The policy configurations of ‘welfare states’

and women’s role in the workforce in advanced industrial societies

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This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the PhD degree at the

London School of Economics and Political Science, the University of London
Abstract

Comparative political economy studies of welfare states have focused on either general processes of modernization or the evolution of different welfare state 'regimes' - such as the social democratic, liberal and conservative types identified by Esping-Andersen. Variations in women's role in the workforce tend to be seen as closely allied with 'welfare regime' types or associated with welfare state modernization. But there are relatively few empirical studies in the political economy field of how, within the overall policy configuration of the state, welfare policies influence women's labour force participation.

First, using a quantitative analysis of country-level data for 17 OECD countries from 1960 to 1987, this study identifies clusters of countries consistent with the Esping-Andersen classification, which share distinct patterns of women's role in the workforce and have different paths of development over time. However, the analysis shows that important anomalies exist and key questions remain unresolved. Second, case studies are used to analyse policy configurations and developments in women's employment over time. 'Core' examples are drawn from each main welfare regime - the USA (liberal), Sweden (social democratic) and Germany (conservative). The Netherlands is examined as a key anomalous case. Third, the lessons from the empirical analyses are used to reconsider aspects of the 'social democratic' and 'modernization' models of welfare state development.

Across the period as a whole female labour force participation has grown in most countries. The most rapid growth of women's involvement has taken place in core countries with either liberal or social democratic welfare configurations (the USA and Sweden). There has been less change in 'conservative' countries (such as Germany) and in the Netherlands despite its 'social democratic' classification. Yet apparent linkages between labour market trends and welfare policies do not necessarily stand up to close over-time or comparative analysis. In the USA there are only weak connections between welfare policies and women's changing role in the labour market, whereas the two factors are closely and directly linked in Sweden. Particular policies contributed to expanding women's employment in Germany, but the overall
policy configuration has bolstered broader patterns of social stratification inimical to women playing a larger role. In the Netherlands, welfare policies have clearly restrictive effects on women's participation in job markets, although some growth has occurred since the 'welfare explosion' of the 1960s.

These findings show that welfare states' impacts on women's employment do not fit neatly into the 'modernization' or 'social democratic' models. 'One path fits all' models perform particularly poorly, but even differentiated analyses of 'welfare state regimes' pay insufficient attention to the location of social welfare within the state's overall policy configuration. A clearer distinction between the 'welfare state' construed as form of state and as a particular sector of state activity can help comparative analysis eliminate the residual influence of 'one-path' models, and provide more compelling analyses of variations in women's employment trajectories.
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Chapter One: Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the welfare state and the entry of women into the paid workforce. Its central contribution is to use the position of women in the workforce to shed new light on welfare state theory. The interest in the position of women is not simply instrumental. I also examine patterns of, and developmental paths taken by, women's involvement in the workforce. Indeed, women's labour market participation trajectories in various states may be key aspects of convergence and divergence in comparative political economy. Moreover, the explosive growth of a (mainly) feminist literature indicates that gender and the welfare state are closely entwined with one another. A good deal of this literature is relevant to - and considered within - the present study, although my main focus of attention is on 'mainstream' welfare state theory.

The thesis has been structured to 'open out' from empirical analyses to theoretical reflection, rather than adopting the conventional 'focus down' approach drawn from the natural sciences. Implicitly, the latter reflects assumptions about method rooted in an hypothetico-deductivism. The structure used here is not based on such assumptions, reflecting a certain unease about them. However, the adoption of an 'opening out' structure raises certain problems of its own, which I address here. First, it requires a clear 'map' of the thesis be presented early on, a function performed by the 'theoretical chapter(s)' with which a conventional thesis would open. Secondly, although theory should not be discussed fully initially, its general outlines need to be sketched in early on, alongside discussion of the derivation of 'hypotheses' examined in the empirical chapters. After clarifying the somewhat distinctive terminology used, I will go on to treat these two issues in turn.

1.1 Terminological clarification

The use of term 'policy configuration' to describe welfare states is deliberate. Together with the placing of quotation marks around the word 'welfare states' in my thesis title, this choice reflects discontent with the 'welfare state regime' concept. The conventional usage suggests that all these 'regimes' are welfare states of some sort. This usage effectively elides the distinction between two meanings of the welfare state concept (welfare state as form of state and as sector of state activity) and
consequently exaggerates the welfare state's role in the wider political economy. My title does, of course, play on the ambiguity in the 'welfare state' expression. On the one hand, I am concerned both the configuration of 'welfare states' understood as a sector of state activity - otherwise referred to as 'social policy'. On the other, although I wish to call into question the implication of most comparative analysis that all states qualify as welfare states of some sort, the title also signals my interest in the overall policy configuration of western democratic states. Indeed, my approach suggests that the configuration of social policy within the state, and indeed within the broader configuration of the political economy, are central issues. However, 'configurative' analysis is based on a distinction between these concepts, as well as considering their relationship. It should not be taken as an invitation to blur concepts.

The 'configuration' expression is used somewhat differently in other welfare state analyses and the comparative literature. In her massive and innovative study of the political origins of social policy in the United States, Skocpol developed a 'structured polity' approach to political analysis (1992). She '...views the polity as the primary locus of action, yet understands political activities, whether carried out by politicians or by social groups, as conditioned by the institutional configurations of governments and political party systems' (1992: 41, emphasis added). She does not discuss 'configuration' concept in detail, but her usage shares some characteristics with mine, although important differences remain. First, although Skocpol's is an analysis of the US placed in comparative context, it is not a fully comparative analysis. Secondly, while she moves some distance from her earlier 'statist' posture, while refusing to return to the more structurally determinist position of her earliest major work (Skocpol 1979), important ambiguities remain in her view of the relationship of the state and society (see Katznelson 1997: 105-106 for a discussion).

Skocpol has tried to introduce an element of contingency into the study of politics and society. Ironically, while her formulation of the 'structured polity' approach acknowledges that both politicians and social groups 'act', it places this action primarily within political (rather than other social or economic) structures. Moreover, Skocpol tends to privilege political actors (politicians and bureaucrats), in arguing
against positions she depicts as socially determinist. Consequentially, she tends to locate creativity in politics, rather than elsewhere in society, emphasizing that ‘politicians and administrators must be taken seriously’ as ‘actors in their own right’ not merely as ‘agents of other social interests’ (1992: 41). This point needs to be made carefully. In contrast, with her earlier (rhetorically) strong/exclusive focus on states rather than society, social factors come into the theoretical and empirical discussion of *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* powerfully. However, in her theoretical statements, Skocpol retains a tendency to associate emphasis on social interests with structural determinism, rather than as containing potentially creative or partially autonomous actors, whose behaviour cannot be read off from their structural location.

In the end, Skocpol’s use of the notion of configuration is largely synonymous with the notion of structure. Indeed, when she writes of ‘institutional configurations of governments and political party systems’ her use of the plural suggests that she is not primarily concerned with the articulation of these structures, instead seeming focusing on them individually. Although any use of the notion of configuration does have structural resonances, as I have already indicated, my use of the term signals a concern with relationships, in the present case between state social policy, welfare provision, the state and the political economy.

The concept of ‘configuration’ is associated with another, albeit related, strand in comparative analysis famously developed by Barrington Moore (1966; see Katznelson 1997 for a recent evaluation). Comparative macro social history is concerned with tracing distinctive paths of development, or trajectories, to the modern world. My analysis ultimately raises questions about trajectories of development, or patterns of divergence and convergence ‘after the golden age’ of the welfare state. In common with the ‘heroic’ macro approach I am concerned with overall political economy configurations. In this sense my analysis differs from Pierson’s (1994) less heroic comparative analysis of welfare, which uses the notion of policy feedback to identify a common absence of change, suggesting a structuralist tendency to emphasize inertia. Nevertheless, I am concerned with the location of welfare and role of women within overall political economy configurations. In other words it is less holistic, more analytic, than the macro historical sociology tradition of configurative scholarship.
Questions about the trajectories of women’s employment in advanced capitalist democracies and their impact on the developmental paths of OECD states are raised throughout this thesis. In the conclusion patterns of change and stability in welfare states and gender roles are considered as different aspects of the more abstract issue of convergence and divergence among advanced industrial societies. The argument that divergent patterns of development characterize welfare states in advanced industrial societies has become dominant. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom remains that all advanced industrial societies have welfare states. The emphasis on divergence thus exists within some essentially common features. Turning to the position of women, gender roles are widely assumed to have changed according to a common pattern. However, patterns of difference in gender roles or welfare provision may exist within these common features and may even overwhelm the commonality.

Interest in questions of convergence and divergence has renewed in the light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and globalization debates. Indeed, the ‘victory’ of arguments that the policy configurations of welfare states diverge may need to be reconsidered, as the demise of one national ‘model’ after another is announced. The construction of new forms of political economy will take place in conditions inherited from the various configurations of welfare states even if they are reconstructed or dismantled. Among these conditions the patterns and trajectories of women’s involvement in the paid workforce may be particularly significant.

1.2 A ‘map’ of the thesis
The body of this thesis is organized into three main sections; a data analysis, a series of country case studies, and an analysis of welfare state theories. The first section considers hypotheses derived from two main ‘welfare state’ theories - modernization and social democratic/‘politics matters’ approaches - in an examination of women’s involvement in the paid workforce. It is important to remember that modernization and social democratic analyses are subtle and complex bodies of theory. There are important differences of emphasis among the authors I group together. It is therefore unlikely that a large-scale comparison using aggregate data could constitute an authoritative ‘test’ of these theories. Thus this section is presented in an exploratory,
rather than confirmatory, spirit. It seeks to set empirical parameters for the subsequent analysis and is a preliminary sorting device for potential explanations, rather than a means for testing hypotheses and finally adjudicating between them. For these reasons I choose to discuss ‘derived’ hypotheses, rather than ‘theories’ in this section.

The data analysis suggests that variables associated with the political mobilization of women may be more important than those political sociological and party political measures of mobilization typically found to be significant for the explanation of welfare state development. Once in existence the welfare state does seem to have an impact on women’s involvement in the labour force. This impact can be seen both in terms of variables which represent ‘clusters’ of welfare states and those which operationalize the ‘magnitude’ of welfare effort. The same can be said about the impact of variables operationalizing the wider employment patterns found in welfare states. General measures of economic development also seem to have an impact. However, the more specific and ‘fine-grained’ hypotheses, often developed in the context of the study of a single case, about the impact of economic variables such as inflation and the level of personal taxation have more equivocal impacts.

Particularly important for the subsequent analysis, however, the quantitative results seem to show that convergence ‘one path fits all’ models do not fare well, with states instead following divergent patterns and arranged into clusters to some extent similar to the regimes identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). Nevertheless, anomalies exist in the results of the data analysis and important questions remain unresolved by it. While theory suggests that welfare state regimes encompass or construct labour market regimes, no one-to-one correspondence exists between them (cf. Stephens 1994). While a relationship exists between the form of welfare provision and the labour market, it is more complex than existing theories allow. Welfare provision should be more clearly located within broader features of the political economy. In order to address these questions and anomalies, and to go beyond surface level analysis to consider questions of causality, these issues are analyzed ‘over time’ in country case studies.
The first lesson of the case studies (of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the USA) is that dramatic cross-national differences exist in patterns of women's participation in the paid workforce and paths of its development over time. Secondly, national configurations of welfare policy are deeply implicated in these paths and patterns. 'One path' models are further called into question. Moreover, detailed examination reinforces the impression that welfare policies impact on patterns of women's employment in puzzling ways in the context of established theory. For example, some 'conservative' welfare policies in Germany may have aided women's entry into the workforce, albeit in a generally unsupportive context. Making sense of this puzzle requires that welfare is placed in the context of the configuration of the state and political economy.

A key contribution of the case studies is their development within a common framework, to facilitate cross case comparison to bring similarities and differences into focus. The developmental paths followed by social policy and the pattern of women's entry into the workforce are periodized in each case. While in some cases the broad outlines of the developmental path(s) followed is relatively uncontroversial, in others competing explanations suggest particular periodizations. Consideration of the 'periods' into which they divide history provides is a method of assessing these competing explanations.

Each individual country study challenges some aspect of the conventional wisdom on that case. Thus the Swedish case contributes to debates about the distinctiveness of its welfarism, when this structure was 'locked in' and about the role of gender in welfare state construction. In Sweden welfare policy was central to the political economy and was integrated with labour market policy. Consequentially, state welfare policy largely structured the development of women's role in the workforce.

The theoretical expectation for the US 'liberal' welfare regimes is less clear. Developments in the USA are sometimes attributed to the 'unfettered' market, whilst at others they are laid at the door of the welfare state. The major role played by state policy in the development of female labour force participation is clear, but it is less obvious that this role can be appropriately classified under the 'welfare state' heading.
This analysis challenges the rather confused 'power resource' interpretation of the US welfare regime and its impact on women. It also raises difficulties for the widespread view that the welfare state has played a key role in the political mobilization of women in the US (Piven 1985; Flammang 1987 and Erie and Rein 1988).

Women’s participation in the German workforce grew very little between 1960 and 1989 and was relatively low at the end of that period, as might be expected in a conservative welfare regime. However, the role of welfare policy in producing this result is puzzling. The pattern of female labour market participation seems to reflect broader characteristics of the political economy. The segmented form of welfare (including labour market) policy appears to bolster existing labour market and political economy structures, but labour market policy may improve the generally weak position of women in the German workforce. Again this interpretation challenges aspects of the ‘power resource’ interpretation of the German case.

In the Netherlands welfare provision dovetailed with broader patterns of social and political structure to restrict Dutch women to one of the weakest labour market positions in the western world. However, this pattern was associated with a strictly limited role for the state in welfare provision. During the 1960s welfare provision and state involvement in welfare expanded dramatically. Subsequently, female labour force participation began to grow. However, the relationship between welfare expansion, a general weakening of traditional social values/control and the growth of women’s role in the paid workforce are difficult to disentangle. Indeed, the reconceptualization of ‘pillarization’ - a key concept in the analysis of Dutch politics is a key contribution. This reconceptualization makes it difficult to attribute changes in women’s employment directly to developments in welfare policy. Moreover, although it grew significantly, women’s labour market position remained weaker in the Netherlands than elsewhere, while welfare provision remained strikingly sexist well into the 1980s.

Overall, the case studies support the view that different configurations of welfare are associated with distinct patterns of women’s involvement in the workforce. They also deepen skepticism about some of the claims made by mainstream welfare state
theories. ‘One path’ models certainly perform badly and there are problems with the welfare state regime ‘clusters’ associated with predictions of multiple developmental paths. The difficulties with all these theories are profound enough to beg questions about their conception of the welfare state, questions that are tackled below.

Empirical analyses did not support modernization theory predictions of a common path of women’s entry into the workforce. Nevertheless, the theory provides a basis for the influential and persistent view that western states share a common political economy model. It merits careful theoretical consideration. Despite predicting significant variations in and clustering of welfare states, the social democratic theory does not have a clear ‘welfare state’ concept. It slips between conceptions of the welfare state as a form of the state and a sector of state activity. The first notion allows the welfare state to be defined in an encompassing manner, but implies that very few states are welfare states. The second implies that advanced industrial societies have welfare states. The theory develops an overall model that illegitimately selects from these two conceptions of the welfare state. As a consequence it implies that all western democracies are welfare states of some sort, and this status is a key characteristic of the state and political economy, however marginal social policy seems to be. A clearer conception is needed of the relationship between the configuration of; a) a state’s welfare policy, b) state policy in general, c) the public-private welfare mix and d) the overall political economy.

1.3. Welfare State theory and the derivation of hypotheses

The boundaries used to modernization and social democratic theories are considered in detail below - in neither case is the definition of the boundary straightforward. Here, the major elements included within these boundaries are stated. In addition to the well known application of modernization theory to the welfare state associated with the work of Harold Wilensky (1975; 1981; Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985) I include the ‘economic approach’ associated with the Chicago School of Political Economy (particularly Becker 1981/1991).

Work by the ‘power resource’ school (particularly Korpi 1983 and Esping-Andersen 1985; 1990) lies at the heart of the social democratic theory, but it also covers a
number of other elements. I propose to treat the approach relatively broadly, including some work that is explicitly critical of 'social democratic' biases of the theory. I do not wish to exclude important works which designate themselves as 'politics matters', 'non-right hegemony', 'family of nations' 'comparative public policy', 'working class mobilization' or 'power resource' (including its gender and Christian democratic variants) analyses. The social democratic label may appear problematic. Core proponents of the theory have themselves attempted to throw off some of these biases (Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, I argue that these theorists remain trapped within social democratic assumptions. Moreover, many analyses share common roots with the social democratic model (for example asserting that 'politics matters' - see Castles 1978; 1982; 1989; 1993) and remain engaged in debates about social democracy. Still other analyses have developed through a critical engagement with social democracy (van Kersbergen 1995, Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993; Lewis 1992). In all these senses the social democratic model remains central.

A question might be asked about why influential approaches to the analysis of the welfare state - such as institutionalism or feminism - are not considered in their own right here. Part of the answer is that elements of these approaches are analyzed, particularly in as much as they suggest dimensions of variation appropriate for a general comparison, although not as distinct bodies of theory. This is particularly the case for some feminist or 'gendered' analyses. However, little of this work covers the seventeen or eighteen capitalist democracies. The frameworks for such an analysis that have been developed, for the most part, have emerged out of a critical engagement with social democratic and power resource theories. They often present themselves as gendered variants of that approach (see especially Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993; and also Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1996; Daly 1994).

Institutionalist theory, by its nature, has tended to concentrate on particular cases and explanations. It has thus tended to focus on single country or very small 'n' studies. The differences between institutionalist and social democratic/power resource analysis have been exaggerated (Pierson 1994: 27-39 and Skocpol 1992: 1-62 divide the two approaches from one another - but see Skocpol 1992: 59 footnote 119; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). The distinction between them is based largely on claims made by
institutionalists (but see also Korpi 1989) which attribute a social determinism to the social democratic or power resources approach (Pierson 1994: 28-30; Skocpol 1992: 23-26, 38-40). These two traditions are much closer than is often thought.

Power resource analysts are centrally concerned with the (re)shaping of society by public policy - what institutionalists call policy feedback/legacies. Power resource analysts describe a social democratic welfare 'strategy' aimed at increasing the space for socialist politics, just as Bismarck used social policy to reduce such space (see Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984; Esping-Andersen 1985; 1990). As soon as the welfare state is used as an independent variable (as in Esping-Andersen 1990: 141-229 for example) variations in the policy configurations of welfare states are likely to produce divergent outcomes. Greater emphasis on the specificity of particular cases (or clusters of cases) to some extent mirrors the concerns of the institutionalists. The attention paid to the impact of the welfare state also suggests that it is inaccurate to attach a 'social determinist' tag to these analyses. At a more abstract level the balance between general and specific factors in the explanation of welfare state development and women’s employment trajectories is important.

Modernization Theory

Modernization theory is wide ranging and has been influential within social science. Applied to the welfare state it is particularly associated with Harold Wilensky. Although the language of modernization theory was consistently present in his work, Wilensky particularly emphasized the importance of 'the logic of industrialism' and 'industrial society'. This view of modernization theory which focuses on 'the economic' is, I believe, dominant within the welfare state literature, a dominance which will be reflected in my treatment of the theory. Modernization theories are concerned with the relationship between the agricultural, industrial and service sectors of the economy. By contrast, some other proponents of modernization construed the approach more broadly, to include urbanization, democratization, and increasing density of communications (see Flora and Alber 1981: 37-8; Hage, Hanneman and Gargan 1989: 100-110; and Pierson’s discussion 1991: 32).
Differences between versions of the modernization approach may be a question of emphasis. Even in Wilensky’s work the ‘logic of industrialism’ and ‘modernization’ are presented as complex and multi-dimensional. These features are less clearly apparent in later work, although they are implied by his continued use of the language of modernization. Emphasis on complexity and multi-dimensionality raises the possibility that modernization may be a partially ‘open’ process, in the sense that individual and group choice may change it. Understood in this way, it may be possible partially to reconcile the ‘modernization’ perspectives with other approaches (see Pierson 1991). However, even in Wilensky’s early work, complexity and multidimensionality are seen as superficial. The explicit, if flexible, functionalism of this work reduced the appearance of complexity to an underlying unity (see Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). Wilensky’s later work focused on the development of causal propositions and operationalization of measures suitable for statistical analysis. In both his ‘early’ and the ‘late’ work, Wilensky conceives of causation - the determination of outcomes - as itself a determined, rather than a contingent or open, process.

In addition, modernization theory was shaped through debate with ‘politics matters’ perspectives which perhaps increased the emphasis on economic factors. Even where political variables were acknowledged, they were presented as accounting for similarity (emphasising the ‘functional equivalence’ of Christian and social democracy). Modernization theorists share a tendency to emphasize the convergent character of ‘modern (industrial) societies’.

As traditionally conceived within the comparative welfare literature, modernization theory is primarily concerned with the origins and development of the welfare state. Numerous factors converge to produce welfare state development, but little attention is paid to the ‘policy feedback’ impact of the welfare state on political, economic or social arrangements. Indeed, despite the attention seemingly focused on the welfare state, it was mainly used to test general theories of modernization (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 18-19). This position reflects and reinforces the tendency to view welfare state development as determined by common general trends.
Modernization theorists have not made strong predictions about the impact of welfare provision on gender roles. Rather than being integrated into the theoretical framework, remarks on this relationship generally result from the observation that women are comparatively well represented in 'welfare occupations'. However, changes in gender roles are seen as a characteristic of modernization. Indeed, a defining image of 'modernization' is the 'change' from the 'traditional' to the 'modern' household. Changes in gender roles tend to be presented within the complex configuration of factors causing welfare state development. Changes in gender role are presented as produced by 'modernization' and as a key characteristic of modernization, as well as a factor giving rise to (the functional need for) the welfare state. The primary hypotheses derived from these theories concern the impact of economic development and the rate of economic growth on women's role in the workforce. I also analyze the impact of developments in the sectoral character of the economy, focusing particularly on manufacturing and services. Finally, although not well integrated theoretically, I also analyze the impact of government - especially welfare - spending on women's involvement in the labour force.

The emphasis on economic factors within the modernization approach is strengthened further by my inclusion of the 'Chicago School' of economics within it - an apparently surprising move. In their analysis of long-run change and extension of the economic approach to cover all human behaviour Chicago School members work within an essentially functionalist modernization framework. They suggest that convergence on a single model of 'modern society' has largely occurred (Posner 1988: especially 206). They also tend to conceive of the process of causation as determined. These characteristics of the Chicago School are particularly clear in work on gender and the welfare state.

By contrast with mainstream modernization analyses, the Chicago School is unconcerned with welfare state origins, and more interested in changes in gender roles especially in the workforce. The primary causes of these changes are economic, with the overall level of economic development and the rate of economic growth both important. The emphasis on prices within 'Chicago School' analyses means that wages - a factor unconsidered in other theories - are given an important causal role. It
is less clear whether the appropriate measure of wages should be the level of women’s money wages, women’s ‘real wages’ or women’s wages relative to men’s? What empirical evidence Becker deploys on this issue is concerned with women’s real wages (1981: 247). However, a focus on relative wages would fit better with conventional micro-economic emphasis on relative prices. The lack of clarity on this issue is ironic, given the theoretical emphasis on wages. It proved difficult to find appropriate measures of wages for comparative analysis. No such measure was available for the full range of states. The best comparable index of women’s wages relative to men’s was available for a sub-group of eleven states. As a consequence, a second set of pooled analyses was undertaken on a smaller data-set.

Considerable play is made of welfare state impacts on gender roles within Chicago analyses. The hypothesis that welfare state ‘size’ has an impact on women’s involvement in the workforce can be derived from this analysis. However, it is unclear how economic and welfare state factors interact. There is economically determinist strain within the approach - as well as being ‘economic’ in methodology, substantively economic explanations are preferred to political or technological ones. Although effects are attributed to it, the welfare state is seen as part of the overall process of economic modernization. However, considerable complexity is generated by extending the economic approach from ‘traditional’ markets in labour, goods and capital to include a variety of political and social markets as well. The assumption that all these markets ‘clear’ stretches credulity. Instead, the Chicago approach collapses complexity into an underlying unity - these factors are seen as aspects of the development of modern society - a strategy which is ultimately functionalist.

Inconsistency exists even within ‘Chicago’ analyses focused on politics and the state. An analysis of the welfare state could be reconstructed from general ‘Chicago’ work on politics (Becker 1983; 1985). While these analyses have a panglossian character, they are not necessarily functionalist in form. However, when Chicago School analysts consider the welfare role of the state explicitly, they do not simply extend these insights. Although competition between interest groups remains important (the claim is that ‘public policy results from competition among interest groups’ Becker 1991: 378), no discussion is offered of this competition in relation to (welfare) state
provision. Instead, the idea that the state intervenes to correct inefficiency in family arrangements (due to the inability of children to make effective contracts) is attributed to parental altruism. Altruism is insufficiently strong to cause parents to leave bequests, but strong enough to cause redistribution between generations through politics. This argument is functionalist - concerned with aggregate social ‘efficiency’ (it ‘is remarkable how many state interventions in family decision appear to contribute to the efficiency of family arrangements’ Becker 1991: 362-364, 378-379).

While both mainstream modernization theory and the Chicago School are basically optimistic about modernization - its impact on the welfare state and gender roles - a number of authors focus on pathologies of modernization. Some authors seem to suggest that modernization is generally pathological, advocating a return to a ‘golden age’ of family capitalism (Falwell 1981; Vigurie 1981). Others imply that modernization has some pathological features, particularly the development of the welfare state and changes in gender roles (Gilder 1981). While I will not discuss this strand of modernization theory in detail here, the suggestion that high inflation and increasing levels of personal taxation play a significant role pushing women into the paid workforce needs mention.

My main purpose here is to derive hypotheses from modernization theory. However, it is worth pointing out that I consider this theory in detail in chapter seven. The theoretical analysis justifies drawing together sociological modernization and the ‘Chicago School’ - which are traditionally thought of as in opposition to one another. This treatment provides the basis for a distinctive critique of the ‘Chicago School’ analysis of gender, including women’s entry into the workforce, showing that it assumes what it ought to explain - the gender division of households.

‘Politics matters’: social democratic and ‘power resource’ models

If modernization theory is basically associated with predictions of convergence in welfare state development and women’s role in the workforce, ‘politics matters’ and ‘social democratic’ theories suggest that common patterns are less significant than differences. This focus on the emergence of a number of distinct welfare state ‘clusters’ has been extremely influential - although the number and nature of these
clusters has generated debate. Although I am primarily concerned with the 'social democratic' or 'power resource' approach, particularly associated with Korpi and Esping-Andersen, I see this as an especially important strand within a broader literature which emerged from the assertion that 'politics matters' in public policy outcomes, some of which is critical of 'social democratic' work.
Table 1.1 - The Clustering of Welfare States

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<tr>
<th>CONSERVATIVE W.S.R.</th>
<th>LIBERAL W.S.R.</th>
<th>SOCIALIST W.S.R.</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(From Esping-Andersen 1990, page 74 Table 3.3)

Although divergent patterns are primarily identified within welfare provision, these theories are concerned with the consequences of welfare divergence for differentiation in other areas of social, economic and political life - effectively treating welfare state form as an independent variable. These theories are concerned with the feedback effects of public policies, despite some claims to the contrary (in Skocpol 1992 and Pierson 1994). Notwithstanding this emphasis on feedback, the relationship between the welfare state as an independent variable and the social, economic and political factors traditionally deployed to explain welfare state development and variation.

The main hypothesis derived here is that welfare state form impacts on patterns of women’s participation in the workforce. Versions of Esping-Andersen’s (1990)
welfare state regime schema are operationalized in both the cross sectional and pooled analyses. We expect strongly positive results for the socialist regime, moderate positive ones for liberalism, and negative results for conservatism. Although it did not prove possible to operationalize Castles and Mitchell’s categorization in cross sectional analysis, a variant worked in the pooled analysis. Non-right hegemony and liberalism might be positively, and conservatism negatively, associated with women’s formal workforce entry. However, these expectations are not clear or strong. States such as Belgium fall within the non-right hegemony category but fail to follow Scandinavian growth patterns in women’s labour market participation. The theoretical expectation about the impact of the ‘radical’ welfare regime is not strong. Measures of the public, particularly welfare, expenditure and the level of government employment are analyzed.

These theories are also concerned with the social, economic and political context. The level and rate of economic development, patterns of male labour force participation and levels of employment and/or value added in various sectors of the economy, as well as divorce rates and levels of religious - particularly Catholic - belief within a society, are key variables here. In addition, several ‘political’ measures of partisan representation in parliament and government are also analyzed, with particular emphasis on socialist (positive impact expected) and religious (negative) representation in pooled analyses. In addition, given the ‘political sociological’ logic of this analysis, the measure of proportion of women in the legislature was also analyzed (positive impact expected).

As with modernization theory, my main concern in this chapter is with the description of social democratic and power resource theories. Again, the thesis ‘opens out’ to consider the theory in chapter eight. The theoretical analysis provides a basic critique of the dominant ‘welfare state regime’ perspective, arguing that it conflates two distinct interpretations of the idea of the ‘welfare state’; 1) an ontological ‘form’ of the state - something a state is - and 2) a sector of state activity. This conceptual confusion pervades much of the existing comparative literature and is a barrier to understanding patterns of convergence and divergence in contemporary capitalism.
1.4 Conclusion

For the past twenty years the welfare state literature has been bound up with wider debates about the nature of capitalism and democracy. During the 1990s these debates have intensified. Are capitalist democracies converging due to pressures of globalization or will they continue to develop as distinct ‘models’? This study adds a consideration of women’s employment trajectories in OECD countries to these debates. These trajectories do not simply constitute a potential dimension of variation among capitalist states - they may also feed back into ‘models’ of capitalism.

Convergence theories tend to emphasize general trends (and to view them as determining outcomes), while those pointing to divergence, or continuing difference, focus on the particularities of specific cases (and on contingency and choice in their development). To some extent, the balance between the general and the specific results from the closeness of focus on particular cases. A single case study or pairwise comparison would concentrate on particularities, while broader comparisons tend to identify common trends.

There is a strong sense that a general change is occurring/has occurred in gender roles. Yet, these changes are partly shaped by the policy configurations of welfare states, which differ cross-nationally. Evidence of the degree of commonality and difference in women’s employment trajectories is presented throughout this thesis. I will return to the issue of the balance between general and specific factors in the explanation of these trajectories (and of convergence and diversity among modern capitalist states) in the conclusion.

For now it is sufficient to note that a balance will need to be struck between the general and deterministic analysis associated with some forms of modernization theory and the increasing emphasis on differences across ‘welfare states’ associated with ‘regime’ theory. It might be fruitful to contextualize the state and resist the temptation to attribute differences in outcomes to variation in state structures (as do ‘power resource’ and social democratic theories). Equally, the continuing importance of cross-statal variations suggests a move away from deterministic and economistic variants of modernization theory. Attention could be focused instead on the diffusion
of ideas about the economy, state policies and social movements across space. This double shift might produce an analytical framework for making sense of patterns of divergence and convergence in contemporary capitalism.
Part One: Empirical Analyses
Chapter Two: The Entry of women into the paid workforce: A data analysis
This chapter presents analyses of the causes of cross-national differences in, and changes over time of, female labour force participation. It is divided into two main parts. The first part presents a variety of cross-sectional analyses. It analyses a data set made up of 17 advanced industrial democracies, although data are not available for all variables and every state, so even this small number of cases is not always available. As a result of the limits of the application of these techniques to a small cross-national data set the dependent variables are tested against models derived from a number of different theories, and combinations of theories. First it is tested against an economic or modernization model, then a populist new right model, and then a combined economic/new right model. Next it is tested against a social democratic theory of the welfare state, a political sociological model of the mobilization of women, and a combined political sociological model. Finally an attempt is made to develop an overall model, out of variables which are not mutually inconsistent theoretically. The advantage of this approach is that it demands less of the data. Thus we can gain some understanding of issues for which there is relatively little data.

The second part presents two pooled time-series and cross-section analyses. This part uses two data-sets. The first includes data for a smaller number of variables, but a larger number of cases. This data set is used to investigate the various categorizations of different welfare state types or regimes, as well as the impact of other variables considered in the social democratic literature. The second considers a smaller data-set, but one for which a particular variable, women's wages, is available. Although this data-set does not include a sufficiently large number of states to test the various welfare state regimes usefully, an attempt is made to analyze as inclusive a model as possible.

Section One - Cross-sectional analysis

In this part I explore first, the overall level of female labour force participation and second, the proportion of female labour force participation which is part time.
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</tr>
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The sources for these measures can be found in the methodological appendix.
2.1 Overall female labour force participation

For the first part of this first section the labour force participation of women is used as the dependent variable. All the theories analyzed here are concerned with the ‘welfare state’, although some of them treat it primarily as a dependent variable rather than an independent one. The theories also suggest hypotheses about the causes of changes (increases) in female labour force participation can be derived from all of these theories (even if the primary focus of the theorists considered was not with these changes). I consider modernization and ‘economic’ theories first. The most important of these theories provides a basically positive evaluation of ‘modernization’. However, some authors (particularly those associated with the US new right) draw attention to pathologies of modernization (Gilder 1981, Falwell 1981, Viguerie 1981). Sometimes these authors are relatively critical of modernization, preferring a romantic vision of small-scale capitalism, otherwise they are less critical, focusing on the impact of economic pathologies on gender roles. Within the modernization model I examine, in turn, 1) mainstream modernization hypotheses, 2) the ‘pathologies of modernization’ variant, and 3) a model which combines elements of the two. Next I examine a series of political sociology hypotheses, drawn from 4) the social democratic theory, 5) a gender critique of the social democratic analysis focusing on women’s political mobilization, and 6) combined ‘political sociological’ model (made up of social democratic and political mobilization of women variables). Finally, I analyze 7) an overall model combining variables which performed well in various regressions. I attempt to ensure that theoretical arguments exist to justify the combination of variables in any individual equation - theoretically incompatible variables should not be run together simply because they seem statistically adequate. The purpose of all these analyses is heuristic. I wish to see what we can learn from the data, rather than attempting a final adjudication between complex theories on the basis of the data analysis.

Before going on to the individual regressions, a chart is presented which provides an overall guide to them. All the independent variables are listed - for each of them the sign of the coefficient (+ or -) is provided. If a coefficient is statistically significant, at least at
the 0.1 level, it is marked by an asterix (*). Thus by reading along a row, the direction or influence of a single variable can be seen in a variety of regression equations. Of course, this table does not give any indication of the magnitude of the influence of the variables. Both the magnitude and the sign of the coefficient for a variable fully make sense only in context of a particular equation. The justification for the decision to report the signs of coefficients in this sort of table, in the context of the regressions reported here, is that as their robustness is doubtful, the confidence with which we can interpret the influence of a particular variable will be greater if its influence is fairly consistent across various equations. The magnitude of influence of a variable would be expected to change more markedly in equations which are specified differently. Reporting the magnitude of coefficients in a table of this sort would be too misleading. In addition to information about the impact of the independent variables, this table also provides a general map of the ways in which the independent variables are combined in the various models analyzed.

Table 2.1 Overview of influences on Female Labour Force Participation

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Modernization Models

Modernization theorists, general treat the level of economic development as the crucial determinant of differences between states and societies, in this case in relation to the female participation rates, although the rate of change/growth of the economy also sometimes treated as important (see Becker 1981/1991). The ‘economic’ variant of modernization theory also places considerable emphasis on relative prices, in this case in the form of women’s wages (relative to men’s). Within the modernization perspective various other changes, particularly changes in the structure of the economy, are also considered to be important.
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Multiple Regression Y₁:sflp84  3 X variables

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The results of this regression suggest that the model has some merit as an explanation of variation in female labour force participation. Overall the model explained about 40% of the variation in female labour force participation rates across countries. In the context of the model, the level of economic development had the most influence, followed by the rate of economic change. The influence of women's wages was smallest and not significant. This variable plays a crucial role as the mechanism by which economic change transforms gender relations, according to the 'Chicago School' (Becker 1981/1991).

Table 2.1.1b. Economic model with state welfare policy effects
The influence of state welfare policy was considered by running an expanded regression including a measure of the level of social security transfers across countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>Sum Squares:</th>
<th>Mean Square:</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>2.355</td>
<td>3.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.229</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>p = .0401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(i)-e(i-1))</th>
<th>e ≠ 0</th>
<th>e &lt; 0</th>
<th>DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.611</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.
The inclusion of a measure of social security in the model did not improve the overall proportion of variability explained by very much (AR-squared 0.443). Also the overall significance of the equation falls. Social security itself seems to have a negative impact on the labour force participation of women (Std Beta -0.213), which is not the sign predicted by the theory, if social security is taken as a measure of the influence of the welfare state. The value of this variable is small, and, in any case statistically insignificant. The short run economic growth variable is also not statistically significant. In combination with the value for SGNP8, the only variable to achieve statistical significance, it indicates that the labour force participation of women is more susceptible the level of economic development than to short run changes in the economy.
Table 2.1.1c. Economic model plus service sector effects

A regression of the basic economic model including a measure of the importance of the service sector was run. This model was much more successful than the previous ones.

Multiple Regression $Y_1$:sflp84 4 X variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>R:</th>
<th>R-squared:</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared:</th>
<th>Std. Error:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>.872</td>
<td>.761</td>
<td>.665</td>
<td>.628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>Sum Squares:</th>
<th>Mean Square:</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.549</td>
<td>3.137</td>
<td>7.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.945</td>
<td>.394</td>
<td>p = .0038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.493</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(i)-e(i-1)):</th>
<th>e = 0:</th>
<th>e &lt; 0:</th>
<th>DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.673</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.

Multiple Regression $Y_1$:sflp84 4 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgnp8</td>
<td>.519</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>2.593</td>
<td>.0268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgdpc7984</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.582</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>.0071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swmm80</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.9258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svss84</td>
<td>.564</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.508</td>
<td>2.844</td>
<td>.0174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over 66% of the total variation in levels of female labour force participation was explained by the model. The measure of women's wages relative to men's is even smaller and failed the test of statistical significance more dramatically than in equations 1a and 1b.

Modernization theory places some considerable emphasis on changes in the structure of the economy. In the case of the expansion of female labour force participation special emphasis is placed on the development of the service sector (Wilensky and LeBeaux 1958/1965 Wilensky 1968 and from an 'economic' perspective Fuchs 1983) some characteristics of the service sector can be construed in terms of potentially quantifiable costs and benefits. For example, Fuchs suggests that services are more likely to be located in residential areas, thus reducing the costs associated with getting to and from work (Fuchs 1983: 132). These costs may be especially high for women, if they have to juggle formal labour market participation with domestic work. Nevertheless, as considerations of this kind creep into the analysis it will begin to feel like a sociological analysis of industrial or urban change, rather than an economic analysis of human behaviour.

Furthermore, by excluding this variable from the model both the overall proportion of the variation of the dependent variable explained by the model (66.5% up to 71%), and its statistical robustness (F-test 7.953 to 14.06) improved.
Table 2.1.1d Economic and service sector model without wage effects

**Multiple Regression Y :sfip84  3 X variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>.764</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.555</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis of Variance Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.979</td>
<td>4.326</td>
<td>14.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.979</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Residual Information Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(0)-e(i-1)): e &lt; 0:</th>
<th>DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.321</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

Note: 1 case deleted with missing values.

**Beta Coefficient Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Value</th>
<th>t-Value</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgnp8</td>
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<td>.458</td>
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<td>.0074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svas84</td>
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<td>.167</td>
<td>.567</td>
<td>3.491</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgdpc7984</td>
<td>.871</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.668</td>
<td>4.392</td>
<td>.0007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>95% Lower</th>
<th>95% Upper</th>
<th>90 % Lower</th>
<th>90 % Upper</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgnp8</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>.887</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.823</td>
<td>10.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svas84</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>.945</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>12.189</td>
</tr>
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<td>sgdpc7984</td>
<td>.341</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.941</td>
<td>19.286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SFLP84 = 0.055 + 0.458 SGNP8 + 0.567 SVAS84 + 0.668 SGDPC7984

Relative to the results of other equations considered here these results seem to lend strong support to a modernization theory, and perhaps a sociological, rather than an economic, version of the theory of economic and social change. An expanded model based on this
Pathologies of Modernization

Some elements in the US new right draw particular attention to the pathologies of
economic modernization. Their arguments take the family as a collective decision making
unit with conventionally or socially set money income targets. Economic ‘pathologies’
(caused by big government), such as taxation and inflation, result in families being unable
to attain these target on a single income, and so lead women to work outside the home
(Gilder 1981; Falwell 1981; Viguire 1981). Ironically, a more rigorously economic
perspective, taking account of the economic value of domestic production, and
particularly the fact that this production is untaxed and not subject to inflation, would
suggest that these phenomena should lead to a lowering of participation in the formal
labour market. The new right also suggest that a ‘new class’, associated with
employment in government, amongst other things, has waged an ideological war on the
family, particularly by promoting feminist ideology and thereby encouraging women to
work (arguably against their better judgment). A regression did not lend general support
to ‘pathologies of modernization’ hypotheses, although the model explained just over
53% of the variation in the independent variable.
The variables measuring the impact of inflation and taxation each had a small impact. As neither variable was statistically significant, no strong conclusions can be drawn from the
signs of their Beta coefficients. Nevertheless it may be worth noting that the inflation and taxation variables had negative signs, whereas the theory predicted positive signs.

Government employment (used here as a measure of the 'new class') and the level of social security both have stronger influence on the level of female labour force participation. Although a negative, but insignificant, influence of social security was reported in equation 1b, here the variable showed a strong, statistically significant, negative influence on the female labour force participation. While this result might be compatible with the argument that female labour force participation is a (positive) product of economic growth, which is hampered by the (dire) consequences of the welfare state - this is not an argument made by any of the authors under consideration here. Instead the authors analyzed here who emphasize the pathologies of modernization regard both social policy, and the labour force participation of women as undesirable. Government employment showed a moderately large and fairly strong influence on female labour force participation. This influence is relatively consistent with the 'new class' hypothesis, although other interpretations of this variable are possible.

An expanded economic model

A regression for the overall model of the economic theory was run, which explained over 85% of the variation in the dependent variable.
Table 2.1.3a Expanded Economic Model

Multiple Regression $Y_i$:sflp84 5 X variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R-squared:</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared:</th>
<th>Std. Error:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>.953</td>
<td>.908</td>
<td>.856</td>
<td>.405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum Squares:</th>
<th>Mean Square:</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.486</td>
<td>2.897</td>
<td>17.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.473</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>p = .0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(i)-e(i-1)):</th>
<th>$\sigma$ &gt; 0:</th>
<th>$\sigma$ &lt; 0:</th>
<th>DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.

Multiple Regression $Y_i$:sflp84 5 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter:</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgnp8</td>
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<td>.147</td>
<td>.404</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.591</td>
<td>3.288</td>
<td>.0094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.236</td>
<td>-.383</td>
<td>2.148</td>
<td>.0602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.41</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>2.316</td>
<td>.0458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svas84</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>4.509</td>
<td>.0015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Regression $Y_i$:sflp84 5 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter:</th>
<th>95% Lower:</th>
<th>95% Upper:</th>
<th>90% Lower:</th>
<th>90% Upper:</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgnp8</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.813</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>10.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssose84</td>
<td>-1.041</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>-.96</td>
<td>-.273</td>
<td>10.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.027</td>
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<td>-.074</td>
<td>4.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.81</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.734</td>
<td>5.362</td>
</tr>
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<td>.334</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>.943</td>
<td>20.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, it tends to confirm the skepticism about the populist new right suggested by the regression testing pathologies of modernization. That is, variables such as the measure of
taxation have a negative influence on the level of female labour force participation. However the taxation variable just fails the test of significance at the 0.05 level.

A number of other variables were tested in expanded versions of this model, including a measure of government employment, inflation and women's wages as a proportion of men's. Including any of these variables reduced the overall explanatory power of the model. Individually each of these variables had a weak, statistically insignificant influence on the model.

Excluding the taxation variable (which just failed the test of significance at the 0.05 level) the regression explained over 80% of the variation in the dependent variable.

Table 2.1.3b Expanded economic model without taxation effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.727</td>
<td>3.432</td>
<td>16.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.276</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>p = .0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(0)-e(i-1)): e □ 0:</th>
<th>e &lt; 0:</th>
<th>DW test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.938</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 2 cases deleted with missing values.
SFLP84 = 0.507 SGNP8 + 0.499 SGDPC7984 + 0.49 SVAS84 -0.339 SSOSE84 + 0.107

The social security variable, which had a negative sign but was statistically insignificant in equation 1b, is still negative, but now significant. In modernization theories social security is often used as a measure of the level of development of the welfare state, but according to these theories (see for example Becker 1981/1991) the welfare state ought to have a positive impact on female labour force participation. On the other hand, the consistently positive association between the level of economic development and female labour force participation poses difficulties for the new right, which regards female labour force participation as a result of economic, social and public policy pathologies.
Social democratic and power resource models

Social democratic analysis of the welfare state implies that social policy can take a variety of forms, or have various aspects. There are three characteristic styles of welfare provision identified in this literature: socialist, liberal and conservative. These characteristics are shown to varying degrees in the welfare regime of any particular state. Indeed, welfare provision of a state can show characteristics of more than one style of welfare simultaneously. Each style has different implications for the evolution of labour markets, in general, and the labour force participation of women in particular.

A regression was run to test the impact of styles of state welfare and the extent of decommodification on female labour force participation. Overall the regression was not successful. Only 17.5% of the variation of female labour force participation was explained. The only slight relief for the theory was that the individual independent variables did show the signs expected of them.

Table 2.1.4a Welfare state regimes and de-commodification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.275</td>
<td>1.569</td>
<td>1.902</td>
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<td>.825</td>
<td>p = .1702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

| SS(e(i)|e(i-1)): | e = 0: | e < 0: | DW test: |
|----------|--------|--------|--------|
| 21.615   | 10     | 8      | 2.015  |

48
Multiple Regression Y : sflp84 4 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.188</td>
<td>.568</td>
<td>.5797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sconservative</td>
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<td>.251</td>
<td>-.123</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.6325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssocialist</td>
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<td>.256</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>1.197</td>
<td>.2525</td>
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</table>

Multiple Regression Y : sflp84 4 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>95% Lower:</th>
<th>95% Upper:</th>
<th>90% Lower:</th>
<th>90% Upper:</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>.42</td>
<td>-.568</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.095</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>2.225</td>
</tr>
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<td>sliberal</td>
<td>-.247</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-.147</td>
<td>.761</td>
<td>1.434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A regression was run excluding the two weaker variables, those for conservative characteristics of welfare states and the decommodification of labour power.
Table 2.1.4b Socialist and Liberal welfare state regimes

Multiple Regression $Y_{sflp84}$ 2 X variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>R:</th>
<th>R-squared:</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared:</th>
<th>Std. Error:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.349</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.859</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>Sum Squares:</th>
<th>Mean Square:</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.934</td>
<td>2.967</td>
<td>4.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.066</td>
<td>.738</td>
<td>p = .04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

| SS(e(i)-e(i-1)): e \(\neq 0\): e < 0: DW test: |
|----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| 21.838         | 10               | 8               | 1.973 |

Multiple Regression $Y_{sflp84}$ 2 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter:</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>-1.912E-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssocialist</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>2.836</td>
<td>.0125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>siliberal</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>1.253</td>
<td>.2293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Regression $Y_{sflp84}$ 2 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter:</th>
<th>95% Lower:</th>
<th>95% Upper:</th>
<th>90% Lower:</th>
<th>90% Upper:</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssocialist</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td>8.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>siliberal</td>
<td>-.203</td>
<td>.783</td>
<td>-.116</td>
<td>.696</td>
<td>1.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clearly these results do not lend much support to the notion that the welfare regime approach developed by Esping-Andersen can be applied to female labour force participation.

A simple regression of the socialist character of welfare provision on female labour force participation is slightly more encouraging for the social democratic case. However, the very slight character of this support provides that the overall implication of this analysis is that the problems feminists have identified in extending the logic of social democracy to gender issues are well illustrated by these results.
Table 2.1.4c The socialist welfare state regime

Simple Regression $X_1: \text{ssoc}$alist $Y_1: \text{sflp84}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF</th>
<th>R:</th>
<th>R-squared:</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared:</th>
<th>Std. Error:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.281</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>.874</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance Table

<table>
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<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
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<td>4.775</td>
<td>4.775</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.225</td>
<td>.764</td>
<td>$p = .0237$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS($e(i)-e(i-1)$): e $\neq 0$: e $= 0$: DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Simple Regression $X: \text{ssocalist}$ $Y_1: \text{sflp84}$

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOPE</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.0237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confidence Intervals Table

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<th>95% Upper</th>
<th>90% Lower</th>
<th>90% Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEAN (X,Y)</td>
<td>-.437</td>
<td>.437</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOPE</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.979</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SFLP84 = -2.256E-9 + 0.53SSOC

Although measures of quantitative variation in expenditure on various 'aspects' of social policy have come in for criticism as indicators of the 'welfare stateishness' of a state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles and Mitchell 1993), measures of individual factors, such as the size of the public sector in terms of employment, are still considered important within the social democratic tradition. A regression including some measure of government employment and the level of social security transfers, as well as the index of the socialist character of the welfare state was run. It explained over 43% of the variation in the dependent variable.
Table 2.1.4d An expanded ‘social democratic’ model

Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sfip84  3 X variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.735</td>
<td>.541</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>.753</td>
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</table>

Analysis of Variance Table

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSIO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.674</td>
<td>2.891</td>
<td>5.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.372</td>
<td>.567</td>
<td>p = .015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.045</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(l-e(-l))</th>
<th>e &gt; 0</th>
<th>e &lt; 0</th>
<th>DW test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.432</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.229</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 case deleted with missing values.

Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sfip84  3 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Value</th>
<th>t-Value</th>
<th>Probability</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>.056</td>
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<tr>
<td>ssocialist</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>.238</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>1.572</td>
<td>.1399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssose84</td>
<td>-.459</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.458</td>
<td>2.422</td>
<td>.0308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sge84</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>1.225</td>
<td>.2424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sfip84  3 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>95% Lower</th>
<th>95% Upper</th>
<th>90% Lower</th>
<th>90% Upper</th>
<th>Partial F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.89</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>2.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssocialist</td>
<td>-.869</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>-.795</td>
<td>-.123</td>
<td>5.864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssose84</td>
<td>-.231</td>
<td>.835</td>
<td>-.135</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, only one of the independent variables achieved statistical significance. That variable, the level of spending on social security, showed a negative sign. If this variable is taken as a measure of the level of development of the welfare state, then the result is theoretically perplexing. However, according to some leading proponents of the social democratic account (see Esping-Andersen 1990), social security - a variable which measures transfers, rather than wider characteristics of the welfare state - is a divisive, rather than a solidaristic, form of social policy, allied to the 'conservative' welfare state regimes of continental Europe. Others evaluate this pattern of social policy more positively, associating transfers with a distinctive Christian democratic welfare regime (van Kersbergen 1995). On either of these accounts transfer oriented social policy might be expected to have a negative impact on female labour force participation. Running the regression including the measure of liberal aspects of the welfare state as well, explained slightly less of the variation in the independent variable. The liberalism variable was not statistically significant.

The mobilization of women
The basis of much social democratic reasoning is political sociological. One implication of this style of reasoning is that the mobilization of women should be considered as potentially important independent variables in the explanation of variation in the labour force participation of women.

A model of the political mobilization of women made up of a measure of the representation of women in cabinets, of measures of the representation of women in legislatures at various points in time, and of the change in the representation of women in legislatures between 1955 and 1975, was not very successful. Under 29% of the variation in the labour force participation of women was explained, and the overall regression was not significant.
Table 2.1.5a Women’s political mobilization

Multiple Regression $Y: \text{sflp84} \quad 4 \times \text{variables}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.145</td>
<td>1.286</td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>.1191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.356</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.501</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

SS($e(i)-e(i-1)$): e $\neq$ 0: e $< 0$: DW test: 8.992 9 6 1.679

Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.

