

**WORKPLACE RELATIONS IN EAST GERMANY AFTER UNIFICATION:
EXPLAINING WORKER PARTICIPATION
IN TRADE UNIONS AND WORKS COUNCILS**

A dissertation submitted for the degree of Ph.D. (Econ)

Faculty of Economics

London School of Economics and Political Science

Carola Maria Frege

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ABSTRACT

The East German industrial relations system was completely replaced by the transfer of the West German dual system of industrial relations after political Unification in 1990. Works councils emerged, the former socialist trade unions were taken over by their western counterparts, and West German labour law and regulations were implemented.

The thesis focuses on the transformation of workplace relations, with special reference to the viewpoint of the workforce. It is argued that this approach, which has been so far neglected in the German literature, is necessary for a full understanding of the transformation processes.

The study examines firstly workers' (both union and non-union members) *perceptions* of organisational changes and management, of their workfellows and their new collective representative machinery (works councils, union). Secondly, it analyses workers' *reactions* towards the establishment and functioning of the new interest institutions. This is done more specifically with regard to workers' inclination to participate in collective activities. By testing a selection of social psychological theories associated with the willingness to participate (theories of rational choice, of social identity, of frustration-aggression and of micro-mobilization), the core end product should be an understanding of who engages in collective activities in this specific cultural context and why. Furthermore, both dimensions, perceptions and reactions, are used to test the hypotheses of the literature that East German workers are strongly individualistic, instrumental and passive with regard to participation in collective activities; and that the newly established works councils and unions have not been successfully "institutionalised" from the viewpoint of the workforce.

The empirical study is based on a case study of a privatised textile company (including qualitative and quantitative methods) and on a questionnaire survey of a sample of members of the textile union in East Germany in more than 50 companies.

The main findings are that most workers seemed highly dissatisfied with the changes at their workplaces, had strong them-us feelings toward the management, believed in the value of unions and collectivism, and expressed a considerable willingness to participate in collective activities. The new interest institutions were accepted as being necessary, even though their current work was more critically evaluated. This supports the argument that works councils and union have been successfully "institutionalised" from the workers' perspective. The major result however is that workers were not characterized by a strong individualism in contrast to the widespread hypothesis of the literature. Yet, they were difficult to be classified as pure collectivists or pure individualists because many displayed mixed responses regarding different issues. They were equally difficult to classify as purely instrumental, identity-oriented or otherwise regarding collective activities. Thus, the perceived instrumentality of collective action and institutions, union identity, the perception of collective interests and the attribution of workplace problems all contributed to the prediction of individual participation in collective activities. No single examined theory provided a sufficient explanation on its own and they seemed to offer complementary rather than alternative explanations.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

"As German unification proceeds, the transformation of political and industrial relations institutions in the East as well as the effect of unification on West German institutions will afford an exciting opportunity for researchers in the coming years, one that may shed new light on our ideas of institution building and transformation. Although the outcome will undoubtedly be the expansion of West German institutions, including unions, works councils, and industrial relations practices, into the East, the actual functioning of these institutions in the new environment is arguably contingent." (Turner 1991: 242)

The formal transformation of the "socialist" industrial relations system of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)¹ into a "modern, western-style" system took place in a very short time during the unification process of the two German states (1990). The entire West German industrial relations system was transferred to the East. West German labour law and collective bargaining arrangements were introduced, employers' associations emerged, and the industrial branches of the central state trade union² were taken over by their West German "counterparts" (see Fichter 1994, 1996; Weinert 1993). Works councils (which had formerly been forbidden) emerged in a large number of companies as a result of workforce initiatives, even before the West German Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) was officially introduced in East Germany. All this happened with virtually no resistance from the East German population (e.g. Kreißig 1994:2).

The transfer of western institutions to the East distinguishes the transformation in East Germany from the corresponding processes in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. All post-socialist³ societies face the same basic problems, the simultaneous and quick transformation from one party system to a pluralistic democracy and from a planned

¹ "GDR" is used in the following to refer to the former socialist state, whereas "East Germany" will be used more generally to refer to the past and to the present region. This region is today officially called the "five new Bundesländer".

² Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB)

³ The term "post-socialist" will be used to refer to the still ongoing period of transformation from socialist state regimes to modern democracies. The term "socialism" is used rather than "communism" to be in line with the common German terminology with regard to the GDR.

economy to a market economy. However, all countries except East Germany are experiencing a gradual "self-made" transformation, whereas East Germany went through an ad hoc, big-bang transformation as a result of the complete transplantation of an entirely new social system (e.g. Giesen and Leggewie 1991). Thus, the main characteristic of the transformation is the constitutional self-abolition and fusion with another country. The consequences, as well known, have been the territorial expansion of the West German institutional network of the political, legal, economic, monetary and social institutions and massive financial subsidies.

There is a debate as to what extent the specific East German transformation provides a competitive advantage or a burden for East Germany in comparison to its neighbouring states (e.g. Offe 1992; Reißig 1993; Wiesenthal 1994). Most researchers point out that Unification as a mode of transformation does not appear to be an unambiguously advantageous process (e.g. Wiesenthal 1994:1). The less pleasant features of this particular unification have for example been the rapid decline of industrial production (of around 70%) and employment opportunities (of around 40% of total jobs in 1989) (Dathe and Schreiber 1993:44; Wiesenthal *ibid.*); the prospective returns on investment (e.g. unit labour costs) that are hardly better than in West Germany and probably less than in neighbour countries in the East (Wiesenthal *ibid.*); and finally the frustration and dissatisfaction amongst a considerable part of the population due to unexpected unemployment, increasing living costs and problems of adjusting to the new societal system (Offe 1992:38).

A major question of research is whether the institutional transfer of industrial relations into the East succeeded, thus whether the western institutions "function" in their new environment (see also Turner's quote above). There is growing evidence that although the industrial relations institutions are formally in place they do not yet function as they should according to the West German "norm". Thus, Turner's statement that the future development of East Germany is arguably contingent still holds true in 1996. As an example, employers' associations increasingly lack members (e.g. Schroeder 1994) and unions face tremendous problems with regard to membership decline and the virtual lack of workplace representation through voluntary union stewards (e.g. Fichter 1996).

Most current research on the transformation of industrial relations in East Germany is preoccupied with the macro and meso (institutional) changes. A major example is the extensive literature on the emergence of works councils (e.g. Jander and Lutz 1991; Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994; Kreißig and Preusche 1992). The micro or actor level of employees during the transformation has so far been largely ignored (exceptions are Andretta et al. 1994; Alt et al. 1994). As Andretta et al. (1994:1) propose, this neglect might be due to the predominance of (macro) labour market problems (see also Dathe 1993:30). It might be also due to the German academic tradition in the field of industrial relations, which is biased towards the analysis of institutions (e.g. Streeck 1981; Weischer 1993).

Thus, most research focuses on the question of whether the transferred industrial relations institutions function "properly" at a macro or at an institutional level. Current problems of the institutions are explained mainly in two ways. One approach argues that it may just be that more time is needed for industrial relations practice to adapt to the western standard (e.g. Weidenfeld and Korte 1991; Zapf 1993, 1994). This indirectly assumes an 'inevitable' modernization process in East Germany in a predetermined direction (i.e. adaptation to the West). The other approach refers to problems lying within the institutions. They are seen either as inherent problems (e.g. the institutions are not properly equipped for the gravity of economic problems they face in the East) or as problems caused by specific strategies of the institutional actors (e.g. strategies of the West German unions during the transfer into the East) (see Jander and Lutz 1993; Kädtler and Kottwitz 1992, 1994; Mahnkopf 1992b). This approach is based on social actor theoretical accounts on the transformation (e.g. Balaz 1992; Eberwein 1991; Klein 1992; Lehmbruch 1993; Peter 1993; Reißig 1993). These theorists argue that the transformation is not a priori determined by the macro and institutional changes (i.e. formal institutionalisation of western industrial relations system) but is open ended and partly dependent upon the affected social actors. Thus, the transformation is characterized by "a conscious change of the prevailing structure and order [of the GDR society] rather than by an inevitable structural transformation which the social actors cannot influence" (Reißig 1993:3). With regard to the analysis of the functioning of institutions this theory puts great emphasis on the role of the affected social

actors and their culture.⁴ For example, according to Jacoby (1994), institutional change will be effective and enduring only if it is accepted and supported by social actors rather than decreed by policy makers alone. Almond and Verba (1963) or Gabriel (1993) speak of the "interpersonal trust", Sztompka (1993) speaks of a specific "civic" or "discourse" culture, being the prerequisite to the formation of institutions. Moreover, Manytz (1994:23) emphasizes that only by examining the macro and micro levels together can the potential disintegration of both levels be examined, and that this potential is seen as being mainly responsible for institutional mal-functioning (also Lehmbruch 1993). In her view the potential tension between institutions and the individual behaviour of the actors is "one" if not "the" essential problem of the entire social transformation. To conclude, social actor theorists argue that East Germany experiences not just a transfer of industrial relations institutions, but an "autonomous" institutionalisation process.

However, although emphasizing the relevance of social actors in the transformation process most authors focus on institutional actors only (e.g. union officials, works councillors) thus neglecting the workforce as a potentially influencing actor (e.g. Jacoby 1994). In contrast, this study assumes that workers' attitudes and behaviour must be taken into account if we are truly to understand the transformation and institutionalisation processes. It is argued that this approach seems especially suitable to analyse the establishment and functioning of unions in the post-socialist economy, as a result of the dramatic changes in union-membership relations (from membership of a socialist "service station" to membership of a modern interest institution).

Some statements in the recent literature on East Germany also acknowledge this fact. Union membership is seen as a major reason for unions not functioning as effectively as they normally do in the western region. In the main, East German union members are said to be reluctant to engage in collective activities of all kinds, and this is seen to be a major problem for the (West) German unions (e.g. Armingeon 1991; Lippold et al. 1992; Mahnkopf 1992; Neubauer 1992). Indeed, Mahnkopf (1992:35) writes, "there is only a

⁴ Similar claims are made regarding the political transformation towards a democratic society. For example Popper (1990:16) claimed that "it is more difficult to pass over from totalitarianism to democracy than from democracy to totalitarianism. (...) Democracy calls for deep-going, value-oriented changes in the *public mentality* (...)."

small number of members who have an emotional relationship to the union, who identify with the content of union policies and are willing to participate in active and 'self-responsible' collective action". The increasing withdrawal from membership (e.g. during 1992 union membership in the East has dropped by some 18% to just under 3,4 million)⁵, and the apparent lack of commitment and participation of members are interpreted as signs of an individualistic, instrumental membership (see also Heering and Schroeder 1995:176; Martens 1994:314). An implication is therefore that they are different to their western counterparts. However, these claims are simply assertions which have rarely been examined either theoretically or empirically.

This study is based on the micro level of the workforce and analyses the transformation of *workplace relations*⁶ through the point of view of the workforce. It examines firstly workers' (both union and non-union members) *perceptions* of organisational changes and management, of their workfellows and of their new collective representative machinery (works council, union). Additionally, it analyses workers' *reactions* towards the establishment and functioning of the new interest institutions. This is done more specifically with regard to workers' inclination to participate in collective activities.

In sum, the study deals with three interrelated topics (in a layered way such as the make-upon) which take the form of an onion): first, the transfer of western industrial and workplace institutions in a specific context (i.e. the textile industry), workers' perceptions of this transformation at workplace level and finally, as the core of the study, workers' (re)actions in the form of their willingness to participate in collective activities.

The purpose of this study is thus threefold: *firstly* to describe the transformation of workplace relations in one particular industry (textiles), which has not been looked at in the transformation literature. In addition, most previous studies focused on the transformation of one institution only (e.g. the works council) or on the transformation of industrial relations at macro level without analysing workplace relations. The *second* purpose is to

⁵ 1993 shows a similar picture and in 1994 membership dropped by 11% (Fichter 1994:61, 1996:12).

⁶ Workplace relations are defined as the various relations between management, unions, works councils and the workforce at company and shopfloor level.

examine workers' perceptions during transformation and thus to contribute to a better understanding of the transforming workplace relations. For example, workers' views towards the new interest institutions can tell us something about the success of the institutionalisation of these industrial relations institutions at workplace level. Another task will be to examine the widespread hypothesis that East German workers are becoming strongly individualistic. The *third* purpose is to focus on workers' reactions, i.e. their willingness to participate in collective activities, and the possible explanations for variation amongst individuals. By testing a selection of social psychological theories⁷ associated with the willingness to participate, the core end product should be an understanding of who engages in collective activities in this specific cultural context and why.⁸ A major question here is whether the supposed passivity of these workers, if indeed it exists, is reflected in highly instrumental and individualistic decision-making processes. Moreover, since it is very rare for a set of theories to be tested simultaneously, the enquiry should also contribute to the general discussion of antecedents of collective activity. Finally, it should also test the applicability of these theories to a new cultural context.

The study is based on an extensive study of both the literature of union membership and the current literature of the transformation of industrial relations in East Germany. The empirical work comprises both a case study of a firm in the East German textile industry and a survey of union members throughout the East German branch of the textile union. More specifically, the case study comprises an analysis of company documents (agreements between the management and the works council), several interviews with the two full-time works councillors, and with members of management (director, plant directors, supervisors), and structured interviews with selected workers in Summer 1993

⁷ These theories are based on experience in western capitalist, advanced industrialised societies (mostly North America and Great Britain).

⁸ Another possible topic could have been an investigation of the reasons *why East German workers joined* the new West German unions in the first place. However, although this research briefly tackles this question it is not a major focus for several reasons. Firstly, current participation decisions seem to be more suitable to analyse in terms of the actual working of the institutions and their membership relations than past decisions to join. Secondly, the acquisition of former FDGB members by the western unions was organised in such way that members were taken over "automatically" albeit with the right to declare their withdrawal. Arguably, most people did not consciously "join" the new union, they just stayed on. In addition, joining a union in Germany is not such a far reaching event as in the anglo-saxon countries (there is nothing comparable with the unionization process of voting in the US).

and Summer 1994, as well as a large survey for the blue-collar workforce and smaller surveys of the works councillors and supervisors in 1993. The broader survey of the union members in the industry as a whole was conducted in early Summer 1994 and was accompanied by several interviews with the chief union official of the East German branch. Thus, the methodology comprises documentary, qualitative and quantitative methods, respectively a combination of a case study and a "cross-company" survey. The case study's documentary and interview data was mainly used to design the questionnaires as well as to assist in the analysis of the results. The additional union membership survey was used to firstly improve the questionnaire design of the case study survey and secondly to render the overall enquiry more representative.

The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is regarded as a sensible methodology in this particular context. Firstly, research of transforming post-socialist societies had to start by scratch. It is a historically unique phenomenon and social sciences have not developed a specific methodology or theory for this kind of social transformation (e.g. Giesen and Leggewie 1991; Meier 1991; Reißig 1992). Secondly, most East German as well as East European research is qualitative and case-study oriented (e.g. Petkov and Thirkell 1991:chp.4). In order to improve the representativeness of the findings this study attempted to introduce quantitative research methods. Both the case study and the textile union survey contain a works council questionnaire and a workforce/ membership questionnaire.

Furthermore, most previous research is inductive oriented and lacks a clearly argued theoretical framework. In applying the social psychological theories of collective action (which are mainly tested quantitatively in the literature) the study tries to circumvent the descriptive character of most studies on transforming societies.

The textile industry was selected for various reasons. This industrial sector was and still is severely affected by the Unification and the subsequent exposure to the world market (which led to a dramatic reduction in employment) and it is therefore a good representative of most of the East German industry (see Küchle and Volkmann 1993). In addition, the textile industry is a sector which has not been looked at in the research of transformation and is also largely neglected in the general industrial relations studies in

Germany. Furthermore, it is a female-dominated sector, which has rarely been examined in studies of union membership behaviour. As Snyder et al. (1986) note, most studies are male-dominated with regard to proportions of respondents, occupations, unions, and industrial sectors. Thus, possible tendencies of a passive and individualised workforce should become especially evident in the case of textile workers which are traditionally associated with a not militant union and which is traditionally associated with a largely inactive female membership.

Finally, the focus was on blue collar rather than white collar workers since it was assumed that blue collar workers experienced greater organisational changes at their workplaces than white collars. In addition the textile union is a predominantly blue collar union.

This thesis is structured into four parts: firstly "the transformation of workplace relations" (chapters 2-4), secondly a theoretical part which introduces the conceptual and methodological tools of analysing workers' attitudes and behaviour (chapters 5-7), thirdly "workers' perceptions of the transforming workplace relations" (chapters 8-9), and fourthly "workers' (re)actions: their willingness to participate in collective activities" (chapters 10-11).

In **Part 1**, *chapter 2* commences with defining "transformation" as a particular form of "social change", thus changes of the most significant characteristics of an entire social system such as the industrial relations system. The chapter then goes on to briefly describe the "socialist" system of industrial and workplace relations in the former GDR and characterizes it as a highly bureaucratic and centralist triumvirat regime of Party, union and enterprise directors with no independent interest representation of the workforce. Unions were instead transmission belts between the will of the Party state and the working class. Workplaces were characterized by the simultaneous existence of formal bureaucratic regulations and informal networks and practices, producing a sort of "pseudo-bureaucratic" or "pseudo-tayloristic" work organisation. With regard to workers' interest representation it is argued that most workers did not feel that they were represented by the union organisation. Some workers, however, were able to use their limited passive

strength (e.g. due to high labour shortage, job security) to enter into informal bargaining on certain workplace issues with their supervisors, thus representing their interests themselves. A question this study will address is whether these informal networks resist the current institutionalisation of interest representation at workplace level.

Chapter 3 introduces the transformation of workplace relations by providing brief descriptions of the formal take-over procedure of the union branches of the FDGB (the former central union confederation) by the West German unions, of the establishment of the works councils, and finally of the most dominant changes of personnel management in the companies. The rest of the chapter is devoted to analysing the development of workplace relations practices by focusing on management and works council. The existing literature is reviewed and can be characterized as having two opposite views, an optimistic and a pessimistic view, of the characteristics and effectiveness of workplace relations with regard to workers' interest representation through the works council. It is argued that the existing discussions of the functioning of works councils and unions are mainly based on a list of various reasons as to why these institutions are not able to function properly, but without having been tested so far. The studies also fail to take into account workers' perceptions of these new institutions.

Chapter 4 introduces the empirical study by describing the wider industrial relations context of the textile industry. It outlines the chronology of the transformation of the textile union and the employers' association. The chapter then reports the results of a small-scale survey of the workplace climate perceived by a sample of works councillors in the textile industry. The major result is that works councils' relationships with management are perceived as generally harmonious, cooperative and "functioning". The councillors see themselves primarily as a link between company and workforce interests. This adds support to previous research. The last part of this chapter is devoted to discussing the organisational transformation of the case study firm, Bodywear, in the five years from 1989 to 1994. The case study presents a successfully privatised firm with major changes in the work organisation and working conditions. The focus is on the practice of workplace relations, i.e. the attitudes and behaviour of the two actors, works council and management. Workplace relations are seen from both sides as generally harmonious, but

this works council seems to put more emphasis on the interest representation of the workforce compared to the other councillors in the survey above.

In sum, Part 1 explores the formally successful transformation of workplace relations in the East German textile industry, emphasizing the tremendous changes which have occurred at most workplaces, the rapid transfer of the new interest institutions, and the generally positive views of the works councillors of their relationship with management.

However, focusing on the institutional actors at workplace level identifies clearly the need to explore workers' perceptions and reactions towards the ongoing changes at their workplaces and to take the workforce as an influencing actor in the practice and development of workplace relations seriously.

This is the topic of **Part 2**. It introduces an alternative approach to exploring workplace relations through the examination of workers' attitudes and behaviour.

Chapter 5 reviews the literature on former and current worker attitudes and identifies a major hypothesis of the individualisation of the East German workforce. The importance and centrality of work and the workplace in people's former lives is discussed, and the few empirical studies of the former GDR reveal a considerable amount of job dissatisfaction and them-and-us feelings towards management, and the perception of not being represented or helped by the union. The chapter then reviews the current literature on workers' attitudes towards the reorganisation of their workplaces and their new interest institutions. Workers are dissatisfied with the changing working conditions, especially with the increasing job insecurity and pay. Workers are also disillusioned about the effectiveness of works councils, but nevertheless have a positive attitude towards them. Most joined the union out of instrumental reasons, unions are seen as important organisations, and one large scale comparative study found some form of union participation to be low but higher than in West Germany.

Finally, the literature's explanations for workers' general passivity regarding collective activities are summarized, one approach emphasizing the legacy of the former passive behavioural patterns, another stream proposing an individualistic and instrumental

approach of workers to interest institutions and activity. The hypothesis of the individualisation of the workforce is further analysed. It is argued that analysing workers' attitudes and behaviour towards interest representation and collective activities provides a good focus for the study of the individualisation hypothesis.

Chapter 6 surveys the theories on participation in collective activities. Four major socio-psychological theories, the theories of rational choice, social identity, frustration-aggression and micro-mobilization are critically discussed. These theories have rarely been tested together in previous (mainly anglo-saxon) research, and not at all in the East German (or indeed German) context. The theories' significance for the East German context will be tested in Part 4; however, the theories also provide the analytical tools for examining workers' perceptions of workplace relations, which are discussed in Part 3.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the methodology of the empirical studies, i.e. the workforce questionnaires. It commences by outlining the operationalisation of the theories discussed in the previous chapter. It then discusses the possible theoretical interrelations of the four major theories by reviewing previous empirical studies which tested some of the theories together. It will be argued that the four social psychological theories might be complementary rather than independent, competing explanations. The chapter finishes by introducing the two workforce studies.

Part 3 discusses workers' perceptions of the transforming workplace relations. *Chapter 8* deals with workers' perceptions of the organisational transformation, and *chapter 9* deals with workers' perceptions of the new interest institutions. The discussions are mainly based on the frequency distributions of the two worker questionnaires, but they also refer to the interviews with a sample of workers in the case study company.

Chapter 8 results in an alarming picture of workers' perceptions of the current working conditions and management behaviour. Workers are highly dissatisfied with their working conditions and reveal a strong degree of "them-and-us" feelings. On the other hand, they strongly identify with their work group.

Chapter 9 reveals people's conviction of the need for these new interest institutions, although there is a mixed perception of the institutions' instrumentality

regarding specific and broader issues of their interest representation. Union members show a strong degree of identification with the union, yet there is less interest in collective concerns.

In sum, this part provides the picture of a dissatisfied workforce which has so far experienced the transformation as an increasing threat to their job security, their working habits and their solidarity with colleagues. The new interest institutions on the other hand are welcomed and accepted. This provides an argument for the successful institutionalisation of works council and union as outlined in the previous part of the thesis. The effectiveness of these institutions however yields mixed responses according to the kind of issue involved. For example the unions are seen as effective with regard to collective bargaining and their concern for unemployment, but not with regard to more specific workplace issues. Finally, and importantly, workers do not comply with the stereotype of individualised East German workers; rather they believe in the values of unions and collectivism.

Part 4 deals with workers' (re)actions to the changes in their participation in collective activities. *Chapter 10* discusses their level of willingness to participate in collective activities. Overall, the participation level is quite high and certainly not lower than that normally described in western studies. Then, *chapter 11* then focuses on the antecedents of willingness to participate in both surveys using multi-variate statistics (factor analysis, correlation and regression). Overall, no single theory yields encompassing predictive power. Instead the theories of rational choice and social identity yield the most significant antecedents. The theories of frustration-aggression and "micro-mobilization" were significant to a lesser extent. The data supports the earlier hypothesis that the antecedents, especially social identity and collective instrumentality, are highly intercorrelated. Moreover, social identity and collective instrumentality have a mutually reinforcing effect on participation rather than one playing the leading role as has been suggested in some previous research. The finding that East German workers are not exclusively guided by cost/benefit calculations in a context which makes instrumental approaches to collective

activities highly probable (according to some theories outlined before) also reinforces the finding that these workers cannot be characterized as being individualistic.

Finally, *chapter 12* summarizes and interrelates the various themes of this study. The appendix comprises all interview guidelines, copies of all (six) questionnaires (including the pilot study), and several statistical tables.

PART 1

THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORKPLACE RELATIONS

Chapter 2 Industrial and workplace relations in the former GDR

The aim of this chapter is to outline the major characteristics of the former socialist workplace relations in East Germany which present the starting point of the transformation of workplace relations after Unification. In particular, it focuses on the former informal interest representation at shopfloor level. Introducing the background or context of the transformation illustrates the extent of the industrial relations transformation with regard to the institutional changes. Moreover, by discussing informal interest representation it also identifies an area which has the potential for "disturbing" the successful transformation at workplace level.

The chapter commences with defining the concept of "transformation" (2.1). It then outlines the former socialist system of industrial relations (2.2), which is followed by a discussion of the socialist workplace relations (2.3).

2.1 Defining "transformation" of industrial relations

The term transformation is commonly used as a generic term to describe the various social changes and developments ongoing in post-socialist societies⁹. However, the term itself is rarely defined (see Bast-Haider 1992; Reißig 1993c:3). Transformation will in this study be defined as a particular form of "social change" (e.g. Sztompka 1993), thus as a "process of changes in significant, typical characteristics of the structure of a social system" (Endruweit and Trommsdorf 1989:799), i.e. in the dominant institutional order (Lockwood in Zapf 1969:124). Thus, transformation describes a significant alteration of

⁹ The concept of 'transition' on the other hand has been challenged by some authors as value-laden and deterministic, implying that these societies are inevitably 'on the road' to capitalism (Stark 1992).

social structures (that is of social action and interaction), including the manifestations of such structures as embodied in norms, values, cultural products and symbols (Moore in Sills 1968:366). Transformation is then a departure from a relatively stable social structure (Zapf 1993), and as such has a departure point (e.g. the old system of industrial relations) and an arrival point.

Transformation in industrial relations is defined as a change of the whole industrial relations structure, not only of some actors and regulations, but of typical elements and their interaction within the system. In Central and Eastern Europe, including East Germany, one can observe changes in the labour laws and in the state's role in industrial relations, the emergence of capitalist owners and employers, and the emergence of works councils and western style trade unions. In addition, the social relations among the actors, their attitudes, norms and habits should change as well.

However, speaking of transformation in industrial relations in Central and Eastern Europe we need to firstly clarify whether there was an industrial relations system at all before, which is now being transformed, or whether we are currently experiencing the emergence of something new. This obviously depends on our definition of industrial relations. If we understand industrial relations for example to be "the various interrelations between actors, institutions and regulations of capital and labour, as deriving out of an institutionalisation of class antagonism" (Geiger 1949) and thus stress the irreconcilability of industrial conflict, then by definition no industrial relations system existed in socialism. The working class owned the means of production and class conflicts could not exist. On the other hand a more structuralist definition of industrial relations as "a network of (social, legal, economic,...) rules governing relationships of actors derived from an employment contract" (Schienstock 1982:14) can be applied to the socialist societies. Using the term "transformation" thus inevitably assumes the latter type of definition of industrial relations.

It should be also emphasized that the term transformation will be used with regard to East Germany as a continuing process. Although the formal transformation of institutions and regulations has been completed, it is frequently argued that this does not refer to the transformation of the social relations. The next section introduces the starting point of the transformation.

2.2 Industrial relations system in the GDR

The general elements of the industrial relations system under the previous socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are well known and widely documented (e.g. Clarke 1995; Deppe and Hoß 1989; Dittrich et al. 1992; Héthy 1990, 1991, 1994; Smith and Thompson 1992; Széll 1992). It is intended therefore to give only a short overview of the formal system. In essence, all Eastern European countries practised the Stalinist model of industrial relations. This model evolved in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and was introduced in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The nationalization of the means of production, along with a centralized planning system including strict norms and instructions for the production and distribution of goods, can be seen as fundamental elements of this model (Schienstock and Traxler 1993:3).

Perhaps the fundamental assumption of this industrial relations system was the existence of a single homogeneous, predominant "all-social interest" in the national economy and the wider society (Héthy *ibid.*). This social interest is claimed to originate from the public ownership of the means of production and from the exercise of power by the working class. As a consequence, a system theorist would argue that the economic and political social subsystems were not autonomous, independent areas (as "ideally" they are said to be in western societies) but were heavily interlinked at a formal and informal level (e.g. Luhmann 1987:32pp., 1989; Polany 1978). Similarly, the industrial relations actors (state, unions, employers) were seen to be united on behalf of the "socialist construction" (*sozialistischer Aufbau*) (Héthy 1990:10) and could not be identified as being autonomous. It expressed a unitarist view of the interests in society, thus denying the existence of differing/conflicting interests in society and in enterprises. Consequently the exploitation of the working class did not exist in theory. Collective labour disputes and conflicts of interests were looked upon as non-existent (strikes as actions of workers against their own interests were superfluous and forbidden by law). If divergences of interests appeared, they were interpreted as manifestations of individual misbehaviour, violations of the law or of the "socialist morality", or as "subversion" against the state, and were treated accordingly (Héthy 1991:126). In a highly centralized decision-making process the Party

worked out the "one best way" for joint social action in industrial relations within the framework of a bureaucratic central planning system and closely supervises of the realization of the targets set by similarly rigid bureaucratic control (Héthy 1991:125). Thus it decided upon such matters as pay levels, and the size of the workforce. It relied in this respect almost exclusively on legislation and law enforcement, and left no space for any (official) bargaining between the parties.

Within the enterprise (VEB)¹⁰, industrial relations formally consisted of four main actors, the Party's enterprise branch¹¹, the union (FDGB) enterprise branch (BGO)¹², the directors¹³, and to some extent the secret service branch (Stasi) and the FDJ (state youth organisation). The first three formed a triumvirat, constituting one single monolithic bloc of power. Their functions were inseparably intertwined: the Party assumed managerial functions on the top state level (determining production, material, wages,...), the employer performed state functions related to employment and social policies (e.g. guaranteeing full employment, taking care of the accomodation of its workforce), and the unions acted in the place of managers in operating incentive schemes to promote production and by enforcing discipline. The directors often had additional Party mandates or other social duties indicating an additional personal interweaving of these areas (see Kreißig 1993). In more detail, the employers had officially no autonomous interests, which turned enterprise

¹⁰ VEB (volkseigener Betrieb, "people-owned enterprise"), was the official name for the socialist enterprises.

¹¹ The Party (SED = Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) had representatives in each enterprise (Betriebsparteiorganisation). These had four major tasks: (i) to strengthen the ideological conviction of its Party members, (ii) to fight against imperialist influences, (iii) the political and ideological education of its members, and (iv) the education of its members in terms of discipline and work ethics (Unversöhnlichkeit gegenüber Mängeln) (Autorenkollektiv 1978:339).

¹² BGO (Betriebsgewerkschaftsorganisation) was led by the BGL (Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung) consisted of full-time officials and was subdivided into sub-branches in each department, called AGL. The role of the BGL in GDR labour law was described as that of representing the interests of the workforce and fulfilling its constitutional rights (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977). The latter comprised the following explicit tasks: participating in the fulfillment of the plan, negotiating the work agreement, supporting the movement "work, learn, live socialist", organizing the "socialist competition" between brigades (brigades = workgroup units), supporting the intensification of production and controlling the improvement of productivity and of the working conditions, participating in the vocational and political qualification of the workforce, participating in working time/ holiday issues, distributing flats and holiday places, improving health and safety, supporting socialist work discipline, and participating in personnel policy (e.g. employment contracts, dismissals).

¹³ In the GDR this terminology was abolished, they were called instead "socialist leaders". The socialist leaders were by definition "socialist personalities, who led as commissioners of the working class and their marxist-leninist party a specific social institution (Autorenkollektiv, Ökonomisches Lexikon, Bd. H-P, 1979:395). Their official duties were (i) to fulfill the plan, (ii) to foster the personal development of the workers to become real socialist personalities, (iii) to improve not only workers' working but also living conditions, and (iv) to collaborate closely with the Party and union branch (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977).

management into the executors of the "central will" of the economy. They were not free in their decision-making, they depended on the plan, and they were controlled externally by the higher bodies within the combine¹⁴ and the responsible ministry, as well as internally by the union and the Party branch. Without the agreement of the BPO (Party branch leader), as well as the official of the MfS (state security), the director (who as a SED member had to comply to the SED directives anyhow) could not make any decision. Additionally, the BGL was normally included in the collective decision-making, since it had to guarantee the realization of the plans. In short, management discretion was limited and managers' prerogatives derived only out of their appointment by the Party and as formal commissioners of the working class. Thus, whereas in capitalist firms structures of control are a consequence of managerial strategies, in socialist firms they were a consequence of state strategies (e.g. decisions to introduce brigades or to start a new discipline campaign were made at the state level).

Since there was a single predominant interest in the enterprise, and since the Party officially represented the working class, there was obviously no need for a representative body of the workers. The trade unions were therefore primarily transmission belts between Party and workforce and "schools for socialism" rather than representative bodies of worker interests. This interpretation of unions in socialist societies was developed by Lenin in the 1920s. The Leninist doctrine of dual functioning unions, called the "classic dualism", can be seen in the two sets of union functions. Firstly, there was the concern with mobilization of labour production, thus the management of labour in terms of maintaining discipline, mobilizing workers to higher productivity (e.g. via "socialist competition", suggestion schemes (Neuererbewegung)), educating them in the spheres of production, management and ideology. This is summarized in the often quoted Leninist description of unions as "schools of administration, management and communism". Secondly, there was the concern with the protection of members' rights and interests, which meant in essence guardianship of the legal rights of members against managerial

¹⁴ The combine was the socialist type of a "holding", a vertically integrated conglomerate, whereby enterprises of different levels of the production of one product (e.g. textiles) were part of one holding. The combines tended to be highly autarkic in their trading patterns, had monopoly control of their market segments and boasted their own supplying companies and social services.

arbitrariness and the defence of labour interests when necessary. Legally, participation and co-determination rights of the workers in the GDR were in many areas more advanced than in the West German law (see Belwe 1979:216; Gill 1989:379; Lutz 1990:23; Pirker et al. 1990). The labour law (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977) nominated the BGL as the holder of company co-determination rights. Thus, the BGL had the right to "make suggestions and give comments to questions of company planning and management strategy". In addition, the BGL was in charge of the internal grievance procedure (Konfliktkommission).

Although the notion of dualism between both functions implies parity, there is widespread evidence that in practice the "production" function was far more important than the "protection" function (e.g. Freeman 1993b; Kirschner 1991:1034). This functional bias stemmed directly from the concept of interests that underlies "classic dualism", i.e. the absence of "antagonistic" social conflicts within the socialist society. The unions were told to help resolve any possible minor discord and to ensure that it did not disturb the overriding harmony of relations between labour, management, party, and government. As a consequence the unions had to subordinate the protection of their members' interests to the promotion of Party policy, which axiomatically best served the true long term interests of all union members.

The notion of unitary socialist interest was also reflected in two organisational tenets of the union. Firstly, the production principle which made all those employed (managers and workers) in one sector eligible for union membership (i.e. socialist unions were industrial unions). Secondly, the widespread socialist organisational form of "democratic centralism" was also applied to the union organisation. Thus, it is clear that unions were a highly centralized system of bureaucratic decision-making. Power was highly centralized and in addition became subject to outside control by the Party at all levels. The union remained closely subordinate to the Party. In addition, the close collaboration between management and Party officials within the enterprise severely restricted independent union activity.

Finally, the workforce was officially seen as co-owners of the social property, and as obedient executors with their primary interest vested in an effective contribution to production and plan fulfillment (Héthy 1990:12). In theory they had institutionalised

grievance mechanism (see above) and extensive formal co-determination rights concerning their work and shopfloor decision-making (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977). The following section will discuss the arguably different practice.

2.3 Workplace relations in the GDR

This section outlines two major topics of the literature on workplace relations in GDR, the formal and informal system of workplace organisation, and the strong shopfloor position of workers (2.3.1). It then discusses the reasons provided (2.3.2) and concludes with some problems of this literature (2.3.3).

2.3.1 Characteristics of workplace relations in the GDR

(i) The formal and informal system of workplace organisation

As with the system of industrial relations, the formal workplace relations of the socialist enterprises were designed in a highly bureaucratic, centralized way (Heidenreich 1991:417). Socialist firms were managed according to centrally decided-upon production plans and prices, in combination with the granting of assigned quantities of necessary materials, equipment and employees (see Heidenreich *ibid.*). The production system, work organisation and personnel policies are described as tayloristic¹⁵ (e.g. Deppe and Hoß 1989:84; Heidenreich *ibid.*; Voßkamp and Wittke 1990:14). Several authors point out that in reality however this system was constantly undermined by informal networks¹⁶ (e.g. Heidenreich 1991, Voßkamp and Wittke 1991).

¹⁵ "Taylorism" is frequently used in the German literature without a precise definition. It generally refers to a highly bureaucratic, centralized organisation with a production system based on assembly lines, division of labour and "tayloristic" control mechanisms and personnel policies (e.g. piece rate pay).

¹⁶ Networks are defined as social relations of individuals with people within and outside their own household (Diewald 1995:223).

For example, whereas in a western tayloristic firm the systematic analysis and design of work and production processes might be understood as an attempt to intensify standardisation and productivity, scientific management of the piece-rate system seemed to have had only limited influence on the real processes at the production level in socialist firms. The "scientific method trainers" seem to have been hindered in their proper working and ended up confirming workers' entitlement to their workplaces (workers try to keep their workplaces — low internal fluctuation) and their existing piece rate payment (groups faked working times etc.) (Heidenreich 1991:423). Furthermore, since the hierarchical organisation did not provide sufficient formal cross-coordination between the departments¹⁷, employees had to step in and create coordinations themselves within and between the enterprises. In other words, the market which was otherwise absent was provided by a "quasi-market" of personal contacts, networks and bribery ("I'll help you if you help me") (Fritze 1993:186). Thus, the work organisation became "politicized" and "personalized".¹⁸ There is widespread evidence that it was specifically frequent for shortages in production material to be organized in this way (e.g. Heidenreich 1991).

In sum, the authors suggest that scientific time and motion studies, the piece rate system and the formal organization had little real impact on the processes on the shopfloor (e.g. Heidenreich 1991). There is a widespread agreement that a parallel structure of formal, rational, scientific principles of organisation on one hand, and informal organisational practices on the other characterized the socialist organisation (e.g. Deppe and Hoß 1989; Heering and Schroeder 1992; Heidenreich 1991; Voßkamp and Wittke 1990). However, there is a division of views among academics as to how to interpret this co-existence of formal and informal organisation.

The system has been described by one group of authors as a "pseudo-bureaucracy" or as "pseudo-Taylorism" (Alt et al. 1994:54; Heidenreich 1991b:18, 1992:6), "quasi-

¹⁷ The official hierarchical centralized way of communication between departments resembled the tayloristic and socialist ideas of centralism (Heidenreich 1991:424). In addition, the absence of horizontal interdependencies between the departments was fostered by the heads of the departments themselves in order to increase their autonomy (so-called "little principalities").

¹⁸ The term "politicized" work organisation ("Politisierung") refers to the undermining of bureaucratic, formal rules by personal contacts and "connections".

Taylorism" (Makó and Simonyi 1987); "reduced" Taylorism (Deppe 1991); "double reality" (Weltz 1988), "divergence between the formal structure and reality" (Voßkamp and Wittke 1990:23), or "noncontractual relations" (Rottenburg 1991:306). The conclusion of these writers is that the central characteristic of the GDR work organisation was "Taylorism" and the departure from it (Schmidt 1995:2). This is not to say that an informal sector is not common in capitalist bureaucracies as well (e.g. Brown 1972; Hill 1974; Donovan Report 1968), but that in socialist firms it was present to a distinctive degree.¹⁹ An important corollary according to these writers is that the position of workers towards management was more powerful than in the West and formal disciplinary rules and motivation strategies were less influential.

Writers on the other side however question that the postulated "tayloristic" system was really the official, formal system, since "the official collectivist ideology is not compatible with the tayloristic ideology" (Alt et al. 1994:54; Gensior 1992:273; Schmidt 1995:2). In their view the importance of the work collective was fostered by the state ideology, it was supposed to integrate the "whole" personality of the worker. Thus, these authors do not perceive the informal networks or the work collective as deviant to the official doctrine but as the major official characteristic and thus prefer the term "bureaucratic paternalism" (Deppe and Hoß 1989:25) to "pseudo-Taylorism".

(ii) The strong shopfloor position of workers

Despite the above mentioned differences there is an overall agreement in the literature that informal negotiations existed on the shopfloor - not only in East Germany, but in most other Central and Eastern European countries²⁰ - and that they should be interpreted as an important outcome and also source of strength of the workforce at shopfloor level (e.g. Deppe 1989; Fritze 1993b; Heidenreich 1991; Kreißig 1993; Rottenburg 1992).²¹ The

¹⁹ For example in contrast to the socialist case, informal negotiations in capitalist enterprises are restricted by the formal industrial relations institutions, thus informal relations exist *within* a formal framework (Heidenreich 1991b:15).

²⁰ For example in the Czech Republic (e.g. Pollert 1995) or Russia (e.g. Clarke 1993).

²¹ A well-known joke in Hungary was: "There are three workers: an American, a West German, and a Hungarian. The American eats five eggs for breakfast and goes to work in his Buick. At work he is exploited. The West German has three eggs and ham for breakfast and goes to work in his Opel. He is also

literature defines a "strong" workforce with regard to its bargaining power in workplace negotiations. Authors generally argue that the strength of the workers' position is fostered by official policies such as a highly stable rate of pay, a high level of indirect income (subsidized rents and goods, as well as company welfare services) and low taxes (5% for blue collars). Moreover, it is said that it was quite common for highly skilled, productive blue collar workers, especially those doing piecework, to earn a similar if not higher wage than their superiors and than white collar staff.²² In addition however, there is evidence of workers' bargaining power in informal negotiations. For example, Heidenreich (1991) notes that working time was often not used productively (some cases report of 30% of the working time not being used), work intensity was low, and the frequent disruptions in material flow was used extensively for breaks.²³ Lohr (1992) argues in her study²⁴ that although the socialist enterprise aimed to create a holistic welfare/care system which intended to produce political conformity, there were various indicators that this did not prevent interest negotiations and conflicts on the shopfloor. The workforce regulated their mode of working and their cooperative relationships frequently amongst themselves, largely independently of formal standards. Thus, workers' contact with the company's hierarchy is said to have been mediated above all by their informal negotiating relationships with their supervisors. Major personnel issues (e.g. overtime, piece rates, shift work, breaks) were often informally negotiated between work groups and their supervisors, who had no real authority²⁵. Lohr concludes that conflict regulation was determined not by institutional, written, suable rights and duties, but through the real power positions of the actors and that this was arguably to the advantage of the workers, not of the management at

exploited at work. The Hungarian has one egg for breakfast and no meat. He goes to work on a bus but he is not exploited. At work he rules." (joke from the Hungarian shopfloor, quoted in Burawoy 1992: 35).

²² E.g. Heidenreich (1991b:15) mentions that in one of his case study textile firms the supervisors earned 1,100-1,200 Mark gross (=800 Mark net, since taxes for white collars were higher), whereas good sewers earned 1,000-1,200 Mark net. He also states that in the overall economy in 1988 the (net) earnings of East German supervisors were 8% higher than that of all production workers (also Stephan and Wiedemann 1990:561). Adler and Kretzschmar (1993:114) state that in their case study a qualified blue collar worker earned on average 934—1,031 Mark net, and a qualified white collar worker 970—1,193 Mark net. Thus, there was no monetary incentive to become a supervisor (Alt et al. 1994:84).

²³ A good example are the long work cycles: In the case study, Bodywear, the sewing time in former times for one model was 100-300 minutes, i.e. 5-15 minutes per seamstress in a group comprising 20 persons. The average work cycles in Western firms of 1-2 minutes were virtually unknown in the East.

²⁴ Based on a joint DFG-project of Humboldt University and University of Erlangen-Nürnberg comprising 8 case studies of firms in East Berlin.

²⁵ The informal bargaining of the piece rate was particularly crucial, since basic pay was on average only 40% of total earnings.

that time (ibid.:160). In a nutshell, she asserts that the formal interest representation of the union (BGL) was marginal (also Kirschner 1991:1034; Kreißig 1993:120). In other words, informal negotiations at shopfloor level provided the interest representation that was otherwise lacking (Voßkamp and Wittke 1991:32). Authors agree that although the BGL sometimes did provide a grievance path, it never provided a real "voice", i.e. representation of workers' interests. The union mainly promoted workers' involvement in production, and subordinated any short-term preferences of the workers to the overriding interest of economic growth. Empirical studies now reveal that most workers regarded unions as having primarily a service function in social affairs (e.g. distribution of holiday places) (David 1992:133; see also chapter 9).

2.3.2 Reasons for informal networks

There are various reasons given for the informal networks and the supposed "passive strength" of workers. Firstly they were a result of the permanent shortage of labour in the socialist "shortage economies" (Kornai 1986) with supervisors dependent on their workforce.²⁶ In addition, it has been argued that the supervisors were often former workmates (and often not the best ones) (Alt et al. 1994:84; Heidenreich ibid.:12). Secondly, the extensive legal protection against dismissals (i.e. right to work, job security) suspended traditional management controls and disciplinary measures, and limited the possibilities for motivation policies (e.g. Heidenreich 1992:8). Thirdly, the low turnover and (geographically) decentralized production units and company social functions (leisure facilities etc.) fostered a very cosy, personal atmosphere and sense of community which supported informal relations. Also, the competition between and within the hierarchical levels of the enterprise was low due to small income differences and other "equalisation" policies (Diewald 1995:235). Fourthly, the GDR's official image as "the state of workers

²⁶ Labour as with other production factors was utilized inefficiently and stockpiled (due to the "soft budget constraints" companies had no interest in utilizing labour economically and wage costs were low anyhow due to the high living cost subsidies). This made the enterprise dependent on workers to comply with extra work and creativity when production bottlenecks arrived, i.e. to agree to work in "impossible" working conditions with overtime and insufficient material.

and farmers" and management being officially the commissioner of workers added to the social status of the workforce on shopfloor level. Fifthly, as mentioned above management actions were "personalised" and "politicized" (thus not guided by economically rational criteria). Sixthly, the limited autonomy of firms forced managers to conform to the externally made decisions. Any confrontation with the superiors was therefore dangerous in terms of their own career. Accordingly, management feared any industrial unrest amongst their workforce, and this fear took priority over the aim of increasing labour performance (Fritze 1993b:201; KreiBig 1993:111). Furthermore, it is argued that the absence of real interest representation by the unions forced workers to represent their interests on their own. Lastly, the informal negotiations and networks, although they increased the power of workers were beneficial for both sides. For management they met the official objectives (ensured worker compliance), and for workers they rendered their work life as comfortable as possible (Voßkamp and Wittke 1991:31). Thus, there was a practical rationale for working on this slow track, because effort was not rewarded: "You sometimes worked for four hours and were paid for eight" (worker quote in Bodywear case study, see chapter 8).

The literature speaks of a "plan fulfillment pact" (Planerfüllungspakt) between workers and management/ supervisors (Heidenreich 1991, 1992; Kern and Land 1991; Voßkamp and Wittke 1990:25), or "emergency communities" (Notgemeinschaft) (Senghaas-Knobloch 1992:300). In some sense, both sides profited but with regard to the economy and society as a whole this practice was not beneficial at all. Thus, although the enterprise achieved considerable flexibility and some kind of worker compliance, the informal contract fostered the indifference of workers towards the production and quality of the product. The "politicization" of the work organisation is often used by authors to explain the structural inflexibility of the enterprises (despite their strong potential for improvisation) and the aversion to innovation is seen as a major characteristic of socialist firms in the GDR (e.g. Heidenreich 1992:11). Authors conclude that the informal system was complementary to the formal system but at the same time stood "at crossways" to it. Thus, the informal system increasingly undermined and provided a substitute for the formal system, but paradoxically also stabilized it at the same time.

2.3.3 Problems of this literature

Six issues of the above literature on informal networks should be briefly discusses. Firstly, as mentioned above the literature is entirely based on retrospective data (since GDR scientists did not commonly research the practices of workplace relations), which inevitably implies methodological problems (see Diwald 1995; Marz 1992; Lange 1992). As Marz (1992) argues people easily tend to conceive the past in a different, rosier light from what it really was.

Secondly, informal networks might be a phenomenon restricted to certain industrial sectors or occupations. Diwald finds in his study²⁷ that the "personal quality" of the relations²⁸ at the workplace in the retrospective perception of workers varied little between different occupations and income levels (1995:245). However the perceived usefulness of the networks was seen to vary between job levels and industrial sectors. They were perceived as highly useful in the metal industry for example, and in addition white collars perceived them as more useful than skilled and unskilled workers.

Thirdly, it can be questioned whether the informal networks also inevitably incorporated informal bargaining arrangements. For example in our case study firm informal networks might have existed in former times, yet there is little evidence that workers were involved in heavy informal bargaining with their supervisors. Also, one could argue that a lot happened in a rather indirect, implicit way. For example, coming to work late is not an indicator of an active, conscious bargaining between the two sides.

Fourthly, one can argue that even if workers had a relatively high degree of control over the way they produced, it does not necessarily mean they had actual power (see Clarke 1995). For example, they could only escape from potentially dissatisfying working conditions in individual ways (e.g. absenteeism, alcoholism, low motivation, psychological withdrawal, poor discipline), since they had little possibility of collective resistance. In Hirschman's terms (1982) there was no "voice" available and "exit" was limited (i.e. the working conditions were not significantly different in other enterprises).

²⁷ Longitudinal survey of 2,323 East Germans in 1991/2 and 1993.

²⁸ Relations are seen as a "social resource", for example did you get personal help from colleagues, and were these networks used to talk about politics/general topics.

Furthermore, one should not think that informal bargaining was always free of problems and friction. Workers were never sure exactly how far they could go and there were obviously conflicts amongst workers, e.g. older workers may not have been keen to get overtime work, whereas the younger ones wanted the extra pay (see Freeman 1993b). Finally, some authors state that workers were mainly reacting rather than becoming proactive (Kirschner 1991:1035). This can be partly explained by the limited scope of action (e.g. limited bargaining scope at the shopfloor, since a lot was decided at a higher level, i.e. Party, see also Clarke et al. 1993: chp. 1). To conclude, several authors have pointed out that the strong position or bargaining power of the workforce on the shopfloor can only be seen as a form of "passive strength" (Kern and Land 1991; Voßkamp and Wittke 1991) or "informal power" (David 1992:130).

Fifthly, a related question is that of workers power. Studies of Hungary have suggested that there was a significant distinction between core and peripheral workers (Burawoy 1985). Core work groups took the key role in informal negotiating whilst the rest were more passive. Core workers had a strategic function in the production process or were in important departments (e.g. export) with high qualifications, peripheral workers were in less important, less well paid jobs and found it more difficult to participate in bargaining. With regard to the GDR Diwald (1995) finds in his study that women were less likely to perceive the networks as instrumental than men, a finding which cannot be traced back to job segregation. It seems that females were less integrated into these networks than males (ibid.:147). On the other hand age cohorts did not seem to matter in his sample. He concludes that informal networks did not necessarily even out imbalances but rather increased existing inequalities amongst different types of workers (e.g. skilled/unskilled, male/female).

Finally, the degree to which informal bargaining substituted entirely for official worker representation is still a moot point. Rüthers (1972:43) for example mentions that 85% of the conflicts over labour law (*Arbeitsrechtsstreitigkeiten*) were regulated by the official conflict commission. There is also evidence of cases where the BGL (union branch) tried to foster workers interests. For example, Kreißig (1993:110)²⁹ explains that

²⁹ Based on case studies in the tools and electrotechnical industry in Saxony during the 1980s.

the BGL sought to achieve its ends mainly through collaboration and not confrontation with the directors. Differences had to be settled through amicable negotiation and not by adversarial collective bargaining. Where management really infringed members' interests (e.g. health and safety), the union might have protested and referred matters to higher authorities for arbitration. Obviously, there was no room for industrial action, strikes being seen as symptoms of union failure rather than legitimate weapons. However Kreißig found that in many cases the management agreed to workers' demands in order to avoid unrest and scolding from above. In addition, in some cases the good connections of union officials with the above political or union ranks could well undermine the power of directors and Party officials in the enterprise. Nevertheless Kreißig does not want to suggest that the BGL was anything more than a "moderator" and "buffer" for management policies (ibid.:120).

In sum, regarding the outlined methodological and contextual problems one wonders why the thesis of substantial informal bargaining arrangements and strong workforce power was so quickly taken for granted in the research community. It would seem worthwhile to substantiate the argument by studying these proposed characteristics in different industrial sectors, production systems and workforce members.

Conclusion of Chapter 2

Outlining the socialist industrial relations system provided the background for understanding the post-1989 transformation of industrial relations institutions, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In more detail, the chapter emphasized the bureaucratic, hierarchical organisation of socialist enterprises and work organisation, the "cooperation" between the three major actors on top level (triumvirat) and the absence of an effective institutional representation of workers' interests (i.e. by the unions). This might have an impact on workers' current relationship to their new, West German interest institutions (unions, works councils). The chapter also reported the literatures' interpretation of the former workplace relations as being characterized by substantial informal networks and bargaining arrangements. Despite the outlined problems of this interpretation, informal negotiations might well have been an important feature of the socialist shopfloor reality in specific sectors or enterprises. It seems therefore worthwhile to investigate whether those informal networks were succeeded by the formalisation of interest representation after Unification. This will be addressed in the workforce surveys in Part 3. The next chapter introduces the literature on the transformation of workplace relations.

Chapter 3 Transformation of workplace relations in East Germany: review of literature

This chapter introduces the transformation of workplace relations by reviewing the current, mainly institutional, literature on the establishment and development of industrial relations during the transformation. It attempts to cluster the existing literature into specific arguments, although this turns out to be difficult because of the sometimes overlapping, somewhat fragmented, and still developing nature of the arguments of "work in progress". Evaluation of the material is also quite complicated, especially since the empirical basis is in some cases not always clearly expressed.

There are two sections: 3.1 describes the *formal* transformation of the main actors of workplace relations: unions, works councils and management. 3.2 deals with the *current state* of workplace practices and focuses in particular on the works council, its effectiveness in representing workers interests and its institutionalisation.

3.1 "Formal" transformation of industrial relations actors

3.1.1 The acquisition of the FDGB³⁰

The transformation of the socialist state union, FDGB, turned out to be an acquisition of the individual industrial union branches by their West German counterparts, after a short attempt to rescue and reform the FDGB on its own (see Fichter 1996; Fichter and Kurbjuhn 1993; Hertle and Weinert 1991; Klinzing 1992; Pirker et al. 1990a; Weinert 1993). How likely it was that such a reform would succeed and why it failed are the subjects of various studies (e.g. Fichter and Lutz 1991; Hertle 1990; Pirker et al. 1990a,b). The FDGB decided at the end of January 1990 to create financially independent,

³⁰ The following account draws heavily on Fichter's work (esp. 1996, 1994). His work is partly based on a project with Kurbjuhn (1993) which involved interviews with 17 East German and 33 West German union officials who are responsible for the new Länder (German states) in the sixteen unions affiliated to the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund).

industrial unions. However, the DGB unions expected at that time, according to Fichter (1996:6, 1991), a thorough process of democratization and decentralization to ensue, and also that unions in West and East Germany would find "a suitable basis for cooperative relations and possible amalgamation". Fichter argues that the West German unions had no interest in the rapid acquisition of their socialist counterparts. But the West German unions seemed to have overestimated the political potential of the East German citizens' movement, which was quickly overwhelmed by the popular demand to become part of West Germany and gain access to the Deutschmark zone. After the landslide election victory of the CDU-led East German "Allianz für Deutschland" in March 1990, a takeover strategy with the goal of "incorporation" assumed priority in Bonn (Fichter 1996:7). As the speed of this began to accelerate, the DGB unions then faced the choice of either "mounting a breakneck effort to implement their organisational jurisdiction into the GDR or finding the eastern part of a united Germany virtually devoid of functioning unions" (Fichter 1994:52). Armingeon (1991:34) talks of a "Zugszwang" (tight spot) for the West German unions after the West German economic system and the collective labour legislation were extended to the East. Within only a few months (March to September 1990) the West German unions then organized the "jurisdictional" and organizational expansion to the East. On June 8th 1990 the decision was made (within the DGB) to liquidate the FDGB a few months later (September 14th 1990). The acquisition of the single union branches started during the Summer of 1990 and the successful takeover of the membership took place between Autumn 1990 and Spring 1991. The organizational expansion of all DGB unions was completed by Autumn of 1991.³¹ This process was supported by the West German government, as well as by the West German employers' associations, i.e. BDA³² (Wilke and Müller 1991:267). The DGB and BDA discovered a common interest in transferring western collective bargaining instruments as quickly as possible to the East. The consensus between the two organisations seems to have been designed to remove all doubt regarding the future of their established structures, norms and institutional arrangements in the unified Germany (Fichter 1996:5; Wilke and Müller

³¹ There is a debate as to how far it was the political circumstances, the DGB or the FDGB who initiated the merging process (e.g. Fichter 1994:52; Ansorg and Hürtgen 1992; Lippold et al. 1993).

³² Bundesverband Deutscher Arbeitgeber (in charge of collective bargaining issues and social politics).

1991:271) which could also be interpreted as a move to reduce possible competition from the East.³³ At any rate, it required the establishment of employers' associations (which will not dealt with here, but see chapter 4), and trade unions in the East.

The acquisition strategy chosen by most West German unions is interpreted by many observers as "a conservative (risk avoiding) approach designed to retain maximum control over the many uncertainties ahead" (e.g. Fichter 1994:53). Most unions did indeed take a pragmatic stance, arguing that it made sense to take advantage of the existing FDGB infrastructures and resources (buildings, vehicles etc.). The transformation in the end resulted in the complete takeover of both members and union property and assets. It should also be noted that the new union structure in East Germany is a copy of the western model, whether or not this model is an appropriate one (see also Jander and Voß 1991). This meant that the acquisition of most unions was not accompanied by any democratic "discourse" or learning process or examination of whether there was anything worthwhile which could be kept from the socialist unions. Furthermore, there was no common approach or discussion amongst the western unions about the possible challenges of the very different historical, cultural, and socio-economic legacies in East Germany (Fichter 1996:8). Fichter suggests further that union leaders ignored grass root and shop floor initiatives associated with the East German citizens movement and rebuffed all efforts by critical voices within their own camp to promote the idea of coupling the expansion process with necessary internal organizational reforms³⁴ (see also Mahnkopf 1991, 1993).

The take over resulted in large gains in membership in the two years immediately after Unification in 1990 (see table 3.1). Since then, membership has been declining throughout the country in the wake of economic recession and - especially in the East - massive de-industrialization and job losses (Fichter 1996:11; Wiesenthal 1994:7). At the end of 1991 the DGB enjoyed an increase in membership of 49% (= 3,862,490 new members) (Kittner 1994:91). This meant that in 1990 only 10% of the East German

³³ See also their joint agreement to a uniform economic and social system in a unified Germany (DGB/BDA, Gemeinsame Erklärung zu einer einheitlichen Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung in beiden deutschen Staaten, March 9th, 1990 in: DGB Informationsdienst ID7).

³⁴ This refers to the current debate within German unions and the DGB about internal organisational reforms (e.g. Leif et al. 1993; Mahnkopf 1993:10).

workers failed join to the new western unions (Lecher 1990:320). In 1991 union density in East Germany was 59% compared to 29% in West Germany.³⁵ This dramatic increase in total membership was evidently a surprise for the western unions, many of whom had expected a massive exodus of FDGB members (e.g. textile union, GTB, see Wilke and Müller 1991:263). That this did not happen was possibly due to the heightened insecurity and loss of orientation throughout the rapid Unification and transformation process, e.g. the increasing fear of the consequences of the introduction of the market economy (unemployment, social security,..) and the conviction that the unions could help. Thus, several authors claim that there was a widespread belief amongst the East German workforce that West German unions could guarantee a quick improvement of living and working conditions (e.g. Fichter 1994:56).

Even so large an increase in membership cannot be assumed to have led to an increase in union power, and it is argued that density figures in East German will eventually fall to the comparable West German level (Kittner 1994:84; Mahnkopf 1993). By 1992 DGB membership had already decreased by 6.7%; whereas the old Länder recorded a reduction of only 0.2%, the new Länder showed a decrease of 18.4% (Kittner 1994:92). A year later DGB membership dropped a further 6.6%, with East Germany accounting for 64% of the total decrease (Die Quelle, June 1994:14). Losses among members under 25 years of age in East Germany have been particularly high, ranging between 20 and 25% a year since 1992 (Fichter 1996:13). The ratio of female to male members in East Germany, while declining, is still almost twice as high as in West Germany (1994: 46%/25%) (Fichter *ibid.*). Finally, although the loss of members in the East has slackened over the past two years there is still no certainty that a stable level of membership is within reach (Fichter 1996:13).

³⁵ According to the authors' calculations, density here is based on the employed labour force (see table below). Mahnkopf quotes different densities: 50% for East Germany and 35% for West Germany (1993:8), but does not say how she defined densities. Official union statistics do not publish density figures.

table 3.1: Membership figures of the DGB

(31.12)	DGB total	DGB West	DGB East	% of total	West density ³⁶	East density
1989	7,861,000	7,861,000	./.	./.	31.89 %	./.
1990	11,564,923	7,937,923	3,627,000	31.36%	31.17%	45.33% (40.30%) ³⁷
1991	11,800,413	7,642,587	4,157,826	35.23%	29.19%	60.64 % (49.37%)
1992	11,015,612	7,623,865	3,391,747	30.79%	28.89%	56.82% (43.08%)
1993	10,290,152	7,383,500	2,906,652	28.25%	28.47%	50.60% (38.11%)
1994	9,768,373	7,179,123	2,589,250	26.51%	28.09%	44.73%

source: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Sonderheft Arbeitsstatistik) for all years, Buechtemann and Schupp (1992), Kittner (1995); own calculations of the densities.

3.1.2 The establishment of works councils

Works councils were forbidden in East Germany after 1946, when the SBZ government (Soviet military zone) abolished them and - against heavy resistance - replaced them with local union branches: the BGL³⁸ (Bust-Bartels 1980; Gill 1991; Lutz 1991; Suckuts 1982).³⁹ Following the turnaround in October 1989 there was a short period when the FDGB and the BGL tried to reform themselves but without any success (see above). However, in a large number of enterprises active groups were established within the workforce or within the BGL itself who initiated the closure of the old BGL. The literature commonly argues that these groups were disillusioned by the BGL's effort to represent workers' interests, and had lost their last remnants of respect and trust when the BGL did

³⁶ Density is defined here as DGB union membership (thus without DAB, DBB, CGB) as a percentage of the total employed labour force ("Beschäftigte Arbeitnehmer").

³⁷ Densities in brackets give DGB union membership as a percentage of the total labour force (incl. unemployed) ("Erwerbspersonen").

³⁸ BGL was the FDGB company branch (see chapter 2).

³⁹ This was one measure of the GDR state to change unions' role from its traditional defensive role to an industrial-political role within the construction of the socialist state.

not participate in the "revolutionary" period in the enterprises (e.g. Kirschner 1991). The literature is however divided on the reasons as to why these worker councils were established. The main point of contention is whether they indicate an interest by workers in "industrial democracy" (improving workers interest representation), or whether they were merely a vehicle to support management in introducing organisational changes. In short, there are two opposite groups of research.

Firstly, WISOC in Chemnitz (e.g. Ermischer, Kreißig, Lungwitz, Preusche), whose associates have carried out various case studies of companies in Saxony from 1989 onwards. In their view worker councils⁴⁰ were "democratically elected forms of employee 'bottom-up' participation, developed for the first time after more than 40 years" (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 1995:53)⁴¹, which fulfilled the "need of East German employees for self-realisation, to develop their own creativity, to be involved in decision-making processes, for general involvement and information" (ibid.).

Secondly, the Berlin/ Göttingen project (Kädtler, Kottwitz, Jander, Lutz, Rosenbaum, Weinert) who do not interpret the emergence of worker councils as a sign of expanding industrial democracy.⁴² The basic argument for these analysts is that these worker councils did not represent a push for democratic reforms in the socialist firms, but instead emerged as a result of political protests against the SED regime (in order to stop the "red socks" in the enterprises, i.e. to get rid of the Stasi and Party) and to support the reconstruction of the enterprise. Industrial democracy is not seen to be the reason for establishing the worker councils, because they were not linked to any civil movements outside the firm and because people aimed for a restructuring process through harmonious workplace relations ("partnership"). WISOC however argues that improving employee's voice in the enterprise was one reason for the establishment of these councils.

⁴⁰ The term "worker councils" will be used for the councils established in 1989/early 1990 which were not under West German law, and "works councils" will be used for councils under (West) German law (Betriebsräte), thus after the mid 1990s.

⁴¹ Based on case studies in six companies of the machine industry in Saxony.

⁴² Expert interviews and documentary work in 40 companies in Saxony and Thüringen during the unification period (1989/90) and six intensive longitudinal case studies (mainly from interviews with works councils) in these regions, plus equivalent investigations around Berlin (22 companies) till 1992/3 (see Jander and Lutz 1991; Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994), make up their empirical underpinning.

To conclude, their different interpretation might well be due to their different empirical samples which may present regional differences (Berlin - Saxony, the centre of civil movement). A more likely reason seems to lie however in their different understanding of "industrial democracy", which neither side defines with precision. Furthermore, neither side provides explicit and sufficient evidence to support their views, and hinders a final evaluation.

Finally, the West German Works Constitution Act (BetrVG 1972)⁴³, the foundation of works councils, was introduced on June 1st 1990 (Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion), along with other labour laws (e.g. "the law against wrongful dismissal" [Kündigungsschutzgesetz]) before the political Unification (October 3th 1990). Consequently, all existing, "unlawful" worker councils had to be newly elected under the German law, existing company agreements had to be amended, and works councils were introduced in places where they did not yet exist. This had to be achieved within a two year period (until 30.6.1992). In most companies works councils seem to have been established from the mid 1990s onwards (earlier than the transfer of employers' associations and western unions).⁴⁴

⁴³ The German industrial relations system is often described as a "dual system". This means that at the industry level, interest representation is conducted on a voluntary basis through the institutions of collective bargaining between unions and employers' associations, whereas domestic/ company level negotiations are conducted on a statutory basis between works councils and individual employers. The statutory framework at the workplace is provided by the 1972 Works Constitution Act (BetrVG). Under this legislation works councils are elected in all workplaces with over five employees and are responsible for representing and protecting employee interests at the workplace. As statutory bodies, works councils are formally independent of the unions and are elected by the whole workforce. The law does not permit councils to bargain on issues already covered in collective agreements such as pay (only in cases where wages are paid in excess of collectively agreed rates the council can bargain with the employer). In addition, the works council has several information, consultant and co-determination rights concerning various social, personnel and economic issues (e.g. overtime pay, working times, redundancies, recruitment). Alongside the statutory council, the unions maintain a network of stewards (Vertrauensleute) at the workplace. Unlike the council, the body of stewards is an integral part of the union organisation and not subject to the Works Constitution Act (partly quoted from Mahnkopf 1993:10). For further information on the "dual system" of German industrial relations see Adams and Rummel (1977), Berghahn and Karsten (1987), Streeck (1984a), Thelen (1991).

⁴⁴ No data is available on the precise number of East German firms having a works council (according to Niedenhoff of IDW Köln, or see Schneider in Kittner 1995).

3.1.3 Personnel management in transition

The existing empirical research on organisational transformation is mainly based on case studies. These often follow the modernisation processes of one or more firms or of a whole industrial sector (e.g. Dörr and Schmidt 1992; Edwards and Lawrence 1994; Heidenreich 1993; Kühle and Volkmann 1993; Niebur 1992; Wittke et al. 1993), and often focus on the effectiveness of modernisation and restructuring in terms of productivity and competitiveness (e.g. Grünert 1992), but are not concerned with its impact on workers' attitudes and behaviour. Most studies refer to privatised companies, where the process of organisational restructuring was begun earlier than in the Treuhand⁴⁵ owned firms.

Two different tendencies are taking shape. One group of researchers argue that we see innovative, socially engaged managers who introduce "innovative" personnel methods such as total quality management (TQM) or human resource management (HRM). Managers are therefore seen to build on the old informal partnerships and networks on the shopfloor and to be attempting to get the workforce to agree to a new "modernisation pact" instead of the old shopfloor "survival pacts" (see Bluhm 1992; and chapter 2). This view is supported by the WISOC group. For example Preusche (1994) argues that East German managers in her sample (managers of seven companies in the Saxon metal industry)⁴⁶ were, due to their prior socialisation, more "humanistically oriented" and thus care for harmonious employee relations (see also section 3.2.1). Furthermore, Lang (1992:139) found in his comparative study of (155) West and (291) East German managers a more "cooperative and social orientation" in the East German work behaviour. In the same vein

⁴⁵ The Treuhandanstalt Berlin was the state privatisation agency which started its work in 1991. The Treuhand took over the assets and liabilities (over 100 Mrd Deutsche Mark) of the East German combines (VEB's). In 1992 the Treuhand had responsibility for over 5,100 companies (Treuhand prospectus "Entschlossen Sanieren" 1992:17). In the end of 1994/beginning of 1995 the Treuhand had completed its work of privatising most of the firms and was dissolved (being substituted by regional "holdings").

⁴⁶ This study was based on structured interviews with 23 managers of these companies, as well as on interviews with two works councillors of each company.

Stratemann (1993:21) showed in her study⁴⁷ that East German managers score a stronger "responsibility for employees" than their western counterparts.

However, one can argue that this proposed "social behaviour" does not necessarily mean that East German managers will install employee involvement. Neither does it say anything about management's relationship with the works councils. It may equally lead to a patriarchal form of employee relations, with works councils being ignored. It would also be natural to speculate about whether most new management techniques are being typically introduced by the western headquarters rather than on the initiative of East German management. Finally, Heidenreich (1993:94) argues that it is utopian to think that under the current labour market circumstances companies could build on the old "survival pacts".

The other, more pessimistic group of researchers argue that these innovative enterprises are rare exceptions, they are islands largely cut off from their surroundings, and mostly to be found in the automobile industry (e.g. VW in Saxony, General Motors (Opel) in Eisenstadt, see Mahnkopf 1993:5)⁴⁸. For these writers the major trend seems instead to be a revival of the Fordist organisation and control principles. The argument is that management wants to optimize the already existing "Tayloristic" organisation (as defined in chapter 2), which was impossible in former times due to the continuous production problems and the powerful position of the workers on the shopfloor (e.g. Lohr 1992). Today, power relations have changed and real "Taylorism" can finally be practiced. Thus, management does not try to establish a new "pact" (informal agreement) with the workforce but instead tries to motivate them by fear. Several studies support this (e.g. Edeling 1992:55; Heering and Schroeder 1992:24; Lohr 1992; Voßkamp and Wittke 1991). Heidenreich (1991a:33) observes in his study⁴⁹ a tendency towards "structural-conservative" (struktur- konservativ), rigid-tayloristic forms of work organisation. He argues that East German managers have begun to act (for the first time) without any social

⁴⁷ Based on a study of the Institute of Economic Psychology in Dortmund (WIP) on the economically relevant psychological characteristics of East Germans. Further details about this study are published in Stratemann (1991).

⁴⁸ Mahnkopf bases her arguments on interviews with union officials and works council members in Brandenburg during 1991. We are not told how many interviews she conducted nor in which industries they took place (see Mahnkopf 1993:1).

⁴⁹ Based on 12 case studies (92 interviews with managers and works councillors in these case studies and a few other companies from various industrial sectors).

responsibility, and that especially in crisis situations they often do not inform the workforce about the future of the company and, if they do, do so only to secure obedience. It is claimed that these practices will eventually lead to worker resistance and inflexibility (also Bluhm 1992; Kern and Land 1991; Lohr 1992:165; Voskamp and Wittke 1991). Thus, instead of creating innovative workplaces, it merely leads to a "downward spiral" (Kern and Land 1991).

To conclude, one might describe the two scenarios as a "modernisation" and a "polarisation" scenario (Jürgens 1993). However, it is not possible at this stage to make final evaluations as to whether more tayloristic or more flexible production forms will be the common feature in East Germany. Sufficient representative data is not available, and the restructuring of work organisation and personnel management in many companies is still in flux. It will depend for example on the kind of industries which are developing (thus only distribution and mass production ones as most western firms are establishing at the moment) (see Schuldt 1994) and it might also depend on the background of the management, whether they come from West Germany/ foreign countries or whether they are the old directors or new East Germans. It will be one task of the case study later on to examine the possible applicability of these scenarios in the textile industry.

3.2 Current practice of workplace relations

Having discussed the formal establishment of unions, the emergence of works councils and the changes in management style, we now focus on the characteristics of the evolving workplace relations. There is a considerable amount of research on the development of works councils, mostly based on expert interviews and/or case studies of specific companies (interviews with management and works councillors) (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993; David 1992; Mickler et al. 1992; Röske and Wassermann 1991; SOFI group Göttingen [e.g. Bluhm, Kern and Land, Kirschner, Voßkamp and Wittke]; Berlin/Göttingen group and WISOC group, as above). This review will focus on the development

and quality of the works council-management relationship (i.e. workplace relations in a narrow sense). Three interrelated questions arise. Firstly, can we characterize a typical works council-management relationship in East Germany? (3.2.1) Secondly, how successful/ effective is the current works council's interest representation? (3.2.2) And thirdly, have works councils been successfully "institutionalized" so that workplace relations have become formalised? (3.2.3)

3.2.1 Works council - management relationship: "Co-management" or "works council as an extended arm of management"?

The research on workplace relations distinguishes between the period before and after privatisation, since privatisation is seen as having a radical impact on workplace relations (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993:6; Ermischer and Preusche 1992; Hürtgen 1992). With regard to the *first period*, one may distinguish two views (which resemble the above outlined views regarding the establishment of works councils), one arguing that the relationship was essentially harmonious, the other arguing that it was one in which the works council was subservient. In more detail, the first group sees the enterprise as being characterized by a cooperative relationship, i.e. "co-management" (Ermischer and Preusche 1993) or "partnership for progress/construction" ("Aufbau-partnerschaft") (Röske and Wassermann 1991), and give three main reasons.

Firstly, there was the former socialisation and "collective" experiences in the socialist workplaces (e.g. life-long employment in the same firm, everyone knew each other, no extreme social status differences between management and workers) (see section 3.1.3).

