

Europe's Divided North.

A comparative analysis of the conflict over European Union  
membership in four Nordic countries.

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## Abstract.

This thesis is a comparative analysis of how the conflict over membership in the European Union (EU) affected people and parties in four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) between 1985 and 1997. The purpose of the thesis is to analyse how and why a) the people, and b) the political parties in these four countries have reacted to the prospect of membership – or, in the case of Denmark, continued membership – in the EU.

The thesis is divided into two main sections. Section one consists of three theoretical chapters. Chapter one explains why European integration has conflict potential in the Nordic countries, and why this conflict has increased in salience since the mid-1980's. Chapter two outlines and develops a political cleavage model. This has two purposes: firstly, to explain the nature of the Nordic party systems; secondly, to outline social, ideological and institutional limitations to the effect of the conflict over EU membership on the party systems of these countries. Chapter three develops two models derived from rational choice theory. The first assesses how EU membership might be expected to affect the utility of individual citizens. The second focuses on how political parties might be expected to react to the prospect of (continued) EU-membership.

Chapters four to seven (section two) assess the explanatory power of the models developed in chapters two and three for each of the countries concerned, by analysing the hypothesised effects of the EU-conflict on individual utility and on the party systems. Chapter eight compares the results of chapters four to seven. Finally, the conclusion assesses the heuristic value of the methods employed, and the implications for theory.



In summary, it is argued that, firstly, expected consequences for individual economic utility and left-right ideological position are the most important variables for explaining differences in attitude to membership, both within each country and between the four countries. Secondly, for the majority of parties the increased salience of this conflict complicates their strategy, in particular with regard to the ability to pursue vote maximisation and office maximisation simultaneously. A partial solution is to off-load the EU-conflict away from national elections. This explains in large part why in each of the countries the EU-conflict has been off-loaded from the arena of national elections to that of referendums and elections to the European Parliament.

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## Preface.

References to newspapers, magazines and periodicals such as 'Nordisk Kontakt' are made by date of publication on an individual basis in each chapter, and not included in the bibliography. References to Internet sources are also made individually and not included in the bibliography.

The following two paragraphs are inserted at the request of the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. They regard the use of data on the Norwegian 1993 Storting elections and the 1994 referendum.

“(En del av) de data som er benyttet i denne publikasjonen er hentet fra de/n norske valgundersøkelsen/e i 1993. Data i anonymisert form er stilt til disposisjon gjennom Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste (NSD). Bernt Aardal og Henry Valen var ansvarlige ledere for undersøkelsen, og Statistisk sentralbyrå sto for innsamling av dataene. Hverken ansvarlige ledere, Statistisk sentralbyrå eller NSD er ansvarlig for analysen av dataene eller de tolkninger som er gjort her.”

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## Abbreviations.

### Political Parties.

#### Denmark

|                          |      |
|--------------------------|------|
| Unity List               | EH   |
| Socialist People's Party | SF   |
| Social Democrats         | DSD  |
| Radical Liberals         | RV   |
| Centre Democrats         | CD   |
| Christian People's Party | DKRF |
| Conservative Party       | KF   |
| Liberal Party            | DV   |
| Progress Party           | DFRP |

#### Finland

|                                    |     |
|------------------------------------|-----|
| Democratic Alternative             | DA  |
| Left Alliance                      | VF  |
| Social Democrats                   | FSD |
| Greens                             | GF  |
| Rural Party                        | FLP |
| Centre Party                       | CF  |
| Christian League                   | FKF |
| Liberal Party                      | LF  |
| Swedish People's Party             | SFF |
| National Coalition (Conservatives) | NSP |
| Young Finns                        | UF  |

#### Norway

|                          |      |
|--------------------------|------|
| Communist Party          | NKP  |
| Red Electoral Alliance   | RVA  |
| Socialist Left Party     | SV   |
| Labour Party             | AP   |
| Liberal Party            | NV   |
| Liberal People's Party   | DLF  |
| Centre Party             | SP   |
| Christian People's Party | NKRF |
| Conservative Party       | H    |
| Progress Party           | NFRP |

#### Sweden.

|                                 |       |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| Left Party (formerly Communist) | VP(K) |
| Social Democrats                | SSD   |
| Green Party                     | GP    |
| Centre Party                    | CP    |
| Christian Democrats             | KD    |
| People's (Liberal) Party        | FP    |
| Moderate (Conservative) Party   | MP    |
| New Democracy                   | ND    |

## Other

|  |      |
|--|------|
| Common Foreign and Security Policy                       | CFSP |
| European Community                                       | EC   |
| European Central Bank                                    | ECB  |
| European Court of Justice                                | ECJ  |
| European Court Ruling                                    | ECR  |
| European Coal and Steel Community                        | ECSC |
| European Economic Area                                   | EEA  |
| European Economic Community                              | EEC  |
| European Fisheries Policy                                | EFP  |
| European Free Trade Association                          | EFTA |
| Economist Intelligence Unit                              | EIU  |
| European Monetary Institute                              | EMI  |
| Economic and Monetary Union                              | EMU  |
| European Parliament                                      | EP   |
| European Political Co-operation                          | EPC  |
| European Union   | EU   |
| Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance | FCA  |
| General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade                   | GATT |
| Justice and Home Affairs                                 | JHA  |
| Member of the European Parliament                        | MEP  |
| Materialist/Post Materialist                             | MPM  |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organisation                       | NATO |
| Organisation of European Economic Co-operation           | OEEC |
| Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development    | OECD |
| Purchasing Power Parity                                  | PPP  |
| Qualified Majority Voting                                | QMV  |
| Research and Development                                 | R&D  |
| Single European Act                                      | SEA  |
| Soviet Union   | SU   |
| Treaty on European Union                                 | TEU  |
| United Nations   | UN   |
| World Trade Organisation                                 | WTO  |

## **Introduction.**

### **I.1 Introduction and purpose of thesis.**

“Economics is all about how people make choices. Sociology is all about why they don’t have any choices to make.”<sup>1</sup>

This thesis is a comparative study of how the populations and the political parties of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden<sup>2</sup> have responded to the increased political salience of issues related to European integration since 1985, in particular the question of membership in the European Union (EU) <sup>3</sup>. Four inter-correlated areas of investigation are covered. Firstly, the factors which divide the populations of these countries over the question of membership in the EU are identified. Secondly, the relative importance of these factors in each country is evaluated in terms of the effect of EU membership on individual utility. Thirdly, the effect the conflict over EU-membership has had on the domestic party systems is analysed. Finally, the attitudes of the populations towards EU-membership and the effects of the EU-conflict on the party systems are analysed in a comparative perspective.

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<sup>1</sup> Dusenberry, 1960, p. 233

<sup>2</sup> Iceland is not included in this study, mainly because it has never applied for full membership in the EU. Moreover, the literature and data on popular attitudes, as well as on the effect on the party system, are very limited. For a good account of Iceland’s relationship with the EU, see Kristinsson (1996).

<sup>3</sup> The European Community (EC) officially became the EU on November 1, 1993, incorporating the old EC as ‘Pillar 1’. Hence, this thesis refers to the ‘EC’ when events before this date are discussed, and the ‘EU’ thereafter, although in some cases it is necessary to use the amalgam EC/EU. The EU term is also used when dealing with the more general concept of European integration. Before the second Danish and Norwegian applications of 1967, the term European Economic Community (EEC) is also used.

In terms of formal hypothesis, the purpose of this thesis can be stated as follows.

Hypothesis 1: The attitudes of the populations of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden towards EU-membership can be explained in terms of the effect of such membership on individual utility.

Hypothesis 2: Political parties will react to the increased salience of EU-membership as a political dimension so as to maximise their potential for holding political office.

The majority of academic literature on popular attitudes to European integration in the Nordic countries takes the form of individual country-studies, and much of it coincides with the referendums held over membership in the EC and the EU. Comprehensive analysis of popular attitudes have been carried out in conjunction with the 1992 and 1993 referendums in Denmark in two books in Danish by Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard<sup>4</sup>. An article in English by the same authors covers both the 1992 and the 1993 referendums<sup>5</sup>, and there are also individual contributions by Siune<sup>6</sup> and by Svensson<sup>7</sup>, as well as by Worre<sup>8</sup>. Danish popular attitudes towards EU-membership are also analysed in conjunction with elections to the European Parliament (EP), for instance by Worre<sup>9</sup>, and Thomsen<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> 1992 on the 1992 referendum, 1994 mainly on the 1993 referendum.

<sup>5</sup> Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1994a.

<sup>6</sup> 1993.

<sup>7</sup> 1994, also partially in his 1996 contribution on the referendum in Denmark.

<sup>8</sup> 1995.

<sup>9</sup> 1987.

<sup>10</sup> 1995b.

Similarly, a comprehensive study of Finnish attitudes towards EU-membership was carried out in conjunction with the 1994 referendum on membership, and published in a book edited by Pesonen<sup>11</sup>. Briefer accounts can be found in Pesonen and Sänkiaho<sup>12</sup> and Arter<sup>13</sup>. Pehkonen<sup>14</sup> gives a view of the development of Finnish popular opinion in the period from the time the EU-conflict became salient until the 1994 referendum. Suksu<sup>15</sup> also covers popular opinion in his account of the referendum in Finland. An example of the study of popular opinion towards EU-membership as expressed at elections to the EP can be found in Ankcar<sup>16</sup>.

The Norwegian 1994 referendum is covered extensively in Jenssen and Valen et al.<sup>17</sup> Sogner and Archer<sup>18</sup> provide a briefer account. Matlary<sup>19</sup> and Ludlow<sup>20</sup> both discuss public opinion prior to the 1994 referendum. Among literature on popular opinion of Swedish EU-membership, the book edited by Gilljam and Holmberg<sup>21</sup> is quite comprehensive. Miles<sup>22</sup> also deals with this. A briefer account is provided by Widfeldt<sup>23</sup>. Berg<sup>24</sup> covers the development of public opinion in the period leading up to the referendum in Sweden.

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<sup>11</sup> 1994.

<sup>12</sup> 1994.

<sup>13</sup> 1995b.

<sup>14</sup> 1994.

<sup>15</sup> 1996.

<sup>16</sup> 1997.

<sup>17</sup> 1995.

<sup>18</sup> 1995.

<sup>19</sup> 1993.

<sup>20</sup> 1994.

<sup>21</sup> 1996.

<sup>22</sup> 1997, especially pp. 248-254, but also more generally in chapters seven and eight.

<sup>23</sup> 1996a, pp. 104-109.

There is considerably less literature on the effect of the EU-conflict on national party systems. Regarding the Danish party system there appears to be little substantial literature in English beyond the odd comment in election reports. Worre<sup>25</sup> discusses differences between the national and European Danish party systems. In the case of Finland, chapters by Pesonen and Sänkiaho in Pesonen<sup>26</sup> address some effects of the EU-conflict on the party system, the latter primarily which parties were split and which were united; the former covers some correlations between party support and attitude to EU-membership. Tiilikainen<sup>27</sup> covers correlations between some social structures and attitudes to Finnish EU-membership.

With regard to the Norwegian party system, Jenssen<sup>28</sup> evaluates the effect of the EU-conflict on volatility and electoral behaviour, based on inter-party flows of voters between the 1989 and 1993 parliamentary elections, and the 1995 local elections. There are also brief discussions of effects of EU-membership on voting behaviour and coalition formation in election reports by Archer<sup>29</sup>, Valen<sup>30</sup> and Aardal<sup>31</sup>. On the Swedish party system, Holmberg<sup>32</sup> provides an account of the limited effect of the EU-

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<sup>24</sup> 1994.

<sup>25</sup> 1987.

<sup>26</sup> 1994, pp. 54-63 and pp. 164-173.

<sup>27</sup> 1996.

<sup>28</sup> 1995.

<sup>29</sup> 1993.

<sup>30</sup> 1994.

<sup>31</sup> 1994a.

<sup>32</sup> 1996.

conflict on electoral volatility. Widfeldt<sup>33</sup> very briefly considers the effect of the EU-conflict on the Swedish party system.

Other studies, mainly in the field of International Relations, focus almost exclusively on the elite level and notions of 'national interest'<sup>34</sup>. There is also at least one comparative study in this field<sup>35</sup>.

There are very few writings in English that compare popular opinion in all four countries, and even fewer that discuss the effect of the EU-conflict on the Nordic party systems. An exception with regard to public opinion is the study, based mainly on Eurobarometer data, carried out by Årebrott, Berglund and Weninger<sup>36</sup>. The 'European Union and the Nordic Countries', edited by Miles<sup>37</sup>, covers all five Nordic countries. However, it is a compilation of individual essays rather than a comparative study (although some of the individual essays are comparative), and includes little on the effect of the EU-conflict on party systems.

Ludlow<sup>38</sup> carries out some basic comparisons of attitudes towards EU-membership in the three Nordic candidate countries in the run-up to the 1994 referendums. Bjørklund<sup>39</sup> compares the 1994 referendums in Finland, Norway and Sweden, analysing a variety of

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<sup>33</sup> 1996, pp. 114-116.

<sup>34</sup> On Denmark: Pedersen (1996) Petersen (1995, 1996). On Finland: Törnudd (1996).

<sup>35</sup> Mouritzen (1993) analyses the EU-policies of the elite and the governments in Denmark, Finland and Sweden.

<sup>36</sup> 1995.

<sup>37</sup> 1996.

<sup>38</sup> 1994.

<sup>39</sup> 1996.



factors and their relationship with public opinion on EU-membership. His article does not consider the effect on party systems, and is stronger on Norway than the other two countries. Jahn and Storsved<sup>40</sup> also contribute similar analysis, as does Fitzmaurice<sup>41</sup>. Neither of these includes analysis of the effect of the EU-conflict on the party systems in the area, nor do they include Denmark. Svåsand and Lindström<sup>42</sup> carried out a study that compares the stands of the parties in all four countries. However, they concentrate on outlining the actual position of each party and that of their voters, with very limited emphasis on effects of the EU-conflict on the respective party systems.

None of the studies mentioned above are based on a formal model like the one employed in this thesis, although Årebrott, Berglund and Weninger differ from other efforts in the field in that they formally test competing hypothesis about popular opinion to EU-membership<sup>43</sup>. Most of the literature in the area tends to be based on interpreting statistics. Importantly, there is a lack of studies that analyse how EU-membership might actually affect people's utility, and then proceed to study to which extent the data support the hypothesis and models derived from this analysis. And with regard to the effect on the party system, there is simply little literature available, less of a comparative nature, and very little that employs a systematic model<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> 1995a, 1995b.

<sup>41</sup> 1995.

<sup>42</sup> 1996, pp. 205-219.

<sup>43</sup> Aardal (1983) makes an interesting comparison, based on a rational choice framework, of the behaviour of Danish and Norwegian interest organisations in the campaigns for the 1972 referendums.

<sup>44</sup> Hix and Lord (1997, especially chapter two) carry out a study of the positions of political parties across the EU towards European integration. They employ some of the ideas used in this thesis, but in a considerably less formal and comprehensive manner. More importantly, their methodology in this area is flawed. This is because they operationalise the parties' attitudes towards European integration by looking at the

In contrast, this work considers which factors (or variables) EU-membership is actually likely to affect, and how individual utility is likely to be affected with regard to each factor. The model is then applied in each country chapter, and a comparison of the results made in Chapter 8. Two theoretical models are employed to assess how the party system might be affected by the EU-conflict. Firstly, the cleavage model described in Chapter 2 is utilised to assess the crosscutting potential of this conflict. Secondly, a rational-choice based model is developed in Chapter 3, explaining the challenges the political parties might face due to the salience of the EU-conflict. This model is also then evaluated in the country chapters (four to seven), and used as a basis for comparison in Chapter 8.

The starting point for this thesis is the assertion that European integration has considerable potential to generate political conflict within the individual countries of the Nordic area. The overall reason for this conflict potential derives from the transfer of power and legislative authority from the national to the European level. This has the potential to change the utility function for individual citizens of (potential) EU member-states relatively to what they would enjoy if power and legislative authority remained at the national level. This general conflict potential of European integration is demonstrated in Chapter 1.

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attitudes of voters who identify with each party (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 28). This, as will be shown in this thesis, is often far removed from the attitudes of the parties themselves. Moreover, their book does not consider the position of many of the Nordic political parties.

In order to understand the potential and limitations of the effect of the conflict over European integration on both popular attitudes and the party systems, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the nature of the Nordic party systems. In this respect, political cleavage theory, as developed by Stein Rokkan and others<sup>45</sup>, is utilised. In the context of this thesis the term 'cleavage' will be employed only to describe socio-political divisions of particular importance. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical implications of this approach, and separates political cleavages from more shallow divisions. Based on cleavage theory, a detailed description of the party systems of the four countries is then made.

The first section of Chapter 3 builds a model intended to increase our understanding of how people's utility is affected by EU membership. This model is utilised in explaining attitudes towards EU membership in each country in chapters four to seven. The approach to this is similar to what Rokkan and Campbell referred to as 'micro-politics'<sup>46</sup>. This expression refers to a focus on the individual and his political attitudes and motivations, as an individual or as a member of a sample of a larger population.

The second main research question addressed here is how the increased salience of the conflict over EU membership affects the party system in these countries. The second section of Chapter 3 builds a model designed to provide a structured theoretical explanation of the effect of the EU membership conflict on the party system. This model

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<sup>45</sup> Important contributions in this field include Bartolini and Mair (1990); Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992); Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1992); Lane and Ersson (1994); Lipset and Rokkan (1967); Rae and Taylor (1970); Allardt and Littunen (1964); Jahn (1993); Knutsen (1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1990); and Zuckerman (1975, 1982).

<sup>46</sup> Rokkan and Campbell, 1970, chapter 12.

is then utilised in chapters four to seven in explaining the effect of the conflict over EU membership on each country's party system.

The first section of each country-chapter covers each country's international relations generally, and relations with the EC/EU in particular. The second section evaluates the relative importance of the factors likely to influence an individual's estimation of the effects of EU membership on his expected utility. Section three evaluates the effect the conflict over EU membership has had on the party system, employing both the cleavage model developed in Chapter 2, and the rational choice based model developed in Chapter 3.

## **I.2 Comparative Methodology.**

This thesis is intended to be a contribution to the field of comparative politics. It is the view of the author that comparison leads to insights not available to the researcher that concentrates on one country. Knowledge of the self is gained through knowledge of others. Indeed, one may question whether any research is possible without some element of comparison: "there is no nation without other nations"<sup>47</sup>.

There is, however, another very good reason for comparison in political science. As Dogan and Pelassey<sup>48</sup> point out, "political phenomena are not the object of an experimental science; that is all too clear." One cannot test how groups are formed or how conflicts mature. Hence, early sociologists such as John Stuart Mill, Auguste

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<sup>47</sup> Dogan and Pelassey, 1990, p. 5.

Comte, and Emile Durkheim rapidly came to view comparison as the best substitute for experimental method in the social sciences<sup>49</sup>. In contrast to natural science, general statements are improper in social science. Nomothetic statements are never universally true with regard to social reality. Hence, social science is idiographic, natural science nomothetic: "natural science seeks for law, history for the particular"<sup>50</sup>.

There are two main reasons why general statements concerning social reality are not universally true. Firstly, there is the problem of potential errors of measurement in the observed variables. This is also a problem in the natural sciences. Secondly, selected sets of social variables are hardly ever autonomous. There are always other factors that can influence any observed relationship. There are two interpretations of this incomplete determination of social phenomena.

One interpretation involves focusing on the incompleteness of the system of variables - if all relevant factors were known, then we would be able to develop a deterministic model regardless of time and space. This implies a research strategy so far not attempted. It would involve random sampling of the world population, regardless of the social systems to which individuals, groups, or subsystems belong. "Social science based on this kind of assumption would be a-historical: historical circumstances in

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<sup>48</sup> 1990, p. 15.

<sup>49</sup> Dogan and Pelasse, 1990, p. 15. They also note that comparison does form the basis for experimental research. But the manipulation of variables and the keeping of some variables constant is not available to the researcher of human behaviour.

<sup>50</sup> Aron, 1959, p. 157.

which particular observations were made would be ignored since they are assumed to have no significance." <sup>51</sup>

The second interpretation is that social science statements cannot be universally true because each social system contains unique patterns of determination relative to other social systems, due to the interaction of various characteristics. In an extreme interpretation, this makes all general statements across social systems impossible, and all social science statements must be confined to specific social systems. "In a less extreme version, probably dominant within political science today, social science statements are relative to classes of nations or 'areas' that share syndromes of historical, cultural, and social characteristics." <sup>52</sup>

A further type of objection against general statements about social reality is based on the argument that social phenomena are not the same in any two systems. In the strong ontological version, this argument is based on arguing non-comparability of social phenomena "as if it were the nature of social reality rather than a property of statements made about reality that is being disputed. Social phenomena do not have a property of 'being comparable' or 'not comparable'. 'Comparability' depends upon the level of generality of the language that is applied to express observations. The response to the classical objection to comparing 'apples and oranges' is simple: they are 'fruits'."<sup>53</sup> That being said, the selection of the four countries analysed here is intended to allow for a high level of comparability.

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<sup>51</sup> Przeworski and Teune, 1985, p. 7.

<sup>52</sup> Przeworski and Teune, 1985, pp. 7-8.

<sup>53</sup> Przeworski and Teune, 1985, p. 10.

### **I.3 Selection of countries for comparison.**

In the terminology of comparative politics, this thesis is best described as an 'area study'. This is a much-used strategy applied to compare countries that are analogous with respect to history or geography. Its main advantage would appear to be the facilitation in a natural manner of keeping certain variables constant as the researcher observes the fluctuation of others. A main aim of comparative politics is to keep variables that we are not especially interested in as close to constant as possible. In other words, they can be used as elements of control. The area study is one way of progressing towards this goal. The reasoning behind this is well put by Dogan and Pelassey<sup>54</sup>:

"The comparativist, unlike the chemist, can never eliminate the impact of the environment. [...] Similarity is not necessarily linked to proximity. Nevertheless, in the search for analogy the most natural approach is to limit the analysis to a geographical area that, in effect, delineates a homogenous milieu in more than one respect: history, culture, level of development - so many dimensions can be used as elements of control."

There is an intuitive logic to selecting these four countries, since they are all part of the Nordic area of Europe<sup>55</sup>. "The five states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden can be characterised as a family of nations at the north-western corner of Europe."<sup>56</sup> As such, they have a lot in common. Ties between them include geography,

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<sup>54</sup> Dogan and Pelassey, 1990, p. 133.

<sup>55</sup> Scandinavia is probably a more commonly known term. However, strictly speaking this only includes Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. (The narrowest definition of Scandinavia is in fact limited to Norway and Sweden.) 'The Nordic countries' includes the independent countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; as well as the semi-independent territories The Åland Isles (Ahvenanmaa in Finnish), The Færøe Islands, and Greenland.

<sup>56</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 1.

history, culture, language (except the majority of Finns), religion, political system and party-system. These are all similar across the region. This situation creates a good starting point for a comparative study. "Scandinavia [...] fulfils the first requisite for comparative analysis. The countries form an easily identifiable cluster."<sup>57</sup>

Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are clustered together in the far north of Europe, bordering Russia in the east (Finland and Norway), Germany in the south (Denmark), and the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Arctic Ocean elsewhere.

History ties the four countries together, but it is also a potential source of division. Between 1375 and 1523 Denmark, Norway and Sweden were united in the so-called Kalmar Union. This broke down at the onset of the Reformation, but Denmark and Norway remained in 'union'. In practice, this meant continued domination of Norway by Denmark. Hence, for over 400 years (1375-1814) Norway was ruled from Denmark. When Denmark found itself on the losing side of the Napoleonic wars, it was forced to cede Norway to Sweden. Norway remained under Swedish rule for another 90 years (1814-1905). In 1905 Norway gained its independence without bloodshed.

Finland was gradually conquered by Sweden in the 13th and 14th centuries. It remained under Swedish rule until 1809, when it was lost to Russia. Finland was then under Russian rule until 1918, when it gained its independence after a bloody civil war between nationalists and communists. Hence, Finland and Norway have historically been dominated by Sweden and Denmark.

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<sup>57</sup> Berglund and Lindström, 1978, p. 10.



Culturally there are strong similarities in this region<sup>58</sup>. The languages of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland are very similar, and the speakers of these languages can usually understand each other. Finnish, however, is entirely different. Until recent immigration, the ethnic homogeneity of the area was another unifying factor, and it remains a feature of similarity. Again, Finland is an exception.

Religiously, these four countries make up one of the most homogenous areas of Europe. The Reformation was completely successful. Scandinavia is the only part of Europe where Lutheranism is totally dominant. Another common factor is very low church attendance across the region, and participation in religious activities is generally low<sup>59</sup>.

As for the political system, parliamentarism and suffrage developments took place around the same time in all four countries. These are all democratic countries, although in three of them the head of state is a Royal - the Finnish republican system being the exception. The mainland areas of the four countries are also unitary states<sup>60</sup>. There are few federal features, although delegation of responsibilities to the local authorities is common.

After being relatively backward at the turn of the century, the Nordic countries are now among the most developed and prosperous in the world. They are also highly developed

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<sup>58</sup> See, for example, Thomas (1996).

<sup>59</sup> Thomas, 1996.

welfare states<sup>61</sup>, with mixed economies. In many ways these countries can be seen as archetypal representatives of the social democratic form of democracy. In terms of electoral support, the success of the main social democratic parties of the region, especially in Norway and Sweden, has indeed been “extraordinary”, to borrow a phrase from Thomasson<sup>62</sup>.

The party systems in the region are strikingly similar - or at least they were until the 1970's. So much so, in fact, that it became popular to speak of a Nordic - or Scandinavian - party system<sup>63</sup>. This has usually been argued to be a five-party system with some exceptions, mainly located along a left-right axis: far left/communist, social democrats, centre party, liberals, and conservatives. Until recently, Sweden fit this model perfectly with regard to parliamentary representation. In Denmark there have been some minor party deviations from the model, and various parties vying for the far-left position. In Norway the main deviation until the 1970's was the Christian People's Party (NKRPF), which has routinely polled around ten percent since 1945. But Christian parties were formed in the other three countries as well: in Finland in 1958, Sweden in 1964, and Denmark in 1970. Their electoral success, however, has been limited. In Finland the main deviance has been the Swedish People's Party (SFF). However, from 1970 onwards, the relative neatness and similarity of these party systems has given way

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<sup>60</sup> The Åland Islands (Finland) the Færøe Islands and Greenland (Denmark) have special arrangements similar to provinces in a federal union.

<sup>61</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988, p. 22) argue that "the growth of welfare provisions, in fact, became almost a facet of nationalism in these countries."

<sup>62</sup> 1969, writing about the Swedish Social Democrats.

<sup>63</sup> For instance: Berglund and Lindström (1978), Shaffer (1991) and Pestoff (1977). Castles (1978) and Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988) also stress the similarities, without referring specifically to a Scandinavian party system.

to increasing fragmentation and differentiation. This development is described in Chapter 2 and the relevant country chapters.

One could argue homogeneity is so great across the region that a merger of some or all of these countries would appear to be reasonably logical. And there is a certain Nordic loyalty present. However, it is a secondary loyalty for most people. The primary loyalty appears to be to the nation-state. In the words of Stanley Anderson: "the consciousness of distinguishing characteristics, real or imaginary, is stronger than the sense of shared values"<sup>64</sup>. Scandinavianism came to an end in 1864, when Sweden-Norway refused to come to Denmark's assistance in its war with Prussia. The plans for a Scandinavian defence union 1948-1949 broke down because Sweden could not accept it as a link with Western military co-operation, and Norway would not accept an alliance which could make military supplies from the USA unavailable in case of emergency<sup>65</sup>. The Nordic customs union negotiations 1947-1959 broke down when the Nordic countries joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), led by UK, instead. The Nordek plan for a common market around 1970 broke down because Finland could not accept it as a link with the EEC<sup>66</sup>. Hence, all these Nordic co-operation attempts were dependent on developments in the external world. This reluctance to form a Nordic union of some kind is perhaps indicative of the potential for opposition in these countries to other types of supra-national political integration.

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<sup>64</sup> Anderson, 1967, p. 144.

<sup>65</sup> Thomas, 1996, p. 20.

<sup>66</sup> See Thomas (1996) for a comprehensive account of these developments.

Although attempts at supranational Nordic integration have failed, the Nordic countries have agreed on extensive co-operation under the auspices of the Nordic Council, which held its first meeting in Copenhagen in 1952. This co-operation was formalised in the Treaty of Helsinki in 1962<sup>67</sup>. The most important agreements reached within this framework include the 1952 passport union, the 1954 Common Labour Market Treaty and the 1955 Nordic Social Security Convention<sup>68</sup>, but there are also a variety of other co-operation projects and programmes<sup>69</sup>. However, all decisions have to be made by unanimity, and in the fields of a cross-national common market, trade and defence, the Nordic countries have not been able to reach comprehensive integration agreements.

#### **I.4 The development of the relationship between the Nordics and the EU.**

Until the mid-1980's, the EC was a somewhat limited project in practice, although the organisation had far-reaching aims in theory, as set out in the Treaty of Rome. Membership in the EC would not seem to be that different from membership in EFTA, in that economic co-operation - mainly free trade - was also the main area of co-operation within the EC. Importantly, two major exceptions were fisheries and agriculture, two areas of integrated common policy in the EU, but not in EFTA.

The history of the Nordic countries and European integration tends to be concentrated in two periods when the question of membership in the EC/EU was relatively high on the

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<sup>67</sup> Thomas, 1996, p. 23.

<sup>68</sup> Thomas, 1996, p. 25.

<sup>69</sup> Thomas, 1996, pp. 23-29.

political agenda. The first period runs from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. It was in this period membership first became a realistic option for these countries.

After 1972 the situation clarified. After its membership application was supported in a popular referendum in 1972, Denmark joined the EC in 1973. Norway, after the population had rejected membership in a referendum, negotiated a free-trade agreement (July 1973). Sweden did likewise (July 1972), after deciding not to apply for full membership. As for Finland, foreign policy constraints meant that it was unable to apply for membership<sup>70</sup>, but it also signed a trade agreement with the EC, in October 1973. Most tariffs on industrial trade between EFTA and the EC had been abolished by 1977; the remaining ones were removed by 1994<sup>71</sup>. In the period between the mid-1970's and mid-1980's, the debate over EC-membership slowed down considerably.

It is the second period of intensified debate over European integration that is the main concern of this thesis. Hence, the time frame is mainly 1985-1997, with the 1998 Danish national election the last significant event to be included. Since 1985, important changes have taken place in the external environment of the Nordic countries. These changes have had a considerable effect on the Nordic countries' relationship with the EC/EU. The most important external changes can be combined into two categories.

Firstly, those related to the development of the EC/EU. From the mid-1980's onwards, EC integration accelerated dramatically. The most important events in this development were the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and the Treaty on European Union (TEU)

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<sup>70</sup> For specific references concerning these events, see chapters four to seven.

of 1992. These developments led to a considerably more deeply integrated Community, and are described in some depth in Chapter 1 below.

Secondly, developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (SU). The process labelled 'Glasnost' and attributed to the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was of some importance, especially for Sweden and Finland. But eventually this 'relaxation' of the Cold War was far less important than the eventual collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and of the old Soviet Union itself. Again, this development was especially important for Finland and Sweden<sup>72</sup>. But on a more general level, this development changed the whole scope for European integration. It also changed the dynamics of Nordic countries' relationships with the EU. Suddenly the EU could potentially unite not just Western Europe, but all of Europe (or at least the part to the west of the Ukraine)<sup>73</sup>.

These developments led to the Nordic countries re-evaluating their relationship with the EC. One result has been a sharpening of the conflict over European integration across the whole area: between those who support participation in this deeper and, potentially at least, considerably wider integration project, and those who do not.

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<sup>71</sup> Phinnemore, 1996, p. 43.

<sup>72</sup> This development was mainly important for Finland in two ways. Firstly, it had considerably more room to manoeuvre in its foreign policy and thus in its relations with the EC/EU. Secondly, it contributed to a collapse in the Finnish economy (with repercussions also for Sweden). Hence some impetus was added to the idea of joining the EU. A more limited version of the same arguments can be made for Sweden.

<sup>73</sup> See also Svåsand and Lindström (1997, p. 206).

In the Danish case, the increased pace of integration created domestic political problems. The SEA was voted down in the Danish Parliament in 1986. The then Prime Minister, Paul Schluter, called an ad-hoc referendum, held on February 26, 1986, to override the Parliamentary vote. The referendum was passed, and the government then signed the SEA. With the TEU, the problem for the Danish government was not Parliament, but rather the people. In a 1992 referendum Danish voters narrowly rejected the TEU. After a compromise was worked out, giving Denmark opt-outs in certain areas, a second referendum in 1993 gave the government the outcome it wanted.

For the three non-members, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the effects of the above developments were more indirect. Denmark, as an EC member, had no choice but to react to the proposals for further integration. On the other hand, this country also had an opportunity to influence the shaping of the EC. For the other three the situation was all too familiar. Developments outside their control forced them to react. Of particular importance was secure access to the internal market.

At a speech to the EP on January 17, 1989, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, offered the member-countries of EFTA the option of seeking a more structured partnership with the EC, including common institutions. At a meeting of the EFTA heads of government in Oslo, Norway, on March 14-15 1989, the official EFTA response emerged, and it was positive<sup>74</sup>. In October 1991 the EFTA countries<sup>75</sup> and the

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<sup>74</sup> Laursen, 1993, p. 123.

<sup>75</sup> At this time consisting of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

EC agreed on creating a European Economic Area (EEA) comprising of the members of the two organisations. Urwin<sup>76</sup> provides a brief explanation of the essence of the EEA:

"It was essentially to be a gigantic free trade area rather than a customs union with a common external tariff. The EFTA states were not obliged to harmonise taxes or tariffs, or to accept the CAP and CFP. The EEA treaty also excludes the development towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Neither does it include political co-operation, nor a common foreign- and security-policy. Crucially, it excludes participation in the EC's supra-national decision-system and unanimity, not majority-voting, will be the decision-making mechanism. On the other hand, [the non-EU EEA member-states] committed themselves to accepting future EC legislation and to providing substantial funding to assist the economic development of the EC's poorer states, as well as agreeing to adopt EC legislation on turning some 1500 acts into national law. An EEA Council was to supervise the new structure and there was to be a joint arbitration procedure to mediate disputes. The EFTA states had won access to the single market, but largely on the EC's terms."

The implementation of the EEA was postponed by two developments. First the European Court of Justice (ECJ) objected to the proposed joint arbitration authority because it felt that it contravened the Treaty of Rome. This was resolved when the EFTA countries agreed to all arbitration in the EEA being in the province of the ECJ. Then Switzerland rejected the EEA in a referendum. The EEA was implemented (without Switzerland) in January 1994, one year later than planned<sup>77</sup>. Thus, Nordic economic integration had finally been achieved, but within the EU framework<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>76</sup> 1995, p. 247. Regarding the EEA, see also Gjems-Onstad (1993), Gstöhl (1993), Løchen (1991), Sæter (1996, pp. 140, 142).

<sup>77</sup> Urwin, 1995, pp. 246-7.

<sup>78</sup> Thomas, 1996, p. 22.



At the European Council summit of June 1990, a list of states eligible for EC-membership in 1995 was produced. It consisted solely of the EFTA states<sup>79</sup>. Over the next three years, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Austria applied for membership in the Community. Although only Austria was constitutionally obliged to hold a referendum on membership, the other three also decided to do so. The strategy behind the order in which these referenda were held is fittingly described by Jahn and Storsved<sup>80</sup> as a “domino-strategy”.

Public opinion appeared to be more pro-membership in Austria, than, in descending order of pro-EU public opinion, in Finland, Sweden and Norway. The idea captured in the phrase 'domino-strategy' was to hold the referendum first in the most pro-EU country and proceed towards that with the highest resistance in ascending order by opposition to membership. This is indeed what took place in the summer and autumn of 1994. Hence, the referendums on EU membership were held first in Austria, then in Finland, then Sweden, and, finally, in Norway. The thinking behind this was correct insofar as the size of the 'yes'-vote did indeed descend in that order. However, the 'domino-strategy' did not quite work in that the Norwegians voted, albeit narrowly, 'no' to membership. These events (except with regard to Austria) are described in more detail in chapters five to seven.

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<sup>79</sup> Urwin, 1995, pp. 246-7.

<sup>80</sup> 1995.

## **I.5 Conclusion.**

The conflict over European integration is, ultimately, about where political power should reside, and who benefits from such power being concentrated where. If the current level of European integration persists - and especially if it deepens - then it is unlikely that this conflict will disappear. This thesis seeks to explain popular attitudes towards EU-membership in these four countries through focusing on how such membership affects individual utility. Furthermore, it will be shown that the distribution of pro- and anti-EU voters, as well as the position of other actors, and the resulting party strategies, can make the difference between a limited and a wide-ranging effect of the European integration conflict on the party system. The conflicts related to European integration are likely to remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future. As long as this remains the case, the EU-conflict also retains the potential for affecting both voter behaviour and the party systems in the Nordic countries.

## **Chapter 1. The development of the European integration process and its potential for creating political conflict in the Nordic countries.**

*“It should be borne in mind that there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a state’s constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience.”<sup>1</sup>*

### **1.1. Introduction.**

This chapter outlines the development of the European integration process and its potential for creating political conflict in the Nordic countries. It shows that the potential for such conflict has increased over time because this project involves an increasing number of countries and policy areas, and also an increasing depth of integration in various policy areas.

The core hypothesis in this context is that the basic reason for the conflict potential is that a transfer of political power from the nation-state to the EU is in the interest of some actors, and against the interest of others. At the centre of the conflict is the perpetual question of whom decides what and its corollary: who benefits from the fact that decision-making powers reside at one level rather than another.

The main sections of this chapter outline the process of the transfer of power from nation-state to European level. Chapter 3 develops a model concerning the conflicts of interest associated with this transfer of power. This model is then utilised in the country chapters. Some of the more complicated concepts involved in these conflicts of interest are discussed in this chapter, partly so that these concepts can be employed in later chapters without much elaboration. These include nationalism and the nation-state, sovereignty, democracy and legitimacy implications of EU-membership, and alternatives to the EU-form of co-operation.

The first section of the chapter discusses in general form the implications of participation in the EU. This includes an exploration of the transfer of power from nation-state to European level that EU-membership involves. Special emphasis is placed on the increased degree of integration established by the SEA and the TEU. This increased integration involves both more supra-nationality and the power of the EU being extended to a greater number of policy and sub-policy areas. This dual shift expands the conflict-potential of EU-membership. The following section addresses the lack of alternative centres of political power to the nation-state and the EU. The following sections deal with the status of the nation-state as a locus of political power, the notion of 'sovereignty', and the relationship between EU-membership and democracy. Next, the general property of EU-membership having the potential to affect individual utility is established. Finally, the broad implications of EU-membership for the national political system are outlined.

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<sup>1</sup> Machiavelli, 1995, p. 19.

## **1.2. Implications of EU-membership.**

This section outlines the powers transferred from the nation-state to the EU when a country becomes a member. It also indicates how the character of European integration has changed over time. The most important development is the move towards supra-nationalism that has taken place since the mid-1980s.

### **1.2.1. The transfer of power from the nation-state to the EU on entry.**

By becoming a member of the EU a state formally, by acceding to The Treaties, cedes some legal authority to the main supra-national institutions<sup>2</sup> of the EU: the European Commission (Commission, hereafter), the EP, and the ECJ. Furthermore, when the Council of Ministers (Council) votes according to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)<sup>3</sup> rules, it too formally takes on a supra-national character. And, as Coombes argues, there are substantial federal elements in the treaties:

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<sup>2</sup> For a description of the main intergovernmental and supranational features of the EU, see Nugent, 1994, pp. 432-433.

<sup>3</sup> Article 148.2 of The Treaty of Rome: "Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority [...] For their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least 62 [out of 87] votes in favour where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission, 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members, in other cases." However, if there are 23 or more votes against a measure it is withdrawn for a period of reflection before being reintroduced. (George, 1996, p. 23)

“The founding treaties and their subsequent development, as well as the consequent actions of the Community’s institutions themselves, were in part inspired by a federal vocation. That vocation, already embodied in the transfer of legal authority itself, was sustained throughout by the Commission, European Parliament and Court of Justice. All the institutions, including the Council, were to some extent deliberately designed in accordance with federalist principles.”<sup>4</sup>

Through its role as main initiator of legislation, the Commission plays a very important role in setting the agenda of the EU. The power of the EP to influence legislation has increased significantly over time, in particular through the SEA (1986) and the TEU (1992). This is especially due to the co-operation procedure (introduced through the SEA) having been extended, as well as the introduction of the co-decision procedure (introduced through the TEU). The Amsterdam Treaty, if ratified, will increase the use of the co-decision procedure and reduce the use of the co-operation procedure. Furthermore, EU members accept the supremacy of EC law over national law and, consequently, the rulings of the ECJ.

Throughout the EU’s history, many areas of legislative and other activity have been, and still are, subject to unanimity in the Council. Hence, member-states have a formal veto in these areas. In other areas a more informal veto was firmly entrenched as a result of the so-called ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of 1966. This allowed a member state to exercise a veto if it believed its ‘national interests’ were threatened<sup>5</sup>. Although final

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<sup>4</sup> Coombes, 1994, p. 161.

<sup>5</sup> In the mid-1960's the EEC faced a serious crisis that essentially was concerned with the direction of the organisation. The crisis arose from several connected issues. Firstly, the EP, supported by the Netherlands, wanted to increase its powers and become a proper legislature. Secondly, the Commission advocated a proposal that the EEC should

authority in areas of EU activity where the veto still exists rests with the member-state, the process of compromise-finding and negotiations removes the decision-making procedure from the level of the member-state to the supra-national level of the EU. After the TEU and if the Amsterdam Treaty is implemented, the veto only applies to very few areas of Pillar 1, but to virtually all decisions made within the framework of the other two pillars.

The areas where legal authority is most obviously transferred from nation-state to EU-level are those where the Council makes decisions through the QMV mechanism. QMV mainly applies to internal market legislation in what has become 'Pillar One' after the TEU was implemented. This allows for a 'super-majority' in the Council to override the objections of one or more member-states against a particular measure. Although the Council is inter-governmental by nature of representing the governments of member-states, when it votes through QMV it takes on a supra-national character. QMV deprives the member-state of control in the areas where this voting mechanism applies. Importantly, the tendency in the EU since the SEA has been to increase the use of QMV.

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have its own independent source of revenue. Thirdly, the Commission wanted a clear agreement to use the treaty provisions on QMV in the Council. These proposals would make the EEC more supranational, and were for that reason objectionable to France and its president, Charles de Gaulle. However, the Commission also proposed reforms in the EEC agricultural policy. This was strongly supported by France, but Germany objected. The Commission tried to find a way out of the conflict by linking these issues in a package deal. France refused to accept this, and in 1965 simply ceased to attend Council of Ministers meetings for seven months. In the end, a compromise had to be found, as the whole existence of the EEC became threatened. The crisis essentially occurred because France felt its basic national interests were threatened. "The Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 permitted a member state to exercise a veto on discussion of matters which it believed might affect its own national interests." (Urwin, 1989-1993, p. 224) In the end, France emerged 'victorious' from the debacle, as the balance of power had moved away from the EEC institutions towards the national governments. (Urwin,

As more and/or larger parts of policy areas are transferred to an increasingly supra-national organisation, the EU affects people's lives to a greater extent than before. "In terms of width, there are now few significant areas which have completely escaped the EU's attentions. In terms of depth the pattern varies, but in many important areas, such as external trade, agriculture, and competition policy, key initiating and decision-making powers have been transferred from the member states to EU authorities."<sup>6</sup>

With more power and legislative authority in a policy area being transferred to the EU-level, an individual who benefits from such a policy area remaining in the national arena will have increasing reason to oppose European integration. Conversely, a person who benefits from such a decision or policy area being removed to the European level will have increasing reason to support such integration. The more important these policy areas and decisions are judged to be, the more intense conflicts of interest related to European integration are likely to get.

### 1.2.2 The Single European Act.

Essentially, the SEA aimed to create the single market originally set out in the Treaty of Rome, initially scheduled for 1970. In addition, the SEA included extensions to the scope of the EC to cover foreign policy by incorporating European Political Cooperation (EPC) into The Treaties, and - importantly - new forms of decision-making (essentially more QMV) and new legislative processes within the EC.

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1989, 1993, pp. 220-224, Wallace and Wallace, 1996, pp. 45-46)

<sup>6</sup> Nugent, 1994, p. 431



The SEA may have looked like more economic integration, but it implied political integration<sup>7</sup>. Economic integration made wide-reaching political integration possible<sup>8</sup>. This possibility was pursued in the TEU, which has a political content more explicit than that which had been common for the Community. The reaction to its proposals, however, demonstrates the difficulties this European project runs into once it moves from the economic sphere to more openly political integration.

There were especially two elements of the SEA that constituted a move towards a more supra-national EC. Firstly, it vastly increased the scope for majority voting, thus further limiting the power of the veto. The SEA limited unanimity regarding the creation of the single market to tax matters, conditions of employment, and the movement of people. Secondly, the member-states agreed to the principle of 'mutual recognition'<sup>9</sup>. Thus, the members of the EC "conceded that many laws made by their national parliaments could be rendered illegal or unworkable by a vote between ministers of other countries"<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Urwin, 1995, pp. 229-32. See also Taylor (1989).

<sup>8</sup> Osmondsen, 1990.

<sup>9</sup> The principle of 'mutual recognition' was established through an ECJ ruling in the 'Cassis de Dijon' case. (ECR 649 of 1979) West-Germany prevented the import of a French drink called Cassis de Dijon on the grounds that its alcohol content was too high for wine and too low for spirits. The court ruled that French regulations ensured that the drink was safe, and that therefore West-Germany had no right to prevent its import. Such exclusion can only be justified if the product can be shown to be damaging to health, safety, the environment, or other aspects of public interest. Essentially, what can be sold in one Member State cannot normally be prevented from being sold in another. The Commission has utilised this principle to speed up the slow process of achieving European specifications, using it as an alternative for removing technical barriers to trade. Hence mutual recognition has played an important role in the realisation of the internal market.

<sup>10</sup> Colchester and Buchan, 1990, p. 15.

The SEA also increased the power of the EP by giving it the right to amend drafts of European law. Through the SEA the scope of the EC was widened to include Research and Development (R&D), environmental protection, and health and safety in the workplace. It also substantially increased the scope of regional policy. Moreover, it laid out plans for how to achieve Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)<sup>11</sup> and recommitted the member-states to the goal of 'European Union'<sup>12</sup>.

The logic of the single market leads to spill-over effects into fields of policy such as immigration, refuge and asylum, health, secondary and higher education, industrial competitiveness, air and sea transport, and infrastructure<sup>13</sup>. One could also argue that EMU constitutes such a spill-over effect<sup>14</sup>. Overall, the SEA considerably diminished the self-determination of the member-states. Therefore, this development increased the potential for conflict between opponents and proponents of EU-membership and further European integration.

The development of a genuine internal market in the EC increased the political salience of the European integration process in the Nordic countries. On the one hand, access to the internal market was seen as a necessity, in particular by many political and business leaders. On the other hand, there was substantial opposition in all four countries to many of the implications of full EC membership (in Denmark, to further integration), and in particular the supranational elements of the EC. By the late 1980's, the European

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<sup>11</sup> SEA, Article 20.

<sup>12</sup> In the 'Introduction of Signatories' to the SEA. See, for example, Pinder (1989), Nugent (1994, pp. 256-257).

<sup>13</sup> Butt-Philip, 1994, p. 124.

<sup>14</sup> George, 1996, p. 205.

integration process placed increasing pressure on the political parties in the Nordic countries to develop positions on European integration generally and on membership in particular.

### 1.2.3 The Treaty on European Union.

The Treaty on European Union was signed at Maastricht in the Netherlands on February 7, 1992. The last country to ratify the Treaty was Great Britain<sup>15</sup>, in the summer of 1993. It was finally implemented in November 1993<sup>16</sup>. The treaty divides into three 'pillars'. The first contains Titles II, III and IV and amends the EEC, European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom Treaties, formally naming them the European Community. The second pillar (Title V) concerns foreign and security policy and is based on the existing intergovernmental procedures of the EPC. The third pillar (Title VI) covers justice and home affairs<sup>17</sup>. Titles I and VII contain a Preamble and Final Provisions, seeking to bind the three pillars into the EU.

The TEU was a move towards more integration and supra-nationality in both political and economic terms. This treaty took the Community closer to a political union in several areas. Many of the more explicitly political moves were modest and limited. But many are of great symbolic significance, and have obvious potential for becoming more wide reaching in the future. This especially holds for the provisions contained in Pillars II and III.

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<sup>15</sup> Laursen, 1997, p. 59.

<sup>16</sup> Edwards and Pijpers, 1997, p.1.

<sup>17</sup> Denmark later negotiated exemptions from future participation in common defence

Foreign and security policy, as well as judicial affairs, were both developed further but as separate pillars outside the EC decision-making system. Essentially, the Treaty states that the members will work towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), eventually including a common defence policy. The CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”<sup>18</sup>.

Control, at least formally, over foreign and defence policy are core symbols of the power and ‘self-determination’ of the nation-state. One on-going and symbolic erosion of national power over foreign policy is the fact that the Commission had established over 100 diplomatic missions by 1994<sup>19</sup>. Another is the agreement that member-states that are members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council undertake that they will concert and keep other member-states fully informed<sup>20</sup>. The CFSP has a strong potential for eroding further the authority and power of the nation-state. However, for now the CFSP remains intergovernmental and largely outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ, the EP and the Commission<sup>21</sup>.

In the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar the procedural arrangements are comparable to those of the CFSP. The ECJ is largely excluded, there is only very limited majority voting and according to the stricter qualification, and the EP has only a

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and home affairs policies. See Chapter 4 for details.

<sup>18</sup> TEU, Article J4.

<sup>19</sup> Edwards and Nuttall, 1994, p. 95.

<sup>20</sup> TEU, Title V, Article J.5.4.

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed description of the changes the TEU made in foreign and defence

marginal role. The one exception from this is visa policy. This was made subject to normal EC legislative procedure, although with unanimity required in the Council and the EP only to be consulted<sup>22</sup>. There is, however, the possibility that in the future some aspects of member states' interior policy can be transferred to the EC pillar, but only on a case-by-case basis and according to a unanimous decision made by the Council and then ratified by all member states.

Nevertheless, the TEU establishes criminal and police matters, and also immigration and policies towards third-country nationals as legitimate areas for a common policy<sup>23</sup>. The importance of this pillar is mainly prospective; it establishes a framework for increased integration in the areas of justice and home affairs.

A rather vague notion of 'union citizenship' <sup>24</sup> was also agreed, giving people across the union the right to vote and stand at local and European elections on the basis of residence rather than nationality<sup>25</sup>. This "may be interpreted as being of deep symbolic importance"<sup>26</sup>. If nationality is no longer the condition for political participation, then the legitimacy of the nation-state as the supreme political unit is diminished.

The TEU also included reforms giving the EP more power. The main reform was the co-decision procedure as laid down in Article 189b. This gives the EP the right to block

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policy, see for example Edwards and Nuttall, 1994, pp. 84-103.

<sup>22</sup> TEU, Article 100c.

<sup>23</sup> Anderson, den Boer and Miller, 1994, p. 115.

<sup>24</sup> TEU, Article 8. Denmark later negotiated an exemption from this. (See chapter 4 for details.)

<sup>25</sup> For an account of the origins of EC citizenship, see Anderson, den Boer and Miller, pp. 106-107.

legislation in certain areas. It is prescribed in the TEU for a number of sectors, including environment policy, most internal market legislation, free movement of workers, self-employed workers, cultural and educational measures, the framework programme for research, and guidelines for trans-European networks<sup>27</sup>. Except for in R&D and education policy, the Council acts by QMV under the co-decision procedure.

The introduction of an EP vote of confidence in the new Commission (the EP and Commission terms of office coincide from 1994/1995 onwards) was another important reform of the TEU. The EP also has to be consulted on the appointment of the Commission president. The EP earned numerous other minor increases in its power as well<sup>28</sup>. The ECJ also had its powers strengthened in the TEU by the introduction of a provision giving the Court the right to sanction member states failing to respect its judgements.

The most important aspect of the TEU was to lay down the objective of EMU, together with a timetable and schedule for the achievement of monetary union. The EU leaders agreed to move from step one (tighter budgetary discipline) to step two at the end of 1993. This step established the European Monetary Institute (EMI), intended as a precursor to the European Central Bank (ECB). Furthermore, member governments were encouraged to prepare for stage three of EMU by amending policies so that they would be able to meet the convergence criteria<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Duff, 1994, p. 29.

<sup>27</sup> For a detailed list of which policy areas and treaty articles the various EP legislative procedures apply to, see, for example, Corbett (1994, pp. 225-228).

<sup>28</sup> For details, see, for example, Corbett (1994, pp. 215-217).

<sup>29</sup> TEU, Title VI.

Stage three involves the freezing of exchange rates, followed by the introduction of a single currency and the ECB. This stage was made dependent upon whether a majority of states were judged to have satisfied the four convergence criteria set out in the TEU<sup>30</sup>. On March 25, 1998, the European Commission published its Convergence Report and Recommendation, in which eleven<sup>31</sup> countries were judged to meet the necessary conditions to participate in the EU's single currency, the euro, which will be introduced on January 1, 1999. If it succeeds, EMU removes a substantial element of power that has, at least nominally, been an important part of the authority of the nation-state:

“The Treaty gives the Community exclusive authority over money. It pools the monetary sovereignty of the member states, and supersedes any independent activity by them in that field. It ascribes the management of the Emu to a new supranational institution, the European Central Bank [...]”<sup>32</sup>

In addition to this and previous encroachments on nation-state power, it is as yet unclear to what extent monetary union will require further co-ordination of fiscal policy - including taxation levels<sup>33</sup>. But it is quite clear that there will be little scope for substantially independent economic policies at the nation-state level:

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<sup>30</sup> These are: inflation no more than one and a half percent above the average of the three best performing states; government deficit no more than three percent of GDP, and public debt no more than 60 percent of GDP; the currency to have been within the two and a quarter percent band (fifteen percent since August 1993) of the ERM for at least two years; and interest rates during the previous year should have been no higher than two percent above those of the three best performing states.

<sup>31</sup> Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. The Council meeting in Brussels on May 2, 1998, confirmed this.

<sup>32</sup> Duff, 1994, p. 21.

<sup>33</sup> For a detailed discussion of this, see Johnson (1994).

“Given EC control of the customs union, common trade policy, single market and single currency, it is an important element of Emu that the political management of the economy - in other words, fiscal policy - will be shared but well co-ordinated between the EC institutions and member governments.”<sup>34</sup>

According to the Treaty itself, the internal market and EMU requires “the adoption of an economic policy, which is based on the close co-ordination of Member States’ economic policies”<sup>35</sup> and “member states shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern”<sup>36</sup>.

One might of course argue that small and medium-sized nation-states of the 1990’s do not in any case have much autonomy over economic policies. Globalisation, international finance, foreign exchange markets untamed by borders, the opening-up of markets and the presence and power of global organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) severely curtail the powers of the nation-state. But EMU and fiscal co-ordination formalises the loss of control in a manner that these other developments do not. In this respect, EU-membership can increasingly be viewed as a symbol of the nation-states’ loss of control over monetary and fiscal policy.

The TEU also extended EU competence in the fields of consumer protection, environment, education, health and transport<sup>37</sup>. The social charter extended EC competence to fields such as health and safety at work, working conditions, consultation

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<sup>34</sup> Duff, 1994, p. 23.

<sup>35</sup> TEU, Article 3a.

<sup>36</sup> TEU, Article 103.1.

<sup>37</sup> See, for example, Butt-Philip (1994, pp. 129-139) for details of these changes.



of workers and various other areas connected with the work place<sup>38</sup>. A cohesion fund was established to assist the poorer member-states in moving closer to the conditions set for further integration.

As Sbragia notes, the Community of the mid-1990's was a very different and more integrated one than that which existed only ten years earlier:

"Members entering the Community before 1992 essentially joined, in economic terms, a customs union and an incomplete common market with a multiplicity of non-tariff barriers. Agricultural policy was much more developed than industrial or financial policy. Countries entering the EC after 1992 will be joining an economic system with both a common agricultural policy and a largely completed common market in industrial goods and financial services, as well as a system committed to the creation of a central bank and common currency by the year 2000. They will therefore be joining an economic entity very different from that which Spain and Portugal joined as late as 1986."<sup>39</sup>

The TEU entailed a further instalment of transfer of power from the level of the member-state to the Community. Of course, the member-states retain power and legislative authority over many policy-areas, but the SEA and the TEU have shifted the balance of the European project towards supra-nationalism.

Although the SEA and the TEU were the most important, other developments have also moved the Community further in the supra-national direction. The Schengen Agreement aimed at abolishing border controls among its signatories, and thus implemented an

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<sup>38</sup> See, for example, Butt-Philip (1994, pp. 129-139) for a discussion of the negotiations and details of the Social Charter. The UK did not sign up to this, and hence it could not be incorporated as the 'Social Chapter' as intended. However, at the Amsterdam meeting in June 1997, the UK signed up to this agreement. Pending ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Social Chapter will be incorporated into the treaties.

<sup>39</sup> Sbragia, 1992, pp. 14-15.

integral part of the internal market<sup>40</sup>. Norway has reached an agreement with the EU, which effectively means it also implements the Schengen Agreement<sup>41</sup>. The Amsterdam Treaty will bring the Schengen arrangement into the EU proper in conjunction with asylum- visa- and immigration policy being incorporated into the supra-national Pillar One<sup>42</sup>. One important consequence of this is the extension of ECJ jurisdiction to this area, and after five years the member-states can decide to apply QMV-voting to this area. The rest of Schengen was incorporated into the inter-governmental Pillar Three<sup>43</sup>.

Increasing trade dependence is also an important aspect related to European integration. Trade dependence between the EU member-states is only partly an effect of membership, as members are in many cases natural trading partners. Nevertheless, trade between these states has increased as a percentage of each individual state's total trade, and they have no doubt become more dependent upon each other in this respect<sup>44</sup>. All these developments make it increasingly difficult to maintain a high level of national self-determination.

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<sup>40</sup> The SEA stipulates that "the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers" (Article 8a). However, political and technical objections have prevented this from being implemented.

<sup>41</sup> As the only Non-EU State, Norway signed a modified version of the Schengen Treaty in 1996, and the Norwegian parliament ratified that Treaty in June 1997.

<sup>42</sup> The main provisions relating to this are to be found in 'Protocol integrating the Schengen Acquis into the framework of the European Union' and the following annex on the 'Schengen Acquis' in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

<sup>43</sup> Europabevegelser i Danmark, Sidste Nytt.  
(<http://www.zapp.dk/wwwbev/snam02c1.htm>, 2/2/98).

<sup>44</sup> See, for example, Wijkman (1990, pp. 89-139) for a description of the increasing European trade dependencies.

### **1.3. Ambiguities and Alternatives.**

At this point it is necessary to deal with the observation that the EU is hardly the only possible form of co-operation between European states. However, it is the only political integration project that properly transfers legislative authority to a level above the nation-state available to the people, politicians and nation-states of Europe for the foreseeable future. It is important to distinguish between European ‘integration’ and ‘co-operation’<sup>45</sup>. Because European integration is ultimately a political project, some political whole must be created. This means that there must be European decision-making institutions whose decisions are binding throughout the entire integrated area. If a project has no integrative element and nation-state veto is retained, then the conflict-potential of such a project is very likely to be considerably more limited. Crucially, such a project would not formally delegate legal authority to an organisation outside formal nation-state control.

In this thesis, the term ‘European integration’ refers to what is represented by the organisation or project currently known as the EU. The more specific term ‘EU-membership’ refers to the level of integration implied by the implementation of all treaties and agreements up to and including the TEU. A variety of other co-operation and integration projects have been proposed, and some have been attempted. Below follows a catalogue of the most important of these projects and ideas that are relevant to this thesis.

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<sup>45</sup> Integrate: “combine (parts) into a whole, complete by adding parts”. Co-operate: “work or act together in order to bring about a result”. (Hornby, 1978).

a) EFTA, established in November 1959. This had<sup>46</sup> as its aim only free trade between its member-states, and was as such not a project directed at European political integration. However, the idea of a free-trade agreement as an alternative to European integration long remained popular in the Nordic countries. But several factors also pulled these countries towards the EU. Many of these factors are connected to the attraction of the internal market<sup>47</sup>, including fear of tariffs and of companies moving facilities to the EU. Moreover, to some people, and crucially this includes many in the political and other elites, the idea of European political integration is an attractive one not provided by EFTA.

b) Nordic union in various shapes and forms. This was a regional, not European, project. Some type of Nordic co-operation agreement has been suggested several times since the late 1940's, and progress has been made in many areas. However, no formal agreement of a supranational character has ever been made. With Denmark's entry into the EC this became an even more difficult task to achieve. Now that Sweden and Finland have also joined the EU, a separate 'Nordic solution' seems further away than ever. The limits of Nordic integration are covered in the introduction, and in the specific context of each country in chapters four to seven.

c) North-Atlantic co-operation. This might include Greenland, the Færø Islands, Iceland, and Norway. The main problem of this solution is the very limited market this

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<sup>46</sup> EFTA still exists, but now includes only Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

<sup>47</sup> And, for Denmark, the need to secure access for its important agricultural exports.

would provide. Dependency upon and conflicts of interest over fisheries is also problematic. This option has never been seriously attempted.

d) Galtung has proposed several co-existing alternatives such as a Nordic, Neutral, Central European (Habsburg-empire recreated) and an Eastern European project. There might be some kind of double membership in the EC and these other projects, or maybe a wider but shallower organisation similar to EFTA<sup>48</sup>. The main problem with this proposal is that most of the countries that might consider such a project are already members of the EU or are aiming to become EU-members. Thus, the realisation of the project requires the reduction of the EU to a co-operation project rather than an integration project.

e) Some argue for wider solutions that incorporate states outside Europe, in particular poorer ones. Although assistance is given to poorer countries, no serious such integration project has been attempted.

f) Wider internationalism tends to be promoted mainly by left-wing parties such as the Socialist Left Party (SV) in Norway and the Socialist People's Party (SF) in Denmark. It can take many shapes, but they can be narrowed down to two main directions:

1. Utopian internationalism, which would include some type of world government and either no armed forces or an army controlled by an organisation such as the UN. This option is entirely unrealistic in the foreseeable future. There is no evidence that the population of the countries analysed here could be persuaded to follow such a course.

And even if the population of the Nordic countries could be persuaded, they remain small states, with only modest power on the world political scene. Hence, they are likely to remain reactive rather than proactive players. This means that they have to relate to organisations initiated by other states, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO, EFTA and the EU.

2. A socialist (or green, or libertarian, or even xenophobic) vision that is ultimately distinctly nationalist in character. At the core of such visions is the presumption that it is possible to obtain a popular majority for a certain vision in one country that it is not possible to obtain across Europe. Thus, because of often undisclosed or vague obstacles, it is not possible to achieve a 'better' society as an EU member. It follows that EU membership must be resisted. It is assumed that those promoting a vision of a different (and, according to its protagonists, better) society can obtain the support of enough people in one nation-state to form a government. At the same time, the same protagonists argue that this better society cannot achieve majority support across the EU. The conclusion must be that it is only in their particular, 'chosen', nation (and perhaps a few others that are very similar) that people will support the better society. EU membership would therefore make it impossible, or at least considerably more difficult, to achieve this better society, because the 'chosen' nation lose control over its political destiny.

It could be argued that devolution of power to sub-national regions is a further alternative to the nation-state and the EU. Such arrangements exist in many European

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<sup>48</sup> Galtung, 1989, pp. 33-35.

countries, including Belgium, Germany, Spain and, increasingly, Great Britain. However, although local and regional authorities have considerable power in areas such as health and education in the Nordic countries, there is no pressure towards or popular movements advocating considerable devolution of power downwards, and certainly no pressure for federal solutions<sup>49</sup>. The Nordic countries are among the most unitary states in Europe. Debate over alternative loci of power is firmly focused on supra- or international alternatives to the nation-state, not sub-national ones.

Whilst many of the above mentioned alternatives to power remaining with the nation-state or being transferred to the EU are still theoretically possible, they are not on the political agenda as realistic alternatives. The extension of the EU to fifteen member-states in 1995 and the invitation to a further eleven to join - including ten Eastern European ex-communist states - further reduces the potential for alternative projects. For the foreseeable future, the nation-state and the EU are the only available centres of power relevant to the Nordic area<sup>50</sup>. In the current situation, therefore, whilst in theory an anti-EU position can involve support for alternative types of integration, in practice it denotes support for power remaining with the nation-state.

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<sup>49</sup> There are some exceptions to this, but they mainly concern overseas territories. The Færøe Islands and Greenland are part of Denmark, but have considerable autonomy with regard to domestic affairs. There is a similar relationship between the Åland Islands and Finland.

<sup>50</sup> Matlary (1995, p. 114) argues that the EU is the only 'rival' to the state in terms of making a claim to be governing legitimately.

#### **1.4. The nation-state alternative to the EU.**

The importance of the nation-state in this context is its position as the most powerful political unit and essential to the concept of 'national self-determination'. As important as it has become, the concept of the 'nation-state' deserves some elaboration. There is, both in academic and popular terms, confusion about the use of the concepts 'state' and 'nation'. In contrast to the 'nation', the 'state' is fairly straightforward to define: "The state is the major political subdivision of the globe."<sup>51</sup> As such, it can be easily defined and conceptualised as a 'territorial-political unit' covering a certain area. Defining 'nation', is a different matter: "Defining and conceptualising the nation is much more difficult because the essence of the nation is intangible."<sup>52</sup>

The core definition problem is to decide what turns a group of people into a nation. The title of an article by Connor puts the problem succinctly: "When is a Nation?"<sup>53</sup> Similarly, "if the concept of 'nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the 'nation'. In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus, the concept belongs in the

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<sup>51</sup> Connor, 1978, p. 379.

<sup>52</sup> Connor, 1978, p. 379.

<sup>53</sup> Connor, 1990.



sphere of values. Yet, there is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or about what concerted action should result from such solidarity.”<sup>54</sup>

However, whether or not an ‘objective’ definition of ‘nation’ exists is not material for the argument made here<sup>55</sup>. The nation-state is the dominant political unit of this century<sup>56</sup>. It provides the only viable alternative seat of political power to the EU, and thus a focal point for opposition to European integration.

The development of nation-states is closely connected to the ideology of nationalism<sup>57</sup>. Nationalism is commonly seen as a political phenomenon<sup>58</sup>, and indeed many authors view it as primarily, or even exclusively, a political concept or ideology<sup>59</sup>, originating around 1800<sup>60</sup>. As a political doctrine, nationalism is related to the boundaries of the state and the legitimacy of its government:

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<sup>54</sup> Weber, 1948, p. 172.

<sup>55</sup> For an example of an attempt at setting objective criteria for defining ‘nation’, see Tivey (1981, pp. 5-6).

<sup>56</sup> For critical views of the idea of ‘national identity’ as the ‘natural’ division of territory into separate political units, see Gellner, (1983, especially pp. 47-49) and Østerud (1991, especially p. 161).

<sup>57</sup> See Anderson (1983) for an account of the most important elements in the development of nationalism, and Breuilly (1982) for an elaboration and history of nationalist ideology. See also Kohn (1945) regarding the connection between nationalism and the nation-state.

<sup>58</sup> Although some authors also or primarily consider it to be a cultural concept. See for example Hutchinson (1987). See also Smith (1981, 1991) for a more primordialist view, with a strong focus on the ethnic and cultural elements of nationalism.

<sup>59</sup> See, for example, Alter (1985), Gellner (1983), Greenfeld (1992), Kedourie (1993), and Nairn (1977).

<sup>60</sup> Kedourie, 1993, p. 1.

"Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."<sup>61</sup>

"Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government."<sup>62</sup>

Gellner argues that the worst violation of the nationalist principle occurs where the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation different from the majority of the ruled. This can be the case with an empire, or local domination by outsiders<sup>63</sup>. Clearly, the EU, with its supranational elements, can be construed as representing such a violation.

### **1.5. Sovereignty and self-determination.**

The concept of 'sovereignty' is frequently invoked in debates over European integration. The central question in this regard is the effect EU-membership and different degrees of integration have on sovereignty. The view taken here is that what happens when a nation-state joins the EU is better described in terms of a limited transfer of legal authority than in terms of whether, and to what extent national sovereignty is delegated, transferred or surrendered.

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<sup>61</sup> Gellner, 1983, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> Kedourie, 1993, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Gellner, 1983, p. 1.

Nevertheless, sovereignty has become virtually synonymous with self-determination, and is commonly used with the pre-fix 'national'. It is necessary for a state to claim to be not only a nation-state but also 'sovereign' in order to be accepted as an independent actor in the international community. "The mutual recognition of state sovereignty can conveniently be dated to the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, where the norm of sovereignty based on territorially defined states as separate and autonomous entities was laid down."<sup>64</sup>

The theoretical and traditional meaning of sovereignty relates to supreme authority and control over a certain population or territory. For example, Minogue<sup>65</sup> argues that "sovereignty is a basically legal term used to refer to the ultimate authority which can determine the law and government of a human community", whilst Krasner<sup>66</sup> asserts that core element in any definition of sovereignty is the assertion of final authority within a given territory. In modern day Europe this community or territory is usually a state. Sovereignty allows the government of the state to issue legislation that is binding for the population of the state. However, there is also an element of freedom from outside interference involved. Thus, Strayer argues that "sovereignty requires independence from any outside power and final authority over men who live within certain boundaries"<sup>67</sup>. But ultimately sovereignty relies on state control over the military forces - the idea that the state has the sole right to the legitimate use of violence on its territory. In this sense, ultimate national sovereignty is retained as long as the military forces remain (predominantly) under national control.

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<sup>64</sup> Matlary, 1995, p. 101.

<sup>65</sup> 1992 pp. 23-4.

<sup>66</sup> 1980, p. 86.

Ideas of how a state or government acquires the authority to legislate have varied over time. In medieval and early modern times, sovereignty was exercised by a monarch and/or religious leader. Today, sovereignty is commonly (and as a rule within the EU) exercised through democracy, and hence rests with the people, or to be precise, citizens with the right to vote. The modern democratic form of government usually involves elections of representatives to an assembly or parliament that has the right to issue legislation. This legislation is usually (proposed and) implemented by a government that relies on the support of the majority of the legislature to remain in office. Hence, we have the notion of popular sovereignty; sovereignty vested in the population of the state. Sovereignty becomes a legal claim arising out of popular rule, or democracy. The nature of democracy is arguably affected by European integration. This is discussed below.

However, if one views sovereignty as intrinsically bound up with the nation, and the nation as somehow a separate entity from the population of the nation-state, as 'national sovereignty' rather than 'popular sovereignty', then European integration involves giving up sovereignty.

Thus, sovereignty is a very ambiguous concept. It has at least two distinct meanings: ultimate legal authority and popular rule. In the first sense, sovereignty has come to be associated with the nation-state. In this denotation EU membership implies a loss of sovereignty. The Commission initiates and influences legislation, seeking to enlarge the EU's competence. The member-states' parliaments have minimal direct influence on EU legislation. QMV is increasingly applied to EU legislation. Hence, EU directives can be

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<sup>67</sup> Strayer, 1970, p. 58. Also see Finer (1974, pp. 79-126)

enforced in national courts even if the member-state in question voted against this legislation and did not implement it in its own law. Furthermore, the decisions of the ECJ can only be overturned by Treaty amendment. All this amounts to a loss of power at the national level. However, the view taken here is that this process is better assessed in terms of the degree of transfer of legal authority from the nation-state to the EU, than in terms of whether or not sovereignty is given up. When 'national sovereignty' is debated in relation to EU-membership, the question is really one of where power should reside. However, loss of national sovereignty is not equivalent to a loss of popular sovereignty - rule by the people.

Popular sovereignty involves a notion of popular self-determination. And popular sovereignty means that it is the people who decide to whom to delegate sovereignty - a city council, a regional government, a national president, a national parliament, a European institution, or a world institution. Viewed in terms of popular sovereignty, the question becomes how EU-membership affects the say of the people in affairs that concern them.

#### **1.6. Democratic legitimacy and European integration.**

The EU-conflict in the Nordic countries has included a debate over the effect of EU-membership on democracy and legitimacy. Broadly, three overlapping sub-areas of this debate can be identified: those pertaining to the 'democratic deficit' (narrowly conceived), a debate over the 'openness' and 'transparency' of the EU institutions, and a 'closeness' debate over the connection between the size of the political unit and democracy.

The 'democratic deficit' derives, in its most narrow conceptualisation, from the gap between the powers transferred to the EU-level and the control of elected representatives over EU-legislation emanating from these powers:

"The 'democratic deficit' is the gap between the powers transferred to the Community level and the control of the elected [European] Parliament over them, a gap filled by national civil servants operating as European experts or as members of regulation and management committees, and to some extent by organised lobbies, mainly representing business."<sup>68</sup>

The Council is perhaps the biggest 'problem' in this respect, in that it operates as the EU final decision maker. But nobody can force a vote of confidence on the Council of Ministers - it is not responsible to any popularly elected organisation or assembly. Furthermore, Lodge<sup>69</sup> notes that any expansion of the EC's competence expands the democratic deficit, unless the power-balance between the institutions changes. Similarly, Coombes argues that:

"The prevailing doctrine seems to condone the cumulatively joint or collusive exercise of functions of public policy by states' governments without a concomitant transfer of political, or even legal, authority."<sup>70</sup>

Another aspect of the deficit is the consequence for the balance of power between elected representatives and the executive organs:

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<sup>68</sup> Williams, 1990, p. 306.

<sup>69</sup> 1991, p. 151. See also Sbragia, 1992, pp. 277-278.

<sup>70</sup> Coombes, 1994, p. 163.

“The effect of the peculiar assignment of powers to the community, as endorsed and extended by the Maastricht Treaty, is a usurpation of legislative power by the executive branches of states. But states’ executives, even so, are authorised to use that power collectively, and in many crucial aspects of public policy, only when they are able to act through their representatives by unanimity. The effective transfer of law-making power to the executives of states by means of the treaties, which is potentially overriding when the state’s own executive representatives can act by unanimity, makes a nonsense of the separation of powers at both national and European levels. Equally importantly, the capacity of the states’ executives to assume discretion to act authoritatively outside the Community’s legal framework, for example in the sphere of CFSP, or even in spheres where powers have been duly assigned to the EC, has a similar consequence.”<sup>71</sup>

Various measures have been taken or suggested to increase democratic accountability.

The most obvious is increasing the power of the EP<sup>72</sup>. Some argue for an elected Commission<sup>73</sup>, others have suggested the creation of a second chamber consisting of national parliamentarians<sup>74</sup>. Also, citizenship is linked with popular sovereignty and democratic participation. In this context, the development of EU citizenship in the TEU is one way of addressing the democratic deficit<sup>75</sup>. Finally, the national parliaments are set to take a more active role after the TEU. They have been encouraged to co-operate with each other and with the EP, and many member states have introduced measures designed to enhance national parliamentary scrutiny<sup>76</sup>. However, this does not necessarily improve public participation:

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<sup>71</sup> Coombes, 1994, pp. 172-173.

<sup>72</sup> Featherstone, 1994, p. 166-167; Lodge, 1991, 1994.

<sup>73</sup> Bogdanor and Woodcock, 1991, pp. 483-484, 489-490.

<sup>74</sup> Herman and Lodge, 1978; Heseltine, 1989a, 1989b.

<sup>75</sup> Anderson, den Boer and Miller, 1994, p. 107.

<sup>76</sup> Corbett, 1994, pp. 217-218. See Fitzmaurice (1996) for an overview of the national parliamentary control of EU policy in Denmark, Finland and Sweden.

“In practice it has always proved difficult to interest the public in an elite-driven process of functional integration focusing largely on economic activities and governed by opaque procedures of intergovernmental decision-making.”<sup>77</sup>

An alleged lack of openness and transparency in the EU’s institutions forms another aspect of the democracy and legitimacy debate. It is a widespread assumption in the Nordic countries that their national political institutions and processes are considerably more open and transparent than elsewhere, in particular when compared with those of the EU. This belief is based mainly on the ability and ease with which Nordic citizens can access public records of various kinds. Some authors claim that more ‘openness’ in the Council would improve the democratic accountability of the EU<sup>78</sup>. Similarly, Jacobson<sup>79</sup> argues that “the root of EU’s legitimacy problems [...] is in the non-communicative nature of the legislation process, both nationally and supranationally.”

At the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992, a series of measures designed to enhance transparency in the EC’s decision-making process were made. These included greater access to documents and information, and the holding of certain Council meetings in public. However, there are clear limits to how far this transparency can be taken with regard to the Council or any other government:

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<sup>77</sup> Anderson, den Boer and Miller, 1994, p. 106.

<sup>78</sup> Colchester and Buchan, 1990, pp. 236-237; Boyce, 1993, p. 470.

<sup>79</sup> 1997, p. 86.



“Because the [...] Council is what it is, an intergovernmental negotiating forum with the difference that some of its products pass into national law, open and public sessions cannot give an authentic picture of its work. The observer affects the phenomenon. By its nature a negotiation cannot be open to public view. The negotiator needs to be able to take positions and change them in a way which would upset particular interest groups and weaken its bargaining stance. Open sessions are for the delivery of set piece speeches.”<sup>80</sup>

A related assertion states that the Scandinavian form of democracy brings democracy closer to the people<sup>81</sup>, involving a high number of individuals and organisations in the decision-making process, and therefore is more legitimate than other types of government<sup>82</sup>. For example, Jacobson<sup>83</sup> describes the Swedish law making system with its public inquiries, reports, and circulation of bills and public hearings. Jacobson then argues that the communicative element of Swedish democracy is connected with a traditionally high degree of legitimacy. However, if this communicative element is eroded, without any compensation (for example at the supranational level) then there is a risk of legitimacy being eroded as well<sup>84</sup>.

A more basic argument can also be invoked with regard to the ‘closeness’ discussion. Decentralisation of power should give each individual more say over his own situation. Hence, if the value of a lower level of delegation outweighs advantages (if there are any) of higher levels of delegation, then the individual can be expected to prefer that lower

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<sup>80</sup> Nicoll, 1994, p. 192.

<sup>81</sup> See, for example, *Frihet - i en liten urne* (Ungdom mot EU, Leaflet, 1994, Oslo); *Norge og EU - Virkninger av medlemskap i Den europeiske union*. (Nei til EU, Oslo, 1994).

<sup>82</sup> Rousseau (1968, especially pp. 90-96) puts forward a strong argument for the virtues of the small state. Also see Pedersen (1992).

<sup>83</sup> 1997, p. 81.

level. Based on this argument in isolation, government at the national level is preferable to the European level in terms of popular self-government. For example, while the people in a Nordic state elect all representatives to their national parliament, they will have very few representatives in either the Council or the EP. Hence, influence will be greater per person in the national parliament than in a European institution. However, this argument is compromised if the existence of the EU affects the freedom of action of the non-member. If this is the case, it could be argued that some chance of influence in decisions and legislation that affects the people of the Non-member State would increase legitimacy and democracy<sup>85</sup>.

These democracy and legitimacy issues form an important part of the debate over EU-membership in the Nordic countries. It is unlikely that these problems can ever be solved to the satisfaction of all the actors involved<sup>86</sup>. After all, they go to the core of the debate of what is the appropriate level of government. However, the overall effect of EU-membership on the quality of democracy and legitimacy is difficult to evaluate.

### **1.7. The influence of EU membership on individual utility.**

When power is transferred from the national to the European level, individual utility may be affected in various ways. These effects can be grouped into three categories. Firstly, the individual may approve of or reject the transfer of legal authority from the

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<sup>84</sup> Jacobson, 1997, p. 82.

<sup>85</sup> See, for example, Nugent, 1994, p. 441. See also Gstöhl (1994, p. 335) for the argument that EU-membership has both positive and negative effects on state autonomy.

<sup>86</sup> For a thorough discussion of democracy problems in the EU, and proposed remedies, see Boyce (1993), Featherstone (1994).

national to the EU level *per se*. Secondly, he may condone or disapprove of the form of European integration manifest in the shape of the EU. Third, it is highly likely that EU-policy will not be the same as national policy.

These various (potential) conflicts of interest emanating from European integration have two features in common. Firstly, they all result from the transfer of power from the nation-state to the EU. Secondly, they all have the potential to affect individual utility. Some individuals will benefit and some will incur a loss to their utility because of EU-membership, relative to their position had power remained at the national level. This is dealt with extensively in general terms in Chapter 3, and in country-specific terms in chapters four to seven.

### **1.8. EU-membership and the national political system.**

Joining the EU, in the parlance of a world where the nation-state is the dominant political unit, involves a 'transfer of sovereignty' to an 'international organisation'. According to the constitutions of the four countries discussed here, such a transfer requires either a 'super-majority' in parliament, or a popular referendum. In Denmark it has become the norm to hold referendums over any Treaty revision or major development such as EMU. This practice looks likely to be at least partially adopted by Sweden, and perhaps also by Finland. Elections to the EP add a new feature to the political system. So far, these have also functioned largely as 'mini-referendums' on EU-membership.

EU-membership transfers substantial legislative authority from the national parliament to the EU-level. However, the effect on the power of the national executive is more ambivalent. Through participation in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, the members of national governments have substantial influence over decisions they would have little or no influence over if their country were not a member of the EU. Hence, one effect of EU-membership is a relative increase in power for the national executive vis-à-vis the national legislature. The fact that executives negotiate treaties has a similar effect<sup>87</sup>. Overall, however, all national institutions lose power through EU membership. Furthermore, there is a decline of the state as the source of political legitimisation<sup>88</sup>. A related consequence is a much more diffuse distinction between the foreign and the domestic:

“The European Community represents a second arena for national or domestic policy-making which may strengthen some groups within a state and sometimes weaken the national government. Thus it may no longer be very useful to speak of the state as a unitary actor on the European scene or even an actor that can be classified as domestic: the state border, itself to a large extent an imagined divide between one state and the other, is now less and less powerful and less useful as an empirical distinction. Domestic and EU-level politics become confused or at least entangled.”<sup>89</sup>

The increased salience of the conflict over European integration also has the effect of making the national party system more complicated by introducing another dimension. This can create numerous problems for the parties because a variety of actors and groups take different positions on this dimension. These actors and groups include voters, party members, other parties, European politicians, and the EU institutions. Thus, the parties

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<sup>87</sup> Sbragia, 1992, pp. 271-274.

<sup>88</sup> Matlary, 1995.

<sup>89</sup> Matlary, 1995, p. 110.

have to consider the position of all these actors when deciding on a position on European integration. These complications are discussed in detail in chapters three to eight.

### **1.9. Conclusion.**

Because of the limited scope of the EC, and a largely inter-governmental decision-making mechanism, political conflict over European integration was not so overt in the early years of the Community. However, with the SEA and the TEU there has been a clear move towards deeper integration and supra-nationalism. The conflict over European integration is arguably becoming one of the most important political divisions in Europe in the 1990's.

For the foreseeable future, conflicts over European integration are likely to remain important in Nordic politics. There are two main reasons for the likelihood of this continued salience. Firstly, these conflicts are about power and authority - about who decides what. Secondly, where decisions are made has the potential to affect people's utility. Therefore, people have an interest in where power and influence resides.

The formal transfer of legal authority from the nation-state to the EU-level makes these conflicts particularly contentious. The status of the nation-state as the dominant political unit has become so entrenched in this century that any change in this status seems destined to lead to conflict. Furthermore, European integration affects core notions such as democracy and legitimacy. These have also been strongly linked to the nation-state. But when the nation-state is no longer the 'sole and supreme' legal authority, then it

cannot remain the sole focus for democratic government and legitimacy either. This leads to both disagreements over this development in principle, as well as arguments over how to rectify problems related to democracy and legitimacy. As chapters three to seven will show, it is very difficult to evaluate the overall effect of EU-membership in these important areas.

The political system is affected by EU membership in various ways, as outlined above. In the rest of this thesis, the focus will, in this respect, be more specifically on how the EU-conflict affects the party system and coalition patterns in the Nordic countries. Of particular interest is the very limited representation among political parties and in the national parliaments, arguably with the exception of Norway, of the strong anti-EU sentiments in all four countries.

Expansion of European integration since the mid-1980s has increased the potential for conflicts of interest over this development, and the degree to which such conflicts affect the domestic politics of actual and potential member-states. The next two chapters set out frameworks for understanding how and why this might take place. Chapters four to seven analyse how important this conflict has become in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; and to what extent it has affected their domestic political systems. Chapter 8 then compares these developments.

## **Chapter 2. Political cleavages and the party systems of the Nordic countries.**

### **2.1. Introduction.**

This chapter outlines the political cleavage model and the Nordic party systems. The first section of the chapter deals with the more theoretical aspects of the cleavage model. The second section applies the cleavage model, as described in the first section, to the analysis and description of the party systems of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The application of the political cleavage model serves four purposes. Firstly, it offers a very useful framework model for a description and understanding of the party systems of these countries. Secondly, it makes a major contribution to the evaluation of the effect of the conflict over European integration on their party systems. This is achieved through assessing the crosscutting potential of this conflict. Thirdly, the cleavage model will be employed in chapters four to eight to evaluate the hypothesis that the conflict over European integration is a new cleavage. Finally, the model illustrates some of the limitations of the rational choice model developed in Chapter 3 below.

