* Vol. 9: 32 , 2 September 1994
- South Scan* Vol. 9: 42 November, 1994, p. 335
- South Scan*, Vol. 9 :43, 18 November, 1994
- South Scan*, Vol. 9, 29 July 1994.
- South Scan*, Vol. 9, 16 September, 1994,
- South Scan*, Vol. 9:42, 11 November, 1994, also
- South Scan*, Vol. 9:42, 11 November, 1994, p. 330
- Southall, Roger, "The New South Africa in the New World Order: Beyond the Double Whammy" *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 15:1, 1994
- Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community*", SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, 1993
- Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, Declaration by the Governments of Independent States of Southern Africa* Lusaka, April 1980
- Sparks, Allister, *The Minds of South Africa: The Story of Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (London: Heinemann, 1990)
- Spence, J. E., "South African Foreign Policy: The Outward Movement", in Christian P. Pholton and Richard Dale (eds) *Southern Africa in Perspective* (London: MacMillan, 1972)
- Spence, J. E., *Foreign Investment in South Africa, The Political and Military Framework*, Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (Uppsala, 1975)
- Spence, J. E., South Africa and the Defence of the West, *Survival*, London IISS Vol. XIII, n-3, March 1971
- Spence, J. E., *Strategic Significance of Southern Africa*, (London: Royal United Service Institution, 1970)
- Spence, J. E., The West and South Africa in R. O'Neil and R. J. Vincent (eds), *The West and the Third World* ( London MacMillan)
- Spence, J.E., "South Africa: The Nuclear Option" , *Report in African Affairs* Vol. 2 n-4, 1980, p.445



- Spence, J.E., (ed), *Change in South Africa* (London: MacMillan, for RIIA,1994)
- Spence, J.E., *International Problems of Nuclear Proliferation and the South African Position*, Occasional Paper Series, (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1980)
- Spence, Jack E., *Republic Under Pressure* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965)
- Sreuder, D. M., *The Scramble for Southern Africa 1877-1895: The Politics of Partition Reappraisal* (Cambridge University Press, 1980)
- Stephan, A., "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in Southern Cone of Latin America", in P. Evans, D. Ruechmeyer, and T. Skocpol ( eds) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
- Strange, Susan, "Political Economy and International Relations" in Booth and Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995)
- Strange, Susan, *States and Markets*, (London: Pinter, 1988)
- Taylor, Maxwell, *the US Policy Towards Portugal and Republic of South Africa, Memorandum for Secretary of Defence from Joint Chief of Staff, JCSM*, 19 July 1963
- The Bicesse Accords* signed between the Government of People's Republic of Angola and UNITA.
- The Charter of Organisation of African Unity*, Addis Ababa, 1963
- The Defence White Paper*, Department of Defence, The Government of South Africa, 1977
- The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Zambia*, 1994.
- The Economist*, London, 6 March 1969
- The Economist*, 23 December 1989; 4 January 1990
- The Economist*, London, 6 March, 1969
- The Financial Times*, London, 11 March 1980
- The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-1951* (Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press, 1953), pp. 164-165

- The General Peace Accord* signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo, October 1992.
- The Lusaka Protocol* signed between the Angolan government and UNITA in 1994.
- The Tanzanian Daily News*, 5 May 1981
- The Times*, London, 12 March 1968
- The World Development Report*, The World Bank 1994
- The World Development Report*, The World Bank, 1995, pp. 162-228
- Thomas, Caroline, *In Search of Security, The Third World and International Relations* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987)
- Thomas, Caroline, *New States Sovereignty and Intervention* (London: Gower, 1985)
- Thomas, Caroline, *The Environment in International Relations* (London: RIIA) 1992
- Thompson, L. "Co-operation and Conflict: The High Veld" in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (ed) *The Oxford History of South Africa: Vol I South Africa to 1870* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969)
- Thucydides, *The Peloponessian Wars* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1979)
- Tilly, C., "Making and State Making as Organised Crime" in P. Evans, D. Ruechmeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
- Towards Southern Africa Development Community Declaration of Heads of State and Governments of Southern Africa states*, Windhoek, August 1992
- Toyne-Sewell, T. P., "Zimbabwe and the British Military Advisory and Training Team", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, January 1991
- Ullman, Richard H., "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol. 8:3, 1983,
- United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa, United States Department of political Affairs, UN(1957/14), 1993
- United Nations General Assembly Report A/9621: Report on the Commission of Inquiry on the Massacres in Mozambique, 1974