Secondly, there was the actual inter-dependence of the two actors: it is argued that both parties had an equal status in the beginning, where management was sometimes even in a weaker situation since it had to earn/regain legitimacy from the workforce (i.e. unclarified power relations, i.e. "power vacuum" [Machtvakuum]) (e.g. Kirschner 1992:85). Consequently, management was dependent on the works council to get the

support of the workforce for any restructuring. Moreover, both parties faced radical challenges from the plants' internal and external environment. It is argued that this worked as a force for cooperative relations in order to have at least one stabilizing factor during the difficult survival process. According to Ermischer and Preusche (1995:55) "the cooperation enhanced the plant level process of transformation and helped to compensate for the lack of experience of both management and the works council with the strange economic and legal system". One should also note that the common "enemy" Treuhand (the state privatisation agency) arguably induced "emergency associations" (Notgemeinschaften).

Thirdly, there was the unifying aim of (a) preparing the enterprise for the market economy (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993:9), and (b) of dismantling the political structures, i.e. "de-ideologisation" of the work structure and organisation (e.g. getting rid of the "red socks"). Some even argue that there has been a third common aim, the development of more employee involvement (Ermischer and Preusche 1992:2).

In sum, these authors conclude that co-management emerged as a typical trend in their case study companies because of the specific internal situations after the "Wende" (turnaround). Ermischer and Preusche's empirical investigation (interviews in 34 companies of mostly the metal industry in Saxony from 1991 onwards) bases its conclusion on the finding that in the majority of cases the management and works council saw their relationship as a positive, cooperative relationship with the aim of achieving consensus (1993:185).

However, we are not told which interview questions were asked, nor are important terms like "cooperation" clearly defined. For example, the perception of "shared goals" does not necessarily lead to co-management or effective codetermination. It is also possible that the works council, since it shares the same goals as management, does not see the need to become pro-active. This view is supported by the other group of academics who propose that cooperative works councils in East Germany are "extended arms of management" rather than effective worker institutions. Some of their arguments will be reviewed:

Jander and Lutz (1991:411) of the Berlin/Göttingen group found in their survey (outlined above, 3.1.2) that cases of pro-active works councils were the exception rather than the rule, and speculate that they were likely to have been concentrated around Leipzig and Dresden (the home of the civil movement). They also found that even in the beginning when works councils formally attended management meetings they did not participate greatly in the decision making, but basically agreed to decisions which sounded economically rational. For example, there was no works council in their sample which had developed alternatives to management's reconstruction concept. In general, works councillors were found to be very open to economic arguments because of their belief that economic irrationality led the former system into ruin. Economic rationality and especially technological progress are often seen as panaceas (also Dathe and Schreiber 1993:42; David 1992:132-134). Mickler et al.'s case study of VW gives an impressive account of the works council's agreement to the introduction of lean production without any restrictions (1992:16). Moreover, according to Jander and Lutz (*ibid.*)'s observation East German works councils generally did not and still do not mobilize against staff reductions, because they are accepted as unavoidable. They also typically avoid any politicisation of labour relations since it is seen as the core reason for the old mis-management. Consequently, as for example Kädtler and Kottwitz (1994) argue, the "works council as a partner/arm of management" type is often believed by works councillors themselves to be the ideal type (see Kotthoff's typology in section 3.2.2). Accordingly, as the authors conclude, the relationship between management and works council is not seen by the councillors as the expression of any fundamental conflict of interest but as a "functional complementary relationship". Similarly, Kädtler and Kottwitz's study (1994) finds that works councils, albeit having realized that their scope for action is very limited, were persuaded that cooperation is best. The authors mention that "it is not the announcement of a third or fourth redundancy round which causes a 'hardening of the fronts' but instead the times when management violates the rights of the works council or is guilty of negligence". Thus, only when informal norms were violated, did the works council become "aggressive".⁵⁰

⁵⁰ The author observed the same in a chemical company which she visited in Bitterfeld in 1993. It

Jander and Lutz also remark that the early attendance of the worker council at board meetings in some firms could easily be seen more as a management strategy to get the workers to accept organisational changes than as an indicator of co-management. In addition, Kädtler (1992:8-10) cannot find any evidence to suggest that there were conflicts in the early period (Winter 1989) in those enterprises with extensive rights for their worker councils over the introduction of the more restrictive German works councils law. He goes so far as to argue that even if the broader participation rights would have been kept, the outcome of "co-management" would have been the same, largely due to the particular economic and political context.

Similar to their interpretation of the origins of worker councils the two groups provide different interpretations of the works council development, in these the WISOC group might be labelled as more positive/optimistic, and the Berlin/Göttingen group as more negative/pessimistic.

With regard to workplace relations *after privatisation* there is more agreement among researchers. It is argued that workforce, works council and management no longer jointly face the Treuhänder in safeguarding the interests of the enterprise. The classic division of interests between capital and labour becomes more explicit (Ermischer and Preusche 1995:59; Lungwitz and Preusche 1994). Workplace relations become characterized on the one side by management strengthening its position (e.g. legitimized by new owners or by a management buy-out), frequently reinforcing "taylorist" control and disciplinary methods (e.g. Bluhm 1992; Lippold et al. 1992; Voskamp and Wittke 1991). On the other side the deteriorating economic situation reduces the task of works councils to that of administering redundancies instead of "co-managing" the on-going reorganisation. For example, Mickler et al.'s case study (1992) of the new Volkswagen car factory in Saxony showed that the informal "survival pacts" which existed in 1990 were by 1992 starting to fall apart: management wanted more productivity and the workforce wanted to keep their traditional piece rates and customs. Thus, Mickler et al. write, "not the democratisation of workplace relations, but company survival, massive redundancies and

experienced mass redundancies without any interference from the works council or workforce, but when management once violated a specific legal (information) right of the works council, the works council organized an immediate walkout.

the securing of a minimum social standard determines the daily work of the councils" (1993:21). Finally, one should not forget that privatisation often leads to the employment of West German or foreign managers who are likely to challenge the established East German community (see Aderhold et al. 1994).

In conclusion, most of the literature agrees that there has been a shift and development in works council-management relations. However, it is not entirely clear what the development is about. Firstly, the characterisation by some researchers of early workplace relations as cooperative would be enhanced by defining the concepts, "cooperation" or "co-management". Is it a "real" cooperation, say between two equally strong partners⁵¹, or is it more a one-sided acquiescence on the part of the works council? Furthermore, is a representation of workers interests possible at all in a co-management arrangement?

Secondly, the argument that "cooperation" has declined since privatisation does not say what it has been substituted by. Does "non-cooperation" mean a conflictual relationship or does it mean that the works council becomes (or continues to be) an extended arm of management, thus administering management functions, as Mahnkopf (1991:280) or Jander and Lutz (1991) argue? Obviously, it is difficult at this stage to make clear judgements about this development, so that statements inevitably remain vague, e.g. Ermischer and Preusche's (1995:60) conclusion that their case studies in 1994 show "more conflictual relations without the loss of cooperation". In addition, the discussion on "co-management or conflict" seems to be burdened with the problem that the authors seem to have different understandings of what they mean by these terms, and that the concepts themselves are difficult to operationalize. One way to circumvent the problem of measuring cooperation would be to examine whether works councils can manage to represent interests *effectively* or not. This will be topic of the following section.

⁵¹ Cooperation is often defined differently, e.g. that people willingly cooperate because of mutual gains (see Axelrod 1990).

3.2.2 Effective interest representation: problems of the works councils

There is little (West) German research evaluating the quality of workplace relations and in particular examining the interrelation between the two actors in terms of effective interest representation (effective from the view of the workforce). Works councils in general have only gained academic interest in recent years⁵², and most studies so far have concentrated on the contextual changes and challenges (e.g. new technology, lean production). The only major study which focuses on the quality of interest representation is Kotthoff's longitudinal case study analysis of 64 companies (1981, 1994)⁵³, which created a useful typology of effective and ineffective works councils and distinguished between the categories as follows: (i) deficient forms of interest representation: "the ignored works council"; "the isolated works council"; "the works council as an extended arm of management"; and (ii) effective forms of (autonomous) interest representation: "the respected, cooperative works council"; "the respected, steadfast works council"; and "the works council as a cooperative hostile power".

It is hard to measure the effectiveness of interest representation especially during times of transformation. The most common approach in the current East German literature is to outline some problems which works councils are currently facing and to assert (rather than to analyse) that these problems hinder the proper functioning of works councils. There are various problems mentioned in the literature (more by the Berlin/Göttingen group than by WISOC) and it is difficult to disentangle them: (i) the intensified classical dilemma of works councils between the interests of company and workforce; (ii) the unsuitability of the West German industrial relations system in the East German context; (iii) problems due to the newness of the institution; (iv) the problematic union-works council relationship; and (v) the low image of the works council. In the following, these five problems will be briefly outlined:

⁵² For example Hoffmann et al. (1987); Trinczek (1987, 1989, 1993); Promberger (1991); Weinert (1984).

⁵³ In various industries in Baden-Württemberg in 1974/5, and 15 years later he looked at the same case studies again to measure possible changes in workplace relations.

(i) The intensified classical dilemma of works councils between the interests of company and workforce

Jander and Lutz (1991:2) state that interest representation in East Germany has to deal with a fundamental dilemma: on the one side enterprises are confronted with global competition which makes modernisation and reorganisation (including the reduction of staff overheads) necessary and which leaves little room for negotiation or alternative ideas; on the other side the works council wants to fulfill its task of representing the immediate social interests of the workforce. Also Kottwitz (1991:417) emphasizes the economic constraints works councils face in her sample of works councils in Leipzig and Dresden. However, one might wonder whether West German works councils do not also face severe economic constraints, and do not also have to deal with Jander and Lutz's "fundamental dilemma". An additional question is why this situation should prevent works councils from functioning properly, i.e. from representing workers' interests effectively under the given conditions.⁵⁴

(ii) The unsuitability of the West German industrial relations system in the East German context

A related argument refers to the non-existence of economically prosperous firms in East Germany, and such firms are assumed to be a necessary precondition for the successful functioning of the West German industrial relations system (Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994:19, 1992:3). Yet, the authors leave the consequences of this conjecture open. Does this mean that the western industrial relations system is intrinsically unsuitable for the East? Jander and Lutz (1993:16) are more specific in arguing that the institutions are overstrained and cannot cope with the vast problems of privatisation and de-industrialisation, and that this indicates that these institutions (e.g. works councils) are not made for managing the transformation from planned to market economy. This thesis has been taken on by other

⁵⁴ Obviously this depends on one's definition of "effective" representation, either in a ideal-typical way or in a realistic way taking the given situation into account.

authors as well (see Gut et al. 1993; Jacoby 1994:24; Mahnkopf 1992b), who go on to speculate that this presumed inability to cope with the economic problems could jeopardise the much needed social integration of the eastern society and could in the long term hinder the successful institutionalisation of industrial relations. To give one example: Kädler (1993:3) states that the right of the works council to be informed about any plans of management which will affect the employment situation of the firm (e.g. privatisation, acquisition) was repealed during the privatisation process so that all Treuhand negotiations took place without the works councillors and sometimes also without management. Thus, crucial decisions took place outside the realm of the firm and thereby outside the domain of co-determination (also Dathe and Schreiber 1992:13). Yet, one can argue on the other side that these exceptional measures were taken in order to adapt the western regulations to the specific East German situation, exactly what the authors demand.

In short, we are not provided with a convincing argument as to why all these problems should evoke a dysfunctioning of the works councils and thus also prove the unsuitability of the West German industrial relations system. The authors do not give evidence as to why the East German works councils should act in a significantly different way from that of their western counterparts. Furthermore, without wanting to go into the debate as to how far the situation in the East today is comparable with that of West Germany after 1945 (see Jacoby 1994), it seems a dubious assertion that the West German industrial relations system only "works" in prosperous economic situations. The system seems to have managed various recessions during the last few decades in West Germany.

(iii) Problems due to the novelty of the institution

The third problem said to hinder the proper functioning of the works councils is the novelty of the institution; works councillors still have to gain experience and learn their trade. One might object that management also needs time to adjust to the new situation. Additionally, other sources have for example stated that the lack of information, e.g. on western labour law, was quickly addressed by the East German works councils (Gut et al. 1993:48).

A related point refers to the different background of East German councillors which makes them behave differently from their western colleagues. For example, Mahnkopf (1991:275) or Jander and Lutz (1993) argue that the "tacit skills" necessary for the effective articulation and representation of interests are lacking. They can only be learned with time and experience. However, they do not specify these skills.

Additionally, Mahnkopf (1991:281) speculates that works councils' avoidance of conflictual struggles with management not only result from their inexperience and their uncertainty about legal rights, but also from the fact that they often actually "hide" behind the legislation, trying to legitimize their passivity and unwillingness to become active. Thus, references to the authority of the law are used as an excuse for inaction ("handlungsentlastende Funktion"). This argument assumes that the former East German "socialisation" process provoked the avoidance of individual responsibility and "proaction" (see section 3.3.3). However, the author does not provide any evidence to support this assertion.

Finally, works councils frequently lack the vision to generate forces from within the enterprise in order to influence higher level industrial relations or politics — except in the case of rescuing a single, insolvent firm when the liquidator is the government or Treuhand (e.g. the famous Bischofferode's hunger strike was initiated by the works council). According to the Berlin/Göttingen group there is also a strict differentiation to be made between the works council's work and its councillors' private political engagement (also David 1992:134)⁵⁵. Whilst in West Germany both areas are often interconnected, East Germans dismiss this because of past experience (e.g. Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994:29). This observation has been questioned in other studies which have instead found highly political works councils (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993:21)⁵⁶. All these statements however come from a small empirical basis.

⁵⁵ Based on a literature review (no more details are provided).

⁵⁶ Based on literature review, and own interviews with 8 union officials and 4 works councillors of two companies and one personnel manager during the end of 1992/ beginning 1993.

(iv) Problematic union-works council relationship

There is also an argument that works council-union relations are not at their best in East Germany. Unions have a conflictual relationship with East German works councils because of the rising "plant-level egoism", which is assumed to be more pronounced than that in West Germany (Lippold et al. 1992⁵⁷; Mahnkopf 1991:282, 1993:17). Furthermore, the sporadic attempts in the early years after the turnaround of some East German works councils to establish regional associations were seen by the unions as dangerous competition (see Jander and Lutz 1993b on the "works council conference"). It is also emphasized that a growing number of firms have no unionized works council (i.e. works councillors who are not union members), or even that firms have no works council at all (Mahnkopf 1993). Other sources report instead a high "unionization" of works councils (David 1992:131). Works councils which have merely a formal relationship with the union, but neither expect nor desire union advice are also observed. Also union stewards (*Vertrauensleute*) are virtually non-existent in East German firms (as all studies confirm). Thus, Mahnkopf concludes that the relationship between East German works councils and unions is much looser than in the West (where plant-level representatives and the union movement are comparatively well-integrated) (Mahnkopf 1993:18)⁵⁸. In addition, unions themselves are said not to be very successful in East Germany yet: density is generally declining (as shown in table 3.1), and there is an argument that unions face severe difficulties mobilising their members (Fichter 1995:16; Mahnkopf 1991, 1992). This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Besides, several authors suggest that unions have difficulty in establishing regional industrial policies which, as mentioned above, some authors regard as necessary to tackle the problems of unemployment efficiently (and which would require an uncommon collaboration of single unions at regional and local level) (Jander and Voß 1991; Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994:32; Lohr 1992).

⁵⁷ Lippold et al. base their argument on structured interviews with seven union officials of the IG Metall in Berlin, 11 Works councillors and managers, as well as on an analysis of union documents.

⁵⁸ As noted above her empirical work is based on interviews with union officials and works councillors in Brandenburg during 1991.

In sum, the problems unions face impede their services for works councils at a time when works councils are especially dependent on powerful and helpful unions. Rosenbaum and Weinert (1991:19) therefore conjecture that workplace interest representation will only become fully accepted and effective if the dual system of workplace and industrial interest representation work well together (as they do in West Germany), and where unions have the key role to play .

(v) The low image of the works council

Finally, there is the assertion that the current problems works councils face (and which account for their apparent poor performance) make the workforce perceive them as ineffective. This in return weakens the power of works councils (see Jander et al. 1992). An additional problem mentioned by Jander and Lutz (1991) is that workers' interests in the firms are highly heterogenous (e.g. the different group interests of short-term workers, workers in retraining, workers in "employment programmes" (ABMler), part-timers, and full-timers), and that it is difficult for any council to reconcile these interests. However, this task seems to be an inherent characteristic of any works council (and indeed union), whether in the East or the West.

In short, although most authors do not explicitly refer to the question of the effectiveness of works councils, they conclude that the problems discussed above do in fact constrain their functioning. Kädtler and Kottwitz (1993:4) conclude that the deficiencies in workplace relations have implications for the institutionalisation (functioning) of the whole industrial relations system. According to Jander and Lutz (1993) there is the paradox that although the West German industrial relations system was transferred without any adjustments to the particular East German situation, East Germany could very well end up not practising the same industrial relations as the West, especially due to the ineffective works councils (see also Jacoby 1994). The likely scenario is therefore a few companies with "good" workplace relations surrounded by a majority of companies with poor co-determination practices (see also Mahnkopf 1991).

However, as already mentioned the authors do not provide evidence as to why these problems render works councils ineffective, nor do they analyse whether these problems are short-term (due to the novelty of the institutions) or long-term (due to the structural unsuitability of western regulations in the East).

In addition, there are other points which are not discussed. For example, we are not told how the problems interact with each other and whether they are valid for all or most councils, i.e. representative. It has also not been tested how far these problems, rather than, for example, uncooperative management account for the works council's ineffectiveness. Moreover, since these studies are mostly based on expert interviews with union officials and works councillors, it might be useful to have more case studies of individual firms including interviews with the workforce (as for example the Mickler et al. study). However, criticising these research projects one should always keep in mind that this research area covers new ground and several projects are still on-going.

Finally, one can think of two possibilities for approaching the question of the quality of interest representation in a more thorough way: one could investigate empirically possible clusters or types of works councils or one could try to apply Kotthoff's typology of West German works councils to the East. Thus, this study does not entirely agree with the objections of David (1992) or Lippold et al. (1992:97) that the application of "West" typologies is problematic, since "they cannot do justice to the specific East German circumstances and cannot thus account for the new forms of works council which are being established there". Instead one can argue that only by using some theoretical framework or ideal types it is possible to account for differences and deviations. On the other hand one could focus on the "customers" of works councils, the workforce, and analyse their perceptions of the works council's effectiveness. This is the approach used in this study (see chapter 9).

3.2.3 Institutionalized works councils and the formalisation of workplace relations

The question of effective interest representation is closely related to the question of whether the works council has been "successfully" institutionalised. The latter can be seen as a necessary precondition for the former. "Institutionalisation" will be defined as the process of setting up new institutions⁵⁹ in a specific context. In the East German context it is equivalent to the political science term "successful institutional transfer", i.e. one "that must be pulled by social actors rather than decreed by policy makers alone" (Jacoby 1995:2). Success might be defined, as Jacoby does, "on the basis of the criteria of those actors advocating the transfer". However, this approach seems too abstract to be operationalised in our context. For example, who exactly are the actors advocating the transfer of works councils? East German workers, worker councils, West German industrial relations actors, such as unions and employers' associations, or the German law?

This study will therefore take a different approach and distinguish between "formal" and "informal" institutionalisation. The former indicates how far the institution is legally founded, i.e. how far the legal requirements have been fulfilled. The latter refers to the relationship between the institution and management and between the institution and its "members", the workforce. Thus, on the one side: does management accept the works council as a bargaining partner in the enterprise? On the other side: does the workforce accept the works council as a new institution, trust it, and take advantage of its services? This should then tell us whether the former "informal" workplace relations have been formalised, i.e. substituted by the council (allowing a certain mix of formal and informal relations).

⁵⁹ Institutions are defined as social constructs which are created for a specific cause, and determine "what has to be done" in the long term (Lipp in Endruweit and Trommsdorff 1989:307). They are multi-functional but with one main function, multi-dimensional, stabilize the tensions between the individual and society, and have a specific "Leitidee" (ideology), at least in the German sociological tradition (e.g. Gehlen 1956; Schelsky 1952).

The common opinion is that formal, legal institutionalisation has been successful (see also chapter 1), but the literature is ambivalent about informal institutionalisation. Fichter (1996:2) talks of "the uncompleted crucial step from institutional transfer to institutionalisation" of industrial relations in the East. The Berlin/Göttingen group argues that although the institutions exist, the network of informal and formal norms, habits, co-operation and forms of conflict resolution between the actors has not yet been achieved in the East (e.g. Kädtler and Kottwitz 1994:19).

In more detail, with regard to *works council-management* relations, depending on how the development of workplace relations in the last few years is interpreted, some authors are more optimistic than others. For example, the WISOC group (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche) declare that in the instances where "co-management" is practiced, it is indeed effective, and thus institutionalised. The Berlin/Göttingen group (e.g. Jander and Lutz) on the other hand is more pessimistic stating that the works councils are not working effectively at all (due to the problems outlined above) and are therefore not properly institutionalised (also Lippold et al. 1992:96).

With regard to the *works council-workforce* relationship the question is, as mentioned above, whether the earlier informal negotiations (or the mixture of formal and informal relations, see chapter 2) have been substituted by formal interest representation through the works council. There is overall agreement that the traditional behavioural patterns and rules have been lost. For example, Kern and Land (1991)⁶⁰ argue on the basis of their case study that the former informal networks and "plan fulfillment pact" (see chapter 2) have been destroyed, and that the workforce is happy to get rid of the informal networks, since they are seen as illegal and part of the old, inefficient system (also Kirschner 1991; Lippold et al. 1992). Yet, opinions are split about what has been established instead. Kern and Land do not make any judgements, but others are more optimistic in that they see the formalisation taking place. Kirschner (1991:1041)⁶¹ for example interprets the new formalised regulations (e.g. labour law) as the new basis of

⁶⁰ Kern and Land belong to the SOFI research group which investigated one case company during 1990, about which we are not told more specific details (see Voßkamp and Wittke 1991).

⁶¹ Kirschner bases his discussion on the SOFI case study (see above) plus two other intensive case studies (including observatory participation in the works council of these companies for two weeks) during 1992.

working together, which both sides (management and workforce) accept and legitimize. Lippold et al. (1992:76)⁶² observed that works councils are currently determined to make formal, written agreements, and stick to the law in a pedantic way (also Alt et al. 1993:20). Furthermore, Kirschner (1992:87) observed that the works councils may even become the only actor of interest representation. The workforce retires from any direct interest representation and the works council itself becomes more and more distant from the workforce (p.88).

Others are more cautious and argue that even if formalisation has taken place so far, an increasingly disappointed workforce might also threaten it. Gut et al. (1993: 52)⁶³ stress the danger (but without giving evidence) that the perceived ineffectiveness of the works council will encourage the old informal, company specific practices to return, which could erode the formal regulations. Senghaas-Knobloch (1992) found evidence in her study⁶⁴ that people increasingly bemoan the loss of the former "cushy" informal system and the related solidarity. This however does not necessarily mean that they will react by forming new informal relations.

In sum, there are two scenarios of the institutionalisation of the works council, one optimistic and one pessimistic. Both are speculative and are based on opinions of the so-called experts (works councillors, managers) but not of the workforce itself. As mentioned before, this might be a major deficiency of all studies on workplace relations reviewed in the last two sections and is a reason for this study to focus on the workforce.

Measuring "institutionalisation" of works councils by investigating the attitudes and behaviour of the workforce involved might include the following attitudinal and behavioural dimensions (table 5.3) which will be used in this study and which are further manifested in the following discussions on worker attitudes and behaviour (e.g. chapters 6 and 7). In addition, it is argued that the discussion of institutionalisation of the works council can be also be applied to the institutionalisation of the new West German unions in

⁶² Study as outlined above, footnote 58.

⁶³ Their study is based on surveys of 12 companies and expert interviews, we are not given any further details of these investigations.

⁶⁴ Based on 29 intensive (two-five hour long) interviews and two days of research seminars during 1990 and 1991 with managers, engineers, union officials, works councillors, and researchers.

East Germany. An additional measurement is then the identification with the union, and also the level of union membership might tell us something about the success of the institutionalisation of the union. These variables will be further discussed and developed in Part 2.

table 3.2: attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of the institutionalisation of interest representation from the viewpoint of the workforce

dimensions
— acceptance of the institution
— utilization (e.g. consultation for grievance procedures)
— active support (e.g. voting of works councillors)
— perception of an effective institution
— interest in issues of the institutions
— union identity
— union membership

Conclusion of Chapter 3

It might be useful to summarize the institutional literature on workplace relations into two broad arguments, a positive/optimistic and a negative/pessimistic position, which go through all discussed items of workplace relations (table 3.3).

table 3.3: classification of two main streams in the literature regarding workplace relations in East Germany

	main reason for emergence of worker councils	management style	works council -management relations	effectiveness of works council	institutionalisation of works council
Optimists e.g. WISOC	"industrial democracy"	"HRM"	co-management*	no comment	yes
Pessimists e.g. Berlin/ Göttingen	reconstruction of the enterprise, "consumer revolution"	"Taylorism"	works council as extended arm of management	not effectively working due to various problems	no

* "co-management" will be interpreted as a cooperative works council who tries to represent workers' interests without losing sight of the companies' situation and needs.

Obviously, these two groups are "ideal types". Reasons for this division are difficult to find. There is some suggestion that East German researchers are more inclined to optimism whereas West Germans are more pessimistic. This might be true about the East German WISOC team and West German Berlin/Göttingen group, yet does not work for most other projects (e.g. the Hannover study by Mickler et al.) which include both West and East German researchers. The optimism/pessimism about the transformation of workplace relations is also found with regard to the entire industrial relations transformation in the East and its impact on the German industrial relations system as a whole. Famous protagonists are thus Lowell Turner the "Optimist" (e.g. 1992) and Wolfgang Streeck the "Pessimist" (e.g. 1995).

To conclude, this chapter discussed the take-over of the socialist unions, the changes in personnel management styles, the establishment of works councils and their subsequent problems as seen by the literature. Questions arose as to whether the works council has been institutionalised and is "effectively" working in terms of interest representation. Whether the works council is institutionalised by now, i.e. whether workplace relations are formalised, becomes a crucial issue especially with regard the informal networks discussed in chapter 2, which have existed to some degree on the socialist shopfloors. However, these issues have not yet been empirically tested to any satisfactory extent. In addition, most of the reviewed empirical studies on the development of works councils are based on interviews with the councillors only rather than on more comprehensive case studies and do not include workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the new institutions. This is also true for the discussion of the functioning and institutionalisation of the West German unions in East Germany. This study will focus on workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the new interest institutions. The next chapter introduces the study's empirical research by outlining the transformation of industrial and workplace relations in the textile industry.

Chapter 4 Transformation of industrial and workplace relations in the textile industry

This chapter introduces the empirical work by outlining the wider industrial and workplace relations context in the textile sector in East Germany, as well as the organisational development of the case study firm. As mentioned in chapter 1 and as will be further outlined in chapter 7 the empirical work consists of a case study and a cross-company survey in the textile industry. This chapter will report only documentary data and the data of interviews with union officials and with managers and works councillors in the case study (see appendix: A 1.1) and thus will stay on an "institutional" level. The purpose is not only to provide background information for the following workforce surveys, but also to examine the applicability of some of the findings and hypotheses of the studies reviewed in the previous chapter in the context of the textile industry.

The first section commences with outlining the economic transformation of the textile industry (4.1), and continues with a more detailed account of the development of the employers' association, the union and collective bargaining in the textile industry (4.2). The workplace climate is then investigated in a small sample of textile companies (4.3).

The second section introduces the organisational transformation of the case study, Bodywear, as well as its workplace relations from the viewpoint of management and works councillors (4.4).

4.1 The textile industry in East Germany post-1989

The socialist textile industry of the GDR consisted of nine textile combines with approximately 526 enterprises and with more than 220,000 employees (FAZ (18.10.94); Tarifgemeinschaft Masche Ost [TMO], employers' association, interview 8/1993). All combines were under the control of the "Textile, Clothes and Leather" Department of the Ministry for "light industries". The headquarters and the centralized design, product development and marketing facilities of all textile combines were situated in East Berlin,

while the production plants were situated mostly in Brandenburg and Saxony (80% of the East German textile industry was in Saxony) (e.g. Rasche 1994:1). In 1990 these combines were decentralised into autonomous companies (e.g. AG, GmbH).⁶⁵ The privatization agency, Treuhand, tried to privatize them but had little success by 1994 when it was dissolved. By 1993 the Treuhand had privatized two third (200) of the textile firms still in operation, with still 100 firms Treuhand owned at that time (Handelsblatt no14, 21/1/1993). The rest were liquidated.⁶⁶

Unification exposed East German industry overnight to western European and Third World competition and effectively eliminated the traditional Eastern European markets (e.g. for the textile industry every other workplace depended on this market). A rapid collapse of the economy followed. During the first half of 1990, i.e. before the "currency union", East German industrial production fell to 93% of its 1989 level and matters worsened dramatically with the introduction of the DM at a 1:1 conversion rate on 1 July 1990. From July to December 1990 the economy-wide net production ("Nettoproduktion")⁶⁷ dropped by almost 50% (Buechtemann and Schupp 1992:95). Overall employment decreased by around 3 million to 6.3 million employees from 1989 to 1994 (Nolte and Sitte 1995:302). 1.1 million people were officially unemployed, and the other 2 million were short term contract workers in "public job creation programmes" (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, §249h Arbeitsförderungsgesetz); in retraining courses; in early retirement schemes or in the reserve labour force. Employment in the East German industrial sectors decreased by 63% from 3.4 million to 1.3 million during the same period (see Herbstgutachten 1994 des IWH). Although there were subsequently some signs of recovery (e.g. 9% increase of GDP in East Germany in 1994, Kittner et al. 1995:201) all expectations of equalizing the economic strength of the two regions before the end of this century evaporated. East Germany looks likely to remain for a long time a "dependence - and transfer economy" (see also Nolte and Sitte 1995:300).

⁶⁵ Treuhand law (§ 11 ff. "Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Vermögens vom 17. Juni 1990"), which required this transformation process to be finished before 30.6.1990.

⁶⁶ There are slightly divergent data found in another newspaper: 320 textile enterprises still existed in 1993, the rest were liquidated. Of the existing, half are privatised, the other half owned by the Treuhand (FAZ 21/4/93).

⁶⁷ Nettoproduktion: value of production minus input costs (e.g. raw materials).

The transfer to a market economy was especially hard for the textile industry. This industry had major economic importance in East Germany for historical reasons (the centre of German textile manufacturing before the War was in Saxony), but was also affected by the socialist policy of "autarky". Its share of East German industrial production was 7% in 1989, and its share of East German employment was 8%⁶⁸ — compared with 3% in West Germany (Küchle and Volkmann 1993). 67% of all textile employees in 1989 were female (Rasche 1994).

Between 1990 and 1993 the textile industry lost 72% of its net production (Statistisches Bundesamt). To take the example of 1992, the year with the most drastic employment reduction, the net production of the textile industry dropped by 25.3% (-2.6% average of all industrial sectors) (Küchle and Volkmann 1993:5). Labour productivity (turnover per employee) remains around a third of that in the West German textile sector (Küchle and Volkmann 1993:4). The figures are equally depressing with regard to the employment situation. Out of the more than 220,000 textile employees in 1989 only 10% are estimated to have survived into 1992 (Gebbert and Gebbert 1993:220; Jahresbericht 1992 des Verbandes der Nord-Ostdeutschen Textilindustrie).⁶⁹ In 1992 alone, the textile sector saw a decrease of 68% in its employment, compared with an average decrease of 48% in the industrial sector overall ("verarbeitendes Gewerbe"). In Chemnitz (formerly Karl-Marx-Stadt) and the surrounding areas (the center for textile industry in Saxony and the location of the case study), the unemployment rate in the textile industry was 20% for women and 10% for men in August 1993.⁷⁰ According to figures from the textile employers' association (TMO): employment in their associated firms fell from 20,670 to 8,260 employees (-60%) during 1992 alone. Yet, this reduction process has to be understood in the context of the ongoing structural adaptation which occurred in the West German textile industry especially during the 1970s and 1980s. Over the last 20 years textile has been a declining industry (between 1966 and 1990 employment fell by 40%

⁶⁸ Another source speaks of 12% (Rasche 1994).

⁶⁹ Different sources provide different figures: e.g. NZ (5/8/1993): "in 1989 380,000 people worked in the textile industry, in 1993 50,000 had left with an estimated permanent employment level of 20,000". FAZ (18/10/1993): "In the four years after Unification the textile industry saw a drop from 220,000 to 27,766 employees."

⁷⁰ Without counting people on short work contracts, in training centres and in public job creation programmes.

from 406,000 to 164,000 and the number of enterprises decreased in the same period by 65% from 5781 to 2074) (Gebbert and Gebbert *ibid.*).

4.2 Establishment of the employers' association, trade union, and collective bargaining in the textile industry

(i) Employers' association

In the beginning of 1990 the German industrial association, BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) gave the green light for the establishment of the three industrial organisations (industry and trade councils, employers' associations [BDA], and industry associations) (see Henneberger 1993). By the end of 1990, textile employers' associations (at first independent from the West) were installed in all regions of the East. For example in Saxony and Thüringen the "Verband der Baumwoll-Industrie Sachsen und Thüringen" was created in April 1990. It later merged with the head (West) German textile employers' association (Textilgesamtverband, Stuttgart) and became the regional textile employers' association called "Verband der Nord-Ostdeutschen Textilindustrie".

Since its foundation, the textile employers' association has faced a constant decrease in membership due to both liquidations and dropping out. It is difficult to get precise data from the association, but during the three months from September to December 1992, the number of firms (textile and clothing) declined from 488 firms with 37,500 employees to 371 firms with 34,129 employees. Of the 371 firms only 190 were affiliated to the employers' association. In the sector the case study belongs to, "Masche" (stockings, knitting and underwear), only 29 out of 50 firms were members of the employers' association in June 1993. One third of the 50 firms were still Treuhand owned in 1993 (TMO, interview 8/1993). It is also important to note that even fewer member firms joined collective bargaining agreements. For example, in 1992 the collective bargaining for the "Masche" subunit comprised 25 firms (including the case study firm), and 15 firms had "enterprise contracts" (Haustarifvertrag) with the union. There were also

several firms who had illegal company-contracts with the works council or only individual employment contracts (according to the GTB official). In 1995 there were 51 clothing firms in the employers' association, of which only three accepted the collective bargaining outcomes. In the textile section (incorporating the "Masche" subunit since 1993) there were 267 firms in 1995, whether members or not of the employers' association, of which 93 agreed to collective bargaining and 31 to an enterprise contract (interview data of GTB Süd Ost).

To conclude, the drop out rate is definitely a major problem for the employers' associations, not only in the textile sector but overall in East Germany (see Mahnkopf 1993:25). Yet, it is not clear to what extent this phenomenon will continue and challenge the German dual system of industrial relations. Some commentators argue that the importance of these problems has been exaggerated by the high level of public awareness (Schroeder in Kittner 1994:635). One should also not forget that privatization led to a significant decrease in average company size, which is likely to have had an effect on the firm's relationship to collective bargaining. Most textile firms today employ between 20-100 people only (TMO source).

(ii) Textile trade union GTB

The socialist FDGB-union "textile, clothes, leather" (Textil, Bekleidung, Leder = TeBeLe) had 570,000 members in 1989 (Wilke and Müller 1991:258)⁷¹, two thirds of them female. Chemnitz was the largest union district with 256,000 members in 1989. There were two West German equivalents, the GTB (Gewerkschaft Textil und Bekleidung) which was the tenth-largest DGB union with 250,783 members in 1990 (=3.2% of DGB membership) and the small "Leather" union with 44,583 members (second smallest DGB union).

During 1990 the TeBeLe dissolved voluntarily (officially on 31.12.1990) after trying to reform itself (see section 3.1.1) and its acquisition by the West German GTB took place (via coordination groups, round tables) resulting in a takeover of all members. However, the GTB differed from other western unions (especially IG Metall) in that they

⁷¹ Another source (Küchle and Volkmann 1993) speaks of 601,747 members (31.12. 1989).

tried to keep the staff of the socialist union, as long as they were supported by the members and had no former "Stasi"-affiliation. The GTB did not expect enormous membership increases, and even reduced its headquarters personnel at that time. However, out of 570,000 former FDGB textile members (including the leather section, and all the retired members) around 98,215 transferred to the GTB in 1990/91 (see table 4.1). This was an increase of 39% in the western membership level⁷². However, in the following years membership decreased constantly. For example, in 1992 the total membership decreased by 17.2% (43.5% in the East and 5.9% in the West) to 288,198.

Figures for the GTB East include the "South-East" district, which covers most of East Germany (Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Berlin/Brandenburg [also West Berlin]), and also the East German members which are incorporated in two West German districts (Frankfurt, Bavaria).

table 4.1: membership figures of GTB

31.12.	GTB total	GTB East	South-East district of GTB	% of South-East of total	GTB total density	West density	South-East density
1989	250,783	-	-	-	-	47.0 %	-
1990	249,880	150,000	98,215*	39.30 %*	n.a.	46.4 %	80 %*
1991	348,095	104,837	69,484	19.96 %	n.a.	46.2 %	70 %*
1992	288,198	59,181	39,100	13.57 %	n.a.	45.9 %	68 % *
1993	255,708	43,426	30,132	11.78 %	45.9%	45.0 %	56.5 %
1994	234,240	36,049	25,859	11.04 %	43.1%	42.7 %	48.2 %
1995	216,288	31,171	22,240	10.28 %	n.a.	n.a.	42.6 %**

source: Kittner 1993, 1994, 1995; DGB Pressedienst, GTB information 1995, 1996

*= approximately, **= November 1995, only companies with works council included

The South-East district is also the area where the studies reported here took place. Chemnitz is the district headquarters and oversaw five administration branches in 1995 (eight in 1993). The leader and officials in this district are all East Germans. In 1993 there

⁷² DGB average gain was 48.7% (IG Metall for example achieved 32.9%) (Klinzing 1992).

were 15 full-time union officials, out of which 8 were female (GTB source). The following table 4.2 gives more detailed information:

table 4.2: figures of the GTB South-East district

31.12	firms in union district*	firms with a works council	firms included in coll. bargaining	employed people in the textile industry of this district*	total union members (see above)	female members (% of total)***	employed union members	rest: unemployed, retired, apprentices
1991	1,769	635	146	138,280	69,484	52,251 (75.20%)	58,525	10,959
1992	488	n.a.	n.a.	37,500	39,100	29,766 (76.13%)	23,438	15,662
1993	446	n.a.	n.a.	29,141	30,132	23,230 (77.09%)	15,075	15,057
1994	449 (385**)	148 (out of 449)	115	28,070	29,859	19,912 (77.00%)	12,330	17,520
1995	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	22,439	17,138 (77.06%)	9,449	12,990

source: GTB South-East documents (the data is slightly different to the figures of the headquarters of the GTB in Düsseldorf)

*= approximately, different data from different sources, **= firms with over 20 employees, *** the percentage of female members in the East compares with around 60% female rate of total GTB members in Germany.

(iii) Development of collective bargaining

The first two collective bargaining rounds were according to the employer association characterized by insecure and unorthodox behaviour by the new actors (TMO official 1993). In August 1990 the first collective bargaining negotiations in East Germany took place between the GTB and the employers' association. At that time the employers' association was still affiliated to the industrial association which resulted in the combining of pay politics with industrial policies, quite unusual for West Germany. The TMO official stated that in the beginning roles were not yet clearly "understood", thus employers had to remind themselves that "they were not responsible anymore for the 'social functions' of the firms". In the following years bargaining typically became progressively more difficult.

The second bargaining round in 1991 was already considered to be more severe by both sides. For the first time in its history the GTB had to agree to "get-out clauses" (Öffnungsklausel) for 28 firms out of 146 firms. These allow firms in economic difficulty not to stick to the negotiated pay agreement but nevertheless to stay in the employers' association⁷³. However, the union has to agree that the firm is indeed in economic difficulty. In 1992 this number increased to 34 firms.

A year later collective bargaining was even "tougher", according to the union official. During collective bargaining and at the time of a debate in Parliament on industrial policies for the East German textile industry there was a protest demonstration in Bonn organised by the GTB and supported by the employers' associations. Since these particular bargaining results were in force at the time of the fieldwork of this study, they deserve to be outlined in more detail. The result was a 5.60% pay increase from May 1993, and an additional 3.3 % from January 1994 until April 1994. Thus, by the end of 1993 the pay level for blue collar workers in the East German textile industry was 69.9% of the average pay level in the West (white collar 55.4%) (clothing industry: 66.3% blue collar, 55.4% white collar) (WSI Tarifarchiv, 1993).⁷⁴ Including extra payments (such as holiday pay, "13th month" bonus, government bonuses ["vermögenswirksame Leistungen"]) the overall wage in the clothing industry for example decreased slightly to around 63% of the level in the West.⁷⁵ In addition, one has to note that in West Germany the actual pay normally exceeds the negotiated basic pay (except in the public sector), while the actual pay levels in East Germany largely correspond to the official wage settlements (Mahnkopf 1993:16). Compared to other industrial sectors the textile (and clothing) industry pays less — this is also the case in West Germany as well as in the former GDR. Furthermore, the ratio of "East-West" is worse than in other sectors: e.g. in the metal industry East blue collars were already earning 80% of the western level in 1993. The working week in the East is 40 hours compared to 37.5 hours in the West. Also, the East has 27 days holiday

⁷³ A maximum of 50% reduction in the official pay level (Tarif) is possible but without any staff reductions.

⁷⁴ The aim of adapting the East pay level step by step to the West level (Tarif) was first introduced in the bargaining agreement in the metal industry in March 1991, where both bargaining partners agreed to an adaptation process to be finished by April 1994 (Bispinck in Kittner 1993:172).

⁷⁵ There are no differentiating data available regarding male and female earnings in the textile industry.

compared to 30 days in the West, and holiday pay is not given in the East (the West gets 758 DM holiday pay) (WSI Tarifarchiv, 31.12.1993).

In 1994 bargaining was very complicated and, as the chief official of the union noted, it was "the beginning of the end" ("Einstieg in den Ausstieg"). There was also industrial action for the first time: over 200 members demonstrated in front of the building where the bargaining took place. The pay level for the textile sector increased to 72% of the average pay in the West⁷⁶. In 1995 bargaining was even worse. According to the chief GTB official after months of negotiations an agreement for the textile sector was only reached thanks to token strikes organised in seven sites (involving 4000 people) and a collection of signatures of union members. This was the first time people had gone on strike in the textile industry in East Germany. The result was a sequence of pay increases which totalled 8.75% over the next 12 months.

In sum, the data reveals increasingly difficult bargaining rounds for the union. Comparing the ratios of pay level in the textile industry in the West/East with other industrial sectors, the bargaining results of the GTB were in 1994 in the fifth lowest group of all 20 sectors (WSI Tarifarchiv 31.12.94: Bispinck in Kittner 1995:161). The West German pay result of the GTB in 1994 was also one of the lowest increases of all unions compared to 1993 (ibid.:138).

With regard to the *union's attitudes towards the employers* it can be only deduced from the interviews the author had with the chief official of GTB South-East in 1993, 1994 and 1995. No data is available on the employers' side. Overall, the chief union official revealed a pragmatic, "cooperative" attitude towards the employers, thus she was in favour of social partnership: "we are all sitting in the same boat", "I know of no employer who puts the profits in his/her own pockets". If she negotiates for example an "enterprise contract" (Haustarif) she takes the economic situation of that firm into account, although she is not sure whether the (West) German headquarters of the GTB likes this. She states that she is the "favourite enemy" of the chief official on the employers' side and both seem to be aware of their common interests. For example, at several occasions both visited together

⁷⁶ 87% in the metal industry (Saxony compared with Bavaria).

companies which wanted to leave the employers' association to convince the management to reconsider this idea. This kind of working relationship is as she argued often criticised by the works councillors, who are sometimes more "opportunistic" and not very cooperative in their approach to management.

She prefers objective discussions instead of using rituals and ideologies during collective bargaining and is not happy that within the last two years collective bargaining has become increasingly conflictual. Her general aim is to make the union an even better service institution for members and the works councils. In 1994 she stated that she is not in favour of strikes: "there is no benefit to it in this economic situation, and firms are too small". However, in 1995 shortly after the successful ending of the collective bargaining conflict, she was entirely positive about the token strikes which were largely initiated by her. She firmly believed that without this instrument they would not have achieved an agreement. In addition, she argued that this strike was "good for the people in that they experienced for the first time the strength of collective action". However, this does not mean a turnaround of the unions' non-militant, cooperative strategies.

In sum, the data highlights the severe economic constraints upon the industrial relations actors in the textile industry, it described the quick learning process of both sides, union and employer association, in defining their roles and different interests after Unification. However, it is interesting to note the mutual agreement to pursue a cooperative rather than antagonistic strategy. Both sides are aware of their common interest in keeping collective bargaining alive, both organisations' existence depends on it. To what extent this "social partnership" strategy has evolved mainly due to the West German industrial relations regulations and the influence of the West German headquarters, or due to the actors' own beliefs and strategies is obviously hard to tell. Yet, as mentioned above the chief union official seemed to act quite independently from the headquarters. Thus, one might suggest that these actors have created their own strategies, which might partly be influenced by the structural conditions of the industrial relations system and partly by their own (socialist) background and experiences.

4.3 Workplace climate in the East German textile industry

This paragraph reports a small-scale survey of works councillors in the sample of textile firms of the East German district of the GTB which accompanied the GTB membership survey (see chapter 7). The questionnaire was sent (together with the union member questionnaires) in 1994 to the works councillors of the survey firms and was returned by 53 works councils.⁷⁷

The purpose was not only to obtain some background information on the surveyed companies (i), and to enable an examination of the representativeness of the case study firm, but also to apply a more structured method (compared to the research outlined in the previous chapter) to the investigation of the current "workplace climate" (management-works council relationship) from a works councillors' point of view (ii).⁷⁸

(i) Background company information

Four topics were discussed, organisational changes (ownership, management, staff reductions, technology), workforce characteristics (male/female ratio), union membership (density), and incidents of industrial conflict. Most firms have been privatised (only 7 were still owned by the Treuhand) and belong to West German or foreign companies or are privately owned (management-buy-out). This facilitates the comparison of the case study (privatised firm) and the GTB survey. Changes in management have occurred in most sites. There is a mixed picture regarding old/new managers. 22 (out of 53) firms have either kept all or most former managers and 30 firms kept no or only very few former managers. At the supervisory level nothing really changed, 41 firms kept the former supervisors.

⁷⁷ The return rate is not known, since it was beyond the authors' control to monitor the number of firms which received the questionnaire. In the most unlikely case that all unionized works councils in the district (148) had received a questionnaire, the rate would be 35.8%. The questionnaire was to be filled out by one full-time councillor, not necessarily the chief councillor. The questionnaire consists of 29 questions altogether (first part see appendix: A 1.2.4). The second part consists of 5-point Likert scale attitudinal questions which were adopted from Dastmalchian et al. (1991), Angle and Perry (1986) and Allen and Stephenson (1983).

⁷⁸ It would have been too difficult to approach management in these companies, as access was secured through the union.

Unfortunately there is no representative company data available either on the textile industry or on other industrial sectors.

However, the ownership is correlated with the changes at supervisory level (western-owned firms have more new supervisors than Treuhand owned), yet there was no correlation with the changes at board level.⁷⁹

With regard to staff reductions, the size of the firms decreased considerably, supporting earlier made claims of this trend in the whole textile industry in East Germany. 25 firms had less than 100 employees in 1994, whereas in 1989 22 firms employed between 200 and 1000 employees. Thus most firms reduced their staff by at least 50%, which was also not uncommon in other industries. With regard to the medium-term prospects of their firms, the respondents are split: 22 are sceptical and 20 are more optimistic (with western-owned firms more optimistic than Treuhand owned firms). Further reductions during the next 12 months are expected in 13 firms.

With regard to changes in the work organisation a majority invested in new machinery and restructured the production process. A majority of 49 works councils perceived the work pace on the shopfloor to have increased enormously from 1989. However the data does not ask for detailed information on any new production methods such as lean production. According to the union however no such innovation has been introduced with the emphasis instead on improving the existing assembly-style, "Tayloristic" production line.

With regard to the workforce, in only 3 firms was the female rate less than 50% of the total workforce, and in 16 firms it is higher than 90%. This confirms the female dominance in the textile workforce. Union density was still high, in 11 firms it was over 80% and in 20 cases between 30 and 79% (which in average is in line with the union density of the district: 48.2%). Some respondents argued that in most cases membership dropped due to reductions in employment. However, union density was not correlated with the size of the workforce, though it was correlated with the female share in the workforce (the more females the stronger union density). Thus, it seems female workers were more inclined to join this union than their male colleagues (perhaps because their jobs

⁷⁹ Correlation coefficient = .35** (**= $p \leq 0.10$, *= $p \leq 0.50$)

were more at risk).⁸⁰ Moreover, union density was higher in western-owned firms than in Treuhand-owned firms.⁸¹ Various reasons might apply (e.g. employees might be completely disappointed by the unions' achievements in Treuhand firms).

There were only three incidences of industrial unrest so far, which supports the conception of the textile industry as a non militant sector. And the larger the female share in the workforce the lower was the likelihood of industrial unrest (which supports the well-known argument in the literature that females are less militant).⁸²

Finally, with regard to the responding works councillors over half have been in this position since 1990/1. 16 were active members of the former union (BGL), and 34 were not. Thus, Martens' (1992) suggestion that old unionists are in a majority in East German works councils cannot be supported here. Furthermore, although not explicitly controlled for, one can assume that all respondents were union members (since the GTB only distributed questionnaires to unionized works councils⁸³).

In sum, although there was some variation among the companies. Interviews with the officials at the employers' association and the union however highlighted the fact that these companies in overall represented typical firms in the industry which had experienced a considerable amount of job losses and organisational restructuring. As mentioned above, there are no comparable official figures for the textile industry.

(ii) Workplace climate from the viewpoint of the works councils

The idea was to apply a set of previously tested questions⁸⁴ here in order to examine the quality of workplace relations (relation between works council and management) from the works councillors' viewpoint, and also to test the two opposite hypotheses of the literature, works council as co-manager or as extended arm of management (see chapter 3).

⁸⁰ Correlation coefficient = .45**

⁸¹ Correlation coefficient = .36**

⁸² Correlation coefficient = .42**

⁸³ Which means that at least the chief councillor is a union member.

⁸⁴ See footnote 77.

table 4.3: absolute level of items of works council-management relations (N= sample size)

	strongly dis agree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
In general relations between the works council and management in our company are good.	4	8	1	29	11	53
Management is a trustworthy bargaining partner.	5	12	6	21	8	52
Works council can only be successful if it harmoniously works together with management.	4	6	2	17	24	53
We often solve problems with management informally.	4	7	3	26	11	51
Management often involves works council in strategic planning.	13	17	1	14	8	53
We are never sufficiently informed by management	2	6	1	24	20	53
Management tries constantly to strengthen their power position.	2	7	3	22	19	53
Unions and employers have opposed interests.	3	6	3	29	12	53
We regard ourselves primarily as a connecting link between management and workforce.	2	2	3	14	31	52
We try to do the best for the firm even if this sometimes contradicts GTB's policies.	4	5	4	20	20	53
The works council here is strongly supported by workforce.	7	11	7	22	6	53
Management tries to foster a trustworthy relationship with the workforce.	4	14	3	22	10	53

The first eight questions analyse management-works council relationship, whereas the remaining questions explore broader related topics. Three quarters of the respondents agreed on most issues, and there are also virtually no missing answers.

In a nutshell, the relationship between management and works council is perceived as harmonious and trustful. Yet, management is perceived as sometimes less cooperative (e.g. providing insufficient information, and insufficient involvement in strategic planning) and as trying to strengthen its power (this is more perceived in financially "secure" than in "insecure" firms).⁸⁵ Furthermore, the councillors acknowledge conflicting interests of employers and unions. It seems therefore that although the works councils are convinced of the necessity of harmonious relations, and are willing to do its part, they realize that management is sometimes less willing to cooperate, and they perceive the different interests of both sides as existing.

⁸⁵ Correlation coefficient = .35**

There were significant correlations between whether the general relationship is perceived as good and the number of former directors employed in this company⁸⁶ and whether the councillor was a former BGL official⁸⁷: Works councillors in a company with no former directors were more likely to perceive the relationship as "good" as in companies with former directors, and works councillors who were not former BGL officials were more likely to perceive the relationship as good than works councillors who were former BGL officials. Thus, contrary to some suggestions in the literature (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 1992) it may be that the old networks between directors and union officials are more obstructive than helpful in creating cooperative workplace relations in the privatised firms.

The general perception of the workplace relations is correlated with the following questions: the more works councils were involved in strategic planning (.35*) or feel sufficiently informed (-.38**), the more they perceived a positive relationship with management and the less likely they described management as strengthening its power. If management was perceived to strengthen its power, works councils were also more likely to perceive union - employer relations as antagonistic (.31*). In addition, there was also a correlation between the perception of a good relationship and the conviction that only a harmonious relation with management can make the works council successful (.31*). Moreover, companies which did not experience industrial conflicts were more likely to have this harmonious relationship (.35*). Furthermore, the more insecure the future of the firm, the more the works council saw the need for harmonious relationships (in the best interest of the workforce). This is a very interesting finding. At first sight one might interpret good relationships with management as coming out of a weak bargaining position of the works council. However, one could also interpret it as difficult times binding the two sides together. Interestingly there was no correlation between the extent of informal negotiations between management and works council and whether there are old or new directors on the board. This supports the thesis that informal relations are a common feature in West German workplaces and do not necessarily derive out of a "socialist legacy".

⁸⁶ Correlation coefficient = .29*

⁸⁷ Correlation coefficient = .27*

Regarding the second part of the questionnaire, works councils were described primarily as connecting links between management and workforce, thus not as a pure interest representation, and consequently the well-being of the company was seen as of prime importance. This is also a typical phenomenon in West German studies (e.g. Kotthoff 1994) and in line with the legislative objectives (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). The data also adds support to the argument in the literature that "plant-level egoism" (e.g. Lippold et al. 1992) predominates East German works councils.

Furthermore, management was seen as pursuing a trustworthy relationship with the workforce, which correlated with the general perception of good workplace relations⁸⁸ and with works councils being described as a connecting link.⁸⁹ Interestingly, the higher the share of females in the workforce, the more management was perceived as fostering a trustful relation with the workforce⁹⁰, and the works councils as a connecting link⁹¹. Moreover, in western owned companies this management attempt is perceived stronger as in Treuhand-owned firms.⁹² Finally, the workforce was perceived as supporting the works council, especially in firms employing few former directors.⁹³ Thus, the councillors argued that generally workplace relations are better in firms with new management than with the old directors, and the workforce seems to support the works council more in firms with new management. One could follow that the works council saw privatisation and new management as favourable conditions, whereas the workforce might have more them-and-us feelings towards the new management (and therefore supports their interest representation stronger). This will be further discussed in Part 3.

With regard to the literature reviewed in chapter 3, the findings contribute to three propositions. Firstly, they cannot support the widespread claim of researchers that workplace relations are going down the drain after privatisation (see chapter 3, 3.2.1). Obviously this data is a "snap shot", not longitudinal and thus does not provide information on possible changes before and after privatisation. Also, the small sample and

⁸⁸ Correlation coefficient = .68**

⁸⁹ Correlation coefficient = .32*

⁹⁰ Correlation coefficient = .50**

⁹¹ Correlation coefficient = .31*

⁹² Correlation coefficient = .34*

⁹³ Correlation coefficient = .29*

the small number of questions do not allow a final judgement on the quality of works council-management relations. Nevertheless, the data gives a first indication that the current relationship in these firms, which are mostly privatised, is more or less harmonious. Surprisingly cooperation was more likely in privatised firms than in Treuhand firms, and more likely in the case of "new" managers and "new" works councillors.

Overall, the data adds support to the argument of "co-management" by the WISOC group (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 1992). However, it challenges the argument that co-management is at risk in firms after privatisation (e.g. WISOC, Ermischer and Preusche 1995:59), and that privatisation is likely to cause a polarisation between the two sides (e.g. Kern and Land 1991). A rather straightforward explanation for our finding could be that the old relations between directors and worker representatives were highly distrustful and conflictual and privatisation enabled "fresh blood" to make a new start. The assumption is that both sides perceive cooperative relations as worthwhile (the councillors acknowledged this). It would be interesting to analyse if and why the new managers have the same conviction. The case study tries to explore this.

Secondly, the findings oppose the fear of some researchers (especially the Berlin/Göttingen group) that works councils are powerless "extended arms of management". Although the councillors in this sample are obviously not "conflictory, class conscious works councils" (see Kotthoff's typology 1981), they are aware of the different interests of capital and labour and also of the power balance within the firm. They also feel accepted by management as workplace partners. Thus, they surely do not represent Kotthoff's "deficient types" of works councils (isolated, ignored, extended arm of management), but more likely his "effective types", and here in particular the "respected, cooperative" works council. In other words, the data supports more the hypothesis of cooperative relationships than that of a one-sided acquiescence on the part of the works councils. Surely, the data does not allow any final conclusion regarding the practical effectiveness of the works councils' interest representation, and therefore the categorisation can be only hypothetical. The real effectiveness of these councils is better to be explored by methods such as non-participative observation or interviews with the workforce as has

been done in the case study or by workforce questionnaires (see chapter 9). This brings us to the third contribution.

The finding that the works councils felt strongly supported by the workforce might be a first indicator of the works councils' functioning and indeed its institutionalisation (i.e. acceptance by the workforce). This finding also provides a contrasting picture to the literature's proposition of a disappointed and frustrated workforce regarding their works councils' limited possibilities for working effectively (e.g. Jander et al. 1992). Clearly, the data provides only the councillors' perceptions and one needs to know the perception of the workforce as well (see chapter 9). For example, this data does not tell us whether the workers' support is of a passive or active nature. Finally, this survey is also not suitable for discussing the various problems prohibiting works councils' functioning as outlined in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). The works council questionnaire at Bodywear which deals with this issue (see below).

In sum, this survey obviously cannot provide an in-depth analysis of workplace relations as intensive case studies can provide. In particular it would be useful to ask the same questions to management as well, which as mentioned above was not possible. On the other hand it is rare to see a larger sample of works councils being examined and this in an industrial sector which is normally neglected in such an area of research. In a nutshell the data presented a harmonious relationship between management and works council, in particular in privatised firms with "new" managers and "new" councillors. This survey thus adds a different kind of data (i.e. of quantitative nature) to the existing literature and supports overall the finding of cooperative workplaces which was found in various other industrial sectors in the literature.

4.4 Transformation at the enterprise level: a case study in the textile industry

This section is divided into two parts, the first (4.4.1) presents the organisational transformation of the case study, as well as the changes in personnel policies and in management style. The second part (4.4.2) deals with its workplace relations from the viewpoint of management and works council, and the handling of specific workplace problems at the time of the fieldwork.

4.4.1 Organisational transformation

(i) Chronology of the organisational restructuring

The investigated case study is a producer of underwear and belonged to the "Masche" sector of the textile industry. The company was selected because it is one of the largest companies in the GTB South-East area, it is a full member of the employers' association (thus under collective bargaining), was privatized very quickly and since then has experienced a thorough and "successful" transformation (in financial terms). The company, Bodywear is situated in Saxony, and was formerly the main GDR producer of underwear, named VEB Trikotwear.⁹⁴ Trikotwear belonged to one of the large textile combines, VVB Trikotagen, which employed about 52,000 people in 52 enterprises. Bodywear was bought in 1991 by a German company (a major underwear producer in the up market sector) which is owned by a Swiss holding company, with headquarters and major plants in West Germany. Bodywear is today financially a 100% owned subsidiary, but legally an autonomous company (AG). Even before Unification, Trikotwear had a "production contract" with this western firm and soon after the turnaround in 1989 negotiations started about closer cooperation. In July 1990 VEB Trikotwear became Dessous AG (according to the newly introduced Treuhand law, see above). It then had a

⁹⁴ To guarantee anonymity the names of the firm have been changed.

loss of 5,875,917 DM in 1991 (first balance of 31.12.1991). After months of negotiations the Swiss decided to buy the company in July 1991 with a debt obligation of 4.1 million DM. It ran at a loss (which was mainly due to high depreciation rates) for the next two years until it reached 1993 and for the first time had a surplus (the only subsidiary of the Swiss holding company to do so) and a turnover of 38 Million DM.

The company started to reorganize itself soon after autumn 1989 even before it was privatized. The old company director established an "action programme" to get all workers involved in the aim of increasing performance and productivity. Special work groups were created, not dissimilar to quality circles, with the major work group consisting of the director, the BGL, the Party secretary and shopfloor work group leaders (document Aktionsprogramm 17/11/89). However, the director was not seen as competent enough and was soon fired in December 1989. In his place the board of the combine appointed a trained engineer, who worked in the planning department of the combine. He introduced a new strategy to find a western investor as quickly as possible and meanwhile continued with the reorganisation. The new director's first idea was to continue with their own product line and additionally to produce certain segments for the Swiss company. But since the major market for Trikotwear (Eastern Europe) was vanishing and in East Germany nobody wanted to buy the old socialist fashion brands anymore, and also because the Swiss were not very happy about these two production paths, Trikotwear became more and more dependent on the ideas of the Swiss (director, interview 8/1993).

The reconstruction process started by decentralizing the plants. Trikotwear was already decentralized geographically (e.g. 25 production cells in the wider region in 1980⁹⁵). The firm managed to privatize/reprivatize or liquidate the majority of the smaller units and non-production related workshops (such as tool shops, kindergarten). The main surviving production plants were reorganized and modernized: the three major departments, knitting, dyeing, sewing, became independent profit centres. The company then started to invest in buildings, machinery and internal redecoration during summer 1990, with the major

⁹⁵ The idea behind that was to provide workplaces in each little village to make the transport for workers more convenient.

investment going into new factory premises for the dyeing plant (now the most modern in Europe, with the latest environmental technology). 36 million DM in total was invested between 1990 and 1992 (a further 20 million was planned for the following two years). The renovation of the factory premises was particularly necessary⁹⁶, and was completed long before the headquarters/ management building was renovated (summer 1993). Machinery was improved or substituted in all three production units as well as in the offices (e.g. copy machines, computers). The production process itself was not significantly changed.

The reorganisation of personnel started with the dismissal of pensioners (who were still working) and Vietnamese "guest workers" (who had to go back to their home country). Also, a reshuffling of staff took place: firstly, all jobs were internally advertised (as demanded by the works council, only later to go to the external labour market). However, most people applied for their old jobs. Middle management and supervisors (Meister) were nevertheless frequently substituted by East Germans deemed to be more competent and given another job. There are now three major middle managers, each responsible for one production unit (sewing, knitting, dyeing). The most important unit (sewing) is led by a West German (from the West German headquarters), the other two are East Germans. At the same time, redundant production workers, especially dyers and knitters, were offered a transfer to the sewing department instead of dismissal.⁹⁷ The sewing plant was built up as the major and most labour intensive production unit. However, around 80% of workers did not take up this offer. Sewing pays less and has a bad image (as before in the former GDR: "those who sew are dull"). Thus, people preferred to go on dole, presumably in the belief that they would find a job somewhere else. This naive belief changed rapidly in the following years (director, interview 8/1993).

The director declared in his first company assembly (Betriebsversammlung) that there would be no redundancies without an internal job offer. It soon became clear however that he could not keep this promise. Especially in the administrative departments

⁹⁶ It was raining through the factory roof in the dyeing plant, and people were standing up to their knees in water.

⁹⁷ In former times reshuffling also existed and people were shifted around without being asked.

the reduction of staff was necessary, due to the typical GDR employment ratio of 2:1 "administration — production workers".⁹⁸ Employees who were made redundant got compensation⁹⁹ in line with the "social plan" of the Treuhand. In other words, this compensation was paid by the Treuhand, since at that time Bodywear was still Treuhand owned. No ABM's (retraining courses) existed at that time for the textile workers. The works council and personnel manager also agreed that redundancies should be made "sozialverträglich", i.e. taking the personal social circumstances into account¹⁰⁰. However, this was and is an informal agreement, which is not mentioned in the formal social contract between works council and management (Sozialplan). This "Sozialplan" primarily regulates the level of compensation (once the Treuhand was no longer in charge). Although the works council insisted that this arrangement works, they nevertheless admitted that bad performers were and are dismissed without taking their family circumstances into account.

Altogether Bodywear reduced its workforce from 2,232 employees (= 1,640 blue and 592 white collars) in 1989 to 680 in May 1993, and to 625 employees in August 1994, a reduction of 72% over a period of five years. The redundancies mostly took place from May 1990 to May 1991. At the time of the case study (August 1993) the then 680 employees comprised 490 production workers (blue collars) and 154 administrative staff (white collars) and "non-productives" (Ungewerbliche). The sewing plant alone employed 379 workers in 1993. In 1994 there were 345 sewers, with 300 planned for end of 1995.¹⁰¹

There was an interesting state of affairs in 1992 and 1993 when Bodywear wanted to recruit new workers on the external labour market because there was an increasing number of orders coming in. Such recruitment turned out to be very difficult, and so their staffing

⁹⁸ This resulted primarily from the complicated hierachical coordination between departments and plants. For example at Trikotwear 450 people worked in administration. Today there are 30 people.

⁹⁹ Maximum 5000 DM

¹⁰⁰ German labour law forbids the dismissal of working mothers with children under three years only.

¹⁰¹ The workforce (1993) can be divided into: (i) knitting: 17 production workers and 9 people in administration; (ii) dyeing: 30 production workers and 10 people in administration; (iii) sewing: 379 production workers and 44 people in administration; (iv) other units: cutting 38, product wrapping 26, logistics 12, transport 5, distribution 2 workers; (v) 72 Employees in central administrative units.

plan had to be revised (originally the sewing plant planned to employ 600 workers to sew). The recruitment problem seemed to be mainly due to the bad image of the job, and also to the bad image of Bodywear itself during those years ("Bodywear concentration camp" it was called). They could thus not get enough applications (works councillor and director, interview in 1993). According to the director and works councillor the public thought that workers at Bodywear were not paid the agreed wage and were fired immediately if they did not meet the piece rate norms. This is surprising especially because Bodywear was and is one of the few firms which paid/pays the negotiated pay rates. However, unemployed workers, who were formerly sewing in a Treuhand owned firm, did not apply and preferred to stay on the dole, because their unemployment benefits were higher than what they would have earned at Bodywear. The reason was that the benefits were calculated on their former earnings (which were quite high due to low production norms in the Treuhand firms). Even the state employment agency (Arbeitsamt) failed (or did not want) to find any people for interviews. Interestingly not only the director but especially the chief works councillor were very angry about the employment agency's attitude. They saw it as a threat to the expansion plans of the plant. By 1994, the labour market situation had changed, but Bodywear was no longer seeking new sewers (due to less demand). By 1994/5 the labour market situation in that area was so depressed, that even small firms which were not unionized and paid around 4.50 DM an hour¹⁰² could still find people to work for them (according to the director and works councillor).

(ii) Changes in personnel policies and management style

The organisational restructuring also involved major changes in personnel management policies and practices, including payment systems, training, and working time. With regard to the payment and evaluation systems, the western job classification and payment system (which is negotiated by collective bargaining) was introduced in 1990.

Most changes were experienced in the sewing department. In the old system, sewers were paid by piece rate, and also earned a group (brigade) bonus. Bodywear

¹⁰² The official pay rate was 10.28 DM per hour for 100% norm for sewers in 1994.

introduced new piece rates, i.e. norms¹⁰³, which were more demanding than before. At first this caused a great deal of trouble as reported by the sewing director (interview 1993). Although in the beginning everyone got 100% pay (i.e. for fully meeting the newly introduced norm) the average individual performance fell from 120% (of the old norm) to 40% (of the new norm) and the workplace climate became highly conflictual (in fact the director held a workforce meeting as the conflict escalated in order to ask whether the workforce even wanted him to stay, which seemed to have some impact). Changes were less severe in the other two plants (according to the views of the directors at these plants). Knitters used to work on piece rates plus group bonuses, and subsequently they worked on a new piece rate system without a bonus. Dyers worked on a piece rate system, which was abolished after 1989. Hourly pay was introduced instead, but in 1993 management decided to reintroduce a performance-related pay system (evaluation by supervisors) in addition to the basic hourly pay. All group bonuses were abolished.

There is great emphasis on quality and flexibility especially in the sewing plant, according to managers and works councillors. Whereas in the beginning Bodywear received only simple garments to produce, they are now able to produce more fashionable, i.e. more difficult, items. And both management and works council are proud of this. With regard to training, all sewers receive specific training to learn the approved Bodywear sewing methods, which meant that those who were used to sewing in their own way for often more than 20 years had suddenly to learn a different sewing technique¹⁰⁴. Today a method trainer is linked to each working shift on a constant basis, and teaches the necessary sewing methods each time a new item has to be produced. A probation period of several days (with 100% pay) is given. New recruits get a probation period of four weeks, and a training period of ten days. In the first three months they are paid a minimum wage of 95% of the norm.

The East German managers and supervisors went to the West German main plant for a few months to be trained themselves, and West German supervisors also came to

¹⁰³ The norm determines how many pieces a worker has to produce in a specified time in order to get 100% of the pay (basic pay). They are "scientifically" measured by REFA-trained engineers.

¹⁰⁴ Formally there were also specific sewing methods such as TAN (technische Arbeitsnorm) and WAN (wissenschaftliche Arbeitsnorm) but they were not really practiced.

Bodywear (some stayed for nearly a whole year). Sewers were then advised by western trainers to learn the formal western sewing methods. The director attended a course in management studies in Vienna.

There were also major changes in working time. Formerly workers worked 43.5 hours per week. This figure has now been reduced to 40 hours, which makes eight hours plus an unpaid break of 30 minutes per day. Part-time work did not exist in the GDR, and still does not, although many female employees express a desire for it (according to the director and works council). Shift working was however commonplace in the GDR: dyers worked three shifts a day and this arrangement has continued, and knitters currently work two shifts as before. Only those in the sewing department never had shift work before. Today there are two shifts for all workers and one shift only for single mothers with children under 14 years (or older if the husband works three shifts). Shift working has no appeal for sewers. They truly hate it (see chapter 8).

Finally, all social services which the socialist enterprise previously provided were abolished (e.g. kindergarten), including the benefits for mothers (e.g. a day off a month called "household day"). Bodywear did however keep a company transport service, picking people up from home and bringing them back (since people now live quite far away and public transport is inadequate). They also set up an employee shop where Bodywear products can be bought at a special rate.

With regard to the *changes in management style of the supervisors* a small survey was conducted in 1993.¹⁰⁵ The supervisor or Meister is responsible for a so-called "Meisterei", a large workgroup (shift).¹⁰⁶ An average Meisterei in the sewing department consisted of 42 workers. The survey suggested that the transformation led to an increase in supervisors' status, they felt more respected by managers and workers alike. On the other hand supervisors also felt more pressure at work and said that there is more competition among supervisors. This is a common finding in the literature (e.g. Lungwitz 1994:305).

¹⁰⁵ Including 8 supervisors from all three plants (see appendix: A 1.2.1).

¹⁰⁶ In 1993 there were 9 supervisors in sewing, 3 in dyeing, and 2 in knitting.

With regard to supervisors' perceived changes in worker (Mitarbeiter¹⁰⁷) supervisor relations, the supervisors declared that work pace is increasing. However, they thought that "teamspirit" still existed among the workforce. Most did not let workers participate in shop-floor decisions, control was tight, and they had a "traditional" view of pay as the major work motivator. These statements confirm the picture of a traditionally organized and managed company. Also, they thought that the capitalist system treats the workers in a more fair manner. Lastly, there was a divided view about whether workers complain less today than they previously did. In sum, the supervisors seemed to provide support for both scenarios in the literature (chapter 3:3.1.3): the "tayloristic" traditional management style¹⁰⁸ (e.g. Mahnkopf 1991) and the "caring" East German manager-type (e.g. Lungwitz and Preusche 1994).

Summing up the various facets of the internal transformation of Bodywear, one can argue that a rigorous reorganisation took place on all hierarchical levels which implied rationalisation, new organisational structures (e.g. profit centres) and the adaptation of personnel management to western laws and regulations. This was achieved in a very short period of time without any direct employee participation or major interference by the works council. Not all personnel and social policies of the western plants have yet been introduced (e.g. consultation in social/private affairs, "Sozialberatungsstelle"). Overall, the production standards of the West German plants have been introduced, which are however quite traditional and therefore not linked to any fashionable management ideas such as TQM or HRM. Thus, there is a strong division of labour within the production arena and between decision-making and execution. Production workers have no real discretion over their work. Disciplinary measures are taken seriously and control is thought to be tight (interviews with production managers, workers, supervisor questionnaire). For example, "performance is crucial, otherwise you are sacked" (production manager S). In particular, the West German managing the sewing plant is a firm believer in "tayloristic" leadership

¹⁰⁷ The term "Mitarbeiter" is untranslatable, it means something like a "co-worker" but not as much as a "colleague".

¹⁰⁸ "Taylorism" is used in the same way as it is used in this kind of literature (see chapter 2), which sometimes differs from the "original" Taylor, i.e. authoritarian and paternalistic management styles were not a contradiction for Taylor.

styles. However, West German textile firms are also generally thought to be organised in highly "Tayloristic" ways. This is seen as more suitable for the production process (as the production manager of a major West German textile firm explained, interview Düsseldorf 9/1995), or as Heidenreich (1991b) puts it, is caused by the industries' high labour intensity, large recruitment of "problematic" groups (women, foreigners) and the low flexibility of its machines. He argues further that the East German textile industry is an especially good example of this "Tayloristic" work organisation, since it relied in GDR times on low quality mass production, which again fostered tayloristic production forms. However, this company emphasized from the beginning the importance of their human resources for company performance, and took great interest in quality control and in selecting good workers and training them well.

4.4.2 Workplace relations at Bodywear

This section introduces the works council at Bodywear and its relation to the GTB and to the workforce (i). It then outlines management's (ii) and the works council's (iii) perceptions of the workplace relations. Four major workplace problems of that time and their handling are illustrated as examples of the relationship between the two actors in practice (iv). Finally, the works councillors were asked about the problems which impede an effective working of the works council (v).

