

WOMEN IN TWO NATIONS AND FOUR STATES :
A Comparative Study of the Impact of Political Regimes
and Culture on the Status of Women
in the two Koreas and the two Germanies, 1945-89.

Miryang Youn

The London School of Economics and Political Science
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WOMEN IN TWO NATIONS AND FOUR STATES :
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by Miryang Youn

Submitted for a Doctor of Philosophy Degree
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THESIS

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Abstract

Communist regimes have claimed that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation. They maintain that sexual inequality can only be abolished as part of the broader socialist transformation through pulling women into the paid labour force. If the communist claim is true, women in communist regimes should be equal regardless of their cultural tradition, while women's position in communist regimes should be higher than in capitalist regimes.

However, women's experiences in communist regimes revealed that their position varies from country to country and region to region, revealing the influence of culture in a variety of guises. In this respect, the former two Germanies and the two Koreas provide a rare chance of a cross-regime and cross-cultural comparative study.

Germany and Korea have maintained distinct cultures different from their neighbours. The traditions of the two nations ran into revolutionary changes and discontinuities in the wake of their division into communist and capitalist regimes. The communist regimes of Germany and Korea advocated women's emancipation through making women part of the working class. Their achievements and failures compared with their severed national halves constituted a laboratory situation for the test of the communist claim. In this thesis, the communist claim is tested through the comparison of women's positions in the four countries, in all aspects of social life: under the law, in the

education system, at work, in the family and in politics.

The novel contribution of the thesis is its cross-cultural and cross-regime analysis, measuring the impact of the state on women's emancipation, taking into account different cultural impediments. It contributes to the development of feminist analyses of the state and culture, adding empirical evidence to theoretic arguments.

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I would like to thank my sister, my brother-in-law and my niece. I have never seen anybody who has sweeter sister and brother-in-law than mine. They were the reservoir of my strength. Love you all.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. 1 Women, Paid Work,¹ and Emancipation

The collapse of communist regimes while producing political freedom in some cases also led to many casualties. One noticeable instance in some countries seemed to be feminist advocacy of women's participation in paid work outside the home. Since their inception, communist regimes claimed that communism alone could emancipate women through making women the working class. They insisted that they provided a paradigm of women's emancipation: a social order which guaranteed women's full employment and equal access to the labour market, which offered full-time child care from birth to adolescence, and which regarded combining paid employment and family life as the normal pattern of a woman's everyday life, not as a special problem nor as an achievement against the grain of socio-economic realities (Kolinsky, 1991). Legislation in communist regimes indeed supported their claim, guaranteeing the principle of equal pay for equal work, and providing equal opportunities at work and education, and in some cases, preferential treatment for working mothers. Although there were many variations among communist regimes the core communist

¹ In this thesis, the terms 'work', 'labour force', and 'labour force participation' imply that those are 'paid'. Women have always participated in the labour force of any society, albeit mainly in the unpaid one. Since women's unpaid work is work, too, I should add the word 'paid' to the terms 'the labour force' or 'labour market' and so on. However, following the common usage of those words, I omit the epithet 'paid' in this thesis. Wherever labour or work participation is mentioned, it means the paid one, unless otherwise stated.

framework for achieving women's emancipation was the same — women's participation in paid work. Women's labour participation thus constituted *the necessary and sufficient condition* of women's emancipation.

Despite the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation, there have been persistent criticisms of inequality between the sexes in communist regimes. Women in communist regimes shouldered the double burden of paid work and unpaid domestic work. Men hardly shared the responsibility of household chores and child-care. Even in paid work, women faced discriminatory practices in work assignments and promotions, as well as wage differentials between the sexes. Traditional gender relations were still alive in most communist regimes, with different patterns and shapes following their cultural traditions. Additionally, despite the similarly high level of women's labour participation among communist regimes, women's rights in statutes and women's educational advances varied country by country. Women's equal participation in the labour force did not in reality bring about full sexual equality. Therefore, many feminists became sceptical about communist regimes. Their enhancement of women's positions was condemned as tokenism or as a disguised form of exploitation of women. This led some to question whether women's labour participation has any relevance in achieving sexual equality (Einhorn, 1991).

Two questions arise from the comparison of communist and capitalist regimes: (i) did communist regimes by mobilising women into the paid labour force change gender relations, or, emancipate women? and, (ii) did cultural traditions hinder

communist efforts to emancipate women? The purpose of this thesis is to answer these two questions.

1. 2 Feminist Analyses of Women's Emancipation

Despite the scepticism about the achievement of communist regimes, existing feminist theories, except radical feminism, have broadly accepted the view that women's labour participation is a necessary condition of women's emancipation. Although the feminist claim of sameness between the sexes during the 1970s has been watered down by many feminists' subsequent acceptance of difference between the sexes, the sexual division of labour is still rejected, and women's equal labour participation still advocated.

Many feminists have argued that women's work at home has been under-valued, and that high status comes of being thought to hold a high position on a scale which is highly regarded. This leads to the conclusion that it is *unjust* to restrict women's work within the home or to specific women's jobs (Richards, 1980). Socialist feminists conceptualize the "*gendered category of the division of labour*", or the sexual division of labour, as the essential and fundamental characteristic of both patriarchal and capitalist oppression of women. They point out that gender stereo-typing of activities has been persistent in human society, and label this division of labour as the intersection of two sets of social forces: capitalism and patriarchy (Young, 1981; Mackintosh, 1981). A research report provides a clear picture of

labour segregation in OECD countries, pointing out that women have been concentrated in less-paid, low-valued jobs (Bakker, 1988). Similarly, many feminists' cross-cultural research concerns whether, and how, economic development alters the preexisting sexual division of labour (Reinharz, 1992, p.115).

Radical feminists by contrast reject this view and insist that without fundamental change the dominant patriarchal socio-economic paradigm will continue to exert itself and retain structural inequality.

1.2.1 Liberal Feminism and Women's Rights

Liberal feminism assumes that women suffer injustice because of their sex (Richards, 1980, p.11). Liberals organize campaigns for equality and redistribution between men and women: equal pay; equal civil rights; equal access to education, health and welfare; and equal access to the democratic political process. The political rights of liberalism are redefined to include equal opportunity for women as well as men. Early liberalism accepted the separation between the private and the public and the separation between the home and society, and assumed women's place to be in the home, given women's lesser rationality (Jaggar, 1983, pp.28-33; Z. Eisenstein, 1981, pp.33-35, pp.56-59). By contrast, modern liberal feminists question the separation of two realms and stress women's equal rationality (Richards, 1980; Z. Eisenstein, 1981). They demand equal opportunity with regard to every sphere of society irrespective of sex. Liberal feminists can be found wherever women fight for health, work, education, legal rights, decent housing, and an

improved standard of living for women in general.

As women's enfranchisement was a condition for equality in the political sphere, women's participation in the labour force is a condition for freeing women from economic dependence and inability. Harriet Taylor argued that the institution of marriage could be made equal only if: (i) a woman, by virtue of her employment, has a real chance to remain husbandless; and (ii) once married, she has the confidence and sense of entitlement that come from contributing materially to the support of the family (Tong, 1989, p.19). In her discussion of "the problem that has no name," Friedan (1963) advised women in the United States to work outside the home. Liberal feminists argue that in patriarchal society women are supposedly only suited for certain occupations —e.g., teaching, nursing and clerking— and are seen to be largely incapable of other tasks —e.g., ruling, preaching and investing. They claim that this type of gender stereotyping is unjust and must be remedied. The liberal feminist rejection of different sex-roles is to a great extent based on the assumption of the sameness of men and women in terms of human rationality. Rejecting the ideas of either biologically or psychologically determined "female sex-role," Kanter argues that the fate of women is inextricably bound up with organizational structure and processes in the same way that men's life-at-work is shaped by them (Kanter, 1977, p.9).

Liberal feminists focus on the equality and liberty of women, in particular, equal opportunity to engage in paid work outside the home and, hence, the economic independence of women. They have also paid increasing attention to equal opportunity

within work and in access to promotion, as a desirable route to the women's liberation (Z.Eisenstein, 1981; Kanter, 1977). Although their emphasis on legal reforms and institutional changes was open to the criticism of accepting the patriarchal nature of the state,² their demands for equality have been acceptable to many men and women, inducing many legal reforms in many countries. Their programme can thus be considered to represent mainstream feminism.

1.2.2 The Marxist Theory of Women's Emancipation

After Engels formulated the idea of antagonism between men and women in monogamous marriage and the "first class oppression" of the female by the male (Engels, 1884), most Marxist analyses of "the woman question" have attempted to include women in the working class and to understand women's oppression as another aspect of class oppression. For Marxists, the notion of class is the key to understanding all social phenomena, including the phenomenon of women's oppression. Early Marxists argued that capital and private property are the cause of women's oppression just as capital is the cause of the exploitation of workers in general. Therefore, women's liberation requires: (i) that women become wage-workers like men; and (ii) that they join with men

² Initially, the four groups of feminists were easily discernible by their language. Liberals demanded *women's rights, liberty, and equal opportunity*, while radicals invariably attacked *patriarchy*. Socialist feminists attacked *capitalism and patriarchy* equally, but marxists blamed *capital, or capitalism* as the true oppressor of women. Recent development and interaction among feminists have blurred these linguistic differences. Many liberals have accepted the patriarchal nature of the state, capital's interest in women's oppression, and the difference between the sexes, biologically and psychologically.

in the revolutionary struggle against capitalism. Contemporary Marxist analysis continues this early Marxist position and incorporates women into the analysis of everyday life in capitalism (Zaretsky, 1976). According to Zaretsky, women are labouring for capital, not for men. There are two reasons for the common misunderstanding that women are working for men privately in the home: (i) *the separation of home from work place*; (ii) *the privatization of housework brought about by capitalism*. According to this perspective, recognizing capitalism as the root of their problem, men and women should fight against capital and not against each other. Other Marxist feminists focus on the relation of housework to capital. For example, Dalla Costa (1973) argues that what is socially important about housework is its necessity for the reproduction of capitalism. She proposes that women demand wages for housework. All these Marxist analyses focus on the struggle against capital and try to include 'the woman question' into this theoretical structure. They lead to the conclusion that women's participation in labour outside the home is the way to emancipation.

1.2.3 Socialist Feminism: Dual Systems Theory

While traditional Marxist approaches consider the woman question as another aspect of class oppression, socialist feminists suggest what has been called "dual systems theory" (Young, 1981; Walby, 1990).³ Socialist feminism originated from

³ "Dual systems theory" refers to two systems of oppression, capitalism and patriarchy, by that socialist feminists have subsequently enlarged the analysis by incorporating other oppressive systems such as racism, imperialism or heterosexuality (Jaggar, 1983; Walby, 1990).

Marxism. However, they rejected the "unhappy marriage of Marxism and feminism" (Hartmann, 1981).⁴

A defining feature of socialist feminism is that it attempts to interpret the historical materialist method of traditional Marxism so that it applies to the sex/gender issues made visible by radical feminists. To revise Juliet Mitchell's comment,⁵ it uses a feminist version of the Marxist method to provide feminist answers to feminist questions. In the socialist feminist analysis, capitalism and patriarchy are inextricably intertwined. Consequently the abolition of any of these systems of domination requires the end of all of them. They believe that an adequate account of "*capitalist patriarchy*" requires the use of the historical materialist method developed originally by Marx and Engels. In investigating the fundamental causes of women's oppression, socialist feminists have developed a conception of the material base as the set of social relations which structures the production and reproduction of the necessities of daily life, the production of people, including sexual relations, as well as the production of goods and services. To socialist feminists, these relations simultaneously express capitalist and patriarchal

⁴ Hartmann describes the separation of Marxism and feminism in her article "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union" by beginning with this declaration (Hartmann, 1981, p.2): "The marriage of Marxism and feminism has been like the marriage of husband and wife depicted in English common law: Marxism and feminism are one, and that one is Marxism. Recent attempts to integrate Marxism and feminism are unsatisfactory to us as feminists because they subsume the feminist struggle into the "larger" struggle against capital. To continue our simile further, either we need a healthier marriage or we need a divorce."

⁵ Mitchell (1971, p.99) writes "We should ask the feminist questions, but try to come up with Marxist answers."

male domination, and both aspects must be changed to liberate women (Jaggar, 1983, p.332).

However, socialist feminists have confronted the criticisms that pointed out the cleavage within its theoretical framework between two systems of capitalism and patriarchy. To develop a single theory out of a materialist base and a feminist view, they needed a bridge to connect capitalism and patriarchy. Jaggar (1983) identified "alienation" as the concept that can unify the theoretical cleavage within the dual systems. She argues that socialist feminist explorations reveal the ways in which women are alienated as sexual beings, as mothers and as wives. To analyze the contemporary oppression of women in terms of the concept of alienation is to link that oppression inevitably with capitalism. It is to deny that "patriarchy" is an unchanging trans-historical and cross-cultural universal and to assert instead that the subordination of women takes different forms in different historical periods. The alienation of contemporary women is an historically specific feature of capitalism as is the fetishism of commodities, the rise of positive science, and especially the separation of home from workplace, accompanied by the characteristic split between emotion and reason, the personal and the political. Similarly, Young (1981) believes that feminists who wish to avoid the pitfalls of the dual systems approach to capitalist patriarchy need to develop a new core concept for Marxist theory. She suggests that the "gendered category of division of labour" or sexual division of labour has the conceptual power to transform Marxist feminist theory into socialist feminist theory.

While traditional marxism has taken the abolition of class as its explicit goal, socialist feminism makes an explicit commitment to the abolition of both class and gender. Socialist feminists conceptualize the material base of society to include both the mode of reproduction as well as the mode of production. To abolish class and gender, they propose (Jaggar, 1983):

- (i) the transformation of sexuality and reproduction;
- (ii) the abolition of the existing wage system that disregards the monetary value of housework; and
- (iii) the development of independent women's organizations to further these aims.

One distinctive feature of socialist feminism is its emphasis on democracy. It has argued that it is necessary to institute not only democratic control of the economy, as traditionally construed, but also democratic control of procreation — i.e., socialization of child-rearing, education and so on. However, they have not shown clearly how more genuine democratic practices can be instituted.

1.2.4 Radical Feminism: Rejecting Patriarchy

Radical feminists reject women's labour participation as meaningless unless the male-dominated cultural and socio-economic system itself changes. Radical feminists take the subordination of women as their central concern. Under the slogan of "the personal is political," they deny the distinction between the political and the personal: every area of life is subject to "sexual politics" (Millet, 1977). Radical feminism focused directly on women's relation to men as politically problematic. It brought sexuality and reproduction into the political arena and transformed women's political consciousness (Ramazanoglu,

1989, p.12).

Radical feminists conceptualize men and women as opposing classes. Within the sex class system, the ruling class is known as "*the patriarchs*," or, in Mary Daly's conception, "*the Planetary Men's Association*" (Daly, 1973); a system characterised by power, dominance, hierarchy, and competition (Tong, 1989). Patriarchy, in their terminology, means the manifestation and institutionalisation of male dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society as a whole (Lerner, 1986). Patriarchy is named as the prevailing religion of the world (Daly, 1978) that sustains the class division of sex: men as the oppressing class, women as the oppressed. Even though men dominate women universally, they do so through a variety of social structures which vary tremendously both across and even within cultures. Marxists say women work in reality for capital despite appearances. Radical feminists, on the contrary, hold the view that women work for men, both in appearance and in reality. Men have a vested interest in the work women do.

Radical feminists have searched for a single overriding source of male power over women (e.g., Millet, 1977; Daly, 1978). This ahistorical view of patriarchy raises very directly issues of biological reductionism and conceptions of the innate essence of being male and being female, which lead the radical feminists to emphasize sexuality (MacKinnon, 1982, 1989; Ramazanoglu, 1989). Sexuality is conceived as a far broader social phenomenon, as no less than the dynamics of sex as social hierarchy

(MacKinnon, 1989).⁶ MacKinnon (1982) points to the role of sexual harassment in the workplace and indeed suggests that "labour is to marxism as sexuality is to feminism." They argue not only that sexuality is socially constructed, though not entirely, but also that female sexuality has, throughout history, become systematically constructed in relation to male dominance (Ramazanoglu, 1989, p.64).

For many radical feminists, but not all, the institution of heterosexuality is a central institution of patriarchy (Walby, 1990; Daly, 1977; MacKinnon, 1989). Some radical feminists argue that it is the most important base of patriarchy. Within heterosexual relations women serve men, emotionally and materially, as well as sexually. Women support men more than men support women. Men sexually objectify women, reducing them to mere sexual objects. Male dominance is sexual, and the male sexual role centres on aggressive intrusion on those with less power. Male-dominated forms of sexuality reach into many areas, not merely the conventionally sexual. The form of control of women through sexuality has changed, but it is neither a simple reduction in degree, nor merely a substitution of one form of control for another equally pernicious (Walby, 1990, p.127). In this sense, the most radical feminists question the norm of heterosexuality and demand, in Firestone's words, "the

⁶ Much has been made of a supposed distinction between sex and gender. Sex is thought to be the more biological, gender the more social; the relation of each to sexuality varies. However, radical feminists deny the distinction. As race becomes ethnicity within a system of racial inequality, sex becomes gender within a system of sexual inequality. Both are social and political in a system that does not rest independently on biological difference in any respect (MacKinnon, 1989, p.xiii).

elimination of the sex distinction itself" (Firestone, 1971). They believe that all existing societies have marginalized and exploited women through the sex-distinction. To radical feminists, women's oppression does not consist primarily in the lack of equal job opportunities or in exclusion from full participation in the public world. Instead, radical feminists see women as oppressed primarily in so-called intimate relations: in sexual and procreative relations, in the home, and more generally in that sphere of life that the male culture defines as personal. They argue that, so long as women are excluded from socially powerful activity, whatever activity women do will reinforce their powerlessness, because women are doing it. And so long as women are doing activities considered socially valueless, women will be valued only for the ways they can be used (MacKinnon, 1989, p.80).

Radical feminists propose several ways to free women from the cage of femininity. These proposals range from working towards an androgynous culture in which male and female difference is minimized, or completely eliminated (Firestone, 1971), to replacing male culture with female culture. Similarly, radical feminists propose several ways to enable women to escape from the sexual domination of men. These range from transforming the institution of heterosexuality so that neither men nor women play a dominant role to rejecting heterosexuality in favour of celibacy, autoeroticism, or lesbianism (Tong, 1989, p.95).

To pursue these goals, they require separate political organizations in order to formulate their own demands and to ensure that those demands are taken seriously. Though this

separatism may be partially necessary, or healthy (Tong, 1989; Jaggar, 1983), total separatism is open to the criticism that women will destroy patriarchy by confronting it, not by isolating themselves from it (Tong, 1989, p.126).

1. 3 Purpose of The Study

It has been a claim of communist regimes that they, and they alone, can bring about the full emancipation of women. They maintain that the abolition of sexual inequality can only be achieved as a part of the broader socialist transformation through pulling all women into the paid labour force. Many feminists who compared capitalist with communist states in terms of women's economic conditions have pointed out significant differences in the economic indicators between socialist and capitalist societies, in favour of the former societies, even if they criticised the lack of democratic institutions in these societies. State intervention seemed to bring about sexual equality, or at least greater sexual equality than in capitalist societies.

However, women's experiences in communist regimes revealed the persistent influence of cultural impediments, which delimited women's activities within traditional female spheres, or women's occupations within traditional female jobs. Women's disproportionate responsibilities for household chores and child-care also confirmed that women were still subordinate to men in the family. Further, despite the similar level of women's labour

participation in communist regimes, women's advances in society differed from country to country. Among capitalist democracies, a predominantly Catholic society is less likely to adopt progressive ideas, including the idea of sexual equality, than other societies (Kaplan, 1992, p.54). Similarly, communist countries with a Confucian tradition confronted the hard task of dissolving the familial bond which had presided over all other social bonds. Therefore, apparently similar devices to effect radical reforms including changes in gender relations brought about different results among communist regimes.

These uneven results among communist regimes prompt the following two questions: how much change can be delivered by the state, in particular, by communist regimes? And, what obstacles to institutional change are expected in different cultural traditions? The purpose of this study is, therefore, to provide empirical evidence about whether, or to what extent, communist regimes in practice emancipated women, or changed gender relations; and whether, or to what extent, cultural traditions hindered the effort to effect changes in gender relations. By answering the questions, this study could also establish which of the four feminist theories is most sound in reality.

1.3.1 Political Regimes and Culture

Feminist analyses of communist regimes have so far concentrated on the East European countries, including former East Germany and to some extent on developing countries —e.g., Nicaragua and Yemen. These regional analyses have mainly focused on the achievements and failures of communist regimes,

irrespective of cultural hindrances. On the other hand, many feminists compared the living conditions of women in the GDR and the FRG, to some extent simply applauding women's advances in East Germany. These regional studies and comparisons between the former two Germanies fell short of analysing the impact of political regimes with a full understanding of cultural varieties among communist regimes.

In this respect, the comparison of the former two Germanies and the two Koreas should provide an insightful example of the impact of political regimes with the cultural difference controlled. Germany and Korea have been maintained as distinct nations different from their neighbours. Although their histories have similarly shown a patriarchal and submissive culture within their respective domains, their specific restrictions of women's activities have differed considerably. While women in Germany were subject to the restriction of activities within the Three Ks —i.e., women's duties with regard to children, kitchen, and church— women in Korea were confined at home under the Rule of the Three Obediences —i.e., obediences to the father, to the husband, and to the eldest son. Domestification of women was stricter in Korea than in Germany.

The traditions of the two nations ran into revolutionary changes and discontinuities in the wake of their division into communist and capitalist regimes. East Germany and North Korea, on the one hand, were at liberty to abolish the economic foundation of class division and to mobilize women to participate in production in accordance with their new Marxist foundations. West Germany and South Korea, on the other hand, kept their

traditional order even if South Korea experienced some transformations in introducing a capitalist market economy. These political divisions and their impact have made significant differences to the status of women between East and West Germany, and between North and South Korea. Yet, not only between East and West Germany, but also between East Germany and North Korea there have been considerable variations in women's position in society. If the differences between the former two Germanies and between the two Koreas could be explained as the impact of political regimes, the differences between the two communist regimes must be attributable to cultural difference.

Therefore, these four countries can give us an incisive example of cross-cultural, cross-country analysis with a very small number of cases —i.e., four. This is not to say that there has been no such cross-country or cross-cultural analysis of the status of women. Many feminists have undertaken cross-country analyses, yet with an overwhelming focus on Western European nations (Lovenduski, 1982; Jenson et.al., 1988; Dominelli, 1991; Kaplan, 1992). Although these studies have paid some attention to cultural differences, their concern has been limited to Christianity. Other feminists, notably Robin Morgan (1984), have done cross-cultural analyses to explore how women's lives in seemingly disparate societies actually have much in common (Reinharz, 1992, pp.109-125). However, existing cross-cultural, cross-country analyses have focused either on public policy or on cultural specificity. They have not yet questioned how specific cultures respond to a regime trying to deliver changes in gender relations with more universally-oriented political

perspectives. The cross-cultural, cross-country analysis of the four countries chosen here permits a two-dimensional analysis of cultural and political effects on women's emancipation.

1.3.2 The Two Hypotheses of the Study

The two questions under review can be restated as two hypotheses:

Hypothesis One. Women's positions are equal among communist and capitalist regimes, regardless of the political system.

Hypothesis Two. Women's positions are equal among the communist regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.

Hypothesis One is tested by measuring the differences between the former two Germanies and between the two Koreas. Hypothesis Two is tested by measuring differences between the two communist regimes and between the two capitalist regimes. In order to test the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation, Hypothesis One need to be rejected, and Hypothesis Two accepted. If Hypothesis One is accepted, the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation can not be accepted, since there is no regime difference. If both hypotheses are rejected, the communist claim can not be accepted either, because communists claimed the universal relevance of their pledge, and attributed women's oppression to capital alone. The rejection of Hypothesis Two would prove the existence of causes of women's oppression other than capital. This result, rejecting both hypotheses, could partially support socialist feminism, because the difference between communist and capitalist regimes may be attributed to capital, whereas the difference between the

communist regimes could be attributed to differences in patriarchy. Yet, both liberal and radical feminism can also be seen to be supported, because liberal feminism has not attributed women's oppression to a single social cause, and because radical feminism has been sceptical about the claim that the state can deliver fundamental changes in the position of women. However, these hypotheses can reject Marxist feminism, even if they are inconclusive about the other feminisms.

1. 4 Data and Methodology

The methodology of this study comprises two sequential steps. In the first step, descriptive sociological surveys on women's position in the four states are carried out, and in the second step, a comprehensive comparison of the four countries is performed.

1.4.1 Methods and Data for the Sociological Surveys

In the first step of this study, an individual sociological survey is carried out country by country. This sociological survey includes the political and the historical and cultural background of each country. Yet, greater emphasis is placed on five interrelated aspects in accordance with the emphases of feminists analysis;

- (i) Legislation for Sexual Equality;
- (ii) Women's Educational Achievements;
- (iii) Women's Economic Conditions;
- (iv) Women between Paid Work and the Family;
- (iv) Women's Political Representation.

Legislation for Sexual Equality is the cornerstone on which demands for equal opportunities could be based. Though so often an empty promise on paper, the law nevertheless reflects different views on women's roles, and enables women to claim their rights.

Women's Educational Opportunities, together with legal equality, were the first target of liberal feminist struggles. Men's exclusion of women from the public sphere stemmed from the assumption of the irrational female, and uneducated females in turn strengthened male prejudice against women. Women's educational achievement is also important in equal opportunities at work, since discrimination by vocational qualification is in many respects justifiable by reference to education differentials.

Women's Economic Conditions are the foremost concern of Marxist and socialist feminism, but liberal feminism also struggles for equal opportunities at work. By participating in the labour force, women could obtain economic independence and self-confidence. In appearance, the biggest difference between communist and capitalist regimes occurs in women's economic conditions: the great difference in women's labour participation rate, women's unemployment rate, and social support for working mothers. On the other hand, there still remains the sexual division of labour in communist regimes as much as in capitalist regimes. Wage differentials between the sexes, too, are found in both communist and capitalist regimes. The question here is, to what extent, and in which aspects, are women in communist regimes better off?

Women between Paid Work and the Family reveals the reality of women's emancipation through paid work. Unless women could expect equal shares of household work, women's employment outside the home could result in women's "double burden". As long as women are subordinate to men in the family, or women alone are supposed to do unpaid household work, women's emancipation is improbable.

Women's Political Representation is a further index of sexual equality. Women have long been supposed not to rule, and have been under-represented in political institutions. Sharing power may be the last thing men will accept. Although the number of women in parliaments increased, women's presence in the core of policy making, or in the locus of power, is still very limited. This has certainly been true of communist regimes. Yet, as a symbol, a large number of women in parliaments could encourage women to become politically interested and active.

Data for each of these dimensions are collected through various sources such as official publications, academic writings, magazines, newspapers, historical archives, and so on.⁷ Major data for each aspect are as follows:

(i) Legislation for Sexual Equality: stipulation of equality in Constitutions; legislation on family, marriage, divorce, and abortion; legal protection of maternity and child-care.

(ii) Women in Education: Women's school enrolment rate; the proportion of women in higher education; women's vocational qualifications.

(iii) Women's Economic Conditions: the proportion of women

⁷ Subject to availability of data, each aspect may be captured by different variables for the four countries. However, best efforts are made to ensure comparability across countries.

in the labour force; the proportions of women by occupation (managerial, technician, clerical, manual operatives); wage differentials between men and women; women's working hours.

(iv) Women between Employment and the Family: numbers and capacities of kindergartens; division of household chores between the spouses; marriage and divorce rates.

(v) Women's Political Representation: numbers of women MPs; numbers of women Cadre members in the leading party; numbers and distribution of women ministers.

1.4.2 A Comprehensive Comparison of the Four Countries

In the second stage, a comprehensive comparison of the four countries is carried out to test the two hypotheses of this study. The focus is placed on cross-country differences in women's position under the law, women's political representation, and the socio-economic conditions of women.

Analyses of women's position in the legal, political, and economic arenas involve both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Although economic analysis could be carried out by quantitative methods, the analysis of legal changes could hardly be quantitative, whilst the analysis of women's political representation would require both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Therefore, in analysing women's status in the four countries, I employ both qualitative and quantitative methods: in the analysis of the legal and political status of women, qualitative argument with figurative comparison is carried out; and in the analysis of the economic position of women, a limited quantitative comparison with standardized variables is undertaken. In either case, I try to deal with concrete and tangible material rather than abstract arguments.

There is the time limit set to the data collection : from 1945 to 1989 when Germany and Korea were divided. Since the

unification of Germany, the two-dimensional analysis has not been valid. The impact of unification to women's life is left to further study.

1. 5 Composition of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of eight chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 examines the cultural patterns of Germany and Korea before their respective partitions. What were the cultural impediments for women in Germany and Korea? Was either of the two harsher and more oppressive to women? By examining these two questions, Chapter 2 provides a broad picture of women's experiences in Germany and Korea, with the assumption that, irrespective of the political regime, women in the more oppressive culture would remain less equal to men than those in the less oppressive culture.

From Chapter 3 to 6, women's conditions in the four countries are examined one by one. Chapter 3 considers women's life in the Federal Republic of Germany, Chapter 4 in the German Democratic Republic, Chapter 5 in the Republic of Korea, and Chapter 6 in the Democratic People's Republic. The primary concern of these four chapters lies in the continuity and discontinuity of traditions affecting women, and changes in women's status after the respective partition. In particular, the differential changes between the two former Germanies and between the two Koreas are paid special attention. Also, the difference between the two communist regimes and between the two capitalist

regimes are considered.

In Chapter 7, a comprehensive comparison of the four countries is carried out, with three different methods being applied to three major aspects of women's conditions: women under the law, women's political representation, and women's socio-economic conditions. Through this comparison, the two hypotheses of this thesis are tested. The conclusion follows in Chapter 8.

Through this thesis, the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation is tested on empirical grounds, and the impact of political regime, or of the state, is assessed with the influence of culture taken into account. This cross-cultural, cross-country analysis of the impact of political regime will, I hope, aid the understanding of both the necessity and the limitations of state intervention in women's issues. Sexual equality ultimately is to be obtained by women's struggles, not by state intervention, though the latter can help.

CHAPTER TWO

CULTURE AND WOMEN IN GERMAN AND KOREAN HISTORY, 1871-1945

2. 1 Two Cultural Patterns: Christianity and Confucianism

Feminist concern with the impact of culture has centred on three principal issues. Why have women so long accepted, or acquiesced in, sexual inequality? Is there a dominant ideology maintaining sexual inequality? Is it possible to change culture, and in particular to what extent can women change male-dominated culture towards sexual equality? This thesis is mainly concerned with the latter question, but this Chapter deals with the second question.

The first question has been discussed in socialization theory, psychoanalysis, and discourse theory (Walby, 1990; Chorodow, 1978; Mitchell, 1975; McNay, 1992).¹ The second question has been the subject of cross-cultural studies, and the third question has been the main concern of cross-country

¹ Socialization theory, following Parsonian concepts, explains how an individual accepts and internalizes existing ideas of masculinity and femininity. However, this process of socialization does not explain where the content of these notions come from. The psychoanalytic approach, though originating in Freudian biological determinism, tries to explain gender inequality by the unconscious. Chorodow suggests early childhood experience of gender difference leads individuals to shape gender identity in the unconscious (Chorodow, 1978). Another psychoanalyst, Juliet Mitchell, suggests a dualistic approach, in which capitalist relations are rooted in the economy, while patriarchy is based in culture and the unconscious (Mitchell, 1975). Discourse analysis, following Derrida and Foucault, attacks traditional forms of thought and orthodox notions of rationality, and in particular, the unitary notion of "woman." Unlike socialization theory, discourse analysis examines how the category of woman is construed in society (Walby, 1990).

empirical studies.

The question of dominant ideology has led to the criticisms of existing religions. Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Confucianism among others have provided the core beliefs which have shaped social relations. These dominant cultural patterns have provided and maintained the ideology of women's subordination to men as part of the social and cultural order. Yet, the pattern of women's experiences varies country by country, society by society, and period by period. In this chapter, therefore, two questions are considered: what were dominant cultural patterns that shaped women's lives in Germany and Korea?; and, which cultural pattern was more oppressive, or more benevolent, to women, Korean or German culture?

Empirical studies show how existing political regimes, and the women's movement, have tried to change gender relations through constitutional promises, legal and structural guarantees, and through struggles. Yet, changing laws and policies is one thing, changing gender relations is another: empirical studies suggest that gender relations that were shaped by cultural traditions are least susceptible to changes. The question therefore arises whether the efforts made by political regimes, or by the women's movement, have changed gender relations. In this thesis, the following four chapters, from Chapter Three to Chapter Six, examine whether the four countries —the former two Germanies and two Koreas— have changed gender relations. Before discussing the four countries, however, I shall describe the background against which these countries developed their policies.

2.1.1 An Overview of Christianity and Confucianism

The two dominant cultural patterns in Germany and Korea were Christianity and Confucianism, respectively. Yet, Christianity and Confucianism are not easily comparable with each other. While Christianity is first and foremost a revealed religion, Confucianism refers to the body of practical, secular, and moral teachings. The texts of Confucianism, *the Classics*, introduce their readers to a world of moral values, human action, and reliance upon a superior power.² Confucian teaching has always acknowledged man's possession of an inner faculty of moral discernment — his conscience. The difference between the Confucian and the Christian teachings of conscience lies especially in the Christian's emphasis on God, the giver of moral law and the judge of human conscience. Though Confucian teaching implies that conscience is a gift, it does not dwell on God's role as supreme lawgiver and judge. It prefers to analyze the meanings of conscience itself (Ching, 1977, p.90). Christianity, by contrast, is a religion with basic insights into God and man, and with an institutional church that comprises an organized hierarchy and priesthood, a clearly defined system of dogmas and moral concepts, a solemn and public cult and a sacramental system.

Yet, both Confucianism and Christianity have exercised decisive influence in shaping the beliefs, moral codes and

² Confucianism is actually a misnomer, a Western designation of an East Asian tradition. The Chinese themselves have usually preferred *Juchia*, or *Juchiao*, the school or teachings of the scholars. Confucius himself never made exclusive claims as a teacher, calling himself rather a "transmitter" of the teachings of ancient sages. The term *Ju* refers to the entire development of the so-called Confucian tradition, throughout the centuries.

behaviours of large populations in the East —i.e., China, Japan and Korea— and in the West —i.e., North America and the whole European continent including Germany. Confucianism and Christianity have woven the history of the East and the West, by demanding compliance from the individual, and by legitimizing or condemning specific events. Every phase of individual life including marriage and familial life as well as political activity in the West and the East has been regulated, instructed and transformed by the demands of Christianity and Confucianism, respectively.

2.1.2 Christian Womanhood: The Original Sin of Eve

Christian womanhood, especially in the Catholic tradition, has been constructed around the notions of women's inferiority to men, submissiveness, the polluting power of the woman's body, and the imperatives of being wife and mother as second-best to celibacy in serving God. Women as sinful beings had only two ways of being forgiven: either getting married, and bearing and rearing children as chaste wives and devoted mothers; or remaining virgins in service of God. Women's independence outside religious asceticism was suspect and deemed anti-social, amoral, and promiscuous.

Though every known history all over the world showed the persistence of patriarchal order, Christianity has been accused of displaying the "original spell of patriarchal myth" (Daly, 1978). While man (Adam) was created in the image of God, woman (Eve) was an inferior, sinful, and secondary creature. In the Judaeo-Christian myth of Creation, *Genesis*, Eve was a secondary

creature made from Adam's rib, as a helper for Adam. Referring to Eve's supposed creation from Adam's rib, Paul instructed people to "let a woman learn in silence with all submissiveness" (I Timothy 2:11). In the New Testament there is talk of male "headship" and teaching of the subordination of the wife to the husband.

Because Eve inspired lust in Adam, and seduced him into the *original sin*, Christian writers asserted that women's bodies had the power to pollute, which led them to oppress female sexuality. Female sexuality was denounced as a sinful desire,³ indeed, if possible, the Church would have demanded celibacy for all women (Ranke-Heinemann, 1989). But since most women — and men — were too weak to practice asceticism, they were allowed to get married, in order to 'increase and multiply and fill the earth' (The Book of Genesis) —i.e., to reproduce offspring. Therefore, in the Christian world, women's proper role was to serve God (Church), to please men (wifery and housekeeping), and to procreate (motherhood).⁴

³ Through this Biblical imagery of the male God and the sinful female, Christianity excluded women from the priesthood. So women were denied any leadership in this religion. Despite many debates and long conflicts, the Roman Catholic Church continues to deny women priesthood. Protestant Churches first launched the idea of women priests in the 1940s. The Anglican Church decided to accept ordination of women on 11 November 1992. At the news of Anglican Church's acceptance of women ordination, the Vatican Church announced that the ordination of women in the Anglican Church would be a grave obstacle to reconciliation between the two Churches.

⁴ A few feminists who have deep faith in Christianity have read the Bible in favour of women, in order to escape from the criticism of Christian misogyny. They exalt the Virgin Mary as being a true model for women; she is the highest to which humanity has attained. They want to make common cause with Virgin Mary as a counterweight to the male Christ. However, this idea has been attacked: in the story of Virgin Birth, Mary does

Protestantism created an atmosphere more conducive to the women's movement. Though Protestant women were supposed to be wives and mothers, the Protestant emphasis on individual spiritual responsibility could provide an encouraging atmosphere for a strong-minded woman, like Mary Wollstonecraft. In Germany, as early as 1927, Protestant women won the right to function as assistant pastors (*Vikarin*) in some synods.⁵ Even so, the Protestant emphasis on motherhood and the imperative of being a chaste wife leave little room for equality between women and men.

2.1.3 Confucian Womanhood: The Duty of Filial Piety

While Christian womanhood was shaped around original sin and procreation, Confucian womanhood was woven by a notion of society that was inexorably hierarchical, and gave the utmost importance to filial piety. Although Confucian scholars did not explicitly express female inferiority, their hierarchical perspective placed women under men. Women's subordination to men was considered part of the natural order. Also, the duty of filial piety inescapably focused on motherhood.

The Confucian regards human society in terms of personal relationships and ethical responsibilities resulting from such relationships. In Confucian teachings, society is composed of the well known "Five Relationships": ruler-subject; father-son;

nothing (Daly, 1978, p.83; Hampson, 1986, p.135). The Virgin Mary enters in the story because she is humble and obedient, and produces a male child.

⁵ Though this was not full priesthood, Protestant theology on the relation of the soul to God provided a new horizon for women to read the Bible, and further, to take theological degrees in the early twentieth century (Phayer, 1990).

husband-wife; elder-younger brothers; and friend-friend relationships. Three of these are family relationships, while the other two are usually conceived in terms of the family model. The system of Five Relationships, all the same, emphasizes a basic sense of hierarchy. The only truly horizontal relationship is that between friends; however, even here, seniority of age demands a certain respect, as is also the case with brothers. The husband-wife relationship bears natural resemblance to that between elder-younger brothers, but is more usually compared to the ruler-subject relationship. The wife should be submissive to, and obey, her husband and her parents-in-law.

Filial piety is the first of all Confucian virtues, that comes before loyalty to the sovereign, conjugal affection, and everything else (Ching, 1977, pp.97-101).⁶ For women, filial piety, the need to procure progeny to assure the continuation of the ancestral cult, meant the duty to get married and to bear sons. Consequently, womanhood in Confucian society has been summarised as "Wise Mother, Good Wife" with varied emphasis among the countries.⁷

This Confucian conception of womanhood shows no significant difference from the Christian one. In both societies, women were inferior and submissive to men, and had to be wives and mothers.

⁶ In Korea, a son or a wife who informed on the crimes of his father or her husband to the authorities would face severe punishment, not be praised, because he, or she, betrayed familial loyalty. This priority of filial piety and familial loyalty lasted until the beginning of twentieth century.

⁷ In Korea and China, motherhood was pre-eminent. However, in Japan, motherhood gained attention only after the Meiji Restoration. Even then, the Japanese said "Good Wife, Wise Mother," reversing the order of the phrase. See Bernstein (1991).

Instead of serving God (the Church), the Confucian world emphasized ancestor worship (filial piety). The only difference between women in the Christian world and the Confucian world was whether women were condemned as original sinners, or were trapped in filial piety. Yet, Korean and German women's lives were different, as were their struggles for better living conditions.

2. 2 *Kinder, Kueche and Kirche*: Cultural Impediments for German Women

The classic functions assigned to women in German society have been neatly, and famously, summarized by the Three Ks - *Kinder* (children), *Kueche* (kitchen) and *Kirche* (church). These Three Ks, which are clearly the outcome of Christianity, were crystallised and reinforced in the Nazi regime. In the late nineteenth century, many German women actively joined in the economy, fought for socialist ideals, women's suffrage, and social welfare, often as prominent leaders. German women published the first women's newspaper in history, and were ahead of their times in arguing for women's ordination in the church.⁸ During World War One, they contributed on a large scale to the wartime national economy, while sustaining the churches and families. Partly as a result, they won the right to vote for the

⁸ Apart from winning the assistant pastoral position in 1927, both Catholic and Protestant women, led by Paula Mueller (Evangelisch Women's League) and Gerta Krabbel (Catholic German Women's League), began to discuss the question of women's ordination in the early years of the Weimar Republic (Phayer, 1990).

national parliament in the Weimar Republic. Most of these achievements were, however, eclipsed in the course of the Nazi regime. The Nazi regime revitalised the traditional notion of separate spheres for men and women, and returned women back to the realm of the Three Ks. Since the permeation of Nazi dogma was so thorough, German women's past achievements were much shaded by the fixed cultural impediments of the Three Ks.

2.2.1 German Unification

Although the Germanic tribes showed up in Europe as early as the Middle ages, the history of modern Germany began with the unification of 1871. The fact that militarist Prussia took the initiative in the unification was decisive in moulding the political culture, constructing political and economic institutions, and in shaping the role of women in Germany.

The rise of capitalism and the emergence of the bourgeoisie led in Germany, as elsewhere, to a confrontation with the feudal aristocracy; but in Germany, unlike France or Britain, this resulted in a victory for the old order (Evans, 1987). The defeat of the bourgeoisie set the pattern for the next century, which was characterised by state intervention in the economy and a comprehensive social welfare system. The unification of Germany in 1871 was the last, and final, victory of the feudal aristocracy, and left the legacy of a "missing revolution" to Germany (Evans, 1987, pp.94-127).

For women, the strengthening and the expansion of the Prussian order further hindered their activity in the public realm. Early Germanic and Celtic tribes had ranged in structure

from patriarchal to matriarchal, and some of them surprised Roman chroniclers by the presence in battle of women, often leading raids (Morgan, 1984, p.241). Although Christianization confined German women within the home, there remained regional variations in the extent of delimiting women's activity, the extreme of which was the Salic Law. The Salic Law in most of the European monarchies barred women from ruling, although the ascension of Maria Theresia to the Hapsburg throne in the eighteenth century was a notable exception (Morgan, 1984, p.242). Further, the Prussian Law of Association (Vereinsgesetz) of 1851 prohibited women from engaging in politics, joining political parties and even attending political meetings; only in the states of Baden, Bremen, Hamburg, and Wuerttemberg were women permitted to join political parties. This regulation of women's participation in the public sphere remained valid until 1908. Therefore, German unification under Prussian militarism implied, in a manner of speaking, the expansion of the Salic Law to the whole of German society, limiting women's role to the church and the home.

However, many German women rejected the status of passive victims. The women's movement, which had sprang up before German unification, continued to voice demands for women's rights. Although the German women's movement was bitterly split between bourgeois and socialist movements, it succeeded in achieving the abolition of the Law of Association, and after the First World War, in obtaining universal suffrage.

2.2.2 The Bourgeois Women's Movement

The first women's movement in Germany emerged in 1848 when

turbulence reigned throughout the country. Stimulated by the news of the Paris February Revolution of 1848, liberalisation movements swept Berlin. During the period of petitions, demonstrations, and aggravating political struggle between the bourgeoisie and the military, many bourgeois women organised themselves, and demanded women's freedom and liberation along with political liberalisation. The forerunner of the women's movement was Luise Otto-Peters who demanded better education for girls and the 'participation of women in the life of the state' (Frevert, 1986, p.74). She published the first women's newspaper, The Women's Newspaper (*Die Frauen Zeitung*, 1849), under the slogan of "Recruiting Women Citizens for the Realm of Freedom (*Dem Reich der Freiheit werb' ich Burgerinnen*)" (Herve, 1983, p.18). Otto-Peters criticized those men who had only the masculine half of humanity in mind. Yet for women too, she wrote, the realm of freedom was not infinite, the boundaries were marked by feminine morality.

As was revealed in Otto-Peters' emphasis on feminine morality, the women's movement in 1848 represented the liberal idea of female rights. It demanded the right to participate in the public life, on the ground that a woman could not fulfil her duty as a mother, or as a housewife, without understanding the world outside the home. This was much concerned about education and political rights for women.

After the first women's movement had been silenced by a wave of political repression in 1849-1850, new organizations developed. Under Otto-Peters's leadership, the German Women's Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein*: ADF) was born

in October 1865. The ADF, unlike the first movement, carefully maintained its distance from political parties and groupings, though its position was unmistakably bourgeois and liberal in character (Frevert, 1989, p.116). While the ADF petitioned for better occupational training for young proletarian women, and for their employment in the post and telegraph office, its energies were primarily directed towards ensuring that the 'young ladies' could enjoy sound educational and employment opportunities. The ideals of young ladies were too high for proletarian women. The 'ladies' required etiquette, morality and self-responsibility, chastity, tidiness, the ability to manage a healthy and clean household, and child-care. For proletarian women, however, those standards were almost impossible to reach because of their working and living conditions.

During the nineteenth century the numbers of female and child workers were greatly increasing,⁹ and the conditions of work and housing were deteriorating. Frequently female workers were the breadwinners, with unemployed husbands and children at home (Herve, 1983, pp.15-16). Male workers' wages, though much more than those of female workers', were also not enough to sustain the family, forcing wives to the factories. Under these circumstances, cleaning the house, where there was a house, meant depriving women of the already insufficient time for sleep. Child-care hardly mattered, and the idea of childhood had not yet

⁹ In 1849, Sachsen recorded 11,000 female workers and 20,000 male workers, Prussia 13,000 male and 12,400 female workers, in the spinning industry (Herve 1983, p.13).

spread down.¹⁰ For proletarian women, participating in work outside the home was not a right, but the only way to sustain their family. Thus, the ideal of ladies was only for bourgeois women, revealing the class split in German society.

2.2.3 Women and Socialism

Engels wrote in his *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) that the first condition for the liberation of women was to bring the whole female sex into public industry. August Bebel also wrote in his extremely popular book *Women under Socialism* (*Die Frau und der Sozialismus*, 1879) that there could be no emancipation of humanity without the social independence and equality of the sexes, and advocated the employment of women.

However, socialist positions on women's paid work were not consistent.¹¹ Many socialists believed that cheap female labour was one of the major obstacles to the economic advancement of the

¹⁰ Following the research of P. Aries (1960), some sociologists argue that the idea of childhood developed in the eighteenth century among the nobility. This idea infiltrated into the bourgeoisie, and contributed to the idea of modern nuclear family (Firestone, 1970; Weeks, 1981).

¹¹ They had deplored the disappearance of women's traditional roles: Marx called the dissolution of the old family ties "terrible and disgusting"; and Engels early in his career declared that a wife earning wages outside the home "deprived the husband of his manhood and the wife of all womanly qualities." Lassalle declared in 1867 to the General German Workers Congress that "the employment of women in the great industrial workshops is one of the most shocking abuses of our age. It is shocking because it causes the condition of the working class not to be improved but to be impaired, and it places the working population in a wretched condition through its destruction of the family." He reflected the position of majority of male workers whose wish was to keep their family just like the bourgeois family (Herve, 1983, pp.12-40; Pore, 1981, pp.8-23; Frevert, 1989, pp.94-106; Anderson and Zinsser, 1988 II, pp.371-390; Engels, 1859; Fletcher, 1987, pp.16-24, etc).

working class and clamoured for the exclusion of women from industrial work. Contrary to this view, Clara Zetkin vehemently argued that the only way to combat the capitalist system was not to deny work to women but to socialize the means of production. The liberation of women and men depended upon the liberation of labour from capital. One of the first steps towards this liberation was the organizing and political awakening of women workers to make common cause with men of her class (Pore, 1981; Koepecke, 1979; Thoennesen, 1969).

Despite the controversy about female workers within socialist circles, the foundation of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*: SPD) in 1875 through the merger of two socialist parties, Ferdinand Lassalle's General German Worker's Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein*) and Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel's Social Democratic Labour Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei*), gave a new chance for the proletarian women's movement. In fact, at its founding Congress in Gotha, the SPD demanded the right to vote for *all* citizens, without making clear the meaning of *all*. The party leadership was well aware of the necessity to recruit female members since the *Sozialistengesetz* of 1876 outlawed the socialist party, and since organising the party was very tough. However, it was not enthusiastic about guaranteeing equality or establishing a clear party line on that matter. The Gotha Programme¹² was the best compromise of the conflicting

¹² The Gotha programme reflected the greater influence of the popular ideas of Lassalle. Lassalle strongly opposed Marx's view that the state was the product of class division and that its function was the perpetuation of the existing power distribution. While Marx believed that the state would wither-away together

interests of the moment (Herve, 1983; Frevert, 1989; Pore, 1981; Anderson and Zinsser II, 1988; Berlau, 1949).