- United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer*, 1989, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989
- Vail, Leroy, (ed), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (University of California Press, 1986)
- Vale, P. and Booth, K., Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism, *International Affairs* Vol. 71: 2 1995
- Vale, P., “The Case for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Southern Africa (CSCSA)” in Van Nieukerk & Van Staden (eds) *Southern Africa at the Cross Roads: Prospects for the Political Economy of the Region*, (Bramfontein: SAIIA ,1991)
- Vale, P., *The Case for Baskets: The Watershed Years* ( Cape Town: Leadership Publication, 1991)
- Vasquez, John et. al., *Beyond Confrontation, Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post Cold War* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1996)
- Vincent, Andrew, *Theories of the State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)
- Vletter, Fion de “Foreign Labour on the South African Gold Mines : New Insights on an Old Problem” *International Labour Review*, 126:2, 1987
- Vondebosch, Amy, *South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid* ( Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970)
- Waever, Ole, “Societal Security: the Concept” in Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993)pp. 15-40
- Walker, B., and Dava, G., *The Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) In Mozambique*, One World Action Report, September 1994
- Walker, Eric, *A History of South Africa* (London: Longman Green , 1957)
- Walt, Stephen M., “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 35:3, 1991
- Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading Mass: Addison Welsly, 1979)
- Watson, Adam and Bull Hedley, (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
- Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocatiooon” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed.) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routlege, 1991)

- Weimer, Bernard “South Africa and the Frontline States: From Confrontation to Confidence Building”, *SAPEM Magazine*, August 1990
- Weimer, Bernard Europe, “the United States and the Frontline States of Southern Africa: The Case for Closer Co-operation”, *Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 2, 1984
- White Paper on Defence*, South African Government, 1973
- Whiteside, Alan, (ed.) *Industrialisation and Investment Opportunities in Southern Africa*, ( London, James Currey, 1989)
- Willet, Susan, *South African Defence Forces: How Much Real Change?* Paper prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on The New South Africa , March 1995,
- Williams, Hodder R. *An Introduction of Politics of Tropical Africa* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984)
- Williams, Howard, *Rousseau in International Relations in a Political Theory*, (Open University Press, 1992)
- Wilson, Francis, *Labour in South African Gold Mines 1911-1969* ( Cambridge University Press, 1972)
- Wolfers, Alfred, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991);
- World Bank National Economic Indicators and National Estimates for 1994”, *World Development Report*, World Bank 1993
- Zacarias, A. M., in “The New Has to Be Struggled For” *Silver Jubilee Papers n.12*, Sussex Institute of Development Studies, 1991
- Zacarias, A. M., *Relações Entre os Militares e Civis na Mitigação do Conflito Moçambicano* Paper Presented to XII Lisbon International Conference on Democracy and Integration in the Space of the Portuguese Language, December 1992.
- Zartman, I. William (ed), *Collapsed States* (London: Lynne Rynner,1995)
- Zartman, I.W., *Ripe for Resolution, Conflict and Intervention in Africa* ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

**ANNEX I**

**TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN  
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY**

**A**

**DECLARATION**

**BY**

**THE HEADS OF STATE OR**

**GOVERNMENT OF**

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES**

In the Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, adopted in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1st April, 1980, the Heads of State or Government of independent States of Southern Africa committed themselves to pursuing policies aimed at economic liberation and integrated development of the economies of the region. This Declaration gave rise to the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).

Our common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations, remain a firm and enduring foundation for common actions to promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance and integration; in the spirit of equity and partnership. This firm foundation is necessary for the attainment of our cherished ideals of economic well-being, the improvement of the standard and quality of life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security, for the peoples of Southern Africa.

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Southern African States hereby commit ourselves and our governments to the establishment of a *SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)* to achieve these ideals, and to serve as a vehicle for the development and integration of the region. We also offer and commend this Declaration to the peoples of Southern Africa, and call upon them to make the same commitment, and to participate fully in the process towards regional integration. Furthermore, we call upon the international community to continue to support the efforts of the countries of Southern Africa to realise this ideal.

### **SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CONTEXT**

Since the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration, Southern Africa has changed, and is still changing. The quest for democracy and popular participation in the management of public affairs is entrenched, and spreading fast and wide. The management of economic affairs is being reformed to allow for efficiency, economy and competitiveness, and to enable individuals to innovate and to take the responsibility for improving their own lives and their communities.

The attainment of independence and sovereign nationhood by Namibia, formally ended the struggle against colonialism in the region. In the other countries, concerted efforts to end internal conflicts and civil strife are bearing positive results.

In South Africa, the process is underway to end the inhuman system of apartheid, and to bring about a constitution dispensation acceptable to the people of South Africa as a whole. It is, therefore, only a matter of time before a new South Africa is welcome to join the family of free and majority-ruled States of the region.

The developments outlined above will take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of co-operation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development, and for the improvement of the standard and quality of life of the peoples of the region.

These changes taking place in the region are also bringing about a greater convergence of economic, political and social values across the region, and will help create the appropriate environment for deeper regional co-operation.

On the African continent, efforts continue, principally under the auspices of the organisation of African Unity (OAU) to promote closer economic relations.

Both the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, signed by OAU Heads of State or Government, in June 1991, make Regional Economic Communities (RECs) the building blocks for the continental community.

We, therefore, view our efforts at regional integration in Southern Africa as part of this continental effort.