(i) Establishment of the works council at Bodywear

The "turnaround" of worker representation happened at Trikotwear in spring 1990. In early 1990 a "union stewards" (Vertrauensleute) meeting and election was organised, which became highly conflictual because the BGL resisted the demands of some "reformers" to introduce a worker council (they got the idea when researching "what the West has got"). However, the election results supported the reformers who then succeeded in abolishing the BGL. In a subsequent poll of the workforce 90% voted for a new worker

council, which was then created. The rights of this worker council resembled those allowed by the West German co-determination law (BetrVG).

The first works councillor (who remained in his post until 1995) was formerly active in the BGL, and is a male technician, which is a typical profession for East German councillors, or at least was in the early years (e.g. Kottwitz 1991). Technicians had contact with people in all departments through their work, and being highly skilled workers ("Facharbeiter") they were interested in the firms reconstruction and in the introduction of better technology. The first vice councillor, female, was not active in the union before, but was voted in as a new steward in 1990.¹⁰⁹ In July 1990 a new, "proper" works council under the (West) German law had to be formed, which made new elections necessary. The council consisted of 17 members at that time, including two full-timers (councillor and vice)¹¹⁰. 13 members were blue collars, four were white collars (including the two full-time councillors).

Four years later (1994) the two full-time works councillors were re-elected. Turnout for this election was 85%, which was much higher than expected by the works councillors. Five former members did not want to be re-elected and had to be replaced. 17 people were nominated, 11 had to be elected (due to the decreasing labour force). There were four white collars (one male, three females) and seven blue collars, three from the sewing department (female), one of the dyers (female), one from product packing (female), one from transport (male), and one engineer (male). Thus, eight out of the eleven were female. This female dominated works council is quite typical for the East German textile works councils (52% of all chief councillors are female and 62% of all council members in 1995, source: GTB Süd Ost), and in East Germany generally, it is no exception: according to Martens (1992:9) the female rate of councillors is "quite high" without however giving more information.

According to the chief councillor the works council should ideally work closely together with the main West German works council (Gesamtbetriebsrat), however he complained

¹⁰⁹ She become chief councillor in 1995.

¹¹⁰ The co-determination law (BetrVG) determines the number of works council members in proportion to the size of the workforce, and also the percentage of white collar members.

that the recession has weakened the previous harmonious relationship between all the works councils of the company in that it led to "plant-egoism"(insularity) and competition. Besides, in the early 1990s all works councils within the union district South-East used to meet regularly to discuss their problems but these meetings have been discontinued due to the worsening economic situation.

The works councillor sought regular contact with the workforce but argued that the interest of the workers in the works council's work is decreasing. He accused them of being highly inactive with regard to collective issues. For example, Bodywear still has no union stewards. According to the councillor, workers in former times went to the BGL and were helped, especially if party members. There was also a lot of informal networking and nepotism (Gemauschel) going on. In modern, capitalist times the works council cannot help everybody and is therefore sometimes, wrongly he claimed, perceived as part of management.

Both works councillors and the chief union official stated that the relationship between works council and GTB is generally close and good. Bodywear is the largest unionized firm in the union district and both works councillors are engaged in union committees. In the beginning (1990) there was a lot of joint activity between union and works council in order to unionize the workforce. Today, the union officials attend works council meetings but besides this are not very active at Bodywear. For the first time the GTB organised a two day information desk at Bodywear (in the canteen, management did not allow it to be inside the production hall) at the time of the author's fieldwork in 1993, and this was on the initiative of the works council. The works councillors did not regard themselves as representing the GTB. The union is primarily a service organisation for them. Company interests have priority, but they acknowledged the union position (this is also supported by the questionnaire results, see below). Union density at Bodywear was around 32% (the works council had no precise figures) and did not change significantly over the last four years, however according to the councillor it would be lower if the union subscription was

not deducted by check-off (1% of pay). The density was below the overall density of 57% (1993) in the union district.

In August 1995 an interesting event took place which supports the thesis that the councillors put the interests of the firm before union interests. As mentioned before the union was organising token strikes in several major companies during the collective bargaining period. Bodywear, being a major company, was asked to organise a similar strike. The works council discussed this in their meeting and the majority of members voted against it. This was a few days before the official workforce assembly took place. Shortly before the assembly started the chief union official (who usually attends) convinced the councillors to at least try a "sit-in" after the assembly had finished. Accordingly, the assembly was officially closed after twenty minutes, and then the GTB official asked the workers to remain (voluntarily) in their seats for 10 more minutes in order to strike. Most people (200) indeed stayed. Astonishingly, even the personnel manager who was attending the assembly, asked whether she could stay on and thus in effect joined the strike! However, according to the works councillor, many workers complained afterwards that they had felt overwhelmed by the union, that it was a lousy strategy of the union and that they had not wanted to strike. The councillor agreed with the workers' view. In the interview the councillor was convinced that most workers did not really understand what was going on. Truly the fact that the personnel manager stayed on supports this argument. The union official however argued that the workers stayed voluntarily and that they had the opportunity to leave. This was the first industrial action in the history of Bodywear.

(ii) Management's views of works council and union

Sources are interviews (in 1993/1994) with the chief executive, the three directors of the plants (especially the director of the sewing plant) and discussions with the personnel managers (head and assistant) (see appendix: A 1.1), and a questionnaire which was filled

out by the head of the personnel department (see appendix: A1.2.2, an identical questionnaire was filled out by the works council, see below).

Overall, the general conclusion of all sources is that the works council is an accepted partner, and that the relationship with the council is functioning, although differences can and do exist. The works council is definitely not seen as an arm of management. In the following the positions are outlined in more detail:

The chief executive had no problems in negotiating with the works council, but "we are not friends". Whereas in the first years he negotiated directly with the works council, at the time of the interview it was the personnel department or production managers themselves who did the job. This was because, according to him, he had too much other work to do, being in charge now of the two Czech/Slovak plants.

The director of the sewing department, the West German middle manager, recounted a different relationship with the works council. Although he acknowledged the need for a good relationship, he did not seem to care for it much and assumed that it is the works council's responsibility (rather than his) to compromise. He also thought that there were some "troublemakers" in the works council, and that a lot of sewers frequently went to the works council and complained (interview, August 1993). In 1995 he took over the day-to-day management of the whole company, due to the chief executives' main responsibilities in the Czech plant. In an interview in September 1995, he still considered the works council more as "a millstone around his neck" rather than a legitimate institution, and only seemed to negotiate with them "because it is the law". Whether works council - management relations were now changing and deteriorating could not be confirmed at this time. However, the major day-to-day bargaining partner of the works council remained the personnel department. It is therefore that the questionnaire (table 4.3) is taken as the most important source of management's view on workplace relations.

The personnel manager was more in line with the chief executive and saw the works council as a responsible and fair bargaining partner, who cares about the well-being of the firm, does not want to weaken the discipline of the workforce, and to provoke disputes at every opportunity. Problems are often regulated informally. The council was

not seen as a mouthpiece of the union. Management was said to inform the works council extensively.

Yet, on the other side the personnel manager argued that management does not really respect the views of the works council, and that they would prefer not to have a council at all. Similarly, the works council was not perceived as trying to cooperate with management, and it did not, she believed, really understand the problems and worries of management. In general the relations between works council and management were considered as poor. Interestingly, she did not answer the question about whether the works council should have more co-determination rights on economic issues. Perhaps this question was too theoretical and abstract, perhaps it was just something she had never thought about and had no strong views on.

These statements to some extent contradict the personnel managers' views as expressed above. One reason might be that at the time of this survey the works council and management had a major disagreement about on Saturday work (see below) and the more negative views of the works council might be influenced a result of this particular dispute. It seems safe therefore to conclude that in overall the personnel manager seem to indicate a respectful relationship with the works council which works to a greater or lesser degree, although differences can and do exist. The works council is definitely not perceived as an arm of management. Also, the interviews with the head and assistant personnel manager revealed that despite heavy differences of opinion they care about the "harmonious" relationship with the works council, and prefer "rational" discussions to ideological fights. They have their offices next to each other, know each other from the old days, and have breakfast together every day. Thus, as also the chief councillor claimed, "personal relations should not suffer".

Finally, the personnel manager acknowledged that the works council has strong support among the workforce, but that the workforce is not very interested in the quality of the relationship between management and council.

With regard to the *union*, the chief executive argued that Bodywear has no intention of quitting the employers' association and would have even considered a company-contract

with the GTB if regional collective bargaining had fallen apart, which was a real possibility in the 1993 round. It is not clear whether this attitude derives from a conviction of the need for collective bargaining or of unions in general or whether this is just following the line set by the headquarters in the West. However, he was convinced of the need for high pay in order to motivate people and as a principle of justice ("we are doing good work here"). On the other hand he perceived a low wage level as necessary to secure Bodywear's competitiveness on the external as well as on the internal market. For example, the recent acquisition of a textile company in the Czech Republic meant that Bodywear competed with wages there which were about one fifth of the East German wages. The director had an objective relationship with the GTB chief official ("she is a trade unionist but nevertheless quite serious and rational"). The personnel manager saw in general divergent interests between employers and unions, but regarded the GTB to be a responsible bargaining partner (see questionnaire). Thus, in sum Bodywear accepted the union as a legitimate collective bargaining partner.

(iii) Workplace relations from the viewpoint of works council

The works council's view on workplace relations will be presented mainly on the basis of a questionnaire which incorporates identical questions to the above questionnaire of the personnel manager, and which was filled in by the chief and vice works councillor (see appendix: A 1.2.3). The questions are identical to those of the works council questionnaire of the GTB survey (see table 4.3).¹¹¹

The councillors' answers are compared with those of the personnel managers' at Bodywear, and with the other works councillors' of the GTB survey. The interviews conducted in 1993/1994 with both councillors will also be incorporated in the discussion.

Firstly, the management - works council relationship was seen as overallly cooperative, in contrast to the personnel managers' view. Management was seen as a

¹¹¹ The GTB survey was also distributed to the Bodywear works council and was filled out by six, not full-time members of the works council.

responsible bargaining partner (which is in line with what the personnel manager thought about the works council), and as a cooperative partner (whereas the personnel manager described the council as not cooperative). They also agreed that problems are often solved informally, as did the personnel manager. These different perceptions of both sides are quite interesting: the works council's opinion of management and their relationship was more positive than the personnel managers' view of the council.

The councillors also expressed slightly less positive views. For example, management was accused of exploiting each opportunity to improve their power position (whereas the personnel manager did not think the same of the works council). Moreover, they were unsure whether management understands the problems of the workforce, and whether management would prefer not to have a council. The negative views were supported in the interviews. For example, the chief official did not want to be elected again in four years time and chose to take retirement instead in 1995. Although he is, as he says, "married" to this enterprise: his grandfather and father both worked here and he has known this company from childhood. However, he is fed up having less and less opportunities to improve the social conditions in the firm. "It isn't fun anymore and it is getting worse every year. Your hands are bound, because the demand is down. ... The constantly increasing pressures on sewers' performance and the increasing threat on those who want to consult the works council is just capitalism at its worst" (interview in August 1994).

On the other hand, the councillors agreed that management informs the council sufficiently, and also that management respects the views of the council, in contrast to the manager's expressed view. However, the "part-time" council members had a different view: they did not agree that management is informing the works council sufficiently, and they also disagreed that problems are often solved informally with management. This difference to the chief councillors' view might indicate that the chief councillors primarily communicate informally with management without informing their colleagues. Thus, they might have an informal communications which are often hidden to their colleagues. This is a phenomenon which also Kothoff frequently observed in his study (1994). This is supported by the fact that the works council leader also sits on the supervisory board of

Bodywear (comprising two shareholder representatives, one workforce representative), which gives him access to more information, but not he argued really influence.

With regard to the works council - union relationship, there was a disagreement among the two councillors whether the council represents the GTB in the company. Yet, both regarded themselves as trying to achieve the best for the company even if not in line with official union policy. This is in line with the personnel manager's view. The GTB was also not regarded as intervening in company concerns. Moreover, unions and employers were seen as having divergent positions, as did the personnel manager. The works council did not agree that the GTB represents the members from the West rather than the East, and the interests of the officials rather than those of the membership.

Finally, management was not seen as having strong support among the workforce, and the councillors thought, in contrast to the personnel manager, that the workforce does indeed have an interest in the quality of the relation between works council and management. With regard to the question of more co-determination rights (a classic topic of discussion among unionists) one councillor agreed strongly, the other however chose not to answer. It might be concluded that this issue is not high on the agenda of this works council.

In sum, despite the mixed accounts it seems safe to argue that in overall the councillors' overall perceptions of management were more positive than the more divergent statements of the personnel manager. Yet, both parties seemed to indicate a more or less working and respectful relationship, although differences between both sides can and do exist. Both sides supported the interpretation that the works council is independent from the GTB and from management. One might conclude that the works council seemed to belonged to the category of works council which provides an "effective" interest representation (see Kotthoff's typology, chapter 3). It seems that the works council understood itself as a representative of workers' interests, as well as an "Ordnungsfaktor", an institution which guarantees the proper functioning and organisation of the workplace. This thesis has to be further examined by the workforce view of the effectiveness of the works council (chapter 9).

Finally, comparing Bodywear with the other works councils of the GTB survey, in most questions Bodywear revealed similar views, i.e. a generally positive account of workplace relations. The only major difference was that Bodywear disagreed that "the works council can only be successful if it works harmoniously with management" whereas nearly 80% of the works council survey agreed. This might indicate that Bodywear had a more independent, even powerful and definitely not "collaborative" and perhaps also more effective works council than the rest of this sample.

(iv) Workplace problems

Finally, to illustrate the current workplace relations at the time of investigation (summer 1993) four major examples of workplace problems and how management and the work council were dealing with them are reported. With regard to the first two problems, high absenteeism rate and low labour productivity the works council has no legal co-determination rights, whereas it has legal rights regarding the last two issues, the closure of the knitting department, and the introduction of overtime/ saturday work.¹¹²

1. Firstly, absenteeism was a serious problem in the sewing plant until 1994. Absenteeism figures were similar to the high levels in the former GDR. For example, in 1989 296.7 working hours per person out of 2188.1 hours per annum were lost, out of which for example 186.6 hours were due to sickness, 6.7 hours due to defective machinery, 11.3 unpaid, and 2.5 unexplained). This absenteeism figure amounted to 15% of total working time. In September 1992 the average absenteeism rate in the sewing plant was 13.1%, which was still above the average Bodywear total of 9.8%. A year later the rate declined to 10.18% (compared to 9.04% total). However, the absenteeism rate of Bodywear was higher than that of the West German plants (around 7%).

The director related this problem to the increasing "private stress" of the employees (e.g. household, small children without kindergarten, husband often unemployed). But

¹¹² See footnote 43 in chapter 3.

also due to the fear of not being able to learn the new sewing methods when new items were to be produced. Accordingly, absenteeism rates rose each time new sewing products were introduced. The director's strategy was to speak to each individual, explaining to them that they need not fear being sacked, and that it was important for the companies' success and for their colleagues that they come to work. In addition the supervisors were told to make people feel that they were missed if they did not come to work. Since this did not help achieve any sustainable improvement, the director repeated the talks a year later in 1993, making it very clear that if they did not perform to their best ability their jobs will be put at risk due to the increasing Czech competition (besides two plants had already closed in West Germany). So far (1994) these measures have worked. These interventions were not opposed by the works council. The councillors shared the concern of management, but blamed the increasing work pace and stress at work. However, they stayed very much in the background.

2. Secondly, a related problem was the lower labour productivity¹¹³ of the sewing plant compared to standards in the plants in the West. In 1993 an average of 105/108% of the standard was achieved, which was an improvement on previous years but which was still under the West's average of 125%.¹¹⁴ Management argued that this was not due to lower qualifications, but instead that it was a mental problem, i.e. missing "quality thinking". The (East German) director claimed in general, "these East Germans only want D-Marks and travel, but not to work. Here a strong man is necessary ("hier muß mal ein starker Mann her"). In West Germany there is too much democracy" (interview, 5/94). The West German manager agreed that "workers are lazy here" and added that "they always stand together in groups and complain about something, whereas in West Germany people stand together and discuss positive things, for example their activities last weekend". He states that in former times the workers went to the BGL or Party and complained, now they have to approach the supervisor and this creates problems for them. However, he distinguished between two basic groups: one group has adapted well and

¹¹³ = worked minutes./ presence in h (Leistung = erarbeitete Minuten./ Anwesenheit in h)

¹¹⁴ The average norm in the old regime (e.g. 1989) was 140-150 % (also 160-180% was reached quite frequently, since piece rates/norms were easier, as mentioned above.

likes the new flexibility, others do not like it, since it involves too much thought and too many changes for them. Management put a lot of effort into talking and threatening sewers that they will lose their jobs if they do not increase their productivity, and this has had an effect, according to them. The works council as stated above shared the concerns of management, but on the other hand emphasized the improvements already achieved. However, they did not oppose management's talks with employees.

3. Thirdly, another major event was the closure of the knitting plant, which was announced in the summer of 1993. From autumn 1993 onwards production and labour were to be gradually reduced to finally end altogether in spring 1995 (contracting-out has become cheaper). The knitters were informed at very short notice, and they had to decide within a few days whether or not to take up the offer of a job in the dyeing plant. This was the bargaining achievement of the works council: all knitters were to be offered a new job. Some knitters, who were selected by different criteria (living close to the dyeing plant, who were actually present at the time and not on holidays,...), were told to move right away. Others had to move in the months following. For the knitters, many of whom had worked in this plant for the last 20-30 years, this meant not only a change to completely new work but also less money (dyers get paid less than knitters). In addition, there were for example supervisors who now had to start all over again as unskilled workers. However, most people obeyed: "what can I do?? It's good to have a job at least" was the common response. And: "it was a shock, but what can I gain from running around like a 'dog without a bone' all the time?" Another one: "I don't know why I was selected to move immediately. They decided."

4. Fourthly there was the constant problem of Saturday work in the sewing department. Saturday work was not unknown in the GDR, however it was voluntary and brought not only overtime pay but also a very high extra bonus just for turning up. In 1993 when the topic arose at Bodywear again, most did not really understand the need for it and argued that it was caused by the inadequate planning of the company. According to personnel management workers still did not seem to realize that in a market economy "the

firm cannot plan as well as it formerly did in the plan economy". A year (1994) later sewers, although not blaming the poor planning anymore, were still reluctant, largely because performance pressures during the week were perceived as being so high that they preferred their weekend for recreation. Under the labour law the company cannot introduce overtime or Saturday work without the works council's permission. The works council acknowledged the need for overtime in the current situation, yet wanted to agree to additional work on a few Saturdays only on the condition that workers work seven hours and get eight hours pay. However, the collective bargaining contract that year allowed that flexible working hours be worked without additional payments. Thus, as long as workers got a few days off in the following months to recompense the Saturdays, no overtime had to be paid. This resulted in a major conflict between works council and management. In the end the works council had to drop its objections and support management. They argued that workers should be happy to have additional work. For the winter temporary cuts in working hours (*Kurzarbeit*) had already been planned.

In sum, these examples of how workplace problems were handled at Bodywear contribute to the characterization of Bodywear's workplace practices. Overall, workplace problems were dealt with by management in a highly authoritative but also paternalistic way. For example, the chief executive found the time to talk to each of the sewers individually, whereas on the other hand the closure of the dyeing plant was carried out without informing the workforce in advance. In addition, the works council seemed to become active in issues where there are statutory (co-determination) rights for the works council (e.g. plant closure or Saturday work), and they tried hard to achieve a compromise which takes the social interests of the workforce into account. In issues however where they do not have formal rights (e.g. absenteeism, productivity, management interviewing workers) they remained in the background, supporting in principle management's rationale ("survival of the firm"), and felt that they are powerless to react against the overwhelming power of the free market. This supports a previous suggestion of Kirschner (1991) (see chapter 3:3.2.3) that the works councils are highly dependent on their legal rights, thus favouring a juridical relationship with management.

(v) Problems impeding effective interest representation¹¹⁵

Three problems of an effective interest representation were emphasized by the two councillors. Firstly, specific interests of the workforce often do not conform with the council's ideas. This is quite a strong and honest statement to make. Secondly, reference was made to the lack of interest and the indifferent attitude of the workforce, and lastly to the threats imposed by management on workers who consult the council. The two latter explanations were repeated in all the interviews the author had with them over the years. One might ask however whether the "passivity" of the workforce is really so dramatic and impedes works council's work or whether it is not instead part of repertoire a works councils to mock their passive co-fellows in order to underline their own importance and commitment. Or even to justify their own inactivity (see Mahnkopf 1991). On the other hand, different opinions within the works council, the heavy workload of the council, the possibility that the council has lost contact with the workforce, the divergent interests of the workforce, or individualistic employees who prefer to represent their interests alone, were not seen as impeding effective interest representation. This stands in contrast to several propositions of the literature (see chapter 3). For example, Jander and Lutz (1991,1993) stressed the fact that works councils are restricted in their functioning because they are overloaded, and because of the divergent interests of the workforce. Kirschner (1992) stated that the East German works councils have become too distant from the workforce (see chapter 3:3.2.3). Additionally, there is the widespread argument that workers prefer to represent their own interests (e.g. Gut et al. 1993, see chapter 3:3.2.3). However, the perceptions of the works council can only be a first source, workers' views are needed to further substantiate the claim and to challenge the statements in the literature.

¹¹⁵ The works council questionnaire included questions on possible problems impeding effective working of the works council (see appendix: A 1.2.3).

Conclusion of Chapter 4

This chapter outlined the transformation of workplace relations in the East German textile industry. It can be characterized by desperate economic determinants, companies experiencing tremendous organisational changes, an employers' association struggling to keep its members and a union which is not dogmatic or militant, but cooperative although not necessarily "weak" with regard to the bargaining outcomes. The workplace climate, surveyed in 53 firms, was characterized as harmonious overall from the works councillors' point of view. Works councils seemed to cooperate with management as accepted partners, not as accomplices or arms of management. The chapter provided details about the extent of organisational change in the textile companies and there is some evidence that changes are similar to those reported in other industrial sectors (see chapter 3).

The case study Bodywear presented a company which successfully managed the transformation to market economy. Its employee relations were characterized by significant changes in working conditions, in particular increases in work pace and quality. It is therefore an interesting example for the study of workers' attitudes towards the organisational change. The company is a prototype of privatized East German companies organised in a strictly "Tayloristic" way, as characterised in the previous chapter, chapter 3. Yet, the "polarization" scenario of conflictual workplace relations which was suggested to result from the intensifying "Taylorisation" by some authors (e.g. Kern and Land 1991) (see chapter 3) cannot be supported. The case study presented a specific mixture of optimizing a "Tayloristic" work organisation, while introducing more flexibility and higher quality standards, practicing some "paternalistic" personnel policies, and bargaining with the relatively strong works council in a mostly cooperative way.

Thus, as with the works councils in the GTB survey and perhaps even to a slightly larger extent, the Bodywear works council could be characterized as being cooperative, but at the same time not an "extended arm of management". It was however concerned with keeping the interests of the workforce on the agenda. Yet, the works council saw the need for working together in order to achieve the most for both the firm and the workforce. Overall, the survey data provides more specific answers regarding the extent and quality of

the cooperative relationship and contributes to previous studies such as by Ermischer and Preusche (1992) who achieved their finding of cooperative workplace relations on a rather weak methodology.

It should be noted that the data of the case study and the GTB survey did not intend to investigate the origins and reasons for this cooperation. In the case of Bodywear it could be traced back to the personal relationship among the actors on both sides.¹¹⁶ However, the retirement of the chief councillor (Autumn 1995) seemed not to have affected workplace relations in any significant way, at least not in the short-term, according to the vice councillor who took over the post (interview October 1995). In addition, it might be not so much the personality of the chief councillor and of the chief executive, but rather a legacy of the cooperative workplace climate of the socialist past which accounts for the current workplace relations. However, the case study does not provide data on the former socialist workplace relations and thus cannot contribute to the discussion in chapter 2, but it does provide some limited evidence that workplace relations did not become more conflictual after privatisation, as has been suggested in various studies (see chapter 3). This might indicate that workplace relations also were "cooperative" in former times. Finally, the cooperative relations at Bodywear could also be due to specific, favourable conditions. Thus, the original worker council at Bodywear was installed in 1989/90 in order to explicitly improve interest representation, thus neither to install self-management of the workers, nor to become a management consultant or administrator of the reorganisation. It could be argued that the specific circumstances in this company supported more independent interest representation. Thus, management did not really need the worker council to discipline the workforce in the beginning. The early replacement of the director secured management authority. Furthermore, the early connections with the western investor and an unproblematic relationship with the Treuhand prevented the works council from becoming a wholesale management accomplice. Consequently, the works council dealt and deals with far more favorable conditions than those of lots of other East German textile firms, and might have it easier in maintaining cooperative relations with

¹¹⁶ See Kotthoff (1994) who emphasized the importance of personalities in shaping workplace relations.

management. Yet, as said above, it is difficult to pinpoint a single reason for this cooperation, a mixture of various factors might be the most likely explanation.

Finally, the case study cannot support many of the listed problems inhibiting works councils' effectiveness as outlined in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). For example, the workforce is quite homogeneous (no part-timers, short-term workers, "ABMler") which makes the works councillors' work that bit easier. With regard to the problem of the lack of experience, the interview material did not provide any indicators to suggest that knowledge or "tacit" skills necessary for effective interest representation are lacking. Both councillors seemed very knowledgeable with regard to the legal regulations (as also mentioned by Lippold et al. 1992 and others). Finally, the relationship between union and council has been stable and cooperative throughout the last few years, and also the disagreement over the token strike did not seem to have challenged the overall relationship (according to the works councillor and chief union official, interview, October 1995).

So, in this respect the works council should work effectively, the data does not however tell us anything about the workers' views yet. In addition the data provides some indicators for the successful institutionalisation of the works council at Bodywear (e.g. management accepts and cooperates with the works council; the existence of formal work agreements). Less data on these issues are available in the case of the works councils of the GTB survey. However, as said before "cooperation" does not necessarily imply that the works council is effective in representing workers' interests. And the data says nothing about workers' acceptance of the works councils. The institutional approach is thus not appropriate for addressing these issues. As argued in chapter 3 this can only be addressed by surveying workers' attitudes and behaviour, which will be done in Part 3 and 4.

CONCLUSION OF PART 1

"THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORKPLACE RELATIONS"

Part 1 introduced the socialist workplace relations as the starting point of the transformation focusing in particular on the workers' situation at that time. It then outlined the formal development of industrial relations institutions after unification, and the current workplace practices and problems of the interest institutions as seen in the literature. The final chapter of part 1 contributed to this literature review by outlining the transformation of the industrial relations actors of the textile industry, by analysing in depth the workplace transformation in one case study, and by examining management-works council relations through a survey of a sample of textile companies.

In short, part 1 implied two aims: firstly to present the current research issues and findings of the transformation of workplace relations based on the widespread institutional literature; and secondly to introduce the wider industrial and workplace relations context of the textile industry in general and of the case study in particular.

Some shortcomings of the institutional approach to workplace relations become evident. The approach neglects the workforce- works council and workforce- union relationship and their possible impact on the transformation of the interest institutions. According to this study these relationships have to be examined if one truly wants to understand the transformation process. For example, the finding that works councillors claim to have a harmonious work relationship with management does not tell us anything about the extent workers actually trust and accept the works council and also whether they perceive the works council as being effective in representing their interests. This might be a necessary precondition for the effective working of works councils. Thus, asking workers about these issues seems necessary in order to understand to what extent the union or works council has been institutionalised in practice. This is especially true in the face of the informal networks which existed on the socialist shopfloors and which might interfere today with the formalisation of interest representation (see chapter 2). In addition, workers' attitudes and behaviour can equally advance our understanding of the institutionalisation of West German unions in East Germany.

Another task of workforce investigations is to had to what extent the "harmonious" workplace climate in the examined textile companies has had an impact on the workers' relationship to management. Thus, does the workforce reveal low "them-and-us" feelings towards management and emphasize instead a unitarist "we"? Analysing worker's perceptions might also tell us something about the general success of the organisational transformation in terms of workers' acceptance and commitment to the changes.

In sum, the workforce survey should address firstly workers' perceptions (attitudes) of the organisational changes in order to get a better understanding of the success of the transformation at workplace level; and secondly it should investigate workers' perceptions of and reactions to the new interest institutions in order to advance the understanding of the institutionalisation process, and to get some idea about the extent to which the informal workplace relations have been formalised.

This will be dealt with in Part 3 by analysing textile workers' perceptions towards the transformation of workplace relations, and in Part 4 by exploring their reactions with regard to participating in collective activities. The next part, Part 2 will outline the theories and methodology of the workforce studies.

PART 2

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF STUDYING WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TOWARDS THE TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE RELATIONS

Part 1 of the study was devoted to providing an analysis of the transformation of workplace relations by focusing on the institutional actors. Part 2 introduces an alternative way of exploring the changing workplace relations through examining the perceptions of the workforce. The first chapter reviews the literature on worker attitudes pre- and post-1989 and identifies a major hypothesis of the individualisation of the East German workforce. The next chapter, chapter 6 provides the analytical tools to investigate workers' perceptions and (re)actions towards the transforming workplace relations. It outlines four major theoretical approaches to workers' willingness to participate in collective activities. The theories provide the conceptual tools for discussing workers' perceptions of the transformation of the work organisation and of the interest institutions, and they also provide explanations for individual differences in people's willingness to participate in collective activities. Finally, chapter 7 introduces the operationalisation of the theories in this study, it explores the possible interrelations of the theories, and reports the methodology of the empirical studies.

Chapter 5 Workplace relations from the viewpoint of the workforce: review of literature

This chapter commences by outlining the few existing studies on workforce attitudes in the GDR (5.1), and reviews the current literature on workers' attitudes towards the reorganisation of their workplaces, the works council and the unions (5.2). It then looks at the literature's explanations of workers' current reluctance to engage in collective activities (5.3). And finally, the increasing "individualisation" of the East German workers is characterized as one core hypothesis of this literature and further discussed (5.4).

5.1 Workers' attitudes in the GDR

Only very few formal studies on workers' attitudes, conducted in the GDR or current (retrospective) studies, exist. The arguments of this literature can be broadly summarized into five categories: (i) work group solidarity, (ii) them-and-us feelings, (iii) job satisfaction, (iv) interest representation, and (v) general "attribution" mechanisms. The purpose of this section is to provide some preliminary understanding of workers' former working lives in order to facilitate the analysis of possible legacies in workers' current attitudes and behaviour.

(i) work group solidarity

It is well-known that work was a central reference point in the East German life, much more than in western countries, and this has consequently left an impact on workers' former and possibly current mentality (Diewald 1995:235; Gensior 1992:273; Senghaas-Knobloch 1992). This is for example supported by Voigt's GDR study (1973:82)¹¹⁷ which found that only 30% of his surveyed workers wanted to stop working. This work

¹¹⁷ Study included participant observation, interviews and questionnaires, was done during the years 1965/66 in several construction sites across the GDR, sample of 911 questionnaires (response rate not known).

commitment can be still found today, as for example interviews with workers at Bodywear revealed. Whether asked whether they would want to continue to work if they had won in a lottery nearly all said yes, they could not imagine a life without work (see also chapter 8).

Diewald (1995) explained the importance of the working life by noting that the workplace is a prime social place (i.e. where you met your friends) with this in turn supported by the official social functions of the firm (e.g. company kindergarten, doctors). His data also revealed that the social relations of the workplace, i.e. informal networks (see chapter 2), were not only important for people's working lives, but also for their private lives.¹¹⁸ To what extent the former centrality of work evoked a strong "company identity" (e.g. Allen and Meyer 1990; Guest and Dewe 1991) was not the subject of research in the socialist era. However, some studies have been done on workers' identification with the work collective ("Arbeitskollektiv"). There is widespread evidence for this concept in retrospective studies (e.g. Alt et al. 1994: section 1.2; Diewald 1995: section 5; Gut et al. 1993:33; Lungwitz 1994:307), but also in the "real-time" study of Voigt (1973:93pp.). Yet, there is a debate as to what extent this "workgroup solidarity" or "collectivism" was caused by official policies (e.g. socialist education¹¹⁹, specific personnel policies such as "brigades" or group bonuses) or by the informal networks (e.g. Alt et al. 1994:58; Fritze 1993b:189). Or to use the terms of Etzioni, whether it was a calculative or a moral solidarity (Durkheim 1893; Etzioni 1975:10). Rottenburg (1991:322) for example argues for the former, "it was more conformity and compliance than commitment, more a "mechanistic solidarity" than a real solidarity on the GDR shopfloor" (see also Senghaas-Knobloch 1992). He claims that shopfloor solidarity was a fiction, an "emergency solidarity" which vanished once people were not dependent on each other anymore, and once competition over money and social status started (i.e. after Unification). According to Swartz (1990) the perceived community and warmth was only "the deceptive community feeling which only a ghetto can evoke", thus a "ghetto-solidarity" out of pure survival

¹¹⁸ He distinguishes between three meanings of the networks for the individual, which he labels "Kollektiv" (collective, working community), "Vitamin B" (connections, contacts), and "Nische" (niche). Firstly the informal networks supported and fostered the formal "Kollektiv". Secondly, informal networks were also a source for "Vitamin B" which would better allow people to obtain for example goods on the black market. And lastly, informal networks were also creating specific niches of privacy and security.

¹¹⁹ The working group was seen in the socialist ideology as the essential core of the socialist state (like a family) (e.g. Autorenkollektiv 1983:77; Diewald 1995:258).

instinct which inevitably breaks down after "liberation". In short, these writers are sceptical about the quality of the "emotional" character of the informal networks and argue that the solidarity of the work collective should be better described as a "cosiness within the cage or prison". However, none of these writers precisely defines concepts (e.g. solidarity) nor backs them up with more than impressionistic empirical data.

On the other side authors such as Gensior (1992:273) interpretes the informal networks as a real "work community" and stress the emotional importance of these collectives. The "Kollektiv" also stood for collegiality, warmth, friendship and solidarity (e.g. Alt et al. 1994:54; Gut et al. 1993:33; Schmidt 1995:5). Finally, Diewald (1995) provided evidence for the co-existence of various, calculative and emotional, roles of informal networks in people's personal lives. Supporting this view one might also suggest that the impact and value of informal networks differs according to the type of worker (e.g. "core" highly-skilled worker or "peripheral" worker).

(ii) them-and-us feelings

Some authors argue that them-and-us feelings (them= management, us= workforce) did exist in former times (e.g. Haraszti 1974:151, 1977; Kern and Land 1991; Voigt 1973:109). According to the study of Kern and Land¹²⁰ it was typical for East Germans at their work or in public to make a sharp distinction between "top" and "bottom": between the world above (of politicians, directors, and superiors — who make workers' lives more difficult) and their own world. Some writers (e.g. Kreißig 1992) argue that this orientation resembled the "them-us" feelings of workers in West Germany in the 50s (e.g. Popitz et al. 1957). However, no study has explicitly or in depth dealt with these feelings. Voigt for example based his analysis on just one question ("if there are problems on the building site, what are the causes?"; with the following answers to choose from: administration/headquarters, brigade, supervision of the site, do not know"; result: 74% chose administration). In addition, one might ask whether this kind of question is an appropriate

¹²⁰ Based on a case study and other unspecified empirical material of a major project of the SOFI Institute Göttingen and Humboldt University Berlin.

measurement of the concept one which does not instead measure "causal" attribution (see also chapter 7). Furthermore, it remains to be discussed whether these them-and-us feelings existed for the same reasons as in the West (see also chapter 8). Voigt (*ibid.*) for example argues that the dichotomy between top and bottom existed independently of property and class relations, yet again does not provide evidences.

(iii) job satisfaction

With regard to workers' job satisfaction in the socialist enterprises there were only very few reliable studies conducted in the GDR (e.g. Miethe et al. 1989; Voigt 1973). The overall finding is that most workers were dissatisfied with their working conditions.¹²¹ In Miethe's study 77% of the responding workers were "totally dissatisfied" with their working conditions in 1989. A national representative study of employees (IU88, 1988) was more detailed and showed that in 1988 68% of the respondents (1037 persons) were satisfied with the collegiality at their workplace, but only 43% with their participation rights¹²², 33% with their performance-related pay, and 23% with their working conditions (quoted in Gensicke1992:17). Only 39% were satisfied or very satisfied with their work in general. This is in contrast to the more positive results of a previous survey conducted in 1977 (IU77). Voigt (1973:75) found in his study in 1965 that more than 50% of the building workers were "more or less" satisfied with their work, however asked about their general associations if they hear the word "work" (positive, negative, half and half), most workers answered "half and half". Asked whether they would generally like to change their job 40% said no, 25% said yes and 35% were undecided. Voigt compared this with the results of that question in a survey of West German workers (Mannesmann AG, 1955) which resulted in 70% saying no. He concluded (p. 80) that the building workers (being

¹²¹ Similar findings are reported from other Eastern European countries (e.g. Blanchflower and Freeman 1993).

¹²² There is evidence that employee participation, which was in theory quite extensive (see chapter 2), was in reality restricted (e.g. Party directives and economic plans limited the discretion and impact of participation) (Voigt 1985:478). Asked people whether they thought they could participate at their workplace, 3% answered yes, 47% no (Voigt 1973:126). On the other side, people expressed a strong wish for codetermination on pay, piece rates, job shift, working times, the distribution of tools and work, the distribution of flats and holiday places, and the selection of brigade leaders (*ibid.*:126).

the best paid workers in the GDR) had a lower job satisfaction than workers in West Germany. This seems to be a hasty conclusion, since the comparability of the surveys is not discussed.

Furthermore, Voigt argued that "socialist work commitment"¹²³ was not established in reality and that workers had instead a highly instrumental approach to work (p.86). For example, more than 90% of his sample perceived their pay as too low (p.81). In addition, 71% gave the high pay as a reason for becoming builders, and for slightly more money they would consider changing their job (p.121). However, dissatisfaction with pay does not exclude a commitment to work and so his conclusion seems again premature. Finally, Voigt (1985:470) explained the increasing job dissatisfaction during the 1980s by the fact that the qualifications of workers were increasing in the late 1970s and 1980s but not the standards of people's work (also Graf and Miethe 1990:1003). In addition, an increasing dissatisfaction with the political system and the economic stagnation during the 1980s was brought into the workplace. Voigt argued further that the protest manifested in a high inclination to escape, a retreat into privacy (and niches) and an internal withdrawal from work (1985:467). And Fritze proposes that after years of a planned economy the workforce lost their belief that the plants belonged to themselves, or that their contribution and effort mattered or paid off (e.g. Fritze 1993b). However, both lack direct evidence for their observations.

Overall, the methodology of these studies is not without problems. For example, the use of very few, broad questions to tackle the multi-dimensional concept of job satisfaction, the failure to examine causes for the job dissatisfaction, and the small empirical basis all of which prevents any generalising of the findings to the whole of the East German workforce. Nevertheless, they give an idea of the discrepancy between socialist ideology or official propaganda and the real situation on East German shopfloors. Voigt's study which although not readily generalisable to the whole East German workforce, provides an

¹²³ Socialist work commitment (Sozialistische Arbeitsmoral) was the aim of the socialist education. People should work out of their commitment to the socialist community, not for money or individual ambition.

especially interesting case, since construction workers were among the best paid workers in the GDR and had a key position in terms of work autonomy.

(iv) interest representation

Voigt's (1973) study is one of the only GDR studies which investigates the relationship of worker to union and Party. No current study deals with this issue. Again, his findings are not generalizable, but they nevertheless provide some interesting insights. To his question whether the FDGB or the SED represented workers' interests on the site: 74% answered no and only 7% yes. Most said "they are all in cahoots with each other". This is in line with an earlier made hypothesis that the socialist system lacked an effective institutional interest representation of workers. Furthermore, to the question about what would they say to a colleague who is not a union member, 56% said "it's his/her own business", 26% "good", only 2 out of 911 criticised the colleague. Thus, the fact that despite this devastating judgement union density in the GDR was extremely high (97% according to Glaesner 1989:211) supports the earlier argument that the main reasons for joining the FDGB lay elsewhere (i.e. its social functions).

(v) causal attribution

There is a large (retrospective) literature on the psychological attribution mechanism of East Germans. According to Stratemann (1993:16)¹²⁴ people in socialist regimes tended to externalize the causes of their problems and circumstances and avoided internal attributions. Externalizing also means delegating responsibility to external authorities, another suggested East German characteristic (Alt et al. 1993:31). In other words the cause of a social phenomenon was seen to be largely outside of oneself. This often made sense. For example, decisions about one's career were very much in the hands of the directors and planning committees. Even decisions about which profession one would like to pursue

¹²⁴ Based on an empirical study of the Institute for Economic Psychology (WIP) Dortmund, which is unfortunately not further described in this article.

was not a purely personal decision. People learned that most important situations in their lives, as well as many day-to-day decisions, were more or less out of their control. Marz (1993a:11) pointed out that people also tended to make external attributions for their own failings/failures. He argued that, knowing what a burden it was to take on individual responsibility in the system, without any incentives or normative pressures to do so, and with the possibility of avoiding this responsibility, people became reluctant to assume responsibility. For example, teachers were responsible for good marks, doctors for one's health, the work collective for one's day-to-day well-being, the union for holiday places, the state for social security and so on.

It seems likely that this habit had an impact on people's personal and social identities. Avoiding personal responsibility makes one dependent on the system, and on others, and hinders the establishment of a realistic perception of oneself (Marz *ibid.*). It has been argued therefore that people often had a theoretical, unreal conception about themselves, "if I only could as I want, I would...". Peoples' self-esteem and social identity¹²⁵, it was claimed, was mainly based on these hypothetical convictions (e.g. Alt et al. 1994:69; Belwe 1991; Marz 1993b). Besides, the permanent "double life" (Henrich 1989: 109; Rottenburg 1992: 245) of the formal and informal/ private roles made it more difficult of establishing a "normal" social identity (Marz 1992:230). Marz added that identity and individuality certainly did exist in the GDR, but that they were more restricted to the private niches and could not effectively develop in the official work environment. The open question then is what implications that might have for the current attitudes and behaviour of the East German workers. Thus, it would be no surprise to see today a continuation of "external" attribution habits and the avoidance of individual responsibility.

In sum, the few studies of workers' attitudes contribute to the literature on former socialist workplace relations discussed in chapter 2 in that they provide some evidence that workers in the GDR were dissatisfied with certain working conditions, felt some sort of them-and-

¹²⁵ Defined as a voluntary membership in a group with value and emotional significance attached to that membership (see chapter 6).

us feelings towards management and a certain solidarity with their work colleagues. Most did not feel represented by the union, and attributed their work problems to external actors. The studies are not generalizable to the whole East German workforce, but nevertheless might help to interpret the attitudes of workers after Unification, which are discussed in the following.

5.2 Workers' attitudes towards the transforming workplace relations: review of current empirical studies

(i) Workers' attitudes towards organisational restructuring

There is a lack of research on workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the organisational transformation at their workplaces and towards the old or new management. The four empirical studies which are known to the author, will be briefly reviewed. Two of these are qualitative studies. Alt et al. (1991, 1992, 1994)¹²⁶ focused on workers' attitudes to transformation of workplace relations and companies' social policies ("Sozialpolitik")¹²⁷ and investigated "individualism" amongst the workforce. Lungwitz (1994a)¹²⁸ interviewed 130 employees (including 70 blue collars) on a variety of issues (e.g. attitudes to the market economy or to the former work "collective"), but did not explicitly look at people's reactions to organisational changes. More useful for our research are the two quantitative studies, Andretta et al. (1994)¹²⁹ and Heering and Schroeder (1992)¹³⁰, which will be

¹²⁶ Based on three intensive case studies of companies of the metal and steel industry in Saxony comprising open interviews (single and group) of 44 people (managers, white and blue collar workers) during 1992/1993.

¹²⁷ Referring to the socialist firms' duties regarding the social welfare of their employees (e.g. kindergarden, holiday places, doctors, leisure facilities...).

¹²⁸ The qualitative interviews took place in four companies of the automobile industry during 1991 and 1993, and are part of Mickler et al.'s project (e.g. 1992). No more details about the type of interviews are published.

¹²⁹ Semi-structured interviews with 84 employees in four companies in the metal and chemical industry (two green-field sites, one Treuhand owned, one privatised); this study is part of a large project at the SOFI institute, Göttingen, with a panel survey of 600 white and blue collars in training workshops on their views of re-training activities and on their perception and handling of the transformation as such.

¹³⁰ Quantitative survey: seven companies of various industrial sectors (metal, electro, chemical) around Dresden with questionnaires to the management and workforce (273 people, return rate 47.9%) in 1990/1991.

briefly outlined here and further discussed when analysing the workforce questionnaires in chapter 8 and 9. Andretta et al. retrospectively examined general job satisfaction as compared to former times. They found that 44% of the sample (66% for the privatised firm) were more satisfied after Unification, 27% were less satisfied and that for 29% there was no difference. Dissatisfaction with the pay-performance relation was high in all investigated firms (p. 13). Andretta et al. further concluded that the majority of workers had great problems in adapting to the changing "organisational life" and especially to the new work requirements. This is partly because it is difficult to change old work habits and attitudes (e.g. they observed the continued extensive incidence of breaks), and partly because of the new requirements which are perceived as being too high and often contradictory: e.g. simultaneous demands for efficiency and quality.

Heering and Schroeder (1992) investigated perceptions of the working conditions, of company restructuring, of work motivation, and of general attitudes towards unification. They found a highly motivated workforce, whose relationship to management was however less clear. On the one side a majority (61%) stated a positive general attitude towards management, but only 40% were persuaded of management's capacity to modernize the firm (p. 75).

In sum, both studies - although investigating slightly different issues - come up with a mixed picture of positive and negative attitudes towards the organisational changes.

(ii) Workers' attitudes towards the works council

The major argument of the few studies investigating this issue is that workers are disillusioned about the effectiveness of the works council in representing their interests. An obvious example is that of mass redundancies, which the East German works councils typically did not resist. Lippold et al. (1992:88)¹³¹ argue that earlier on (1989/90) workers were easily mobilised into collective action, but that when job reductions started they became disappointed about the limited power of the works council and their increasingly

¹³¹ As mentioned before the empirical basis is that of interviews with union officials, works councillors and managers.

subservient "co-management" role. There is also the widespread feeling of being increasingly excluded from management and works council decision-making, which makes the workforce retreat into individual survival strategies. Similarly, Andretta et al. (1994:13) observed in their sample that workers increasingly perceived their chances of realising their interests in the enterprise as low. Thus, only 12% of the sample totally agreed that "you can achieve your interests in the company quite well"; nearly the same amount (8%) agreed to the same question which related to the interest representation in the old socialist firm. They conclude that these new interest institutions have not yet achieved a significant change in these people's minds. Mahnkopf (1991:280pp) speculates that there is a general feeling that "co-management" resembles the old "triumvirat" negotiations — which evokes the perception that nothing has changed at all. That is, the works council often tries to be accepted by management as a reliable partner in difficult times instead of trying to gain trust and support among the workforce — without acknowledging that its power rests on this support, and that without it, management will not continue to accept them. The previously mentioned argument of the Berlin/Göttingen group (e.g. Jander and Lutz 1993) that works councils as an imported western institution have no legitimacy on the shopfloor, since they do not derive from any worker-led social movement at shopfloor level, is related to this.

Overall, the authors conclude that these problems result in a de-solidarisation within the workforce and a low commitment to the works council (e.g. Lippold et al. 1992:92; Spangenberg 1993:20). However, other sources report different, more positive results. For example, Mickler et al. (1992:17) found that in their sample works councils got more trust from the workforce than the union did. And the above mentioned study of Heering and Schroeder (1992:80) found that 76% of their sample had a positive attitude towards their works council and 71% towards the union (the precise question is unfortunately not published). Furthermore the large-scale survey, DGB Trendbarometer (IFEP 1994) which surveys a representative sample of the working population (employed and unemployed) every other year (since 1992 in the East and West), on their attitudes towards unions, shows that a majority of East German employees value the works councils' work in 1994, slightly more than in 1992, although they were still more critical

than in the West: in 1994 32% of East Germans valued the work (46% West Germans), 30% marked it negatively (25%).

The different findings might be partly due to the methodology used, i.e. the use of often vague, too general questions. Andretta et al. for example asked only the above quoted question on interest representation, which only says something indirectly about the works council. Lippold et al. based their statements on interviews with the institutional actors only. And Heering and Schroeder asked vague questions (e.g. "positive attitude towards the works council"). Thus, it seems useful to examine workers' perceptions of works councils in more detail, thus for example to focus on possible differences between workers' attitudes and their behaviour towards the works council. They might evaluate the works council's work critically, but still support it.

(iii) Workers' attitudes towards the union

Similarly, the relationship between the western unions and their members in the East is perceived as problematic. East German union members are declining in numbers and are generally seen as passive, individualistic, apathetic and having little interest in the union (e.g. Gut et al. 1993:50; Eidam and Oswald 1993:167; Fichter 1996:16; Zech 1993:28). As mentioned in chapter 1, there are virtually no specific empirical or theoretical studies on union members' attitudes and behaviour in East Germany during the current transformation. However, there are some accounts in the literature which will be briefly reviewed: some theoretical notions as to why East Germans joined the new western unions in 1990; and a few large scale attitudinal surveys with some questions on participation and other issues of union membership.

Reasons for joining the West German unions

With regard to the reasons for "joining" the western unions in 1990 most academics argue that people demonstrated a highly instrumental decision-making approach. For example,

Mahnkopf (1992:35) proposed¹³² that most members who joined the new unions after 1989 did so because the western unions were seen as highly successful and professional and because of the (selective) incentives, such as strike pay and legal advice (also Fichter 1994:56). Heidenreich (1991) adds that western unions were seen as belonging to the "successful" German model of industrial relations, and are even accepted by the successful western companies, which meant that the future economic prosperity might not be much at risk by having unions. Besides, they also symbolized successful interest representation (also Hildebrandt 1990:102). Thus, the East German workforce did not want any different development to West Germany but to take over that western "success" system. In addition, Kreißig (1990b: 2)¹³³ argued that the major reason for workers to join the new unions was to achieve security against the arbitrariness of employers and the impending job losses. However, Zech (1993:28) gave an example of the GEW (Gewerkschaft für Erziehung und Wissenschaft), union for teachers and academics, where West German union officials working in the East declared that East Germans just joined "out of habit" and now ask what the union is doing for them, thus prevailing a "consumption-oriented" attitude towards their membership.

Two points can be concluded: firstly, it seems that the overwhelming rejection of the FDGB had no bearing on people's acceptance of the new unions; and secondly, most members joined out of instrumental reasons. It has to be emphasized that none of these statements are backed up with direct evidence, if at all they are based on second-hand data (i.e. interviews with union officials rather than with the membership/workforce). Furthermore, even if joining was a conscious instrumental decision, and even if people were also instrumental in their decision to participate in collective action, it does not necessarily lead to "low participation" in further collective activities. Finally, the authors are not explicit as to what they mean by an "instrumental approach" and what the converse would be.

¹³² Based on her interviews with union officials, as mentioned before (chapter 3, footnote 48).

¹³³ Kreißig belongs to the WISOC research group, his arguments here are based on a survey of employees in companies in the area of Chemnitz in early 1990. Unfortunately no further details are provided.

Various issues of union membership

There are various statements about union membership in discussion of the problems West German unions face in the East. The common argument is, as mentioned before, that union members are passive, individualistic and instrumental and thus reluctant to support collective activities. However, these statements have not been tested explicitly. There are only a few large-scale attitude surveys, comparing the West and East German population, which contain some measurement of union participation and attitudes towards unions. For example, a well-known large scale study¹³⁴ on the East German population, "Sozialreport" (Winkler 1992:288) showed a decreasing willingness to participate in voluntary institutions such as political parties or unions (also Sozialreport 1993:27). However, they base this interpretation on declining union membership figures, rather than on any direct measurement of willingness to participate. There are four other surveys (Weßels, IPOS, Heering and Schroeder, and the DGB Trendbarometer) which incorporate some measurement and these will be briefly reported. Weßels (1992:16) used secondary panel data¹³⁵ to compare peoples' attitudes towards public institutions (political parties, occupational associations, unions, churches, environmental movements etc.) in West and East Germany. There were two questions on participation in union activities and two broader ones:

table 5.1: people's attitudes towards public institutions: selected questions from Weßels (1992:7)

a) how often have you recently joined events (meetings etc.) of unions, religious groups, occupational-, industrial-, social associations?			
<i>% of participation in union activity: (sometimes or often)</i>			
East Germany:	34%	(rank 5 out of 5)	(East average of all organisations = 40%)
West Germany:	26%	(rank 4 out of 5)	(West average of all organisations = 32%)
(highest rank = 1., lowest rank = 5.)			

¹³⁴ This is based on yearly representative surveys of the East German population on their social situation, living and working conditions, and of people's way of thinking, attitudes and behaviour changes.

¹³⁵ Wahlpanel, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1990: representative sample of adults in West and East Germany; Eurobarometer study no 34, WZB Berlin: representative sample of adults in West and East, 1990

b) have you recently read publications of your own organisation (e.g. union)?

% of yes answers:

East Germany:	61%	(rank 3 out of 5)	(East average of all organisations = 58%)
West Germany:	82%	(rank 3 out of 5)	(West average of all organisations = 82%)

c) do the following organisations (whether you are a member or not) represent your interests?

d) which of those organisations is the most important for you personally?

	East Germany (%)		West Germany (%)	
	I feel represented	most important organisation	I feel represented	most important organisation
unions	68.4	35.1 (1)	48.1	14.0 (2)
environmental groups	80.1	12.8 (2)	75.1	27.5 (1)
protestant church	22.1	5.4 (3)	23.9	2.6 (6)
civil movement	64.1	4.9 (4)	59.2	4.8 (4)
womens groups	33.3	2.4 (5)	37.1	4.2 (5)
catholic church	8.1	1.8 (6)	26.3	9.1 (3)
employer associations	16.0	1.0 (7)	25.1	1.0 (7)

In sum, participation in union activities got the lowest rank in East Germany (the highest participation rate was found in occupational organisations with 68%), but was slightly higher than in the West. Reading union journals was however a less appealing activity in the East than in the West (although this might perhaps be due to fewer publications being distributed in the East). On the other side, unions represented most people's interests in East Germany (second only to the environmental groups), which is higher than in the West, and were also voted as the most important organisations. Obviously this is partly due to the devastating labour market situation¹³⁶ being one of the most important issues which concerns the East German population (see population polls, Weßels 1992:8).

In short, the picture seems quite favourable for the unions. Other representative population surveys come up with similar findings. The Mannheimer Institute for Applied Social Science Research (IPOS) found that the East German population trusts unions (after the judiciary) more than they trust parliament, the police, the media, the government or political parties (Handelsblatt no 22, 2.2.1993, p.6). However, comparing the results of

¹³⁶ See also chapter 4.

1991 and 1992 the degree of trust is diminishing. Yet, trust in unions in the East was higher than in the West in both years (Gabriel 1993:9). The already mentioned study of Heering and Schroeder (1992) found an acceptance of the unions in their sample (71%). Unfortunately, the questionnaire design is not published.

The DGB Trendbarometer (IFEP 1994) is more negative. The overall conclusion is that union commitment (identity) and engagement is decreasing in both the West and East. Four examples are given. Firstly, regarding people's general expectations of unions in 1992, a majority of East Germans did not see their expectations fulfilled; in 1994 the figures were more positive and there is a growing similarity between the East and the West (the majority is happy). Secondly, regarding the general evaluation of unions' achievements since the "Wende" (turn around) West and East Germans were more critical in 1994 than in 1992: 49% of the total German membership were critical, 28% were more positive (1992: 42% bad, 36% good).¹³⁷ Thirdly, 54% of East Germans considered leaving their union in 1994, which was more than in the West (42%), but slightly less than two years previously, 59% (41%). Finally, there is the question as to whether people saw themselves as active union members: in 1994 20% of West and East Germans declared themselves active, in 1992 this figure was 27% (more East than West Germans then). This survey provides the most comprehensive data available, yet not all data is published, and questions are sometimes quite vague (e.g. with regard to general expectations of the unions).

Summing up this section (5.2) of current attitudes of the East German workforce the literature basically suggests that workers are dissatisfied with certain changes in their work environment, are disappointed about the works councils' effectiveness in representing successfully workers' interests, joined the unions out of instrumental reasons, regard the union as an important organisation and participate in certain collective activities more than their West German colleagues. However, there are methodological problems in some

¹³⁷ No differentiated figures for West and East are available.

studies, explanations for their findings are rare and in addition they do not provide a comprehensive picture of workers' views of all major aspects of workplace relations.

The membership surveys revealed two broad tendencies. Firstly, the East is adjusting to the West, and secondly the union is seen as a very important organisation especially in the East, even if perceptions of the unions' achievements are critical and participation with regard to the asked issues is low (but higher in East than in West). Unfortunately, these studies do not provide us with explanations for these findings. They have also not investigated the "institutionalisation" from a workers' viewpoint or the hypothesis of "the passive, individualistic union member" in detail. Only Weßels' survey provided a first indicator that workers accept and trust the new interest institutions, and his question about whether people went to union events and read union publications indicated the excessive simplicity of the proposition of "passive union members in East Germany" and the need for more detailed research.

Other authors however do propose significant passive behaviour with regard to collective activities on the part of workers and offer some theoretical explanation but with little empirical work or without referring to the above discussed studies. They will be briefly outlined in the next section.

5.3 Explanations of workers' reluctance to participate in collective activities

The explanations which exist in the literature are of a theoretical nature only and can be summarized in five statements: (i) "there is a legacy of the former passivity of workers", (ii) "collective action is not perceived as effective in pursuing workers' interests", (iii) "unions are not regarded as effective in representing workers' interests", (iv) "workers have no moral commitment to the union", and (v) "workers are becoming individualistic".

(i) "there is a legacy of the former passivity of workers"

Most authors refer to socialist socialisation (and thus to a specific East German "mentality"¹³⁸) and try to find psychological explanations for the supposed continuing passive behaviour (e.g. Belwe 1991, 1992; Hofmann and Rink 1993; Marz 1993; Pollack 1991; Schöbel 1993; Stratemann 1993; Woderich 1992). In essence this literature assumes specific characteristics of the East German personality in comparison to that of West Germans (e.g. East Germans put more emphasis on "order" and stick to their principles, they are more norm-oriented, more reliable, have their behaviour more under control, are less open, less flexible and autonomous, e.g. Becker 1993:24). The key thesis with regard to the unions is that the socialist system of paternalistic "caring and social security" ("from the cradle to the grave" or "custodial state", Henrich 1989), i.e. the bureaucratic paternalism of the enterprises (Deppe and Hoß 1989) had psychological consequences which reduced individual activism and involvement in former times and today also (e.g. Marz 1993b:78). For example, Mahnkopf (1991:278) regards self-confidence, self-responsibility, personal initiative, or pro-activity as virtues which the socialist system sanctioned negatively. She argues that the formerly common state/institution-oriented way of thinking ("staatsgläubig", i.e. "union is in charge...") has not yet vanished, but has expanded to include expectations about the government ("Kohl promised us...") and politics in general (also Heidenreich 1991). Kreißig (1990) adds that the common (and official) thinking in categories of the "community" ("Gemeinschaft") in former times, which prohibited the classical conflicts of distribution ("Verteilungskonflikt"), and the fact that the enterprises belonged to all and therefore nobody really felt responsible, is a legacy which now hinders union members' mobilization. Furthermore there is the observation that the East German workforce regards the market economic system as intrinsically "rational" and therefore one which takes their interests into account automatically, thus implying that individual activity is not necessary (Mahnkopf 1991:278; Kern and Lang 1991).

¹³⁸ Others speak of a "socialist mentality", "captive mind" or "homo sovieticus" (Milosz 1953; Sztompka 1993:245).

Overall, a correlation between former socialisation and the assumed passive attitudes and behaviour of today might at first sight seem plausible. Convincing evidence however is more difficult to provide. Ideally it requires an examination of the impact of the former socialisation processes on people's current behaviour and attitudes. Thus, one would need to show that current behavioural patterns are due to the former socialisation (and thus due to specific East German mentalities), and not due to the possible structural constraints in today's environment.

(ii) "collective action is not perceived as effective in pursuing workers' interests"

Some authors explain that workers' passivity is due to the current economic recession. This relates to the well-known, but ever-simple argument that collective action is lower in recession than in boom periods. For example, Augustin and Sprenger (1992:38) argue that people in general are afraid to make use of their "freedom of speech" at their workplace, because they fear being sacked (also Kurbjuhn and Fichter 1993:39; Lippold et al. 1992). Lippold et al. quote: "when one employer announced at the company assembly that out of the existing 94 employees only 30 will stay, there was a deathly silence — nobody stood up to say anything, everybody was sitting there hoping that by not attracting any attention he/she would be one of the 30" (p.36). Their perception of the instrumentality of collective action was similar: "striking only makes sense if you can refuse to work and damage the employer, but in our situation we don't damage the employer, because there is no work anyway" (p.37).

However, the instrumental approach to collective action is taken for granted and not further discussed. One might ask whether the authors regard this as an universal approach or do they see it as a specific legacy of the former instrumental attitudes to the FDGB. The latter argument is developed by Klinzing (1992:20)¹³⁹ who proposes that workers had an entirely consumption-oriented, cost-benefit approach to the former trade union, which

¹³⁹ Based on documentary and statistical material of the DGB unions, literature review, and personal interviews with union officials in the East.

continues today. Thus, in the light of the current depressed labour market situation, the perceived costs of participation are just too high. There is unfortunately insufficient data on workers' former attitudes to the FDGB (see section 5.1) to sustain this assumption.

Another "structural" argument, which is sometimes emphasized, is that of company size. Most East German industries now consist of small or medium firms, the workplace relations in which could be more paternalistic and company-focused than in large companies, and thus collective action is less dominant (Lippold et al. 1992:99).

(iii) "unions and works councils are not regarded as effective in representing workers' interests"

It is suggested that East Germans still expect the trade union to fulfill the holistic caring role of former times and are now disappointed about the limited service which the West German unions provide (e.g. David 1992:133). For example, they are disappointed about the closure of the former "help lines" of the union which absorbed complaints and proposals, and in the event of legal difficulties or conflicts of interest, the union officials sprang more or less automatically into action with a phone call (Mahnkopf 1993:17). Mahnkopf argues (again on her rather limited empirical basis as outlined in chapter 3) that East Germans therefore have an even higher expectation of unions as pure service and insurance institutions than their western colleagues. Furthermore, because the (West) German unions provide fewer social services than the FDGB did, and also maintain a lower profile on the shop floor (e.g. no union stewards), wage agreements emerge as the primary and most tangible union "service" to the East German worker (Mahnkopf 1993:14). As unions are currently not seen to be doing well in pay bargaining, there is a strong disappointment among their members.

A different argument is that people were highly disappointed by the former "farce of interest representation" of the socialist unions and so continue to have a sceptical, disillusioned image of the union (e.g. Bialas and Ettl 1993:72; Eidam and Oswald 1993:167). For example, Klinzing (1992) proposes that today's union members often elect their union officials/ stewards in order to relieve themselves of any activity. She interprets

this passivity and wait-and-see attitude of members as an alienation from the union which she believes will take a long time to overcome. Moreover, if all FDGB members were indeed highly dissatisfied than they surely did not join the new unions. With the massive numbers of East Germans who joined the new unions in 1990 one has wonder how dissatisfied these members have really been.

(iv) "workers have no moral commitment to the union"

Workers have no "moral" relationship to the union, they do not identify with union politics and are therefore not willing to become active (e.g. Fichter 1994:56). Fichter adds that examples of strong membership identification are only available where members have actively participated in conflict situations (e.g. mining strike in Bischofferode 1993 or the metal strike 1993). Three reasons for workers' lack of union identity are mentioned.

Firstly, there is the argument that due to the centrality of the workplace in socialist times (see 5.1) workers still identify strongly with their enterprise and management and therefore do not commit themselves to the union. Gensior (1992) for example found in her survey¹⁴⁰ that employees had a strong emotional link to their company (also Dathe and Schreiber 1993:10; Ruppert 1994:284). According to Lippold et al. (1992:95) the high incidence of company identity (i.e. perception of "we are the owners", "Eigentümbewußtsein") is still observable today which fosters, in her opinion, company loyalty and lowers the conflict potential in the workforce. Yet, there are other authors who claim that company identity has not existed since the 1970s in the GDR (due to generational changes and the obvious official neglect of the factories' working conditions) (Hofmann and Rink 1993:33), and if at all is now decreasing as a response to the organisational changes, especially to the redundancies. However, these are assertions without evidence. For example, it would be necessary to investigate what kind of organisational identity or commitment did exist in former times (i.e. to the company as such, to the management, department, work collective, see Guest et al. 1993).

¹⁴⁰ Postal questionnaire to female employees of 115 companies of 16 industrial sectors, 675 questionnaires were returned (45%).

Furthermore, it is not evident why company and union commitment cannot co-exist (see the literature on dual commitment, e.g. Guest and Dewe 1991).

The second argument is that union members were not morally affiliated to the FDGB and have insufficient experience of being a member of a truly voluntary organisation, i.e. a social movement. In former times the union functioned as a department of the state, today the union only functions and has power through the support of its members. Thus, the new union members are not prepared for "solidaristic actions, open conflicts or for thinking in legally defined rights, demands and duties in the dual system of industrial relations" (Mahnkopf 1991:279, 1993:16). They are not familiar with the role of unions and duties of their members in the West (e.g. Heidenreich 1991)¹⁴¹. Another author, Klinzing (1992:20) relates this to the prevalence of the old consumerist attitude towards the union. Thus, the West German unions might need some time to get members "morally" and emotionally involved with their organisation. However, the question is that of whether the existing instrumental attitudes and union identity can co-exist.

Thirdly, and related, is the proposition of the wider lack of democratic values and attitudes in the East German population (e.g. Jander et al. 1990, 1991). Heidenreich (1991:33) takes workers' passivity during the peaceful revolution in 1989 as an indicator of the East Germans' apathetic attitude towards the fate of the labour movement. Also after the turnaround there was little movement within the firms to establish more democratic work organisation in terms of self-management (see chapter 3). This attitude is well described in the following quote: "better to earn 3000 DM per month and be exploited than 800 East Mark and participate (mitregieren)" (worker quoted in *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 5.2.1990). The suggestion is that there is no identification with the ideas of the labour movement or with industrial democracy and therefore no interest in collective action. However, it is debatable as to whether a general belief in the goals of the labour movement is really a necessary precondition for identification with the union or for collective participation.

¹⁴¹ On the basis of his empirical study, see chapter 3.

(v) "workers are becoming individualistic"

Lastly, the argument is that workers became (more) individualistic during the transformation process, which also diminished their commitment to the unions (e.g. Pollock 1991:280). For example, they might now prefer individualistic to collective actions. A representative opinion poll of the East German population (Allenbach-Umfrage, FAZ 13.4.1994) shows that "the solidarity among people" is perceived by 87% of their sample as decreasing. This for many authors also seems visible at workplace level: East Germans have experienced an individualisation and de-solidarisation process in their working lives (e.g. Alt et al. e.g.1994; Holst 1991; Hofmann and Rink 1993).

With regard to the explanation of the individualisation process in East Germany some authors argue that the people experienced the Unification and its consequences as a colonisation by West Germany and a forced intervention into their lives rather than something which resulted from their own initiative (Senghaas-Knobloch 1992:195). There is also the more abstract thesis that individualism is an inevitable consequence of the modernization processes in post-socialist societies (e.g. Pollock 1991:280; Zapf 1992). This argument is not without critics. Some authors indicate that the GDR as well as other countries in Central and Eastern Europe experienced a modernization and individualisation process in the last decade, which was sometimes even more dramatic than that in the West (e.g. Engler 1993:195).

Another argument, which puts the blame neither on the Unification process as such nor on general modernization processes, states that the rapid transformation resulted (inevitably) in high disorientation and insecurity in dealing with the new situation, a sudden and complete loss of formerly secure and stable personal and professional identities (i.e. who they were before, who they are now), material and social positions, and ideological beliefs (see Drawert 1993; Ehses 1993:132; Kurbjuhn and Fichter 1993:40; Marz 1992; Maaz 1991; Rottenburg 1992). There is a vast literature on the socio-psychological problems that people in general, and employees in particular, face during the turbulent times of societal transformation with regard to their norms, values, convictions, mentalities, identities, traditional behavioural patterns etc. (especially Marz 1993; also

Becker 1992; Brähler and Geyer 1995; Brähler and Richter 1995; Gensior 1992; Hofmann and Rink 1993; Holst 1991; Maaz 1990; Marz 1992; Rottenburg 1992; Senghaas-Knobloch 1992; Trommsdorff 1994; Woderich 1992). Some authors emphasize a widespread "identity crisis" (e.g. Belwe 1992; Maaz 1991; Rottenburg 1992). For example, Andretta et al. (1994:1) emphasize that workers have experienced a decline in their status in society: "I am a worker - who is less?" is the now more appropriate version of the socialist slogan "I am a worker - who is more?" (Nethöfel 1993:190; see also Berger 1993). Alt et al. (1994) who present what is currently the most comprehensive study in this area, propose that this process of individualisation has different characteristics from those in the advanced capitalist societies. They argue that the liberation of the repressive patronizing of the state in all spheres of life goes hand in hand with the dissolution of paternalistic caring and social safety nets and leads therefore to a state of extremely high uncertainty and insecurity. A general de-solidarisation is seen as a common individual reaction (also Andretta et al. 1994:110). Unfortunately, it is not specified whether workers de-solidarize for example with their colleagues, and/or with their company, and/or with their union. There is some evidence that for example the old solidarity within the work groups has broken down (Senghaas-Knobloch 92:298; Spangenberg 1993:20; Rottenburg 1991).

When evaluating research on "individualisation" one should keep in mind that this is work in progress. After a period of six years of unification final results cannot yet be expected (also Dathe and Schreiber 1993:3). However, the literature would benefit from a more precise definition of individualisation, in terms of workers' attitudes and behaviour. In addition, it is still not evident why the supposed "identity crisis" necessarily leads to individualisation. Another unclear point is whether this individualisation of East Germans is synonymous with the adaptation of West German "mentalities".

Overall, this section presented a variety of different propositions which tried to explain current workers and union members' supposed passive behaviour regarding the new West German unions. However, "passivity" is never properly defined in this literature (with regard to decisions to join, to participate in collective activities, or to act individually), nor

do these studies explain the link between certain attitudes (such as instrumentality) and the passive behaviour. Furthermore, they do not examine any possible interrelations between the explanations. Thus, is there any relationship, and if so of what sort, between "individualisation" and "instrumentality", and "union identity"? For example, are individualistic workers necessarily instrumental with regard to the union?

This study attempts to address these issues in a more structured way by utilizing a theoretical framework and by testing the propositions empirically. "Individualisation" is seen as the generic hypothesis in this discussion and thus should be defined in more detail. The following paragraph will briefly describe its meaning in the German sociological literature.¹⁴²

5.4 Individualisation

Beck, one of the leading German academics of the sociology of modernism, defines individualisation as "specific biographical aspects of the civilisation process" (1986:206). He analyses three dimensions. The first dimension refers to the release of historically given social living forms and relations (e.g. the dissolution of traditional power/control systems) which leads to increasing responsibilities and competences for the individual and to "emancipation" ("Freisetzungsdimension"). Beck gives three examples: the dissolution or pluralisation of social classes ("the dissolution of the proletarian milieu", Mooser 1983), especially with regard to their re-production habits; the changing social and economic position of women; and the flexibilisation of working time and the decentralisation of working location (e.g. mobility). The second dimension refers to the loss of traditional securities, unquestioned norms and beliefs, thus "loss of stability" ("Entzauberungsdimension"). The third dimension refers to the new control mechanisms as a form of social re-integration ("Kontroll-bzw. Reintegrationsdimension"). For example, the individual looses its traditional social bindings (e.g. social class or traditional family) but at the same

¹⁴² This literature is different to the more empirically oriented, psychological literature of individualism/collectivism which provides highly developed, complex measures of the two constructs (e.g. Hofstede 1980; Triandis 1994; Triandis et al. 1988).

time is forced into new controls and norms by new intermediary institutions (e.g. labour market requirements, standardisations of the "consumer society").

In addition to these three (horizontal) dimensions Beck outlines two (vertical) dimensions: the objective living situation ("objektive Lebenslage") and the subjective consciousness/identity ("subjektives Bewußtsein: Identität/Personwerdung"). The result is an a-historical model of "individualisation" which is presented in the six-field grid (see table 5.2), incorporating all different dimensions of individualisation. According to Beck one frequent misunderstanding is that individualism is equated with the top right field only.

table 5.2: Beck's dimensions of individualisation (source: Beck 1986: 207)

<u>Individualisation</u>		
	Living conditions (objective)	Consciousness/ self- identity (subjective)
Emancipation		
Loss of stability		
Form of control		

How could this concept be applied to the East German situation? Firstly, one could argue that with regard to the horizontal dimensions the third dimension, control and reintegration, has not yet been established in East Germany and therefore one could speak more of an alienation than of an individualisation process. Thus, we might have observed an "emancipation" of the East German population from their socialist, dictatorial regime, and we have also seen the tremendous "loss of stability" in all parts of people's lives. In addition, new control mechanisms and regulations have been introduced (transferred from the West), but one might argue that they have not yet managed to re-integrate people into the new society.

Furthermore, the vertical division allows us to propose that an individualisation of the "objective situation" of the workforce (e.g. job insecurity) has happened, but that this is not necessarily accompanied by an individualisation of their "identities" (e.g. identification with the union). Thus, the table suggests that the process of individualisation

has not yet finished, indeed it questions whether at this stage one can speak of an individualisation at all. For example, is it not necessary to observe decreasing social "identities" in order to talk of individualisation? Beck unfortunately does not outline the possible dependencies and interrelations of the variables. Implicitly however he argues that only if the two bottom fields are realized can one speak of an "individualised" social entity.

To conclude, the complexity of Beck's definition sheds doubts on the widespread and simplified use of this concept in the debate on the transforming East German workforce.

Going a step further one can elaborate on Beck's "consciousness" dimension and create two sub-categories, attitudes and behaviour. Thus, we may observe an increasing individualisation of behavioural patterns, but not necessarily of attitudes. Both categories should be therefore kept theoretically and empirically separate. The literature on "individualisation" in East Germany discussed above does not distinguish between these concepts. In contrast, the argument of this study would be that as long as one can observe only individualised behaviours the thesis of the complete individualisation of the East German workforce cannot be sustained.

It is proposed that one way of analysing workers' possible individualisation tendencies is to focus on their attitudes and behaviour towards their interest institutions, in particular with regard to their participation in collective activities. Thus, individualisation will be conceptualised as a generic term and divided into "individualistic" attitudes and "individualistic" behaviour.

As presented in table 5.3 "individualistic" attitudes of workers will be characterized by a number of dimensions, without determining which might be necessary or sufficient dimensions. It is rather a preliminary list of various attitudes which will be further discussed in the following chapters. The dimensions characterize the variables of the workforce surveys which are introduced in the next chapter. Possible interrelations between the variables will be investigated in Part 4. "Individualistic behaviour" of workers will be characterized by a low willingness to participate in collective activities.

In sum, this differentiation enables us to transcend the very general debate about the rise of individualism and to think much more precisely about different facets of collectivism and individualism. It also enables us to recognize that there may be disjunctures between the different facets of collectivism, so that, for example, the absence of collective activities in a particular workplace in and of itself tells us nothing about the degree of collectivist attitudes or of group identity amongst the workforce (see also Kelly 1996, chp.5:4). In other words, people might not show strong willingness to participate in collective activities, but might still have strong collectivist attitudes. The latter might be seen as partially leading to the former in the future if conditions change.

table 5.3: dimensions of "collectivism" and "individualism"

dimensions	"collectivism"	"individualism"
behaviour	active behaviour: strong willingness to participate in collective activities	passive behaviour: low willingness to participate in collective activities
attitudes	perceived strong instrumentality of interest institutions + coll. activities	perceived low instrumentality of interest institutions + coll. activities
	union identity	no union identity
	workgroup identity	no workgroup identity
	them-and-us feelings	no them-and-us feelings
	interest in collective issues	no interest in collective issues
	general collectivist attitudes	general individualistic attitudes
	"collective" approach to collective participation: union identity = major antecedent	instrumental approach to collective participation: instrumentality of institutions/collective activities = major antecedents

Conclusion of Chapter 5

In sum, this chapter provided an overview of the existing accounts of workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the transformation of industrial and workplace relations. It revealed

various shortcomings in the literature and in particular a lack of empirical evidence and theoretical underpinnings. The major hypothesis which evolved is that of the individualisation of the East German workforce, which has to be tested in terms of the various attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of individualisation.

Including Part 1 of this study, our debate has now identified the two main themes which have to be examined in more detail in the workforce surveys to follow: The first topic is works council/union - workforce relations from the viewpoint of the workforce and hereby as one major theme the institutionalisation of the interest institutions (see Part 1): thus are unions and works councils becoming institutionalised from the workers' point of view (i.e. regarding the attitudes and behaviour which indicate workers' acceptance and support of the new institutions)?

The second topic is the individualisation of workers (regarding the above mentioned dimensions), and one major question will be whether East Germans workers become passive and instrumental regarding collective activities. The two topics are interrelated, in that individualism might have an impact on the institutionalisation and functioning of the interest representation. Thus, one could argue that individualistic workers will be less likely to accept the works council and the union as their representatives. The next chapter will provide us with the analytical categories to approach these issues in a more systematic way.

Chapter 6 Explaining participation in collective activities

This chapter reviews the literature on workers' participation in a variety of forms of collective activities. It focuses on four social psychological theories, which will be tested in this study: the more traditional frustration-aggression theory and the theories of rational choice, social identity, and "micro-mobilization".

The chapter has two purposes. It provides firstly the analytical tools to examine workers' perceptions and reactions of the transforming workplaces and interest institutions (see Part 3). Placing the discussion of workers' attitudes and behaviour in a theoretical framework is especially welcomed given the absence of theoretical concepts in most existing discussions of the workplace transformation in East Germany (see chapter 5).

Secondly, the reviewed theories provide alternative explanations for people's behaviour towards collective activities, thus who participates and why. Investigating people's inclination to collective participation contributes to the question whether East German workers are becoming "individualistic" (is the supposed passivity of workers reflected in a highly instrumental decision-making process?). Moreover, the theories' cross-cultural applicability is tested (the theories have been primarily developed and tested in an anglo-saxon setting). Thus, one may investigate which theories are significant predictors of participation, and whether East German workers show significantly different participation patterns than those known in western studies.

The chapter starts with defining "participation" and provides an overview of the variety of existing theories of participation (6.1). It briefly reviews some traditional theories (6.2), and then focuses on the three recent social psychological theories (6.3). The chapter finishes with some remarks concerning the applicability of these theories.

6.1 Theories of participation: overview

There is no common definition or measure of participation in collective activities. Most studies tend to focus on a number of quantifiable indices of union member participation,

such as attending meetings, voting in a union election, filing grievances, reading union literature, holding union office and participating in industrial action. Unions are defined with regard to their nature as social movements (i.e. labour movement). Thus they are seen as membership organisations which generate particular sets of beliefs and to which members feel an attachment (see Tilly 1978:9).

There is no substantial literature on the participation in works council activities (which is not a research topic either in the German or Anglo-saxon literature). It shall be presumed, however, that the theories of union participation can also be applied, perhaps with certain amendments, to other collective activities such as those initiated by the works council. It should be remembered that works councils and unions are not competing institutions with regard to workers' commitment, but have their clearly defined and complementary areas of activities. In addition, most works councillors are also active union members.

There is also no agreement on the differences between union action, industrial action, collective action or collective activities. "Collective activities" will be used as the generic term to describe all activities initiated by a group of workers, a union or a works council. Collective or industrial action is then just one specific form of activity, which typically takes a more militant form.

Participation in union activities emerged first as a major research topic in the U.S. in the 1960s (e.g. Spinrad 1960; Tannenbaum 1965; Anderson 1978), and later in the UK (e.g. Nicholson et al. 1981), but has never done so in Germany, where union research is traditionally biased towards the analysis of institutions.¹⁴³ The following sections will outline the major approaches in the mainly Anglo-Saxon literature to individual *willingness* to participate in collective activities which seek to account for variations in this

¹⁴³ In Germany there was a stream of work in the 1960s examining union democracy (e.g. Bayer 1979) and workers' (class) consciousness in sociological and political terms (e.g. Kern and Schumann 1985; Popitz et al. 1957), but membership behaviour or the micro structures of the unionisation process were not frequent topics of interest at that time and are still not today. An exception is Nickel's (1972) study of the relationship between blue collar workers and union, which comprised several surveys on motives to join or leave the union. Even there, the underlying causes of people's decisions were not analysed. There are also a few studies in the 1980s on workers' attitudes towards collective interest representation, with particular emphasis on the effects of the recession (e.g. INFAS study: Bertl et al. 1989, Feist et al. 1989 and Krieger et al. 1989; Prott 1993; Wiedenhofer et al. 1979; Research group "metal strike": Zoll 1979, 1981, 1984) and the annual DGB Trendbarometer and its interpretations (e.g. Schreiber 1995 on the IG Metall survey). However none of these studies investigate the reasons for peoples' willingness to become active. According to Weischer (1993) there exists no other, more recent major studies on union membership in Germany.

participation. In other words, we will not be concerned with the *process* of participation or on mobilization itself (e.g. Kelly and Nicholson 1980 on the social process of strikes; Zurcher and Snow 1981). The literature is similar to the mainly US literature on unionisation (voting) and joining decisions (e.g. Barling et al. 1992: chp.3; Block and Premarck 1983; Cregan and Johnston 1990; DeCotiis and LeLouarn 1981; Hartley 1992; Heneman and Sandver 1983; Hills 1985; Premarck and Hunter 1988; Schriesheim 1978; van de Vall 1970: chp.4; Zalesny 1985).

Theories of antecedents (or predictors¹⁴⁴) of individual participation have been classified and discussed in various ways. Barling et al. (1992), in a comprehensive review of participation, distinguish between demographic, personality, work-related, union-related, non-work related, and structural predictors. Kelly and Nicholson (1980) in a study on strikes differentiate between environmental, institutional, sociological and psychological factors. Guest and Dewe's (1988) study on why people stay in the union, distinguishes between structural factors, job dissatisfaction, frustration, rational choice theory and solidarity.

Another group of authors focuses more specifically on social psychological theories. Hartley (1992) differentiates between personal and occupational characteristics, job attitudes, social and instrumental beliefs (class consciousness and instrumentality of unions), and social networks (socialisation). Klandermans (1986b) focuses on psychological factors only and deals with frustration-aggression theory, rational choice theory and social interaction theory. Finally, Kelly and Kelly (1992) separate individual attributes (demographic factors and worker attitudes) and individual decision-making (based on expectancy-value theory and social cognition theory).

A broad classification between "traditional" and more recent approaches might be useful. The first category comprises macro/ structural explanations, demographic accounts, psychological characteristics and workers' attitudes, which will only be briefly reviewed

¹⁴⁴ Antecedents are not predictors in a strict sense, i.e. assuming causal inferences, but are only able to support diagnostic (attributional) inferences. Strict causal inferences cannot be produced with the type of empirical data normally available (e.g. cross-sectional rather than longitudinal).

(they have been extensively reviewed elsewhere¹⁴⁵). The second category focuses on social psychological theories dealing with the individual decision-making process. It is this second category of theories that this study will mainly focus on.

6.2 Traditional theories of participation

6.2.1 Structural approach to participation

This approach emphasizes four external or structural conditions which are said to influence the individuals' inclination to collective action: (i) the economic situation, (ii) the size of the company, (iii) technology, and (iv) the industrial relations context. The common proposition is that people participate in collective activities not because they are demographically, psychologically or attitudinally compelled to, but because their structural location in the world makes it easier for them to do so (see McAdam et al. 1988:707). In other words, it matters little if one is demographically or psychologically disposed towards participation if one lacks the structural vehicle to pull one into activity.

The standard argument is that the economic (as indexed by the state of the labour market) situation determines union members' behaviour. Thus, in times of economic crisis industrial action (e.g. strike rate) is low, whereas in prosperous times it is high (this could refer to short-term business cycles or long wave theories) (e.g. Ingham 1974; Kelly 1996a: chp. 8; Knowles 1952; Shalev 1983; Shorter and Tilly 1974).

Other authors refer to company size: an increasing size reinforces pro-union attitudes since it fragments the work community. For example the emerging social isolation in large plants leads to polarisation (the "size-leftism" hypothesis) (see Barling et al. 1992:116; Dewey et al. 1978:126; George et al. 1977; Ingham 1970; Parkin 1967; Prais 1977; Revans 1956).

A related argument refers to the organization of technology (e.g. division of labour, job interdependencies, work layout) as a crucial determinant of collective action (e.g.

¹⁴⁵ See for example Barling et al. (1992); Kelly and Kelly (1992); Klandermans (1986b).

Sayles 1958; Kuhn 1961). For example, Sayles relates the organisation of technology to personal interaction, group cohesion and power resources. One hypothesis is that team-work organisations are supportive of collective action, whereas individual piece-rate systems hinder the creation of collective interests and action.

Finally, there is a vast amount of literature on various industrial relations factors and their impact on collective action. Thus, Clegg (1976) argues that whether industrial conflict is manifested in the form of strikes will depend upon the existence and quality of joint regulatory mechanisms at the workplace. In addition, there are factors such as state intervention, trade union unity, growth of collective bargaining, changing union and management policies which are invoked to account for the alleged trends in collective activities (see Ross and Hartman 1960; Kochan 1980). A related type of theory deals with the industrial relations climate, i.e. the perceived nature of the relationship between labour and management (e.g. Anderson 1979; Brett 1980; Strauss 1977). The argument is that the climate will influence participation such that under conditions of a more hostile, non-cooperative relationship between management and labour, union participation will be greater (e.g. Bluen and Donald 1991; Kelly and Nicholson 1980; Stagner and Eflal 1982). A group of theories also suggests that characteristics in union officers such as the ability to communicate, accessibility and leadership in times of industrial conflict, enhance members' participation (e.g. Fantasia 1988; Fullagar et al. 1992; Hartley 1989; Kotthoff 1994; Nicholson et al. 1981). And finally, there is the hypothesis that the power of the union is a pivotal factor in strike causation and also in other forms of participation (Nicholson and Kelly 1980). For example, Dubin (1960) argues that conflict is a curvilinear function of the relative power of the parties, being lowest under conditions of mild disparity.

In sum, structural theories explain broad trends rather than variations in individual participation patterns. For example, although the labour market situation in East Germany and the predominance of small companies would suggest a low degree of participation, these theories do not explain why some people are nevertheless active. The theories also neglect to take other possible predictors and their interrelations into account (e.g. between the economic situation and industrial relations system and political situation or between

size, industrial sector and technology). Finally, some empirical studies found contradictory evidence¹⁴⁶, and some concepts such as the leadership of union officials also lack an underlying theory.¹⁴⁷

To conclude, these theories will not be tested in this study since they require cross-national or -sectional data. However, they might provide some suggestions for interpreting the levels of participation (rather than the determinants) in our sample. One could argue that these theories would predict a low level of participation in the East German (textile) industry with it being characterized by a devastated labour market, small company size, traditional work organisation with piece rate systems, and the existence of West German industrial relations institutions.

6.2.2 Demographic variables

Another stream of research has sought to answer the question as to why some people are more engaged than others on the basis of the individual characteristics of movement activists (McAdam et al. 1988:706). Particularly in the 1960s much research was aimed at establishing whether an active "trade unionist type" existed. Thus, analysts tried to discover the social and personal characteristics of union activists, such as age, gender, personality, occupation, seniority and wage level. Studies declared that union activists are *better educated* (McShane 1986; Oliver 1984), have a greater *occupational status* (Nicholson et al. 1981; Spinrad 1960), have been *socialized* in families whose members were unionized and actively involved (Purcell 1953)¹⁴⁸, enjoy *higher salaries* (Farber and Saks 1980; Kolchin and Hyclak 1984; Oliver 1984; Spinrad 1960; Strauss 1977) and are *full-timers* rather than part-timers (Geare et al. 1979) and *blue collars* more than white

¹⁴⁶ For example there is evidence that smaller rather than larger plant size facilitates collective participation (e.g. Lipset et al. 1956; Seidman 1953; Seidman et al. 1958; Spinrad 1960) and more recent studies do not find robust support for either interpretation (e.g. Allen and Stephenson 1983; Dewey et al. 1978; Gallie 1989:10). Furthermore, concepts such as technology or union characteristics have not been tested sufficiently (see Nicholson and Kelly 1980).

¹⁴⁷ For a more detailed critique see Barling et al. (1992), Kelly and Nicholson (1980) and Klandermans (1984b).

¹⁴⁸ Socialisation is used in this case as a demographic variable.

collars (Gallie 1989:9). The two most popular demographic variables however were *age* and *gender*.

With regard to *age* most research focuses on the relationship between age and joining the union rather than participation. There are three different hypotheses: younger workers are more likely to join the union than older colleagues¹⁴⁹, they are less likely¹⁵⁰, and that younger and older workers are both more likely to join than the middle age group¹⁵¹.

It is not clear whether all three interpretations can be easily applied to union *activity*, and which of the hypotheses is right. However, Kelly and Kelly (1992:247) note with regard to a largely empiricist literature on age and union militancy that it has produced conflicting results, shows dubious associations and has no body of theory.¹⁵²

With regard to the *gender* impact on participation there is widespread evidence that female employees are less likely to be union members than their male counterparts (e.g. Bain and Elias 1985; Bain and Price 1983:8), are less committed to the union and are less active (Gallie 1989:15; Gordon 1990; Lawrence 1994; Purcell 1979). Several studies trace it back to general gender differences in personality, perceptions and attitudes (e.g. Sydner et al. 1986) or to women's lower commitment to their employment (see Lawrence 1994). However, if one controls factors such as employment conditions (part-time/ full-time work), occupational mix (e.g. less female employment in male-dominated and traditionally unionized industries) and the degree of concern of unions to recruit such workers, studies find no gender difference in the willingness to join and stay in the union and with regard to their perceptions of union instrumentality (e.g. Bain and Elias 1985; Booth 1986; Fiorito and Greer 1986:161; Gallie 1989:17; Kochan 1979; Richardson and Catlin 1979:379).

¹⁴⁹ Because in comparison with older workers they are less loyal to the employer, less threatened by costly victimisation, more resentful of arbitrary treatment by management and more attuned to union ideology (e.g. Shister 1956)

¹⁵⁰ For example younger workers have higher turnover rates, which suggests a great reduction in the value of those union benefits associated with seniority, and are less ideologically bound to union values (e.g. Perline and Lorenz 1970; Richardson and Catlin 1979). They are also likely to be with the union longer (Glick et al. 1977; McShane 1986; Perline and Lorenz 1970; Strauss 1977).

¹⁵¹ In other words a curvilinear relationship according to Guest and Dewe (1988:183).

¹⁵² For example younger workers are militant because of the absence of financial commitments vs younger workers are less militant because of their weaker attachments to the firm and thus can resolve job dissatisfaction more easily through quitting. Some studies however found no relationship at all (see Klandermans 1986b).

However, no studies were found which specifically dealt with gender differences in participation.

Overall, most of the demographic studies and their call for a stereotypical union member have either very weak or inconsistent associations with measures of participation, and lack a clear body of theory, thus they justify their discussions on any grounds other than that they are proxies for more fundamental arguments (e.g. Barling et al. 1992:195; Gallagher and Strauss 1991; Kelly and Kelly 1992:247; Klandermans 1986b; Kolchin and Hyclak 1984; Nicholson et al. 1981).¹⁵³ However, since some variables such as gender and age are still commonly in use in most studies, they have also been included in this study. In addition, age is particularly interesting to test the generational effect between the older East German workers (having been socialised longer under socialism) and the younger generation. It could be argued that younger workers have become more individualistic than their older colleagues and are therefore more passive. The gender variable is interesting in this context because of the supposed equalizing gender politics of the socialist GDR state (see Feminist Review special issue, 1991). Thus, gender should then be a less significant determinant of participation than it is in western societies.

6.2.3 Workers' attitudes: job dissatisfaction

There is a large literature on workers' attitudes and union membership, of which only the most important concept of job dissatisfaction will be reviewed and tested.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ If the authors of demographic variables give an explanation for their findings they commonly refer to theories such as rational choice theory. For example, Oliver (1984) argues that the restricted engagement of "poor" workers in union activity is not due to apathy but to an acute free-rider problem in which costs of participation outweigh the individuals' share of the collective good (see also Bain and Price 1980 or Fiorito and Greer 1982 for explanations of union growth and decline and Shalev 1983 for the analysis of strike statistics).

¹⁵⁴ Due to space constraints the concepts of "alienation", "ideology" and "psychological characteristics" can only be briefly reviewed. Regarding "*alienation*", authors argue that activists are drawn disproportionately from among the marginal, alienated members of society (e.g. Kornhauser 1959). The idea is that it is the individuals' desire to overcome their feelings of alienation (both from the job and society) and achieve the sense of community they lack in their life that prompts them to participate in collective action (e.g. Tannenbaum 1952).

The concept of "*ideology*" differs in that it looks at specific non-work related propensities, i.e. arguing that causes of individuals' union-related behaviour lie outside the work context (e.g. Barling et al. 1992:110). Thus, close-knit working communities facilitate participation (e.g. Lipset et al. 1956;

Drawing on theories of cognitive consistency (Rokeach 1969), of cognitive balance (Bern 1967:128), of relative deprivation (e.g. Geschwender 1964; Gurney et al. 1982; Walker and Pettigrew 1984), of frustration-aggression (e.g. Dollard et al. 1939; Gurr 1970), or dissatisfaction-withdrawal (e.g. Birchall 1975; Hackman and Lawler 1971), the general approach is based on the idea that when people become conscious of a social inconsistency, it is in their psychological self-interest to change the situation.

The most popular version with regard to the union context is the theory of relative deprivation linked with the frustration-aggression hypothesis. This theory holds that it is an unfavourable gap between what people feel entitled to and what, in fact, they are receiving that leads to expressions of discontent in terms of joining the union or becoming actively involved in union activities. In other words, frustration (dissatisfaction) at work encourages activism by the psychological mechanism of tension reduction (Klandermans 1986b:199).¹⁵⁵

The empirical nature of the relationship between dissatisfaction and participation is equivocal. Several reviews of the earlier literature conclude that job satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction is positively correlated with union participation (e.g. Perline and Lorenz 1970; Strauss 1977). Compared to their non-active counterparts, active members appear to be more satisfied with their jobs, have a greater interest in work (Tannenbaum and Kahn 1958), and have higher job status (Blyton et al. 1981; Sayles and Strauss 1953; van de Vall 1970). Spinrad (1960) explains these relationships by arguing that union participation

Seidmann 1953; Seidman et al. 1958; Spinrad 1960; Strauss 1977), as do ideological values which are rooted in the social context (e.g. family socialisation, political ideology, social class) (e.g. Blumer 1975; Klandermans et al. 1976). In particular there is an extensive literature on whether active union members are more "class-conscious" than non members (Deppe 1971; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Kern and Schumann 1974; Mallet 1963; Mann 1973; Perline and Lorenz 1970; Popitz et al. 1957; Purcell 1953; Sayles and Strauss 1953).

Finally, the *psychological* literature refers to the assumed specific needs of union activists (Gurney and Tierney 1982:36). For example Barling (1992:96) argues that union members with a high need for affiliation tend to engage in such social union activities as attending meetings (also Nicholson et al. 1981). Or see van de Vall (1970) on the need for self-esteem, growth, and to belong; Purcell (1953) on the need for social interaction, or Seidman et al. (1950) on the need for power and recognition etc. However, this literature can be criticized for avoiding the issue why some people have this need and not others.

The first two concepts have not been tested in this study because the East German textile workforce is strongly homogeneous in terms of its social background and socialisation, and also does not come from a specific "occupational community". The third concept was not tested because of its theoretical deficiencies.

¹⁵⁵ An important distinction for some is made between "individual" relative deprivation (where the individual feels personally deprived compared to other individuals) and "collective" relative deprivation (where the individual feels that his/her group is deprived relative to other groups). Some evidence suggests that it is the perception of collective relative deprivation which has most impact on participation in collective action (Kelly and Kelly 1992b:6).

enriches the individual's overall job satisfaction and provides a means for greater interpersonal influence, status and meaning. However, the causality remains unclear, job satisfaction might be a cause of union participation as well as a consequence. In addition, according to Brett and Hammer (1982:245) there is no research that either confirms or refutes the proposed causal direction.

On the other hand there are recent studies which support the outlined theoretical hypothesis. Job dissatisfaction is in this instance positively correlated with joining or voting decisions and also with participation in union activities (Guest and Dewe 1988; Hamner and Smith 1978; Hills 1982:245; Kochan 1979; Kolchin and Hyclak 1984; Olson et al. 1986). The studies refer accordingly to different facets of job satisfaction and come up with different results. Some studies conclude that dissatisfaction with *economic factors* is more influential than dissatisfaction with the job content (Brett 1980; DeCotiis and LeLouarn 1981; Kochan 1979; Schriesheim 1978). Other work has indicated that dissatisfaction with more *intrinsic factors*, i.e. job content and status, is important as well (e.g. Huszczo 1983; Nicholson et al. 1981). Additionally McShane (1986) found a mixture of both types of dissatisfaction to be significant (dissatisfaction with wage, promotional decisions and supervision) regarding attendance at union meetings and voting behaviour.

Finally, there are empirical studies which show only a small positive correlation between job dissatisfaction and union activity (e.g. Flanagan et al. 1974; Scott et al. 1963). McAdam (1986:705) even concludes that for all the apparent theoretical sophistication, empirical support for the theories behind this account, has generally proved elusive. He claims that although the frustration-aggression hypothesis works in animal studies its application to human studies has been significantly discredited and its spelling power regarding union participation or strike causation is questionable at best (Hartley 1984), and has not been empirically supported. Also Kelly and Nicholson (1980:865) argue that the empirical relationship between job dissatisfaction and propensity to strike is neither consistent nor substantial.

In addition to the empirical lack of clarity, there are several theoretical objections. For example, Klandermans (1986b:199) states that the frustration-aggression paradigm seems of limited significance, since dissatisfaction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for participation. Moreover, the relationship between tension reduction and participation is weak (see Kelly and Nicholson, 1980:865, for a similar argument with regard to aggression and militancy). The theory does not explain how dissatisfied individuals are activated and why they prefer one form of participation to another. Thus, Kelly and Kelly (1992:249) argue that workers who experience dissatisfaction in their job have a series of options - to raise an individual grievance, to retrain, to press for promotion, to work harder, to quit - of which collective industrial action is but one (also Klandermans *ibid.*; Zurcher and Snow 1981:451). Moreover, there may be circumstances where dissatisfaction is not necessary for collective action at all, such as in sympathy strikes.

Finally, Guest and Dewe (1988) highlight a conceptual problem in using job dissatisfaction to explain continued union membership, i.e. ongoing participation as opposed to joining the union. A persistent dissatisfaction presumably means that union membership does not help to eliminate the sources of dissatisfaction, so it is then hard to see why membership is continued. However, studies confirm that union members are not more likely to consider leaving the firm, despite greater dissatisfaction, which gives some support to the argument that the union provides a "voice" for the expression of discontent (*ibid.*:185).

To conclude, despite the empirical and theoretical problems frustration-aggression theory is still widely in use (also by its critics, such as Klandermans, 1995). It was included in this study, because workers in East Germany have experienced tremendous changes in their work organisation (see chapter 5) and there may be considerable scope for feelings of frustration or dissatisfaction. It was thought worthwhile to examine whether in these circumstances dissatisfaction would be associated with, or help to determine, collective activity.

Summing up the "traditional" approaches to collective activities, although some variables have explanatory power they do not offer a satisfactory account of union participation. For example, the structural theories tend to assume that union participation is an unconventional, irrational type of behaviour (e.g. Klandermans 1984b; Schwartz 1976). Moreover, there has been an increasing awareness in the last few years that dichotomous foci on either micro or macro factors are not helpful and that an integrative model is necessary. The question is then how the approaches can be linked in a theoretically informed and empirically grounded way (Snow et al. 1986:464). There are three distinct recent attempts trying to address this issue by focusing on the individual decision-making process: the social psychological theories of rational choice, social identity and "micro-mobilization".

6.3 Recent social psychological theories of participation

6.3.1 Theories of rational choice

1. Outline of the theory

Rational choice or cost/benefit theory¹⁵⁶ analyses the process by which prospective participants approach the decision to participate in a rational manner: The individual decision-makers approach a choice (of action) by searching the environment for information about outcomes, alternative choices and their personal value. They then select the choice that maximizes the probability of favourable outcomes by weighting the anticipated costs and benefits so as to opt for the one which has the greatest ratio of benefit to cost (see Brett and Hammer 1982:251; Friedman 1983; Kelly 1996a, chp.4:1; Oberschall 1973:116).

¹⁵⁶ The study acknowledges the existence of different definitions and theories of rational choice. The utilized definition and theoretical model is that of psychology or sociology and might differ from some models used in economics.

Rational choice theory can be seen as evolving out of a "paradigm" shift in the research on participation away from psychological discussions on the attitudinal and perceptual differences of members and non-members and structural theories of social movements towards "resource mobilization theories" (Zurcher and Snow 1981). Resource mobilization theories, which are structural models of collective action, emphasize the importance and direct influence of the availability of various resources (e.g. material, organisational) to a collectivity and stress the rationality of participation in social movements (Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Snow et al. 1980; Tilly 1978). They emphasize the variability of resources in accounting for the emergence and development of collective action, but neglect the underlying decision making processes of the actors involved (e.g. McAdam 1988:126; Klandermans 1984b:584).

In contrast to the approach of resource mobilization, advocates of rational choice theory identify the interaction between individuals as the appropriate level of analysis (e.g. Gamson et al. 1982; Klandermans e.g. 1984b; Oberschall 1980). The basic assumption is that people behave in a perceived reality (a psychological truism), thus that individual decisions to participate in a social movement are based on the perceived costs and benefits of participation.

Unions for example are seen as feasible means for social actors to pursue their interests, and the decision to join a social movement is treated as just that — a rationally calculated decision distinguishing risks and rewards.

One specific development of rational choice theory is Klandermans' "value-expectancy" theory, which will be briefly outlined.¹⁵⁷ Kelly and Kelly (1992:249) even state that this theoretical refinement represents "the most comprehensive attempt by any psychologist to sharpen our understanding of industrial action".

¹⁵⁷ His general theory of participation in social movements has two components, a theory of consensus mobilization (esp. Klandermans 1988) and a theory of action mobilization (e.g. 1984b) which integrates the expectancy-value theory. *Consensus mobilization* means the process by which a union familiarizes its members with the objectives of intended action and tries to win their support for those objectives. The perceived reality of the individual is capable of being influenced and social movement leaders try to do so. This process is necessary but not sufficient for participation to occur because rational workers will think not only about the desirability of a given objective but also about the costs of achieving it. Hence the need for *action mobilization*, in which the union tries to persuade its members that the benefits of action will outweigh the costs and that they should participate (Kelly and Kelly 1992:250).

In general, expectancy-value theories consider the individual's action to be related to the person's expectations and the subjective value of the consequences that are perceived to follow the action (Feather, 1982). According to Klandermans (1984a, 1986b), collective action is contingent on anticipated outcomes. Optimism about the outcome of collective action will enhance the probability of participation: when the benefits of union activity are perceived as high, and the costs low, then willingness to participate will be high. Klandermans distinguishes the costs and benefits under three headings: goal, social, and reward motives.

The goal motives express the expectation that the action will lead to the achievement of the goal (collective good), that other workers will participate as well, and that a high turnout is necessary for success, multiplied with the value of this goal.¹⁵⁸

The social motives refer to the expected reactions of "significant others", multiplied by the value assigned to those reactions (e.g. what do family, friends or colleagues think about the person's desire to participate in a strike?);

The reward motives indicate the individuals' assessment of the personal costs and benefits of action (e.g. lost wages, victimization, lost time for family), multiplied by the value placed on these consequences.

The individual's willingness to participate is then the weighted sum of these motives (weighted because the three motives can take different weights for different individuals and can also compensate for one another). Thus, one individual may have strong social motives but weak goal and reward motives, whilst another may have strong goal motives but weak social and reward motives (Kelly and Kelly 1992:251). In general, Klandermans' expectancy-value theory allows considerable flexibility in that it accounts for

¹⁵⁸ Klandermans tries to overcome the "free-rider problem" which has been outlined by Olson (1965) and which underlies rational choice theory. Thus, if the costs of participation are seen as extremely high, then many potential recruits are expected to choose another course of action. Olson's contention is that rational calculation would lead few actors to choose collective action as a means of obtaining public goods, since they could expect to obtain those goods whether they were active or not. He believed that he thereby refuted the popular view that individuals with a common interest would act together so as to achieve that interest (except in cases with selective incentives or possible sanctions on nonparticipants in small groups). However, Klandermans and others (e.g. Gamson 1975; Schwartz 1976) argue that people will participate in activities to produce a collective good precisely because they are aware that the good would never be produced if everyone sat back and waited for someone else to do something. Klandermans argues further that the value of a collective good is a function of its instrumentality for social changes which the movement hopes to achieve and of the value of changes (Klandermans 1984b:585). For a detailed critique of Olson's rational choice theory see Kelly (1996, chp. 4).

differing perceptions and expectations across different types of membership, union, and situation. It acknowledges the dynamic character of participation (i.e. varying over time and situation), which is not accounted for in the "traditional" theories (e.g. demographic variables).

2. Problems of the theory

Four major objections to the social psychological theories of rational choice will be outlined: (i) the basic assumption of rational choice, (ii) the neglect of the *social* character of the decision-making process, (iii) the neglect of the *processual* character of decision-making, and (iv) the causality between rational choice and participation.

(i) Rational choice theory in its basic form assumes that individuals *act rationally* and have *complete information* over their situation (i.e. over all possible costs and rewards).¹⁵⁹ Yet, Zurcher and Snow (1981:468) argue that the most obvious shortcoming is this tautological character of the rationality assumption. People are supposed to participate in social movements because it is rewarding to them. Defining participation, rewards, and rationality in terms of each other precludes finding negative cases. Thus, the circularity of the argument renders a central component of the rational choice theory unfalsifiable.

Another major problem of all rational choice theories (incl. value-expectancy theory) is that it is basically an "optimal" theory. It postulates how people might behave if they had complete information and the ability to process that information in a maximally rational manner. Which is not realistic, and even if all conditions would be existent, people would not always behave in a purely rational manner.

(ii) Most rational choice theories, including Klandermans' value-expectancy theory, try to explain the emergence of a collective phenomenon out of individual decisions, but without specifying the *social context and processes* in which the decisions are made (Kelly 1996a, chp. 5:20; McAdam 1988:137). It ignores the generation of expectations on which choice depends and which is a profoundly *social process*, i.e. shaped by the interaction

¹⁵⁹ See Kelly (1996a, chp. 4) for a more fundamental analysis.

with other social actors. For example, it does not explain the *nature of rewards*. How do they come to have a subjective meaning as rewards? Do they vary from situation to situation? And is it possible to assess the rationality of strategies without assuming that goals of action are well-defined, consensual, and relatively stable? Moreover, the theory takes *interests or preferences* as given and although it assumes that people operate under constraints it does not offer an explanation of the origins and durability of those constraints on preferences and does not explain where different interests and preferences come from (see Kelly 1996a, chp.4:9). As Schrager (1986:859) notes collective activity might be more than the sum of individual economic calculations: "social and ideological factors figure powerfully in people's willingness to act". In addition, the importance of people's interpretation of events and grievances relevant to participation is also not acknowledged (Snow et al. *ibid.*:465).¹⁶⁰

A related point is that the theory assumes that people are mobilized solely on the basis of instrumental calculations of individual self-interest (a point now acknowledged by Klandermans, e.g. 1989b, 1995). As Kelly (1996a, chp. 5:20) points out individuals with a strong sense of social identity (see section below) may think in terms of group interests and group gains and losses (also Fireman and Gamson 1979), or might be mobilized without thinking through costs and benefits at all (also Jenkins 1983). For example, Kelly and Kelly (1992:253) illustrate that especially long strikes, where workers often suffer acute financial hardship (e.g. UK miners' strike in 1984/5) cannot be explained by an instrumental motive alone. What is necessary is a consideration of the underlying social processes, i.e. the relationship between management and workers, and hence an awareness that the industrial conflict is an instance of "intergroup relations" (Kelly and Kelly 1992: 256). "What is critical is that individuals *identify with the union* as an organization" (1993:19). In short, it is the individuals' identification with various groups (e.g.

¹⁶⁰ For example, regarding grievances, too much attention is focused on grievances per se, and on their socio-psychological manifestations (e.g. relative deprivation, alienation), to the neglect of the fact that grievances or discontents are subject to differential interpretation, and of the fact that variations in interpretation among individuals can affect participation. Thus, the theory neglects this by assuming an almost automatic linkage between intensely felt grievances and susceptibility to movement participation (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977:1214-15; Turner and Killian 1972:365).

workforce, company) which will affect his/her perception of intergroup relations and also of the costs and benefits of participation.

In sum, the underlying critique is the theory's profound individualism. Klandermans, for example, acknowledges this point and increasingly emphasizes the importance of social interaction theory¹⁶¹ (social motives) in his recent work. He writes that the costs of participation are all socially constructed, "which is to say defined in social interaction with one's social environment" (1995:5). However, he still refers to rational choice theory as the leading antecedent of union participation. Moreover, Klandermans' social motives do not take the social identities of the workers into account. Thus, the social environment becomes a factor only in terms of social pressures of friends, but not in terms of the persons' identification with social groups (as will be outlined below).

(iii) Another problem concerns the decision-making *process*. Most rational choice theories see the decision-making rather mechanically and non-processually, thus treating participation (or willingness to participate) as quite a static dependent variable, based on a single, time-bound, rational decision (Snow et al. 1986:465). This overlooks the contextual and activity-based nature of much movement participation. One can argue that just as social movements change over time, there is variation in the individual's stake in participating in new activities. Decisions to participate over time are thus subject to frequent reassessment and renegotiation. For example, with regard to Klandermans' work, beliefs of expectancies are temporally variable and can be modified during the course of actual participation (Snow et al. 1986:471). To conclude, it is argued that rationales for participation are both collective and ongoing phenomena, and have therefore to be conceptualized and studied as a processual phenomena.

(iv) Finally, it has been argued that the theory does not really investigate the causes of behaviour, but instead looks for *rationalizations* of it. Kelly and Kelly (1992:254) for

¹⁶¹ He defined social interaction theory as "relating participation to social interaction in networks and groups inside and outside the company" (1995:2). This definition is quite vague in view of the theories' development since the 1960s (originally constructed by Sherif, 1967, and others) (see Tajfel et al. 1978; Turner et al. 1987).

example state that workers' strike calculations may be rationalizations which are designed to justify their decision ("post hoc justifications"), just as much as rational reflections which precede their decisions as rational choice theorists sustain. Thus, the causal link between cost/benefit calculations and the willingness to participate is not clarified in this theory (Kelly and Kelly 1992:254). However, according to Bem (1972) this is true for attitudes in general: attitudes are a justification for, rather than a cause of, behaviour (also Weick 1969).

3. Empirical evidence

There are several case studies and surveys showing that workers make cost-benefit calculations about industrial action in certain circumstances (e.g. Batstone et al. 1978; Cole 1969; Martin 1986; Woolfson and Foster 1988). However, Newton and Shore (1992:279) claim that union instrumentality has been mostly studied in relation to union certification voting (e.g. DeCotiis and LeLouarn 1982; Fiorito and Greer 1982; Heneman and Sandver 1983; Klandermans 1986b; Premack and Hunter 1988; Zalesny 1985), and there has been little investigation of the role of instrumentality after voting decisions.

More specifically with regard to Klandermans' model, Kelly and Kelly (1993) note that relatively few studies have tested the validity of the model. Klandermans conducted three studies (e.g. 1984a) with regard to specific forms of participation (union demonstrations, rallies, industrial action) organized by Dutch unions, and reports that his model could explain 40-60% of the variance in participation between plants and over time (Klandermans 1984a:112). Kelly (1996a, chp.5:20) points out however, that it is hard to say whether these were the reasons that informed workers decisions or post-hoc justifications prompted by the arrival of a questionnaire (also Kelly and Kelly 1990).

Evidence from several studies contradicts various propositions of Klandermans. For example, Oliver (1984) found that activists were more pessimistic about the participation of others and therefore participated ("if I don't participate, nobody will") rather than Klandermans' motive ("I participate because the others do so also"). Kelly and

Kelly (1993)¹⁶² tested Klandermans' model and concluded that individual calculation is not sufficient to induce willingness to participate. "What is critical is that individuals identify with the union as an organisation" (1993:18). And finally, other studies came up with evidence that different people respond to different incentives. Oliver (1982) found that full-time union activists were more ideologically committed, while transitory activists were more concerned about personal benefits. Wilson (1973:72) found that social classes appear to respond to different incentives. And Hartley (1992:171) indicated that those who perceive themselves as unable to influence their work environment on their own are more likely to unionize than others.

One might conclude that the major potential weaknesses of rational choice theory lies in the neglect of the social processes of mobilization. This is the focus of social identity theory, and it seems therefore a good idea to test both theories together in order to study their compatibility.

Rational choice theory was tested in this study because it might provide a powerful explanation of the behaviour of East German workers. As will be remembered from the discussion in chapter 5 there are widespread hypotheses in the East German literature that workers perceive the costs of collective activities as too high (in the face of the devastating labour market situation), and/ or do not perceive the new interest institutions as effective and therefore remain passive. Yet, rational choice theory could also be applied differently. One could argue that due to their collectivistic past people might value collective activities as more effective than individual ones, and they might also perceive the new interest institutions as more instrumental than the old union.

¹⁶² Based on 350 returned questionnaires (39.15%) of members of a white collar union in UK.

6.3.2 Social identity theory

1. Outline

Social identity theory has emerged as one of the major critiques of individualism in social psychology (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1982a), and it is thus also a reaction to the individualistic approach of the rational choice model. Authors of social identity theory focus instead on the *social processes* between individuals within a social movement.

The basic idea is that people are always members of social groups and thus individual action has to be seen in its social context. A social group is defined as "one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison (i.e. with which they compare and evaluate themselves) and for the acquisition of norms and values, that they privately accept membership in, and which influences their attitudes and behaviour" (Turner et al. 1987, chp. 1:1). Thus, the members perceive and define themselves as a group and share some common identity (Tajfel and Turner 1985). Social identity is then defined as "that part of an individuals' self-concept which derives from his/her knowledge of his/her membership of a social group(s) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel 1978a:63).¹⁶³ Thus, this group is a (positive) "reference group" and not merely a "membership group" as defined by outsiders, i.e. it is not simply a group which one is objectively in, but one which is subjectively important in determining one's actions.

A basic assumption of the theory is that people desire to have a positive social identity, since this contributes to a positive self-esteem (e.g. Hogg and Abrams 1990:28), and that this is achieved by demonstrating "positive in-group distinctiveness" by engaging in *social comparisons* with outgroups (Kelly and Kelly 1993:60). Thus, the value attached to any particular social identity is determined by comparisons between an individual's own group and other groups in his/her environment (Kelly and Kelly 1992:258). Social comparison or

¹⁶³ The concept of social identity is used to describe (i) limited aspects of the concept of self which are (ii) relevant to certain limited aspects of social behaviour (Tajfel *ibid.*). Thus, an individual's self-concept comprises both personal identity (i.e. personality) and social identity (membership of a group) (see Harré 1983,1993).

categorization can be defined as the ordering of the social environment into manageable social units, thus in terms of groupings of people in a manner that makes sense to the individual (Tajfel 1978:61), e.g. men/women, workers/managers.

A further step is to argue that there is a positive relationship between levels of ingroup identification and *intergroup differentiation*, which is, according to Kelly (1993:60), one of the fundamental tenets of social identity theory. Thus, the social categorization may lead to perceptions of the outgroup in a *stereotypical* manner ("them-us") (e.g. Allport 1954). Social identity theory proposes that individuals who identify strongly with a social group (and whose self-esteem is therefore highly dependent on it) will be more likely than weak identifiers to differentiate between fellow ingroup members and members of alternative social groups (them-us).¹⁶⁴ To conclude, the concepts of social identity, social categorization and differentiation (them-us) are seen as strongly interrelated (see Condor 1990; Hogg and Abrams 1990; Tajfel 1978, 1981).¹⁶⁵

Empirical evidence of a positive association between the strength of group identification and the extent of positive intergroup differentiation is sometimes inconsistent (Brown et al. 1984, 1986; Condor et al. 1987). Brown et al. tested this central hypothesis of social identity theory and found only a weak positive correlation. Attempting to explain this finding, Hinkle and Brown (1990) suggested that social identity processes may not apply equally in different group contexts. They proposed a typology of group contexts using the two dimensions of individualism-collectivism and autonomous-relational orientation (see also Brown et al. 1992). Their hypothesis is that the impact of group identification on intergroup differentiation will be greatest amongst groups which are characterized by a *collectivist orientation* (i.e. stressing intragroup cooperation, collective achievement, and interdependence amongst fellow ingroup members) and/or a *relational orientation* (i.e. where ingroup evaluation is achieved by social comparison with other groups) (Kelly and Kelly 1994:5). In addition they recognized that for some groups social identities are formed and maintained through processes other than intergroup comparison

¹⁶⁴ In an industrial relations context them-and-us feelings are commonly defined as combining (i) the perception of a clear division between managers and workers, and (ii) a feeling of identification with one of these groups (Kelly and Kelly 1991:26).

¹⁶⁵ Other authors have thought to combine the concept of social identity with concepts of relative deprivation, perceived intergroup conflict or political efficacy (see Kelly and Kelly 1994).

(e.g. families, therapy groups). Empirical support for the typology was found in studies by Hinkle et al. (1990) and Kelly (1990a). This discussion leads to three hypotheses:

Firstly, as Kelly and Kelly (1994:6) conclude, strong group identification may be linked not only to conflictual intergroup attitudes, but also to conflictual intergroup behaviour. Applied to the union context the theory argues that people who strongly identify with their union and/or with their workgroup will be more willing to participate in union activities (e.g. Triandis et al. 1988), especially if they possess strong collectivist attitudes. Thus, people do not participate merely because of perceived benefits, but also because they seek social recognition and affirmation of their identity. On the other side individuals who identify only weakly with their group might be more likely to engage in individual action in trying to improve their personal status.

Secondly, individuals who have a clear distinction between "them" (management) and "us" (workers) are more likely in the case of perceived inequality to pursue conflictual behaviour, i.e. participation in industrial action, in order to challenge the status quo (Kelly 1993:97; Wetherell 1987). For example, strikes might be seen not only as instrumental actions achieving specific goals but also as expressions of particular social identities (Kelly and Kelly 1992:259). In addition, social identity (e.g. union identity, workgroup identity) might also play a moderating role between them-and-us feelings and participation (Kelly and Kelly 1994:12).

Thirdly, as Kelly and Kelly (1994:5) outline, research on differences in individual orientation (collectivist or individualist) suggests that this factor might also have a direct impact on the willingness to participate in collective action. Thus, individuals with a collectivist orientation are more likely to get involved in collective activities (e.g. Triandis et al. 1988; Wheeler et al. 1989). This resembles a long-standing argument in industrial relations that collectivist attitudes are related to union activism.¹⁶⁶ For example, Fosh (1981) examined the consequences of strong class consciousness (i.e. collectivist attitudes) and concluded that active members manifest a strong commitment to collectivism in that they have a firm belief in the political, social, as well as economic goals of the union rather than an instrumental belief in trade unionism as a means for acquiring individual ends

¹⁶⁶ See footnote 154: the concept "ideology".

extrinsic to trade unionism (also Huszczo 1983). Finally, collectivist attitudes might be a moderator for the relationship between social identity and participation (Kelly and Kelly 1994:12).

The three variables (union identity, them-and-us feelings, collectivism) have been tested in the study of Kelly and Kelly (1994)¹⁶⁷ and emerged as significant predictors of participation.

2. Problems of social identity theory

One can distinguish four major problems. The first three refer to the associations between the three variables (union identity, them-and-us feelings and work group identity) which are not sufficiently explored in the theory. The fourth objection refers to the intra group mechanisms and the failure to recognize individual differences among group members.

Firstly, social identity theory assumes a correlation between them-and-us feelings (e.g. social identity with the workforce), and identification with the union, which need not always be the case. Workers with strong them-us attitudes need not necessarily have a strong union commitment. They may not even be a union member (e.g. they can think that the union is too weak or not appropriate for representing their interests), which means that them-us attitudes and union identity can exist without each other, that they are independent although they share a conceptual affinity. One could argue that them-and-us feelings are, though not a sufficient precondition, still a necessary condition for union identity.

Secondly and related, in a favourable group context in the terms of Brown and Hinkle (i.e. with a strong degree of collectivism) and where strong group identity and them-us feelings exist, the relationship towards collective action is not entirely clear. Are both factors each independently correlated with participation or are they highly interrelated? And if they are related, has union identity a moderating role between them-us and participation (as Kelly and Kelly suggested) or can them-us also have a moderating role between union identity and participation?

Thirdly, social identity theory also does not explore the relationship between workgroup identity and union identity. And besides it does not investigate the possible

¹⁶⁷ Study based on 350 returned questionnaires (39.15%) of a British trade union.

problem of various social identities, i.e. the problem of dual commitment (e.g. Guest and Dewe 1988).¹⁶⁸ Kelly and Kelly (1992:260) suggest that studies focusing on the impact of group identity have to examine not only the strength but also the meaning of that identity to the individual. However, Brown and Williams (1984) advanced the theory in this direction by arguing that it is necessary to examine the ideological meaning of group identification, as well as to recognize the existence and consequences of different group memberships and identities of one person.¹⁶⁹

Fourthly, another group of critics refer to the intra group mechanisms which have been insufficiently dealt with in social identity theory.¹⁷⁰ Thus, the theory is not explicit about how individual group members will behave in a "disadvantageous" group situation where the group wants to adopt collective strategies to change its situation. There are propositions that relate member' choices (to behave collectively or individually [e.g. leaving the group]) to the presence or absence of cognitive alternatives to the existing situation, and whether the present situation is perceived as legitimate and stable or illegitimate. For example, if a member sees the present situation as legitimate and stable, then that member is unlikely to try to change it through intergroup confrontation or any other means (Taylor et al. 1987:82). Yet, it is not clear where the individual gets his/her perception of legitimacy and stability from, and how one accounts for individual preferences of collective or individualistic strategies. The theory only argues that when one's self-image as a group member is salient, one will behave as a group member (thus collectively). And when personal identity is salient, individual group members are likely to resist group pressure and take individualistic strategies. However, this explanation is potentially tautological and runs the risk of constructing individuals as "cognitive automatons" (Abrams 1989a), entirely constrained by their perceptions of the social field.

¹⁶⁸ Guest et al. (1993:197) found evidence for different categories of identities: traditional pluralist identity, local unitarist identity, and managerial identity.

¹⁶⁹ In their study they suggest that in certain groups (e.g. those with little history of trade unionism and high degree of contact with management) a strong sense of identification with the departmental group was synonymous with a sense of company loyalty which, in turn, did not encourage clear differentiations between company sub-groups. In addition groups were characterized by varying degrees of individualism and collectivism.

¹⁷⁰ There are however developments such as Taylor et al.'s (1987) concept of "cognitive availability" which attempt to account for variations in group behaviour.

It leaves no room for variation within individuals once the social identity is salient, thus it overestimates homogeneity in groups (also Klandermans 1986b:200).

In sum, these criticisms point to the insufficient *empirical* work on the associations between the variables, and to the inadequate explanations of intra group mechanisms. With regard to the latter one could imagine rational choice theory contributing to our understanding of why group members might choose different strategies (e.g. individual or collective action), which gives another reason for testing the theories together.

This study is not primarily interested in the determinants of social identity, but tests social identity theory because of its potential explanatory power of participation in the East German context. It will be remembered that chapter 5 discussed two hypotheses which could be based on social identity theory: "workers have no moral commitment to the union" and "workers are becoming individualistic". Thus, people have not yet identified enough with their new union and are therefore less willing to become active, and/or generally they prefer individualistic strategies which overshadow their group identities. However, social identity theory could also argue that people had strong group identities and collectivist attitudes in former times which might continue today and therefore should lead to strong activity.

6.3.3 Micro-mobilization theories

Two theories, attribution theory and the concept of "collective interests", will be discussed under this generic term.

Attribution theory (e.g. Heider 1958; Hewstone 1989; Jaspars et al. 1993; Kelley and Michela 1980; Weiner 1985) is a long standing theory in social psychology which has been rarely applied in industrial relations research so far (see as an exception Hartley et al. 1991). It is concerned with the ways try to explain the behaviour of individuals and, more generally, events in their own social environment (Klandermans et al. 1991:52). Attribution is defined as an explanation for an event or action in terms of reason, causes or

both (Kelly 1996a, chp. 5:9). A basic assumption is that in order to make sense of the world people will make judgements about the causes of behaviour or events. It is conventional to classify attributions along three dimensions: personal (internal) versus situational (external) causes, stable versus unstable factors and controllable versus uncontrollable factors (Hewstone 1988, chp.3). The theory then argues that each attribution has different consequences for future behaviour. For example, external and controllable attribution of workplace problems leads to mobilization, i.e. collective action (e.g. Ferey and Miller 1985; McAdam 1988), whereas internal attribution could lead to fatalism or individual action (Kelly 1996a, chp.5:9; Klandermans et al. 1991:55).

The concept of "collective interests" basically argues that a major pre-condition of participation in collective activities is that people achieve a mutual understanding of a collective interest which derives from a common interpretation of a situation (see Kelly 1996a, chp. 5:8). For example workers have to perceive that their work problems are shared by others too.¹⁷¹

Both concepts are part of theoretical attempts, so-called micro-mobilization theories, which present the most recent reaction to purely structural explanations of participation in focusing on the *cognitive processes* of individual decision making within its social context (e.g. Donati 1992; McAdam 1988; Melucci 1980,1984,1989; Snow et al. 1986; Tilly 1978). They are interested in the cognitive processes through which grievances are 'interpreted' and by which 'consensus' around the collective goals of a movement is constructed and mobilized (Donati 1992:137). The aim is to consider the various interactive and communicative processes within social groups that affect people's understandings and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations.

Micro mobilization theories cover an extremely wide range of approaches and methods. Some theories have even included concepts such as social identity, them-and-us feelings, relative deprivation and rational choice (e.g. McAdam 1988; Kelly 1996a, chp.

¹⁷¹ McAdam (1988) highlights the role of perceived illegitimacy in stimulating a sense of (collective) grievance, provided it coexists with personal notions of rights and a sense of efficacy (see Kelly 1996a, chp. 5:29).

5:7). However, the original core of most theories are three (necessary) conditions for collective action:

(i) a mutual understanding amongst the actors of a collective interest deriving from a common interpretation of a situation (e.g. Kelly *ibid.*:3);

(ii) the attribution of workplace problems to the management rather than to the workers themselves (see Feree and Miller 1985; Hewstone 1989; Jaspars et al. 1993; Klandermans 1988; Snow et al. 1986);

(iii) the legitimization of the grievances and the action itself (see Fantasia 1988; McAdam 1988; Piven and Cloward 1979:3-4).

One common assumption of these conditions or cognitive processes is that successful collective activities proceed from a significant transformation in the "collective consciousness" of the actors involved (Gamson et al. 1982). Thus, collective activities are viewed as being closely connected to the capacity of the actors to influence each other, to negotiate the meaning of their experiences, and to construct a common understanding or reality (e.g. Abelson 1981; Eiser 1980). Consequently, seeking to link collective behaviour (e.g. union participation) to role requirements, expectations, attitudes or rules is seen as inconsistent with recognizing that people, social actions and the environment are fluid, and continuously constructed and reconstructed through defining and interpreting processes (which is a basic assumption of the theories of symbolic interactionism, see Berger and Luckmann 1967; Blumer 1969; Goffman 1974).

The tools to uncover these cognitive processes are concepts such as "cognitive mobilization" (Klandermans 1988), "cognitive liberation" (McAdam 1988), "framing" (Goffmann 1974), "frame alignment" (Snow et al. 1986), or "political discourse" (Donati 1992; Foucault 1991; Gamson 1988). They describe the processes by which people shift from one meaningful definition of reality to a new one, thus "making sense" of the situation, of facts or events in new terms. The basic idea is that they do so by using a new "frame", and a process of frame alignment.¹⁷² Thus, much emphasis is put into

¹⁷² A frame (or script) is defined as "a general, standardized, predefined structure which allows re-cognition and guides perception" (Minsky 1981). Frame alignment is defined as "the linkage of individual and

understanding how people with a sense of grievance coalesce into a social group with a collective interest, thus how individuals acquire a sense of collective, as opposed to individual, grievance.

The three concepts have rarely been *tested* in relation to union participation. An exception is the study by van Vuuren et al. (1991) who found external attribution to be significant in determining participation (see also chapter 7 below). In addition, theoretical interest in these concepts in industrial relations has just emerged recently (e.g. Kelly 1996a, b) and thus it is too early for criticism. Moreover, this study is not primarily interested in why people come to define interests to be collective ones, to externally attribute their problems and to perceive their actions as legitimate. It wants to examine the concepts' explanatory power with regard to participation.

With regard to the East German context the first two concepts, collective interests and attribution were tested. Attribution theory raises the question as to whether workers attribute their problems to themselves (e.g. "I do not work hard enough therefore I will be dismissed") or to external factors (e.g. controllable ones such as "the current economic crisis" or uncontrollable ones such as "unqualified management"). As was outlined in chapter 5 there is some evidence (e.g. Stratemann 1993:16) that external, situational attribution has been the prevalent form of attribution in the GDR ("the System" is to be blamed), and it is therefore likely that this will continue to be so for some time. According to attribution theory one would expect this to lead to a high level of collective action, if people transfer the attribution of their current work problems to management (instead of the [uncontrollable] System). With regard to the definition and perception of "collective interests", it could be argued that in such a situation of uncertainty and insecurity people might be less inclined to think in terms of common interests. On the other hand one can also argue that due to their strong collectivist socialisation they are likely to continue to define their interests collectively.

Conclusion of Chapter 6

This chapter has focused on the four social psychological theories (frustration-aggression, rational choice, social identity, micro-mobilization) which are tested in this study. Most criticism of these theories refer to the insufficient explanations of the determinants of the concepts and to the fact that most empirical and theoretical work has been confined to developing and testing any one theory while failing to test competing models (also Kelly and Kelly 1993:19). Furthermore, it should be noted that all these theories assume a causal relationship between their variables (e.g. attitudes) and participation. However, the reservation mentioned with regard to rational choice theory is true for all theories testing attitudes: attitudes might well be justifications for or consequences of behaviour rather than a cause of behaviour (Bem 1972). This is discussed in more detail in chapter 11. This study will continue to assume that attitudes precede behaviour.

The studies' contribution to the literature is to test these theories together, and to test them in a new cultural context. Thus, it deals with the applicability of the theories in a post-socialist context. An underlying fundamental question is whether industrial relations knowledge is generalizable across national boundaries, or whether cultures are so different that any industrial relations theory must be considered culture-specific (see Kuruvilla et al. 1990:374). This becomes interesting especially in the case of post-socialist societies. With regard to East Germany the question is the extent to which forty years of socialism has had a significant impact on workers' attitudes and behaviour towards their union/collective activities. However, the applicability of theories is difficult to prove and also depends on the scientific methodology used¹⁷³. Firstly, the study can only test each theory's applicability with regard to its sample or population (e.g. East German textile workers), but might not be generalizable to whole of East Germany. Moreover, what are the criteria to judge a theory's applicability? A pragmatic approach could be to argue that a theory is applicable if it results in significant determinants of participation. However, since some theories have had varying results in western studies (e.g. frustration-aggression), and

¹⁷³ This study is based on a positivist conception of science (see Kromrey 1986).

others have not yet a standardized set of variables, it seems unwise to refute a theory merely on the grounds of two empirical tests (Bodywear and GTB). A more feasible task, which is pursued in this study, is to examine whether the East German sample yields significantly different results compared to existing western studies (obviously without having matching comparative data), and whether the variance explained is similar to other studies. An additional criteria is whether people understand the meaning of the questions (e.g. problems which occur when piloting the questionnaire such as a large amount of "no view" in the questionnaires).

The next and last chapter of Part 2 will introduce the concepts and methodology of the empirical studies.

Chapter 7 Concepts and methodology of the workforce surveys

This chapter discusses various aspects of the methodology of the workforce surveys. It commences by outlining how the discussed theories of participation have been operationalised in the two surveys (7.1). It then discusses the possible interrelations of the theories (7.2), and finally introduces the methodology of the empirical studies and the demographic characteristics of the samples (7.3).

7.1 Operationalising the theories in the two surveys

7.1.1 Operationalising participation: the dependent variable

Two issues are discussed: the attitudinal and behavioural definition of participation and the proposed multi-dimensionality of the concept.

(i) As mentioned in chapter 6, the study investigates the *willingness or intention* to participate in collective activities, not the actual participation. There are a few studies which have used the actual behaviour, but the large majority focus on the intention assuming that it will predict behavioural outcomes. This has been subject to considerable critique and debate (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Eiser 1986; Fullagar and Barling 1987:64; Kelloway et al. 1992:208; Kelly and Kelly 1992:249; McPhail 1971; Schrager 1986:858; Wicker 1969:75). For example, Barling et al. (1992:99) claim that more objective measures of participation (e.g. official records) are needed, so as not to rely completely on subjective self-reports. However, several studies have investigated the relationship between "attitudes" and "behaviour", and found a robust correlation, in particular if the attitudes were measured on a more specific level (i.e. not just the attitude to industrial action in general but referring to a specific incident) (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980;

Fishbein 1967; and more specifically for union membership: Fullagar 1986; McShane 1986; Premack and Hunter 1988¹⁷⁴).

This study is more interested in the determinants of intention rather than the extent of actual participation. In the following the term "participation" refers to willingness to participate, and the term "behaviour" refers to attitudes towards behaviour.

(ii) Early research defined "participation in union activities" relatively narrowly as a holding of office (Kolchin and Hyclak 1984) and treated it as a static and dichotomous phenomenon, i.e. individuals were classified as either active or inactive. Barling et al. (1992:26) describe this early research as having an "inconsistent conceptualization of participation, and either poor quality or inadequate accounts of empirical evidence, and simplistic and bivariate analyses". In recent years however, there is an increasing awareness of the inherent dynamics and multi-dimensionality of the concept. In other words it is realized that union participation varies over time and in degree: most of the time little participation is required, and most members most of the time do not participate actively. For example, van de Vall found that "just over half of all union members in various countries are completely apathetic, while the rest are occasional participants, members who regularly participate and voluntary officials" (1970:154). Thus, periods of high activity (e.g. during elections, strikes) are followed by dormant stretches and stability.

In addition, recent research has extended the definition towards a more continuous concept which includes a wider variety of union activities (e.g. Fosh 1981; Hartley 1989; McShane 1986, Nicholson et al. 1981; Strauss 1977). Several authors have suggested that different kinds of union activity have different determinants.

For example McShane (1986) tried to demonstrate empirically the multi-dimensionality of union participation by factor analysis and by showing that different kinds of union activity have different predictors. He identified three major types of union participation: (i) involvement in the administration of the union branch, (ii) union voting participation, and (iii) union meeting attendance (p.180). Gallagher et al. (1987)

¹⁷⁴ They found a correlation of 0.79 between voting intent and actual voting for the union.

distinguish between administrative, intermittent and supportive activities, as well as participation in industrial action. Industrial action refers to the participation in organized conflict with management (including not only strikes but all collective grievance procedures, such as stoppages, go-slows, interpersonal conflict with management) (see Fullagar and Barling 1987:67). Klandermans (1986) defines union participation for example as being a member, attending meetings, holding positions, taking part in strikes, and voting for a union list in works council elections. A later specification distinguished between (i) membership — without engagement in organizational activities; (ii) active membership — participation in day-to-day activities; and (iii) participation in collective action initiated by the union (Van der Veen and Klandermans 1989). Klandermans's study (1984a) found evidence which justified distinguishing between the willingness to participate in strikes and the willingness to participate in moderate action. More recently he proposed a more complex typology of four forms of participation combining effort and time dimensions (low/high effort vs limited/unlimited duration) (1995:11). For example, attending union meetings is a form which is limited in time and requires little effort or cost, whereas joining a strike is limited in time but involves considerable efforts. Joining a union on the other hand is an undemanding but indefinite form of participation.

Kelly and Kelly (1993, 1994) found empirical support for their distinction between "easy" forms of activity (discussing union affairs, taking part in industrial action, attending union meeting, etc.) and "more difficult" ones (e.g. standing as an elected union official, being a union delegate). And finally, Fullagar and Barling (1989) differentiated between formal and informal activities: formal ones are activities which are necessary for the union to operate effectively and democratically (which are related to Kelly and Kelly's difficult ones), and informal activities reflect support for the union but are not necessary for its survival.

Concluding, although the concept of multi-dimensionality seems logical, the question as to whether the different forms are really statistically independent and have different antecedents has not yet been sufficiently tested. There are also criticisms of conceptual and statistical grounds. For example Barling et al. (1992:96) argue that the orthogonal solution McShane imposes on his data (i.e. that the McShane's participation

items are unrelated to each other) is unrealistic. In addition, the dichotomous nature of McShane's data is said to inhibit the interpretation of factor analysis except for a purely heuristic set of criteria. It is difficult if not impossible, according to Barling et al., to express dichotomous variables within the factor analytic model. They also emphasize that a far greater proportion of the research on union participation has reported unidimensional scales (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1989; Huszczo 1984; Kelloway et al. 1990). The authors might be right in arguing that the different forms of participation could be highly interrelated, which highlights the need for more research on the facets of participation and their possible interrelations (see Fullagar and Barling 1987:68). Furthermore, different antecedents for different forms of participation can also provide evidence for the multi-dimensional nature. For example, it might be that participation in works council rather than union activities has different predictors. One explanation could be that a person who participates in works council activities might do so because he or she feels committed to the well-being of the company, without being attracted to the union.

This study uses participation as an indicator of membership involvement in union and works council activities. The possible multi-dimensionality is tested by factor analysis, as well as by the possible different antecedents for the different types of participation (see McShane 1986:185). The items include participating in strikes and demonstrations, as well as standing for works council elections or becoming a union official. The Bodywear questionnaire utilized five items adopted from Kelly and Kelly (1993,1994). Three relate to works council activities and two to union activities. The GTB questionnaire elaborated on the measurement of participation by including more examples of Kelly and Kelly's "difficult" activities. Out of the seven items only three were taken from the case study. Four dealt with the union and three with the works council.

In addition, the questionnaires included two other variables which provide additional information but were not used as dependent variables. Firstly, *joining the union* at Bodywear was investigated with two alternative ranking questions on joining and non-joining reasons which were adapted from Whitston and Waddington (1994). The variable can contribute some additional information about whether people had a more instrumental

or "collective" attitude towards their membership. Secondly, *individual reactions to workplace problems* was measured in both surveys. The Bodywear survey investigated various responses (avoidance, individualistic, collective) to job insecurity at company and workplace level. The GTB survey examined various reactions to three workplace problems (job insecurity, work pace, unequal pay). The questions were selected from van Vurren et al. (1991).

7.1.2 Operationalising selected theories of collective activities: the independent variables

As noted in the previous chapter, this study focused primarily on the four theories of rational choice, social identity, "micro-mobilization" and frustration-aggression. In addition, some demographic characteristics were examined. The social psychological theories refer to people's attitudes. Attitudes are defined as a "wider compound of values, beliefs and feelings and are themselves made up of several components..." (Oppenheim 1992:175). Thus, the variables of the theories are commonly operationalised by a pool of questions (items), i.e. a broad set of attitudes towards the research concept.

Collective instrumentality. Rational choice theory has seldom been systematically used in this context. As Newton and Shore (1992) state, there is a lack of adequate research on the determinants of instrumentality and its construct validity. Thus, the instrumentality or cost-benefit concept is diversely defined and operationalised in various studies. Some authors refer to the "instrumentality of trade unions" (DeCotiis and LeLouarn 1981), or to the "functionality of union activities" (Spinrad 1980), some use the "perceived influence of unions" (Glick et al. 1977), or the "perceived value and effectiveness of unions" (Anderson 1979; Kolchin and Hyclak 1984; McShane 1986). A broader concept is that of "union satisfaction" (Glick et al. 1977; Fiorito et al. 1988). Most research refers to union instrumentality only, although Klandermans (1984) focuses on the instrumentality of collective action rather than of the institutions and also includes the

personal costs/benefits of participation and the expectations of the behaviour of the other workers.

In addition, the German literature provides no recent quantitative studies on works council instrumentality. Furthermore, most research is US based and examines mainly unionisation/joining rather than more diverse participation decisions, which might require a different measure of instrumentality.

This study measures collective instrumentality as a multi-dimensional concept. Both surveys distinguish between people's perceptions of the instrumentality of the works council, of the union and of collective action itself. It is assumed that these variables will be strongly correlated. Klandermans' value-expectancy theory is not tested here in detail (e.g. this study did not include his "social" and "reward" motives, but included the instrumentality of interest institutions which was not tested by Klandermans) (see chapter 6). However, by including the perceived instrumentality of collective action the study tests Klandermans' goal motive variable which has been found to be the most important of his model in the study of Kelly and Kelly (1993).

In addition, this study does not differentiate between costs/benefits in terms of the individual and the group (which might in certain circumstances differ) (see Elster 1989; Kelly and Kelly 1993:5) and utilizes only questions referring to perceived "group" instrumentality.

The questions are adapted from Deshpande and Fiorito (1989), Fiorito (1988) and Hartley et al. (1991) and are applied to the specific context (e.g. works council). The Bodywear survey asked eight questions on works councils, five on the union, and four on collective action. The GTB survey included five on works councils, two on the union and two on collective action. Only three questions from the case study were kept. The GTB survey put more emphasis on the distinction between general perceptions of the works council and the union (e.g. "do we need works councils at all?") and on the evaluation of the institutions' success with regard to specific issues, such as job security, work load and pay (e.g. works council policies concerning overtime pay). This conceptual distinction between the general and specific perceptions of collective institutions was introduced by Deshpande and Fiorito (1989). They found specific beliefs of union instrumentality to be

more salient determinants of voting intentions for unionisation in their US sample than general beliefs about the union (p. 894) (also Glick et al. 1977:149).¹⁷⁵

An additional variable, *comparing interest representation* in pre- and post-1989, was asked in the Bodywear survey with regard to eight workplace issues (adapted from Guest and Dewe 1991) in order to provide some additional information, and the variable was not used as an independent variable in the statistical analysis.

Social identity. Both surveys distinguish between union and work group identity. Bodywear asked seven questions and the GTB survey five different questions on union identity, based on Kelly and Kelly (1993) and Kelloway et al. (1992). Union identity is commonly operationalized as an affective attachment to the union and is denoted by (i) positive attitudes toward the union and its values and goals, (ii) a sense of pride in being a member of the union, and (iii) a desire to maintain one's membership (Guest and Dewe 1991:213).¹⁷⁶

Bodywear utilized 12 questions on workgroup identity from Brown et al. (1986) and Kelly and Kelly (1993). In contrast the GTB survey kept only one question from the case study questionnaire and instead emphasized items of "collectivism". The items were modified from Agho et al. (1992), Earley (1993), and Kelly and Kelly (1994, 1993).

¹⁷⁵ This goes back to an idea of Fishbein (1967), who suggested that attitudes toward a specific behavioural object should be more highly related to behaviours encompassing that object than attitudes toward the class of behavioural objects into which the specific object falls.

¹⁷⁶ The concept of union identity is similar to that of "union commitment", which is a recent construct in social psychology (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1987; Fukami and Larson 1984; Gordon et al. 1980, 1984, 1990), deriving from the concept of organizational commitment (Mowday et al. 1982). The original definition by Gordon et al. (1980) consists of (i) a strong loyalty to the union and a desire to remain a member of the union, (ii) a feeling of responsibility towards the union, (iii) a willingness to exercise a strong effort on behalf of the union, and (iv) a belief in and acceptance of the values and goals of both the individual union and labour movement as a whole.

Thus, union commitment is assumed to be a multi-dimensional concept with an in-built behavioural component. The major component in this attitudinal definition is the belief in union values, which can be compared with the construct of them/us attitudes or social identity (Kelly and Kelly 1993:4). Thus, union commitment is viewed as an affective attachment to the union, thus as a normative or moral commitment (Allen and Meyer 1990; Etzioni 1975), as opposed to an instrumental or calculative "commitment". With calculative commitment members adjust their level of involvement to match inducements, whereas moral involvement is relatively unaffected by changes in rewards.

However, the multi-dimensionality of this definition makes operationalisation difficult and also problematic, since it contains both process and outcome dimensions. The desire to maintain membership of an organization and also to participate should be a consequence of identifying with the organization (Guest and Dewe 1991:78). Union identity therefore refers to a reduced definition of union commitment (Guest and Dewe describe it as the core of commitment), and bypasses the confusing relations of union identity, commitment and the willingness to participate within the same concept.

There are no questions on identification with the works council, because this concept is not appropriate here (the works council is not a membership organisation).

Them-and-us feelings were investigated in both surveys, adapting questions from Grant (1992) and Kelly and Kelly (1992b). The GTB survey focused on a comparison between former and current them-and-us feelings.

Micro-mobilization. This was differently measured in the two surveys. There are five questions in the Bodywear survey dealing with the information flow between collective institutions and the workforce. The idea was firstly to capture the extent of information/communication flowing from the interest institutions to the workforce. This was not regarded as a significant antecedent, but instead used as an independent piece of information, which might also reveal some influence on other antecedents such as instrumentality. For example, a weak information flow might inhibit perceptions of the collective institutions as instrumental. In addition, three questions dealt with the information flow from the workforce to the institutions including the degree of involvement of the workforce in discussing union/works council issues amongst each other. The argument is that these items (workers' effort to communicate) could be used as a proxy for the concept of "collective interests".

Attribution was addressed only in the GTB survey. The study used the three workplace grievances, work load, pay and job security, and asked about internal controllable and external controllable attributions for these problems.¹⁷⁷ Questions are based on Klandermans et al. (1991) and also on Zoll et al. (1981:198pp).

Job dissatisfaction and related issues. The Bodywear questionnaire contained eight questions on the perceived changes in the work organisation, and these were essentially used to check the information given by management and the works council. There were six further questions on job satisfaction (with work load, job insecurity and pay). They include intrinsic and extrinsic items reflecting the differing results in the literature (see chapter 6).

¹⁷⁷ It used a simplified version of the conventional, more complicated classification (see chapter 6).

The GTB survey asked only four questions, two general ones which compare the old times with today and two specific ones dealing with work pace and job insecurity (pay is dealt with in another section on them-and-us feelings). The questions were selected from the Overall Job Satisfaction scale of Warr et al. (1980), developed specifically for use on blue-collar workers. They were adapted to the work situation in these textile firms.¹⁷⁸

In addition, the Bodywear questionnaire asked also three questions on *general feelings towards Unification*, which were not used in the further analysis.

Demographic variables. The Bodywear survey included eight variables. Four were used in further statistical analysis: union membership, age, gender and qualification. "Gender" was analysed with great care (due to the small numbers of males, see below) but did not show any strange or incoherent results and was therefore kept. The four age categories of the questionnaire were also used in the later statistical analysis. The other variables were excluded because they displayed no significant variation in the sample: department, household earner, position as works councillor or union official, and resignation from the FDGB.

The GTB survey included six variables, and used four in further analysis: age, gender, works council membership and blue/white collar. A dummy variable was created for blue/white collar workers. The other variables were excluded (seniority because it was similar to age, and former union activists because the sample was too small).


To conclude, it should be noted that the discussion of the operationalisation of the theories revealed a young research area which has not yet developed standardized, long established catalogues of questions. Rather, different studies use often different operationalisations of the same theories which renders comparisons difficult and which hinders an easy adaptation to a new cultural context.

The following table (7.1) provides an overview of the utilization of the discussed variables in the further empirical analysis.

¹⁷⁸ Based on the information obtained by the pilot study and the interviews at Bodywear.

table 7.1: overview of the utilization of the variables in the study

variables	TOPICS			HYPOTHESES	
	PERCEPTIONS of the transforming workplace	of the interest institutions	REACTIONS participation in collective activities and its determinants	individualistic attitudes and behaviour (see chapter 5)	institutionalisa- tion of interest institutions (see chapter 3)
instrumentality of unions		X	X	X	X
instrumentality of w. council		X	X	X	X
instrumentality of coll.activities		X	X	X	X
group identity/ collectivism	X		X	X	
union identity		X	X	X	X
them-us	X		X	X	
attribution	X		X		
satisfaction in receiving union information		X			
interest in union inform./ coll. interests		X	X	X	X
job dissatisfaction	X		X		
willingness to participate			X	X	X



The variables serve the two major topics of the study, the perceptions and the reactions towards the transformation of workplace relations. The table also identifies which variables examine the two underlying hypotheses, the individualisation of the workforce and the institutionalisation of interest representation (see also table 5.3, chapter 5). The following discussion of the empirical findings is divided into two parts. Part 3 deals with the perceptions of the workers and Part 4 deals with their reaction and its explanations. The

two underlying hypotheses will be discussed throughout and summarized in the final conclusion (chapter 12).

7.2 Interrelations of the four theories of collective activities: previous empirical findings and theoretical propositions

(i) Previous empirical findings

As mentioned in chapter 1 and 6 it is rare for "alternative" theories to be tested together (see also Kelly and Kelly 1993:7). The author is not aware of any recent study testing the four social psychological theories together. This adds to the above mentioned difficulty of comparing the results of this study with those of other studies. Besides, as mentioned before, there are no comparable East or West German studies.

Most recent studies concentrate on either union identity (e.g. Kelly and Kelly 1994) or instrumentality (e.g. Klandermans 1984b). A few studies however have tested a selection of antecedents and come up with mixed results (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1989; Glick et al. 1977; Guest and Dewe 1988; Kelly and Kelly 1993; Klandermans 1986b; Kuruvilla et al. 1990; Martin 1986; McShane 1986; van Vuuren et al. 1991). Their results will be briefly discussed.

Glick et al.¹⁷⁹ examined predictors of three variables, overall satisfaction with the union, and two items on participation (willingness to attend union meetings, and willingness to represent the union). Six antecedents were used: demographic variables, general beliefs about unionism, perceptions of activities in the union (members' influence, leadership's effectiveness, sense of harmony among union members etc.), assessments of support to participation given by union leaders and by management, job-related factors (job tenure, job satisfaction, commitment), and individual need patterns. The result was that there were strong positive correlations between measures of individual needs and job

¹⁷⁹ Study is based on 185 returned questionnaires of members of a professional engineering union in the US.

related factors and the two items of participation, and with some measures of "perceptions of union activities" (e.g. "members' integration and member influence") and general beliefs about unionism also achieved significance.

Martin¹⁸⁰ tested the propensity to strike against three categories of antecedents: demographic, economic (pay), and political variables (support from significant others, attitudes towards the union and its union officials¹⁸¹). He found that political variables were more important than the others. Yet, these variables were general perceptions and did not measure either instrumentality or identity specifically.

McShane¹⁸² tested three forms of participation (so-called "administrative" participation, attendance at meetings, voting participation) and nine antecedents: education, seniority, employment status, salary, distance to the union (kilometres between home and union hall), social integration (social attachment to the union branch), value of unions (general attitude towards unionism), interest in union business (interest in day-to-day union affairs), extrinsic job satisfaction, and job involvement. Education, seniority and interest in union business had the most significant positive regression coefficients with administrative participation; salary, distance to the union and extrinsic satisfaction had the most significant regression coefficients with regard to meeting attendance; and employment status was the only significant antecedent with regard to voting participation.

Fullagar and Barling¹⁸³ measured ten antecedents (race, union socialisation, extrinsic and intrinsic job satisfaction, job involvement, life satisfaction, marxist-related beliefs, and work ethic beliefs) with regard to union loyalty and union instrumentality, and then union loyalty and instrumentality with regard to participation. They argued that both union loyalty (identity) and instrumentality had a significant impact on participation, yet instrumentality moderated the impact of identity.¹⁸⁴ Klandermans (1992) claimed, refering

¹⁸⁰ Study is based on 141 returned questionnaires (33%) of the Service Employees International Union in the US.

¹⁸¹ E.g. "union officers are interested in the welfare of the rank-and-file workers". Do you agree?

¹⁸² Study is based on 297 returned questionnaires (62%) of members of a Canadian Union.

¹⁸³ Study is based on 453 returned questionnaires (38%) of black and white union members in two South African factories.

¹⁸⁴ They found that both variables were equally important predictors of union participation for white manual workers, but found union loyalty was more important than instrumentality for black manual workers (due to limited "voice" possibilities).

to this study and his own research¹⁸⁵, that instrumentality, commitment and social integration (interaction with others) in the union have a "mutually reinforcing effect on sustained participation" if participation is regarded positively (p. 190). However he did not investigate this further.

Guest and Dewe¹⁸⁶ argued that instrumentality is the main correlate for remaining in membership, yet this study suffers from deficient measurements of the two concepts (e.g. union identity is for example operationalised with "father's occupation", "vocational education" and "perceptions of social inequalities in UK"), and its dependent variable is not "participation" but staying in the union.

Kelly and Kelly¹⁸⁷ tested Klandermans' expectancy-value theory and contrasted it to social identity theory and showed convincingly that union identity is the crucial determinant for participation. They also found some moderating effect of union identity for the goal motive only.

Kuruvilla et al.¹⁸⁸ examined predictors of union participation in Japan measuring demographic variables, job-related variables, union attitudes (attitudes toward union leader, identification with local union, perceived value of unionism), social integration in the workplace (similar to group identity), and perception of union-management relations. They found that in general union attitudes variables are better predictors of participation than demographic or job-related variables, and that the union identity variables scored higher than union instrumentality variables.

Finally, van Vuuren et al.¹⁸⁹ examined variables of attribution of job insecurity, and cost/benefit perceptions of collective action in a sample of employees who perceive a high level of job insecurity. Cost/benefit perceptions were stronger predictors than causal attributions but both were significant and accounted for 43% of the variance in collective action.

¹⁸⁵ Longitudinal study (1984) based on interviews/questionnaires (66-80% response rate) of members of a Dutch union.

¹⁸⁶ Study is based on 716 returned questionnaires of union members and non members of three UK based plants.

¹⁸⁷ Study based on 350 returned questionnaires (39.15%) of a British trade union.

¹⁸⁸ Study based on over 6600 returned questionnaires (78%) of Japanese union members from 18 companies (in 32 sites).

¹⁸⁹ Study based on 311 structured interviews (72%) of employees of three Dutch companies.

Overall, these studies came up with mixed results and are difficult to compare because they use different variables and sometimes operationalize the same variable differently. This is also pointed out by Kuruvilla et al. (1990:375) who argue that diverse orientations coupled with alternative disciplinary orientations have resulted in studies that differ in the participation measures and antecedent or correlate measures used. For example, only the studies by Fullagar and Barling, Kelly and Kelly and Kuruvilla et al. have tested two major concepts proposed, rational choice and social identity, together. Both concepts were found to be significant in these three studies. Instrumentality was more significant than identity as an antecedent in Fullagar and Barling, but it was less significant than identity in Kelly and Kelly and Kuruvilla et al..

Furthermore, most of the above studies did not investigate possible interrelations of these theories (e.g. Kuruvilla et al. *ibid.*). Exceptions are Kelly and Kelly (1993) who propose that the link between value-expectancy calculations and participation might be moderated by social identity, and Fullagar and Barling (*ibid.*) who suggest that instrumentality moderates the influence of union loyalty (identity) on participation. Thus, union identity may not exist in the absence of positive outcomes or rewards from the union. Both studies found some evidence for their hypotheses. Yet, both studies tested only their a priori assumptions, not whether the moderating effect was also possible the other way around. For example, Kelly and Kelly did not investigate whether the perception of instrumentality had any effect on union identity, and Fullagar and Barling did not investigate whether identity had a different effect on instrumentality. However, Fullagar and Barling admitted that despite their longitudinal data a competing causal model could be consistent with their data (p.224).¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ One might however question the longitudinal character of their study. It consisted of a survey conducted twice with 8 months in between, a period which might be criticized as being too short for significant changes in attitudes (especially if there was no major event such as a strike occurring during that time).

(ii) Theoretical propositions

The literature's conceptual treatment of the theories' interrelations is not yet well advanced. There are a few recent attempts to create models of collective action in the "mobilization" literature (e.g. McAdam 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Tilly 1978). For example, Snow et al. (1986:476) propose five basic collective beliefs people must have in order to become active: (i) common beliefs about the seriousness of the problem/grievance (also Gamson et al. 1982; McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977); (ii) beliefs about the locus of causality or blame (also Ferree and Miller 1985; Piven and Cloward 1977; Zurcher and Snow 1981); (iii) stereotypical beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence (also Turner and Killian 1957); (iv) beliefs about the probability of change and the efficacy of collective action (also Klandermans 1983; Oberschall 1980; Olson 1965; Piven and Cloward 1977); and (v) beliefs about the necessity and propriety of "standing up" (also Oliver 1984; Piven and Cloward 1977). Furthermore, Kelly (1996, chp. 5:7) interprets McAdam as proposing a path from "perceived illegitimacy" to "social identity" to "social attribution" to "cost/benefit calculations" to "collective action". Yet, these attempts remain in most cases merely lists of variables without explanations for their interrelations.

Moreover, there is some interest in the association between the two variables, *identity and instrumentality*, but most accounts remain rather vague. For example Etzioni (1975) suggests that "moral and calculative involvements" may interact with each other, but does not outline how. More specifically, Guest and Dewe (1988:179) note that cost-benefit calculations, union identity and also job dissatisfaction are "competing explanations, but not necessarily mutually exclusive". Others suggest that instrumentality and "normative attachments" may arise or exist concurrently (Summers et al. 1986; Zalesny 1985).

Some authors outline more detailed theoretical assumptions. For example, Newton and McFarlane Shore (1992:280) suggest a causal arrow from "instrumentality based" membership to "ideologically based" membership. Thus, they argue that it is unlikely for a strong ideologically based membership to develop unless the newcomer also has strong instrumentality beliefs (p. 293). Instrumental beliefs are a precursor to the development of

identity/ideological beliefs but do not ensure this development. Their model however has not been empirically tested.

Klandermans (e.g. 1989, 1992, 1995) proposes "a comprehensive approach" to be necessary for the study of theories of participation. As will be remembered, he uses rational choice theory, interactionist theory ("social motives") and frustration-aggression theory which "each make their own contribution to the social psychology of union participation" (1995:4). He claims that the empirical data in union studies show that either the "cost/benefit theory" or the "commitment theory" are able to explain membership behaviour (e.g. leaving the union in the study by Van der Veen and Klandermans, 1989:192). Yet, in explaining the link between the two concepts he applies Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action as his master frame (1995:4). He argues that the two theories are not in conflict, but that the concept of commitment (and the theory of frustration-aggression) can be used to complement to the cost/benefit theory, i.e. both influence the motivation to participate but the cost/benefit calculation is the most influential factor (1995:ibid.). He also acknowledges (which shows a significant extension of his earlier work) that the social environment determines the value of the costs and benefits (being socially constructed) (p.5).

In sum, it seems safe to say that the studies either do not deal with possible empirical interrelations at all (e.g. Kuruvilla et al.) or the superiority of "instrumentality" is assumed but not further tested. This study in contrast tests the possible interrelations between instrumentality and identity and other independent variables.

The study predicts that instrumentality and identity are interrelated and mutually reinforce the willingness to participate, and thus does not provide a priori assumption that one variable leads over the other. In other words, it is assumed that workers' perceptions of collective instrumentality are influenced by the degree of their social identities (e.g. union identity), and union identity is influenced by their perceptions of the interest institutions and of collective action. Thus, with regard to the East German context, workers who identify with their new unions (perhaps because they have already identified with the union movement in former times or because they have established in the last five

years an increasing loyalty and identification with the union as a new social group) might be seeing the effectiveness of the union and the works council in a more positive light than their colleagues who are not in the union or who are union members out of calculative reasons only. At the same time, workers who have good experiences of the interest institutions might increase their emotional affiliation to the union.

Furthermore, the study also examines possible interrelations between the other independent variables, which are sometimes mentioned in the literature but not really tested. The following intercorrelations seem possible:

As mentioned in the previous literature review *union identity*, *work group identity* and *them-and-us feelings* should interrelate (see also Kelly and Kelly 1994). *Them-and-us feelings* should also be related to *job dissatisfaction* (see *ibid.*:6), thus workers with a high degree of job dissatisfaction should also have strong them-and-us feelings. *Them-and-us feelings* might also relate to the *attribution* variables. Thus, stronger them-and-us feelings should correlate with external attributions of work problems (see Hewstone 1988:173; Kelly 1996, chp.5:14; Waddington 1987 for the application of this in a case study). Furthermore, *attribution* and *union/workgroup identity* might be interrelated. McAdam (1988:137) argues that the tendency of people to explain their situation as a function of individual rather than situational factors is more likely to occur under conditions of personal isolation than of integration.¹⁹¹ Finally, *collective interests* might be linked to *social identity*. McAdam (1988) argues that the recognition of collective interests is more likely to occur in groups with strong group identity. In the absence of strong interpersonal links to others, people are likely to feel powerless to change conditions even if they perceive present conditions to be favourable to such efforts (also Ferree and Miller 1985:46). In other words, even if cognitive alternatives are seen, a strong group identity seems still necessary in order to make people active.

Before introducing the methodology of the two surveys, it might be useful to briefly sum up the last two sections (7.1 and 7.2). There are two main conclusions. Firstly

¹⁹¹ The practical significance of this relationship comes from the fact that only external attribution affords the necessary rationale for movement activity. Thus, changes of external attribution are greatest in groups with a strong group identity (Ferree and Miller 1977:34).

operationalising the social psychological theories requires a rather inventive adaptation of previous sets of items, which is partly due to the lack of well-established sets of items and partly due to the fact that these theories have not yet been tested in the East German context. Secondly, testing the four theories together in this post-socialist context and examining their possible interrelations should contribute to the general literature on collective participation. Finally, examining the determinants of peoples' willingness to become active also serves the understanding whether East German workers are becoming individualistic. This will be further discussed in chapter 11.

7.3 Methodology of the two workforce surveys

7.3.1 Methodology of the Bodywear survey

The case study consisted of a *questionnaire* of a sample of blue collar workers, conducted in summer 1993 and which was piloted in spring 1993 (with 60 workers), and *interviews* of a selected group of blue collar workers, conducted in 1993 and 1994. The two methodologies used were complementary, however the quantitative data was given the primary reference. A copy of the questionnaire, of the pilot questionnaire, and the interview guidelines can be found in the appendix (A 2).

Bodywear questionnaire. 400 questionnaires were distributed by the author during working time to all blue-collar workers (union and non-union members) present, i.e. in all major departments and in all of the working shifts. The author collected 305 questionnaires the next day, out of which 291 were suitable to be used for further analysis. This gives a return rate of 72.80 % of the distributed questionnaires and 59.40 % of the total population (blue collar workforce of Bodywear in March 1993: 490 blue collar workers). This return rate is very high (e.g. 26% in Fullagar and Barling 1989; 39.15% in Kelly and Kelly 1994).

The survey contains mostly Likert scale attitudinal questions¹⁹², but also several ranking, rating and yes/no questions¹⁹³. It is important to note that such scales yield information about individuals relative to each other, not in absolute terms.

There were 109 questions altogether. The sections of the questionnaire were structured according to the variables of the four social psychological theories (instrumentality, identity, attribution, information, job dissatisfaction). As also mentioned earlier, five additional topics were included: "individual reactions to workplace problems", "joining the union", "interest representation", and "general attitudes towards the political Unification". There was a mixture of positive and negative questions. The latter were sometimes changed back in the later analysis (e.g. factor analysis).

Bodywear interviews. The qualitative research consisted of several informal discussions with blue-collar workers during work, loosely-structured, open-ended interviews with a selection of 15 workers (dyers, sewers and knitters) (in a separate room during work time) in 1993, and structured in-depth, one/two hour interviews with ten sewers in a separate room during work time in 1994, all of which were taped.¹⁹⁴ Interviewees were asked to volunteer by both the supervisors and the author. The aim was to speak to those who had been working before 1989, both troublemakers as well as more malleable workers. Obviously, this small sample of interviews cannot claim

¹⁹² Scales of attitudes are widely seen as the best way to ensure the validity and reliability requirements of attitudinal research (e.g. Oppenheim 1992). The most frequently used technique is Likert scaling, in which the subjects place themselves on an attitude scale. This has the advantage of not requiring researchers to position attitudes, and can also be used in additional scaling techniques such as factor analysis.

¹⁹³ Ranking simply means arranging responses in order with regard to some common issue, without actually putting a value on that order, whereas rating gives a numerical value to some kind of judgement (see in more detail Bailey 1994:78-79).

¹⁹⁴ It should be noted that the quality of the interviews could have been improved. Interviews conducted after work at workers' homes might have provided better access to what really goes on in people's minds than the interviews conducted at work. Furthermore, there is also a general problem with interviews in East Germany in that it is difficult to judge how far people's views really express their beliefs. This is a general problem of qualitative studies. Yet, one got the feeling that these workers were especially keen to please the interviewers and thus tried to anticipate what the interviewer wanted them to say. For example, it was often difficult to convince sewers to agree to an interview, even though the author was not a total stranger to them by 1994 and it was an entirely voluntary decision with time given for the interview and no disadvantage for the balancing of their day pieces. Asking the ones who agreed about this reluctance, it became clear that many were just frightened that this would be an examination, and they were not sure what kind of questions they would be asked and whether they would be able to answer. The fear that this would be reported back to the management was hard to overcome.

representativeness for the whole workforce, yet provided sufficient insights for the purpose of this study.

The main purpose of the preliminary interviews (spring 1993) was to get a preliminary feel of "what is going on" at workplace level and the material gathered was used in designing the questionnaire. Thus, it clarified the core questions to be asked regarding the variables which were to be tested. The results of these interviews along with the pilot questionnaire suggested that the above outlined attitudinal questions were required in the questionnaire.

The later interviews (Summer 1993, 1994) were intended to explore further questions the survey had left open or actually raised in order to facilitate the interpretation of the quantitative data. These topics were: (i) workplace relations in the former times, especially with regard to workgroup solidarity; (ii) expectations and hopes during the turnaround (Autumn/Winter 1989) with regard to desired changes at the workplace; (iii) current workgroup relations (supporting/correcting the results of the survey); (iv) current workplace problems and individual reactions; and (v) general perceptions of changes in their lives after Unification.

In addition, they were used as an indicator of the reliability, i.e. coherence of people's attitudes after one year. The interview data of both years did not show significant differences and this indicates a certain continuity of the attitudes and behavioural patterns of the sample. It also supports a comparison of the quantitative data between the Bodywear study and the GTB survey which was conducted a year later. The interview data of both years are integrated in the discussion of the questionnaires in chapters 8 and 9.

7.3.2 Methodology of GTB survey

The GTB questionnaire was designed after a preliminary analysis of the Bodywear results. The questionnaire was developed to expand on issues not covered sufficiently in the case study survey (e.g. section on "attribution"). It left out issues not directly linked to the approaches on collective activities to be tested (e.g. reasons for joining), and overall tried

to improve the measures of all concepts (e.g. participation). The consequence is a diminished comparability of the two surveys. However, both surveys emphasized slightly different issues. The GTB survey concentrated on measuring the proposed antecedents of participation, whereas the case study questionnaire focused on describing workers' perceptions of workplace relations.

Yet, although an improvement compared to the Bodywear survey this questionnaire can only be seen as a first attempt to survey participation patterns in a German/post-socialist context (having in mind the lack of previous studies in Germany and the general lack of standardized sets of questions).

The questionnaire was distributed through the union machinery and works councils to union members in 53 randomly selected textile (including clothing) firms of the South-East district of the GTB in East Germany in early summer 1994. 433 completed questionnaires were returned. With regard to the entire membership at that time (14,425 employed union members of the district) this makes 3% of the population. The exact return rate is unknown since it was beyond the authors' control to monitor how many questionnaires were actually copied and distributed in these firms. The chief union official estimated that around 1000 questionnaires were distributed, which would result in a return rate of 43%. Etzel and Walker (1974) claimed that a "normal" return rate for mailed surveys of union members is between 10-30%.

It should be emphasized that the study cannot claim representativeness for the whole workforce of the East German textile sector. However, by using various methodologies of a qualitative and quantitative nature (e.g. expert interviews, cross-firm survey and case study) it was assured that the survey succeeded in providing a valid characterisation of the workforce, and in particular of the union membership in that industry. A further possible weak point is that only loyal union members (and/or to the works council) might have responded to the GTB survey, as happened in Gordon et al.'s (1980) study. Yet, the substantial variance in the responses makes this possibility unlikely.

Virtually all questions were answered on 5-point Likert scales. Thus, the ranking and rating questions were excluded since it transpired that they were difficult to use in testing the antecedents of some concepts. The GTB questionnaire comprised 71 questions, which is around a third less than that in the case study. This seemed to be a necessary measure since the questionnaire was not distributed personally. The questionnaire covered the four antecedents, collective instrumentality, social identity, "micro-mobilization" and job dissatisfaction. Furthermore, an additional issue "individual reactions to workplace problems" (pace of work, job security, pay level)¹⁹⁵ was explored.

7.3.3 Demographic characteristics of the two samples

The *Bodywear sample* consisted of 93.4% females and 6.6% males (N=286). This was overrepresentative with regard to the female rate of 84% of the total workforce (blue and white collar in all departments), but in line with the female ratio in the largest department, sewing, of 96%. The departmental and age distributions (table 7.2) indicated that the sample was roughly representative. Seniority was only asked for in the pilot study (appendix A 2.1), since its distribution was equivalent to the age distribution. The workforce was highly skilled which is typical for East Germany (see Blaschke et al. 1990:23). The questionnaire did not subdivide occupational training in different professions and job specific training.

table 7.2: levels of departments, age, qualification of the Bodywear survey

departments (N=291) 1993	sample	population (blue collar workforce)
sewing	81.1 %	77 %
dyeing	4.8 %	6 %
knitting	2.7 %	3 %
rest ¹⁹⁶	11.4 %	13 %

¹⁹⁵ These grievances were most frequently mentioned by the interviewed workers at Bodywear and present three of the classical workplace grievances (the fourth one is "control over work" which was not a prime issue) (see also Hartley et al. 1991).

¹⁹⁶ Goods reception, stocking, quality/packing control, trimmings/ tailoring

age (N=248) 1993	sample	population (blue collar)
1- 30 years	21.8 %	25 %
31- 40 years	35.1 %	28 %
41- 50 years	29.4 %	32 %
51- years	13.7 %	15 %

qualifications (N=254) 1993	sample	sewing (population)	total population (blue collar)
unskilled/ on the job training	30.3 %	11 %	11 %
skilled (apprenticeship university)	69.7 %	67 % in sewing 22 % other profession	65 % job related 24 % other profession

Furthermore, the majority of the workers (59.5%) lived in two earner-households, 31% in one earner-households (N=252). 1.7% currently held a works council or union post (past positions were not asked for) (N=290), which was representative (13 blue collar council members out of 490 blue collars). 45.2% were union members (GTB), 54.4% were not members (N= 270). The union members were overrepresented because the union density of Bodywear was around 32% according to the works council. 48.2% said that they had resigned from the former FDGB, 43.5% said they had not (N= 253). There is unfortunately no data available on how many people did voluntarily resign from the FDGB in 1989/1990. T-tests (see appendix A 2.6) revealed that non-union members were more likely to have resigned from the FDGB, that union members were older, and that older workers were more likely to be union members.

The *GTB sample* consisted of 75.4% females and 24.6% males (N=403), which was somewhat non-representative of the population (the official female rate of the GTB East in 1992 was 77%). The author had no information on the representativeness of the age distribution of textile companies in this area, but it was similar to the case study distribution: 12.4% were under 30 years, 39.6% were between 30-40 years, 27% between 41-50 years and 21% were more than 51 years old (N=404). Seniority was similar: 11%

had worked in their current company for 5 years or less, 14.1% have worked 5-10 years, 35.9% 10-20 years and 39% worked 20 years or more (N= 326). There were no questions on qualification, department, and the number of household members. Qualification levels were generally high, and did not show any significant impact in the regression analysis of the case study (see chapter 11). Similarly, the number of household members and department did not show any impact. Instead of department this survey asked for employees' professional classification: 80% were blue collar workers, 5.4% supervisors and 14.1% administrative officers ("Verwaltungsangestellter", white collar) (N= 405). 26.5% were present or past works council members, which represents an overrepresentation (there were around 6% works councillors of total employed union membership of the GTB district) (N=404), 9% were union officials (overrepresentative) (N=402), and 17.6% were former active union members (BGL) (N= 408). These figures were also higher compared to the Bodywear sample. Virtually no respondent filled out the company's name, which prevented a correlation of workers' and works councillors' questionnaires of the same company (see chapter 4). Finally, t-tests (see appendix A 2.6) revealed that males were more often works council members and were slightly older than females. Older employees had been more active in the BGL, and they were more often supervisors than younger employees. Works council members were more often union officials, and had been also more active in the BGL than non works council members. Consequently, former BGL activists were more often union officials and more often works council members than non activists.

CONCLUSION OF PART 2

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STUDYING WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TOWARDS THE TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE RELATIONS

Part 2 has dealt with the conceptual and operational issues of examining workers' perceptions and reactions toward the transformation of workplace relations. Chapter 5 summarized the existing findings and hypotheses of East German workers' attitudes and behaviour and characterized the individualisation of the workforce as one major hypothesis in the literature. Chapter 6 outlined the four social psychological theories of collective participation, which will be used to structure the discussion of workers' perceptions and to explain the variation in workers' willingness to participate. And finally chapter 7 focused on the operationalisation of the theories in the East German context and formulated some hypotheses regarding the interrelations of the variables. The major hypothesis is that the variables, social identity and collective instrumentality, are strongly interrelated and might mutually reinforce people's willingness to participate in collective activities. Testing the theories of participation contributes to the question whether East German workers are becoming individualistic (e.g. their willingness to participate is determined by instrumental factors only) and examines their cross-applicability in a new cultural context. Finally, the chapter introduced the methodology and demographic characteristics of the two surveys.

The next two parts will deal with the surveys' data sets. Part 3 discusses the textile workers' perceptions of the transformation, and part 4 investigates their reactions (i.e. willingness to participate in collective activities) and the determinants of collective participation.

PART 3

WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE RELATIONS

Part 3 discusses the two data sets with regard to workers' perceptions of the organisational transformation (chapter 8) and of the new interest representation (chapter 9). Thus, it looks at the organisational transformation from the viewpoint of the workforce, and analyses the relationships between workforce and works council and union from a workers' perspective. The two major hypotheses which this study investigates are discussed throughout: the "individualisation" of the workforce and the "institutionalisation", i.e. acceptance of the new interest organisations. However as will be remembered from table 7.1, the variables cannot be divided neatly according to the two hypotheses because most variables serve both hypotheses. We will therefore discuss the questionnaires variable by variable rather than hypothesis by hypothesis. The final chapter of Part 4 will summarize the findings related to the two hypotheses.

Both questionnaires, Bodywear and GTB, are separately discussed for each variable (the discussion of the Bodywear questionnaire incorporates also the data of the interviews with the selected workers). The statistical tools are simple frequencies and also t-tests which are presented in more detail in the appendix (A 2.6).

Chapter 8 Transformation of the work organisation from the point of view of the workforce: the case study and the GTB survey

Workers' attitudes towards the transformation of the work organisation includes workers' relationship with management, their relationship with other colleagues and their attitudes towards their work. The data contributes to the discussion of the mainly institutional literature of the organisational transformation (which was briefly reviewed in chapter 3), and also to the few empirical studies of workers' attitudes after Unification outlined in chapter 5.

The frequencies of five variables of the Bodywear and GTB questionnaire are discussed: job dissatisfaction (8.1), them-and-us feelings (8.2), general attitudes toward Unification (8.3), workgroup identity and related issues (8.4), and causal attributions of workplace problems (8.5).

8.1 Job dissatisfaction and other job-related issues

(i) Bodywear survey

There are two sections, one dealing with workers' perceptions of the organisational changes at their workplaces (table 8.1.1) in order to confirm the information given by the management at Bodywear (chapter 4), and the other with workers' feelings towards those changes (table 8.1.2).

table 8.1.1: level of items of perceived changes in the work organisation of Bodywear¹⁹⁷

J.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
B	The quality of work has become more important than before.	5.6	7.3	1.0	24.0	62.0	287
D	We have to be more flexible today.	3.2	3.5	2.8	14.1	76.3	283
X	You have to concentrate so much on your work, that there is hardly time to have a chat.	2.1	3.9	1.1	21.8	71.2	285
E	If you do not work hard, you get fired.	2.1	5.6	8.4	32.9	51.0	286
AD	Most people do not work anymore with their former workfellows.	7.4	5.3	13.7	16.1	57.5	285
H	There is more emphasis on health and safety issues today.	31.6	26.7	12.3	23.2	6.3	285
G	Formerly we had more control about when and how we work.	19.4	16.9	8.5	33.1	22.2	284
C	Supervisors and managers are more strict than before.	6.4	11.0	6.4	33.8	42.3	281

There is strong evidence that from the viewpoint of the workforce working conditions at Bodywear have changed dramatically over the last years. The questionnaire did not ask about the "material" changes such as new premises, machines, better materials, tools etc. (the interviews revealed that these were welcomed by the workforce), but dealt with the more "intrinsic" changes of working conditions.

Most workers were working with new colleagues, which confirms management's statements of a reshuffling of the workforce (see chapter 4). In terms of work content there were increasing pressures for better quality, quantity and flexibility, all leading to a higher work pace. A majority feared that they were at risk of being dismissed if they did not comply. Yet, health and safety issues were not seen to be more of a priority of management today. These changes of working conditions have also been confirmed in the interviews (e.g. knitter no 1 1993; sewer no 3 1993). However everybody put great emphasis on the fact that they also worked hard in former times, "we had to work before as well!" Yet, the workers agreed that the pace of work before was nevertheless more

¹⁹⁷ All following tables show frequencies in percentage, the single letters mark the question (see questionnaires in appendix A 2.2, 2.3), N = number of valid cases (Bodywear sample = 291, GTB sample = 433). Figures mentioned in the text are the cumulated sums of the positive (strongly agree and agree) or negative answers.

"easy going", more "human". This conviction has been also found in other studies (e.g. Alt et al. 1994:33).

Furthermore, over a half argued that they had more control over their work before than today. An obvious example are the workers who are no longer allowed to sew as they like, but must instead apply "scientifically" approved sewing methods (see chapter 4:4.3.2?). This is also reported in the study of Diewald et al. (1995:312)¹⁹⁸ who found 48% of their sample workers claimed that external control had increased considerably.

Finally, supervisors were perceived to be more strict, which corresponds with the supervisors' own views (see chapter 4:4.4). In general, changes in management style were perceived as one of the major consequences of the transformation from a "socialist" to a "capitalist" workplace: "they behave differently, have a different tone now". Supervisors agreed: "You have now more respect of them [managers]" (supervisor 2 in dyeing 1993). However, this does not necessarily indicate that the former socialist workplace relations were characterized by a "passive strength" of workers and weak supervisors, as outlined in chapter 2 (e.g. Heidenreich 1991c). In contrast, the interviews suggested that most supervisors of Bodywear were accepted authorities also in former days. Supervisors distributed for example the work also in former times without consulting workers (see chapter 4:4.4), see also question on employee involvement below). Thus, it seems safe to conclude that "informal power" of workers existed - if at all - in extending the breaks, having chats during work and having a more relaxed attitude towards work.

In sum, this data confirmed the information given by management and works councillors (see chapter 4) in terms of intensified work pace and tighter control by supervisors and management and indicated the scope and direction of the organisational changes at Bodywear. The work organisation has become more efficient due to rationalisation and intensification of work, better quality of production and tighter control by management.

The next section (table 8.1.2) deals with workers' subjective feelings towards the changing organisation of their work.

¹⁹⁸ Sample of 1254 employees, the study has been discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

table 8.1.2: level of items of job dissatisfaction and other job-related issues at Bodywear

J.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
A	Work load is heavier than in former times and there is more pressure to perform.	2.1	4.2	2.4	25.5	65.7	286
I	Formerly you also had fun while working, today you only work for the money.	6.3	9.8	1.0	33.4	49.5	287
J	You have the constant fear of getting sacked.	3.8	7.0	1.4	27.2	60.6	287
CF	"My current pay level is justified".	41.2	16.8	3.4	21.0	4.8	254
CG	What is your index/comparison, if you want to show the justice/injustice of your pay level? (only one number please) ¹⁹⁹						236
1	my former pay level in the GDR		= 2.1 %				
2	the other pay groups at Bodywear and their work requirements/ performance		= 5.5 %				
3	the other workers in my group who conduct less machines/ have easier jobs		= 5.5 %				
4	the pay I would earn in (West German headquarters) for the same job		= 70.3 %				
5	different (specify) _____		= 1.7 %				
L	I prefer a free Saturday to additional income.	4.9	5.6	3.5	26.0	56.1	285

The changes at their workplaces (see above) made a large majority feel more pressure at work and a loss of "happiness", and that they had become more "materialistic" in terms of their work motivation (in contrast to their supervisors who perceived no changes in their motivation to work, chapter 4:4.4). Also Diewald et al. (1995:313) found that their workers have less "fun" coming from work.

The Bodywear survey did not ask specifically if people were *content* with the changing work pace and job requirements. Interviews were seen as more appropriate in dealing with this issue. In summer 1994 the major topic in the sewing plant was the constantly increasing pressures to work better and achieve higher output norms. The interviewed sewers were uniformly frustrated: "We are only machines anymore"; "it's so stressful, it is not fun anymore" (sewer no 2,3). A few even admitted that they sometimes cried at work. Asked whether they like working for Bodywear, most denied that they did: "You have learned here that human beings are exchangeable. In the GDR it always was the

¹⁹⁹ The results reported are of the 85.2% who chose correctly one number only, 14.8% chose two or three numbers, which are not reported here (% of 236 people answered).

saying that nobody is exchangeable." (sewer no 6 1994); "It is a sad feeling. You are just a production factor. Not a human being. Something is missing." (sewer no 3 1994). "I came, I earn my money, I leave" (sewer no 4 1994). Most of those interviewed agreed that they would work for another company for more money, but many made this conditional on working conditions (shift work, transport to work, work atmosphere) and most importantly job security. If they had enough money some would also stop working (sewer no 4, 7 1994), but most said they would continue at least for a few hours, since "we are used to work". "Formerly 'not working' was regarded as an 'anti-social' behaviour" (sewer no 3 1994).

Summing up, the work pace was perceived as inhuman and the interviewees often appeared to be losing any hope of coping with the increasing pressure. Diewald et al. (ibid.) found their sample similarly suffering under the increasing work pressure (63% of skilled workers).

The remaining questions concerned *job security and pay*. Nearly 90% perceived a constant fear of losing their job. This is a surprising figure, since by the summer of 1993 Bodywear had had nearly no redundancies in the previous two years (especially compared with most other companies in the area or in the overall textile sector). Those interviewed however tended to compare their job security with the old socialist conditions of complete job security instead of comparing their situation with other companies.

Most workers were also discontented with the pay, which is in line with other studies (see chapter 5, e.g. Andretta et al. 1994). This was also evident in the interviews, especially in 1993. Pay was considerably lower than in company's main plant in West Germany which was used as a benchmark by most of the workers. The comparison with the West is a common finding in East Germany (e.g. Andretta et al. 1994; Lungwitz 1994:302). Workers argued that although they have the same qualifications and do the same job they are not equally paid, despite the fact that their living costs are rising disproportionately to their wages. Interestingly, almost nobody compared his/her current pay with their former pay level. Surely, this comparison is difficult to make. For example, even if people earn more now than before, the disproportionate increase of the living costs

means that their net income might not have increased at all. On the other hand people can buy more and "better" consumer goods, but their consumer demands might have increased as well. Thus, the question "are you better off today?" is difficult to answer and depends on people's subjective evaluations (see also Freeman 1993).

However, perceiving your wage level as unjustified is a relative evaluation and does not say anything about the absolute amount. Asked how far they were prepared to work Saturdays for additional pay (an important topic at that time), the majority of them preferred a free Saturday, and wanted to have Saturday working as a voluntary option. This might be interpreted as an indicator that they did earn enough money. Yet, it could also mean that the work load during the week was heavy enough, and people wanted the weekend to recover.

Furthermore, the interviews revealed that workers did not seem to have problems with the fact that administration and white collar staff earn more money than production workers, which is the reverse of the situation in the old GDR (see chapter 2). However, Alt et al. (1994:170) explained that blue collar workers do not see the increasing differentiation between staff as something new, but rather as a continuation of former times: the status difference was always there, and the pay difference now adds to it. Thus, the blue collar workers of their study did not see themselves as having been the privileged employee group in former times, but rather as the breadwinners of the administrative staff. The interviews at Bodywear supported this observation. For example, one sewer declared, "we always had to pay for the administrative overhead" (sewer no 4 1994).

In addition, sewers did not grumble about their pay being lower than that of the other occupations in the same company (e.g. dyer, knitter), although in the "private" opinion of some management, they ought to earn the same. However, this discriminatory job evaluation (sewer= females, dyer= predominantly males) existed already in the GDR, and is the norm in West Germany as well. Moreover, the plants are geographically too far away for contact and comparison to be done easily.

One should note a difference between the interviews in 1993 and 1994. In 1993 the most important grievance was pay, in 1994 it was the increasing work pace. Whereas in 1993 workers were more or less content with their work, in 1994 all the sewers were

complaining. A reason could be the increasing efforts of management to foster productivity during 1994 (e.g. by having individual talks with bad performers, see chapter 4) as a response to the more competitive external and internal (within the holding companies) economic situation. However, in both years people displayed strong grievances with regard to the three classical areas: work pace, pay and job security.²⁰⁰

Finally, a topic, which was not asked in the questionnaire, but touched on in the interviews was how far worker were dissatisfied with the degree to which they were involved in the organisational changes and indeed whether "*employee involvement*" was generally practiced. The interviewees in overall did not feel that they had been involved in the company decision-making in former times nor were they involved now. However, they did not seem to be interested in this topic. One sewer even argued, "there should not be workers deciding, since a bit of order is necessary." (sewer no1 1994). Yet, in the survey a third saw employee involvement as a precondition to make the firm competitive (see question BW, chapter 10). This is in line of Jander et al.'s (1992:4) proposition that if East German employees are given the chance to participate in the restructuring of the firms they are very happy to do so.

(ii) GTB survey

table 8.1.3: level of items of job dissatisfaction in the GTB firms

I.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
A	All in all our work situation is better today than in the former socialist enterprise.	31.4	34.0	4.7	26.7	3.3	424
B	"Capitalist" enterprises treat their employees more fairly than did former "socialist" enterprises.	39.8	36.1	9.4	12.4	2.3	427
G	I am dissatisfied with how hard I have to work now.	14.2	18.0	5.2	32.5	30.1	422
I	I am constantly worried about losing my job.	7.0	7.7	3.3	22.1	60.0	430
H	I am paid a fair wage.	65.7	19.2	3.5	8.4	3.3	428

²⁰⁰ This result is congruent with the results of the pilot study (May 1993), which predominantly examined working conditions and job satisfaction.

This survey was not concerned with the perceived changes in the organisation of work, but with attitudinal reactions only. It distinguished between general job satisfaction in comparison to former times and satisfaction of specific issues. Most felt that the overall work situation is worse today than before, and 76% thought that they were better treated in the socialist firm than in the capitalist firm today. This supports the impression which the interviews at Bodywear provided. Similar negative data, although not to such an extreme, were reported by Andretta et al. (1994). With regard to the specific job issues, an overwhelming majority of the GTB sample was dissatisfied. One person remarked on his/her questionnaire: "the working life under the capitalists resembles slavery. Working without pay and frequent threats." Overall, these findings correspond with the case study results. Yet pay dissatisfaction was higher than at Bodywear, which might be due to the fact that Bodywear paid the agreed wage which was not the rule among textile companies (as explained in chapter 4).

Summing up, a strong majority of both data sets displayed strong dissatisfaction regarding general or specific workplace issues. It seems safe to say that dissatisfaction was a widespread result of the organisational restructuring in East German (textile) companies after Unification. This is in line with the few empirical studies of other industrial sectors outlined in chapter 5 (e.g. Andretta et al. 1994). Frustration about work pace, stricter control and supervision overshadowed the improvements of the material working conditions (better machines, working environment/ buildings).

However, the occurrence of job dissatisfaction is not specifically East German. Job dissatisfaction is a common reaction to organisational changes also in western societies. Job dissatisfaction might be due to the procedure of how the organisational changes were introduced, i.e. with or without involving the workforce (in the case of Bodywear without), and/or due to the content of these changes (i.e. intensification of work). On the other hand, one might object that dissatisfaction is not a result of the restructuring at all, but a continuation of former job dissatisfaction (see chapter 5:5.1). Yet, the comparative questions of workers' job satisfaction in pre- and post- 1989 in the GTB survey suggest that people were more satisfied with their jobs in former times.

8.2 "Them-and-us" feelings

(i) Bodywear survey

table 8.2.1: level of items of them-and-us feelings at Bodywear

./.	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
Q You can never really trust your supervisor.	9.0	12.3	19.9	32.9	26.0	277
R The workers here are exploited.	7.2	11.9	11.9	33.6	35.4	277
U Management takes full advantage of the current labour market situation.	6.1	7.2	19.4	20.8	46.6	279
P Real partnership between management and workforce is not possible, because we have too different interests.	7.7	12.5	21.4	33.2	25.1	271
S Formerly the supervisors were on the side of the workers, today they are on management's side.	7.5	12.5	13.9	36.7	29.5	281
T In former times we were all working together to fulfill the quota, today there is much more a "them-and-us" atmosphere.	6.1	11.5	12.5	24.4	45.5	279
O I am proud to work for Bodywear.	12.5	16.1	13.6	36.4	21.4	280
V I am pretty sure that Bodywear will always try to treat its workers in a fair way.	9.6	16.4	19.6	38.1	16.4	281
K A capitalist firm treats its employees in a fairer way, because only performance criteria count and not personal or partial ones.	13.8	16.3	13.8	31.8	24.4	283
AJ In general: an "individualistic" social system where everybody has the chance to lead a better life than others, but also has the risk of failing, is better than a "collectivist" social system, where all have equally mediocre life chances.	10.5	12.5	32.0	29.3	15.6	256

This section examines workers' attitudes towards the management, i.e. top, middle, lower and supervisory management levels. As mentioned before, top management and most middle/lower managers were East Germans, but mostly new appointed after the Unification. Supervisors (Meister) remained the old ones, or are newly appointed East Germans. Thus, the possible problem of a division between "Wessies" (West Germans) being managers and "Ossies" (East Germans) being the labourforce, is here less severe (nevertheless, since the company headquarters is in West Germany, the top manager of Bodywear is often seen as being "directed" by the West).

Overall, the data revealed strong them-and-us feelings. Well over a half did not trust their supervisors at all, and felt exploited (a word which is still common language in East Germany). Irreconcilable interests between capital and labour did exist in the view of most of the respondents. This is in line with the works councillors' opinion (chapter 4). Furthermore, nearly 70% argued that supervisors are changing sides to management, and strongly perceived a them-and-us atmosphere today compared to former times.

However, the following, more general questions complicate the picture. Over 50% were proud to work for Bodywear, and they also believe that capitalist firms in general (and Bodywear in particular) treated its workforce in a fairer way than socialist firms. This is in line with the supervisors' view (see chapter 4). With regard to the first statement, one could explain this apparent contradiction between being proud and having them-and-us feelings by referring to the possible co-existence of different types of identities and commitment in a firm (as outlined in chapter 7, e.g. Guest et al. 1993). Thus, one can be proud to work for Bodywear, because it has a high prestige to work for them, but on the other hand one does not like its management style and culture²⁰¹. With regard to the second statement on fairness, one wonders how employees can perceive managers as fair, but not trust them.

One explanation could be the slightly misleading questions. The first question might be slightly misleading in that it postulates that in a capitalist firm only performance criteria are used, and in a socialist firm only personal or partial ones. This is certainly an oversimplification (especially in this company where most departments worked with piece rate systems before). The other question assumed that a collectivist social system has only mediocre life chances - without defining what are "better" life chances. Actually, one person even remarked in the questionnaire that this question could not be properly answered, "since both systems have tremendous advantages and disadvantages. The major disadvantage of both systems is that they are so extreme, and mutually exclusive, i.e. cannot be combined."

²⁰¹ But see Heering and Schroeder (1992:98) for the opposite case, where a high identification of East German workers with their company correlates with their positive judgement about management and also works councils.

Another explanation could be the still widespread (especially in this highly selected workforce) acceptance and support of the new capitalist, free-market values, which were perhaps surprisingly associated especially in the beginning with intrinsic fairness and equality. Also Mickler and Walker (1992:41) found that their investigated workforce accepted the more severe leadership and discipline, since it conformed with workforce's expectations of introducing market economy performance principles.

In addition, the very last question showed a majority of 45% preferring an individualistic to a collective societal system. However, this has to be seen in contrast to over three quarters of West Germans who preferred the individualistic system (the same question was asked in representative survey of East and West Germans by the Emnid Institute, 1993:table 47).

Concluding, the data shows that people were proud to work for their company, they appreciated the new capitalist system as being fairer, yet did not prefer an individualistic societal system as much as their West German counterparts and revealed strong them-and-us feelings. This presents a complex mixture of attitudes which might be a normal state of affairs, or might be due to the transformation and its attendant confusions.

With regard to the strong them-and-us feelings one might ask whether they are a continuation of former times or a new development. Although the questionnaire did not explicitly ask for them-and-us feelings in former times, question T suggests that them-and-us feelings were emerging or increasing after the Unification (whether through privatisation, i.e. "expropriation" of workers' ownership of the production means in socialist firms, or through the interplay of structural factors and management strategies). In line, the interviews suggested, as does some literature (see chapter 5:5.1, e.g. Kern and Land 1991; Voigt 1973), that if them-and-us feelings existed in the old GDR they had a different form to the western concept. Thus, they were without the conflictual connotations which typically mark them-and-us feelings in western capitalist firms. For example, the interviewees normally accepted the people "on the top" as persons who got their instructions and "had to do their jobs as well" (knitter no 3, 1994). In addition, there was rarely any personal, close contact between them and the workforce. It was a "live and let

live" attitude. They were seen indifferently, because it was the System that was to be blamed. "They didn't interest me a lot. What could they do against us? They had their job, we had our jobs. You were safe." (sewer no 3 1994). Thus, it was a them-and-us differentiation between people here and people "above" ("die da oben") but without conflictual or ideological connotations (see also Alt et al. 1994). In the end, workers felt that they were in the same boat as the directors. This contrasts interpretations by authors such as Kreißig (1992) who argue that "ideological", class-based them-and-us feelings also existed in former times (see chapter 5).

Today, this is changing. The division between management and workforce becomes more evident. For example, "they are managers" (sewer no 9 1994); "you see them driving their big BMWs while you are sitting in your small Trabi" (sewer no 3, 1994). Asked about them-and-us today, managers seem to become for the workforce what the System was before: the anonymous power which determines your fate and which you cannot influence. The sentiments expressed against management might also be biased by people's increasing frustration with the transformation itself: "the small man of the street always loses out in each system. This was before and is also now the case. However, in former times the little man could sometimes open his mouth and complain" (sewer no 3, 1994).

(ii) GTB survey

table 8.2.2: level of items of them-and-us feelings in the GTB firms

J.		level of items of them-and-us feelings					N
		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	
F	Today I don't have any trust in my supervisors.	7.0	12.0	10.8	43.7	26.5	426
D	Today workers are exploited here.	6.8	5.6	5.4	27.9	54.3	427
E	In the old times you could still trust your supervisors.	14.8	22.2	9.8	42.4	10.8	427
C	In the socialist enterprise workers were not exploited.	10.9	20.6	5.9	40.4	22.2	423

With regard to current them-and-us feelings the data yielded slightly stronger results than Bodywear. Furthermore, this survey inquired about former them-and-us feelings more

explicitly. A majority argued that workers were not exploited in former times and could trust the supervisor. This supports the conjecture of the Bodywear data that them-and-us feelings were emerging after the Unification.

To conclude, both data sets yielded a strong degree of them-and-us feelings, which seem to have developed or increased after the turnaround. This finding contributes to the literature on workers' attitudes towards the transformation since no empirical study has so far investigated them-and-us feelings in this context (see chapter 5).²⁰² A large-scale opinion poll of West and East Germans (Möllner sample institute, FAZ 21.6.95) gives further support to these findings. It indicates that the reputation of entrepreneurs/managers in East Germany has decreased since 1990. For example the statement, "the image of entrepreneur as an exploiter belongs to the past", was believed by only 27% of East Germans in 1995, whereas over 50% agreed to this statement in 1990 (and 40% of West Germans in both years). And only 31% attributed "social responsibility" to managers (in 1990: 58%). Weßels (1992:23) reported that in 1990 only 40% of East Germans believed there was an opposition between capital and labour, which was slightly less than the 43% of West Germans.²⁰³

One should note however, that the data of this study and also of the quoted studies present retrospective views and it might be that the old GDR is seen in a happier than in a realistic light today ("golden age"). In addition, the Bodywear survey revealed the complex attitudes of workers towards the company, management and the transformation to a capitalist firm — an issue which will re-emerge throughout the discussion of workers' perceptions.

²⁰² E.g. Heering and Schroeder's (1992) study found that their sample had a positive "relationship" to management and a positive "identification" with the company, but they did not explicitly measure them-and-us feelings.

²⁰³ Weßels' study was discussed before, these figures are from the large-scale Eurobarometer survey of the WZB Berlin. More recent data is not provided.

8.3 General attitudes towards Unification at Bodywear

table 8.3: level of items of general attitudes at Bodywear

./.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
CO	In general, I have a positive view on the future.	8.8	15.3	10.3	41.8	23.8	261
CY	In general: "it is frequently argued that the East Germans will remain second class citizens for quite a while."	4.0	2.0	2.0	19.4	72.6	248

The two questions were not used as potential explanations of participation but to get a more general idea of peoples' responses to the societal transformation, and were complemented by some interview questions.

A large majority (66%) looked positively into the future despite all troubles and fears despite the fact that nearly all felt as second class citizens. This is supported by several polls (e.g. SOEP panel WZB, Landua 1993:21: 59% of the East German sample were confident about the future in 1992; Emnid Institute 1993, table 2: 77% felt as second class citizens in November 1992). As has been outlined above most workers accepted and supported the introduction of the capitalist market economy (see questions AJ, K). Thus, despite the grievances nobody wanted the old conditions back. "If there is anything at all I want back from the old days then it's the cheap lunch" (sewer no 3, 1993). On the other side, asked in the interviews how they saw their future at work, most could not answer or provided a pretty pessimistic (sewer no 9 1994) or a disillusioned view: "it cannot become worse" (sewer no 4, 6 1994). But the emphasis was on keeping their jobs: "if I keep my job, it will be o.k.." (no 5). Thus, it seems that people differentiate between working and private life: the pessimistic perspectives of their working life did not seem to overshadow their more optimistic hopes regarding their private lives. Similarly, Koch (1993:177) found a mixture of gains and losses in different life spheres of most East Germans (e.g. Koch 1993:177).

In addition, despite their general acceptance of the market economy, the attitudes towards the societal and economic transformation are quite complex. For example, the interviews indicated that it is never a clear-cut judgement whether or not workers at

Bodywear prefer the current work situation to former times or not, or even their current life to that of former times. Too many factors interrelate. And too many comparisons are available: comparison with West Germans, with their life before, or with people who are now worse off (e.g. the unemployed).

One can also observe a change of perceptions over time: In the beginning (1989) workers obeyed and accepted the changes at their workplaces as an inevitable consequence of the new market system. Asked in the interviews about their hopes in 1989, most had no hopes or expectations about improvements at their workplace, they just hoped to keep their jobs (e.g. sewer no 5 1994). However, they soon became disappointed, disillusioned and even sometimes sarcastic about the "true face of capitalism", after having woken up from the illusion during the turnaround of capitalism as the panacea. In addition, some interviews gave the impression of a fatalistic attitude in the face of a perceived all-powerful market. This is supported by Lungwitz (1994:299) who found a distinctly fatalistic attitude which reminded him of the findings in West German studies in the 1950s on workers' lives (e.g. Popitz et al. 1957).

A revival of a more positive image of the past started to become popular in East Germany around the time of research (1993/4). It did express a new pride "to come from the East" rather than the desire to turn back the clock (e.g. the reversing trend in consuming traditional East German products again [see Spiegel edition June 1995; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4.10.1995, article by H.J. Heims] or possibly also the success of the former socialist party, PDS, in the general election in autumn 1994). On the other side there was still a widespread agreement that it was necessary to "tidy up the socialist mire". For example one dyer answered when asked about the bonus workers got in former times for working on Saturdays: "the bonus wasn't healthy as with plenty of other things here". Question: "healthy for whom?" Reply: "for the economy. The money must come from somewhere, it has to be earned for and at the moment there stands no profit behind" (dyer no 3 1993). However, several argued that it would have been best to take the good things of socialism and the good sides of capitalism together. "But the people 'up there' do not want this" (sewer no 4, 1994).

8.4 Workgroup identity and related issues

(i) Bodywear survey

table 8.4.1: level of items of workgroup identity and related items at Bodywear

J.	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
AA I would rather like to work in another group.	65.4	9.2	14.1	4.9	6.4	283
Z I am not very interested in my colleagues.	36.0	30.4	4.6	25.8	3.2	283
W I can rely on my colleagues, they help me where they can.	5.6	15.1	8.8	46.3	24.2	285
AF Nowadays I hardly meet my workfellows after work.	3.5	3.9	2.1	15.1	75.4	285
AG I have nearly no contact to the workers of other workgroups.	5.9	8.0	0.7	23.8	61.5	286
F The solidarity among workfellows decreases.	7.3	11.5	3.8	45.8	31.5	286
AE In former times the group solidarity was much better.	6.7	8.1	8.1	22.1	55.1	285
AH Formerly the solidarity of the whole workforce was much better.	6.3	7.7	13.6	21.3	51.0	286
AI Because of the job insecurity people become egoistic and just think of their advantage.	2.8	3.1	5.6	29.2	59.4	288
AC I rather fight for my interests alone than rely on my colleagues' support.	9.9	10.2	4.2	34.6	41.0	283
Y You often feel quite alone and isolated.	17.4	22.4	4.6	33.5	22.1	281
AB I would rather sacrifice 100 DM of my pay than see some of my workfellows of my group getting sacked.	28.0	16.0	23.0	20.6	12.4	282

This section covers items on workgroup identity, and on solidarity and collectivistic attitudes. Firstly, the data presented a strong degree of *group identification*. For example, most people liked to work in their group (which is in most cases a newly created group, as showed above) and perceived their colleagues as helpful. Some sewers however revealed a more sceptical attitude in the interviews. For example, "if you have a problem now with your work nobody comes and helps you" (sewer no1 1993). This is in line with supervisors' instructions, who did not want that sewers help each other, because this was now the job of the method trainer.

The remaining two questions indicated that social interactions between the workforce for example after work were very limited. Yet, these findings do not challenge the overall result of a strong group identification: Private contact among work group members might not be a necessary condition for work group identity and might be the result of very practical reasons. For example, a lot of workers live now far away (which was not the case before); the working groups consist of new colleagues; their free time gets occupied with organising various household and private issues (such as insurances, banking - which formerly did not exist or were organised by the State); and they need more private time to "digest" all the societal changes and to recover from the exhausting work (e.g. interview knitter no 2, 1993). Furthermore, the question assumes that people saw each other more frequently in the socialist times, yet this might not be true for all people (one person wrote exactly this remark in her questionnaire). Finally, the fact that a large majority had no real contact with workers in other workgroups (see also question AP, section 9.4, showing the lack of information workers have of what is happening in other parts of the enterprise) might be a sign for a weak group identity of the whole workforce but might equally be regarded as an indicator of a strong and close community of the individual work groups. It also reflects the "departmental principalities" which characterized most socialist companies (see chapter 2).

Moreover, the interviews dealt with people's private circumstances which could have a positive effect on their social identities. Most workers lived in small villages with strong community and neighbourhood life, which seem to have let Unification simply wash over them (a finding which has also been reported in other studies, e.g. Gebhardt and Kamphausen 1994).

Secondly, when directly addressing facets of *solidarity (collectivism)* the data depicted an overall perception of a decreasing solidarity within the whole workforce at Bodywear and within the work group itself. This was actually the thing people mentioned in the interviews they missed most of the socialist era. For example, "the atmosphere changed totally"; "everybody only thinks about his/her performance"; "in earlier times we had much

more comradeship. We even had voluntary 'godparenthoods' for new sewers." (sewer no 3,5 1994). "If there is something I want back from the old times, then it is the collegiality and the social intercourse we had here" (knitter no 2, 1993).

In addition, most people admitted they would themselves rather fight alone for their interests than rely on their colleagues. This is in contrast to the above statement that most could rely on their colleagues. However, it might be a different issue whether you can rely on colleagues to help you with your work, or whether you want them to help you pursue your own interests.

Although the obvious interpretation might be a decreasing solidarity and thus increasing individualistic attitudes, we interpret this data differently. Firstly, people were disappointed about this decreasing solidarity. Thus, one can argue that only because they still strongly identify with their workgroup, are they able to feel the loss of solidarity so strongly. In addition, as outlined in chapter 5, perceiving a decreasing solidarity does not mean that workers necessarily behave more "individualistic". For example, a surprisingly large number (33%) said they would sacrifice money to secure the job of a co-worker. A sewer commented, "I would sacrifice 100 DM if my colleagues could keep their job. Although the others would probably call me crazy." This is an astonishing statement of solidarity.

To conclude, Bodywear workers identified strongly with their work groups, had collectivist beliefs and attitudes, and were concerned about the decreasing solidarity among the workforce.

(ii) GTB survey

table 8.4.2: level of items of workgroup identity and related items in the GTB firms

./.		strongly disagree	agree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
BN	I identify strongly with my group.	17.7	9.8	17.2	31.1	24.2	396
BL	I would like to change the workgroup.	61.9	17.8	6.9	8.9	4.5	404
BM	I increasingly feel isolated in my group.	42.1	26.7	7.9	15.8	7.4	433
BO	In the old days (GDR) group solidarity was much better.	9.3	7.8	3.2	20.8	58.9	409
BS	Only those who depend on themselves at work get ahead.	18.6	19.3	8.2	28.7	25.2	404
BP	I accept group decisions also if I am different opinion.	4.2	5.2	5.7	50.4	34.5	403
BR	In general problems are better solved in groups than alone.	5.4	7.9	5.4	27.1	54.2	406
BQ	I prefer to work in groups than alone.	13.3	11.8	6.1	24.3	44.5	407

In the GTB survey the number of items on solidarity was decreased and substituted with questions of people's general attitude to "collectivism" with regard to working habits (see chapter 7).

There was a strong *work group identity*. For example, 80% did not want to change their group, which is similar to the Bodywear response. But 69% did not feel isolated within their work groups, much larger than 39% in the case study. This might be due to the different sample (mixed sample at Bodywear, union members only at GTB). Similar to the Bodywear results, group solidarity was perceived as decreasing. The possible difference between group identification and perception of solidarity decreasing was already discussed in the case study survey.

Moreover, over a half thought that only those who depend on themselves got ahead at work (see similar question in Bodywear). This more "individualistic" response to "life chances" might be explained by the fact that people think this is how they should behave in the new capitalist world, thus conforming to new norms, but is not necessarily an indication that they actually will behave like this. This was also supported in the case study interviews: people had a very precise picture of how they should behave for their best

advantage, perhaps because they see those behaving in this way getting along. However, most declared that they had problems conforming with these new norms, attributing this to their different, "old-fashioned" personality. And as we will see later (chapter 10) most people thought their behaviour did not change during the transformation so far.

Finally, the sample presented strong *collectivistic attitudes*. For example, 85% would accept decisions made by their group even if they have a different private opinion. Overall, the questions yielded a high degree of workgroup identification and of collectivistic attitudes, but also a decreasing solidarity, all of which is consistent with the findings of the case study.

In sum, both data sets support the continuing importance of the work collective, and the perception of a decreasing solidarity among workfellows, results which are in line with various empirical surveys (see also Becker 1993:35). For example, the Allensbach representative poll in East Germany (1994, in FAZ 13.4.94) found that 87% of the East German population thought that solidarity among people has decreased since Unification. Brähler and Richter (1995:8)²⁰⁴ found that East Germans revealed significantly higher collectivist attitudes than their West German counterparts.

The strong group identity and the importance of solidarity adds support to the argument of some authors that the previous work communities in the old GDR had an emotional importance for the workforce (and not just an instrumental one, see chapter 5: e.g. Diewald 1995; Gensior 1992). The finding of strong group identities in both samples challenges the widespread argument in some literature of an identity crisis and a virtual elimination of social identities in favour of individualistic attitudes (see chapter 5: e.g. Belwe 1992; Maaz 1991; Marz 1993; Rottenburg 1992). Thus, with regard to this dimension of individualism/collectivism (see table 5.3) the individualisation thesis cannot be supported at least with respect to relations at work.

It should be mentioned that the data gives no information on the development of group identity (i.e. it might have decreased compared to former times, although this seems unlikely given the strong degree of identity present today). Some critics might object that

²⁰⁴ Their sample consisted of 2025 West Germans and 1022 East Germans.

the surprisingly strong workgroup identity in the samples is due to the predominately female workforce. Yet, the theoretical justification (that females have a stronger identification to their workfellows than males) might be more difficult to obtain. More importantly, t-tests revealed that there was no difference between males and females in the GTB sample concerning their workgroup identity. Females however perceived more strongly than males that the workgroup solidarity was decreasing (see appendix A 2.6).

8.5 Causal attribution of workplace problems at GTB

table 8.5: level of items of attribution in the GTB firms²⁰⁵

J.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
<i>external attribution</i>							
R	Lack of support from politicians and Treuhand for the textile industry [accounts for many job losses].	4.0	2.9	12.8	10.2	70.1	421
AH	The politicians are the ones to blame [for unequal pay level].	1.2	0.9	4.0	7.3	86.7	427
J	Management exploits us, taking advantage of the devastating employment situation.	4.5	6.1	10.4	30.4	48.7	425
AF	East German employers take advantage of the current labour market situation [therefore unequal pay level compared to West Germany].	5.7	5.2	10.4	21.3	57.2	423
K	It is not so much management's fault, as the introduction of market economy which inevitably increases work pressures.	5.2	5.6	8.0	37.3	43.9	426
S	Incompetent management [accounts for job losses].	27.5	19.1	22.7	22.5	8.2	414
Q	lack of demand for our products [accounts for job losses].	21.6	20.7	11.5	23.1	23.1	416

²⁰⁵ In the original questionnaire questions were subdivided differently according to the three topics: pace of work, job insecurity and pay level (see appendix A 2.3).

<i>I.</i>		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
T	<i>internal attribution</i>						
	Not enough effort from the workers [accounts for job losses].	51.3	18.9	6.7	19.4	3.6	417
U	Wages are too high [therefore job losses].	79.3	14.7	1.9	1.7	2.4	421
L	The workforce does not offer enough resistance to management's strategies [in terms of work pace].	5.2	10.1	3.5	30.4	50.7	424
V	Workforce doesn't show enough solidarity with colleagues made redundant.	10.9	16.4	24.4	22.7	25.6	414

There was a high degree of external attribution to politicians, but more divided ones concerning the management. For example, nearly 80% felt that management had taken advantage of the employment situation with regard to work pace and pay levels²⁰⁶. However, the same amount of people also agreed that it is not so much management's fault as the pressures of the market economy which increased the pace of work. With regard to job insecurity only a third saw the incompetence of management as the core cause, and there was a two-sided view of whether it was due to the lack of demand for the products. Thus, people might have strong feelings about management's abuse of the devastating employment situation, but when asked whether they think the latter is due to incompetence or to inevitable market pressures on management, it seems that people prefer to blame the external market pressures. This might reflect the perceived reality in these companies. Another interpretation might be that this attitude arises out of the former experience that directors were merely tools of the System and that this continues today. As one worker argued: "only the System changed" (knitter no 4 1993).

With regard to internal causes, job losses were linked with lacking solidarity/resistance of workers rather than an inadequate performance of the workforce.

In sum, external attribution was stronger than internal attribution. As noted in chapter 5, Stratemann (1993:16) argues that external, situational attribution has been the prevalent form of attribution in the GDR ("the System is to be blamed"), and our data supports the

²⁰⁶ These questions could have been also discussed in the section on them-and-us feelings.

view that this will continue to be so for some while. The currently perceived helplessness within the transformation process might also support this type of reaction.

Conclusion of Chapter 8

Summing up the discussion of workers' perceptions of various facets of the organisational transformation, the data provided a rather depressing picture of the current working conditions and management-workforce relations of Bodywear as well as in the GTB survey companies. It substantiates the claim made in the literature that the transformation has left the workers highly dissatisfied and disappointed. It also provides new insights other studies have not dealt with. For example, them-and-us feelings were strong and indicate a deterioration of the workplace climate during the reorganisation of the enterprises; and the strong workgroup collectivity challenges the supposed increasing individualism of East German workers.

With regard to the general literature on organisational transformation, in particular on personnel management in transformation (chapter 3:3.1.3), one could suggest that companies which practiced organisational changes without involving their workers (procedure) and/or adopted intensified "tayloristic" production methods (content), did not succeed to achieve job satisfaction among its workforce. This might generate future problems in terms of work motivation and company commitment once the threat caused by job insecurity is less predominant. Both samples of workers can be characterized as showing "compliance" but not "commitment" to their organisation or management (for the different terms see Walton 1985). For example, the workforce of Bodywear and of the other companies had a more negative view of management and the general workplace climate than did the works councillors. Thus, the question as to whether the "harmonious" workplace relationship between management and works councils (as shown in the councillor questionnaires, see chapter 4) is also perceived by the workforce can be answered negatively. The workforce yields no "unitarist" view but rather a "them-and-us"

perception of the workplace relations. To what extent this is caused by the tayloristic restructuring of the work or by a lack of direct employee involvement is hard to say. As noted before job dissatisfaction and them-and-us feelings are familiar outcomes of organisational interventions in western companies too, and it raises the difficult question of how far they are a "normal" reaction to organisational change rather than a specific reflection of transformation.

Chapter 9 Interest representation and collective activities from the viewpoint of the workforce: the case study and the GTB survey

This chapter provides the empirical basis for the second topic of this study, the relationship between the workforce and the interest institutions from the viewpoint of the workers (see table 7.1). It discusses the variables of the two questionnaires exploring workers' perceptions of the new interest institutions and collective activities: collective instrumentality (9.1), general views of interest representation (9.2), union identity (9.3), communication flow and collective interests (9.4).

9.1 Perceived instrumentality of the works council, union and of collective activities

9.1.1 Instrumentality of works council

(i) Bodywear survey

table 9.1.1: level of items of the perceived instrumentality of the works council and of related items at Bodywear

./.	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
AS We do not need a works council, since management takes sufficient care of us.	53.8	24.2	11.7	7.7	2.6	273
AQ The former BGL represented our interests better (than the works council).	20.8	26.4	24.5	20.1	8.2	269
AN The works council so far has put forward workers' interests very well.	8.5	18.4	15.1	41.9	16.2	272
CJ The works council wants to help, but has no power.	9.5	14.1	17.2	43.1	16.0	262
AO Works council and management are in league with each other.	8.8	11.7	49.1	19.4	11.0	273
CI It's a waste of time to consult the works council, they are not interested in my problems.	28.1	26.2	13.7	27.8	4.2	263
CC Did you consult the works council with a problem during this year? yes: 22.0 no: 78.0						270
CL Usually I do not have any grievances.	14.5	20.9	4.0	49.8	10.8	249

The first five questions dealt with workers' perceptions of the *effectiveness* of the works council. Nearly 80% regarded the works council as a necessary institution. In addition, nearly half preferred the works council to the former BGL (former union) (though nearly a third thought the latter represented workers' interests better, and a quarter abstained).

The interviews confirmed this result, although there was a general confusion about the BGL's functions. Most interviewees tended not to differentiate between the institution of the BGL itself and its context (often they equated the BGL with the Party, e.g. supervisor 1, knitting 1993). This can be tracked back to the fact that the BGL was a part of the company's triumvirate, and its work was therefore difficult to distangle from the overall company policy (see chapter 2). In addition, asked more specifically about the functions of the BGL, most sewers were not sure. "What did the BGL for you? "it was present" (sewer no 3 1994). The only thing everybody mentioned was its administrative function of holiday places. A few argued, that "the BGL was more present at the actual workplace and could intervene more easily" (written remark on the questionnaire). Yet, a lot held the view that "the works council is doing a lot here, more than the BGL" (knitter no 1, 1993). Moreover, a forthcoming question (question CX, section 9.2) asked for who represented workers in former days, and the BGL was only mentioned by 13%.

The next issue dealt with the more specific work of the council in representing workers' interests (i.e. not personal but collective interests). Over a half of the sample agreed that the works council had done this very well. However, the same fraction perceived the works council as powerless. This contradiction is difficult to interpret. Most obviously it could signify a realistic assessment of works councils' possibilities and the current scope of action. The works council is willing and maybe has potential, but is not yet able.

The interviews revealed more accusations and resentments than praise. For example, "the works councillors talk a lot about their activities in the assemblies but nothing happens", "they have weekly meetings but no results, and in our daily life they and their achievements are not really visible" (sewer no 3,4 1994). Several also argued that the council not only represents workers' interests, but also management's (a frequently mentioned example was Saturday work to which the works council agreed, see chapter 4).

But when asked in the survey whether the works council and management are in league with each other, nearly half of the sample did not know. One gets the impression that the interviewees were highly emotional, and enjoyed blaming nearly everyone in the company, whereas the survey seemed to have been answered in a more thoughtful way. The difference might also lie in the selection of interviewees (although it was tried to get a balanced sample of obedient workers and troublemakers), and could also indicate people's possible unsureness and confusion over these issues.

The last three questions investigate whether people *consults the works council* in practice. Although most workers had not recently consulted the council, for more than half of them it is (in theory) not a waste of time to do so. The interviews suggested that workers who were more positive about the usefulness of the works council, have had contact with the works council (e.g. sewers no 8,7 1994), whereas the more sceptical ones had not had any personal experience.

Whether the level of consultation is low or high is difficult to evaluate since there is no directly comparable East or West German data available. However, it is well-known that a large number of problems at German shopfloors are usually regulated informally directly with the supervisor, and thus this relatively low response might well be seen as "normal" for the German standard.²⁰⁷ Moreover, in many cases in Bodywear it seemed sufficient just to "threaten" the supervisors with consulting the works council, as was told by several workers in the interviews. Another reason might be that workers might have no grievances, as more than 60% in the survey admitted. Or, they might not feel it to be "morally" justified to express them. Various reasons are brought up in the interviews: "you should be happy with what you get — this is a question of education" (sewer no 2 1994). This reminds one of the propagated socialist ideal of a "clean, orderly, and obedient

²⁰⁷ E.g. Krieger et al. (1989:174) in a representative study of West German employees found that 40% consult their supervisors and 29% the works council when having problems. Feist et al.'s (1989:89) study (based on a representative sample of blue collar workers in the "Land" Hessen, West Germany) showed that 36% consulted the supervisor, 39% the works council and 27% preferred to represent their interests alone (the rest goes to the union/ shop steward). Moreover, Morgenroth et al. (1994:90) found gender to have an impact. Based on interviews of 110 West German union members they found that females preferred an informal way of interest representation, whereas males were more attuned to consult the works council.

socialist worker". Another example is: "... [this is the] price we have to pay for getting the company working" (dyer no 1 1993).

A further obvious reason might be the fear of risking one's job if one complained too much (as was suggested in the written comment in one questionnaire). For example, several sewers mentioned a person who was directly threatened with dismissal by the supervisor if she consulted the works council (sewer no 3, 6, 1994). The works council itself confirmed this was increasingly happening.

In sum, it seems safe to say that workers at Bodywear were more or less positive about consulting the works council, but that some were restricted in doing so out of fears (to risk the job) rather than because they believed that the council was not helpful.

(ii) GTB survey

table 9.1.2: level of items of instrumentality of works council in the GTB firms

./.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
AT	We don't need a works council since management cares enough for us.	71.1	18.2	2.8	5.7	2.1	422
AU	I can solve my work problems with my supervisor alone, I don't need the works council for that.	58.1	19.5	4.5	13.1	4.8	420
AS	The old BGL represented my interests better than today's GTB and works council.	28.0	22.5	13.3	27.5	8.8	422
W	Works council does not oppose management strategies strongly enough [to secure jobs].	18.3	22.6	9.5	29.3	20.2	420
M	Our works council is not powerful enough to negotiate better working conditions.	13.3	17.8	12.9	32.8	23.2	427

The GTB survey focused more on union members' perceptions of the works council as an institution and its work successes. The overall necessity of works councils was widely acknowledged and confirmed the Bodywear result. The comparison between the BGL and the works council received again more divided answers, but still more than a half preferred the works council (similar to the Bodywear result). With regard to members' perception of works council effectiveness in dealing with specific workplace issues, the results were nearly equally split in positive and negative perceptions, but with slightly more emphasis

on the negative side. The result was therefore slightly more negative than at Bodywear. However, one should note that people were not being asked here their overall views on being represented by their works council.

In conclusion, the major findings of both surveys regarding works council instrumentality were firstly the overall acceptance of the works council as a necessary institution, and a clear preference for the new interest institution. This also confirms the preliminary suggestion in the works council questionnaire, that works councils saw themselves being accepted by their workforce.

The second major result refers to the works council's actual work, and this is perceived in the two surveys slightly differently. Bodywear respondents made a realistic but overall positive evaluation, although they were more critical in the interviews, whereas the GTB sample was more evenly divided. The slightly better score for the works council of Bodywear again might support the hypothesis that this council is relatively successful in its interest representation (see chapter 4).

One needs to address how these findings relate to the hypothesis in the literature that workers are highly disillusioned over the effectiveness of works council (with respect to the redundancies, co-management etc.) (see chapter 5:5.2). Workers in both surveys were realistic about works council's limited resources in these economic circumstances. This might be disillusioning, yet it did not lead people to reject the institution as such. In addition, Bodywear workers even argued that the works council did a good job in representing them. In short, although the findings do not suggest highly effective and powerful institutions workers conclude that this is related more to the external conditions than to the design of the institution as such. In conclusion, the data adds support to the more positive studies about workers' attitudes towards the works council such as Heering and Schroeder (1992) and challenges pessimistic studies such as Jander et al. (1992) (see chapter 5). Moreover, the data is more positive than the DGB Trendbarometer results for the GTB (West and East): These were in 1992 considerably below the DGB German average with only 6% approving the works council's work (no separate data for 1994).