The political cleavage model has, over the last thirty years, been an important element of a multitude of works on electoral behaviour and party systems<sup>1</sup>. It has also been the

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<sup>1</sup> Aardal (1994b) argues that the concept of 'cleavage' is one of the most common in political science. To list all the works that employ the concept would be beyond the scope of this chapter. Most books that cover electoral behaviour, political parties, or party systems will use the concept in some form. Examples include Smith (1989, chapter 2); Meny (1990, chapter 1); Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1992, chapter 4) and Ware (1996, chapter 6).

subject of various criticisms, both with regard to methodological aspects and relevance. In particular, it has been argued that the model has become less relevant over time.

The starting point for this chapter is Lipset and Rokkan's seminal work 'Party Systems and Voter Alignments'<sup>2</sup>. Importantly, this work emphasises that not every conflict of interest becomes a cleavage, and that the cleavage hierarchy changes over time and differs between polities. Essentially, Lipset and Rokkan's model is a framework model. It is an aid for further analysis, not a static construct. Moreover, it focuses attention on the central role of what the authors call 'critical junctures' - important historic-sociological developments such as the French Revolution.

If the cleavage model is to be employed in any meaningful way, then the concept of political cleavage must have meaning beyond being a substitute for words such as 'conflict', 'division' or 'dimension'. Lipset and Rokkan looked at cleavages in society, and then on how these were translated into the party system. The position taken here is that today the focus for the cleavage model should be more directly on the political system.

Several conflicts have been suggested as giving rise to new political cleavages in the 30 years that have passed since 'Party Systems and Voter Alignments'. However, in many cases, labelling these conflicts of interest 'cleavages' does not add to our understanding of politics. And that must remain the test for the application of the model to any such conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to establish some criteria for determining which

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<sup>2</sup> Aardal (1994b) argues that this remains the central reference point for the cleavage concept.



conflicts of interest should be analysed as cleavages, and which should not. The criteria developed in section one of this chapter are taken into account when describing the cleavage system in the Nordic area in section two.

## **2.2 The Lipset and Rokkan model.**

Lipset and Rokkan identify "four critical lines of cleavage"<sup>3</sup>. Two of these result from the (French) National Revolution. Firstly, the centre-periphery cleavage between the central nation-building culture and the subject populations based on some ethnic, linguistic or religious differences. Secondly, the Church-State cleavage between the emerging Nation-State and the historically entrenched and privileged Church<sup>4</sup>. The other two are products of the Industrial Revolution<sup>5</sup>, although one is partly the result of the later Russian Bolshevik revolution of 1917<sup>6</sup>. Firstly, a cleavage between landed interests and industrial entrepreneurs, and secondly one between owners and employers on one side and workers and tenants on the other<sup>7</sup>. According to Lipset and Rokkan, the deepest of these cleavages were caused by the National Revolution<sup>8</sup>.

Most of the literature in this area includes these cleavages or some variation on them. That is, one or more territorial cleavages (usually centre-periphery, urban-rural or ethnic conflicts), a religious cleavage, and some form of class, left-right or socio-economic

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<sup>3</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> This is the assertion made at an early point in the chapter but it is modified later.

<sup>6</sup> On pages 47-50 the authors argue that the last cleavage is partly a result of the Russian Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Unfortunately, this is not acknowledged earlier on.

<sup>7</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 15.

cleavage<sup>9</sup>. Many authors also include some reference to 'new cleavages' such as the 'the new politics cleavage', 'the green cleavage' or 'the post-materialist cleavage'<sup>10</sup>.

It is not necessary to restrict applications of the cleavage model to conflicts based on social structure. It is quite likely that those who insist on this limitation do so because the relevant variables for analysing such cleavages are more readily available from data sets than variables of a more ideological or value-based character. Lipset and Rokkan point out that "a concrete conflict is rarely exclusively territorial or exclusively functional but will feed on strains in both directions"<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, cleavages do not have to be exclusively structural or exclusively ideological<sup>12</sup>.

Lipset and Rokkan stressed that cleavage constellations will vary between different polities<sup>13</sup>. Furthermore, they also emphasised that the cleavage hierarchy would vary over time. Hence, their model does not posit that certain cleavages will be dominant everywhere all the time. It is a framework-model rather than a 'universal truth' model:

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<sup>9</sup> Examples include Smith (1989, chapter 2); Dalton (1988, chapter 8); Meny (1990, chapter 1); Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1992, chapter 4) and Ware (1996, chapter 6).

<sup>10</sup> See for example; Dalton (1988), Knutsen (1990), and Jahn (1993). These are discussed in more detail below.

<sup>11</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> An example of this view of cleavages can be found in Rae and Taylor (1970). This kind of simplification is unrealistic. It assumes that a conflict of interest can actually be exclusively based in ideology or in social structure.

<sup>13</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 14.

“We are less concerned with the specifics of the degrees of fit in each national case than with the overall structure of the model. There is clearly nothing final about any such scheme; it simply sets a series of themes for detailed comparisons and suggests ways of organising the results within a manageable conceptual framework. The model is a tool and its utility can be tested only through continuous development: through the addition of further variables to account for observed differences as well as through refinements in the definition and grading of the variables already included.”<sup>14</sup>

### **2.3. Specifying the political cleavage model.**

“Concepts are neither right nor wrong but are more or less useful; their utility is determined by the twin and mutually dependent requirements of empirical precision and theoretical importance. ‘Empirical precision’ has to do with a concept’s ability to ‘carve up’ the world of phenomena without unnecessary ambiguities; ‘theoretical importance’ has to do with the utility of a concept in the development of statements of wide explanatory and predictive power. “<sup>15</sup>

The negative side of the flexible nature of the Lipset-Rokkan model is that they did not explicitly define what they meant by ‘cleavage’. It is arguably one of the most imprecise and ambiguous concepts in the study of politics<sup>16</sup>. There is a variety of terminology that is used to describe the cleavage concept, sometimes as synonyms. For example: conflict, line of division, dimension, contrast, difference, and opposition. At the extreme, one could argue that any difference in attitude on any issue between groups of people is a cleavage.

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<sup>14</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> Zuckerman, 1975, p. 231, writing about cleavages.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Zuckerman (1975), Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Aardal (1994b).

If the cleavage model is to be utilised for analysis of more recent developments, then it is necessary to focus more clearly on the political aspect of cleavages. Thus, it will be argued that a political cleavage is a conflict of interest that has a substantial effect on the party system.

It is important here to emphasize that cleavage patterns and hierarchies will change over time<sup>17</sup>. Cleavage 1 may be dominant at time A, at time B it may be over-shadowed by Cleavage 2. The correlation between a party and some variable may well reflect an old conflict of interest that has become much less relevant for the political system.

Also, over time different aspects of a cleavage may become more important whilst others become less so. Eventually, such a development may change the character of the cleavage into something very different from its previous incarnation.

One example of such a development is the Church-State cleavage described by Lipset and Rokkan. This cleavage itself is no longer manifest in most countries, but could be argued to have several reincarnations. In the case of the Nordic countries, a moral-religious cleavage has developed.

Similarly, it may no longer be appropriate to talk about a 'class-cleavage' that is based mainly in social structure<sup>18</sup>. Policy differences along a left-right ideological dimension were always part of this cleavage, but have become increasingly more relevant over

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<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Aardal (1994b, pp. 231-32).

<sup>18</sup> In the Lipset-Rokkan model the worker vs. employer cleavage is similar to the class cleavage.

time, especially in terms of operationalisation. So much so, in fact, that it is now more appropriate to talk about a left-right ideology cleavage rather than a class cleavage.

### 2.3.1 The continued relevance of the Cleavage Model.

Over the last thirty years, two lines of argument in particular have led to assertions that political cleavages are of declining relevance for the analysis of electoral behaviour and party systems. Firstly, based on electoral upheavals in the 1970's, assertions have been made about increased electoral volatility and an 'unfreezing' of the Western European party systems<sup>19</sup>. Whether volatility actually is increasing is questionable<sup>20</sup>. However, even if increased volatility is taking place, this does not necessarily mean declining relevance for the cleavage model.

It is a simplistic account of cleavages, limiting the concept to social structures, which enables the dismissal of the cleavage model. Similarly, segmentation of the cleavage concept into structural, ideological and attitudinal cleavages enables other writers to argue that 'social structure cleavages' are in decline and that new, mainly ideology based, cleavages are on the rise.

Social structures will change over time. If cleavages are defined based entirely on such structures, then the character or importance of the cleavage will change if the structure changes. But if the concept is broadened to include elements of social structure, ideology and values, then it is clear that not only do cleavage hierarchies change over

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<sup>19</sup> For examples of such assertions, see Pedersen (1979), Maguire (1983), and Wolinetz (1979).

time, but so does the nature of the cleavages themselves. The validity of a framework-model such as the cleavage model depends largely on the continued usefulness of its application to the current situation, not the continued importance of time- and situation-specific applications of the model.

Careful consideration should be given to how many dimensions of cleavage to include in analysis of party systems. The number of dimensions must be limited for analytical purposes. A model that is to create an analytical simplification and be useful empirically must be based on a small number of cleavages. One implication of this is a need to be conservative in the search for 'new' cleavages, unless they are substitutes or variations on 'old' ones. This is discussed below. First, however, it is necessary to develop a coherent model of what constitutes a political cleavage.

### 2.3.2. Towards a definition of political cleavage.

The main area of conceptual disagreement in the literature that incorporates the cleavage concept is with regard to the position of social structure in the cleavage model.

Zuckerman<sup>21</sup> adroitly summarises the different positions on this disagreement:

- (a) Social divisions are a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of political cleavages;
- (b) Social divisions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of political cleavages;

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<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Mair (1993).

<sup>21</sup> 1975, p. 237.

(c) Social divisions are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of political cleavages.

As noted above, Lipset and Rokkan were rather vague on the definitional aspects of cleavage. However, their model did not dictate a social structure element as a necessity for cleavage formation. Zuckerman<sup>22</sup> more explicitly argues that there is not necessarily a link between socio-economic structure and cleavages. Daalder<sup>23</sup> identifies nationality and regime change as two of five historically important cleavage types in Europe. And Dogan argues that political cleavage differs from political division in its persistence over time and extensive nature of membership as measured by electoral behaviour. In the case of France, Dogan's cleavages derive from particular crucial events in French history<sup>24</sup>.

In contrast, Bartolini and Mair argue that a cleavage must have a social structure element. They describe this as “an *empirical* element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms”<sup>25</sup>. This implies that the main reason for including a social structure element is its usefulness for operationalising the cleavage.

Some authors try to get around the question of social structure by dividing the cleavage concept into different categories or classes. Rae and Taylor make an unrefined attempt at this. They divide the concept into three ‘classes’. The social structure class they label

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<sup>22</sup> 1975.

<sup>23</sup> 1966.

<sup>24</sup> Dogan, 1967, especially pp. 182-184.

‘traits’. This includes class (confusingly) and language. The other two classes are ‘opinions’, such as ideology and preference; and ‘behaviour’, such as voting and membership in organisations<sup>26</sup>.

Allardt and Pesonen’s distinction between ‘structural’ and ‘non-structural’ cleavages is somewhat more elegant<sup>27</sup>. The ‘structural’ definition is restricted to social groups, but also implies organisational and cultural attributes (‘cohesion’ and ‘solidarity’). Similarly, Valen introduces the description ‘ideological cleavage’ to separate cleavages that can be traced to socio-economic differences from those where this connection is more unclear<sup>28</sup>.

The position put forward in this chapter is that it may be useful to stress the relative importance of different aspects of a cleavage, but that rigid segmentation or required elements reduces the flexibility of the model more than is necessary.

The social structure and segmentation approaches are also in danger of neglecting the fact that it is necessary to account for changes in the cleavage structure over time. For example, Valen argues that the structural cleavages identify the long-term changes of society, the ideological cleavages the short-term and situational changes<sup>29</sup>. Aardal argues that this creates a problem, since one of the main reasons for establishing cleavages as a tool for political science analysis is that these can be used as devices for understanding

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<sup>25</sup> Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 215. Dahrendorf (1965, p. 165) and Eckstein (1966, p. 34) also take this view.

<sup>26</sup> Rae and Taylor, 1970, p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> Allardt and Pesonen in Lipset and Rokkan, 1967.

<sup>28</sup> Valen, 1981.

<sup>29</sup> Valen, 1981.



political preferences and actions over time, i.e. lasting conflicts. This is one important aspect in which cleavages are separated from issues<sup>30</sup>.

That cleavage structures change over time is a sometimes neglected aspect of the cleavage model. It is, however, crucial for its continued validity. Much of the criticism of the model seems to be based on focusing on the cleavages mentioned by Lipset and Rokkan, or, more often, on the pivotal position of the class cleavage and its (supposed) decline. It is also based on a view of cleavages as, partly or completely, tied to social structures. Once different elements of cleavages constituting dominant aspects of a cleavage at different times and changes to the cleavage hierarchy over time are accounted for, then the continued relevance of the cleavage model becomes clear.

The following, then, is a general model for identifying political cleavages. It aims to separate cleavages from politically less important conflicts. At the same time it also incorporates the reservations outlined above regarding social structure and efforts of segmenting the cleavage model. The model consists of three closely linked aspects.

Firstly, a cleavage must be centred on an important and observable conflict of interest between substantial groups of people. For example: between centre and periphery; left- and right-wing ideology; primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors of the economy; religiosity and secularity; environmentalism and the maximisation of economic growth.

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<sup>30</sup> Aardal, 1994b, pp. 229-30.

Secondly, there must be awareness of the relevance of the conflict by significant elements of at least one side of the conflict. Unless a large number of people perceive the particular conflict of interest as important, then the conflict is unlikely to become a cleavage. There must be some feeling of common interest and identity, some involvement of the mass public, to turn a 'private' division into a political alignment<sup>31</sup>.

There is a further aspect to this. Changes in society are producing an increasing number of more diffuse communities, and sometimes there is a lack of identifiable 'enemies'. Hence, many conflicts may never become obvious and/or intense enough to provide the basis for a cleavage.

Some expression in non-party organisational terms also makes it more likely that a conflict becomes a cleavage. Examples include trade unions, religious institutions and environmental organisations. Such organisations can focus attention on the conflict and form the basis for its political expression.

Thirdly, before a conflict can be argued to have developed into a political cleavage, there must be some translation of it into the political system. What is crucial is that the political system is substantially affected by the cleavage. The most obvious manifestation of this is occurs when a party (or parties) specifically support(s) the interests of one side or aspect of a conflict, and that those who identify with that side or aspect of the conflict vote in disproportionate numbers for that party (or parties). Other potential manifestations of a political cleavage include the emergence of new parties,

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<sup>31</sup> Mair, 1997, p. 951. See also Schattschneider's (1960, p. 39) notion of "politics as the

substantial changes in the relative levels of party support, and/or changes in co-operation or coalition patterns, related to changes in the relative saliency of political dimensions.

### 2.3.3 The search for new cleavages.

Ever since the cleavage model became widely known, there has been a search for ‘new’ cleavages<sup>32</sup>. In addition, work that does not take its inspiration from this model quite often incorporates the term.

By ‘new’ it is not necessarily meant that the conflicts these proposed cleavages are based on are new. The term simply refers to cleavages that differ substantially from those proposed in Lipset and Rokkan’s model<sup>33</sup>. Below follows an evaluation of the relevance of some of these ‘new cleavages’.

Foreign policy is sometimes proposed as a cleavage. For example, Allardt and Pesonen argue that foreign policy is a cleavage in Finland, based on Finland’s relationship with Sweden and Russia<sup>34</sup>. Valen also sometimes presents foreign policy as an independent cleavage<sup>35</sup>. But unless foreign policy issues are related to ideology or national self-determination, then a cleavage is unlikely to develop.

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socialisation of conflict”.

<sup>32</sup> For instance, Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992), Dunleavy (1979, 1980), Inglehart (1990) Dalton (1988, 1991) and Flanagan (1982).

<sup>33</sup> Although many ‘new’ cleavages are very similar to those proposed by Lipset and Rokkan.

<sup>34</sup> Allardt and Pesonen, 1967, p. 325.

<sup>35</sup> Converse and Valen, 1971.

It should also be borne in mind that important foreign policy questions have a tendency to produce consensus in the political system. Therefore, a new party may be needed to turn the conflict into a cleavage, as no outlet may be available in the existing party system.

It has been argued that employment in and/or dependence upon the public sector vs. the private sector has become a cleavage<sup>36</sup>. This division has particular attraction because it incorporates a social structure element. However, it fails to satisfy the criteria of common identity as well as some representation at the political level. It is highly questionable whether the connection to the private or the public sector provides the basis for a common identity. Furthermore, there are few organisations that are based entirely on either sector.

At the political level, there is little evidence of parties actively promoting the interests of people dependent upon either the public or the private sector. The promotion of this 'new cleavage' is a good example of how simple correlation with party support is not enough to form the basis for a cleavage. Furthermore, as Aardal points out, it may be closely connected to other cleavages, in particular the left-right cleavage<sup>37</sup>. Hence, conflicts of interest based on public vs. private sector may reinforce other cleavages rather than form a new one.

It might also be tempting to analyse gender as a political cleavage. However, there are several problems with this. Firstly, interests are very fragmented within the two groups.

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<sup>36</sup> For example Dunleavy (1979 and 1980). See also Knutsen (1986) on Norway.

<sup>37</sup> Aardal, 1994b, p. 235.

One might argue that sexual equality in various areas is in the interest of all women, but connotations such as feminism and family considerations can make the interests of women as a group very fragmented. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that men would be any more united against equality than women would be for it<sup>38</sup>. Hence, gender will not be considered as a cleavage here.

Some authors argue that a 'green' cleavage is developing in Western Europe<sup>39</sup>. This is based partly on the rise of 'green' parties but also on the augmentation of environmentalist organisations and public concern over environmental issues. Both organisational strength and, connected to that strength, the development of a collective identity give credence to this claim. Furthermore, with its messages of anti-growth and protection of the environment at the cost of material wealth, the 'green movement' has a substantial element of an 'us-against-them' profile, which makes cleavage formation more likely. Finally, parties that specifically promote one side of this cleavage exist in many European countries. In Scandinavia specifically Green parties have been successful in Finland and Sweden, as have 'red-green' parties in Norway and Denmark. Arguably, the Finnish and Swedish far-left parties are also transforming into 'red-green' parties.

Among proposed new cleavages, the 'Materialist/Post-Materialist' (MPM) cleavage is the one that has probably received the most attention. The political science debate about

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<sup>38</sup> For example, in the 1994 Finnish presidential election, where there was one male and one female candidate in the second round, female solidarity did not make much of a difference. (Anckar, 1994, pp. 275-6)

<sup>39</sup> For example, Jahn, 1993. Unfortunately, much of the work on a green dimension in politics is tangled up with the 'post-materialist' debate. Thus, Dalton (1988), Knutsen (1988b,1990) discuss this dimension, but only as part of the post-materialist cleavage.

the MPM cleavage has its origins in Ronald Inglehart's 1977 book "The Silent Revolution". In this and later writings Inglehart attempts to distinguish two groups of people with different values and priorities: 'materialists' and 'post-materialists'<sup>40</sup>. Since then various other authors have written about the MPM dimension in politics<sup>41</sup>.

Inglehart argued that people's values are changing in Western Europe because of the increasing levels of prosperity since World War II, and because of the absence of war in the same period. These changes are also linked to higher educational levels, the increasing importance of mass communications, and alterations in the occupational structure. Inglehart employs Maslow's hierarchy of needs to hypothesise that from the above developments it is reasonable to expect differences in priorities between older and younger generations. Specifically, those of the older generation (those brought up before the World War II) can be expected to place higher value on economic and physical security than those belonging to the younger post-war generation. This is because a person's political values depend to a large extent on the macro-economic conditions that were prevalent during one's formative years.

The MPM cleavage is derived from asking people several questions on political issues, ideology and preferred social arrangements and developments. On the basis of aggregating the responses to these questions, it is argued that a MPM cleavage exists. Hence, it is constructed from positions on various issues.

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<sup>40</sup> Inglehart, 1977, Chapter 2

<sup>41</sup> For example, Dalton (1988), Knutsen (1988a, 1990).

One problem with this approach is that one could create an indeterminable number of 'cleavages' in this manner. Put together any batch of questions and some kind of pattern will develop, and this pattern would no doubt have some correlation with party choice. Employed in this manner, the cleavage concept is broadened to such an extent that it loses its meaning.

A second, more technical problem makes a comparison of these 'cleavages' with other 'older' cleavages rather problematic. How does one compare the importance of a cleavage based on an aggregation of variables to one based on one variable?

There are various other problems with the MPM cleavages. For example, they identify 'values' that do not necessarily exist among people. No one is asked if he is a post-materialist or a materialist, or neither. These 'values' are inferred from the aggregate responses of an individual, which are then again aggregated for the total population of the sample. (Knutsen<sup>42</sup> lists the questions most commonly employed in MPM-analysis.)

#### 2.3.4. New junctures, new cleavages?

"With 'the end of history', the final triumph of liberal capitalism as a form of society, it is the cleavage between nationalists and internationalists that is likely to become a crucial one in the industrial democracies."<sup>43</sup>

Despite the above criticisms, some elements of the MPM literature are useful in that they draw attention to important changes that have taken place in society over the last

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<sup>42</sup> 1988a, p. 350.

<sup>43</sup> Article by V. Bogdanor in the British newspaper Independent on Sunday, June 25, 1995.

thirty years. Knutsen divides cleavages into three categories, and labels the last type 'post-industrial'<sup>44</sup>. This is similar to Lipset and Rokkan's 'critical junctures', and an interesting notion. With fewer people dependent upon the industrial sector and with increasing wealth, it is not unreasonable to expect changes in values and in voting patterns. For example, a 'green' cleavage may be argued to be related to these developments.

With increasing internationalisation of trade, finance, media and other sectors; regional integration projects such as the EU; and the power wielded by organisations such as the WTO, the nation-state has become weaker. This can be viewed as a 'counter-national evolution'. One potential cleavage that emanates from this juncture is one centred on European integration. The extent to which such a cleavage exists is addressed in chapters four to eight.

For the individual voter, the attraction of taking a position on EU membership is that it is much more tangible compared to effects on his life emanating from international trade or international finance. The EU has specific policies, and membership has consequences that one can, to some extent at least, evaluate and decide to be for or against and let this be reflected in national elections, and in some cases also vote on in referendums. If the voters' country is an EU-member, he also has the opportunity to express his opinions on European integration in elections to the EP. In contrast, short of policies aimed at a completely free market or completely closed national borders, the

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<sup>44</sup> Knutsen, 1988a. He measures the post-industrial degree of a society by the percentage of the workforce employed in the service industries, and the size of GNP.



evaluation of how to use one's vote with regard to policies aimed at affecting the nature of international trade and finance is considerably more complicated.

Lipset and Rokkan, and most of the literature referring to their model, made each historical development correspond with one or two cleavages. The view taken here is that in some cases more than one 'critical juncture' was instrumental in leading to the cleavage. The resulting 'revised' scheme for the development of the cleavage model looks like this:

Table 2.1. Critical Junctures and Associated Cleavages.

| Development                                | Cleavages <sup>45</sup>  |
|--|--|
| National revolution                        | Centre vs. Periphery/Urban vs. rural<br>Church vs. State/Moral-religious |
| Industrial revolution                      | Land vs. Industry  |
| Industrial revolution/Russian revolution   | Worker vs. Employer/Owner, Left vs. Right                                |
| Russian revolution/Post-industrial society | Left-socialist/Communists vs. Moderate Socialists                        |
| Post-industrial society                    | Environmentalism/'Green' vs. Materialism                                 |
| Counter-national evolution                 | Pro-EU vs. Anti-EU   |

Some of the older cleavages, such as the centre-periphery cleavage, are still represented in the Nordic party systems. Others, such as the Church/State cleavage and the Worker/Employer cleavage have changed radically over time, as explained in examples above. The Land/Industry cleavage is of little importance today, but arguably the 'Green cleavage' contains elements of that older cleavage.

<sup>45</sup> In addition to these, foreign policy is a cleavage in some polities. However, the critical juncture that led to the cleavage varies widely. Therefore, this cleavage is not included in the table.

The first four (and partly the fifth) of the above cleavages are covered in Lipset and Rokkan as well as in many text-books and other literature referred to above. The last three, however, require further explanation. Figure 2.1 below summarises how these 'newer cleavages' are represented in the party systems of the Nordic countries, as well as some of the most important of the issues they are often associated with.

Figure 2.1. 'Newer Cleavages', Party System Divisions and Related Issues.

| Cleavage  | Party System Division   | Issues  |
|---|---|---|
| Left-Socialist/Communists vs. Moderate Socialists | Communists and left socialist parties vs. social democratic and other moderate socialist parties.   | Communism or democratic socialism, the degree of state control and ownership, NATO-membership.  |
| Environmentalism vs. Materialism                  | Greens and Left Socialists vs. most other parties in Finland and Sweden, left socialists and liberals (Norway) vs. most other parties in Denmark and Norway.  | Protection of the environment, less or more economic growth, pollution, nuclear power.  |
| Pro-EU vs. anti-EU                                | Anti-EU factions or parties vs. a majority of parties. Usually most opposition is from the far right and/or the far left, from some Christian parties, and large sections of farmers parties in Finland, Norway and Sweden. | European integration <i>per se</i> , the EU is too capitalist or too socialist, foreign interference, immigration, too much bureaucracy and too many regulations. |

Figure 2.1 illustrates how these cleavages are related to developments in the party systems in Western Europe. Some newer parties have emerged not because of the manifestation of a cleavage, but by representing aspects of cleavages already present in the party system. Examples of this include the Progress Parties of Denmark and Norway, and New Democracy in Sweden. These parties are mainly against big government and promote lower taxation. Thus they represent an aspect of the left-right cleavage. The

Communist/Democratic Socialist cleavage has faded significantly since the collapse of the SU.

If a conflict of interest is to develop into a political cleavage, then it must have an effect on the party system. For this to happen, the conflict must crosscut already existing cleavages, and in such a manner that it cannot be accommodated by the existing party system. The most obvious way that this will manifest itself is through new parties entering the system. However, other developments also signify that a political cleavage exists. Firstly, a cleavage might exist if the conflict leads to large swings in party support. (This can of course happen for reasons very different from the emergence or re-emergence of a cleavage.) Secondly, previous coalition patterns may become untenable or new ones develop as the result of the emergence or re-emergence of a conflict of interest.

However, party tactics can moderate the effect of a potentially crosscutting dimension such as European integration. The most obvious manner of achieving this is for most, or at least the mainstream parties, to take up the same (or very similar) position (a 'common front') on European integration generally and EU-membership specifically. However, this could be risky since voters might decide to vote for parties that do not part-take in the common front, or a new party might utilise the gap in representation. Hence, in combination with, and/or as a partial alternative to the common front tactic, the members of the common front might find it advantageous to off-load the potentially crosscutting conflict away from the national election arena. These tactics are discussed in depth in Chapter 3, and their usefulness evaluated in chapters four to eight.

## **2.4. Cleavages and The Nordic Party System<sup>46</sup>.**

In the 1920s the basic five-party Scandinavian model was completed after the turmoil of parliamentary and electoral reform and rapid economic transformation of previous decades. This model remained fundamentally unaltered until the 1960s: Radical Left - Social Democrat - Liberal - Agrarian - Conservative. Until then, the model fit Sweden best, with no other party gaining more than two percent of the vote. And in the 1970s, the model continued to function in Sweden. In Denmark the share of the five main parties increased from 96.6 percent in 1932 to 97.3 percent in 1968 - although the radical left at that time consisted of three different parties. There were only two minor alterations to the model in the period until the 1960s: in Norway the NKRF from 1945 nation-wide, in Finland the SFF<sup>47</sup>. However, as shown below, all four party-systems have changed radically since the 1960's, starting with the fragmentation and revival of the far left in Norway and Denmark in the early 1960's.

### **2.4.1. The left-right cleavage.**

The class-cleavage has long been viewed by many as the dominant cleavage in Scandinavia. In 1978, Berglund and Lindström<sup>48</sup> wrote that "class is still the single most important determinant of voting behaviour in Scandinavia". And as late as 1988, Elder,

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<sup>46</sup> With a few exceptions, and for reasons of interest as well as space, only parties that have been represented in the respective national parliaments since 1970 are included here. References to 'elections' are, throughout the thesis unless otherwise noted, to national parliamentary elections.

<sup>47</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 29-30. For detailed accounts of the development of the Nordic party systems, see Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988), Castles (1978), and Berglund and Lindström (1978).

<sup>48</sup> 1978, p. 16.

Thomas and Arter<sup>49</sup> argued that "class [...] is the chief determinant of how people cast their ballots in the region."

Building a model with several independent social variables, Worre found that occupation remained the most important variable in the early 1970's, accounting for between eleven percent and 20 percent of total party variance. Occupation accounted for 76 percent of the R-squared of the total model in Denmark, 70 percent in Finland, 66 percent in Norway, and 56 percent in Sweden<sup>50</sup>.

Thus, class was long a very important element in the analysis of voting behaviour, especially with regard to the social democratic and other left-wing parties. Until the mid-1960s, close to 3/4 of blue-collar workers tended to vote for parties of the left<sup>51</sup>. Class interests were very important for the formation of certain parties, and for a long time class was considered the dominant cleavage. However, most parties no longer appeal directly to a particular class<sup>52</sup>, and class seems to be much less correlated with voting patterns than before<sup>53</sup>. (See Table 2.2 below.)

In keeping with the discussion above and for the analysis of the current party systems, the left-right cleavage is a much more relevant analytical device. This does not exclude

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<sup>49</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 16-17. See also Castles (1978, chapter three).

<sup>50</sup> Worre, 1980, pp. 300-301. This article also gives a detailed account for the basis of what Worre calls the three 'class parties': the Social Democratic, Conservative, and Agrarian/Centre parties.

<sup>51</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 19.

<sup>52</sup> Although the Centre Parties still owe a large part of their support to farmers.

<sup>53</sup> Measured in terms of occupation, rather than by any 'subjective' notion of class. The latter, when correlated to left voting, becomes a substitute for left-right position. See for example Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992). See also Borre (1987, pp. 349-50) on Denmark.

class or other social structure elements. It is, however, operationalised along a left-right ideological scale, rather than in terms of social structure. This cleavage is now considered dominant in most western European countries, and party-systems are usually operationalised along a left-right continuum based on this cleavage<sup>54</sup>.

Table 2.2. Relative effects of socio-demographic and attitudinal core variables in predicting socialist vote. The effect of the variable 'manual occupation' ('working class occupation' in Denmark).

| <b>Denmark</b> | <b>1971</b> |         |             | <b>1987</b> |         |         |
|----------------|-------------|---------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------|
|                | SDG         | SDG     | OA          | SDG         | SDG     | OA      |
|                | Model 1     | Model 2 | Model 3     | Model 4     | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|                | 0.44        | 0.43    | 0.41        | 0.24        | 0.20    | 0.21    |
| <b>Norway</b>  | <b>1969</b> |         | <b>1977</b> | <b>1985</b> |         |         |
|                | SDG         | OA      | SDG         | OA          | SDG     | OA      |
|                | Model 1     | Model 2 | Model 1     | Model 2     | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|                | 0.26        | 0.14    | 0.24        | 0.14        | 0.14    | 0.08    |
| <b>Sweden</b>  | <b>1964</b> |         | <b>1976</b> | <b>1985</b> |         |         |
|                | SDG         | OA      | SDG         | OA          | SDG     | OA      |
|                | 0.37        | 0.30    | 0.24        | 0.15        | 0.19    | 0.11    |

SDG = Socio-demographic, OA = Overall, which includes attitudinal variables. In the Danish case the same data was not available for both years and hence the models are not exactly the same. Sources: Borre (p. 154), Valen (p. 313), and Oskarson (p. 348) chapters in Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992). There is no directly comparable data on Finland, but Sankiahö (1995, Chapter 4) shows that the trend is for less class-voting in Finland also.

The common interest element of this cleavage is based on the involvement of the state in society in general and the economy in particular. That is, state ownership, involvement through regulations, and redistribution. The particular operationalisation used in this thesis is from Laver and Hunt<sup>55</sup>, with scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership vs. cutting tax/anti-public ownership. For details see chapters four to seven.

<sup>54</sup> In some writings this is explicit, in others implicit. See for example Downs (1957), Sartori (1976) and Ware (1996).

A similar operationalisation is used by Knutsen<sup>56</sup>, who includes three items in the measurement of his 'left-right materialism' dimension. These are all deemed to be associated with the left: the expansion of public ownership of industry, increased efforts to reduce income inequality, and a greater role for government in the management of the economy. He also amalgamates this ideological dimension with an industrial cleavage, hence combining ideological and structural elements. Harmel and Janda<sup>57</sup> use four leftist vs. rightist party positions: (i) governmental vs. private ownership of the means of production; (ii) a strong vs. a weak governmental role in economic planning; (iii) support vs. opposition to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor; and (iv) the expansion of vs. resistance to governmental social welfare programs.

The left-right cleavage is the dominant cleavage in all four countries. All the parties can be meaningfully placed relatively to each other on a left-right axis, and for some it is the only cleavage they can be usefully placed on. This cleavage has also traditionally defined potential coalition partners as well as a left-leaning 'bloc' and a right-leaning 'bloc'<sup>58</sup>. The relative placing of the relevant political parties on this cleavage can be found in chapters four to seven.

Denmark has had a multi-party system since the beginning of this century when the Social Democratic Party (DSD) began its challenge against the Conservative Party (KF) and the Liberal Party (DV). In 1905 the DV split into Radical (RV) and Agrarian Liberals (DV). Two blocs formed, with the DSD and the RV on the left, and the KF and

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<sup>55</sup> 1992.

<sup>56</sup> 1988a, p. 350.

<sup>57</sup> 1982, chapter 3.

the DV on the right. The DSD's share of the vote grew, and by World War II the norm had become DSD government with RV support<sup>59</sup>.

The Danish Communist Party (DKP)<sup>60</sup> was significant immediately after World War II, but declined thereafter. However, the SF has formed a more powerful left-wing threat since 1960. Some smaller parties, mainly on the left<sup>61</sup>, have also been represented in the Danish parliament. On the right, the Progress Party (DFRP) formed in 1972. All these 'newer' parties are based mainly on the left-right cleavage (as are the DSD and the KF), with the SF supporting a large role for the state and substantial redistribution. The DFRP is at the opposite side of the spectrum; it has traditionally particularly focused on tax-cuts. Berglund and Lindström argue that the DFRP is best described as an extreme anti-tax party, with elements of early laissez-faire Liberalism<sup>62</sup>.

A new far-right party, the Danish People's Party (DFP) was formed in October 1995 by four DFRP members of the Danish parliament (the 'Folketing'), with Pia Kjaersgaard as its leader<sup>63</sup>. This party appears to have taken over most of the voters who supported the DFRP. It is more populist than the DFRP, and focuses more strongly on halting

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<sup>58</sup> See Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 103-107) regarding theories of the connection between policy-dimensions and coalition-formation.

<sup>59</sup> Borre, 1992, pp. 145-147.

<sup>60</sup> The DKP was founded as the Left Socialist Party of Denmark in November 1919. It contested its last elections as an independent party in 1988. Since then it has fielded candidates as part of the Unity List (EH).

<sup>61</sup> The Justice Party (RF) formed 1924, centre-right, participated in its last election in 1990. The Left Socialist Party (VS), formed 1967 from a split in the SF over devaluation (Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 83), contested its last elections as an independent party in 1988, since then it has fielded candidates as part of the EH. The EH started out as a far-left electoral alliance consisting of the VS, the DKP and some smaller groups, and became a fully-fledged political party in 1994. Common Course (FK) on the far-left fought its last election in 1990.

<sup>62</sup> Berglund and Lindström, 1978, pp. 176-77.



immigration and repatriation of refugees. At the March 1998 Folketing elections the DF received 7.4 percent of the vote, the DFRP 2.4 percent<sup>64</sup>.

In 1973 the Centre Democrats (CD) broke away from the DSD, originally in opposition to perceived excessive taxation of homeowners<sup>65</sup>. The party has since established itself in the centre of Danish politics. Berglund and Lindström describe the CD as mainly an issue party, concentrating on issues like left-wing bias in public television and radio, property tax, and car excise<sup>66</sup>. Since 1970 there has also existed a small Christian People's Party (DKRF), which is slightly to the right of centre.

The Danish party system can be divided into centre-left and centre-right 'blocs', with the left consisting of the DSD and various smaller parties to its left, the centre-right of the CD, the DKRF, the DV, the KF and the DFRP/DFP. The RV inhabits the central position in the party system. This division is largely reflected in government formation, with only two exceptions since 1972<sup>67</sup>.

The Finnish Social Democratic Party (FSD) has not achieved the same strength as in the other three countries. The party faces unusually strong competition from the left, until 1990 from an alliance called the Finnish People's Democratic League (FPDL). The FPDL's main element was the Communist Party. After a brief split in the late 1980's,

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<sup>63</sup> Bille, 1996, p 319.

<sup>64</sup> The Danish newspaper Politiken, 12/3/98, <http://www.politiken.dk/valg/98lands.htm>.

<sup>65</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, p. 83.

<sup>66</sup> Berglund and Lindström, 1978, pp. 176-77.

<sup>67</sup> In 1978 the DSD formed a government with the DV, in 1993 with the DKRF and the CD, as well as the RV. (Petersson, 1994, p. 100) For details of the parties in government in this period, see Table 4.4.

this party re-emerged as the Left Alliance (VF)<sup>68</sup>. The Green Party (GF) is located on the centre-left.

In the Finnish centre, the Centre Party (CF)<sup>69</sup> and the Rural Party (FLP)<sup>70</sup> are relatively close, with the Christian League (FKF)<sup>71</sup> somewhat further to the right, and the SFF and the National Coalition party (NSP)<sup>72</sup> close to each other on the right. The Young Finns (UF) only registered as a party in December 1994<sup>73</sup>, and won two seats at the 1995 elections to the Finnish parliament (the 'Eduskunta'). This party is located close to the NSP and the SFF on the left-right scale<sup>74</sup>. Of these parties, the FPD/UF, the FSD, the NSP, and the UF can mainly be differentiated on the left-right cleavage.

The Finnish party system cannot usefully be described as bloc-based. The only bloc-feature evident in government formation since 1970 has been the exclusion of the NSP.

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<sup>68</sup> The two wings of the Communist Party separated in 1986, with the majority a member of the traditional radical-leftists umbrella-group FPD and the minority (hard-liners) forming the dominant part of the newly-created Democratic Alternative (DA). (Arter, 1987, p. 171) In April 1990 the SKDL and the DA formed the VF. The VF committed itself to "social and ecological management of the market economy" (Arter, 1991, p. 175). For the sake of simplicity the various incarnations of the far left in Finland is referred to simply as the 'VF' throughout this thesis, except for when other descriptions are necessary.

<sup>69</sup> Agrarian Union (AU) until 1965.

<sup>70</sup> Splinter group from the AU.

<sup>71</sup> Founded 1958.

<sup>72</sup> Small right wing splinter groups from the NSP and the SFF formed the Constitutional Peoples Party in 1974.

<sup>73</sup> Arter, 1995a, p. 201.

<sup>74</sup> This party is a strong advocate of neo-liberalism, emphasising individual freedom and rejecting the Scandinavian welfare model. (Sundberg, 1996a, p. 323)

This ended in 1987<sup>75</sup>. The CF has often preferred to co-operate with the left rather than the right<sup>76</sup>. However, the left-right cleavage remains central<sup>77</sup>.

The flow of votes remains dominated by neighbours to the left or right on this scale. There is, however, a flow of votes between the FSD and the NSP. This is because “the two parties represent the same urban and industrial pole on the centre/periphery dimension; and they have a long history of co-operation on the local and regional levels<sup>78</sup>”.

There have been several splits on the left of Norwegian politics. However, by 1960, only a few small parties remained to the left of the Labour Party (AP)<sup>79</sup>. But a new party, the Socialist People’s Party, (later the Socialist Left Party, SV) gained two seats at the 1961 election. This party remained represented in the Norwegian parliament in the 1990’s. Both the Danish SF and the SV were initially based on opposition to NATO membership, in particular the SV<sup>80</sup>. However, by the 1990’s these parties were mainly defined by their position on the far left of the left-right cleavage.

In the centre of Norwegian politics, the old ‘Venstre’ (NV) has split several times, with the mother party nearly disappearing in the process. However, on the left-right scale all

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<sup>75</sup> For details, see Table 5.4. Since 1987, Berglund (1995) describes coalitions as ‘red-blue’ and ‘rainbow’. This indicates the absence of government-formation by blocks in modern Finnish politics.

<sup>76</sup> Arter, 1987, p. 173.

<sup>77</sup> Berglund, 1991, p. 259.

<sup>78</sup> Berglund, 1991, endnote 7, p. 260.

<sup>79</sup> Mainly the Communist Party (NKP), which has not been represented in the Norwegian parliament (the ‘Storting’) since 1961. Another far left grouping, the Red Electoral Alliance (RVA) gained representation in the Storting for the first time in 1993, with one seat in Oslo. It lost that seat at the 1997 election.

these splinter groups remained close, and have often co-operated. The NV staged a revival in the 1990's after its two most current factions (the Liberal People's Party - DLF and the rump NV<sup>81</sup>) re-united in 1988. The other two centrist parties, the Centre Party (SP)<sup>82</sup> and the NKR<sup>83</sup>, both resulted from splits in the NV.

Traditionally, the main party on the right of Norwegian politics has been the Conservative Party (H). From the 1973 election onwards, a new party established itself to its right. Its original name was Anders Lange's Party for substantial reduction of taxes, duties and governmental intervention. It changed its name to the Progress Party (NFRP) in 1977. At the 1997 national election the NFRP vote surpassed that of the H.

All but one of the Norwegian governments since 1971 have either been AP single party governments, or centre-right coalition governments<sup>84</sup>. The SV, the RVA and the NFRP have never been in government.

The Swedish five-party system developed early this century and remained intact until 1988. In this period the party system consisted of the Conservative Party (MP) on the right<sup>85</sup>, the Liberal Party (FP)<sup>86</sup> and the Agrarian Party (Centre Party, CP from 1958) on the centre-right, the Social Democrats (SSD) on the centre-left and the Left Party

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<sup>80</sup> Castles, 1978, pp. 37-38.

<sup>81</sup> The NV split in 1972 over membership in the EC, the DLF being the pro-membership faction.

<sup>82</sup> Contested elections from 1915 as the Agrarian League, from 1921 as the Farmers Party, and from 1957 as the SP.

<sup>83</sup> Formed in 1933, for details see below.

<sup>84</sup> For details, see Table 6.4.

<sup>85</sup> The Right Party until 1969.

<sup>86</sup> It has contested elections under that name since 1934, when two factions reunited. They had split over prohibition in 1923.

(VP(K)) (then a communist party) resulting from splits in the SSD in 1917 and 1921, on the far left<sup>87</sup>.

The Christian Democratic party (KD)<sup>88</sup> was formed in 1964. It changed from a confessional party into a broader non-socialist party in the 1980s, emphasising moral and ethical values as well as a willingness to join a non-socialist government. On the left-right scale, the KD belongs slightly to the right of centre. The Green Party (GP) was formed in 1981, in the aftermath of the nuclear power referendum of March 1980. It belongs on the centre-left. In 1988 it became the first new party in the Swedish parliament (the 'Riksdag') for more than 70 years<sup>89</sup>. On the right, New Democracy (ND) emerged in 1990, and gained parliamentary representation at the 1991 election. However, it was reduced to 1.2 percent of the votes and no seats at the 1994 election.

In the period 1932-1976 the SSD was in government, but very seldom in a majority alone. It governed in coalition with the Agrarian Party in the periods 1936-9 and 1951-7, and at other times relied on support from other parties<sup>90</sup>. Centre-right parties were in government in the periods 1976-1982 and 1991-1994<sup>91</sup>.

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<sup>87</sup> Oskarson, 1992, pp. 339-341.

<sup>88</sup> The party changed its name from the Christian Democratic Assembly to the Christian Democratic Community Party ('Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet') in 1987, and to the Christian Democratic Party ('Kristdemokraterna') at the party congress of June 1996. (Information received from the KD's international secretary, Göran Holmström.)

<sup>89</sup> For a detailed account of the GP's history, policies and electoral breakthrough in 1988, see Bennulf and Holmberg (1990). Jahn (1992) compares the Swedish Greens to their German counterpart.

<sup>90</sup> Oskarson, 1992, p. 341.

<sup>91</sup> For details, see Table 7.4.

#### 2.4.2. The territorial cleavages.

"The main line of cleavage in the Scandinavian social structures, before the appearance of an appreciable industrial sector in the late nineteenth century, was between the economic and cultural interests of the rural independent peasantry and the urban aristocratic bureaucracy."<sup>92</sup>

Based solely on the left-right cleavage, the fractured party systems of the Nordic countries would be difficult to explain<sup>93</sup>. The secondary political cleavage(s) in all four countries tends to be territorial<sup>94</sup>.

The diversity on the non-socialist side is, at least partially, a "reflection of the interest cleavages in the pre-industrial social structure"<sup>95</sup>. Two aspects of 19th century Scandinavian social structures are particularly relevant in explaining the weak and accommodating Right. Firstly, the unusually strong position of the independent peasantry led to distinctive interest cleavages at the time of increased political mobilisation<sup>96</sup>. Secondly, late and rapid industrialisation led to peasants occupying an established position without having time to assume a conservative stance at the time of the arrival of industrialisation and the new social forces<sup>97</sup>.

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<sup>92</sup> Castles, 1978, p. 138.

<sup>93</sup> The existence of centre-left, far-left, centre-right and far-right parties can be understood based on this cleavage; but it is difficult to explain the centrist parties based solely on this cleavage, and in particular the fragmentation in the centre. Jahn and Storsved (1995a, pp. 22-23; 1995b, p. 242) argue that in Scandinavia, and in particular in Norway, the urban/rural cleavage does much to account for the nature of the Scandinavian multi-party system.

<sup>94</sup> See, for example, Berglund and Lindström (1978, especially pp. 17-20 and chapter 4).

<sup>95</sup> Castles, 1978, p. 134.

<sup>96</sup> This is explained in detail in Castles (1978, pp. 135-138). See also Smith (1989, pp. 31-32).

<sup>97</sup> Castles, 1978, p. 134.

The interests of urban and rural areas remain different. In particular, the conflict between producers and consumers of agricultural products remains, although the proportion of farmers in the population has declined dramatically<sup>98</sup>. By 1993, the percentage of the civilian population employed in agriculture had dropped to five percent in Denmark, nine percent in Finland, six percent in Norway, and four percent in Sweden. The average for the EU-12 at this time was six percent<sup>99</sup>.

In the case of Norway, fishing is also of great importance in many rural areas, and in Finland and Sweden forestry is a substantial industry in rural areas. Also, extending and modernising infrastructure to sparsely populated areas versus improving urban infrastructure pits rural and urban interests against each other.

In addition, as Worre argues, “agriculture provides, in many ways, very favourable conditions for class party formation. Farmers have a broad community of interests in their trade, income, and residence: they constitute a rural subculture more influenced by tradition and religion than the urban one. [...] Farmers have an extensive organisational apparatus, where the overlapping membership between the farmers’ associations, co-operative societies, and the branches of the Agrarian parties is considerable, and the social pressure to follow the dominant political norms is strong.”<sup>100</sup>

The lifestyles of urban and rural populations are often quite different. In particular, the rural population is often culturally more conservative. The most obvious manifestation

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<sup>98</sup> See for example Smith (1989, pp. 28, 32).

<sup>99</sup> Eurostat, 1995b, p. 147.

of this is to be found in the three 'counter-cultures' of Norway, a well-established theme in Norwegian historical sociology<sup>101</sup>. These are centred on a preference for the 'second' Norwegian language, neo-Norwegian ('nynorsk'); abstinence and teetotaler movements; and membership in confessional 'free-churches'. Rokkan argues that the urban-rural divide was deeper in Norway than elsewhere in Scandinavia because centuries of foreign domination was channelled through the cities and a continuous link between rural and urban elite was missing<sup>102</sup>.

There is often a centre-periphery aspect to the territorial conflicts, pitting the interests of the periphery against those of the centre. These are largely based on the same factors as the urban-rural conflict. However, the centre-periphery conflict also includes an additional element, one of a cultural-political nature. The political power disproportionately resides in the centre, and this creates a political conflict between the low-powered periphery and the high-powered centre. This has a cultural element because the centre may make decisions that are less in accordance with the culture of the rural areas than with that of the centre. Examples include issues connected to religion, imposing urban standards as well as extensive rules and regulations on rural and peripheral areas, and accusations of generally neglecting the interests of the periphery and rural areas.

Territorial conflicts include all the elements of the cleavage definition set out above. Firstly, there are obvious and observable conflicts of interests present, based both on

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<sup>100</sup> Worre, 1980, pp. 308-09.

<sup>101</sup> Årebrott, 1982, p 82. For the importance of the counter-cultures in Norwegian politics, see for example Valen and Martinussen (1972), Valen and Aardal (1983), Valen, Aardal, and Vogt (1990), Valen (1992) and Udgaard and Nilsson (1993).



social structure and on cultural values. Secondly, these conflicts are amenable to an awareness of their relevance, and to a feeling of common identity. The dichotomy and the many differences between centre and periphery, urban and rural, north and south, makes it relatively easy to identify 'the enemy'. Finally, these conflicts are translated into the political system. Details about the current status of these cleavages are set out in chapters four to seven<sup>103</sup>.

In Finland, Norway and Sweden, Agrarian parties formed early in this century. These were based on promoting the interests of the food-producers against the interests of the rest of society, in particular the urban population. The Centre parties and the Liberals in Denmark were - and to some extent still are - class parties as much as the Social Democratic parties, they represent a particular group. "The farmers' interests are similar to those of primary producers the world over: higher agricultural prices and cheaper industrial products. As such, farmers' interests are opposed to those of both capitalists and the industrial working class."<sup>104</sup>

The Conservative parties in the region tend to be substantially stronger in urban than in rural areas<sup>105</sup>. The support patterns for the rump Liberal parties tends to vary from country to country and over time. Generally, the Swedish party tends to be more urban, and the Norwegian party more rural. The Finnish party has virtually disappeared. However, one might argue that it has to some extent been replaced by the more

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<sup>102</sup> Rokkan and Valen (1964 pp. 162-238) and Rokkan (1966, pp. 70-115).

<sup>103</sup> For a detailed account of the traditional regional strongholds of the various parties, see Berglund and Lindström, 1978, chapter 4. A good detailed analysis of the historical as well as 1990's strongholds of the Finnish parties can be found in Arter (1987, pp. 197-202).

<sup>104</sup> Castles, 1978, p. 113.

libertarian UF<sup>106</sup>, and that the SFF represents traditional liberalism as well as the Swedish-speaking community.

In the Danish case, the Liberal party did split into two parts, but the rump party retained the support of most of the farmers. The KF remains weak in the rural areas, and is often outvoted by the DV overall, especially of late. The DV has the support of the highest proportion of farmers in Scandinavia, and has traditionally been unsuccessful in the cities<sup>107</sup>.

#### 2.4.3. The moral-religious cleavage.

The Nordic countries are all among the more religiously homogenous countries in Europe insofar as most of their inhabitants are, nominally at least, Lutheran Protestants<sup>108</sup>. Measuring religious heterogeneity, Bartolini and Mair characterised all four countries as among the most homogenous<sup>109</sup>. However, there is some fragmentation among these Lutherans. The divisions are mainly between the mainstream state churches and the so-called 'free-churches'. The latter have been particularly prominent in

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<sup>105</sup> Castles, 1978, pp. 114-115, also see chapters four to seven.

<sup>106</sup> Mainly urban and well-educated voters in the Helsinki metropolitan area support this party. However, the party is neo-liberal rather than social liberal like the LPP. (Sundberg, 1996a, p. 323)

<sup>107</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, chapter 3.

<sup>108</sup> By the 1990's, there were substantial Muslim and minor Catholic minorities in Denmark, Norway and Sweden due to immigration over the past few decades.

<sup>109</sup> On religious heterogeneity scores, with a scale of 0 (low) to 1 (high) Denmark scored 0.06, Finland 0.10, Norway 0.09, and Sweden 0.09. (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, pp. 227-230)

Norway. But it was moral issues related to religion that led to the establishment of specifically 'Christian' parties in the region<sup>110</sup>.

Prohibition referendums split both the Swedish and the Norwegian Liberal parties. However, in Sweden in 1922 the prohibitionists lost (but received the support of 49 percent of the population in the consultative referendum), whilst in Norway they won in October 1922 with 61.6 percent of the vote. In Sweden the two factions united in 1934, but in Norway a splinter group formed two years after the referendum never rejoined. In 1933 there was a further split based on moral issues, and the NKRF was formed<sup>111</sup>.

The NKRF in Norway was established largely because of frustration with 'Venstre' not promoting low-church values, and failure to secure representation for 'Christians' on the party lists. The decisive episode, however, seems to have been the theatre piece 'The Green Pastures' by Marc Connelly, presented at the National Theatre in Oslo in 1932. The piece was seen as highly blasphemous among active Christians. Other controversies concerned conflicts between the Christian activists and 'Venstre' over temperance policy, a personal grievance over a NV nomination in the province of Hordaland, and the author Arnulf Øverlands' speeches about "Christianity - the Tenth Plague"<sup>112</sup>.

The Norwegian NKRF<sup>113</sup> became a national party in 1945<sup>114</sup>. Specifically 'Christian' parties - based mainly on moral issues and Christian values - were formed in the other

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<sup>110</sup> Madeley, 1977. He also provides a comprehensive account of the development of the religious cleavage structures in the Nordic area.

<sup>111</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 49-51.

<sup>112</sup> Karvonen (1993, pp. 29-30), Madeley (1977, pp. 381-382) and Madeley (1996).

<sup>113</sup> For a detailed account of the particular and ambiguous character of this party, and how it differs from Continental Christian Democratic parties, see Madeley (1996).

three countries in the following decades. These have been strongly influenced by the Norwegian one, including detailed policies. The first programme of the Finnish FKF, founded in 1958, was close to a verbatim translation of the Norwegian NKRF programme<sup>115</sup>.

The Swedish KD emerged in a period of heated debates over morality and religion, particularly about promiscuity, venereal diseases and abortion. There were also conflicts over non-conformist religious groups, over religious instruction in schools, and the film "491" which contained relatively explicit sex scenes<sup>116</sup>.

The Danish DKRF was established in 1970, with a background similar to the situation in Sweden. It was partly related to liberalisation with regards to pornography and abortion, and also to school reforms reducing the time allotted to religious education<sup>117</sup>.

The establishment of these parties led to further fragmentation on the centre-right of the party-systems in all four countries. However, the Norwegian party has so far been substantially more important and successful than the other three<sup>118</sup>.

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<sup>114</sup> Madeley, 1996, pp. 149-150.

<sup>115</sup> Karvonen, 1993, p. 30.

<sup>116</sup> Karvonen, 1993, pp. 31-32.

<sup>117</sup> Karvonen, 1993, p. 32, Madeley, 1977, p. 282.

<sup>118</sup> See Madeley (1977, p. 269) regarding the history of electoral success for these parties.

#### 2.4.4. Other cleavages.

With the exception of the Swedish-speaking Finns, there are no substantial minorities based on religion, language, or ethnic origin in Scandinavia<sup>119</sup>. Hence, such bases for political parties that in other countries have appeal across the left-right divide are missing, or at least very limited, in the area. In Finland there is a linguistic cleavage, with the SFF representing the interests of the Swedish minority.

On the left, the Communist parties were arguably separated from the mainstream left by their commitment to revolution and anti-system character. However, the Communist parties of Norway and Denmark have become very small. The Swedish VP(K) has moved away from its more radical socialist policies ('democratic controls' over the private sector, nationalisation of the entire financial sector) towards promoting itself as a 'red-green' party<sup>120</sup>. Furthermore, the revolutionary features of the larger parties on the far left have not been very prominent since the 1950's, and these features virtually disappeared in the aftermath of the SU's collapse.

The Finnish case differs strongly from the others historically. Here the 1918 Civil War divided the nation as well as the left between the FSD and Communists. "The civil war

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<sup>119</sup> See for example Castles (1978, pp. 106-108, although he mistakenly argues there are no such minorities present) and Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988, pp. 14-15). The latter lists many of the minorities present. See also Bartolini and Mair's (1990, pp. 227-30) heterogeneity index, where Finland scores 0.18, 0.15, and 0.13 on a scale of 0 (low) to 1 (high) in the periods 1918-44, 1945-65, 1966-85; and the other three countries zero. Berglund and Lindström (1978, pp. 19-20) also view the Swedish/Finnish division as a cleavage in Finland.

<sup>120</sup> VP(K) party programs 1985, 1988, 1991, and 1994.

of 1918 may be interpreted as a nation-building crisis in the midst of a mobilisation of the electorate. The present day Communist/Non-Communist cleavage partly corresponds to the Civil War alignment."<sup>121</sup>

Since World War II, however, the Finnish Communists participated in government both in the period immediately after the war and in most of the period 1966-83, and the current left-wing party, the VF, has been in government since 1985. Nevertheless, in the past ideological cleavages have run far deeper in Finland than elsewhere in Scandinavia<sup>122</sup>. However, the VF appears to have developed into a party primarily distinguished by its relatively extreme position on the left-right cleavage.

The main left-socialist parties in Denmark (SF) and Norway (SV) were formed in opposition to NATO-membership, and as such they could be argued to be based on a foreign-policy cleavage. However, they have since developed into parties mainly differentiated by a far-left position, although foreign policy positions remain part of their distinctiveness.

A 'Green', or environmental cleavage can be difficult to identify because virtually all parties include some kind of commitment to the environment in their manifestos. Nevertheless, there appears to be good reasons to argue for the existence of such a cleavage. Firstly, there are obvious conflicts of interest between a preference for protecting the environment and aiming for increased material welfare. Specific examples include (the pace of) oil and gas extraction in Norway and nuclear power in Sweden.

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<sup>121</sup> Berglund and Lindström, 1978, p. 23.

<sup>122</sup> Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988, pp. 12-13.

More generally, clean air and water, protection of animal habitat, and the set aside of land for non-development can often be in conflict with projects that promote material welfare. Secondly, there are various environmental organisations, both national and international, that promote environmental causes. Thirdly, certain parties quite clearly represent 'greener' interests compared to other parties. Hence, it is argued here that there is a green cleavage present in these party systems.

In Finland and Sweden there are successful Green parties represented in parliament. In Sweden the GP<sup>123</sup> rose partly from the ashes of defeat in the nuclear power referendum of 1980. Before it entered government in 1976-8 and had to compromise over the issue, the CP had benefited electorally from its opposition (together with the VP) to nuclear power.

In Finland the Green list incorporates several new social movements such as the environmentalists, the women's movement, the movement for the disabled, and the peace movement. The list won 1.5 percent and two seats in 1983, and four percent and four seats in 1987<sup>124</sup>. In the 1991 Finnish elections, the GF broke through across the party political spectrum, testifying to the presence of a green cleavage in Finnish politics. It is becoming more salient, but Berglund<sup>125</sup> argues that it is still clearly dominated by the traditional left-right and urban-rural cleavages.

In Denmark and Norway, the far left, especially the SF and the SV, has developed into 'red-green' parties, with a strong emphasis on protection of the environment. In

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<sup>123</sup> See for example Bennulf and Holmberg (1990) for an account of the rise of the GP.

<sup>124</sup> Knutsen, 1990, pp. 262-63.

Denmark various small parties on the radical left have supported many 'green' values. In the Norwegian case, the NV has also become distinguished by its strong environmental stance. Part of the reason no new Green party has emerged in Norway is the fact that the NV, the SP and the SV support many green values<sup>126</sup>.

One might argue that immigration- and refugee- policies also constitute a cleavage in at least some of these countries. The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway, the ND in Sweden, and the FLP in Finland have all taken stances against immigration that have led to accusations of racism. However, by 1997 the FLP had ceased to exist and the ND seemed destined for oblivion. As for the two Progress parties, it appears that anti-immigration sentiments forms part of their appeal. However, the Progress Parties and the ND were formed in opposition to high taxes and what they argued was too extensive state involvement. They remain distinguished largely on the left-right cleavage, although they also retain a large element of populism and protest - against the prevailing policies in areas such as taxes, immigration and crime.

## **2.5. The cleavage system and European integration.**

In terms of the cleavage model, the conflict over European integration is likely to be most disruptive if it leads to a) substantive new parties being formed, b) substantial changes in the relative numbers of votes received by each party, and/or c) coalition patterns being substantially altered. In general, the more the EU-dimension crosscuts

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<sup>125</sup> 1991a, p. 259.

<sup>126</sup> Knutsen, 1990, pp. 262-63.



other cleavages, the more likely it is that the existing cleavage system will be disrupted as a result.

The cleavage system also limits the choices with regard to position on European integration available to both voters and parties. It limits the choices of parties because their image and policies in other areas lead to them having strongholds among certain groups of voters whose view on the EU they need to take into account. Also, a party's cleavage position(s) affects which parties are potential coalition partners. That is, when considering the party's position on a newly salient dimension the existing cleavage system needs to be taken into account.

The cleavage system limits the choices of many voters because they are unlikely to base their vote solely on the question of EU-membership, or on other issues related to European integration. A party's position on other cleavages, and on issues salient at the time of an election, will also influence the voters' decision. This makes it difficult for a party to predict how the EU-dimension will affect its appeal with the voters.

## **2.6. Conclusion.**

The cleavage model helps us to understand and explain party system developments and how party systems differ from one country to another. Over time, the cleavages underlying the party-system tend to change character. They also change in importance relative to each other. Thus, if the strength of a conflict of interest underlying a certain cleavage fades, the importance of that cleavage is also likely to fade. Alternatively, it changes character and may arguably turn into a different cleavage altogether, but related to the original one.

In the four countries studied here, the left-right cleavage is dominant. But some conflicts cut across the left-right cleavage. Territorial cleavages have remained in the party-system, and thus enabled accommodation of conflicts of interest related to this cleavage. There is also a 'Green' cleavage present in all four countries, as well as a moral-religious one, and a few others as described above.

The development of a new political cleavage becomes more likely if an important conflict of interest cannot be accommodated by the current cleavage system. Such accommodation is more likely if a 'new' conflict closely follows other cleavage lines. In particular, the formation of a new cleavage becomes likely if the conflict does not correspond with the dominant cleavage at the time the conflict becomes salient.

Alternatively, some accommodation can take place along pre-existing but less important conflict-lines. However, the latter type of accommodation is more likely to lead to changes in the relative levels of party-support, and perhaps also in coalition patterns. If

no accommodation along major existing cleavage-lines can be found, then a new political cleavage formation becomes likely. With respect to the cleavage model developed here, it is in terms of its crosscutting effect the importance of the conflict over European integration with regard to the party system will be measured.

The cleavage model generally, and its application to the Nordic party system specifically, as set out in this chapter, serves four purposes. Firstly, it helps us to develop a structured understanding of the development and current status of these party systems. Secondly, it provides us with the necessary background for developing an explanation for the effect the conflict over European integration has had on these party systems. Thirdly, the cleavage model provides the theoretical understanding needed to evaluate if the conflict over European integration is a new cleavage. And, finally, it implies some limitations for the room parties and voters have to react to the increased salience of the conflict over European integration. These are made more specific in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 3. Voter and Party Behaviour on European integration.**

### **3.1. Introduction.**

The first section of this chapter develops a model aimed at explaining the logic behind opinion formation on European integration. The cleavage model outlined in Chapter 2 above provides a framework for analysing which voting tendencies are prevalent among people who share certain characteristics. Members of group A tend to vote for a Conservative party, members of group C tend to vote for a Socialist party, and so on. But this does not tell us much about the reasons why these tendencies exist. If characteristic A is 'urban inhabitant' and characteristic C 'industrial worker', then all this tells us is that people with those particular characteristics tend to vote a certain way. The cleavage model does not enter into the logic behind why a certain factor or characteristic might influence an individual to behave in a certain way.

Membership in the groups 'urban inhabitants' and 'industrial workers' are not mutually exclusive. If a person lives in an urban area, is male, a low earner, and a Catholic, which one - if any - of these group memberships influenced him to be for or against EU-membership? This may not be possible to find out, even asking the person may not yield a satisfactory answer. But a model can be developed that systematises the various influences that can reasonably be argued to affect his decision. Rational choice theory will be utilised to build such a model in the first section of this chapter. Such a model also allows for the inclusion of factors of a more individual nature that are not directly related to group-membership.

In the second section a model is constructed to enable an assessment of the effect of this conflict on the party system. The starting point for this section is the rational choice assumption that the main aim of political parties is to be in government. This aim implies that parties will aim to maximise its number of votes, unless other concerns intervene. But in the Nordic countries the multi-party system means that, for most of the time, most parties need coalition partners, or at least support from other parties, to form (part of) a government. In addition, concerns for party cohesion and conflicts between the personal opinion of key players may not correspond with the other aims of the parties. It will be demonstrated how this complicates the strategy of the parties with regard to position on European integration. This section will also investigate how the parties are likely to deal with the often conflicting aims of maintaining party cohesion, maximising votes and retaining coalition and co-operation potential.

### **3.2. Rational Choice Theory.**

Essentially, rational choice models assume that people are rational actors<sup>1</sup>, and will act so as to maximise their utility, where utility is a measure of benefits in an individual's mind which he uses to decide among alternative courses of action. "Given several mutually exclusive alternatives, a rational man always takes the one which yields him the highest utility, *ceteris paribus*; i.e., he acts to his own greatest benefit."<sup>2</sup>

Friedman argues that a distinction should be made between 'Public Choice' and 'Rational Choice'. Public Choice theory, according to its 'Virginia School' gives public

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Downs (1957), Dunleavy (1991). For a particularly good elaboration and justification of the rationality assumption, see Diermeier (1996).

choice theory a ‘thick’ connotation where it is assumed that political actors pursue their material interest. Rational Choice theory, on the other hand, includes “the much broader claim that, regardless of what sort of ends people pursue, they do so through strategic, instrumentally rational behaviour”<sup>3</sup>. Rational Choice covers a wide field and intense disagreements. Hence, it is best understood as a family of theories <sup>4</sup>.

Downs defines ‘rational’ as “an ordering of behaviour [...] reasonably directed towards the achievement of conscious goals. [...] If a theorist knows the ends of some decision-maker, he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows: (1) he calculates the most reasonable way for the decision-maker to reach his goals, and (2) he assumes this way will actually be chosen because the decision-maker is rational.”<sup>5</sup>

A basic criticism of rational choice theory is that it is tautological<sup>6</sup>. This is directed at the basic assumption that people act in their self-interest in order to maximise their utility. On its own, this statement can rationalise any action through post-hoc goal-specification. But it is an assumption, not a theory:

“It is important to distinguish between the content of a *statement* and the content of a *theory*. While a particular statement, such as the fundamental law of a theory, may be tautological, the conjunction of fundamental law, specific law, constraints, and so on, typically will not. It is precisely the assumption of particular motivations in particular applications that would guarantee the empirical content of rational choice models *even if the fundamental assumption of rational action were indeed tautological*.”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Downs, 1957, pp. 36-37.

<sup>3</sup> Friedman, 1996, p. 2. Also see Elster (1983).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Ferejohn and Satz (1996), Fiorina (1996), Kelley, (1996).

<sup>5</sup> Downs, 1957, p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Green and Shapiro (1994, chapters two and three in particular).

Rational choice theory is applied to three aspects of this thesis. Firstly, the decision of individual voters to oppose or support EU-membership. Secondly, how the parties react to this relatively newly salient conflict entering the political system. Regarding the second aspect it is contended that parties are office-maximising. This leads to the contention that certain off-loading tactics are beneficial to most parties with regard to how to deal with European integration. The third aspect is the argument that the EU-conflict complicates voting decisions in national elections. In this regard, a separation of the EU-conflict from other issues is argued to be the preference of many voters.

Goal specification is more difficult with regard to the first aspect<sup>7</sup>. A large variety of areas that influence a person's utility are affected by EU-membership. Similarly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain information about how each variable affects a person's decision. "‘Disturbing causes’ may offset the action of the independent variable, diminishing the impact on the dependent variable or making it disappear. While a true theory may predict that X will cause Y to occur, not-Y may yet occur in the presence of X because of the overpowering effect of other variables."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Diermeier, 1996, p. 67.

<sup>8</sup> Fiorina (1996, p. 88) argues that "[rational choice] models are most useful where stakes are high and numbers low, in recognition that it is not rational to go to the trouble to maximise if the consequences are trivial and/or your actions make no difference". See also Fiorina (1990). "Giving little or no thought to what you are doing *is* maximising behaviour when little or nothing is at stake and/or your actions make little or no difference. It is not that rational choice models cannot explain such behaviour, just that they do not say anything very interesting about it." (Fiorina, 1996, endnote 4, p. 94) Hence, on work on mass behaviour Fiorina utilise minimalist notions of rationality (Fiorina, 1981, p. 83), whilst in work on elites he assumes a higher order of rationality (Fiorina, 1989, chapters 5 and 11).

<sup>9</sup> Friedman, 1996, p. 14.

The contention promoted here is that people's attitudes, in so far as these can be empirically studied, are affected mainly by those factors where EU-membership has obvious repercussions on their utility. Importantly, this implies that factors such as nationalism (in its pure form) and national sovereignty mainly affects the opinion of those who are not strongly affected by membership in more direct ways, or for whom other effects are very uncertain. Section 3.3 of this chapter will address each relevant factor in turn, in order to evaluate their likely importance for people's attitude to EU-membership.

A further criticism of rational choice is that it often indulges in post-hoc rationalisation<sup>10</sup>. That is, if the theory does not fit the empirical data, then the theory is modified. However, post-hoc developments improve many theories, and are, at least in the social sciences, often difficult to distinguish from the original theory. Diermeier argues that what Green and Shapiro label post-hoc theory development, Thomas Kuhn would call 'puzzle-solving'<sup>11</sup>. The view taken here is that such modifications and developments improve rather than jeopardise theories<sup>12</sup>.

Another main area of criticism is that rational choice, if not tautological, merely restates earlier observations or that its contribution is simply stating the 'obvious'. However, "even when deductions from a particular model reproduce what is already known, rational choice theory is valuable for specifying a causal mechanism behind the

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<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Green and Shapiro (1994, especially pp. 34-38).

<sup>11</sup> Diermeier (1996, p. 61), Kuhn (1962, especially chapter 4).

<sup>12</sup> For further justification of post-hoc theory development, see for example Chong (1996, pp. 44-6) and Diermeier (1996, pp. 61-63).



phenomenon in question”<sup>13</sup>. In section 3.3 of this chapter, and in section two of each country chapter, this is held to be the main contribution of rational choice. However, the model developed in section 3.4 of this chapter, as well as its application in chapters four to seven, covers new ground and is of a more ‘non-obvious’ nature.

Some rational choice theories assume perfect information<sup>14</sup>. That is, the actors all have access to all relevant information. But in most decisions we are faced with the problem of having to make up our mind with only limited access to information relevant to our decision. Dunleavy argues that there is an assumption that plentiful and low-cost information on group-joining is available and that in public choice there generally is a rather simple approach to information, even in otherwise sophisticated work<sup>15</sup>.

Unfortunately, some assumptions about access to information must be made here. It is assumed that all actors have access to the same information regarding European integration. For example, if one person knows the degree to which foreign policy is included in the EU framework, then everybody knows this. It is further assumed that all the voters are aware of the position of the various political parties with regard to European integration. With regard to the parties themselves, party leaders and party members, it is assumed that they are aware of their own and other parties’ position on the important policy dimensions, including positions on European integration.

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<sup>13</sup> Chong, 1996, p. 41.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Laver and Shepsle (1996, p. 23).

<sup>15</sup> Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 3-4.

Another assumption often made is that a political party, which in most cases consists of more than one person, acts as a 'unitary' actor<sup>16</sup>. Laver and Schofield<sup>17</sup> discuss and justify the unitary actor assumption with regard to coalition formation, although they also argue for consideration of splitting potential on certain policy dimensions. "Parties do in practice tend to go into and come out of government as single actors."<sup>18</sup> This same assumption is applied in this thesis.

However, this assumption does not extend to there being no dissension from the official party line. Indeed, at the referendums held over European integration, most parties allow their members (even MP's) to campaign against the official party line. However, it is assumed that when in government, a party will pursue the official policy of the party. Thus, insofar as a person votes for say, a pro-EU party, then that person is assumed to be aware that this party will (at least attempt to) pursue a pro-EU policy in government.

One might argue that, even if a person votes for a party that is split but officially pro-EU, he could still vote for an individual politician who is anti-EU. This could get anti-EU politicians elected on a pro-EU party-list. This could therefore increase the number of anti-EU MP's in parliament. But because of the list-systems in these countries, it would in many cases be difficult for the voter to know which politician his vote will help to elect. Furthermore, the party whip will ensure that most MP's follow the official

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<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Laver and Shepsle (1996, pp. 24-25), although they modify this in chapter 12.

<sup>17</sup> 1990, chapter 2.

<sup>18</sup> Laver and Schofield, 1990, p. 15.

party line, further increasing the uncertainty of voting for a politician one believes will vote against the party line<sup>19</sup>.

### **3.3 A rational choice model for attitudes towards EU membership.**

This section builds a model based on factors likely to influence an individual's estimation of the effects of EU membership on his expected utility. The main assumption of rational choice theory is applied, namely that people will act according to their self-interest. A citizen will only want his country to join, and/or remain a member of, the EU if he believes it will increase his utility.

In this thesis a distinction is made between 'common' and 'group differentiated' factors. The difference between these two main categories of factors is that group-differentiated factors can be analysed through related individual and aggregate level indicators. This makes this analysis more comparable across countries, and also less reliant on surveys having asked exactly the right question for our purpose. Both main categories are then divided into 'economic' and 'non-economic' sub-categories. It should be stressed that this analysis shows only the increased likelihood of an individual being for or against EU membership insofar as certain social, economic, ideological and value characteristics apply to him. Unless otherwise noted, each factor is analysed *ceteris paribus* in this section.

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<sup>19</sup> Laver and Shepsle (1996, p. 29) argue that the value of the party label and party discipline as an appealing feature for voters encourage non-defection from the official line.

Some other ideas from economic theory are also utilised here. Firstly, it is assumed that people are generally risk-averse. Hence, they are unlikely to support actions that have a high risk of decreasing their utility. That is, they are unlikely to pursue a course of action where the chance of success is below 50/50.

Linked to risk-aversion is the theory that people prefer concrete and short-term gains to abstract and long-term ones. This even applies to situations where the latter has a far higher return than the former. This is because abstract and long-term benefits are discounted at a much higher rate than concrete and short-term ones. An often-used example is that of smoking. Many people will much rather have a cigarette today than reduce the risk of lung-cancer somewhere in the distant future. Similarly, it could be argued that people disadvantaged by particular changes in the short term are likely to resist change, even if long term benefits are likely, in particular if there is a high level of uncertainty, because in that scenario the long-term benefits cannot be persuasively demonstrated<sup>20</sup>.

On the other hand, the European integration process is open-ended with wide-reaching aims as set out in the Treaty of Rome, the SEA, the TEU, and the Amsterdam Treaty. Nobody can be certain to which extent, or if at all, the welfare state, exports, oil revenues, food prices, culture, etc. will be affected by European integration, but it is reasonable to believe that these areas are likely to be affected sometime in the future. Hence, if a person believes EU policies in these areas will affect his utility, then he may to some extent base his attitude to EU-membership on these future contingencies.

### 3.3.1 Common economic factors.

The most obvious factor in this category is the net contribution to/receipt from the EU budget. The average citizen is likely to view his utility income as increased if this is positive, and reduced if it is negative. A net contributor to the EU-budget would, as a non-member, be free to spend this money domestically. Conversely, a net recipient would have fewer funds as a non-member.

It is assumed that lower taxation increases individual utility. However, the effect of membership on the taxation level is difficult to assess. With the exception of Finland, the general taxation level is higher in the Nordic countries than is the EU average<sup>21</sup>. Therefore, one could argue that, in the three other cases, membership is likely to reduce taxes due to the competitive pressures of the internal market<sup>22</sup>. Also, additional downward pressure on taxation might result from the strict EU competition policy requiring the reduction of subsidies for certain firms and/or industries.

However, since most formal powers of taxation remain in the national domain, one could also argue that membership will have only minor effects on taxation. Furthermore, EEA-membership is likely to have similar effects as EU membership in this respect. The high level of uncertainty makes it difficult for an individual to assess how his utility will be affected in this respect. "Rational behaviour requires a predictable social order. [...]"

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<sup>20</sup> Hannan and Freedman, 1977.

<sup>21</sup> As a percentage of GDP.

<sup>22</sup> More formally, EU-membership, as opposed to EEA-membership, includes moves towards the harmonisation of indirect taxes. (Gstöhl, 1994, p. 349)

Whenever uncertainty increases greatly, rationality becomes difficult.”<sup>23</sup> Thus, viewed in isolation, effects on the tax level appear to be a relatively unimportant factor for people’s attitude to European integration<sup>24</sup>.

It is assumed that lower prices *per se* increases utility. As with taxation, one could argue that pressures from the internal market might lead to a lower price level than would be the case without membership. But EEA membership should, in theory, have much the same effect as EU membership in this respect. However, with regard to the price level of food and drink, cuts in subsidies may lower the price level to EU levels (or keep them in check in the Danish case). On the other hand, one could argue that cuts in these subsidies could be achieved without membership. Nevertheless, membership would ensure that this would happen, and that it would happen sooner rather than later. Hence, for the average Nordic, it is likely that his utility would increase somewhat with respect to the price level, although there are substantial differences between the four countries.

It is assumed that higher unemployment decreases utility. Although it is difficult to assess the impact of EU membership on unemployment, one option for the voter would be to compare unemployment rates in his own country with those of (other) EU member-states. In the 1990’s, there have been significant variations across the Nordic countries with regard to unemployment rates (see Table C) and it can therefore be expected that this factor affects utility differently in each country. However, there is not necessarily a connection between EU membership and unemployment. Witness, for

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<sup>23</sup> Downs, 1957, p. 57.

<sup>24</sup> If only factors of such a nature were involved, the rational course of action would be for the voter to abstain in the referendum.

example, the great variation in unemployment between the countries, at the time both members and non-members of the EU, listed in Table C.

### 3.3.2 Common non-economic factors.

EU membership implies the transfer of decision-making in many policy-areas from the national to the supranational (EU) level. The effect from this transfer *per se* on an individuals' utility income is likely to vary according to whether the person in question is for or against European integration as represented by the EU. A person's position on this issue depends primarily on two factors. Firstly, the value he puts on power resting chiefly with the nation-state. Secondly, the extent to which he approves of the specific version of European integration represented by the EU. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the likely outcomes of the ideal types of these positions. People can of course be placed anywhere between these extremes.

Figure 3.1

| Nation-state control vs. Approval of EU integration format. |                                   |                    |
|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Extent to which value nation-state control                  | Approval of EU integration format |                    |
|   | Low                               | High               |
| High  | Clearly anti-EU (1)               | Impartial (3)      |
| Low   | Probably anti-EU (2)              | Clearly pro-EU (4) |

The quality of democracy could arguably be affected by EU membership. The ‘democratic deficit’ is an important factor in this equation. The gap, technically, culturally and geographically, between the voter and the decision-makers is likely to increase when a state joins the EU. Technically because the Council consists of government ministers, not parliamentarians<sup>25</sup>. Culturally because national decision-makers are likely to have more in common with his countrymen than European decision-makers. And geographically the institutions in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg are further away than those in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm.

On the other hand, non-membership can also be argued to be detrimental to democracy, in particular if the alternative is EEA membership. Such membership requires the whole-scale adoption of all EC legislation with regard to the internal market. EEA members are then required to adapt any EU legislation and regulations in the areas covered by the EEA Treaty. Although it is possible for non-EU members of the EEA to veto such legislation, this veto cannot be used extensively without jeopardising the entire treaty<sup>26</sup>. Furthermore, EU initiatives such as the Schengen Agreement and EMU will affect most European non-members unless the EU is radically reduced in size.

<sup>25</sup> Insofar as some government ministers are not members of their respective national parliaments, they are of course making decisions without being democratically elected at all.

<sup>26</sup> In theory, EEA membership allows for the use of a veto against any piece of EU regulation or legislation. But if this is used to extensively limit the implementation of the single market it is highly unlikely that this will be tolerated by the EU. Hence, it is



If popular influence over decisions that affect people is considered as important for democracy, then removing such decisions from the democratic process through non-participation is also detrimental to democracy. On the other hand, non-membership in the EU does technically retain more national self-determination than membership does. Thus, while the effect of EU membership on democracy is difficult to determine, more national self-determination is retained by remaining outside. (The effects of membership and non-membership on democracy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.) The effect on individual utility based on this factor is extremely difficult to ascertain. It will depend on whether the individual considers influence on EU-legislation or directness of democracy as more important. Individual survey data will to some extent enable us to make a meaningful evaluation of this.

Until recently, a high degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity set the Nordic countries apart from many other European countries<sup>27</sup>. Immigration from other EU countries is unlikely to be either greater or less if an EEA-member joins the EU. Immigration from outside the EU is also unlikely to be affected, since most West-European regimes are committed to a restrictive immigration policy towards people from outside the EEA. However, if the planned common border and immigration policy comes into place, then any member-state would have to abide by these. Hence, the effect on utility would depend on two factors. Firstly, whether a person desires more or less immigration. Secondly, whether a national or an EU immigration policy would be more in tune with

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assumed that any use of such a veto will be limited and not significantly affect the argument made here. However, the higher risk of the EEA-treaty being cancelled does affect the argument, and this point will be incorporated below.

this person's own views on immigration. It would be very difficult to evaluate this situation. Hence, views on immigration are unlikely to have more than a marginal effect on people's attitude to European integration. However, such views may have an effect on people's position on EEA-membership, since this could increase immigration substantially compared to remaining completely outside the EU. It is contended here that people's attitude towards EU-membership is partially also a reflection of their attitude to EEA-membership.

Feelings of Nordic solidarity may affect utility incomes in relation to EU-membership. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not Nordic co-operation in some form is seen as positive or negative for utility incomes. Moreover, the significance of this factor has changed. The failure of Nordic integration efforts, Denmark's EC-membership in 1973, and Swedish and Finnish EU membership in 1994 (with Norway and Iceland still outside) have shown that Nordic solidarity has its limits.

For most people, peace is likely to have a positive effect on utility income. It is not possible to ascertain what - if any - effect European integration has had on peace in Europe. However, war has been absent in the area covered by the ECSC/EC/EU since these organisations came into being. In this respect EU membership is likely to increase utility income, albeit modestly. One can also argue that increased trade dependency promotes peace between nation-states<sup>28</sup>. Similarly, the potential for a stronger Europe is likely to affect utility, but whether negatively or positively depends on the individual view of how (un)desirable such a development is.

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<sup>27</sup> In the last thirty years substantial numbers of immigrants from countries such as Pakistan, Vietnam, and Turkey have arrived in Scandinavia.

Other factors that may affect attitudes to membership irrespective of social and ideological characteristics include environmental concerns, food quality, control over pharmaceuticals, consumer issues, and treatment of farm-animals. For these factors, however, it is very difficult to discern the effect of membership, if any, on utility income. Hence, they will not form part of the analysis in chapters four to eight<sup>29</sup>.

### 3.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.

Belonging to the internal market of the EU affects many people's income prospects differently. The most important and obvious distinction is between people whose income is derived from industries that are able to compete in the internal market and those employed in less competitive industries. Since for all four countries the most likely alternative to EU membership (*de facto* in the case of Norway, and also for Sweden and Finland in the period 1993-4) is EEA-membership, EU membership would primarily affect sectors of the economy not included in the EEA Treaty.

The main areas excluded from the EEA Treaty but included in EU membership with respect to the internal market are agriculture and fisheries. Therefore, those whose income is dependent upon these industries can be expected to be among those who are most strongly affected by membership or non-membership in the EU. If agriculture or fisheries are less competitive than elsewhere in the EU, then many of those involved in these industries can be expected to be against membership based on this factor alone.

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<sup>28</sup> Paine, 1791-1985, especially chapter on 'Ways and Means'.

The size of national subsidies to these industries relative to those obtainable in the EU is also likely to affect attitudes towards EU membership among those dependent upon these industries. In the case of Denmark it is difficult to estimate what the national subsidies would be if Denmark was not a member of the EU. For the other three countries comparisons are easier. If agricultural subsidies are higher through the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) than the national ones are, then most farmers would be expected to be pro-EU. With regard to both competitiveness and subsidies, the more extreme the discrepancies with the EU are, the more pronounced the effect will be on attitudes towards EU membership.

Changes in agricultural subsidies are also likely to lead to changes in the employment level in areas where agriculture is important. In the internal market, employment will to a greater extent depend upon the ability of the agriculture industry to compete with foreign products. For those employed in farming-related industries (such as food-processing), similar effects on utility income to that of farmers as a consequence of membership can be expected. Because farming and farming-related industries are mainly located in rural areas, a relatively distinct position among the rural population can be expected. They are among those most directly and obviously affected by EU membership.