On the global scene, fundamental and far-reaching political and economic changes are taking place. The cold war has ended, and world affairs are increasingly being managed on the basis of consultation and consensus, rather than confrontation and competition.

In addition, economic and social progress in the world is increasingly based on the mastery of science and technology, advanced human skills and high levels of productivity.

Integration is fast becoming a global trend. Countries in different regions of the globe are organising themselves into closer economic and political entities. These movements towards stronger regional blocs will transform the world, both economically and politically. Firms within these economic blocs will benefit from economies of scale provided by large markets, to become competitive both internally and internationally.

Colonialism, racism, especially apartheid, and destabilisation have left Southern Africa a legacy of wide disparities, deep economic dependence and social dislocation. This situation is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long term, because it is both unjust and wasteful. It is also a potential source of tension that could lead to future instability in the region. There is, therefore, an urgent imperative to restructure regional economies and relations towards balanced, equitable and mutually beneficial growth and development.

### **THE SADCC EXPERIENCE**

SADCC was established as a vehicle for the reduction of economic dependence and for equitable regional integration; an appropriate sequel to the political emancipation of the region. SADCC has made commendable achievements since its founding in 1980, particularly seen against the national economic problems, the hostile international economic environment and the massive destabilisation and military aggression of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Of all the contributions SADCC has made to regional development, the greatest has been in forging a regional identity and a sense of a common destiny among the countries and peoples of Southern Africa .

However, progress towards reduction of the region's economic dependence, and towards economic integration, has been modest. The Organisation has, so far, not been able to mobilise to the fullest extent possible, the region's own resources, for development. Yet this is one of the central objectives, as well as strategies, for effective and self-sustaining regional development. This requires political commitment and effective institutions and mechanisms to mobilise the regions own resources.

### **A SHARED FUTURE**

In the light of its peculiar circumstances, and international changes in the organisation of production and trade, Southern Africa needs to arrange and manage its affairs in a



manner that will provide opportunities to all its peoples, on the basis of equity and mutual benefit; to invest and to become effective actors in the regional and international market places.

The economies of Southern African States are small and under-developed. The countries of the region must, therefore, join together to strengthen themselves economically and politically, if the region is to become a serious player in international relations. No single country of Southern Africa can achieve this status on its own.

Southern Africa has also been an arena of conflict and militarisation, associated with the struggle for political liberation, and the fight against apartheid and racism, aggression and destabilisation. A new Southern Africa, concerned with peace and development, must find a more abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation, in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region; and to free resources from military to productive development activities.

The countries of Southern Africa will, therefore, work out and adopt a framework of co-operation which provides for:

- a) deeper economic co-operation and integration; on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and freer movement factors of production, goods and services across national borders;
- b) common economic, political, social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty;
- c) strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony.

There is, therefore, a critical need to develop, among all the countries and peoples of Southern Africa, a vision of shared future, a future within a regional community.

## **STRATEGIES**

### **a) Human Resources, Science and Technology**

The most binding constraint to development of the region is inadequate professionally and technically qualified and experienced personnel, to plan and manage the development process efficiently and effectively.

Human development is a life-long process of developing an individual's potential to the fullest, through education and training, improved health, ability to earn a decent living, the exercise of economic and political choices, and guaranteed basic human rights; to afford him/her full involvement in the development process.

The region also lacks an adequate scientific and technological base, and is substantially dependent on imported expertise and technology.

A high priority for the region must, therefore, be to develop effective national and regional policies on science and technology, setting realistic goals and

identifying practical, cost-effective instruments for achieving these goals. In formulating policies and programmes, close links will need to be developed with the business sector which utilises the technology and skilled people.

Appropriate measures will be taken to improve the region's scientific and technological base, through curricula improvement; establishment of centres of specialisation and concerted efforts in the promotion of research and development.

Policies will also be implemented to release the innovative potential and entrepreneurship of the peoples of the region, and to encourage self-application and a strong work ethic.

b) Food Security, Natural Resources and Environment

Land, agriculture and food security are synonymous with life and livelihood. Most of the people of Southern Africa remain dependent on agriculture as a source of food and income. Agriculture is also critical to the industrialisation of the region, by ensuring availability of raw materials for local industries, and a source of purchasing power for the people. Agricultural development will, therefore, need to provide for increased production and productivity, and intra-regional trade in food and other crops, to guarantee food security and enhance the quality of life of the peoples of the region.

The exploitation and utilisation of natural resources, especially land, water and minerals will contribute to human welfare and development. However, such exploitation requires good management and conservation, to ensure that development does not reduce or impair the diversity and richness of the regions natural resource base and environment.

In this context, policy measures will be taken, and mechanisms instituted to protect the environment, and manage natural resource utilisation with a view to achieving optimum sustainable benefits for the present and future generations of Southern Africans.

c) Infrastructure and Services

In order to enhance services to the peoples of the region, to support industrial development and growth, and promote intra-regional trade; the rehabilitation and upgrading of existing, and development of new transport and communications and energy systems will remain a priority.