However 59% did not answer and the sample consisted only of 83 persons, which questions the data's reliability.

Finally, the support for the works council does not mean that people now rely exclusively on formal interest representation. But it is safe to say that the informal interest representation is not the major form of representation in today's shopfloors in the textile industry. A mix of formal and informal mechanisms (with a predominance of the former) is most probable, as the West German experience also shows (e.g. Morgenroth et al. 1994:90).

9.1.2 Instrumentality of the union

(i) Bodywear survey

table 9.1.3: level of items of perceived instrumentality of the union at Bodywear²⁰⁸

./.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
BB	The union had not yet done a lot at this place.	10.1	15.5	27.9	28.7	17.8	258
BC	The union's pay policy only worsens the economic situation and risks jobs	28.3	26.4	26.0	13.2	6.2	258
BE	If the unions would not exist the East German employment situation would look even worse.	8.1	8.9	27.5	27.9	27.5	258
BP	Unions make the worker class more powerful.	9.3	15.0	15.5	36.7	23.5	226
BD	The union works more for the West German workforce than for us.	10.1	12.8	36.8	20.5	19.8	258

Nearly half of the sample thought that the GTB has not achieved anything at Bodywear, but roughly a third did not know and a quarter thought the union had. Also the interviews revealed that union policies were seen as too remote from people's day-to-day working life. This might well be fostered by the absence of union stewards in this company.

²⁰⁸ The high absense rate in this section is due to the fact that non union members did not (and should not) answer. However, some did nevertheless.

Moreover, West German studies (e.g. Morgenroth et al. 1994:109) and other East German studies (Mickler et al. 1992:17) revealed a similar perception of unions' relative unimportance regarding workplace issues.

With regard to the union activities on industrial level (e.g. pay policies) however the judgement was much better, and over a half thought the union is necessary (to improve the employment situation) and makes the workforce more powerful. Thus, the union was accepted as a necessary institution supporting the claim that the institutional transfer of West German unions succeeded with regard to this workforce.

Finally, around 40% argued that the union is biased toward their West German members, but a nearly the same amount did not know. Thus, one can conclude that there is not a strong support for this popular claim which is also underlined by the fact that the presumed "western" bias of the union was not mentioned as a major reason for not joining the union (see chapter 10: section on "joining" question BL). One explanation might be the unions personnel policy to keep most former East German officials in post (see chapter 4).

The interviews presented a slightly more negative picture of the union. Although some respondents agreed that the GTB is fighting for their interests during bargaining, a lot are depressed by the results: "they fight for us but in the end nothing is coming out" (sewer no 1, 1994). In addition, asking whether the union is representing their interests, a lot did not really know how to respond (e.g. sewers no 4, 7 1994). This inconsistency of quantitative and qualitative data could be due to the fact that these questions ("how is the union representing you" etc.) are more difficult to answer in an interview than in pre-given statements to tackle. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section workers seemed to use the interviews partly to "let off steam" on everybody. Thus, assuming that the questionnaire answers are more reliable one can argue that in overall the union was accepted and appreciated as a necessary and legitimate interest institution.

(ii) GTB survey

table 9.1.4: level of items of perceived instrumentality of the union in the GTB firms

J.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
X	GTB not putting enough pressure on employers [to secure jobs].	10.2	10.2	17.6	27.1	34.9	421
AG	The GTB is not doing enough to secure the adjustment of East German wage levels.	7.5	10.8	9.2	25.9	46.6	425

The two questions dealt with the union regarding specific issues. Union's effectiveness was perceived more negatively than works council's effectiveness (see above) and also more negatively compared to the responses at Bodywear.²⁰⁹ This might be due to the slightly different questions asked in both surveys.

In sum, both data sets present a negative perception of union instrumentality concerning shopfloor issues, a mixed evaluation of collective bargaining outcomes (Bodywear vs GTB sample), and a positive perception of the necessity of the union. This resembles some results of the existing empirical studies on union-membership relations (chapter 5). For example, the perceived necessity of unions is in line with Weßels' (1992) finding that the unions are the most important (voluntary) organization for East Germans, and also with Gabriel's (1993) finding that unions are more trusted in the East than in the West.²¹⁰ In addition, the critical evaluation of union's achievements has been also shown in the DGB Trendbarometer (in the East and West).

Finally, it should be noted that none of this data indicates possible reasons for these perceptions of instrumentality. For example, how far does the assumed disappointment with the former union and the former socialisation influence today's perception of instrumentality? One hint is however given in the respondents' comments in the free space of the questionnaire. Quite a few people declared that they felt like "paying

²⁰⁹ I.e. compared to all workers and compared to union members only at Bodywear (see t-tests).

²¹⁰ Referring to IPOS, a representative study in West and East Germany.

members as before". This might indicate a frustration over a perceived absence of internal democracy in the union, and a feeling that member-union relations had not really changed.

9.1.3 Instrumentality of collective activities and related issues

(i) Bodywear survey

table 9.1.5: level of items of perceived instrumentality of collective activities and related issues at Bodywear²¹¹

./.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
CK	Improvements at the workplace can only be realized through collective action of all colleagues.	7.7	11.2	11.2	24.6	45.4	260
AR	The works council is only as strong as they are supported by the workers.	2.6	11.6	24.3	34.0	27.6	268
CM	If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker you can't do anything against it.	6.2	2.7	16.2	15.8	59.2	260
CH	If you complain nowadays about your job, you get sacked.	15.5	23.8	13.2	35.5	12.1	265

Collective action was seen by 70% as the only means to change the working conditions, and the same number saw the necessity of collective support for the works council. But few believed that collective action had any chance in the case of a plant closure (as happened with the knitting plant). One could argue that this reveals a realistic perception by workers of their limited power to prevent plant closures in the existing economic situation rather than a general disapproval of collective action. It also provides an interesting point that people might evaluate the effectiveness of collective action differently according to the level the action and focus takes place (e.g. shopfloor vs industrial level).

The interviews were characterized by an overall mood of serenity and scepticism. For example, "acting leads to nothing", "there is nothing we can do" (sewers no 3, 5 1994). When asking about the specific workplace problems the interviewees never regarded collective reactions as an option to be considered ("this doesn't change anything", sewer no 9, 1994). Some interviewees argued that people were more prepared to speak up

²¹¹ The few double answers (e.g. "union" and "works council") were treated as missing cases.

in the company assemblies more in former times than today. "Today you do not know whether what you say is right or wrong, and what they want to hear" (sewer no 2, 1994); "Everybody is silent in the assemblies [today], but afterwards the talking starts" (sewer no 10, 1994). One gets the impression that East German workers grouse a lot among each other, yet rarely stand up for their interests (e.g. West German manager interview (see chapter 4), and also Alt et al. 1993:24).

One can think of at least three explanations for this divergence between quantitative and qualitative findings. Firstly, it could be a methodological problem, i.e. due to the small, not representative sample of interviews, and or due to the survey design which did not ask more detailed questions on collective reactions to workplace grievances. Secondly, it could be a sign that people have unstable, incoherent attitudes: on the one side they realize that only solidaristic action can achieve something (perhaps supported by the positive experience of the peaceful turnaround in 1989). On the other side, they perceive no chance of influencing management decision-making and therefore do not act. Thirdly, it could be a reaction to the perceived high job insecurity. In the survey 48% agree that you get sacked if you complain.

In sum, one might argue that people strongly believed in collective action as an effective and necessary means, yet were frustrated about its potential success in the current economic circumstances.

In addition, there are some statements in the interviews concerning the role collective action played in former workplace relations, which might be worth reporting regarding the suggestion reported in chapter 5 that the absense of voluntary collective activities in former times might prevent participation today (e.g. Mahnkopf 1991).

There is some tentative evidence that expressing grievances over working conditions was rarely done before. "You got used to the fact that nothing is changing anyhow" (sewer no 3 1994). And there was the additional fear that you were disadvantaged in the holiday place distribution or got a bad remark in your personnel file etc. (sewer no 4 1994). Only during the turbulent times in 1989 people felt more confident expressing their dissatisfaction. "People didn't mince their words anymore. Once some

people start, others follow" (no 4). Protocol documents of company assemblies from that period (e.g. November 1989) showed that quite a few people mentioned problems and suggested necessary improvements.

However, some workers said that people used to speak up more in former times than today, but others counter that the complaints had no impact then. "Now they listen to your claims, since they want to avoid conflicts and are interested in the ideas. I wouldn't have thought this is the case in a West firm" (sewer, no 5 1994). This is in line with the councillors' view that management does try to foster a trustful relationship with the workforce (chapter 4: 4.4). One can tentatively suggest that this was a rather obedient, even obsequious workforce in former times, which might have spoken up at certain times, but was not highly involved in informal bargaining with their supervisors, as some literature suggests (Kern and Land 1991). However, the assumed low level of practice of voluntary collective activities in the GDR did not prevent people to have a generally positive view of collective activities today.

(ii) GTB survey

table 9.1.6: level of items of perceived instrumentality of collective activities in the GTB firms

I.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
AV	Works council and GTB will only be effective if they get active support from the workers.	5.0	6.0	6.0	20.1	62.9	418
AL	Strikes are an effective means to strengthen the union during collective bargaining.	7.3	8.7	10.4	28.9	44.7	425

The two questions revealed a highly positive distribution and provide a more positive response to collective action than did the case study (also with regard to union members only at Bodywear, see t-tests in appendix A 2.6).

In sum, despite the slight differences between the two data sets, the common result is that people are generally attentive to the principle of collective action, yet judge its success

chances at shopfloor level in the current circumstances as lower than at industrial level (i.e. strikes). It is an interesting finding that people differentiate the strength of collective action according to the different levels of action (micro/ meso). It also suggests that workers are not sufficiently "individualistic" that they cannot appreciate "collective" activities, as is argued in some literature.

Moreover, it has been argued that East Germans lack experience in "voluntary" collective action and therefore cannot perceive it as effective. This cannot be supported by the data, especially not with the GTB sample. One could argue that workers have learnt over the last years that their interest representation needs active support, and that strikes can make a change (e.g. the "successful" strike of East German members of the IG Metall in 1993 which lasted two weeks, the first large-scale strike in the East). Yet, one can also argue that workers might remember the possible "informal" group actions on the former shopfloor and regard this kind of collective action as instrumental and even more successful than works councils' activities. Consequently, workers might still prefer to rely on themselves to represent their interests than use institutional procedures, and thus the informal interest representation might not yet substituted by formal institutions. However, this analysis overlooks the fact that group actions seem never to have been the norm in the former textile plants, and that the interest institutions are overwhelmingly accepted by the workforce. As mentioned before, a continuous interplay of informal (group) and formal interest representation on shopfloor level might be the most likely scenario (see chapter 3, e.g. Morgenroth et al. 1994:90).

Finally, with regard to the whole section on collective instrumentality it should be also noted that the variety of results of these variables adds support to the assumed multidimensionality of the concept (see chapter 7).

9.2 General views on interest representation at Bodywear

The purpose of these questions was to provide additional information of people's views on their interest representation in former and current times.

table 9.2: level of items of interest representation at Bodywear

Who represents your interests <i>today</i> with regard to the following working conditions? (in %)		union	works council	personnel dept.	super-visor	nobody	N
CR	pay level	41.4	18.2	14.8	12.9	12.9	209
CQ	job security	13.2	32.9	13.2	17.4	23.3	219
CW	working time	20.6	27.3	14.8	22.5	14.8	209
CV	health & safety	9.7	21.5	2.7	25.8	40.3	186
CU	introduction of new technology	0.0	4.9	4.3	76.2	14.6	185
CT	qualification/training	2.9	6.4	38.6	13.5	38.6	171
CS	job requirements	1.5	10.8	6.2	66.7	14.9	195
CX	And who did represent best your interests in <i>former</i> times? (one only)						224
	BGL = 13.0 %	my workgroup = 10.3 %					
	plant director = 7.6 %	nobody, myself alone = 33.0 %					
	supervisor = 34.8 %	different (specify) = 1.3 %					

The union was mainly seen as representing wage interests, but not for example job security concerns. The works council was seen as representing the workforce in its traditional tasks (e.g. working time) but not for example with regard to the introduction of new technology. This supports the assertion in the literature (see chapter 3) that there is little activity on an issue which is seen as a major general problem of German works councils, especially for the East German ones (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992). Similarly, the personnel department was the major representative for training, and the works council was not seen to be in charge. The supervisor was also the representative of most workplace issues. However, the modal response was that workers felt represented by nobody regarding training and health & safety (this was also pointed out in several interviews, e.g. supervisor in knitting no 1 1993).

In sum, there is a fair distribution of representative bodies depending on the issues. This might be partly due to the dual system of interest representation in Germany (see chapter 3). However, one wonders sometimes whether people had not picked out the actor who is theoretically responsible for that specific issue rather than the true representative (e.g. regarding new technology or work requirements: is the supervisor really representing workers' interests?). Yet, the surprising dominance of the supervisors could be also explained as a legacy of former times where the supervisor was seen as being more a "friend" of the work group than today.

With regard to the representation of interests in the socialist days, the BGL got the third place after the supervisor and nobody, and was placed higher than the workgroup. This confirms an earlier hypothesis on the low effectiveness of the former state union in representing workers interests (see chapter 2). It might also support earlier suggestions of the limited extent of informal bargaining between the workgroup and supervisors in these firms (see chapter 3, 4). A comparison between former and current times which could show us changes of interest representation, is not really possible with this data. However, one might say that the union and works council are both seen as fulfilling more representative roles (especially in the three traditional issues, pay, job security and working time) than the BGL did in former times. This could be used as another support for the successful institutionalisation of the two organisations.

In sum, this section supported the findings on the necessity of the interest institutions and their overall effectiveness in representing workers interests in the traditional areas.

9.3 Union identity and related items

(i) Bodywear survey

table 9.3.1: level of items of union identity and related items at Bodywear

./.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
BR	It is important for me to belong to the union.	22.8	12.4	15	28.0	21.8	193
BQ	I never tell my friends that I am a union member.	50.6	12.2	7.8	15.6	13.9	180
BS	I would stay in the union if I had to work on short term or became unemployed.	28.5	5.2	30.1	14.0	22.3	193
BU	Not belonging to the union is anti-social.	78.8	8.5	9.0	1.4	2.4	212
BF	I regard myself as a member of the working class.	9.2	6.7	12.1	17.1	55.0	240
AY	It's difficult to be loyal to both the union and the company.	6.7	9.4	38.2	28.3	17.3	254
BA	As a union member you are discriminated against by your supervisor.	46.3	9.0	36.5	4.7	3.5	255

These questions were mainly filled out by union members, although this was not explicitly required. The first four questions asked directly for peoples' identification with the union. Over half stated that union membership was important for them, and even a larger number did not hide their membership from their friends. With regard to keeping their membership in the case of unemployment, the answers were, unsurprisingly, more divided. Nevertheless, these figures might be interpreted as a consistent (although not extremely strong) positive identification with the union. However, one might object that the questions do not provide a good measurement of identity. The questions are not precisely worded, i.e. it is not clear why it is important to belong to the union and why they want to stay in the union if unemployed (both could have instrumental reasons as well). The GTB survey tried to avoid these misunderstandings.

Furthermore, 87% thought that not belonging to an union is not "anti-social". This might indicate that joining the union was not a social norm anymore as it was before. However, over 70% (of non union and union members) described themselves as belonging to the working class. This is in contrast to Hofmann and Rink (1993) who claim

the dissolution of the "worker milieu" (Arbeitermilieu) in East Germany. It is also a striking number compared to the western experience, where "working class" is increasingly becoming something you do not want to belong to ("embourgeoisement" of the working class, see Goldthorpe et al. 1968; Kern and Schumann 1970; Zweig 1961). An explanation might be the legacy of the former glorification and high status of the working class. Perhaps it is also pure obstinacy. But it might also be a sign of a (still) strong collectivist feeling among the workforce.

The next question asked about dual loyalty to the firm and the union. Although a majority of 45% thought that it is problematic to be loyal to both, 38% did not know, which might indicate, that this has never been an issue before. People experienced unions as being a normal, accepted part of the socialist company life, not as autonomous bodies but rather part of a unity with management. This might also influence people's perception that union members are not discriminated against at their workplaces, as the last question shows.

(ii) GTB survey

table 9.3.2: level of items of union identity and related items in the GTB firms

./.	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
BF I share the aims and values of the union.	5.4	6.1	13.2	44.9	30.4	408
BG Union solidarity is very important for me.	4.6	3.9	11.2	32.8	47.4	411
BB I feel a sense of pride in being a member of the GTB.	9.2	18.2	15.8	35.7	21.1	412
BE I feel strong ties with the other union members (in my plant).	11.7	19.6	22.7	31.1	14.9	409
BC I would remain in the union, even if I were unemployed.	22.7	14.3	20.5	14.7	27.8	414
BA I seriously think about quitting the GTB in the future.	44.3	21.2	11.1	14.5	8.9	415

This survey expanded and improved the measurement of union identity. Overall, a large majority of members identified strongly with their union. 80% declared that union solidarity is very important for them. Slightly fewer felt strong ties with other members, or

would remain in the union if unemployed (43% which is slightly more than Bodywear's 36%). Finally, a majority of 65% was not thinking of leaving the GTB, albeit nearly a quarter were. This is however much less than the average in East Germany as illustrated by the DGB Trendbarometer (54% were thinking of leaving their union in 1994). This better result could be due to the overrepresentative share of union or works council officials in the GTB survey sample, yet t-tests showed no significant differences for this question. In short, the data yielded a strong degree of union identity and a more reliable measurement than that of the case study.

In sum, the strong union identity of both samples is in line with the high degree of solidarity and collectivist attitudes discussed earlier (chapter 8). It gives evidence that the postulated East German "identity crisis" regarding public institutions has not affected these samples yet (see chapter 5). For example it challenges Fichter's proposition (1996), that high union identity exists only in conflict situations, or Eidam and Oswald's (1993:167) assertion, that the unions have not yet succeeded in developing a culture of solidarity and commitment. Unfortunately, there is no comparable empirical study of "union identity" (neither in the West nor East).

Finally, it should be repeated that the survey did not intend to obtain information on the development of its attitudinal variables (i.e. recently "developed" by union members or a legacy of the past). Thus, it did not address the question how do the "disappointing experiences with the former union" impede identification with the current union, or what is the link between "people's former socialisation" and their union identity today. What is possible however to examine is the relationship between the strong union identity and the weaker collective instrumentality which will be dealt with later in Part 4.

9.4 Information flow between collective institutions and the workforce and collective interests at Bodywear

table 9.4: level of items of information flow and collective interests at Bodywear

./.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
AX	You get well informed about the work of the GTB.	18.2	23.6	13.6	39.1	5.4	258
AK	You are not sufficiently informed about the work councils' work.	6.4	15.6	10.3	34.0	33.7	282
AP	The works council guarantees another job for all knitters.	4.5	1.9	76.1	5.6	11.9	268
AW	Please state one important difference between the works council and the union. Just write what comes into your mind: mentioned one difference = 23.0% no answer = 76.3%						69
BV	Guess how many of Bodywear's workforce are union members? 0-20% = 9.3% 21-30% = 15.8% 31-40% = 20.3% 41-50% = 15.8% 51-100% = 12.4%						214
AM	The work of the works council is a frequent topic of our chats.	20.3	31.3	11.0	23.0	7.9	272
AL	Our group keeps the works council informed about relevant events on the shopfloor.	9.3	15.9	33.7	26.3	14.8	270
AZ	In our workgroup we often discuss union issues.	46.9	34.6	3.1	13.5	1.9	260

The first five questions dealt with the *information flow*. Workers felt insufficiently informed by the works council and were divided with regard to the union. Interestingly, there is no significant difference between union and non union members regarding both institutions, as t-tests found out. The slightly better evaluation of the union might be traced back to the "information desk" of the GTB at Bodywear (being set up just at the time of the survey) rather than to different underlying communication policies of the two institutions. Moreover, the works council is a major channel for union information (especially when there are no union stewards, as is the case in most sites in the East, see chapter 3).

The next questions examined how informed workers actually were. Asked about a specific, at that time major, success of the works council in the knitting plant (see chapter 4) nobody in the other departments seemed to be informed. In the same vein, 76% could

not or did not bother to provide a distinction between "union" and "works council". Out of the few people who filled out this open question, most argued that "the union represented workers, and the works council represented management". But there were also remarks such as, "the works council cares for us, the union is only for paying members". Some people maintained that there was no difference at all between the two institutions, while others argued that the works council was more approachable than the union. Further comments were, "the union is more powerful", "Betriebsrat = Geheimrat" (works councillor = secret servant), and one person wrote very 'philosophically', "according to the situation one is quicker in giving in than the other (dialectical interrelation see Marx)".

In sum, there are mixed and divergent perceptions of the two institutions. It is striking that quite a few people mixed up the union with the former BGL and actually compared the works council with the BGL. This also occurred in the interviews. The difference between old union, new union and works council was often not yet clear (e.g. sewer no 5 1994). In the interviews the works council was seen as a transmission belt between management and workers as was the former BGL, rather than a pure representative body of the workforce or of the management. "The works council represents the company and also the workers" (sewer no 4 1994). However, one can either relate this to peoples' continuing association of the works council with the former BGL, or to the belief that the works council is actually acting as a prolonged arm of management. Furthermore, only 20% knew the correct union density figure at Bodywear (between 31-40%).²¹² Although it is difficult to investigate the actual amount and quality of information flows between the two institutions and the workforce by survey and interview method (participant observation during a longer time seems more appropriate), one can conclude that workers felt largely left out and uninformed about what is going on. Insufficient information supply, a lack of experience and/or interest might be all reasonable explanations.

²¹² T-tests revealed that union members were more likely to guess the right density figure than non-members.

Finally, the last three questions refer to *workers' interest in the institutions*, which can be interpreted as indicating a preliminary interest in collective issues. The data suggested a rather low interest in common affairs. Most did not discuss union issues, a few more discussed works council affairs, but on the other side 41% kept the works council informed about group issues. However, this is not an uncommon finding also in western societies. There is evidence that interest in collective issues is low for most workers but is "switched on" in times of concern (e.g. before collective bargaining rounds or strikes) (e.g. Zoll 1979).

As outlined in chapter 7 it might be interesting to examine the possible relation between these variables and union identity or instrumentality. For example, do people who feel well informed perceive a higher instrumentality of the interest institutions than those who feel less informed? Or are strong union identifiers more interested in collective issues than weak identifiers? These questions will be addressed in Part 4.

CONCLUSION OF PART 3

WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE RELATIONS

" ... May I add a few comments. Today you are as an employee completely and utterly at the management's mercy. Obviously the union tries to represent the interests of the worker. But in the end it is always the profit which wins, and only the profit. The individual human does not count anymore in this system. Due to the market situation (unemployment) in East Germany it is very easy to tie workers' and the union's hands. A worker in East Germany earns in average 60-80% of the wage his colleague in West Germany gets, and this with the same level of living expenses. You are forced to work also for a low wage in order to survive. In the GDR you were not allowed to travel abroad. Today you cannot afford it. A large amount of law needs to be overhauled by the government. May I conclude with my own, very personal view. The socialist system, combined with a market economy, i.e. with the free market economy, might be the golden mean in order to prevent Germany becoming one day a third world country. ..."

("anonymous worker from East Germany", written on the back of his/her questionnaire, 1993)

Part 3 was concerned with workers' perspectives of the transforming workplace relations. It was earlier proposed that this perspective is necessary to really understand the transformation process. In a nutshell three relationships were explored: between workers and management, between the workers themselves, and between workers and works council/ union.

Worker- management relations were not harmonious in either data set. Management was seen as having deteriorated the working conditions in virtually all aspects (e.g. through an intensification of work), and were described as distrustful "exploiters". Workers felt betrayed, humiliated and not involved in the organisational transformation process.

Yet, with regard to the relationship among the workforce, this development did not lead (yet) to a complete de-solidarization and increasing competition among the workers.

Although workers felt a decreasing solidarity among their colleagues, they still identified strongly with their work collectives.

Regarding the relationship between the workforce and the new interest institutions the result was mixed. Works councils and the union were accepted, but their specific effectiveness was evaluated differently and, on average, more negatively. On the other hand the instrumentality of collective activities was seen slightly more positively. It seems that people have complex views on interest representation, and this underlines the complexity of workers' attitudes in general and in particular in times of change and also comprises an important methodological point on debates about collectivism, instrumentality and unionism. As was already pointed out in table 5.3 (chapter 5) there are likely to be various dimensions of individualism/ collectivism, rather than a simple "black and white" picture. For example, the surveyed textile workers believed in the value of works councils, unions and of collectivism, but were less sure about solidarity. Or they attributed representative duties not only to works councillors and union officials but also to their supervisors. Furthermore, union members revealed strong union identities but a generally low perceptions of the instrumentality of the union.

One could speculate that this divergence between identity and instrumentality can only last for a short while. According to Newton and McFarlane Shore (1992:278) it characterizes a "cognitive dissonance" (e.g. Festinger 1957), and thus creates tensions within individuals which they will attempt to reduce. Ultimately these people will either reduce their identification with the union or will enhance a positive perception of the unions' instrumentality. However, it might be that this presumed cognitive dissonance is a rather "normal" phenomenon which comes and goes during a membership life. The next Part will investigate the relationship between the two dimensions of collectivism in more detail.

Finally, what do the attitudes discussed in Part 3 tell us about the two underlying questions of this study, the "individualisation" of the workforce and the "institutionalisation" of the interest representation?

With regard to the widespread claim that East German workers are becoming increasingly individualistic, passive and instrumental, Part 3 dealt with five of the attitudinal dimensions outlined in table 5.3. Collectivist attitudes were characterized by a mixed perception of the instrumentality of the interest institutions and strongly positive perceptions of the instrumentality of collective activities, a strong union and workgroup identity, strong them-and-us feelings, general collectivist attitudes, and a rather low interest in collective concerns. Thus, the average textile worker is not alienated from collectivist values, has rather a strong sense of solidarity and of them-and-us feelings, and union members identify with their union. Moreover, people perceive the interest institutions as important to have, they do not dismiss them as useless just because they are not perceived as highly successful at the moment.

As will be recalled, table 5.3 did not distinguish necessary or sufficient dimensions of collectivism. However, it seems safe to conclude that with regard to most attitudinal dimensions these workers can be characterized as "collectivists". The individualisation thesis can therefore not be supported with regard to the examined attitudes of the workforce. However, they should not be classified as 'pure' collectivists since they display some mixed responses. This will be further discussed in the next chapter, which examines their behavioural patterns, e.g. whether they react individualistically, or passively, as has been suggested in the literature.

With regard to the second hypothesis, it was argued in chapter 3 that one essential, necessary condition of an effective functioning of the collective institutions is that the actors involved accept them. Both data sets presented a strong belief of workers that the two institutions are necessary and important, although they were realistic with regard to the restricted power of the institutions during these difficult economic times. This is a reassuring result that after three or four years the institutional transfer has settled in people's minds. It also confirms the findings of the works councillor questionnaires which gave the impression that, perhaps selectively, management works together with the works council rather than tries to avoid and obstruct them as much as possible, and confirms the works councillors' view that the workforce is supporting them (see chapter 4). With

regard to the other variables which characterize the institutionalisation from the workers' viewpoint and which are mentioned in table 3.2 (chapter 3) two yielded more mixed results: workers displayed a weak interest in collective issues (yet as outlined the low interest level might be a quite normal phenomenon). They had a positive view on utilizing the works council in theory as a grievance institution yet were threatened to do so in practice. Finally, the strong union identities (and indeed the union membership figures) give another support for the institutionalisation of the union. Whether workers also support the institutions actively is matter of the next chapter.

Finally, the data also suggests that informal interest representation does not play a major role in these textile companies, thus the formalisation of interest representation in the West German system did succeed. Thus, the various dimensions of "institutionalisation" which were here discussed seem to support the hypothesis that the works council and the union are institutionalised from the viewpoint of the workers.

PART 4

WORKERS' REACTIONS: THE WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN COLLECTIVE ACTIVITIES AND ITS DETERMINANTS

Part 4 discusses various forms of workers' reactions to the transforming workplace relations and analyses the relevance of the selected theories in determining workers' willingness to participate in collective activities. The discussion has two aims: Firstly, it continues to analyse of two main hypotheses of this study, the "individualisation" of the workforce and the "institutionalisation" of the interest organisations. Secondly and primarily, it investigates the applicability of the four social psychological theories in the East German context and the possible interrelations between them.

Chapter 10 focuses on the level of activism in both data sets, and chapter 11 examines the determinants.

Chapter 10 Workers' reactions to the transforming workplace relations: behavioural variables in both surveys

The chapter discusses workers' reactions to the transforming workplace relations by focusing on their willingness to participate in collective activities (10.1), which is the dependent variable in the further statistical analysis. It also investigates two other variables: reactions to workplace problems (10.2), and reasons for joining the union (10.3). The former is used as an additional proxy for the willingness to become active. The latter provides some insights of how people made the decision to join the West German union, which might have some parallel to people's approach to participate in the union, which is discussed in the next chapter.

10.1 The willingness to participate in collective activities

(i) Bodywear survey

table 10.1.1: level of items of willingness to participate in collective activities at Bodywear

./.	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
AV I will attend the next works council assembly.	3.7	2.2	22.3	8.4	63.4	273
AT I will attend the next works council election.	9.2	4.4	32.2	8.1	46.2	273
BO I never visit union events. ²¹³	4.4	5.9	19.5	32.2	38.0	205
CN "Bischofferode" (mining strike) has a meaning throughout East Germany and if the union would call a strike I would participate.	10.0	5.8	37.8	20.8	25.5	259
AU If my colleagues want me to, I would stand for the works council election.	58.7	16.2	17.3	3.3	4.4	271
BT I am not a very active and loyal member.	15.2	10.5	19.3	36.8	18.1	171

²¹³ The question in the original questionnaire: "do you visit union events?" (1 always/2 quite often/3 sometimes/4 very rarely/5 never) was here transformed.

The high willingness to attend works councils' assemblies was in line with the works councillors' statement that these assemblies are always well attended. This is hardly surprising taking into account that these meetings take place during working time and are more or less obligatory to attend.²¹⁴ Fewer but still over a half, were willing to attend the next works councillor election (early summer 1994), while a third did not know at this stage. This cannot support the expressed concern of the works council of a decreasing interest of the workforce in works council elections (see chapter 4). Indeed, the actual attendance rate in the following year was 85% (of total workforce) which is very high.

With regard to the union, responses were more varied. A large majority was not willing to attend union events (albeit more than a third do not know). Union events were not specified and thus can mean different things to different people (e.g. assemblies, cultural events, demonstrations). One reason for this low level might be that these questions were also filled out by non union members. It is obvious that, as the t-tests confirmed, members attended works council assemblies, union events and strikes more than non union members. In addition, it has to be taken into account that the GTB did not organise a great amount of "events" (especially when compared with the former socialist union). It will be remembered that the first union "event" at Bodywear (the information desk) took actually place at the time of the survey. However, the percentage of people attending these events is still quite low compared to Weßel's study (see chapter 5) which revealed 34% of employees attending union events in East Germany in 1990. However, one might object that in 1990 union events happened more frequently due to the extraordinary situation of the union mergers at that time.

On the other side, there was a high willingness to participate in strike action. One could however object that the results might be biased by the emotions evoked at that time by the famous hunger strike in the mines in Bischofferode. The interviews (in 1993 and 1994) were much more stamped by a wait-and-see attitude towards the usefulness and effectiveness of strikes. Interviewees all provided an "instrumental", "rational" approach to strikes, thus mentioning pros and cons, emphasizing the economic situation and the

²¹⁴ Works council assemblies take place four times a year (by law: BetrVG 1972, § 42), elections each third year.

possible West German winner of East German strike activities ("only the West German plants would profit if we strike" [knitter no3, 1993]). The author met nobody who was enthusiastic to take part in a strike. But who is enthusiastic about striking in the West? Also one should keep in mind that interviews are generally leading in that they push respondents to provide "rational" explanations for their attitudes and behaviour. In addition, the interviews also gave evidence that some people just looked for an excuse for not acting, and not becoming responsible for their action. For example, "we are not used to strikes", "we are happy what we have got" were common phrases.

Another reason why strike participation might be lower in reality than expressed in the survey is that industrial action is not really an issue for the workforce of Bodywear. They are paid the bargained wage and they work for a prosperous privatised company with a relatively stable employment situation.

On the other side, the token strike (over pay and working conditions) happening two years later at Bodywear (1995) can provide another support for the declared activism in the questionnaires. Obviously, it depends on how one interprets the way workers participated in it (i.e. "reluctantly" forced or voluntarily) whether this can be taken as a support for workers' strong inclination to participate in collective activities. One has also to account for the fact that attitudes might have changed during that period of time. Talking to the councillors in 1995 did however not provide any evidence that this had happened. In sum, the data does not allow us to make final judgements about a possible difference between expressed willingness and actual behaviour. However, the strong willingness to participate in strikes is a surprising and important finding in itself.

Finally, three quarters were not interested in standing for works council election. This proportion seems not markedly different from what is known of West German employees (e.g. Krieger et al. 1989) or union members (e.g. Zech 1993), or indeed from other western countries (Brett 1980; Van de Vall 1963). For example, Krieger et al. (1989:163) found that 72% of their representative sample of West German employees in various industries refusing to stand for works councillor election and 26% agreeing (out of which 30% are male, and 19% are female). Thus, it seems that people are easier to mobilize for selective activities than for continuous voluntary commitments, despite the

fact that they acknowledge the significance of worker's support for the council (see items discussed above). However, a single question is not obviously sufficient for valid statements regarding members' attitudes towards this kind of participation, and the GTB survey included more items on this issue.

The very last question refers to employees' own perceptions of being an active and loyal union member. More than half felt they are not an active and loyal member. However, the question does not distinguish between active and loyal, which might not be correlated in all cases: in addition this question was answered by only 39% of the sample. This question is therefore statistically not highly reliable, and is improved in the GTB survey.

In sum, the findings are mixed: on one side workers were willing to participate in "normal" works council activities and also in strikes, on the other side they were reluctant to stand for a councillor post and do not see themselves as active and loyal union members. The strong willingness to become active in certain activities however challenges the works councillor's view at Bodywear of the generally "inactive workforce" (see chapter 4).

(ii) GTB survey

table 10.1.2: level of items of willingness to participate in collective activities in the GTB firms

./.		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
AJ	I would take part in demonstrations/ rallies during collective bargaining.	7.5	12.7	20.9	26.4	32.5	416
AK	If the GTB calls a strike I would participate.	9.7	9.0	18.4	17.7	45.3	424
AW	I will attend the next works council assembly.	6.9	1.4	11.2	5.5	74.9	418
AO	Did you vote in the recent works council election?						412
	yes = 91.5 % no = 8.5%						
AX	If asked I would have stood for the works council election.	26.6	18.2	17.7	12.4	25.1	418
AY	If asked I would serve on a committee for the GTB.	40.4	19.2	22.6	10.1	7.7	416
AZ	I constantly try to recruit new members for the union.	35.6	19.5	18.0	16.1	10.7	410
BD	I don't see myself as a union activist.	9.4	11.1	9.9	34.5	35.0	414

The GTB survey focused more on activities of the union than the case study. The items can be divided into two broad categories, "organised" and "self-initiated" forms of collective activities. The former comprises activities organised by the union or work council where people "submissively" join without making any initiative of their own. The latter comprises activities where people deliberately take the initiative to become active. These two categories are later confirmed by factor analysis (chapter 11).

The frequency distribution revealed a 'high' level of willingness to join *organised forms of participation* (such as strikes), and a relatively low inclination to become active on one's own. In other words, the involvement in self-initiated activities was much lower in absolute terms than the organised activities. A comparison with the case study data is possible with regard to the last three questions of the first category. Attending works council assembly and actual voting in works council election yielded similar results, as did strike participation, which was somewhat higher in the GTB sample (63% vs 47% in Bodywear). This difference might well be due to the different sample (union members and

members/non members in the case study — similar differences have been found in Krieger et al. 1989).

These results challenge the popular notion of East Germans being passive and reluctant to strike (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992, Woderich 1992, see chapter 3). This becomes especially evident taking into account the usual association of the textile sector as a traditionally female-dominated and not highly militant union sector and the fact that the East German textile industry by now consists of small plants (see the structural theories of participation, chapter 6). T-tests revealed no significant differences between females and males regarding the participation items (see appendix A 2.6).

The recent token strike (1995) and the other actions during collective bargaining during 1993-1994 do not contradict to the general non-militancy of the GTB. This has been also underlined by the works council questionnaire (1993) which revealed no incidence of industrial action of any kind in the surveyed companies (see chapter 4). Consequently, it might be argued, as in the Bodywear survey, that the correlation between willingness to become active and the actual behaviour is much looser in the East than in the West. One reason could be that East Germans might think they should participate (because of group norms, socialisation etc.), but nevertheless might not do in the actual situation, as long as they are not "forced" or heavily mobilized. It could be also due to a cost-benefit analysis which prevents an engagement because it is seen as ineffective in these economic circumstances. This would be supported by the case study interviews presenting a more cautious "wait-and-see" approach to strikes.

On the other hand, the data does not differ significantly from available West German data. For example, Wiedenhofer (1979:45) found in his sample of West German union members in the food industry (NGG) 60% who would participate in a strike. And the study of Krieger et al. (1989:127) examined in a representative survey of West German union members whether they would follow the call of the unions to participate in the following activities: "public declaration" (Kundgebung) (60%), demonstration (42%), strike (34%), silent minute (53%), human chain (9%), "occupation of the plant" (5%). 15% did not participate out of principle. In addition, one should not forget that participation is only possible if there are opportunities available, and this depends among

other things on the structure and degree of internal democracy and strategies of the particular union (see Lawrence 1994:11). In sum, it is not clear that the gap between willingness and activity is significantly different in East from that in West Germany.

With regard to the more "*difficult*" *self-initiated forms of participation* in the survey, slightly over a third would have stood for works council election, which is higher than at Bodywear (7% all workers, 11.2% union members only). Considerably fewer (18%) wished to serve on a union committee, and over a quarter tried to recruit new members on a constant basis. Overall, as already mentioned in the case study, the findings support an established western theory, that members are far easier to mobilize for selective collective actions than for continuous voluntary commitments. The results are also in line with available West German data. For example, Wiedenhofer (ibid.:44) found 20% willing members to stand for works council election, the Sozialreport (1993:30) found 23% willing to become active for "worker interests", and Krieger et al. (1989:165) found 36% of their union sample (representative for West Germany).

The last question refers to people's *own perception of their activism*: 70% saw themselves as not active members. The GTB survey improved the question in that it did not combine "loyalty" and "activity", and only decreased the number of people with "no views" compared to Bodywear. Thus, the result is more reliable than the, more or less similar, Bodywear result. It is also in line with (West) German findings. Weischer (1993) quoted a representative study on political consciousness of West German employees, where 20% declared themselves as active union members (Infas-study). And also the DGB Trendbarometer yielded 26% declared active members in East vs 17% in West in 1994, which is in both regions lower than in 1992 (East 33%, West 24%). For the GTB (West and East) subsample the results in 1992 were below the East or West activity rate with only 19% activists, however the sample consisted of 83 persons only and is therefore not highly reliable (it is not said how many of these were East Germans).

Finally, the question is used as an indicator of how far people's own perception of activism correlates with the survey's "artificial" measurements of participation. The correlation is significant ($r = -.30$) which can be interpreted as supporting the question's validity.

In sum, the findings resemble the Bodywear data in that their willingness to become active depends on the type of activity. Thus, the union members are highly willing to participate in organised activities, but less in self-initiated activities. And both samples do not characterize themselves as highly active members.

10.2 Reactions to workplace problems

This variable was included as an additional proxy for willingness to become active, not as a dependent variable on its own.

(i) Bodywear

Four different types of responses to job insecurity were examined: individualistic or collectivistic responses, externalizing or no reaction at all (avoidance). The first part asked for the approach to secure the company's survival, the second asked for individual job security.

table 10.2.1: levels of items of reactions to workplace problems at Bodywear

BW/BX/BY In general: how do you think the "viability" of Bodywear can be secured for long term? (max. three) (N of BW=251, of BX=187, of BY=97) (% = sum of BW, BX, BY)		
5	by means of better performance of myself and my fellowworkers	29.5 %
4	" more codetermination/involvement of the employees	18.9
3	" better management	17.4
2	" a more powerful works council	12.0
7	" politics (industrial policy)	11.8
1	" a more powerful union	7.3
6	" lower pay levels and cost savings at all workplaces	5.2
8	" not at all	3.4
9	" different reason (please specify) ____	1.7

BZ/CA/CB	How can you improve your job security? (max. three) (N of BZ=243, of CA=117, of CB=27) (%= sum of BZ, CA, CB)	
1	I have to work better than my fellowworkers	38.2 %
2	I have to have a good relationship to my supervisor and do not "rebel"	22.5
3	I have to solidarize with my colleagues	17.1
5	I cannot do anything	12.4
4	I have to become engaged in union or works council work	6.2
6	something else (please specify) _____	3.6

With regard to the company level 38% of the sample chose collective measures (point 1, 2, 4), 35% took individual measures (point 5, 6), 29% took external measures (point 3, 7), and 3% chose avoidance (point 8). Thus, the majority responded collectively to the threats at the level of the firm. On the other side most were inclined to act individualistically in the face of threats to their own job: 61% chose individual measures (point 1, 2), 23% chose collective measures (point 3, 4), and 12% chose avoidance (point 5). The relatively low level of avoidance challenges the widespread impression of "apathetic East Germans" (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992).

In sum, people chose more individualistic than collectivist strategies concerning the security of their own job, but slightly more collectivist strategies regarding the overall security of the firm. Thus, one might argue that at their workplace they conformed to the management slogan that increasing productivity helps to secure jobs. But for the well-being of the firm more employee involvement, a strong interest institution alongside better performance was preferred.

This interplay of threat definition- interest definition is echoed in some previous data. For example, collective action was seen as highly effective at industrial level (i.e. strikes) but less at shopfloor level (see chapter 9:9.1.3). It also reflects the German dual system of industrial relations (i.e. collective action at shopfloor level is not common). Moreover, it supports the proposition that people are difficult to classify as pure collectivists or pure individualists. They might be both depending on the circumstances, i.e. the levels of threat.

(ii) GTB survey

The GTB survey investigated alternative reactions to job insecurity, and also to two other workplace problems, work pace and pay level, together with the attribution of those problems, which have been already discussed on their own (section 8.4). It utilized Likert scales (instead of ranking questions of the Bodywear survey).

table 10.2.2: level of items of reaction to problems in the GTB firms

		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree	N
reaction to job insecurity							
Y	I cannot do anything [in order to improve my job security].	11.1	7.8	14.6	15.6	50.9	424
Z	I would try everything not to attract any negative attention [to improve my job security].	5.5	15.8	9.3	24.9	44.5	418
AD	I would look for another job [to improve job security].	24.0	16.1	19.2	17.7	23.0	417
AA	I have to work better than my workfellows [to improve my job security].	6.9	20.3	8.9	25.1	38.8	418
AB	I have to act together with my colleagues.	13.5	16.6	21.4	22.2	26.3	415
AC	I have to support more actively works council and GTB.	5.3	4.8	16.5	27.3	46.2	418
AE	It's the task of the works council not of us workers to [improve job security].	12.2	11.1	4.4	36.0	33.7	422
reaction to intensified work pace							
N	I cannot do anything [to improve working conditions], because otherwise I will risk losing my job.	10.0	9.3	8.2	30.1	42.3	428
O	I have to act together with my workfellows [to improve our working conditions].	7.5	9.9	9.6	28.9	44.1	426
P	Works council has to deal with it [improving working conditions], it's not our responsibility.	11.0	10.0	2.1	38.2	38.7	429
reactions to unequal pay							
AI	I cannot do anything [in order to improve the pay level in the textile industry].	11.5	12.2	20.4	18.9	36.9	417
AM	With company bargaining we are better off than with industry level bargaining.	32.7	14.1	27.2	14.1	11.9	419
AN	I would prefer to negotiate my pay individually with my employer.	39.1	17.7	16.5	18.1	8.6	419

With regard to the first problem, job insecurity, all four responses, avoidance, individualistic or collectivist reactions and institutional strategies, were offered. The other two issues, work pace and pay level, offered fewer options (avoidance, collectivist, institutional; and avoidance, relatively individualistic, strongly individualistic).

Overall, the first two issues displayed incoherent results. A large majority agreed strongly to all given, contradictory possibilities. For example, with regard to job insecurity, 67% agreed that they cannot do anything, yet 70% also argued that they have to perform better than their colleagues. The last section on pay level revealed a clearer picture. Over a half thought the individual was powerless with regard to the pay level in the textile industry, and most rejected company or individual pay bargaining. Thus, similarly to Bodywear, they preferred collective responses at an industry level.

One could explain the incoherence of the answers regarding the first two sections with a methodological fault, arguing that the respondents simply did not understand the exercise, and that therefore results are unreliable. However, one could also treat the answers seriously and wonder whether this does not tell us something worthwhile. It might be the case that people simply do not know whether they have a clear behavioural preference. It might vary from situation to situation. They might be right in showing their confusion. This points to a major general problem in attitudinal surveys, which always create the impression that people know what kind of attitude and behavioural preference they have and that these are stable. The reality might be quite different (see also Billig 1989).

To conclude, the case study's finding of a preference of individual reactions at shopfloor level and collectivistic reactions at company/industry level can only be partly supported with regard to the issue of unequal pay.

10.3 Joining the West German union at Bodywear

This variable is not a behavioural variable in the strict sense, it rather examines possible determinants of people's decision making to join the union. As outlined in chapter 1 this

study did not use joining decisions as the major dependent variable for various reasons. However, this question might be used as a first attempt to predict workers' approaches, e.g. instrumental or collectivist, to collective activities. The assumption of the literature is that East Germans approach joining and staying decisions in a highly "instrumental way" (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992).

table 10.3: level of items of joining/not joining decisions at Bodywear

BL,BM,BN		If you are a union member, why? (maximum three) (N of BL=119, of BM=90, of BN=63) (%= sum of BL,BM.,BN)
1	because of the free legislative consulting and legal help in case of dismissal	29%
3	in order to support the union in its collective bargaining with the employers	21.7
6	because I was a member also in former times	21.0
2	because of the strike money	14.7
5	because I believe in the principles and values of trade unionism	8.8
4	because most of my workfellows are members as well	4.0
7	different reason (please indicate) _____	0.7
BI,BJ, BK		If no union member, why not? (maximum three) (N of BI=132, BJ=89, BK=38) (%= sum of BI, BJ, BK)
4	the former union disappointed us too much.	29.3 %
5	the unions do not do enough for the East German worker.	23.6
6	the union fee is too high	17.8
1	the works council sufficiently represents my interests.	10.0
3	union do not interest me	8.9
7	other reason (please indicate) _____	5.4
2	Bodywear cares sufficiently for its workforce	5.1

The reasons to join can be divided into instrumental, collective and social reasons²¹⁵. The reasons for not joining are more varied: the bad experience with the former FDGB, no belief in the instrumentality (or necessity) of unions, and no interest in union affairs.

²¹⁵ The "social" reasons are difficult to interpret, since they could be interpreted as loyalty to the union or pure idleness to leave.

The three most frequently chosen *reasons for joining* the West German union (i.e. staying in the union) were an instrumental, a collectivist and a social reason. "Solidarity", i.e. a belief in the principles of trade unionism, was mentioned by only 9%.

The absence of pure ideological reasons was also manifested in the interviews. Most people brought up the two "traditional" functions of unions, providing security and collective bargaining. For example, "I am a member for security reasons. Something could happen. It could come to a strike perhaps. It could come hard. You never know" (sewer no 3 1994); "You need them now for the pay bargaining. In earlier times you didn't need the union for that" (sewer no 7 1994). "You need the union in case of a dismissal (sewer no 5 1994) and "GTB you need for dismissals, not really before" (sewer no 8 1994). The solidarity of working people was definitely not a reason mentioned in the interviews. When asking directly for it, one reply was, "Solidarity? No idea. What do I get out of it?" (sewer, no 3 1994)

However, classical reasons (security and pay) have been shown to be also prevalent in western studies on joining (see Gallie 1989; Lind 1996:114; Whitston and Waddington 1994). Newton and McFarlane Shore (1992:293) even suggested that newcomers' most likely form of membership is instrumental (rather than value-based). This can obviously be criticized for assuming (rather than explaining) a causal arrow from instrumentality to value-based membership. It also would raise the question whether the instrumental approach of East Germans is inevitably due to their being newcomers and not due to other reasons (e.g. a legacy of the former socialisation).

In sum, the suggested highly instrumental approach of East Germans to unions is not fully supported here, the data is more split: 44% instrumental reasons vs 35% collective and social reasons. It seems safe to say that the East German workers do not seem to behave more instrumentally than what we know from western workers.

The reasons why people *did not join or left the union*, were mostly related to the union itself (e.g. too western oriented, fees) rather than to general "anti-union" sentiments (e.g. "unions do not interest me") or because unions were not seen as necessary anymore. This is in line with statements in the East German literature (see chapter 5:5.3 (iii), e.g. Bialas

and Ettl 1993). Similar results have been also found in West German studies. For example, Prott (1993:32)²¹⁶ stated that the most frequent reasons for leaving the union are unfulfilled expectations (disappointment) which led firstly to an inner withdrawal, (followed by an actual exit) and/or "socio-economic" reasons (restricted personal financial situation makes them thinking of cost/benefits). In other words they did not leave out of antipathy against the labour movement ideas.

The interviews at Bodywear revealed that many workers did not really know why they were not in the union. Many had just never thought about this before. For example, "just like this. I just stopped paying" (sewer no 4, 1994); "I do not know why I left. Perhaps it was a mistake" (sewer no 9, 1994)²¹⁷. Nevertheless, there were also voices like, "I am not in the union and will never be. They should show first what they are doing, before I give money to them. We also have to perform first before we get paid" (sewer no 6, 1994). Others referred to the "high" union fee (1% of their wage). Finally, one temporary dyer argued, "if I get a full time contract I will perhaps enter the union. You then perhaps get additional money, no?"

Overall, it seems safe to say that most workers left the union because they do not believe in unions' effectiveness, presumably out of disappointment with the former FDGB, and not because of "anti-union" sentiments. This provides an important message for the unions that they could recruit new members if they only were more convincing about their instrumentality.

In conclusion, there is a mixture of different reasons for joining or not joining. Instrumental reasons were not as predominant as one might have imagined from the literature, but they were most frequently chosen. The two major reasons, "legal help" for being a member, and "disappointment with the FDGB" for not being a member, are in line with the suggestion made in the literature, that there is experiences with the former union still have an impact today and that instrumental approaches dominate. Nevertheless, the

²¹⁶ Study based on interviews with 50 former union members of the German union HBV (union of banking and retailing).

²¹⁷ The last remark also indicates the fragile interview situation at this company as the interviewees were constantly worried not to say something "wrong".

"instrumental" approach is not the only one and collective reasons have an important role as well. In addition, one should note that these pre-given catalogues of reasons tend to bias people to justify their decisions rationally. Catalogues presume that people make conscious, rational decisions. Thus, the risk is that people might choose to say the GTB is too western-oriented, only because it is popular and legitimate to say so. Or that they mention "legal help" because it is something the union itself propagates.

We will not investigate whether the reasons for joining the union have any impact on people's decisions to participate in collective activities. However, the mixture of instrumental and collective reasons might suggest that also participation decisions will not be determined by one approach only as has been already proposed in chapter 7. This will be further examined in the next chapter.

Conclusion of Chapter 10

Overall, the major result is that both data sets presented workers who were strongly willing to participate in certain activities, who reacted collectively to certain workplace problems and who joined, i.e. stayed in the union due to collective or instrumental reasons. Together this creates a different picture to the common (western) view of the "dreary", passive "Ossis" (East Germans) (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992), and enhances doubt about the "individualisation" thesis.

However, people's behaviour is difficult to be classified as purely collectivistic or purely individualistic, which adds to the similar findings regarding their attitudinal patterns discussed in the previous chapters. Many displayed mixed responses. For example, there was mixed degrees of willingness for different categories of collective activity (which adds another support to the hypothesis of participation being a multi-dimensional concept), and people also revealed individualistic or collectivistic reactions to different types of workplace problems. Reasons for this mixed pattern might be the fact that the parameters of their decisions are often not known, unclear and confusing, that too many factors play a

role, and because the fear of job insecurity overshadows all decisions. People seem essentially to muddle through their new situation. They might react individualistic in one occasion or the other (and who tells us that people did not do this in the past?), but many of their values and attitudes are (still) rooted in collectivist ideas.

Whether this is a normal state of affair or a product of the transformation of the GDR and its attendant confusions, is obviously hard to tell. However, there is some evidence from West German studies that it might well be the former. For example, Zoll developed a useful typology comprising three ideal-types of union members (1979: 349) in an empirical study on "strike and worker consciousness" during a large-scale strike of the IG Metall in West Germany (see also Prott 1993 for two categories similar to Zoll's first and second type).

Firstly, there are *passive members*, who show little active support for the union, and whose interests are represented by the general union interests. These have a consumption approach to the union (service-oriented) and delegate the representation of their interests to the union machinery. They are generally against industrial action and prefer cooperation and negotiation. To characterize this group the term "delegation" was chosen. Secondly, these are *actively committed members*, who are conscious of their own interests, participate extensively in union activities ("we are the union"), and reveal a strong identification. This group can be characterized with "strong social identity". Thirdly, there are *average members*, who show a low involvement in "normal" times, but can be mobilized in critical periods. They see the necessity of both interest representation at company and industry level. They can be critical about the union in certain circumstances, but this does not affect their general attitude toward the union. They think that the interest representation should adapt to the given circumstances, they are for peaceful bargaining but also in favour of strikes if necessary. They can be best characterized as having "loyalty" to the union.

Leaving the possible criticism of this kind of typology aside, one can conclude that although the Bodywear and GTB samples obviously contain members of all three categories, the modal members are of the third type. They have a basic identification with the union and what it stands for, and although they are not too ambitiously active they

probably can be mobilized on certain issues or occasions and they are convinced of the possibility of the effectiveness of collective action. Thus, they "switch on" collectivistic or individualistic characteristics depending on the situation. One can conclude from this classification that East German workers or union members do not seem to behave significantly differently than their West German counterparts.

Finally, the overall positive willingness to become active adds support to the "institutionalisation" thesis. As outlined in chapter 3 (table 3.2) behavioural commitment to support the interest institutions was seen as an important dimension of an successful institutionalisation.

A last point should be added: Throughout the chapter it was noted that the questionnaires did not intend to investigate possible causes for current behavioural (and attitudinal, see Part 3) patterns, i.e. whether they are merely a continuation of former behavioural patterns or new patterns due to current structural forces. One question in the Bodywear survey asked however for workers' own judgement how far their behaviour changed since 1989.²¹⁸

CP How do the societal changes in East Germany after the "Wende" influence your behaviour? (one answer only) N= 248		ISDA study	
		blue collar	blue and white collar
I am more active than before	= 11.3 %	15.1	20.3
I did not change at all	= 56.9 %	59.0	51.9
I live a more secluded life	= 31.9 %	25.6	27.8

Over a half felt they did not change their behaviour in post-1989 (i.e. during the last four years), whereas a third thought their life style had become more secluded. This is similar to the answers of the large-scale survey in 1991 by ISDA (1992:246) (see slanting figures in table). The last answer does not necessarily mean passivity, it might just indicate a revival of the private vs. public life sphere. Overall, this question reinforces doubts as to whether people change so quickly following societal transformation (see also Stratemann 1993), and is in contrast to some studies proposing significant changes in people's behaviour. For example, Fischer (1991:220) found that between May 1990 and October

²¹⁸ This question belongs to the section on "general attitudes towards Unification" (see chapter 8).

1990 there were significant changes in the distribution of personality types among East Germans (leisure-oriented type, inactive type, social oriented type). His "inactive" category increased from 12% in May to 43% in November 1990 (to the expense of the leisure oriented type). However, it is not clear how reliable this representative survey is (no information is given on the survey itself, nor is it clear whether this period is long enough to allow generalizations of the results). Our data in contrast suggests a certain stability in peoples' behavioural patterns.

The next chapter will investigate the determinants of peoples' willingness to participate in collective activities.

Chapter 11 Predicting "who participates in collective activities?" in both surveys

This chapter analyses the significance of the attitudinal (and demographic) variables, discussed in chapter 8 and 9, as antecedents of people's willingness to participate in collective activities. In particular, it investigates whether any of the four social psychological theories can explain participation behaviour in the East German context, and it also contributes to the theoretical discussion of the interrelationship of these theories (see chapter 7).

Factor analysis was conducted in both surveys trying to summarize the items (i.e. questions) of each (dependent and independent) variable, thus to check whether the indicators are really related to each other (and not to indicators that are supposed to measure other variables) (see appendix A 3.1). Descriptive statistics, i.e. means and standard deviation, as well as intercorrelations were then estimated for all variables. The antecedents (independent variables) were put into (linear) regression analysis (ordinary least square regression) for the participation factors (dependent variables) of the two surveys. The independent variables were as follows: instrumentality of interest institutions and collective activity itself, union and workgroup identity, them-and-us feelings, attribution of workplace problems, information flow/ collective interests, job dissatisfaction, and some demographic variables (see chapter 7).

Both surveys are separately discussed (11.1 Bodywear, 11.2 GTB). The last section (11.3) summarizes the results in both surveys and compares them to the literature. It also investigates the interrelations between major antecedents, in particular between social identity and collective instrumentality.

11.1 The determinants of participation at Bodywear

The Bodywear survey yielded two dependent factors of participation: low intensity and high intensity participation. Thus, the division was not between works council and union activities, but regarding the "intensity" of effort. The low intensity participation deals with

attending the assembly and works council election which takes places during working time and are attended usually by most people. High intensity participation includes joining a strike, standing for election and attending union events.

The six independent variables yielded five factors of instrumentality (negative evaluation of union, positive instrumentality of union, negative instrumentality of works council, no necessity of works council, and instrumentality of collective activities), one factor of union identity, two factors of workgroup identity (decreasing solidarity, individualism/isolation), three factors of them-and-us feelings (them-us today, company identity, capitalism better), two factors of information (interest in information, receiving information), and two factors of satisfaction (job dissatisfaction, pay satisfaction).

In sum, the factor analysis produced some interesting and useful factors (see appendix A 3.1.1), yet in some cases they were unreliable according to their alpha coefficients being below .60.²¹⁹ With regard to the two dependent factors, "low intensity participation" was kept (the alpha is just below .60), whereas "high intensity participation" revealed a very low alpha and thus its items were discussed separately. Two regression analyses were then conducted for each of the dependent variables, one with all independent factors and the other only with the "reliable" factors (i.e. with an alpha coefficient above .60)²²⁰ and selected items substituting the lacking factors. The factor-based regressions produced slightly different antecedents, and it seemed therefore better to use the item-based regressions only. The selection of the items took place in two ways. Firstly, an "intuitive" (inductive) way, whereby items were selected which were thought to have an impact on the dependent variable and then this equation was step by step reduced (i.e. the items with the lowest t's were excluded until the significant items "stabilized" and the R square did not increase significantly when further reducing the equation). Secondly, a "mechanistic" way of selecting items, whereby all items (37 including the 4 reliable independent factors) were included in an equation and the equation was then step by step reduced. The following discussion relies on this second method. A correlation of all antecedents of low and high intensity participation is presented in the appendix (A 3.2).

²¹⁹ There is no rule in the literature on the minimum level of the reliable alpha coefficient, however the common consensus seems to be between .50 and .60.

²²⁰ These are decreasing solidarity, them-us feelings, company identity, and job dissatisfaction.

11.1.1 Low intensity participation

The (mechanic) item-based regression equation was six times reduced and produced the following result (table 11.1.1).²²¹ Means, standard deviation and intercorrelations are shown in table 11.1.2.

table 11.1.1: Predicting low intensity participation at Bodywear: standardized regression coefficients using 10 items²²²

Independent variables		h.D.	low intensity participation (part.al)	
			Sig T	Beta
BB	union has not done a lot at this place here	+	.055	.161
BC	unions' pay policy only worsens economic situation and risks jobs	-	.001	-.280**
CI	waste of time to consult works council, they are not interested in my problems	-	.114	-.129
ANnew	works council has not put forward workers interests very well	-	.020	-.188*
AS	don't need a works council, mgt cares enough for workers	-	.060	-.148
BU	not belonging to the union is "anti-social"	+	.086	-.131
BQnew	I tell my friends that I am in the union	+	.063	-.147
AJ	In general: an "individualistic" social system where everybody has the chance to lead a better life than others, but also has the risk of failing, is better than a "collectivist" social system, where all have equally mediocre life chances.	-	.020	-.178*
AZ	our group often discusses union issues	+	.001	.258**
DC	age		.006	.223**

(* = $p \leq 0.05$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$)

R square (adj.) = .27809, standard error = .72488, residual = 128(cases), F = 6.31593 (sig F = .000)

²²¹ A *factor-based* regression of low intensity participation revealed only two significant antecedents, age and positive union instrumentality. Thus, the older workers were and the more they regarded the union as instrumental (e.g. "making workforce more powerful") the more likely they were to attend the works council assemblies/election. However, these two antecedents were not highly revealing. A transformation of the dependent factor into a dummy variable (split according to the median) did also not improve the equation. The "*intuitively*" *item-based* regression selected 19 single items: The idea was that for such a basic activity people would decide with regard to their views of the works council, their group affiliation ("group pressure"), their union membership and identification, them-us feelings and job dissatisfaction (if they are really dissatisfied they would use the assembly to express their discontent), a basic interest in works council information, and regarding demographic variables, gender and age. The equation was step-by-step reduced to seven items. Four antecedents occurred, explaining 20% of the variance in 155 cases: age, and three items of a positive instrumentality and necessity of the works council.

²²² In the following regression and correlation loadings are rounded up to three digits, means and standard deviation are rounded up to two digits. h.D. is the hypothesized direction according to the literature (chapter 6).

table 11.1.2: means, standard deviation ([-] = negatively worded)

		means	standard deviation	N= cases
part.a1	low intensity participation	3.30	.86	276
BB	union has not done a lot at this place here	3.28	1.22	258
BC(-)	unions' pay policy only worsens economic situation and risks jobs	2.43	1.21	258
CI	waste of time to consult works council, they are not interested in my problems	2.54	1.27	263
ANnew (-)	works council has not put forward workers interests very well	2.61	1.20	272
AS	don't need a works council, mgt cares enough for workers	1.81	1.08	273
BU	not belonging to the union is "anti-social"	1.40	.89	212
BQnew	I tell my friends that I am in the union	3.70	1.54	180
AJ	In general: an "individualistic" social system where everybody has the chance to lead a better life than others, but also has the risk of failing, is better than a "collectivist" social system, where all have equally mediocre life chances.	3.27	1.18	256
AZ	our group often discusses union issues	1.89	1.10	260
DC	age	2.35	.97	248

table 11.1.3: intercorrelation (*= p<=0.05, **=p<=0.01)

	part.a1	BB	BC	CI	ANnew	AS	BU	BQnew	AJ	AZ	DC
part.a1											
BB	.001										
BC	-.217**	.269**									
CI	-.213**	.196**	.185**								
ANnew	-.272**	.090	.027	.222**							
AS	-.146*	.009	.214**	.176**	.157**						
BU	-.050	-.006	.088	.036	.007	.198					
BQnew	.089	.058	-.205**	-.004	-.045	-.059	.038				
AJ	-.022	.040	.105	-.096	-.055	-.045	.079	.012			
AZ	.170**	-.052	-.041	-.057	-.164**	-.057	.094	.072	.013		
DC	.282**	.051	.002	-.047	-.210**	.126	.051	.075	.077	.096	

The "mechanically" designed equation emphasized the measures of collective instrumentality²²³ but collective interests and the perception of an unfair economic system were equally important. Virtually all included antecedents have a t-significance of at least 10% indicating a rather complex picture of possible predictors which is further substantiated by the intercorrelation of several items. Thus, the analysis comes up with a cluster of antecedents rather than a very specific single item. Another major finding is that neither job nor group related factors played a role for this low intensity activity (which more or less most workers joined). In addition, company identity and the hypothesis that strong company identifiers were more likely to be committed to engage at the workplace (with the works council) did not play a role, nor did them-and-us feelings (except the feelings regarding capitalism).

Thus, social identity or frustration-aggression theories had no explanatory power. The major explanator was the rational choice theory and the concept of "collective interests". The importance of the instrumentality antecedents is somewhat surprising, since the decision to attend these assemblies (or to fill out the list of the election) does not really involve any individual costs. Yet, it seems that people must have the feeling that it is "worthwhile" to attend and this is affiliated with their general perception of the interest institutions.

Regarding the demographic variables only age played a role. The age effect confirmed earlier hypotheses of a generation impact (the older generation might be more used to obey going to organized meetings, and might be more interested in the future of the company and of their jobs). Gender and union membership were not significant.

An additional regression analysis showed that older workers were more likely to attend these meetings if they were male, whereas younger colleagues were influenced by the perception of instrumentality (question BC).²²⁴ The correlation table revealed in addition that older workers were more likely to be convinced that their interests were well represented by the works council than younger ones (or the other way around). Thus, it seems that contrary to some suggestions in the literature (see chapter 5) older workers

²²³ This emphasis is similar to the result of the "intuitive" equation.

²²⁴ Older workers: adj.Rsquare= .17547, standard error= .92809, residual= 73, F= 2.93899, sigF= .0050; younger workers: adj.Rsquare= .14512, standard error= .70541, residual= 47, F= 2.05622, sigF= .0534

seemed to be more positive about the works councils than younger colleagues, despite the fact that they might have been more used to the old system and are more reluctant to accept the new institutions (or more disappointed about the former interest representation and thus not convinced of the new institutions' effectiveness).

Finally, another interesting point is how far people's decisions were influenced by their union membership. Although the variable itself has no significant impact, separate regressions for non union members and members revealed some interesting differences²²⁵. Non members produced two significant antecedents, works council and union instrumentality (ANnew, BC). Members on the other hand were influenced by their interest in union issues (AZ) and their feeling that the union is not only acting in the interest of its West German members (BD). It follows that non members were likely to be slightly more calculative than members, who depended more on their degree of "affiliation" to the union.

11.1.2 High intensity participation

(i) Standing for works council election

The first regression (including the 37 independent items) produced already most antecedents which remained significant during the process of eliminating insignificant items. The result is shown in table 11.1.4.

²²⁵ Union member: adj.Rsquare= .15136, standard error= .73014, residual= 65, F= 1.86029, sigF= .0386; non member: adj.Rsquare= .33881, standard error= .71433, residual= 34, F= 2.53731, sigF= .0102

table 11.1.4: predicting standing for works council election at Bodywear: standardized regression coefficients of 9 independent items

Independent variables		h.D.	standing for works council election (AU)	
			Sig T	Beta
AS	we don't need a works council, - management cares enough for workers	-	.005	.194**
BC	union's pay policy only worsens - economic situation and risks jobs	-	.143	-.099
AR	works council is only as strong as it + gets supported by workers	+	.003	.205**
Z	not interested in my fellow workers	-	.264	.074
K	capitalist firm is more fair, because - only performance criteria count	-	.079	-.120
AL	our group keeps works council well + informed about what happens at our workplaces	+	.530	-.042
AZ	our group often discusses union issues	+	.039	.141*
DC	age		.023	-.154*
DB	gender (1=female, 2=male)		.001	.263**

(*= $p \leq 0.05$, **= $p \leq 0.01$)

R square (adj.) = .17452; standard error = 1.01722; residual = 189; F = 5.65122 (Sig F = .000)

table 11.1.5: means, standard deviation

		means	standard deviation	N = cases
AU	standing for works council election	1.79	1.12	271
AS	don't need a w. council, mgt cweres enough for workers	1.77	1.06	230
BC	union's pay policy only worsens economic situation and risks jobs	2.40	1.20	221
AR	w.council is only as strong as it gets supported by workers	3.78	1.05	227
Z	not interested in my fellow workers	2.30	1.28	234
K	capitalist firm is more fair, because only performance criteria count	3.36	1.36	233
AL	our group keeps w.council well informed about what happens at our workplaces	3.26	1.17	227
AZ	our group often discusses union issues	1.91	1.12	225
DC	age	2.34	.97	239
DB	gender (1=female, 2=male)	1.06	.24	236

table 11.1.6: intercorrelation (*= $P \leq 0.05$, **= $P \leq 0.01$)

	AU	AS	BC	AR	Z	K	AL	AZ	DC	DB
AU										
AS	.126*									
BC	-.104	.214**								
AR	.087	-.233**	-.012							
Z	.032	.091	.116	-.136*						
K	-.097	.153*	.166**	-.029	-.002					
AL	-.049	-.112	-.015	.137*	-.037	.043				
AZ	.191**	-.057	-.041	.118	-.004	.055	.247**			
DC	-.044	.126	.002	.006	.119	.195**	.031	.096		
DB	.306**	.006	-.061	.057	-.033	-.093	-.039	.113	.111	

In short, the likely candidate for works council was characterized as young, male, having collectivist attitudes (i.e. aware of collective interests, critically judging the new "individualism"), and being convinced of collective activity (i.e. the necessity of workers' support of the council), but not of the necessity of the institution as such. Two main findings stand out. Firstly, the importance of demographic variables, age and gender, and secondly the contradictory results of the instrumentality variables.

With regard to the former, females were less likely to stand for election than males, confirming the earlier made hypothesis that for more "intense" (time-consuming) activities the female "double burden" might prevent participation (see chapter 6). Remember that gender did not play any role in attending the assemblies (which does not take any leisure time). However, the dominance of the gender variable here might also indicate that the equation did not address relevant underlying factors. In addition, one should be aware of the methodological problem that males only make 7% of the sample. However, excluding the variable gender in the main regression did not make any major impact²²⁶ and separate regressions for males and females did also not turn out to be significant.

Furthermore, older workers were less likely to stand for election (but more likely to attend the assemblies). A separate regression for older and younger workers revealed again

²²⁶ Except that variable K ("individualism is better") becomes significant (with a negative sign).

the strong correlation between age and gender (older and males).²²⁷ With regard to the latter result, the second strongest antecedents is instrumentality of collective activities. Thus, not instrumentality of the works council nor union membership or union identity as one would have imagined. In other words, "the works council needs to be supported and therefore I stand for election". Strangely enough the other major variable (AS) is contradictory. It says that the more people perceive the works council as *not* necessary, the more likely they were to stand for election.²²⁸ It is obviously difficult to find an explanation for this incoherence. One could relate this incoherence to a purely statistical reason or to the content, which is more difficult.

Statistically there was a correlation between this variable and two others (K, AR) whereby AR had a negative sign: people who think the works council is not necessary also think that capitalism is a fairer system and deny that works council is only strong with the support of the workforce. Excluding one variable (K, AR) from the equation immediately rendered AS insignificant. And excluding AS made the beta of AR decreasing. In addition, creating a factor of these three variables and including it in the regression rendered the beta negative albeit on an insignificant level. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient of the single item AS and the dependent variable (AU) was quite small (.13 with 5% significance). In short, one could argue that the three variables belong closely together and make sense, but putting them all into the regression changes the sign of AR out of unknown reasons.

Regarding possible contextual reasons one could only argue that prosperous councillors might have such a highly cooperative idea of workplace relations that they were not convinced of the need for worker representation, but still "sacrifice" themselves out of other reasons which have not been tackled (e.g. job security, self-esteem, power). However, the regression revealed that a basic interest in union issues was necessary (although union membership was not). In addition, a critical perception of the new

²²⁷ Separate regression (split according to the median of 2.00) reveals that older ones were influenced primarily by their gender, whereas younger colleagues were influenced by a variety of items (similar to the main equation): older worker (>2.00): adj.Rsquare= .17547, standard error= .92809, residual= 73, F= 2.93899, sigF= .0050; younger worker (<=2.00): adj.Rsquare= .14621, standard error= 1.07607, residual= 106, F= 3.18823, sigF= .0019

²²⁸ Also recoding the item into the positive variable *ASnew* did not change the direction.

"individualistic" system (K) was also of advantage, and could be standing for a general perception of unfairness or for dissatisfaction. Thus, it is very difficult to provide an encompassing contextual explanation. However, it should be noted that the to be explained cohort of volunteers is actually very small (8%) (see chapter 10), and this might have an effect on the results, and that the variance explained in this equation is only 17%.

Finally, a variety of concepts such as job-related issues, them-and-us feelings, company identity, group or union identity and union membership did not reveal significant betas. A separate regression for union and non union members revealed different approaches²²⁹: Union members were mainly guided by their gender and a belief that the capitalist system is not "better", non members on the other hand were solely influenced by instrumentality issues (see similar finding in low intensity participation).

²²⁹ Union member: adj.Rsquare= .18329, standard error= 1.11459, residual= 81, F= 3.24423, sigF= .0021; non member: adj.Rsquare= .21009, standard error= .90734, residual= 96, F= 4.10287, sigF= .0002

(ii) Visiting union events

As noted before this variable asked for participation in not frequently occurring activities such as leisure events, (public) union meetings or demonstrations. The original regression of 37 items revealed only union membership as significant. Table 11.1.7 presented the final "leaner" equation.

table 11.1.7: predicting visiting union events: standardized regression coefficients of 7 independent items

Independent variables		h.D.	visiting union events (BOnew) Sig T	Beta
BQnew	I certainly tell my friends that I am in the union	+	.004	.231**
F	solidarity among colleagues decreases	-	.198	-.107
Wnew	I cannot rely on my colleagues	-	.269	.090
themus	them-and-us feelings	+	.072	.149
AKnew	sufficiently informed about w.c.'s work	+	.373	.075
AX	well informed about work of union	+	.005	.233**
BH	union member (1=yes, 2=no)	-	.006	-.219**

(* = $p \leq 0.05$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$)

R square (adj.) = .15003; standard error = 1.00549; residual = 141; F = 4.73209 (Sig F = .0001)

table 11.1.8: means, standard deviation

		means	standard deviation	N = cases
BOnew	visiting union events	2.06	1.10	205
BQnew	I certainly tell my friends that I am in the union	3.74	1.53	163
F	solidarity among colleagues decreases	3.78	1.21	236
Wnew	I cannot rely on my colleagues	2.31	1.17	235
themus.2	them-and-us feelings	2.44	.60	235
AKnew	sufficiently informed about w.c.'s work	2.28	1.24	234
AX	well informed about work of union	2.94	1.25	222
BH	union member (1=yes, 2=no)	1.54	.52	236

table 11.1.9: intercorrelation (*= $p \leq 0.05$, **= $p \leq 0.01$)

	BOnew	BQnew	F	Wnew	themus	AKnew	AX	BH
BOnew								
BQnew	.229**							
F	-.047	-.097						
Wnew	.062	.020	.287**					
themus.2	.032	-.070	.249**	.119*				
AKnew	.071	-.006	-.045	-.072	-.245**			
AX	.227	-.103	-.060	-.070	-.223**	.217		
BH	-.304**	-.161*	-.057	-.029	-.057	.021	.078	

The regression resulted in three major antecedents: union members, with a positive union identity and a perception of being well informed by the union, were more likely to participate. Strong them-and-us feelings were supportive as well. Instrumentality measures did not play a role, nor does job dissatisfaction or any other demographic variables except union membership. Thus, whereas the works council election was heavily influenced by instrumentality issues, visiting union events seemed not to be a calculated activity.