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<sup>29</sup> For data on some of these issues, see Ringdal (1994, pp. 45-64) and Oskarson (1996, pp. 124-148).

Similarly, it is also likely that cutting farm subsidies generally would “trigger a perverse multiplier effect”<sup>30</sup> and accelerate the exodus of rural merchants, therefore impairing the quality of life in the rural areas. Traders, storers and food processors also have a substantial stake in the fate of farmers<sup>31</sup>.

Furthermore, social and group pressures<sup>32</sup> can have a counter-balancing effect on more narrow self-interest. This might lead to an inclination to agree with the predominant community view on an issue<sup>33</sup>. Another variation of this is ‘sociotropic’ (as opposed to ‘egocentric’) voting. This model is narrower: it is limited to concerns about regional economic prosperity<sup>34</sup>. Of course, this can apply equally to urban areas (or other in-group/out-group situations). However, such effects are likely to be stronger the more is at stake.

One effect of EU-membership likely to increase the utility of people in rural areas in Finland, Norway and Sweden was the introduction of an ‘Objective 6’ in EU regional policy. This covers regions with “extremely low population density”<sup>35</sup>, defined as regions with “a population density of 8 persons per [square kilometre] or less”<sup>36</sup>. There

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<sup>30</sup> The Economist, A survey of Agriculture, 12/12/1992, pp. 13-14.

<sup>31</sup> Keeler, 1996, p. 130. See also Tarditi et al. (1989) for a comprehensive account of the effects of agricultural trade liberalisation.

<sup>32</sup> Janis (1972) describes what he calls ‘group-think’ i.e. mutually reinforcing bias. For example, if in an area some people have a very strong preference for an option then others will be affected by that. This is particularly likely if the ‘others’ do not have a very strong preference either way. Such pressures can lead to people’s opinion on EU membership being based on pressures from people around them.

<sup>33</sup> Chong, 1996, p. 51.

<sup>34</sup> See, for example, Johnston and Pattie (1995).

<sup>35</sup> Accession Treaty, Protocol No. 6, Article 1. (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, p. 354.)

<sup>36</sup> Accession Treaty, Protocol No. 6, Article 2. (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, p. 354.)

were also EU regional policy allocations to the new members under Objectives 2 (industrial regions in decline) and 5b (low level of socio-economic development combined with high level of agricultural employment, low level of agricultural income and low population density). Some of these funds are already allocated to Denmark. The specific geographical areas affected and the effect on utility are covered in chapters four to seven. Objective 2 allocations are likely to increase the utility of people in some urban areas, Objective 5b allocations the utility of people in many rural areas. However, due to lack of very detailed data, it is only possible to evaluate the utility-effect of these EU-funds in terms of a general effect on the utility of people who live in urban and rural areas.

With regard to the effect of EU membership on the formal position for state subsidies for other areas than agriculture, there is considerable room for interpretation. Articles 92 to 94 in the Treaty of Rome set out the EU position on public subsidies which threaten competition between the member-states. In practice, objections have tended not to be raised against the majority of state aid cases. Therefore, the effect on the legality of such subsidies is likely to have limited effect on individual utility.

EU membership may affect people's utility income with regard to public sector expenditure and social transfers. These are often referred to as the 'welfare state'<sup>37</sup>.

When an individual considers the merits of EU membership, a comparison of the size

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<sup>37</sup> "A system in which the government undertakes the main responsibility for providing for the social and economic security of the state's population by means of pensions, social security benefits, free health care, and so forth." (Oxford Concise dictionary of Politics, p. 526)

and nature of the welfare state in various European countries is likely to be made, especially since this institution has become very important in the Nordic countries<sup>38</sup>.

Public sector expenditure and social transfers vary across the EU and the Nordic countries. So does the nature of the welfare state. Generally, the Nordic countries provide similar and relatively high universal State funded benefits, regardless of contribution. To varying degrees the coverage in other European countries depends to a greater extent upon personal contributions or insurance arrangements. Alternatively, the benefits are more universal, but relatively low. However, this does not necessarily mean that EU membership would lead to changes in the Nordic welfare model. Unless EU membership, explicitly or implicitly, requires the Nordic countries to change their welfare models, then it would appear that such membership is unlikely to lead to changes in the welfare state and the level of social expenditure. And it is very difficult to argue that EU-membership explicitly requires such changes.

However, by simple comparison<sup>39</sup> the voter may well conclude that there is a possibility of such changes implicit in membership. For example, it might seem reasonable to compare social legislation and the extent and nature of the welfare state in other European countries with the Nordic equivalents. (See Table F for data on social

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<sup>38</sup> See Lawler (1997). Millner (1994, 1996) shows that preference for an extensive welfare state is compatible with rational behaviour. Similarly, an experiment by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) across three countries showed that a vast majority of the subjects of the experiment preferred an income floor to the worst-off individuals rather than maximisation of average incomes.

<sup>39</sup> Downs (1957, chapter 3) shows how the voter compares the past performance of the government with the potential past performance of the opposition, and then calculates expected future utilities if either party was elected based on this. Similarly, with respect to EU-membership and the welfare state it is rational for the voter to compare the development of the welfare state in his country with that of the (other) member-states.

expenditure.) Furthermore, the logic of the Treaty of Rome and the TEU makes future convergence in social policy at least possible, and reasonably believable.

The Treaty of Rome aimed ultimately for a political union. The development of the EU is towards more uniform policies in more areas, especially in the co-ordination of monetary and economic policies (EMU). The TEU brought this goal substantially closer, and if EMU is successful it will come closer still.

Because the Nordic countries are small and the trend of the EU is towards more majority voting, the Nordic welfare-state model is unlikely to be adopted by the EU. Hence, it is reasonable to assume the extent of the welfare state is considerably more likely to be reduced than increased as a result of EU membership<sup>40</sup>. The same applies to the position of women and other areas where differences between the Nordic countries and the rest of the EU are obvious and substantial.

Another argument is that the logic of the internal market dictates that high social costs means that, other things being equal, locating a business in another area of the internal market where such costs are lower would be beneficial for a company. Therefore, social costs must be kept low in order for the national economy to be able to compete. Consequently, if social costs are substantially higher than elsewhere, then the welfare state must be reduced. Non-membership is likely to allow for more national control over the development of the welfare state.

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<sup>40</sup> Although such reductions are unlikely to be very radical. Social expenditure is high in most EU countries.



Although the Nordic welfare states make payments to most of their populations, it is those who benefit disproportionately from social expenditure who would see their utility level decline most distinctly in the case of membership with regard to this factor. Members of such groups can be expected to be disproportionately more likely to oppose EU membership. Conversely, those who contribute disproportionately to finance social expenditure compared to their benefits derived from this expenditure are likely to derive increased utility from EU membership. This factor is operationalised through public/private sector employment, income, and gender.

Public employees have an interest in maintaining an extensive welfare state. For many, their employment and career depend on it. The poorer sections of the population also have an interest in maintaining the welfare state. Without it, they would have to rely more on private provision of services like health-care and education. Without subsidies from the wealthier sections of the population in the form of transfers, they may not be able to afford such services, or see a deterioration in the quality of these services.

The welfare state benefits women disproportionately, both as recipients and employees<sup>41</sup>. Hence the utility of women is more likely to decline as a consequence of EU membership than that of men. Relative to men, women's income, subsidies, employment and career prospects are likely to be adversely affected by a reduction of the welfare state.

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<sup>41</sup> For data, see country chapters.

The Nordic countries are highly dependent upon trade<sup>42</sup>. Traditionally, much of this trade has been with other Nordic countries, the UK, and some other European countries. Thus, it is crucial to secure access to the market represented by the EU and to avoid restrictions such as duties and other trade barriers.

Because EEA membership secures access to the EU market for most goods and services, one might conclude that for those not employed in the primary industries EU membership will make little difference to their income and employment arising from patterns of trade. However, if people are generally risk-averse, then this might not be the case. EEA membership is less secure than EU membership for market access<sup>43</sup>. This is because the arrangement can be cancelled by giving a year's written notice by any of the parties<sup>44</sup>. In contrast, there is no facility for expelling a member from the EU, and no country has been forced out of this organisation or its predecessors. Hence, EU membership can be expected to increase the utility of those whose income and welfare is particularly dependent upon international trade.

#### 3.3.4 Group differentiated non-economic factors.

People may derive utility from an extensive welfare state for other reasons than economic benefit. In general terms, support for the welfare state can be viewed as ideological, and more specifically as support for a large sector of the economy being controlled by the state. Such policies are more likely to be supported by those on the left of the political spectrum than those on the right. This argument is reinforced by the

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<sup>42</sup> For data, see country chapters.

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, Kekko (1994).

possibility of many votes against the EU also being votes against the internal market, including an arrangement such as the EEA.

Opposition to EU-membership based on concerns for detrimental effects on the welfare state is likely to be based on three elements: comparisons, a vote against the internal market/EEA, and fears about future developments. In addition, the EU can also be seen as symbolising developments that are difficult to change through changing party preferences in a small country, such as the rule of market forces, globalisation, and trade liberalisation. The EU is a potent symbol for these more subtle forces that limit a small country's freedom of action in fiscal and monetary policy. Based on this factor, it is likely that opposition to EU membership will be higher on the political left than on the right.

In addition to the economic factors mentioned above, it is possible that women's position in society could be altered through EU membership. Women may view the EU more negatively than men partly because EU membership is seen as a threat to the status women have achieved in the Nordic countries over the last few decades. In most of the member-states of the EU, women have less representation in political institutions and organisations than has been achieved in the Nordic countries<sup>45</sup>.

Another factor is the Catholic influence in the EU, which may affect liberal legislation in areas such as abortion and divorce, if these become EU-level issues in the future. Together with the economic factors mentioned above, these factors are likely to make

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<sup>44</sup> Article 127, EEA Treaty.

<sup>45</sup> For evidence and examples of this, see the relevant sections in chapters four to seven.

women more negative to EU membership than men. This argument only holds, however, for women who actually want such rights and a high level of equality. It is assumed that this is the case for a high number of Nordic women.

Some other factors will also be taken into consideration. However, since these are more country specific, they will be covered in chapters four to seven.

### **3.4 The effect of the conflict over European integration on the party system.**

In this section the effects of the conflict over European integration on the party system is analysed. The starting point for this analysis is that this conflict has become more salient in the Nordic countries since the SEA in 1986<sup>46</sup>. However, the importance of this conflict is reflected differently in the various countries. This section provides a model aimed at improving our understanding for why this is, to be employed in the country-specific analysis that follows in the next four chapters.

A core concern is why so few relevant political parties in the Nordic countries oppose EU membership. The SEA and the TEU led to a revival of European integration. With this revival, political conflict over this development has also intensified, and the conflict over EC/EU-membership has become increasingly salient. In Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 40 percent or more of the population has for most of the time since

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<sup>46</sup> This conflict is very similar to what Laver and Shepsle term a 'shock' to the party system. (However, it cannot be described as an 'unanticipated event'.) (Laver and Shepsle, 1996, pp. 196-97) "[One] type of shock that might destabilise an equilibrium government is the emergence of a new issue. In its most dramatic form, this may result in the creation of a completely new policy dimension [...]. In a less dramatic form, it

the late 1980's been opposed to EC/EC membership. At times, opposition has been twice as high as the support for EU membership in Norway and Sweden. (For data, see tables 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2).

As observed in Chapter 1, European integration is affecting large areas of what used to be national policies, as well as changing the status of the nation-state itself. If large segments of the population oppose this development, then it would appear rational for at least some parties to oppose participation in this integration project. Nevertheless, as tables 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3 show, with the exception of the situation in Norway, most of the relevant<sup>47</sup> political parties have remained (officially) supportive of EU membership.

Both parties and voters are faced with a difficult situation because of the salience of the EU-conflict. For the parties, there appears to be votes to be gained by establishing a strong position on this issue - especially by opposing EU-membership. But the parties are torn between various aims – in particular between maximising votes, keeping the party together, and retaining coalition potential. For the voters the EU-conflict complicates their voting decisions and increases the cost of information needed to make these decisions.

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may result in the perturbation of party positions on existing policy dimensions, changing interparty distances. [...]" (Laver and Shepsle, 1996, p. 197).

<sup>47</sup> Sartori's 'criterion of irrelevance' is employed to determine which parties to consider as relevant. Inclusion is based on two conditions. Firstly, coalition potential. A relevant party must be needed, on at least some occasions, for a feasible coalition that can control government. Secondly, (and this criterion is secondary to coalition potential), blackmail potential. For this term to apply, a party's existence must affect the tactics of party competition of those parties that do have 'coalition potential'. The second category refers to large parties that no other parties would consider as coalition partners. This

### 3.4.1 The problems faced by the parties.

When considering the motivations of politicians, one of two aims tend to be assumed: office maximisation or policy maximisation<sup>48</sup>. Office maximisation implies that the general aim for any political party is to get elected so that it can partake in government. Unless there are complicating factors, this aim implies vote-maximisation<sup>49</sup>. Therefore, rational action for a political party is to pursue a strategy that will maximise its number of votes<sup>50</sup>. In the extreme version, office-maximisation assumes that parties will do anything to get into office. Hence, it must appeal to as many voters as possible. This includes changing policies purely for instrumental reasons.

Office-maximisation is famously argued by Downs. His model assumes that every government seeks to maximise political support, that the governments' prime goal is re-election, and that election is the prime goal of the parties not in government<sup>51</sup>. Downs takes this assumption to the extreme, assuming that party members act "solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office. Thus politicians in our model never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office *per se*. [...] [Hence,] parties

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could be either because of their extreme views on policy, or because they are opposed to the regime itself (Sartori, 1976, pp. 121-123).

<sup>48</sup> See Laver and Schofield (1990, chapter 3) for a more detailed elaboration of these two aims and the interaction between them.

<sup>49</sup> Some authors also distinguish between vote- and office-maximisation, where the former is concerned with maximising the number of votes so as to control government, while the latter aims solely to maximise the spoils of office (Strom, 1990).

<sup>50</sup> Laver and Schofield, 1990, p. 36.

<sup>51</sup> Downs, 1957, p. 11.

formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies.”<sup>52</sup>

The other main motivation attributed to parties and politicians is policy maximisation. Laver and Schofield<sup>53</sup> argue that proponents of this view tend to regard membership of a coalition cabinet as a purely instrumental means to affect policy, rather akin to the way Downs viewed office maximisation. However, policy maximisation requires the power to affect government policy-making. The best way to achieve this is government participation. This allows more control over policy formation and legislation not subject to direct legislative review compared to a powerful parliamentary position. The second best way to achieve influence is to maximise votes so as to have parliamentary power to influence policy<sup>54</sup>. It will be noted in this connection, however, that unless a party controls a majority of seats in parliament, then the party risks getting none of its policies through.

Similarly, Lewin<sup>55</sup> argues that strategic assessment is always present in politics. An ideological programme, no matter how carefully thought out, will be of little use in a democracy if it is not supported by a large number of people. To become and remain important, a politician must achieve a position of influence.

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<sup>52</sup> Downs, 1957, p. 28.

<sup>53</sup> 1990, p. 38.

<sup>54</sup> See, for example, Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 53-57).

<sup>55</sup> 1988, p. 10.

Or, as Isaksson<sup>56</sup> argues, “ in the long run, a typically policy-seeking party must be a vote-seeker as well.” Hence, the argument that parties seek to get elected in order to carry out particular policies is compatible with the argument that the primary aim of parties is to get elected to government<sup>57</sup>. The pursuit of particular cabinet posts is not considered here<sup>58</sup>.

It should be noted that even instrumental office-maximisation does not necessarily imply that politicians pursuing such a strategy will necessarily change their policies to suit the perceived current mood of the population (or the specific population it seeks to appeal to). “The need to maintain long-term credibility, both with fellow politicians and with voters, may well provide politicians with incentives to stick with a policy that in the short term has come to look like a liability.”<sup>59</sup>

Even if parties pursue office-maximisation strategies it is not implied this will necessarily result in ‘minimal winning coalitions’<sup>60</sup>. Parties are not considered to be solely interested in the spoils of office, but as also interested in the implementation of their policies. Hence, they tend to aim for government with compatible parties<sup>61</sup>, both for the purposes of remaining in office and in order to be able to pursue their policies.

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<sup>56</sup> 1994, p. 105.

<sup>57</sup> Laver and Shepsle (1996, especially pp. 8-9) make the assumption that politicians are policy-seeking, but they show that this does not contradict the assumption that they are office-seeking.

<sup>58</sup> See, for example, Laver and Schofield (1990, chapter 7) for such a consideration.

<sup>59</sup> Laver and Shepsle, 1996, p. 19.

<sup>60</sup> Riker, 1962. A minimal winning coalition contains only as many members as are necessary to win, usually in terms of a majority of seats in parliament. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1995, p. 319) found that only 27 percent of cabinets formed in fifteen Western European parliamentary democracies in the period from the end of World War II to 1993 were minimal winning. For a detailed further discussion of circumstances favouring minority and surplus majority governments, see Laver and Shepsle (1996, chapter 12).



This can lead to both minority and surplus majority coalitions being more viable than minimal winning coalitions.

Ultimately, it appears that the pursuit of office or the pursuit of policies - be it in parliament or in the cabinet - requires the party to aim for vote-maximisation. The more seats the party has in parliament, the more influence it is likely to have on policy, and the more likely it is to form (part of) the government. Unfortunately for the parties, vote-maximisation is often incompatible with either, or both, of the ultimate aims of policy- and/or office-maximisation. And the emergence of a conflict such as that over European integration in a party system derived from cleavages related to other dimensions makes such compatibility considerably more difficult to achieve. This is the core of the problem for the parties when the EU-conflict is salient.

When faced with a newly salient or resurgent political conflict, many political parties are faced with cross-pressures from various different 'actors', who may differ on which position to take on the issue(s) at hand. This affects the degree of synergy between the aims of party-, policy-, and office-maximisation, and party unity. Some of these actors are internal; party history, the party elite, and party members. Others are external; current voters, potential voters, coalition partners, as well as parties and actors outside the national arena. These are discussed in general terms below, and in country-specific terms in chapters four to seven. Figure 3.2 below illustrates the different environments and actors that a party may have to consider<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> See, for example, Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 80-81).

<sup>62</sup> See Tsebelis (1990) for an in-depth discussion of games in different arenas.

Figure 3.2. Party Environments and Relevant Actors.

| Arena No. | Environment | Actors  | Concerns  |
|-----------|-------------|---|---|
| 1         | Intra-party | Party-elite, party members  | Cohesion, compatibility with vote-maximisation and coalition-potential, jobs for party elites |
| 2         | Electoral   | Voters  | Vote-maximisation   |
| 3         | Inter-party | (Potential) coalition partners                                    | Compatibility with other parties  |
| 4         | European    | Foreign and pan-European parties and governments, EU institutions | Co-operation, recognition, power, influence   |

Another consideration is the information a party has from previous elections and the behaviour of party-members and -leaders on the dividing potential of the EU-conflict and on the willingness of pro/anti-EU voters to keep supporting the party. If it changes position, then it knows neither the extent to which this change would divide the party, nor how many of the party's voters would be willing to keep voting for it.

### 3.4.2 Intra-party conflicts.

Intra-party conflicts can lead to constraints on party policies. For example, rank-and-file party members may disagree with the party leadership and thus prevent certain policies from being pursued, even if they seem likely to win votes<sup>63</sup>. From what was argued above, this would appear to be irrational. However, this depends on the aim of the persons involved. For the political leadership, members of parliament and potential members of parliament, election and government power are likely to be the rational aims. But for the rank-and-file members other aims - identity, comradeship, common purpose, ideology *per se* - may be more important than election<sup>64</sup>. Also, some party

<sup>63</sup> Tsebelis (1990, chapter 5) illustrates this with the British Labour Party.

<sup>64</sup> See also Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 23-24, 57).

members may argue that although certain policies may appear popular and advantageous in the short term, other policies will give the party the advantage in the long term.

It should be stressed that it is not attempted here to explain how politicians initially formed their positions on EU-membership. This would involve a different research strategy from that employed here, focusing on the opinion formation of elites. Some politicians might have considered the position of their voters and party-members before making up their mind, others may not have. Some might listen to their spouses, their children, or their parents. It would appear, as outlined in the first section of chapters four to seven, that the majority of political leaders in these countries view EU-membership as a necessity for reasons of trade dependency and market access. Furthermore, it should not be discounted that political leaders consider the effect of EU-membership on their career prospects. It should also be noted that most party leaders decided on their initial attitude towards EU-membership before the EU-conflict reached a high level of salience. But once the party has established a policy, then the puzzle becomes why not more parties, upon realising the under-representation of the anti-EU view, pursue the anti-EU voters.

### 3.4.3 Vote-maximisation concerns.

Following Arrow<sup>65</sup>, parties can essentially adopt three positions on EU membership. They prefer membership in the EU (M) to non-membership (NM), they prefer NM to M,

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<sup>65</sup> Arrow (1963) states that, given the choice between two alternatives (e.g. X and Y), an individual has three options: to prefer X, to prefer Y, or to be indifferent. He then goes on to state that if an individual prefers X to Y and Y to Z, then he also prefers X to Z. This is the essence of what is termed transitivity of choices.

or they take an indifferent position. At time X (here the focus is on the last election before a EU-referendum) each party takes position M, NM, or indifferent with regard to EU-membership. Although there appears to be votes to be gained by assuming an anti-EU position, several factors complicate vote-maximisation based on the EU-conflict, even before the potential for intra-party conflicts and coalition problems are taken into account.

In order to account for the situation in the Nordic countries, the cleavage system must be taken into account. All four countries have multi-party systems. Many of the parties are supported by very distinct sections of the population. None of the parties are true 'catch-all'<sup>66</sup> parties. Nor are any of the party systems truly or completely uni-dimensional. Therefore, party competition does not conform to the central or median voter theorem<sup>67</sup>. This limits the effect of any newly salient<sup>68</sup> issue such as European integration, since none of the parties are likely to be able to appeal to all voters who agree with them on the EU-conflict. Parties have other policies and they also have identities, both of which limit their appeal to certain voters. History and tradition are also important in this respect. An ex-communist (or other far-left) party may find it difficult to appeal to more centrist, and especially right-leaning, voters even after it has shed its ideological baggage. And an ex-farmers party re-labelling and re-positioning itself as a Centre Party may still find it difficult to appeal to urban voters.

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<sup>66</sup> Kirchheimer, 1966.

<sup>67</sup> Black, 1958. This theorem makes the assumption that voters can be modelled based on a ideal point on a single policy dimension. Black then showed that this point is the only one that is preferred by some majority of voters to any other point on the policy dimension. Also see Downs (1957, chapter 8).

Thus, even with the conflict over European integration salient, voters are unlikely to cast their vote solely based on their position on European integration. And, if they do change their vote, then they are more likely to vote for a party close to their previous party on other dimensions, not one that is completely different<sup>69</sup>.

Furthermore, it may be in the interest of certain parties to attempt to limit the influence of a new conflict on voting behaviour purely for vote-maximisation purposes. Given the socialisation and institutionalisation of conflicts, it is of utmost importance to political actors that it is 'their' conflict(s) which become(s) salient. Hence, if a conflict involves parties A and B, it is in their mutual interest, despite their disagreements, that this conflict remains to the fore<sup>70</sup>. Conversely, "the substitution of conflicts is the most devastating kind of political strategy"<sup>71</sup>. In this case, the parties that are mainly differentiated along the left-right axis and have succeeded electorally based largely on this division have a considerable interest in trying to limit the effect of the EU-conflict on voting behaviour.

As argued above, it is the voters who oppose EU membership who lack representation in their respective parliaments. There may of course be some votes to be gained by a party stressing its pro-EU stance, but there appears to be more scope for increasing the party's number of votes by stressing an anti-EU stance. Thus, the main puzzle is why more parties do not oppose European integration.

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<sup>68</sup> One might argue that this conflict re-emerged in the late 1980's, rather than being new.

<sup>69</sup> This thesis will not develop an elaborate model for examining multidimensional equilibria. For investigations into this, see for example Kadane (1972) and Laver and Schepsle (1996).

<sup>70</sup> Mair, 1997, p. 951.

One explanation may be that the net effect of taking a strong position on EU-membership could alienate more voters than it will attract. This is of course a difficult assessment to make for the parties. However, from information sources such as opinion polls, local party branches, the media and public debate it will be possible for the parties to form a reasonable opinion of whether focusing on opposition to or support for EU membership is likely to be a vote winner.

The temptation to stress opposition to or support for EU membership will vary between the parties. If it appears that a clear majority of the party's voters are for EU membership, then it would appear that opposition to such membership risks alienating more voters than it will attract, and vice versa for a party whose opposition to EU membership is supported by a clear majority of its voters<sup>72</sup>. The closer a party's voters appear to being evenly (50/50) divided on this issue, the more difficult it will be for that party to position itself on EU-membership. Crucially, however, the potential for gaining new voters based on positioning on the EU-issue also depends upon how the other parties position themselves.

The next section will illustrate how a party might decide to position itself on this issue. For the purpose of this theoretical discussion, only three of the parties in the party system are considered for now. The three parties, A, B and C, are normally (without the EU-conflict being salient) potential coalition partners. Also, for now, it is assumed that voters will switch only between these parties based on position on the EU-conflict, and

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<sup>71</sup> Schattschneider, 1960, p. 91.

<sup>72</sup> Unless the electorate is extremely volatile.

not to any other parties. The parties' share of the vote is not material to this part of the discussion, so let it add up to 100 percent. It is also assumed that the EU-conflict is salient, and that the voters take it into consideration when they decide how to vote.

For illustration, it is assumed that a majority of the population in a certain country support EU-membership. Assuming all three parties remain in support of EU-membership, suppose the following distribution of opinion and share of the vote between three parties:

Table 3.1. Theoretical Distribution of Position on EU Membership and Share of Vote.

| Party | Position of voters on EU membership (percent) |        | Party's share of total vote (percent) | Proportion of all voters who: |        |
|-------|---|--------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|
|       | Support                                       | Oppose |                                       | Support                       | Oppose |
| A     | 90  | 10     | 60                                    | 54                            | 6      |
| B     | 10  | 90     | 20                                    | 2                             | 18     |
| C     | 40  | 60     | 20                                    | 8                             | 12     |
| Total |   |        | 100                                   | 64                            | 36     |

This situation gives parties B and C an incentive to change their stance and oppose EU-membership. Assuming that the voters would all change their preference based on their position on the EU-issue, then if either B or C change to opposition, the distribution of votes would change in accordance with the table below.

Table 3.2. Potential vote for parties if voters change party based on position on EU issue.

| Party | Party position | Share of vote | Party position | Share of vote | Party Position | Share of vote |
|-------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| A     | o              | 36            | s              | 55            | s              | 58            |
| B     | s              | 29            | o              | 36            | s              | 6             |
| C     | s              | 35            | s              | 9             | o              | 36            |

Key: o = oppose, s = support EU membership. It is assumed that each party keeps the voters who agree with the party's position, and that the distribution of changing votes is equal for each party.

As can be observed, party A is better off remaining in support of EU-membership. But each of B and C are worse off than before if the other changes position to opposing such membership. The rational action if one party defects from the common position appears to be for the other to also defect. Now the situation changes to that illustrated in table below. Note that with an unequal distribution among B and C of supporters and opponents of European integration one will be better rewarded for its opposition than the other.

Table 3.3. Potential vote for parties if voters change based on position on EU issue.

| Party | Party    | Share of | Party    | Share of | Party    | Share of |
|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|       | position | vote     | position | vote     | position | vote     |
| A     | o        | 12       | o        | 15       | s        | 64       |
| B     | o        | 24       | s        | 64       | o        | 21       |
| C     | s        | 64       | o        | 21       | o        | 15       |

Key and assumptions as in the previous table.

For party A, opposing European integration will invariably lead to an outcome worse than if it remains supportive of such integration. For B and C opposition is a tempting option. However, if B decides to oppose European integration this would then force C to do the same, and vice versa. Otherwise it would come out as the overall loser<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>73</sup> It is unlikely that all voters will change their vote based solely on the EU-issue becoming salient. Although in reality the effect will be less dramatic than that in this illustration, the direction of the effects is likely to be similar.



#### 3.4.4 Coalition considerations.

In the Nordic multi-party systems, it is rare for one party to have a majority of seats in parliament<sup>74</sup>. Therefore, coalition or some form of minority government is the norm. Even if a party can keep or increase its share of votes by opposing EU-membership, it still has to consider how this affects its potential as a coalition partner.

“Parties seek spatially closer coalition partners because they forecast eventual government policy to be closer to their own preferred policy as a result. It is also easier to arrive at a joint policy position with those whose preferences are substantively similar than with those whose preferences are different - each side needs to concede less to reach an agreement.”<sup>75</sup>

The left-right cleavage is normally dominant in the Nordic countries. Government alternatives are normally minority Social Democrat governments with support either from the far-left, centrist parties or ad-hoc support; or a coalition centred on the centre-right, excluding the far right<sup>76</sup>. This could limit a party's opportunities to exploit the EU-issue to increase its share of the vote. It is unlikely that a party will be able to co-operate with another party based only on their policies towards EU-membership coinciding.

Sartori<sup>77</sup> used the term ‘coalition potential’ as a post-dictive rather than as a predictive term. Following this, a party's coalition potential is determined by observing past

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<sup>74</sup> No party has achieved a majority on its own since 1970.

<sup>75</sup> Laver and Shepsle, 1996, pp. 186-187.

<sup>76</sup> The coalition alternatives are somewhat different in Finland. Traditionally they have been based mainly on the left-right axis, but after the last couple of elections the left-right dimension appears to have become less important for coalition formation.

<sup>77</sup> 1976, p. 123.

participation. Parties of the far-left and the far-right<sup>78</sup> are considered unlikely, but not impossible, coalition partners<sup>79</sup>. They have never formed part of a formal coalition agreement in three of the countries. In Finland, however, this exclusion has not applied.

The debate over, as well as the fact of, EU-membership entails numerous practical policy decisions that must be taken by the government. Hence, any government must be able to reach agreement on a whole host of policies related to European integration, both with regard to integration as such, and with regard to specific policies.

Again considering the relationship between parties A, B and C, let us now evaluate how the EU-conflict might affect coalition formation. It is again assumed that the parties support EU membership, and also that they are able to form a coalition. In coalition they are likely to be able to form a government. It is also assumed that co-operation between all three parties is needed to form a viable coalition, two is not sufficient. Disagreement on European integration among the coalition partners would be detrimental for the overall coalition. For this reason, the parties have an incentive not to defect from a common position as long as the others do not defect either.

However, as demonstrated above, because of lack of representation for opponents of EU-membership, there appears to be votes to be gained by changing position on this dimension. Unless all three parties change position, however, the coalition will be jeopardised and none of the parties will be able to participate in government.

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<sup>78</sup> Laver and Schofield (1990, p. 200) classify the DFRP and the NFRP among, at one stage or another, 'pariah parties'.

<sup>79</sup> Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 200-201) outline the dangers of assuming any party is actually 'uncoalitionable'.

An additional incentive to co-operate is present if a majority of the leaders of the coalition-partners (assuming they can get agreement from the rest of their respective parties) have strong and similar beliefs about European integration. In the cases considered here that position would seem to be support for such integration, given the party positions. This will then reinforce the incentive to co-operate and not defect.

Yet another incentive for a pro-EU position is that EU-membership increases the numbers of high-powered, highly paid jobs available to politicians. This is especially the case for politicians in a small country. There is the highly coveted job as member of the EU Commission, and various jobs in the Commission bureaucracy. There are also positions in the EP. This also gives an extra element of motivation to aim for government, since members of government parties are more likely to receive many of these positions.

A related concern is the need to consider the interests and views of other European politicians and of the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU. Even as a member of a coalition government containing pro-EU parties, anti-EU politicians would be unlikely to be met with a positive attitude from pro-EU politicians from other countries and from representatives and employees of the EU. (A wholly anti-EU government would presumably aim to leave the EU.)

Now let it be assumed that one of the parties, A, has pre-committed itself to supporting membership no matter what B and C do<sup>80</sup>. This makes sense considering the great majority of A's supporters who support such a policy. Now B and C are involved in a non-zero-sum<sup>81</sup> game<sup>82</sup>. If one of them defects it has great potential to increase its vote, mainly at the expense of the other. However, at the same time the coalition is jeopardised. This is illustrated in the model below, where D = defect, and C = co-operate.

Figure 3.3. Co-operation Game.

|                |   | <b>Party B</b> |     |
|----------------|---|----------------|-----|
|                |   | C              | D   |
| <b>Party C</b> | C | 4,4            | 1,3 |
|                | D | 3,1            | 2,2 |

The model has two equilibria, D,D and C,C. However, only C,C is pareto-optimal. That is, no other outcome is preferred unanimously<sup>83</sup>. If one of B or C defects, then it is rational for the other to also defect. However, by doing so, they jeopardise the coalition. Thus, it would be better to remain in support of European integration and retain the coalition arrangement. This is the only pareto-optimal outcome. The likely outcome of A's action is therefore to force B and C to co-operate, and the game becomes a co-operative game.

<sup>80</sup> For the effects of pre-commitment in n-person games, see Taylor and Ward (1982, especially pp. 365-370).

<sup>81</sup> That is, a game in which some outcomes yield a greater aggregate outcome than others, hence the parties have a common interest in achieving a higher-payoff outcome. See, for example, McLean (1991, p. 498).

<sup>82</sup> The theory of games was invented by John von Neumann in the 1920s. It was first applied to social science in the 'The Theories of Games and Economic Behaviour' by von Neumann and Morgenstern (McLean, 1991, p. 498).

<sup>83</sup> See, for example, Schofield (1996, p. 197).

As long as party B supports membership in the EU, then party C is likely to do the same (and vice versa), because to do otherwise would jeopardise the coalition. But if either one defects, then the other is likely to do the same, as the coalition is already ruined and non-defection could lead to massive loss of votes.

But if priority is given to vote-maximisation over coalition considerations, then the parties are faced with a collective action problem. “A collective action problem is any situation in which players’ individually rational actions lead to an outcome which could have been bettered if players had chosen differently.”<sup>84</sup> The potential outcomes would change to those in the illustration below.

Figure 3.4. Prisoners Dilemma.

|                |   | <b>Party B</b> |     |
|----------------|---|----------------|-----|
|                |   | C              | D   |
| <b>Party C</b> | C | 3,3            | 1,4 |
|                | D | 4,1            | 2,2 |

Now the parties face a classic prisoner’s dilemma<sup>85</sup>. There is no longer a pareto-optimal outcome, both parties prefer defection to co-operation. If the other player does not co-operate, then each player prefers D. But if the other player does co-operate, then each player also prefers D. Therefore, D,D is the only equilibrium. But D,D is pareto-inferior, since it destroys the coalition. However, this may not be the case if B or C can form an alternative coalition, and/or increase its share of the vote sufficiently. This is considered below.

<sup>84</sup> McLean, 1991, p. 500.

<sup>85</sup> See, for example, Taylor and Ward (1982, pp 351-352)


Let us now remove the assumption of voters only moving between the coalition partners, A, B and C, and consider the effect of, and positions taken by, X other parties in the party system. With the EU issue salient, and potential for loss of voters to parties outside the coalition, the situation becomes quite different.

If a large number of their voters consider EU-membership to be important, then parties B and C may not be able to maintain their position. A new party may form and drain their support from opponents of EU-membership, or other parties in the party system may hold or take up an anti-EU position, with similar results. This increases the pressure on B and C to defect. If their share of the vote declines sufficiently, then they may not be able to form part of a coalition anyway. At some point it becomes rational to pursue pure vote maximisation, even if this is detrimental to coalition potential. It would seem that these parties face a choice between keeping the coalition intact and losing, or forfeiting a chance to increase their share of, votes, or destroying the coalition but retaining or increasing their share of the vote.

However, there are other options. If the coalition is to be kept, then these are basically two. One is to persuade a large enough majority of voters to support a pro-EU position, so that the temptation for vote-maximisation based on an anti-EU position is reduced. So far, this strategy has not been successful in any of the Nordic countries. A second, and as will be shown in this thesis, more common strategy, is to remove the issue from the political agenda related to national elections, or at the very least relegate it to where its impact is reduced as much as possible. For this purpose, the referendum is a very useful device. In addition, the direct elections to the EP are also helpful.

It might still be tempting for a political party to focus on the EU conflict simply to increase its share of votes. However, if the party in doing so makes coalition with (a) previous coalition partner(s) impossible, then in order to retain or improve its chances of governing the party must achieve one out of two feats, or a combination of the two. The first is to increase its share of the vote to a level where it compensates for the loss of coalition partner(s). The second is to find new coalition-partners. However, this option is complicated by at least two difficulties. Firstly, the new partners must be in close agreement on this dimension. Secondly, this option requires that votes gained must not be excessively at the cost of the votes of potential new partners. If they are, then the net gain for the new coalition may not be sufficient. Furthermore, it may lead the potential new coalition partners to reject such an arrangement. Figure 3.5 below illustrates these options.

Figure 3.5. Party options.



These considerations are less likely to apply to the parties on the extreme left and the extreme right. These parties are not likely to form part of a government coalition. Therefore, the incentive to stick to the dominant position is much smaller or even non-existent<sup>86</sup>. Their main concern on this dimension is more likely, compared to the more 'mainstream' parties, to be geared towards vote-maximisation. However, even such parties need to balance their efforts somewhat:

“The outsiders, parties which are never or seldom in office, have the best opportunities of being effective vote seekers. However, if such a party wants to be an office-seeking party as well, the forms of vote seeking must be moderate. If the major cabinet parties are attacked too aggressively, the party remains an outsider. On the other hand, the greater the legislative weight of the party, the greater value the party will receive as a potential partner in future governing coalitions.”<sup>87</sup>

Thus, for these parties the decision of whether to support or oppose EU membership will mainly depend upon two factors. Firstly, the attitude of the parties' supporters to this question. This is important for the judgement of which position would alienate more old supporters and members than it would attract new ones, and also which position is more likely to lead to internal party conflicts. Secondly, how the other parties behave. If they are all supporting EU membership, then there is greater potential for gaining votes than if some other parties are, or if one other party is, also opposing EU membership.

At this point two further elements need to be considered. One is 'rational extremism'. This involves trying to commit your party to a position which is a vote-loser. If

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<sup>86</sup> Although the size of this incentive does vary. As shall be demonstrated in chapters four to seven, some of the extreme parties do co-operate with other parties, even if they are not in a formal coalition arrangement with them. Hence, these parties have some incentive to stick to the dominant position.



members, activists and leaders of party B see little difference between the policies of the coalition it can participate in and those of other government alternatives, and believe opposition to EU-membership is important over all other issues, then there is little reason for not focusing strongly on this opposition. With this scenario, you are no worse off if your party loses than if your party wins. In this situation, 'policy sincerity' could override coalition concerns.

For some parties there might be alternatives to coalition that can also give considerable influence. If, for example, party C can reasonably expect to be able to influence government policy through more informal influence over government policy-making, then defection becomes a more attractive option - even more so if combined with policy sincerity. However, this is only an option if it is not possible to form a majority government without C's participation. Furthermore, without ministries and access to government meetings C's influence would be much reduced compared to coalition participation<sup>88</sup>. Hence, on its own this may not be enough to persuade C to defect. However, if combined with potential loss of voters, policy sincerity, other potential coalition partners and rational extremism, then it might be. And, of course, the more of these factors that combine in favour of defection, the more attractive this option becomes.

However, the main problem for the parties when deciding how to deal with the EU-conflict is to find a balance between maximising votes and retaining both party cohesion and its coalition potential. For many parties maximising votes on the basis of the EU-

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<sup>87</sup> Isaksson, 1994, p. 106.

<sup>88</sup> Laver and Schofield, 1990, chapter 3, especially pp. 53-57.

conflict is such an uncertain proposition that it is not worth the concurrent risk of jeopardising party cohesion and coalition potential. That is, a vote maximisation strategy would be in conflict with other aims. In this situation, the latter considerations get priority, but only as long as a substantial vote loss can be prevented.

### 3.4.5 The voter and the EU-conflict. The problem of cross-pressures and objectionable parties.

As the data on the voting in EU-referendums by party in Appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3 and Tables 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3 on party position show, many voters face cross-pressures when the EU-conflict is salient. If this dimension is important enough for the voter, then he may vote for a party different from the one he would otherwise (this conflict not being salient) vote for. But the salience of the EU-conflict may also lead him to abstain, so that he will neither vote against his otherwise favoured party, but nor will he support a position on European integration that he disagrees with. Of course, the difficulty faced depends very much on how strongly the voter supports any one party, and how strongly he feels about European integration. This is illustrated by Figure 3.6:

Figure 3.6.

| <b>Voter disagrees with his party's position on European integration</b> |                             |                    |
|--|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| <b><u>Degree of disagreement</u></b>                                     | <b><u>Party support</u></b> |                    |
|  | <u>Strong</u>               | <u>Weak</u>        |
| <u>Strong</u>  | Abstain                     | Vote against party |
| <u>Weak</u>  | Vote for party              | ?                  |

Take the case of a voter who would, without the EU-conflict being salient, have a clear preference for a certain party. If he disagrees with that party's position on EU-

membership, then his decision is now more complicated. The salience of the EU-conflict may move him from strong support for a certain party to weak support, or even to support another party. By moving away from one party he has to consider the merit(s) of supporting other parties. These parties may be parties he has previously been able to dismiss with ease, because they were clearly objectionable in some important respect. But now his previously favoured party is also objectionable in an important respect. Therefore, he must seek more information about other parties than was previously necessary. This increases the cost of voting, and therefore the chance of the abstention<sup>89</sup>.

But even abstention, if that is an option the potential voter is comfortable with, is likely to be costlier than being able to vote for an established favoured party. In order to reach the abstention decision, he would have to evaluate the importance of disagreeing with his (previously) favoured party's position on European integration, and probably do some research on other parties to establish whether he can vote for them. It would therefore be preferable to such a voter not to have to deal with the EU-conflict in national elections. Removing the conflict from this arena would reduce his information costs, and also reduce the chance of abstention, which may be an undesirable option.

However, many voters will also want a say in their country's policies with regard to European integration. Establishing a preference over whether your country should be a member of the EU and which level of integration is the most desirable requires information. But if this decision can be removed from the normal national election agenda, then the decision becomes simpler. The voters' concern for the position of his

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<sup>89</sup> See, for example, Downs (1957, chapters 12-14) for the cost of information and the likelihood of abstention.

otherwise favoured party would be greatly reduced if the EU-conflict does not affect, or has a very limited effect on, the domestic political system. Hence, his information costs would be reduced. Therefore, the holding of referendums over European integration is likely to be in the interest of the voter who finds himself in a cross-pressure situation on this dimension.

EU-referendums also provide a good opportunity for a protest-vote, in the cases considered here in the form of a vote against the predominantly pro-EU ruling elite. This can be done in the knowledge that the government will keep the country close to the EU anyway, through arrangements such as the EEA, economic policy adjustments, free-trade agreements, etc. This also goes some way to explain the very different voting patterns in elections to the EP. These elections provide an opportunity to voice an opinion on the process of European integration without considering how your vote affects the domestic party system.

The difficulty faced by voters in a cross-pressure situation is often exacerbated by the 'objectionable factor'. In particular, this is a problem for anti-EU voters. With the exception of Norway, nearly all relevant parties opposing membership are to be found on the far left or the far right, or among protest and anti-establishment parties. This makes it less likely that the voter will cast his vote on the basis of his position on European integration. Although he can find parties that agree with his position on this issue, the likelihood is also that he so strongly disagrees with many other policies of these parties that he either remains loyal to his old party or abstains.

However, if many voters disagree with their party's position on EU-membership, then it is likely average party loyalty will decline as a result of the EU-conflict being salient. If this happens, then the number of 'floating voters' will increase. This is likely to lead to changes in voting patterns, although these may not be directly related to the fit of a voters' EU-position with that of a party. Disagreement with the position of a previously favoured party may simply lead the voter to consider other parties, and hence to greater volatility.

#### 3.4.6 The solution for both parties and voters: Remove the conflict from the national election agenda as much as possible.

##### *Referendums on European integration.*

Lewin proposes '8 strategies if you are losing' at a meeting of an association<sup>90</sup>. These include denying that the body is qualified to make a decision. Lewin contends that this is often argued on constitutional grounds<sup>91</sup>. This is the strategy followed by a majority of the Nordic political parties with regard to the EU-conflict. By holding referendums on EU membership and further integration and through EP elections most parties and voters avoid or at least reduce the problems outlined above. This allows the majority of the parties to reduce, or perhaps even avoid, loss of votes due to discrepancies between the party's position on European integration and the position of its (potential) voters. Most parties also reduce the risk of internal splits, and the risk of coalition breakdown is limited. Many voters avoid the cross-pressures created by a salient EU-conflict.

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<sup>90</sup> Lewin, 1988, pp. 13-21.

<sup>91</sup> Lewin, 1988, p. 15.

Another strategy is to refer the issue to another body where the potential loser has better hopes of success<sup>92</sup>. This has also played a part in the strategies followed by the parties. This latter strategy becomes necessary when constitutional requirements for super-majorities apply to EU-membership or participation in further European integration, and such majorities cannot be found. The referendum then becomes an alternative way of securing the governments' (and its supporters') preferred outcome.

#### *Elections to the European Parliament.*

As is the case in other countries, turnout at EP elections has been low in the Nordic countries compared to national elections<sup>93</sup>. Considering the very limited powers exercised by the EP, this is entirely understandable, and compatible with rational behaviour. When the institution itself has a low level of power, the differentiation in policy between the parties becomes less important as well.

The EP elections in Denmark have turned into 'mini-referendums' on Danish EU-membership, and it looks as if EP elections in Sweden and Finland might follow similar patterns. (See chapters four, five and seven for data.) This further alleviates pressure on the national election agenda. Attention to EU-matters - including the question of membership itself - can be referred to EP-elections (and referendums).

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<sup>92</sup> Lewin, 1988, p. 15-16.

<sup>93</sup> 52.9 percent in Denmark in 1994, 61.1 percent in Finland in 1996, and 41 percent in Sweden in 1995, compared to between 70 and 90 percent at national elections.

Through this disassociation of European integration from the national electoral arena, the parties can hope to avoid or reduce internal splits<sup>94</sup>, loss of votes and damage to coalition prospects. And the voter can avoid or at least reduce cross-pressures.

### **3.5 Conclusion.**

Rational choice theory is introduced for the purpose of addressing two of the main aspects of this thesis. Firstly, in building a model for understanding the effects of the conflict over EU membership on individual utility in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Secondly, in developing a model for understanding the effect of this conflict on the party systems in these four countries.

By exploring the potential for EU-membership to affect utility with regard to a number of factors it has been established which factors are likely to be the more important. The realistic assumption is made that an arrangement similar to EEA-membership is the most likely alternative to EU-membership. This has the effect of reducing, but not removing, the importance of several factors, such as prices, taxes, and trading concerns. Importantly, EU-membership includes common policies in agriculture and fisheries, whilst the EEA-treaty does not.

Among the factors common to people across each country, and to some extent the entire region, concerns about national sovereignty, the quality of democracy, and the ability to influence EU-legislation are likely to be the most important. The most important among

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<sup>94</sup> By giving an outlet for internal dissent to the party's official position.

group differentiated factors can be arranged into two categories: rural-urban differences of interest, and utility derived from the size of the welfare state.

Directly, farming and fisheries employ a small minority of people in the Nordic countries. However, many jobs are directly and indirectly dependent upon these industries, and in rural areas large sections of the population are dependent upon the primary industries. Hence, it would be highly detrimental to the utility of rural people if EU-membership had a negative effect on the primary industries, and vice versa. The urban population, however, is likely to have no direct, and a very limited indirect, interest in the fate of rural areas. The utility of urbanites with respect to the relationship between primary industries and EU-membership depends largely upon the effect this is likely to have, or has had, on prices of food and drink.

The welfare state benefits some groups of people in the Nordic countries considerably more than others. Members of these groups are more likely to oppose membership, because it can be argued that it is likely that EU-membership will ultimately reduce the Nordic welfare state. Those who support the welfare state for more ideological reasons are also more likely to oppose EU-membership.

For most of the political parties, the salience of the EU-conflict makes their situation more complicated. The reason for this is that it becomes more complicated for parties to reconcile the aims of office maximisation, vote maximisation and party unity.

Some parties have an easier task than others in deciding on the best policy on European integration generally and EU-membership in particular, either because some actors and



aims are less important to them than they are to other parties, or because there is a high degree of correspondence in the views of the different actors, and hence the different aims can be easier reconciled.

For the parties who find a high level of conflict between their actors, and therefore have difficulties in reconciling their various aims, off-loading the EU-conflict onto other arenas than national elections is the most advantageous solution. The referendum is the main off-loading mechanism employed, but EP elections also serve as a useful device in this regard. This off-loading of the EU-conflict also suits many voters, for who cross-pressures at national elections are greatly reduced.

The next four chapters utilise the cleavage model outlined in Chapter 2, and the rational choice based models developed in this chapter to analyse the effect of the EU-conflict on the utility of the population of the Nordic countries, and the effect of this conflict on the party-systems of these countries.

## **Chapter 4. Denmark. A Nordic nationalist in Europe.**

*"Within the Six, Germany will occupy an overshadowing position of dominance. Even if time does heal many wounds, it is with Germany that Denmark has had so many great troubles throughout its history. We cannot grant to German ministers the right to decide the level of unemployment in this country."*<sup>1</sup>

### **4.1 Introduction.**

Denmark joined the then EC in 1973, after a 1972 referendum gave the Folketing a popular mandate to do so. However, ever since then, the Danish people and many political parties have had a problematic relationship with what is now the EU. So far the biggest crisis was the rejection of the TEU in the 1992 referendum, but by 1997 several other potential problems loomed ahead<sup>2</sup>. Two episodes serve to illustrate this problem.

In 1986 the SEA was voted down in the Folketing by 80 votes to 75. This was against the policy of the centre-right government headed by Poul Schlüter. Therefore, the government decided to hold an ad-hoc, non-binding referendum as a means of overturning the parliamentary vote. In the campaign leading up to the referendum,

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<sup>1</sup> Hans Rasmussen, leader of the second largest Danish trade union, at the Social Democrats' party conference in 1961. Quoted in Miljan, p. 168. From Politiken, 14 June 1961, as cited in Nielsson, G. P.: Denmark and European Integration: A small country at the crossroads. (University of California, 1966, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. On file at University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, p. 532.)

<sup>2</sup> Of which the most important were a constitutional challenge to the legality of signing the TEU, how EMU will affect Denmark when it comes into effect, and the May 1998 referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty. The constitutional challenge was rejected unanimously by the Danish high court April 6, 1998. (the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 7/4/98, <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/d37412.htm>, 24/04/98)

Schlüter declared the idea of a Political Union as 'stone dead'<sup>3</sup>. In the referendum, 56.2 percent of the participating citizens voted 'yes' to Denmark ratifying the SEA, and the Folketing duly did so.

In 1992 the Folketing voted 130-25 in support of Denmark signing the TEU. Because this is less than a 5/6th majority, the constitution required this decision be confirmed by a referendum before Denmark could sign the treaty<sup>4</sup>. In this campaign, some supporters of the TEU, notably Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen, stressed the political content of the TEU. In the referendum, 50.7 percent of the participating citizens voted 'no'<sup>5</sup> to Denmark signing the TEU<sup>6</sup>.

The difference in these results illustrates the general attitude towards European integration among the Danish population. As long as integration is seen as predominantly economic, not political, the level of support is generally higher than when the content of integration is more overtly political.

Denmark both wants and needs trade arrangements with as many other European countries as possible. However, most of the population, and many of the political parties, have traditionally preferred a co-operation arrangement between independent states to supranational integration.

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<sup>3</sup> Petersen, 1993, p. 197.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix 4.1 for details about the use of referendums in Denmark.

<sup>5</sup> Befolkning og valg, 9/1993, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> These referendums and the 1993 referendum are covered in more detail below.

The first section of this chapter covers Denmark's international relations generally, and relations with the Community in particular. The second evaluates the factors likely to influence an individual's estimation of the effects of European integration on his expected utility. Section three evaluates the effect the conflict over European integration has had on the Danish party system, employing both the cleavage model developed in Chapter 2, and the rational choice based model developed in Chapter 3.

## **4.2. A historical review of Denmark's relations with the EC and the EU.**

### **4.2.1 Denmark's international relations after World War II.**

After 1945 Denmark attempted to re-establish its neutrality, and enthusiastically supported the formation of the UN. However, when attempts at forming a Nordic defence union failed in 1948-9, Denmark joined NATO with Norway. Thus Denmark's foreign and security policy became tied to the UK and the US<sup>7</sup>.

In its relations with the rest of Europe after 1945, Denmark has had two main concerns. The first has been to ensure the best possible access for its main export markets, especially for agricultural products. The second that, if possible, some degree of unity and co-operation with the other Nordic countries be maintained.

Trade concerns have usually taken precedence over the attachment to maintaining some measure of Nordic unity. In terms of trade, the Nordic markets have been of secondary importance to Denmark. In 1958 25.9 percent of Denmark's exports went to the UK, and

20.1 percent to West Germany. The other Nordic countries accounted for only 14.1 percent of Denmark's exports between them. The other five original members of the EC made up a further 8.5 percent of Denmark's total exports<sup>8</sup> Thus, concerning trade, it was most important for Denmark to secure access to the British and the West German markets at this time.

In 1958 Danish industry exported about two thirds of its production, as did Danish farmers. Crucially, the EFTA arrangement did not include any agreement on trade in agricultural goods, on which almost half of Denmark's exports depended. Danish farmers feared that they would be out-competed in the EC and that a later membership would be too late, as Danish agriculture would be in decline before then<sup>9</sup>.

EFTA membership and trade dependence linked Denmark's policy towards European integration with the British position, which was opposed to far-reaching such integration. Thus, when Britain changed its position on membership, Denmark followed and applied for EEC-membership in 1961, 1967, and 1970<sup>10</sup>.

#### 4.2.2. Denmark and European Integration 1961-1972.

Denmark and the UK formally applied for membership of the EEC on August 10, 1961. In January 1963 Charles de Gaulle offered the Danish Prime Minister, Krag, separate full membership in the EEC or a form of associate membership. Krag immediately

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<sup>7</sup> Sørensen, 1978, pp 34-5.

<sup>8</sup> OECD. Quoted in Wijkman, 1990, p. 93.

<sup>9</sup> Sørensen, 1978, chapter 2.

consulted Macmillan, and declared that this was not an option for Denmark, and that a split in EFTA would not happen<sup>11</sup>. The negotiations broke down later that same month.

Throughout the 1960's there was very little popular opposition to Danish EEC-membership. Eleven Gallup polls from 1961 to 1970 showed that, on average, in this period only eight percent of the electorate opposed Danish membership, 52 percent supported it, and 40 percent were undecided<sup>12</sup>. Only the SF was clearly against Danish EEC membership in both 1961 and in 1967.

During 1971 and 1972, opposition to membership surged. Fifteen Gallup polls showed that, on average, 41 percent of the Danish population supported membership, 30 percent opposed it, and 29 percent were undecided<sup>13</sup>. The DSD won the elections in September 1971. The new Prime Minister, Krag, decided to hold the referendum on EC membership one week after the Norwegian one, on October 2, 1972<sup>14</sup>. The referendum resulted in 63.4 percent voting 'yes' and 36.6 percent voting 'no' to membership, on a turnout of 90.1 percent. On January 1, 1973, Denmark joined the EC.

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<sup>10</sup> Sandegren (1969), Worre (1987, footnote 4). Also Miljan (1977) and Sørensen (1978) for accounts of how Danish applications were tied to the British ones.

<sup>11</sup> Miljan, 1977, p. 176.

<sup>12</sup> Worre, 1987, p. 81.

<sup>13</sup> Worre, 1987, p. 81.

<sup>14</sup> Sørensen, 1978, p. 81. Strictly speaking, it might not have been necessary to have a referendum on the matter of Danish membership in the EC. Section 20 of the 1953 constitution allows "powers vested in the authorities of the realm ... [to be] delegated to international authorities...." However, it then goes on to state that "for the passing of a Bill dealing with the above, a majority of five-sixth of the Members of the Folketing shall be required" and that if this cannot be achieved then the matter shall be decided by a referendum. (Miljan, 1977, p. 182, from The Constitution of Denmark, Paragraph 20.) However, the Constitution also allows for the submission to a referendum of a Bill passed by the Folketing if so demanded by one third of its members. The DSD held 34.6 percent of the seats, and declared that there should be a referendum on membership of the EEC in any case.

#### 4.2.3 Denmark and European integration 1972-1995.

After the 1972 referendum popular Danish support for EC/EU-membership declined. For the rest of the 1970's, the blocks supporting and opposing membership were of fairly even size with 40 percent popular support for each. In the early eighties, opinion polls consistently showed majorities against EC-membership<sup>15</sup>. However, it would seem that the undecided tend to opt for membership when they have to make their minds up.

In 1972 opinion polls had indicated that the two sides were much closer than the final result showed. And the result of the ad hoc referendum on the SEA (February 26, 1986) also contrasted with the majority of opinion polls of the preceding decade. Also, by supporting the SEA, a majority of Danes voted for continued membership in an EC that seemed set to increase its powers and integration efforts dramatically<sup>16</sup>.

It has been claimed that Danes only agreed to become members of the EC because they believed that it was mainly of an economic nature and that the political element was negligible. "In 1972 a majority of the population expressed negative attitudes to political integration, but proponents managed to convince the voters that the issue was all about the economy, and the Danes voted YES according to a so-called 'economic logic.'"<sup>17</sup>

Siune repeats this line of argument for the 1986 referendum<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Worre, 1987, p. 81.

<sup>16</sup> Miljan, 1977, p. 184.

<sup>17</sup> Siune, 1993, p. 94.

<sup>18</sup> Siune, 1993, p. 94.

In fact, the EC that Denmark joined in 1973 was largely economic in character, with political integration limited to the co-operation needed to carry out the economic collaboration. However, as economic integration has increased, many EC member-states have increasingly argued that there is a need for political integration to accompany this. Of course, political integration has been a distant goal all along, but it only gained momentum with the SEA. By 1992 the EC was a much more closely integrated area than it had been when Denmark joined in 1973, and the TEU increased this integration further. The TEU also stressed political integration more overtly than earlier treaties.

Given Danish opposition to political integration, one could question the wisdom of the decision to take the TEU to the people. However, because of the precedence of the referendums of 1972 and 1986, the Danes had come to expect referendums over serious EC matters. Thus it had become politically impossible to ratify the TEU treaty without a referendum. This was held on June 2, 1992, in accordance with paragraph 20 of the constitution. Significantly, this makes the result binding on the Folketing, which could thus not overrule the referendum result.

On a turnout of 83 percent, a majority of 50.7 percent rejected the TEU. However, this result left Denmark in a European limbo. Furthermore, it jeopardised the entire TEU<sup>19</sup>. Consequently, some solution had to be found. It would seem to make sense to give

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<sup>19</sup> The TEU had to be ratified by all the member-states to come into effect. Without Danish agreement, this would not happen. Theoretically, the other eleven states could proceed with a modified TEU that excluded Denmark. However, this would also be problematic. Firstly, because the British government had already said that it would not ratify the TEU unless Denmark did. Secondly, even if the UK government could be persuaded, it would effectively mean Danish withdrawal from the Community. This would create negative publicity for the whole integration project. For Denmark the main



Denmark certain opt-outs from the Treaty in the areas that appeared to be most objectionable to the Danes, and that this might enable Denmark to sign the treaty.

In October 1992 the RV and the DSD were invited by the SF to discuss a possible 'National Compromise' on the TEU. They agreed on a document labelled 'Denmark in Europe', and the centre-right government had little choice but to accept the contents of this. The central part of the National Compromise consisted of a demand for four exemptions in order for Denmark to take part in the EU: "(1) Denmark does not participate in the so-called defence policy dimension involving membership of the Western European Union and a common defence policy or a common defence; (2) Denmark does not participate in the single currency and the economic policy obligations linked to the third stage of the EMU; (3) Denmark is not committed in relation to union citizenship; and (4) Denmark cannot accept the transfer of sovereignty in the area of justice and police affairs."<sup>20</sup>

Denmark also demanded that these limitations should be legally binding for all the members of the EU for an unlimited period<sup>21</sup>. The exact implications of the exemptions were somewhat unclear, since they referred to a future contingency (EMU 3<sup>rd</sup> phase), broad unbinding formulations (defence, police and justice), and symbolic rejection (citizenship, Denmark had already indicated it would give EC residents the rights involved). In Edinburgh the European Council reached an agreement at its meeting on December 11-12, 1992, that largely approved the Danish demands. This allowed for a

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problem was uncertainty about what Denmark's relationship with the EU would be if it had to withdraw from this project.

<sup>20</sup> Svensson, 1994, pp 71-72.

<sup>21</sup> Svensson, 1994, pp 71-72.

new referendum to be held, on this 'Son of Maastricht'. In the referendum on May 18, 1993, 56.7 percent voted in favour of the Edinburgh Agreement, with a turnout of 86.5 percent.

### **4.3 Danish attitudes towards EU membership.**

#### **4.3.1 Common economic factors.**

Denmark is a net recipient of funds from the EU. In 1995 Denmark received ecu 306 million more from the EU than it contributed<sup>22</sup>. Hence, the average Dane sees his utility increase as a result of EU-membership based on this factor.

When Denmark joined the EC in 1973 it had a relatively high level of taxation. But although Denmark has been a member of the Community for well over two decades now, there is no evidence that this has had any substantial effect on the overall tax level. (See Table B for data.) The main reason for this is that most matters of taxation remain in the national domain. Competitive pressures from the internal market seem to have had a minimal effect on tax policies. A large part of the reason for this is probably that the average EU tax level has become more similar to that of Denmark. In addition, the competitive effects of the internal market are unlikely to have had their full effect yet. Nevertheless, low observable changes derived from membership combined with uncertainty about the overall effect means that, with regard to this factor, EU membership is unlikely to have much effect on individual utility. Effects on taxation

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<sup>22</sup> The Economist, 23/11/96.

were not mentioned by those surveyed by Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard<sup>23</sup> to a sufficient extent to warrant specific mention.

Regarding the effects of membership on prices and unemployment, the arguments are largely the same as for taxation. Internal market pressures may keep the price-level down, but alternatives to EU-membership are likely to have similar effects. The most likely exception to this argument concerns food-prices. As a non-EU member Denmark would be unlikely to take part in the CAP, and thus in theory be free to set a national level of agricultural subsidies and potentially also a price policy different from that of the EU. However, there is great uncertainty as to what would happen to Danish food prices if Denmark left the EU. Hence, this factor is unlikely to substantially affect individual utility. The price level was not mentioned specifically in the 1992-survey by Siune et al.

The unemployment level in Denmark has not varied significantly from the EC/EU average over the last ten years, as Table C shows<sup>24</sup>. One might argue that it would differ more, for better or for worse, if Denmark was outside the EU. However, a comparison with the other Nordic countries shows such variation across the region that a prediction of the relationship between EU-membership and unemployment appears futile. On the

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<sup>23</sup> 1994. Unless otherwise specified, numbers referring to arguments for and against EU-membership in this and the next three sub-sections are from this survey. Note that those surveyed were permitted to give as many reasons as they wanted to. The average number of reasons given was 1.1 for 'yes'-voters and 1.6 for 'no'-voters.

<sup>24</sup> Although the development of the unemployment level in Denmark does have some interesting correlation with attitudes to Community membership. In 1972 3.6 percent of Danes were unemployed. By 1977 this had increased to 11.4 percent, and more Danes were hostile to membership, as Table 4.2 shows. By 1986 the unemployment level was down to 7.9 percent, and the EU much more favourably viewed. But by 1992 unemployment was back up to 11.4 percent. (Source: Statistisk tiårsoversikt, 1993)

other hand, unemployment had been used by the 'yes'-side as an argument in favour of integration in the 1986 referendum campaign. Since then unemployment had increased, contrary to assertions made by the pro-integrationists. This may have led to further mistrust of what politicians promised in the 1992 campaign<sup>25</sup>. But the data in Appendix 4.2 does not support this theory, with the ten percent of those surveyed who mentioned employment giving it as a reason for voting 'yes'. Overall, it is unlikely that concern for employment has had considerable effect on utility emanating from membership. Overall, it is difficult to identify any factor in this category where EU-membership has anything more than a marginal effect on a Danes' utility.

#### 4.3.2 Common non-economic factors.

In Chapter 3 it is argued that the transfer of policy-areas and power to the EU *per se* may affect an individual's utility, depending upon the value he assigns to power resting with the nation-state and his (dis)approval of the EU-form of European integration. It appears that there is a strong nationalist element in the opposition to EU membership in Denmark<sup>26</sup>. Appendix 4.2 shows that 43 percent of those asked gave 'surrendering of sovereignty' as a reason for voting 'no'. Moreover, eleven percent mentioned that 'the EC shall not have decision-making powers over Danish legislation'. Hence, effects on national self-determination appear to be a very substantial part of the reasoning behind

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<sup>25</sup> Siune, 1993a, pp. 101-2.

<sup>26</sup> Reddy (1993, pp. 130-131) argues Danes feel that their culture is quite distinct from other European cultures, and very proud of it, perhaps because of the ample opportunities they have had in comparing themselves with others, such as Germans, the English, Jews, Greenlanders and other Scandinavians.

voting 'no'<sup>27</sup>. A large number of voters appear to believe that EU-membership *per se* decreases their utility.

This is likely related to the ambitions set out in the TEU. Mouritzen argues that concern about the 'United States of Europe' trend was the main force behind the Danish 'no' in 1992. "Common defence, common currency, sovereignty over justice and police matters, along with Union citizenship, are all symbolic attributes of statehood - even if only perspectives for the future."<sup>28</sup>

In the survey by Siune et al., 26 percent of those asked gave as their reason for voting 'no' that they did not want co-operation in a variety of policy-areas, notably defence. Similarly, Table 4.1 below shows that the more openly political the European integration process becomes, the less Danes are likely to approve of it.

Table 4.1. Areas to be included in EC co-operation. Percent.

|   | May 1992 | June 1992 | May 1993 |
|---|----------|-----------|----------|
| Breaking down barriers of trade and customs tariffs | 61       | 69        | 65       |
| The single market                                   | 59       | 74        | 71       |
| The economic and monetary union                     | 45       | 53        | 42       |
| Levelling economic differences between EC countries | 42       | 49        | 43       |
| Common foreign policy                               | 38       | 38        | 37       |
| Common defence policy                               | 37       | 30        | 34       |
| Single currency                                     | 35       | 34        | 23       |
| The social dimension                                | 33       | 39        | 41       |
| Establishing the United States of Europe            | 23       | 19        | 21       |
| Common citizenship                                  | 15       | 13        | 14       |

Source: Svensson, 1994, p. 79.

<sup>27</sup> Denmark's historically relationship with Germany (and this country's prestigious position in the EU) is likely to be important in this respect. See, for example, Reddy (1993, p. 118).

<sup>28</sup> Mouritzen, 1993, p. 379.

If it is assumed that decentralised democracy is an important Danish value, then this is challenged by the increase in powers gained by the central EC/EU institutions since the mid-1980s. Regarding the democratic qualities of Denmark, Svensson argues it is no more democratic than other countries:

"Even if the Danes take high pride in their political system and think of it as a 'democracy', the democratic idea is not realised any more completely in this country than elsewhere. Denmark is a small country with five million inhabitants and four million voters, but this does not mean that the political system is more perfect than in other countries, or that it is more direct than representative."<sup>29</sup>

Moreover, "the Danish stressing of 'democracy' is actually fairly ambiguous - even some might say, 'hypocritical'"<sup>30</sup>. The most straightforward way to reduce the democratic deficit is to increase the powers of the EP. However, this would infringe Danish autonomy, especially since Danish influence in the EP is very modest. Hence, Denmark has always, both before and after June 2 1992, stressed reduction of the deficit through subsidiarity and national parliamentary control over the Council. Mouritzen concludes:

"It should appear from this that Denmark supports 'democracy' only in so far as it does not come into conflict with national autonomy. The latter is given obvious priority over democratic identity. One might perhaps even proceed one step further and speculate whether 'democracy' rhetoric is only a fig-leaf for national autonomy. But 'democracy' is much better rhetoric than 'autonomy' at EC level."<sup>31</sup>

Concerns about Nordic solidarity appear to have minimal influence on the utility derived from EU membership for Danish voters. That the other Nordic countries were in the process of applying for membership around the same time is mentioned as a reason for

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<sup>29</sup> Svensson, 1996, p. 33.

<sup>30</sup> Mouritzen, 1993, p. 381.

voting 'yes' in the 1992 referendum by one percent of 'yes'-voters and even fewer 'no'-voters.

In the survey by Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard<sup>32</sup>, issues related to immigration and refugees were mentioned by very few people (less than five percent) when they were not prompted. However, when the voters were asked for their reaction to the statement "if we had said yes to the EC-union, we would have been flooded with refugees and immigrants"<sup>33</sup>, the response patterns are very different between those who voted 'yes' and those who voted 'no'. Among all those asked, 30 percent either fully agreed or partly agreed with this statement. Of those who fully agreed, there were six percent 'yes'-voters and 31 percent 'no'-voters. Among those who partly agreed the corresponding numbers were nine and twelve percent. It appears that of those who considered the TEU likely to lead to increases in the numbers of immigration and refugees a majority viewed this development as detrimental to their utility<sup>34</sup>.

Attitudes to EU-membership do not seem to be affected by implications of the European integration process on prospects for peace in Europe. This could be due, at least partly, to a perception of NATO being more important in this respect.

#### 4.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.

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<sup>31</sup> Mouritzen, 1993, p. 381.

<sup>32</sup> 1994, p. 91 and p. 93.

<sup>33</sup> Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1994, p. 94.

<sup>34</sup> Concerns about immigration are not new to Danish politics. For example, Borre (1988, p. 78) argues that anti-immigration sentiments were the main reason behind the

For Denmark agriculture is a major export industry<sup>35</sup>, with the majority of this export going to other EU-countries. Should this export become less competitive through tariffs and other trade barriers, then Danish farmers would see their utility drop. It is very unlikely that Danish agricultural goods would be allowed free access to the EU market if Denmark left the EU. Concerns over such access has been a major driving force behind Danish membership in the Community ever since such membership became a possibility<sup>36</sup>. Leaving the EU would also negatively affect those employed in food processing, as well as those more indirectly dependent upon the agricultural industry. In addition to this, many rural areas receive assistance under Objective 5b under the EU's structural funds<sup>37</sup>. For these reasons, the utility of the rural population in Denmark is more dependent on EU membership than the utility of the population at large.

Those who live in urban areas may calculate that non-membership would lead to higher or lower food prices. However, since they do not know what the level of national subsidies or European tariffs and other obstacles to trade would be in the event of non-membership, there is a high level of uncertainty attached to this factor. Thus, this factor is likely to have only a minor effect on the utility of the urban population. One factor that might affect attitudes to EU-membership in the regions Nordjylland and Storstrøm

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success of the DFRP and the populist far-left FK at the 1987 election. See also Piovene (1975).

<sup>35</sup> In 1973 export of agricultural products made up 28 percent of total Danish exports. By 1982 this had dropped to 24.3 percent, by 1992 to 16.9 percent (Source: Statistisk tiårsoversigt, 1984 - 1993). See also Reddy (1993, chapter 3) regarding the importance of exports for Danish agriculture.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Sørensen (1978).

<sup>37</sup> [www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/dnk.htm](http://www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/dnk.htm), 23/03.98.



is the receipt of regional assistance under Objective 2 of the EU's structural funds<sup>38</sup>.

However, the funds involved are quite small.

There are substantial differences in attitude to EU-membership between urban and rural areas<sup>39</sup>. In central Copenhagen, 38.3 percent voted 'yes' in the 1992 referendum, compared to 49.3 percent nation-wide. Similarly, many of the electoral districts containing the largest urban areas outside of Greater Copenhagen also show a lower 'yes'-vote than the national average. Although these differences are not great (with a few exceptions, such as Århus south and Odense west) when compared to the national average, there are considerable differences between rural and urban areas within each county<sup>40</sup>. Also, in each of the four referendums the more rural provinces in western and southern Jutland (Viborg, Ringkøbing, Ribe and Sønderjylland) have recorded the four highest yes-votes. These counties also make up four out of the top five with respect to employees in the primary industries per capita. (See Appendix 4.4)

It is likely that EU-membership affects utility incomes derived from the level of public sector expenditure and social transfers. The Danish State provides a relatively high level

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<sup>38</sup> [www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/dnk.htm](http://www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/dnk.htm), 23/03.98

<sup>39</sup> The most general division of Denmark used here is one that divides the country into three parts - Copenhagen (or the 'Metropolitan area'), the Islands, and Jutland. This basic division is most commonly used in the literature. Here a more detailed division is also applied, dividing the Islands into seven counties, and the Jutland area also into seven areas. This provides for a more detailed analysis, and a better understanding of the correlation between variations in party support and the correlation of these variations with attitudes to European integration. Also, it should be noted that the Metropolitan area (Copenhagen-Fredriksberg) when used for this analysis, only has a population of about 550,000, although the 'capital area' has a population of over 1.7 million people. (As per April 1, 1992, Befolkning og Valg, 10/1993).

<sup>40</sup> In particular the 'no'-vote was higher in Odense in Fyn county, Esbjerg in Ribe county, Århus and Randers in Århus county, and Ålborg in Nordjylland county. For data, see Befolkning og Valg, No. 9, 1993, pp. 28-30.

of social protection compared to most other EU-countries (see Table F for details. In terms of final domestic consumption, public consumption was nearly twice as high (191 percent) as the EU-average in 1993, compared to a private consumption level close to average (114 percent)<sup>41</sup>.

EU-membership does not explicitly require substantial changes in social spending. In fact, Danish expenditure on social spending has changed little as a percentage of GDP. In 1981 social spending in Denmark was 38.9 percent of GDP, in 1986, 34.8 percent (probably due to an economic boom and lower unemployment) and in 1991, 38.3 percent<sup>42</sup>.

The voter cannot know for certain whether EU-membership affects, or will in the future affect, the size and character of the Danish welfare state. However, non-membership allows for more national control over the development of this institution. Furthermore, downward pressures on taxation could result from membership due to the competitive pressures of the internal market, and/or by moves towards equalisation of taxation. Efforts to meet the criteria for EMU could also be argued to have such effects. In the 1992 referendum campaign, the SF argued there would be equalisation of taxation, and 'inevitable' cuts in the Danish welfare state as a consequence. The party also claimed that 'we shall have to pay, whenever we get sick, old or unemployed'<sup>43</sup>. And the very nature of the TEU is such that such developments are certainly not impossible:

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<sup>41</sup> Eurostat, 1995b, p. 359.

<sup>42</sup> Statistisk tiårsoversikt, 1993.

<sup>43</sup> Worre, 1995, p. 239.

“The Union opponents [...] asserted that the Union Treaty was the beginning of a self-increasing process, a slide which would lead the EC in a federalist direction and reduce Denmark to a semi-autonomous status with dwindling influence on, for example, welfare and taxes. [...] The complexity of the Maastricht Treaty and its many distant objectives offered considerable scope for interpretation.”<sup>44</sup>

Thus, the Danish voter may conclude that the end result of EU-membership will be a reduction of the welfare state. If the voter sees such a development as detrimental to his utility, then he is likely to oppose membership based on this factor, and vice versa.

Danish women tend to work disproportionately in the public sector. In 1992, 50 percent of women in employment worked in the public sector, compared to only 24 percent of men<sup>45</sup>. Women's pay also tends to be lower, on average, than men's. In 1991 it was 71.7 percent of the male average<sup>46</sup>. Women also benefit disproportionately from various schemes established through the welfare state, long and well paid maternity leave (see Table G) and a high number of publicly financed childminding facilities<sup>47</sup>. Hence, a reduction of the welfare state would reduce many women's utility.

Chapter 3 explains why public employees and the poorer sections of the population are likely to see their utility decline if the welfare state is reduced. The data in Appendix 4.3 indicates there is evidence that public sector employees are considerably more likely to see EU-membership as detrimental to their utility than private sector employees. It is

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<sup>44</sup> Worre, 1995, p. 251.

<sup>45</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.

<sup>46</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.

<sup>47</sup> At 48 percent coverage the highest by far in the EC for 0-2 year olds in 1989, and also higher than any other Nordic country. Between the ages of three and starting school (seven years of age in Denmark) the coverage was then 85 percent, behind only Belgium and France. (Friis, 1992, p. 144. Sources: Childminding in the EC 1985-1990.

also noticeable that skilled workers are much more likely to vote 'yes' than unskilled workers. It is quite likely that the latter have a lower income, and are thus more reliant upon the welfare state.

Denmark is highly dependent upon trade, as Table A shows. And by 1994, 74 percent of both imports and exports went to the EU and the four applicant countries<sup>48</sup>. Although an arrangement similar to the EEA-treaty would secure access for most products to the EU-market, such an arrangement is much easier to cancel, and therefore a riskier option for securing trade-interests in the long term. Hence, EU-membership increases the utility of those who are dependent upon international trade, including farmers. This factor may contribute to the large gap between white collar employees in the public sector compared to those in the private sector.

#### 4.3.4 Group differentiated non-economic factors.

Ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be high on the left of the political spectrum, and low on the right. Thus, if EU-membership affects people's utility with respect to prospects for the welfare state, then a similar distribution of support for membership can be expected. The data in Appendix 4.3 shows this is indeed the pattern. The main exception is the supporters of the DFRP on the far right, but their opposition to membership is likely to be based much more on concerns about immigration, refugees, and national controls than support for the welfare state. Further evidence for this is shown in Appendix 4.5. Copenhagen, the stronghold of the Danish far left, was

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Supplement to Europas Kvinder, no. 31, 1990; Rita Knudsen: Familieydelser i Norden 1989. Teknisk rapport fra Nordisk statistisk sekretariat no. 52, Copenhagen 1990.)

decisively more anti-EU than other areas<sup>49</sup>. Conversely, the 'no'-vote in the equally urban area of the county of Copenhagen surrounding the central area of the city, which is not a stronghold of the far left, is very close to the national average<sup>50</sup>.

By simple comparison, EU-membership may be viewed as a threat to women's status in Denmark because they are more likely to be in employment<sup>51</sup> and better represented in political institutions<sup>52</sup>, compared to women in most other EU countries. Secondly, the Catholic influence in the EU may affect liberal legislation on abortion and divorce, if these become EU-policies in the future. Together with the economic considerations outlined above, these factors add up to EU-membership being relatively more detrimental to the utility of women compared to that of men. Appendix 4.3 confirms that more women are against European integration than are men.

#### 4.3.5 The 1993 referendum - 'Son of Maastricht'.

Speculation as to what the effect of a new 'no'-vote would be was running high and became an important issue at the 1993 referendum. Among the parties, the 'no'-side this time only included the DFRP and some SF dissenters. The 'no'-side argued there was nothing new in the Edinburgh agreement and that it would not be legally binding. Furthermore, they contended that a new 'no' would not force a Danish withdrawal, but

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<sup>48</sup> OECD, 1994b, pp. 64-65.

<sup>49</sup> Similarly for other left-wing strongholds, such as Esbjerg, Odense, Århus and Ålborg (Befolkning og Valg, 1994, No. 11, pp. 25-27).

<sup>50</sup> 48.9 percent in 1992 (Befolkning og Valg, 1993, No. 9, p. 28).

<sup>51</sup> 73.8 percent of Danish women participated in the labour force in 1994, compared to 56.7 percent in the EU (OECD, 1996a, p. 197).

rather the collapse of the TEU. Unsurprisingly, the proponents argued virtually the opposite on each of these two issues. They also promised further referendums on any future changes to Danish EC/EU policy<sup>53</sup>.

Appendix 4.3 shows the differences in the results between the 1992 and the 1993 referendums. Geographically, the patterns of opponents and proponents were still very similar to previous referendums, with substantially more opponents in central Copenhagen than elsewhere. Women changed their vote to 'yes' to a greater extent than men did. Supporters of the KF and the DFRP voted 'no' in higher numbers this time around, but they presumably did so for opposite reasons. It would appear that the supporters of the KF disliked the limitations of the Edinburgh Compromise, whilst those of the DFRP toed the party line to a greater extent this time<sup>54</sup>. However, the change from no to yes on the left was heavy enough to tilt the balance in favour of yes. In particular, many DSD voters changed their mind, with only 50 percent voting 'no' this time.

#### **4.4 Party System effects.**

In this section the effects of the conflict over European integration on the Danish party system are analysed. The starting point is that this conflict has become increasingly salient since the SEA in 1986. Yet it appears to have had only minor effects on electoral behaviour at national elections, and on the behaviour of the parties. The feature that concerns us the most is why so few relevant political parties in Denmark oppose the

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<sup>52</sup> As of January 1997, 33 percent of the seats in the Folketing were held by women (UNDP, 1997, p. 162). This is considerably above the EU average. Furthermore, as of January 1995, 7 out of 20 Cabinet ministers were women (Bille, 1996, p. 315).

<sup>53</sup> Svensson, 1994, p. 73.

deepening of European integration represented by the TEU. This would appear to be an advantageous strategy given the substantial opposition to membership in the population. The behaviour of the parties is particularly puzzling since disagreement over other issues is so limited. Describing the 1990 election, Borre argues that agreement about the issues across the board seemed so widespread among the parties that voters wondered what the election was about<sup>55</sup>. In such a situation, it would appear that opposition to European integration could attract a substantial number of voters.

General evidence of the salience of the EU-conflict can be found in the high turnout in referendums<sup>56</sup>. Also, the fact that over the last 25 years it has become virtually a 'rule' for Danish governments to hold referendums over European integration<sup>57</sup> developments shows the importance this conflict has risen to in Denmark.

The salience of the conflict is also demonstrated by the quarter of voters who at EP elections vote for protest movements whose aim is to get Denmark out of the EC/EU. And many voters vote against the position of the party they vote for in national elections both before and after the EP elections<sup>58</sup>. Also, Siune has shown the increased salience created by the TEU. In May 1992, 34 percent of those surveyed mentioned the EC as the most important issue. And in June 1992, after the referendum, 50 percent mentioned the EC, the Maastricht Treaty or other EC issues<sup>59</sup>. Moreover, it is unlikely that Denmark's

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<sup>54</sup> Svensson, 1994, p. 79.

<sup>55</sup> Borre, 1991, pp 135-136.

<sup>56</sup> 90.1 percent in 1972, 75.4 percent in 1986, 83.1 percent in 1992, and 86.5 percent in 1993.

<sup>57</sup> With one exception (voting age lowered from 20 to 18 in 1978) this is the only issue referendums have been held over in this period.

<sup>58</sup> See, for example, Worre (1981 and 1987).

<sup>59</sup> Siune, 1993a, pp. 101-102.

relationship with the EU is going to disappear from the Danish political agenda as long as such a relationship exists:

“Through the referendum of 1993 Denmark achieved special status in the European Union, but this did not settle the European Union question finally. It has been followed by continuous debate on the four Danish reservations to the TEU. The following year the Liberals suggested a new referendum on joining the European Union, in connection with the European elections in June. The acceptance by Sweden, Finland and Austria of full Union membership, without reservations, has renewed the debate on the viability of the Danish exceptions.”<sup>60</sup>

The incorporation of the Schengen Treaty into the EU, and the transfer of policy-areas in justice and home affairs from Pillar Three to Pillar One also has great potential to create political conflict in Denmark. Because of the Danish opt-out in Justice and Home Affairs, a protocol in the Amsterdam Treaty sets out a complex procedure for how the Folketing is to deal with EU decisions in this area<sup>61</sup>. If the Folketing rejects such decisions, this could jeopardise the Nordic passport union, as well as reducing the freedom of movement for Danish citizens within the EU<sup>62</sup>.

Ever since the early 1970's, there has been a substantial gap between public opinion on EC/EU membership and the opinion of the parties and the members of the Danish parliament, the 'Folketing'. Most of the time since 1972, around 90 percent of the

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<sup>60</sup> Worre, 1995, p. 257.

<sup>61</sup> 'Protocol on the Position of Denmark' in the Amsterdam Treaty. This also deals with the other three exceptions set out in the Edinburgh Compromise. There are also further provisions in 'Declaration by Denmark on Article K.14 of the Treaty on European Union'.

<sup>62</sup> Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt.  
(<http://www.zapp.dk/wwwbev/snam02c1.htm>, 2/2/98).



parties<sup>63</sup> represented in the Folketing have supported membership, as have over 80 percent of individual representatives at most important votes.

On December 16, 1971 the Folketing voted on authorising the Government to sign the Treaty of Accession. The votes were 81.5 percent for and 18.5 percent against. As 5/6ths is 83.3 percent, it turned out that a referendum would be needed anyway. The 32 opponents consisted of all the SF members, eleven from DSD, and four RD representatives. On the Enabling Act on September 8, 1972 these were joined by one more social democrat and the Greenland representative<sup>64</sup>. The 1992 vote in the Folketing on the TEU was 135-25 for. This is nearly a 5/6 majority (the requirement for transferring authority to a international organisation without a referendum) for the Treaty, with only the members for the DFRP, SF and one member of the DKRF voting against it<sup>65</sup>. The 1993 vote on the Edinburgh Compromise was 153-16 for, with all DFRP representatives, two SF representatives and one RV representative voting against the treaty<sup>66</sup>.