Emphasis will also be placed on increased and effective operational co-ordination, towards efficiency, cost-effectiveness and competitiveness; in order to ensure economic viability of the system.

d) Finance, Investment and Trade

The creation of an environment conducive to increased investment, particularly in the material productive sectors of the regional economy, is central to the strategy for regional integration.

The experience gained in regional co-operation so far, shows that collective self-reliance with respect to the mobilisation of regional resources, is one of the areas where the gap between the declared aims and practice has been widest. Appropriate measures will be instituted urgently to address this issue, in order for the region to achieve its aims and objectives.

Although the creation of a regional market under existing circumstances could lead to only a modest increase in intra-regional trade, its most important impact will be to spur new types of investment in more productive and competitive industries, to supply the regional and international markets.

Continuing policy and management reforms, the restricting of production at higher levels of enterprise, productivity and competitiveness; are accordingly identified as the main pillars to a strategy capable of engendering increased investment in production and trade.

It is evident that for this to take place, the countries of Southern Africa will need to harmonise their economic policies and plans, and ensure that regional integration becomes an intrinsic and integral part of the management of national affairs. In this regard, particular attention will be given to factors which impinge on inter-regional investment and trade flows, such as payments and clearance, monetary and financial relations, and mechanisms for the mobilisation of the region's own resources.

e) Popular Participation

Regional integration will continue to be a pipe dream unless the peoples of the region determine its content, form and direction, and are themselves its active agent.

Measures will, therefore, be taken, and appropriate mechanisms and institutional framework put in place; to involve the peoples of the region in the process of regional integration.

f) Solidarity, Peace and Security

War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare.

Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration.

The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.

## INSTITUTIONS

Successful regional integration will depend on the extent to which there exist national and regional institutions with adequate competence and capacity to stimulate and manage efficiently and effectively, the complex process of integration.

Integration will require mechanisms capable of achieving the high level of political commitment necessary to shape the scope and scale of the process of integration. This implies strengthening the powers and capacity of regional decision-making, co-ordinating and executing bodies.

Integration does imply that some decisions which were previously taken by individual States are taken regionally, and those decisions taken nationally give due consideration to regional positions and circumstances. Regional decision-making also implies elements of change in the focus and context of exercising sovereignty, rather than a loss of sovereignty.

**INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION**

This Declaration is a Statement of commitment and strategy, aimed at economic development and integration of Southern Africa, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit. However, Southern Africa is still a developing region which will continue to need the support of the international community to realise its plans and aspirations. Every effort will, therefore, be made to consolidate the goodwill which the Southern African States have established with their international co-operating partners, and to justify and stimulate enhanced practical international co-operation, for mutual benefit.

**COMMITMENT**

Underdevelopment, exploitation, deprivation and backwardness in Southern Africa will be overcome only through economic co-operation and integration. The welfare of the peoples of Southern Africa, and the development of its economies, require concerted and higher levels of co-ordinated regional action.

The primary responsibility for upliftment of the welfare of the peoples of this region rests primarily with them and their Governments. Member States recognise that the attainment of the objective of regional economic integration in Southern Africa will require us to exercise our sovereign right in empowering the organisation to act on our behalf and for our common good. This is the challenging mission of SADC.

This Declaration is produced in two original copies in the English language, and two in the Portuguese language; all of which are equally valid.

**Done in Windhoek, Republic of Namibia on 17th August, 1992.**

..... PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA	..... REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA
..... KINGDOM OF LESOTHO	..... REPUBLIC OF MALAWI
..... REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE	..... REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
..... KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND	..... UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
..... REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA	..... REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE



**ANNEX II**

**TREATY OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN**  
**DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY**





## **PREAMBLE**

We, the Heads of State or Government of:

The People's Republic of Angola  
The Republic of Botswana  
The Kingdom of Lesotho  
The Republic of Malawi  
The Republic of Mozambique  
The Republic of Namibia  
The Kingdom of Swaziland  
The United Republic of Tanzania  
The Republic of Zambia  
The Republic of Zimbabwe

HAVING REGARD to the objectives set forth in "SOUTHERN AFRICA: TOWARD ECONOMIC LIBERATION - A Declaration by the Governments of independent States of Southern Africa, made at Lusaka, on the 1st April, 1980";

IN PURSUANCE of the principles of "TOWARDS A SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY - A Declaration made by the Heads of State or Government of Southern Africa at Windhoek, in August, 1992," which affirms our commitment to establish a Development Community in the Region;

DETERMINED to ensure, through common action, the progress and well-being of the peoples of Southern Africa;

CONSCIOUS of our duty to promote the interdependence and integration of our national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the Region;

CONVINCED of the need to mobilise our own and international resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies, programmes and projects within the framework for economic integration;