A separate regression for union members and non members revealed a similar picture for members, but non members showed to be entirely influenced by their them-and-us feelings.²³⁰ Concluding, for union members the decision to get involved in the union depended mainly on their union identity and the wish to be properly informed (similar to low intensity participation). It seems that a good communication policy by the union was essential for mobilizing its members. Non members however with strong them-and-us feelings might join these events, but do not necessarily join the union.

In addition, the intercorrelations revealed two interesting relationships. Firstly, the more workers felt that they were informed by the union the less them-and-us feelings they had. Yet, there was no association between receiving information and peoples' perception of instrumentality as was proposed in chapter 7. Secondly, the stronger the them-and-us feelings the more people thought that the solidarity among colleagues (i.e. "us") decreased.

²³⁰ Members only: adj. R square = .18856, standard error = .92351, residual = 70, F = 2.18925, sigF = .0117; non members: adj. R square = .25353, standard error = .78264, residual = 24, F = 1.81913, sigF = .0874

In other words, them-and-us feelings might not necessarily always increase in-group solidarity (see chapter 6), but rather the experience of distrust within *intergroup* relations can spread over to *intragroup* relations as well (thus among the group members).

(iii) Joining a strike

The starting equation (with 37 items) already produced six antecedents which stayed significant during the process of excluding the insignificant items, resulting in table 11.1.10.

table 11.1.10: predicting joining a strike at Bodywear: standardized regression coefficients of 11 independent items

Independent variables	h.D.	joining a strike (CN): all cases		joining a strike: young union members only	
		Sig T	Beta	SigT	Beta
BB union has not done a lot at this place here	-	.009	.204**	.023	.188*
BC unions' pay policy only worsens economic situation and risks jobs	-	.067	-.132	.055	-.148
BD union works more for West German members than for us	-	.005	-.217**	.003	-.244**
CM If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker you cannot do anything against it.	-	.034	.149*	.172	.100
BR important for me to belong to the union	+	.099	.148	.000	.292**
Z not interested in my workfellows	-	.008	.194**	.059	.144
CF my current pay is justified	-	.022	-.172*	.008	-.212**
AX well informed about work of union	+	.042	.152*	.184	.105
DC age		.000	-.272**		
BH union member (1=yes, 2=no)	-	.000	-.333**		

(* = $p \leq 0.05$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$)

all cases: R square (adj.) = .31895; standard error = .98377; residual = 142; F = 8.11847, sig F = .000

young members: adj.Rsquare = .21640, standard error = 1.05524, residual = 144, F = 6.24700, sig F = .000

table 11.1.11: means, standard deviation

		means	standard deviation	N = cases
CN	joining a strike	3.46	1.22	259
BB	union has not done a lot at this place here	3.30	1.22	222
BC	unions' pay policy only worsens economic situation and risks jobs	2.40	1.20	221
BD	union works more for West German members than for us	3.22	1.22	221
CM	If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker you cannot do anything against it.	4.18	1.20	231
BR	important for me to belong to the union	3.19	1.48	174
Z	not interested in my workfellows	2.30	1.28	234
CF	my current pay is justified	2.27	1.41	226
AX	well informed about work of union	2.94	1.25	222
DC	age	2.34	.97	239
BH	union member (1=yes, 2=no)	1.55	.52	239

table 11.1.12: intercorrelations (*= $p \leq 0.05$, **= $p \leq 0.01$)

	CN	BB	BC	BD	CM	BR	Z	CF	AX	DC	BH
CN											
BB	-.009										
BC	-.154**	.269**									
BD	-.167**	.352**	.260**								
CM	.085**	.057	.081	.059							
BR	.282**	-.067	-.117	-.001	-.086						
Z	.177**	.218**	.116	.145*	.006	.186**					
CF	-.210**	-.053	.063	-.157*	-.019	-.028	-.047				
AX	-.001	-.209**	-.042	-.120	-.067	.132	-.051	.300**			
DC	-.158**	.051	.002	.032	.158*	.165*	.119	.090	.050		
BH	-.361**	.039	.154*	.100	-.069	-.615**	-.151*	.108	.078	-.174**	

Compared to the other two measures of high intensity participation this equation revealed a large variety of significant antecedents. The antecedents were union membership (as in visiting union events), age (as in standing for election, i.e. younger workers more strike prone), and at least one measure of each theory (i.e. rational choice, social identity, "collective interest", frustration-aggression). However, a few items turned out to be

contrary to the hypothesized direction. Firstly, the perception that "the union did not achieve anything at this workplace" was supportive rather than a barrier to union activity, and so was the belief that a worker is powerless facing plant closure. Both seemed to be an incentive for union members to achieve something on a higher (industrial) level instead. Secondly, the antecedent "no interest in colleagues" (Z) was more difficult to explain. It could only mean that activists had no interests in their work colleagues but rather saw the union as their primary social group.

A separate regression was conducted for union members only.²³¹ The most important determinants were age, negative union instrumentality at workplace level (BB) and being well informed by the union (AX). Thus, union members were more likely to join a strike if they saw unions not being effective at workplace level. Similar findings were made regarding workers' different reactions to different workplace problems (see chapter 10, e.g. individualistic reactions to threats of job security, collectivist reactions to threats to company survival).

The correlation table (for union and non union members) presented the two variables being interrelated: well informed workers perceived the union in a more positive light than less informed ones (and the other way around) as it was proposed in chapter 7. In addition, well informed workers were also more satisfied with their pay. It might be that the union achieves to explain the current pay level more satisfactorily than the employers' side. At last, union identity (BR) was obviously highly related to union membership. It follows that excluding union membership from the equation rendered BR significant.

A further regression for younger and older workers²³² indicated that whereas union membership is important for both, the younger workers were more influenced by their lack of interest in the works council (AM, AKnew with negative signs) and consequently might had the desire to achieve something at a higher (industrial) level. A regression for the

²³¹ Adj.Rsquare = .23332, standard error = .90664, residual = 65, F = 2.40327, sigF = .0053. The regression for non union members did not become significant.

²³² Younger (\leq median of 2.00): adj.Rsquare = .40421, standard error = .91925, residual = 58, F = 3.86449, sigF = .000; older: adj.Rsquare = .927003, standard error = .95703, residual = 34, F = 2.06865, sigF = .0332

largest subset, young union members, is presented in table 11.1.10. Activists were high union identifiers and were dissatisfied with their pay level and the achievements of the union on workplace level. In contrast, older workers (members and non members) were influenced by their perception of union instrumentality (positive perception of general effectiveness but negative regarding the achievements at shopfloor level), and whether they were well informed (more information rendered them more strike-prone). In addition, the correlation provided more support that older workers were more likely to be in the union.

11.1.3 Summary

Finally, the question arises whether the results of the four equations produce a common pattern of antecedents. Table 11.1.13 provides an overview of the findings.

table 11.1.13: summary of significant antecedents of participation at Bodywear

	low intensity participa- tion	high intensity participation		
		works council election	union event	strike
<i>instrumentality:</i> - instrumentality of institutions - instrumentality of coll. action	x	x		x x
<i>social identity:</i> - union identity - group identity - them-us - company identity - general judgement (collectivist attitudes)	x		x	x
<i>frustration-aggression:</i> - job/pay dissatisfaction				x (pay)
<i>information:</i> - receiving information - interest in information	x	x	x	x
<i>demographic:</i> - union membership - age - gender - qualification	x	x x	x	x x

In overall, the theories of rational choice and social identity and also the variables of information (i.e. collective interest) produced the major predictors besides the demographic variables which came out more strongly than expected. Frustration-aggression theory had little explanatory power, as had gender, or the variables them-and-us feelings, company identity or "general judgement". With regard to the high level of dissatisfaction and them-and-us feelings in that plant this is an unexpected outcome. However, it might well be that it is due to the standard deviations being too small to have any statistical impact (e.g. them-us). Furthermore, it is interesting that job insecurity as an item of job dissatisfaction did not emerge as a significant antecedent throughout the analysis. Again, this might be due to insufficient variation, but it might also question the underlying "economic theory" (see chapter 6).

In a nutshell one can argue that standing for election is a mostly calculative affair as is low intensity participation, whereas joining union events is more related to identity and "moral" affiliations and strike participation is somewhat in between. It is difficult to find clearly differing patterns for low and high intensity participation. The major difference is that social identity items do not have any impact on low intensity participation but have in some high intensity cases. Overall, the antecedents of low intensity participation resembled most those of works council election. Thus, one could argue for a division between activities within the workplace (related to the works council), and outside activities organized by the union. Workplace activities were then a more calculative affair than the union guided activities. This seems to support the earlier mentioned difference between works council being an institution implemented by law and the union being essentially a voluntary membership organisation.

Furthermore, a few words seem necessary about the two major demographic variables, union membership and age. Interestingly, *union membership* influenced positively union activities, but did not have an impact on works council oriented activities. This might be interpreted as indicating the relative independence of works councils from the union in the views of the workforce within the German dual system of industrial relations. On the other side, union members were determined by a variety of issues such as age, union identity,

level of information and negative union instrumentality at workplace level, whereas non members were basically guided by two items, perception of instrumentalities and them-and-us feelings.

Older workers were more likely to be a union member, to participate in low intensity activities (which were here purely works council activities), to have a strong union identity, but on the other side regard the capitalist system as more fair. On the other side, younger workers were disproportionately interested in high intensity activities. It follows that the proposition in the East German literature (see chapter 3) that workers who experienced the former socialist union (i.e. the older ones) must be highly disappointed and therefore opposed to the new unions cannot be supported. In contrary, it seems the old FDGB must have achieved some kind of positive, lasting identification with the union among its members, whereas the GTB has so far not been able to get the younger workers to identify with the union.

Finally, one should note that the amount of variance explained in the above regressions is between .15 and .32 which is not high but in line with the literature. It compares with figures of 13%-24% (Kelly and Kelly 1994), 26% (Flood 1993), 36% (Kuruvilla et al. 1990), 38%-43% (Klandermans 1984b), 29%-42% Martin (1986), and 16%-28% Schutt (1982).

11.2 The determinants of participation in the GTB survey

The factor analysis yielded two dependent factors, "self-initiated" and "organised" participation (see also chapter 10). Self-initiated activities are not to be confused with "high intensity" activities. Self-initiated activities refer to activities where the individual member is acting voluntarily on its own, whereas organised activities are events which the member joins among other members and where the individual is part of a mass movement. Thus, the factors **differ** from the Bodywear survey (low and high intensity participation), which obviously makes a comparison of the antecedents of the two samples difficult. The different factors are a surprise in the sense that both surveys ask various similar questions.²³³ Various explanations are imaginable: It could be due to the fact that the GTB survey put more emphasis on participation in the union, or that the samples are different. However, a factor analysis of the Bodywear items for union members only yielded the same factors as the mixed sample. Another explanation could be the fragility of the data set of Bodywear.— It remains to say that this phenomenon underlines the multi-dimensionality of the concept participation. Moreover, it supports the thought of Kuruvilla et al. (1990:381) that applying the theories of collective activities for the first time to a new cultural context might not produce highly reliable measures of participation.

With regard to the five independent variables, the factor analysis produced three factors of instrumentality (negative instrumentality of union/works council, no necessity of works council, instrumentality of collective activities), one factor of union identity, two factors of workgroup identity (collectivism, workgroup identity), three factors of attribution (external attribution to politics/management, internal attribution to lacking workers' effort, and internal attribution to lacking solidarity of workforce), two factors of job dissatisfaction (general job satisfaction, specific job dissatisfaction), and two factors of them-and-us feelings (former trust relations, current them-us).

Similar to the Bodywear survey not all factors yielded a high enough alpha reliability. Two regressions were conducted, one substituting the "unreliable" factors with

²³³ The first four items in the table (AJ to AX) are similar to the Bodywear questionnaire, but they fall into different categories. However, putting these four items only into factor analysis did also not yield the same factors as in Bodywear (which equation included one additional item).

their single items, the other using all factors (reliable and unreliable ones). Contrary to Bodywear the resulting antecedents were mostly identical, and the "factor-based analysis" was therefore used in the following.²³⁴ This similarity might serve as an indicator of the data set is more robust than that of Bodywear.

table 11.2.8: Predicting self-initiated and organised participation in the union and works council: standardized regression coefficients for 13 independent factors and four demographic variables

Independent variable	h.D.	(admpart2) self-initiated participation		(occpart2) organised participation	
		Sig T	Beta	Sig T	Beta
negative instrumentality of works council/ union (tuinst.b)	-	.648	-.026	.528	.036
no necessity of works council (wcinst.b)	-	.531	-.032	.577	-.029
instrumentality of collective activities (cainst.b)	+	.030	.110*	.000	.346**
union identity (tuiden2)	+	.000	.227**	.001	.180**
collectivism (grcoll.b)	+	.265	.057	.165	.071
work group identity (griden.b)	+	.510	-.032	.046	-.099*
former trust (ftrust.b)	+	.969	.002	.754	-.016
current them-us (themus.b)	+	.312	-.054	.586	-.029
external attribution (ex att.b)	+	.123	.086	.045	.112*
internal attribution: lacking work effort (att eff.b)	-	.904	.006	.001	-.180**
internal attribution: lacking solidarity (att sol.b)	-	.765	-.016	.200	-.071
general job satisfaction (gensat.b)	-	.578	.029	.779	.015
specific job dissatisfaction (dissat.b)	+	.012	.133*	.903	.006
gender (1=female, 2=male) (BK)		.005	.140**	.291	-.052
blue/white collar (1= blue, 2 = white) (B1new)		.605	.026	.532	-.032
w. council member (1= yes, 2= no) (AP)	-	.000	-.338**	.142	-.073
age (BJ)		.857	-.009	.749	-.016

(* = $p \leq 0.05$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$)

self-initiated participation: R square (adj.) = .27217, Standard error = .76409; residual = 322 cases, $F = 8.45692$ (Sig $F = .000$); organised participation: R square (adj.) = .26403; Standard error = .58883; residual = 322 cases, $F = 8.15402$ (Sig $F = .000$)

²³⁴ See item-based analysis in appendix (A 3.3).

table 11.2.9: means, standard deviation

	mean	standard deviation	N = cases
1. self-initiated participation	2.01	.90	420
2. organised participation	2.82	.71	427
3. negative instrumentality of works council/union	2.57	.75	432
4. no necessity of works council	1.32	.57	423
5. instrumentality of collective activities	2.71	.59	430
6. union identity	2.79	.68	418
7. collectivism	2.70	.65	408
8. workgroup identity	2.83	.73	405
9. former trust	2.59	.84	428
10. current them-us	3.02	.61	430
11. external attribution	3.03	.56	432
12. internal attribution (effort)	1.23	.60	421
13. internal attribution (solidarity)	2.86	.75	429
14. general job satisfaction	1.82	.84	429
15. specific job dissatisfaction	2.51	.60	431
16. gender	1.25	.43	403
17. blue/white collar	1.20	.40	405
18. w.council membership	1.74	.44	404
19. age	2.57	.96	404

table 11.2.10: Intercorrelations of all 19 variables (2-tailed significance: * = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.
1.																			
2.	.30**																		
3.	-.08	.05																	
4.	-.16**	-.13**	.14**																
5.	.18**	.37**	-.02	-.15**															
6.	.36**	.29**	-.14**	-.17**	.28**														
7.	.17**	.18**	.06	-.04	.17**	.26**													
8.	.02	-.06	-.13**	-.03	.02	.13**	.19**												
9.	.02	.06	-.02	.13**	.04	.11*	.05	-.07											
10.	.01	.11*	.21**	-.08	.01	.03	.00	-.04	.14**										
11.	.14**	.19**	.27**	-.12*	.19**	.10*	.07	-.06	.09	.31**									
12.	-.05	-.23**	-.03	.09	-.05	-.02	-.12*	-.05	.05	-.25**	-.13**								
13.	-.02	-.01	.36**	-.04	.09	.07	.05	-.03	.03	.20**	.29**	.10*							
14.	-.06	-.11*	-.08	.06	-.09	-.10	-.03	.02	-.21**	-.16**	-.21**	.14**	-.16**						
15.	.12*	.12*	.21**	.00	.13**	.09	.06	-.12*	.15	.18**	.26**	.04	.24**	-.20**					
16.	.14**	-.08	-.09	-.09	.05	-.04	-.06	.05	-.19**	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.12*	.12*	-.18**				
17.	.05	-.07	-.11*	-.15**	.05	.06	-.05	.03	.01	-.13**	-.01	.14**	.06	-.00	-.12*	-.01			
18.	-.39**	-.10*	.18**	.19**	-.05	-.12*	-.03	-.01	.07	-.06	-.03	.10	.08	.02	.08	-.14**	.01		
19.	.09	.07	.09	.07	.10	.20**	.06	.04	.07	-.04	.09	-.09	.08	-.04	.03	.05	.20**	.02	

Discussion

Self-initiated participation

Five major antecedents emerged. Males, high union identifiers, works council members, people with strong (specific) job dissatisfaction and belief in the instrumentality of collective activities were more likely to participate in self-initiated activities. This supports the underlying social identity theory, as well as the frustration-aggression and rational choice theory. It also supports the earlier mentioned thesis of the "double burden" phenomenon preventing female's engagement in more time-consuming activities. Attribution theory was not supported, nor were other variables of social identity theory (work group identity, collectivism, them-and-us feelings). In addition, general satisfaction, age and job status had no predictive power.

The two major factors, works council membership and union identity were further analysed. To examine whether the general equation was biased (due to the slight overrepresentation of works councillors in the sample), separate regressions for works council members and non members were conducted.²³⁵ The regression for works council members revealed two significant antecedents which were different from the above, works council necessity and general job satisfaction (both with a negative sign). On the other hand, the equation for non council members produced instrumentality of collective activities and union identity as above, and thus it can be concluded that the councillors did not bias the outcome.²³⁶ Overall, works councillors were driven by a general concern for the deteriorating working conditions and by the conviction of the importance of a (strong) works council, whereas non council members got engaged because of their affiliation to the union and general belief in collective action, thus issues not directly related to the works council itself.

²³⁵ Additionally the variable was excluded from the equation which did not alter the result.

²³⁶ Works council member: Rsquare (adj.) = .25214 (standard error = .79885), residual = 81, F = 3.04396 (sigF = .0005); non member: Rsquare (adj.) = .10841 (standard error = .73308), residual = 225, F = 2.83156 (sigF = .0003).

Furthermore, regressions were conducted for low and for high union identifiers, but did not come up with major differences.²³⁷

Organised participation

Again, five major antecedents emerged which were however not all the same as of self-initiated participation. Only two antecedents were similar (instrumentality of collective activities, union identity). The different antecedents give another support of the hypothesis of participation being a multi-dimensional concept (see chapter 7).

Additional significant variables were workgroup identity, internal and external attribution; in contrast to the self-initiated participation, no demographic variables turned out to be significant. In sum, rational choice theory had here the most explanatory power. Attribution theory and social identity theory (though not the items collectivism and them-and-us feelings) got supported as well, yet frustration-aggression theory did not. Thus, people who participated in organised activities had a positive perception of the instrumentality of their action, were strongly attributed current problems externally (e.g. management), and were high union identifiers. They were female or male, young or old, blue or white collars, works councillors or not without any difference.

The antecedents were considered in more detail. With regard to union identity the above mentioned "item-based" analysis (splitting participation into its three items) came up with an interesting finding. Union identity was significantly related to (organised) participation in demonstrations, but not to strikes or assemblies. One could therefore argue that cost/benefit calculations are more difficult to make regarding demonstrations, which renders identification and solidarity more important. Finally, a separate regression analysis

²³⁷ Split according to the median = 2.90: high identifier (>2.90): Rsquare (adj.) = .32371 (standard error=.75440), residual= 142, F= 5.72670 (sigF= .000); low identifier (<= 2.90): Rsquare (adj.) = .06549 (standard error = .77812), residual = 164, F = 1.78841 (sigF = .0365). High identifiers yielded the same antecedents as the main equation (and in addition group collectivism and external attribution), whereas low identifiers produced two antecedents (of the main equation), instrumentality of collective activities and works council membership.

revealed that high or low union identifiers were mainly influenced by the same variables.²³⁸

Workgroup identity yielded a negative beta coefficient which is contrary to the social identity theory, i.e. the more union members identify with their workgroup the less willing they are to participate. Yet, the item-based analysis characterized "happiness with the group" as the major item within this factor. The factor might then be explained with the frustration-aggression theory, i.e. that people who are dissatisfied with their group are more likely to become active than their satisfied colleagues.

Within the measures of attribution, "internal attribution" (lack of work effort) revealed a negative impact (i.e. people who do not make internal attributions are more likely to participate) which is equal to the external attribution with a positive sign.

Furthermore, job dissatisfaction had no impact, which might be explained by the fact that strikes or demonstrations are not the usual type of reaction to workplace problems in German industrial relations.

Women are as likely as men to participate in organised activities, where time problems are less severe, which could be also traced back to the hypothesized "equal" gender socialisation of the GDR. Unfortunately no comparable western study is available which examines gender differences regarding these two types of participation.

Finally, although works council membership had no impact as a variable, a separate regression for councillors and others showed that councillors were most influenced by their perception of instrumentality of collective activities, whereas non councillors took also other issues into account such as their union identity and degree of external attribution (similar to self-initiated participation).²³⁹ This is different to their approach to self-initiated participation. Thus, councillors had a more cautious, calculative approach to strikes, perhaps because they are more aware of the costs and risks involved.

²³⁸ Low identifier (\leq median 2.90): Rsquare (adj.) = .26544 (standard error = .59680), residual = 164, $F = 5.06533$ (sigF = .000); high identifier: Rsquare (adj.) = .10935 (standard error = .58609), residual = 142, $F = 2.21245$ (sigF = .0071)

²³⁹ Works council member: Rsquare (adj.) = .16132 (standard error = .60229), residual = 81, $F = 2.16613$ (sigF = .0126); non member: Rsquare (adj.) = .30026 (standard error = .57725), residual = 225, $F = 7.46346$ (sigF = .000)

11.3.1 Comparing the findings with previous studies

The following table (11.3.1) provides an overview of the significant antecedents of the measures of the four social psychological theories and of the demographic variables in both surveys. It should be remembered that the two surveys had different samples (mixed vs union members only), tested different measures of participation and some different antecedents. All this rendered a comparative analysis difficult. In addition, the comparison with the previous research must be tentative, since similar variables were often tested differently and the regression equations often included antecedents not tested in Bodywear or GTB.

table 11.3.1: summary of significant antecedents of participation in both surveys (./.= was not asked)

tested independent variables of participation in the two surveys (B= Bodywear, G= GTB survey)	significant in Bodywear (for at least one form of participation)	significant in GTB
instrumentality of collective activities (B, G)	√	√
instrumentality of interest institutions (B, G)	√	
union identity (B, G)	√	√
workgroup identity (B, G)	√	√
collectivism (B, G)	√	
(current) them-us (B, G)		
former trust (G)	./.	
internal attribution (G)	./.	√
external attribution (G)	./.	√
information/ common interests (B)	√	./.
general job satisfaction (G)	./.	
specific job dissatisfaction (B, G)	√	√
gender (B, G)	√	√
age (B, G)	√	
blue/white collar (G)	./.	
works council membership (G)	./.	√
union membership (B)	√	
qualification (B)		./.

Instrumentality of collective activities but not instrumentality of union/works council turned out to be significant for both types of participation in GTB and was found to be the major variable of the concept "collective instrumentality".²⁴⁰ At Bodywear both factors of instrumentality were significant. As said before this supports the hypothesis of the multidimensionality of the concept collective instrumentality. Both variables are in line with previous research, for example by Fullagar and Barling (1989), Glick et al. (1977), Klandermans (1986b), Kuruvilla et al. (1990) and Martin (1986) who found their measures of instrumentality (of unions) to be associated with union participation.²⁴¹

With regard to the social identity theory union identity was significant for both types of participation in GTB and for visiting union events in Bodywear. Union identity was also found to be the main factor of social identity to determine participation.²⁴² Overall, this is consistent with Fullagar and Barling (ibid.) and Kuruvilla et al. (ibid.) who found union identity (loyalty) and participation to be related, as did Kelly and Kelly (1994) with regard to both types of participation (easy and difficult), and McShane (1986:181) with regard to his variable "value of unions" and administrative participation.

Work group identity was a significant antecedent for organised participation in GTB only, and in Bodywear it was significant for strike attendance. Workgroup identity has been rarely examined, however Kuruvilla et al. (1990) found this variable to be significant regarding union participation.

Collectivism was not significant in the GTB survey, but in Bodywear a related variable (general judgement) was significant with regard to low intensity participation.

²⁴⁰ A regression was conducted for each of the two types of participation in the GTB survey with the three factors of *collective instrumentality* as independent variables. The instrumentality of collective activities was the main antecedent at both times. Moreover, people's perception of collective action was not influenced by their perception of the institutions. This was confirmed when analysing the possible antecedents of the perception of collective action as a dependent variable (all other variables as independent). Thus, the significant correlation (-.14**) between the factors, no necessity of works council and instrumentality of collective activities, is not sufficiently strong to survive in the large-scale regression.

²⁴¹ Glick et al. (ibid.) found a correlation with "representing the union", but not with "attending union meetings". Klandermans (1984b) is one of the few studies which tested the instrumentality of collective action (as an item within his "collective motives"). The "collective motives" were significant, however, he did not report individual the beta coefficients of the separate measures of instrumentality.

²⁴² A regression was conducted for each of the two types of participation in GTB, with the factors of social identity as the only independent variables.

Thus, Kelly and Kelly's (1994) finding of a significant relation with easy but not with difficult participation can only be partly confirmed.

Current or former them-and-us feelings did not yield any significance in either survey. These results do not support Kelly and Kelly's (ibid.) finding that their variable "outgroup stereotyping" was correlated with easy participation, but not with difficult participation. On the other hand, our finding is in line with Fullagar/Barling's (ibid.) who found their related variable "Marxist beliefs" was not significant for union participation.


Furthermore, the three measures of social identity (union identity, workgroup identity, collectivism), but not them-and-us feelings, were intercorrelated in the GTB survey²⁴³. This is in contrast to the hypothesis of the social identity literature which suggests a link between them-us and identity (i.e. the stronger the identification with the group the stronger are them-and-us feelings) (e.g. Kelly and Kelly 1993,1994). Them-and-us feelings might be better understood in this context as a reaction against changing working conditions, i.e. management styles, than as being affiliated with group feelings (e.g. outgroup stereotyping).

The interrelations between the three social identity factors²⁴⁴ were further examined by separate regression analyses (each of the social identity variables being dependent variable and the other two being independent).²⁴⁵ Union identity and workgroup identity were not correlated with one another, and collectivistic attitudes were the pivotal point in the triangle relationship (table 11.3.2). This finding suggests a refinement of the literature in that collectivist attitudes rather than workgroup identity have an impact on the strength of union identity, and it adds support to a similar finding of Kelly and Kelly (1994:26) and of Hinkle and Brown (1990, quoted in Kelly and Kelly).

²⁴³ The following analyses were conducted for the more reliable factors of the GTB survey only.

²⁴⁴ Them-and-us feelings were excluded. Conducting four regression analyses with all four factors as dependent variables did not reveal any significance of them-and-us feelings.

²⁴⁵ First regression (workgroup identity= dependent): collectivism: beta coefficient = .178** (sigT=.0005), union identity: beta coefficient=.075 (sigT=.1420); Rsquare (adj.) =.03915 (standard error=.70629), residual=395, F=9.08887 (sigF=.0001); Second regression (collectivism= dependent): group identity: beta coefficient=.169** (sigT=.0005), union identity: beta coefficient=.230** (sigT=.000); Rsquare (adj.)=.08616 (standard error=.60524), residual=395, F=19.71441 (sigF=.0000); Third regression (union identity= dependent): workgroup identity: beta coefficient=.073 (sigT=.1420), collectivism: beta coefficient=.236** (sigT=.000); Rsquare (adj.)=.06284 (standard error=.65776), residual= 395, F= 14.30989 (sigF= .000).

table 11.3.2: regression coefficients of collectivism, union identity and workgroup identity (**= $p \leq 0.01$)

With regard to the variables of micro-mobilization, "information" variables were found to be significant in all four types of low and high intensity participation in Bodywear. The only study known to the author which tested this variable in some form is McShane (ibid.) whose variable "interest in union business" was correlated with administrative participation as well as with union meeting attendance, and thus supports this study's outcome.

Attribution was found to be significantly related to organised but not self-initiated participation in GTB. All factors of *attribution* were intercorrelated and did not show a single main factor but external attribution was the most important antecedent for self-initiated participation and external and internal attribution were the most important antecedents for organised participation. There is no comparable previous study known. However, as mentioned in chapter 7 van Vuuren et al. (1991) found attribution (of job insecurity) to be a significant correlate for participation in collective action, but also for individual action and avoidance.

Job dissatisfaction was a significant predictor in both surveys (i.e. pay dissatisfaction was significant for strike attendance in Bodywear and specific [but not general] dissatisfaction was significant for self-initiated participation in GTB). It is interesting that specific job dissatisfaction was more powerful than general satisfaction, which adds support to the theory of Deshpande and Fiorito (1989) or Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) that specific attitudes are better predictors of specific behaviour than are general attitudes.

Several studies have confirmed the general relationship. For example, McShane (1986) found job dissatisfaction to be related to union meeting attendance (but not to administrative participation in the union), Martin (1986) found dissatisfaction with pay equity to be related to strike attendance, and Fukam and Larson (1984) found it to be related to "union commitment". Kuruvilla et al. (1990) found extrinsic, but not intrinsic dissatisfaction to be a significant correlate for participation. Fullagar and Barling (1989) found both to be linked indirectly only to participation (via union loyalty). This contrasts the argument of Gordon (1980, 1984) that job dissatisfaction predicts initial union activity (e.g. joining in studies by Brett 1980 or DeCotiis 1981) but not afterwards.

Finally, with regard to the demographic variables, gender was found to influence participation in both surveys (in Bodywear for "standing for works council election", in GTB for "self-initiated participation"). Thus, concerning highly time-consuming activities, males were more likely to participate than females. Barling et al. (1990)'s request for studying gender as a moderator rather than a direct predictor cannot be supported here. However, previous research revealed divergent results. For example, Glick et al. (1977) found gender to be associated with the willingness to attend union meetings but Kuruvilla et al. (1990) did not find a significant relationship between gender and union participation.

Age was significant in Bodywear (younger workers with regard to standing for works council election and strike, older with regard to low intensity participation), but not in GTB. Previous research is in line with the Bodywear results. For example, Martin (1986) found youth to be important for strike participation, as did Kuruvilla et al. (ibid.) with regard to union participation.

Union membership was significantly correlated with visiting union events and strikes in Bodywear, works council membership was a significant correlate for self-initiated participation in GTB. Blue/white collar work was not a significant correlate in GTB. These three variables have not been tested in previous studies. Qualification was not significant in Bodywear contrary to some western findings (e.g. Kuruvilla et al. 1990; McShane 1986).

To conclude, four main common factors in both surveys can be extracted. They are collective instrumentality, union identity, and also information and attribution. In other words rational choice theory, social identity theory, and "micro-mobilization" theory each show significant explanatory power.²⁴⁶ The factors of the frustration-aggression theory, as well as the demographic factors did not present a consistent pattern (e.g. age is significant in Bodywear but not in GTB) or were insignificant throughout (e.g. qualification, job status). It should be noted that the insignificance of these variables does not necessarily refute their underlying theories (i.e. it might be that the variables did not show enough variation, e.g. general job satisfaction in GTB, or that the measures could be criticized for being deficient).

A final point deserves notice. Throughout the study we have assumed that participation is the dependent variable to be explained and collective instrumentality, union identity and others are the explanatory factors. However, this is obviously a theoretical assumption. Fullagar and Barling (1989:219) state that the literature is equivocal in terms of the direction of the relationship between union loyalty (identity) and participation in union activities. The ability of cross-sectional data (as used in this study) to prove this assumption, thus to distangle cause and effect is obviously less than if one had employed a longitudinal design. In addition, empirical evidence on whether attitudes such as union identity cause committed behaviour such as participation, or whether enacting behaviour results in committed attitudes remains ambiguous (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1989:216; Mowday et al. 1982). In order to test how far the willingness to participate influenced peoples' union identity and their perception of instrumentality of collective activities, two regression analyses (in the GTB survey) were conducted using participation as an independent variable.²⁴⁷ The instrumentality of collective activities was heavily influenced by organised participation (beta= .352**), but not at all by self-initiated participation. Union identity on the other hand was influenced by both types of participation (self-initiated participation beta=.203**, organised participation beta=.144**). In sum, the data

²⁴⁶ However not all measures of the theories were significant (e.g. them-and-us feelings of social identity theory).

²⁴⁷ Instrumentality: Rsquare (adj.)=.22882 (standard error=.52083), residual= 321, F=6.58807 (sigF=.000); identity: Rsquare (adj.)=.26451 (standard error=.57907), residual= 321, F=7.77314 (sigF=.000).

revealed that the three concepts were highly interrelated and, as explained, cause and effect was impossible to manifest. More importantly, the findings provide further support for the results of the regression analysis. In particular, they confirm the close relationship between organised participation and instrumentality.

11.3.2 Determinants of the antecedents of participation

As mentioned throughout the discussion of the frequencies (Part 3) the questionnaires did not focus on the determinants of the independent variables. However, we can examine possible determinants within the sets of independent variables. As has been noted in chapter 5 and 7 most previous studies have not examined possible interrelations between the antecedents of collective participation in much detail.

A regression analysis was conducted for the determinants of the major variables of the four theories of participation in the GTB survey, i.e. instrumentality of collective activities, union identity, external attribution, and (specific) job dissatisfaction (see appendix: A 3.4, also for similar regression of Bodywear). Overall, we found support for most of the hypothesized interrelations of the independent variables (see chapter 7:7.2). Firstly, union identity and collective instrumentality were each other's most important predictor, and their relationship will be discussed in more detail below.

Them-and-us feelings were influenced negatively by internal attribution (i.e. the less workers attribute work problems to their own lack of effort the more likely they perceive a them-and-us climate), and positively by external attribution as has been hypothesized. This is consistent with the earlier made proposition (chapter 9) that it might not be previous them-and-us feelings which are the cause of the current them-and-us climate but rather the current changes in workplace relations, which make workers perceive a them-and-us climate.

Attribution was interrelated with instrumentality, which is an unexpected association, but not with social identity as was hypothesized. Thus, the more people

attribute their problems externally the more they perceive collective activities as instrumental (and the other way around).

Specific job dissatisfaction was associated as expected by general job satisfaction²⁴⁸. More interestingly, blue collars were more dissatisfied than white collars, and females more than males, which might be traced back to the fact that blue collar jobs and female jobs (sewing) were in general more strongly affected by the organisational transformation than white collar and male-dominated jobs (e.g. knitting, dyeing). Moreover, external attribution of work problems supported dissatisfaction (as expected), and a strong workgroup identity made workers more satisfied with their working conditions. Thus, the workgroup atmosphere was an important factor of the overall working conditions. Whether this is a general phenomenon or specific to the East German context is hard to tell. However, it is surely not caused by the female-dominated sample.²⁴⁹ Finally, dissatisfaction was not linked with them-and-us feelings, in contrast to the proposed association between frustration-aggression theory and them-and-us feelings.

In sum, the two studies found several significant interrelations between the antecedents of participation, especially between social identity and instrumentality. These intercorrelations might be a major reason why no single antecedent, either in the GTB or in the Bodywear sample, provided a sufficient explanation on its own. It seems safe to say that the antecedents are more complementary than competitive, i.e. mutually excluding, explanations as has been sometimes suggested in the literature but not tested (see chapter 7:7.2). Finally, the findings also highlight that the attitudinal dimensions of "individualism" (see chapter 5: table 5.3) or indeed of the "institutionalisation" of interest representation (see chapter 3: table 3.2) are not single, independent but strongly interrelated dimensions.

²⁴⁸ However excluding this independent variable from the equation did not significantly change the constellation of the other antecedents.

²⁴⁹ The regression was repeated for males only and did not show any difference regarding the importance of group identity.

Comparing the findings of self-initiated and organised participation one can conclude that organised participation was mainly explained by instrumentality of collective activities, and to a lesser extent by union identity and attribution. Self-initiated participation on the other side was mainly explained by union identity and works council membership. Thus, union identity and instrumentality of collective activities were the only antecedents which yielded significance in both types of participation. Whereas them-and-us feelings, collectivism and age are the only items which did not turn out to be significant in both equations. More focussed, comparing rational choice theory and social identity theory, one can argue that union identity "predicts" self-initiated participation, i.e. the more "difficult" form of participation, whereas instrumentality of collective activities is the major factor for more "easy" activities such as strikes and demonstrations. It seems understandable that a temporary event such as a strike with more "visible" costs provokes a cost-benefit calculation more strongly than on-going collective engagements. The relationship between the two antecedents will be further discussed below.

Finally, the variances explained in the GTB survey are 26% and 27% and therefore lie in the range of the Bodywear results. The "normal" share of variances explained in both surveys provides additional support for the assumed applicability of the theories to the East German context.

11.3 Summary of findings and implications

This section summarizes the findings in both surveys, Bodywear and GTB, and compares them with previous findings of studies outlined in chapter 7 (11.3.1). It then discusses possible interrelations between the antecedents (11.3.2), and examines the relationship between social identity and collective instrumentality in more detail (11.3.3).

11.3.3 Relationship between union identity and collective instrumentality

Finally, the strong intercorrelation between instrumentality of collective activities and union identity is further examined. First of all, it should be noted that the relationship could simply be due to multi-collinearity, yet according to Bryman and Cramer (1994:239) this should emerge only by Pearson's r exceeding .80 (which is not the case). Besides, by using standardized regression coefficients the problem of multi-collinearity is restricted (Bryman and Cramer *ibid.*). It seems therefore more likely to indicate a theoretical affinity.

The intercorrelation between the two variables does not yet tell us whether one variable is the leading part. As has been stated in chapter 7 this study does not propose a priori a master frame to understand predictors of individuals' decision-making regarding participation, which is in contrast to Klandermans (1995) and others using rational choice theory as some kind of master frame (also Newton and MacFarlane Shore 1992). However, the causality between the two variables is difficult to test with cross-sectional data. Longitudinal research, preferably qualitative nature, seems necessary. Gallagher and Strauss (1991:149) note that the relative scarcity of longitudinal studies in this area makes it difficult to determine the direction of the causal relationship between instrumentality and commitment/ identity. However, whether it is possible at all to establish causalities with statistical methods is subject of a longstanding debate in philosophy (see Howson and Urbach 1990 or Sosa and Tooley 1993). For example, path analysis is not able to confirm or reject hypothetical causalities (Bryman and Cramer 1994:248).

Taking this into account the data can nevertheless tell us something. Two issues have to be discussed. Firstly, whether the association between the two variables is a positive or negative relation (table 11.3.3). A negative relation would imply that the more people identify with a social group (union) the more likely it was that they were not calculating a cost/benefit analysis of their participation efforts. This is the relation one would commonly expect. In contrary, the positive relation states that the more people identify with their social group the more they perceive the instrumentality of the group or of collective activities in a positive light. And at the same time, the more a person perceives the instrumentality of this group or of collective activities as positive the more he/she will

identify with this group (in order to increase his/her positive self-esteem). Surprisingly, the data of the GTB survey supported the positive relation (positive beta weights). Thus, the more workers' decisions to become active are influenced by their union identity, the more they are also influenced by their perceptions of instrumentality. This could mean that union members who are not strongly committed to their union also do not care about costs and benefits of participating, whereas instrumentality issues become important for high identifiers.

table 11.3.3: positive and negative relation between instrumentality and identity



Secondly, the question arises whether there are different determinants of low and high union identifiers' perception of instrumentality of collective activities. Separate regressions were conducted for high and low identifiers. Collectivism and job dissatisfaction had a major influence on low identifiers' perception of collective activities. Thus, the more they were "collectivists" and/or are dissatisfied with their jobs the more they perceived collective activities as worthwhile²⁵⁰. The equation for high identifiers was not significant²⁵¹ (they were influenced only by their perception of instrumentality of the union and works council). One might tentatively conclude that low identifiers were less influenced by calculative perceptions than high identifiers, which supports the above result. It also resembles Kelly and Kelly (1993:16) who found no evidence that a strong social identification with the union reduces the relevance of value-expectancy calculations or that


²⁵⁰ Cases <median of 2.9: Rsquare (adj.) = .064 (standard error = .61389), residual = 165, F = 1.81447 (sig F = .0363)

²⁵¹ Cases >= median of 2.9: Rsquare (adj.) = .00972 (standard error = .49792), residual = 143, F = 1.10334 (sigF = .3586)

weak identifiers are more likely to weigh up costs and benefits of union participation.

Table 11.3.4 illustrates the result.

table 11.3.4: interrelations between instrumentality of collective activities, union identity, and participation



Union identity influences people's perception of collective instrumentality, and at the same time the perceptions have an impact on their identity. What comes first remains a "chicken-egg" problem. Yet, it opposes the popular notion of union members (workers) as either "rational individuals" or "social beings". They might well be both at the same time. It might also resemble the well-known ambivalence between the symbolic and the material dimension of social phenomena. In any case, one major implication is that instrumentality is not just a moderator of the link identity - participation, nor is identity just a moderator for instrumentality, as suggested for example by Fullagar and Barling (1989).

Concluding the chapter three major results should be highlighted. Firstly, the data supports the hypothesis of this study that no single antecedent, and thus no single theory of participation, has encompassing explanatory power (see chapter 7). The antecedents are complementary rather than competing explanations. The fact that East German workers seemed to be guided by both, instrumental and collective, motives and not exclusively by cost/benefit calculations in a context which makes instrumental approaches to collective activities highly probable (according to several theories) gives particular weight to the argument that the concepts social identity and collective instrumentality are complementary and interrelated. Secondly, the comparison with previous, mostly western studies provides some indication that the East German sample does not behave in a notably different way

from western workers, and thus supports the theories' applicability in this new cultural context (see chapter 6).²⁵² Thirdly, the data provides another challenge for the "individualisation" thesis. Thus, the finding that East German workers are not exclusively guided by cost/benefit calculations with regard to collective activities suggests that the workforce of the two samples is not yet individualised in this regard (see chapter 5: table 5.3).

²⁵² Obviously further comparative research, for example with West Germany, is needed to substantiate this point.

Chapter 12 Conclusion

*"Instead of an institutional vacuum, we find routines and practices, organisational forms and social ties, that can be assets, resources, and the basis for credible commitments and coordinated actions."
(Stark 1992b:300)*

This chapter briefly summarizes the major findings of this study (12.1). It then outlines the major implications for the two underlying hypotheses (individualisation and institutionalisation) and for the literature on collective activities. It finishes with some suggestions for future research and for the transformation of industrial relations in East Germany (12.2).

12.1 Summary of findings

The primary aim of the study was to advance our knowledge of the transformation of workplace relations in East Germany by examining the attitudes and behaviour of the workforce regarding the changes in their working environment. The focus was on workers' relationship with the newly installed interest institutions. In a nutshell we can distinguish six main findings:

- (i) The relationship between management and works council was generally described as harmonious and cooperative by the works councillors. The works council did not perceive itself as a prolonged arm of management or as something pushed to the sidelines, but as an accepted partner. Using Kotthoff's (1981, 1994) typology these works councils typically fell into the category of "the respected, cooperative works council", which was the dominant type in his West German sample. This provides empirical support for the more positive view in the literature of the works councils' position in East Germany (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche, WISOC).

The case study presented a company which was successfully realizing the organisational changes seen as necessary by management to create a market-oriented firm. The company was characterized by a specific mixture of optimizing the "tayloristic" work organisation while introducing more flexibility and higher quality standards, practicing some paternalistic personnel policies and bargaining with the relatively strong works council in a mostly cooperative way. This might be interpreted as a successful combination of socialist legacies and capitalist requirements within the institutional, legalistic framework of the German industrial relations system. Whether this is a typical privatised company of the textile industry or of the whole of East Germany is not known. At first glance however it bears a resemblance to the stereotypical picture of the traditional (West) German company.

(ii) Workers powerfully resented the changing working conditions (i.e. increasing work pace and job insecurity). This overshadowed their satisfaction with improvements such as better materials, tools, and the overall organisation of production. They were also very opposed to management (i.e. strong them-and-us feelings), yet blamed their situation not only on management but also on external factors such as the market economy or the inability of politicians to help. They yielded no "unitarist" view (as one would have expected regarding the "harmonious" relations between management and works councils) but rather a "them-and-us" perception of the workplace relations. Them-and-us feelings seemed to have increased after Unification. Thus, overall the relationship between the workforce and management was tense and this might have serious implications in the future in terms of the motivation and commitment of the workforce.

(iii) Workers' relationships with each other did not seem to have become anything like as individualised and fragmented as much of the literature suggests. Workers identified strongly with their work group, strong collectivist values and attitudes espoused even though group solidarity was seen to be decreasing.

(iv) With regard to workers' perceptions of and reactions to the new interest institutions, a complex picture was found. Workers believed in principle in the value of

unions and works councils. Union identity was very strong. They accepted works councils and unions as necessary interest institutions. All the analysis of their attitudes and behaviour towards the two organisations supported the thesis that the process of institutionalisation had been broadly successful. Both unions and works councils were perceived as trying to represent workers' interests but with varied success which was linked to the hostile economic situation. Whether this means that workplace relations became entirely formalised, thus supplanting any informal networks which might have existed in the past, is hard to tell because convincing measures of previous informality were not available. However, it seems safe to say that today's textile shopfloors are not characterized by informal negotiations.

(v) Workers were willing to become active in organised activities, but less so in self-initiated ones, which is a pattern of behaviour commonly observed in western societies also.

The relatively high stated willingness of union and non union members to become active in certain collective activities was astonishing when one considers the industrial sector and the female dominance of the workforce in question. It challenges the stereotype of the passive, lethargic East German worker. However, workers did not mainly think in collectivist terms when reacting to all workplace problems. For example, they were more inclined to pursue individualistic strategies regarding their own job security, whilst being in favour of collective action to oppose certain threats at company level.

(vi) The theories of rational choice, social identity and micro-mobilization were the most successful explanators of workers' willingness to participate in collective activities, whereas frustration-aggression theory as well as the demographic variables did not present a consistent pattern. Further analysis found strong interrelations between several independent variables, such as between collective instrumentality and union identity. In a nutshell, East German workers were guided by both instrumental and collective motives in their decision-making to become active. This adds support to the overall finding that these workers were not notably individualised.

12.2 Implications of this study

(i) Implications for the hypothesis: individualisation of the workforce

The findings on workers' perceptions of and reactions towards the transforming workplace relations did not conform to the widespread hypothesis that East German workers are becoming clearly individualistic. Workers revealed in many cases strong collectivist attitudes and behaviour towards management, colleagues or interest institutions (table 12.1, adapting table 5.2 of chapter 5).

table 12.1: dimensions of "collectivism" and "individualism" and the results of the two workforce surveys

dimensions	"collectivism"	results	"individualism"	results
behaviour	active behaviour: strong willingness to participate in collective activities	√ (mostly in organised activities)	passive behaviour: low willingness to participate in collective activities	√ (mostly in self-initiated activities)
attitudes	perceived strong instrumentality of interest institutions + coll. activities	√ (in some issues)	perceived low instrumentality of interest institutions + coll. activities	√ (in some issues)
	union identity	√	no union identity	
	workgroup identity	√	no workgroup identity	
	them-and-us feelings	√	no them-and-us feelings	
	interest in collective issues		no interest in collective issues	√
	general collectivist attitudes	√	general individualistic attitudes	
	"collective" approach to collective participation: union identity = major antecedent	√	instrumental approach to collective participation: instrumentality of union/ collective activities = major antecedent	√

Yet, the different dimensions of collectivism/ individualism revealed the complex and dynamic nature of workers' attitudes and behaviour. Thus, it was impossible to classify workers as *pure* "collectivists" or *pure* "individualists" because many displayed mixed responses when confronted with different issues. Workers' attitudes were equally difficult

to classify as purely instrumental, identity-oriented or otherwise. This point becomes clear when examining possible determinants of individual willingness to participate in collective activities. This study emphasizes the importance of recognizing the different dimensions of collectivism/ individualism and in which circumstances and under which conditions they are switched on rather than assuming a general trend towards a uniform, individualised workforce.

As said before, whether the noted complexity of workers' attitudes and behaviour is a normal state of affairs rather than a product of the transformation of the GDR and all its attendant confusions is hard to tell. However, similar studies in western societies (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1989; Kuruvilla et al. 1990) came up with a similar mix of individualistic and collectivist approaches to participation in collective activities, and also general studies of the characteristics of union membership revealed a mix of individualistic and collectivist characteristics in union members (e.g. Lind for Denmark, 1995; Waddington and Whitston for UK, 1995). One might therefore suggest that the complex attitudes of East German workers are more likely to be a normal state of affair.

Moreover, it seems safe to say that the data indirectly questions the persistence of "socialist legacies" in peoples' attitudes and behaviour which are frequently assumed to make these workers significantly different from their western counterparts (e.g. Blanchflower and Freeman 1993 for the whole of Central and Eastern Europe including East Germany). Clearly, this can only be a tentative and general proposition. It does not exclude the possibility that East Germans might for example reveal stronger degrees of general collectivist attitudes than West Germans (as has been found for example in Brähler and Richter 1995:8). However, it seems safe to conclude in overall that the data supports the thesis that workers' attitudes and behaviour are not predominantly culturally-bound, but that their cognition of their current circumstances and environment determines to a large extent their behaviour.

Finally, the rejection of a general individualisation thesis does not mean that people did not change over time (although most workers in the Bodywear sample thought they had not changed, see chapter 10). It will be remembered that the study did not investigate the development of workers' attitudes and behaviour over time. Thus, whether the

similarity of post-socialist and capitalist workers' attitudes and behaviour (which comparative data with West Germany should substantiate) is due to changes (increasing individualism) in the East Germans cannot be entirely excluded. However, the related question would be whether West German workers can be characterized as individualistic or whether they do not also reveal a mixture of individualistic and collectivist attitudes.

(ii) Implications of the hypothesis: "institutionalisation" of interest institutions

As was outlined before, a successful institutionalization comprises not only the transfer of the institutional "hardware", but also the creation of appropriate "software" or culture (i.e. practices, norms and attitudes). Some literature (see chapter 5) interpreted the current problems of the institutions (e.g. union membership decline) as being caused (among other things) by a mismatch between the implemented, "foreign" "hardware" and the incompatible "software". This study proposes that on the contrary — with regard to the workforce — the "software" is not obstructing the functioning of the institutions. Studies on the *political culture* of East Germans, especially on their democratic attitudes, came up with the similar result of a culture strongly supportive of the new political institutions (e.g. Dalton 1991; Seifert and Rose 1994; Weil 1992). For example, Seifert and Rose found that unsurprisingly East Germans were most advanced in adapting to the Western political culture (West Germany was used as an example) compared to other Central and East European countries. Thus, as Stark (quoted above) suggested with regard to the post-socialist societies in Eastern Europe in general, there is no institutional vacuum on East Germans shopfloors but instead supportive practices and norms in favour of the interest institutions.

In a nutshell, this study found workers providing support to the new interest institutions and concluded that the workforce was a stabilizing factor within the transformation process of these institutions, in contrast to some other literature (see chapter 5). The expansion of West German interest institutions (i.e. unions and works councils) in the East was accepted and supported by the workforce. Judged on most of the dimensions

of workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the new institutions the institutionalization was successful (see table 12.2 adapting table 3.2 of chapter 3). The fact that the works councillors saw their relationship with management as cooperative and functional added further support to this finding.

Furthermore, it is reassuring to know that it is not mainly East German workers' attitudes and behaviour which are to be blamed for union (or works council) problems. The current problems of the workers' institutions are far more likely to be caused by structural factors (e.g. recession, restructuring of the industry) or by institutional actors' strategies, rather than by internal factors or by an unsuccessful institutionalisation of the two organisations. In addition, it is not the individualisation of East Germans which impedes the institutions' functioning as sometimes argued in the literature. As argued in the beginning of this study (chapter 3) individualisation is a threat to collective institutions. A certain degree of collectivism is thus a necessary condition for successful institutionalisation, and this seems to be present in both data sets.

Besides the general strong support for the institutionalisation, table 12.2 reveals the mixture of workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the institutionalisation, similar to that which was found when "individualisation" was examined.

table 12.2: attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of the institutionalisation of interest representation (union and works council) from the viewpoint of the workforce and results of the two workforce surveys

dimensions	results
— acceptance of the institution	strong
— actual utilization (e.g. consultation for grievance procedures)	similar to the level common in West Germany
— active support (e.g. voting of works councillors)	strong in some issues, weaker in others (self-initiated activities)
— perception of an instrumental institution	low/high with regard to different issues
— interest in issues of the institutions	low
— union identity	strong
— union membership	medium/high (compared to West Germany)

One might classify the different attitudes and behaviour on three levels: culture ("software"), structure and performance of interest institutions. The two data sets revealed strong support for the structure (i.e. the institution as such), a mixed perception of its performance, and a mixed presence of the necessary "culture" (e.g. interest in collective issues, active support, union identity).

This result resembles political studies on attitudinal conditions for the successful transformation to democratic societies in Central and Eastern Europe (including East Germany) (e.g. Fuchs and Roller 1994: tables 4,5,6). Fuchs and Roller found in their East German sample a high degree of support for the institutions essentially constituting the structure of liberal democracy, a high degree of a "democratic" culture, but less confidence in the performance of these institutions (p. 42). The complexity of attitudes (actively supporting vs not supporting the interest institutions) might indicate the relatively early stage of the societal transformation, but equally it might characterize the normal complexity of peoples' attitudes towards interest institutions.

Finally, whether the implementation of the new interest institutions caused changes in workers' minds or whether they already had developed "attitudes" suitable for the highly institutionalised, West German industrial relations system is beyond the scope of this study. However, one might argue that East Germans were already used to a highly institutionalised societal system before and might have also developed some sense of a democratic culture during the socialist regime.²⁵³

(iii) Implications for the literature on collective activities

A major purpose of this study was to gauge the general applicability of theories of collective activities to East Germany, and also to test the comparative validity of different social psychological theories.

²⁵³ There are various attempts in political science to explain changes in political cultures, for example Weil's (1989) "inside learning model", which argues that people can develop a critical view towards their political system on their own, and his "outside learning model", where people learn by observing other national experiences. Weil argued that both models apply to the GDR: the GDR had already developed an informal, unofficial culture before 1989 which was "western-oriented" and which differed from the official political culture.

Firstly, the fact that the theories were applicable (in terms of the used criteria, see chapter 6) and that most results (e.g. with regard to the level of participation) were similar to western experience add support to the, in Cole's (1972) terms, "structuralist view" in comparative industrial relations. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that the determinants of union participation have some universality, and can for example be also extended to emerging market economies and not only to union but also to works councils' activities. The structuralist view which is in this context similar to modernization theory (e.g. Zapf 1994) would argue that collective participation in East Germany and other industrial relations phenomena may become more similar to those of West Germany as East Germany's industrial relations practices become more similar to those of the West. On the other side the alternative, the "culturalist" view, attributes international differences to unique historical and value orientations. One would expect for example significantly lower or higher degrees of willingness to participate and/or significant differences in the loadings of the antecedents. Yet, the available comparative data of West German studies did not support these assumed differences.²⁵⁴

Secondly, testing the set of theories simultaneously resulted in four major antecedents (union identity, collective instrumentality, and attribution and information to a lesser degree) which were strongly interrelated. The study emphasises that no theory is sufficient on its own and that the theories are complementary rather than competitive explanators. It confirms the importance of collective and instrumental motives. However, both seem to have a mutually reinforcing effect on participation rather than one playing the leading role as has been suggested in some previous research (e.g. Newton and McFarlane Shore 1992, but see Klandermans 1992:190).

(iv) Implications for future research

This study addressed a complex set of questions, and highly specific recommendations cannot be easily made. However, there were two broad suggestions for future research.

²⁵⁴ Clearly, to falsify the proposition real comparative data on West Germany is needed.

Firstly, the study highlights an important methodological point on debates about collectivism, instrumentality and unionism. Future research should acknowledge the complexity and multi-dimensionality of workers' attitudes and behaviour. For example more emphasis might be put on the different dimensions of collectivism/ individualism and in which circumstances and under which conditions they are activated rather than assuming a general trend towards a uniform, individualised workforce. This also includes a more detailed (preferably qualitative) investigation of the relationship between the significant antecedents of participation, especially between social identity and rational choice. The well-known ambivalence about the "symbolic" and the "material" dimensions of collective organisation and activities should be acknowledged as a continuing, important feature of industrial relations research.

Secondly, one of the under-researched areas in comparative industrial relations is the interrelationship between institutions and actors (partly because in countries with a highly institutionalised industrial relations system academics tend to devalue the relevance of the actors). For example, Wolfgang Streeck claims that it is unions which unionize and mobilize people, rather than people being the initiators (i.e. some being more inclined to become active than others) (talk in Madison, July 1995).²⁵⁵ However, it is hoped that this study's investigation of the newly established interest institutions from the viewpoint of a specific group of actors, i.e. workers, has added some new insights to the understanding of the East German institutional transformation, and thus supported the relevance of micro-level research. Future research of workers' perceptions and reactions could for example compare workers in different situations (e.g. in companies with formalised interest institutions and in companies without) to address the question as to how far specific external conditions determine peoples' perceptions. For example, would the East German workforce perceive the current working conditions in such a negative way if they did not have the works council as a secure interest representation? How far do institutions affect peoples' perceptions and reactions? It would be interesting to compare East German workers' attitudes and behaviour with those of workers in other post-socialist societies

²⁵⁵ cf. political scientists such as Gabriel Almond: his work deals extensively with the relations between political institutions, actors and culture (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1980).

who experience similar organisational changes without such legalized and strong interest institutions at workplace level.

(v) Implications for the transformation of industrial relations in East Germany

Finally, one might ask whether this study contributes to the general debate on the future of industrial relations in East Germany. The literature often outlines two scenarios (Jürgens et al. 1993; Reißig 1993:20; Turner 1992:12). The first is a *polarization scenario* (or arrested transformation, "abgebrochene Transformation", Reißig 1993) in which the eastern region is exploited for its lower labour costs, with production facilities serving the function of extended assembly lines for western-based mass production (Voßkamp and Wittke 1991). In this scenario East Germany would emerge at the bottom of a nationally segmented labour market, as a permanently less developed region (a sort of German "Mezzogiorno" [see Boltho et al. 1995; Mahnkopf 1992]). German unions could be weakened as employers play the eastern workers off against their counterparts in the West. This scenario would most likely also include an increase in conflict and a potentially serious destabilization of German industrial relations.

The alternative is a *modernization scenario* (or successful transformation, Reißig *ibid.*), in which firms take advantage of eager and flexible workforces and workforce representatives in the East to bring in the latest organisational innovations (e.g. semi-autonomous groups) and new technology. Works councils and unions are integrated into relations of partnership in the drive towards advanced levels of productivity and flexibility, spurring new growth for Germany as a whole. Unions influence could expand in this scenario, provided unions adopt bargaining strategies which cater to the innovations in the East, facilitate the transfer of learning in both directions (West-East and East-West), and prevent East-West whipsawing strategies by employers.

The data on the workplace climate of the survey companies supports the latter scenario more than the former. Capital-labour relations seemed to be harmonious and

trustworthy rather than antagonistic. Moreover, works councils supported most rationalisation decisions. With regard to the workforce data however the decision is more difficult to make. This is partly due to the lack of information about what kind of workforce these scenarios require. One might argue that the polarization scenario would require either highly dissatisfied and militant workers or, if the unions were weakened, workers who are dissatisfied, passive and apathetic. On the other side the modernisation scenario seems to require workers who are committed to their company and supportive of a trustful, productive relationship between management and works council and a union which supports the modernisation processes. On the other side, "modernisation" might be also thought of as a process which leaves workers and interest representation without any influence.

The data revealed highly dissatisfied workers who supported the works council and the union, and who were willing to be mobilized by these institutions. To repeat, there was no evidence for the "nightmare" scenario of some authors of a completely individualistic, alienated, apathetic East German workforce who let the transformation pass by without any interests, expectations or commitment. Instead the workforce became a stabilizing factor for the institutions. It might be argued therefore that the workforce provided the necessary "software" for a modernization scenario which includes cooperative workplace relations. However, it seems also clear that the likelihood of this scenario becoming reality for the textile industry in East Germany will depend largely on other, external factors (especially in view of the tremendous current reform problems and the need to safeguard the pillars of the industrial relations system in the entire country, e.g. the principle of industry-wide collective bargaining). It strictly remains an open question in what way East German workers would react to a significant decentralisation and destabilisation of the institutional network of industrial relations. Yet, there is nothing in the results of this study that suggests that workers would behave fatalistically and comply passively with these changes as some people might wish, or indeed fear.

APPENDIX

A 1 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4²⁵⁶

A 1.1 Interview guidelines

A 1.1.1 Interview guideline: the two full-time works councillors at Bodywear (Summer 1993)

- A. employment relations in the GDR**
1. how much influence had the BGL in reality over management decisions? how effective were they in representing workers' interests? (e.g. overtime pay, wage group, health & safety)
 2. did workers consult the BGL frequently?
 3. how informal was their relationship with supervisors? plan fulfillment pact?
 4. how was the AGB (labour law) handled?
- B. birth of worker council in 1989**
1. who were the initiators of council? old BGL activists or qualified workers?
 2. who are the active people today?
 3. what were their original demands? more than West German BetrVG?
 4. was there any protest against the directors? (strike?)
- C. today's workplace relations**
1. cooperative, conflictory? what happened since Mai (pilot study)?
 2. bargaining outcomes
 3. data: membership in union, collective bargaining agreements, redundancy plan at Bodywear
 4. how "social" (sozialverträglich) was the redundancy plan?
- D. general**
1. what are the most important tasks of works council?
 2. what is currently the major difficulty/problem in your work?
 3. what was the major success in your work as a councillor so far?
 4. how do you describe your relationship with the GTB?
 5. how would you describe your relationship with the West German works councils (of Bodywear)?
 6. how would you characterise the general relationship works council - workforce?
 7. how much information do you get from management? what kind of information? how often are there consultations with management (economic council = Wirtschaftsausschuß)?
 8. how often do you have works council assemblies (Betriebsversammlungen)?
 9. are there any negative feelings (Distanzierungserscheinungen) in the workforce and works council against union officials from West Germany?
 10. how would you characterize current management style/ personnel policies? how does the current management style differ from former managers/ styles?
 11. in how far do you use the consultation rights concerning the introduction of new technology, training etc.?
 12. how do you evaluate union pay policies (gewerkschaftliche Tarifpolitik)?

²⁵⁶ Copies of the German original of interview guidelines and questionnaires are available from the author.

A 1.1.2 Interview guideline: Chief executive at Bodywear (May, Summer 1993)

1. chronology of privatisation and company development 1989-1993
2. how would you describe the workplace climate in post-1989? How do you think workers perceive the transformation? What are the major problems?
3. how would you describe the former workplace relations?
 - informal/formal
 - how did you motivate people? and today?
 - how did you control the work?
 - how did you manage to fulfill the targets? plan fulfillment pact?
4. company data: e.g. balances from 1990 - 1993

A 1.1.3 Interview guideline: chief personnel manager (Summer 1993)

1. documents on personnel development, personnel structure: male/female, age, qualifications
2. anticipated new redundancies, recruitment?
3. labour cost development 1989-1993
4. data on labour productivity, pay, absenteeism
5. what are the major problems at shopfloor level?
6. how is your current relationship with the works council?

A 1.1.4 Interview guideline: chief official of the GTB (South-East) (Summer 1993)

1. general information regarding the turnaround 1989/90: when was GTB taken over, what happened with members?
2. membership development: 1989-1993
3. what kind of possibilities are there for members to engage in union activities?
4. union stewards? (gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute)
5. how is the relationship with the employer association? what about company contracts? general problems in collective bargaining
6. what is the position of Bodywear employers: pro or contra collective bargaining? how are workplace relations at Bodywear? how effective is works council?
7. relationship with GTB West Germany/headquarter (Düsseldorf)?

A 1.1.5 Interview guideline: responsible officer of the employers' association (TMO) for collective bargaining (Summer 1993)

1. development of employers' association from 1989
2. membership development 1989-1993
2. future perspective of this industrial sector in East Germany, for association? regarding collective bargaining?
3. what is the position of Bodywear in comparison with other employers in the sector?

A 1.2 Questionnaires

A 1.2.1 Questionnaire for supervisors of Bodywear (Summer 1993)

The sample consisted of 8 supervisors: four of the sewing department, two of the knitting and two of the dyeing department, of which seven were female, seven worked for Trikotwear, and five had not been supervisor in former times.