The one exception to this pattern of overwhelming parliamentary support for membership and further integration came in 1986. The SEA was voted down in the Folketing by 80 votes to 75. On this occasion, the DSD and the RV joined forces with the anti-EU far left parties. However, the reasons for this were very complicated and not all related to these parties' position on the SEA. Worre argues that the RV essentially

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<sup>63</sup> As measured in terms of electoral support.

<sup>64</sup> Miljan, 1977, p. 184.

<sup>65</sup> Nordisk Kontakt, No. 5, 1992, p. 23.

<sup>66</sup> Vote on Proposal of law for Denmark's accession to the Edinburgh-decision and the Maastricht Treaty (Folketinget, 1993, L 177).

voted against the SEA in order to emphasise their special standpoint<sup>67</sup>. Many of its leaders and members were for the SEA<sup>68</sup>, and 82 percent of its voters supported the SEA in the referendum<sup>69</sup>. At the time when the RV decided to oppose the SEA, however, they appear to have believed that the DSD would support it. If that had been the case, their stand would have had no effect on the outcome of the vote<sup>70</sup>.

However, on January 14, 1986, the DSD parliamentary party decided to oppose the treaty. This was partly due to genuine disagreement with certain sections of the SEA, partly because of pressure from anti-EU party activists, and partly a tactical vote designed to force an election<sup>71</sup>. However, the DSD was outmanoeuvred by the centre-right government which immediately announced a consultative referendum. This exercise only served to emphasise internal DSD divisions and its disagreement with a large section of its voters on European integration. After 1986 DSD policy on the EU shifted towards a more pro-EU position, and the party has since supported moves towards further integration<sup>72</sup>.

Over the period 1972-1992, only 40-60 percent of the Danish people supported membership, as table 4.2 shows.

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<sup>67</sup> The only element of the SEA the RV appeared to disagree with was the inclusion of the EPC treaty, which was a rather insignificant formalisation of current practice. (Worre, 1988, pp. 369-370).

<sup>68</sup> Worre, 1988, pp. 371-372.

<sup>69</sup> Worre, 1988, p. 380.

<sup>70</sup> Worre, 1988, pp. 369-370.

<sup>71</sup> Worre, 1988, pp. 368-369.

<sup>72</sup> See Laursen (1993, pp 121-22) regarding the problems faced by the DSD and the RV when integration deepened with the SEA.

Table 4.2: Position on EC/EU membership among the Danish people. Percent.

|           | 1975-1979 | 1980-1984 | SEA 27/2/1996 | 02/06/<br>1992 | 18/5/<br>1993 |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| Yes       | 41        | 34        | 56.2          | 49.3           | 56.8          |
| No        | 40        | 45        | 43.8          | 50.7           | 43.2          |
| Undecided | 19        | 21        |               |                |               |

Sources: Worre (1987, p. 87), Svensson (1996).

However, when the Danish government decided, in February 1992, to hold a referendum on the TEU, only the SF and the DFRP (of the parties with parliamentary representation<sup>73</sup>) recommended their supporters to vote 'no'<sup>74</sup>, while the DKRF was divided, as shown in Table 4.3 below. At the 1993 referendum over the Edinburgh Compromise, only the DFRP remained in opposition among the parties with representatives in the Folketing<sup>75</sup>. It would appear incompatible with rational choice theory that more parties do not pursue (potential) voters who oppose European integration by representing this opposition themselves.

Table 4.3. Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party at last parliamentary election before the 1992 referendum.

| SF          | DSD          | RV          | DKRF        | CD          | KF         | DV           | DFRP        |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|
| Opp.<br>8.3 | Sup.<br>37.4 | Sup.<br>3.5 | Div.<br>2.3 | Sup.<br>5.1 | Sup.<br>16 | Sup.<br>15.8 | Opp.<br>6.4 |

Sup. = support membership as defined by the TEU, Opp. = Oppose, Div. = Divided.  
Sources: on support/opposition to membership: Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard (1994); on 1990 election data: Peterson (1994).

<sup>73</sup> The general threshold of representation is two percent, although it is possible to get individuals members elected with lower national support if they have concentrated local support.

<sup>74</sup> See Petersen (1993, pp 207-208) and Svensson (1996, pp 42-43) for the specific reasons why these parties opposed the TEU.

<sup>75</sup> At SF's extraordinary congress on March 13-14, 1993, over 70 percent (223/300) of the delegates voted 'yes' to the Edinburgh Compromise (Nordisk Kontakt, No. 4, 1993, pp 20-21).

During the 1972 referendum debate it became increasingly clear where the Danish parties stood on the EC-question, and relative positions have not changed much since then for most of the parties<sup>76</sup>. On the centre-right, the DV, the KF, the CD and the DKRF were long "committed and unreserved supporters of the EC and [...] not unfavourable towards further integration"<sup>77</sup>. However, in 1992 the DKRF leadership was split over which position to take on the TEU, and its national conference actually recommended a 'no'-vote<sup>78</sup>. The CD also appeared to be somewhat divided<sup>79</sup>.

On the centre left, the DSD and the RV have in principle supported Danish EC/EU-membership, but are generally hesitant about further integration. However, they have been arguing this since 1972 and in their party literature frequently agree to further integration rejected in previous party literature<sup>80</sup>. The DSD was united in supporting the TEU, and all the party's decision-making units had unanimously agreed to support the Amsterdam Treaty by August 1997<sup>81</sup>. This 'hesitance' has affected Danish EU-policy, and (except in the period 1986-1993, when it was more pro-integration and aggressive) been characterised as 'foot-dragging' by its critics<sup>82</sup>. The 'reluctant' Danish EU-parties have been doing this for 25 years. Hence they provide no distinct alternative to the more pro-EU parties. Petersen<sup>83</sup> argues that, on EU-policy, there is a consensus coalition

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<sup>76</sup> However, because European integration has become so much deeper since 1972, one could argue that any party which is not explicitly against EU-membership has become more pro-EU since then.

<sup>77</sup> Worre, 1987, pp 81-82. See also Worre (1989, p. 237).

<sup>78</sup> Worre, 1995, p. 238. However, the party leadership and the Folketing representatives supported a 'yes'-vote in the 1993 referendum (DKRF brochure, 1993).

<sup>79</sup> Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1994, p. 72.

<sup>80</sup> The Social Democratic Party, 1996; Socialdemokratiet, 1994; Det Radikale Venstre, Copenhagen, 1993; Det Radikale Venstre, Copenhagen, 1995.

<sup>81</sup> Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt, 8/8/97

(<http://www.zapp.dk/wwwbev/sndk18c1.htm>).

<sup>82</sup> Mouritzen, 1993, p. 380. Petersen (1993, p. 196) attributes this expression to Elleman-Jensen, the former leader of the DV and former Foreign Minister, in particular.

<sup>83</sup> 1993, pp. 193-194.

consisting of the DSD, the KP, the DV, the RV, the CD and the DKRF - and from 1992 including the SF.

Since 1992 the SF has no longer advocated withdrawal from the EU. Rather, it advocates the 'Edinburgh Compromise' as the basis for Danish EU-membership. Essentially, this shifts SF's position to that of the DSD in the past: accepting the status quo but opposing 'further integration'. The SF split on the Amsterdam Treaty, with the party's annual meeting in September 1997 resulting in about 2/3rds of delegates opposing this Treaty, and the rest, including the party chairman (who resigned as a consequence of this vote), supporting it<sup>84</sup>.

A variety of small left-wing parties, such as the VS and the DKP, have also opposed EU-membership, as has the centre-right RF. The latest far-left party with parliamentary representation, the EH, has campaigned actively against EU membership, the Edinburgh Compromise and the Amsterdam Treaty. It hopes to utilise the divide in the SF especially so as to gain votes, and also to attract votes from anti-EU DSD-supporters<sup>85</sup>. The DFRP position was similar to that of the DSD and the RV until the TEU, but the party has since been opposed to EU-membership, as is the DFP.

As Appendix 4.3 shows, the DV supporters tend to be most heavily for membership, whilst the SF voters tend to be most strongly opposed. The supporters of the DKRF, the RV, the DFRP, and the DSD tend to be most clearly split on the issue. Based on

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<sup>84</sup> Europabevegelsen i Danmark, Sidste Nytt, 12/9/97  
(<http://www.zapp.dk/wwwbev/sndk25c1.htm>)

<sup>85</sup> Nordisk Kontakt, 10/1994, p. 34.

contributions to the media in the 1992 debate, politicians representing the RV, the CD and the DKRF were most clearly split<sup>86</sup>.

At both the 1990 and the 1994 national elections, European integration issues were relatively unimportant<sup>87</sup>. In 1990, the EEC was only mentioned by five percent of those surveyed as an important issue, "probably because of the high degree of consensus among the major parties"<sup>88</sup>. In 1994 (different survey) only three percent of those polled found the EU issue important<sup>89</sup>. At the 1998 election eight percent of those surveyed mentioned the EU among the most important issues<sup>90</sup>.

There is some evidence that a small number of voters changed their preference based on changes in party positions on European integration between 1990 and 1994<sup>91</sup>. Worre argues that most supporters of the EU left the DFRP between 1990 and May 1993, whilst the party at the same time increased its support among anti-EU voters. Whilst 45 percent of the party's 1990 supporters voted 'yes' in the 1993 referendum, that figure drops to seventeen percent among those who gave the DFRP as their party preference in May 1993<sup>92</sup>. Similarly, regarding the period after this, polls show anti-EU voters leave the DSD to the advantage of the DFP<sup>93</sup>.

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<sup>86</sup> Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, 1993, p. 39.

<sup>87</sup> Worre (1989, p. 238) argues they played only a minor role in national elections before then as well. For the most important concerns at the 1988 election, which did not include European integration, see Sauerberg (1988).

<sup>88</sup> Borre, 1991, pp. 134-135.

<sup>89</sup> Thomsen, 1995a, pp. 318-319.

<sup>90</sup> Bjugan, 1998, forthcoming. Data from Gallup.

<sup>91</sup> For detailed election results, see *Befolkning og Valg* (11/1994, pp. 28-30).

<sup>92</sup> Much smaller, but similar moves took place with regard to the SF and the DSD (Worre, 1995, p. 246).

<sup>93</sup> *Europabevegelsen i Danmark*, *Sidste Nytt*, 14/11/97 (<http://www.zapp.dk/wwwbev/sndk36c1.htm>).

Focusing on the SF (from anti-membership to supporting at least a form of restricted membership) and the DFRP (from pro- to vehemently anti-EU), there is a distinct pattern in their change of support between these two elections. The SF lost a disproportionate number of votes in urban areas, where opposition to EU-membership is higher than the national average. The newer, anti-EU left-wing party, the EH, increased its number of votes disproportionately in the same areas. Interestingly, the DFRP also increased its votes by disproportionate numbers in anti-EU areas, and lost votes in the more rural, pro-EU areas. However, the changes are relatively small.

At the 1998 national elections, a new anti-EU party, Democratic Renewal (DF) only managed to attract 0.3 percent of the votes cast. However, more anti-EU members were elected to the Folketing at this election, partly because more anti-EU representatives were elected for the SF partly because of an increase in votes and representation for the far right anti-EU parties, the DFRP and the DFP<sup>94</sup>, combined.

#### 4.4.1 The extent to which the EU-conflict cross-cuts other cleavages.

The left-right cleavage is the dominant political cleavage in Denmark. Most parties can be meaningfully separated from each other based upon this cleavage, and it also tends to define potential coalition partners. Figure 4.1 shows how the relevant parties align along the left-right axis.

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<sup>94</sup> Bjugan, 1998, forthcoming.

Figure 4.1. The left-right cleavage in Denmark.

| Left |      |      |      |      |       |       |       |       |       | Right |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| DKP  | VS   | FK   | SF   | DSD  | CD    | DKRF  | RV    | KP    | DV    | DFRP  |
| 2.95 | 3.84 | 5.42 | 5.92 | 9.27 | 12.11 | 13.67 | 15.68 | 16.00 | 17.58 | 19.33 |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 170-171. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting tax/anti-public ownership (20).

Between 1966 and 1990, the DSD tried to govern with the support of the left, moving the RV into co-operation with the parties to its right<sup>95</sup>. In 1990 the DSD again looked to the centre<sup>96</sup> for support. Hence, coalitions tend to be based on parties that are close to each other on this axis.

The secondary cleavage in Danish politics is one between rural and urban interests. It is difficult to define the urban-rural cleavage in Denmark beyond Copenhagen vs. the rest of Denmark, although Appendix 4.4 shows that some areas outside the capital area are more urban than others. Hence, the centre-periphery dimension is very similar to the urban-rural cleavage.

Figure 4.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Denmark.

| Urban |      |     |      |     |     |       |       |      |       | Rural |
|-------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| DKP   | FK 2 | VS  | SF   | DSD | CD  | KF 10 | RV 12 | DFRP | DKRF  | DV    |
| 1.75  |      | 2.2 | 5.43 | 7   | 8.2 |       |       | 14.6 | 15.29 | 18.13 |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 172. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti)

In some cases it is debatable if one party is more or less oriented towards urban interests than another. The above is only meant as an indication. The small left-wing parties and the SF are more distinctly 'urban' than other parties, and vice versa for the DFRP, DKRF and the DV, with the DSD, the CD, the KF and the RV closer to the centre of this

<sup>95</sup> Borre, 1992, pp. 145-147.



cleavage. The same holds for territorial differences in support, as shown in Appendix 4.6. In the end, the territorial dimension(s) do(es) not appear to introduce any serious obstacles to co-operation based on the left-right cleavage<sup>97</sup>. Evidence for this assertion can be found in Table 4.4 below.

With this in mind, the conflict over European integration would need to cross-cut the left-right division in order to have maximum impact. As Figure 4.3 shows, this is not the case.

Figure 4.3 Position on EU-membership at the 1992 referendum.

| Anti-EU  |      |    |     |    | Pro-EU |    |    |    |
|----------|------|----|-----|----|--------|----|----|----|
| Far left | DFRP | SF | DSD | RV | DKRF   | CD | KF | DV |

Based on party-programmes, literature and media reports.

The most dramatic difference between this division and the left-right cleavage is the very different position of the DFRP compared to the other parties on the centre-right/right, who tend to be more pro-EU than the centre-left/left. This conflict has also reinforced the division between the DSD and the parties to its left, with the possible exception of the SF in the period 1992-1997.

Hence, based on the cleavage model, the EU-conflict does not create any significant coalition or co-operation problems between traditional partners. The DFRP is not a potential coalition partner for the centre-right, although one attempt has been made at

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<sup>96</sup> The RV, the DKRF and the CD. See Table 4.4 for a complete list of governments since 1972.

such an alliance. This is, however, unlikely to be repeated<sup>98</sup>. As for centre-left governments, they have never included the SF, or any other currently existing party to the left of the DSD. Such governments do at times rely on ad-hoc support from the SF, but disagreement over European integration is unlikely to prevent such co-operation as long as support on EU-related issues is easy to find elsewhere. Considering the very minor effects of the EU-conflict on the Danish party system and coalition patterns, it cannot be described as a cleavage.

However, with the more anti-EU views of large sections of the Danish voting public not represented in the Danish parliament, it would appear that one or more of the pro-EU parties has (have) an incentive to oppose European integration. Why they remain supportive of membership is not possible to explain through the cleavage model.

#### 4.4.2. The potential for vote maximisation based on the conflict over European integration.

Among the parties spanning the left-right cleavage from the DSD to the KF, there is not much disagreement on a majority of domestic issues. The Schlüter minority governments from 1982-1988 were mainly voted down on foreign and defence policy, not domestic policies. Hence, it should be possible to attract anti-EU voters from all parties in this middle area of the left-right division.

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<sup>97</sup> Except, perhaps, that any party wishing to co-operate with the DV should not be against farming interests.

<sup>98</sup> The alliance formed in the summer of 1994 between the KF, the DV and the DFRP did not benefit them. Thomsen (1995a, p. 319) calls it a "major mistake".

For three parties, the CD, the DV and the KF, it would not be rational to oppose EU-membership, because too many of their voters support membership. But for the DKRF, the RV and the DSD, opposition looks likely to be more profitable. About half of the RV and the DKRF voters voted 'no' in the 1992 and 1993 referendums, more than half of DSD voters did the same. Being centrist parties, they have the potential to attract 'no'-voters from other parties. Yet none of these parties oppose EU-membership.

For the SF, an anti EU-position would appear to be most likely to maximise votes, considering the high level of opposition to EU-membership among the party's own and the DSD voters. The same holds for other far-left parties, especially since the SF compromised its anti-EU position in 1992/1993. For the DFRP, it is difficult to say whether a pro- or anti-EU stance is more likely to be vote-maximising if this analysis is based on those who voted for the party at the time of the 1992 and 1993 referendums, considering its voters appear to be relatively evenly split. However, as long as all the other parties except the far left ones remain pro-EU, an anti-EU position is considerably more likely to maximise votes than is a pro-EU position.

#### 4.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.

Table 4.4 below shows the composition of Danish governments since 1972. As Appendix 4.6 shows, no single party has been able to command a simple majority of seats in the Folketing in this period. Indeed, no party has even been close to such a majority. Therefore, coalition (minority or majority) or single party minority governments have been, and are likely to continue to be, the options available.

Table 4.4. Government participation in Denmark.

| Year | Prime Minister  | Party      |    |      |    |           |           |
|------|-----------------|------------|----|------|----|-----------|-----------|
| 1972 | Jørgensen, A.   | <b>DSD</b> |    |      |    |           |           |
| 1973 | Hartling, P.    |            |    |      |    | <b>DV</b> |           |
| 1975 | Jørgensen, A.   | <b>DSD</b> |    |      |    |           |           |
| 1978 | Jørgensen, A.   | <b>DSD</b> |    |      |    | <b>DV</b> |           |
| 1979 | Jørgensen, A.   | <b>DSD</b> |    |      |    |           |           |
| 1982 | Schlüter, P.    |            |    | DKRF | CD | <b>DV</b> | <b>KF</b> |
| 1988 | Schlüter, P.    |            | RV |      |    | <b>DV</b> | <b>KF</b> |
| 1990 | Schlüter, P.    |            |    |      |    | <b>DV</b> | <b>KF</b> |
| 1993 | Rasmussen, P.N. | <b>DSD</b> | RV | DKRF | CD |           |           |
| 1994 | Rasmussen, P.N. | <b>DSD</b> | RV |      | CD |           |           |
| 1996 | Rasmussen, P.N. | <b>DSD</b> | RV |      |    |           |           |

The Prime Minister's party is in bold type. Sources: 1972-1990: Petersson, 1994, p. 100. 1993: Thomsen, 1995a. 1994 onwards: the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 19/2/98.

As can be observed from the table, every government in the period of interest here has included either the DSD or the DV, and since 1982 any government not including the DSD has also included the KF.

However, to achieve a majority in parliament, Danish governments have to include several parties, usually including centrist ones. Similarly, minority governments need support, usually also from the centrist parties. As long as the mainstream parties remain pro-EU<sup>99</sup>, they can discount the EU-conflict as a problem for coalition formation. Moreover, this removes the problem of the effect of other parties' reaction to defection from the pro-EU position, as explained in Chapter 3. That is, focusing on an anti-EU position becomes decreasingly profitable in terms of votes with more parties changing to an anti-EU position.

It is an important consideration in this respect that if not enough parties defect to be able to form a government (with other anti-EU parties), then the anti-EU party runs the risk

of having removed itself from consideration from government office. Moreover, a simple count of 'anti-EU seats' will not suffice to see if a government can be formed, since the parties have to agree on other policies as well. The 'pariah-status' of the SF and the DFRP with respect to government formation makes it considerably more difficult to achieve a majority for an anti-EU coalition even if other parties should switch to an anti-EU position.

On the centre-right, obstacles to holding an anti-EU position are exacerbated by the need for the CD, the KF and the DV to maintain a pro-EU position. In fact, policy sincerity, credibility concerns and the position of their voters indicate that they cannot change position without dramatic events taking place. These three parties are essentially pre-committed to support for European integration. Therefore, if either the RV or the DKRF (or both) should become anti-EU, a coalition including these parties and the CD, the KF or the DV would become more unlikely.

A coalition of the SF, the DSD and the RV; all of which tend to have an anti-EU majority among their voters, would in the years 1987-1988 and 1990-onwards have commanded a majority of votes in the Folketing. However, on none of these (or any other) occasions has the SF been able to join any Danish government. Furthermore, any coalition or co-operation project including the SF and the RV tend to have great difficulties agreeing on economic policy. For instance, Borre argues that the bourgeois four-party government formed by Schlüter in September 1982 resulted from the inability of the DSD government under Jørgensen to carry on because it was dependent upon

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<sup>99</sup> All the parties that have been in government since 1985 (or even 1972) have been pro-EU.

support from both SF and the RV, who disagreed on practically everything on economic policy<sup>100</sup>. Hence, this is not a likely option.

Thus, a DSD or DSD-RV government depends either on ad-hoc parliamentary support, or on other parties joining the coalition. An anti-EU position would make this more difficult to achieve. Thus, for coalition purposes, it is the most rational option for the parties from DSD to the KF to remain in support of membership.

#### 4.4.4 Complications and synergy between various party goals.

For the CD, the KF and the DV, a pro-EU position allows a high degree of correspondence between most party goals, including vote- and office-maximisation. For the centrist DKRF and the RV, the situation is considerably more problematic. Neither a pro- or an- anti-EU position is likely to remove the potential for internal splits based on this dimension, and it is difficult to say which would maximise votes. However, their coalition potential with the parties on the centre-right, and with the DSD, are higher as pro-EU parties, as long as the centre-right and the DSD remain pro-EU. In addition, this position is also compatible with policy consistency, and with the pro-EU position of most party leaders.

For the DSD, it does not appear that its pro-EU position is compatible with vote-maximisation aims. However, the party tends to rely on centrist parties for coalition or parliamentary support, and an anti-EU position would make such support more difficult

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<sup>100</sup> Borre, 1987, p. 345.

to obtain. In addition, an anti-EU position would be incompatible with policy consistency and with the pro-EU position of the vast majority of the party's leaders.

Moreover, if a party on the centre-left or centre-right becomes anti-EU, then the other parties adjacent on the left-right scale are left in a very difficult situation. They might feel the need to exclude the defector from coalition considerations, but this would not remove the risk of losing votes to him. Alternatively, they can also change to opposition, but this could be extremely difficult or dangerous, or both: policy sincerity might lead to deep divides or even splits in the party, and it could lose more votes than it will gain.

The same complications apply if a party supports EU-membership but significant sections of the party and/or the party's voters oppose membership. However, the pro-EU party has some information<sup>101</sup> on the willingness of anti-EU voters to keep supporting the party, and on whether or not the party can avoid deep divisions. If it becomes anti-EU, then it knows neither how many of the party's pro-EU voters would be willing to do the same, nor if the party will be divided or split as a result.

For the parties on the fringes, the DFRP and the SF (and other, smaller, left wing parties), the situation is different. Because these parties have never been in government in Denmark (and the DFRP and the SF have been around since 1973 and 1960 respectively), and have little hope of being invited to join coalitions, their priorities can be geared towards maximising votes rather than coalition concerns. However, their situation is not quite the same, with the SF being in the most awkward position.

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<sup>101</sup> In the Danish case, especially from the 1973, 1988, 1994 and 1998 national elections, but also from the EP elections.

Until late 1992 the SF opposed Danish EC-membership. But after the 1992 'no'-vote the party changed its policy and initiated the 'National Compromise' which ensured continued Danish membership. This served three main purposes. Firstly, the SF could play the role of 'saviour of the nation'. Secondly, it hoped to persuade other EU-members to agree to reduce European integration to the level of the National Compromise<sup>102</sup>. Thirdly, the party could reasonably expect this action to improve its coalition potential vis-a-vis the DSD. However, this policy-change did risk loss of votes to other left-wing parties that remain anti-EU. Hence, the SF also profits, post-1992, from off-loading the EU-issue to other arenas. For the smaller parties on the left, however, active opposition to EU-membership for vote-maximisation purposes appears to be the best option.

For the DFRP and the DFP it is more clear-cut that vote maximisation, not coalition potential, should be the first priority. Unless these parties change policies (too populist, too libertarian, too anti-foreigner) that are unpalatable to other parties, they are unlikely to be offered participation in any coalition. And many of these radical policies are the ones that make the DFRP and DFP different and attractive to voters. Therefore, if there are votes to be gained by being anti-EU, then this is the best strategy. It helps these parties that such a strategy fits in with their more general ideology, such as libertarianism and nationalism. However, this anti-EU position does make these parties considerably less likely coalition partners than they might otherwise be.

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<sup>102</sup> The SF wanted the Danish exemptions to be available to new members of the EC, especially the potential Nordic entrants. This was part of the 'national compromise' negotiations, not clearly stated in the final compromise, and completely rejected at



There are two other considerations that are likely to make the political elites, regardless of which party they belong to, more likely to support EU-membership. Firstly, EU-membership increases the number of attractive jobs available to Denmark's politicians. The EU also offers an alternative career option for politicians who have fallen out of favour in national politics, such as ex-Prime Minister Schlüter, now a Member of the European Parliament (MEP). Secondly, consideration of the views and interests of other European political leaders and the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU - the vast majority of whom are pro-EU - makes opposition more difficult.

Apart from some minor parties on the far left, the DFRP and the DFP are really the only parties in whose interest it is to attempt to maximise votes by focusing on an anti-EU policy in the national election arena. For the other parties it is a high-risk strategy, making it more complicated and difficult to reconcile all their aims. Therefore, off-loading the EU-conflict to arenas other than national elections benefits a clear majority of the parties.

#### 4.4.5 The choices available to the Danish voter.

The so-called 'ambivalent' parties, the DSD and the RV, are in reality pro-EU parties, although they sometimes try to hold up Danish support for further integration. However, over time they have shifted their views towards supporting more integration. And, crucially, they have not at any time advocated withdrawal. The DSD wholeheartedly supported the TEU, and was for once not even split over this. Hence, the alternatives for

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Edinburgh. The Edinburgh Agreement explicitly stated that the Danish case was *sui generis* and would not create precedence (Mouritzen, 1993, p. 382).

anti-EU Danes if they want this view reflected at national elections are to vote either for the far left or the far right (the DFRP/DFP).

Many voters are therefore left with the option of either not seeing their view on European integration reflected in the Folketing or voting for an extremist party which is unlikely to represent their views on much else. In addition, cross-pressures require the voter to seek more information. This increases the cost of voting and hence makes this act less likely. However, non-voting may for many people be an unattractive option as well. Hence, many voters have an interest in off-loading the EU-conflict into another arena.

#### 4.4.6 Off-loading through referendums.

In May 1971, Per Hækkerup, a DSD leader, suggested an advisory referendum be held on Danish EC-membership before the vote on this was held in the Folketing. A few days later his party agreed that the referendum should be held according to Article 20, regardless of whether or not a bill was passed by 5/6 in the Folketing. This was then agreed to by the RV, and hesitantly also agreed to by the KF and the DV<sup>103</sup>.

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<sup>103</sup> Petersen and Eklit, 1973, p. 202.

"This early call for a referendum before it was known whether one would be constitutionally necessary reminds us that referendums may serve other functions than the obvious ones - in particular, they may serve as a device for removing an issue from the political agenda. The Social Democrats - and to some degree the Radical Liberals - were in the early 1970s internally divided on the EC issue and the proposal to submit this issue to the people whatever the size of the parliamentary majority for EC membership indicates that the Social Democrats wanted to remove the issue from the forthcoming election campaign. By referring the EC issue to a later referendum, the party hoped to prevent a loss of voters to the Socialist People's Party, which strongly emphasised the EC issue and was opposed to Danish membership."

<sup>104</sup>

Since then the referendum has been utilised to avoid or minimise splits in parties<sup>105</sup>, vote loss, and the break-down of traditional coalition patterns that the EC/EU-conflict had – and has - the potential to cause. It is debatable whether the 1992 and 1993 referendums were actually constitutionally required (the 1972 one probably was). For example, Siune<sup>106</sup> questions if the referendum on the TEU was legally necessary. This was debated, with the discussion centred on whether the level of integration was unconstitutional. Instead of these referendums being used as additions to the parliamentary procedure, they have become (with the EP elections) the arena where Danes express their views on European integration.

#### 4.4.7 Off-loading through EP elections.

EP elections in Denmark are seen by many as referendums on EC/EU-membership, and as a chance to express their opinion on the EC/EU. Worre argues that differences in voting patterns between national and EP elections are mainly due to "the influence of the

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<sup>104</sup> Svensson, 1996, p. 41. See also Worre, 1995, p.370.

<sup>105</sup> The DSD is probably the party with the worst such problems. See, for example, Worre (1988).

<sup>106</sup> 1994, p. 94.

EC-cleavage: many voters consider Euro-elections as a kind of referendum, and opportunity to say yes or no to Danish membership of EC"<sup>107</sup>. These elections are contested by at least one anti-EC/EU movement each time, which regularly get(s) 20-25 percent of the votes. This gives opponents of the EC/EU that normally vote for a pro-party an opportunity to voice their opposition without altering the party-political balance at the national level.

Table 4.5 below shows the Danish results of the direct elections to the EP, and compares the results to the preceding and following national elections<sup>108</sup>. This table tells us two things. Firstly, that the Danish party system for elections to the EP is markedly different from that which results from national elections. Secondly, that many Danes will vote for a different party at EP-elections and then revert to their 'normal' party for national elections, even within the same year<sup>109</sup>. EP elections compliment referendums. They assist the Danish parties in reconciling their various aims, and in particular in avoiding punishment at national elections for having an EU-position that differs from many of their voters. And they assist the voter who oppose EU-membership in giving him an outlet for his anti-EU views without this having more than a minimal effect on his life, and making his voting-decision easier by being able to disregard EU-related issues at national elections.

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<sup>107</sup> Worre, 1987, p. 94. See also Worre (1981, pp. 73-4; 1989, p. 237) and Thomsen (1994, p. 334).

<sup>108</sup> It is important to note that in the 1994 EP-elections, the June Movement (JM) focused on retaining the status quo, while the People's Movement (PM) advocated withdrawal from the EU. Hence, by 1994, even at the EP elections, only ten percent of voters voted for a party/movement that is against Danish EU-membership.

<sup>109</sup> See Worre (1989).

Table 4.5. Danish Elections to the EP compared to national elections. Percent.

| Party | 1988<br>Nat. | 1989<br>EP | 1990<br>Nat. | Change<br>%<br>88-90 | Change<br>%<br>89-90 | 1994<br>EP | 1994<br>Nat. | Change<br>%<br>90-94<br>Nat. | Change<br>90-94<br>EP |
|-------|--------------|------------|--------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------|--------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| DV    | 11.8         | 16.6       | 15.8         | -4                   | +0.8                 | 19.0       | 23.3         | +7.5                         | +3.2                  |
| KF    | 19.3         | 13.3       | 15.8         | +3.5                 | -2.5                 | 17.7       | 15.0         | -0.8                         | +1.9                  |
| CD    | 4.7          | 7.9        | 5.1          | -0.4                 | +2.8                 | 0.9        | 2.8          | -2.3                         | -4.2                  |
| DKR   | 2.0          | 2.7        | 2.3          | -0.3                 | +0.4                 | 1.1        | 1.8          | -0.5                         | -1.2                  |
| F     |              |            |              |                      |                      |            |              |                              |                       |
| DFRP  | 9.0          | 5.3        | 6.4          | +2.6                 | -1.1                 | 2.9        | 6.4          | 0                            | -3.5                  |
| RV    | 5.6          | 2.8        | 3.5          | +2.1                 | -0.7                 | 8.5        | 4.6          | +1.1                         | +5                    |
| DSD   | 29.8         | 23.3       | 37.4         | -7.6                 | -14.1                | 15.8       | 34.6         | -2.8                         | -21.6                 |
| SF    | 13.0         | 9.1        | 8.3          | +4.7                 | +0.8                 | 8.6        | 7.3          | -1                           | +0.3                  |
| OT    | 5.0          | -          | 5.2          | -0.2                 | N/A                  | -          | 4.1          | -1.1                         | N/A                   |
| PM    | -            | 18.9       | -            | N/A                  | N/A                  | 10.3       | -            | N/A                          | N/A                   |
| JM    | -            | -          | -            | -                    | -                    | 15.2       | -            | N/A                          | N/A                   |

OT = Other. Sources for election data: 1979-1989: Petersson (1994, p. 70). 1994 European elections: Thomsen (1995b). 1994 Folketing elections: Thomsen (1995a). Changes calculated by author.

#### **4.5 Conclusion.**

Danish opposition to EU-membership is centred on a defence of Danish sovereignty. Many opponents of EU-membership want to limit European co-operation to some form of a free trade arrangement. This is partly based on fear of what would happen to the welfare state and the position of women if European integration is taken further. Consequently, most of those who support the far left and many who support the moderate left oppose membership. Because urban areas are the strongholds of the far left, this is reflected in, and may even reinforce, the urban-rural divide over membership.

Many Danes appear only to support Danish participation in the EU internal market if free movement of people and capital is somewhat curtailed. This is evidenced in the hostility of the Danes and the Danish governments to common citizenship, the fear of being flooded by refugees and immigrants as a result of the TEU, and the exemption

demanding from the TEU from allowing foreigners to buy holiday property in Denmark. Concerns related to the quality of democracy in the EU seems of little importance to Danes, and many of their representatives at the EU-level actively work against any increased powers for the EP<sup>110</sup>.

Support for membership is based on the need for access to the internal market, especially for agricultural goods. Although regional differences are in decline, rural areas (and especially those with a high proportion of farmers) show disproportionately high support for membership. This is mainly because Danish agriculture is highly export-dependent, and non-discriminatory access to the EU-market is crucial to this industry. Conversely, this is not a concern for the urban population, who are more likely to base their view of EU-membership on other factors than the effects on agriculture.

Party-political opposition to Danish EU-membership is confined to the extreme right and the extreme left, usually holding only 10-20 percent of the seats in Parliament with a similar share of the vote. Because a much higher number of Danes oppose European integration, it would appear rational for more of the parties to do so as well, especially those on the centre-left who attract many anti-EU voters in national elections.

Both main theoretical frameworks employed in this thesis offer explanations for the lack of impact of the EU-conflict on national elections. According to the cleavage model, the EU-conflict has a limited crosscutting effect in Denmark because it follows both the primary left-right cleavage and the secondary territorial cleavage(s) relatively closely. The rational choice explanation is that including the EU-conflict in the agenda for

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<sup>110</sup> See for example Petersen (1993).

national elections would run the risk of dividing parties and of making normal coalition patterns more difficult, if not impossible. It would also make it more difficult for many voters to decide how to vote. Thus, it is in the interest of both many voters and most political parties to remove the conflict over European integration from the arena of national politics. This has the effect of letting parties and voters avoid serious debate over European integration most of the time. This off-loading is achieved through two devices. The first is holding referendums on important European integration issues. The second device is elections to the EP.

The conflict over European integration has altered the political system in Denmark, but perhaps not in the expected manner. Decisions and debates over European integration are removed from the 'normal' political procedure of national elections to the more exceptional arena of referendums. EP-elections act as a side-show in this off-loading exercise. Hence, the EU-conflict has neither created any successful new parties, nor does it seem significantly to alter the relative strength of parties at national elections. But the overall effect of EU-membership and this off-loading is to remove both policies now decided at the EU-level and the decision of the nature of Denmark's relationship with the EU from the national election arena. Hence, the scope of what can be affected through national elections has been severely limited.

## **Chapter 5. Finland: the European Nordic.**

### **5.1 Introduction.**

Until the end of the Cold War, membership in the EU was a political impossibility for Finland and virtually a non-issue in Finnish politics. When Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the SU disintegrated in 1991 the situation changed dramatically, and so did the options available to Finland. At the same time, the moves towards further integration in the EC made a Finnish reconsideration of its relationship with the Community a matter for more urgent consideration.

Although Finland must still consider the view of, and situation in, its great neighbour to the east, such considerations have become less pressing. Finland retains its official policy of neutrality, but post-1991 this had ceased to be an impediment to a closer relationship with, and even membership in, the EC.

Finland formally applied for membership in the EC in March 1992. It was decided to hold a referendum on this issue<sup>1</sup>. This was held in October 1994. The outcome was a solid, but not overwhelming, majority for the 'yes'-side. The referendum result was confirmed by a vote in the Finnish parliament, the 'Eduskunta'. On January 1, 1995, Finland joined the EU.

This chapter has two main aims. The first is to evaluate the effects of Finnish membership in the EU on the utility of Finnish voters. This is carried out by evaluating a



number of factors influenced by membership which are argued likely to affect the utility income of individuals. The relevance of these factors is established using a variety of data from surveys of the 1994 referendum and other sources. This is the topic of section two of the chapter.

The other main concern is the effect on the Finnish party system of the conflict over European integration. This is dealt with in section three of the chapter. The fact that a substantial minority in the population who are hostile to membership have very limited representation in parliament and government is highlighted. Some officially pro-EU parties are opposed by a considerable minority, and some even by a majority, of their voters on this conflict. This is argued to give impetus for some parties and politicians to oppose EU-membership for vote-seeking purposes. Conversely, it is also shown why these parties have so far remained pro-EU. It is also demonstrated why many voters would find it more complicated to decide how to vote if the EU-conflict was a more prominent feature at national elections. It is concluded that it is in the interest both of many voters and of most parties to off-load this conflict onto other electoral arenas than national elections.

Before these two main concerns are addressed, it is necessary to outline Finland's international relations in general, and the details of its relationship with the EC/EU in particular.

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<sup>1</sup> For the referendum provisions in the Finnish Constitution, see Appendix 5.1.

## 5.2. A historical review of Finland's relations with the EC and the EU.

### 5.2.1. Finland's international relations after World War II.

For most of the post-war period, Finland's main concern in international relations and in conducting its foreign policy was to retain its status as a independent nation. This was the result of having been invaded by and having fought against the SU during World War II<sup>2</sup>. Between World Wars I and II, in the pursuit of national self-preservation, Finland largely pursued a neutral security policy. After World War II, Finland had little choice but to continue this pursuit, given its past experiences and as its room for manoeuvre had been even more circumscribed. As Törnudd argues:

“The experiences of seeking support in alliances directed *against* the Soviet Union had been mainly unsatisfactory, and this option was in any case politically impossible in the post-war situation. On the other hand, Finland did not wish to ally herself *with* the Soviet Union. The only remaining option was that of a form of neutrality policy, combined with a sufficient deference to Soviet security interests.”<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, Miljan argues that for Finland neutrality was a necessity in order to preserve Finnish sovereignty, “an adaptive response to a single external demand”<sup>4</sup>. He goes on to argue that Finnish neutrality was therefore more stable than the Swedish form of

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<sup>2</sup> In November 1939 the SU invaded Finland. The ‘Winter War’ ended in March 1940. Finland lost, and had to cede 32,000 square miles to the SU. When Germany invaded the SU in 1941, Finland started what became known as the ‘Continuation War’ and effectively fought on the German side. In 1944 Finland signed an armistice in Moscow, ceding even more territory and agreeing to terms of reparation.

<sup>3</sup> Törnudd, 1996, pp. 39-40. This article describes Finnish trends and traditions in security policy since the early 19th century until 1995 in some detail on pages 38-43.

<sup>4</sup> Miljan, 1977, p. 258.

neutrality, but at the same time coloured by its dependence upon the security perceptions of the SU<sup>5</sup>.

Like many small countries, Finland is heavily dependent upon trade, with exports amounting to about a quarter of GDP at the time when Finland was debating whether or not to join the EU<sup>6</sup>. And, as the table below shows, a majority of its trade was (and is) with EU-countries or EU-applicants<sup>7</sup>. The table also shows the collapse in trade with Russia. Exports to the SU traditionally made up 20 percent of Finnish exports.

Table 5.1 Finland's main trading partners in 1993.

| Country | Exports ( percent) | Imports ( percent) |
|---------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Germany | 13.2               | 16.4               |
| Sweden  | 11.1               | 10.2               |
| UK      | 10.5               | 8.9                |
| USA     | 7.8                | 7.3                |
| Russia  | 4.5                | 7.6                |
| EU      | 46.9               | 47.2               |
| EFTA    | 17.0               | 19.0               |

Source: Barnes, p. 178. (From the Financial Times, 9/11/94, Survey of Finland 9).

Neutrality and the special relationship with the SU has also made Nordic co-operation more difficult for Finland, although these factors also provide convenient cover for other reasons for rejecting such co-operation. The advent of the Cold War essentially sealed the fate of the Nordic Defence Union. Finland was obliged to pull out under pressure

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<sup>5</sup> Miljan, 1977, p. 258. The consideration towards the SU also had a formal side. Finland was forced by the SU to sign a 'Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance' (FCA) in April 1948. This included provisions with the potential of linking the defence policies of Finland and the SU. See, for example, Noreen's (1983) account of the 1961 'Note Crisis' (p. 45, and endnote 12, p. 55).

<sup>6</sup> See Table A.

<sup>7</sup> Considering that the EFTA countries Sweden, Norway and Austria had applied for membership, the share of Finnish trade with the EU with these three as members would exceed 60 percent. Even without Norway the figure would be about 60 percent.

from the SU, and signed the FCA Treaty with the SU<sup>8</sup>. Nevertheless, Finland signed up to the Nordic Common Labour Market Treaty of 1954, and joined the Nordic Council in 1956, four years after its creation. This especially assisted Finns in moving to Sweden for work. Nordek was finally rejected by Finland in 1970<sup>9</sup>.

Finland did not join EFTA at its formation. This was partly due to a wish to assuage Soviet dislike of 'imperialist' EFTA, and partly to safeguard some quantitative import restrictions on goods from the SU that were necessary for the continuation of bilateral trade with the SU. Instead, a separate free-trade area consisting of the seven EFTA-members and Finland - FINEFTA - was created in a treaty signed on March 27, 1961. This strengthened Finnish sovereignty by giving Finland all the advantages of EFTA membership but without sacrificing its security interests<sup>10</sup>. In 1986 Finland became a full member of EFTA.

As long as the Cold War 'bloc' policy lasted, membership in the EC was not compatible with Finnish neutrality<sup>11</sup>. Its special and precarious relationship with the SU reinforced this position. The EC was seen as West-bloc oriented, and membership therefore as both incompatible with neutrality and an affront to the SU that might jeopardise Finnish independence. For Finland, EU membership was only possible because the Cold War and the bloc policy ended.<sup>12</sup> Hence, Finland did not apply for membership at any time

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<sup>8</sup> Elder, Thomas, and Arter, 1988, pp. 203-4.

<sup>9</sup> Elder, Thomas, and Arter, 1988, pp. 197-200. Also see Arter (1995b, p. 365).

<sup>10</sup> Miljan, 1977, p. 260.

<sup>11</sup> The importance of the neutrality argument during the Cold War is stressed by, for example, Bjørklund (1996); Jahn and Storsved (1995a); Laursen (1993), Ludlow (1994), Miljan (1977), Mauritzen (1993) and Tørnudd (1996).

<sup>12</sup> This argument is made by, for example, Bjørklund (1996, p. 13) and Jahn and Storsved (1995a, p. 22). Similarly, Tørnudd (1996, p. 41) argues that Finland's security

until 1992. Berglund argues that Finland's 1992 application to join the EC "would have been completely unthinkable only a few years earlier"<sup>13</sup>.

#### 5.2.2. Finland and European Integration 1961-1972.

Finland did not react to the first (1961) and second (1967) rounds of applications for EC-membership by EFTA countries. But by the time of the third applications in 1970 it had become clear that the EC would expand and that Finland had to react. This need for reaction stemmed mainly from potential foreign trade problems. Firstly, Britain and Denmark were two of Finland's main trading partners. Secondly, Sweden and Norway were two of Finland's leading competitors in trade with the EC. Of these, three seemed about to enter the EC, and Sweden was about to negotiate an arrangement reducing the EC tariff walls<sup>14</sup>.

After a host of official and unofficial visits by President Kekkonen to the SU and a renewal five years before its expiration date of the FCA Treaty in July 1970, Finland started negotiations with the EC in November 1971. (There were exploratory talks in the beginning of spring 1970.) In July 1972 a free trade agreement between the EC and Finland was installed.

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situation changed significantly when the SU dissolved at the end of 1992.

<sup>13</sup> Berglund, 1995, p. 361.

<sup>14</sup> Miljan, 1977, pp. 260-61.

A variety of political, constitutional and economic difficulties and conflicts then held up the treaty for some time<sup>15</sup>. In the end, it was signed in Brussels on October 5 1973, and ratified in the Eduskunta on November 16, 1973. Only the Communists voted against<sup>16</sup>.

### 5.2.3. Finland and European integration 1972-1995.

Until the late 1980's, European integration was virtually a non-issue in Finnish politics. But then Finland's entire international environment changed very rapidly. In addition, and partly as a result of these changes, Finland's until then very comfortable economic situation deteriorated with a speed similar to that of the collapse of Communism to the east and south.

Mouritzen argues that Finland's relationship with the SU has been the main restraining factor on Finnish integration policy. 'Good neighbourly relations' with the SU was always given priority over the 'welfare value' that dominated policies regarding Western integration. But with the SU's disintegration after 1991 the welfare value became the number one priority. This was reinforced by the severe economic crisis from about 1990. EU membership was seen as part of the solution to the economic crisis. Thus, having gained autonomy from the SU collapse, Finland used it to announce its desire to have this autonomy limited in a future political union. This was accepted as a partial means to safeguard the welfare value. A further reason may have been to emphasise Finland's (Western) European status<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> For details, see Miljan, 1977, pp. 266-67.

<sup>16</sup> Miljan, 1977, pp. 266-68.

<sup>17</sup> Mouritzen (1993, pp. 389-90). See also Arter (1995b, p. 362). Varynen (1993) argues that the effort to emphasise Finland's European status also played a role in connection

The breakdown of the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989-90, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1991, and the political and economic collapse of the SU made possible - and necessary - a radical review of Finland's options in its rapidly changing foreign policy environment<sup>18</sup>.

Part of Finland's economic problems were caused by the collapse of the Soviet economy and the failure of Russia to introduce a working market economy. Other reasons include the world-wide economic slowdown and structural problems such as an export sector heavily dependent upon forestry and a subsidy-dependent agricultural sector<sup>19</sup>.

Arter describes Finland as "emerging from the deepest recession in its history and the worst to affect any OECD member-state since the Second World War"<sup>20</sup>. In the period 1990-1993 Finland's economy shrank by fifteen percent. The SU's collapse coincided with the international recession, sending both the Soviet and the Western European export outlets into the doldrums. In addition, the economy had been overheating in the late 1980s, with a credit boom fuelled by financial deregulation. Then interest rates increased rapidly, asset values collapsed, and hundreds of companies went bankrupt. In 1991 the Finnish mark was devalued by fourteen percent, leading to increased interest payments. In 1990 unemployment stood at 3.4 percent; by March 1995 it had risen to 20 percent. Also, the government, at the same time as unemployment costs increased rapidly, bailed out banks that had incurred huge credit losses. Costs related to this took

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with Finnish EEA membership.

<sup>18</sup> Berglund, 1995, p. 361.

<sup>19</sup> Berglund, 1995, p. 361.

<sup>20</sup> Arter (1995a, pp. 194-95; 1995b, p. 362).

the government deep into the red, and by the 1995 election state debt had risen to 70 percent of GDP<sup>21</sup>.

The increased pace of integration in the EC - and especially the SEA and the TEU - also made a reappraisal of Finland's relationship with the Community necessary. Finally, the increased possibility of Norway, and especially Sweden, moving towards closer ties with the EC, and perhaps membership, moved Finland further in a similar direction.

Finland probably would not have applied for EU-membership if Sweden had not done so first. Arter sums up the importance of both the Swedish position and the increasing pace of European integration: "the Swedish government's [...] 1990 announcement of its intention to seek full membership of the European Community (EC) challenged Finland to reconsider her role in a rapidly integrating Europe"<sup>22</sup>. Furthermore, the Finnish government did not want to see the Gulf of Bothnia as a border with the EU<sup>23</sup>.

Finland applied to join the EU on March 18, 1992. Negotiations were held between February 1, 1993 and March 1, 1994. The referendum was held on October 16, 1994. The 'yes'-vote was 56.9 percent. Parliament then approved membership in November, and Finland joined the EU on January 1, 1995.

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<sup>21</sup> Arter, 1995a, p. 195.

<sup>22</sup> Arter, 1991, p. 174.

<sup>23</sup> Tørnudd, 1996, p. 49.



### **5.3. Finnish attitudes towards EU membership.**

#### **5.3.1. Common economic factors.**

The Finnish net contribution to the EU budget in 1995 was ECU 165 million. This is equivalent to 32 ECU per head, and makes Finland the 7th largest per head contributor to the EU budget. In the same year Finland's GDP per head, based on PPP, was only 93 percent of the EU average<sup>24</sup>. Although some Finns would be net recipients of EU funds (see below), for the vast majority this factor would have a negative impact on their utility.

The taxation level in Finland was about the same as the EU average in 1990. (See Table B for details.) Moreover, the taxation level rose at a slower pace in Finland than in the EU between 1980 and 1990. Among the four countries studied here, Finland had the lowest taxation level, although the increase between 1980 and 1990 was more rapid than in Denmark and Norway. Finland's taxation level was very close to the EU average in 1990. There is therefore little reason to expect either direct (harmonisation) or indirect (competitive pressures) effects on the overall Finnish taxation level as a result of EU-membership. Consequently, little effect on people's utility is expected to derive from this factor.

One result of EU-membership compared to EEA-membership is to open up the market for food and drink to foreign competition to a much greater extent. Because Finnish

subsidies to the agriculture sector were considerably higher than the EU-average (see Table D), and with increased competitive pressures, prices of such goods would be expected to fall as a result of membership. For the average Finn, this would benefit his utility. By 1997 food prices had indeed dropped by thirteen percent<sup>25</sup>. Heikkiläe and Myhrmann<sup>26</sup> specifically argue that the drop in food-prices was due to decreased producer prices and the competition of the single market.

In 1991, Finnish unemployment stood at 7.6 percent, close to the EU average of 8.8 percent. However, as Table C shows, by 1993 it was up to an astonishing 17.3 percent compared to an EU average of 10.6 percent. Although an increase in unemployment was common to most West European countries in this period, the Finnish deterioration in employment was much more severe. Although Table C shows there is no observable pattern differentiating EU-members from non-EU members with regard to the level of unemployment, it is difficult to imagine the Finnish situation getting much worse as a result of EU membership.

Hence, it is reasonable that the average Finn would expect his employment prospects, and thus his utility, to improve as a result of EU membership. Appendix 5.2.C<sup>27</sup> shows that this was indeed the expectation of the average Finnish voter, with a gap of 25 percent between the optimists among 'yes'-voters and the pessimists among 'no'-voters.

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<sup>24</sup> The Economist, 23/11/94.

<sup>25</sup> The Economist, 11/10/97, p. 72. See also Table E.

<sup>26</sup> 1996, p. 66.

<sup>27</sup> The survey data used in this and the next three sections is, unless otherwise noted, translated from the 1994 book edited by Pesonen. For complete references, see the appendices to this chapter.

The effect of membership on the Finnish economy is the most general argument in this category. Considering the difficult economic situation of Finland in the early 1990's, it is not surprising that most Finns viewed membership as a good thing for the Finnish economy, as the data in Appendix 5.2 shows. A vast majority of 'yes'-voters and even a majority of 'no'-voters felt EU membership would improve the Finnish economy<sup>28</sup>.

### 5.3.2 Common non-economic factors.

The case for the transfer of policy areas and power *per se* as potentially affecting the utility of an individual was made in Chapter 3. The direction of this effect depends upon the value assigned to power resting with the nation-state and (dis)approval of the EU-form of European integration.

Appendix 5.2 displays public opinion on a variety of factors related to national control. Most directly, Table C in this appendix shows that very few voters felt that Finland's national independence would be greater as a result of membership. A clear majority of 'no'-voters believed that Finland's national independence would be more limited<sup>29</sup>, and so did a substantial minority of 'yes'-voters.

Some voters are likely to oppose EU-membership because they disapprove of the form of integration represented by the EU. One potential reason for this is that the EU is not

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<sup>28</sup> Bjørklund (1996) also argues that a majority of Finns viewed EU-membership as equivalent to an improvement to their economy. Several other writers argue that prospects for the Finnish economy was an important reason for voting 'yes'. See for example Jahn and Storsved (1995a, pp. 32-34) and Suksi (1996, pp. 58-59).

<sup>29</sup> This argument is common in the literature. See for example Jahn and Storsved (1995a, pp. 32-34; Suksi (1996, p. 59) and Pesonen (1994, p. 188).

international enough. The survey data in Pesonen et al. do not provide any direct data that enables us to evaluate this proposition. However, Appendix 5.4 indicates that the number of people in this category is rather limited. When asked about identity, those who included 'international' among their primary or secondary identities were substantially more likely to vote 'yes' than those whose identities were more local or regional.

Similarly, Appendix 5.2.A shows that fear of immigration was a stronger concern among 'no'-voters than among 'yes'-voters. On the other hand, Appendix 5.2.B provides some support for the argument that some Finns voted against membership in the EU because it is not international enough. The argument 'we must become a EU-member in order to secure our belonging in the Western world' was strongly rejected by 'no'-voters and supported by 'yes'-voters. Nevertheless, this was not a particularly strong reason for anti-EU sentiment. Rather, an internationalist outlook seems to make the average Finn more likely to be a europeanist, or torn between support for nationalist control and a positive view of the European integration process.

Another reason for opposing EU-membership on the basis of the nature of the EU form of integration is the so-called 'democratic deficit' in the EU. Unfortunately, no data was available that enables direct evaluation of expectations regarding the effect of EU-membership on democracy. However, Appendix 5.2.B displays some interesting data that relates to this. The argument 'power in Brussels is so far away that the common man loses his influence over public matters if we join the EU' was seen as a strong argument by both a clear majority of 'no'-voters and many 'yes'-voters.

On the other hand, reaction to the argument ‘as an EU-member we have more influence over our future than if we stay outside’ reveals the other side of this argument. This was seen as a strong argument by nearly 2/3rds of ‘yes’ voters and also some ‘no’-voters. Hence, arguments related to democracy are inconclusive. It is also indicative of Finnish priorities that Pesonen did not even include a category for the effect of EU-membership on democracy in the tables displayed in Appendix 5.2<sup>30</sup>.

Concern about the effects of EU-membership on Nordic integration and co-operation does not appear to be important among Finnish voters. Among the reasons for voting behaviour (listed in Appendix 5.2), this does not warrant a separate category or question. There is no evidence to support the idea that this factor was of significant importance for Finnish attitudes to membership.

Remarkably, the book edited by Pesonen does not even include any question about the effect of EU-membership on Finnish neutrality<sup>31</sup>. However, Appendix 5.2 provides us with information on how the Finnish people view the effects of EU-membership on security. Table A in this appendix shows that ‘security’ was considered to be a good reason for voting ‘yes’ but not a particularly good reason for voting ‘no’. Furthermore, according to Appendix 5.2.B, a majority of ‘yes’-voters and a quarter of ‘no’-voters

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<sup>30</sup> See also Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 1995b); Suksi (1996, pp. 57-59) and Pesonen (1994a, p.188).

<sup>31</sup> See Tørnudd (1996) for a discussion of the effect on membership on neutrality. Several authors mention this factor as a reason for voting ‘no’ (E.g. Tørnudd 1996; Suksi, 1996) but there is no evidence that Finnish voters actually considered EU-membership to affect their utility in any substantial degree based on this factor.

considered the argument 'membership in the EU is positive for Finnish defence' to be a strong argument, while considerably fewer voters considered it to be a weak argument<sup>32</sup>.

The importance of this factor is likely to be strongly connected to the geographical and historical significance of Finland's enormous neighbour to the east. It is only 80 years since Finland was part of Russia. This and the experiences of the Second World War and the Cold War has entrenched the significance and danger represented by Russia in Finnish security considerations. Although the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the SU released some pressure in this respect, it far from removed it.

One episode in particular served to emphasise the continued threat from the east. The only time the Finnish opponents of EU-membership were in a majority in the opinion polls was in December 1993. But that same month the extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's party scored 22.8 percent in the Russian parliamentary elections<sup>33</sup>. One of his policies was that Finland should again become part of Russia<sup>34</sup>. Bjørklund<sup>35</sup> argues that this was the decisive event in turning public opinion firmly towards membership again. Similarly, Suksi<sup>36</sup> argues that the strong support for Russian nationalists in these elections probably made support for membership more pronounced. Thus, for Finns who derive utility from Finnish sovereignty, it does not necessarily make sense to oppose

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<sup>32</sup> See also Bjørklund (1996); Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 1995b); Suksi (1996, pp. 57-59) and Pesonen (1994a, p. 188).

<sup>33</sup> He had already come third in the 1991 Presidential elections, with six million votes.

<sup>34</sup> Frazer and Lancelle (1994, p. 39) argue that Zhirinovsky's threats to occupy Finland "is a rhetorical flourish and little more than that". However, they also reproduce some Zhirinovsky quotes that were unlikely to calm Finnish nerves: "Keep away from NATO and all the other military alliances that are directed against Russia, otherwise Russian and German Troops will fight on Finnish territory." (p. 44, from *Izvestiya*, 5/4/94); "The Finns: they are afraid of me." (p. 44, from *La Stampa*, 16/12/93).

<sup>35</sup> 1996, p. 17.

EU-membership, even if the decision is based solely on this factor. If the voter sees EU-membership as (a step towards) increasing protection against Russian aggression, then such membership increases his utility.

### 5.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.

The agricultural sector is the main beneficiary of EU funds. But at the time of Finland's membership-negotiations with the EU, Finnish agricultural subsidies were much higher than the EU average. Table C shows that subsidies to Finnish agriculture were substantially higher than that of the EC. With Finnish EU membership, this figure will eventually drop to the EU-level. Hence, the average farmer can be expected to see a severe drop in his utility as a result of EU-membership.

The effect of EU-membership on farmers' income varies according to produce and region. However, with the exception of dairy farmers in Northern Finland, all farmers will experience substantial income losses both in the five year transition period and thereafter<sup>37</sup>. Without changes in technology or the number of farms, average farm net incomes will decrease by 30 percent by the end of the transition period.<sup>38</sup> Niemi and Linjakumpu have shown that, in order to retain the same income level as prior to EU-membership, the number of farms would have to drop from about 115, 000 in 1994, to 70, 000 or 49, 000 by 2005, depending on how much national subsidy is allowed. Finland agreed a subsidy programme with the Commission in July 1996, and the higher

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<sup>36</sup> 1996, p. 56.

<sup>37</sup> Kettunen, 1996, pp. 18-19.

<sup>38</sup> Heikkiläe and Myhrmann, 1996, p. 63.

figure is based on this programme being implemented. However, this subsidy will be up for review in 1999<sup>39</sup>.

Appendix 5.2.C shows hardly even any 'yes'-voters expected Finnish agriculture to benefit from membership<sup>40</sup>. Also, Appendix 5.2.A shows that concern for primary industries was seen as a reason for voting 'no' by sixteen percent of those asked. Appendix 5.3 shows that only 29 percent of those employed in the farming sector voted 'yes'.

From the Accession Treaty, it was clear that most EU regional aid to Finland would go to the sparsely populated northern and central areas. Objective 6 covers the provinces of Lapland, Kainuu, Pohjois-Karjala, and Etelä-Savo in their entirety, as well as parts of Pohjois-Savo, Keski Suomi, Keski Pohjanmaa and Pohjois Pohjanmaa. Objective 5b covers many rural areas all over Finland. Objective 2 covers only a few small areas in central and southern Finland<sup>41</sup>, and is unlikely to have substantial observable effect on utility. The indicative commitment appropriation for Finland was 1,193 Million ECU for the period 1995-1999 for Objectives 1 to 5b, and 511 Million ECU for Objective 6<sup>42</sup>. Based on this factor the utility of people living in these areas can be expected to increase as a result of EU membership. However, it would not compensate for much of the loss

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<sup>39</sup> Niemi and Linjakumpu, 1996, pp.131-139.

<sup>40</sup> Suksi argues that concern for agriculture was a reason for voting 'no' in the 1994 referendum, (1996, pp. 57-59), as does Pesonen (1994a, p. 188).

<sup>41</sup> Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 355); [www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/fin.htm](http://www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/fin.htm).

<sup>42</sup> Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 356.)



of agricultural subsidies. Furthermore, the future status of these funds, especially considering the EU enlargement into Eastern Europe, is very uncertain.

Appendix 5.3 shows that support for Finnish EU-membership varied substantially among regions and between rural and urban areas. There was also a distinct north-south dimension. Among the counties the 'yes'-vote at the 1994 referendum varied between 73.5 percent in the capital Helsinki and 43.7 percent in the second most northern county, Oulu. There was a 'yes'-majority in the five southernmost counties and Ahvenanmaa, and a 'no'-majority in the six northernmost counties.

Even in the 'no'-counties in the northern and western parts of Finland there were solid 'yes'-majorities in the biggest towns. In Rovaniemi in Lappi 63.3 percent voted 'yes', compared to 47.4 in the county as a whole. In Oulu the corresponding numbers were 60.3 percent (Oulu town) and 43.9 percent, and in Vaasa 65.8 percent (Vaasa town) and 44.4 percent. If EU regional aid had any effect on attitudes to EU-membership in these areas, then it has been only in limiting, not eliminating, regional differences. The population of rural and more peripheral areas were substantially more opposed to EU-membership than urban and central ones<sup>43</sup>. Furthermore, a comparison of Appendices 5.3 and 5.5 shows that the four most urban provinces (Uusimaa including Helsinki, Turku<sup>44</sup>, Häme and Kymi) also recorded the four highest 'yes'-votes. Conversely,

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<sup>43</sup> See also, for example, Jahn and Storsved (1995a, p. 33), Bjørklund (1996) and Fitmaurize (1995, p. 229) for the importance of the urban-rural cleavage.

<sup>44</sup> A direct and complete comparison is complicated because the data for Turku (and Häme) are split in the referendum results. It is possible that Turku falls slightly behind Mikkeli because of the lower 'yes'-vote in Turku North. However, this is still consistent with the urban-rural split, since Turku north is considerably more rural than Turku South. Strictly speaking, however, Turku as a whole may not fit the pattern.

excluding Ahvenanmaa, three of the four lowest 'yes'-votes by county were recorded in the three most rural counties.

There are various possible explanations for these territorial differences. The most important one is the effect of EU-membership on Finnish agriculture, as outlined above. Differences in political leanings are also likely to be of importance. This is discussed in section 5.2.4 below. Also, as Appendix 5.6 shows, there are substantial regional discrepancies with respect to state transfers and subsidies. This has two, reinforcing, aspects. Firstly, there are differences between provinces, with northern and central ones receiving much more state aid per capita than southern ones. In the extreme case, the province including Helsinki, Uusimaa, receives half the amount of state aid per capita of that received by some central and northern provinces such as Oulu. (See Appendix 5.6.) Secondly, state subsidies also vary between urban and rural areas. Overall, the difference is over 35 percent. But because of differences between provinces, the overall effect is that urban areas in southern provinces receive 60 percent or less in the way of state subsidies per capita than the northern and central rural areas. EU membership, through competitive pressures and/or legislation, forms a potential threat to such subsidies.

Public social expenditure is relatively high in Finland. As Table F shows, overall social protection expenditure has been considerably above the EU-average, and only second to Sweden among current EU-members. In terms of final domestic consumption, public consumption was considerably higher (150 percent) than the EU-average in 1993, compared to a private consumption level close to average (105 percent)<sup>45</sup>. EU-membership does not necessarily entail any changes in Finnish social spending.

However, based on simple comparison with EU-countries and expectations about future harmonisation and competitive pressures, one could conclude that a reduction in social spending would be the end result of membership<sup>46</sup>. Efforts to meet the criteria for EMU could also be argued to have such effects. Non-membership allows for more national control over such spending. Therefore, if the voter views a reduction in social spending as beneficial to his utility, then he is likely to support membership based on this factor, and vice versa.

It is explained in Chapter 3 why public employees and poorer sections of the population are disproportionately likely to see their utility decline if the welfare state is reduced. Thus, members of these groups are more likely to reject EU membership than the average person. Appendix 5.3 shows that private sector employees were more likely to view EU-membership as beneficial to their utility than were public sector employees. However, the differences between income groups were much greater. The relationship is close to linear, with a much higher proportion of people in high income groups voting 'yes' than those with a lower income.

Considerably more Finnish women (46 percent of those in employment) than men (24 percent) worked in the public sector in 1993<sup>47</sup>. Women also tend to be somewhat less well-paid, at 93.6 percent of male pay in 1991<sup>48</sup>. In addition, Finnish women benefit disproportionately from a variety of tax-funded schemes, such as long and well paid maternity leave, as Table G shows. However, the number of publicly funded

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<sup>45</sup> Eurostat, 1995b, p. 359.

<sup>46</sup> Suksi (1996, pp. 57-59) argues that fear for reductions in social security was a reason for voting 'no' in the 1994 referendum, as does Pesonen (1994a, p. 188).

<sup>47</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.

childminding facilities is only about average<sup>49</sup>. A reduction in social spending would therefore somewhat reduce the utility of women disproportionately compared to men.

Finland is highly dependent upon trade, as shown in Table A. The West European export markets have long been of vital importance, especially for wood and wood products. In this context, it is also very important never to be excluded from markets that rival Swedish industries have access to<sup>50</sup>. Although the EEA-Treaty secures access to the internal market of the EU, this arrangement is much riskier for securing trade-interests than full membership. Hence, EU-membership can be expected to increase the utility of those whose income is dependent upon trade. Information that allows direct analysis of the importance of this factor is not available. However, this is likely to have contributed to the gap in attitude between the public and the private sector.

#### 5.3.4. Group differentiated non-economic factors.

Ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be high on the political left and low on the right. If EU-membership affects people's utility with regard to their attitude to the welfare state, then support for membership can be expected to be high on the right and low on the left. Looking at party-support, there is some evidence that this is the case. Supporters of the VF voted 'no' by a margin of two to one, and supporters of the NSP voted nine to one in favour. However, opposition appears to have been just as strong

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<sup>48</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.

<sup>49</sup> At 22 percent higher than any EU-country for 0-2 year olds in 1989. Between the ages of 3 and 6-7 (normal age for starting school in Finland) the coverage was only 52 percent, which is one of the lowest of any Nordic or EC country. (Friis, 1992, p. 144. Sources: Childminding in the EC 1985-1990. Supplement to Europas Kvinder, no. 31, 1990; Rita Knudsen: Familieydelser i Norden 1989).

among CF-voters, and especially supporters of the FKF, as it was among VF-voters, and FSD-voters were nearly as enthusiastic about membership as NSP-voters. (See Appendix 5.3 for details.)

To an extent these differences followed territorial differences in voting patterns. The CF and the VF have their strongholds in the northern and central parts of Finland, and the CF also in rural areas generally. The NSP and the FSD, conversely, are stronger in the more urbanised south. However, the differences in attitudes to EU-membership between supporters of different parties were greater than urban-rural differences in attitude to membership. This is confirmed by data on left-right self-placement displayed in Appendix 5.3. The differences between those on the left and in the centre were minor, but support for membership was considerably higher on the right. Hence, there appears to be a left-right dimension in attitude to membership. However, overall it is difficult to say if this was due to attitudes to the welfare state.

Returning now to differential effects of membership based on gender. In 1994 the number of Finnish women in employment was considerably higher than the EU average<sup>51</sup>. Finnish women are also better represented in political institutions<sup>52</sup>. It is also possible to argue that Catholic influence in the EU could affect the relatively liberal

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<sup>50</sup> Mouritzen, 1993, pp. 389-90.

<sup>51</sup> In 1994, labour force participation in Finland was 70.2 percent for women, compared to an EU average of 56.7 percent. (OECD, 1996a).

<sup>52</sup> At the 1995 election, 67 women candidates were elected to the Eduskunta. This is down from 77 at the 1991 election, but still substantially higher than any non-Nordic European country (Sundberg, 1996, p. 326). The Aho II government had, on January 1 1995, five female members out of a total of sixteen. The Lipponen Government, as of 31 December 1995, had seven female members out of eighteen. (Source: Sundberg, 1996, pp. 324-25) Early in 1995 the Eduskunta elected Riitta Uosukainen, the Minister of Education, as its first female speaker. (Pesonen, 1994c, pp. 264-5)

Finnish legislation on abortion and divorce, if such policies are ever to be set at the EU-level. Added to the more economic considerations above, these factors make EU-membership relatively detrimental to the utility of women compared with the utility of men.

Appendix 5.3 confirms that substantially more Finnish women voted 'no' to EU-membership in 1994 than did men. Thus, it appears that comparisons of the conditions for women in EU-countries with those in Finland affected voting behaviour<sup>53</sup>.

Finland is the only Nordic country with a long-standing and substantial ethnic minority: Swedish-speaking Finns. The obvious connection to Sweden means that for Swedish-speaking Finns EU-membership for both Sweden and Finland would bring them closer to Sweden and reduce isolation. This could be argued to increase their utility. The data displayed in Appendix 5.3 supports this contention. A disproportionately large number of Swedish-speaking Finns supported membership. However, there is a very strong geographical split in the Swedish-speaking community. Whilst in Uusimaa and Southern Finland 77 percent and 90 percent respectively in this group voted 'yes', only 33 percent did so in Central Finland<sup>54</sup>. This is also reflected in that the agrarian wing of the SFF was opposed to membership<sup>55</sup>. Hence, in rural areas economic concerns appear to override linguistic/cultural concerns among the Swedish-speaking minority.

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<sup>53</sup> See also Bjørklund (1996, pp. 26-28); Jahn and Storsved (1995a, p. 31) and Fitzmaurice (1995, p. 229).

<sup>54</sup> More specifically, the Swedish-speakers in Ostrobothnia in rural Mid-Western Finland were heavily against (Suksi, 1996, p. 59; Tiilikainen, 1996).

<sup>55</sup> Jahn and Storsved (1995, pp. 30-31), Suksi (1996, p. 59).

#### 5.4 Party System effects.

The main concern of this section is to explain the limited effect of the EU-conflict on the national election agenda and results. In particular, an explanation is sought for the under-representation of anti-EU public opinion by the political parties.

The most obvious manifestation of the increased salience of European integration in the Finnish political landscape was that after three decades of refusal to even contemplate full membership in the EC, Finland applied for such membership on 18 March 1992. Arter<sup>56</sup> argues that one of the two most important issues facing the Aho-government after its formation in 1991 was whether or not to apply for EC membership.

As table 5.2 below shows, there was substantial opposition to Finnish membership throughout the 1990's, with over 42 percent voting 'no' in the 1994 referendum.

Table 5.2: Position on EU membership among the Finnish people.

|                         | 1987 | Autumn<br>1990 | Spring<br>1992 | Autumn<br>1992 | Spring<br>1993 | Autumn<br>1993 | Autumn 16/10/94 |
|-------------------------|------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Yes                     | 39   | 44             | 56             | 43             | 40             | 39             | 56.9            |
| No                      | 12   | 14             | 28             | 41             | 40             | 41             | 43.1            |
| Uncertain/don't<br>know | 49   | 42             | 16             | 16             | 19             | 20             |                 |

Sources: 1994 referendum: Fitzmaurice (1995), otherwise Ludlow (1994).

The contrast with the position of the parties is quite conspicuous. Among the parties represented in the Eduskunta after the 1991 election, only two small parties opposed

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<sup>56</sup> 1991, p. 180.

EU-membership, as Table 5.3 below illustrates<sup>57</sup>. These were supported by about seven percent of voters. At this time popular opposition to membership was also low<sup>58</sup>. However, after Finland actually applied for membership in March 1992 and the debate increased, opposition increased rapidly to around 40 percent, a level at which it remained for the next couple of years.

On the Accession Treaty vote (November 18, 1994) about 25 percent of Eduskunta members voted against. (152 for, 45 against, one blank, and one absent). Ratification required a 2/3ds majority<sup>59</sup>. However, because the minority was divided between every party represented in the Eduskunta except the SFF<sup>60</sup>, this does not alter the fact that the vast majority of the parties as a whole were pro-EU. More reflection among the parties of this higher popular opposition would be expected if parties really are vote maximisers.

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<sup>57</sup> In the vote over Finland's EU application (March 1992), the vote was 130-60 in favour. Among the opponents were 22 CF members, eight FKF members, and two SFF members. These parties were all in government at the time. The other opponents consisted of all the members of the VF, four from the GF, and six from the FLP (Nordisk Kontakt, 3/1992).

<sup>58</sup> Only fourteen percent in May 1991, according to Ludlow (1994, p. 5). However, 31 percent answered 'don't know' to the question of whether Finland should join the EU.

<sup>59</sup> Nordisk Kontakt, 11/1994.

<sup>60</sup> The no-voters consisted of 24 from the CF, seven from the VF, six from the FKF, two from the FLP, three deserters from the FLP, one from the GF, one from the FSD, and one from the SFF. The blank vote came from an independent representative (Nordisk Kontakt, 11/1994).



Table 5.3. Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party at last parliamentary election before the 1994 referendum.

| VF   | FSD     | GF  | FLP    | CF      | FKF    | NSP     | SFF     |
|------|---------|-----|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|
| NOP  | Support | NOP | Oppose | Support | Oppose | Support | Support |
| 10.1 | 22.1    | 6.8 | 4.8    | 24.8    | 3      | 19.3    | 5.5     |

Support = support membership as defined by the TEU. NOP = No Official Position. Sources: 1991 election results: Berglund (1991); EU-position: Party programmes, Jahn and Storsved (1995), Bjørklund (1996).

At the previous two parliamentary elections, in 1987 and 1991, the issue did not feature among the most important ones<sup>61</sup>. And, looking at flows of votes between the parties at the 1991 election, it does not appear that the EU-related issues affected voting patterns. There are no distinct movements from anti- to pro-EU parties or vice versa<sup>62</sup>.

There have since, however been some disturbances to the party-system and to government make-up due to the EU-conflict. The FKF had a government minister in the period 1991-94, Toimi Kankaanniemi (Overseas Development). He resigned over opposition to the EU, and the FKF was the most anti-EU of all the parties in the October 1994 referendum<sup>63</sup>. Furthermore, the Free Finland Union (FFU) promotes the single issue of leaving the EU<sup>64</sup>. However, this party has not been particularly successful, it received one percent of the votes and no seats at the 1995 election. At a SFF party meeting in June 1994, the party's leader, Norrback, argued that if the meeting voted against the government's pro-EU position, then the SFF would also have to leave the government<sup>65</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> Arter (1987, 1991), Berglund (1991).

<sup>62</sup> Berglund, 1991, p. 258.

<sup>63</sup> In its European policy program from 1996, the FKF at the very least insinuates that, if not directly label, the EU as a totalitarian and dangerous form of state (FKF European Policy Program, 1996).

<sup>64</sup> Arter, 1995a, pp. 200-201.

<sup>65</sup> Nordisk Kontakt, 5/94, p. 43.

In the campaign for the 1995 Eduskunta election<sup>66</sup>, only the FKF, the FLP<sup>67</sup> and the FFU demanded Finland's withdrawal from the EU<sup>68</sup>. The FKF and the FLP, the only anti-EU parties with representation in the Eduskunta, both lost votes at this election. The FKF lost 0.1 percent and an MP, the FLP 3.5 percent and all but one of its MPs. Over 90 percent of voters supported a pro-membership party. Hence, the number of parties opposing membership and their support has declined substantially since the early 1990's, in spite of the lack of representation for many of the voters who opposed membership. The 1995 election campaign focused on the economy, with European integration issues left off the agenda: "The 'European' questions - preparations for the 1996 IGC, possible future membership of EMU, etc. - were not on the agenda, mainly because they were not vote winners."<sup>69</sup> As shall be argued below, however, there are reasons for keeping the EU-conflict off the agenda at Finnish national parliamentary elections other than an assumption that they are not 'vote-winners'.

After the 1995 election, Paavo Lipponen of the FSD put together a coalition government including the NSP, the SFF, the VF, and the GF<sup>70</sup>. Thus, this government included two parties relatively united in favour of European integration (the FSD and the NSP), two

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<sup>66</sup> Due to lack of space the 1994 presidential election will not be considered here. However, the campaign and outcome of this election do not alter the argument made here. For analysis of this election, see, for example, Anckar (1994) and Pesonen (1994c).

<sup>67</sup> The FLP party congress 18-19/6 1994 categorically rejected membership. A proposal even to tolerate EU-supporters in the party was rejected (Nordisk Kontakt, 5/94, p. 45).

<sup>68</sup> Tiilikainen (1996, p. 130) only mentions the FKF.

<sup>69</sup> Arter, 1995a, p. 196.

<sup>70</sup> The Lipponen government program emphasises the importance of joining EMU and thus is ready to fulfil the criteria for this. The government will also work for enlargement of the EU towards the east. (Sundberg, 1996, p. 327) Clearly, there is no room for an anti-EU party in such a government.

that were severely split on the issue (the SFF<sup>71</sup> and the GF<sup>72</sup>), and one that took a “critical attitude towards membership in the EU”<sup>73</sup> (the VF). However, the VF no longer opposes Finland’s membership. It opposes joining the WEU, but by 1996 had become pragmatic about Finnish membership in EMU<sup>74</sup>. The Lipponen government program emphasises the importance of joining EMU and thus is ready to fulfil the criteria for this. The government will also work for enlargement of the EU towards the east<sup>75</sup>. Clearly, there is no room for an anti-EU party in such a government.

Such disparate views among the government parties suggest it would be prudent to keep questions related to European integration off the public agenda. And not focusing on EU-related issues at the 1995 election is likely to have been related to keeping coalition

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<sup>71</sup> At a SFF party meeting (11-12/6/94) it was decided not to take a vote on the party’s EU-position directly, but to support the governments position (pro-membership). It was argued that the yes-side would have a clear majority, and that a formal vote would isolate the ‘no’-side (Nordisk Kontakt, 5/94, p. 43).

<sup>72</sup> At a meeting of delegates (8-9/2/1992) the GF voted 15-13 against membership, with one blank vote. However, the party had previously at the same meeting decided that a 2/3 majority was needed in order to arrive at an official position. Therefore, the party decided to have no official position. Among the GF members of the Eduskunta, six were known to be pro-EU and four against at this time. (Nordisk Kontakt, No. 2, 1992, p. 63) The decision to have no official position was confirmed by a GF federation meeting in June 1994. (Nordisk Kontakt, 6/1994, p. 44)

<sup>73</sup> Modern Left (The VF’s semi-annual bulletin), No. 1, 1994, p. 2. The more critical motion of being totally against membership failed 27-16 at the VF council meeting in mid-March. This position meant, contrary to several articles (e.g. Bjørklund 1996; Jahn and Storsved, 1995a, Svåsand and Lindström, 1997), that the VF did not take a firm view for or against EU-membership, and as a party did not recommend its supporters to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The only member of the party leadership that would vote ‘no’ in a referendum was the party leader, Claes Anderson. Both vice-chairmen and the party secretary intended to vote ‘yes’. (Nordisk Kontakt, 3/1994, pp. 54-55)

<sup>74</sup> Modern Left, No. 1, 1996, Furthermore, “there will be no exhausting discussion inside the LWA about the Finnish membership in the Union. The Finnish membership is a fact and cannot be changed, unless the Union itself will drift into a crisis” (Modern Left No. 1, 1996, p. 4).

<sup>75</sup> Sundberg, 1996, p. 327.

options open as much as because they are not considered to be vote-winners. Because Finnish coalitions tend to be broad (and are, if anything, becoming broader), it is important for most parties to keep as many coalition-options open as possible. Focusing on the EU-issue would make government-formation more difficult.

Finnish membership in the EU affects an increasing number of policy-areas and is likely to remain important in Finnish politics. EMU membership was one area of friction among the government parties. The FSD supports joining EMU, and the NSP and the SFF officially decided they wanted to join EMU in 1997<sup>76</sup>. By early 1998, the GP and the VF also agreed to support EMU membership. Had they not done so, they would have had to leave the government<sup>77</sup>. But there are numerous other policies affected by EU-membership that have the potential to cause tension. For example, EU-expansions in the areas of foreign and defence policy are particularly salient in Finland, and the Schengen Treaty and its incorporation into the EU proper also has considerable conflict potential. In addition, Finland received numerous exemptions in 1994 that will be removed over the next few years. The EU is an evolving project, and with the depth of integration already reached there will be a constant stream of issues the parties must position themselves on.

Yet, there is very little popular support for anti-EU parties. The voter who wants to register his disapproval with EU-membership has a very limited number of options, and

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<sup>76</sup> These two parties made this decision at their party congresses in June 1997 (the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 10/6/1997).

<sup>77</sup> The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 10/3/98.

this is no coincidence: “All the major parties took a conciliatory approach towards EU membership and called for a consensus accepting EU-membership.”<sup>78</sup> In this situation, the voter who opposes such membership, but does not want to vote for a single-issue party, has only one substantial party left to vote for after the 1995 election - the FKF. Unless he agrees with the FKF in other areas, such a state of affairs means that an anti-EU voter must feel extremely strongly about European integration to vote for this party<sup>79</sup>.

#### 5.4.1 The extent to which the EU-conflict cross-cuts other cleavages.

The two most important cleavages in Finland are the left-right cleavage and the territorial cleavage, usually operationalised as a rural-urban divide. Chapter 2 considered the historical aspects of the Finnish party system and its development. Here its current features are the focus of attention.

Most parties can be placed relatively to each other in a meaningful way along a left-right scale in the manner of the one below in Figure 5.1. The main importance of this cleavage with regard to government formation since 1970 has been to keep the NSP out of the cabinet. But it is increasingly of less importance for government formation. Recent governments have spanned the left-right division, as Table 5.4 shows.

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<sup>78</sup> Tiilikainen, 1996, p. 130.

<sup>79</sup> The FKF claims to base its program firmly on the Bible. It is anti-abortion, very nationalist, and appears to have little sympathy for any other form of lifestyle than marriage and a corresponding core family unit. (Based on its Principle Program, 1997.)

Figure 5.1. The left-right cleavage in Finland.

| Left       |             |         |              |          |           |              | Right        |
|------------|-------------|---------|--------------|----------|-----------|--------------|--------------|
| VF<br>4.93 | FSD<br>7.04 | GF 8.63 | FLP<br>11.72 | CF 12.32 | FKF 14.43 | SFF<br>15.25 | NSP<br>15.40 |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 179-180. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting tax/anti-public ownership (20).

The urban-rural cleavage cuts across the left-right cleavage quite extensively, as illustrated by Figure 5.2 below. The most important difference is the much larger gap between the CF and the NSP.

Figure 5.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Finland.

| Urban    |             |         |         |              |              | Rural        |          |
|----------|-------------|---------|---------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| FSD 3.21 | NSP<br>6.71 | VF 8.29 | GF 8.43 | SFF<br>10.50 | FKF<br>11.93 | FLP<br>14.21 | CF 17.79 |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 181. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti)

In terms of electoral support, the GF, the UF, the NSP and the SD are the more distinctly urban parties, as Appendix 5.8 illustrates. The CF, the FLP and the VF are the most rural parties in this respect.

Considering the above discussion and Table 5.4 below, it is difficult to see how the EU-conflict would have much impact on the party-system based on the cleavage model. However, since the above cleavages appear to be of little importance for coalition formation, a new dimension centred on European integration may have more impact than it would in a different party system. There may also be reinforcing effects of the EU-conflict on other cleavages and/or policy dimensions.



Figure 5.3 illustrates how the parties line up on the EU-dimension. The FSD, the SFF and the NSP are very close. They all supported membership, and they support Finnish membership in EMU. The GF and the VF were divided over membership, and were also sceptical to monetary union. The CF was officially for membership but split<sup>80</sup>. The FKF campaigned against membership and is the only substantial (although minor) party that advocates withdrawal<sup>81</sup>.

Figure 5.3. Party position on EU-membership at the 1994 referendum in Finland.

| Anti EU |     |    |    | Pro EU |     |     |     |
|---------|-----|----|----|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| FKF     | FLP | VF | GF | CF     | FSD | SFF | NSP |

Based on party-programmes, literature and media reports.

The FKF is the most distinct party based on the EU dimension. The party and its voters are extremely anti-EU. The FSD and NSP remain close together, as they were on the territorial division. The GF moves away from these two towards a central position. The CF remains quite far removed from the NSP. The division on the left, between the FSD and the VF, is somewhat deepened by the salience of the EU-conflict.

Based on this division, the pro-EU parties are likely to find it very difficult to form a coalition including the FKF, and to a lesser extent also with the VF, the GF and the CF.