DEDICATED to secure, by concerted action, international understanding, support and co-operation;

MINDFUL of the need to involve the peoples of the Region centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law;

RECOGNISING that, in an increasingly interdependent world, mutual understanding, good neighbourliness, and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the Region are indispensable to the realisation of these ideals;

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of April 1980, and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community signed at Abuja, on the 3rd of June, 1991;

BEARING IN MIND the principles of international law governing relations between States;

HAVE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION  
TO BE KNOWN AS THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT  
COMMUNITY (SADC), AND HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **ARTICLE 1**

#### **DEFINITIONS**

In this Treaty, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. “Treaty” means this Treaty establishing SADC;
2. “Protocol” means an instrument of implementation of this Treaty, having the same legal force as this Treaty;
3. “Community” means the organisation for economic integration established by Article 2 of this Treaty;
4. “Region” means the geographical area of the Member States of SADC;
5. “Member State” means a Member of SADC;
6. “Summit” means the Summit of the Heads of State or Government of SADC established by Article 9 of this Treaty;
7. “High Contracting Parties” means States, herein represented by Heads of State or Government or their duly authorised representatives for purposes of the establishment of the Community;
8. “Council” means the Council of Ministers of SADC established by Article 9 of this Treaty;
9. “Secretariat” means the Secretariat of SADC established by Article 9 of this Treaty;
10. “Executive Secretary” means the chief executive officer of SADC appointed under Article 10 (7) of this Treaty;
11. “Commission” means a commission of SADC established by Article 9 of this Treaty;
12. “Tribunal” means the tribunal of the Community established by Article 9 of this Treaty;
13. “Sectoral Committee” means a committee referred to in Article 38 of this Treaty;
14. “Sector Co-ordinating Unit” means a unit referred to in Article 38 of this Treaty;

15. “Standing Committee” means the Standing Committee of Officials established by Article 9 of this Treaty;

16. “Fund” means resources available at any given time for application to programmes, projects and activities of SADC as provided by Article 26 of this Treaty.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **ESTABLISHMENT AND LEGAL STATUS**

#### **ARTICLE 2**

##### **ESTABLISHMENT**

1. By this Treaty, the High contracting Parties establish the Southern African Development community hereinafter referred to as SADC).
2. The headquarters of SADC shall be at Gaborone, Republic of Botswana.

#### **ARTICLE 3**

##### **LEGAL STATUS**

1. SADC shall be an international organisation, and shall have legal personality with capacity and power to enter into contract, acquire, own or dispose of movable or immovable property and to sue and be sued.
2. In the territory of each Member State, SADC shall, pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, have such legal capacity as is necessary for the proper exercise of its functions.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS**

#### **ARTICLE 4**

##### **PRINCIPLES**

SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles:

- a) sovereign equality of all Member States;
- b) solidarity, peace and security;

- c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;
- d) equity, balance and mutual benefit;
- e) peaceful settlement of disputes;

## ARTICLE 5

### **OBJECTIVES**

1. The objectives of SADC shall be to:

- a) achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- b) evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
- c) promote and defend peace and security;
- d) promote self-sustaining development of the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member States;
- e) achieve complementary between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- f) promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the Region;
- g) achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment;
- h) strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the Region;

2. In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, SADC shall:

- a) harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member States;
- b) encourage the peoples of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the Region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC;
- c) create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of SADC and its Institutions;

- d) develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the Region generally, among Member States;
- e) promote the development of human resources;
- f) promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology;
- g) improve economic management and performance through regional co-operation;
- h) promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the international relations of Member States;
- I) secure international understanding, co-operation and support, and mobilise the inflow of public and private resources into the Region;
- j) develop such other activities as Member States may decide in furtherance of the objectives of this Treaty.

## ARTICLE 6

### **GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS**

1. Member States undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.
2. SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture or disability.
3. SADC shall not discriminate against any Member State.
4. Members States shall take all steps necessary to ensure the uniform application of this Treaty.
5. Member States shall take all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of national law.
6. Member States shall co-operate with and assist institutions of SADC in the performance of their duties.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### MEMBERSHIP

ARTICLE 7

**MEMBERSHIP**

States listed in the Preamble hereto shall, upon signature and ratification of this Treaty, be Members of SADC.

## ARTICLE 8

### **ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS**

1. Any State not listed in the Preamble to this Treaty may become a Member of SADC upon being admitted by the existing Members and acceding to this Treaty.
2. The admission of any such State to Membership of SADC shall be effected by a unanimous decision of the Summit.
3. The Summit shall determine the procedures for the admission of new Members and for accession to this Treaty by such Members.
4. Membership of SADC shall not be subject to any reservations.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### INSTITUTIONS

## ARTICLE 9

### **ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS**

1. The following Institutions are hereby established:
  - a) The Summit of Heads of State or Government;
  - b) The Council of Ministers;
  - c) Commissions;
  - d) The Standing Committee of Officials
  - e) The Secretariat; and
  - f) The Tribunal.
2. Other institutions may be established as necessary.