Multiple Regression $Y: \text{sflp84} \quad 4 \times \text{variables}$

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>.038</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwg75</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>.633</td>
<td>.454</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.5204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwl</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>.574</td>
<td>-.556</td>
<td>.854</td>
<td>.4129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwcb</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.0979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swl5575</td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>.378</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td>1.661</td>
<td>.1276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Regression $Y: \text{sflp84} \quad 4 \times \text{variables}$

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>95% Lower:</th>
<th>95% Upper:</th>
<th>90% Lower:</th>
<th>90% Upper:</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwg75</td>
<td>-.989</td>
<td>1.832</td>
<td>- .726</td>
<td>1.569</td>
<td>.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwl</td>
<td>-.769</td>
<td>.788</td>
<td>-.533</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwcb</td>
<td>-.725</td>
<td>.816</td>
<td>-.581</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swl5575</td>
<td>-.214</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>1.312</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even the strongest of the variables in the equation, the change in the political mobilization of women from 1955 to 1975, failed to achieve statistical significance.

A simple regression of the position of women in the legislature from 1955 to 1975 showed a much more significant result. This regression explained over 40% of the variation in the dependent variable.

**Table 2.1.5b Women in the legislature, 1955-1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>Sum Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>REGRESSION</td>
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<td>4.708</td>
<td>4.708</td>
<td>10.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.793</td>
<td>.446</td>
<td>p = .0063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.501</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS[e(i)-e([-1])]: e □ 0:</th>
<th>e &lt; 0:</th>
<th>DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.725</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.
Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sflp84 1 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Value</th>
<th>t-Value</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.178</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.0063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swl5575</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.0063</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sflp84 1 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>95% Lower:</th>
<th>95% Upper:</th>
<th>90% Lower:</th>
<th>90% Upper:</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swl5575</td>
<td>.194</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td>.896</td>
<td>10.584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SFLP84 = 0.032 + 0.67 SWL5575

A simple regression run using the percentage of women in legislatures in 1975 as the independent variable explained a very slightly smaller percentage of the variation in the independent variable (AR squared .398) and scored higher on the F-test (12.223). This latter score may be an artifact of the fact that the measure of the political mobilization of women from 1955 to 1975 has three missing values. However in a regression including both the change in the political mobilization of women between 55 and 75, and the level of the political mobilization of women in 1975, the former variable both had more of an impact (Std Beta (0.619 compared to 0.061) and had a much larger T-statistic (1.638 compared to 0.162).
More interesting than the comparison of these variables with each other is the comparison of them with more recent measures of the political mobilization and representation of women. Both as part of a multiple regression model, and comparing simple regressions on the same independent variable measures of the earlier political mobilization of women show stronger results than later measures of these patterns of mobilization. (Simple regressions which used SPWLG and SPWCB as independent variables explained 29.7% and 29.2% respectively.) These results suggest that the political mobilization of women may act with a time lag.

Social democracy and the political mobilization of women

Some hypotheses generated from the 'social democratic' and 'political mobilization of women' perspectives can be regarded as complementary. A combined 'political sociological' model can be developed. This approach would suggest that the character of welfare state provision and other patterns in public policy, as well as the political mobilization of women can have an influence on women's labour force participation decisions.

A regression was run which used measures of 'welfare stateness' and of the political mobilization of women. It explained over 71% of the variation in the dependent variable.
Table 2.1.6 Welfare, regimes and women

Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sflp84  4 X variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>R:</th>
<th>R-squared:</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared</th>
<th>Std. Error:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.886</td>
<td>.785</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>.536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>Sum Squares:</th>
<th>Mean Square:</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.602</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>10.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.444</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>p = .0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residual Information Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$SS[e(i)-e(i-1)]: e &gt; 0$:</th>
<th>$e &lt; 0$:</th>
<th>DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.198</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 case deleted with missing values.

Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sflp84  4 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.465</td>
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<td>.14</td>
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<td>.0256</td>
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<td>.373</td>
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<td>spwlg75</td>
<td>.734</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>.751</td>
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Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sflp84  4 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>95% Lower:</th>
<th>95% Upper:</th>
<th>90% Lower:</th>
<th>90% Upper:</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sliberal</td>
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<td>.153</td>
<td>.786</td>
<td>6.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.659</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>-.604</td>
<td>-.107</td>
<td>6.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sge84</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.723</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>5.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwlg75</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>1.042</td>
<td>18.061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SFLP84 = 0.006 +0.751 SPWLG75 + 0.465 SLIB + 0.373 SGE84 - 0.355 SSOSE84
The results show that percentage of women in legislatures in 1975 has a strong positive influence on the labour force participation of women (other variables measuring aspects of the political mobilization of women did not perform as well). They suggest that a liberal, 'market reinforcing' approach to social policy facilitates the labour force participation of women, as does the level of government employment, while increasing social security spending hinders that participation, consistent with the pattern of results we have seen so far. It is also worth pointing out that the variable measuring the socialist quality of the welfare state regime could not be run successfully alongside the political mobilization of women variables, and when used in the place of these variables performed less well. This might draw attention to the distinctiveness of Scandinavian countries for the period under question. As the variables which operationalize the political mobilization of women show a cluster of very high values for the Scandinavian countries, while the socialist variable includes high values for the Netherlands. Indeed, given the distinctiveness of these countries, there is the risk the political mobilization of women variables are serving as a proxy for some other feature of the Scandinavian countries.

An overall model
Using variables which are not mutually inconsistent in terms of their theoretical influence on the dependent variable an overall model explaining female labour force participation was built. It explained almost 80% of the variation in the dependent variable.
Table 2.1.7 An overall model

**Multiple Regression \( \mathbf{Y}:sflp84 \) 4 \( \mathbf{X} \) variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>R:</th>
<th>R-squared:</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared</th>
<th>Std. Error:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.921</td>
<td>.848</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>.451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis of Variance Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF:</th>
<th>Sum Squares:</th>
<th>Mean Square:</th>
<th>F-test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.603</td>
<td>3.401</td>
<td>16.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.443</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>p = .0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>16.045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Residual Information Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(i)-e(i-1))</th>
<th>e &gt; 0</th>
<th>e &lt; 0</th>
<th>DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.564</td>
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</table>

Note: 1 case deleted with missing values.

**Beta Coefficient Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter:</th>
<th>Value:</th>
<th>Std. Err.:</th>
<th>Std. Value:</th>
<th>t-Value:</th>
<th>Probability:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.0032</td>
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<tr>
<td>sliberal</td>
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<td>.147</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>.0006</td>
</tr>
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<td>sge84</td>
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<td>.145</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>3.789</td>
<td>.0026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgdpc7984</td>
<td>.503</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>3.751</td>
<td>.0028</td>
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</table>

**Multiple Regression \( \mathbf{Y}:sflp84 \) 4 \( \mathbf{X} \) variables**

**Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter:</th>
<th>95% Lower:</th>
<th>95% Upper:</th>
<th>90% Lower:</th>
<th>90% Upper:</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwl75</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>13.456</td>
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<tr>
<td>sliberal</td>
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<td>1.006</td>
<td>.423</td>
<td>.948</td>
<td>21.715</td>
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<tr>
<td>sge84</td>
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<td>.866</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>.808</td>
<td>14.359</td>
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<tr>
<td>sgdpc7984</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.796</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td>.742</td>
<td>14.072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{SFLP84} = 0.585 \text{SPWL75} + 0.68 \text{SLIB} + 0.549 \text{SGE84} + 0.492 \text{SGDPC7984} + 0.34 \]
The overall conclusion of the exercise in model building suggests that none of the theories has a monopoly on satisfactory explanation of the labour force participation of women. Clearly elements of political mobilization, the character of the state, and the performance of the economy all have important influences on the dependent variable. However, none of the variables has an influence on the dependent variable which supports the political motivation of those who wrote the theory.

Thus the political convictions of those who emphasize the positive influence of political variables in explanations of economic outcomes are usually social democratic. The 'welfare state regime' variable which has a significant positive influence on female labour force participation measures the liberal rather than the socialist character of the welfare state.

It might be expected, then, that a general liberal explanation of the labour force participation of women would be successful. Indeed the annual average rate of economic growth between 1979 and 1984 has a significant impact. Also the political mobilization of women could be accommodated as an important influence in some versions of liberalism.

This version of liberalism would be different from Becker's economic liberalism. Becker would be skeptical about the independent influence of a political variable, such as the percentage of women in legislatures in 1975. Further, the key variable for a liberal price or economic theory such as Becker's is the relative wage rate. This variable does not feature in the final regression presented here, nor has it shown an important influence in any of the regressions run here.

It is difficult to place the influence of the rate of government employment discerned here in theoretical context. A new right, 'new class', interpretation of the influence of SGE84 is not satisfactory in the context of a model which suggests a broadly liberal and optimistic interpretation of cross national variation in female labour force participation.
rates. Equally it is difficult to place the variable in a social democratic theoretical context. Perhaps the most that can be said is that women are disproportionately involved in public sector work, so the larger the public employment sector, the more women work.

Even this interpretation tends to undermine a strong (not rigourously economic) liberal interpretation of the model. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the model supports a broad political sociological interpretation of international variation in the labour force participation of women.

2.2 The proportion of female employment which is part-time
The increasing proportion of female employment which is part-time is much commented on, although many of the theories considered here do not have unambiguous explanations for it. It is, nevertheless, worth considering, as it may throw further light on confidence with which the social democratic argument can be extended to cover gender as well as class. If the socialist welfare regime is associated with women working part time, then its universalism may be regarded as dented. Because the normative significance of women working part time is disputed, measures of the impact of women’s political mobilization and influence have been included in the regression. If they show positive influence on the dependent variable then a less pessimistic interpretation of the growth of part time work might be justifiable.

Over 79% of the variation in the proportion of part-time work in female employment was explained by a regression using the socialist character in welfare states, the conservative character of welfare states, the proportion of women in cabinets and the proportion of women in legislatures in 1975 as independent variables.
Table 2.2 Part-time work

**Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sptfe83  4 X variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DF</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>Adj. R-squared</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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**Analysis of Variance Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th>Sum Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGRESSION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.496</td>
<td>3.374</td>
<td>16.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDUAL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.504</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>p = .0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Residual Information Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SS(e(i)-e(i-1)): e(0): e &lt; 0: DW test:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.913 8 9 2.362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 case deleted with missing values.

**Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sptfe83  4 X variables**

**Beta Coefficient Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Value</th>
<th>t-Value</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.909</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.937</td>
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<td>.0002</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.0085</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.479</td>
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<td>.0349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spwlg75</td>
<td>-.816</td>
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<td>-.841</td>
<td>3.598</td>
<td>.0037</td>
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</table>

**Multiple Regression $\gamma$:sptfe83  4 X variables**

**Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>95% Lower</th>
<th>95% Upper</th>
<th>90% Lower</th>
<th>90% Upper</th>
<th>Partial F:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ssocialist</td>
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<td>-.322</td>
<td>-1.221</td>
<td>-.412</td>
<td>12.946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SPTFE83 = 0.937 SSOC + 0.479 SPWCB - 0.841 SPWLG75 - 0.376 SCON - 0.006

64
These results show that the 'welfare state regime' variables do have an important influence on the pattern of female labour market participation, although not in a way which is especially supportive of the social democratic argument. Social democratic regimes seem to be characterized by women working part-time. The association of a pattern of gender segmentation in the labour market with socialist welfare state characteristics is at odds with the universalist thrust of the social democratic theory of social citizenship.

Esping-Andersen associates conservative welfare states with low growth in general employment, and little change in the dominant type of employment, as well as little development of female labour force participation. The results reported here are in line with his interpretation. We would not expect the labour markets regulated by conservative welfare regimes to have developed as much part-time employment as elsewhere. We would expect relatively little combining of labour market and domestic work by women in these countries. The laggard status of these states in terms of the development of female labour force participation, seems to be associated with a traditional labour market structure, and what female labour force participation does take place seems to be full time.

The results for the political influence and mobilization present a paradox. They show a large negative influence of the percentage of women in legislatures in 1975, but a positive influence of the level of cabinet participation of women, on the percentage of part-time work in female employment. Using the percentage of women in legislatures at later date changes the strength of the association, but not its sign. These results do not help with the interpretation of the dependent variable.
Section Two - Pooled Cross-section Time Series Analyses

The following two sections present analyses of the impact of the welfare state on the economic participation of women. The discussion is based on regression analysis of two different data sets, both composed of pooled time series and cross sectional aggregate data. The presentation of the analysis will be organized using two principles. First the analyses of each data set will be presented together. Thus the results of (the more comprehensive) analysis of the larger data set will be presented first, followed by results of the analysis of the smaller data set.

Secondly, the discussion of results for each data set will be organized into sections based on groups of similar variables which will be considered together. For both data sets the groups of variables are as follows: 1) particular welfare state regimes, or particular groups of states, 2) the impact of Catholicism, 3) aspects of the social and economic status or political mobilization of women, 4) economic development, especially the rate of economic growth, 5) the structure of employment, 6) the character of state expenditure, 7) the impact of inflation and personal taxation, 8) patterns of partisan politics, 9) control variables, such as the time trend and total population. The previous chapter presented a discussion of the expected impact of these variables in a range of theoretical frameworks.

Before going on to detailed analysis the general pattern of results should be mentioned. Generally, although not universally, it was possible to make (theoretical) sense of the results. They were also fairly stable across the various data sets and different regressions. The main difficulties of interpretation which derive from the analysis concern labour market characteristics. Here, significant negative coefficients were present for service employment (in both data sets) and government employment (in the larger data set) variables in most of the models. These results are not easy to reconcile with a widespread expectation (if for different reasons) that both these variables would have a positive impact on female labour force participation. The partisan political mobilization variables and the inflation and personal taxation variables also produced results which are difficult
to interpret. In the latter case this empirical difficulty compounds a theoretical conflict over the expected impact of these variables. In order to aid the comparison and interpretation of the results presented in TABLES 2.3 and 2.4 report unstandardized coefficients from all the pooled regressions reported here. In these tables statistical significance is indicated by giving three stars (***), for coefficients significant at the 99% level, two stars (**), for the 95% level and one (*), for the 90% level. Coefficients which are statistically indistinguishable from zero are given no stars.
Table 2.V.2 Variables and data sources for the pooled analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>dummy variable for the Low Countries</td>
<td>GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schcath</td>
<td>a measure of Catholicism based on Schimdt (1993)</td>
<td>Malelab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womleg</td>
<td>presence of women in the legislature - Inter-Parliamentary Union data</td>
<td>Femlab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womwag</td>
<td>women's wages relative to those of men - ILO data</td>
<td>Servemp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div</td>
<td>divorce rate - UN data</td>
<td>Govtemp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftpmen</td>
<td>left presence in parliament - based on Lane, MacKay and Newton 1991 and Keesings Contemporary Archives.</td>
<td>Socsec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftgovt</td>
<td>left presence in government - based on Lane, MacKay and Newton 1991 and Keesings Contemporary Archives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relgovern</td>
<td>religious parties in parliament - based on Lane, MacKay and Newton 1991 and Keesings Contemporary Archives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relgovt</td>
<td>religious parties in government - based on Lane, MacKay and Newton 1991 and Keesings Contemporary Archives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ttoppop</td>
<td>total population - OECD Historical data and UN Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govtcd</td>
<td>current disbursements of government - OECD Historical Statistics (from Eileen Minhane)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>change in the consumer price index - OECD Historical Statistics (from Eileen Minhane)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ptax</td>
<td>a measure of personal taxation based - OECD revenue statistics (from Jeff Owens)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Time trend variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dummy variables for individual countries are signified by the standard three letter abbreviations used by the OECD. All quantitative independent variables have been lagged one period in the pooled data analysis.
# 2.3. Pooled analysis - the full data set

## Table 2.3

Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>TABLE 2.3.1</th>
<th>TABLE 2.3.2</th>
<th>TABLE 2.3.3</th>
<th>TABLE 2.3.4</th>
<th>TABLE 2.3.5</th>
<th>TABLE 2.3.6</th>
<th>TABLE 2.3.7</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>8.5536***</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHCATH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-2.3640**</td>
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<td>1.1721</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.2804***</td>
<td>0.28073***</td>
<td>0.54820***</td>
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<td>MALELAB</td>
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<td>0.27096***</td>
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<td>-0.26915E-01***</td>
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<td>-0.18294***</td>
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Welfare state regimes (WSR)

Neither the operationalization nor the interpretation of the welfare state regime variables was straightforward. Although useful results were eventually generated from these categorizations, it should be noted that in their pure forms none of the welfare state categorizations produced the expected results, even where they produced results at all. In other words, the main welfare state regime theories do not receive direct support from the analysis of changes in the economic position of women. Welfare state regime theories attempt to account for the different extent and form of either (social) citizenship or patterns of equality and inequality in various states. These theories implicitly or explicitly suggest that aspects of gender roles, including women's role in the formal workforce, fall within the scope of their core concepts. Thus, the failure of these theories to account for patterns of female labour force participation must be taken seriously. Modified versions of the welfare state regime categorizations did prove helpful in the analysis of female workforce participation. Before going on to discuss the results of these regressions, it must be noted that they should not be treated as supporting the theory in its pure form. Moreover, as the WSR categorizations are grounded on detailed empirical investigation and theoretical argument they should not be altered without good reason. In addition, results produced by modified categorizations need to be interpreted with particular care.

With slight modifications of the categorizations, the pooled regression could be run successfully. In general, the results obtained with the regressions on modifications of the Esping-Andersen categorization were as expected, at least for the larger data set (the second data set produces unexpected results, probably due to the small number of countries some of the categories). Although regressions were run on a version of the Castles and Mitchell categorization, the results proved difficult to reconcile with theoretical expectations. In addition to the results on the theoretical categories, these regressions also drew attention to interesting characteristics of the particular states. As I have already noted, the interpretation of results from modified categorizations needs to be
carried out with care, however, these results may also contribute to the on-going process of theoretical and empirical debate about welfare state regime typologies.

**Esping-Andersen and WSR**

It proved to be impossible to run pooled regressions on the pure version of Esping-Andersen's theory (taking those states classified as 'strong' examples of the socialist, liberal and conservative WSR). However, by cutting the Netherlands out of the Socialist category, and running a regression including a separate dummy variable for it, a successful regression could be run. (An unsuccessful attempt was made to estimate an equation using the Esping-Andersen categorization plus a dummy for the Netherlands and Belgium together as the 'Low' countries.) This grouping left only Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland) in the Socialist category. The regressions run including this categorization produced a common pattern, in which the variables were significant at the most exacting statistical levels (see TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). The modified Socialist or Scandinavian variable consistently showed a positive impact on the dependent variable and showed the largest absolute value of any of the state form variables. The Conservative variable showed the second largest absolute value, and had a negative sign. The Liberal variable showed the smallest value, and took a positive sign. In as much as the modified categorization can 'test' the application of Esping-Andersen's theory to gender relations, these results are broadly in line with his expectations (Esping-Andersen 1990). One of the more controversial elements of Esping-Andersen's interpretation is his view that liberal welfare regimes generally encourage women to participate in the labour force. His interpretation is supported by the analysis presented here and in particular by the positive sign for the Liberal variable.

However, the results obtained for the Netherlands variable (alongside the fact that it had proven impossible to estimate an equation for the full Esping-Andersen theory) suggest that his version of WSR requires significant modification before it could be applied to gender relations. The Netherlands variable consistently produced coefficients with very large, statistically significant negative values. In other words the model/ independent
variables consistently overpredicted the level of female labour force participation in the Netherlands by a large amount.

The character of the Dutch welfare state and the pattern of female labour force participation in the Netherlands have both been subject of critical analysis from social democratic and feminist perspectives (van Kersbergen 1995; Therborn 1986, Therborn 1989; Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988; De Vries, 1981). Social policy in the Netherlands has been characterized as a Social Democratic Welfare State in a Christian Democratic society. While the characterization of the Dutch experience in this way begs important questions about the generality of the explanation of the development of welfare regimes by this model, nevertheless it does provide a context for the interpretation of the results presented here. A more detailed consideration of these questions is presented below, in the country case studies.

*Esping-Andersen and WSR without the Netherlands*

In order to provide an additional test that the striking results found for the Netherlands was not an artifact of some mis-specification in the model or a statistical artifact of some other kind, the data for the Netherlands were cut out of the data-set and the same model was tested on this smaller data-set. The results of this regression are reported in TABLE 2.3.3 below. The same pattern of signs for the regression resulted, with an essentially similar pattern of magnitude of the coefficients for individual independent variables. The statistical significance of the social security variable was slightly stronger in the regression excluding the Netherlands, and its magnitude increased (we will return to this point later), while the statistical significance of the personal taxation variable weakened in this second regression. The overall explanatory power of the regression, as measured by the Buse R-square statistic, excluding the Netherlands was slightly smaller than the regression on the full data-set (BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9327 compared to BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9575). However both figures indicate that a very sizable proportion of the variation in the independent variable has been explained. All in all the impression that the result obtained for the Netherlands does not reflect an inaccuracy of the regression on
the full data-set. Instead it seems to demonstrate a genuine characteristic of Dutch political economy.

Castles and WSR

With a number of collaborators Castles has developed a critique of Esping-Andersen's approach which has both empirical and theoretical elements. The alternative categorization he proposed produced four welfare state regimes: conservative, liberal radical and non-right hegemony. Because the full categorization of welfare states provided by Castles placed every state subjected to empirical analysis in a category, is impossible to estimate an equation using dummy variables to represent the categories. However in the analysis he developed with Mitchell, Castles identified groups of states in which political configurations are matched by welfare state types (Castles and Mitchell 1993: 123 Table 3.7). Using this categorization it was possible to estimate equations.

Running the regressions on this modification of Castles' categorization produced a set of results which were not altogether convincing (See TABLE 2.3.4 below). All of Castles' four categories had strong, statistically discernible, negative impact on female labour force participation. Castles' conservative category produced strongest negative influence. The remaining categories and an impact of roughly similar magnitude, in the following descending order; Radical, Non-Right Hegemony and Liberal. The overall explanatory power of regressions alone should not be taken as an indication of their comparative adequacy. However in addition to the odd signs of the WSR variables it is worth noting that the overall explanatory power of this regression, as measured by the BUSE R-SQUARE of 0.8716 remains high, although noticeably lower than the same regression with the Esping-Andersen categorization. The general pattern of the signs and magnitudes of the other variables in the regression remains basically the same as in the earlier regressions, with the exception of the overall 'level' of the regression, which is much closer to the origin, as indicated by the smaller coefficient for the constant.
The results obtained from the application of Castles' categorization of welfare states pose a problem of interpretation. The strong negative influence of the Conservative category of states is what might have been expected. The theoretical expectation for the Radical group of states is more ambiguous, as is the expectation about the Liberal states. However the strong expectation would be for the Non-right hegemony variable to have a positive impact on female labour force participation. It suggests that categorizations which include non-Scandinavian states and/or take some of the Scandinavian states out of the socialist/NRH category do not produce the expected large positive sign in a regression explaining female labour force participation.

As TABLE 2.3.8 shows, when variables for the patterns of partisan politics are included in the regression, different results are obtained. Negative, statistically significant values (at the 99% level) for the conservative and radical classifications were obtained, while the liberal and non-right hegemony categories showed small positive coefficients, which were statistically indistinguishable from zero.

**Mixed models**

In order to test the idea that it is the Scandinavian states which exhibited a powerful pressure for women's economic mobilization, regressions were run which cut out the non-right hegemony category. These regressions (TABLES 2.3.5 and 2.3.6) strongly support the idea that the Scandinavian countries alone have a strong positive impact on female labour force participation. Moreover, given that Belgium (included in non-right hegemony) and the Netherlands (Socialist) share a certain number of social and political characteristics (both are 'plural' societies, with consociational political systems), a new category of the Low countries. This variable shows a negative sign (but not as strong an influence as an equation estimated with just the Netherlands dummy in the same equation).

As well as telling us something about the Netherlands and Belgium, these results also beg a question about the situation in Scandinavia. The typologies of welfare states developed
by both Esping-Andersen and Castles include one or other of the Low Countries in a category dominated by Scandinavian states. To what extent can the welfare state characteristics of the Scandinavian states be considered as the cause of their distinctive pattern of women's participation in the paid workforce? If these typologies do measure important characteristics of the configuration of state welfare policy, then a puzzle appears, if welfare policy is an important influence of women's participation in the paid workforce. Countries which, according both Esping-Andersen and Castles, share key welfare features show strikingly divergent patterns. Either there are other dimensions of variation in welfare policy which Scandinavian countries share but which mark them out from other states, or some other feature of the Nordic states or societies accounts for their distinctiveness in terms of female labour force participation.

Catholicism

In the context of one of the few attempts explicitly to use quantitative public policy analysis to understand gender issues Schmidt (1993; see also Castles 1994) has argued that Catholicism has a strongly negative influence on female labour force participation. This influence is not simply a matter of the social power of the church. It is also a question of the political influence mediated through certain Christian Democratic political parties. This kind of influence is also measured, to some extent, by other variables used in the analysis presented here, in particular the impact of religious parties in parliament and in government. However, important differences exist between these variables and Schmidt's measure. First, the religious parties variables include non-Catholic religious parties. Secondly, Schmidt's variable seems to include an important element of qualitative assessment about the social and political significance of Catholicism, whereas the religious parties variables are more purely quantitative (although, there is, of course, an element of qualitative evaluation in the decision of which parties to include in the religious parties categories). TABLES 2.3.6 and 2.3.8 show contradictory influences from the Catholicism dummy variable. In TABLE 2.3.6, in the context of a general model mixing elements of the Castles and Esping-Andersen approaches, a negative impact was reported, significant at the 95% level. In TABLE 2.3.8 the Catholicism
variable was statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results lend some support - albeit of a limited character - to the theoretical claim that Catholic countries restrict the labour market participation of women.

Aspects of the socio-economic status and political mobilization of women

Two variables are included in the regression in order to capture some other aspects of the situation of women - the proportion of the legislature made up by women and the divorce rate. The impact of these two variables was consistent across the various models analyzed here both in terms of the sign of the variables and in terms of their relative impacts as measured by the (relative) magnitude of the coefficients for them. The variables were statistically significant to the most stringent levels.

The expected impact of the political variable is a matter of dispute between the various theoretical perspectives analyzed. The grounding of the social democratic perspective in political sociology and the consistent theme in this literature that 'politics matters' leads to a strong expectation that gendered politics should have an impact on gendered labour force participation. By way of contrast the economic perspective, particularly as developed by Gary Becker, treats the political mobilization of women as a dependent variable - a consequence of economic growth rather than a cause of the expansion of female labour force participation. An empirical analysis of the kind developed here should not be treated as the decisive element in a resolution of a theoretical difference of this sort. Nevertheless, the consistent presence of a positive sign for the women in the legislature variable and the fact that the size of the coefficient for this variable was fairly large in comparison to other non-dummy variables in the analysis provide some support for the 'political sociological' approach rather than the 'economic' one (see *inter alia* TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.5).

The divorce variable was included in the analysis mainly in order to control for changes in the social character and significance of gender. The divorce rate is also considered to have had an impact on patterns of women's work in some economic and new right
analyses. The consistently positive and statistically significant results for the divorce variable provide some general support for these positions. However the relative magnitude of the coefficients for this variable in most of the models estimated suggest that its influence has been relatively small (see *inter alia* TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.5).

**Economic development**

Economic growth plays a considerable role in modernization theories of social and political development. It would be expected have a significant positive impact on female labour force participation. In particular, some aspects of Becker's economic theory place considerable emphasis on the rate of economic growth as well as the level of economic development. Moreover, although early debates pitched modernization and 'politics matters' approaches against one another, those who place emphasis on partisan politics can integrate elements of economic development into their analyses (see Pierson 1991). With the exception of some new right or 'pathologies of modernization' approaches, most analyses would suggest that economic growth would have some positive impact on the dependent variable, although not all theories would place economic variables at the heart of their accounts. The economic growth variable consistently showed a statistically significant positive impact on female labour force participation, as expected in the theoretical discussion. However, the magnitude of this positive impact was consistently fairly small, relative to the other variables in any given regression (see TABLE 2.3.6, *inter alia*). Although these results do dent some 'pathologies of modernization' accounts, they do not discriminate decisively between other approaches.

**The structure of employment**

A number of variables representing the structure of employment were included in the regressions. These variables produced unexpected results which are generally difficult to rationalize. Against the strong expectation of almost all of the various literatures (modernization, new right and social democratic) the variables representing the level of service sector and government employment consistently proved to have a negative,
statistically significant (although occasionally at the 95% rather than the 99% level) impact on the female labour force participation rate (see, for example, TABLE 2.3.6).

Although this result is not reported here, the level of employment in manufacturing consistently failed to achieve statistical significance and was dropped from the model. The theoretical expectations of the impact of manufacturing employment were not especially strong. The male labour force participation rate has a positive impact on female labour force participation despite the fact that the former variable typically exhibited a secular decline at the same time as the latter grew.

Although we remain some distance from a satisfactory explanation of these counter-intuitive results, they may imply that the retention of what might be called 'traditional' labour market structures both help to sustain male levels of labour market participation, and provide support for female labour force participation. It should be emphasized again that this interpretation is weak and these results are unexpected.

The impact of government spending

Two variables have been included to measure the impact of state expenditure on female labour force participation. These variables are a traditional measure for the level of development of the welfare state. They are included to supplement the structural characterization of welfare state regimes given by Esping-Andersen and Castles. Theoretical expectations about the impact of these variables are mixed.

In general, the more accurately a state can be characterized as a welfare state the higher a level of labour force participation by women we might expect. In principle, welfare state provision could make it easier for women to combine their 'traditional' domestic role with formal labour force participation. Moreover, in a longer term perspective the welfare state could take over some of the tasks which the extended family undertakes in more traditional societies. Most analysts expect there to be a strong relationship between government spending and women's labour market participation. This theoretical
expectation has been consistently supported by positive statistically significant results for inclusive measures of government spending, such as the current disbursements measure in the regressions reported here (See, *inter alia*, TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).

However, the social democratic school makes a rather different prediction about the social security as a social policy technique. Social security, based on transfer payments, is pictured as one form of social policy, particularly dominant in corporatist rather than universalist welfare regimes, and also used in residually oriented systems. Thus high levels of social security spending are associated with restrictive welfare regimes which reproduce work-based status, and could not be expected to promote female labour force participation. The skepticism about the progressive impact of social security seems to gain some support from the results reported here. Consistently social security received a statistically discernible coefficient with a negative sign, although its magnitude was generally small (see TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.6, for example). It is worth noting that this result contradicts the general expectations of modernization authors, including those who emphasize the pathologies of modernization, although some care is needed to make this point. The economic approach might suggest that the employment of women would fall as a result of higher social security (although, in some circumstances the domestic work of women might confound the relationship between these variables). Nevertheless, labour force participation is a more inclusive category than employment. Those on social security are included in labour force participants. The most straightforward of economic analysis suggests that raising the price of a good increases its supply - so we should expect social security to have a positive impact on labour force participation.

It is worth noting that TABLE 2.3.3, which reports a regression on a data-set excluding data from the Netherlands, shows a larger negative result for the social security variable than any of the other equations and a very much larger result than in a regression of the same independent variables on the data-set which includes Dutch data. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive. On the face of it the logic of the Dutch case (as well as of welfare provision in conservative or Christian democratic states) is that an expensive,
transfer-oriented, welfare state is associated with restrictions on women’s entry into the paid workforce. That being the case, we would expect the removal of a key example of this pattern to weaken the negative association between spending on transfers and women’s involvement in the labour market - but we find that one of the influences of the Dutch case is to strengthen its negative impact (compare TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.3). Bearing in mind that the extremely large negative coefficient for the Netherlands in the other regressions can be interpreted as meaning that women’s participation in the labour market falls a long way below the general prediction of the model, this result might suggest that factors other than those included in the model restrict Dutch women’s involvement in the formal workforce. In turn, this suggests that there may be dangers in taking the welfare state regime out of the wider political economy context. On the other hand, while the exclusion of the Dutch case from the model produces results remarkably similar to those for the full data set (suggesting some stability in the model), it may be that the full data set underestimates the negative impact of high social security/transfer spending, loading these negative effects into the variables for the Netherlands and Conservative welfare state regimes. The decline in the magnitude of the coefficient for the Conservative variable may be significant here. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the negative influence of the social security variable with the exclusion of the Dutch case does present something of a puzzle.

The impact of inflation and personal taxation

These variables, which are emphasized only in the literature which stresses the ‘pathologies of modernization’, proved difficult to interpret. The literature suggests that these variables have a positive (though pathological) impact on women’s participation in the paid workforce. However they are the only variables which did not show a consistent pattern of influence across the various models. Thus the signs of the variables did not consistently support the theoretical prediction of positive influence. The inflation variable consistently showed a positive sign, although it moved out of statistical significance in TABLE 2.3.4, while the personal taxation variable moved from a statistically significant negative sign (TABLES 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3), through to positive
signs (TABLES 2.3.4, 2.3.7, 2.3.8), by way of some coefficients which failed to achieve statistical significance (TABLES 2.3.5, 2.3.6). In other words, in regressions involving Esping-Andersen's formulation of WSR the inflation variable (CPI) showed a positive impact while personal taxation (PTAX) showed a negative impact. In other regressions, both variables showed a positive sign, but the influence of one or the other (and this varied) was impossible statistically to distinguish from zero. Finally, the magnitude of the influence of these variables was small. Often, these variables had the weakest influence on the dependent variable of any in the model.

Patterns of partisan mobilization
These variables, which represent factors which bulk large in the comparative political economy literature, were very difficult to operationalize successfully. The magnitude of these variables was very much smaller than the literature suggests and some did not have the sign which theory would have predicted. On occasions it proved impossible to estimate equations which included all these variables (generally see TABLES 2.3.7 AND 2.3.8).

Across a number of regressions left influence in parliament seems to have had a negative impact on female participation in paid work. This influence is small in size and falls from statistical significance in some of the models. In addition, control of government by religious parties seems to have had a small positive impact. The two variables with coefficients of the expected sign, left control of government, and religious representation in parliament generally retained statistical significance even when the other variables failed to do so. The influence of religious parties in parliament always showed the strongest influence. The left politics variables include another puzzle. In the absence of a strong pressure from below, consistent positive influence of left control of government on women's participation in the paid workforce might not be expected by those social democratic theorists skeptical about 'state-centred' approaches (see Korpi 1983).
It might be possible to construct an account within which this pattern of results makes sense. Such an account might suggest, for example, that left parliamentarians have been preoccupied with the concerns of the male working class, while left governments are open to plural influences - including the political mobilization of women - rather than controlled by their parliamentary mandates. To be successful such an interpretation would require some statement of why left governments should be particularly influenced by political forces other than their parliamentary groupings. A certain caution is required in the *post hoc* development of an account of this sort in order to make sense of unexpected empirical results, especially when these results are mutually inconsistent in the context of established theories. These difficulties are particularly deep given the significance attributed to the *social* bases of policy in the relevant bodies of theory. Even Scandinavian 'state' feminists see political power building from the bottom up. They suggest that women have managed to gain representation at or access to lower, less influential levels of political power in Scandinavia, while the centre of power has remained male.

One implication which might be drawn from this overall pattern of results is that the variables which identify structural characteristics or 'policy configurations' shared by groups of states (generally Esping-Andersen) or nations (Castles and his collaborators) seem to have a much more important direct impact on gender issues than do patterns of party political mobilization or short run control of government. In other words, although the partisan political characteristics of particular societies may have influenced the form of the state and the configuration of welfare policy, their impact on women's involvement in the formal workforce does not seem to have been direct. Instead, it seems that it is (what the social democratic model depicts as) the product of these factors (the form taken by the state or the welfare 'policy configuration') which influences women's role in the paid workforce. This interpretation is generally consistent with the explicit claims made in the social democratic literature. Claims are made about the causes of variation in (the policy configurations of) welfare states, which may then have feedback effects on the
forces which initially formed them, but have other effects as well, including those on gender roles.

This interpretation requires that the policy configurations of welfare states have a fairly clear impact on women’s role in the workforce. However, we have already seen that there are difficulties in interpreting the variables operationalizing different ‘welfare state regimes’. Given that no unmodified typology of welfare states produced satisfactory results in (and some produced no results at all), the possibility was raised that these variables were acting as proxies for some feature of the societies in question aside from their welfare state regimes. Given that the partisan character of parliament and control of government are obvious candidates as other features of western democracies which might help to account for this variation, the interpretation as having a mainly indirect impact women’s participation in the paid labour market may require modification. Either some other features of the policy configuration of welfare states, or other features of the broader societies, need to be identified which clusters them in a new way, rather than reproducing the established typologies.

Control variables

The two control variables used here are a time variable and a population variable to try to control for variations in the size of the states analyzed. The time variable showed a consistent moderately strong statistically significant impact on the dependent variable. This fits with the assumption, which is too low grade to be designated as ‘theoretical’, that women have become increasingly active in labour markets as time has gone by (see, for example TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.7).

The second variable was introduced in order to control for differences in the size of states. It is worth noting that the inclusion of this variable made very little difference to the overall pattern of results of the regressions. A numbers of regressions were run excluding this variable which are not fully reported here - they show very similar patterns of results to those which include it. Nevertheless, the impact of this variable is of
interest. Its coefficient was consistently positive and statistically significant at the most demanding levels. Larger states have larger labour markets, which are usually thought to be more difficult to manage through inclusive national or state level social bargains, but may arguably afford a more diverse range of opportunities for employment. Other things being equal, then, this result might suggest that the latter facilitates female labour force participation more than the former (see, inter alia, TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.7).
### TABLE 2.3.1 Baseline model
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation

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DURBIN-WATSON = 1.6243
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.6286
RHO = 0.12375
# TABLE 2.3.2 Baseline model plus left politics effects

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355 DF

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DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5830
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5872
RHO = 0.14461
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336 DF

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DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5681
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5726
RHO = 0.15077
TABLE 2.3.4 Families of welfare model
Dependent variable: Female Labour Force Participation

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DURBIN-WATSON = 1.7416
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7463
RHO = 0.07052
### Table 2.3.5: Mixed welfare and partisan politics model

**Dependant Variable: Female Labour Force Participation**

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354 DF

BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9680
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.7082
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7128
RHO = 0.08156


TABLE 2.3.6 Families of nations model, with low country effects
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation

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DURBIN-WATSON = 1.7083
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7129
RHO = 0.08273
### TABLE 2.3.7 Partisan politics model
Dependant Variable: Female Labour Force Participation

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DF 357
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9616
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VON NEUMANN RATIO= 1.8116
RHO = 0.03956
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<th>STAND COEFF</th>
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DF 352
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9493
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.7840
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7888
RHO = 0.04255
2.4 Pooled analysis - the supplementary data set

The overall pattern of results of the regressions on this smaller, more 'European' data-set was not as consistent across models as the pattern for the larger data-set. For example, women's wages, the variable in which we are most interested here achieved statistical significance in some, but not all of the models. As with the larger data-set, a table (Table 2.4) of the unstandardized coefficients is presented (with an indication of statistical significance) in order to facilitate comparisons of the various models tested.
### TABLE 2.4

Dependent variable: Female labour force participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>TABLE 2.4.1</th>
<th>TABLE 2.4.2</th>
<th>TABLE 2.4.3</th>
<th>TABLE 2.4.4</th>
<th>TABLE 2.4.5</th>
<th>TABLE 2.4.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCNLND</td>
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<td>15.367***</td>
<td>11.505***</td>
<td>1.8469</td>
<td>2.7098**</td>
<td>24.505***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.80075</td>
<td>11.375***</td>
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<td>8.4203***</td>
<td>15.318***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.4203***</td>
<td>8.4203***</td>
<td>8.4203***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.24812</td>
<td>-0.24812</td>
<td>-0.24812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-108.10***</td>
<td>-108.10***</td>
<td>-108.10***</td>
<td>-108.10***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the remaining variables, the values are not provided in the image.
Welfare state regimes

As with the larger data set an estimation of Esping-Andersen's welfare state regime categorization illustrated that the socialist category required disaggregation. The Scandinavian welfare states showed a strong positive impact on female labour force participation, while the Dutch welfare state showed a strong negative impact in the model. This model included only two states in each of the Conservative and Liberal categories. An oddity of this model, by comparison with results obtained from the larger data set is that the Conservative welfare regime had a positive impact on female labour force participation (at the 95% significance level), in a regression which included variables measuring the impact of Catholicism, against the predictions of the theory (TABLE 2.4.1). Indeed this positive association was even stronger in a regression including variables measuring the partisan politics. In such regressions the variable measuring the representation of religious political parties showed a negative, statistically significant, impact on the dependent variable, in some cases of a large magnitude (see, for example Table 2.4.3). Even where the Catholicism variable was left out of the regression the Conservative welfare state did not get the predicted negative coefficient, instead producing a very small positive result, which was not statistically from zero (TABLE 2.4.2). Clearly there is some sort of interaction between the variables operationalizing the influence of religious parties in politics, Catholicism and conservative welfare state regimes.

Aside from the 'Socialist' variable relatively few states fell into each category of welfare state regime. Moreover, the core example of the Liberal welfare state regime - the USA was excluded from the analysis. In order to check whether these characteristics of the reduced data set produced any idiosyncratic results for particular countries, a regression was run using dummy variables for the states. Some care is required in the interpretation of the results for this regression, particularly in comparison with a regression in which the country variables were replaced by regime ones, but all the other variables remained the same. This caution is required because the values, and sometimes the signs, of those variables present in both models differ. In other words, we cannot read the impact of the

96
liberal variable as a simple aggregation of the impact of variables for the 'liberal' states in the regression. That having been said the results from this regression are quite striking. Germany, the archetypal conservative regime, shows a huge negative coefficient as does Britain, and the Netherlands and Australia show substantial negative coefficients. All these results suggest that these countries show lower levels of female involvement in the labour market than the model would imply. Ireland shows a very small negative coefficient. The remainder of the states show positive coefficients, which suggests that their levels of women’s labour market participation are higher than that predicted by the model. These states include the four Scandinavian ones (showing the highest values) and Switzerland.

Catholicism
In keeping with the theoretical expectation, the Catholicism variables showed a negative coefficient where it was included in a regression (TABLES 2.4.1 and 2.4.6). It achieved statistical significance in TABLE 2.4.1. This generally confirms the pattern of results shown by regressions on the larger data-set.

Aspects of the socio-economic status and political mobilization of women
The proportion of the legislature made up of women and the divorce rate both showed a statistically significant positive impact on the dependent variable, just as they did on the larger data-set (compare TABLES 2.3 and 2.4).

Women's wages
The main reason for running the regression on this smaller data-set is to test the impact of women's wages on female labour force participation. This relationship is of the highest importance for the economic theory, although a measure of this kind can at best give only a very general indication of its character. The variable gave a mixed performance, ranging from results which are statistically indistinguishable from zero to moderately strong positive results. Thus these result lend some support to the theoretical claim that wages have an impact on labour force participation (see TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6).
Economic development

The impact of this variable was much less consistent in regressions on the small data-set, than those on the large data-set. It never achieved statistical significance at the most demanding level, and indeed was statistically indistinguishable from zero in three regressions reported here (TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6).

The structure of employment

As with regressions on the larger data-set, the male labour force participation variable showed a consistent positive statistically significant impact on female labour force participation, despite the fact that male labour force participation appears to be in a secular decline, while female labour force participation is growing. This result suggests high levels of female labour force participation develop in high labour force participation states (see TABLE 2.4.5, *inter alia*).

Service employment and government employment were both subject to strong theoretical expectations of a powerful positive impact on female labour force participation, which was consistently contradicted by the empirical results reported in the previous section. The regressions which were run on the smaller data-set showed less consistent results. Thus the service employment variable showed only one statistically significant (and negative) result (TABLE 2.4.1). All the other results reported here were statistically indistinguishable from zero (see TABLES 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6).

The government employment variable also showed inconsistent results, failing to achieve statistical significance in regressions reported in TABLES 2.4.1 and 2.4.3, but showing the theoretically expected positive results in those reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6. These results might indicate that government employment may have a more important impact in the smaller group of states, dominated by European states and in which the Scandinavian states bulk comparatively large, than in the more inclusive set of states. It may be worth noting that these regressions either did not include the dummy
variable representing the Socialist WSR (excluding the Netherlands), or showed surprisingly small (TABLE 2.4.6) or statistically insignificant coefficients (TABLE 2.4.4). Nevertheless the results for the government and service employment variables remained something of a puzzle.

The impact of government spending

The results of the regressions on the smaller data-set were much less consistent than were those for the larger one. Across the various models reported here both the social security and the current disbursements of government variables showed significant coefficients of both positive and negative signs, as well as statistically insignificant ones. As a result the relatively strong conclusions drawn from the results of the regressions on the cross-sectional and larger pooled data-sets might have to be modified. In the regressions which tested the (adjusted) Esping-Andersen categorization of welfare state regimes, the pattern of results for the variables testing the impact of patterns of state expenditure showed results broadly consistent with those reported above for the full data set (TABLES 2.4.1 and 2.4.3), although the negative sign for the social security coefficient in TABLE 2.4.3 was not statistically significant. A second qualification is also in order: the argument which emphasizes the conservative character of high levels of social security within government spending is rooted within the general framework developed by analysts including Esping-Andersen (1990 - see also van Kersbergen 1995). Any interpretation based on the Esping-Andersen analysis would have to account for the variable representing the Conservative welfare regime showing an unexpected positive impact on female labour force participation.

The remaining regressions reported here showed a pattern of results which is very difficult to interpret. The social security variable showed a statistically insignificant positive result (TABLE 2.4.4), a negative, significant result (TABLE 2.4.5) and a positive, significant result (TABLE 2.4.6). Although social security could be understood as a measure of overall welfare state effort, allowing for easy interpretation of the positive result, in the context of the overall pattern of results reported for the variable in this
chapter, the positive coefficient is better understood as a qualification of the general conclusion that social security has a negative impact on female labour force participation.

The results for the wider government spending variable in the regressions reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 are even more difficult to rationalize. In each of these regressions the coefficient of current disbursements of government had a negative sign (although the regression reported in TABLE 2.4.5 was statistically insignificant). These results are difficult to interpret, both in the context of the general pattern of results for the larger data set and individually. Elsewhere this variable has gained positive, statistically significant coefficients. Moreover, making sense of this result in theoretical terms this result is not easy. In the light of the overall pattern of results those reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 are probably better understood as qualifying the general result that government spending contributed to female labour force participation. The element of qualification in this case is even larger than that entered in the case of the social security variable considered above.

The impact of inflation and personal taxation
The results for these variables, again, contradict the results from regressions on other data-sets. The results for the inflation variable flatly contradict those for the other data set. The results reported here have consistently shown a negative impact, which achieved statistical significance in three cases (TABLES 2.4.1, 2.4.3 and 2.4.5). This set of results generally weakened the argument advanced by those concerned with the pathologies of modernization, that inflation contributed to female labour market participation. Personal taxation showed an inconsistent pattern of results in the regressions on the larger data-set. The results reported here generally support the contention that higher levels of personal taxation contributed to higher levels of female labour force participation, lending some support to this element of ‘pathologies of modernization’ arguments. The results for the regressions reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 showed positive coefficients, significant at the most demanding level, while the results for the other regressions showed the same sign, but were not statistically significant.
Patterns of partisan political mobilization

The results for these variables were much more encouraging than the results for the larger data-set. The contrast between the results for the two data-sets might be partly explained by claiming that partisan politics has had more of an impact in the European states, which remained in the smaller data-set, than the non-European states, which tended to drop out of it. In general the impact of the religious parties was more impressive than that of left parties. The left control of government never achieved statistical significance, by contrast with the results from the larger data-set, where left control of government moderately strong results. The left control of parliament showed small, but positive and statistically significant results in the regressions reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6. It gained a negative, but statistically insignificant result in one of the other regressions (TABLE 2.4.3). It is worth noting that these results were for regressions which did not include the full range of Esping-Andersen's welfare state regime categorizations. The welfare state regime variables and the partisan political mobilization variables may have measured the same, or closely related, phenomena. These results also contradict the results for the larger data-set.

For the religious parties variable, again the control of parliament showed a stronger set of results than the control of government measure. The first variable showed consistent negative results which were statistically significant at the most demanding levels. This pattern is consistent with the results from the regression on the larger data-set, and with the general theoretical expectation for this variable. The control of parliament by religious parties is the only one of these variables to achieve a consistent set of results across all these regressions.

The religious control of government showed negative, statistically significant coefficients in two regressions (see TABLES 2.4.4 and 2.4.6). It also showed two statistically insignificant coefficients, one of which was positive (TABLE 2.4.3), the other negative (TABLE 2.4.5). These results might indicate some weak support for the general
contention that governments controlled by religious parties uphold traditional family patterns and thereby hold back female labour force participation.

Control variables
The results for both the total population time variables showed the same pattern of results as those for the larger data-set. Both variables have consistently shown statistically significant, positive coefficients.
TABLE 2.4.1 Welfare state regime model with Catholicism effects
Dependent Variable: Female labour force participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>T-RATIO</th>
<th>STAND COEFF</th>
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DF 145
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9280
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5118
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5210
RHO = 0.13469
### TABLE 2.4.2 Welfare state regime model
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation

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DF 147

BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9295
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.4870
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.4960
RHO = 0.15212
### TABLE 2.4.3 Welfare state regime model, with partisan political effects

Dependent variable: Female labour force participation

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<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>T-RATIO</th>
<th>STAND COEFF</th>
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DF 143

BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9395
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.4364
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.4451
RHO = 0.16931

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TABLE 2.4.4 Families of welfare model
Dependent variable: Female labour force participation

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<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>T-RATIO</th>
<th>STAND COEFF</th>
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BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9486
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5301
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5394
RHO = 0.12153
### TABLE 2.4.5 Partisan politics model

Dependent variable: Female labour force participation

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BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9177
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.6791
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.6893
RHO = 0.06746
### TABLE 2.4.6 Clusters of welfare model with partisan effects

Dependent variable: Female labour force participation

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BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9477
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5155
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5247
RHO = 0.12788


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<th>STAND COEFF</th>
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DF 141

BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9960
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.6808
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.6911
RHO = 0.08318
2.5 Overall conclusions

The data analyses discussed in this chapter make it clear that relationships exist between the policy configurations of ‘welfare states’ and patterns and paths of development of women’s involvement in the paid workforce. While the analyses presented here suggest that some of the variables emphasized by modernization theorists do have an impact on women’s role in the workforce, they do not support ‘one path fits all’ models. Instead, clear evidence that women’s participation in the workforce group into a number of clusters. These clusters mirror typologies of ‘welfare state regimes’, at least to some extent. Nevertheless the data analyses suggest that several important anomalies exist and key questions remain unanswered. In particular, causal claims made about the impact of welfare state regimes and patterns of labour market organization do not seem sustainable, particularly as the labour market organization of some states does not match their welfare state regime. Moreover, the data analyses raise questions about the relationship of welfare states, conceived of as independent variables, with other independent variables. In general, these results suggest that the welfare state needs to be more clearly located within broader configurations of welfare policy (especially in relation to the public-private mix in welfare), of state policy, and of the overall pattern of national political economy. It is to these issues - as well as the reconstruction of the unfolding of complex causal chains over time - that we now turn in the country case studies. In the cases of Sweden, Germany and the USA the countries have been chosen because the existing literature and the data analysis both indicate that they are exemplars of particular welfare regimes. The Netherlands emerged as a key anomaly in the data analysis - it is also receiving increasing theoretical attention in the literature, as we shall see.
Chapter Three: Towards social citizenship? The impact of the social democratic welfare regime on the economic position of women Sweden
3.1 Social Policy and the path of women’s participation in the workforce

The Swedish welfare state has had a major impact on gender relations. Female labour force participation and state welfare (even defined narrowly as social policy) are more directly connected in Sweden than elsewhere. Particularly since 1970 women’s work has been increasingly concentrated in the extensive public welfare sector (see Rein 1985: generally and Table 16: 167; Esping-Andersen 1990: 211-212; Ruggie 1984; 1988). The division of the labour market along gender lines is particularly clear in Sweden. The private sector is largely a male domain and women are concentrated in public employment.

However, it is misleading to focus exclusively on this picture. The pattern of comparatively high levels of female labour force participation concentrated in the public sector is a characteristic of the 1970s and 80s. The emergence of this pattern needs to be explained by going further back into history. Tracing female labour force participation since the 1930s reveals connections between it and the development of Sweden’s ‘welfare state’ characteristics. In doing this tracing, however, we have to confront divergent interpretations of the position of women in the labour force and rely on data which are less consistently available and comparable.

Chart 3.1 Sweden - Female Labour Force Participation
According to OECD data - the most comprehensive broadly comparable data available - female labour force participation seems to have gone through three phases.
since the war. Although the data are not wholly consistent with those available for the later period, it seems that the post-war starting point was one of comparatively low female labour force participation, which suggests it went through a stagnant period (female employment seems to have been comparatively high in the 1930s). The first post-war phase lasted until the late 1950s or early 1960s. It was characterized by steady growth from a comparatively low starting point to a position towards the top of comparative league tables. Female labour force participation rates were stagnant in the mid 1960s - the second phase. The final phase, which began in the late 1960s and early 70s, saw a dramatic take-off of female labour force participation to levels unmatched outside Scandinavia.