(i) table: absolute level of items of changes in the supervision job

no		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree
13	the company expects more commitment from us than in former times.	1	2	0	2	3
14	supervisors are more respected today than before.	0	2	0	4	2
17	supervisors are primarily responsible to their superior, not to their workers.	2	1	0	4	1
18	in former times I had more influence over when and how we worked in the brigade.	4	1	1	2	0
19	in former times our main duty was to organize the raw materials, today the main task is to organise and control the labour/work.	2	1	0	3	2
20	in former times there was more collegiality among the supervisors, today there is more competition.	1	0	2	4	1

(ii) table: absolute level of items of supervisors' perceptions of current working conditions

no		strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree
1	there is more work today than before, and the pressure to perform is higher.	0	0	0	4	4
2	those who do not perform well, will be dismissed.	0	0	0	7	1
3	in former times the brigade (Meisterei) was a real community, today there is not a great deal of teamspirit.	1	5	1	0	1
4	in former times workers also got pleasure from their work, today they only work for money.	4	2	0	2	0
5	workers are as qualified as in the main plant in West Germany.	1	2	0	2	3
12	we were better trained in the GDR than the West German supervisors.	2	4	2	0	0
6	in former times more workers came to me with grievances, today people complain less.	3	1	1	2	1
7	a capitalist firm treats its employees fairer, because only performance criteria count and no personal or partial ones.	0	1	0	5	2
8	human beings are lazy by nature, and have to be forced to work.	6	2	0	0	0
9	workers are primarily motivated by pay.	0	0	0	4	4
10	more participation of workers is in theory desirable, but practically not possible.	2	1	1	4	0
11	I give my workers a lot of discretion, I am just interested in their output.	3	3	0	2	0
15	I treat my workers more strictly than before.	2	0	1	3	2
16	a great problem in former times was that you did not have any means of pressuring against employees.	1	2	0	1	4

A 1.2.2 Questionnaire for the head of personnel at Bodywear (1993)

table: absolute level of items of personnel managers' perceptions of workplace relations at Bodywear

no	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree
1. the works council is a responsible and fair bargaining partner.	1	2	3	4	⑤
2. the council is as concerned as management about the wellbeing of the firm.	1	2	3	4	⑤
3. the works council weakens the discipline of the workforce.	①	2	3	4	5
4. the works council never misses the chance to pick a quarrel with management ²⁵⁷ .	①	2	3	4	5
5. we often clarify differences of opinion informally.	1	2	3	④	5
6. the council does not understand the problems and worries of the management.	1	2	3	④	5
7. the council is simply a mouthpiece of the GTB.	①	2	3	4	5
8. the council pursues union politics intensively.	①	2	3	4	5
9. the management informs the council extensively about the economic situation of the firm.	1	2	3	4	⑤
10. management respects the views of the council.	1	②	3	4	5
11. management would prefer not to have a council.	1	2	3	④	5
12. the council tries to cooperate with management.	①	2	3	4	5
13. in general relations between the council and management are good.	①	2	3	4	5
14. the council has strong support among the workforce.	1	2	3	④	5
15. the council should obtain more co-determination rights in economic decisions.	1	2	3	4	5
16. the workforce is not very interested in the quality of the relationship between the council and management.	1	2	3	④	5
17. unions and employers have in principle divergent positions.	1	2	3	④	5
18. the GTB is a responsible collective bargaining partner.	1	2	3	④	5
19. human beings are lazy by nature and have to be forced to work.	①	2	3	4	5
20. employees are primarily motivated by pay.	1	2	3	④	5

²⁵⁷ The term "management" refers to top management (Geschäftsführung)

A 1.2.3 Questionnaire for the two full-time works councillors of Bodywear (Summer 1993)

table (i): absolute level of items of works councillors' views of workplace relations at Bodywear

no	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree
1. management is a responsible and fair bargaining partner.	1	2	3	(4)	5
2. the works council never misses the chance to change power relations to their advantage.	1	2	3	(4)	5
3. we often clarify differences of opinion informally.	1	2	3	(4)	5
4. management does not understand the problems and worries of the workforce.	1	2	(3)	4	5
5. the council represents the GTB in the company.	1	(2)	3	(4)	5
6. we try to achieve what is in the best interest for the company, even if this sometimes concur with the policy of the GTB.	1	2	3	4	(5)
7. the management informs the council extensively about the economic situation of the firm.	1	2	3	(4)	5
8. management respects the views of the council.	1	2	3	(4)	5
9. management would prefer not to have a council.	1	2	(3)	4	5
10. management tries to cooperate with the works council.	1	2	3	4	(5)
11. in general the relations between works council and management are good.	1	2	3	4	(5)
12. management has strong support among the workforce.	1	(2)	3	4	5
13. the workforce is not very interested in the quality of the relationship between the council and management.	1	(2)	3	4	5
14. the council should obtain more co-determination rights in economic decisions.	1	2	3	4	(5)
15. unions and employers have in principle divergent positions.	1	2	3	(4)	5
16. the GTB represents more the interests of their officials than of their members.	1	(2)	3	4	5
17. the unions are more concerned about the well-being of their western than their eastern members.	1	(2)	3	4	5
18. the relationship to the GTB is close and good.	1	2	3	4	(5)
19. the GTB offers primarily services to the works council.	1	2	3	4	(5)
20. the GTB intervenes too much in company issues.	1	(2)	3	4	5

table (ii): absolute level of items of works councillors' views on "the representation of workers' interests is impeded..."

no	strongly disagree	disagree	no view	agree	strongly agree
1. due to differences of opinions within the works council	①	2	3	4	5
2. due to the works council being overburdened	①	2	3	4	5
3. because the works council has lost contact with the workforce.	①	2	3	4	5
4. because the workforce represents contradictory interests.	①	2	3	4	5
5. because specific interests do not conform with the ideas of the works council.	1	2	3	④	5
6. because employees prefer to represent their interests themselves.	①	2	3	4	5
7. because employees present an indifferent attitude towards the works council.	1	2	3	④	5
8. because employees fear negative reactions by management if they consult the works council.	1	2	3	4	⑤

A 1.2.4 First part of questionnaire for works councillors in GTB South-East (Summer 1994)

table (i): first general information about the textile companies; absolute level of items, valid cases: 53

01.	company name:	40 answers, 13 missing	
02.	number of workforce (1994):	1-99 employees = 25	
		100- 999 employees = 15	
		999- = 0	
		missing = 13	
03.	number of workforce (1989):	1-99 = 3	
		100-999 = 22	
		1000-3000 = 9	
		missing = 19	
04.	female rate of total workforce (1994):	-50% = 3	
		50-89% = 20	
		90-100% = 16	
		missing = 14	
05.	current owner of company:	1 Treuhand	7
		2 management buy out/private	12
		3 West German/foreign company	22
		4 other/ missing	12
06.	current board of directors:	1 all are former directors	14
		2 most are former directors	8
		3 some former directors, but minority	19
		4 no former directors	11
		missing	1
07.	current supervisors:	1 all are former ones	34
		2 most are former ones	7
		3 same, but minority	3
		4 only new supervisors	6
		missing	3

08. Did your company experience major organisational changes during the last years? (more choices are possible)
- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| 1 investment in machinery/tools | 67% |
| 2 restructuring of production | 58% |
| 3 introduction of more shift work | 14% |
| 4 introduction of piece rate system | 10% |
| 5 other | 8% |
| missing/ nothing | 13% |
09. do you think that the work pace at most workplaces increased after the "Wende"?
- | increased a lot | increased slightly | stayed the same | decreased slightly | decreased a lot | missing |
|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------|
| 21 | 28 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
10. are there any employment reductions planned in the next 12 months?
- | | | | |
|--------|-------|---------------|-----------|
| yes 13 | no 17 | don't know 21 | missing 2 |
|--------|-------|---------------|-----------|
11. in general, how secure is your company in the next five years?
- | very insecure | insecure | don't know | relatively secure | secure | missing |
|---------------|----------|------------|-------------------|--------|---------|
| 9 | 13 | 8 | 19 | 1 | 3 |
12. union density at your company (1994) (missing = 15)
- | | | | |
|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 1-30 % = 7 | 30-50% = 12 | 50-80% = 8 | 80-100% = 11 |
|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
13. how much did membership fall in the last two years?
- | | | | |
|----------|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| -10% = 6 | 10-50% = 12 | 50- % = 3 | missing = 32 |
|----------|-------------|-----------|--------------|
14. female rate of union members in the company?
- | | | |
|----------|--------------|--------------|
| -50% = 8 | 50-100% = 28 | missing = 17 |
|----------|--------------|--------------|
15. were there any industrial conflicts in the last two years?
- | | | |
|---------|---------|-------------|
| yes = 3 | no = 47 | missing = 3 |
|---------|---------|-------------|
- if so, what happened? (if people answered at all: "nothing")
16. since how many years are working for the works council?
- | | | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1 year = 15 | 2 years = 7 | 3 years = 9 | 4/5 years = 19 | missing = 3 |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
17. have you been working for the BGL formerly?
- | | | |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| yes = 16 | no = 34 | missing = 3 |
|----------|---------|-------------|

A 2 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTERS 8 - 10

A 2.1 Pilot questionnaire: Bodywear (May 1993)

sample: 60 blue collar worker in the sewing, knitting and dyeing department

1. age: below 25 years [9%]
 25 - 35 years [27%]
 35 - 45 years [43%]
 over 45 years [22%]
2. are you the only wage earner in your houshold? yes [37%] no [64%]
3. do you have dependent children? yes [82%] no [18%]
4. professional education:
 apprenticeship [83%] college [11%] no special education, but training-on-the-job [5%]
5. how many years do you work for Trikotwear/Bodywear?
 0-3 years [65%] 4-14 years [9%] 15-37years [25%]
6. have you ever been unemployed? yes [40%] no [60%]
7. are you frightened to loose your job? yes [30%] a bit [23%] no [47%]
8. would you like to work part time? yes [42%] no [58%]
 in sewing only: yes (55%) no (45%) - if yes, due to family reasons
9. have you been a union steward in former times? yes [19%] no [81%]
10. are you member of the new union (Gewerkschaft Textil- Bekleidung)?
 yes [35%] no [65%]

I. job satisfaction

11. are you satisfied with your job? yes [66%] a bit [29%] not at all [3%]
12. would you rather like to do a different work at Bodywear? yes [12%] no [87%]
 which kind? _____, why? _____
13. could you get promoted? I believe yes [0%] I do not know [0%] no [100%]
14. would you like to work for a different company? yes [30%] no [67%]
 why? _____ common answer: for higher wages, shorter travel to work

II. work attitudes

15. what is the most important in your work? (please choose the numbers 1 to 6 in sequence)

—	possibilities for promotion	[6=76%]
—	earning good money	[1=72%]
—	good relation to your supervisor	[4=35%, 5=26%]
—	good relation to your colleagues	[3=32%, 2= 27%]
—	work conditions (new machines, friendly rooms,...)	[2=33%]
—	varied work	[2=22% , 3=20%]

16. in general: what is most important in your life? (numerate from 1 to 6)
- satisfying work [4=26%, 5=24%]
 - a nice house [6=33%, 5=30%]
 - have a good family life [1=56%]
 - earn good money [3=33%]
 - employment security [1=50%]
 - to lead a respectful life and be a useful member of society [6=51%]
17. in general: if an unknown person would ask you what you work, what would you answer?
- 27% = my occupation, 33% = the company name, 38% both

III. perception of change

18. if you compare your work now with your work in GDR times, what was for you the most crucial change?
- technical (sewers: shift work, long journey) [53%]
 - other things [14%]
 - nothing [16%]
 - more work [11%]
19. Did your work became more exhausting?
- yes [53%] stayed the same [31%] less exhausting [13%] don't know [1%]
20. Do you earn more money than in former days?
- yes [53%] more or less the same [23%] no [23%] don't know [0%]
21. Do you think your earning is justified?
- yes [18%] no [72%] don't know [9%]
22. do you reach the same piece rate than before?
- yes [63%] no [32%] don't know [4%] (not really reliable)
- sewing alone: yes (44%) no (53%)
- if no, why not? sewers: new rates too high
23. what is the most important thing you would like to change at your workplace if you could?
- nothing (explicitely and implicitely) [37%]
 - work flow, arrangements [18%]
 - shift, rates [16%]
 - other things _____ [13%]
 - less pressure [11%]
 - human, social issues [5%]
24. what do you miss from your former work?
- human, social issue (collegiality) [43%]
 - different things (meals,...) [13%]
 - nothing [11%]
 - missing [32%]

25. do you like the more varied work, or is it essentially more stressful?
- makes fun and is not more stressful [13%]
 - make fun although more stressful [73%]
 - no fun since more stressful [15%]
26. how would you describe the relation your colleagues have to your supervisors?
- very good [15%] good [73%] not very good [7%] bad [2%] don't know [4%]
27. did the behaviour of the supervisors change compared to the former times?
- yes [15%] no [58%] don't know [15%]
- if yes, what changed? 1/2 negative (more autocratic leadership style), 1/2 positive (more competence)

IV. statements: work attitudes, them-us feelings

28. In post-1989 a lot of new machinery have been installed. Do you support the following statement? "Automatization should serve all, but in reality the workers pay for it."
- yes, very strongly [23%] a bit [38%] not at all [11%] not in our company [23%]
- don't know [6%]
- what is your opinion to the following statements?
29. "most decisions in the departments are made by the supervisor (foreman/ forewoman), but it would be better if the workers could have a saying too."
- I agree [63%] I don't agree [26%] I don't know [11%]
30. "most employers in East Germany are employee oriented (social) and consider the well being of their employees."
- I agree strongly [9%] I agree more or less [34%] I don't agree [50%] don't know [7%]
31. "the management knows what is best for the company and the workforce should do what they are asked to do."
- I agree strongly [11%] I agree more or less [58%] I don't agree [25%] don't know [7%]
32. "management and workforce sit in the same boat."
- I agree strongly [16%] I agree more or less [38%] I don't agree [40%] don't know [5%]
33. "management will always try to exploit the workforce, if they get the chance."
- I agree strongly [30%] I agree more or less [38%] I don't agree [16%] don't know [16%]
34. "if the workforce could manage the company all would be better."
- I agree strongly [7%] I agree more or less [36%] I don't agree [40%] don't know [18%]
35. " if the employees had more rights of codetermination, we would have chaos. "
- I agree strongly [9%] I agree more or less [34%] I don't agree [48%] don't know [9%]
36. " the employees should always be loyal to the company and should work as hard as they can."
- I agree strongly [36%] I agree more or less [55%] I don't agree [5%] don't know [4%]

V. union commitment

37. have you been in the SED (socialist Party)? no reliable answers
38. if member of the new West German union: why? (numerate from 1 to 4)
- to represent the interests of the workers [1=79%]
 - because I get benefits and help [2= 37%]
 - because I believe in the ideals of the worker movement [3=42%]
 - because I have been a member before [4=37%]
39. if not a member: why? (multiple naming possible) (absolute answers)
- in the capitalist economy unions can not act properly [11x]
 - the union is not representing the interests of the East Germans properly [12x]
 - my interests are sufficiently represented by the works council [9x]
 - my interests are sufficiently represented by the management [4x]
 - unions in general do not interest me [9x]
40. do you think that union members are being discriminated by their supervisors?
- yes, obviously [0%] a bit [7%] no [61%] don't know [31%]
41. In your opinion did the FDGB represent the interest of the workforce in a better way than the union today? yes [17%] no [83%]
42. what are the tasks of the unions in your opinion? (numerate from 1 to 5)
- to adjust the eastern pay level to the western level [1=83%]
 - to pursue more social tasks [2=30%]
 - to enforce more codetermination for workers in the companies [3=37%]
 - to unite the workforce against the employers [5=47%]
 - to fight for better working conditions [4=28%]

VI. works council

43. did you vote for the works council in the last election (1990)?
- yes [73%] no [27%]
44. will you vote again next year?
- yes [44%] no [16%] don't know yet [39%]
45. do you think the works council represents your interests?
- in most cases yes [37%] in most cases not [31%] don't know [31%]
46. do you think the works council has a good relation with the management?
- yes [46%] no [3%] don't know [50%]
47. if you have a problem do you consult your supervisor or the works council?
- preferably the supervisor [30%] depends on the kind of problem [71%] preferably the works council [0%]
48. did the BGL represent your interests better than the works council today?
- yes [17%] no [85%]
- if yes, why? only a few replied: because the BGL cared more for them individually

49. how well does the works council inform you about its work?
 well informed [13%] satisfying [64%] badly [23%] I am not interested [0%]
50. does the works council have too much or too little influence on management policy?
 — too much influence [0%]
 — enough influence [11%]
 — too little [22%]
 — don't know [66%]
- if too little influence: in which area the works council should have more influence? no answer
52. what are the main tasks of the works council? (1 to 5)
 — to represent the interests of the workforce to the management [1=91%]
 — to improve working conditions [2=40%]
 — to organize more social issues (e.g. holiday camps) [5=41%]
 — to help with personal problems e.g. with your supervisor [3=30% , 4=27%]
 — to represent the union in the firm [3=27% , 5=27%]
53. do you think of yourself as a member of the working class?
 yes [48%] no [15%] don't know [13%] this phrase has no meaning to me [23%]

VII. wages

54. are you interested in the current wages conflict in the metalworking and steel industry?
 very interested [74%] not interested [25%]
55. do you think it is worthwhile for the metal workers to go on strike?
 yes [72%] no [16%] don't know [9%]
56. if a similar case would happen in the textile industry, would you vote for strike?
 yes [57%] no [12%] don't know [27%]
 if no, why not? if answered than: "bad for economy, risk of workplaces"
57. do you think that an increase of your wages of 10% would threaten the survival of Bodywear?
 yes [5%] perhaps [21%] no [61%] don't know [10%]

A 2.2 Questionnaire: workforce Bodywear (Summer 1993)

I. Job satisfaction

Below are a series of statements about how satisfied you are with various aspects of your job. Please indicate your opinion ticking the number that best shows how you feel about each of them.

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

A.	Work load is heavier than in former times, and there is more pressure to perform.	1	2	3	4	5
B.	The quality of work becomes more important than before.	1	2	3	4	5
C.	Supervisors and managers are more strict than before.	1	2	3	4	5
D.	We have to be more flexible today.	1	2	3	4	5
E.	If you don't work hard, you get fired.	1	2	3	4	5
F.	The solidarity among the workfellows decreases.	1	2	3	4	5
G.	Formerly we had more control about when and how we work.	1	2	3	4	5
H.	There is more emphasis on security and health issues today.	1	2	3	4	5
I.	Formerly you had also fun while working, today you only work for the money.	1	2	3	4	5
J.	You have the constant fear to get sacked.	1	2	3	4	5
K.	A capitalist firm treats its employees in a fairer way, because only performance criteria count and not personal or partial ones.	1	2	3	4	5
<i>for sewer and dyer only:</i>						
L.	I prefer a free saturday to an additional income.	1	2	3	4	5
<i>for dyer only:</i>						
M.	The new performance-related-pay scheme will only create a bad atmosphere.	1	2	3	4	5
N.	The new pay bonus should have been bound to the performance of the group.	1	2	3	4	5

II. Management at Bodywear

Do you agree with the following statements? (Again, please tick the most appropriate number on the scale).

		<u>strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree</u>				
O.	I am proud to work for Bodywear.	1	2	3	4	5
P.	Real partnership between management and workforce is not possible, because we have too different interests.	1	2	3	4	5
Q.	You can never really trust your supervisor.	1	2	3	4	5
R.	The workers here are exploited.	1	2	3	4	5
S.	Formerly the supervisors were on the side of the workers, today they are on management's side.	1	2	3	4	5
T.	In former times we were all working together to fulfill the quota, today there is much more a "them and us" atmosphere.	1	2	3	4	5
U.	management takes full advantage of the current labour market situation.	1	2	3	4	5
V.	I am pretty sure that Bodywear will always try to treat its workers in a fair way.	1	2	3	4	5

III. Workcolleagues in your workgroup

Here are a few statements regarding your work co-operation and group life. (Again, please tick the most appropriate number on the scale).

		strongly disagree/	disagree/	no view/	agree/	strongly agree
W.	I can rely on my colleagues, they help me where they can.	1	2	3	4	5
X.	You have to concentrate so much on your work, that there is hardly time to have a chat.	1	2	3	4	5
Y.	You often feel quite alone and isolated.	1	2	3	4	5
Z.	I am not very interested in my colleagues.	1	2	3	4	5
AA.	I would rather like to work in another group.	1	2	3	4	5
AB.	I would rather sacrifice 100 DM of my pay than see that some of my workfellows of my group get sacked.	1	2	3	4	5
AC.	I rather fight for my interests alone than rely on my colleagues' support.	1	2	3	4	5
AD.	Most people do not work anymore with their former workfellows.	1	2	3	4	5
AE.	In former times the group solidarity was much better.	1	2	3	4	5
AF.	Nowadays I hardly meet my workfellows after work.	1	2	3	4	5
AG.	I have nearly no contact to the workers of other workgroups.	1	2	3	4	5
AH.	Formerly the solidarity of the whole workforce was much better.	1	2	3	4	5
AI.	Because of the job insecurity people become egoistic and just think of their advantage.	1	2	3	4	5
AJ.	In general: an "individualistic" social system where everybody has the chance to lead a better life than others, but also has the risk of failing, is better than a "collectivist" social system, where all have equally mediocre life chances.	1	2	3	4	5

IV. Works council

Do you agree? (Again, please tick the most appropriate number on the scale).

		<u>strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree</u>				
AK.	You are not sufficiently informed about the work councils' work.	1	2	3	4	5
AL.	Our group keeps the wc informed about relevant events on the shopfloor.	1	2	3	4	5
AM.	The work of the wc is a frequent topic of our chats.	1	2	3	4	5
AN.	The wc sofar has put forward workers' interests very well.	1	2	3	4	5
AO.	Works council and management are in league with each other.	1	2	3	4	5
AP.	the wc guarantees another job for all knitter.	1	2	3	4	5
AQ.	The former BGL did represent our interests better.	1	2	3	4	5
AR.	The wc is only as strong as they get supported by the workers.	1	2	3	4	5
AS.	We don't need a works council, since management takes sufficient care of us.	1	2	3	4	5
AT.	I will attend the next works council election (1994).	1	2	3	4	5
AU.	if my colleagues want me to, I would stand for the election.	1	2	3	4	5
AV.	I will attend the next work council assembly.	1	2	3	4	5
AW.	Please state one important difference between the wc and the trade union. Just write what come into your mind. _____					

V. The new trade union (GTB)

1) a few questions to the new trade union:

		<u>strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree</u>				
AX.	You get well informed about the work of the GTB.	1	2	3	4	5
AY.	It is difficult to be loyal to both, the GTB and the company.	1	2	3	4	5
AZ.	In our workgroup we often discuss union issues.	1	2	3	4	5
BA.	As a union member you are discriminated by your supervisor.	1	2	3	4	5
BB.	The union had not yet done a lot at this place.	1	2	3	4	5
BC.	The union's pay policy only worsens the economic situation and risks jobs.	1	2	3	4	5
BD.	The union works more for the West German workforce than for us.	1	2	3	4	5
BE.	If the unions would not exist the East German employment situation would look even worse.	1	2	3	4	5
BF.	I regard myself as a member of the working class.	1	2	3	4	5

2) a few general questions:

BG. Did you resign membership of the old union (FDGB)? 1 yes 2 no 3 no member

BH. Are you a member of the GTB today? 1 yes 2 no

(if member go to Q BL)

BI,BH,BJ if no member, why not? (please only indicate maximal three)

- 1 The wc sufficiently represents my interests
- 2 Schiesser cares sufficiently for its workforce
- 3 union do not interest me
- 4 the former union did disappoint us too much
- 5 the unions don't do enough for the east german worker
- 6 the union fee is too high
- 7 other reason (please indicate) _____

BL,BM,BN if a member, why? (maximal three)

- 1 because of the free legislative consulting and legal help in case of dismissal
- 2 because of the strike money
- 3 in order to support the union in its collective bargaining with the employers
- 4 because most of my workfellows are members as well
- 5 because I believe in the principles and values of trade unionism
- 6 because I was a member also in former times
- 7 different reason (please indicate) _____

BO. Do you visit union events?

- 1 yes, always 2 quite often 3 sometimes 4 very rarely 5 never

3) What do you think of the following statements?

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

BP.	The union makes the workforce more powerful.	1	2	3	4	5
BQ.	I never tell my friends that I am a union member.	1	2	3	4	5
BR.	It is important for me to belong to the union.	1	2	3	4	5
BS.	I would also stay in the union, if I would work on short term or would become unemployed.	1	2	3	4	5
BT.	I am not a very active and loyal member.	1	2	3	4	5
BU.	Not belonging to the union is anti-social.	1	2	3	4	5

BV. Guess how many of Bodywear's workforce are union members?

- 0-20% = 1 21-30% = 2 31-40% = 3 41-50% = 4 51-% = 5

VI. problems

We will now discuss general problems at your work.

BW/BX/BY in general: how do you think the viability of Bodywear can be secured for long term? (max. three)

- 1 by means of a more powerful union
- 2 " works council
- 3 " better management
- 4 " more codetermination/involvement of the employees
- 5 " better performance of myself and my fellowworkers
- 6 " lower pay levels and cost savings at all workplaces
- 7 " politics (industrial policy)
- 8 " not at all
- 9 " different reason (please specify) _____

BZ/CA/CB how can you improve your job security? (max. three)

- 1 I have to work better than my fellowworkers
- 2 I have to have a good relationship to my supervisor and don't "rebel"
- 3 I have to solidarize with my colleagues
- 4 I have to become engaged in union or works council's work
- 5 I cannot do anything
- 6 something else (please specify) _____

CC. Did you consult the works council with a problem during this year? 1 yes 2 no

(if no go to Q CF)

CD. Was the issue personal or of general concern? 1 personal 2 general

CE. what was the issue about? (only one number please)

- 1 grievance about a supervisor
- 2 grievance about too high work norms/ conditions
- 3 grievance about additional Saturday work
- 4 threatening dismissal/ transfer
- 5 something else (specify) _____

CF. "My current pay level is justified." Do you agree?

I totally disagree I disagree no view I agree I strongly agree
 1 2 3 4 5

CG. What is your index/comparison, if you want to show the justice/injustice of your pay level?
(only one number please)

- 1 my former pay level in the GDR
- 2 the other pay groups at Bodywear and their work requirements/ performance
- 3 the other workers in my group who conduct less machines/ have easier jobs
- 4 the pay I would earn in the West German headquarter of Bodywear
for the same job
- 5 different (specify)_____

What do you think about the following statements?

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

CH.	If you complain nowadays about your job, you get sacked.	1	2	3	4	5
CI.	It's a waste of time to consult the works council, they are not interested in my problems.	1	2	3	4	5
CJ.	The works council wants to help, but has no power.	1	2	3	4	5
CK.	Improvements at the workplace can only be realized through collective action of all colleagues.	1	2	3	4	5
CL.	Usually I don't have any grievances.	1	2	3	4	5
CM.	If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker you can't do anything against it.	1	2	3	4	5
CN.	"Bischofferode" (mining strike) is everywhere and if the GTB would call a strike I would participate.	1	2	3	4	5
CO.	In general, I have a positive view on the future.	1	2	3	4	5

CP. How does the societal changes in East Germany influence your behaviour? (only one number)

- 1 I am more active than before
- 2 I did not change at all
- 3 I live a more passive/ retired life

VII. summary

Who represents your interests concerning the following working conditions? (Please....)

		union/	works council/	personnel dept./	my supervisor/	nobody
CR.	pay level	1	2	3	4	5
CQ.	job security	1	2	3	4	5
CS.	work requirements	1	2	3	4	5
CT.	qualification/training	1	2	3	4	5
CU.	introduction of new technology	1	2	3	4	5
CV.	health & security	1	2	3	4	5
CW.	working time	1	2	3	4	5

CX. And who did represent best your interests in former times? (one only)

1	BGL	4	my workgroup
2	plant director	5	nobody, myself alone
3	supervisor	6	different (specify) _____

CY. In general: "it is frequently argued that the East Germans will remain second class citizens for quite a while
Do you agree?

<u>I totally disagree</u>	<u>I disagree</u>	<u>no view</u>	<u>I agree</u>	<u>I strongly agree</u>
1	2	3	4	5

VIII. general information

CZ. your department:

sewing = 1	dyer = 2	knitter = 3
packing/quality control = 4	goods reception/stocking = 5	
trimmings = 6	tailoring = 7	

DA. how many earn in your household? one person = 1 two persons = 2 three and more = 3

DB. your gender? (you don't have to answer) female = 1 male = 2

DC. your age? under 30 = 1 30-40 = 2 41-50 = 3 50 and more = 4

DD. have you been trained for your job (apprenticeship, university course) or have you learnt on the job?
on the job = 1 officially trained = 2

DE. do you hold a post in the union or works council right now? yes = 1 no = 2

A 2.3 Questionnaire: union members of GTB South-East (Summer 1994)

I. JOB SATISFACTION

Here are some statements about the working conditions at your current workplace. Do you agree?

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

1. All in all our work situation is better today than in the former socialist enterprise	1	2	3	4	5
2. "Capitalist" enterprises treat their employees more fairly than did former "socialist" enterprises	1	2	3	4	5
3. In the socialist enterprise workers were not exploited	1	2	3	4	5
4. Today workers are exploited here	1	2	3	4	5
5. In the old times you could still trust your supervisors	1	2	3	4	5
6. Today I don't have any trust in my supervisors	1	2	3	4	5
7. I am dissatisfied with how hard I have to work now	1	2	3	4	5
8. I am paid a fair wage	1	2	3	4	5
9. I am constantly worried about loosing my job	1	2	3	4	5

2. PACE OF WORK

A. Here are some reasons why in many enterprises people are working harder since '89. What do you think regarding your workplace?

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

- | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Management exploits us, taking advantage of the devastating employment situation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| 2. It's not so much management's fault, as the introduction of market economy which inevitably increases work pressures | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. The workforce does not offer enough resistance to management's strategies | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. Our works council is not powerful enough to negotiate better working conditions | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

B. Is there something you personally can do to improve working conditions?

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

- | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I cannot do anything, because otherwise I will risk losing my job | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. I have to act together with my workfellows because only collective action by all of us will help | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. Works council has to deal with it, it's not our responsibility | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

3. JOB SECURITY

A. Here are some explanations for the loss of jobs in East Germany. In your view how important is each reason for your plant?

	not at all important / not important/ no view/ important/ very important				
1. lack of demand for our products	1	2	3	4	5
2. lack of support by politicians and Treuhand for the textile industry	1	2	3	4	5
3. incompetent management	1	2	3	4	5
4. not enough effort from the workers	1	2	3	4	5
5. wages being too high	1	2	3	4	5
6. workforce doesn't show enough solidarity with colleagues who are made redundant	1	2	3	4	5
7. works council is not opposing management strategies strongly enough	1	2	3	4	5
8. GTB not putting enough pressure on employers	1	2	3	4	5

B. If the company decided to cut some jobs in your department, what would you personally do to improve your own job security?

	strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree				
1. I cannot do anything	1	2	3	4	5
2. I would try everything not to attract any negative attention	1	2	3	4	5
3. I have to work better than my workfellows	1	2	3	4	5
4. I have to act together with my colleagues	1	2	3	4	5
5. I have to support more actively works council and GTB	1	2	3	4	5
6. I would look for another job	1	2	3	4	5
7. it's the task of works council not of us workers to do something	1	2	3	4	5

4. PAY LEVEL

A. Here are some reasons for the lower level of wages in EastG compared to the West.
Do you agree?

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. East German employers take advantage of the current labour market situation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. The GTB is not doing enough to foster the adjustment of East German wage level | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. the politicians are the ones to blame | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

B. What are you prepared to do to improve the pay level in the textile industry?

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I cannot do anything. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. I would take part in demonstrations/rallies during collective bargaining | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. I would go on strike during collective bargaining | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. strikes are an effective means to strengthen the union during collective bargaining | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5. with company bargaining we are better off than with industry level bargaining | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. I would prefer to negotiate my pay individually with my employer | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

5. GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING WORKS COUNCIL AND GTB

A. General questions:

- | | | |
|--|-------|------|
| 1. Did you vote in the recent works council election? | 1 yes | 2 no |
| 2. Are you or have you been a member of the works council? | 1 yes | 2 no |
| 3. Are you a union official? | 1 yes | 2 no |
| 4. Were you an active member of the BGL?
(former union) | 1 yes | 2 no |

B. Do you agree with the following statements? (again tick the number which best represents your opinion)

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5. the old BGL represented my interests better than today's GTB and works council | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. we don't need a works council since management cares enough for us | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. I can solve my work problems with my supervisor alone, I don't need the works council for that | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. Works council and GTB will only be effective if they get active support from the workers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9. I will attend the next works council assembly | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10. if asked I would have stood for the works council election | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. if asked I would serve on a committee for the GTB | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. I constantly try to recruit new members for the union | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 13. I seriously think about quitting the GTB in the future | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

6. YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNION (GTB)

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

1. I feel a sense of pride in being a member of the GTB	1	2	3	4	5
2. I would remain in the union, even if I were unemployed	1	2	3	4	5
3. I don't see myself as a union activist	1	2	3	4	5
4. I feel strong ties with the other union members (in my plant)	1	2	3	4	5
5. I share the aims and values of the union	1	2	3	4	5
6. Union solidarity is very important for me	1	2	3	4	5

7. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. company name (you don't have to answer): _____
2. how long have you been working for this company? _____
3. are you: 1 blue collar worker 3 white collar
 2 supervisor 4. other (please specify) _____
4. age: 1 [< 30years] 2 [30—40 years] 3 [41-50 years] 4 [> 50 years]
5. gender: 1 female 2 male

8. SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING YOUR WORK GROUP IDENTITY

strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree

1. I would like to change my workgroup	1	2	3	4	5
2. I increasingly feel isolated in my group	1	2	3	4	5
3. I identify strongly with my group	1	2	3	4	5
4. in the old days (GDR) group solidarity was much better	1	2	3	4	5
5. I accept group decisions also if I am different opinion	1	2	3	4	5
6. I prefer to work in groups than alone	1	2	3	4	5
7. in general problems are better solved in groups than alone	1	2	3	4	5
8. Only those who depend on themselves at work get ahead	1	2	3	4	5

A 2.4 Interview guideline: 15 sewers of Bodywear (Summer 1994)

A. GDR times

1. can you describe your former relationship to your supervisor, plant director, company director?
2. how was overtime arranged in former times? was it negotiated, between whom, any specific regulations? how did you manage to fulfill the "target norm"?
3. did you trust your workcolleagues?
4. if you had a workplace problem, whom did you consult?
5. were there any incidences of "industrial unrest", stoppage of work?
6. did you feel "powerless" / deprived of power today compared to former times?
7. what happened exactly in October/November 1989 in the firm? Strike against directors? Any demands by the workforce (only against Stasi/SED or also for more employee participation?)

B. current times: grievances

1. Do you have any actual problems at your work? What was the last grievance you had?
2. what do/did you do? what would you have done in a similar situation in former times? is this a personal or collective problem?
3. whose fault was it?

C. current times: work group

1. how many work groups do you have in the firm? (definition of groups as workgroups or shifts?)
2. if the firm would announce redundancies, e.g. 10% of the current 700 employees: where (department, workplaces) do you think it would be easy to cut back jobs?
3. if the redundancy would also concern your work group, what would you do? —> if answered: individual reaction —> 2. Question: could you not act together? advantages/disadvantages of collective action
4. how much do knitters/dyers/sewers earn in average? Was this difference in wages already in former times?

A 2.5 Interview guideline: 10 sewers of Bodywear (Summer 1994)

A. introduction

1. how long have you worked for Bodywear?
2. how do you like your work at the moment?
3. what has mostly changed at your workplace after unification?

B. working for Trikotwear (GDR)

4. what do you miss from your former work?
5. what meaning did the brigade had for you? (group identity/solidarity)
6. more specific information on brigade life: how large was your brigade? how was the collegiality within your brigade? what events did you organize? who organised? how much influence did the brigade had over working conditions (e.g. work distribution, saturday work,...)? what did you do when you has a problem? (grievance handling)
7. what was the BGL for you? And the Party? (union identity, grievance handling)
8. how was your relationship to your supervisor? (them-us, passive strength)
9. how was your relationship to the directors? (them-us)

C. turnaround/ "Wende"

10. what kind of hopes, expectations did you had in autumn 1989?
11. what happened with the directors?
12. how was the works council installed?

D. work today

13. how is the atmosphere in your group today?
14. what happend with group collegiality? —> more precise (helping, egoism, what do you do, what do your colleagues do, meeting after work,...)
15. can you think of reasons why solidarity is decreasing? how do you feel about this?
16. how is your relationship to your supervisor?
17. do you feel you are treated fairly? more fair than before?
18. how is your relationship to directors? do you think they are competent?
19. what meaning does the works council have for you? what are they doing? ...
20. are you union member? what is your relationship to the union? what are they doing?...
21. what are you doing now if you have problems?
22. do you like working? if you had enough money would you continue working? would you leave Bodywear if you could find somewhere else a job for more money?
23. do you think you have more participation in work decisions today than before?
24. do you think the layoffs could have been avoided? how?
25. your opinion to saturday work?

E. life today

26. where do you live? (village, city)
27. what do you do in your free time? how do you organise your private life in terms of seeing friends etc.? did it change after the unification? family problems, unemployment in surrounding (e.g. social identity, security = "Verwurzelung")
28. comparsion before - today: if you draw a balance: do you have more advantages or disadvantages in post-1989 compared to pre-1989? Are you more happy now than before?...
29. how do you see your future?

A 2.6 Significance tests of items of the questionnaires of Bodywear and in GTB firms

T-tests were conducted to determine if the means of the two unrelated groups of a variable differ.²⁵⁸ Age and union membership were analysed in the Bodywear survey. Gender, age, blue/white collar, works council membership and former BGL activists were analysed in the GTB survey.

2.6.1 t-tests of age groups at Bodywear

Are there statistically significant differences between the age-groups (item DC) in regard to all items? All four age groups ("under 30s", "31-40", "41-50", "over 50s") were tested. Comparing the youngest group ("under 30s") with the oldest group ("over 50s") yielded the most significant differences and will be reported here.

M1 = mean (arithmetic) of age-group 1

M2 = mean (arithmetic) of age-group 2

(Likert scale: 1=disagree — 5=agree)

table: comparison between M1= "under 30s" and M 2 ="over 50s"

no		M 1 ("under 30s")	M 2 ("over 50s")	2-tailed probability p<=0.05
B	increase in quality of work	4.00	4.53	.034
F	decreasing solidarity of co- workers	3.36	4.33	.000
K	capitalist firm is more fair	2.87	3.74	.004
O	proud to work for Bodywear	3.00	4.03	.000
Q	trust in supervisors today	3.74	3.03	.018
V	Bodywear treats workforce fairly	2.93	3.62	.021
X	"no time for a chat anymore"	4.30	4.74	.050
Y	"feeling alone"	2.72	3.44	.039
AN	works council fosters our interests well	2.83	3.91	.000
AT	participation in works council election	3.44	4.50	.000
AV	visiting works council assembly	3.70	4.62	.001
BF	I am working class	3.17	4.00	.034
BH	union membership	1.61	1.24	.002
BS	stay member also if unemployed	1.83	2.94	.005
CK	instrumentality of collective activities	4.13	2.88	.000

²⁵⁸ T-tests were used due to the non-categorical nature of the variables.

2. t-tests of union membership at Bodywear

Are there significant differences between union members and non-union members (item BH) with regard to all items?

M1 = mean (arithmetic) of group 1 (= union members)

M2 = mean (arithmetic) of group 2 (= non union members)

(Likert scale: 1= disagree — 5=agree)

no		M1 (members)	M2 (non members)	2-tailed probability $p \leq 0.05$
J	You have the constant fear to get sacked	4.46	4.12	.016
Z	I am not very interested in my colleagues	2.46	2.07	.016
AN	The works council sofar has put forward workers' interests very well	3.48	3.03	.008
AT	I will intend the next works council election	3.92	3.46	.010
AV	I will attend the next works councils' assembly	4.31	3.99	.044
BA	As a union member you are discriminated by your supervisor	1.75	2.05	.049
BE	If the unions would not exist the East German employment situation would look even worse	3.57	3.12	.014
BF	I regard myself as a member of the working class	3.80	3.26	.017
BG	Did you resign membership of the old union (FDGB)?	1.63	1.36	.003
BP	Union makes the workforce more powerful	3.70	2.12	.000
BU	Not belonging to the union is anti-social	1.35	0.84	.000
BV	Guess how many of Bodywear's workforce are union members?	3.05	1.86	.000
CC	Did you consult the works council with a problem during this year?	1.61	1.77	.021
CN	"Bischofferode" (mining strike) is everywhere and if the union would call a strike I would participate	3.68	2.75	.000
CQ	who represents your interests concerning job security	2.23	2.81	.028
CR	who represents your interests concerning pay level	1.70	2.35	.040
CY	In general: "it is frequently argued that the East Germans will remain second class citizens for quite a while"	4.26	3.86	.480
DC	age distribution	2.30	1.88	.004

3. t-tests of blue/white collar workers in GTB firms

Are there significant differences between blue and white collar workers (item BI) with regard to all items?

M1 = mean (arithmetic) of group 1 = blue collars

M2 = mean (arithmetic) of group 2 = white collars

(Likert scale: 1= disagree — 5=agree)

no		M 1 (blue collars)	M 2 (white collars)	2-tailed probability (p<=0.05)
AN	I prefer individual pay negotiations	2.47	1.98	.013
AU	I can solve my problems alone, don't need works council	1.96	1.45	.000
BD	I don't see myself as a union activist	3.67	4.07	.031
BJ	age	2.47	3.00	.000
G	dissatisfied with pace of work	3.57	3.04	.019
M	works council not powerful enough to negotiate better working conditions	3.46	2.85	.002
O	I have to participate in collective action to improve working conditions	4.00	3.63	.049
Q	lack of demand for products causes job losses	3.14	2.58	.006
S	incompetent management causes job losses	2.72	2.18	.006
T	not enough effort by workforce causes job losses	2.01	2.45	.020
W	works council is not opposing management enough and this causes job losses	3.17	2.67	.013
Z	not to attract negative attention = strategy for job security	3.99	3.47	.010

4. t-tests of gender in GTB

Are there significant differences between male and female workers (item BK) with regard to all items?

M1 = mean for group 1 = females

M2 = mean for group 2 = males

(Likert scale: 1= disagree — 5=agree)

no		M 1 (females)	M 2 (males)	2-tailed probability ($p \leq 0.05$)
AE	task of works council to act in order to secure jobs, not our duty	3.82	3.35	.008
AG	unions not doing enough to foster wage adaptation	4.00	3.68	.041
AP	males more likely to be member of works council	1.76	1.61	.009
AY	I would serve on a committee for union	2.16	2.53	.022
BO	group solidarity was better before	4.22	3.77	.008
C	no exploitation in former times	3.53	3.06	.004
E	no trust in supervisors today	3.23	2.74	.001
J	management takes advantage of economic situation and this causes increase in work pace	4.22	3.87	.013
L	workforce not resistant enough against management= reason for job losses	4.22	3.81	.006
N	I cannot do anything because I risk my job	3.94	3.56	.019

5. t-tests of age in the GTB firms

Are there significant differences between the youngest and oldest age group (item BJ) with regard to all items?

M1 = means of group 1 = <30 years

M2 = means of group 4 = >50 years

(Likert scale: 1=disagree — 5=agree)

no		M 1 ("under 30s")	M 2 ("over 50s")	2-tailed probability ($p \leq 0.05$)
AD	I would look for another job if my job is at risk	3.29	2.54	.007
AF	management takes advantage of labour market situation	3.94	4.42	.018
AI	I cannot do anything to increase wages	3.14	3.94	.001
AL	strikes are an effective means to increase wages	4.00	4.41	.029
AW	I will attend next works council's assembly	4.23	4.60	.043
BH	years in employment	1.97	3.36	.000
BK	gender	1.12	1.28	.024
BR	groups are better problem solver	3.89	4.33	.047
N	I can't do anything because I would risk my job	3.56	4.27	.001
O	I've to act collectively in order to improve working conditions	4.25	3.76	.024
BF	I share the aims and values of the union	3.62	4.35	.003

6. t-tests of works councillors in the GTB firms

Are there significant differences between works council members and "normal" union members (item AP) with regard to all items?

M1 = means of group 1 = works council member

M2 = means of group 2 = not works council member

(Likert scale: 1=disagree — 5=agree)

no		M 1 (works council member)	M 2 (not council member)	2-tailed probability (p<=0.05)
AC	I've to support actively works council/ union	4.36	3.89	.000
AE	it is task of works council to act, not of us workers	3.31	3.84	.001
AG	the union doesn't do enough to foster wages	3.58	4.07	.002
AI	I cannot do anything against wage level	3.21	3.69	.004
AQ	union official	1.72	1.98	.000
AR	active in BGL	1.71	1.87	.002
AS	BGL represented us better	2.28	2.82	.001
AU	I can solve problem alone without works council	1.52	2.03	.000
AW	I will attend next works council assembly	4.76	4.30	.000
AX	I would stand for a works council post	3.92	2.55	.000
AY	I stand for post in union	2.82	2.03	.000
AZ	I try to recruit members	3.08	2.24	.000
BD	I don't see myself as union activist	3.02	4.00	.000
BE	I have strong ties with other union members	3.48	3.05	.004
BK	gender	1.36	1.22	.009
BP	I accept group decisions	4.24	3.96	.021
BS	depend on yourself -> get ahead in life	2.88	3.37	.005
E	former supervisors you could trust in	2.88	3.18	.041
H	I have fair wage	1.46	1.72	.016
I	I worry about job	3.95	4.37	.006
M	works council not powerful enough	3.15	3.50	.044
N	I can't do anything to improve working conditions	3.50	4.00	.002
P	works council has to act, not us	3.41	3.96	.001
T	not enough effort by workforce	1.78	2.11	.019
W	works council not oppsing management enough	2.79	3.26	.004
Y	I can't do anything for job security	3.42	3.99	.001
Z	I should not attract any negative attention	3.63	3.98	.024

7. t-tests of former BGL activists in the GTB firms

Are there significant differences between former BGL activists and non activists (item AR) with regard to all items?

M1 = means of group 1 = active = BGL official
 M2 = means of group 2 = not active
 (Likert scale: 1= disagree — 5=agree)

no		M 1 (BGL activist)	M 2 (non activist)	2-tailed probability (p<=0.05)
AA	to work better than my fellows	3.33	3.77	.016
AC	I have to support works council/union	4.27	3.97	.033
AD	look for another job	2.60	3.06	.015
AE	works council's task not of wf to act against job insecurity	3.28	3.80	.009
AM	company bargaining better than industrial bargaining	2.29	2.65	.047
AN	prefer individual pay negotiation	2.07	2.45	.023
AP	works council member	1.57	1.78	.001
AQ	union official	1.78	1.94	.005
AV	works council/union need collective support	4.63	4.22	.001
AX	attend next works council assembly	3.29	2.81	.024
AZ	I recruit new members	2.86	2.39	.009
BA	I think about leaving union	1.86	2.31	.005
BH	seniority	3.29	2.99	.039
BJ	age	2.82	2.53	.013
BS	only relying on yourself —> get ahead in life	2.30	3.33	.006
C	no exploitation in former times	3.11	3.50	.039
P	works council has to act, not us against pace of work	3.46	3.89	.026
S	incompetent management = reason for job losses	2.19	2.74	.001
Z	I should not attract any negative attention	3.49	3.96	.013

A 3 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 11

A 3.1 Factor analysis for the items of the workforce questionnaires of Bodywear and GTB

A factor analysis for all question items of the two questionnaires was conducted at first, yet not surprisingly it did not reveal any usable results.²⁵⁹ The items were then put into "clusters" representing the variables/concepts (e.g. job dissatisfaction) according to the theoretical assumptions (see chapter 7). Factor analysis was conducted in the principal component form and the orthogonal (varimax) rotation was applied, which produces factors which are unrelated or independent of each other²⁶⁰. Besides, the items were checked for their positive and negative wording and were sometimes recoded. The factors were computed with the means function of the correlating items each multiplied by their factor loading. This method is used in order not to lose all missing values through a factor analysis. The missing values are substituted by the means of the items. This procedure has well recognized dangers but the pattern of occasional missing values meant that there would sometimes be a significant loss of observations if it were not done. Two measures of reliability were used. Firstly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)²⁶¹ measure was used to test the sampling adequacy, thus indicating whether the items are belonging together by

²⁵⁹ A factor analysis for all 109 items of the Bodywear questionnaire (see appendix A 2) did not come up with a usable result. 33 factors were developed, which together explained 71.6 % of the total variance (the first, with an Eigenvalue of 10.3 explained 9.9 % of the variance).

Factor variables (only factor loadings over 1.50)

- 1 CJ, CN, CM, AY, BP, CK, CY, BE, BD, CH, CP
- 2 AH, S, AE, Q, Y, T
- 3 BH, BI, BR, BJ, BS, BM, BT

A second attempt used 70 items which were selected on a more factual basis. 18 factors developed which together explained 62.6 % of total variances (the first factor has an Eigenvalue of 8.7 and explained 12.5 % of total variances).

Factor variables (only factor loadings over 1.50)

- 1 CJ, BD, CH, BB
- 3 B, D, K
- 4 BR, BT, BS
- 5 CK, CM

²⁶⁰ The results were double-checked with the oblique rotation, which assumes that the factors are correlated, yet no significant differences were found.

²⁶¹ The KMO is based on an "anti-image correlation matrix" and is defined as an index for comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients (Norusis 1990: B-128-9).

examining the underlying correlation matrix (see Backhaus et al. 1994:205). It serves to indicate whether factor analysis is usefully to be applied or not. "Small KMO values indicate that a factor analysis of the variables may not be a good idea since correlations between pairs of variables cannot be explained by the other variables" (Norusis 1990: B-128-9). KMO-values should be above .50.²⁶² Secondly, the internal reliability (consistency) of the factor items was tested with the Cronbach's alpha coefficient which should be as a general rule above .60.

A 3.1.1 Factor analysis at Bodywear

Factor analysis was conducted for the dependent variable, participation and for each of the six independent variables.

1. Factor Analysis of participation items

Out of the six items of participation (see chapter 7) five items were used for factor analysis²⁶³. Factor analysis (table 1) resulted in two dependent variables, which will be called "low intensity" and "high intensity" participation.

table 1: factors of participation

		(partA1) <u>low intensity</u> <u>participation</u>	(mpartA1) <u>high intensity</u> <u>participation</u>
AT	willingness to attend next works council's election	.83	.11
AV	willingness to attend next works council's assembly	.82	.04
AU	willingness to stand for works council's election	.15	.52
BOnew	visiting union events	.18	.75
CN	willingness to go on strike	-.17	.70

(rounded up to two digits, F1 = Factor 1), KMO = .55, cumulated percentage of variance: 55.6
 low intensity participation (AT, AV): eigenvalue: 1.61621 (% of variance = 32.3), alpha = .5897 (standardized alpha = .5970);
 high intensity participation (AU, BOnew, CN): eigenvalue: 1.16279 (% of variance = 23.3), alpha = .3634 (standardized alpha = .3679)

²⁶² In the .90s marvelous; in the .80s meritorious, in the .70s middling; in the .60s mediocre and in the .50s miserable but still acceptable (see Kaiser et al. 1974:111)

²⁶³ Question (BT) "I am not a very active and loyal union member" was excluded. As mentioned before this question is not really measuring "activity", but people's perception of their activity.

2. Factor analysis of perceptions of instrumentality

There are 17 questions dealing with collective instrumentality, of which 13 questions are in Likert scale and direct measures of the concept²⁶⁴. Factor analysis was firstly conducted for all 13 items, yet the result proved impossible to interpret. Two separate analyses were then conducted for the items of works council/ union instrumentality (table 2), and of instrumentality of collective activities (table 3). The first factor analysis revealed four interpretable factors. There is a clear distinction between evaluation (instrumentality) measures of the union and the works council.

table 2: factors of perceptions of instrumentality

		tu.n.i.1 <u>negative</u> <u>evaluation</u> <u>of union</u>	tu.p.i.1 <u>positive</u> <u>instrumenta</u> <u>lity of</u> <u>union</u>	wc.n.i.1 <u>negative</u> <u>instrumenta</u> <u>lity of</u> <u>works</u> <u>council</u>	wc.n.ne1 <u>no</u> <u>necessity of</u> <u>works</u> <u>council</u>
BB	union has not done a lot at this place here	.77	.10	.18	-.13
BC	unions' pay policy only worsens economic situation and risks jobs	.63	-.25	-.13	.35
BD	union works more for West German members than for us	.70	.00	.22	.00
BE	without unions East German employment situation would look worse	.23	.76	-.20	-.07
BP	union makes workforce more powerful	-.25	.75	.06	.07
ANnew	works council has put forward workers interests very well	.05	-.42	.49	.06
CI	waste of time to consult works council, they are not interested in my problems	.26	-.05	.65	.29
CJ	works council wants to help but has no power	.07	.03	.80	-.08
AQ	former BGL (shopfloor branch of FDGB) was better in representing our interests	.32	.37	.16	.52
AS	don't need a works council, mgt cares enough for workers	-.11	-.09	.05	.87

(rounded up to two digits, F1=Factor1), KMO = .64, cumulated pct of variance = 60.6
 negative evaluation of union (BB, BC, BD): eigenvalue = 2.24533 (pct of variance = 22.5), alpha: .5521, standardized: .5519
 positive instrumentality of union (BE, BP): eigenvalue = 1.58104 (pct of variance = 15.8), alpha: .5188, standardized: .5188
 negative instrumentality of works council (BOnew, CI, CJ): eigenvalue = 1.17720 (pct of variance = 11.8), alpha: .5127, standardized: .5101
 no necessity of works council (AQ, AS): eigenvalue = 1.05977 (pct of variance = 10.6), alpha: .2232, standardized: .2251

²⁶⁴ Excluded are items: CC, CL, AO, CH.

The second factor analysis revealed one factor, instrumentality of collective activities. The factor is difficult to interpret, since one item is negatively worded. This item (CM) was reworded, yet resulted into a factor with a negative alpha coefficient and was therefore unacceptable. Thus, the single items was used instead. CM is representing (negative) instrumentality of collective activities in an extreme situation, whereas CK and also AR represents instrumentality of collective activities on shopfloor level respectively with regard to the works council.

table 3: factor of instrumentality of collective activities

		Factor 1
AR	works council is only as strong as they get supported by workers	-.63
CM	If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker you cannot do anything against it.	.55
CK	improvements at workplace only possible through collective action of all colleagues	.63

(rounded up to two digits), KMO = .52, eigenvalue = 1.08911 (cumulated pct of variance = 36.3), no rotation)

3. Factor analysis of union identity

There are seven questions on union identity, out of which the four questions which directly measure the concept were utilized in the factor analysis.

table 4: factor of union identity

		(tuiden.1) <u>union identity</u>
BR	important for me to belong to the union	.86
BS	I would also stay in the union if working short term or becoming unemployed	.83
BU	not belonging to the union is "anti-social"	.14
BQnew	I tell my friends that I am in the union	.52

KMO = .56, eigenvalue = 1.70411 (cumulated pct of variance = 42.6), no rotation, alpha: .5092, standardized: .4793

4. Factor analysis of workgroup identity

Workgroup identity was examined by 12 questions, all of which were used in the first factor analysis but without interpretable factors. Step by step items were deleted till finally two usable factors emerged.

table 5: factors of workgroup identity/ collectivism

		(gr.n.sol) <u>decreasing group</u> <u>solidarity</u>	(gr.indiv.1) <u>individualism/</u> <u>isolation</u>
AE	Formerly group solidarity was much better.	.81	.06
AH	Formerly solidarity of whole workforce was better	.90	.06
AI	Job insecurity makes people egoistic	.67	.34
AC	I rather fight for my interests alone than rely on my colleagues' support.	.23	.58
Y	feel isolated	.43	.56
Wnew	can rely on my colleagues	-.11	.85

(rounded up to two digits, F1=Factor1), KMO = .70, cumulated pct of variance = 60.8
 decreasing group solidarity (AE, AI, AH): eigenvalue = 2.52894 (pct of variance = 42.1), alpha: .7684, standardized: .7704
 individualism/isolation (AC, Y, Wnew): eigenvalue = 1.12059 (pct of variance = 18.7), alpha: .4872, standardized: .4884

5. Factor analysis of them-and-us feelings

All ten questions were used in the factor analysis, which resulted in three factors. The item "R" got two very similar factor loadings and it was decided to incorporate it into the factor "them-us" feelings rather than into company identity, being aware of the resulting high intercorrelation of the two factors (-.43).

table 6: factors of them-and-us feelings

		(themus.2) <u>them-us (today)</u>	(coiden.A2) <u>company identity</u>	(genjudA2) <u>capitalism better</u>
P	real partnership between management and workforce not possible due to different interests	.64	-.05	.01
Q	you can never really trust your supervisor	.61	-.35	-.06
S	formerly supervisors were on the side of the workers, today they are on mgt side	.77	-.11	-.03
T	formerly all were working together to fulfill the quota, today there is more a "them-us" atmosphere	.77	-.04	-.15
U	management takes full advantage of current labour market situation	.63	-.42	.08
R	workers here are exploited	.52	-.57	.10
O	proud to work for Bodywear	-.11	.83	.12
V	Bodywear will always try to treat its workers in a fair way	-.15	.82	.12
AJ	In general: an "individualistic" social system where everybody has the chance to lead a better life than others, but also has the risk of failing, is better than a "collectivist" social system, where all have equally mediocre life chances.	-.06	-.08	.80
K	capitalist firm is more fair, because only performance criteria count.	-.01	.26	.69

(rounded up to two digits, F1= Factor1), KMO = .79, cumulated pct of variance = 59.3
 them-us today (P, Q, S, T, U, R): eigenvalue= 3.57816 (pct of variance =35.8), alpha: .8024, standardized: .8022
 company identity (O, V): eigenvalue = 1.28337 (pct of variance = 12.8), alpha: .7016, standardized: .7031
 general judgement (K, AJ): eigenvalue = 1.06420 (pct of variance = 10.6) , alpha: .2852, standardized: .2872

6. Factor Analysis of perceptions of information flow between representative institutions and workforce

Out of the eight questions dealing with the information flow, five questions were used for the factor analysis (the rest were not Likert-scaled) and produced two factors. One factor represents people's interest in information of the interest institutions and also actively "giving" information to them, whereas the other looks at people's evaluation of how much information they "receive". The first factor could thereby be a very preliminary indicator for people's perception of *common* interests.

table 7: factors of information flow

		(g.info.1) <u>interest in</u> <u>information</u>	(r.info.1) <u>receiving</u> <u>information</u>
AL	our group keeps works council informed about what happens at our workplaces	.77	.03
AM	work of works council is frequent topic of our chats	.77	.02
AZ	our group often discusses union issues	.62	.21
AKnew	sufficiently informed about works council's work	-.03	.81
AX	well informed about work of the union	.22	.74

(rounded up to two digits), KMO = .63, cumulated pct of variance = 57.5

interest in information (AL, AM, AZ): eigenvalue = 1.79309 (pct of variance = 35.9), alpha: .5624, standardized: .5612

receiving information (AKnew, AX): eigenvalue = 1.08241 (pct of variance = 21.6), alpha: .3568, standardized: .3568

There are eight questions on the perceived changes of the work organisation, which are not used as antecedents. Out of the six remaining questions dealing more directly with people's perceptions of the changes, five were selected for factor analysis (one was not possible since it was not Likert scaled). Two factors emerged. Pay (dis) satisfaction is thereby so strong that it stands as a single item.²⁶⁵

table 8: factors of job dissatisfaction

		(jobsati2) <u>job</u> <u>dissatisfaction</u>	(CF) <u>pay</u> <u>satisfaction</u>
A	work load and pressure to perform heavier today than before	.60	-.21
G	formerly we had more control when and how we worked	.62	.06
I	formerly work was also fun, today you work only for money	.74	-.25
J	constant fear to loose job	.72	.18
CF	my current pay is justified	-.03	.96

(rounded up to two digits, F1 =factor1), KMO = .66, cumulated pct of variance = 57.5

job dissatisfaction (A, G, I, J): eigenvalue = 1.84883 (pct of variance = 37.0), alpha: .6108, standardized: .6245

pay satisfaction (CF): eigenvalue = 1.02420 (pct of variance =20.5)

²⁶⁵ Pay dissatisfaction in the GTB survey is part of them-and-us feelings. This was also tried here but without success.

A 3.1.2 Factor analysis at GTB

Factor analysis was conducted for the dependent variable and for each of the five independent variables (see chapter 7).

1. Factor analysis of participation items

All seven questions on participation were put into the factor analysis. Two factors emerged.

table 9: factors of participation

		(admpart2) <u>self-initiated</u> <u>participation</u>	(occpart2) <u>organised</u> <u>participation</u>
AJ	willingness to take part in demonstrations during collective bargaining	.27	.79
AK	willingness to go on strike during coll. bargaining	-.06	.84
AW	willingness to attend next works council assembly	.16	.54
AX	willingness to stand for works council election	.80	.17
AY	willingness to serve on a union committee	.86	.16
AZ	constantly recruiting new members	.71	.06

KMO = .67; cumulated percentage of variance: 61.1,
administrative participation (AX, AY, AZ): eigenvalue = 2.41960 (Pct of variance = 40.3), alpha .7257 (standard. = .7311)
occasional participation (AJ, AK, AW): eigenvalue = 1.24642 (Pct of variance = 20.8), alpha = .5909, standard. = .5871)

2. Factor analysis of perceptions of collective instrumentality

All nine questions on collective instrumentality were put into factor analysis. The emerging three factors resemble the factors of the Bodywear survey, which were however slightly more detailed.

table 10: factors of collective instrumentality

		(tu.inst.b) <u>negative</u> <u>instrumentality</u> <u>of union/works</u> <u>council</u>	(works councilinst.b) <u>no necessity of</u> <u>works council</u>	(cainst.b) <u>instrumentality</u> <u>of collective</u> <u>activities</u>
AT	don't need works council, management cares enough for workers	-.06	.83	.08
AU	can solve problems alone, don't need a works council	.08	.74	-.30
AS	BGL was better than works council/union	.20	.50	.25
AV	union/works council need active support of workers	-.13	.03	.76
AL	strikes are a effective means during collective bargaining	.10	-.12	.55
W	works council is too weak to oppose management	.83	.00	-.22
X	union provide not enough pressure on employer	.79	-.06	.23
M	works councils are not powerful enough to negotiate better agreements	.69	.16	-.22
AG	union doesn't do enough for wage adaptation with West Germany	.64	.13	.24

KMO = .62; cumulated pct of variance = 56.3

specific instrumentality of union/works council (X, W, M, AG): eigenvalue = 2.34748 (pct of variance= 26.1), alpha = .7314, standardized alpha = .7299

general instrumentality of works council (necessity) (AT, AU, AS): eigenvalue = 1.59963 (pct of variance= 17.8), alpha = .4774, standardized alpha = .5084

instrumentality of collective action (AV, AL): eigenvalue = 1.11591(pct of variance = 12.4), alpha = .2303, standardized alpha = .2313

3. Factor analysis of union identity

There are six items in the questionnaire dealing with union identity, four were selected.²⁶⁶ One factor was produced, as happened with slightly different items in the Bodywear survey.

table 11: factor of union identity

		(tuiden2) <u>union identity</u>
BE	feeling of strong ties with other union members	.74
BF	share aims/values of union	.82
BG	union solidarity is very important for me	.82
BB	feeling of pride being a union member	.65

KMO = .72, no rotation; union identity (BB, BE, BF, BG): eigenvalue = 2.32296 (pct of variance = 58.1), alpha = .7488, standardized alpha = .7560

4. Factor analysis of workgroup identity

Factor analysis was conducted for all eight items, which produced an incomprehensible result. Five items were selected (BS, BM, BO was left out) and one item, BL, was reworded (the alpha coefficient for the factor [BL, BN] was negative). The two factors are different to the Bodywear factors (which did not manage to produce a factor of group identity as such).

table 12: factor of workgroup identity and collectivism

		(grcoll.b) <u>collectivism</u>	(griden.b) <u>workgroup identity</u>
BP	accept group decisions	.42924	.35140
BQ	prefer to work in a group	.77833	.00734
BR	problems better solved in a group	.81866	.07971
BN	identify strongly with group	.27808	.62151
BLnew	I do not want to change my workgroup.	-.12447	.83813

KMO = .61; cumulated pct of variance = 55.4;
 collectivism (BP, BQ, BR): eigenvalue = 1.72086 (pct of variance = 34.4)), alpha = .5133, stand. alpha = .5141
 group identity (BN, BLnew): eigenvalue = 1.05082 (pct of variance = 21.0) alpha = .2935, stand. alpha = .2979

²⁶⁶ Two items have a double meaning (BA, BO) in that they could stand for identity-oriented or instrumental attitude towards union, and were excluded.

5. Factor analysis of attribution

A factor analysis was conducted for all 11 items of external and internal attribution, which did not reveal an interpretable result. Two separate factor analyses were conducted, one for external and one for internal attribution. The analysis of external attribution produced three factors, two of those did not make any sense. A new factor analysis for the one remaining factor "external attribution" was conducted and the factor was computed with these new loadings (see brackets). The analysis for "internal attribution" revealed two factors.

table 13: factors of external attribution

		(exatt.b) <u>external attribution:</u> <u>politics/</u> <u>management</u>	Factor 2	Factor 3
J	management makes us work harder: advantage of labour market situation	.65 (.69)	.22	.04
R	lack of support of politicians/ Treuhand	.46	.05	.51
AH	politicians causing lower wage level	.69 (.66)	-.19	.16
AF	low wages due to management	.74 (.73)	.08	-.15
Q	job losses due to lack of demand for products	-.05	.75	.33
S	bad management to be blamed for job losses	.15	.79	-.25
K	market competition causes job losses	-.06	.00	.81

KMO = .59; cumulated pct of variance: 58.8; attribution to politics/management (J, AH, AF): eigenvalue = 1.79127 (pct of variance = 25.6), alpha = .4322, standardized alpha = .4635; Factors 2, 3 make no sense (pct of variances: 17.6, 15.6)

table 14: factors of internal attribution

		(atteff.b) <u>internal attribution:</u> <u>lacking workers'</u> <u>effort</u>	(attsol.b) <u>internal attribution:</u> <u>lacking solidarity of</u> <u>workforce</u>
T	job losses due to lacking effort of workforce (too lazy)	.69	.14
U	job losses due to high wages	.79	-.11
L	heavy work load due to lacking collective resistance of workforce	-.18	.86
V	job losses due to lacking solidarity among workforce	.41	.64

KMO = .52; cumulated pct of variance: 62.1; internal attribution to lack of individual effort at work (T, U): eigenvalue = 1.37650 (pct of variance = 34.4), alpha = .3245, standardized alpha = .3552; internal attribution to lacking solidarity among workers (L, V): eigenvalue = 1.10810 (pct of variance = 27.7), alpha = .3081, standardized alpha = .3093

6. Factor analysis of general job issues

Since the questionnaire asked them-and-us feelings and job satisfaction in one section (in contrast to the Bodywear survey) the factor analysis incorporated all nine "job related" items. The item H was reworded in Hnew, in order to render the alpha reliability positive. Four factors evolved. Except the division between general and specific job dissatisfaction and the factor former trust, all factors resemble similar factors at Bodywear. The items were put together in one factor analysis (in contrast to Bodywear) since they formed a group in the questionnaire. (However conducting the factor analysis separately for the two groups, dissatisfaction and them-us/trust, revealed the same factors.)

table 15: factors of general job issues

		(gensatb) <u>general job</u> <u>satisfaction</u> (comparative)	(dissat.b) <u>specific job</u> <u>dissatisfaction</u> (today)	(ftrust.b) <u>former trust</u> <u>relations</u>	(themus.b) <u>current them-us</u>
A	overall work situation is better than before	.82	-.12	-.11	-.03
B	capitalist firms treat workforce better than socialist firms	.84	-.07	-.07	-.09
G	dissatisfied with work load today	-.14	.68	-.07	.18
I	worried about job security today	-.11	.72	.05	-.23
F	don't trust supervisor today	.05	.57	.23	.39
C	formerly workforce was not exploited	-.02	-.05	.82	.09
E	formerly you could trust supervisor	-.17	.13	.76	-.00
Hnew	I am not paid a fair wage	-.13	-.13	-.10	.78
D	today workforce is exploited	-.00	.28	.15	.63

KMO = .65; cumulated pct of variance: 61.0

general job satisfaction compared with former times (A, B): eigenvalue = 2.10404 (pct of variance = 23.4), alpha = .6381, standardized alpha = .6424

specific job satisfaction (G, F, I): eigenvalue = 1.18214 (pct of variance = 13.1), alpha = .4290, standardized = .4316

trust relations (them-us compared with before) (C, E): eigenvalue = 1.14835 (pct of variance = 12.8), alpha = .4935, standardized alpha = .4937

current them-us (exploitation) (Hnew, D): eigenvalue = 1.05974 (pct of variance = 11.8), alpha = .2635, standardized alpha = .2642

A 3.2 Correlation of all antecedents of the Bodywear survey

table 16: intercorrelations of all antecedents used in Bodywear (29 variables) (2-tailed significance, *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01; 291 cases)

variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.
1. participation in w. council activity																		
2. participation in union events (BO)	.06																	
3. participation in strike (CN)	.19**	.13*																
4. negative union instrumentality	.21**	.17**	.13*															
5. negative w council instrumentality	.13*	.22**	.47**	.35**														
6. pos. evaluation of w. council work (AN)	.45**	.05	.11	.19**	.06													
7. positive union instrumentality (BP)	.29**	.42**	.34**	.12	.21**	.28**												
8. no necessity of w. council (AS)	.17**	-.06	.02	.18**	.14*	.02	-.04											
9. pos instrumentality of coll. action at shopfloor (CK)	.15**	.27**	.40**	.19**	.54**	.09	.32**	.04										
10. neg instrumentality of coll. action (CM)	.18**	.22**	.43**	.20**	.50**	.17**	.22**	-.01	.51**									
11. union identity	.25**	.41**	.34**	.18**	.23**	.20**	.63**	.02	.14*	.19**								
12. workforce solidarity	-.00	.01	.10	.17**	.22**	-.04	.03	-.05	.10	.15*	.07							
13. unhappy with workgroup (AA)	-.08	.01	.17**	.15**	.25**	-.02	-.04	.03	.07	.10	.06	.12*						
14. solidarity with colleagues (AB)	.01	.04	.09	.03	.10	-.02	.16**	.10	.11	.03	.06	.04	.13*					
15. individualistic attitude (AC)	.01	-.05	.08	.03	.16**	-.03	.00	-.01	.00	.10	-.05	.34**	.20**	.16**				
16. isolation in group (Y)	-.04	.01	.09	.15**	.24**	-.04	-.00	.06	.08	.12*	.17**	.42**	.21**	.05	.23**			
17. reliable colleagues (W)	.03	-.03	-.05	-.01	-.03	.09	-.01	.04	-.04	-.00	-.08	.06	.04	.14*	-.05	-.18**		
18. them-us	.01	.06	.21**	.24**	.32**	-.11*	.03	-.02	.13*	.20**	.15*	.36**	.19**	-.03	.25**	.47**	-.14*	

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.
19. company identity	.20	.03	-.08	-.03	-.09	.25**	.14*	.10	.01	.06	.08	-.01	-.19**	.18**	-.01	-.09	.08	-.13*
20. job dissatisfaction	-.09	.05	.03	.11	.13*	-.01	.05	-.06	.13*	.10	.07	.37**	.14*	-.00	.17**	.29**	-.01	.36**
21. pay dissatisfaction (CF)	.13*	.11	.11	.03	.14*	.18**	.10	.12*	.19**	.15*	.09	-.07	-.03	-.01	-.02	-.06	-.02	-.14*
22. insufficient information of works c. (AK)	.19**	.17**	.16**	.34**	.25**	.03	.12*	.16**	.09	.14*	.15*	.17**	.09	.02	.10	.05	-.04	.19**
23. informing the w. council (AL)	.26**	.06	.16**	.07	.05	.38**	.10	-.01	.08	.11	.07	.02	-.01	-.10	-.10	.02	.18**	.13*
24. discussing union issues (AZ)	.32**	.07	.09	.27**	.13*	.26**	.19**	.06	.13*	.14*	.16**	-.06	.03	.05	.01	-.03	-.01	-.01
25. informed by union (AX)	.33**	.10	.16	.28**	.13*	.28**	.25**	.14*	.15**	.11	.23**	-.10	-.05	-.01	-.08	-.04	.02	-.05
26. age (DC)	.33**	.10	.17**	.08	.19**	.28**	.20**	.08	.14*	.28**	.23**	.03	-.10	-.07	.04	.07	-.07	-.04
27. union member (BH)	.11	-.02	-.07	.25	.11	-.03	-.20**	.11	.16**	.08	-.33**	-.01	.04	-.06	.01	.00	.13	.01
28. earnings (DA)	.13*	.14*	.29**	.09	.35**	.12*	.10	-.04	.37**	.25**	.08	.03	.01	-.03	.02	-.01	-.01	.06
29. qualification (DD)	.13*	.11	.29**	.11	.32**	.12*	.20**	-.03	.32**	.27**	.15*	.02	.02	.00	-.00	-.05	.03	.00

	19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.
20. job dissatisfaction	-.13									
21. pay dissatisfaction (CF)	.22**	-.08								
22. insufficient information of w. council (AK)	-.08	.10	-.08							
23. informing the w. council (AL)	.05	-.03	.02	.10						
24. discussing union issues (AZ)	.06	.03	.12*	.05	.22**					
25. informed by union (AX)	.17**	-.04	.30**	-.02	.15*	.40**				
26. age (DC)	.21**	-.02	.23**	-.03	.13*	.16**	.14*			
27. union member (BH)	.04	.01	.16**	.08	.11	.07	.23**	.00		
28. earnings (DA)	.04	-.01	.27**	.06	.19**	.09	.10	.43**	.19**	
29. qualification (DD)	.05	.01	.10**	.05	.15**	.07	.02	.43**	.14*	.55**

A 3.3 Item-based regression of the GTB survey

table 17: Predicting administrative participation and three items representing occasional participation:
standardized regression coefficients of 34 variables

<i>Independent variables</i>	<i>h. D.</i>	<i>administrative participation (admpart1)</i>			<i>participation in demonstration (AJ)</i>			<i>participation in strike (AK)</i>			<i>attending w.council assembly (AW)</i>		
		T	Sig	T	Beta	T	Sig	T	Beta	T	Sig	T	Beta
specific instrumentality of w.council/ union (tuinstr1)	+	-.405	.686	-.025		-.928	.3541	-.0557		.026	.980	.001	
no necessity of w.council (AT)	-	-.628	.531	-.036		.449	.654	.025		.857	.392	.044	
BGL better than w. council (AS)	-	-.131	.896	-.007		-1.917	.056	-.102		-2.448	.015	-.120	
coll. support for union/w.council (AV)	+	1.112	.267	.062		-1.237	.217	-.067		-1.636	.103	-.081	
instrumentality of strike (AL)	+	.902	.368	.050		6.887	.000	.368		12.47	.000	.615	
union identity (tuident1)	+	3.043	.003	.178		2.944	.004	.168		1.284	.200	.068	
group identity (BN)	+	1.479	.140	.080		-.053	.958	-.003		-.933	.351	-.046	
collectivism: groups better (BR)	+	1.288	.199	.073		.435	.664	.024		.365	.715	.019	
collectivism: accept group decisions (BP)	+	-.132	.895	-.008		1.739	.083	.097		1.214	.226	.063	
happy with my group (BLnew)	+	-2.336	.020	-.123		-2.46	.015	-.126		-.358	.721	-.017	
no trust in supervisor (F)	+	.269	.788	.016		1.176	.241	.068		.209	.835	.011	
formerly no them-us feelings (C)		-.428	.669	-.023		-.006	.995	.000		.030	.976	.002	
former trust in supervisor (E)		1.135	.257	.066		1.038	.300	.059		.345	.730	.018	
dissatisfaction with pay (Hnew)	+	-1.001	.318	-.058		-1.369	.172	-.077		-.673	.501	-.035	
them-us today (D)	+	-.235	.814	-.013		.214	.831	.011		.946	.345	.046	
ext. attribution to mgt (J)	+	.083	.934	.006		.972	.332	.067		.726	.468	.046	
ext. att: politicians (AH)	+	.105	.917	.006		-.781	.435	-.042		1.305	.193	.066	
ext. attribution: mgt (AF)	+	1.293	.197	.071		2.216	.028	.119		.894	.372	.044	
int. attribution: lacking work effort (T)	-	-.497	.620	-.027		-2.719	.007	-.141		-1.684	.093	-.081	
int. att.: high wages (U)	-	.005	.996	.000		-2.351	.019	-.122		-1.059	.291	-.051	
int. att.: lacking resistance (L)	-	-.177	.860	-.011		-.401	.689	-.024		-1.304	.193	-.071	
int. att.: lacking solidarity (V)	-	.406	.685	.022		.746	.457	.039		.939	.349	.046	

general job satisfaction (jobsatig) -	.643	.521	.036	.668	.505	.037	.904	.367	.046	.321	.749	.019
dissatisfaction with work load (G) +	2.174	.031	.126	-1.850	.065	-.104	-.642	.521	-.033	.315	.753	.020
dissatisfaction with job security (I) +	.355	.723	.019	1.084	.279	.057	1.276	.203	.062	.862	.390	.050
gender (1=female, 2=male) (BK)	2.286	.023	.124	-.079	.937	-.004	-.304	.761	-.015	-2.242	.026	-.130
blue/ white collar (1= blue, 2 = white) (BI new)	-2.336	.020	-.123	-.626	.532	-.034	-1.258	.210	-.063	1.308	.192	.078
works council member (1= yes, 2= no) (AP)	-6.412	.000	-.352	-3.070	.002	-.163	-.544	.587	-.027	-2.798	.006	-.163
age (BJ)	-.233	.816	-.012	-1.300	.195	-.067	-.780	.436	-.037	1.048	.295	.059

(* = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$)

admpart1: Rsquare (adj.) = .26564; standard error = .77194; F = 4.89171 (SigF = .00); AJ: Rsquare (adj.) = .30736; standard error = 1.05169; F = 5.72824 (SigF = .00); AK: Rsquare (adj.) = .40241; standard error = 1.00945, F = 8.24486 (SigF = .00); AW: Rsquare (adj.) = .15515; standard error = 1.08591; F = 2.97567 (SigF = .00)

A 3.4 Regression of antecedents of GTB

table 18: Predicting four antecedents of the GTB survey: standard regression coefficients for 17 variables

<i>Independent variable</i>	<i>instrumentality of collective action (cainst.b)</i>	<i>union identity (tuident2)</i>	<i>external attribution (exatt.b)</i>	<i>specific job dissatisfaction (dissat.b)</i>
negative instrumentality of works council/union (tuinst.b)	-.053	-.184**	.229**	.113
no necessity of works council (wcinst.b)	-.051	-.140**	-.118*	-.021
instrumentality of coll. action (cainst.b)	./.	.178**	.140**	.104
union identity (tuident2)	.198**	./.	.034	.083
collectivism (grcoll.b)	.156**	.183**	-.015	-.019
work group identity (griden.b)	-.002	.094	-.037	-.110*
former trust (ftrust.b)	-.011	.055	.036	.081
current them-us (themus.b)	-.039	.039	.128*	.025
external attribution (ex att.b)	.166**	.037	./.	.098
int. attribution: lacking effort (att eff.b)	-.027	.060	-.079	.127*
int. attribution: lacking solidarity (att sol.b)	.012	.056	.157**	.109
general job satisfaction (gensat.b)	-.006	-.059	-.129*	-.147**
specific job dissatisfaction (dissat.b)	.112	.080	.088	./.
gender (1=female, 2=male) (BK)	.043	-.016	.039	-.130*
blue/white collar (1=blue, 2=white) (Blnew)	.033	-.004	.006	-.134*
w. council member (1= yes, 2= no) (AP)	.008	-.056	-.057	.013
age (BJ)	.039	.196**	.002	.004

(* = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$)

instrumentality of collective action: Rsquare (adj.) = .12097 (standard error: .55606), residual = 323, F = 3.91577 (Sig F = .000);

union identity: Rsquare (adj.) = .21244 (standard error: .59922), residual = 323, F = 6.71527 (Sig F = .000);

external attribution: Rsquare (adj.) = .26214 (standard error: .49961), residual 323, F = 8.52742 (Sig F = .000);

specific job dissatisfaction: Rsquare (adj.) = .18478 (standard error: .53804), residual= 323, F=5.80242, sigF=.000

In the case of *Bodywear* regressions were conducted using the most important antecedents as dependent variables. Overall, the analysis of *Bodywear* did not reveal too many interrelations between its antecedents, which might be due to the item-based nature of the equations. The factor-based GTB regression seemed more rewarding. However, a major result was the association between items of instrumentality and of social identity. In more

detail: With regard to "*low intensity participation*" two factors, an instrumentality measure (BC) and "interest in union information" (AZ) were used as dependent variables.²⁶⁷ Union identity (BQnew) was a major antecedent for instrumentality (BC) and the information variable revealed an insignificant equation. With regard to the three measures of "*high intensity participation*", regressions were conducted for all major antecedents of the three factors. However, "standing for works council election" and "visiting union events" produced only associations with factors of the same concept or insignificant equations. With regard to "*joining a strike*" several significant correlations emerged. Pay dissatisfaction (CF) was influenced by information (AX), the information item was influenced by pay dissatisfaction (the more people think their pay is justified the more they perceive being well informed by the union) and union identity, and the instrumentality item (BB) was influenced by another instrumentality item and by a measure of group identity (Z).²⁶⁸

²⁶⁷ Instrumentality: Rsquare (adj.)=.15747 (standard error= 1.14308), residual= 129, F=3.86573 (sigF=.0002); information: Rsquare (adj.)=.03111 (standard error=1.02549), residual=129, F=1.49232 (sigF=.1573).

²⁶⁸ The items tested were BB, BD, Z, CF, AX. BB: Rsquare (adj.)=.19156 (standard error=1.12270), residual=144, F=5.02809 (sigF=.000); BD: Rsquare (adj.)=.17310 (standard error=1.10215), residual=144, F=4.55873 (sigF=.000); Z: Rsquare (adj.)=.06823 (standard error=1.27241), residual=144, F=2.24493 (sigF=.00223); CF: Rsquare (adj.)=.13191 (standard error=1.28745), residual= 144, F=3.58321 (sigF=.0005); AX: Rsquare (adj.)=.13388 (standard error=1.18660), residual=144, F=3.62777 (sigF=.0004).

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