## ARTICLE 10

### THE SUMMIT

1. The Summit shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of all Member States, and shall be the supreme policy-making Institution of SADC.
2. The Summit shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC.
3. The Summit shall adopt legal instruments for the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty; provided that the Summit may delegate this authority to the Council or any other institution of SADC as the Summit may deem appropriate.
4. the Summit shall elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman of SADC from among its Members for an agreed period, on the basis of rotation.
5. The Summit shall meet at least once a year.
6. The Summit shall decide on the creation of Commissions, other institutions, committees and organs as need arises.
7. The Summit shall appoint the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary, on the recommendation of Council.
8. Unless otherwise provided in this Treaty, the decisions of the Summit shall be by consensus and shall be binding.

## ARTICLE 11

### THE COUNCIL

1. The Council shall consist of one Minister from each Member State, preferably a Minister responsible for economic planning or finance.
2. It shall be the responsibility of the Council to:
  - a) oversee the functioning and development of SADC;
  - b) oversee the implementation of the polices of SADC and the proper execution of its programmes;
  - c) advise the Summit on matters of overall policy and efficient and harmonious functioning and development of SADC;
  - d) approve polices, strategies and work programmes of SADC;
  - e) direct, co-ordinate and supervise the operations of the institutions of SADC subordinate to it;

- f) define Sectoral areas of co-operation and allocate to Member States responsibility for co-ordinating Sectoral activities, or re-allocate such responsibilities;
- g) create its own committees as necessary;
- h) recommend to the Summit persons for appointment to the posts of Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary;
- I) determine the Terms and Conditions of Service of the staff of the institutions of SADC;
- j) convene conferences and other meetings as appropriate, for purposes of promoting the objectives and programmes of SADC; and
- k) perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Summit of this Treaty.

3. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council shall be appointed by the Member States holding the Chairmanship and the Vice-Chairmanship of SADC respectively.

4. The Council shall meet at least once a year.

5. The Council shall report and be responsible to the Summit.

6. Decisions of the Council shall be by consensus.

## ARTICLE 12

### COMMISSIONS

1. Commissions shall be constituted to guide and co-ordinate co-operation and integration policies and programmes in designated Sectoral areas.

2. The composition, powers, functions, procedures and the matters related to each Commission shall be prescribed by an appropriate Protocol approved by the Summit.

3. The Commission shall work closely with the Secretariat.

4. Commissions shall be responsible and report to the Council.

### ARTICLE 13

#### **THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF OFFICIALS**

1. The Standing Committee shall consist of one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each Member State, preferably from a ministry responsible for economic planning or finance.
2. The Standing Committee shall be technical advisory committee to the Council.
3. The Standing Committee shall be responsible and report to the Council.
4. The Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Standing committee shall be appointed from the Member States holding the Chairmanship and the Vice-Chairmanship, respectively, of the Council.
5. The Standing Committee shall meet at least once a year.
6. Decisions of the Standing Committee shall be by consensus.

### ARTICLE 14

#### **THE SECRETARIAT**

1. The Secretariat shall be the principal executive Institution of SADC, and shall be responsible for:
  - a) strategic planning and management of the programmes of SADC;
  - b) implementation of decisions of the Summit and of the Council;
  - c) organisation and management of SADC meetings;
  - d) financial and general administration;
  - e) representation and promotion of SADC; and
  - f) co-ordination and harmonisation of the policies and strategies of Member States.
2. The Secretariat shall be headed by the Executive Secretary.
3. The Secretariat shall have such other staff as may be determined by the Council from time to time.

## ARTICLE 15

### **THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY**

1. The Executive Secretary shall be responsible to the Council for the following;
  - a) consultation and co-ordination with the Governments and other institutions of Member States;
  - b) pursuant to the direction of Council or Summit, or on his/her own initiative, undertaking measures aimed at promoting the objectives of SADC and enhancing its performance;
  - c) promotion of corporation with other organisations for the furtherance of the objectives of SADC;
  - d) organising and servicing meetings of the Summit, the Council, the Standing Committee and any other meetings convened on the direction of the Summit or the Council;
  - e) custodianship of the property of SADC;
  - f) appointment of the staff of the Secretariat, in accordance with procedures, and under Terms and Conditions of Service determined by the Council;
  - g) administration and finances of the Secretariat;
  - h) preparation of Annual Reports on the activities of SADC and its institutions;
  - I) preparation of the Budget and Audited Accounts of SADC for submission to the Council;
  - j) diplomatic and other representations of SADC;
  - k) public relations and promotion of SADC;
  - l) such other functions as may, from time to time, be determined by the Summit and Council.
  
2. The Executive Secretary shall liaise closely with Commons, and other institutions, guide, support and monitor the performance of SADC in the various sectors to ensure conformity and harmony with agreed policies, strategies, programmes and projects.
  