<sup>80</sup> The CF launched its 1991 election campaign by reversing its anti-EC stance and indicated that it was ready to discuss at least the possibility that Finland might apply for full membership in the future. (Arter, 1991, p. 174) The Agricultural Producers' Union (APU), the farmers interest organisation, came out against membership. However, the chairman of the APU, Heikki Haavisto, was appointed Finnish Foreign Minister in April 1993. (Arter, 1995b, p. 376) He made a substantial effort to secure the interests of farmers during and after the negotiations, and this was an important part of the reason the CF ended up supporting membership. The party also secured generous support for farmers from the Finnish budget, in addition to the regional support for Arctic farming from the EU. (Bjørklund, 1996, p. 19) At a meeting (29/2/1992) attended by delegates from the party and the members of the Eduskunta, the CF voted 121-54 for the motion to apply for EU membership. (Nordisk Kontakt, No. 2, 1992, p. 59)

<sup>81</sup> At a meeting 8/2/1992, the FKF voted 39-6 to oppose Finland applying for EU

From the anti-EU parties' perspective, the FKF would clearly find it unattractive to join a government with a pro-EU profile. The CF could also have problems in this respect. After the 1995 election, the FKF and the CF were the only substantial parties not in government. The inclusion of the VF and the exclusion of the CF could be due to it being easier for the party more in tune with its voters at the time of the referendum to join the largely pro-EU government. If the CF joined such a government, the party's voters might suspect that it would represent its official party line rather than its voters.

The EU-conflict appears unlikely to constitute more than a minor political cleavage in Finland. The conflict has not had any substantial effects on voting patterns, although government formation could be argued to have been affected by this dimension, since the EU-ambivalent and split CF and the anti-EU FKF were left out of government after the 1994 referendum.

With large sections of the population against membership, and even more opposed to a single currency<sup>82</sup>, and with these views underrepresented in the Eduskunta, there appears to be an incentive for more parties to oppose EU membership and further European integration. Yet, in the period when the EU-conflict has been salient in Finland, opposition to EU membership among the parties has actually declined. The FKF has continued to oppose membership. The VF and the GF have both accepted Finnish membership in the EMU. The FLP opposed membership, but no longer exists.

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membership (Nordisk Kontakt, 2/1992, p. 62).

<sup>82</sup> 59 percent of those surveyed opposed a single currency in 1995 (Tiilkainen, 1996, p. 130).



#### 5.4.2. The potential for vote-maximisation based on the conflict over European integration.

There were substantial differences in the fit between the parties' policies and their voters' preferences at the time of the 1994 referendum. (See Appendix 5.3 for details.) The FKF's anti-EU stance fits that of their voters, 95 percent of whom appears to have voted 'no' in the 1994 referendum. Similarly, the pro-EU SFF and NSP had the support of 80-90 percent of their voters, and the FSD was supported by around 80 percent of theirs. The split in the GF was reflected among their voters, who split down the middle at the referendum. Among VF voters, a substantial minority, around 25 percent, voted for membership. However, it is the CF who was least in agreement with its voters, two thirds of whom appear to have voted 'no' and against the party line.

For the SFF and the NSP in particular, but also the FSD, opposing membership would not be beneficial. The vast majority of their voters support EU-membership. In addition, the NSP is at the extreme of the left-right cleavage and close to the extreme of the territorial cleavages. This makes it difficult to attract voters based on position on EU. The SFF and the FSD are close to the centre on one dimension each, and not at the extreme on any. However, the SFF face the obstacle of having to attract voters outside its Swedish-speaking core constituency. For this party it would only make sense to be anti-EU if a substantial majority of Swedish-speaking people were so as well. They are not, as Appendix 5.3 shows.

For the CF, opposing membership would make a lot more sense. The party is close to the centre of the left-right cleavage. It is at the extreme of the territorial cleavages, but it

is the extreme where 'no'-voters are concentrated. The party is therefore very well placed to oppose membership. The counterpoint to this would be that the CF is already so strong in the north and rural areas that there are no more voters to gain. However, because these are the areas where EU-opposition is the highest, there is still large number of anti-EU voters who do not vote for the CF.

For the VF the main problem is its isolation on the extreme left, but it occupies a centrist position on the territorial cleavages. Opposition to membership should enable the party to attract anti-EU voters from the FSD, the GF, and the CF. The potential to attract CF voters is based on the support for both parties being high in certain provinces with high numbers of anti-EU voters<sup>83</sup>. The GF could also benefit from opposing membership. Because it is small, it would need to attract less anti-EU voters in absolute terms than the larger parties in order to profit from such opposition. The FKF is close to the centre on all the cleavages, and should therefore be well placed to capitalise on opposition to the EU.

#### 5.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.

Table 5.4 below shows the make-up of Finnish governments since 1970. No single party held an overall majority of seats in the Eduskunta in the period. Most governments have been coalition (minority or majority) governments, the exceptions being a single-party minority government and two caretaker governments.

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<sup>83</sup> In particular, Kuopio, Keski-Suomi, Oulu and Lappi.

Table 5.4. Government participation in Finland.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Prime Minister</i> | <i>Party</i> |            |           |     |            |     |
|-------------|-----------------------|--------------|------------|-----------|-----|------------|-----|
| 1970        | Karjalainen, A.       | VF           | <b>FSD</b> | <b>CF</b> | SFF | L          |     |
| 1971        | Karjalainen, A.       |              | <b>FSD</b> | <b>CF</b> | SFF | L          |     |
| 1971        | Aura, T.              |              |            |           |     |            |     |
| 1972        | Paasio, R.            |              | <b>FSD</b> |           |     |            |     |
| 1972        | Sorsa, K.             |              | <b>FSD</b> | CF        | SFF | L          |     |
| 1975        | Liinamaa, K.          |              |            |           |     |            |     |
| 1975        | Miettunen, M.         | VF           | <b>FSD</b> | <b>CF</b> | SFF | L          |     |
| 1976        | Miettunen, M.         |              |            | <b>CF</b> | SFF | L          |     |
| 1977        | Sorsa, K.             | VF           | <b>FSD</b> | CF        | SFF | L          |     |
| 1978        | Sorsa, K.             | VF           | <b>FSD</b> | CF        |     | L          |     |
| 1979        | Koivisto, M.          | VF           | <b>FSD</b> | CF        | SFF |            |     |
| 1982        | Sorsa, K.             | VF           | <b>FSD</b> | CF        | SFF |            |     |
| 1982        | Sorsa, K.             |              | <b>FSD</b> | CF        | SFF |            |     |
| 1983        | Sorsa, K.             |              | <b>FSD</b> | CF        | SFF |            | FLP |
| 1987        | Holkeri, H.           |              | <b>FSD</b> |           | SFF | <b>NSP</b> | FLP |
| 1990        | Holkeri, H.           |              | <b>FSD</b> |           | SFF | <b>NSP</b> |     |
| 1991        | Aho, E.               |              |            | <b>CF</b> | SFF | NSP        | FKF |
| 1994        | Aho, E.               |              |            | <b>CF</b> | SFF | NSP        |     |
| 1995        | Lipponen, P.          | VF           | <b>FSD</b> |           | SFF | NSP        | GF  |

The Prime Minister's party is in bold type. Source 1970-91: Petersson (1994, p. 101). 1994 and 1995 onwards: Arter (1995a). The Aura government was a caretaker/technocrat government. The Liinamaa government was also a caretaker government, but included more ministers from the parties, Liinamaa himself was from the SD.

As the table shows, Finnish governments have, in this period, included all the substantial parties at some time or another. Until 1987, the NSP was excluded from government, but it has been a member of every government since. After the EU-conflict surfaced around 1990, the only parties not to take part in government have been the FLP and the LF, both of whom were in decline by then, and the UF and EC, both of which gained their first representatives at the 1995 election. Thus, every party appears to have the potential to be in government, and most governments span the left-right cleavage, often the urban-rural cleavage, and nearly always the language cleavage. In this environment, exclusion from a particular government is more likely to be based on specific policy disagreements and personality issues rather than more general ideological differences.

One such policy disagreement is Finnish EU-membership, and related to this what depth of integration Finland should support. Opposing membership could lead to exclusion from government. This is an important reason why so few Finnish parties oppose EU-membership. Since 1990, only one government party (the FKF) has opposed membership, and it left government directly as a result of this. In the 1990's anti-EU parties have become pro-EU, rather than vice versa.

In terms of vote maximisation, this seems like irrational behaviour for some parties. A majority of VF- and CF-voters oppose EU-membership, as do approximately half of the GF-voters. There also ought to be votes to be gained from anti-EU voters who would vote for pro-EU parties without the EU-conflict being salient.

But in terms of office seeking, this behaviour is quite rational. Crucially, it enables the parties to remove the EU-conflict from the national election agenda. If none of the major parties oppose membership, then they have little to gain by campaigning on this issue. It also makes government formation easier, and from a particular party's point of view it keeps it in contention for cabinet positions. Furthermore, it removes the conundrum faced by pro-EU parties if one of their main competitors is gaining votes based on an anti-EU position, as explained in Chapter 3.

#### 5.4.4 Complications and synergy between various party goals.

For the SFF and the NSP, and to a somewhat lesser extent the FSD, there is a relatively high degree of correspondence between party aims. The combination of a high

proportion of their voters supporting EU-membership and policy sincerity concerns makes a pro-EU position the only tenable position. Consequently, they would find it difficult to take part in a coalition with parties that actively oppose membership. Moreover, the extreme pro-EU position taken by these parties makes it more difficult for other parties to be anti-EU if they wish to join in a coalition including any of these parties.

It should be noted that, since the EU-conflict became salient, there has been no combination of parties with a majority of 'no'-voters that would command a majority in the Eduskunta, even if they all took up anti-EU positions and could agree on forming a government. The highest number of seats commanded by such a coalition at the 1991 election would be 89 (CF+FKF+VF+FLP), or 99 including the GF, whose voters split down the middle. At the 1995 election these numbers had dropped to 74 and 83 respectively.

For the CF, the GF and the VF a pro-membership position makes government participation more likely. An anti-membership position would not necessarily exclude these parties from government, but it adds a complicating factor. And actively campaigning for withdrawal would make participating in a government with the pro-EU FSD, NSP and SFF very difficult. At the VF annual meeting in March 1994 the party made it clear that it was aiming for government participation after the 1995 election. This plan succeeded, the VF entered government in 1995. Since then, the party has not opposed membership, although it might object to further integration. The GF was and is in a similar position. However, for these parties vote- and office-maximisation are not compatible, and they are dangerously split internally on this dimension. Hence, it is very

much in their interest to remove the EU-conflict from the national election agenda, or at least to reduce its importance.

The CF was the leading party in the Finnish government 1991-94, holding the post of Prime Minister in Esko Aho. It was the Aho-government that applied for full EU-membership in March 1992. This committed the CF to support EU-membership, assuming acceptable terms could be negotiated. Considering the position of the party's voters, this appears to be a decision driven more by policy sincerity than by vote maximising concerns. However, the CF's main partners in government were the very pro-EU SFF and NSP. Hence, one could argue that the CF-support for membership was also driven by office-seeking concerns for retaining its position in government.

Post-1995, the now-out-of-government CF appears to have a stronger incentive to take up an anti-EU position. But it has not, for several reasons. Firstly, it would look somewhat cynical, considering the party played an important role in bringing Finland into the EU in the first place. Secondly, such a second volte-face would make co-operation with pro-EU parties more difficult. These reasons also explain, at least partly, why the CF did not defect from the pro-EU position to counter the threat to its voters represented by the anti-EU FFU and FLP.

The FKF has been in government once, between 1991 and 1994. Considering its extreme anti-EU position and the heavy anti-EU vote among its electorate, the party has little choice but to aim for vote maximisation on the EU-conflict. So far this has not borne any results. This could be partly due to its heavily religious nature making the party an unpalatable alternative for many anti-EU voters.

Finally, two other considerations make the Finnish political elites more likely to support EU-membership. Firstly, EU-membership increases the number of attractive jobs available to Finland's politicians. Secondly, consideration of the views and interests of other European politicians and the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU makes opposition more difficult.

Thus, for all parties but the FKF, a combination of consideration for coalition-potential, internal splits, credibility, and the risk of losing more votes than are gained keep them away from an active anti-EU stance. This holds even though for some parties this appears to contradict the aim of vote-maximisation. As long as the relatively united pro-membership front holds, and off-loading mechanisms exist and are used, the EU-conflict can be kept out of (or at least of reduced importance at) the national elections agenda.

#### 5.4.5 The choices available to the Finnish voter.

For pro-EU Finns there is a wide variety of parties to vote for. For anti-EU Finns the only options at the 1995 election were the FLP, the FFU and the FKF. The FKF, from past performance, appears to represent the views of only a small minority of Finnish voters. Nor does the FLP appear to have held much attraction at the 1995 election, and the appeal of the FFU is limited by it being a single issue party. In this situation the party-political opposition to the EU will be unattractive to most anti-EU voters.

In addition, cross-pressures faced by voters who disagree with their party on EU-policy requires them to seek further information<sup>84</sup>. This makes it less likely that such people will vote because of the increased cost of voting. At the 1995 election, turnout was lower in eastern than in western Finland, and particularly low in areas of low EU-support, e.g. down to 59.8 percent (compared to the national average of 71.8) in Hyrynsalmi<sup>85</sup>. But non-voting may also be undesirable. All this gives many voters an interest similar to that of the parties: off-loading the EU-conflict into other arenas will benefit the utility of many.

#### 5.4.6 Off-loading through referendums.

The strategy of off-loading the EU-conflict through holding a referendum on membership in 1994 appears to have succeeded. As table 5.5 below shows, there is no discernible pattern of changes in party support due to position on EU-membership. European integration not to have played any major role in the outcome of the 1995 election.

Although the CF suffered the greatest loss of votes in absolute terms, this is more likely to be due to it having led the government through Finland's most severe recession since World War II, than to its position on European integration. A similar argument can be made for the NSP. The anti-EU FLP suffered the most severe loss in relative terms. It went bankrupt and ceased to exist as a result. The anti-EU FKF did not seem to benefit from its anti-EU position. And the pro-EU FSD and UF both did well.

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<sup>84</sup> This also holds for pro-EU voters who otherwise would support an anti-EU party, although there are a lot fewer of them.



Table 5.5 Finnish parliamentary election results 1991 and 1995. Percent.

| Party  | 1991 | 1995 | Change 1991-95 |
|--------|------|------|----------------|
| NSP    | 19.3 | 17.9 | -7             |
| CF     | 24.8 | 19.9 | -20            |
| LF     | 0.8  | 0.6  | -25            |
| SFF    | 5.5  | 5.5  | 0              |
| FKF    | 3.1  | 3.0  | -3             |
| FLP    | 4.8  | 1.3  | -73            |
| FSD    | 22.1 | 28.3 | +28            |
| VF     | 10.1 | 11.2 | +11            |
| GF     | 6.8  | 6.5  | -4             |
| UF     | -    | 2.8  | N/A            |
| FFU    | -    | 1.0  | N/A            |
| Others | 2.7  | 4.2  | +55            |

Sources: 1991: Peterson (1994, p. 59); 1995: Arter (1995a, p. 197).

Similarly, Suksi<sup>86</sup> argues that the EU-conflict appeared to have little effect on the 1995 general election. Only in a few rural areas was there some reaction to the parties' stand on the EU referendum. The CF and perhaps also the SFF suffered some losses in these cases, but these did not appear to affect the overall election results for these parties.

Although it lost votes at the 1995 election, the referendum appears to have worked well as an off-loading device for the CF. Its 1995 vote was still 2.3 percent above its vote in both 1983 and 1987. Suksi argues that for the CF, a referendum was the only way to deal with EU membership since a majority of its voters were against membership<sup>87</sup>. The party does of course have another option: to oppose membership. But it was shown above why this is a less attractive option.

<sup>85</sup> Arter, 1995a, pp. 200-201.

<sup>86</sup> 1996, p. 63.

<sup>87</sup> Suksi, 1996, p. 56.

It appears that very few voters considered EU-related issues at the 1991 or the 1995 parliamentary election. The divided public opinion on this had no discernible substantial effect on voting behaviour.

#### 5.4.7 Off-loading through EP-elections.

At first sight, the 1996 elections to the EP do not appear to have functioned as an off-loading mechanism. There was minimal support (less than ten percent) for the anti-EU parties (the AEU, the FFU, the FKF, the FLP and the RF), as Table 7.4 below shows.

Table 5.6. 1995 elections to the Finnish Eduskunta and 1996 EP elections.

| Party  | Eduskunta election<br>1995, percent | 1996 EP elections,<br>percent | Seats in EP | Change<br>1995-96,<br>percent |
|--------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|
| CF     | 19.9                                | 24.4                          | 4           | +23 percent                   |
| FSD    | 28.3                                | 21.5                          | 4           | -24 percent                   |
| NSP    | 17.9                                | 20.2                          | 4           | +13 percent                   |
| VF     | 11.2                                | 10.5                          | 2           | -6 percent                    |
| GF     | 6.5                                 | 7.6                           | 1           | +17 percent                   |
| SFF    | 5.5                                 | 5.8                           | 1           | +5 percent                    |
| UF     | 2.8                                 | 3.0                           | 0           | +7 percent                    |
| FKF    | 3.0                                 | 2.8                           | 0           | -7 percent                    |
| AEU    | -                                   | 2.1                           | 0           | N/A                           |
| RF     | 1.3                                 | 0.7                           | 0           | -46 percent                   |
| FFU    | 1.0                                 | 0.6                           | 0           | -40 percent                   |
| Others | 3.1                                 | 0.8                           | 0           | -74 percent                   |

AEU = Alternative to EU, RF = Real Finns, formerly the FLP. The ratios in column five were calculated by the author. Sources: Arter (1995a, p. 197); EIU Country Report on Finland (4th quarter, 1996).

Nor does there appear to be any consistent pattern of increased support for the parties more sceptical to membership (the VF, the GF and the CF) compared to the more pro-EU NSP, SFF, FSD and UF.

However, this perception changes when the individual attitude to membership among the candidates is considered. Of the sixteen candidates elected, eleven voted for EU-membership in 1994, and five against. Overall, the pro-EU candidates received 62.2 percent of the votes cast, the anti-EU candidates 37.8 percent. And the two candidates who topped the electoral list, Paavo Värynen of the CF and Esko Seppänen of the VF, were both opponents<sup>88</sup>. But their parties officially remain committed to membership. Thus, the 1996 EP-elections illustrate both the off-loading mechanism provided by these elections and the continued popular opposition to membership.

### **5.5 Conclusion.**

When Finland applied for EU-membership in 1992 the Finnish economy was in an extremely poor state, and the unemployment-rate the second highest in Western Europe after Spain. Hence, many Finns appear to have viewed EU-membership as likely to improve their utility with regard to these factors. EU-membership was also seen by a clear majority of voters as having a positive effect on Finland's security position. Conversely, few Finns seem to have considered the effect of membership on neutrality. On the other hand, reduced national independence resulting from membership appears to have negatively affected the utility of a majority of Finns. Among other factors, the effect on Nordic co-operation, on taxation levels, and on democracy seem to have had little influence on perceived utility emanating from membership.

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<sup>88</sup> By the time of this election, only four of the elected representatives could be classified for certain as opponents. The other two are both MEP's for the CF (Anckar, 1997, p. 263).

There were substantial territorial differences in attitude to EU-membership in Finland. In particular, there was a strong urban-rural divide, as well as a somewhat less pronounced north-south one. This is very likely to be related to a loss of subsidy for rural areas and agriculture resulting from membership, as well as strong support for the more EU-critical parties in these areas. Conversely, urban inhabitants can expect to benefit from membership in form of lower food prices and paying less subsidies to rural areas.

Opposition to membership was considerably higher among those more dependent upon the welfare state. Indeed, differences are substantial between male and female voters and private and public sector voters. For women it is also likely that a comparison of the high level of equality achieved in Finland compared to that in other European countries had an effect. Furthermore, concern for the effect of EU-membership on the welfare state also contributed to opposition to membership being relatively high on the far left, and low on the right.

However, it is when comparing income levels with attitude to membership that the biggest differences are found. People with high levels of income were much more likely to support membership than those on low levels. This is likely to be based in less reliance on the state for income, as well as a higher ability to, and belief in, benefiting from the internal market, perhaps especially the free movement of labour. In this respect it is also noteworthy that anti-EU voters were considerably more likely to view EU-membership as detrimental to their utility based on fears related to increased immigration.

The EU-conflict has had some minor effects on the domestic Finnish party system. The FKF left government because it opposes EU-membership, and a small anti-EU party, the FFU, was formed. However, after the 1995 election less than ten percent of the seats in the Eduskunta were held by anti-EU parties. With a much higher proportion of Finns opposing membership and particularly further participation in European integration, it would appear to be rational for more parties to oppose membership. In particular, this goes for the CF and the VF, two thirds of whose supporters oppose membership, and the GF, half of whose do. However, at the 1994 referendum the CF remained pro-membership, and the GF and the VF had no official position. However, these anomalies can be better understood when political parties are viewed as primarily office-seeking and the tendency towards broad coalitions is considered.

The framework employed here leads to two explanations for the limited impact of the EU-conflict on national election results. Using the cleavage model, this conflict neither corresponds very well with the left-right cleavage, or with the territorial cleavages. However, in Finland the left-right cleavage is of limited importance for government formation, as Table 5.4 above demonstrates. And the government that formed after the 1995 election takes the 'rainbow' tendency of Finnish government formation further than ever before.

On the other hand, it could also be argued that other divisions are reinforced by the EU-dimension. The effect of this might just make the differences between certain parties too big for their taking part in the same government - such as the FKF and maybe the CF on one side and the NSP, the FSD and perhaps the SFF on the other. Furthermore, since the left-right and territorial cleavages appear to be of little importance for coalition

formation, a new European dimension may have more impact than it would in a different party system.

The model derived from rational choice theory shows that it is in the interest of many voters and nearly all the parties to keep European integration issues away from the national elections arena. The ensuing off-loading takes place through employing the referendum, and through elections to the EP. This is, however, dependent upon the parties adhering to a relatively united position, and on the voters not demanding attention to EU-issues and representation for opposition to EU-membership and/or further integration.

If the EU dimension was to figure more prominently at national elections, both party unity and coalition participation could be jeopardised. Also, a strong focus on the EU dimension would make it harder for voters who do not agree with their party on this issue to decide how to vote. But many voters are likely to wish to express their opinion on European integration, and parties need to provide an outlet for this opinion. Hence, both parties and voters have an interest in off-loading the EU-conflict to referendums and EP-elections.

## **Chapter 6. Norway: the Different Country.**

*"Norwegians cannot forget history, and there is not a single word which has a worse ring in Norwegian ears than Union."<sup>1</sup>*

### **6.1. Introduction.**

Norway is unique in having rejected membership - twice - in what is now the EU. Membership in the EC was rejected in 1972, EU-membership in 1994. On both occasions a popular referendum<sup>2</sup> was held, and on both occasions the margin of rejection was relatively small.

However, Norway has become part of the internal market of the EU through its membership in the EEA. This ties the country closely to the EU, and changes in EU policy that are connected to the internal market therefore also affect Norway.

The first section of this chapter provides an outline of Norway's international relations since World War II in general, and of its relations with the EC/EU in particular. The effect on the utility of Norwegian voters emanating from EU-membership is addressed in section two. This is achieved by investigating a number of factors where membership can be argued to affect individual utilities. The importance of each factor is then assessed by employing data from surveys of the 1994 referendum and other sources.

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<sup>1</sup> Hambro, C. J.: Nordisk samarbeide eller Nordisk Råd. (Nordisk Kontakt, 2/1957, p. 2). Quoted in Anderson (1967, p. 12).

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the constitutional position and practice of referendums in Norway, see Appendix 6.1.

Section three deals with the effect of the EU-conflict on the Norwegian party system. The most important feature of this is that parties previously able to co-operate take different - and sometimes opposite - positions on EU-membership. Therefore, coalition and co-operation patterns became considerably more complicated with the EU-conflict salient.

There are considerable differences in the difficulties faced by the parties with regard to the EU-conflict. Some enjoy a very high degree of correspondence in the views of various actors such as party members, party leadership, voters, and (potential) coalition or co-operation partners. This allows for a high level of synergy between the aims of office- and vote-maximisation. For other parties there is little or no correspondence in the views of these actors. It is for such parties that the EU-conflict causes the biggest problems.

The salience of the EU conflict causes massive problems in coalition formation on the centre-right. In particular, it makes it very difficult for the pro-EU H to co-operate with the anti-EU centrist parties. It also makes it difficult for the AP (who have, when in government, ruled alone since World War II) to find stable co-operation partners. Hence, it is in the interest of many of the parties to downgrade or remove the conflict from the national election agenda.



## **6.2. A historical review of Norway's relations with the EC and the EU.**

### **6.2.1. Norway's international relations after World War II.**

Two concerns have dominated Norway's international relations since World War II. Firstly, security considerations have always been of great importance<sup>3</sup>. This is partly because of the experience of German occupation between 1940 and 1945, and partly because of the potential threat from Norway's large neighbour to the east, the SU. Secondly, because Norway is very dependent upon trade with the external world, it is very important to ensure market access for Norwegian goods. In 1994, exports amounted to 31.6 percent of the Norwegian GDP<sup>4</sup>. By 1992, 66.4 percent of Norwegian exports were to the EU-12, with another 12.4 percent to the other three EU-applicants<sup>5</sup>. And the five most important trading partners are all in the EU, as Table 6.1 below shows.

Table 6.1 Norway's main trading partners, 1994. Percentage of total.

| Country        | Exports | Imports |
|----------------|---------|---------|
| United Kingdom | 20.7    | 10.4    |
| Germany        | 12.1    | 13.9    |
| Netherlands    | 9.5     | 4.2     |
| Sweden         | 9.5     | 15.0    |
| France         | 7.9     | 4.0     |
| Total top five | 59.7    | 47.5    |

Source: United Nations, 1995, p. 38.

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<sup>3</sup> Sæter (1993) argues that security interests are pivotal in Norway's considerations of regional integration. He also (1996, p. 136) holds that the main priority in Norwegian foreign and security policy since WWII has been NATO membership.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, 1995, p. 38.

<sup>5</sup> Stortingsmelding nr. 40 (1993-1994, Kortversion, Utenriksdepartementet) Source for data: Statistisk Sentralbyrå.

Parallel to the above concerns, external influences also affect Norwegian foreign policy. Like most small states, Norway has been forced to adapt its foreign policy to external conditions, rather than being in a position to influence the external environment in accordance with internal demands. Sæter<sup>6</sup> expresses the view that Norway has always been a follower, rather than a leader, in matters of regional integration.

After World War II, Norwegian neutrality was regarded as unrealistic. A Scandinavian defence union was discussed in 1948, but this failed to materialise. This was partly because Denmark and Norway wanted such a union to have a Western military guarantee, and this was not acceptable to Sweden because of its neutrality<sup>7</sup>. But it was also a matter of Norwegian reluctance to be dependent upon Swedish military hardware for its defence. And there was still lingering resentment towards the past domination exercised by Sweden and Denmark<sup>8</sup>. Hence, in 1949 Norway joined NATO. This limited the scope of Nordic co-operation, and subordinated Norway's policy on Nordic integration to its NATO membership<sup>9</sup>.

Norway's options in trade policy were partly curtailed by the same concerns as those that applied to its security policy. Deeper Nordic co-operation was resisted, and in particular any proposal involving supranational elements. One important consideration was fear of Swedish domination of the Norwegian economy<sup>10</sup>. It was this Norwegian political fear

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<sup>6</sup> 1993, p. 21.

<sup>7</sup> Sæter, 1993 pp. 21-22.

<sup>8</sup> Anderson, 1967, p. 12.

<sup>9</sup> Sæter 1993, pp. 21-22.

<sup>10</sup> Elder, Arter and Thomas, 1988, p. 2; Miljan, 1977, pp. 195-196; Straath, 1980, pp. 109-110.

of competition and supranational institutions that eventually caused the Nordic Economic Community, and the Nordek proposals ten years later (1968), to founder<sup>11</sup>.

Although there were political reasons for not wanting a Nordic union or common market, economic reasons also weighed heavily on Norwegian minds. A Nordic common market would not have solved matters for Norway. A market of 20 million people is not a feasible alternative to one of 250 million. Hence, it was expected that Norway would follow the UK and Denmark into the EEC, if only on purely economic grounds<sup>12</sup>. Norway's trade has traditionally been especially dependent upon Britain<sup>13</sup>.

#### 6.2.2. Norway and European Integration 1961-1985.

Because of its trade dependence, Norway needed to secure access to the market represented by the EEC. In the 1960's and early 1970's important parts of the Norwegian economy - fisheries, manufacturing and shipping – were more dependent upon the outside world than in any other Nordic country. Norway's policy on Europe has always focused on reducing trade barriers so as to increase access for these three

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<sup>11</sup> Miljan (1977 pp. 195-196) and Allen (1979, chapter 3).

<sup>12</sup> Miljan, 1977, pp. 195-196. On Norwegian dependence upon the British position, see Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977, p. 21-23), Nelsen (1993, p. 46) and Sæther (1993, p. 22-23).

<sup>13</sup> In the period 1947-70 between fifteen and 23 percent of Norwegian exports were to Britain. Hence, Norway has followed Britain's applications for EC-membership. Also strong political and personal ties since World War II have been important, and it has been common practice to let Denmark decide before Norway (Gleditsch and Hellevik, 1977, pp. 21-22). Miljan (1977), Udgaard and Nilsson (1993), and Nelson (1993) also observe that it has been common Norwegian practice to follow Britain in foreign policy questions.

sectors<sup>14</sup>. British and Danish intentions of joining the common market made this access even more important. Hence, after Britain and Denmark applied for membership in the EEC in 1961, Norway applied to join the next year.

The EEC debate in Norway began when Britain applied to join the organisation in July 1961. Norway faced several obstacles to membership. Firstly, a constitutional amendment was needed to transfer powers to an international organisation. Secondly, Storting approval was needed for the application. Thirdly, the political parties had promised a referendum if Norway applied to join the EEC. Finally, EEC acceptance of the application was required.

The constitutional amendment, for which a 2/3ds majority is needed for approval<sup>15</sup>, was passed by 115 votes to 35 on March 8, 1962. The new paragraph 93 of the Norwegian Constitution requires a 3/4rs majority for the Storting to cede power to an international authority. Later that same year, Storting approval for the Norwegian application for EEC membership was secured by a majority of 113 votes to 27. The referendum did not take place at this time, however, as de Gaulle rejected British entry into the EC<sup>16</sup>.

Britain again formally applied for full membership in May 1967. The Norwegian Borten government recommended to the Storting that Norway do the same. In July 1967 the Storting passed the membership proposal by 136 votes to 13. Again, the application was

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<sup>14</sup> Miljan, 1977, pp. 193-194.

<sup>15</sup> Paragraph 112, The Constitution ('Grunnlov') of Norway.

<sup>16</sup> Nelson (1993, p. 46), Miljan (1977, pp. 200-206). On the vote over the full membership application, the parties voted as follows: the H 29-0 for, the NV 12-2 for, the AP 63-11 for, the NKRF 8-7 for, the SP 15-1 against, and the SV 2-0 against. This

halted by France's opposition to British membership, but this time Norway did not withdraw its application. Hence, when membership again became a possibility after the December 1969 Hague Summit, Norway was ready to negotiate. The Storting reaffirmed this on June 25, 1970, by a vote of 132 to seventeen<sup>17</sup>.

On January 22, 1972, Norway signed the Treaty of Accession with the existing EC members. In the advisory referendum on September 25 the turnout was 79.2 percent, 53.5 percent of whom voted 'no' to membership in the EC.

In the aftermath of the referendum, the AP government resigned, as it had promised to do if membership was rejected. It was replaced by a minority coalition government consisting of the NV, the SP, and the NKRF, which negotiated a free trade agreement with the EC. This was signed in April 1973. There were other, and in the long term more serious, political repercussions from the referendum outcome. One of the most important was the split in, and decline of, NV. Arguably this had been a long-term trend, but the conflict over membership in the EC led to a split that would eventually take the party out of parliament altogether in 1985. The conflict also caused a split in AP, with a leftist minority joining the Socialist Electoral Alliance (SVF)<sup>18</sup> that later developed into the SV<sup>19</sup>. The ensuing political turbulence also helped launch the NFRP<sup>20</sup>.

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vote was to be indicative of the battle lines of the future.

<sup>17</sup> Nelsen (1993, pp. 48-49), Miljan (1977, pp. 209-210).

<sup>18</sup> The SVF consisted of the Socialist People's Party (SF, later SV), Communists, AP defectors, and other assorted leftists.

<sup>19</sup> See also Sogner and Archer (1995, pp. 391-394) regarding the party system effects of the conflict over EC-membership.

<sup>20</sup> Madeley, 1994, p. 197.

With a trade agreement with the EC and the developments in the North Sea, Norway seemed to function well without EC membership<sup>21</sup>. The EC-issue was effectively buried for the next fifteen years. The issue had little or no effect on the political system in this period<sup>22</sup>.

### 6.2.3. Norway and European Integration 1985-1994.

When European integration resurfaced on the Norwegian political agenda, it was predictably again because of developments outside Norway. From the latter half of the 1980's onwards, adaptation to the single market became the official Norwegian government policy, insofar as this was permitted by the domestic political situation. However, it was stressed that co-operation with the EC should take place largely through EFTA, not bilaterally.

Since the early 1970's, the range of options had narrowed considerably for Norway with regard to European co-operation. With Denmark an EC-member, and EFTA reduced to an extension of the EC through the EEA<sup>23</sup>, Sæter<sup>24</sup> argues that alternative constellations and an exclusively unilateral approach had become unrealistic.

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<sup>21</sup> Sæter, 1993, p. 25.

<sup>22</sup> The EC-issue was not seen as important for the outcome of the Storting elections held in 1977 or in 1981. (Valen and Aardal, 1983) In the 1985 election the issue was so unimportant that Valen and Aardal (1989) did not even mention it in their account of that election.

<sup>23</sup> For Norway, the EEA also represented a convenient way of side-stepping the issue of full membership (Sæter, 1993, pp. 28-29).

<sup>24</sup> 1993, pp. 29-30.

What eventually forced Norway's hand and led to its 1993 application to join the EU were the membership applications of Austria (1989), Sweden (1992) and Finland (1992)<sup>25</sup>. If these three countries did join the EU, EFTA would be reduced to an even smaller appendage to the EU, with a similar decline in status. Such a development also meant that three of the five Nordic countries would be EU-members.

The AP government (in power since 1990) promised to hold a referendum over EU membership once the negotiations were completed. This was duly held on November 30, 1994. For a second time, the Norwegian people rejected membership, by a margin of 52.2 percent to 47.8 percent, on an 89 percent turnout. This time there was no need to negotiate a trade agreement, since the EEA-Treaty already covered this. The government did not resign, and no parties formally split. But the conflict does appear to have led to changes in electoral support for individual parties. And it has had important effects on the government alternatives that exist in Norway. These issues will be discussed below.

### **6.3. Norwegian attitudes to European integration.**

#### **6.3.1. Common economic factors.**

Norway's net contribution to the EU budget would have been N.kr. 2.6 Bn. in 1995, increasing to 6.5Bn. by year 2000<sup>26</sup>. Hence, this factor would have had a negative effect

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<sup>25</sup> Sogner and Archer (1995, p. 396) argue that the Finnish and Swedish applications, combined with the TEU and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forced Norway to apply.

<sup>26</sup> Stortingsmelding nr. 40 (1993-1994) Kortversion.

on the average Norwegian's utility. However, from the survey data analysed by Ringdal<sup>27</sup> this argument ranked only as number eighteen among reasons to vote 'no'.

The general taxation level has long been higher in Norway than the EU average. (See Table B.) However, the tax level has increased much faster in many EU member-states. Whilst the Norwegian tax level actually dropped by 0.8 percent between 1980 and 1990, the average tax level in the EC increased by nine percent over the same period.

With EEA membership exerting most of the same competitive pressures combined with this narrowing gap, the effect of EU membership on taxation would have been likely to be limited. However, because subsidies to agriculture are higher in Norway than they are in the EU, the reduction in this expense required by membership could lead to lower taxes. On the other hand, the 'membership fee' may have led to increased taxes. Overall, it was difficult for an individual to assess how his utility might have been affected in this respect. Thus effects on the tax level are likely to be a relatively unimportant factor for Norwegian attitudes to European integration. However, overall this factor might contribute to the left-right divide over EU-membership.

Although EEA membership should, in theory, have much the same effect as EU membership on the price level, agricultural subsidies would have had to be cut if Norway joined the EU. In theory this should lower the price level on food towards EU levels. Food prices were about twice as high in Norway as in the EU-member states

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<sup>27</sup> 1995. Unless otherwise specified, numbers referring to arguments for and against EU-membership in this and the next three sub-sections are from this survey. The number given is in percent of the numbers of answers. With each person giving, on average, 2.2 answers, the number of people using each argument will be correspondingly higher.



around the time of the membership application<sup>28</sup>. Import restrictions exist for all agricultural produce except sugar and tropical fruits<sup>29</sup>. Table D shows the implicit tax levelled on the consumer due to agricultural subsidies in 1993. There was a substantial gap between the 60 percent tax in Norway and the 39 percent EC average. One effect of membership would have been that this tax would have dropped towards the EU-level.

Hence, for the average Norwegian, it was likely that his utility would have increased somewhat with respect to the price level. Cheaper food and alcohol ranks as the eleventh most important argument for joining the EU. Thus, these concerns appear to be of some, but limited importance.

In 1993 the Norwegian rate of unemployment was only just over half that of the EU average. (See Table C.) Risk aversion implies that for the average Norwegian this factor was likely to lower the utility of membership. Appendix 6.2 shows that of the arguments against membership 'employment' was the second most frequently mentioned argument. The same argument was ranked tenth as an argument for membership. However, in terms of the number of opponents and proponents of membership mentioning this as a reason for their voting behaviour in the referendum, the difference was quite small. This indicates uncertainty with regard to the effect of EU-membership on employment, but supports the idea that more people felt their utility would decline based on this factor, than increase.

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<sup>28</sup> Bulletin of the European Communities, 2/93, p. 15.

<sup>29</sup> Ingebritsen, 1995, p. 351 and note 3 p. 362.

In Norway oil and gas are extremely important national resources. Oil and gas-production represents approximately 1/7th of GNP, and 1/3 of export<sup>30</sup>, and Norway is the second largest oil exporter in the world. An EU directive (EC/94/22) adopted in May 1994, and accepted by the Storting in June 1994, for the first time confirmed member states' sovereign rights concerning petroleum resources, and permits state determination of the pace of extraction<sup>31</sup>. Furthermore, Protocol 4 of the Accession Treaty, in addition to guaranteeing Norwegian jurisdiction over its petroleum resources, also recognised the right of state participation in the management of these resources<sup>32</sup>.

The same directive also introduced full competition into the Norwegian petroleum sector. Hence, the Norwegian State owned oil company, Statoil, and other Norwegian oil companies have thereafter faced competition for shares of licences for oil and gas extraction. Increased foreign involvement could lead to reduced activity in industry and activities related to this very important sector of the Norwegian economy, as products and services for the industry to a greater degree could be produced, and profits earned, outside the country. After this directive came into force, only about half of all goods- and service contracts related to the petroleum-industry have been awarded to Norwegian companies<sup>33</sup>.

EEA-membership is likely to have the same effect as EU-membership in this respect, and so this directive should not have affected attitudes to EU-membership. However, the

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<sup>30</sup> Stortingsmelding nr. 40 (1993-1994), Kortversion.

<sup>31</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit (4/1993, p. 10), CMA European Briefing note (June 1995).

<sup>32</sup> Stortingsmelding nr. 40, 1993-1994, pp. 186-187.

<sup>33</sup> Olje- og energidepartementet, <http://odin.dep.no/oed/publ/pfakta97/kap-0006.htm>,

timing of the directive in the run-up to the referendum is likely to have increased opposition to membership. Furthermore, for many people a vote against EU-membership was also a vote against EEA-membership, without which EU-directives would not apply to Norway. Considering the crucial importance of this industry for the Norwegian economy, many people are likely to view EU-membership as detrimental to their utility based on this factor.

This oil-wealth also gives Norwegians considerably more room to pursue high-spending policies such as massive agricultural subsidies, other subsidies, and a substantial welfare state, and still maintain very healthy state finances. “Oil and gas have been the basis for Norwegian economic wealth over the past 20 years, being a main reason why Norway has been able to pursue an independent economic policy.”<sup>34</sup> Similarly, Svåsand and Lindström<sup>35</sup> argue that the petroleum resources “was a sedative to Norway’s public debate about the fundamental consequences of a global economy”.

There is also a connection between the oil- and gas-industry and (un)employment. In 1993, over 78,000 people were employed directly as a result of this industry<sup>36</sup>. In all likelihood considerably more jobs, in sectors such as services and trade, are indirectly dependent upon the oil- and gas-industry. Hence, unemployment would most likely be considerably higher in Norway without this industry. Consequently, state finances would be less advantageous, and less money would be available for state spending. This again

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28/1/98.

<sup>34</sup> Sogner and Archer, 1995, p. 390.

<sup>35</sup> 1997, p. 208.

<sup>36</sup> Olje- og Energidepartementet, Odin, Petro95. 6 Fastlandsaktiviteter or petroleumsforskning. (<http://odin.dep.no/oed/publ/pfakta97/kap-0006.htm>, 28/01/98/ p.

puts Norway in a comparatively advantageous economic situation, and allows voters to consider other factors than economic ones when deciding on their opinion on EU-membership.

### 6.3.2. Common non-economic factors.

EU membership implies the transfer of power and decision-making from the national to the EU level in many policy-areas. The effect on individual utility emanating from this transfer *per se*, rather than of changes in policy resulting from this transfer, will vary according to a combination of two factors. Firstly, the value the individual assigns to which level legal authority and political power is vested. Secondly, whether and to which extent he (dis)approves of the specific form of European integration established by the EU. Unfortunately, the data collected by Jenssen and Valen et al. is organised so that arguments related to self-determination are grouped with arguments related to democracy (see Appendix 6.2). Nevertheless, because one in two ‘no’-voters mention such arguments<sup>37</sup>, it appears that a desire to retain power at the national level was an important argument against EU-membership. Norway’s history of domination by others is most likely an important reason for this.

For over 400 years (1375-1814) Norway was ruled from Denmark, and then for another 91 (1814-1905) from Sweden. German occupation between 1940 and 1945 also forms part of this history of foreign domination. This history is likely to fuel resistance to voluntarily transferring power from the nation-state.

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<sup>37</sup> Ringdal, 1995, p. 51.

Furthermore, the arguments related to 'open' government 'close to the people' outlined in Chapter 1 should not be underestimated as reasons for opposition to EU-membership<sup>38</sup>. Concerns about a likely detrimental effect on the quality of democracy were prevalent among opponents of EU-membership. As mentioned above, about half of these mentioned an argument linked to features of Norwegian democracy and self-government.

Conversely, one could argue that EU-membership increases influence and hence strengthens democracy. Indeed, the argument that 'membership gives influence' (together with 'important to co-operate') was the most frequently given argument for voting 'yes' (see Appendix 6.2 for data). This provides some support for the hypothesis set out in Chapter 1 that the effect of EU-membership is somewhat Janus-faced in this respect.

A remarkable degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity until recently set Norway apart from many European countries. If an individual takes the view that a more heterogeneous society would benefit his utility, then he might support EU-membership based on this factor, and vice versa.

It is of course difficult to assess how important these reasons are for attitudes towards European integration. However, fears of 'losing our distinctive character' ranked as the fifth most important reason for voting 'no' in the 1994 referendum. Furthermore, a

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<sup>38</sup> See, for example, leaflets published by Norwegian anti-EU organisations: Frihet - i en liten urne (Ungdom mot EU, Leaflet, 1994, Oslo); Norge og EU - Virkninger av

category of argument including immigration and border controls ranked eight among such reasons. Conversely, 'cultural fellowship' (with other Europeans) ranked ninth among arguments for membership.

Security and peace concerns turn out to be among the most important arguments for membership. Security policy ranks second, and the EU's ability to secure peace (together with conflict-resolution) eight. Norwegian EU-membership can only have a marginal effect in these areas. Therefore, it would seem that a morally driven desire to partake in the perceived security- and peace-promoting aspect of European integration is the reason for the prominence of these arguments. This may also have a background in history. When Germany invaded Norway in 1940, Norway had tried to establish itself as a neutral state, with very limited military resources. It then had to rely on other countries' military forces to defeat the Nazi Empire in order to regain its freedom. Although preserving self-determination is a main reason for opposing EU-membership, the prevention of war in Europe and the effects of that on self-determination forms the other side of this argument.

Feelings of Nordic solidarity may affect Norwegian utility incomes in relation to EU membership. However, the significance of this factor has changed. The failure of Nordic integration, Denmark's EC-membership in 1973, and Swedish and Finnish membership in 1994 have shown that Nordic solidarity is somewhat limited. Appendix 6.2 shows that 99.6 percent of the 10.3 percent that mentioned Nordic unity as an important issue voted 'yes' in the 1994 referendum.

### 6.3.3. Group differentiated economic factors.

Subsidies to the agricultural sector would be dramatically affected by Norwegian EU-membership. At the time of the 1994 referendum, Norwegian agriculture was the most heavily subsidised in the world<sup>39</sup>. At the same time, it employed 5.5 percent of the labour force, or about 110,000 people. Of these, agriculture was the primary source of income for 40 percent. Importantly, in one of every four municipalities agriculture constituted more than 50 percent of available employment<sup>40</sup>. The Norwegian Agricultural Research Institute has estimated that EU-membership would reduce employment in farming from 70, 000 man-years to 15-30, 000, and that agricultural activity in peripheral areas might be reduced by 90-95 percent<sup>41</sup>.

The CAP is much more market oriented than Norway's very protectionist agricultural policies<sup>42</sup>. Thus, because agricultural subsidies would eventually be reduced in the event of EU-membership, such membership would have a negative effect on the utility of farmers generally<sup>43</sup>. Appendix 6.3 provides ample evidence that this was indeed the view taken by most farmers. Nine out of ten farmers voted 'no' in the 1994 referendum

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<sup>39</sup> The Economist, 21/8/1993 (source: OECD). At close to US\$ 1000 per head of population, agricultural subsidy per capita was then more than twice as high in Norway compared to the EC and OECD averages.

<sup>40</sup> [Http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~oskar/norway/nor\\_eu.html](http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~oskar/norway/nor_eu.html), 14/10/97, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> Nersten, N. K.: The impact of a new agricultural policy (Norwegian Agricultural Research Institute, Oslo, 1993). From Ingebritsen, 1995, p. 360.

<sup>42</sup> Ingebritsen, 1995, pp. 351-352.

<sup>43</sup> In a leaflet issued in May 1994, the Norwegian Farmers' Organisation argues that various types of farmers will all have their incomes dramatically reduced if Norway joins the EU. According to their calculations, this is entirely due to direct subsidies and artificially high price levels in Norway compared to the EU. (Norges Bondelag, 1994)

(see Appendix 6.3.). In fact, there was probably not another substantial group of people that was as partisan with regard to this question.

But these adverse effects of EU-membership affect more than those directly employed in agriculture. Rural Norway is so heavily subsidised by the State that the reduction in subsidies demanded by EU-membership would most likely lead to the collapse of a large number of rural communities. Indeed, Norwegian agricultural policy specifically aims for the facilitation of a dispersed settlement pattern by supporting the viability of rural areas<sup>44</sup>.

Four and a half percent of the labour force, about 90,000 people, have full employment in farming related industries such as food processing, dairy, and forest industries<sup>45</sup>. A decline in Norwegian agriculture would also lead to a decline for such industries. With lower employment, lower incomes and most likely population decline; people living in areas where farming and related industries are important would generally see their utility income drop as a result of membership. The very distinct attitude of farmers is also likely to influence that of the people around them. Thus, considerably higher opposition to membership would be expected in rural areas compared to the country at large.

Urban areas provide the clearest contrast with farming areas. The vast majority of the urban population is unlikely to be directly negatively affected by detrimental effects on primary industries. Furthermore, it is quite likely that EU membership, by opening up

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<sup>44</sup> Ingebritsen, 1995, p. 351.

<sup>45</sup> [Http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~oskar/norway/nor\\_eu.html](http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~oskar/norway/nor_eu.html), 14/10/97, p. 3.



for imports and forcing Norwegian farmers to become competitive or perish, would lead to lower prices for food. This would increase the utility of most urban dwellers.

The Accession Treaty stipulated that in the Norwegian case, the regions covered by Objective 6 were the four northernmost counties: Nord-Trøndelag, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark<sup>46</sup>. Norway would also have received funds from Objectives 2 and 5b, but it was not entirely clear which areas these would cover. The indicative commitment appropriation for Norway was 769 Million ECU for the period 1995-1999 for Objectives 1 to 5b, and 368 Million ECU for Objective 6<sup>47</sup>. Based on this factor the utility of people living in northern and rural areas can be expected to increase as a result of membership.

However, these funds would not compensate for much of the loss of agricultural subsidies. Furthermore, the future status of these funds, especially considering the EU enlargement into Eastern Europe, is very uncertain. Moreover, rural counties also receive considerable higher transfers from central government than do most urban areas, as shown in Appendix 6.4. Competitive pressures resulting from the internal market, EU competition policy and future EU legislation and regulation are all potential threats to such transfers.

Territorial conflicts are of both historical and current importance in Norwegian politics<sup>48</sup>. Many authors argue that urban-rural and centre-periphery conflicts offer the

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<sup>46</sup> Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 355.)

<sup>47</sup> Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6, (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 356.)

<sup>48</sup> See for example Bjørklund (1988), Valen and Martinussen (1972), Valen and Aardal

best explanation of the differences in attitudes to EU membership among the Norwegian population<sup>49</sup>. However, most of these authors do not attempt to explain why these conflicts appear to exist, beyond referring to historical factors and observed geographical differences in voting patterns. In contrast, the above arguments demonstrate that such differences are likely to exist largely because of the effects of European integration on narrow economic self-interest.

Appendix 6.3 shows there are substantial differences in attitudes to EU-membership between rural and urban areas, and also between the central area around Oslo and the rest of Norway county-wise. The general trend is for opposition to Norwegian EU membership to increase the further away from Oslo a county is situated. Overall in the 1994 referendum, only just over 30 percent of the rural population voted 'yes'.

Even in most of the 'no' counties (see Appendix 6.3) there were clear 'yes' majorities in urban areas. For example, in Stavanger in Rogaland the 'yes'-vote was 57.6 percent, in Hamar in Hedmark 60.3 percent, in Kristiansund in Møre og Romsdal 56.7 percent, and in Trondheim in Sør-Trøndelag 53.8 percent<sup>50</sup>.

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(1983), Valen (1981, 1986) and Valen, Aardal and Vogt (1990).

<sup>49</sup> See for example Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977), Miljan (1977), Nelsen, (1993), Aardal (1994a). In fact, it was impressions from the debate about Norwegian membership in 1962-63 that inspired Rokkan's original contribution (Rokkan and Valen, 1964) to the cleavage model. (Jenssen, Listhaug and Pettersen, 1995, p. 144)

<sup>50</sup> Source: referendum results in the Norwegian newspaper Klassekampen November 30, 1994.

In Northern Norway<sup>51</sup> and two other counties these effects are reinforced by the importance of the fisheries industry. Because EU membership would include participation in the common European Fisheries Policy (EFP), one could argue that this could be detrimental to the interest of Norwegians dependent upon this industry for employment and income. The reason for this is that they might be required to share more of this resource with people from other EU countries. Although EU membership would only lead to a minor loss of fish quotas, Norway would lose national control over fisheries policies, and the requirement of Norwegian citizenship for the ownership of a Norwegian fishing vessel would only be retained for a three and a half years transitional period. Hence, the fishermen's organisations rejected the deal<sup>52</sup>.

In all but five counties, the fishery industry employs less than 0.6 percent of the population. But in Sogn og Fjordane and Møre og Romsdal counties in Western Norway, and in Northern Norway, the fishery industry employed between 2.5 and over six percent of the population in 1993 (see Appendix 6.4). These counties are also five of the six with the lowest 'yes' vote in the 1994 referendum. For Sogn and Fjordane, this is in addition to this county having more farms per capita than any other county. Large sections of the population of counties dependent upon primary industries had good reasons to object to EU-membership because they are dependent upon public subsidies and national control over resources for their income. The data in Appendices 6.4 and 6.3 provides substantial evidence for this conclusion.

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<sup>51</sup> Nordland, Troms and Finmark.

<sup>52</sup> Sogner and Archer, 1995, pp. 397-399.

The Norwegian welfare state's social expenditure has been relatively high compared to the EU average, as Table F shows. Protection of the welfare state has been argued to have been an important argument against membership<sup>53</sup>. Much of the campaign literature from the 'no' side in the referendum campaign also focused strongly on this issue<sup>54</sup>.

Membership in the EU would not necessarily entail a reduction in Norwegian welfare state provisions. However, based on comparison, one might conclude that because the level of public sector social spending is lower in the EU, membership would lead to pressure for a reduction in Norwegian public spending. Moreover, the logic of European integration and future developments in social policy could also lead to changes or reductions in the Norwegian welfare state provisions. Also, it could be argued that in order to remain competitive in the internal market, taxation and hence public expenditure levels would have to fall. For these reasons, it is likely that those who benefit disproportionately financially from an extensive welfare state would have their utility reduced if Norway were to join the EU, and vice versa.

Chapter 3 explains why public employees and the poorer sections of the population have a particular interest in maintaining an extensive welfare state. The data displayed in Appendix 6.3 shows that those employed in the public sector were considerably less inclined to support membership than those employed in the private sector. The same appendix also shows that the wealthier sections of the population were dramatically more likely to vote 'yes' to EU-membership than the poorer sections.

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<sup>53</sup> Ringdal, 1995.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Bjørnøy (1994), 'Frihet i en liten urne', 'Ja til folkestyre', 'Farvelvelferd'.

The Norwegian welfare state benefits women disproportionately, both as recipients and as employees<sup>55</sup>. The welfare state is the biggest employer of women in Norway<sup>56</sup>. Overall, 44 percent of women worked in the public sector in Norway by 1992, compared to only 22 percent of men<sup>57</sup>. Women also tend to be less well paid than men, at 63.4 percent of male pay in 1991<sup>58</sup>. Norwegian women also benefit from long and well-paid maternity leave, as Table G shows. “The future of the welfare state loomed large in the campaign, mobilising women employees to its perceived defence.”<sup>59</sup> Compared to the situation for men, women’s income, employment and career prospects were all more likely to be adversely affected by EU membership.

The effects of cuts in state spending would be reinforced in Northern Norway. The population of the northern part of Troms and all of Finmark (the two northernmost counties) has since 1990 enjoyed considerable subsidies not available to other Norwegians, totalling about N.Kr. 1Bn in 1997<sup>60</sup>. Student loans are reduced by ten percent for each year of residence<sup>61</sup>, income taxes are lower, employers are exempted from social security contributions, child benefits are higher, and electricity duty is reduced<sup>62</sup>. In addition, 50 percent of employment in inner Finmark is in the public

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<sup>55</sup> Bjørnøy, 1994.

<sup>56</sup> The Norwegian Newspaper Dagbladet, 28/9/95. In 1994, women working for the public sector in Norway made up more than 20 percent of the workforce. (The British newspaper The Independent, 27/11/94).

<sup>57</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.

<sup>58</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.

<sup>59</sup> Wyller, 1996, p. 147.

<sup>60</sup> The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, 1/4/97.

<sup>61</sup> Aftenposten, 21/8/95.

<sup>62</sup> Aftenposten, 1/4/97.

sector, in outer Finnmark it is 36 percent<sup>63</sup>, both considerably higher than the countrywide average. These two counties recorded the two highest 'no'-votes at the 1994 referendum in percentage terms.

Norway has long been a trading nation and is still very dependent upon trade. As documented above, much of this is with EU-members. Thus, it is crucial for Norway to secure access to the market represented by the EU and to avoid restrictions such as duties and other trade barriers. Because EEA-membership is a less stable way to ensure such access, EU- membership can be expected to increase the utility of those whose income is dependent upon international trade. After the rejection of EU-membership, the large industrial group Norsk Hydro abandoned a Nkr. nine Billion plan to expand and modernise its four Norwegian aluminium smelting plants<sup>64</sup>. This factor probably contributed to the gap in attitude towards EU-membership between the public and the private sector.

There is no comprehensive direct data available that enables analysis of the attitude of people dependent upon exports compared to those who are not. However, the most spectacular result of the whole 1994 referendum was probably that in the town of Årdal in Sogn og Fjordane county. This is a very rural and strongly anti-membership county, yet in Årdal the 'yes'-vote was 69.7<sup>65</sup> percent. This town is extremely dependent upon metal-exports from its heavy industry. The denizens therefore had a strong incentive to vote 'yes' in order to secure market access for these products.

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<sup>63</sup> Aftenposten, 1/4/97.

<sup>64</sup> Thomas, 1996, p. 23.

<sup>65</sup> The Norwegian newspaper Klassekampen, 30/11/94.

#### 6.3.4. Group differentiated non-economic factors.

It is argued in Chapter 3 that ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be higher on the political left than on the right. Thus, if EU-membership is seen as leading to reductions in welfare state provisions, then this is likely to reduce support for membership on the political left. The data in Appendix 6.3 provides some support for this idea. Support for membership in the 1994 referendum was low among SV voters, high among H voters, and above average among NFRP voters. Based on individual data, Aardal has shown that those who identify themselves as on the left show a strong tendency to be against EU-membership, and that this tendency remains strong in a multivariate analysis<sup>66</sup>.

Furthermore, this factor is likely to form part of the explanation for the territorial differences in attitude to EU-membership. Appendix 6.5 shows that where the far left was strong at the previous parliamentary election (Northern Norway, inland Eastern Norway), so was the anti-EU vote. Generally, however, there is no consistent geographical pattern between voting for the parties of the left and attitude to EU-membership. This is partly due to the centre parties representing many of those who oppose EU-membership for more materialistic reasons, and related factors such as belonging to the counter-cultures (see below).

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<sup>66</sup> Aardal, 1995.

In 1994, women were very well represented at the top level of Norwegian politics, with the Prime Minister and six other ministers (out of seventeen) being female<sup>67</sup>, and over forty percent of the Storting representatives also women. This is very visible, and an obvious contrast to most other (non-Nordic) European countries. This situation is, at least partly, due to conscious policies promoting women to such positions, including discrimination against men in political nomination processes and in higher education. Such discrimination would most likely not be allowed if Norway were to join the EU. Another factor is the Catholic influence in the EU which may adversely affect liberal legislation on abortion and divorce, if these become EU-level decisions in the future.

Together with the economic factors mentioned above, this makes it likely that more women than men would view EU-membership as negative for their utility. The data displayed in Appendix 6.3 shows that considerably more women than men voted 'no' in the 1994 referendum.

The three counter-cultures were a manifestation of cultural and religious resistance to the dominance of the central national elites. They were directed against the standards and practices seen to be spreading from the central areas and the cities. They symbolise the defence of rural values against the centralising forces triggered by economic development and the strengthening of governmental agencies. Importantly, they have all been given a disproportionately high support in the South and the West since the emergence of mass politics.

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<sup>67</sup> Heidar, 1994, pp. 389-390.



Opposition to EU-membership is arguably another manifestation of 'counter-culture' politics. And at least two of the counter-cultures could be negatively affected by EU-membership. It is highly likely that EU membership would eventually lead to a relaxation of the restrictive Norwegian alcohol legislation. And the Catholic influence in the EU is likely to be an argument against membership among orthodox Lutherans associated with the revivalist organisations.

As Appendix 6.3 shows, few people who belong to the language and abstinence counter-cultures appear to have supported EU membership. However, only just over ten percent of the population are neo-Norwegian speakers, and the non-drinkers make up a small minority of the population. As for the orthodox Lutherans, they appear to have a similar attitude to membership as the population at large. They also make up a very small part of the population. Thus, the importance of the traditional counter-cultures should not be exaggerated. However, the anti-EU attitude prevalent in the counter-cultures is likely to have reinforced other divisions between rural and urban areas, and to have increased the 'no'-vote in the Southwest.

#### **6.4. Party system effects.**

The conflict over European integration in Norway has two important implications for the political system. Firstly, its effect on voting behaviour has led to substantial fluctuations in the levels of support enjoyed by certain political parties. Secondly, the division over European integration has affected the potential for co-operation and coalitions between the parties.

The salience of the EU-conflict began to increase in the mid-1980s, when it was becoming clear that the government was re-considering its relationship with the EC. The debate over the EEA-Treaty increased the salience of this conflict. Valen<sup>68</sup> argues that the EU question resurfaced on the political agenda in 1989. It has dominated Norwegian politics since 1990, even at the level of local elections in 1991. Election results and the changes in (potential) coalition alternatives provide the clearest evidence of the increased salience of the EU-conflict since then (see below).

One might have expected the referendum in 1994 to have removed the EU-conflict from the Norwegian political agenda. There are several reasons for why this has not happened. Most importantly, Norway remains a member of the EEA. As such it has to abide by all internal market legislation issued by the EU. Hence, any controversial EU internal market legislation is likely to cause conflict, since the parties disagree on how to deal with the EEA-membership as well (see below). Other potential problems include how to deal with EMU.

The Schengen Treaty, aiming at the realisation of free movement within the EU, is another likely conflict area. The Nordic countries already practice open borders among themselves. Because Denmark, Finland and Sweden are all EU-members, the implementation of the Schengen Treaty threatened to reintroduce passport-controls on the Norwegian border. The AP government managed to negotiate a special arrangement for Norway.

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<sup>68</sup> 1994.

Norway signed up to join the Schengen Group in June 1997. Only the H and the NFRP supported AP in this. This is likely to become more controversial after the EU agreed, in Amsterdam later the same month, to bring the Schengen Treaty into the EU proper. "The discussion on EU-adaptation and full membership seems to have become a normal part of the Norwegian political process."<sup>69</sup>

As Table 6.3 below shows, there has never been any sustained period of popular majority support for Norwegian EU membership.

Table 6.2: Position on EU membership among the Norwegian people.

|           | Autumn -81 | Autumn -89 | 1991 | Sep-93 | Dec-93 | 28/11/94 |
|-----------|------------|------------|------|--------|--------|----------|
| Yes       | 18.2       | 31.6       | 34.2 | 25.7   | 24     | 47.8     |
| No        | 67.9       | 46.6       | 40.9 | 50     | 52.3   | 52.2     |
| Undecided | 13.9       | 21.8       | 24.9 | 24.3   | 23.7   |          |

Sources: 1981, 1989 and 1991: Election studies. Nov-92, Sep-93, Dec-93, Jun-94: average of monthly opinion polls by MMI, Opinion, and Norsk Gallup; all referred to in Jenssen and Valen (1995).

There is also considerable opposition to membership among the members and leaders of the Norwegian political parties. However, this is notably lower than the popular opposition. As can be seen from Table 6.3 below, the anti-EU parties combined (among those with parliamentary representation) received 37.7 percent of the vote, and a similar share of seats (35.7 percent) in the 1993 national elections. In the vote (November 19, 1992) on whether or not to apply for membership in the EU, 104 members of the Storting voted 'yes', and 54 'no'<sup>70</sup>. There is thus a considerable gap between public

<sup>69</sup> Sæter, 1996, p. 134. See also Madeley (1994, p. 201).

<sup>70</sup> One member of the AP voted 'no' by mistake, six others who were absent would all have voted 'yes'. All the representatives of the SV and the SP voted 'no', as did the majority of the NKRf representatives and fifteen members of the AP. The 'yes'-majority consisted of the rest of the AP, two representatives of the NKRf, and all of the

opinion and the (official) opinion of the parties and individual members of the Storting. Similarly, on the vote in the 'Odelsting', comprising 2/3ds of the Storting members, on whether there should be a referendum over membership, the result was 67-32 for<sup>71</sup>. The minority voted against in the knowledge that they could block membership in a parliamentary vote. The voting patterns were similar in the vote ratifying the EEA-Treaty<sup>72</sup>, although this arrangement has consistently enjoyed considerably higher popular support than EU-membership.

The final negotiation result was debated in the Storting on April 26-27, 1994, but not put to the vote because it had already been decided to put the matter to a referendum<sup>73</sup>. Thus, the best guide to the parliamentary opinion remains the official party positions combined with the vote on the application. Both of these show under-representation of opponents of membership.

Table 6.3. Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party at last parliamentary election before the 1994 referendum.

| NKP/RVA       | SV            | AP              | SP             | NKRF          | NV            | H               | NFRP           |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Oppose<br>1.1 | Oppose<br>7.9 | Support<br>36.9 | Oppose<br>16.7 | Oppose<br>7.9 | Oppose<br>3.6 | Support<br>17.0 | Support<br>6.3 |

Support = support membership as defined by the TEU. Sources: 1993 election: Petersson (1993). EU-position: Party Programmes, Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 1995b).

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representatives for the H and the NFRP. (Nordisk Kontakt, 11/1992, pp. 87-88)

<sup>71</sup> Law Number 69, 1994, on referendum over the question of whether Norway should become a member of the EU. This was voted over 15/6/94. All members for the SP and SV voted against, as did six out of seven NKRF representatives. (Personal correspondence with Ms. Lotte Grepp Knutsen of the Storting Archive, February 1998)

<sup>72</sup> The vote was held 16/10/92. The overall vote was 131 for and 34 against. The majority was made up of 61 AP, all 36 H, 21 NFRP, the one FFF, and eleven NKRF representatives. The minority consisted of all eleven SP, all seventeen SV, three NKRF, one NFRP, and two AP representatives. (Personal correspondence with Ms. Lotte Grepp Knutsen of the Storting Archive, February 1998.)

<sup>73</sup> Personal correspondence with Ms. Lotte Grepp Knutsen of the Storting Archive, February 1998.

There is also a sub-dimension arising from EEA-membership. The NV, the NKRf, the AP, the H, and the NFRP support this, the other parties oppose it. A similar division exists with regard to the propensity for using the veto on EEA-legislation. This sub-dimension has the potential to create additional co-operation problems on the centre-right.

In an election survey of the 1989 parliamentary election, Valen<sup>74</sup> found that Norway's relationship with the EC was mentioned as an important issue by 52 percent of SP voters and fourteen percent of H voters. This represented important issue number one and number five for the two parties' voters respectively. Overall, this issue was mentioned by ten percent of voters. However, it did not seem to affect the election result to any substantial degree<sup>75</sup>. A transition matrix based on a survey of the election<sup>76</sup> shows no evidence of the EU-issue having influenced anything more than a very small number of individual vote transfers between the parties. Aardal<sup>77</sup> argues that the EU-issue did not return to the agenda until the 1993 election.

By the 1993 parliamentary election, the question of EU membership had become the most important issue. "Above all, the political debate [preceding the election] had been dominated by the question of Norway's entry into the European Union (EU)."<sup>78</sup> It was

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<sup>74</sup> 1990, p. 284

<sup>75</sup> The AP official platform at this election remained the result of the 1972 referendum, as it would otherwise risk losing votes to the SV (Sæter, 1996, p. 141).

<sup>76</sup> Aardal, 1990, p. 156.

<sup>77</sup> 1994a.

<sup>78</sup> Valen, 1994, p. 169. See also Wyller (1996, p. 141, 143).

selected by 65 percent of voters as their most important concern<sup>79</sup>. Large numbers of voters switched parties at the 1993 election based on their position on EU-membership<sup>80</sup>. A transition matrix based on a survey of the election<sup>81</sup> showed that half of the pro-EU SV-voters switched to the AP, and that a quarter of anti-EU AP-voters switched to anti-EU parties, as did a third of anti-EU H-voters. Furthermore, some anti-EU NV- and NKRF-supporters switched to the more anti-EU SP and SV. The most anti-EU party, the SP, increased its share of the vote from 6.5 percent in 1989 to 16.7 percent in 1993.

At the 1993 election there was no credible alternative to an AP government, due to the salience of the EU-dimension<sup>82</sup>. "The non-socialist (bourgeois) parties [...] were hardly on speaking terms in this election."<sup>83</sup> In 1993 the previous coalition partners the H and the SP were clearly opposing each other over the issue of Norwegian EU membership<sup>84</sup>.

Other effects of the EU-conflict included de-selection of candidates based on their position on EU-membership in the nomination process before the 1993 election. This included the sitting pro-EU Storting member for Aust-Agder and the NKRF, Helga Haugen<sup>85</sup>. There were also high-level defections based on the EU-dimension. In mid-

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<sup>79</sup> Aardal, 1994a, pp. 176-177. When divided by party, the figures were 81 percent for SV-voters, with the corresponding numbers 55 for the AP, 65 for the NV, 58 for the NKRF, 89 for the SP, 60 for the H, and 42 for the NFRP.

<sup>80</sup> See Valen (1994) and Aardal (1994a) for detailed explorations of this.

<sup>81</sup> Valen, 1994, p. 177.

<sup>82</sup> For a similar example from Ireland, see Laver and Schofield (1990, pp. 2-6).

<sup>83</sup> Aardal, 1994a, p. 175.

<sup>84</sup> Aardal, 1994a, p. 175.

<sup>85</sup> Nordisk Kontakt, 12/1992, p. 77.

December 1992, Inge Staldvik, Storting-representative for the AP in Nord-Trøndelag, joined the SV-group in the Storting<sup>86</sup>.

At the 1997 Storting election, the EU-conflict again prevented the old allies on the centre-right from forming a coalition. The NV, the NKRF and the SP formed an alliance, the Centre Alternative (CA), excluding the H, which went on to form the government<sup>87</sup>. There were also massive changes in voting patterns at this election, with the SP-vote halved, continuing decline for the H, the NKRF-vote nearly doubling, and the NFRP more than doubling its share of the vote<sup>88</sup>. This disruption to voting pattern is likely to be connected to disruptions to voter loyalty caused by the EU-conflict. So far, the 1994 rejection of EU-membership has not removed the EU-conflict from the Norwegian political agenda.

#### 6.4.1 The extent to which the EU-conflict crosscuts other cleavages.

The left-right cleavage is normally dominant in Norwegian politics. A party's position on this axis tends to define its coalition partners, and often also which parties a minority government will seek parliamentary support from. Figure 6.1 indicates how the relevant parties place on the left-right dimension.

Figure 6.1. The left-right cleavage in Norway.

| Left |    |    |      |    |          | Right   |      |
|------|----|----|------|----|----------|---------|------|
| RVA  | SV | AP | NKRF | SP | NV 11.20 | H 15.08 | NFRP |

<sup>86</sup> Nordisk Kontakt, 12/1992, pp. 77-78.

<sup>87</sup> The effects of the EU-conflict on government formation and coalition-alternatives are covered in more detail below.

<sup>88</sup> For the importance of the EU-dimension at this election, see Bjugan (1998).



| Left |      |      |       |       | Right |  |       |
|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|--|-------|
|      | 4.75 | 7.27 | 10.49 | 11.04 |       |  | 18.76 |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 277-278. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting tax/anti-public ownership (20). The RVA was not part of this exercise, and its placement is based on its party program. The NV score is based on the average of the scores for the NV and the DLF before the reunification.

Territorial dimensions are normally secondary in the Norwegian party system. These can be operationalised in a variety of ways. The urban-rural dimension is probably the most important one, and the one that most obviously can be described as a cleavage. Crucially, it crosscuts the left-right cleavage, as Figure 6.2 shows.

Figure 6.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Norway.

| Urban |      |      |         |       | Rural |            |          |
|-------|------|------|---------|-------|-------|------------|----------|
| RVA   | NFRP | H    | AP 7.72 | SV    | NV    | NKRF 14.72 | SP 18.61 |
|       | 4.25 | 5.39 |         | 11.06 | 11.47 |            |          |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 279. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti).

The SP and the NKRF are the most obviously rural parties, the RVA and the H the most urban. This dimension dramatically crosscuts the left-right cleavage. The distance between the H and the centre parties on this dimension illustrates the potential for co-operation problems between these parties. The centre parties remain the defenders of the interests of rural Norway, just as 'Venstre' was at the turn of the century. Conversely, the H is predominately the defender of urban and business interests. In terms of electoral support, operationalised as a centre/periphery ratio, the parties place in a very similar manner, as shown in Appendix 6.6.

Of other territorial differences, the most important one is the consistently and disproportionately high support for the centre parties in Western and Southern Norway,



and a corresponding weakness for these parties in the capital area. The H remains considerably stronger in the capital area compared to the rest of the country<sup>89</sup>.

The conflict over European integration also crosscuts the left-right cleavage. Figure 6.3 below indicates party positions on European integration.

Figure 6.3 Party position on EU-membership at the 1994 referendum in Norway.

| Pro-EU |    |      |    |      |    | Anti-EU |    |
|--------|----|------|----|------|----|---------|----|
| H      | AP | NFRP | NV | NKRF | SV | RVA     | SP |

Figure based on party positions. Sources: Party programmes and Jahn and Storsved (1995, p. 27).

This dimension has very little in common with the left-right dimension. It also appears to crosscut the urban-rural cleavage, albeit to a lesser extent. However, all the parties including and to the right (figuratively) of NV are against EU-membership. The NV and the NKRF are in a central position on this dimension because they are for EEA-membership, the SV<sup>90</sup>, the RVA and the SP are against this<sup>91</sup>. Thus, in terms of attitude

<sup>89</sup> In the four counties of Western Norway the three parties of the CA combined polled about 37 percent on average at the 1997 election, with the left (Labour, the SPP and the REA) trailing with around 35 percent. In the South these two 'blocks' are about equal in strength. But in the capital area (Oslo plus the surrounding county of Akershus) the left out-polled the CA by three to one (44 percent to 15 percent). The H-vote in Oslo was about 50 percent above its national average. (Source: 1997 election results in Aftenposten, <http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/valg97/backup/land.htm>, 18/9/97.) Author's calculations.

<sup>90</sup> As of July 1996, all SV representatives in the Storting had voted against EEA- and EU-membership at all relevant votes. (Personal correspondence with Rolf A. Vestvik, political adviser for the SV.)

<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, the SP stated that its representatives in the Storting would vote against membership even if the 1994 referendum result was a 'yes' majority. The SV qualified its stance with the assertion that there had to be a 'yes'-vote in a majority of counties for its Storting representatives to support membership. The other parties stated that they would respect the referendum outcome. Also, before the 1993 election the RVA, the SV and the SP wanted Norway to withdraw its EC-application. After the election the NKRF joined this position (Nordisk Kontakt, 10/1993, p. 64).

towards EU-membership, all the 'rural' parties are against, with a more mixed picture among the 'urban' parties. The latter parties are divided on the EU-question similarly to where their position is on the left-right cleavage.

The EU-conflict creates immense coalition and co-operation problems between parties that were previously able to co-operate. In particular, the division over European integration on the centre-right has rendered any coalition including both the SP and the H virtually impossible. Any government including both centre parties and the H would find it very difficult to remain in government whenever any EU-related issue is on the agenda. In addition, the division between the far left (RVA and SV) and the centre-left (AP) is reinforced by this conflict.

The EU-conflict constitutes a political cleavage in Norway. In section two of this chapter it was established that the EU-conflict creates an observable conflict of interest between those whose utility is increased through EU-membership and those for whom it declines. It has also been demonstrated that substantial numbers of people appear to perceive this conflict of interest as important. Finally, the conflict has had substantial effects on the Norwegian party system, affecting both relative distributions of votes between the parties and coalition patterns.

#### 6.4.2 The potential for vote-maximisation based on the conflict over European integration.

The H is unlikely to profit in terms of votes from making a shift to an anti-EU position. 80 percent of the party's voters supported EU-membership at the 1994 referendum. However,

anti-EU voters who would otherwise vote for the H can switch their vote with relative ease to the centrist anti-EU parties without thereby supporting other policies they disagree fundamentally with. This makes the salience of the EU-conflict problematic for the H in vote maximisation terms.

About 1/3 of the AP's voters rejected EU-membership in the 1994 referendum. Their potential voters can also easily find anti-EU alternatives both to the left and to the right. Hence, vote-maximisation on this issue is problematic for AP, although it would appear that more votes would be at risk with an anti-EU stance.

For the NKRF and the SP, the pursuit of anti-EU voters is the most rational option. The vast majority of their voters objected to membership in 1994. In addition, their core-voters (farmers and rural people in general) are largely anti-EU. This situation makes a pro-EU position virtually impossible, no matter what other concerns these parties have. For the NV, the position is somewhat more complicated, with its voters divided down the middle.

At the 1993 election, the SP benefited greatly from its anti-EU stance. "The gains of the Centre Party can only be explained in terms of the strong anti-EU sentiments among Norwegian voters. The main factor behind this remarkable surge was the increased salience of the EU (European Union) issue."<sup>92</sup>

For the SV, an anti-EU position is easily the more attractive option. In the 1994 referendum, about 80 percent of its voters voted 'no'. The party should also be well

positioned to gain anti-EU voters from AP. However, it appears that the SV has not been able to capitalise on its anti-EU position in terms of votes.

A potential reason for why the SP benefited more from being a 'no' party than the SV is that the former "carried on the most uncompromising battle against the EU"<sup>93</sup>. That is, the party was completely unambiguous on this issue, it was very clear what its position was. Hence, a vote for the SP could virtually be said to be a vote against EU membership.

However, the SP did not appear to benefit from its strong anti-EU stance at the 1997 election. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, off-loading the issue of membership to the referendum-arena succeeded in lowering the salience of the EU-issue among voters (although not at the political elite level). Secondly, the SP's primary aim at this election was to gain office. Therefore, it could not focus strongly on its anti-EU position, since this would put it in an untenable position if office was achieved. The party would then be obliged to follow this up in government. Such a position would make the coalition with the less anti-EU NV and NKRFF and co-operation with other parties more difficult. Furthermore, any Norwegian government needs to co-operate and negotiate with the EU, and this would be more difficult with a publicly very intransigent and hostile position towards European integration.

For the NFRP positioning on this issue for vote-maximisation purposes is very complicated. In the 1994 referendum, about 60 percent of its voters supported EU

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<sup>92</sup> Aardal, 1994a, pp. 177-178.

<sup>93</sup> See Valen (1994, p. 177).

membership. The party tends to trade voters with most of the other parties, but mainly with the H and, to a lesser extent, the AP<sup>94</sup>. Therefore, its vote-maximising position would depend upon the stances of these two parties and the position of their voters in particular. However, although they are both pro-EU, the number of anti-EU voters in the H is low, and the centre-parties are probably better placed to pick up anti-EU voters from both the H and the AP. Furthermore, other issues (crime, health, immigration) are probably better vote-winners for the NFRP. In addition, NFRP voters appear to be the least concerned about the EU of all voters<sup>95</sup>. Thus, on the EU-dimension, other concerns than vote-maximisation are likely to be more important for this party.

Overall, the Norwegian parties' positions on the EU-dimension appear to be rational based on vote-maximisation concerns. With pro- and anti-EU parties both on the left and in the centre, and the lower popular and no party opposition to membership on the right, there seems to be few votes to be gained for any party by changing position.

#### 6.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.

Table 6.4 below shows the make-up of Norwegian governments since 1971. As Appendix 6.6 demonstrates, no single party has held a majority in the Storting since then. Hence, all governments have either been coalition (minority or majority) or single party minority government.

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<sup>94</sup> Aardal (1990, p. 156), Aardal (1994a, p. 174) and Valen (1994, p. 177).

<sup>95</sup> Aardal, 1994a, p. 177.

Table 6.4. Government participation in Norway.

| Year | Prime Minister    | Party     |    |    |             |          |
|------|-------------------|-----------|----|----|-------------|----------|
| 1971 | Bratteli, T.      | <b>AP</b> |    |    |             |          |
| 1972 | Korvald, L.       |           | NV | SP | <b>NKRF</b> |          |
| 1973 | Bratteli, T.      | <b>AP</b> |    |    |             |          |
| 1976 | Nordli, O.        | <b>AP</b> |    |    |             |          |
| 1981 | Brundtland, G. H. | <b>AP</b> |    |    |             |          |
| 1981 | Willoch, K.       |           |    |    |             | <b>H</b> |
| 1983 | Willoch, K.       |           |    | SP | <b>NKRF</b> | <b>H</b> |
| 1986 | Brundtland, G.H.  | <b>AP</b> |    |    |             |          |
| 1989 | Syde, J.P.        |           |    | SP | <b>NKRF</b> | <b>H</b> |
| 1990 | Brundtland, G.H.  | <b>AP</b> |    |    |             |          |
| 1996 | Jagland, T.       | <b>AP</b> |    |    |             |          |
| 1997 | Bondevik. K.M.    |           | NV | SP | <b>NKRF</b> |          |

The Prime Minister's party is in bold type. Sources: 1971-1993: Petersson (1994, p. 102); 1996: Heidar (1996 p. 464); 1997: Bjugan (1998).

All but one of the governments in the period have been either AP single party governments, or a centre-right coalition government including both the SP and the NKRF. The table also illustrates the very important point that the H has only been excluded from centre-right governments in the aftermath of the two EU referendums. A salient EU-dimension tends to keep the H out of office. However, the importance of this division also makes the centre-parties' hold on power more tenuous than it would be likely to be with the H included in the coalition. In 1972 their government only lasted until the next election a year later.

After the 1989 Storting election the H, the SP and the NKRF formed a centre-right minority coalition government. However, the Syde government fell in November 1990, "due to increasing tension over the EU issue"<sup>96</sup>. The AP then formed a single-party minority government.

The AP remained in government between 1990 and 1997, despite being far from securing a majority of seats in the Storting<sup>97</sup>. Valen<sup>98</sup> argues that the EU-issue was crucial for the survival of the AP government after the 1993 election. "The EU issue [was] decisive in the sense that it [created] barriers between parties that have formerly been friends and allies."

#### 6.4.4 Complications and synergy between various party goals.

For the centre parties many party goals correspond relatively well even with the EU-dimension salient. Since majority-government seems to be a thing of the past in Norway, a centre-minority government appears to be as realistic as any other alternative. The centre parties are in a central position on the left-right cleavage, and close together at the rural end of the urban-rural cleavage. In addition, they all took an anti-EEC position in the early 1970's<sup>99</sup>, and hence policy-consistency could be argued. Also, the vast majority of their members and leaders are against membership, internal splits are limited<sup>100</sup>. Yet, for coalition purposes it remains a problem that the NKRF and the NV are for the EEA, while the SP are against this agreement.

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<sup>96</sup> Valen, 1994, p. 170. This development was predicted by Madeley (1990, p. 291)

<sup>97</sup> After the 1993 election, it held 67 of 165 seats, sixteen short of a majority.

<sup>98</sup> 1994, p. 170.

<sup>99</sup> Although the pro-EU faction of the NV split and formed a new party. Wyller (1996, pp. 144-145) argues the NV has, because it realised the split this issue caused in the party, been the foremost supporter of the referendum device since 1961.

<sup>100</sup> At the annual meeting of NV in 1991, 25 percent of the delegates supported membership. However, by the annual meeting in March 1994, there was no suggestion that Norway should join the EU. A motion was proposed that the party should reconsider EU-membership if Sweden and Finland joined. This was rejected by 109 votes to 26. No supporters of EU-membership were elected to the central or to the national committee, and two EEA-opponents were elected to the former (Nordisk Kontakt, 3/1994, p. 85).

Furthermore, the lack of a majority in parliament is an obvious problem for the anti-EU centre parties. If the EU-conflict could be removed from the national political agenda co-operation with the H would be more likely. It would also make the split in the NV less dangerous, and tone down the differences over EEA-membership between the SP and the other two. However, it might also cause a loss of votes. At the 1997 election, EU-membership as such was not on the agenda, and the SP lost nearly as large a share of its vote as it had gained in 1993. (Although this was nearly off-set by a massive gain for the NKRF at the 1997 election.) Hence, vote-maximisation based on the EU-dimension is difficult to reconcile with office-maximisation even for these parties, at least when considered individually.

For the H the situation is considerably more complicated. An anti-EU position would make it much easier for this party to join a coalition with the centre parties. Hence, the aim of vote-maximisation conflicts with the aim of office-maximisation. Furthermore, the party has always been pro-EC/EU, as are virtually all its leaders<sup>101</sup>. Thus, credibility and policy-sincerity makes an anti-EU stance very difficult. Removing the EU-conflict from the national election arena would therefore be of great benefit to the H.

The EU-conflict also creates problems for the AP. The party is internally split<sup>102</sup>, and the salience of the EU-conflict also makes it more difficult for the AP to get ad-hoc support from the anti-EU parties. However, the AP has always been officially pro-EU, and its

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<sup>101</sup> At the party's annual meeting in April 1994 the vote was 225 to seven for membership. (Nordisk Kontakt, 3/1994, p. 60)

<sup>102</sup> At the AP annual meeting on November 8, 1992, 182 delegates supported the motion that Norway should apply for EU-membership, 106 opposed it (Nordisk



leadership even more so. In both 1972 and 1994, it was AP governments that proposed to join. Thus, policy-sincerity and credibility concerns prevent an anti-EU stance. Overall, it is in the interest of the AP to reduce the importance of this conflict in the national election arena.

The SV and the NFRP have never been invited to join any government. To obtain office, both parties either have to change their policies so as to become more congenial to other parties, or increase their share of the vote to where they can no longer be excluded. It is possible that the EU-conflict could lead to a realignment so dramatic that the 'right' EU-position could get these parties into government. However, because they are both on the extremes of the left-right cleavage, it is likely that they would also have to make considerable changes to other policies to achieve office. This is highly risky, since it could reduce the attraction of these parties to the voters. Therefore, on the EU-conflict, a strong emphasis on vote-maximisation appears to be the best option for these parties.

For the SV, an anti-EU position gives a high degree of synergy between party aims. The vast majority of SV party members and leadership are opponents of membership. An anti-EU position also corresponds with looking for new partners, based on an anti-EU constellation with the centre parties. Although this position also is likely to alienate the party closest to the SV on the left-right cleavage, the AP, this is of minor importance. The AP has never invited the SV to join in government, and a pro-EU SV is unlikely to change this.

For the NFRP the situation is more difficult. The party is split over the EU-issue internally, and in the 1994 referendum its voters split 60-40 for membership. It is therefore unclear which policy would be vote maximising and which would keep the party more united. There appears to be little to be gained for the NFRP on this conflict either way. Not surprisingly, the party tries to downplay and defuse the EU-conflict. At the 1993 election, the party's policy was 'yes to EC-membership, no to EC-union'<sup>103</sup>. Off-loading is therefore a very good option for this party, so that the political debate can focus on policies more likely to be vote-winners for the NFRP.

Two elite considerations make all the parties more likely to be pro-EU, or at least to tone down anti-EU sentiments. Firstly, EU-membership would increase the number of attractive jobs available to Norway's elite in general and politicians in particular. Secondly, consideration of the views and interests of other European politicians and the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU makes opposition more difficult. This forms part of the explanation for why many party leaders and members of the Storting tend to be more pro-EU than the population and the party rank-and-file. Any party with office-ambitions have to consider these factors, although they are unlikely to be sufficient to overturn the anti-EU position of a party for which an anti-EU position is the most beneficial for vote-, policy- or office-maximisation, or to keep the party united.

#### 6.4.5 The choices available to Norwegian voters.

Both pro- and anti-EU voters have several parties to choose from, although the centrist 'yes'-voter and the right-wing 'no'-voter would have to travel further along the left-right

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<sup>103</sup> Nordisk Kontakt, 9/1993, p. 71.

axis to find a suitable party based on this dimension. However, many voters have found themselves in disagreement with their 'normal' party's position, especially supporters of the AP, the NFRP and the NV, as Appendix 6.3 shows. These voters face cross-pressures which would require them to seek further information in order to make a decision. This increases the cost and decreases the likelihood of voting.

It would appear that many people's voting decision at national elections would be less complicated if the EU-issues could be off-loaded to other electoral arenas. Valen<sup>104</sup> argues that at the 1993 election, the salience of the EU issue may have contributed to the decline in voter turnout.

#### 6.4.6 Off-loading through referendums.

In the 1993 Storting election the promised 1994 referendum appears to have worked well as an off-loading device for the AP<sup>105</sup> and the NV in terms of votes. Both parties were split on this issue, but neither lost votes overall. But the massive increase in votes for the SP at the 1993 election indicates the limited efficacy of this device while the issue of membership was still undecided. However, once the decision not to join had been made, EU-issues seem to have faded from public concern. On the other hand, it is likely that the turbulence caused by the EU-conflict at the 1993 election was an important reason for the considerable volatility at the 1997 election.

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<sup>104</sup> 1994, p. 178.

<sup>105</sup> In the election campaign, the AP stressed that the upcoming referendum should be binding, and hence voters should be able to vote for the party without compromising their position on EU-membership. (Madeley, 1994, p. 200)

The referendum off-loading mechanism appears to have worked insofar as only limited high-level defections and no party splits have resulted from the EU-conflict in the 1990's. However, at least as late as 1997, the off-loading technique did not mend divisions between potential coalition partners. The salience of the EU-conflict at the political elite level persists. There are two main causes for this. Firstly, the continued Norwegian EEA-membership ensures that EU-related issues will continue to cause splits between potential coalition partners. Secondly, the very extent of the power and influence of a widening and deepening EU over European politics, trade and economics makes it virtually impossible to avoid EU-related issues in a small, open European economy like Norway.

## **6.5 Conclusion.**

The clearest differences in expected utility from membership that emerge in the Norwegian case are between those dependent upon the agricultural sector and the rest of the population. These differences are particularly strong because EU membership would lead to certain cuts in the very high public sector subsidies to this sector. Also, in Northern Norway, the dominance of the fisheries industry combined with massive public sector subsidies to this region make people less likely to support membership.

Those dependent upon the welfare state economically, or in support of it ideologically, are also disproportionately likely to oppose membership. Thus, women and public sector employees tend to oppose membership, as do those on the political left.

One of the most important results of this conflict is that it has increased the importance of certain divisions. Most strikingly, it has shown how different the self-interest of the farmers and their rural dependants is from that of other Norwegians. Related to this, the EU conflict has sharpened the conflict between urban and rural Norway. In the Southwest, this effect is reinforced by the presence of the counter-cultures.

The EU-conflict has had a profound effect on the Norwegian party system. In terms of the cleavage model, this is because it crosscuts the normally dominant left-right cleavage at the same time as it strengthens the normally secondary territorial cleavages. In Norway the EU-conflict has developed into a political cleavage. In terms of the rational choice model, it is because it was in the interest, for both vote-maximisation and internal conflict avoidance purposes, of several of the centrist parties to oppose membership. At the same time, this was a virtually impossible position for the H to take. Furthermore, the Norwegian anti-EU-parties could reasonably hope to be able to be able to form a government.

Although the EU-conflict has not yet led to the creation of any new parties in Norway, it has led to large swings in support for certain parties. Furthermore, the conflict does increase the divide between certain parties. In particular, co-operation between the H and the SP, but also with the NKRF and the NV, has become much more difficult than it was in the past. To a lesser extent, this is also true for the relationship between the SP and the other two centrist parties. The most serious effect of the EU-conflict on the party system so far is the deep division it has caused on the centre-right of Norwegian politics.

Off-loading the EU-conflict away from the national election arena through employing the referendum device has only been moderately successful. It has made it easier for certain parties, especially the AP and the NV, to avoid internal splits. However, the off-loading technique has not avoided inter-party divisions on the centre-right from precluding a government including both the SP and the H. The government potential of these two parties has been reduced as a result of the salience of this conflict and the fact that a complete off-loading has not been possible. Finally, off-loading devices may not be in the (vote-maximising) interest of certain parties, such as the SV and the SP. On the other hand, the SV does not appear capable of benefiting in terms of votes from this conflict, and the SP risks reducing its government potential if it focuses its national election campaigns on an anti-EU position.

EEA-membership; Danish, Finnish and Swedish EU-membership; and the increasing importance of the EU in European politics and economics makes it virtually impossible to completely off-load the Norwegian conflict over European integration away from national elections. And for several Norwegian political parties, the SP, the NKRf and the H in particular, there is very little choice on which position to take on this issue. This new (or revived) cleavage cross-cuts the usually dominant left-right cleavage. This complicates otherwise normal co-operation patterns to the point where they can no longer function.

## **Chapter 7. Sweden: Neutrality Lost.**

*"The conceptualisation of Sweden as the committed neutral also reflects domestic sentiments. To many Swedes, neutrality is a dogma as embedded in the national character as democracy. To question its utility as a security strategy would be political suicide for any aspiring leader. Like the sacrosanct welfare system, this notion offers protection for a people that have been characterised as obsessed with individual security."*<sup>1</sup>

### **7.1 Introduction.**

Ever since the inception of the European integration project until the late 1980's, one issue dominated the Swedish debate over membership in the various incarnations of this project: concern for neutrality. Although Sweden has been an eager participant in international co-operation, it was never willing, during the Cold War era, to participate in a European integration, as opposed to co-operation, project. And especially not one which included, albeit nominally only for most of its existence, defence and foreign policy co-operation.

When Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union disintegrated in the late 1980's, this dramatically changed the basis for Swedish neutrality, and also the extent to which EC-membership would put this policy at risk. Sweden could no longer locate itself between the western and the eastern bloc - the dichotomy no longer existed. Joining the EC no longer seemed to symbolise choosing sides.

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<sup>1</sup> Sundelius, 1989, p. 12.

In 1991 the Swedish government formally applied for membership in the EC, and after some debate it was decided to hold a referendum on membership<sup>2</sup>. The outcome of the referendum, held in late 1994, was a narrow 'yes'-vote. This was confirmed by a vote in the Swedish parliament, the 'Riksdag'. On January 1, 1995, Sweden joined the EU.

Section two of this chapter investigates how Swedish membership of the EU could be expected to affect the utility of Swedish voters. This is carried out by evaluating a number of factors where membership can be argued to affect individual utilities. The validity of each factor is assessed using a variety of data from surveys of the referendum and other sources.

Section three evaluates the effect this conflict has on the Swedish party system. The considerable gap between the many voters who are critical or hostile to EU-membership and the political leadership, which is largely positive to such membership, is emphasised. Several parties are at odds with a majority of their voters on this dimension. This appears to give impetus for more parties to change their pro-EU stance for vote maximisation purposes. But for many parties there are also strong reasons for not wanting to change their stance. Ultimately however, it is in the interest of most parties and many voters to try to reduce the importance of this conflict in the national election arena.

Before the above main concerns are considered, it is necessary to survey Sweden's international relations in general, and its relations with the EC/EU in particular.



## **7.2. A historical review of Sweden's relations with the EC and the EU.**

### **7.2.1. Sweden's international relations after World War II.**

An over-riding concern for neutrality has been at the centre of Swedish foreign policy throughout this period<sup>3</sup>. However, this has not prevented the country from pursuing an active foreign policy. In the late 1940s Sweden joined the UN, the Marshall Aid project, the OEEC and the European Council. However, when co-operation turns towards integration Swedish enthusiasm tends to decline.

Hadenius argues that the main problem for Sweden with regard to European integration has been concerns created by trade dependence versus concerns for neutrality. Sweden is highly dependent upon trade. And by 1994, 69 percent of imports were from, and 67 percent of exports to, the EU and the other applicant countries<sup>4</sup>.

The formation of the EEC in 1957 - a large, and in some measure protectionist, trade block in the middle of Europe - posed a problem for Sweden. However, since Britain was Sweden's largest trading partner, this problem did not become acute until the UK applied for membership. Complicating the problem was the potential for a situation where some Nordic countries joined the EC and some did not. This could create a new

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<sup>2</sup> For the referendum provisions in the Swedish Constitution, see Appendix 7.1.

<sup>3</sup> Åström (1989, p. 4) states that "the classic definition of the Swedish foreign policy doctrine is 'freedom from alliances in peace aiming for neutrality in war'." He also stresses that Swedish neutrality is neither guaranteed by other states or organisations, nor is it enshrined in the Swedish constitution. (Åström, 1989, p. 16)

tariff barrier in the middle of the Nordic area. Hence, economic reality formed a compelling argument for joining<sup>5</sup>.

However, Sweden did not join the EC in 1972 because the Treaty of Rome was seen as incompatible with neutrality<sup>6</sup>. Miljan argues that Swedish foreign policy at that time was defined by security policy, and this was subsumed under Swedish neutrality. Neutrality became a "sacred cow" and a central part of "Swedishness"<sup>7</sup>.

Bergquist highlights that even in the 1960's, although the EEC was not a military alliance, it was not simply an economic one either. It formed a very important step towards political integration of Western Europe. Other Swedish concerns have included the NATO membership of most EC members<sup>8</sup> and the mechanisms for majoritarian decisions to be introduced at a later stage. There were also concerns that membership might impede Sweden's ability to trade with and give aid to other countries<sup>9</sup>.

Interestingly, Nordic integration was viewed as compatible with Swedish neutrality. Åström admits that the suggestion of a Nordic military defence union (proposed by

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<sup>4</sup> Source for data: OECD, 1996a, pp 94-95. Author's calculations.

<sup>5</sup> Bergqvist, 1969, p. 2-3.

<sup>6</sup> Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander, 1991, p. 339. Also see Ludlow, 1994; Ross, 1991. Wallenstein (1977) argues that the effect of rejecting EC membership was to widen the notion of neutrality to keeping Sweden outside economic alliances.

<sup>7</sup> Miljan, 1977, p. 233. However, Miljan also highlights the limits of this neutrality. He argues that a main problem for Sweden was that de facto its economy had become integrated with other Western European economies, with the militarily sensitive advanced engineering and electrical sectors particularly involved. This is the price to pay for a small country if it wants to keep its weapons and control systems up to the same standard as greater powers. (Miljan, 1977, pp. 237-9) See also Åström (1989).

<sup>8</sup> Ross, 1991, p. 121.

<sup>9</sup> Bergquist, 1969, pp. 3-4. For an extensive moral defence of Swedish neutrality, see

Sweden in 1948) was a departure from Sweden's traditional policy. Its implication was that Sweden would go to war if Norway was attacked at the North Cape or if Denmark was attacked in South Jutland. However, it was also implied that outwardly this defence union would pursue a common neutrality policy<sup>10</sup>. For Sweden it was a primary concern that the Nordic defence union should be independent of the great powers - neutrality had to be preserved. Such independence was not acceptable to the Norwegian government<sup>11</sup>. But this would still have been a serious derogation from absolute neutrality - a member of a 'neutral defence union' of more than one nation-state cannot claim to remain neutral in the traditional sense. Although this attempt at a Nordic defence union failed, it sent an early signal that Swedish neutrality might not run as deep as the official line would indicate.

Rejecting the European integration project and having its proposals for deeper Nordic integration rejected by others, Sweden joined EFTA as a founding member in 1960. One could argue that Sweden's fear of being dominated by others kept it out of Europe, and that the other Nordic countries' fear of being dominated by Sweden kept the Nordic countries apart.

#### 7.2.2. Sweden and European Integration 1961-1972.

Sweden attempted to open negotiations aiming at some form of closer co-operation with the EU in 1961, 1967 and 1970. In December 1961 Sweden applied for associate

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Sundelius, 1989. Åström (1989) sets out the necessary aspects for a credible neutrality.

<sup>10</sup> Åström, 1989, p. 23.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander, 1991, for an account of the

membership in the EEC. This was seen as a good way of obtaining close economic co-operation and at the same time maintain a certain political distance<sup>12</sup>.

Miljan argues that in 1967 the Swedish position moved somewhat closer to full membership with escape clauses, the main one of which was to retain neutrality. This development was influenced by an argument put forward by the FP and the MP, that the EEC was less likely to move towards further political integration than it was in 1961-2. This argument was largely based on de Gaulle's opposition to such a move<sup>13</sup>. This application fell for the same reason as the first one, namely de Gaulle's veto of the British application.

The 1970 attempt to reopen negotiations was the most far-reaching one. Sweden continued to insist that sovereignty and neutrality could somehow be separated from participating in the trade, free market, and social policies of the EC. This insistence continued after Sweden officially rejected full membership on March 18, 1971. The rejection of full membership was largely based on the content of the Davignon Report and the Werner Report (the latter adopted by the Council of Ministers on 8-9 February 1971). "Swedish participation in the foreign policy co-operation drawn up on the basis of the so-called 'Davignon Report' is not compatible with a firm Swedish policy of neutrality. [...] Swedish participation in an economic and monetary union, which implies

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failure of the Nordic defence union.

<sup>12</sup> Bergquist, 1969, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Miljan (1977, p. 251), Bergquist (1969, p. 8), Åström (1989, p. 24).

an abandonment of the national right of decision-making in important fields, is not compatible with a Swedish policy of neutrality.”<sup>14</sup>

Sweden finally settled for a free-trade agreement with the EC, largely similar to that of other EFTA states, and largely dictated by the EC. This agreement consisted of a plan to mutually reduce, and eventually eliminate, tariffs on most industrial goods<sup>15</sup>. However, this agreement covered neither agricultural products nor fish; nor social, labour, capital, or transport policy. On the other hand, Sweden avoided binding itself to any political commitments<sup>16</sup>. The treaty on a customs union between the EEC and Sweden was signed in Brussels on July 22, 1972. It came into force on January 1, 1973. Both Sweden and the EEC retained the right "to take unilateral steps, regardless of other sections of the Treaty, to safeguard its security during war or 'serious international tension'"<sup>17</sup>.

### 7.2.3. Sweden and European integration 1972-1995.

For most of the 1970's and the 1980's the EC was a virtual non-issue in Swedish politics. The few polls taken in the early 1980's showed 35-40 percent of Swedes believing membership would be more disadvantageous than advantageous, 20-25 percent held the contrary opinion, and 35-40 percent had no clear opinion. But, as Berg argues, the EU issue was not seriously discussed. Furthermore, the "doctrine of neutrality" was still

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<sup>14</sup> Swedish Government Memorandum. (Co-operation and Conflict, Vol. 7, 1972, p. 346) Also, see Åström (1989, pp. 24-5).

<sup>15</sup> Phinnemore, 1996, p. 43.

<sup>16</sup> Ross, 1991, pp. 118-19. See also Widfeldt (1996a, pp. 101-102) regarding Swedish EC policy in this early period.

accepted by a large majority of the population, and regarded as incompatible with EC membership<sup>18</sup>. At a speech to the Commission in Brussels in February 1983, the then Swedish Prime minister, Olof Palme, argued that the reasons for Sweden not applying for full membership in 1972 were still valid. Sweden's neutrality policy continued to exclude it from co-operation projects that aim for a co-ordination of foreign policy<sup>19</sup>.

In the latter half of the 1980's, three factors in particular changed this situation: the geopolitical importance of the end of the Cold War and the related changes in Eastern and Central Europe, the success of the EC in this period, and a deterioration in the domestic Swedish economy.

Ross argues that because of Sweden's stance on neutrality and related policies, the end of the Cold War was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Sweden's change in attitude towards the EC. Particularly helpful was the fact that this development rid the Community of the image of being bloc-based. "At a stroke, the European Community itself was no longer regarded as a Western European contribution to the division of the continent, but as a potential pan-European institution promoting European security in the broadest sense."<sup>20</sup> Pederson labels this new role of the EC as a "political stabiliser"<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> Miljan (p. 256, from the Treaty on Customs Union, p. 14, Article 21).

<sup>18</sup> Berg, 1994, p. 87.

<sup>19</sup> Palme (1984, p. 42, from a speech to the European Commission February 24, 1983). As late as May 1988, Prime Minister Carlsson insisted that neutrality remained the prime obstacle for full Swedish membership (Ross, 1991, p. 21).

<sup>20</sup> Ross, 1991, p. 122.

<sup>21</sup> Pedersen, 1990, p. 97.

Related to this, the economic security element of neutrality has become increasingly compromised because of trade dependency. Since the late 1960s Swedish neutrality has been considered also in economic terms<sup>22</sup>. By the mid 1980s, 52 percent of Swedish exports and 56 percent of imports were to/from the EC, and 20 percent and seventeen percent respectively to/from EFTA. This trade dependency has led to the idea of economic neutrality becoming increasingly questioned. This tendency has been intensified by aggressive acquisition and expansion abroad by Swedish firms. In terms of both volume and value, Sweden's expansion in Europe has been much greater than Japan's. In the first half of 1990, Sweden outpaced all other countries with US\$ 11Bn in cross-border European acquisitions<sup>23</sup>. As Åström puts it:

"Our economic dependence on the rest of the world is constantly growing. The difficulties of securing necessary supplies in the event of war or blockade will increase. We may be confronted with new and trying problems of striking a balance between economic benefits and firm adherence to our traditional foreign policy. Holding our defence forces at top-level technological standards demands not only the unfailing willingness of the Swedish people to make sacrifices, but probably also intensified international co-operation for military research and development."<sup>24</sup>

The progress made towards completion of the internal market during the 1980's made a re-evaluation of Sweden's relationship with the EC essential. In particular, the SEA of 1986 made adjustment necessary. Together with the other EFTA countries, Sweden moved towards closer co-operation with the EC. It signed the EEA-agreement in May 1992. The EEA Treaty was ratified by the Riksdag in December 1993.

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<sup>22</sup> Dohlman, 1989.

<sup>23</sup> Ross, 1991, pp. 122-23. See also Svåsand and Lindström (1997, p. 208).

<sup>24</sup> Åström, 1989, p. 29.

By the third quarter of 1990, the growth in Swedish real GDP had become negative, industrial production was lower than it had been in 1985, unemployment was increasing dramatically, the current account deficit grew rapidly to reach 2.5 percent of GDP, and inflation was close to eleven percent against an OECD average of just over six percent<sup>25</sup>. Ross argues that negative economic developments led to a rude awakening in Sweden, and that the 'Swedish Model' has been severely blemished. The humiliating free-fall of the Swedish Krona in 1990 and the accompanying rise in interest rates to seventeen percent were seen as symptomatic of increased international scepticism about Sweden's likely future economic performance<sup>26</sup>.

By the beginning of the 1990's the main obstacles to Swedish membership - the divisions of the Cold War and the perception of incompatibility of EC-membership with neutrality - were disappearing. In addition, the EU was progressing towards further integration both politically and economically, at the same time as Sweden was in crisis in the same areas. Among the Swedish elite (and, for a while, the people) EC-membership became increasingly popular. The situation in the early 1990's has been described as 'europhoria'<sup>27</sup>. In July 1991 the Carlsson government submitted the application for full membership<sup>28</sup>. In the referendum held on November 13, 1994, 52.2 percent voted 'yes' to Swedish membership in the EU, and the 'Riksdag' duly ratified membership. Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995.

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<sup>25</sup> Ludlow, 1994, pp. 19-20.

<sup>26</sup> Ross, 1991, pp. 123-24.

<sup>27</sup> Ludlow, 1994.

<sup>28</sup> Berg, 1994.



### **7.3. Swedish attitudes towards European integration.**

#### **7.3.1. Common economic factors.**

Sweden's net contribution to the EU budget for 1995 was 937 million ecu. This represents 106 ecu per head, making Sweden the fifth largest contributor to the EU budget per head<sup>29</sup>. However, Sweden's GDP per head the same year, based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), was only 95 percent of the EU average<sup>30</sup>. Hence, the average Swede could expect his utility to decline as a result of membership based simply on the 'membership fee'. Considering the fact that the average Swede had, by 1994, become poorer than many citizens in countries that are net recipients of funds, this is unlikely to have impressed many Swedish voters. At the time of the 1994 referendum, the debate over the size and shape of the Swedish contribution to the EU-budget was very intense<sup>31</sup>.

Sweden has long had one of the highest tax levels in the world, as Table B shows. Moreover, it has increased significantly over the last 20 years, and the gap to many other countries has also increased over time. By 1990, Sweden's tax level was nearly eighteen percent higher than the EC average.

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<sup>29</sup> Sweden's contribution to the EU will be at a reduced level until 1999.

<sup>30</sup> The Economist, 23/11/96.

<sup>31</sup> Widfeldt, 1996a, p. 108.

The evidence from Denmark suggests low effects on the tax level from membership. However, this may not be an accurate guide for Sweden. Firstly, Sweden joined the EU in a period when economic policy generally and even taxation specifically were (and still are) considered brought in under the EU umbrella. Hence, EU-membership was likely to have greater effect on national tax levels after the TEU than in the earlier days of the EC. Secondly, the competitive pressures of the internal market were more likely to affect Swedish tax levels than Danish ones. This is because Swedish tax levels were substantially more out of line with the EU average than Danish ones. Hence, it could be argued that Swedish taxation was likely to be reduced overall as a result of EU membership<sup>32</sup>.

Unfortunately, there are no individual data available that refers directly to taxation with regard to Swedish attitudes to EU membership. However, this factor is likely to have contributed strongly to the left-right difference in attitude to EU-membership.

EEA membership is likely to have very similar effects to EU-membership with respect to the overall Swedish price level. Swedish agricultural subsidies were close to the level of the EU (see Table D), and hence the effect on food-prices is also likely to be limited. Thus, this factor is not expected to have had any significant effect on individual utility derived from EU-membership.

Until the early 1990's the unemployment level in Sweden was extremely low. As late as 1991, it was less than 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of the EU average. However, by 1993 Swedish unemployment was much closer to the EU average, as Table C shows. This increase in

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<sup>32</sup> Expectations of lower taxation were put forward as a pro-EU argument. (Berg, 1994)

unemployment was common to all western European countries, and more likely to result from the world-wide recession of the late 1980's and the early 1990's than whether or not a country was an EU member. However, Sweden, together with Finland, saw a much steeper increase in unemployment in this period than most other countries.

According to data collected around the time of the 1994 referendum, 'employment' was an important factor influencing peoples' attitude to EU-membership. As Appendix 7.2 shows, it ranked fourth among reasons given for people's voting behaviour in the referendum. In particular, those who voted 'yes' gave this as an important reason<sup>33</sup>. The appendix also shows that 'general economic issues' was the most important category overall. This probably includes reasons connected to taxation and price levels, but also a whole range of other factors. Overall, common economic factors appear to have been important for Swedish attitudes to European integration. More people expected their utility to improve due to EU membership with regard to general economic issues and employment than expected it to decline<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Unless otherwise specified, numbers referring to arguments for and against EU-membership in this and the next three sub-sections are from the survey-data analysed by Oscarsson (1996). The interview subjects were given the opportunity to give as many reasons as they wanted for their attitude towards the EU. These were then put into more generalised categories by the researchers. In interviews before the referendum the average number of reasons given was 1.97, afterwards the number increased to 2.14 (Oscarsson, 1996).

<sup>34</sup> Economists disagree on the general economic benefits (or disadvantages) EU-membership would bring. For example, Kekko (1994) argues that the long-term economic effects are highly uncertain and difficult to estimate. Sapir (1994), on the other hand, argues that there is a definite economic benefit to be had in form of higher growth and more investment in Sweden.

### 7.3.2 Common non-economic factors.

In Chapter 3 it was argued that the transfer of policy-areas and power to the EU *per se* may affect an individual's utility. How his utility is affected depends upon the value he assigns to power resting with the nation-state and his (dis)approval of the EU-form of European integration. In the survey analysed by Oscarsson, 'national independence' ranks twelfth among reasons for voting behaviour in the 1994 referendum, with only six percent of those surveyed mentioning reasons in this category. Among 'no'-voters this ranks as the sixth most important category (among the specific categories) with fourteen percent. Considering the nature of the decision, this is rather underwhelming. On the other hand, Table 7.1 below shows that the more openly political the European integration process becomes, the less likely most Swedes were to approve of the integration format.

Table 7.1. Attitudes towards Sweden's future relationship with the EU among 'yes'- and 'no'-voters in the 1994 referendum. Percent.

| Suggestion  | Yes-voters | No-voters | Blank | Non-voters | All  |
|---|------------|-----------|-------|------------|------|
| Sweden should not remain an EU-member, and the EEA-treaty should be cancelled                       | 0          | 10        | 2     | 5          | 5    |
| Sweden should not remain an EU-member, but should keep the EEA-treaty                               | 1          | 66        | 26    | 14         | 30   |
| Sweden should remain a EU-member, but should abstain from e.g. defence co-operation and EMU         | 29         | 5         | 10    | 11         | 17   |
| Sweden should remain an EU-member but membership should be limited to the current negotiated treaty | 41         | 1         | 2     | 10         | 21   |
| Sweden should remain an EU-member and in the longer term work towards a united states of Europe     | 16         | 0         | 0     | 7          | 8    |
| No definite opinion/don't know.   | 13         | 18        | 60    | 53         | 19   |
| Sum percent   | 100        | 100       | 100   | 100        | 100  |
| N   | 2061       | 1794      | 53    | 326        | 4263 |

Source: Holmberg, 1996b, p. 270.

One might also argue that the EU is not international enough. This argument is closely connected to Sweden's involvement in international projects of a more global or non-European nature. These include a keen involvement in UN organisations and financial and other support for developing countries<sup>35</sup>. However, Appendix 7.4 shows that if there was any systematic effect of an internationalist attitude on opinion on EU-membership, it was that those of an internationalist bent were more - not less - likely to vote for EU membership. Also, Oscarsson<sup>36</sup> shows that the more tolerant a Swede was towards

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<sup>35</sup> For example, Berg (1994) stresses that fear of EU-membership being damaging to international solidarity and relations with Eastern Europe and the third world are part of Swedish opposition to EU-membership. This is a long-standing argument, see for example Bergquist (1969, pp. 3-4).

<sup>36</sup> 1996, pp. 262-263.

foreign aid, immigrants and refugees, the more likely he was to have voted 'yes' in the referendum.

The internally open borders implied by the common market and the Schengen agreement reduces national control. Appendix 7.2 shows that the category 'open borders' ranked as the eighth most important overall reason for voting behaviour in the 1994 referendum, among 'no'-voters it was the fourth most important. However, the previously all-important issue of neutrality appears to have had rather limited influence over voting behaviour at the referendum. The 'neutrality' category ranked as number ten, and even among 'no'-voters only as equal seventh.

Some more obscure arguments related to national character have also been put forward to explain Swedish opposition to EU-membership, for example the rumour that the EU would ban snuff ('snus') tobacco. Berg even sees the snuff outrage as a turning point in public opinion. A more substantial fear was that the right of access to public land ('Allemansrätten') would be compromised if the Swedes had to share it with 330 million Europeans<sup>37</sup>.

Berg argues that it would appear the Swedes have little understanding of the EU's historical aspects in keeping the peace between France and Germany, and that neutrality is seen as having kept Sweden out of two world wars<sup>38</sup>. However, from Oscarsson's research (see Appendix 7.2) it appears that 'peace' was one of the most important

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<sup>37</sup> Berg, 1994, pp. 89-90.

<sup>38</sup> Berg, 1994, p. 90.

arguments for voting 'yes' in the 1994 referendum, and that few people considered Swedish neutrality as a good enough reason to stay out of the EU.

It is commonly argued that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit, and that Nordic democracy is more open and accessible than in European countries and the EU. (See Chapter 1 for an elaboration of these arguments.) Reflecting such sentiments, Appendix 7.2 shows that considerably more voters viewed EU-membership as having a detrimental rather than positive effect on democracy.

Nordic solidarity appears to have had very little influence on Swedish attitudes to European integration. In the survey by Oscarsson it does not even warrant a separate category among the top 25, as shown in Appendix 7.2. Neither do issues directly concerned with immigration and/or refugees. However, the 'open borders' category of reason is most likely related to such concerns. This category is specifically concerned with the free movement of people inside the EU. It could conceivably include concerns with drug and other smuggling, but desires to keep foreigners out of Sweden are rather more likely. Berg<sup>39</sup> highlights concern for increased immigration as a reason for opposition to EU-membership.

### 7.3.3 Group differentiated economic factors.

The agricultural sector is the main beneficiary of EU funds. However, by the time Sweden joined the EU, its agricultural subsidies were already similar to those of the

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<sup>39</sup> 1994.

EU<sup>40</sup>. Hence, on average, the utility of farmers could be expected to be relatively unaffected by EU membership. Lindahl shows that the voters expected a very small negative effect on agriculture because of EU-membership<sup>41</sup>. Appendix 7.3 shows that a small majority of farmers voted 'yes' in the 1994 referendum, and that there was no significant relationship between the number of primary industry employees in an area and the 'no'-vote in that area.

Most of the EU regional aid goes to the sparsely populated areas of northern and central Sweden. Objective 6 covers the province of Jämtland in its entirety, Norrbotten and Västerbotten with the exception of some small coastal areas, as well as parts of Västernorrland, Gävleborg, Kopparberg and Värmland. Objective 5b covers many rural areas all over Sweden. Objective 2 covers only a small number of areas all over Sweden<sup>42</sup>, and is unlikely to have substantial observable effects on utility. The indicative commitment appropriation for Sweden was 1,190 Million ECU for the period 1995-1999 for Objectives 1 to 5b, and 230 Million ECU for Objective 6<sup>43</sup>. Based on this factor the utility of people living in many rural, especially northern, and some urban areas could be expected to increase as a result of membership. However, the future status of these funds, especially considering the EU enlargement into Eastern Europe, was, and is, very uncertain.

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<sup>40</sup> The Economist, 21/8/1993 (source: OECD).

<sup>41</sup> Subtracting those who believed EU membership would result in a great or some deterioration from those believing in a great or some improvement on various factors, the number arrived at for the agricultural sector was -5. (Lindahl, 1996, p. 151)

<sup>42</sup> Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6 (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 355-356); [www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/sve.htm](http://www.inforegio.org/wbpro/prord/guide/sve.htm).

<sup>43</sup> Accession Treaty, XVII and Protocol No. 6 (Official Journal of the European Communities, C241, 1994, pp. 284, 356).



Appendix 7.3 shows that there were substantial differences in attitude to EU-membership between urban and rural areas, as well as between regions. While only 41 percent of those who lived in rural areas voted 'yes', 64 percent of those residing in one of the three largest cities - Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö - did so<sup>44</sup>. And among the counties the 'yes' vote varied from a low of 27.7 percent in the north-western county of Jämtland to 66.5 percent in the city of Malmö. More generally, there was a distinct north-south divide. The six northernmost counties recorded the six lowest 'yes'-votes, the highest of these being 41.7 percent in Västernorrland<sup>45</sup>. Regional aid from the EU seems to have had little effect on voting behaviour, although it might have limited the regional differences in voting. The most likely reason for these regional discrepancies is differences in attitudes towards the welfare state and other issues linked to the left-right cleavage. This is returned to in section 6.3.4 below.

The Swedish state provides a relatively high level of welfare state social expenditure compared with the majority of EU countries, as Table F shows. By 1992 public spending as a percentage of GDP had reached 65 percent<sup>46</sup>. In terms of final domestic consumption, public consumption was more than twice as high (224 percent) as the EU-average in 1993, compared to a private consumption level close to average (110 percent)<sup>47</sup>.

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<sup>44</sup> Gilljam, 1996, p. 197.

<sup>45</sup> Gilljam, 1996, p. 199.

<sup>46</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country profile of Sweden 1993/94.

<sup>47</sup> Eurostat, 1995b, p. 359.

Membership in the EU does not necessarily require any changes in Swedish social spending. However, the voter may, through simple comparison with EU countries, conclude that membership implies a reduction in social spending, or a move away from the Swedish universal benefit system. Also, the logic of European integration could lead to future harmonisation of social policy. Furthermore, one might argue that in order for Sweden to remain competitive in the internal market, taxation and thus social expenditure and the welfare state will have to be reduced. Efforts to meet the criteria for EMU could also be argued to have such effects. Non-membership is likely to allow for more national control over welfare state spending. If the voter sees a reduction in social expenditure as beneficial to his utility, then he is likely to support membership based on this factor, and vice versa.

Swedish women work disproportionately in the public sector. In 1992, 58 percent of Swedish women in employment worked in the public sector, compared with 25 percent of men<sup>48</sup>. Women also tend to be paid less than men are, at 66.1 percent of the average male income in 1991<sup>49</sup>. They also tend to benefit from various tax-funded schemes, such as long and well-paid maternity leave (see Table G) and a high number of publicly funded childminding facilities<sup>50</sup>. For these reasons, a reduction in the welfare state is likely to reduce the utility of more Swedish women than men.

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<sup>48</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 87.

<sup>49</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, 1994a, p. 92.

<sup>50</sup> At 31 percent higher than any EC country for 0-2 year olds in 1989, and second only to Denmark among the Nordic countries. Between the ages of 3 and 7 (the normal age for starting school in Sweden) the coverage was 79 percent, the fifth highest of the EC and Nordic countries. (Friis, 1992, p. 154. Sources: Childminding in the EC 1985-1990. Supplement to Europas Kvinder, no. 31, 1990; Rita Knudsen: Familieydelse i Norden

In Chapter 3 it is explained why public employees and the poorer sections of the population are groups that are likely to see their utility decline if the welfare state is reduced. Thus, more members of these groups would be expected to vote 'no' in the 1994 referendum than other groups.

Appendix 7.3 shows public sector employees were more likely to view EU membership as detrimental to their utility than are private sector employees. Regarding income direct data are missing, but 'occupational group' provides a useful substitute. Appendix 7.4 shows that workers and the lower ranks of white-collar workers were much more likely to vote 'no' than were middle and higher ranks of white-collar workers. It is likely that the former occupational groups are lower paid than the latter, and therefore more dependent upon the welfare state.

Sweden was, and is, highly dependent upon trade<sup>51</sup> (see Table A). The higher security of access to the EU-market provided by EU-membership compared to EEA-membership is likely to increase the utility of those whose income and welfare is dependent upon trade. This factor is likely to have contributed to the gap in attitude to EU-membership between the public and the private sector, since public sector employees have little direct interest in the prospects for Swedish exports. It is also likely to be part of the reason for the gap between attitudes towards EU-membership in urban and rural areas.

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1989. Teknisk rapport fra Nordisk statistisk sekretariat no. 52, Copenhagen 1990.)

<sup>51</sup> Several authors stress trade and export arguments related to EC/EU membership. See for example Bergquist (1969), Miljan (1977), Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander (1991, pp. 329-30) and Kekko (1994). Miles (1997, pp. 35-39 especially) stresses trade and competitiveness concerns as an impetus to apply for membership, and the significance of the high number of Swedish export-driven multinationals. However, he fails to

#### 7.3.4. Group-differentiated non-economic factors.

Ideological support for the welfare state is likely to be high on the political left and low on the right. Hence, if EU-membership is seen as leading to reductions in welfare state spending, then support for membership can be expected to be low on the left and high on the right. Appendix 7.3 shows that this was the general pattern in Sweden in 1994, the only significant deviation being more anti-EU voters in the GP than expected from this hypothesis.

Individual data based on survey research also showed a very strong relationship between voters' self-placement on the left-right dimension and attitude to the EU, with those on the left more likely to oppose membership<sup>52</sup>. This relationship remains strong also when controlled for a variety of other ideological and social structure variables<sup>53</sup>. Furthermore, Appendix 7.5. shows that areas where the more left-wing parties are strong also showed much less support for EU membership. This is perhaps the most important reason for the regional differences in attitude to EU membership in Sweden.

For several reasons, simple comparison with other European countries can yield the conclusion that EU membership is a threat to women's position in Sweden. Firstly, more Swedish women are in employment than elsewhere in the EU<sup>54</sup>. Secondly, women are

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account for the significance of the EEA-Treaty in this respect.

<sup>52</sup> Oscarsson, 1996.

<sup>53</sup> Oscarsson, 1996, pp. 264-265.

<sup>54</sup> 72.4 percent in 1994, compared to an EU average of 56.7 percent. (OECD, 1996a, p. 197).

better represented in political institutions<sup>55</sup>. Thirdly, the Catholic influence in the EU may affect the relatively liberal Swedish legislation on abortion and divorce, should such policies be decided at the EU-level in the future. Added to the more economic considerations discussed above, these factors make EU-membership appear more negative for the utility of women than that of men.

Appendix 7.3 shows that considerably more Swedish women than men opposed EU-membership in 1994. The difference in the 'yes'-vote was thirteen percent. Given the variety of factors that may influence a person's attitude to EU-membership, this is a large difference.

#### **7.4 Party System effects.**

Swedish EU-membership had only been considered a possibility by a small, if influential, minority until the late 1980's<sup>56</sup>. With Swedish membership firmly on the political agenda, conflict over this development also intensified. Hadenius argues that during 1990 the EC-question became the focus for the party-political debate<sup>57</sup>. Similarly, Ruin states that "the EU question became central in Swedish politics in the early 1990s"<sup>58</sup>. Madeley holds that both the GP and the VP profited from their opposition to

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<sup>55</sup> For example, as of 1/1/95, the Swedish Cabinet consisted of seven men and nine women, the latter including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Justice. (EJPR, Vol. 30, 1996, p. 464) After the 1994 elections, 40 percent of the members of the Riksdag were women (<http://www.riksdagen.se/arbetar/siffror/kvinman.htm>, 1/1).

<sup>56</sup> Reports on national elections prior to 1994 tend not to mention European integration as a relevant election issue (Micheletti, 1988; Widfeldt, 1992).

<sup>57</sup> Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander, 1991, p. 330.

<sup>58</sup> Ruin, 1996, p. 177.

Swedish EU-membership at the 1994 elections<sup>59</sup>. And in 1994 Swedish politics was mainly about the forthcoming referendum on membership.

As table 7.2 below shows, from the late 1980's to the 1994 referendum there has been no sustained period of popular majority support for Swedish membership, with the exception of a short period in 1991. From late 1991 to 1994 opposition to membership was running at close to half the population.

Table 7.2. Position on EU-membership among the Swedish people.

|                      | 1970 | 1988 | Dec-91 | Jun-92 | Jun-93 | Dec-93 | 13/11/94  |
|----------------------|------|------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
| Yes                  | 38   | 41   | 24     | 32     | 30     | 26     | 52.3      |
| No                   | 13   | 19   | 48     | 47     | 43     | 46     | 46.8      |
| Uncertain/don't know | 49   | 40   | 27     | 21     | 27     | 28     | 0.9 blank |

Sources: 1970 and 1988: election studies; the rest: Sifo-data published in the Swedish newspaper Göteborgs-Posten, all in Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996).

In the Riksdag however, opposition to EU-membership has been much more limited in this period. In the vote over the EU-application on December 12, 1990, 90 percent of the Riksdag voted for the motion to apply for full membership. The 28 opponents were all from the GP and the VP(K)<sup>60</sup>. According to Miles, the number of opponents of EU-membership in the Riksdag increased from 20 to between 60 and 65 after the 1994 election, mainly because of an increase in the vote for the VP and the GP, and the return to the Riksdag of the latter. However, seventeen SSD-members were also among the opponents, including two ministers, Margareta Winberg (agriculture) and Marita Ulvskog (interior)<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> Madeley, 1995.

<sup>60</sup> Miles, 1996, p. 184.

There was no vote on EU-membership in the Riksdag until after the 1994 referendum. By then, all the members had committed themselves to following the result of the referendum. Hence, in the vote on December 14, 1994, those who were (previously) against EU-membership either abstained or voted 'yes'<sup>62</sup> to membership. For this reason, it is difficult to know how many members actually would have voted against membership in a freer vote, or, more generally, how many of them opposed EU-membership<sup>63</sup>.

Both the SSD and the CP were internally split on EU membership, and it can therefore be expected that some of their representatives would have voted against EU-membership had the decision been taken exclusively in parliament. However, it is not certain that the personal opinion of all anti-EU Riksdag-members would be reflected in a vote. For instance, party discipline is likely to reduce dissent from the official party line. Lacking the information a pre-referendum Riksdag vote on full EU-membership would have provided, it is more reliable to focus on official party positions.

Of the parties, only the VP and the GP have consistently opposed EU-membership<sup>64</sup>. As can be observed from table 7.3 below, these two parties combined commanded only 11.1 percent of the vote at the 1994 election. Put another way, in the 1994 general

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<sup>61</sup> Miles, 1997, p. 245.

<sup>62</sup> Ruin, 1996, p. 182.

<sup>63</sup> In the vote over EEA membership on 18 November 1992, only 13 members of the Riksdag voted against (Nordisk Kontakt, 11/1992, pp. 105-106).

<sup>64</sup> For early accounts of party positions on EC-membership, see Bergquist (1969, pp. 5-6), Miljan (1977, especially pp. 241-253) and Wallenstein (1977, pp. 99-101). For positions when the issue re-emerged in 1990 and later, see Hadenius, Molin and Wieslander (1991, p. 330), Ross (1991, pp. 124-5), Berg (1994, pp. 87-89), Pierre and Widfeldt (1992, pp. 523-24) and Ruin (1996, pp. 177-92).

elections at least 87.7 percent of Swedish voters voted for a pro-EU party<sup>65</sup>. Hence, there is a large gap between public opinion and that of the parties in this respect.

Table 7.3: Official position on EU-membership by party and support in percent by party at last parliamentary election before the 1994 referendum in Sweden.

| VP            | SSD             | GP          | KD             | CP             | MP              | FP             | ND             |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Oppose<br>6.1 | Support<br>45.4 | Oppose<br>5 | Support<br>4.1 | Support<br>7.7 | Support<br>22.2 | Support<br>7.1 | Support<br>1.2 |

Support = support membership as defined by the TEU. Sources: 1994 elections: Madeley, 1995; EU-position: Jahn and Storsved, 1995; Bjørklund, 1996.

Since the EU-conflict re-entered Swedish politics the parties have had to make their official positions clear. On the centre-right the FP and the MP<sup>66</sup> both came out as strongly pro-membership. The KD was somewhat against EU-membership until 1990, but then it was not really a relevant question before then. After the referendum, there was 100 percent support for membership in the parliamentary group. At the party congress, some 20 percent were against membership<sup>67</sup>. The far-right ND was also for membership, but has since the 1994 election become irrelevant in Swedish politics. Therefore, this party will be largely ignored in the rest of this chapter.

On the centre-left, the CP and the SSD have both been - and remain - split on this question. At its last party conferences before the 1994 referendum, about one third of the delegates at each conference voted against membership<sup>68</sup>. The GP has been strongly

<sup>65</sup> 1.2 percent did not vote for the parties represented in Table 7.3.

<sup>66</sup> The MP allowed no dissent against its pro-EU position. The one anti-EU MP Riksdag-representative, Björn von der Esch, was deselected from the party list in Sörmland before the 1994 election (Nordisk Kontakt, 4/1994, p. 75).

<sup>67</sup> Letter from the KD's international secretary, Göran Holmström (3/2/1997).

<sup>68</sup> The CP voted 184 to 92 for membership at a extraordinary party conference on 8/5/1994 (Nordisk Kontakt, 5/1994, p. 70); and the SSD 232 to 103 for membership at their party conference on 19/6/1994 (Nordisk Kontakt, 6/1994, p. 80).



opposed to Swedish EU-membership all along<sup>69</sup>. After Sweden became a member, the party has advocated withdrawal as soon as possible<sup>70</sup>.

On the left, the VP stated in its 1988 program that it was against “both hidden and open” membership in the EC<sup>71</sup>. It opposed EEA membership as well as EU membership<sup>72</sup>. However, the party’s representatives in the Riksdag voted for membership in the parliamentary vote after the referendum, on grounds of respecting the decision made in the referendum. It has also decided to work towards its goals inside the EU, instead of simply aiming for withdrawal. Although the party still remains convinced “that Sweden ought not be a member of the EU”<sup>73</sup>, the VP is not as anti-EU as the GP.

The effect of the conflict over EU-membership on national election results appears to be limited. Appendix 7.6 lists election results and seat allocation in the ‘Riksdag’ since 1970. At the 1991 election both anti-EU parties, the VP and the GP, lost votes. However, the EU-conflict was still at a low intensity level at that stage. Between the 1991 and the 1994 election, these two parties both increased their share of the vote, the VP from 4.5 percent to 6.2 percent, and the GP from 3.4 percent to 5.0 percent. One could argue that this increase is hardly dramatic, especially considering that the elections were held only two months before the referendum on membership. The split but

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<sup>69</sup> Bennulf and Holmberg, 1990, pp. 167-68. According to Worlund (1989, p. 79) One of the main demands of the GP at the 1988 election was ‘no’ to the EEC.

<sup>70</sup> Miljöpartiet de Gröna: Mot EU. GP party literature for the 1995 EP election in Sweden.

<sup>71</sup> The party was then called ‘Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (VPK)’ - the Left Party Communists (VPK election manifesto, 1988).

<sup>72</sup> Europe-resolution supported by the VP’s congress 1993 (VP, 1993a).

<sup>73</sup> Vänsterpartiet: More democracy less union. The EU programme of the Left Party of Sweden (VP).

officially pro-EU SSD increased its share from 37.6 percent to 45.4 percent - although this is more likely to have been a vote against the government and general economic misery rather than for the SSD policies on the EU<sup>74</sup>. Nevertheless, Widfeldt argues that their opposition to EU-membership was important for the success of the VP and the GP<sup>75</sup>:

“The successful results for the Left and Green parties were conspicuous and surprising. The Left Party recorded its best Riksdag election result since 1948, while the Green Party is the first ever Swedish party to regain Riksdag status after having lost it. One reason behind the success of both parties is that they were able to capitalise on Euro-scepticism; their firm opposition against Swedish entry to the European Union made them unique among the eight major parties.”<sup>76</sup>

Further to this argument, based on survey results of the 1994 referendum Holmberg<sup>77</sup> found that eight percent of voters had changed the party they sympathised with because they disagreed with their old party’s position on EU-membership. Based on the same survey, the anti-EU parties, the VP and the GP, both appeared to have increased their share of the vote substantially between the Riksdag election and the referendum<sup>78</sup>. The VP and the GP would probably be better placed to capitalise on their opposition to EU-membership if their policies and image were less radical and left wing. In particular, many anti-EU voters may find it difficult to vote for the VP - which used to be a

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<sup>74</sup> Widfeldt, 1995 and 1996a.

<sup>75</sup> Madeley, (1995, p. 426), and Widfeldt (1996a, pp. 107, 114, 115) make similar arguments.

<sup>76</sup> Widfeldt, 1995, p. 211.

<sup>77</sup> 1996a, pp. 230-232.

<sup>78</sup> Holmberg, 1996a, p. 234.

communist party<sup>79</sup> - unless opposition to EU-membership is an absolutely paramount concern.

#### 7.4.1 The extent to which the EU-conflict crosscuts other cleavages.

The dominant political cleavage in Sweden is the left-right cleavage<sup>80</sup>. Most parties can be placed relatively to each other along a left-right axis in a meaningful way. A party's position on this axis also tends to define coalition partners. Figure 7.1 shows how the relevant parties are aligned along the left-right axis.

Figure 7.1. The left-right cleavage in Sweden.

| Left    |         |         |          |          | Right    |          |
|---------|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| VP 3.77 | SD 8.53 | GP 9.27 | CP 12.03 | KD 13.03 | FP 14.55 | MP 17.22 |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, pp. 304-305. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards increasing services/pro-public ownership (1) vs. cutting tax/anti-public ownership (20).

The secondary cleavage in Sweden is an urban-rural one. This does to some extent crosscut the left-right cleavage, as Figure 7.2 shows.

Figure 7.2. The urban-rural cleavage in Sweden.

| Urban   |          |         |         |          | Rural    |          |
|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|
| VP 6.11 | SSD 6.11 | FP 6.95 | MP 7.00 | KD 12.53 | GP 13.88 | CP 16.42 |

Source: Laver and Hunt, 1992, p. 306. Scores based on average expert scores of party leaders' attitude towards urban interests. (1 = pro, 20 = anti)

<sup>79</sup> They dropped the 'communist' label in 1990. The official Swedish name changed from 'Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna' (VPK) to 'Vänsterpartiet' (VP).

<sup>80</sup> See, for example, Elder, Thomas and Arter (1988, chapters 1 and 2); Gilljam and Oscarsson, (1996). Bräntgarde (1989) also gives a detailed account of this cleavage, as well as class, sectorial, territorial, age, educational, and private/public divisions. Oskarson (1992) also analyses the left-right cleavage, as well as class, religion, sectorial, territorial, gender, age, educational, and green dimensions.

In terms of patterns of electoral support, it is the MP and the GP that are the most urban parties (See Appendix 7.6). At the other end of the scale, the CP is the only party with a truly rural support profile. For the other parties the pattern is less clear, although the SSD is weaker in the big cities and metropolises than elsewhere<sup>81</sup>. The support for the FP and the VP is somewhat erratic based on urbanity, but both parties have strongholds in the big cities, as well as in the most rural areas.

There is only a weak (geographical) centre-periphery dimension (measured in terms of pattern of electoral support) in Sweden, with the MP being disproportionately strong and the SSD correspondingly weak in the capital area. In terms of a north-south divide (see Appendix 7.6), it is the MP which has the most distinct profile. It receives substantially more support in the south. On the opposite end of the scale, the VP is the most 'northern' party, with particularly high levels of support in the northernmost county, Norrbotten. The SSD has a similar, but less distinct, profile. For the other parties the north-south divide is less important. However, the KD has a very distinct stronghold in Jönköping in central south Sweden, where it exceeds its national voting average by more than double.

The urban-rural cleavage does not appear to make co-operation based on the left-right cleavage particularly difficult. The only problem is that the CP and the MP are far apart on the urban-rural scale. The weaker north-south dimension is even less of a problem. The general weakness and decline of these dimensions make them relatively unimportant for coalition considerations. In fact, single issues appear to be more

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<sup>81</sup> Source: Brantgärde (1989, especially page 257). See also Worre (1980, pp. 307-10) regarding the rural basis of support for the CP.

important. In the 1970's the debate over nuclear energy made co-operation difficult between the CP and the other parties on the centre-right. In the end it broke their coalition, and the first non-socialist government for 44 years resigned on October 5, 1978<sup>82</sup>.

Considering the above discussion, it is clear that for the conflict over European integration to have maximum impact, it must crosscut the left-right cleavage. As figure 7.3 below shows, it does so only to a limited extent. The most significant deviation from the left-right divide is the extreme anti-EU position of the GP.

Figure 7.3. Party position on EU-membership at the 1994 referendum in Sweden.

| Anti-EU |    |    |     |    |    |    | Pro-EU |
|---------|----|----|-----|----|----|----|--------|
| GP      | VP | CP | SSD | ND | KD | FP | MP     |

Based on party positions. Sources: Party programmes and Jahn and Storsved (1995, p. 27).

Thus, based on party position, the EU-conflict does not create any significant coalition problems between traditional partners. The VP and the GP are unlikely coalition partners for the other parties. No government has ever included either. However, the EU-conflict increases differences between these two parties and the party closest to them on the left-right dimension, the SSD.

So far, the EU-conflict arguably constitutes a minor political cleavage in Sweden. In section two of this chapter it was established that the EU-conflict creates an observable conflict of interest between those whose utility is increased through EU-membership and

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<sup>82</sup> For an account of this episode, see for example Lewin (1988, chapter 8).

those for whom it declines. It has also been demonstrated that substantial numbers of people appear to perceive this conflict of interest as important. However, the effect on the national party system has so far been limited, with increases in support for the anti-EU GP and VP possibly attributable to this conflict. However, because the SSD has ruled alone since the 1994 EU-referendum, it remains to be seen to what extent this conflict affects coalition formation.

With the anti-EU views of large sections of the Swedish electorate not represented in the Swedish parliament - and particularly not by the parties' official policies - it would appear that there is an incentive for one or more of the pro-EU parties to oppose European integration for vote maximisation purposes.

#### 7.4.2. The potential for vote maximisation based on the conflict over European integration.

The parties from the SSD to the KD, and even the MP, are not that far apart on the dominant left-right scale in the view of the Swedish voter<sup>83</sup>. Therefore, they are all likely to be able to attract anti-EU votes from all the parties to the right of the VP - and perhaps even some from that party.

However, for the FP and the MP it is unlikely to be beneficial to oppose EU-membership. A vast majority of their voters supported membership at the 1994 referendum. For the SSD, the KD and the CP, on the other hand, opposition to EU-membership looks more likely to be a profitable vote-seeking exercise. Approximately

half their voters opposed membership at the referendum. They all have the potential to attract 'no' voters from other parties, since they operate close to the centre of Swedish politics. Yet none of them oppose membership.

For the GP and the VP, opposition to EU-membership is much more likely to lead to an increase in votes than is support for membership. The vast majority of those who tend to vote for these parties are opposed to membership. Furthermore, there are numerous centre-left (SSD) and centrist (CP, KD) anti-EU voters whose view is not represented by their pro-EU party. Many of these can be considered as potential voters by the GP and the VP. At the two (excluding local) elections held in the period when the EU-dimension has been salient in Sweden (the 1994 election to the Riksdag and the 1996 election to the EP), these two parties have increased their votes substantially compared to previous elections.

#### 7.4.3 Coalition problems and considerations.

Table 7.4 below shows the make-up of Swedish governments since 1970. As Appendix 7.6 shows, no single party has held an overall majority of seats in the Riksdag since then. Hence, all governments have been either coalition (minority or majority), or single party minority governments.

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<sup>83</sup> See Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996).

Table 7.4. Government participation in Sweden.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Prime Minister</i> | <i>Party</i> |           |           |           |    |
|-------------|-----------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----|
| 1970        | Palme, O.             | <b>SSD</b>   |           |           |           |    |
| 1976        | Fälldin, T.           |              | <b>CP</b> | FP        | MP        |    |
| 1978        | Ullsten, O.           |              |           | <b>FP</b> |           |    |
| 1979        | Fälldin, T.           |              | <b>CP</b> | FP        | MP        |    |
| 1981        | Fälldin, T.           |              | <b>CP</b> | FP        |           |    |
| 1982        | Palme, O.             | <b>SSD</b>   |           |           |           |    |
| 1986        | Carlsson, I.          | <b>SSD</b>   |           |           |           |    |
| 1991        | Bildt, C.             |              | CP        | FP        | <b>MP</b> | KD |
| 1994        | Carlsson, I.          | <b>SSD</b>   |           |           |           |    |
| 1996        | Persson, G.           | <b>SSD</b>   |           |           |           |    |

The Prime Minister's party is in bold type. Source 1970-91: Petersson (1994, p. 103). 1994: Widfeldt (1995). 1996: Nordisk Kontakt (5/1996, p. 84).

As the table shows, every government in this period has been either a SSD single party government, or it has included the FP. That is, governments are based either on the centre-right or the centre-left, and, as the data in Appendix 7.6 show, all possible government combination need formal or informal co-operation from several parties to achieve a majority in parliament. Coalition considerations are very important for why the SSD, the KD and the CP do not oppose EU-membership. Since 1990, when the EC-membership became a serious consideration, no government party has opposed EU membership<sup>84</sup>.

On the centre-right, both the FP, and especially the MP, are very pro-EU. As an added incentive to the pro-EU position of most of their voters, these two parties are also prevented by policy sincerity and credibility considerations from changing position on EU-membership. Without dramatic events interfering, they are basically pre-committed to support such membership. Hence, if either the KD or the CP (or both) should become anti-EU, then a coalition that includes either of these parties together with the FP or the

<sup>84</sup> The CP was against membership until 1990 (Widfeldt, 1996a, p. 112).



MP would be considerably more unlikely. Moreover, there are few opponents to membership among the Riksdag-members representing these four parties.

There are several centre-left combinations of parties with a 'no'-majority among their voters which would command a majority in the Riksdag, both in 1991-94 (SSD + VP + CP), and especially since 1994 (SSD + either VP, GP or CP). But no Swedish government has ever incorporated the VP or the GP.

The CP is a different matter. It has been in government with the SSD before (albeit a long time ago, in the periods 1939-1936 and 1951-1957), and has often, especially since 1994, provided minority SSD governments with parliamentary support. Since 1994, these two parties together command a majority of seats in the Riksdag, and would therefore not need support from any other parties to be able to form a majority government. However, this also provides motivation to stay pro-EU. As long as they both do so, they will be able to co-operate closely in this area, and both retain the possibility for government participation. If one defects, then the other would have a strong incentive to do so as well, both for vote- and office-seeking purposes.

However, if both the SSD and the CP became anti-EU, they would face the risk of losing 'yes'-voters to other parties, such as the KD and the FP. Furthermore, since 1994 the SSD has shown that it can govern in a minority. Whether it could do so as an anti-EU party has not been put to the test. And the CP runs the risk of becoming less influential as well as having a smaller government potential (in both directions on the left-right scale unless there are further defections) if it becomes anti-EU. Risk aversion indicates these parties should remain pro-EU. Hence, the most rational option for

coalition purposes for all parties except the VP and the GP is to continue their pro-EU stance. This conclusion also makes it useful for all parties except the VP and the GP to remove the most basic EU-related questions (membership and further integration) from the national election arena.

#### 7.4.4. Complications and synergy between various party aims.

Among party members there are considerable differences in support for the official party policy on EU-membership. According to a poll carried out in April to May 1992<sup>85</sup>, 71 percent of VP- and GP- members opposed EU-membership, as did 47 percent of SSD-members, 61 percent of CP-members, and 46 percent of KD-members. A majority of the members of the FP (58 percent) MP (72 percent) and ND (52 percent) were for membership. Thus it would appear that only the VP, the GP and the MP have considerable support for their position on EU-membership among their members. And only the VP and the GP are in a position of being able to pursue an anti-EU position which has the support of a majority of their voters, members, and party-leaders.

For the FP and the MP, a pro-EU position is considerably more likely to fulfil the aims of vote maximisation and retaining party unity than an anti-EU position. This is also more likely to maximise government potential for each party as long as the other centre-right parties remain pro-EU. For the SSD, the CP and the KD, the situation is considerably more complicated. It is unclear which position would maximise votes, and also which would be more likely to keep these parties united.

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<sup>85</sup> Carried out by the Temo Institute and the newspaper Dagens Nyheter. The overall numbers showed 38 percent in opposition to full membership, 39 percent in favour, and

If these three parties aim for vote maximisation, then an anti-EU position seems to be the most advantageous. About half of the SSD-, CP-, and KD- voters oppose EU-membership, and there ought to be votes to be gained from other parties for a party willing to oppose EU-membership. However, if any of these parties defect from the pro-EU position, then the other pro-EU parties are left with some difficult options. They can exclude the defector from government, but this leaves the problem of the defector gaining votes from them. Alternatively, they can also change position. However, this could be extremely difficult or dangerous, or both. Firstly, the party might lose more votes than it will gain. Secondly, it could lead to deep divisions and even splits in the party.

Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, defecting from the common pro-EU position is only potentially profitable as long as the other pro-EU parties do not defect. But if the CP becomes anti-EU and starts to gain votes (some of which will be from the SSD and the KD), then these parties will find it difficult to remain pro-EU. And if all three change their position then they would be chasing a small number of anti-EU voters in the FP and the MP. In addition, they would be in competition for anti-EU votes with the VP and the GP, as well as each other. They would also be vulnerable to losing pro-EU voters.

There are also further disincentives to defection related to the office-seeking nature of parties. If not enough parties defect from the pro-EU position, then the defector might find that it has excluded itself from government participation. And a simple majority of

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21 percent undecided (Miles, 1997, pp. 203-204).

seats for anti-EU parties does not necessarily amount to a government basis. The parties will have to agree on other policies as well. For this reason, parties such as the VP and the GP are unlikely to be able to take part in an anti-EU government with more centrist and mainstream parties.

The KD has a further incentive to pursue a pro-EU policy. The party is aiming to model itself on the continental Christian Democrat parties and to move away from its earlier 'confessional' character. Commitment to European integration is a cornerstone of the Christian Democrat movement, and hence a natural part of this transformation into a Christian Democratic party. As for the SSD, the vast majority of its leaders and Riksdag-members are pro-EU, and it would appear that an anti-EU position is more likely to split the party than a pro-EU position is.

The VP and the GP have never been in government, and have little hope of joining coalitions. If they want to gain office, they have to become stronger in terms of votes or move their policies closer to other parties. But shifting policies risks alienating voters who support them precisely because they are different. In addition, they both (and the GP in particular) owe some of their support and appeal to their 'anti-system'<sup>86</sup> character. Hence, increasing their share of the vote appears to be the better option for these parties if they want to get into government. Therefore, it is in the interest of these two parties to keep the EU-conflict in the national election arena. In contrast, for the other parties focus on this conflict would risk internal splits, loss of votes and/or the destruction of traditional coalition patterns.

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<sup>86</sup> Not as in 'anti-democratic', rather against the politics represented by the older and 'mainstream' Swedish parties.

Finally, there are two factors which make members of the political elite more likely to be pro-EU. Firstly, EU-membership increases the numbers of high-powered, highly paid jobs available to politicians. Secondly, Swedish politicians have to consider the interests and views of other European politicians and of the politicians and bureaucrats of the EU, and these are overwhelmingly pro-EU.

#### 7.4.5 The choices available to the Swedish voters.

Most pro-EU Swedes have a wide variety of pro-EU parties to choose from. But the anti-EU Swedes are left with the choice of voting either for the far-left VP or the anti-system GP. These parties are unlikely to represent the views of many anti-EU Swedes on most other issues. Furthermore, the cross-pressures faced by many voters in this situation require them to seek further information. This makes voting less likely because of the increased cost. But non-voting may also be undesirable. All this makes off-loading the EU-conflict away from national elections attractive to many voters.

#### 7.4.6 Off-loading through referendums.

The 1994 referendum served well as an off-loading device, especially for the SSD. It increased its vote dramatically in the 1994 general election, and returned to power. The other pro-EU parties suffered limited losses, and the anti-EU parties enjoyed equally limited gains. (See Appendix 7.6) Since the MP, the FP, the KD and the CP had been partners in a government residing over the biggest recession to hit Sweden since the 1930's, it is unlikely that these losses were closely related to these parties' pro-EU position.

As for the voters, it appears that most Swedes prefer to express their position on European integration at referendums and EP elections. The deeply divided public opinion on EU-membership did not appear to change the voting patterns dramatically at the 1991 or the 1994 elections.

#### 7.4.7 Off-loading through EP-elections.

Although the turnout was a low 41 percent (compared to 80 percent and above at national elections), the results of the 1995 EP election in Sweden were still quite remarkable. Table 7.5 below compares the 1994 parliamentary election results with those of the 1995 EP election.

The anti-EU VP and GP were the clear winners, taking nearly 30 percent of the vote between them. This represented close to a tripling of the combined vote these parties received in the 1994 parliamentary elections. Conversely, the SSD was the clear loser, along with the FP. The most pro-EU party, the MP, increased its vote somewhat from 1994. Many opponents of Swedish EU-membership used the EP-election to show their opposition to EU-membership. In contrast, they did not do the same in the 1994 national elections. Hence, EP-elections also appear to function as an off-loading mechanism in Sweden.

Table 7.5. The results of the 1994 elections to the Swedish 'Riksdag' and 1995 EP elections.

| Party | Riksdag election 1994, % | 1995 EP elections, % | Seats in EP | Change 1994-95, % |
|-------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------------|
| VP    | 6.2                      | 12.9                 | 3           | +108              |
| SSD   | 45.4                     | 28.1                 | 7           | -38               |
| GP    | 5.0                      | 17.2                 | 4           | +244              |
| CP    | 7.7                      | 7.2                  | 2           | -6                |
| FP    | 7.2                      | 4.8                  | 1           | -33               |
| KD    | 4.1                      | 3.9                  | 0           | -5                |
| MP    | 22.4                     | 23.2                 | 5           | +4                |

Sources: 1994 election results: Madeley, 1995, p. 425. 1995 election results: Widfeldt, 1996b. The percentages in column five were calculated by the author.

It could be argued, of course, that the increase in support in polls and the EP elections represent popular concern for other issues. In particular, displeasure with Sweden's disastrous economic development in the early and mid 1990's might lead people to vote for the 'anti-system' GP and VP. And some of their increased support probably is linked to this and other issues. However, Sweden's economic problems were serious long before the 1995 elections, with only minor increases in support for these parties. Massive increase in support for the anti-EU parties in a period with strong public concerns about EU-membership is simply too much of a coincidence.

## **7.5 Conclusion.**

Many Swedes appear to have expected their utility increase in connection with EU membership through anticipating a positive effect on the Swedish economy, the chance to influence the EU, and prospects for peace in Europe. Conversely, many Swedish people seem to have viewed the effects of EU membership on factors related to national control and the nature of EU integration as detrimental to their utility. This is quite

rational, since these are areas where EU-membership has the most obvious effect. Neutrality seems to have been of only minor importance for attitudes to membership.

There were substantial territorial differences in attitudes towards EU membership in Sweden. This appears to be mainly due to variances in ideological support for the welfare state. There were also substantial differences between the attitudes of men and women, and those employed by the public or private sector. This is likely to have been related to the high levels of equality and benefits for women, and a highly developed and universal welfare state in Sweden compared to many other European countries.

Based on comparison with (other) EU-countries and the assumption that membership would lead to an eventual reduction of the welfare state, membership could be argued to lower the utility levels of many women and public employees. The data confirms that a disproportionate number of members of these groups opposed membership. The same argument can be put in terms of ideological support for the extensive welfare state, and left-wing opposition to membership is likely to be linked to this. Of the two seemingly sacrosanct features of Sweden mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, it would seem that the welfare state is substantially more venerated than neutrality.

The EU-conflict has so far had a limited impact on the domestic Swedish party system. Only minor differences in party support appear to be related to this dimension. In terms of the cleavage model this is because the EU-conflict crosscuts the dominant left-right cleavage only to a limited degree. The GP moves from the centre of the left-right cleavage to the extreme on the EU-dimension, and the CP shifts somewhat away from its traditional coalition partners. Since it is unlikely the GP would be a potential



coalition partner for the centre-right anyway, this is of minor importance. The CP, with its voters and members split on this dimension, might find it more difficult to co-operate with the FP and the MP. The same goes for the KD, but to a lesser degree, since its party leadership is heavily pro-EU, even if a lot of its voters are not.

In terms of the rational choice model, it is in the interest both of many voters and the majority of the parties to off-load the EU-conflict to referendums and EP-elections. The only parties who oppose EU-membership have an anti-system character and some relatively extreme policies, and are therefore not palatable options for many anti-EU voters. These parties tend to hold only about ten percent of the seats in the Riksdag. Because a much higher number of Swedes oppose EU-membership, it would appear rational for more of the parties to do so as well, in particular the SSD, the CP and the KD, since around half of their voters oppose EU-membership. However, these parties have remained pro-EU.

If the EU-conflict was to play a more prominent role in national elections, internal party divisions would become more likely, especially in the SSD, the KD and the CP. And if more parties took an anti-EU position, this would risk both party-splits and make normal coalition patterns more difficult - and maybe impossible. A strong focus on the EU-conflict at national elections would also make it more difficult for voters who disagree with their 'normal' party on this issue to decide how to vote. Therefore, both the majority of political parties and many voters have an interest in off-loading the EU-conflict away from the national election agenda. This off-loading is based on two main devices. The first is the use of the referendum to decide the question of EU-membership as well as future important decisions related to European integration. The second device

is EP elections. It appears that these are likely to take on a certain 'Danish flavour' by functioning at least partly as 'mini-referendums' on European integration.

## **Chapter 8. Nordic Contrasts. Comparative analysis and conclusions.**

In this chapter it is demonstrated to which extent the populations of the Nordic countries have different interests with regard to European integration. In chapters four to seven, the effects of EU membership on individual utility was separated into a variety of factors where membership had been argued to make a difference in Chapter 3. The importance of some of these factors varies considerably between the four countries, while the importance of other factors is much more similar. Furthermore, for ~~some~~ <sup>Example</sup> factors the effects of EU membership affects attitudes to membership in opposite directions in different countries.

Statistics → formula  
Math. ved

This chapter also demonstrates that the position of parties in the same 'family'<sup>1</sup> varies considerably in the four countries. The cleavage model illustrates the resulting crosscutting effect. It is also demonstrated how the degree of correspondence between the parties' aims strongly influences how the conflict over European integration affects the party systems in the region. The reasons for off-loading the EU-conflict and the usefulness of this strategy are also discussed. The final sections of this chapter consist of theoretical conclusions, overall conclusions, and proposals for a future research agenda.

### **8.1. The effects of EU-membership on individual utility.**

This section is organised according to two principles. Firstly, a distinction is made between factors which appear to have a similar effect on individual utility across countries, and those where there are marked differences. Secondly, a further distinction

is made between factors which have a considerable or clearly identifiable effect on utility and those that either appear to be unimportant or where the effect on utility is unclear.

It is argued here that people are more likely to base their opinions on obvious effects on factors close to their personal life, and in particular on economic factors, than factors which have a more obscure effect on their utility. The more obscure concerns can, however, be important for people who have little or no stake in the factors where EU-membership has a more direct effect. The uncertainty of how some factors are actually affected by EU-membership also renders some factors of less importance. Rational people will discount or even ignore factors where uncertainty is substantial. This is reflected in the structure of this section.

#### 8.1.1 Substantive factors with similar effects on utility across countries.

##### *Material benefits derived from The Welfare State.*

By comparison with the EU-12 average, the Nordic countries have more extensive welfare states. From the EU-Treaties, one would be hard pressed to see direct effects on the welfare state emanating from EU-membership. However, it is possible that more social and welfare policies will be brought in under the EU-umbrella in the future. Furthermore, competitive pressures and/or harmonisation could be argued to lead to less comprehensive welfare states in Scandinavia. Although this would affect all the inhabitants of this area, those employed in the public sector, the poor, and women (see

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<sup>1</sup> See von Beyme, 1985.

below) would be more adversely affected by such a reduction than the average citizen would. Hence, for people who fit one or more of these characteristics, risk aversion makes them more likely to oppose EU-membership. The significance of this factor is likely to also contain opposition to EEA-membership, since this is likely to have much the same effect as EU-membership in this regard.

As Table 8.1 below shows, in all four countries those employed by the public sector were more likely to oppose EU membership than those in private sector employment were. Similarly, those with a higher income were more likely to be pro-EU compared to those with lower income. These differences vary, but they have the same direction in each country. The considerably higher public/private sector gap in Denmark is partly due to the inverse position of farmers there compared to the other countries. Conversely, the smaller differential in the Finnish and Norwegian cases is partly due to the vast majority of farmers (especially in Norway), who are nearly all in the private sector, opposing membership. The position of Swedish voters is somewhere in-between, reflecting the limited effect of EU membership on Swedish agriculture. It is also likely that the difference in opinion between public and private sector employees in Sweden is increased, relatively to the other three countries, by the Swedish welfare state being the most extensive.

Table 8.1<sup>2</sup>. Income and private/public sector divides and yes-vote in referendums. Percent.

|                     | Denmark <sup>3</sup> | Finland <sup>4</sup> | Norway | Sweden |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------|--------|
|                     | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes    | Yes    |
| Sector              |                      |                      |        |        |
| Public              | 42                   | 61                   | 47.3   | 46     |
| Private             | 63                   | 68                   | 52.1   | 58     |
| Income <sup>5</sup> |                      |                      |        |        |
| Low                 | N/A                  | 51                   | 21.9   | 49     |
| Low medium          | N/A                  | 57                   | 25.1   | 59     |
| High medium         | N/A                  | 61                   | -      |        |
| High                | N/A                  | 74                   | 40.4   | 76     |

Data sources: see Appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3.

Similarly, the country chapters on Finland and Norway demonstrate that the areas with disproportionately high numbers of opponents of membership also receive a disproportionately high share of state spending, both in the form of agricultural subsidies (see below) and other forms of public funds.

### *Gender Differences.*

As Table 8.2 shows, women consistently voted against membership more frequently than men did across the region. Disproportional dependence upon the welfare state, public employment and the highly egalitarian nature of the Nordic countries relatively to most (other) EU countries all make EU-membership less attractive to women than to

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise stated, all data in tables in this chapter refer to surveys of the 1994 referendums for Finland, Norway and Sweden. For Denmark, the 1992 referendum over the TEU is the standard.

<sup>3</sup> For Denmark, the public/private data includes only white-collar employees.

<sup>4</sup> For Finland the public/private data only includes the service sector.

<sup>5</sup> For Finland there are four categories: <60k Fmk. per year, 61-120k, 121-200k, and above 201k. For Norway there are three categories: <149k NKr. per year, 150-299k, and above 300k. The Norwegian data is based on the 1993 election study, when opposition to membership was considerably higher than at the referendum in 1994. However, trends and differences are likely to be similar. For Sweden there is no direct data for income, and the categories used are low, medium and high white collar from Appendix 7.3.

men. The fact that the gender gap was larger in Sweden corresponds well with the fact that many welfare provisions, and in particular those for women on maternity leave, were considerably more generous in Sweden than elsewhere in the Nordic countries.

Table 8.2. Gender and yes-vote in EU-referendums.

| Gender            | Denmark | Finland | Norway | Sweden |
|-------------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|
| Male              | 53      | 65      | 44     | 59     |
| Female            | 46      | 57      | 52     | 46     |
| Gender difference | 7       | 8       | 8      | 13     |

Data sources: See appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3, 7.3.

*Trade considerations.*

Nordic countries trade widely, and are dependent upon trade for a large portion of their GDP, as Table A shows. Because so much of this trade is with EU countries (see country chapters for evidence), access to their markets is pivotal. Hence participation in the EU makes sense from a pure trade perspective for all these countries.

It could be argued that the EEA-Treaty secures trade interests. However, because this Treaty can be cancelled at one year’s notice, this is a less secure option for optimal trade access to the EU-market than full EU-membership. In addition, for Denmark access to the EU-market for agricultural products is extremely important, and agriculture is largely excluded from the EEA-Treaty.

Those who can clearly relate their utility to effects of EU-membership on trade are likely to be affected by this in their opinion of EU-membership. Hence, people employed in export industries are likely to be more pro-EU than the average citizen due to the

positive effect on their utility of secure access to the EU-markets. Conversely, those individuals employed in non-competitive industries dependent upon public subsidies or protection from competition are likely to view EU-membership as detrimental to their utility. Farmers in Norway and Finland are good examples of such individuals.

As appendices 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2 show, arguments related to trade and general economic welfare arguments are among the most prominent pro-EU arguments in all four countries. The town of Årdal in western Norway is the best specific example of the effect of this factor. In addition, this is very likely to be part of the reason for the differences in attitude to membership between public and private sectors and urban and rural areas, with the inverse urban-rural divide in Denmark related to the importance of farm exports and a more left-wing urban population (see below). Related to this, it is likely that those who support parties on the right are more likely to support free trade than those who support parties on the left are. This factor is therefore most likely part of the reason for the left-right divide on EU-membership.

#### *Peace and security.*

With regard to peace and security in Europe, EU-membership appears to have had a positive effect on utility for many voters in at least three of the countries, and a negative effect for very few. In the Danish case (Appendix 4.1) there is no clear survey answer category that covers peace and security. In Finland, (Appendix 5.2) 'security' was the fourth most frequently given reason for voting 'yes', with very few people arguing the opposite. In Norway (Appendix 6.1) security-policy was viewed as the second most important argument for membership, again with very few people mentioning this as a



reason to oppose membership. In Sweden (Appendix 7.1) 'peace' was the third most important reason given for having voted 'yes' in the referendum.

This factor also forms part of the explanation for the centre-right voters generally being more positive to EU-membership than those on the left. Support for internationally binding co-operation in the field of security policy tends to be considerably higher on the centre-right than on the left, with the far left particularly opposed to participation in military alliances<sup>6</sup>. The formation of the Danish SF and the Norwegian SV was initially largely based on opposition to NATO-membership. In the Swedish case, Rutger Lindahl<sup>7</sup> demonstrates that 'military security' was a reason for voting behaviour (overwhelmingly in the form of support for membership) in the 1994 referendum by a considerably higher number of voters on the centre-right than on the left. Furthermore, supporters of the FP and the MP were much more likely to view EU-membership as an improvement to Sweden's military security than were supporters of the other parties.

For reasons given in Chapter 5, it was expected that these factors would be more important for the Finnish than for the inhabitants of the other countries. From the available data, this does not appear to be the case. With the possible exception of Denmark, there is cross-regional support for the notion that with regard to peace and security; EU-membership increases utility for overwhelmingly more people than it reduces it for.

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<sup>6</sup> With the exception for some far-left parties, in the past, of alliances with Communist countries.

<sup>7</sup> 1996.

Interestingly, utility-effects of membership based on material benefits derived from the welfare state, trade considerations, and peace and security are all likely to be related to an individual's position on the left-right cleavage. And they are likely to reinforce each other in this respect, with all three factors making it more likely that a person on the right supports membership and a person on the left opposes it. This reinforcing effect of these three substantial factors (as independent variables) forms a substantial part of the reason for the left-right divide (as a dependent variable) over European integration. Related to this, the left-right divide (as an independent variable) is an important contributing factor to the observed regional differences in attitude to EU-membership. This feature is considered below.

#### 8.1.2 Lesser factors (and those where information is severely limited) with similar effects on utility across countries.

##### *Democracy versus influence.*

The effect of EU-membership on 'democracy' is debatable. In reality there is a trade-off between small distance to legislators who have little say and control over a variety of policy-areas, where the EU influences 'associated' (EEA) members-states as well as member-states, and longer distance to legislators who have at least some – and potentially substantial - influence over decisions. This is demonstrated by the data in Appendices 4.2, 5.2, 6.2, and 7.2. Whilst opponents of membership tend to mention detrimental effects on democracy as a reason for their voting behaviour, proponents tend to include arguments related to influencing decisions relevant to the citizens of the Nordic countries. The Danish case is somewhat different, with virtually no mention of

the effect of EU-membership on democracy, although desire for influence appears to be an important reason for supporting membership.

*The Nordic dimension.*

Nordic solidarity, Nordic co-operation and common interests and values are important aspects of politics in Scandinavia. However, this thesis shows that such feelings and policies linked to them are only important up to a point. The moment national interest, or narrow economic self-interest, comes into conflict with Nordic co-operation, the latter loses out. Formal Nordic integration projects such as Nordek have failed, although more informal co-operation, with decisions based on unanimity, has been more successful. Denmark joined the EC in 1972 with little concern for any effects on Nordic co-operation. In the referendums in the 1990's, very few voters appear to have considered the Nordic aspect. And Finland and Sweden joined the EU despite Norway and Iceland remaining outside. Conversely, the Norwegians were not persuaded to join the EU so that Nordic co-operation could take place within the EU framework, neither were the Icelanders.

*Factors where the effect of membership is highly uncertain.*

Regarding some factors, such as crime and drug-smuggling and -use, it is very difficult to evaluate the effect - if any - of EU-membership on individual utility. Such effects depend on whether the individual views international co-operation across open borders as a better solution to these problems than closed borders.

Aid to poor countries is another factor where the effect of EU-membership is highly uncertain. The Nordic countries are among the world's most generous donors to poorer countries as a percentage of GDP. However, it is difficult to assess if EU-membership will have any effect on these policies. Arguably, the same reasoning applies here as to the welfare state. That is, if tax income is reduced, then the possibility that foreign aid will be reduced as well increases. And again this is likely to make those on the right more likely to support membership and those on the left less likely to do so. However, any factor where uncertainty of the effect of membership is high is unlikely to affect people's utility calculations.

#### 8.1.3 Substantive factors with different effect on individual utility across countries.

##### *Agriculture and urban/rural differences of interest.*

The effect of EU-membership on the primary sector, and the rural economy generally, are the main reasons behind territorial differences in attitude to membership in at least three of the countries; the possible exception being Sweden.

Subsidies for agriculture in Norway and Finland were among the highest in the world and considerably above the EU-average in 1994. In Denmark subsidies were obviously adjusted to EU-rules. In Sweden they were becoming similar, Sweden having started an adjustment to the EU-level of agricultural support. In Sweden, in contrast to Norway, the government substantially reformed its agricultural policies in 1989, changing from

producer- to consumer-oriented policies<sup>8</sup>. It should also be stressed that Denmark's exports are very agriculture-dependent. For Denmark it is crucial to have competitive access to the EU market for agricultural products, for which EU-membership is necessary. Table 8.3 shows referendum voting patterns among those employed in agriculture compared to the country average, as well as urban-rural and centre-periphery (capital area vs. country as a whole) patterns of voting in the relevant referendums.

Table 8.3. Yes-vote in EU-referendums among farmers and by territorial differences.

|                 | Denmark | Finland           | Norway             | Sweden             |
|-----------------|---------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Farmers         | No data | 29                | 10                 | 53                 |
| Country Average |         | 61                | 52                 | 53                 |
| Farmers-country |         | -32               | -42                | 0                  |
|                 |         |                   |                    |                    |
| Urban           | 43.8*   | 70.8*             | 53.6               | 57.2               |
| Rural           | 55.7*   | 51.8*             | 30.6               | 46.2               |
| Urban-rural     | -11.9   | +19.0             | +23.0              | +11                |
|                 |         |                   |                    |                    |
| Capital         | 38.3    | 73.5              | 65.6               | 61.5               |
| Country Average | 49.3    | 56.9              | 47.8               | 52.3               |
| Capital-country | -11.0   | +16.6             | +17.8              | +9.2               |
|                 |         |                   |                    |                    |
| North           | N/A     | 45.5 <sup>9</sup> | 28.1 <sup>10</sup> | 35.0 <sup>11</sup> |
| South           | N/A     | 55.7              | 50.2               | 55.0               |
| North-South     | N/A     | -10.2             | -22.1              | -20.0              |

Sources: See Appendices 4.4, 5.3, 6.3, 7.3.

\* There are no urban/rural data as such available in the Danish case. As a surrogate, the 'urban' figure for Denmark was arrived at by calculating the average score of the most urban part of Greater Copenhagen, amalgamating the first two areas listed in Appendix 4.4. Conversely, the 'rural' figure is for the rest of Denmark. Similarly, for Finland the 'urban' figure is the average 'yes'-vote in Uusimaa and Helsinki.

This voting pattern among farmers and between rural and urban areas, combined with knowledge of the amount of subsidies received by this sector, and the importance of

<sup>8</sup> Ingebritsen, 1995, pp. 352-353.

<sup>9</sup> The average 'yes' vote in Oulu and Lappi combined.

<sup>10</sup> Nordland, Troms, Finnmark.

<sup>11</sup> Västmanland, Jämtland, Västerbotten, Norrbotten

exports for Danish farmers, provides strong evidence that narrow economic self-interest is a core factor behind the territorial differences. In addition to the farmers, many inhabitants of rural areas who are not employed directly in farming are employed in farming-related industries such as food processing. Furthermore, many of the other inhabitants of rural areas are dependent upon the existence of farming and farming-related industries for employment (shops, services, the public sector) when there are few other private enterprises. Without the farming-sector, large parts of the rural economy are likely to collapse. Also, other public subsidies are disproportionately high in many rural areas of Finland and Norway, reinforcing the dependency of such areas on agricultural subsidies.

Hence, the rural attitude towards EU-membership is very dependent upon the interests of the farming-sector. This is the main reason for the dramatic differences in rural voting patterns between pro-EU rural Denmark and anti-EU rural Finland and Norway, with Sweden in an intermediate position. Although agricultural subsidies there have been cut back towards EU-levels, it is not nearly so dependent upon agricultural exports as is Denmark. That its farmers and rural population take an intermediate position compared to the other countries is therefore to be expected.

In the Norwegian case, the importance of fishing, and the concentration of this industry in certain rural and peripheral counties, contributes to the urban-rural and centre-periphery differences. This is likely to be related to Norwegian fishermen wanting neither to risk having to share these resources with others, nor to allow foreigners to buy Norwegian-owned boats. Furthermore, it could also be argued that Norway's fisheries

policies are more responsible than those of the EU are, and more likely to preserve fish stocks in the long run<sup>12</sup>.

### *Nationalism.*

Nationalist arguments, such as the protection of sovereignty, are frequently mentioned as arguments against membership in all four countries, particularly in Denmark. However, concerns for sovereignty appear to be secondary, taken into account more when other factors do not affect utility to any great extent. The clearest evidence of this is provided by the contrast of the regional differences in voting patterns, as described above. Regional differences in voting patterns are considerably more likely to be a result of economic effects on individual utility than of regional differences in concern for sovereignty.

### *The left-right ideological divide.*

Support for the welfare state and state subsidies and control need not be based on deriving personal economic benefit from such policies. Utility is derived at least partly from an ideological perspective, a wide rather than a narrow self-interest. It is assumed here that ideological support for the welfare state and a large state sector is higher on the political left than on the right. The arguments for why EU-membership is likely to be viewed as detrimental to the Nordic welfare model are outlined in section 8.1.1 above and in Chapter 3. It is also quite possible that this factor contains people's position on EEA-membership, as well as developments such as globalisation and increasingly open

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<sup>12</sup> See, for example, The Economist, 19/10, 1996.

world markets, with the European single market advanced by the EU viewed as symbolic of such developments.

Opposition to EU-membership among those who vote for the far left is consistently high across the region, as Table 8.4 below shows. However, among SD-voters there is less consistency. Whilst opposition to EU membership (as expressed at the 1992 and 1994 referendums) was disproportionately high among Social Democrat voters in Sweden and Denmark, it was considerably below average in Norway and Finland.

There are several reasons for this. In Norway, the 1993 election was dominated by the EU-conflict. Hence, the off-loading exercise did not succeed at this election, although the promise of a referendum on EU-membership almost certainly limited the effects of the EU-conflict. The AP gained pro-EU voters from the SV and other parties, and lost considerable numbers of anti-EU voters to the centre parties and the SV<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, the proportion of anti-EU AP-voters declined substantially at this election, and vice versa for the SV and some other parties. In Sweden the off-loading exercise appears to have succeeded relatively well at the 1994 parliamentary election, despite, or perhaps because, being very close to the referendum. In Finland, the last general election before the 1994 referendum was in 1991, when the debate over EU-membership had only just started. Although there was a general election in Denmark in 1990, this was well before the TEU. Furthermore, in Denmark the off-loading mechanisms had been in use for nearly 20 years by the early 1990s.

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<sup>13</sup> Valen, 1994.



In Finland, Southern Finland and the capital area are the FSD strongholds, where the pro-EU side also has its strongholds. Also, in Finland the welfare state is less directly connected only with the Social Democrats compared to the other three countries. Furthermore, Finland traditionally has a much larger far-left party, as well as a considerably larger farmers/rural party (the CF) than do the other three countries. Hence, whilst the Finnish party is urban and has only limited support from voters who tend to be anti-EU, the other Social Democratic parties appeal to a wider segment of the population and are therefore liable to be in conflict with more of their voters on the EU-issue.

Table 8.4. Left-voting and yes-vote in EU-referendums.

| <b>Party</b>           | <b>Denmark</b> | <b>Finland</b> | <b>Norway</b> | <b>Sweden</b> |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| <b>Far-left</b>        | 8              | 36             | 19            | 13            |
| <b>SD</b>              | 36             | 75             | 64            | 46            |
| <b>Left</b>            | 27             | 60             | 55            | 40            |
| <b>Country average</b> | 50             | 62             | 48            | 53            |
| <b>Left-country</b>    | -23            | +2             | +7            | -13           |

'Far-left' includes only the largest party on the far left. 'Party' refers to party at last election. Sources: appendices 4.3, 5.3, 6.3 and 7.3.

This is also part of the explanation for regional differences in attitudes towards EU membership. Support for different political parties varies heavily by region across Scandinavia. If the EU-conflict is viewed in light of the left-right cleavage, then it can be detected that regional variations in anti-EU sentiments are positively correlated to differences in support for far-left parties in all countries, and the broad left in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. However, as Table 8.5 shows, the correlations are only significant for the far and broad left in Denmark and Sweden, and for the far left in Norway.

Table 8.5 Pearson Correlations between left-voting by county and ‘no’-vote in referendum.

| Party/ies   | Denmark | Finland | Norway | Sweden |
|-------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|
| Far left    | 0.859*  | 0.351   | 0.673* | 0.636* |
| SD          | 0.654*  | -0.417  | -0.109 | 0.681* |
| Far left+SD | 0.931*  | -0.166  | 0.201  | 0.722* |

0 signifies no correlation, 1 complete correlation.

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). Authors calculations. Data sources: appendices 4.5, 5.7, 6.5 and 7.5. If the RVA is included in the Norwegian case, then the correlation drops to 0.490 (significant at the 0.05 level) for the far left and to 0.134 for the left.

### *Capital attitudes.*

A related explanation applies to the most obvious cross-country difference that cannot be explained through the above exposition about territorially differentiated economic interests. Three of the capital areas are the strongholds of the ‘yes’-side in their respective countries. Yet, in Denmark, Copenhagen is the main stronghold of the ‘no’-side. Because the vast majority of analyses of attitudes to European integration in the Nordic countries are of single countries only, this difference has not been addressed in depth. But, if the attitude to EU-membership in the capital areas is juxtaposed with the far-left vote in these areas, then an explanation for these differences surfaces.

Table 8.6 Yes-vote in EU-referendums and far-left vote in capital areas.

|                                  | <b>Copenhagen<br/>1990/92</b> | <b>Helsinki 1994/5</b> | <b>Oslo 1993/4</b> | <b>Stockhol<br/>m 1994/4</b> |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|
| <b>‘Yes’-vote capital</b>        | 38.3                          | 73.5                   | 65.6               | 61.5                         |
| <b>‘Yes’-vote country</b>        | 49.3                          | 56.9                   | 47.8               | 52.3                         |
| <b>Capital-country</b>           | -11.0                         | +17                    | +14                | +10                          |
| <b>Far-left vote<br/>capital</b> | 23.9                          | 8.9                    | 12.3               | 6.7                          |
| <b>Far-left vote<br/>country</b> | 11.8                          | 10.1                   | 9.0                | 6.2                          |
| <b>Capital-country</b>           | +12.1                         | -1.2                   | +3.3               | +0.5                         |

Far-left vote in the last election prior to the referendums. Parties: Denmark: SF, FK, EH; Finland: VF; Norway: SV, RVA; Sweden: VP. Sources: Appendices 4.5, 5.7, 6.5, 7.5.

From Table 8.6 it can be observed that the population in the Danish capital is considerably more likely to vote for a far-left party than are the inhabitants of the other three capitals. From what is argued above, this provides a plausible explanation for a considerable amount of the difference between Copenhagen and the other three capitals.

#### *The national economic situation.*

The economic situation and prospects in the early to mid 1990's were very important for attitudes towards European integration<sup>14</sup>. Unemployment rates were significantly lower than the EU average in Norway, somewhat lower in Sweden, about average in Denmark, and significantly higher in Finland. Based on this factor, incentives for agreeing to EU-membership and (further) European integration should be lowest in Norway and highest in Finland. A similar - and related - situation existed for state finances and individual income development. For Norway, the income from oil and gas resources provided the

<sup>14</sup> Aardal (1983, pp. 31-32) makes a similar argument in a comparison of the 1972 referendums in Denmark and Norway.

Norwegian economy and state with a much better situation. Furthermore, many Norwegians wanted to protect the national ownership of these resources. These petroleum-industry-related factors give the average Norwegian additional incentives to oppose membership.

#### 8.1.4 Lesser factors (and those where information is severely limited) with different effect on individual utility across countries.

For Sweden, staying out of alliances and protecting neutrality were long priorities for the Swedish elite and for many other Swedes. However, the importance of neutrality appears to have been reduced in the after-math of the cold war, and this factor mattered very little for Swedish attitudes to EU-membership. For the Finns, there is no evidence that concern about neutrality had any effect on the 1994 referendum outcome. Both Denmark and Norway were - and are - members of NATO. Hence, neutrality is unlikely to have been a decisive factor for attitude to EU-membership in these two countries.

EEA-membership should have very similar effects to EU membership on the overall price level. Furthermore, for many goods (e.g. transport, housing) price elasticity will be relatively unaffected by competitive pressures from abroad. Hence, the effect of EU-membership on the general price level is very uncertain, and is likely to have had a limited effect on utility.

The one exception to this argument is food-prices. Because of the high agricultural subsidies in Norway and Finland, one could reasonably expect food-prices to drop as a result of EU-membership in these countries. The resulting effect is associated with the

difference in attitude to EU-membership between rural and urban populations. The rural population has an interest in maintaining subsidies and high food prices, for the urban population lower food prices would increase utility. With regard to Sweden, food subsidies were already close to the EU-level by the time Sweden joined the EU, and so the effects on food-prices will be limited. This is likely to be part of the reason for why the urban-rural difference in attitudes to EU-membership was smaller in Sweden than in Norway and Finland. If Denmark left the EU it is highly uncertain what the effect on agricultural subsidies and food-prices would be. Hence, this factor is unlikely to have been part of the utility-consideration of most Danish voters. Therefore, prospects for lower food-prices are unlikely to form part of the pro-EU argument in Denmark. This removes one reason for support for membership from the urban population.

Regarding taxation, the effects of EU-membership are difficult to assess, as explained in Chapter 3 and in the country chapters. There has also been a convergence in taxation level between most of the Nordic countries and the EU-average over time. However, in Sweden the taxation level remained so much higher than the EU-average even by the early 1990's, that one could expect some tax reduction in that country as a result of membership. This is likely to contribute to the left-right divide over membership in Sweden. Conversely, this factor was probably least important in Finland, since that country's tax level was the lowest in the region.

The approach used in section three of each country chapter (utility changes derived from membership) allows us to stress how different factors might re-enforce each other. In all the countries various factors connected to the left-right cleavage are likely to reinforce each other, as argued above, making those with right-leaning political inclinations

considerably more likely to see improvements to their utility emanating from membership compared to those on the political left. In Western Norway, in particular in rural areas, counter-cultures and agricultural subsidies reinforce each other. In Northern Norway concern for national control over fish resources, disproportionate support for the left wing parties, and massive state subsidies intended to keep the population from moving south do the same. In central and northern Finland, agricultural subsidies, disproportionately high state spending and relatively high support for the far left ('backwoods communism') also reinforce each other. The far left also has disproportionately high support in central and northern Sweden. These are all areas where opposition to EU-membership was considerably above the national average.

## **8.2. The EU-conflict and the party system.**

The EU-conflict has affected electoral behaviour and the Nordic party systems to a certain extent. However, the effects vary considerably among the four countries analysed here. The next sections provide a comparative analysis of how the party systems have been affected by the EU-conflict. The first comparison is carried out in terms of the cleavage model; the second follows the rational choice model.

### **8.2.1 The cleavage model.**

In terms of the cleavage model, the effect of the EU-conflict on the party system depends on the extent to which it crosscuts other important cleavages. In all four countries examined here, the left-right cleavage has long been the dominant cleavage. It

is also important whether and to what extent the EU-conflict aligns with other cleavages, as these might be accentuated if there is close correspondence.

Chapters four to seven show that the EU-conflict changes the relative strengths of the more important cleavages. In particular, it appears to have the potential to increase the importance of territorial cleavages relatively to the left-right cleavage. However, the significance of the EU-conflict varies greatly between the four countries, both with regard to the extent it crosscuts other cleavages and with regard to the political consequences.

In Denmark the EU-conflict does crosscut the left-right cleavage, but to a very limited extent. It aligns more closely with the territorial cleavage, but territorial differences are muted. And territorial dimensions do not appear to significantly affect coalition formation in Denmark. No significant new parties have developed on the basis of the EU dimension at the level of national elections, and no party appears to have gained or lost significant numbers of votes as a result of this conflict. Nor have coalition patterns changed as a result of the conflict. However, the EU-dimension deepens differences between the DFRP/DFP and the other parties on the right, and has also increased the magnitude of differences between the DSD and the parties to its left. Moreover, if the DFRP/DFP and the far left continue to focus on anti-EU positions, whilst (in the case of the DFRP/DFP) linking this to an anti-immigration sentiment, then the EU-conflict could develop into a cleavage in Danish politics.

In Finland, there is a greater amount of crosscutting between the EU-conflict and the left-right cleavage. The conflict contains stronger territorial elements in Finland than in

Denmark. However, coalition formation in Finland, in particular over the last decade, has crosscut the left-right and the territorial cleavages, as well as the foreign policy cleavage over the relationship with the SU/Russia. (The latter has, of course, declined in importance.) Therefore, although the EU-conflict has a medium crosscutting effect in Finland, this has limited influence on co-operation patterns and coalition formation.

However, because a considerable majority of the voters who support the CF and the VF are anti-EU, and as these parties (and the GF) are hesitant towards further European integration, there is ample scope for the EU-conflict causing deeper divisions in the future. It is already conspicuous that the CF and the small and vehemently anti-EU FKF are the only substantial parties (with the exception of the relatively newly formed UF) that have been excluded from government after Finland joined the EU. A new anti-EU party, the FFU, participated in the 1995 national election, but failed to make much impact. However, the EU-conflict led directly to the departure of the FKF from government in 1994, and as such the EU-conflict has caused a, so far, minor cleavage in the Finnish party system.

In Sweden the EU-conflict has a medium crosscutting potential similar in magnitude to that in Finland. However, because the two anti-EU parties (the GP and the VP) have never been in government, the effect on coalition formation is limited. On the other hand, the CP in Sweden has similar problems to its sister-party in Finland, and opposes further European integration. This makes a repeat of the CP's previous government participation with the other centre-right parties (often difficult anyway) considerably more complicated. Although no new parties have been formed based on the EU-conflict, the GP (in particular) and the VP have both focused strongly, and tried to capitalise on,



their anti-EU stance. On the evidence of the EP-election of 1995, and perhaps also the 1994 national election, the anti-EU parties have been able to capitalise on this opposition. If this can be sustained in national elections, the EU-conflict will have a considerable effect on the Swedish party system. Arguably, the EU-conflict already constitutes a minor political cleavage in Sweden.

The Norwegian case stands out as the one in which the EU-conflict has had the most dramatic effect on the party system. Importantly, it significantly deepens the territorial cleavages. At the 1993 election there was substantial electoral volatility due to the salience of the EU-conflict, with the anti-EU SP nearly tripling its vote and becoming the second largest party in the Storting. The party system was unsettled by this conflict, and there was more volatility at the 1997 election, when the NKRF and the NFRP were the big winners. The big loser over this period has been the most pro-EU party, the H. Although the 1997 election-outcome was not a direct result of the EU-conflict, the large amount of floating voters at the last two elections is at least partly due to this conflict.

An equally important effect of the EU-conflict in Norway, and one that is more directly a result of this conflict, is the coalition problems experienced on the centre-right. Without the EU-conflict salient, the NV, the SP, the NKRF and the H have, over the past 30 years, largely been able to agree on a coalition agreement. However, since 1990, when the EU-conflict became salient, they have been unable to do so. In particular, the SP and the H have not been willing to join the same coalition. This considerably narrows the base for any centre-right government. At least for the period 1990-1997, the EU-conflict constitutes a political cleavage in Norway.

### 8.2.2 The EU-conflict and the cohesion of party aims.

As demonstrated in chapters four to seven, there is considerable under-representation of the anti-EU voters among the political parties, and in all four national parliaments, although less so in Norway. In theory, this should make it tempting for more parties to take up an anti-EU position and pursue voters who oppose EU-membership. However, in the same chapters it was also shown that the decision of which position to take on EU-membership is more complicated than simply to aim for vote-maximisation. This section compares the difficulties and complications faced by the political parties with regard to the pursuit of various party aims in the face of a salient EU-conflict. The comparative analysis is organised by party-family.

From the late 1980's onwards, European integration became an increasingly salient dimension in Nordic politics. The question of EU-membership and how to deal with European integration generally added, or greatly increased the importance of, a European dimension in the political systems in the region. With this development, the political parties in Finland, Norway and Sweden had to decide - and communicate to the public and other political actors - which position they would take on EU-membership, and what kind of European integration, if any, they wanted to support. In Denmark, the political parties had to decide if they wished to support the deeper and more explicitly political integration envisaged in the TEU.

A salient new (or revived) dimension makes life more complicated for established political parties. They risk alienating voters who would otherwise support them, disruptions in coalition and co-operation patterns, internal party splits, and

complications in relations with political actors outside the national arena. The most advantageous position for a party exists when all its 'relevant actors', as described in Chapter 3, align close to the same position. Unfortunately for most of the parties studied here, this is hardly ever the case. As the matrix in Table 8.7 below illustrates, the majority of parties face considerable lack of cohesion between party aims with regard to position on EU-membership.

Table 8.7 Cohesion of party aims with regard to position on EU membership. 1 is low, 5 high, except for with regard to government potential, where 1 is very detrimental and 5 no discernible effect.

| Party          | Party Unity | Voter support for position* | Effect on Government potential of EU conflict being salient | Sum   | Average   |
|----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---|-------|-----------|
| <b>Denmark</b> |             |                             |   |       |           |
| Far left       | 5           | No data                     | 1   |       |           |
| SF             | 4           | 5                           | 2(4)#   | 11/13 | 3.67/4.33 |
| DSD            | 2           | 2                           | 4   | 8     | 2.67      |
| RV             | 2           | 3                           | 4   | 9     | 3         |
| DKRF           | 2           | 3                           | 4   | 9     | 3         |
| CD             | 4           | 4                           | 4   | 12    | 4         |
| KF             | 4           | 5                           | 4   | 13    | 4.33      |
| DV             | 5           | 5                           | 4   | 14    | 4.67      |
| DFRP/DFP       | 3           | 3                           | 1   | 7     | 2.33      |
| <b>Finland</b> |             |                             |   |       |           |
| LF             | 2           | N/A                         | 3(4)#   |       |           |
| FSD            | 4           | 4                           | 4   | 12    | 4         |
| GF             | 1           | N/A                         | 3(4)#   |       |           |
| CF             | 2           | 2                           | 2   | 6     | 2         |
| FLP            | 5           | No data                     | 1   |       |           |
| FKF            | 5           | 5                           | 1   | 11    | 3.67      |
| SFF            | 3           | 5                           | 4   | 12    | 4         |
| NSP            | 5           | 5                           | 4   | 14    | 4.67      |

|               |         |         |   |    |      |
|---------------|---------|---------|---|----|------|
| <b>Norway</b> |         |         |   |    |      |
| RVA           | 5       | No data | 1 |    |      |
| SV            | 4       | 5       | 1 | 10 | 3.33 |
| AP            | 3       | 4       | 3 | 10 | 3.33 |
| SP            | 5       | 5       | 3 | 13 | 4.33 |
| NKRF          | 4       | 5       | 4 | 13 | 4.33 |
| NV            | 3       | 3       | 4 | 10 | 3.33 |
| H             | 4       | 5       | 2 | 11 | 3.67 |
| NFRP          | 3       | 3       | 2 | 8  | 2.67 |
| <b>Sweden</b> |         |         |   |    |      |
| VP(K)         | 4       | 5       | 1 | 10 | 3.33 |
| SSD           | 2       | 3       | 4 | 9  | 3    |
| GP            | 5       | 5       | 1 | 11 | 3.67 |
| CP            | 2       | 3       | 2 | 7  | 2.33 |
| KD            | 4       | 3       | 4 | 11 | 3.67 |
| FP            | 4       | 5       | 4 | 13 | 4.33 |
| MP            | 5       | 5       | 4 | 14 | 4.67 |
| ND            | No data | 3       | 1 |    |      |

\* 80 percent or more voted in agreement with party position = 5, 60-79 = 4, 40-59 = 3, 20-39 = 2, 0-19 = 1. The VF and the GF in Finland had no official position. Based on party voted for at election before 1994 referendums, 1992 referendum in Denmark.

# The Danish SF and the Finnish GF and VF all changed their policy to considerably more pro-EU positions after the respective referendums.

Sources: Party Programmes, communication with parties, Jahn and Storsved (1995a, 1995b), Bjørklund (1996) and Siune (1993).

In addition, there would be substantial coalition and EU-level co-operation problems if governments of EU-member states (and also an EEA-member such as Norway) contain strong anti-EU elements, in particular if this is the official position of a party (or parties) in government. Essentially, EU-membership would become impossible if such a party tried to exercise its opposition. It would have to attempt the blockage of some, if not all (depending on the level of pragmatism), EU legislation being implemented nationally. Also, it would presumably veto any legislation it could when its minister(s) attend Council meetings and votes. *Ceteris Paribus*, this consideration makes it less attractive for any Nordic political party to oppose European integration, unless they aim for

complete disassociation with the EU and not to enter into coalition with any pro-EU party.

As can be deduced from Table 8.7 above, the problems faced by a Nordic political party due to the salience of the EU-conflict vary considerably, both between parties in different countries but belonging to the same 'family' and between parties in one country. The numbers given in the final column of Table 8.7 provides a measure of the problems faced by the parties. The lower this number is, the worse the problem.

There is little cohesion across party families in the region in this regard. On the far left party unity tends to be high, as does voter support for the position taken. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, none of the far-left parties have ever been invited to join a government. Hence, these parties can aim for vote maximisation on the EU-conflict, giving only secondary consideration to office-maximisation. Although these parties often are involved in supporting minority Social Democrat governments, taking a position at variance with the Social Democratic parties or other potential co-operation partners should not impede this.

For the far-left parties in these three countries the position of their voters would make a pro-EU position very problematic. The vast majority of voters who supported the three larger such parties (the SF, the SV and the VP) at the last election before the referendums opposed membership. Also, substantial numbers of voters in the Social Democratic parties in each of these countries oppose membership, in particular in Denmark. Based on the assumption that voters are more likely to switch to parties close to their previously preferred party on the left-right scale, there is considerable potential

for attracting anti-EU voters who would otherwise (the EU-conflict not being salient) have voted for a Social Democratic party. However, the potential for attracting Social Democratic voters depends on the position taken by other parties close to these parties on the left-right scale, that is, the centrist parties. The Norwegian centrist parties differ from the ones in Denmark and Sweden in that they have taken an anti-EU stance. Hence, the potential for vote-maximisation is higher for the Swedish and Danish far-left parties than for the Norwegian one(s).

However, the Swedish situation is complicated by the position of the GP. This party places on the centre-left of the left-right cleavage and at the anti-EU extreme of the EU-dimension. Therefore, the potential of the VP to attract anti-EU voters from the SD is compromised by the similar potential of the GP. Furthermore, the GP's central-left position on the left-right axis could also make this party more attractive than the VP to centrist anti-EU voters. Although the GP's environmentalist focus may not be overtly attractive to many such voters, they should be able to attract some voters who would otherwise support the CP. The CP has long profiled itself partially as an environmentalist party, and the GP and the CP have opposition to Swedish nuclear power in common.

In the Danish case, the SF campaigned against the TEU in the 1992 referendum, but then instigated the 'National Compromise' which allowed Denmark to sign up to the TEU with certain exemptions in 1993. The SF then campaigned for Denmark's continued participation in the EU on these terms, but the party was not supported in its new stance by considerably more voters than the number that opposed it when it

campaigned against the TEU. Hence, the SF appears to have reduced its vote-maximising potential based on the EU-conflict through these actions.

However, four other factors should also be taken into account to explain the SF position. Firstly, a qualified pro-EU position brings the SF closer to the position of the SD and the RV. Hence, the party appears to have switched its focus from vote- to office-maximisation on the EU-conflict. Secondly, the SF appears to have had a genuine hope that the Danish position could be adopted by the EU as a whole, and that the integration-tendencies prevalent in the TEU could be halted. This would make the EU more palatable to the Danish position, and contribute to the vote-maximisation aim. Thirdly, as part of the National Compromise, it was stipulated that all further EU Treaty changes would be put to a referendum in Denmark. This off-loading reduces the risk of vote-loss for SF as well as other parties, and therefore allows for a change towards aiming for office-maximisation. Fourth, in its programmes<sup>15</sup> the SF makes it abundantly clear that it still believes the EU in its current form should be radically reformed or abolished, and the party officially opposes the Amsterdam Treaty. Hence, the SF policy switch appears to be fuelled by a realistic approach to limit the EU integration project as much as possible whilst maximising the party's office-potential and minimising the risk of vote-loss.

The situation in Finland is somewhat different. In this country there is a tradition (partly because of past requirements that certain legislation be passed by a super-majority) for excess majorities that span the left-right and territorial dimensions. All parties represented in parliament with more than two seats since 1990 have been members of a

government in this same decade, including the far-left amalgamation now known as the VF, which in the past included strong communist elements. This puts the VF in a somewhat different situation from other far-left parties in the region. The very realistic potential to gain office is likely to have reduced the otherwise obvious temptation to pursue an anti-EU policy. The party did not have an official anti-EU policy at the time of the 1994 referendum, and after the referendum the VF decided not to pursue a policy of withdrawal. This moderation is likely to have made it considerably easier for the VF to be able to join the pro-EU five-party government formed after the 1995 election.

The centre-left Social Democratic parties face considerable problems due to the EU-conflict in three of the countries, Finland being the exception. In Norway the party is badly split, but has received considerable support from its voters for its position. Also, the problems faced by the centre-right in Norway benefits the AP with regard to its government potential. Although the SV and the SP are both anti-EU, ad-hoc support for EU-related matters can be found elsewhere. The Danish and Swedish parties are both split and in disagreement with at least half their voters on the EU-conflict. But their government potential does not appear to have been adversely affected, partly because the parties on the centre-right are also pro-EU and therefore remain potential coalition and co-operation partners. However, without the off-loading mechanisms, it is unlikely that party unity and voter loyalty could be retained.

The centre parties in Finland and Sweden are badly split on the EU-question and in conflict with the opinion of about 2/3ds of their voters. The Norwegian SP achieves a high average score in Table 8.7, but this is due to the extreme party unity on European

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<sup>15</sup> For example, 'Et Europa i Flere Rum', 'Rød-grøn politik i Europa', 'SF & EF'.



integration and the party's position as the standard bearer for the anti-EU side in Norway. The party does not benefit from the EU-conflict with regard to office maximisation, since this conflict splits the centre-right in Norway, and in particular separates the H from the SP. On the other hand, with the party and its voters so united against membership, it is not very difficult for the SP to decide on a position. In addition, in Norway - as opposed to all the other three countries - there is actually a realistic chance of a government made up exclusively of anti-EU parties to get into office. This is because Norway is unique in that a substantial number of parties and the vast majority of voters in the centre of the left-right cleavage oppose membership.

This is not the case in the other three countries. In particular, the other 'traditional' liberal parties take a much more pro-EU position, as do considerably more of their voters. The Swedish FP and the Danish DV are among the most pro-EU parties in the Nordic area. In Finland the SFF are also very pro-EU, although a substantial and distinct section of its voters (the rural, mainly farming, population in Ostrobothnia) disagrees with this position. And the new, ultra-liberal UF party is perhaps the most pro-EU political party in Finland, although it is too soon to establish which parties this party might try to, or be able to, enter into coalitions with. In contrast, the NV is opposed to EU-membership, although about half its voters disagree with this position.

Among the Christian parties the Norwegian NKRF and the Finnish FKF oppose EU membership. Because the latter party is small and the only centrist party in Finland to oppose membership, and because Finnish governments straddle the left-right divide, this is of minor importance for government formation. In Denmark the DKRF is deeply split over EU membership. It opposed the TEU in 1992, but supported the 'Edinburgh

Compromise' in 1993. In Sweden the KD is pro-membership, although a considerable number of its voters are not.

The Norwegian SP is the only substantial rural/farmers party that officially opposes EU-membership. In Finland (CF) and in Sweden (CP) the main centre parties are sceptical to membership, and a majority of their voters opposed membership at the 1994 referendums. However, as opposed to the situation in Norway, these parties have no other substantial<sup>16</sup> parties that are anti-EU to align themselves with in the centre of the left-right cleavage.

In Denmark there is no rural based centre party as such. Rather, the DV and the RV combine as right-leaning (DV) and left-leaning (RV) liberal parties, with the DV in particular representing rural and farming interests. Because the vast majority of DV voters are pro-EU, this party would need very good reasons to take up an anti-EU position. Although the majority of RV voters have tended to be anti-EU, this party also lacks anti-EU coalition partners, since no other centrist party in Denmark is anti-EU. The last centrist party in Denmark, the CD, is also pro-EU. Hence, whilst there is potential for an anti-EU centrist coalition in Norway, such a potential does not exist in the other countries. Therefore, whilst an anti-EU position would be in conflict with the aim of office-maximisation for centre parties in three of the countries, the situation in Norway is more ambivalent. On the one hand, the salience of the EU-conflict makes coalitions between the Norwegian centre-parties and the H very difficult, on the other, the centrist parties can realistically form a government on their own. They did so after

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<sup>16</sup> Arguably, the tiny FKF is an exception to this.

the September 1997 Storting election. However, such a government must either be very pragmatic to retain enough parliamentary support, or it will be short-lived.

In all four countries the leadership, voters and core-support groups of the centre-right mainstream Conservative parties (business-interests, supporters of a more market-oriented economy, urbanites) are largely pro-EU. However, whilst in Denmark, Finland and Sweden most of these parties' normal and potential coalition partners are all pro-EU, this is not the case in Norway. Therefore, while the EU-conflict does little damage to the office-maximising potential of the Conservative parties in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, it makes government participation very unlikely for the Norwegian H. In addition, this party also risks losing votes due to the salience of the EU-conflict, since voters can move to anti-EU parties in the centre, whose other policies (in particular economic ones) are not that dissimilar from those of the H.

The far-right parties in the region have never been in government in any of the four countries. By 1994, the Swedish party (the ND), which had only existed since 1990, appeared set for oblivion, receiving only 1.2 percent of the vote at the 1994 general election. In Finland there is no significant far-right party, although the FLP might be considered as one because of its populist and sometimes xenophobic policies. However, by 1994 this party was also heading for oblivion, and after the 1995 election it went bankrupt.

In Denmark and Norway, however, the far right has had a considerable presence since the early 1970's in the 'sister-parties', the DFRP and the NFRP. With government potential seemingly limited (without increased blackmail potential through increased

size), vote-maximisation appears to be the best option for these parties. And, since it is the anti-EU voters who appear to lack representation, an anti-EU position would appear to be the most advantageous. However, two factors complicate their decision regarding which position might be more appropriate to this aim. Firstly, their voters are quite split on this issue<sup>17</sup>. Secondly, the voters who support parties close to the Progress Parties on the left-right scale are largely pro-EU, particularly in Denmark. Hence, the vote-maximising potential appears to be limited. But the populist profile of these parties tends to enable them to gain votes from parties further away on the left-right scale<sup>18</sup>. It is therefore unclear which policy would be vote-maximising for the Progress Parties.

However, an anti-EU position removes the Progress Parties further from office in that it distances them from the pro-EU Conservative parties, and, in the Danish case, from the DV. Hence, it appears that a pro-EU position would be more in accordance with an office-maximising strategy, at least in Denmark. In Norway the situation is much more complicated, since a pro-EU position would correspond with the position of the H, but an anti-EU position would agree with the position of the centrist parties. However, it is questionable if a 'coalition-friendly' position on European integration would make the Progress Parties more acceptable as coalition partners in any case. Overall, these parties do not stand to benefit from an increased salience of the EU-conflict, in particular because such a situation detracts from other issues they are more likely to benefit from.

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<sup>17</sup> Svåsand and Lindström (1997, pp. 213-214) suggest that this is connected to these parties containing several streams of supporters. The liberal faction see EU-membership as perfectly natural, the populist faction object to membership for xenophobic reasons, and the libertarians reject membership due to opposition to adding another layer of government.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Thomsen (1995a, p. 321) regarding Denmark, Aardal (1990, p. 156) and Valen (1994, p. 177) regarding Norway.

Their actual positions (very anti-EU in Denmark, vaguely pro-EU in Norway) on the EU-conflict is unlikely to increase either votes or office potential.

Ultimately, seeking votes based on positioning on European integration is a highly risky affair. Individual opinion on European integration is likely to be made up of a complex set of utility-functions, as chapters four to seven show. In addition, it is difficult for parties to ascertain whether people actually will base their vote on their position on European integration.

In certain circumstances, focusing on opposition to European integration may benefit certain parties in terms of vote maximisation. This can be seen in the 1993 election in Norway and in the 1994 national and 1995 EP elections in Sweden. But in the long run, focusing on position on the EU is not likely to benefit any Nordic political party in terms of office-seeking. Even though certain parties may benefit in vote-seeking terms from focusing on anti-EU sentiments, these parties are, at the same time, further distancing themselves from office.

### **8.3 A party-driven solution: off-loading the EU-conflict away from the national election agenda.**

Because of the complications a salient EU-conflict cause for the majority of political parties with regard to national elections and national government formation, off-loading this conflict onto other electoral arenas offers a good solution to the majority of political parties in the region. The main off-loading mechanism is referendums, but elections to the EP are also useful in this respect. Danish anti-EU voters appear to use this as an opportunity to voice their opinion on European integration, whilst reverting to their 'normal', largely pro-EU parties at national elections. From the one EP-election in Sweden and Finland so far, there are indications that this pattern is developing in these countries as well, but it is too early to draw any firm conclusions.

Some parties stand to benefit substantially more from such off-loading exercises than others do. Table 8.7 and the discussion above indicates which parties face more difficulties uniting their main aims due to the salience of the EU-conflict, and which ones face more limited problems. For the parties that are split and/or in disagreement with considerable numbers of their voters on the EU-conflict, off-loading is of paramount importance. The alternative, to focus on these matters in national elections, could lead to formal splits in parties and/or massive vote loss.

In the 1990s off-loading the EU-issue from national elections has been particularly important for the Social Democratic parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden; the Centre parties in Sweden and Finland; the Christian parties in Denmark and Sweden; the RV in Denmark, the NV in Norway, the DFRP and the NFRP, and the GP and the LA in

Finland. These parties are all in disagreement with substantial numbers of their voters on the issue of EU-membership, as well as suffering from deep internal divisions on this issue.

But even for parties that themselves face only limited problems with respect to internal unity and support from voters due to the salience of the EU-conflict, problems faced by their (potential) coalition partners are likely to make them favour off-loading. Furthermore, several parties see their coalition potential reduced as a result of the salience of the EU-conflict, and for these off-loading is also attractive. Thus, many parties that are united, and whose voters are relatively unified in their opinion on European integration, have to decide if they wish to aim for vote-maximisation by focusing on the EU-issue at national elections, or aim for office-maximisation and therefore off-load the EU-issue to other arenas.

These latter considerations are relatively unimportant in Denmark, but could possibly be of some consequence for the KF and the DV. In Finland the FSD, SFF and the NSP might wish to aim for off-loading in order to broaden the choice of coalition partners to include the CF, the GF and the VF. As for the FKF, this party is extremely anti-EU, and virtually all its voters opposed EU-membership. However all its potential coalition partners are pro-EU, and so this party's coalition potential is very limited regardless of whether or not the EU-conflict is off-loaded. In the Norwegian case, the H, the NKRK and the SP are all in a situation where they have to decide whether to give priority to vote- or office-maximisation. At the 1993 election SP chose to maximise votes, in 1997 office-potential. The party succeeded both times, but only at the cost of failure to achieve the other aim on each occasion. In Sweden the FP and the MP can broaden their

coalition-basis by off-loading the EU-issue, to make matters easier for the KD and the CP.

Conversely, some parties may view their office potential as minimal unless they increase their share of the vote dramatically, and for such parties the EU-conflict might be worth focusing on in national elections. This is arguably the case for the SF and the DFRP in Denmark, the SV and the NFRP in Norway, and the VP and the GP in Sweden. However, the voters who tend to support the Progress Parties are split fairly evenly into opponents and proponents of EU-membership, and hence off-loading is an attractive option for these parties as well. Similarly, the SF's official position has, in the period 1992-1997 at least, been in contradiction with that of the vast majority of its voters, and hence off-loading is a good option for this party as well. Even the remaining three parties (the VP, the GP and the SV) have to consider how focusing on the EU-conflict affects their coalition-potential, but they are the parties most likely to benefit from a failure or lack of off-loading.

#### 8.3.1 Why off-loading is an incomplete solution.

The nature of the EU integration project makes it virtually impossible to off-load the EU-conflict completely from the Nordic national election arenas. When a country has joined the EU, the constant evolution and increasing influence of this organisation necessitates debate and action in national parliaments more or less constantly. Legislation and regulations are issued by the EU to be incorporated into national law, the ECJ makes rulings that have to be accepted by one or several member-states, draft resolutions and Treaty changes have to be debated, and policies agreed upon for Council



and European Council meetings. Much of this also applies to association agreements such as the EEA.

It is not possible to refer all these matters to referendums, and nor can it be expected that people will voice their opinion on EU-related decisions made by their national government and parliament only at EP-elections. The parties can reduce the effect of the EU-conflict by presenting a united front on European integration, and thus give the voters little choice, or they can attempt to keep EU-issues out of the national election arena. However, it is obvious that if one party decides to focus on EU-issues in the national election arena, then the off-loading solution is at risk. So far the most obvious of such 'breaches' were made by the SP in Norway at the 1993 election, and by the GP and the VP at the 1994 Swedish election. But, as argued above, for most of the parties there are very good reasons for making the off-loading exercise as complete as possible.

Off-loading is perhaps more difficult for a 'nearly EU-member' such as Norway. While political parties in the other countries can attempt to 'bypass' the conflict over substantial EU developments through referendums (and, to a lesser extent, EP elections) the Norwegian domestic political system has to cope with these questions internally to a greater extent. Therefore, European integration is likely to be of greater importance for the Norwegian party system than in the other three countries. While Danish, Finnish and Swedish politicians can promise referendums on every 'major' development in the EU, their Norwegian colleagues have to deal with such developments within the confines of the national parliament and the national elections arena.

In Denmark - and, so far, in Sweden - people vote for 'anti-EU' parties at EP elections and then return to the fold at national elections. In Finland the party vote changed considerably less at the EP election. However, this appears to be because many Finnish voters support candidates based on their individual position on EU-membership to a much greater extent than in Denmark. Hence, in all three countries the elections to the EP appear to reflect position on European integration to a considerable extent, and much more so than voting patterns at national elections do.

Considering how little of the political power at the EU level is vested in the EP, this makes for poor representation of the anti-EU position held by many voters in these three countries. It is at the national level that the representatives for the powerful positions at EU level are selected. Hence, by reverting to more pro-EU parties at national elections, those who oppose European integration are limiting the effect of their opposition quite dramatically. This leaves the pro-EU parties with a mandate to pursue, or agree to, a higher level of European integration than many of their voters appear to support.

#### **8.4 The divided Nordics.**

With regard to the traditional idea of Nordic unity, the EU conflict has highlighted two problems. Firstly, the disparate interests of the four countries. Secondly, and partly resulting from the first point, the limits of Nordic solidarity. Denmark needs access to non-Nordic markets for its massive agricultural sector; the other three could manage without. Indeed, most of the farmers in Finland and Norway would be far happier to retain their higher national subsidies than having to submit to the EU system with its lower subsidies.

The timing of the revival of the EU-conflict also highlighted differences of interest between these four countries. Both Finland and Sweden had severe economic problems when EU-membership entered the political agenda around 1990. In Finland unemployment surged above twenty percent, in Sweden to around ten - both levels unheard of since World War II. In addition, Sweden's public finances were deteriorating severely. Joining the EU could be viewed as a way out of these problems, a way of reviving their economies. Their situation could hardly get worse. In addition, Finland needs to firmly assert its belonging with Western Europe, and not with Russia. For this country, EU membership is a way of achieving this, and Nordic integration does not appear to be an acceptable substitute.

Denmark was in a relatively comfortable economic position around the same time. Although the European recession affected it as well, it did so in a less severe manner than elsewhere, and especially compared with Sweden and Finland. But for Denmark leaving the EU would risk severe effects on the agricultural industry. Norway was probably less affected by the recession than any other European country. Its substantial revenues from oil- and gas-production in the North Sea allowed it to pump money into subsidies and public employment so as to limit the effect of the recession. Alone among the four countries, EU membership seems to hold little economic benefit for the country as a whole. The wealth from the North Sea, NATO membership and the lack of an export-driven agricultural sector allows for a much freer position compared to the other three.

The main obstacles to previous attempts at Nordic integration were covered in the introduction. European integration and the differing approaches of the four countries add to the previous problems. Varying interests with regard to EU membership between individuals and groups in the different countries as well as between the countries when viewed as whole entities makes EU-membership much more attractive for some actors than for others. Nordic solidarity is not strong enough to override these interests. Consideration for Nordic unity did not prevent Denmark - or the majority of the Danish population - from joining the EU in 1973, nor did it prevent the Norwegian government, elites, and nearly half the voters from trying to do the same. And in the 1990's there was minimal consideration in any of the countries as to how EU-membership would affect Nordic co-operation, with the possible exception of Norway joining the Schengen arrangement. As three Nordics pursue their varying interests within the EU and two stay outside, Nordic disparity seems more likely than unity.

## **8.5 Theoretical conclusions.**

### **8.5.1 The cleavage model.**

The cleavage model, as employed in this thesis, contributes to answering the research questions addressed in two ways. Firstly, as a device for understanding the development and character of the party systems of the Nordic countries. Secondly, the cleavage system helps us understand the complexity of the appeal of the political parties in the party system, and the limitations this complexity implies for the impact on the party system of a new dimension such as European integration. Combined, these two

contributions of the cleavage model help us to compare the effect of the EU-conflict on the party system between countries.

With regard to the party system, the cleavage model helps us to understand what separates the parties in the party system, and in particular whether they are also separated mainly by occupying different points on a scale based on one cleavage, or whether they are separated by one or more cross-cutting cleavages. The main Social Democratic and Conservative parties, as well as the far-right and far-left parties, are mainly competing on the left-right scale. But other parties, such as the Christian parties and the Centre and Liberal parties, and the SFF, are differentiated not so much by their position on the dominant left-right scale as by their position based on other cleavages that cross-cut the left-right cleavage.

This party-system framework derived from the cleavage model is valuable when evaluating the impact of the EU-conflict. The degree of correspondence between the existing cleavages and the EU-conflict informs the judgement of how strong an influence this new or resurgent dimension will have on the party system. Furthermore, the cleavage model also provides a means of evaluating which parties are likely to be separated, and which are likely to be brought closer together, as a result of a salient EU-conflict.

#### *Off-loading and the cleavage model.*

Attempts made by party elites to off-load the EU-conflict have had the effect of moderating the impact of the EU-conflict as a potential cleavage. The extent to which

this off-loading is successful thus correlates with the cleavage potential of the EU-conflict. If the issues related to European integration are excluded from the national elections debate, or at least reduced in importance, then the cleavage potential of the EU-conflict is likely to be reduced as well.

It would appear that EU-membership is conducive to removal from the national election arena because it can readily be reduced to a yes/no decision suitable for referendums. Other dimensions, such as the left-right divide and territorial conflicts of interest appear to be both more complicated and more chronic, and therefore more likely to retain an influence on the party system over time. However, the EU-dimension has taken on a more permanent nature over time, and it is increasingly unlikely that it can be off-loaded completely through referendums and/or elections to the EP. Large numbers of people see their utility affected by whether decisions are made by national institutions or EU institutions. This has two main aspects. Firstly, the nationalist/europeanist dichotomy as to whether, as such, authority should rest with the nation-state or with the EU. Secondly, on a variety of other, mostly less philosophical factors, people's utility is also affected by whether or not their state is an EU-member. EU-membership affects, for example, income from subsidies, taxation, control over national resources, the ability of the national government to lead a right-leaning or left-leaning economic policy, and immigration.

It could be argued that if a country decides to stay out of the EU, then the conflict potential of the EU-dimension is reduced. However, this would require those who wish to be EU-members to refrain from seeking a closer association with the EU. Similarly, as in the case of Norway, EEA-membership and related arrangements such as the

Schengen Treaty keeps the EU-dimension on the agenda. As long as EU-legislation is applicable there will be conflicts of interest over EEA-membership similar to those there are over EU-membership.

Overall, while the EU-conflict may not have developed into a cleavage in all four countries, it continues to disturb the party system. Due to the pervasive and extensive nature of the EU, EU- and EEA-membership affects so much of peoples' lives that referendums cannot off-load the entire debate over European integration away from the national elections agenda. Thus, the cleavage potential of the EU-conflict remains strong, and the off-loading strategy can only be partially successful. However, it does reduce the cleavage-potential of the EU-conflict.

#### 8.5.2 Rational choice theory.

*The utility of rational choice theory for this thesis.*

Rational Choice is the dominant theoretical framework employed in this thesis. The view taken here is that, at the very least, rational choice employed as a heuristic device can make a considerable contribution to the analysis of politics. This contribution is in two main areas. Firstly, a rational choice approach may lead the researcher to ask questions in a different manner, to question established truths, or even to ask completely new questions. Secondly, rational choice lends itself well to building framework models for further analysis.

In this thesis, an important question asked is why so few parties oppose EU membership given the apparent size of the opposition to such membership in the population. Asking such questions can yield valuable insights that may otherwise not have surfaced. If one focuses on parties as vote maximisers, then it would seem rational for more parties to be anti-EU. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, other concerns, such as office-maximisation, retaining party-cohesion and the ability to co-operate with the EU, make an anti-EU policy, and in particular the campaigning on an anti-EU platform at national elections, very difficult.

Once it has been established that the EU-conflict complicates tactics and strategy for many political parties, the question for the parties is how to reduce or remove these complications. One solution is to off-load the EU-conflict from the national election arena to referendums and elections to the EP. This allows European integration matters to be largely avoided in the arena of elections to the national parliament. This reduces complications for many parties and voters. This then raises the question as to what the purpose of popular referendums is. No doubt the idea that the referendum is a means of giving the population of an otherwise representative democracy a direct say in a question of supposedly great importance has some validity. But it is not the whole story. The referendum employed as a tactical device to remove a thorny question from the national elections arena is also part of the equation.

One frequent criticism of rational choice theory is that it makes too many assumptions, and/or ignores relevant factors. For example, it could be argued that this thesis does not sufficiently account for how the leaders of political parties come to hold their personal views, regardless of tactical considerations such as vote- and office-maximisation, of



European integration and EU-membership. But this is a limit of political science, not of the rational choice approach. We cannot know exactly how each politician makes up his mind about EU-membership, nor can we separate this opinion-formation from his tactical concerns, and indeed personal development, as a politician.

Just like any other citizen, the politician can be analysed according to the model developed in section 3.3 (in Chapter 3) and the relevant country-chapter sections based on this model. But, just as the farmers' opinion of EU-membership is affected by the effect it has on the farming industry, so the politicians' opinion is affected by how the EU-conflict affects him as a politician, including the effect on his party, its prospects for maximising its number of votes, and its potential for government participation.

Making explicit assumptions about, for example, the aims of political parties or actors has two important advantages. Firstly, it allows the researcher to frame his research question in an unambiguous form. Secondly, through stripping away other considerations, the researcher can focus on one or a few factors, and thus hopefully generate valuable insights about these particular variables, and their interactions with other variables. Moreover, explicitly stating which assumptions have been made is more straightforward than making assumptions without clarifying what they are. For example, most analyses of parties and party systems implicitly assume that parties are trying to maximise one or more aims, most commonly votes or office. Rational choice models make these aims and the (potential) conflict between them more explicit.

On the other hand, narrow, or strict, rational choice models can simplify politics to such an extent that the value of the analysis becomes questionable. For example, focusing on

one party aim such as office maximisation, or arguing that policy-maximisation is the ultimate aim of a political party may be useful in certain circumstances. But to ignore the existence and potential conflict of different party aims can make the resulting analysis inadequate. In this thesis, the overall aim of a political party is argued to be office-maximisation, but other aims are also considered. In particular, it is stressed that it becomes more difficult to pursue different party aims simultaneously when the EU-conflict is salient.

It appears that rational choice is better suited for explaining a situation where the number of relevant actors is relatively small, and, based on reasonable assumptions, where their aims can be argued to be relatively few. In the context of this thesis, this means that a rational choice model provides a more powerful explanation of the behaviour of political parties, and a more limited contribution to the explanation for the attitudes towards EU-membership in the population at large.

It is reasonable to limit the number of general aims of political parties in a manner similar to that argued in Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, it is considerably more difficult to generalise about how the utility of an individual citizen is affected by something as complicated and wide-ranging as membership in the EU. For a political party gaining office is, seen in isolation, presumably beneficial to it. However, it is much more difficult to arrive at one or a few general aims that each person pursues.

Chapter 3, section one, lists factors where EU-membership might materially affect individual utility in a general manner, the country chapters specify and evaluate the importance of these factors in each country. It is possible to operationalise the effect of

EU-membership on a variety of factors, and to evaluate how people's utility is likely to be affected by these developments. However, in order to evaluate which factors affect individual utility more, it is necessary to make assumptions about which aims individuals have, which factors make how much contribution to his utility. If each individual's aim could be argued to be to maximise his financial prosperity, then his support or opposition to membership would depend upon his view of how EU-membership affects his financial prosperity. But because EU-membership affects so many factors, and it is not possible to know how much each factor contributes to each individual utility calculation, it is necessary to make some assumptions in order to arrive at a meaningful analysis. The result is that the rational choice analysis is considerably more powerful with regard to some factors - where general aims can be reasonably assumed - than to others. Unfortunately, it is not necessarily the case that the former category is more important for individual utility than the latter.

First, however, it is necessary to address the general problem of people's lack of information on which to base rational decisions, and to specify such problems with regard to the effect of EU-membership on individual utility. As argued in Chapter 3, the rational course of action if the effect of EU-membership on all relevant factors is 100 percent uncertain would be to abstain in EU-related referendums, and to discount EU-related issues completely when voting in other elections. Moreover, if there is a high, but not 100 percent level of uncertainty, then abstention becomes a likely option if the cost of information is substantial. For many of the factors mentioned and evaluated in chapters three through eight the effect of EU-membership is highly uncertain, or they contradict each other. This is partly due to EEA-membership being the most likely alternative to EU-membership.

Because EEA-membership also extends the internal market to the Nordic countries, many effects of EU-membership that would otherwise be quite important, become rather less so. Examples include taxation, the general price-level, access for exports, and the Norwegian petroleum industry. Although EU-membership does affect these factors, the effect tends to be minimal in the short term, and whilst future effects could potentially be substantial, they are at present uncertain. As such, it is to be expected that the individual discounts the effect of such factors on his utility emanating from EU-membership.

Another decision-making problem is related to countervailing influences on utility. Some factors, whilst evaluated in isolation, might seem to clearly point the individual towards or away from EU-membership. For example, the decision-making mechanisms of the EU are very complex, indirect, and move the decision-making institutions further from the people, both physically and culturally. Hence, 'democracy' appears to suffer when a country joins the EU. On the other hand, membership in the EU, especially if seen as an alternative to the EEA, affords a country and its people influence over decisions that either indirectly (e.g. EMU, foreign policy, environmental policy) or directly (EEA-regulations) affect it whether or not it is a member of the EU. In this respect, then, EU-membership is positive for 'democracy'. As a consequence, it is argued in this thesis that the 'democracy-factor' is of only minor importance for the effect of EU-membership on individual utility.

The factors where EU-membership makes an easily observable difference are thus reduced to a few. Firstly, for many people EU-membership affects utility in a narrow,

economic sense. Secondly, EU-membership transfers power from the nation-state to the EU. Hence, for those who view this as positive or negative, utility is affected. Thirdly, the welfare state and the level of state spending are likely to be affected by EU-membership. Fourth, EU-membership makes free trade with the EU member-states much more secure than EEA-membership. Thus, from a rational choice point of view, these are the major factors people take into account when deciding how EU-membership affects their utility. Although they might consider other factors as well, they are likely to assign only minor importance to them.

However, three problems arise from this argument. Firstly, even within this framework it is very difficult to evaluate how these factors affect individual utility relatively to each other. Secondly, with respect to the last three factors, it is difficult to assign a reasonable general aim. For example, is free trade positive or negative for individual utility? Thirdly, due to incomplete information, or a skewed evaluation of countervailing factors, people might assign considerably more weight to factors this model assumes they will ignore or at least heavily discount.

Because of these concerns, the rational choice model works best if limited to considering narrow economic effects of EU-membership on individual utility. This is not to say that it is impossible to use a rational choice model as a general framework model for the analysis of the effect of EU-membership on individual utility. Indeed, this has been the approach used in this thesis. However, rational choice theory provides a more powerful explanatory tool when applied to the more economic aspects of this type of problem. This is because it is possible to make a general assumption in this area: people will view EU-membership as beneficial to their utility if their monetary income

increases or becomes more secure as a result. Hence, farmers in Finland and Norway; fishermen in Norway; women, public sector employees, and others disproportionately dependent upon a large welfare state tend to oppose membership; while farmers in Denmark; private sector employees; and those dependent upon secure access to export markets tend to support membership.

However, it is unlikely that people base their attitude to membership only on such economic considerations. For some people, their income or security of income will hardly be affected by EU-membership in any clearly observable manner. For others, other concerns may override these economic concerns. Thus, in this respect the rational choice model can only make a limited contribution. Nevertheless, it works well as a heuristic device for which to build a model for consideration of all the factors involved in such a complex decision as whether or not to support EU-membership.

In particular, the rational choice model used in this thesis allows consideration of a wide variety of factors in a comparative analysis. Used in combination with the comparative method, the rational choice approach can add to our understanding of popular attitudes to EU-membership. The addition of comparison allows a more viable evaluation of factors where it is difficult to ascertain which general aims people are likely to pursue, as well as of factors where the effect of EU-membership is difficult to ascertain if the analysis is limited to one country.

## **8.6 Overall Conclusions.**

It is an important part of the approach used in this thesis that factors where EU-membership either has little effect on utility, or where uncertainty of the effect is high, are discounted as influences on attitudes to EU membership. The factors identified as important through this method can be divided into three broad groups: effects on personal economic utility, left-right ideological position, and nationalism.

The most obvious effects from EU-membership on personal economic utility are connected to the primary industries. Because the EEA is the most likely alternative to EU-membership, the effect on the primary industries is the most important economic effect of full EU-membership. Because the Danish agricultural sector is competitive and export-dependent and those in Finland and Norway are not, the utility of the rural primary sector population is increased through EU-membership in Denmark, and reduced in the other two countries. The Swedish situation is somewhere in between.

The utility of those employed in industries related to the primary sector and the utility of rural people generally is also likely to be affected in the same manner as those directly employed in the primary industries. Conversely, the inhabitants of urban areas have an interest in reduced food prices, making them more likely to be pro-EU in Finland and Norway. These economic factors make up a large part of what can be observed as substantial territorial differences in attitudes to EU-membership.

Similarly, but to a lesser extent, EU-membership tends to be viewed negatively by more people in the public sector compared to the private sector, and by more women than men. The argument put forward here is that this is at least partially due to public sector employees and women (partly as public sector employees) are disproportionately dependent upon the welfare state for their income, combined with a fear that EU-membership will lead to a reduced welfare state. With regard to women, this effect is reinforced by fears of women's social status being negatively affected by joining in an integration project with countries that are seen as less egalitarian with respect to gender.

The other important element manifesting itself in territorial differences is the left-right divide over EU-membership. This division incorporates EU-membership favouring many aims of the right, such as the right's view of military security, free trade, more competition, and potentially lower taxes. These are aims that are either not particularly important, or even counter to the aims of parties and voters on the left. In particular, the far-left parties and their supporters would be unlikely to support EU-membership if they perceive that membership would promote such policies. Based on comparison and plans for co-ordination of economic policy and taxation, as well as the competitive pressures of the internal market, EU-membership can be viewed as a potential threat to the welfare state and higher state spending. This further increases the gap in attitudes to EU-membership between the left and the right, and is particularly likely to turn the far left against membership. This makes up the other main element of the territorial differences in attitudes to EU-membership: where the far left-vote is generally high, so is anti-EU sentiment.



The nationalist element in opposition to membership is likely to be connected to, and difficult to separate from, the factors above. EU membership can be viewed as a tool for promoting ideas and values of the right, nationalism as a tool to defend and/or promote ideas and values of the left. Hence, opposition to membership can be viewed partially as a 'nationalism of the left'. However, nationalism can also be a reason for voting against EU-membership not connected to such factors, and a belief in a united Europe can be a reason for favouring such membership. However, the regional patterns of voting indicate that these factors were given secondary consideration when other factors, in particular those affecting individual economic utility, were of importance.

In all four countries, the anti-EU voters are under-represented among the parties and in the parliaments, although less so in Norway than in the other countries. However, for virtually all the parties in the region, including the EU-conflict in the national election arena and surrounding debates is detrimental to the achievement of at least one, and often more, of their aims of party unity, vote maximisation policy maximisation, and office maximisation.

For many parties a salient EU-conflict at national elections constitutes a major threat by making formal splits and/or considerable loss of votes likely. However, an anti-EU position is likely to jeopardise coalition – and therefore office – potential for many of the same parties. For such parties, the need to off-load the EU-conflict to arenas other than the national election one becomes paramount. But even united parties with overwhelming support for their position on EU-membership are liable to see their office-potential reduced by a salient EU-conflict if their 'normal' or potential coalition partners are split or lose votes due to this conflict.

For virtually every Nordic political party a salient EU-conflict in the national elections arena makes it harder to reconcile vote- and office-maximisation while retaining party unity. Therefore, removing the EU-conflict from the national election arena is beneficial to the vast majority of these parties. The most efficient off-loading mechanism is the referendum, but EP-elections also serve a useful purpose as a vent for people's opinions on European integration.

Unfortunately for the political parties, they cannot completely avoid EU-related issues affecting the national election arena. EU-membership simply affects too many policy areas too deeply and too frequently to be able to persuade the voters to only consider such issues in infrequent referendums and EP-elections. However, as long as the parties present a reasonably united pro-EU front, the anti-EU voters have relatively little choice but to abstain, vote for a party whose EU-position they disagree with, or vote for an anti-EU party many of whose other policies they are likely to disagree with. So far they have tended to opt for the second option. But the 1993 election in Norway showed what can happen if European integration is turned into a prominent campaign issue at national elections.

The off-loading strategy appears to have functioned relatively well in terms of avoiding vote loss and party splits. It remains to be seen if this will be possible in the future, as European integration seems set to deepen and take in more members. However, the parties have not been as successful at avoiding the EU-conflict affecting (potential) coalition patterns. Again, the effect is strongest in Norway, but there are also problems in Sweden, where it makes the GP and VP less likely partners for the SSD, and the CP

becomes a more problematic partner for the other centre-right parties. In Finland the FKF had to leave government because of the EU-conflict, and the CF also appears to be a less likely coalition partner than before the EU-conflict became salient. In addition the VF and the GF have also become more problematic coalition partners for the more strongly pro-EU Finnish parties. Danish coalition patterns are probably those least affected by the EU-conflict. It does, however, make the DFRP and the DFP less likely coalition partners for the DV and the KF.

In terms of Hypothesis 1 stated in the introduction to this thesis, analysing attitudes to EU-membership in terms of effects on individual utility leads to a strong emphasis on certain factors, and to a de-emphasis of others. The rational choice based explanation works best for factors where the effect of EU membership on individual utility is relatively clear-cut, and in particular with economic factors. For other factors, such as the effect of nationalism on attitudes to EU-membership, this approach is less effective. However, with the aid of the comparative method the approach employed here provides a good explanation for differences in attitudes between people with different characteristics, both within and between countries.

Hypothesis 2 asserted that political parties will react to the increased salience of EU-membership as a political dimension so as to maximise their potential for holding political office. In terms of the rational choice model, a salient EU-conflict leads to a decline in synergy between the various aims of most Nordic political parties, such as vote-, policy-, and office-maximisation, and also tend to decrease party unity. In terms of the political cleavage model, the result is a cross-cutting cleavage that, although it varies in strength between the four countries discussed here, leads to relative changes in

party support as well as increases in problems of coalition formation. For these reasons, it is in the interest of most political parties, as well as many voters, to reduce or eliminate the importance of issues related to European integration at national elections. The means by which this is achieved is through off-loading the EU-conflict to the arenas of referendums and EP elections. In this manner, the parties seek to maximise the synergy between their various aims, and thus their potential for holding office.

## **8.7 Future research agenda.**

### **8.7.1 Extension of the analysis to other European countries.**

Parts of the analysis carried out in this thesis could be replicated for other European countries. It would be particularly interesting to evaluate the extent to which the question of EU-membership, or aspects of European integration such as EMU, the Schengen Treaty or the Amsterdam Treaty have affected, or are likely to affect, the party systems and/or party competition in other European countries. This would of course be a very much bigger project than the current one if all relevant European countries were to be included.

However, it is also possible to carry out such analysis of other groups of countries, rather than all EU-countries and prospective entrants, and so limit the size of the project. Alternatively, a broader study could concentrate on certain aspects of the model, such as the effects of European integration on coalition formation.

### 8.7.2 Off-loading and democracy.

A second area of study that could be usefully pursued further in the light of this thesis is related to the relationship between off-loading the EU-conflict to electoral arenas other than national elections, and the nature of democracy and representation.

With increased European integration, the off-loading solution becomes increasingly untenable. The voters have rightly observed that the EP lacks power and therefore many are indifferent to EP elections. However, the corollary to this is that it is through national elections that those who actually set and influence EU policies are elected. The Commission is made up of men and women nominated by the national governments. Participants at Council meetings are even more directly results of national elections: they are all government ministers.

The effect of this is often more insidious than obvious. Because the politicians representing these countries at the European level (excluding the EP) are nearly all pro-EU, they are unlikely to object to developments of further integration. At times this integration may lead to steps where it is decided to have a referendum on whether to participate in this further integration. But by this stage it is usually difficult to conceive of a 'compromise solution' whereby the country in question can remain at a lower level of integration whilst other countries proceed. The choice is more likely to be stark: either we remain part of the EU or we withdraw. This creates a high-risk situation. Withdrawal from the EU is likely to lead to a situation where the alternative is not very clear - or where it may appear to be similar to membership without voting rights (e.g. the

EEA). The situations in Denmark in 1992-1993 and in Norway post-1972 and post-1994 are good examples of what happens if a referendum result goes against further European integration.

The lack of representation is not, strictly, in general policy areas. If a party represents the same policies at the European level as at the national level, then people's votes and policy preferences are as well represented there as at the national level. (But note the size of democratic unit argument as well as the problem of public opinion in one country differing hugely from that of others or opinion prevalent in the EU. These are, however, compatible with an argument that the division is largely nationalist/europeanist.) However, it is the level of European integration wanted (and this is related to the arguments in brackets above) by the anti-EU voters which is under-represented. With no anti-EU parties in government there is no representation at the EU-level (except in the EP) for those who do not want a high level of integration.

As long as the separation of European integration from the national level of politics remains, many voters will effectively contradict themselves in their voting patterns between referendums, EP elections and national elections. Of course, this is nothing new: people do that frequently between national and local or regional elections. But the problem here is deeper. By voting for pro-EU parties, anti-EU voters are giving a mandate to these parties to continue a process of European integration that these voters oppose. The effects of this development on democracy, both nationally and at the European level, are surely worthy of further research.

# APPENDICES

Table A. Exports and Imports as percentage of GDP.

|         | Denmark |      | Finland |      | Norway |      | Sweden |      |
|---------|---------|------|---------|------|--------|------|--------|------|
|         | 1988    | 1993 | 1988    | 1993 | 1988   | 1993 | 1988   | 1992 |
| Exports | 0.25    | 0.27 | 0.21    | 0.24 | 0.25   | 0.29 | 0.27   | 0.23 |
| Imports | 0.24    | 0.23 | 0.20    | 0.18 | 0.26   | 0.22 | 0.25   | 0.20 |

Authors calculations. Source for GDP and trade data: UN Economic Commission for Europe: Trends in Europe and North America, 1995. GDP data was not available for Sweden for 1993.

Table B. Taxation as a percentage of GNP in market prices.

|         | 1971    | 1980 | 1990 | 1994 |
|---------|---------|------|------|------|
| Denmark | 43.5    | 45.5 | 48.6 |      |
| Finland | 33.6    | 33.0 | 38.0 |      |
| Norway  | 42.4    | 47.1 | 46.3 |      |
| Sweden  | 41.4    | 49.4 | 56.9 | 50   |
| France  | 35.0    | 41.7 | 43.7 |      |
| UK      | 35.2    | 35.5 | 36.7 |      |
| EC      | no data | 30.2 | 39.0 |      |
| OECD    | no data | 28.5 | 37.2 |      |

Sources: Sweden 1994: Widfeldt, 1995, p. 207. The remainder: Statistisk tiårsoversikt 1984 and 1993.

Table C. Unemployment, (%), EU and selected countries.

|      | EU12 | Denmark | Finland | Norway | Sweden | France | UK   |
|------|------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|------|
| 1991 | 8.8  | 8.9     | 7.6     | 5.5    | 2.7    | 9.5    | 8.9  |
| 1993 | 10.6 | 10.3    | 17.3    | 6.2    | 7.7    | 10.8   | 10.4 |

Source: Eurostat, 1995, Table 3.22, p. 154

Table D. Subsidies To Agriculture in 1993. Percent.

|   | EU-12 | Finland | Sweden | Norway |
|---|-------|---------|--------|--------|
| Assistance to producers (producer subsidy equivalent)   | 48    | 67      | 52     | 76     |
| Implicit tax on consumers (consumer subsidy equivalent) | 39    | 66      | 45     | 60     |

Barnes, 1996, Table 14.4, p 225. Note: Producer subsidy is the net total of agricultural support given to farmers. Consumer subsidy equivalent is the implicit tax that has to be born by the consumer as a result of artificially high food prices. Source: OECD 1994.



Table E. General price level and food prices.

Comparative price level February 1994. US=100. Ratio of Purchasing Power Parity to Exchange rates. The higher the ratio, the higher the price level.

| Denmark | Finland | Norway | Sweden | Germany | Netherlands | Spain | UK |
|---------|---------|--------|--------|---------|-------------|-------|----|
| 140     | 122     | 138    |        | 120     | 109         | 86    | 90 |

Source: OECD, February 1994, pp. 204-205.

Food prices excluding drinks and meals out. 1985 = 100

|          | EU12   | Denmark | Finland | Sweden |
|----------|--------|---------|---------|--------|
| 1992     | 134.7  | 114     | 120     | 131    |
| 1994     | 140    | 117     | 119     | 134    |
| 1996 Jan | 146.1* | 121     | 108     | 126    |

Eurostat: Eurostatistics. Data for short- term economic analysis. (7, 1996, p. 155, Luxembourg-Brussels)

Table F.

Social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP at market prices, 1993. Including expenditure on sickness, disability, unemployment, various pensions, maternity and family.

|                  |             |
|------------------|-------------|
| <b>Sweden</b>    | <b>40.3</b> |
| <b>Finland</b>   | <b>35.2</b> |
| Netherlands      | 33.4        |
| <b>Denmark</b>   | <b>33.3</b> |
| Germany          | 31          |
| France           | 30.9        |
| <b>Norway</b>    | <b>30.8</b> |
| UK               | 27.8        |
| Belgium          | 26.9        |
| Italy            | 25.7        |
| Luxembourg       | 24.6        |
| Spain            | 24.5        |
| Ireland          | 21.5        |
| Portugal         | 18.5        |
| Greece           | 15.8        |
| EU 11 average    | 25.5        |
| Nordic 4 average | 34.9        |

Sources: Sweden: Nordic Council of Ministers, 1996a. All other figures: Eurostat, 1997a

Table G

Maternity leave and pay. Denmark 1994, Finland, Norway and Sweden 1993, the rest 1992.

|                  | Weeks        | Pay in percent<br>of wage |
|------------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Sweden</b>    | <b>64</b>    | <b>90<sup>1</sup></b>     |
| <b>Norway</b>    | <b>42/52</b> | <b>100/80</b>             |
| <b>Finland</b>   | <b>44</b>    | <b>66</b>                 |
| <b>Denmark</b>   | <b>28</b>    | <sup>2</sup>              |
| Italy            | 20           | 80                        |
| UK               | 6+12         | 90+flat rate              |
| Luxembourg       | 16           | 100                       |
| Netherlands      | 16           | 100                       |
| France           | 16           | 84                        |
| Spain            | 16           | 75                        |
| Belgium          | 15           | 82/75                     |
| Greece           | 15           | 50                        |
| Germany          | 14           | 100 <sup>3</sup>          |
| Ireland          | 14           | 70                        |
| Portugal         | 13           | 100                       |
| EU 11 average    | 16           |                           |
| Nordic 4 average | 47           |                           |

Sources: Nordic Council of Ministers (1994a, p. 39), Eurostat (1995a, p. 86).

<sup>1</sup> For 51 weeks, then 13 with guaranteed minimum amount.

<sup>2</sup> A minimum guaranteed amount and/or wage compensation (depends upon employer). Friis (1992, p. 55) reports that in 1989 the compensation was 90-100 percent.

<sup>3</sup> Benefit expressed as a percentage of net income.

#### Appendix 4.1. Legislation and practice regarding referendums in Denmark.

The current Danish Constitution offers five possibilities for holding referendums. The first four of these are explicitly mentioned in the constitution and the results of these are binding.

1. A mandatory referendum on constitutional amendments (Article 88). Approval requires a majority of participating voters, and 40 percent of the whole electorate.
2. An optional rejective law referendum (Article 42). This can be demanded by 1/3 of the members of the Folketing. Rejection requires a negative majority comprising at least 30 percent of the electorate.
3. A mandatory law referendum on the voting age (Article 29).
4. A mandatory law referendum on the delegation of constitutional powers to international authorities (Article 20). This is only necessary if a bill is not approved with a 5/6th majority in the Folketing. Rejection requires a negative majority comprising at least 30 percent of the electorate.
5. It is possible to call ad hoc referendums that legally are only advisory<sup>1</sup>.

By 1997, Denmark had experienced seventeen referendums, fourteen of which have been held since 1953. However, four of these were held at the same date in June 1963 (land-reforms) and two at the same time in May 1953 (constitutional amendment and lowering voting age)<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Svensson, 1996, pp. 34-38. The final referendum possibility is from Sørensen (1969, pp. 178) onwards.

<sup>2</sup> Svensson, 1996, p 38.

The 1986 ad hoc referendum was an example of using this device to break a parliamentary deadlock. After the yes-vote on a turnout of 75 percent the Folketing approved the SEA. However, there was no provision in the Danish Constitution for prior consultative referendums. Special legislation was required for this, and a bill to this effect was passed before the referendum<sup>3</sup>. The 1972 referendum was held according to Article 20, as were both the 1992 and the 1993 referendums on the TEU and the Edinburgh Agreement.

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<sup>3</sup> Worre (1988, footnote 5, p. 370).

#### Appendix 4.2. Reasons for attitudes to Danish EU membership at 1992 referendum.

| Reasons for voting 'yes'. Percent.                     |     |
|--|-----|
| We are members after all, and would like to remain so  | 13  |
| We cannot manage outside the EC                        | 44  |
| Employment   | 10  |
| Other economic advantages                              | 19  |
| Desire for influence                                   | 9   |
| Environmental co-operation                             | 4   |
| Other specific policy-areas                            | 4   |
| A stronger Europe                                      | 9   |
| Re-negotiation is not possible                         | 0   |
| The other Nordic countries are applying for membership | 1   |
| Don't know   | 26  |
| Would not answer                                       | 1   |
| Total  | 138 |

Authors translation. Source: Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard (1992, p. 93).

| Reasons for voting 'no'. Percent.                         |     |
|---|-----|
| Surrender of sovereignty                                  | 43  |
| The EC shall not decide over Danish legislation           | 11  |
| Do not want co-operation over foreign policy              | 3   |
| Do not want co-operation over defence policy              | 13  |
| Do not want co-operation (other specific areas mentioned) | 10  |
| The moves towards union                                   | 14  |
| Danish identity   | 11  |
| Want re-negotiation                                       | 0   |
| Uncertainty over what there is - don't know enough        | 12  |
| The politicians don't know enough                         | 1   |
| No confidence in politicians                              | 3   |
| It will cost us   | 2   |
| Don't believe in economic advantages                      | 1   |
| Other   | 32  |
| Don't know  | 2   |
| Would not answer  | 0   |
| Total   | 154 |

Authors translation. Source: Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard (1992, p. 93).

Appendix 4.3. Group membership and vote in the 1992 and 1993 referendums in Denmark. Percentage voting 'no'.

|  | 1992 | N   | 1993 | N   |
|--|------|-----|------|-----|
| All                                      | 50   | 699 | 42   | 905 |
| Men                                      | 47   | 376 | 39   | 444 |
| Women                                    | 54   | 323 | 44   | 461 |
| Basic School                             | 52   | 286 | 41   | 348 |
| Grammar School/O-levels                  | 47   | 240 | 42   | 329 |
| High School/A-levels                     | 52   | 171 | 42   | 226 |
| Unskilled workers                        | 65   | 84  | 51   | 85  |
| Skilled workers                          | 46   | 88  | 48   | 131 |
| Public white collar without high school  | 60   | 70  | 48   | 87  |
| Public white collar with high school     | 54   | 48  | 47   | 57  |
| Private white collar without high school | 36   | 74  | 25   | 109 |
| Private white collar with high school    | 39   | 37  | 20   | 51  |
| Self-employed                            | 34   | 48  | 27   | 64  |
| SF                                       | 92   | 79  | 81   | 100 |
| DSD                                      | 64   | 207 | 50   | 263 |
| Centre Parties                           | 38   | 33  | 37   | 78  |
| KF                                       | 13   | 68  | 18   | 156 |
| DV                                       | 18   | 144 | 12   | 161 |
| DFRP                                     | 55   | 24  | 69   | 38  |

The 'Centre Parties' comprise the RV, the CD, and the DKRF. Source: Svensson (1994, p. 78). Based on a survey by the AIM institute using a questionnaire developed by K. Siune, P. Svensson and O. Tonsgaard at Aarhus University.

Appendix 4.4 Urbanisation, primary industry employment and vote in EC/EU referendums.

| County                      | Urbanisation (%) | Primary empl. div. population | ind. Yes- by vote 1972 | Yes- vote 1986 | Yes- vote 1992 | Yes- vote 1993 |
|-----------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Copenhagen                  | 99.88            | 0.02                          | 58.2                   | 49.8           | 48.9           | 55.4           |
| Copenhagen and Fredriksberg | 99.57            | 0.14                          | 47.5                   | 36.3           | 38.3           | 44.7           |
| Fredriksborg                | 90.14            | 0.50                          | 64.1                   | 58             | 53.5           | 59.5           |
| Roskilde                    | 89.28            | 1.29                          | 63.9                   | 55.1           | 51.6           | 59             |
| Århus                       | 84.78            | 2.32                          | 62.1                   | 53.5           | 48.7           | 57.4           |
| Vejle                       | 81.70            | 2.77                          | 68.3                   | 62.5           | 51.9           | 60.8           |
| Vestsjælland                | 73.06            | 2.93                          | 67                     | 56.9           | 48.6           | 55.4           |
| Storstrøms                  | 70.74            | 3.36                          | 68.9                   | 56.1           | 48.4           | 55             |
| Fyn                         | 80.62            | 3.43                          | 67.5                   | 57.6           | 48.1           | 56.2           |
| Nordjylland                 | 80.29            | 3.79                          | 66.3                   | 59.5           | 48.7           | 55.9           |
| Sønderjylland               | 77.04            | 4.03                          | 75.1                   | 68.3           | 54.1           | 61.5           |
| Bornholm                    | 72.77            | 4.36                          | 62.6                   | 57.3           | 49.3           | 53             |
| Ribe                        | 79.72            | 4.53                          | 70.9                   | 68.1           | 53.7           | 61.3           |
| Ringkøbing                  | 77.49            | 5.29                          | 75.3                   | 73.7           | 57.5           | 66.4           |
| Viborg                      | 70.01            | 5.56                          | 74.6                   | 67.7           | 53.6           | 62.8           |

Source: Statistisk Årbog (1993, p. 54; 1995, p. 168 and p. 172); Befolkning og Valg (No. 9, 1993, p. 7). Population and area are as by 1/1/93, urban population as by 1/1/92. Primary industries include agriculture, fisheries and raw material extraction.

Appendix 4.5. Vote for left-wing parties at 1990 election compared to no-vote in 1992 EU-referendum.

| County                         | SD   | SF   | FK  | EH  | Broad<br>Left | Far left | No-vote<br>1992 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|-----|-----|---------------|----------|-----------------|
| Ringkøbing                     | 28.8 | 4.8  | 1.1 | 0.4 | 35.1          | 6.3      | 42.5            |
| Sønderjylland                  | 35.3 | 4.4  | 1.3 | 0.6 | 41.6          | 6.3      | 45.9            |
| Ribe                           | 32.6 | 5.3  | 1.6 | 0.7 | 40.2          | 7.6      | 46.3            |
| Viborg                         | 33.8 | 5    | 1.1 | 0.6 | 40.5          | 6.7      | 46.4            |
| Fredriksborg                   | 31.4 | 8.3  | 1.6 | 2.1 | 43.4          | 12       | 46.5            |
| Vejle                          | 36.5 | 7.3  | 1.3 | 0.8 | 45.9          | 9.4      | 48.1            |
| Roskilde                       | 35.4 | 8.5  | 1.7 | 1.7 | 47.3          | 11.9     | 48.4            |
| Bornholm                       | 43.8 | 4.8  | 2   | 0.9 | 51.5          | 7.7      | 50.7            |
| Copenhagen                     | 36.4 | 9.4  | 2.5 | 2   | 50.3          | 13.9     | 51.1            |
| Århus                          | 37.9 | 9.5  | 0.9 | 1.8 | 50.1          | 12.2     | 51.3            |
| Nordjylland                    | 42.2 | 5.8  | 1.4 | 0.8 | 50.2          | 8        | 51.3            |
| Vestsjælland                   | 39   | 8.5  | 2.1 | 1.2 | 50.8          | 11.8     | 51.4            |
| Storstrøms                     | 45.2 | 7.1  | 1.9 | 1.1 | 55.3          | 10.1     | 51.6            |
| Fyn                            | 40.4 | 8.2  | 1.2 | 1.4 | 51.2          | 10.8     | 51.9            |
| Copenhagen and<br>Fredriksberg | 39.5 | 15.2 | 3.9 | 4.8 | 63.4          | 23.9     | 61.7            |

Source for data: Statistisk Årbog (1994, pp. 81-83).

Far-left = SV + FK + EH, Left = SV + FK + EH + DSD



Appendix 4.6. Election results (percent) to and seat allocation in the Danish parliament ('Folketing'), 1971-1998.

Election results.

| Party | 1971 | 1973 | 1975 | 1977 | 1979 | 1981 | 1984 | 1987 | 1988 | 1990 | 1994 | 1998 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| KF    | 16.7 | 9.2  | 5.5  | 8.5  | 12.5 | 14.5 | 23.4 | 20.8 | 19.3 | 16.0 | 15.0 | 8.9  |
| DV    | 15.6 | 12.3 | 23.3 | 12.0 | 12.5 | 11.3 | 12.1 | 10.5 | 11.8 | 15.8 | 23.3 | 24.0 |
| RV    | 14.3 | 11.2 | 7.1  | 3.6  | 5.4  | 5.1  | 5.5  | 6.2  | 5.6  | 3.5  | 4.6  | 3.9  |
| DKRF  | 2.0  | 4.0  | 5.3  | 3.4  | 2.6  | 2.3  | 2.7  | 2.4  | 2.0  | 2.3  | 1.8  | 2.5  |
| DFRP  | -    | 15.9 | 13.6 | 14.6 | 11.0 | 8.9  | 3.6  | 4.8  | 9.0  | 6.4  | 6.4  | 2.4  |
| CD    | -    | 7.8  | 2.2  | 6.4  | 3.2  | 8.3  | 4.6  | 4.8  | 4.7  | 5.1  | 2.8  | 4.3  |
| DSD   | 37.3 | 25.6 | 29.9 | 37.0 | 38.2 | 32.9 | 31.6 | 29.3 | 29.8 | 37.4 | 34.6 | 36.0 |
| SF    | 9.1  | 6.0  | 5.0  | 3.9  | 5.9  | 11.3 | 11.5 | 14.6 | 13.0 | 8.3  | 7.3  | 7.5  |
| VS    | 1.6  | 1.5  | 2.1  | 2.7  | 3.7  | 2.6  | 2.7  | 1.4  | 0.6  | -    | -    | -    |
| KOM   | 1.4  | 3.6  | 4.2  | 3.7  | 1.9  | 1.1  | 0.7  | 0.9  | 0.8  | -    | -    | -    |
| RF    | 1.7  | 2.9  | 1.8  | 3.3  | 2.6  | 1.4  | 1.5  | 0.5  | -    | 0.5  | -    | -    |
| SP    | 0.2  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| FK    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2.2  | 1.9  | 1.8  | -    | -    |
| GP    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1.3  | 1.4  | 0.9  | -    | -    |
| EH    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1.7  | 3.1  | 2.7  |
| DFP   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 7.4  |
| DF    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.3  |
| OT    | 0.1  | 0    | 0    | 0.9  | 0.5  | 0.3  | 0.1  | 0.3  | 0.1  | 0.3  | 1.1  | 0.1  |
| TO    | 87.2 | 88.7 | 88.2 | 88.0 | 85.6 | 83.2 | 88.4 | 86.7 | 85.7 | 82.8 | 83.4 |      |

Sources: Petersen (1994), Borre (1991, p. 137), Thomsen (1995, p. 350), Bjugan (1998, forthcoming). KF = Conservative Party, DV = Liberal Party, RV = Radical Liberals, DKRF = Christian People's Party, DFRP = Progress Party; CD = Centre Democrats, DSD = Social Democrats, SF = Socialist People's Party, VS = Left Socialists, KOM = Communist Party, RF = Justice Party, SP = Schlesvig Party, FK = Common Course, GP = Green Party, EH = Left Alliance, DFP = Danish People's Party, DF = Democratic Renewal, OT = Other Parties, TO = Turnout. OT in 1994 includes Jacob Haugaard, an independent candidate elected in Århus with 0.7% of the national vote.

# Seats in Parliament.

| Party | 1971 | 1973 | 1975 | 1977 | 1979 | 1981 | 1984 | 1987 | 1988 | 1990 | 1994 | 1998 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| KF    | 31   | 16   | 10   | 15   | 22   | 26   | 42   | 38   | 35   | 30   | 27   | 16   |
| DV    | 30   | 22   | 42   | 21   | 22   | 21   | 22   | 19   | 22   | 29   | 42   | 42   |
| RV    | 27   | 20   | 13   | 6    | 10   | 9    | 10   | 11   | 10   | 7    | 8    | 7    |
| DKRF  | 0    | 7    | 9    | 6    | 5    | 4    | 5    | 4    | 4    | 4    | 0    | 4    |
| DFRP  | -    | 28   | 24   | 26   | 20   | 16   | 6    | 9    | 16   | 12   | 11   | 4    |
| CD    | -    | 13   | 3    | 10   | 6    | 15   | 8    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 5    | 8    |
| DSD   | 70   | 46   | 53   | 65   | 68   | 59   | 56   | 54   | 55   | 69   | 62   | 63   |
| SF    | 17   | 11   | 9    | 7    | 11   | 20   | 21   | 27   | 24   | 15   | 13   | 13   |
| VS    | 0    | 0    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 5    | 5    | 0    | 0    | -    | -    | -    |
| KOM   | 0    | 6    | 7    | 7    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | -    | -    | -    |
| RF    | 0    | 5    | 0    | 6    | 5    | 0    | 0    | 0    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| SP    | 0    | 1    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| FK    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 4    | 0    | 0    | -    | -    |
| GP    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0    | 0    | 0    | -    | -    |
| EH    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 6    | 5    |
| DFP   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 13   |
| DF    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| FØ    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 222  | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    |
| GL    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 210  | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    |
| OT    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |

Additional key: FØ = Representatives from the Færøe Islands, GL = Representatives from Greenland. Sources as above.

Urban-rural voting differences. Based on 1990 general election result ratio between Copenhagen and Jutland.

|                   | DFRP | DKRF | DV   | CD  | KP   | DSD  | RV  | Other | SF   | FK  | EH  |
|-------------------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|-------|------|-----|-----|
| Jylland           | 8.2  | 3.4  | 19.3 | 4.5 | 14.5 | 36.4 | 3.2 | 1.7   | 6.6  | 1.2 | 1.0 |
| Central           | 3.1  | 1.3  | 7.7  | 3.8 | 14.9 | 39.5 | 3.7 | 2.1   | 15.2 | 3.9 | 4.8 |
| Copenhagen        |      |      |      |     |      |      |     |       |      |     |     |
| Urban/rural ratio | 0.4  | 0.4  | 0.4  | 0.8 | 1.0  | 1.1  | 1.2 | 1.2   | 2.3  | 3.3 | 4.8 |

Source for data: Statistisk Årbog (1994, pp. 81-83).

## Appendix 5.1. Legislation and practice regarding referendums in Finland.

Only two referendums have been held in Finland, both were consultative only. The first was held December 29-30, 1931 on repeal of the Prohibition Act, and 70.6 percent voted 'yes' to repeal on a turnout of 43.6 percent. The second was on membership on the EU, held 16.10.1994, and 56.9 percent voted 'yes' to membership on a turnout of 70.8 percent<sup>1</sup>.

During the 1930's the Committee on the Constitution of the Finnish Parliament made a authoritative interpretation of the constitution. Note that Finland neither has a constitutional court, nor any provision for judicial review of legislation<sup>2</sup>.

The Committee's interpretation was that:

"- parliament could, on an ad hoc basis, organise a consultative referendum by means of ordinary legislation - in this way, the institution of the referendum would not become a permanent constitutional feature and an organic outgrowth of the constitution that would facilitate a careless use of popular votes;

- the matter should be of such character that it could be submitted to the people, that is, the questions should pertain to topics and issues on which the people have knowledge and experience;

- the referendum could be resorted to only on the basis of exceptional and compelling reasons."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Suksi, 1996, pp 52-53.

<sup>2</sup> Suksi, 1996, p 53.

<sup>3</sup> Suksi, 1993, p. 223.

Article 22a of the Form of Government (Constitution) Act (1987) “provides for a referendum that can be characterised as a consultative, pre-regulated, and optional referendum, is not initiated by ordinary citizens, requires the enactment of implementing legislation, and makes provisions for certain connected elements”.<sup>4</sup> “Its main provision is that the organising of each consultative referendum shall be determined by means of an act of parliament, which is to specify the alternatives to be submitted to the voters, and it also prescribes that the state shall inform the voters of the alternatives and support the dissemination of information concerning them. This should, however, be viewed mainly as a codification of practice; it did not purport to alter the decision-making mechanisms.”<sup>5</sup>

The only requirement for organising a referendum is a majority in parliament. Article 22a allows for multiple choice referendums. The Act on Procedure in Consultative Referendums stipulates that the voter must have the option of indicating that he does not support any of the options presented<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Suksi, 1993, p. 228.

<sup>5</sup> Suksi, 1993, p. 225.

<sup>6</sup> Suksi, 1996, p. 55.

## Appendix 5.2. Reasons for attitudes to Finnish EU-membership.

### A. Reasons for voting 'yes' and 'no' in the 1994 referendum. Percent.

| Argument          | Reasons for voting 'yes'. |            |           |     | Reasons for voting 'no'. |            |           |     |
|-------------------|---------------------------|------------|-----------|-----|--------------------------|------------|-----------|-----|
|                   | Yes-voters                | Un-certain | No-voters | All | Yes-voters               | Un-certain | No-voters | All |
| Influence         | 40                        | 13         | 7         | 22  | 22                       | 29         | 54        | 33  |
| Security          | 22                        | 11         | 6         | 14  | 3                        | 3          | 7         | 5   |
| Environment       | 0                         | 0          | 1         | 1   | 2                        | 4          | 7         | 4   |
| Primary industry  | 3                         | 2          | 1         | 2   | 16                       | 14         | 19        | 16  |
| Economic Activity | 52                        | 49         | 20        | 42  | 7                        | 20         | 29        | 17  |
| Social security   | 4                         | 3          | 1         | 3   | 4                        | 9          | 11        | 7   |
| Culture           | 30                        | 18         | 11        | 21  | 3                        | 3          | 5         | 4   |
| Immigration       | 0                         | -          | 0         | 0   | 5                        | 10         | 11        | 8   |
| Mood/feeling      | 8                         | 4          | 1         | 5   | 6                        | 10         | 24        | 12  |
| No reason         | 7                         | 30         | 62        | 30  | 50                       | 28         | 6         | 30  |
| All               | 166                       | 130        | 110       | 14  | 118                      | 130        | 173       | 13  |
|                   |                           |            |           | 0   |                          |            |           | 6   |

Columns add up to more than 100 because people could give more than one reason.

Source: Pesonen (1994a, p. 87).

B. Assessment of arguments. Percent.

|   | Vote in<br>1994<br>referendum | Very<br>strong | Strong | Neither<br>strong nor<br>weak | Weak | Very<br>weak |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------|--------|-------------------------------|------|--------------|
| EU-membership<br>weakens our ability  | Yes                           | 4              | 22     | 25                            | 40   | 9            |
| To control our<br>economy   | No                            | 29             | 38     | 15                            | 13   | 5            |
| Activity toward<br>equality among men   | Yes                           | 2              | 9      | 25                            | 47   | 18           |
| And women if EU-<br>member  | No                            | 8              | 24     | 36                            | 26   | 5            |
| Business community<br>wants membership  | Yes                           | 5              | 26     | 37                            | 26   | 5            |
| To get rid of political<br>controls   | No                            | 11             | 24     | 41                            | 18   | 5            |
| Membership in the EU<br>means giving up   | Yes                           | 4              | 13     | 21                            | 44   | 19           |
| National sovereignty  | No                            | 27             | 31     | 22                            | 14   | 6            |
| Environmental<br>problems can only<br>be solved with help<br>from the EU  | Yes                           | 13             | 44     | 23                            | 17   | 3            |
| Membership in the EU<br>is positive   | No                            | 5              | 20     | 27                            | 36   | 12           |
| for Finnish defence   | Yes                           | 16             | 42     | 30                            | 10   | 2            |
| We must become a<br>EU-member in order<br>to secure our<br>belonging in the<br>Western world                              | No                            | 4              | 22     | 31                            | 31   | 12           |
| Power in Brussels is<br>so far away that the<br>common man loses<br>his influence over<br>public matters if EU-<br>member | Yes                           | 28             | 38     | 21                            | 11   | 2            |
| As EU-member we<br>have more influence<br>over our future than if<br>we stay outside                                      | No                            | 2              | 15     | 26                            | 37   | 19           |
| Membership in the EU<br>will be bad for<br>Finland, but staying<br>outside would be even<br>worse                         | Yes                           | 6              | 20     | 29                            | 35   | 10           |
| Opposing membership<br>is useless   | No                            | 38             | 32     | 14                            | 10   | 6            |
| Because Finland will<br>join anyway   | Yes                           | 12             | 51     | 27                            | 9    | 1            |
|   | No                            | 3              | 9      | 35                            | 35   | 18           |
|   | Yes                           | 15             | 42     | 29                            | 12   | 2            |
|   | No                            | 2              | 9      | 43                            | 34   | 11           |
|   | Yes                           | 10             | 22     | 27                            | 29   | 11           |
|   | No                            | 6              | 13     | 24                            | 31   | 26           |

N = 652 'yes' voters, 423 'no' voters. Source: Sankiaho and Säynäsallo (1994a, p. 98).

C. How will EU-membership influence Finland in these areas? Percent.

|                                   | Vote<br>1994 | Improve<br>a lot | Improve<br>some-<br>what | No<br>diffe-<br>rence | Worsen<br>some-<br>what | Worsen<br>a lot |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Environment                       | Yes          | 10               | 49                       | 36                    | 5                       | 0               |
|                                   | No           | 3                | 23                       | 47                    | 21                      | 6               |
| Economy                           | Yes          | 27               | 58                       | 11                    | 3                       | 1               |
|                                   | No           | 4                | 32                       | 36                    | 22                      | 6               |
| Employment                        | Yes          | 7                | 56                       | 30                    | 6                       | 1               |
|                                   | No           | 1                | 17                       | 43                    | 27                      | 11              |
| Agriculture                       | Yes          | 2                | 9                        | 29                    | 49                      | 10              |
|                                   | No           | 2                | 4                        | 15                    | 41                      | 38              |
| Social                            | Yes          | 1                | 4                        | 64                    | 27                      | 4               |
| security                          | No           | 0                | 2                        | 25                    | 49                      | 25              |
| Equality                          | Yes          | 1                | 9                        | 77                    | 11                      | 2               |
|                                   | No           | 0                | 4                        | 56                    | 31                      | 8               |
| Military                          | Yes          | 13               | 47                       | 35                    | 4                       | 1               |
| security                          | No           | 2                | 23                       | 48                    | 18                      | 8               |
| National                          | Yes          | 2                | 7                        | 64                    | 23                      | 5               |
| independence                      | No           | 0                | 1                        | 19                    | 42                      | 37              |
| Possibility to<br>influence<br>EU | Yes          | 10               | 63                       | 23                    | 4                       | 1               |
| developments                      | No           | 2                | 28                       | 42                    | 14                      | 14              |
| Finnish living<br>conditions      | Yes          | 5                | 51                       | 35                    | 8                       | 1               |
| overall                           | No           | 0                | 7                        | 41                    | 38                      | 14              |

N = 652 'yes' voters, 423 'no' voters. Source: Sänkiäho and Säynäsallo (1994a, p. 102).

Appendix 5.3. Group membership and vote in 1994 referendum in Finland. Percent.

|                   | All voters | Male | Female | Southern Finland | Uusimaa | Central Finland | North-ern Finland |
|-------------------|------------|------|--------|------------------|---------|-----------------|-------------------|
| <u>All voters</u> | 61         | 65   | 57     | 63               | 74      | 54              | 45                |
| <u>Gender</u>     |            |      |        |                  |         |                 |                   |
| Male              | 65         | 65   |        | 68               | 75      | 56              | 54                |
| Female            | 57         |      | 57     | 57               | 72      | 52              | 36                |
| <u>Education</u>  |            |      |        |                  |         |                 |                   |
| Primary           | 47         | 46   | 49     | 60               | 62      | 38              | 29                |
| Upper             | 51         | 56   | 45     | 51               | 71      | 49              | 42                |
| Grammar School    | 61         | 63   | 59     | 69               | 68      | 57              | 26                |
| Technical College | 64         | 72   | 58     | 67               | 68      | 62              | 51                |
| University        | 82         | 88   | 76     | 71               | 91      | 75              | 88                |
| <u>Income</u>     |            |      |        |                  |         |                 |                   |
| <60k              | 51         | 57   | 46     | 50               | 56      | 50              | 46                |
| 61-120k           | 57         | 62   | 54     | 85               | 76      | 43              | 44                |
| 121k-200k         | 61         | 65   | 57     | 59               | 74      | 83              | 42                |
| 201k+             | 74         | 74   | 73     | 73               | 84      | 63              | 61                |
| <u>Language</u>   |            |      |        |                  |         |                 |                   |
| Finnish           | 60         | 65   | 56     | 61               | 74      | 65              | 45                |
| Swedish           | 71         | 63   | 84     | 90               | 77      | 33              | -                 |

Income is in Finnish Markka per year. Source: Sänkiaho (1994, p. 65).



Yes-vote by occupation, sector and social class. Percent

|                          | All | Men          | Women | Uusimaa | South | Central | North |
|--------------------------|-----|--------------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| All                      | 61  | 65           | 57    | 74      | 63    | 54      | 45    |
| <u>Occupation</u>        |     |              |       |         |       |         |       |
| Wage earner              | 64  | 67           | 61    | 74      | 66    | 60      | 46    |
| Entrepreneur             | 53  | 64           | 31    | 88      | 55    | 41      | 40    |
| Unemployed               | 53  | 50           | 56    | 52      | 51    | 67      | 42    |
| Student                  | 69  | 78           | 62    | 74      | 73    | 65      | 53    |
| Old Age Pensioner        | 62  | 65           | 59    | 81      | 59    | 53      | 44    |
| Disability benefit       | 57  | 70           | 42    | 79      | 64    | 25      | 54    |
| Self-employed            | 62  | <sup>7</sup> | 62    | 69      | 73    | 40      | 50    |
| <u>Sector</u>            |     |              |       |         |       |         |       |
| Agriculture              | 29  | 37           | 18    | 63      | 18    | 26      | 33    |
| Industry                 | 62  | 63           | 60    | 73      | 64    | 56      | 43    |
| Private service          | 68  | 74           | 61    | 70      | 75    | 72      | 47    |
| Public service           | 61  | 64           | 59    | 80      | 59    | 51      | 49    |
| Other                    | 66  | 72           | 60    | 73      | 58    | 80      | 46    |
| <u>Social Group</u>      |     |              |       |         |       |         |       |
| Upper white collar       | 75  | 77           | 70    | 81      | 75    | 63      | 70    |
| Lower white collar       | 58  | 65           | 55    | 68      | 58    | 62      | 39    |
| Worker                   | 55  | 55           | 53    | 74      | 55    | 49      | 43    |
| Farmer                   | 21  | 30           | 11    | (50)    | 9     | 25      | 21    |
| <u>Family background</u> |     |              |       |         |       |         |       |
| Working class            | 60  | 62           | 58    | 68      | 63    | 52      | 44    |
| White collar             | 79  | 78           | 80    | 83      | 78    | 74      | 72    |
| Farmer                   | 45  | 54           | 38    | 60      | 50    | 44      | 33    |
| Entrepreneur             | 69  | 78           | 62    | 81      | 62    | 73      | 50    |

Categories with less than 20 cases in brackets. Source: Sänkiaho (1994, p. 67).

<sup>7</sup> Data missing.

Voting intention in September 1994, and voting in the EU referendum in October 1994, in Finland, by party, percent.

| Voting intention<br>(September) | Yes | No | Yes | No  | DK  | DK | Total |    | Total<br>% | N   |
|---------------------------------|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|----|-------|----|------------|-----|
| Voted<br>(October)              | Yes | No | No  | Yes | Yes | No | Yes   | No |            |     |
| CF                              | 18  | 51 | 2   | 6   | 12  | 10 | 36    | 63 | 99         | 158 |
| FSD                             | 48  | 15 | 2   | 2   | 25  | 9  | 75    | 26 | 101        | 265 |
| NSP                             | 78  | 9  | 1   | 1   | 10  | 1  | 89    | 11 | 100        | 173 |
| VF                              | 15  | 51 | -   | 2   | 7   | 26 | 24    | 77 | 101        | 55  |
| GF                              | 38  | 33 | -   | 2   | 15  | 13 | 55    | 46 | 101        | 101 |
| SFF                             | 68  | 12 | -   | -   | 17  | 2  | 85    | 14 | 99         | 41  |
| FKF                             | 4   | 76 | 8   | -   | -   | 12 | 4     | 96 | 100        | 25  |
| Total                           | 44  | 27 | 1   | 2   | 16  | 9  | 62    | 37 | 99         | 860 |

Source: Suksi (1996, Table 4.3).

Yes-vote in 1994 referendum by left-right dimension. Percent

|        | All | Men | Women | Uusimaa | South | Central | North |
|--------|-----|-----|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| All    | 61  | 65  | 57    | 74      | 63    | 54      | 45    |
| Left   | 58  | 60  | 57    | 64      | 57    | 63      | 47    |
| Centre | 60  | 64  | 56    | 74      | 65    | 48      | 41    |
| Right  | 71  | 79  | 62    | 87      | 65    | 66      | 62    |

Source: Sänkiaho (1994, p. 72).

Vote in 1994 referendum by county and urban-rural residence. Percent

| County             | Yes  | No   |
|--------------------|------|------|
| Urban <sup>8</sup> | 70.8 | 29.2 |
| Rural              | 51.8 | 48.2 |
| Helsinki           | 73.5 | 26.5 |
| Uusimaa            | 68.0 | 32.0 |
| Kymi               | 65.2 | 34.8 |
| Häme south         | 60.1 | 39.9 |
| Turku south        | 56.7 | 43.3 |
| Häme north         | 55.6 | 44.4 |
| Mikkeli            | 54.3 | 45.7 |
| Ahvenanmaa         | 52.2 | 47.8 |
| Turku north        | 50.1 | 49.9 |
| Kuopio             | 48.3 | 51.7 |
| Pohjois-Karjalan   | 48.0 | 52.0 |
| Keski-Suomen       | 47.6 | 52.4 |
| Lappi              | 47.3 | 52.7 |
| Vaasa              | 44.3 | 55.7 |
| Oulu               | 43.7 | 56.3 |

Source: Pesonen (1994, p. 61).

<sup>8</sup> There is no urban/rural data as such available in the Finnish case. As a surrogate, the 'urban' figure was arrived at by calculating the average score of the most urban part of Finland, that is Helsinki and Uusimaa. Conversely, the 'rural' figure is for the rest of Finland.

Appendix 5.4. Vote in 1994 referendum according to internationalisation and identity.

Yes-vote by internationalisation and identity by gender and region.

|   | All | Male | Female | Uusimaa | South | Centra<br>l | North |
|---|-----|------|--------|---------|-------|-------------|-------|
| <u>Identity</u>                                   |     |      |        |         |       |             |       |
| Parochial   | 44  | 52   | 36     | 61      | 49    | 44          | 29    |
| Nationalist                                       | 55  | 58   | 51     | 59      | 60    | 48          | 44    |
| Internationalist                                  | 69  | 74   | 63     | 82      | 67    | 61          | 55    |
| Cosmopolitan                                      | 74  | 74   | 75     | 77      | 78    | 66          | 68    |
| <u>Regional Identity</u><br>(primary + secondary) |     |      |        |         |       |             |       |
| Local/region                                      | 52  | 57   | 46     | 58      | 63    | 46          | 39    |
| Region/Finland                                    | 60  | 65   | 55     | 79      | 62    | 49          | 35    |
| Finland/region                                    | 56  | 63   | 49     | 62      | 57    | 63          | 38    |
| Region +<br>Finland/North                         | 66  | 65   | 68     | 72      | 66    | (59)        | (63)  |
| Region +<br>Finland/international                 | 80  | 78   | 82     | 84      | 77    | (87)        | (64)  |
| International/region +<br>Finland                 | 66  | 65   | 67     | 82      | 68    | 35          | (80)  |
| International                                     | 72  | 81   | 59     | 80      | (56)  | (80)        | (63)  |

Numbers in brackets are based on less than 20 cases. Source: Säynässalo (1994, p. 119).

Appendix 5.5. Finland's population, urbanity and population density by province, 1994.

| Province             | Population in<br>1000's | Urbanity<br>(percent) | Population<br>density |
|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Uusimaa              | 1309,6                  | 82.6                  | 132.3                 |
| Turku                | 700,7                   | 66.5                  | 35.1                  |
| Haeme                | 727,4                   | 63.5                  | 37.8                  |
| Kymi                 | 333,4                   | 68.2                  | 30.9                  |
| Mikkeli              | 206,7                   | 44.0                  | 12.7                  |
| Pohjois-<br>Karjalan | 177,9                   | 55.1                  | 10.0                  |
| Kuopio               | 258,8                   | 58.8                  | 15.7                  |
| Keski-Suomen         | 257,7                   | 53.3                  | 15.9                  |
| Vaasa                | 449,4                   | 52.6                  | 17.0                  |
| Oulu                 | 449,7                   | 49.6                  | 7.9                   |
| Lappi                | 202,3                   | 47.0                  | 2.2                   |
| Ahvenanmaa           | 25,2                    | 41.5                  | 16.5                  |
| Finland              | 5098,8                  | 64.3                  | 16.7                  |

Population density is measured in inhabitants per square kilometre. Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland (1995, pp. 50-51).

Appendix 5.6. State subsidies and transfers by province and urbanity.

State transfers per capita, 1992. Does not include agriculture.

| Province        | Total  | Grants to provinces | Grants to industries | Column 3+4 |
|-----------------|--------|---------------------|----------------------|------------|
| Uusimaa         | 17.516 | 6.275               | 1.462                | 7.737      |
| Turku ja Pori   | 18.647 | 7.897               | 3.387                | 11.284     |
| Häme            | 18.011 | 7.839               | 2.196                | 10.035     |
| Kymi            | 17.460 | 7.623               | 2.394                | 10.017     |
| Mikkeli         | 21.647 | 9.547               | 3.612                | 13.159     |
| Pohjois-Karjala | 24.466 | 10.609              | 4.548                | 15.157     |
| Kuopio          | 22.830 | 10.381              | 4.122                | 14.503     |
| Keski-Suomi     | 20.585 | 9.263               | 2.737                | 12.000     |
| Vaasa           | 22.864 | 9.663               | 5.331                | 14.994     |
| Oulu            | 23.902 | 10.962              | 4.095                | 15.057     |
| Lappi           | 25.218 | 11.785              | 3.635                | 15.420     |
| Ahvenanmaa      | 33.749 | 26.671              | 3.589                | 30.260     |
| Finland         | 20.013 | 8.498               | 2.974                | 11.472     |

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland (1995, pp. 290-291). Column five calculated by author.

State subsidies per province divided by urban/rural municipality. Does not include agriculture.

| Province        | Urban  | Rural  |
|-----------------|--------|--------|
| Uusimaa         | 5,294  | 6,519  |
| Turku ja Pori   | 7,031  | 8,414  |
| Haeme           | 6,710  | 7,886  |
| Kymi            | 7,126  | 8,019  |
| Mikkeli         | 7,730  | 9,953  |
| Pohjois-Karjala | 9,296  | 11,728 |
| Kuopio          | 8,874  | 10,777 |
| Keski-Suomi     | 8,161  | 10,004 |
| Vaasa           | 8,578  | 10,311 |
| Oulu            | 8,803  | 11,840 |
| Lappi           | 10,187 | 12,959 |
| Ahvenanmaa      | 3,637  | 3,750  |
| Finland         | 6,957  | 9,445  |

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland. (1995, pp. 298-316)

Appendix 5.7. No-vote and left/centre-party voting in Finland at 1995 Eduskunta elections.

| County           | No   | FSD  | CF   | LF   | FSD+LF | CF+LF |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|--------|-------|
| Helsinki         | 26.5 | 26.8 | 3.7  | 8.9  | 35.7   | 12.6  |
| Uusimaa          | 32   | 31.4 | 7.7  | 9.3  | 40.7   | 17    |
| Kymi             | 34.8 | 38.9 | 18.9 | 6.6  | 45.5   | 25.5  |
| Häme south       | 39.9 | 34.2 | 14.4 | 9.4  | 43.6   | 23.8  |
| Turku south      | 43.3 | 27.6 | 15   | 13.3 | 40.9   | 28.3  |
| Häme north       | 44.4 | 30.5 | 13.2 | 14.1 | 44.6   | 27.3  |
| Mikkeli          | 45.7 | 34.6 | 27   | 3.9  | 38.5   | 30.9  |
| Turku north      | 49.9 | 33.2 | 20.9 | 14.6 | 47.8   | 35.5  |
| Kuopio           | 51.7 | 24.7 | 32.1 | 16   | 40.7   | 48.1  |
| Pohjois-Karjalan | 52   | 39.4 | 27   | 5.4  | 44.8   | 32.4  |
| Keski-Suomen     | 52.4 | 31.3 | 25.6 | 12.8 | 44.1   | 38.4  |
| Lappi            | 52.7 | 18.9 | 39.1 | 25.6 | 44.5   | 64.7  |
| Vaasa            | 55.7 | 17.9 | 33   | 5.9  | 23.8   | 38.9  |
| Oulu             | 56.3 | 16.5 | 38.8 | 16.4 | 32.9   | 55.2  |

Excluding Ahvenanmaa. Sources for data: Pesonen (1994, p. 61), Statistical Yearbook of Finland (1997, p. 505).

Appendix 5.8. Election results (percent) and seat allocation in the Finnish parliament ('Eduskunta'), 1970-1995.

Parliamentary election results since 1970. Percent.

|         | 1970 | 1972 | 1975 | 1979 | 1983 | 1987 | 1991 | 1995 |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| NSP     | 18.0 | 17.6 | 18.4 | 21.7 | 22.1 | 23.1 | 19.3 | 17.9 |
| CF      | 17.1 | 16.4 | 17.6 | 17.3 | 17.6 | 17.6 | 24.8 | 19.9 |
| LF      | 5.9  | 5.2  | 4.3  | 3.7  | *    | 1.0  | 0.8  | 0.6  |
| SFF     | 5.7  | 5.4  | 5.0  | 4.6  | 4.9  | 5.6  | 5.5  | 5.5  |
| FKF     | 1.1  | 2.5  | 3.3  | 4.8  | 3.0  | 2.6  | 3.1  | 3.0  |
| CO      | -    | -    | 1.6  | 1.2  | 0.4  | 0.2  | 0.3  | -    |
| FLP     | 10.5 | 9.2  | 3.6  | 4.6  | 9.7  | 6.3  | 4.8  | 1.3  |
| FSD     | 23.4 | 25.8 | 24.9 | 23.9 | 26.7 | 24.1 | 22.1 | 28.3 |
| LF      | 16.6 | 17.0 | 18.9 | 17.9 | 14.0 | 9.4  | 10.1 | 11.2 |
| DA      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 4.2  | -    | -    |
| GF      | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1.4  | 4.0  | 6.8  | 6.5  |
| UF      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2.8  |
| FFU     | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1.0  |
| Ecology | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.1  | 0.3  |
| Women's | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.3  |
| Other   | 1.7  | 0.9  | 2.4  | 0.3  | 0.2  | 1.9  | 2.4  | 1.4  |
| Turnout | 82.2 | 81.4 | 73.8 | 75.3 | 75.7 | 72.1 | 68.4 | 71.8 |

\* In 1983 the LP had an electoral pact with the CP. Key: CO = Constitutional Party; UF = Young Finns; FFU = Free Finland Union; EC = Ecology; WP = Women's; DA = Democratic Alternative. Sources: 1970-1991: Peterson (1994, p. 59), 1995: Arter (1995, p. 197).

Distribution of seats in the Eduskunta.

|         | 1970 | 1972 | 1975 | 1979 | 1983 | 1987 | 1991 | 1995 |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| NSP     | 37   | 34   | 35   | 47   | 44   | 53   | 40   | 39   |
| CF      | 37   | 35   | 39   | 36   | 38   | 40   | 55   | 44   |
| LF      | 8    | 7    | 9    | 4    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 0    |
| SFF     | 12   | 10   | 10   | 10   | 11   | 13   | 12   | 12   |
| FKF     | 1    | 4    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 5    | 8    | 7    |
| CO      | -    | -    | 1    | 0    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| FLP     | 18   | 18   | 2    | 7    | 17   | 9    | 7    | 1    |
| FSD     | 51   | 55   | 54   | 52   | 57   | 56   | 48   | 63   |
| LF      | 36   | 37   | 40   | 35   | 27   | 16   | 19   | 22   |
| DA      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 4    | -    | -    |
| GF      | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | 4    | 10   | 9    |
| UF      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    |
| FFU     | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Ecology | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
| Women's | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Total   | 200  | 200  | 200  | 200  | 200  | 200  | 200  | 200  |

Sources: as above.

## 1995 parliamentary elections by constituency. Percent

|     | FSD  | CF   | NSP  | LF   | GF   | SFF  | FKF | FLP | LF  | U<br>F | EP  | OP  | OT  |
|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| He  | 26.8 | 3.7  | 23.9 | 8.9  | 14.2 | 10.0 | 1.9 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 6.0    | 0.1 | 3.7 | 0.2 |
| Uu  | 31.4 | 7.7  | 19.5 | 9.3  | 8.1  | 12.3 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 5.2    | 0.1 | 2.7 | 1.2 |
| Ts  | 27.6 | 15.0 | 23.3 | 13.3 | 5.8  | 4.5  | 1.9 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 4.3    | 0.1 | 1.7 | 1.4 |
| Tn  | 33.2 | 20.9 | 18.9 | 14.6 | 3.1  | -    | 3.4 | 2.2 | 0.7 | 0.8    | 0.0 | 0.9 | 1.2 |
| Hs  | 34.2 | 14.4 | 26.6 | 9.4  | 5.9  | -    | 4.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 1.9    | 0.0 | 2.4 | -   |
| Hn  | 30.5 | 13.2 | 20.4 | 14.1 | 6.8  | -    | 2.6 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.5    | 2.9 | 2.9 | 1.4 |
| Ky  | 38.9 | 18.9 | 21.6 | 6.6  | 6.7  | -    | 3.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.3    | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| Mi  | 34.6 | 27.0 | 16.8 | 3.9  | 5.3  | -    | 4.6 | 4.4 | 0.1 | 1.2    | 0.1 | 2.0 | -   |
| PK  | 39.4 | 27.0 | 12.5 | 5.4  | 4.4  | -    | 6.6 | 2.0 | 0.2 | 0.8    | -   | 1.4 | 0.2 |
| Ku  | 24.7 | 32.1 | 12.5 | 16.0 | 5.6  | -    | 3.3 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 1.9    | -   | 1.6 | -   |
| KS  | 31.3 | 25.6 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 6.0  | -    | 7.0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.6    | 0.0 | 1.5 | -   |
| Va  | 17.9 | 33.0 | 11.4 | 5.9  | 2.6  | 19.9 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 0.3 | 1.0    | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Ou  | 16.5 | 38.8 | 9.7  | 16.4 | 5.7  | -    | 1.6 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 2.2    | 0.0 | 2.6 | 2.8 |
| La  | 18.9 | 39.1 | 9.0  | 25.6 | 2.4  | -    | 1.4 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 1.1    | -   | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| Ah  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -   | -   | -   | -      | -   | -   | -   |
| All | 28.3 | 19.8 | 17.9 | 11.2 | 6.5  | 5.1  | 3.0 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 2.8    | 0.3 | 2.1 | 1.2 |
| Urb | 31.1 | 12.5 | 20.2 | 11.7 | 7.8  | 5.3  | 2.8 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 3.3    | 0.3 | 2.3 | 1.1 |
| Rur | 23.2 | 33.2 | 13.7 | 10.2 | 4.1  | 4.7  | 3.3 | 1.9 | 0.7 | 1.8    | 0.2 | 1.8 | 1.3 |

Key constituencies: He = Helsinki; Uu = Uusimaa; Ts = Turku ja Pori south, Tn = Turku ja Pori north; Hs = Häme south; Hn = Häme North; Ky = Kymi; Mi = Mikkeli; PK = Pohjois-Karala; Ku = Kuopio; KS = Keski-Suomi; Va = Vaasa; Ou = Oulu; La = Lappi; Ah = Ahvenanmaa. Parties: YF = Young Finns; EP = Ecology Party; OP = Other Parties; OT = Others; TO = Total. Source for data: Statistical Yearbook of Finland (1997, p. 505).

## 1994 election by urban/rural support. High rural support on the left, urban on the right

|            | CF    | FLP  | LF   | OT   | FKF  | SFF  | LF   | OP   | FSD  | NSP  | EP   | UF   | GP   |
|------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Urb        | 12.5  | 1    | 0.5  | 1.1  | 2.8  | 5.3  | 11.7 | 2.3  | 31.1 | 20.2 | 0.3  | 3.3  | 7.8  |
| Rur        | 33.2  | 1.9  | 0.7  | 1.3  | 3.3  | 4.7  | 10.2 | 1.8  | 23.2 | 13.7 | 0.2  | 1.8  | 4.1  |
| Difference | -20.7 | -0.9 | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.6  | 1.5  | 0.5  | 7.9  | 6.5  | 0.1  | 1.5  | 3.7  |
| Urb/Rur    | 0.38  | 0.53 | 0.71 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 1.13 | 1.15 | 1.28 | 1.34 | 1.47 | 1.50 | 1.83 | 1.90 |



North-south divide based on comparing support in the south with that of the north and central provinces combined.

|           | CF      | FLP    | FKF    | LF      | FSD     | GF      | NSP     | Total     |
|-----------|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| South     | 202,655 | 14,187 | 42,018 | 180,944 | 530,344 | 133,108 | 371,281 | 1,701,071 |
| Central   | 217,209 | 18,191 | 35,071 | 63,461  | 196,696 | 32,296  | 94,120  | 730,194   |
| North     | 132,137 | 3,807  | 5,222  | 65,935  | 58,597  | 15,795  | 32,223  | 339,751   |
| Ratio s/n | 1.53    | 3.73   | 8.05   | 2.74    | 9.05    | 8.43    | 11.52   | 5.01      |
| South %   | 0.12    | 0.01   | 0.02   | 0.11    | 0.31    | 0.08    | 0.22    |           |
| Central % | 0.30    | 0.02   | 0.05   | 0.09    | 0.27    | 0.04    | 0.13    |           |
| North %   | 0.39    | 0.01   | 0.02   | 0.19    | 0.17    | 0.05    | 0.09    |           |
| N+C %     | 0.33    | 0.02   | 0.04   | 0.12    | 0.24    | 0.04    | 0.12    |           |
| % s/n+c   | 0.37    | 0.49   | 0.53   | 0.91    | 1.30    | 1.78    | 1.86    |           |

South = Helsinki, Uusimaa, Turku ja Pori, Häme and Kymi. Central: Mikkeli, Pohjois-Karala, Kuopio, Keski-Suomi, Vaasa; North = Oulu and Lappi. There is no data for the SPP because this party only fields candidates in four constituencies, none of which are Oulu or Lappi.

## Appendix 6.1. Legislation and practice regarding referendums in Norway.

There is no written provision for referendums in the Norwegian Constitution. Attempts have been made to include such provisions, most lately during the EU campaign in 1994. They have all been defeated. However, interpretations and practice has opened up the possibility of holding ad hoc and consultative referendums. The control of referendums is completely in the hands of the Storting. In strict constitutional terms the Storting also decides whether or not to accept the advice of the voters<sup>1</sup>. “The Storting is empowered, by simple majority, to consult the voters at any time and on any issue. But it is not authorised to delegate to them the final decision on any topic.”<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, it could be argued that it has, in practice, become mandatory to hold referendums on membership in what is currently the EU:

“From the use of the [referendum] device twice, it follows that the EU issue cannot be put on the agenda again without asking the people’s advice anew. This means – in systemic terms – the introduction of a mandatory referendum variant, albeit limited to the EU issue. From the outcomes it follows, secondly, that membership cannot be accepted if the electorate repeats it’s refusal. This means the introduction of a binding referendum variant, again limited to this issue and also to the electorate’s right of veto. This follows because no precedent exists as to the effect of a voters’ majority supporting a government’s proposal for membership.”<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Wyller, 1996, p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Wyller, 1996, p. 139.

<sup>3</sup> Wyller, 1996, p. 149.

There have been six referendums in Norway, all since 1905. In 1905 on separation from Sweden, and on the approval of monarchy, in 1919 to approve prohibition, in 1926 to repeal prohibition, in 1972 to join the EC, and in 1994 to join the EU. The first four were approved, but with a smaller majority in each consecutive one. The last two were rejected, and with very narrow majorities<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Wyller, 1996, p. 140.

Appendix 6.2. Reasons for attitudes to Norwegian EU-membership in 1994.

Arguments for EU-membership. Percent.

| Rank | Argument(s)   |      |
|------|---|------|
| 1    | Important to co-operate, membership gives influence   | 18.8 |
| 2    | Security-policy, need to enter the WEU                | 11.7 |
| 3    | Membership provides market access to the EU           | 9.6  |
| 4    | Norway becomes isolated outside the EU                | 9.1  |
| 5    | Economy, economic growth                              | 6.9  |
| 6    | Environment, resource management                      | 5.8  |
| 7    | The four freedoms, more market, currency co-operation | 5.6  |
| 8    | EU secures the peace, conflict resolution             | 5.6  |
| 9    | Cultural fellowship                                   | 4.7  |
| 10   | (Un)employment  | 4.6  |
| 11   | Cheaper food and alcohol                              | 3.6  |
| 12   | Norway, Sweden and Finland together in the EU         | 3.5  |
| 13   | Reduce borders (the united states of Europe)          | 1.8  |
| 14   | Education   | 1.8  |
| 15   | Agriculture, fisheries, regional policy               | 1.7  |
| 16   | Secure the welfare state, prevent social problems     | 1.2  |
|      | Other 'yes'-arguments                                 | 3.9  |

Source: Ringdal (1995, p. 49).

#### Arguments against EU-membership. Percent.

| Rank | Argument(s)  |      |
|------|--|------|
| 1    | Self-government/sovereignty, secure 'rule of the people'/democracy and local democracy | 22.5 |
| 2    | (Un)employment   | 7.0  |
| 3    | Agriculture  | 6.9  |
| 4    | Against the Union and the Maastricht Treaty  | 5.9  |
| 5    | Loose our distinctive character, counter-culture arguments                             | 5.8  |
| 6    | Against economic growth, against capitalism  | 5.8  |
| 7    | Control over fish resources, law of the sea  | 5.2  |
| 8    | Border controls, narcotics, crime, immigration   | 4.7  |
| 9    | Environment, resource management   | 3.9  |
| 10   | Retain dispersed population pattern  | 3.5  |
| 11   | We know what we have got, but...   | 3.5  |
| 12   | Welfare state, weakening of public pension provision, social problems                  | 3.3  |
| 13   | Quality of food and medicine, treatment of domestic animals                            | 3.2  |
| 14   | Norway will be powerless in the EU   | 3.2  |
| 15   | Negative for business  | 2.9  |
| 16   | We will manage, the EEA-agreement is sufficient  | 2.1  |
| 17   | EU is a bloc against other countries   | 2.1  |
| 18   | The membership fee is too high   | 1.9  |
| 19   | EU weakens peace   | 0.6  |
|      | Other 'no'-arguments   | 6.0  |

Source: Ringdal, 1995, p. 51.

Note: The people surveyed were given the opportunity to give as many reasons/arguments as they wished. However, in 'practice', only three answers were written down by the interviewers. 94 percent of voters gave at least one argument. The average was 2.2 reasons, both for arguments for and arguments against membership (Ringdal, 1995, pp. 48-49).

#### Most Important issues for attitude to the EU at the 1994 referendum.

| Issue                    | Yes  | No   | Share of sample |
|--------------------------|------|------|-----------------|
| Democracy, influence     | 16.0 | 40.2 | 28.3            |
| Defence, security        | 18.5 | 2.3  | 10.2            |
| Economy, employment      | 23.1 | 19.8 | 21.4            |
| Nordic unity             | 21.2 | 0.1  | 10.3            |
| Confidence in Brundtland | 12.3 | 0.2  | 6.0             |
| Confidence in Lahnstein  | 0.2  | 12.0 | 6.2             |
| Other                    | 8.7  | 25.4 | 17.5            |
| Total                    | 48.4 | 51.2 | 100.0           |

N = 2,351. Source: NSD/MMI Election Day study.

### Appendix 6.3. Group membership and vote in 1994 referendum in Norway.

#### Attitude to EU-membership 1993/1994. Percent.

|  | Yes  | No   | Number of interviewees | Notes               |
|--|------|------|------------------------|---------------------|
| <u>Gender</u>                            |      |      | 4015                   |                     |
| Women                                    | 43.7 | 56.3 |                        |                     |
| Men                                      | 52.0 | 48.0 |                        |                     |
| <u>Income (Nkr. '000)</u>                |      |      | 1642                   | 1993 election study |
| 0-149                                    | 21.9 | 78.1 |                        |                     |
| 150-299                                  | 25.1 | 74.9 |                        |                     |
| 300+                                     | 40.4 | 59.6 |                        |                     |
| <u>Occupation/class</u>                  |      |      | 4015                   |                     |
| Blue collar                              | 44.5 | 55.5 |                        |                     |
| Managerial, white collar                 | 64.4 | 35.6 |                        |                     |
| White collar, other                      | 54.0 | 46.0 |                        |                     |
| Pensioner + disabled                     | 44.8 | 55.2 |                        |                     |
| Other                                    | 42.3 | 57.7 |                        |                     |
| <u>Occupational sector 1</u>             |      |      | 2529                   |                     |
| Public sector                            | 47.3 | 52.7 |                        |                     |
| Private sector                           | 52.1 | 47.9 |                        |                     |
| <u>Occupational sector 2<sup>5</sup></u> |      |      | 2553                   |                     |
| Primary                                  | 10.3 | 89.7 |                        |                     |
| Primarily Public                         | 48.2 | 51.8 |                        |                     |
| Mixed                                    | 54.3 | 45.7 |                        |                     |
| Primarily Private                        | 55.3 | 44.7 |                        |                     |
| <u>Education</u>                         |      |      | 4015                   |                     |
| Non-university level                     | 43.9 | 56.1 |                        |                     |
| University level                         | 57.6 | 42.4 |                        |                     |

<sup>5</sup> 'Primarily public' includes healthcare, education, research and public administration; mixed sectors transport and 'other' occupations; private sector trade and industry, commodity trade, shopworkers, banking, insurance, services and 'no occupation'.

|                             |      |      |      |                     |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|---------------------|
| <u>Language</u>             |      |      | 1801 | 1993 election study |
| Neo-norwegian, active       | 11.3 | 88.7 |      |                     |
| Neo-norwegian, passive      | 8.8  | 91.2 |      |                     |
| Standard Norwegian, active  | 29.9 | 70.1 |      |                     |
| Standard Norwegian, passive | 33.3 | 66.7 |      |                     |
| <u>Abstinence movement</u>  |      |      | 1809 | 1993 election study |
| Abstinence, active          | 13.4 | 86.6 |      |                     |
| Abstinence, passive         | 13.9 | 86.1 |      |                     |
| Non-abstinence, active      | 22.9 | 77.1 |      |                     |
| Non-abstinence, passive     | 44.5 | 55.5 |      |                     |
| <u>Religious activity 1</u> |      |      | 1810 | 1993 election study |
| Passive                     | 32.7 | 67.3 |      |                     |
| Low                         | 29.4 | 70.6 |      |                     |
| Medium                      | 19.7 | 80.3 |      |                     |
| Member                      | 16.8 | 83.2 |      |                     |
| <u>Religious activity 2</u> |      |      | 1819 | 1993 election study |
| Non-conformist              | 33.3 | 66.7 |      |                     |
| State Church                | 29.0 | 71.0 |      |                     |
| Other                       | 29.1 | 70.9 |      |                     |

Vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.

|                                       | Yes  | No   | Number of<br>interviewees |
|---------------------------------------|------|------|---------------------------|
| <u>Urban-rural residence</u>          |      |      | 4015                      |
| Rural areas                           | 30.6 | 69.4 |                           |
| Towns and cities                      | 53.6 | 46.4 |                           |
| <u>Centre Periphery 1</u>             |      |      | 4015                      |
| Oslofjord area                        | 63.0 | 37.0 |                           |
| Rest of Norway                        | 40.1 | 59.9 |                           |
| <u>Centre Periphery 2</u>             |      |      | 4015                      |
| Oslo, Akershus                        | 67.1 | 32.9 |                           |
| Rest of Norway                        | 42.6 | 57.4 |                           |
| <u>Centre Periphery 3</u>             |      |      | 4015                      |
| Oslo, Akershus, Buskerud,<br>Vestfold | 65.0 | 35.0 |                           |
| Rest of Norway                        | 40.1 | 59.9 |                           |
| <u>County<sup>6</sup></u>             |      |      |                           |
| Østfold                               | 53.5 | 46.5 |                           |
| Akershus                              | 63.8 | 36.2 |                           |
| Oslo                                  | 66.6 | 33.4 |                           |
| Hedmark                               | 42.7 | 57.3 |                           |
| Oppland                               | 44.1 | 55.9 |                           |
| Buskerud                              | 57.2 | 42.8 |                           |
| Vestfold                              | 57.0 | 43   |                           |
| Telemark                              | 42.2 | 57.8 |                           |
| Aust-Agder                            | 44.4 | 55.6 |                           |
| Vest-Agder                            | 45.6 | 54.4 |                           |
| Rogaland                              | 45.3 | 54.7 |                           |
| Hordaland                             | 43.7 | 56.3 |                           |
| Sogn og Fjordane                      | 31.8 | 68.2 |                           |
| Møre og Romsdal                       | 38.4 | 61.6 |                           |
| Sør-Trøndelag                         | 45.0 | 55   |                           |
| Nord-Trøndelag                        | 36.0 | 64   |                           |
| Nordland                              | 28.6 | 71.4 |                           |
| Troms                                 | 28.5 | 71.5 |                           |
| Finnmark                              | 25.5 | 74.5 |                           |
| <u>Region</u>                         |      |      |                           |
| South                                 | 50.2 | 49.8 |                           |
| North                                 | 28.1 | 71.9 |                           |

Actual result

Sources for data: NSD/MMI Election Day study, unless otherwise stated. Source 1993 election study: NSD. Authors calculations. All survey data calculations excludes the categories 'don't know' and answers other than the categories listed.

<sup>6</sup> Source: Statistisk Årbok (1995).



Vote in the 1994 referendum

| Party voted for in 1993 | Yes | No | Number of interviewees |
|-------------------------|-----|----|------------------------|
| SV                      | 19  | 81 | 346                    |
| AP                      | 64  | 36 | 1454                   |
| NV                      | 45  | 55 | 117                    |
| SP                      | 5   | 95 | 565                    |
| NKRF                    | 14  | 86 | 249                    |
| H                       | 81  | 19 | 778                    |
| NFRP                    | 59  | 41 | 175                    |

Source: NSD/MMI referendum day survey.

Appendix 6.4. The importance of primary industries and central government transfers by county.

Table 6.4A Inhabitants per farm and yes-vote in referendum.

| County           | Inhabitants per farm | Yes-vote in Referendum (%) |
|------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| Sogn og Fjordane | 17                   | 32                         |
| Oppland          | 23                   | 44.2                       |
| Nord-Trøndelag   | 24                   | 36                         |
| Hedmark          | 26                   | 42.5                       |
| Møre og Romsdal  | 40                   | 38                         |
| Buskerud         | 45                   | 57                         |
| Telemark         | 45                   | 42.2                       |
| Sør-Trøndelag    | 48                   | 44.9                       |
| Rogaland         | 51                   | 45.4                       |
| Østfold          | 56                   | 53                         |
| Vest-Agder       | 58                   | 44.8                       |
| Aust-Agder       | 62                   | 43.8                       |
| Hordaland        | 65                   | 43.8                       |
| Vestfold         | 70                   | 57.1                       |
| Akershus         | 226                  | 63.2                       |
| Oslo             | 226                  | 65.6                       |

The table excludes the three northernmost counties because their climate allows only very limited agricultural activities. In these areas, fishing is a much more important primary economic activity. Sources: Landbrukssamvirkets Felleskontor (1996).

Table 6.4.B. The importance of the fisheries industry by county.

| County           | Fishermen 1993 | Percent of population | Employees in fish processing* | Population in fish industry |
|------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Østfold          | 270            | 0.11                  |                               |                             |
| Akershus         | 34             | 0.01                  |                               |                             |
| Oslo             | 47             | 0.01                  |                               |                             |
| Hedmark          | -              | -                     |                               |                             |
| Oppland          | -              | -                     |                               |                             |
| Buskerud         | 22             | 0.01                  |                               |                             |
| Vestfold         | 157            | 0.08                  |                               |                             |
| Telemark         | 104            | 0.06                  |                               |                             |
| Aust-Agder       | 187            | 0.19                  |                               |                             |
| Vest-Agder       | 625            | 0.42                  | 405**                         |                             |
| Rogaland         | 1061           | 0.30                  | 584                           | 0.46                        |
| Hordaland        | 1483           | 0.35                  | 915                           | 0.57                        |
| Sogn og Fjordane | 1521           | 1.41                  | 1237                          | 2.56                        |
| Møre og Romsdal  | 5648           | 2.35                  | 1765                          | 3.09                        |
| Sør-Trøndelag    | 1040           | 0.41                  | 510                           | 0.60                        |
| Nord-Trøndelag   | 663            | 0.52                  | 86                            | 0.59                        |
| Nordland         | 5623           | 2.33                  | 1530                          | 2.96                        |
| Troms            | 4356           | 2.89                  | 1323                          | 3.77                        |
| Finnmark         | 2555           | 3.34                  | 2152                          | 6.15                        |

\* Data only includes large (over 10 employees) firms.

\*\* Figure includes all the above counties. The maximum figure this could lead to would be 0.59 percent in Aust-Agder. Source: Fishery Statistics (1996, pp. 17, 83-84).

Table 6.4.C. The relationship between transfers from the central government and vote in 1994 referendum.

| County           | Central government transfers per capita* | No-vote in 1994 referendum |
|------------------|--|----------------------------|
| Akershus         | 2419                                     | 36.2                       |
| Rogaland         | 3702                                     | 54.7                       |
| Buskerud         | 3934                                     | 42.8                       |
| Vestfold         | 3983                                     | 43                         |
| Vest-Agder       | 4571                                     | 54.4                       |
| Østfold          | 4799                                     | 46.5                       |
| Hordaland        | 4834                                     | 56.3                       |
| Telemark         | 5229                                     | 57.8                       |
| Sør-Trøndelag    | 5295                                     | 55                         |
| Oppland          | 6158                                     | 55.9                       |
| Oslo             | 6196                                     | 33.4                       |
| Aust-Agder       | 6296                                     | 55.6                       |
| Møre og Romsdal  | 6540                                     | 61.6                       |
| Hedmark          | 6615                                     | 57.3                       |
| Sogn og Fjordane | 7238                                     | 68.2                       |
| Nord-Trøndelag   | 7746                                     | 64                         |
| Nordland         | 8675                                     | 71.4                       |
| Troms            | 9267                                     | 71.5                       |
| Finnmark         | 13497                                    | 74.5                       |

\* Not including agriculture or fisheries. Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrå  
([Http://www.ssb.no/www-open/statistikk\\_et...00generelt/0000oversikt/000020regionale/,28/1/98](http://www.ssb.no/www-open/statistikk_et...00generelt/0000oversikt/000020regionale/,28/1/98)).

Appendix 6.5. The relationship between left-voting and vote in the referendum.

|                  | SV   | SV+RVA | AP   | SV+AP | RVA+<br>SV+AP | No-vote |
|------------------|------|--------|------|-------|---------------|---------|
| Vest-Agder       | 4.8  | 5.1    | 27.8 | 32.6  | 32.9          | 54.4    |
| Møre og Romsdal  | 5.9  | 6.2    | 30.5 | 36.4  | 36.7          | 61.6    |
| Rogaland         | 6.2  | 6.4    | 29.3 | 35.5  | 35.7          | 54.7    |
| Buskerud         | 6.6  | 7      | 42.7 | 49.3  | 49.7          | 42.8    |
| Vestfold         | 6.5  | 7.1    | 35.4 | 41.9  | 42.5          | 43      |
| Østfold          | 6.7  | 7.2    | 42.4 | 49.1  | 49.6          | 46.5    |
| Aust-Agder       | 7    | 7.2    | 33.1 | 40.1  | 40.3          | 55.6    |
| Akershus         | 6.6  | 7.4    | 37.8 | 44.4  | 45.2          | 36.2    |
| Oppland          | 7.6  | 7.9    | 47.1 | 54.7  | 55            | 55.9    |
| Hordaland        | 7.4  | 8.1    | 32.8 | 40.2  | 40.9          | 56.3    |
| Sogn og Fjordane | 7.9  | 8.2    | 32.5 | 40.4  | 40.7          | 68.2    |
| Sør-Trøndelag    | 8.9  | 9.9    | 39.5 | 48.4  | 49.4          | 55      |
| Nord-Trøndelag   | 9.8  | 10.3   | 38.4 | 48.2  | 48.7          | 64      |
| Telemark         | 10   | 10.6   | 38.7 | 48.7  | 49.3          | 57.8    |
| Hedmark          | 10.5 | 10.8   | 48.8 | 59.3  | 59.6          | 57.3    |
| Oslo             | 7.2  | 12.3   | 36.6 | 43.8  | 48.9          | 33.4    |
| Nordland         | 12.3 | 12.9   | 36.7 | 49    | 49.6          | 71.4    |
| Troms            | 12.7 | 14     | 35.8 | 48.5  | 49.8          | 71.5    |
| Finnmark         | 17.5 | 18     | 39.6 | 57.1  | 57.6          | 74.5    |

Source for data: Statistisk Årbok (1995, p. 33). Author's calculations.

Appendix 6.6. Election results and seat allocation in the Norwegian parliament ('Storting'), 1969-1997.

Election results. Percent.

| Party     | 1969 | 1973 | 1977 | 1981 | 1985 | 1989 | 1993 | 1997 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| H         | 19.5 | 17.4 | 24.8 | 31.7 | 30.4 | 22.2 | 17.0 | 14.3 |
| SP        | 10.5 | 11.0 | 8.6  | 6.7  | 6.6  | 6.5  | 16.7 | 7.9  |
| NV**      | 9.4  | 3.5  | 3.2  | 3.9  | 3.1  | 3.2  | 3.6  | 4.5  |
| DLF**     | -    | 3.4  | 1.4  | 0.5  | 0.5  | -    | -    | -    |
| NKRF      | 9.4  | 12.3 | 12.4 | 8.9  | 8.3  | 8.5  | 7.9  | 13.7 |
| NFRP      | -    | 5.0  | 1.9  | 4.5  | 3.7  | 13.0 | 6.3  | 15.3 |
| AP        | 46.5 | 35.3 | 42.3 | 37.2 | 40.8 | 34.3 | 36.9 | 35.0 |
| SF/SVF/SV | 3.4  | 11.2 | 4.2  | 4.9  | 5.5  | 10.1 | 7.9  | 6.0  |
| *         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| NKP/RVA   | 1.0  | -    | 0.4  | 0.3  | 0.8  | 0.8  | 1.1  | 1.7  |
| FFF       | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.3  | -    | -    |
| NG        | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.4  | 0.1  |      |
| Other     | 0.3  | 0.9  | 0.8  | 1.4  | 0.3  | 0.7  | 2.5  | 1.6  |
| Turnout   | 83.8 | 80.2 | 82.9 | 82.0 | 84.4 | 83.2 | 75.8 |      |

SF = Socialist People's Party, SVF = Socialist Electoral Alliance, FFF = Future for Finnmark, NG = Norwegian Green Party.

\* This party participated in elections until 1973 as SF. At the 1973 elections the SF, the NKP, left-wing AP and various other left-wingers combined into the SVF. From the 1977 elections onwards, this party (although not strictly the same as the SF) has participated in elections as SV, although many elements of the SVF did not part-take in this party.

\*\* The V and the DLF split in 1972 and reunited in 1988, although a rump-DLF still exists. Data sources: 1969-1993: Petersson, (1994, p 60); 1997: Bjugan (1998a).

Seats in the Storting.

| Party     | 1969 | 1973 | 1977 | 1981 | 1985 | 1989 | 1993 | 1997 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| H         | 29   | 29   | 41   | 54   | 50   | 37   | 28   | 23   |
| SP        | 20   | 21   | 12   | 11   | 12   | 11   | 32   | 11   |
| NV        | 13   | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 6    |
| DLF       | -    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    | -    | -    | -    |
| NKRF      | 14   | 20   | 22   | 15   | 16   | 14   | 13   | 25   |
| NFRP      | -    | 4    | 0    | 4    | 2    | 22   | 10   | 25   |
| AP        | 74   | 62   | 76   | 65   | 71   | 63   | 67   | 65   |
| SF/SVF/SV | 0    | 16   | 2    | 4    | 6    | 17   | 13   | 9    |
| NKP/RVA   | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 0    |
| FFF       | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    |
| NG        | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| Other     | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 1    |
| Total     | 150  | 155  | 155  | 155  | 157  | 165  | 165  | 165  |

Data sources: 1969-1993: Petersson, (1994, p 60), 1997: Bjugan (1998a).

Centre-Periphery division in terms of electoral support, 1993 Storting election.

|                      | SP    | NKRF | SV   | NV   | AP    | Others | NFRP | H     | RVA  |
|----------------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|--------|------|-------|------|
| Centre               | 9.40  | 4.90 | 6.77 | 3.20 | 36.60 | 2.57   | 8.70 | 25.70 | 2.17 |
| Periphery            | 21.76 | 9.54 | 9.45 | 3.80 | 39.71 | 2.37   | 5.48 | 14.02 | 0.53 |
| Ratio                | 0.43  | 0.51 | 0.72 | 0.84 | 0.92  | 1.08   | 1.59 | 1.83  | 4.06 |
| centre-<br>periphery |       |      |      |      |       |        |      |       |      |

The centre is the average vote in Oslo, Akershus and Vestfold, the periphery the rest of the country. Source for data: Statistisk Årbok (1995, p. 33). Author's calculations.

## Appendix 7.1. Legislation and practice regarding referendums in Sweden<sup>1</sup>.

The Swedish Constitution (the 1974 Instrument of Government) includes two provisions for referendums: a consultative referendum (Ch. 8, paragraph 4) and a decisive referendum (Ch. 8, paragraph 15).

The consultative referendum clause is very wide, and allows the Riksdag to decide if a referendum is to be held, when, and the question(s). A simple majority of the Riksdag is needed for a decision. So far all five Swedish referendums have formally been consultative.

The rules for the decisive referendum are more complicated. A pending constitutional amendment must be referred to a referendum if requested 10 percent of the members of the Riksdag and supported by 1/3 of its members. This rejective referendum must take place simultaneously with a general election. Rejection requires a 'no'-vote from a majority which also has to exceed half of the number of voters who voted at the simultaneous general election.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ruin (1996, pp. 171-172).



Appendix 7.2. Reasons for attitudes to Swedish EU membership. Percent.

| Argument  | Before the referendum |         |      | After the Referendum |            |      |
|---|-----------------------|---------|------|----------------------|------------|------|
|   | Pro-EU                | Anti-EU | All  | Voted 'yes'          | Voted 'no' | All  |
| Economy, general  | 44                    | 20      | 32   | 38                   | 22         | 30   |
| Sweden will be isolated                                   | 36                    | 2       | 19   | 30                   | 2          | 17   |
| Influence the EU  | 20                    | 7       | 13   | 22                   | 11         | 16   |
| Employment  | 19                    | 9       | 14   | 20                   | 9          | 15   |
| Democracy   | 2                     | 15      | 8    | 8                    | 21         | 14   |
| Peace   | 14                    | 1       | 7    | 27                   | 1          | 14   |
| Environmental- and energy-questions                       | 6                     | 9       | 7    | 12                   | 13         | 12   |
| Open borders  | 5                     | 17      | 11   | 3                    | 17         | 9    |
| EU-organisation   | 1                     | 17      | 9    | 0                    | 18         | 8    |
| Neutrality.   | 4                     | 9       | 6    | 3                    | 13         | 7    |
| Consumer questions  | 2                     | 20      | 11   | 1                    | 15         | 7    |
| National independence                                     | 0                     | 12      | 6    | 0                    | 14         | 6    |
| Social safety/welfare                                     | 1                     | 5       | 3    | 2                    | 5          | 3    |
| Equality  | 0                     | 6       | 3    | 0                    | 5          | 3    |
| EU's relations with the rest of the world                 | 1                     | 4       | 2    | 10                   | 6          | 3    |
| International exchanges                                   | 4                     | 3       | 3    | 4                    | 3          | 3    |
| Farming/forestry  | 2                     | 3       | 2    | 1                    | 3          | 2    |
| Development   | 4                     | 1       | 2    | 2                    | 0          | 1    |
| Business  | 1                     | 0       | 1    | 1                    | 0          | 1    |
| Regional questions  | 0                     | 1       | 1    | 0                    | 3          | 1    |
| Health  | 0                     | 1       | 1    | 0                    | 1          | 0    |
| Ideological reasons                                       | 0                     | 1       | 0    | 0                    | 2          | 1    |
| Trust/distrust/influence                                  | 1                     | 2       | 2    | 3                    | 2          | 3    |
| Uncertainty   | 1                     | 10      | 5    | 2                    | 11         | 9    |
| Other reasons   | 10                    | 11      | 10   | 12                   | 15         | 13   |
| Other   | 1                     | 2       | 1    | 2                    | 2          | 2    |
| Number of reasons (mean)                                  | 1.87                  | 2.08    | 1.97 | 2,03                 | 2,33       | 2,14 |
| Percent of interviewees who mentioned one or more reasons | 96                    | 91      | 94   | 94                   | 93         | 89   |
| Number of interviewees                                    | 794                   | 766     | 1569 | 867                  | 748        | 1715 |

Source: Oskarson (1996, p. 127).

Appendix 7.3. Group membership and vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.

|  | Yes | No | Blank | Number of<br>interviewees | Number of<br>non-voters |
|--|-----|----|-------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| <u>Gender</u>                            |     |    |       |                           |                         |
| Women                                    | 46  | 52 | 2     | 1884                      | 16                      |
| Men                                      | 59  | 40 | 1     | 2024                      | 17                      |
| <u>Occupational status</u>               |     |    |       |                           |                         |
| Old age pensioner                        | 61  | 38 | 1     | 605                       | 18                      |
| In employment                            | 54  | 45 | 1     | 2365                      | 16                      |
| Student                                  | 51  | 47 | 2     | 304                       | 17                      |
| Early retired                            | 49  | 51 | 0     | 145                       | 20                      |
| Working at<br>home/housewife             | 44  | 56 | 0     | 55                        | 20                      |
| Unemployed <sup>2</sup>                  | 37  | 59 | 4     | 317                       | 21                      |
| <u>Occupation<sup>3</sup></u>            |     |    |       |                           |                         |
| Industrial worker                        | 41  | 57 | 2     | 434                       | 20                      |
| Other workers                            | 37  | 61 | 2     | 813                       | 20                      |
| Low white collar                         | 49  | 49 | 2     | 403                       | 16                      |
| Medium white collar                      | 59  | 40 | 1     | 854                       | 14                      |
| High white collar                        | 76  | 24 | 0     | 545                       | 11                      |
| Small businessmen                        | 63  | 36 | 1     | 255                       | 18                      |
| Farmers                                  | 53  | 45 | 2     | 104                       | 20                      |
| Students                                 | 51  | 47 | 2     | 292                       | 17                      |
| <u>Occupational category<sup>4</sup></u> |     |    |       |                           |                         |
| Health care, education<br>and culture    | 45  | 54 | 1     | 778                       | 15                      |
| Farming                                  | 47  | 52 | 1     | 166                       | 19                      |
| Trade and transport                      | 53  | 45 | 2     | 878                       | 19                      |
| Industry                                 | 55  | 44 | 1     | 863                       | 17                      |
| Administration/services                  | 66  | 33 | 1     | 495                       | 13                      |
| <u>Occupational sector</u>               |     |    |       |                           |                         |
| Public                                   | 46  | 52 | 2     | 1424                      | 15                      |
| - local authority                        | 42  | 57 | 1     | 976                       | 15                      |
| - state                                  | 56  | 43 | 1     | 448                       | 14                      |
| Private                                  | 58  | 41 | 1     | 2144                      | 18                      |
| <u>Education</u>                         |     |    |       |                           |                         |
| Basic schooling                          | 43  | 56 | 1     | 931                       | 20                      |
| Additional schooling <sup>5</sup>        | 49  | 50 | 1     | 1344                      | 18                      |
| 3 year high school                       | 59  | 40 | 1     | 586                       | 16                      |
| University                               | 64  | 34 | 2     | 927                       | 12                      |

<sup>2</sup> Includes labour market training and youth work experience.

<sup>3</sup> Pensioners are included in their previous occupation.

<sup>4</sup> Pensioners are included in their previous occupation.

<sup>5</sup> This includes occupational schools, 'peoples high schools', high school/gymnasium, and older forms of these.

Urban-rural residence

|                          |      |      |     |      |    |
|--------------------------|------|------|-----|------|----|
| Rural area               | 41   | 58   | 1   | 661  | 18 |
| Small town               | 50   | 48   | 2   | 904  | 15 |
| City or large town       | 55   | 44   | 1   | 1732 | 18 |
| Sthlm, Gbg, Malmö        | 64   | 34   | 2   | 536  | 17 |
| Rural (rural + sm. Town) | 46.2 | 53.8 |     |      |    |
| Urban (city + SGM)       | 57.2 | 42.8 |     |      |    |
| <u>County</u>            |      |      |     |      |    |
| Malmö                    | 66.5 | 32.7 | 0.8 |      |    |
| Malmöhus south           | 66.4 | 32.6 | 1.0 |      |    |
| Stockholm                | 61.5 | 37.6 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Stockholm county         | 61.4 | 37.7 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Malmöhus north           | 61.3 | 37.9 | 0.8 |      |    |
| Halland                  | 57.8 | 41.1 | 1.1 |      |    |
| Kristianstad             | 56.7 | 42.4 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Göteborg                 | 56.3 | 42.8 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Västmanland              | 54.3 | 44.8 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Östergötland             | 53.9 | 45   | 1.1 |      |    |
| Södermanland             | 53.8 | 45.3 | 1.0 |      |    |
| Uppsala                  | 53.4 | 45.5 | 1.1 |      |    |
| Kronoberg                | 51.4 | 47.6 | 1.0 |      |    |
| Bohuslän                 | 51.1 | 48.1 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Älvsborg south           | 51   | 48   | 1.0 |      |    |
| Gotland                  | 50.9 | 48.1 | 1.0 |      |    |
| Skaraborg                | 49.5 | 49.4 | 1.1 |      |    |
| Jönköping                | 48.5 | 50.7 | 0.8 |      |    |
| Kalmar                   | 48.3 | 50.8 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Värmland                 | 47.1 | 52.1 | 0.8 |      |    |
| Örebro                   | 47   | 52   | 1.0 |      |    |
| Blekinge                 | 46.5 | 52.6 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Älvsborg north           | 46.5 | 52.6 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Västernorrland           | 41.7 | 57.6 | 0.7 |      |    |
| Gävleborg                | 41.3 | 57.8 | 0.9 |      |    |
| Kopparberg               | 38.7 | 60.4 | 0.8 |      |    |
| Västerbotten             | 37   | 62.3 | 0.7 |      |    |
| Norrbotten               | 34.8 | 64.6 | 0.6 |      |    |
| Jämtland                 | 27.7 | 71.5 | 0.7 |      |    |
| Sweden                   | 52.3 | 46.8 | 0.9 |      |    |

# Region<sup>6</sup>

|                            |    |    |   |     |    |
|----------------------------|----|----|---|-----|----|
| Southern Sweden            | 65 | 33 | 2 | 478 | 16 |
| Stockholm                  | 65 | 34 | 1 | 660 | 17 |
| Western Sweden             | 56 | 43 | 1 | 665 | 17 |
| Eastern central Sweden     | 52 | 47 | 1 | 567 | 15 |
| South-east Sweden          | 49 | 50 | 1 | 456 | 15 |
| Western central Sweden     | 43 | 55 | 2 | 641 | 17 |
| Northern Sweden            | 35 | 64 | 1 | 441 | 17 |
| All except Northern Sweden | 55 | 44 | 1 |     |    |

Sources: Gilljam and Holmberg (1996; Tables 10.2, 10.4, 10.7, 10.9, 10.12, 10.14, 10.18, 10.24, 10.26, 10.27, 10.29, 10.30; pp. 172-200).

## Vote in the 1994 referendum and party supported in 1994 general election.

| Party voted for in 1994 | Yes | No | Blank | Number of interviewees | Number of non-voters |
|-------------------------|-----|----|-------|------------------------|----------------------|
| VP                      | 13  | 85 | 2     | 235                    | 5                    |
| SSD                     | 46  | 53 | 1     | 1596                   | 7                    |
| GP                      | 20  | 79 | 1     | 192                    | 6                    |
| CP                      | 44  | 54 | 2     | 297                    | 4                    |
| KD                      | 54  | 44 | 2     | 145                    | 4                    |
| FP                      | 79  | 20 | 1     | 268                    | 3                    |
| MP                      | 86  | 13 | 1     | 767                    | 4                    |
| Others                  | 38  | 62 | 0     | 50                     | 4                    |
| Blank                   | 38  | 59 | 3     | 73                     | 5                    |
| Non-voters              | 44  | 55 | 1     | 171                    | 41                   |

Source: Holmberg (1996, p. 226).

<sup>6</sup> Southern Sweden consists of Malmö, Malmöhus north and Malmöhus south. Stockholm consists of Stockholm and Stockholm county. Western Sweden consists of Halland, Göteborg, Bohuslän, Älvsborg south and Skaraborg. Eastern central Sweden consists of Uppsala, Södermanland, Östergötland and Västmanland. South-east Sweden consists of Jönköping, Kronoberg, Kalmar, Gotland and Blekinge. Western central Sweden consists of Älvsborg north, Värmland, Örebro, Kopparberg and Gävleborg. Northern Sweden consists of Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten.

Relationship between primary industry employees in the area and no-vote in the 1994 referendum.

| County             | Primary industry employees<br>per capita** | No-vote in 1994 referendum |
|--------------------|--|----------------------------|
| Stockholm county * | 0.4  | 37.1                       |
| Göteborg *         | 0.7  | 45.5                       |
| Västmanland        | 2.3  | 44.8                       |
| Norrbottn          | 2.3  | 64.6                       |
| Malmöhus *         | 2.4  | 34.4                       |
| Örebro             | 2.4  | 52                         |
| Älvsborg *         | 2.6  | 50.3                       |
| Jönköping          | 2.8  | 50.7                       |
| Värmland           | 2.8  | 52.1                       |
| Blekinge           | 2.8  | 52.6                       |
| Västernorrland     | 2.8  | 57.6                       |
| Östergötland       | 2.9  | 45                         |
| Uppsala            | 3.1  | 45.5                       |
| Gävleborg          | 3.1  | 57.8                       |
| Kronoberg          | 3.2  | 47.6                       |
| Södermanland       | 3.3  | 45.3                       |
| Kopparberg         | 3.3  | 60.4                       |
| Västerbotten       | 3.3  | 62.3                       |
| Halland            | 4.6  | 41.1                       |
| Kalmar             | 4.6  | 50.8                       |
| Skaraborg          | 5  | 49.4                       |
| Jämtland           | 5  | 71.5                       |
| Kristianstad       | 8.3  | 42.4                       |
| Gotland            | 9  | 48.1                       |

Author's calculations. Source: Jordbruksstatistisk Årsbok (1995, p. 32) and as above. Note: for the counties marked with an '\*', there is not complete correspondence between the data for the general election and the referendum. These counties were divided into two areas, and in one case three, for the referendum data. To achieve comparability, an average percentage was calculated. While this is not ideal, the discrepancies are not great, and the end result only minimally distorted.

\*\* Including agriculture, forestry and fishing.

#### Appendix 7.4. Internationalism and attitude towards European integration.

7.4.A. Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “aim for a form of society with a more international outlook and less borders between people and countries” by vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.

| Attitude to the suggestion |                |                                 |                 |             |                        |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Vote                       | Bad suggestion | Neither bad nor good suggestion | Good suggestion | Sum percent | Number of interviewees |
| Yes                        | 11             | 17                              | 72              | 100         | 821                    |
| No                         | 29             | 34                              | 37              | 100         | 684                    |
| Blank                      | 8              | 38                              | 54              | 100         | 24                     |
| All                        | 19             | 25                              | 56              | 100         | 1529                   |

7.4.B Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “aim for a multi-cultural society with great tolerance towards other people from other countries, with different religions and life-styles” by vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.

| Attitude to the suggestion |                |                                 |                 |             |                        |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Vote                       | Bad suggestion | Neither bad nor good suggestion | Good suggestion | Sum percent | Number of interviewees |
| Yes                        | 26             | 22                              | 52              | 100         | 829                    |
| No                         | 31             | 24                              | 45              | 100         | 695                    |
| Blank                      | 13             | 46                              | 41              | 100         | 24                     |
| All                        | 28             | 23                              | 49              | 100         | 1548                   |

7.4.C. Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “aim towards a society that protects traditional Swedish values” by vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.

| Attitude to the suggestion |                |                                 |                 |             |                        |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Vote                       | Bad suggestion | Neither bad nor good suggestion | Good suggestion | Sum percent | Number of interviewees |
| Yes                        | 11             | 19                              | 70              | 100         | 830                    |
| No                         | 8              | 21                              | 71              | 100         | 705                    |
| Blank                      | 13             | 8                               | 69              | 100         | 24                     |
| All                        | 10             | 20                              | 70              | 100         | 1559                   |

7.4.D. Attitude towards the suggestion that we should “reduce development aid” by vote in 1994 referendum. Percent.

| Attitude to the suggestion |                |                                 |                 |             |                        |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Vote                       | Bad suggestion | Neither bad nor good suggestion | Good suggestion | Sum percent | Number of interviewees |
| Yes                        | 47             | 30                              | 23              | 100         | 826                    |
| No                         | 55             | 24                              | 21              | 100         | 705                    |
| Blank                      | 54             | 33                              | 13              | 100         | 24                     |
| All                        | 51             | 27                              | 22              | 100         | 1559                   |

Source: Lindahl (1996, pp. 163-4). Author's translations.

7.4.E. Arguments for and against Swedish EU-membership among voters intending to vote ‘yes’ and ‘no’ by factors with an international content. Percent.

| Category of argument                       | ‘yes’-voters arguments   |                              | ‘no’-voters arguments        |                          |
|--|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
|  | Arguments for membership | Arguments against membership | Arguments against membership | Arguments for membership |
| National independence                      | 0                        | 7                            | 12                           | 0                        |
| EU's relations with the rest of the world  | 1                        | 3                            | 4                            | 0                        |
| Sweden will be isolated without membership | 36                       | 0                            | 2                            | 15                       |
| Open borders                               | 5                        | 22                           | 17                           | 9                        |
| Foreign and security policy                | 18                       | 9                            | 10                           | 16                       |
| Other categories                           | 103                      | 84                           | 104                          | 70                       |
| Number of interviewees                     | 794                      | 461                          | 766                          | 353                      |

Source: Lindahl in Giljam and Holmberg (1996, p. 160). Author's translations.

Appendix 7.5. The relationship between left-voting at the 1994 parliamentary election and vote in the 1994 referendum.

|                         | VP   | SD   | SD+VP | 'No'-vote in 1994<br>referendum. |
|-------------------------|------|------|-------|----------------------------------|
| Stockholm *             | 6.7  | 36.6 | 43.3  | 37.7                             |
| Halland                 | 4.3  | 40.5 | 44.8  | 41.1                             |
| Jönköping               | 4.4  | 41.9 | 46.3  | 50.7                             |
| Skaraborg               | 5.5  | 42.6 | 48.1  | 49.4                             |
| Kronoberg               | 5.8  | 42.8 | 48.6  | 47.6                             |
| Uppsala                 | 5.8  | 43   | 48.8  | 45.5                             |
| Gotland                 | 5.2  | 43.7 | 48.9  | 48.1                             |
| Kristianstad            | 3.5  | 45.4 | 48.9  | 42.4                             |
| Bohuslan and Göteborg * | 7.6  | 41.4 | 49    | 45.5                             |
| Malmöhus *              | 3.7  | 45.9 | 49.6  | 34.4                             |
| Älvsborg *              | 5.7  | 45.5 | 51.2  | 50.3                             |
| Sweden 1994             | 6.2  | 45.4 | 51.6  | 46.8                             |
| Östergötland            | 5.5  | 46.2 | 51.7  | 45                               |
| Kalmar                  | 5.6  | 47.7 | 53.3  | 50.8                             |
| Kopparberg              | 7    | 49.6 | 56.6  | 60.4                             |
| Värmland                | 6.8  | 49.9 | 56.7  | 52.1                             |
| Södermanland            | 5.4  | 51.9 | 57.3  | 45.3                             |
| Västmanland             | 6.3  | 51.4 | 57.7  | 44.8                             |
| Örebro                  | 7.1  | 51   | 58.1  | 52                               |
| Jämtland                | 6.8  | 51.6 | 58.4  | 71.5                             |
| Blekinge                | 6.5  | 53   | 59.5  | 52.6                             |
| Västerbotten            | 7.3  | 52.2 | 59.5  | 62.3                             |
| Gävleborg               | 7.8  | 53.8 | 61.6  | 57.8                             |
| Västernorrland          | 6.7  | 55.2 | 61.9  | 57.6                             |
| Norrbottn               | 11.4 | 60.7 | 72.1  | 64.6                             |

Note: for the counties marked with a '\*', there is not complete correspondence between the data for the general election and the referendum. These counties were divided into two areas, and in one case three, for the referendum data. To achieve comparability, an average percentage was calculated. While this is not ideal, the discrepancies are not great, and the end result only minimally distorted.

Sources for data: Statistisk Årsbok (1995, p. 398), Gilljam and Holmberg (1996, p. 199). Author's calculations.



Appendix 7.6. Election results and seat allocation in the Swedish parliament ('Riksdag'), 1970-1994.

Election results.

| Party    | 1970 | 1973 | 1976 | 1979 | 1982 | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 |
|----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MP       | 11.5 | 14.3 | 15.6 | 20.3 | 23.6 | 21.3 | 18.3 | 21.9 | 22.3 |
| CP       | 19.9 | 25.1 | 24.1 | 18.1 | 15.5 | 9.8  | 11.3 | 8.5  | 7.7  |
| FP       | 16.2 | 9.4  | 11.1 | 10.6 | 5.9  | 14.2 | 12.2 | 9.1  | 7.2  |
| KD       | 1.8  | 1.8  | 1.4  | 1.4  | 1.9  | 2.6  | 2.9  | 7.1  | 4.1  |
| SSD      | 45.3 | 43.6 | 42.7 | 43.2 | 45.6 | 44.7 | 43.2 | 37.7 | 45.4 |
| VP       | 4.8  | 5.3  | 4.8  | 5.6  | 5.6  | 5.4  | 5.8  | 4.5  | 6.2  |
| GP       | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 1.7  | 1.5  | 5.5  | 3.4  | 5.0  |
| ND       | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 6.7  | 1.2  |
| Other    | 0.5  | 0.5  | 0.3  | 0.8  | 0.2  | 0.5  | 0.8  | 1.1  | 0.9  |
| Turn-out | 88.3 | 90.8 | 91.8 | 90.7 | 91.4 | 89.9 | 86.0 | 86.7 |      |

The threshold of representation is four percent, so none of the parties in the 'Other' category have ever been represented in the Riksdag. Sources: 1970-1991: Petersson, (1994, p. 60); 1994: Madeley, (1995, p. 425).

| Party | 1970 | 1973 | 1976 | 1979 | 1982 | 1985 | 1988 | 1991 | 1994 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MP    | 41   | 51   | 55   | 73   | 86   | 76   | 66   | 80   | 80   |
| CP    | 71   | 90   | 86   | 64   | 56   | 43   | 42   | 31   | 27   |
| FP    | 58   | 34   | 39   | 38   | 21   | 51   | 44   | 33   | 26   |
| KD    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | 26   | 14   |
| SSD   | 163  | 156  | 152  | 154  | 166  | 159  | 156  | 138  | 162  |
| VP    | 17   | 19   | 17   | 20   | 20   | 19   | 21   | 16   | 22   |
| GP    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 20   | -    | 18   |
| ND    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 25   | -    |
| Seats | 350  | 350  | 349  | 349  | 349  | 349  | 349  | 349  | 349  |

Sources: 1970-1991: Petersson (1994, p. 63); 1994: Madeley, (1995, p. 425).

## 1994 Riksdag elections. Results by county.

| County                     | MP   | CP                | FP   | KD   | GP  | ND  | SSD  | VP   | Other |
|----------------------------|------|-------------------|------|------|-----|-----|------|------|-------|
| Stockholm city & Stockholm | 32.3 | 3.8               | 9.7  | 3.3  | 5.4 | 1.3 | 36.6 | 6.7  | 1.0   |
| Uppsala                    | 22.3 | 7.9               | 8.9  | 3.8  | 6.1 | 1.2 | 43.0 | 5.8  | 0.9   |
| Södermanland               | 18.8 | 6.7               | 6.8  | 3.4  | 5.0 | 0.9 | 51.9 | 5.4  | 1.1   |
| Östergötland               | 21.6 | 7.7               | 6.6  | 4.8  | 5.1 | 1.4 | 46.2 | 5.5  | 1.1   |
| Jönköping                  | 19.8 | 10.8              | 6.2  | 10.7 | 4.1 | 1.0 | 41.9 | 4.4  | 1.0   |
| Kronoberg                  | 21.5 | 13.4              | 5.4  | 4.8  | 4.8 | 0.9 | 42.8 | 5.8  | 0.9   |
| Kalmar                     | 18.9 | 13.0              | 4.3  | 4.3  | 4.3 | 1.3 | 47.7 | 5.6  | 0.6   |
| Gotland                    | 17.9 | 18.0              | 4.5  | 2.5  | 6.6 | 1.3 | 43.7 | 5.2  | 0.3   |
| Blekinge                   | 18.4 | 7.6               | 5.2  | 3.3  | 4.4 | 1.0 | 53.0 | 6.5  | 0.5   |
| Kristianstad               | 25.1 | 9.8               | 5.2  | 4.1  | 4.1 | 1.5 | 45.4 | 3.5  | 1.4   |
| Malmöhus                   | 28.1 | 5.1               | 6.4  | 2.7  | 4.0 | 1.7 | 45.9 | 3.7  | 2.4   |
| Halland                    | 25.3 | 12.7              | 6.6  | 3.7  | 4.6 | 1.5 | 40.5 | 4.3  | 0.7   |
| Göteborg city & Bohuslän   | 24   | 4.8               | 9.3  | 4.7  | 5.8 | 1.6 | 41.4 | 7.6  | 0.9   |
| Älvsborg                   | 19.7 | 10.3              | 6.7  | 4.9  | 5.5 | 1.2 | 45.5 | 5.7  | 0.5   |
| Skaraborg                  | 20.6 | 12.4              | 5.9  | 5.8  | 5.2 | 1.6 | 42.6 | 5.5  | 0.6   |
| Värmland                   | 18.5 | 9.4               | 6.1  | 3.4  | 4.3 | 1.0 | 49.9 | 6.8  | 0.6   |
| Örebro                     | 16.2 | 6.9               | 7.4  | 5.0  | 4.6 | 1.2 | 51.0 | 7.1  | 0.7   |
| Västmanland                | 18.9 | 6.1               | 7.2  | 3.3  | 4.6 | 1.2 | 51.4 | 6.3  | 1.0   |
| Kopparberg                 | 16.1 | 10.1              | 5.8  | 3.7  | 6.0 | 1.0 | 49.6 | 7.0  | 0.7   |
| Gävleborg                  | 13.1 | 9.1               | 5.8  | 3.2  | 5.5 | 1.1 | 53.8 | 7.8  | 0.5   |
| Västernorrland             | 13.0 | 9.2               | 6.0  | 3.9  | 4.8 | 0.7 | 55.2 | 6.7  | 0.6   |
| Jämtland                   | 12.9 | 15.0              | 4.4  | 2.3  | 5.8 | 0.5 | 51.6 | 6.8  | 0.6   |
| Västerbotten               | 11.1 | 9.4               | 8.0  | 5.1  | 5.8 | 0.4 | 52.2 | 7.3  | 0.7   |
| Norrbottn                  | 10.3 | 5.4               | 4.7  | 2.6  | 3.5 | 0.3 | 60.7 | 11.4 | 1.0   |
| Sweden 1994                | 22.3 | 7.7               | 7.2  | 4.1  | 5.0 | 1.2 | 45.4 | 6.2  | 1.0   |
| 1991                       | 21.9 | 8.5               | 9.1  | 7.1  | 3.4 | 6.7 | 37.7 | 4.5  | 1.0   |
| 1988                       | 18.3 | 11.3              | 12.2 | 2.9  | 5.5 | -   | 43.2 | 5.8  | 0.7   |
| 1985                       | 21.3 | 12.4 <sup>7</sup> | 14.2 | -    | 1.5 | -   | 44.7 | 5.4  | 0.5   |
| 1982                       | 23.6 | 15.5              | 5.9  | 1.9  | 1.7 | -   | 45.6 | 5.6  | 0.3   |

Source: Statistisk Årsbok (1995, p. 398).

## Degree of urbanity in Commune and party support.

| Degree of urbanity | MP | CP | FP | KD | GP | ND | SSD | VP | Other | Not vote |
|--------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|-------|----------|
| All urban          | 38 | 3  | 14 | 4  | 7  | 5  | 25  | 4  | 0     | 9        |
| 90-99.9%           | 27 | 3  | 12 | 7  | 4  | 6  | 36  | 4  | 1     | 8        |
| 70-89.9            | 19 | 11 | 8  | 8  | 3  | 7  | 40  | 3  | 1     | 9        |
| 50-69.9            | 14 | 15 | 5  | 8  | 3  | 10 | 39  | 5  | 1     | 9        |
| 30-49.9            | 11 | 14 | 18 | 7  | 2  | 0  | 39  | 9  | 0     | 20       |

Source: Statistisk Årsbok (1995, p. 400).

<sup>7</sup> Electoral co-operation with KD.

Urban-rural ranking calculations.

|           | MP  | CP  | FP  | KD  | GP  | ND  | SSD | VP  |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Urban 1+2 | 33  | 3   | 13  | 6   | 6   | 6   | 31  | 4   |
| Rural 4+5 | 13  | 15  | 12  | 8   | 3   | 5   | 39  | 7   |
| U/R       | 2.6 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| Rank U-R  | 1   | 8   | 3   | 6   | 2   | 3   | 5   | 7   |

Authors calculations. Source for data: Statistisk Årsbok (1995, p. 400).

North-South ranking calculations.

|            | MP   | CP  | FP  | KD  | GP  | ND  | SSD  | VP  |
|------------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
| Avg. South | 21.6 | 9.2 | 6.6 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 1.3 | 45.6 | 5.6 |
| Avg. North | 12.8 | 9.7 | 5.8 | 3.5 | 5.2 | 0.7 | 53.9 | 7.8 |
| Ratio S/N  | 1.7  | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 0.8  | 0.7 |
| Rank S-N   | 1    | 5   | 4   | 3   | 6   | 2   | 7    | 8   |

Authors calculations. North: Kopparberg, Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten, Norrbotten. Source for data: Statistisk Årsbok (1995, p. 398).

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