However, in its Erfurt Programme of 1891, the SPD officially endorsed and supported the emancipation of women. More significant was the party's support for the organization of a separate women's affiliation¹³ under the leadership of Clara Zetkin, who ran a socialist women's newspaper, The Women Worker (*Die Arbeiterin*), and later Equality (*Gleichheit*, 1904). However, Zetkin herself was a devoted wife as well as a mother, demanding women to be super-women who could shoulder the double burden of household and paid work with the spirit of self-sacrifice (Koepcke, 1979; Pore, 1981).

Although the SPD was not always of one mind, and there were persistent and decided opponents of sexual equality, it was the

with class division, Lassalle viewed that state as a separate power, independent of the nature of society, and indispensable for the realization of socialist ideas. Therefore, the Gotha programme accepted the existence of the state, and declared that "by utilizing all legal means, the SPD aspires to establish the free state and the socialist order, to destroy the Iron Law of Wages" (Berlau, 1949, pp.17-37). The programme demanded state-supported, democratically controlled socialist co-operatives in industry and agriculture. The programme also demanded universal, equal, secret and compulsory elections; universal military service (*Allgemeine Wehrhaftigkeit*) and a militia system; the abolition of all restrictions upon the press, assembly, associations and coalition; jurisdiction by the people; free legal aid (*Unentgeltliche Rechtspflege*); universal, compulsory, free and equal education; the ban of child-labour and of all female labour detrimental to health and morals.

¹³ Lovenduski assesses the establishment of a separate women's organization in the SPD as very important, since it enabled women's issues to be developed and women to have groups in which they felt comfortable and in which they could learn to speak in public and think for themselves (Lovenduski, 1986, p.37). Though the women's organization did not have decisive power in the party leadership, it was effective in training and in recruiting female leaders, for the party and for the women's movement.

socialist movement that tried to improve the living conditions of proletarian women.

2.2.4 Struggles, War, and Disillusionment

While the socialist movement on a large scale won the support of proletarian women, a new bourgeois women's organisation, the Federation of German Women's Associations (*Bund deutscher Frauenvereine*: BDF) emerged in 1894, under the leadership of Auguste Schmidt, Marie Stritts, Helene Lange, and later Gertrud Baumer. The BDF, as an "umbrella organization" (*Dachverband*: Herve, 1983, p.50; Frevert, 1989, p.113), united thirty-four women's groups including regional associations and religious organizations, with social welfare orientations. In 1899 Marie Stritts was elected chairwoman, and led the BDF to call for female suffrage as the official BDF programme (1902).

As a result of the emergence of the BDF and the SPD, the German women's movement had confirmed class and ideological divisions that were to endure. Nevertheless, the organizational power of the women's movement gained a new impetus, and in 1908 the Law of Association (*Vereinsgesetz*) was abolished, permitting women to join political parties and groups.

During World War I and the Weimar Republic, the women's movement encountered a new chance to enhance women's status. Women were increasingly incorporated into the labour market, and their work given public recognition and praise. Above all, middle-class women proved their civic maturity and social responsibility. This new environment, however, turned out to be the cause for another split in the women's movement.

In the socialist movement, the dispute over the "Truce in the Fortress" (*Burgfrieden*)¹⁴ led to the division of the SPD into three socialist parties: the core of the future Independent Social Democratic Party (*Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*: USPD) and the Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*: KPD) left the party, opposing the truce. Most importantly, Zetkin left the SPD, and her replacement, Marie Juchacz, steered socialist women into more womanly concerns, accepting the bourgeois ideas of a separate female sphere.

In the bourgeois women's movement, nationalist and pro-war sentiments caused a split in the BDF. When the BDF set up the National Women's Service to support the war, the radical wing in the BDF, headed by Anita Augspurg and Lida Heymann, vehemently criticized support for the war, calling for German participation in the international peace movement. However, the majority of women's organizations, in particular, the Protestant women's organization, agreed the "truce", and supported the government in conducting the war.

After the defeat of Germany in the war, constitutional reforms were introduced, including "universal" suffrage but excluding women. Women finally won the vote with the

¹⁴ On the brink of World War One, an intense nationalist mood ruled the whole of German society, which led the SPD to a crisis of conscience between nationalism and the socialist principle of internationalism. When the war broke out, the Imperial government suggested all political groups which had fought against the government should make a truce for the duration of the war (Truce in the Fortress). Despite vehement disputes within the leadership, the SPD decided to conclude a temporary peace with the state, which was named the "policy of the 4th August" in 1914 (Thoennessen, 1969, p.75). Likewise, many political groups, including the BDF, agreed a truce to support the war (Herve, 1983, pp.84-118).

constitutional recognition of sexual equality as a basic right in 1919. In the Weimar Republic, 41 of 421 delegates sent to the national assembly were women, with the largest delegation coming from the SPD. Marie Juchacz, in the first address by a woman before a German parliament, stressed that the woman question no longer existed in the old sense of the word. She did not mention that women might have special problems that prevented them from exercising those rights. In her two addresses, she specifically mentioned the special credentials and interests of women as mothers. This was indicative of the way the SPD was to view and appeal to women during the Weimar republic. "Vote for the SPD for the future of your children" was a common campaign slogan designed to appeal to women (Pore, 1981, pp.40-42). Other parties also continued to woo the female vote and to accept the presence of a few women in elected bodies, but they kept them well away from high-level politics. No political party undertook the task of re-educating women to accept full citizen status.

On the economic front, women's labour participation and their contribution to the reconstruction of Germany were not rewarded, rather they were condemned for abandoning their family. Men allegedly cherished the peculiar camaraderie of the trenches, and the "stab in the back" myth grew. According to this myth, the war was lost on the home front rather than by the army, because of subversion by Jews, Communists, Social Democrats — and also women (Bridenthal et al., 1984; Conradt, 1978). Women were forced to leave the workplace by the Demobilization Orders (*Demobilmachungsverordnungen*, 1921).

Despite much rhetoric about women's rights, most Germans did

not envision a change in the traditional role of women. When women did enter the traditionally masculine occupations, they were neither paid nor treated equally. No political solution to this problem appeared to be forthcoming. When the Nazis came to propagate the traditional ideas of woman's sphere, the Three Ks, disillusionment had already eroded much of the impetus of the women's movement. Without an appealing alternative, many women, mostly middle-class housewives, were attracted by the Nazi propaganda of the familiar *Kinder, Kueche, Kirche* ethos and saw emancipation more often as a threat than as a blessing (Bridenthal et.al., 1984, p.56). Thus, many women voted for the Nazis on the basis of what they perceived as their own interests,¹⁵ with the hope of security and comfort.

2.2.5 Women under the Nazis

The Nazis promised orderly families and healthy children in

¹⁵ Despite the myth of massive female support for Hitler, research has made it clear that until the 1930 election, as many men as women were leaning towards the Nazis. In Saarland, 489,000 men out of 2,816,000 total male voters voted for the Nazis (22 percent), while 472,000 women out of 3,081,000 total female voters (15 percent) did so. In the Greater Berlin area, the voting difference was reversed: 204,122 females voted for the Nazis, so did 191,866 males (Beyer, 1933, p.82; Charles et.al, 1982, p.23). The support for the Nazis was more differentiated by age and class than gender (Childers, 1986). Further, the Nazis never won an absolute majority — in July 1932, they won only 37 percent of the vote, and in November 1932, 33 percent. However, the fact that many young girls frantically joined the march to Berlin, and that many middle class housewives were attracted by Hitler helped the Nazis to power. Bridenthal (1984) argues that some bourgeois women's gender specific attraction to Nazism was the outcome of a long development of middle-class housewives organizing to gain some control over their own lives.

place of "double earners" (*Doppelverdiener*) and illegal aborters.¹⁶ It also promised women gender-separated spheres of activity. For many women this meant home and family, as well as the female worlds of teaching or social work. Instead of demanding equality, Nazi women called for "Room for living" (*Lebensraum*), changing Hitler's word.¹⁷ Nazi women adapted the dream of a separate space and forswore claims to "masculine" public power and in exchange expected greater influence over their own, feminine social realm. Health care, education, reproduction, folk traditions and handicrafts, social work and religion all fell into the sphere that women called their own social space (Koonz, 1986, p.14). "We want more than the Three Ks," wrote one Nazi women, "besides *Kinder*, *Kueche*, *Kirche*, we want two more - *Krankenhaus* (hospital) and *Kultur* (culture)" (Koonz, 1984, p.213). The sexual division of labour and retreat to the home were demanded by many women themselves. It was the logical outcome of some German women's frustration. When their lot was cruel competition with men, women began demanding some control over their own lives, though much restricted. Rather than competing in the men's world, they expanded their own sphere

¹⁶ In the setting of the Depression, unemployed men condemned married women workers as selfish double earners. Thus, the notion of "*Doppelverdiener*" supposed that married women should return and keep the home, and that husbands should entirely provide for the family.

¹⁷ Before Hitler used "*Lebensraum*" to popularize conquest in the East, the term was ambiguous. Besides serving as a code for bellicose expansion, it also meant to contemporaries a space in which to live inside Germany — a social sphere where domestic tranquillity and traditional values reigned (Koonz, 1984, p.200). When Nazi women used this word, they meant a peaceful social sphere within which women of all classes and ages would cooperate to revive the gospel of love and harmony. This sphere, they believed, would not be disturbed by men.

beyond men's direct intervention.

While Hitler's misogyny allegedly allowed women to hold more power in "feminine" spheres (Koonz, 1984, 1986; Pore, 1981; Herve, 1983; Frevert, 1989; Bridenthal et. al., 1984), the Nazi regime strongly reinforced the sexual division of labour, making it the period when biology became "destiny" (Bridenthal et. al., 1984; Kaplan, 1992). Nazi doctrine created a society structured around "natural" biological poles, based on racial mythology. When he seized power, Hitler promised renewed nationalism and "volkisch" solidarity in place of class, cultural, religious divisions. To Germans, the term *Volk* meant a racial unity, a shared history, fate, and consciousness. To the Nazis, however, only Arians belonged to the racial community or *Volksgemeinschaft*. Jews and "asocials" were to be ostracized and excised from the *Volk*. In addition, they propagated the ideology of innate differences between men and women and sex-specific work. Under this ideology, the only legitimate role of a woman was being a mother or one of its derivatives in "social motherhood" —e.g., social worker, teacher, nurse and the like. Race and sex, therefore, became the predominant social markers.

Nazi policies towards women were carried out in two patterns. One was pushing women towards motherhood, the other was segregating the labour market.¹⁸ On the one hand, the Nazi regime decreed many laws and regulations to encourage motherhood: providing material incentives for childbirth and marriage, promoting Mother's Day, and organizing the Federation of German

¹⁸ Troeger depicts these two patterns as "the blood and soil model" and "the social engineering model" (Bridenthal et. al., 1984, pp.237-270).

Women (NS *Frauenschaft*) and the Federation of German Girls (*Bund deutscher Madel* -BDF). These two organizations were to integrate women into the Nazi regime and provide essential support for the regime (Kolinsky, 1989). The BDF, once the biggest women's organization of Germany, had already dissolved itself in 1933, before the Nazis imposed authoritarian forms on all existing associations in the process of so-called Synchronization (*Gleichschaltung*).¹⁹

On the other hand, the Nazis curtailed women's engagement in paid work: by segregating the labour market along sexual lines, educating girls for womanly skills, dismissing married women, and by condemning married women workers as selfish double earners. Though the sexual division of labour was certainly not a Nazi invention, the impact of numerous laws and governmental regulations was more powerful than at any other time (Bridenthal et. al., 1984). As a result, women came to perceive going out to work as a sign of hardship, and not-working as a sign of affluence. When World War Two broke out, women were reluctant to work for the fatherland. Despite statements about women's duty to work, female labour participation hardly rose throughout the war (Kolinsky, 1989, p.22). Women had seemingly embraced the ideology of the separate sphere, and accepted the Three Ks as

¹⁹ Under the name of Synchronization, all organizations and groups in Germany were forced to co-operate with the regime. In this process many organizations were either dissolved, coerced into propagating Nazi ideology, or integrated into a national organization. The BDF dissolved itself in 1933, when the authoritarian character of the Nazis became clear. Historians and feminists continue to debate the meaning of the BDF's dissolution. Was it a courageous act of defiance or an act of passive resignation? (Koonz, 1986; Bridenthal et.al, 1984; Frevert, 1989)

their own, secure space.

After World War Two, many women were devoted to rebuilding family and nation, and sweeping away the rubble.²⁰ Once again women joined the world outside the home, in the work place, in social activities, or in politics, putting aside the experience that they were demobilized after World War One.

2.2.6 The Fluctuating Women's Movement

In line with the sharp discontinuities in the history of German politics, the women's movement fluctuated. German women won the franchise as early as in 1919. They sent almost ten percent of female delegates to the *Reichstag* in 1919, when British women had not yet been fully franchised. Some of them were eminent socialist leaders and theoreticians. Yet, with the emergence of the Nazi regime, German women retreated into the "female sphere", surprising other western women.²¹ The Nazi propaganda of the Three Ks' feminine functions had such a sweeping impact that the history of the powerful women's movement

²⁰ "These Prussians, these German men! So marvellously competent — you could conquer half the globe with them. And then in defeat they were suddenly no good for anything, not even stealing spinach." The memoir of Countess Libussa Frits-Krockow shows the immediate post-war years of German aristocratic women. Though this memoir is not a conventional history text, it vividly shows the life of women trying to keep their family alive after a total national destruction. See Krockow (1992).

²¹ Rose traces the perspectives of the English language press about the position and activities of women in Nazi Germany. She argues that English-speaking journalists were so critical of German women's acceptance of the regime that they did not conceive that some German women could rise up in revolt against the Nazis (Rose, 1975). Therefore, the myth of the massive female support for the Nazis could be the outcome of the international press, ignoring the fact that not only the women's movement, but also almost all the social, political movements were silenced during the Nazi regime.

was almost buried into oblivion. Many feminist scholars have been deeply disappointed because, they think, the German women's movement had lost its long history of struggles and progress towards sexual equality during the Nazi regime (Bridenthal et. al., 1984; Kaplan, 1992; Koonz, 1986).

However, in my view, German women had taken advantage of every possible opportunity. In the decision making process, human beings are presumably taking strategies to optimize, or maximize, their utility considering the conditions. The German women's movement was an exemplary case of conditional optimization. It depended upon the situation and the condition of struggles. When women were allowed to join the world outside the home, they extended their spheres to the masculine realm. When they were condemned for abandoning their family, they intensified their control over the separate female sphere. Though their acceptance of the ideas of the Three Ks hindered women's activities and achievements for decades, German women's experience during the Nazi regime had not only a negative, but also positive impact for the women's movement.

During the Nazi regime, German women, particularly middle-class women, strengthened their power in the "female spheres." As Koonz puts it, Nazi men inadvertently gave women unique opportunities because they cared so little about the women in their ranks. Men allowed women considerable latitude to interpret Hitler's ideas as they wished, recruit followers, write their own rules, and raise funds. In the service of womanly ideals, Nazi women sometimes behaved in most un-"ladylike" ways: managing the funds they raised, marching, facing down hecklers, making soapbox

speeches, and organizing mass meetings, marches, and rallies (Koonz, 1986, p.5). Through this process, women learned skills of organizing and financing, which are indispensable for political leadership. As the separate women's organization in the SPD contributed to recruit female leaders, the Nazi policy of sexual segregation and indifference to the female spheres helped the middle-class women to cultivate their potential. In the churches as well, while the Nazi regime furthered the sexual segregation of labour, Christian women were greatly integrated into the churches, and through them, into community affairs (Phayer, 1990). For Protestant women, this integration led directly to eldership and eventually full ministerial ordination from 1946 onwards.²²

Therefore, I would argue, German women developed their competence and power under these circumscribed conditions. The fluctuation by the women's movement was the outcome of strategic efforts and compromises of women to enhance their status, and to expand their control despite being bitterly divided by class, even if not always successful. However, without the change of gender relations, sexual equality can not be achieved. Although the sexual segregation of labour allowed women some control over certain matters for a while, the Three Ks hindered the change of gender relations. Thus, after World War Two, the task of German women was the abolition of the Three Ks, the key legacy of the Nazi regime for women.

²² Beginning with Westphalia in 1946, the church synods changed their constitutions to allow women elders one by one (Phayer, 1990, pp.225-244).

2. 3 The Rule of the Three Obediences:

Restrictions on Korean Women

Korean women had for centuries lived under the Rule of the Three Obediences, which demanded that women obey three men during their lives —i.e., their fathers in their childhood, their husbands after marriage, and their eldest son after their husbands' death (Nahm, A., 1988, p.114; Morgan, 1984, p.150).²³ That means that the Korean women's realm was only inside the home, within the family. When Japanese colonisation of Korea (1910) brought about a sudden collapse of the Confucian order, Korean women were overwhelmed by the demand to join the independence struggle. During the colonial period, the national cause overrode all the other causes, and almost all the organized movements were in one way or another in subservience to the independence struggle. In Korean, "the women's movement" referred only to women's activism in nationalist struggles.

Nevertheless, during this period, women's sphere was expanded irreversibly: women were allowed to join the world outside the home, as industrial workers or as students, or as members of rapidly spreading social organisations, most of which were nationalist. Women's education and women's organisational activities were supported and legitimised by nationalism. Women's participation in the labour market, and their subsequent

²³ Though the Rule of the Three Obediences culminated under Confucian teachings, this way of confinement of women was not distinctive to Asian society. In ancient Greece, 'respectable' women were placed under the guardianship of men: first her father had control, then her husband; finally, should he die before her, the eldest son took charge of her life (Roberts, 1992, p.15).

participation in industrial disputes gained national support. Women could be students, workers, strikers, and nationalist fighters — yet, it was insisted that women should be mothers and wives in the end.

2.3.1 Women's Confinement at Home

Before the infiltration of Confucianism in the fourteenth century, Korean women enjoyed relatively equal status with men.²⁴ The establishment of the *Chosun* dynasty in 1392, however, led to the thorough Sinification and Confucianization of Korea. The ruling Confucian scholars stressed the importance of the virtues of loyalty, filial piety, self-cultivation and self-control. The Korean version of the Confucian code comprised *Three Cardinal Principles* (*Samgang*) and *Five Ethical Norms* (*Oryun*). The *Three Cardinal Principles* are loyalty to the ruler (*Chung*), filial piety (*Hyo*), and chastity of the wife (*Yol*). The *Five Ethical Norms* run parallel with the Confucian Five Relationships: namely, the principle of righteousness and justice between the ruler and the subjects (*Ui*), cordiality and closeness between parents and children (*Chin*), distinction between husbands and wives (*pyol*), order between elders and juniors (*Su*), and trust between friends

²⁴ Ancient Korean society showed a strong shamanist faith, in which female shamans performed the roles of priestess, healer and diviner (Nahm, A., 1988; Jayawardena, 1986; Morgan, 1984). In Korea, the word "shaman" (*Mudang*) assumes the person is a woman. Male shamans, though rare, are called "Paksu *Mudang*". Although the introduction of Buddhism in the fourth century diminished the power of shamans, women still managed to keep a large part of their previous rights: both matrilineal and patrilineal descent was recognized; women had equal inheritance rights and the remarriage of widows was not frowned upon; divorce was possible, though it was easier for a man than for a woman (Nahm, A., 1988; Morgan, 1984).

(*Shin*). These principles of Samgang-Oryun were regarded as those qualities possessed only by superior and civilized individuals, keeping them separated from inferior men.

The status of women declined with the permeation of these moral codes. The domestication of women reached its culmination, and the Rule of the Three Obedience took firm hold. Remarriage of widows was also prohibited by law in 1485. Sons of remarried widows, even those out of first marriage, could not apply for the state examination. A man was at liberty to divorce, or rather expel, his wife on the grounds of the *Seven Evils* (*Chilgujiak*): disobedience to parents-in-law, failure to bear a son, jealousy, adultery, hereditary disease, garrulousness and larceny. A woman who gave birth to many daughters, but not a son, could face a forced divorce, or, if very lucky, had to endure the presence of many consorts of her husband — jealousy of her husband's consorts or concubines was included in the seven evils.

The only comfort for Korean women was the existence of the "Three Cases of Non-Expulsion", which prohibited expelling the wife even when the wife committed one or several of the Seven Evils. The three cases were: first, if the wife had performed the three-year lasting mourning rituals for the deceased parents-in-law; second, if the wife had managed to save the family from poverty, and amass a fortune after the marriage; and last, when the wife had nowhere to go. However, these exceptions did not prohibit men abandoning their wives inside the home. The wife could remain in the house, without rights or voice.

Women, including young girls, were not to be seen in public or heard, and when they went out in public they covered their

head and face with a large scarf. Women over the age of seven were not permitted to sit with men in a place not separated by a curtain or wall and so on, which was called *the rule of male-female separation over seven years of age (Namnyu Chilse Boodongsuck)*. With the exception of peddlers, peasants and the like, most women were confined to domestic activities in what was called *anpang*, the inner quarter, where no man, with the exception of the state police in charge of high treason cases, was allowed to enter.

Also, after the middle of the seventeenth century, only the first son, who was responsible for performing ancestor worship rituals, had inheritance rights, thereby establishing the primogenitive system. Confucianisation of Korea thus deprived women of most of their traditional rights. The only traditional women's right which survived Confucianisation was that women kept their natal family's name after marriage.²⁵ Confined in the inner quarter and under the Rule of the Three Obediences, Korean women's role was only to serve their husbands and, more importantly, to bear and rear children, to be "Wise Mothers and Good Wives".

2.3.2 Mothers without Sexual Desire

Although the idea of "Wise Mother, Good Wife" is common in

²⁵ Since the beginning of the Korean history, Korean women have never experienced the custom that they should adopt their husbands' name after marriage. Therefore, a Mrs. Kim's husband is not necessarily a Mr. Kim. Korean people normally use the title Mrs. only when they intend to show she is married, without showing her husband's family name. For example, the first lady in Korea now is Mrs. Sohn, Myung-Sook, though her husband is President Kim. Japanese and Chinese women are named after their husbands.

Confucian society, the Korean version gave overwhelming emphasis to motherhood. In the case of China, wifery held the same importance as motherhood. A wife without children could face many consorts, but was in control of the whole household. After her husband's death she could take revenge on consorts by separating the children from their natal mother, or by selling the concubines to a brothel. In Japan, wifery was more important than motherhood. Women were valued as workers, wives, and especially as daughters-in-law, not solely as mothers.²⁶

By contrast, child-bearing and rearing were the sacred, foremost duty of Korean women. Fathers were not expected to show any affection to their children. The father should be a model for his son, not with affection, but with discipline. Thus, the sole responsibility of child-rearing rested with the mother. While women were supposed to be good wives, the adjective "good" almost exclusively applied to household management. The wife was to please her husband, not with sexual pleasure or conjugal affection, but with absolute obedience and good household management. Women's sexuality was thoroughly denied: a coquettish wife would be blamed for promiscuity; a wife who revealed her sexual desire could be expelled. The only reason for intercourse

²⁶ In Japan, the traditions of the merchant class, especially in the Kansai era, apparently encouraged women to be active in their family's business. The most outstanding of female entrepreneurs was Tatsuuma Kiyō, whose management strategies made her a pioneer in the sake-brewing industry during its period of most rapid growth and prosperity (Bernstein, 1992, p.6). This was beyond the understanding of Korean people during the Chosun dynasty.

should be procreation. Even upper-class consorts, *Kisaeng*,²⁷ could keep their reputation only by their academic knowledge of the *Classics* and poetic and artistic talent, not by their sexual attraction.²⁸

However, regulation of sexuality could not permeate into the working class. There is much historical evidence of adultery and promiscuity among the working class, particularly among peasant women and female servants. Among the working class virginity in any case was not sacred, and the stigma against extra-marital sex seems to have been very weak.²⁹ Yet, on the whole, women of the

²⁷ *Kisaeng* was the group of women entertainers. They were beautiful women mainly from the lower classes, who were trained in a special institute, the *Kyobang*, to be professional entertainers who could sing, dance, play instruments and engage in lively and witty conversation. Their duty was to entertain at court and at the houses of the nobility. They very often became victims of sexual oppression, but they existed outside the boundaries for women fixed by the Confucian system. Some of them became strong forces in the polity, acting from "behind the screen". A notable example of a "behind the screen" figure was *Nahap*, who became a consort of powerful minister Kim who was in control of the puppet king. Another *Kisaeng*, *Sulmae*, helped a successful coup d'état that led to the enthronement of King *Injo*. A large proportion of female poets and novelists came from among the *Kisaeng*. For example, Hwang Jin-i (1516-1559), has been considered the greatest poet of the Chosun dynasty.

²⁸ In China, by contrast, there were few limitations on the sexual behaviour of upper-class women. Many classical Chinese novels show the sexual behaviour of upper-class members. Though female chastity was the most valuable virtue, a woman was expected to maintain her husband's love with sexual attraction. Women could, or should, make themselves up to maintain their beauty and sexual attraction. For example, Chinese women have long endured painful foot-binding since they believed that bound feet would certainly arouse sexual passion from their husbands.

In Japan, women's sexuality began to be oppressed after the Meiji restoration, but not as thoroughly as in Korea. See: *The Dream of Red Chambers*, written in the early Qing dynasty; *Golden Lotus*, written in the late Ming dynasty; *Flowers in the Mirror*, written in the late Qing dynasty. Also see Spence (1991).

²⁹ As Weeks (1989) shows in the case of Britain, the working class in Korea held their own autonomy in terms of regulating sexuality. They shaped their sexuality within a world dominated

upper and middle class in the Chosun dynasty were curtailed within the home without parallel in history.

The Confucian order in Korea came to face a heavy pressure for change during the nineteenth century because of the advancement of western powers, the transmission of Christianity and Japanese invasion. The aggressive presence of foreign powers, which drove Korea to the open door policy (1876) and Japanese colonisation (1910), urged Korean intellectuals to search for a balance between change and tradition, and between adaptation and preservation. In the quest, many intellectuals developed a modern Korean nationalism, and accepted many aspects of western culture. For women, western culture, particularly Christianity, and nationalism provided a new opportunity: Christian missionaries preached equality between the sexes before God, and established schools for women; and the nationalist movement supported women's rights.

2.3.3 Transmission of Christianity

During the nineteenth century, Christianity was introduced via China, and began to spread amongst women and deviant intellectuals. Despite its patriarchal nature, Christianity in Korea advanced women's status by propagating equality between nobles and commons, and between men and women in the eyes of God, as well as by denying church membership to non-monogamous males. For Korean women, the practice that the churches seated women in the chapel along with men was almost revolutionary. Although the

by respectable values, but even when they approximated such values, they did so for reasons which had a different rationale in each class.

church instructed women to subordinate themselves to their husbands, at least it condemned polygamy. This was one of the most important factors that motivated women to step into the church (Kim Yung-Chung, 1976). Like Protestantism in Europe, Christianity, regardless of Catholicism or Protestantism, was a revolutionary cultural movement in Korea. In this regard, it was not surprising that more women than men were attracted to Christianity (Min Kyungbae, 1972; Kim Yung-Chung, 1976; Park Suncheon, 1977).³⁰ The organization of female believers, "Women Believers' Association" (*Nyu-Sinja Hoe*) in the Catholic churches, also brought in women's organizational activities, which Korean women for centuries had not even dreamed of.

Most important of all, Christian churches supported women's education and women's organisations: the first school for women was established by a missionary; and the organisation of women believers in the Catholic churches provided women with the experience of organisational activities. Mrs. Mary F. Scranton, a medical missionary of the Methodist Church, established the first school for Korean girls. In 1877, Queen Min named it *Ehwa Haktang*. It developed into one of the finest educational institutions, and still remains the best university for women in Korea. Another school for girls named *Yongdong Haktang* began in 1887, by Annie Ellers of the Northern Presbyterian Mission.

Many women educated in these Christian schools later opened schools for women, and played a leading role in the women's movement and anti-Japanese resistance. However, this group was

³⁰ In the 1839 massacre of Catholics, for example, two-thirds of the victims were women (Park Suncheon, 1977, p.99).

conservative in gender relations, and often submissive to Western powers in foreign relations. Their commitment to women's education stemmed from nationalist concerns, rather than women's rights. In their schools, they educated Korean women with a combination of Christian principles, national consciousness, and traditional womanly virtues (Lee Hyoje, 1992, p. 66), never questioning Korean womanhood.

2.3.4 Nationalist Support of Women's Rights

Korean nationalism had a dual character: one resistant and antagonistic to foreigners, the other reformist and popular in nature. The reformist movement advocated women's rights, particularly equal opportunities in education and social activities; but resistant nationalism overrode all the other causes, delimiting women's activism in subservience to the independence struggle.

Nationalism provided legitimacy for women's education. Most nationalist intellectuals perceived education as an ultimate national resource. Under the slogan of "Knowledge is power", they established many schools, public or private, registered or underground, not only for men, but also for women.

The *Tokrip Hyuphoe* (Independence Club), the most reformist and clearly nationalist group of intellectuals, delivered the strongest support for women's education. This club made it clear that men and women had equal rights in all spheres of social life. Its newspaper, *Tokrip Sinmun* (*The Independence*), often published articles advocating sexual equality, and demanding equal educational opportunities for women. The *Tokrip Hyuphoe*

perceived education as a prerequisite for sexual equality, and urged the government to establish public schools for women (Chandra, 1988; Shin Yong-Ha, 1990).

Under the influence of the *Tokrip Hyuphoe* many intellectuals joined the enlightenment movement, and opened a number of schools for women and men. Immediately before and after Japanese colonisation, all the newspapers run by nationalists emphasized the importance of women's education, for much the same reason as Mary Wollstonecraft demanded women's education: education can produce enlightened and strong mothers and wives, and hence, make the nation healthy and modern. In 1897 the first women's school run by a Korean woman was established, and in 1898, the first women's organisation presented a petition to open a public school for women (RCKW, 1992; Lee Hyoje, 1989). From 1905 to 1910, the number of women's schools was officially reported as up to 170 (RCKW, 1992). Taking into account night schools and underground schools, the number must have been far larger. As a result, women's education in Korea was easily accepted as a principle after independence.

Nationalism also supported women's organisations. Many women's organisations emerged during colonisation, independently or under the auspices of nationalist organisations. The first women's organisation outside the churches, the *Chanyang-Hoe* (Meeting of Praise), was born in support of women's education in 1898.³¹ Following the *Chanyang-Hoe*, many women's organisations

³¹ When a small number of women announced their intention to form a meeting to establish a school for women, all national newspapers came to their aid, and named the meeting "Praise" (*Chanyang*). Its members had a variety of backgrounds, from the high nobility to *Kisaeng*. It first petitioned for the

emerged, on local or national basis. Most of them pursued expanding women's education, and raising national consciousness. Women's organisational activities culminated in 1907, when a movement spread, on an unexpected scale, appealing to Koreans to pay off the national debt to Japan. Almost every women's organisation mobilised its members, and collected a large amount of jewellery and money that possibly constituted the only property at their disposal. Although the "Pay Off the National Debt" movement could not save the destiny of the nation, women's organisations through this movement expanded the range of their members, including not only women in the ruling class or *Kisaeng*, but also housewives of commoners or the lowest caste. This event opened a new era for women's activism, for the nascent women's organisations afterwards took deep roots in Korea, with pride and support (RCKW, 1992; Chung Yosup, 1971).

There could have been a bitter struggle for women's education had it not been supported by the nationalists. Also, women's activities outside the home might have been ridiculed and suppressed by men had they not exerted themselves so vigorously through nationalism. Yet, women's activities in the independence struggle were not a women's movement in its original sense. Nor was nationalist support of women's rights an outcome of a concern with sexual equality. The demands of reform and women's education arose from sheer nationalist necessity — strengthening the

establishment of a public women's school, and held weekly meetings and open lectures for women's education. As most lecturers were members of the *Tokrip Hyuphoe*, its meetings and lectures were all about reform and independence. While the government, already under Japanese control, was indifferent to its demands, to a great extent because of its nationalist activities, it opened a school for women in 1899.

nation. The women's movement was rather suffocated by nationalists, on the grounds that it would undermine the unity of national forces.

2.3.5 Women in the Communist Movement

Under Japanese colonial rule, many nationalists became communists, as happened in many other colonised countries. During this period, class oppression was so inextricably interwoven with national oppression that the oppressor was in any analysis the same, Japanese imperialism. In fact, in the early stages of communist development in Korea, communism was taken as a strategy for nationalist struggles during the 1920s (Suh Joong-Suk, 1985; Suh Dae-Sook, 1967; Lee and Scalapino, 1972).³² As in western European countries, communists in Korea pledged sexual equality through labour participation and economic independence of women. In practice, communists focused on organising trade unions, and induced many industrial disputes as part of the anti-imperialist struggle. In these organisations and disputes, women workers played a crucial, almost indispensable role.

³² Although many communists cherished a strong nationalist sentiment, the communist perception of the fundamental conflict did not coincide with nationalist one. In the ideology of nationalism, the nation is the source of all political and social power, and loyalty to the nation overrides all other allegiances (Smith, 1991, p. 74); but in the ideology of communism and socialism, class struggle should supersede all other causes of struggle. As Korean communists expanded their activities, and penetrated into the nascent working class, the communist emphasis on class struggle became stronger, making a discernible difference from nationalists. In Korea, communists centred on the labour movements; nationalists focused on the "Patriotic Enlightenment Movement". In the Korean diaspora of Manchuria and Shanghai, communists were actively engaged in the small scale guerilla warfare in cooperation with the Chinese Reds; nationalists were inclined to diplomatic appeals to the Western superpowers and to supporting the exiled government in Shanghai.

The Korean Labour Mutual Aid Association (*Chosun Rodong Gongjehoe*, 1920-1922), the first nation-wide labour organisation, led Korean workers to organise trade unions and led to many industrial actions. Women participated in these unions and strikes. In the textile industries, in which the female proportion of the labour was about 80 percent, industrial disputes broke out with the highest frequency (RCKW, 1992, p. 130). All-female industrial action was not rare either: strikes took place at the Kyung Sung Rubber Production Company (1923); at Sunmi Production (1923-24); and a synchronised strike was organised in four rubber production companies (1923), and so on.

After the successful organisation of some trade unions, the first communist women's organisation was born in 1924, the Korean Women's League (*Chosun Nyusung Dongwoohoe*). It focused on organising female labour, moulding women into the working class, and enhancing women's economic conditions, in line with the communist theory of women's emancipation. During 1923-1927, the number of women's organisations grew up to 200, of which a quarter were inclined to communist ideals (RCKW, 1992, p. 142).

Although the communist movement contributed to expanding women's activities in Korea, it had many limitations. First of all, its activities were based on the Marxist framework of class oppression, not on gender relations. Men and women were instructed to struggle against capital, not each other. Although women's wages on average were half of men's (Lee Hyoje, 1989, p. 94), the issue of wage differentials between the sexes was suppressed for the sake of the unity of the working class.

In addition to this common problem of the communist

movement, there was the colonial question: national oppression was far more obvious than class oppression. The average wage of Japanese workers employed in Korea was, at their lowest, twice as high as that of Korean workers. An adult male Japanese worker earned twice as much as an adult male Korean, four times as much as an adult female Korean, and six times as much as a Korean minor (Ibid., p. 94). Further, in the case of industrial disputes, the Japanese military police was utterly brutal. The indifference of the colonial government to the conditions of Korean workers goes without saying.

Worst of all, the communist women's movement had very little impact on Korean society. In the 1920s, 90 percent of the male and 93 percent of the female labour force were engaged in agriculture; in the 1930s, 85 percent of males, 91 percent of females; and in the 1940s, 78 percent of males and 89 percent of females still remained in agriculture. Until 1940, the proportion of employees in the industry was less than 3 percent (Kang Ee-Soo, 1993, p. 174). While communist women were organising only 3 percent of the Korean populace, a vast majority of women suffered from feudal relations and national oppression.

2.3.6 A Condemned Group of Feminists

Women's organisations increased in numbers and in their membership, but as a part of anti-colonial, anti-imperial struggles. Women's organisations under the communist line, like the European women's movement in the nineteenth century, were subject to class struggle; under the nationalist line, women's organisations were auxiliaries to the resistance struggle. In

either case, women and men were, and had to be, in cooperative relations — the concept of sexual oppression was ruled out.

Nevertheless, in the early 1920s, a minuscule number of women demanded sexual equality and women's emancipation. Most of them came from the upper or upper-middle class, and had experienced education abroad. They preferred "women's emancipation" to "women's rights." They rejected the traditional Rule of the Three Obediences, and the double standard of morality between men and women. The most notable feminist, Na Hyesuk, who was an artist and poet, called for women's independence from their fathers and husbands. One of her poems, the House of Dolls, described women as dolls for fathers and husbands, and urged women to recognise their own human dignity, not to be dolls (RCKW, 1992, p.124). Another feminist, Kim Wonjoo, also demanded women's self-esteem and full development as individuals. She argued that "men, since the beginning of history, had treated women as lower animals, not as human beings" (RCKW, 1992, p. 124-126). They recognised that women's emancipation required struggles against men, albeit implicitly.

However, they confronted utter rejection and suspicion since they were accused of undermining the nationalist movement. Their demands were despised as immoral, and their struggle as pro-Japanese. This national condemnation called forth a bitter end in which the feminists fell into personal misery and their demands withered away. Na Hyesuk was accused of being a pro-Japanese bourgeois, which was clearly untrue, and an adulterer, which was doubtful. The fact that Na Hyesuk had once been arrested and imprisoned for five months because of her activity

in the independence struggle was almost always ignored. She ended her life as an abandoned homeless person in Paris.

Although they lacked a theoretical framework and strategies, these women the only group to question sexual oppression. The condemnation of this group eliminated the first chance for the development of an autonomous women's movement. The recognition of sexual oppression thereafter remained ever-missing in Korean women's activities.

2.3.7 Women's Activism: All for Independence

As the oppression from the colonial government became worse during the late 1920s, the national cause more and more dominated all social organisations. As a response, communists and nationalists sought joint warfare against Japanese colonialism, leading to a united front, the *Singan-Hoe* (1927-1931). In accordance with the emergence of the *Singan-Hoe*, women's organisations also had an opportunity to combine the communist and liberal ideas of women's emancipation. The *Geunwoo-Hoe* (1927-1933) was a unified national organisation of women. Though the formation and decline of the *Geunwoo-Hoe* very much resembled that of the *Singan-Hoe*, it was an independent organisation of women.

The programme and purpose of the *Geunwoo-Hoe* was ambiguous, in order to avoid suspicion from the colonial government and obtain legal registration. Its ostensible goals were to strengthen women's cooperation and to protect Korean women's political, economic, and social interests. Its programme included the abolition of social and legal discrimination against women, the elimination of feudal custom and superstitions, women's right

to choose their marriage, prohibition of public prostitution, prohibition of lower wages and night work for women, and the protection of female labour. These were advanced, and promising for the development of the Korean women's movement. Also, it consisted of all social groups: the communists and nationalists, the nobles and commoners, the educated and non-educated, and female workers and housewives. For these reasons, some Korean scholars today regard the *Geunwoo-Hoe* as the first moment of the modern Korean women's movement (Chung Yosup, 1971; RCKW, 1991).

The *Geunwoo-Hoe* was, however, more enthusiastic about the independence struggle than a women's movement. Its notable activities were obviously nationalist: investigating and supporting the Gwangjoo Students' Movement (1929) in which a conflict between Japanese and Korean students developed into an anti-Japanese independence struggle; supporting and protecting the student movement that often set off national resistance and independence struggles (Sook-Myung Girls High School Strike, 1927; Kyungsung Girls Trade School Strike, 1928; Junjoo Girls High School Students' Communist Union Incident, 1929); attempting demonstrations for independence (Chungjin, 1930; Seoul, 1930); and supporting Korean workers' industrial actions (Gwangjoo Textile Industry Strike, 1929; Pusan General Strike, 1929).

However, the *Geunwoo-Hoe* disappeared by 1933-1934, even without official dissolution. Its decline was first of all the outcome of its nationalist activities and the subsequent arrest of the leaders. Yet, the split between the communists and nationalists was equally responsible. After its disappearance, Korean women's activities lost their sense of direction, and fell

into depression until independence.

During colonisation, many women's organisations and activities were supported and legitimised by many Koreans, because "the forerunners of the women's movement *rightfully* (*sic!*) perceived national independence as the supreme end of their activities, more than their own emancipation and improvement" (Chung Yosup, 1971, p. 7). Like South African black feminists (McClintock, 1993), Korean women's activities were evaluated only by the extent of their nationalist commitment. Also, the overwhelming concern for independence held the women's movement at bay: what Koreans refer to as the history of the Korean women's movement is better described as the history of women's activism in the independence struggle. Women were fighters in the independence struggle and, at the same time, had to be wise mothers and submissive wives.

2. 4 Summary

Returning to the issues posed at the beginning of this chapter, it is clear that the dominant cultural heritage in Germany has been Christianity; and in Korea Confucianism. For German women, German culture delimited their sphere within the Three Ks; and Korean culture confined women within the home as in the Rule of the Three Obediences. Comparing the two cultural patterns, it is evident that the Korean one was more oppressive to women, restricting women's activities to the utmost. The German women's movement had been continuously developed, though

not in a linear fashion, to enhance women's status in society. But in Korea, women's activities, when they developed, were overwhelmed by the national cause — i.e., Japanese colonisation, and the Independence struggle.

The thriving and decline of the German women's movement had provided a variety of experiences, which enabled women to respond respectively to the changing social relations. The acceptance of Nazi propaganda of the Three Ks, however, had been severely attacked as the "selfish" middle class collaboration with racist and sexist Nazism (Bridenthal et.al., 1984). The Three Ks toughened the traditional, unequal gender relations. Instead of changing the gender relations towards sexual equality, Nazi women apparently strengthened the ideas of women's subordination to men. Nevertheless, German women's experience enabled women to realize how much the class division within women had weakened their power. The experience of Nazism also proved that women could obtain power and control over their lives only by changing the existing cultural pattern of gender relations. After the fall of the Nazi regime, many women began to search for a new strategy for sexual equality.

While German women were partially able to choose their strategy, Korean women were crippled by harsher surroundings and Japanese colonisation, and their struggle towards sexual equality more circumscribed by the national cause. Although nationalism supported some women's rights, the national imperative of independence left no room to question the Rule of the Three Obediences. While German women "accepted" the Three Ks for their own perceived interest, Korean women had no alternative but to

fight with men for the national cause. Some forerunners of feminism were suspected of undermining the national solidarity, and condemned to death. It was not until the defeat of Japanese colonialism that Korean women began to advance full-scale sexual equality. Yet, the widely accepted necessity of women's education and the experience of organisational struggles, combined with the hope of rebuilding an independent nation state, enabled women to search for new gender relations.

After the partitions of Germany and Korea, the two communist regimes claimed that they would emancipate women. But since gender relations are the least susceptible to institutional change, the efforts made by the political regimes towards sexual equality would be hindered by the cultural impediments. Therefore, it would be expected that, *ceteris paribus*, gender relations in the two Koreas would remain less equal than in the former two Germanies after the partition —i.e., less equal in South Korea than in West Germany, and less equal in North Korea than in East Germany. The following four chapters examine whether, or to what extent, gender relations in the four countries have changed; in particular, whether, or to what extent, the communist regimes outdistanced the capitalist regimes in achieving sexual equality, overcoming the cultural impediments of the Three Ks and the Rule of the Three Obediences.

CHAPTER THREE

WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

3. 1 Introduction

After partition West Germany struggled to regain its sovereignty and control over its citizens as a new democratic state. Sovereignty was incomplete, and its political system was penetrated by external states (Katzenstein, 1987). Despite initial confusion and conflicts, West German people developed the "social market economy" (*Soziale Marktwirtschaft*) and parliamentary democracy as their principles of political and social life. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) soon won a reputation for political stability and miraculous economic recovery. But missing in the FRG was an ideological preoccupation with women's emancipation. While women in the East were fully participating in a buoyant labour market, women in the West were under pressure to return to full-time home-making (Kolinsky, 1989; Helwig, 1987). The traditional notions of separate men's and women's spheres remained almost intact, and legal amendments towards sexual equality were slow and painstaking. However, in tandem with dramatic economic growth and the need for an expanded labour force, women's employment and social activities of all kinds increased steadily. So did women's voices. By comparison with the GDR, enhancing women's status in society was pursued by women themselves. This chapter examines how FRG women have struggled for sexual equality, without a regime-commitment.

3.1.1 Politics and the Economy

The political structures of the two Germanies were initially very similar. Both were federal, with lower and upper houses of parliament (in the East, *Volkskammer* and *Staatsrat*; in the West, *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*), and ceremonial Presidents in addition to the political leader (Prime Minister in the East and Chancellor in the West). However, even in 1949, the systems were very different in practice. Whereas the SED in the East monopolised power, the parties in the West had to compete for parliamentary seats and to compromise with each other to form a coalition government.

Under the Basic Law, the only way to control the Federal government was to obtain as many seats as possible in the *Bundestag* through election. However, neither the CDU nor SPD managed to gain a working majority in the *Bundestag*, except in 1957 when the CDU gained an absolute majority. Therefore, the Federal government has been formed through coalition and to a large extent has depended on compromise between the coalition partners. In this multiparty system, the ideological commitment of a party, if any, was narrowly circumscribed by the onus of attracting votes¹ and by the coalition requirements.² Therefore,

¹ The two parties announced themselves to be "people's parties" (*Volksparteien*), and transformed their party programmes: the CDU claimed to hold a general Christian commitment and a concern with class conciliation (Smith, 1986, pp, 92-93); and the SPD adopted the Godesberg Programme in 1959, accepting private enterprise as the economic order (Turner, 1992, p. 130).

² The CDU/CSU in the 1950-60s and 1980s, and the SPD in the 1970s had to rely on the FDP to form a government. Though the FDP narrowly escaped extinction and suffered twice from party splits (1956 and 1972), it has played an indispensable role in government composition: the FDP joined nine of the eleven governments formed during 1949-1989.

a new programme, or a party's proposal for progressive change was modified during election campaigns and by party compromises.

FRG economic consensus was set by the philosophy of the "social market economy" (*Soziale Marktwirtschaft*).³ The social market economy enjoined a limited state with the responsibility of securing law and order, and providing a stable monetary system. Therefore, while the GDR controlled the economy with central planning, the FRG stimulated the freest possible competition in the market. Women's labour participation, too, was subject to the labour market.

3.1.2 Family Policies (*Familienpolitik*)

The parties in the FRG, except the Green Party, considered women's issues almost always in relation to the family. While the SED issued policies for women (*Frauenpolitik*), the CDU and SPD had family policies (*Familienpolitik*).

During the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition (1949-1966) marriage and the family were regarded as social institutions which needed the special protection of the state (Textor, 1991). The Ministry of the Family (*Bundesministerium fuer Familie*) was established in 1953, and issued an "Eight-Point Programme" (*Acht-Punkte Programm*), which paid much attention to

³ As first spelled out by Ludwig Erhard in the Economic Council of Frankfurt, the social market economy implied a commitment to a capitalist system based on the operation of market forces, but was modified by an important social qualification (Barry, 1993). It was based on the belief that private property and the price system were the best means of exploiting scarce resources for the maximisation of human welfare. The state had certain welfare responsibilities for the innocent victims of economic change, but not for a comprehensive social security system supported by general taxation. Instead, the FRG welfare system was predominantly insurance-based.

families with children. In line with the government's reaffirmation of the family, many Germans looked forward to "normalising" their private life —i.e., husbands as breadwinners, and wives as full-time house-keepers and mothers. However, this expectation was not fully met: too many families were under the poverty line; war widows were not rare; and in the 1950s, every second woman between the ages of twenty and thirty was not married (Kolinsky, 1989).

During the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition (1969-1982), the emphasis in family policies changed. The SPD considered the family as a voluntary organisation of individuals. The relationship between the married couple was assumed to be a partnership (*Partnerschaft*), and the responsibilities over children were to be shared by both parents. The government also regarded child welfare and the socialisation of education (*Vergesellschaftung der Erziehung*) as of great importance, and changed the Ministry for Family into the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family and Health (*Bundesministerium fuer Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit: BMJFG*).

In 1982, the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition returned to government, once again emphasising the family as a social institution. However, the emergence of the Greens and the women's movement, along with the pressure from the then EEC, obliged the government to recognise the "woman question." The concept of a women policy (*Frauenpolitik*) came into use in government as an independent subject (BMFJ, 1992).⁴

⁴ Accordingly, the Ministry for Women and Youth (*Bundesministerium fuer Frauen und Jugend*) was conceived of in 1989, and fully set up in 1991.

Despite wavering public policies and staggeringly slow legal reforms, FRG women continued to expand their space in society. By the end of the 1980s, women composed 40 percent of the labour force, 40 percent of university students, and around a quarter of the party membership, and made their voice heard.

3. 2 Women under the Law

The original constitutions of the FRG and GDR contained almost identical equal right provisions that men and women are to be equal under the law, and that no one is to be given preference or be discriminated against because of sex. However, the two Germanies developed quite different ways to enforce these basic rights provisions. The GDR enacted radical, and theoretically informed, laws to realise the principles of the constitution; the legislature of the FRG took some time to relieve the shock that rapid change might cause. By the end of the 1980s, many equal right provisions of the constitution were fulfilled through legislation, but not all.

3.2.1 Equal Rights Promise in the Basic Law

Article 3 of the Basic Law makes explicit reference to the principle of equality. According to Article 3 (2), women have equal rights unconditionally. Another provision for equal rights in the Basic Law is Article 33 (2), which declares that every German shall be equally eligible for any public office according to his aptitude, qualifications, and professional achievements.

This provision, however, could not prevent the revised Civil Service Law of 1950 from retaining the discrimination against married women: "a female civil servant can be dismissed if he (*sic*) marries" (BG; §63 (1)).

The Basic Law provided that any previous law that contradicted the equal right provision "remains in force until it has been adjusted to the constitution, but no later than 31 March, 1953" (Article 117 (1)). The Federal Constitutional Court declared on 18 December 1953 that the equal right provisions of the Basic Law were henceforth in force. However, the new Civil Code on equality of the sexes dated only from 1957, and became effective from 1958. Not until 1977, when the new Family Law came into force, had equality between the husband and wife within the family been provided. Legal reform towards sexual equality, therefore, demanded a great deal of energy and time of the women's movement.

3.2.2 Family Law

The Family Law composes Book Four of the German Civil Code (*Buergerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB*). The original Civil Code was based on the assumption that wives were subject to their husbands. Every decision in the family was taken by the husband. With regard to children, the old Civil Code gave the father sole parental power over their persons and their property and made him their sole representative in legal transactions. An illegitimate child had the legal status of a legitimate child in respect to the mother, but not in respect to the father; it was not even deemed to be related by blood to the father. The mother had the

right and the duty to take care of the child; but the mother could represent the child only if she was appointed guardian.

In 1957, the FRG adopted an Equal Rights Law (*Gleichberechtigungsgesetz*) that transferred parental power to both parents "by mutual consent", and called on the parents to solve the differences of opinion which might arise between them (BGB §1626). In the case of illegitimate children, the mother alone held parental authority (§1705-1712).

The major improvement in the 1957 Equal Rights Law lay in the economic relations within marriage: the property and possessions of the spouses which were obtained during the marriage were declared joint property (§1416); each spouse was allowed to have and manage special property (§1417) and separate property (§1418) independently. In the case of widowhood or divorce, the wife had a right to her share, regardless of whether she had contributed to the family income by gainful employment (§1361a). However, the guilt principle in the case of divorce remained, and the guilty party's claim to property was restricted (§1478).⁵

Nevertheless, the Equal Rights Law did not effectively alter the sex roles in the family. The law was based on the notion that a woman should marry, and keep the household as a housewife and mother. Women's gainful employment was assumed to be

⁵ Under the old Civil Code, marriage could be dissolved only if at least one of the spouses was found guilty of severe matrimonial transgression such as adultery or desertion. After divorce, the guilty party should make support payment to the other party.

exceptional.⁶ Therefore, the 1957 reform was taken to "advocate" that women be full-time housewives as the most suitable type of marriage (Kolinsky, 1989, p. 49; Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, p. 138; Helwig, 1982, p. 48).

Throughout the early 1970s, the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition government tried to revise the marriage and family law, but confronted strong opposition and controversies. Eventually, however, the First Act for Reform of Marriage and Family Law (*Erstes Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts: EheRG*) was passed on 14 June 1976, and took effect on 1 January 1977.⁷ The

⁶ The Equal Rights Law did not modify Art.1355-6 and Art.1360 of the Civil Code. Art.1356 stipulated that a wife could be gainfully employed, but only to the extent that such employment did not conflict with her marital and family obligations. It regarded the management of the household as the wife's individual responsibility. Also, Art.1360 made it obligatory for the wife to find gainful employment and contribute to family income if her husband's income was not enough to support the family. The married and family name continued to be the name of the husband (§1355).

⁷ By this new Family Law, sections §1355-1360 of the Civil Code were rewritten as follows:

- §1355 (1). The spouses have a common family name (married name).
(2). On their wedding, the spouses declare to the authorities one of the spouses' family name which he or she was given by birth as their family name (married name).
- §1356 (1). The spouses arrange the conduct of the household in mutual agreement. If only one of the spouses takes full charge of the household, then he or she alone assumes full responsibility for it.
(2). Both spouses are entitled to be gainfully employed. In the choice and the performance of their gainful occupation, they are to give due consideration to the interests of the other spouse and of the family.
- §1357 (1). Each spouse is entitled to enter into business linked to the needs of the family and also on behalf of the other partner.
- §1360. The spouses are obliged to each other to adequately support the family by their work and personal means. If one of the spouses is left in charge of the household, then he or she meets his or her obligation to work for the support of the family as a general rule by taking care of the household.

new law eliminated the concept of male head of household, and was based on the concept of partnership (Textor, 1991, p. 37; Kolinsky, 1989, pp. 49-50; Shaffer, 1981, pp. 28-33). According to the new Family Law, both spouses share the responsibilities in the household, and are equally entitled to take on paid employment (§1356). The married and family name can be chosen from either the husband's or wife's family name before marriage (§1355). If the gainfully employed wife alone supports the family, her husband is responsible for the household (§1360). Also the new Family Law abolished the guilt principle altogether, and allowed divorce on the ground of marital breakdown without a guilty sentence for either party.⁸ Equal rights within the family, which East German women obtained more than a decade earlier (1965), were finally granted.

In 1982, the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition returned to government, and took several legislative steps to reaffirm motherhood. In 1984, the *Bundestag* passed a law to set up a "Mother and Child Foundation".⁹ Other laws improved tax reductions for single parents, raised child allowances, and reintroduced child benefit for unemployed adolescents up to the age of 21. In a 1986 legislation, housewives acquired pension

⁸ Marriage can be dissolved after a one-year separation if there is mutual consent, or a three-year separation without consent. Each partner is responsible for her and his own maintenance after divorce unless one partner has custody of children, can not find employment, or could not complete study or training because of marriage, or is disabled. All pensions and other entitlements acquired during marriage are divided, no matter which partner had earned through employment.

⁹ It was to receive an annual endowment of DM500 million in order to extend financial and institutional support to pregnant women in need.

rights in relation to the number of their children and their previous employment. However, women who never worked before childbirth were not included in the pension entitlement. Though much limited in scope, the legislation made a turning point in the recognition of child-rearing as a contribution which society should reward (Kolinsky, 1989, p. 69). Ironically, from a conservative perspective, the legislation widened the scope of maternity leave to include fathers as well as mothers. Moreover, the legislation granted a longer additional time off (up to ten months in 1986/87, and up to twelve months from 1988) and increased payment to mothers or fathers, following the recommendation by EC directives.

3.2.3 Labour Law

In the FRG's market economy, the state did not guarantee employment to anyone; nor was there a general duty or obligation for anyone to work. Although the SPD was still concerned about the goals of the socialist women's movement, in particular the belief that sexual equality rested on women's gainful employment, it was by no means at liberty to effect a thorough reform. Most legislation on women's employment was concentrated on the protection of working mothers and pregnant women. Many of the laws simply place legal restrictions on women's employment; others provide for special privileges extended for their protection.¹⁰

¹⁰ For instance, the Law for the Protection of Working Mothers (*Mutterschutzgesetz*: MuSchG, 1952, 1979) meticulously regulated pregnant women's or nursing mothers' employment. Pregnant women or nursing mothers could not be employed on jobs where they would be exposed to harmful effects of health

Fundamental for the equality of the sexes in employment is the concept of equal pay for equal work. In the FRG, the principle was supposedly included in Article 3 of the Basic Law. However, since Article 9 of the Basic Law guarantees the autonomy of the two sides of industry —employers and employees— and their right to co-determine the conditions of work and pay, the wage settlements assumed reduced rates for women. In 1955, the Federal Labour Court declared this practice unconstitutional, and suggested that wage groups should be specified in detail, and pay awarded accordingly. In response, the industries classified many posts, which were mainly occupied by women, as lower wage groups (*Leichtlohngruppen*). Normally men's work was assigned to a higher wage group. The constitutional command of equality was thus circumvented.

In 1980, facing heavy pressure from the European Commission and the European Court of Justice,¹¹ the FRG responded with a legislative package: the Labour Law to Comply with the European

endangering materials or rays, dust, gases, vapour, heat, cold, dampness, strong vibrations, or noise, or on jobs where they might be required to lift regularly over 5 kg, or occasionally over 10 kg of weight without mechanical aid, and so on. They were not allowed to work overtime, nights and holidays. This law also allowed women maternity leave, at full pay, during six weeks before and eight weeks after delivery. However, maternity leave was considerably shorter than in the GDR, which provided women with one year (*Kindjahr*).

¹¹ In 1975, the European Commission advised member states to revise their legislation to guarantee equal pay to men and women. One year later, the Commission requested member states to put the principle of equal treatment into practice and ensure that women and men enjoyed equal access to employment, training and promotion, and that working conditions were the same for both sexes. In 1978, the Commission ordered member states to commence the legislative process needed to guarantee sexual equality in all aspects of social security, notably insurance cover and pensions. Finally, the European Court of Justice opened proceedings against the FRG government in 1979.

Community Provisions (*Gesetz ueber die Gleichbehandlung von Maennern und Frauen am Arbeitsplatz und ueber die Erhaltung von Anspruechen bei Betriebsuebergang: EG Anpassungsgesetz*). According to this law, articles 611 and 613 of the Civil Code were rewritten. Equal treatment of men and women becomes obligatory for all aspects of appointment, promotion and dismissal; should a dispute arise, the employer has to prove that discrimination has not taken place (BGB §611a). All positions have to be open to men and women, and all advertising of posts has to remain gender-neutral (§611b). The principle of equal pay for equal work is once more confirmed, and the intentions of the Treaty of Rome are to be incorporated into the FRG legislation (§612b).

3.2.4 The Penal Code: Crimes against Women and Abortion

The German Penal Code (*Strafgesetzbuch: StGB*) distinguishes the crime of rape (§177) from the crime of forcing sexual intercourse (§178). The crime of rape is concluded by the attacker's insuperable violence against a woman, while the crime of forcing sexual intercourse does not necessarily include violence and a female victim. Teubner (1988) criticised §177-178 of the StGB for three reasons: first, §177 excludes marital rape by the spouse; second, §177 gives an impression that the absence of consent does not count unless there is severe violence or intimidation accompanied; and third, both §177-178 imply that rape means penile-vaginal penetration, excluding all other sorts of sexual assaults. There is no other provision related to crimes against women in the StGB.

The Penal Code restricts abortion (*Schwangerschaftsabbruch*) severely in §218.¹² The §218 turned many women into illegal aborters, and caused unnecessary pains for them.¹³ As a result, §218 gave a new impetus to the women's movement. In 1971, the magazine *Der Stern* published a letter in which 347 women, among them well-known figures, all publicly announced "I have aborted." In an another magazine, *Der Spiegel*, 329 doctors signed a letter that they had performed abortions, of course, illegally. In March 1972 a women's congress was organised, which had an unexpected attendance of about 400 women. Mass demonstrations and a flood of publications on the abortion issue followed. Finally, the government, then the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition, worked very seriously for a repeal. In 1974, an abortion law was passed in the *Bundestag* against strong conservative opposition. It allowed women the right to interrupt their pregnancy at will during the first three months of pregnancy. However, in 1975, the Federal Constitutional Court declared this law unconstitutional. Facing the defeat, the SPD-FDP coalition introduced another more moderate law. In 1977, an amendment for abortion was accepted by the *Bundestag*, which allowed abortion by specific indications

¹² The German Penal Code permitted abortions only when there was a "medical indication" —i.e., if, in the opinion of qualified physicians, continuation of the pregnancy would seriously endanger the life of the mother.

¹³ In 1969 alone, the number of illegal abortions was estimated to have been between 350,000 and one million (Kaplan, 1992, p. 114). Katherina Focke, Minister for Youth, Family, and Health (1972-76), advocated the repeal of "the infamous Art.218" which "brought sorrow, desperation, and misery to countless German women" (Shaffer, 1981, p. 52).

(Indication solution: *Indikationsloesung*).¹⁴ The so-called "indication solution" was very similar to the pre-1972 abortion law of the GDR. Thus a social, ethical, or medical indication could represent an allowable indication for an abortion. However, even in cases where the existence of social indication was certified, pregnant women in Southern Germany frequently faced difficulties in finding a physician, or a hospital, willing to perform the abortion.

By the 1980s, the laws concerning women in the two Germanies became almost identical, except on the matter of abortion. The process until then had formed a stark contrast. In the GDR, the SED-controlled government took initiatives in legal reforms. In the FRG, individuals took suits to the court, made an appeal to the parties, or agitated against the laws. The Federal Constitutional Court proved itself a guardian of the Constitution, but not a protector of women's rights. The European Commission and its directives were more influential in changing laws in the FRG. After faltering progress, women came to obtain equal rights, at least on paper.

¹⁴ The indication solution was vulnerable to further, and possibly reactionary, amendments. The threat became real when the amendment came under attack by the CDU. Also in 1979, the extreme right politician, and well-known misogynist, Joseph Strauss of the CSU was put up as a candidate for the federal Chancellor. This stirred women from the various factions of women's organisations into action. In the 1979 election, the CDU/CSU was defeated by the SPD.

3. 3 Women in Education

As the Basic Law guaranteed the free development of the personality (Article 2), there was not a monolithic ideological object of education in the FRG like that of "moulding a socialist personality" in the GDR. Nor was there a specific programme for furthering women's educational opportunities. While GDR laws amounted to a thorough-going effort to legislate for the educational furtherance of women, there was no comparable law in the FRG. Only Article 3 of the Basic Law supposedly provides the principle of equal opportunity of education for all citizens irrespective of sex.

Education policy in the FRG was affected by many factors: by the parents' rights; by the Court; by party politics; and by external pressure from the European Commission.

3.3.1 Education System

The entire FRG education system was under close supervision of the *Laender* (*Grundgesetz*, Article 7, (1))¹⁵, and most schools and all institutions of higher education were state

¹⁵ In 1953, the Federal government agreed with the ministers of education, or culture, of the *Laender* and thereby established an Educational Advisory Committee, so as to coordinate *Laender's* educational policies. After the "Education Crisis" of the 1960s (Fishman and Martin, 1987, pp. 101-108; Kolinsky, 1989, p. 100), this Committee developed in 1965 and 1970 into the Educational Council (*Deutscher Bildungsrat*: DBR) and Educational Planning and Research Commission (*Bund-Laender-Kommission fuer Bildungsplanung und Forschungsfoerderung*: BLK). The BLK in 1973 agreed the Comprehensive Education Development Plan (*Bildungsgesamtplan*) which provided long-term educational planning goals and a clear picture of FRG education system (Kloss, 1990, pp. 140-142).

establishments until the 1980s.¹⁶ Since the Basic Law stated explicitly that "the care and upbringing of children are the natural rights of the parents and a duty" (Article 6 (2)), parents had the right to decide the course of education for their children.




Figure 3.1 Education System

School attendance is compulsory from the ages of six to eighteen, for twelve years, during which full-time attendance is required for nine years and part-time attendance at vocational

¹⁶ Since the 1980s there are a small number of private universities.

school thereafter. Primary school (*Grundschule*) lasts four years, in Berlin six. After that, pupils attend one of the junior secondary schools (*Hauptschule*), intermediate schools (*Realschule*), or grammar schools (*Gymnasium*). The fifth and sixth school years are an "orientation stage" (*Foerderstufe* or *Orientierungsstufe*), when children and their parents can revise their choice of school.

Until the 1960s two thirds of children were educated in *Volksschule*;¹⁷ a tenth in *Realschule*; and a seventh in *Gymnasium*. However, along with improved living standards and changing attitudes towards higher education, the mapping of schools has changed: by 1989, a larger number of pupils were educated in the *Gymnasium* (37%), than in the *Hauptschule* (31%) or the *Realschule* (20%). The change was even more dramatic for girls. Traditionally, many parents considered it luxurious to educate girls beyond basic literacy and numeracy. However, the FRG experienced a "miracle of girls" (*Fraeuleinwunder*) in the 1970s (Kolinsky, 1989), and the proportion of female students in *Gymnasium* increased rapidly (Figure 3.2)¹⁸.

Anyone who left full-time general education, and did not attend a full-time vocational school or college was required to attend a vocational school (*Berufsschule*). Part-time vocational school pupils were required to attend on-the-job training (dual system). Although a majority of young people went to the dual system, the shortage of training places in trade or industry led

¹⁷ In the 1960s, the old *Volksschule* was redefined into an elementary part, *Grundschule*, and a secondary part, *Hauptschule*.

¹⁸ Sources: StBA, *Datenreport*, 1983, 1987, 1990.




Figure 3.2 The Proportion of Female Pupils in Secondary Education

many school leavers to full-time courses in one of specialised vocational schools (*Berufsfachschule*), senior vocational schools (*Fachoberschule*), extended vocational schools (*Berufsaufbauschule*), or technical schools (*Fachschule*). More women than men entered full-time vocational schools, which offered less attractive prospects and did not teach the full range of qualifications (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Proportion of Female Participants in Vocational Education (%)

Year	Beruf- schulen	Berufsfach- schulen	Berufsauf- bauschulen	Fachober- schulen	Fachschule
1955	44	71			34
1965	44	63	27		60
1975	40	66	25	33	57
1980	40	66	29	37	65
1985	42	66	30	36	66
1989	37	65	25	37	54

* Note: Proportion calculated by the numbers of total and female trainees in StBA, *Statistisches Jahrbuch* 1957, 1967, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1990.

A survey of 1981, repeated in 1985, explained why more women took full-time training courses than men: they were less likely to be offered in-plant training. In 1981, male trainees applied on average six times before they were offered a place; but female trainees had to apply eight times. This gender gap in getting a training place was aggravated in 1985. In 1985, male trainees applied seven times before they were admitted, female trainees thirteen times (Schweikert, 1989, p. 46). The low acceptance rate for women in the in-plant training courses confined women to a narrow spectrum of work.

3.3.2 Women in Higher Education

In the FRG, as in the GDR, institutions of higher education were tuition-free. However, there were substantial differences in financial assistance and special aid to female students. In the FRG, the parents of most students paid at least part of the considerable living and study material expenses connected with a college education. This was disadvantageous for women and, in particular, for mothers who needed child-care facilities and extra money. The birth of a child was one of the main reasons why female students interrupted their studies much more frequently than men (Shaffer, 1986, p. 131). There was no obligation on colleges and universities to minister to the particular needs of student-mothers.

Nevertheless, along with the *Frauleinwunder*, women's proportion in tertiary education —in colleges (*Hochschulen*), technical colleges (*Fachhochschulen*), and universities




Figure 3.3 Proportion of Female Students by College Type

(Universitaeten)— increased as well (Figure 3.3).¹⁹ However, there still remained differences in the subjects taken by men and women. Women tended to concentrate in the arts, medicine, language and literature, and pedagogy; men in electronics, mechanics, engineering, and information technology and computer science. Women composed 74 percent of students in English; 70 percent in German; and 63 percent in psychology (*Statistisches Jahrbuch* 1990, p. 370). By contrast, men composed 97 percent of students in electronics, mechanics and telecommunications; 90 percent in physics and astronomy; and 89 percent in industrial relations.

Unfortunately, 'women's subjects' do not match with the changing demand of the labour market. Also, the number of university or college graduates is expected to rise to 3.7

¹⁹ Sources: "Studierende an den Hochschulen" in StBA, *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1957-1990.

million by the turn of the century. Though higher education has a bright prospect in the labour market, the recent trend towards graduate unemployment seems the likely scenario for the future. Therefore, the place of FRG women in higher education and their bids for advanced vocational qualifications have been overshadowed by the mismatch between preferences and career opportunities in the current economic environment.

3. 4 Women at Work

By the 1980s, the FRG had made progress in changing its laws and attitudes, albeit belatedly, towards equal rights and opportunities for women. Women were legally guaranteed to be treated equally in employment. The principle of equal pay for equal work was officially in force. Women had caught up with men as far as participation in all levels of the education system was concerned. In appearance, women had equal rights, and competence, to choose whether and where they work, and under what conditions. In practice, women's choice was still restricted by the labour market. The labour market was segregated in line with sex: women's access to certain occupations was limited; their status in employment was lower than men's; their chances to be promoted were slim. Worse, their earnings were far less than men's even when they had equal education and qualification. Nevertheless, women have expanded their economic activities, and cultivated self-confidence at work.

3.4.1 Women in the Labour Force

The proportion of women in the labour force has changed less than 4 percentage points in four decades, remaining around 36-39 percent. The temptation is to suggest that FRG women have been less active, or more reluctant, to participate in the labour market than their eastern sisters. However, at least three explanatory factors need to be taken into account. First, unlike in the GDR, there was no strong legal and political support for women's equal opportunity in the FRG, leaving aside the weak ideological pledge for women's emancipation. Secondly, since the 1970s, West European societies have entered the 'post-industrial' era, and some socio-economic forecasters predicted an end of the 'working society' with employment receding in importance for the individual (Kolinsky, 1989). For men, participation in the labour market has fallen. While the proportion of gainfully employed men between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five has fallen by 13 percentage points, the proportion of women has been rising, from 41 percent to 50 percent by the 1980s (Table 3.2).

Finally, whereas the GDR suffered from shortages of labour, the FRG suffered the opposite since the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, the unemployment rate was 9 percent, and women's unemployment rate was higher, over 10 percent. The so-called silent reserve (*Stille Reserve*) who were not registered as unemployed and did not appear in the statistics, but were looking for work was much larger.

Table 3.2 Women in the Labour Force

Year	Proportion of women among the Employed	Women's Labour Participation Rate Aged 15-65	Men's Labour Participation Rate Aged 15-65
1950	36	41	94
1963	36	47	91
1973	37	48	87
1981	38	48	83
1985	38	47	84
1989	40	50	81

* Note 1). Calculation based on "*Bevoelkerung nach dem Alter*", "*Erwerbstaetige nach Altersgruppen und Stellung im Beruf*", and "*Wohnbevoelkerung und Erwerbspersonen nach Stellung im Beruf*" in StBA, *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1957; 1967; 1975; 1982; 1987; 1990.

* Note 2). Labour Participation Rate = (The Employed + The Recognised Unemployed)/Working Age Population * 100 (in Percentage)

Considering these factors, the growth of women's labour participation rate appears rather impressive. In this light, it is of importance that many young women regarded work as indispensable. In a survey of 1985, to the question "if you had enough money, could you imagine a life without work (*Arbeit*)?" 68 Percent of women and 60 percent of men answered "no" (Schweikert, 1989, p. 47). There were similar surveys, and similar outcomes, in 1979 and 1989 (Shaffer, 1981; BMFJ, 1992). More women than men among the young generation highly valued their work. Whether they were welcome in the work place, or whether they received rewards appropriate to their work, women continuously expanded their places in the FRG economy.

3.4.2 Vocational Qualifications of Women

Although young women on average had better marks in their school-leaving certificates than men, they ended up in a narrower spectrum of vocational training courses: 57 percent of women

crowded in 10 out of 370 occupational training courses, while 36 percent of men did so (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Distribution of Trainees in the Top Ten Occupational Courses, Women and Men (1989)

Women's Courses	Number of Female Trainees in the Course	% in total Female Trainees
Office Worker	59,397	8.9
Hairdresser	51,814	7.7
Small Shopkeeper	46,657	7.0
Doctor's Receptionist	42,178	6.3
Industrial Saleswoman	40,012	6.0
Saleswoman in Food Industry	38,393	5.7
Dentist's Nurse	29,689	4.4
Bank Clerk	28,581	4.3
Buyer	24,873	3.7
Large/International Trade Assistant	21,273	3.2
Subtotal	382,867	57.3
Total Female Trainees	669,325	100.0
<hr/>		
Men's Courses	Number of Male Trainees in the Course	% in total Male Trainees
Motor-Vehicle Mechanic	69,151	7.8
Electronic Installer	45,818	5.2
Industrial Mechanic (Machine/System Technic)	35,174	4.0
Carpenter	28,017	3.2
Large/International Trade Assistant	27,962	3.2
Industrial Mechanic (Factory)	26,956	3.1
Bank Clerk	25,448	2.9
Painter	25,212	2.9
Small Shopkeeper	24,029	2.7
Gas/Water Engineer	24,106	2.7
Subtotal	332,282	37.6
Total Male Trainees	883,768	100.0

* Sources: *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1991*, p. 392.

Among the ten largest occupational training courses, only three —small shopkeepers, bank clerks, and large and international trade assistants— were shared by both men and

women. Women's 'preferences' were apparent in nursing, caring, and assisting jobs, which were occupations with a higher unemployment rate after training, or occupations with more unfavourable working conditions (Schweiker, 1989).

In order to widen the narrow spectrum of women's vocational training opportunities, the Social Democrat-Liberal coalition government launched an initiative "Girls in Men's Jobs" (*Maedchen in Maennerberufe*) in 1976. The programme focused on those fields where traditionally 80 percent or more of the trainees had been men. As an incentive to take girls, the government covered the cost to companies of female trainees in a 'male' field. In 1976, 2 percent of female apprentices in the dual system were trained in the 'male' fields; ten years later, so were 8 percent of women (*Frauen in der BRD*, 1989). Though the proportion of women in 'male fields' is still very low, the degree of change — quadrupled in proportion— seems significant.

As far as qualifications were concerned, the young women of the "*Fraeuleinwunder*" were well prepared for employment. In 1989 women aged between twenty and thirty reached a near parity with men in vocational qualifications (Figure 3.4).²⁰ Though both men and women have improved their qualifications during four decades, women's advancement has been more evident. Less than 40 percent of women aged fifty and above were qualified as skilled workers, while 60 percent of younger women were so qualified.

The driving force towards higher education was the expectation of better opportunities in employment and living

²⁰ Source: "Bevoelkerung im April 1989 nach Altersgruppen und Bildungsabschluss" in StBA, *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1991, p.383.




Figure 3.4 Vocational Qualification by Age

conditions. Higher educational and vocational qualifications, in turn, motivated women to work, regardless of age. Women with higher qualifications were least likely to give up their work, and keenest to resume it if they did take a career-break (Kolinsky, 1989, p. 157; Shaffer, 1981). Despite these improved qualifications and enhanced expectations, however, women confronted in the labour market the invisible barriers that severed men's and women's work.

3.4.3 Women in Employment: Segregated Labour Market

In 1989, the total labour force in the FRG numbered close to 28 million; and just over 10 million were women. Though the proportion of female employees in the labour force grew little, the structure of women's employment changed more. In the immediate post-war era one in three women were engaged in

agriculture; one in four worked in manufacturing and industry. In 1989, more than a third of employed women were working in the service sector. Also, women's status in employment has improved. In the 1950s, less than 8 percent of public sector employees (*Beamte*) were women. In 1989, one in every five women was running her own business; another one in five women was serving in the public sector. However, there remained stereotyping of men's and women's work and segregation in the labour market. The segregation of the labour market has four patterns: segregation by economic sectors; by status; by occupations, horizontally and vertically; and by part-time and full-time jobs.

First, women were well recruited in service and manufacturing sectors (Table 3.4). The segregation by economic sectors helped keep the labour market flexible. When the economy was prosperous, women were welcomed in almost every economic sector; in recession, however, female workers were more likely to be ousted than men where both sexes were competing.

The segregation of women by employed status is displayed in Figure 3.5.²¹ Most women were employed as low-paid workers (*Arbeiter*),²² and made up half of the work force. Otherwise, women joined the family business, while men tended to run their own business. Although the proportion of women in the public sector (*Beamte*) was growing, women's low proportion in the self-employed, and over-representation in family business sector

²¹ Sources : "Erwerbstätige nach der Stellung im Beruf" in StBA, *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1958-1991.

²² The concept of worker (*Arbeiter*) here refers to unskilled or semi-skilled worker. In German, *Angestellte* refers to blue-colour employee, and *Beamte* to public sector employee.

suggest that there was a 'glass ceiling' in big business.

Table 3.4 Women's Employment by Economic Sectors

Women's Proportion in Each Economic Sector (%)					
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1989
Total	36	37	36	38	39
Domestic/Non-paid	52	84	70	63	61
Services	51	61	59	60	60
Commerce	42	54	54	56	56
Finance/Banking		44	44	48	47
Agr/Past/Fishery	55	54	53	49	44
Regional Service		23	24	28	32
Industry	29	32	30	29	27
Transport/Communication	10	16	17	21	24
Energy/Mining	4	5	7	10	11
Construction	3	3	6	8	10

* Note: Calculation based on "Erwerbstätige nach Wirtschaftszweige" in StBA, *Bevoelkerung und Wirtschaft 1872-1972*, p. 146; and *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1980; 1990.




Figure 3.5 The Proportion of Female Employees by the Status

The occupational segregation between the sexes in its horizontal form leads women to a narrow spectrum of choice; in 1989, 67.2 percent of women employees were concentrated in ten occupations (Table 3.5).

More than a fourth of female employees were office assistants; one in eight women were large or small shop assistants. Men's and women's occupations were almost categorically differentiated. Further, 'men's occupations' had a stronger power of exclusion than women's. It has been argued that horizontally segregated, sex-typed occupations are least susceptible to change; once an occupation has been sex-typed, normative and other forces operate to maintain segregation (Murgatroyd, 1985).

Vertical segregation includes both the recruitment of women into permanent lower-level occupations and the exclusion of women from the occupations higher up in the hierarchy of occupations. A women's congress on economic power and women (1988, Berlin) established that less than 1 percent of women employees held key positions in private companies (Kaplan, 1992, p. 125).

In another pattern of sexual segregation, women composed nearly nine out of every ten part-timers. In 1989, one in every three employed women was working part-time; three fifths of them were working less than 20 hours a week (Table 3.6). For women, part-time work has one clear advantage: combining the family and employment: 82 percent of total female part-timers were married. Also, three in four women who would return after a career break preferred to work part-time (Kolinsky, 1989, p. 174).

Table 3.5 Top Ten Occupations of Women and Men, 1984/89

Women's Occupations	1984		1989	
	% in Female Labour Force	% in the Occupation	% in Female Labour Force	% in the Occupation
Office Worker/Assistant	22	66	24	68
Sales Assistant	13	62	12	62
Health Care (Nurse)	8	86	8	85
Cleaner	5	84	4	84
Agriculture Worker	5	79	3	79
Data Processing	4	60	4	53
Teacher	4	48	4	48
Social Worker	3	82	4	80
Bank Clerk	3	43	3	43
Guest Service	3	61	2	62
Subtotal	68	25	67	21
Total Female Employees	100	38	100	39

Men's Occupations	1984		1989	
	% in Male Labour Force	% in the Occupation	% in Male Labour Force	% in the Occupation
Office Worker/Assistant	7	34	7	32
Land-Transport	5	97	5	96
Sales Assistant	5	38	5	38
Metal Worker	5	98	5	98
Electrician	4	92	4	94
Technician	4	93	5	93
Mechanic	4	94	3	96
Accountant/Auditor	3	79	4	79
Engineer	3	97	3	95
Builder/Constructor	3	99	2	99
Subtotal	42	65	42	62
Total Male Employees	100	62	100	61

* Note 1). The Ten Occupations of women and men are selected and ordered by 1984 basis.

* Note 2). Calculation based on "Erwerbstätige in Juli 1984 nach Berufsgruppen", *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1985*, p. 104; and "Erwerbstätige im April 1989 nach Berufsgruppen", *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1991*, p. 123.

Despite its popularity among women, married women in particular, part-time work provides less job security, fewer promotion chances, and smaller pensions. It has consolidated the gender gap in the labour market and left the position of women

at the less favoured end of status, prospects, and pay. By 1989, the gender gap between part-time and full-time workers became the most powerful pattern of the segregation of German labour market.

Table 3.6 Women in Part-Time Work

Year	Weekly Working Hours			
	up to 20 Hs ¹⁾	21-39 Hs ²⁾	40-42 Hs ³⁾	43 Hs more ⁴⁾

Women's Proportion in Employees by Working Hours (%)				
1966	68	50	70	25
1975	70	71	31	26
1980	90	88	31	26
1985	89	88	33	26
1989	88	85	32	23

Proportion in Total Female Work Force (%)				
1966	12	23	31	33
1975	17	17	48	15
1980	16	14	55	12
1985	16	18	46	10
1989	17	13	53	8

* Note 1). In the case of 1966, up to 24 hours per week.

* Note 2). In the case of 1966, 24 to 42 hours per week.

* Note 3). In 1966, 42 to 45 hours per week; in 1989, 21 to 35 hours per week.

* Note 4). In the case of 1966, 45 hours and above per week; in 1989, 36 hours and above per week.

* Sources: StBA, "Strukturdaten ueber Erwerbspersonen und Erwerbstaetige", *Statistisches Jahrbuch* 1967; 1976; 1982; 1987; 1990.

3.4.4 Women's Earnings

Although women extensively participate in the labour market, and although the Labour Law to comply with the European Community Provisions (*EG Anpassungsgesetz*) demands equal pay for equal work, women earn less money, have less prestige and less chances of promotion, even when they are engaged in the same work. For instance, female *Arbeiter* on average drew only 70 percent of their male colleagues' wage; and female *Angestellte* received less

than 65 percent of males workers' salary (Table 3.7).²³ On average, German women's earnings were lower than men's; while a quarter of employed men received more than 3000 DM as net monthly income, so did 8.7 percent of employed women (Table 3.8). The largest proportion of women were distributed in the lowest income group. While the income disparity among men was reducing, the disparity between the sexes was growing.

Table 3.7 Average Earnings of Full-Time Arbeiter and Angestellte in the Industry and Trade Sector (in DM)

Year	Average Wage of Arbeiter (Weekly)			Average Salary of Angestellte (Monthly)		
	Men (A)	Women (B)	B/A (%)	Men (A)	Women (B)	B/A (%)
1960	134	79	59	714	391	55
1970	294	180	61	1,511	887	59
1980	597	404	68	3,377	2,129	63
1985	705	494	70	4,158	2,648	64
1989	811	571	70	4,824	3,108	64

* Source: *Frauen in der BRD (1992)*, pp. 50-51.

Table 3.8 Distribution of Monthly Net Income Group (%)

Income Groups (DM)	1981		1985		1989	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
under 1000	10	44	10	37	9	30
1000-1800	40	44	28	44	18	41
1800-2500	31	9	35	13	36	20
2500-3000	7	2	9	3	12	4
3000-4000	7	1	10	2	13	3
4000 above	5	1	8	1	12	2
Employees (1,000)	15,624	9,020	15,015	9,047	15,792	9,783

* Sources: StBA, "Erwerbstätige nach Stellung und Nettoeinkommensgruppen", *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1982; 1987; 1990.

²³ In the public sector, too, most women are found in the lower income class. While 18.9 percent of male Beamte earned 4,000 DM and above a month, only 6.7 percent of female Beamte earned likewise in 1989 (*Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1990, p. 99).

In a 1991 survey, 81 percent of women answered that women could perform as well as men in the 'men's occupations' (*Maennerberufe*); 82 percent of women recognised that women did not receive equal pay for the same work as men; and 76 percent of women speculated that women needed more competence and better performance than men to reach the same top position (BMFJ, 1992, pp. 96-106). Also, 87 percent of women regarded women's economic independence from men as important, or very important, even when they were married (BMFJ, 1992, pp. 85-86).²⁴ Their growing self-confidence and awareness led women to remain in the labour market, despite unfavourable market conditions.

3. 5 The Family and Work

The legal improvement in women's rights in the 1970s did not, in fact, make significant progress for women's lives. They still had to combine the family and employment mainly at the expense of their career; and child-care was the unchallenged domain of women. However, many women demanded partnership and shared responsibilities between the spouses, and became more and more aware of the importance of economic independence. As their expectations of married life and children changed, divorces increased, while child-births were declining. These changing family styles, in turn, altered the attitudes of women.

²⁴ Total number of sample in the western part of Germany (the "old *laendes*") was 1554; among them 821 were women.

3.5.1 Combining the Family and Employment

During four decades, the average age of first marriage changed very little. In 1950, the average age of first marriage was 25.4 for women, and 28.1 for men. In 1989, it was 25.7 and 28.2 respectively. Since their higher education increased, and their school-leaving age became higher, women had a shorter period of single life between school leaving and marriage. Also, women tended to remain in their jobs after marriage, or after giving birth to children. In 1961, the labour participation rate of married women was 28 percent; in the 1970s and 1980s, it increased to about 45 percent (Table 3.9).

**Table 3.9 Labour Participation Rate of Women
by Marital Status (Aged 15-65)**

Year	Not- Married	Married	Divorced Separated	Widowed	Total ¹⁾
1961	48	28	62	75	47
1972	70	41	71	30	47
1976	59	42	70	30	46
1981	52	40	59	10	49
1985	53	38	57	9	47
1989	63	45	68	31	50

* Note 1): Labour Participation Rate of women aged 15-65.

* Sources: "Erwerbstätige Frauen nach Familienstand", *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1964; 1977; 1982; 1987; 1989.

As married women's labour participation increased, combining employment and family attracted much attention. In particular, working women with children needed special consideration, not only for the protection of motherhood, but also for the child's welfare (*Kinderwohl*; Textor, 1991). More than 40 percent of women with children under the age of eighteen were working. However, the younger the children, the less the mothers participated in

the labour force: 43 percent of mothers with children under fifteen; 36.3 percent of mothers with children under six; 32.5 percent of mothers with children under three were employed in 1989 (*Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1990, p. 100).

One of the main reasons that prevented mothers of young children from seeking employment was the cost and availability of kindergartens and creches. Though 80 percent of all three- to six-year-olds attended kindergarten in 1989, these facilities were largely private or church-owned and operated, and open only part of the day. Parents had to contribute to the cost. Worse, creches or nurseries for children under the age of three were in short supply.²⁵

While the women's movement and trade unions demanded an increase in child-care facilities,²⁶ the government sought solutions in expanding part-time work (Epstein et. al., 1986: *Frauen in der BRD*, 1991) and child-care leave.²⁷ The FRG

²⁵ Until the 1970s nurseries and kindergartens for children had been so insufficient that the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family and Health (BMJFG) introduced a centrally financed system of "day mothers". The day mothers took very young children into their homes during working hours, and took care of them together with their own children. These day mothers were paid not by the child's parents but out of social security funds. Despite the effort of the BMJFG to provide more creches and kindergartens, in 1987, only 1.6 percent of children under three were accommodated in creches (BMFuS, 1991, p. 36).

²⁶ In a survey of 1988, which questioned all mothers in the FRG, 58 percent of them responded that, first of all, getting a place in kindergarten or creche was of "critical importance" for the mothers. Also, 27 percent of mothers hoped that the child-care hours of the facilities could be extended to an all-day basis (Textor, 1991, p. 154).

²⁷ In 1983, the BMJFG published a report under the title of "Family-Friendly Formation of Work Life (*Familienfreundliche Gestaltung des Arbeitslebens*)", and motivated women to take part-time work. In the next year, the BMJFG published the "Family and Work World (*Familie und Arbeitswelt*)" which analyzed the aspects

government proposed to reduce the work-day, extend child-care leave for any of the parents, and protect the legal status of part-timers (*Frauen in der BDR*, 1992; Textor, 1991).²⁸

The shortage of child-care facilities, with the opportunity cost of child-bearing and care, contributed to some extent to reducing family size. In the 1960s the first child on average was born less than two years after marriage; in the 1980s, it was almost three years after marriage (Kolinsky, 1989, pp. 80-81). Families also tended to have fewer children. In the 1950s, the annual birth rate per thousand was about sixteen; in the 1980s, it was eleven. Consequently, family size became smaller: in the 1950s, the average number of household members was 3; in the 1980s, it was 2.2. The reduced number of household members and the improved equipment of families saved women time spent on household work. In the 1950s, a housewife of a four-person family spent 284 hours per month doing household chores excluding child-care; while a gainfully employed wife spent 168-243 hours per month on it. In the 1980s, a housewife was occupied for 6 hours per day (180 hours per month) in doing so; and an employed wife 3 hours per day (90 hours per month: Gerhardt and Schuetze, 1988, pp. 260-264ff). However, most of the household chores were still the responsibility of the wife: the distribution of household chores between the spouses changed very little (Table 3.10).

and problems of combining employment and the family. In both reports, the FRG government basically conceived that reducing the work-day was essential.

²⁸ Since 1984, many regulations restricting the legal status of part-timers have been repealed: for example, many part-timers in the public sector (*Beamte*) and lawyers (*Richter*) were allowed to apply for legally protected leave.

**Table 3.10 Distribution of Household Chores between
Husband and Wife, 1970 and 1986 (in %)**

Household Chores	Year	Mainly responsible Spouse			
		Wife	Husband	Both	Equal
Cooking	1970	73	2	19	5
	1986	68	1	27	4
Child-Bath and Clothing	1970	69	1	24	6
	1986	61	1	31	7
Cleaning	1970	59	3	34	3
	1986	58	0	38	4
Shopping	1970	45	2	48	4
	1986	45	1	48	6
Helping Children's School Homework	1970	32	5	55	7
	1986	32	3	56	9
Family Income	1970	4	46	45	4
	1986	2	44	48	6
Repairing	1970	3	48	43	5
	1986	1	53	42	4

* Source: Textor (1991), p. 19.

3.5.2 Marriage and Divorce

While women's self-confidence and awareness were growing, they were less tolerant of family problems. The marriage rate was declining; while the divorce rate was increasing (Table 3.11). By 1989, one in three married couples ended their marriage in divorce (*Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990*, p. 70).

Table 3.11 Marriage and Divorce Rate

Year	Marriage in every 1,000 Population	Divorce	
		in every 1.000 Population	in every 1,000 existing marriages
1950	10.7	1.7	6.8
1960	9.4	0.9	3.6
1970	7.3	1.3	5.1
1980	5.9	1.6	6.1
1989	6.4	2.0	8.5

* Source: StBA (1989), *Bevoelkerung und Erwerbstaetigkeit*, p. 154; and *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1990, p. 61.

More women than men initiated divorce cases: more than half of all divorce cases were initiated by the wives (56.2 percent in 1989); a third by the husbands (34.7 percent), and 9 percent by both spouses (*Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1990). Though most Germans considered marriage meaningful (87 percent in the 1991 Survey), women's expectation to be in employment and independent from men made the family bond weaker than in the past.

3. 6 Women in Politics

The changes in the educational, vocational and occupational positions, and the changing expectations of women affected the role of women in political life. Though women's political representation in the *Bundestag* or *Landtage* had been consistently below that of their eastern sisters, the gender gap in political participation has to some extent been narrowed. Women's electoral turnout has been well over 80 percent, and sometimes around 90 percent. Around a quarter of party members are women, and more than 30 percent in the Greens. Women's under-representation in the *Bundestag* or in the Federal and state governments, however, has not been altered very much. Nevertheless, women have organised themselves, and demanded equal rights despite many unfavourable circumstances.

3.6.1 The Women's Movement

After the war, the women's movement suffered from inertia and amnesia about the struggle for sexual equality before the

war.²⁹ The rejuvenation of the women's movement proceeded from the struggle against §218 of the Penal Code. Since 1972, many books that dealt with abortion and contraception have been published, and mass demonstrations have occurred. Abortion was finally taken up by the political parties, and a liberal amendment was passed in the *Bundestag*. In 1975, however, the amendment was ruled unconstitutional in the Federal Constitutional Court. Although §218 was finally modified in 1977, the new abortion law fell far short of women's demands for free choice, and the women's movement lost much of its force.³⁰

Furthermore, the Radicals' Decree (*Radikalenerlass*) of 1972 daunted the women's movement.³¹ Although the women's movement never used violence, women's centres involved in organising abortion trips to Netherlands were regularly raided by police for 'supporting criminal organisations'. Whenever they planned the civil rights protests, they had to make non-violence part of their platform.

Despite these circumstances, the women's movement entered a new phase and saw a dissemination of alternative activism in which women played a crucial role. In 1978, the army (*Die Bundeswehr*) announced that it took women's emancipation

²⁹ In the 1960s, many young German feminists did not know, and were not informed in formal education, about the women's struggle for equal rights before the war (Kaplan, 1991, p. 108).

³⁰ See the Law section of this Chapter (Footnote 14).

³¹ From the late 1960s, right and left extremist groups flourished, and committed numerous terrorist actions. In 1972, the government over-reacted to these terrorists with the Radicals' Decree, applied mostly to left-wing radicals, which led the FRG into a conspiratorial hysteria, like the McCarthy era in the United States.

'seriously' and intended to see women conscripted to the army in the same way as men —i.e., for a compulsory military service of eighteen months. This proposal resulted in a series of demonstrations in May 1979. It signalled, in fact, the beginning of a new movement towards a new alternative politics (*Alternativen*) on the left: anti-nuclear, anti-military politics.³² This revitalisation of the women's movement was overshadowed in 1982 when the CDU was reelected to the government, and the trends towards right-wing values became apparent. However, the alternative movements, with ecological and feminist concerns, gathered to form the Green Party, and succeeded in entering the *Bundestag*. The programme of the Greens made it clear that all the leadership positions of the party should be composed of an equal proportion of men and women.

3.6.2 Women in Political Parties

Women composed around 14 to 33 percent of party membership in the four major parties, and three parties had women's divisions.³³ In 1987, 42 percent of all female party members

³² Many women considered this proposal as yet another ploy for armament and militarisation of FRG society and as a purposeful misconstruction of women's fight for equality (Kaplan, 1992). In Hamburg and Koeln (Cologne), large anti-military and anti-nuclear congresses of the women's movement were held and thousands of women pledged their solidarity.

³³ The Women's divisions of the parties are: the SPD's "Working Team of Social Democratic Women" (ASF); the CDU's "Women's Association of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany"; and the CSU's "Women's Union of the CSU". The Greens did not need to have a women's division since its party programme obliged it to equal distribution of power between the sexes in all the party decisions and leadership positions. In 1985, the Greens' federal Party Congress decided to include a special section on the representation of women, and chose a 50 percent quota system of all electoral and organisational positions. The

belonged to the CDU/CSU, and 44 percent to the SPD. While women constituted 22 percent of the CDU membership, one in three new members were women in the 1980s.

In many senses, the SPD and Greens drew on the same segment of the electorate, and a strong appeal of the Greens might cause direct losses of party membership and electoral support to the SPD. Thus, the SPD Party Congress of 1986 endorsed a three-stage plan of transition towards equality: by the 1990s women should be represented at all levels of the party organisation and in parliaments in proportion to their share of the population or at no less than 40 percent.

Although the CDU drew on a different segment of the electorate from the SPD or Greens, it also felt obliged to respond to the new challenge of the political climate. In the 1986 Party Congress, the CDU passed a resolution that women should be involved at all levels of party organisation, and have political representation in accordance with their share of the membership, but it ruled out the quota regulation. However, its more conservative twin, the CSU, did not show any change in its strategy towards women.

For the FDP, membership developments during the 1970s and 1980s have been troubled by the aftermath of coalition changes. Further, the Greens came to challenge its third party position. As a response, the FDP endorsed a Plan for the Furtherance of Women (*Frauenfoerderplan*: May 1986), and promised to create an "Equality Office (*Gleichberechtigungsstelle*)" in the head office, and to further women's share in decision making functions in line

FDP does not have a women's division.

with their share of membership (25 percent). Though it was not a quota solution, it certainly set the party on a path towards better opportunities for women.

3.6.3 Women in Parliaments: Federal and Laende Parliaments

Until the early 1980s, women comprised less than 10 percent of FRG legislators (Table 3.12). In the first *Bundestag*, relatively few women gained seats. The SPD, in the second election, brought veterans of the socialist women's movement into the *Bundestag*, and the number of female SPD parliamentarians rose despite the party's poor electoral performance. As a response, the CDU included more woman candidates, and contributed to expanding women's proportion in the *Bundestag*. In the 1960s and 1970s, women's proportion in the *Bundestag* fell again. The SPD included even less women than the CDU in the parliamentary group. However, in the 1980s, the Greens contributed significantly to increasing the parliamentary seats of women: in 1987, more than 20 percent of all women in the *Bundestag* belonged to the Greens.

Two women were elected as the President of *Bundestag* (*Bundestagpraesidentin*), which is the highest Constitutional office next to the President: Annemarie Renger from 1972 to 1976, and Rita Suessmuth since November 1988. Rita Suessmuth had served as Minister for Youth, Family, Women and Health (*Bundesministerin fuer Jugend, Familie Frauen und Gesundheit*) and received strong electoral support in 1987.

In the *Landtage*, a similar process has been evident, and access of women to the parliaments accelerated in the 1980s. In the first *Land* elections an average of 8 percent of the seats

were won by women; in 1985-88, the share of women's seats rose to 16 percent. There are differences among the states; women's representation ranged from a third of parliamentary seats in Hamburg to 7 percent in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Although the SPD tends to have a large number of female members of parliaments, the Greens have an even larger proportion. In Hamburg, the regional Green party entered an all-women list in the last two *Land* elections.

Table 3.12 Female Members of the Bundestag

Year	All		CDU/CSU		SPD		FDP		Others	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1949	28	7	11	8	13	10	0	0	4	5
1953	45	9	19	8	21	13	3	6	2	4
1957	48	9	22	8	22	12	3	7	1	6
1961	43	8	18	7	21	10	4	8	-	-
1965	36	7	15	6	19	9	2	7	-	-
1969	34	7	14	6	18	8	2	5	-	-
1972	30	6	15	6	13	5	2	5	-	-
1976	38	7	19	8	15	7	4	8	-	-
1980	44	8	18	8	19	8	7	13	Greens	
1983	51	10	17	7	21	10	3	12	10	36
1987	80	15	18	8	31	16	6	13	25	57

* Source: Kolinsky (1989), p. 222.

In many respects, the system of party candidate selection hampered women's capacity to enter the parliaments. In constituency nominations, the parties tended to assign women to the rather marginal, or hopeless, constituencies. In the list votes, the parties put the female candidates on the tail end. However, this situation, too, was changing. In 1987, women were more strongly represented as direct candidates than ever before. The SPD put up one woman candidate in three, the CDU one in four,

and the Greens more than half. Though women's success in entering parliament was still far behind their numerical presence as direct candidates and on the party lists, the 1987 election showed a clear sign of improving women's representation in party politics and parliaments.

3.6.4 Women in Governing Bodies

During the four decades of the FRG, eleven women held ministerial offices, and there was at least one woman minister in every Federal government since 1961. Normally, women administered the traditional 'female sphere': health and family affairs. Only two women served as ministers outside of the traditional women's realms: in the mid-1970s, Marie Schlei became Minister for Economic Cooperation; in 1982, Dorothee Wilms was appointed to Minister for Education and Science, and in 1985, changed her position to Minister of Inner German Relations. As in the parliaments, women's offices in the government increased during the 1980s. Since 1985, the Federal government has had more than two woman ministers. In 1989 cabinet reshuffle, a third woman, Gerda Hasselfeldt from the CSU, was appointed Minister of Urban Planning and Housing.

Eight women held top political appointments just below ministerial level and served as parliamentary secretaries. Among them, the two most interesting appointments were those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had a female parliamentary secretary in 1976, and the Ministry of Defence, which appointed

a female parliamentary secretary in 1987.³⁴

3. 7 Summary

Despite the legacy of the Three Ks, West German women have expanded their place in the labour market, higher education, and in politics. Their attendance and performance in education have improved remarkably. Vocational qualifications of the young generation had almost reached parity between the sexes. However, women were still confined in a small number of 'female subjects', which did not match the demand of the changing labour market. Consequently, their occupational spectrum was far narrower than men's. 57 percent of women were found in ten occupations, generally in the lower levels. Their economic position, though, has been improved with regard to earnings and status, but has fallen short of equal opportunities and rewards.

Contrary to the traditional notion of non-political female, women furthered their representation in politics, too. The 1980s was a memorable decade in women's advancement. Their proportions in party membership, in the *Bundestag* and *Landtage*, and in the government were increasing. Yet, women are still under-represented in the parliaments, governments, and in the party leadership positions.

³⁴ When the *Bundeswehr* proposed compulsory military service of both sexes, the women's movement, the SPD, and the Greens strongly opposed it. The appointment of a woman in the Ministry of Defence was regarded as an attempt to neutralise the controversy. Whatever the intentions might be, it seems that political leaders have become more and more obliged to recognise and take into account the presence of women.

In the GDR, the government and the ruling communist party stood in the front line of the struggle for equal opportunities for women. By contrast, in the FRG, the government responded passively to the demands from women. Despite the lack of enthusiasm about sexual equality in the government, women's advancement in society was significant. When abortion was a punishable action, many women were brave enough to declare "I have aborted." Women also organised anti-military, anti-nuclear demonstrations and congresses in many cities. German women's initiative and contribution to the international peace movement were substantial (Kaplan, 1991). Yet, by comparison with the GDR, some of the changes in gender relations were small, adding evidence to the communist claim that communism is the best vehicle for women's emancipation.

CHAPTER FOUR

WOMEN IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

4. 1 Introduction

While the Federal Republic of Germany in the West had been successfully integrated into the Western world, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East had become an essential part of the world of the Soviet bloc. For women, the GDR meticulously promoted women's labour participation, while the FRG only slowly responded to the demands of equality for women. In the West, women experienced opportunities and limitations in choosing between employment and family roles or combining the two; in the East, women's life was prescribed as encompassing both (Kolinsky, 1992, p. 264).

4.1.1 SED Dominated Politics and the Economy

GDR politics was dominated by the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*: SED), in particular, by the Politburo of the SED.¹ Placing itself above the government, the SED set itself the task of leading the GDR

¹ The SED was formed through a merger of the Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*: KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*: SPD) in April, 1946. Initially the SED assumed an ideological position much closer to the SPD than the KPD, espousing Marxist principles but omitting any mention of Leninism. Also, the leadership of the party showed a parity between social democrats and communists. However, after arrests and purges of former SPD members, communists predominated in the key organs of the party by early 1949. After the purge of the social democrats, the SED transformed its organisation in the first Party Conference of January 1949, and the Soviet-style Politburo became the locus of power.

towards communism. Although there were four other parties —CDU, LDPD, NDPD and DBD²— as well as the mass organisations —Free German Labour Union, Free German Youth, Democratic Women's Federation, and Culture Federation— they were dependent on subsidies from the SED. In fact, those were largely regarded as "echoes" of the SED (Childs, 1969, p. 104). These four parties, the SED, and the mass organisations were together included in the National Front. In elections, the nine constituent organisations were coordinated in the nomination of candidates, and proposed a Unity List for representatives. During the nomination, the SED was in control. The People's Congress (*Volkskammer*) of the GDR was composed of the delegates elected from this Unity List.

There was formally a dual set of hierarchies, one in the state —with its formal head, the Council of State; its government, the Council of Ministers; its national parliament, the People's Congress; and regional and local representative bodies— and one in the party. In practice, however, the hierarchy of the state was shadowed and dominated by the parallel hierarchy of the SED. The SED, with its puppet parties and mass organisations, clearly dominated the state and was the guardian and articulator of official ideology, the definer of orthodoxy, heterodoxy and heresy (Fulbrook, 1991, p. 38). Every aspect of

² The Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union*: CDU) and the German Liberal Democratic Party (*Liberal Demokratische Partei Deutschlands*: LDPD) were founded after the war, and were very similar to their sister parties in West Germany at that time. The National Democratic Party (*National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands*: NDPD) and the Democratic Farmers Party (*Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands*: DBD) were set up later partly as counterweights to the CDU and the LDPD, and partly to win new groups for the regime (Childs, 1969, p. 104; Turner, 1991, pp. 16-17 and pp. 50-51).

GDR society, therefore, reflected the perception and determination of the Marxist-Leninist party.

In line with the Marxist commitment to a classless society, leaders in the SED effected public policies in pursuit of economic socialisation, formation of the socialist personality in the people, and enhancement of the working people's quality of life. Under the slogan of "the unity of economic policy and social policy," all public policies were linked with the economy. Education policy was directed to shape all the people into the working class. Housing was exceedingly cheap, though in short supply. Health-care and education were free. It is disputable whether these public policies were exploitative, and whether the population was forced to work. However, the people at least were free from the fear of unemployment, and from illness without a source of protection.

4.1.2 The Women Policies (*Frauenpolitik*)

The SED took the Marxist-Leninist view that women's oppression was another aspect of class oppression, and hence, that women could be emancipated only through joining with men in the struggle against capital (Schubert, 1980; DDR Handbuch, 1985). Equality as "workers" (*Werktaetige*) was declared the precondition and the guarantor of equal opportunities.

The women policies (*Frauenpolitik*) in the GDR was primarily directed to promote and protect women's employment (Schubert, 1980; Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991). The Labour Law (*Arbeitsgesetzbuch*: AGB) declared that women as well as men had the right to work (*Arbeitsrecht*). The AGB provided a special

protection for women in pregnancy, or with children. Also it assured women's rights to return to their job after giving birth or child-care leave, as well as the state's responsibility to provide child-care facilities (*Kinderbetreuungseinrichtungen*). Expanding women's access to higher education was another aspect of guarantees for the women's right to work. To institute equal chances for women, the GDR made professional or vocational training obligatory for both men and women, along with equal opportunities for higher education. Either because of the need to have an expanded labour force or because of its ideological presuppositions, or both, the fact that the GDR was making a great effort to change existing gender relations in the society is undisputed.

4. 2 Women under the Law

From the feminist point of view, many laws in the GDR were more favourable for women than in the FRG. In keeping with the constitutional guarantee of sexual equality, the Family Law (*Familiengesetzbuch*: FGB, 1965), the Labour Law (*Arbeitsgesetzbuch*: AGB, 1977), and the Education Law (*Gesetz ueber das Einheitliche Sozialistische Bildungssystem*, 1965) provided women with full equal rights and special considerations for education and maternity protection. Besides equal rights to work and education, abortion was fully legal and considered as a right of women since 1972 (*Gesetz ueber die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft*).

4.2.1 Sexual Equality in the Constitution

The first constitution of the GDR in 1949 proclaimed that men and women had equal rights before the law (Article 7), and that all laws and decrees forming an obstacle to equal rights for women were revoked (Article 7, (2)). Article 30 again provided for equal rights within the family. Article 33 revoked all laws and decrees discriminating against unmarried parents and the children born outside of wedlock.

The GDR revised its Constitution in 1968, and the new version contained a statement which provided not only for equal rights, but, in some respects, for preferential treatment for women: "Men and women have equal rights and have the same legal position in all spheres of social, political and private life. The promotion of women, particularly in vocational qualification, is a social and governmental objective" (Article 20, (2)).

Unlike the first Constitution, the Constitution of 1968 did not have to provide a precedence clause because by then the new Family Law and the Law of Labour (*Gesetz der Arbeit*: GB1) had replaced the old Civil Code *in toto*. In addition to the right to work, the Constitution of 1968 added the duty to work. Socially useful activity is an honourable duty for every citizen. The right to work and the duty to work form a unity (Article 24, (2)).³ This right to work was effected through central economic planning. In 1974, the GDR altered the Constitution again, but

³ It had been disputed whether or not the word "duty" meant an obligation. Though it was not an obligation, every woman and man in the GDR, in effect, was assigned a job by the central economic plan, and carried out that duty. However, as far as I could meet with and interview former East German women, they said they accepted their job with the feeling of being accepted and considered an important individual (March 1993, Berlin).

left the equal rights paragraph unchanged.

4.2.2 The Family Law

Prior to the legislation of the Family Law, the GDR had made several laws concerned with one or a few aspects of family relations such as marriage, divorce, or child custody. In early 1949, during the time of the drafting of the first Constitution, a commission set up to propose necessary legislation published a brochure entitled "Proposals for the New German Family Law" (*Vorschlaege zum neuen deutschen Familienrecht*). Its proposals were accepted as Article 30 of the Constitution (equal rights within the family). The Thesis on the Effects of Marriage in General (*Thesen ueber die Wirkungen der Ehe im allgemeinen*), adopted in 1949, spelled out clearly that all matters that affected their common life in marriage were to be settled by the spouses in mutual agreement. In 1950, the Law for the Protection of Mother and Child and the Rights of Woman (*Gesetz ueber den Mutter- und Kinderschutz und die Rechte der Frau*) reiterated that the hitherto prevailing right of the husband to make all decisions in all aspects of conjugal life was to be replaced by the joint right of both spouses to make decisions (§14). It denied the husband's right of decision whether his wife could be employed, or whether his wife could join vocational education (Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, p.135). It also stated that parental care which included the right and duty to care for the children and their property, as well as the right to represent the children, was vested jointly in both parents (§16). Equal rights of unmarried parents and children born outside of the

wedlock were once again confirmed (§17). In the Marriage and Divorce Decree (*Verordnung ueber die Eheschliessung und Eheaufloesung*) of 1955, the process of separation became simpler, and the "guilt principle" (*Verschuldensprinzip*) in divorce cases was abolished and replaced by the "irreparable breakdown principle" (*Zerruettungsprinzip*).⁴

The Family Law (*Familiengesetzbuch: FGB*) of 1965 was the first comprehensive law on familial relations in the GDR (Shaffer 1981, p. 30; Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, p.135), and rescinded Book 4 of the old Civil Code. It abolished male supremacy in marriage and urged that marriage be engaged in for life and be based on mutual love, respect, faithfulness, understanding, trust, and unselfish assistance for each other (§5, (1)). The FGB was apparently keen to strengthen the marital ties. It proclaimed that state and society contribute to the strengthening of relations between husband and wife and between parents and children as well as to the development of the family (§1). Apart from state institutions to strengthen the familial relations, such as social organisations, labour collectives, and parents' counselling services, it also provided marriage and family counselling services (§4). In addition, since in the GDR gainful employment was greatly encouraged for both spouses, husband and wife were supposed to share in household chores, and to support

⁴ Under the old Civil Code, marriage could be dissolved only if at least one of the spouses was found guilty of severe matrimonial transgressions such as adultery or desertion. As a result, the party who was found guilty of the break-up of the marriage was to pay support payment to the other party. In the new Decree, support and alimony payments were abolished except in hardship cases (Shaffer, 1981, pp. 38-39).

each other's educational and career goals (§10).⁵

The minimum age of marriage was 18 (§5, (4)); the spouses should have the same last name, but they could choose either the husband's or the wife's name (§7); the children followed that chosen family name; the one whose name was not chosen could append it to the family name only when, for instance, a spouse had become especially well known to the public by his or her previous name and had achieved special respect (FGB-Kommentar); all commodities, property rights, and savings accumulated during the marriage through the work or work income of one or both spouses belonged jointly to both spouses (§13).

In the case of divorce, society and the state were assigned a great role in determining causes for the breakdown of marriage and in bringing about reconciliation (§24-27).⁶ Marriage of long duration in which the spouses had grown old together were deemed

⁵ §10 of the FGB reads as follows:

§10 (1) Both spouses do their share in the education and care of the children and the conduct of the household. The relations of the spouses to each other are to be so shaped that the wife can combine her professional and social activities with those of motherhood.

(2) If the spouse who hitherto had not been gainfully employed takes a job, or if a spouse decides to continue his or her education or engage in socially useful work, the other supports with comradely consideration and assistance the intentions of the spouse (Gesetzblatt, 1966, p. 5).

⁶ §24 of the FGB reads:

§24 (1) A marriage may be dissolved only when the court has determined that such severe reasons prevail that it is clear that the marriage has lost its purpose for the spouses, the children, and therefore also for society.

(2) If divorce proceedings have been initiated by one of the spouses, the court is to undertake a careful investigation of the development of the marriage. In this investigation, judges find out whether interests of young children would be adversely affected by a divorce, and whether the divorce would constitute unreasonable hardship for one of the spouses.

to be in particular need of protection; judges were admonished to investigate their breakdown with special care and to explore all possibilities for the reconstitution of longstanding ties (FGB-Kommentar). This court's investigation seemed an undue interference into the intimate details of family life. However, the GDR family court claimed considerable success in that divorce petitions were withdrawn in one out of four cases (Shaffer, 1981).

The property of the spouses was divided equally in the proceedings of divorce (§39). However, a spouse could claim a larger share because of greater need, or could be excluded from property sharing because he or she had not contributed to the creation of the common property by either gainful employment or participation in household chores (§39, (1)). Because both spouses were assumed to participate in the labour force, one party's claim of rights to pensions and other retirement income of the other party was deemed irrelevant. So was the claim of support payment or alimony. Support payment, if any, was based on need only, and was temporary in nature.

4.2.3 The Labour Law

Not only because of its ideological imperative of making its citizens working people (*Werktaetige*), but also because of the need to have a large and flexible labour force, the GDR made a great effort to mobilize all able men and women into paid work. The laws relating to labour had reflected the government's ideological intention and economic concerns. On 19 April 1950, the GDR adopted the Law of Labour (*Gesetz der Arbeit*: GB1, S.

349), in which the principle of equal pay for equal work was declared. With the constitutional right to work, this law guaranteed employment to all citizens. This law developed into the Law of Labour of 1961 (*Gesetzbuch der Arbeit*: GBA, GB1, I, S. 27), and was merged with the Law of Protection for Mother and Children into the Labour Law (*Arbeitsgesetzbuch*: AGB, GB1, I, S. 185) of 1977. In this merger, the GDR's intention to pull all women into the labour force was fully realised through the provisions of rights and protection of working women, especially working mothers, and enabled women to combine both employment and the family.

In the AGB, many sections stipulated rights and protection of working women: the state was assigned the responsibility for promoting and protecting women, youth and certain groups of persons (§3); work managers and trade union committees should lay out and conclude together promotion plan for women (§30); women were granted special considerations for training and further education (§148); the health and working capacity of women and young people under eighteen years of age were under special protection (§210).

In particular, the AGB devoted much attention to facilitating the combination of employment and motherhood: fully employed women having a household of their own were given an additional monthly day off during which standard wages were paid (§185); working parents could get leave of absence for their ill children and receive 90 percent of their net monthly earnings for up to two working days (§186); expectant and nursing mothers as well as mothers with children of up to one year of age were not

assigned night work, overtime, or specific tasks listed in regulations (§242-243).

Maternity leave was granted for six weeks before delivery and twenty weeks after giving birth. In the event of more than one baby being born, and in the event of a complicated delivery, maternity leave was extended to twenty-two weeks (§244); during maternity leave, women received grants equivalent to their net average earnings from social security (§244, (4)); if mothers wanted to take care of their new born children, they could stay home up to the first birthday of the child at full pay, or when mothers could not find a creche for their baby, they could be released from work up to the third birthday of the child (§246). This maternity leave, called the Baby Year (*Kinderjahr*), provided for women the right to social care by their enterprise, and could be applied to other working people when they looked after and brought up a child in place of the mother (§246, (3)).

To enable mothers of preschool and schoolchildren to accept outside employment, the AGB imposed on the state and all enterprises the responsibility for providing necessary child-care facilities (§233). The law also required the enterprise to take up any opportunity for providing the children of their personnel with cultural, social, and sports facilities which were open free of charge to schoolchildren for extra-curricular activities and leisure pursuits (§234-235).

Unlike in the West, women in the GDR were required in principle to be employed full-time, and could take part-time work only temporarily for reasons of special family obligations (§161). Instead, the AGB provided a shortened work week at full

pay for women taking care of large families, or for mothers of two or more children, the normal working week was reduced by three and three quarter hours, from 43 3/4 hours to 40 hours a week (\$160). Yet, in practice, a third of female workers made their work contracts part-time (See Section 4.4.3 of this chapter).

4.2.4 Abortion

Until 1968, the old Penal Code of 1871 had been in force, hence the infamous §218 that had outlawed abortion was also valid. The Law for the Protection of Mother and Child of 1950 declared a pregnancy could be legally interrupted if there was a medical, ethical, or social "indication" (Indikation).⁷ Though the social indication was very liberally interpreted, the necessity to justify the abortion before a committee of physicians and representatives of the social authorities drove some women to have illegal abortions —60 percent of abortions were illegal (Berghahn and Fritzsche, 1991, p. 197). Further, the Penal Code (*Strafgesetzbuch*, StGB; GB1. I, S. 1) of 1968 added up to three year imprisonment for illegal abortion (§153). In March 1972, however, the GDR passed the Law on the Interruption of Pregnancy (*Gesetz ueber die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft*), declaring women's right to abortion. Under the law, pregnancy could be legally interrupted by any qualified physician at any gynaecological institute or hospital department,

⁷ In this indication solution, an ethical indication referred to the pregnancy as a result of rape or incest; social indication referred to situations where parents were not able to properly care for the child-to-be, or where it would have been unreasonable to impose such a burden on them.

during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, with no questions asked. No matter what the rights and wrongs of abortion, the liberalisation of abortion had at least one highly desirable effect: maternal death-rates dropped sharply after 1972 (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Maternal Death Rates (per 100,000 live births)

Year	1968	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Rate	52.0	42.0	44.0	32.0	26.6	20.0	23.1	22.0

* Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR, 1979.*

4. 3 Women in the Education System

Educational policy in the GDR centred on mixing mental and manual labour, linking education and employment, and combining theory and practice as in other communist countries (Childs, 1969, pp. 173-199). It was set to open higher education to those social groups which had been unable to benefit from it in the past —working people and women (Mertens, 1993, p. 113). Since 1958, the GDR made vocational training from the seventh class in all general school obligatory (*Politechnische Unterricht*). In addition, there were wide open opportunities of higher education for working class and women in the GDR. Beginning with instituting the Workers' and Peasants' Faculties (*Arbeiter- und Bauernfakultaeten: ABF*)⁸ in the late 1940s, the GDR had advanced

⁸ In 1946, in line with its denazification policy, the Soviets established the German Administration for Education, which was responsible for all rules and regulations governing the schools of the Soviet zone. This Administration issued many

a system of women's promotion in universities (*Frauenfoerderung*) and the Special Programme for Women's Studies (*Frauensonderstudium*) during the 1960s. By the mid-1980s, women had gained almost equal treatment in higher education as far as access and the number of students were concerned (Mertens, 1993, p. 113).

4.3.1 The Law on the Integrated Socialist Education System

The Law on the Integrated Socialist Education System (*Gesetz ueber das Einheitliche sozialistische Bildungssystem*: GEB, GB1, I, S. 83)⁹ of 1965 declared its objectives as "a high educational standard for the whole people, the formation and education of all-round and harmoniously developed socialist personalities who consciously shape social life, change nature, and lead a fulfilled, happy life as human beings should" (§1). It guaranteed all citizens equal rights to education (§2, (1)). The integrated socialist education system comprised the institutions of pre-

decrees and rules to eliminate Nazi influence and re-orient higher education. It regulated the type of students who could be admitted and given first preference in higher education. It also established pre-universities (*Vorstudienanstalten*) which offered matriculation courses for adult students who had not had the chance to gain their university qualifications in the normal way. It started in 1947 to help particularly those of working class background, ex-servicemen, some ex-prisoners, and women. In 1949, they were transformed into the ABF (Childs, 1969, p. 178; Martens, 1993, 113).

⁹ Before the Integrated Socialist Education System, communists adopted the Law for the Democratisation of the German School (*Gesetz fuer die Demokratisation der deutsche Schule*) in 1946, which was to be the basis of a new school system. Under this law, all children were obliged to attend the eight-year elementary school (*Grundschule*). After this, children went on to four-years of secondary school or received vocational training. With other decrees and laws relating to education, this law developed into the Integrated Socialist Education System in 1965.

school education, the ten class general polytechnic school, the institutions for vocational training, the educational establishments leading to university entry, the engineering and specialist colleges, the universities and colleges, and the institutions for training and continuing education for working people (§2, (2)). This education system was set up to apply the principle of the integration of education and life, the integration of theory and practice, and the integration of learning and study with practical activity (§4). It also implied the integration of education and vocational training (§5, (1)).

This education system included creches and kindergartens, for those whose mothers were either employed or studying. Creches were open to babies aged from three weeks to three years; kindergartens for the children from three year old to school age (§10-11). Providing creches for student mothers encouraged women to continue their education or vocational training. This system contributed greatly to women's qualification, or re-training for the new technology.

A higher level of education was provided by the technical or engineering schools (*Fach-, Ingenieurschulen*; §41-49), which were narrowly defined institutions more or less operated by specific economic and government ministries to produce highly skilled employees. Other higher educational institutions included art colleges (*Kunsthochschulen*) which trained socialist artists and art workers in close connection with artistic practice (§50). The highest level of education, universities and colleges (*Universitaeten and Hochschulen*), were to "train and educate academically highly qualified personalities with a socialist




Figure 4.1 Education System

consciousness" (§52), and provided for its students the most likely chance of success in society. All the educational institutions were tuition-free, and the students on a large scale received monthly stipends. Though there was severe competition for entry to university, women were much more encouraged to enter higher education than in other countries, with creches and

kindergartens for their children.

There were also life-long opportunities for further education. In particular, the Work Academies (*Betriebsakademie*) carried out the training and continuing education of working people in accordance of the needs of the enterprises and branches of the economy (§39). With the promotion provision for women in the Labour Law, all these further education institutions were wide open to women.

4.3.2 Women in Vocational Education

When recruiting women to a higher level of jobs, the first barrier came from women's lack of qualifications. Therefore, in addition to the obligatory vocational training in general school, the Constitution of 1968 made professional and vocational training mandatory for general school leavers. Ten Year general school leavers who did not immediately pursue further studies in a *Fachschule* or work towards a college or university degree started to prepare themselves for at least a skilled worker's certificate in the on-the-job vocational training courses (*Berufsausbildung*). These vocational training courses were also open to those who did not finish the general school. Parts of the vocational training courses provided for participants the possibility to take the Abitur for universities and colleges. Almost 99 percent of general school leavers who did not enter higher education institutes went on to the on-the-job training courses. It was called apprenticeship (*Lehrling*: Helwig, 1982, p. 19), and after this vocational training, pupils obtained the certificate of specialist (Table 4.2). However, the word

"specialist" (*Facharbeiter*) meant in fact only a skilled worker —i.e., a typist (*Facharbeiter fuer Schreibtechnik*) or a dress maker (*Kleidungsfacharbeiter*) was qualified as a specialist. In the vocational training courses, there clearly was segregation of labour between men and women. For example, almost 100 percent of trainees in typing courses were women, while in electric fitting courses 95 percent of trainees were men (*Frauenreport*, '90, p. 44).

Table 4.2 Participants in Vocational Training Courses

Year	Total Students	Women Students	% of Women
1965	183,603	83,760	45.62
1970	193,984	89,155	45.96
1975	206,837	90,585	43.80
1980	231,450	102,585	44.32
1985	186,777	81,237	43.49
1989	135,640	55,895	41.21

* Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1990, pp.337-338.

To further women's vocational education, from the mid-1960s onwards, special *Fachschule* classes were provided for working wives and mothers.¹⁰ They could keep their jobs but work only two or three days a week and went to school two to four days, while earning their full, regular wage. Or they could attend school for three years on a full-time basis and draw 80 to 90 percent of their average net wage as a stipend (Table 4.3). In this *Fachschule* system, too, there was a strong tendency towards

¹⁰ *Fachschule* was similar to a British Polytechnic. It required registration for three years, on a full-time basis. Graduates could get a diploma in medicine, engineering, electronics etc. Until 1974, medical *Fachschule* was not included in the vocational *Fachschulen* system. After the medical *Fachschulen* were included, the proportion of women in the *Fachschulen* rose up to 70 percent.

sexual segregation. In Medicine/Health-care Fachschulen the female proportion of students reached up to 96 percent, while in technology Fachschulen the proportion of female students was only 27 percent (Table 4.4).

Table 4.3 Students in Fachschulen

Year	Total Students	Women Students	% of Women
1960	126,018	36,000	28.57
1970	167,158	81,176	48.56
1975	156,384	102,210	65.36
1980	172,825	123,549	71.49
1985	162,221	117,695	72.55
1989	152,700	107,397	70.33

* Note: Since 1974, Medicine Fachschulen included.
 * Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1990, p.341.

Table 4.4 Women Students by Subjects (in Fachschulen)

Year Subjects	1971		1989	
	Number of Women Students	% of Women Students	Number of Women Students	% of Women Students
Medicine/Health-care	1,602	91.7	40,784	95.5
Education	25,843	85.6	21,148	88.6
Public Service/Library	1,554	73.8	1,975	78.5
Economics	39,854	70.5	27,093	85.9
Arts	1,005	51.0	651	60.8
Agriculture	4,401	32.6	4,223	44.3
Culture/Sports	265	29.5	815	46.4
Technology	15,027	20.9	10,708	27.0

* Source: *Frauenreport '90*, p. 46.

4.3.3 Women in Higher Education

The GDR government also encouraged women to enter university or college. In addition to free tuition, over 90 percent of

students, male and female, received monthly stipends. In particular, single parents were guaranteed the stipend, which benefited mothers who in most cases had custody of minor children (Shaffer, 1981, p. 132).

The Women's Promotion Programme (*Frauenfoerderungsplaen*) assured qualified women that their college education would be adequately funded. In the 1970s, the GDR initiated special provisions for mothers to enable them to pursue their studies: they received maternity grants and child allowances, just as working mothers.¹¹ The Special Programme for Women's Studies (*Frauensonderstudium*) ran in colleges and Fachschulen (*Frauenreport*, p. 236). As a result, on the eve of the unification in 1989, 48.6 percent of East German university or college students were women. However, in university or college, women had a tendency to take "female subjects." In the education department, female students occupied more than 70 percent of seats. On the contrary, only one quarter of seats were taken by women in technology department (Table 4.5). Though still much concentrated in female subjects, women in university showed less segregation than in vocational education or in the *Fachschulen*. It is worth noting that GDR women had penetrated more widely at a higher level of education than at the lower level —i.e., there was less segregation in universities than in *Fachschulen*, and

¹¹ Since 1972, mothers studying full-time were given an extra 50 Mark per child per month; for single parents or parents whose spouses were also students and who were unable to find a place in a nursery for their children, the extra subsidy was raised to 125 M for one child, 150 M for two children, and 175 M for three or more children, by the Decree on the Promotion of Women Students with a Child and Expectant Mothers Studying at Colleges and Technical Schools (*Anordnung ueber die finanzielle Unterstuetzung von Studentinnen mit Kind*: GB1, II, p.321).

less in *Fachschulen* than in the *Berufsausbildung*. Despite the sexual segregation in the education system, GDR women's advancement into higher education was enough for the GDR government to claim their success in establishing sexual equality in education.

Table 4.5 Proportion of Women Students by Subjects

Year	1971	1975	1980	1985	1989
Total	37.1	48.2	48.7	50.1	48.6
Education	62.2	72.7	74.4	73.2	73.0
Economics	38.4	48.4	59.8	68.2	66.7
Literature	63.4	72.3	71.6	65.0	62.2
Medicine	70.0	66.5	56.3	56.0	55.2
Agriculture	35.1	49.2	48.8	48.7	46.4
Theology	41.4	48.3	44.3	51.3	46.1
Math/Natural Science	33.2	41.5	46.5	51.0	46.0
Arts	40.8	38.4	41.0	44.3	44.6
Culture/Sports	31.5	32.5	35.4	36.2	40.3
Phil/History/Law	36.0	37.9	37.6	39.3	39.8
Technology	15.8	28.8	26.9	27.4	25.3

* Source: *Die Frau in der DDR*, 1989, pp.69-70.

4. 4 Women at Work

Responding to the government's support for promotion of women in education and economy, GDR women participated to a great extent in the labour force. They composed 48 percent of the total employed population; 82.34 percent of working-age women were employed, and this proportion rose up to 91 percent when full-time students are counted. Official GDR statistics presented the situation of women as one of decreasing disadvantage (Kolinsky,

1992, p. 268). However, as in education, a gender gap remained in employment. Women were concentrated to a large extent in "female work" such as light industry or in social services — i.e., health care and education. Also, their access to leadership positions and high earnings was more constrained than officially claimed.

4.4.1 Women in the Labour Force

One peculiar demographic feature of the GDR was the small proportion of women of working age. In 1989, working age women composed 47.7 percent of the total working age population, while the female population was 52 percent of the total population. 22.8 percent of women were sixty year old or above (*Frauen in der DDR*, 1989, p. 11). This relative shortage of working age population led the GDR to record a high level of labour participation rate of women (Table 4.6).

In 1989, women formed about 40 percent of the labour force in industry and manufacturing, more than 70 percent in trade and social service, and around 37 percent in agriculture and fishing. Two thirds of female employees were engaged in either industry, including textile industry, or the social service sector (Table 4.7).

Considering the highly industrialised GDR economy, a large number of women in industry seemed normal. However, the disproportionately large number of women working in the social service (a third of total women employees) suggests that social services were regarded as female work. Less than 12 percent of total male employees were engaged in social services, composing

less than 30 percent of social service workers. Social services are certainly an expanded version of mothering, which echo the Three Ks. Massive labour participation of women, therefore, failed fundamentally to transform gender stereotyping.

Table 4.6 Women in the Labour Force

Year	Working Age Population (Aged 15-65)			Labour Participation Rate		Proportion of Women among the Employed (%)
	Total (1,000)	Female (1,000)	F/Total*100 (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	
1950	11,546	6,451	55	83	45	40
1960	10,542	5,581	53	85	62	45
1970	9,866	5,005	51	83	75	48
1980	10,581	5,257	50	77	78	50
1989	10,649	5,204	48	78	82	49

* Note: Labour Participation Rate = (The Employed + The Recognised Unemployed) / Working Age Population * 100 (%)

* Sources: Calculation Based on "Bevoelkerung" and "Weibliche Beschäftigte" in *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1955-1989.

4.4.2 Women's Vocational Qualification

As the GDR took pains to further women's education, women's vocational qualification were greatly enhanced. At the lower level of qualification was the "specialist" or skilled worker (*Facharbeiter*). *Facharbeiter* composed 67 percent of total employees, of which women amounted to 47 percent. At the middle level of vocational qualification was mastership (*Meister*) and *Fachschule* graduation. The proportion of women *Meisters* dropped to 14 percent, while women received a preference in *Fachschulen*, of which 70 percent of students were female.

Table 4.7 Women's Labour Participation by Industry

Proportion of Women in Each Industry						
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985	1989
Total	40	45	48	50	49	49
Social Services	52	62	70	73	73	73
Industry	20	40	43	43	43	41
Commerce	50	65	69	73	73	72
Agr/Min/Fishery	53	45	46	42	39	37
Transport	31	33	36	37	36	35
Mfg/L-Industry	55	34	40	38	37	37
Construction	9	9	14	16	16	17
Others	65		54	55	56	56

Composition of the Female Labour Force						
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985	1989
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Social Services	18	24	25	29	31	32
Industry	13	32	32	33	32	31
Commerce	9	16	16	15	15	15
Agr/Min/Fishery	35	18	12	9	9	8
Transport	6	5	5	6	5	5
Mfg/L-Industry	18	4	4	2	2	2
Construction	1	1	2	2	2	2
Others	-	-	3	4	3	3

Composition of Male Labour Force						
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985	1989
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Social Services	11	12	10	11	11	12
Industry	35	39	41	43	44	43
Commerce	6	7	7	6	6	6
Agr/Min/Fishery	20	17	13	12	13	13
Transport	8	8	9	9	9	9
Mfg/L-Industry	10	6	6	4	4	4
Construction	9	10	12	12	11	11
Others	-	-	2	3	3	3

* Note 1). Calculation of proportion and distribution is based on "Weibliche Beschäftigte nach der Stellung im Betrieb und nach Wirtschaftsbereichen", "Beschäftigte nach der Stellung im Betriebe und nach Wirtschaftsbereichen," in *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1955-1989.

* Note 2). Each industrial sector in this table appears by descending order of the composition of female labour force in 1989.

Fachschule graduates made up 16 percent of the total employed population.¹² At the highest level of qualification was the graduate holding a university or college degree. Less than 10 percent of employees were educated in university, among which 40 percent were female (Table 4.8). As a whole, women's vocational qualifications appeared highly balanced, except in *Meister*¹³ category. Since *Meisters* composed the managerial and administrative bodies, the shortage of women *Meisters* indicated that women's high qualifications did not guarantee a fair representation of women in management and administration.

Table 4.8 Proportion of Women by Qualification

Year	Total	College Graduate	Fachschule Graduate	Master	Facharbeiter
1970	40	27	36	-	40
1975	43	31	43	9	46
1980	46	35	57	11	47
1985	47	38	62	12	47
1989	47	40	64	14	47

* Note: Calculation is based on *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1990, p. 138.

¹² Female dominance in *Fachschule* partly resulted from the characteristic of the school itself. *Fachschule* was half-professional, half-vocational school, and provided its students with practically applied disciplines, most of which were conventionally regarded as female subjects, like nursing, education, and social service. In communist regimes, medicine was also a female subject because doctors were less professional, less prestigious than in western societies.

¹³ According to the Five-Year Plan of 1976-1980, the GDR re-launched the traditional German system of mastership test (*Meisterpruefung*). Masters were to be in charge of management and administration in each industrial sector —i.e., industry, transportation, construction, manufacturing, etc.— and were called, for example, "Master of Industry" or "Master of Manufacture." It was a certificate of an advanced skill and managerial ability. The low proportion of women in mastership resulted in the shortage of women in administrative bodies.

4.4.3 Women's Earnings

Considering the principle of equal pay for equal work, and the fairly balanced qualifications between men and women, women should have earned equal amounts of money with men. In practice, however, women were poorer (Table 4.9). Women's lower income was brought about by three employment patterns: women's assignment to lower wage groups; women's slimmer chances of getting pay rises, and the large proportion of women in part-time work.

Table 4.9 Average Monthly Earnings of Full-Time Employees

Average Monthly Earnings	Number of Men in the Income Group	Number of Women in the Income Group	Proportion of Women in the Income Group (%)
400-600	35,771	112,605	76
600-800	228,780	660,023	74
800-1000	833,513	920,784	53
1000-1200	1,051,510	562,592	35
1200-1500	898,419	352,589	28
1500-1700	287,247	59,031	17
1700 above	221,895	41,243	16
Total	3,557,135	2,708,867	43

* Source: *Frauenreport '90*, p. 88.

First, women were more likely to be assigned to the lower levels of wage groups in both 'productive' economy and social services. In the 'productive' economy —i.e., industries excluding social services— women were concentrated in the fifth wage class (43.3 percent of total women workers), while men were over-represented in the sixth and seventh classes (67.8 percent). Women in the seventh and eighth classes composed only 13.8 percent of total female workers, while men in the same groups made up 43 percent of total male workers (*Frauenreport '90*, p.

91). As a result, women's average wage class was 5.46, but men's was 6.29 (Table 4.10).

**Table 4.10 Composition of Wage Classes
in the Productive Economy**

Wage Class	Composition of Men (A)	Composition of Women (B)	Difference (B-A)	Female to Male Wage Ratio (Men=100)
4	3	13	+ 10	406
5	18	43	+ 25	235
6	35	29	- 6	84
7	33	12	- 21	36
8	10	2	- 8	19

* Source: *Frauenreport '90*, p. 91.

Disparity in earnings appeared in the education sector as well. 47.5 percent of total female university and Fachschulen staff were assigned to the tenth salary class, while 46.5 percent of male staff were in the eleventh class (Table 4.11).

**Table 4.11 Composition of Salary Classes
in Universities, Colleges, and Fachschulen**

Salary Classes	Composition of Men (A)	Composition of Women (B)	Difference (B-A)	Female to Male Salary Ratio (Men=100)
9	5	18	+ 13	357
10	29	48	+ 19	165
11	47	29	- 18	61
12	18	6	- 12	33
13	1	0	- 1	25

* Source: *Frauenreport '90*, p. 92.

Secondly, women's chances of getting shift (rise in wages) in industry fell short of the level of men's. In the GDR,

industry and construction sectors had a three level shift system. As a whole, two thirds (62.4 Percent in 1989) of workers were in the first level, one eighth (11.8 percent in 1989) were in the second level, and one fourth (26 percent in 1989) were in the third level (*Sozialreport '90*, p. 108). The second level workers earned an average of 113 percent of the first level workers' gross wage, and the third level workers 124 percent of that (*Ibid.*, p. 122). In 1988, 30.8 percent of men got wage rises, but only 9.4 percent of women did so (*Die Frau in der DDR*, 1989, p. 47). Also, while 22.7 percent of male workers were shifted to the third level, only 5.8 percent of female workers were shifted —i.e., men were four times more likely to get shifted to the third wage level. Therefore, women's opportunity to get a wage rise was slimmer than men's, leading women to earn less money than their male counterparts.

Thirdly, although all the workers were assumed to work full-time, many women were engaged in part-time work. About 27 to 32 percent —one third— of total employed women had part-time job contracts (Table 4.12). Women often had to choose part-time jobs either because of young children, or because of other familial constraints. In spite of the government's effort to support working wives and working mothers, women's household chores restricted women's economic activities considerably.

Neither the communist pledge of sexual equality, nor women's full-scale labour participation, nor their vocational qualifications, established sexual equality in income. Nevertheless, women's penetration of all the economic sectors made them visible, and provided a significant amount of

independence from their husbands and fathers.

**Table 4.12 Proportion of Part-Time Workers
in Total Women Workers**

Economic Sector (in %)	Year				
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1989
Total in Economy	32	33	29	27	27
Industry	24	28	26	26	26
Manufacturing	46	49	50	47	45
Construction	30	31	28	28	30
Agr/Min/Fishing	25	35	31	29	27
Transportation	22	24	22	21	21
Communication	53	52	49	47	46
Trade	41	41	37	33	33
Other Production	33	32	29	28	29
Social Service	36	33	28	25	24
Under this:					
Health-Care	29	30	28	25	25
Education	37	30	26	23	20

* Source: *Frauen in der DDR*, 1989, p. 43.

4.4.4 Women in Leadership Positions in the Economy

As they earned less money than men, GDR women were less likely to be found in leadership positions. Women working in a female dominated economic sector —i.e., education, health-care, and trade— reached to leadership positions more easily, but not in proportion to their numbers and vocational qualifications (*Frauenreport '90*, p. 94). In the education sector where 82 percent of the employees who graduated from Fachschule or university or College were female, about 25 percent of top administrative positions were occupied by women, which was the highest female proportion at the top level of any economic sector. By contrast, in the health-care sector where 75 percent of the highly qualified employees were women, less than 3 percent

of top positions were assigned to women, which was the lowest female proportion at the top level. In agriculture, where less than 30 percent of highly qualified employees were female, 40 percent of middle range managerial positions, 20 percent of high level managerial positions, and about 5 percent of top level administrative positions were occupied by women. Therefore, irrespective of vocational qualifications, women were more likely to be found in the lower level or middle level of management, and much less likely to be found in the top positions.

4. 5 Women, Children, and the Family

GDR laws and decrees prescribed that both spouses should share all the responsibility for household chores, bringing up children, and financial matters. The previous custom of husband's right to familial decisions and to the headship of the family was denied. Also GDR laws and decrees provided for child-care facilities as the responsibility of all the enterprises and society. However, there still remained heavier burdens on women than on men in child-caring, in household chores, and in managing the home.

4.5.1 Motherhood and Child-Care

The GDR government endeavoured to combine women's employment and motherhood. A long maternity leave and the Baby Year, the provision of time-off to take care of a sick child (AGB §186), and the provision of a day off for household chores (AGB §185)

enabled women to accommodate both motherhood and work outside the home. The fully provided child-care facilities and care for younger pupils after school hours also helped women to combine the family and work. Many creches and kindergartens were provided for the working or studying mothers free of charge. In 1989, 80 percent of babies up to three years of age were cared for in creches (*Kinderkrippen*), and 95 percent of young children between three to six years of age were accommodated in Kindergartens (Table 4.13). Community child-care was subsidised by the state and parental contributions were minimal (Alsop, 1992, p. 191).

As a result, the fertility rate increased again after a short period of sharp drop, and remained stable until the mid-1980s. The birth rate in every 1,000 population of the GDR became larger than that of the FRG after the 1970s (Table 4.14).

Table 4.13 Child-Care Facilities

Year	Number of Facilities	Number of Nurses	Total Capacity	The Accepted per 1,000 ¹⁾	C/N ²⁾
1955	8,527	21,575	350,332	345	16.24
1965	12,921	36,636	555,472	528	15.16
1975	12,218	52,986	701,809	846	13.25
1980	12,233	56,605	664,478	922	11.74
1985	13,148	69,612	788,232	940	11.32
1989	13,452	73,383	717,140	951	10.18

* Note 1). Accommodated Children in every 1000 Children aged three to six.

* Note 2). Children/Nurses Ratio

* Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1990, p. 329.

By protecting and privileging motherhood, and providing full child-care facilities, the GDR achieved both stabilisation of the fertility rate and women's participation in the work force on a large scale. However, a retrospective survey of 1991 reported

that, under the guise of privileged motherhood, GDR full-time employed mothers tended to spend more time on their children than FRG working mothers (Table 4.15).

Table 4.14 Birth Rate in the GDR and the FRG

Year	GDR		FRG Birth Rate ²⁾
	Fertility Rate ¹⁾	Birth Rate ²⁾	
1960	83.9	17.0	17.4
1970	70.1	13.9	13.4
1980	67.4	14.7	10.1
1989	57.4	12.1	11.0

* Note 1). Fertility Rate: the number of children born to every 1,000 women aged from 15 to 45.

* Note 2). Birth Rate: the number of children born to every 1,000 population.

* Sources: for the Fertility Rate of the GDR, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1990; the Birth Rate of the GDR is calculated by the number of children and the total population; for the Birth Rate of the FRG, StBA (1991) *Statistisches Jahrbuch*.

Table 4.15 Time-Distribution of GDR and FRG Women

Women's Job Position	Spent Hours					
	Unemployed		Part-Time		Full-time	
	GDR	FRG	GDR	FRG	GDR	FRG
paid work	-	-	6.8	4.6	9.3	9.1
Household work	6.3	5.2	5.2	4.3	4.2	2.3
Child-care	4.9	6.3	3.1	5.1	2.6	2.5
Fixing/Garden	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.6
Total Housework	12.4	12.5	9.4	10.3	7.5	5.4

* Source: Jasper, Gerda (1993) "Wie stand es in der DDR um die Gleichberechtigung von Frau und Mann?", unpublished MS.

4.5.2 Marriage and Divorce

When women are economically independent and motherhood is protected, irrespective of marital status, increasing numbers of divorces are predictable. While the marriage rate in every

1,000 population was in decline, the divorce rate was increasing (Table 4.16). The divorce rate of the GDR was higher than that of the FRG by one point per 1,000 population (See, Chapter Three). Though the Family Law attempted to reconcile couples and prevent the breakdown of marriages, the young generation became more demanding, and one third of married couples ended in divorce.

Table 4.16 Marriages and Divorces

(per every 1,000 population)

Year	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985	1989
Marriage	11.7	9.7	7.7	8.0	8.0	7.9
Divorce	2.7	1.4	1.6	2.7	3.1	3.0

* Source: for Marriage, *Frauenreport '90*, p. 106; for Divorce, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1990, p. 417, and *Die Frau in der DDR*, 1989, p. 29.

Regarding divorce, 45 percent of couples wanted divorce within three years of marriage, 20 percent between three and five years of marriage (*Frauenreport '90*, p. 110). In 1989, spouses without children filed for 31.9 percent of divorce cases, spouses with one child 40.7 percent, and spouses with two children made up nearly a quarter of divorce cases (*Die Frau in der DDR*, 1989, p. 29). Those who with three or more children were reluctant to divorce (3.9 percent of cases). However, the number of children appeared less influential than the age of spouses: if either both spouses, or one of the spouses were younger than 25 years of age, the possibility of marriage break down was very high —29.3 percent of total divorce cases were taken by them (*Ibid.*, p. 30).

More women initiated divorce than men. One third of divorce cases was initiated by husbands, and the rest by wives. The fact

that the majority of divorce cases was initiated by women suggests that women became less tolerant of conflicts within the family. In the past, they had to brace such problem, because they were economically dependent on husbands, or because they were afraid of the stigma of divorce which was once fatal for women. Yet, women still faced more burdens in child-care, household chores, and familial relations.

4.5.3 Household Work

Time distribution of household work largely depended on the family's economic position, especially on vocational qualifications. The workers' families (*Arbeiter*) spent a lot more time in household work, while the intellectual families —i.e., both spouses graduated university or college— spent the least time in household work (*Frauenreport '90*, p. 127). On average, two or three hours per day were assigned to household work by both spouses. In the typical family of workers —i.e., consisting of husband, wife, and children— wives spent twice as much time as their husbands in household chores (Table 4.17).

Table 4.17 Distribution of Household Chores in the Family

Year	1965		1970		1985	
	H,M/Week ¹⁾	%	H,M/Week	%	H,M/Week	%
Wife	37,42	79.4	37,06	78.7	26,43	58.7
Husband	5,30	11.6	6,06	13.0	11,54	26.3
Others	4,18	9.0	3,54	8.3	6,53	15.0
Total	47,30	100	47,06	100	45,30	100

* Note 1). H,M/Week: Time spent in Hours, Minutes per Week.

* Sources: for 1965 and 1970, Shaffer, (1981), p. 145; for 1985, *Sozialreport '90*, p. 269.

In 1988 there was an interesting survey about the division of household chores between spouses (Sozialreport '90, pp. 270-273; Frauenreport '90, pp. 127-131). The result eloquently shows that traditional notions of different male and female roles still survived. Both men and women answered cleaning and washing were predominantly wives' work, and weekend shopping and crockery washing-up could be shared (Table 4.18). Ironically, a larger proportion of men thought more work could be shared than women. While 44 percent of women thought daily shopping could be shared, 56 percent of men were willing to share. In the same token, while 79 percent of women answered that laundry was the wife's job, 67 percent of men thought so. Overall, more women regarded most of household work as their responsibility than men.

**Table 4.18 Which Household Work should be Shared
between the Spouses?**

Household Work that should be shared.	Women's Answer (%)	Men's answer (%)
Weekend Shopping	61	60
Daily Shopping	44	56
Dish Washing	51	55
Vacuum Cleaning	44	51
Going to Bank etc.	44	51
Preparing Meals	36	38
Cleaning	31	32
<hr/>		
Household Work that is Wife's Job.	Women's Answer (%)	Men's Answer (%)
Laundry	79	67
Cleaning	59	50
Preparing Meals	53	43
Small Reparation	42	36
Dish Washing	36	22
Daily Shopping	34	24

* Source: Sozialreport, '90, p.270 and 272. Two tables are combined.

Consequently, despite their heavier burden in household work, a majority of women were satisfied with the division of household chores (Table 4.19), which resonates the legacy of the Three Ks. After all, the kitchen was the women's sphere. Despite women's labour participation, traditional gender relations were still prevailing in the family, though weakening as a matter of fact.

Table 4.19 Satisfaction over Sharing Household Work

The Extent of Satisfaction	1982	1988	
		Women	Men
Very Satisfied	63	12	11
Satisfied		55	64
Half and Half	34	31	23
Unsatisfied	3	2	2

* Source: *Sozialreport*, '90, p. 271.

4. 6. Women in Politics

Though still under-represented, GDR women became visible in politics. Women composed nearly a third of delegates in the People's Congress (*Volkskammer*). A few women became ministers and played important roles in the party committees. However, women were more likely to be found at the local level or at a lower level of politics than at the centre. The only women's organisation in the GDR was a mere echo of the SED. Yet, GDR women's political representation, at least formally, was in far better shape than that of their western sisters.

4.6.1 Women in the People's Congress (*Volkskammer*)

In the Constitution, the People's Congress was bestowed all the powers expected of an elected parliament. However, this Congress was only a rubber-stamp, opening for less than one month during its five year term, and confirming all the proposals and laws initiated by the SED controlled government. It is implausible to assume that the proportion of women among the delegates gave a genuine picture of women's political representation. However, the proportion of women in the parliament was higher (on average 29 percent), and women were better-represented, than in the FRG (Table 4.20).

Table 4.20 Women Delegates in the Congress
(in Percentage)

Session	Total Delegates	Women Delegates	% of Women	Opening Days ¹⁾
1950-1954	466	111 ²⁾	23.8	49
1954-1958	466	128	27.5	36
1958-1963	466	114	24.5	27
1963-1967	434	115	26.5	27
1967-1971	434	129	29.7	20
1971-1976	500	159	31.8	18
1976-1981	500	168	33.6	13
1981-1986	500	162	32.4	-
1986-1989	500	161	32.2	-

* Note 1) Total opening days of the Congress for the whole term.

* Note 2) According to Gast (1973), there were 92 women delegates in the first Congress. However, the record in the DFD-Archives wrote 111 female delegates, of whom 107 delegates were named. I follow the DFD record.

* Sources: from the first to the third, a record in the DFD-Archive in Berlin; from the fourth to the ninth, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1978, 1982, 1986.

Women representatives were more easily found in local assemblies: in 1981 around 35 percent of community assembly delegates, 42 percent of District assembly delegates, and 39

percent of county assembly delegates were women (Edwards, 1985, p. 99). Women were better represented in urban than in rural areas, and better at the local than at the national level.

4.6.2 Women in Governing Bodies

The highest organ of GDR government was the Council of Ministers (*Ministerrat*), composed of 45 ministers with a five year term. Of more than one hundred of ministers ever appointed to the Council of Ministers, only six were women, including two ministerial officials (*Ministerrang*)¹⁴. The four women ministers were Else Zaisser, Hilde Benjamin, Margarete Wittkowski, and Margot Honecker;¹⁵ and the two ministerial officials Greta Kuckhoff and Elli Schmidt. All six women were members of the former KPD, and then the SED. Since Zaisser and Benjamin had studied law and education, respectively, and had been zealots of the KPD since 1920s, their position in the government could be

¹⁴ Ministerial officials (*Ministerrang*) were members of the *Ministerrat*, but did not have an independent responsibility over a specific ministry.

¹⁵ Else Zaisser was minister of education from 1952 to 1953. Her husband Wilhelm Zaisser was also a minister, in charge of the notorious Stasi (*Staatssicherheit*) until 1953. Both of them were zealots of the KPD since 1926. She studied pedagogy.

Hilde Benjamin was in charge of the ministry of Justice, from 1953 to 1967. She joined in the KPD in 1927 as a law student and worked as a public prosecutor (*Staatsanwaeltin*). Her husband was murdered in 1944 by the Nazis.

Margarete Wittkowski was not minister in title, but President of German Bank from 1967-1974, and became regular member of the Council of Minister from 1972 to 1974. Therefore I put her in a ministerial position.

Margot Honecker was minister of education since 1963 till the end of the Honecker government. She was the second wife of Erich Honecker. Before she joined in the KPD in 1945, she was a shorthand typist. She got married in 1954, and since then had been a head of department in the ministry of education until 1963, when she formally took the seat of minister.

regarded as a reward for their contribution and competence in building the communist regime. Wittkowski was an expert in banking. All of them were cadre members of the SED (Gast, 1973).

At the local level, women began to be elected as mayors shortly after the war. However, at that stage their number was very small (approximately 1 percent in 1947: Edwards, 1985, p. 100). In the 1950s and 1960s women became mayors in a large number of the cities and larger towns. In 1981, 23.6 percent of total mayors were women. Mayors in the GDR were not merely representative figures but had many tasks and responsibilities in local government, and hence were required to have higher qualifications. Therefore, the existence of many women mayors reflected the possible acceptance of the political significance and competence of women in the GDR. However, in the governing bodies, too, women were better represented at the local level than at national level.

4.6.3 Women in the SED

Despite having a high and growing female membership, the SED also revealed women's under-representation. In 1981, women composed 33.7 percent of total party members (Helwig, 1982, p. 113),¹⁶ but had never been elected as regular members to the locus of power, the Politburo of the Central Committee. Only four women had been elected as candidate members: Elli Schmidt, Edith Baumann (Edith Honecker until 1954), Margarete Mueller, and

¹⁶ The proportion of female membership in the SED varied: it was 21.5 percent in April 1946; 23.9 percent in May 1947; 20 percent in April 1954; 26.5 percent in December 1966; 28.7 percent in June 1971; and 31.3 percent in March 1977 (Edwards, 1985, p. 106).

Inge(borg) Lange.¹⁷ Since the Politburo consisted of twenty-one regular members and four candidates (after 1973, before there were 5 regular members and 2 candidates), four women candidates during four decades were disproportionately low, particularly compared with the rather high proportion of women in the Congress. Outside the Politburo, women held nineteen regular seats (out of 189 total seats: 10 percent) and five candidate seats (out of 24 total seats: 20 percent) in the Central Committee (in 1981: *DDR Handbuch II*, p. 1541). Therefore, in the SED as well, GDR women were consistently found at a lower level and at the local level of politics, where less responsibility and less political power were bestowed.

4.6.4 The Democratic Women's Federation of Germany

The Democratic Women's Federation of Germany (*Demokratische Frauenbund Deutschland*: DFD) was the only women's organisation, and one of the nine constituent organisations in the National Front. It was established in 1945 as the Anti-Fascist Women's

¹⁷ Elli Schmidt was journalist, and member of the KPD since 1927. During 1946-1953, she was elected in the Party Committee, and 1950-1953 candidate member of the SED Politburo. She was also minister rank official in the Commission for Trade and Supply.

Edith Baumann was the first wife of Honecker, and acted in the SPD before its merger into the SED. She held the post of Secretary of Central Committee of the SED, during 1950-1953 and 1961-1963. She was candidate member of the Politburo from 1958-1963.

Margarete Mueller was a party functionary, and became candidate member of the Politburo in 1963. She held the post until 1989.

Inge(borg) Lange studied sociology, and edited party pamphlets. She joined the KPD in 1945, and became a member of the SED since its merger. She had been in charge of women policy, and was head of the Department of Women in the SED Central Committee. She also held the post of Secretary of the Central Committee.

Of the four, three women held the post of Secretary of the Central Committee.

Committee, and changed its name into the DFD.

It was organised in accordance with the model of the SED, the same number of local organisations and a similar structure. Its highest organ was the Federal Congress, which was assumed to open every four years. The Federal Committee of the DFD was equivalent of the Central Committee of the SED, and was responsible for its programme, organisation, financial affairs, and normal administration in between the Congresses. The Presidency of the DFD was held by only one person, Ilse Thiele, who was a functionary of the SED, and a member of the Central Committee. The objective of the DFD was to "bridge the party (SED) policies and women through the DFD, and to build socialist consciousness (*sozialistisches Bewusstsein*) in women" (Helwig, 1982, p. 117). It also pursued the enhancement of women's vocational qualifications. In 1967, it established a "Women's Academy" (*Frauenakademie*), and provided a highly political adult education. In 1982, it gathered 1.4 Million members, of which 66.5 percent were younger than 35 years of age.

Though it was an echo of the SED, the fact that the DFD was one of the constituent organisations of the National Front and sent many women to the People's Congress allowed GDR women easier access to national politics. However, the lack of critical discussion of existing gender relations and its absolute compliance with SED policies limited its role and influence in politics.

As a whole, GDR women in politics were in appearance more visible than those of the FRG. Many women delegates in the People's Congress and local assemblies, women as heads of public

administrative bodies, and the existence of women's mass organisation did not fall short of statistical comparison with any other countries. However, women were better represented at lower levels and in local politics. The sharp drop of female figures at the top level of politics reveals a *de facto* under-representation of women. Also, women figures in politics repeated the intention of the SED in unison. The absence of women's own voice was one of the main targets of the Western criticism.

4. 7 Summary

GDR women enjoyed better life-chances than their western sisters in many respects. The law guaranteed them a full array of equality between the sexes; women and men had rights and duties to work, rights to education and employment; the law imposed on the state and society the responsibility of protection and promotion for women; the law revoked husbands' rights which traditionally restricted women's activity outside the home; furthermore, the law articulated that household chores should be shared between the spouses. GDR women, at least under law, received in some instances preferential treatment. Accordingly, they made certain progress in improving their conditions.

In education, they obtained an almost equal position and enhanced qualifications: in the *Fachschule*, women overshadowed men; women penetrated more widely in the university than in other school systems, and composed 48.5 percent of university and college students. At work, women composed 48.8 percent of the

labour force, and contributed to the economy. Women provided 47 percent of total skilled workers, 64 percent of total *Fachschule* graduates, and 40 percent of total university and college graduates. In politics, they became visible as delegates and administrators. They comprised 32 percent of the People's Congress delegates and approximately 40 percent of local assembly delegates; many women also took responsibility as mayors.

However, there remained persistent sexual inequality. In education, women were still concentrated in the "female subjects." At work, women were assigned to lower levels of responsibility, and to lower levels of wage/salary class; also there remained "female jobs" in the work place. Women still suffered slim opportunities to get wage rises and to reach top posts. In politics, women were less represented at the higher level of politics. Also, at home, women still shouldered a double burden, and did household chores twice as long as their husbands. Therefore, many feminists fell into deep despair because they found a lack of critical voice and impetus towards sexual equality in GDR women. Many of them perceived the formal equality in the GDR as a mere tokenism, or, at best, "a gift from above."

Nevertheless, GDR women's achievements in education, employment, and in politics, though much limited and slow, were paving the way towards sexual equality. The collapse of the GDR deprived them of opportunities to take advantage of the socialist ideology of women's emancipation, and to widen their confidence and ability in employment. However, their encounter with their questioning sisters in the West will give them a new chance to rethink what they achieved, and how they could secure their past

achievement. In this regard, the establishment of the Independent Women's Association (*Unabhaengige Frauenverband*: UFV) in 1989 demands attention, since GDR women began to advance again to improve their situation by their own demands and struggles.

CHAPTER FIVE

WOMEN IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

5. 1 Introduction

Since the end of World War Two, the Republic of Korea (ROK: South Korea) has encountered a full array of political changes —e.g., division of its nation; a three-year civil war; a dictatorship based on charismatic mass popularity; a students' uprising which defeated the dictatorship; two military coups and military governments; and nine Constitutional modifications and alterations. Despite political instability, its economy has grown rapidly, propelling it into the ranks of the industrialised world and the status of twelfth largest trading state (The Financial Times, 29, Oct. 1991).

The strict norm of women's confinement at home in the Korean tradition lost much of its control during Japanese colonisation and the Korean War (1950-1953). More and more women participated in the labour market, at first for the war effort, and later for economic growth. However, there remained many feudal and patriarchal social relations, to which the legislature and government paid only meagre attention. The moderate, but persistent, women's movement has strived to establish sexual equality, and had induced many legal reforms by the late 1980s.

5.1.1 Authoritarian Government and Controlled Economy

The Republic of Korea maintained the appearance of liberal

democracy since the war: a multi-party system has been sustained, though the opposition parties have never succeeded in winning power; and people have participated in the political process through elections on regular basis. In reality, however, the authoritarian executive and the President were in full control of ROK politics until the mid-1980s. The domination of the executive was the result of three factors: the low level of institutionalisation of the parties; traditional elitism and supremacy of the bureaucracy; and, most of all, the need of the military leaders for economic achievement.

First, despite their commanding might in the National Assembly, the ruling parties have been dependent upon Presidents for their viability, and have collapsed with the Presidents. The opposition parties have also relied on the popularity and characteristics of their leaders. The splits among the opposition parties in many cases were the outcome of factional power struggles among their leaders, not of ideological differences.

Secondly, governmental officials in the *Chosun* Dynasty cherished elitism, which, combined with deference, left behind the legacy of an authoritarian bureaucracy. Japanese colonial rule and the military coup after independence fortified the elitist, supremacist, but efficient bureaucracy.

Thirdly, the military government concentrated on economic development, as the junta of 1961 claimed to have come to power to save the country from 'communist threat and poverty'. Its developmental strategy empowered the executive to interfere with the market and society to a great extent. The military modified the market economy with comprehensive national economic plans —

the Five-Year Economic Development Plan. To achieve its planned economic growth,¹ the government provided thick protection and privileges for industries, while oppressing the labour movement and controlling the consumer prices of most basic goods.

Behind the successful economic growth, labour's rights and social welfare were impaired: industrial action was severely restricted; industrial disasters passed by unnoticed; and national health insurance and national pension schemes did not cover all the populace until as late as 1988, and are not yet in full force (Choi Sook-Hee, 1992).

The challenge to the authoritarian government sprang up forcefully during the mid-1980s, however. Despite oppressive military control and severe restrictions on election campaigns, the opposition parties, which had been banned in 1980 and rebuilt only months before the national election of 1984, won enough seats in the National Assembly to voice popular demand for democratisation. The parliamentary opposition tallied with the citizens' and students' anti-military demonstrations, forcing the President to promise democratisation. The 1987 Constitution was the first amendment achieved through government-opposition collaboration. The new Constitution and the heightened citizens' power kindled hopes of a democratic political order.

¹ During the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-66) the average GNP growth rate was 7.8 percent per year; in the Second (1967-71), 9.6 percent; in the Third (1972-1976), 9.7 percent; and in the Fourth (1977-1981), 5.8 percent. From the Fifth Plan onwards, the government added an adjective "socio-" to the plan. During the Fifth Socio-Economic Development Plan (1982-86), the average GNP growth rate was 8.6 percent a year; and during the Sixth, 7.3 percent (Yeon Ha-cheung, 1988).

5.1.2 Marginalised Women's Issues

As most parties have been conservative or liberal, the party programmes have not shown significant differences either among the opposition parties, or between the ruling and opposition parties.² All radical parties failed to win seats in the National Assembly, and consequently disappeared.

The conservatism of Korean parties, along with the authoritarian political order, hampered the changes in social relations. Even when the authoritarian bureaucracy took the initiative on a social issue —e.g., the modification of the Civil Code— the National Assembly rejected it on the ground that it 'defied traditional values'. Women's issues were at best incorporated into family issues, or left untouched. Legal reforms for sexual equality, therefore, were initiated, supported, and fought for by the women's movement.

5. 2 The Status of Women Under the Law

Until as late as 1989, ROK women were discriminated against under the law: the Civil Code hindered sexual equality in the family; and the Labour Standards Law did not provide the principle of equal pay for equal work. While the alterations of the Constitution were plentiful, amendments of the Civil Code or

² The Korean War and Confucianism shaped Korean political culture. Mass killings during the War led many elderly South Koreans to abhor communism, while Confucianism instructed people to obey the authorities without question. Confucianism and anti-communism have inhibited the prospects of socialist and radical parties (Academy of Korean Politics, 1986, pp.270-297; Kim Untae et al. 1989, pp.232-275).

Labour Law were processed slowly and noisily. Not until the 1987 Constitution specifically stated women's rights in the family and employment did the struggle of the women's movement fare well.

5.2.1 Constitutional Promises of Sexual Equality

The first Constitution of 1948 promised sexual equality unconditionally: all citizens, men and women, had equal rights (Article 5); and any previous law remained in force unless it contradicted the provisions of the Constitution (Article 127). These provisions were supposed to revoke many laws that infringed on women's equal rights. In reality, however, laws discriminating against women remained valid.³ The National Assembly passed the bill for the Civil Code in 1958, which came into force in 1960, fifteen years after independence.

Despite the ups and downs of human rights provisions by alterations of the Constitution, the equal rights provision did not show much variation, except in the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, in addition to the general provision of equal rights (Article 11, (1)), provided that female labour shall be protected, and that women shall not be discriminated against in employment, wages, and working conditions (Article 32, (4)). Also, Art.34 obliges the state to improve women's welfare and equal rights. Marriage and family life are based on the individual's dignity and sexual equality, and the state takes responsibility to protect maternity (Article 36). Accordingly the

³ In 1954, wives' ability to initiate a legal case was denied, and in 1955, the restriction on mothers' parental authority was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court (Pae Kyung-Sook, 1993).

Sexual Equality Employment Law was promulgated in 1987, and amended in 1989. Modification of the Civil Code followed in 1989.

5.2.2 The Family Law

Before a written civil code was first implanted by the Japanese colonial government in 1912 (The Regulation of Civil Relations in Chosun: *Chosun Minsaryung*), private relations in Korea were regulated by common law —i.e., Confucian instructions (Chung Gwang-Hyun, 1968). Though the Regulation contributed to improving women's legal status, by coding women's status on paper, it denied wives' legal capacity and restricted women's rights far more than the German Civil Code.

The 1960 Civil Code was an amendment of the colonial Regulation rather than a promulgation of a new code. Immediately after the legislation of the Civil Code, the women's movement issued the "Ten Points Programme", protesting against ten discriminatory aspects of the Civil Code (Lee Tae-Young, 1989):

1. The family register, the headship of a family system, and its succession through paternal lineage (§778-799; §980-996) reinforced the patriarchal social order.⁴ The family register provided a tangible entity for a paternal lineage; and the head

⁴ To understand Korean family law, it is essential to recognise the importance of the family register and clan. All members of a clan share the same surname and origin, and are assumed to be related by blood, or, to belong to a family. Each clan has an original family register, and each family has a branch family register. The relative relationship, sometimes even several tens of times removed, can be recognised by the original family register. Though the Civil Code does not recognise the original family register, it still uses many expressions derived from the original family register —e.g., in the wording of "legal setting-up of a branch family", "compulsory setting-up of a branch family" and so forth.

of a family was the archetypal patriarch. The headship of the family was part of inheritance (*Sangsock*), not a simple object of succession or continuation (*Seunggye*). The heirship (*Sangsock-Gwon*) of the family headship was a duty, since renouncing the heirship was prohibited (§991). The largest legal portion of property for the heir of the family headship was ensured (§1009). In addition, when the head of a family died without a son, the Civil Code allowed adoption of a son, so that the son should succeed to the headship (§867).

2. The definition of relatives that held legal efficacy was inequitable: maternal relatives by blood were recognised up to four times removed, compared with paternal relatives by blood who were recognised up to eight times removed; and husbands' relatives, paternally and maternally, were fully recognised, but wives' relatives, except their parents, were not regarded as relatives in legal terms.

3. The prohibition of marriage between the parties whose surname and origin are the same (§809) caused a ridiculously wide-ranging restriction on marriage.⁵

4. The Civil Code ignored wives' contribution to obtaining property, either through their employment or dowry, or through (unpaid) household work: any property of which the title was uncertain, whether it belonged to the husband or wife, was assumed to be the property of the husband (§830, 2).

⁵ The Korean "surname" represents an original legendary ancestor, and the "origin of surname" means the place where the ancestor first settled down more than a millennium ago. In Korea, about 220 surnames are recognised as distinguishable clans among the alleged 70 million population, including North Koreans and Korean descendants abroad.

5. Housewives' economic prospects after divorce were threatened because the Civil Code did not provide a spouse's right to claim a share of property in the case of divorce.

6. The Civil Code did not provide a proper procedure for divorce by agreement (§834-835). §834 read very simply: "husband and wife may effect divorce by agreement." As a result, many illiterate women found themselves divorced with empty hands without their genuine agreement, or by fraud.

7. The Civil Code gave the sole parental power to the father (§909). If a child had no father, or the father was unable to exercise parental power for any reason, the child's mother with whom the child was residing exercised parental power (§909, 2). If a divorced woman or a widow remarried, she was not granted parental authority over the children born to her during her previous marriage, even after the father of the children died (§909, 5). The Civil Code was also silent on the parental right to contact their children in the case of divorce. These provisions led many women to give up any hope of divorce or remarriage, and to exert themselves to remain in (the first and must-be-only) marriage for the sake of the children, echoing the traditional Rule of the Three Obediences.

8. The Civil Code forced women to be in a mother and child relationship with their husbands' children, while distinguishing lawful mothers from stepmothers. Wives entered a mother and child relationship with their husbands' children born outside of wedlock, when their husbands recognised the children, regardless of their opinion (§773: *Juckmo-Soja gwangye*: lawful mother-illegitimate child relationship). Also, women by marriage entered

a mother and child relationship with the (legitimate) children of their husbands (§774: *Gyemo-Ja gwangye*: stepmother-legitimate child relationship). Stepmothers, however, were not allowed parental authority over the children, unless they were appointed as guardians after the death of their husbands (§912). By contrast, men were not regarded as the fathers of the children born to the previous marriage of their wives: the children and stepfather were relatives by affinity (§777).

9. The provisions of succession were obviously discriminatory: women could not succeed to the headship of a family (§981); sons and male descendants took precedence over daughters and female descendants in inheritance rights (§1000); and the legal portion of female relatives for inheritance was smaller than that of male relatives (§1009).

10. The provisions concerning succession lacked a reserve system. A compulsory legal portion of inheritance for the family of the deceased was deemed necessary, in case husbands abandoned their wives and children, and left nothing for them.

In 1973, the women's movement stood together in union, and initiated a draft bill which focused on these Ten Points. It took two years for female parliamentarians to propose the draft in the National Assembly, and another three years to debate. In 1977, the National Assembly passed the bill, amending five out of the ten points: the family property of which the title is uncertain is assumed to be the joint property of the spouses (§808: the fourth point); divorce by agreement requires confirmation procedure by the Familial Court (§836, 1: the sixth point); both parents share parental power (§909, 1-2: the seventh point); an

inheritance shall be divided by equal proportion among the heirs who have the same precedence, regardless of sex (§1009: the ninth point); and a legal portion of inheritance for the family of the deceased is reserved (§1122-1118: the tenth point).

The remaining five points were debated for the following decade, until the Civil Code was modified again in 1989. Though the new Civil Code did not abolish the headship of family system (the first point), it made the headship of a family an object of continuation (*Seunggye*). The successorship (*Seunggye-Kwon*) of the family headship is renounceable (§991), and open to women. The adoption of a son to succeed the headship of a family was repealed. The scope of relatives is now decided by the same computation between men and women (the second point): both paternal and maternal relatives by blood are within the eighth degree of relationship; relatives by affinity are within the fourth degree of relationship from the husband and wife. In divorce cases, both spouses have the right to claim a share of property regardless of whether he or she contributed to the accumulation of property by paid employment (§839, 2: the fifth point). Custody of the children is to be decided by the divorce agreement (§837, 1), and a parent who does not reside with the children has the right to contact their children (§837, 2). The forced mother and child relationship between the wife and the children of her husband is abolished (the eighth point). The prohibition of marriage between the parties whose surnames and origins are the same, however, remained intact (the third point). Yet, this third point was not sexually discriminating. Therefore, the Civil Code nearly reached sexual equality in the family.

5.2.3 Labour Laws

The first Constitution of 1948 obliged the state to legislate labour standards and to protect female and minor labour (Article 17). Accordingly, the Labour Standards Law (1953) provided for the protection of female and minor labour,⁶ but it missed the principle of equal pay for equal work. The principle was assumed to be included in the general equal treatment provision (§5): an employer shall not discriminate among workers by sex, and shall not discriminate among their working conditions by their nationality or creed or social status. However, the law allowed employers a wide range of freedom to determine the working conditions by agreement with the employees. In the work contract, many employers inserted such clauses as women's early retirement and dismissal upon marriage, and assigned women to low-paid jobs, paying them less than half of men's wages. Also, this Law dealt only with working conditions in the work place, not with equal opportunities to be employed. The Labour Standards Law was amended six times, but not until the Sexual Equality Employment Law (1988) came into force was the practice of women's earlier retirement challenged.

The Sexual Equality Employment Law was to secure equal

⁶ Neither females nor minors under eighteen years of age were authorised to engage in any work detrimental to morality or harmful to health (provided by a Presidential Decree: §51). Neither females nor minors were authorised to perform overnight or holiday work, unless there was approval from the Bureau of Labour (later the Minister of Labour). Females' overtime work was limited (§57), and females could not be placed inside a pit (§58). Maternity leave was guaranteed for sixty days during pregnancy, another thirty days after giving birth, with pay (§60, 1). Pregnant female workers were to be transferred to light and easy work upon request (§60, 2). A female worker with an infant under one year of age was allowed twice a day for nursing for not less than thirty minutes on each occasion (§61).

opportunity and treatment for employees regardless of their sex, to protect the maternal role of women, and to develop the capabilities of female employees and, thus, to enhance the status of females and to promote their welfare (§1). As soon as it was passed in the National Assembly, however, this law came under fire because it still missed the principle of equal pay for equal work and a definition of discrimination against female labour. Not least this law was criticised because it presumed women's foremost role as mothers (RCKW et. al., 1991; Kim Elim, 1989). As a result, the law was amended in the next year.

The amended Sexual Equality Employment Law of 1989 provided a definition of the term "discrimination" and the principle of "equal pay for work of equal value."⁷ The term "discrimination" refers to when an employer unreasonably differentiates between workers with respect to recruitment or working conditions, or takes a disadvantageous action because of gender, marital status, status in a family, or pregnancy (§2-2, 1). Equal opportunities and treatment for males and females are guaranteed in recruitment and employment (§6), wages (§6-2), education, placement and promotion (§7), and in retirement, resignation and dismissal (§8). The criteria on "work of equal value" are technique, endeavour, responsibility, working conditions, or others required

⁷ Instead of the common phrase of "equal pay for equal work", the Sexual Equality Employment Law provides the principle of "equal pay for work of equal value." The law defines the criteria of work of equal value as "technique, endeavour, responsibility, working conditions or others which are required in the process of work" (§6-2, (2)). The Ministry of Labour claims that the term "work of equal value" is more precise and clearer, and hence more protective of women, than the term "equal work." However, there is little difference between the two terms in principle. Therefore, I use the two terms interchangeably.

in the process of work (§6-2, 2). For maternity protection, the Sexual Equality Employment Law provides leave of absence for female employees with an infant under one year old, upon request (§11, 1). The leave of absence, including the maternity leave of the Labour Standards Law (90 days), should not exceed one year, but is included in the length of service (§11, 2-3).

Though more advanced than ever before, the Sexual Equality Employment Law has many problems. The principle of equal pay for work of equal value may well match with the wage system by job-specification, or job-analysis. However, Koreans have long been paid by occupation and seniority and hence lacked the experience of job-analysis by collective agreement. Therefore, many critics expect rows from both sides of industry (Cho Soonkyung, 1991; Kim Elim, 1991). More critically, the law is based on the traditional sexual division: it provides maternity protection on the ground that 'women are responsible, and need to be allowed time, for household work' (Kim Elim, 1991; Lee Hyo-Je, 1989); and it provides leave of absence for child-rearing only for mothers, unlike the GDR and the FRG.

5.2.4 The Penal Code

Four provisions in the Penal Code attract attention: the crime of sexual intercourse under pretext of marriage (§304); the crime of extra-marital affairs (§241 and 242); the crime of rape (§297); and the crime of abortion.

The public interventions in privacy, by incriminating sexual intercourse under pretext of marriage, or extra marital affairs, reflect women's vulnerability to the stigma of losing their

virginity before marriage and of divorce resulting from the common practice of husbands' adultery. A middle-aged housewife had no prospect of employment, and very limited means of living, while the Civil Code and legal aid system were insufficient to support them in divorce cases. Thus the women's movement has supported these interventions as the last resort.

Similar to the FRG Penal Code, the Korean Penal Code defines rape as perpetration of sexual intercourse, by means of violence or intimidation, with a female (§297). Therefore, there is no rape without violence or intimidation regardless of dissension or resistance. Also, men cannot be rape victims. In legal practice, the rape victim has to give proof of violence, and judges tend to decide in favour of the alleged rapist,⁸ on the ground that the victim's resistance to the violence seemed not strong enough, or the victim's behaviour was improper, or the victim had many sexual experiences. In the case that the victim was unconscious or unable to resist, the sexual intercourse constitutes "constructive rape" (§299). Although the Penal Code does not distinguish rape and constructive rape in punishment, judges normally inflict lenient punishment on constructive rape.

The Korean Penal Code prohibits abortion without exception (§269-270). However, the Law concerning the Health of Mothers and Children takes precedence over the Penal Code, and allows abortion exceptionally on medical, eugenic, and ethical grounds

⁸ The Korean court does not use the jury system. A judge, or a bench of judges decides the case. In Korea, 99 percent of judges are male.

(§14).⁹ Unlike in Germany, Korean women and the women's movement have rarely paid attention to the restriction of abortion because abortion has in practice been easily available. The discrepancy between the law and the practice of abortion can be attributed to four factors: first, the high density of the Korean population (the second highest in the world next to Hong Kong), and the urgent need of population control turned the Korean government to neglect enforcing the law; secondly, the highly practical Confucian instructions emphasized human beings, already born, and loyalty to parents at the expense of the children, which freed Koreans from religious condemnation of abortion; thirdly, for unmarried women, the stigma of having children was too grave to force them to give birth; and finally, the underdeveloped social welfare system failed to provide support for single mothers and their children. Child benefits or child allowances have not been introduced yet.¹⁰ Although a few legal scholars and feminists demanded the liberalisation of abortion recently, abortion is not a crucial interest for the women's movement, compared to the task of improving social welfare, legal reforms, or providing child-care facilities.

In short, during the late 1980s, there was a flood of

⁹ An abortion can be legally allowed when the mother or her spouse has a hereditary disease (named in a Presidential Decree); when the mother or her spouse is infected with a contagious disease; when the pregnancy is the result of rape or constructive rape; when the pregnancy comes from the relationship between the relatives by blood or by affinity who are not allowed to marry by law; and when the continuation of the pregnancy may severely damage the health of the mother.

¹⁰ In 1989, the Law for the Welfare of Mothers and Children was promulgated to support the single mother family, but it has not been fully supported by the budget.

legislation and amendments for sexual equality, including the amendment of the Civil Code, promulgation of the Law for the Welfare of Mothers and Children, amendment of the Law concerning the Health of Mothers and Children, and promulgation of the Sexual Equality Employment Law. However, there still remains sexual inequality in many laws. Sexual equality under the law, therefore, requires further endeavours by the women's movement.

5. 3 Women in Education

During the Japanese colonisation, the nationalists perceived education as a part of the independence struggle. Under the slogan of "knowledge is power", the nationalists and socialists appealed to educate women as well as men, and organised many night and adult schools to raise national consciousness. When Korea regained its sovereignty, universal education was easily accepted as a basic principle.

The ultimate goal of South Korean education derives from the traditional ideal of "Benefits for all Human Beings (*Hongik-Ingan*).". While the DPRK perceived education as an instrument to mould socialist personality, and prescribed objectives specifically, the ROK considered education to benefit all human beings, and provided rather vague, idealistic objectives. As in the FRG, no specific effort has been made to further women's education.

5.3.1 The Education System

The Education Law of 1949 provided a 6-3-3-4 four-stage education system, and specified six years of elementary education as compulsory, from six years of age to eleven. Secondary education is divided into two schools, three years of middle school and another three years of high school. Unlike the FRG, the ROK does not provide compulsory vocational training courses.




Figure 5.1 Education System

Primary and middle schools provide for the pupils general knowledge and basic humanities. Though middle school education is not compulsory, and requires tuition and other costs related

to study, almost 99 percent of elementary school leavers advance to middle school. In 1975, 74.7 percent of middle school leavers went to either academic or vocational high school; in 1980, 84.5 percent; in 1990, 95.7 percent (KSA, 1992, pp. 174-175). By 1990, school-enrolment ratio from six to seventeen year olds became 99 percent, comprising almost all the school age population. Also, the sexual gap in school enrolments was reduced to such an extent that in 1990, girls' ratio came to be bigger than boys' (Table 5.1). Consequently, the average years of educational attainment of the populace have increased: in 1960, the average years of schooling was 3.86; in 1990, it became 9.54. Also, in the 1980s, the generation aged six to nineteen had the same length of schooling in both sexes (KSA, 1992, p.169).

Table 5.1 School Enrolment Ratio, Aged 6 to 17 (%)

Year	Average	Boys (A)	Girls(B)	B/A*100 (%)
1970	76.7	80.5	72.6	90.2
1975	80.8	84.3	77.0	91.3
1980	91.6	93.3	89.8	96.2
1985	97.1	97.4	96.7	99.3
1990	99.3	99.1	99.5	100.4

* Source: KSA (1992), pp. 172-173.

5.3.2 Sexual Segregation in the Education System

A large number of secondary and higher educational institutions in the ROK are single-sex schools. During the late nineteenth century, the traditional instruction that "males and females over the age of seven may not be seated in the same room" was the gravest obstacle in providing formal education for women. Therefore, forerunners of women's education established women-only schools, as the most acceptable, if not the only, pattern

of women's education. The rapid expansion of women's education and weakening of traditional instructions increased the proportion of coeducational schools, and changed sexual segregation in secondary education, though not in full scale: in 1989, 34.5 percent of academic high schools and 43.9 percent of vocational high schools were coeducational (Statistical Yearbook of Education, 1989).

Women-only schools have contrasting effects. On the one hand, women-only schools have provided women with better opportunities to cultivate independence and leadership, whilst in coeducational schools, a female student may at best be elected, or appointed, as vice-chairperson. By separation, female students enjoy better opportunities of leadership training. On the other hand, single-sex schools reinforce traditional sex-stereotypes. Most girls' schools take home management or domestic science in the compulsory curricula, while most boys' schools take skills training. Female students in the home management course learn how to cook, make dresses, and embroider, while in the skills training male students learn the principles of machinery and vocationally-oriented knowledge. It also has been pointed out that female schools' facilities are smaller, and their equipment for laboratories and other practice rooms are poorer than male schools (White Paper for Women I and II, 1984 and 1991). Sexual segregation in education, therefore, brings about not only different curricula, but also unequal opportunities of educational achievement.

5.3.3 Women in Higher Education

Women's advances in secondary education have not affected their proportion in higher education very much. Also, fields of study are differentiated by sex (Table 5.2). Nonetheless, women students' fields of studies have diversified towards a less sex-stereotyped pattern. Women's advancement in the social sciences has been remarkable, and women became increasingly interested in highly employment-oriented courses: the proportion of women in engineering grew by a factor of six, and tripled in agriculture or marine fields for three decades. However, the proportion of women has never been over thirty percent, and their disproportionately strong preferences in arts, education, and linguistics/literature and humanities narrowed their spectrum of vocational training, and aggravated competition among women in employment.

5. 4 Women in Employment

During the rapid economic growth, ROK women participated in the labour force on a large scale. In particular, married women's employment outpaced single women's, in the labour participation rate, in the composition of the female labour force, and in numbers by the mid-1980s. However, women's employment structure embodied many problems that curtailed women's economic independence. First, a large number of women were engaged in the family business, farming, or small fisheries, which did not reward women in proportion to their labour, if at all. Secondly,

almost three quarters of women were employed in small factories or trade, where the Labour Standards Law was not applied, and where their working conditions were never enviable — i.e., low wages, long working hours, no paid leave, and no job security. Thirdly, female workers' working hours were, unlike in the two Germanies, longer than that of male workers'. Fourthly, occupational segregation between the sexes, horizontally and vertically, was all too clear. Until the early 1980s, women were rarely found in professional or administrative occupations. Finally, women's average income remained less than half of men's average income.

5.4.1 Women in the Labour Force

In appearance, ROK women's labour participation showed a better performance than in the FRG: women composed 40 percent of total employees by the end of the 1980s; and women's labour participation rate grew by 20 percentage points during three decades. Including the school attending population, women's activity rate was boosted by 30 percent (Table 5.3).

During 1965 to 1970 when the military government introduced the Five-Year Plan, women's labour participation rate increased by 11 percent. The growth rate of women's labour participation overtook that of men's in the 1980s. In particular, among the prime age group of economic activity, aged between 25 and 54, women's labour participation rate increased, while men's rate reduced. Since a majority of women aged between 25 and 54 are married, their increased labour participation implies an increase of married women's economic participation. However, the

numerically strong presence of women in the labour force did not, in fact, enhance women's economic situation appropriately — female labour is still secondary, and less rewarded.

Table 5.2 Women Students in Higher Education

Distribution of Men Students (in %, Total=100)				
Year	1965	1975	1983	1989
Social Science	33.1	22.2	27.6	31.4
Engineering	21.4	28.7	31.5	28.3
Literature/Humanities	14.1	9.1	12.4	14.4
Agri/For/Fish/Marine	11.3	8.6	7.4	6.6
Medical Science	7.6	6.9	4.0	3.4
Natural Science	7.1	5.2	7.3	8.2
Arts/Sports	3.1	2.5	2.4	3.6
Education	2.4	9.5	7.2	4.2
General	0.0	7.3	0.2	0.0
Distribution of Women Students (in %, Total=100)				
	1965	1975	1983	1989
Literature/Humanities	32.4	12.2	25.0	30.0
Arts/Sports	16.7	15.8	13.5	13.1
Natural Science	16.2	13.1	15.1	9.7
Medical Science	13.3	11.1	5.2	5.0
Education	10.2	29.8	27.7	14.2
Social Science	8.1	6.0	9.7	24.0
Agri/For/Fish/Marine	2.5	2.5	2.0	4.2
Engineering	0.6	1.0	1.4	4.5
General		8.5	0.4	
Number of W-Students	23,761	55,439	199,449	284,493
Proportion of Women Students in Each Field				
	1965	1975	1983	1989
Literature/Humanities	40.0	32.7	41.4	43.9
Arts/Sports	61.6	69.8	65.7	57.8
Natural Science	40.0	47.3	41.8	30.6
Medical Science	33.8	36.5	31.4	35.3
Education	55.1	52.9	57.1	56.1
Social Science	6.7	8.9	10.9	22.2
Agri/For/Fish/Marine	6.0	9.3	8.6	19.1
Engineering	0.9	1.3	1.5	5.6
General		29.7	37.7	
Variance	0.0476	0.0514	0.0484	0.0292
Proportion of Women	22.5	26.5	25.8	27.9

* Note: Calculation based on numbers of students by field, *Statistical Yearbooks of Education*, 1965, 1970, 1983, 1989.

Table 5.3 Women in the Labour Force (in %)

Year	% of Women in Working Age Popu- lation 1)	% of Women in the Employed	Female LPR 2)	Male LPR 2)	Female Activity Rate 3)	Male Activity Rate 3)
1965	52.78	27.90	27.16	67.42	41.72	90.82
1970	51.73	36.72	38.50	75.10	50.07	90.23
1975	50.77	36.69	39.60	74.50	53.24	91.84
1980	50.98	38.25	41.60	73.60	55.92	91.66
1985	51.31	38.91	40.60	69.60	58.03	93.19
1989	51.33	40.67	46.50	73.30	61.75	93.78

* Note 1). During 1965-1985, proportion of women in the population aged 14-65; after 1986, proportion of women in the population aged 15-65.

* Note 2). LPR (Labour Participation Rate) = (the Employed + the Recognised Unemployed)/Working Age Population * 100; in percentage.

* Note 3). AR (Activity Rate) = (Labour Participating Population + School Attendants + Other Non-Economic Service Persons)/Working Age Population * 100; in percentage.

* Sources: Calculation of proportion and Activity Rate based on the numbers in EPB, *Statistical Yearbooks of Korea*, 1972-1989; EPB, *Annual Reports on the Economically Active Population Survey*, 1983-1989.

5.4.2 Women's Vocational Qualifications

Among the groups aged 45 and above, more than 90 percent of female employees attained less than nine years of schooling. Only a minuscule number of female employees ever went to university. The gender gap in educational attainment has narrowed rapidly. Among the group aged 15 to 24, female employees' educational attainment became bigger than males' in 1989. A larger proportion of women advanced to high school than men, to some extent because women can hardly find a job with a middle school leaving certificate,¹¹ but for whatever reason, this remarkable

¹¹ Male middle school leavers can get a job as a production and related worker, or as a manual labourer: 41 percent of male employees with middle school leaving certificate are production workers, equipment operators, and manual labourers (Report on the Employment Structure Survey, 1989, p. 188). While jobs open to men with low educational attainment are holding their importance in the national economy, jobs for women with meagre education are reducing. 43 percent of female workers with middle school education were found in the agricultural sector which is declining. Therefore, many women turned to clerical jobs, which

improvement of educational attainment enabled women to compete with men for better employment. In formal education, the qualifications of female labour have been improving remarkably (Figure 5.2).¹²

Since formal education is not specifically vocational, the ROK economy required another paths to produce skilled workers. The ROK government introduced a vocational training system in the Second Five Year Economic Development Plan of 1967, and later obliged the state and large companies to conduct vocational




Figure 5.2 Educational Attainment of Employees by Age Group (1989)

training by the Basic Law for Vocational Training of 1976. This Basic Law for Vocational Training provides three kinds of vocational training institutes (§2): public vocational training; in-plant (company) vocational training; and authorised vocational

in general required high school leaving certificates.

¹² Source : EPB (1989), *Report on the Employment Structure Survey*, pp.74-75.

training. These institutes provide short-term training, ranging from three month to two year courses.

Of the skilled workers trained in these courses women composed a meagre 20 percent (Table 5.4). Surprisingly, the public training courses have provided the smallest number of places for female trainees: of the trainees in the public training courses, women composed 5 percent. In 1989, only 21 of the 74 public training institutes were open to women, while 58 of 110 in-plant training, and 47 of 97 authorised training institutes accepted women (White Paper for Women II, 1991, p. 153). The ROK government did not even attempt to pose as a guarantor of sexual equality in vocational training.

Table 5.4 Female Trainees by Training Places

Training Places	Female Trainees	Periods		
		1978-81	1982-86	1987-90
Public	Numbers	6,289	5,487	4,260
	Proportion (%)	4.7	5.0	4.8
In-Plant	Numbers	99,051	23,335	21,696
	Proportion (%)	32.1	20.3	29.7
Authorised	Numbers	11,462	18,540	16,985
	Proportion (%)	34.2	49.7	28.9
Total	Proportion (%)	24.6	17.3	19.5

* Note 1). Calculation based on the data provided by the Ministry of Labour, Vocational Training Bureau.

* Note 2). Composition of men and women before 1978 is not available.

However, the Ministry of Labour designated twenty-two training courses as "vocational training courses for women", which included eight courses in the textile industry, six courses in food-processing, and four courses in electric and electronics. These courses are clearly sex-stereotyped. The traditional men's jobs — i.e., metal and steel work, equipment operating, machinery or chemistry— are reserved for them. This designation curtails

women's choice in vocational training to twenty-two occupations. In 1989, two thirds of total female trainees in public training institutes concentrated in only three courses: hairdressing, dressmaking, and electronics courses (Women in Employment, 1989). In authorised institutes, too, four fifths of female trainees were crowded into three courses: hairdressing, information processing, and typing (Shin Young-Soo, 1991). In-plant institutes offer thirteen courses mainly in textiles (36.8 percent), electronics (27.5 percent), shoemaking (16.2 percent), and food-processing industries (10 percent).

Throughout this vocational training system, women face a restricted range of courses. The government's designation of vocational training courses for women is state-authorised sexual segregation of training.

5.4.3 Segregated Labour Market

Like in the FRG, the ROK labour market is sexually segregated in economic sectors, occupations, employed status, and full-time or part-time jobs. Though both men and women depended heavily on agriculture in early stage of economic development, agriculture has been of a higher importance in women's employment than in men's: in 1963, 69 percent of female employees were concentrated in agriculture, compared with 56 percent of males. Even in 1989, 21 percent of female employees, but 17 percent of male employees, remained in agriculture. The proportion of females became higher than that of males only in sales and commerce since the 1980s (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Female Employment by Economic Sector

Proportion of Female Employees in Each Economic Sector					
	1963	1970	1980	1985	1989
Agriculture	39.5	42.3	44.5	44.6	46.2
Fishery/Marine	-	-	28.0	19.0	20.5
Industry	30.3	33.8	39.1	38.6	42.5
Energy/Mining	-	-	8.9	3.2	9.7
Construction	-	-	8.5	7.1	9.7
Sales/Commerce	32.9	34.5	48.6	51.8	52.6
Service	-	-	27.2	31.7	33.5

Distribution of Female Employees to Each Economic Sector					
	1963	1970	1980	1985	1989
Agriculture	68.7	57.3	37.7	27.2	21.2
Fishery/Marine	-	-	1.2	0.6	0.4
Industry	6.9	12.2	22.1	23.2	28.9
Energy/Mining	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.1
Construction	-	-	1.4	1.1	1.6
Sales/Commerce	24.4	30.6	24.4	30.0	27.7
Service	-	-	12.6	17.9	20.1

Distribution of Male Employees to Each Economic Sector					
	1963	1970	1980	1985	1989
Agriculture	56.1	45.0	29.1	21.5	16.9
Fishery/Marine	3.9	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.1
Industry	8.5	13.8	21.3	23.6	26.8
Energy/Mining	1.1	1.8	1.3	1.6	0.8
Construction	3.9	4.6	9.1	9.3	9.9
Sales/Commerce	26.6	33.4	16.0	17.8	17.1
Service	-	-	21.4	24.6	27.3

* Note 1). Calculation based on the numbers provided by Korean Labour Institute Database and Database of National Statistics Office.

* Note 2). The labour force data are available only after 1963, when the Korean Bank began to conduct survey on national economy.

Sexual segregation by occupations was clearer than in economic sectors: 76 percent of female employees were crowded into ten occupations, of which only one occupation was shared by both men and women — office assistants (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6 Top Ten Occupations of Men and Women, 1984/1989

Women's Occupations	1989		1984	
	% in Female Labour Force	% in the Occupation	% in Female Labour Force	% in the Occupation
Electronic Assembler	10.3	74.9	8.9	79.4
Office Assistant (Typist)	10.1	38.4	5.5	34.7
Cashier	9.1	73.7	9.1	66.4
Dressmaker (Tailor)	9.0	94.1	12.6	95.9
Shoe-production Tailor	5.5	71.0	4.1	75.5
Spinner	4.9	90.2	5.6	86.5
Weaver	4.0	88.5	6.3	90.6
Electric/Mechanic Fitter	2.1	26.3	1.5	27.5
Cook	2.1	73.8	1.1	65.4
Assembly Line Worker	1.9	68.3	2.4	73.5
Subtotal	59.6	76.0	57.1	68.5
Total Female Employees	100.0	40.7	100.0	38.4

Male Occupation	1989		1984	
	% in Male Labour Force	% in the Occupation	% in Male Labour Force	% in the Occupation
Public Transportation - Operator/Driver	11.6	99.7	10.6	99.6
Office Worker	9.7	98.1	7.5	98.6
Office Assistant	8.0	61.6	6.0	65.3
Manager (Non-Specific)	5.6	98.0	5.5	98.9
Production Manager	3.3	88.4	3.2	81.1
Blacksmith	3.0	73.7	2.4	72.5
Security Guard	2.4	99.9	2.5	99.4
Mechanic	2.1	95.1	2.1	96.0
Machinery Fitter	1.9	96.4	2.0	95.3
Machine Installer	1.9	83.7	1.2	92.8
Subtotal	45.5	87.0	43.0	88.9
Total Male Employees	100.0	59.3	100.0	61.6

* Note 1). Occupations are selected and ordered by 1989 basis.

* Note 2). Selection and Calculation based on the numbers in KLI Data Base, Average Wage by Occupation, 1983 and 1989; Ministry of Labour, Survey Tape on Wage and Salary by Occupations, 1983 and 1989.

* Note 3). The survey of the Ministry of Labour targeted establishments employing more than 10 persons. Therefore, employees in small business and domestic service, mainly maids, are not included.

Men's and women's largest occupations are obviously differentiated: women are concentrated in textile and assembly line work; men in mechanics and managerial work. Even in this horizontal occupational grouping, women's secondary position is obvious: a majority of women were only office assistants, mainly typists. Women made up only 1.9 percent of regular desk-workers who held their own work responsibilities.

Vertically, ROK women have been excluded from the highest rank of occupations to a worse degree than women in the FRG. In 1984, 98.2 percent of female employees were rank-less or the lowest ranking workers, while 86.8 percent of male were rank-less. In boards of directors or executives, women filled only 1.7 percent of the seats. A meagre 0.05 percent of female employees ever reached membership of a board. Men had 34 times as much chance as women: 1.7 percent of male employees were members of boards (Women in Employment, 1985, p. 75). After half a decade, the proportion of women on boards of directors or executives increased to 2.5 percent in 1990, a negligible 0.1 percent of total female employees (Women in Employment, 1991, p. 68).

In employed status, Korean women shared a very similar pattern with Germany. Women had rarely self-employed status, but were abundant in family-business (Figure 5.3).¹³ During the 1960s and 1970s, more than half of employed women were family workers. This disproportionately high focus on family business can be explained by two factors: the distribution of women in agriculture has been higher than that of men, while three

¹³ Sources: "Employed Persons by Status of Workers", in EPB, *Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey, 1963-1989*.

quarters of family workers belonged to farm households in the 1960s, and two thirds in the 1980s; and, if there is a family business, the husband or father is taken as self-employed, and the wife and daughters are regarded as family workers. Though the family workers' share of the female labour force is dropping, the proportion of women in family business is growing because of the overall increase of women's employment (Statistical Yearbooks of Labour, 1960-1990).




Figure 5.3 Composition of Male and Female Employees by Status

In Korea, the proportion of self-declared part-time workers in the labour force is very low. The low rate of part-time workers has resulted from the abundant supply of labour and the lack of jobs suitable to part-time work (Kim Young-Mi, 1992, p. 121). Instead of part-time work, Koreans took daily or seasonal work. In many cases, particularly in construction and agriculture, work contracts were settled on a daily or seasonal basis. As the daily or seasonal workers often work more than 44 hours a week, like regular workers, they have been differentiated

from part-time workers. For these reasons, many Korean women's studies concluded that the composition of part-time workers in the female labour force was very low, around 3.2 percent (White Paper for Women II, 1991).¹⁴

However, irregular workers, daily or seasonal, are as disadvantaged as part-time workers in western society. Their employment is temporary, and in general, unprotected. They do not receive extra employment benefits such as paid leave, leave of absence, or pension scheme. If these irregular workers were taken as part-time workers, women's part-time work ratio would rise very sharply (Table 5.7). Nearly two out of every ten female workers were partially employed; women composed 64.5 percent of partially employed workers. Moreover, while the proportion of part-time workers in the total labour force reduced, women's proportion in the partially-employed increased by 10 percentage points during five years. Many studies are expecting that more and more women will enter the labour force as part-timers (Kim Young-mi, 1991; KWDI, 1992; White Paper for Women II, 1991).

As a whole, like in the FRG, ROK women confront a sexually-segregated labour market, in economic sectors, occupations, status, and in part-time and full-time work. This segregation is compounded by women's concentration in the low wage-occupations, threatening women's economic independence.

¹⁴ According to the ILO (1989), the proportion of part-timers in Korea was 0.2 percent. Compared to the United States (7.3 percent), Germany (13.6 percent), and the United Kingdom (24.7 percent), the Korean labour market is based on an extreme full-time work system.

Table 5.7 Partially Employed Workers, 1989 and 1984

1989						
Average Weekly Work H. ¹⁾	Male Workers		Female Workers		% of Women	Composition (%)
	1,000	% ²⁾	1,000	% ²⁾		
1-26	293	2.7	574	9.0	66.2	5.1
27-35	375	3.5	640	10.0	63.1	5.9
36-44	1,808	16.9	1,416	22.1	43.9	18.9
45 above	8,142	76.2	3,756	58.6	31.6	69.6
Temporary absence	73	0.7	24	0.4	24.7	0.6
		(100.0)		(100.0)		(100.0)

1984						
Average Weekly Work H. ¹⁾	Male Workers		Female Workers		% of Women	Composition (%)
	1,000	% ²⁾	1,000	% ²⁾		
1-26	548	6.0	690	14.8	55.7	9.0
27-35	513	5.7	565	12.1	52.4	7.8
36-44	1,723	19.0	976	20.9	36.2	19.6
45 above	6,221	68.6	2,418	51.8	28.0	62.9
Temporary absence	66	0.7	16	0.3	19.5	0.6
		(100.0)		(100.0)		(100.0)

* Note 1). In the case of irregular workers, Average WH = (Total Working Hours of the Year)/52 weeks

* Note 2). The share of the group in total male/female employees (in percentage).

** Sources: Calculation based on numbers in EPB, *Reports on the Employment Structure Survey, 1984; 1989*. Because of differences in period and survey methods, the numbers of total employees are not consistent with the statistics of EPB, *Annual Reports on the Economically Active Population Survey*.

5.4.4 Longer Working Hours, Smaller Earnings

In Korea, female workers in paid employment worked longer than male workers (Table 5.8).¹⁵ Yet, women's average monthly

¹⁵ As far as the ILO is concerned, Korea is the only country to do so. Amongst 24 countries that informed the ILO of male and female weekly working hours, during 1980 to 1989, Korea alone reported women's working longer hours than men's. ILO, *Yearbook*

wage has been far smaller than men's, around 43 to 53 percent of men's wage (Table 5.9). Half of female employees are found in the occupational groups that provide the second lowest level of wages, while a large number of men were working in the occupations that paid a higher level of wages.

The occupations that recorded low wage indices had high proportions of female labour, while occupations that marked high wage indices were nearly male-only. Among the top twenty occupations that had the highest wage indices, during 1973 to 1988, more than half have been virtually male-only. Among the bottom twenty occupations, women's proportion averaged 75 percent in 1988. When the wage index is applied to Table 5.6 —i.e., the Top Ten Occupations of Men and Women— women's top ten occupations are revealed to be paid at far under-average rates (Table 5.10): 9 out of the 10 women's occupations were paid at under-average rates, compared with 6 out of the 10 men's occupations.

Table 5.8 Average Weekly Work Hours for Regular Employees

Year	South Korea			West Germany		
	Men(A)	Women(B)	B/A*100(%)	Men(A)	Women(B)	B/A*100(%)
1974	50.0	50.4	100.8	-	-	-
1977	56.2	56.9	101.2	-	-	-
1980	52.6	54.4	103.4	42.2	40.0	94.8
1985	51.9	53.2	102.4	41.1	39.5	96.1
1989	50.4	50.8	100.7	40.2	38.7	96.3

* Sources: For Korea, Ministry of Labour, *Survey Reports (and Tapes) on Wages and Salary by Occupations, 1974-1989*; for West Germany, ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1989-1990*, p. 696.

of Labour Statistics, 1989-1990, pp. 693-699.

Table 5.9 Average Monthly Wage, Men and Women

Year	Total Average	Male (A)	Female (B)	Female Ratio (B)/(A)*100
1975	46,019	81,937	35,431	43.2
1980	176,058	223,825	99,380	44.4
1985	324,283	397,265	189,845	47.8
1987	386,536	467,286	234,071	50.1
1989	540,611	639,578	336,879	52.7

* Note: Average Monthly Wage = Contract Monthly Wage + Overtime Work Pay + (Bonus*1/12)

* Source: Ministry of Labour, *Monthly Reports on Labour Statistics*, 1975-1989, December

Table 5.10 Wage Indices of Top Ten Occupations by Sex

Rank	Women's Top Ten Occupations		Men's Top Ten Occupations	
	1989 W-Index	1983 W-Index	1989 W-Index	1983 W-Index
1	62.1	47.4	88.7	100.4
2	102.7	116.2	168.0	199.4
3	79.4	98.5	102.7	116.2
4	47.9	39.6	231.8	279.1
5	53.1	44.3	109.2	99.7
6	52.7	46.3	71.2	57.6
7	54.2	43.7	75.2	87.0
8	71.2	57.6	86.7	76.0
9	73.8	70.1	104.7	90.9
10	94.9	42.5	89.9	81.1

* Note 1). Rank of the occupations are identical with Table 5.7.

* Note 2). Wage Index = (Average Wage of the Occupation)/(Average Wage of Total Occupations)*100

* Sources: Calculation and ranking based on the numbers of employees in Ministry of Labour, *Survey Tapes on Wage and Salary by Occupations*, 1983; 1989.

Uh Soo-Bong (1991) incisively points out that, *ceteris paribus*, men received 30 percent higher wages than women; when men and women have the same qualifications and performance except the length of service, then men with a 64 percent shorter length of service than women receive the same wage as the women. This means that explanations based on women's time lost in child-

rearing do not have any empirical support. This research proves empirically that the reward for length of service is different between the sexes; and there exists sexual discrimination in the labour market. Therefore, women's apparently strong existence in the labour market has not, in reality, been followed by appropriate rewards that might enable women to be as independent as men.

5. 5 The Family and Work

Korean women have invariably shouldered the sole responsibility of household chores regardless of whether they have been employed. Nevertheless, married women's employment has increased steadily because of women's increased advances in higher education.

5.5.1 Marriage and Employment

As in many other countries, the Korean divorce rate has been increasing, but it is still very low by western standards. The marriage rate per 1,000 population has risen by one point (Table. 5.11), making a stark contrast to the FRG. The divorce rate per 1,000 population has quadrupled during three decades, but it is a quarter of the rate of the FRG, and the divorce rate per 1,000 existing marriage is a third of that of the FRG.

While married women in the FRG have never recorded higher labour participation rates than never-married women, ROK married women have always been the largest group in the female labour

force; and since the early 1980s, married women's labour participation rate has been higher than that of unmarried women, and it is still growing (Table 5.12). In 1970, the proportion of married women in the female labour force, including the divorced and widowed, was 71 percent. Excluding the widowed and divorced, married women's proportion in the female labour force was 62.6 percent in 1989 (KSA, 1992, p. 113).

Table. 5.11 Marriage and Divorce

Year	Average Age of First Marriage		Marriage per 1,000 Population	Divorce per 1,000	
	Male	Female		Population	Existing Marriage
1960	25.4	21.6	8.23	0.26	0.74
1970	27.1	23.3	9.56	0.40	1.15
1980	27.3	24.1	10.84	0.66	1.73
1985	27.8	24.8	9.38	1.00	2.44
1990	28.6	25.5	9.25	1.05	2.40

* Note 1). Population and numbers of existing marriage (married couples): "marital status of the Population 15 years old and over" in EPB, *Population and Housing Census, 1970-1990*.

* Note 2). Numbers of marriage and divorce case: for 1960-65, "Family Register Case", in *Statistical Yearbooks of Korea, 1960-65*; for 1970-90, NSO (1991) *Marriage and Divorce Statistics*.

**Table 5.12 Employment Rate of Women by Marital Status,
Aged 14 and over**

Year	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced
1970	39.5	29.9		
1975	50.4	42.9		
1980	43.5	34.6	31.1	57.3
1984	31.9	34.1	31.6	65.3
1990	39.8	48.1	39.7	67.2

* Note 1). for 1984, percentage calculated by the number of employees; for 1990, percentage calculated by the proportion of population by marital status and the composition of female employees by marital status (Female Employees = 100).

* Note 2). For 1970-75, married women included divorced and widowed women.

* Sources: for 1970-75, *Population and Housing Census, 1970-75*; for 1980, *White Paper for Women, I*, p. 118; for 1984, EPB (1984) *Report on the Employment Structure Survey*, pp. 46-47; for 1990, KSA (1992) *Social Indicators of Korea*.

Despite their employment, Korean women's household responsibilities have not been reduced. In a survey in 1985, 86 percent of married working women took sole responsibility for household chores. It was almost the same in 1991 (KWDI, 1992). A meagre 2 percent of working women questioned shared household works with their husbands or children, and others resorted to female relatives and house maids with pay.

5.5.2 Employment and Child-Care

Considering the married women's labour participation rate, child-care facilities in the ROK are wholly inadequate. In 1989, less than 3 percent of all children aged three to six were enrolled in kindergartens. Creches for infants up to three year old were almost non-existent (Table 5.13).

Table 5.13 Child-Care Facilities

Year	Number of Facilities	Enrolled Children		Child-Carer	
		in Number (A)	per 1,000 Children	in Number (B)	B/A*100
1965	423	19,566	1.0	1,402	14.0
1970	484	22,271	1.3	1,660	13.4
1980	901	66,433	4.1	3,339	19.9
1985	6,242	314,692	18.9	9,281	33.9
1989	8,246	410,824	30.1	14,886	27.6

* Sources: *Statistical Yearbooks of Korea, 1960-1990.*

In the FRG, as women's labour participation increased, the birth rate fell, and child-care facilities accommodated 80 percent of three to six year olds. The Korean birth rate, similarly, has been lowered: the crude birth rate per 1,000 population was 29.5 in 1970, and 15.5 in 1990 (KSA, 1992, p. 65),

but it was still twice as high as that of the FRG. The average number of household members, too, was larger than that of the FRG: 5.2 in 1970, 3.7 in 1990 (KSA, 1992, p. 304).

In a 1985 survey, 60.7 percent of employed mothers with children under the age of six answered that they alone took care of their children. This situation has not changed very much: in 1991, 58.6 percent of employed mothers said the same. The second largest proportion of working mothers relied on either the wives' or the husbands' parents (around 20 percent). Also, 3 percent of mothers committed their children to the care of relatives, and another 1.5 percent to house maids (KWDI, 1986 and 1992). However, 3 percent of working mothers replied that they abandoned their children during their working hours (KWDI, 1992, pp. 99-100). In a 1991 survey, 45 percent of economically non-active women answered that they chose not to be employed because of child-care or child education, revealing that the lack of child care facilities has been the gravest obstacle to their employment.

5. 6 Women in Politics

ROK women's presence in politics has been much worse than in education or employment: an average 2 percent of legislators have been women. Women in public administration have not fared any better: in 1989, only 1.2 percent of senior government officials were women. Though women composed around 20 to 40 percent of party membership in the 1980s, women's proportion in

decision-making bodies of the parties was at best 4.5 percent. The higher the rank, the smaller women's proportion, proving the "iron law of andrarchy" (Aberbach et.al., 1981). Nevertheless, the women's movement remained a relatively strong social force, owing to the eminence of a small number of leaders.

5.6.1 The Women's Movement

The Korean women's movement succeeded to the tradition of the women's independence movement, and thus was accepted and justified by Koreans. In 1990, there were 75 registered women's organisations with 9.8 million members (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1991). Like in Germany, the Korean women's movement have had a central organisation: the Korean National Council of Women (KNCW), which comprised 26 organisations and a half-million membership. Born in 1959 through an agreement of 10 women's organisations, the KNCW joined the International Council of Women (ICW) in 1960, and represented the united voice of the women's movement. However, after experiencing a forced dissolution and reorganisation by a military junta, the KNCW reverted to being a conservative, strongly anti-socialist, and submissive organisation, distancing itself from full-scale sexual equality. This tendency subjected the KNCW to the criticism of collaboration with the military government, but succeeded in winning the cooperation of the government in return.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the key issues of the women's movement were legal reforms, women's vocational training, protection of women from violence, and national unification. Among legal reforms, the amendment of the Family Law was the

foremost imperative. The YWCA (with 3 million members, the largest single organisation), the Legal Aid Centre for Family Relations (LAFA: 1900 members), and the Women's Research Association (WRA: 300 members) organised the Pan-Women's Association for Modification of the Family Law in 1973, and battled until 1989.

Since democratisation in the mid-1980s improved citizens' accessibility to formerly forbidden information and political procedures, women's organisations have moved forward to the issue of national unification. The Korean Women's League (KWL), a cooperative body of progressive groups, demanded entry into the South-North dialogue, assuming itself as the counterpart of Korean Democratic Women's League (KDWL) of North Korea. The KNCW, opposing the KWL, also asserted its legitimacy as the representative organisation of Korean women. This has led the women's movement into a split between the conservative and the progressive groups. Although the diversification of women's movement is not necessarily harmful, the categorical opposition between the KNCW and KWL may enfeeble the women's movement, like the division of the BDF and socialist movement in the 1890s of Germany. Yet, this division leads to a clarification of ideological goals and strategies, and contributes to the understanding of sexual inequality.

Since the late 1980s, the women's movement has endeavoured to enhance women's representation in the National Assembly: trying to pressurise political parties for better women's representation; and running research centres to develop election campaign strategies, and to exchange information and experiences

for women politicians (White Paper for Women II, 1991).

5.6.2 Women in the National Assembly and Political Parties

While the women's movement was concentrating its forces on legal reforms, women's representation in the National Assembly lingered at around 2 percent of total legislators (Table. 5.14).¹⁶

Table 5.14 Female Members in the National Assembly

Term	Election	Total	Total Female MPs		Female MPs by Constituency	
	Year	MPs	No.	%	No.	%
1	1948	200	1	0.5	1	0.5
2	1950	210	2	0.9	2	0.9
3	1954	203	1	0.5	1	0.5
4	1958	233	3	1.3	3	1.3
5	1960	233	1	0.4	1	0.4
6	1963	175	2	1.1	1	0.6
7	1967	175	3	1.7	1	0.6
8	1971	204	5	2.5	0	0.0
9	1973	219	12	5.5	2	0.9
10	1978	231	8	3.5	1	0.4
11	1981	276	9	3.3	1	0.4
12	1984	276	8	2.9	2	0.7
13	1988	299	6	2.0	0	0.0
Total		2,934	53	2.0	16	0.5

* Source: Shin Myung-Soon (1990), p. 26.

¹⁶ The Korean electoral system varied with the Republics. In the First and Second Republic (1948-1960), all parliamentarians were elected by the first-past-the-post system. The Third Republic (1962-1972) combined constituency elections and proportional representation which assigned a third of seats to the parties in proportion to votes won in national elections. In the Fourth Republic (1972-1979), a third of parliamentarians were appointed by the President, and made up the Yusin-Jongwoo-Hoe (Group of Restoration Politics). In the Fifth and Sixth Republic (1980-), the system resembled that of the Third Republic, combining constituency election and proportional representation, though it was not the same.

Women's under-representation in the National Assembly stems from three factors: the patriarchal and male-dominated Korean culture; money-dominated and blackmail-prone Korean election campaigns, which have easy tactics at their disposal to wound the chastity- and reputation-oriented Korean women; and the obstruction by the "old-boys' network". In a survey of 1990, 91.3 percent of men and 59 percent of women answered that, other things being equal, they would vote for a male candidate (White Paper for Women II, 1991). Women's lower turn-out rate in elections and referendums also strengthened the notion of non-political females (CKWP, 1990a): while women's proportion in the electorate has been constantly higher than men's by around 3 percent, women's turnout rate has been persistently lower than men's by an average 4.5 percent (KWDI, 1986, p. 441). In addition, the "old boys network" obstructed women from being nominated to important constituency elections, or led to female candidates being put at the tail-end in the party list for proportional representation (Youn Jongsuk, 1992).

Women's proportion in party membership, similar to the FRG, ranged from 20 percent to 40 percent. During the 1960s, women made up to 20 percent of the ruling Korean Democratic Republican Party membership, and about 30 percent of the opposition New Democratic Party. In the ruling Democratic Justice Party of Korea (DJPK), women came to compose 40 percent of membership during the mid-1980s, the highest level proportion of females amongst the major political parties.

Yet, women have been almost non-existent in party leadership. In the offices of party secretary or central

committees, women gained only one or two seats. In 1983, the ruling DJPK appointed only one female member to the 28-member central committee; and two opposition parties had none (National Assembly, 1983). The situation has not changed: all the parties had one woman each in the central committees (CKWP, 1990a).

5.6.3 Women in the Executive and Judiciary

Five out of 410 ministers in the ROK government were women during four decades (1948-1987). Among the five women ministers, Rim Youngsin took charge of Ministry of Trade and Industry, and Kim Hwallan of the Office of Public Relations. Others were responsible for education, health and social affairs, or political affairs on women's issues, all of which were regarded traditionally as female spheres.

The increase in the number of woman ministers was brought about by the democratisation of Korean politics.¹⁷ After the 1987 election, President Rho entrusted the office of the Second Secretary for Political Affairs with responsibility for women's issues, and from 1988 onwards, recruited women into the job, adding three names to the list of women cabinet members (1988-1992).

Of the government employees and civil servants, 21.4 percent were women in 1983, 23.7 percent in 1989. When teachers are excluded, the female proportion fell to 13.4 percent, which includes 56.4 percent of typists or office assistants. The female

¹⁷ During his election campaign of 1987, Mr. Rho promised to enhance women's status in society. After voting analysis, Mr. Rho was reported to attract the largest number of female votes, although their motive was not clear.

proportion of mid- and high- administration officials (Grade V and above) was 1.6 percent in 1989, up from 0.5 percent in 1983 (MOGA, 1985).

The proportion of women in the judiciary was no better, composing 1.2 percent of total judges, state prosecutors, and lawyers in 1991. Until 1985, it was 0.46 percent (two women out of 477 state prosecutors; eight women out of 722 judges; and three women out of 1,179 lawyers).¹⁸ Only one woman judge has ever been appointed to the High Court. In the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court, women have not taken any seat so far.

¹⁸ This miserable performance of women stems from the recruitment system of the Korean judiciary. In Korea, even to be a lawyer, one has to pass the (so-called Highest) Test for the Judiciary, or the test for law officers for the army. Army law officers are open to men only. Therefore, women have to pass the so-called Highest Test for the Judiciary. Three kinds of so-called Highest Test have been the core gateway to success in the leadership positions: one for senior government (executive) officials (Grade V), one for career diplomats, and the other for the judiciary. All the three tests are held once a year for a small number of seats on offer. Until the end of the 1960s, the number of successful applicants were a few tens. Although a new quota system increased the numbers of successful applicants in the 1970s and 1980s, passing the test is extremely difficult. In the case of women, they have to overcome many obstacles even before they enter the competition: many parents are sceptical, and reject supporting a daughter for a highly competitive test, which in general takes several years of intensive study; and it is very hard to find a place to study, while men share many places to discuss and exchange information related to the tests. During five decades, from 1948 to 1993, the numbers of successful female applicants were 38 in the executive, 10 amongst diplomats, and 57 in the judiciary. Their proportion remained at 1 percent.

5. 7. Summary

It may sound sarcastic if one says that ROK women have been amazing, but in a sense, they have been: amazing in their ability to combine all the responsibilities in the family and employment alone. They composed 40 percent of national labour force, and worked longer than men, while earning half of men's wages. They were employed mainly in low paid work, with a grim prospect for promotion and low prestige. In enterprise board rooms, women filled only 1.7 percent of seats.

Their maternity leave was short — 90 days before or after the birth. A majority of female workers were not granted leave of absence for child-care. If they wish to stay with their children a little longer, they may give up their job altogether. Nevertheless, women have combined employment, child-bearing and child-care. Of the working mothers, 60 percent took care of their children without a contribution from either their husbands or others. Despite this inordinate double burden, the marriage rate was far higher and the divorce rate lower than in any other country in the industrialised world.

In the state structure —i.e., in the executive, legislature, or the judiciary alike— women were almost non-represented. Written promises for sexual equality in the family and employment were only given as late as 1989. It is too soon to evaluate the effects of these legal reforms.

Despite all these conditions, ROK women, little by little, expanded their domains: in education, politics, and in the upper echelons of the government structure. During 1989 to 1991, for

three years, 27 women newly entered into the justice system, 14 women into senior executive officialdom, and 4 women into the career diplomatic circle — as large a number as the whole that had done so in the four decades before 1989. Though later than FRG women, who made a new trend in the 1980s, ROK women began to speed up their participation in power, expanding their realm and demanding their rights. It is quite probable that ROK women will create a new history of their own in the 1990s. Yet, painstaking struggles have to be continued.

CHAPTER SIX

WOMEN IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

6. 1 Introduction¹

In contrast to the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has managed to maintain an apparently stable political order — a communist dictatorial system. The Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) has been in power for nearly five decades, under the unchallenged leadership of Kim Il Sung and his son. Although its communist ideology has been

¹ In writing this chapter, I faced a grave problem in getting materials about DPRK women. In addition to the principal difficulty in obtaining DPRK statistics, most research reports on the DPRK focus on economy and trade, and military force. Even when Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister estimated the North Korean population and social indicators (1990), they could not figure out the proportion of women in the social sector —e.g., in the education system or in the medical system. Therefore, I more often than not rely on interviews with refugees from the DPRK. In 1989, I performed a series of interviews with refugees, as part of a research project for the National Unification Board. Interviewees included: 11 members of the Kim Manchul family, escaped North Korea by sea (1987); Kim Jongmin, a cadre member of the WPK who fled to Seoul (1987); Im Jonghee, a nurse who crossed the border river between the South and North by swimming (1989) — the only woman who has escaped the DPRK in that way; Kim Namjoon and Kim Gangchoon who came with Im Jonghee; Suh Yongchul a secret serviceman (1989); Kim Unhak and Cho Sungkoon, university students studying in the GDR who fled first to the FRG, and then ROK (1989); Ko Unkee, an attache of the DPRK Embassy in Mozambique (1989); Park Myungwha, a housewife (1970); Oh Eeshup, a vice captain of a fishing ship (1979); Kang Deukhoon, the captain of an ocean liner (1982); and Han Heeback, a farm worker who crossed over the frozen border river between the DPRK and China in 1987, reached Peking in 1989 by working as assistant cook or daily labourer, and then fled to Seoul (1989). Among the 23 refugees I interviewed, 5 were women aged between seventeen and sixty. I am aware that stories of the refugees can not be taken at face value. Nevertheless, as those interviews were focused on the aspects of daily life, social and cultural, rather than political, a large part of interviewees' accounts seems safe to quote.

tainted by the idolisation of the Kim family, and its economy has tumbled into decades-long depression, the DPRK has claimed that it has emancipated women completely: it guaranteed full employment of women; it provided sexual equality at work and in the family; and it socialised education and child-rearing. This chapter examines whether, or to what extent, the communist regime in practice has succeeded in changing gender relations, abolishing the Rule of Three Obediences, and establishing sexual equality.

6.1.1 Under the *Chuche Thoughts*

Like other communist regimes, DPRK politics is under full control of the communist Worker's Party of Korea (WPK).² The Politburo of the WPK holds the nucleus of power in policy-making, while the legislature —the Supreme People's Assembly— performs the limited function of giving *ex post facto* approval to Party decisions. This familiar communist party-dominated political system has taken a deviant path by upholding the *Chuche Thoughts* as its guiding ideology.³

² Similar to the SED, the WPK was formed by the merger of the North Korean Worker's Party and the Korean Worker's Party. The North Korean Worker's Party was organised in 1946 under the tutelage of the Soviet Union's occupational authorities, while the Korean Worker's Party had a longer history of resistance and labour movement during Japanese colonisation. Since the Korean Worker's Party had its headquarters and most of its membership in Seoul, the partition of Korea deprived the domestic communists of their power base. From the merger onwards, the domestic communists (the Home Sect) were gradually persecuted and driven out by Kim Il Sung and his partisan colleagues.

³ Until the mid-1950s, the WPK had been faithful to Marxism-Leninism. However, as Kim Il Sung secured his power through purging many communists who had their power base in the Korean Peninsula (the Home Sect), in Siberia or Vladivostock (the Russian Sect), or in Manchuria (the Yan'an Sect) one by one, the

The *Chuche Thoughts* incorporate in its concrete policy expressions four dimensions: self-reliance in thought; independence in politics; self-subsistence in economy; and self-defence in national security. These apparently immaculate thoughts have functioned to further Kim Il Sung's personality cult and supported the hereditary succession of power to his son.⁴ The gist of the *Chuche Thoughts* lies in the quest for people's loyal obedience to the leader and his "revolutionary" family. The slogan "To Be Loyal For Generations," which has been loudly recited by the press, is the sublime expression of the *Chuche Thoughts*. The 1972 edition of *Dictionary of Political Terminologies*, published by the Academy of Social Science, deleted the entry "hereditary succession" which had been defined as a "reactionary custom of exploitative societies" in the 1970

WPK gradually moved away from Marxism-Leninism (Scalapino and Lee, 1972; Suh Dae-Sook, 1988). In 1970, the Fifth Congress of the WPK announced the *Chuche Thoughts* to be its *only* (unitary) guiding ideology (WPK Documents, 1972). The Sixth Congress of the WPK (1980) adopted a new Party Programme proclaiming that "the WPK is guided by the Great Leader Kim Il Sung's *Chuche Thoughts*, his Revolutionary Thoughts alone." *Chuche* literally means self-reliance and independence.

⁴ According to Shuhachi Inoue (1984), a Japanese apologist for the DPRK, the *Chuche Thoughts* arise from the proposition that humans are masters of all creation, and are uniquely endowed with three special attributes: *Chachusong* (the spirit of independence and self-reliance), creativity, and consciousness of their own identity and potential. The doctrine is based on four "socio-historical principles": (1) the popular masses are the subjects of social history; (2) human history is the history of the struggle of the popular masses for *Chachusong*; (3) the socio-historical movement is the creative movement of the popular masses; and (4) independent thought and consciousness of the popular masses perform the decisive role in the revolutionary struggle. However, the masses can not succeed in their struggle without a uniquely qualified leader to interpret and shape their aspirations and to direct their efforts (Inoue, 1984, p. 30). Inoue states that Kim Il Sung is such a leader, and his son is uniquely qualified to succeed him, because of his total loyalty, careful training, and personal traits.

edition. Under the banner of *Chuche Thoughts*, therefore, the DPRK politics has returned to a dynastic dictatorship.

In economic policy, the DPRK has indeed relied on the principle of self-reliance, and pursued an inward-looking development policy. Until 1984 foreign trade and investments were neglected to the extent of autarky. Although the striving for autarky was a common phenomenon in most communist economies, the prescription in the *Chuche Thoughts* more effectively shut out foreign investments (Hwang Eui-Gak, 1993). With scarce natural resources, the autarkic economy resorted to mass labour — and women's economic participation was consequently encouraged.

6.1.2 Revolutionization and Proletarianization of Women

Like other communist regimes, the DPRK has emphasized women's emancipation through making women the working class, with reference to Marxism. Even before the DPRK officially came into being, the Provisional People's Committee (PPC: 28 Feb. 1946 - 21 Feb. 1947), the provisional government of North Korea under the tutelage of the Soviet Union, adopted a flood of laws and decrees, every one of which included provisions for sexual equality. Until the 1970s, the DPRK government was faithful to its commitment of sexual equality: it guaranteed women's full employment by central economic planning; it expanded the range of socialisation of child-care and education as far as its economy could afford; and it sought socialisation of household chores through community feeding and laundering systems.

However, sexual equality became blatantly at odds with political patriarchy from the 1970s onwards. In the history of

the "revolutionary family," the Kims depicted Kim Jongsook, Kim Jongil's late mother, and Kang Bansuck, Kim Il Sung's late mother, as devoted mothers and subordinated wives to the Kims, rather than as revolutionary fighters. The traditional notion of women's foremost role as mothers and wives, and not individuals or individual workers, was resuscitated and reinstated.

In 1971, Kim Il Sung addressed the Fourth Congress of the Democratic Women's League of Korea (DWLK) under the title "On the Revolutionization and Proletarianization of Women" (Works 6, 1979, pp.112-3). In this address, Kim Il Sung demanded women to marry late, in order to contribute for a longer while to the party and revolution. This late marriage policy presupposed that married women had to stay at home, or, at least, take sole responsibility for the family as mothers and wives. Not surprisingly, therefore, Kim emphasized that women's revolutionization and proletarianization held the utmost importance 'in revolutionizing the family'. He explained in considerable detail the important role of women as mothers and wives, rather than as workers. Instead of freeing women from traditional familial duty, the alleged "revolutionization and proletarianization" tied up women more strongly with the family.

6. 2 Women under the Law

Since its inception, the DPRK legislature has adopted and maintained provisions of sexual equality in almost every law and decree, effecting radical reforms in society. The PPC was the

first government to transform social relations in Korea: its legal reforms became the foundation of the first Constitution of 1949; and its social reforms enhanced women's rights unprecedentedly in Korean history. The Constitution, promulgated in 1948 and altered in 1972, also promised sexual equality in all domains of social life. Accordingly, the DPRK legislature adopted the Socialist Labour Law (1978) and the Law concerning Upbringing and Education of Children (1976), although the Socialist Family Law belatedly came into being in 1991.

6.2.1 Legal Reforms under the PPC

During its short life, the PPC transformed North Korean society irreversibly. All feudal relations were declared abolished; and laws contradicting the provisions of sexual equality became null and void instantly. The Law on Agrarian Reform (6 Mar. 1946) vested the right to use land with the tillers; it confiscated the land owned by the Japanese state, individuals and organisations, or owned by "traitors to the Korean nation"; and it redistributed the land to the families on the criteria of the number and age of households, including those of women. This land reform entitled women to receive land in their own right, not in tandem with their fathers or husbands, marking a milestone in Korean women's economic independence. The Twenty-Points Platform of the PPC (23 Mar. 1946) promised to guarantee equal rights in the political and economic life to all people, irrespective of their sex, religion, and property (the Fifth Point). The Labour Law for the Workers and Office Employees (24 June, 1946) established the principles of equal pay for equal

work, equal opportunity to work, maternity protection, an eight hour working day, and a compulsory social insurance system.

Further, according to the Sexual Equality Law (30 July, 1946), women were formally given equal rights in every domain of political, economic, social, and cultural life (§1); women have equal rights in employment, social insurance, and education (§3); women have the right to choose to marry, or divorce, and the right of child custody (§4-5); concubinage, polygyny, and prostitution were prohibited (§7); women have an equal right to inherit property, and to demand a share of property in the case of divorce (§8); and all the laws and decrees by the Japanese colonial government became invalid on and after the day of proclamation of this law (§9). Although existing concubinage was *de facto* accepted, this law embodied sexual equality in full swing. Yet, women's rights to inherit and demand a share of property were held to be meaningless after the full abolition of private ownership in 1958. Also, by the Decree of Citizenship Registration (9 Aug. 1946), women aged over eighteen were issued ID cards as individuals, on equal terms with men. The Abolition Act of Persistent Feudal Custom (24 Jan. 1947) again emphasized sexual equality in the family and marriage. Although these laws remained for a while rather nominal, because of budget limits and persistent social custom, they were followed up in subsequent legislation.

6.2.2 Sexual Equality in the Constitutions

The first Constitution of 1948 was more like an approval for the legislation by the PPC rather than a new device. In addition

to the general provision of equal rights for the people (Articles 11-12), Article 22 specifically provided sexual equality in every domain of private and public life. Also, the Constitution obliged the state to protect marriage and family, and provided equal rights for the children born outside wedlock to the rights of those born within (Article 23).

The Socialist Constitution of 1972 announced that class oppression and exploitation were eliminated for ever (Article 6). In this Constitution, too, sexual equality is guaranteed in considerable detail (Article 62): women have the same social status and rights as men; the state shall protect mothers and children through providing maternity leave and a shorter working day for mothers, increasing child-care facilities, and taking other policy measures; the state shall free women from the burden of household chores, and provide conditions that enable women to participate in public activities. Also, the state shall protect marriage and the family, and take scrupulous care to *strengthen the family as the cell of society* (Article 63; my emphasis). The relevant article resonated with Kim's aforementioned address: in the course of strengthening the family, women's roles as mothers and wives had to be reinforced.

6.2.3 The Socialist Labour Law

From the Labour Law for the Workers and Office Employees (1946) onwards, the DPRK has abided by the principle of equal pay for equal work, and has concerned itself with women's full

employment and maternity protection.⁵ Also, in 1966, the Working Day Regulation for Working Mothers (Cabinet Resolution No.23) shortened the working day for mothers with three or more children under the age of thirteen.⁶

The Socialist Labour Law of 1978 was promulgated on the principle of collectivism (§3) —i.e., "individuals for the sake of the collective, the collective for the sake of individuals". According to the Socialist Labour Law, like the 1968 Constitution of the GDR, all the workers have the *duty and right to work* (§4-5; my emphasis). Yet, this new Labour Law was not novel in its provisions: the principles of the 1946 Labour Law remained almost intact; but the shorter working hours for working mothers gained legal ground. The difference between the two Labour Laws lay in the scope of application: while the 1946 Law concerned industrial workers and office employees, the Socialist Labour Law applied to all workers, including agricultural and fishery workers. However, as work became a duty, unmarried women were forced to work, unless they were full-time students.

The Labour Laws of the DPRK are dubious by any rigorous

⁵ Pregnant women were allowed maternity leave for 35 days before, and 42 days after giving birth (§14). After the second trimester of pregnancy, women might be transferred to light work, in which case their wages were decided by the average for the last six months (§15). Working women with an infant under the age of one were allowed to breast feed twice a day for thirty minutes each (§16). Pregnant women and breast feeding mothers should not be assigned to overtime or night work (§17).

⁶ Working mothers could work for six hours a day, six days a week (the normal working hours were eight hours a day, six days a week). Or, if the nature of a work place did not allow shorter working hours, working mothers might work for eight hours a day, five days a week. This Regulation was reconfirmed by Kim Il Sung, who instructed the government to shorten working hours for working mothers with three or more children, and pay the same wages as if they worked for eight hours (1973).

evaluation of sexual equality. They have emphasised the principle of equal pay for equal work and the protection of female labour and maternity, but not equal opportunities in work assignment and promotion. Instead of widening the range of women's occupations, a Cabinet Resolution of 1958 (No.84: "On the Increase of Women's Labour Participation in Every Sector of the National Economy") specified education and health care as women's fields, setting up the target proportion of women in the two fields up to 60 percent. Kim Il Sung (Works 1, 1979) also pointed out that "since male labour is required in difficult and important sectors such as heavy and chemical industry, men can not work in the education sector. Therefore, more women should be involved in education, *particularly in primary education (sic; my emphasis).*" Education and child care, health care, and the textile industry have been women's work since then. Therefore, "sexual equality" in the DPRK is explicitly and contradictorily a specific sexual division of labour.

6.2.4 The Socialist Family Law

The DPRK did not establish a single code of family law until 1990. Familial relations were covered by many different laws, including the Sexual Equality Law of 1946 which has been the principal code of familial relations. In 1955, the DPRK abolished the family register system by the Decree of Citizenship Registration which regulated the formation and dissolution of familial relationships. The abolition of the family register system led to the eclipse of the (male) head of a family. Yet, while the Sexual Equality Law allowed divorce, both by mutual

agreement and by court decision, the Cabinet Resolution No.24 of 1956 repudiated divorce by agreement, making divorce possible only by court decision.⁷

The Socialist Family Law of 1990 is the first coherent code of familial relations, albeit very simple and short (with 54 paragraphs in total). The Socialist Family Law, in contrast to the Family Law of the ROK, does not include provisions for the family register, computation of relatives, or the prohibition of marriage between the parties who have the same surname and origin.⁸ Many paragraphs are mere repetition of previous laws, but the Law stipulates that "the state shall encourage youths to marry *after devoting themselves* to their nation and people, and to society and the collective" (§9; my emphasis), repeating the 1971 Kim Il Sung address, and discouraging early marriage.⁹

⁷ This change in divorce procedure was similar to that of the GDR. In the GDR, the Marriage and Divorce Decree of 1955 allowed a simple procedure for separation and divorce, abolishing the "guilt principle", but the Family Law of 1965 introduced a court investigation procedure to bring about reconciliation. The same pattern happened in the Soviet Union and in the People's Republic of China. The DPRK restricted divorces relatively early on, since divorce by agreement in many cases led to the desertion of an uneducated wife in favour of a young and well-educated mistress, as happened in the ROK.

⁸ In fact, since the abolition of the family register system, many North Korean youngsters have no idea of their origin. The abolition also made the complicated computation of relatives unnecessary.

⁹ This late marriage policy stems from men's long military service (up to 10 years by conscription) and the need for female labour to fill the void of missing young male labour. After the 1971 Kim Il Sung address "On the Revolutionisation and Proletarianization of Women", the Sixth Congress of the League of the Socialist Working Youths (June, 1971) passed a resolution that demanded late marriage for all youths — the suggested marriage age was 32 for men, and 27 for women (NUB, 1975). In 1976, a Cabinet Resolution decided that the marriageable age of men should be over 30, that of women over 28 (DPRK Research Centre, 1983). The authorities would not allow marriage

Marriage is concluded by marriage registration, which the state is able to interfere with (Youn Miryang, 1991; KWDI, 1992). The DPRK also prohibits cohabitation of unmarried couples: a conjugal relationship without marriage registration is prohibited (§12). The short supply of houses and the well-organised civil monitoring system almost completely prevent cohabitation.

The provisions of parental rights and child-custody are a blending of Korean custom and sexual equality. Children take the surname of the father (§26), but the husband and wife keep their surnames after marriage (§17), in accordance with Korean custom. Yet, in the case of divorce, child custody is to be decided by agreement, or, if necessary, by the court. Children under the age of three shall be brought up by mothers, unless unavoidable circumstances require otherwise (§22). The relationship between stepparent and stepchildren is assumed to be equivalent to a blood relationship (§29). Although this paragraph forces the husband and wife by marriage to enter into a parental relationship with the children of their spouses, it does not differentiate the relationship between stepmother and children from the relationship between stepfather and children. However, after the step-parental relationship is established, the parental relationship between the natural parent and the children is to be terminated (§29). Consequently, many divorcees lose their parental rights when their ex-spouses who reside with their children remarry.

registration against the Resolution, and without marriage registration, housing was not supplied. These conditions to a great extent discouraged early marriage. But because of economic decline, the DPRK in practice allowed early marriage in the 1980s.

Education of the children is an important duty of parents (§27). Parents must bring up their children as revolutionary, new communist humans (§27). In return, offspring must support their parents when their parents cannot work (§28). In the case of orphanage, grandparents have the duty to support the orphaned children (§35). In return, too, grandchildren must support their grandparents when they cannot work, or they have no other relatives to support them (§38). Siblings also have the duty to support their disabled or sick sisters and brothers (§36). Relatives, sisters or brothers, or other members of the family must support inactive members of the family —e.g., minors or elderly people, or the disabled (§37). Those who do not support members of the family could face punishment: up to two years of imprisonment or of 'correction' labour under the Penal Code (§155). Despite the DPRK's announcement of a completed socialist revolution, these provisions still echo the Korean custom of extended families, imposing the duty to support the members of a family on the family itself.

6.2.5 Abortion and Crimes against Women

In the DPRK, like in the GDR, abortion is legal, and free on demand. Until 1982, any woman who wanted an abortion had to produce her ID card to the medical institutes and police, and reveal the father of the child. Fearful of possible punishment for "sexual misdemeanour", many men murdered their pregnant lovers, which became a social problem. In 1982, Kim Jongil came to the rescue of pregnant women by ordering the authorities concerned not to demand the ID card from those women, and to

allow abortions in secret (Im Jonghee and Choi Bongrye Interviews).

In the DPRK Penal Code, rape is defined in two patterns: one by using violence or intimidation (§172), the other by using the power derived from responsibilities at work or other relations (§173). §172 reads: "*one who raped a woman by violence or intimidation* shall be imprisoned for less than five years" (my emphasis). But §173 reads: "*one who exact sexual intercourse from a woman who is under his responsibility at work or at other duty-bound relationship* shall be imprisoned for less than two years" (my emphasis). Therefore, violence or intimidation is necessary in constructing rape, and the rape victim is limited to women only. The Penal Code did not recognise other patterns of crimes against women, leaving women vulnerable to sexual harassment of other sorts.

Unlike in the ROK, legal reforms in the DPRK have been pursued by the WPK and the government, and formally provided better protection and equal opportunities for women at work and at home. However, from the 1970s onwards, no legal reform concerning sexual equality was initiated. The 1990 Family Law was not for sexual equality, but for state control over the private life of people. Although the DPRK devoted itself to radical reforms during the embryonic stage of regime building, it is now compromising communist ideas with Korean customs, reflecting an incomplete socialist revolution by any reasonable criterion.

6. 3 Women in Education

As the DPRK pursued the proletarianisation of men and women, women's equal opportunity in education has been guaranteed from the Sexual Equality Law of 1946 onwards. Further, since the 1958 Cabinet Resolution No.84, women's participation has steadily increased in higher education that prepares students for teaching, child-care, and health care.

6.3.1 Education System

Since 1972, the DPRK has provided eleven years of compulsory schooling, from the age of five to sixteen. Compulsory schooling includes one year of Kindergarten, four years of People's School (*Inmin Hakgyo*: Primary School), and six years of high school attendance (Figure 6.1). After eleven years of schooling, students have to choose either to advance to higher education, which depends on the class of the student's family, or to enter the labour force. For young men, military service is an attractive alternative, though the class position of a man's family may in some cases prohibit him from serving in the army.¹⁰

The Theses on Socialist Education of 1977, which declare the basic principles of education in the DPRK, prescribe the content of socialist education as ideological instruction, scientific-technology, and gymnastics. These three contents of socialist

¹⁰ The DPRK has a conscript military service system, but excludes the "class enemies" —e.g., members of the former landlord family— from conscription. Military service in the DPRK normally lasts for eight to ten years. After long service, men are rewarded by being recruited into better jobs than those without military experience. A woman working for ten years in a work place often faces a male newcomer presiding over her.




Figure 6.1 Education System

education are in accord with the pedagogy of other communist countries, but communist ideas are revised by the *Chuche Thoughts*. Accordingly, in the People's School, the emphasis has been put on basic literacy and numeracy, and ideological instruction (the *Chuche Thoughts*), occupying 67.6 percent of educational curricula (Moon Yong-Ryn, 1987); while in High School, scientific-technological training is the most important part (41.6 percent: Ibid.).

Unlike the GDR, the DPRK does not provide comprehensive compulsory vocational training outside formal schooling. Instead,

a complementary system of study-while-working provides many adult workers with part-time higher education, with full wages until their graduation. This study-while-working system includes factory colleges, higher technical schools, and evening and correspondence courses of the regular colleges. The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the WPK of 1960 decided to improve the training for technicians, and set up factory colleges and higher technical schools in major factories and enterprises, in accordance with "the goal of intellectualizing the whole society" (Kyowon Sinmun, 1992; Li Yong Bok, 1986). Factory colleges offer a four year on-the-job course which lead to certification as an engineer for those who successfully complete it and pass the state examination. By 1987, Factory colleges constituted 40 percent of total higher educational institutions (Moon Yong-Ryn, 1987). Since 1981, farm colleges and fishermen's colleges have been added to the study-while-working system (Kyowon Sinmun, 1992).

Regular colleges and universities also look more like vocational institutes, with less academic but more technical and practical courses on offer. Most of these institutions are regional colleges, each with a single specialisation, such as technical, medical, agricultural, or arts studies (Thomas and Postlethwaite, 1983). The Kim Il Sung University is the only existing equivalent to western universities, and provides the most promising future for graduates.

6.3.2 Sex-Stereotyping in the Education System

Despite the DPRK's rhetoric of women's emancipation, sexual segregation in its education system is more severe than in the ROK. Male and female pupils are separated from the People's School onwards: coeducation is found only in the Kindergartens and colleges; the People's School has separate boys' and girls' classes; and high schools are all single-sex establishments, except for a few special schools for the privileged or gifted (Toikoo, 1982). When a Japanese journalist asked the reason for single-sex education, the unanimous answer was:

First of all, single-sex education is to develop the *distinctive characteristics of men and women*. Although men's and women's social status must be equal, men should be brave, while women should be elegant. Secondly, men and women are different in biological, physiological nature. Men and women can not play football together. (In the case of coeducation) *what could women do, while men are playing football in the (only) playground?*" (Toikoo, 1982; my emphasis).

Accordingly, in the high school curriculum, girls' schools offer home economics, embroidery, and sewing as compulsory courses, whereas boys' schools offer training in basic electricity and mechanical skills, or sports such as oriental fencing and karate. The educational authorities in the DPRK without question accept the traditional division of labour as desirable. Like in the ROK, the education system of the DPRK contributes to sex-stereotyping and sexual segregation rather than to widening the spectrum of women's activities.

6.3.3 Women in Higher Education

After compulsory education, about 16 percent of high school

leavers advance to higher education (Nam Insook, 1992), and a third of them (5 percent) become full-time students (Suh Dongik, 1987). The proportion of college and university students in the total population is estimated at 1.46 percent (Eberstadt and Banister, 1990). Although there are entrance examinations for each college or university, the final decision about admission is made by the local party committees upon reports by teachers in the People's School and high school. In this admission procedure, the first requirement is the family background of the students (Suh Dongik, 1987; The Daily Chosun, 1991),¹¹ and the second is the loyalty and devotion of the student to the WPK. Academic achievement comes last.

According to the Central Statistics Bureau of the DPRK (CSB) the proportion of women among graduates of universities and specialised colleges was 35.2 percent in 1988 (Table 6.1). Yet, the proportion of women among university graduates was 28.8 percent, while the proportion of women among college graduates was 40.2 percent, revealing that women were more likely to enter specialised colleges than universities.

The reported distribution of women students by the field of study indicates a strong tendency towards sexual segregation. Women are concentrated in humanities and literature (composing a third of students), but are rare in technology (Nam Insook, 1992; Interviews). In the field of education, the proportion of

¹¹ Many highly academically qualified applicants have failed to enter college, because of their "anti-revolutionary, reactionary" family background. A refugee, Han Heeback, was a case. He obtained very high marks during the school years and at the university examination, but failed to advance because his grandparents were landlords (Interviews with Cho Sungkoon, Kim Unhak, and Han Heeback).

women changes in inverse proportion to the schooling level for which the students study: the higher the level, the smaller the proportion of women. In the Teacher's Colleges that offer training course for primary schools, the proportion of women is about 80 percent. In the Second Pedagogical Universities that train teachers for junior high school, the proportion of women is 50 percent, while in the First Pedagogical Universities that train teachers for senior high school, the proportion of women drops to 30 percent (Nam Insook, 1992; Youn Miryang, 1991).

Table 6.1 College and University Graduates, 1988

(in 1,000)

	Total	Male	Female	% of Fe.
Total Graduates	1,353	876	477	35
among them				
University Graduates	592	421	171	29
College Graduates	761	455	306	40

* Source: Eberstadt and Banister (1992), *The Population of North Korea*, p. 76.

Outside regular colleges and universities, women tend to advance to technical colleges that offer three-year courses at a higher level of skill, or short-term technical institutes that offer six-month courses at the apprenticeship level (Nam Insook, 1992). Women are concentrated in the dressmaking, food-processing, crafts, or nursery courses. In particular, dressmaking and food-processing courses are so sex-stereotyped that a man can rarely be found.¹²

¹² A refugee, Lee Ungpyung who was a pilot in the air force, unwittingly revealed the sex-stereotyping of fields of studies. When he filled in the application form for college, he wrote the military service as the first choice, food-processing course as the second, and political economy as the last. Seeing his

The inaccessibility of educational statistics obstructs a clear picture of the status of DPRK women in the education system. However, it is clear that the DPRK educational authorities' commitment to the "feminisation" of some fields of study reinforces the sexual segregation in occupations, leading women to smaller earnings and lower prestige.

6. 4 Women in Employment

Not only because of communist ideology, but also because of the shortage of the labour force, the DPRK has made every effort to increase women's labour participation. In particular, the 1958 Cabinet Resolution No. 84 wanted to "increase the labour participation of women in every sector of the national economy." By 1990 the proportion of women in the labour force grew to 49 percent. However, the Resolution restricted the spectrum of women's occupations. Further, as the DPRK economy has stagnated since the 1970s, many married women have been transferred to non-paid voluntary labour. Despite the rhetoric of revolutionisation and proletarianization of women, women remain a secondary labour force and labour reservoir, with a far narrower range of occupations and less prestige and earnings.

6.4.1 Women in the Labour Force

Like the ROK and the GDR, the DPRK population has always had

application form, all his friends bullied him as philandering or effeminate, since food-processing was regarded as a women's course (Suh Dongik, 1987).

a female surplus. Further, according to the report by the Central Statistics Bureau of the DPRK, the sex ratio —i.e., the number of males per hundred females— rapidly dropped from the 1970s onwards, falling to 84.2 (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992, p. 32), showing an extreme anomaly in the sex ratios.¹³ Regardless of whether these "missing males" (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992) were mobilised to the military, the population structure of the DPRK, or, at least, the reported sex ratios, would demand a high level of female participation to fill the void of the male population. Consequently, women were reported to make up half the total labour force (Table 6.2).

The Central Statistics Bureau of the DPRK recently reported four occupational categories, which surprisingly comprise virtually 100 percent of the entire civilian population aged 16 and over —i.e., out of the 6,950 thousand female population aged 16 and over, 6,950 thousand female employees were included in the four occupational categories in 1986. Such a figure suggests that the population aged 16 and above may refer to those who are actually economically active (Table 6.3).

¹³ The sex ratio was reported to be 100 in 1946, but became 86.9 in 1975, 84.2 in 1987. This demographically mysterious "missing males problem" (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992, p. 86), the anomalous sex ratio, strongly supports the proposition that a sizeable and growing proportion of the male population was purposely excluded from official counts from the 1970s onwards, most plausibly for military reasons. The proportion of military forces in the DPRK population is estimated at 6 percent in 1986 (Ibid., pp. 93-97). Yet, recent studies suggest the figure must be even higher.

Table 6.2 Women in the Labour Force (in %)

Year	Reported Sex Ratio ¹⁾	Estimated Sex Ratio ²⁾	% of women in the total LF ³⁾	Women's LPR ⁴⁾	Men's LPR ⁴⁾
1953	88	-	26	-	-
1963	94	94	36	37	75
1986	84	97	<u>57</u> ↓	100	100
1990	-	98	49	-	-

- * Note 1). Reported by the Central Statistics Bureau, cited by Eberstadt and Banister (1992) with permission of the CSB, Pyongyang, May 25, 1990.
- * Note 2). Estimated by Eberstadt and Banister (1992), including the military.
- * Note 3). Source of the data for 1953 and 1963, Central Yearbooks of the DPRK, 1953 and 1963; for 1986, Eberstadt and Banister (1992), pp. 82-83 (see Table 6.3); for 1990, the Address by Yuh Yungoo at the 85th Congress of IPU, Pyongyang, broadcasted by Pyongyang Radio and Chungang Radio, May 1, 1991.
- * Note 4). LPR is the percentage of the employed in the population aged 16 and above. For 1963, estimated by Eberstadt and Banister (1992); for 1986, the calculation is based on the CSB report of population ages 16 and above by occupation and the CSB report of civilian population by age group. These reports are cited by Eberstadt and Banister (1992).

Table 6.3 Population aged 16 and Over by Occupations, 1986

Occupations	State Worker	Official	Farmer	Coop Worker	Total
In thousands					
Male	2,990	855	1,305	41	5,191
Female	3,840	1,205	1,836	69	6,950
The Proportion of women in Each Occupations (%)					
	56	59	59	63	57
The Distribution of Men and Women to Each Occupations (%)					
Male	58	17	24	1	100
Female	55	17	27	1	100

- * Note 1). The numbers of the population in each occupation are cited in Eberstadt and Banister (1992), p. 80.
- * Note 2). "State worker" refers to the workers in state-owned industrial enterprises; "Official" to the officials in the government agencies or other institutions; "Farmer" to those in cooperative agricultural units; and "Coop worker" to those in cooperative industrial units.

Confusingly, the statistics are not coherent. Whereas the DPRK has reported that women made up 48-49 percent of the total labour force (48 percent in 1975, the Rodong Sinmun, July 30, 1975; 49 percent in 1990, at the IPU Congress, Pyongyang, May 1,

1991), Table 6.3 shows that the proportion of women in the employed must be higher than 57 percent. The most plausible explanation for this rapid and inconsistent change in the proportion of women in the labour force is that the 1986 statistics reported by the CSB excluded the military, while other reports included the military population. Therefore, while a sizeable number of "missing males" are serving in the military, a great deal of economic and productive responsibility rests with women, especially when the "missing males" must be the young and most productive age group.

6.4.2 Women's Vocational Qualifications

It is impossible to obtain an accurate description of the structure of women's vocational qualifications. Yet, in addition to the number of university and college graduates (report by the CSB, 1988), the DPRK has twice reported the number of skilled workers and specialists, for 1963 and 1989 (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4 Skilled Workers and Specialists, 1963 and 1989

Year	in numbers (1,000)			% of Women
	Total	Male	Female	
1963	294	241	43	15
1989	1,350	850	500	37
Growth Rate (%)	360	250	1,060	

* Source: Kim Ae-Sil (1991), p. 196.

Between 1964 and 1989, the number of female skilled workers and specialists has increased by 1,060 percent, compared with a male rise of 250 percent. Although becoming skilled workers or specialists does not necessarily mean being highly qualified, the growth rate of women is impressive, narrowing the sexual gap in

vocational qualifications.

6.4.3 The Sexual Division of Labour

Immediately after the Korean War, the DPRK government mobilised every possible human resource into the reconstruction of the national economy. The aforementioned 1958 Cabinet Resolution "On the Increase of Women's Labour Participation into Every Sector of National Economy" was part of these efforts. Although this Resolution already indicated a presupposition of different roles between the sexes in labour, until the mid-1960s the DPRK government had tried to change the sexual division of labour. The DPRK proclaimed that "women can do every job that men do", and assigned women into a few "men's jobs." One notable example was the launch of "The Women", a deep-sea fishing vessel with all women crews, in the late 1950s (Youn Miryang, 1991; RCDPRK, 1983). "The Women" ceased to exist within a year, reportedly because of the poor performance of the crew and severe criticisms, but it had joined in the "300-days Fishing Movement" on the same conditions as other fishing vessels with all-male crews.¹⁴ Also, in the 1960s, the DPRK assigned women to coal-mining, organising "The Women Rock-Driller Company" at the Wee-Won Coal Mine (RCDPRK, 1983; Kim Ae-Sil, 1991). Although the

¹⁴ In the DPRK, as in communist China, "movement" refers to a mass mobilisation towards a government-established goal, social, economic or political. For example, the famous Chollima Movement was the DPRK's equivalent of the Chinese "Great Leap Forward Movement" during the late 1950s. It started an effort to complete the processes of industrial socialisation and agricultural collectivisation. Many "movements" have swept the DPRK as a way of encouraging labour competition — i.e., as non-monetary incentives. The "300-days Fishing Movement" demanded fishing vessels to continue fishing for almost a year without returning.

Women Rock-Driller Company was dissolved in 1965, allegedly because of sabotage by women rock-drillers, a few women are still working in pits (The Daily Workers, 29 Nov. 1983).

These early efforts of the DPRK government to change the sexual division of labour, however, gradually turned into mere rhetoric. Faced with the criticisms of ignoring women's physical conditions and harming women's maternity, the DPRK government resorted to assigning women into jobs that were regarded as suitable for women, rather than improving working conditions. In 1980, the proportion of women in light and textile industries was estimated at 70 percent, and in primary education at 80 percent (Lee Whan-Gu, 1986). Instead of further questioning the sexual division of labour, the DPRK retreated to the traditional notion of different roles for the two sexes.

6.4.4 Lesser Earnings in Women's Work

Any analysis of the working conditions of DPRK women either becomes pure guesswork, or relies on piecemeal estimation, because of the lack of authoritative statistics. Yet, the principle of equal pay for equal work has never been disputed or questioned among the scholars who are interested in the DPRK. Yet, a cluster of piecemeal sources suggest that women's earnings are smaller than men's, because of the sexually segregated assignment to occupations. While men take "laborious and difficult jobs" with larger earnings, women are assigned jobs "suitable for the peculiar characteristics of women" (*sic!*: Central Yearbook, 1970) with smaller rewards. Also, the larger the proportion of women in an occupation, the lower the average

wage (Table 6.5). Without breaching the principle of equal pay for equal work, therefore, the DPRK government has effectively made women the secondary labour force, receiving smaller wages.

Table 6.5 Proportion and Average Wages of Women in Each Economic Sector (1985)

Industrial Sector	% of Women	Average Wages (DPRK Won ¹⁾)
Primary Education	80	70-100
Light/Textile Industry/Office Workers	70	60-80
High School	35	80-100
Technical School	30	90-130
Mining	20	92-180
Heavy Industry	15	92-150
Universities	15	120-200

* Note: the source for the proportion of women in each sectors is Lee Whan-Gu (1986), p. 267; the average wages were drawn from Nae-Woe Tongshin [The Internal and External Affairs Correspondent], No. 448 (8 Nov. 1985) and No. 460 (16 Aug. 1985).

* Note 1): Won is DPRK currency.

6.4.5 Domestic Workshops: Housewives' Part-Time Work

Since the early 1980s, with the economy in decline, and with many plants only in partial operation (Hwang Eui-Gak, 1993), the DPRK government allowed more and more married women to stay at home as housewives.¹⁵ According to refugees, up to 70 percent of married women in rural areas choose not to be employed (Youn Miryang, 1991; Kim Ae-Sil, 1991). Yet, staying at home all day long has not been an option open to DPRK women. Although they are not employed full-time, DPRK women have to join either in

¹⁵ However, unmarried women are not allowed to stay at home. This compulsory assignment to a job is effectively sustained by food rationing. In the food rationing system, employed persons and full-time students receive 700g of rice and subsidiary foods; those registered as dependants receive 300g of rice and other foods. Those aged over eighteen are not permitted to register as dependants, except housewives.

'voluntary labour' or in the *Ganae Jakup-Ban* (Domestic Workshops) that produce consumer goods in a variety of community centres.

'Voluntary labour' in fact refers to a kind of forced labour, which enjoins all the unemployed to engage at least once a week, six to eight hours a day, in manual labour without pay, even without provisions of equipment necessary for the work. 'Voluntary labour' has been mobilised into road work or drainage works, or even into large scale construction sites.¹⁶ 'Voluntary labour' was a familiar phenomenon in almost every communist regime, and left behind the problem of women's unpaid work outside the home being unmeasured.

While 'voluntary labour' is not paid, but compulsory, Domestic Workshops provide a little incentive to join in. Domestic Workshops originated in the Socialist Labour Law of 1978 which stipulated that the state, enterprises, and local authorities should organise Domestic Workshops or Cooperatives for those who were not employed (§31). Domestic Workshops gained a new momentum in 1983 when the DPRK government declared it the Year for Increasing Consumer Goods (Youn Miryang, 1991; Kang Gwang-Ha, 1990).

Domestic Workshops are organised in connection with plants, factories, mining, community councils, and collective farms.

¹⁶ The media of the DPRK often unwittingly reveal the scale of 'voluntary labour'. In Hyesan city, 730 housewives were reported to work for the housing construction 'voluntarily' —i.e., without pay (The Korean Woman, Feb. 1980). It was also proudly reported that a large number of housewives provided their labour for extension work of the Kim Cheak Iron and Still Company, the largest iron and still plant in the DPRK (The Korean Woman, Mar. 1988). In the Gum-Duk Mining Company, as many as 3,000 housewives joined in this 'voluntary labour' (The Korean Woman, May 1988).

Domestic Workshops in plants or factories produce goods, using waste materials, which are related to the products of the plant or factory. Workshops in community councils supply local specialities; workshops in collective farms produce various vegetables apart from the main products of the farm, or breed a small number of pigs, chickens, or goats.¹⁷

Part of the products from Domestic Workshops are permitted to be sold on the market: 80 percent of the products must be submitted to the local government, but the remaining 20 percent accrues to the workers, either in cash after selling, or in kind. Although the period workers serve in the workshop is not included in the service length for pension entitlement, and although workers have to work six to eight hours a day, many married women prefer those workshops, because of the flexible working hours and less strict rules than in full-employment (Refugees: Im Jonghee and Choi Bongrye). The growth of Domestic Workshops has been very fast: during five years, from 1984 to 1988, the average annual growth rate was 20.8 percent, products of Domestic Workshops composing 9.5 percent of total consumer goods on sale on the market (The Daily Dong-A, 13 Sep. 1990).

This Domestic Workshop system is the DPRK's equivalent to

¹⁷ For example, a Domestic Workshop in Gae-Cheon County bred 375 goats, pigs, and chickens, and cleared land at the height of 850 meters above the sea (The Korean Woman, Mar. 1984). The Domestic Workshop in the Jin-Cheon Children's Clothing Factory makes hats, slippers and gloves for children using remnants of dress materials (The Korean Woman, June 1984). The Domestic Workshop at the Ansan Button Factory produces buttons, using waste vinyl wrappers (The Korean Woman, June 1988).

The size of Domestic Workshops varies, from as small as three or four member teams to several hundreds of workers. In the case of Sunkyo District Domestic Workshop, a district (community) workshop in Pyongyang, the number of members is as high as 5,000, producing 6,000 small items (Kim Ae-Sil, 1991).

part-time jobs: it does not guarantee stable earnings; it does not provide job security, any chance of promotion, self-achievement, or pension. Further, the Domestic Workshops have to hunt for the materials necessary for their products by themselves. Those in plants or factories are able to take advantage of waste materials from the plants, but others have to collect the rare material that workers have at home (Refugees: Im Jonghee and Choi Bongrye), or create goods almost out of nothing.

Despite the problem of material supply and lack of prospects, Domestic Workshops at least pay members for their labour. With the short supply of consumer goods in the DPRK, Domestic Workshops are understandably favoured by many married women because of the reward of consumer goods. However, during the late 1980s, the DPRK government put more emphasis on 'voluntary labour', and demanded that Domestic Workshops as a unit should join in 'voluntary labour', urging many women into unpaid work both outside and inside the home (The Resolution of the DWLK Central Committee, 4-5, Nov. 1988). Yet, the DPRK's statistics of the population and the number of the employed suggest they invariably include those women working in Domestic Workshops or 'voluntary labour' in the category of the employed.

DPRK women have filled the gap of the "missing males" in the labour market, as full-time employees, members of Domestic Workshops, or voluntary labourers. They are however a secondary labour force, being assigned into specific "women's jobs" with lower pay than men; working in Domestic Workshops with small and unstable earnings and no prospects; and joining in manual work

without pay. While women are performing the paid and unpaid work outside the home, they at the same time take the sole responsibility for household chores.

6. 5 Women in the Family

During the early stage of regime-building, the WKP attempted to reduce the influence of familial relationships and to dissolve the traditional patriarchal family. Making divorce easy and fast —i.e., divorce by agreement between the spouses— was part of the effort to weaken familial bonds. However, as the communist regime consolidated its power, the family was revalued as the cell of society, and many patriarchal aspects of traditional familial relationships returned. Although child-care has been socialised on a large scale, women's role as mothers remains of foremost importance. Although local governments have attempted to save women's labour for household chores, sharing household work between the spouses is improbable, if not unthinkable. Further, as the Kims set the late wife and mother of Kim Il Sung as the true ideals for Korean women, as loyal devotees of their husbands and sons, so women's loyalty and devotion to the family became an indispensable element in the 'revolutionisation of women'. Therefore, political patriarchy has reinforced the patriarchal family system.

6.5.1 Marriage and Divorce

Until the end of the 1970s, the DPRK had a strict policy

requiring late marriage. Under this late marriage policy, the average age for the first marriage was reported at 26-28 for women, and 30-31 for men (Youn Miryang, 1991; Bunge, 1981). However, in the 1980s, there was a great surge in the annual numbers of marriages (Table 6.6). This marriage boom is attributed to two factors: first, a 31 percent increase in the number of women aged 20-34, from 2.2 million in 1980 to 2.9 million in 1987 (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992); and secondly, and more importantly, the relaxation of the late marriage policy during the 1980s. Eberstadt argues that the surge in the annual number of marriages can not be wholly explained by the increased number of women in the peak marriage ages (Ibid., pp. 63-66).

Table 6.6 Marriage and Divorce

Year	The Number of		Marriage per 1,000 Population	Divorce Rate	
	Marriages (A)	Divorces (B)		per 1,000 Population	to Marriage (B/A*100)
1953	30,564	3,453	3.6	0.4	11.5
1956	107,098	4,124	11.4	0.4	3.9
1965	107,493	3,021	8.7	0.2	2.8
1970	86,639	3,971	5.9	0.2	4.6
1975	84,819	3,714	5.3	0.2	4.4
1980	99,871	4,359	5.8	0.2	4.4
1985	142,753	4,526	7.6	0.2	3.2
1987	188,007	4,231	9.7	0.2	2.3

* Note: Calculation based on the numbers of marriage, divorce, and population.

* Sources: The numbers of Marriages and Divorces are reported by the CSB, and cited by Eberstadt and Banister (1992), p. 64; the numbers of population are reported by the CSB, and cited by Eberstadt and Banister (1992), p. 32.

According to the refugees from the DPRK (Youn Miryang, 1991; Nam Insook, 1991; Son Bong-Sook et.al., 1991), the government weakened the late marriage policy because of economic decline.

With many plants in partial operation,¹⁸ providing jobs for all of the working age population became very difficult. Married women are thus permitted to stay at home, and early marriage is not discouraged any more. During the 1980s, the average age for the first marriage is reported to be 23-24 for women, 25-27 for men.

While marriage is booming, the number of divorces remains negligible. Since the 1956 Cabinet Resolution made divorce effective only by a court decision, the DPRK has continuously discouraged divorce. The effect was a sharp drop in the annual divorce ratio to marriages in 1956. The GDR also discouraged divorce through court investigation, but the divorce rate of the GDR was higher than that of the FRG. By contrast, after the 1956 Cabinet Resolution, the divorce rate of the DPRK remained lower than that of the ROK, recording a fifth of the ROK divorce rate per 1,000 population, in 1987. The low divorce rate of the DPRK partly reflects the firm hold of the state over people's life, but also echoes the Rule of the Three Obediences, since the ROK has also recorded lower divorce rates than other industrialised countries.

6.5.2 Triple Burden: The Family, the State and Employment

As the DPRK suffered from shortages of labour, it was not interested in birth control until the 1970s. Rather, like the GDR, it had a pro-natal policy, restricting access to contraceptives or abortion, and providing benefits for mothers

¹⁸ In extreme cases, plants are reportedly operating at only 25 percent of capacity (Guardian Weekly, 5 June, 1994).

with more than three children. However, in 1974, Kim Il Sung declared that the ideal number of children in the family was three (Choi Hong-Gi, 1977), suggesting a policy change towards mild birth control. Kim Il Sung's instruction had such a powerful impact that the crude birth rate fell by 2 percent, and the total fertility rate per woman dropped by 3 points, during 1970-1975 (Table 6.7). Refugees of late report that most households have four members: the spouses and two children. Yet, extended families with three generations living together are not rare, particularly in rural areas. The single person household is reported as almost non-existent. Therefore, the average size of a family —i.e., the number of household members— remains bigger than in the ROK or western countries.

Table 6.7 Birth Rate, Fertility, and Family Size

Year	Crude Birth Rate in Percentage	Total Fertility Rate per Woman	Average Number of Household Members
1960	3.85	5.40	
1970	4.47	6.94	
1980	2.18	3.03	5.1
1987	2.89	2.50	4.8

* Note 1). The Crude Birth Rate is reported by the CSB, cited from Eberstadt and Banister (1992), p. 42.

* Note 2). The Fertility Rate is estimated by Eberstadt and Banister (1992), Appendix A, pp. 108-110. Fertility Rate refers to the average number of children a woman has during her life time.

* Note 3). The average number of household members is reported by the CSB to the UN Population Fund in 1989. NUB (1991) Social Indicators of South and North Korea, p. 152.

To keep the proportion of women in the labour force high, the provision of child-care facilities was an urgent necessity. Like other communist regimes, the DPRK has paid great attention to such facilities. The government has proudly paraded facilities which accommodate 80 percent of all pre-school age children free

of charge.¹⁹ The remaining 20 percent of children come mainly from the families of the WPK cadre members whose wives tend to stay at home as full-time housewives, or from the collective farms, which include many elderly people who take care of the children. Creches and kindergartens are run by enterprises, localities, collective farms, or by the state. Daily, weekly, or monthly child-care is available, but mothers prefer daily care in which children are accommodated during the mothers' working hours.

Yet, mothers hold the responsibility of being 'the first instructor to children' at home, because 'it is the mother who bears and rears children, not the father' (Kim Il Sung's instruction: The Korean Woman, Feb. 1981; The Chollima, Feb.-Mar. 1982; The Chollima, Jan. 1983; The Chollima, July 1989). Whenever issues related to children are discussed, the media emphasizes the responsibility of mothers, not parents. Regardless of their employment, and regardless of education provided in child-care facilities, mothers alone are to blame if anything goes wrong with the children. Sharing the responsibility of upbringing between the spouses is an unfamiliar issue in the DPRK. It is for this reason that women's revolutionization is of utmost importance — mothers are responsible for bringing up the children as revolutionaries (Kim Il Sung, Works 6, pp. 112-135).

At the same time, the duty of household chores rests solely with wives. DPRK families depicted in novels are thoroughly male-

¹⁹ In 1986, the total pre-school age population was reported 2.5 million (Eberstadt and Banister, 1992, p. 40), and the DPRK provided 28,358 creches and 19,262 kindergartens with a total capacity of 2 million children (Bang Wanjoo, 1987, p. 138).

dominated. Wives hardly expect their husbands to share household work. Instead, for example, a husband gets angry because his wife failed to prepare the lunch table for his retired parents before she went to work (Kim Yonghan, 1975). A wife is anxious about her cooking, because her husband may skip breakfast if the meal is not delicious (Rim Jaesung, 1983). Another wife is obsessed with returning home during her lunch time, in order to make a fresh lunch for her husband (Um Danwoong, 1980). In a recent novel, the husband is very supportive of the wife's work in employment, but gets angry when he has to do household work (Paek Namryong, 1988). The Korean Woman, the magazine of the DWLK, also demands women that 'respect and listen to their husbands and parents-in-law', and do their best to 'keep the house clean and tidy' (The Korean Woman, Sep. 1981; Mar. 1986). The Chollima, a magazine published by the WPK, repeatedly asks women to respect their husbands: when women talk about their husbands, they should refer to the husband as 'my master', 'master of my family', or 'the head of my family', while men are expected to call their wives 'my wife' or 'the keeper of my family' (The Chollima, Apr. - May 1981; Nov. 1988).

The supposed true models of Korean women, Kim Il Sung's late wife and mother, are depicted as loyal wives and wise mothers who always obeyed their husbands without question. Kim's late wife Kim Jongsook, who was an anti-Japanese guerilla warrior, is invariably described as preparing meals and doing needle work for the warriors, while joining in armed struggle. In an alleged memoir about Kim Jongsook, she tells a young guerrilla (the author) that 'sewing and cooking are by nature women's work' (The

Korean Woman, Feb. 1986). When the ideal woman heroically took on the double responsibility of household work and struggle against Japanese imperialism, who today can dare to demand the equal sharing of household work? Therefore, DPRK women are under the triple burden of employment, the state, and the family.

6. 6 Women's Political Representation

In politics, at least formally, DPRK women are far better represented than their southern sisters. The proportion of women representatives in the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) has remained around 20 percent; two women were elected as Vice Chairpersons of the SPA; there has been at least one woman minister in the Cabinet, except for the fifth Cabinet (1972-1977); and the proportion of women in the Central Committee of the WPK was 6.54 percent in 1970, and 3.33 percent in 1990. However, since the 1970s, women have experienced a political setback: the erstwhile-powerful women's organisation, the Democratic Women's League of Korea (DWLK), has been in decline, both in size and voice; and no woman has been newly recruited into central positions in decision making bodies. As the Kims try to reinstate patriarchal order in politics, women's voice has become weaker and weaker.

6.6.1 Women in the Supreme People's Assembly

The SPA is, according to the Constitution, the supreme sovereign organ of the DPRK. However, its function is only to

approve the decisions of the Politburo, and its meetings last less than a month in total for its four year period of office. The number of Representatives has varied term by term, from 215 to 655, of which the proportion of women has been 9.1 percent at the nadir, and 21 percent at the zenith (Table 6.8).²⁰

Table 6.8 Women in the Supreme People's Assembly

Term	Election Year	Total Number of		Number of Women		% of Women	
		MPs 1)	St-MPs 2)	MPs	St-MPs	MPs	St-MPs
1	1948	572	34	69	1	12	3
2	1957	215	32	27	2	13	6
3	1962	383	27	35	3	9	11
4	1967	457	18	73	1	16	6
5	1972	451	19	113	2	21	11
6	1977	579	19	120	2	21	11
7	1982	615	19	121	2	20	11
8	1986	655	15	138	3	21	20
9	1990	687	15	138	2	20	13

* Note 1). MPs refers to the Representatives.

* Note 2). St-MPs refers to the members of the Standing Committee.

* Source: Youn Miryang (1991), p. 115. This table is based on the reports of the SPA, "The Election Result and the Composition of Representatives" at the first session of each term.

Despite the nominal position of the SPA, the relatively high proportion of women in the SPA reflects the WPK's principle of sexual equality in politics. Further, the fact that many women Representatives had been awarded the title "Hero of Exertion", the highest level of honour, before they entered the SPA implies

²⁰ In all DPRK elections, votes are cast for or against a single candidate. Since 1962, the turnout rate and the support rate have been both 100 percent (NUB, 1991). The candidates for the SPA are all selected by the WPK, but allegedly nominated by either the WPK, the Chungwoo Party, or other affiliates of the National Front that comprises all organisations of the DPRK. The Chungwoo party is allegedly the political wing of a religious group, the Chundokyo (The Heavenly Friends) which originated in a popular revolutionary movement of the nineteenth century. This party claims itself to be a 'friendly party to the WPK', and helps the WPK to keep the appearance of a multi-party system.

that the Representatives are selected for their achievements and merits. Among the 47 women Representatives who were elected more than three times, 25 were Heroes of Exertion (53.2 percent: Youn Miryang, 1991).

Seven women have been selected in the Standing Committee which exercises the SPA's authority when the SPA is out of session. Among the women members of the Standing Committee, three women were prominent communists who had joined the anti-Japanese struggle either as intellectuals or as armed guerillas; one was devoted to building the WPK during the early stage of the DPRK; two were academics; and the other is Kim Songae, Kim Il Sung's wife. With the exception of Kim Songae, the other six women members in the Standing Committee reached their position on their own merits, and were well known, even in the ROK. In this light, the women Representatives in the SPA indeed "represent" the contribution women have made to the DPRK — or, the DPRK acknowledges women's contribution to society. Yet, the percentage of women Representatives falls short of sexual equality, and reveals the limitation of state-induced women's emancipation.

In various levels of the People's Assemblies, the proportion of women representatives are reportedly slightly higher than in the SPA, ranging from 13.1 percent to 33.1 percent. As in the GDR or the FRG, the lower the level of assemblies, the higher the proportion of women representatives. The "Iron Law of Andrarchy" operates.

6.6.2 Women in the Government

The DPRK Cabinet (Administration Council) is composed of a

Premier, several Deputy Premiers (at present 10 Deputy Premiers), Ministers and Directors, and Chairpersons of many ministerial ranks of Committees. The total number of the Cabinet members varies, but has averaged around 30. Of the 260 men and women who have ever been in the Cabinet, from 1948 up to now, only 5 were women (1.9 percent: Youn Miryang, 1991). Compared with the proportion of women in the SPA, the proportion of women in the Cabinet is surprisingly low. Yet, women in the DPRK Cabinet have in some sense received better treatment than in many other countries.

The most prominent woman member in the Cabinet is Kim Bokshin, Deputy Premier. She first obtained a high reputation as a manager of a military uniform and textile supply factory during the war. Because of her highly regarded management in the factory, she was accepted to the Central School for Party Cadre Members, and began political activities. She is reportedly an excellent technocrat in industrial management and administration. She has successively filled various posts in the Cabinet such as Minister of Textile Industry (1967-72), Chairperson of Trade Committee (1982-1986), Chairperson of External Economic Relations Committee (1986-1990), and Minister of Light Industry (1990-). She has been Deputy Premier since 1977 until now, while holding other positions in the Cabinet as well.

Another woman, Youn Kijong, is an expert in finance. She has remained Minister of Finance since 1977. She is known as a genius in statistics, accounting and finance. Of the two women Ministers of Culture, one (Park Yongshin) was a famous actress, and the other (Huh Jongsook) a renowned intellectual, theoretician, and

activist for the then-nascent communist movement, capable of speaking five languages without difficulty. The remaining woman Minister was responsible for agriculture, having a strong Soviet connection.

The positions held by women shows that, at least in the Cabinet, the sexual division of labour has been ignored. Also, as all five women Ministers were zealous communists or eminent technocrats, it is certain that they obtained their positions for excellent ability and achievement. Unlike Honecker in the GDR, Kim Il Sung never appointed his wife to the Cabinet. DPRK women Ministers have not been restricted to the traditional women's spheres, either. In that sense, women members in the Cabinet have received fairer rewards than in many other countries, although their proportion is nevertheless low.

6.6.3 Women in the Workers' Party of Korea

The proportion of women in the WPK's membership has not been reported, but is estimated at 30 to 40 percent. Although the WPK has held Party Congresses five times, only the second Congress reported the number and proportion of women delegates to the Congress — 142 women made up 14.4 percent of delegates (WPK Documents, Vol. 1). Yet, the composition of the Central Committee of the WPK is accessible information: the proportion of women in the Central Committee has been between 2.3 percent and 6.5 percent (Table 6.9). The women members in the Central Committee include most of those women in the Cabinet and the SPA. However, unlike the Standing Committee of the SPA or the Cabinet, the Party Central Committee includes many women whose only

achievement might be successful marriage to powerful men, or whose family happens to be in close relationship with the Kims. All the members of the Kim family are included. The Party Central Committee seems to be a blend of a new aristocracy and technocrats.

Table 6.9 Women in the Central Committee of the WPK

Congress Date	Number of Women		Proportion of Women	
	Regular Member	Candidate Member	Regular Member	Candidate Member
1946	2/43	-	5	
1948	2/67	-	3	
1956	2/71	-	3	
1961	2/85	3/50	2	6
1970	7/107	6/55	7	11
1980	6/169	8/103	4	8
1990	6/180	8/148	3	5

* Note: The column of the number of women members is to read as (the number of women)/(total number of members).

* Source: Youn Miryang (1991) p. 183. This table is based on the reports of the Organisational Committee to the Party Congress in each Congresses (1946-1990). The reports were traced and recorded through the broadcast of the Pyongyang Radio and the Chungang Radio.

The Politburo of the Central Committee, at present composed of one standing member (Kim Jongil),²¹ ten regular and ten candidate members, has two women candidate members: Kim Bokshin and Lee Sunshil. Lee Sunshil has worked for the party organisation, and was honoured in 1982 with the Kim Il Sung Medal, the highest medal in the DPRK. She is well known for her espionage activities against the ROK. In 1991, she penetrated

²¹ Before the death of Kim Il Sung (1994) and Oh Jinwoo(1995), the number of standing members was 3 : Kim Il Sung, Kim Jongil and Oh Jinwoo. After the death of the two members, the Party has not yet recruited any new standing member.

into the ROK, and initiated an illegal communist group in Seoul. After returning to Pyongyang, the communist group was detected by the Korean Central Information Agency, which made her famous even in the ROK. Like the SED of the GDR, the WPK has never elected a regular woman member to the Politburo.

6.6.4 The Democratic Women's League of Korea

The DWLK had been one of the most important organisations in the DPRK until the 1970s. Under the leadership of Park Jongae, who was Minister of Agriculture during 1957-1962, the DWLK grew rapidly: its membership was 0.6 million in 1946, 2.5 million in 1962, and 2.7 million in 1971. However, it suddenly declined in size and voice during the 1980s, experiencing a dramatic loss of membership — only a meagre 0.2 million membership remained in 1987 (Youn Miryang, 1991, p. 185).²²

The DWLK was the driving force in the mobilisation of women into the labour force, during and after the Korean War, and boasted of its great contribution to the DPRK's nation-building and post-war reconstruction. The first President of the DWLK, Park Jongae, was awarded the Stalin Medal in 1951, because of her contribution to the army during the war.

When the DPRK began to carry out the "Three Revolutions Movement"²³ in the 1970s, the DWLK set up its targets for the

²² The sources of the number of members are: for 1946, Han and Shim (1988), p. 89; for 1962, *Central Yearbook of the DPRK 1964*, p. 156; for 1971, *The Daily Workers*, 6 Oct. 1971; and for 1987, Bang Wanjoo (1987), p. 74.

²³ The Three Revolutions Movement demands DPRK people to join in new revolutionary struggles in thoughts (ideology), technology, and culture. The 'Ideological Revolution' is to make all the people into revolutionaries and the working class. This

movement: for the Ideological Revolution, DWLK members were required to read the book "Learn from Kang Bansuck, the Mother of Korea" at least 100 times; for the Technological Revolution, the members should try to invent and create new devices related to their work; for the Cultural Revolution, mothers should pay greater attention to education in order to make their children into revolutionaries and the working class (Report at the DWLK 30th Anniversary, Nov. 1976). As the DWLK's target for the Three Revolutions Movement reveals, the DWLK stood in the front line of idolisation of the Kims. The DWLK praised Kang Bansuck and Kim Jongsook, because of their loyalty and devotion to their husbands and sons, which reinstated the notion of women's foremost role as mothers.²⁴ Instead of rejecting the roles of submissive mothers and wives, the DWLK has led its membership to return to the family, to be good mothers and loyal wives.

The decline of the DWLK became clear in 1983 when it held the Fifth Congress. In this Congress, the DWLK amended its regulations and programme, restricting the conditions of membership. Initially, the DWLK was open to all adult women, aged

is only possible when the people are guided by the *Chuche Thoughts*. The Technological Revolution is to develop new technology and engineering. The Cultural Revolution is to make all the people intellectuals, with at least high school leaving level of knowledge, and capable of coping with new technology.

²⁴ Many articles that allegedly recall the activities and personality of Kim Jongsook have been indispensable elements of The Korean Woman. Scarcely a single issue of the magazine failed to publish an anecdote about Kim Jongsook in the 1980s. She was called the First Royal Guard (to Kim Il Sung) or the Mother of Revolution. In a film (The First Royal Guard), Kim Jongsook makes a pair of feet-warmers with her hair for Kim Il Sung, and risks her life to rescue Kim Il Sung. A famous group sculpture "The Water of the Fatherland" depicts Kim Jongsook passing a cup of water to Kim Il Sung, with her head lowered, and her knees bent.

18 to 55, regardless of whether they were affiliated with other organisations. Now, the DWLK is open to women without any other organisational affiliation. As all youths aged 18 to 30 are in the League of Socialist Working Youths, and as all employees are required to join either the National League of Trade Unions or the League of Agricultural Workers, the amended regulations of the DWLK meant that it became the organisation of full-time housewives. The result was a dramatic reduction in membership, to less than a tenth of former membership. Although the DPRK officially explains that as the regime has succeeded in achieving full emancipation of women, there remains very little cause for a huge women's organisation, the true reason that underlies the decline of the DWLK is speculated to be the conflict between Kim Songae, the President of the DWLK since 1971, and Kim Jongil. Allegedly, the heir to power was not on good terms with his stepmother, and felt threatened by his half-brothers. To restrain the influence of his stepmother and half-brothers, the organisation under the control of Kim Songae was weakened. In short, while the DPRK trumpets its success in achieving the full emancipation of women, the major women's organisation is devoted to making women into wise mothers and loyal wives. The traditional Rule of the Three Obediences is stronger in the DPRK than in the ROK — political patriarchy has revived social patriarchy as well.

6. 7 Summary

DPRK women have contributed to the DPRK economy to such an extent that, excluding the military population, the proportion of women in the labour force has risen up to 57 percent. However, they form a secondary, and complementary, labour force. Many only fill the gap of "missing males", and when men return to work after military service, women with long work service have to endure male newcomers presiding over them. When the DPRK economy was in desperate need of labour, women were assumed to be able to do everything men can do; but when the economy stagnated, married women were required to provide unpaid 'voluntary labour' rather than full-employment.

Nevertheless, in the DPRK women's formal political representation is in better shape than in the ROK: the proportion of women in the SPA is around 20 percent; in the Cabinet, women hold positions that are not sex-stereotyped, and require a high standard of qualification and ability.

However, during the 1980s and 1990s, DPRK women retreated into the home: in the economy, women's unpaid work outside the home has been increasing; in politics, the once-powerful women's organisation has been in decline; and in political office, no woman from the post revolutionary generations has reached top positions; and the state has reimposed the role of loyal wives and wise mothers on married women, reinstating the traditional Three Obediences' Rule.

Worst of all is the lack of possibility to develop an autonomous women's movement and organisation. While all

organisations and the whole media in the DPRK function as a mouthpiece for the government, expressing complaints about sexual oppression is suppressed. Women are under-represented in politics, but *non-represented* in their own interests. Only when politics allows autonomous interest-articulation, will women's issues be taken seriously. Despite its loud rhetoric and the claim of women's emancipation, the DPRK has failed fundamentally to change gender relations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A COMPREHENSIVE COMPARISON OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES

7. 1 Methods of Analysis

After the respective partitions of Germany and Korea, the GDR and the DPRK took initiatives affecting the status of women: especially in legal reforms and the mobilisation of women into the labour force. As a result, these new states appeared to differ from their severed halves. Yet, the FRG and the ROK greatly enhanced women's status in society in their own ways. By the end of the 1980s, at least in legal reforms, the two capitalist regimes had almost caught up on their communist counterparts. In the economic and political arena, however, women in capitalist regimes remained less represented than their communist sisters. The evidence I have surveyed enables me to address my initial questions. Did communist regimes indeed make changes in gender relations? If so, to what extent? Did cultural traditions hinder the efforts to emancipate women? If so, to what extent? In this Chapter, the changes in the four countries are analyzed in terms of legal reforms, political representation, and the economic position of women. The two questions of this study are hereby hypothesized:

Hypothesis One. Women's position is equal among communist and capitalist regimes, regardless of the political system.

Hypothesis Two. Women's position is equal among the Communist regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.

In order to vindicate the communist claim that communism is

the vehicle for women's emancipation, Hypothesis One must be rejected, whilst Hypothesis Two be accepted. If the comprehensive comparison of the four country suggests that women in communist regimes are better off in the legal, political, or socio-economic arena, Hypothesis One will be rejected, supporting the communist claim. If women's position is not equal or similar among the communist regimes, Hypothesis Two will be rejected. The rejection of Hypothesis Two could confirm that cultural traditions hinder the efforts made by communist regimes towards sexual equality, leading to the rejection of the communist claim. I will argue that women's emancipation in practice inextricably involves changes in gender relations that are shaped by cultural traditions.

The analysis of women's position in the legal, political, and economic arena involves both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Although economic analysis could be carried out by quantitative methods, the analysis of legal changes can hardly be quantitative, whilst the analysis of women's political representation requires both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Therefore, in analysing women's status of the four countries, I employ both qualitative and quantitative methods: in the analysis of the legal and political status of women, qualitative analysis with figurative comparison is carried out; and in the analysis of the economic position of women, a limited quantitative comparison with standardized variables is undertaken. In either case, I try to deal with concrete and tangible data rather than abstract arguments.

In analysing the legal systems of the four countries, I take

the method of ordinal scaling. Ordinal scaling can provide a comprehensive picture of legal changes in the four countries in a single table. Ordinal scaling is to give numbers according to the order, or to the preference, of a set objective, but not at regular intervals. For example, giving number 3 to the best, number 2 to the middle, and number 1 to the worst is typical ordinal scaling. Yet, these numbers do not tell how much, or to what extent, number 3 is better than number 2 or number 1.¹

In the analysis of the political representation of women, a figurative comparison of women in parliaments and governments is undertaken. In addition, the sexual division in ministerial positions is analyzed. Although numeric figures in parliaments and government do not necessarily reflect women's representation in practice, social perceptions towards women's role in politics could be indicated.

The socio-economic position of women is analyzed by a limited number of indicators. Indicators are selected through face validation, but limited because of data availability. The indicators are measured by standardized variables and compared by the mean and standard deviation of each indicator in each country, and the average of all indicators in each country. In this socio-economic analysis, the DPRK is excluded because of the lack of reliable statistical data. Also, because the data concerning wage differentials in the GDR is available only after 1980, the time span for this analysis is limited from 1980 to 1989.

¹ Ordinal scaling could be mistaken as quantification, but the numbers given by an ordinal scale can not be transferred, without misleading results, into linear equations.

7. 2 Sexual Equality Under The Law

Before partition, German women had lived under the same law that embodied Christian values and the duty of the Three Ks. Likewise, Korean women had lived under the Rule of the Three Obediences. Immediately after the respective partitions, communist regimes made great advances for women through legal and political reforms. But legal reforms in communist regimes reached a plateau very early on. Since the 1960s, communist regimes hardly renewed legal reforms towards sexual equality, while women in capitalist societies struggled for, and sometimes induced legal reforms, making the gap between communist and capitalist regimes narrower and narrower.

7.2.1 Ordinal Scaling

As to the indicators of sexual equality under the law, I have taken fourteen factors that have been disputed, or fought for, by feminists, as listed below:

- 1). the constitutional guarantee of sexual equality;
- 2). the principle of sexual equality in the family;
- 3). the choice of marriage, divorce, and remarriage;
- 4). equality in parental authority and child custody;
- 5). the wife's equal right to the family property;
- 6). the principle of equal pay for equal work;
- 7). the scope of sexual equality in employment;
- 8). provisions for maternity leave;
- 9). provisions for leave of absence for child care;
- 10). provision of child-care facilities;
- 11). legality of abortion;
- 12). the scope of criminalisation of rape;
- 13). the scope of crimes against women;
- 14). sexual freedom.

Each indicator in each country is to be ranked as a scale from 3 to 0, in accordance with the relative preference for

women. I give Scale 3 to what I consider is the best for sexual equality, Scale 2 to what seems in the course of positive progress towards sexual equality, and Scale 1 to what seems in need of reform. Scale 0 would indicate complete lack of sexual equality in the specific aspect. Certainly, part of my scaling could evoke criticisms. For example, I give Scale 3 to a law that allows abortion free on demand, Scale 2 to abortion on demand, but at women's cost, and Scale 1 to restricted abortion. Scale 0 would be total prohibition of abortion. Even among feminists, the question of who should pay for abortion is not yet agreed. But, I would argue, the cost of abortion does affect women's control over their body and their life, and abortion free on demand is thus necessary. Yet, in principle, I take account of the debates and discussions among feminists of various perspectives in scaling.

The sum of scales given to each country will show, albeit approximately, the performance of the country in the quest of sexual equality —i.e., the larger the sum, the better for sexual equality. Yet, the differences in the sum scored by each country do not measure the precise extent of sexual equality. They only show which country is more favourable, or preferable, for women. Indicators are scaled in every decade —i.e., in 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and in 1989. The change in indicator scales suggests legal development in the specific aspect of the four countries.

7.2.2 Legal Indicators of Equality

1. Constitutional Guarantee of Sexual Equality: The criteria for scaling of constitutions are two: (1) the existence of a

provision of sexual equality; and (2) the immediacy of the effect.

When the constitution guarantees sexual equality with immediate enforcement —e.g., through a precedence clause to annul the laws that contradict the principle of sexual equality— I give Scale 3 to the constitution. If the constitution promises sexual equality, but without a precedence clause, it scores Scale 2. If the constitution does not provide a precedence clause, many laws that contradict the principle of sexual equality might be valid for a considerable while. The constitution promising sexual equality but having a clause that limits the effect of sexual equality provision scores Scale 1. Scale 0 is given to a constitution without any provision of sexual equality altogether.

In the cases of the GDR and the DPRK, the first Constitutions contained precedence clauses, which immediately annulled laws that contradicted the principle of sexual equality. By contrast, the FRG Basic Law provided that any previous law that contradicted the equal right provision remained in force until it would be adjusted to the Basic Law, but no later than December 1953 (§117 (1)). Therefore, the Constitutions of the GDR and the DPRK have scored Scale 3 since 1948, while the Basic Law of the FRG scored Scale 1.

The case of the ROK is more complicated. Although the ROK Constitution of 1948 contained a precedence clause stipulating that any previous law was to remain in force unless it contradicted the provisions of the Constitution (§127), many laws that violated the equal right provision remained valid, even without promulgation of new laws. As late as 1960, the first ROK

Civil Code came into force. The ROK Constitution was thus measured as Scale 1 until 1960.

2. The Principle of Sexual Equality in the Family: The criteria for scaling are: (1) the existence of the provision of sexual equality in the Family Law; and (2) whether, or to what extent, the Family Law gives precedence to male members of the family.

If the Family Law guarantees sexual equality within the family, including equal right to family property, inheritance and succession, and to the choice of family name, without giving precedence to male members of the family or to the male paternal lineage, the law scores 3. If the Family Law gives precedence to the paternal lineage in familial succession, but not in property inheritance, it scores 2. If the Family Law gives precedence to male members of the family as to the family property or succession, or as to the choice of family name, albeit promising sexual equality in principle, it scores 1. If the Family Law discriminates against women even without an empty promise of sexual equality, it is graded as 0.

In the cases of the GDR and the DPRK, before the legislation of a single Family Law (in the GDR, 1965; in the DPRK, 1990), several laws were enacted to provide sexual equality in the family —e.g., Thesis on the Effects of Marriage in General (GDR, 1949), and the Sexual Equality Law (DPRK, 1946). Also, both the GDR and the DPRK abolished the priority of male members of the family. Therefore, both countries have scored 3 since 1949.

In the FRG, until 1957 when the Equal Rights Law

(*Gleichberechtigungsgesetz*) was adopted, the principle of sexual equality in the family was not established. Thus it was graded 0. Even after the Equal Rights Law, the FRG gave precedence to paternal lineage in the choice of family name until 1977, thus scoring 1. Only after 1977 was sexual equality in the family a rule in the FRG. Afterwards, the FRG Family Law scored 3.

In the ROK, before the 1960 Civil Code, there was no provision of equal rights in the family (Scale 0). Also, the 1960 Civil Code gave precedence to male members of the family in inheritance and succession, scoring 1. It was not until 1977 that an inheritance became divided in equal proportion among the heirs who have the same precedence, regardless of sex. Yet, the principle of paternal succession and the male headship of a family remained unchanged. Therefore, the ROK 1977 Family Law is ranked Scale 2.

3. Choice of Marriage and Divorce: The criterion here is simple: whether the Family Law allows women to choose marriage, divorce or remarriage. If the Family Law provides women with equal right of choice to marry, divorce, or remarry, without unnecessary conditions —e.g., restriction over child custody in the case of women's remarriage, compulsory procedural restrictions on marriage or divorce, or prohibition of women's remarriage for a prolonged while— it scores 3. If the law imposes procedural restrictions on women in the case of remarriage, including prohibition of women's remarriage for a while, it scores 2. When medical knowledge was limited, prohibiting women's remarriage for a while was acceptable on the

ground of possible pregnancy. But recent development in medics proves this restriction unnecessary. If the law imposes substantial restrictions on women in the case of divorce and marriage —e.g., depriving women of child custody, or the state interfering with regulations or restrictions— it scores 1. If the law does not allow women to raise a divorce case, or prohibits women's remarriage, it scores 0.

In the GDR and the FRG, the guilt principle (*Vershuldensprinzip*) was a grave and substantial restriction in divorce procedure (Scale 1). The GDR changed the guilt principle into the irreparable breakdown principle (*Zerruettungsprinzip*) by the 1955 Marriage and Divorce Decree, scoring 2 since then. However, the FRG kept the guilt principle until 1977 when the Marriage and Family Law (EheRG) adopted the irreparable breakdown principle. Therefore, the GDR scores 2 since 1955, while the FRG scores 2 only after 1977.

In the ROK, substantial restrictions were imposed on women over divorce or remarriage by depriving them of child custody and the right of access to their children until 1977 —i.e., divorced or remarried mothers were regarded as non-related to the children of previous marriage at all. Thus it scored 1. After 1977, the ROK Family Law of marriage and divorce became similar to the other countries, being made Scale 2. However, in the case of the DPRK, the freedom of marriage and divorce is much restricted. While early laws allowed a wide range of freedom of marriage and divorce with only procedural restrictions, the 1956 Cabinet Resolution restricted marriage: it was concluded only by registration, and divorce only by court decision. Therefore, the

score of the DPRK changed from 2 (1946) to 1 (1956). In the DPRK, the freedom of marriage and divorce was not increasing, but declining. The 1990 Socialist Family Law contains the same restrictions (§10-22).

4. Equality in Parental Authority and Child Custody: Here the criteria for scaling are: (1) equal parental authority of the father and mother over the children during the marriage; and (2) equal child custody in the case of divorce.

If the Family Law guarantees equal parental power for the mother and father, and does not give precedence to the father over child custody in the case of divorce or the mother's remarriage, it is Scale 3. If the Family Law guarantees equal parental power for the mother and father, but gives precedence to the father over child custody in the case of divorce or the mother's remarriage, it is Scale 2. If the law promises equal parental authority during the marriage, but deprives the mother of child custody in the case of divorce or her remarriage, it is Scale 1, since it gravely mars women's choice. If the law denies the parental authority of the mother, and deprives her of child custody after divorce, it is Scale 0.

In the GDR and the DPRK, the 1950 Law for the Protection of the Rights of Mothers and Children (GDR) and the 1946 Sexual Equality Law (DPRK) gave equal parental authority to fathers and mothers, and demanded that child custody be decided by divorce agreement. Therefore, the GDR and the DPRK have scored 3 since 1950.

In the FRG, only after 1957 did women obtain equal parental

authority, and equal right to child custody in the case of divorce. Therefore, the FRG scored 1 before 1957, and scored 3 afterwards. However, in the ROK, not until 1977 did women have parental authority over their children. Nor had women child custody in the case of divorce. Thus it was Scale 0. Even after 1977 women did not have child custody in the case of divorce (Scale 1). Only since 1990 have ROK women had equal parental authority and equal right to child custody (Scale 3).

5. The Wife's Equal Right to the Family Property: The criteria for scaling here are: (1) married women's right to separate property; and (2) the wife's equal right to the family property that was accumulated during the marriage.

If the Family Law fully recognises the wife's property rights to own and manage a separate property that was her entitlement before the marriage, and recognises the equal right of the spouses to the family property that was accumulated during the marriage, regardless of whether the wife contributed through her paid employment, the law is Scale 3. In this case, the wife can claim a portion of the family property in the case of divorce, in her own right, not as an alimony.

If the law recognises the wife's property right over her separate property, but recognises the wife's equal right to the property that was accumulated during the marriage only when she contributed to the property through paid employment, it is Scale 2. It does not recognise the wife's contribution to the property through her unpaid domestic labour.

If the law recognises the wife's property right over her

separate property, but denies altogether her right to the family property that was accumulated during the marriage, it is Scale 1. If the law does not allow the wife property right at all, it is Scale 0. In both cases, women's property rights are severely breached.

Although private ownership over capital property was denied in the GDR, all commodities, property rights, and savings accumulated during the marriage belonged jointly to both spouses, and would be divided equally in the proceedings of divorce. The provisory clause which allowed a spouse's claim for a larger share because of greater need, or a spouse's exclusion from property sharing because he or she had not contributed to the creation of the common property by either gainful employment or participation in household chores did not discriminate against women, nor denied women's contribution through household chores. Therefore, the GDR scored Scale 3 from 1950 onwards. In the FRG, the 1957 Equal Rights Law first recognised women's right to have and manage special property and separate property of their own. Also, the 1957 law provided the wife a right to her share of the family property, regardless of whether she had contributed to the family income by gainful employment. Thus it has scored 3 since 1957.

In the DPRK, the 1946 Sexual Equality Law provided women with the equal right to have property and to demand, unconditionally, a share of property in the case of divorce. Therefore, the DPRK has scored 3 since 1946. In the ROK, women's property right during marriage was not recognised until the 1960 Civil Code (Scale 0). Although the 1960 Civil Code did recognise

women's right to have separate property, it assumed that any property of which the title was uncertain belonged to the husband. It also ignored wives' contribution to obtaining family property, either through their employment or through household work (Scale 1). The 1977 amendment of the Civil Code provided that the family property of which the title was uncertain was assumed to be joint property, partly recognising women's contribution (Scale 2). Yet, it was not until 1990 that women's claim to a share of the family property, regardless of whether they contributed to the property through gainful employment, was recognised (Scale 3).

6. The Principle of Equal Pay for Equal Work: The criteria for scaling are: (1) the provision of the principle of sexual equality in employment; (2) the principle of equal pay for equal work; and (3) the provision of procedures to claim against sexually discriminatory pay arrangements.

If the Labour Law specifically provides the principle of sexual equality in employment and the principle of equal pay for equal work, with the provision of procedure to claim discrimination against women, it scores 3. If the law provides the general principle of sexual equality in employment, not mentioning the principle of equal pay for equal work specifically, and provides procedures to protest against discriminatory pay arrangement, the law scores 2. If the law provides the principle of sexual equality, with or without specific mentioning of the principle of equal pay for equal work, but lacks the provision of a procedural remedy, the law scores

1. If the law is silent about both principles, it scores 0.

In both the GDR and the DPRK, the principle of sexual equality in employment and the principle of equal pay for equal work were fully adopted in the labour laws, but without procedural remedies (Scale 1). In the FRG, sexual equality in employment was supposedly included in Article 3 of the Basic Law. Further, the constitutional guarantee of the autonomy of the two sides of industry —employers and employees— took precedence over the principle of equal pay for equal work (Scale 0). Only in 1980, when the Labour Law to Comply with the European Community Provisions (*EG Anpassungsgesetz*) was adopted, were sexual equality in employment and the principle of equal pay for equal work established (Scale 3).

In the ROK, the 1953 Labour Standards Law had a general equal treatment provision (§5), but missed the principle of equal pay for equal work (Scale 1). Even the Sexual Equality Employment Law of 1988 did not stipulate the principle of equal pay for equal work. Only by the amended Sexual Equality Employment Law of 1989 were sexual equality in employment and the principle of equal pay for equal work (equal pay for work of equal value) installed, with procedural remedies (Scale 3).

7. The Scope of Sexual Equality in Employment: The criteria for scaling are: (1) the scope of sexual equality in employment; (2) the provision of procedures to protest against discrimination. In many cases, the term sexual equality in employment has meant only equal opportunity in recruitment and equal pay for equal work. Discriminatory practices against women

—e.g., sexually segregated work assignments, slim chances of getting promotion, and more often, early retirement of women—have escaped the application of the principle of sexual equality.

If the Labour Law explicitly demands sexual equality not only in recruitment, but also in work —e.g., work assignment, working conditions, promotion, resignation, retirement and dismissal— and if the law provides procedures to claim the existence of discrimination, the law scores 3. When the law demands sexual equality only in general terms, but provides procedures to claim discrimination, it scores 2. If the law demands sexual equality in every aspect of employment, including work assignment, promotion, retirement and dismissal, but lacks procedures to protest against discrimination, it scores 1. If the law demands sexual equality only in general terms, and lacks procedures to claim discrimination, it scores 0.

Both the GDR and the DPRK demand sexual equality only in general terms, and lack legal procedures to claim discrimination (Scale 0). They might presume that the guarantee of sexual equality could automatically lead to prevention of discrimination. Yet, in the case of DPRK, the 1958 Cabinet Resolution specified education and health care as women's fields, involving sexual inequality in a specifically sexual division of labour.

Similarly, in the FRG, the discriminatory practice of assigning women to lower wage groups prevailed until 1980 (Scale 0). However, the 1980 Labour Law (*EG Anpassungsgesetz*) obliges equal treatment of men and women for all aspects of appointment, promotion and dismissal. Should a dispute arise, the employer has

to prove that discrimination has not taken place (Scale 3). In the ROK, too, it was only after the 1988 Sexual Equality Employment Law that sexual equality covered all aspects of employment, and that legal procedures were provided to claim discrimination (Scale 3).

8. The Provisions for Maternity Leave: The Criteria for scaling are: (1) the provision of paid maternity leave; and (2) the length of maternity leave.

If the Labour Law provides paid maternity leave for up to one year before or after giving birth, it scores 3. If the law provides paid maternity leave for up to six months before or after giving birth, it scores 2. If the law provides maternity leave for up to three months before or after giving birth, it is Scale 1. If the law does not provide paid maternity leave, it scores 0.

In addition to twenty six weeks maternity leave before and after giving birth, GDR women were allowed to stay at home up to the first birth day of the new born baby, at full pay, by the 1977 Labour Law (AGB, Scale 3). Before the AGB, the GDR allowed twenty six weeks maternity leave (Scale 2). By contrast, the FRG allowed only fourteen weeks' maternity leave with pay after 1952 (Scale 1). Similarly, the 1946 Labour Law of the DPRK allowed 77 days of maternity leave (Scale 1), and the 1953 Labour Standards Law of the ROK guaranteed 90 days of maternity leave (Scale 1).

9. The Provisions for Leave of Absence for Child Care: The criteria for scaling are: (1) the provision of leave of absence

for child care; and (2) the applicability of leave of absence —either to any parent or only mothers.

If in addition to paid maternity leave, the Labour Law provides further leave of absence for child care for either fathers or mothers, for longer than a year, it scores 3. If the law provides further leave of absence for child care for either fathers or mothers, for less than a year, it scores 2. If the law provides further leave of absence for less than a year, but only for the mothers, it scores 1, since this provision imposes the responsibility of child care only on the mothers, not on the parents. If the law does not provide leave of absence, outside the maternity leave, it is Scale 0.

The GDR Labour Law of 1977 (AGB) allowed mothers or fathers to be released from work up to the third birthday of the child if they could not find a creche for their baby (Scale 3). A decade later, the FRG provided mothers or fathers with leave of absence up to 10 months (1986/87), with protection from dismissal for both partners and a right to return to equivalent employment after the period (Scale 2). Since 1988, the leave of absence has been extended up to 12 months (Scale 3).

However, the ROK Sexual Equality Employment Law of 1987 provides leave of absence for female employees with an infant under one year old, upon request, but it must not exceed one year including paid maternity leave (90 days). The ROK law allows unpaid maternity leave only for mothers, and for less than a year (Scale 1). The DPRK labour laws do not provide leave of absence or release from work (Scale 0).

10. The Provision of Child-Care Facilities: The criteria for scaling are: (1) who has the responsibility to provide child-care facilities; and (2) who pays the bill?

If the law obliges the state, enterprises, and local government to provide child care facilities free of charge, with binding power, it scores 3. If the law obliges the state, enterprises, and local government to provide child care facilities, but at least part of the cost is imposed on the parents, it is Scale 2. If the law demands the state, enterprises, and local government to provide child care facilities, without binding power, and at least part of the cost is imposed on the parents, it is Scale 1. If the law is silent about who is responsible to provide and pay for child care facilities, it scores 0.

In the GDR and the DPRK, the state, enterprises and local government had to provide child care facilities, free of charge (Scale 3). By contrast, the FRG and the ROK left child care facilities largely in private hands, at parents' cost (Scale 0).

11. Abortion: The criteria for scaling are: (1) legality of abortion; and (2) who pays the cost of abortion.

If the law allows abortion on demand, and free of charge, it scores 3. If the law allows abortion on demand, but at the aborter's expense, it is Scale 2. Also, if the law allows abortion only under specific conditions, but the legal abortion is covered by national health care system, it is Scale 2. If the law restricts abortion under specific conditions, and at the aborter's cost, it scores 1. If the law prohibits abortion

altogether, it scores 0.

In the DPRK, the penal code has been silent about abortion, and the medical establishments have provided free abortion on demand (Scale 3), whereas the GDR restricted abortion until 1972. The 1950 Law for the Protection of Rights of Mothers and Children allowed abortions on the grounds of limited "indications," but if allowed, abortion was covered by the national health care system (Scale 2). By the 1972 Law on the Interruption of Pregnancy, GDR women obtained the right to abortion, free on demand (Scale 3).

In the FRG, abortion had been illegal altogether until 1975 (Scale 0). The 1975 Abortion Law allows abortions under limited conditions ("indications"), and the cost is paid by the health insurance if it fits any of the indications (Scale 2). The ROK has restricted abortion under limited conditions, and at the aborter's cost (Scale 1).

12. The Scope of Criminalisation of Rape: The criterion for scaling is the definition of rape. The essential elements of a rape statute were traditionally: (1) force, (2) absence of consent, and (3) penile-vaginal penetration (Spohn and Horney, 1992). The traditional statute did not include sexual conduct other than penile-vaginal penetration, sexual assaults with an object, or sexual assaults by a spouse. Critics demanded that rape must be redefined to include not only penile-vaginal penetration, but also forced cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal

opening of other person's body.

Further, together with the element of force, the consent standard required the rape victim to prove she physically resisted to the utmost —i.e., not only struggling and screaming, but doing everything she could under the circumstances. Critics argued that the law "required of a rape victim a level of resistance demanded of no other victim of violence" (BenDor, 1976). Therefore, reformers and feminists have struggled for changes in definition and the consent standard by eliminating the requirement that the victim physically resist the attacker. Also, they demand to criminalize rape by husbands .

If the law defines rape as wide as requiring the consent standard only and includes rape by husbands, it is Scale 3. If the law defines rape as wide as requiring the consent standard only, but excludes rape by husbands, it scores 2. If the law defines rape as narrow as penile-vaginal penetration, but does not require force, it scores 1. If the law defines rape very narrow and requires the element of force, imposing the rape victim of the responsibility to prove the absence of consent, it scores 0.

However, all the four countries simply defined rape as sexual intercourse against a woman, requiring the element of violence or intimidation (All Scale 0).

The German Penal Code (StGB; in the FRG and GDR) distinguishes the crime of rape (§177) from the crime of forced sexual intercourse (§178). The crime of rape is concluded by the attacker's insuperable violence against a woman, while forced sexual intercourse does not necessarily include violence and a

female victim. The DPRK Penal Code, similar to the StGB, distinguishes the crime of rape (§172) from the crime of exacting sexual intercourse against a woman who is under his responsibility at work or as other duty-bound relationship (§173). All three countries do not regard sexual intercourse as rape if violence or physical intimidation was absent. The absence of consent, in a sense, is not considered at all. The "forced sexual intercourse" in the three countries should be defined as rape.

The ROK Penal Code, with a slight difference, distinguishes the crime of rape (§297) from the crime of constructive rape (§298). Rape refers to forced sexual intercourse against a woman, with insuperable violence or intimidation, whereas constructive rape means sexual intercourse while the woman was unconscious because of medicine, mental illness, or any other reasons. The ROK Penal Code, too, does not count the absence of consent.

13. The Scope of Crimes against Women: Here the criterion of scaling is whether the law protects women from sexual harassment of any kind other than rape. Critics of existing rape statutes have demanded that, in addition to redefinition of rape, sexual assault or harassment other than rape —i.e., other than penile-vaginal penetration— should be punishable in the same way as other crimes of violence are punished to the degree of bodily harm inflicted to the victim.

If the law defines sexual harassment at work and various sexual assaults other than rape as punishable crimes, in accordance with the degree of the assault or harassment, it is

Scale 3. If the law defines sexual assaults as punishable crimes, in accordance with the degree of the assault, but is silent about sexual harassment at work, it is Scale 2. If the law defines sexual assaults as punishable crimes, but only when those were accompanied by violence or intimidation, it scores 1. If the law only recognises rape, but no other sexual assault, it scores 0.

The German Penal Code in the FRG and the GDR (StGB), does not recognise crimes against women other than rape or "forced sexual intercourse." Nor does the DPRK Penal Code. Thus all three scored 0.² Only the ROK Penal Code defines the crime of indecent assault against women (§299). Indecent assault means sexual assault against women other than sexual intercourse. But it does not recognise sexual harassment of all sorts at work. Thus the ROK scores 2.

Considering the crime of rape and crimes against women together, it is clear that all four countries are short of providing protection for women from various sexual crimes. As Teubner (1988) describes the German practice of rape cases, the law tends to "legitimize men's possessive power (*Verfügungsmacht*) over women," at least in sexual crimes.

14. The Scope of Sexual Freedom: The criterion of scaling here is whether the law guarantees adults sexual freedom without unnecessary restrictions. Most modern states criminalize sexual intercourse with children under a certain age. Yet, sexual relationship between adults with legal capacity, other than

² I regard "forced sexual intercourse" as rape, full stop.

adultery, is rarely prohibited by the law.³ If the law does not interfere with individuals' sexual relationships, and protects privacy, it is ranked on Scale 3. If the law does not interfere with, but lacks the protection of privacy, it scores 2. If the law regulates individuals' sexual behaviours, but only as a normative declaration, it scores 1. If the law prohibits individuals' sexual relationship outside marriage, it scores 0.

Although women's sexual 'misbehaviour' was still stigmatised, the law does not interfere with individuals' sexual conduct, and protects privacy in the GDR, the FRG and the ROK (Scale 3). However, in the DPRK, the law prohibits conjugal relationship between unmarried couples (The Socialist Family Law). Even before the Socialist Family Law, 'sexual misbehaviour' was punishable as one of several 'anti-social, amoral crimes' by the Penal Code. The Penal code of the DPRK permits the analogous interpretation of crimes, and enables judges to punish an unnamed 'crime' by applying 'similar' cases. Sexual relationships outside the registered marriage are regarded as amoral, which is punishable crime in the Penal Code. Accordingly, cohabitation without marriage registration becomes a punishable crime.⁴ Therefore, the DPRK alone scores 0.

³ Although in some countries homosexual relationships were made criminal offences, most modern countries force homosexual relationships into privacy or do not recognise them at all. However, homosexuality is not the concern of this thesis.

⁴ Many refugees witnessed instant executions of 'anti-social, amoral criminals' at 'the people's court'. 'The people's court' allows the mass, without proper legal procedure, to consider a 'criminal' case and pronounce sentence at any public place. The people's court often ends in instant execution (death sentence). A famous actress was executed at the people's court because she committed adultery (Human Rights in North Korea, 1991).

7.2.3 Legal Rankings of the Four Countries

Table 7.1 summarises the changes in the thirteen indicators in the four countries. The changes in the total points suggest development in legal reforms of each country. During four decades, the FRG and the ROK have made efforts in legal reforms towards sexual equality, albeit slowly. While sexual equality in the statutes was almost non-existent in the 1950s, in both the two market economy countries, several legal reforms changed matters by the end of the 1980s. By contrast, the GDR and the DPRK initiated radical reforms in the beginning, but rarely made further efforts to consolidate the principle of sexual equality. The score of the FRG has changed from 6 to 29 (+23 points), that of the ROK from 8 to 28 (+20 points), while the legal points of the GDR have increased only by 6 points. However, the DPRK was alone scaled down by one point. By the end of the 1980s, the gap between the two Germanies was narrowed to 3 points, and the ROK overtook the DPRK.

Therefore, the initial differences made by political regimes were almost eliminated by the end of the 1980s. In other words, women's status in capitalist and communist societies became even. This result partially supports Hypothesis One, heavily undermining the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation. At the same time, the result rejects Hypothesis Two because there were apparent differences between the two communist regimes, rejecting the communist claim.

Table 7.1 Changes in Legal Rankings

In. ¹⁾	FRG (Capitalist)					'45	GDR (Communist)				
	'89	'80	'70	'60	'50		'50	'60	'70	'80	'89
1	3	3	3	3	1	0	3	3	3	3	3
2	3	3	1	1	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
3	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
4	3	3	3	3	1	0	3	3	3	3	3
5	3	3	3	3	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
6	3	3	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2
7	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	2	2	3	3
9	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
11	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	3	3
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
T	29	26	15	15	6	4	25	26	26	31	31

In. ¹⁾	ROK (Capitalist)					'45	DPRK (Communist)				
	'90	'80	'70	'60	'50		'50	'60	'70	'80	'90
1	3	3	3	3	1	0	3	3	3	3	3
2	3	2	1	1	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
3	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
4	3	1	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
5	3	2	1	1	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
6	3	1	1	1	0	0	2	2	2	2	2
7	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
11	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	3	3	3	3
12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
T	28	18	14	14	8	4	23	22	22	22	22

* Note 1). In. refers to indicators.

* Note 2). In the table, the decade labels move to the opposite direction between two regimes: for the capitalist regimes, the decade labels move anti-clockwise (from right to left); for the communist regimes, the decade labels move clockwise (from left to right).

7. 3 Political Representation of Women

At least in formal political representation, the communist regimes were far ahead of their severed national halves. In parliaments, the proportion of women in the communist regimes was around 20 percent, while that in the capitalist regimes was less than 10 percent, or, at the worst, almost nil. In ministerial positions, however, the difference between the capitalist and communist regimes were small, confirming that parliamentary representation does not reflect the true nature of power-distribution.

7.3.1 Women in Parliaments

In numeric terms, the proportion of women in the parliaments partially supports the communist claim to have achieved women's emancipation. The GDR recorded the highest proportion of women, and the DPRK followed next. The worst was the case of the ROK, recording often less than 1 percent of women in parliament. On average, the proportion of women was 29 percent in the GDR, and 14 percent in the DPRK, while the corresponding figures in the FRG and ROK was 9 and 2 percent respectively. Figure 7.1 summarises the changes in the proportion of women in parliaments (Sources: chapters 3-6).

Women in all the four countries suffered political setbacks during the late 1950s and early 1960s, but returned to the previous level of representation during the 1970s. From the 1970s onwards, the proportion of women in parliaments in the two communist regime remained steady, around 32 percent in the GDR,

20 percent in the DPRK. The proportion of women in the FRG *Bundestag* increased sharply during the late 1980s, but in the ROK National Assembly it rather shrank during the same period.

Both the SED in the GDR and the WPK in the DPRK were in full control of election procedures, and nominated as many women candidates as they chose. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, political instabilities, which were manifested by the Berlin Crisis of 1961 in the GDR, and the purge of the Russian Sect within the WPK in the DPRK, coincided with the decrease in the




Figure 7.1 Proportion of Women in Parliaments

proportion of women in parliaments. Yet, over the four decades, political changes in the two communist regimes rarely had a significant impact on women's parliamentary representation. Women's presence in parliaments depended almost solely on the party leadership. The gap between the two communist regimes,

therefore, reflects different perceptions of women's political role, which are inexorably shaped by dominant cultural patterns in the two communist party leaderships. Korean communists appear to have failed to eliminate the influence of the Confucian tradition more than their German counterpart failed with Christian culture.

In the FRG, the increase in the proportion of women in the Bundestag during the 1980s began with the emergence of the Greens. The Greens nominated many women candidates, and pressurized other parties to do the same, appealing to women voters. The keen competition among the parties to attract votes ensured that other parties would respond to the initiative of the Greens, recognising women's issues. The advancement of women in the 1980s, therefore, was possible because women's votes mattered, and because women obtained political importance. In the case of the ROK, however, the change in the proportion of women in Korean National Assembly was directly linked with political change, more precisely, with the often-changing electoral system. In fact, the proportion of women MPs elected by the constituency has remained less than 1 percent, except once. Most women MPs entered the National Assembly through appointment by the President, or through a party-list. When the President held the power to appoint a third of MPs (1973-1979), the proportion of women recorded its highest level. The present electoral system, which combines constituency election with proportional representation, too, contributes to explaining female figures in the National Assembly —in the 1988 election, no woman was elected by the constituencies, but 6 women became

parliamentarians by party-list. Korean women's failure in political representation is largely to be blamed on the political culture shaped by Confucian tradition, and the political partition between South and North Korea. The fact that the women's movement has been preoccupied with the amendment of the Family Law also meant that the non-representation of women was ignored.

The smaller proportion of women in the DPRK than in the GDR, and smaller proportion in the ROK than in the FRG suggest that cultural traditions hinder the communist efforts to achieve women's emancipation. However, as Table 7.2 reveals, the difference between the two Germanies or between the two Koreas was larger than the difference between the two communist regimes or between the two capitalist regimes. In other words, regime difference had a stronger impact on women's formal political representation than cultural difference, formally supporting the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation.

The proportion of women in the GDR *Volkskammer* did not show much deviation from the average, maintaining a relatively high level of women's political representation. Although the difference between its highest point (34 percent) and its lowest (24 percent) was big (10 percentage point), its standard deviation was relatively small, taking a slightly rising linear pattern. In comparison, the proportion of women in the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly fluctuated. The difference between its highest point (21 percent) and its lowest (9 percent) was the biggest among the four countries. Its standard deviation was also the biggest, taking an unstable, yet fast-rising line.

Table 7.2 Proportion of Women in the Four Parliaments

Year	Proportion of Women in Parliament (%)				Regime Difference		Cultural Difference	
	GDR	FRG	DPRK	ROK	GDR- FRG	DPRK- ROK	GDR- DPRK	FRG- ROK
1948			12	1		12		
1950	24	7	12	1	17	11	12	6
1954	28	9	12	1	18	12	15	9
1958	25	10	13	1	15	11	12	8
1961	25	9	9	0	16	9	15	8
1963	27	9	9	1	18	8	17	8
1967	30	7	16	2	22	14	14	6
1969	30	7	16	2	23	14	14	5
1972	32	6	21	3	26	19	11	4
1976	34	8	21	6	26	15	13	2
1982	32	9	20	3	24	16	13	6
1984	32	10	21	3	22	18	11	7
1988	32	16	21	2	16	19	11	14
Mean	28	9	17	2	20	14	13	7
S.D.	3	3	5	1	4	4	2	3

* Note: Election years varied in each country: In the FRG, *Bundestag* elections were held in 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, and 1987; in the GDR, *Volkskammer* elections in 1950, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1986; in the ROK, National Assembly elections in 1948, 1950, 1954, 1960, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1973, 1978, 1981, 1984, and 1988; and in the DPRK, Supreme People's Assembly elections in 1948, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1986, and 1990. Therefore, years labelled in the table were in some cases mid-term.

Until 1984, the proportion of women in the *Bundestag* had changed very little. The difference between the lowest (6 percent) and highest point (10 percent) was very small, and its standard deviation was only 1.3, taking an almost horizontal linear pattern until then. However, the surge in the proportion of women in 1988 pulled the average up by 1 percentage point, and the standard deviation up to 2.6, suggesting a possibility of women's advancement in the future.

Despite the increase in the proportion owing to presidential

appointments during the 1970s, the ROK average was a meagre 1.9 percent, and the standard deviation 1.4, taking an apparent horizontal linear pattern.

At least in parliamentary representation, therefore, the two communist regimes were in better shape, not only in numbers or proportions of women, but also in the pattern of changes. The changes in the proportion of women in parliament in both communist regimes were taking rising linear patterns, while those in the two capitalist regimes were taking a near horizontal line. Also, despite the sheer size of difference in the average proportion of women in parliament between the two communist regimes, the small difference and similar patterns in the two capitalist regimes rather confirm the communist claim of women's emancipation, and communist determination in inducing changes. However, the firm grip of Confucian traditions hampered communist efforts towards change far more than that of Christianity.

7.3.2 Women in the Cabinet

While parliamentary representation of women displayed stark contrasts among the countries, representation of women in the Cabinet did not. All four countries had only a minuscule number of women ministers and women members in the Cabinet (or, in the Council of Ministers). However, the number of women ministers was larger in the two capitalist regimes than in the communist regimes, reversing the trends of parliamentary representation. Considering the fact that the communist regimes had larger numbers of ministers or members of the Cabinet than the capitalist regimes, the smaller number of women in this level

reveals the lack of true political representation in the communist regimes. While the GDR recorded the highest level of parliamentary representation of women, the number of ministers was smaller than in the ROK. The DPRK had the smallest number of women ministers. Table 7.3 summarises the number of women ministers and their posts in the four countries. Despite the differences in numbers, there remains a clear similarity: women ministers were in general in charge of health, education, and women's issues, which had been traditionally regarded as female spheres. In the case of the FRG, 8 out of 11 women ministers were in charge of health, education, and family and women's issues. In the GDR, 2 out of 4 women ministers took responsibility in education, and in the ROK, 5 out of 7 were in charge of education, health, and women's issues. Slightly different is the case of the DPRK, where 3 out of 5 women ministers were engaged in economic matters. While culture has been linked with females in Germany,⁵ it has been a male domain in Korea. In the ROK, no woman has ever been in charge of culture. Therefore, only the DPRK has ignored the sexual division of labour at the Cabinet level.

The shortage of women ministers in the communist regimes evinces scepticism about the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation. Since the communist regimes had a planned economy, the power of ministers was in practice much stronger than that of parliaments, holding the authority of policy making and implementation. The shortage of women in the

⁵ Remember a Nazi woman, who wrote "we want more than Three Ks. Besides *Kinder*, *Küche*, *Kirche*, we want two more — *Krankenhaus* (Hospital) and *Kultur* (culture)." See Chapter Two.

Cabinet, therefore, reveals that women in the communist regimes had only nominal representation, remaining far away from real power.

Table 7.3 Women in the Cabinets

Country	Number	Posts/Responsibility	Names
GDR	6	Education Minister	E. Zaisser; M. Honecker
		Minister of Justice	H. Benjamin
		President of German Bank	M. Wittkowski
		Ministerrang ¹⁾	G.Kuckhoff; E. Schmidt
FRG	11	Health	E. Schwarzhaupt; K. Strobel;
		Family/Youth/Women	K. Strobel; A. Brauksiepe; K. Focke; A. Huber; R. Suessmuth; U. Lehr.
		Education & Science	D. Wilms
		Economic Cooperation	M. Schlei
		Inner German Relations	D. Wilms
		Urban Planning & Housing	G. Hasselfeldt
DPRK	5	Deputy Premier/Trade	Kim Bokshin
		Finance	Youn Kijong
		Culture	Park Yongshin; Huh Jongsook
		Agriculture	Park Jongae
ROK	7 ²⁾	Trade & Industry	Rim Youngsin
		Public Relations	Kim Hwallan
		Health	Kim Jongrye
		Education	Kim Okgil
		Political/Women's Issues	Park Hyunsook; Kim Yongjong; Kim Youndeuk

* Note 1). Ministerrang is not minister, but holds the status equivalent to ministers.

* Note 2). During 1945-1989.

In politics, women's formal (parliamentary) representation supports the communist claim of women's emancipation, but women's absence in practical power (policy making and its implementation)

denies it. These conflicting results consequently reject part of Hypothesis One, since women's position in the political arena was similar between the capitalist and the communist regimes.

7. 4 Women's Socio-Economic Positions

Communists argue that only when women participate in the labour market, or when women become the working class can women be emancipated. Women's labour participation is, therefore, the core of the communist pledge for sexual equality. Women's labour participation rate is far higher in communist than in capitalist regimes. However, it is yet to be examined whether the higher level of women's labour participation in communist regimes automatically yields better conditions for women in other socio-economic aspects than in capitalist regimes. In this analysis, three indicators are measured with standardized statistical figures: the ratio of women's to men's labour participation rate; the ratio of women to men in university enrolment rate; and the ratio of women's to men's average wages.

In order to obtain conclusive evidence to accept or reject my hypotheses, all the four countries concerned would have to be analyzed together. However, because of the lack of statistical data, the DPRK must be excluded from this analysis.

7.4.1 Indicator Selection Process

The process of indicator selection and data preparation in general includes five main steps: face-validation,

redirectioning, proportioning, transformation to natural logarithms, and finally, construction validation. Face validation is the process of examining the complete package of potentially useful measures to determine which ones by common sense best represent the different socio-economic conditions between men and women. Or, by common sense which ones most obviously mirror the socio-economic position of women. Redirectioning is the process of ensuring that all the measures run in the same direction so that in each case, as women's condition becomes more similar to men's, the ratio or percentage becomes larger. Proportioning is the process of ensuring that all the measures are proportions, ratios, or percentages, and thus have scores that range from 0 to 1, or from 0 to 100 in percentage. The averaging of measures with this common characteristic is statistically more robust than the averaging of measures comprising a variety of proportions and raw counts (Harvey et.al., 1990). Transformation of the data to natural logarithms has the effect of pulling more extreme, deviant values into line, thus ensuring a higher correlation among the various measures. Yet, in this analysis, since all the data is standardized by ratio, ranging from 0 to 1, transformation to natural logarithms is not necessary. The final step of constructing validation is to ensure that these indicators are highly correlated with one another. Otherwise, one of several indicators may represent a quite different aspect, not the socio-economic condition of women. In general, construction of validation is carried out by factor analysis. However, in this analysis, since only a limited number of indicators are selected, factor analysis is not necessary. Only multi-correlation analysis

is undertaken.

Considering the data availability and face validation, I select three indicators: (1) the ratio of women's to men's labour participation rate; (2) the ratio of women to men in university enrolment; and (3) the ratio of women's to men's average monthly wages. In multi-correlation analysis, these three indicators are highly correlated with each other,⁶ successfully constructing validity of these three indicators.

The ratio of women's to men's labour participation rate is the ratio of the proportion of women labour force participants in the female working age population to the proportion of men labour force participants in the male working age population. Indicator value 1 means women's labour participation rate is the same as men's. Values larger than 1 means women's labour participation rate is higher than men's, and values smaller than 1 means the opposite. The ratio of women to men university enrolment is the ratio of women to men full-time university enrolment levels. Values less than 1 mean that a smaller number of women enrolled in universities than men. The ratio of women's to men's average monthly wages is the ratio of average women's earnings to average men's earnings. Values less than 1 mean women's average monthly wages are smaller than men's, denoting unequal working conditions for women.

⁶ Correlation matrix:

	Labour	University	Wage
Labour	1	0.9148	0.8317
University		1	0.7907
Wage			1

* All are significant at 0.01 level.

7.4.2 Indicators for the Three Countries

Table 7.4 shows the indicators in the three countries. In the GDR, women's labour participation rate was higher than men's, and their university enrolment rate was almost equal with men. Yet, their average monthly wages were smaller than men's, revealing that women's labour participation is not a cure-all.

FRG and ROK women's labour participation rates were far smaller than men's, so were their university enrolment rates and average monthly wages. On average, differences were larger between the two Germanies than between the FRG and the ROK, but wage differentials were relatively large in the GDR, considering women's equal labour participation. While the mean difference in labour participation rate was 0.35 between the GDR and the FRG, the mean difference in wage differentials was only 0.11, less than a third of the former (Table 7.5).

In Table 7.5, the standard deviations show the degree of change in each country. In the labour participation indicator, the GDR recorded the smallest standard deviation, because women's labour participation rate was already higher than men's. Yet, GDR women's to men's labour participation ratio was still rising. The relatively big standard deviations of the FRG and the ROK suggest more women in the two countries were fast entering the labour force. This is confirmed by the fact that the difference between the highest point and the lowest in the GDR was 0.04, while that of the FRG was 0.08, the ROK 0.07.

Table 7.4 Indicators of Socio-Economic Equality

Country	Year	Labour	University	Wage	Average Ratio
GDR	1980	1.01	0.94	0.71	0.89
	1981	1.01	0.95	0.71	0.89
	1982	1.02	0.97	0.72	0.90
	1983	1.03	1.00	0.73	0.92
	1984	1.03	0.99	0.74	0.92
	1985	1.03	1.00	0.75	0.93
	1986	1.03	1.01	0.75	0.93
	1987	1.03	1.00	0.75	0.93
	1988	1.04	0.96	0.75	0.92
	1989	1.05	0.94	0.75	0.91
	Mean	1.03	0.98	0.74	0.91
	SD	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01

FRG	1980	0.64	0.57	0.63	0.61
	1981	0.66	0.60	0.61	0.62
	1982	0.66	0.61	0.63	0.63
	1983	0.67	0.61	0.63	0.64
	1984	0.68	0.60	0.63	0.64
	1985	0.69	0.61	0.63	0.64
	1986	0.69	0.61	0.64	0.65
	1987	0.70	0.61	0.64	0.65
	1988	0.71	0.62	0.64	0.66
	1989	0.72	0.62	0.64	0.66
	Mean	0.68	0.61	0.63	0.64
	SD	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01

ROK	1980	0.56	0.29	0.44	0.43
	1981	0.56	0.29	0.45	0.43
	1982	0.58	0.32	0.45	0.45
	1983	0.59	0.35	0.47	0.47
	1984	0.57	0.36	0.47	0.47
	1985	0.58	0.36	0.48	0.47
	1986	0.60	0.36	0.49	0.48
	1987	0.62	0.36	0.50	0.49
	1988	0.62	0.37	0.51	0.50
	1989	0.63	0.38	0.53	0.51
	Mean	0.59	0.34	0.48	0.47
	SD	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03

Table 7.5 Mean and Standard Deviation Differences

Difference between Countries	Average			Difference in Standard Deviation		
	Lab.	Uni.	Wage	Lab.	Uni.	Wage
GDR-FRG	0.35	0.37	0.11	0.01	0.01	0.01
FRG-ROK	0.09	0.27	0.15	0.00	0.02	0.02

* Note: Difference in Standard Deviation is the modulus.

In the university enrolment indicator, the GDR was not moving upwards, but fluctuating, while the other two countries were clearly heading upwards. This situation is partly the outcome of an already high level of women's university enrolment. Yet, considering the still-rising women's labour participation, the declining GDR women's university enrolment ratio in the late 1980s casts shadows on the communist claim to be women's emancipationist.

Owing to the improvement in the wage differentials indicator, the ROK was the fastest changing. The ROK ratio rose by almost 0.1 point (10 percent), while the FRG ratio rose only 0.03 point, the GDR 0.04 point. The standard deviation of the ROK, too, was the biggest. However, ROK wage differentials have yet to be reduced a great deal.

7.4.3 The Socio-Economic Position of Women

Since all indicators are standardized as ratios, averaging the three indicator values could provide a clear picture of women's relative positions among the three countries. Figure 7.2 summarises the change in average values of three indicators in the three countries. Reflecting the decline in the university




Figure 7.2 Socio-Economic Position of Women

enrolment ratio during the late 1980s, the GDR women's socio-economic positions did not change for the better. The FRG and the ROK drew an almost horizontal, but rising line, albeit with a slight upward gradient.

Even without the DPRK average, the topology of the three countries in this figure resembles Figure 7.1. The difference between the two Germanies is far bigger than the difference between the FRG and the ROK, suggesting that regime difference has a stronger impact than cultural difference. If an estimated DPRK average line is added, this resemblance becomes bigger.

DPRK official statements, though inconsistent (See Chapter Six), suggest that the women's to men's labour participation rate was similar to that of the GDR. However, the university enrolment indicator must have lain in between the FRG and the ROK, since the DPRK reported in 1988 that women made up 28.8 percent of

university and college graduates. When redirectioning this percentage into a ratio, women's to men's university enrolment ratio comes out 0.40, which is far lower than that of the FRG, but slightly higher than that of the ROK. Considering these two indicators together, the DPRK average must be far smaller than that of the GDR, but probably similar to that of the FRG. At least, the DPRK average must have been higher than that of the ROK, because two indicators already made a big difference, which the poor record of ROK wage differentials could never make up. Therefore, an estimated DPRK line could be drawn in between the GDR and the FRG, but nearer to the FRG.

Like women's political representation, the socio-economic condition of women in the four countries is not conclusive in either rejecting or accepting the two hypotheses. The socio-economic condition of women rejects both Hypothesis One and Two. Only when Hypothesis One is rejected and Hypothesis Two is accepted could the communist claim to be women's emancipator be vindicated. Yet, the bigger difference between the two Germanies than between the two capitalist regimes suggest that, at least to a certain extent, regime efforts towards sexual equality do change the condition of women for the better.

7. 5 Summary

Returning to my initial question, the purpose of this chapter was to test the two hypotheses:

Hypothesis One. Women's position is equal among communist and capitalist regimes regardless of the political system.

Hypothesis Two. Women's position is equal among the Communist regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.

Initially, communist regimes made big progress towards sexual equality, rejecting Hypothesis One and supporting the communist claim. However, during the four decades, cultural impediments hampered the change, and made differences not only between the communist and capitalist regimes, but also between the two communist regimes, clearly rejecting Hypothesis Two. The rejection of Hypothesis Two is a rejection of the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation. However, the bigger difference between the communist and capitalist regimes than between the two Germanies or between the two Koreas suggests that regime efforts to achieve sexual equality can make a difference by establishing platforms from which women can wage further struggles towards sexual equality.

In the legal arena, women in the two communist regimes initially enjoyed more favourable conditions. However, the legal reforms in the communist regimes reached a plateau rather early on, losing impetus towards further reforms towards sexual equality. By contrast, the two capitalist regimes continued legal reforms, though very slowly, and gained upon the communist regimes during the 1980s, thus accepting Hypothesis One —i.e., rejecting the communist claim.

In the indicators of political representation of women, numeric figures in parliaments strongly reject both Hypotheses One and Two — i.e., partially supporting the communist claim, but also rejecting it at the same time. Further, the number of women in the Cabinet was higher in the capitalist regimes than

in communist regimes, thus rejecting Hypothesis One —but in a way of undermining the communist claim.

As far as the three socio-economic indicators are concerned, the two communist regimes were far ahead of their capitalist halves, thus rejecting Hypothesis One. Yet, the big difference between the two communist regimes again rejects Hypothesis Two.

Therefore, the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation is not vindicated. Regime commitment towards sexual equality was obstructed by cultural traditions, and there remained inequality between the sexes —e.g., in the patterns of women's under-representation in politics, wage differentials between the sexes, and unresolved legal inequality.

While the communist regimes were sleeping on their initial achievements, women in capitalist regimes struggled for sexual equality, demanding and inducing many legal reforms, participating in the labour force, and fighting for equal treatment in employment. The surge during the late 1980s in the number of women MPs in the FRG was the outcome of women's struggles and demands, while ROK women have waged a decades-long war to amend many discriminatory laws.

Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the overall conditions of women were better in communist regimes than in capitalist regimes. If only, and this is a big *If*, women in communist regimes could have voiced their demands, they might have made further progress towards sexual equality. Sexual equality, after all, can not be given solely from above, but can be achieved at least partly through struggles from below, as all the reformist movements have succeeded only through struggles.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8. 1 Test Result of the Hypotheses

Did communist regimes in practice emancipate women, or change the existing gender relations as they claimed they would? Did cultural traditions hinder the effort made by the communist regimes to emancipate women? In the quest for the answers, I restated these questions as two hypotheses, repeated below:

Hypothesis One. Women's position is equal among communist and capitalist regimes, regardless of the political system.

Hypothesis Two. Women's position is equal among the communist regimes, regardless of cultural tradition.

These hypotheses were tested by three different methods: ordinal scaling of women's legal status, figurative comparison of women's political representation, and an indicator analysis of the socio-economic position of women. The test result is summarised in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 Test Result of Two Hypotheses

Aspects	Hypothesis One	Hypothesis Two
Legal Status	A/R	Reject
Political Representation	A/R	Reject
Socio-Economic Indicators	Reject	Reject

* Note: A/R means partial acceptance and partial rejection.

Hypothesis One was mostly rejected, but not completely. The two communist regimes initiated radical reforms during their early stage of regime-building, making apparent differences from

their national halves. Equal opportunities in education were reasonably guaranteed, and in the GDR women received preferential treatment. At work, equal pay for equal work was guaranteed as a fundamental principle, and women's full employment was ensured through the planned economy. The proportion of women in parliaments was beyond comparison with their severed national halves. However, the two communist regimes slept on their early achievements and made no further effort to improve the legal position of women. In legal reforms for sexual equality, the DPRK was outpaced by the ROK during the 1980s.

In the numbers and responsibilities of women ministers, the two communist regimes were more feminist. Further, in both countries a larger proportion of women participated in the labour force, but only with smaller earnings than men. The responsibility for household work and child-care rested heavily with women, and sharing the household-responsibilities was not a common practice. Though greatly enhanced, women's position was far short of equality. Women's position in legal, political, and socio-economic aspects in the two communist regime was, therefore, not always higher than those in the two capitalist regimes, making little difference between the two regimes. In order to vindicate the communist claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation, Hypothesis One needs to be rejected completely. Partial rejection —i.e., partial acceptance— of Hypothesis One casts shadow on the communist claim, albeit not completely denying it.

Hypothesis Two was rejected in all aspects, suggesting that there are causes of sexual inequality other than capital, and

that cultural tradition is one of such causes. The traditional Three Ks were found in the pattern of the sexual division of labour by occupations, by economic sectors, and by sex-stereotyping of the few ministerial positions occupied by women. The Rule of the Three Obediences remained healthy in the guise of the almost indissoluble marriage, the negligible rate of divorce, and of the two exemplary role-models for North Korean women, who were depicted as subordinate, loyal, and devoted wives and mothers. Women's position in the DPRK was lower than in the GDR, as the Confucian tradition was more sexually oppressive than Christianity.

The claim that communism is *the vehicle* for women's emancipation, therefore, proved untrue. Women's labour participation also proved not to be *the condition* for women's emancipation. Nonetheless, the fact that women's position in general was higher in communist regimes than in capitalist regimes suggests that state intervention, or, state commitment, can to a great extent support women's struggle for sexual equality.

8. 2 Implications of the Study

The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence about whether, or to what extent, communist regimes in practice emancipated women, or changed gender relations; and whether, or to what extent, cultural traditions hindered the regime effort to effect changes in gender relations. The test result evinces

that communist regimes failed in practice to change gender-relations, but improved women's conditions more than capitalist regimes did. It also shows that cultural traditions hindered regime's effort for women's emancipation to varying degrees and extents.

This test-result does not definitively reject any of the feminist theories. However, the result most severely damages Marxist feminism, forcing it to overhaul thoroughly the claim that communism is the vehicle for women's emancipation. There obviously are causes other than capital of sexual inequality. The result also attacks radical feminism for its limited —and mostly negative— account of the role of the state. Even in a patriarchal culture, women's labour participation and the state's effort towards sexual equality have improved women's conditions. Therefore, the test-result of this study is to deny these two theories.

In comparison, socialist feminism and liberal feminism seem to gain solid ground for their claims. Women's labour participation and legal reforms indeed enhanced women's position in society. Yet, socialist feminism needs to take account of the different pattern of patriarchy in different societies; and liberal feminism to recognise the limitation of legal and political reforms. The state, through legal and political reforms, does make a difference. Yet, the grip of culture differs from country to country, from time to time, thus hindering state efforts for sexual equality.

Sexual equality has ultimately to be achieved at least partly through women's struggles. Women's experiences in

communist regimes strongly suggest that without political freedom to voice their demands, women's emancipation cannot be complete. In this light, I agree with the liberal and socialist feminist perspective of women's emancipation. If women with feminist concerns participate fully in the process of legal, political, and socio-economic reform, sexual equality can be achieved, although of course cultural traditions will persist and resist the reform for an indefinitely long while.

There have been many case studies concerning women's status in communist regimes —e.g., women's positions in the former Soviet Union, in the People's Republic of China (e.g., Gilmartin et.al., 1994), and in the GDR (e.g., Schubert, 1980; Frauenreport '90). Also, there have been a few comparative studies of women's status in the GDR and the FRG (e.g., Helwig and Nickel, 1993; Shaffer, 1981; Helwig, 1982), and rarely, in the ROK and the DPRK (e.g., Nam Insook, 1991). However, the first group of studies has focused on the limitations and achievements of communist regimes in improving women's conditions, and the second group has centred on the difference between the two states that shared the same culture.

There have also been other comparative studies concerning cultural differences affecting women's status (e.g., Parker, Russo, Sommer and Yaeger eds., 1992; Morgan, 1984), and studies focusing on the impact of public policies for sexual equality (e.g., Maclean and Groves eds., 1991; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Sassoon, 1987). Again, these studies consider the impact of either culture or the state, not of both.

By contrast, this thesis has undertaken a cross-cultural and

cross-regime analysis, examining what difference political regimes have made in women's emancipation, and what obstacles cultural patterns have imposed on regime efforts for sexual equality. It is a novel attempt, I dare say, to measure the impact of the state on women's emancipation, taking into full account the different cultural impediments. Therefore, this study will, I hope, contribute to the development of feminist analyses of the state and culture, adding empirical evidence to theoretical arguments.

8. 3 Limitations

In its search for empirical evidence, this study suffered most from the shortage of statistical data, particularly from the lack of DPRK statistics. Although shortage of reliable data is a common barrier in political science and sociological surveys, it endangers the validity of quantitative analysis in particular. Furthermore, any comparative analysis demands identical, or at least comparable, data structures for the countries compared. Even if all the countries except one provide comparable set of data, the comparison ends in an inconclusive result because of the one exception. The lack of the DPRK statistics set the limit in the validity to the test result.

My initial plan was to construct a Sexual Equality Index with time series data and to run a multiple regression to test my hypotheses. In order to construct a valid Sexual Equality Index, and for any quantitative analysis, a large number of

indicators —preferably about 10— would be required to yield a conclusive result. However, the process of indicator selection is circumscribed by the availability of data. I had to delete two potentially valid indicators, the ratio of women's to men's unemployment rate and the ratio of women's to men's part-time employment rate, because the related data turned out to be fragmented or non-existent. This situation forced me to give up the idea of constructing the Sexual Equality Index. Instead, I employed the mean and standard deviation analysis for a limited number of indicators.

Further, the lack of, not shortage of, DPRK statistical data again forced me to employ more qualitative methods. The lack of statistical data from the DPRK limits the scope of the analysis of the socio-economic position of women, leading to the exclusion of the DPRK in that analysis. The exclusion of the DPRK in the indicator analysis is the weakest point of this thesis.

Even after the exclusion of the DPRK, the data selection process was marred by the shortage of data. In the case of the GDR, data about the unemployment rate and men's proportion in part-time workers did not exist, and even data for men's and women's wage differentials became available only after 1980. In the case of the ROK, detailed surveys on part-time workers and women's unemployment rate have been published only every 3 years, since 1984. Most data are available only in the case of the FRG. By contrast almost all the necessary data are not available in the case of the DPRK, leading to the exclusion of the DPRK in the empirical socio-economic (indicator) analysis. Therefore, in this analysis, data selection was dominated by both availability of

time series data and face validation.

To remedy this weakness, I applied a variety of methods in the survey of the DPRK, however. In addition to interviews with DPRK refugees, I examined magazines, monthly or bimonthly, and daily news papers of the DPRK issued from 1970 to 1992. The most important one among them was Korean Women which is the official monthly publication of the Democratic Korean Women's League, the only women's organisation in the DPRK. I am convinced that, as long as the DPRK regime remains the way as it is, no other study could have better access to information than these materials.

Future developments in statistics and the release of DPRK data, I hope, may enable follow-up studies to make a reliable Sexual Equality Index and measure the regime differences more exactly. The unification of Korea will certainly remove many obstacles for future studies.

8. 4 Suggestions for Further Studies

In this thesis, I avoid to discuss the question of differences in economic development between Korea and Germany. Differences in women's position may be attributable to the different levels of economic development rather than culture. However, women's position varies country to country even among the most advanced G7 countries. Follow-up studies may establish the relationship between women's position and economic development.

Also, I would suggest to examine the changes of women's

position in post-communist regimes in the long run. In a short term, women's position is argued to deteriorate after the collapse of communist regimes (e.g., Funk and Muller ed., 1993). The regime transition from the planned economy to the market economy has not completed, however. Women's position after the regime transition is still an open question. Economic development and democratization may support women's emancipation in the future.

At the least, democratization will help women to voice their interest. Like the Independent Women's Association (UFV) in East Germany,¹ women begin to organize themselves and advance to improve their situation by their own demands and struggles. In the long run, I believe, women's demands will force the state to improve women's situation. After all, women's demands and struggles have been, and will be, the most important factors in women's emancipation.

¹ See Chapter 4 (Section 4.7).

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