3. The Executive Secretary shall be appointed for four years, and be eligible for appointment for another period not exceeding four years.

## ARTICLE 15

### **THE TRIBUNAL**

1. The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it.
2. The composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related matters governing the Tribunal shall be prescribed in a Protocol adopted by the Summit.
3. Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed for a specified period.
4. The Tribunal shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or the Council may refer to it.
5. The decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.

## ARTICLE 17

### **SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS**

1. Member States shall respect the international character and responsibilities of SADC the Executive Secretary and other staff of SADC, and shall not see to influence them in the discharge of their functions.
2. In the performance of their duties, the members of the Tribunal, the Executive Secretary and the other staff of SADC shall be committed to the international character of SADC, and shall not seek or receive instructions from any Member States, or from any authority external to SADC. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their positions as international staff responsible only to SADC.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### MEETINGS

## ARTICLE 18

### **QUORUM**

The quorum for all meetings of the Institutions of SADC shall be two-thirds of its Members.

## ARTICLE 19

### **DECISIONS**

Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Institutions of SADC shall be taken by consensus.

## ARTICLE 20

### **PROCEDURE**

Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Institutions of SADC shall determine their own rules of procedure.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### CO-OPERATION

## ARTICLE 21

### **AREAS OF CO-OPERATION**

1. Member States shall co-operate in all areas necessary to foster regional development and integration on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit.
2. Member States shall, through appropriate institutions of SADC, co-ordinate, rationalise and harmonise their overall macro-economic and Sectoral policies and strategies, programmes and projects in the areas of co-operation
3. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, Member States agree to co-operate in the areas of:
  - a) food security, land and agriculture;
  - b) infrastructure and service;
  - c) industry, trade, investment and finance;
  - d) human resources development, science and technology;
  - e) natural resources and environment;
  - f) social welfare, information and culture; and
  - g) politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.
4. Additional areas of co-operation may be decided upon by the Council.

## ARTICLE 22

### **PROTOCOLS**

1. Member States shall conclude such Protocols as may be necessary in each area of co-operation, which shall spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for, co-operation and integration.
2. Each Protocol shall be approved by the Summit on the recommendation of the Council, and shall thereafter become an integral part of this Treaty.
3. Each Protocol shall be subject to signature and ratification by the parties thereto.

## ARTICLE 23

### **NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully, the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of regional integration.
2. SADC shall co-operate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and peoples of the Region.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

## ARTICLE 24

1. Subject to the provisions of Article 6 (1), member States and SADC shall maintain good working relations and other forms of co-operation, and may enter into agreements with other states, regional and international organisations, whose objectives are compatible with the objectives of SADC and the provisions of this Treaty.

Conferences and other meetings may be held between member States and other Governments and organisations associated with the development efforts of SADC to review policies and strategies, and evaluate the performance of SADC in the implementation of its programmes and projects, identify and agree on future plans of co-operation.

## **CHAPTER NINE**

### **RESOURCES, FUND AND ASSETS**

#### **ARTICLE 25**

##### **RESOURCES**

1. SADC shall be responsible for the mobilisation of its own and other resources required for the implantation of its programmes and projects.
2. SADC shall create such institutions as may be necessary for the effective mobilisation and efficient application of resources for regional development.
3. Resources acquired by SADC by way of contributions, loans, grants or gifts, shall be the property of SADC.
4. The resources of SADC may be made available to Member States in pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, on terms and conditions mutually agreed between SADC and the Member States involved.
5. Resources of SADC shall be utilised in the most efficient and equitable manner.

#### **ARTICLE 26**

##### **FUND**

The Fund of SADC shall consist of contributions of Member States, income from SADC enterprises and receipts from regional and non-regional sources.

#### **ARTICLE 27**

##### **ASSETS**

1. Property, both movable and immovable, acquired by or on behalf of SADC shall constitute the assets of SADC, irrespective of their location.
2. Property acquired by Member States, under the auspices of SADC, shall belong to the Member States concerned, subject to provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, and Articles 25 and 34 of this Treaty.
3. Assets acquired by Member States under the auspices of SADC shall be accessible to all Member States on an equitable basis.



## **CHAPTER TEN**

### **FINANCIAL PROVISIONS**

#### **ARTICLE 28**

##### **THE BUDGET**

1. The budget of SADC shall be funded by contributions made by Member States and such other sources as may be determined by the Council.
2. Member States shall contribute to the budget of SADC in proportions agreed by the Council.
3. The Executive Secretary shall cause to be prepared, estimates of revenue and expenditure for the Secretariat and Commissions, and submit them to the Council, not less than three months before the beginning of the financial year.
4. The Council shall approve the estimates of revenue and expenditure before the beginning of the financial year.
5. The financial year of SADC shall be determined by the Council.