The a closeness of the relationship between welfare and gender in Sweden is widely recognized (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rein 1985; as well as, inter alia Hernes 1987; Lewis and Åstrom 1992). However, a number of issues remain to be resolved concerning the nature of this relationship. The first concerns whether or not the impact of welfare on gender was intended and relatedly whether welfare changes which influenced gender were partly produced by gendered political mobilization or debate. Third, these issues need to be considered in relation to the ‘mainstream’ debate on Swedish welfare state development. Positions in this debate variously emphasize working class mobilization and left control of government, the formation of cross class political and policy alliances (especially between workers and farmers), the political role of capital or business in politics, or the form of the state. Most ‘mainstream’ analysts implicitly suggest that the impact of the welfare state on gender was an unintended, they do not consider gender explicitly, for the most part. They do vary in the degree to which they are open to modification to take account of gender.

Finally, welfare state analysts run a clear risk of anachronism. They may define the welfare state on the basis of its characteristics in the 1970s or 80s and read them back into earlier periods in history. The presence of strong social democratic control of government dating back to the 1930s might suggest the dominance of a single social democratic ‘social model’ throughout the period of left control of government.
3.2 Periodizing the Swedish case: when was the ‘universal’ or ‘social service’ welfare state ‘locked in’?

One way of addressing these problems and engaging with debates about welfare development and changes in gender in Sweden, is to consider the way they divide history into periods. Explicit consideration of the periodization of the development of the Swedish ‘welfare state’ helps to alleviate the risk of anachronism. Although they are rarely compared in these terms, competing interpretations of the Swedish welfare state rely on distinct (implicit or explicit) periodizations. Each identifies a particular ‘formative moment’ at which the basic character of the welfare state was ‘set’. Factors present at the ‘formative moment’ - including the balance of (class, gender and other) forces, the character of the state, and so on - become embedded in, and largely reproduced by welfare state institutions. Subsequent ‘turning points’ when the initial settlement was somewhat modified are sometimes identified. Space can be created for the impact of gender mobilization on the welfare state and the issue of whether subsequent welfare state impacts on gender were intended. Analyses do not include gender explicitly, but identify change at moments when a gender mobilization or debate occurred are more likely to be open to the suggestion that gender had an impact.

A careful look at the historical record suggests that changes in the position of women may be connected to welfare reform patterns. This periodization of Swedish history is claims that there have been two phases of relevant social policy innovation. The first started in the 1930s within an important debate about ‘democratic population policy’, partly in reaction to the depression. Reforms were adopted from the late 1930s until the end of the 1950s. The second phase began during the 1960s and continued in the 1970s, beginning with a period of intense debate about welfare priorities and gender. Change in both female labour force participation follow a similar pattern of gradual growth, sustained until early 1960s, a stagnation during the 1960s, followed by explosive growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

This periodization of the Swedish ‘welfare state’ development is not universally accepted. Key features of the development of the Swedish model are variously dated.
from the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century; the 1930s and 40s; and the post-war period (attributed by Baldwin 1992 and Rothstein 1991 to the first of these phases; by Mydral 1938 and Sainsbury 1994 to the second and by Esping-Andersen 1985 and Lewis and Astrom 1992 to the third). Each of these approaches is associated with a particular claim about the character of the (welfare) state. My approach is closest those who focus on the 1930s and 40s, but also emphasizes the 1960s and 70s. Important changes are identified during the second period, albeit in the context of other legacies of earlier policies and adopting some of their institutional forms.

Baldwin’s purpose is to demolish the social democratic analysis. He dates the origins of the Scandinavian model to the 1913 universalist pension reform, before the social democrats attained power. In contrast to his account of continental European social policy, he fails to explain how this early choice precluded alternatives (for, say, ‘capital’ or the middle classes) and locked Sweden into a social citizenship state form. Baldwin’s analysis mixes breathtakingly comprehensive comparative archival research with an overblown general argument and significant distortions of the positions of others. For example he ignores the emphasis placed on class alliances by power resource analysts. (Baldwin 1992: 62-63, 93, 113 on the 1913 reform; Esping-Andersen 1985: 153 provides a contrasting interpretation).

Others who emphasize the early period account for its continuing impact more plausibly, either by examining capital/labour bargains (this analysis could be extended to show the ongoing benefits yielded to both parties) or by emphasizing the Swedish state’s unique character. Even these more differentiated analyses fail to show how social service oriented social policy was determined by early policy choices. (Rothstein 1991 emphasizes on the distinctive form of the Swedish state; Swenson 1991 stresses the detailed patterns of capital/labour bargains. Both provide analyses which place the ‘Swedish Model’s’ formative moment before the first world war; as well as Baldwin see Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984 on how early choices locked continental states into social policies which restricted social democracy; Esping-Andersen and Friedland 1982 and Esping-Andersen 1985 discuss class alliances.)
By contrast, mainstream power resource analysis largely bypasses the interwar period. The implicit periodization developed privileges social democracy. Esping-Andersen’s consideration of the interwar period is limited to economic crisis and unemployment policy. He suggests that the social democrats did not develop a blueprint of the welfare state (1985: 154). Policies created at the end of the 1940s are treated as distinctive post-war phenomena. They are not considered in the light of the debates and reforms of the previous ten or fifteen years. The power resource approach emphasizes one strand within Swedish ‘social democratic’ state and society, reflecting its masculinist and workerist bias. The policies of the 1930s and 40s seem not to be regarded as significant, presumably because they were not primarily concerned with de-commodifying workers.

Authors concerned with feminist questions usually treat the 1930s more carefully. Here the debate revolves around whether or not Swedish experiment in democratic family and population policy can be considered ‘feminist’ (A. Myrdal: 1945; compare Lewis and Åstrom 1992 and Ginsburg 1992 with Sainsbury 1994 and Therborn 1989a for varying evaluations of its ‘feminist’ quality). Interesting though this discussion may be it has meant that the legacy of the 1930s and 40s has not been considered in a balanced way. Authors who see little feminism in the debate of the 1930s tend to view it as a constraint on subsequent developments, which are usually evaluated more positively (Lewis and Åstrom 1992; Lewis 1992; Ginsburg 1992). They have distracted attention from whether or not the debates and policies of the 1930s and 40s helped to construct the space for, as well as restrictions on, subsequent reforms.

Ginsburg disparages the Mydrals’ approach as ‘certainly not feminist in orientation’. While listing some reforms introduced during this period, he emphasizes the absence of ‘liberal abortion reform, and day care and nursery education for the under sevens ... both of which represented too much of a challenge to traditional ideology’ (1992: 49 and 50).

The 1930s and 40s set the pattern for subsequent reforms, others argue. Debate around population policy in the 1930s and 40s rooted the ‘universalist, ‘popular’
conception' of social policy deeply in Sweden. ‘The population policies of the 1930s’ have even been traced as the origin of ‘the principle of care as a basis of entitlement to benefits and the origins of the ‘social service state’’. The social service state delivering individual and collective benefits in kind became firmly established as a dominant ethos, at the expense of cash benefits. The Myrdals’ seminal work on the Crisis in the Population Question concluded with a chapter entitled ‘In Cash or in Kind’. In it they argued strongly that the state should deliver services rather than just transfer cash (published in Swedish in 1934, reproduced in A. Myrdal 1945: see 133-153, and G. Myrdal 1938: 209-210; Therborn 1989a: 219 and Sainsbury 1994: 162-163 both discuss the universalist popular conception of social policy and the 'social service state').

Most early reforms were aimed at families - particularly children and mothers. Initially policy sometimes took the form of individualized and means tested benefits. However, in the 1940s the number of generally available services for families and children expanded ‘to include free school lunches, school medical services, social services for families, and day nurseries’. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the individualized means tested benefits in kind which had been characteristic of some of the early programmes were phased out, to be supplanted by ‘cash benefits and collective benefits in kind’ (Sainsbury 1994: 163).

The structuring of space for later reform by early concern with gender in democratic population policy may have contributed to the subsequent development of a (relatively) decommodifying welfare state. However, choices made in the 1930s are not the whole story. Changes in the 1950s and 60s were also significant. The power resource approach claims that gradual social policy development during the late 1940s and early 1950s was largely consensual, but was followed by a distinct politicization around the ATP pension plan. The Social Democrat’s eventual success on this issue strengthened them substantially, and opened further space for gradual welfare state development (Esping-Andersen 1985: 160-163), particularly after the 1960s ‘sex-role equality’ debate and leadership change in the SAP.
The relationship between the periodization of Swedish welfare policy development and women’s path into the paid workforce since the second world war is key. Dividing women’s entry into the paid workforce into three phases shows an initial phase of growth, followed by an episode of stagnation and finally a period of sustained growth from the mid 60s until the end of the 1980s. This periodization begs a number of questions. How and why did female labour force participation grow in the period up to the early 1960s? Why did it stagnate during the mid 1960s, a period of rapid economic growth and intense debate about the role of women in Sweden? How and why did female labour force participation explode during the late 1960s and 70s? In relation to this last question, the politics of welfare were clearly crucial. However, the extent to which the change was motivated by gender concerns is less obvious - was women’s desire to work accommodated by the state, or was growth in women’s employment an unintended consequence of the expansion of social welfare work? (Rein argues that both ‘interpretations are strongly held by many observers and participants in Swedish society’ 1985: 77, on the argument generally see 76 - 88; see also Jenson and Mahon 1993.)

There is some disagreement about this periodization. During the 1950s and early 60s ‘the labour force participation rate of women over fifteen remained constant at about 30 percent’ argue Lewis and Astrom. Moreover, they suggest that ‘participation rates were lower during the 1950s and early 1960s that in countries such as the United States or Britain’ (1992: 66; 70). However, the balance of evidence suggests that women’s rate of the workforce grew during this period. The rate rising from roughly 35 per cent to 50 per cent between 1950 and 1960. By 1960, according to these data the Swedish rate had topped those in the USA or the UK (OECD Historical Statistics, various years; OECD 1985 Table I.2: 14; Ginsburg 1992 Tables A.12 and A.13: 203). The impression left by the Lewis and Astrom analysis is misleading in a further respect. They suggest that a period of stagnation which continued into the early 1960s was replaced by rapid growth of female labour force participation (1992: esp. 66-70). The OECD evidence shows a stagnation in female labour force participation during the mid 1960s.
3.3 The Initial Phases: from before the war to the 1960s

The pre-war background

The historical development of women’s employment in Sweden shows little evidence of a decisive shift in the character of female labour force participation having between 1930 and 1950, although a number of trends continued, gradually changing the pattern of women’s employment. By the end of the 1930s women’s work in domestic service and agriculture was clearly declining. Women’s industrial employment was concentrated in certain areas - such as textiles, tobacco, chocolate and preserves. Private sector clerical and service work accounted for an important and increasing proportion of women’s work. Finally, public sector and social service employment were already established as important sectors of female employment, despite significant decline in some traditional areas, such as midwifery. Within the public sector, however, women were largely excluded from the higher levels of the civil service, being concentrated in health care and teaching (A. Myrdal 1938: 223-229).

Despite the fact that this was a period of growth in many other countries female labour force participation growth was not dramatic during the 1940s. Sweden’s neutrality during the Second World War may be a factor - many countries involved in the war actively mobilized women, although there is evidence that women were brought into employment to replace men conscripted as a precaution against invasion. Even before the war Alva Myrdal described the situation of Swedish women as ‘closer to a complete equality with ... men than in most other countries’ in terms of ‘economic standard, ... legal status, ... civil rights, ... daily work environment, and .... general attitude to life’ (1938: 216). Whether this relatively equal status was reflected in female labour force participation rates is unclear - reliable comparative data are not available for this period. She presents data which suggests that the proportion of ‘gainful employment among all adult women’ was 36 per cent in 1920 and 38 per cent in 1930 (1945: 406, the passage is slightly ambiguous, and may refer to rates in Stockholm, which would be higher rate than elsewhere). Although not directly comparable, OECD data for 1950 provides a helpful contrast. It shows female labour force participation as a proportion of the female population aged 15-64 at 35.1 per
cent in 1950 (OECD 1989; Ginsburg 1992: 203 Table A.13; see Ruggie 1984: 255 on women’s mobilization during the war).

Growth in participation during the 1950s

During a single decade - the 1950s - Sweden’s laggardly position disappeared. However, there is little evidence that this growth was caused by a decisive break in the character of, or causal factors behind, women’s work. Within the general pattern of women’s work from the late 1930s until the 1950s, the balance between different elements changed. Thus the decline of certain traditional sectors of female employment, such as midwifery, was largely complete by 1950, it no longer offset growth in other sectors. During the 1950s the importance of women’s employment in the public sector continued to grow, while that of low wage private sector work was broadly maintained. Between 1950 and 1960 the proportion of women employed by the central government grew substantially (calculated from data in Peters 1985: 219 Table 6.8)

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s public sector social welfare employment grew gradually due to of the extension of direct service provision. Although the origins of the ‘social service state’ can be found in the 1930s, a series of reforms incrementally extended it in the 1940s, 50s and early 60s. The reforms changed the ethos of provision of benefits in kind from selective means tests to general availability. At this stage the impact of policy changes on women’s labour force participation was relatively limited and apparently largely unintended, despite debate explicitly touching on gender. Private sector work remained very significant for women. Subsequently, Swedish women came to be disproportionately employed in state social services. Gradual social service expansion between 1938 and the early 1960s contributed to growth in female labour force participation. It helped to create conditions within which subsequent expansion could occur. (Sainsbury 1994: 163 on the ‘social service state’ - she sometimes refers to generally available, but individually consumed, goods - such as free vitamins and minerals - as ‘collective’; on gender in political debate see A. Myrdal 1938; 1945 and Jenson and Mahon 1993: 80 - 84.)
The (neglected) stagnation of the mid 1960s

During the mid 1960s female labour force participation in Sweden was stagnant. This episode - which, ironically, coincided with the sex-role equality debate - has not been widely recognized in the comparative literature (although the restriction of employment opportunities may have triggered the debate). 'Rapid economic growth' in the 1960s which 'spread prosperity to almost all social and occupational groups' makes female labour force participation stagnation more puzzling. An important part of the explanation of stagnation during the 1960s lies in changes to the solidaristic wage policy at the end of the 1950s. The existing approach, created in 1951, required job evaluation to ensure equal pay for equal work. A simpler and more vigorous policy using the mean wage as a benchmark replaced it. All wages falling below this level were considered 'low'. Powerful collective bargaining ensured that low paid workers gained disproportionate wage increases to 'catch up'. The solidaristic wage policy was also meant to facilitate structural economic change, by putting pressure on low-wage, low productivity sectors (on this period see Heclo and Madsen 1987: 116-117).

The solidaristic wage policy had a dramatic impact on private sector jobs historically taken by women. From the 1930s, women made up a high proportion of textile industry employees. 'During the 1960s and early 1970s' employment in this industry was 'ravaged because the labor movement's solidaristic wage policy resulted in wage rates that made Swedish textile products uncompetitive in world markets'. Consumer, particularly retail, services suffered a similar fate. Employment in this sector grew rapidly in other countries during the 1960s and 70s but suffered a sharp fall in Sweden. A consequence of the solidaristic wage policy was that 'fewer women (were) employed in retail stores, and more use (was) made of automated processes'. The decline in private sector low wage female employment took hold during the 1960s, but continued into the 1980s. It was part of a general fall in private sector employment. The labour market participation of women suffered as an unintended consequence of a policy pursued for general welfare reasons. (See A. Myrdal 1938: 225 on women in the textile industry; Heclo and Madsen 1987: 325 on
the devastation of textiles and Rein 1985: 35; 167 Table 16 on the fate of consumer services).

3.4 Continuity and Change: from the mid 1960s to the 1980s

The explosion of female employment

By the end of the 1960s women's workforce participation was expanding rapidly - an expansion which continued into the 1980s. It occurred despite stagnation in private sector employment. Stable or declining employment in the private sector, meant that full employment and growth in female labour force participation were due to explosive public sector and welfare employment growth (see Peters 1985: 208 on employment patterns between 1960 and 1980; Jenson and Mahon 1993; and Ruggie 1984). I differ most from mainstream analyses by identifying the mid 1960s and early 1970s as a 'turning point' (while acknowledging that establishment of the social service welfare orientation in the 1930s and 1940s helped to shape the context for choices made in the 1960s and early 1970s).

The growth in female labour force participation in the 1960s and 1970s was closely bound up with the expansion of welfare services and employment. It requires an account of the renewal and expansion of 'the welfare state'. After 1960 public sector employment exploded in size. The most dramatic growth in government employment occurred after 1965 and remarkable rates of growth continued throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. Within public employment, strongest growth was in welfare work, within which women had traditionally been strongly represented (see Peters 1985: 207 on the 1950s and on OECD statistics for the later period). The welfare expansion and related female labour force participation growth beg questions of the balance between policies directly concerned with gender and unanticipated consequences of other policies (see Scott 1982; Ruggie 1984; Eduards 1991a; Rein 1985).

Women had long been strongly represented in some parts of the Swedish public sector. Women dominated county and local employment - largely in social service jobs - but were much less well represented in central government employment. The proportion of women in central government grew more rapidly between 1975 and
1980, the period of bourgeois control of government, than it had in the previous 25 years. Employment in central government grew steadily but strongest growth was at local and county levels, particularly in social welfare work. It was primarily responsible for the growth of female labour force participation (Peters 1985: 213 Table 6.5 on growth at local and county levels; 209 Table 6.3 and 211 Table 6.4; Rein 1985 on growth in social welfare work).

The proportion of county and local government employment taken by women fell between 1965 and 1970. Although it grew again later, it had not regained its 1965 level (82.7 per cent) by 1980. This decline in the percentage of female employment occurred in the context of massive growth in their absolute number. In 1975 there were nearly 2 1/3 times as many female local and county government employees as there had been in 1970. The 1980 level was just over 5 times that of 1965. By 1980, 840 900 women were employed by local and county government (based on Peters’ data, 1985: 219 Table 6.8). The explanation of expansion in women’s workforce participation returns us to the identification of the purpose of welfare state growth. I examine first at ‘needs’ which the growth of the welfare state was intended to meet (in relation to gender and poverty) and ask how far meeting these needs necessarily required, or was likely to produce, an explosive welfare employment growth. Then I consider the use of the welfare state to sustain the ‘full employment’ state.

Welfare ‘needs’ and welfare expansion
The expansion of ‘the welfare state’ was partly motivated by an attempt to meet newly identified ‘welfare needs’. These ‘needs’ were identified within a wide-ranging equality debate which pre-occupied Swedish politics during the 1960s and into the 1970s. A number of distinct, if intertwined, elements made up the ‘equality movement’. The two most important were concerned with ‘sex-role equality’ and the (re)discovery of poverty. The overall movement became concerned with ‘social equality of outcome in the welfare state’. The movement was associated with a radicalization of Swedish social democracy following its ‘victory’ on ATP pensions. (On radicalization and the ‘equality movement’ generally see Ginsburg 1992: 32, 50 and Jenson and Mahon 1993, also discuss the 1960s as a ‘golden age’; on the SAP
The concern with gender relations predated the rediscovery of poverty. The gender debate developed initially in academic and journalistic circles, outside formal politics. Opinion on the manner and order in which the political parties took up this issue is divided. Those associated with the radical gender critique of social democracy argue that the issue was first taken up by the Liberal Party. Those sympathetic to the SAP provide evidence that the party had formed a study group as early as 1960, with Erlander, the Prime Minister, as its honorary chair. The work of this group culminated in the ‘The Erlander Report’ which was adopted by the party in 1964 and was eventually incorporated into the 1969 *Programme for Equality*. The terms of debate within the SAP, and the wider ‘social democratic movement’ changed gradually through the 1960s. (For an relatively critical analysis of the SAP’s role in these debates see Lewis and Åstrom 1992: 66-67; Scott 1982: 4-6 discusses the origins of the debate outside of formal politics, the SAP study group, the Erlander Report and the 1969 *Programme*; Ginsburg also discusses most of these developments 1992: 50.)

In the mid-1960s poverty was ‘rediscovered’ in Sweden. This rediscovery is often attributed to a report of the Royal Commission on Taxes published in 1964, which argued that ‘numbers of people were still living at standards unacceptably low in an affluent society and, worst of all, many of these were children’. It triggered a wave of research within trade unions, the civil service and universities. In 1966 ‘a large scale investigation ... by the government to analyze the ‘characteristics and causes’ of the new poverty’ was undertaken (Wilson 1979: 13; also Ginsburg 1992: 32, 50; Scott 1982: 18-19).

Debates sparked by the equality movement continued throughout the 1960s. They influenced state policies and the corporatist partners during this decade. However, the major impact on political elites and policy occurred in the late 1960s and early 70s, after the equality movement’s ‘heyday’. 1969 stands as a turning point, marked
by two events. First, the 'Equality Programme' was adopted as official SAP policy; second Palme (more sympathetic to the New Left) replaced Erlander as Prime Minister. Under Palme the SAP won the 1969 election on a reformist agenda 'Increased Equality for a More Just Society' (see Wilson 1979: especially 13; Scott 1982: especially 6-7; Heclo and Madsen 1987: 164, 173-178; Jenson and Mahon 1993: especially 84; Esping-Andersen 1985).

The policies advocated by the equality movement (and subsequently pursued as state policy or through corporatist arrangements - albeit in modified and diluted form) demonstrate that sex-role equality was integrated into the broader equality movement. For example, the demand of the sex-role feminists for gender egalitarian labour-market policies was partly recognized. However, it was subsumed within attempts to help a variety of underprivileged groups. The significance of this 'integration' is unclear. Gender equality policies were blended together with other aspects of the programme in ways which made gender issues both less clear and more acceptable. Hilda Scott states that

'...the sex role equality program was assimilated because it was part of an equality program' that had something for everybody. ... The program’s overall purpose was to 'restore the balance' for all less-privileged groups - the young, the old, the handicapped, the unemployed, the low-income groups, and the rural dwellers - as well as women. Thus some of the more fiercely debated measures relating to the status of women (or the status of men) were packaged so that the inclusion of women was only implicit' (1982: 7; see also Ginsburg 1992: 50-51).

The equality initiatives sought to transform 'sex roles' domestically and in private sector employment as well as in the public sector. Three types of initiative were used. First, policies, such as adequate childcare (which might be expected to result in an increase in public welfare employment) were aimed at providing the supportive conditions necessary for women to participate equally in the general workforce. Secondly, policies were adopted to alter the patterns of incentives for women and men to participate in domestic unpaid labour and paid work. They included parental leave (open to both women and men) and changing tax arrangements (as well as patterns of eligibility for benefits - increasingly based on employment) to increase incentives for
wives/female partners to work, even on a part-time basis and reduce those for husbands/male partners to work additional hours. Finally, there were policies directly to challenge conventional attitudes towards sex roles, both those of men towards domestic work and of employers towards employing both women and men in non-traditional occupations. While the increase in childcare would expand welfare employment, many of these policies would not necessarily result in welfare employment expansion.

However, the anti-poverty aspect of the equality movement did increase welfare employment. Here we see a legacy of earlier welfare policy development. The reforms of the 1930s and 1940s introduced a form of welfare which was biased towards the provision of welfare services and benefits in kind, more than cash transfers. 'New poverty' was tackled in line with the established tradition, and reinforced it. The resulting welfare expansion led to growth in female employment.

Welfare expansion and full employment

The expansion of welfare employment soon became a vehicle for sustaining full employment, as much as poverty eradication (although employment was seen as key to tackling poverty). During the 1960s aggregate private sector employment stopped growing. The state attempted to maintain full employment for men and women partly through labour market policies, but increasingly through public employment. The Swedish state's commitment to full employment was integral to its 'welfarist' character (Peters 1985: especially 208 discusses the decline in private sector employment; Ruggie 1984: 82-83 and 155 analyzes the expansion of public sector employment to sustain full employment; Esping-Andersen 1990: 28 considers the centrality of full employment to Swedish social democracy).

A number of changes which encouraged women to participate in the labour market occurred during the optimistic 1960s and early 70s, before decline in private sector employment and general economic climate became obvious. Not fully appreciated at the time, their significance became clear subsequently. Once in the labour market, women came to be covered by the framework of workers rights (if only so as not to
'undercut' male workers) - Swedish employment is significantly mediated through politics. Women came to be included in the full employment target - to have the 'right' to work. These changes were not wholly motivated by gender egalitarianism (see Ruggie 1984: especially 83-84; 155; 342-346; Rein 1985; Peters 1985; Scott 1982.)

Part of the explanation of women's inclusion in the formal labour force concerns a change in the attitude of the trades unions during the 1960s. This change was not primarily concerned with gender equality. Instead the unions became increasingly hostile towards immigration which rose sharply during the 1960s. They chose to support the employment of Swedish women instead. It had been actively encouraged by the Swedish state (only slackening in the 1970s) bringing (mainly male) workers into goods production. However, if the unions' posture was intended to deliver women into goods production, it failed. The change in union attitudes was broadly contemporaneous with the end of private sector employment growth. While this change facilitated (perhaps even as a necessary condition) the subsequent employment of women for example altering the role of unions in labour market policy (see below), it was not its main cause. Immigrants and Swedish women were employed in different sectors - the former mainly in private sector and goods production; the latter in the public sector and service provision. (Jenson and Mahon 1993; Ruggie 1984; Scott 1982; Ginsburg 1992.)

Active labour market policy is a crucial facet of the 'Swedish Model'. Women, and particularly married women, came to be important participants in, and beneficiaries of, Swedish labour market policy during the 1960s. By 1970 46 per cent of those in training at any one time were married women, up from fourteen per cent in 1960 (Wilson 1979: especially 79). However, women were concentrated in training for 'traditional female occupations, such as domestic and secretarial work and nursing'. At the same time as women were gaining greater access to training a change occurred 'in training and public works towards the service occupations'. This mirrored a change in employment generally. The shift in training may have been a consequence of increased priority for (married) women's employment or perhaps it was partly led
by changes in employment, as the government turned to the public sector to maintain full employment in spite of declining private employment. It is worth noting that in county and local government (the area of most rapid public and also welfare employment growth) a smaller proportion of the workforce was female in 1980 than it had been in 1965. Women made up over 75 per cent of employees throughout the period, and absolute numbers of women employed expanded rapidly during. (Wilson 1979: 79; Ruggie 1984: 83-84; 155; Peters 1985: 219-220, especially table 6.8.)

The introduction of individual taxation, notably for married couples gave the clearest indication of the increased priority given to women's work. This reform had the effect of strongly increasing the incentive for both marriage partners to work, even if one did so part time. The impact on incentives was particularly strong given the high levels of marginal tax rates in Sweden - in 1981 the marginal rate for a typical first (male) wage earner was 90 per cent, compared to 68 per cent on second (female) earners (data from Lewis and Åstrom 1992: 67; see also Scott 1982: 72). Taxation reform was demanded by the (sex-role) equality movement. Lewis and Åstrom state that this approach was introduced on a voluntary basis in 1968 (1992: 67), while Sundberg dates its introduction from 1965 (1971: 231; Glendon 1977: 178 misquotes Sundberg and dates it from 1960). It was formalized in 1971, making separate assessments the general practice (Scott 1982: 8, 72; Ginsburg 1992: 51; Lewis and Astrom 1992: 67). The change in the structure of taxation influenced the incentives for women to work, rather than the availability of work for women. The explanation of the growth of employment for women remains key. In a country strongly committed to full employment, with institutionalized active labour market policies to achieve it, growth in the demand for work draws forth a strong state response. Powerful 'social partners' might have the capacity to stymie this response, hence the importance of the change in union attitudes.

This analysis suggests that explosive growth of female labour force participation in Sweden was less the consequence of a clear political decision, or the decisive outcome of a political struggle around gender (associated with the sex-role equality movement) than it might appear. Important policy changes were made but the consequences of
these changes often appear to have been poorly understood at the time - as the case of unions seeking to substitute Swedish women for foreign migrant workers illustrates. The unanticipated change from expansion to stagnation in private sector employment may have thrown reforms to extend equality off course. The cause of this change might be debated itself, - how far did it result from increasing employment costs, associated with state welfare? A clear concern with gender existed, but the expansion of women's workforce participation depended on welfare employment growth (among other things). Although this growth emerged from the same political conjuncture as gender egalitarianism, it occurred for other reasons (particularly meeting new welfare needs). Moreover, welfare expansion took a labour intensive form partly as a legacy of earlier policy choices.

Two illustrative policy areas: non-traditional employment and childcare
Examination of two cases illustrates the extent to which gender equality policies had unanticipated consequences and occurred in a changing, unpredictable environment. Several policies were clearly aimed at increasing equality, but often failed to achieve their particular targets. One attempted to place men and women in 'nontraditional employment', the other concerned childcare. The attempt to give rights to men in the domestic sphere and women in formal employment was an aspect of the equality agenda. Some new rights, such as those for parental leave, seem to have had some impact. However, encouraging women (and men) in non-traditional areas of employment was a spectacular failure, despite the attention it received. The Swedish labour force became one of the most gender segregated in the world (Esping-Andersen 1990: 212 and Ruggie 1984 especially 158-161; Scott 1982: 25-28; Wilson 1979: 102; Rollen 1980: 193).

Swedish childcare policy development is particular revealing, although its gender implications are difficult to interpret. The sex-role equality movement drew attention to the importance of childcare for women's access to employment. As the issue was taken up more broadly, its benefits to children and contribution to inculcating them with collective social democratic values were emphasized (compare Rothstein 1996 on the weakness of 'social democracy' in secondary education). From the mid 1960s
onwards childcare provision expanded dramatically. From 1965 to the end of the 1980s the Swedish state played a considerable role childcare expansion. However, the growth of direct state childcare provision took a considerable time to get started and failed to meet its target levels. The significance of childcare in facilitating labour market participation was almost matched by its importance as an employment sector. Although Family Commissions in the early 1960s had made recommendations about childcare ‘the government did not respond directly to the increase in the number of working women by immediately expanding day care provision’. A good deal of the expansion before 1965 was either part-time or in traditional ‘child minding’ in private homes. A Commission on Child Centres was appointed in 1968, reported in 1972, and resulted in legislation which was passed in 1973. Further legislation was passed in 1975 and 1976 (on childcare expansion see Scott 1982: 99-117 and Ruggie 1984: 249-293, especially at 262 on the initial failure to expand day care; and at 256 on the Commission on Child Centres).

Childcare provision increased dramatically during the 1970s, with full time municipal preschools taking in the lead, providing nearly 100 000 more places in 1980 than 1970. Despite the authorities’ strongly expressed preference for municipal preschools, throughout the 1980s other forms of day care continued to represent large segment of provision. After 1980, the increase in childcare provision seems to have continued, although it fell short of the (1982) target of a place for all preschoolers by 1991. (Ruggie 1984: 263, provides data on the expansion of the 1970s; see also Wilson 1979: 99-101; Lewis and Åstrom 1992: 68 state that public childcare accommodated 27 percent of the age group 1979 and 47 per cent in 1987.)

As a significant sector of employment, mainly for women, the childcare system reveals a good deal about the nature of employment in Sweden. A significant amount of day care provision occurs in private homes. From 1966, as a result of a Family Commission Report in 1965, child minding in private homes began to be integrated into the municipal system and came to be known as Family Day Homes, or Family Day Nurseries. As a consequence, many of the (largely female) workers in this sector have become salaried public employees, enjoying the considerable rights and benefits.
which are attached to this status in Sweden, whereas (private sector) chidminding is a notably unprotected occupation in many other countries. However, the fact that childcare became a relatively secure sector of employment invested with important rights was probably as much due to the general policy towards employment security in Sweden, as any particular concern with the position of women. (See Ruggie 1984: 259-260; Ginsburg 1992: 55 on the rights of childcare workers and Peters 1985: 210 on the formalization - what others might call the commodification - of work done informally by women in other countries.)

Of course, once begun, the increase in women’s employment is likely to set up a dynamic of demand for childcare. Due to the legacy of earlier policies, the Swedish state accepted significant responsibility for, and partly carried out the expansion of, day care. However, if the increase in female employment was set in train primarily by other factors (such as the change in the taxation regime) the assumption that public childcare provision implies a much higher rate of female labour force participation than a private system may not be accurate.

Purposes and consequences: welfare expansion and gender

It is easy to assume that the explosive growth of female labour market participation must have been politically intended and/or planned especially given the politicized character of the labour market. Moreover, the Swedish state did pursue policies designed to improve the labour market position of women. From a comparative perspective some of these policies have been remarkably successful. However, the particular path taken by female labour market participation in Sweden can only be understood as the contingent coming together of a variety of factors. These include the legacy of past welfare reforms, the use of the public sector as a means of sustaining full employment, the achievement of extensive rights for workers in Sweden, and the impact of ‘women’s’ or ‘feminist’ demands on the Swedish state.

The legacy of past welfare reforms gave Swedish welfare policy particularly labour intensive service oriented character, as some ‘gendered’ analysis distinctively emphasizes (Sainsbury 1994 - by contrast, mainstream authors concentrate on
universalism). Particular concerns with the family and gender - and female activists - bulked large in the politics of creating the ‘social service state’, along with other important factors. Welfare expansion in a social service state was likely to create large scale employment. Moreover, in the face of private sector employment stagnation, welfare expansion was an obvious tool to sustain full employment. The implications of adopting policies which tend to increase the proportion of women looking for work simultaneously with a fall in private sector employment may not have been appreciated at the time. This double shift helps to explain the failure of policies to combat labour market segregation. The sector in which women generally worked was expanded to sustain full employment, just as more women sought formal employment. (We might speculate on what would have happened had private sector employment been sustained. Would women’s employment have expanded rapidly, but more evenly across public and private sectors? Would the state have expanded welfare employment rapidly had full employment for men not come under threat?)

However, focusing on the direct role of the central state in full employment policy overestimates its strategic capacity. Much of the expansion in welfare and women’s employment took place in local and regional government, which provide most welfare employment. Rather resulting from central state control, a widespread - perhaps even hegemonic - commitment to full employment which pervaded the state (and society), produced a policy climate within which all levels of government contributed to public employment expansion.

The way in which women came to benefit from the generally strong rights associated with the status of ‘worker’ in Sweden is relatively well understood. Policies to improve the position of women in the Swedish labour market can only be understood adequately in this context. Many of the benefits which women gained - for example associated with comparatively high part time wages - resulted from general workers rights not policies specifically aimed at women. This far, Ruggie is quite correct - that women have rights as workers and, in as much as their position is comparatively strong, it reflects the position of workers generally in Sweden (1984: 342-344). This emphasis underestimates the impact of policies more immediately concerned with sex-role equality - especially the move to individual taxation. The equality movement
especially its sex-role component - influenced the development of policies which triggered, facilitated or supported female labour force participation. Accurate assessment of its impact is difficult - many analysts argue that ‘feminism’ was weak in Sweden, resulting in the attribution of an autonomous feminist agenda to the state, or granting inadequate attention to gender policy initiatives (on the weakness of feminism see Lovenduski 1986: 98-100; Kaplan 1992: 71-72, this is also an implication of Ruggie 1984).

A balanced account would pay attention to the co-optation (and consequent dilution) of women’s demands by the state. Policy changes which pushed women into the labour market (such as tax regime change) need emphasis alongside ‘supportive’ policies including those in the labour market. ‘Gender’ concerns and explicit demands made by women in the early 1960s and the 1930s helped to create a comparatively egalitarian context which influenced welfare policy and the level of female participation in the labour market. However, the actual processes by which female employment and welfare provision expanded seem to have been neither anticipated nor fully managed by the state. Instead, the legacy of earlier policies resulted in a labour intensive social service state. Welfare expansion, in the context of decline in private sector employment, a state commitment to full employment and a climate of opinion concerned with sex-role equality, resulted in rapid growth in female employment. Extreme segregation of the labour market along gender lines was an unintended consequence of this expansion, which contradicted other aspects of the ‘drive’ for equality.

3.5 Conclusions: the implications for welfare state theory
My broad conclusion is that the Swedish state’s welfarist character is deeply implicated in changes in gender. By contrast, the general condition of the Swedish economy features relatively little here. Contrary to modernization theories, changes in gender relations are not to a direct product of economic growth. The possibility remains that the level of economic development could act as a threshold through which a society must pass before such changes could occur. During the period from 1960 to 1989 economic change in Sweden was largely achieved through bargaining
and other political mechanisms, not through ‘the market’. If the explanation of change in gender relations is sought in economic causes, then the importance of politics in the Swedish economy would need to be acknowledged. Conversely ‘perverse’ economic factors - high inflation and high taxation - may have had some impact in Sweden. However, the Swedish economy grew for most of the period under question, suggesting these ‘perversities’ should not be given too strong an emphasis. While patterns of personal taxation probably did influence the growth of female labour force participation especially after 1971, it was the structure more than the level of these taxes which was crucial in Sweden.

The Swedish ‘welfare state’ has influenced female labour force participation in a number of ways, some deliberate, others unintended. For example, the disproportionate destruction of women’s jobs by the solidaristic wage policy was unintended. The general commitment to full employment, operationalized through active labour market policy and public sector employment, committed the state to finding work for women (including those put out of work by the wage policy). Equally, many policies to improve the status of women - such as the movement of women into ‘male’ occupations - were (initially) resisted by unions and eventually largely failed. However, women benefited from the general commitment to strong workers rights.

Possibly as a result of the extremely powerful position of the Social Democratic Party during the 1960s (noted and explained by Esping-Andersen 1985), the equality debate and the politicization associated with it, took place mainly, but not wholly, within the social democratic movement. The apparent weakness of autonomous second wave Swedish feminism is usually attributed to Swedish social democracy’s capacity to co-opt and redirect feminist demands, which is partly rooted in the debates and reforms of the 1930s (Lovenduski 1986: 98-100; Kaplan 1992: 71-72). Without opening the question of whether the debates and reforms were ‘feminist’, the fact that gender issues were debated immediately before the two periods (1930s/40s and 1960s/70s) of major (re)orientation of the Swedish welfare seems significant.
Non-gender factors contribute to the politicization of gender at particular moments in history. It would be a grave error to infer from my argument that that the evolution of gender was controlled by the state or that the state consistently supported women's interests. Nevertheless, the definition of key historical moments and the contests between various conceptions of gender that occur during them cannot be reduced to these factors. Notions of gender in the debates of the 1930s and 1960s had a certain autonomy. Conceptions of gender directly influenced subsequent changes in welfare policy and in female labour force participation. Rather than seeing the welfare state as a product of working class social democratic strength alone (or in alliance with middle class or agrarian interests), social democratic strength took on a particular gender character. This resulted in there being more 'for' women in the welfare state's institutional form. A generous, service oriented and market displacing form of social policy became possible during this conjuncture. In other words, the 'gender' aspects of these debates influenced the developing possibility of a social democratic welfare state and influenced the particular form it took.

The attribution of some autonomy to the notions of gender which were generated in the 1930s and 1960s also helps to get us out of a potential trap. Analysis of the Swedish case has recently come to emphasize its peculiarity. The historical path of social democracy there is increasingly depicted as unique even when compared to other Scandinavian countries. Thus, Rothstein attributes much of the social democratic model's success to labour market policies and argues that those developed elsewhere in Scandinavia do not compare to them (1996). Generally he emphasizes the unique character of the Swedish state (1991; Knudsen and Rothstein 1994). Leira argues that Norway falls a long way behind Sweden in policies for working mothers (1994) and other feminists suggest that Sweden and Denmark, which Knudsen and Rothstein treat as unique and contrasting cases, share relatively 'woman friendly' characteristics (Borchost and Siim 1987). According to these analyses, and much of the discussion of Sweden here, the particular path taken by Sweden ought to mark it out. Although Sweden stands out in a general comparison of OECD states, it also does within a group of similar Scandinavian states. Although Scandinavian states collaborate on policy, this collaboration has not ironed out all differences among
them. They also share ideas - the debates provoked by the Myrdals in the 1930s or on sex-role equality in the 1960s rapidly became Scandinavian, not just Swedish. A comparison of this sort suggests that the particular path taken by an individual state may be less important than the broad outlines of policy, ideas and social values.

The claim that Sweden is a welfare state has a gender dimension - most conceptions of social citizenship imply women and men should enjoy it on equal terms. The image of Sweden as a model welfare or social citizenship state is bolstered by casual international comparison. However, development of (something approaching) an ungendered social citizenship cannot be confirmed simply by dint of Sweden occupying a 'leading' position in the comparative ranking of women’s labour market participation, any more than it can by similar comparisons of expenditure levels (Shalev 1983). More detailed analysis of the relationship between state welfare and gender has been ambivalent in its conclusions, suggesting that citizenship remains gendered (particularly focusing on occupational segregation and the high proportion of women in part time work) while acknowledging the important resources for women provided by worker/citizenship based welfare rights. Thus there is ambivalence and disagreement about the validity of interpreting Sweden along social citizenship lines in the light of the condition of gender, mirrored by a less obvious ambivalence about the development of social citizenship or the welfare state itself.
Chapter Four: Must an active, social state be a welfare state? The German state and the path of female participation in the labour market
4.1 Social Policy and the path of women’s participation in the workforce

To explain the development of German female labour force participation, we need to have a clear image of the pattern of, and change in, this participation. The German case is somewhat puzzling, particularly comparatively. Despite a relatively high level of women’s labour force participation in the early post-war period, by the end of the 1980s it had increased by less than six percentage points, and its level was comparatively low. The level of women’s participation in the labour force actually declined during the 1960s. From a low point in 1967, the level rose again during the early 1970s. However, in the mid to late 1970s, women’s rate of labour market participation was stagnant (even falling slightly) before growing briefly, but explosively, at the turn of the decade. Another phase of stagnation occurred in the early to mid 1980s, before growth returned in the later 1980s.

The proximate cause of periods of decline or stagnation and growth in women’s workforce participation seems straightforward. The former correspond general economic recessions, the latter to phases of economic growth. Some of the variability of women’s workforce participation results reflects general influences labour market rather than its gender structure. However, the general performance of the economy is not the whole story.

Chart 4.1 Germany - Female Labour Force Participation
The impact of economic slowdown on the position of women in the labour market weakens with successive recessions. A comparison of female and male labour market patterns shows a striking gender pattern, which dividing the period into two phases - changing in 1969-70. Before that date, the relationship was stable, after it the relative proportion of women in the workforce increased steadily. Finally these economic
factors do not account for the position of women in Germany in international comparison.

**Chart 4.4** Observed series and smooth of female labour force participation as a proportion of male labour force participation

Women were hit disproportionately hard during the recession of the mid 1960s, although the decline in participation can be dated from before 1965. Nevertheless, in 1967 the rate fell below the trend both for female labour force participation and female as a proportion of male labour force participation. The two periods shown in Chart 4.4 would seem to indicate that a structural change occurred in the late 1960s or early 1970s. The recession of the mid 1960s may have triggered a change in the position of women in the labour market. From 1970 onwards, female labour force participation grew while male employment declined, producing a consistent pattern of increase in female relative to male participation. Since 1967 to the female labour force participation has grown in absolute terms, except during periods of recession. Even during periods of recession female labour force participation remained reasonably stable while male employment fell sharply.

From a comparative perspective the initial issue is why women’s workforce participation grew so slowly and remained at a relatively low overall level. Given
generally strong economic performance the weakness of female labour force participation is a particular puzzle for modernization theory. ‘Power resource’ theorists suggest that the ‘conservative’ form of the German ‘welfare state regime’ accounts for women’s comparatively weak presence in the labour market. There is a good deal in this argument - the form of welfare provision did not provide extensive incentives for women to work (through the taxes and benefits) nor did it provide many welfare employment opportunities, often taken up by women elsewhere. However, arguments of this sort can be overplayed. They may exaggerate the role of the (welfare) state in the political economy and misdescribe its direct impact on social relations.

4.2 Periodizing the German case: ‘normalizing’ gender, blocking social democracy

There is less controversy about the periodization of social policy development in Germany than there was in Sweden. Here again the periodization of the path taken by female entry into the employment market corresponds in some respects to that of social policy development. The importance of the post-war settlement consolidated by a lengthy period of CDU dominance of government is widely acknowledged, both from the point of view of the (re)establishment of ‘the family’ and in terms of welfare policy. The immediate post-war period was one of particularly extensive social, political and economy reconstruction in Germany in which social policy and gender roles were important. The social insurance system was one area in which traditional German policies could claim not to have been tainted by Nazism, and could therefore play an important symbolic - as well as practical role.

Although the meaning of, and balance between, the social and market elements of the social market economy altered during the 1950s and 60s, the next major shift in welfare policy was by the SPD from the late 1960s onwards. The take off of relative growth in female labour force participation coincided with innovation in social and economic policy by the Social Democrats in government. Of course, the evidence that they were contemporaneous does not mean they were causally related. Labour market policy - a key aspect of welfare and economic policy which emerged in 1969 –
had an impact on employment patterns. However the 'social democratization' of the Federal Republic was only ever partial. It was significantly stymied by the restrictive Bundesbank monetary policy in reaction to fiscal expansion during the first oil crisis of the 1970s. Finally, it is unlikely that growth in women's workforce participation was driven by one set of factors from 1970 to the end of the 1980s. During the latter half of the 1980s the process seems to have had some distinctive features.

I will analyze the place of social policy and gender in the post-war German settlement to account for the relatively high level of female labour force participation in Germany at the start of the 1960s. It is particularly difficult to account for this level of participation given that German society had taken a distinct 'domestic turn' during the 1950s, celebrating the traditional family. Moreover, a number of analysts argue that social policy had played a key role in reconstructing the German family, in a form which allocated women to the domestic sphere. I contest elements of this analysis. Next I will turn to the relative growth in women's participation in the workforce especially from the 1970s onwards, placing it in the context of the comparatively low level of female labour force participation and focusing on the role of state welfare in accounting for it.

4.3. The initial phases: The limited role of social policy in the (re)construction of gender roles in post-war west Germany

The immediate post-war period provides important context for developments between 1960 and 1989 and draws out the distinctiveness of the German experience. Women undertook significant 'economic' work. Initially this work was significantly in the black market, subsequently, however, it featured a comparatively large and growing proportion of women in formal employment. By the 1960s women's role in the workforce had ceased to grow. Although often exaggerated, the image of the post-war reconstruction of the state and society from nothing plays an important part in German history. Institutions created immediately after the 'zero hour' - Stunde Null - helped to set the pattern for subsequent developments. The processes of post-war stabilization and reconstruction were deeply and explicitly gendered and there was considerable political struggle over gender in this period of German history. Social policy was also
instrument in the reconstruction of West German politics, with the Bismarckian system of social insurance defended by the likes of Adenauer as representing a long German tradition, largely untainted by Nazism.

There is an acute risk of exaggerating the role of the state here. The dominant historical interpretation depicts social policy as an explicit instrument for moving women from the workforce into motherhood (while acknowledging that it may have also improved the position of, and been supported by, many women). The argument is that social policy, ‘defined the social and political status of women’ and, without doing violence to the argument, one could add ‘economic’. Although Moeller’s focus remains on the traditional family’s political reconstruction (1989a: 137 – 138) elsewhere he acknowledges that a number of other perspectives might also be useful (1993: 3 – 4.) This analysis dovetails with the ‘power resource’ perspective on the impact of the German ‘welfare state regime’ on the position of women. Claims that social policy was instrumental in the reconstruction of gender roles are not fully supported by the historical evidence on which they are based. The timing of gender ‘reconstruction’ fits uneasily with this interpretation. Women’s role in the formal workforce increased during the early 1950s. In 1960 the level of female labour force participation was comparatively high. Only during the 1960s did it begin to appear low by international standards. My argument is that the position of women was only ‘normalized’ in the 1950s. Earlier debates were hotly contested, a contestation reflected in both constitutional construction and social policy. However, this contest had ambiguous implications for the position of women, particularly in the labour market. Social policy was not wholly effective as an instrument for the reconstruction of traditional gender roles in the 1940s and 50s, despite the hopes of some Christian Democratic politicians.

Women had substantial political resources they could deploy to enhance their position in the post-war situation. Several initiatives shortly after the war illustrate women’s public influence and power, which had various sources. The illegitimacy of conventional domestic politics women’s contribution to wartime and post-war economic and social life and the influence of the Allies in German governance were
particularly important. Ironically in the later context of the 'economic miracle' the first and second of these factors seem to have contributed to German women focusing their attention on the 'little circle' of the domestic sphere (Kolinsky 1989: 78-80).

The extraordinary post-war gender situation was gradually 'normalized', but not primarily through the development and operation of social policies. Instead, it occurred through a combination of 1) political rhetoric and the construction of social ideologies of gender (particularly through the media) and 2) the emergence of a remarkably successful industrial base. By the mid 1950s the Christian democrats dominated the terms of political debate and sexist attitudes among many employers seem to have weathered the post-war gender 'storm'. Of course state policy, including social policy, contributed to the 'economic miracle'. As such it had an indirect impact on the position of women. The structure of social insurance may have been particularly significant here. It supported the stratification of the labour market along traditional status lines. Together with the assumption that employees were male breadwinners, this status orientation meant that social policy provided few additional incentives for women to work. In addition, it was not a system likely to result in rapid growth of 'women friendly' welfare employment.

The remainder of this section will develop four lines of analysis. First, I consider the position of women in the German labour market in a little more detail. Second, I examine the development of the constitutional and social policy context for women. Third, I analyze other influences on the 'normalization' of gender relations, with a view to explaining the internationally unusual decline in the level of female labour force participation in the mid 1960s.

Labour Market

An accurate image of the position of women in the labour market is a prerequisite for my argument. Women's workforce participation was comparatively high during the 1950s. The explanation of this high level of participation is complex. Several analysts argue it was partly an artefact of the Nazi mobilisation of women. Older women remained economically active after the war, particularly in agriculture, many
unpaid. These analysts imply that female labour force participation in paid employment manufacturing and services was not unusually high (Rein 1985; Haug 1986: 72; Ginsburg 1992: 78).

However, the much vaunted 'scarcity' of men after the war probably pushed women into paid work. Women - divorcees and widows - headed almost one-third of households in 1950. Evidence exists that women's participation in paid work increased sharply between 1947 and 1955 by some two million women, a proportionate increase of 48 per cent (total employment grew by only 28 per cent). The expansion of women's waged work reversed the immediate post-war situation when the Allied authorities failed to entice the female 'silent reserve' into regular paid work. Until the currency reform of 1948 rewards for formal work were probably more limited than for informal and black market activity. (Moeller 1993: 25-27 and 148 on Allied failure to mobilize women; 150 on the subsequent increase in women's waged work; generally see Moeller 1989: 140 - 141; Kolinsky 1989/1993 24 - 37; Frevert 1989: 255 – 264.)

The legislative context

The equality provisions of the 1949 Basic Law are a legacy of women's contribution to the reconstruction, together with some 'egalitarian' pressure from the Allies. The story of their inclusion in the Basic Law is instructive. Initial drafts drawn up by heads of state governments contained no equality clause. Its absence of such a provision suggests that even the SPD did not rate it as constitutionally central. Despite political party reticence and outright hostility from Christian parties, interventions by Elisabeth Selbert, an SPD delegate, backed by mobilisation of pressure from women's organizations introduced the equality provisions. Although these provisions influenced later legislation, their impact was mixed and tardy - partly reflecting the special protection for the family also provided by the Grundgesetz in Article 6. (Grundgesetz Articles 3 and 6; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 41 - 74; Moeller 1993: 45 on the early absence of gender equality provisions and generally 38-75; Moeller 1989: 141-143; Glendon 1977; 1987.)
Gender issues remained on the political agenda after the Basic Law Debates and attendant mobilisation of women. The Basic Law itself recognized that it was inconsistent with the Civil Code - the legal foundation of social life - on family organization. The Civil Code prescribed a patriarchal family organization, which subordinated wives to husbands. It contributed to the restriction of women’s labour market participation. Wives did not have full independent authority to enter and maintain employment contracts, as husbands had some power to end them. Despite the constitutional requirement for change by March 1953, the Christian Democrats opposed changes to the Civil Code. A political stand off resulted in the legislature. No reforming legislation was passed (Glendon 1977; 1987: 92-93; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 48-49; Moeller 1993: 180 - 228; Frevert 1989: 278 - 286).

After March 1953 the Courts used the Basic Law to override some patriarchal elements of the Civil Code. For example, husbandly control of the wife’s paid employment was ruled unconstitutional. Despite anticipation of ‘legal chaos’ due to gradual judicial review of the Civil Code, no legislation ‘implementing’ Article Three was passed until 1957. Even then, the ‘Equality Law’ confirmed the Civil Code’s sexist character as much as it altered it, underlining patriarchal authority over children while declaring spouses equal with one another. After the legislation passed the Constitutional Court reversed many of its elements swiftly (Urteil vom 29 Juli 1951; Gesetz über die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau auf dem Gebiete des bürgerlichen Rechts - GleichberG; Moeller 1993: 180 - 209, especially 203; Glendon 1977; 1987: 92-93; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 48-49; Frevert 1989: 278 - 286).

Social Policy
The Christian democratic view of gender and the family was amply illustrated in social policy debates of the 1940s and 50s. However, claims that the ‘welfare state’ - even interpreted to include the constitution and social policy - restricted women’s workforce participation are overstated. These policies were the subject of intense political debate and contestation. Several provisions were passed which apparently supported some groups of working women. Legislation which did attempt to push women into more traditional roles mostly had little impact. Even some evidence
presented in accounts of the reconstruction of the family by social policy contradicts the argument (see Moeller 1989: 137). For example, policies to encourage large families - the ‘will to children’ - benefited only families with three or more children and the proportion of families of this size continued to fall. As *Kindergeld* or ‘family allowances’ helped few people they could not have been instrumental in restricting women to the domestic sphere (Moeller 1989a: 154 and generally 142-145, 151-155, he seems not to notice the damage this evidence does to his general argument about social policy reconstruction of gender; Moeller 1989b; 1993; Ginsburg 1992: 77-79; Frevert 1989: 284).

Some policies which ‘eased’ the situation of working mothers were passed in the early 1950s. The *Mutterschutzgesetz* (1952) extended maternity leave and protected pregnant women from being sacked, reversing a decision of 1948 which had suspended this protection. Unlike *Kindergeld*, which divided the political parties, the protection of working mothers was generally supported. Despite increasing Christian Democratic concern about the detrimental social impact of working mothers, they felt unable to oppose it (see Moeller 1993: 142 - 179; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 36). Before we are too carried away by this evidence of support for working mothers, the practices of the factory inspectors and Labour Courts charged with the enforcement of the *Mutterschutzgesetz* need to be examined. Often the law appears to have been honoured in the breach. Inspectors frequently ignored the sacking of pregnant women, sometimes on the basis of moral judgements about the women concerned.

The practices of state officials often contradicted egalitarian constitutional and legislative provisions. During the late 1940s and early 1950s women were sometimes sacked from public employment when they married, on the basis of a 1937 Nazi law. The Allies opposed these sackings, albeit somewhat inconsistently. In November 1949, shortly after the passage of the Basic Law, Adenauer’s government Federal government employment regulations which allowed for married women to be sacked. Because it was temporary the Allies reluctantly accepted this legislation. It is probably the most direct legislative attack on women’s employment during the period (Moeller 1993: 142 - 179; 1989b; Garner 1995: 52 - 63).
The temporary legislation remained in force until replaced by the (1953) Federal Civil Service Law. Well organized attempts to introduce a clause allowing for the termination of married women's employment in the public sector eventually failed. Legislation which had the potential to restrict women's access to paid work did not do so - for instructive reasons. Many Christian Democrats in the *Bundestag* failed to vote for it: more than 40 per cent abstained or failed to attend the decisive vote. They may have been concerned that the Courts would strike down restrictive rules. The prospect of the 1953 election also seems to have weighted heavily on them (female considerably outnumbered male voters) despite strong evidence that women backed the CDU much more strongly than men. At this stage Christian democratic vision of gender and family life seems not to have pervaded women's consciousness. However, the Christian Democrats had little to fear from women voters - their margin over the SPD increased beyond 10 per cent (Garner 1995 52 - 63; on the CDU-CSU position on gender see Moeller 1989a; 1989b; 1993; on the gender gap in west German elections see Rusciano 1992, especially at 341; Kolinsky 1989/1993).

The terms of social and political debate about gender
After 1949 public policy did little to encourage or hinder women’s employment, but neither did federal legislation do much to hinder it. The reconstruction of ‘the patriarchal family’ was not primarily a result of social policy. However, social policy debate *was* informed by a clearly articulated image of women’s domestic and reproductive contribution to the social market economy, particularly associated with Christian Democracy. There was a strongly natalist element within it, especially after the 1953 confirmation of Christian Democratic electoral dominance. The CDU government was particularly concerned with the ‘one child families’. However, SPD *Bundestag* members also generally saw women primarily as wives and mothers (Moeller 1989; 1993; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 82- 84; but compare with Frevert 1989: 282-283 who nevertheless acknowledged official concern about one child families on 284).
The terms of political debate shifted during the ten or fifteen years after 1949. Liberal feminism had never been a strong force - 'difference' was stressed in all Parties. At the end of the 1940s, a powerful mobilisation occurred around a certain conception of equality. Despite earlier opposition, the CDU eventually supported Article 3. They also asserted that 'There is a natural right to work. Women should have equality of opportunity' (*Düsseldorfer Leitsätze der CDU, 15.7.1949*). Subsequently the CDU position hardened. Cold War images depicted the family as Christian and Western as against an Eastern, Atheist/Communist totalitarian anti-familialism became increasing evident after 1953. The creation of a new Ministry of Family Affairs and Ministerial appointment of Franz-Josef Muermeling - a traditionalist - marked and deepened these trends. Even SPD increasingly used an image of the family to distinguish itself from Soviet Communism. In Basic Law debates, SPD delegates insisted that they were not anti-family and that women had a special familial vocation. Even before the 1953 election, the SPD position was that, ideally, working mothers would not exist (Moeller 1989a; 1989b; 1993: 88).

A shift of focus from public policy to political discourse might partially 'rescuing' the notion that the family was 'politically' reconstructed. However political debate largely reflected on developments outside formal politics; the normative ideal of the traditional family and the desire for a (re)construction of comfortable domestic life were strong social forces in post-war Germany, partly reflecting a 'shifting involvement' from the Nazi politicisation of everyday life and the deprivations of military defeat and occupation. This climate of opinion placed women primarily in the domestic sphere (the 'shifting involvement' notion is Hirschman's 1982). The terms of social discourse were not just constructed by politicians. The popular media, particularly magazines aimed at women were also important. Popularized academic analyses were surprisingly direct about the economic value of women's domestic work. The centre and right dominated academic discussion - the left, including the Frankfurt School, had a more marginal position following its exile during the Third Reich (on the academic and political debate see Moeller 1989: 146-155; on the social construction of women's role after the war see Heineman 1996; Höhn 1993; Harsch 1993; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 46, 78-84; Moeller 1993).
Moreover, electoral evidence suggests that women did not, on balance, strongly resist this interpretation. The Christian Democrats always had ‘female bonus’ over the Social Democrats which grew from 1949 to 1957, the period during which CDU familialist rhetoric developed most powerfully. On the other hand, growth in the CDU’s ‘female bonus’ largely reflects the overall pattern of support for the party - men as well as women turned to them in the 1950s. Moreover, although the CDU parties never re-gained their 1957 level of support, until the mid 1960s they had more than an eight per cent advantage amongst women (Rusciano 1992; Kolinsky 1989/1993).

My general argument is that the ‘domestic turn’ in post-war western Germany had an irreducibly social element. Politicians did adopt and promote this discourse of domesticity. In line with the national mood the CDU concentrated on economic success and celebrated the family, emphasizing its contribution to the economic miracle. Nevertheless, the legislative manifestations of this discourse were not themselves the major forces taking women out of the labour market. The CDU failed to achieve many of their specific family policy objectives (see Moeller 1989: 140 generally on Christian democracy, domesticity and the economic miracle; Kolinsky 1989/1993: especially 46, 78-84; Frevert 1989). Of course, public policy contributed to the German economic miracle. Economic strength allowed wives to play a largely domestic role. So policy had an indirect impact on gender. The structure of social insurance supported labour market stratification along status lines. Moreover, social benefits were mostly constructed after the image of a male worker - supportive of full time permanent employees - and their families. Thus they provided few additional incentives for wives to join the workforce. Even so, social policy was not the origin of the ‘domestic turn’.

By the mid 1960s the position of women in the German workforce had reached a remarkable position. Over the previous fifteen years a social ideology of domesticity had become deeply entrenched. By 1963 women’s labour force participation was actually falling, reaching its lowest point in the recession year of 1967. Only in 1973
that female labour force participation exceed its 1960 level. In the late 1960s women’s labour force participation fell, even relative to the male rate. Cross-nationally perceptions of this period are coloured by feminism borne women’s increasing integration in the workforce - while in Germany the rate of women’s labour force participation fell.

4.4 Continuity and Change: the 1970s and 80s

The character of female labour force participation seems to have changed during the late 1960s or 1970s. Compared to that of men, women’s labour market position appeared remarkably static during the 1960s. Indeed, as we have seen women suffered particularly during the late 1960s. However, during the 1970s and 80s relative to men, women’s labour force participation grew consistently. In absolute terms it grew during periods of expansion - and levelled off, rather than falling, during recessions (see Chart 4.A and especially Chart 4.B). Although it is tempting to assume that these changes reflect a single structural change, unless it can be empirically substantiated such an assumption is dangerous. Instead, it seems likely that distinct dynamics operated in the 1970s and late 1980s.

In this section I concentrate on the timing, nature and causes of the change from a steady state to growth in female relative to male labour market participation. However, the comparatively low levels of labour market participation in Germany must be kept in mind. This section strives to sustain balance between the cause of change and the explanation of continuity. Social policy seems to be important in both processes. In terms of continuity, the general, largely indirect impact of the structure of social and labour market policy helped to sustain a pattern of economic-industrial structure which was remarkably successful and left little scope for female employment. This form of social provision also provided relatively few welfare employment opportunities.

If its comparatively low level requires explanation, so too does the relative pattern of increase in women’s employment from 1970. Once underway, this change may be partially self-sustaining, if it reflects and sustains a change in women’s aspirations.
Nevertheless, self-sustaining change is not the whole story. Special explanation of the rapid growth after the mid 1980s is required. It occurred under CDU political leadership traditionally concerned to restrict women’s entry into the workforce. However, the general political context was changing significantly at this stage, in ways which reflected and reinforced changes in gender roles.

The change from stasis to growth

The initial change from stasis to growth requires explanation. A mixture of structural change in the German economy and policy changes resulting from the SPD coming into government is important. Of course, the SPD maintained most of the social policy legacy of post-war Christian democracy. However, the SPD innovated in labour market policy, an area which falls within social policy broadly defined and is particularly relevant to employment patterns. This policy area also illustrates the complex, even contradictory, impact of policy on the relative position of men and women. It also emphasizes the limitations imposed on the SPD’s Keynesian and welfarist strategies by the Bundesbank’s restrictive monetary reaction to the fiscal expansion with which the government met the oil crisis.

The economic context

The general economic context for women’s labour force participation from the late 1960s to the late 1980s was of a comparatively strong economy which experienced at least three serious recessions. Rather than necessarily attributing change to recession, they may have disclosed and deepened changes already under way. The first began the period under question and reached its trough in 1967 and tested confidence in the German economic miracle. The others occurred in the mid to late 1970s and in the early 1980s. There is an implicit disagreement about the character of these recessions in the literature. Some commentators interpret the recession of the late 1960s as a major turning point, when a structural change occurred or was revealed, others regard it merely as a cyclical downturn, depicting the recession of the mid 1970s as ‘structural’ (Leaman 1988 sees the late 1960s recession as a structural turning point; while Therborn 1986: 144-146 claim the second recession was structural as does Dyson 1981: 45 who identified the earlier one as cyclical).
From a gender viewpoint the recessions of the 1960s and 1970s appear different. It is less clear whether, either of them was a primary cause of gender change or that change occurred during the intervening years. Decline in male employment is a key part of women’s relative increase. This decline is largely due to changes in manufacturing employment, which reached its peak in 1970 and then declined consistently. Ironically the decline in manufacturing employment was comparatively slow, and non-development of other sectors accounts for the relatively low level of employment (Esping-Andersen 1990 discusses employment patterns; Vogelheim 1988; Therborn 1986; Leaman 1988; Dyson 1981).

Concentrating on economic recessions and related structural changes pays insufficient attention to politics and policy. Decline in male employment is attributed to a state strategy of dis-employment by power resource analysts (see Esping-Andersen 1990: especially 185; von Rhein-Kress 1993, especially 149-154, 160-163 and Schmidt 1993). This approach involved repatriating guestworkers as well as encouraging older workers to retire earlier and marginal or sick workers out of the workforce onto benefits. Relatively generous benefits, at least for those workers who had held employment consistently, facilitated dis-employment. Many of those who left the workforce did not suffer dramatic standard of living decline.

Labour Market Policy

A strategy of dis-employment would represent the defeat of active labour market policy - at least in social democratic form. It was introduced by the Employment Protection Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz vom 25 Juni 1969 Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 Nr 51 28 Juni 1969 - AFG) as the Grand Coalition’s final flourish when the SPD gained the upper hand over increasingly directionless Christian Democrats. Many see the AFG as the apex of ‘social democracy’ in German social policy (Esping-Andersen 1990; Ginsburg 1992). ‘Active’ policies on placement, job creation and training. Four main categories of training were created by the AFG: initial job training; retraining for victims of economic and technological change; advanced training for those in work; and on the job training for narrow jobs in specific firms (Janoski 1990; Schmid 1985).
The recessions of the 1970s restricted the capacity of public policy to counteract trends in the labour market. The Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit - BfA), which is responsible for the AFG, received a significant proportion of its funds from employee contributions, which shrank during periods of unemployment. Also, as the BfA’s primary responsibility is the payment of unemployment compensation, high unemployment diverted funds from ‘active’ training and job creation initiatives. Thus labour market policy’s countercyclical capacity was limited. Specific reversals in labour market policy were mirrored in a confrontation between the federal government and the Bundesbank over general economic policies. Social Democrats responded to recession with attempted fiscal expansions - the Bundesbank thwarted these expansions through a restrictive monetary stance. However, the suggestion that a strategy of dis-employment was adopted between 1961 and 1983 (the period which Esping-Andersen analyzes) is misleading. Dis-employment was not the preferred choice of the dominant element, never mind the unified totality, of the German state. Policies promotive of dis-employment emerged from a stand off between state agencies, and the consequent failure of the federal government’s social democratic strategies. These policies required only marginal modifications of existing welfare policies and cut with the grain of the broader economic structure.

Active labour market policy was largely transformed into a tool of a paradoxical conservative modernization. It became a tool to enhance the skills and productivity of core workers. Despite its limitations - perhaps a consequence of thwarted ambitions - as a counter-cyclical tool for expanding labour force participation, the AFG had an important impact on the labour market. Largely unsuccessful in relation to marginal workers, it nevertheless helped to improve the quality of core workers and maintain the comparative efficiency of German industry. Priority shifted from retraining largely benefiting workers in declining industries, to advanced training, which improved the skills of workers in their existing industries. In the AFG’s first year retraining and advanced training were more or less equal in size. Over the next few years advanced training outstripped retraining. Even retraining became focused on
skilled workers rather than the unemployed and disadvantaged. Eligibility for most training programmes depended on having spent between three and six years in work (Janoski 1990: 117; 119. Periods spend as a housewife counted towards eligibility for some training - see MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 220).

From an early stage, rather than concentrating on expanding the workforce, training policy was largely focused on upgrading the skills of core employees. It is a moot point whether it contributed to dis-employment. The policy illustrates how a seemingly 'social democratic' initiative became imbued with 'conservative' characteristics of the wider political economy, perhaps even before the recessions of the 1970s. Moreover, some analysts identify ambivalence about labour market policy within Christian Democratic 'welfare regimes' (Janoski 1994: 80; van Kersbergen 1995: 144). Although perhaps not directly responsible for dis-employment, if labour market policy developed around a conception of the core workforce, it is at least compatible with the destruction of many marginal jobs. With an image of the Germany as a 'low employment' economy and society, and a fortiori, if dis-employment policy was pursued, the changes in women's employment between 1970 and 1989 start to seem odd. Comparatively German female labour force participation looks weak, but against a background of labour market shrinkage it is the steady growth in women's participation relative to men's and more erratic absolute growth that appear puzzling.

Women made up over 40% of the unemployed fairly consistently throughout the 1970s, a figure which reached 51% in 1978 (MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 223; compare with Cook 1984: 68), a remarkably high figure given the relatively low level of female employment. Clearly the unemployed were a significant element in female labour force participation in the 1970s. Changes in private sector employment provide little help in explaining the growth of female relative to male labour force participation. Some areas in which women were over-represented, such as electronics, were relatively stable, but others, including leather, textiles and clothing were hit particularly hard in the recession of the 70s (Daubler-Gmelin 1980: 335; Dyson 1981: 44).
Ironically, a key part of the explanation of the relative strength of women's labour market participation - relative to its weaker character in earlier periods and the weakening position of men outside the 'core' - is the role of government - labour market policy. The assessment of the AFG's impact on women is generally harsh, presenting it as reflecting and confirming their inferior labour market position. Most analysts read women's participation rates in training schemes as low, especially compared female unemployment levels. Women were worst represented in prestigious advanced or further training (25 per cent of advanced training schemes 1981) and more poorly represented on advanced training than in the general workforce. Critics suggest that the AFG's failed to mention female workers explicitly when helping 'hard to place' - for example through integration allowances which subsidise wages. (On training see MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 223 - 224 and 226; Cook 1984: 69; Daubler-Gmelin 1980; Janoski 1990: 144 criticizes integration allowances although this critique seems rather harsh as the AFG included key groups of women among the 'hard to place' - Arbeitsförderungsgesetz BGBl Teil I Nr. 67: 1421.)

During the 1970s the position of women in active labour market policy largely reflected their position outside the 'core' workforce. As we have seen, women were under-represented on advanced training, which concentrated on upgrading the skills of existing employees. In the west German context the AFG's support for women workers is perhaps more remarkable than its poor quality compared to that given to 'core' male workers. The AFG explicitly sought to integrate women into the labour market, especially the 'hard to place' (due to family commitments). Consequently women were better represented in re-training than the advanced programme. Mothers returning to the labour force made up 40 per cent of retaining participants in 1981 (data on women in training from MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 226; Cook 1984: 69 and, generally, Daubler-Gmelin 1980).

Labour market policy influences on women's position become clearer in the light of the sectoral structure of women's employment. The relatively stronger position of
women in labour market during the 1970s and early 80s was not due to private sector employment, whatever the role of state training. Despite the small amount of, and weak position of women within, public employment, growth of female public sector employment offset a potential decline in female employment. ‘Government’s share of net total female-job growth’ between 1961 and 1983 was 149% (Esping-Andersen 1990: 201-202).

Following traditional conceptions of the sexual division of labour, labour market policy channelled women into part-time public - especially social - sector employment. An ad hoc, federally funded job creation policy introduced in April 1977 attempted to place women in part-time social service jobs. The Special Employment Programme (as part of AFG’s 1979 ‘Fifth Change’) developed this approach further. The Special Employment Programme contributed to the sharp increase in female labour force participation between 1979 and 1980. It had such a quick impact because of its ‘greyhound’ - first come first served - mechanism for funding allocation. It was massively oversubscribed on the very first day that applications could be approved (funding was meant to be allocated over a full year). The first day for approval of funding became the last day and the budget was immediately doubled to cover the crisis. Thus, although still weak, the strengthened labour market position of women after about 1970 owes a good deal to labour market policy. (Fünftes Gesetz zur Änderung des Arbeitsförderungsgesetz; on the channelling of women in part time public sector work see Janoski 1990: 146-7; Schmid and Peters 1982 analyze the Special Employment Programme.)

The 1979-80 increase in women’s workforce participation cannot be attributed wholly to the Special Employment Programme. In 1978-9 a general reflation was attempted which influenced manufacturing employment. It increased slightly between 1979 and 1980, a single exception to the general decline pattern. Its impact on government and service employment is harder to discern, both simply continued to grow modestly (on the reflation see Janoski 1994: 80; Esping-Andersen 1990: 185; Dyson 1982: 58 - 59).
The recession of the early 1980s hit the (ambiguous) achievements for women in training policy hard, even before the CDU replaced the SPD in government. In 1981 the BfA issued new guidelines which used women’s family obligations to cast doubt on the commitment to seek work and eligibility for training. Moreover married women would qualify for training only if their husband could not guarantee economic upkeep. In 1982 further changes to the AFG removed some training for women returning to work after having families (Kolinsky 1989/1993: 58). Remarkably the level of female labour force participation broadly was maintained, despite these changes.

After the Wende: the CDU in power

When the CDU took office in 1982 the newly restrictive pattern seemed to be confirmed. Several changes were introduced by 1985 which seem to be aimed at the reconciliation of women’s demands for employment with the Christian democratic vision of family life in the context of a new gender dynamic in party politics. Some changes improved women’s labour market position. For example, women retained their qualification for retraining and special employment programmes for five (rather than three) years after they left employment. Thus, labour market policy partially re-affirmed its support for certain forms of female labour market participation (Frevert 1989: 298 - 299 on the attitude of the incoming CDU government and Kolinsky 1989/1993: 59-60).

Part-time work increased in significance for women. The CDU-led government sought to promote it to increase the flexibility of the economy (at least outside of its core sectors) and particularly to reconcile its traditional views on women’s domestic role with their increased desire to enter the workforce (as political attention on gender increased after ‘Green’ political successes). The new government improved the legal status of part-time work (against the background of earlier union hostility, led by their women’s sections). However, too much concentration on part-time work as an explanation of increased female workforce participation would be mistaken. Between 1983 and 1989 the proportion of working women in part-time employment remained fairly consistent at 30 per cent. Despite government policies to promote it, the
increase in female labour force participation in the late 1980s was not due to part-time work. (See Kolinsky 1989/1993: 60 on the CDU and part time work; Frevert 1989: 271-272, 300; on the hostility of unions towards part time work see Cook 1984: 69; data on part-time work from EUROSTAT, various years.)

4.5 Conclusions: implications for welfare state theory

Modernization and social democratic power resource theories suggest that the welfare state is a key influence on the path of gender relations. Modernization theories suggest that economic development and the evolution of social policy cause large increases in female labour force participation. Power resource theories delve deeper into welfare state form and purposes suggesting that some of its variants can constrain women's labour market participation. German experience provides a test of the relative merits of these two approaches. Modernization theorists would expect Germany to have high levels of female labour force participation, due to comparatively expensive social sector and a relatively strong economy. Power resource theorists expect the 'conservatism' of the German 'welfare state regime' to restrict women's labour force participation.

However, the path of change in women's involvement in the workforce does not fit neatly with these theoretical expectations. The expense of German social policy has not been associated with major increases female labour force participation, confounding modernization expectations. Equally, the pattern of change is hard to accommodate within power resource theory, as it is difficult to explain the changes that have occurred. More fundamentally, while moving in the right direction compared to most welfare state literature, power resource theory does not go far enough to identify the specificity of national forms of social policy. Differentiating usefully between liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes, power resource analysts apply the generic 'welfare state regime' concept to all western capitalist democracies. While the 'welfare state regime's' conceptual scope and limits remain unclear, its analytical usefulness is potentially undermined.
Modernization theorists might want to alter the focus from economic growth and expensive social policy. The character of the German economy is as distinctive as its overall performance. Its manufacturing sector is comparatively strong, in terms of productivity and employment levels. Various explanations of the relative strength of manufacturing in Germany exist. They include factors over which the state has responsibility such as relatively stable monetary environment, often credited to the Bundesbank, and the impact of labour market policy on the skill levels of the core workforce. Other factors such as the long term financial support for industry are more difficult to attribute to state institutions.

Employment in service and government, two sectors which provided most job growth elsewhere, remained low in Germany. The low level of non-manufacturing employment is not simply a corollary of the success of manufacturing, because overall labour force participation levels are low. The privileged character of government employment in Germany may help to explain its limited extent. The weak development of private services may be due to the attitudes of the social partners and finance - concentrating on (providing funding for) manufacturing. State policy to support industry may also be implicated here. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to explain the limited development of government and services. Slow growth of services may be partly due to continued domestic rather than market or state provision, reversing the direction of causation generally asserted.

Even variants of the modernization theory that eschew economism and determinism have difficulty explaining the path of German female labour force participation. Post-war west Germany has the general qualities of modernity. Existing institutional frameworks seem capable of absorbing and modifying external modernizing ideas about gender rather then being disrupted by them. Examples of 'subverted' diffusion include the Allied influence on the initial form of social policy and gender equality and the lessons learnt from Swedish on active labour market policy. Outside influences on German feminism after 1970 also seem to have been incorporated into a distinct 'German' tradition.
Social democratic power resource theories might seem to have a stronger explanation of women's labour force participation in Germany. The conservative, restrictive character of the welfare state regime is reflected in the weak position of women in welfare policy, especially social security. The conservative welfare regime is seems responsible for the weakness of female labour force participation (van Kersbergen 1995: especially 144-147; Esping-Andersen 1990: 27, 201-202, 214), although the mechanisms by which this responsibility operate are insufficiently spelt out, gives the argument a slightly slippery feel.

Power resource analysts mistake correlation for causation. For van Kersbergen (1995: especially at 144) because Christian Democracy is associated with low female labour force participation, the latter is due to the Christian Democratic welfare state regime. Instead weak female labour force participation it might be due to other aspects of Christian Democracy or a prior factor, such as Catholicism might 'cause' both. Simple association does not allow us to attribute pattern of women’s workforce participation to the structure and practice of the welfare state regime.

Power resource theory tends to lead to a false attribution of changes in or characteristics of the political economy to the (welfare) state. For it to explain gender changes it must be possible to 1) attribute them to the state and 2) characterize the state as a welfare state. While narrower than the 'welfare state', social policy likely to play an important part in accounts of change. Although Esping-Andersen carefully argues that no actual regime is wholly consistent (all have attributes of various regime types), nevertheless he tends to attribute an overall coherence to state policy emphasizing the dovetailing of various aspects of a political economy (Esping-Andersen 1990).

The misattribution of social and economic outcomes to public policy is not limited to welfare state analysis. The Bundesbank, is widely credited with controlling inflation in Germany. On closer investigation its 'success' owes something to the structure and success of German industry. In other words, non-statist factors play a crucial role. In turn, low inflation (alongside, for example, long term stable investment
finance) contributes to economic success and thus to the preservation of its particular industrial structure. The analytical distinction between the state and society is important - but so too are the complex and mutually supportive ways in which the two to interlock (it may be difficult to break into the relationship analytically).

The Federal Republic of Germany might not qualify as a welfare state at all. The tough definitional criteria that Esping-Andersen sets are not met. Arguably neither the primary purpose nor main activity of the state is welfare (1990: 18-23; compare Therborn 1989). The Federal Republic may be better characterized as a *Sozialstaat* than a *Wohlfahrtsstaat*. The former concept is entrenched in the Basic Law (Articles 20 paragraph 1 and 28 paragraph 1) while some argue that the latter has a generally negative and patronizing ring (see Zapf 1986: 132; more equivocally Ginsburg 1993: 68; but compare Schmidt 1989: 66-69). The caution of Orloff, Therborn, and Esping-Andersen (compare Orloff 1993; Therborn 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990: 20 with Esping-Andersen 1994: 716) about the claims of states to be welfare states may be appropriate in the German case.

It is debatable whether the main purpose of the *Sozialstaat* - or even social policy - is 'welfare'. If the market is regarded as self-sustaining, then the *Sozialstaat* might be assimilated to the welfare state. Social policy is not an egalitarian or socialist incubus within German capitalism. Within it the ideology and practices of equality and vertical redistribution are weak. Instead, it reflects and (re)produces status divisions associated with employment (blue collar, white collar and higher Civil Service see Schmidt 1989: 66-67; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984; Esping-Andersen 1990). Social policy further strengthens those in a strong labour market position. Women's perilous position in the *Sozialstaat* reflects and reinforces rather than primarily causing their weakness in the labour market (see Schmidt 1993; van Kersbergen 1995 and Esping-Andersen 1990; and Schmidt 1989: 66-67 on labour markets and social policy interaction). This general insight seems to be confirmed historically. Social policy did not establish the post-war return to domesticity. During the 1970s and into the 1980s active labour market partly counteracted a potential decline in women's
labour market position. To the extent that 'the welfare state' is based on ideals of equality, or common social citizenship, it may be inappropriate in the German case.

Even if the German state is 'active' and 'social' state (possibly attributing it with too much coherence) its 'purposes' may be with industrial performance not welfarism (Schmidt and Rose 1985 on the 'active' state; Zapf 1986 on the Sozialstaat; Titmuss 1974 discusses the industrial performance 'welfare' state). In turn, comparatively stabile industrial structure contributed to 'core' male workers' ability to win 'family wages', perhaps reducing pressure on women to work outside the home and prevent a critical mass of women workers emerging which might have sustained a new service sector - a strikingly limited sector in Germany. The state, partly through social policy, indirectly sustained traditional gender roles, for example, through its influence on economic success in manufacturing industries. Social policy and political discourse also directly influenced gender. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to attribute the German gender pattern primarily to social policy, the state, or the welfare state regime. Although difficult to separate from the state's role, non-statist factors, such as religion or industrial success had a more important impact.

The claim that Germany is not a welfare state may logically extend core power resource claims. First the state is always and everywhere deeply engrained in economic and social life, almost to the point of vitiating the analytical distinction between them (Block 1994). Secondly, that the institutional form of the state varies, with important economic and social consequences. The further development of these insights is now hindered, not helped, by an insistence that all developed capitalist democracies are welfare states.
Chapter Five: Women and work in the USA: liberal welfare state regime or liberal feminism and legal rights?
Chart 5.1 USA- Female Labour Force Participation
The main candidate for a single (cluster of) force(s) acting consistently throughout the period is economic – specialization, marketization or economic development. While described by ‘process’ phrases these developments are sometimes attributed to step-changes. A pattern of steady growth is consistent with either incremental or ‘step’
images of change. Becker hypothesises that the character of US female labour supply changed in about 1950, when women's wages passed a particular threshold (1981/1991, although, he also attributes significance to causal forces with varying values - 'variables' such as the economic growth rate compare with Power's 1988: 142 Marxist influenced feminism). If a deep change occurred in women's workforce participation, OECD data suggests 1965 as a turning point, not 1950 unless the change was subject to a fifteen year lag. Women's workforce participation was more than 4 percentage points higher after each half decade between 1965 and 1990, the difference between the level in 1965 and 1960 was only 1.7 points. Moreover, data on women's participation rate shows growth by 3.8 percentage points for the whole decade of the 1950s only slightly higher than that between 1960 and 1965 (Power 1988: 143).¹

Closer study of the data reveals distinct developmental phases between 1960 and 1980 despite its comparative overall consistency. Little attention has yet been paid to the 'path' of development (or periodization) of US female labour market participation. If the period after 1965 differs from that before it, even it is not homogeneous. During each half decade between 1965 and 1990, except one, women's workforce participation grew by between 4.1 and 4.6 percentage points. Between 1975 and 1980 the increase was as high as 6.5 percentage points. The variability of female labour force participation growth might suggest that general forces may not operate in immediately or straightforwardly. Public policy also played an important, and probably more immediate, part. Both welfare and the state (for example in the form of gender equality policies) were important in the development of female labour force participation between 1960 and 1990. However, I do not necessarily accept that 'the welfare state' was responsible for female employment growth.

The US may be distinctive in comparison with other cases. The analysis of aggregate, national level data always disguises what happens at an individual or local level. However, the attempt to make sense of US labour market, political or public

¹ It should be noted that these data also show smaller increases than the OECD data used for the subsequent 25 year period. These differences are to be expected as the first series records working age population, while the second considers all those over 16. However, as the size of the population aged
(especially welfare) policy changes at the national level is particularly problematic. Politics and public policy operate at Federal, State and City levels (producing pressures for divergence) moreover the regional working of the labour market and the sheer size and complexity of the US exacerbates difficulties that are also encountered in other countries. The extent and complexity interaction between public and private sectors of ‘welfare services’ provision generates further difficulties. Taken together these problems beg the question of whether a single US welfare state regime exists.

The US ‘state welfare’ sector is less uniform than other (even federal) states analysed. Practices vary across locations. ‘AFDC ... has very uneven standards of eligibility, coverage, and benefits across states, generally providing the least to poorest and weakest people in the poorest states’. Nevertheless, federal level sets the framework for social policy development, arguably justifying a national ‘macroscopic and historical perspective that highlights political institutions and processes’ (on variation generally see Ginsburg 1992: 99 for a useful statement of this sort; the quote on variability is from Skocpol (with Ikenberry)1995: 137; while the justification for treating the US as a whole is due to Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988: xi). The complexity of welfare service organization also reflects the integral role of commercial and private charitable institutions. Spatial variation in these institutions adds to the difficulties for the identification of a single welfare regime. Their importance raises a question about the role of the state in welfare, further problematizing the application of the welfare state idea to the analysis of US welfare services.

5.2 Periodizing the US case: when did social democracy become impossible?

Unlike much of the literature, I analyze the relationship between welfare and gender over time. Static analyses risk a collapse into anachronism. Periodizations of the relationship between gender and welfare may help to untangle complex causal chains and patterns of interaction (but Abramovitz 1988 does consider change over time).

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over 65 was growing throughout the period, we would expect the 16 plus data to be closer to the that for ages 16-65 during the 1950s than during the 1980s.
Questions about its 'exceptionalism' are the perennials of studies of the US case in comparative perspective. While there are disagreements about the periodization of US social policy development, they are not as intense, nor do they bear as strongly on the present analysis, as similar debates about Sweden. In relation to social policy, the preoccupation is with the 'laggardo' status of the US, its 'failure' to develop a 'European' style 'welfare state', an issue entangled with the issue of the weakness of US socialism. As analysts of European welfare states have come to pay increased attention to non-socialist forces in social policy development, this issue has faded into the background. Concern about the 'stunted' character of the US 'welfare state' remains. Many analysts suggest that a more 'fully developed' welfare system was historically possibility in the US. There is less agreement about the periodization of the passing of this historical opportunity.

For present purposes the key question concerns the post war period, particularly the 1960s. It is tempting to see the Johnson Administration as the key turning point. Moynihan, centrally involved in the 'Great Society', has argued that 'an immense opportunity to institute more or less permanent social changes - a fixed full employment program, a measure of income maintenance - was lost'. Emphasis on the 1960s might suggest that changes in welfare and in women's role in the labour market dovetailed with one another. A number of influential analysts dispute this periodization. They see the social policy initiatives of the Great Society as occurring 'too late' after the possibility for a 'fully developed' welfare state had already vanished (Moynihan 1969: 193; for alternative views see Katzenelson 1989 and Skocpol 1992). While these alternative views do not necessarily mean that changes in welfare in the 1960s did not influence gender roles, they problematize the conceptualization of these changes in 'welfare statist' terms.

Katzenelson argues that the opportunity for welfare policy supportive of labour movement, cross-race politics was lost in the 1940s rather than the 1960s. Less convinced of the centrality of class, Skocpol focuses instead on the creativity of administrators, but also on non-socialist collective actors - the Grand Army of the Republic and a network of women's organizations. While acknowledging that after
the Great Depression the US would take ‘new paths’ associated with the New Deal, she seems to suggest that the possibility for a ‘fully developed’ welfare state - of a distinctive ‘maternalist’ type - disappeared in the 1920s (Skocpol 1992: 526 and generally 525-539; Katznelsn 1989).

Welfare policy and government social spending has experience several phases since 1960. Coverage was extended and expenditure grew from the 1960s until the mid 1970s, followed by stagnation and retrenchment, during the 1980s. Although there is disagreement about its precise timing, welfare policy transformation and expenditure expansion, it is usually dated from the early or mid 1960s, contemporaneous with acceleration of female labour force participation growth. Standard texts on welfare describe a politically ‘unsung’ revolution in welfare dating from 1965 (Patterson 1994: 157-198 dates the ‘revolution’ between 1965 and 1973, for DiNitto 1991: 24-26 the key dates are 1965 to 1975).

Turning to women’s workforce participation, two distinct, although interconnected, dynamics help to define its development between 1960 and 1989. One was associated with welfare, which played a role throughout the period, but was particularly important in the 1960s and early 1970s. Although some change occurred outside social welfare during the 1960s, from the early 1970s movement of women into corporate America became increasingly important. This became the main source of new female employment when welfare expansion initially weakened and was later attacked. The movement of women into corporate America was strongly influenced by equal employment and affirmative action policies.

The intersection of these two dynamics produces a number of periods. Welfare employment grew rapidly, although not wholly consistently up to the early 1970s. It continued a gradual, if no longer dramatic, growth throughout the rest of the 1970s. During the Reagan years, it stagnated, despite growth in some private sector welfare services. Female private and corporate sector employment did not grow strongly during the 1960s, but began to take off in the early 1970s. By the 1980s substantial opportunities existed for (some) women in the corporate sector, which appear
unmatched in other countries. Unfortunately, many available sources do not organize data in these periods. Rein's (1985) particularly useful data are presented from 1962 and 1982, although he sometimes presents data for 1972. Nevertheless, these data, in combination with data from the OECD, corroborate my argument.

Temporal coincidence does not demonstrate that female employment expansion occurred within welfare. Other arguments and pieces of evidence suggest that it did. Many suggest that welfare was a strong - even the primary - influence on women's entry into the workforce (Ginsburg 1992; Eisenstein 1984; Abramovitz 1988; Piven 1985; Rein 1985; Erie and Rein 1988; Steinberg 1988). While there is a good deal of truth in these arguments, they are often presented in misleading forms. They overplay the extent to which the US can be characterised as a welfare state, in particular by overemphasising the role of government employment in the transformation of the position of women. As a corollary, they also underestimate the part played by non-welfare private sector employment, particularly after the early 1970s.

Even in the US social welfare industries played an important role in female employment growth. While direct government (particularly federal) employment was relatively unimportant throughout the period (representing 3 per cent of human services employment) government has had significant indirect consequences. Federal social spending has an important impact on local and state government welfare and, albeit often mediated by other levels of government, on private (profit and non-profit) welfare services (Rein has demonstrated that social welfare industries were important in women's employment growth; see especially Rein 1985; Erie and Rein 1988: 179, show the limited importance of direct government employment the figure of 3 per cent seems to refer to 1980; on the indirect impact of government see Erie and Rein 1988: 178-181 and Rein 1985: 43).

Comparative analysis reinforces the impression that state's impact on (women's) welfare employment was less direct and significant than elsewhere. The most striking comparison is with Sweden where the public sector became increasing important in social welfare between 1964 and 1983; 81 per cent of women in welfare services were
public sector employees by the mid 1980s. The US trend was towards greater private sector involvement, with only 46 per cent of women employed in social welfare industries in the public sector (Rein 1985: 43). While we have evidence that the expansion of ‘welfare’ played an important part in the development of female labour force participation, the relationship between the developments will be addressed by means of an analytic periodization of state regulation, welfare and female employment expansion. Welfare did provide an important impetus to women’s employment, particularly during the 1960s. However, the political conjuncture out of which welfare expansion emerged also precipitated a feminism movement and pressure for the extension of women’s legal (especially employment) rights, on the model of the civil rights movement. Together these factors seem to have contributed to some women gradually gaining greater access to corporate sector employment after 1970.

5.3 The initial phase: social policy and the path of women’s employment in the 1960s and early 70s

Between 1962 and 1972 female employment grew by 35 per cent, 47 per cent which occurred in (public and private) social welfare industries. Growth in social welfare employment was not as important as that in other sectors (data from Rein 1985: 161 - Table 10). Female employment in non-social welfare (except in agriculture and household services) grew roughly proportionately to the overall growth in female employment. The proportion of employed women working in social welfare grew by seven per cent, slightly less than the fall in agriculture and household services. Female employment increased more rapidly between 1962 and 1972 than between 1972 and 1982 only in goods production and social welfare. In 1962 and 1972 roughly one in five employed women worked in goods production. (Data from Rein 1985: 157 - Table 6 and 153 - Table 3.)

During the mid 1960s female employment in welfare grew largely as an unintended consequence of the ‘unsung’ welfare revolution. This point is controversial - scholars debate whether welfare provision primarily regulates the poor or gender. Legislators were conscious of gender issues - the Equal Pay Amendment (1963) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964) were passed in the early 1960s. They were products of
the political conjuncture which produced welfare expansion. They might be regarded as different facets of the transformation of the US ‘welfare state’ or ‘regime’ (see Patterson 1994 and DiNitto 1991 on the ‘unsung revolution’; Gordon 1988 and Piven and Cloward 1988 take opposite sides in the gender and welfare debate).

However, these laws were not passed to ameliorate the position of women (although the stories told about laws are not wholly consistent compare Steinberg 1988: 189-190; Flammang 1987: 290 and Meehan 1985: 62-63 with Greenberger 1980:122 and Freeman 1987: 220). It seems that the legislation was not strongly grounded in a coherent supportive feminist coalition, nor was it implemented consistently. Welfare expansion contributed significantly to female employment growth during the 1960s, but that growth was not intended. If female employment growth was intended it was not consistently quick - for a number of years (1968, 1970, 1971) female labour force participation grew rather slowly. For the five years from 1967 to 1971 (or 1969 -72) the growth in women’s workforce participation was under four percentage points. The equality legislation was largely dormant until new political phase which began in the late 1960s. Processes of politicization - particularly of women - ‘activated’ the legislation. This politicization may have resulted partly when middle class women welfare workers interacted with poor female welfare clients (see, particularly Piven 1985; Piven and Cloward 1988, but also Erie and Rein 1988).

5.4 Continuity and change: slowdown and stagnation in welfare and the growth of female employment in the private sector

Changes in law, opportunities and consciousness occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s. They appear to have influenced gender patterns in general and welfare employment. I will look first at the overall trajectory of welfare employment as well as the gender pattern within it. From the early 1970s the growth rate of welfare provision began to slow alongside a partial feminization of welfare employment. Women’s private sector employment opportunities seem to have increased as well, in ‘junk’ and executive employment, a growth which strengthened in the 1980s. Neither of these developments was due to ‘welfare statism’ per se - the development of liberal
feminism and equality of opportunity was influential especially in legal ‘equality’ rights.

Changes in women’s welfare employment in the 1970s and 80s

Apparently paradoxically the most rapid growth of female labour force participation occurred as the rapid expansion of welfare - one of its putative main causes - began to slow. Although other factors sustained female labour force participation growth, changes in social welfare employment also help to resolve the apparent paradox. Although overall social welfare employment grew more quickly from 1962 to 1972, the proportion taken by women grew more rapidly between 1972 and 1983. Male social welfare employment change was 77.5 per cent of female between 1962 and 1972, but only 52.7 per cent between 1972 and 1982 despite, the inclusion in the data of the early Reagan years during which welfare employment was cut, particularly for women. This pattern is slightly at odds with images of gender equality in employment promoted by the legal changes of the early 1970s (data from Rein 1985 153 -Table 3; see Eisenstein 1984 and Brackman, Eire and Rein 1988 on how cutbacks impacted upon women.)

Reagan’s welfare retrenchment introduced the final phase women’s social welfare employment development. In the early 1980s women’s labour force participation grew more slowly than it had done since the 1960s, partly as a result of Reagan’s cuts, which hit women particularly hard, and offset continued growth elsewhere. Female federal employees, were laid off ‘at rate 150 percent higher than men’, because the concentration of women employed in social agencies which were hardest hit, ‘veteran’s preference’ and ‘seniority’ which tended to protect men. State and local government felt the most significant impact as did private sector employment, where it depended on federal funding. (Abramovitz 1988: 377 and Eisenstein 1984: 117-118 both mention the rate; Erie and Rein 1988: 186-87 specify the mechanisms).

Viewed over time, welfare work has been an important area for women’s employment, but comparative analysis casts this experience in a different light. The (public and private) social welfare employment contribution to US female
employment growth has been comparatively small. From the early 1960s to the early
1980s only 38 per cent of US female employment growth was in welfare industries,
compared to 64 per cent in Britain and over 90 per cent in Sweden. Government’s
role in social welfare is smaller (and less direct) in the US than elsewhere; as is social
welfare’s contribution to the labour market, particularly for women (data from Rein
1985: 46 and 161 Table 10 - the Swedish figures are inconsistent - 92 per cent in the
text and 91 per cent in the Table).

Women in private sector employment
If welfare work contributed to female employment growth for women between 1960
and 1989, the gradual opening up of corporate America to women during the 1970s
(Gilbert-Shaffer 1980) helped to transform women’s labour market position. Many
analyses of welfare and women’s employment explicitly disparage the ‘much-touted
move of women into corporate America’ (Brackman, Erie and Rein 1988: 217)
arguing that ‘private industry does not have a good record of hiring professional ...
women’ (Eisenstein 1984: 118). Judged over time and comparatively these
assessments seem too harsh.

Over time, the assessment that private sector employment was of little significance for
women during the 1970s and 80s is not convincing. Evidence from the mid to late
1980s, after the main Reagan retrenchment taken effect, suggests that female labour
force participation continued to grow. Earlier evidence also suggests that non-welfare
private sector employment increased in importance over time. Women’s welfare
work expansion was much faster during the 1960s than the 1970s. The proportion of
working women employed in goods production fell away quite sharply between 1972
and 1983, having held its own during the 1960s. The proportion of employed women
working in consumer and social welfare services remained roughly the same in 1972
and 1983 (about a quarter and just under three tenths), while the proportion increased
most sharply (from 13 to 17 per cent) in business services (Rein 1985: 157 - Table 6).

In comparative perspective the US labour market looks remarkably dynamic.
Elsewhere employment has declined (as in Germany), or the increase has been
strongly dominated by public employment. Although US women are under-represented in managerial and professional employment, that under-representation is less severe - and has declined more rapidly - than elsewhere. In some countries women’s under-representation actually worsened (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 209 compares the US, Sweden and Germany).

The early 1970s seem to have been the turning point in private non-welfare employment as both women’s consciousness and the legal framework for female employment changed. Legal changes occurred in the interpretation and implementation of equal opportunities. They resulted from executive actions and judicial decisions. Congress passed over 70 laws concerning the women’s movement during the 1970s (Steinberg 1988: 190; see also Katzenstein 1987 on the relationship between changes in women’s consciousness and public policy).

Many of these changes concerned pay equality or ‘comparable worth’. This issue bubbled up through various localities to surface on the national political agenda in the late 1970s. As Carter’s Administration took office, Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Chair of the EEOC, placed the issue at the centre of the Commission’s priorities. Considerable opposition developed from business groups. However, Reagan did not target it until 1984. At this stage, the issue became entangled with bureaucratic politics and inter-agency competition (Steinberg 1988: 198-205). While comparable worth policies helped to attract women into the workforce, they did not increase the availability of work for women, for which we must turn to other policies. Two legal changes were particularly important for women in the corporate labour market. The Supreme Court decision of 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. endorsed a results-oriented interpretation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s sex discrimination provisions. It focused attention on the discriminatory consequences - not intentions - of an employers actions (Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 277-278). Secondly, the scope of the Executive Order 11246 was increased. The Executive Order was issued by President Johnson in 1964 and prohibited discriminatory employers from holding federal contracts. It was amended to include sex discrimination by Executive Order 11375 in 1968. So as to improve the policy’s overall effectiveness, from 4 December 1971 the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance insisted that all businesses holding government contracts have a written affirmative action plan. These plans should include objectives for increasing the representation of women in all job categories in which they were underrepresented and timetables for meeting these objectives (Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 277-278 and 309; see also Steinberg 1988: 190; and Greenberger 1980: 118-119 on Executive Orders 11246 and 11375).

These legal changes precluded some changes in corporate practices - for example AT&T undertook a high profile Affirmative Action project, which culminated in a multi-million dollar consent agreement, signed by the company, the EEOC and the Department of Labor, and subject to court supervision. This ‘active’ equal opportunities policy cost an estimated $60 million plus over five years. The attention AT&T attracted helped to put Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Action on the agenda of large corporations (Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 278).

Government agencies tended to target large corporations, because they had larger numbers of employees, greater symbolic significance and the capacity to implement the policy through employee training and personnel departments (on these issues see Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 279, 286-93). Similar policies also had a significant impact in education and especially recruitment of students in higher education, with an obvious impact on the qualifications of labour market entrants. Some smaller employers were exempt from equal opportunity laws.

The Reagan Administration targeted Affirmative Action more quickly than it did equal pay. A direct attempt to weaken contract compliance rules in 1981 met with strong opposition and was abandoned. Nevertheless, general retrenchment reduced the effectiveness of the Office of Contract Compliance. The Justice Department, which had previously helped to expand the scope of equal opportunities policies, began to attack it on grounds of reverse discrimination against white men (Steinberg 1988: 152 - 154, especially 153). The impact of the Reagan Administration serves to highlight sectoral differences in changes in the gendering of the US labour market. The corporate labour market had changed with women’s presence in senior
managerial and professional positions increasing. By the early or mid 1980s this change appears to be largely self-sustaining although equal opportunities, particularly in education continued to contribute to it. By contrast, women’s access to skilled craft employment (tenuous even during the late 1970s) was heavily hit. The prospects for young working class women were restricted to the rapidly expanding ‘junk job’ sector. Women found work in two increasingly differentiated labour markets, with few bridges between them (Power 1988: 153-154 - firms ‘may be willing to accept women with advanced degrees from respectable business schools without the ‘whip’ of affirmative action’; see also Esping-Andersen 1990).

Changes in the pattern of both welfare and corporate employment during the 1970s seem to have had a common source, the political and legal changes which date from the early 1970s, suggesting that increases in the supply of jobs for women and women for jobs were both important. These changes were influenced by government policy and the judiciary, which were themselves pressured by organised feminists. Later, however, increasing opportunities for exit from welfare to corporate work may have weakened the commitment of middle class women to state support for welfare provision.

5.5 Conclusions: the implications for welfare state theory

A number of distinct, mutually incompatible and unconvincing interpretations exist of the relationship between welfare and female employment expansion. Esping-Andersen has asserted that US post-industrial employment pattern is a product of ‘unfettered’ markets (1990: 215, see also 201, 202). Others are committed to the argument that from ‘the 1950s to the 1970s the expansion of employment in the welfare state was ‘the single most important impetus behind the greater economic mobility of women and minorities” (Ginsburg 1992: 111, (mis)citing Eisenstein 1984: 118, in turn citing Carnoy and Shearer 1981: 464). Some theorists bundle market and state together in one overall modernization process, although many modernization theorists imply that economic forces were fundamental. All these positions use flawed conceptions of the welfare state and produce distorted views of broader social, economic and political developments.
Economic 'modernization' theory explains changes in gender roles primarily in terms of the incentives which women face (Becker 1981/1991). Becker detects a threshold change in the US economy in 1950, after which women’s employment grew steadily. Such an account oversimplifies the story considerably. Rather than one general process, patterns of women’s employment were influenced by several distinct, if interconnected, dynamics. In one sense we should not expect a general theory to deal with the detail of a particular case. However, the generality of Becker’s approach may be questioned - it is clearly rooted in the US case.

One aspect of this modernization approach requires further attention. Becker’s treatment of politics is somewhat unclear. Generally he views political processes as broadly efficient (Becker 1983; 1985; see Dunleavy 1991: 25-26 for discussion). On the other hand, he disparages the impact of feminist politics, claiming that the women’s movement was ‘a response to other forces’ rather than an ‘independent force’ (Becker 1981: 251). The story told here of the women’s path into paid employment in the US certainly shows that both ‘politics’ in general and feminism in particular were influential.

The non-modernization literature is sophisticated and rooted in daunting quantities of empirical evidence (Rein 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, good evidence and valid points are often constructed into unconvincing arguments around misconceptions of the welfare state. Difficulties exist more in the implications drawn from direct and explicit claims rather than the claims themselves. Problems arise in the conflation and confounding of, and slippages between, distinct positions on, or conceptions of, the welfare state.

Esping-Andersen’s claims that US post-industrial employment patterns are ‘market-powered’ or produced by ‘unfettered’ markets (1990: 225, 215) rest uneasily with his general account. His overall analysis commits him prima facia to the view that they were produced by the welfare state, albeit in the attenuated form of the ‘liberal welfare state regime’. As if aware of this difficulty, Esping-Andersen himself makes an
explicit, although rather unconvincing (and unconvinced?), attempt to reconcile these positions. ‘A welfare-state-based explanation would appear at odds the American market-powered trajectory, yet many of its peculiarities are directly associated with welfare-state residualism’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 225). While I quibble with little in either part of this sentence, as a whole it is problematic. Esping-Andersen’s rather guarded discussion (as shown in the use of the phrase ‘directly associated’ in the place of ‘explained ... ’ or ‘caused by’ in the second part of the sentence) implies that the ‘welfare state’ can be deployed as a causal force, even when it fails to develop.

The argument that the business enterprise filled the need left by the weak development of state welfare has a functionalist and teleological tone (although one mitigated by emphasis on the ‘tax-expenditure side of the American welfare state’ 1990: 225). Europe’s welfare state employees and some US managers and workers in business services do not just fulfil the same needs - those employed in business services in the US appear as welfare state employees manqué. The contingent, but path shaping, processes by which business services emerged are left uninvestigated. Instead their development is ‘explained’ by the non-development of the welfare state, which is presented as a ‘welfare-state-based’ explanation. The implication is that the welfare state is a kind of telos - towards which progress is made even despite appearances.

Esping-Andersen’s comments on the ‘unique interplay of private and public in the American system’ are based in an important dimension of US politics and society and hint at more adequate explanations (1990: 225). The difficulty is that Esping-Andersen does not take this interplay sufficiently seriously. If it is ‘unique’ then it should not be understood as a failed - or even underdeveloped - welfare state. Moreover, if the ‘privateness of the market is to ‘seriously question[ed]’ due to the unique US private-public interplay (Esping-Andersen 1990: 215; 225) what is left of ‘unfettered’ markets powering post-industrial employment development?

Esping-Andersen explicitly discusses the ‘fettering’ of (labour) market; that is, its political, legal and social construction (see 1990: 4; 225-226). He draws attention to
the encouragement of ‘the market adhere to such lofty ideals’ of equal opportunities and notes the effectiveness of the ‘Equal Opportunity type of approach’ in promoting female employment (1990: 226). However, explicitly justifying this position, he attributes these policies to the ‘peculiar American welfare state’ rather than, say, to a ‘liberal’ traditional of individual rights based on public interest litigation and progressive regulation, rather than redistributive welfarism (on which see Lowi 1964 and Majone 1996).

By contrast, Esping-Andersen does not discuss conventional ‘core’ of US welfare policy, such as AFDC. These policies may have influenced welfare clients/claimants and welfare employees. The first of these influences may not represent a major deviation from the ‘unfettered’ market due to the low levels of benefits and gaps in the welfare system. However, if welfare ‘regulates’ the labour market, the US looks less like a case of ‘unfettered’ market development. ‘Regulation’ might involve the rise and fall of programmes in reaction to fluctuations in the labour market and the patterns of political protest (see Piven and Cloward 1971; 1977).

Welfare employment might also be relevant - immediately after noting Rein’s (1985) documentation of ‘singular importance of welfare services as an avenue of female employment-entry’ cross-nationally, Esping-Andersen suggests that in ‘line with Rein’s findings’ government’s role was ‘at best, modest’ in the US. While the substance of both these statements may be true, Esping-Andersen elides two distinct notions - of welfare services and ‘government’s role’ - to derive the unwarranted conclusion that in the US ‘women’s employment is largely produced in the market’ (1990: 201).

Esping-Andersen’s general analysis is rooted in a contention that markets are politically constructed and bounded - in principle he is sceptical about the notion of the ‘unfettered’ market (see, for example, the discussion of markets as political constructions - 1990: 4). In the US case he has not taken the logic of his analysis far enough. If an unfettered market cannot exist (which may be why he puts scare quotes around ‘unfettered’), it is difficult to sustain the argument that state welfare
necessarily ‘drains’ economic performance. Equally, however, there is no reason to assume that all ‘fetters’ on markets are due to the welfare state, even if a variety of distinct welfare state regimes are identified.

Esping-Andersen allows a number of mutually inconsistent concepts to motivate different parts of his analysis, while seeming to unite them in a single notion ‘welfare state regime’. This gives the impression that the ‘welfare state regime’ notion can explain the US case. On close investigation this impression turns out to be superficial and the coherence of Esping-Andersen’s earlier welfare state concept (1990: 18-23) is itself compromised by stretching it to cover this range of phenomena, as we shall see in chapter eight.

An overall reading of Esping-Andersen’s account conveys the impression that welfare is not a significant cause of women’s employment in the US. Most other analyses of the relationship between female employment and welfare in the US misconceive the nature of the ‘welfare state’ in a different way, and therefore overstate its role in the development of female labour force participation. Ginsburg opens his analysis of the US by dismissing the claim that it ‘might not be considered to be a welfare state at all’ on the grounds that ‘there is no question that the US has a welfare state’. Thus he clearly elides the state form notion of the welfare state with the idea that it is a sector of state activity (Ginsburg 1992: 98 - emphasis added). He overplays the role of government as a direct employer, by inaccurately associating welfare with the state (and the state with welfare). Ginsburg argues that from ‘the 1950s to the 1970s the expansion of employment in the welfare state was ‘the single most important impetus behind the greater economic mobility of women and minorities’” (1992: 111). Although welfare employment was important, this claim is misleading.

First, welfare employment may not be can be properly understood as a single influence. Nor is it obvious what would count as other single influences for comparative purposes (is ‘non-welfare employment’ a ‘single impetus’?). Secondly, the association of this ‘single’ impetus with (welfare) state employment is contestable. It depends on defining ‘the welfare state’ to include private sector welfare industries -
by the mid 1980s the majority of women employed in social welfare industries in the US were private sector employees (Rein 1985: 43). The inclusion of these industries within the welfare state might be justified to the extent that they depend upon government finance or were regulated by the state - but such a justification would have to be developed explicitly (as Piven 1985 begins to do).

Ginsburg’s argument relies on a quotation from Eisenstein (1984: 118, itself citing Carnoy and Shearer 1981). Eisenstein actually makes a subtly but significantly different point (the tone of the surrounding text helps to account for the mistake). The argument is that ‘increased public spending’ after 1950 increased the ‘economic mobility of women and minorities’ (Eisenstein 1984: 118) not that welfare state employment causes female employment growth. This claim is consistent with Erie and Rein’s (1988) evidence that direct government welfare employment had some impact, but the indirect influence of (particularly federal) government on women’s employment in welfare industries at state and local levels and in the private sector was more important.

Several influential analysts of US politics and public policy have developed sophisticated arguments about the interaction of government, welfare and gender. Despite its sophistication these arguments are marred by a flaw similar to that in Ginsburg’s analysis (Eisenstein 1984; Erie and Rein 1988; Brackman, Erie and Rein 1988; Piven 1985; Steinberg 1988; Flammang 1987; Abramovitz 1988; Gordon 1988). The claim is that ‘the gender of state power’ has changed somewhat. If this argument is to hold water the US must qualify as a welfare state.

The changing ‘gender of state power’ analysis integrates political and economic aspects of welfare and women’s employment. The expansion of welfare brought middle class women employment and poor women ‘benefits’. It provided these two groups of women with a common interest in welfare, and brought them together in such a way as to create (the potential for) a cross-class gender political alliance, which - in turn - serves to protect welfare provision. Welfare employment also helped to put women into government jobs, which placed them in positions of state power. Further,
the 'public' experience given to women provides potential launching pads for political careers.

A story of this sort could be constructed around an analysis of women's labour market position, particularly in social welfare industries. Even as late as the 'Reagan revolution' employed middle class women were likely to work in welfare and these welfare workers were likely to be in the public sector. Nearly two thirds of women in 'middle class' - professional, administrative and technical - employment worked in social welfare (Erie and Rein 1988: 183 - Table 8.3; Brackman, Erie and Rein 1988: 217) as did almost 59 per cent of college educated women workers in the early 1980s (Rein 1985: 168 - table 17). Within the welfare sector 'better-educated women are much more likely to be found in the public sector, while it is the less-educated women who are crowded into the profit and non-profit sectors of social welfare' (Rein 1985: 43). Middle class women - who play a key role as potential political leaders are concentrated in the most 'welfare statish' labour market sectors.

However, these analyses are marred by overemphasising government employment, government contribution to welfare employment and even welfare employment itself. Taking the last two issues first we have seen that, the overall contribution of social welfare employment, whether in the public or private sectors was comparatively small in the US. Viewed comparatively, then, government played a small role in female employment growth. We have seen that three per cent of human services employees worked for the federal government in the early 1980s. Government employment accounted for 20 per cent of female employment growth from the early 1960s to the mid 1980s (149 per cent in Germany and 106 in Sweden). By the mid 1980s the proportion of employed women working in government was less than 18 per cent in the US, nearly 20 per cent in Germany and over 55 per cent in Sweden (human services employment data from Erie and Rein 1988: 179; see Esping-Andersen 1990: 202 on government employment growth).

Several analysts emphasize actual contact between women of various classes (Piven 1985; Gordon 1988). Its significance is not stated explicitly, but cross-class contact is
seen as significant in subjective consciousness of ‘objective’ common interests. However, in the 1980s only 3.3 per cent of women worked in services which would provide regular contact (higher than that the German, but lower than in Britain - 4.2 per cent - and much lower than in Sweden - 15.1 per cent - Rein 1985: 155-158 tables 4 - 7). Outside Sweden, these levels do not seem high enough for common consciousness development - either the consciousness developed for other reasons, or it did not emerge in the ways analysts anticipated.

The emphasis on government and welfare employment misjudges the role of other sectors for women’s employment. Sometimes analysts argue explicitly that corporate sector employment has been overrated. We have seen arguments that the ‘much-touted move of women into corporate America’ (Brackman, Erie and Rein 1988: 217) has not really occurred and that ‘private industry does not have a good record of hiring professional ... women’ (Eisenstein 1984: 118). As already noted, this portrayal not accurate. Equal opportunities and affirmative action policies helped women into the corporate labour market. Many analysts attribute or assimilate these policies to the US welfare state (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Eisenstein 1984: 114 - 138). One justification for this position is that welfare, civil rights and gender rights all emerged from the same political period in the 1960s and early 70s, as a product of intersecting social and political movements.

Equal opportunity and affirmative action are probably better conceptualized in ‘Regulatory State’ rather than a ‘Welfare State’ terms. They rely on individualist liberal conceptions of rights rather than welfare statist notions of social rights. The development of these liberal rights may disclose tensions within the overall set of rights when extended to women and emphasize the complexity and inevitability of politics and government even within a market oriented individualist system. On the other hand, my argument may overstate the coherence of welfare state theory, and underplay the importance of liberal rights within the ‘welfare state’.

Many analyses which posit a close relationship between social welfare and women’s employment contain a grain of truth, particularly when made prospectively (see
especially Piven 1985 and Erie and Rein 1988). Overall, however, if government and welfare employment provides the conditions for a gendered political coalition, these conditions are less propitious in the US than elsewhere, especially if actual contact between female welfare state employees and clients is required. Finally, exit options exist to other forms of employment, particularly for middle class women. If the existence of these options reduces the likelihood of loyalty to the welfare state and voice within it, they are likely to be exhibited less in the US than elsewhere.
Chapter Six: The Netherlands: a limited and late feminization of the labour market in a generous, transfer based welfare regime
6.1 Social Policy and the path of women’s participation in the workforce

Since 1945 Dutch female labour force participation has been low and social policy strikingly sexist. Elite consociation characterized politics and society was divided into ‘pillars’. None of these characteristics has remained wholly unchanged since the war. State welfare provision and the ‘pillars’ have changed dramatically. State welfare policy had laggard status until the 1960s, when it began to develop rapidly. By the early 1970s Holland had one of the most generous, expensive, ‘regimes’ in the world - the only non-Scandinavian regime classified as ‘socialist’ by Esping-Andersen (1990). Similarly, the restrictive - conservative - Dutch social ‘pillars’ appeared to break down remarkably rapidly. By 1970 the Netherlands had become known for liberality and tolerance exemplified by a thriving, internationally known ‘alternative’ culture (on the distinctiveness of the Dutch welfare regime see Cox 1993; Flora 1986; Therborn 1989a; Wilensky 1975 and van Kersbergen 1995 - the definition of the pillars is due to van Kersbergen: 43). Even the path of female workforce participation changed after the 1960s, from the stagnation of the early post-war period to modest growth, while remaining comparatively low. The rate remained under 30 per cent until 1974. During the previous fourteen years it had grown from about 25 per cent. Thereafter the growth rate increased, with female labour force participation topping 35 per cent in 1980, and 40 per cent in 1983. Nevertheless, even at the end of the 1980s the rate remained one of the lowest in Europe.
Chart 6.1 The Netherlands - Female Labour Force Participation

Chart 6.2 Smooth of female labour force participation

It is important to note that the 'jump' in the data in the late 1980s was largely a consequence of a redefinition of the series by the Dutch government, rather than a sudden increase in the rate of female labour force participation. These OECD data remain the best - most 'comparable' - comparative data series to which I have access.
During the early post-war years Dutch state welfare was very limited, although the state underwrote various voluntary welfare organizations. As a consequence (state) social policy could not have had a major direct impact on women’s workforce participation. Nevertheless, social policy indirectly influenced women’s position in Dutch society. It was centrally implicated in the development and sustenance of the ‘pillars’. Indirectly, then, social provision contributed to the maintenance of social values and structures which restricted women’s workforce role.

Two apparently dramatic changes occurred between the late 1950s and the early 1970s. The Dutch ‘welfare state’ moved from bottom to top of the international ‘league table’ and Dutch society was subject to a ‘silent revolution’ of ‘depillarization’ (see inter alia Cox 1993; van Kersbergen 1995; Therborn 1989a). Although these processes were interconnected, their precise relationship - particularly the direction of causality - is much less clear partly due to the widely used but flawed concept of ‘pillarization’. The need for a critical analysis and partial reconstruction of the ‘pillarization’ concept means that the question of periodization will be given considerable attention. Analysis of the ‘concept pillarization’ paves the way for a more convincing periodization of ‘depillarization’ and the explosive growth of social policy focusing on complex causal chains linking the two.
I argue that social policy development played a key part in the 'collapse' of the pillars. In turn, social changes labelled 'depillarization' weakened traditional gender roles. Thus - indirectly - social policy helped to cause the change from stagnation to modest growth in female labour force participation after 1974. However, rapid growth and high levels of female paid work are not automatically produced by high levels of expenditure and wide population coverage in social policy. Although the weakening of the 'pillars' opened space for women to join the workforce, the level of female labour force participation remained comparatively low throughout the 1970s and 80s. Moreover, Dutch social policy's direct impact on women's incentives to work was restrictive, at least until the mid-to-late 1980s.

6.2 Periodizing the Dutch case: the question of 'Pillarization'

An adequate account of the (somewhat unusual) development of Dutch social policy is necessary before its relationship with women's role in the workforce can be analyzed. Although detailed analysis suggests (perhaps inevitably) that the causal chains of social policy development are complex, it remains important to take a view on the direction in which they tend to operate. Conventional 'sociology of politics' (Sartori 1969) accounts suggest that social change precipitated new policy patterns. The standard account of Dutch politics points to a paradoxical relationship between deep social division and elite accommodation (see particularly Lijphart 1975; 1977). The emphasis on elite autonomy in 'consociational' theory might seem incompatible with a 'sociology of politics' position. However, Lijphart's work was intended to modify and extend 'sociological' pluralism, rather than repudiating it (1975: 2 and generally 1-15, 181-195). He tends to treat the 'pillars' as driven by social dynamics - paying little attention to the potential feedback effects of elite consociation on the mass pillars (compare with Scholten 1980 and 1987a and Wassenberg 1982).

Analysis of social policy suggests that it may have helped to trigger social transformation in the character of society (see especially Cox 1993, while neither Therborn 1989a nor van Kersbergen 1995 develop this sort of argument, both could be read as taking issue with the convention analysis). Important though these accounts are, their potential is partially undermined by ambiguities in the concept of

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'pillarization'. In order to provide an adequate periodization of the path of 1) social policy development and 2) the position of women in the labour market, the twin concepts of ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ require analysis.

Existing analyses tend to organize post-war Dutch experience into two periods. Together with a number of ‘modernizing’ social tendencies, the development of state social policy occurred relatively late in the Netherlands. Once initiated the Dutch ‘welfare state’ grew rapidly, to very high levels. There is difficulty in dating precisely when the first period of weak welfare development ended and period of rapid growth began. When the issue of women’s labour market position is introduced, this picture clouds further. Although the 1960s mark something of a turning point, by international comparison both the levels and rate of change in women’s workforce participation seem relatively low. The position of women in the labour market suggests, first that there are important limits to the liberalization associated with ‘depillarization’ and second, as noted above, a ‘large’ welfare state is not automatically associated with high levels of female labour force participation.

The ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ concepts distort analysis of social policy and women’s role in the workforce in several interconnected ways. The precise scope of the pillars is rarely identified adequately. A general presumption exists that the pillars are basically a form of social organization. However the extent to which political factors should be included within the pillars is unclear. This ambiguity is particularly problematic when the ‘pillars’ are deployed as explanatory variables, and makes it difficult to deal with policy feedback effects. Questions of structure and process are generally conflated in discussion of the ‘pillars’. The terms ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ suggest that each is a monolithic process, whereas historical analysis suggests that tendencies towards ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ coexist in Dutch society for significant periods of time.

The Scope of the Pillars
The scope of the pillars is unclear. Primarily they refer to the structure of Dutch society, depicted as ‘highly integrated yet segregated’ (van Kersbergen 1995: 43)
social worlds based on religion and class. The social worlds organized 'the entire existence of an individual from nursery school via sporting club, trade union, university, hospital, broadcasting and television corporation, to the burial society' (Kossman 1978: 304, cited in van Kersbergen 1995: 255; see also Scholten 1980, Wassenberg 1982 and Lijphart 1975 - Lijphart uses the term 'bloc' in place of 'pillar' here). A 'member of an organization for one purpose can only legitimately choose an organization for another purpose within the same pillar' (Therborn 1989a: 202). The pillars seem to shape individuals within 'social worlds'.

This description of the scope of the pillars includes no reference to political parties. How far Dutch political organization falls within the pillars remains unclear. We might expect that the encompassing social worlds of the pillars would 'shape' politics as well as individual social outlooks. The 'pillars' are sometimes depicted as shaping the party system. More problematically, the elite politics of coalitions, cabinets and 'corporate' institutions in and around the state are sometimes included 'within' the pillars, albeit in an inconsistent and fitful manner. Lack of clarity on this issue is compounded by an apparently paradoxical relationship between social segmentation and elite consociation.

Ambiguity over their scope reveals deeper flaws in the way the pillars have been conceived. If the primary definition of the pillars is 'social', then the presumption is that social take priority over political causes. Attention tends to be distracted away from policy feedback effects. Secondly, the social characteristics of the pillars often appear as essential, static features of Dutch society. Such a depiction of the pillars as social structure is ill equipped to explain change. Elite political factors are sometimes presented as core elements of the pillars in order to account for change - especially 'depillarization'. However, to use elite politics in this way it needs some autonomy from its 'social base' creating ambiguity over whether aspects of (elite) political decision-making ought to be included within the scope of the pillars.
The conflation of structure and process

The ambiguous treatment of the scope of the pillars is linked to a confounding of structure and process. Analysts rarely discuss the 'pillars' or the 'pillar structure' or 'organization' of society. The language of process is used to describe structure or organization. For example, van Kersbergen writes of 'highly integrated yet segregated sub-cultural organisation named pillarisation' (1995: 43, emphasis added) and authors also speak of 'pillarized' organizations. While this usage sometimes gives the appearance of accounting for change, it may not result in a sufficient challenge to the underlying conception of social structure as natural and immobile. It generally results in a static representation of processes.

The slippage between structure and process allows authors to hold an apparently rich, but basically contradictory position. On the one hand the pillars are primarily presented as the structure or essential nature of Dutch society. There is a sense of permanence about them. They are sometimes even reified - given an existence above and beyond the elements which constitute them. Instead, the slippage between structure and process in analysis of the pillars effectively occludes agency, while superficially dispensing with the need for such a consideration. The use of the language of process gives the (misleading) impression that analysts have dealt adequately with the issue of change, particularly the breakdown of the pillars (or 'depillarization'). As well as giving a spurious sense of agency to the structure it validates occasional and ad hoc inclusion of non-structural elements in the core of the pillars (keeping in mind the relevant structures are primarily presented as 'social'). 'Pillarization' itself comes to be seen as a cause (attributing agency to a process), a consequence and an overall description. Already complex and tangled causal chains become further obscured. Taken together with the ambiguity over the scope of the pillars this slippage results in a structuralist tendency in much work on Dutch politics.

An alternative focus on decision-making raises issues of the role of social and political agents pursuing strategies to (re)create of the (social worlds of the) pillars, that the image of elite accommodation associated with consociationalism fails to capture. Important moves towards such an approach have been made. In its most
striking version, this analysis emphasizes the political construction of the pillars as a means of social control. Particular attention is paid to religious (especially Catholic) forces attempting to limit the impact of socialism (Scholten 1980; see also Scholten 1987a; Wassenberg 1982; Cox 1993). While this analysis improves on earlier formulations, it nonetheless treats pillarization monolithically, imputing it with undue success. Greater emphasis on policy in the construction, maintenance and erosion of the pillars would push the argument further. Despite the widespread use of a language of process, the ambiguous conception of the pillars has inhibited analysts from understanding the pillars processually. A wholeheartedly diachronic analysis of the pillars - as processes rather than structures - might be fruitful. Indeed some of the better accounts, particularly those concerned with social policy, contain elements of this sort. They touch on social policy feedback into politics and social organization as well as the political sociology of social policy creation.

The co-existence of tendencies towards ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’

The terms ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ might be used helpfully to denote general processes, which require explanation. Their use tends to imply that a single basic process is occurring. However, tendencies towards ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ have coexisted in Dutch society for significant periods of time. Even during periods generally characterized by pillarization, depillarizing counter tendencies existed (and vice-versa). Questions concerning which tendency dominated at a particular moment and whether a period in which pillarization dominated gave way to an episode of decisive depillarization are essentially matters for empirical analysis. In a developed approach of this kind the pillars would be understood as social and political projects which need continual (re)creation. Consideration would be given to agents in social institutions, rather than oscillating between attributing agency to social structures and solely to political elites.

‘Pillarization’, ‘depillarization’ and the path of social policy development
A more steadfastly processual view of pillarization allows the paradoxical quality of the relationship between patterns of social organization and elite accommodation to be analysed more precisely. The conventional interpretation of Dutch politics suggests that elite accommodation was required if strong social segmentation was to be politically sustainable. Otherwise pillared ‘vertical pluralism’ might have broke up the Dutch state. Closer investigation reveals that consociationalism has coexisted with significant conflict, even within governing coalitions (see Therborn 1989a: 215 and Cox 1993: 49, 221 for illustrations of this point in a welfare policy context). Arguably, however, the social vitality of the pillars also resulted from political threats to their integrity and autonomy. If the pillars ceased to be politically controversial their raison d’etre partly dissipated. Pillarization processes may require both accommodation - consociationalism - and conflict. The pillared/consociational form of society and polity might run continual risks of self-destruction and be sustained only as a (series of) temporary settlements.

There is a widespread assertion that pillarization ‘shaped social policy and institutions in characteristic ways’ (Therborn 1989a: 207). However, as welfare was shaped by the pillars, struggles over welfare were part of pillarization processes, animating, strengthening and (re)producing the traditional values and social divisions of the pillars. The institutionalization and comparatively lengthy endurance of segmented welfare provided by societal organizations (albeit often in partnership with the state) was integral to pillarization. The role of social welfare in shaping the pillars is reflected in the fact that the socio-political usage of the word ‘pillar’ appeared first in a social welfare context in the 1930s (Therborn 1989a: 207 contends that the origin of the term demonstrates that the pillars shaped social policy, I suggest the opposite).

The switch from ‘pillarization’ to ‘depillarization’ is particularly difficult to explain in conventional terms. It also raises issues about the relationship between the breakdown of the pillars and social policy, the periodization of social policy development and women’s labour market position. The key issue is whether depillarization caused changes in social policy, as the conventional wisdom seems to suggest, although some social policy specialists partly disagree. While some accounts
do provide rich material for a critique of conventional conceptions, confusion over ‘pillarization’ continues to weaken their analyses. Cox’s (1993) otherwise fruitful analysis of the ‘anomalous’ Dutch case in the context of comparative welfare state theory exemplifies the difficulties which arise from the pillarization notion.

Cox is clear on the empirical issues involved. His argument is based on the observation that most major structural alterations to welfare policy occurred before wide ranging changes in the social bases of politics, at least as they are conventionally dated. Early on he suggests two ways of squaring this circle: ‘either the changes observed and identified in the 1970s were already well under way much earlier, at the beginning of the 1960s, or the politics that surrounded development actually brought on these later changes’ (Cox 1993: 53). In the end, he fails to make a clear choice between them.

Cox identifies four important interconnected factors: changes ‘elite thinking’, alterations in corporatist relations, the development of welfare policy and changes in patterns of social organization and mobilization. The ‘flawed’ conventional argument is that changes in the social bases of politics undermined corporatist patterns of policymaking, which opened the possibility of rapid expansion of welfare. Instead he argues that changes in elite ideas (eventually) resulted in the alteration welfare policy, which in turn helped to cause social change. However, he is inconsistent about which of these facets of Dutch society fall within the scope of the pillars.

Cox follows conventional definitions of pillarization, concentrating on the organization of society. This concept ‘refers to a social organization based on vertical and functional separation of social groups, or vertical pluralism’. If it is primarily understood as ‘social’, pillarization can then have ‘political effects’ expected to be ‘especially evident in the party system’ (Cox 1993: 60). In some places, however, Cox expands his definition of ‘pillarization’ to include corporatist patterns of decision-making and ‘elite thinking’ about politics and policy. In consecutive paragraphs Cox moves between inconsistent definitions of the scope of the pillars and dates ‘depillarization’ from markedly different points in time. First, he criticizes the
conventional view that social change alters the (corporatist) pattern of policymaking, in turn producing new welfare policy developments. Criticizing this view he states that ‘the breakdown in pillarization began ‘in ... 1967’, placing it after key changes in welfare policy. He distinguishes pillarization from increased parliamentary assertiveness and the alteration of corporatism (Cox 1993: 213).

When tracing welfare changes to new ideas developed by exiled elites during the Second World War, Cox alters his image of ‘pillarization’ and view of the timing of its breakdown. ‘In contrast to the claims of the many scholars in the 1970s who asserted that a silent revolution had caused a change in Dutch politics’ he argues that ‘the breakdown of pillarization began much earlier’. It is somewhat unclear what it is earlier than - presumably the date of 1967 and either the ‘silent social revolution’ or the ‘change in Dutch politics’ or both (1993: 213). In order to shift the date back in time, Cox also increases the scope of his conception of ‘pillarization’ including new thinking by exiled elites within it. The ‘breakdown of pillarization’ may have begun during the second world war (Cox 1993: 213-214).

Cox’s emphasis on ‘new thinking’ and the impact of policy on politics is refreshing, but ambiguous. Cox seems to suggest that policy can remake politics (welfare development contributed to widespread social change - ‘depillarization’ in the social sense Cox 1993: 58-59). However, although the ‘desire for change was expressed by an elite’ before the ‘upsurge of discontent in society’, Cox’s account suggests first that ‘dramatic political change’ in the form of ‘a grass-roots upsurge of discontent in society’ allowed welfare reformers ‘to push through dramatic [welfare] reforms’. Secondly both elite ideas and grassroots discontent are aspects of ‘the breakdown of pillarization’ which comes to be presented as a ‘cause’ of welfare policy development. The relationship between society, politics and policy remains muddled (Cox 1993: 213-214).

Reconceptualization of the pillars and of pillarization shows that they are social and political constructs. The early post-war period can be seen as a period of conflict over the existence of the pillars, won by those wishing to strengthen the pillars (especially
Catholics) with paradoxical results. ‘Victory’ itself reduced the significance of the pillars, making them more difficult to sustain, both in terms of popular sentiment and by allowing greater scope for elite consideration of existing welfare reform ideas. Newly confident Catholic groups began to build institutions which eventually undercut some sources of Catholic autonomy.

6.3 The initial phases: from the second world war to the 1960s

The level of female labour force participation was remarkably low in reflecting the strength of the pillars. The conceptual problems with the notion of ‘pillarization’ have relatively little impact on the analysis of the relationship between social policy and gender at this stage. The pillars did impose a powerful social discipline in the Netherlands, which had the effect of limiting social change. There are specific reasons why it was particularly restrictive of female participation in paid employment. The confessional pillars (particularly the Catholics) held strong traditional views on the place of women. While confessional forces were powerful within society, women occupied traditional roles. Within the Catholic pillar (although, perhaps somewhat uncharacteristically also within Protestantism) a sceptical pre-capitalist attitude prevailed towards the (labour) market (Therborn 1989a: 234). This tradition strongly valued social participation. Welfare provided by organizations within the pillars staffed by (often female) volunteers illustrates this point. The strength of the pillars in social policy contributed to, and was partly predicated on, the weakness of female mobilization in the paid workforce. (The Dutch birth rate was comparatively high in the immediate post-war period, which probably contributed to low female labour force participation (Therborn 1989a: 209). In the short term the birth rate would entail a relatively heavy domestic burden likely to be carried by mothers, which would militate against paid work outside the home.)

So far the account of the low level of female labour force participation is compatible with conventional interpretations of the pillars. Even during the immediate post-war period, however, the politics of social policy bolstered the pillars rather than just being shaped by them. Despite not being as radical as is often assumed, social democratic proposals for the development of state welfare during this period did
threaten the autonomy of the religious (especially Catholic) pillars. The resistance of confessional political and socio-economic agents did not simply block social policy development and (re)shape or perpetuate it in traditional, segmented, largely voluntary, form, although they did achieve all this (Cox 1993: 130-131) at least in the short term. The generation of political controversy around the pillars made them appear valuable and thus probably contributed to their social strength.

The creation of the Ministry of Social Work in 1952 illustrates this point. It is sometimes described as part of a ‘foundational political compromise’ on social policy which van Kersbergen characteristically states ‘mirrored the ‘pillarised’ organisation of society’ (1995: 129). However, more than it was a ‘compromise’ it represented a Catholic/confessional victory over the original social democratic plans. Associated with this compromise state social policy institutions were reconfigured. The new Ministry of Social Work restricted the scope of the Ministry of Social Affairs which had been controlled by the Social Democrats in the Red-Roman coalitions and provided the base for attempted Social Democratic social policy innovation. The new Ministry came under Catholic party control and took responsibility for social services. It underscored the responsibility of voluntary organizations within the pillars (Cox 1993: 129; van Kersbergen 1995: 93). The creation of the Ministry of Social Work had the effect of invigorating the ‘social policy’ within the Catholic pillar. The effects of this invigoration were equivocal, if not paradoxical for Catholicism and the pillars.

The weakness of state welfare development in the first decade after the war was not directly responsible for low levels of female labour force participation, although some women participated in the largely unpaid voluntary welfare provision. Instead, the weak development of state welfare and low female labour force participation were due to the strength of the pillars and the way they bolstered traditional values. Debates over social policy may have strengthened the pillars and, indirectly promoted traditional values and gender roles.

6.4 Continuity and Change: 1970s and 80s
In the mid 1970s the female labour force participation growth rate increased. This change is best regarded as a product of the breakdown of the pillars. Dutch society was becoming increasingly secular and the decline in the ‘social discipline’ capacity the pillars allowed traditional gender roles to change. Social policy was indirectly implicated as one element contributing to the breakdown of the pillars. However, the direct impact of state social policy was to inhibit women’s workforce participation. Although it grew more rapidly during the 1970s, female labour market participation remained comparatively low. Social policy contributed to this low level in several ways. Dutch social policy was remarkably sexist, providing few incentives for women to work. Its transfer-bias resulted in comparatively little direct state welfare employment. The timing of state welfare development meant it became closely associated with and facilitated labour shedding. This occurred at precisely the time when women were increasingly entering paid work. More speculatively, the use of transfer-oriented state welfare as an avenue out of work may have precluded the development of more active labour market policies. The state seems to have locked-in to a passive form.

The breakdown of the pillars I: change in female labour force participation

In comparative terms the change female labour force participation in the mid 1970s is less striking than its failure to occur earlier. However, from having been a notably traditional society, Holland became famous for its officially socially tolerated ‘counter-culture’. From having been a welfare laggard, it had become a welfare leader. The (modest) change in female labour force participation occurred late compared to these changes, indicating that it occurred only after society had been thoroughly shaken-up. Secularization was particularly striking. The proportion of Catholics attending Mass fell from 71 per cent in 1961 to 33 percent in 1975. Confessional voting declined - the Catholic party fell from 31.9 per cent of the vote in 1963 to 26.5 in 1967 and merely 17.7 per cent in 1972. By 1972 only 38 per cent of Catholics voted for ‘their’ party (Therborn 1989a: 210). These changes were central to ‘depillarization’.

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However, if the breakdown of the pillars is to be used as an explanation of the change in women’s workforce participation, it must be remembered that the breakdown was itself a complex interweaving of processes, in which social policy played an important role. The concept of ‘depillarization’ misrepresents these processes, at least as it is usually used. The social policy literature rightly rejects that policy change was caused by depillarization (see Therborn 1989a; Cox 1993; van Kersbergen 1995), although, as we have seen, it is insufficiently critical of the depillarization concept. For the most part this view is rejected because the major social policy reforms before breakdown of the pillars.

A more fundamental objection exists. Developments in Dutch policy and society since the early 1950s, particularly within the key Catholic pillar, often show mutually reinforcing interactions between political and social demands, institutional developments and welfare reform. A generous transfer-based state welfare system emerged from these interactions and began to erode the social, and religious, substance of the pillars, and their capacity to exert social discipline. Social policy development was intimately involved in the breakdown of the pillars, not simply its cause or consequence. Factors which explain the breakdown of the pillars are indirect causes of female labour force participation change. Women’s workforce participation seems not to have contributed to ‘depillarization’ - its treatment as a consequence of ‘depillarization’ seems justified.

Erosive social policy change partly began within the Catholic pillar - we have noted that the creation of the Ministry of Social Work had paradoxical consequences. It has been described as the moment at which the Dutch (party) politics came to be inscribed with a comparatively unusually sexist character. The sexism of the Catholic and other confessional parties, is usually taken for granted. The main claim that Dutch politics is comparative sexist concerns Social Democracy. It is characterised as ‘patriarchically sexist’ (Therborn 1989a: 216) - committed to the ‘traditional family’ as ‘the ‘cornerstone’ of society’ (van Kersbergen 1995: 93). While it may be valid, the assertion that Dutch politics is particularly sexist often lacking in detail or are confused.
Van Kersbergen presents the most detailed account of how sexism 'came to dominate Dutch politics'. It is profoundly equivocal. He asserts that a fundamental agreement on gender already existed between Catholic and social democratic forces, but he also suggests that it occurred as a consequence of a Catholic victory (van Kersbergen 1995: 93). Again the formation of the Ministry of Social Work is key. Various elements with which we are concerned were brought together: social policy, elite politics, the pillars, and gender. Van Kersbergen has two points to make; the first relates to a victory of Christian over social democracy the second to evolving notions of gender.

The key analysis begins with a statement that Catholic and social democratic forces were already committed to a common notion of gender - embedded in 'the traditional family'. He goes on to analyse the creation of the Ministry of Social Work as Catholic victory over social democracy. Finally he suggests that this victory meant that the 'predominance of a traditional ideology in the role of the family as a fundamental constituent of society came to dominate Dutch politics' (1995: 93, emphasis added). The implication that this was a new consequence of (the institutionalisation of) Catholic political success is strengthened because of its impact on the 'traditional patriarchal structure of Dutch society' where the 'existing' structure is described as merely 'reinforced' (1995: 93 emphasis added).

This analysis reflects confusion about the relationship between the pillars and elite consociation. If political elites are basically regarded as emanations of the 'social' pillars they would reflect the sexism present within the pillars. But van Kersbergen implies that Social Democrats initially had some autonomy from their social 'base'. He then suggests that sexism became dominant in Dutch political - including among Social Democrats as a consequence of a clear Christian Democratic victory (van Kersbergen 1995: 93) and example of neither elite accommodation nor- seemingly - social determinism.
Therborn asserts unambiguously that sexism in Dutch politics originated in confessional parties and subsequently ‘spread to Dutch Social Democracy as well’ (1989: 216), but does not explain the spread of the ‘infection’. This account of the spread of sexism is not inconsistent with consociational elite accommodation, although it would still inherit the tensions and ambiguities inherent within the notion of pillarization and its relation to the politics of consociation. How elite accommodations feed back into the social structures or organizations of the pillars remains particularly problematic.

A ‘pillarization’ analysis of the creation of the Ministry of Social Work risks distracting attention from agency. Detailed accounts of the ‘moment’ of Catholic victory are likely to be filled with agents activities. Nevertheless, if the episode is then described as a manifestation of a monolithic process, its subsequent impact (sometimes with unintended or even paradoxical consequences) may be downplayed. The Catholic Ministry of Social Work ‘victory’ altered the context for later action particularly by invigorating social policy actors within the Catholic pillar, with paradoxical consequences. Several Catholic universities developed degree courses in social work. Their graduates gradually displaced traditional volunteers and altered the character of Catholic social policy and its cohesive capacity within the pillar. A ‘professional’ ethos (setting and meeting standards) replaced the ‘emissaries of a religious community’ role (Cox 1993: 139). Moreover, they concentrated on service delivery so increasing referred those needing income assistance to municipal agencies. Eventually welfare professionals became advocates of welfare reform and increasing the state’s role.

Professionalization of welfare provision cannot be wholly explained by the increased self-confidence of Catholic social policy actors. However, the ‘victory’ gave Catholic Universities confidence that the ‘pillars’ strength within social policy could be consolidated. Their attempt to do so was externally influenced. They looked to ‘models’ of social work professionalization provided by the Social Work curricula of US and UK Universities (Cox 1993: 138-139), suggesting non-deterministic
‘diffusionist’ theory might be useful. Many existing versions of this perspective place insufficient emphasis on the internal preconditions of such external influences.

There is also evidence of generational change within Catholic politics during the 1950s, with youthful radical party factions emerging into positions of some power. They advocated closer relations with Social Democrats, sometimes even moving from Catholic to Social Democratic organizations. By the mid 1950s the issue had provoked sharp conflict (particularly after a bishop’s 1954 mandate which forbade Catholics to listening to ‘social’ radio broadcasts see Cox 1993: 135). The existence of these factions indicates that social change was occurring. Moreover, such generational change might be regarded as a carrier of modernization.

In addition to maintaining the Red-Roman coalition, the new problem emerged of appeasing left factions within Catholicism. Increasingly welfare reform became an area in which legislative progress was possible, albeit on the basis of delicate negotiation. It became the common glue binding the coalition and the Catholic party itself (Cox 1993: 136; van Kersbergen 1995: 132). The last ‘Red-Roman’ coalition was negotiated in this atmosphere in 1956. Although the Catholics retained control of the Ministry of Social Work, the negotiations’ success depended on the replacement of the traditionalist Their, by the reformist Klompé, as Minister (Cox 1993: 136-137).

Once welfare reform began in earnest (with pensions in 1957) it seems to have contributed to declining pillar cohesiveness (and disciplinary capacity). If the state - not the pillar - provided social benefits, individual incentives to maintain the pillars declined - particularly as the new state system was very generous -as the Catholics insisted in the face of social democratic concern about potential costs. The acceptance of the state involvement social provision, revealed a latent expansionary potential within Catholicism (see Therborn 1989a: 212-213). The importance of providing benefits at levels adequate to support families, the idea that social provision should allow individuals to maintain their previous social status and an emphasis on moral rather than economic incentives to ensure that families provided for themselves all
had expansive implications. In principle the earlier system had been financially open ended - limited only by its voluntary nature and discipline within the pillars.

Welfare reform was a precondition for the expansion of social spending. Reform may have contributed to an erosion of the social discipline associated with the pillars, itself causing some expansion. However, it was the interaction of new welfare provisions with other social and economic changes that resulted in dramatic social expenditure growth. The gradual weakening and eventual abandonment in 1964 of wage restraint policy was key. These changes led to a wage boom which caused employment rationalization in labour intensive industries (van Kersbergen 1995: 132) The social acceptability of rationalization depended on the new generosity of welfare which together caused costs to escalate rapidly. These changes began to occur in the 1960s alongside the erosion of religious observance and shortly before change began in female labour force participation.

The change in wage restraint policy itself requires some explanation. It suggests the public was increasingly demanding from the late 1950s onwards, which itself amounts to societal change and suggests that further such change was occurring (van Kersbergen 1995: 132). As with state welfare expansion, the breakdown of the wage restraint system is partly a story of social democratic resolve broken by Catholic populism. This 'populism' indicates that elite attitudes to social pressure had changes. It is usually explained as being a product of electoral competition (Cox 1993: 135; van Kersbergen 1995: 133) which implies that electors are not pre-committed to their 'pillar' party.

Overall, 'depillarization' is a complex tendential process (or set of interacting processes) which require explanation. It appeared as sudden set of social changes - a 'cultural landslide' in which the 'hard crust' of the pillars broke up and 'the religious grip of the population loosened dramatically' (Therbom 1989a: 210). Changes in female labour force participation occurred after the completion of this complex change. Some evidence of changing employment opportunities for women emerged from detailed analysis of 'depillarization', while being partly disguised by the concept
itself. For example, replacement of charitable volunteers by professional social workers provided women with new paid employment opportunities. Generally, however, changes in women's labour market participation seem to have resulted from not contributed to the breakdown of the pillars.

The breakdown of the pillars II: continuity in female labour force participation

Even after 1974 the participation of Dutch women in the workforce remained comparatively low. Social policy helped to restrict it in two main ways. First, the form of social policy restricted the incentives for women to work and presented comparatively few employment opportunities for women. Secondly, growth in female labour force participation needs to be placed in the context of general Dutch labour market conditions, which were influenced by social policy. The reforms of the 1950s and 60s facilitated dis-employment. More speculatively, the passivity of social policy may have prevented active labour market policy from emerging (van Kersbergen suggests that a connection exists 1995: 132, albeit assuming that such policies have a social - rather than Christian - democratic character). These factors may reflect the relative passivity of political leadership in consociational polities. The form of welfare provision may have reinforced the Dutch state's bias towards passivity.

Although social policy changes indirectly contributed to female labour force participation growth the new forms of social policy also constrained that growth. Moreover the generosity of the new system did not necessarily make it a 'social democratic welfare regime' nor did it take the 'social service' form of Swedish social policy. Dutch social democracy contributed to the re-orientation of Catholicism towards state welfare, but social policy is essentially transfer-based, reflecting Christian democratic priorities.

State welfare reflected and reinforced Christian democratic priorities on the family and gender roles as well. Indeed, as we have seen, these values had come to dominate social democracy as well. The pension legislation of 1957 reveals the profoundly
sexist character of Dutch social policy. The legislation, which was introduced by a social democrat, was clearly based on a breadwinner model of the family. It gave married women no independent right to a pension, whether or not they had been employed. Instead, married men received a larger pension than single people. The policy was only changed in 1985 under pressure from the EEC (Sainsbury 1991: 86; van Kersbergen 1995: 131; Therborn 1989a: 216).

Other aspects of Dutch social policy were structured similarly. Married women were largely excluded from the extended unemployment benefits introduced in 1965. The main form of unemployment insurance provided benefits for only a 26 week period. 1965 legislation gave rights to benefits above basic assistance level for a two year period. Unless a women was the family breadwinner, she was ineligible for this benefit. Only in 1987 was this legislation changed (Sainsbury 1993: 83). The exclusion of married women from a number of benefits would not, of course, directly bar women from participating in the labour force. Such exclusions limit the incentives to work (married women do not qualify these additional benefits). Housewives were sometimes explicitly covered by pension and disability programmes, although women could not directly or individually claim some of them. A family could qualify them on the basis of the housewife’s eligibility (Cox 1993: 166).

Generally low levels of employment provided the context for low female labour force participation levels. Male labour force participation shrank while female participation grew. Dutch politics had long been characterised by some ambivalence towards formal employment (Therborn 1989a: 234). Even during the 1960s and certainly in the 1970s it became a low employment state (Therborn 1986; 1989a). The combination of the ending of wage restraint with welfare reform led to the shedding of employment in labour intensive industries and provoking rapid social policy cost increases. Initially, it seems that politicians did not intend to use social policy in this way. Subsequently, however, social policy appears to have been part of a dis-employment strategy. The role of disability programmes is particularly striking. They grew dramatically during the late 1960s and 1970s (by more than 100,000
beneficiaries in 1975-6). Employers used them to shed workers after the oil crisis. Other benefits, including special assistance programmes for artists (which helped to fund Dutch counter-culture), kept some young people off the job market. In this context, low female labour force participation levels are unsurprising (see Therborn 1989a: 234 on dis-employment strategies and 232 on growth in numbers of disability claimants; Cox 1993: 154, and 166-167 on artists benefits).

Gradually social policy and dis-employment became locked together, with welfare policy used to reduce labour force participation. The commitment of politicians and resources to this approach meant that alternative, more active uses of social and labour market policy, such as those followed in Sweden and Germany featured little on the political agenda. The form taken by Dutch social policy seems to have reflected and reinforced the passive nature of the Dutch state. Elite consociationalism contributed to immobilism in political decision-making (see Therborn 1986: 153-155 and 1989).

The expansion of Dutch social policy did not provide large numbers of welfare jobs, a source of employment for women in some other states. This does not make the state responsible for low levels of female labour force participation, unless that Dutch social policy could have taken another, more service-oriented, form. The acceptability of this sort of argument depends upon the identification of a point in history at which it an alternative path might have been taken (Elster 1978; 1983). It is not clear that such a point can be identified. More modestly, the transfer from of state welfare can help to account for differences between the Netherlands and other countries.

6.5 Conclusions: implications for welfare state theory

Overall, social policy was intimately involved in the processes by which the ‘hard crust’ of the Dutch pillars broke down. The breakdown of the pillars was the main prerequisite for an increase in the rate of female labour force participation. Social policy had an important but indirect impact on changes in the pattern of female labour force participation. More strikingly, however, these changes took place late and left female labour force participation at a comparatively low level. Despite dramatic and
rapid social change, gender roles in employment seem to have changed little and slowly in Holland. Social policy features in the explanation of this phenomenon in two ways. First, Dutch social policy is strikingly sexist, even in international comparison. As such it has not provided incentives for women to work. Secondly, rather than promoting work, as the social policies of some other states have done, Dutch state welfare has become a tool for restricting and rationing employment. In addition, the scale of Dutch social policy has meant that it used up resources which might otherwise have been devoted to other projects. It seems to have reflected and bolstered a general passivity in the Dutch state. Finally, the transfer rather than service orientation of Dutch social policy is associated with low levels of public employment.

Dutch social policy is implicated in restricting, not promoting female labour force participation. An extremely generous and expensive pattern of social policy emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s. The Netherlands is the only non-Scandinavian country which Esping-Andersen classified as a socialist welfare state regime (1990). In terms of its role in 'dis-employment' and the image of the family and the role of women inscribed within it Dutch social policy seems rather 'conservative'.

Dutch experience contradicts important aspects of 'modernization' theory. Despite being a relatively wealthy Northern European nation, the Netherlands was a welfare laggard long into the post-war period. It then experienced a rapid growth of its 'welfare state', unaccompanied by particularly rapid economic growth. Moreover, although female labour force participation seems to have grown after the 'welfare explosion' it remained at a low level compared to most other wealthy countries. Social change in the Netherlands seems to have been significantly triggered by policy innovation, rather than the other way round. Those modernization theorists who grant a significant autonomy to ideas (perhaps emphasising non-deterministic variants of policy diffusion arguments) might draw most comfort from the Dutch experience. Ideas from outside the Netherlands, from the UK, Germany and especially the USA do seem to have had a particularly important influence on Dutch social institutions and policy making.
Social democratic or power resources approaches do not seem to fare particularly well either. First, the Dutch developed a wide-ranging and expensive welfare state despite having comparatively weak Social Democratic party. Secondly, classifying the Netherlands as a 'socialist' welfare state regime is problematic given when the striking differences in the labour market position of women in Holland and Scandinavian and the contrast between transfer and service oriented systems.

However, the overall explanatory approach favoured by power resource analysts finds some support. First, patterns of partisan politics played an important role in the development of Dutch social policy - 'politics mattered' both structurally and in terms of political agency. Secondly, the precise character of the welfare regime seems to make a difference, perhaps even more than proponents of 'power resource' theory suggest. The approach is essentially concerned with the feedback effects of social provision on politics - which may be sensitive to variations in institutional form (notwithstanding attempts to suggest the contrary see Pierson 1994: 28-29, compare with the more conciliatory comments made from a similar US institutionalist perspective by Skocpol and Amenta 1986: 151). These effects appear to play a major role in the shaping of women's role in the Dutch workforce. Clearly, the Dutch case raises issues for both modernization and social democratic theories.
Part Two: Theoretical analyses
Chapter Seven: Women, Welfare and Modernization Theory
7.1 An outline of the argument

The empirical evidence presented above tends to undermine ‘one path’ views of change in women’s participation in the formal, paid workforce. Emphasis on diverse national trajectories mirrors, and may reinforce, the conclusions of comparative political economists who emphasize several distinctive state-society configurations in the provision of welfare. In the light of these findings the theoretical underpinnings for the expectation of ‘one path’ change need to be considered particularly carefully. In this chapter, I consider the most important cluster of such analyses - theories of ‘modernization’.

For the purposes of this analysis I treat ‘modernization’ inclusively, in two ways. First, the ‘logic of industrialism’ approach is included within the broad family of ‘modernization’ theory (pace Hage, Hanneman and Gargan 1989; Flora and Alber 1981 and see the discussion in Pierson 1991: 32). These analyses form the standard version of modernization theory and take a generally sociological form. These theories are open to a number of well known theoretical critiques (Barry 1970 is particularly biting on sociological theories of politics). Two seem particularly pertinent here. First, sociological theories of modernization tend to be oriented to the analysis of system stability rather than change. They analyze change in comparative static terms. Secondly, they emphasize social complexity - the ‘multidimensionality’ of society - although they also resolve this complexity into a (functional) unity. The emphasis on complexity can give these accounts a rather descriptive quality. In addition to these difficulties, I show that these accounts do not analyze the relationship between ‘the family’ and ‘modern society’ adequately. The logic of their analyses leaves little room for the family.

The second dimension of inclusiveness is more controversial. I argue that putatively rational-choice or economic analysis of gender relations associated with the ‘Chicago School’ is a ‘modernization’ theory. The ‘Chicago School’ is sharply critical of sociological method. Its members make sweeping claims for micro-economic analysis. Although others have discerned an underlying functionalism in ‘Chicago School’ analyses (Field 1981; Field 1984; Elster 1985; Gordon 1984) my argument
the ‘Chicago School’ analysis of households and families can be treated as a
modernization theory is a novel contribution.

The treatment of the ‘Chicago School’ gender analysis as a modernization theory sets
up a critique of its conceptual foundations. Underlying the logic of the ‘Chicago
School’ analysis is a distinctive notion of specialization. Individuals become
increasingly specialized through the life long acquisition of ‘human capital’, which
increases general well being by increasing efficiency and facilitating gains from trade.
These patterns of specialization and human capital development amount to an
analysis/description of ‘marketization’. Despite its claimed basis in sound
microfoundations and deductive logic, the ‘Chicago’ analysis is grounded on casual
empiricism which qualifies its underlying logic. Simple observation of households
(and families) leads to an assumption that market and household sectors of activity
exist, each with sector specific human capital in which individuals can specialize.
Once identified, this sectoral analysis (an ad hoc restriction of specialization)
contrasts with the fastidious and logically consistent absence of the ‘sectoral’
categories (manufacturing, service and so on) in ‘Chicago’ analysis. Both
economic/rational-choice and standard sociological, modernization theories fail to
account for the existence of households/families, or acknowledge that they represent a
restriction to the general logic of ‘modern’ society.

Conventional sociological modernization theory and the ‘Chicago School’ share an
underlying optimism about the transition from ‘traditional’ family forms and gender
roles that is odd that no major new right rational choice analysis of changes in gender
roles exists. Indeed, the fundamentalist religious and populist US new right is
ambivalent about modernity, criticizing large corporations (particularly in cultural
and entertainment industries) almost as roundly as government agencies. Modernity
is viewed as pathological, compared to pre-modern or early modern ‘family
capitalism’.

Although ‘modernization’ theory appears to fit poorly with the empirical evidence
presented in earlier some valuable insights may be retrieved from it. First, the social
democratic theories analyzed in the next chapter go further to acknowledge the
variety of welfare state forms, or *regimes*, which may help to account for variations in female labour force participation. However, these theories tend to exaggerate the role of the welfare *state* in changes in female labour force participation. Although modernization accounts do not locate the welfare state precisely enough in the broader processes with which they are concerned (industrialization, extension of the market, urbanization, democratization and so on), they do contextualize it.

Secondly, modernization theory might help to explain differences in welfare provision between advanced industrial and other societies. In the case of welfare development, it may be that common patterns of modernization, and particularly of economic development, provide the necessary conditions for the emergence of welfare policies, but do not dictate the form they take (see Pierson 1991: 16 - 21 for an argument of this sort). State welfare policy development might be a general tendency, variable in form as well as extensiveness. Unless modernity *is* the final destination of social and political development the implications of variation in the form of state welfare for divergent changes after modernity remain important.

Just as some analysts argue that a widespread expansion in the role of government in welfare provision occurred between 1920 and 1975 (dates which correspond roughly to Pierson’s cross-national periodization of welfare state development, see 1991: 115-132; 1998: 111-128 and Alber 1988), changes in women’s roles are often understood as a general tendency in advanced industrial societies. The view that changes in gender roles are a general tendency in advanced industrial societies may be grounded partly on a lack of awareness of the variability in the position of women but it may also have more defensible roots. Particular configurations of welfare, and indeed broader state-economy configurations, may constrain, block or basically alter the general tendency in various ways, while others might channel it in diverse directions. It is worth emphasizing that my empirical focus is only on one aspect of women’s position. Some of the states which show little change in women’s labour market position show considerable change in other dimensions of gender relations. Despite little change in women’s participation in paid work, the female presence in the German legislature was transformed during the 1980s, largely under pressure from the Greens. Even if relatively little endogenous pressure for change has existed
within a particular state, exogenous pressure and lesson-drawing (increasingly discussed under such headings as 'globalization', 'internationalization', 'regulatory competition' and 'policy transfer') make it unlikely that any state will remain wholly untouched by change in gender roles.

If cross-border diffusion processes are to be given a significant role, the changeability of ideas as they move should be emphasized (see Boyer 1997). This is likely to be true whether the ideas concern state policies or social roles. Thus the addition of insights from diffusion models to modernization theory to account for some cross-national diversity within it, perhaps moving it in the direction of a recent debate about 'models of capitalism' (Albert 1993; Crouch and Streeck 1997). This would represent a significant modification of the theory begging questions about how far the concepts of modernization and modernity should be stretched.

7.2 Scope and evolution of the modernization theory and its application to welfare state development

The purpose of this section is to assess modernization theories of welfare state development. Modernization theory can encompass the analysis of all states and societies. Identifying which parts are relevant to the present analysis is relatively difficult, a difficulty compounded by two arguments I make here. First, some work has been inappropriately included under the banner of 'modernization theory of the welfare state'. Secondly, much 'Chicago School' work should be included within the scope of modernization theory (there are striking parallels between these accounts and the standard sociological theory of modernization). This treatment of the 'Chicago School' is based on work which is not mainly concerned with the (welfare) state, instead focusing primarily on gender roles - the family and the household (Becker 1981; 1991). Nevertheless, this 'rational-choice' or 'economic' analysis does consider the (welfare) state. It is also located within a 'Chicago School' analysis of regulation and the state, which shares some of these features.

Putting the welfare state in its place?

Modernization theorists do not overplay the role of 'the welfare state'. The theory goes some way towards contextualizing the welfare state within other social and
economic processes. Thus the orientation of 'all institutions ... in terms of social welfare aims' and the potential transformation of 'the 'welfare state' into 'welfare society' are subjected analysis (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 147), as is the impact of 'the welfare state' on 'real welfare' (Wilensky 1975). This contextualization could act as a corrective to the tendency, noted in the country studies, to overstate the role of welfare policy in the explanation of changes in gender roles.

Although the role of the 'welfare state' is not overemphasized in these accounts, neither is it identified clearly. Poor specification of the welfare state's role is largely a product of modernization theory's (implicit or explicit) functionalism. Rather than modernization being analyzed into its various elements, these elements are homogenized, or subsumed, within the overall approach and relationships between state welfare policy, economic growth and changes in gender roles remains un(der)specified. Modernization theories usually place economic developments near the centre of their causal accounts. They start from the position that both the development of the welfare state and general changes in gender roles are caused by economic factors. Moreover, together with the inclination to treat social change as a unity, emphasis on economic causes produces little explicit discussion of the interaction between the welfare state and gender roles. Even where modernization theorists do not privilege the economic, the overarching process concept of modernization tends to homogenize of diverse elements (Flora and Alber 1981), amounting to a functionalist 'explanation' of welfare state development.

Many texts treated as 'classics' in the welfare state literature deal with broader questions of social change rather than the welfare state (particularly Kerr 1960 and Bell 1988). Even when it is considered, interest in the welfare state per se is often superficial (with an early and important exception Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). Analysts seem interested in the welfare state as a test case for more general theories (see Kerr 1960 and Wilensky 1975; 1976 who seems to be centrally concerned with the welfare state; as well as the discussion in Esping-Andersen 1990: 18). The exception is an important one. Wilensky and Lebeaux's analysis of *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (1965) pays considerable attention to the detail of welfare provision (in the USA). It also presents comparatively extensive analysis of changes
in family organization and gender roles. I subject this text to particularly close scrutiny.

One consequence of the concern with broader social change is that the welfare state is mostly used as a dependent variable, rather than an independent one. Relatively little attention is paid to welfare policy feedback, which requires close attention to the specific forms taken by welfare (for a discussion see Pierson 1993; 1994 - the use of ‘welfare’ as an independent variable is central to Esping-Andersen 1990). Even where welfare state ‘impacts’ are discussed - as in Wilensky’s work on ‘backlash’ and ‘real welfare’ - little interest was shown in the form of the welfare state. Instead, treating state welfare relatively monolithically, the analysis examines its aggregate impact, for example, on income distribution (Wilensky 1975).

The treatment of Bell’s The End of Ideology in the welfare state literature is particularly odd. This work was intended to run against the current of the sociological mainstream. Bell was critical of academic sociology, decrying both formalism and quantification. Moreover, he explicitly eschews holism - closely related to the functionalism of much modernization theory - in favour of an explicitly partial approach, concerned with causality (1988: 413 - 414). In retrospect, his work may seem more typical, less idiosyncratic than he intended, perhaps serving as a warning of the difficulty of standing outside the ideas of the time. On the other hand, one is left with a sense that fewer analysts of the welfare state have read The End of Ideology than have cited its rather striking title.

The ‘Chicago School’: methodological prescriptions
By contrast with more sociological traditions, there is relatively little ‘general’ analysis of ‘modernization’ from the Chicago School (but see Posner 1980/1988). Analysis of gender roles provides the context for analysis of the transition from traditional to modern societies. Sociological modernization is more concerned with the welfare state than with gender roles. ‘Chicago School’ welfare state analysis is largely a secondary product of analysis of gender. Although there is a ‘Chicago School’ tradition of state analysis, initially in terms of ‘regulation’ and ‘law’, subsequently more generally (see Stigler 1971/1988; Peltzman 1976/1988; Posner
1971; Becker 1983; 1985/1988), little of it is directly concerned with the ‘welfare state’.

‘Chicago School’ analysts argue that rational choice or economic methods can explain all social phenomena (a position with which Becker himself is particularly closely associated). It claims to deduce clear and falsifiable claims from a few clearly stated assumptions. Parsimonious explanations are preferred to descriptive accuracy. In the words of a critic, for the ‘Chicago School’

‘...the ultimate task of microeconomic and game theory to provide a dynamic theory of the origin, persistence, and change of institutions, using a model that does not make appeal to 'ad hoc' exogenously specified rules or norms.’ (Field 1984: 683).

Becker’s own contributions have mainly applied economic analysis to sociological or political issues (crime, the family and interest group behaviour). Those who adopt different methods have been criticized severely

... economists cannot resist the temptation to hide their own lack of understanding behind allegations of irrational behaviour, unnecessary ignorance, folly, ad hoc shifts in values, and the like, which is simply acknowledging defeat under the guise of considered judgment ...

Naturally, what is tempting to economists nominally committed to the economic approach becomes irresistible to others without a commitment to the scientific study of sociology, psychology or anthropology. With an ingenuity worthy of admiration if put to better use, almost any conceivable behaviour is alleged to be dominated by ignorance and irrationality, values and their frequent unexplained shifts, custom and tradition, the compliance somehow induced by social norms or the ego and the id. (Becker 1976: 11; 13)

Becker claims to have adhered consistently to a methodology grounded on three assumptions: 1) individuals engage in maximizing behaviour, 2) that markets exist, and 3) that individuals have stable preferences, which do not differ importantly between individuals (Becker 1976: 5; Becker 1981: xi - x; Becker 1991: x; but see his analysis of political preferences 1983; 1985 which is discussed below and criticized sharply in Dunleavy 1991: 102-103). The first claim is an uncontroversial statement
of the basic assumption of rational choice theory; the other two require more attention.

The assumption that markets exist is difficult to evaluate. It could immediately undermine the claim not to appeal to social norms. The existence of markets might imply that a framework for exchange exists based on law or custom, preventing the emergence of a Hobbesian state of nature. Becker's own words are not terribly helpful

... the economic approach assumes the existence of markets that with varying degrees of efficiency coordinate the actions of different participants - individuals, firms, even nations - so that their behaviour becomes mutually consistent. (Becker 1976: 5)

Moreover, in later formulations (which are specifically associated with gender analysis) assumptions about the existence of markets become less clear. The conceptualization of other social arrangements as 'implicit' markets, guided by 'shadow' prices, is introduced, although these terms are not clearly defined. Becker assumes that (implicit or explicit) markets are in equilibrium (Becker 1981: ix; Becker 1991: x) - which may be similar to the claim that markets 'coordinate ... actions ... so that ... behaviour becomes mutually consistent'. A system which is in equilibrium can change only as a result of exogenous influences. It amounts to an assumption of system stability, especially when associated with the assumption of stable preferences.

The Chicago School position on preference stability is that the mainstream economic assumption that individual tastes or preferences are 'given' is insufficiently assertive. It has been associated with the modest notion that analysis of the formation of tastes or preferences should be left to psychologists or sociologists. For the 'Chicago School', preferences remain the same across individuals and over time. They refer to a small number of underlying 'commodities', which individual time and market goods combine to produce, rather than 'market goods' themselves. The production of these commodities involves skill (or human capital) which may be acquired. Activity
specific human capital improves efficiency in that activity. People can acquire human capital in activities ranging from taking heroin, appreciating music, as well productive skills. If preferences are stable then individuals are fundamentally alike (presumably irrespective of gender, among other individual characteristics) and behavioural differences are largely environmental (although see Becker 1983: 393, and the discussion in Dunleavy 1991:102 -103, on the malleability of ‘political’ preferences).

Becker and the ‘Chicago School’ in general fail to live up to their own methodological standards - as I will show. They implicitly (and sometimes more or less explicitly) resort to functionalist explanations of long run change. Moreover, the analysis of the households, families and changes in women’s rate of participation in the formal workforce rely on ad hoc, exogenously specified factors.

Modernization theory: Parallels between sociological and ‘Chicago School’ variants

This analysis claims that sociological modernization theory and the ‘Chicago School’ share a great deal. As well as illustrating the parallels between them, my purpose is to criticize their reliance on functionalism. Both approaches structure their analyses around the distinction between traditional and modern societies. Each claims to explain change, but actually compares distinct ‘stages of development’ assuming that comparative static analyses explain the changes between ‘stages’. Both use ‘specialization’ as a defining feature of ‘modern’ societies and as an explanation of change from traditional to modern, introducing a circular element into the analysis. Both approaches describe considerable societal complexity, but resolve this complexity into an underlying unity. This resolution is achieved by a reliance on functionalism.

_The ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ society distinction_ is a defining feature of modernization theory, albeit often implicitly. Key works by Wilensky and Lebeaux and Becker use it explicitly, although its full significance is not acknowledged. It

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1The questionable acceptability of claims about the capacity of collective actors, especially nations, but also firms, in a methodologically individualist account is worth noting.
provides a fundamental tool structuring the analyses of social change. The basic contrast between traditional and modern societies is closely related to distinctions between status and contract, community and society and mechanical and organic solidarity. Sometimes modern society is associated with industrial society and the factory system, at others it is associated with 'the market' having a wide scope. All of these theories see 'traditional' societies as being based on familialism (the extended family is the most important social and economic unit) while in 'modern' societies economic activity is mainly in the market, factory and state.

The dominant image of modernization in the welfare state literature centres on industrialization and economic development. In its most influential versions it privileges economic explanatory factors (especially Wilensky 1975; 1976 - ultimately economic may be subordinate to technological change - 'good procedure is first to assume that changes in technology are more basic, more causal, than other social changes, and then to look for exceptions and specify conditions' Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 343 and passim 337 - 351). The emphasis on economic development as an explanation of welfare state development or changes in gender roles is shared by sociological and economic modernization theories. For all that rational-choice modernizers emphasize (micro)economic method, the basic substantive explanations appealed to are economic as well (Becker 1981; 1991).

There is some debate within sociological modernization theory on the place of economic explanations. Several analysts suggest that the multi-dimensional quality of modernization should be emphasized, even at the expense of greater ambiguity (see Flora and Alber 1981: 36-37 - see also the discussion in Pierson 1991: 32). The proposal seems to be that 'the logic of industrialism' should be distinguished from modernization. The operationalization of modernization by measures of GNP has been particularly severely criticized (Hage, Hanneman and Gargan 1989). There is considerable validity in these arguments, but they should not be pushed too far.

First, even critics of the ‘logic of industrialism’ treat non-economic explanations in a rather undifferentiated way - appealing to general and common processes of democratization. Secondly, Wilensky’s position - the main target for these criticisms
should be considered in more detail. He uses both the 'logic of industrialism' and 'modernization' concepts, although he makes more use of the former one (see Wilensky 1975: 47; 114). Especially in his early work he was clearly concerned with a complex and multi-dimensional conception of 'urban-industrial' society, developed within a broadly Parsonian framework (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 33, 63, 69; work which he continued to cite favourably Wilensky 1975: 15). He argues that 'modern industry and its major effects come wrapped in an all-or-nothing package' (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 348), emphasizing both the economic determination, and the complex unity of modernity. Finally, Wilensky sometimes appears concerned to disparage the impact of social democracy (particularly the claim that it could result in divergent public policy patterns) rather than political explanations as a whole (see the discussion of the functional equivalence of Christian and social democracy in Wilensky 1981).

Comparative Statics
Modernization theories generally present comparative static rather than dynamic analyses, although they claim to present accounts of modernization - a process of change. The change between forms of society is inferred by contrasting characteristics of each form. Apparent explanations of change from traditional to modern society often evaporate on investigation. The explanation turns out to be embedded in the theory's (acknowledged or unrecognized) premises. This criticism of sociological accounts of political phenomena is well established (Barry 1970). It is more surprising to find that the supposedly rational-choice 'Chicago School' also commits these explanatory misdemeanours (Becker 1981; 1991).

The strategy of contrasting various states, or even stages of change is nicely demonstrated in Wilensky and Lebeaux's (1965) relatively neglected analysis of 'the welfare state'. Particularly in the first part of the book, descriptions of early with late stages of a given process (such as industrialization or urbanization) are contrasted as are optimistic with pessimistic interpretations of each process. They attempt to apply a Parsonian (variant of the) contrast between traditional and modern societies to social change (a difficult issue for structural-functionalism given its heavy emphasis
on system maintenance). They contrast stages in a process of change giving an impression of dynamic analysis.

The Wilensky and Lebeaux analysis of industrialization is found in consecutive chapters on 1) the early and 2) the later impact of industrialization on society. It finesses the problem of how industrialization began. Essentially they associate critical evaluations of industrialism (and urbanism) with the earlier stages of these processes. Thus the ‘early’ chapter concludes with sections on Initial Polarization of Social Classes and Early Labor Protest (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 84 - 89), which detail difficulties experienced during early industrialization. Even this early period is not characterized as wholly negative. Positive elements of the early experience are built upon in the next chapter. It suggests that more mature interpretation of industrial society becomes possible.

A quote from the final section of the last chapter of the first part of the book, appropriately entitled ‘Appraising the Indictment’ serves to illustrate the general approach.

The central theme running through our picture of urban-industrial America is this: We can perhaps view most of the targets of complaint as transitional, passing results of industrialization under nineteenth century conditions. Coercive recruitment and painful transformation of peasant immigrants into urban-industrial workers; the insecurities of the factory system, the uncushioned impact of the dilution and obsolescence of skills; the dehumanization of work (whether through backbreaking labor or machine-paced, repetitive routine); class polarization; community disintegration -- these decline as economic growth continues. A new welfare bureaucratic society emerges - more stable than its early forms suggest, richer and more varied than men had dreamed when they observed the harsh initial development. (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 132-133)

The entwining of normative and positive elements in this analysis should be stressed. As values play a central role as a method of system maintenance in structural-functional theory, extensive discussion of norms is not surprising. A society which
cannot reproduce the value system which supports it is likely to change. Again, it is unsurprising that the early negatively valued phase of industrialization is seen as unstable, while the later phase is positive and stable. However, the analysis is sufficiently ‘flexible’ to allow the reassertion of ‘pessimistic trends’ within mature industrial societies to be envisioned (see, for example Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 110 - 114).

Characteristically, rich description of the contrasting characteristics of early and late stages on industrialization is provided. Modern societies are characterized by much smaller families and households, and by a much greater scope for formal market activities. In other words modern societies are defined as being made up of household and market sectors. The insurance and education functions of extended families and large households in traditional societies have been taken over by markets and the state. However, hints are given about underlying causes of these changes. Specialization is the most important causal mechanism mentioned, although even this concept is used almost as much to characterize later industrial society, rather than as a cause of changes in society (see, for example Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 90 - 106).

The economic or rational-choice variant of modernization theory also analyses the characteristics of traditional and modern societies in comparative static terms (see Becker 1981: 237 - 244, 1991: 342 - 349). Mirroring ‘sociological’ descriptions of ‘modernization’, the traditional-modern distinction structures key passages which purport to explain changes in gender roles. As a consequence an exercise in comparative statics takes the place of a dynamic account, despite the claim to explain an ‘evolution’. The ‘Chicago School’ shares the generally positive normative evaluation of ‘modernity’ shown by the sociological analysts. With some justification, economic analysis of politics and society has often been associated with ‘neo-conservativism’ or the ‘New Right’. While this association may have been true within the ‘Chicago School’ at one time, it seems no longer to hold, despite some claims to the contrary (Winegarden 1988; Becker 1981; 1983; 1985/1988; 1991; Peltzman 1976; 1989; Posner 1980/1988).

The same approach is adopted in the analysis of cities and the process of urbanization. Hostile interpretations of urban life are associated with the early stages of urbanization, the later stages of the process overcome early problems and result in a stable, sustainable modern society.

\[2\] The same approach is adopted in the analysis of cities and the process of urbanization. Hostile interpretations of urban life are associated with the early stages of urbanization, the later stages of the process overcome early problems and result in a stable, sustainable modern society.
No clear discussion of the breakdown of traditional societies is undertaken - the implication is that modern society replaced traditional societies because of its economic efficiency - a view which is supported by the ‘evidence’ that a ‘very small proportion of the world’s population ... lives in primitive societies today’ (Posner 1988: 206). It seems that advanced societies are successful because they are efficient, and we know that they are efficient because they are successful. More generally, the same factors are described as characteristics of modern society and causes of the change from traditional society, introducing further elements of circularity. The role ascribed to the (welfare) state is typical. It is described as a feature of modern society, but also treated as a cause of modernization, a factor undermining traditional society. The ‘Chicago School’ has moved towards viewing politics and government in modern societies as broadly ‘efficient’ (see Becker 1983; 1985/1988 Peltzman 1976; 1980/1988; 1989).

**Specialization**

Specialization is attributed a central role in modernization theory. It appears as a cause of change between traditional and modern societies and as a characteristic of modernity. On some readings ‘specialization’ plays the central role in each approach. ‘Specialization’ appears to describe a process, but is used primarily statically, to describe the diversity of roles within modern society. In both approaches specialization means that small differences in ‘initial’ abilities or endowments can account for large differences in ‘roles’ (see Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 64; Becker 1981: 14 - 37; 1991: especially 4, but also 54 - 79). Specialization does retain some processual connotations. It is also associated with efficiency and closely related to the conception of the market (making it difficult to present either as the cause of the other) in both perspectives (compare Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 249 with Becker 1981: 190-191).

The ‘Chicago School’ analysis of specialization reverses the conventional economic analysis that differences in factor endowments explain specialization, which captures comparative advantages. Instead, comparative advantage is produced by specialized (human and other) capital investments. This view dovetails with the ‘Chicago’ view
of preferences - individuals are initially similar, later differentiated by human capital investment (Stigler and Becker 1977). More trade seems to occur between countries with similar, than between those with vastly different, factor endowments (see Becker 1981: 20 - 21). Although the ‘Chicago School’ analysis of gender issues seems to be based on specialization, it is actually founded on an untheorized, *ad hoc* restriction on the logic of specialization.

*Functionalism*

The use of functionalist arguments to resolve the appearance of complexity into an underlying unity is a further feature of both sociological and ‘economic’ theories. Urbanization, the growth of government, the development of secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy other factors are resolved into the underlying concept of industrial society. ‘Sociological’ modernization does this most clearly - often appearing to dispense with clear accounts of causality. Despite their commitment to parsimonious explanation, putatively economic analysts of gender present distinct economic explanations *and* introduce a significant role for the (welfare) state in accounting for changes in gender roles. Questions are begged about the relationship of the state to other areas of human activity (especially about how state activities complicate the attainment of general equilibrium).

The tradition of sociological modernization theory is largely explicitly (structural) functionalist in method, drawing heavily on Parsonian sociology. Their functionalism (apparently) resolves complexity into underlying unity. The comparative static and functionalist characteristics of these theories may be connected. If functionalism is concerned with social stability, it is predisposed to present accounts of distinct, relatively stable historical epochs. It is not well equipped to account for a basic shift between forms of social organization.

It is more surprising that ‘economic’ analysts of gender roles fall into functionalism, given their aggressive hostility to non-economic reasoning. ‘Chicago School’ analysts end up roundly contradicting their own theoretical strictures in their analyses of long-run change - particularly in Becker’s account of gender relations, and state analysis. The implicit functionalism of this analysis (and in North 1981) has been
noted before (see Field 1981; 1984; Gordon 1984; Elster 1985: 241). It may be a consequence of attempting to explain large scale social change within a micro-economic framework.

Becker discusses a series of factors which influence the change from traditional to modern society, most of which are also presented as characteristics of 'modern societies', although the relationships them are rarely explored explicitly. Modern society is presented as complex. This presentation of connected elements of modernity, without a clear explanation of the causes of their emergence, means that Becker does not live up to his own standards of parsimonious explanation, leaving a legacy of confusion and ambiguity. Moreover, a suggestion of functionalism may creep into the analysis. Becker has some difficulty in distinguishing the impact of the increasing scope of the market from that of the (welfare) state. The market operates in tandem with 'other organizations of modern societies' including the state (Becker 1981: 244 - he discusses the education system and various forms of insurance - both market and state 1981: 252-253).

Hints from the Treatise's first edition about the relationship between the state and the family were developed in the 1991 edition, showing that the reading of Becker which stresses pathological public policy impacts is mistaken. Instead Becker

...believe[s] that a surprising number of state interventions mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their own care. Stated differently, our belief is that many regulations of the family improve the efficiency of family activities. ...

The efficiency perspective implies that the state is concerned with justice for children, if 'justice' is identified with the well-being of children ... . The efficiency perspective does not imply, however, that the effect on children alone determines whether the state intervenes. The effect on parents is considered too. The state tends to intervene when both gain, or when the gain to children exceeds the loss to their parents. (Becker 1991: 363)

As well as disclosing a value position not normally associated with the economic perspective these statements violate basic principles of rational choice analysis. Motivations are attributed to an abstract entity (or at best a collective actor) – the state
is 'concerned with justice'. It also trades the interests of parents off against their children. Becker partially acknowledges this change in tone, being at pains to point out that he

... cannot prove that efficiency guides state involvement in the family. But [I] will show that state interventions in the market for schooling, the provision of old-age pensions, and access to divorce are consistent on the whole with the efficiency perspective. (Becker 1991: 363)

Becker appears ambivalent here, perhaps reluctant to embrace fully a functionalist approach to the state and the family. He does suggest interest group activity might influence state policy, perhaps implying that they provide the mechanism by which individual interests result in collective justice. Some of his other work embodies the claim that the activities of interest groups do provide a sufficient explanation of the efficiency of public policy (Becker, 1983; Becker 1985; see also Peltzman 1989, for a strong claim about Becker's achievement in reconciling the activities of government with the efficiency perspective). However, Becker's discussion of interest groups in relation to state-family interactions does not follow his general analysis of interest groups. Even his general position is somewhat panglossian, embodying assumptions of perfect information, frictionless adjustment and so on (Becker 1983; 1985). In addition, his analysis of the state and family assumes that the interests of children too young to vote or participate politically (perhaps even of future - i.e. unborn - generations) are somehow taken into account by interest groups and in public policy making. Becker's own acknowledgment of the absence of proof that justice guides 'family' policy the conclusion that he not provided a positive economic explanation difficult to resist (Becker 1991: 362-379). It amounts to 'acknowledging defeat' although perhaps without 'the guise of considered judgment.' (Becker 1976: 12)

The introduction of the state complicates the analysis of the substantive causes of modernization. Becker asserts that economic growth should be regarded as the primary causal influence on the transition from traditional to modern society (and the evolution of the family). However a second, political, causal influence is also offered, without making clear its relationship economic causes. They appear to have parallel, perhaps mutually, re-enforcing impacts. When read together with the hints
of functionalism in the analysis of the state, this image removes Becker’s account of 
modern society from the parsimony usually associated with rational-choice (although 
it does not match the complex descriptiveness of structural-functionalism).

The ‘Chicago’ analysis implies that the state takes on responsibilities which the 
family used to fulfill. Although the tone of Becker’s discussion is overwhelmingly 
optimistic, state interventions could be easily re-cast into a more ‘pessimistic’ 
discourse of undermining the family. Oddly Becker does not consider the incentive 
implications of his argument that the state is functionally equivalent to an ideal, but 
non-existent, family. We are left questioning what makes families cohere when the 
state takes on services which (some) families would otherwise provide. Becker’s 
optimism may have been based on his inaccurate belief that he had developed a cast 
iron explanation of the existence of the household/family.

I have set out the broad scope and evolution of modernization theory welfare state 
analyses. The welfare state is one part of ‘modernization’, but the theory fails to 
specify the particular contributions of various components of modernization, instead 
treating them as a complex unity. Particular attention has been paid to similarities 
between ‘sociological modernization’ and the ‘Chicago School’. The analysis has 
established the legitimacy of treating the ‘Chicago School’ as a variant of 
‘modernization theory’, showing that it fails use its own methods consistently.

My analytic strategy has been to consider the Chicago School and sociological 
modernization theories together, in order to draw attention to their underlying 
similarities. As a consequence, I may have concentrated on economistic and 
deterministic variants of modernization theory at the expense of its more open and 
multidimensional forms. For example, some theorists consider the manner in which 
‘modernity’ diffused across political and cultural borders (compare Wilensky 1975; 
Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985 with Flora and Alber 1981, see also the 
discussion in Pierson 1991; and for a good discussion of ‘diffusion’ see Boyer 1997). 
I do not think that this risk is especially severe for two reasons. First, at least when 
applied to the welfare state, even the more flexible versions of modernization theory 
deploy an explanation which is essentially organized around a unified concept of
'modernization', without paying a great deal of attention to the nature of that concept. Secondly, I believe that the most influential versions of the modernization approach are those associated with Wilensky. Particularly from the mid 1970s onwards his work on the welfare state is marked by a deep conviction that welfare differences were of relatively little significance.

7.3 The analysis of gender in modernization theories

If it occurs at all, analysis of gender in modernization theories of welfare state development generally takes the form of discussion of family and household organization. Many modernization analyses of welfare state development hardly consider gender roles or family organization (see Wilensky 1975; 1976; 1981). Other modernization analyses which have been influential in the comparative welfare state literature (despite their marginal concern with state welfare) often consider gender issues only briefly. By contrast the 'economic' or 'rational choice' variant of modernization theory is primarily concerned with household and family organization, with welfare state analysis a secondary product of this concern. Despite the limited attention paid to gender issues, distinctive forms of family and household organization are a (perhaps the) defining feature of traditional and modern societies. Kerr describes the family in modern industrial society in terms which are generally echoed by (both sociological and 'rational choice') modernization theorists:

> There is no place for the extended family in the industrial society; it is on balance an impediment to requisite mobility. The primary family constitutes a larger and more mobile labor force. The function of the family under industrialism is constricted: it engages in very little production; it provides little, if any, formal education and occupational training; the family business is substantially displaced by professional management. (Kerr 1960: 35-36)

However, the logic of this analysis raises questions about the sustainability of households and families under the pressures of modernization and modernity. In both sociological and rational-choice versions of the theory (but particularly the latter) the existence of the family/household is 'protected' by an *ad hoc* retreat from the general logic of the analysis.
Sociological Modernization Theory

Where gender roles are considered in more detail, the account follows similar lines to general modernization analyses - different stages of modernization are compared descriptively and normatively. Thus, when Wilensky and Lebeaux raise gender roles in the discussion of ‘The Early Impact of Industrialization’ two interpretations of changes in gender roles are discussed. The first suggests a pessimistic view of the conventional family’s future. ‘[T]he family is disappearing’ and ‘The decay of the family, our most important primary group, heralds the further decay of civilization itself.’ The second acknowledges change in gender roles and the shifting of functions previously fulfilled by the family to other social institutions, but suggests that ‘the family is simply changing its organization, and will emerge strengthened, better adapted to a democratic society.’ Characteristically, Wilensky and Lebeaux argue that these positions stem from ‘different value premises’ but ‘[b]oth ... are correct in their facts’ (1965: 67 - 68).

Wilensky and Lebeaux argue economic development and industrialization processes cause changes in family organization. The ‘traditional’ family and modern industry are ‘mutually subversive’; modern industry ‘must force the breakup of the economically self-sufficient extended family’ (1965: 68). The generalization of the factory system (an aspect of industrialization) is specifically mentioned as a cause of changes in ‘the family’. The statement that ‘[t]he factory system creates a family system which best fits its needs ...’ has a flavour of functionalism, but this explanation is better fleshed out than many. The factory system ‘requires’ that 1) large numbers of workers are 2) mobile and 3) highly motivated (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 81).\(^3\) This explanation is easily translated into one with more acceptable ‘microfoundations’. Factory employment provides strong incentives for people to move in order to work. By implication, mobile workers cannot maintain ‘traditional’, i.e. multi-generation, households. Thus the degeneration of larger households begins.

In addition, industrialization directly lowers the value of children. ‘[T]he shift from self-sufficient agriculture to the factory system makes children less valuable

\(^3\)In a section entitled Variations in the American Family System. See also pages 72 - 3.
economically’ (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 71). Children change from being an economic asset into a drain on family resources. This change results from specialization, which increases the costs of educating children. Although we have seen that Wilensky and Lebeaux do not use specialization wholly as an external cause of changes in modern societies, it is cited as a specific cause of alterations to family patterns (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 71). Large family size acts as an encumbrance on both parents and children in the struggle for ‘status’ (a necessary corollary of industrialism although one perhaps intensified by ‘the culture of capitalism’). This provides a second way in which economic development alters family structures, lowers the requirement for domestic work, and therefore embodies and facilitates changes in gender roles. As the economic value of children falls, parents become willing ‘to limit family size by using rational birth control’ (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 71).4

Sociological modernization theory addresses the question of the limits of this erosion (what is left of the family) inadequately. The image of the ‘modern’ family is based on the experience of middle class suburban families (Wilensky and Lebeaux: 1965: 125). The extended family is replaced by a tight knit nuclear family in which

[m]arriage is idealized as a total intimacy. The belief is strong that romance should play a part in courtship and people should marry for love.

The system also favours equal rights and obligations for the parties in a marriage. Since love cannot be forced, the contract is voluntary and each side is supposed to be a fully responsible partner. (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 70)

The normative evaluation of changes in gender roles is more ambivalent than the discussion of other facets of modernization which are ultimately exonerated. Negative descriptions of changes in gender roles continue far into the text (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 73-79) - positive aspects of gender role change occurs after other aspects of modernization have been categorized as beneficial. The evaluation remains equivocal, witness

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4 Notice that the technology of birth control plays a secondary role here. A change in values makes use of an advance in technology, rather than a change in contraceptive technology causing a change in values, reversing the general causal pattern assumed by Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965: 343).
...there are reasons to believe that mature industrialization will in itself bring new patterns of family life, and perhaps reverse the long-term trend towards family instability’

and

another group of recent studies point to the emergence of new, perhaps more stable patterns of family life (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 128, 125; emphases added).

Thus the normative attachment to the ‘traditional’ seems stronger in discussion of the family than elsewhere. It colours the categorization of caring for children, cooking, washing dishes and decorating the home as feminine leisure activities, rather than work (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 196 - they do sometimes consider the drudgery of housework: 68). Elsewhere Wilensky explicitly considers the limits to changes in gender roles. Although contradicting his general emphasis on technological and economic factors, he states that gender ‘norms’ are likely to block some changes in gender relations. Women’s ambivalence about such changes means that they will not carry through a feminist ‘revolution’ in the family (Wilensky 1968: 239-243). As well as ruling out the possibility of ‘fundamental’ change, this essentialization of norms about gender leaves very little room for cross-national variation or for consideration of the extent to which changes in women’s consciousness diffuse across space.

The ‘Chicago School’

‘Rational-choice’ modernization theory based the distinction between traditional and modern societies on differences in characteristic household/family form. Traditional society is depicted as organized around households/families, while modern society is differentiated into markets and households. In effect, ‘modern society’ is defined as a society divided into public and private - market and household - ‘sectors’. ‘Chicago School’ claims is to provide an economic analysis of the existence of households and families. On closer investigation this claim is cannot be sustained.

In their evaluation of changes in the family ‘rational-choice’ are more wholeheartedly positive than sociological modernization theorists. Becker refuses to
deplore the passing of traditional family forms (Becker 1981: 244). Nevertheless, a
certain ambivalence about the future of the family remains. The analysis of family
evolution is based on comparative static analysis of traditional and modern society,
but modern society is not the end of the story. Whether they amount to a refinement
of modernity, or a change beyond it, developments in the latter half of the twentieth
century are treated separately (Becker 1981: 245; 1991: 350). The account of
developments ‘after modernity’ sometimes seems to suggest that the ‘modern’
nuclear family itself might be under threat.

The assumption that households exist is embedded in the notion that the market and
the household are two distinct sectors. However, Becker does not demonstrate why
two - household and market - sectors exist. One way to illustrate this point is to
consider the nature of these two ‘sectors’. The market can be understood as a single
sector only by contrast with the household sector. Within the market individuals gain
by specializing - indeed Becker’s concept of the market is very close to his notion of
specialization. By contrast, the household sector is one in which individuals are
conceived of a ‘specializing’ in a myriad of specific tasks. Rather than deducing the
existence of households from clearly stated first principles, Becker asserts, seemingly
by a casual empiricism, that they do exist. He then considers how households might
be reconciled with rational-choice principles, inventing a distinction between
household and market sectors of the economy and, wrongly, assuming that
specialization between these two sectors follows the same logic as specialization
within the market.

If household and market sectors exist then Becker can show that all, or almost all,
members of a rational household will be specialized in one sector or the other.
Whatever the circumstances no more than one household member would work in both
sectors. Consideration of the acquisition of human capital suggests that this division
of labour would not be flexible. Individuals would become more and more expert in
the activities of their sector, and therefore able to command a higher and higher
‘price’ within it, increasing the gains from trade. However, if the logic of market
specialization holds good as an explanation of changes in gender roles then there is no
obvious reason to expect the household sector to survive. Once the fallacious nature of this conceptual distinction is exposed, the structure of Becker’s analysis is undermined.

Becker's conception of 'commodities' plays an important part in the account of the existence of households. It suggests that consumption is much more active than the traditional theory assumed. Market goods need to be 'processed' in order to be consumed, at the very least requiring some of the consumer's time. Much household activity is construed as the (necessary) production of commodities out of market goods using the time of the household worker. The theory of the division of labour between household and market activities is based on the idea that a core of 'household' work producing commodities from market goods is unavoidable.

However, there is no principled reason why (most of) this work could not be carried about by specialized agents in an explicit market implying that households need not exist. If Becker's dynamic notion of the specialization is applied, there would be a pressure for greater and greater specialization. It is difficult to see how the myriad of tasks evoked by the expression 'household work' could resist the logic of specialization transforming them into explicitly priced market activities. Indeed, this is the logic of Becker's own view of the change from traditional to modern society. The possibility that household activities might merge into explicitly marketed activities must be entertained. This possibility (which might be called the 'Manhattanization' of society) would mean that no group of activities could be considered as a 'household sector'. All cleaning could be done by specialized market cleaners, cooking undertaken by restaurants, take aways, or be 'pre' prepared.

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5 In the second edition of the Treatise Becker presents what is effectively an analysis of the limits to specialisation in the family. They are based on the inability of children to make effective contracts. Becker ends up arguing that the state steps in to correct for these inefficiencies see 1991: 362 - 379).

6 There is probably a residual amount of effort which is unlikely to be put out to tender. Even a MacDonald's hamburger, or a meal cooked by another member of a household, requires time and effort to consume, time and effort which is difficult logically to distinguish from household work (or from leisure activities). However Becker subsequently argues that the logic of specialisation implies that at most one member of any household would work in both the market and household sectors. Although he does not actually state it, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that some individuals in these households do actually specialise completely in market activities, in other words they do absolutely no household work. Clearly Becker is prepared to ignore the residual effort which any individual must put in to consumption, or at least he is prepared not to classify it as "household" work.
to be reheated in a microwave and so on - a possibility that Becker does not seem to have grasped fully.

In other words, the analysis represents a limitation of the logic of specialization, based on a casual empiricism rather than a deductive model. The households sector constitutes an ad hoc assumption of the sort he deplores in the work of others. The endurance of the nuclear family is an assumption of his theory, rather than something demonstrated by it. The failure to provide microfoundations for the notion of the household sector has ramifications for other aspects of Becker's work. Although Becker himself does not conceive of it in this way, he seems to search for other foundations for the existence of the household sector. Two that seem to lie behind his work are arguments from biological difference and from history.

Biological/sex differences

Biological or sex differences are used relatively little in sociological modernization theories, which tend to concentrate on norms. There is an ambivalence about biological or sex differences in Becker's analysis. Thus, on the one hand he states that

...biological differences in comparative advantage between the sexes explain not only why households typically have both sexes, but also why women have usually spent their time bearing and rearing children and engaging in other household activities, whereas men have spent their time in market activities. (Becker 1981: 23)

On the other hand in the first edition of the Treatise he stated that biological or sex differences were not particularly important (Becker 1981: x). Forcefully reiterating this view in the expanded edition, he nevertheless acknowledges that he

'e evidently conveyed the impression to many ... that I rely[ed] only on biological differences ... to explain the division of labour between household and other activities. That is certainly not my intent ...' (Becker 1991: 4).

Becker seems torn between the necessity of making additional assumptions in order to 'explain' families and his basic methodological position which implies that he
should seek explanations which do not rely on *ad hoc* assumptions, even ones sufficiently ‘scientific’ to be rooted in genetics. It should be remembered that Becker has elsewhere sought to explain human behaviour as rooted in a set of preferences which are essentially the same for all individuals (Stigler & Becker 1977). It is problematic for him to admit that a very large portion of human behaviour results from differences between women and men.

A very small difference in initial conditions (which might be caused by biology or discrimination against women) could result in a completely specialized family division of labour. One family member would specialize in looking after children. Becker suggests that mothers have a comparative advantage in looking after children, based on the casual observation that ‘a mother can more readily feed and watch her older children while she produces additional children than while she engages in most other activities’ (Becker 1981: 22).

The ambivalence about the role of biological and genetic factors is revealed by Becker’s treatment of the genetic element in family specialization. Rather than accepting that individual might want to reproduce for genetic/biological reasons, he suggests that as biological parents share genes with their children, they have privileged information about them, and therefore have a comparative advantage in caring for them. So Becker makes out a kind of biological case for parents (mothers) specializing in looking after their own children. However, this case does more to illustrate his ambivalence about the use of biological explanations - notably his use of genes combined with a reluctance to accept a genetic or biological urge to reproduce than to explain the existence of families.

Whatever its merits, this recourse to biology does not amount to an explanation of the distinction between household and market sectors. The generalization from child bearing and rearing to other household activities is not explicitly explained at all. It amounts to an assumption that it is more efficient for a mother with children to cook and clean for a ‘shadow’ wage than to engage in any other work, perhaps from the home, for a money wage. This is an empirical claim, and provides no theoretical basis for the distinction between household and market sectors. Moreover it runs
counter to the general logic of specialization. It does not rescue Becker from having to
make the *ad hoc* assumption that households exist.

Becker also uses sex differences in another way. They mean that men and women are not
perfect substitutes for one another - indeed, men and women may be complimentary in
the production of some commodities. He considers complementarity in household but
not market production. Complementarities ‘cannot be unimportant’ because ‘women are
becoming less specialized in household activities, and men are spending more time at
household activities’ (a seemingly causal empiricism Becker 1981: 24). It is important to
be clear about this point which provides the logic behind his earlier assertion ‘that
biological difference probably have weakened the degree of specialization’ in the
family/household (Becker 1981: 14). This argument about the weakening of
specialization within the family is quite different from the implicit limitation to the logic
of specialization involved in the assertion a household/family sector exists.

**Historical evolution**

In places Becker also suggests a historical ‘explanation’ of the existence of household
(Becker 1981: 237 - 244). Even here he begins by assuming that households and families
existed in traditional societies. Indeed the extended family living in a household was the
main form of social organization in such societies. Becker believes that

... if modern society evolved from traditional society with the
characteristics emphasized in this chapter, the individualism and
nuclear familialism of modern society would have evolved from the
extended families and kinship groups of traditional society. (Becker
1981: 244)

If Becker relies on an account of the existence of households as a legacy of history then
historical has priority over deductive economic analysis. This account does not confront
the crucial question of why households and families have not been destroyed by the logic
of specialization, which is used to account for the transition from traditional to modern
society. ‘Rational-choice’ modernization theory suggests that modern society is efficient
‘...because family functions ... are more effectively handled by markets’ (Becker 1981:
244).
The discussion does not present a clear order of causation. There is an implication that economic change is primary and causes other changes, although this claim is only made clearly in the context of later discussions for changes in gender roles, rather than directly as a cause of the emergence of modern society (Becker 1981: 245). As a consequence, the stylized and comparative static ‘historical’ account plays a very significant, if unacknowledged, part. By structuring the account around the distinction between traditional and modern societies an implicit justification for the existence of families is provided - they are a ‘legacy of history’. We are back to what amounts to the unstated assumption that household activities have some common elements which mean that they coalesce into a ‘sector’, which prevents them from being subject to the logic of specialization.

Faced with gender issues sociological and rational-choice variants of the modernization theory display a peculiar ambivalence. Both see changes in family/household forms as a general product of the process of modernization, which they view broadly as positive. However, both assert that gender roles will not be wholly revolutionized by modernization, without relying on biological determinism (at least in a full blown form). Without recognizing the fact, sociological and rational-choice modernization theorists depend upon a particular exception to their general logic of analysis (in both cases closely related to the concept of specialization and a material - technological/economic - determinism) to ‘protect’ something ‘traditional’ about gender roles and household/family forms. The ambivalence involved in granting this particular exception to their analyses is reflected in their accounts of changes in female labour force participation.

7.4 A critical assessment of modernization theory and its analysis of women’s role in the workforce

Modernization theorists generally share an expectation that women’s involvement in formal work increases over time, which is a corollary of the family losing many of its traditional functions. In as much as they are interested in gender roles, this interest in focused on changes in dominant family and household forms. The arguments they develop imply that these changes have a fairly direct impact on female labour force
participation. However, often modernization theorists do not specify clearly the causal relations in operation, a lack of clarity which is, I think, indicative of a deeper flaw of the theory.

Kerr’s assertion that

... economic growth and a transference of women’s work from the household to the market go closely hand in hand (Kerr 1960: 35-36 emphasis added - Kerr took it from Lewis 1955: 116 - but placing the quote in its original context does not fully clarify the question of causality, although it does imply that economic growth is more fundamental)

is typical of this vagueness about causality. If modernization theorists share a basic image of the pattern of change in female labour force participation, they diverge in their interpretations of some of its aspects. Through its impact on family/household organization modernization appears to be the ultimate causes of greater female labour force participation. The passage from Kerr (and Lewis before him) seems to define modernization in terms of economic growth, although several differences in emphasis exist, with attention paid to factors ranging from economic growth and industrialism to the factory system and the extension of the market. However, differences over the characterization modernization have relatively little impact on their discussion of changes in women’s labour market participation. The significance of these differences tends to diminish due to the tendential functionalism of these theories and their depiction of modernization as a complex unity.

The granting of priority to rich description over the specification of causal mechanisms is exemplified in Wilensky and Lebeaux’s work

[advancing industrialization not only puts an increasing percentage of the whole population in the labor force; it not only changes the proportions between employed men and women, but it also gives the edge to married women. At midcentury, the number of married women at work exceeded for the first time the number of single women at work, a trend that seems to be continuing. Women work to supplement family income (an aspect of rising levels of aspiration for self and children), to support their families (a necessity, for an increasing number head broken families), to achieve ‘self-fulfillment’ (a reflection of the changing definition of woman’s role), and because the
opportunities have increased (an aspect of the shift toward work assignment on the basis of 'what you can do' and the fact that women can do an increasing proportion of the jobs available) (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 74).

The mechanism by which industrialism 1) changes the proportion of women in the workforce and 2) particularly 'gives the edge' to married women, is unclear. Three changes in the motivation or incentives for women to work are listed which could form part of an explanation of changes in gender roles. The first of these incentives would also contribute to changing the position of married women in particular (the second might make a similar contribution in the cases of women who were married once upon a time). However all three of these changed motivations are a presented as a consequence of other changes which are themselves caused by or associated with industrialization. Thus they are presented as part of an overall complex interdependent notion of industrialization or modernization, more than as mechanisms by which industrialization influences gender roles.

In keeping with his increasing emphasis on economic growth within modernization processes in welfare state analysis, Wilensky subsequently attributed changes in gender roles, and particularly women's participation in the paid labour force, largely to economic development (Wilensky 1968: 236). Rather than assimilating a variety of cultural, ideological, political and social factors into the process of modernization, he contrasts their impact (unfavourably) with that of economic growth factors. Wilensky argues that economic growth is much more important than egalitarian or feminist ideology in explaining growth in women's workforce participation (Wilensky 1968: 236-239).

'Chicago School' analysts argue that the traditional family collapsed due to its inefficiency. This inefficiency is associated with changes in the pattern of women's employment due to alteration of the (mainly monetary) incentives they face. A stripped down version of this argument might be: more women work as women's (presumably relative) wages increase. Unfortunately Becker's argument is not presented as clearly as this - it is rather confused. A rather unconvincing argument about the role of the state is made. Moreover, the relationship between economic change and the role of the state is left unclear. Although these difficulties are
associated with broad characteristics of the 'Chicago' approach to some extent, they are also grounded in a specific conceptual flaw in the analysis of gender which is also present in some of Wilensky's work.

Briefly, attention should be drawn to the fact that economic growth, changing earning power of women and the state are not the only hypotheses considered in the 'Chicago' analysis. Becker explicitly refuses to attribute causal significance to modern contraceptives, despite the fact that he believes that changes in women's fertility are important. Changes in fertility are seen as a result of changing economic opportunities for women, occur whether or not technologically sophisticated forms of contraception are available. Becker also echoes Wilensky's disparaging of the independent impact of feminism and changes in women's consciousness (see 1981: 251 on both these points).

Two differences between sociological and rational choice accounts
Before going on to discuss these issues, attention must be drawn to important differences between the sociological and 'Chicago School' analyses. First, they part company in their more detailed consideration of changes in the pattern of women's employment. Sociological modernization theorists suggest that (exogenous) changes in the character of work have made it more compatible with traditional female 'roles'. Although the reasons for changes in the nature of work are rarely examined in detail, they are generally associated with 'modernization'. Thus, some industrial and (prefiguring later 'post-industrial' analyses) most service sector work dovetails with social norms concerning femininity, and therefore draws women into the formal labour market (Kerr 1960: 201; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 322 - 325; Wilensky 1968). As this view amounts to a conventional wisdom, Becker's silence on this subject is striking (Becker 1981; 1991 - however, Fuchs 1983: 132, uses an 'economic' approach which he attributes to Becker and does discuss the service sector). The silence is in keeping with the 'economic' principle that norms and values cannot be used legitimately as explanatory variables.

Second, despite the emphasis on rich and inclusive description, rather than parsimonious explanation, conventional modernization analysts do not deploy the
welfare state as a major explanation of changes in women’s involvement in paid work. Instead the welfare state and changes in gender roles both appear as consequences (or characteristics) of modernization, and the relationship between them is not explored in detail. To the extent that it is discussed, the impact of the welfare state is mainly considered for its impact on the supply of (service sector) work appropriate to female norms (see Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 323-325). By contrast, the (welfare) state is seen as having a major impact on family and household organization in the ‘Chicago School’ analysis (Becker 1981: 237-256). This impact is on the supply of women workers (as they are ‘freed’ of family responsibilities) rather than the supply of ‘female’ jobs in welfare services.

Economic factors
For ‘sociological’ modernization theorists the general pattern of causation is from a cluster of factors such as urbanism, industrialism and the development of the factory system - presented as aspects of economic development and hence of modernization (although each may have some specific characteristics of its own) - to a variety of other changes (such as the development of a service sector as well as changes in the characteristic structure of families and in gender roles). Gender roles change initially in the area of female labour force participation (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 64-65). However, in work directly focused on the question of women’s formal employment, Wilensky suggests that there is a ceiling to the level of female labour force participation and to the achievements of women once in work. He argues that women will be restricted to a certain number of feminized occupations. Moreover, even within these sectors, the senior jobs are likely to go to men. The explanation of this ceiling to women’s opportunity could be explained by the unequal distribution of domestic responsibilities, an issue which Wilensky does discuss (1968: 242-243). However, contradicting his earlier claim that technological or economic factors should be regarded as primary, Wilensky explains the limits on women’s labour market opportunities in ideological or normative terms. According to Wilensky ideology cannot explain differences between levels of female labour force participation, but it can be used to explain why women will not gain employment equality with men and themselves feel ambivalent about movement in that direction (1968: 241-243).
For ‘Chicago School’ analysts the fundamental cause of changes in female labour force participation remains economic (Becker 1981: 245), although the state also plays a role. On inspection, the character of the economic mechanism at work is ambiguous. For Becker, economic growth altered the ‘earning power’ of women, changed the pattern of incentives faced and therefore influenced the choice between market and non-market work. However, it is not clear whether changes in relative wages or an absolute improvement in prosperity is the key here. Moreover, the analysis is ambiguous about the role of thresholds of economic development (which may be related to supply-side bottlenecks). There is also a hint that a further factor, the rate of change in the economy, has a part to play.

Becker seems to suggest that absolute increases in prosperity are the trigger for changes in female labour force participation, but, in general the ‘Chicago School’ focuses on the role of relative prices (in this case, presumably relative wages). A close reading of Becker’s work does not resolve this ambiguity - although he discusses increases in the earning power of women, he does not make the comparison with the earning power of men. Changes in relative wages might alter gender patterns of household work, but would not automatically change the quantity of housework required overall. Thus, changes in relative wages would not necessarily imply that household constraints on labour force supply were insignificant. In short, such changes might imply that men did more housework, or more precisely that the household division of labour and the gender division of labour would be decoupled.

A casual empiricism shows that male labour force participation rates have generally experienced a decline in advanced western democracies, while female rates have risen, which could lend general support to a relative wage change hypothesis.

The analysis of the impact of an absolute increase in prosperity (‘economic growth’) on women’s participation in the paid labour market is potentially circular. An increase in women's wages, without altering relative to men's, is economic growth. Although never clearly defined, Becker's view of economic growth is bound up with the notion of the extension of the market, and increasing the specialization of the division of labour. Indeed, as we have seen, he suggests that specialization itself is
the ‘ultimate’ cause of gains from trade, and hence of economic growth. Although it is not wholly clear that Becker regards the movement of women from the household to the market as a form of ‘specialization’, he should do so. When this implication of Becker’s account is drawn out, it becomes clear that it is circular, with ‘specialization’ presented as both a cause and a consequence of economic growth.

At the end of the Treatise Becker confuses the account further by introducing an additional distinct argument. Instead of the level of economic development, the pace of economic change might be a crucial factor in explaining difference in gender roles. Becker makes the claim in the context an argument that a sufficient slowing of the pace of development could eventually ‘... reverse the [recent] trends in ...’ the labour force participation of married women and ‘other forms of family behaviour’ (Becker 1981: 255 - 256). By implication, in periods of rapid economic development, women are drawn out of the household and into the formal labour market. This approach might imply a sustainable change in gender roles if Becker’s earlier characterization of modern societies as in a state of continual change is emphasized. It is difficult, however, to see such changes in gender roles as permanent.

Emphasis on the rate of economic change rests somewhat uneasily with another assertion Becker makes about the economic mechanisms which influence women’s workforce participation. His analysis of late modernity is almost wholly couched in terms of the incentives which entice women to work in the formal labour market. However, the burden of his analysis of the existence of household/families and their gendered character suggests that important ‘supply-side’ factors inhibit women’s participation in the labour force. Indeed, his analysis of the inauguration of the latter half of the twentieth century (the late modern period) is centrally concerned with discontinuities in the supply of women in the labour market. ‘Thresholds’ of economic development must be passed before increases in female earning power translates into greater female labour force participation (according to Becker the US passed this threshold in the early 1950s 1981: 247-250).

These thresholds are understood primarily in terms of the human capital investment decisions of women, rather than other forms of supply side constraint. Women will
only start to invest in ‘market oriented’ human capital after their earning power has passed the threshold. Emphasis on thresholds suggests that change is structural - the decoupling of gender and household divisions of labour would prove difficult in the short term, whether under the influence of a change in relative wages or an absolute increase in prosperity. Therefore the timing of the impact of economic development and increases in women's earning power on female labour force participation is difficult to discern or predict. Nevertheless, in principle, it is difficult to reconcile Becker's emphasis on the rate of economic change with that on thresholds.

If Becker were explicitly to pull together a story about the supply side of female labour (most of whose elements are already hinted at in his discussion), he would change focus from the expansion of the earning power of women and an implicitly narrow conception of economic growth to a wider conception of modernization which would include the notion of the expansion of the market as well as the erosion of family functions. Moreover, because female labour force participation has an influence on patterns of marriage and decisions about fertility, which themselves could conceivably have an influence on female labour force participation, Becker's theory would rapidly achieve a complexity which approaches that of sociological analyses.

The Welfare State

The explanation of changes in female workforce participation in terms of general process of modernization is that social policy makes only a small contribution. Female labour force participation is sometimes thought to be caused by the same forces which produced the welfare state, with no interaction between the two (see Kerr 1960, for example). Wilensky and Lebeaux attribute some significance to the welfare state, although generally in its guise as an employer, rather than as part of the egalitarian normative rationale for the welfare state. The welfare state provides many of the jobs which provide 'appropriate' work for women, although, even here, as we have seen there may be important limitations on women’s potential careers (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 322-325; Wilensky 1968: 235)
By contrast, even in the first edition of the *Treatise* the state is seen as having an important and seemingly independent impact on the character of the family, particularly through altering the conditions of female labour supply. There is some discussion of the (pathological) influence of specific ‘welfare’ programmes on, for example, the fertility of unemployed women. Becker asserts that ... programs providing aid to mothers with dependent children ... have induced a... decline in the labor force participation of mothers ... (1981: 97). However, this element of Becker’s analysis is not nearly as important as some commentators seem to assert (see, for example, Winegarden: 1987, 1988). Instead, Becker is primarily optimistic about modernity, regarding it as a product of economic growth, as we have seen. In addition, even in 1981 Becker recognized that welfare state programmes had replaced reliance on the family as a form of insurance, in a way which has reduced the significance and role of the family. By implication women were freed from their domestic roles and allowing them to participate more fully in the labour market (Becker 1981: 252-253). The discussion of the state’s role might imply that supply side restrictions of the labour market participation of women existed, at least until they were removed by state intervention. Implicitly then, the notion that women would be able to increase labour supply easily in response to an increase in demand signaled by wage changes is qualified.

Arguably Becker displays a certain ambivalence over the normative evaluation of the role of the state in the 1981 edition of the *Treatise*. For example, in his main discussion, and positive evaluation, of modern societies (Becker 1981: 242-244) considers the impact of the development of the market as the bearer of modernization. He emphasizes various factors which play an important part in this process, including the rise of (non familial) insurance and education. However, these factors are identified as ‘market insurance’ and ‘market education’ (Becker 1981: 242, 243), with no acknowledgment of the state’s role in the development of these practices and no identification of when it developed. Becker implicitly identifies the causes of changes in gender roles with economic development, and, to some extent disguises the impact of the state within his discussion of modernization.
More important than this ambivalence, however, Becker does not clearly distinguish the impact of the state from that of the market, nor analyze the relationship between them. In fact, he expresses an explicit functional equivalence between 'the growth of public programs' in the twentieth century and 'the growth in the nineteenth century of private-market life insurance' (Becker 1981: 252) in their impact on the role of the family and, by extension, on female labour force participation. This equivalence between private market insurance and state programmes implies that Becker's positive evaluation of economic development should be expanded to include the development of the welfare state.

The implication of Becker's discussion in the Treatise's first edition is that the influence of the state and economic development are essentially parallel. The state provided programmes similar to market insurance and education. They removed functions related to the education of the young and the care of the elderly from families. By stripping away the functions of the family, the state (and economic growth) has freed women to participate in the formal labour market. Thus, in his consideration of the impact of the state, Becker introduces an additional ad hoc explanation of changes in the organization of families, further adding to its complexity/diminishing its parsimony. It is worth noting that this discussion of the state is embedded in consideration of the characteristics of modern societies.

The additional complexity introduced by parallel impacts of the state and economic growth influences on gender roles is consistent with a functionalist view of the role of the state. The sense that this putatively 'economic' explanation actually has functionalist underpinnings can be drawn out of Becker's account in the first edition of the Treatise. It is powerfully bolstered when the explicit and more extended analysis of the state in the final chapter of its second edition is considered, in which together with the market, the state is seen as promoting 'efficiency'. Beyond the bland assertion that all changes are consistent with 'efficiency', this perspective gives us little purchase on the empirical question of the impact of the (welfare) state on changing patterns of female labour force participation.

7.5 Conclusions
Modernization theory encompasses a sociological variant (conventionally deployed in the welfare state literature) and an economic variant associated with the ‘Chicago School’. Both of these variants provide us with ‘one path’ models of the impact of the welfare state on the employment trajectories of women in advanced capitalist societies. These ‘one path’ accounts may result from the explicit deployment of a deterministic (usually economistic) explanation, the use of complex, but essentially (functionally) unified accounts of modernization or a conceptually bizarre combination of the two. Nevertheless, neither variant of modernization theory provides us with much of a handle on the patterns of diversity and divergence found in the forms taken by social policy and national patterns of women’s employment.

Wilensky’s discussion of diffusion processes illustrates his deterministic view of what constitutes an adequate explanation (see Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 12-15). The purpose of this discussion is to question the usefulness of ‘diffusion’ theories. However, in Wilensky’s eagerness to do so, he deploys mutually inconsistent arguments. First, he calls doubt onto the ‘independent influence ‘of borrowing from one’s neighbor” because patterns of social policy emulation coincide ‘with patterns of economic growth and the spread of liberal ideologies’ (Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 13). This position suggests that the latter two factors should be regarded as prior to the former one, and that they wholly determine the process of social policy development leaving no space for policy emulation. However, he also suggests that evidence which implies that social policy development occurred initially in countries at a lower levels of modernization (Germany) and were adopted later in countries at a higher level (the UK) means that the model ‘loses its power to predict social-policy development’ Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 14 - emphasis added).

Within a less deterministic framework it is possible to view social policy development as requiring, but not being the inevitable concomitant of, a certain level of economic development. Given such a level, the timing, form and perhaps even the very existence of social policy is a matter of imagination and political choice. If coming up with the idea of (particular forms of) social policy is understood as a creative process, once it has been conceived in one place, it becomes available for
emulation. Moreover, after a policy has been implemented in one place, a particular policy (idea) would be expected to gain a greater ‘reality’ and have a stronger chance of being copied elsewhere.

However such emulation should not be regarded as inevitable - although perhaps not requiring the creativity needed initially. Further, all cross-national emulation should be expected to involve some modification of the policy or idea being copied, as the context into which it is brought will differ from that from which it originated (see Boyer 1997 for a discussion of this point). Building on the insights of the ‘family of nations’ approach, we might expect greater - and quicker - diffusion between countries which share some common linguistic, institutional or other features. Geographical proximity may also make diffusion more likely and faster.

An approach of this sort can provide an alternative interpretation of economic development itself. Wilensky views the level of economic development as an ‘internal characteristic’ of a country, while (policy) diffusion is seen as an external factor (Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 12). However, the emergence of capitalism or industrialism can be understood as a creative innovation which occurred at particular points in time and space and was subsequently emulated elsewhere. In this context it is particularly important to emphasize that this emulation took place both within the economy (entrepreneurs copying one another) and at the level of state policy (governments driving forward the industrialization of particular territories). It may be useful to borrow from these images of economic diffusion to understand processes of diffusion in gender roles, which also include influences at state and non-state levels. If economic change is viewed in this way, then space is also opened for a view of ‘modernization’ as providing the conditions for change rather than determining it (along similar lines to Pierson’s re-interpretation of these issues in relation to welfare state development 1991: 6-39). This approach allows us to retain some sense that common changes may have occurred or be occurring. However, it leaves considerable space for the resources and pressures of modernization to be used by social and political actors.
Chapter Eight: Women, Welfare and the Social Democratic and ‘Power Resource’ Models
8.1 An outline of the argument

Over the past twenty years the comparative political economy of the welfare state has been one of the most vibrant and fruitful fields of social science research. It has been substantially concerned with the strengths and weaknesses of ‘social democratic’ accounts of welfare state development. In early analyses, emphasis was placed on (various facets of) working class mobilization, with particular welfare states placed along a continuum between ‘residual’ and ‘institutional’ forms. Over time, emphasis has shifted away from these ‘linear’ accounts and greater attention has been given to the historical specificity of different forms of welfare state.

‘Power resource’ theory is, rightly, one of the most influential analytic approaches within this field (Esping-Andersen’s 1990 analysis is the key work). The ‘welfare state regime’ concept has facilitated wide ranging comparative analysis whilst holding out the possibility of theoretically useful generalization. Equally, however, the significance of the historical specificity and ‘structuration’ of ‘welfare states’ is acknowledged, resisting the temptation to reduce each regime to a thinly understood ‘case’. Moreover, Esping-Andersen’s analysis rests on a monumental effort in the construction and analysis of a comparative data-set on the welfare state.

At its most ambitious comparative ‘welfare state’ analysis is nothing less than an attempt to analyze distinct forms of capitalism (whether nationally or more broadly based). Welfare state analysis provides finer grained distinctions within capitalism than other styles of comparison (such as Albert’s 1993 influential account), identifying many more forms of welfare capitalism. Indeed, if all the categories and distinctions developed in the welfare state literature could be combined, almost every ‘welfare state’ would be ‘model’.

Notwithstanding its influence and ambition, the achievements of the power resource approach rest on insecure conceptual foundations. This insecurity is rooted in a failure to distinguish adequately between two meanings of the expression ‘the welfare state’. ‘The welfare state’ concept can refer to the ‘character’ of a state - it making an ontological claim about it. It is also used to refer to a sector of state activity. My
focus on female labour force participation, a topic which is within the scope of mainstream comparative welfare state analysis, but is right at its margin allows the nature of the conceptual flaw and its significance for theory to be seen clearly. As well as undermining important aspects of the power resource analysis, this conceptual confusion is present elsewhere in the comparative literature. Indeed many authors conflate the ontological and sectoral concepts of the welfare state or slide from one to the other, resulting in an exaggeration of the importance of ‘the welfare state’.

Despite the attempt to capture the variability of ‘welfare states’ through the development of the notions of different ‘worlds of welfare’ or ‘welfare state regimes’ within the mainstream power resource framework, a number of scholars argue that it remains partly trapped within the ‘social democratic model’ (Pierson 1991: especially at 215; Castles and Mitchell 1993; van Kersbergen 1995; and, from various feminist positions, Lewis 1992; Lewis and Astrom 1992; Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993). There is a good deal which is useful in these critiques. However, as they are not grounded in an adequate distinction between the ontological and sectoral definitions of the welfare state, many of these accounts misdiagnose problems in power resource analysis and overplay the extent to which a social democratic ‘bias’ within welfare state theory constitutes a flaw within it. In developing their own accounts, many of these analysts are actually trapped themselves by the elements of conceptual confusion which are present in power resource analysis.

I ground a (sympathetic) critique of the power resource approach on the distinction between ontological and sectoral images of the welfare state. As a consequence, the power resource analysis wrongly depicts the (form of the) welfare state as a primary cause of patterns of women’s participation in paid employment, and the changes to these patterns. I argue that the approach basically misconstrues the policy configurations of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ states. However, I believe that there is some justification for a ‘social democratic’ bias in normative aspects of the discussion of ‘the welfare state’ as a form of the state, at least if it can be modified and augmented to take gender better into account.

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Although providing a generally adequate account of developments in Sweden, the claim that the welfare state is a primary causal force is less persuasive outside Scandinavia. Esping-Andersen’s description of the pattern of rapid entry into the formal workforce in the USA is accurate. Women also gained some access to the high-wage, high skill segment of the economy, although they have been disproportionately represented in the low wage sector of the ‘dual’ labour market. Equally, the limited growth of female labour force participation in Germany and the comparatively strong hold of traditional forms of employment in the labour market are accurately described by Esping-Andersen. While ‘liberalism’ in the USA and ‘conservatism’ in Germany do have important consequences for women’s labour market participation, these consequences do not necessarily, or primarily, operate through welfare policy. A closer consideration of the policy configuration of the Dutch state and the impact of this configuration on women’s role in Dutch workforce than Esping-Andersen provides renders the notion that the Netherlands has, or is, a ‘social democratic welfare state regime’ problematic - at the very least the ‘social democratic’ quality of the Netherlands is restricted to social policy. Although Esping-Andersen’s contribution remains singular - in my view the most important made over the past twenty five years - ultimately, his attempt to provide the comparative analysis of welfare with adequate conceptual and normative foundation fails.

Lack of clarity concerning the two meanings of the expression ‘the welfare state’ has had unfortunate consequences beyond Esping-Andersen’s work. Partly, this flaw has been imported into other analyses where concepts have been borrowed from the power resource framework. Where analysts have sought to develop alternative perspectives by means of modifying and adapting concepts from the power resource analysis, their critical revisions of the initial framework have rarely gone far enough. While my principle concern here is with debates around the concept of ‘welfare state regimes’, the ambiguity discussed here is present in some other analyses of the welfare state. For example, as we have seen in the case study of the US, a self-consciously left-wing and ‘critical’ account, which might be expected to be sceptical about the claims of states to be welfare states slips egregiously from the ontological to
the sectoral conception of the welfare state. Ginsburg answers the concern that the US might not be a welfare state with reassurance that it certainly has one (1992: 98).

8.2 The scope and development of the social democratic model and its relation to other forms of comparative policy analysis

It will be clear by now that I am primarily concerned with the 'power resources' approach (and especially the work of Esping-Andersen), but my analysis covers much more. It includes: 'politics matters' studies; working class mobilization; families of nations accounts; analyses of 'social capitalism'; feminist 'power resource' analysis; some variants of institutionalism and studies of Scandinavia as well. Aside from modernization theory, much of the comparative analysis of 'welfare states' falls within my scope here. In some ways the label 'social democratic' is not an accurate description of all these approaches; some of the analyses on the list (arguably including Esping-Andersen's 1990), were explicit attempts to move away from the 'social democratic' approach.

What is 'social democratic' about the 'social democratic model'?

The normative (ontological) definition of the welfare state in power resource theory is intimately related to its conception of social democracy and the 'social democratic' experience of Scandinavia. The elision of the distinction between this ontological and the sectoral conception of the welfare state results in their empirical analysis of non-Scandinavian states being skewed by 'social democratic' assumptions. In addition, some analysts who attempt build on Esping-Andersen in order move further beyond the 'social democratic' approach by adopting and modifying the 'welfare state regime' framework fail to address this flaw decisively, and so remain trapped by it. The critique of social democratic bias may be trapped by these assumptions itself (see van Kersbergen 1995; Orloff 1993; O'Connor 1993).

The social democratic approach remains a key pole in debates about the welfare state. Many current approaches developed from more explicitly 'social democratic' roots (compare Castles 1978; 1989; 1993). Finally, other labels may be equally misleading - comparative political economy would encompass too much - including modernization.

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theories, while comparative public policy focuses too closely on government outputs, rather than social outcomes.

From continuum to typology

The theoretical and methodological evolution of the social democratic theory is a story of the change from a ‘linear’ account of welfare state development to analysis of multiple ‘welfare state’ forms. Despite appearances to the contrary, my argument suggests that this change cannot be fully achieved unless basic conceptual clarification is undertaken. The ‘linearity’ of the early literature is widely recognized as problematic and closely related to its social democratic bias. It refers to the idea that welfare states vary along a (single) continuum (usually) from ‘residual’ to ‘institutional’ ideal types (a distinction often attributed to Titmuss 1958, but see also Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). Its origins have been accurately diagnosed. They include: metatheoretical assumptions about progress; the use of the welfare state to test general theories about power and consequent lack of interest in the welfare state per se; the (related) weakness of conceptual and normative analysis of the welfare state; an idealization of the Swedish and/or Scandinavian experience (so-called ‘Swedocentrism’); the crude use of OLS regression techniques (especially those which used all western industrial democracies as equivalent and undifferentiated ‘cases’); as well as an approach basically rooted in a ‘social interpretation’ or a ‘sociology of politics’.

The (surprising) lack of interest in social policy (see also Esping-Andersen 1990) of much of the early welfare state literature contributed to its ‘linearity’. In it, the welfare state was used as a testing ground for general theories about power and development. Little attention was paid to conceptual and normative analysis. This lack of interest in the welfare state was compounded by an over-concentration on Sweden (and other Scandinavian states). Depicting Sweden as a ‘model’ weakens the impetus for conceptual analysis of, and the development of the normative justification for, the ‘welfare state’. The Swedish experience served these functions. Focusing on Sweden reflected and reinforced the literature’s social democratic bias. Its particular
welfare state configuration and social democratic political dominance (and, latterly, women's position in social welfare economy) were use to develop 'general' models.

Sweden's use as the 'model' welfare state is revealed in the structure of many influential studies. A number of them were designed as studies of Sweden (or Scandinavia) in comparative perspective (Castles 1978; Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983 - see Shalev 1983 for a critique of 'Swedocentrism') - often combining detailed analysis of Sweden, with a broader statistical analysis of other cases. Even where more detailed single country or comparative case studies were developed, Sweden was often chosen for analysis, because it was identified as an ideal type of a universalist or social democratic welfare state (see, for example, Ruggie 1984).

The use of cross-sectional statistical methods (particularly OLS regression analysis) also contributed to the 'linear' bias many of the early studies, although perhaps they were not essentially tainted in this way (see Shalev 1983 for the critique but compare Esping-Andersen's use of OLS techniques 1990). The technical bias of these analyses was strongly reinforced by their spuriously scientific 'confirmatory' mood, rather than a more open 'exploratory' one. On the basis of a very small number of cases results were presented as though they decisively confirmed that, say, working class strength or economic openness caused welfare state development. OLS techniques and 'Swedocentrism' tended to reinforce one another because Sweden was usually at the top of comparative ranking of welfare states. After a period during which grand claims were made on the basis of this sort of analysis, the debate settled down, and a number of factors were widely agreed to be influential.

The character of the data has had an impact on the results achieved in the early literature. The availability of reasonably comparable and moderately trustworthy data for advanced industrial countries was a precondition for the literature to develop. By the mid-1970s various international organizations, particularly the OECD (but also the ILO and UN) were publishing a range of relevant and broadly comparable statistics. However the heavy reliance on these 'official' statistics arguably distorted the literature by restricting the sorts of questions which could be answered, and perhaps
even those which the analysts would think of asking (Castles 1989: 5-7; Esping-Andersen and van Kersbergen 1992). As has been hinted at above, the use of the available comparative data tended to homogenize welfare states into a small number of aggregate indices (such as total government spending, social security spending) which did not necessarily capture what was conceptually significant (Esping-Andersen 1990: 19).

The ‘linearity’ of these analyses was not simply a technical matter. The background to the social democratic theory, is a Marxist influenced ‘social interpretation’ of politics, which makes ‘class’ central. Korpi’s anti-Leninist Marxism (1980; 1983) emphasizes the ‘social’ (for example, in his comparison of societal bargaining and corporatism) showing significant similarities with a ‘sociology of politics’ approach (see Sartori’s 1969 critical discussion; and Baldwin’s 1990 critique of ‘social interpretations’ of the welfare state).

The ‘working class mobilization’ approach did discuss mobilization, effectively as series of strategic choices would have positive or negative feedback effects on the space for future mobilization. Detailed examinations of Sweden analyzed the institutionalization of working and ruling class power resources at moments of ‘historic compromise’ between classes (Korpi 1983). Nevertheless, workers and capitalists sometimes appear as the two basic classes and the struggle between them as the basis for the explanation of political change. Despite an interest in the role of ‘intermediary’ classes - particularly in alliances and coalitions - the approach seems to assume that major changes are produced by the (inter)action of the two primary classes of any historical epoch. Class coalitions are important so far as they allow one of the major classes to achieve ‘historic’ change.

If analyses of the Swedish case grant some space to coalitions and compromise, the tension between these factors and (basic?) class analysis plays out differently in broader comparative analyses. Cross-nationally, patterns in party politics and industrial relations appear primarily manifestations of underlying class power. The extent of welfare state development seems to be attributed primarily to differences in
underlying social structure, as revealed by differences in patterns of working class organization (although emphasis on ‘organization’ might leave some space for politics - also see Esping-Andersen and Friedland 1982 for a qualitative coalitional comparison).

Much work has sought to move beyond the widely recognized weaknesses of ‘linear’ analyses (see especially Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles 1989; 1993) Important strides in this direction have been made. However, neither the ‘welfare state regime’ nor the ‘families of nations’ approaches have yet produced an adequate conceptual basis for the comparative analysis of ‘welfare states’. Both these approaches are potentially concerned with institutions, although their similarities may be disguised as analysts seek to emphasize the distinctiveness of their own analyses (against one another and the ‘new institutionalism’). Of course, the approaches are not identical. The ‘welfare state regime’ analysis does not effectively locate welfare policies within the state’s overall policy configuration, while the ‘family of nations’ approach may lose sight of these policy configurations within the broad ‘national political culture’. Greater attention to the precise location of welfare policy within the state’s overall policy configuration, might help to build a common basis for future research.

Historical paths, Institutional specificity and clusters of regimes
Notions of ‘power resources’, the implied strategic conception of class struggle and related emphasis on class coalitions gradually came to have a new significance as institutions were increasingly emphasized. For example, the power resource notion implies that a class might ‘invest’ its resources of power in particular (state or societal) institutional arrangements. If wisely done, these investments may enhance the power of the class, if foolishly, they may weaken it. Welfare state development was increasingly viewed in terms of alternating formative moments (historic compromises) and periods of relative stability or ‘normal politics’. Its strategic choices in the institutionalization of particular policies would feedback to help sustain or undermine the coalition. An increasing variety of paths and patterns of ‘welfare state’ development were analyzed. The welfarism of Bismarck in Germany and von Taaffe in Austria were seen as pre-empting working class politics. (Esping-Andersen
and Korpi 1984 discuss continental Europe as well as Scandinavia; Esping-Andersen 1985 compares developments within Scandinavia.)

Initially, however, the social democrats still assumed that the welfare state was essentially about class. The strategies and coalitions formed to create the welfare state, and created by it, were class strategies and coalitions. These classes seem to provide the dynamism of any coalition (implying that the possibility of a middle class welfare state is theoretically excluded - see Baldwin 1990 for a critique of this position).

Eventually, both the causes and the consequences of the welfare state became detached from a primary focus on class. Traditions of absolutist rule and catholic party strength (as well as working class strength) came to be seen as important causes of a number of distinct welfare state regimes. Although initially interested in the organizational capacity of the working class, as a more differentiated power resource analysis of the welfare state developed, the consequences of the welfare state for other groups, including state officials and women, came into focus (Esping-Andersen 1990).

Reconsidering the normative underpinning of the welfare state
Initially, social democrats justified their interest in the welfare state because it reflected and expanded working class power. As this justification faded, interest in the normative underpinnings of the welfare state increased with particular attention paid to social rights of citizenship (Marshall 1949/1992 - see Esping-Andersen 1985; 1990; Korpi 1989). Ironically, however, this normative analysis was strongly influenced by traces of class analysis. Effectively, a welfare state is one in which citizens have social citizenship rights, and these rights are defined by their capacity to de-commodify labour power (Esping-Andersen 1990). According to this definition, very few states approximate to welfare state status.

Developments within the power resources framework had parallels elsewhere. For example, Castles’ work moved away from ‘the cross-national aggregate data analysis
mode' (1989: 2) towards a greater concern with the 'puzzle, paradox or critical case' (1989: 10) in the context of general explanations (although within a universe of fewer than 25 cases, at least eight were treated as puzzling - a relatively large number).

Initially this endeavour was presented as the second stage of the earlier research project, 'with objectives substantially unchanged' (Castles 1989: 2), but a third wave moved decisively beyond the earlier account - rather than regarding national experiences as hard cases within a general explanation particular explanations would work for groups of states or 'families of nations' (1993).

8.3 The analysis of gender in the Social Democratic and 'Power Resource' Models

Greater space was opened for the consideration of gender issues as greater diversity of form in welfare provision came to be accepted. Initially, if gender was considered at all, it remained right at the margins of the analysis (for example, Korpi 1983: 154-156), with one major exception (Ruggie 1984) the ambition of which was partly thwarted by its research design. Some feminist analysts acknowledged and challenged the 'working class mobilization' approach, mainly (but not wholly) focusing on Scandinavia (particularly Hemes 1987, but also Piven 1985 and the contributions in Showstack-Sasson 1987). Acknowledgment of a greater diversity of welfare state forms also seems to have resulted in more consideration of gender in the mainstream analyses (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmidt 1993). However, feminist reactions to these theories (which also build on earlier feminist analyses) point the way to a gendered comparative analysis of welfare (Lewis, 1992; O'Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Daly 1994; Lister 1995).

'Linearity', the welfare state and gender roles

'Linear' accounts welfare state development left relatively little space for the analysis of gender issues, especially given their emphasis on class. The landmark analysis illustrates this point nicely (Korpi 1983). While Korpi is sympathetic to the women's movement, he does not explicitly link the statement that '... the perceptions of sex roles seem to be less traditional in Sweden than in most Western countries' to working class mobilization or 'institutional' social policy. In fact, the only explicit
connection he makes between class and gender is more defensive. He challenges the view that the cultural conservativism of workers makes them hostile to gender equality as being based on ‘meagre’ evidence. It fails to recognize the fact that workers are more progressive ‘on concrete reforms to increase equality between the sexes’. He seems to suggest that ‘... demands for equality and equal opportunities between the sexes ...’ develop according to a distinct feminist logic, as a ‘...continuation of the long historical struggle for the equal rights of women’. The position of women seems to be treated as incidental to welfare state development (Korpi 1983: 154-156).

In principle, the position of women could be viewed as a product of the welfare state or indeed of the same forces which produced a particular ‘welfare state’ form. Ruggie provides the main analysis of this sort (a ‘statist social democratic’ analysis 1984) which is basically ‘linear’ in form and ‘social democratic’ in substance but displays considerable ambivalence about the role of the state and policies aimed specifically at the position of women. Ultimately, better research design would show that the ‘linear’ and social democratic quality of the argument to be unsustainable.

This analysis is ‘linear’ in its identification of a ‘continuum produced by ... two ideal types’ of welfare state (Ruggie 1984: 12). Broadly speaking the UK ‘liberal welfare state’ corresponds to the notion of a residual social policy system while Sweden approximates to the ‘corporatist welfare state’ or institutional social policy (Ruggie 1984: 12-17). With the possible exception of the US, other ‘welfare states’ are apparently located along this continuum. The relationship of the US social policy system to these ideal types is not entirely clear (the analysis sometimes appears to be an attempt to help the US select between the Swedish and British examples). The favourable position of women in Sweden is largely understood as an outcome of non-gender factors, powerfully reinforcing the ‘linearity’ of the analysis. Emphasis is placed on same explanatory factors (particularly working class mobilization) as those stressed initially by social democratic theorists. The core proposition is that ‘the differential role of the state vis-à-vis women workers ... reflects the differential status of labor more generally’ (Ruggie 1984: 298).
As we have seen the 'linearity' of the social democratic literature is associated with its 'social interpretation' of politics (Sartori 1969; Baldwin 1990) and becomes difficult to sustain if the state can have 'autonomous' or 'feedback' (Lowi 1964; Pierson 1994) effects on social outcomes. However, 'statism' was weakly conceptualized in Ruggie's analysis - the issue of whether autonomous or feedback state effects exist is not resolved clearly. The role of the state is set in opposition to 'economic determinants' and 'women specific factors' rather than with other social factors, including class/labour, which are largely assimilated with the state. The relationship of the 'state centred' perspective and the (then) dominant social democratic anti-statist 'societal bargaining' analysis is largely left hanging (see Ruggie 1984: 165, 251).

The second area of ambivalence concerns the role of 'women specific factors' and gender policies. The argument that gender equality requires 'specific measures' was made at times (Ruggie 1984: 162). However, the potential success of these measures requires a powerful general framework for equality. Moreover, specific equality measures for working women in Sweden are often attributed to working class mobilization, and, in formal legal terms these measures seem weaker in Sweden than in the UK, but practically they are more effective.

Although only at the margins of the statist social democratic account of gender, Ruggie raised some questions about the sustainability women's position in Sweden. First, occupational segregation remained higher in Sweden than in the UK (Ruggie 1984: 61, and in more detail in 1988). Secondly, she noted 'an apparent halt in further progress for women' and argued that further selective measures for women are necessary for the re-starting of that progress. Moreover, Ruggie stated that '[t]hus far, women workers in Sweden have allowed their interests to be pursued by dominant coalitions speaking on their behalf' implying that some specific female mobilization might be required '[f]or the successful achievement of their [women’s] employment pursuits'. Nevertheless, for Ruggie, for this opportunity for further political/policy developments to emerge 'women must be incorporated into labor, and labor must be incorporated into the governing coalition' (Ruggie 1984: 345 - 346 - greater emphasis
on female political mobilization in 1988). Several peculiarities of the Swedish situation - particularly the extreme occupational segregation by gender - were effectively glossed over, making it appear 'better' for women than the evidence warrants.

Her explanation of changes in women's workforce participation would not have been generally sustained had Ruggie's research been designed differently. The analysis of the Swedish and UK cases is very helpful, but it is not clear that they both represent ideal types of the welfare state, never mind that they represent the extremes of a 'continuum' along which other welfare states are ranged. The analysis relies too much on the peculiarities of the particular states examined. As a consequence, generalizing results from these two cases is dangerous.

The flawed research design also makes it difficult to establish the causes of the particular advantages for working women in Sweden or the weakness of the position of women in the UK. Factors such as the evolution of family law in Sweden in the early part of the twentieth century, and the consequences of an ongoing debate on population and gender cannot be 'controlled' out of the analysis in a study of this kind. All in all a broader comparison than that of the UK and Sweden would have avoided these mistakes.

Beyond linearity: feminism, social democracy and power resources

Although no single wide-ranging comparative analysis of gender and welfare has emerged, the theoretical basis for such an account has begun to be laid. Largely (but not wholly) ignored in the mainstream literature feminist scholars have been analysing the relationship of the welfare state and women's position in a variety of countries since the early 1980s. The relationship between women's political agency and 'welfare state' developments which address their concerns has been a particular issue here (see, for example, Piven 1985 on the US; Balbo 1987 on the UK; Hernes 1987 on Scandinavia). This concern mirrors the social democratic interest in class. The literature on Scandinavia was notably vigorous and applied social citizenship concepts
to the position of women. It engaged with the mainstream ‘power resource’ analysis

Increased awareness of the variety of ‘welfare state’ forms dramatically increased the
potential for dialogue between ‘mainstream’ (particularly ‘power resource’) accounts
and more explicitly gendered or feminist analyses. For a start, more space for the
consideration of gender was made within the ‘mainstream’, albeit without adequately
integrating it into the analysis - Esping-Andersen (1990) again stands out as a turning
point. Gender is considered briefly in the conceptual and normative analysis of
welfare states, and at more length in parts of the empirical analysis. Women are
effectively ignored when attention turns from general issues to the detailed conceptual
and normative specification ‘the welfare state’ (this much has been criticized in
subsequent feminist work, as we shall see in a moment). Moreover, he considers
women mainly in the second part of his account, where the impact of social policy on
labour markets is analyzed, rather than the first part, which concerns the internal
configuration of welfare policies. Nevertheless, each of the forms of welfare is
associated with a distinctive causal pattern, implying that a variety of causal forces
combine in a number of different ways to bring various welfare regimes into being,
and potentially allowing that gendered factors might be relevant. The potential for
this dialogue was also improved by the increased attention paid to the conceptual and
normative basis of the welfare state, a previously somewhat neglected issue in the
comparative literature.

The key question concerns whether and how the broad pattern of explanation
proposed in the power resource analysis might be extended to explain variation in the
position of women. In principle a number of alternative possibilities exist. For
example, the analysis of gender is sometimes effectively reduced to an aspect of the
situation of the working class. According to this approach, changes in gender relations
would be caused by the same factors which change the position of the working class.
Along similar lines, other analysts treat changes in gender relations as a kind of
unintended consequence of the development of the welfare state. Power resource
analysts have regarded the working class as a major protagonist for the welfare state
while at the same time being shaped by it. Sometimes advocates of this approach suggest that as a result of the (unintended) mobilization of women, gender divisions are on the point of taking a similar place class conflicts in the structuration of the welfare state.

By contrast, some analysts argue that the welfare state has always been as much a matter of gender as of class (for example Gordon 1988; Abramovitz 1988). Mostly, those presenting this sort of analysis suggest that the welfare state bolsters patriarchy, rather than (potentially) emancipating women. A certain amount of historical work has been done on the influence of women in the formation of the welfare state. Although this work does provide a basis for arguing that as well as becoming important in the future, gender power resources have been important in the past. However, this work generally accepts that proposals made specifically to enhance the position of women were (mostly) unsuccessful during initial period of welfare state formation. No-one has (yet) made a detailed case that differences in women’s mobilization/power resources have already introduced cross-national welfare state variations.

Families of Nations

Gender issues have also found more space within the second major ‘multi-dimensional’ approach - the ‘families of nations’ school. However, in these analyses welfare policies and the overall state policy configuration are replaced by broader notions of political culture clustering into ‘families of nations’. This approach suggests that the fundamental differences between nations are rooted in clusters of traditions and the institutions to which they give rise, designated by the notion ‘culture’. The fundamental explanation of the ‘clustering’ of various policy regimes and social characteristics lies with the common cultural roots of ‘families’ of nations. There is no presumption that ‘policy’ or ‘the state’ play a fundamental role in the structuration of society. Instead such social characteristics as the levels of inequality or female labour force participation may be as much a product of the underlying culture, as they are of, say, the character of the welfare state. Indeed, the welfare state itself might be regarded as a distinct cultural product.
Thus key 'family of nations' analyses of welfare pay little attention to gender (Castles and Mitchell 1993), while an exploration of the gendered nature of labour force participation deals with welfare policy only at a very general and aggregate level (Schmidt 1993). The 'concept' which motivates the account of low levels of (change in) female labour force participation is 'being a 'Germanic' country' (clustering Germany, Austria and Switzerland). However, emphasis on these 'Germanic' countries makes it difficult to account for Italy and Ireland which both show (according to Schmidt's own data for 1960 and 1985) low levels of, and little change in, women's participation in the formal labour market. Nor does it make sense of the Dutch case where the overall level of female labour force participation remains the OECD's lowest, despite some change, or the Japanese experience of a fall in women's participation, albeit at a level a higher level. Moreover, the 'Germanic' states encompass at least two types of 'welfare state', as both categorizations place Switzerland within the 'liberal' group, while Austria and Germany are 'conservative' (see Schmidt 1993: especially Table 5.2 at 182; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990).

Feminist power resource analysis

Building on the insights of earlier accounts of welfare in particular states or small groups of states in the 1990s feminists began to develop frameworks for general comparative analysis (Lewis, 1992; O'Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Daly 1994). These accounts criticize, but also build upon, the social democratic analysis of the welfare state (particularly Esping-Andersen 1990). They have made two main contributions. Some have pointed to states which do not fit within Esping-Andersen's comparative typology as far as gender relations are concerned (see, for example, the role of France in Lewis 1992).

Secondly, many feminists have developed a critique of the normative and methodological bases of Esping-Andersen's analysis (Lewis 1992) and develop alternatives which could form the basis of gendered typologies for comparative analysis (O'Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Daly 1994). They engage with the workerist
bias of the concept of 'de-commodification' used as the normative basis for the welfare state. Typically they attempt to broaden it into a concept of 'independence' or 'autonomy' by adding new 'dimensions' of social, economic and political life which cover 'hidden' areas of women's dependency and point to potential state policies (and perhaps other social changes) which might contribute to the emancipation of women.

8.4 A critical assessment of social democratic theory and its analysis of women's role in the workforce

I turn, now, to the core of my argument. I have already suggested that there is a lack of clarity about the definition of the 'welfare state' concept. Ontological and sectoral usages of the notion - whether a state is or has a welfare state - need to be distinguished from one another more sharply. The key effect of this conceptual confusion is to exaggerate the significance of 'the welfare state' in contemporary political economy. For example, changes in gender relations, particularly in women's participation in the formal labour market, are falsely attributed to the welfare state, as we have seen in the case studies of the USA, Germany and the Netherlands.

Power resource analysts point to the weakness of earlier welfare state conceptions, as well as investing some effort in developing a seemingly clear conceptual framework for welfare state analysis (Esping-Andersen 1990: 1-5; 18-23). It is ironic that, while claiming to sweep aside the conceptual weakness of the earlier literature, the power resource school itself remains trapped by a very similar flaw - it does not use a clear and consistent conceptualization of the welfare state. The mainstream power resource approach has revolutionized the comparative analysis of welfare states, allowing greater space for the analysis of distinct 'welfare state regimes'. However, the extent of this achievement is questionable. The analysis of non social democratic welfare state regimes is certainly inadequate - the concept of the 'welfare state regime' itself may be problematic. Moreover, because they have not engaged with it at a sufficiently fundamental level, even critical engagements with power resource analysis have perpetuated some of its flaws.
At root, the theoretical and normative facets of the power resource analysis are basically concerned with the welfare state as a form of the state but its empirical account is grounded on a sectoral view of welfare provision, and primarily concerned with social policy. The empirical analysis periodically does allude to the ontological concept of the welfare state, thus, falsely sustaining the impression that the analysis is integrated. The normative analysis provides the impression that the welfare state is at the heart of the national political economy, but suggests that few, if any, states qualify as welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22 - 23). The more sectorally oriented concepts deployed in the empirical analysis allow all established capitalist democracies to be classed as welfare states. In combination, such claims make the welfare state appear as the central characteristic of contemporary capitalist political economy. The elision of the distinction between the ontological and sectoral images, and exaggeration of the importance, of ‘the welfare state’ 1) are closely bound up with the continuing social democratic bias of the power resource approach, 2) entwined with the notion of ‘welfare state regimes’ and, 3) confuse its analysis of stratification.

Confusion of the ontological and sectoral welfare state conceptions is entangled with the continuing social democratic bias of power resource analysis. Social democratic (and mostly Swedish) characteristics underpin the ontological definition of ‘the welfare state’ - its conception as a form of the state. There is some justification for this approach - ‘welfare’ may come closest to being the ‘purpose’ of the state in Scandinavia. However, this sort of definition comes close to equating ‘welfare statism’ and social democracy. In comparative analyses covering a number of states, power resource analysts effectively shift to a sectoral welfare state definition. In so doing states within which social policy (and the broad configuration of policy) is organized around principles quite distinct from - perhaps inimical too - ‘welfare’ and social democracy come into the analysis. Because the sectoral and ontological conceptions of the welfare state are not distinguished from one another, some ‘social democratic’ elements taint the comparative analysis of social policy (compare with Castles and Mitchell 1993; Pierson 1991).
In principle, power resource theory espouses an unequivocally broad conception of the welfare state. For example, Esping-Andersen aims 'to follow ...[a] ... broad approach' to the welfare state 'fram[ing] its questions in terms of political economy'. 'In the broad[...] view ... issues of employment, wages and overall macro-economic steering are considered integral components in the welfare-state complex '. Here the welfare state encompasses more that 'conventional social-amelioration policies' also considering 'employment and general social structure' (1990: 2). Moreover, he argues that 'our personal life is structured by the welfare state, and so is the entire political economy' (1990: 141). This perspective may be sustainable for a social-democratic, de-commodifying ‘welfare state’ (the welfare state as state form). Other state policy configurations may be organized according to quite different principles, if they are ‘organized’ at all. Employment, wages, macro-economic steering and, indeed, social policy itself may be mutually inconsistent, and/or directed towards objectives other than the welfare of the citizenry, such as military capacity or sustaining a particular economic structure.

The ontological image of the welfare state is deeply entrenched in the normative concept on which the power resource analysis is grounded, the social rights of citizenship. This notion suggests that the distinct forms of (welfare) state and (social) citizenship are mutually constitutive. Focusing on workers as individuals, power resource analysts suggest that if welfare provisions are to constitute social rights, they remove workers from market-dependence - or de-commodify labour. A state is a welfare state if it de-commodifies labour. This rule has important implications and limits, as I will show in the next section on the (ontological) welfare state’s normative foundations. Subsequent sections consider the ‘welfare state regime’ concept going on to consider its relationship to stratification and the labour market, in each of these areas showing that the analysis is flawed by slippage between ontological and sectoral conceptions of the welfare state.

Citizenship: De-commodification and autonomy; workers and women
De-commodification is an odd concept on which to ground welfare state analysis. It is a negative notion, the opposite of commodification. As commodification is closely
related to market liberalism defining the welfare state in terms of de-commodification constructs it as ‘anti-liberalism’. De-commodification definitions of the welfare state make it difficult to distinguish between ‘social democratic’ and ‘conservative (familialist)’, but anti-liberal capitalist social policy. Esping-Andersen attempts to distinguish them by identifying conservative social policy with ‘pre-commodification’. However, it is not clear how pre-commodification could be distinguished from de-commodification in the analysis of contemporary welfare states. Moreover, this notion re-introduces a whiff of linearity to the analysis if conservatism is treated as ‘pre-commodification’, liberalism as ‘commodification’ and social democracy as ‘de-commodification’. Ironically, many comparative analyses have also defined the social policy of most states negatively, by its failure to reach social democratic standards (on this point see Shalev 1983; Baldwin 1989; 1990; van Kersbergen 1995).

If a welfare state is a state in which citizens have social rights, then we should be suspicious about the almost exclusive focus on workers in mainstream power resource analysis, as a number of feminist critics have argued (inter alia Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993; Daly 1994; Sainsbury 1996). Shifting attention back to citizens may help to correct the negative ‘anti-liberal’ bias of power resource analysis, and hence to distinguish welfare states from conservative social policy. The key attribute of citizens is their autonomy or independence, albeit within a particular social context.

In fact, a closer examination of the principle of ‘de-commodification’ itself leads swiftly to a notion of independence or autonomy - a ‘de-commodified’ worker is clearly understood as independent of market forces. Esping-Andersen (1990: 28) gives more than a few hints that for a state to qualify as a welfare state the market independence of a worker must not thrust him (or her?) back onto familial dependence, although these hints are inadequately developed in the argument. The argument over the substance of individual ‘autonomy’ is essentially an argument between liberalism and social democracy. Analysis of the social capitalism of Christian Democracy from within a modified ‘power resource’ perspective is
somewhat ambivalent on this point. Although state policy might be regarded as 'de-
commodifying' male workers, removing them from the direct 'whip' of the market,
the purpose of state policy is self actualization not independence, and self
actualization is substantively defined in terms of finding oneself within relations of
familial (and broader social) mutual dependence (van Kersbergen wants to retain a
notion of Christian democratic de-commodification, but is much more convincing on

The question of the relationship of de-commodification and independence or
autonomy as a founding normative value for the welfare state understood
ontologically raises gender issues. Some self-styled feminist power resource analysts
have explicitly developed a normative and conceptual analysis of the welfare state as a
form of the state in terms of independence/autonomy, or, more precisely
‘independence within interdependence’, as they argue that complete independence is
normatively unattractive and empirically unattainable (O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993).
However, even here, the failure to ground the critique of mainstream power resource
teacher on a distinction between ontological and sectoral welfare state concepts limits
the plausibility of otherwise important contributions.

After developing the argument that the welfare state ought to be defined in terms of
independence within interdependence, some feminist power resource analysts do not
push the argument through to its logical conclusion. Orloff’s influential (1993)
argument is that the power resource theory has analyzed three ‘dimensions’ of the
welfare state (state-market relations; stratification; and social citizenship rights/de-
commodification), but that these need to be gendered and supplemented by two more -
access to paid work and the ability to form and maintain autonomous households. In
effect, she misses the difference between power resource theory’s conceptual
foundation (de-commodification/social rights) and the framework for the comparative
analysis of social policy in terms of stratification.

A combination of the social democratic bias of power resource theory with the
inadequate distinction of the ontological and sectoral conception of the welfare state
may make stratification and de-commodification appear as two ‘dimensions’ of welfare state analysis which work on the same conceptual level. However, de-commodification is so closely theoretically entwined with ‘socialist’ welfare stratification principles and hence the social democratic welfare state regime that the latter does not constitute a fully separate concept (a point is nicely demonstrated in the ‘family of nations’ critique - Castles and Mitchell 1993: 102 - 105). In effect, the de-commodification concept is the normative core from which the analysis of social democracy and liberalism develop, with the account of conservatism based on distinct empirical indices, which are not grounded in a conceptual or normative analysis.

The feminist position develops a richer normative definition of what constitutes a welfare state, building on arguments around de-commodification, and augmenting them with discussion of ‘access to paid work’ and ‘the ability to form and maintain autonomous households’ - two new gender ‘dimensions’. Orloff explicitly considers whether these ‘dimensions’ of the welfare state ought to be regarded as aspects of a ‘unitary concept of individual independence, or better yet, a concept of self-determination within webs of interdependencies (complete autonomy does not exist)’. Ultimately, however, she rejects this approach, preferring ‘that separate dimension deal with different social relations’ (1993: 320). Had a deeper critique of the mainstream power resource analysis been developed, then the grounding concept of independence within interdependence could have been used to define various social and social policy ‘dimensions’, rather than being seen as opposed to them.

Three further characteristics of the feminist power resource approach are worth noting. First, even the three ‘dimensions’ do not seem to be of equal status. That relating to ‘autonomous households’ seems to be conceptually prior to those relating to access to paid work and de-commodification. The latter two dimensions are practical pre-conditions for, but not automatically constitutive of, autonomy of, and within, households. Second, the dimensions amount to a descriptively and normatively rather ‘thick’ substantive account of what ‘independence within interdependence’ would look like. Finally, because this account is a substantive statement of the characteristics a state (society and economy) would have to display in
order to qualify as a welfare state its application as a framework for comparative analysis of social policy may be limited. Its implication is that even fewer states qualify as welfare states than the power resource normative analysis would allow (as Orloff herself hints 1993: 303 fn. 1). Because it does not concern itself with an analysis of social policy in states which fail the test for welfare state status, or the political forces which created 'welfare states' (aside from remarking that organized women attempted to influence the formation of 'welfare states', but generally failed to have a decisive impact), it may not have much purchase on empirical variations in the configurations of welfare policy provision.

There is a sense then, in which the social democratic bias of power resource analysts is justified, when compared to other mainstream analyses of the welfare state. Using the notion of the social rights of citizenship to define the welfare state means that such a state takes a distinct form, in which the full range of state activities are implicated in and subordinated to 'welfare'. Indeed, for a state to qualify as a welfare state in these terms, it must have considerable influence over the broad trajectory of the political economy as well. Non-social democratic traditions of social policy may indeed mean that workers are not wholly treated as commodities and indeed, may bulk large within their domestic political economies. However, the purpose and general impact of these policies may be to contribute to the construction of a 'conservative' status bound pattern of labour market stratification. It is hard to reconcile this form of social policy with the normative definition of the 'welfare state'. The feminist critique demonstrates that the power resource analysis is flawed by social democratic and workerist biases, but that these flaws allow too many states to seem to qualify as welfare states.

Welfare State Regimes

Power resource analysts put the welfare state regime notion to a number of mutually incompatible uses. It plays a central role in disguising the elision of the ontological and sectoral conceptions of the welfare state, helping to hide the continuing social democratic bias in the power resource approach and exaggerating the importance of 'the welfare state' in contemporary political economy. Within power resource theory
the concept of the 'welfare state regime' refers to a broad (ontological) conception of
the welfare state. However, it is also deployed to facilitate the comparative analysis
of social policy in a wide range of established capitalist democracies. Variation is
allowed in 'welfare state regimes' while they all retain something in common as
'welfare state regimes', leaving the precise scope and status of 'welfare state regime'
unclear. How far is it a 'sectoral' concept, concerned with the internal organization of
social policy, or does it range more widely? What is the relationship of 'welfare state
regimes' to the 'pension regimes' and, particularly the 'labour market regimes' which
Esping-Andersen also discusses?

When espousing a broad view of the welfare state as encompassing 'employment,
wages and overall macro-economic steering', Esping-Andersen states that ... [t]his is
also why we prefer to employ terms such as 'welfare capitalism' and 'welfare state
regimes'. ... To talk of 'a regime' is to denote the fact that in the relations between
state and economy a complex of legal and organizational features are systematically
interwoven' (1990: 2). This conception sits nicely with a definition of the welfare
state in terms of de-commodification, according to which the overall policy
configuration of the state is turned to 'welfarist' purposes - a welfare state conception
which categorizes very few states as 'welfare state'.

Yet Esping-Andersen does not eschew a general comparative analysis. He uses the
'regime' concept itself to allow more states within the 'welfare state' category than
permitted by his normative analysis, while seemingly making space for greater
variation among welfare states by introducing three distinctive 'welfare state regimes'
- the liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes (probably the most widely
recognized features of his analysis). The explicit reference of the 'regime' concept
here is relatively narrow - it is mostly concerned with the internal characteristics of
social policy, occasionally branching out to the public-private mix in welfare
provision. These two uses of the regime notion lend the analysis a spurious
consistency. The question of the scope of the welfare state regime concept requires
further attention.
Moreover, Esping-Andersen introduces other ‘regime’ concepts - in particular those of pension regimes and, more important, labour market regimes, without ever spelling out their relationship to the ‘welfare state regime’. This lack of clarity is relatively unimportant in the case of pension regimes which fall ‘within’ the welfare state. It is much more problematic in the case of labour market regimes, where Esping-Andersen seems to want to eat his cake and have it, by including employment policies within conceptions of ‘welfare state regimes’, whilst also distinguishing them from ‘labour market regimes’, and using the latter to validate the former. I will analyze the relationship between ‘welfare state regimes’ and stratification before returning to the labour market issues.

Stratification

Esping-Andersen’s empirical analysis of stratification and ‘welfare state regimes’ fails fully to clarify whether the concern is with stratification within social policy or more broadly - it can be read in both ways. Initially, he is mainly concerned with the internal organization of social policy and benefits (1990: 55 - 78, although it is concerned with the relationship between public and private health care and pensions). In other words, he develops a novel, but narrow, analysis of the welfare state as ‘social policy’ - a sector of state activity. The impact of this ‘internal’ welfare stratification on overall social stratification is discussed only in general terms. However, in several places he implies that a broader notion of the welfare state is being used. Here, as elsewhere, the general implication is that the welfare state is the central feature of contemporary political economy, an idea sustained idea by eliding the two welfare state concepts.

In his theoretical reflections on stratification, it is unclear whether Esping-Andersen is concerned with the impact of social policy on stratification outcomes, or with welfare states (or social policy regimes) as ‘systems of stratification’. He implicitly criticizes the notion that the welfare state ‘just ... intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the system of inequality’ in order to assert that ‘it is, in its own right, a system of stratification’ (1990: 23). Yet, later, immediately after re-asserting the notion that the welfare state (regime?) ‘is also, and always has been, a system of social stratification’,
he shifts ground to focus on the impact of the welfare state in 'the structuring of class and social order ... [the] organization features of the welfare state help determine the articulation of social solidarity, divisions of class, and status differentiation' (1990: 55 emphasis added) which is similar to the notion of the welfare state as an intervention which he originally criticized.

In other words, Esping-Andersen slides between a conceptualization of stratification 'within' the welfare state and the 'impact' of the welfare state on general patterns of stratification in society (while showing considerable ambivalence about the latter view). The conflation of these views may be given some apparent empirical support in a couple of cases. In Sweden we might expect the internal features of 'welfare state' stratification to be broadly the features of societal stratification. Equally, welfare stratification and social stratification may follow similar patterns if large scale welfare provision follows patterns of societal stratification, and therefore reflects (and perhaps reproduces) them (as may occur in Germany), although the welfare state is not the primary cause of stratification in this case. However, in the US case the two do not correspond at all.

These stratification issues play themselves out in the encounter between 'power resource' and 'family of nations' accounts of welfare. The manner in which theoretical preconceptions about 'the welfare state' taint power resource analysts' empirical investigation of 'stratification' is analyzed sharply by Castles and Mitchell (1993: 100 - 107). They themselves are explicitly concerned with redistribution, rather than with the conferral of status. They sometimes read Esping-Andersen as sharing redistribution as a central concern (compare 1993: 98, 104 and 102). When they argue that his 'operationalization makes absolutely no sense in terms of a Socialist principle of stratification' (1993: 104) Castles as Mitchell are, I think, arguing about the redistributive impact of social policy. Despite the ambiguity, the bulk of Esping-Andersen's empirical analysis of stratification is concerned with the internal patterns shown by social policy (or at least the public-private welfare mix), rather than its redistributive impact on overall patterns of stratification. In terms of the internal
organization of (the public-private mix in) welfare, his operationalization does make 'a sort of sense'.

The exposure of the lack of clarity in Esping-Andersen's consideration of stratification is helped considerably by the Castles and Mitchell analysis, particularly on the issue of whether it is concerned with overall social relations or mainly those 'within the welfare mix'. It also contributes a useful analysis of taxation and expenditure policy on income (in)equality (as measured by Gini coefficients) and of the impact of state policy on general patterns of stratification. However, the full significance of this contribution can only be felt in the context of a broader approach which analyses relationships between, first, social policy, second, the public private welfare mix, third, broader patterns of state policy and finally the overall configuration of the political economy.

Moreover, while theoretical debate concerning the nature of the welfare state should be analytically distinguished from the empirical and theoretical issues surrounding the comparative analysis of state policy configurations and the welfare mix, the two do remain interconnected. As far as the definition of the welfare state is concerned, as we have seen, the values which seem to lie behind power resource accounts are less concerned than is common with 'equality' as a foundational normative principle for state welfare. If worked through to its conclusion, the power resource approach seems to ground 'the welfare state' on a notion of autonomy.

Welfare state regimes and labour market regimes
In its second part The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, turns to the study of welfare states as 'independent causal variables' (Esping-Andersen 1990: 141). Through these analyses, Esping-Andersen treats all established capitalist democracies as welfare states, and considers the welfare state in terms of its 'centrality' in structuring 'our personal life and the entire political economy' (1990: 141). The empirical analysis of the 'impact' of the welfare state is mainly concerned with employment, and considers women's labour market participation in some detail.
However, the relationship between employment and the welfare state is not fully specified.

As we have seen, in his theoretical discussion, Esping-Andersen depicts employment policy as closely connected to welfare, arguing that the 'regime' concept signifies a broad conception of the welfare state, encompassing 'wages, employment and overall macro-economic steering' (1990: 2). This usage suggests that employment is part of the overall welfare state regime (and the regime concept signals an ontological understanding of the welfare state). Later the ground shifts subtly. The premise of the empirical analysis of labour markets is that different welfare state forms cause different patterns in employment, suggesting that employment might be regarded as closely connected with, but external to, the welfare state regime. Indeed, the purpose of introducing the new concept of the labour market regime is, it seems, (partially) to externalize employment from the welfare state. Esping-Andersen’s argument would remain broadly plausible, it seems to me, if he can maintain that (variations in) welfare state regimes cause (differences among) labour market regimes.

However, in the detailed analysis of the relationship between the welfare state and patterns of employment, the language of causality slips away to be replaced by a language of association - they go ‘hand in hand’ or ‘tend to coincide’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 142, 159). In principle, of course, even a one-to-one correspondence of welfare state and labour market regimes would not demonstrate that a causal relation exists, but without such a correspondence a causal relation cannot be present. Caution about causality may be well advised. For all the discussion of the dovetailing of welfare and labour market policies, there are important examples where they do not co-incide. Moreover, detailed accounts of the exemplars of each three welfare state regimes fail to show the claimed causal impact on the labour market, although a broad association between each of the welfare regimes and patterns of female employment can sometimes be shown.

*The liberal regime*
The liberal regime is most problematic, in the sense that it is most difficult to assert that this regime directly causes a particular pattern of female labour force participation, either intentionally, or as its unintentional by-product. Power resource analysts depict this pattern as one of extreme inequality, with large numbers of 'junk jobs' and a small number of good jobs, but a situation in which women and men hold broadly equal proportions of each kind of job. As we have seen in the case-study of the USA, this approach sometimes gives the impression that the position there is one that the unmodified market would produce, rather than being the product of a particular interaction of economic activity and public policy (1990: 215). In other words, rather than being the product of the liberal welfare regime, the emergence of US type patterns of female labour market activity are the product of other forces, which simply have not been altered by the 'welfare state'. In this case it would seem more accurate to suggest that this pattern of female employment is associated with, rather than caused by, the liberal welfare regime. Moreover, the question remains whether both the welfare regime and the pattern of employment would both be better regarded as the products of some other deeper social, political or economic forces.

The conservative regime

The conservative welfare state regime, which is particularly influenced by Catholicism, is partly based on support for the traditional family, and therefore has a rationale for minimizing female labour force participation. Moreover, Esping-Andersen provides considerable evidence that female labour force participation has not grown rapidly in Germany, the exemplar of conservatism in this account. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the lack of growth of female labour force participation is a direct consequence of state policy. Explaining why something 'failed' to occur is problematic. Sometimes the German state appears to be 'blamed' for failing to follow, say, the Swedish pattern of welfare employment. What evidence we do have that German state policies restrict female employment, for example that tax policy includes a substantial disincentive for two wage earner couples (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 159), is presented almost incidentally - as an afterthought to the main thrust of the analysis. It is, however, hard to attribute the peculiar mix of a relatively strong employment record in manufacturing and extraordinarily weak (public or private)
service sector growth to the desire to restrict the opportunities for women to find paid work, although this employment pattern probably did have that effect. Moreover, the strength of manufacturing and the weakness of the service sector are peculiarities of Germany, and cannot be generalized to all conservative welfare regimes.

Although some aspects of state policy clearly operate to restrict female labour force participation, it seems at least as plausible, if not more so, that both the character of the welfare regime and the pattern of female employment can be attributed to some deeper common cause. Nonetheless, it is important to allow for some mutually reinforcing interaction between them. Schmidt (1993) suggests that the explanation may be sought in the ‘Germanic’ character of several low female labour force participation nations, although this suggestion brings problems of its own in train. In particular, it fails to deal with a number of cases of low levels of and/or limited growth in female labour force participation outside the group of Germanic nations, including the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and, perhaps, Japan.

Analysis of ‘social capitalism’ and the impact of Catholicism and Christian Democracy on social policy go some way towards addressing the European states poorly accounted for in the Schmidt analysis. A key (sympathetic) critique of the power resource approach, is concerned with its social democratic bias, and develops just such an analysis. However, it also illustrates the widespread nature of confusion about the ontological and sectoral images of the welfare state. Moreover, given that this analysis is constructed using its conceptual tools (including ‘de-commodification’ and ‘welfare state regimes’) it too exaggerates the role of the welfare state in the political economy of capitalism.

The analysis of ‘social capitalism’ conflates the welfare state with the broader policy configuration of the state or indeed with the overall configuration of the political economy. As we have seen in the context of the German case, analysis of the impact of the Christian Democratic welfare state on female labour market participation actually tests the influence of Christian Democratic political strength. As a result it assumes that this influence operates through the welfare state rather than marshalling
evidence that it does. Moreover, the risk exists that Christian Democratic power is a proxy for some other factor - such as the social influence of Catholicism - rather than being a causal force in its own right (see van Kersbergen 1995: 144).

The social democratic regime

The social democratic or socialist regime coincides with a full employment regime, of a sort which seeks to encourage high levels of labour force participation. While this combination may describe Sweden and Norway accurately, it completely misdescribes the Netherlands, which is the sole non-Scandinavian example of the social democratic welfare state regime. Indeed, although he does not explain why a social democratic welfare state regime should fall in this category, Esping-Andersen himself places the Netherlands in the category of 'welfare states that strongly nourish exit and reduced labour supply, along with a number of continental European conservative welfare states (1990: 159). A similar point can be made in relation to the differences in the labour market position of women between France (see Lewis 1992) and Germany, both classed as by Esping-Andersen as conservative welfare regimes.

Scandinavian welfare state regimes have a more direct, although arguably initially unintentional impact on female labour force participation (subsequently however, 'maximum female labour-force participation' became 'a principle of social policy' according to Esping-Andersen 1990: 155). The massive expansion of the welfare state associated with this regime resulted in a large number of new jobs, which were mostly filled by women. Thus the welfare state 'caused' an increase in female labour force participation. The question of whether the expansion of welfare state employment was undertaken in order to provide jobs for women is difficult to resolve. Arguably the 'decision' to staff the welfare state with women, or at least to expand female employment alongside the expansion of the welfare state was made in order to prevent the private ('productive') sector being deprived of workers. Once women had become workers they attained the rights given to workers in Sweden. However, female employment in the welfare state, although sometimes attracting similar formal rights to those attached to private sector employment, is, in other ways, on quite different terms. For example, it is often on a part-time, not a full time, basis. In
general, then, the pattern of labour force participation is dramatically 'gendered' in Sweden, even more so than in the US.

Esping-Andersen’s discussion of the relationship between the welfare state and employment seems to work most effectively as a causal analysis in the cases of the Scandinavian social democratic welfare state regimes. In other cases, although there clearly is an association between the form taken by the welfare state and the position of women, particularly in the labour market, it is harder to claim the former directly caused the latter. At best, the welfare state reinforced patterns whose fundamental causes lay elsewhere. Of the cases Esping-Andersen considers in detail only in Sweden can the welfare state be regarded directly as the ‘fundamental force ... in the organization and stratification of [the] modern econom[y]’ (1990: 159). The Scandinavian, and particularly the Swedish, experience seems to be privileged in the analysis, perhaps also privileging the role of the working class, albeit indirectly.

In addition to the concern with the impact of the welfare state on the labour force participation of women, Esping-Andersen also hints that the Scandinavian welfare state may be having an unintended impact on the social bases of politics. The association of women with public sector, welfare state employment and of men with the private sector has opened the possibility of politics and industrial relations developing a merged gender and public-private dimension. Thus the (social democratic) welfare state could have an impact on the (political and industrial) mobilization of women, according to Esping-Andersen (1990: 227). This argument seems to suggest that one form of the welfare state, or perhaps more accurately, its labour market consequences has an impact on political mobilization. Although he does not cite them, a more fully developed version of this argument has been made by a number of feminist scholars (notably Hernes 1987). In the feminist version of this argument it is not only the employment opportunities provided for women by it but the wider resources provided for women by the welfare state and the consequent manner in which women interact with one another as both employees and clients which result in a politicization of gender.
8.5 Conclusions

Analytical clarity can only be achieved if the normative/ontological definition of the welfare state is distinguished from the conceptual framework for comparative analysis of national welfare configurations. Once this distinction is established, with relatively little re-organization of elements already implicit within 'power resource' analyses, a coherent normative account can be re-constructed. The conceptual framework for comparative analysis of social policy configurations, or national welfare configurations requires more work.

Some unease about the conceptual framework of the power resource approach may be reflected in the reluctance of analysts, particularly feminists, to use the phrase 'welfare state regime' even as they adopt the 'regime' terminology, often in the context of a critical review and partial modification of the 'power resource' analysis. Some have used the notion of a 'welfare regime' dropping the reference to the state (Lewis 1992), whilst others have preferred the concept of a 'social policy regime' (Orloff 1993; Daly 1994). Oddly, none of these analysts comment on their deviation from the conventional power resource terminology, and one author even attributes the 'social policy regime' notion to Esping-Andersen (1990), claiming it replaced 'the welfare state concept' (Daly 1994: 105; to be fair to Orloff, she makes her scepticism about state's own claims to 'welfare state status' which, so her usage of the 'social policy regime' notion is internally consistent).

The power resource approach has, rightly, attempted to focus attention on the interrelation of social policy with other aspects of policy, and indeed the wider configuration of the political economy. However, in doing so, the ontological and sectoral conceptions of 'the welfare state' have been confused. Indeed, in order to achieve analytical clarity four distinct elements need to be distinguished and labelled, two which refer to the state or state policy and two to the relationship between the state and society. I use the expression 'configuration' to emphasize the importance of encompassing distinct, and potentially mutually inconsistent, elements within each of these notion.
The 'welfare state regime' notion clearly encompasses the configuration of social policy within a state (Orloff's and Daly's 'social policy regime' might also be an appropriate label here). This conception is rather narrower than the 'welfare state regime'. The national welfare configuration, including the mix of public and private welfare provision is also to some extent included within the 'welfare state regime' concept, although less completely than state social policy narrowly defined (Lewis' 'welfare regime', stripping the concept of its statist connotations and much of its normative baggage, seems apt here). Both of these conceptions are rather 'sectoral', and need not encompass claims about the overall purpose or consistency of the state. Read as an ontological claim about the state, the 'welfare state regime' concept directs our attention to an overall state policy configuration; and indeed, understood in maximalist terms, in which the welfare state is seen as the central political and economic characteristic of a society, it is sometimes used so as effectively to define the general configuration of a political economy.

If a clearer distinction is made between these two conceptions of the 'welfare state' it then be possible explicitly to place 'social policy' in the broader contexts of state policy or the wider political economy. This would require a clear engagement with the comparative literature on forms of capitalism (see, in particular Albert 1993 and Crouch and Streeck 1997). In the context of sketching in some of the features of such an engagement I now turn to the issue of the employment trajectories of women - a key, but neglected, factor in the past and likely future political economy trajectories of capitalist countries.
Chapter Nine: Conclusion
This thesis provides evidence that 1) 'one path fits all' models of the patterns of, and trajectories taken by, aggregate women’s employment in advanced industrial societies perform badly - they cannot account for variations in these patterns and trajectories, 2) against the expectations of modernization theorists, these variations are related to differences in the policy configurations of (welfare) states, but 3) the social democratic power resource literature underplays the role of social institutions, by wrongly attributing all - or almost all - cross-national variation to differences in (welfare) states. In this conclusion I ‘open out’ the analysis further, to consider the implications of women’s employment trajectories for patterns of convergence and divergence (and/or of similarity and difference) among ‘welfare states’ and capitalist political economies.

The issue of convergence dominated the comparative literature on the welfare state during the 1970s and early 1980s, mainly focusing on whether welfare state development followed convergent paths in advanced industrial societies (or indeed common paths - in this context convergence was often taken to mean commonality, relatively little attention was paid to issue of whether the states in question had common or disparate origins). Ironically, just at the point when those emphasizing the diversity of ‘welfare state regimes’ became dominant, the collapse of the Soviet Union together with stronger trends towards globalization (or at least greater attention paid to globalization) raised the issue of convergence once again. Taken together, these two bodies of scholarship seem to present us with a puzzle. Beyond the welfare state literature, one group of scholars has announced the demise of the nation-state (see, for example Strange 1997), while another has noted and celebrated the diversity of capitalist ‘models’ - although many of those celebrating diversity seek to defend it against perceived encroaching uniformity (see Albert 1993).

The ‘organized’ capitalisms of Scandinavia, continental Europe and Japan - sometimes referred to collectively as the ‘Rhenish model’ - are pitted against neo-liberal deregulation associated with the Anglo-American countries, and comparative against international political economy (see inter alia Albert: 1993; and the contributions in Crouch and Streeck 1997). The ‘Rhenish model’ is often seen as
more efficient, but difficult to sustain. Tendencies towards convergence around the Anglo-American model have been noted as the difficulties of sustaining the Rhenish model appear to have grown. There seems to have been relatively little cross-fertilization between the discussions of the welfare state and of comparative capitalism, despite the apparent similarities of the concerns of involved in these debates (compare Albert 1993 and Crouch and Streeck 1997 with Esping-Andersen's 1990 discussion of degrees of de-commodification which move from Scandinavia though continental Europe to North America, where labour is regarded as largely commodified).

The recent discussion of patterns of convergence and diversity has largely ignored gender issues. This oversight is important, not just because gender roles may be an important aspect of convergence or divergence themselves, but also because they may have an impact on the aspects of political economy with which convergence theorists are concerned. In other words, the analyses of mainstream theorists may be (partly) undermined by their failure to take gender into account. My main objective in this conclusion is to add to the catalogue of diversity and divergence among capitalist countries by underlining the extent and nature of divergence in the patterns of, and trajectories taken by, aggregate women's employment in eighteen OECD states. In addition, I show that patterns of women's employment are indeed an important element in the overall configurations of various national political economies. As such they both depend upon and support other aspects of these configurations. In other words, as well as being born of and embodying diversity, they feed back into the distinctive paths followed by advanced industrial societies and open to each state.

Regarding the pattern of women's employment as an important feature of the political economy of advanced industrial societies which can have significant feedback effects means that 'one path' or 'convergent path' models cannot be regarded as adequate. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the distinctiveness of particular (clusters of) cases should not be allowed wholly to swamp the sense that some general (or at least very widespread) trends exist. For example, important changes in gender roles seem to have occurred in most advanced industrial societies in the past thirty or forty years.
The key issue is how these trends are conceptualized. ‘One path’ models tend to present general trends as determining common or convergent outcomes. At least for the period under analysis this vision does not seem to be sustainable (although the jury should remain ‘out’ on the issue of globalization and the possibility of current/future convergence). However, other conceptualizations of general trends and common influences which allow for some diversity may prove helpful.

Putting the (welfare) state in its place

We have seen that confusion of the concepts of the welfare state as state form and as a sector of state activity has produced misleading analyses. The state’s role in contemporary capitalism tends to be exaggerated, perhaps as a consequence of the residual influence of a ‘linear’ (one path) social democratic model. This exaggeration actually downplays the degree of diversity among advanced industrial societies, because it distracts our attention from the social (and perhaps also economic) sources of diversity. A clearer analytic distinction between these two conceptions of the welfare state should help to eliminate the residual influence of ‘one path’ models.

There is a risk that the exaggeration of the role of the state which is present in welfare state analyses of the differences among capitalist countries may also taint analyses of convergence. Sometimes it seems to be assumed that differences between countries or rely upon differences in state policy. Thus if state ‘autonomy’ declines or is destroyed, countries are assumed to have converged. Ironically, International Political Economists may be the most prone to this danger. They often protest that they have little interest in the nation state, seeing concern with it and with cross-national variation as trivial (see the particularly the pointed remarks made in Strange 1997: 182 - 185). Although increasing attention is being paid to the ‘uneven’ quality of globalization, nonetheless, vanishing state autonomy is often portrayed as causing a reduction in variability (Cerny 1997; Strange 1997).

Comparative analysis of ‘models of capitalism’ also risks attributing differences across countries wholly to state institutions and policies, given its concern with distinctive ‘models’ of capitalism based on nation-states. Nevertheless, even as they
agree that a degree of convergence is taking place, some comparative political economists are careful to draw attention to other forms of political and social (collective) action as well as the scope and limits of the state. While taking the state and public regulation seriously they also pay close attention to the role of social institutions. Moreover, although they may be, it should not be automatically assumed that social institutions are dependent on public regulation (Crouch and Streeck 1997 and Streeck 1993).

If we are to make sense of patterns of convergence and diversity in contemporary capitalism, and in particular to explain patterns of, and trajectories taken by, aggregate women’s employment in OECD countries, then careful attention to the role of social institutions, as well as the (welfare) state is required. The analytical distinction between the welfare state as a form of the state and as a sector of state activity is crucial here. The welfare state, understood as a sector of state activity, is likely to be a key element in the explanation of women’s employment trajectories in comparative analysis. However, by building in a sensitivity to the role of social (and other) institutions, some of the wider resonances of idea of the welfare state can be retained, without falling into the trap of attributing all cross-national variation to it. The welfare state (understood as a sector of state activity) needs to be placed in context, which should include the public-private mix in welfare provision, the broader policy configuration of the state and the overall configuration of the political economy as well as social policy.

General trends, particular (clusters of) cases and the diffusion of ideas and policies
A deeper theoretical issue, concerning the relationship between seemingly general changes and particular (clusters of) cases, lies behind many of these debates. For the most part discussion of convergence, whether in the context of welfare state development or globalization and welfare retrenchment, asserts that it is the product of common, general forces (compare Wilensky 1975 and Strange 1997). The argument is that general forces exist which determine particular cases. Alternatively convergence can be seen as a tendency or trend, which faces counter tendencies and
trends, the outcomes of which are not wholly pre-determined. In itself ‘convergence’ is a somewhat abstract analytical subject. It has been rendered more concrete in analyses of welfare state development and could be made similarly concrete in studies of change in gender roles. In both cases the balance between the general and the particular needs to be struck carefully. We have already seen the emphasis placed on the diversity of welfare states in capitalist states, nevertheless, many still apply the expression welfare state to them all.

Turning to the issue of change in gender roles (and particularly the diversity of women’s aggregate employment trajectories), whether and how the position of women is changing across advanced industrial societies remains something of a conundrum. The evidence of divergence presented in this thesis suggests that changes in the position of women have not been determined by some common and convergent trend. A view generally supported by work on differences in the position of women in advanced industrial societies, mostly in connection to the welfare state (see inter alia Hernes 1987; Showstack-Sassoon 1987; Lewis 1992; O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996; but also Rubery 1988 and Jenson, Hagen and Reddy 1988 on the position of women in the economy; see also Lovenduski 1986; Kaplan 1993).

Nevertheless, emphasis on diversity should be balanced against a more general sense that since 1960 fairly basic and widespread - if not common - changes have occurred in gender roles in advanced industrial societies.

It is usually assumed - particularly in the literature on social policy - that convergence is caused by common patterns of economic development (perhaps underpinned by technological change). Divergence is associated with the particular characteristics of states, usually attributed to distinctive political, institutional or cultural patterns. One way of achieving this balance is to reconceptualize ‘general’ trends and tendencies in a less deterministic manner. Rather than assuming that economic (or other) changes force states into common patterns, these changes can be viewed in a more open manner. In this context, emphasis might be placed fruitfully on the diffusion of ideas and policies across national boundaries (Boyer 1997). Long-standing concerns with the spatial diffusion of policies and ideas, which have been the focus of increased
attention recently (under the headings of ‘lesson-drawing’ Rose 1991; ‘policy transfer’ Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; and even ‘institutional isomorphism’ Powell and DiMaggio 1991) also speak to questions of convergence and divergence.

Only accounts of policy ‘diffusion’ which conceive of causality in non-deterministic ways can be used to account for diversity within some tendencies towards commonality. This is to alter the traditional treatment of policy ‘diffusion’ within comparative welfare analysis (see Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 12-15). By contrast, a non-deterministic view of diffusion, which emphasizes that every time a policy is copied it is also altered (Boyer 1997), matches the sense that convergent trends coexist with divergence and continuing diversity. Such an approach stresses the complexity of political economy configurations at the expense of analytic parsimony.

There is no reason to assume that diffusion occurs only, or even primarily through the state. Social and economic actors can carry ideas across (national and other) boundaries. Economic development itself could be viewed as a relatively open diffusion process, in place of the deterministic view of economic development often deployed in analyses of welfare state development and globalization. Concepts of diffusion may be particularly useful in the analysis of changes in gender roles and women employment trajectories.

Divergent trajectories for women’s employment in advanced industrial societies

The relationship between the level of women’s involvement in the workforce in 1960 and in 1989 is not especially strong.
Consider a group of the 18 largest OECD countries which have had democratic governments throughout the period. The mean level of labour market participation for women in 1960 was 43.294, with a standard deviation of 10.325. Three states - Canada, the Netherlands and New Zealand - fell more than one standard deviation from the mean in 1960, all of them below the mean. The mean level in 1989 was 60.678, with a standard deviation of 11.233. By 1989 six states fell more than one standard deviation from the mean, with two - Italy and Ireland - below the mean, and four - Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden - above the mean. Twice as many states were more than one standard deviation from the mean in 1989 than in 1960 and at the latter date states deviated both above and below the mean. Both these facts suggest that women’s labour force participation patterns diverged during the period. This evidence of divergence is supported when the change in women’s labour market participation is considered. The mean level of change was 17.383 percentage points, with standard deviation of 12.616. Despite the fact that the standard deviation is a very large percentage of the mean, the level of change in eight of the states falls more than one standard deviation from the mean, with Austria, Italy, Ireland and Japan considerably below it, and Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden well above it.
More countries which fell below the mean level of female labour force participation in 1960 fell above it than below it in 1989. Equally, a larger number of states which were above the mean level in 1960 fell below the mean for 1989 than remained above it.

Table 9.1 Clusters of states in relation to the mean levels of female labour force participation in 1960 and 1989

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1960</th>
<th>1989</th>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK; FIN; GBR; SWE</td>
<td>AUT; DEU; JPN; FAR; SWI;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS; CAN; NOR; NZL; USA</td>
<td>BEL; IRL; ITA; NLD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 9.2 Plot of female labour force participation change between 1960 and 1989 against its level in 1989
Almost all those countries which grew most rapidly between 1960 and 1989 were also above the median level of women’s involvement in the workforce in 1989. In other words, developments since 1960 generally overwhelm patterns before than date. The divergence between these two groups - one showing a trajectory of rapid growth to a high level of participation, the other a low growth low participation pattern - powerfully qualifies any suggestion that convergence occurred.

Table 9.2 Clusters of states in relation to the mean levels of female labour force participation change between 1960 and 1989 and its level in 1989

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Change 1960 - 1989</th>
<th>1989</th>
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<td>AUS; CAN;</td>
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<td>DNK; GBR;</td>
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<td>SWE; USA</td>
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<td>JPN; SWI</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The two exceptions, the Netherlands and Finland, fell at the two very bottom and top of the distribution in 1960. The exceptionally low level of Dutch women’s involvement in the workforce in 1960 means that, despite an above average rate of growth during the intervening period, it remained below the mean in 1989. This period saw the break-up of an remarkably rigid, ‘traditional’ and strict society, a process to which developments in social policy contributed, and which in turn contributed to some changes in gender roles, despite the fact that these roles remained comparatively rigid at least into the 1990s. Between 1960 and 1989 the level of women’s involvement in the formal workforce in Finland declined for a period. This pattern of decline which was followed by growth may reflect a relatively late and compressed transition away from agricultural employment (in which women often play a larger role) to an industrial and service economy.
The structure of divergence: is it related to the policy configurations of welfare states?

The remaining 16 states fall into two groups. Clusters of countries sharing other significant features generally fall into one or other of these two groups. The countries which grew rapidly to a comparatively high level include all the North American and Antipodean countries, the three most populous Scandinavian states and Britain. For the most part the low growth states are located on continental Europe, alongside Japan and Ireland. Ireland is the only primarily English speaking country which shows a low growth trajectory for women’s employment, probably owing to the role of Catholicism (and perhaps the economic structure between 1960 and 1989). Together with Norway, all ‘settler states’ - Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA - show a trajectory of rapid growth in women’s employment between 1960s and 1989 from a below average level. Together with Britain, they are all predominantly states with English speaking populations, thus making the cross-national transmission of ideas particularly likely.

Evidence of difference and divergence in patterns and trajectories of women’s participation in the labour market seems to be strong. The next issue is how difference and divergence in the position of women in the workforce nests within the state policy and the overall configuration of the political economy. The states most closely associated with various forms of organized capitalism, aside from those in Scandinavia, all show comparative low levels of female involvement in the workforce by the end of the period. Not all low growth states fall into the category of organized or ‘Rhenish’ capitalism - Ireland stands out as a strong exception here - and Switzerland may do as well. It seems likely that religion in general, and Catholicism in particular has an influence on the levels and developmental trajectories of women employment.

Nevertheless, there may be a relationship between (non Scandinavian) ‘organized’ capitalism and a low growth trajectory for women’s employment. Socially or politically organised forms of capitalism are often thought to be characterised by greater stability or rigidity. This stability/rigidity may provide (or include)
institutional and economic support for more traditional forms of household organization. For example the organized, ‘non market’, forms of wage negotiation which are centrally important to ‘Rhenish capitalism’ may have sustained the payment of ‘family wages’ for male breadwinners. In turn, organized capitalism of this sort may derive some of its stability from the continued existence of a substantial ‘voluntary’ sector located outside of the formal workforce, and from the unpaid work of women in the household. The ‘strength and stability of the Rhine model’ is often attributed to the ‘interdependence of economic institutions’ (Boyer 1997: 93). If the contribution of the form of gender roles and the organization of domestic life need to be added to the list of mutually supporting institutions, then the complexity of these systems and difficulty of exporting them (or their elements) grows dramatically.

By contrast countries in which women’s employment followed a high growth trajectory appear considerably more diverse. The Scandinavian group stands out as distinctive, falling into the organized capitalism category, but with the role of political organization extending dramatically into what would be ‘domestic’ life elsewhere. Even within the group of primarily English speaking countries, considerable differences can be identified, distinguishing North America (and particularly the USA) from Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

Even in the North American cases, it would be a mistake to identify any of these economies as purely ‘market driven’. Through public policies and legal decisions, the state has had a considerable impact in the structuring of these markets as far as gender is concerned. Nevertheless both through corporations and through the market, domestic life seems to have become comparatively strongly ‘commodified’, a pattern also associated with substantial inequality as the large private service sector which partial replaces domestic work absorbs significant numbers of poorly paid workers.

By contrast the Australian and the New Zealand experience has been of rapid growth from low levels of women’s employment. Historically, the regulation of wages was at the heart of the social bargain, especially in Australia, and included a fairly explicit notion of a male breadwinner earning a family wage (to some extent at the expense of
other welfare policy and service development). The growth of women’s involvement in the paid workforce in Australia lagged somewhat behind other high growth countries during the 1970s. However, the development of a distinctive feminist element in public bureaucracy (dubbed ‘the femocracy’) and public policy both reflected the developed nature of feminist sentiments in Australia. Together these factors meant that even the a general climate of retrenchment in the 1980s (and into the 1990s) policies for women and the family - including some service provision - actually expanded (Sawer 1996).

Divergence in women’s employment trajectories: its impact on the political economy

Differences and divergences in women’s employment trajectories among advanced industrial societies are extensive enough to suggest that they are significant. They seem to be associated with particular policy configurations of welfare states. However, the significance of divergent trajectories of women’s employment is still greater if they constrain or otherwise influence the range of feasible options or paths for other facets of the political economy or state policy. Here I want to note the ways in which these connections have been hinted at in some existing work, but also to point out how the failure to attend to gender issues may have flawed otherwise interesting analyses of the potential paths feasible for particular countries. Taken together, I hope that these brief remarks demonstrate the scope for further work in this area.

Within the welfare state literature a number of authors have suggested that due to the impact of the welfare state on women, its development - at least in some forms - has the indirect consequence of politicizing women (Piven 1985; Piven and Cloward 1987; Esping-Andersen 1990). In Sweden, for example, where women tend to work in the public and men in the private sector, there is some evidence the gender and public private sector divisions to some extent became mutually re-inforcing cleavages during the 1980s and 1990s. Patterns of both industrial action and political behaviour were influenced - for example, a larger proportion of women than men opposed joining the European Union, which was seen as posing a threat to state welfare.
provision and the public sector more generally (see also Esping Andersen 1990; 227). Some analysts have also attributed the 'gender gap' in American voting behaviour to a defence of the welfare state.

However, placed in a broader comparative perspective, these arguments appear less convincing. While levels of female political mobilisation appear high in Scandinavia when measured by the level of female representation in legislatures, for example, Scandinavian - and especially Swedish - feminism is usually depicted as comparatively weak. Perhaps more tellingly, levels of female representation in legislatures are much higher in the continental European states (usually with proportional electoral systems) than in the liberal (majoritarian) states, despite the 'conservative' welfare provision and low levels of female involvement in the formal workforce in the former and much higher levels of female labour market participation in the latter. By contrast, of course, assessments of other aspects of women's political mobilization (feminist movements, access to executive power in government) would rate women's power higher in the USA and Australia than in Germany.

Although the possible impact of changes in the position of women partially induced by state welfare policy has been attended to by some authors, the failure to consider gender issues adequately may flaw some (of the increasingly voluminous) work which seeks to analyse the political economy trajectories now open to various states. The 'Swedish model', for example, is generally thought to have died in the late 1980s or early 1990s, and speculation on the topic 'whither Sweden?' continues apace. Certain Swedish reforms - particularly the deregulation of finance - seem to point in the direction of 'Anglo-American' liberalism, while others suggest that it may be possible to reconstruct a form of organized or 'Rhenish' capitalism, albeit of a less 'social democratic' nature than the 'Swedish model' of the past.

Some commentators have suggested that as the 'German model' becomes untenable in Germany, it may be possible for Sweden to 'adopt' - or at least evolve towards - it (Pontusson 1997: 68-70). However, if the comparatively restricted level of women's employment was not merely a co-incidental feature of the German model, and
particularly if the viability of that model was partially predicated upon substantial unpaid domestic labour, then its attractions for Sweden do not just appear questionable (Pontusson 1997: 69), instead its very feasibility is limited. It is certainly hard to envisage widespread social consensus if a requirement of the 'model' is that Swedish women return to unpaid domestic work in large numbers.

Analyzing Gender: general trends and particular (clusters of) cases

The debate about patterns of convergence and divergence in modern capitalism has largely failed to engage with gender issues, with deleterious analytical consequences. At the same time, however, those concerned with gender issues have paid insufficient attention to patterns of commonality and convergence or difference and divergence in the position of women in advanced industrial societies. The evidence presented here suggests that diversity and divergence should be emphasized (compare with the 'gender and welfare literature - Hernes 1987; Showstack-Sassoon 1987; Lewis 1992; O'Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996 - which tends to concentrate on variations in the treatment of women and men in social policy programmes).

Two important and widespread, if mutually exclusive, views suggest that we should expect common patterns and/or convergence in the position of women in advanced industrial societies. First, the concept of 'patriarchy' tends to suggest a basically common pattern to advanced industrial societies (although there are, of course, important debates concerning the meaning of this concept). By contrast, the view is also prevalent that common fundamental changes are occurring, or have occurred, in gender roles and the position of women in western societies, signalled in some popular discussion by the notion of 'genderquake'. However, this image has largely developed within particular countries and is usually assumed to have taken a common form across the western world, with little evidence about the dimensions of change in gender roles across the range of western democracies (but in the area of employment see Rubery 1988; Jenson, Hagen and Reddy 1988). We are left with a sense that some common tendencies towards change do exist, but that they do not overwhelm - or have not yet overwhelmed - diversity and divergence.
Once again it is important to acknowledge the role of the state without exaggerating it. The state should be seen as one of a number of elements which provide the institutional context for the economy. Rather than immediately attributing women’s role in the workforce to the character of the welfare state, we can place the (welfare) state in the context of the wider configuration of the political economy. The distinction between the direct consequences of (welfare) state policy and its indirect impact is particularly helpful. The position of women is sometimes constrained by social institutions or the general configuration of the political economy which may not depend on state policy. Thus some state policies may seem helpful to women, without altering the social institutions or changing the political economy configuration which constrains their position. More subtly still some policies may help women directly, while indirectly bolstering social institutions which constrain them (for example, some German labour market policies help women to get work, while contributing to a political economy which is configured in such a way as to limit the employment opportunities of women).

It is important to preserve the idea that state policy plays an important role, but that it must be kept in context as we turn to consider the concept of diffusion. The notion of ideas crossing national boundaries - and also eventually linguistic and other cultural boundaries - through channels created by social and economic actors as well as state policy is likely to be particularly helpful in the consideration of gender. Although a small literature considers the distinctiveness of feminist movements within various western states (Lovenduski 1986; Kaplan 1992), it also provides evidence of cross-national diffusion of ideas (historically French and US feminism have been particularly influential). In other words, as well as the possibility of policymakers having their ideas and expectations influenced from elsewhere, those of women could be changed in the same way. As with the diffusion of policy there is, of course, no guarantee that the diffusion of such ideas will occur at any particular rate, or even at all; and again ideas will alter as they diffuse.

In order to consider this idea in a bit more detail, the example of the Scandinavian states will be considered. Viewed from the outside, Scandinavian states appear as a
relatively cohesive group - certainly in the comparative data analysis presented in this thesis they stood out as a distinctive group - albeit with Sweden usually identified as the 'leader' of this 'leading group'. They have been widely regarded as exemplars of social democracy and as leaders in the transformation of the economic and political position of women. However, over the past decade important strands in both feminist and social democratic research have pointed to (what they regard as) significant differences among the states of Scandinavia. Feminists have suggested that the Norwegian state lags behind Sweden and Denmark in its treatment of women, power resource analysts have pointed to the greater potential for 'welfare backlash' in Denmark, while social democratic institutionalists have suggested that, even within Scandinavia, Sweden followed a distinctive path through and from feudalism which resulted in a significantly different modern state form (Leira 1989; 1992; Korpi 1980; Knudsen and Rothstein 1994). No doubt these differences in state structure and state policy seem more important when viewed 'up close' than they do in a more general comparative analysis. Nevertheless, some of the gap between these differences and the seemingly common or similar patterns in the level of women's participation in the paid workforce could be made up by giving due attention to communication among social (and economic) actors in Scandinavia, as well as state structures and policies.

Concluding remarks

We need a clear conception of the scope and limits of the welfare state concept if we are to make sense of commonality and variation in women's employment trajectories. Conflation of distinct (sectoral and ontological) conceptions of the welfare state has led to an exaggeration of the role of the state in contemporary capitalism. The idea of the welfare state as a sector of state activity is more appropriate for comparative analyses which include a wide range of OECD countries than the notion of the welfare state as a particular form of the state. Nevertheless, some of the resonances of the wider concept need to be retained if the narrower one is to be deployed successfully. First, this 'social policy' view of the welfare state needs to be placed in the context of the general policy configuration of the state. Second, due attention needs to be given to the social and economic context within which state or public policy is located. The
interplay of public and private in welfare provision and in the configuration of the political economy are both particularly important here.

If the (welfare) state is put in its place (taking it seriously, while recognizing its limitations) then diversity in patterns of public policy, the configurations of social (and economic) institutions and practices, and the way these factors interlock can all be acknowledged. Thus the basis for more compelling analysis of variations in women’s employment trajectories can be laid by distinguishing conceptions of the welfare state as a sector of state activity from those as a form of the state. This distinction opens up the space for the analysis of state policy configurations within the overall political economy. Nevertheless, while national political economy configurations may be made up of mutually interlocking parts, they should not be regarded as completely seamless, nor wholly impermeable to outside influences.

Some factors do seem to be common to a number of OECD states - for example, some expression of dissatisfaction with traditional roles among a significant proportion of women has emerged at some time between 1960 and 1989 in most OECD countries; or, the proportion of jobs ‘open to’ or ‘appropriate for’ women seems to have increased, perhaps associated with the relative growth of the service sector. It seems plausible that, for example, feminist ideas about the roles of women have moved across national and linguistic boundaries, albeit being significantly altered in the process. I have also noted that ideas about the appropriate organization of the economy and about the range of economic products available are likely to diffuse across boundaries. While these processes may produce common or convergent patterns, the manner in which they can change as they cross boundaries means that they need not have identical (similar) consequences in different settings. Viewed in this way ‘diffusion’ allows ideas about the role of ‘power resources’ and economic development to be integrated, so long as none of these factors are conceived of in deterministic terms. Taken together these ideas can provide us with a framework for analysis within which it is possible to make sense of patterns of divergence and convergence, of particular cases and general influences (albeit at some cost in
parsimony) in both women’s employment trajectories and the overall evolution of capitalist political economies.

However, the diversity of women’s employment trajectories and the ways in which they feedback into other aspects of state policy and the configuration of the political economy suggest that differences in levels of women’s involvement in the workforce and employment trajectories among advanced industrial societies are likely to have an enduring significance.
Methodological Appendix
MA.1 Methodology

The statistical chapter of this thesis is composed of two sections, one made up of cross-sectional regressions, the other of pooled cross-section time-series analyses. Both techniques have been widely used in the comparative literature on the welfare state. Broadly speaking in the late 1980s the relevant literature began to make use of the latter technique much more extensively, having previously almost exclusively relied on the former one. However the use of cross-sectional analysis has not entirely disappeared and indeed is deployed in some of the most influential recent contributions to the literature (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles and Mitchell 1993; van Kersbergen 1995). Each of these techniques poses difficulties.

The difficulties and limitations of cross-sectional regression analyses in comparative welfare state studies are well known, nevertheless the technique has been widely used. Thus the use of this technique is important in order to engage directly with this literature as it has developed since the late 1970s. Most of the difficulties which face cross-sectional regressions in the context of welfare state analysis derive from the very small number of cases - some twenty five at most, typically no more than eighteen - available for study. There are simply not enough data points to test the variety of hypotheses proposed in the literature, never mind theories in which they are embedded, in single equations, even if the data did capture the dimensions of variation deemed relevant by the theory. Indeed the small number of data points means that it is difficult to build equations which meet generally accepted standards of statistical adequacy. It is also worth noting that some issues of statistical adequacy, for example concerning significance, may be of little importance, given that it is at least debatable whether the data we are analyzing ought be thought of as a sample from a class, or as exhausting the class itself.

The analysis of pooled cross-section and time-series data does not face the issue of a scarcity of data (unfortunately sufficiently long series of annual data for the time-series analysis of this subject do not exist, at least on the same basis for various states). Thus this technique allows for the possibility of adjudicating more directly among a number of competing hypotheses, and perhaps even theories. Using this
technique, then, more inclusive analyses are undertaken. However, particularly with some of the rather more theoretically elaborate issues, which are difficult to operationalize empirically, except by means of dummy variables, technical constraints (which probably often can be traced to the problem of distinguishing between non-compossible, but empirically similar, categorizations) - typically problems of multicollinearity - prevent the direct comparison of various approaches in the literature. As a result a variety of different equations have been estimated, which vary the basic model as little as possible. Again however, these equations are comparable only at the most general level, although an overall sense of the importance of various factors may emerge from the analysis, particularly if the influence of these variables is stable in sign, significance and relative size over a number of them.

The pooling of time-series from a number of cross-sections presents the data analyst with both the difficulties associated with modeling cross-sectional data and time-series data, as well as some difficulties peculiar to pooled datasets (see Stimson 1985 for a general discussion of these issues in a political science context). There may be autocorrelation of errors within a cross-section. Secondly there may problems of heteroscedasticity, especially across individual units, but also across groups of cross-sections and blocks of time. Thirdly, and especially when pooling time-series from political units (Kmenta 1986; Swank 1992) the errors are likely to be cross-sectionally correlated.

To minimize the risks from these potential difficulties the regressions were estimated using the "pool" procedure in the econometrics package "SHAZAM" (White et al. 1993). This procedure uses Kmenta's (1986) generalized least squares model correcting for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation of errors, and first order autoregressive errors (see Hicks 1994 for a general discussion of pooling options). Particular attention needs to be paid to Durbin-Watson test statistics, which test for serial correlation in the residuals of a regression. Scores with a value of approximately two suggest that the regression is unlikely to suffer from these problems (scores significantly under two suggest positive autocorrelation, those over two suggest negative autocorrelation). The results from
these tests on the two data sets used for pooled analysis suggest that greater confidence should be placed in the results from the larger data set, regressions on which generally produced Durbin-Watson results closer to two. (In addition, being a larger data set, values further from two would be more likely to fall within the margin of error.)

Additionally various dummy variables have been used, sometimes as country dummies (N-1 countries with Belgium the excluded country), and at other times for theoretically defined clusters of countries (developed from Esping-Andersen 1990 or Castles and Mitchell 1993). Country dummies act to take out variation across countries or groups of countries, so that the impact of the quantitative independent variables on the dependent variable can be estimated more efficiently (see Swank 1992 for the use of a similar method). However, there are advantages (of method and theory - see Stimson 1985) to be gained from using categorizations which are derived from theory, rather than simply using country dummies.

The first chapter discussed a number of factors which meant that rather than testing the various theories considered here in their own terms, the statistical portions of this study are better understood as analyses of models derived from them. One of the factors mentioned there was the impact of the statistical techniques used. It is worth stressing this point again here - the statistical analyses presented were explorations of derived models and hypotheses, rather than direct examinations of the (empirical implications of the) original theories.

MA.2 Data Sources

Aside from the dummy variables the rest of the data was primarily gathered from the OECD - the male labour force participation, female labour force participation, employment in the service sector, and value added in government employment, year on year economic growth, social security, total outlays of government are from this source. As it is not possible to reconstruct a consistent historical series from published sources, these data were acquired direct from the OECD - thanks are due to Eileen Minihane. The personal taxation variable is derived from OCED revenue
statistics - again a fully consistent set is not available from published sources - thanks are due the Jeff Owens of the OECD. As these statistics give revenue outturns, which might be an artifact of the level of employment, they were divided by the total employment statistics for individual states. The inflation figures were calculated from a series of indices of consumer prices given in an OECD publication Main Economics Indicators Historical Statistics: Prices Labour and Wages. These series were differenced to give the variable used. Divorce statistics were derived from UN Demographic Statistics - various years. The proportion of legislatures made up by women was derived from Inter-Parliamentary Union statistics in The Distribution of Seats between Men and Women in National Assemblies International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation Series " Reports and Documents", No. 14, with information on Sweden before the shift to Unicameralism from Eduards, M "Sweden" in Lovenduski and Hills (1981). Sivard 1985 provided some data on the level of gross national product and data on the position of women in legislatures and cabinets. Data on women's wages relative to men's were calculated from information in ILO Labour Force Statistics - various year (hourly wages in manufacturing were used in order to maximise the number of countries covered). EUROSTAT Labour Force Surveys, Women of Europe, and Commission of the European Communities 1984 provide data on women in part time employment within Europe. Left and religious influence in Parliament was calculated from Mackie and Rose (1991). Left and religious control of government was calculated from Lane, Mackay and Newton (1991), supplemented by Keesing's Contemporary Archives (especially for France - the data for France in Lane, Mackay and Newton were inaccurate). Categorizations of political parties were based on those in Mair and Castles 1984, supplemented by Mair 1987. The welfare state regime variables require special consideration. The statistical techniques used have an impact on the nature of the data which it is possible or appropriate to test - particularly with respect to the analysis of types of welfare state. These issues will be discussed in greater detail below.

Dummy variables have to be treated cautiously in the cross-sectional analysis - a binary variable might well distort the equations given that they are estimated on such a small number of cases. In the pooled analysis, on the other hand, dummy variables
play an important part methodologically, as well as being theoretically useful. Thus the categorisations of states are handled quite differently in the two approaches. Esping-Andersen's analysis of (liberal, conservative and socialist) dimensions of the welfare state is well suited to the cross-sectional analysis, because it captures (or at least claims to capture) a quantitative aspect of these dimensions. Moreover, the dimensions are not mutually exclusive - any individual welfare state is likely to mix some aspects of at least two of the three dimensions of socialism, liberalism and conservatism. His measure of the de-commodifying impact of welfare can be used similarly. Although Esping-Andersen's argument is largely concerned with the ways in which welfare states cluster, with 'types' of welfare state, it is not as stripped down a typology as is sometimes thought. Rather than simply allocating countries to a particular cell in a two dimensional table, he develops a measure of the influence of each welfare 'type' within the welfare policies of the states he analyses. In the subsequent statistical analysis he uses these variables as if they measured a continuous quantitative dimension of these states. The use of these variables in this manner is of dubious validity according to the tenets of statistical theory. Esping-Andersen does not attempt explicitly to justify this position. Despite these difficulties, I will use his measures as variables the cross-sectional analyses. I will do so because of the influence of Esping-Andersen's work on the subsequent literature for the sake of addressing the existing framework as directly as possible. The measures Esping-Andersen develops derive from snapshots of welfare states in the early 1980s. This does not present an additional problem, beyond those already discussed, for the cross-sectional analyses, which are of data from this period. However, Castles and Mitchell's analysis is much less quantitative - it is more categorical (identifying conservative liberal radical and non-right hegemony types). As a result their typology is unsuited to a cross-sectional regression analysis, at least where the use of (a number of) dummy variables is inappropriate.
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</tr>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>France (8)</td>
<td>Belgium (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Germany (6)</td>
<td>Canada (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Italy (6)</td>
<td>Germany (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Netherlands (8)</td>
<td>New Zealand (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom (6)</td>
<td>Switzerland (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Australia (0)</td>
<td>Austria (4)</td>
<td>Austria (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Belgium (4)</td>
<td>France (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Finland (4)</td>
<td>Ireland (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Ireland (2)</td>
<td>Italy (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>(0)</td>
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<td>Japan (0)</td>
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<td>(0)</td>
<td>Norway (0)</td>
<td>United States (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>Sweden (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(From Esping-Andersen 1990: 74 Table 3.3)
**Table MA.2 De-Commodification Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Esping-Andersen 1990: 52 Table 2.2
In the pooled analyses the categorizations of welfare states are operationalized as dummy variables. This approach does beg a question about the treating of these categories as holding for the entire period under analysis, given that the works from which they are drawn only cover parts of it. For the sake of simplicity, because there are no evident dates for changing the values of the dummies within particular panels, they will be treated as structural characteristics of the states for the whole period under investigation. This assumption is easier to justify for Castles and Mitchell’s analysis, rooted as it is in relatively unchanging national cultures, than for Esping-Andersen’s which is more closely connected to the institutional characteristics of the (welfare) state.

The categorical nature of Castles and Mitchell’s (1993) analysis of worlds of welfare lends itself to the generation of dummy variables. However, because the full categorization of welfare states provided by Castles and Mitchell placed every state subjected to empirical analysis in a category, is impossible to use it to estimate an equation using dummy variables. The analysis did identify groups of states in which political configurations are matched by welfare state types. It seems appropriate to use this categorization, as it is most likely to fit the logic of their argument closely - making their use as the basis for the generation of dummy variables justifiable. Using this categorization it was possible to estimate equations. The states fall into the following categories.

**Table MA.3 Families of Welfare**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>RADICAL</th>
<th>N-RH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Castles and Mitchell 1993: 123 Table 3.7

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) account is less easily modified for use in pooled analysis. It is based in the institutional nature of welfare states at particular points in time.
(usually in the 1980s), it is less clear that it is valid to assume that these characteristics existed at other times. This is particularly true for the socialist/decommodifying welfare state, which he explicitly suggests came into existence only recently, while the liberal and conservative forms seem to have existed for longer. However, as no clear break point is given for any of the states becoming socialist/de-commodifying welfare states, in keeping with the deployment of all the other dummy variables, and for reasons of methodological simplicity, the dummy variables will be given the same value for the whole period. Moreover, the analysis of dimension of the welfare state is not really a categorization of welfare state types, although Esping-Andersen himself does treat it in this way at times. However, in keeping with some aspects of Esping-Andersen’s own discussion, and certainly with the way that his work as been appropriated in the literature, the states while he lists as ‘strong’ examples of the three dimensions of the welfare state will be transformed into dummy variables (see Table MA.1).

These categories are mutually exclusive, in the sense that no state fall into more than one of them, and have the methodologically desirable quality of not being mutually exhaustive of the states in the analysis. There is also a strong rationale in the methodological literature for the use of theoretically based dummy variables to motivate successful pooled statistical analyses in Political Science. In general, the alternative is an empirical one, in which dummy variable categories emerge from statistical analysis, which runs a risk of ‘dredging’ the data for patterns (Stimson 1985). However, the possibility that the use of these variables measures some aspect of the countries under investigation other than their welfare state regimes must be kept in mind when they are operationalized in this way.
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