#### **ARTICLE 29**

##### **EXTERNAL AUDIT**

1. The Council shall appoint external auditors and shall fix their fees and remuneration at the beginning of each financial year.
2. The Executive Secretary shall cause to be prepared and audited annual statements of accounts for the Secretariat and Commissions, and submit them to the Council for approval.

#### **ARTICLE 30**

##### **FINANCIAL REGULATIONS**

The Executive Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Council for approval financial regulations, standing orders and rules for the management of the affairs of SADC.

## **CHAPTER ELEVEN**

### **IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES**

#### **ARTICLE 31**

1. SADC, its Institutions and staff shall, in the territory of each Member State, have such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the proper performance of the functions under this Treaty, and which shall be similar to those accorded to comparable international organisations.
2. The immunities and privileges conferred by this Article shall be prescribed in a Protocol.

## **CHAPTER TWELVE**

### **SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES**

#### **ARTICLE 32**

1. Sanctions may be imposed against any Member State that:
  - a) persistently fails, without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed under this treaty;
  - b) implements policies which undermine the principles and objectives of SADC; or
  - c) is in arrears for more than one year in the payment of contributions to SADC, for reasons other than those caused by natural calamity or exceptional circumstances that gravely affect its economy, had has not secured the dispensation of the Summit.
2. The sanctions shall be determined by the Summit on a case-by-case basis.

#### **ARTICLE 34**

### **WITHDRAWAL**

1. A Member State wishing to withdraw from SADC shall serve notice of its intention in writing, a year in advance, to the chairman of SADC, who shall inform other Member States accordingly.
2. At the expiration of the period of notice, the Member State shall, unless the notice is withdrawn cease to be a member of SADC.

3. During the one year period of notice referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Member State wishing to withdraw from SADC shall comply with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall continue to be bound by its obligations.
4. A Member State which has withdrawn shall not be entitled to claim any property or rights until the dissolution of SADC.
5. Assets of SADC in the territory of a member State which has withdrawn, shall continue to be the property of SADC and be available for its use.
6. The obligations by Member States under this Treaty shall, to the extent necessary to fulfil such obligations, survive the termination of membership by any State.

#### ARTICLE 35

#### **DISSOLUTION**

1. The Summit may decide by a relation supported by three-quarters of all members to dissolve SADC or any of its Institutions, and determine the terms and conditions of dealing with its liabilities and disposal of its assets.
2. A proposal for the dissolution of SADC may be made to the Council by any Member State, for preliminary consideration, provided, however, that such a proposal shall not be submitted for the decision of the Summit until all Member States have been duly notified of it as a period of twelve months has elapsed after the submission to the Council.

#### **CHAPTER FOURTEEN**

#### AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY

#### ARTICLE 36

1. An amendment of this Treaty shall be adopted by a decision of three-quarters of all the Members of the Summit.
2. A proposal for the amendment of this Treaty may be made to the Executive Secretary by any Member State for preliminary consideration by the Council, provided, however, that the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to the Council for preliminary consideration until all Member States have been duly notified of it, and a period of three months has elapsed after such notification.

#### **CHAPTER FIFTEEN**

#### LANGUAGE

#### ARTICLE 37

The working language or languages of SADC shall be determined, from time to time, by the Council.

## **CHAPTER SIXTEEN**

### **SAVING PROVISIONS**

#### **ARTICLE 38**

A Sectoral Committee, Sector Co-ordinating Unit or any other institution, obligation or arrangement of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference which exists immediately before the coming into force of this Treaty, shall to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Treaty, continue to subsist, operate or bind member States or SADC as if it were established or undertaken under this Treaty, until the Council or Summit determines otherwise.

## **CHAPTER SEVENTEEN**

### **SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, ACCESSION AND DEPOSITARY**

#### **ARTICLE 39**

##### **SIGNATURE**

This Treaty shall be signed by the High Contracting Parties.

#### **ARTICLE 40**

##### **RATIFICATION**

This Treaty shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

#### **ARTICLE 41**

##### **ENTRY INTO FORCE**

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two thirds of the States listed in the Preamble.

#### **ARTICLE 42**

##### **ACCESSION**

This treaty shall remain open for accession by any state subject to Article 8 of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 43

**DEPOSITARY**

1. The original texts of this Treaty and Protocols and all instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Executive Secretary of SADC, who shall transmit certified copies to all Member States.
2. The Executive Secretary shall register this Treaty with the Secretariats of the United Nations Organisation and the organisation of African Unity.

**CHAPTER EIGHTEEN**

**TERMINATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING**

ARTICLE 44

This Treaty replaces the Memorandum of understanding on the Institutions of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference dated 20th July, 1981.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, the Heads of State or Government have signed this Treaty.

DONE at Windhoek, on this ..... day of August, 1982 in two (2) original texts in the English and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

.....  
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

.....  
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

.....  
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

.....  
REPUBLIC OF MALAWI

.....  
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

.....  
REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

.....  
KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

.....  
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

.....  
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

.....  
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE